

**GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**NORDIC PEACE DIPLOMACY THROUGH PEACE
MEDIATION AND FACILITATION PRACTICES IN
THE SELECTED CASES**

Ph.D. THESIS

Özgenur AKTAN

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Erhan Ş. BÜYÜKAKINCI

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Thesis scrutinizes the link between peace mediation and facilitation experiences of the Nordic countries and the field of peace and conflict resolution. Within this connection, the purpose of this Thesis is oriented at exploring the achievements and failures of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. To that end, these third-party practices are examined through the phases of selected protracted conflicts, such as Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. Taking their peaceful and humanitarian reputation as a starting point, this Thesis examines the role of the Nordic countries by utilizing not only process but also outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses to mediation.

In response to the main question of this Thesis, which is primarily concerned with the adequate addressing of the underlying roots of conflicts and the integration of the aforesaid lenses as a prerequisite for the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model, both the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy are analyzed and compared. In this process, the focus is directed to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices in the phases of selected protracted conflicts as small cases. Based upon the findings, the suitability of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation is identified for the development of a distinctive model. With this in mind, it is also important to stress that this discussion is inevitably linked to peaceful implications of Nordic identity. The reason is that there is a strong connection between Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy.

At present, we are witnessing the escalation of various conflicts and controversial issues throughout the world. In response to the need for comprehensive peace mediation and facilitation practices, this Thesis aims provide theoretical and empirical lessons in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Further to this, channels and means oriented at benefiting from third-party techniques in the protracted cases were also sought in the nexus of the elaboration of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation and the presentation of small case-studies. Despite the context-specific nature of these cases, the findings and suggestions of this Thesis can be useful not only for the improvement of the framework of peace mediation and facilitation but also for the authenticity of Nordic peace diplomacy.

In this context, I wish to express my gratitude for the guidance of Prof. Dr. Erhan Ş. Büyükkancı, my Thesis advisor, throughout this process. I sincerely thank the esteemed members of the Thesis Committee, Prof. Dr. Havva Kök Arslan, Assoc. Prof. Feride Selcan Serdaroğlu Polatay, Assoc. Prof. Menent Savaş Cazala, and Assoc. Prof. Gül Pınar Erkem Gülboy for their critiques and insights. Also, I wish to affirm the support provided by Huriye Çelebi, as librarian at Galatasaray University, and the National Library of Norway for granting me access to their resources as part of my research. I would like to express my gratitude to Mete Hatay for sharing his time and insights during the interview. His experiences in the dialogue facilitation role of “The

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This Thesis is the outcome of a difficult period for me, which has yet to come to an end. Therefore, I would like to express my immense gratitude to my mother, Nuray Aktan. Without her love, I could not complete this process. This Thesis is dedicated to her and my father, Bekir Aktan. Likewise, I would like to thank my brothers, Ozan and Onur, for making me laugh when I felt discouraged and isolated. I am thankful to my friends, especially Nevin, for her moral support and sense of humor. Also, I extend my gratitude to Kenan Şahin for his prior feedback, which better equipped me for research and academic writing processes of my Thesis, and valuable lessons. Last but not least, I thank myself for not giving up. Despite the odds, I feel happy that this long road is finished, and I am looking forward to exploring new chapters awaiting me in this life. Onto the next adventure as I bid farewell to my twenties...

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMB	: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
AMM	: Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CMI	: The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation at the present)
COPRI	: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CRIC	: Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts
CVAR	: The Centre of Visual Arts and Research
DIIS	: Danish Institute for International Studies (<i>“Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier”</i>)
DoP	: Declaration of Principles
EC	: European Community
EEA	: European Economic Area
ESDP	: European Security and Defence Policy
EU	: European Union
FAFO	: Director of the Institute for Applied Social Science
FARC	: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<i>“Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia”</i>)
GAM	: Free Aceh Movement (<i>“Gerakan Aceh Merdeka”</i>)
GCA	: Greek Cypriot Administration
GNP	: Gross National Product
HD	: The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
IPKF	: Indian Peace Keeping Force
IPRA	: International Peace Research Association
IR	: International Relations
JPR	: Journal of Peace Research
LoN	: League of Nations
LTTE	: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	: Memorandum of Understanding
MTD	: Multi-Track Diplomacy
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	: Non-governmental Organizations
NISA	: Nordic International Studies Association
NORAD	: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NUPI	: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
NWFZ	: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
OPEC	: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCC	: PRIO Cyprus Centre
PIJ	: Palestine Islamic Jihad
PFLP	: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC	: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PLC	: Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	: Palestinian National Authority
PNC	: Palestine National Council
PoW	: Prisoners of War
PRC	: Popular Resistance Committees
PRIO	: The Peace Research Institute Oslo
P-TOMS	: Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure
RTCYPP	: Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process
SIPRI	: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLMM	: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
TAPRI	: Tampere Peace Research Institute
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TULF	: Tamil United Liberation Front
UCDP	: Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	: United Nations
UNFICYP	: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA	: United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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RÉSUMÉ

L'histoire de la mise en œuvre d'instruments tiers dans les conflits et les questions controversées remonte à la quête des êtres humains pour la coexistence, la coopération et la justice entre les grands groupes et les sociétés. En effet, il ne serait pas exagéré de prétendre que les compétences en communication efficaces et les capacités diplomatiques ont permis le développement de la civilisation humaine. Dans ce processus, des efforts ont été orientés vers l'identification des instruments les plus efficaces et de leurs techniques correspondant à divers types de conflits et de questions controversées à une large gamme de niveaux. Bien qu'il y ait eu des caractéristiques générales liées au fonctionnement et aux fondements des instruments de tiers, il y a également eu des inférences spécifiques aux cas et aux contextes. Pour cette raison, il peut y avoir des difficultés à tirer des évaluations généralisables sur le succès des instruments de tiers. Néanmoins, les pays Nordiques ont généralement été renommés comme des acteurs plus pacifiques par rapport à d'autres pays. Dans ce processus, la médiation et la facilitation de la paix, en tant que composantes principales et instruments tiers de la diplomatie de paix Nordique, ont joué un rôle crucial dans la formation de la réputation pacifique des pays Nordiques. En réponse aux difficultés liées à l'évaluation des instruments tiers, ainsi qu'à la nécessité d'apprendre des techniques tierces qui se sont révélées efficaces et/ou inefficaces dans les conflits sociaux prolongés, cette étude se concentre sur les pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix Nordiques. En utilisant et en élargissant les approches orientées vers le processus, les résultats et la transformation des conflits en matière de médiation et de facilitation de la paix, les phases de quatre petits cas dans lesquels les pays Nordiques ont été impliqués à travers ces pratiques sont analysées. L'objectif est de contribuer au domaine de la paix et de la résolution des conflits à travers l'évaluation des expériences de médiation et de facilitation de la paix Nordiques.

Malgré de nombreux instruments tiers interconnectés, cette Thèse se concentre sur les pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix telles qu'elles sont utilisées par les pays Nordiques. Dans l'évaluation des effets de ces pratiques, une attention particulière a été accordée à la facilitation de la communication directe entre les parties belligérantes, à la signature des accords de paix, à la prévention de la guerre ou de son escalade à différents niveaux, et à l'assurance de la transition de la guerre à la paix comme réalisations. Bien que ces réalisations axées sur les processus et les résultats reflètent des contributions et des objectifs importants, l'incapacité de les maintenir et de les soutenir avec d'autres réalisations peut générer des problèmes. Il est important de noter que l'incapacité à maintenir les réalisations orientées vers les processus et les résultats et à les soutenir avec des approches orientées vers la transformation des conflits peut générer des résultats plus destructeurs dans les conflits sociaux prolongés. Avec l'escalade des conflits sociaux prolongés remettant en question l'autorité des États nationaux, la sécurité et la paix internationales, les efforts pour tirer parti des instruments tiers ont été approfondis par des initiatives théoriques et pratiques. Ces initiatives ont donné un nouvel élan à la gestion, à la prévention, à la résolution et à la transformation des conflits mortels.

Diverses approches liées à la paix et à la résolution des conflits ont joué un rôle de guide pour le développement et la transformation de la discipline des Relations Internationales. De plus, la discipline des Relations Internationales a influencé ces

approches. Par exemple, la souveraineté nationale et le principe de non-ingérence ont ajouté une complexité à l'applicabilité des moyens pacifiques. Fait intéressant, l'histoire de la civilisation humaine a été témoin de la dissolution des normes et des règles associées à la conduite des hostilités et des guerres. Cependant, les processus concernant la mise en œuvre des instruments tiers ont été abordés avec des perspectives plus prudentes en ce qui concerne la souveraineté des États nationaux. En effet, un équilibre délicat entre l'utilisation des instruments tiers et la non-ingérence dans les affaires internes des États, tel que façonné par la paix de Westphalie, a été recherché. Maintenir cet équilibre était jugé nécessaire pour la coexistence et la coopération, qui ont soutenu la civilisation humaine, ainsi que l'autorité nationale et la sécurité nationale. Cela dit, les interactions entre la paix et la résolution des conflits, ainsi que la discipline des relations internationales, ont acquis une nouvelle dimension en ce qui concerne la relation entre la souveraineté et la responsabilité et les études critiques de la sécurité. En réalité, la légitimité des instruments de tiers a été liée à des objectifs dirigés vers la paix, la prospérité et la satisfaction des besoins humains fondamentaux, parmi d'autres objectifs intéressés et motifs cachés. Néanmoins, les conditions et les moyens de commencement de l'assistance de tiers, les formes de conduite des instruments de tiers, le consentement des parties et la protection de la souveraineté des États, entre autres facteurs, ont constitué les éléments essentiels de la diplomatie de la paix dans le cadre de la discipline des Relations Internationales.

Pendant la guerre froide, la prévention de l'escalade des conflits et des questions controversées en conflits destructeurs entre les grandes puissances était une priorité. Dans le système international bipolaire, les préoccupations concernant la compétition des grandes puissances pour la suprématie nucléaire ont conduit à l'adoption d'efforts de paix et de résolution des conflits axés sur la prévention de l'escalade des conflits. D'autre part, les efforts intellectuels à travers la résolution des conflits et la recherche sur la paix ont fourni différentes perspectives et contributions en réponse aux restrictions. Ces restrictions découlaient du lien entre le système international bipolaire et la prévention des conflits. À la lumière de ces circonstances, les pays Nordiques ont réussi à établir une identité nationale/régionale crédible et distinctive grâce à leurs contributions à la médiation et à la facilitation de la paix. Cependant, dans ce processus, les échecs des pays Nordiques n'ont pas été abordés et examinés aussi adéquatement que leurs succès. Dans cette négligence, leur réputation humanitaire et pacifique, ainsi que l'importance des considérations orientées vers le processus dans les pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix, ont été décisives.

Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, il y a eu quelques problèmes dans les domaines de la résolution des conflits et de la recherche sur la paix en relation avec les compréhensions et perceptions dominantes liées au pouvoir, à la sécurité et à la survie dans UN système international centré sur l'État. Par exemple, la recherche sur la paix a été critiquée pour son incapacité à éviter de s'aligner avec un système international sûr et stable. Il y a eu des dilemmes concernant l'alignement des tiers avec les dynamiques/tendances structurelles, ou avec les besoins et les positions des parties belligérantes dans les conflits et les questions controversées. Ces problèmes et dilemmes se sont non seulement approfondis en raison de divers bouleversements et modifications systémiques, mais ont également mis à l'épreuve les capacités diplomatiques des acteurs et des organisations ainsi que les limitations découlant du système centré sur l'État. La période post-Guerre froide, en particulier, a été un tournant pour le rôle de la diplomatie de la paix dans les conflits sociaux prolongés et les questions controversées. Dans ce processus, il a été observable que les pays Nordiques ont protégé et promu leur réputation pacifique liée à la diplomatie de paix Nordique, malgré des échecs notables et des rôles marginaux du Royaume du

Danemark et de la République d'Islande. À cet égard, cette Thèse révèle qu'il n'est pas surprenant que les pays Nordiques aient obtenu une réputation pacifique. En s'appuyant sur diverses sources, cette Thèse présente des cas dans lesquels les pays Nordiques ont été impliqués dans des efforts de paix et de résolution de conflits allant de la période de l'entre-deux-guerres à la période post-Guerre froide sous forme de jeu de données général réparti en trois tableaux distincts. De plus, leurs réalisations dans les cas sont brièvement analysées à travers des approches orientées vers les processus. Il est important de prendre en compte les raisons qui ont été déterminantes pour le maintien de cette réputation, et il sera souligné qu'il est essentiel d'apprendre des échecs et des erreurs pour la continuité et l'amélioration de la diplomatie de paix Nordique et de l'identité pacifique Nordique.

Pour cette raison, l'objectif principal est d'examiner comment les pays Nordiques peuvent contribuer au développement d'un modèle distinctif de paix et de résolution des conflits à travers leurs rôles de tiers. Dans ce processus, leurs forces et faiblesses sont abordées. Le modèle susmentionné, en revanche, repose sur la capacité à traiter efficacement les causes profondes des conflits et à intégrer des approches orientées vers le processus, les résultats, et la transformation des conflits. Les éléments constitutifs de ce modèle sont essentiels pour la convergence des pratiques de médiation et de facilitation avec l'atteinte de la paix et pour leur adéquation dans les conflits sociaux prolongés. De plus, ces éléments constitutifs sont utilisés dans l'évaluation des pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix Nordiques. Ensemble, les pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix seront examinées dans les phases de quatre petits cas sélectionnés présentant les caractéristiques de conflits sociaux prolongés. Avec le pouvoir explicatif et interprétatif des approches tripartites et la présentation de petits cas liés à la médiation et à la facilitation de la paix nordique, les forces et les faiblesses de la diplomatie de paix Nordique peuvent être comprises.

À cette fin, les caractéristiques de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix, ainsi que les rôles et responsabilités des tiers, et les composantes et raisons qui ont affecté le développement de la diplomatie de paix Nordique seront élaborés. En conséquence, il sera clairement établi qu'il existe une base solide pour la réputation pacifique des pays Nordiques. Cette compréhension sera complétée par l'ensemble de données général présentant divers rôles des pays Nordiques dans le contexte de la paix et de la résolution des conflits. Par la suite, les rôles de médiation et de facilitation de la paix des pays Nordiques seront abordés dans les phases de paix pertinentes de quatre cas. Dans ce contexte, les cas tels qu'Aceh, Chypre, la Palestine et le Sri Lanka ont été sélectionnés pour comprendre les contributions et les échecs des pays Nordiques. Les raisons de la sélection de ces cas peuvent être résumées comme suit: Les effets régionaux et systémiques des cas; l'exemplification à la fois des conflits sociaux prolongés et des processus de paix prolongés; le commencement officiel de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordique suite à la conclusion de la guerre froide, à l'exception des contributions du Royaume de Suède au conflit Israélo-Palestinien; le rôle des questions liées à l'identité et à l'exclusion politique, une représentation équilibrée des réalisations et des échecs découlant de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordique, et les trajectoires différentes des conflits et des processus de paix dans les cas d'Aceh et du Sri Lanka en réponse au tremblement de terre et au tsunami de l'océan Indien de 2004.

Dans l'exécution des capacités diplomatiques et des techniques de tiers, les parties belligérantes, en tant que principaux acteurs et agents responsables, ainsi que les racines sous-jacentes des conflits, doivent être prioritaires. Mais l'examen des phases dans des cas sélectionnés révèle non seulement des succès, mais aussi des

échecs qui ont sapé les efforts pacifiques et constitué d'autres exemples de processus de paix prolongés. Ces échecs contredisent les vues optimistes envers les pays Nordiques. Malgré ces échecs et ces problèmes, les pays Nordiques continuent d'être perçus comme des acteurs compétents dans les domaines de la paix, de la résolution des conflits, du dialogue et des négociations. À cet égard, cette Thèse problématise les vues largement optimistes envers les pays Nordiques en révélant à la fois les aspects affirmatifs et contradictoires de leur réputation pacifique dans le contexte de la paix et de la résolution des conflits.

Dans cette Thèse, des perspectives orientées vers le processus, les résultats et la transformation des conflits ont été liées à la question de recherche principale, à la construction théorique et à l'évaluation de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques. Dans ce processus, les phases de paix de petits cas ont été présentées afin d'explorer l'authenticité et la singularité des pays Nordiques. Dans ce cadre, les phases suivantes ont été sélectionnées pour examiner la médiation et la facilitation de la paix Nordiques: Le processus de paix d'Helsinki entre le Gouvernement Indonésien et le Mouvement de Libération de l'Aceh; les activités du Centre de Chypre de l'Institut de Recherche sur la Paix d'Oslo suite à l'échec du plan Annan à Chypre; le contexte suédois du processus de paix d'Oslo et le rôle de tiers du Royaume de Norvège entre Israël et l'Organisation de Libération de la Palestine dans le processus de paix d'Oslo, et l'assistance de tiers de la Norvège aux négociations de paix entre la République socialiste démocratique du Sri Lanka et les Tigres de Libération de l'Eelam Tamoul. En explorant le commencement, les techniques utilisées et les effets de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques dans ces phases, cette étude contribuera à la fois aux pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix et à la diplomatie de paix Nordique. En fonction de ces phases dans les petits cas sélectionnés, les rôles de tiers des pays Nordiques et leur potentiel pour le développement d'un modèle distinct pourront être discutés.

Dans ce contexte, les pays Nordiques ont réussi à aborder et à améliorer les causes profondes du conflit dans le cas d'Aceh. En effet, des contributions authentiques ont été apportées, en intégrant des approches orientées vers le processus, les résultats et la transformation des conflits grâce au rôle du diplomate *Martti Ahtisaari* et l'Initiative de Gestion des Crises-Fondation pour la Paix Martti Ahtisaari. Cependant, les pays Nordiques n'ont pas réussi à s'attaquer aux causes profondes des conflits dans les cas de la Palestine et du Sri Lanka. Les contributions axées sur le processus et les résultats n'ont pas pu être maintenues, sans parler des contributions plus profondes et à long terme. En conséquence, les techniques de tiers ont fait partie intégrante des processus de paix prolongés. Dans le cas de Chypre, il y a eu des contributions notables orientées vers la transformation des conflits grâce au rôle de facilitation du dialogue du Centre de Chypre de l'Institut de Recherche sur la Paix d'Oslo, qui met l'accent sur une approche non linéaire et de base vers la paix. Cet exemple est notable car il comprend un certain nombre de projets ayant pour objectif de traiter à la fois un conflit social prolongé et des processus de paix prolongés au sein du conflit. À la suite de l'analyse de ces cas, les techniques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix Nordiques seront également comparées. Avec les avantages de cette comparaison, les forces et les faiblesses de la diplomatie de paix nordique peuvent être comprises plus en profondeur. À cet égard, les paramètres suivants sont utilisés pour comprendre, évaluer et comparer les effets (réussites et échecs) et les rôles de tiers des pays Nordiques:

Cas sélectionnés en tant que conflits et questions controversées dans la politique mondiale; les phases des conflits et des questions controversées dans le contexte de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques; les principales parties belligérantes

dans les cas sélectionnés; le commencement de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques dans les cas sélectionnés; l'entrée des pays Nordiques dans les phases des conflits et des questions controversées dans le contexte de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix; les pays Nordiques éminents impliqués dans les processus de médiation et de facilitation de la paix pendant les phases sélectionnées des conflits et des questions controversées; les objectifs et les points focaux de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques; les approches et techniques diplomatiques éminentes utilisées par les pays Nordiques; les réalisations et les échecs dans le contexte des lentilles orientées vers le processus et le résultat de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix, et les réalisations et les échecs dans le contexte des lentilles orientées vers la transformation des conflits de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix. À la lumière de ces éléments, un ensemble de données particulier est présenté afin que les cas pertinents puissent être évalués et comparés.

En s'appuyant sur tout cela, il est soutenu que les échecs et les problèmes identifiés à travers les prismes de la transformation des processus, des résultats et des conflits doivent être abordés. De cette manière, les capacités diplomatiques et les manœuvres des pays Nordiques peuvent être améliorées. De plus, une étape supplémentaire peut être franchie vers le développement d'un modèle distinctif de paix et de résolution des conflits grâce à l'examen des contributions et des échecs des pays Nordiques. Dans ce contexte, le fait de ne pas aborder les racines sous-jacentes des conflits et d'adopter le modèle tripartite susmentionné; l'adhésion au maintien du système; la dépendance aux dynamiques structurelles et aux grandes puissances, y compris la relation étroite entre la Norvège et les États-Unis d'Amérique; le rôle inadéquat du Danemark et de l'Islande en matière de médiation et de facilitation de la paix; l'augmentation du populisme et la participation à des opérations militaires controversées affectent négativement le potentiel des pays Nordiques pour le développement d'un modèle distinctif de paix et de résolution des conflits.

Les résultats de cette Thèse peuvent également être importants pour améliorer l'identité Nordique. La raison en est qu'il existe un fort chevauchement entre les explications sous-jacentes de la diplomatie de paix Nordique et l'identité Nordique. Pour cette raison, la dernière partie de la Thèse est consacrée non seulement à la comparaison de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordique à travers certains paramètres dans les phases de cas sélectionnés, mais aussi à certaines dimensions de l'identité Nordique. Dans cette optique, un développement récent a ajouté un élan à la formulation de l'identité Nordique. L'adhésion de la République de Finlande et de la Suède à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord pourrait susciter des inquiétudes quant à la poursuite de la diplomatie de sécurité ou de la diplomatie de paix à long terme. À cet égard, une gestion efficace de ces préoccupations et des incertitudes concomitantes jouera également un rôle décisif dans l'amélioration de la diplomatie de paix Nordique et de l'identité Nordique.

De cette manière, cette étude contribuera à la fois aux pratiques de médiation et de facilitation de la paix ainsi qu'à la diplomatie de la paix Nordique. En explorant le commencement, les techniques utilisées et les effets de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques dans les phases de paix du processus de paix d'Helsinki entre le Gouvernement Indonésien et le Mouvement Libre de l'Aceh; les activités du PRIO Cyprus Centre après l'échec du Plan Annan à Chypre ; le processus de paix d'Oslo entre l'État d'Israël et l'Organisation de Libération de la Palestine, et son arrière-plan Suédois qu'il ne faut pas négliger en relation avec les contributions Norvégiennes; ainsi que les négociations de paix entre le gouvernement de la République Socialiste Démocratique du Sri Lanka et les Tigres de Libération de l'Eelam Tamoul, cette Thèse

évalue les rôles des tiers des pays Nordiques et leur potentiel pour le développement d'un modèle distinctif.

Dans cette Thèse, il sera révélé que les pays Nordiques ont réussi à aborder et à améliorer les causes sous-jacentes du conflit dans le cas d'Aceh. Dans ce contexte, le Diplomate *Martti Ahtisaari* et la l'Initiative de Gestion de Crise-Fondation pour la Paix Martti Ahtisaari ont apporté des contributions authentiques tout en intégrant des approches orientées vers le processus, les résultats et la transformation des conflits. Cependant, les pays Nordiques n'ont pas réussi à traiter les causes profondes des conflits dans les cas de la Palestine et du Sri Lanka. En conséquence, les techniques de tiers ont fait partie des processus de paix prolongés, mais elles n'ont pas réussi à contribuer à la résolution des conflits ni à l'élimination de la violence structurelle. Dans le cas de Chypre, des contributions notables orientées vers la transformation des conflits ont été réalisées grâce à la fonction facilitatrice de dialogue du PRIO Cyprus Centre, qui met l'accent sur une approche non linéaire de la paix. Cet exemple est remarquable en ce qu'il inclut un certain nombre de projets visant à aborder à la fois un conflit social prolongé et des processus de paix prolongés au sein même du conflit. En s'appuyant sur tout cela, les paramètres suivants ont été utilisés pour comprendre, évaluer et comparer les réussites et les échecs des pays Nordiques dans les phases sélectionnées des cas :

Les cas sélectionnés en tant que conflits et questions controversées dans la politique mondiale; les phases des conflits et des questions controversées dans le contexte de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques; les principales parties en guerre dans les cas sélectionnés; le commencement de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques dans les cas sélectionnés; l'entrée des pays Nordiques dans les phases des conflits et des questions controversées dans le cadre de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix; d'éminents pays Nordiques participent à la médiation et à la facilitation de la paix pendant les phases sélectionnées de conflits et de questions controversées; les objectifs et points focaux de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordiques; les principales approches diplomatiques et techniques utilisées par les pays Nordiques; les réalisations et les problèmes dans le cadre des perspectives orientées vers le processus et les résultats de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix, ainsi que les réalisations et les problèmes dans le cadre des perspectives orientées vers la transformation des conflits de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix.

Cette Thèse révèle que les problèmes identifiés à travers les perspectives orientées vers le processus, les résultats et la transformation des conflits doivent être abordés afin d'accroître la marge de manœuvre des pays Nordiques dans leur contribution au développement d'un modèle distinctif dans le cadre de la paix et de la résolution des conflits. De plus, l'adhésion à la maintenance du système, la dépendance aux dynamiques structurelles et aux grandes puissances, y compris la relation étroite entre la Norvège et les États-Unis d'Amérique, le rôle insuffisant du Danemark et de l'Islande en matière de médiation et de facilitation de la paix, l'augmentation du populisme et la participation à des opérations militaires controversées affectent négativement le potentiel des pays Nordiques pour le développement d'un modèle de paix et de résolution des conflits.

En outre, un développement récent pourrait nécessiter la reformulation de l'identité Nordique. En effet, l'adhésion de la Finlande et de la Suède à l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord pourrait, à long terme, susciter des inquiétudes concernant la diplomatie de la paix ou la diplomatie de la sécurité. La gestion efficace de ces préoccupations et des incertitudes qui les accompagnent jouera également un rôle déterminant dans la diplomatie de la paix Nordique et dans l'identité Nordique.

En réalité, les efforts pour reformuler l'identité Nordique ne peuvent être dissociés du processus d'évolution de la diplomatie de la paix Nordique. Ainsi, ce processus peut être évalué de manière intégrée avec le renforcement de divers mécanismes et pratiques de tiers, notamment la médiation et la facilitation de la paix. Cependant, négliger ces mécanismes et pratiques au détriment des préoccupations sécuritaires pourrait mettre en danger les acquis obtenus jusqu'à présent en termes de rôles de tiers, ainsi que la réputation que les pays Nordiques ont construite.

En résumé, des preuves soutenant la réputation pacifique et humanitaire des pays Nordiques peuvent être identifiées à travers des approches axées sur le processus et les résultats dans les petites affaires sélectionnées. Mais des échecs et des problèmes notables liés à la médiation et à la facilitation de la paix Nordiques dans ces cas devraient également attirer l'attention, surtout à la lumière des approches orientées vers les résultats et la transformation des conflits qui sont également tout aussi vitales. Ces échecs et problèmes ont été identifiés en se concentrant sur les phases de paix et de résolution des conflits de conflits sociaux prolongés particuliers. L'approche efficace de tous ces défis est jugée essentielle pour l'amélioration de la diplomatie de paix Nordique et de l'identité Nordique. En essence, les efforts pour reformuler l'identité Nordique ne peuvent être isolés de l'évolution de la diplomatie de paix Nordique. Il est important de noter que les pays Nordiques s'engagent également à intégrer leur diplomatie de la paix dans la politique étrangère et la construction de l'identité aux niveaux national et régional. Par conséquent, aborder les divers défis liés aux effets et aux techniques de tiers de la médiation et de la facilitation de la paix Nordique jouera sans aucun doute un rôle crucial pour l'amélioration de l'identité Nordique également.

ABSTRACT

The history of the implementation of third-party instruments in conflicts and controversial issues dates back to the pursuit of human beings for co-existence, cooperation, and justice among large-groups and societies. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that effective communication skills and diplomatic abilities have enabled the development of human civilization. In this process, there have been efforts oriented toward identifying the most effective instruments and their techniques as corresponding to various types of conflicts and controversial issues at a wide range of levels. While there have been general characteristics related to the functioning and fundamentals of third-party instruments, there have also been case and context-specific inferences. For this reason, there can be difficulties in drawing generalizable assessments about the success of third-party instruments. Nonetheless, the Nordic countries have generally been renowned as more peaceful actors compared to other countries. In this process, peace mediation and facilitation, as primary components and third-party instruments of Nordic peace diplomacy, have played a critical role in the formation of the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries. In response to difficulties related to the assessment of third-party instruments, along with the need to learn from third-party techniques that proved to be efficient and/or inefficient in protracted social conflicts, this study focuses on Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices. By utilizing and expanding process, outcome- and conflict-transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation, the phases of four small cases in which the Nordic countries were involved through these practices are analyzed. The aim is oriented at contributing to the field of peace and conflict resolution through the assessment of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation experiences.

Despite numerous interconnected third-party instruments, this Thesis is concerned with peace mediation and facilitation practices as utilized by the Nordic countries. In assessing the effects of these practices, there has been a particular emphasis on facilitating direct communication between the warring parties, signing of peace agreements, preventing war or its escalation to different levels, and ensuring transition from war to peace as achievements. While these process- and outcome-oriented achievements reflect important contributions and objectives, the inability to sustain and support them with further achievements can generate problems. Importantly, failure to sustain process- and outcome-oriented achievements and to support them with conflict transformation-oriented approaches can generate more destructive outcomes in protracted social conflicts. With the escalation of protracted social conflicts as challenging the authority of national states and international security and peace, efforts to benefit from third-party instruments have been deepened by theoretical and practical initiatives. These initiatives have added momentum to the management, prevention, resolution, and transformation of deadly conflicts.

Various approaches related to peace and conflict resolution have played a guiding role for the development and transformation of the International Relations discipline. Also, the discipline of International Relations has influenced these approaches. As an example, national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference have added a complexity into the applicability of peaceful means. Interestingly, the history of human civilization has witnessed the dissolution of norms and rules associated with the conduct of hostilities and wars. However, processes regarding the implementation of third-party instruments have been approached from more cautious perspectives in relation to the sovereignty of national states. Indeed, a delicate balance

between the utilization of third-party instruments and non-interference in the internal affairs of states as shaped by the Westphalian peace has been pursued. Maintaining this balance was deemed necessary for co-existence and cooperation, which have underpinned human civilization, along with the national authority and national security. With that being said, the interactions between peace and conflict resolution and the International Relations discipline have obtained a new dimension with regard to the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility and critical security studies. Actually, the legitimacy of third-party instruments has been linked to objectives directed to peace, prosperity, and the accommodation of basic human needs amidst other self-interested objectives and ulterior motives. Nevertheless, conditions and means of the commencement of third-party assistance, the forms of the conducting third-party instruments, the consent of the parties, and the protection of state sovereignty, among other factors, have constituted the essentials of peace diplomacy within the discipline of International Relations.

During the Cold War, preventing the escalation of conflicts and controversial issues into destructive conflicts between major powers was prioritized. In the bipolar international system, concerns over the competition of major powers for nuclear supremacy led to the embracement of such peace and conflict resolution efforts that focused on the prevention of conflict escalation. On the other hand, intellectual endeavors through conflict resolution and peace research provided different angles and contributions in response to the restrictions. These restrictions stemmed from the link between the bipolar international system and conflict prevention. In the light of these circumstances, Nordic countries have achieved the ability to establish credible and distinctive national/regional identity with their contributions to peace mediation and facilitation practices. However, in this process, the failures of the Nordic countries have not been addressed and investigated as adequately as their successes. In this negligence, their humanitarian and peaceful reputation and the importance of process-oriented considerations in peace mediation and facilitation practices have been decisive.

As expected, there have been some problems within the fields of conflict resolution and peace research in relation to prevailing understandings and perceptions related to power, security, and survival in the state-centric international system. For example, peace research has been criticized for its inability to avoid aligning with a secure and stable international system. There have been dilemmas regarding the alignment of third-parties with structural dynamics/tendencies or with the needs and positions of the warring parties in conflicts and controversial issues. These problems and dilemmas have not only deepened due to various turmoils and systemic alterations but have also tested the diplomatic capabilities of actors and organizations and the limitations stemming from the state-centric system. The post-Cold War period, in particular, has been a turning point for the role of peace diplomacy in protracted social conflicts and controversial issues. In this process, it has been observable that Nordic countries have protected and promoted their peaceful reputation as linked to Nordic peace diplomacy, despite notable failures and marginal roles of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Iceland. In this regard, this Thesis reveals how it is not surprising that the Nordic countries have obtained a peaceful reputation. By relying on various sources, this Thesis presents cases in which Nordic countries were involved in peace and conflict resolution efforts ranging from the Interwar period to the Post-Cold War period as a general dataset within three separate tables. Also, their accomplishments in the cases are analyzed through process-oriented approaches in brief. Importantly, by taking the reasons that were instrumental for the maintenance of this reputation into consideration, it will be emphasized that it is essential to learn from

failures and mistakes for the continuity and improvement of Nordic peace diplomacy and peaceful Nordic identity.

For this reason, the main purpose is oriented at examining how the Nordic countries can contribute to the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model through their third-party roles. In this process, their strengths and weaknesses are addressed. The aforesaid model, on the other hand, is grounded in the ability to effectively address the underlying roots of conflicts and to integrate process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. The constituting elements of this model are critical for the convergence of mediation and facilitation practices with the achievement of peace and for their suitability in protracted social conflicts. Also, these constituting elements are utilized in the assessment of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices. Taken together, peace mediation and facilitation practices will be scrutinized in the phases of four selected small cases with the characteristics of protracted social conflicts. With the explanatory and interpretive power of three-folded approaches and the presentation of small cases related to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, both strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy can be comprehended.

To that end, the characteristics of peace mediation and facilitation, along with the roles and responsibilities of the third-parties and the components and reasons that have affected the development of Nordic peace diplomacy, will be elaborated. As a result, it will be crystalized that there is a solid foundation for the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries. This understanding will be complemented by the general dataset, as presents various roles of the Nordic countries in the context of peace and conflict resolution. Following that, peace mediation and facilitation roles of the Nordic countries will be addressed in the relevant peace phases of four cases. In this context, the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka were selected in understanding the contributions and failures of the Nordic countries. The reasons in selecting these cases can be summarized as follow: Regional and systemic effects of the cases; exemplification of both protracted social conflicts and protracted peace processes; the official commencement of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation following the conclusion of the Cold War with the exclusion of the Kingdom of Sweden's contributions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the role of identity-and political exclusion-oriented issues, a balanced representation of both achievements and failures stemming from Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, and different trajectories of the conflict and peace processes in the cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

In executing diplomatic capabilities and third-party techniques, the warring parties, as the main focus and responsible agents, and the underlying roots of conflicts need to be prioritized. But the examination of the phases in selected small cases reveals not only successes but also failures that undermined peaceful efforts and constituted other examples of protracted peace processes. These failures contradict the optimistic views towards the Nordic countries. Despite these failures and problems, Nordic countries continue to be approached as skilled actors in the fields of peace, conflict resolution, dialogue, and negotiations. In this regard, this Thesis problematizes the widespread optimistic views towards the Nordic countries by revealing both the affirmative and contradictory aspects of their peaceful reputation in the context of peace and conflict resolution.

In this Thesis, process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses have been linked to the main research question, theoretical construction, and the assessment of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. In this process, peace phases of small cases have been presented in order to explore the authenticity and

distinctiveness of Nordic countries. In this framework, the following phases have been selected to examine Nordic peace mediation and facilitation: the Helsinki peace process between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement; the activities of the Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre following the failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus; the Swedish background of the Oslo peace process and the Kingdom of Norway's third-party role between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Oslo peace process; and Norway's third-party assistance to peace negotiations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. By exploring the commencement, utilized techniques, and the effects of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in these phases, this study will contribute to both peace mediation and facilitation practices and Nordic peace diplomacy. Depending upon these phases in the selected small cases, the third-party roles of the Nordic countries and their potential for the development of a distinctive model will be able to be discussed.

Within this connection, Nordic countries achieved to address and ameliorate the underlying roots of the conflict in the case of Aceh. Indeed, authentic contributions have been made while integrating process, outcome, and conflict-transformation-oriented approaches through the role of Diplomat *Martti Ahtisaari* and the "Crisis Management Initiative - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation." However, Nordic countries could not be successful in addressing the underlying roots of the conflicts in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. Process- and outcome-oriented contributions could not be sustained, let alone deeper and long-term contributions. As a result, third-party techniques have become part of protracted peace processes. In the case of Cyprus, there have been notable conflict transformation-oriented contributions through dialogue facilitation role of the Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, which emphasizes a non-linear and grass-root approach towards peace. This example is notable because it includes a number of projects with the objective aimed at addressing both a protracted social conflict and protracted peace processes within the conflict. Following the analysis of these cases, Nordic peace mediation and facilitation techniques will also be compared. With the benefits of this comparison, the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy can be grasped more profoundly. In this regard, the following parameters are utilized in comprehending, evaluating and comparing the effects (achievements and failures), and third-party roles of the Nordic countries:

Selected cases as conflicts and controversial issues in world politics; the phases of conflicts and controversial issues in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation; main warring parties in the selected cases; the commencement of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the selected cases; the entry of the Nordic countries into the phases of conflicts and controversial issues in the context of peace mediation and facilitation; prominent Nordic countries involved in the processes of peace mediation and facilitation during the selected phases of conflicts and controversial issues; objectives and focal points of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation; prominent diplomatic approaches and techniques utilized by the Nordic countries; achievements and failures in the context of process- and outcome-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation, and achievements and failures in the context of conflict transformation-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation. In the light of these, a particular dataset is presented so that the relevant cases can be evaluated and compared.

Drawing from all of these, it is contended that the failures and problems as identified through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses need to be addressed. In this way, the diplomatic capabilities and maneuvering of the Nordic

countries can be improved. Also, a further step can be taken towards the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model through the examination of contributions and failures of the Nordic countries. In this context, failure to address the underlying roots of conflicts and to embrace the aforesaid three-folded model; adherence to system maintenance; dependence on structural dynamics and major powers, including the close relationship between Norway and the United States of America; the inadequate role of Denmark and Iceland related to peace mediation and facilitation; increasing populism; and taking part in controversial military operations affect the potential of the Nordic countries for the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model adversely.

The findings of this Thesis can be important in improving Nordic identity as well. The reason is that there is a strong overlap between the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy and Nordic identity. For this reason, the last part of the Thesis is devoted not only to the comparison of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation through certain parameters in the phases of selected small cases but also to some dimensions of Nordic identity. With this in mind, there has been a recent development that adds momentum to the formulation of Nordic identity. The accession of the Republic of Finland and Sweden into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might cause concerns over the pursuit of security diplomacy or peace diplomacy in the long-term. In this regard, effective management of these concerns and concomitant uncertainties will also play a decisive role in the improvement of Nordic peace diplomacy and Nordic identity.

In summary, evidences that support the peaceful and humanitarian reputation of the Nordic countries can be identified through process- and outcome-oriented approaches in the selected small cases. But notable failures and problems related to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in these cases should also attract attention, especially in the light of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches that are also equally vital. These failures and problems have been identified, with a focus on the peace and conflict resolution phases of particular protracted social conflicts. Effective addressing of all these challenges is deemed essential for the improvement of Nordic peace diplomacy and Nordic identity. In essence, efforts to reformulate Nordic identity cannot be isolated from the evolution of Nordic peace diplomacy. Importantly, the Nordic countries are also committed to integrating their peace diplomacy into foreign policy and identity-building at national and regional levels. Therefore, addressing various challenges related to the effects and third-party techniques of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will undoubtedly play a critical role for the improvement of Nordic identity as well.

ÖZET

Çatışmalarda ve ihtilaflı meselelerde üçüncü taraf araçlarına başvurulması, insanların büyük gruplar ve toplumlar içerisinde birlikte var olma, iş birliği ve adalet arayışına dek uzanmaktadır. Gerçekten de etkili iletişim becerilerinin ve diplomatik kabiliyetlerin insan uygarlığının gelişimine olanak sağladığını belirtmek abartılı olmayacaktır. Bu süreçte geniş bir yelpazeye yayılan seviye ve türlerdeki çatışmalar ve ihtilaflı meseleler için en etkili araçlar ve teknikler belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Üçüncü taraf araçlarının esaslarına ve işleyişine yönelik genel özellikler bulunsa da ayrıca bağlam ve vaka özelinde de birtakım çıkarımlar yapılmıştır. İşte bu yüzden ki üçüncü taraf araçlarının başarısına yönelik genel değerlendirmelerde bulunulurken birtakım zorluklar yaşanabilir. Ancak yine de Nordik ülkelerinin diğer ülkelerle kıyaslandığında genellikle daha barışçıl aktörler olarak öne çıktığı görülmektedir. Bu süreçte Nordik barış diplomasisinin ana bileşenleri ve üçüncü taraf araçları olarak barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı, Nordik ülkelerinin barışçıl itibarının gelişiminde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma, üçüncü taraf araçlarının etkinliğini değerlendirmede yaşanan zorluklar ve uzun süreli sosyal çatışmalarda etkili ve/veya etkisiz olduğu kanıtlanmış tekniklerden ders çıkarma ihtiyacına yanıt olarak Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına ilişkin süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımlar kullanılarak ve bu yaklaşımlar genişletilerek Nordik ülkelerinin bahse konu bu uygulamalarla müdahil olduğu dört alt vakanın (*small cases*) belirli barış aşamaları analiz edilmektedir. Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı deneyimlerinin değerlendirilmesiyle barış ve çatışma çözümü alanına katkıda bulunmak bu çalışmanın öncelikli hedefidir.

Çok sayıda ve birbirleriyle bağlantılı üçüncü taraf araçlarına rağmen bu Tez, Nordik ülkeleri tarafından kullanılan barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına odaklanmaktadır. Bahse konu uygulamaların etkileri değerlendirilirken savaşı taraflar arasında doğrudan iletişimin kolaylaştırılması, barış antlaşmalarının imzalanması, savaşın önlenmesi ya da sınırlandırılması ve savaş durumundan barışa geçişin sağlanması gibi kazanımlar üzerinde bilhassa durulduğu görülmektedir. Ancak bu süreç ve sonuç odaklı kazanımları sürdürmeyiip daha fazla başarıyla destekleyememek birtakım sorunlara yol açmaktadır. Bilhassa uzun süreli sosyal çatışmalarda, süreç ve sonuç odaklı kazanımları sürdürmeyiip çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımlarla destekleyememek daha yıkıcı sonuçlar doğurabilir. Esasında ulusal devletlerin otoritesini, uluslararası güvenliği ve barışı tehdit eden uzun süreli sosyal çatışmaların tırmanmasıyla üçüncü taraf araçlardan yararlanma çabaları, teorik ve pratik girişimlerle daha da derinleşmiştir. Bu girişimler, ölümcül çatışmaların yönetimi, önlenmesi, çözümü ve dönüşümü alanlarına ivme kazandırmıştır.

Barış ve çatışma çözümü üzerine çeşitli yaklaşımların, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin gelişimi ve dönüşümünde yönlendirici bir rol oynadığı belirtilebilir. Diğer taraftan, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini de söz konusu yaklaşımları etkilemiştir. Örneğin, ulusal egemenlik ve müdahale etmeme prensibi, barışçıl araçların uygulanabilirliğini daha karmaşıktırıştır. İlginçtir ki insanlık tarihinde, düşmanlıkların ve savaşların yürütülme biçimiyle ilgili norm ve kuralların çözülüşüne tanıklık edilirken üçüncü taraf araçlarından yararlanma süreçlerine ise ulusal devletlerin egemenliğiyle bağlantılı olarak daha temkinli yaklaşıldığı görülmektedir.

Nitekim üçüncü taraf araçların uygulanması ile Vestfalya barışının şekillendirdiği devletlerin iç işlerine müdahale etmeme prensibi arasında hassas bir denge izlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu dengeyi sürdürmek insan uygarlığının temelini oluşturan birlikte var olma ve iş birliği ile birlikte ulusal otorite ve ulusal güvenlik için gerekli görülmüştür. Ancak barış ve çatışma çözümü ile Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini arasındaki etkileşimler, egemenlik ve sorumluluk ilişkisi ve eleştirel güvenlik bağlamında yeni bir boyut da kazanmıştır. Aslında üçüncü taraf araçlarının meşruiyeti, kişisel çıkarlara dayalı amaçlar ve art niyet gözetilmesine rağmen barış, güvenlik, refah ve temel insan ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması yönündeki hedeflerle bağlantılıdır. Bahse konu meşrulaştırıcı bu hedeflere rağmen üçüncü taraf desteğinin nasıl başlatılabileceği, üçüncü taraf araçlarının uygulanma biçimleri, tarafların rızası ve devlet egemenliğinin korunması gibi boyutlar Uluslararası İlişkiler disipliniinde barış diplomasisinin dayanaklarını oluşturmaktadır.

Soğuk Savaş dönemi sırasında, çatışmaların ve ihtilaflı meselelerin büyük güçler arasında yıkıcı çatışmalara dönüşmesini önlemeye öncelik verilmiştir. İki kutuplu uluslararası sistemde büyük güçlerin nükleer üstünlük rekabetinden kaynaklanan endişeler, çatışmaların tırmanmasını önlemeye yönelik barış ve çatışma çözümü faaliyetlerinin benimsenmesinde etkili olmuştur. Diğer taraftan, iki kutuplu uluslararası sistem ve çatışma önleme arasındaki bağlantıdan kaynaklanan kısıtlamalara karşı çatışma çözümü ve barış araştırmaları gibi entelektüel çabalarla önemli kazanımlar elde edilmiştir. Bu gelişmeler ışığında, Nordik ülkeleri, barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına yönelik katkılarıyla güvenilir ve ayırt edici bir ulusal/bölgesel kimlik oluşturmaya başarmıştır. Ancak bu süreçte Nordik ülkelerinin başarısızlıkları, başarılarıyla kıyaslandığında yeterli ölçekte ele alınmamıştır. Bu ihmalkârlıkta, Nordik ülkelerinin insani ve barışçıl itibarları ile birlikte barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarındaki süreç odaklı yaklaşımlar belirleyici olmuştur.

Beklenebileceği üzere, devlet-merkezli uluslararası sistemde güç, güvenlik ve hayatta kalma gibi hüküm süren anlayış ve algılarla bağlantılı olarak çatışma çözümü ve barış araştırmaları alanlarında da birtakım sorunlar yaşanmıştır. Örneğin, barış araştırmaları güvenli ve istikrarlı bir uluslararası sistemle uyum sağladığı gerekçesiyle eleştirilmiştir. Üçüncü tarafların yapısal dinamik ve eğilimlerle ya da çatışan tarafların ihtiyaç ve pozisyonlarıyla uyum sağlamaları üzerine ikilemler yaşanmıştır. Bu sorunlar ve ikilemler, çeşitli çalkantılar ve sistem düzeyindeki değişiklikler nedeniyle daha da derinleştirmekle kalmayıp aynı zamanda aktör ve örgütlerin diplomatik kabiliyetlerini ve devlet-merkezli sistemden kaynaklanan kısıtlamaları sınamıştır. Bilhassa Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem, barış diplomasisinin uzun süreli sosyal çatışmalarda ve ihtilaflı meselelerde oynadığı rol üzerine bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Bu süreçte dikkat çekici başarısızlıklara ve Danimarka Krallığı'nın ve İzlanda Cumhuriyeti'nin marjinal rollerine rağmen, Nordik ülkelerinin Nordik barış diplomasisiyle de bağlantılı barışçıl itibarlarını koruyup geliştirdikleri görülmektedir. Bu Tez çeşitli kaynaklar aracılığıyla Nordik ülkelerinin İki Savaş Arası dönemden Soğuk Savaş Sonrası döneme dek barış ve çatışma çözümü bağlamında müdahil oldukları vakaları genel bir veri seti olarak üç ayrı tabloda sunup elde ettikleri başarıları süreç odaklı yaklaşımlarla kısaca değerlendirerek Nordik ülkelerinin barışçıl bir itibar elde etmelerinin nasıl şaşırtıcı olmadığını da ortaya koymaktadır. Bu itibarın sürdürülmesindeki nedenler de ele alınarak esas olarak Nordik barış diplomasisinin ve barışçıl Nordik kimliğinin devamlılığı ile gelişimi için başarısızlık ve hatalardan ders çıkarılmasının zaruri olduğu vurgulanacaktır.

Bu nedenle bu çalışmadaki amaç, Nordik ülkelerinin üçüncü taraf rolleriyle ilgili olarak özgün bir barış ve çatışma çözümü modelinin gelişiminde nasıl katkılar

sunabilecekleri sorusunu irdelemeye yöneliktir. Bu süreçte Nordik ülkelerinin hem güçlü hem de zayıf yönleri ele alınmaktadır. Bahse konu bu model, çatışmaların altında yatan nedenleri ele alma ve süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımların bütünleştirilmesi yeterliğine dayanmaktadır. Nitekim bu modelin dayanakları, arabuluculuk ve kolaylaştırıcılık uygulamalarının barışın sağlanması ve uzun süreli sosyal çatışmalar için uygunluğu bakımından önem arz etmektedir. Ayrıca bu dayanaklar, Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının değerlendirilmesinde de kullanılmıştır. Barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamaları uzun süreli sosyal çatışma niteliğindeki dört alt vakanın belirli barış aşamaları üzerinden incelenecektir. Süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı üçlü yaklaşımların açıklayıcı ve yorumlayıcı etkisi ve Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına ilişkin alt vakaların sunumu ile Nordik barış diplomasisinin hem güçlü hem de zayıf yönlerinin anlaşılması sağlanacaktır.

Bu doğrultuda barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının özellikleri, üçüncü tarafların rol ve sorumlulukları ve Nordik barış diplomasisinin gelişimini etkileyen unsurlar ve nedenler ayrıntılı olarak ele alınacaktır. Bu sayede Nordik ülkelerinin barışçıl itibarları için sağlam bir temelin bulunduğu anlaşılacaktır. Bu anlayışımız, Nordik ülkelerinin barış ve çatışma çözümü bağlamında çeşitli rollerinin sunulduğu genel veri setiyle tamamlanacaktır. Akabinde seçilen alt vakaların ilgili barış aşamalarında, Nordik ülkelerinin barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı rollerine yer verilecektir. Bu bağlamda Açe, Kıbrıs, Filistin ve Sri Lanka vakaları, Nordik ülkelerinin başarı ve başarısızlıklarını kavramak amacıyla seçilmiştir. İlgili vakaların seçilmesinin nedenleri şu şekilde özetlenebilir: Vakaların bölgesel ve sistemik etkileri ve uzun süreli sosyal çatışmalar ile uzun süreli barış süreçleri bakımından örnek teşkil etmeleri, İsveç Krallığı'nın İsrail ve Filistin çatışmasındaki katkıları hariç olmakla birlikte barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının ilgili vakalarda resmi olarak Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinin ardından başlaması, kimlik ve politik dışlanma odaklı meselelerin rolü, ilgili vakalar aracılığıyla Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının başarı ve başarısızlıklarının dengeli bir şekilde temsil edilmesi ve Açe ile Sri Lanka örneklerinde ise barış ve çatışma süreçlerinin, 2004 Hint Okyanusu depremi ve tsunamisi nedeniyle farklı seyirler izlemesi.

Diplomatik kabiliyetlerin ve üçüncü taraf tekniklerinin uygulanmasında, ana odak ve sorumlu temsilciler olarak çatışan taraflara ve çatışmaların altında yatan nedenlere öncelik verilmesi önem arz etmektedir. Ancak ilgili alt vakaların aşamaları incelendiğinde, barışçıl çabaları baltalayan ve uzun süreli barış süreçlerinin başka örneklerini teşkil eden başarısızlıkların yaşandığı görülmektedir. Bu başarısızlıklar, Nordik ülkelere yönelik iyimser değerlendirmelerle çelişmektedir. Ancak yaşanan başarısızlıklara ve problemlere rağmen, Nordik ülkeleri barış, çatışma çözümü, diyalog ve müzakereler konularında ayırt edici ve yetkin aktörler olarak görülmeye devam etmektedir. Bu bağlamda bu Tez, Nordik ülkelerinin barışçıl itibarlarının, barış ve çatışma çözümü alanındaki hem olumlu hem de çelişkili yönlerini ortaya koyarak bu ülkelere yönelik yaygın iyimser değerlendirmeleri sorunsallaştırmaktadır.

Bu Tezde, süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı bakış açıları; ana araştırma sorusu, teorik çerçeve ve Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının değerlendirilmesi ile ilişkilendirilmiştir. Bu süreçte Nordik ülkelerinin özgün yönlerini keşfetmek için belirli barış aşamalarına odaklanılan alt vaka çalışmalarına yer verilmiştir. Bu çerçevede Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığıyla ilgili olarak şu aşamalar incelenmek üzere seçilmiştir: Endonezya Hükümeti ile Özgür Açe Hareketi arasındaki Helsinki barış süreci, Kıbrıs'ta Annan Planının başarısızlığa uğramasını takiben Oslo Barış Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Kıbrıs

Merkezi'nin faaliyetleri, Oslo barış sürecinin İsveç arka planı ve Norveç Krallığı'nın Oslo barış sürecinde, İsrail ile Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü arasındaki üçüncü taraf rolü ve yine Norveç Krallığı'nın Sri Lanka Demokratik Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti ile Tamil Eelam Kurtuluş Kaplanları arasındaki barış müzakerelerinde üçüncü taraf desteği. İlgili bu aşamalarda Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının başlangıcı, kullanılan teknikler ve üçüncü taraf uygulamalarının etkileri incelenerek hem barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarına hem de Nordik barış diplomasisine katkı sağlanacaktır. Seçilen alt vakalardaki bu aşamalara dayanarak Nordik ülkelerinin üçüncü taraf rolleri ve özgün bir model geliştirme potansiyelleri tartışılacaktır.

Bu bağlamda, Nordik ülkelerinin çatışmanın altında yatan nedenleri ele almak ve iyileştirmek bakımından Açe örneğinde başarılı olduğu görülmektedir. Nitekim Diplomat *Martti Ahtisaari* ve "Kriz Yönetimi Girişimi-Martti Ahtisaari Barış Vakfı" aracılığıyla süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımlar bütünleştirilirken birtakım özgün katkılarda da bulunulmuştur. Ancak Filistin ve Sri Lanka örneklerinde Nordik ülkeleri, çatışmaların altında yatan nedenleri ele alıp çözüme kavuşturmada başarılı olamamıştır. Süreç ve sonuç odaklı katkılar sürdürülemediği gibi daha derin ve uzun vadeli yaklaşımlarla da desteklenememiştir. Nihayetinde üçüncü taraf teknikleri, uzun süreli barış süreçlerinin bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Kıbrıs örneğinde ise barışa yönelik doğrusal olmayan ve tabandan bir yaklaşımı öne çıkaran Oslo Barış Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Kıbrıs Merkezi'nin diyalog kolaylaştırıcı rolüyle çatışma dönüşümü bağlamında önemli katkılar sağlanmıştır. Bu örnek hem uzun süreli bir sosyal çatışmayı hem de uzun süreli barış süreçlerini ele almaya yönelik birtakım projeleri içermesi bakımından da dikkat çekicidir. İlgili vakaların analizini takiben vakalardaki Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı teknikleri de karşılaştırılacaktır. Bu karşılaştırmanın etkisiyle Nordik barış diplomasisinin güçlü ve zayıf yönlerinin daha derinlemesine kavranabileceği değerlendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Nordik ülkelerinin ilgili örneklerin seçilmiş aşamalarındaki başarı/başarısızlıkları ve üçüncü taraf rolleri birlikte kavranıp değerlendirilirken ve karşılaştırılırken aşağıdaki parametrelerden yararlanılmıştır:

Dünya siyasetinde çatışmalar ve ihtilaflı meseleler şeklinde yer edinmiş örnekler; Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı bağlamında çatışmaların ve ihtilaflı meselelerin aşamaları; seçilmiş örneklerdeki başlıca çatışan taraflar; seçilmiş örneklerdeki Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılık uygulamalarının başlangıcı; barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı bağlamında Nordik ülkelerinin çatışmaların ve ihtilaflı meselelerin belirli aşamalarına müdahil olması; çatışmaların ve ihtilaflı meselelerin ilgili aşamalarında barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı süreçlerine müdahil olmuş öne çıkan Nordik ülkeleri; Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının hedefleri ve odak noktaları; Nordik ülkeleri tarafından kullanılan ana diplomatik yaklaşımlar ve teknikler; barış arabuluculuğuna ve kolaylaştırıcılığa yönelik süreç ve sonuç odaklı yaklaşımlar bağlamında elde edilen başarı ve başarısızlıklar; barış arabuluculuğuna ve kolaylaştırıcılığa yönelik çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımlar bağlamında elde edilen başarı ve başarısızlıklar. Bu parametreler ışığında ilgili vakaların değerlendirilip karşılaştırılabilmesi için özel bir veri seti sunulmaktadır.

Tüm bunlardan hareketle bu Tez, süreç, sonuç ve çatışma dönüşümü odaklı yaklaşımlar aracılığıyla tespit edilen başarısızlıkların ve problemlerin ele alınması gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Nitekim bu sayede Nordik ülkelerinin diplomatik kabiliyetleri ve manevra alanları geliştirilebilir. Ayrıca, Nordik ülkelerinin başarı ve başarısızlıklarının irdelenmesiyle özgün bir barış ve çatışma çözümü modelinin geliştirilmesi yönünde önemli bir adım atılabilir. Bu çerçevede çatışmaların altında

yatan nedenleri ele almada ve yukarıda belirtilen üç aşamalı modelin benimsenmesinde başarısız olunması, sistemin korunmasına dönük bağlılık, yapısal dinamiklere ve Norveç ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki yakın ilişki dahil olmak üzere büyük güçlere bağımlılık, barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarıyla bağlantılı olarak Danimarka ve İzlanda'nın yetersiz rolü, artan popülizm ve tartışmalı askeri operasyonlara katılım, Nordik ülkelerinin özgün bir barış ve çatışma çözümü modeli geliştirme potansiyelini olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir.

Bu Tez'in bulguları, Nordik kimliğinin geliştirilmesinde de önemli bir rol oynayabilir. Zira Nordik barış diplomasisinin temel açıklamaları ile Nordik kimliği arasında güçlü örtüşmeler bulunmaktadır. Bu nedenle, çalışmanın son bölümünde sadece seçilen alt vakaların aşamalarındaki Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının belirli parametreler ekseninde karşılaştırılmasına değil, aynı zamanda Nordik kimliğinin birtakım boyutlarına da yer verilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Nordik kimliğin şekillenme sürecine ivme kazandıran son bir gelişme daha yaşanmıştır. Finlandiya Cumhuriyeti'nin ve İsveç'in Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'ne katılması, uzun vadede güvenlik diplomasisi ya da barış diplomasisinin takip edilmesi üzerine birtakım endişelere yol açabilir. Bu süreçte bahse konu endişelerin ve beraberindeki belirsizliklerin de etkin bir şekilde yönetilmesi, Nordik barış diplomasisinin ve Nordik kimliğinin gelişiminde belirleyici bir rol oynayacaktır.

Sonuç itibarıyla Nordik ülkelerinin belirli alt vakalardaki üçüncü taraf rollerine, süreç ve sonuç odaklı yaklaşıldığında barışçıl ve insani itibarlarını destekleyen bulgular tespit edilmektedir. Ancak aynı derecede önemli olmakla birlikte, bilhassa sonuç ve çatışma çözümü odaklı yaklaşımlar ışığında önemli başarısızlıklar ve problemler yaşandığı da görülmektedir. Belirli uzun süreli sosyal çatışmaların ilgili barış ve çatışma çözümü aşamalarına odaklanılarak tespit edilen bu başarısızlıkların ve problemlerin etkin bir şekilde ele alınması hem Nordik barış diplomasisi hem de Nordik kimliğinin gelişimi için zaruri görünmektedir. Nihayetinde Nordik kimliğini yeniden şekillendirme çabaları, Nordik barış diplomasisinin tekamül sürecinden izole değerlendirilemez. Zira Nordik ülkeleri barış diplomasisini, dış politika ve ulusal/bölgesel seviyelerdeki kimlik inşası ile bütünleştirme çabası da göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, Nordik barış arabuluculuğu ve kolaylaştırıcılığı uygulamalarının etkileri ve üçüncü taraf teknikleriyle ilgili çeşitli zorlukların ele alınması, Nordik kimliğinin gelişimi için de şüphesiz önemli bir rol oynayacaktır.



*To my parents: Nuray Aktan and Bekir Aktan,
with love and understanding.*

*“In the struggle between life that wants to
maintain itself and reflection that wants to fulfill itself
through the sacrifice of life,
life prevails”.*¹

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, the inquiry for peace and war has been inevitable for various actors and large-groups. There have been different perspectives regarding the emergence, intensification, and legitimacy of war in human societies. Additionally, various third-party instruments have been utilized in efforts to prevent war and support peace. In response to the deprivation of basic human needs and the loss of lives, these instruments have aimed to manage, resolve, and/or transform destructive conflicts. This is understandable since there is also a history of international humanitarian law that regulates human behaviors and responsibilities during war. Human experiences with violence thus reflect moral concerns and norms. What made third-party instruments distinctive, on the other hand, has been grounded in the efforts aimed at the prevention and non-recurrence of wars and the creation of a new reality beyond a non-war setting.

Peaceful efforts have gained further recognition through the internalization and dissemination of peaceful means. Examples of these means include peace mediation and facilitation practices that have become part of peace diplomacy. In this process, the objectives focus on preventing war, transforming incompatibilities peacefully, and creating new opportunities for interactions between the parties. Organizations such as the League of Nations (LoN) and United Nations (UN) were instrumental in operationalizing these third-party efforts. International peace and security have been the fundamental bases of these organizations.

Importantly, the UN's functioning prioritizes major powers. This has been evident in the veto rights of the French Republic, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the United States of America (USA) in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such neo-realist UN functioning has been associated with the failure of the LoN. Moreover, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

¹ Hans Morgenthau, “Thought and Action in Politics”, **Social Research**, Vol. 51, No. 1/2, Fifty Years of Social Research: Continental and Anglo-American Perspectives, Spring/Summer 1984, pp. 162-163.

(NATO) has consolidated the idea that world peace cannot be attainable in the realm of world politics. Therefore, regional security and stability have been advocated against aggressions.

In addition to these different but interconnected undertakings in the forms of treaties and multilateral organizations, the methodological and systematic understanding of destructive conflicts has affected the development of the International Relations (IR) discipline. As a result, IR theories have encompassed concerns about the probability of war, its overall effects and types, as well as means of peace, security, and survival. Concerns about war have also affected the fields of conflict resolution and peace research. Hence, discussions related to peace and war have played a critical role in the evolution and framework of the IR discipline, conflict resolution, peace research, and vice versa.

In this process, some actors and large-groups have gained wider acceptance and recognition in the fields of conflict resolution and peace research. In particular, Nordic countries² have been renowned as more altruistic, humane, and peaceful actors in comparison to other countries. Indeed, a variety of factors have contributed to the establishment of this distinctive reputation at both national and regional levels. These factors can be summarized as follows: The Nordic countries have made empirical and theoretical contributions to the fields of conflict resolution and peace research. They have also reflected a distinctive welfare state model, contributed to humanitarian aid, and demonstrated their diplomatic capabilities in peacefully resolving conflicts and controversial issues among themselves. Of equal importance is that they also established a widespread tradition of Nordic diplomats in regional/international organizations, created Nordic peace research institutes and centers, and participated as third-parties in various conflicts ranging from the Interwar period to the post-Cold War period. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is widespread optimism about the Nordic countries.

² This Thesis uses the term “Nordic” because it includes Finland, which is not part of the Scandinavian peninsula. However, there will also be usages of the terms “Scandinavia”, “Scandinavian”, or “Scandinavian diplomacy” to remain faithful to the terminology used in the original benefited source. It is important to note that the term “Norden” is also preferable, as it encompasses Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Also, the term “Nordic” has been used interchangeably with the term Scandinavia by *Håkan Wiberg*. For this preference, along with the inclusiveness of the term “Norden” and the distinctiveness of Finland due to its geographical position and Finnish language, see: *Håkan Wiberg*, “Scandinavia”, in Richard Dean Burns (Ed.), **Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament - Volume I**, New York : Charles Scriber’s Sons, 1993, p. 209.; Nevertheless, this Thesis dedicates itself to using the term “Nordic countries” to encompass Finland while also briefly highlighting Iceland’s role as an outsider in Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.

In the execution of peace and conflict resolution instruments, Nordic countries have left a lasting impact through their third-party roles. These countries have also made significant contributions to the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. These practices took place in various conflicts and controversial issues, including cases with protracted dynamics. In this process, Nordic countries have been identified as peaceful agents, possessing effective communication, dialogue, negotiation, and persuasion skills, despite their challenges and failures. The reputation of the Nordic countries has affected and has been affected by peace mediation and facilitation efforts in various contexts.

However, the optimistic views of the Nordic countries have impeded the comprehensive exploration and examination of the challenges and problems that have arisen as a result of their third-party practices. Thus, there has been inadequate analysis of the failures that have stemmed from Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. In response to this negligence, this Thesis problematizes the widespread optimism directed to Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution. The portrayal and reputation of the Nordic countries in their third-party engagements also link to the optimistic view. Therefore, it is necessary to build a more nuanced perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of the Nordic countries.

The main hypothesis is that, compared to their achievements and contributions in the context of third-party engagements, the failures and limitations of the Nordic countries have not received adequate scrutiny and comparison. In essence, there has been a stronger focus on the achievements and contributions of these countries compared to challenges. The identification and self-identification of the Nordic countries as progressive and peacemaker agents, the continued effectiveness of process-oriented approaches to mediation in the literature, and the decisiveness and primary responsibility of the warring parties play a pivotal role in this heightened interest and the negligence of failures. Consequently, holistic and joint effects resulting from the third-party roles of the Nordic countries have not been adequately assessed.

This negligence poses challenges not only to the peaceful efforts and reputation of the Nordic countries but also to the field of peace and conflict resolution. The latter challenge arises from the need for alternative and authentic approaches that can guide peace mediators and facilitators in this field. Thus, the philosophy of this thesis is based on understanding the achievements and contributions of the Nordic countries while complementing these diplomatic capabilities with the problems and failures that

stem from their concentrated third-party roles. With this need and philosophy in mind, the main research question is formulated as follows: What might be the implications of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in developing a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model? The ability to address the deep-roots of incompatibilities between the warring parties and integrate process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches in “selected protracted cases” (*emphasis added*) is the foundation of this model. Taken together, these approaches serve as different orientations within the framework of traditional mediation.³

By using and enriching process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches, this Thesis will assess peaceful contributions and failures of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. This assessment will be conducted by focusing on the selected phases of peace in four conflicts, approached as specific “small cases”.⁴ The performance of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be assessed in the nexus of this three-folded model and the presentation of cases. The factors that both encourage and restrict the ability of Nordic countries in creating a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model will be discussed. Also, the means of improving these practices will be included in the creation of a just and sustainable peace.

In essence, the articulated question conveys the idea that Nordic peace mediation and facilitation may be useful for the development of a peace and conflict resolution model that can guide practitioners in dealing with protracted conflicts. To discuss the link between the third-party roles of Nordic countries and the establishment of such a referent model, it is essential to address both the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. Therefore, assessing the third-party roles of the Nordic countries in addressing the underlying reasons behind the cases is of paramount concern. This, together with the utilization of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented analysis, supports the main research question of this Thesis.

This question is crucial for discerning whether the Nordic countries prioritized the deep-roots of the cases or concentrated on structural dynamics and international

³ See: Sara Horowitz, “Mediation”, in Charles Webel, and Johan Galtung (Eds.), **Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies**, London and New York : Routledge, 2007, p. 57.

⁴ Relying upon comparative research, small case-studies allow for both contextual and in-depth analysis. The selection of cases in this process requires clear and strategic justification. The cases need to include both differences and similarities. See: Sandra Halperin, and Oliver Heath, **Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills**, Third Edition, New York : Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 237-238.; Following this, the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka were selected as experiences of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. To prevent redundancy and enhance practicality, these small cases, representing the applications of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, will be referred to as cases.

security. In addition, it enables us to investigate the impacts of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation while considering outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches in the selected cases. In this Thesis, Nordic peace mediation and facilitation serve as the primary case-study, through which its implications and ramifications will be explored in protracted cases, regarded as small cases. In this regard, this analysis will focus on four specific cases that have experienced Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. In each case, both the achievements and failures of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be analyzed. These practices have been seen as main components of Nordic peace diplomacy.

As reflecting one of the primary findings regarding the adequate addressing of the underlying reasons, the presentation of selected cases is worthy of scrutiny. The reason is that national interests, power asymmetries, structural dynamics, and various forms of disparities have also shaped peace and international security. Accordingly, it will be understood whether Nordic peace diplomacy focused on the reasons that have given rise to hostilities and violence between the warring parties and the emergence of protracted conflicts in selected cases. With the benefits of comparative and contextual assessments of these cases, the third-party roles of the Nordic countries will be analyzed.

In this Thesis, the main research question is generated by the widely held understanding and perception towards the Nordic countries regarding their promotion of peace, peaceful handling and resolution of conflicts, and negotiation skills. Accordingly, the reputation of the Nordic countries includes the utilization of peace mediation and facilitation techniques effectively and peacefully. In addition to the aforesaid reasons, this Thesis assumes that this reputation is empirically derived from the relatively peaceful state of Norway after the transformation of violence during the Viking era; the peacefulness of Sweden after the transformation of its militaristic approach that prevailed in the seventeenth century⁵; historical experiences of the Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution and the construction of Nordic identity in world politics.

This Thesis evaluates the achievements of peace mediation and facilitation practices in parallel to the efforts as capable of effectively tackling the underlying roots while converging process, outcome, and transformation-oriented lenses. In this

⁵ Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Role of Conflict in the Dynamics of Society", **Current Research on Peace and Violence**, Vol. 9, No. 3, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1986, p. 100.

context, examination of the utilized techniques will reveal the achievements and failures of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation from process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented perspectives. Furthermore, this three-folded assessment will be helpful to compare the utilized techniques and validate the interactions between various peace and conflict resolution mechanisms.

In essence, peace mediation can be considered a peaceful third-party intervention oriented at supporting the achievement of peace in conflicts. This process witnesses various forms and techniques that circulate at different phases.⁶ If the purpose of mediation is linked to the achievement of peace, then it can be asserted that such third-party practices need to deal with the underlying roots of conflicts and controversial issues while integrating complementary perspectives on peace and conflict resolution. The achievement of peace requires various prerequisites. In this regard, it is crucial to address the underlying roots of conflicts and controversial issues and to embrace interlinked approaches, such as process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses, which are critical.

These considerations signal the need to deal with the underlying reasons of the cases while utilizing not only process but also outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. The link between third-party practices and the achievement of peace brings process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to the peace and conflict resolution agenda. For this reason, it is important to assess the techniques and effects of the Nordic countries in relation to these approaches, which can be utilized in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

As emphasized, literature pays narrow attention to the limitations and problems resulting from the peace mediation and facilitation experiences of Nordic countries compared to their achievements. Various challenges have not been adequately and comparatively researched in the literature. This restrictive understanding might obstruct or cloud the ability to effectively and proportionately reflect and frame the contributions and challenges of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. Also, it can jeopardize the development of authentic and innovative skills in the field of peace and conflict resolution. For this reason, it is important to compensate for this restrictive understanding by expanding the implications of Nordic peace mediation and

⁶ Marko Lehti, and Jenny Saarinen, "Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts: A Survey on Nordic Studies on Peacemaking", in Marko Lehti (Ed.), **Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation: Research, Practices and Policies**, Tampere, Finland : Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), No. 101, 2014, p. 15.

facilitation beyond the stereotypes and labels and by developing holistic understandings.

In this process, different cases that allow us to draw conclusions both in line with the mainstream portrayal of the Nordic countries and in contrast to the widely held perceptions can be enriching. With this in mind, it is important to note that this problematic and main hypothesis do not indicate to refute, disregard, or invalidate the contributions of Nordic countries, which cannot be passed unnoticed and unappreciated in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Instead, it advocates for the promotion of complementary, holistic, comparative, and critical perspectives. These perspectives not only transcend traditional mindsets and restrictive academic gazes but also serve as a foundation for more in-depth studies.

In this Thesis, the supportive hypothesis has been grounded in a five-fold typology. As a result, the following factors might be described as instrumental in assisting the Nordic countries to protect and retain their reputation in the field of peace and conflict resolution: the decisiveness and primary responsibility of the warring parties; the role of multilateralism in Nordic peace mediation and facilitation; a process-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation practices; the voluntary nature of mediation; and the variety of internal/external actors that might be involved, contingent upon specific cases. In this regard, these factors might be hypothesized as contributing to the enduring reputation of the Nordic countries in promoting peace and effectively managing, resolving, and negotiating conflicts.

With the utilization of the selected cases, the characteristics and orientation of Nordic peace diplomacy can be assessed in order to explore the following inquiries: (i) Did the Nordic countries primarily concentrate on the root causes of conflicts or on the structural dynamics and security patterns in world politics? (ii) What are the strengths and challenges arising from the Nordic diplomatic abilities in the phases of selected cases? (iii) How do peace mediation and facilitation techniques align with process, outcome, and transformation-oriented approaches?

These inquiries, being relevant to the main research question, have the potential to enhance our understanding of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation techniques within a broader framework. They can also compensate for the lack of critical scrutiny in the literature regarding these practices in the Nordic context. Drawing from these inquiries, both comprehensive and thematic approaches regarding the interactions

between Nordic diplomatic abilities and the field of peace and conflict resolution can be developed.

In this context, this Thesis will present multiple cases to provide a comparative and explanatory analysis of the third-party techniques that are used. By drawing on the cases that entail both the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, we can take a step toward exploring the potential of Nordic countries in developing a distinctive model. For this reason, Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices will be limited to the selected phases of cases, such as Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka.

Importantly, these cases do not aim to provide a generalizable analysis regarding the potential of Nordic countries for the development of a distinctive model. By departing from the widely optimistic view of the Nordic countries, these cases actually reveal both compatible and contradictory findings with this view. As a result, it can be contended that these contradictory findings, as failures and problems, need to be addressed for the improvement of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation toward the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model.

Taken together, these cases aim to provide explanatory and comparative findings related to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices in selected “protracted social conflicts”⁷ with regional and systemic effects. As reflecting the context-specific nature of these practices, selected phases of cases provide insights for the commencement, dynamics, and third-party techniques of Nordic peace diplomacy. The idea is that the presentation of cases, as applications or examples of Nordic peace diplomacy, might enrich our understanding about Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices and might play a guiding role for the development of a referent model.

Thus, this Thesis is will explore how Nordic peace mediation and facilitation were conducted and realized in the context of protracted social conflicts that have threatened peace and security at various levels. As a result, the techniques of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will attempt to shed light by incorporating

⁷ The term protractedness refers to conflict situations with hostility spreading over long periods of time, despite a cessation of violence. This lingering process involves entire societies, and is characterized by the emergence of open warfare, which has been subject to fluctuations in terms of its frequency, and intensity. Such conflicts lack of distinguishable and explicit point of termination as a result of the protracted nature. Protracted conflicts have been decisive in the context of national identity, and social solidarity. Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini, and Ronald McLaurin, “Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 1978, p. 50.

comparative, critical, and descriptive lenses. Given the escalation of protracted conflicts, it is important to benefit from third-party experiences that marked nodal points in the trajectory of conflicts and in the interactions between the parties.

Despite the criticisms upon case-study research, engaging with Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, as a primary case-study,⁸ might be effective in deepening our understanding about the techniques as adopted by the intermediaries and in identifying factors that have weakened peace processes. Originating from the benefits and limitations of four exemplars, as protracted cases related to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, this Thesis will examine the third-party roles of the Nordic countries across different contexts, periods, and conflicting parties. Within this connection, both theoretical and empirical-sensitive approaches will be adopted. Comparing different exemplars will also be helpful in identifying the similarities and differences surrounding third-party techniques.⁹

On closer inspection, Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be contextualized while the cases, as exemplars of Nordic peace diplomacy, are being examined. The cases, highlighted above, were selected due to the following reasons: the official commencement of the third-party roles of the Nordic countries in these cases corresponded to the conclusion of the Cold War. Exception includes the Swedish background of the Oslo Accords. The period following the conclusion of the Cold War witnessed significant transformations related to peace and conflict resolution instruments. As a result, it has become more apparent that third-party practices must engage in the creation of positive, peace-oriented conditions. Thus, these cases were selected in order to explore how Nordic countries have responded to this transformation through their third-party techniques. As reflecting this timeframe, third-party roles of the Nordic countries will thus cover the period following the conclusion of the Cold War. As a result, it will be captured how third-party techniques of the Nordic countries were affected by the turmoil in the post-Cold War period. In this way, selected cases will guide us in assessing the authenticity and relevance of the

⁸ For the strengths, and weaknesses of case-study, please see the following publications: Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings about Case-study Research", *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 219-245.; Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (Eds.), *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi : SAGE Publications, 2000.

⁹ For the strengths and weaknesses of the comparative method, see also: Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. 3, Sep., 1971, pp. 682-693.

techniques of Nordic countries and in understanding the extent and inclusiveness of their engagements.

Importantly, these cases exemplify both protracted conflicts and “protracted peace processes.”¹⁰ Amidst the role of the other factors, identity-oriented issues have been evident in the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka as well. In particular, the cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka were selected due to different paths in response to the link between disaster diplomacy and the support for peace. The concentration on the case of Sri Lanka was also important so that the effects of 11 September on the peace process could be revealed. Of equal importance is that these cases entail both the contributions and failures of Nordic countries and are relevant to the overall purpose of the Thesis. Thus, they reflect a balance between the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy.

These cases might be seen as significant not just in terms of the field of peace and conflict resolution but also in terms of the undertaking of third-party roles in protracted conflicts. For this reason, they are capable of revealing perennial problems with regard to civil wars; displacement; heightened terror campaigns and attacks; identity issues; international interventions and aspirations (whether in terms of annexation, secessionism, statehood, or self-determination); political exclusion and non-recognition; societal traumas, and territorial and border conflicts.

The selected cases, which entail armed conflicts, struggles, identity issues, wars, and transgenerational traumas with a protracted nature, are also critical in emphasizing the difference between conflict resolution and conflict management¹¹; in understanding the complementary dimensions of peace mediation and facilitation, and in investigating the alterations in the focus of the Nordic countries. As for the selection of the particular stages within these cases, the developments that have marked milestones in the history of the conflict and conflict resolution while testing diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries were decisive.

In particular, this Thesis will cover the following phases of the selected cases: Helsinki negotiations between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia) and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement, “*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*”);

¹⁰ For the characteristics of protracted peace processes, as lingering peace processes, see: Joana Ricarte, **The Impact of Protracted Peace Processes on Identities in Conflict: The Case of Israel and Palestine**, Palgrave Macmillan Cham, 2023.

¹¹ For the difference between conflict resolution, and conflict management, see: John Burton, “The Theory of Conflict Resolution”, **Current Research on Peace and Violence**, Vol. 9, No. 3, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1986, p. 125.

dialogue facilitation role of “The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)” Cyprus Centre following the failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus, along with the inclusion of a brief emphasis on the role of Nordic peace mediators and facilitators under the auspices of the UN; third-party efforts of Sweden in the case of Palestine, and third-party efforts of Norway in the Oslo process between the State of Israel (Israel) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and finally, Norway’s third-party involvement in the peace process between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

In the case of Aceh, this Thesis will examine the third-party role of the Republic of Finland (Finland) through the involvement of the Finnish Diplomat *Martti Ahtisaari* and the Finnish-based “Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation.” The focus will be directed to the approaches and efforts of *Ahtisaari* while looking into the utilized techniques. The conditions and reasons that catalyzed the formation of a peace agreement between Indonesia and GAM will be explained. Also, the added impact of disaster diplomacy, which proved to be inefficient in the case of Sri Lanka, will also be included.

In the case of Cyprus, the engagement of Nordic countries will be approached by analyzing the dialogue facilitation role of the PRIO Cyprus Centre (PCC). This role is grounded in the generation and dissemination of accurate information, dialogue and debate, and the role of grass-root approach to peace. The functioning of this Centre will be explored with regard to its non-*status quo*-oriented approach following the failure of the Annan Plan. In this process, the focus will be directed to dialogue facilitation-oriented projects of the Centre that have been commenced following the Annan Plan period. With the analysis of third-party techniques through the functioning of this Centre and its completed projects, it will be revealed how conflict transformation-oriented practices through the role of dialogue facilitation can take place before conflict resolution.

Further to this, the case of Cyprus and the dialogue facilitation role of PCC will be enriched through an interview as conducted with *Mete Hatay*, who is Senior Research Consultant in the Centre. The reason for the inclusion of this interview in only this case can be stated as follows: In this Thesis, the case of Cyprus will be analyzed through the functioning of a peace research institute that is located in Nicosia with the researchers from both main large-groups on the island. Thus, the dialogue facilitation role of PCC also reflects “internal” (*emphasis added*) third-party practice

in contrast to the cases of Aceh, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. In relation to this context-oriented functioning and specificity, an interview has been conducted with the objective to provide insights from a Senior Research Consultant in the Centre.

The third-party role of the Kingdom of Norway (Norway) and the Kingdom of Sweden (Sweden) in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict will be examined with a particular emphasis on the background, achievements, and failures pertaining to the peace mediation and facilitation practices in the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords demonstrate a direct dialogue between Israel and the PLO through the third-party role of Norway and its Swedish background.

Within this connection, there were prior peaceful attempts related to peace mediation and facilitation and academic diplomacy exercises of Sweden. Actually, the background of the Oslo peace process also holds relevance for Nordic cooperation in the field of peace and conflict resolution. But these prior attempts could not be sustained and generate successful outcomes related to conflict resolution. As a result, there was a transfer of Sweden's third-party role to Norway following the loss of the Social Democrats in the 1991 Swedish parliamentary election. With Norway's third-party role, there have been critical achievements that led to hope for the creation of humane, just, and peaceful conditions. However, both Sweden and Norway could not be successful in resolving this deep-rooted, protracted conflict. For this reason, it is important to scrutinize how Sweden and Norway approached this conflict and its underlying roots so that their efforts and third-party techniques could not be effective.

In addition, the third-party role of Norway in the case of Sri Lanka will equally be important in providing another critical assessment about Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. The idea is that the assistance and peaceful efforts of Norway proved to be promising while marking a threshold in this conflict. Nevertheless, the engagement of Norway could not be effective in providing just and sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. For this reason, the case of Sri Lanka also deserves careful elaboration so that the challenges and problems resulting from the peace mediation and facilitation performance of Norway can be identified. Such analysis directed to the performance of Norway will also be important in understanding the permeability and reflections of third-party roles of Norway, particularly between peace mediation and facilitation.

The idea is that these cases, which entail large-groups as corresponding to nationalities, non-state actors and states¹², different contexts and geographies, identity dynamics, and political conjunctures, might provide extensive lenses to understand the third-party roles of the Nordic countries. These lenses can be important in assessing the background and planning, formulation, execution, entry, and focal points of peace mediation and facilitation exercises and overall effects of the Nordic countries. With the presentation of cases, the potential of Nordic peace diplomacy for the development of a distinguishable peace and conflict resolution model can be discussed. Also, both supportive and contradictory aspects regarding the reputation of the Nordic countries can be revealed in the field of peace mediation and facilitation.

Importantly, the focal point is grounded in the interlinkage between the Nordic diplomatic abilities and the field of peace and conflict resolution, which will be scrutinized through Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the phases of cases. Hence, a detailed account regarding the history and trajectory of the cases is not covered within the scope of this Thesis. Rather, there will be a brief historical background in order to understand the roots and main warring parties of the conflicts. Also, this Thesis will examine peace mediation and facilitation of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. Iceland will not be covered within the scope of this Thesis. The exclusion of Iceland is grounded in the assumption that Iceland has an outsider role in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. With that being said, this Thesis considers the efforts of Norway, Finland, and Sweden as more evident and identifiable compared to Denmark in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. For this reason, the focus will only occasionally, or to a much lesser extent, be directed to Denmark in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

The third-party role of the Nordic countries will be limited to peace mediation and facilitation practices. Within the scope of the peace and conflict resolution instruments and the third-party roles, the emphasis will be placed on peace mediation and facilitation as essential and cross-cutting instruments of Nordic peace diplomacy. The concentration on peace mediation and facilitation was preferred due to the following reasons: These instruments have been utilized in various conflicts and controversial issues. Importantly, they demonstrate integrative and flexible approaches in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Peace mediation and facilitation practices

¹² For the explanations and components of large-group, and the importance of protecting the integrity of large-group identity, see: Vamik Volkan, "Large-group Identity: Border Psychology and Related Societal Processes", *Mind and Human Interaction*, Vol. 13, 2003, pp. 49-76.

are relevant with the undertakings of Nordic peace diplomacy and the phases of selected cases.

In addition, the reasons for the inclusion of peace facilitation can be stated as follows: The role of the PCC in Cyprus and the efforts to identify the third-party role of Norway as a facilitator rather than a mediator in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka, which have affected official narratives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. In this study, peace facilitation has been considered as necessary but not a sufficient component of peace mediation in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy. As highlighted, the distinctiveness and successfulness of utilized techniques will be analyzed through process, outcome, and transformation-oriented lenses to mediation. This analysis will also be supported with the insights of political psychological approaches in relation to the assessment of the utilized techniques.

Political psychological approaches will be elaborated by utilizing *John Burton's* "human needs theory" of conflict resolution¹³ and *Vamik Volkan's* formulation of "large-group identity".¹⁴ Human needs theory will be included in assessing the successfulness of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation through outcome-oriented lenses. The phenomenon of large-group identity will encompass both main warring parties and Nordic peace mediators and facilitators.

In order to reveal the peaceful involvements of the Nordic countries, this Thesis will provide a general dataset that corresponds to the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. In the general dataset, the peaceful efforts and engagements of the Nordic countries in conflicts and controversial issues will be ranging from the Interwar period to the post-Cold War period. Thus, this dataset will entail peaceful efforts and engagements of the Nordic countries from a historical perspective. Following that, Nordic peace diplomacy will be assessed through process-oriented lenses.

In response to the need for further elaboration, process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses will be included in a particular dataset, which will be concerned with peace mediation and facilitation practices of the Nordic countries in

¹³ See: John Burton (Ed.), **Conflict: Human Needs Theory**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.; For the relevance of human needs theory in connection with conflict resolution, the following publications can be recommended: Abraham Harold Maslow, **The Farther Reaches of Human Nature**, (ed. by Stuart Miller), An Esalen Book, The Esalen Publishing Program, New York : The Viking Press, 1971.; Hossain B. Danesh, "Human Needs Theory, Conflict, and Peace", in Daniel J. Christie (Ed.), **The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology**, Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 510-514.

¹⁴ For the explanations and components of large-group identity and large-group psychology, see: Volkan, "Large-group Identity: Border Psychology...", pp. 49-76.; Vamik Volkan, **Psychoanalysis, International Relations, and Diplomacy: A Sourcebook on Large-Group Psychology**, London : Karnac Books, 2014.

the phases of selected cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. In this connection, the emphasis will be put on the phases of selected cases as protracted conflicts that witnessed peace mediation and facilitation efforts of Nordic countries. The particular dataset will entail mainly qualitative, and to a limited extent, quantitative information while being assessed through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Following that, cross-case and thematic analysis will be important to contribute discussions about peace mediation and facilitation while assessing the performance and third-party techniques of Nordic countries.

The information related to general and particular datasets was collected through a variety of document analyses, UN resolutions, and different sources, including Norwegian and Swedish texts. In the case of Cyprus, insights obtained from the interview were also reflected. Also, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and PRIO data will occasionally be included in providing information regarding the selected cases. In this context, the reasons for this choice can be stated as follows: The inclusion of the UCDP and PRIO data will be important in providing a Nordic perspective towards the selected cases. In addition, some of the PRIO data builds upon the extension of and cooperation with the UCDP while following some of the definitions as provided by the UCDP, or the UCDP-PRIO.¹⁵ Given the importance of the Nordic understanding and the Nordic research cooperation related to the field of peace and conflict resolution, it is more appropriate to include both of the data in engaging with protracted conflicts.

Understanding the means to handle conflicting situations requires comparative or generalized (conceptual) contexts despite their distinctive components.¹⁶ With this in mind, it is important to analyze and compare the techniques as adopted by Nordic peace mediators and facilitators in different contexts and situations. With the introduction of a particular dataset prepared through Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in phases of selected cases, a comparative approach will be provided. This

¹⁵ For example, see: Bethany Lacina, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths", *European Journal of Population*, Vol. 21, 2005, pp. 145-166.; Johan Dittrich Hallberg, "PRIO Conflict Site 1989-2008: A Geo-Referenced Dataset on Armed Conflict", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2012, pp. 219-232.; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, September 2002, pp. 615-637.; Scott Gates, Håvard Moksleiv Nygård, Julie Jarland, and Vilde Bergstad Larsen, "PRIO Conflict Recurrence Database", *The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)*, 30 March 2020, <https://www.prio.org/data/31> (accessed 19.05.2023).

¹⁶ I. William Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of International Conflicts", in I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 10.

comparison, as capable of revealing the assessment of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in relation to process, outcome, and transformation-oriented approaches to mediation, will be conducted through parameters as follow:

Main warring parties; the commencement of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the phases of selected cases; the entry of Nordic countries into the phases of selected cases; prominent Nordic countries and Nordic actors as involved in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation; objectives and focal points of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation; prominent diplomatic approaches and techniques, and achievements and failures through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. Accordingly, theoretical construction through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses will be useful in understanding accomplishments and challenges of Nordic peace diplomacy.

As a result of such comprehensive illustration in a particular dataset, a comparison will be provided on the aforementioned parameters. This comparison will be utilized in analyzing the authenticity of the techniques resulting from Nordic peace diplomacy. Following that, the distinctiveness of Nordic peace diplomacy will be discussed through the dimensions of Nordic identity. In this context, affirmative and non-affirmative instances related to the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries will be provided throughout the comparison and discussion.

Within this framework, the concern of this Thesis has been centered on the exploration of not just successes but also failures that stem from third-party roles of the Nordic countries, along with the efficiency and sustainability of the utilized techniques. An examination concerning third-party roles of the Nordic countries in the selected cases might be important to reinforce alternative and operational approaches. In the end, this examination has a direct relevance for the formulation or designation of the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation in such a manner as to be capable of transforming the existing reality and incompatibilities between the warring groups and of eliminating destruction and violence in societies.

In *Fredens diplomater: Nordisk medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari* (“*Diplomats of Peace: Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari*”, translation of the author), it is argued that understanding peace efforts and experiences of the Nordic mediators, which often took place in difficult or ostensibly hopeless contexts, might be important to deepen theoretical and practical understanding about

mediation.¹⁷ Therefore, engaging with Nordic peace mediation and facilitation might be effective to learn lessons and to benefit from their experiences.

As reflecting Nordic identity, there will be an emphasis on Nordic peace research institutes and centers. In this context, Nordic institutes and centers will be limited to the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC); PRIO; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), which epitomize geographical and interdisciplinary cooperation in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy. The importance of the PRIO will be demonstrated not only for the construction of Nordic identity but also for the case of Cyprus in relation to the dialogue facilitation of the institute. Hence, the role of PCC will be illustrative of the link between Nordic identity and Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.

Further to this, Nordic scholars and practitioners, who have remarkably contributed to the development of peace research and who have notably been affiliated with the establishment of the Nordic peace research institutes and centers, will also be emphasized. Hence, both individual- and institutional-oriented contributions of the Nordic countries will be demonstrated. Such contributions will affirm the reflections of Nordic identity, which will be brought together as we approach the conclusion.

Taken together, the motivation of this Thesis is to broaden the literature and practices of peace mediation and facilitation by benefiting from Nordic diplomatic abilities. In this context, this study might be seen as a modest departure from the dominant orientations and mindsets that have affected the literature and as an attempt to combine the joint effects of the third-party roles of the Nordic countries into a comprehensive framework. In line with this motivation, it is necessary to investigate and to re-visit the exceptionalism of Nordic countries in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

To such ends, this Thesis is divided into three parts. In the first chapter of the first part, the development of peace mediation and facilitation, as instruments of Nordic peace diplomacy, will be elaborated. In this process, the focus will be directed to the underpinnings and precepts of peace mediation and facilitation. The approaches to peace mediation and facilitation will be analyzed in terms of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented classifications. Adding to this, the prerequisites and

¹⁷ Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk Medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari** (“**Diplomats of Peace: Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari**”), Stockholm : Santérus Förlag, 2016, p. 12.; The original text in Swedish.

techniques of peace mediation and facilitation will be discussed. Some of these techniques will also be observable within the brief historical background of the selected cases. The essence of these discussions will be more meaningful in engaging with the commencement and undertaking of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation upon the cases. Also, the roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators will be included so that we can comprehend the achievements and failures of third-parties.

Following that, this Thesis will focus on human needs theory and large-group identity with the objective of applying their relevant insights in the functioning and outcomes of Nordic peace diplomacy. In engaging with the phases of cases, the success of Nordic peace diplomacy will be assessed, including whether human needs are addressed and accommodated, along with other short- and long-term indicators. In the second chapter of this part, the underlying explanations and motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy will be explained. It will be emphasized how the development of Nordic peace diplomacy has been shaped by the configurations of these underlying explanations. As a result, the reasons that have affected the prominent role of Nordic countries will be understood before introducing the general dataset in the field of peace and conflict resolution. In addition, the motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy will focus on identity construction and international influence among other stimuli.

In the second part of the Thesis, a general dataset associated with peaceful efforts and engagements of the Nordic countries will be introduced in its first chapter. These efforts and engagements will be approached through process-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation. As a result, the reasons that have contributed to the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries will be further enhanced. Hence, general dataset will be complementary with process-oriented emphasis on mediation, and underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy. In the second chapter of this part, the background of conflicts in the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka, and Nordic peace mediation and facilitation experiences in the selected phases of these cases will be explained and analyzed. Hence, there will be a flow from general to a particular framework with the prioritization of these cases. The background of conflicts in the cases of Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka will also entail the Nordic connection related to peace and conflict resolution efforts in brief.

The last part of the Thesis will commence with the assessment of the overall effects and performance of Nordic countries in the selected phases of cases. Following

that, the strengths, weaknesses, and characteristics of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be brought together. In this context, a particular dataset associated with Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices, which stem from third-party experiences in the selected phases and from utilized techniques in retrospect, will be introduced. This dataset will be useful in analyzing the distinctiveness of Nordic countries through process, outcome, and transformation-oriented approaches. As a result, Nordic peace diplomacy will be able to be approached from a comparative perspective. With the benefits of this comparison, the analysis of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be strengthened.

The second chapter of this part will be devoted to hallmarks and typologies of Nordic peace diplomacy and dimensions of Nordic identity. In this regard, the hallmarks and typologies that stem from third-party roles of the Nordic countries will be explained. Also, there will be an emphasis on how these hallmarks and typologies were materialized in the phases of cases. Following that, tangible and less tangible dimensions of Nordic identity will be elaborated. As a result, it will be understood how the dimensions of Nordic identity have affected the evolution of Nordic peace diplomacy and the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries.

Taken together, the Nordic identity will be identified with regard to hallmarks and typologies that stem from their narratives and third-party roles; multilateralism as observable through a general dataset; the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries in global reality; the effects of political conjunctures associated with Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods; and Nordic peace research institutes and centers, along with the role of Nordic pioneers. These dimensions will be affirmative of the underlying explanations for Nordic peace diplomacy as well. Importantly, the emphasis on Nordic multilateralism and the political conjunctures will be critical in avoiding an isolated Nordic framework.

In the third and last chapter of this part, the prominent role of the Nordic countries related to the field of peace and conflict resolution will be linked to their theoretical contributions in the field; being considered as small states in the world politics, and the framework of the security community. By providing a glimpse of the expertise and guidance of Nordic countries in peace research and conflict resolution, the readers will be able to appreciate how the theoretical and applied knowledge of the Nordic countries promoted the development of Nordic peace diplomacy and the

institutionalization of peace research and conflict resolution. In this context, the objectives of peace research and conflict resolution will also be briefly included.

In conclusion, the potential of Nordic countries in developing a dignified and distinctive peace and conflict resolution model will be discussed. Obtained from the findings of the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, the Nordic understanding towards peace, protracted conflicts, and the third-party efforts will be identified. In this context, concerns over a shift from peace diplomacy to security diplomacy will also be provided with regard to internal and external conditions and recent developments. Hence, the challenges that require addressing and overcoming will be elaborated. Overall, the discussions and findings of this Thesis will be directed towards the improvement of Nordic peace diplomacy and the field of peace and conflict resolution.



PART I - THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE MEDIATION AND FACILITATION AND NORDIC PEACE DIPLOMACY

António Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN, describes mediation and conflict prevention as two of the most important tools for the reduction of human suffering while referencing conflict- and violence-affected states and Chapter VI of the UN Charter. *Guterres* denotes that broader political efforts and greater unity are necessary for the effectiveness of mediation and conflict prevention.¹⁸

Despite the increasing use, importance, and offerings of mediation both in the spheres of human interactions and IR, there are disagreements regarding the constituting elements, affecting conditions, and contexts that surround the efficiency and performance of mediation. The offerings of mediation can be important and practical due to its essential characteristics in terms of independence, sovereignty, and freedom of choice. Nevertheless, there are confusions and little consensus concerning mediation in the literature.¹⁹

Such confusions have especially been observable in protracted social conflicts. Progression oriented at settling protracted and violent social conflicts usually takes forms in terms of direct and interparty negotiations and the introduction of a third-party as a go-between, facilitator, or mediator. However, there have been confusions concerning the meanings of mediation and precise activities in violent and protracted conflicts, which refer to conflicts between communities or ethnicities within the boundaries of national states. Consequently, precise and systematic knowledge about mediation has relatively been scarce in protracted social conflicts compared to other

¹⁸ António Guterres, “Remarks at Security Council Meeting on Conflict Prevention and Mediation”, Speech at the United Nations Security Council Meeting, New York, 12 June 2019, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-06-12/conflict-prevention-and-mediation-remarks-security-council> (accessed 12.09.2022).; For the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, titled as the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, please see: **Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice**, United Nations Treaty Collection, San Francisco : United Nations, 1945, Article 33-38, pp. 8-9, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf> (accessed 12.09.2022).

¹⁹ Jacob Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations”, in Jacob Bercovitch, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Eds.), **Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1992, pp. 1-2.

fields of mediation.²⁰ This negligence requires unveiling the practices of peace mediation and facilitation, which have been utilized in protracted cases.

Magnus Lundgren and *Isak Svensson* reveal how mediation practices have declined despite the mobilization of infrastructures as supportive for conflict mediation and increased capacity. In their study, dated 2020, it is argued that conflict mediation practices have decreased due to the increase of the Islamist armed conflicts that led to the prioritization of stability and counter-terrorism compared to conflict resolution.²¹ Drawing from this finding, the dynamic undertaking of peace mediation and facilitation can be considered as challenging against such cases that entail Islamist conflicts.

Nevertheless, this challenge does not indicate that characteristics of peace mediation, which has a significance not only in the context of world politics but also in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy, offer critical and relevant insights when formulated and assessed through comprehensive approaches. In relation to inadequate knowledge about these third-party practices in protracted cases and significant contributions of the Nordic countries, it is important to trace the development and relevance of peace mediation and facilitation and the underpinnings of Nordic peace diplomacy, respectively.

Chapter I - The formulation and utilization of peace mediation and facilitation in conflicts and controversial issues characterized by protractedness

In this chapter, the correspondence of peace mediation and facilitation to protracted conflicts and controversial issues will be explained through relevant concepts, methods, and the contributions of Nordic countries. Accordingly, conceptual approaches will be limited to process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses to mediation, human needs theory, and large-group identity. Methods will entail the prerequisites and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation. In addition, the qualities of peace mediators and facilitators will be identified in understanding the planning and mission of peace mediation and facilitation.

In this Thesis, the nomenclature of the terms peace mediation and facilitation will be grounded in the limitations of mediation and facilitation for protracted conflicts and controversial issues, in the reflections of peace research, and in the realm of peace

²⁰ Christopher Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts", in John Darby, and Roger Mac Ginty (Eds.), **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-war Reconstruction**, Second Edition, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 94.

²¹ Magnus Lundgren, and Isak Svensson, "The Surprising Decline of International Mediation in Armed Conflicts", **Research & Politics**, Vol. 7, No. 2, April-June 2020, doi:10.1177/2053168020917243.

diplomacy. Accordingly, the usage of the terms peace mediation and facilitation can be encouraging in transcending management and settlement problems-oriented implications of mediation as explained by *John Wear Burton*. In this context, it is demonstrated that conflicts need to be approached as different from management problems and disputes.²² As reflecting this consideration and the variety regarding executed areas of mediation and facilitation, these third-party practices encompass requirements for distinctive treatment of conflicts and the achievement of peace as an eventual purpose.

Peace mediation and its different forms, including peace facilitation, can be considered appropriate for the peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts and controversial issues. However, these third-party practices can also become protracted peace processes.²³ The fact that peaceful initiatives in protracted conflicts and controversial issues can contribute to protractedness requires proceeding with cautious considerations as capable of challenging adverse and paradoxical effects of third-party involvements. This is why this Thesis is in the conviction that a model related to improvement of peace mediation and facilitation is necessary.

It is evident that peace mediation can be used interchangeably with mediation.²⁴ Nevertheless, this Thesis prioritizes the term peace mediation and its components, including peace facilitation, over the term mediation in analyzing peaceful initiatives that took place in protracted cases and in emphasizing interconnected instruments of peace and conflict resolution. The usage of peace mediation and facilitation can be beneficial for the convergence of the practices of peace mediation and facilitation and for the achievement of peace, which requires the transformation of attitudes and mindsets of warring parties. Also, this preference has been considered as important in tackling conceptual ambiguities and criticisms directed to the framing of mediation and its efficiency, which will be explained in the following section of this part.

Of critical importance is that the terms peace mediation and peace facilitation have been utilized to develop a more comprehensive understanding while embracing approaches grounded in process, outcome, and conflict transformation, also named as

²² See: John Wear Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement, and Resolution**, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1990.

²³ For example, see: Joana Ricarte, **The Impact of Protracted Peace Processes on Identities in Conflict: The Case of Israel and Palestine**, Palgrave Macmillan Cham, 2023.

²⁴ For particular examples, see: Lehti, and Saarinen, "Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts: A Survey...", p. 18.; Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, "Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 51, No. 2, Anniversary Special No., March 2014, pp. 315-327.

“Transcendence”²⁵ through the inclusion of a peace research agenda. Hence, peace mediation and facilitation have been preferred in promoting such approaches under the guidance of peace research that will also be explained in relation to contributions of the Nordic countries in this Thesis.

Further to this, this Thesis also places mediation and facilitation into the sphere of international peace diplomacy by utilizing Nordic peace mediation and facilitation experiences. Accordingly, this Thesis links peace mediation and facilitation practices of Nordic countries with Nordic peace diplomacy that has affected phases of protracted conflicts. Actually, the utilization of mediation in the sphere of peace diplomacy dates back to the year of 1948, in which Swedish Diplomat *Folke Bernadotte* was appointed as the UN mediator in Palestine. Since then, peace mediation has been an important component of international peace diplomacy.²⁶ For this reason, this Thesis will look into process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches that account for peace mediation and facilitation in varying degrees. Following that, the constituting elements of Nordic peace diplomacy will be elaborated.

Section I - Studying peace mediation and facilitation in the context of peace diplomacy: Process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches

Mediation can be utilized for various conflicts and controversial issues. With its ad hoc basis, voluntary nature, and non-binding characteristics, the responses of mediation have been relevant and useful towards the problems that stem from ethnic, regional, and global conflicts in the international arena. As a complex and dynamic social process, mediation encompasses disputing parties, social environment, context, the dispute or the problem between the parties, and a mediating agent, each of which is ultimately capable of affecting the success or failure of mediation.²⁷

As one of the voluntary procedures of third-party forms of conflict management, mediation is suitable for the realities of IR and the international system. In this process,

²⁵ For more information about peaceful conflict transformation, namely Transcend-oriented approach, see: Johan Galtung, “Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation – the TRANSCEND Approach”, in Charles Webel, and Johan Galtung (Eds.), **Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies**, London and New York : Routledge, 2007, pp. 14-32.; From another perspective, dialogic approach has also been formulated in emphasizing the role of dialogue for a transformative approach and greater inclusivity in the peace processes. See: Marko Lehti, **The Era of Private Peacemakers: A New Dialogic Approach to Mediation**, Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 6.; It will be revealed that this link between dialogue and a transformative approach is reflected through the contributions of PRIO Cyprus Centre in the case of Cyprus.

²⁶ Marko Lehti, **The Era of Private Peacemakers: A New Dialogic Approach to Mediation**, Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 2.

²⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation: Selected Essays**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, pp. 36-37.

assistance and facilitation, which are not reliant on judicial or coercive techniques, can be utilized. Mediation encompasses a wide range of third-party activities as acceptable by the parties for the abatement, settlement, or resolution of disputes. With its flexible and non-binding characteristics and autonomous decision-making processes, mediation dissuades the parties as adversaries refraining from exercising force or appealing to authoritative rules.²⁸

Facilitation has been a critical element and technique for the functioning of mediation. The reason is that mediators can facilitate mutual understanding while enhancing communication and proposing solutions between the parties. In relation to the modification of physical, situational, and structural constraints, the introduction of alternative solutions, the manipulation of goals-perceptions, and the promotion of motivation, mediators also play an important role in the arrival of a particular outcome or an agreement. As a result, they affect bargaining and negotiation processes.²⁹ Hence, facilitation can be considered as a means of mediation along with the utilization of information, communication, interpretation, and reward and punishment-oriented approaches. It is also stressed that mediation should not be seen as an altruistic initiative.³⁰ Importantly, interpretation reveals the creative functioning of peace mediation.

From this point on, the injection of facilitation into third-party practices entails the encouragement of motivation and the improvement of communication. With a facilitative third-party role, one can focus on the exploration and creative problem-solving processes rather than the arrival of a settlement. Facilitation associated with mediation can be considered as more suitable when the purpose of intervention is directed to reach an agreement wherein most of the issues have already been identified and discussed. Further to this, a more supportive relationship between the facilitator and the antagonistic participants can be established with the entry of the consultant. This process can be important for confrontation.³¹ Hence, facilitator and/or consultant

²⁸ Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation, Feb. 1991, pp. 3-4.

²⁹ Jacob Bercovitch, "A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan. 1986, p. 62.

³⁰ Jacob Bercovitch, "Introduction: Thinking about Mediation", in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), **Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation**, London, Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p. 9.

³¹ Ronald J. Fisher, "Third-party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict", **Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, pp. 77-78.

roles can be specified in connection with the particular objectives of third-party practices.

It is possible to state that peace mediation and facilitation are the most commonly applied instruments in the field of peace and conflict resolution. For this reason, it is important to address their characteristics and tasks of third-parties through different explanations and approaches. According to I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, mediation can be defined as “*a form of third-party intervention in a conflict with the stated purpose of contributing to its abatement or resolution through negotiation*”.³² Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad consider mediation as “*a matter of influence*”.³³ Mediation has also been approached from the lenses of contingency, or reciprocal interactions that stem from conflict management.³⁴ Of equal importance is that the influence of mediation has also been reciprocal. This is why the mediators and their relations with the parties are of the utmost importance as well.³⁵ These general and particular approaches, and their reflections, will be explained and described before engaging with the three-folded framework assigned to peace mediation and facilitation.

a. What is peace mediation and facilitation?

In essence, mediation indicates the intervention of intermediaries with the purpose of the facilitation of a negotiated settlement.³⁶ In this process, states, organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can take part as mediators. As a result of the variety of actors and parties, it would be appropriate to describe mediation as “*a crowded field*”.³⁷ The functioning of mediation, as a non-binding third-party intervention, has been oriented at managing conflicts and disputes. Mediation, as a non-binding conflict and dispute management mechanism, involves diverse actors and parties, including international, regional, and intergovernmental

³² I. William Zartman, and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics”, **Journal of Social Issues**, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1985, p. 31.

³³ Peter J. Carnevale, and Sharon Arad, “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation”, in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), **Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation**, London, Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p. 39.

³⁴ Bercovitch, “Introduction: Thinking about Mediation”, p. 9.

³⁵ Bercovitch, “International Mediation”, p. 6.

³⁶ Ronald J. Fisher, and Lorelei Keashly, “Third-party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution”, in Ronald J. Fisher, **The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution**, New York : Springer, 1990, p. 212.

³⁷ David Lanz, and Rachel Gasser, “A Crowded Field: Competition and Coordination in International Peace Mediation”, **Centre for Mediation in Africa, University of Pretoria**, Mediation Arguments No. 2, February 2013, p. 1.

organizations, states, individuals, and diplomatic initiatives.³⁸ As a result, peace mediation has been witnessing growing competition between a wide range of actors.³⁹

Intermediaries and mediators aim to facilitate the settlement of critical issues between the parties.⁴⁰ In this process, they offer a wide range of solutions. However, third-parties are not granted power over the decision-making processes of the parties.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the objectives of mediation entail efforts for the generation of influence upon the actions and perceptions of the parties and of an acceptable outcome through triadic interactions. These interactions and the role of mediation take form with regard to particular contexts and circumstances surrounding conflicts and disputes.⁴² As reflecting the objectives of mediation, Jacob Bercovitch defines mediation in the following passage:⁴³

“(...) a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own efforts, where the disputing parties or their representatives seek the assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perceptions or behavior, without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law”.

As explained, mediation has been critical in contributing to the efficiency of conflict management.⁴⁴ Also, mediation can be regarded as a form of conflict

³⁸ Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, pp. 7-8.

³⁹ David Lanz, Martin Wählisch, Lars Kirchhoff, and Matthias Siegfried, “Evaluating Peace Mediation”, **The Initiative for Peacebuilding (IFP) Mediation Cluster, The Swiss Peace Foundation, The Center for Peace Mediation, The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)**, November 2008, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Oran R. Young, “Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third-parties”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 16, No. 1, Mar. 1972, p. 52.

⁴¹ Stephen LaTour, Pauline Houlden, Laurens Walker, and John Thibaut, “Some Determinants of Preference for Modes of Conflict Resolution”, **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 20, No. 2, Jun., 1976, p. 320.

⁴² Bercovitch, “International Mediation”, pp. 3-4.

⁴³ Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation...”, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice”, in I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds.), **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques**, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 127.; For another study that frames mediation in terms of conflict management and resolution approaches, see: Christopher W. Moore, **The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict**, San Francisco : Jossey-Bass, 1986.

resolution through a third-party whose role is to create peace and to facilitate an agreement between warring parties.⁴⁵ Simply put, there have been both conflict management and conflict resolution-oriented lenses in engaging with the functionality of mediation. There have also been other conceptualizations that affected conceptual lenses towards mediation.

Accordingly, mediation has been regarded as a tactic of conflict settlement that has been considered as a technique of conflict management. Primarily, the operation of settlement has been characterized at a behavioural level. With the effects of sophisticated settlement techniques, the purpose is oriented at changing the beliefs and views of the adversaries.⁴⁶ The techniques and dimensions of peace mediation and facilitation should be able to influence the mindsets and perceptions of the parties regardless of the preferred conceptualizations. Such remarks affirm that change has been at the core of the task of peace mediation and facilitation.

In this process, one can detect certain traits of peace mediation and facilitation, including abatement, settlement or resolution of dispute, the proposal of solutions, facilitation of understanding and communication between the warring parties, the modification of constraints, and having an influence upon actions and perceptions. In this way, third-parties contribute to the development of positive and new interactions between the warring parties.

However, such certain traits need to be formulated with regard to particular context and the underlying causes of conflicts. This is why mediation is impinged by the context and characteristics of conflicts.⁴⁷ In addition to contextual and conflict-specific considerations, the rich and varied history; plentiful references; and different areas of mediation, ranging from group conflicts, neighborhood, and personal conflicts to organizational, environmental, and policy fields, can be linked to diverse

⁴⁵ Deiniol Lloyd Jones, "Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 26, No. 4, Oct., 2000, p. 648.

⁴⁶ Christopher Roger Mitchell, **The Structure of International Conflict**, New York : St. Martin's Press, 1981, pp. 277-278.; Mediation has also been described as a conflict handling approach. For example, see: Friedrich Glasl, "The Process of Conflict Escalation and Roles of Third-parties", in Gerard B. J. Bomers, and Richard B. Peterson (Eds.), **Conflict Management and Industrial Relations**, Dordrecht : Springer, 1982, pp. 119-140.

⁴⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, and Allison Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence", in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), **Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation**, London, Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p. 15.; The context and process-oriented emphasis is also referred to as the contingency approach. See: Bercovitch, and Houston, "Study of International Mediation: Theoretical...", pp. 15-16.; This particular-case-oriented approach has also been referred to as the historical tradition in the study of mediation. See: Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1986, p. 157.

understanding and minimal definitional consensus for mediation.⁴⁸ The diversity and minimal consensus have also been accompanied by controversies over time.

From the perspective of *John Burton*, for example, mediation cannot be considered as appropriate in tackling the underlying roots of conflict when approached through conflict management mechanisms. As understood, there is a difference between conflict resolution and conflict management in which the latter has not been oriented at addressing the underlying roots of conflict.⁴⁹

Ronald J. Fisher and *Loraleigh Keashly* contend that it is actually consultation, also known as the problem-solving approach, that attempts to confront the underlying roots of the conflict. The purpose of consultation is oriented at facilitating problem-solving through communication and scientific analysis and knowledge of the conflict while improving relationships between the parties. As a result, it is more likely that substantive issues can be settled through consultation.⁵⁰

According to *Burton*, the reason for the utilization of mediation in the processes of conflict resolution can be explained in terms of the negligence pertaining to linguistic separation between conflicts and disputes. As a result, *Burton* contends, dispute handling techniques, including judicial procedures, arbitration, and all forms of mediation, have been used for conflict resolution.⁵¹ Within the frameworks of conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict settlement, and dispute handling techniques, mediation has been used in various conflicts and controversial issues, including protracted cases.

Mediation under the auspices of a conflict management framework does not indicate the isolation of mediation from deep-rooted conflicts and controversial issues. According to *Bercovitch*, enduring conflicts cannot be disconnected from the efforts

⁴⁸ Bercovitch, "Introduction: Thinking about Mediation", p. 2.

⁴⁹ John Burton, "The Theory of Conflict Resolution", *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1986, p. 125.

⁵⁰ Fisher, and Keashly, "Third-party Consultation as a Method of...", p. 212.; In the following chapter, consultation or facilitation has also been defined in terms of the promotion of conflict resolution and the transformation of relations between the parties. This diagnostic and inclusive practice is in contrast to the third-party mediation due to its objective related to conflict resolution. See: Mark Hoffman, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in John Baylis, and Nicholas J. Rengger (Eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, Oxford : Clarendon Press; New York : Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 270-271.; Since this Thesis combines peace mediation and facilitation, and embraces a broader view of peace, addressing the underlying roots of the conflict by the processes of consultation and problem-solving approach is considered as one of the processes and prominent purposes of peace mediation and facilitation within the scope of this Thesis.

⁵¹ John Wear Burton, *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement, and Resolution*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan, 1990, pp. 1-2, 8.

for conflict management. Rather, different characteristics and types of conflicts reveal different degrees of amenability with regard to conflict management strategies. Despite generic principles as guidelines grounded in the transition from war to peace, different conflict management approaches can be required for different conflicts. Therefore, *Bercovitch* contends that third-party interventions of conflict management are actually more appropriate for such conflicts with endurance, longevity, and seriousness; the reluctance of the disputants for direct negotiations, and the disinclination of disputants for direct communication.⁵²

Bercovitch explains that mediation practices can be considered as the continuation of conflict management efforts by the parties; the intervention of a third-party as non-coercive, and the purpose oriented at influencing or resolving conflicts. On the other hand, mediation processes can be characterized by the intertwining of the interests of the parties and mediators and the overall interest to provide a change in the course of the conflict.⁵³ Hence, mediation can be pursued for ambitious objectives linking the generation of an influence with resolution of conflicts. Also, the evaluation of mediation as the continuation of conflict management does not necessarily disregard conflict resolution. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of such conceptual convergences and divergences in a detailed way. Failure to be aware of different ideas can obstruct our understanding in enriching the functioning of mediation.

As a warning, *Burton* argues that power bargaining and mediation can probably be responsible for the protracted course of some conflicts since they often avoid the underlying issues and result in temporary settlements.⁵⁴ This can be detrimental given the effects of peace processes with a protracted course in terms of the reinforcement of “dehumanization”, which is one side of the coin, along with the promotion of reconciliation that is peace-less in character, namely “peace-less reconciliation”. Dehumanization and normalization of violence are reflections of othering processes in

⁵² Bercovitch, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation...*, pp. 135-136.; In a study, dated 2020, it is revealed that the rise of fragmentation, protractedness, internationalization of civil conflict, and different regional distribution of mediation capabilities cannot be accountable for the decline in mediation. See: Lundgren, and Svensson, “The Surprising Decline of International...”, para. 5.; This finding disrupts explanations as linking the decline in peace mediation and facilitation with the increase in protracted conflicts. However, it does not indicate that protracted conflicts are suitable for peace mediation and facilitation. Given the concerns and doubts, it is important to formulate the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation, as aligning with general and particular dimensions of protracted conflicts. Thus, we can contribute to the resolution of protracted conflicts through these practices, as they are still being utilized.

⁵³ Bercovitch, “Introduction: Thinking about Mediation”, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Burton, “Theory of Conflict Resolution”, p. 129.

protracted cases. The threats associated with dehumanization and violence are especially observable when protracted peace processes fail to address issues about identity.⁵⁵ Hence, this Thesis takes identity as one of the prominent reasons behind the emergence of protracted cases and behind the improvement of peace mediation and facilitation framework.

Drawing from these remarks, identity-related issues can be considered especially critical given the threats resulting from the protracted nature of conflicts and protracted peace processes. For this reason, peace mediation and facilitation practices need to be formulated in such a manner that does not avoid underlying causes and does not exclude complex dynamics as exemplified by the interactions between dehumanization and peace-less reconciliation. In essence, mediation in identity-related conflicts aims to reduce the intensity of the conflict. Also, inhibiting the escalation of conflicts is considered. The approaches towards mediation in identity conflicts can be classified in terms of rationalist, contingent, structuralist, and social-psychological understandings that have already dominated the field of mediation.⁵⁶ In brief, the insights of such approaches will be explained. Following that, it will be demonstrated why process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses have been formulated and preferred rather than these approaches.

From a rationalist perspective, it is argued that the scope of mediation is primarily concerned with strategic interactions marked by competition and cooperation, which are not affiliated to their extreme levels between the original parties. Hence, both pure conflict and pure cooperation, as extreme interactions, do not fall into the functioning of mediation activities. The reason is that the former indicates a challenging and impracticable process with few exceptions, while the latter can even disregard the need for a mediator. This is why mediation is quite a complex process. Accordingly, the functioning of mediation is affected by the extent of the possible settlements as preferable compared to the options of no agreement or the perpetuation of the conflict by the parties. As a result, the rationalist perspective elaborates the cases and conditions under which the parties would prefer to accept an

⁵⁵ Ricarte, **Impact of Protracted Peace...**, pp. 9, 13-14.

⁵⁶ Joshua Lerner Smilovitz, "Mediation and Identity Conflicts", in I. William Zartman, Mark Anstey, and Paul Meerts (Eds.), **The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder**, New York : Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 195-196.; Social-psychological approaches will be exemplified in the following section of the Thesis.

agreement in relation to gains.⁵⁷ It can be stated that this approach can neglect irrational attitudes while putting an emphasis on the content of preferred solutions rather than emotions and interactions as surrounding the parties.⁵⁸

The contingency approach examines the successfulness of mediation in terms of context and process-oriented variables. This approach has been formulated due to the inadequacy of ideographic/descriptive and normative approaches in the field of mediation. In this context, the ideographic/descriptive approach contends that meditation behaviours, kinds, and outcomes cannot be generalized since all of the cases subject to mediation are different. The normative approach contends that all of the obstacles to the achievement of a settlement can be removed since there is no such dispute that is too intractable. This approach is concerned with perception, communication, and experience. In response to this, the contingency approach determines the variables and attributes for the efficiency of mediation.⁵⁹

Within this reactive framework, conflicting parties, the nature of the specific issues surrounding the conflict, the character and identity of mediators, and the social environment affect the outcomes of mediation.⁶⁰ In this way, this approach allows us to focus on one or multiple cases as being subject to the utilization of mediation. In this process, there is an emphasis on the rank and identity of mediators, the relationship between mediators and the warring parties, and the prior mediation efforts along with

⁵⁷ Young, "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on...", pp. 52-54.; In addition to the extent of the contract zone, the presence of alternative effective techniques and mechanisms can affect the necessity of mediation activities and the termination of strategic interactions. See: Young, , "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on...", pp. 53-55.; Cost-benefit-oriented considerations can be utilized in understanding the motivations of the warring parties, and the mediators. See: Zartman, and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution...", pp. 32-37.

⁵⁸ For a detailed analysis of the reasons and strategies, including the analysis of costs and benefits that affects decisions for the conflict termination and peace-making, see: Mitchell, **Structure of International Conflict**, Part III, Chapter 8.; As regards for irrationality, parties can choose to continue the fighting because of tremendous costs and losses. In order to justify and reward the sacrifices made, parties can carry on fighting. This decision has been explained as part of "The Entrapment Model". Christopher Mitchell, "The Right Moment: Notes on Four Models of 'Ripeness'", **Paradigms**, Vol. 9, No. 2, Winter 1995, p. 42.; This is why, rationalist approaches can be linked to structural approaches in terms of ripeness, which will be explained as part of structuralism. For the restrictions of rationalist approaches in brief, see also: Smilovitz, "Mediation and Identity Conflicts", p. 196.

⁵⁹ Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical...", pp. 8-9.; For the utilization of the contingency approach with the identification of context and process-oriented variables, see: Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical...", pp. 9-17.; The context, process, and outcome refer to the characteristics of the parties, disputes, mediators, or outcomes. Accordingly, the outcome of mediation indicates the resultant of context and process-oriented variables. See: Jacob Bercovitch, and Allison Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behavior on the Success of Mediation in International Relations", **The International Journal of Conflict Management**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1993, p. 299.

⁶⁰ Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation...**, pp. 6-9.

the mediation strategies. All of these identified variables determine the outcome of mediation in terms of its failure or its successfulness.⁶¹

According to *Joshua Lerner Smilovitz*, the rationalist approach⁶² is too restrictive and capable of neglecting the greater community since it is concerned with particular cases. The contingency approach is also inadequate on the grounds of the absence of clarity regarding exclusively necessary components or standards for mediation in identity-related conflicts.⁶³ As reflecting another discernible understanding, structural approaches have been comprehended in terms of ripe moments that indicate an opportunity for the management and resolution of conflicts. Importantly, seizing and creating ripe moments need to be supported with an understanding towards the interests of the parties. Following that, these interests and issues need to be formulated into a common understanding. In this process, it is important to reflect a solution in the form of an agreement with no disregard for the notion of justice and a guideline for its implementation. As regards justice, a formula can encapsulate the problem itself.⁶⁴

From another perspective, the approaches towards mediation can be classified in terms of mediation with much power or muscle and mediation with little or no power.⁶⁵ Examples also include power-politics and facilitation-oriented approaches;⁶⁶ pure mediators with no inclusion of material resources, and powerful mediators,⁶⁷ or trust mediators, with the aim to elucidate confusions and misunderstandings, and resource-based mediators, who bring positive or negative incentives for the momentum of the peace process.⁶⁸ These classifications reveal multiple roles for peace mediators and facilitators.

⁶¹ Jacob Bercovitch, and Allison Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behavior on the Success of Mediation in International Relations", **The International Journal of Conflict Management**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1993, p. 300.

⁶² For more information about the rationalist approach, along with its examples, and reflections in the literature, see: Peter Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, Third Edition, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington D.C. : SAGE Publications, 2012, pp. 44-49.

⁶³ Smilovitz, "Mediation and Identity Conflicts", p. 196.

⁶⁴ I. William Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation", in Diane B. Bendahmane, and John W. McDonald, Jr. (Eds.), **Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations**, Washington, D.C. : Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1986, pp. 205-206. For more information about structural approaches, see: Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, pp. 295-296.

⁶⁵ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, pp. 292-293.

⁶⁶ Jones, "Mediation, Conflict Resolution and...", p. 647.

⁶⁷ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts**, Second Edition, Cambridge, Malden : Polity Press, 2005, pp. 18-21.

⁶⁸ Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation...**, pp. 7-8.

In peace processes and third-party activities, all of these approaches and mechanisms can be synthesized to a varying extent for conflicts and controversial issues characterized by protractedness. However, adverse effects can stem from peace processes that have been part of protractedness. As a result, peace mediation and facilitation techniques need to correspond to challenges and threats, especially in protracted conflicts with identity dynamics. Accordingly, the dimensions of protracted peace processes can be illustrated in the following table:

Table 1.1: Protracted peace processes.⁶⁹

<i>Time Dimensions</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Activities/goals</i>	<i>Consequences</i>
Past is only dealt with after formal peace	Fail to address root causes of conflicts	Reconciliation as the end of the road instead of an everyday process	Maintains and can even increase mistrust
Present is dealt with in an action/reaction manner	Concentrates on present manifestations of conflict	Peacebuilding-like actions Humanitarian relief	Deals with social injustice, but not in a structural manner Normalizes conflict
Future for latter.	Minimalistic approach to peace	End direct violence through negotiated agreements	Lack of consideration Disregard for past/history/memory

It can be seen that failure to address the underlying causes can cause protracted peace processes. This Thesis reaffirms that low-level consensus and high-level controversial thoughts are embedded in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Taking such explanations and illustrations into consideration, this Thesis suggests to evaluate peace mediation and facilitation through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses while reflecting on human needs theory and the implications of large-group identity. Such alignment and combination have been oriented at rectifying challenges related to traits of protracted peace processes and

⁶⁹ Ricarte, *Impact of Protracted Peace...*, p. 42.

restrictive understanding of mediation. This suggestion can be considered as compatible in formulating and utilizing peace mediation and facilitation techniques for protracted cases and in addressing various challenges.

In the realm of traditional mediation, there has been an emphasis on process, outcome, or transformative approaches. Therefore, utilizing different strategies was necessary.⁷⁰ As adopting and deepening this classification, this Thesis will examine peace mediation and facilitation through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches in order to assess third-party experiences of the Nordic countries in the phases of selected cases.

This examination will be relevant in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy. The content of these approaches will be pieced together in the following sub-sections. Social-psychological approaches, on the other hand, will be included in the following section of this Thesis, albeit with limitations. Linking such approaches within the scope of peace mediation and facilitation, one can deepen peace mediation and facilitation techniques while benefiting from salient social-psychological dimensions.

b. Peace mediation and facilitation as a process

Firstly, evaluation of peace mediation and facilitation as a process does not indicate the isolation of process-oriented achievements from outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented processes. In a document, titled as “Peace Mediation: Finland’s Guidelines”, peace mediation has been evaluated as the first step for the achievement of reconciliation. It is further affirmed that peace mediation is capable of affecting the deep-roots of conflicts while contributing to the creation of political, economic, and social institutions in the long-term.⁷¹ This explanation links peace mediation with reconciliation and the creation of various institutions. For this reason, approaching third-party activities through process-oriented lenses cannot be isolated from outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

⁷⁰ Horowitz, “Mediation”, p. 57.; For a glimpse of the different strategies, and typologies of mediation, the following article is recommended: Jacob Bercovitch, and Richard Wells, “Evaluating Mediation Strategies: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”, *Peace & Change*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 5-9. For a detailed understanding, see also: S. Touval, and I. William Zartman (Eds.), *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1985.

⁷¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Peace Mediation-Finland’s Guidelines*, Helsinki, Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010, p. 8, https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/peace_mediation_finland_s_guidelines/1c0f591c-184c-9fc3-e9b2-38be8af0e1d1?t=1525860146706 (accessed 14.05.2023).

Process-oriented achievements might not necessarily lead to comprehensive achievements in terms of outcome and conflict transformation. The applicability of process-oriented approaches does not ensure success in terms of conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Nevertheless, discerning the underpinnings and indicators of process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation is important since it constitutes the fundamentals of such third-party activities while explaining the endurance of the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries. Understanding process-oriented lenses will also be informative since a process-oriented framework holds value against confusions associated with the efficiency of third-party practices.

Mediation has been marked by the fundamental philosophy oriented at bringing parties together and cooperating with warring parties. The aim is finding a solution as acceptable to the parties and as capable of resolving conflict.⁷² To that end, bringing conflicting parties together and triadic cooperation can be considered achievements in the context of a process-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation. In this capacity, mediators encourage conditions as capable of delivering a settlement. With this in mind, mediators arrange meetings or maintain a distance between the parties while organizing settings that allow discussions between the parties and producing information with the objective to promote informed decision-making for the parties.⁷³ All of these activities reveal the successfulness of peace mediation and facilitation in terms of process-oriented lenses.

Process-oriented mediation is also concerned with dialogue facilitation.⁷⁴ Hence, arranging meetings or providing indirect contact depending on the conditions surrounding the warring parties, assistance for the exchange of ideas, and promotion for informed decision-making, along with the dialogue facilitation, account for the underpinnings and indicators of process-oriented approaches. Put differently, such third-party efforts and initiatives demonstrate the efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation.

Mediation indicates an intervention, which is acceptable by the adversaries and a diplomatic cooperation between the adversaries and the intervenor. Mediation, as a

⁷² Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen, and Carl G. Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation: Towards More Holistic Approaches to Peacebuilding and Peace Actor Empowerment", in Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen, and Finn Tschudi, **Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND**, London, Quicksilver Drive, Sterling : Pluto Press, 2000, p. 233.

⁷³ Jacob Bercovitch, and Judith Fretter, **Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003**, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C. : CQ Press, 2004, p. 17.

⁷⁴ Horowitz, "Mediation", p. 57.

political process, is not grounded in the direct use of force and on the embracement of win-or-lose mindsets between the participants. There is also not a commitment for the adversaries to accept the ideas and suggestions of the mediator. In this regard, the tasks of mediation can be emphasized in terms of helping the adversaries to communicate; changing the attitudes of the participants; suggesting ideas for a compromise; negotiating, and bargaining with the participants.⁷⁵ With the reinforcement of these connected tasks, more positive interactions can be inculcated between the parties.

The achievement of all of these tasks can be linked to objectives and strengths of peace mediation when assessed through process-oriented lenses. In this process, facilitation can be described as a type of mediation, along with agenda setting and implementation.⁷⁶ From a traditional perspective, mediators try to find and suggest compromises as reasonable and to seek an agreement between the parties in the process. Facilitators try to help the parties in arriving at a common definition of their relationship, in defining separate goals of the parties clearly, and in discovering options, which meet the needs of the parties through facilitated analysis.⁷⁷ Hence, facilitation needs to be implemented in such a way that meets the needs of the parties, including basic human needs. These remarks reaffirm the link between process- and outcome-oriented lenses.

It is particularly true that peace mediation and facilitation play an enabling role for the identification and accommodation of the needs of the parties. In this context, assistance for communication; influencing the attitudes and mindsets of parties; proposing new ideas as capable of encouraging a compromise and meeting basic needs; negotiating and bargaining; agenda setting and implementation; efforts for the arrival of an agreement and the creation of a common ground between the parties can be added as achievements for process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation practices. The achievements of peace mediation and facilitation are also dependent upon the willingness of warring parties and their perceptions towards third-parties.

The willingness of the parties to reach a third-party or to accept its offer is necessary for the commencement of mediation. This process is also affected by the perceptions of the parties towards the mediator, which should not be sidelined.⁷⁸ In this regard, the offering of mediation is also part of the processes of peace mediation

⁷⁵ Zartman, and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution...", pp. 31-32.

⁷⁶ Wallensteen, and Svensson, "Talking Peace: International Mediation...", pp. 318-319.

⁷⁷ Burton, "Theory of Conflict Resolution", p. 125.

⁷⁸ Oliver P. Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations**, London, Portland, OR : Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, p. 5.

and facilitation.⁷⁹ The occurrence of mediation may be considered a success since it denotes that different options beyond conflict are open. But the possibilities for such options do not provide assurance for further success.⁸⁰ As a result, the offering of mediation by a third-party and the acceptance of this offer by the warring parties; the request for mediation from the warring parties, and the initiation of mediation can be considered as important process-oriented achievements.

The commencement of peace mediation and facilitation, whether through the acceptance of an offer as made by a third-party or request for third-party practices, denotes a success in itself. In this process, mediators need to be seen as acceptable, credible, independent, knowledgeable, reasonable and skilled, along with having the abilities to retain trust, cooperation, and positive attitudes that stem from the warring parties. Peace mediators and facilitators also need to utilize such resources as capable of encouraging and influencing the warring parties for concessions or for the arrival of a political agreement.⁸¹ Taken together, maintaining and promoting the willingness of the parties affect the successfulness of third-party practices and increases opportunities for outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented achievements.

In essence, the warring parties have been considered as more decisive for the successfulness or failure of peace mediation and facilitation. As reflecting the voluntary characteristics of peace mediation and facilitation, the warring parties need to be willingful for negotiation and conflict settlement; the inclusion of third-party mediation, and the development and implementation of agreements. Voluntariness, political will, and commitment to this process are critical in conducting effective mediation and dialogue facilitation.⁸² Examples related to process-oriented achievements can be deepened in relation to the context, the underlying causes of conflicts, or the positions of warring parties.

If the roots of the conflicts are believed to be resolved through a deeper experience, for example, the engagement of participants in profound introspection can be considered as a necessity. With this process, namely as “T-group Resolution”, the objective is grounded in changing the perceptions and behaviours of the participants.

⁷⁹ Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner, and Jacob Bercovitch, “Fear of Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict”, **Conflict Management and Peace Science**, Vol. 30, No. 4, September 2013, p. 357.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 355, 364.

⁸¹ Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation...**, pp. 7-8.

⁸² Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, **Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in the OSCE-Reference Guide**, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), 13 November 2014, p. 20.

This process can be more useful when the parties as directly involved to a conflict are participating rather than being represented.⁸³ Hence, T-group Resolution and direct representation are also related to the efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation.

As reflecting political psychological dimensions of peace and conflict resolution, meeting with the members of a large-group, perceived as enemy, requires to deal with anxiety and prejudice.⁸⁴ Actually, anxiety can be considered as a prerequisite and as an undermining force in peace processes.⁸⁵ Therefore, it is necessary to address anxiety and prejudice resulting from the warring parties in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Following that, it is also advisable to distinguish the positions, the underlying main interests, and the needs of the parties. This classical advice has proven to be valid and sound in creating a political space and in concluding a settlement. Examples include the arrival of the Camp David settlement between Egypt and Israel.⁸⁶

Conflicts can be instrumental for clear boundaries between friends and enemies. At different levels, conflicts allow for the endurance of self-narratives as stable, consistent, and clear. The fears and deprivations, and concomitant responses associated with conflicts, can result in stability and certainty, despite the adverse consequences of conflicts. Accordingly, various costs as induced by the conflict can paradoxically contribute to existential questions about the self while providing clear definitions about its relationship with identity, the other, and the world. Hence, conflicts can be a source of ontological security and can function as a source of guidance against fluid and contested identity narratives. The consolidation of the distinction between friends and enemies and the acts of securitization are examples of ontological security at the state level.⁸⁷ Anxiety, prejudice, and the link between protracted conflicts and ontological security can produce further challenges in peace processes.

Protracted cases can be a source of ontological security for the main warring parties and members of the relevant large-group. Conflicts can be instrumental for

⁸³ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 121.; For more information about T-group Resolution, see: Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, pp. 128-138.

⁸⁴ See: Vamık D. Volkan, **Divandaki Düşmanlar: Bir Türk Psikanalistin Serüveni**, (transl. by Serap Erdoğan Taycan), Istanbul : Alfa Printing Publishing Distributions, March 2013, pp. 33-39.

⁸⁵ Bahar Rumelili, "Ontological (In)security and Peace Anxieties: A Framework for Conflict Resolution", in Bahar Rumelili (Ed.), **Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, p. 13.

⁸⁶ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 18.

⁸⁷ Bahar Rumelili, "Introduction", in Bahar Rumelili (Ed.), **Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, pp. 1-2.

identity construction and security policies while offering a form of relief against ambiguities and existential questions. As a result, bargaining and negotiation processes can be seen as a threat for engaged warring parties and their large-group identities. In this regard, it is not surprising that the collapse of peace processes can further reinforce the distinctions between large-groups involved to a conflict. Hence, protracted conflicts, third-party experiences, and protracted peace processes affect identity dynamics, actions, habits, and narratives at different levels. Therefore, adaptation to peaceful interactions can be challenging given the effects of firmly established mindsets and prejudices, let alone conflict transformation.

Taking these remarks into consideration, it is necessary for third-parties to obtain comprehensive information about the underlying roots of the conflict and of the interests, needs, and positions of the parties. As such, they can clarify the techniques while challenging anxiety, prejudice, and ontological insecurities. Of critical importance is that it is also necessary to address negative perceptions and distrust generated from the initiation and sustainability of peace processes and concerns for the protection of large-group identity. In the following table, the contents of peace mediation and facilitation, framed as a process, have been illustrated.

Table 1.2: The assessment of peace mediation and facilitation in the context of process-oriented lenses.⁸⁸

Peace Mediation and Facilitation as Process	
Arranging meetings, and venue or ensuring distance between warring parties;	Assistance for clear definition of the goals of the warring parties;
Assistance for the synchronization of definitions as provided by the warring parties for their relationship;	Bringing warring parties together;
Dealing with the anxieties and prejudices of the warring parties;	Distinguishing the positions, main interests, and needs of the warring parties;
Efforts for the arrival of a settlement;	Efforts for the exploration of a common ground between the warring parties;

⁸⁸ The information in this table has been compiled and reflected from the references as utilized by the author in this Thesis.

Encouragement for a compromise;	Enhancing direct communication;
Facilitating dialogue and mutual understanding;	Facilitating negotiations;
Have an influence upon the attitudes, behaviours, goals, and perceptions of the warring parties;	Maintaining and promoting the credibility in intervening as peace mediators and facilitators;
Maintaining and promoting voluntariness, political will and commitment of the warring parties;	Mediation offering by a third-party, and its acceptance by the warring parties or vice versa;
Modification of constraints;	Negotiation and bargaining;
Persuasion oriented at avoiding the use of physical force and violence by the warring parties;	Promotion of informed decision-making;
Proposing compromises, ideas, and solutions that satisfy the needs of the warring parties, including basic human needs;	Tackling ontological insecurities of the parties;
The occurrence of mediation itself;	Triadic cooperation;
The utilization of resources when needed;	Understanding the underlying roots of the conflict.

The information in this Table reveals the agenda, techniques, and goals of peace mediation and facilitation exercises as overlapping process-oriented components with broader implications. The success of third-party practices is dependent upon the achievement and embracement of these components. This process requires the application of various skills, which will be explained in the following section. Nevertheless, it is clear that peace mediation and facilitation skills need to consider such components as indicating the efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation processes. Of equal importance is that such dynamic processes will also require the utilization of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to mediation.

Depending on how many of these components and indications are brought together, the success of the process-oriented approach to mediation can increase or decrease. There cannot be all-or-nothing, fixed-oriented approach in assessing the initiation and effects of peace mediation and facilitation from process-oriented lenses.

As highlighted, the offering of or request for mediation can also be considered as progressive.

With that being said, there might be cases in which the occurrence of mediation has not been oriented at addressing, resolving, and transforming the conflict. Therefore, process-oriented indications should not be necessarily linked to genuine peaceful endeavours. Subtle agendas, self-interest-seeking behaviours, objectives other than peace, and compelling factors can also lead to process-oriented initiatives, which can result in protracted peace processes as well. This reality is not part of this Thesis, albeit the role of self-interested objectives in the part of peace mediators and facilitators.

Conflict resolution does not necessarily indicate the notion of peace, albeit considerable overlap, and the widening framework of conflict resolution. This reality can also be linked to the motivations of warring parties. According to *Peter Wallensteen*, the agenda and content of conflict resolution will ultimately be dependent upon the will of and agreement between the parties.⁸⁹

Also, in comparison to negotiation, bargaining or other forms of process-oriented components and indications, direct communication between the warring parties and/or understanding the underlying roots of the conflict can be more demanding and thus important in certain cases. Hence, some components and indications are of paramount importance compared to others. The conflict, its historical background, and the positions between the parties affect the level of importance of the aforementioned components and indications. For this reason, third-parties need to be aware of dynamic, both comprehensive and nuanced perspectives in combining process-oriented components and indications into the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

The components and indications of process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation cannot be considered static. Accordingly, process-oriented lenses can be deepened or restricted with regard to contextual factors, the conflict itself, and the external factors, including the international system and world politics. This suggests that what is meant by achievement and efficiency can be further detailed in parallel to the flexible nature of mediation. For that purpose, it is important for third-parties to articulate and reflect on minimum, modest, and culminated practices of process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation.

⁸⁹ Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, p. 10.

c. Peace mediation and facilitation as an outcome: All ends are final?

This Thesis primarily considers outcome-oriented approaches in terms of basic human needs, conflict management, conflict resolution, and creative means of addressing the underlying roots of conflicts, all of which require the integration of three-folded lenses. When peace diplomacy is directed to conflict resolution, the commencement of this process entails an understanding towards the situation characterized by conflict; the underlying roots and evolution of conflict; the prolongation and broadening of conflict; directions and dimensions of conflict; the actors and behaviours in the conflict; the actual and potentially expected outcomes of conflict and so forth. Understanding these components has been important for the resolution and transformation of conflict and for the arrival of a consensus. In addition, a dialectical approach that has been marked by the recognition of negative aspects in positive situations and positive aspects in negative situations also needs to be included with regard to conflict resolving peace diplomacy.⁹⁰

Drawing from such remarks as linking peace diplomacy with conflict resolution, obtaining extensive understanding towards conflict and the warring parties; consensus between the parties, and reflections of a dialectical approach can be considered as successful outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation. Admittedly, peace diplomacy can also be directed to conflict transformation, which reaffirms interactions between outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

Differences between conflict resolution and conflict transformation can be considered valid and sound when conflict resolution is positioned as a bridge between narrow and broad concepts of peace. Accordingly, the first concept indicates the condition of no war, and the second one indicates the notion of justice.⁹¹ In this context, it is vital to heighten awareness for the broader concept of peace that entails various components, including justice. Nevertheless, ensuring a non-war setting can be considered an achievement in the context of outcome-oriented peace mediation and facilitation.

⁹⁰ Amalendu Guha, **Peace Diplomacy**, Ganesh Nandy, Chinsurah, Dist. Hooghly, West Bengal, India : Mahatma M. K. Gandhi Foundation for Non-Violent Peace, India Chapter, July 2005, p. 1.; The dialectical approach can be considered as compatible with the relationship between conflict, peace, and war. Accordingly, conflict is part of all wars. With that being said, some conflicts can entail peace, whereas all non-conflict indicates peace. Hence, both conflicting and non-conflicting structures can be detected in the context of peace. See: Kenneth E. Boulding, **Stable Peace**, Austin & London : University of Texas Press, 1978, pp. 10-11.

⁹¹ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, p. 11.

In essence, mediation can be linked to conditions of peace and war. Accordingly, negotiations through mediation can be demonstrated as a method to move from war to peace.⁹² Within this connection, the avoidance of war and promotion of peace can be considered as critical objectives of peace mediation and facilitation. As reflecting this, the successfulness of peace mediation and facilitation can be assessed when these objectives are achieved.

With this in mind, it is important to emphasize that not all ends are final in the field of peace and conflict resolution. The outcomes of third-party practices, including formal agreements and the transition from war to peace, cannot be considered sufficient in ensuring just and sustainable peace, especially in cases with a protracted nature. This has been evident in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. As a result, it is vital to include conflict transformation-oriented lenses into peace mediation and facilitation practices. This inclusion can be effective in order to prevent the re-occurrence of armed conflicts and violence. Also, such an integrative perspective encourages and mainstreams reconciliation in contrast to protracted peace processes.

In this regard, it is important to examine the indicators regarding the successfulness of peace mediation and facilitation practices in terms of outcome-oriented lenses while clarifying why all ends are not final. Such clarification can push discussions in formulating more ambitious and nuanced techniques in the field of peace and conflict resolution. As highlighted by *António Guterres*, mediation is a critical tool for the reduction of human suffering.⁹³ From outcome-oriented lenses, these practices advance the avoidance of war, the signing of a peace agreement, and the reduction of human suffering.

Depending on the perceptions regarding the reasons that have given rise to conflict, different recommendations can further be explored. If the roots of the conflicts are perceived to have emerged from misunderstandings, misperceptions, or cultural differences, then offerings as capable of providing or promoting confidence, trust, and experience-sharing can be pursued.⁹⁴ The successfulness of these process-oriented initiatives can be tested through the removal of misunderstandings, misperceptions, or cultural differences, which indicate outcome-oriented achievements.

⁹² Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...** p. 11.

⁹³ Guterres, "Remarks at Security Council Meeting on Conflict Prevention and Mediation".

⁹⁴ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 121.

In this regard, if peace mediation and facilitation practices undermine such differences, then the outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation can be considered as successful. As a result, third-parties need to be mindful of the elimination of such barriers that can jeopardize constructive outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation. This need also emphasizes that indications related to the successfulness of peaceful initiatives can overlap with the roles and responsibilities of third-parties.

Also, peace agreements, as integral components of conflict resolution, play a necessary role in spite of possible insufficiencies related to a durable peace. An agreement indicates a formal or informal understanding and a signed document under solemn arrangements and conditions as accepted by the parties. Regarding the link between conflict resolution and an informal understanding, a considerable level of trust is necessary between parties. As a result, formal arrangements usually precede informal agreements. Nonetheless, the parties accept the existence of the other fighting party while solving their incompatibilities and suspending violence concomitantly or separately.⁹⁵ The consolidation and sustainability of these outcomes in the forms of agreements, acceptance and recognition of the other party, compatibility between the parties, and suspension of violence affect the overall efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation.

An armistice or a treaty, as a ritual act, signalizes the shift from war to peace.⁹⁶ As a result, the threats associated with being killed are decreased. There can be cases in which ceasefire agreements precede political agreements that regulate incompatibilities between the fighting parties. With that being said, political agreements can simultaneously be concluded with or precede the ceasefire agreements. However, ceasefire agreements do not necessarily lead to peace accords. For this reason, ceasefire agreements can be considered as connected with the term conflict management, which denotes the maintenance of a military *status quo*. Further to this, it can be contended that if a cessation of armed struggle or fighting is not simultaneously undertaken, then the credibility of the peace agreement is in jeopardy. With conflict resolution, on the other hand, the solution of incompatibilities and the end of fighting are combined.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, pp. 8-9.

⁹⁶ Boulding, **Stable Peace**, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁷ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, pp. 9-10.; I. William Zartman also emphasizes that agreement upon a joint formula by the warring parties does not necessarily indicate the resolution of conflict. See: Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment...", p. 206.

Consequently, conflict management in the forms of ceasefire agreements that are *status quo*-oriented rather than transformation-oriented perspectives also accounts for the outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation. Depending upon the role of peace mediators and facilitators, the structure of conflict, the pattern of communication, and the power-balance may also be changed.⁹⁸ Hence, such alterations can be included in assessing the outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation. The practices of peace mediation and facilitation can alter destructive, and incompatible patterns of communication along with the power relations, which can be critical especially in protracted conflicts.

As reflecting the literature of conflict resolution, third-parties aim to assemble the parties by building trust. In this process, they can provide additional resources, including information and technology with the objective to alter the nature of the conflict. The guarantees, as needed for stable peace, can be supplied by third-parties.⁹⁹ The establishment of trust and alteration of the nature of the conflict through the supply of resources and guarantees can be considered as successful outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation.

The achievement of stable peace, on the other hand, will be considered as aligning with conflict transformation-oriented approach to mediation. With that being said, it can be ambiguous to pinpoint precise boundaries between these three approaches to mediation. However, such ambiguities as acceptable challenges are indicative of the link between process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. The passage from one approach to another can be considered dynamic and interactional undertaking that needs to be embraced by peace mediators and facilitators, especially in protracted cases marked by issues related to basic human needs, including but not limited to identity dynamics.

Conflicts that are rooted in human needs and transcend normal disagreements and confrontations generally require major institutional and structural alterations for

⁹⁸ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 18.; In asymmetric conflicts, the costs of established relations and roles between dissimilar parties might no longer be endured. Thus, conflict resolution, which involves a shift from the existing structure of relations and roles as marked by power imbalances and the quality of being unpeaceful, can take place. Within this framework, third-parties need to support a structural transformation, albeit the temporal increase in conflict due to the awareness towards the role of power imbalances and injustices. This process can be referred to as the stage of education, or conscientization. See: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 21.

⁹⁹ Ayşe Betül Çelik, and Bahar Rumelili, "Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in Resolving Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, p. 203.; Stable peace indicates a situation characterized by a low probability of war. See: Boulding, **Stable Peace**, p. 13.

resolution. The underlying issues of conflicts that are grounded in deep-rooted human needs are non-negotiable in contrast to disputes that involve constructive, negotiable, and normal aspects of social life. With presumably intractable character, conflicts have the potential of being destructive for human beings, properties, and systems. As a result, physical and psychological security and future development can be affected adversely.¹⁰⁰ Among the outcomes related to the efficiency of third-party practices, institutional and structural changes are thus necessary, especially in cases marked by deprivation of basic human needs. It is clear that these changes require the combination of conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

While doing so, it is important to reflect on the means of conflict resolution, which aim to change conditions that have given rise to the intractable character of the conflict.¹⁰¹ Related to this, alteration of the conditions associated with intractability can be emphasized in terms of the efficiency of outcome-oriented peace mediation and facilitation. This process also requires meeting human needs that have a decisive role in addressing the underlying roots of conflicts. Examples associated with human needs entail identity, security, and survival-oriented considerations. It is observable that the denial and deprivation of human needs cause intractable conflicts.¹⁰² The cases in this Thesis are illustrative of various issues that stem from human needs.

The denial of physical and economic security and of political participation and recognition, as detrimental conditions for identity, also pertains to the human needs. This reality, and efforts in regaining distinctive large-group identity, underpin the emergence of protracted social conflicts.¹⁰³ Such conflicts can arise from various reasons. Nevertheless, the aforesaid findings as linking the denial and deprivation of human needs with intractable conflicts require to address and meet human needs in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

Recognition and accommodation of human needs that were avoided, neglected, or restricted are of the utmost importance, especially in protracted conflicts. Admittedly, issues associated with identity, security, and recognition take a critical

¹⁰⁰ John Burton, **Conflict: Resolution and Prevention**, (with foreword by Samuel W. Lewis), New York : St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰¹ Kumar Rupesinghe, "Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri Lanka", in Jacob Bercovitch (Ed.), **Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation**, London, Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996, p. 157.

¹⁰² Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 18.

¹⁰³ Edward E. Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", in Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Eds.), **The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work**, D. C. Heath and Company/Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto : Lexington Books, 1991, p. 95.

part in the emergence of intractable human conflicts.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, the mitigation and resolution of such conflicts inevitably require to deal with issues grounded in identity, security, and recognition. As we shall see, conflict transformation-oriented approaches emphasize the transcendence of these issues.

If the conflict is comprehended within the framework of human needs, then an outcome satisfying the needs of both parties needs to be formulated.¹⁰⁵ Hence, the framework of human needs can play a facilitative role for the arrival of an outcome that is acceptable and satisfactory. In the following table, the contents as components and indications of peace mediation and facilitation have been elaborated in terms of outcome-oriented lenses to mediation.

Table 1.3: The assessment of peace mediation and facilitation in the context of outcome-oriented lenses.¹⁰⁶

Peace Mediation and Facilitation as Outcome	
Addressing the underlying roots of the conflict;	Alteration of the intractability of the conflict;
Alteration of the nature of the conflict;	Alteration of the pattern of communication between the warring parties;
Alteration of the power-balance;	Alteration of the structure of the conflict;
Articulation of the conflict through the lenses of human needs theory;	Conflict management or conflict resolution and their combination;
Consensus between the warring parties;	Formation and implementation of peace agreements;

¹⁰⁴ H. B. Danesh, “Human Needs Theory, Conflict, and Peace”, in Daniel J. Christie (Ed.), **The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology**, Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 510-511.

¹⁰⁵ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 18.; With that being said, there have also been problems associated with the human needs theory, and its workshop, problem-solving, -oriented undertakings. These problems have been linked to the challenges in terms of communication, the asymmetrical power-balance, the failure in including active parties to the conflict, the absence of a common cultural ground and high level of polarization between the warring parties, with embedded stereotyping and demonization. Taken together, these problems obstruct the development of a political negotiation. See: Rupesinghe, “Mediation in Internal Conflicts...”, pp. 155-156.

¹⁰⁶ The information in this table has been compiled and reflected from the references as utilized by the author in this Thesis.

Meeting human needs;	Promoting awareness for broader understanding of peace and conflict transformation;
Recognition of the other party;	Reduction of suffering and violence;
Removal of misunderstanding and distrust between the warring parties;	Transition from war to peace.

The information in this Table reveals the indicators as embedded in an outcome-oriented peace mediation and facilitation framework. Accordingly, these indicators can be utilized in assessing the effects of third-party roles in protracted conflicts and controversial issues. Also, these indicators can be relevant with process- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. Depending on how many of these components and indications are brought together, the success of outcome-oriented approach to mediation can increase or decrease.

As emphasized in the previous sub-section, the achievement of such components and indications, such as the transition from war to peace and/or meeting human needs, can be more important or urgent compared to other components and indications. Hence, actor, case, time frame, historical and prevailing conditions are required in deciding and shaping the roadmap and for the combination and prioritization of various components and indications, which can be broadened further.

Regarding the formation and implementation of peace agreements, for example, outcomes in the form of an agreement can also account for process- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. The formation of an interim agreement, as in the case of Palestine, a ceasefire, as in the case of Sri Lanka, or a partial agreement can be considered as process-oriented achievements. Accordingly, such achievements need to be supported by further approaches. A permanent agreement, or full agreement, and the process of implementation, as in the case of Aceh, on the other hand, fall into the sphere of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches more clearly.

For this reason, peace mediators and facilitators, along with the relevant decision-makers, need to approach such indicators with no disregard for fluid boundaries between process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. From conceptual and empirical perspectives, it is necessary to increase awareness for the underlying roots of conflicts and means of conflict resolution, and conflict transformation.

With this in mind, this Thesis gives third-party efforts to understand and address the underlying roots of conflicts a priority for the arrival of a just and sustainable peace. However, this is necessary but not sufficient, as illustrated through various indications above and below. Thus, the concept of conflict transformation and the assessment of phases of selected cases through conflict transformation-oriented approaches have been included in order to avoid merely conflict resolution-oriented framework that gives the link between addressing the underlying causes and peace a high probability.

d. Peace mediation and facilitation as conflict transformation

The concept of conflict transformation can be defined through its difference from conflict resolution, which entails the restructure of a relationship as more equitable and just following the processes of confrontation and negotiation.¹⁰⁷ Conflict transformation, on the other hand, is concerned with constructive change that transcends the realm of conflict resolution. This terminology is grounded in the evaluation of conflict as a usual reality in human relations and as a momentum of change.¹⁰⁸

There has been a striking deviation from zero-sum-oriented conflict resolution strategies to conflict transformation, structural prevention, and normative change, especially since the conclusion of the Cold War. As expected, there are problems related to the effective utilization of these strategies. Also, these strategies are not always preferred. Despite its joint utilization with other strategies and conceptual ambiguities regarding the boundaries of such strategies, conflict transformation indicates efforts oriented at reaching an accommodation between the warring parties with interactive processes.¹⁰⁹ Hence, constructive change and interactions support the framework of conflict transformation.

As following this understanding, conflict transformation refers to the construction of healthy relationships and communities at the levels of local, and global and the generation of a fundamental change in the ways of relating and thinking. Accordingly, transformational approaches can be utilized for the broader field of peace and conflict studies and particular field of mediation.¹¹⁰ Regarding the eventual

¹⁰⁷ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 21.

¹⁰⁸ John Paul Lederach, **The Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear Articulation of the Guiding Principles by a Pioneer in the Field**, Intercourse, PA : Good Books, 2003, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰⁹ Committee on International Conflict Resolution, "Conflict Resolution in a Changing World", in Paul C. Stern, Daniel Druckman, and National Research Council (U.S.) (Eds.), **International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War**, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 2000, p. 5.

¹¹⁰ Lederach, **Little Book of Conflict Transformation...**, p. 5.

purposes of peace mediation and facilitation, as the achievement of a just and sustainable peace, conflict transformation needs to be included against counter-productive implications that can stem from inadequate techniques and protracted peace processes. Therefore, the inclusion of conflict transformation actually converges third-party practices with peace and reconciliation.

With its interactive processes, conflict transformation reconciles tensions and redefines interests between the parties. This approach assumes that interests, and conflicts of interest are, to a certain degree, constructed. Building upon this assumption, the offerings of conflict transformation can be quite enriching, especially in identity-related intergroup conflicts. In the following table, the mechanisms of conflict transformation have been formulated with regard to its differences from power politics, structural prevention, and normative change-oriented strategies.¹¹¹

Table 1.4: Strategies and tools for conflict resolution.¹¹²

Strategy	Tools that Feature the Strategy
Power politics	Threats of force
	Defensive alliances
	Economic sanctions
	Bargaining as a tradeoff of interests
	Power mediation
Conflict transformation	Problem-solving workshops
	Alternative dispute resolution
	Reconciliation by truth commissions
Structural prevention	Electoral system design
	Autonomy
	Legal guarantees of free speech and association
	Civilian control of military organizations
Normative change	OSCE invocation of human rights norms

¹¹¹ Committee on International Conflict Resolution, “Conflict Resolution in a Changing...”, p. 5.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 5. Committee on International Conflict Resolution notes that “*these strategies and tools are often used in combination; moreover, the conceptual distinctions among them are sometimes blurred in use*”. See: Committee on International Conflict Resolution, “Conflict Resolution in a Changing...”, p. 5.; In this context, this explanation is also valid and sound in the components and indications of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

It can be contended that multiplying agenda and content of conflict resolution can be linked to promotion of conflict transformation, especially following the Cold War period. Accordingly, conflict transformation-oriented approaches make peace mediators and facilitators more attentive not only to the interests, needs, and positions of the parties but also to innovative ways of relating and thinking in the long-term. As a result, conflict transformation-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation can be important, especially in asymmetric protracted conflicts, which have challenged national security and power politics.

Protracted conflict, referred to as a doctrine as well as a strategy, denotes the annihilation of an opponent over an extended period through limited operations and wars, feints and maneuvers, psychological manipulations, and various forms of violence. Despite the postponement of the decisive war, protracted conflicts cannot be considered as excluding the conclusive and total blow.¹¹³ This has been observable in the case of Sri Lanka, in which military defeat of the LTTE was framed as the end of conflict. In this context, limited operations and wars, along with the ceasefires, cannot be taken for granted in protracted conflicts and peaceful initiatives, respectively.

As it can be seen in various cases, protracted conflicts can be subject to policies grounded in power, security, and violence. Such purposive considerations result in the negligence of peace-oriented frameworks. In order to prevent this and contribute to the resilience of peace processes, third-parties need to engage with conflict transformation-oriented techniques. This alignment does not indicate a disregard for conflict resolution. Quite contrary, third-parties can and should combine different strategies, including conflict resolution and conflict transformation, in which the latter indicates a more ambitious agenda. In this context, the following Table can be useful to prevent any confusion between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. At this point, third-parties need to be aware of distinctions between conflict resolution and conflict transformation perspectives.

¹¹³ Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, and Alvin J. Cottrell, **Protracted Conflict**, New York : Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959, pp. 2, 4.

Table 1.5: Conflict resolution and conflict transformation: *A brief comparison of perspective.*¹¹⁴

	<i>Conflict Resolution Perspective</i>	<i>Conflict Transformation Perspective</i>
<i>The key question</i>	How do we end something not desired?	How do we end something destructive and build something desired?
<i>The focus</i>	It is content-centered.	It is relationship-centered.
<i>The purpose</i>	To achieve an agreement and solution to the presenting problem creating the crisis.	To promote constructive change processes, inclusive of, but not limited to, immediate solutions.
<i>The development of the process</i>	It is embedded and built around the immediacy of the relationship where the symptoms of disruptions appear.	It envisions the presenting problem as an opportunity for response to symptoms and engagement of systems within which relationships are embedded.
<i>Time frame</i>	The horizon is short-term relief to pain, anxiety, and difficulties.	The horizon for change is mid- to long-range and is intentionally crisis-responsive rather than crisis-driven.
<i>View of conflict</i>	It envisions the need to de-escalate conflict processes.	It envisions conflict as an ecology that is relationally dynamic with ebb (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change).

This Table reaffirms the interactive, constructive, and crisis-responsive characteristics of conflict transformation. The combination of these characteristics with the conflict resolution framework needs to be coordinated in an effective manner. Given the challenges and failures related to peaceful initiatives in protracted cases,

¹¹⁴ Lederach, *Little Book of Conflict Transformation...*, p. 33.

decision-makers can prioritize security through annihilation. As reflecting this, deterrence and defence have been crucial in the context of security. The primary concern of security studies entailed the physical protection of states as primary actors in the international system. *Nils Andrén* emphasizes how “*si vis pacem, para bellum, 'if you want peace, be prepared for war', remains the fundamental maxim in the theory and practice of security*”.¹¹⁵ However, such understanding can be restrictive, especially for protracted conflicts, which tend to combine ethnic and interstate conflicts.¹¹⁶ Therefore, conflict resolution and conflict transformation-oriented approaches affirm not only interactions between process- and outcome-oriented lenses but also inadequate understanding that firmly links peace with security.

Against the prioritization of security, *Johan Galtung* demonstrates the importance of focusing on peace rather than security. Despite the dominance of security approach, including in the UNSC, the focus on peace has been emphasized for the improvement of relations between parties through this proposal, namely the “Transcend Approach.” Accordingly, peaceful conflict transformation requires “Transcendence” to move beyond the goals of the parties and to create a new reality as exemplified by the European Community. *Galtung* further argues that the transcend approach, as a holistic and dynamic *process* (emphasis added), has critical offerings for classical mediation in terms of bringing parties together for negotiation and compromise.¹¹⁷

This dynamic approach can be challenging due to the formulation of such solutions that transcend beyond the entrenched rules and thinking. Also, it can be closely linked to the emergence of ontological insecurities since its prominent objective is grounded in changing the mentality of the parties. Therefore, it is important to be creative and imaginative in relevant initiatives, including the establishment of a dialogue and confidence-building measures.¹¹⁸ As highlighted, these processes can be a source of ontological insecurity in comparison to experiences resulting from prolonged conflicts. Because of this, one can expect that the transcend approach deepens both challenges and opportunities in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

¹¹⁵ Nils Andrén, “In Search of Security”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 3, No 4, 1968, p. 217.

¹¹⁶ Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin, “Protracted Social Conflict; Theory...”, p. 51.

¹¹⁷ Johan Galtung, “Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation – the TRANSCEND Approach”, in Charles Webel, and Johan Galtung (Eds.), *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, London and New York : Routledge, 2007, p. 14.

¹¹⁸ Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, p. 37.

This Thesis considers the transcend approach in the context of conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Accordingly, the transcend approach can be utilized to remedy restrictions that stem from the emphasis on the security approach. Transcendence can be enriching for classical understanding of mediation while providing opportunities through creation and imagination. As following this proposal, this Thesis considers transcendence as a necessity for conflict transformation, distinguished by positive effects upon the mindsets and perceptions of the parties in protracted cases.

Conflict transformation-oriented lenses reveal the immediate situation and content and deeper or underlying patterns/roots and context while proposing a conceptual framework. This conceptual framework links immediate problems with deeper patterns of relationships between the parties. All-embracing comprehension towards the conflict serves as a critical component in the context of conflict transformation. With the benefits of this conceptual framework or structure, as offered by the lenses of conflict transformation, a platform can be created to address not only the presenting issues but also the changes that are required with regard to underlying patterns between the parties.¹¹⁹ Hence, conflict transformation is capable of addressing the underlying causes of conflicts while challenging risks related to the collapse of peace negotiations and protracted peace processes. This approach also deepens avenues for the inclusion of political psychological approaches.

In this context, the organization of intergroup processes with careful consideration can be effective in changing the emotions and perceptions of the parties. Such actions can aid reconciliation while providing new opportunities and pathways for solutions.¹²⁰ All of these have also been compatible with the broadening field of conflict resolution, which entails the construction of appropriate conditions for peace, including but not limited to post-violence reconciliation, promotion of justice, and the establishment of conflict management systems.¹²¹ Being inspired by this understanding, this Thesis considers reconciliation, justice, and conflict management systems as compatible mechanisms of conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

In addition to its framing as a routine activity, reconciliation has also been considered as the ultimate purpose of conflict resolution. Despite different

¹¹⁹ Lederach, **Little Book of Conflict Transformation...**, pp. 10-12.

¹²⁰ Committee on International Conflict Resolution, "Conflict Resolution in a Changing...", p. 5.

¹²¹ Louis Kriesberg, "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution", in Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (Eds.), **The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution**, Thousand Oaks, California : SAGE Publications, 2009, p. 17.

terminologies regarding the terms conflict resolution and conflict transformation, reconciliation refers to restoring or healing damaged relationships while ensuring that non-violent co-existence is internalized and learned amidst radical differences. As reflecting this understanding, reconciliation underpins the basis for a sustainable transformation.¹²² Adding to this, reconciliation is also necessary for co-existence. Regarding the link between peaceful co-existence and sustainable conflict transformation, it can be stipulated that the promotion of equality, human rights, and justice are necessary to enable and strengthen this link.

With the process of reconciliation, the purpose has been oriented at transforming the state of international enmity into a bilateral amity and at changing former hostilities into friendship and magnanimity. Accordingly, reconciliation indicates a path towards the establishment of a long-term peace between former adversaries. In this context, forgiveness does not necessarily indicate a prerequisite for reconciliation. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of reconciliation entail apology from the perpetrator, forgiveness from the victim, or the utilization of bilateral institutions while developing empathy and trust.¹²³ In order to promote reconciliation, the management and reduction of hostilities can take place across actors, levels, and interactions.

In essence, reconciliation indicates a shift from the conflictive *ethos* to the peaceful *ethos*. It also underpins the creation of peaceful relations.¹²⁴ In this way, co-existence and unity can be encouraged. Also, it is important to note that process- and outcome-oriented lenses to mediation play a supportive role for conflict transformation. As highlighted, these lenses cannot be comprehended from an isolated and static perspective. As an example, peace agreements may facilitate the

¹²² Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 231.; Reconciliation can also be considered as a process, and as an outcome. For relevant example, see: Daniel Bar-Tal, and Gemma H. Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process", in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), **From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation**, New York : Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 11-38.; Lily Gardner Feldman, **Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity**, Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.; This Thesis considers reconciliation within the scope of conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. The aforesaid considerations, on the other hand, affirm the permeability and dynamic interactions between process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

¹²³ Lily Gardner Feldman, **Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity**, Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012, pp. 1-3.; For a classified illustration of the mechanisms of reconciliation, along with the approaches that stem from different disciplines, see: Gardner Feldman, **Germany's Foreign Policy of...**, pp. 3-11.

¹²⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis", **Political Psychology**, Vol. 21, No. 2, Jun. 2000, p. 352.

transformation of conflict from a destructive and hostile encounter to a constructive experience, shared by the parties.¹²⁵

Meeting basic human needs also reaffirms interactions between outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses since the elimination of dehumanization also requires a transformative approach directed to actions and mindsets of the parties. Under these conditions, the integration of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to mediation is deemed justified for the efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation.

As departing from the satisfaction of human needs, which has been evaluated as a critical component of outcome-oriented lenses to mediation, *H. B. Danesh* contends that the roots of peace can be found in survival, safety, security-oriented human needs, and in the pursuit of freedom, justice, and interconnectedness. All of these are also accompanied by the exploration of meaning, purpose, and righteousness as undertaken by human beings. In this context, peace, as a psychosocial, political, moral, and spiritual condition, is marked by a transition from survival- and identity-oriented conflicting processes to universal and all-inclusive worldview. This unity-based worldview denotes the connectedness of human beings and the creation of a peace culture and healing within the framework of integrative theory of peace.¹²⁶ These remarks reinforce the implications of reconciliation. In particular, a connection between a unity-based worldview and reconciliation is demonstrated.

Actually, this perspective adds a deeper layer to functioning and mechanisms of conflict transformation. Based upon the stated condition regarding a shift from survival- and identity-oriented worldviews to unity-based worldview, the integrative theory of peace can be important in challenging the limitations of human needs theory grounded in identity, security, recognition, survival, safety, and security. With that being said, the emphasis on the unity-based worldview cannot be considered as the indication of total exclusion of survival and identity-oriented worldviews. Rather, unity-based worldview can be approached as a deeper level that remains conditional

¹²⁵ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, p. 36.

¹²⁶ H. B. Danesh, "Towards an Integrative Theory of Peace Education", **Journal of Peace Education**, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2006, p. 64.; For the development of a peace culture, the following studies can be recommended: Elise Boulding, "Building a Culture of Peace: Some Priorities", **NWSA Journal**, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 55-59.; Elise Boulding, **Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World**, New York: Teachers College Press, 1988.; Elise Boulding, "Peace Culture: The Problem of Managing Human Difference", **CrossCurrents**, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1998/1999, pp. 445-457.

to a considerable extent while connected with the achievements in terms of survival and identity-oriented worldviews.

It follows from this perspective that peace mediation and facilitation exercises need to encompass unity-based worldview especially in dealing with protracted cases. The need for unity-based worldview does not indicate to disregard for the importance of survival- and identity-based needs. Rather, it presupposes a new reality beyond destructive and othering strategies of identity conflicts in the long-term. Despite the prominent role of identity emanating from the functioning of large-groups and protracted conflicts, the reality beyond the tension between self and other should not be neglected if the purpose is truly directed to peace. These worldviews have further been elaborated in the following table.

Table 1.6: Correlation of concepts of worldview, human needs, human rights, conflict, and peace.¹²⁷

Worldview	Human needs	Human rights	State of conflict	State of peace
Survival-based worldview	Survival needs (food, shelter, healthcare ...) <i>First-order needs</i>	Right to security and sustenance	Fear-based and power-based conflict <i>Suppressed conflict</i>	Force-based peace <i>Authoritarian oppression</i>
Identity-based worldview	Association needs (justice, equality, freedom ...) <i>Second-order needs</i>	Right to equality, personal freedom, and happiness	Competition-based conflict <i>Survival of the fittest</i>	Conflict-based peace <i>Adversarial democracy</i>
Unity-based worldview	Spiritual needs (transcendent meaning/purpose) <i>Third-order needs</i>	Right to truth, justice, and freedom of spiritual conviction	Unity in diversity <i>All-centered relationships</i>	Unity-based peace <i>Consultative democracy</i>

Drawing from such models and remarks, this Thesis frames unity-based worldview in terms of conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation

¹²⁷ Danesh, “Human Needs Theory, Conflict,...”, p. 513.

and facilitation. This worldview needs to be embraced as a long-term mechanism and as a purpose in dealing with protracted conflicts grounded in various issues, including basic human needs, identity recognition, and political rights. The embracement and utilization of unity-based worldview can be effective not only for peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts that require delicate considerations in the long-term but also for the transcend approach. This worldview can also enrich utilized techniques.

According to *John Paul Lederach*, the overall purpose of conflict transformation can be formulated as follows: “(...) **to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships**”.¹²⁸ Assessment of change through constructive lenses can be important in dealing with the ontological insecurities of the parties. In response to such explanations and recommendations, the following criteria can be included in understanding the role and scope of peace mediation and facilitation exercises, along with extensive implications in the long-term.

Table 1.7: The assessment of peace mediation and facilitation in the context of conflict transformation-oriented lenses.¹²⁹

Peace Mediation and Facilitation as Conflict Transformation	
Addressing both the immediate issues and the underlying roots and relationships as surrounding the conflict;	A fundamental change in the cognitive and relational means of the warring parties;
Alternative dispute resolution;	Awareness for a broader conceptual/empirical understanding of peace and violence;
Change from survival- and identity-based worldviews to unity-based worldview;	Change through mid and long-term lenses and crisis-responsive mechanisms;
Construction of healthy relations and communities at different levels;	Constructive and normative change between the warring parties;

¹²⁸ Lederach, **Little Book of Conflict Transformation...**, p. 14.; Emphasis added for the italicized sentences in this direct quotation.

¹²⁹ The information in this table has been compiled and reflected from the references as utilized by the author in this Thesis.

Creation of a common ground between the warring parties;	Learning and development of peaceful co-existence;
Offering new avenues for conflict resolution;	Post-violence reconciliation;
Problem-solving workshops;	Redefinition of interests;
Reconciliation by truth commissions;	Stable peace;
The arrival of an accommodation through interactive processes;	The establishment of conflict management systems;
The formation of a conceptual or structural framework towards the analysis of the conflict;	The promotion of equality, human rights, and justice;
Transcend approach;	Transformation of the emotions, and perceptions of the warring parties.

Depending on how many of these components and indications are brought together, the success of conflict transformation-oriented approach can increase or decrease. As explained in the previous sub-sections, these components and indications can be broadened further, or some of them can be prioritized at the expense of others. Regardless of different choices and combinations, the purpose of conflict transformation should be oriented at offering a change from destructive and violent conflict to constructive conflict. This is why it requires to embrace of a process-oriented understanding.¹³⁰ Taken together, conflict is treated as an opportunity for constructive and normative changes. In this context, conflict transformation is also inevitably linked to process-oriented approach.

In this context, it is also important to address that problem-solving workshops can be linked to outcome-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Problem-solving workshops have been depicted as conflict transformation tools by the “Committee on International Conflict Resolution.” However, within this connection, conflict transformation tools, including problem-solving workshops, can also be framed as part of conflict resolution.

¹³⁰ Lederach, **Little Book of Conflict Transformation...**, p. 19.

As explained, problem-solving workshops indicate confrontation with the underlying roots of the conflict and the improvement of the relationship between the parties, which require the embracement of a long-term perspective. In this process, peace facilitation can also be utilized. In essence, problem-solving workshops can be linked to not only conflict transformation but also conflict resolution. Nonetheless, this Thesis considers problem-solving workshops as part of conflict transformation in order to be faithful to the conflict transformation tool by the Committee.

Importantly, the achievement of the components and indications of conflict transformation-oriented approach indicates a process depending on the dynamics of conflict. As a result, there might be a confusion between process- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Albeit the similarities reflected in the time frame, the agenda of conflict transformation indicates more ambitious changes at different levels and structures. As reflecting this, the practices of peace mediation and facilitation entail both narrow and broad agendas, including but not limited to bargaining, communication, cooperation, justice, negotiation, positive and negative peace, persuasion, reconciliation, and unity.

Section II - The scope of peace mediation and facilitation and political psychological approaches

In *UN Guidance for Effective Mediation*, mediation has been explained in terms of third-party assistance for prevention, management, or resolution of conflict between two or more parties. The third-parties aim to help in reaching agreements as acceptable by the adversaries. In this process, the consent of the parties and the right environment are required for the improvement of relationships and for the promotion of cooperation. The consent of parties is critical since mediation is a voluntary endeavour. The approval of parties affects both the processes and outcomes of mediation. The outcomes of mediation range from a specific issue in connection with the containment or management of a conflict to broader issues that have been confronted and addressed through a comprehensive peace agreement. The scope of mediation transcends the signing of peace agreements.¹³¹

This explanation reveals the scope of peace mediation and facilitation while linking process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches with the characteristics of mediation. Adding to this, mediation is affected by the causes,

¹³¹ United Nations, **United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation**, New York : United Nations, 2012, p. 4, <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/documents/united-nations-guidance-effective-mediation> (accessed 12.09.2022).

dynamics, and the specificity of the conflict. In this process, not only the warring parties but also the society, the regional, and the international environments need to be taken into consideration.¹³² As a result of this, the scope of peace mediation and facilitation practices is extensive and inclusive, albeit the decisive role of the parties.

The forms, reasoning, rules, and mechanisms of mediation cannot be considered in a fixed framework. The reason is that differences in conflicts, the background and position of the parties, and the relationships, resources, and motivations also take a part in this multi-dimensional process.¹³³ Hence, it is necessary to provide a contextual analysis, albeit the detection of certain traits and mechanisms, which also benefit from facilitation, information, communication, interpretation, negotiation, and reward and punishment-oriented approaches.

In what follows, the prerequisites and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation, and the roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators will be demonstrated. Accordingly, this Thesis will emphasize the need for a contextual perspective in understanding the scope of peace mediation and facilitation. The importance of such perspective will become more evident in engaging with the role of Nordic countries in the phases of selected cases. Also, the roles and responsibilities are of particular interest for political psychological approaches as limited with the importance of human needs theory and large-group identity. Hence, there will be an emphasis on the validity and soundness of human needs theory and large-group identity as well. Taken together, this section will be instructive while guiding us in assessing third-party roles of the Nordic countries.

As emphasized, conflict resolution processes cause different forms, degrees, and levels of anxiety. Drawing from *Anthony Giddens*'s notion of ontological security, conflict transformation and resolution can unleash existential anxieties associated with death, meaningless and condemnation that have been contained through the conflict. Such anxieties, namely "peace anxieties", can be considered as undermining dynamics of peace and conflict resolution marked by ontological insecurity.¹³⁴ Also, it should be stressed that the processes of conflict resolution can revive nostalgia for conflict.¹³⁵

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹³³ Bercovitch, "Introduction: Thinking about Mediation", p. 9.

¹³⁴ Rumelili, "Ontological (In)security and Peace...", pp. 12-13.; Within this framework, ontological insecurity induced by conflict resolution indicates various unleashed anxieties that cannot be contained anymore. Rumelili, "Ontological (In)security and Peace...", p. 12.

¹³⁵ Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of...", p. 17.

For such reasons, these processes cannot be isolated from the role of political psychological approaches.

In engaging with violent conflicts and wars, peace mediation and facilitation practices can be restricted by the persistence of power politics and the state-centric approaches. This restriction needs to be problematized, especially in asymmetric and intra-state conflicts. The reason for this problematization can be rested upon various forms of identification, the dynamic characteristics, influencing, destabilizing, and strengthening capacities of identities, along with their fragmentation and entanglement with major power struggles. However, modern peace mediation practices have not been able to tackle identity-oriented issues in an effective manner.¹³⁶

Against this backdrop, the offerings of political psychological approaches can be effective when confronted with challenges, insecurities, and restrictions as capable of generating protracted and counter-productive peace processes. Within this framework, it is critical to understand the implications of complex emotions, human needs, and identity dynamics that need to be dealt with in initiating dialogue and negotiation between warring parties.

In essence, antagonism for the other group, nostalgia for conflict, and anxiety in connection with peace negotiations carry critical insights for peace mediation and facilitation that cannot be formulated in isolation from political psychological approaches. In this Thesis, such approaches will be limited with the human needs theory and large-group identity terminology. These approaches will be considered supportive especially in engaging with conflicts and controversial issues grounded in protractedness.

The idea is that political psychological approaches can offer critical insights as capable of converging process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation practices with the transformation of conflict and the achievement of peace. The utilization of political psychological approaches can be important given the restrictions that stem from the state-centric peace mediation and facilitation practices with regard to conflicts and controversial issues. For this reason, it is important to address such approaches as particularly aligning with outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

¹³⁶ Lehti, *Era of Private Peacemakers...*, pp. 1-3.; This is why, enriching these third-party practices with political psychology can play an important role. For the development, content, and reflections of the field of political psychology, and its relevance in identity and group conflict, see: Morton Deutsch, and Catarina Kinnvall, "What is Political Psychology?", in Kristen Renwick Monroe (Ed.), **Political Psychology**, Mahwah, New Jersey, London : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2002, pp. 15-42.

a. The prerequisites and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation

As explained in the previous section, there have been rationalist, contingent, structuralist, and social-psychological approaches to mediation. Taken together, these approaches affect the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation in relation to actors and underlying roots of the conflict. This Thesis considers the approaches to mediation as permeable with the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation. From a rationalist approach, for example, techniques include the creation of such conditions as capable of encouraging the parties to reach an agreement. In this process, the benefits and costs of the parties as engaged in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation need to be taken into consideration.

Warring parties usually intend to perceive their interests in opposition to one another. Therefore, the creation of a common ground against lose-win, or zero-sum-oriented understandings needs to be promoted by helping the conflictants. The need for a common ground and guidance to the positive sum direction holds critical meanings due to such outcomes, in which both of the parties can experience more craptastic outcomes compared to the implementation of other positions and strategies, including compromises, lose-win, or win-win-oriented techniques.¹³⁷ In encouraging parties to a destination grounded in a positive-sum framework, it is wise to avoid all-or-nothing-oriented perspectives. That is why efforts for the arrival of a common ground require a delicate balance.

Power-oriented techniques can be considered as connected with rationalist considerations. As building upon such considerations, peace mediators and facilitators can utilize their leverage, power, and strategic tactics for the creation of an agreement between the parties. In this process, punishment and reward-oriented approaches can be included for the encouragement of a consensus.¹³⁸ It can be contended that power, or power politics-oriented approaches, affect not only the techniques and roles of peace mediators and facilitators but also their motivations and performance.¹³⁹ Similar

¹³⁷ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, pp. 15-16.; For more detailed considerations regarding the advantages and disadvantages of particular outcomes through the utilization of game theory, see: Thomas Schelling, **The Strategy of Conflict**, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1960.

¹³⁸ German Federal Foreign Office, Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, "Basics of Mediation: Concepts and Definitions", Fact Sheet Series: Peace Mediation and Mediation Support, **German Federal Foreign Office & Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland (IMSD)**, January 2016/January 2017, p. 2, <https://berghof-foundation.org/library/basics-of-mediation-concepts-and-definitions> (accessed 09.12.2023).

¹³⁹ Zartman, and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution...", p. 28.

considerations grounded in self-interested behaviors can also be found in the attitudes of the parties.¹⁴⁰

This pragmatic commonality reflects one of the prerequisites of peace mediation and facilitation. Accordingly, the commencement of third-party exercises is grounded in the purpose of reaching a better outcome. As a result, the assistance of peace mediators and facilitators commences with the expectation that this process will generate a better outcome compared to other alternatives.¹⁴¹ Based on this expectation sought, warring parties aim to pursue or accept the assistance of third-parties.

In relation to the willingness of the parties, third-parties can utilize facilitative, formulative, and power-based mediation approaches. With a facilitative approach, the efforts entail the organization and facilitation of communication through a non-directive mode; the elicitation of the underlying interests and needs, and the avoidance of providing substantial suggestions. With a formulative approach, the guiding role of third-parties is more direct. Accordingly, formulative approaches entail efforts in structuring the peace process. In this context, aggregation of suggested solutions and formulation/proposal of different solutions are required. As emphasized, the leverage, power, and tactics of mediators can be utilized to compel the parties to reach an agreement with a power-based approach.¹⁴²

Importantly, *Molly M. Melin*, *Scott Sigmund Gartner*, and *Jacob Bercovitch* reveal that the circumstances affecting the choice of a mediator in order to take a role in the conflict are different from those affecting the choice of the belligerents towards the utilization of mediation. In this regard, the offering of mediation by third-parties is dependent upon the intensity of the conflict¹⁴³; the prospects for an agreement, and the ties between the mediator and the conflict. From the perspective of belligerents, on the other hand, the acceptability of mediation is actually lower under these aforementioned

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁴¹ Bercovitch, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation...*, p. 18.

¹⁴² German Federal Foreign Office, Initiative Mediation Support Deutschland, "Basics of Mediation: Concepts...", p. 2.

¹⁴³ The intensity level indicates the level of fighting resulting from a state-based or non-state-based conflict in each year. The intensity level, as a variable, has two dimensions that follow: Minor, and war. Minor intensity level is measured in terms of a minimum of 25 to a maximum of 1000 battle-related deaths. War, on the other hand, is indicative of minimum 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. For the definition of intensity level, see: Uppsala University, "UCDP Definitions", **Department of Peace and Conflict Research**, 29 May 2024, <https://www.uu.se/en/departments/peace-and-conflict-research/research/ucdp/ucdp-definitions> (accessed 12.11.2024).

circumstances. Hence, their strategic reactions differ towards similar conditions.¹⁴⁴ Taken together, being able to overcome such differences can be considered one of the prerequisites for the initiation of third-party practices. Circumstances that affect the choice of third-parties and warring parties are also related to choices for the utilization of techniques.

The improvement of interactions between the parties, as disputants, negotiators, or interacting parties, and the intervention of mediators underpin the origin of mediation. Mediation might take place following the decision of the parties to seek the assistance of third-party. In this process, third-party might benefit from various available approaches and influenced by various factors, including the environment, training of mediators, characteristics of the parties, and the nature of the conflict. The outcomes of utilized approaches are relevant not only to the parties but also to mediators and third-parties. The factors such as the intensity of the dispute, the relative power of the parties, and the type of conflict might mitigate the nature and extent of this influence in relation to determinants of outcomes.¹⁴⁵

In this process, appropriateness and stability can be considered as important guidelines while being susceptible to changes in the international system. As an example, mediators in the Cyprus and Sri Lanka conflicts faced uncertainties regarding the source of stability. Mediation attempts could not be successful due to a lack of clear solutions. In a broader framework, the alterations or ambiguities pertaining to the norms of conflict management and resolution can further complicate conflict handling, as exemplified during the 1990s that witnessed the reduction of the Cold War tensions. Under such conditions, the identification of national interests and legitimacy can be vague with regard to external involvement in conflicts and peace processes. As a result, engagements in conflicts (whether in the forms of peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement) can be perceived as unfriendly.¹⁴⁶ Negative perceptions and uncertainties can harm all third-party involvements and add further complications to the conflict.

¹⁴⁴ Melin, Gartner, and Bercovitch, "Fear of Rejection: The Puzzle of...", p. 355.; The types of conflict also affect the commencement of mediation. For the conditions as affecting the offering of mediation, and the acceptability of mediation in civil wars, for example, see: J. Michael Greig, and Patrick M. Regan, "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 759-781.

¹⁴⁵ James A. Wall, Jr., John B. Stark, and Rhett L. Standifer, "Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Jun. 2001, p. 371.

¹⁴⁶ Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of...", pp. 6-8.

The appropriateness and the exploration of stability are linked to the prerequisites and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation, respectively. Compromise can also be important for the efficiency of third-party activities. After all, mediation is grounded in compromise between the antagonists. In this context, possible solutions and means of handling problems as inherited to conflict need to be identified. Voluntariness and the acceptance or consensus of antagonists in participating in the process of mediation are also entangled with the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. The participation itself also affirms leastly, a small concession.¹⁴⁷ Deepening concession to an extent as capable of marking a change reveals that third-parties have adequate capabilities.

According to *Bercovitch*, the unique characteristics of mediation can be considered as an extension of conflict management efforts; an outsider intervention into a conflict that takes place between two or more actors; non-coercion, non-violence, and non-binding forms of intervention by an individual, a group, or an organization with the purpose oriented at affecting, changing, resolving, modifying, or influencing the conflict. Further to this, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of mediators, which have been reflected whether consciously or unconsciously, also affect this process. As emphasized, mediation is rooted in the voluntariness while operating on solely ad hoc basis.¹⁴⁸

Taken together, the appropriateness and stability, the voluntariness, the improvement of interactions between the parties through third-party assistance, and intervention characterized by non-coercion, non-violence, and non-binding traits, the influence upon the conflict, and the reinforcement of concession can be considered as prerequisites for the efficiency of peace mediation and facilitation practices. In this process, the involved actors bring their interests, perceptions, and resources into the processes of mediation. In addition, the interactions between contextual variables and the identity of the mediator also determine the form and character of mediation.¹⁴⁹ In other words, the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation can be indicative of contextual dynamics and the identity, interests, perceptions, and resources of third-parties and the antagonists.

¹⁴⁷ J. Michael Greig, and Patrick M. Regan, "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 761-762.

¹⁴⁸ Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview...", pp. 127-128.

¹⁴⁹ Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation...", p. 8.

Mediation, as a third-party intervention, *Jeffrey Z. Rubin* argues, is one of the constructive conflict management approaches. Negotiation and third-party intervention, as constructive conflict management approaches, take the preferences of disputants into consideration. Mutual consent underpins these strategies. In the practices of mediation, it is not obligatory for the disputants to heed the recommendations of the mediator.¹⁵⁰ Collectively, the prerequisites and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation practices entail the inclusion of the preferences, mutual consent, and voluntariness of the warring parties.

In this process, consent can be evaluated as one of the prerequisites for peace mediation and facilitation. Actually, effective consent of the parties underpins the voluntary nature of mediation. The consent of the parties can be affected by the integrity of mediation; security and confidentiality; the acceptability of mediators; the dynamics of the conflict; the interests and various considerations of the parties, external actions, and different perceptions towards mediation. Also, there might be cases that entail partial consent, incremental consent, or the lack of full commitment despite the given consent. The consent of the parties might also be explicit, informal, or tentative. The increase of confidence in mediation can lead to a shift from tentative to more explicit expressions of consent. However, there might also be cases that entail the withdrawal of the consent.¹⁵¹ In order to prevent that, third-party techniques need to be attentive to the perceptions of the parties and their trust in the peace mediation and facilitation.

As reflecting this, the contingency approach requires formulating techniques that are in line with the dynamics and context of the conflict. Hence, peace mediation and facilitation techniques can be formulated to be more in concord with the case and context-specific. As reflecting this, societal support for peace through socio-political reconciliation is necessary, especially in identity-based conflicts that took place in ethnically divided societies. In this process, addressing the fears of majorities and the demands and hopes of minorities is critical for the mobilization of this social support.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Models of Conflict Management", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 50, No. I, Spring 1994, pp. 33-34, 41.

¹⁵¹ United Nations, *United Nations Guidance for...*, p. 8.

¹⁵² Mehmet Gurses, and Ayşe Betül Çelik, "Settling Softly: Ending War and Making Peace in Divided Societies", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2024, pp. 626-627.

Hence, reconciliation, as an indication of assessments regarding conflict transformation-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation, needs to be fostered in identity-oriented cases marked by ethnical divisions. Social support has a critical role in mainstreaming reconciliation exercises. The emphasis on social support inevitably requires adopting contexts and groups-specific lenses. In order to achieve social support, third-parties can benefit from a contingency approach.

The utilization of the contingency approach is not necessarily limited to the sphere of peace mediation and facilitation. In essence, the contingency approach is grounded in the recognition of social conflict as a dynamic process. Therefore, it advocates the utilization of a range of techniques with regard to a particular conflict and its different stages while acknowledging the limitations of these approaches. The escalation and de-escalation of a social conflict witness the interactions of objective and subjective elements/interests/issues, as corresponding to the nature of the conflict while affecting the utilization of appropriate third-party intervention(s), including but not limited to mediation. Examples of objective elements are associated with resource scarcity, whereas subjective elements entail misperception, miscommunication, and different assessments towards objective elements. Facilitation of a compromise or a judgment can be considered as appropriate techniques when objective elements are prevailing. In case of the predominance of subjective elements, the inducement of problem-solving approaches can be demonstrated for the improvement of relationships.¹⁵³

The trajectory of problem-solving conflict resolution has been linked to the utilization of behavioral sciences for non-coercive settlement of intractable situations. This approach entails a variety of techniques, including the dissection of conflict with concern for warring parties and issues; direct interactions between the representatives of the parties; assistance to dialogue by facilitators, or a panel of facilitators; and analytical interactions. These interactions include one or multiple seminars or workshops. The latest technique has been oriented at revealing and analyzing the positions, frustrations, constraints, and perceptions of the parties while exploring acceptable options. Analysis of these components underpins the essence of conflict resolution. In this process, third-parties aim to assist the belligerents with the accurate

¹⁵³ Ronald J. Fisher, and Loreleigh Keashly, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third-party Intervention", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, p. 34.

identification of their negotiable interests, along with the non-negotiable basic needs and values.¹⁵⁴

Such identification can be effective in remedying misperception and distrust between the parties. With the inclusion of human needs, the interests of the parties can be clarified while a framework directed to analysis of the conflict can be established. Both facilitative and problem-solving approaches can be linked to efforts referred to as “soft settlement.” The term soft settlement indicates a path towards conflict transformation and the alleviation of the resistance and stubbornness of the dominant/majority groups to the demands of minority groups. With soft settlement, there can be added value for the improvement of mutual dialogue.¹⁵⁵ Hence, soft settlement can be approached as another technique connected with facilitation and problem-solving. The conceptualization of soft settlement can also be added into the indications of conflict transformation-oriented assessment.

Facilitative approaches have fundamentally been related to communication. As a result, communication-facilitation-oriented processes primarily entail very little area of maneuver for third-party intervention. Such processes can be characterized by fairly passive attitudes and limited control of third-parties. With procedural strategies, on the other hand, the control of third-parties may be increased. Examples include, *inter alia*, control over the form, organization, venue, and agenda setting for meetings, publicity, and the dissemination of information. With directive strategies, the most active type of third-party intervention can take place in order to produce a change in the issues and actions surrounding the conflict. As a result of such strategies, exemplified by the utilization of incentives and ultimatums, there is a direct influence upon the content, process, or substance.¹⁵⁶

From a structural perspective, the notion of ripeness and power balance between the parties need to be taken into consideration. The process of ripeness contains the following elements: the gradual erosion of the ancient and original regime; the defeat of alternative formulas; readjustment and realignment of power relations among the

¹⁵⁴ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 143.; P. Terrence Hopmann emphasizes that the foundations of problem-solving approach, paradigm, can be found in the study titled as **Fights, Games, and Debates** by Anatol Rapoport. P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving”, **The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (AAPSS)**, Vol. 542, Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation, Nov. 1995, pp. 26-27.; For this study, as cited in the aforementioned article, see: Anatol Rapoport, **Fights, Games, and Debates**, Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1960.

¹⁵⁵ Gurses, and Çelik, “Settling Softly: Ending War...”, p. 626.

¹⁵⁶ Bercovitch, and Houston, “Influence of Mediator Characteristics...”, p. 304.

parties; and the development of a resolving formula following the culmination of ripening. All of these elements underpin the notion of ripeness in conflicts and controversial issues. As reflecting alterations/shifts in power relations and structures, apparent examples include the elimination of one party's power, which indicates weakening, or the equalization of one party's power in a gradual process.¹⁵⁷

However, *Morton Deutsch* proposes that if parties mutually consider themselves as equal in terms of power and legitimacy, then the undertaking of cooperative conflict resolution can actually be more difficult compared to such conflicts in which the parties are aware of their differences in terms of power and legitimacy.¹⁵⁸ In this regard, third-parties can focus on bridging the differences and power asymmetries or acknowledging the inequality between the parties with regard to their power and legitimacy.

Despite different ideas, it is clear that recognition and/or alterations of power relations cannot be isolated from peace mediation and facilitation practices. As highlighted, mechanisms, including electoral system design; autonomy; free speech and association, and control of military organizations by civilians, which underpin structural prevention strategy,¹⁵⁹ can be emphasized for structural techniques of peace mediation and facilitation.

From a structural perspective, the focus is directed to the patterns and effects of the underlying roots of conflict upon economic, political, and social structures, organizations, and institutions. In this regard, structural perspective indicates the need to explore the means surrounding the creation, sustainability, and alterations of structures, organizations, and institutions. Moreover, means oriented at meeting basic human needs and decision-making processes are also linked to structural dimensions.¹⁶⁰

The techniques can also be approached through pure or power mediation lenses. Accordingly, the combination of separate meetings that entail the representations of the parties and of joint negotiation sessions underpins the functioning of pure

¹⁵⁷ Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment,...", pp. 216-218.; For an explanation of the structuralist paradigm, and its synthesis with social-psychological approaches, the following chapter is recommended: Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle", in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Eds.), **Herdning Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World**, (with a foreword by Richard H. Solomon), Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, pp. 19-45.

¹⁵⁸ Morton Deutsch, **The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes**, New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1973, p. 46.

¹⁵⁹ Committee on International Conflict Resolution, "Conflict Resolution in a Changing...", p. 5.

¹⁶⁰ Lederach, **Little Book of Conflict Transformation...**, p. 25.

mediation. In this process, reasoning, persuasion, the control of information, and the offering of alternatives can be utilized for the facilitation of acceptable and negotiated settlements between the antagonists. Albeit building upon such functions, power mediation, or mediation with muscle, differs in terms of the utilization of leverage or coercion. Relevant examples include the promises by third-party associated with rewards and threats and bargaining with each party to the conflict.¹⁶¹ Hence, it can be concluded that mediation does not necessarily exclude coercive techniques.

In stressing the role of peace mediation and facilitation techniques, “Track I Diplomacy” and “Track II Diplomacy” cannot be avoided. These techniques can be utilized in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. Relevant examples of Track I Diplomacy, as a traditional approach, entail policy statements prepared by the president and secretary of state, official visits, and meetings. Accordingly, governmental statements and position papers have been drafted with the guiding role of full dimensional analysis as provided by the staff of government officials.¹⁶² Referred to as official mediation, the scope of Track I Diplomacy usually entails decision-makers of the conflicting parties.¹⁶³

As enhancing the deficiencies of official relations and forceful posture derived from Track I Diplomacy, Track II Diplomacy provides unofficial, non-structured, and open-minded interactions. Track II Diplomacy has been grounded in the assumption that conflicts can be resolved or alleviated through shared human capabilities. This assumption has been considered as responsive for good will and reasonableness. Relevant examples of Track II Diplomacy entail cultural and scientific exchanges and problem-solving meetings, with a focus on psychology. According to *William D. Davidson*, and *Joseph V. Montville*, both tracks establish complementary relations and are required due to psychological reasons.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Fisher, and Keashly, “Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation...”, p. 33.

¹⁶² William D. Davidson, and Joseph V. Montville, “Foreign Policy According to Freud”, **Foreign Policy**, No. 45, Winter, 1981-1982, pp. 154-155.

¹⁶³ Lanz, and Gasser, “A Crowded Field: Competition...”, p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Davidson, and Montville, “Foreign Policy...”, pp. 155-156.; For more information about Track II diplomacy, see also: Joseph V. Montville, **The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy**, in Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Eds.), **The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work**, D. C. Heath and Company/Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto : Lexington Books, 1991, pp. 161-175.; For relevant examples of Track II diplomacy, this paper is also recommended: Joseph V. Montville, “Track Two Diplomacy: The Work of Healing History”, **The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations**, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2006, pp. 15-25.

Track II, or Second Track Diplomacy allows for informal and more exploratory means. As a result, it is known as a flexible and unofficial approach.¹⁶⁵ The combination of Track I and Track II Diplomacy, as prominent techniques that support one another, affects the course of peace mediation and facilitation. There has also been a change that allows for the encouragement and promotion of internal or indigenous third-parties and the empowerment of indigenous actors and resources rather than external/outsider third-parties. In this regard, establishing local constituencies and capacities and benefiting from domestic means of sustainable conflict management have been offered through the lenses of “Multi-Track Diplomacy”.¹⁶⁶

Within that context, “The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy” (IMTD) was created in May 1992 to promote a systems-based view towards peacebuilding while addressing the causes of conflicts, and assisting the adversaries to realize that the other party, perceived as enemy, is also a human being. Of critical importance is that the purpose of the Institute has been oriented at facilitating the transformation of deep-rooted social conflicts.¹⁶⁷ Bluntly put, the extension of Track II Diplomacy indicates the level of Track III Diplomacy, which minimizes official involvement.¹⁶⁸ It can be contended that efforts for peacebuilding and the transformation of lingering conflicts through facilitation align with a conflict transformation-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation. As a result, Track III diplomacy can be utilized, especially in protracted conflicts and in conflict transformation-oriented initiatives.

In the processes of peace and conflict resolution, it is important to coordinate multiple efforts. Ensuring cooperation among assisting parties is required at official and unofficial levels.¹⁶⁹ By recalling the crowded field of mediation, the utilization of Track I and Track II Diplomacy can be important not only for cooperation between

¹⁶⁵ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 121.; For more information about Track II diplomacy and its examples, see: Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, pp. 139-142.

¹⁶⁶ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 25.; With this in mind, multi-track diplomacy, as a broader approach, was also formulated. For information about this approach, see: Louise Diamond, and John W. McDonald, **Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace**, Third Edition, Oakwood Avenue, West Hartford, Connecticut : Kumarian Press, 1996.

¹⁶⁷ John W. McDonald, “The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy”, **Journal of Conflictology**, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012, p. 66.

¹⁶⁸ Ann Kelleher, and James Larry Taulbee, “Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style”, **Peace & Change**, Vol. 31, No. 4, October 2006, p. 480.; Further to this, Track I ½ diplomacy is also re-interpreted to understand Norway’s peacemaking approach that entails the utilization of NGOs, and the activities of Track II diplomacy while supporting grass-root and interactive approaches to peace. In essence, the cooperation/partnership between governments and NGO play an enabling role for peace and conflict resolution. Kelleher, and Taulbee, “Bridging the Gap: Building...”, pp. 480-483.

¹⁶⁹ Zartman, “Towards the Resolution of...”, p. 14.

third-parties but also for the interconnectivity of different third-party mechanisms. As for peacemaking, for example, cooperation and coordination between official and unofficial actors have been important for its success.¹⁷⁰ This is also valid and sound for the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Coordination can be required not only for various peaceful initiatives and techniques but also for process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation.

According to *Peter Carnevale*, fundamental mediation strategies can be framed in terms of integration, pressing, compensation, and inaction. Integration indicates the efforts oriented at finding or assisting a solution within the realm of shared ground. Pressing entails the efforts for the reduction of non-agreeable alternatives. Compensation involves efforts oriented at enhancing agreeable alternatives. Inaction, on the other hand, indicates to let the disputing parties handle the controversy.¹⁷¹ Drawing from such various strategies, mediators affect the potentiality and availability of agreeable and non-agreeable alternatives, along with the offering of a protagonistic approach when needed.

At this point, peace studies have also provided critical methods within the frameworks of non-passive and non-violent resistance, social justice in relation to solidarity with the underprivileged groups, peace culture, the development of inner peace and individual harmony, and social change. The combination of these methods allows for the broader formulation of conflict resolution methods that also entail peace mediation and facilitation. However, the development of conflict resolution has experienced a shift regarding the ethics and methods of peace studies, critical theory, and hegemonic discourse. As a result, there is a danger that conflict resolution practitioners can cause the justification of injustices and structural violence. In this context, the distance between the frameworks of conflict resolution and peace studies continues to generate a tension in the literature.¹⁷²

As concerned with this distance, this Thesis contends that the utilization of critical methods is also necessary as part of conflict transformation-oriented

¹⁷⁰ J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors", in I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds.), **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques**, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 43.

¹⁷¹ Peter J. D. Carnevale, "Strategic Choice in Mediation", **Negotiation Journal**, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1986, p. 42.; For the benefits and costs of these strategies, see: Carnevale, "Strategic Choice in Mediation", pp. 49-52.

¹⁷² Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Reflections on the Field of Conflict Resolution", **International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution**, Vol. 1, No. 2, Taking Stock of the Field: Past, Present and Future - Part II, 2013, pp. 173-175.

approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. In particular, encouragement of equality, human rights, and justice, along with the transcendence, affirms the necessity for the inclusion of critical methods into the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Hence, third-parties also need to be aware of the gap surrounding the techniques of conflict resolution and peace studies in addressing and resolving the underlying roots of the conflicts. Such awareness holds indispensable value, especially in engaging with protracted conflicts.

b. The roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators

The successfulness of mediation, as a social process, has essentially been connected with its adaptive and responsive characteristics. As previously stated, mediation is affected by particular context and characteristics of a situation and entails different problems, parties, and situations with regard to its compatibility and reflective character.¹⁷³ Hence, adaptability and responsiveness need to be embraced regardless of the utilization of different approaches and techniques by third-parties. Ensuring to adopt these characteristics can be considered as deeply connected with the efficiency of the activities of peace mediators and facilitators.

Such characteristics also affirm various dimensions of mediation. As reflecting one of these dimensions, the identity of the mediator, and the relationship between a mediator and conflicting parties also affect the arrival of a durable outcome of mediation. In this process, the acceptability and credibility of mediators cannot be ignored. But prior to this, the willingness of the main conflicting parties is necessary for the efforts oriented at achieving a negotiated settlement. Moreover, the conflict should be amenable to the initiation of mediation. There should also be regional and international consensus. Given the regional and international connection of many conflicts, it is critical for the mediators to have external support while resisting external pressures.¹⁷⁴

In order to achieve this balance, mediators need to be considered as trustworthy. Trust underpins the cooperation and strategic information sharing between the parties and mediators.¹⁷⁵ Trust affects the approachment of the parties towards peace mediators and facilitators whose professions can be linked to academia, diplomacy, law, politics, and appointments under the auspices of international organizations such as the UN, or NGOs. For this reason, experiences, political orientations, and

¹⁷³ Bercovitch, and Houston, "Study of International Mediation: Theoretical...", p. 15.

¹⁷⁴ United Nations, **United Nations Guidance for...**, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁵ Melin, Gartner, and Bercovitch, "Fear of Rejection: The Puzzle of...", p. 358.

reputations of the third-parties cannot be neglected in relation to the decisions and willingness of the parties. Suffice it to say that the belief of the parties upon the practices of peace mediation and facilitation cannot be isolated from the characteristics of and perceptions towards third-parties. The factors that affect the outcome of mediation have been revealed in the following figure:




Figure 1.1: Factors associated with successful mediation.¹⁷⁶

As connected with the identity of mediators, the maintenance of the acceptability and credibility of third-parties is necessary for peace mediation and facilitation. Third-parties are responsible for helping the warring parties in agreeing upon a negotiated settlement. As a result of this, they need to play enriching, guiding, and inspiring roles

¹⁷⁶ Bercovitch, and Houston, "Study of International Mediation: Theoretical...", p. 31.

in engaging with conflicts and controversial issues. Such roles can be effective in order to establish and encourage direct communication between the warring parties.

Hence, it can be argued that Nordic practitioners can be considered as relatively advantageous in their third-party entry and subsequent efforts. The background of the Nordic countries, their reputation, and adaptability skills can be instrumental for the establishment and maintenance of trust at dyadic and triadic levels. The peaceful background and reputation can be considered as leverage in making suggestions while attracting external assistance.

As it can be seen in the above figure, the political and cultural system, linked to the parties, inevitably affects the outcome of mediation. The entry or involvement of mediators into a conflict is marked by the efforts oriented at helping the parties to reach an outcome or a more appropriate outcome. The behaviors of mediators range from making suggestions to settle the conflict to refraining from making suggestions. Some mediators might prefer the achievement of a compromise. For some, compromise might not be chosen. Moreover, the commitment towards neutrality can also differ. This should not be considered unexpected since neutrality does not necessarily indicate successful and effective mediation. In this connection, relevant examples include various mediation experiences of Henry Kissinger, and Jimmy Carter.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, roles and responsibilities of third-parties can also be case and context dependent albeit some generalizable traits.

The figure above also reveals how the nature and underlying causes of the conflict are directly relevant to the outcome of peace mediation and facilitation. Given the variety concerning the behaviors and commitments of mediators, a contextual approach can be quite important since the roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators can differ in connection with the underpinnings of conflicts and controversial issues, external conditions, and the relationship with the warring parties.

As highlighted, there are also generalizable roles and responsibilities that contribute to the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. All of these remarks bring forward the following question: What qualifications and skills should be expected from peace mediators and facilitators? It is necessary to identify the factors that affect the commencement, processes, and outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation, all of which are also complementary with the efficiency of conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

¹⁷⁷ Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview,...", p. 129.

In essence, peace mediators and facilitators need to be adaptable and responsive actors towards different cases. They also need to be considered as approachable and credible by the parties. In this process, it is utmost important for peace mediators and facilitators to take regional and international dynamics into consideration while not allowing for obstructing efforts of any external pressures. Accordingly, a delicate balance across different contexts becomes the natural consequence of the undertaking of peace mediation and facilitation.

Roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators can also be approached from the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-negotiation or post-agreement phases. During the pre-negotiation process, for example, the readiness and willingness of the parties and the options for solutions need to be identified. Reassuring the parties to transcend the classical understanding that takes winning or losing as the whole point can be encouraging for supportive interactions. Focusing on the parties and withdrawing external patrons from the conflict while enlisting them for other duties with the prospects to generate constructive and positive outcomes, as decoupling the role of the mediator, can also be critical in converging mediation to conflict resolution.¹⁷⁸

Fundamentally, it is crucial for the parties in crisis to trust the mediator. This is why mediators must be upright, honourable, determinative, good communicator, listener, feedback provider, patient, and persuasive. Of critical importance is that mediators should not have hidden agendas and should not be familiar with the conflict and its socio-cultural environment. It is also important for the mediator to create an atmosphere of trust, since the conflicting parties are in a negative position marked by disagreement, struggle, misunderstanding, distrust, and evaluation of the other party as an enemy or opponent, along with the feelings of anger, hate, and betrayal. Positive manipulation oriented at benefiting the parties for the arrival of a solution has also been recommended rather than negative manipulation.¹⁷⁹

With that being said, third-parties need to acquire knowledge regarding the underlying roots of the conflict and the political, social, and cultural surroundings when the practices of peace mediation and facilitation are initiated. Being aloof from the conflict and the needs and motivations of the warring parties can jeopardize the

¹⁷⁸ Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts", pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁹ Horowitz, "Mediation", pp. 52-53.

credibility of peace mediators and facilitators. Further to this, this acquired knowledge needs to be integrated into the techniques of peace mediation and facilitation.

During the pre-negotiation process, amelioration of cleavages in the parties and promotion of consensus upon interests, values, and concessions cannot be insulated from the tasks of a mediator. Also, mediators need to develop their skills and competencies in such a manner as capable of assisting the parties for the arrival of a durable solution. With the initiation of peace dialogue, arrangement of venue, and legitimization of talks and meetings, the parties can move towards the process of negotiation. In this process, the role of mediators as facilitators commences. Accordingly, mediators play a facilitating role in promoting fruitful exchanges between the parties. Offering new and fresh information and suggestions and utilizing resources for a solution grounded in positive-sum outcomes are necessary for the fulfillment of mediation tasks.¹⁸⁰ This statement links peace mediation and facilitation in terms of the commencement of negotiations while highlighting capabilities and duties.

In addition, previous relationships of a mediator with conflicting parties can be considered as decisive for their perceptions and behaviors and the assessment of mediation in terms of its efficiency, leverage, and legitimacy. The values through which the adversaries attribute their relationship with a mediator may influence their perceptions and behaviors. The alignment, shared common experience, or goals of a mediator with one of the adversaries, and the interactions cannot be seen as non-relevant. As a result, a greater level of flexibility and confidence can be acquired from the parties. Overall, the behaviors and outcomes of mediation can be affected by the alignment of mediator; past relationship between the mediator and the adversaries, and the interests of the mediator.¹⁸¹

Peace mediators and facilitators should take the perceptions of the conflicting parties into consideration with concern for the effects of any previous contact or familiarity upon the parties. In the case of any previous contact or familiarity, this experience should be able to channel into such means as capable of prompting the parties for flexibility and confidence in the processes of peace mediation and facilitation. With this in mind, it is also important to utilize Track I Diplomacy and/or Track II Diplomacy, or MTD, depending upon the roots and trajectory of the conflict.

¹⁸⁰ Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts", pp. 102-103.

¹⁸¹ Bercovitch, and Houston, "Study of International Mediation: Theoretical...", p. 27.

In combining or choosing these approaches, the interactions between conflicting parties also need to be taken into consideration for the amelioration of conflict.

Mediators, who operate in an environment characterized by complications and uncertainties, also need to effectuate and stabilize the interactions between the negotiators; establish and enforce the protocol; and control inter-negotiator relationships.¹⁸² In this process, mediators play a wide variety of roles as facilitator; initiator of negotiation channels and communication; translator between warring parties when necessary; reframer or reformulator of the conflict; differentiator regarding the positions and interests of parties; creator through suggestion of ideas and options, and agent of reality with concern oriented at increasing awareness about the needs of the parties and demonstrating the costs and benefits of conflict resolution.¹⁸³

To gain a better understanding, it should not be neglected that peace mediators and facilitators have a political role, which denotes a particular emphasis on interpretation. In engaging with the effects of language, culture, and identity on international conflict resolution, *Tarja Väyrynen* explains that third-parties have a political role in the processes of conflict resolution. This role is grounded in the illustration of the attempts of parties to find shared meanings and frames as to be reflected through behaviors. According to *Väyrynen*, mediators and facilitators provide interpretative frameworks in order to understand and construct realities between the parties.¹⁸⁴ The political role embedded in interpretation is critical in managing misunderstandings between the parties. This role also supports the creation of new realities beyond the underlying roots of conflicts.

Taking the adverse effects of misunderstandings into consideration, it is important to provide insurance in case of the collapse of peace talks and to be able to assure any durable solution. Hence, peace mediators and facilitators also need to play a guarantor role. This role, among other tasks, needs to be combined with the legitimizer role. Efforts related to legitimization have been oriented at adding credibility, prestige, and legitimacy into any offered and agreed solution.¹⁸⁵ Fulfilling a legitimizer role can be directed to the needs of the parties and solutions in asymmetric

¹⁸² James A. Wall, Jr., "Review Section : Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research", **The Journal of Conflict Resolution**, Vol. 25, No. 1, Mar. 1981, p. 160.; For more information about these tasks, see: Wall, Jr., "Review Section : Mediation: An Analysis...", pp. 160-165.

¹⁸³ Horowitz, "Mediation", pp. 55-56.

¹⁸⁴ Tarja Väyrynen, **Culture and International Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis of the Work of John Burton**, Manchester and New York : Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts", p. 103.

conflicts. In this process, third-parties can strengthen the commitment of the parties for the implementation of solutions. Providing guarantee, credibility, prestige, and legitimacy into peace negotiations and resolutions can be indicative of the efforts to undermine the counter-efforts of “peace spoilers” as well.

Peace mediators and facilitators need to be aware of the threats resulting from peace spoilers. This denotes that the grievances and issues of peace spoilers should not be avoided by third-parties. In this process, the demands and perceptions of spoilers, as jeopardizing peace, need to be identified and assessed. Following that, there can be attempts to manage or meet the demands that shape the behaviors of spoilers. These attempts can be important in including peace spoilers into peace processes. As part of an inducement strategy, such attempts can be useful for the problem of peace spoilers. There can also be other strategies, including socialization, concerned with the establishment of acceptable behaviors directed to the parties, or coercion, concerned with force, threat, and punishment.¹⁸⁶ Nevertheless, recognition of needs can also be situated within the efforts directed to management and prevention of peace spoilers.

Importantly, third-parties facilitate dialogue directed to the relationships between the representatives of the adversarial groups. This position requires maintaining composure and being prepared to address emotional challenges. In this process, it is also important to be aware of not only the differences but also the similarities between the adversaries.¹⁸⁷ Time also holds a central place in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. As an example, ill-timed mediation performed by *Mercutio* in *Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet* changed the course of the play, or the fate of the characters.¹⁸⁸ This example reaffirms the importance of timing in third-party processes. In this context, it is important to refrain from ill-timed practices as capable of threatening the arrival of peaceful and positive outcomes. As highlighted in *Table 1.1*, postponement of past issues can cause the emergence of protracted peace processes. Also, conflict transformation-oriented lenses emphasize mid- and long-term approaches towards peace processes. Therefore, third-parties need to set a more inclusive and well-considered time frame.

Concomitant with such remarks, peace mediation and facilitation processes aim to guide the adversaries to travel on a peaceful path in contrast to destruction and

¹⁸⁶ Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 12-14.; These strategies also vary with regard to total, limited, and greedy spoilers. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, pp. 14-16.

¹⁸⁷ Volkan, *Divandaki Düşmanlar...*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁸⁸ Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation...”, p. 2.

violence. For this reason, third-parties need to be aware of the ripeness and the immediate action for the encouragement of the parties towards dialogue and negotiation.¹⁸⁹ It is valid and sound to contend that “(...), *some moments are better than others for managing and resolving conflict*”.¹⁹⁰ Hence, third-parties need to be able to capture such moments as conducive for conflict management and resolution.

There have been various types, structures, and techniques of mediation. Nevertheless, there has been a consensus concerning the core process and defining components of mediation that entails “(1) *assistance or some form of interaction by (2) a third-party who (3) does not have the authority to impose an outcome*”.¹⁹¹ The latest explanation asserts that third-parties cannot force the parties for an outcome. Hence, there is an assisting or guiding role, which requires to reinforce the legitimizer role so the parties can be persuaded for peaceful interactions. Also, restrictions related to non-binding functioning of mediation require to benefit from ripeness and time.¹⁹²

To overlook such components, including “ripeness” and “the process of legitimization”, (*emphasis added*), would jeopardize creative and constructive aspects of conflicts and peaceful opportunities. Following the seizure of such an appropriate moment, the following components, as guidelines, are required for the development of a resolving formula: a new regime as capable of bringing solutions to major problems; ensuring a commonality for the definition of the issue that has given rise to the conflict; the establishment of a working relation among the parties; the inclusion of the main parties; the incorporation of justice as the basis of the solution; and the addition of a transitional formula.¹⁹³ In creating a transitional formula, third-parties need to establish an applicable time frame so efforts for peace and conflict resolution can be maintained and deepened.

The roles and responsibilities of third-parties also cover the process following the arrival of an agreement. In this regard, reassuring the commitment to and

¹⁸⁹ Alan Bullion, “Norway and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka”, **Civil Wars**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2001, pp. 72-73.

¹⁹⁰ I. William Zartman, “Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change”, **The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, Vol. 518, Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives, Nov. 1991, p. 16.

¹⁹¹ Wall, Jr., Stark, and Standifer, “Mediation: A Current Review...”, p. 375.

¹⁹² From another perspective, this restriction can also be circumvented by making suggestions that do not reveal power asymmetry between the parties. See: Johannes Hörner, Massimo Morelli, and Francesco Squintani, “Mediation and Peace”, **The Review of Economic Studies**, Vol. 82, No. 4 (293), October 2015, pp. 1483-1501.

¹⁹³ Zartman, “Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment...”, p. 218.; For the ripeness and related factors in peace processes, the following book is also recommended: Stephen J. Stedman, **Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980**, Boulder, Colorado and London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

fulfillment of the agreement is important for its durability. In response to non-performance of the agreement, third-parties need to implement sanctions as checks and deterrents for violations committed by the parties. Of equal importance is that third-parties need to act as reconcilers in the post-agreement or post-negotiations phases of peace mediation and facilitation. Reconciliation denotes assistance for the construction of new interactions and relations in the long-term. With this in mind, the practice of reconciliation takes place between and within the adversaries.¹⁹⁴ This conflict transformation-oriented duty is also critical in guiding parties for reconciliation with their past.

Jacob Bercovitch, and *Allison Houston* explain that the traits such as neutralism, voluntariness, concessions, and impartiality were embedded in traditional research towards mediation. These traits reflect the expectations from mediators while obscuring any understanding of mediation activities.¹⁹⁵ In essence, the fundamentals of mediation consist of impartiality and preparedness of third-parties, the consent of the warring parties, inclusivity, national ownership, compatibility with normative and legal frameworks, coherence, coordination and complementarity of third-party activities, and a viable peace agreement.¹⁹⁶ These duties, complementary practices, and traits reveal mutual interactions among peace and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Moreover, the neutrality of mediators, the willingness of the warring parties to reach an agreement, the offering of substantive suggestions, and concessions can be proven to be invalid. Also, there might not be a correlation between the invalidity of such traits and the effectiveness of mediation. As an example, concessions can be avoided at the expense of integrative solutions.¹⁹⁷ As reflecting the problems associated with neutrality, *Bercovitch* reaches a conclusion that suggests “*mediators may be impartial, or better still perceived as impartial, but they certainly can not be neutral*”.¹⁹⁸

In response to challenges and different ideas, the role and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators should be approached through different contexts. Contextual lenses do not exclude generalizable approaches that need to be included in

¹⁹⁴ Mitchell, “Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts”, p. 103.

¹⁹⁵ Jacob Bercovitch, and Allison Houston, “Why Do They Do It like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Apr. 2000, p. 174.

¹⁹⁶ United Nations, *United Nations Guidance for...*, pp. 6-22.

¹⁹⁷ Burton, *Conflict: Practices in Management...*, p. 25.

¹⁹⁸ Bercovitch, “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation...”, p. 6.

the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Therefore, political psychological approaches and mechanisms will be introduced in order to demonstrate the convergence of both contextualized and generalized approaches in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

As reflecting this and the problem of neutrality, peace psychology promotes values that encourage being involved in suffering rather than being distant or indifferent and being part of the situation through experience sharing and reciprocal relationships rather than vertical relationships. Hence, significant changes can be facilitated at the individual and contextual levels.¹⁹⁹ Involvement in the suffering of the warring parties can be seen as contradictory to the principle of neutrality. However, this statement actually problematizes the traditional principle of neutrality and encourages empathy towards the grievances of the parties.

Drawing from such remarks, political psychological approaches, and particularly peace psychology, can be considered as supportive for the inclusion of a contextual analysis, which has also been embedded in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation regardless of their generalizable scope. This contextual analysis can take place in relation to the nature of the conflict, the warring parties, and third-parties. It should also be noted that not only contextual analysis but also individual and group analysis can be important in the context of peace psychology. The following chapter will provide more detailed perspective about the conceptual and methodological importance of such approaches.

c. Making peace with the adversary: Making peace with the past?

Peace mediation and facilitation processes require to deal with past grievances and traumas. In this Thesis, making peace with the past is considered one of the necessary elements for the suitability of peace mediation and facilitation in the resolution of protracted conflicts within which the underlying roots of conflicts need to be addressed. Hence, peace mediation and facilitation techniques need to be formulated in such a manner as capable of dealing with past grievances and traumas.

As explored in the preceding chapter, mediation indicates a voluntary process for the examination and resolution of differences between parties. This process is accompanied by discussion, clarification, and negotiation. With these in mind, the undertakings of mediation may be oriented at past offenses. Nevertheless, the main

¹⁹⁹ Antonella Sapio, and Adriano Zamperini, "Peace Psychology: Theory and Practice", in Charles Webel, and Johan Galtung (Eds.), **Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies**, London and New York : Routledge, 2007, p. 271.

focus of mediation is considered to be prospective rather than retrospective. This is reflected in the construction of consensus through reasonable and required actions in the long-term.²⁰⁰ In response to restrictions that stem from this prospective tendency, it is critical to be attentive to the past grievances and traumas, which can be activated and intensified due to challenges and ontological insecurities during peace processes. In this context, the injection of a retrospective perspective inevitably requires understanding the psychology of the parties.

Engaging with human psychology has provided significant insights regarding conflict confrontation, conflict management, and resolution. A normal conflict resolution process indicates the ability of human ego to gratify instinctual drives, emotional needs, conscience, and the idealized construction of the self with no disruption upon the relationship between the self, and the others. These processes can be considered successful since they provide an enriching experience for individuals while psychologically adapting and equipping them in dealing with new conflicts. Intergroup or international conflicts also entail the individualistic elements and experiences associated with conflicts. For this reason, it is important not to neglect psychological insights oriented at exploring such processes.²⁰¹ This is why it is necessary to address and comprehend human needs both internally and externally.

Given the link between identity-oriented issues and protracted cases, peace psychology needs to be included in the undertakings of peace mediation and facilitation. Peace psychology is a cross-disciplinary field and practice oriented at dealing with human suffering and achieving non-violent transformation of conflicts. In this process, facilitation and experience-sharing-oriented approaches can be utilized rather than therapeutic interventions. Also, the benefits of peace psychology can be critical for post-constructivism while enriching collective psychology.²⁰² It can be contended that peace psychology can be especially required to erode critiques that problematize the appropriateness of mediation and facilitation for protracted cases. This is evident in linking the approaches of facilitation and experience sharing with peace psychology.

²⁰⁰ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 34.

²⁰¹ Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach", **Political Psychology**, Vol. 6, No. 2, Special Issue: A Notebook on the Psychology of the U.S.-Soviet Relationship, Jun. 1985, pp. 220-221.; The distinction between individual psychology, and group psychology is not rigid. For more information about the interactions of individual psychology, and group psychology, see: Sigmund Freud, **Group Psychology and the Analysis of the EGO**, (transl. by J. Strachey), Fifth Impression, London : The Hogarth Press, Toronto : Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1949.

²⁰² Sapio, and Zamperini, "Peace Psychology: Theory...", pp. 265-266.

In essence, political psychological approaches reveal the correspondence of the self to groups or nations, which acquire their own directions and group behaviors when confronted with a conflict.²⁰³ Hence, political psychology should not be approached as the reflection of the aggregation of human beings within a large-group. Rather, the interactions between human beings and large-groups, and the group or nation itself, and the trajectory of large-groups in response to conflicts should be considered as the main focus of political psychology.

Human beings are part of various large-groups, including countries, nations, ethnicities, and religions. Nevertheless, social living has usually been characterized by intergroup conflicts that can take the form of armed conflicts. There has been a tendency to externalize and distance the phenomena of aggression, conflict, and hate. With the reinforcement of the distinction between self and the other, this tendency has been perceived as more appropriate, especially if the other belongs to a different group. However, both social conflict and cooperation are part of social living.²⁰⁴

Therefore, it is critical to be keenly aware of both constructive and destructive aspects as embedded within human relations rather than exclusion of destructive aspects. Further to this, conflicts can be a source of psyche's growth when resolved with no harm upon integrity.²⁰⁵ Navigating and resolving destructive aspects of conflict generate such outcomes as conducive for individual and social development. Accordingly, political psychological approaches reflect the dual direction of conflicts while promoting constructive and developmental outcomes.

²⁰³ Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies...", p. 221.

²⁰⁴ Arie Nadler, "Intergroup Conflict and its Reduction: A Social-Psychological Perspective", in Rabah Halabi (Ed.), **Israeli and Palestinian Identities in Dialogue: The School for Peace Approach**, (transl. from Hebrew by Deb Reich), New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London : Rutgers University Press, 2004, pp. 15-16.; By the same token, here is another explanation that does not consider perpetrators as psychologically disturbed individuals and large-groups: I. William Zartman, and Mark Anstey, "Lessons for Theory", in I. William Zartman, Mark Anstey, and Paul Meerts (Eds.), **The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder**, New York : Oxford University Press, Inc., 2012, pp. 362-363.; Of equal importance is that the tendency to approach violent individuals and large-groups as psychologically disturbed units has been stressed in the context of the therapeutic approach. In this regard, pacifists argued for the utilization of preventive mechanisms, including non-violent resistance techniques. Examples associated with non-violent resistance include persuasion, sanction, social ostracism, and non-cooperation. See: Arthur I. Gladstone, and Herbert C. Kelman, "Pacifists vs. Psychologists", **American Psychologist**, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1951, p. 127.

²⁰⁵ Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies...", p. 220.; For constructive and destructive processes, and outcomes of conflict, see: Morton Deutsch, "Cooperation and Conflict: A Personal Perspective on the History of the Social Psychological Study of Conflict Resolution", in Michael A. West, Dean Tjosvold, and Ken G. Smith (Eds.), **International Handbook of Organizational Teamwork and Cooperative Working**, Chichester : John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003, pp. 9-43.; Morton Deutsch, **The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes**, New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1973.

Human beings have inner and outer sameness in relation to their individual identity and large-group identity. Both of these identities provide security and protection for large-groups. In times of collective stress and threats, whether perceived or real, large-groups become more aware of their identity. Accordingly, individuals pursue not only the security and protection but also the defence or improvement of large-group identity. In this context, sadistic or masochistic means can be utilized along with the pursuit for a leader.²⁰⁶ Demands and needs associated with large-group identity are also linked to survival and identity-based worldviews, which have affected both protracted conflicts and protracted peace processes.

In engaging with peace processes, the animosity and hostility can intensify with regard to peace anxieties and the nostalgia for the past. Not only conflicts but also peace processes cause stress. The reason is that bringing adversaries together can activate past grievances and traumas, which can be directed to participants or representatives of the other large-group perceived as the enemy. This links the practices of peace mediation and facilitation with political psychological approaches since influencing the emotions and perceptions of the parties is in the interest of third-parties if the purpose is directed to conflict resolution and transformation.

Therefore, the practices of peace mediation and facilitation need to be formulated through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. With its components and indications such as the shift from survival- and identity-oriented perspectives to unity-based peace and the promotion of reconciliation, conflict transformation allows for the embracement of constructive and innovative means by the warring parties and the whole society. This approach can also be effective in preventing the emergence of protracted peace processes.

As explained, both the immediate issues and the underlying roots and relationships surrounding the conflict need to be addressed from the lenses of conflict transformation. Such considerations can point to the activation of the past while awakening anxieties associated with peace processes. The interactions between warring parties cannot be considered apart from psychological factors. Building upon this, it is clear why peace mediation and facilitation inevitably require retrospective understanding, which can be developed through political psychology.

²⁰⁶ Vamik D. Volkan, "Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of Large-Group Identity", **Group Analysis**, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2001, pp. 83-84.

In *Vamık Volkan's* footsteps, the term “time collapse” captures the resurrection of a “chosen trauma.” The term chosen trauma indicates mental representations associated with past traumas, tragedies, and the feelings of helplessness, shame, and humiliation of a group when confronted with another group during a conflict. The past traumas and aforementioned feelings, as shared by a large-group and transmitted or handed down across generations, are connected with transgenerational inability for mourning. Large-groups fail to reverse narcissistic humiliation and losses and the injured prestige and self-image. In response to drastic changes and the need for the enhancement of large-group identity, a chosen trauma can be reactivated. In this process, time collapses. As a result, an ancient event and ancient enemy are felt or perceived as new. The distinction between one’s large-group identity and other(s) is exaggerated.²⁰⁷ This statement also affirms why it would be naive to avoid a retrospective perspective in third-party practices.

With this in mind, political psychological approaches play encouraging and guiding role in dealing with past traumas and tragedies of the parties and their large-groups at large. The negligence of the past can obliterate peace mediation and facilitation while obstructing the suitability of these practices in protracted conflicts and controversial issues. As a result, engaging with another large-group identity through a third-party requires to deal with the past. In this way, warring parties can be motivated for a long-term change and durable peace.

In times of crises or wars, not only chosen traumas but also “chosen glories” can be reactivated. In such processes regarding humiliations, treats, or killing by other large-group, human beings can move away from their routines, become involved in protecting and repairing their large-group identity, and become more aware of the difference between their group and other(s). Moreover, they can also choose to dehumanize the other. All of these actions have been linked to efforts for the consolidation of their large-group identity.²⁰⁸ In this regard, the term time collapse captures both chosen traumas and chosen glories.

For this reason, it is important to benefit from political psychological analysis in addressing human barriers for the resolution of political problems. Political psychology, as a scientific endeavour, entails the application of human behavior to the realm of political action. One of the greatest contributions of political psychology to

²⁰⁷ Volkan, “Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen...”, pp. 87-89.

²⁰⁸ Vamık D. Volkan, “Large-group Identity, Psychological Borders, and Unofficial Diplomacy”, *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2023, pp. 342-344.

the field of international conflict can be placed within the context of ethnic conflict, which indicates conflicts that occur between culturally different groups. Such differences can be exemplified by differences in terms of race, language, or religion. Given the persistence of ethnic conflicts, both foreign policy specialists and political psychologists are engaged with ethnic conflicts that cause wars within and among states.²⁰⁹ Hence, third-parties need to appreciate experiences and insights of these relevant actors, along with the effects of various emotions that stem from warring parties in ethnic conflicts.

As reflecting one of the prominent emotions, anxiety can emerge when there is a change in relation to an intrapsychic danger. Relevant examples include the loss of a mother image or of security. In addition to internal and external changes and threatening circumstances, facing with the representatives from the enemy group can also be a source of anxiety and lead to a deeper level of engagement with one's own identity.²¹⁰ In response to the emergence of anxiety, which occurs in times of large-group regression, peace negotiations, or intrapsychic threats, the absence of enriching political psychological approaches can jeopardize positive outcomes- and conflict transformation-oriented achievements initiated by the processes of peace mediation and facilitation.

Therefore, it is necessary to be prepared for such difficulties resulting from the emotions of the representatives and the implications of large-groups. In making peace with the adversaries, one should not disregard the role of political psychological approaches. Among these approaches, forgiveness and reconciliation can be considered as necessary components with regard to conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Means for forgiveness and reconciliation can be effective in dealing with the disruptive effects of peace anxieties and in dismantling the reinforcement of dehumanization. The role of forgiveness and reconciliation can be grasped in the following passage:²¹¹

*“In cases of social conflict where at least
one of the parties involved is not the equal of the*

²⁰⁹ Davidson, and Montville, “Foreign Policy...”, pp. 145-146.; In a more broader framework, the field of conflict resolution can be described as one of the most susceptible areas for the contributions of political psychology. See: Davidson, and Montville, “Foreign Policy...”, p. 153.; Hence both the resolution of conflict, and resolution of ethnic conflicts, in particular, can be considered as critical for the dissemination of the contributions of political psychological approaches.

²¹⁰ Volkan, “Large-group Identity, Psychological Borders,...”, pp. 341-342.

²¹¹ Daniel L. Smith, “The Rewards of Allah”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 26, No. 4, Nov. 1989, p. 386.; Emphasis added for the *italicized* sentences in this direct quotation.

*other in military potential or national sovereignty, the language of **forgiveness and reconciliation** more appropriately expresses the inevitable fact that the parties involved not only need to ‘resolve a conflict’ or ‘reach a settlement’, but must also **live together in some form of socio-political relationship that is on-going and continuous**”.*

Drawing from this explanation, it is clear that parties need to be motivated for forgiveness and reconciliation in making peace with the adversaries and with the past and in establishing a new regime, a commonality surrounding the identification of issues, a working relationship, justice, and a transitional formula through the involvement of the direct parties²¹², albeit power asymmetries, and transgenerational effects of past traumas, losses, and injustices. Accordingly, this Thesis considers forgiveness and reconciliation in a complementary relationship with political psychological approaches to peace mediation and facilitation.²¹³

Political psychological approaches can also be important in understanding the motives and challenges of the relevant actors. For the motives behind the engagement of mediators, as legitimized through the purpose of conflict reduction, for example, mediators can be evaluated as humanitarian and self-interested actors. Mediators can choose to get involved in a conflict when the continuance of the conflict jeopardizes their interests, affects their relationship with the conflicting parties, or a regional balance. The motives of mediators can also be explained with the pursuit to extend and increase their influence. In such cases, the solution of the conflict can be treated as a vehicle for the establishment of closer relations with the conflicting party or parties. It is emphasized that the pursuit of mediators oriented at achieving peace cannot be carried out at the expense of their interests. However, the interests of mediators cannot be evaluated as harmful since such interests widen the range of outcomes and offer greater flexibility in the process of bargaining.²¹⁴

In essence, the motives and rationale of peace mediation and facilitation are complex and transcend mere considerations directed to altruism and the achievement

²¹² These components have been explained as part of the “Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation” by I. William Zartman. See: Zartman, “Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment,...”, p. 218.

²¹³ For the socio-psychological importance of reconciliation, the following book is recommended: Lily Gardner Feldman, **Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity**, Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

²¹⁴ Zartman, and Touval, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution...”, pp. 32-33.

of peace.²¹⁵ For the conflicting parties, on the other hand, the motives oriented at pursuing or accepting mediation entail expectations and hopes in connection with possible outcomes that produce more favorable conditions compared to the continuance of conflict; a more favorable settlement compared to direct negotiations; the effects resulting from the rejection of mediator's offering that might cause greater harm; reduction of risks associated with concessions through intermediary; protection of their image and reputation, and the belief in the arrival of a final agreement that can be guaranteed through the involvement of mediators, which also indicates the reduction of risk for violence.²¹⁶ The parties can also expect an alignment between intervention and their own interests.²¹⁷ All of these factors affirm the complexity behind decision-making processes in third-party practices.

In response to the benefits of political psychological approaches, the following sections will provide enriching insights devoted to elucidation of the complexities behind peace mediation and facilitation. These insights hold importance for the cases in this Thesis. Accordingly, the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy will also be assessed by utilizing these insights regarding the role of human needs and large-group identity in the phases of cases. As a result, the following sub-sections will explore human needs and large-group identity. It will be reaffirmed how human needs theory and large-group identity, as corresponding to survival and identity-based worldviews, are relevant with the undertakings of Nordic peace diplomacy.

d. The relevance of human needs theory in the context of peace mediation and facilitation

Human needs theory asserts that conflicts can occur when certain fundamental and universal needs of human beings are not fulfilled. In this context, *H. B. Danesh* recalls the hierarchical human needs proposal of *Abraham Maslow* as follows: the need for food, water, and shelter, which have been followed by the need for safety and security, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization.²¹⁸

The fulfillment of these needs has also been linked to the functioning of large-group identity. Accordingly, mobilization under identity and elimination of the other

²¹⁵ Bercovitch, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation...*, p. 21.

²¹⁶ Zartman, and Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution...", pp. 34-35.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²¹⁸ Danesh, "Human Needs Theory, Conflict...", p. 510.; For the explanation of these needs, as cited by *Hossain B. Danesh*, see: Abraham Maslow, "Preface to Motivation Theory", *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1943, pp. 85-92.

can be pursued for the fulfillment of human needs and interests.²¹⁹ With that being said, the concept of human needs can also be considered as the translation of the notion of structural violence introduced by *Galtung*.²²⁰ Hence, the link between human needs and peace processes contains efforts to address and eliminate structural violence.

From a political psychological perspective, one can assume that the need of human beings to have both allies and enemies underpins the essence of political psychology. As a result, depth psychology must be a part of conflicts and politics.²²¹ This denotes why large-group identity can also be part of human needs through allies and enemies. Given ideally transformative effects of peace processes, parties and their friends and foes-oriented mindsets can be disrupted, and a new reality can be created. Hence, the inclusion of human needs also signals the need to benefit from depth psychology.

Human needs can be considered as connected with conflicts, large-group identities, and the formation of alliances and enemies. As a result, human needs inevitably affected the objectives of conflict resolution. In this context, *Burton* emphasizes how conflict resolution is concerned with the formation of such an outcome that is capable of completely satisfying the needs and interests of parties in conflicts rather than win-lose or a certain level of compromise-oriented outcomes. Satisfaction of human needs and interests makes conflict resolution a self-sustaining practice.²²² Taken together, human needs and large-group identity have structural, social, and individual accommodations that guide the rationale and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation.

Hence, addressing problems associated with human needs can be considered a vehicle for peaceful resolution of conflicts between parties. Within this framework, failures and unsatisfactory outcomes following the practices of peace mediation and facilitation can deepen identity-related conflicts. Therefore, the following paragraphs will articulate both human needs theory and large-group identity. With the following paragraphs, it will be crystallized that human needs theory and large-group identity

²¹⁹ Zartman, and Anstey, "Lessons for Theory", pp. 361-362.

²²⁰ John Burton, and Frank Dukes, "Introduction", in John Burton, and Frank Dukes (Eds.), **Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution**, New York : St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 6.

²²¹ Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies...", p. 221.

²²² John W. Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in Edward E. Azar, and John W. Burton (Eds.), **International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice**, Sussex : Wheatsheaf Books; Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 94.

can be approached as abstractions in capturing both generalizable and the context-specific roles and responsibilities of peace mediators and facilitators.

With the acceptance of human beings as integrated and completely organized entities, it would be unwise and unsound, *Maslow* argues, to select hunger as a paradigm that can be generalizable for all other human motivations. In comparison with physiological needs, which have customarily been considered as guiding and setting drives, secondary or cultural desires, such as praise, prestige, and social ties, have been regarded as less important and less decisive.²²³

Importantly, the aforesaid desires can be linked to physiological needs. Hence, a rigid distinction between physiological needs and secondary or cultural desires might not be valid and sound. Accordingly, third-parties should not have a biased posture, although the importance of distinctions between primary needs and more secondary desires, or negotiable and non-negotiable, is critical. With that being said, certain hierarchical categorizations can be restrictive in some cases.

From a social-psychological perspective, both collective needs and fears can cause international conflicts.²²⁴ For this reason, it is important to understand not just the dynamic of human needs but also large-group identities. This is also reflected in the critique of *Väyrynen* with regard to *Burton's* IR and conflict resolution theory and its role in the approachment to socio-biological human needs as a point of departure. In contrast to *Burton*, *Väyrynen* contends that the emphasis on socio-biological human needs and ontological drives can lead to denial of culture, negligence of the context-specific approaches, and concomitant social constructions that also affect human beings. For this reason, third-party techniques can also benefit from cultural and social aspects.²²⁵ Hence, approaches grounded in human needs should be responsive to culture and large-groups as well.

As for *Maslow*, all other needs can be considered as non-existent or can be pressured when physiological needs are not satisfied. As a result, physiological needs

²²³ Abraham Maslow, "Preface to Motivation Theory", *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1943, p. 85.; In this study, *Maslow* uses the terms drive, need, and desire as interchangeable. *Maslow* also emphasizes that "*any motivation theory must take account not only of the fact that the organism behaves ordinarily as an integrated whole, but also of the fact that sometimes it does not*". See: Maslow, "Preface to Motivation Theory", p. 90.

²²⁴ Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-psychological Dimensions of International Conflict", in I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds.), **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques**, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 194.

²²⁵ Väyrynen, **Culture and International Conflict Resolution...**, pp. 1-2.

affect and dominate all capacities.²²⁶ However, non-physiological desires, which can usually be treated as means to an end rather than as ends in themselves, are more important and more common compared to the drive of hunger. In this connection, it is contended that it would be more appropriate to consider the desire for money and love per se as more fundamental compared to the hunger drive in the context of human motivation. With this in mind, the desire for money and love reflects physiological motives.²²⁷

Appreciation, self-esteem, and worthiness also mark basic human motivations. Importantly, these motivations affect the relations between large-groups. The fulfillment of motivations reverberates in the tendency to favour the belonging group and to belittle other social groups.²²⁸ Such remarks affirm the link between basic human needs and large-group identity relations. Of critical importance is that common basic human needs can cause confrontational interactions and promote survival and identity-based worldviews. Failure to challenge the aforesaid tendency regarding the marginalization of others can jeopardize diversity, peaceful co-existence, and unity.

Actually, dualistic and restrictive understanding can also affect human development adversely. In essence, human needs are required for development. With this in mind, the deprivation of common human needs that are required for development can cause protracted social conflicts. These common elements include security, identity, social recognition of identity, and involvement in such processes that are decisive upon the conditions surrounding security and identity. The pursuit of these compelling needs is embedded as an ontological drive.²²⁹

Hence, unfulfillment of these aforesaid common elements affects human development adversely and dominates the behavior and motivation of human beings. As a result, human beings can mobilize and resort to violence when their needs are not addressed and accommodated. In engaging with such conflicts, third-parties need to acknowledge not only such common elements but also context- and culture-specific

²²⁶ Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation", **Psychological Review**, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1943, p. 373.

²²⁷ Maslow, "Preface to Motivation Theory", pp. 85-86.

²²⁸ Nadler, "Intergroup Conflict and its Reduction:...", p. 19.

²²⁹ Edward E. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in Edward E. Azar, and John W. Burton (Eds.), **International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice**, Sussex : Wheatsheaf Books; Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, p. 29.; For another perspective as linking the satisfaction of human and non-human nature needs with the concept of development, see: Johan Galtung, **Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization**, Oslo : International Peace Research Institute, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi : SAGE Publications, 1996, pp. 128-129.

circumstances. Given the link between human needs and development, this process should also be consolidated with the promotion of humanitarianism.

According to *Maslow*, motivation can be evaluated as constant, dynamic, and complex. Therefore, an isolated framework should not be chosen. Further to this, human drives should not be analyzed within an atomistic list. Rather, a hierarchy of specificity should be utilized. This hierarchical classification can be constructed through fundamental goals or needs as remain constant rather than instrumental and ordinary drives or particular goal objects. Examples of fundamental human motivations include, but are not limited to, the pursuit of safety and self-esteem. In this process, culture, the environment, or the field also affect human motivations.²³⁰ Hence, common human needs do not exclude the inclusion of a contextual understanding.

Maslow contends that five sets of needs can be determined with regard to the theory of human motivation. These needs can be explained in the following order as characterized by the hierarchy of prepotency: satisfaction and gratification of physiological and sensual needs; the safety needs that indicate a reliable, familiar, and manageable world; love, affection, warmth, acceptance, and belonging as emphasizing a place in the group; self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence; self-actualization as the fulfillment of one's potentialities and capacities. The achievement of these needs or purposes will be affected by various notions, including freedom, full information, justice, and order. As a result, human beings will also seek the fulfillment of such notions.²³¹ Deprivation from these notions will no doubt generate grievances and conflicts.

According to *Burton*, human needs and interests affect the categorization of conflicts and disputes. Additionally, values can be positioned between these categories due to their dynamic characteristics with regard to time and personal adjustments. *Burton* argues that identity, along with other human needs, can be included in the strongly held values. As a result of this, identity can be treated as a need. Concerning the processes of dispute settlement and conflict resolution, the emphasis needs to be put on negotiable interests and non-negotiable human needs, respectively.²³² In this context, conflict resolution is concerned with non-negotiable needs, among which identity plays a central role. Identity can be seen as both a human need and a value.

²³⁰ Maslow, "Preface to Motivation Theory", pp. 87-90.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92n12.

²³² Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, pp. 3-4.; For a detailed explanation about human needs, values, and interests, see: Burton, **Conflict: Resolution and Prevention**, pp. 36-41.

Within this framework, there are subjects that have been accepted as outside of the bargaining and negotiation processes. Accordingly, identity falls under this category. The expression of identity regarding its recognition, approval, and accommodation, on the other hand, can be negotiated.²³³ Hence, the nature of conflicts has been marked by the involvement of not just human interests but also human needs and processes in which the parties must follow a path from aggression to problem-solving. Ontological and universal human characteristics and needs thus underpin conflicts and problem-solving processes.²³⁴

The processes of dispute settlement can be considered as more suitable when confronted with such cases that are in need of authoritative determinations with regard to the preservation of social norms and that are outside of human needs. These cases can be repressed through the enforcement of settlement. In essence, dispute settlement puts an emphasis on punishment rather than reduction of the underlying problems of conflicts. The processes of resolution, on the other hand, are suitable for such cases that require in-depth analysis of human behaviors and relationships. In this context, third-party assistance can also be required. Conflict resolution processes extend in connection with the focus directed to the sources of the conflict. Removal of the sources of conflict for its prevention has been linked to the extension of the resolution process.²³⁵ That is why, dealing with problems related to human needs can be considered as an achievement in the context of conflict resolution.

Examples of needs, as inherent drives, include identity and recognition. As highlighted, human needs cannot be negotiated and traded in contrast to interests.²³⁶ The deprivation of basic human needs indicates conditions marked by structural and cultural violence.²³⁷ The adverse effects of identity conflicts in forms of mass killings and genocide have been observable.²³⁸ As a result, basic human needs can be linked to identity, intergroup conflict, conflicts characterized by protractedness, and multi-

²³³ Zartman, and Anstey, "Lessons for Theory", p. 361.

²³⁴ John Burton, "Introduction", in John Burton (Ed.), **Conflict: Human Needs Theory**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p. 2.; In addition to ontological and universal human needs, the incorporation of human needs into identity groups can also be associated with the ramifications of human needs. Accordingly, individual needs can be articulated in large-group conflicts. Kelman, "Social-psychological Dimensions of...", p. 195.; This is why, human needs are linked to the functioning of large-groups.

²³⁵ Burton, **Conflict: Practices in Management...**, p. 4.

²³⁶ Burton, **Conflict: Resolution and Prevention**, pp. 39-40.

²³⁷ Wilfried Graf, Gudrun Kramer, and Augustin Nicolescou, "Counselling and Training for Conflict Transformation and Peace-building: The TRANSCEND Approach", in Charles Webel, and Johan Galtung (Eds.), **Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies**, London and New York : Routledge, 2007, p. 130.

²³⁸ Zartman, and Anstey, "Lessons for Theory", pp. 361-362.

culturalism. With its extensive implications, human needs can be effective to improve intergroup relations and to resolve protracted social conflicts.²³⁹

For this reason, means for the satisfaction of human needs have been linked to the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution.²⁴⁰ It follows from these remarks that the practices of peace mediation and facilitation cannot neglect the role of human needs for the emergence, intensification, and resolution of conflicts. However, engaging with human needs theory cannot be considered sufficient and free from any problems. Human needs are intertwined with existential and ethical questions concerning the place of human beings and the reasons and motivations behind the behaviours of human beings in the world.²⁴¹ Hence, what can be approached as a human need can be quite comprehensive and even elusive.

In addition, *Galtung* argues that positing sets of conditions that are sufficient for the well-being of human beings can be problematized. The term well-being connotes a general human drive in terms of a transition from the conditions of ill-being to well-being. This drive can be expressed through basic human needs. However, the conditions associated with well-being are too extensive. Also, the feeling and perception of well-being can change with regard to different circumstances and contexts. With that being said, positing sets of conditions for the identification of ill-being can be less problematic. Nonetheless, well-being can be approached from different frameworks grounded in body, mind, and spirit and through particular basic needs.²⁴² But still, it is clear that there is a wider universal, social, and individual dimension that needs to be taken into consideration for human needs. This consideration can also disrupt hierarchical evaluation of human needs. Further to this, it can also be important to focus on the opposite conditions of human needs regarding ill-being.

²³⁹ Ronald J. Fisher, "Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict", in John Burton (Ed.), **Conflict: Human Needs Theory**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p. 89.

²⁴⁰ Burton, "Introduction", p. 3.; This approach also allows for the operationalization of justice by addressing the basic concerns and needs of the parties. See: Kelman, "Social-psychological Dimensions of...", p. 198.; One of the reasons for the compatibility of the problem-solving approach with conflict transformation-oriented perspectives is the concern over the operationalization of justice through basic human needs.

²⁴¹ Germann Diligensky, "Problems of the Theory of Human Needs", **Social Science Information**, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1981, p. 169.

²⁴² Johan Galtung, "Meeting Basic Needs: Peace and Development", in Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis, and Barry Keverne (Eds.), **The Science of Well-being**, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 477-481.; Also, the approaches for well-being include but not limited to peace, development, health, human rights, and Buddhism. Galtung, "Meeting Basic Needs: Peace...", p. 478.

As reflecting dynamic traits of human needs, *Maslow* proposes the term self-transcendence, which indicates the highest and most comprehensive level of human behavior, cognition, and consciousness. In this regard, this offering can be considered as an end in itself to oneself, others, human beings and species, the nature, and the cosmos.²⁴³ Despite the inclusion of a wider focus, the following basic needs, *Galtung* argues, can be considered as necessary for the well-being of human beings: survival, wellness, freedom, and identity. These needs negate the following components: violence, misery/disease, repression, and alienation.²⁴⁴

With that being said, meeting these human needs through affirmative and negative components cannot be sufficient in understanding various complexities behind the individual and collective psychology, peace psychology, and identity dynamics at large. In this context, the non-violent framework of Transcend aims to offer a new reality behind the prioritization of some human needs grounded in ideological considerations or pathological fixations towards one basic need, of which the latter can be observed in deep-rooted conflicts. Hence, the framework of Transcend is compatible with the work of conflict transformation.²⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the deprivation and satisfaction of human needs provide a solid basis for the practices of peace mediation and facilitation in conflicts and controversial issues. In this regard, basic human needs can be considered as a path between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The avoidance of and constraints upon basic human needs, and the alienation of one's large-group identity from the formation and functioning of political processes, underpin various protracted conflicts. With the benefits of human needs, there can be important contributions in terms of conflict transformation. This is reflected in the Transcend approach, which can be considered complementary with conflict resolution.

e. The relevance of large-group identity in the context of peace mediation and facilitation

Quincy Wright explains how viewing the world through Soviet and American power groups-oriented grouping might restrict opportunities for stability, and international peace and security. In this regard, engaging with lesser groups and levels

²⁴³ Abraham Maslow, *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*, (ed. by Stuart Miller), An Esalen Book, The Esalen Publishing Program, New York : The Viking Press, 1971, p. 279.; For various meanings of Transcendence, see: Maslow, *Farther Reaches of Human Nature*, pp. 269-279.

²⁴⁴ Galtung, "Meeting Basic Needs: Peace...", p. 481.; Basic human needs can also be subject to different prioritizations. See: Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescou, "Counselling and Training for...", p. 130.

²⁴⁵ Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescou, "Counselling and training for...", p. 130.

has been demonstrated for more opportunities. Understanding individuals within various groups and levels, including great power combinations, nations, associations, local groups, and parties, and comprehending the attitudes of individuals along with conflicts, tensions, and cooperations at different levels have been critical in social sciences. As reflecting this, both conflict and cooperation can be observed in various groups and levels.²⁴⁶

Focusing not only on great power combinations but also on nations, associations, local groups, and parties can be effective in providing more nuanced perspective towards conflict and cooperation. It can be argued that the utilization of lenses as derived from power groups and rivalries during the Cold War can inhibit the inclusion of broader views pertaining to international peace and security. As a means of transcending this restrictive perspective resulting from the bipolar international system, the focus can be directed to large-groups that can provide enriching foresights for third-parties especially following the end of the Cold War.

Volkan contends that a large-group refers to tens of thousands or millions of people as sharing a feeling of sameness, large-group identity, myths and realities of common beginnings, historical continuities, geographical realities, and linguistic, societal, religious, cultural, and political ties.²⁴⁷ Large-group identity can be linked to various aspects, including a feeling of belonging, history, geography, language, and social, religious, cultural, and political values.

Continuity and protection of these components can be critical against pressures and uncertainties as experienced during conflicts. As reflecting this, the identification of a situation as a conflict leads to cognitive activities in connection with the formation of beliefs by society members. This two-fold cognitive engagement can be explained by referencing the need for epistemic understanding of conflict, which often causes stress and uncertainty. In response to this stress and uncertainty, cognitive activities have been marked by efforts oriented at capturing the eruption of conflict, the

²⁴⁶ Quincy Wright, "The Importance of the Study of International Tensions; Meaning of Social Tension", *International Social Science Bulletin*, UNESCO, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1950, pp. 91-92.

²⁴⁷ Vamik Volkan, "Large-Group-Psychology in its Own Right: Large-Group Identity and Peace-making", *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Special Issue: Community Psychoanalysis: I: Basic First Steps, September 2013, p. 210.; Approaching individuals and communal groups as units of analysis has also been referred to as pluralist paradigm in International Relations. This alternative paradigm has been advocated against the restrictions of realist and structural paradigms in dealing with protracted social conflicts. However, pluralist paradigm does not indicate to refute the role of realist and structural paradigms. Rather, a synthesis of realist and structural paradigms into the pluralist paradigm has been emphasized in the context of protracted social conflict. See: Azar, "Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", p. 95.

identification of responsible party, and the intentions of the adversaries.²⁴⁸ It can be contended that such cognitive efforts aim to offer a reliable foundation against ambiguities and pressures. In this process, addressing the underlying roots of conflict is also necessary to be able to comprehend its eruption.

Peace processes can be approached as a source of disruption and further complication for cognitive activities. The reason is that warring parties reflect their mindsets as corresponding to their groups and their perceived enemies. With the intensification of animosity and competition between the representatives of adversarial groups as engaged in dialogue, managing peace processes can be challenging. The competition can revolve around the inheritance, the grievance, and even the genuine pursuit of the achievement of peace.²⁴⁹ Further to this, there can also be competition grounded in ethnic or national exclusivity over emotions, including fear and vulnerability. In this regard, an attitude marked by efforts oriented at denying human emotions of the other, namely the enemy, can characterize this competition.²⁵⁰ As a result, navigating these dehumanization practices holds importance for peace processes.

The dynamics of large-group identity should be directed to peaceful interactions rather than violence. This is especially critical given the catalyzing role of the components of large-groups in conflicts and controversial issues. As emphasized by *Volkan*, the interactions between national, ethnic, religious, or political ideological large-groups and the psychology of these large-groups are quite relevant to IR, especially in terms of peaceful or destructive movements. It is contended that large-groups affect not only destructive conflicts but also negotiations and agreements of their leaders.²⁵¹ For this reason, large-group identity and its psychology cannot be neglected in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

With this in mind, it is important to acknowledge both functional and dysfunctional aspects of intergroup conflict, which occurs in various levels, such as organizational, communal, and international. Conflict, as a central fact of human existence, might be functional or dysfunctional depending upon its constructive and destructive handling. Therefore, it is important for scientists and practitioners to be able to direct such means as capable of reducing the destructiveness of intergroup

²⁴⁸ Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution...", pp. 352-353.

²⁴⁹ Volkan, *Divandaki Düşmanlar...*, p. 41.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁵¹ Vamık D. Volkan, "Large-group Identity, International Relations and Psychoanalysis", *International Forum of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, pp. 206-207.

conflict. Reduction of destruction might be effective for the realization of functional outcomes of conflicts. In this context, the functionality of conflicts can be explained in terms of social change, justice, equality, and the improvement of the human condition.²⁵² All of these demonstrate a link between outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses to third-party practices.

Reduction of destructiveness of intergroup conflict can be crucial, especially in protracted conflicts. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, is also characterized as an intergroup conflict with important implications in terms of the role of leaders and fatal threats, including genocide. Group leaders do not possess a monopoly over the use of force, nor sufficient guarantees regarding the compliant actions of their constituencies. Further to this, groups can also face threats and extreme cases, which can cause their demise. Intergroup conflicts can be described as highly antagonistic, indiscriminate, and susceptible to anarchy while evoking and intensifying the security and identity of the participants or followers, blurring the difference between combatants and civilians, and offering negative outbidding.²⁵³

Hence, approaching these cases through the inclusion of large-group identity can be important in understanding the emergence and trajectory of conflicts, the behaviours and motivations of involved actors, the internalization and externalization processes, and the risks and threats directed to international peace and security. Also, third-parties can map the reactions of large-groups towards a change or an added insecurity.

Of equal importance is that the term large-group identity also captures the identity of third-parties, which affects their acceptability and relations with the warring parties. In the case of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, one can consider Nordic countries as an appropriate large-group to a considerable extent. This will become evident in engaging with the selected phases of cases that entail the reflections of Nordic identity and reputation as well. In this regard, it will be comprehended how Nordic countries can be approached as an example of a specific large-group with enabling implications for third-party involvements.

As reflecting the destructiveness of identity, on the other hand, it can be important to focus on the emergence of identity-based conflicts, which take place

²⁵² Ronald J. Fisher, "Introduction: The Pervasive Enigma of Intergroup Conflict", in Ronald J. Fisher, **The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution**, New York : Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 1-2.

²⁵³ Oren Barak, "The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 42, No. 6, Nov. 2005, p. 720.

between large-groups. Identity-based conflict indicates collective identities grounded in ethnicity, religion, language, and other characteristics associated with communal groups. These characteristics, as qualities, perpetuate communal differences and affect the perceptions of the combatants. As a result, the combatants intend to evaluate every human being in each group as part of the conflict. Immutable collective identities may cause destructive conflicts, including genocide.²⁵⁴ It has also been observable that such conflicts can take a protracted direction, which can also be observable in peaceful initiatives.

Protracted social conflicts entail prolonged and often destructive struggles that cause human and material loss. Such conflicts reveal the failure of states in the functions of inclusiveness, institution-building, national integration, and satisfaction of basic human needs of all communal groups. Societies that are economically underdeveloped with multi-ethnic composition can especially be vulnerable to the emergence of protracted conflicts. Terrorism, the tendency to spill-over, persistence, and struggle over basic human needs, including identity needs, the obtainment/promotion of economic and political rights, and redemption of the failure of the state towards the needs of large-group members, characterize protracted conflicts. The parties to these conflicts are motivated by cultural, economic, political, psychological, racial, and religious considerations.²⁵⁵

In response to the emergence of protracted conflicts, destructive actions such as genocide and terrorism can occur. These actions are linked to destructive mindsets, which consider the other communal group(s) as non-human and as targets for violence. Moreover, inflicting harm on other can be evaluated as a means of the gratification and remedification of their own large-group identity. These actions can even be considered heroic for the protection and consolidation of large-group identity. As has been indicated above, collective identities affect the actions and mindsets of human beings in such a way as capable of generating irreversible destructive outcomes, including crimes against humanity.

Albeit different levels of internal/external identification, large-group identity underpins the protracted nature of selected cases in this Thesis. Conflicts characterized by protractedness inhibit the alteration of fundamental grievances between the warring

²⁵⁴ Louis Kriesberg, "Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 38, No. 3, Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes, May 2001, pp. 374-375.

²⁵⁵ Azar, "Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", pp. 93-94.

parties. Reduction of means as capable of dealing with issues; generation or consolidation of deceptive images resulting from the perspective of both parties; the tendency for the escalation of confusions as affecting direct/indirect communication processes adversely; the escalation of anxieties and the promotion of strategies that maintain conflict are indicative of protracted social conflicts.²⁵⁶ In response to this, both psychopolitical and socioeconomic needs of the communities need to be accommodated.²⁵⁷ All of these remarks affirm how protracted conflicts can be challenging for peace mediation and facilitation practices.

For this reason, direct and indirect reflections of large-group identity need to be addressed through comprehensive perspectives. This denotes a means against restrictions that stem from the system and the state-centric perspectives. For this reason, individual, contextual, and large-group-oriented analysis needs to be mainstreamed into the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. It should not be overlooked that protractedness can be linked to both conflicts, and peace processes. With the benefits of such a framework, which has been limited to human needs and large-group identity in this Thesis, the generation of another protracted and deadlocked process led by peace mediation and facilitation can be prevented.

Chapter II - Nordic peace diplomacy in International Relations

Understanding the most effective institutions and/or third-party intervention strategies for conflict resolution and prevention has been a fundamental objective of IR.²⁵⁸ In this regard, various forms and instruments of conflict resolution and prevention have been coordinated in relation to IR. As a result, peace mediation and facilitation have been considered as catalysts of peace diplomacy at different levels.

Overt and/or quiet functioning of peace mediation and facilitation has been reflected in various peace-promoting cases in which there has been a space for Nordic understanding. This understanding has been shaped by Nordic expertise and guidance, along with systemic conditions. For this reason, unveiling Nordic peace diplomacy can allow us to explore peaceful contributions, techniques, and the reputation of Nordic countries. With this in mind, this chapter will focus on the interactions between Nordic peace diplomacy, which entails peace mediation and facilitation instruments, and internal/external factors that affected its development.

²⁵⁶ Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict; Theory...", p. 51.

²⁵⁷ Azar, "Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict", p. 94.

²⁵⁸ Johannes Hörner, Massimo Morelli, and Francesco Squintani, "Mediation and Peace", **The Review of Economic Studies**, Vol. 82, No. 4 (293), October 2015, p. 1483.

In particular, the underlying explanations that have given rise to Nordic peace diplomacy will be examined. Also, the lessons that can be derived from these explanations and the motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy will be elaborated. Among these motivations, the emphasis will be given to peaceful identity construction that reflects both humanitarian and self-interested objectives. In this chapter, the challenging aspects and directions of Nordic peace diplomacy will be briefly discussed. With the introduction of contributions and failures of Nordic peace diplomacy that stem from selected cases, these challenging aspects and directions will be complemented. On closer inspection, Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be addressed by looking into process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. That is why problems related to Nordic peace diplomacy will primarily be identified through the presentation of cases. With that being said, these cases will also affirm how the contributions of the Nordic countries have been widely internalized.

In *Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation: Research, Practices and Policies*, published by TAPRI, it is contended that peace diplomacy and conflict resolution have been important for Nordic countries to gain a role in global politics. In this regard, the emphasis is given to Norway, described as “*a pioneer of new peace diplomacy in the early 1990s*”.²⁵⁹ Peace diplomacy has also been important for Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. As an example, Denmark is committed to contributing to international development and security by reversing costs and challenges related to fragile states. In this process, military and political instruments, or a combination of humanitarian, political, security, and developmental efforts, can be required. This underscores the significance of prioritizing conflict prevention.²⁶⁰

According to *Anine Hagemann* and *Isabel Bramsen*, on the other hand, mediation has not been a priority for Denmark. Nevertheless, there has been support for religious, humanitarian, and preventive dialogue in various regions.²⁶¹ This is especially reflected in the challenges faced by failing and failed states. Notably, the efforts of Denmark concentrated on the failing and failed states with regard to the

²⁵⁹ Lehti, and Saarinen, “Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts: A Survey...”, p. 13.

²⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, **Fred og Stabilisering: Danmarks Politik for Indsatser i Skrobelige Stater 2010-2015** (“**Peace and Stabilization: Denmark’s Efforts for Interventions in Fragile States 2010-2015**”), Copenhagen : Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (“Udenrigsministeriet”), September 2010, pp. 2-3.; The original text in Danish.

²⁶¹ Anine Hagemann, and Isabel Bramsen, **New Nordic Peace: Nordic Peace and Conflict Resolution Efforts**, TemaNord 2019:524, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019, p. 20, <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1302296/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (accessed 12.11.2022).

conjuncture of the post-Cold War.²⁶² In hindsight, one can argue that the post-Cold War period added new momentum to Nordic peace diplomacy regarding peaceful engagements of Norway and Denmark's focus on the conditions of failing and failed states.

In a document, titled as "Peace Mediation: Finland's Guidelines", compiled and published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, it is explained that peace mediation aims to bring two or more parties together; to prevent a conflict or to solve it through negotiations. In this regard, peace mediation diversifies the instruments as utilized for the crisis management efforts and development policy of Finland.²⁶³ Also, Finland commits to promote and increase its expertise in peace mediation. For this reason, it is affirmed that the means oriented at expanding Finnish mediation activities will be pursued.²⁶⁴ In 2020, "The Centre for Mediation" was also established to support the practices of Finnish peace mediation at the state level.²⁶⁵

In this regard, Finland approaches peace mediation and facilitation as an inclusive framework that entails conflict prevention and conflict resolution processes. The practices of peace mediation and facilitation also promote crisis management and development at large. With the Centre as created in 2020, one can observe that there has been state support for third-party engagements in world politics. Taken together, the commitment of Finland aligns with the reflections of Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy related to peace mediation and facilitation.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden also acknowledges the need for the improvement of sustainable peace against the roots of conflicts and poverty. In an article, dated 07 February 2017, the Government of Sweden announced its new initiative as established at the Ministry with the objective to improve interactions between diplomacy and development cooperation in conflict areas. In this context, peace support efforts of the embassies were decided to be guided through expertise and knowledge of diplomats. The purpose of the creation of such support function has been oriented at strengthening diplomatic capacities for political change, dialogue, and

²⁶² Pertti Joenniemi, "Peace Mediation and Conflict Resolution: The Policies Pursued by Four Nordic Countries", in Marko Lehti (Ed.), **Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation: Research, Practices and Policies**, Tampere, Finland : Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), No. 101, 2014, p. 100.

²⁶³ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, **Peace Mediation-Finland's Guidelines**, p. 8.

²⁶⁴ The Finnish Government, **A Strong and Committed Finland: Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government 20 June 2023**, Helsinki, Finland : Finnish Government, 20 June 2023, p. 185, <https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/165044/Programme-of-Prime-Minister-Petteri-Orpos-Government-20062023.pdf?sequence=4> (accessed 27.08.2022).

²⁶⁵ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Mediation as Part of Finland's Foreign and Security Policy", n.d., <https://um.fi/peacemediation> (accessed 27.09.2022).

negotiation. This purpose requires a broader understanding about conflicts; identification of paths directed to possible solutions for complex conflicts; bringing parties to conflict together, and the promotion of dialogue. The support of Sweden also entails national initiatives that encompass peacebuilding, reconciliation, transitional justice, and mediation.²⁶⁶

As a result, it can be stated that Sweden's approach to peace integrates process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation. Norway's approach to peace will be reflected in engaging with the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka in detail and with the hallmarks and typologies of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. Taken together, it is crucial to comprehend how Nordic countries have utilized peace diplomacy as an overlapping component, despite their differences. Also, peace diplomacy has interacted with various mechanisms, including development, preventive dialogue, crisis management, negotiation, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and transitional justice. In this process, there has been a notable consideration for issues related to poverty and struggles of failing and failed states as well.

In this Thesis, the processes of peace mediation and facilitation, in which the latter is described as a crucial but not a sufficient component of peace mediation, will be evaluated as complementary instruments in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy. It will be revealed why peace mediation and facilitation, as the approaches to peace and conflict resolution, can be captured within a Nordic framework. Accordingly, directing the focus to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation experiences necessitates to understand the background of Nordic peace diplomacy. In what follows, this background will be elaborated through the underlying explanations as driving forces behind Nordic peace diplomacy.

Section I - The underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy: Why Nordic countries?

What makes Nordic countries so distinctive and prominent actors in the field of peace and conflict resolution? In response to this question, the underlying explanations that led to the development of Nordic peace diplomacy can be illustrated in the following *Table 1.8*. These characteristics have been important sources in grasping the

²⁶⁶ The Government Offices of Sweden, **The Government's Measures for a more Peaceful World**, Article from Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 07 February 2017, <https://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/the-governments-measures-for-a-more-peaceful-world/> (accessed 12.12.2022).

prominent role of Nordic countries in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. It can be argued that there has been an interplay between these characteristics as capable of reflecting the role of Nordic countries. In this regard, it is important to comprehend such characteristics in engaging with Nordic peace diplomacy.

Table 1.8: The underlying explanations regarding the prominence of the Nordic countries in the context of peace diplomacy.²⁶⁷

Selected Areas and Aspects	Activities and Effects of Nordic Countries
Expertise and Guidance in the Fields of Peace Research and Conflict Resolution	The Contributions of Nordic Countries to Peace Research
	The Contributions of Nordic Countries to Conflict Resolution
Nordic Balance	Different but Balanced Organizational Affiliations Reduction of Tensions and Restriction of Great Power Involvement during the Cold War ²⁶⁸
Nordic Brand	Nordic Model and Nordic Exceptionalism ²⁶⁹ Peaceful Engagements as Instruments for the Construction of Peace Nation Narrative ²⁷⁰ Scandinavian Humanitarian Brand ²⁷¹ Third Way between Communism and Capitalism during the Cold War ²⁷²
Nordic Humanitarianism	Humanitarian Efforts and Policies

²⁶⁷ The information in this Table has been brought together and compiled through the utilization of the references by the author.

²⁶⁸ Arne Olav Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance: Past and Present", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1966, p. 30.

²⁶⁹ Christopher S. Browning, "Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 42, No. 1, Special Issue on Nordic Internationalism, March 2007, pp. 27-51.; For the strength and weaknesses of the Nordic model related to international peace and security, see also: Anders Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model for International Peace and Security?", **Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice**, Vol. 29, No. 4: Peace Journalism, 2017, pp. 492-495.

²⁷⁰ Ada Nissen, "A Historical View on the Nordic 'Peace Brand': Norway and Sweden: Partners and Competitors in Peace", in Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl (Eds.), **Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 80-100.

²⁷¹ Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl, "Introduction: On the Resilience of the Scandinavian Humanitarian Brand", in Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée and Kristian Bjørkdahl (Eds.), **Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 2-4.

²⁷² Anders Wivel, and Peter Nedergaard "Introduction: Scandinavian Politics between Myth and Reality", in Peter Nedergaard, and Anders Wivel (Eds.), **The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics**, London and New York : Routledge, 2018, p. 1.

	Developmental Efforts and Policies
Nordic Model	The Contributions of the Nordic Countries to International Peace and Security ²⁷³
Nordic Peace	Diplomatic Skills
	Peaceful Co-existence and Dissolution
	The Culture for Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts, Disputes and Negotiations
Direct/Indirect Implications of Nordic Identity	The Reputation of the Nordic Countries
	Nordic Multilateralism
	Political Conjunctures and Circumstances
	Nordic Peace Research Institutes and Centers
	Nordic Pioneers as Peace Scholars and Practitioners
	Being Small States
	The Security Community Framework

In this Table, Nordic internationalism and multilateralism will be understood through the presentation of the general and particular datasets related to peaceful engagements of the Nordic countries. The role of Nordic identity, on the other hand, will be explained in the final part of this Thesis. The depictions surrounding the reputation of the Nordic countries; political conjunctures resulting from the effects of the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods; the role of Nordic peace research institutes and centers; Nordic pioneers in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution; the reflections of being small states and the relevance of the security community framework will be elaborated in connection with the implications of Nordic identity.

These aforementioned characteristics, as corresponding to the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy, intersect with the implications of Nordic identity. Nevertheless, the chief aim will be oriented at explaining Nordic balance; Nordic brand; Nordic humanitarianism; Nordic model, and the Nordic peace in

²⁷³ See: Anders Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model for International Peace and Security?", **Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice**, Vol. 29, No. 4: Peace Journalism, 2017, pp. 489-496.; For the peaceful intra-Nordic relations, see also: Pertti Joenniemi, "Norden Beyond Security Community", in Clive Archer, and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), **The Nordic Peace**, Hampshire, Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, pp. 198-200.; In this Thesis, emphasis will be put on the effects of Nordic Model in the context of the exceptionality and peacefulness of Nordic countries in world politics.

introducing the distinctiveness of Nordic countries in terms of Nordic peace diplomacy. Such underlying characteristics will also play complementary roles in further revealing the reputation of the Nordic countries in the final part of the Thesis.

a. Nordic balance: By accident or design?

The term “Nordic balance” was coined in reference to stability in the Northern European region during the Cold War. This stability was characterized by the reduction of great power involvement; the existence of such possibilities oriented at neutralizing the involvement of two superpowers in the region, and the removal of initiatives as capable of escalating tensions. The USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had primarily military interests as displayed towards the Fenno-Scandinavian area following the Second World War. However, the military interests were marked by denial operations rather than possession.²⁷⁴ As a result, external conditions and policies of major powers also affected the development of Nordic balance during the Cold War.

This period witnessed efforts for the maintenance of a defence posture. This posture was oriented at preventing the escalation of tensions and the provocation of external interference in the Scandinavian region. In this process, Scandinavian countries pursued different policies in relation to these aforementioned common objectives.²⁷⁵ According to *Arne Olav Brundtland*, the defence policies of Fenno-Scandinavian countries can be classified as follows:²⁷⁶

- “a)membership of an alliance with one superpower,*
- b) well-armed neutrality, and*
- c)neutrality with ‘arms control’ in the framework of a friendship treaty with the other superpower”.*

According to *J. J. Hoist*, the theory of Nordic balance entails both descriptive and normative elements. In this regard, Nordic countries form a security policy constellation, which was marked by the position of Finland grounded in its cooperation and support agreement with the USSR, the non-alignment of Sweden, NATO membership of Denmark and Norway adjusted through conditional armor restraints,

²⁷⁴ Brundtland, “Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, p. 30.

²⁷⁵ Steve Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Nordic Balance”, *New Zealand International Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January/February 1981, p. 22.

²⁷⁶ Brundtland, “Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, p. 30.

and the bases of the USA in Iceland. As a result, the Nordic region was not characterized by hard confrontation. Leading on from this, Nordic balance theory was grounded in the precondition suggesting that a profound change in the status of one or several Nordic countries would lead to compensations from others.²⁷⁷ One can draw the conclusion that low tensions and relative stability were dependent upon this delicate balance.

These aforesaid differences were linked to distinctive geopolitical and historical conditions of each Scandinavian country. As reflecting the interactions between Denmark, Norway, and the Western alliance, for example, Nazi occupation was decisive for their shift from their former tendency of non-alignment. For Sweden, prevention of wartime occupation was decisive for the reinforcement of neutrality. The Winter War and the Second World War experiences, on the other hand, affected Finland to pursue accommodation with the USSR, albeit reluctantly. All of these policies mutually reinforced one another while restricting super-powers in the region.²⁷⁸

Historical experiences, including the effects of the Second World War, different perceptions regarding external threats, along with geographical and economic conditions, affected the formation of Nordic balance. The security pattern surrounding Nordic balance was marked by a form of buffer that prevented direct confrontation between power blocs in the Nordic area. As reflecting different roles of Nordic countries, it is explained that “(...), *this buffer is neither totally self-reliant nor wholly allied*”.²⁷⁹

As a result, the distinctiveness of Nordic countries was also explained in terms of the introduction of a form of buffer as constituted through differences in terms of alliances and self-reliances. For this reason, this buffer can be described as both fragile and robust with regard to power blocs during the Cold War. In respect to the purpose of this Thesis, one can understand that the formation and maintenance of such delicate balance also account for the improvement of diplomatic capabilities of Nordic

²⁷⁷ Johan Jørgen Holst, **Norsk Sikkerhetspolitikk I Strategisk Perspektiv, Vol. 1: Analyse (“Norwegian Security Policy in Strategic Perspective, Vol. 1: Analysis”)**, Oslo : Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Flekkefjord : Hegland Boktrykkeri, 1967, p. 129.; The original text in Norwegian.

²⁷⁸ Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact,...”, p. 22.; For the implications of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, please see the following article: Keijo Korhonen, “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Finland: Some Aspects of International Politics”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 8, No. ¾, 1973, pp. 183-188.

²⁷⁹ Nils Andrén, “Prospects for the Nordic Security Pattern”, **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1978, p. 182.

countries. However, the overall objective of Nordic balance has been oriented at ensuring national defence and security, all of which denote a connection between peace and security.

In response to the East-West dichotomy and deepened polarization, which remained to be a critical problem following the exposure of North's vulnerability against the effects of oil policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), security policies of Nordic countries were referred to as Nordic balance. In essence, this term denotes patterns that were marked by the promotion of the national security of Nordic countries since 1948-1949. Nordic balance was appropriate in tackling security challenges while contributing to the preservation of power-balance in the Northern European region.²⁸⁰ In this regard, it can be contended that Nordic balance was oriented at challenging security threats through different but connected policies while maintaining regional power-balance. Hence, this formula entailed both innovative and *status quo*-oriented components.

The development of Nordic balance was grounded in concerns over security and protection of national/regional integrity amidst arms race competition and polarization. In Norway, *Halvard Lange*, as former Norwegian Foreign Minister, introduced the term balance in relation to the "Note Crisis" in 1961. Following that, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) initiated a research project with the purpose to explore problems regarding security policies in the Nordic region. This research project resulted in the theory of Nordic balance while affecting defence, foreign affairs, and public defence debate in Sweden. The terms balance and equilibrium were also applied by Finnish politicians in describing security policies for the Fenno-Scandinavian region. However, the embracement of the concept of Nordic balance by the Finnish people became seldom.²⁸¹

Nevertheless, the term Nordic balance denoted commonalities in terms of eventual purpose directed to the improvement of security and defence of Nordic countries. During the Cold War, these policies were affected by a common threat, which was identified as the escalation of tensions in the Nordic area and its surroundings. As a result of this threat, which was captured rather in an abstract manner, Nordic countries attempted to coordinate measures with the purpose to restrict tensions. In this context, these counter-attempts against the escalation of tensions can

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²⁸¹ Erik Noreen, "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1983, p. 43.

be explained in relation to the term Nordic balance.²⁸² Hence, Nordic balance also connotes check and control mechanisms and the management and prevention of tensions.

Despite their differences, the attempts of Nordic countries were mutually reinforcing, which enabled them to cooperate against security threats in the region. As an example of mutual reinforcement, the neutrality of Sweden was influential upon the independence of Finland and upon the perception of the USSR related to security threats. NATO membership of Denmark and Norway affected the convenience for the policy of neutrality of Sweden and its deterrence against the USSR. The alliance between Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Germany and the accessibility of American protection were also balanced by the neutrality of Finland and Sweden.²⁸³ It is clear that these attempts and balancing efforts cannot be considered in isolation from the dynamics of the international system.

In a broader framework, policy considerations and formulations of the Nordic countries corresponded to the world system, as the bipolar system, the sub-system, as the Nordic dimension, and the interplay, as taking place between interests at the global and local levels and forces. Such aspects have been evaluated as the main dimensions of Nordic balance. As a result, Nordic balance contributed to regional stability while confronting security challenges.²⁸⁴ The operationalization of Nordic balance reflected various levels while providing stability that affected the exceptionality of Nordic countries in world politics.

The approach of Brundtland can be interpreted in terms of balancing and reciprocal interactions that stem from the security policies of Nordic countries and their relations with great power blocs. Such policies and relations were effective in greatly obstructing military and political engagement of super-powers in Fenno-Scandinavia.²⁸⁵ The diversity resulting from the military alliances and policies of the Nordic countries reflected harmony, whether by “good consideration or accident” (*emphasis added*). Nevertheless, Nordic balance contributed to integrity, stability, and security in the Baltic region.²⁸⁶ Also, it may have played a role in arms control and

²⁸² Håkan Wiberg, “Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of Nordic Exceptionalism?”, **Julkaisu: Kosmopolis**, Vol. 34: UV 60/2004, Special Celebrity Issue for Unto Vesa’s 60th Birthday, 2004, p. 210.

²⁸³ Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact,...”, p. 22.

²⁸⁴ Brundtland, “Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, p. 30.

²⁸⁵ Noreen, “Nordic Balance: Security Policy...”, p. 44.

²⁸⁶ Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact,...”, p. 22.

disarmament regime for the Nordic countries during the Cold War, as marked by the conflict between the East and West and maritime rivalry in the High North.²⁸⁷

Håkan Wiberg asserts that “‘the Nordic balance’ may best be described as a balance of latent possibilities”.²⁸⁸ However, Nordic countries were successful in balancing intimidations and threats directed at one another and in reducing the detrimental effects of ideological and military super-power competition in their region. Thus, a distinctive form of peacefulness through security and stability was reflected while paving the way for Nordic balance with delicate and dynamic traits. During the Cold War, Nordic countries had to focus on national and regional security more promptly. This imposed need, along with the experiences related to the Second World War, affected the link between Nordic balance, Nordic exceptionality, and relative stability.

The Nordic balance, as a wider concept, also subsumed the following operational factors: the absence of foreign military deployments in Denmark and Norway, Sweden’s freedom from allies in relation to its substantial defence efforts, and the effects that stemmed from the USSR on the neutral policy of Finland and its friendly relationship with the USSR.²⁸⁹ As a result, a balance concerning the involvement of the USA and USSR in Northern Europe was created. As emphasized, the functioning of Nordic balance was oriented at deterring military engagement of these powers in the area. In this process, security relations of Nordic countries were also maintained in balance and mutual influence with no disregard for the *status quo*.²⁹⁰ Hence, Nordic balance was connected with defence and security interactions among the Nordic countries. However, a significant variation from the dynamics of the international system cannot be emphasized due to concerns for power-balance and the *status quo*.

As expected, there were challenges and problems that affected the validity of the term Nordic balance. According to *Wiberg*, the Nordic area can be considered a failure from military cooperation and defence unions perspective. During the Cold War, the NATO membership of Denmark and Norway, the policy of the non-alignment of Sweden, and the conclusion of “Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid Agreement”

²⁸⁷ Wiberg, “Scandinavia”, p. 209.

²⁸⁸ Wiberg, “Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of...”, p. 211.

²⁸⁹ Brundtland, “Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, p. 31.; As a particular example of the Nordic balance doctrine, the emphasis has been given to the note crisis between Finland, and the USSR, dated October-November 1961. For the detailed examination of this crisis, please see: Brundtland, “Nordic Balance: Past and Present”, pp. 40-47.

²⁹⁰ Holst, *Norsk Sikkerhetspolitikk...*, pp. 129-130.

between Finland and the USSR, dated 1948, led to cleavages associated with military arrangements in the Nordic area. With that being said, secret, or rather informal cooperation; consideration for the security concerns of each country; interest in the preservation of the strategic role of the Nordic region; and controlling and restricting tensions can be enounced as critical in engaging with the implications of Nordic cooperation with regard to military arrangements and Nordic balance.²⁹¹

Despite failures, Nordic countries achieved a relatively more stable and secure environment during the Cold War. This capability required to adopt a multi-level perspective towards the prevention of tensions and insecurities across different contexts, effective defence posture and political engagements, cooperation amidst the cleavages and polarization, management of ambiguities and contradictions, and neutralization or removal of tensions through compromises and compensations. Hence, Nordic balance as a means of national and regional security also affected diplomatic capabilities and third-party roles of Nordic countries and vice versa, which will be illustrated in the second part of Thesis.

All of these mechanisms affected the posture of Nordic countries and the perceptions directed to the Nordic countries. In response to diplomatic capabilities and relevant mechanisms, Nordic countries were approached as a distinctive large-group in the reality of the Cold War. This distinctiveness has been transformed into a national brand while being reflected in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. The following underlying explanations will also affirm how Nordic balance was utilized and was complemented by the Nordic model in terms of the promotion of an alternative approach that transcends ideological rivalries.

Accordingly, Nordic balance was instrumental in promoting third-party roles of the Nordic countries in connection with the dynamics of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, this model lost its direct relevance due to its foremost objective, as emanated from bipolar geographical and structural considerations. However, it can be observed that differences in terms of alliances and organizational affiliations

²⁹¹ Wiberg, "Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of...", pp. 210-211.; For the disappearance of the Nordic balance after the Cold War, see: Hans Mouritzen, "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2001, p. 302.; This Thesis approaches the disappearance of the Nordic balance as a significant change rather than a total collapse. The reason is that the repercussions of the Cold War and prevailing major power rivalries still reinforce the traits of the Nordic balance, providing security and stability through various alliances. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, on the other hand, the validity and soundness of Nordic balance can be considered as more uncertain, whose conjecture and discussion are beyond the scope of this Thesis.

accounted for the traits of Nordic balance as inherited from the bipolar international system. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, on the other hand, adds another layer into the reflections and residues of Nordic balance.²⁹² Given the effects of increasing rivalries and tensions and the escalation of conflicts and controversial issues, it is yet to be known whether peace and security through the traits of Nordic balance were deeply dismissed or modified in order to benefit from a more harmonious defence posture in world politics. But still, Nordic balance denoted a sense of distinctiveness, despite the effects of the international system.

b. Nordic brand: Peace as a means of distinctive national identity

“Nordic brand” can also be considered worthy of examination in understanding the effects of peaceful engagements of the Nordic countries. Actually, there have been various elements of Nordic brand, including the Nordic model and distinctive approaches of Nordic countries in world politics. In this context, branding the Nordic model has been effective for the position and international role of the Nordic countries. Nordic countries have been considered successful in marketing a Nordic brand that comprised various elements, including a socio-economic model, an approach to international affairs, and the idea suggesting the distinctiveness of the Nordic model. These elements and ideas were included in the construction of Nordic identity.²⁹³ Taken together, Nordic model, the approach and posture of Nordic countries, and the distinctiveness or exceptionality of this model have underpinned the Nordic brand and Nordic identity at large.

As *Carl Marklund* has pointed out, the welfare state has also played a central role in the cultural outreach, public diplomacy, and strategic communication of the Nordic countries.²⁹⁴ This explanation incorporates the welfare state as a component of

²⁹² NATO membership can no longer be considered a diverging factor among the Nordic countries. As of 04 April 2023, Finland became the 31st ally of NATO. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Finland Joins NATO as 31st Ally”, **NATO Newsroom**, 04 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm (accessed 18.07.2023).; The Accession Protocol for Sweden has also been signed. Therefore, Sweden is also expected to become the 32nd ally of NATO following the final ratifications by Hungary and Türkiye. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Transformation, “An Update: Sweden’s Journey to NATO Membership”, 17 January 2024, <https://www.act.nato.int/article/update-sweden-journey-nato/> (accessed 18.07.2023).; As of 07 March 2024, Sweden also became the 32nd ally of NATO. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Command Transformation, “Sweden Joins NATO as 32nd Member of the Alliance”, 11 March 2024, <https://www.act.nato.int/article/sweden-joins-nato-as-32nd-alliance-member/> (accessed 18.07.2024).

²⁹³ Browning, “Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...”, pp. 28-29.

²⁹⁴ Carl Marklund, “The Nordic Model on the Global Market of Ideas: The Welfare State as Scandinavia’s Best Brand”, **Geopolitics**, Vol. 22, No. 3, Special Section: Nation Branding and Competitive Identity in World Politics, 2017, p. 626.

nation-branding for Nordic countries. The period following the Second World War witnessed the shaping of the welfare state and the emergence of the Nordic model. The aim of the Nordic welfare model has been oriented at providing high standards of living while ensuring high levels of equality grounded in healthy national finances and fair distribution of benefits.²⁹⁵ As highlighted, the Nordic model has characterized the Nordic brand in relation to Nordic identity.²⁹⁶ In order to understand the foundations of Nordic peace diplomacy, it is helpful to look at the connection between the Nordic model, the Nordic brand, and Nordic identity.

In a broader framework, reconfiguration of the nation into a commercial product and the promotion of a specific national image characterize the practices of nation-branding.²⁹⁷ Such practices indicate novel means of utilization regarding social, political, and cultural discourses as constituting the nation.²⁹⁸ This process also entails the maintenance and perpetuation of the nation as a means of sovereignty and self-determination encompassing identities and loyalties. This statement can appear as highly antithetical to the former statement.²⁹⁹ Notwithstanding, Nordic branding has been marked by discourses and practices oriented at promoting the reputation of the Nordic countries, and at protecting the region against conflicts, threats, and power struggles through cooperation. Importantly, Nordic cooperation was also reinforced by differences, as evidenced in the formation of Nordic balance.

During the Cold War, the reasons for the establishment and the dissemination of the Nordic brand have largely been oriented at securing the region from conflicts.³⁰⁰ Drawing from this explanation, it can be seen that there was a commonality between the Nordic brand and Nordic balance in terms of security and stability in the Nordic region. Also, both of these components demonstrated the distinctiveness of the Nordic countries. This connection affirms the interactions among the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy. As complementary with these explanations, third-party

²⁹⁵ Nordic Co-operation, “Social Policy and Welfare”, n.d., <https://www.norden.org/en/information/social-policy-and-welfare> (accessed 15.06.2023).

²⁹⁶ For the differences between brands and identities, see: Browning, “Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...”, p. 30.; For the role of nation branding practices and objectives upon national identity, see: Melissa Aronczyk, **Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity**, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2013.

²⁹⁷ Per Ståhlberg, and Göran Bolin, “Having a Soul or Choosing a Face? Nation Branding, Identity and Cosmopolitan Imagination”, **Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture**, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2016, p. 274.

²⁹⁸ Melissa Aronczyk, **Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity**, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 4.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁰⁰ Browning, “Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...”, p. 32.

roles of the Nordic countries have also become part of nation or large-group-branding that denotes distinctiveness through relative calmness.

“*Scandinavian Humanitarian Brand*” (emphasis by Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl), as incorporating the processes of nation-building, nation narratives, negotiation of national identities and nation-branding, can also be considered as another relevant experience. It is argued that Scandinavian humanitarian brand entails different humanitarian interventions, including peace efforts, development assistance, and the promotion of democracy and human rights. In this profound process, particular trajectories and contexts corresponding to each Nordic country cannot be isolated from the branding of Scandinavian humanitarianism.³⁰¹ Hence, Nordic brand also represents Nordic humanitarianism and peaceful third-party interventions of Nordic countries, along with the commitment to and encouragement of democracy and human rights. Because of these, the Nordic brand also has a compelling role as a moral and responsible actor in the international area.

In a similar vein with the Nordic balance, the effects of particular political conjunctures can also be discerned in the approaches that focus on the Nordic brand. Regarding the link between the welfare state and the Nordic brand, the welfare state has been suggested through the Scandinavian model. This associates the Scandinavian model with the Nordic brand. Importantly, the origins of the cultural construction of the Scandinavian framework can be traced to the first half of the twentieth century and the Interwar period. The cultural formation of this framework precedes the economic and social construction of the Scandinavian model. Discourses, political contexts, and the particular time periods have influenced the progressive images of the Scandinavian model.³⁰²

During the Cold War, Nordic countries aimed to create a distinctive identity while targeting the international audience in marketing a Nordic brand.³⁰³ Generally, though not invariably, positive connotations and views surrounding the concept of the Nordic or Scandinavian model, or welfare regime type, depended upon contextual, periodical, and ideological approaches.³⁰⁴ For this reason, this Thesis will also include

³⁰¹ de Bengy Puyvallée, and Bjørkdahl, “Introduction: On the Resilience of...”, pp. 2-4.

³⁰² Kazimierz Musiał, **Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation**, Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002, pp. 9-11.

³⁰³ Browning, “Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...”, p. 32.

³⁰⁴ Stein Kuhnle, and Matti Aaltonen, “The Modern Scandinavian Welfare State”, in Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (Eds.), **The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics**, London and New York : Routledge, 2018, p. 14.

the connection between components and objectives of Nordic brand and political conjunctures of the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. This connection will come to the surface in engaging with Nordic identity.

In parallel to the Nordic balance, the Nordic brand also entails different efforts and policies among the Nordic countries. In this regard, there were distinctive nation-branding efforts regardless of the development and utilization of the Nordic brand. As reflecting this, Finland puts considerable effort into branding itself as a Nordic country while establishing a bridge-building role in world politics.³⁰⁵ *Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée* and *Kristian Bjørkdahl* emphasize that there have been different and unifying aspects associated with the overarching Nordic brand. The distinctive experiences of the Nordic countries in relation to the Nordic brand have been marked by cooperation and competition. Competition has been oriented at distinguishing one's self from the other Nordic countries, as exemplified by the efforts of Norway to portray itself as a peace nation and by the efforts of Sweden to fulfill the role of the leading or even spearhead representative of Scandinavia.³⁰⁶

Having said that, the Nordic institutions, particularly the Nordic Council, have contributed to the region's identification as the Nordic area by recognizing Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, as well as Greenland and the Faroes, as sovereign nations and autonomous island territories within the region.³⁰⁷ This diversity related to sovereignty and autonomy can also be considered as a critical component of the Nordic brand and Nordic large-group identity.

Progressiveness also underpinned the constitution of the Nordic brand. To a significant extent, Scandinavia has been considered an advanced post-modern society. Certain versions of the welfare state, the activism within the UN, contributions to the development of the Third World, and *détente* have been quite influential for the position of the Nordic countries. As a result, they represented the Third Way between communism and capitalism. It is argued that Nordic countries purposely embraced this stance during the Cold War. As a result, the representation of the Third Way has also

³⁰⁵ Christopher S. Browning, and Antonio Ferraz de Oliveira, "Introduction: Nation Branding and Competitive Identity in World Politics", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2017, p. 490.

³⁰⁶ de Bengy Puyvallée, and Bjørkdahl, "Introduction: On the Resilience of...", p. 4.; With this in mind, it is argued that Sweden has been the foremost representative for the societal development and the Nordic model in comparison with the other Nordic countries. However, it is contended that Sweden has abandoned this model, which functioned as a bastion for the foreign policies of Nordic countries, in relation to its national interests. See: Hans Mouritzen, "The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1 Feb. 1995, pp. 9-21.

³⁰⁷ Mary Hilson, *The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945*, London : Reaktion Books, 2008, p. 12.

been an important component of the Nordic brand.³⁰⁸ In particular, assistance to the Third World, *détente*, engagement, and political activism within the UN are particularly relevant to the Nordic brand and the diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries.

Sue Curry Jansen explains that national images or identities can be branded in order to fulfill the following objectives: the creation of greater visibility; attraction of foreign investors and tourists while widening exports; enhancement of national geopolitical profile; the generation of national pride and internal solidarity; and the renovation of reputations, which were damaged.³⁰⁹

In this regard, objectives associated with the improvement of social and geopolitical profile and reconstruction and renovation of reputations cannot be avoided in engaging with the reasons behind nation-branding practices. Accordingly, *Kenneth E. Boulding* mentions that Norway managed to transform the violent culture of the Vikings into a relatively peaceful state, and Sweden managed to transform military characteristics in the seventeenth century into a remarkably peaceful period in the eighteenth century.³¹⁰ For Sweden, this period coincided with the relative decrease of its role in power politics and war, which contrasts with its great power status in the mid-seventeenth century.³¹¹ Hence, this statement is also indicative of the role of external conditions in significant transformations related to nation-branding.

Of critical importance is that nation-branding can be oriented at communicating national priorities at the domestic and international levels; conveying an image that demonstrates legitimacy and authority in diplomatic arenas, and ensuring a position in multilateral decision-making processes or institutional/organizational memberships for state leaders or national elites. This process can be accompanied by objectives such as capital (re)generation, combination of public and private sector resources for the obtainment of fiscal advantage, successful competition in various areas, the act of repairing tarnished reputation, the avoidance of unfavorable attention, and controlling and managing impressions.³¹²

³⁰⁸ Wivel, and Nedergaard "Introduction: Scandinavian Politics between...", p. 1.

³⁰⁹ Sue Curry Jansen, "Designer Nations: Neo-liberal Nation Branding - Brand Estonia", **Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture**, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2008, p. 124.

³¹⁰ Boulding, "Role of Conflict in Dynamics...", p. 100.

³¹¹ Jack S. Levy, **War in the Modern Great Power System: 1495-1975**, Lexington, Kentucky : University Press of Kentucky, 1983, pp. 38-39.

³¹² Aronczyk, **Branding Nation: Global Business...**, p. 16.

These aforementioned objectives can be seen as connected with the undertakings of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. The idea is that the Nordic brand has also been oriented at demonstrating the legitimacy and authority of Nordic diplomatic capabilities in the realm of third-party practices. According to *Christopher S. Browning*, the advancement of the Nordic brand has entailed the following components as corresponding to Nordic exceptionalism: being peaceful societies and bridge-builders, which have been derived from the security community framework of *Karl Deutsch* et al.'s, the embracement of a peace-oriented approach to IR, engagements as mediators and bridge-builders in relation to the conflict between the East and West, internationalist solidarism, and morality.³¹³ These components affirm how Nordic brand is directly related to Nordic peace diplomacy.

In *Strategy for International Branding of the Nordic Region, 2019-2021*, it is explained that each of the Nordic countries has succeeded in establishing its own model in parallel with Nordic co-operation. In this Strategy, the coordination of branding activities for the Nordic region has been emphasized while leveraging positive images and attention on the Nordic countries.³¹⁴ The Nordic perspective, which entails trust; equality; sustainability; innovation, and openness for the right to express opinions, has been evaluated as the foundation of the Nordic brand.³¹⁵ Such approaches and values have also been at the forefront of the Nordic brand.

On 06 February 2014, a joint statement was issued by the ministers for Nordic co-operation, as entailing their objectives and visions for Nordic co-operation in the long-term. In this regard, the emphasis was also given to the Nordic brand by referencing strong profiles of the Nordic countries. Accordingly, it is affirmed that there is a growing interest in the experiences of Nordic countries. The Norden spirit has corresponded to the development of such societies that are highly productive and socially secure. Gender equality and a healthy environment have also underpinned Nordic societies. Therefore, there has been a commitment oriented at enhancing this profile, along with the visibility of the Nordic countries.³¹⁶

³¹³ Browning, "Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...", pp. 32-36.; The security community framework will be explained in engaging with the implications of Nordic identity.

³¹⁴ Nordic Council of Ministers, *Strategy for International Branding of the Nordic Region, 2019-2021*, PolitikNord 2019:709, Copenhagen, 2019, pp. 11-12, <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1279355/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (accessed 03.05.2023).

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

³¹⁶ Nordic Co-operation, "The Nordic Region - Together we are Stronger", *Ministers for Co-operation (MR-SAM)*, 06 February 2014, <https://www.norden.org/en/declaration/nordic-region-together-we-are-stronger> (accessed 01.05.2023).

In order to achieve these objectives, peace has been a crucial component of the Nordic brand. In *New Nordic Peace: Nordic Peace and Conflict Resolution Efforts*, prepared by the Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Council of Ministers Secretariat, Nordic peace brand, and efforts for peace and conflict resolution have been assessed by heavily relying on semi-structured interviews conducted with the aim to broadly represent the Nordic countries. Nordic cooperation associated with foreign and defence policies has also been emphasized in relation to historical background and geopolitical challenges.³¹⁷ Hence, it can be contended that the Nordic brand through Nordic cooperation can be described as a means of minimization of geopolitical threats as well.

Despite different and even skeptical ideas regarding the existence of a distinctive Nordic peace brand, it is explained that the brand for Nordic peace has entailed values such as humanism, non-military solutions, non-violent conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, among others.³¹⁸ Such explanations have cultivated Nordic peace diplomacy with regard to nation-branding strategies, which culminated in the dissemination of peace mediation and facilitation exercises and the promotion of Nordic peace. What is understood with the formation of Nordic peace has been concerned with non-military and non-violent resolutions of conflicts and peaceful conflict transformation.

As a result of these efforts and interconnected formulas, Nordic countries have generated positive attitudes towards their large-group identity, which affected their involvement and third-party roles in conflicts and controversial issues. One can link the generation and promotion of such positive perceptions with the intersection of the suitability of the Nordic countries and the approval of the warring parties in conflicts and controversial issues. Hence, nation-branding has been quite functional for the Nordic countries and reflected Nordic humanitarianism and Nordic peace to a distinguishable extent.

c. Nordic humanitarianism: The manifestation of Nordic identity

Humanitarianism, which denotes adherence to human rights and satisfaction of basic human needs, has also been another prominent and legitimizing component of Nordic peace diplomacy. Nordic countries have often been evaluated as leading nations for the promotion of human rights. The welfare state model, reputation for the

³¹⁷ Hagemann, and Bramsen, *New Nordic Peace: Nordic...*, pp. 9-11.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

contribution to international peace and solidarism, and central roles within the LoN and UN characterized the weight of Nordic countries in the international area.³¹⁹

Such attributions have been strongly embraced with reference to third-party roles and peaceful undertakings of Nordic countries in world politics. In the explanation below, it is emphasized how the statesmen from the Nordic countries regarded themselves as mediators in relation to the development of Scandinavian sense of humanitarianism.³²⁰

“The characteristically Scandinavian sense of humanitarianism and innocence in international affairs was able to develop, and Nordic statesmen increasingly came to regard themselves as natural mediators, go-betweens, and peace-prize awarders on the world scene. It was hardly a coincidence that the first two secretaries-general of the UN, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld, were Scandinavians. In the 1920s, Fridtjof Nansen, the polar explorer, gained preeminence as ‘the conscience of the world’ in the League of Nations”.

This explanation suggests that the role of Nordic diplomats in intergovernmental and international organizations has manifested Nordic humanitarianism. Nordic humanitarianism has also revolved around the practices of peace mediation and facilitation in conflicts and conflict-prone areas. The Nordic countries have further enhanced their peacemaker image by reflecting their humanitarianism through their third-party roles. Broadly speaking, it is argued that Nordic countries, coupled with Western European small states, have traditionally exhibited a peacemaker image. This image can be identified in foreign policies associated with neutralism, peaceful engagements, such as peacekeeping, mediation, and facilitation, as well as the fulfillment of specific roles within the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later the Organization for Security and Co-operation

³¹⁹ Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, Steven LB Jensen, Linde Lindkvist, and Johan Strang, “Histories of Human Rights in the Nordic Countries”, **Nordic Journal of Human Rights**, Vol. 36, No. 3: Nordic Histories of Human Rights, 2018, pp. 189-190.; However, the perception of the Nordic countries as altruistic agents leading human rights does not stem from a thorough historical investigation. Rather, the Nordic countries’ rhetoric in world politics has shaped such considerations. Vik, Jensen, Lindkvist, and Strang, “Histories of Human Rights in...”, p. 193.

³²⁰ Bernt Hagtvet, and Erik Rudeng, “Scandinavia: Achievements, Dilemmas, Challenges”, **Daedalus**, Vol. 113, No. 2, Nordic Voices, Spring 1984, p. 231.

in Europe (OSCE), and NATO. These orientations have been related to peaceful contributions, foreign policy, and national identity. Also, security conditions during the Cold War played a catalyzing role in this process.³²¹ It can be seen that there is a connection between Nordic humanitarianism and peacemaking, which is reflected through détente, multilateralism, and third-party roles.

Nordic humanitarianism has supported this peacemaker image and peaceful undertakings of the Nordic countries. In the Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government of Finland, it is explained that effective handling of protracted crises requires effective coordination between various fields, including peace mediation, humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, and trade policy. It is also explained that Finland will contribute to the missions and operations within the OSCE, EU, NATO, and UN while promoting peace mediation effectively.³²² Humanitarian assistance has thus been evaluated as part of the initiatives corresponding to effective handling of conflicts and crises with a protracted nature.

There have been various explanations that account for the humanitarian engagement of Nordic countries. In this regard, liberal internationalism, liberal approaches, and stress on identity have been recurring themes in engaging with the developmental and humanitarian policies at large. According to *Katarzyna Pisarska*, the liberal internationalist tradition has underpinned the persistence of Norway's commitment to funding development and humanitarian efforts and in establishing consensus for its involvement in out-of-area operations of NATO as humanitarian and legitimate.³²³

As one of the components of Nordic humanitarianism, development and disaster aid have also been emphasized in understanding the specialization of certain powers in the context of systems-maintenance. According to *Iver B. Neumann*, institution-building as exemplified by LoN and UN; peacekeeping; development and disaster aid; and the role of third-parties have been discernible for the specialization of certain powers, including Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland in the context of system institutionalization. *Neumann* argues that small and medium powers are capable of

³²¹ Laurent Goetschel, "Introduction to Special Issue: Bound to be Peaceful? The Changing Approach of Western European Small States to Peace", *The Swiss Political Science Review (SPSR)*, Vol. 19, Issue. 3, Special Issue: Natural Born Peacemakers? Ideas and Identities in Foreign Policies of Small States in Western Europe, September 2013, pp. 259-260.

³²² The Finnish Government, **A Strong and Committed Finland: Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government 20 June 2023**, pp. 176-178.

³²³ Katarzyna Pisarska, "Peace Diplomacy and the Domestic Dimension of Norwegian Foreign Policy: The Insider's Accounts", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 2015, p. 203.

spending more resources with the objective of contributing to systems maintenance. As an example, Norway has increased its peace and reconciliation institutionalization efforts following the Cold War period.³²⁴ In this context, Nordic humanitarianism is also related to concerns over system institutionalization and systems maintenance.

Regarding the link between humanitarian policies and peaceful efforts, the purpose can be oriented at promoting liberal internationalism, identity construction, and systems maintenance at large. Such pragmatic and *status quo*-oriented purposes can affect the practices of peace and conflict resolution adversely. Hence, it can be contended that the motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy also entail pragmatic purposes and conformity with the system. These purposes and systemic compliance can generate mistrust for the prospects of peace, jeopardize peace negotiation or its resumption, and can lead to failure in formulating structural prevention-oriented strategies against structural injustices.

The disruption of the *status quo* can also be required for the resolution of protracted conflicts. For this reason, it is important for the third-parties to manage and minimize the adverse impacts resulting from the link between humanitarianism and pragmatic, and *status quo*-oriented considerations by promoting both constructive and normative interactions, with a focus on the warring parties and on the underlying causes of the conflict. In this regard, the involvement of Nordic countries in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka will reveal the adverse effects of pragmatic, *status quo*-oriented and moderate approaches in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. The involvement of PRIO in the case of Cyprus, on the other hand, will affirm the importance of the prioritization of constructive and normative interactions rather than the prioritization of structural tendencies.

d. Nordic model: Functioning and values

The implications of the “Nordic model” have also been connected with the appropriateness of Nordic countries for the conduction of peace diplomacy. In this context, the combination of growth and solidarity, economic openness and free trade, along with the tolerance for different cultures, religions, and opinions has affected the successfulness of Nordic countries. Taken together, the Nordic model entails values such as “*democracy, transparency, social solidarity, equality, individualism and*

³²⁴ Iver B. Neumann, “Peace and Reconciliation Efforts as Systems-maintaining Diplomacy: The Case of Norway”, *International Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 3, The Future of Diplomacy, Summer 2011, p. 572.

tolerance of dissent".³²⁵ These values have been embedded in the construction of Nordic identity and the functioning of peaceful culture.

Considering this variety, the contents of the Nordic model have encompassed different areas and labels. Examples include international peace and security³²⁶; the contributions to peacekeeping operations³²⁷; the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian political, economic, and social systems³²⁸; the functioning of the Nordic model as an utopia³²⁹; the image associated with the progressiveness of the Nordic countries³³⁰, along with the welfare state; and relevant reforms.³³¹

According to *Hans Mouritzen*, this progressive image that has been framed in terms of the Nordic model entails the traits as follows: peacefulness; egalitarian society; solidarity with the Third World; hospitality to refugees and immigrants, and environmentalism.³³² In this regard, it can be seen that the backbones of the Nordic model can be approached through such traits that require different areas of focus. The Nordic model can also be subject to the effects of political conjunctures. As this suggests, the Scandinavian model emerged as a generalization resulting from the progression of Denmark and Sweden. This was established before the Second World War. This progressive image reflected the superiority of Denmark in the areas of agriculture and general education during the 1920s and 1930s; the combination of social and political policies, and Sweden's quick economic recovery during the 1930s.³³³

Hence, the dynamic contents surrounding the Nordic model have affected the images upon and self-identification of the Nordic countries. A close look into Nordic

³²⁵ Nordic Council of Ministers, **The Nordic Model in a New Era: Programme for the Swedish Presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers 2013**, ANP 2012:749, Copenhagen : Nordic Council of Ministers, 2012, p. 9, <https://www.norden.org/en/publication/nordic-model-new-era> (accessed 23.04.2022).

³²⁶ See: Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", pp. 489-496.

³²⁷ See: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, **Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?**, London and New York : Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-5.

³²⁸ Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, p. 9.

³²⁹ Jenny Andersson, and Mary Hilson, "Images of Sweden and the Nordic Countries", **Scandinavian Journal of History**, Vol. 34, No. 3, September 2009, p. 220.

³³⁰ Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, pp. 9-10.; See also: Marklund, "The Nordic Model on the Global Market...", pp. 623-639; Browning, "Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...", pp. 27-28.

³³¹ Hilson, **Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945**, pp. 87-91.; Torbjörn Tännsjö, **Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government**, Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 2008, pp. 49-50.

³³² Hans Mouritzen, "The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 32, No. 1, Feb. 1995, pp. 10-11.

³³³ Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, pp. 10-11.; For the reasons why Denmark and Sweden were epitomes of Scandinavian progressivity, along with the historical factors and the American and British perspectives, see: Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, pp. 42-108.

identity inevitably reveals that historical perspectives and debates associated with the Nordic model have significantly shaped the images regarding the *Norden* and Sweden.³³⁴ Ideological issues and political orientations influenced views about Scandinavia's progression as embodied in various facets of life and institutions in the period following the Second World War. The processes of modernization and development in the American and European societies also affected these views.³³⁵ Hence, the progressive image of the Nordic countries has also been derived from not only systemic but also ideological, comparative, political, and social perspectives.

The reasons that account for the emergence of the Nordic model have also been approached through the implications of "Nordic Enlightenment." According to Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, the Nordic region experienced a particular kind of Enlightenment. In their democratic political culture, the inherent tension between freedom and equality was more competently contained and controlled compared to the other communities.³³⁶ This particularity was expressed through social democracy as corresponding to the persistence and transformation of Lutheranism; parochial political culture; Nordic popular movements; social liberalism, and even reform conservatism.³³⁷ In this regard, it can be restrictive to direct the focus to the Interwar period in engaging with the underpinnings of the Nordic model. Nevertheless, the Interwar period witnessed appreciation and further recognition of this model, whereof its peaceful reflections became more apparent in the Cold War period. Hence, the Nordic model entered into a new phase related to the promotion of third-party practices during the Cold War.

In relation to the Nordic model, Sweden was particularly depicted as an example and a guider. This explains why the Nordic model was also predominantly approached by the contributions of Sweden rather than other Nordic countries. The self-identification of Sweden entailed distinctiveness from others in the post-war era. In this regard, Sweden was characterized by its wealth, social progress, model to be embraced and followed by others, neutrality, friendly relations with the Third World,

³³⁴ See: Andersson, and Hilson, "Images of Sweden and the Nordic...", pp. 219-222.

³³⁵ Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, p. 11.; Having said that, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a discursive conception of the Scandinavian framework, which had implications for its effective economy and political culture. Musial, **Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...**, p. 10.

³³⁶ Øystein Sørensen, and Bo Stråth, "Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden", in Øystein Sørensen, and Bo Stråth (Eds.), **The Cultural Construction of Norden**, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Boston : Scandinavian University Press, 1997, p. 3.

³³⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 5.

and its role as a bridge between the East and West and the North and South.³³⁸ In the period following the Second World War, the capabilities and determination of Sweden to pursue a “*middle way*” have even been evaluated as miracle.³³⁹ Hence, Sweden represented vehicles for wealthness, progressiveness, a model that needs to be emulated, neutrality, amicable interactions with the Third World, diplomatic capabilities, and determination in the post-war period.

However, the offerings of the Swedish system have also been subject to profound criticisms, as mirrored by fulfilling the prophecy of *Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World* with its dystopian and totalitarian visions. In this context, *Roland Huntford* argues that Sweden has consistently fulfilled the following requisites and specifications as the solution to problems associated with security, the arrival of collective prosperity, economic security, a comprehensive understanding concerning the interaction between economics and power by rulers, compliance with authority and respect for the expertise of those who rule, reluctance to individuality, suspicion for parliamentary institutions, worship for the state, and predilection for bureaucrats rather than politicians within the government. Also, various elements, including conditions resulting from a century and a half of peace, isolation, and neutrality; being a small state and being easily governed, and the proportionality between its population and natural resources, played a supportive role for the fulfillment of such requisites and specifications.³⁴⁰

Hence, being a small state and peacefulness affected attributions directed to the exceptionality of Sweden. However, there were also criticisms related to democracy and individualism in brief. Nevertheless, the Nordic model has been advocated for its economic, political, social, and cultural progressiveness that allowed the Nordic countries to enjoy self-esteem to an important extent. As highlighted, there have been discernible historical elements, including the role of peasants, education, the nation that indicates a community of destiny, social liberalism, capitalism, the political creation of the welfare state, pietism, and Lutheranism that have been embodied in the Nordic model. The core elements associated with the “Nordic idea” have also entailed

³³⁸ Erik Ringmar, “Re-Imagining Sweden: The Rhetorical Battle Over EU Membership”, *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 23, No. 1-2, 1998, p. 45.

³³⁹ Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way*, New Revised and Enlarged Edition, New Haven : Yale University Press, May, 1947, p. 179.

³⁴⁰ Roland Huntford, *The New Totalitarians: A Terrifying Portrait of an “Ideal” Society that has Destroyed Democracy*, Paperback and Revised Edition, New York : Stein & Day Pub, 1980, pp. 7-9.

the combination of equality and individual freedom.³⁴¹ In this regard, the Nordic model has been grounded in the combination of these factors and historical conditions that played a cultivating role.

The 1990s revealed critical flaws with regard to the Swedish model. Following that, Sweden was faced with challenges aimed at finding a new role and to re-define its position. This process led to the EU membership of Sweden, dated 01 January 1995.³⁴² Hence, EU membership has also been oriented at remedying problems directed to the Swedish model and Nordic model, along with Nordic identity in the post-Cold War circumstances. In a broader framework, the image directed to Scandinavia was dominated by the political and social third way approach between the two regimes. *Kazimierz Musial* reveals that this perception was dominant orientation until the 1990s in the Eastern and Western European.³⁴³ It can be contended that such perception also falls within the domain of peace mediation and facilitation. With the end of the Cold War, there have been adjustments to protect the established Nordic image and re-definition of the positions of Nordic countries. As it will be seen in the general dataset of Thesis, deepened third-party practices have also been oriented at improving Nordic large-group identity and the peaceful implications of the Nordic model in terms of bridge-building.

Actually, not only this period but also the 1930s entailed the commencement of several years of setbacks for Denmark and Norway. In this regard, the Second World War and the invasion of Denmark and Norway by German troops represented the deadlines associated with the progressive image of Scandinavia. Sweden was the only Scandinavian country that survived this turmoil.³⁴⁴ It can be argued that inadequate responses to both troubling conditions and selective glorifications have also been connected with the promotion of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation tradition. With that being said, Denmark and Iceland could not play satisfactory roles in these third-party practices. In this Thesis, the effects of troubling conditions will be included in understanding how fear and uncertainty with regard to the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods affected third-party engagements of the Nordic countries. The problems regarding the Nordic model will also be revealed in the context of the challenges and contradictions of Nordic peace diplomacy.

³⁴¹ Sørensen, and Stråth, "Introduction: Cultural Construction...", p. 7.; For a detailed explanation of each elements, please see: Sørensen, and Stråth, "Introduction: Cultural Construction...", pp. 7-19.

³⁴² Ringmar, "Re-Imagining Sweden: Rhetorical Battle...", pp. 45-46.

³⁴³ Musial, *Roots of Scandinavian Model: Images...*, p. 13.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

e. Nordic peace as the culture for negotiations and peaceful resolution of conflicts

In discussing Nordic exceptionalism, the focus is usually directed to the construction of Nordic societies and the development of the welfare state. However, it is equally important to focus on peaceful relations among Nordic societies. As reflecting this understanding, it is important to note that sixty wars were recorded within and between the Nordic countries and with their neighbours during five centuries, which culminated in the Napoleonic wars. The twentieth century witnessed only Finnish revolution concerning the occurrence of war inside the Nordic countries. During the twentieth century, wars with the neighbours of the Nordic countries were limited with the attack of the USSR on Finland in 1939 and with the attacks of Germany on Denmark and Norway in 1940.³⁴⁵

The theme of peaceful relations has also been echoed by the assertion suggesting that the Nordic region can be considered a friendly neighborhood, in which the interactions between Nordic countries have been characterized by friendly relations and trust. By relying on several interviews as conducted with Nordic diplomats, friendly relations between Nordic countries have been evaluated as a communal feeling, which allows for the establishment of a friendly neighborhood, a collective polity stance, greater recognition, and privileges in world politics. In addition, such friendly relations have also been evaluated as restrictions upon the rivalry associated with competition in the nexus of status-seeking policies and interactions within the Nordic grouping. As a result, competition for status-seeking has been characterized by friendship rather than animosity or hostility.³⁴⁶ This quality will be evident in the cooperation between Sweden and Norway in the case of Palestine.

According to *Nir Levitan*, Scandinavian culture and Nordic political cooperation cannot be neglected in engaging with Nordic peace, conflict resolution, and the promotion of peace.³⁴⁷ In this regard, it can be argued that “Nordic peace” stands for the proneness to peaceful relations within the Nordic societies and countries, along with the role of friendship and trust, as affecting not only cooperation but also competition while guiding the pursuit for status-seeking and political cooperation.

³⁴⁵ Wiberg, “Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of...”, p. 208.

³⁴⁶ Pål Røren, “Status Seeking in the Friendly Nordic Neighborhood”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2019, pp. 563-564.

³⁴⁷ Nir Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Official and Unofficial Soft Power*, London and New York : Routledge, 2023, p. 11.

Hence, Nordic peace has also been one of the applied explanations in discussing the exceptionality of Nordic countries and Nordic peace diplomacy.

There have been certain characteristics that demonstrated Nordic countries as distinguishable. The historical background of the Nordic countries, their postulate in world politics, population structure, economic and social conditions, cultural life, and their political system have been evaluated as certain special features that distinguish the Nordic countries.³⁴⁸ The Nordic distinctiveness has also been explained in terms of their strategic position, the absence of ethnic and cultural differences within the region, the policies followed by the decision-makers, and political culture. In this regard, both the international environment and the absence of internal divisions have taken part in preventing conflicts and ensuring peace.³⁴⁹

Taken together, Nordic balance, Nordic brand, Nordic humanitarianism, and the development of the Nordic model as an alternative/third way capture the combination of both international and internal conditions. These aforementioned features have been reaffirmed in representing the Nordic region as a zone of peace with regard to the concepts of negative peace, stable peace, and the security community.³⁵⁰ From a historical perspective, it is contended that there has been a delay in the development of the stable peace between Norway and Sweden in contrast to common assumptions. For this reason, it is advisable not to quickly jump to a conclusion concerning the characterization of the relationship between these two countries as a security community. The reasons that delayed the development of the stable peace have been explained in terms of the relatively undemocratic character of the Swedish State and diverging external geopolitical tendencies between Norway and Sweden.³⁵¹

In the early 1930s, the relationship between Norway and Sweden has become one of the examples of stable peace, which witnessed the disappearance of remaining fears on both sides.³⁵² By this time, bilateral relations also witnessed the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905. This secession was marked by the unilateral declaration

³⁴⁸ Göran von Bonsdorff, "Regional Cooperation of the Nordic Countries", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1965, p. 32.

³⁴⁹ Clive Archer, "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1996, p. 458.

³⁵⁰ Clive Archer, "Introduction", in Clive Archer, and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), **The Nordic Peace**, Hampshire, Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, p. 8.

³⁵¹ Magnus Ericson, "The Case of Norway and Sweden", in Clive Archer, and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), **The Nordic Peace**, Hampshire, Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, pp. 24-26.; It is also interpreted that despite not being particularly democratic, one of the descriptions of the Swedish government in 1905 has been explained as "*peace-seeking by nature*". Ericson, "The Case of Norway and Sweden", p. 36.

³⁵² **Ibid.**, p. 33.

of independence. Nevertheless, the overriding political forces were not prone to military means in both countries. Sweden eventually recognized the secession of Norway following a negotiation that led to the “Treaty of Karlstad.”³⁵³ In a way, this separation has been seen as a “*landmark*” across Western history.³⁵⁴ In this context, the secession of Norway and stable peace between Norway and Sweden reveal Nordic culture for negotiations, conflict transformation, and peacefulness.

Such achievements can be considered as intriguing given the historical background of the Nordic countries. Actually, historical background accounts for both harmonious associations and wars.³⁵⁵ To give an overview, the medieval “Kalmar Union” was divided into the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden in the early sixteenth century. Norway, Iceland, and the Swedish provinces of Skåne and Blekinge were included within the territories of the Danish monarchy. In this process, the distinctive entities of Iceland and Norway persisted in contrast to Finland and Sweden. From an early modern history perspective, the territories of Sweden and Denmark in the southern Baltic coast and in northern Germany need to be included as well. Hence, the map of the *Norden* started to take on a more recognizable shape that is resembling the contemporary configuration only after the year of 1814.³⁵⁶

Between the end of the eighth century and the eleventh century, prominent Scandinavian figures corresponded to pirates, conquerors, and colonists, respectively, in the history of western Europe. They were primarily from large-groups that are currently referred to as Denmark, Norway, and west Sweden. Similarly, others from east Sweden were also active in eastern Europe. Before being labeled as “Vikings”, Scandinavians were often referred to as “Danes” and “Northmen” in western Europe. Occasionally, descriptions such as heathens or gentiles were adopted as well. In the east, Scandinavian invaders were called *Rus*, derived from the Finnish word for *Svear*. It was only in English that Scandinavians began to be identified as Vikings, which dates back to the ninth century. Derived from *vikingr*, this term describes not only Viking warriors but also various aspects of Scandinavian society.³⁵⁷

³⁵³ Wiberg, “Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of...”, p. 208.

³⁵⁴ Boulding, **Stable Peace**, p. 45.

³⁵⁵ George R. Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe**, Assisted by Aune Mäkinen-Ollinen, Sverrir Thorbjörnsson, Kaare Salvesen, and Göran Tegner, Sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Trent University Library, Presented by J. Alex. Edmison, Q.C., Copenhagen, Denmark : Krohns Bogtrykkeri, 1953, p. 11.

³⁵⁶ Hilson, **Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945**, p. 14.

³⁵⁷ Peter Sawyer, “The Viking Expansion”, in Knut Helle (Ed.), **The Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Volume I, Prehistory to 1520**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 105.

Historically, the Viking period witnessed expansion, raids, foreign trade, and colonization.³⁵⁸ During this period, Scandinavians became familiar with different cultures, environments, and nationalities as a result of the increased level of contact, information, and traveling. It is also presumable to argue that tolerance for other cultures affected the astonishing ability of Scandinavians in positioning themselves as traders, conquerors, or colonists.³⁵⁹ On closer inspection, the tolerance for cultural diversity can be considered as a passing tradition in connection with the historical experiences resulting from the Viking period. This tradition might be considered as useful in engaging with different large-groups and in utilizing contextual approaches in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

This period was also characterized by the lack of or little centralized power, social differences, uneven distribution of power, the importance of honour at the group level, and vengeance. Actually, vengeance was seen as a duty to various kinds of violence and as means of the restoration of balance. In this regard, vengeance and honour were considered to be crucial for the maintenance of peace.³⁶⁰ Despite the prominent labels associated with the Viking period such as pirates, conquerors, colonists or traders, it is plausible to assert that such labels were successfully replaced by humanitarianism and peacefulness of the Nordic countries. In this process, the exploration of different cultures that dates back to the Viking era can be considered as instrumental.

In addition, there were also cases in which peace was a conduit in bringing Northern monarchies together long before the cultural construction of positive connotations of Nordic identity. Let it here suffice to explain relevant examples as follows: At the end of the fourteenth century, the Northern monarchies united to secure peace in the North and maintain freedom and independence. In this process, pressures resulting from the German political and economic expansion were decisive for the union, which endured for half a century and resulted in the Swedish independence movement.³⁶¹ Hence, this union indicates cooperation and “we” feeling of Northern

³⁵⁸ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 11.

³⁵⁹ Else Roesdahl, and Preben Meulengracht Sørensen, “Viking Culture”, (transl. by J. Jesch), in Knut Helle (Ed.), **The Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Volume I, Prehistory to 1520**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 121.

³⁶⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 132.

³⁶¹ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 12.; For information about the Kalmar Union, please see: Harald Gustafsson, “A State that Failed? On the Union of Kalmar, Especially its Dissolution”, **Scandinavian Journal of History**, Vol. 31, No. 3-4: Break-up of Political Unions - from the Kalmar Union to Five Nordic Nation-States , 2006, pp. 205-220.; Margaretha Nordquist, “Eternal

monarchies with the pursuit of balance against German expansion and of peace as common ground.

In regard to distinctive Nordic political traditions as derived from historical experiences, it is important to underline that Nordic countries were never part of the Holy Roman Empire.³⁶² In the sixteenth century, Northern countries embarked on their own course. The kings of the Northern countries severed ties with the Catholic Church and established national Protestant churches. In the following centuries, the political area was characterized by struggles for domination directed at the Baltic between the Danish-Norwegian monarchy, which also entailed Iceland, and the Kingdom of Sweden-Finland as two great powers of the North.³⁶³

Sweden's imperial ambitions gradually shifted into a smaller nation-state after its defeat at Poltava in 1709. However, this process was also accompanied by revanchist ambitions targeting the rising Russia, which culminated in a war between 1788 and 1789. As a result of the stalemate, the conflict ultimately resulted in the total defeat of Sweden between 1808 and 1809. In this context, half the Swedish state was lost to Russia. This province, along with eastern Karelia, was re-organized as Finland.³⁶⁴ In the light of these remarks, it seems appropriate to claim that the power politics of Russia also affected identity dynamics and shifts of the Nordic countries in terms of being small states with foreign policy objectives oriented at preventing geopolitical threats and power rivalries.

In the period between 1648 and 1713, wars/interventions fought among the Nordic countries and involving one of the Nordic countries can be explained as follows: Sweden-Poland dated 1655-1660; Denmark-Sweden dated 1675-1679; France-Spain, Great Britain, Holland, Denmark dated 1702-1713; Denmark-Holstein-Gottorp (Sweden) dated 1699-1700; Saxony (Poland)-Sweden dated 1700-1706; Russia-Sweden dated 1700-1721, and Denmark-Sweden dated 1709-1720. The two wars between Denmark and Sweden, grounded in territory issues, can be described as

Bonds of Love or Foreign Oppression? Entangled Identities in Late-Medieval Scandinavia", *Quaestiones Medii Aevi Novae*, Vol. 23, 2018, pp. 379-403.; Rowland Kenney, *The Northern Tangle: Scandinavia and the Post-war World*, (maps by J. F. Horrabin), London : J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1946, pp. 14-18.

³⁶² Uffe Østergård, "The History of Europe Seen from the North", *European Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2006, p. 282.

³⁶³ Nelson (Ed.), *Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...*, pp. 12-13.

³⁶⁴ Uffe Østergård, "The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-states", in Øystein Sørensen, and Bo Stråth (Eds.), *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Boston : Scandinavian University Press, 1997, p. 26.

wars of revenge corresponding to the attempts for the reversion of results that stemmed from previous wars.³⁶⁵

The political role of the North was decreased in connection with the prominence of Russia and Prussia in the eighteenth century.³⁶⁶ In the year of 1814, the status of Denmark was diminished to a medium-sized power following the loss of Norway. In the year of 1864, the status of Denmark was decreased to the epitome of a small state. Nevertheless, the burdens of its empire past still persist.³⁶⁷ Such remarks demonstrate the historical shifts regarding the status of Nordic countries as great, medium, and small powers. In brief, the traditional balance of power in the North was disrupted due to the Napoleonic wars. Finland came under the rule of the Russian czar at the time; nevertheless, it retained its Nordic legal system. This process was also marked by the separation between Norway and Denmark and the union between Norway and Sweden.³⁶⁸

As emphasized, Denmark cannot be seen as completely detached from the burdens of its empire past regardless of being a small state. With the Faeroes and Greenland, Denmark represents both a nation-state and the Commonwealth.³⁶⁹ Taken together, the prominent role of Russia and Prussia and the propagation of conflicts affected the status and power-balance among the Northern countries. In particular, the influence and rule of Russia and connection to other Nordic countries have affected the identity construction of Finland. Accordingly, the historical background of Finland, its geopolitical position, and identity construction account for its diplomatic abilities in terms of peace mediation and facilitation. As for Denmark, similar concerns related to geopolitics and power politics, along with the effects of its empire legacy, have led to a cautious and defensive approach for the formulation of its foreign policy.

In terms of inter-Nordic conflicts, the Nordic region was typified by the conflict that involved wars of rivalry between Sweden and Denmark until the nineteenth century. *Clive Archer* explains that Nordic countries were involved in the wars of inequality from 1815. Following that, the Nordic countries were subject to attacks

³⁶⁵ Kalevi J. Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 47-49.; It is important to note that there is a deep-rooted fear of Russia in Sweden. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Russia was the enemy. Childs, **Sweden: The Middle Way**, p. 181.

³⁶⁶ Matti Klinge, "Aspects of the Nordic Self", **Daedalus**, Vol. 113, No. 2, Nordic Voices, Spring 1984, p. 258.

³⁶⁷ Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 26.

³⁶⁸ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 13.

³⁶⁹ Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 26.

from larger powers outside of the region, as exemplified by the Schleswig-Holstein wars; the invasion of Finland by the USSR, and the German invasion of Denmark and Norway. Drawing from all of these, it might be contended that the decline in inter-Nordic conflict can also be explained in terms of structural reasons.³⁷⁰ As a result, Nordic peace can be approached as the culmination of both internal and external conditions.³⁷¹

In hindsight, the period of the Napoleonic Wars was important not only because of the loss of Finland to the former Russian czar, the establishment of the union between Sweden and Norway, and the ability of Denmark to keep Iceland under its rule but also because of the demonstration of the next-to-last step. This included the formation of the present political geography of Northern Europe and the last war among the states of Northern Europe. In this process, Finland relatively developed in terms of economics and security since it was spared from being a battleground between the neighbors. It also safeguarded its own legal system, *inter alia*, its own constitution and its own language against Russifying attempts. Concerning successful defence against Russifying attempts, Finland combined non-violent resistance and political skill.³⁷² Such political skills were proven to be effective in engaging with protracted conflicts, including the case of Aceh. Also, non-violent resistance affected its identity construction, which aligns with being a member of the Nordic community in terms of Nordic peace.

In the nineteenth century, there were also attempts to establish a closer union between Norway and Sweden, which were united kingdoms at the time, and Denmark. These attempts were referred to as “Scandinavianism.” Finland, as ceded to Russia in 1809, was also considered to be part of Scandinavianism by Swedish optimists.³⁷³ Nevertheless, political ambitions were oriented at uniting Denmark, Norway, and Sweden during the mid-nineteenth century. However, much less ambitions oriented at ensuring international cooperation emerged by the end of the First World War.³⁷⁴ Hence, the prospects for unification were channeled into cooperation. With the devastating effects of the Great War, there were efforts, which were not as ambitious

³⁷⁰ Archer, “Introduction”, p. 3.

³⁷¹ As a reflection of external conditions, particularly geopolitical ones, Scandinavian countries have avoided armed conflicts. For this and its exception, see: Wiberg, “Scandinavia”, p. 212.

³⁷² Håkan Wiberg, “The Nordic Countries: A Special Kind of System?”, **Current Research on Peace and Violence**, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, Nordic Security, 1986, pp. 2-3.

³⁷³ Åke Holmberg, “On the Practicability of Scandinavianism: Mid-nineteenth-century Debate and Aspirations”, **Scandinavian Journal of History**, Vol. 9, No. 2-3, 1984, p. 171.

³⁷⁴ Hilson, **Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945**, pp. 11-12.

as Scandinavianism, for increased cooperation. This also denotes the intentions of Nordic countries for defence and security through cooperation.

Actually, ambitions for pan-Scandinavian unity were decreased following the year of 1864, which marked the defeat of Denmark against Prussia and the broken promise of Sweden. In this regard, cultural and linguistic aspects continued to affect intra-Scandinavian cooperation. Of equal importance is that this idea also functioned as a means of solidarity against large states, especially Russia and Germany. As reflecting this, the definitions surrounding Scandinavia partly entailed the differences of Scandinavian countries from Russia. Examples associated with the distinctiveness of Scandinavia from Russia include the Germanic culture and language, free peasants, and constitutional monarchy.³⁷⁵ In this regard, efforts for pan-Scandinavian unity were linked to not only defence and security but also large-group identity-oriented fears, of which the latter required providing means of differentiation from Russia.

The original purpose of this movement has been oriented at developing cultural contacts in the fields of science and literature. In this process, efforts also entailed the advocacy of military cooperation with the objective to defend the southern frontier of Denmark against the threat of Germany. Hence, this movement, originally grounded in scientific and cultural Nordic cooperation, became a political force. Despite the failure of political ambitions, this movement has been a contributing factor to the conclusion of distrust and hostility among Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.³⁷⁶ Simply put, the abandonment of Scandinavianism did not prevent Nordic cooperation and partnerships among the Nordic countries. Rather, it functioned as a source of friendly and peaceful relations.

According to *Anders Wivel*, Scandinavism has also affected the Nordic model associated with international peace and security. As inspired by the ideas from German and Italian nationalism and by cultural figures, including Danish poet and Protestant priest *N.F.S. Grundtvig*, Scandinavism indicates a romantic movement with an emphasis on “Nordic brotherhood.” With this in mind, the distinctiveness of Scandinavism lies in its purpose oriented at a Scandinavian civil society creation rather than state-building. In this process, the importance of a shared history and common values has also been demonstrated. The combination of political liberalism and

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.; For the list of issues that led to war between German Confederation (Prussia) and Denmark, dated 1863-1864, see: Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, p. 141.

³⁷⁶ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 13.

economic equality, as affected the Nordic Peasant and labor movements since the late nineteenth-century, was particularly important among these values.³⁷⁷ With this historical background, there was a salient capability for the dissemination of civil society as reflected in third-party initiatives as well.

Importantly, there was a shift from political union-oriented efforts to Nordicism in the twentieth century. According to *Åke Holmberg*, one of the reasons for this shift can be explained in terms of the wish for dissociation with the nineteenth century movement, which revealed the unsuccessfulness, unrealism, and unattainability of Scandinavianism and its incompatibility with the significant majority of Scandinavian peoples and the European realities at the time.³⁷⁸ Approaching Nordicism and distancing from Scandinavism can also be linked to such conditions and developments, including the independence of Finland in 1917 and international tensions during the 1930s.³⁷⁹

In sum, it is argued that the term Nordic became a crucial component for national identity construction rather than national state-building. Despite the similarities with other parts of Europe, national identity construction in Scandinavia entailed different traits in terms of being more peaceful compared to other regions and the non-escalation of conflicts and disputes into wars.³⁸⁰ Such traits also account for the development of Nordic peace and the distinctiveness of Nordic countries in terms of the prevention of the escalation of conflicts and propensity to peacefulness.

The implications of peacefulness have also been reflected through the concept of “procedural quality peace.” Within this framework, *Erik Melander* defines quality peace in terms of “*the conduct of politics with respect for the physical person of one’s adversary, using consensual decision making, on the basis of strong equality values*”.³⁸¹ This understanding has been grounded in the violent political conflict theory of *Carl von Clausewitz*, peace research-oriented pioneering works of *Quincy Wright*, and feminist theory. The term procedural quality peace indicates such

³⁷⁷ Wivel, “What Happened to the Nordic Model...”, p. 490.

³⁷⁸ Holmberg, “On the Practicability of Scandinavianism...”, p. 171.

³⁷⁹ Norbert Götz, “Norden: Structures That Do Not Make a Region”, **European Review of History—Revue Européenne d’Histoire**, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003, p. 337.; In essence, Nordism was oriented at reconciling relations between Denmark and Sweden. The use of this term was also functional in demonstrating the inclusion of Finland into the members of the Nordic community. See: Wiberg, “Scandinavia”, p. 213.

³⁸⁰ Wivel, “What Happened to the Nordic Model...”, pp. 490-491.

³⁸¹ Erik Melander, “A Procedural Approach to Quality Peace”, in Christian Davenport, Erik Melander, and Patrick M. Regan, **The Peace Continuum: What it is and How to Study it**, New York : Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 113.

procedures oriented at resolving political conflicts in all societies, not just those in post-conflict societies. From an operational perspective, the level of quality peace can be measured through traits as follows: the absence of war, which entails different forms of organized violence, high respect for the physical integrity of the adversary, democratic political institutions, and high respect for women's rights.³⁸²

In this regard, the traits of respect for the physical integrity of the adversary, consensual decision-making, and values encompassing democracy and equality can be described as mutually reinforcing. Importantly, it is argued that Scandinavian countries are strong in the context of these aforementioned elements. As a result, it is very unlikely for Scandinavian countries to deviate from such elements and to regress into a lower quality peace, which is characterized by the cycles of violence and oppression. The attainment of these mutually reinforcing elements of peace reduces the probability of war. The weaknesses in these elements, on the other hand, generate challenges in breaking the cycles of violence and oppression.³⁸³ This argument supports the peacefulness of Nordic countries marked by the transformation of the Viking culture and relative absence of the cycles of violence and oppression, along with the abilities for conflict resolution and conflict transformation. These abilities have been linked to the peace culture for negotiations and conclusion of hostilities among the Nordic countries as a means of security against larger threatening powers.

*"There has been no armed conflict between Nordic countries since 1815".*³⁸⁴ Peace has prevailed since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Relatedly, major conflicts between the great powers were shifted to other geographical areas following the Napoleonic Wars.³⁸⁵ This geopolitical shift also accounts for the development of a high level of quality peace through the absence of armed conflicts. As a result, the possibility for the development of peace mediation and facilitation can increase instead of inducing war.

With the developments in world politics and the gradual emergence of the five Nordic countries as distinct and rather small nations, the former policy of expansion of Nordic countries as directed to both each other and foreign powers was removed at its foundations. The value of Nordic cooperation and mutual understanding has attained further recognition in the context of IR. As a result, it is contended that the

³⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

³⁸⁴ Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model", p. 491.

³⁸⁵ Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 27.

Nordic peoples learned to solve even intense disputes through means of peaceful negotiations.³⁸⁶

This also affects the acceptability of Nordic countries as third-parties positively. Drawing from these remarks, it is clear that external conditions can also be considered as important for the development of Nordic peace diplomacy and the widespread implementation/utilization of peaceful mechanisms and techniques, including negotiation. The importance of external conditions will be crystallized in engaging with the effects of the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods.

In *New Nordic Peace: Nordic Peace and Conflict Resolution Efforts*, the Nordic region has been evaluated both as a region of peace and as a region for peace.³⁸⁷ Nordic peace has also been explained by referring to both internal context as the internal peace and to external context as the involvement of Nordic countries for peace and conflict resolution. It is argued that peaceful relationships between the Nordic countries and their peaceful living conditions have been important for internal context. The emphasis on the resolution of political conflicts in peaceful ways, on the other hand, has been important for external context.³⁸⁸

There have been examples as demonstrated peaceful solutions within the Nordic context and/or national contexts. In 1944, the political ties of Iceland with Denmark were dissolved in a remarkably peaceful manner. This peacefulness has been connected with the Nordic attitude towards the solutions of disputes, which gained ground during the nineteenth century. It is further contended that the case of Iceland demonstrates an excellent example of a peaceful Nordic solution of disputes that entails negotiations, described as slow but almost constant and as mostly informal in terms of its characteristics.³⁸⁹

The demand of Iceland for secession from Denmark has been described as an important example, which demonstrates a nationalist struggle that did not lead to violent conflicts or oppressions. With that being said, it is contended that this peculiar example needs to be examined in the context of Icelandic nationalism, rather than in the context of a pacific Nordic mentality, which might be invalidated from a historical

³⁸⁶ Nelson (Ed.), *Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...*, pp. 13-14.

³⁸⁷ Hagemann, and Bramsen, *New Nordic Peace: Nordic...*, p. 9.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³⁸⁹ Gunnar Karlsson, "Denmark's Peaceful Release of Iceland", in Clive Archer, and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), *The Nordic Peace*, Hampshire, Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, p. 45.

perspective.³⁹⁰ In this regard, a contextual approach has been demonstrated for the case of Iceland, rather than Nordic mentality. But it can be contended that the latter has also been supported through the Danish response. The reason is that the attitudes and policies of the Danish government were also effective for the peaceful secession of Iceland.³⁹¹

Primary examples also include the secession of Norway from Sweden, as peacefully through negotiations, the resolution of the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the resolution of the disagreement between Denmark and Norway related to sovereignty and control in Eastern Greenland through ICJ, settlement of the status of *Svalbard* through international treaty, the independence of the Faroe Islands from Denmark through referendum; and the independence of Greenland in the late 1970s.³⁹²

As a result, Nordic countries have been examined through the lenses of Nordic peace, a zone of peace, the Nordic balance, and peace operations. In terms of Nordic peace and approachment to the Nordic region as a zone of peace, it is argued that the Nordic avoidance of wars, as related to negative peace, along with the representation of positive peace, the political culture of compromise, and solidarity through a network of organizations, might be evaluated as important elements for Nordic peace and a regional zone of peace.³⁹³

It is contended that both the strategic position of the Nordic area and the culture of Nordic countries and societies have been influential for the term “zone of peace”, which is described as a status.³⁹⁴ Examples related to Norway’s and Iceland’s secession from Sweden and Denmark, respectively, and the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden can be indicative of this peaceful status.

For the political culture of Nordic countries, it is contended that Nordic decision-makers prioritize peacefulness and negotiations over conflictual decisions and threats, respectively. In this regard, it is explained that social peace-oriented political culture, externalization of this culture towards other countries, and its institutionalization have

³⁹⁰ Guðmundur Hálfðanarson, “Iceland: A Peaceful Secession”, *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 25, No. 1-2, 2000, pp. 87-88.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³⁹² Wiberg, “Scandinavia”, pp. 210-211.

³⁹³ Archer, “Introduction”, p. 19.; Positive and negative peace will be elaborated in the last part of this Thesis.

³⁹⁴ Archer, “Nordic Area as a ‘Zone of Peace’”, p. 452.

been important for the propensity of the Nordic countries, which are characterized by being less aggressive and confrontational compared to most other European states in the realm of foreign affairs.³⁹⁵ In externalizing peaceful culture, third-party practices have inevitably played a consolidating role in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy.

Section II - The motivations and contradictions in Nordic peace diplomacy: The disenchantment of Nordic peace diplomacy?

There have been different frameworks that have accounted for the third-party roles of the Nordic countries. As an example, peace promotion of Norway can be explained through the lenses of national identity construction in the international area. The leading role of Norway has been exemplified in the cases of Israel and Palestine conflict, as well as in Guatemala, Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, Kosovo, and Colombia.³⁹⁶ The involvement of Norway in these cases played a direct role in the construction of its peaceful identity.

As reflecting this, peace policy and peace promotion have been fundamental for the foreign policy of Norway and largely driven by an identity-oriented framework, which demonstrates a liberal approach to the world. Accordingly, this approach was accompanied by the belief that Norway can contribute to the world's improvement.³⁹⁷ Within this connection, identity construction and liberal views affected Norway in its peaceful endeavors while guiding its foreign policy. This ambitious consideration has been reflected not only in terms of national identity and foreign policy formation but also in terms of Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy.

In parallel to the link between the demonstration of liberal views and peace diplomacy, adherence to international law and norms; taking supportive roles in international organizations, and the prioritization of communication and humanitarian aid also comply with the efforts for a peaceful and progressive identity of Norway. In order to strengthen these efforts, peace mediation and facilitation have been considered as instructive and self-glorifying practices in world politics. As a result, one can state that peaceful endeavors have been directed by self-interested purposes as well.

These efforts have also exerted influence on foreign policy, which can also be seen as the politics of identity. Foreign policy statements and practices of Norway have

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

³⁹⁶ Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 76.

³⁹⁷ Halvard Leira, "'Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace': The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace", *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, Special Issue: Natural Born Peacemakers? Ideas and Identities in Foreign Policies of Small States in Western Europe, September 2013, p. 339.

been characterized by particular images, such as being a small country; being a peace nation; generosity through economic aid; contributing to the international community through the UN system; multilateralism and regular international politics; dedication to Atlanticism; being an outsider country; and having such ideals and interests as serving for the common good by pursuing self-interests and being an altruistic and environmentalist country. These self-images have been intertwined with the foreign policy of Norway albeit with gaps and tensions in different areas.³⁹⁸

However, a tension has been noted between images as corresponding to being a peaceful nation and being a faithful NATO ally. This tension was quite observable during the involvement and military presence of Norway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples also include trade policy as balancing altruistic identity of Norway and tensions between multilateralist and environmentalist images and the High North policy of Norway marked by self-interest seeking and sovereignty. Hence, there has not been a constant harmony between the reflections of these aforesaid self-images into the realm of alliances, foreign policy, and military practices.³⁹⁹

Such tensions have also been evident in the distinguishable peace policy of Norway, which affected its foreign policy formulation around since 1900. Motivations for peace diplomacy entailed both an ambitious agenda directed to the change of the international system, and utilitarian objectives. With that being said, Norwegian peace mediation and facilitation practices were particularly prominent in the immediate years following the conclusion of the Cold War. Following the years of 1999 and 2001, Norway has played active roles in external military operations. Despite differences, it is argued that identity-oriented concerns have guided peace policy, which holds an increasing weight in the foreign policy of Norway.⁴⁰⁰

As an example of such concerns, the efforts for the promotion of a peacemaker image affected Norway's willingness for the role of peace mediation in the case of Sri Lanka.⁴⁰¹ In addition, self-interested objectives related to fishing also affected its motivations in the third-party roles as fulfilled in the conflict between the LTTE and

³⁹⁸ Halvard Leira (Ed), Axel Borchgrevink, Nina Græger, Arne Melchior, Eli Stamnes and Indra Øverland, **Norske Selvbilder og Norsk Utenrikspolitikk** ("Norwegian Self-images and Norwegian Foreign Policy"), Oslo : Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt ("Norwegian Institute of International Affairs", NUPI), April 2007, pp. 9-10.; The original text in Norwegian.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 15.; For further information about the tension between the Atlanticist, and pacifist orientations, see: Leira (Ed), Borchgrevink, Græger, Melchior, Stamnes, and Øverland, **Norske Selvbilder og...**, pp. 32-35.

⁴⁰⁰ Leira, "Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace...", p. 339.

⁴⁰¹ Kristine Hoglund, and Isak Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions: Norwegian Peace Diplomacy in Sri Lanka's Civil War", **Contemporary South Asia**, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 2009, p. 176.

Sri Lankan government.⁴⁰² In essence, pragmatic and self-interested behaviours can be linked to various reasons, including economic development. With this in mind, there can be a mutually reinforcing relationship between economic development and peacemaking. For example, wealth obtained from oil also allowed Norway to have its flexible and selective approach to peacemaking and the pursuit of third-party roles in the long term.⁴⁰³

As highlighted in the previous section, systems-maintenance has been one of the applied frameworks regarding peaceful engagements of Norway. According to *Neumann*, peaceful endeavors of Norway can be evaluated as the demonstration of systems-maintaining diplomacy conducted by wealthy and small/medium-sized powers, as satisfied with the system. It is argued that the means of peace and reconciliation efforts and engagements have been oriented at maintaining and further institutionalizing the system.⁴⁰⁴ Hence, both system change and system maintenance/institutionalization account for the motivations of Norway. Ambitious or *status quo*-oriented choices can be linked to Norway's interests, compatibility, and satisfaction with the system.

In a speech/statement, titled as "Norway's Engagement in the Middle East", former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs *Anniken Huitfeldt* has demonstrated that strengthening vulnerable states, stabilizing countries as affected by conflict and fragility; developing strategies, and finding solutions for conflicts through peace initiatives; preventing situations that create refugee flows; helping internally displaced people; combating radicalization and extremism; generating opportunities for investments; providing advices to Norwegian companies, supporting sustainable growth, development, green transition, health and education, and promoting human rights and gender equality might be important to safeguard Norway's interests while making a difference. In this speech/statement, both humanitarian reasons and interests of Norway have been demonstrated for its peace and reconciliation engagement, described as complementary with the mediation of the UN in the Middle East.⁴⁰⁵

These explanations also indicate a duality regarding moral and self-interested motivations that account for peaceful engagements of Norway. Of equal importance is

⁴⁰² Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 77.

⁴⁰³ Kelleher, and Taulbee, "Bridging the Gap: Building...", p. 483.

⁴⁰⁴ Neumann, "Peace and Reconciliation Efforts...", p. 564.

⁴⁰⁵ Anniken Huitfeldt, "Norway's Engagement in the Middle East", Speech/Statement at the University of Oslo, Oslo, 06 May 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/middleeast_engagement2/id2911708/ (accessed 23.09.2022).

that the contribution to the UN's mediation role also reinforces humanitarian and peaceful endeavours of Norway. As a result, multilateralism stands for the motivations behind Norway's third-party roles and Nordic peace diplomacy. In a broader framework, moral and humanitarian reasons, contributions to stabilization, security, and predictability in the system, and complementary third-party exercises can be considered as critical components for Nordic peace diplomacy.

As expected, external peaceful efforts of Nordic countries have been connected with concerns over security and national interests. In a speech/statement, titled as "Norway's Conflict Resolution Efforts – Are They of Any Avail?", by former Minister of Foreign Affairs *Jonas Gahr Støre*, for example, reconciliation and peace efforts have been described as key areas of Norwegian foreign policy. Accordingly, it is explained that Norway's policy of engagement is connected with its security policy and interests. *Støre* contends that Norway does not demand to engage in the processes of conflict reconciliation unless the parties ask for it. In this context, it is argued that Norway does not pursue fulfilling this sort of role. Nevertheless, global conflict reconciliation efforts of Norway have provided contributions. The efforts to prevent conflicts can be explained in terms of humanitarian action, disarmament, negotiations, facilitation, brokering, military intervention, contributions to peacekeeping forces, and various phases of reconstruction.⁴⁰⁶ Despite this modest statement, Norway's peaceful efforts can also entail a more ambitious agenda since both internal and social peacefulness hold critical value in its identity construction and foreign policy.

As highlighted, the beginning of the 1990s was decisive for increased undertaking of third-party roles in terms of peace mediation and facilitation. Nevertheless, the motivations for promoting these practices leaned on such commitments that date back to the period before the emergence of the First World War. Accordingly, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the endeavours of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway oriented at contributing to international law and neutrality. These endeavours have been considered as important for the prevention of war or of inclusion in armed conflicts.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ Jonas Gahr Støre, "Norway's Conflict Resolution Efforts – Are They of Any Avail?", Speech/Statement at House of Literature, Oslo, 11 June 2010, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2010/conflict_efforts/id608187/ (accessed 23.09.2022).

⁴⁰⁷ Olav Riste, "War and Peace in the Political Culture of Scandinavia in the 20th Century", *Institutt for Forsvarsstudier*, IFS Info 5/03, 2003, p. 5.

Hence, Nordic peace diplomacy benefited from motivations for the prevention or restriction of wars and armed conflicts. Given the effects of systemic and geographical challenges upon Nordic countries, one cannot neglect the link between encouragement of peaceful relations, promotion of law, neutrality, and security, all of which also affected intellectual endeavors for peace and conflict resolution. Of critical importance is that differences in forms of alliances of Nordic countries following the Second World War generated Nordic balance that was also related to motivations regarding security and restriction of major power rivalries. Hence, managing systemic and geographical challenges has been a recurring theme not only for the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy but also for its motivations.

In this context, adherence to peace and neutrality can be explained by referencing geographical conditions. Accordingly, autarchic policies, crises, conflicts, and war affect the economies of Scandinavian nations by interrupting exports and imports adversely or destructively. As a result, high dependence on foreign trade exchange through shipping also underpins their policies directed to peace and neutrality.⁴⁰⁸ Therefore, navigating challenges resulting from their geographical positions while protecting and promoting foreign trade can be seen as motivations behind Nordic peace diplomacy. The link between trade and engagement in third-party roles affirms and complements liberal approaches as well.

In addition, Finland's efforts for the development of a distinctive profile and capacity in the field of peace mediation deserve attention.⁴⁰⁹ The third-party involvement of Finland has been oriented at promoting such a profile and capacity that are identifiable. As reflecting the support for multilateralism, Finland also participated in the EU debate that was oriented at developing peace mediation.⁴¹⁰ Hence, the motivation of Finland has entailed the improvement of its national posture while contributing to and influencing the agenda of organizations in the context of peace mediation.

This motivation is also evident in Finland's efforts to take a role in the prioritization of peace mediation within the areas and policies of the UN. Accordingly, the role of the UN and its network were demonstrated with the objective to promote peace mediation structures at the international level. In this process, Finland's efforts

⁴⁰⁸ John H. Wuorinen, **Scandinavia**, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., A Spectrum Book, 1965, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁹ Joenniemi, "Peace Mediation and Conflict...", p. 110.

⁴¹⁰ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, **Peace Mediation: Finland's Guidelines**, p. 10.

for cooperation were materialized through the initiation referred to as “The Group of Friends of Mediation” under the auspices of the UN. This initiation aims to develop the role and capabilities of the UN in the field of mediation. Bringing mediators together, encouraging experience-sharing, and increasing international awareness and cooperation were also sought through the activities of this Group.⁴¹¹

Peace mediation has also been an important component for Sweden. As a small state, Sweden is considered a norm entrepreneur in the context of international influence-seeking. The adoption of norm entrepreneurship has been described as a foreign policy strategy. The motivations of Sweden, on the other hand, have been explained in terms of its foreign policy legacy, foreign policy identity, and desire to export its domestic values to the global level.⁴¹² Taken together, reflection and promotion of foreign policy heritage related to neutrality and peace, norm entrepreneurship, national identity, and international influence-seeking can also be approached as motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy.

It is further contended that there has been a compatibility between the norm entrepreneurship of Sweden and the normative framework of the UN and EU, which have been described as norm-generating arenas.⁴¹³ In this regard, it can be argued that international affiliations have also been important for Nordic countries in terms of norm generation and norm dissemination. This process has affected their reputation and image as peaceful countries. As will be revealed in this Thesis, differences in institutional memberships also affected the divergent approaches of Nordic countries. Such approaches will be briefly included by focusing on the stance of Norway and Sweden in the case of Palestine.

The motivation of the Nordic countries can also be associated with the endeavors to protect the continuum concerning the establishment of a peaceful tradition. In this way, Sweden emphasizes its established tradition directed to peace-support mechanisms, including conflict management at bilateral, regional, and international levels. With that being said, the emphasis is also given to increasing need for conflict prevention in line with the political realities and Sweden’s foreign policy objectives.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Joenniemi, “Peace Mediation and Conflict...”, pp. 112-113.

⁴¹² Annika Björkdahl, “Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy”, *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 3, Special Issue: Natural Born Peacemakers? Ideas and Identities in Foreign Policies of Small States in Western Europe, 2013, p. 326.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

⁴¹⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, *Preventing Violent Conflict: Swedish Policy for the 21st Century*, Government Communication 2000/01:2, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Secretariat for Conflict Preventing, May 2001, p. 18.

This peaceful tradition, as linked to conflict prevention, has been part of Nordic large-group identity.

From a historical perspective, the development of mediation, as a normal and admired diplomatic practice and device, has been connected not only with the termination of conflicts but also with the obtainment of prestige and reputation for those who acted as intermediaries during the peace treaties era of the period between 1715 and 1814. Despite its importance, the provision of mediation has been oriented towards the termination of wars, rather than prevention in the context of the post-Westphalian period. For this reason, it was quite challenging to formulate and to systematically extend mediation into the field of conflict prevention. In this regard, the practice of mediation has developed by the individual initiatives without reflecting a community and the consciousness of a common interest.⁴¹⁵ Hence, peace mediation and facilitation practices have fundamentally been linked to prestige and reputation-seeking, as they affect the motivations of Nordic countries. Importantly, these embodied a peaceful community and common ground amidst differences.

As reflecting one of such grounds, norm entrepreneurship has been a critical motivation not only for Sweden but also for Nordic peace diplomacy.⁴¹⁶ Drawing from these explanations, national and large-group identity construction, promotion of liberal values, norm entrepreneurship, and systems-maintaining diplomacy can be considered relevant motivations in the context of Nordic peace diplomacy. In essence, a mixture of normative and self-interested motivations account for the peaceful practices of Nordic countries. In this Thesis, it will be revealed how peace mediation and facilitation roles of the Nordic countries in the selected cases also carry such motivations. However, the emphasis will be put on the development and promotion of peaceful identity construction as a prominent motivation, in the international area.

In the literature, critical and skeptical perspectives towards the Nordic countries focus on the contradictions of the Nordic model with an emphasis on internal and external developments or the political conjuncture. In this regard, the end of the Cold War and reorientation of security policies in relation to institutional affiliations and memberships; the impacts of the development of EU as prioritized human rights and peacebuilding in relation to international influence-seeking while moderating Nordic

⁴¹⁵ Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, pp. 111-112.

⁴¹⁶ For Sweden's role, see: Björkdahl, "Ideas and Norms in Swedish...", pp. 322-337.; For the norm entrepreneurs of Nordic countries, see: Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002, pp. 11-23.

approach to international peace and security as an integral part of European power politics rather than as an alternative; the democratization and politicization of Nordic foreign and security policies in which the priorities in these fields have become part of general political debate, and the new populist sentiments in the Nordic countries can be explained as reasons for the contradictions within the Nordic model.⁴¹⁷ These contradictions also jeopardize the functioning of Nordic peace diplomacy.

According to *Kjetil Fallan*, the self-promotion of Norway and Sweden as peaceful and peacemaking nations can be evaluated as aggressive at the international level. In this regard, Sweden's longstanding policy of neutrality and Norway's role as a prominent negotiator in the processes of peace and reconciliation can be described as means for self-promotion and cultural/political identity.⁴¹⁸ This argument also disrupts the non-aggressive and humanitarian posture of the Nordic countries. It also leads to the conclusion that identity construction and promotion of Nordic countries might not exclude aggressive and self-interested purposes.

As connected with self-interested pursuits, it is argued that the Nordic model associated with international peace and security also emerged less progressive compared to its branding. In practice, the Nordic model actually encapsulated more pragmatic considerations. As reflecting this, Sweden was considered a shadow member of NATO despite its commitment to neutrality and to a Third Way advocacy during the Cold War. While Denmark and Norway embraced the East-West détente and global equality as led by Sweden, they also adopted a pragmatic approach with the aim of not offending superpowers. Despite the exception made for Greenland, both Denmark and Norway aimed to avoid the stationing of troops and nuclear weapons on their territories by expanding their activity domain through ideological and geopolitical means.⁴¹⁹

As reflecting the link between the Nordic model and major contributions to traditional peacekeeping, for example, it is argued that this model failed to survive the

⁴¹⁷ Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", pp. 492-493.

⁴¹⁸ Kjetil Fallan, "Nordic Noir: Deadly Design from the Peacemongering Periphery", **Design and Culture: The Journal of the Design Studies Forum**, Vol. 7, No. 3: The Influence of Scandinavian Design, 2015, p. 378.; The humanitarian and peacemaking design of Scandinavia contrasts with the military arms industry and equipment in the region. This is particularly evident in Norway and Sweden. See: Fallan, "Nordic Noir: Deadly Design...", pp. 377-402.

⁴¹⁹ Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", pp. 494-495.; During the Cold War period, Finland and Iceland were only occasionally considered as the exponents of the Nordic model due to their geopolitical position, which restricted their activity. Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", p. 495.

fall of the Berlin Wall.⁴²⁰ However, it is also argued that there have been achievements in terms of the establishment of a new and effective model of Nordic cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Nordic countries can still offer expertise and value for peacekeeping operations that entail civilian components as well. In the mixture of the achievements and failures, there are risks and threats, as diluting the distinctive Nordic profile in the field of peace operations. Therefore, it is advised to provide new initiatives as capable of demonstrating Nordic cooperation and the survival of the Nordic brand in the context of peacekeeping.⁴²¹

It can be argued that the Nordic model entails a comprehensive framework related to peacefulness and promotion of peace. But the developments associated with the post-Cold War have appeared to produce added challenges and critical outcomes for the resilience of this model. According to *Anders Wivel*, the Nordic model for international peace and security and its distinctiveness have been undermined due to such developments at the global, European, and domestic levels. Examples related to contradictions of the Nordic model include their migration policies and military policies.⁴²² With that being said, the challenges and contradictions stem not only from the alterations in the post-Cold War period but also from the Interwar and Second World War periods. Such challenges and contradictions will be emphasized in the last part of the Thesis. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War has generated such tensions that required further adjustments for Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy.

As connected with the interests of mediators, there have also been criticisms targeting the idealistic assessments about the Nordic countries. The idealistic discourse on the peacemaking of Norway, for example, has been problematized by arguing that it obscures its underlying national interests and motivations. In this regard, a critical interpretation and political economic approach have been adopted in examining material and capital interests of Norway during the peace process in Myanmar between 2011 and 2019. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with diverse stakeholders in the peace process, it is argued that the peacemaking process has been instrumental for Norway in accessing markets of conflict-affected states in the Global South. Also, Norway's peacemaking was in favour of the dominant power groups.⁴²³ This argument

⁴²⁰ Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations...*, p. 1.


⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

⁴²² Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", p. 495.

⁴²³ Chiraag Roy, Anthony Ware, and Costas Laoutides, "The Political Economy of Norwegian Peacemaking in Myanmar's Peace Process", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 9, 2021, pp. 2172-2173.

contradicts the widely held or mainstream understandings and perceptions towards the Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

As emphasized, the political trajectory of the post-Cold War and populist sentiments in the Nordic countries have affected and jeopardized the distinctiveness of the Nordic model in world politics. Drawing from all of these, it can be important to formulate both the contributions and challenges of peace mediation and facilitation experiences of the Nordic countries in relation to conflicts and controversial issues with no disregard for internal and external conditions. Further to this, the techniques, main determinants, phases, diplomatic approaches, and tracks that flow through the assistance and involvement of the Nordic countries in selected cases also need to be explained and analyzed. This process can be important in improving Nordic peace diplomacy and addressing challenges for its further distinctiveness and guidance.



PART II - THE PRESENTATION OF GENERAL DATASET FOR PEACEFUL INVOLVEMENT OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES IN CONFLICTS AND CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AND SELECTED CASES

As connected with the scope of this Thesis, focusing on mediation attempts of the Nordic countries might be important to deepen our understanding about mediation. This assertion has been grounded in the abundant peace tradition and knowledge of the Nordic countries in relation to their mediation experiences.⁴²⁴ Taking peace tradition and knowledge of the Nordic countries, along with the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy and peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries into consideration, it is essential to take a look into the peaceful involvements of the Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

Accordingly, peaceful involvements of the Nordic countries will be illustrated in the following general dataset, which entails information about period, case, country/actor, and international organization in the nexus of the peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries and the history of Nordic peace diplomacy. This general dataset will be compartmentalized with regard to the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. Of equal importance is that peaceful attempts will convey process-oriented achievements of the Nordic countries corresponding to peace and conflict resolution undertakings.

These attempts, including but not limited to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, account for the interconnectedness of peace and conflict resolution instruments and mechanisms. Also, the link between peaceful contributions of the Nordic countries and process-oriented assessment will affirm the inadequacy of specific components or prescriptions of process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation for a durable and just peace.

As highlighted, the occurrence of mediation itself can be considered as an achievement. Nonetheless, this Thesis will present a general dataset in order to stress not just the historical experiences and sequent crystallization of peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries but also the inadequacy of merely process-oriented approaches to

⁴²⁴ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 11-12.

mediation. As a result, a look into the peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries will be followed by a close examination of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the selected cases of this Thesis. This examination will be supported through the presentation of a particular dataset in which more detailed analysis will be provided for the contributions of the Nordic countries. This particular dataset will be presented in the following part of this Thesis.

The information in a general dataset will justify the extensive peace diplomacy tradition of the Nordic countries, which has been supported by humanitarianism and various diplomatic capabilities and means, including but not limited to bargaining, dialogue with various large-groups, facilitation, taking a part in influencing warring parties, mediation, and negotiation. Accordingly, this general dataset will be effective in deepening our understanding about peace mediation and facilitation processes at a more practical level.

Despite the utilization of process-oriented assessment, there will also be further explanations for some of the listed cases in the general dataset. These explanations will address not only contributions but also challenges and failures of Nordic peace diplomacy emanating from process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Hence, it will be affirmed that challenges and failures can be obtained from process-oriented lenses as well. Nonetheless, the general dataset will mainly be concerned with the achievements and tasks of the Nordic countries rather than challenges and failures.

The inducement of further assessments will be critical due to the need for outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. As reflecting this, particular phases of the selected cases will be assessed through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Hence, a more detailed analysis will be provided concerning the role of Nordic countries in the particular phases of cases, such as Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. With the benefits of general and particular datasets directed to peaceful involvements of the Nordic countries, the typology of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be introduced in order to capture both strengths and challenges, which will be brought together in the last part of the Thesis.

Chapter I - Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution: Transcending geography?

In world politics, there has been a seldom or rare focus on Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Despite few exceptions, these countries have rarely

been at the center or principal point of crises or turmoils, which can be considered as a good fortune. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, there has been a more obvious need for such patterns or models as capable of shaping world politics in a more peaceful, fairer, positive, and balanced manner. In this context, the offerings of the Nordic countries cannot be passed unnoticed. This is due to opportunities that stem from both internal and external conflict resolution efforts, international cooperation-driven dedication, and small state perspectives. Against various challenges and anxieties, the offerings of these countries can be important to balance concerns, to enhance the utilization of scarce resources more wisely, and to contribute to the avoidance of new conflicts.⁴²⁵

This Thesis contends that a sense of distinctive Nordic character can be traced in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. The distinctiveness of the Nordic countries will be observed through their peaceful contributions, as identifiable in the selected cases, and the concomitant construction of Nordic identity in world politics. Accordingly, the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy are reflected in the Nordic identity and in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. Nordic peace mediation and facilitation contribute to the dynamic construction of Nordic identity in terms of being peaceful actors with diplomatic abilities for effective handling and resolution of conflicts. Hence, there is also a connection between Nordic peace diplomacy and Nordic identity.

As this Thesis will reveal, there have been challenges and problems in terms of the sustainability of peaceful outcomes and the commitment to conflict transformation. For this reason, the authenticity of Nordic countries remains to be restricted as long as the endurance of peaceful outcomes and the adoption of long-term approaches as exemplified by conflict transformation, are not prioritized. Restrictions regarding Nordic authenticity will become more apparent in examining the peaceful involvements of Nordic countries in the selected phases. Accordingly, the following sections will look into peaceful attempts and engagements and the presentation of selected cases in the nexus of the third-party roles of Nordic countries and the field of peace and conflict resolution.

⁴²⁵ Eric S. Einhorn, "Just Enough ('Lagom') Europeanization: The Nordic States and Europe", *Scandinavian Studies*, Vol. 74, No. 3, The Scandinavian Way to Europe, Fall 2002, p. 269.

Section I - Peaceful attempts and engagements of the Nordic countries: General dataset from the Interwar period to the Post-Cold War period

In the following general dataset, one can understand the reasons that account for expertise, guidance, and the peaceful image of Nordic countries, especially in terms of conflict resolution, international cooperation, and prominent practitioners. This dataset has been illustrated as three tables that correspond to the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. With the benefits of a general dataset, it is evident how Nordic countries have transcended geographical restrictions by undertaking peaceful initiatives and third-party roles across different cases and contexts. This general dataset can also be effective in understanding the development of peaceful reputation and image of Nordic countries over time, and the Nordic internationalism and multilateralism as being components of Nordic identity that will be introduced in the last part of the Thesis.

There have been restrictions in the formulation and presentation of general dataset. As emphasized, outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented assessments have not been included. There have been periodizations corresponding to the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. These periods have been reflected in different tables. The term accomplishment, framed primarily through process-driven lenses in this dataset, indicates efforts and initiatives as capable of bringing the warring parties together for dialogue, assisting the warring parties for an agreement, ensuring a transition from war to peace, and making suggestions for conflict resolution. Peace agreements, which were considered to be part of outcome-oriented lenses to mediation, have also been included since they can also be temporary or deprived of implementation.

The three tables of this general dataset will focus on process-oriented achievements and contributions of Nordic countries. The term accomplishment does not refer to a state of completed and enduring success, or a durable peace due to the intensification and recurrence of conflicts, and the persistence of incompatibilities between the warring parties. Hence, accomplishment mainly refers to process-oriented contributions. Within this framework, process-oriented contributions will reaffirm how such contributions cannot guarantee a sustainable peace.

However, challenges and failures, which can be associated not only with outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses but also with process-oriented lenses, will be included through relevant materials such as press releases, resolutions,

and treaties, along with the primary and secondary sources that will be provided in the footnotes. Accordingly, the listed cases will be effective in capturing surfaced engagements and themes that affected third-party roles of the Nordic countries in world politics. Also, general dataset affirms that a distinctive and special Nordic identity related to peaceful initiatives and humanitarianism is indeed observable albeit challenges and failures.

Table 2.1: The peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries in the context of peace and conflict resolution during the Interwar period.

The Periods for the Commencement of Peaceful Attempts	Cases as Conflicts and Controversial Issues	Prominent Nordic Countries and Nordic Actors	Primary International Affiliations (The Evidence of Nordic Multilateralism)	Process-oriented Assessment as Accomplishments
Interwar Period	Repatriation of Prisoners of War (PoW); 1919-1947 ⁴²⁶	Norway/ <i>Fridtjof Nansen</i> ⁴²⁷	LoN	Accomplishment ⁴²⁸
	Protection of and Assistance to Refugees and Displaced	Norway/ <i>Fridtjof Nansen</i>	LoN	Accomplishment, albeit with challenges and problems

⁴²⁶ For more information about this case, please see the following archival group: “Fonds - League of Nations Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds), 1919-1947”, Geneva : **United Nations Library & Archives**, <https://archives.ungeneva.org/refugees-mixed-archival-group-nansen-fonds> (accessed 14.07.2022).

⁴²⁷ For the achievements of *Fridtjof Nansen* regarding war prisoners, the following studies can be recommended: Arthur Sweetser, “What the League of Nations has accomplished”, **Current History (1916-1940)**, Vol. 16, No. 6, September 1922, pp. 1003-1004.; Otto Hieronymi, “The Nansen Passport: A Tool of Freedom of Movement and of Protection”, **Refugee Survey Quarterly**, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fridtjof Nansen and the International Protection of Refugees, 2003, pp. 36-47.

⁴²⁸ The accomplishment is evident in the efforts of *Fridtjof Nansen* for the facilitation of cooperation between the governments as involved in the repatriation of prisoners; the arrival of an agreement with the USSR regarding the delivery of trains for the transportation of PoW; the exchange of Russians prisoners in Central Europe; the arrangement of assistance from the governments of such countries whose territories the prisoners were to cross under the auspices of the Council of the League, and organization, and coordination activities at large. In this regard, this case can also be seen as an accomplishment in terms of process- and outcome-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation. For detailed explanation of these achievements, see: Fridtjof Nansen, “Rescuing Millions of War Victims from Disease and Starvation”, **Current History (1916-1940)**, Vol. 30, No. 4, July 1929, pp. 567-568.

	Persons; 1919-1947 ⁴²⁹			
	Åland Islands Dispute; 1921.	Finland and Sweden; <i>Finland/Paul Enckell, Rafael Waldemar Erich, and Carl Enckell;</i> Sweden/ <i>Eric Birger de Trolle, Erik Marks von Würtemberg</i> ⁴³⁰	LoN, The Permanent Court of Arbitration ⁴³¹	Accomplishment ⁴³²
	Exchange of the Populations between Türkiye	Norway, Sweden, and Denmark; <i>Norway/Fridtjof Nansen, Erik</i>	LoN	Accomplishment, albeit with challenges and problems ⁴³⁵

⁴²⁹ For more information about this case as being undertaken by *Fridtjof Nansen*, his contributions, and encountered challenges in this process, please see the following archival group: “Fonds - League of Nations Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds), 1919-1947”, Geneva : **United Nations Library & Archives**, <https://archives.ungeneva.org/refugees-mixed-archival-group-nansen-fonds> (accessed 14.07.2022).

⁴³⁰ The prominent Nordic countries and actors can be seen in this following Convention: **Convention relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands**, League of Nations Treaty Series, No. 255, Geneva, 20 October 1921, pp. 211-221, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%209/v9.pdf> (accessed 09.07.2022).

⁴³¹ The Åland Islands dispute was resolved by the Permanent Court of Arbitration following the decision of Finland, and Sweden to refer this dispute to LoN. Wiberg, “Nordic Peace: Another Dimension of...”, p. 208.

⁴³² The resolution of the Åland Islands dispute by the LoN has been an important example that contributed to peaceful governance, minority rights, international law, peace and stability while deepening the belief in mediation. See: Timo Soini, “Opening Address”, **The Åland Example and Conflict Resolution Today** at Seminar at Finland’s Permanent Representation to the European Union, Brussels, 15 September 2015, pp. 3-4, https://www.regeringen.ax/sites/default/files/attachments/page/the-aland-example-and-conflict-resolution-today-5-9-2015_0.pdf (accessed 12.04.2022). Within this framework, this Thesis considers the resolution of the Åland Islands dispute as an accomplishment not only in terms of process- and outcome-oriented approaches but also in terms of conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

⁴³⁵ The accomplishment has been grounded in the efforts for dialogue facilitation and negotiation practices, and the implementation of the Convention for Greco-Turkish population exchange. For this Convention, see: **Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne**, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 1923, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi_-convention-concerning-the-exchange-

	and Greece; 1923-1924 ⁴³³	<i>Colban, Hans Holstad; Sweden/Erik Ekstrand; Denmark/Carl Widding, Dane Rosting</i> ⁴³⁴		

Drawing from these remarks, it can be contended that the Interwar period has been decisive for the development and the dissemination of Nordic peace diplomacy, including peace mediation and facilitation. Of critical importance is that the case of the Åland Islands dispute, which has been interpreted as the promotion of trust in mediation, reflects the culture of Nordic countries in terms of negotiations and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Accordingly, the forenamed selected cases in this Table also support the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy at internal and external levels.

Within this framework, the role of prominent figures, especially *Fridtjof Nansen*, is extremely important for the emergence and endurance of peaceful and humanitarian narratives surrounding Nordic countries. This will be further detailed in engaging with the role of Nordic pioneers in the final part of the Thesis. The omission of such direct

[of-greek-and-turkish-populations-signed-at-lausanne_en.mfa](#) (accessed 15.05.2022).; However, *Fridtjof Nansen*'s third-party role for the exchange of the populations between Türkiye and Greece can be considered as a failure from the perspective of conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Accordingly, this conflict regulation measure produced both securities and insecurities not only for the people, who were forced to immigrate but also for the people, who were assimilated or included. As for the latter, *Pınar Bilgin* and *Başak İnce* argue that this compulsory exchange has actually affected the ability of the included citizens to co-exist with what is perceived as "different" adversely, and generated an ontological insecurity. This argument does not aim to undermine the significance of Türkiye's transformation into a Republic, and the contributions of such transition for its people. See: *Pınar Bilgin* and *Başak İnce*, "Ontological (In)security of 'Included' Citizens: The Case of Early Republican Turkey (1923-1946)", in *Bahar Rumelili* (Ed.), **Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, pp. 117-133.

⁴³³ For the third-party role of *Fridtjof Nansen* in the compulsory Greco and Turkish population exchange, please see: John F. L. Ross, "Fridtjof Nansen and the Aegean Population Exchange", **Scandinavian Journal of History**, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2015, pp. 133-158.; See also: Raoul Blanchard, "The Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", **Geographical Review**, Vol. 15, No. 3, Jul. 1925, pp. 449-456.

⁴³⁴ The prominent Nordic countries and actors can be seen in the following sources: "Greco-Turkish Exchange of Populations - Appointment of a Secretary to the Mixed Commission also as Chairman to the Sub-Commission, 1923-1927", Reference Code: R82/2/31152/31152, Geneva : **United Nations Library & Archives**, 29 October 2021, <https://archives.ungeneva.org/greco-turkish-exchange-of-populations-appointment-of-a-secretary-to-the-mixed-commission-also-as-chairman-to-the-sub-commission> (accessed 14.07. 2022).; See also, Matthew Frank, **Making Minorities History: Population Transfer in Twentieth-Century Europe**, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017, Chapter II.

implications resulting from the Interwar period could obstruct efforts in developing a comprehensive understanding regarding Nordic peace mediation and facilitation and the fundamental components, particularly humanitarianism and negotiation.

In the following table, peaceful attempts and contributions of the Nordic countries, which have been commenced during the Cold War period, will be explained along with the emphasis on process-oriented achievements. The selected cases will demonstrate peace mediation and facilitation engagements of the Nordic countries in different cases and controversial issues. The contributions of Nordic countries will demonstrate the integral aspects of peace mediation and facilitation processes, which cannot be isolated from the reflections of geopolitical landscapes.

Within this framework, process-oriented assessments will be explained through achievements and contributions of the Nordic countries in brief. These explanations will be important in deepening our understanding about the components of effective and successful peace mediation and facilitation. With that being said, efficiency and successfulness have been grounded in the assessment of process-oriented approaches in a world characterized by superpower blocks at the time. Hence, it would be valid and sound to state that preventing the transformation of a conflict into a superpower fight was established as the prevailing criterion for the successfulness of third-party roles.

In this context, this Table will also reveal the efforts in addressing not only conflict and controversial issues but also restrictions resulting from the international system. As explained, process-oriented properties can be enriched with regard to underlying roots of cases and involved large-groups. For this reason, this Table will inevitably demonstrate further avenues for process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation and its connection with outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Nevertheless, the emphasis will be put on process-oriented approaches.

Table 2.2: The peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries in the context of peace and conflict resolution during the Cold War period.⁴³⁶

The Periods for the Commencement of Peaceful Attempts	Cases as Conflicts and Controversial Issues	Prominent Nordic Countries and Nordic Actors	Primary International Affiliations (The Evidence of Nordic Multilateralism)	Process-oriented Assessment as Accomplishments
Cold War Period	1948 Arab-Israeli War; 1948-1949	Sweden and Norway; Sweden/ <i>Emil Sandström</i> , ⁴³⁷ <i>Folke Bernadotte</i> , ⁴³⁸ Norway/ <i>Trygve Lie</i> ⁴³⁹	UN	Sweden: Justice <i>Emil Sandström</i> : Sweden's representative for UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), and Chairman of UNSCOP; ⁴⁴⁰ <i>Folke Bernadotte</i> : The ceasefire for a period of four

⁴³⁶ The information in this table corresponds to the Cold War period and the dates in the second column covers peace and conflict resolution efforts of concentrated Nordic countries, which have been collected and compiled from the sources as follows: Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 84.; Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993", **Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, 27 June 2024, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/peace_efforts/id732943/ (accessed 12.07.2024).; Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 18-20.; With that being said, particular resources have also been added in engaging with the cases. The reason for such addition is to offer further information, and to further assess Nordic peace diplomacy in terms of process-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation.

⁴³⁷ United Nations General Assembly, **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly**, Volume 1, A/364, Lake Success ; New York : United Nations, 1947, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/703295?v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴³⁸ See: United Nations General Assembly, **Resolution 186 (S-2). Appointment and Terms of Reference of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine**, A/RES/186(S-2), 14 May 1948, pp. 5-6, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/210013?ln=ar&v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴³⁹ *Trygve Lie*, as Secretary-General of UN at the time, supported and exerted all authority of his office for the partition of Palestine, and the establishment of Israel. See: *Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations*, New York : The Macmillan Company, 1954, p. 158.; For the partition plan, see: United Nations General Assembly, **Palestine Plan of Partition with Economic Union – General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine**, A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185393/> (accessed 07.04.2022).; According to *Joana Ricarte*, this plan can be framed as the formal commencement of the peace process/conflict resolution attempts between Israel and Palestine, and the conflict between the Arabs and Jews. See: Ricarte, **Impact of Protracted Peace...**, pp. 4, 14.

⁴⁴⁰ United Nations General Assembly, **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly**, pp. 3-4.

				weeks, and supervision of the ceasefire;⁴⁴¹ Shuttle diplomacy that led to the First Truce;⁴⁴² Communication with the opposing parties, detection of the fundamental issues, and offering of suggestions.⁴⁴³ Norway/<i>Trygve Lie</i>: Failure in terms of prioritization of UN's institutional interests over the conflict in Palestine and the alignment between his pro-Zionist attitudes and his efforts directed to the promotion of the UN's diplomatic capabilities for regional conflict resolution and the office of Secretary-General.⁴⁴⁴
	The Korean War; 1950	Norway; Denmark; Sweden;	UN	Facilitation efforts by Norway; ⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 50 (1948)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its **310th Meeting**], of **29 May 1948**, [S/801], S/RES/50(1948), 29 May 1948, pp. 20-21, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/111999?v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁴² Benny Morris, **1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War**, New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 2008, p. 264.

⁴⁴³ For the proposals as presented by *Folke Bernadotte*, see: United Nations, **Palestine Question/Peaceful Settlement – UN Mediator (Bernadotte) – Proposals Presented to Arab and Jewish Authorities, Text of Suggestions Presented by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the Two Parties on 28 June 1948**, S/863, 27 June 1948, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178534/> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁴⁴ Ellen Jenny Ravndal, “‘The First Major Test’: The UN Secretary-General and the Palestine Problem, 1947-9”, **The International History Review**, Vol. 38, No. 1, February 2016, pp. 198-199.

⁴⁴⁵ Nissen, “Historical View on the Nordic Peace...”, p. 84.

				Humanitarianism by Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in South Korea ⁴⁴⁶
	China-USA, 1954-1955	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i>	UN	<i>Dag Hammarskjöld's</i> negotiation with <i>Chou En-lai</i> for the release of the American soldiers; ⁴⁴⁷ Efforts as a “crisis diplomat”, prevention of the escalation of interstate conflict between China and USA into an armed conflict ⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ David W. Kim, and Heung-Sook Yang, “*Seojeon Byungwon, Jutlandia, and NORMASH: UN's Scandinavian Allies at the Korean War and Beyond (1950s-1960s)*”, **East Asia**, Vol. 39, 2022, pp. 127-147.

⁴⁴⁷ The Office of the Historian, “11. Telegram from the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State”, in Harriet D. Schwar (Ed.), and John P. Glennon (Gen. Ed.), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, China, Volume II**, Foreign Service Institute of the United States Department of State, United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1986, Document 11, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d11> (accessed 25.06.2024).; See also: “Dag Hammarskjöld's Life and Legacy”, **Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation**, n.d., <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/dag-hammarskjold/dag-hammarskjold/> (accessed 25.06.2024).; In this process, *Hammarskjöld* utilized Swedish channels to contact with Beijing, and request a meeting, all of which were followed by an invitation from China, where he had discussions for the release of American pilots. The reason for the utilization of Swedish channels was due to Sweden's recognition of China. See: Peter Wallensteen “Leave it to Dag!”, in Henning Melber (Ed.), **Dag Hammarskjöld and the United Nations: Vision and Legacy – 50 Years Later**, Special Issue of **New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action**, Vol. 16, 2/2011, p. 18.; Of critical importance is that the involvement of *Hammarskjöld*, and the initiation of negotiations were justified in relation to compliance with the legal obligation of the UN Charter concerning the reduction of international tensions. This rationale has later been referred to as the “Peking Formula.” See: Brian Urquhart, “Dag Hammarskjöld's Legacy: A Beacon of Hope”, in Henning Melber (Ed.), **Dag Hammarskjöld and the United Nations: Vision and Legacy – 50 Years Later**, Special Issue of **New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action**, Vol. 16, 2/2011, p. 27.

⁴⁴⁸ Peter Wallensteen, “Dag Hammarskjöld's Diplomacy: Lessons Learned”, in Carsten Stahn, and Henning Melber (Eds.), **Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and International Agency: Rethinking Human Security and Ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 370.

	Suez Crisis; 1956-1957 ⁴⁴⁹	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i>	UN	Accomplishment ⁴⁵⁰
	India and Pakistan; 1957	Sweden/ <i>Gunnar V. Jarring</i> ⁴⁵¹	UN	Accomplishment in relation to the actions, and efforts of <i>Gunnar V. Jarring</i> ⁴⁵²
	Cambodia and Thailand; 1958-1959; 1966;	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i> ; <i>Baron Johan Beck-Friis</i> ; ⁴⁵³	UN	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i> : Earlier actions directed to the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand ⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁴⁹ Suez Crisis has also been critical for the development of UN peacekeeping to which Nordic countries have made decisive contributions. See: Manuel Fröhlich, “The ‘Suez Story’ Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations and the Creation of UN Peacekeeping from Part IV - The Role of the UN Secretary-General”, in Carsten Stahn, and Henning Melber (Eds.), **Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and International Agency: Rethinking Human Security and Ethics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 305-340.; The following chapter is also recommended due to its formulation of a critical argument towards the first UN peacekeeping, and the development of Nordic peacekeeping: Martin Ottovay Jorgensen, “The ‘Birth’ of Nordic Peacekeeping: Can it Withstand Closer Scrutiny?”, in Christopher S. Browning, Marko Lehti, and Johan Strang (Eds.), **Nordic Peace in Question: A Region of and for Peace**, London : Routledge, 2024, pp. 149-164.

⁴⁵⁰ The accomplishment has been grounded in the mediation and negotiation practices of *Dag Hammarskjöld*, and the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. Of critical importance is that *Hammarskjöld*’s approach encompassed partial partiality. For more information about *Hammarskjöld*’s mediation and different arguments surrounding his third-party engagement, see: Jonathan Franco, “The Suez Crisis and Dag Hammarskjöld’s Mediation: Biased or Balanced? A View from Cairo”, **The International History Review**, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2024, pp. 673-686.

⁴⁵¹ For the role of *Gunnar V. Jarring*, as the representative of Sweden to UN, on the India and Pakistan question, see: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 123 (1957) / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 774th Meeting], of 21 February 1957**, [S/3793], S/RES/123(1957), 21 February 1957, pp. 2-3, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112096?v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).; United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 126 (1957) / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 808th Meeting], of 2 December 1957**, [S/3922], S/RES/126(1957), 02 December 1957, pp. 3-4, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112085?v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁵² The accomplishment has been grounded in the actions, and efforts of *Gunnar V. Jarring* oriented at discussing with the governments of India and Pakistan; at detecting the factors that prevented the complete execution of UNCIP Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 05 January 1949; at solving relevant problems; being aware of the grave problems as capable of emerging with regard to a plebiscite as envisaged by the resolution of 05 January 1949; making suggestions for the confrontation with or mitigation of challenges, albeit the lack of acceptance by the parties; making proposals and means such as arbitration for elimination of this deadlock regarding the execution of UNCIP resolutions, and notification of the difficulties resulting from the delays for the effective execution of an international agreement due to political, economic and strategic alterations concerning the Kashmir, along with the power alterations in the West and South Asia. See: United Nations, **Part I, Section I, Chapter 9: The India-Pakistan Question**, in Yearbook of the United Nations, New York : United Nations, Office of Public Information, 1957, pp. 81-83, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/860241?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁵³ United Nations, “Secretary-General Names Representative to Asssit Cambodia and Thailand” (Press Release), New York : UN Department of Public Information, 22 December 1958, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3994028?ln=ru> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁵⁵ Wallensteen, “Dag Hammarskjöld’s Diplomacy...”, p. 370.

		<i>Herbert de Ribbing</i> ⁴⁵⁴		Sweden/Baron Johan Beck-Friis: The good offices of <i>Johan Beck Friis</i>, as a special representative of the UN Secretary-General; The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and Thailand, and the solution of difficulty between the two countries;⁴⁵⁶ Sweden/<i>Herbert de Ribbing</i>: Efforts for the reduction of tensions, exploration of such means for the resolution of issues;⁴⁵⁷ Contribution for the stabilization of the border areas, and assistance to UN Secretary-General for the renovation of the relationship between Cambodia and Thailand⁴⁵⁸
	The Congo (Katanga); 1960-1961	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i>	UN	Sweden/ <i>Dag Hammarskjöld</i> : Conflict settlement, and the prevention of entanglement of the issue into Cold War entanglements, and its

⁴⁵⁴ United Nations, "Secretary-General Appoints Ambassador Herbert de Ribbing as His Special Representative in Cambodia, Thailand", (Press Release), SG/A/35, BI0/439, 16 August 1966, pp. 1-2, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1627244?v=pdf> (accessed 07.04.2022).

⁴⁵⁶ United Nations Security Council, **Letter dated 6 February 1959 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand Addressed to the Secretary-General**, S/4158, 07 February 1959, pp. 1-2, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/627986?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 01.04.2024).

⁴⁵⁷ United Nations, "Secretary-General Appoints Ambassador Herbert de Ribbing as His Special Representative in Cambodia, Thailand" pp. 1-2.

⁴⁵⁸ Michael Leifer, "Cambodia: The Limits of Diplomacy", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1966: Part I, Jan. 1967, p. 72.

				integration into the agenda of UN, albeit the lack of a solution ⁴⁵⁹
	The Conflict in Cyprus; 1964	Finland/ <i>Sakari Tuomioja</i> ⁴⁶⁰	UN	<i>Sakari Tuomioja</i> was UN mediator in the Cyprus dispute. However, he died following only a few months of his appointment. ⁴⁶¹
	USA and Vietnam; 1965-1968;	Sweden (1965-1968) and Norway (1967) Sweden/ <i>Torsten Nilsson</i> ; Norway/ <i>John Lyng</i>	-	Sweden/ <i>Torsten Nilsson</i> : Sweden's undertaking of a peace diplomacy and initiative between late 1965 and the beginning of 1968, albeit the failure of its purpose for negotiations, secret meetings with the representatives from North Vietnam, and the Secretary of State of the USA at the time; ⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ Wallensteen, "Leave it to Dag!", p. 19.; The accomplishment can also be grounded in the prompt action of *Hammar skjöld* for the gathering the UNSC with the objective to deploy peacekeeping forces at the beginning of the crisis in Congo. Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, p. 54.

⁴⁶⁰ United Nations Press Services, "Sakari Severi Tuomioja Appointed United Nations Mediator in Cyprus", (Press Release), BI0/263/Rev.1, Office on Public Information of Press Services, New York : United Nations, 25 March 1964, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3833325?ln=en> (accessed 11.03.2022).; United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 186 (1964) / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1102nd Meeting], of 4 March 1964**, [S/5575], S/RES/186(1964), 04 March 1964, pp. 2-4, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112185?v=pdf> (accessed 13.03.2023).; See also: Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, p. 21.

⁴⁶¹ The New York Times Archives, "Sakari Tuomioja, U.N. Mediator in Cyprus Dispute, Dead at 53; Finnish Envoy also Served as 'Presence' in Laos — Was Banking Expert", 10 September 1964, p. 35, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/10/archives/sakari-tuomioja-un-mediator-in-cyprus-dispute-dead-at-53-finnish.html> (accessed 15.03.2023).

⁴⁶² Fredrik Logevall, "The Aspen Channel and the Problem of the Bombing", in Lloyd C. Gardner, and Ted Gittinger (Eds.), **The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968**, College Station : Texas A&M University Press, 2004, p. 183.; Importantly, Sweden was critic of the American war in Vietnam, and compared the actions of USA with Holocaust. Further to this, Sweden, as a neutral country since 1812, abandoned its neutral policy and stance by establishing alliance with Hanoi. Perry Johansson, "Hanoi's Diplomatic Front in Sweden: Communist Propaganda Strategies in the Vietnam War", **Contemporary European History**, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2022, p. 195.; For more information about Aspen Channel and why it failed, see: Logevall, "Aspen Channel and Problem of Bombing", pp. 183-206.; For Sweden's role in the Vietnam War, see also: Ulf Bjereld, "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945-90", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 32, No. 1, Feb. 1995, pp. 30-31.

				Mediation efforts by Sweden;⁴⁶³ The combination of criticism, mediation and bridge-building roles by Sweden;⁴⁶⁴ The intermediary role of Sweden, referred to as “<i>ASPEN</i>”, which lasted from November 1966 through February 1968, was considered as continuous but minor involvement. In comparison to other intermediaries, Sweden played a more active role over time while generating the least amount of information.⁴⁶⁵ Norway/<i>John Lyng</i>: The establishment of a secret channel between the USA and North Vietnam through Norway⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶³ Nissen, “Historical View on the Nordic Peace...”, p. 84.

⁴⁶⁴ Ulf Bjereld, “Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945-90”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Feb. 1995, p. 30.

⁴⁶⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, **United States - Vietnam Relations: 1945 - 1967**, Vietnam Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, CIA-RDP80R01720R001200090001-5, 27 February 2014, pp. 4-6, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01720R001200090001-5.pdf> (accessed 07.01.2023).; It is also explained that Sweden was willing to take responsibility beyond being a message carrier. Accordingly, they were enthusiastic to be a broker. However, the role of Sweden was evaluated as highly affected by its domestic context. Therefore, the USA never approached the Swedish track with much consideration. Unlike Norway, Sweden also exerted pressure on the USA regarding the bombing. See: Central Intelligence Agency, **United States - Vietnam Relations: 1945 - 1967**, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁶⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, **John Lyng: Prime Minister 1963**, 13 March 2012, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-governments/historiske-artikler/offices/prime-minister-since-1814/john-lyng/id463397/> (accessed 07.01.2023).; Also, June 1967 to March 1968 was the duration of the key contacts between Norway and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These consisted of rather infrequent and low-key interactions. Norway’s involvement was not given significant importance. Nonetheless, its exchanges were approached as more reliable compared to other channels. Central Intelligence Agency, **United States - Vietnam Relations: 1945 - 1967**, pp. 5-7.

	1967 Arab and Israeli War (Six-Day War); 1967-1991	Sweden/ <i>Gunnar Jarring</i> ⁴⁶⁷	UN	Persuasion of Israel and Arab states for peace negotiations in compliance with the UNSC Resolution 242;⁴⁶⁸ Acting as a go-between for the resolution of conflict or for its reduction, finding means such as the exchange of the PoW for the appeasement of conflict in the Middle East, discussing with the warring parties for the implementation of the aforementioned resolution, the utilization of humanitarian means to affect the minds of the parties, the continuance of conversations, and meetings with the parties, but failure due to absence of an outcome, the incompatibility for the stalemate issues, and the absence of a clear definition

⁴⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council, **Note by the Secretary-General**, S/8259, 23 November 1967, pp. 1-2, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/524339?v=pdf> (accessed 07.01.2023).

⁴⁶⁸ Dennis McLellan, "Gunnar V. Jarring, 94; U.N. Diplomat for the Mideast", **Los Angeles Times**, 01 June 2002, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jun-01-me-jarring1-story.html> (accessed 07.01.2023).; For the UNSC Resolution 242 (1967), which entails the principles regarding the withdrawal of Israel from territories as occupied in 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the termination of all claims or belligerency by states, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and the right to live in peace, assurance for freedom of navigation, achievement of a just settlement for refugee issue, measures oriented at supporting territorial integrity and political independence of states, and the request for the appointment of a Special Representative to Middle East with the purpose to assist the development of an agreement and a peaceful and acceptable settlement. See: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 242 (1967)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd Meeting], S/RES/242(1967), 22 November 1967, pp. 8-9, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/90717?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 14.02.2023).

				for the boundaries in the aforementioned resolution ⁴⁶⁹
	Morocco (Western Sahara); 1976- 1977	Sweden/ <i>Olof Rydbeck</i>	UN	Mediation by Sweden; ⁴⁷⁰ Efforts oriented at establishing a direct contact, albeit the failure ⁴⁷¹
	Iran and Iraq I; 1980-1986;	Sweden/ <i>Olof Palme</i>	UN	<i>Olof Palme's</i> role as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, undertaking of five mediation missions by <i>Palme</i> , and maintenance of contact with the warring parties; ⁴⁷² Sweden's mediation for the UN; ⁴⁷³ Failure in persuading Iran and Iraq for a ceasefire; ⁴⁷⁴ Failure in establishing a direct contact, and important outcomes in forms of agreeing to avoid civilian targets in 1984-85, along with the UNSC Resolution 598 in 1987 ⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁹ Gunnar V. Jarring, "Interview with Gunnar Jarring", by Jean Krasno, **Yale-UN Oral History Project on the United Nations**, ST/DPI/Oral History(02)/J2, Stockholm, Sweden, 07 November 1999, pp. 10-12, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/476569?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 21.04.2022).

⁴⁷⁰ Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 84.

⁴⁷¹ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, p. 204.

⁴⁷² Bjereld, "Critic or Mediator? Sweden...", p. 31.

⁴⁷³ Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 84.; See also: Claës Palme, Olof Palme, Herbjørn Sørensen, and Reulf Steen, **Olof Palme**, (transl. by H. Grøhn), Norwegian Edition, Länsi-Suomi, Rauma : Kirjayhtymä, Pax Forlag A/S, 1986, p. 24.

⁴⁷⁴ "Around the World; Palme Says Talks Fail to End Iran-Iraq War", **The New York Times**, 02 March 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/02/world/around-the-world-palme-says-talks-fail-to-end-iran-iraq-war.html> (accessed 09.07.2023).

⁴⁷⁵ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, pp. 204-205.; The UNSC Resolution 598 called on Iran and Iraq to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to participate in mediation efforts. See: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 598 (1987) / Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th Meeting, on 20 July 1987**, S/RES/598(1987), 20 July 1987, Article 4, p. 6,

	Iran and Iraq II; 1988-1991	Sweden/ <i>Jan Eliasson</i>	UN	Direct contact, and the UNSC Resolution 620 in 1988; ⁴⁷⁶ Assistance to <i>Olof Palme</i> for mediation; Initiation of rounds of shuttle diplomacy and shuttle visits ⁴⁷⁷ ; The development of step-by-step approach, and a comprehensive approach ⁴⁷⁸ ; Failure in releasing ships stuck in Shatt al-Arab; ⁴⁷⁹
	The Conflict between Israel and the PLO; 1988-1991	Sweden/ <i>Sten Andersson</i>	-	Arrangement of a meeting between the PLO delegation and five American Jews, which led to the acceptance of Israel's statehood by the PLO ⁴⁸⁰ ; Mediation, which led to the removal of the prohibition as imposed by USA on direct talks with the PLO ⁴⁸¹

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/137345?v=pdf> (accessed 09.07.2023).; As reflecting the need for mediation in the UNSC Resolution 598, Ambassador *Jan Eliasson* was appointed as Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the implementation of this aforementioned resolution. United Nations Peacekeeping, "Iran-Iraq-UNIIMOG: Background", n.d., <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/uniimogbackgr.html> (accessed 09.07.2023).

⁴⁷⁶ Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 204-205.; For the UNSC Resolution 620 that has condemned the use of chemical weapons in Iran and Iraq war, see: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 620 (1988) / Adopted by the Security Council at its 2825th Meeting, on 26 August 1988**, New York : United Nations, 26 August 1988, p. 12, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/44865?v=pdf> (accessed 09.07.2023).

⁴⁷⁷ Jan Eliasson, "Interview with Jan Eliasson", By James Sutterlin, **Yale-UN Oral History Project on the United Nations**, ST/DPI/Oral History(02)/E42, New York, 09 November 1999, p. 2, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/503272?v=pdf> (accessed 21.04.2022).

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁸⁰ The New York Times, "Arafat Says P.L.O. Accepted Israel", 08 December 1988, <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/08/world/arafat-says-plo-accepted-israel.html> (accessed 09.07.2023).

⁴⁸¹ Los Angeles Times, "Swedes Played Key Role in PLO Diplomacy", 15 December 1988, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-12-15-mn-525-story.html> (accessed 09.07.2023).

It seems from the hindsight that the Cold War period has particularly been critical for the undertakings of Nordic peace diplomacy associated with, but not limited to peace mediation and facilitation in different conflicts and controversial issues, including protracted conflicts. This table also reveals various techniques such as shuttle diplomacy, dialogue facilitation, negotiation, the utilization of humanitarianism policies, secret meetings, the creation of a secret channel, partial partiality as in the case of the Suez Crisis, peacekeeping, the good offices, conflict settlement, and conflict prevention with regard to Cold War power blocks, skills associated with communication and persuasion, efforts in order to have an influence upon the mindsets of the warring parties, and the establishment of direct contact.

Section II - Peaceful attempts and engagements of the Nordic countries: General dataset of the Post-Cold War Period

In this section, peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries that have been commenced during the post-Cold War period will be reflected. In this context, process-oriented contributions will be listed and explained in brief. The post-Cold War period has generated many challenges for peace and conflict resolution processes and techniques as utilized at different levels. As a result, the following table will reveal not only the escalation of identity-oriented conflicts and controversial issues but also the urgent need for a broader perspective of peace as it became indisputable. In response to this need, it is further recognized that connecting process-oriented accomplishments with outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches is necessary for a durable peace.

As reflecting this, the particular dataset will be illustrated through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches as capable of revealing both the utmost importance of identity-oriented worldview and techniques and the inclusion of unity-oriented understanding towards conflicts and controversial issues. In the following Table, on the other hand, it will be understood how Nordic peace diplomacy was consolidated given the prevailing effects of process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation and the decisiveness of warring parties. This Table puts an emphasis on process-oriented accomplishments as well.

Table 2.3: The peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries in the context of peace and conflict resolution during the Post-Cold War period.⁴⁸²

The Periods for the Commencement of Peaceful Attempts	Cases as Conflicts and Controversial Issues	Prominent Nordic Countries and Nordic Actors	Primary International Affiliations (The Evidence of Nordic Multilateralism)	Process-oriented Assessment as Accomplishments
Post-Cold War Period	Guatemala; 1990-1996	Norway/ <i>Jan Egeland, Petter Skauen</i>	-	Peace agreement through the facilitation of negotiations; assistance to the efforts of UN for peace mediation; the signing of partial agreements in Oslo; ⁴⁸³ The utilization of Track I ½ diplomacy ⁴⁸⁴
	Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) I-II; 1992; 1993-1996; 1995-1997	Finland, Norway, Sweden Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> ; Norway/ <i>Thorvald Stoltenberg</i> ; Sweden/ <i>Carl Bildt</i>	Norway/UN (1993-1996); Sweden/EU (1995-1997)	Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> : <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> 's leadership of the mediation team in the Bosnian war; ⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸²The information in this table corresponds to the post-Cold War period and the dates in the second column covers peace and conflict resolution efforts of concentrated Nordic countries, which have been collected and compiled from the sources as follows: Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 84.; Karin Aggestam, and Isak Svensson, "Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?", in Karin Aggestam, and Ann E. Towns (Eds.), **Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation**, Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 154-155.; Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993"; Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 18-20.; With that being said, particular resources have also been added in engaging with relevant cases. The reason for such addition is to offer further information and to assess Nordic peace diplomacy in terms of process-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation.

⁴⁸³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁴⁸⁴ Asoka Bandarage, "The 'Norwegian Model': Political Economy of NGO Peacemaking", **The Brown Journal of World Affairs**, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011, p. 227.; The term Track I ½ diplomacy is formulated to appreciate the complexity behind peacemaking by transcending the tension between Track I and Track II diplomacy, and by demonstrating interactive approach, and blended instruments of Norway. See: Kelleher, and Taulbee, "Bridging the Gap: Building...", pp. 481-482.

⁴⁸⁵ The President of the Republic of Finland, "Operation Balkans", **The Suomen Kuvalehti Magazine**, 18 June 1999, <https://www.presidentti.fi/ahtisaari/eng/speeches/interviewa.html> (accessed 11.03.2024).

				Chairmanship of the UN Working Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina in Geneva;⁴⁸⁶ Norway/<i>Thorvald Stoltenberg</i>: Formulation of peace plans and discussions with the parties; Co-chairman in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;⁴⁸⁷ The role as a UN mediator; taking part as peace broker, albeit the failure of the “Vance/Owen Plan” following a few weeks of his appointment as a peace mediator, and the signing of the “Dayton Agreement;”⁴⁸⁸ Sweden/<i>Carl Bildt</i>: Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans;⁴⁸⁹ Efforts for the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴⁹⁰ <i>Overall Remarks:</i>

⁴⁸⁶ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, **Martti Ahtisaari 1937-2023**, 09 November 2023, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/martti-ahtisaari-1937-2023 (accessed 11.03.2024).

⁴⁸⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping, “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force”, **The Department of Public Information, United Nations**, September 1996, https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unprof_b.htm (accessed 01.04.2024).

⁴⁸⁸ Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Kai Eide, **De Tusen Dage: Fredsmeklere på Balkan (“The Thousand Days: Peacemakers in the Balkans”)**, Oslo : Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1996, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁹ United Nations Security Council, **Letter dated 6 May 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council**, S/1999/526, New York : United Nations, 07 May 1999, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1490972?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 01.04.2024).

⁴⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council, **Letter dated 14 April 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council**, S/1997/310, New York : United Nations, 14 April 1997, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/233132?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 01.04.2024).

				The establishment of direct contact; the formation of both partial, and full agreement; the implementation of full agreement, along with the participation of a mediator; critical contributions towards a lasting peace ⁴⁹¹
	The Conflict between Israel and the PLO, the Palestinian Authority; 1993-1995	Norway/ <i>Gro Harlem Brundtland; Hans Wilhelm Longva; Jan Egeland; Johan Jørgen Holst; Mona Juul; Reiulf Steen; Knut Frydenlund; Terje Rød-Larsen; Thorbjørn Jagland; Thorvald Stoltenberg</i>	-	Declaration of Principles (DoP) between Israel and the PLO; Mutual recognition between the parties; the establishment of Palestinian Self-Government Authority; agreeing for local self-determination of the Palestinians; the evacuation of the Israeli forces from some Occupied Territories; ⁴⁹² Failures as identifiable through outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses
	Nagorno-Karabakh I-II; 1993-1995; 1995-1996	Sweden, Finland Sweden/ <i>Jan Eliasson, Mathias Mossberg, Anders Bjurner;</i>	OSCE	Mediation by <i>Jan Eliasson</i> under the auspices of OSCE in 1993-1994; ⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 204-205.

⁴⁹² Hilde Henriksen Waage, “Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians?” **Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East**, Evaluation Report 9/2000, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo, 30 May 2009, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/dep/UD/Reports-programmes-of-action-and-plans/Reports/2001/norwegians-who-needs-norwegians/id451594/> (accessed 15.04.2023).; Since this is one of the selected cases, the achievements will be analyzed in detail. Additionally, a Swedish background precedes the achievements of Norway. Therefore, this background will be included in engaging with the case of Palestine. This background, along with the cooperation between Norway and Sweden regarding the Palestine case, played a significant role in focusing attention on the conflict between Israel and the PLO.

⁴⁹³ United Nations, “Jan Eliasson: Former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations”, n.d., <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/profiles/jan-eliasson> (accessed 11.11.2022).

		Finland/ <i>Heikki Talvitie, Terhi Hakala</i>		The establishment of direct contact and ceasefire in 1994; ⁴⁹⁴ <i>Terhi Hakala's</i> role in the mediation team, which was co-chaired by Finland ⁴⁹⁵
	Croatia; 1993-1995	Norway/ <i>Thorvald Stoltenberg, Kai Eide, Knut Vollebæk</i>	UN	Sporadic negotiation meetings; efforts for the international recognition of Croatia within its existing borders, the implementation of the UNSC resolutions, and a comprehensive ceasefire; the promotion of confidence-building measures through the improvement of economic infrastructure and efforts for a political solution ⁴⁹⁶
	Moldova (Transnistria) I-II; 1997; 2008	Denmark, Finland Denmark/ <i>Niels Helveg Petersen</i> (1997); Finland/ <i>Heikki Talvitie</i> (2008)	OSCE	Signing of the “Moscow Memorandum” with the presence of <i>Niels Helveg Petersen</i> as the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE; ⁴⁹⁷ Meetings of Ambassador <i>Heikki Talvitie</i> , as the OSCE Special Envoy of the Finnish Chairman-in-Office, with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria, along with the various mediators and observers, discussions for the confidence-building measures, and efforts for

⁴⁹⁴ Wallenstein, and Svensson, *Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...*, pp. 204-205.

⁴⁹⁵ Aggestam, and Svensson, “Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?”, p. 158.

⁴⁹⁶ Stoltenberg, and Eide, *De Tusen Dagene...*, pp. 150-151.

⁴⁹⁷ **Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria**, The Moscow Memorandum, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 08 May 1997, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/9/42309.pdf> (accessed 11.11.2023).

				the peaceful resolution of the conflict ⁴⁹⁸
	Northern Ireland; 1997-1998	Finland/ <i>Harri Holkeri</i>	-	Three folded structured peace negotiations; the arrival of an agreement; establishing a basis for self-rule in Northern Ireland; efforts for decommissioning of illegal weapons; influencing the mindsets of the warring parties; making recommendations and suggestions, and the signing of the “Good Friday Agreement” ⁴⁹⁹
	Guinea-Bissau; 1998-1999	Sweden/ <i>Ulla Andrén</i>	-	The undertaking of critical negotiation role; ⁵⁰⁰ Lower-level mediation due to the representation of a small state ⁵⁰¹
	Russia (Chechnya); 1999	Norway/Finland Norway/ <i>Kim Traavik</i> Finland/ <i>Tarja Halonen</i>	OSCE EU	Failure due to the lack of direct contact ⁵⁰² Mediation efforts by <i>Tarja Halonen</i> under the auspices of the EU ⁵⁰³
	Yugoslavia (Kosovo); 1999	Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i>	EU	Face-to-face meetings with the representatives from the USA and Russia; dealing with a disagreement between the UN and NATO over the Kosovo operation;

⁴⁹⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Political Impetus Needed to Achieve Progress on Confidence-building between Chisinau and Tiraspol, Says OSCE Special Envoy”, (Press Release), 23 July 2008, <https://www.osce.org/moldova/49953> (accessed 11.11.2023).

⁴⁹⁹ Harri Holkeri KBE, “Speech by Harri Holkeri at a Seminar on Northern Ireland”, Speech at the Government Banquet Hall, Smolna, Helsinki, 09 April 2008, https://finlandabroad.fi/web/irl/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/h5w4iTUJhNnc/content/valtioneuvos-harri-holkerin-puhe-pohjois-irlanti-seminaarissa/35732 (accessed 21.01.2024).

⁵⁰⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Guinea-Bissau Humanitarian Situation Report, 1 - 15 Jun 1999”, 15 June 1999, <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/guinea-bissau/guinea-bissau-humanitarian-situation-report-1-15-jun-1999> (accessed 21.01.2024).

⁵⁰¹ Aggestam, and Svensson, “Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?”, p. 158.

⁵⁰² Wallenstein, and Svensson, *Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...*, p. 204.

⁵⁰³ Aggestam, and Svensson, “Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?”, p. 154.

				efforts for the maintenance of the NATO's role; the utilization of secret channel of mediation to persuade <i>Milosevic</i> ; negotiations and mediations; the UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999); the intervention of NATO and the cessation of its air strikes, the withdrawal of the Serbian forces, and the deployment peacekeeping troops as conducted by NATO; ⁵⁰⁴ Joint facilitation for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav/Serbian forces from Kosovo, the creation of international security, and a civilian presence ⁵⁰⁵
	Sri Lanka; 2000-2009	Norway/ <i>Erik Solheim, Vidar Helgesen, Lisa Golden, Jon Hanssen-Bauer, Kjersti Tromsdal</i>	-	Facilitation for negotiations between 2000 and 2006; the signing of a ceasefire; the monitoring of ceasefire Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission led by Norway, albeit its cancelling in 2008; ⁵⁰⁶ The utilization of Track I ½ diplomacy; ⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁴ The President of the Republic of Finland, "Operation Balkans"; Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk....**, p. 205.; For the UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), see: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 1244 (1999) / Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th Meeting, on 10 June 1999**, S/RES/1244(1999), New York : United Nations, 10 June 1999, pp. 1-8, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488?v=pdf> (accessed 12.04.2022).

⁵⁰⁵ Martti Ahtisaari, "Conflict Resolution: The Case of Kosovo", **Irish Studies in International Affairs**, Vol. 19, 2008, p. 183.

⁵⁰⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁵⁰⁷ Bandarage, "Norwegian Model: Political Economy...", p. 227.

				Failures as identifiable through outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses
	Macedonia; 2001	Sweden/ <i>Anna Lindh</i>	EU	Awareness and encouragement for conflict prevention;⁵⁰⁸ The signing of “Stabilization and Association Agreement” between the European Community (EC) and its Member States and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;⁵⁰⁹ Assistance to the democratically elected government for the solution of the crisis, and the promotion of peace⁵¹⁰
	Sudan/South Sudan; 2001-2005	Norway/ <i>Hilde F. Johnson</i>	UN	Direct contact;⁵¹¹ The joint formation of Troika as added momentum to the negotiations, and the arrival of a peace agreement;⁵¹² The utilization of Track I ½ diplomacy⁵¹³

⁵⁰⁸ European Commission, “2327th Council Meeting - General Affairs”, C/01/19, 5279/01 (Presse 19), Brussels, 22-23 January 2001, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_01_19 (accessed 21.04.2023).

⁵⁰⁹ **Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**, C/01/143, 7835/01 (Presse 143), Luxembourg : European Commission, 10 April 2001, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/pres_01_143 (accessed 21.04.2023).

⁵¹⁰ European Commission, “Statement by Anna Lindh, Javier Solana and Chris Patten on Developments in FYR Macedonia”, (Press Release), IP/01/898, Brussels, 26 June 2001, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_01_898 (accessed 21.04.2023).

⁵¹¹ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 204-205.

⁵¹² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993”.

⁵¹³ Bandarage, “Norwegian Model: Political Economy...”, p. 227.

	The Philippines; 2001-	Norway/ <i>Elisabeth Slåttum</i> ⁵¹⁴ , <i>Ture Lundh</i> , <i>Vegar Brynildsen</i> , <i>Hans Brattskar</i> , <i>Tore Hattrem</i>	-	Facilitation of negotiations between the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and the government of the Philippines; participation in the monitoring and disarmament between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; ⁵¹⁵ Mediation efforts by <i>Elisabeth Slåttum</i> in 2014 ⁵¹⁶
	North Korea and South Korea; 2001	Sweden/Göran Persson	EU	Failure due to lack of a direct contact; ⁵¹⁷
	Somalia; 2003-2008	Sweden, Norway Sweden/ <i>Per Lindgärde</i> , <i>Marika Fahlén</i> , <i>Jens Odlander</i>	-	The establishment of direct contact, and partial agreement in 2008; ⁵¹⁸ Norway's assistance to peace and reconciliation efforts that took place at national and local levels, along with the assistance to the parties in preparing for negotiations ⁵¹⁹
	Indonesia (Aceh); 2005	Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i>	CMI	Direct talk between the parties; Gradual establishment of trust and confidence; the approach of “ <i>nothing is agreed before everything is agreed.</i> ” ⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁴ See: Nordic Women Mediators, “Elisabeth Slåttum”, n.d., <https://www.nordicwomenmediators.org/members-elisabeth-slattum> (accessed 21.04.2023).

⁵¹⁵ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993”.

⁵¹⁶ Aggestam, and Svensson, “Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?”, p. 159.

⁵¹⁷ Wallensteen, and Svensson, *Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...*, p. 204.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

⁵¹⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993”.

⁵²⁰ Martti Ahtisaari, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 6, 2008, p. 10.

				Dealing with the underlying roots of the conflict, especially self-government; assistance to the formation of a final agreement; ⁵²¹ Norway's financial and technical assistance ⁵²²
	Côte D'ivoire; 2005-2007	Sweden/ <i>Pierre Schori</i>	UN	<i>Pierre Schori</i> as Special Representative for Côte D'ivoire; ⁵²³ Direct contact, and partial agreement in 2007; ⁵²⁴ Efforts for the pursuit of a lasting and sustainable peace ⁵²⁵
	Sudan (Darfur) I-II; 2005-2007, 2007-2008	Finland, Sweden Finland/ <i>Pekka Haavisto</i> ; Sweden/ <i>Anders Oljelund, Jan Eliasson</i>	Finland/EU Sweden/UN	Finland/ <i>Pekka Haavisto</i> : EU Special Representative for Sudan and Darfur, and the Special Advisor for the UN Assistant Secretary-General in Darfur peace process; ⁵²⁶ Discussions with guerrilla groups, and efforts for peace negotiations; ⁵²⁷

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵²² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁵²³ United Nations, "Secretary-General Appoints Pierre Schori as New Special Representative for Côte D'ivoire", (Press Release), SG/A/909, BIO/3642, 04 March 2005, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1316168> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵²⁴ Wallensteen, and Svensson, *Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...*, pp. 204-205.

⁵²⁵ United Nations Security Council, **Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**, S/2005/398, 17 June 2005, p. 18, Article 90, <https://onuci.unmissions.org/en/documents> (accessed 07.05.2024).; United Nations Security Council, **Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**, S/2005/604, 26 September 2005, p. 16, Article 68, <https://onuci.unmissions.org/en/documents> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵²⁶ Finnish Government, "Finnish Foreign Minister Haavisto to Travel to Sudan and the Region on Behalf of the EU", (Press Release), **Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland**, 09 July 2019, <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/finnish-foreign-minister-haavisto-to-travel-to-sudan-and-the-region-on-behalf-of-the-eu> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵²⁷ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Negotiations about Peace in Darfur to be Launched in Libya in October", **Finland Abroad**, 11 September 2007, https://finlandabroad.fi/web/sdn/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/h5w4iTUJhNnc/content/darfurin-rauhasta-neuvotellaan-libyassa-lokakuussa/35732 (accessed 07.05.2024).

				Observation of the peace negotiations on Darfur between 2005 and 2007; assistance to <i>Jan Eliasson</i>, as the UN Secretary General Special Envoy to Darfur for the resumption of peace talks;⁵²⁸ Sweden/<i>Anders Oljelund</i>, <i>Jan Eliasson</i>: Mediator role of Ambassador <i>Anders Oljelund</i> under the auspices of the EU, and assistance to the African Union-led peace negotiations in the Darfur conflict;⁵²⁹ <i>Jan Eliasson</i>'s consultations and discussions with President <i>Omar al-Bashir</i> and other Sudanese leaders with the purpose to ensure cooperation at different levels;⁵³⁰ <i>Jan Eliasson</i>'s efforts for the revitalization of the political process, as UN's Special Envoy for Darfur⁵³¹

⁵²⁸ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Haavisto Thinks Finland should Take Part in the UN Darfur Operation alongside Norway and Sweden", 10 August 2007, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/haaviston-mielesta-suomen-pitaisi-osallistua-yk-n-darfur-operaatioon-norjan-ja-ruotsin-lailla (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵²⁹ Government Office's of Sweden, "Ambassador Anders Oljelund to be Mediator in the Darfur Conflict", (Press Release), **Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden**, 30 January 2006, <https://www.government.se/information-material/2006/12/press-releases-2002-2006/> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵³⁰ Ban Ki-Moon, "Secretary-General's Press Conference", Press Conference at United Nations, New York, 11 January 2007, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2007-01-11/secretary-generals-press-conference> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵³¹ Ban Ki-Moon, "Secretary-General's Message to Opening Session of Darfur Peace Talks", Statement at United Nations, New York, 27 October 2007, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/former-secretary-general/statement/2007-10-27/secretary-generals-message-opening-session-of-darfur-peace-talks> (accessed 07.05.2024).

	Colombia; 2005-2007, 2010-	Norway/ <i>Dag Nylander, Rita Sandberg</i>	-	Engagement in the peace processes as a central partner; involvement in dialogues between governments and guerrilla groups in Colombia; facilitation of peace negotiations with the FARC, guarantor role in the implementation of the peace agreement; guarantor role in negotiations with EMC and ELN guerrilla groups, of which the latter temporarily ceased fighting with the Colombian government in 2023; assistance to the peace dialogue with other armed groups; ⁵³² Mediation by <i>Rita Sandberg</i> and her role as a guarantor in the Colombia-FARC peace talks in 2014; ⁵³³ Successful example of classical bilateral settings between the government and the FARC, albeit with the subsequent challenges resulting from the negligence of the plurality of parties ⁵³⁴
	Lebanon; 2006	Norway/ <i>Terje Rød- Larsen</i>	UN	Efforts for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1559 ⁵³⁵

⁵³² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993”.

⁵³³ Aggestam, and Svensson, “Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?”, pp. 154, 160.

⁵³⁴ Lehti, *Era of Private Peacemakers...*, pp. 22-23.

⁵³⁵ United Nations, “United Nations Delegation Discusses Resolution 1701 in Beirut”, SG/2115, 21 August 2006, <https://press.un.org/en/2006/sg2115.doc.htm> (accessed 07.05.2024).; For the UNSC Resolution 1559 (2004) that reaffirms the sovereignty, integrity, unity, and independence of Lebanon and calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces, along with the emphasis on disarmament, governmental control, and support for the conduction of presidential election in a fair and free manner, see: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 1559 (2004) / Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th Meeting, on 2 September 2004**, S/RES/1559(2004), New York : United Nations, 02 September 2004, pp. 1-2, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/529421?v=pdf> (accessed 07.05.2024).

	Nepal	Norway	UN	Assistance to the UN; providing a venue for the parties during the peace process; the arrival of a peace agreement in 2006 ⁵³⁶
	Serbia (Kosovo); 2006-2007	Finland, Denmark Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> ; 2006-2007; Denmark/ <i>Søren Jessen-Petersen</i> 2004-2006	UN; NATO	Finland/ <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> : Leading political process for the determination of Kosovo's status; consultations with the Kosovo Contact Group; visits to Belgrade and Pristina; efforts oriented at closing the gap between the positions of Belgrade and Pristina on technical issues; offering solutions; direct talks with both parties; ⁵³⁷ Recommendation for the independency of Kosovo; ⁵³⁸ Kosovo's independence in 2008, which is not recognized by Serbia; ⁵³⁹ Denmark/ <i>Søren Jessen-Petersen</i> : Undertaking the roles as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; the improvement of security environment, albeit its fragility, and the significant decrease of ethnicity-related

⁵³⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁵³⁷ Ahtisaari, "Conflict Resolution: Case of Kosovo", pp. 183-185.

⁵³⁸ United Nations Security Council, **Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status**, S/2007/168, 26 March 2007, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵³⁹ Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, p. 205.

				incidents; the conduction of peaceful election; cooperation and coordination at different levels; synchronization of political strategy with the military preparedness and capability through NATO/Kosovo Force, (KFOR); efforts for the establishment of democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo ⁵⁴⁰
	Afghanistan 2006; 2008-2010; 2010-2011; 2011-	Norway, Sweden Norway/ <i>Kai Eide</i> ; (2008-2010); Team-Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011); Sweden/ <i>Staffan de Mistura</i> (2010- 2011)	UN (2008-2011)	Different forms of peace engagement since 2006; establishment of contact with the Taliban in 2006, and the promotion of structured dialogue surrounding human rights, peace and women ⁵⁴¹
	Uganda; 2006-2008	Norway/ <i>Heidi Johansen</i> Sweden/ <i>Anna Sundström</i>	EU	Mediation; witnessing the “Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions” as signed between the government of Uganda, and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) on 02 May 2007, and the combination of witnessing an agreement and mediation engagement in the Uganda’s Juba peace process,

⁵⁴⁰ United Nations, “Briefing Security Council on Kosovo Situation, Special Representative Says ‘Endgame May Be in Sight’”, (Press Release), SC/8253, 29 November 2004, <https://press.un.org/en/2004/sc8253.doc.htm> (accessed 07.05.2024).

⁵⁴¹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Norway’s Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993”.

				along with <i>Anna Sundström</i> (EU) ⁵⁴² Norway's financial and technical assistance ⁵⁴³
	Georgia (South Ossetia); 2008	Finland/ <i>Alexander Stubb, Heikki Talvitie</i>	OSCE	The establishment of direct contact, and ceasefire in 2008 ⁵⁴⁴
	Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia); 2010	Finland/ <i>Antti Turunen</i> ⁵⁴⁵	UN	Efforts for the establishment of a dialogue between the parties to the conflict and other important stakeholders; conflict mediation in Geneva and Georgia; shuttle diplomacy ⁵⁴⁶
	Myanmar; 2011-2021	Norway	-	Support for the peace process, which ended following the military coup in 2021, and the maintenance of peace initiatives; contact with all parties to the conflict; attention on humanitarian access, and the return of civilian rule; support for civil society organizations; problems due to the efforts for the

⁵⁴² Aggestam, and Svensson, "Where are the Women in Peace Mediation?", pp. 155, 160.; **Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions**, United Nations Peacemaker, 22 February 2008, <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9462> (accessed 09.05.2023).

⁵⁴³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁵⁴⁴ Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁴⁵ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Antti Turunen Appointed UN Representative to Georgia", 02 March 2010, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/antti-turunen-yk-n-edustajaksi-georgia-1 (accessed 03.03.2024).

⁵⁴⁶ Kaarina Vainio, "Ambassador Turunen will Continue Mediation of the Georgia Conflict", **Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland**, 09.05.2011, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/turunen-jatkaa-georgian-konfliktin-sovittelua (accessed 03.03.2024).

				advancement of Norway's capital interests through peacemaking ⁵⁴⁷
	Cyprus; 2014-2017	Norway/ <i>Espen Barth Eide</i>	UN	Assistance to the parties for comprehensive negotiations with the purpose for conflict settlement;⁵⁴⁸ Discussions with the leaders from the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots; efforts for triadic cooperation; efforts in dealing with the most challenging and contentious issues; enabling direct meeting between the guarantor powers and the Cypriots in addressing guarantees and security issues in a broader framework for the first time in this process; reflection of the awareness for emotional traumas of the Cypriots;⁵⁴⁹ Despite over 27 months of negotiations, failure due to ongoing elusiveness of a solution⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁷ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993"; Roy, Ware, and Laoutides, "Political Economy of Norwegian Peacemaking...", p. 2173.

⁵⁴⁸ United Nations Cyprus Talks, "SASG - Espen Barth Eide", n.d., <https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sasg-espen-barth-eide> (accessed 12.12.2022).

⁵⁴⁹ Espen Barth Eide, "Press Conference by Espen Barth Eide, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on Cyprus, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 11 January 2017", Press Conference at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, 11 January 2017, <https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/press-conference-espen-barth-eide-special-adviser-un-secretary-general-cyprus-palais-des-nations> (accessed 12.12.2022).

⁵⁵⁰ United Nations Cyprus Talks, "SASG Eide Bids Farewell to Cyprus", 05 August 2017, <https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sasg-eide-bids-farewell-cyprus> (accessed 12.12.2022).

	Syria; 2014	Norway/Sweden Sweden/ <i>Staffan de Mistura, Birgitta Holst Alani</i>	UN	<i>Staffan de Mistura's</i> good offices for the peaceful solution of the Syrian crisis; ⁵⁵¹ Norway's financial and technical assistance; ⁵⁵² Failure due to armed conflicts and humanitarian crises
	Venezuela; 2019-	Norway	-	Peace facilitation for negotiations; the signing of "Memorandum of Understanding" in 2021; the arrival of a few partial agreements ⁵⁵³

Drawing from such contributions, it can be contended that both the Nordic framework and a multilateral framework related to peace and conflict resolution can be identified. The expansion of Nordic multilateralism becomes more evident with regard to cooperation at international and regional levels. This cooperation can provide an entry point for the initiation of third-party involvements.⁵⁵⁴ This expansion can be seen as linked to further escalation of protracted conflicts. In this turbulent process, Nordic countries have utilized various techniques of peace mediation and facilitation while acquiring field experiences and leading mediation teams. Accordingly, the following techniques can be demonstrated for Nordic peace mediation and facilitation:

The pursuit for dialogue and direct communication, including guerrilla groups, the achievement of mutual recognition between the warring parties, the promotion of confidence-building measures, persuasion, cooperation and multilateral assistance for peace and conflict resolution, conflict prevention, the use of Track I ½ diplomacy, and the NGOs such as CMI, the development and offering of peace plans, secret channel of mediation, assistance for state formation as democratic and multi-ethnic, efforts for monitoring, disarmament, and decommissioning with the purpose to ensure the

⁵⁵¹ United Nations, "Staffan de Mistura: Personal Envoy", n.d., <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/profiles/staffan-de-mistura> (accessed 12.12.2022).

⁵⁵² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ The UN Secretaries-General, for example, can provide an entry point while expanding the limited space for peace diplomacy. See: Wallenstein, "Dag Hammarskjöld's Diplomacy...", p. 366.

implementation of peace agreements and/or relevant decisions and resolutions, and the promotion of political process, political strategy and civilian presence oriented at ensuring a lasting peace.

The phase related to the implementation of agreements can be conceptualized in terms of “implementation diplomacy”, with the purpose of translating the text that is accepted and agreed upon by the warring parties into a reality. At present, such efforts are known as “peacebuilding.”⁵⁵⁵ Hence, the need for implementation diplomacy cannot be neglected in the context of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to mediation. Of critical importance is that the composition of Nordic practitioners also entails women mediators and facilitators. As a result, it can be contended that Nordic peace diplomacy is also concerned with the inclusion of gender perspective into the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

The experiences and diplomatic approaches of the Nordic countries also affirm the interconnectedness of peace and conflict resolution instruments, including peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. In parallel to expanding field experiences and the engagements of Nordic practitioners, there have been distinguishable Nordic contributions in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Among these contributions, the following chapter will focus on selected phases of conflicts that witnessed challenges and failures as well.

Chapter II - Examination of the selected cases in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation: The cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka in focus

It is evident that the exercises of peace mediation and facilitation need to be approached from process, outcome, and conflict transformation-explorings. The prioritization of process-oriented exploring and the negligence of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented explorings can lead to a limited understanding of third-party activities and roles. In order to convey a comprehensive understanding and to undermine the obstacles behind the development of a distinctive model, third-party experiences of the Nordic countries are of great importance in the context of peace and conflict resolution. This chapter will demonstrate the contributions and overall effects of Nordic countries in close detail.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 366-367.; For implementation diplomacy, see also: Wallenstein, “Dag Hammarskjöld’s Diplomacy...”, p. 372.

In this Thesis, the general dataset and the link between the Nordic countries and the field of peace and conflict resolution affirm the reputation of the Nordic countries from related cases and historical-oriented perspectives. However, in order to be able to truly understand the actual and potential role of the Nordic countries, outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented explorings also need to be included. For this reason, a particular dataset will be introduced following the scrutinization of the selected phases as the Helsinki peace process, the role of PCC in the post-Annan period of Cyprus, the Oslo peace process, along with its Swedish background, and the Sri Lanka peace process between 2000 and 2006, as corresponding to the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka.

The Israeli-Palestinian, Sri Lankan, and Cyprus cases can be described as ethnically rooted, protracted, and intractable prominent conflicts that problematize and transcend the state-centric boundaries that have been subject to particular intensification of these conflicts. Taken together, these cases challenge conventional understanding about the constituting concepts regarding what is international.⁵⁵⁶ The conflict in Aceh also illustrated the properties of protractedness. Combined together, the cases allow for both the testing of hypothesis (as reflecting the neglect of failures) and the addressing of problematization (as reflecting optimistic views towards the Nordic countries). Hence, the following sub-sections will address third-party involvements of the Nordic countries in the cases of Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. As already explained, these cases will be limited to particular phases of peace and conflict resolution practices.

Section I - The case of Aceh in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation

In this section, the background, primary dimensions, and the roots of the conflict between GAM and the Indonesian government will be addressed. Of critical importance is that this section will reveal the commonalities and differences between the conflict in Aceh and in Sri Lanka as well. Following that, the third-party role of Finland will be interrogated in understanding the initiation and effects of the peace process between the conflicting parties limited to GAM and the Indonesian government.

⁵⁵⁶ Jay Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 518, Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives, Nov. 1991, p. 96.

In this process, the leadership of *Martti Ahtisaari*, the role of CMI, the utilized techniques, and the encountered challenges will be refined. Of critical importance is that it will be understood how the resolution of the Åland Islands dispute played a compelling and guiding role in peace negotiations. Within this framework, the third-party role of Finland will be evaluated from process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to mediation. Also, the contributions of Finland will be interpreted in terms of the leadership of *Ahtisaari* and the implementation of lessons as learned from the Åland Islands dispute with regard to its autonomous status.

a. Historical background of the conflict in Aceh: The conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia

The case of Aceh was one of the critical and protracted conflicts that began as part of a provincial rebellion in September 1953. In the post-independence period of Indonesia, this rebellion was led by “Darul Islam.” Particularly, three following periods witnessed waves of outbursts in this intra-state conflict: “(...) *September 1953-May 1962, December 1976-December 1979 and May 1989-August 2005*”.⁵⁵⁷ As will be explained in the following passages, the rebellion of Darul Islam was due to various problems associated with politics, religion, human rights, and identity relations between the Acehnese people and the Central Government, especially following the immediate years of independence.⁵⁵⁸

Prior to the independence, the relationship between Aceh and the Central Government was affected by the resistance of Aceh against the Dutch, Aceh’s relatively low level of integration with Indonesia, and its military and economic contributions to the independence of Indonesia. In practice, Aceh was the only major territory with no Dutch control between 1945-1949. As a result of the achievement regarding the prevention of Dutch re-occupation, the Aceh region was autonomous. In this process, the bargaining power of Aceh was increased with regard to their role and support. Also, there was no need for the Acehnese people to disrupt their loyalty and

⁵⁵⁷ Efri Yoni Baikoeni, and Mikio Oishi, “Ending a Long-Standing Intrastate Conflict Through Internationalisation: The Case of Aceh in Indonesia”, in Mikio Oishi (Ed.), **Contemporary Conflicts in Southeast Asia** Mikio Oishi Editor: **Towards a New ASEAN Way of Conflict Management**, Asia in Transition, Vol. 3, Institute of Asian Studies, Springer Singapore, 2016, p. 20.

⁵⁵⁸ However, the reasons for the conflict in Aceh can date back to the Dutch colonial domination. This interpretation is also compatible with the understanding of GAM regarding the causes of the conflict. From this point of view, the independence of Indonesia marked another phase of conflict, referred to as “(...) *illegal transfer of sovereignty*”. See: Michelle Ann Miller, “The Conflict in Aceh: Context, Precursors and Catalysts”, in Aguswandani, and Judith Large (Eds.), **Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives**, No. 20: Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia – Aceh Peace Process, London : Conciliation Resources, 2008, p. 12.; With that being said, GAM’s arguments were controversial and even refuted. Miller, “Conflict in Aceh: Context, Precursors...”, pp. 12-13.

beneficial relations with the national leadership in Indonesia. However, the autonomy of Aceh was considered an embarrassment from the perspective of the government.⁵⁵⁹ This issue marked the root of this conflict in Aceh.

Following the independence, the relationship between Aceh and the government became complicated. This complication was grounded in the differences and incompatibility between Aceh and governmental policies. The differences of Aceh involve its commitment to Islam; its historical position as an independent sultanate until the Dutch rule, and regional, ethnic, and national identity, of which the latest can be subject to contestation. These differences affected its low level of integration with the government. Coupled with the governmental policies regarding secular nation-building of Indonesia and centralization, the tension arose between the Acehnese people and the government.⁵⁶⁰

The aforementioned differences accounted for the causes of the conflict. However, the general consensus was that the government's activities and policies were the primary cause.⁵⁶¹ As expected, the warring parties had different ideas for the causes. From the perspective of the Acehnese people, governmental policies and unkept promises for a special status resulted in tension. For the government, the Acehnese people were rebellious in nature. Consequently, it was assumed that this rebellious nature resulted in tension.⁵⁶²

From a historical perspective, an Acehnese independence movement dates back to before the independence of Indonesia. This movement became effective following

⁵⁵⁹ Sjamsuddin Nazaruddin, **The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion**, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, pp. 1-2.; There was a guerrilla warfare between the Netherlands Indies, whose incorporation of Aceh shaped Indonesia's basic form until its independence, and the Acehnese guerrillas and religious leaders that lasted almost forty years. Antje Missbach, "The Aceh War (1873-1913) and the Influence of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje", in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, and Edwin Wieringa (Eds.), **Aceh: History, Politics and Culture**, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, p. 39.; As a result, it is emphasized that the history of Aceh is marked by armed resistance, and struggle against the Dutch. In this process, religion played an important role. See: SM Amin, **Understanding the History of the Aceh Conflict: Social Revolution in Post-Independence Indonesia (1945-1949)**, (transl. of *Atjeh Sepintas Lalu*), Buku OBOR Books, Singapore : Springer, 2020, p. 8.; It is also explained that *Hasan di Tiro*, founder of the GAM, utilized the Aceh War to prompt support for the independence and separation struggle of GAM against the Republic of Indonesia. Missbach, "Aceh War (1873-1913) and...", p. 58.

⁵⁶⁰ Kirsten E. Schulze, **The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization**, Policy Studies 2, Washington D.C. : East-West Center, 01 Jan. 2004, p. 1, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/free-aceh-movement-gam-anatomy-separatist-organization> (accessed 17.05.2023).

⁵⁶¹ Miller, "Conflict in Aceh: Context, Precursors...", p. 13.

⁵⁶² Schulze, **Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy...**, p. 1.; As reflecting this, *Novri Susan* also explains how the historically-rooted resistant character of Aceh is maintained after joining Indonesia. See: Novri Susan, **The Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia: The Practice of Governance in Conflict**, Second Edition, Airlangga University Press, Singapore : Springer, 2023, p. 17.

the fall of the pepper production, which coincided with the middle years of the 1920s. In the Second World War, Indonesia, as the Dutch East Indies at the time, was occupied by Japan. The Dutch, as an influential power in the area of the Acehnese sultanate since the seventeenth century, did not try to revive its control following the Japanese occupation.⁵⁶³

In this process, Indonesia became independent on 17 December 1949. Of critical importance is that the province of Aceh was granted a large degree of autonomy. However, the autonomy status was withdrawn due to the incorporation of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra, dated August 1950.⁵⁶⁴ The issues related to autonomy generated concerns for the large-group identity of Acehnese and their political rights.

Prior to independence, the survival of Aceh was considered as connected with the struggle of the government against the Dutch. Following the independence, on the other hand, the relationship between Aceh and the government changed adversely. The enhancement of power by central leaders, the end of the favoured treatment for the Acehnese leaders, the dissolution of the provincial status of Aceh, and the avoidance of their religious values at the governmental level resulted in the promotion of a sense of regionalism and rebellion in the end.⁵⁶⁵

One can contend that political and religious values and recognition, as primary components of large-group identity, were threatened by the actions of government. Hence, regionalism and rebellion were pursued in order to protect and remedy the Acehnese large-group identity and their self-images. These counteracting pursuits were followed by a cycle of violence and deepened incompatibility. With that being said, concerns and interests differed among the Acehnese as well. In this regard, the term main warring parties rather functions as an abstraction since there can be differences and even fragmentations within one party.

In particular, dissatisfaction with the governmental policies differed for the leaders of “*ulama*” and “*zuama*”. The main interests of the *ulama* were grounded in

⁵⁶³ For information about the Japanese occupation, the following resources can provide useful insights: Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, **Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945**, Jakarta : Equinox Publishing, 2009.; Harry J. Benda, “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java”, **The Far Eastern Quarterly**, Vol. 15, No. 4, Aug. 1956, pp. 541-560.; M. C. Ricklefs, “World War II and the Japanese Occupation, 1942-5”, in M. C. Ricklefs, **A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 1981, pp. 187-199.

⁵⁶⁴ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Conflict, Indonesia: Aceh”, n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/366> (accessed 12.04.2024).; The movement of GAM is affected by resistance, including the war against the Dutch, and the revolt of the Darul Islam, or “Abode of Islam”. See: Edward Aspinall, **Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation**, Prepared for the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, August 2005, p. 2.

⁵⁶⁵ Nazaruddin, **Republican Revolt: Study of Acehnese Rebellion**, pp. 2-3.

their religious commitment and the protection of religious values rather than political interests of the Acehnese. As for the *zuama*, the main concern was directed to autonomy, political interests, and political influence. In this regard, the aggregation of dissatisfaction and the opposition of these groups resulted in the emergence of rebellion.⁵⁶⁶ Despite different but connected ideas, the increased tension between Aceh and the Indonesian government can be classified through the following components: “(1) national ideology, (2) centralisation policy and (3) the status of Islamic law”.⁵⁶⁷

In essence, secular government and the incorporation of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra caused discontent. Thereby, Acehnese leaders supported the rebellion led by Darul Islam. The aim of this rebellion was grounded in the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state. On 20 September 1953, the independence of Aceh was declared by the governor, *Daud Beureu'eh*.⁵⁶⁸ As an Islamic cleric and Acehnese leader, *Daud Beureu'eh* announced that Aceh was separated from Indonesia. However, this separatist endeavor was obstructed when the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion surrendered in May 1962.⁵⁶⁹

The 1953 rebellion revealed profound differences concerning the attitudes of the Acehnese towards the Indonesian national state. Accordingly, the Indonesian national state was regarded as a new type of imperialism while being associated with secularization and communist influence. In the following years, Aceh was subject to exploitation and suppression while becoming a target for extensive transmigration from the island of Java. This process led to hatred, alienation, the establishment of GAM, and another renewed rebellion in 1976.⁵⁷⁰ Prior to this, Aceh's status as an autonomous province was actually restored in 1959. However, its autonomous status

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁶⁷ Baikoeni, and Oishi, “Ending Long-Standing Intrastate Conflict...”, p. 21.

⁵⁶⁸ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Conflict, Indonesia: Aceh”.

⁵⁶⁹ Baikoeni, and Oishi, “Ending Long-Standing Intrastate Conflict...”, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁷⁰ Fritz Schulze, “From Colonial Times to Revolution and Integration”, in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, and Edwin Wieringa (Eds.), **Aceh: History, Politics and Culture**, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, pp. 76-77.; “The National Liberation Front of Aceh”, Sumatra, is referred to as the predecessor of GAM with the purpose for the freedom and independence of Aceh. See: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “GAM”, n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/327> (accessed 12.04.2024).; Also, “The Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front” is referred to as the formal, but less common name of GAM. See: Damien Kingsbury, “The Aceh Peace Process”, in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, and Edwin Wieringa (Eds.), **Aceh: History, Politics and Culture**, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, p. 137.

was removed in the mid-1960s.⁵⁷¹ This decision reinforced mistrust between the parties and intensified efforts for independence.

As briefly highlighted, there have been different explanations regarding the underlying roots of the conflict. According to information obtained by the UCDP, the uneven distribution of the wealth acquired from the natural resources in Aceh also played a critical role for the emergence of this conflict characterized by territorial incompatibility.⁵⁷² Hence, this protracted conflict was marked by issues related to autonomy, failure of national integration, natural resources distribution, and territory.

In addition, various issues regarding economics, human rights, religion, identity dynamics, nationalism, and self-determination affected this conflict and perceptions of the warring parties. Importantly, particular emphasis was given to identity issues, as reflecting fundamental incompatibilities from the perspective of most Acehnese nationalists. From the perspective of the Government of Indonesia, on the other hand, key causes of the conflict were built upon various grievances, including but not limited to economics, human rights, and religion in Aceh.⁵⁷³

The reasons for this conflict can also be detected in the Declaration of Independence of Aceh, dated 04 December 1976. In this declaration, it is emphasized that colonialism, whether by the Dutch, European powers, or Javanese, Asians, cannot be accepted. Accordingly, Indonesia was considered as a deceit to conceal Javanese colonialism as stated by *Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro*, who was the Chairman, National Liberation Front of Aceh, Sumatra, and Head of State.⁵⁷⁴ The aforementioned explanation indicates that the GAM sees the Indonesian state as the continuation of the colonial control in Aceh.

With that being said, the historical background also entails differences with this stated perception. Accordingly, the revolutionary period in Indonesia was marked by the upheaval against the Dutch and the continuance of social revolution in Aceh. The

⁵⁷¹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Conflict, Indonesia: Aceh", n.d. For detailed information about the periods of *Sukarno*, and *Soeharto*, and the reflections on Aceh, please see the following publications: Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh?", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3, Jun. 2001, pp. 437-452.; Tjin-kie Tan, *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*, Brisbane : Jacaranda Press, 1967.; Susan, *Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...*, pp. 17-21.

⁵⁷² The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Conflict, Indonesia: Aceh".

⁵⁷³ Aspinall, *Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options...*, p. 3.

⁵⁷⁴ **Aceh: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF ACHEH**, Aceh, Sumatra, 04 December 1976, The Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), <https://unpo.org/acheh-declaration-of-independence-of-acheh/> (accessed 12.05.2023).; Also, it is important to note that the exploitation of Aceh, and the utilization of the annual generation of a revenue over 15 billion US dollars by Aceh only for the benefit of Java and the Javanese have been demonstrated as important reasons for the exercise of self-determination in the Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra. See: **Aceh: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF ACHEH**.

renovation of self-determination and removal of “*uleebalang*” feudalism were at the core of this process. In this regard, the “Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh” (“*All-Aceh Ulama Association*”) followed the option of integration with the Indonesian national state while declaring a fight against the Dutch, as “*jihad*”.⁵⁷⁵ According to *Edward Aspinall*, the conformity with the integration to Indonesia makes the experience of Aceh distinctive.⁵⁷⁶ Hence, being part of the Indonesian national state was acceptable in fighting with the Dutch.

Nonetheless, the post-independence period of Indonesia witnessed the emergence of conflict that followed a protracted course. The feelings of betrayal and resentment for governmental policies were intensified due to various unresolved issues, including but not limited to the exploitation of natural resources, failed promises regarding the status of Aceh, and the depredations suffered by the Acehnese civilians and civilian casualties as a result of the Indonesian military operations, the arrival of migrants, who were not Acehnese and Muslim, into the region, and the deterioration of socio-economic conditions.⁵⁷⁷ The variety and accumulation of the underlying roots of conflict made peaceful settlement a challenge.

In this process, dissatisfactions emanating from the relationship between the center and periphery triggered another rebellion by GAM. In contrast to the Darul Islam rebellion, the purpose of *Hasan di Tiro*, as the leader of GAM, was directed to the independence of Aceh rather than the transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state.⁵⁷⁸ With the Darul Islam rebellion, the purpose was grounded in the autonomy of Aceh under the Islamic state of Indonesia. GAM, on the other hand, prioritized independence over the status of autonomy.⁵⁷⁹ In this context, this rebellion was marked by a shift from the status of autonomy to independence for Aceh.

The unilateral declaration of independence and establishment of the GAM by *Hasan di Tiro* were responded to by military operations as conducted by the government. With military operations, the activities of GAM were restricted.

⁵⁷⁵ Schulze, “From Colonial Times to...”, p. 76.; For information about the circumstances that led to the creation of the “Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh” (“*All-Aceh Ulama Association*”), see: Schulze, “From Colonial Times to...”, pp. 63-66.; For the conflict between “*Uleebalang*”, which refers to feudal landlords, and “*Ulema*”, see: Amin, **Understanding History of Aceh Conflict...**, pp. 2-10.

⁵⁷⁶ Edward Aspinall, “Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights: History and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism”, **Indonesia**, No. 73, April 2002, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁷⁷ Miller, “Conflict in Aceh: Context, Precursors...”, p. 13.; As regards the placement of workers to Aceh, it is explained that the worldview of the Acehnese people was rather isolated and static. Their views about religion also reflected this course. The negligence of this psychological reality caused problems, and divisions. Amin, **Understanding History of Aceh Conflict...**, p. 38.

⁵⁷⁸ Schulze, **Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy...**, p. 2.

⁵⁷⁹ Aspinall, **Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options...**, p. 2.

However, *Hasan di Tiro* could not be captured. Shortly thereafter, he left Aceh and formed a government in exile in Sweden. Military attacks and operations continued during the 1980s.⁵⁸⁰

The resistance of GAM was crushed by 1977.⁵⁸¹ Despite the restrictions, the movement re-emerged in early 1989. This process was followed by the attacks of GAM, which also obtained substantial support in the region.⁵⁸² In response to the revival of this separatist movement, a new operational regime referred to as DOM (*“Daerah Operasi Militer”* or Military Operations Area) was embarked upon in Aceh. This new operational regime, which was lifted after the fall of President *Soeharto* in 1998, increased sympathy for the GAM and hostility for the armed forces of Indonesia in Aceh.⁵⁸³

It is clear that the Indonesian government considered military operations as a circumvention directed to the underlying roots of the conflict. One can argue that such efforts oriented at circumventing the underlying roots of the conflict through military means can reinforce the protracted direction. This has also been evident in the case of Sri Lanka. However, the case of Aceh was distinctive in influencing the mindsets of the warring parties for the underlying roots of the conflict and for the creation of a common ground. As it will be revealed in this part of the Thesis, the case of Sri Lanka was a failure due to deliberate misinterpretation of the underlying roots of the conflict by the government, unwillingness of the main warring parties, and inadequate third-party efforts.

The struggle of the GAM continued until the peace agreement in August 2005.⁵⁸⁴ On 15 August 2005, a “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)” was signed between

⁵⁸⁰ Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3, Jun. 2001, p. 441.; However, *Kirsten E. Schulze* argues that it would be incorrect to name these actions as military operations. Rather, *Schulze* refers to such actions as counterinsurgency operations, which had a definitive role for the transformation of the GAM in terms of its capability to challenge the Indonesian state; expansion of its members, the controlled areas in the Aceh, and its increasing influence from a small organization to a resistance movement. *Schulze*, **Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy...**, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁸¹ International Crisis Group, **Aceh: Escalating Tension**, Indonesia Briefing, Banda Aceh/Jakarta/Brussels, 07 December 2000, p. 2, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/aceh-escalating-tension> (accessed 21.05.2022).; For more information about the history and transformation of the GAM, its Acehnese nationalism, and the ambiguities surrounding the inclusion of Islam into its ideology, see: *Schulze*, **Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy...**, pp. 4-8.

⁵⁸² Sulistiyanto, “Whither Aceh?”, p. 441.

⁵⁸³ International Crisis Group, **Aceh: Escalating Tension**, p. 2.

⁵⁸⁴ Baikoeni, and Oishi, “Ending Long-Standing Intrastate Conflict...”, p. 21.; Of equal importance is that the hostility was not the only element that defined the relationship between GAM and Indonesian government. There were also ambiguous ties, some forms of deals, or even cooperation between the

GAM and Indonesia with *Martti Ahtisaari* as the facilitator of the negotiation process.⁵⁸⁵ In the following sub-section, the role of Finland through *Ahtisaari* and CMI will be explained. Within this connection, it will be revealed how the underlying roots of this conflict were addressed under the leadership of *Ahtisaari* and the utilization of NGOs.

b. The inception of the peace process: The role of *Martti Ahtisaari* and the “Crisis Management Initiative”

The re-inauguration of peace talks and bargaining rounds between the Indonesian government and GAM was announced following the intensified conflict, which superseded the earlier collapsed peace process;⁵⁸⁶ the military emergency declaration of government in May 2003, and the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004. Peace talks were successful with regard to the signing and implementation of the MoU as reflecting a negotiated peace between the warring parties albeit challenges and problems.

In this Memorandum, a permanent conflict settlement; provisions associated with the government of Aceh; issues concerning human rights, security, and social reintegration of the former combatants from GAM; and the implementation of monitoring⁵⁸⁷ by a third-party have been addressed. Moreover, GAM also accepted

GAM fighters and government/military officials. Hence, competition and mutual adversary represented one dimension of this conflict. See: Edward Aspinall, **Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia**, Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 184-190.

⁵⁸⁵ **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement**, United Nations Peacemaker, 15 August 2005, <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9221> (accessed 17.06.2023).

⁵⁸⁶ The former peace process was conducted through mediation, implementation and “new prevention” roles of “The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.” The term “new prevention” has been formulated as a humanitarian duty for the alleviation of war and creation of peace. In this context, the purposes of the Centre included but not limited to the prevention of humanitarian crises, reduction of violence and suffering, identification of possible solutions through discussions with various groups and stakeholders, have an influence upon the governmental policies by bringing recommendations and main issues together, facilitation for direct communication and negotiation between the GAM and Indonesian government, and the achievement of a peaceful, and political solution. The Centre had consultative meetings with key stakeholders both in Jakarta and Aceh. The meetings with the Acehnese groups, especially the representatives of GAM took place in Malaysia and Sweden. However the peace process, as materialized through the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, collapsed due to the initiation of a military operation as declared by the government on 19 May 2003. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, **Aceh Initiative: Internal Review**, Geneva, November 2003, <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Aceh-internal-review-HD-Centre.pdf> (accessed 17.05.2023).

⁵⁸⁷ In the previous peace process, the international monitoring mission, along with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, collapsed as of the date of 19 May 2003. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, **Aceh Initiative: Internal Review**, p. 2.

being part of the state of Indonesia.⁵⁸⁸ In this regard, this agreement contains a solution for the underlying roots of the conflict through commitment and compromise of the parties and the embracement of a deeper approach to peace. In essence, peace engagement of Finland was crystallized with the formulation and materialization of this Memorandum.

In this aforementioned MoU, signed in Helsinki under the witnessing of *Martti Ahtisaari*, Former President of Finland, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the CMI, and facilitator of the negotiation process, both the Indonesian government and GAM demonstrated their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive, and sustainable solution of the conflict in dignity. The warring parties adhered to the creation of conditions as capable of manifesting the government of Acehnese people in a fair and democratic manner within united Indonesia. They also committed to building mutual confidence and trust. In this memorandum, the impacts of tsunami disasters can also be observed. Accordingly, the peaceful settlement of conflict has been demonstrated as a necessity for the reconstruction of Aceh following the disaster.⁵⁸⁹ Hence, the MoU was also affirmative of the link between peace and reconstruction.

In tune with this atmosphere that stemmed from the disaster, peace efforts and processes apparently gained momentum. Within this framework, *Ahtisaari* affirms how the impacts of tsunami cannot be neglected. Nevertheless, the contact between GAM, the government of Indonesia, and *Ahtisaari* was actually established before the tsunami that hit Aceh as well. Prior to this contact, a Finnish businessman also initiated a discussion of “shuttle diplomacy” between the warring parties. Hence, this personal initiative marked another effort for the resolution of the Aceh conflict. In late 2004, the case of Aceh was presented to *Ahtisaari*.⁵⁹⁰

This Finnish businessman, who approached GAM for mediation, was *Juha Christensen*. This rather unexpected offer initiated the peace process due to *Christensen*’s connections with the Indonesian leadership and his capabilities in bringing *Ahtisaari* and the CMI for the consolidation of mediation. The disaster also played a compelling role in convincing the Indonesian leadership. Also, GAM was

⁵⁸⁸ Edward Aspinall, *The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?*, Policy Studies 20, Washington, D.C. : East-West Center Washington, 01 Jan. 2005, pp. 1-2, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/helsinki-agreement-more-promising-basis-peace-aceh> (accessed 17.05.2023).

⁵⁸⁹ *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ahtisaari*, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, p. 10.

determined for the conclusion of war. Following three days of the tsunami, a unilateral ceasefire was declared by GAM. Further to this, this initiative was strengthened by the international community, whose role was rather limited in the previous peace process. This problem was avoided in the Helsinki peace negotiations.⁵⁹¹

Initial steps oriented at reopening peace talks were thus prior to the tsunami. In this context, the abandonment of long-standing positions by the parties led to the revival of the peace process. It can be stated that the long-standing conflict, GAM's combat fatigue, and the alteration of government in Indonesia affected the willingness and position of the parties for peace talks. In this connection, the effects of the tsunami also provided justifications for their return to dialogue.⁵⁹² Therefore, renewed attention upon the achievement of peace was unavoidable and necessary.

As an example of the abandonment of long-standing positions by the government, Aceh was given a special autonomy and named as "Nangroe Aceh Darussalam." The acquisition of 70% LNG revenue and 50% LNG revenue following the completion of eight years, and the ability to implement "*Syariah Islam*" (Islamic law) were also arranged under the regime of President *Megawati*. In this process, the mediation role led by "The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)" continued for this perpetuated conflict. However, special autonomy could not be implemented wholly and consistently.⁵⁹³

Hence, the previous peace process ended, and President *Sukarnoputri* declared martial law. Since the beginning of the early 2000s, ceasefire agreements had twice provided relative calm that lasted for several months.⁵⁹⁴ However, military operations

⁵⁹¹ M. Nur Djuli, and Nurdin Abdul Rahman, "The Helsinki Negotiations: A Perspective from Free Aceh Movement Negotiators", in Aguswandi, and Judith Large (Eds.), **Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives**, No. 20: Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia – Aceh Peace Process, London : Conciliation Resources, 2008, p. 28.; For the a personal interest of *Juha Christensen* and his efforts that led to the involvement of *Martti Ahtisaari*, see also: Michael Morfit, "The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia's Democratic Development", **International Negotiation**, Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan. 2007, pp. 136-139.

⁵⁹² Aspinall, **Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising....**, p. 2.

⁵⁹³ Susan, **Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia....**, p. 23.

⁵⁹⁴ (i) From January 2000 to May 2000, four meetings that took place in Switzerland between the parties were materialized in terms of the agreement known as the "Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh." There were partial contributions in addressing some contentious issues. Nonetheless, achievements were interrupted due to various problems, including the decline of confidence and trust and the initiation of military operation by the government. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, **Aceh Initiative: Internal Review**, pp. 7-11.; (ii) Nonetheless, the dialogue for peace was renewed, which produced the signing of the Joint Statement that led to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 09 December 2002. In this process, the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh functioned as a starting point. However, both parties interpreted the signing of the Joint Statement differently. GAM was not willing to relinquish the aspiration and struggle for independence, the underlying root of the conflict, as long as the autonomy was not accepted by the Acehnese people. From the perspective of the

were renewed. Actually, the peace process witnessed important tactical concessions from the warring parties. Nonetheless, the fundamental issue associated with the status of Aceh remained as intransigent and non-negotiable. In this process, adherence to a multi-ethnic and multicultural national vision; the defence of inherited borders, the unity of state; economic reasons, and public opinion affected the position of the Indonesian government.⁵⁹⁵ Such considerations prevented the government from engaging in the peace process with GAM.

Following the failure of peace mediation and facilitation as conducted by the HD, the achievement of peace was considered as more distant. Nevertheless, civilian and military officials in Indonesia came to an understanding that military and security-oriented measures could not be successful in ensuring an ultimate resolution. In connection with the impacts of the government's military operations, some of the senior field commanders from GAM were actually interested in returning to peace talks compared to the leadership of GAM in exile. Also, the first direct Indonesian presidential elections had direct implications for the resolution of the conflict.⁵⁹⁶

But GAM leadership was not interested in the resumption of the peace process. Of equal importance is that the possibility for the resumption of this process was grounded in their commitment to HD, albeit the scepticism. Against this backdrop, the election of *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono* as new president of Indonesia, his willingness for the settlement and resolution of the Aceh conflict, the excessive costs of this conflict over the military budget, and increased economic problems with regard to

Indonesian government, on the other hand, the Joint Statement reflected the acceptance of autonomy by GAM that paved the way for the resolution of Aceh conflict. Hence, there were concerns, confusions, and different ideas regarding the formulation of this renewed peace process. After a difficult period of compromises, discussions, and setbacks, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed. However, this agreement, along with the international monitoring mission, was also collapsed due to various issues, including but not limited to disagreements about its implementation. The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, **Aceh Initiative: Internal Review**, pp. 13-22.

⁵⁹⁵ Edward Aspinall, and Harold Crouch, **The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed?**, Policy Studies 1, Washington, D.C. : East-West Center Washington, 01 Jan. 2003, pp. 1-2, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/aceh-peace-process-why-it-failed> (accessed 19.05.2023).

⁵⁹⁶ Konrad Huber, "Aceh's Arduous Journey to Peace", in Aguswandi, and Judith Large (Eds.), **Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives**, No. 20: Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia – Aceh Peace Process, London : Conciliation Resources, 2008, p. 19.; In relation to different levels of interest for peace between senior GAM commanders and GAM leadership, it is important to note that the Swedish-based "Olof Palme International Center" organized meetings between GAM civil society and GAM elite in exile. The purpose was oriented at informing leaders about the grievances and realities in the field. See: Timo Kivimäki, and David Gorman, **Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh**, Geneva : The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, June 2008, pp. 15-16.

concerns about energy security led to the reinvigoration of the peace process.⁵⁹⁷ Despite challenges, all of these factors culminated in another peaceful initiative.

As emphasized, the prior peace process collapsed due to the persistence of the fundamental incompatibilities between GAM and the government. As reflecting the concerns of the central government and military, territorial fragmentation was considered a source of anxiety. Accordingly, these groups were committed to the maintenance of state unitary. From the perspective of GAM, on the other hand, their interests would not be advanced without independence.⁵⁹⁸ In response to this irreconcilability, which was evaluated as the underlying root of the conflict by HD⁵⁹⁹, the peace process ended.

Following the negotiations under the auspices of HD dating from the year of 1999 to 2003⁶⁰⁰, Finnish-based CMI reinitiated negotiations. It was also fortunate that the new government in Indonesia contributed to this process pertaining to constructive negotiation.⁶⁰¹ Accordingly, the situation in Aceh can be considered as approximately a hurting stalemate from the perspective of GAM.⁶⁰² Indeed, the situation in Aceh was appropriate for third-party engagement. With that being said, the term hurting stalemate does not wholly identify the position of the government.⁶⁰³ Nevertheless, the conflict was in a stalemate due to the effects of the tsunami disaster as well. In this regard, the disaster created a ripeness for third-party intervention.⁶⁰⁴

⁵⁹⁷ Damien Kingsbury, "The Aceh Peace Process", in Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, and Edwin Wieringa (Eds.), **Aceh: History, Politics and Culture**, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, p. 136.

⁵⁹⁸ Alfred Stepan, "A Revised Theory of Federacy and a Case Study of Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia", in Joanne McEvoy, and Brendan O'Leary (Eds.), **Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places**, Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p. 241.

⁵⁹⁹ See: The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, **Aceh Initiative: Internal Review**, p. 18.

⁶⁰⁰ This process also coincided with the democratic transition of Indonesia. Following the replacement of *Soeharto* by *B. J. Habibie*, East Timor has become an independent state through referendum. This choice was not granted to Aceh, as being the founder of Indonesia. Aceh was considered different due to their contributions in the independence movement against the Dutch, and their historical connection with Indonesia. The approval of *Habibie* for the independence referendum in East Timor was highly criticized by the Indonesian society and political leadership. Nonetheless, the independence of East Timor played an encouraging role for the Acehnese civil movement. See: Susan, **Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...**, p. 22.

⁶⁰¹ Ahtisaari, "Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks", p. 10.; As of 01 May 2021, CMI became "CMI - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation." See: The Crisis Management Initiative - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, "Crisis Management Initiative becomes CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation as from 1 May 2021", 29 April 2021, <https://cmi.fi/2021/04/29/crisis-management-initiative-becomes-cmi-martti-ahtisaari-peace-foundation-as-from-1-may-2021/> (accessed 12.06.2024).

⁶⁰² Aspinall, **Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...**, p. 7.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁶⁰⁴ Susan, **Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...**, p. 24.

Jusuf Kalla, as the Vice President of Indonesia at the time, played an important role in the resumption of peace dialogue. With his background and commitment, he sponsored the preliminary efforts regarding peace talks with GAM. At the time of early 2004, *Kalla* was a minister in President *Megawati Soekarnoputri*'s cabinet. During this period, military operations continued to be conducted. Despite the ascendancy of military approaches at the time, *Kalla* pursued two tracks directed to the GAM commanders and the leaders exiled in Sweden, respectively.⁶⁰⁵

Following that, *Christensen*, a Finnish businessman who tried to broker peace talks since 2003, approached CMI for the arrangement of peace dialogue and mediation between the warring parties. CMI issued a formal invitation to the warring parties on 24 December 2004. After the tsunami disaster, the invitation was accepted by the GAM and the Indonesian government.⁶⁰⁶ CMI explains that their organization and *Ahtisaari* were officially requested for peace facilitation.⁶⁰⁷ Taken together, the initiation of the peace process was grounded in the efforts of *Christensen*, the involvement of CMI and *Ahtisaari*, and the acceptance by the parties. It can be argued that *Christensen* was a proxy agent between the warring parties and the CMI. Accordingly, the contributions of *Ahtisaari* and the CMI marked the engagement of Finland.

In this regard, *Ahtisaari* and CMI were appointed as mediators by the democratic regime of Indonesia.⁶⁰⁸ The Indonesian government sent a negotiating team to Finland. This team met with the leadership of GAM in exile at CMI.⁶⁰⁹ It was January 2005 when the warring parties met in Helsinki. The negotiations started with a win-win-oriented approach concerning the prestige of both parties. This process was marked by the efforts corresponding to “‘(...) a peaceful solution with dignity for all’”.⁶¹⁰ Concern about the prestige of the warring parties is critical given its importance and historical reflections from the perspective of both parties. Hence, emphasis on dignity can be seen as an encouraging approach given the tenacity of the warring parties.

⁶⁰⁵ Aspinall, *Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...*, pp. 14-16.

⁶⁰⁶ Kingsbury, “Aceh Peace Process”, p. 136.

⁶⁰⁷ The Crisis Management Initiative, *Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project*, (Final Report), 2012, p. 9, https://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/aceh_report5_web.pdf (accessed 12.06.2024).

⁶⁰⁸ Susan, *Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...*, p. 24.

⁶⁰⁹ Huber, “Aceh’s Arduous Journey to Peace”, p. 20.

⁶¹⁰ Ahtisaari, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, p. 10.; This statement has also been reflected in the preamble of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement.

On 27 January 2005, first talks were initiated. The representatives from Indonesia were selected from senior personnel, which added heavy tune regarding the purpose of the government. The representatives from GAM also involved senior leaders and substantial members. *Hasan di Tiro*, on the other hand, was absent in the negotiations due to his poor health conditions.⁶¹¹ Under these circumstances, the first face-to-face meeting took place in Helsinki.⁶¹² During the negotiations, *Ahtisaari* and CMI acted as mediators and good offices. They contributed to communication between the warring parties in times when the negotiations could not progress. Also, political aid was utilized as a pressure mechanism upon the parties.⁶¹³

Ahtisaari adopted the following approach that underpins the successful outcome of this peace mediation and facilitation. “(...) *nothing is agreed before everything is agreed*”.⁶¹⁴ Also, the warring parties were more experienced and realistic due to the prospects resulting from previous dialogue as facilitated by the HD. By taking previous failures into consideration, the main issues that needed to be addressed were related to security and demilitarization, monitoring and enforcement, amnesty and economic compensation for the members of GAM, and the political status of Aceh in the long-term.⁶¹⁵ These issues were present in the minds of the warring parties.

With *Ahtisaari*'s approach, none of the parties would declare their victory and successfulness as long as there was no agreement upon every issue surrounding this protracted conflict. As a result of this approach, the MoU entailed all the agreements as determined by the parties.⁶¹⁶ The culmination of discussions and the arrival of a consensus upon core issues led to the formulation of the MoU. The fact that the MoU entailed all the agreements set by the parties can be seen as positive reinforcement upon its sustainability and commitment of the warring parties.

The MoU has officially ended the violence. Albeit the absence of a ceasefire before the MoU, this protracted conflict was ended due to the critical alterations in the attitudes and incompatibilities of the parties. The conflict cycle was terminated with the cessation of mutual hostilities. In this context, it can be observed that the case of Aceh problematizes a linear approach towards peace and conflict resolution, which

⁶¹¹ Aspinall, *Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...*, pp. 21-22.

⁶¹² The Crisis Management Initiative, *Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project*, p. 9.

⁶¹³ Susan, *Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...*, p. 25.

⁶¹⁴ Ahtisaari, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, p. 10.

⁶¹⁵ Aspinall, *Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...*, p. 22.

⁶¹⁶ Ahtisaari, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, p. 10.

follows the stages of ceasefire, negotiation, agreement, and reconciliation.⁶¹⁷ As emphasized, there was no ceasefire prior to the arrival of the MoU.

In contrast to the approach of the HD for open-ended process, which allowed the parties to identify their common interests through prioritization of the termination of mutual hostilities, *Ahtisaari*'s formula required the consensus of the parties directed to a political settlement. This was considered a prerequisite for the implementation phase of the negotiations. The insistence as imposed upon the parties played an enabling role for the formulation of a compromise, which is acceptable and workable for the key issues. In this process, the parties had to be creative.⁶¹⁸ Accordingly, *Ahtisaari*'s leading role was empowering upon the approaches and behaviors of the warring parties.

International support was also utilized in compelling parties for peace mediation and facilitation practices. In this regard, financial assistance was obtained from the "Rapid Reaction Mechanism of the European Commission", and the government of the Netherlands. The government of Finland also provided financial and in-kind support. Actually, various governments and foundations supported the parties and representations that participated in the peace process. Examples also include the Swedish "Olof Palme International Centre."⁶¹⁹ Such extensive support signals the capacity to influence international actors. This capacity can be considered as instrumental in guiding the parties for the achievement of peace.

In respect to the scope of this Thesis, the conflict in Aceh shared some commonalities with the conflict in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, inadequate recognition of the plurality of political communities affected the cohesion of Indonesia and Sri Lanka while fueling claims associated with national self-determination and separation. In the cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka, internal political challenges and tensions pertaining to the incorporation of ethnic minorities have arisen. Claims for separation emerged in this context and led to reciprocal conflicts.⁶²⁰

In contrast to the case of Sri Lanka, in which a significant minority lives with a majority ethnic group as dominating the state, the Acehnese population is very low within the Indonesian population. The national identity of Indonesia is not identified with the largest ethnic group. In this connection, the Javanese do not constitute more

⁶¹⁷ Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescou, "Counselling and Training for...", p. 132.

⁶¹⁸ Aspinall, **Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...**, pp. 22-23.

⁶¹⁹ The Crisis Management Initiative, **Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project**, p. 9.

⁶²⁰ Damien Kingsbury, "Peace Processes in Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Assessment", **Security Challenges**, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 95-96.

than half of the Indonesian population. The national identity of Indonesia is also multi-ethnic, civic, and inclusionary. Leading on from this, *Edward Aspinall* emphasizes how the identity of the Acehnese and of Indonesians are not considered as irreconcilable from the perspective of a significant part of the Acehnese. It is also emphasized that the territorial or political influence of GAM has never been as dominant as the level of exerted influence of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Despite the challenges and the absence of effective implementation, successive governments in Indonesia also granted autonomy for Aceh.⁶²¹

The tsunami, as triggered by the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, provided considerable incentive for the formal achievement of conflict resolution in Aceh. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was again involved in open war with the deterioration of security situations. Despite the effects of the tsunami disaster and the presence of a ceasefire agreement, Sri Lanka experienced a shift from relative peace to open conflict.⁶²² In Sri Lanka, the tsunami disaster could not compel the main warring parties for the resumption of the peace process. Hence, both ceasefire agreement and disaster could not channel into peace talks, let alone conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

The reason for the divergent role of disaster diplomacy, which leads to the diplomatically catalyzing role of activities related to disaster in the short-term, in these separatist conflicts can be grounded in different pre-existing conditions and impetus for diplomacy and peace. Accordingly, peace talks in Aceh previously emerged following back-and-forth diplomacy. The connections were already created, and the interest and intention for peace were displayed. There were favourable conditions and willingness that affected the commencement of negotiations between the parties. All of these developments affirm that there were pre-existing conditions and reasons in the case of Aceh. Given the compatibility between the interests of the parties and

⁶²¹ Aspinall, *Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options...*, p. 3.; In 2001, the Indonesian government offered Aceh more autonomy to end this lingering armed conflict and to reduce the support for their independence. International Crisis Group, *Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?*, Asia Report No. 18, Jakarta/Brussels, 27 June 2001, p. 1.; For more information about this offering and its potential effects upon the conflict, please see the aforementioned report by the International Crisis Group.; For the problems related to the implementation of the law as “Special Autonomy for the Province of Aceh Special Region as the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, see also: Michelle Ann Miller, “The Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Law: A Serious Response to Acehnese Separatism?”, *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 5, No. 3: Four Approaches to the Aceh Question, 2004, pp. 333-351.

⁶²² Kingsbury, “Peace Processes in Aceh and Sri Lanka...”, pp. 93-94.

disaster diplomacy, the case of Aceh witnessed its successfulness in contrast to the case of Sri Lanka.⁶²³

Hence, the peace process with the expectation and hope to obtain momentum in these cases also differs with regard to circumstances resulting from the tsunami disaster. As reflecting different links between the resumption or reinforcement of peace processes and tsunamis, the aforesaid cases reveal how peace mediation and facilitation processes entail contextual dynamics, and third-parties must always bear this in mind when engaging with such cases. In the case of Aceh, *Ahtisaari*'s diplomatic skills and leading role were undoubtedly effective. The following subsection will look into his approaches and techniques in close detail.

c. The peaceful contributions and challenges of the Republic of Finland through *Martti Ahtisaari* and the “Crisis Management Initiative”

It is important to understand that the negotiations between the years of 1999 and 2004 generated distrust and suspicions rather than a solid foundation for peace.⁶²⁴ Hence, the pre-negotiation phase of the Helsinki peace process was marked by such feelings as capable of obstructing further efforts for peace. In order to challenge the feelings of distrust and suspicions, both advantageous and disadvantageous factors resulting from the previous peace process, along with the expectations and experiences of the warring parties, had to be managed effectively.

Rather than an extensive time of preparation, the combination of various developments and elements, including shuttle diplomacy led by a Finnish businessman, the establishment of a triadic contact between GAM, the Indonesian government, and *Ahtisaari*, the accumulated effects of this lingering conflict upon the parties, the government change in Indonesia, the decision regarding special autonomy status of Aceh, albeit the failure related to its appropriate implementation, economic and military problems, and disaster diplomacy played contributing roles for the resumption of peace negotiations and third-party engagement of Finland through *Ahtisaari* and the CMI.

With the impacts of the tsunami disaster, there were external pressures from relief and reconstruction donors for the recommencement of the peace process.⁶²⁵

⁶²³ Ilan Kelman, **Catastrophe and Conflict: Disaster Diplomacy and Its Foreign Policy Implications**, Brill Research Perspectives in Humanities and Social Sciences Series, Leiden, Boston : Brill Publishers, 2016, pp. 62-63.

⁶²⁴ Michael Morfit, “The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia’s Democratic Development”, **International Negotiation**, Vol. 12, No. 1, Jan. 2007, p. 115.

⁶²⁵ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “GAM”.

Hence, peace negotiations and peace agreement also emanated from ripeness and devastating conditions. Within this framework, the GAM and the Indonesian government signed the MoU as brokered by *Ahtisaari* on 15 August 2005. The military conflict was effectively ended with the arrangement of wide autonomy for Aceh, which excluded “(...) *foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and freedom of religion*”.⁶²⁶

Despite the disappointment and failure resulting from the previously collapsed peace process, Helsinki negotiations generated an agreement. Of critical importance is that this negotiated settlement marked the beginning of a new political era in Aceh. This process, which led to the peaceful resolution of this protracted conflict, marked a success of democratic governance.⁶²⁷ With the idea of federacy, *Alfred Stepan* contends, there have been important contributions to peace and positive changes in Aceh.⁶²⁸ It can be contended that such contributions were enabled by converging the incompatibilities of the warring parties in terms of self-government.

Peace negotiations lasted for seven months. In this process, six main topics were identified as to be discussed and agreed upon between the parties. First of all, the creation of a ground was necessary for dialogue during which the issue and content of the self-government could be addressed. Following that, the parties needed to agree upon provisions associated with political participation and elections. In addition to these main topics, economic arrangements and conditions were also in need of discussion between the parties. Amnesty and its coverage were included in the negotiation agenda as well. These pivotal topics were followed by security arrangements and the decommission of GAM armament. Finally, the means of external monitoring were also part of the issues that need to be dealt with. Helsinki hosted the meetings between the parties with five negotiation rounds of talks.⁶²⁹

With the end of the first round of talks, *Ahtisaari* announced that the future rounds would be conducted within the framework of the acceptance of Aceh's special

⁶²⁶ Hurst Hannum, “The Road to Autonomy in Aceh”, *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, Vol. 102, 09-12 April 2008, p. 116.

⁶²⁷ Morfit, “Road to Helsinki: Aceh Agreement...”, pp. 112-113.

⁶²⁸ Stepan, “Revised Theory of Federacy...”, p. 241.

⁶²⁹ Ahtisaari, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, p. 11.; Also, prior to fourth round of talks, there was a meeting between GAM representatives and Acehnese civil society groups. This meeting was held under the auspices of the Olof Palme International Center. In this meeting, civil society groups were informed about the initiation and trajectory of peace process. See: Kingsbury, “Aceh Peace Process”, p. 143.; Hence, it can be contended that this Swedish-based NGO played a dialogue facilitation role directed to GAM.

autonomy.⁶³⁰ *M. Nur Djuliand* and *Nurdin Abdul Rahman*, as GAM negotiators, explain how autonomy indicated oppression and injustices for them. The Indonesian leadership, on the other hand, was opposed to independence and referendum. With the commencement of the second round of talks, GAM proposed self-government. Interestingly, *Ahtisaari* made a Finnish statement that linked peace and self-government in Aceh. In response to the uncertainty that stemmed from the statements of *Ahtisaari*, the aforesaid negotiators explained that *Ahtisaari* expressed how he actually meant self-government.⁶³¹ Nonetheless, there were ambiguities concerning autonomy, self-determination, and self-government.

In this process, GAM's proposal for self-government and refusal of special autonomy as offered by Indonesia affected negotiations adversely. Of critical importance is that *Ahtisaari* did not consider the linguistic differences between special autonomy and self-government. Both special autonomy and self-government indicate self-determination and can be used interchangeably in Finnish. However, these terms stand for different meanings when translated to English or Indonesian. While the term "special autonomy" stands for a *status quo*-oriented solution, the term "self-government" connotes self-determination or autonomy. The negligence of linguistic consideration was reflected in the news. In response to this confusion, *Damien Kingsbury* explains, *Ahtisaari* confirmed that he actually intended for the term special autonomy rather than self-government. For GAM, on the other hand, this offering was not acceptable.⁶³²

According to information obtained from GAM negotiators, *Ahtisaari*'s explanation stood for self-determination. As emphasized by *Kingsbury*, on the other hand, *Ahtisaari* rather meant for special autonomy. Such different explanations affirm the confusion that affected peace talks. Nevertheless, one can contend that political arrangements needed to be clarified both conceptually and linguistically and supported by further efforts as capable of tackling obstacles in the functioning of these arrangements.

Actually, the offering of self-government rather than independence by the GAM marked a major breakthrough in the peace process. Nevertheless, different positions of the parties towards self-government and negligence towards the linguistic differences caused problems and setbacks in peace negotiations. The reason for the

⁶³⁰ Kingsbury, "Aceh Peace Process", p. 137.

⁶³¹ Djuli, and Rahman, "Helsinki Negotiations...", p. 29.

⁶³² Kingsbury, "Aceh Peace Process", pp. 138-139.

alteration in the GAM's position was due to considerations that self-government might be more useful in improving governmental offerings for special autonomy since the year of 2001.⁶³³ With this in mind, the latest peace negotiations witnessed the discussions of political arrangements regarding special autonomy and self-government of Aceh. It can be assumed that self-government was considered as more appropriate to remedy the restrictions of special autonomy. However, the government's stance had to change in order to make concessions to its commitment to *status quo*-oriented arrangements.

In response to this need, *Ahtisaari* achieved to alter the position of the government by offering a practical solution outlined in the arrangement of the provincial elections that provided a political space for the local parties, along with the inception of the external monitoring. Also, the limitation of the National Armed Forces of Indonesia in Aceh was taken into consideration. This offering was accepted by the Indonesian government. As a result, self-government was put into the agenda of the government. The alteration in the position of the government no doubt marked a pivotal moment in the Helsinki peace process.⁶³⁴

Principally, the government and the GAM were aligned for the offering of self-government. Therefore, discussions and explorations were directed to the meaning and implications of self-government in Aceh. This process was marked by direct communication and friendly attitudes.⁶³⁵ In this context, the approach and formula of *Ahtisaari* allowed for the advancement of peace negotiations by encouraging and persuading the parties to have creative and practical discussions about self-government. As a result of this, parties were able to reinterpret the implications of special autonomy. From the perspective of government, self-government was no longer a source of ontological insecurity due to *Ahtisaari*'s innovative interpretation.

With *Ahtisaari*'s utilization of political aid and formula regarding the sequential solution of issues for the advancement of the negotiation process, both parties faced with pressures while being psychologically affected.⁶³⁶ *Ahtisaari*'s formula was useful in order to prevent any extremist national blaming directed at the government for compromises.⁶³⁷ In this way, the warring parties were aware that they could not ignore

⁶³³ Huber, "Aceh's Arduous Journey to Peace", p. 20.

⁶³⁴ Kingsbury, "Aceh Peace Process", pp. 139-140.

⁶³⁵ Djuli, and Rahman, "Helsinki Negotiations...", p. 29.

⁶³⁶ Susan, *Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...*, p. 25.

⁶³⁷ Timo Kivimäki, and David Gorman, *Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh*, Geneva : The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, June 2008, p. 15.

the underlying issues of the conflict and could not use urgent security concerns as a distraction.⁶³⁸ It is important to recall that the persistence of the fundamental incompatibilities was actually one of the major reasons for the re-emergence of hostilities in 2003.⁶³⁹ Hence, it can be contended that *Ahtisaari* also benefited and learned from the mistakes in the previous peace process. This was reflected in leading the parties to address the underlying issues of the conflict.

The parties were requested to prepare and present working papers regarding six main issues during the third and fourth rounds of negotiations. Future negotiations were considered to be grounded in these working papers. Accordingly, the first draft of the peace agreement was presented during the fifth round. Nevertheless, various versions of drafts were presented to the parties. At the end of the fifth round, the parties reached a common understanding for the content of the peace agreement. As a result of this common understanding, relative momentum was added to the negotiations that led to the signing of the MoU as the final agreement on 15 August 2005.⁶⁴⁰

Taken together, *Ahtisaari* contributed to this process as convener, facilitator, and manager of the peace negotiations. The venue for peace dialogue, along with the security of the delegations, was provided by the government of Finland. Nevertheless, *Ahtisaari* took an active part throughout the process. Examples associated with his roles also include the establishment of fundamental procedures that dominated the negotiations and contribution to the enforcement of such procedures. In order to achieve a constructive and progressive dialogue, controlling and monitoring measures were enacted for the release of information to the press as well. Accordingly, CMI functioned as a source of reliable information since it was decided that all the press statements were to be published by CMI. In these statements, only the basic details of the negotiations were agreed upon to be shared.⁶⁴¹ Ensuring valid and selective information can be considered a measure against misinformation and peace spoilers. Of equal importance is that this partial secrecy can be considered as critical to prevent the emergence of misunderstandings and false accusations.

The peace process was owned by the warring parties themselves rather than the mediator.⁶⁴² Hence, the ownership by the parties underpinned peace negotiations. In contrast to the previous peace process, direct talks between the parties were pursued

⁶³⁸ Aspinall, *Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising...*, pp. 22-23.

⁶³⁹ Stepan, "Revised Theory of Federacy...", p. 241.

⁶⁴⁰ Ahtisaari, "Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks", p. 11.

⁶⁴¹ Morfit, "Road to Helsinki: Aceh Agreement...", p. 116.

⁶⁴² Ahtisaari, "Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks", p. 11.

following the first round of the talks, during which the parties did not directly communicate with one another despite being in the same venue.⁶⁴³ With the benefits of the identification of the framework upon which the future dialogue would proceed and the direct talks following the first round, the parties reached a common understanding by signing the MoU in Helsinki.

In addition, the case of Aceh was a successful example of classical bilateral settings. In classical settings, inclusiveness can be restricted. Such restrictions can generate problems in complex, asymmetric, and multi-sided conflicts. However, the restriction of inclusivity has actually been successful in the case of Aceh. But still, there have been subsequent challenges with regard to the acceptability and legitimacy of the peace agreement.⁶⁴⁴

It can be contended that the paradox associated with the plurality of the parties and asymmetric power relations was nonetheless addressed through the authority of Aceh. In the MoU, the authority of Aceh has been secured for all sectors of public affairs. The administration of this authority has been in conjunction with civil and judicial administration. As highlighted, the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and freedom of religion have been excluded from the exercise of Aceh's authority. The consultation with, and consent of, Aceh have also been necessary for the entry of international agreements as related to the interests of Aceh. This principle also applies to decisions and administrative measures as undertaken by the Indonesian government.⁶⁴⁵

In essence, the agreement addressed and regulated territorial incompatibility through the mechanism of self-governance in Aceh. With the withdrawal of the governmental forces from Aceh and the decommission of GAM's weapons, several parts of the agreement began to be implemented during the fall of 2005. The violence also decreased with the entry of the agreement into force. The elections in Aceh, dated 11 December 2006, also marked a further step for the implementation of the agreement.⁶⁴⁶ With the benefits of MoU, both conflict settlement and the underlying roots of the conflict have been addressed.⁶⁴⁷ Of equal importance is that the anxieties

⁶⁴³ Morfit, "Road to Helsinki: Aceh Agreement...", p. 116.

⁶⁴⁴ Lehti, *Era of Private Peacemakers...*, pp. 22-23.; For example, women were excluded from the peace process in Aceh. See: Ahtisaari, "Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks", p. 12.

⁶⁴⁵ **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement**, Article 1 (1.1.2).

⁶⁴⁶ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Government of Indonesia - GAM", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/794> (accessed 12.05.2024).

⁶⁴⁷ Susan, *Aceh Separatism Conflict in Indonesia...*, p. 25.

related to peace negotiations and self-governance were effectively addressed and managed.

In this accord, an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was decided to be established by the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) contributing countries to monitor the implementation of the MoU.⁶⁴⁸ It was also decided that Norway and Switzerland would take part in this mission. Hence, Norway supported the implementation process, which includes tasks for disarmament and human rights.⁶⁴⁹ As a result of this, Finland, Sweden, and Norway took part in the case of Aceh with different levels of peace engagements.

AMM remained in Aceh between 15 September 2005 and 15 December 2006.⁶⁵⁰ The functioning of AMM has been important in supporting the adherence of the parties to the peace accord, and in transcending beyond process- and outcome-oriented achievements. Also, the inclusion of ASEAN countries can be seen as effective given the variety of the areas as covered in the provisions of the MoU that need to be monitored and in including the assistance of such countries with which Indonesia shares intergovernmental cooperation, land, and maritimes borders. Hence, it can be maintained that burden/responsibility sharing was also considered.

The difference of the MoU has been grounded in the consolidation of Aceh's autonomy, which was granted in the year of 2001. With the MoU, or the Helsinki peace agreement, amnesty and prison release for the GAM members were also offered. There were economic, military, and security-oriented contributions in terms of Aceh's preservation of its 70 percent of natural resources and restriction of governmental troops in the province. Also, Aceh was allowed to have its own regional flag, crest, and hymn.⁶⁵¹ With all of these contributions, this protracted conflict was ended.

In this process, CMI has played a critical role in conflict resolution. Despite the classical bilateral settings, the contributions of Finland to the case of Aceh have been marked by NGO activity. Accordingly, the inclusion of NGOs challenges traditional

⁶⁴⁸ **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement**, Article 5(1).

⁶⁴⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway to Provide Observers for the Peace Agreement for the Aceh Province in Indonesia", (Press Release), **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 16 August 2005/24 October 2006, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2005/norway_to_provide_observers_for/id258093/ (accessed 12.05.2024).

⁶⁵⁰ Ahtisaari, "Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks", p. 13.

⁶⁵¹ Terence Lee, "Political Orders and Peace-building: Ending the Aceh Conflict", **Conflict, Security & Development**, Vol. 20, No. 1: Illiberal Peacebuilding in Asia, 2020, p. 124.; For this and following provisions, see: **Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement**.

diplomacy while promoting a reflexive peace practice.⁶⁵² With the dialogue facilitation role of the Olof Palme International Center, Sweden also took a part in the Helsinki peace process. Additionally, Norway contributed to this peace process with financial and technical assistance.⁶⁵³ The assistance of Norway and Sweden can be considered as complementary with the peaceful efforts and contributions of Finland.

Drawing from such remarks, it can be contended that the contributions of Finland through the framework of a classical bilateral setting and the utilization of NGOs demonstrate detached but connected instruments of peace diplomacy. Hence, both classical and reflexive peace practices have reigned in the context of the third-party role of Finland, which demonstrated a phasing approach to peace mediation and facilitation in this particular case. Despite the main responsibility of the warring parties, *Ahtisaari* utilized such formula and techniques that resulted in the pressure upon the parties. Hence, a delicate balance between the guidance and leadership of a peace mediator and facilitator and the decisive role of the warring parties can be considered as a strength of peace diplomacy experience in the case of Aceh.

Of critical importance is that the contributions of Finland reflected its experience regarding the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute. In interviews with *Alfred Stepan*, *Nur Djuli*, as one of the negotiators from the GAM, explained that the case of the Åland Islands dispute was emphasized as a model for self-governing arrangements. Accordingly, *Djuli* expressed how *Ahtisaari* informed him about the rights and the special status of the Åland Islands. As part of Finland, the autonomous status of the Åland Islands, along with Greenland, led to curiosity and interest among GAM negotiators. Therefore, the arrangements associated with the Åland Islands were begun to be approached as a model for self-government in the case of Aceh.⁶⁵⁴ Further to this, the federacy prerogatives in the MoU were similar to the Åland Islands-Finland federacy.⁶⁵⁵

As a result, the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute provided a way of dealing with the underlying roots of the conflict in Aceh concerning the grievances about autonomy and self-government. Also, the diplomatic craftsmanship of *Ahtisaari*

⁶⁵² For the link between reflexive diplomacy praxis, including the utilization of NGOs and Aceh, see: PRIO Cyprus Center, "Sustainable Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue: Led by Costas M. Constantinou, Jan. 2007-Dec. 2008", n.d., <https://cyprus.prio.org/projects/1041> (accessed 12.05.2024).

⁶⁵³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

⁶⁵⁴ Nur Djuli, "Interviews with Alfred Stepan", Aceh, 02 and 04 November 2007.; Quoted in Stepan, "Revised Theory of Federacy...", pp. 243-245.

⁶⁵⁵ Stepan, "Revised Theory of Federacy...", pp. 244-245.

was effective in persuading the warring parties for a negotiated settlement. Taken together, it can be contended that *Ahtisaari* and CMI combined formulative and power-based approaches to peace mediation and facilitation while encouraging warring parties to find an innovative solution rather than the arrival of a relative calm for some time. In this process, the reflection of the status of the Åland Islands played an encouraging role for the determination of the parties.

In August 2006, “The Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA)” was enacted for the consolidation and legalization of the MoU. However, the implementation process also witnessed failures regarding the execution of several stipulations and the resolution of contested and outstanding issues. CMI’s “The Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project” reveals such failures while offering dialogue facilitation and the promotion of awareness and knowledge between stakeholders and signatories in the Aceh peace process. With such offerings, Aceh’s transition from the stipulations of the MoU into a broader framework for peace building and development can be supported.⁶⁵⁶

As reflecting the importance of reconciliation, the founder of “InterPeace”, as an organization for the facilitation of reconciliation, was introduced by *Ahtisaari* when the MoU was signed in Helsinki. This introduction was the affirmation of the fact that positive outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation cannot be sustainable without reconciliation. In this regard, “InterPeace” also worked in Aceh. Given the effects of past injustices and wrongdoings, it is critical for peace mediators to provide a balanced approach between the past, present, and future. *Ahtisaari* explains that there were discussions about the past. However, such discussions could not be maintained in the interest of the advancement of negotiations. Therefore, dealing with the past through national reconciliation and transitional justice is necessary for a lasting peace and the prevention of the reoccurrence of violence. Such remarks reveal why a follow-up is critical in the case of Aceh.⁶⁵⁷

Concerning the background of the differences resulting from the experiences and perspectives of the GAM elite in exile, civil society, GAM’s soldiers, and commanders, the MoU provided a minimum consensus while consisting of sufficient details. Within this framework, this accord did not provide an ultimate decision for the governance of Aceh. The implementation of the peace accord also witnessed a split

⁶⁵⁶ The Crisis Management Initiative, *Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project*, p. 7.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ahtisaari*, “Lessons of Aceh Peace Talks”, pp. 12-13.

between the GAM elite, who were empowered by the Helsinki negotiations, and local fighters, who were victorious in government elections.⁶⁵⁸ In this regard, such challenges and problems also reveal that the road to peace, as a dynamic process, requires follow-up initiatives and mechanisms.

In early 2007, “Interpeace” initiated a peacebuilding program that lasted for 18 months. This program was conducted in cooperation with the “Indonesian Peace Institute.” In August 2009, CMI also visited Indonesia with the objective of fact-finding. Following this visit, *Ahtisaari* reaffirmed the need for a follow-up initiative in Aceh. Therefore, both *Ahtisaari* and the CMI visited Indonesia to organize such a mission. The purpose has been grounded in the optimization of the implementation of the peace agreement in Aceh and the obtainment of a better understanding towards key issues. There were further meetings, which entailed the signatory parties to the MoU, the provincial government of Aceh, the provincial parliament, leaders of students, and representations of civil society. There were also exchanges between *Ahtisaari*, *Yudhoyono*, and *Kalla* through telephone conversations and international donor community meetings.⁶⁵⁹

In this regard, assistance to the sustainability of process- and outcome-oriented contributions to peace mediation and facilitation overlapped with peacebuilding in the case of Aceh. However, there were also critiques directed at this transition process. Examples include the maintenance of extortion and corruption and normalization of economic extraction, which also took place during the conflict between the GAM and Indonesian government. With the Helsinki peace agreement and the following post-conflict process, the aforesaid parties were able to protect and promote their powers grounded in intimidation. Moreover, the parties were able to combine their power with political influence.⁶⁶⁰ These problems make the task of peacebuilding more challenging in the conflict transformation phase of Aceh.

While the chances of armed conflict recurrence have decreased, ongoing issues such as extortion, favoritism, and criminal activity still persist. There are also problems related to effective authority, reintegration, and ongoing proposals for the division of southern Aceh. It is also important to stress that international law was notably absent from the peace negotiations. This has also affected the process related to the

⁶⁵⁸ Kivimäki, and Gorman, **Non-Governmental Actors in...**, p. 16.

⁶⁵⁹ The Crisis Management Initiative, **Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project**, pp. 9-10.

⁶⁶⁰ Lee, “Political Orders and Peace-building...”, p. 124.

implementation of autonomy arrangements in Aceh.⁶⁶¹ Therefore, it is critical to prevent any perils upon basic human needs, human rights, and justice while addressing and undermining the aforesaid issues and problems.

In response to the need for deeper initiatives, the follow-up efforts of CMI demonstrate the willingness for the embracement of a long-term approach to the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. In particular, the efforts to support the practices of peace mediation and facilitation with peacebuilding program reflect this willingness. In this regard, such efforts need to be continued. In light of these remarks, this Thesis considers the effects of Finland on the protracted conflict of Aceh as successful in terms of process- and outcome-oriented approaches to mediation.

Moreover, there have also been successful efforts related to the phase of conflict transformation, including the ability to address the underlying roots of the conflict, lead changes in the emotions, relations, and perceptions that stem from the warring parties, provide new avenues for conflict resolution, and support peaceful co-existence, among others. “The Follow-Up Project” led by the CMI offers hope and means in support of conflict transformation-oriented approaches as well. Hence, this project can be considered as one of conflict transformation-oriented contributions. However, the assessment of the case of Aceh regarding conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation remains to be an open question.

Section II - The case of Cyprus in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation

The Cyprus issue has been one of the critical protracted conflicts that affected various peace processes and undertakings. As reflecting one of such initiatives, the Annan Plan has marked a critical turning point in the trajectory of the Cyprus conflict and the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the island. Following a short time after the failure of this plan, PCC was established in 2005. Nonetheless, its activities predate this formal inception date.⁶⁶²

In essence, the case of Cyprus exemplifies both a protracted conflict and protracted peace initiatives/processes. Despite the deadlock of the case of Cyprus, the activities of PCC reveal how conflict transformation-oriented approaches, including reconciliation, can take place before the resolution of the conflict and its underlying

⁶⁶¹ Hannum, “Road to Autonomy in Aceh”, p. 117.

⁶⁶² For the activities of the Center as ranging from the year of 1997 to 2026, see: The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, “Projects”, <https://cyprus.prio.org/projects> (accessed 12.05.2024).

roots. Thus, the link between the Cyprus issue and the functioning of this Centre was reinforced due to the promotion of conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation from a Nordic perspective. This perspective entails the benefits of a non-elite and non-linear approach to peacemaking while allowing for the promotion of grass-root understanding.

Of equal importance is that the Nordic dimension in the case of Cyprus also entailed the contributions of the Nordic countries in terms of mediation and peacekeeping roles of the UN. These roles will also be addressed in understanding the historical background of this protracted conflict. Drawing from all of these, the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy will be crystallized through the functioning of the Centre.

a. Historical background of the conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and Nordic connection to conflict resolution in Cyprus

In this section, a brief history of the Cyprus issue will be provided with the inclusion of the following dynamics and developments: the legacy for external involvement on the island, identity and political exclusion-oriented tensions between the main large-groups, the failure of Great Britain for conflict settlement and resolution, the struggle of Turkish Cypriots to be accepted as equal citizens in the Republic of Cyprus, established in 1960, the reasons for and effects of Türkiye's intervention, and the failure of the Annan Plan, which became another protracted peace initiative. In this process, the involvement of Nordic countries for peace and conflict resolution processes will also be briefly discussed.

The history of Cyprus is shaped by the effects of foreign powers, which actually date back to the Bronze Age. As a result, there have been widespread interactions between domestic and foreign elements on the island.⁶⁶³ The island also witnessed the rule of the Ottoman Empire from the year of 1571 to 1878. With the occupation and

⁶⁶³ Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1, Spring 1980, p. 43.; For the heterogeneous historical background of Cyprus from the Stone Age to its conquest by *Richard Lion Heart*, along with its strategic importance, the following book is recommended: Sir George Francis Hill, *A History of Cyprus: Volume 1*, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1940.; This is important in understanding that Cyprus witnessed different civilizations, and rulers. As a result, there is a fragmentary and porous historical background. Importantly, the history of Cyprus is utilized to legitimate political purposes and national claims by avoiding political continuities, discontinuities and socio-cultural interactions in the island. This is reflected in the history education in Cyprus, which has been analyzed in the following comparative study: Yiannis Papadakis, *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus"*, PRIO Cyprus Centre Report: 2, Nicosia : PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2008.

administration of Great Britain, Great Britain's rule on the island commenced.⁶⁶⁴ Great Britain ruled the island as a protectorate.⁶⁶⁵ This process has generated critical outcomes for the large-group relations and the political landscape on the island.

The cessation of Cyprus by Great Britain, combined with the repercussions of the outcome of the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire⁶⁶⁶, gave momentum to *Hellenism*. In this process, hope for union with Greece, as the reflection of the *Megali Idea*, was intensified. Actually, this hope gradually developed. Following the emergence of the First World War and the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain, in particular, circumstances began to be more disturbing and suspicious for the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Not only was their maneuver to manage their affairs restricted, but they were also granted less freedom compared to the Greek Cypriots in this regard.⁶⁶⁷ As a result, the insecurities and tensions deepened while large-group relations were deteriorating on the island.

The consolidation of hopes for unification with Greece, namely *enosis*, led to various discussions and pressures, predominantly revolving around the embracement of a more liberal approach in Cyprus or self-determination. While the first approach was oriented at appeasing the Greek Cypriots, the latter actually emerged following the end of the Second World War. There were also riots that occurred from time to time. Notably, in 1931, a call for civil disobedience was made by the Orthodox Church. The efforts of Great Britain, on the other hand, were not adequate to settle the issue and address the pressures and issues that stemmed from *enosis*. Rather, its response

⁶⁶⁴ Sir George Francis Hill, **A History of Cyprus: Volume IV**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1952, p. 269.; For the Cyprus Convention that marked the consent of the Ottoman Empire for the occupation and administration of the Island of Cyprus by Great Britain, see: Hill, **A History of Cyprus: Volume IV**, pp. 300-304.; For the policy and administration of the Ottoman Empire in the island, see: Halil İnalcık, **Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus after the Conquest**, Ankara : Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1969.; For the policy and administration of Great Britain, the following sources can be recommended: Naomi Rosenbaum, "Success in Foreign Policy: The British in Cyprus, 1878-1960", **Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique**, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 1970, pp. 605-627.; Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, pp. 68-75.; With the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Türkiye recognized the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain as proclaimed the island on 05 November 1914. For the annexation of island and relevant arrangements, see: **Lausanne Peace Treaty**, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 1923, Part I, Section I, Article 20-21, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-_political-clauses.en.mfa (accessed 15.05.2022).

⁶⁶⁵ John Reddaway, **Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection**, London, Nicosia, Istanbul : K. Rustem & Bro. and Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 1986, p. 3.

⁶⁶⁶ For the reasons and effects of the Greek rebellion, influential ideologues, and different interpretations, the following book is recommended: Herkül Millas, **Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu**, Istanbul : İletisim Publishing, 1994.

⁶⁶⁷ Clement Henry Dodd, "A Historical Overview", in Clement Henry Dodd (Ed.), **Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives**, England : The Eothen Press, 1999, pp. 3-4.; For the objectives and reflections of *Megali Idea*, see: Halil İnalcık, "Helenizm, Megali İdea ve Türkiye", **Doğu Batı**, No. 31, February, March, April 2005, pp. 9-26.

further exacerbated the tensions. The end of the Second World War made it more apparent that the roots of insecurities and tensions could shift to destructive conflicts between both communities.⁶⁶⁸

As reflecting this, Cyprus has suffered from extra-state and interstate violence since 1946.⁶⁶⁹ In this process, the British Labour Government's sympathy for the self-determination of Cyprus was tried to be channeled by the Greek Cypriots towards the actualization of *enosis*. In this context, a formal request for union with Greece was made. But this offer was refused by the British Labour Government. With the influence of the Greek lobby and the defeat of communist rebels in the Greek civil war, the USA had a favoring attitude towards *enosis*. In the 1950s, Great Britain, under a conservative government, resisted demands for self-determination and *enosis*. Importantly, the campaign for these demands was pursued through violence, as carried out by the "EOKA" ("*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*", National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in the mid-1950s. This and counter-reactions escalated hostilities towards the Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁷⁰

The conflict between EOKA and Great Britain was grounded in the national liberation and state creation for EOKA and the strategic importance of the island for Great Britain.⁶⁷¹ In this context, the failure of Great Britain to respond effectively to this incompatibility and the efforts for *enosis* as pursued violently by EOKA escalated the threats to the human rights and security of the Turkish Cypriots. In the 1950s, the conditions began to shift into a state of instability on the island while relative stability began in Greece and Türkiye.⁶⁷² As a result, inter-communal hostilities between large-groups, who also had historical connections with the Greek and Turkish nations, were

⁶⁶⁸ Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, pp. 69-70.; In essence, the liberal approach demonstrated a link among economic development, prosperity, and political settlement. In this context, a permanent solution was grounded in the establishment of self-governing Cyprus under the auspices of the Commonwealth. This approach required constitutional adjustments and progression. The combination of liberal and *philhellene* approaches, on the other hand, regarded *Enosis* as the inevitable and ultimate destination. Additionally, some adherents suggested that British policy towards Cyprus should focus on the Turkish perspectives. Also, the *status quo*-oriented considerations were evident. These considerations asserted that British policies would remain unchanged. Finally, there were those who offered the reconciliation of British, Greek, and Turkish interests as prerequisite for the solution of this dispute. Reddaway, **Burdened with Cyprus: British Connection**, p. 14.

⁶⁶⁹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Cyprus", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/352> (accessed 12.05.2024).

⁶⁷⁰ Dodd, "A Historical Overview", pp. 4-5.; For the terrorist activities of the EOKA, see also: Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, pp. 71-72.

⁶⁷¹ Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, p. 275.; For brief information about the period of conflict between April 1955 and February 1959, see: Bercovitch and Fretter, **Regional Guide to International Conflict...**, pp. 239-240.

⁶⁷² Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, pp. 70-71.

intensified. Importantly, Greek Cypriots further advocated for unification with Greece as their ultimate purpose with regard to *enosis*.⁶⁷³

For this reason, the primary phases of this conflict included extra-state conflict; the guerrilla campaign of EOKA with the purpose of self-determination and union with Greece; tensions between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; and Great Britain's utilization of the Turkish Cypriot police units for the suppression of independence.⁶⁷⁴ Taken together, the initiation of the EOKA guerilla campaign was the reflection of the objective for *enosis*. In response, Turkish Cypriots began to shift in favour of "*taksim*", the partition, plan. Also, "The Turkish Resistance Organization" ("*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*") was established for self-defence and the interests of the Turkish Cypriots.⁶⁷⁵

Efforts for conflict settlement could not be effective in improving conditions and large-group relations on the island. As reflecting some of these efforts, examples include the Eden Plan, the Harding Plan, and the Radcliffe Report, formulated by Great Britain with the involvement of Greece and Türkiye to some extent. These initiatives can be seen as the reflections of "power mediation" exercised by Great Britain. The Macmillan Plan, another power mediation attempt by Great Britain, offered a bi-communal government. However, this plan also failed, and the conflict escalated into inter-communal violence. Following that, the Zurich and London Accords were enforced in concert with Greece and Türkiye.⁶⁷⁶ With the Zurich and London Accords, the imperial control of Great Britain ended, and the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960.⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷³ Suha Bolukbasi, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954 and 1996", **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1998, p. 412.

⁶⁷⁴ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Cyprus".

⁶⁷⁵ Fisher, and Keashly, "Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation...", p. 39.; For the envisagement of the *taksim* plan, see: Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, p. 73.; For the resistance of the Turkish Cypriots against *enosis* and EOKA, see: Rauf R. Denktaş, **The Cyprus Triangle**, London, Boston, Sydney : K. Rustem & Brother and George Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp. 22-24.; For a brief illustration of the issues, see also: Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, p. 277.

⁶⁷⁶ Fisher, and Keashly, "Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation...", p. 40.; For the efforts and strategies of Great Britain, along with the international aspects of the Cyprus dispute, the following sources can be recommended: James H. Wolfe, "A Historical Review of the Dispute", in Diane B. Bendahmane, and John W. McDonald, Jr. (Eds.), **Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations**, Washington, D.C. : Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1986, pp. 106-110.; Harold Macmillan, **Riding the Storm, 1956-1959**, London : Macmillan, 1971, pp. 657-701.; Rosenbaum, "Success in Foreign Policy: British...", pp. 605-627.

⁶⁷⁷ Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", p. 43.; For the commencement of the UN's involvement in the Cyprus issue, see: Bolukbasi, "Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations...", pp. 413-415.; For a detailed analysis regarding the recent history of the island that led to the establishment of

Türkiye stipulated the secure exercise of full equal partnership for the Turkish Cypriots in the government as a prerequisite for the independence of Cyprus. In this context, Great Britain, Greece, and Türkiye, as guarantor countries, assumed responsibility for the settlement and intervention when necessary. Under these circumstances, *enosis* and *taksim* were prohibited. For most Greek Cypriots, these accords were seen as imposed on them, disregarding their rights as the majority group on the island. From their perspective, the Turkish Cypriots were considered a minority group. In contrast to most Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots were generally supportive of the accords.⁶⁷⁸ This perspective towards the Turkish Cypriots has constituted one of the critical underlying roots of the conflict.

In essence, the main dynamics of this conflict can be comprehended in terms of inter-communal hostilities, which led to further antagonization, and different ideas/suggestions for the administration and power-sharing within a reunified Cyprus.⁶⁷⁹ According to Zartman, the Cyprus conflict arose in order to challenge the regime, as established through international rules and institutions that governed relations surrounding the conflict, as well as the structure of power at the time. The rules and institutions were also designed for conflict handling. However, the regime may be subject to challenges when dispute handling is not satisfactory. In this process, power, along with its distributions and relations, becomes fluid. As a result, conflicts can arise against the regime and its power structures with the efforts to re-establish them.⁶⁸⁰ The case of Cyprus exemplifies this process, where the unsatisfactory handling of problems and large-group relations by the established regime led to conflict.

The problems and deterioration in the relationship between the main large-groups persisted following the independence of Cyprus.⁶⁸¹ In this regard, the

the Republic of Cyprus and the problems in the Constitution, the following books and chapters can be recommended: Charles Foley, **Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War**, Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1964.; Christalla Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Cyprus**, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, Chapter III.; James Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know**, New York : Oxford University Press, 2011.; Pinar Erkem Gülboy, **Sömürgeci Ülke Devlete: Çok Etnikli Coğrafyalarda Ortak Yaşam**, İstanbul : Kalkedon Publications, 2015.; Rauf R. Denktaş, **The Cyprus Triangle**, London, Boston, Sydney : K. Rustem & Brother and George Allen & Unwin, 1988.; Reddaway, **Burdened with Cyprus: British Connection**, pp. 143-161.; For a political psychological account of the conflict, see also: Vamık Volkan, **Cyprus-War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict**, Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, 1979.

⁶⁷⁸ Dodd, "A Historical Overview", pp. 6-7.

⁶⁷⁹ Bolukbasi, "Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations...", p. 412.

⁶⁸⁰ Zartman, "Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment...", p. 206.

⁶⁸¹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Cyprus".

establishment of a bi-communal state brought significant political challenges and issues. In this context, the main objective of the Zurich and London Accords was undermined by the Greek Cypriot leadership. *Archbishop Makarios*, as the president of Cyprus, remained interested in the objective of *enosis*, despite the constitutional arrangements and the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibited any form of union. Of critical importance is that the Turkish Cypriots were seen as the main obstacle to *enosis* and were marginalized from the government. In 1963, violence directed at the Turkish Cypriots erupted due to efforts for *enosis*.⁶⁸² Hence, distrust and insecurity were intensified with regard to ineffective political and legal arrangements and othering policies, and violence targeted the Turkish Cypriots.

The Turkish Cypriots endured a campaign of violence with the intention aimed at forcing them to a constitutional change, which was part of the “Akritas plan.” In response to the escalating attacks and violence, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to withdraw from their positions in the government while living in enclaves for defence and security. Greek Cypriots, however, choose to interpret the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots as a deliberate abandonment of their roles. The approach of the UN, on the other hand, was inadequate in handling and settling the conflict and in addressing the illegitimacy of the government in Cyprus.⁶⁸³

Therefore, the years 1963 and 1964 marked not only the consolidation of violence but also a constitutional crisis on the island. In this process, political controversies led to the collapse of the government while the representatives from the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from their positions. In addition, they resided in enclaves due to ongoing attacks and violence.⁶⁸⁴ As a result, they faced not only direct violence but also structural violence.⁶⁸⁵

On 04 March 1964, the creation of a peacekeeping force in Cyprus was recommended with the UNSC Resolution 186. In accordance with the preservation of international peace and security, a peacekeeping force was stationed with the objective

⁶⁸² Rauf R. Denktaş, *The Cyprus Triangle*, London, Boston, Sydney : K. Rustem & Brother and George Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp. 13-16.; For the problems in the functioning of the Republic of Cyprus and constitutional crisis, see also: Bolukbasi, “Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations”, pp. 415-417.; Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus”, pp. 48-51.; Dodd, “A Historical Overview”, pp. 7-8.; Ker-Lindsay, *Cyprus Problem...*, Chapter II.

⁶⁸³ Dodd, “A Historical Overview”, pp. 7-8.; For the objectives of the Akritas Plan, including *enosis*, see: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Akritas Plan: The ‘Akritas Plan’ and the ‘Ikones’ Disclosures of 1980”, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/akritas-plan.en.mfa> (accessed: 12.03.2023).

⁶⁸⁴ Christalla Yakinthou, *Political Settlements in Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Cyprus*, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 1.

⁶⁸⁵ The characteristics of direct violence and structural violence will be touched upon in the last part of the Thesis.

to prevent the recurrence of fighting, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law, and to ensure a return to normal conditions. Further to this, in agreement with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Türkiye, and Great Britain, the appointment of a mediator by the UN Secretary-General was designated for the peaceful conflict resolution and settlement.⁶⁸⁶ As highlighted in the general dataset of this Thesis, Finnish diplomat *Sakari S. Tuomioja* was appointed as the UN mediator for the Cyprus issue.⁶⁸⁷ In March-July 1964, *Tuomioja* served as the UN mediator on Cyprus.⁶⁸⁸

Importantly, the London Conference of 1964 and the Acheson Plan initiated by the USA, as power mediation-oriented interventions, failed. Hence, third-party involvement shifted from power mediation to pure mediation by the UN.⁶⁸⁹ With the constitutional crisis in the island, the UN's involvement revolved around the introduction of its peacekeeping force and mediation.⁶⁹⁰ As highlighted, *Tuomioja* was appointed for the mediation role of the UN.

The Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye informed the UN mediator *Tuomioja* that federation is the only acceptable solution for this issue. The division of the island between two communities and the compulsory population exchange were also recommended with the affirmation of the status of Turkish Cypriots as a separate community by Türkiye. However, the proposal for federation was rejected by *Makarios*, who approached the Turkish Cypriots as a minority group on the island. Thus, the situation was an impasse.⁶⁹¹ In response to this, it was hoped that *Tuomioja* could play a guiding role through his diplomatic competences.

Accordingly, the background of Finnish diplomat was described as extraordinary given his experiences, which were accompanied by his negotiation and

⁶⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 186 (1964)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its **1102nd Meeting**], of 4 March 1964, Article 4-5, Article 7.; For more information about the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which supervises ceasefire lines and a buffer zone while undertaking humanitarian roles and assisting the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, see: United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNFICYP Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus", n.d., <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unficy> (accessed 04.04.2024).

⁶⁸⁷ In a Press Release BI0/263/Rev.1 of UN, dated 25 March 1964, it was announced that *Sakari Severi Tuomioja*, who was Finland's Ambassador to Sweden since 1961, was appointed as UN mediator in Cyprus. See: United Nations Press Services, "Sakari Severi Tuomioja Appointed United Nations Mediator in Cyprus".

⁶⁸⁸ The Office of the Historian, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey: Persons", **Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State**, n.d., <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/persons> (accessed 17.05.2023).

⁶⁸⁹ Fisher, and Keashly, "Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation...", p. 40.

⁶⁹⁰ Richmond, **Mediating in Cyprus: Cypriot Communities...**, p. 87.

⁶⁹¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "35. Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State", Nicosia, 22 April 1964, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d35> (accessed 17.05.2023).

arbitration skills. Having in mind his relevant experiences and skills, *Tuomioja* was also selected by *Dag Hammarskjöld*, who was the predecessor of *U Thant*, for Laos missions in late 1959 and early 1961.⁶⁹² In connection with his arbitration skills, it was hoped that he would be successful in bringing a calm atmosphere to Cyprus. However, he could not start a new round of talks in the capitals of Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye. He died in September 1964, following a couple of months of his appointment.⁶⁹³

In addition to this disrupted attempt for mediation, the Nordic countries made contributions for the UN's peace mission. As reflecting this, Finland has been one of the first troops that contributed to the UN peacekeeping in Cyprus. The full contingent of Finland was kept until the year of 1977.⁶⁹⁴ Importantly, Norway still contributes to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with its military personnel. Peacekeeping personnel of Norway currently concentrate in the Middle East, Mali, and South Sudan. Also, Major General *Kristin Lund* was the first woman appointed as Force Commander of UNFICYP in 2014, which can be linked to the priority of Norway oriented at increasing the participation of women personnel in peacekeeping operations. *Anniken Huitfeldt*, as former Minister of Foreign Affairs, explains Norway's contribution to the UN peacekeeping by referencing their support for multilateral cooperation, which is especially important in times of increased international tension and instability.⁶⁹⁵

⁶⁹² The New York Times Archives, "Man in the News; Mediator for Cyprus; Sakari Severi Tuomioja", 26 March 1964, p. 5, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/26/archives/man-in-the-news-mediator-for-cyprus-sakari-severi-tuomioja.html> (accessed 17.05.2023).

⁶⁹³ The New York Times Archives, "Sakari Tuomioja, U.N. Mediator in Cyprus Dispute, Dead at 53; Finnish Envoy Also Served as 'Presence' in Laos-Was Banking Expert", 10 September 1964, p. 35, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/10/archives/sakari-tuomioja-un-mediator-in-cyprus-dispute-dead-at-53-finnish.html> (accessed 15.04.2023).; Following his death, *Galo Plaza Lasso* was appointed as the UN mediator in Cyprus. But he resigned in 1965 due to the disagreement of the Greek government with his submitted report concerning the resolution of the Cyprus issue at the time. In this report, it is explained that the Greek control over the whole country was a mistake. In the government affairs, a greater participation and role for the Turks should be granted. It was also recommended that the presence of the Turks in their area should be promoted. These recommendations have been considered critical upon the fears and perceptions of the Turkish Cypriots. *Galo Plaza Lasso*, "Interview with President Galo Plaza", By Diego Cordovez, **Yale-UN Oral History Project on the United Nations**, ST/DPI/Oral History(02)/P5, New York : United Nations, 28 March 1984, pp. 5-6, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/492251?v=pdf> (accessed 21.04.2022).

⁶⁹⁴ Erkki Tuomioja, "Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja's Address at the Sakari Tuomioja Seminar", Speech at Little Parliament, Helsinki, 10 September 2014, https://um.fi/speeches/-/asset_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/ulkoministeri-tuomiojan-puhe-sakari-tuomioja-seminaarissa-helsingissa/35732 (accessed 15.05.2023).

⁶⁹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Government of Norway, **United Nations Marks 75 Years of Peacekeeping**, 29 May 2023, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/united-nations-marks-75-years-of-peacekeeping/id2979762/> (accessed 12.04.2023).; It is also important to note that none of the Nordic countries have been listed within the top ten military contributors to the UNFICYP as of August 2024. Finland has been fifth

With this in mind, it is important to stress that Denmark, Finland, and Sweden informed *U Thant*, as Secretary-General at the time, that they would withdraw their forces from UNFICYP as of 26 June 1966 unless significant progress was made for the resolution of the Cyprus issue within the coming months.⁶⁹⁶ This statement reveals the Nordic grouping within the UN and their bargaining efforts related to their contributions for UN peacekeeping in the context of the Cyprus issue. Accordingly, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden decided to deploy new troops to the UN peacekeeping force, whose mandate would end on 26 June 1966.⁶⁹⁷ Hence, the Nordic peacekeeping played a complementary role with the stabilization efforts of the UN.

Despite these efforts, ethnic clashes on the island intensified. Also, there was an attempt for the removal of the Greek Cypriot government and the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. The military regime of Greece at the time engineered a *coup d'état* to carry out this.⁶⁹⁸ *Nicos Sampson*, as a former EOKA gunman and *enosis* adherent, took over the Cypriot administration backed by the Greek military. As a result, the declaration of *enosis* was seen as inevitable.⁶⁹⁹ Therefore, Türkiye deployed its troops in order to prevent the actualization of *enosis*.⁷⁰⁰

country among top ten police contributors to the UNFICYP as of August 2024. See: United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNFICYP Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus", n.d.

⁶⁹⁶ Turkish Diplomatic Archives, "Kıbrıs Barış Gücü İskandinav Birlikleri ile ilgili Açıklama", ("Statement on the Scandinavian Forces in Cyprus Peace Force") in **Mart 1966'da Türkiye'nin Dış İlişkileri ve Başlıca Milletlerarası Olaylar Kronolojisi** ("Turkey's Foreign Relations and Major International Events Chronology in March 1966"), 27 March 1966, p. 57, <https://diad.mfa.gov.tr/diad/belleteni/1966-sayi-16-27.pdf> (accessed 12.04.2023).; Also, it should be noted that Sweden's response to the UN's first request for the deployment of its troops to Cyprus island was marked by political concerns, hesitancy, and refusal. This was changed following the great power/UN pressures. Jakobsen, **Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations...**, p. 25.

⁶⁹⁷ Turkish Diplomatic Archives, "İskandinavya Memleketlerinin Kıbrıs Barış Gücü ile ilgili Kararları" ("Decisions of the Scandinavian Countries on the Cyprus Peace Force"), in **Nisan 1966'da Türkiye'nin Dış İlişkileri ve Başlıca Milletlerarası Olaylar Kronolojisi** ("Turkey's Foreign Relations and Major International Events Chronology in April 1966"), 26 April 1966, p. 68, <https://diad.mfa.gov.tr/diad/belleteni/1966-sayi-16-27.pdf> (accessed 12.04.2023).; With the UNSC Resolution 222, the stationing of the UN peacekeeping force was decided to be extended for a period of six months. See: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 222 (1966)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1286th Meeting], of 16 June 1966, S/RES/222 (1966), 16 June 1966, Article 3, p. 3, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/90499?v=pdf> (accessed 12.04.2023).

⁶⁹⁸ Ahmet Sözen, "A Model of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: From the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements to the Annan Plan", **Turkish Studies**, Vol. 5, No. 1: Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente, 2004, p. 62.; For the Greek military coup in the island, see: Denktas, **The Cyprus Triangle**, pp. 64-67.; Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem...**, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁹⁹ Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem...**, p. 42.

⁷⁰⁰ Sözen, "Model of Power-Sharing in Cyprus...", p. 62.; Prior to its intervention, Türkiye consulted with Great Britain for a joint intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. After the decline of Great Britain, Turkey decided to intervene, as the declaration of *enosis* was highly anticipated. For Türkiye's intervention, international responses, and the collapse of the military junta in Athens, see: Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem...**, pp. 42-43.

Türkiye established its control over a third of the island. Following the phase of interstate conflict, the island was divided between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, who control the northern and southern areas of the island, respectively. Of critical importance is that a buffer zone controlled by the UN, as the “Green Line”, was also established. In 1983, the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was declared, and it is still not recognized except by Türkiye.⁷⁰¹ This situation restricts the national capacities and rights of the Turkish Cypriots and reinforces asymmetrical interactions between the main warring parties, which have been one of the prominent reasons for the emergence of this conflict and the struggle of the Turkish Cypriots.

As expected, the intervention of Türkiye has been subject to different explanations between Türkiye and Greece. According to Türkiye, the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots from the Parliament and judges through intimidation or prevention by force; the ignorance of the Constitution by the Greek Cypriots; the failing of the UN peacekeeping force; the forced withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves; the civilian massacres of 1963, 1964, as well as of 1967 and 1974; the overthrowing of *Makarios* as replaced by *Sampson*; the appeal of the Turkish Cypriots and even of the Greek Cypriots for help led to the intervention of Türkiye as a Guarantor Power in relation to its rights and obligations obtained from the Treaty of Guarantee.⁷⁰² These justifications also reflect the underlying/added roots of the conflict and the inadequate role of the UN.

According to Greece, the constitutional problems, alignment of the Turkish Cypriot leadership with the objectives of Türkiye, interpreted as secessionist, threats, and military intervention of Türkiye characterized the Cyprus issue following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Despite various justifications, the military intervention is considered an invasion that violently terminated intercommunal talks. It is contended that the coup against President *Makarios* was used as a pretext by Türkiye. Also, the second operation of Türkiye has been interpreted as the addition of

⁷⁰¹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Cyprus”.; With that being said, the division of the island dates back to the years of 1963 and 1964, when the Turkish Cypriots were forced to live in enclaves and create an elected authority for self-government following the unilateral collapse of the 1960 constitution. See: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, “Cyprus: The Cyprus Issue (Overview)”, n.d., <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue-overview.en.mfa> (accessed 15.05.2023).

⁷⁰² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, “The Cyprus Issue (Overview)”, n.d., <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue-overview.en.mfa> (accessed 07.05.2023).

further issues, which could not be resolved, in the island.⁷⁰³ Because of different explanations⁷⁰⁴, reaching a common framework related to the reasons and trajectory of the conflict has become more challenging. This has also affected large-group relations.

Nevertheless, Türkiye's intervention prevented the Greek junta plans for union between Cyprus and Greece.⁷⁰⁵ In this process, the UN demanded a ceasefire, an immediate end to the foreign military intervention on the island, the initiation of negotiations between Greece, Türkiye, and Great Britain, and cooperation with UNFICYP through Resolution 353.⁷⁰⁶ However, the Geneva negotiations proved unsuccessful, and the second round of fighting was resumed.⁷⁰⁷

Following that, there were numerous talks, discussions, and meetings that could not be effective for the resolution of this conflict. Of critical importance is that the UN's approach was not only inadequate but also contradictory and problematic, misjudging the underlying roots of this conflict. This was particularly reflected in the thirty-seventh session of the UN General Assembly on 13 May 1983. As emphasized, the declaration of the independence of TRNC was not recognized by the international community, except Türkiye. There were concomitant discussions and disagreements regarding the exercise of self-determination. Combined, the talks could not address the incompatibilities.⁷⁰⁸ Importantly, the non-recognition of TRNC serves as another

⁷⁰³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, "The Cyprus Issue after the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus", n.d., <https://www.mfa.gr/en/foreign-policy/foreign-policy-issues/the-cyprus-issue/the-cyprus-issue-after-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus/> (accessed 09.11.2024).

⁷⁰⁴ Christalla Yakinthou explains that framing the events of 1974 as an invasion or as a peace operation negates the historical narratives of the both large-groups in the island. However, the narrative of the Greek Cypriots was embraced by the international community and international law. See: Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies**, pp. 8-9.

⁷⁰⁵ Bolukbasi, "Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations...", p. 412.

⁷⁰⁶ United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 353 (1974)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1781st Meeting], of 20 July 1974, S/RES/353(1974), 20 July 1974, Article 2-6, p. 7, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93470?v=pdf> (accessed 09.11.2023).

⁷⁰⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, "Tripartite Conference & Geneva Declaration", n.d., <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/tripartite-conference-geneva-declaration> (accessed 09.11.2023).; With the second operation of Türkiye, UN recorded its formal disapproval against the unilateral military actions with concern for the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. In accordance with the previous UNSC resolutions, the withdrawal of military forces, and the resumption of negotiations were urged. See: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 360 (1974)** / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1794th Meeting], of 16 August 1974, S/RES/360(1974), 16 August 1974, Article 1-3, p. 9, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93476?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 09.11.2023).

⁷⁰⁸ Bolukbasi, "Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations...", pp. 420-425.; For the aforesaid session of the UN General Assembly that links the solution of the Cyprus problem with the withdrawal of occupation forces, see: United Nations General Assembly, "37/253. Question of Cyprus", in **Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its 37th Session, 21 September-21 December 1982 and 10-13 May 1983 - A/37/51**, Adopted at the 121st Plenary Meeting, A/RES/37/253, 13 May 1983, Article 7, p. 49, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112447?v=pdf> (accessed 12.03.2024).

example regarding the deprivation of human needs, alongside the injustices. That is why the situation in Cyprus has been described as a negative peace.⁷⁰⁹ Good offices of the UN were hindered by the incompatibility between the positions of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Repeated deadlocks occurred over the proposals of a unified state or two separate federated states.⁷¹⁰

Against the backdrop of this deadlock, approaching the Greek Cypriot administration (GCA) as the legitimate and sole representative actor plays a justificatory role for its past offenses and human rights violations. This also solidifies the distinction and distrust between main large-groups with regard to the absence of recognition towards the TRNC. As a result, conflict resolution and conflict transformation efforts have become more challenging.⁷¹¹ At present, the island of Cyprus remains divided, with the TRNC not being recognized by the international community except by Türkiye. The case of Cyprus still awaits a definitive outcome regarding its structure, institutions, and forms of government, let alone conflict resolution and transformation, including the transcendence of negative peace and the promotion of positive peace and reconciliation.

In response to this deep-rooted conflict, *The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, referred to as the Annan Plan, provided another peace attempt in terms of reunification of the island. In this plan, a bi-zonal partnership with the federal government consisting of the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State, as equal in status, was designated. With this in mind, it was also determined that the United Cyprus Republic would join the EU as of 01 May 2004. However, the outcome of this plan generated a whole new set of challenges instead of effectively tackling the deepening roots of this conflict.⁷¹² Thus, another protracted peace initiative was exemplified by the failure of the Annan Plan.

⁷⁰⁹ Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies**, p. 1.

⁷¹⁰ Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus", p. 98.; For the UN negotiations, see: Dodd, "A Historical Overview", pp. 11-13.

⁷¹¹ The obstructing impacts of the non-recognition of the TRNC on the resolution and settlement of the Cyprus conflict, along with the approaches of the UN and EU, are addressed in this article: George Kyris, "Sovereignty and Engagement Without Recognition: Explaining the Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cyprus", **Ethnopolitics**, Vol. 17, No. 4: Engagement without Recognition: The Politics of International Interaction with de facto States, 2018, pp. 426-442.

⁷¹² United Nations Peacemaker, **The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem**, 31 March 2004, <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/8801> (accessed 21.11.2023).; For the development of the Annan Plan, see: Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies**, Chapter IV.; For the emergence of the final version and proposals of the Annan Plan, along with the reasons for opposition of the Greek Cypriots, see: Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem**, pp. 63-71.; For the designation of the federal state in the Annan Plan, in particular, see: Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies**, pp. 75-77.

The Cyprus peace plan as offered by the former UN Secretary-General *Kofi Annan* was actually welcomed by *Jan Petersen*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, at 2004. In a press release, dated 02 April 2004, *Petersen* explained that “*Norway has been following the situation for a long time, and has supported the peace process through various reconciliation projects in Cyprus*”.⁷¹³ Hence, reconciliation, as a complementary mechanism, has been important to address and challenge the barriers towards peace and conflict resolution amidst challenges and failures.

Prior to this, Norway also supported peace and reconciliation efforts directed to the Cyprus issue under the auspices of the UN.⁷¹⁴ As reflecting both governmental and multilateral support provided by another Nordic country, Diplomat *Ingemar Lindahl* was appointed as Sweden’s Special Representative on Cyprus issues. *Lindahl* assisted the negotiations as conducted for the solution of the Cyprus issue within the framework of the UN. As of 27 November 2003, he was appointed as Sweden’s envoy in Nicosia, Cyprus.⁷¹⁵ In addition, Danish diplomat *Michael Moller* was Special Representative for Cyprus between January 2006 and March 2008.⁷¹⁶ In this regard, these Nordic practitioners were involved in the processes of peace and conflict resolution.

However, this protracted conflict could not be resolved through these efforts, including the role of the Nordic practitioners, as well as the formulation of the Annan Plan, which was the first opportunity since the partition of the island regarding direct impact of the decisions of the citizens upon the trajectory of the conflict. Nonetheless, this plan was approved by the majority of the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the majority of the Greek Cypriots in the referendums as held separately.⁷¹⁷ Importantly,

⁷¹³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Foreign Minister Petersen Welcomes Cyprus Peace Plan”, No.: 33/04, **Historical Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 02 April 2004, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2004/foreign_minister_petersen_welcomes/id253758/ (accessed 15.05.2023).

⁷¹⁴ Thorbjørn Jagland, “Statement by Mr. Thorbjørn Jagland at the United Nations General Assembly”, Speech/Statement at United Nations General Assembly, New York, 14 September 2000, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2000/statement_by_mr-thorbjorn_jagland/id264204/ (accessed 12.01.2024).

⁷¹⁵ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “New Ambassador for Cyprus”, (Press Release), 27 November 2003, <https://www.government.se/information-material/2006/12/press-releases-2002-2006/> (accessed 15.05.2023).

⁷¹⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, “Leadership”, <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/leadership> (accessed 12.01.2024).

⁷¹⁷ Susan Sachs, “Greek Cypriots Reject a U.N. Peace Plan”, **The New York Times**, 25 April 2004, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/world/greek-cypriots-reject-a-un-peace-plan.html> (accessed 15.05.2023).; Following the failure of the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot Administration was accepted

this process also coincided with the informative activities and formal establishment of PCC, which functions as a means of conflict transformation through its dialogue facilitation role for the Cyprus issue.

Importantly, the EU has also become a relevant actor for the Cyprus issue, especially following the accession of the GCA.⁷¹⁸ This reaffirms how foreign/outsider involvement has played a critical role in the case of Cyprus.⁷¹⁹ As reflecting this, Finland aimed to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus issue through the channel of the EU. During the EU Presidency of Finland, for example, Finland had an inclination to contribute to this issue through pragmatic means. In this context, Finland chose to connect the tracks of EU and UN to a small degree. The purpose was directed at the exploration of means upon which the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, and Türkiye would agree. The improvement of trade possibilities between the parties was also recommended. This Finnish proposal has been referred to as important for initial steps and confidence-building techniques. In addition, the importance of the improvement of economic benefits was demonstrated by the Nordic countries.⁷²⁰

However, these efforts could not generate positive outcomes for the resolution of this issue. Drawing from all of these, the peaceful efforts of the Nordic countries reaffirm Nordic multilateralism in terms of their assistance to the UN, the utilization of the channel of the EU, and the connection of the EU and the UN tracks, albeit inadequately. Also, a liberal understanding has been reflected in terms of the link between peace and trade. But these efforts and understanding could not bring a just and sustainable peace while leading to protracted peace processes.

There were also concurrent consultations and efforts to contribute to Türkiye's accession process to the EU. Furthermore, efforts were made to improve the conditions

as an EU member despite the partition of the island; the authority of the TRNC; 1959-1960 treaties about Cyprus; international law, and the absence of conflict settlement. See: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Türkiye, "Cyprus: The Cyprus Issue (Overview)."; That is why EU membership has deepened the asymmetrical relations between the main large-groups in the island.

⁷¹⁸ With that being said, the offering of the EU membership was served as an encouraging and incentivizing factor, grounded in the belief that the EU could play a supportive role for conflict settlement. Thus, it is emphasized that there was a link between the offering of EU membership, and the commencement of peace process in 2002. See: Ker-Lindsay, **The Cyprus Problem**, p. 73.; EU membership was also used for the development of elite level cooperation between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. See: Yakinthou, **Political Settlements in Divided Societies**, p. 32.; For this reason, the relevance of the EU can be traced back to the failure of the Annan Plan. For the role of EU in this conflict with regard to pre- and post-accession periods, see: Christalla Yakinthou, "The EU's Role in the Cyprus Conflict: System Failure or Structural Metamorphosis?", **Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics**, Vol, 8, No. 3-4: EU Conflict Management, 2009, pp. 307-323.

⁷¹⁹ Rothman, "Conflict Research and Resolution: Cyprus", p. 98.

⁷²⁰ Erkki Tuomioja, "Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja's Address at the Sakari Tuomioja Seminar".

surrounding both communities in Cyprus. Nevertheless, an agreement could not be reached under the Finnish Presidency. It is particularly emphasized that the purpose was not oriented at resolving the Cyprus issue. But still, indirect implications were also considered to be encouraging for the efforts of the UN, which Finland has also supported.⁷²¹ Hence, there has been direct, but mainly indirect, assistance for the Cyprus issue at formal and informal levels. The formal levels have particularly been marked by the contributions of Nordic countries to the peaceful undertakings of the UN and EU. However, these efforts were neither successful nor effective.

In a seminar, which was organized in collaboration between the Nordic countries and PCC with the attendance of chief negotiators from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on 6-7 March of 2014, the long ties of Finland with the Cyprus dispute have been demonstrated. Following the critical turning point in the relationship between two population groups in 1963, *Tuomioja* was the first UN Special Representative in the region. Also, Finland contributed to the UN peacekeeping force on the island with the service of over 10,000 Finns in the UNFICYP between 1964-2005. In this connection, *Anu Saarela*, as Ambassador of Finland to Cyprus between 2012-2016, explained that Finland and other Nordic countries support reunification negotiations in relation to the joint declaration concerning the recommencement of negotiations by the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities dated February 2014.⁷²²

Hence, Nordic countries also supported reunification negotiations. But these efforts marked another protracted peace process. Nonetheless, peace and conflict resolution efforts also entailed a Nordic dimension to some extent in the case of Cyprus, albeit inadequately and primarily indirectly. This was evident in the peacekeeping and mediation efforts of the UN and assistance through the utilization of the EU channel.

⁷²¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Turkey-Cyprus Issue after Tampere Discussions on November 27", (Press Release), 490/2006, 27 November 2006, https://finlandabroad.fi/web/qat/foreign-ministry-s-press-releases/-/asset_publisher/kyaK4Ry9kbQ0/content/ulkoministeri-tuomioja-turkki-kypros-kysymyksesta-ei-paasty-sopuun/35732 (accessed 15.05.2024).

⁷²² Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "The Nordic Countries Support the Cyprus Reunification Negotiations", 11 March 2014, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/pohjoismaat-tukevat-kyproksen-jalleenyhdistymisneuvotteluita (accessed 12.06.2023).; For information about Diplomat *Anu Saarela*, see: Finland Abroad, https://finlandabroad.fi/documents/20152/121561/bio_anu_saarela_2024_1001563_270287_cv_en.pdf/d8077fe4-589f-e593-73cf-aa0523cbc573?version=1.0&t=1732271240001 (accessed 12.06.2024).

As highlighted in *Table 2.3* regarding the peaceful attempts of the Nordic countries in the context of peace and conflict resolution during the post-Cold War period, Norwegian diplomat *Espen Barth Eide* was the UN Special Adviser on Cyprus between the years of 2014 and 2017. *Eide* chaired the negotiations for the reunification of the island between the leaders of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Greek Cypriots.⁷²³ But the negotiations also failed.

With the failure of these efforts, the parties embraced such policies that further reinforced divisions.⁷²⁴ Taken together, the disappointment and frustration, along with the increased competition in the region, have made opportunities for effective peace talks and negotiations more elusive. This elusiveness is deepened with the isolation on the TRNC and pressures of the GCA.⁷²⁵ Despite the failures of peaceful efforts and talks, the example of PCC can be important in understanding how the absence of conflict resolution cannot be indicative of the absence of avenues for conflict transformation and reconciliation. With this in mind, more efforts and initiatives are still required, with a focus on the underlying roots of the conflict and the isolation of TRNC by international society. Because conflict transformation and reconciliation cannot be actualized without effective undertakings of the latter. Also, academic knowledge and information related to the avenues of discussions for peace plans and solutions should focus on criticisms towards the reunification plan. This was exemplified by the interpretation of Dr. *Christian Heinze* as well.

b. The role of PRIO Cyprus Centre: An exemplary of dialogue facilitation

PCC aims to provide conflict transformation-oriented contributions through its dialogue facilitation role. This role has been materialized with its numerous activities. In the following table, the completed activities, as limited with the project of the Centre, will be explained. These activities have been selected in relation to the availability of information obtained from PCC; direct/indirect implications of dialogue

⁷²³ Cyprus Mail, “The Players: Espen Barth Eide 1964-”, n.d., <https://cyprus-mail.com/divided-island/the-players/espen-barth-eide> (accessed 15.05.2024).; With that being said, Dr. *Christian Heinze* contends that the reunification plan, as alternative to separation, neglects the historical background of the conflict in which there was not an established unity after the year of 1960 in the island. It is also contended that this plan can rather be approached as a predicament due to the involvement of unacceptable conditions not only by the TRNC but also by the other party. For such remarks grounded in the interpretation of the statements by *Espen Barth Eide*, see: CyprusScene, “What is Espen Barth Eide Saying on the Cyprus Issue? By Christian Heinze”, 09 April 2015, <https://cyprusscene.com/2015/04/09/what-is-espen-barth-eide-saying-on-the-cyprus-issue-by-christian-heinze/> (accessed 15.05.2024).; Hence, there have been different ideas not only for the emergence and roots of the conflict but also for peace plans.

⁷²⁴ International Crisis Group, *An Island Divided: Next Steps for Troubled Cyprus*, Europe Report N°268, 17 April 2023, p. 1.

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

facilitation, and the initiation date of the projects following the rejection of the Annan Plan. The uncompleted projects are left out from this Table.

In essence, dialogue facilitation activities of the Centre predate the formal inception of PCC.⁷²⁶ The Centre was formally established in the year of 2005, but the presence of PRIO in the island dates back to the late 1990s. In this process, a “Dialogue Forum” was created with the participation of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. This forum was transformed into a four-party dialogue with the participation of Türkiye and Greece. The purpose was to highlight the main aspects of the Cyprus issue with the benefits of dialogue, discussions, and inclusive meetings.⁷²⁷

Also, it is important to note that the Centre initiated an “Information Project” as part of the “Peace and Reconciliation in the Eastern Mediterranean Project”, dated January 1997 and May 2011. In relation to the Information Project, the purpose of the Centre was oriented at offering clear and neutral understanding about the Annan Plan while encouraging an informed and objective debate.⁷²⁸ This Information Project served as a turning point in PRIO’s involvement in the relationship between dialogue facilitation, information dissemination, and conflict transformation in Cyprus.

With this in mind, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, who participated in the Dialogue Forum, contacted PRIO in order to obtain assistance for the initiation of an Information Campaign that transcends elite-level peacemaking and a campaign grounded in “yes or no” voting. Following the approval of PRIO, the comprehensive Annan Plan was summarized in a neutral and understandable manner with English, Greek, and Turkish translations. The reason is that the concessions, strengths, weaknesses, and points of consensus associated with the Annan Plan needed to be clarified due to different and inaccurate interpretations/perceptions fueled by the politicians as well.⁷²⁹

This purpose still underpins the functioning of the Centre. Accordingly, the Centre prioritizes dissemination of information and research in a language that is

⁷²⁶ For example, “Human Rights and Peace in Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean Project”, entailed efforts in terms of the establishment of bicomunal contacts and cooperation; assistance for the settlement of the Cyprus issue; dialogue facilitation between two large-groups in the island; promotion of confidence-building measures, and assistance to the Centre for Research of Societal Problems (TOSAM) in Ankara. See: PRIO Cyprus Centre, “Human Rights and Peace in Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean, January 1997-May 2011”, <https://cyprus.prio.org/projects/1004> (accessed 15.05.2024).

⁷²⁷ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

⁷²⁸ PRIO Cyprus Centre, “Peace and Reconciliation in the Eastern Mediterranean, January 1997-May 2011”, <https://cyprus.prio.org/projects/1005> (accessed 15.05.2024).

⁷²⁹ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

understandable and presented in English, Greek, and Turkish.⁷³⁰ Hence, the Centre supports its dialogue facilitation activities through social and multilingual approaches for the case of Cyprus. The utilization of such approaches can be important in protracted conflicts, accompanied by polarization, poor communication, prejudice, and the involvement of external actors whose relations have also been marked by challenges and historical animosities.⁷³¹

Despite the outcome of the Annan Plan referendums, the achievements of the Information Project were recognized at the level of international society. *Mete Hatay* explains that the successfulness of the project was especially evident in the voting behaviour of the TRNC. Nonetheless, the following period after referendums was rather characterized by dissolution and polarization. In this context, PRIO decided to transform its office into a center on the island with the purpose of functioning as a research center on the Cyprus issue and on the problems related to unawareness, misunderstanding, and misinformation, as observed during the referendums, while conveying knowledge to people through dialogue. What makes PRIO's engagement interesting was the disengagement of the international society and the promotion of exit strategy at the time. In contrast to this tendency, PRIO decided to engage with the Cyprus issue, which has rather become a tangle of problems.⁷³²

Thus, the dialogue facilitation role of the PRIO has been undertaken with the efforts oriented at promoting awareness, understanding, and information directed to large-group identities on the island and relevant actors/stakeholders. Given the completed projects of the Centre, as elaborated by the author of this Thesis in the following table, dialogue facilitation role provided contributions not only for process-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation but also for conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

Despite limited contributions related to outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches, PCC has played an important role in increasing awareness, knowledge, and understanding directed to the underlying roots of the Cyprus issue, peace plans, and reconciliation while ameliorating large-group relations. Hence, the link between the functioning of PCC and the case of Cyprus reveals how there is

⁷³⁰ The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, "About the PRIO Cyprus Centre", n.d. <https://cyprus.prio.org/about> (accessed 15.05.2024).

⁷³¹ For example, see: Erol Kurubaş, "Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Psikopolitiği ve Sorunların Çözümü Üzerine Düşünceler", in İdris Bal (Ed.), **21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası**, İstanbul : Alfa Publishing, November 2001, pp. 243-262.

⁷³² Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

always a space for conflict transformation-oriented approaches despite the absence of eventual conflict resolution. The following table denotes the completed projects of the Centre in relation to its dialogue facilitation role.

Table 2.4: The completed projects of the PRIO Cyprus Centre with regard to dialogue facilitation.⁷³³

Project Date	Project Name	The Purposes and Tasks
Jan. 2005- Dec. 2015	The Property Issue in the Cyprus Conflict	Contribution to a common understanding about the property issue as one of the critical and contentious aspects of the Cyprus issue and facilitation for an informed public debate.
Jan. 2005- Dec. 2012	Intercultural Dialogue	In response to the declaration of 2001 as the Year of “Dialogue Among Civilisations” by UN, organization of lecture series as capable of revealing the opportunities and challenges for intercultural dialogue.
Jan. 2006- Dec. 2009	Settlers and Immigrants in Cyprus	Contribution to an informed debate about the issues and threat perceptions regarding the settlement of the Turkish citizens in northern Cyprus.
Jan. 2006- Dec. 2006	Reconciliation in Cyprus	Delineation of views of two large-groups on the island regarding the avenues and challenges for reconciliation; the presentation and discussion of interviews; and dissemination of the results; purpose oriented at playing a guiding role for the effective addressing of the issues of reconciliation in Cyprus.
Sep. 2006- Dec. 2012	Minorities and Hybridites	Examination of the effects of Cyprus bicomunalism; comprehensive understanding of

⁷³³ The information in this table has been collected and compiled through the listed projects that stemmed from the Centre. For all these projects that have been classified from the year of 1997 to the year of 2026, see: The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, “Projects”.; It is important to emphasize that the Centre does not have a particular position that favours one peace plan or solution over another. Rather, its purpose is oriented at reflecting different ideas as accurately and effectively. *Mete Hatay* states that their only bias is their wish for a peaceful future on the island, which is grounded in the decisions and free will of the people. Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

		the effects of dominant ethnic identities upon large-groups other than the Greek and Turkish.
Jan. 2006- Dec. 2009	Human Rights in Conflict: The Role of Civil Society (SHUR)	Analysis of the effects of civil society upon ethno-political conflicts with the prioritization of human rights; identification of means as capable of improving the activities of civil society and the EU.
Jan. 2007- Dec. 2010	The Media in the Cyprus Conflict	Analysis of the approaches of media for the Cyprus issue; understanding the interactions between media and society; the influence of media upon the perceptions of society with regard to the Cyprus issue. ⁷³⁴
Jan. 2007- Dec. 2008	Sustainable Diplomacy and Intercultural Dialogue	Awareness for mediatory actions as capable of promoting cooperation and prolonging the durability of diplomatic encounters, along with the peaceful efforts; the transcendence of positive effects of sustainable diplomacy beyond interstate relations; the encouragement of non-traditional diplomatic means, including mediation of estrangement, peacebuilding, and justice; the inclusion of both domestic/external and self/other dichotomies into diplomatic practices.
Jan. 2007- Dec. 2008	Intra-island Trade in Cyprus	The identification of psychological barriers as obstructing trade cooperation; recommendations such as the improvement of information dissemination, reconciliation, forgiveness, and reconsideration of historical narratives as trust-building mechanisms in order to overcome these barriers. ⁷³⁵
Mar. 2008- Dec. 2011	Cultural Heritage and the Reconstruction of	Understanding the effects of cultural heritage upon national and regional identities; exploration of the

⁷³⁴ See: Christophoros Christophorou, Sanem Şahin, and Synthia Pavlou, **Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem**, (PRIO Report 01/2010), Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2010.

⁷³⁵ See: Mete Hatay, Fiona Mullen, and Julia Kalimeri, **Intra-Island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, oppositions and psychological barriers**, (PCC Paper 2/2008), Oslo : PRIO, 2008.

	Identities after Conflict (CRIC)	means for reconstruction and destruction of cultural heritage and identity-oriented implications.
Jan. 2011- Dec. 2012	Internal Displacement	In response to the problems regarding the return of displaced human beings and their property-related rights due to conflict in Cyprus, the promotion of dialogue and debate as informed and constructive at the level of inter-community; mutual understanding; addressing the need for effective information and documentation, and dialogue facilitation. ⁷³⁶
Jan. 2011- Dec. 2011	Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 in Cyprus	The implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in the national and regional contexts; collaboration with the Gender Advisory Team (GAT).
Jan. 2012- Jan. 2015	Gender Rights and Peacebuilding	Activities associated with the UNSCR 1325; assistance to the lobbying of GAT; academic activities.
Sep. 2013- Sep. 2014	The Peace Potential of Hydrocarbon Resources	Means for the mitigation of negative outcomes and encouragement of peace with regard to hydrocarbon development in the Eastern Mediterranean region; addressing peace potential with regard to hydrocarbon development. ⁷³⁷
Jan. 2013- Dec. 2017	Religion in Cyprus: Mapping Cyprus' New Religious Landscape	Appreciation and recognition of the complexity and minority religions in Cyprus; inclusion of the indigenous religious communities and migrant communities in order to advance "interfaith dialogue" with no disregard for secular elements and groups; participation in interfaith dialogue meetings.

⁷³⁶ PRIO Cyprus Centre, "Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife", n.d., <http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=653> (accessed: 02.04.2024).

⁷³⁷ Harry Tzimitras (Ed.), **The Peace Potential of Hydrocarbon Resources: A Scoping Study**, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo, September 2014.

Jan. 2015- Dec. 2017	Vernacular Reconciliation	The evolution of vernacular reconciliation since the year of 2003, in which several checkpoints were opened up.
Jan. 2015- Dec. 2015	The Rise of the Radical Right in Cyprus in the Context of the European Experience and Cypriot Particularities	Exploration of different manifestations of radical right in the post-2004 period; multi-dimensional analysis of the Cypriot radical right within the European framework.
Jan. 2015- Dec. 2015	Building Peace at Home	Linking the eventual agreement with the protection and promotion of gender equality with regard to Women, Peace, and Security agenda.
Jan. 2016- Dec. 2018	Security and Threat Perceptions	A proper understanding of elite and public security perceptions related to co-existence in Cyprus; understanding different perceptions and views about security fears, the causes of conflict, and means of conflict resolution within the protracted conflict environment in Cyprus marked by ethno-political rivalry.
Jan. 2022- Dec. 2024	Reengaging Track II Diplomacy on Cyprus	Bringing together various opinion-shapers from Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye to discuss the creation of rapprochement for the Cyprus issue; discussions for the promotion of engagement and normalization of relations not only between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots but also between Türkiye and Greece.

The information in this Table reveals that PCC plays a multi-layered dialogue facilitation role for the protracted conflict in Cyprus. In this process, various approaches and means of dialogue facilitation have been encouraged and implemented. Relevant examples can be summarized as follow: Advancement of civil society; assisting to informed debates, decisions, and discussions; contributing to intercultural dialogue and intercultural diplomacy along with the interfaith dialogue; engaging with dominant and non-dominant large-groups in the island; encouraging

non-traditional diplomatic mechanisms and resolutions such as peacebuilding and the “UNSC Resolution 1325”; increasing awareness for mediation; integrating dichotomies between the self and other at large; knowledge dissemination; tackling both challenges and opportunities for reconciliation; tackling psychological barriers; transcending beyond interstate relations with no disregard for the critical role of interstate relations upon the conflict; Track II Diplomacy; trade cooperation; understanding security and threat perceptions at different levels, and understanding the role of media upon the perceptions of the public.

These projects reflect the role and various approaches of dialogue facilitation, which is, according to *Mete Hatay*, oriented at bringing parties together in an equitable environment that is conducive to discussions and the development of interdependent relations. In this process, the organization of conferences, meetings, and seminars also plays an enabling role for dialogue facilitation. As a result, the Centre approaches and examines the cluster of problems as embedded in the Cyprus issue separately. With conferences, seminars, reports, and academic publications, the Centre achieves to create a pool of information, which is more credible and beyond the influence of the formal politics upon information. The creation of such an alternative, or rather a third pool of information, has been quite important for the functioning of the Centre.⁷³⁸

In light of these, it can be contended that Norway’s contributions through PRIO have been important for discussions, research, and knowledge about the key aspects of the Cyprus issue. These contributions can be considered as encouraging against the despair and uncertainty with regard to deadlocks in this lingering conflict. Norway also complements its dialogue facilitation-oriented contributions with the “European Economic Area (EEA)” and “Norway Grants.” Accordingly, civil society was granted a large extent of funds up to 2014. *Jonas Gahr Støre*, Norwegian Foreign Minister at the time, considered the efforts of Norway as important for the creation of conducive conditions for dialogue and understanding, the arrival of a solution to the Cyprus conflict characterized by protractedness, and the contacts between the two communities “*at grass-roots level*”.⁷³⁹ The promotion of intercommunal

⁷³⁸ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

⁷³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, **The EEA and Norway Grants: Strengthening Contact between the North and South of Cyprus** (Press Release), 12 December 2011, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2011/strengthening-contact-cyprus/id666400/> (accessed 23.08.2024).

communication at the grass-roots level can be linked to the main objectives of the Centre.

Also, the dialogue facilitation role of the Centre has been in a complementary relationship with academic activities. In this regard, dialogue facilitation has entailed not only the improvement of intergroup relations but also a broader understanding of the controversial issues about the Cyprus conflict. In this context, regional and international developments and issues associated with energy security, migration, climate change, hydrocarbon exploration, and the radical right, particularly in the post-2004 period, are not neglected. In essence, peaceful contributions of this Centre have been grounded in its informative and instructive role, along with the disruption of asymmetric and elite-level approaches. However, these contributions and roles need to be complemented by deepened efforts focusing on the isolation of the TRNC since this is closely intertwined with the underlying roots of the conflict and conflict resolution processes. In tackling issues related to misinformation and power asymmetry, the negligence of the aspirations and status of the TRNC creates contradictions. For this reason, this negligence needs to be compensated with further efforts and initiatives.

On the other hand, the contributions of Norway through the EEA funds enabled another rapprochement on the Cyprus issue. The EEA funds from Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway played an important role that supported the initiation concerning the transformation of the building of a civil society organization, established by the history teachers from both sides, into “The Home for Cooperation.” In this process, a property belonging to an Armenian in the buffer zone was purchased, and this property transformed into “The Home for Cooperation.” What makes this initiation critical is that the aforesaid property has been located in the buffer zone. In this context, *Mete Hatay* addresses that “The Home for Cooperation” provided an alternative channel for the meeting of many civil society organizations and marked another Nordic initiative on the island.⁷⁴⁰

In addition to the activities of Norway, “The Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process (RTCYPP)” led by Sweden has been linked to human rights, peace, and reconciliation in Cyprus. In order to achieve these objectives, trust among the religious leaders and communities; promotion of confidence-building measures; freedom of religion, and religious protection have been pursued. The RTCYPP was initiated in

⁷⁴⁰ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

2009 and was transformed into a peacebuilding effort.⁷⁴¹ The RTCYPP confirms that Sweden takes religion as one of the critical components of large-group identities into consideration for its peaceful initiatives. Of equal importance is that this initiative also complements the interfaith dialogue project of the Centre.

With the EEA funds, a museum titled as “The Centre of Visual Arts and Research (CVAR)” was opened. CVAR entailed the collections of *Rita Severis*, a Greek Cypriot Business Woman. Hence, Nordic assistance also affected the commencement of CVAR, which reflects the history of Cyprus. It is important to note that this museum has a bi-communal board of directors and functions bilingually. With its large library, research centre, and seminar rooms, discussions and research have been actively encouraged.⁷⁴² This effort can be considered as important in promoting peace and conflict resolution through art, culture, and history. This, together with the Home for Cooperation, aimed to improve large-group relations.

It should not be neglected that Norway evaluates the Home for Cooperation as a meeting place that brings organizations from the whole island together. Accordingly, *Ine Eriksen*, as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, announced that Norway will continue to fund this initiative and CVAR. With the funding, efforts to bring ethnic groups together, to develop civil society, and to promote social inclusion will continue to be prioritized. In this process, activities and projects capable of addressing problems related to climate change and the environment were also decided to be funded. With the “EEA” and “Norway Grants”, Norway has taken a part in the reduction of social and economic disparities in the island since 2004.⁷⁴³ Focusing on disparities is especially, albeit inadequately, important given the isolation of and pressures on the TRNC.

All of these activities reinforce the overall mission of the PCC in the context of the Cyprus issue. In conclusion, the Centre provides accurate and alternative information against misinformation and the information hegemony as imposed. By conducting campaigns directed to the reduction of polarization and by proposing suggestions, not only problems related to this protracted conflict but also possible

⁷⁴¹ Office of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process, “Religion, Peacebuilding and Human Rights in Cyprus An Introduction”, n.d., <https://www.religioustrack.com/about.html> (accessed 15.05.2024).

⁷⁴² Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

⁷⁴³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Strengthening Cooperation with Cyprus”, (Press Release), **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 05 March 2019, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/solbergs-government/Ministries/ud/news1/2019/cyprus_grants/id2631330/ (accessed 20.05.2024).

peace plans and solutions are addressed. In this context, the perceptions and positions of both large-groups are reflected amidst the challenges and problems. Also, the Centre provides information to diplomats and politicians from both sides while contributing to informed decision-making. In this way, the UN reports and negotiation processes can be influenced through consultation and information-sharing. With these efforts, the purpose is directed to the elimination of information asymmetry between the parties. Although the Centre focuses on the Cyprus issues, the overall contributions are also relevant in developing a multidimensional understanding directed to the dynamics of unrecognized and *de facto* states.⁷⁴⁴

Drawing from such remarks, these mutually reinforcing efforts that stem from the Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, in particular, and Iceland through EEA funds, can be linked to conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Also, these efforts can be seen as necessary but not sufficient for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The efforts of the PCC and various initiatives can encourage attentive, informed, and responsible decisions in tackling the underlying roots of the conflict and offering solutions. Moreover, such efforts can promote peaceful interactions and recognition/accommodation of the human needs by problematizing deprivations and disparities. Nonetheless, these efforts need to be strengthened, paying special attention to the consequences of the international community's non-recognition of TRNC.

Taken together, developing deeper and more nuanced understanding towards the status of TRNC is required. The efforts to promote conflict transformation and reconciliation cannot be mainstreamed with inadequate and non-comprehensive perspectives towards the isolation and pressures that TRNC still endures. This does not indicate the negligence of the importance of the grass-root approach to peacemaking. Rather, it enriches this approach with a special attention on the status of TRNC and peacebuilding that is just and sustainable. Otherwise, there is a danger that these peaceful efforts can generate other protracted peace initiatives while playing an instrumental role in legitimizing isolating and oppressive structures of domination.

Section III - The case of Palestine in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation

Conflict between Israel and Palestine continues to be one of the most significant protracted conflicts that resulted in the failure of various peaceful initiatives and

⁷⁴⁴ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

mechanisms. This conflict entails the denial of basic human needs, displacement, the loss of lives, and critical pressures on the large-group identity of the Palestinian people. The lingering process associated with the conflict and peaceful initiatives and mechanisms has witnessed crimes against humanity, demonizing dynamics between large-group identities, and transgenerational sufferings and traumas. Despite significant changes in the trajectory of the conflict, despair and tragedy persist and deepen at present.

This protracted conflict with border, large-group identity, and territory incompatibility-oriented dimensions has been subject to third-party involvement of Sweden and Norway. Consequently, this section will focus on the historical background of the conflict, with a focus on the PLO and Israel as the main warring parties in the Oslo peace process. This historical background will be important in understanding the perceptions of the warring parties and the underlying roots of the conflict, which were avoided and manipulated by the international society. Following that, the Swedish background of the Oslo Accords and the role of Norway in the formulation of agreements between Israel and the PLO will be elaborated.

Despite the failure of peaceful third-party involvements, Sweden and Norway provided important achievements upon the trajectory of this conflict. Therefore, significant elements and techniques as activated through third-party roles of Sweden and Norway will be examined. The Swedish background will be explained with regard to dialogue facilitation and academic diplomacy initiatives of Sweden. As linking this background to the initiation of the Oslo peace process, the focus will then be directed to Norway's peace mediation and facilitation experience between Israel and the PLO. In conclusion, the contributions and failures that have stemmed from the Oslo peace process will be analyzed and discussed.

a. Historical background of the conflict in Palestine: The conflict between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the State of Israel and a glimpse of the Nordic attitudes

The underlying roots of the conflict in Palestine have been marked by contentious claims over the lands known as Palestine and national borders. Following the creation of the Jewish-dominated State of Israel, rivalries and violent conflicts have persisted between the main warring parties, as Israel and a competing state for the Palestinians, with the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), being the primary representatives of the Palestinian side. With that being said, this conflict

entails various states and non-state actors.⁷⁴⁵ In this process, the cycles of both protracted violence and protracted peace have characterized this conflict with various dimensions.

Historical, emotional, and religious connections with the land of Palestine have affected the emergence of Arab nationalism and Zionism. The incompatibility between Arab nationalism and Zionism has been linked to sovereignty claims over Palestine. In this context, this confrontation generated the question of Palestine and the antagonism, disputes, and wars between the Arab states and Israel.⁷⁴⁶ According to the UCDP, the conflict is characterized by territorial incompatibility with differing main warring parties, except Israel throughout the years.⁷⁴⁷ In this regard, incompatible sovereignty claims, as fueled by Arab nationalism and Zionism and directed to Palestine and national borders, have been one of the critical underlying roots of this conflict.

In essence, the conflict between Israel and Palestine has been marked by various deep-rooted/added considerations and interests. Accordingly, this endemic and intractable conflict reveals a series of charges and countercharges, claims, demands, and security concerns. The mutual fear and mistrust, which have been fueled and justified by traumas committed by the other, also make the pursuit of peace quite elusive. In this context, attacks and counterattacks and the security dilemma have also been linked to historical investigations directed to mutual charges.⁷⁴⁸ Within this framework, the security dilemma and mutual accusations not only affected the protracted nature of this conflict but also created difficulties in changing the mindsets of the involved parties.

Norway approaches the underlying roots of this conflict in terms of competing claims over the same territory as demonstrated by two ethnic groups, each with deep-rooted and supportive historical and religious justifications.⁷⁴⁹ Sweden, on the other

⁷⁴⁵ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 12.04.2023).

⁷⁴⁶ Fred John Khouri, **The Arab-Israeli Dilemma**, Third Edition, Syracuse, N.Y. : Syracuse University Press, 1985, p. 1.

⁷⁴⁷ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/234/1> (accessed 12.04.2023).

⁷⁴⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, "Building Legitimacy Through Narrative", in Robert I. Rotberg (Ed.), **Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix**, Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana University Press, 2006, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁴⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 31 October 1999, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/involvement/id420034/> (accessed 12.04.2023).

hand, links the underlying roots of this conflict with the occupation of Palestine since 1967.⁷⁵⁰ In this regard, efforts to comprehensively and fairly address the underlying roots of the conflict, let alone resolve and transform it, have been hindered by emotional, historical, nationalistic, and religious grievances and issues, the historical background of the conflict, the occupation of Palestine, the security dilemma surrounding the adversaries, and different perceptions towards the emergence of the conflict.

As highlighted, this conflict is also marked by fragmentation associated with involved parties. In this regard, there have been various parties to the conflict in addition to its interstate trajectory.⁷⁵¹ This heightens problems that stem from peace spoilers more critical. Leading on from this, this sub-section will primarily address the conflict between Israel and the PLO, albeit the fragmentation among and within the involved actors.

Johan Galtung explains that the Middle East region constitutes a conflict arena between the Arabs and Jews as two persecuted and self-preserving peoples who have suffered at the hands of others. But there has been a critical difference in the experiences of the Arabs and Jews regarding their immense suffering. While the Arabs have suffered in the Middle East region, the Jewish suffering was mainly experienced in Europe and due to Nazi Germany rule. In this context, *Galtung* considers the Balfour Declaration, dated 02 November 1917, and the UN resolution for partition and the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state, dated 29 November 1947, as more recent tragic mistakes.⁷⁵²

⁷⁵⁰ This is evident in the following statement and strategy of Sweden. For example, see: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, **Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Palestine 2020-2024**, 25 June 2020, p. 2 (7), <https://www.government.se/contentassets/eafc7fce5494153bfeaffad964b7fc1/strategy-for-swedens-development-cooperation-with-palestine-20202024.pdf> (accessed 12.04.2024).; Olof Skoog, "Swedish Statement on 'the Situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian Question'", National Statement at United Nations Security Council Briefing on 'The Situation in the Middle East including the Palestinian Question', New York, 20 February 2018, <https://www.government.se/statements/2018/02/the-situation-in-the-middle-east-including-the-palestinian-question/> (accessed 12.04.2024).

⁷⁵¹ Please see the following resource, which reveals the main parties to this conflict between the years of 1975 and 2023, with the exclusion of some years and of external involved actors: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/234/1> (accessed 12.04.2023).

⁷⁵² Johan Galtung, "Conflict Theory and the Palestine Problem", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 1972, p. 34.; Galtung explains that the implications, and results of these tragic mistakes have been witnessed and will very likely continue to be witnessed in terms of the loss of lives, reduction in the quality of lives due to the displacement and being left to survive in camps, and diversion of energy and resources from meeting the urgent developmental needs. Importantly, the impacts of this conflict have also transcended the Middle East region in connection with Big Power involvement. See: Galtung,

In this regard, the Balfour Declaration and the UN's decision for partition fueled the conflict. Prior to these, there have also been historical hostilities and confrontations between the Arab and Jewish large-groups in the region. Nevertheless, the roots of the conflict can be traced to the Balfour Declaration and partition plan, which formulated the Jewish homeland in response to the confrontation between the Jewish and Arab people and the suffering of the Jews as culminated in the Nazi Germany rule, respectively.

Actually, the middle of the nineteenth century witnessed the appearance of both the "Jewish National Movement" and the "Arab National Movement." Direct confrontation between these movements was materialized in connection with the arrival of the first Zionists in Palestine, which was part of the Ottoman Empire at the time. Despite the official policies, the late period of the Empire witnessed the establishment of the foundations for the Jewish homeland. In this process, the expansion of the Jewish presence in Palestine led to the increase and exacerbation of the Zionist demands related to land and work. In the 1930s, the escalation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, which became subject to British rule at the end of 1918, was driven by Nazism and Fascism in Europe.⁷⁵³

Rolf Tamnes explains how the Middle East region has witnessed conflict and turmoil in connection with the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire and with the inception of the modern state system in the region. This multidimensional contention has primarily revolved around the rights over the land of Palestine, which had ingrained the roots of the conflict between the Jews, the Palestinian Arabs, neighboring countries, and major powers. According to *Tamnes*, it was the creation of Israel that created the Palestinian problem.⁷⁵⁴

Hence, this conflict has affected not only primary large-group identities as main warring parties in Palestine but also neighboring countries and major powers. With displacement and refugees, spill-over effects of the conflict have further intensified. As a result, the conflict between Israel and Palestine has been encapsulated within

"Conflict Theory and Palestine Problem", pp. 34-35.; For partition plan, see: United Nations General Assembly, **Palestine Plan of Partition with Economic Union – General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine.**; See also: Ilan Pappé, **The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1951**, London ; New York : I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1992, pp. 41-46.

⁷⁵³ Ilan Pappé, **The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-1951**, London ; New York : I.B. Tauris & Co., Ltd., 1992, pp. 1-3.; For this process, the Zionist movement and Arab nationalist movement, see also: Khouri, **The Arab-Israeli Dilemma**, pp. 3-10.

⁷⁵⁴ Rolf Tamnes, **Oljealder: 1965-1995 ("Oil Age 1965-1995")**, Oslo : Universitetsforlaget AS, 1997, p. 376.; The original text in Norwegian.

destructive actions, counteractions, and wars between Israel and neighboring Arab states, all of which deepen the involved parties. This is evident given the conflicts and wars between Arab states and Israel. Of critical importance is that it has also been contended that the creation of Israel and its occupation underpinned the roots of this conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has transformed into a protracted social conflict with regard to the following criteria: conflict durability; fluctuation in relation to intensity and bilateral/regional interactions; the spill-over impacts with regard to animosities and transcendence of the interstate framework; equilibrating forces as strong and capable of constraining interactions, and interaction trends as deviations; and finally, the resistance of this conflict to the conflict termination initiatives. Nationalism and social identity have also been subordinated to this conflict while consolidating mutual animosities and rivalries. With the criteria of equilibration, the conflict remains within its firmly established and decisive boundaries, albeit the emergence of cooperation or further aggressions and hostilities.⁷⁵⁵

With this in mind, the period before the year of 1948 also witnessed friendly and cooperative relations. However, the considerable communal contact was mainly marked by not only negativity but also social and economic separation, political conflict, and violence that periodically took place. A high degree of interdependence was created as a result of the contacts between the two communities, each claiming land ownership. This interdependence was also mainly negative in connection with their national identities. Accordingly, negative interdependence among national identities characterized the interactions between the two communities.⁷⁵⁶ Negative interactions between national identities were further complicated by the deepening effects of political Zionism.

In response to anti-Semitic persecution and assimilation, the primary purpose of political Zionism was oriented at solving the Jewish problem by establishing a Jewish state on Palestinian territory. The creation of a Jewish state was grounded in the aspirations to gather the Jews in exile and to provide long-term security for the Jewish people. However, these purposes and aspirations have extended beyond its security and protection-oriented functioning.⁷⁵⁷ The rationale behind the political Zionism has

⁷⁵⁵ Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin, "Protracted Social Conflict; Theory...", pp. 53-56.

⁷⁵⁶ Herbert C. Kelman, "The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 55, No. 3, Fall 1999, p. 583.

⁷⁵⁷ Herbert C. Kelman, "Israel in Transition from Zionism to Post-Zionism", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 555, Israel in Transition, Jan. 1998, p. 48.

jeopardized the security, protection, and integrity of the Palestinians. Following the year of 1917, the problems between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers were intensified due to increased Jewish immigration, Zionist ideology, and the efforts and challenges related to the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.⁷⁵⁸

The large-scale Jewish immigration was increased with the Nazi persecution of Jewish people in the 1930s. In this process, the Palestinian people demanded independence while resisting immigration. The Palestinian demands resulted in the emergence of a rebellion in 1937. After this rebellion, both sides persisted in engaging with the acts of terrorism and violence throughout and beyond the Second World War. Great Britain, as an occupying power and as a mandatory power at the time, considered and abandoned various formulas but failed to provide a transition to independence due to its commitment to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In this regard, this process resulted in handling the issue over to the UN at the British request dated 1947.⁷⁵⁹ Thus, Great Britain's biased and inadequate handling of the Jewish problem marked the transition period.

While it was evident that the dispute would generate aggression and violence, the partition decision marked another critical phase. In Resolution 181 of the UNGA, dated 29 November 1947, the Mandate for Palestine was decided to be terminated while the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish states and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem were stated.⁷⁶⁰ As emphasized, *Galtung* evaluates both the Balfour Declaration and the UN resolution for partition as mistakes.⁷⁶¹ Following the end of Great Britain's mandate and Israel's declaration of independence, a war emerged between Israel and Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon.⁷⁶²

⁷⁵⁸ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 12.04.2023).

⁷⁵⁹ United Nations, "The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977", **Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR)**, 31 December 1977, para. 3-4, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-202927/> (accessed 12.05.2023).

⁷⁶⁰ United Nations, **Palestine Plan of Partition with Economic Union – General Assembly Resolution 181, Part I, Future Constitution and Government of Palestine**, A. Article 1-3; For the Arab League, the war with Israel was connected with the efforts for national survival and protection of the ethnic/religious confrères. For Israel, war with the Arab League in the years of 1948-1949 was connected with the efforts for national liberation and state creation. See: Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, p. 274.

⁷⁶¹ Galtung, "Conflict Theory and Palestine Problem", p. 34.

⁷⁶² The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 12.04.2023).; For the link between the war in 1948 and UN's peace process, and the circumstances following the First Arab-Israeli War, see: Ricarte, **Impact of Protracted Peace...**, pp. 125-134.

From another point of view, the UN's resolution can be considered as the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, contrary to the belief that the Oslo Accords marked the beginning of this process.⁷⁶³ With that being said, this peace plan was a failure due to the embodiment of dehumanization towards the large-group identity of Palestinians.⁷⁶⁴ As for the Jews, this plan offered a sense of hope and justification for state-building and the protection/rectification of their large-group identity in connection with their suffering, which was intensified due to Nazi ideology.

In 1945, many of the Jews, who survived the genocide, were still in concentration camps. Palestine, under the British mandate, was envisioned as a dream for a new life and future. However, the Palestinians evaluated Jewish demands associated with immigration and the creation of a state as major threats and as an attempt to dominate their homeland. In this regard, demonstrations, militant confrontations, terrorism, and war became daily occurrences for the Jews and Palestinians. On 14 May 1948, the Jewish state of Israel was declared.⁷⁶⁵ The partition plan and the establishment of Israel marked critical points in this protracted conflict with protracted peace processes.

In this process, the Zionist movement's mobilization of both the Jewish people and various actors/groups at the international level played a facilitating role in the creation of the State of Israel. Of critical importance is that the decrease in the assistance and protection provided by Great Britain was replaced by that of the USA. What further made the creation of Israel possible was grounded in the efforts that connected the resolution of the Jewish refugee problem with the future of Palestine and the compatibility of the interests of two emerging superpowers with Israel.⁷⁶⁶

Taken together, the conflict has entailed various existing and added struggles between the antagonistic groups and identities "(...), such as: *Arabs and Israelis, Jews and Palestinians; Jews and Muslims; Western imperialism and the Arab world, Zionists and Palestinian nationalists, and the governments of Israel and Egypt*".⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶³ Ricarte, **Impact of Protracted Peace...**, p. 4.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷⁶⁵ Hilde Henriksen Waage, "How Norway Became one of Israel's Best Friends", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 37, No. 2, Mar. 2000, p. 189.

⁷⁶⁶ Kemal Kirisci, **The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause**, London : Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1986, p. 6.

⁷⁶⁷ Kriesberg, "Mediation and Transformation of...", p. 374.; For the development, trajectory and conflict resolution efforts, the following sources can be recommended: Benny Morris, **One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict**, New Haven & London : Yale University Press, 2009.; Charles D. Smith, **Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict**, New York : St. Martin's Press, 1988.; Rashid Khalidi, **Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness**, New York : Columbia University Press, 2010.

This variety reaffirms the complexity and expansion of this conflict. With this in mind, it can be important to understand the dynamics of interstate conflict before engaging with the utilized diplomatic approaches and techniques. Regarding the link between interstate conflicts and wars, a model can be illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 2.2: A mental model of interstate conflict.⁷⁶⁸

In this model, contextual factors as structural variables have been linked to the emergence of interstate conflicts of interest. The tendency towards the utilization of this mental model has been grounded in its ability to demonstrate the escalation and militarization of interstate conflict. Such conflicts have been marked by fundamental and irreconcilable interests. As a result of unresolved or untolerated conflicting interests, a shift towards the militarized interstate dispute occurs. In this process, initial acts are followed by further counter-acts and so forth with regard to spiral of violence. Militarized interstate dispute can also mature into an interstate war, which can be considered as a threshold in the context of the escalation of conflict and violence.⁷⁶⁹

The Israeli and Palestinian conflict exemplifies the escalation and militarization of interstate conflict due to fundamental and irreconcilable interests. Therefore, an agreeable and permanent solution could not be reached. In essence, the conflict has been viewed as irreconcilable for a long time. This process has shaped the perceptions

⁷⁶⁸ Stuart A. Bremer, "Advancing the Scientific Study of War", in Stuart A. Bremer, and Thomas R. Cusack (Eds.), **The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War**, Amsterdam : Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995, p. 4.

⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.; For the expansion of this model, see: Bremer, "Advancing...", pp. 6-16.

of the conflicting parties, who regarded the conflict through zero-sum lenses. Since almost its initiation, the conflict has been characterized by violence. Following the UN's partition decision, which divided the land between the Jews and the Palestinians, a full-scale war resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, including civilians, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, who became refugees.⁷⁷⁰

With the dynamics of interstate conflict, this conflict and its effects have further been intensified. The interstate dimension has affected this conflict and even suppressed the large-group identity of Palestinians. This is why direct representation of the PLO has been a significant success in the Oslo peace process. In essence, the displacement of the Palestinians has also added a further layer to this conflict. Of critical importance is that Israel began to control more territory compared to the arrangements in the partition plan. Hence, the refugee problem and borders delimitation, in particular, complicated the conflict following the war and alteration of the partition plan by Israel.⁷⁷¹ In this process, Palestinians have been trapped in a spiral of violence and denial of basic human needs.

Norway approached the infant state of Israel with enthusiasm and widespread approval. However, such a welcoming and praising attitude had not always prevailed. The Norwegian Labour Party actually evaluated the establishment of a Jewish state as infeasible and unjust in the first years following 1945 and, in fact, until May 1948. However, this approach was reversed upon the establishment of the new Jewish state by *fait accompli*. In opposition to Denmark and Sweden, Norway approved the application of Israel for UN membership after a year.⁷⁷² Importantly, the attitude of Norway was connected with its guilt towards the horrible experiences that its Jewish community endured during the period of Nazi occupation.⁷⁷³

With that being said, the fluctuations in the trajectory of this conflict also affected the attitudes of Norway to some extent. The Suez Crisis, for example, was a direct threat to the national interests of Norway. As a major shipping nation, Norway

⁷⁷⁰ Daniel Bar-Tal, and Gavriel Salomon, "Israeli-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Evolution, Contents, Functions, and Consequences", in Robert I. Rotberg (Ed.), **Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix**, Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana University Press, 2006, p. 21.

⁷⁷¹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 12.04.2023).; For a look at the conditions of Palestinians, who remained in Israel, and who were displaced following the war between Israel and the adjacent Arab states, see: Kelman, "Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National...", pp. 584SS-585.; See also: Khouri, **The Arab-Israeli Dilemma**, pp. 123-181.

⁷⁷² Waage, "How Norway Became one of...", pp. 189-190.

⁷⁷³ Jane Corbin, **Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO**, London : Bloomsbury, 1994, p. 18.

could not be isolated from this conflict that entailed the involvement of its two NATO allies, Britain and France.⁷⁷⁴ With the invasion of Egypt by Israel and the intervention of Britain and France in the area of the Suez Canal, *Halvard Lange*, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway at the time, expressed their doubts about the assistance of Israel to the efforts of the UN in creating a more conducive atmosphere for conflict settlement. In response to the actions of Israel, *Lange* stated the following remarks: “*We reject their action, but we understand their motives*”.⁷⁷⁵

However, it was also explained that the leaders of Israel must understand and recognize various difficulties, including psychological issues that they caused with the creation of the State of Israel in Palestinian lands. Accordingly, the establishment of Israel has disturbed cultural, social, and economic elements of the Arab states. Therefore, it is important for the Israeli leaders to reflect an understanding and empathy towards the Arab states. The sorrow of the Arab states must be reflected in the policy-making processes of Israel.⁷⁷⁶ To this end, the main focus was directed to the issues of Arab states rather than the Palestinians.

Rolf Tamnes explains that the view of Norway towards the Arab world was multilayered and complex regardless of the generally held negative opinions. In some industries, including the civil service and shipping industry, Norwegian attitude was more pragmatic with regard to geopolitical considerations that weighed heavily and the importance of the region for oil politics. In this regard, it is contended that the need for contact with the oil-producing Arab states was intensified in response to the emergence of Norway as an oil nation in the 1970s. Hence, the increased need for contact with the Arab world was also grounded in practical assessments. Importantly, the commitment to favoring Israel’s position became less effective.⁷⁷⁷

Sweden maintained a mainly pro-Israeli policy until the late 1960s. Even though the mediator *Count Folke Bernadotte* was assassinated by the Israeli extremist in 1948, pro-Israeli policy attitude guided the posture of Sweden.⁷⁷⁸ However, the Suez Crisis

⁷⁷⁴ Hilde Henriksen Waage, “Norway and a Major International Crisis: Suez - The Very Difficult Case”, **Diplomacy and Statecraft**, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998, p. 215.

⁷⁷⁵ United Nations General Assembly, **Eleventh Session Official Records: 598th Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.598, New York : United Nations, 27 November 1956, Article 46-47, p. 362, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/728856?v=pdf> (accessed 05.04.2024).

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 57, p. 363.

⁷⁷⁷ Tamnes, **Oljealder: 1965-1995**, p. 377.

⁷⁷⁸ Jacob Abadi, “Sweden’s Policy toward Israel: Constraints and Adjustments”, **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol. 37, No. 2, Apr. 2001, p. 24.; *Yitzhak Shamir*, as Israeli Prime Minister between 1983-1984 and 1986-1992, had also a direct role in the assassination of Swedish Diplomat Bernadotte: Mohamed Rabie, “The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection”, **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol. 21, No. 4, Summer 1992, p. 55.

generated a critical approach towards Israel. Sweden affirmed how the resort of Britain and France to war violated the UN Charter. In line with the interpretation of *Dag Hammarskjöld*, it was demonstrated that the objective of peacekeeping should not be oriented at putting political pressure on Egypt for the settlement of the issue. It was also emphasized that there is no justification for the preventive war of Israel against Egypt. *Östen Undén*, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the time, stated that Sweden has always been in sympathy with Israel. However, with its offensive actions, Israel harmed its own cause.⁷⁷⁹

The approach of Sweden towards the facilitation of conflict resolution in a fair and realistic manner has been grounded in the following remarks made by *Torsten Nilsson*, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden: “(...): *non-recognition of any rights resulting from military conquest and recognition of the right to existence in security and peace for all countries in the Middle East*”.⁷⁸⁰ Accordingly, it was contended that such remarks need to be stated by the UN in an authoritative form to an extent. Given the moderating effects of the UN in the Middle East, the role of the UN was considered as indispensable despite the failures.⁷⁸¹ Such remarks were advocated against military conflicts, permissibility of territorial expansion through military conquest, and antagonistic large-group relations.

With these spreading considerations and narratives, four following wars in the years of 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, along with the manifestation of terrorism and violence between these military confrontations, emerged in the Middle East. This process entailed military engagements, transgressions of hostile forces, terrorism, various forms of violence, and deepened hostility. Of critical importance is that the years between 1987 and 1991 witnessed the uprising of the Palestinians, namely the “First Intifada.” In 2000, the Palestinians initiated the “Second Intifada”, the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”⁷⁸² In addition, this conflict has also been shaped by one of the most critical

⁷⁷⁹ United Nations General Assembly, **Eleventh Session Official Records: 602nd Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.602, New York : United Nations, 29 November 1956, Article 22, 25, 27, p. 429, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/728861?v=pdf> (accessed 05.04.2024).

⁷⁸⁰ United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Second Session Official Records: 1563rd Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.1563, New York : United Nations, 22 September 1967, Article 7, p. 2, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl7/104/95/pdf/nl710495.pdf> (accessed 09.07.2024).

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Article 7-8, p. 2.

⁷⁸² Bar-Tal, and Salomon, “Israeli-Jewish Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian...”, p. 21.; 1967 Arab-Israeli war can be evaluated as the demonstration of the security disputes over frontiers, borders, and territories. See: Bercovitch, and Houston, “Study of International Mediation: Theoretical...”, p. 24.; For the illustration of the causes of wars, please see: Holsti, **Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...**, pp. 275-278.; For the emergence and consequences of confrontations/wars, see: Khouri, **The Arab-Israeli Dilemma**, Chapter VIII-XII.

peaceful initiatives that established direct contact between Israel and the PLO, one of the armed movements organized against the violence of Israel.

Namely, the Oslo peace process was conducted with the third-party role of Norway. With that being said, Norway's contributions date back to peaceful efforts and initiatives of Sweden as directed to the incompatibility between Israel and Palestine. Accordingly, Sweden played an important role by demonstrating the large-group identity and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people while criticizing the aggressive policies of Israel.

Within this connection, the following sub-section will reveal the practices of peace mediation and facilitation in forms of coordination, dialogue, and negotiations, and academic diplomacy of Sweden, in particular, along with the changing approach towards Israel and Palestine. The peaceful practices of Sweden can be connected with the undertaking of the Oslo peace process by Norway. The avoidance of the contributions of Sweden would be restrictive in engaging with the inception and effects of the Oslo peace process. Therefore, the following sub-section will examine the background of the Oslo peace process through the efforts of Sweden.

b. Swedish background of the Oslo Accords and the peaceful contributions of the Nordic countries

Before the initiation of the Oslo Channel by Norway, Sweden also intervened in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Despite the failure of the USA, Sweden, as a small state, aimed to establish bridges and to facilitate negotiations between the parties. This was conducted with the initiative of *Sten Andersson*, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the time.⁷⁸³ This process can be referred to as the background of the Oslo Accords. Prior to the Oslo Accords, *Olof Palme*, as former Prime Minister of Sweden, and *Sten Andersson*, as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, affected the approaches and posture of Sweden for the grievances and sorrows of the Palestinians. Within this connection, there might be a continuum between the contributions of Sweden and of Norway to an important extent in the case of Palestine.

During the period of *Tage Erlander*, who was the Prime Minister of Sweden between 1946 and 1969 and contributed to the creation of the Swedish welfare state, Sweden's foreign policy was marked by support and positive sentiments towards Israel. As a result, the policy-making elite in Sweden has been receptive to the

⁷⁸³ Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Stockholm and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Interview with State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Annika Söder", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2021, pp. 733-734.

perception and understanding of Israel regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the period of *Olof Palme* as Prime Minister of Sweden between 1969 and 1976 and 1982 and 1986 from the Social Democratic Party, on the other hand, there was a profound change in the Middle East policy of Sweden concerning the recognition of political agency and aspirations of the Palestinians.⁷⁸⁴

Rather belated alterations in the approach of Sweden towards the denial of basic human needs and large-group identity of the Palestinians can be considered as a contrast with its peaceful image and large-group identity of the Nordic countries. In this sense, there was not an observable Nordic distinctiveness in the case of Palestine, which was gradually about to change by the 1970s. This negligence was also compatible with the attitude of the international community. Nonetheless, Nordic distinctiveness has become crystalized through the efforts that canalized in the Middle East policy and relatively pro-Palestinian approaches gradually. With the commencement of the Oslo Accords, a certain level of cooperation between Sweden and Norway was demonstrated in the case of Palestine.

The transformation of Sweden's Middle East policy was also affected by the increasing importance of oil following the Yom Kippur War. In November 1974, Sweden conducted negotiations with the PLO while increasing its contacts with the Arab states. *Olof Palme*'s visit to Algiers played an important role for the interactions between the Arab states and Sweden as well.⁷⁸⁵ It is evident that energy security, or the security of oil supply, in particular, affected the policy orientations of Sweden. As explained in the previous sub-section, such pragmatic considerations were evident in the posture of Norway as well.

Sweden, along with Finland and Norway, voted in favour of the invitation of the PLO to the UNGA, dated 14 October 1974. But Denmark and Iceland used abstaining votes. *Olof Rydbeck* from Sweden stated that the Palestinian people should be able to express their views since the resolution of this conflict is inevitably linked to cooperation between all interested parties. However, it was stressed that this vote does

⁷⁸⁴ Daniel Schatz, "Sweden's Middle East Policy at a Crossroads", *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018, pp. 66-70.

⁷⁸⁵ Abadi, "Sweden's Policy toward Israel...", p. 38.; In response to the Yom Kippur War, the UNSC issued Resolution 338 (1973) in order to call for ceasefire and the termination of military activities by all involved parties to the fighting; the complete implementation of the UNSC Resolution 242 (1967), and the commencement of negotiations for durable and just peace in the region. See: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 338 (1973) / [Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th Meeting], of 22 October 1973**, S/RES/338(1973), United Nations, 22 October 1973, p. 10, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/93466?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.07.2024).

not hold any position of Sweden concerning critical questions such as the identification of the PLO as the representation of the Palestinian people. In this regard, the vote of Sweden also allowed this organization to benefit from the freedom of expression in front of the members of the UNGA.⁷⁸⁶

Despite these remarks, the early 1970s were a critical turning point for Sweden's position towards Israel. Following the Yom Kippur War and oil embargo, in particular, the alterations in the foreign policy of Sweden became more observable. Consequently, the support for Israel began to decrease at the public level. *Sven Andersson*, as the new Foreign Minister of Sweden at the time, acknowledged the political identity and the right of self-determination of the Palestinians while accepting the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in his speech to the UN, dated September 1974. Of critical importance is that the acquisition of land by force was considered illegal and unacceptable.⁷⁸⁷

As reflecting this, *Andersson* stated that a lasting peace can be achieved with the guidance of certain principles and prohibitions. Examples include the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by war. The aforementioned prohibition does not contradict the existence of Israel and its recognition. Rather, it reaffirms security as a prerequisite for all states in the region. The Palestinian Arabs have legitimate interests that need to be satisfied.⁷⁸⁸ Following that, *Yasir Arafat*, as the Head of the PLO, met with *Olof Palme* in Algiers in November 1974.⁷⁸⁹ Such developments were important in promoting the large-group identity of the Palestinians and of the PLO for the resolution of this protracted conflict.

With that being said, a telegram from the USA Embassy in Sweden, dated 14 November 1974, reveals that *Palme* was not early informed about the appearance of *Arafat* in the banquet organized by *Houari Boumédiène*, as the President of Algeria at the time. According to this transferred information, there was no earlier notification of *Arafat's* visit to *Palme*. The introduction of *Palme* and the Swedish delegation was actually a *fait accompli*. As reflected by MFA Official Responsible for UN Affairs,

⁷⁸⁶ United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Ninth Session Official Records: 2268th Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.2268, New York : United Nations, 14 October 1974, Article 75, Article 127, pp. 677-678, 682, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/743426?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.07.2024).

⁷⁸⁷ Abadi, "Sweden's Policy toward Israel..." , p. 35.

⁷⁸⁸ United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Ninth Session Official Records: 2243rd Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.2243, New York : United Nations, 25 September 1974, Article 204, pp. 176-177, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/732162?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.07.2024).

⁷⁸⁹ The New York Times, "Arafat Stops in Algiers On His Way to the U.N.", 13 November 1974, <https://www.nytimes.com/1974/11/13/archives/arafat-stops-in-algiers-on-his-way-to-the-un.html> (accessed 05.07.2024).

this encounter did not indicate a change in the political approaches of Sweden corresponding to support for UN Resolution 242 and Israel's right regarding border security.⁷⁹⁰

With the Resolution 3210 of the UNGA, the prominent role of the Palestinian people, as a principal party, has been affirmed in the context of the question of Palestine. Accordingly, the decision concerning the invitation and participation of the PLO in the deliberations of UNGA was announced.⁷⁹¹ As a result, the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, participated in the UNGA. Regarding the question of Palestine, *Arafat*, as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Revolution, addressed the twenty-ninth session of the UNGA. *Arafat* described this occasion as a new step and a change both for the UN and the national struggle of the Palestinian people. It is stressed that re-examination of the question of Palestine offered hope for the fulfillment of the UN's capabilities concerning the pursuit of peace, justice, freedom, independence, and self-determination more precisely than ever.⁷⁹²

In his speech, *Arafat* described Zionism as a form of racism against the Palestinian people and the Arab territory. Accordingly, it was stressed that the wars of aggression resulting from the actions of the Zionist entity require significant efforts for peace. The road to peace thus signals the need to undermine colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and racism. This process is intertwined with the principles of the UN Charter and human rights. *Arafat* evaluated diplomatic and political efforts as complementary with, and as enhancement of, their armed struggle that took place in a time of significant change. As a result, the struggle of the

⁷⁹⁰ The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, "Palme-Arafat Meeting in Algiers", No. 1974STOCKH05109, 14 November 1974, <https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=260587&dt=2474&dl=1345> (accessed 05.07.2024).

⁷⁹¹ United Nations General Assembly, **3210 (XXIX). Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization**, A/RES/3210 (XXIX), 14 October 1974, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-181536/> (accessed 05.07.2024).; With the Resolution 3236, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty has been recognized. Also, the return of displaced and uprooted Palestinians to their homes and properties has been reaffirmed with regard to realization of their inalienable rights. In this resolution, the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, the prominent role of the Palestinians, the need to accommodate and restore their rights, assistance to the Palestinians in this process, and the establishment of contacts with the PLO have been addressed for the solution of the question of Palestine and the creation of a just and lasting peace. See: United Nations General Assembly, **3236 (XXIX). Question of Palestine**, A/RES/3236(XXIX), 2296th Plenary Meeting, New York : United Nations, 22 November 1974, Articles 1-7, p. 4, <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/738/39/pdf/nr073839.pdf> (accessed 23.08.2023).

⁷⁹² United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Ninth Session Official Records: 2282nd Plenary Meeting**, A/PV.2282, New York : United Nations, 13 November 1974, Article 1, Article 7-9, pp. 861-862, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/743671?ln=ar&v=pdf> (accessed 05.07.2024).

Palestinian people has been part of all liberation movements against imperialism and racism. In parallel to this, the restrictions towards the essence of the Palestine issue have also been addressed due to views and portrayals that still considered this issue as merely a refugee problem and as little more than a dispute over the borders of the Arab states and the Zionist entity.⁷⁹³ Because of this, the underlying roots of this conflict have been neglected and misinterpreted.

With the call for the enablement of the establishment of national independent sovereignty for the Palestinian people over their land, *Arafat* expressed the following statement: “*Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand*”.⁷⁹⁴ These remarks demonstrate how failures to address the grievances, injustices, and effects resulting from the deprivation of basic human needs can result in the utilization of violence and the reinforcement of the cycle of violence. Accordingly, *Arafat* gave a message by linking security, human needs, peace, and self-determination for the Palestinian people.

Following that, Sweden’s approval for the invitation of the PLO to the UNSC yielded critical outcomes for its strong relationship with Israel and the role of the PLO. Allowing the PLO to take a part in the debate about Israel’s aggression against Lebanon not only affected the relationship between Sweden and Israel but also the status of and treatment towards the PLO. The pivotal vote of Sweden in the UNSC caused criticisms and reactions of the opponents. Nonetheless, Sweden was the only Western country that voted in favour of the PLO. *Andersson*, as the Foreign Minister at the time, explained that the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian Arabs, is required for conflict resolution in the Middle East. It is also emphasized that Sweden recognizes the PLO as “*the most authoritative representative of these people*”.⁷⁹⁵

This decision has been in line with the support of Sweden in allowing *Arafat* to address the Assembly. Swedish diplomat *Orjan Berner*, as the head of the UN Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed that the decision of Sweden

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.*, Article 17-22, pp. 862-863.; According to *Arafat*, the roots of this conflict date back to the end of the nineteenth century that marked the emergence of zionism. This period witnessed the spread of colonialism. *Arafat* states that “*this period persists into the present*”. See: United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Ninth Session Official Records: 2282nd Plenary Meeting**, Article 25, p. 863.

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Articles 81-82, p. 868.

⁷⁹⁵ Bernard Weinraub, “Swedes’ U.N. Vote Upsets Israelis”, **The New York Times**, 14 December 1975, <https://www.nytimes.com/1975/12/14/archives/swedes-un-vote-upsets-israelis-stockholm-move-enabled-palestinians.html> (accessed 05.07.2024).

did not indicate a political change, and they were still on good terms with Israel. Accordingly, the PLO was rather considered as a political reality that cannot be ignored.⁷⁹⁶ Despite this rather cautious rhetoric, it is evident that the PLO was approached as the most legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and this approach paved the way for direct contact between Israel and the PLO. Of critical importance is that this approach was also oriented at rectifying and promoting the status of the PLO, which was important given the power asymmetry between parties.

Also, Sweden was against the settlement policy of Israel in the occupied territories. During former Israeli Defense Minister *Moshe Dayan*'s visit to Sweden in May 1978, there were discussions directed to the establishment of the State of Palestine. *Dayan* explained how there was no space for the establishment of this state, which could provide a base for aggression directed at Israel. Further to this, he was in favour of the idea that the resolution of the Palestine problem was linked to the inclusion of Jordan as a party to sign an agreement. In practice, Jordan was considered a Palestinian state.⁷⁹⁷ This statement also reflects the prevailing attitude towards the agency of the Palestinian people and the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

The Norwegian attitude towards the Palestinians, on the other hand, was rather ambiguous. Nevertheless, Norwegian understanding regarding difficult social conditions of the Palestinians has gradually been expanded. With that being said, the PLO, which was established in 1964 and emerged as the collection of the expression and reflection of the Palestinian liberation struggle from 1968 to 1969, was associated with extremism and terrorism. Hence, this organization was subject to skepticism. Despite ambiguities and suspicions, there was an informal contact between the Norwegian authorities and PLO in 1976. This connection was established by the Norwegian authorities. *Tamnes* argues that this informal contact paved the way for the intermediary role of Norway in the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, it was not until 1986 that Norway adopted an officially friendly attitude towards the PLO.⁷⁹⁸

Following the decrease of Sweden's interest towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and a rather cautious approach to the Camp David Accord, its efforts were intensified in criticizing and disapproving of Israel's policies with the return of the Social

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.*; For brief explanation about the factors that affected the vote of Sweden, see: Abadi, "Sweden's Policy toward Israel...", p. 38.

⁷⁹⁷ Abadi, "Sweden's Policy toward Israel...", p. 40.

⁷⁹⁸ Tamnes, *Oljealder: 1965-1995*, p. 377.

Democrats to power in 1982. *Lennart Bodström*, as the new Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the time, for example, heavily criticized Israel due to its invasion of Lebanon while condemning terrorism. Worthy of particular attention was the argument of *Bodström* regarding the consideration of the UN's partition plan as a guidance for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This suggestion caused anger in Israel. Further to this, it was also reiterated that the PLO should not be disregarded from peace negotiations.⁷⁹⁹

The Swedish government and authorities, particularly *Sten Andersson*, played an important role for the decision of the USA regarding the initiation of a dialogue with the PLO, which was announced on 14 December 1988. The intersection of the separate efforts of *William Quandt* from The Brookings Institution and *Mohamed Rabie* aimed at initiating a dialogue between the USA and the PLO, and of the Swedish government aimed at initiating a dialogue between Israel and the PLO, affected the decision of the USA. The efforts of the Swedish government and *Andersson*, who had connections with Israel and the PLO, were initiated in September 1988. These efforts, as combined with the efforts of *Quandt* and *Rabie* starting from October 1988, culminated in Stockholm, dated November 1988. This process led to the announcement of the USA in December 1988. The vital objective of *Andersson* was oriented at ensuring communication between the Israelis and Palestinians and at replacing violence with political dialogue.⁸⁰⁰

In this context, the utilization of quiet diplomacy led by *Andersson* was effective in incepting a dialogue between the PLO and a group of American-Jewish academics. It is argued that the roots of this initiative were grounded in the first Intifada and the urgent need for a change in the deadlocked positions of the warring parties with regard to conflict resolution diplomacy at the international level.⁸⁰¹ Of critical importance is that *Andersson* also developed a close contact with *George P. Shultz*, Secretary of State, and other officials from the Reagan Administration for the task of mediation.⁸⁰² With the obtainment of the tacit consent, *Andersson* inaugurated a dialogue between

⁷⁹⁹ Abadi, "Sweden's Policy toward Israel...", pp. 40-42.

⁸⁰⁰ Mohamed Rabie, "The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Summer 1992, pp. 54-55.

⁸⁰¹ Arne Ørum, *Fred i Vår Tid: Retorikken bak Oslo-prosessen*, ("Peace in Our Time: The Rhetoric behind the Oslo Process"), Trondheim : Tapir Akademisk Forl., 2004, p. 126.; The original text in Norwegian.

⁸⁰² Tyler Marshall, "He Helped Bridge U.S.-PLO Gap: Sweden's Andersson: Master of Diplomacy", *Los Angeles Times*, 16 December 1988, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-12-16-mn-178-story.html> (accessed 05.07.2024).

the PLO and a group consisting of prominent Jewish academics in the USA.⁸⁰³ In this regard, Sweden played a bridge-making and dialogue facilitating roles between the PLO and a group of Jewish academics in the USA and affected the USA regarding dialogue with the PLO as well.

As stated by Swedish Diplomat *Annika Söder*, the purpose of Sweden was oriented at facilitating contacts between the PLO and the USA through American-Jewish academics.⁸⁰⁴ In this process, peaceful efforts of Sweden generated “The Stockholm Document,” which marked a critical alteration in the position of the PLO. On 06-07 December 1988, a meeting between five American Jews and *Arafat* took place in Stockholm. Following this meeting, a document, referred to as “The Stockholm Document,” was formulated. This document precedes the Geneva declarations and the press conference of *Arafat*. In this document, the PLO demonstrated its willingness for an international conference grounded in the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 with the condition for the right to self-determination. Terrorism was condemned and rejected, with no condoning. This also applies to state terrorism. Of critical importance is that the establishment of the State of Palestine and the acceptance of the State of Israel in the region were also stated in this document. Finally, the repatriation or compensation was addressed in order to resolve problems related to Palestinian refugees.⁸⁰⁵ Hence, successful outcomes that stemmed from Sweden’s peace facilitation were evident in this document.⁸⁰⁶

Following the earlier contacts with *George P. Shultz* and others, a team from Sweden negotiated with *Arafat* for the end of terrorism and recognition of Israel’s existence. The negotiations between *Arafat* and the Swedish team took place in Geneva. With the role of Sweden, a meeting between *Robert Pelletreau*, as USA Ambassador to Tunisia in 1987-1991, and *Arafat*, along with the others, took place in Tunis. In the second meeting of negotiations with the Jewish delegation, the Palestinian delegation was led by *Arafat* himself. Hence, *Arafat* also came to Stockholm for discussions associated with the progression of negotiations. Further to

⁸⁰³ Ørum, *Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...*, p. 127.

⁸⁰⁴ Cohen-Almagor, “Stockholm and Israeli-Palestinian Peace...”, p. 734.

⁸⁰⁵ Drora Kass, “The Stockholm Document”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1990, p. 66.; The establishment of the State of Palestine and the acknowledgement of the State of Israel also signify the disruption of the asymmetrical relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, who are viewed as the occupier and the occupied, respectively. See: Kass, “The Stockholm Document”, p. 69.

⁸⁰⁶ This initiative that led to the Geneva Declaration has been framed in terms of peace mediation of Sweden. Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, pp. 82-91.

this, there were important steps for the recognition of Israel as undertaken by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in Algiers. Also, *Arafat* recognized the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 while denouncing terrorism and recognizing the existence of Israel dated 13 December 1988. In this process, Egypt also played an instrumental role.⁸⁰⁷

As emphasized, the decision of the USA concerning the initiation of direct talks with the PLO was evaluated as a triumph for Sweden's international involvement policy. The role of Sweden was crucial in initiating talks that involved the PLO and prominent American Jews. In addition, Sweden also played a conduit role in ensuring communication between Washington and *Arafat*. These roles oriented at advancing peace in the Middle East have been explained by referencing the posture of Sweden as the representative of neutral nations in contrast to being a small nation; its previous criticism of the USA for its involvement in Vietnam and Nicaragua, to which Sweden provided aid; its critical attitude towards both Washington and Moscow at the time; its criticism towards the Moscow with regard to its involvement in Afghanistan; and its submarines in the Swedish waters as well.⁸⁰⁸

On 13 December 1988, *Arafat*'s second meeting with the UNGA took place in Geneva. In his speech, *Arafat* affirmed the evolving political stance of the Palestinians in connection with the Algiers meeting of the PNC. Also, he addressed the USA's contradictory and fragmented approach in taking the UNGA Resolution 181 (II) as the justification for the establishment of the State of Israel and rejecting the half of this aforesaid resolution with regard to the establishment of the State of Palestine. The

⁸⁰⁷ Cohen-Almagor, "Stockholm and Israeli-Palestinian Peace...", pp. 734-735.; Following the nineteenth session of the PNC in Algeria, the declaration of the Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital was issued on 15 November 1988. In this declaration, all-inclusive, revolutionary, resistance, and unifying characteristics of the intifada have been emphasized against Israeli occupation, the obliteration of the question of Palestine, the obscurantist, and the racist practices. This national uprising has also been viewed as the continuation and culmination of the Palestinian people's defiance and struggle, as well as a demonstration of their loyalty to the PLO, the sole legitimate national leader and representative of the Palestinian people. The intifada strengthened the objectives of the Palestinian people in terms of the attainment of self-determination, the establishment of an independent Palestinian State, and the regional and international support towards the cause of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) were accepted as the basis for convening an international conference on the Middle East problem, which is grounded in the question of Palestine. Among other decisions, the PNC also insisted on Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories since 1967, including Jerusalem. See: United Nations, **Declaration of State of Palestine - Palestine National Council. Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**, 15 November 1988/18 November 1988, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-178680/> (accessed 11.09.2023).

⁸⁰⁸ Steve Lohr, "Talking with the P.L.O.; Sweden Chalks Up Points for Role as Go-Between", **The New York Times**, 16 December 1988, <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/16/world/talking-with-the-plo-sweden-chalks-up-points-for-role-as-go-between.html> (accessed 11.09.2023).

rights of the Palestinians to return to their Palestinian homeland and properties have also been evident in the UNGA Resolution 194 (III). Hence, it was stressed that the USA's approach contradicts international law. With respect to the intifada, national resistance of the Palestinians, and the increased support towards the just cause of the Palestinians, there was a growing realization, *Arafat* explained, concerning those fighting for freedom and peace and those pursuing terrorism. Accordingly, it was stated that the essence of this conflict has been rooted in aggression, inhuman actions, and occupation of Israel.⁸⁰⁹

Of critical importance is that *Arafat* informed the UNGA about the proclamation of the statehood of Palestine by PNC. The establishment of the State of Palestine is grounded in the natural, historic, and legal rights of the Palestinian people to the homeland of Palestine; transgenerational sacrifices for liberty and independence; the compatibility with the resolutions issued by the Arab summit conferences; international legitimacy derived from the resolutions issued by the UN since 1947; and the rights to self-determination, political independence, and sovereignty. *Arafat* also emphasized that the State of Palestine is committed to justice, peace, peaceful co-existence, peaceful means of dispute settlement, the rejection of force, violence, or terrorism against its territory, and independence, including themselves and other states. The latest remark does not jeopardize the right to self-defence. Moreover, *Arafat*, in his capacity as the Chairman of the PLO, condemned and rejected all forms of terrorism, including state terrorism.⁸¹⁰

Following Geneva, it became clear that Sweden was on the right track. In this regard, Sweden contacted Israel while cooperating with Norway, whose relations with Israel were more progressed compared to its. By cooperating and working with Norway, as a NATO country considered prestigious in the USA, Sweden aimed to protect and promote the engagement of Israel in the processes of negotiations. This was due to dislike towards Olof Palme, who invited *Arafat* to Sweden in 1983 and who was assassinated in 1986.⁸¹¹ Hence, it can be argued that the cooperation between

⁸⁰⁹ United Nations, **Palestine Question/Arafat Statement – GA Debate (Geneva) – Verbatim Record (Excerpts)**, Forty-third Session, United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Seventy-Eighth Meeting, Geneva : Palais des Nations, 13 December 1988, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-181060/> (accessed 11.08.2023).; The reason for the gathering of the UNGA in Geneva was that *Arafat* could not obtain a visa to the USA. See: Ørum, **Fred i Vår Tid: Retorikken...**, p. 127.

⁸¹⁰ United Nations, **Palestine Question/Arafat Statement – GA Debate (Geneva) – Verbatim Record (Excerpts)**.

⁸¹¹ Cohen-Almagor, "Stockholm and Israeli-Palestinian Peace...", p. 735.

Sweden and Norway was instrumental in pursuing Israel towards peace negotiations. This cooperation demonstrates the importance of Nordic cooperation surrounding Nordic peace diplomacy.

It can also be argued that cooperation with Norway was necessary given the background of Sweden as a critic in world politics. In this regard, a study reveals that Israel was the third country subject to the most critique from Sweden during the years of 1947 and 1990. While South Africa and the USSR were the first and second countries that Sweden criticized the most, respectively, the Palestinians/PLO were ranked as the eleventh among the twelve actors/blocks/countries. Also, it is revealed that the years between 1965 and 1990 weighed much more critique compared to the prior years between 1947 and 1965. In relation to the acquisition of power by non-socialist parties, the mid-1970s witnessed further critique of Sweden directed to other countries. With the return of the Social Democrats to power in 1982, a decrease was detected in the critique of Sweden. With that being said, its level was comparable with the period of 1965 and 1976. Taken together, the increase in the critique of Sweden between 1976 and 1982 was connected with both domestic and external developments. The latter includes the intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan; the Lebanon invasions by Israel; the involvement of the USA in Latin America, and the problems and tensions in Southern Africa.⁸¹²

As for the PLO, all of these developments brought an end to its isolation. It was because of this isolation that the efforts to include the Palestinian people themselves in the international negotiation diplomacy were prevented. Nevertheless, the initiated dialogue with the PLO lasted only for a year and a half and did not generate immediate consequences for the peace process.⁸¹³ With that being said, Sweden's efforts provided important contributions in terms of process- and outcome-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Taken together, the primary achievements of Sweden were grounded in the legitimacy and recognition of the PLO. On the other hand, the recognition of the PLO by the USA was seen as a threat for Israel. This was due to the possible effects of this process upon its close relationship with the USA.⁸¹⁴

Hence, dialogue facilitation between the PLO and the USA, efforts for direct representation of the Palestinian people through the PLO, along with the recognition of the agency and grievances of the Palestinian people, negotiations with *Arafat* and

⁸¹² Bjereld, "Critic or Mediator? Sweden...", pp. 28-29.

⁸¹³ Ørum, *Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...*, p. 127.

⁸¹⁴ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, pp. 92-93.

the PLO, peace mediation and facilitation as evident in the formulation of the Stockholm Document, quiet diplomacy, and support for both more appropriate and comprehensive framing of the question of Palestine can be considered as especially critical achievements.

Before the Oslo channel, there was also a case that entailed Swedish academic diplomacy experience in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. In this context, a meeting took place between a group of Israelis and Palestinians under top-secret circumstances, which was planned to be clandestine for a peace dialogue in the Middle East. On 27-29 June 1990, this meeting was held at the remote conference facility, which was outside of Stockholm. Despite its clandestineness, its diplomatic sensitivity, and being part of the quiet diplomacy of Sweden, the meeting created major headlines not only in Sweden but also in international media. This meeting demonstrated the value and usefulness of Swedish academic department for a sensitive diplomatic operation, which can be described as probably the first example. This meeting, as an experiment for researchers, could actually have led to a sustained peace process, before the Oslo process became the main track. *Peter Wallensteen* further explains how they engaged in this meeting as the first experiment in academic diplomacy. The acceptance of this challenge has also been aligned with the approach of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. According to *Wallensteen*, the optimal outcome of this meeting was oriented toward peace, Swedish quiet diplomacy, and academic integrity.⁸¹⁵

This study recognizes these diplomatic efforts in the forms of peace mediation and facilitation, along with the academic diplomacy experiment, as linked to the background of the Oslo Accords. Together, these diplomatic efforts can be approached as peaceful experiences of Sweden, as highlighted in the general dataset as well. With that being said, the Oslo Accords have particularly proven to be crucial for the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. Therefore, in the following sub-section, the focus will be directed to the commencement, formulation, and reflections of the Oslo Process as one

⁸¹⁵ Peter Wallensteen, "An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy: The Middle East Seminar 1990", in Peter Wallensteen, **Peace Research: Theory and Practice**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 254.; In this context, the purpose was oriented at encouraging the participants for discussions through the seminar rather than a negotiation between the parties. *Sten Andersson* also visited the seminar. Wallensteen, "An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy...", pp. 258-259.; For the outcomes and restrictions of this experiment, see: Wallensteen, "An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy...", pp. 261-262.

of the milestones in the peace and conflict resolution efforts associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

c. The inception of the Oslo Accords and the involvement of the Kingdom of Norway

This sub-section will concentrate on the inception and negotiations of the Oslo Accords and the third-party role of Norway. In this context, *Levitan* is in the conviction that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden provided a fresh and comprehensive approach for the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. As reflecting this, the Oslo peace process entailed both hopes and disappointments, challenges and breakthroughs accompanied by dedication, deception, and passion guided mostly by good intentions.⁸¹⁶

With that being said, Oslo peace process continues to be approached through primarily negative assessments or process- and outcome-oriented achievements. Despite the failure of the invested hopes in this peace process, along with the pessimism and resentment for the prospects of peace mediation and facilitation, it is important to comprehend the commencement and effects of this channel by transcending dualistic assessments.

Following the general elections of 1991 in Sweden, and the loss of the Social Democrats, the peace diplomacy initiative of Sweden directed to the conflict between Israel and Palestine was handed over to Norway. Norway worked on this conflict through *Thorvald Stoltenberg* and *Johan Jørgen Holst*. It is important to note that *Stoltenberg* was already interested in the peaceful efforts of Sweden. As his successor, *Johan Jørgen Holst* was seconded by *Terje Rød-Larsen* and *Mona Juul*. With the role of these actors, the Oslo Agreement was formed in the years between 1991 and 1993.⁸¹⁷ In this context, the road to the Oslo peace process was guided by cooperation between Norway and Sweden.⁸¹⁸ However, there were also prior internal and external developments that facilitated the involvement of Norway.

⁸¹⁶ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 3.

⁸¹⁷ Cohen-Almagor, "Stockholm and Israeli-Palestinian Peace...", p. 736.; Swedish Diplomat *Annika Söder* also clarifies how the USA became more cautious in its interactions with the PLO after *Arafat's* support of *Saddam Hussein* following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Cohen-Almagor, "Stockholm and Israeli-Palestinian Peace...", p. 736.

⁸¹⁸ With that being said, there were ambiguities concerning the intentions of Sweden. Ørum, *Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...*, p. 129.; Also, it is quoted that *Sten Andersson* and *Pierre Schori*, a Swedish diplomat, were envious of Norwegian peace diplomacy when the Oslo Agreement obtained recognition. But, it is very likely that this envy was decreased to a considerable extent. See: Personal communication of *Arne Ørum* with a Swedish diplomat in Jerusalem, October 1993.; Personal Communication of *Arne Ørum* with a Swedish Diplomat in Jerusalem, October 1993.; Quoted in Ørum, *Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...*, p. 129.; With that being said, *Levitan* considers this as a competition directed to international recognition, prestige, and status between Sweden and Norway. See: Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 96.

In this regard, the peace process was affected by the alterations in the international conjuncture concerning the conclusion of the Cold War, which generated profound impacts upon the restrictive understanding of international peace and third-party mechanisms.⁸¹⁹ Prior to this, regional rivalry and the escalation of the conflict were actually prompted by the USSR's backing of the Arab states and the commitment of the USA to Israel. Hence, the East-West conflict played an obstructive and fueling role in this and in many other regional conflicts. With the conclusion of the Cold War, international conditions were actually more conducive for peace.⁸²⁰

Moreover, the first intifada demonstrated the need for more focused and planned approaches oriented at solving the dispute between two national identities.⁸²¹ The first intifada and daily clashes also evoked international attention towards the conflict.⁸²² This was evident in the peaceful efforts and quiet diplomacy of Sweden. As explained in the previous sub-section, the position of the PLO towards Israel also began to change. The alterations in the position of the PLO were reflected in the Stockholm Document and *Arafat's* speech to UNGA in Geneva. There was also belated but growing awareness towards the question of Palestine in terms of the deprivation of basic human needs of the Palestinians.

By the year of 1991, unsuccessful outcomes of the intifada, *Arafat's* choice to support Iraq in the second Gulf War, and the repercussions regarding the withdrawal of financial support from the Gulf states generated a ripeness for the PLO.⁸²³ Despite its economic, military, and political power and alliance with the USA, there were concerns directed to the question of demography within the groups of the Labour Party in Israel. Such concerns were contrasted with the programs of the prior Likud government, which had an ambitious settlement policy. Further to this, threats

⁸¹⁹ Ricarte, *Impact of Protracted Peace...*, p. 161.

⁸²⁰ Jacob Bercovitch, "Conflict Management and the Oslo Experience: Assessing the Success of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking", *International Negotiation*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, p. 223.; During the Cold War, efforts were primarily made for the bilateral crisis management, along with the diplomatic assistance and one-sided delivery of weapons. Wallenstein, "Dag Hammarskjöld's Diplomacy...", p. 370.; In this process, efforts were primarily directed to containment rather than resolution of conflicts. See: Mark Hoffman, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in John Baylis, and Nicholas J. Rengger (Eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, Oxford : Clarendon Press; New York : Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 262.

⁸²¹ Ricarte, *Impact of Protracted Peace...*, p. 161.

⁸²² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁸²³ I. William Zartman, "Explaining Oslo", *International Negotiation*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, p. 196.

associated with Hamas were increasing while the PLO and the PLO leadership were weak.⁸²⁴

Taken together, the effects of the 1992 elections and the loss of the Likud government in Israel increased the commitment of the Israelis and the Palestinians to the Madrid peace process at the time and added dynamism to the Madrid peace process, the perils and pressures resulting from the actions of Hamas as Islamic Social Movement with the efforts to provide an alternative resistance against the PLO leadership, and the failure of the Madrid peace process by early 1993 also accounted for the inauguration of the Oslo peace process. In essence, the Madrid peace process generated another painful stalemate in the context of process-oriented approaches.⁸²⁵ The sequence of events might be complex. But still, it is important to understand that these developments and factors reinforced a ripeness and led to the third-party role of Norway.

There have been various attempts and efforts, ranging from many individuals, organizations, and small states, and large states, and to the USA, as a major superpower, to end the fight between the Israelis and Palestinians. Nonetheless, the conflict between the parties was considered as ripe for mediation with regard to changes at the levels of the main warring parties and the international system, the First Intifada, and the response of Israel. Triggering effects of international, regional, and national changes upon the attitudes of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders also affected the constitution of the "Oslo Back Channel."⁸²⁶ Hence, changing attitudes of the leaders, as reflected from the PLO, and the election of the Labour Party in Israel can be considered as catalyzing factors to a considerable extent in the context of the establishment of the Oslo Back Channel.

The changing approaches, attitudes, and pragmatism of the PLO were connected with various developments, including the disappearance of the USSR, the decrease in the Saudi financial assistance, and the decrease in the fortunes of the PLO that weakened the organization. This process was prompted by the achievement of the intifada, which attracted public support. The extent of such achievement, as the

⁸²⁴ Hilde Henriksen Waage, "The 'Minnow' and the 'Whale': Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Aug. 2007, p. 158.

⁸²⁵ Zartman, "Explaining Oslo", pp. 197-198.; In this context, Madrid peace process can also be considered as an example of protracted peace process. See: Ricarte, *Impact of Protracted Peace...*, pp. 169-171.

⁸²⁶ Waage, "Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians?" *Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East*.

attraction of both internal and external public support, was not attained by the guerrilla movement of the PLO. Actually, this process concerning the alterations in the PLO can date back to the beginning of 1974. The reflections of this long process, as initiated in 1974 and led to the transformation of the PLO into a pragmatic force in the Middle East, and the Israeli elections in 1992, demonstrated the readiness and willingness of the Jewish society pertaining to the evacuation of the occupied lands, precipitating the initiation of the Oslo process.⁸²⁷

In the beginning of the year of 1970, the PLO displayed a cautious willingness to moderate while simultaneously strengthening its position in the international area. This moderate attitude did not indicate the abandonment of its armed struggle. Nevertheless, the PNC implied the possibility of a two-state solution for the first time in June 1974. This suggestion established the groundwork for contact and subsequent negotiations. In 1974, the Arab League that was held in Rabat, Morocco, also marked a breakthrough for the PLO. In that same autumn of the year of 1974, the UN's resolution that has affirmed the rights of the Palestinians and granted the PLO an observer status has also been critical for Norway. Also, *Arafat* delivered a speech in the UNGA dated November 1974.⁸²⁸

The mid-1970s also witnessed the precursors associated with the mediation efforts for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which culminated in the Camp David Accords in 1978. However, discussions continued to focus on the Arab World rather than on the question of Palestine. Nonetheless, this understanding changed by the end of the 1980s. This change has actually been evaluated as a paradigm shift in relation to the recognition of the key agency of the Palestinians in the peace processes and negotiations.⁸²⁹ For this reason, one can also link the increasing recognition towards the identity and needs of the Palestinians with the developments as favoured third-party role of Norway.

⁸²⁷ Ilan Pappé, **A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples**, Second Edition, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 240-241.

⁸²⁸ Tamnes, **Oljealder: 1965-1995**, pp. 377-378.; With the Resolution 3237 (1974), the PLO was invited to participate to the sessions and work of the UNGA; international conferences under the auspices of the UNGA, and other organs of the UN as an observer. See: United Nations General Assembly, **3237 (XXIX). Observer Status for the Palestine Liberation Organization**, A/RES/3237(XXIX), 2296th Plenary Meeting, New York : United Nations, 22 November 1974, Article 1-3, p. 4, <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/738/39/pdf/nr073839.pdf> (accessed 23.08.2023).

⁸²⁹ Ricarte, **Impact of Protracted Peace...**, pp. 164-165.; For the role of international, regional, and national-internal changes that created a ripeness in commencing Oslo negotiations, see also: Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation...**, pp. 138-140.

Therefore, all of these factors paved the way for the arrival of the Oslo Agreements. These comprehensive and conducive effects were also accompanied by a more active approach of Norway towards its Middle East policy. With the beginning of the 1990s, Norway provided humanitarian aid while demonstrating its commitment to peace diplomacy in the Middle East. Norway's humanitarianism obtained support in the realms of politics and civil society.⁸³⁰ Therefore, humanitarianism and civil society also underpinned the engagement of Norway. These dimensions reinforced the reputation of Norway while reaffirming the components of Nordic peace diplomacy.

Prior to this, there was an important decision concerning the promotion of contact with the PLO. Despite strong relationships and ties with Israel, this decision was taken at the Labor Party's national meeting in the spring of 1981. According to *Geir Salvesen*, this decision marked the beginning of the Norwegian channel in the Middle East. It was addressed that while Israel has the right to exist in safe borders, the question of Palestine also requires a solution that is just. In 1982, four Norwegian politicians from the Labor Party, including *Thorvald Stoltenberg*, and a Danish politician, *Kjeld Olesen*, as former Danish Foreign Minister, met with *Arafat* in Tunis. In this meeting, *Arafat* raised a complaint about the impossibility of direct meeting with the USA and Israel since the PLO was not accepted as the representative of the Palestinian people. Also, there was an earlier meeting between Norwegian politician *Reiulf Steen* and *Arafat*. Accordingly, *Steen* was personally invited by *Arafat*.⁸³¹

Before the cooperation between Sweden and Norway and meetings with *Arafat*, there was also an earlier occasion that led to Norway's rejection. Accordingly, there was a meeting between Egypt's Ambassador *Mustafa Kamal*, and Norwegian Ambassador to Washington *Hans Engen*. On 24 March 1965, *Kamal* visited the Norwegian embassy and asked for Norway to be a "secret messenger" in the Middle East. However, Norway's response to the role of a bridge-building in the Middle East was negative.⁸³² This occasion also demonstrates how Norway was considered an appropriate channel in the Middle East even in the 1960s.

⁸³⁰ Ørum, *Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...*, p. 17.

⁸³¹ Geir Salvesen, *Thorvalds Verden*, ("Thorvald's World"), Oslo : Chr. Schibsteds Forlag A/S, 1994, pp. 332-334.; The original text in Norwegian.; This process, the visit to *Arafat* by an official party delegation, and *Arafat*'s return to the bridge-building role of Norway in the Tunis meeting are also reflected in the following publication: Tamnes, *Oljealder: 1965-1995*, p. 380.

⁸³² Odd Karsten Tveit, *Alt for Israel: Oslo - Jerusalem 1948-78*, ("Everything for Israel: Oslo - Jerusalem 1948-78"), ÅiT Norbok, Gjøvik : J. W. Cappelens Forlag A/S, 1996, pp. 309-310.; The original text in Norwegian.

In 1982, *Arafat* expressed his idea regarding the third-party role of Scandinavia and Norway in the aforesaid meeting with Norwegian politicians and a Danish politician in Tunis. In particular, *Arafat* demonstrated that Norway should become leverage against the USA and should assist in the establishment of more direct contact between the PLO and the Israeli Labour Party. Thus, *Arafat* asked his Nordic guests for peace mediation and facilitation with the Israeli Labor Party. The proposal for contact was also due to major difficulties within the PLO. Following this meeting, *Thorvald* delivered *Arafat*'s proposal to the Israeli Labor Party, which responded negatively.⁸³³ Drawing from such remarks, it can be seen that Norway was considered as a suitable actor for the third-party roles in the Middle East region more than once, and in the conflict between Israel and Palestine as well. Further to this, it can be concluded that the beginning of the 1980s also entailed challenges for the PLO, which also accounted for its direct contact proposal.

In this regard, *Tamnes* also quotes how the engagement of Norway was initiated by the chairman of the PLO. In addition to this, the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel can also be considered one of the reasons for the rapprochement of *Arafat*. In response to the inquiry of the USA for participation in a guarantee agreement regarding oil supplies to Israel, Norwegian Diplomat *Hans Wilhelm Longva*, in particular, contacted *Arafat* to uncover any objections from the PLO leadership. There were no objections, and *Arafat*, in return, requested a passage to Norway when he would need a secret channel to Israel. *Longva* explains that they were agreed to this request. *Knut Frydenlund* and *Longva* were driving forces behind this process regarding the involvement of Norway. According to *Frydenlund* and *Longva*, a two-state solution was the key component for the eventual resolution of this conflict. Importantly, the victory of a bourgeois government in Norway did not affect informal connection with the PLO.⁸³⁴

⁸³³ Salvesen, *Thorvalds Verden*, p. 334.

⁸³⁴ Conversation of Rolf Tamnes with Longva.; Quoted in Tamnes, *Oljealder: 1965-1995*, pp. 379-380.; *Hilde Henriksen Waage* also addresses how this process and ideas concerning the third-party role of Norway are evident through a comprehensive archival research. See: Waage, "Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...", pp. 597-615.; On 12 October 1981, *Gro Harlem Brundtland*'s First Government resigned due to the results of the general elections as held on 14 September 1981. In this regard, *Kåre Willoch*'s Government was appointed. See: Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Gro Harlem Brundtland's First Government: 4. February 1981-14. October 1981", n.d., <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-governments/regjeringer-siden-1814/historiske-regjeringer/governments-since-1945/gro-harlem-brundtlands-first-government-/id438727/> (accessed 17.08.2024).

This political background is important in understanding how Norway was involved in this protracted conflict. Despite the unwillingness of Israel, there was another occasion initiated with a call from *Arafat* to *Thorvald*. In this context, *Arafat* informed *Thorvald* about the plan regarding the visit of *Issam Sartawi* to Oslo. The need for a more sophisticated diplomacy towards Israel was also affirmed. *Sartawi* was from the moderate faction of the PLO and in favour of direct negotiations with Israel, and *Thorvald* had already known him. In this context, the purpose was oriented at discussing the advancement of the process and at preventing any obstacles and problems. Accordingly, efforts were going to be made for the obtainment of *Sartawi*'s secret contacts. But this process failed due to the assassination of *Sartawi*.⁸³⁵

This assassination has been interpreted as a warning from pro-Syrian Palestinian extremists, who opposed to negotiation with Israel. This murder also disrupted the delicate negotiations between *Arafat* and King *Hussein* of Jordan. The negotiations were close to ending and oriented at enabling Jordan for peaceful engagement and negotiations with Israel. However, this meeting was already cancelled by Jordan, and it is explained that the conclusion of the talks by Jordan was apparently not known by the killers. Nevertheless, there were also threats against *Arafat* by a splinter faction from the PLO, as responsible for the assassination of *Sartawi*. This group, based in Damascus and Baghdad, was against any negotiation and settlement with Israel. As emphasized, *Sartawi* advocated for direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel.⁸³⁶

The killing of *Sartawi* and threats reveal the factions within the PLO and the problems of peace spoilers that also need to be assessed very delicately in the processes of peace mediation and facilitation.⁸³⁷ Despite the threats, contacts and meetings continued between Norway, Sweden, and the PLO. In this process, not only *Stoltenberg* but also several Norwegian politicians such as *Gro Harlem Brundtland*, *Thorbjørn Jagland*, and *Reiulf Steen* played important roles. *Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky* and *Shimon Peres* were also involved. In April 1983, *Arafat* visited Stockholm and met with Scandinavian social democratic leaders as well.⁸³⁸

The role of *Hans Wilhelm Longva*, Norwegian diplomat, also needs to be recognized in facilitating the Oslo Channel. It is confirmed by *Espen Barth Eide* that

⁸³⁵ Salvesen, *Thorvalds Verden*, p. 335.

⁸³⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "Murder of a P.L.O. Moderate: A Warning For Arafat?; News Analysis", *The New York Times*, 11 April 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/11/world/murder-of-a-plo-moderate-a-warning-for-arafat-news-analysis.html> (accessed 15.08.2024)

⁸³⁷ For the problems of peace spoilers, see: Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes", pp. 5-53.

⁸³⁸ Salvesen, *Thorvalds Verden*, pp. 335-336.

Longva's role was critical, and he was the first official Norwegian representative who met with *Arafat*. In this process, his diplomatic capabilities, personality, and extensive contact network proved to be quite useful.⁸³⁹ The involved diplomats demonstrate the determination of Norway in order to establish direct contact between the main warring parties amidst the challenges and problems resulting from the warring parties, peace spoilers, and from Norway as well.

Despite the continued informal endeavors with *Arafat*, the reluctance of Israel persisted. There were also challenges and problems with regard to the formal line in Norway. The Norwegian Parliament and ministers were rather negative about the official position towards the PLO. With the benefits of archival research, *Tamnes* reveals the evident distinction between official and non-official lines towards the PLO in Norway. It is clear that the rapprochement towards the PLO was pursued by the Labor Party in Norway. The rapprochement entailed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.⁸⁴⁰ In this process, direct contact between the Israelis and Palestinians was not established, let alone the promotion of self-determination.

The peaceful efforts and challenges persisted throughout the 1980s, but none led to a breakthrough in the context of peace and conflict resolution. However, the opinions in Norway towards the PLO began to change. The involvement of the PLO was weighed compared to the violence and stalemate. As explained in the previous sub-section, Sweden established earlier contacts with the PLO. In this process, its relationship with Israel was deteriorating. Further to this, *Sten Andersson* informed *Stoltenberg* about Sweden's peaceful efforts directed to the PLO when *Stoltenberg* began to serve as Norwegian Foreign Minister in 1987. Hence, the collaboration between *Andersson* and *Stoltenberg* cannot be passed unnoticed. With that being said,

⁸³⁹ Adresseavisen, "Hans Wilhelm Longva er Død" ("Hans Wilhelm Longva is Dead"), 13 October 2013, <https://www.adressa.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/m1lLnV/hans-wilhelm-longva-er-dod> (accessed 15.08.2024).; The original text in Norwegian.

⁸⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway ("Utenriksdepartementet"), 25.11/19e, note 5/9-78. Govt. Conf. 11/10 and 29/11-84 and 15/1-85. The National Archives of Norway, Udgaard's Archive, Frøysnes Note 11/1-85.; Quoted in Tamnes, *Oljealder: 1965-1995*, p. 380.; With that being said, there were also skeptical politicians within the Labor Party as well. Salvesen, *Thorvalds Verden*, p. 336.; This should not be surprising since the background of the relationship between Israel and Norway was marked by Norwegian admiration towards the Israel. Such admiration was not restricted with the conservative and religious fronts. The friendly and pro-Israeli stance were observable in the whole political spectrum, including the Labour Party in Norway. See: Waage, "Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...", pp. 601-603; These remarks re-affirm how complicated and challenging the task of peace mediation and facilitation is. Hence, peace mediators and facilitators also need to be opinion-building and persuasive actors in their fronts, especially in engaging with protracted conflicts.

the year of 1987 also marked the worsening relationship between Israel and Palestinians and the beginning of the intifada.⁸⁴¹

Following that, the Madrid Conference could not be successful due to the absence of a direct contact between Israel and the PLO and the problems of peace spoilers from time to time. Accordingly, the representatives of the PLO participated as part of Jordan's delegation. Handling peace negotiations publicly generated controversies while preventing constructive and genuine dialogue as well.⁸⁴² In relation to the lessons as obtained from the Madrid Conference, direct representation and secrecy were prioritized in the Oslo negotiations.

While this background accounts for the involvement of Norway in the protracted conflict, there were also other influencing factors. For *Arafat* and Israel, a negotiation channel needed to be established by such a country, which was not distinguished by critical attitudes towards Israel and by a supportive political posture towards the Palestinian people. Of equal importance is that the secret negotiation channel also needed to involve the people, as arranged in the peace diplomacy, and were not rigidly attached to the old agenda of the cause of Palestine.⁸⁴³ It can be observed that these considerations, along with the intensified alterations in the changing attitudes of Norway towards the PLO, also strengthened the third-party role of Norway.

Importantly, the attitudes of Norway, along with other Scandinavian countries, were shaped by anti-colonialism. In essence, Scandinavian countries were peripheral actors in European politics and were not engaged in EC politics. There was also no established tradition of colonial powers in world politics. As partially evident in their votes at the UN, these countries, along with Greece, Malta, Spain, and Türkiye,

⁸⁴¹ Salvesen, **Thorvalds Verden**, pp. 336-337.

⁸⁴² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East"; In the Madrid Conference, dated October and November 1991, delegations from Israel and Palestine met for direct negotiations. The mandate and directives of the Palestinian delegations were received from the PLO. Direct negotiations took place during the dialogue among the delegations from Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine-Jordan. The purpose of this peace conference entailed not only the formulation of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine but also the inauguration of peace between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. The conference was requested by the USA. See: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 23.08.2023); Taken together, the conference was co-chaired by the USA and the USSR to end the conflict between Arab states and Israel. The importance of this conference was grounded in the gathering of all parties involved to the conflict between the Arab states and Israel, coming together for direct negotiations for the first time, and the following bilateral, and multilateral talks in Washington and in Moscow, respectively. The Oslo process was initiated when the Washington talks became deadlocked. See: The Office of the Historian, "Milestones: 1989-1992: The Madrid Conference, 1991", **Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State**, n.d., <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference> (accessed 23.08.2023).

⁸⁴³ Ørum, **Fred i vår tid: Retorikken...**, p. 131.

supported self-determination and the struggle for independence of colonial peoples since the beginning of the 1960s. In comparison with other countries, this relatively anti-colonial position also accounts for the perceptions towards the Palestinian cause. While all Scandinavian countries supported anti-colonialism, it was actually Finland and Sweden that suggested a cognitive connection between anti-colonialism and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians through their voting behaviours and manners. The involvement in NATO and EC may be the reason for differences and the absence of a cohesive Nordic approach among the Scandinavian countries.⁸⁴⁴

In the 1980s, there was a reassessment regarding the views of the Norwegian Labour Party towards the PLO. In this context, an unofficial meeting took place between *Arafat* and *Knut Frydenlund*, along with the other politicians from the Norwegian Labour Party in Tunis, dated December 1982. In the year of 1989, official talks between *Arafat* and former Foreign Minister *Stoltenberg* of Norway heralded a critical shift concerning the implications of the Palestine issue. The timing in the course of this change was not isolated from the changes in the Norwegian public opinion towards Israel.⁸⁴⁵ As a result, both unofficial and official talks were conducted, which were not detached from the public perceptions in Norway.

These developments mirror the understanding of Norway towards the fundamental demands of the Palestinian people. Such understandings were not prevailing at the time. Rather, most Western countries were cautious and distant towards the PLO. According to the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, the Palestinian leaders appreciated this earlier recognition and understanding directed to the Palestinian cause.⁸⁴⁶ The recognition from both sides must have played a facilitative role in the inception of the Oslo Accords. With the alterations in the Norwegian public opinion and the Norwegian Labour Party, official contacts and meetings were able to take place.

The commencement of the official talks with *Arafat* was held when there was a distance between most of the Western countries and the PLO due to the evaluation of the PLO as a terrorist organization by the USA and Israel. In this assignment, the

⁸⁴⁴ Kirisci, *PLO and World Politics...*, pp. 98-99.

⁸⁴⁵ Michelle Pace, "Norway's Ambiguous Approach towards Israel and Palestine", *Global Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1: Forum: The Occupation of Palestinian Territories since 1967: An Analysis of Europe's Role, 2018, pp. 67-68.; Following that Norwegian authorities allowed the PLO to initiate an information centre in Oslo. See: Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁸⁴⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

Madrid Conference was a turning point towards the PLO, dated 1991. But prior to this, the position of Norway was also important regarding an understanding towards the rights of the Palestinian people. Also, the policies of Norway were evaluated as the maintenance of its balancing act towards both Israel and the PLO. In this context, it is argued that the success of Norway in developing and navigating its relationship with both actors affected the impressions directed to Norway as a neutral country, which fundamentally underpinned the Oslo Agreement.⁸⁴⁷ The balancing policy of Norway aligned with the considerations of the main warring parties for the outsider involvement to the conflict.

Of critical importance is that the academic interest of *Terje Rød-Larsen* played an enabling role for the involvement of Norway in the case of Palestine. *Rød-Larsen*, as a Norwegian academic, aimed to investigate and dissect the suffering, humiliation, and hopeless conditions as experienced by the Palestinian refugees. During his tour of the refugee camps, he was accompanied by *Mona Juul*, assistant to the Foreign Minister of Norway at the time, who specialized in the Middle East affairs, and Colonel *Zacharias Bakker*, as UN Officer from Norway, who escorted them in June 1990. Their witnessing to the living conditions of the Palestinians and to an incident between the antagonists in Gaza compelled them to understand not just the despair and hopeless conditions but also the defiance and political aspirations surrounding the Palestinian people. This widening research interest was effective for both *Rød-Larsen* and Norway to become the conduit of peace in this process.⁸⁴⁸

Drawing from such remarks, the academic interest and increasing understanding towards the worsening conditions and deprived needs and rights of the Palestinian people and the efforts for balancing strategy between Israel and the PLO were reflected in the third-party role of Norway. Further to this, it can be argued that an academic component, post-colonialism, and the approval of the USA also affected the outreach of both Sweden and Norway to this protracted conflict. Nevertheless, Norway's balancing strategy and Sweden's distinguishable record of criticism against Israel favoured the involvement of Norway.

As demonstrated, the failure resulting from the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the Madrid Conference and dissatisfactions resulting from the Washington talks

⁸⁴⁷ Pace, "Norway's Ambiguous Approach...", p. 68.

⁸⁴⁸ Corbin, *Gaza First: Secret Norway Channel...*, pp. 10-11.

also affected the parties for alternative forms of contact.⁸⁴⁹ Actually, it was *Rød-Larsen* who recommended the establishment of an alternative track by Norway.⁸⁵⁰ In response to the impasse resulting from the previous peace process, an alternative and informal track has been initiated. Following a process that stemmed from the utilization of non-official channels, including Track II Diplomacy, official channel was reinaugurated in the 1993 negotiations led by Norway.⁸⁵¹

In this process, there have been various techniques utilized by Norway. Examples include cooperation with Sweden, efforts for direct communication between the warring parties, the establishment of informal contact with the PLO, functioning as a secret contact point between the main warring parties, and its continuance amidst the governmental alterations and challenges, which can be seen as a form of commitment and resilience in relation to the willingness of *Arafat*, humanitarian aid, secrecy, the Norwegian Labour Party's official visit to *Arafat*, the promotion of civil society, Track II Diplomacy, and the shift from informal to formal channels.

Consequently, the importance of the Oslo Accords has resided in the reflection of a paradigm shift directed to the large-group identity and human needs of the Palestinians, along with the diplomatic and political engagements, a rather modest reorientation of the PLO, and internal/external developments and efforts of Sweden and Norway. Of equal importance is that the failure of the Madrid Conference, and the Washington talks led to the search for an alternative road in terms of peace dialogue. As a result of the achievement resulting from alternative approaches, official channel was reinforced. In this context, a sequential shift from non-official to official approaches also underpinned the third-party role of Norway.

The Oslo plan was devised by the Labour movement members of the Zionist left Israelis with the purpose (i) to transcend beyond traditional positions and (ii) to pursue an agreement with the PLO. On this account, a meeting was held between the Israeli negotiators and a pragmatic group from the PLO's second echelon members in Tunis. Following a change in the position of the PNC regarding the acceptance of the partition, Palestinian negotiators arrived in Oslo. With that being said, the PLO remained committed to the right of the Palestinian refugees' return and the

⁸⁴⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁸⁵⁰ Waage, "Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...", p. 600.

⁸⁵¹ Louis Kriesberg, "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field", in I. William Zartman, and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Eds.), **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques**, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 67.

establishment of an independent Palestinian state that is free from Jewish settlements with Jerusalem as its capital. But still, these points were negotiable, which, for the first time, marked a historical departure from the national ideology of the PLO.⁸⁵²

The historical context, changing international circumstances, and the preference of the conflicting parties favored the Norwegian involvement in the case of Palestine. This was also reflected by the willingness of *Yossi Beilin*, who was concerned with the promotion of the peace process in the case of the Labour Party's victory in the Israeli elections. In response to this clear interest, *Rød-Larsen* suggested the utilization of Norway's good offices for the establishment of secret contacts and bridges with the local Palestinians rather than the establishment of direct links with the PLO. *Beilin* was enthusiastic about the suggestions made by *Larsen*. Following that, a meeting was organized to discuss the creation of a second track and the role of the Palestinians to assist the victory of the Labour Party in the coming elections. Both of these efforts were materialized.⁸⁵³

According to *Mona Juul*, the modest and minimalist approaches and definitions, which have been framed as facilitation rather than peace brokering, were effective for the preference of the Norwegian initiation.⁸⁵⁴ As reflecting this, Norway emphasizes its role as primarily facilitation that led to the Oslo Peace Accord, which was followed by the approval of DoP on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.⁸⁵⁵ Of equal importance is that Norway, as a small country, was also concerned in promoting its image as a peacemaker. Norway's distance and size; its positive image and reputation; the absence of any malicious suspicion towards the involvement of Norway in the Middle East, and Norway's ability to develop ties with both Israel and the PLO favoured the mediator role of Norway.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵² Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine...*, p. 240.

⁸⁵³ Corbin, *Gaza First: Secret Norway Channel...*, pp. 22-23.

⁸⁵⁴ Mona Juul, "Israel and Palestine – Experiences of Mediation and Mediators in the Middle East", *Development Dialogue*, No. 53, Responses to Mass Violence – Mediation, Protection, and Prosecution, November 2009, p. 35.

⁸⁵⁵ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's involvement in the peace process in the Middle East"; With that being said, the third-party role of Norway has also been explained as an example of mediation or informal mediation. For example, see: Bercovitch, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation...*, pp. 133-149.; Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview...", p. 140.; Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 36.; The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Israel: Palestine", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/234> (accessed 23.08.2023); Waage, "Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...", pp. 597-615.; The role of Norway has also been referred to as both mediation and facilitation. See: Waage, "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" *Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East*; In this regard, this study defines the role of Norway in terms of peace mediation and facilitation, albeit the flaws and problems.

⁸⁵⁶ Bercovitch, "Conflict Management and Oslo Experience...", p. 228.

Following the elections in Israel, *Yitzhak Rabin* became Prime Minister of Israel. *Shimon Peres* and *Beilin* were appointed as Foreign Minister and Deputy Minister, respectively. In this process, not only *Rød-Larsen* but also the Norwegian government played an important role in the re-establishment of contacts. With the instructions from *Thorvald Stoltenberg*, *Jan Egeland* and *Mona Juul* visited Israel following the formation of a new government.⁸⁵⁷

These efforts led to the Oslo channel, which was crystallized in the greatest secrecy. The initial contacts were established between the leaders of Israel and Palestine.⁸⁵⁸ Hence, the Oslo channel demonstrates how “*direct contacts can result in secret negotiations (...)*”.⁸⁵⁹ In this regard, *Jan Egeland* went to Israel with the objective to explore avenues for secret negotiations. *Beilin*, as the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, recommended *Yair Hirschfeld* and *Ron Pundak*, as two academics who were already in contact with the Palestinians, for the mediation.⁸⁶⁰

In January 1993, the Oslo negotiations were initiated.⁸⁶¹ The meeting between the aforementioned Israeli academics and the Palestinians led by *Abu Ala*, as finance expert of the PLO, took place in Sarpsborg. The meeting was hosted by the Institute for Applied Social Science (Fafo), a research institution directed by *Rød-Larsen* and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.⁸⁶² Despite the encountered problems and power asymmetry between the warring parties, the Oslo negotiations appeared to be a significant opportunity for the Palestinian national movement leaders. The negotiations led to the arrival of DoP, which was announced on 13 September 1993. This declaration was signed on the lawn of the White House with a ceremony, which was, according to *Ilan Pappé*, an “*American pageantry of ‘peace’*”.⁸⁶³

Concerning the power asymmetry between the parties, Norway aimed to implement a balanced approach. Accordingly, the treatment of Norway, in contrast to its involvement in the case of Sri Lanka, was described as “*more or less even-handed*”.⁸⁶⁴ With the focus on the leaders of Palestinians and Israelis, the problems related to power asymmetry were thought to be avoided. Concurrently, leaders-

⁸⁵⁷ Corbin, *Gaza First: Secret Norway Channel...*, p. 23.

⁸⁵⁸ Stoltenberg, and Eide, *De Tusen Dagene...*, p. 18.

⁸⁵⁹ Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, p. 291.

⁸⁶⁰ Waage, “Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway’s...”, pp. 599-600.

⁸⁶¹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway’s Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East”.

⁸⁶² Waage, “Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway’s...”, p. 600.

⁸⁶³ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine...*, p. 241.

⁸⁶⁴ Lehti, and Saarinen, “Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts: A Survey...”, p. 43.

oriented peace diplomacy has been instrumental given the fragmentation within the involved parties to the conflict. Hence, it can be contended that power asymmetry and the problem of peace spoilers were not effectively addressed and managed.⁸⁶⁵ The latter became evident in the assassination of *Yitzhak Rabin*, which will be introduced in the following sub-section.

According to *Levitan*, mediation efforts of the Scandinavian countries in general and particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict entail soft power in terms of attraction, influence, and persuasion for international dialogue processes rather than hard power and coercion. The means of soft power have been oriented at attempting to facilitate the arrival of a resolution to this protracted conflict while advancing the status of Scandinavian countries on the international stage as well.⁸⁶⁶ Hence, even-handed approach to varying extents, peace facilitation, secrecy, soft power in forms of attraction, and having an influence upon direct dialogue, along with status elevation, can be added to the engagement of Norway in the case of Palestine.

In the case of Palestine, Norway facilitated a peace agreement. Accordingly, the role of Norway in the Oslo channel can also be explained with reference to the problem-solving workshop approach of international conflict resolution. Leading on from this, the Oslo channel can be described as the most publicized example regarding informal third-party conflict resolution. A branch of peace and conflict studies, as developed in the 1960s with the purpose of improving inter-nation relations through communication and cultural understanding, affected the Norwegian workshop in the Oslo peace process. Such branches of thinking and acting were mainly based on social-psychological perspectives, which involved a shift from conflictual zero-sum games to more positive-sum games in conflicts.⁸⁶⁷

It should not be neglected that Norway also obtained the tacit approval of the USA in a manner similar to Swedish diplomacy.⁸⁶⁸ Taken together, Norway's modest and minimalist approach, secret diplomacy and secret negotiations, the utilization of the problem-solving workshop approach, the encouragement of the main warring parties, as the representatives of the leaders from both sides, for the actualization of a

⁸⁶⁵ *Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen* and *Carl G. Jacobsen* also emphasize that focusing on the leaders and neglecting the extremists can generate alienation and dissatisfaction while leading to assassinations, and attacks. This was one of the observable failures in the Oslo peace process. Brand-Jacobsen, and Jacobsen, "Beyond Mediation: Towards More Holistic", p. 236.

⁸⁶⁶ *Levitan*, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁶⁷ *Väyrynen*, *Culture and International Conflict Resolution...*, p. 1.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ørum*, *Fred i Vår Tid: Retorikken...*, p. 128.

shift towards positive-sum-oriented perceptions, the instrumentalization of a research institute, and the consent of the USA affected the handling and management of the Oslo peace process. As highlighted, the third-party role of Norway was initially guided by the academic interest and experience of *Rød-Larsen*.

Rød-Larsen, as the Director of Fafo, and *Jan Egeland* and *Mona Juul* from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were aware of the need for confidential contact. Following the confidential talks with *Yossi Beilin* and with the PLO in Tunis, a secret channel organized under the auspices of the Fafo was proposed by *Rød-Larsen*. The utilization of Fafo, a research institute, could contribute to the secrecy of the peace dialogue. As a result, peace negotiations could be concealed as an academic activity. The latter justification was appropriate since Fafo was already engaged in a survey oriented at understanding the living conditions of the Palestinians. This proposal was supported by *Thorvald Stoltenberg*, Norwegian Foreign Minister at the time, and *Jan Egeland*, as State Secretary.⁸⁶⁹

With the utilization of such techniques and the involvement of resourceful diplomats, scholars, and practitioners, Norway achieved bringing the main warring parties together. In this process, diplomats such as *Longva* and *Larsen* also demonstrated the prominent examples surrounding the beneficial outcomes led by unofficial actors. Hence, *Longva* and *Larsen* played essential roles that affected the successfulness of the Oslo channel.⁸⁷⁰ In the following sub-section, there will be an assessment directed to the third-party role of Norway in the context of the Oslo peace process.

d. The peaceful contributions and failures of the Kingdom of Norway

In this sub-section, both contributions and failures of Norway will be elaborated in the context of peace mediation and facilitation efforts in Palestine. As a result, it will be understood that there is a negligence upon the failures that stemmed from Norway's third-party role. The failures of Norway have been sidelined, or the focus was primarily directed to the main warring parties and external developments. Process- and outcome-oriented frameworks that assess the successfulness of third-party practices have also played a critical role in this disparity. In response to this gap and negligence, this sub-section will offer a more balanced assessment while

⁸⁶⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁸⁷⁰ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 40.

compensating for this restrictive understanding. To this end, the following paragraphs will shift between examining achievements and failures.

Despite the failures and problems, Norway provided important contributions in terms of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders through a series of secret talks. These talks, as paved the way for the extraordinary breakthrough in the Middle East conflict, were held in and around Oslo. With the contributions of secret diplomacy and the success of Norway, the representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders agreed on the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority; gradual withdrawal of Israel from some of the Occupied Territories, mutual recognition, and Palestinian self-determination. The Oslo Agreement was signed by *Rabin*, as Prime Minister of Israel, and *Arafat*, as the leader of the PLO, with *Bill Clinton*, as the President of the USA at the time, and engrossed audiences in presence.⁸⁷¹

Taken together, the Oslo Agreements of 1993 can be described as a major turning point due to the following outcomes as achievements: mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO; the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority; and the embodiment of a commitment and an agenda oriented at future negotiations.⁸⁷² In this process, the negotiation process entailed strategies, including secret and official tracks and third-party facilitation. Norway played a facilitative role in the processes of communication and negotiation that characterized the earlier phases of the negotiation.⁸⁷³ Norway's communication-facilitation strategies were followed by mediation, which consists of low-profile and process-oriented practices. In this context, some perceptions of the parties were able to be altered.⁸⁷⁴ Hence, these process- and outcome-oriented approaches and techniques explain the successfulness of Norway. But *Bercovitch* regards the role of Norway as primarily process-oriented mediation.⁸⁷⁵

Importantly, *Egeland* and *Larsen* aimed to limit the engagement of Norway as a facilitation rather than meditation. In this context, bringing the parties together, the utilization of good offices, and the development of mutual trust, knowledge, empathy,

⁸⁷¹ Waage, "Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians?" *Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East*.

⁸⁷² Dean G. Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks", *International Negotiation*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Jan. 1997, p. 237.

⁸⁷³ Karin Aggestam, "Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998", *Doctoral Thesis (Monograph)*, Department of Political Science, Lund University Press, 1999, p. 186.

⁸⁷⁴ Bercovitch, "Conflict Management and Oslo Experience", pp. 231-232.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

and respect were sought. As regards peace negotiations, they aimed that Norway would avoid taking an active and decisive role.⁸⁷⁶ This was also stressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. In this regard, it has been emphasized that Norway's primary role was facilitator.⁸⁷⁷ However, the permeability between peace facilitation and mediation is also a compelling factor in assessing the third-party experience of Norway through the combination of peace mediation and facilitation practices. This assessment can also be enriched with process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

In particular, prior examples related to process-oriented contributions entail confidence-building measures and the establishment of academic contacts as planned in the years of 1991 and 1992. These efforts paved the way for the DoP in 1993. Hence, the arrival of the DoP affirms the success of peace mediation and facilitation techniques in terms of confidence-building measures and academic dialogue. Gathering a small third-party team was also beneficial given the secret initiation of peace negotiations. As highlighted, *Thorvald Stoltenberg* and *Johan Jørgen Holst*, Foreign Ministers; *Rød-Larsen* and his research colleagues from Fafo; and *Mona Juul* and *Jan Egeland* from the Foreign Ministry, made up the Norwegian team. With this team spirit, Norwegian peace mediation and facilitation offered effective and flexible approaches for the warring parties.⁸⁷⁸

In the DoP on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Israel and the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, mutually recognized their rights and strived for human dignity, peaceful co-existence, security, and a peace settlement that is durable, just, and comprehensive. The parties agreed to link peace settlement and reconciliation with the political solutions. The purpose of the peace negotiations has been stated as the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and the elected Council with jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as part of the right to self-determination. Additionally, the DoP agreed that this transitional process could not last longer than five years. Following the interim agreements, the

⁸⁷⁶ Corbin, *Gaza First: Secret Norway Channel...*, p. 40.

⁸⁷⁷ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁸⁷⁸ Jan Egeland, "Norway's Middle East Peace Channel-an Insider's View", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 3, September 1994, p. 349.; For the background of the Norwegian team that created "*the Oslo spirit*", see also: Bercovitch, *Theory and Practice of International Mediation...*, p. 143.

permanent solution of this conflict was decided to be grounded in the UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).⁸⁷⁹

Gro Harlem Brundtland, as Prime Minister of Norway at the time, considered DoP as the introduction of a breakthrough and new era for peace, security, and prosperity not only for the Palestinian people but also for the Middle East region. In her speech in honour of *Arafat*, *Brundtland* emphasized that there is a process for healing. For this reason, the efforts for reconciliation must continue. As for the contributions of Norway, *Brundtland* affirmed that they feel glad and proud since they obtained the trust of the warring parties and played a role in peace facilitation. It is also demonstrated that Norway has the ability to play similar roles in the future. With that being said, both the achievement and responsibility reside in the parties. The Oslo process made peace a possibility. But there is still a road that must be taken to achieve peace, which is grounded in attentive, cooperative, and imaginative implementation of the DoP.⁸⁸⁰

Importantly, the elections for the Council were scheduled to be held within nine months following the entry of this declaration into force. Political elections were emphasized as critical for the self-governance of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It was assumed that just requirements and the rights of the Palestinians would be realized through such preparatory and significant arrangements. DoP was also concerned with the protection of the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.⁸⁸¹ In addition to jurisdictional and political empowerment of the large-group identity of Palestinians, there were also efforts for the promotion of a non-war setting.

As reflecting this, the withdrawal of the forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho was formulated for the commencement of the transitional period set as five years. Negotiations related to the permanent conflict settlement, granted three years as the maximum allowable timeframe for its commencement, would entail issues such as

⁸⁷⁹ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords)**, Forty-eighth Session, Agenda Item 10, A/48/486, S/26560, 13 September 1993/11 October 1993, Annex, Article I-II, Article IV, pp. 4-5, <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/9432> (accessed 12.05.2024).

⁸⁸⁰ Gro Harlem Brundtland, "Speech in Honour of Chairman Yasser Arafat at a Banquet held at Akershus Castle", Speech/Statement at the Akershus Palace, Oslo, 25 November 1993, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Brundtlands-3rd-Government/the-office-of-the-prime-minister/taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/1993/dinner-speech-to-chairman-yasser-arafat-/id558639/> (accessed 23.09.2023).

⁸⁸¹ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Articles III-IV, pp. 4-5.

“Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest”.⁸⁸² Brundtland explained that the postponement of such issues was necessary due to prevailing political attitudes and frameworks, as obstructing a consensus upon the aforesaid components.⁸⁸³ Nevertheless, this postponement strategy has been subject to critiques.

Pappé contends that the precariousness and the real nature of this agreement can be observable through its principles, including Clause 3 of Article 5. In this clause, it is stipulated that the subjects, including the question of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, and the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, were to be dealt with in the future negotiations after the implementation of the interim period. This particular clause, *Pappé* argues, reveals the reason why this document could not be successful in ending this protracted conflict. Further to this, it is even argued that the DoP was designed in accordance with the security perceptions of Israel. Such dictation was accompanied by the representation of the Israeli conception regarding the underlying nature and the substance of the conflict in the interim agreement. Therefore, the 1967 war, not the 1948 war, was considered the root of the problem.⁸⁸⁴

There were also uncertainties concerning the outcome of this interim period. Accordingly, the outcome differed between the Israelis and Palestinians. While Palestinians have aimed for an independent state, the approach of Israel towards the outcome of the DoP was not initially settled. Hence, the outcome was yet to be determined.⁸⁸⁵ In essence, Norway has advocated for the negotiation of a two-state solution. Also, Israeli settlements have been considered illegal and a threat for peace. In this regard, Norway’s third-party engagement was oriented at promoting a two-state solution to ensure a lasting peace.⁸⁸⁶

However, these views could not be reflected in the DoP. There were mainly political, economic, and military arrangements between the Israelis and Palestinians and the inauguration of the Palestinian Council. A two-state solution was not included

⁸⁸² *Ibid.*, Article V, p. 5.

⁸⁸³ Brundtland, “Speech in Honour of Chairman Yasser Arafat at a Banquet held at Akershus Castle”.

⁸⁸⁴ Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine*..., pp. 241-242.

⁸⁸⁵ Aaron David Miller, “Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed”, *Foreign Policy*, 13 September 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/13/oslo-accords-1993-anniversary-israel-palestine-peace-process-lessons/> (accessed 05.05.2024).

⁸⁸⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Israel – Palestine: A Negotiated Two-state Solution”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway*, 06 July 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/israel_palestine/id2522237/ (accessed 05.05.2024).

as a prerequisite for the permanent settlement of this protracted conflict. In this regard, neglecting different commitments and perspectives of the parties towards the outcome of the DoP can be demonstrated as one of the failures of Norway in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. This also makes the legitimizer role of Norway quite problematic. Nonetheless, there were also important and promising developments.

With the authority transfer from Israel to authorized Palestinians, and then to the Council, along with the promotion of economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, preparatory steps were taken for the accommodation of powers and responsibilities of the Palestinians.⁸⁸⁷ However, there was a contradiction between Israel's withdrawal and the continuation of Jewish settlements. Hence there were both contradictions and uncertainties in the DoP.⁸⁸⁸

In addition to the establishment of the Palestinian police force, the following areas have been stipulated for the authority transfer between Israel and the Palestinians: “*education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism*”.⁸⁸⁹ One can assert that the aforesaid decisions were necessary but not sufficient for the basic human needs and protection/rectification of the large-group identity of Palestinians.

Also, the Oslo peace treaty was also seen as an example of a structured peace, which cannot be effective to ensure peace.⁸⁹⁰ The assassination of *Rabin* affected not only the peace process but also Israel's stability adversely. Terrorist attacks by Hamas generated further challenges for Israel to compromise. As a result, there was a renewed dilemma between peace and security. As emphasized, there were differences in the positions of Israel and the PLO during the interim talks. Israel was committed to a step-by-step approach and considered confidence-building measures as a prerequisite for the negotiations related to final status. The PLO, on the other hand, was committed to negotiations of final status from the beginning and requested further compromises.

⁸⁸⁷ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article VI, p. 5.; With the initiation of the Council, Israel's Civil Administration and military government were decided to be withdrawn. See: United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article VII(5), p. 6.

⁸⁸⁸ Aggestam, “Reframing and Resolving Conflict...”, p. 186.

⁸⁸⁹ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article VI (2), p. 5.; Israel's responsibility was decided to be maintained for defence against external threats, the internal security of Israelis, and public order. See: United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article VIII, p. 6.

⁸⁹⁰ Guha, **Peace Diplomacy**, pp. 94-95.; For the restrictions of structured or imposed peace that involves similarities with the understanding of peace during the Cold War, see: Guha, **Peace Diplomacy**, pp. 36-37.

With the assassination of *Rabin* and terrorist attacks, it was more challenging to reconcile such different approaches and positions between the parties. This is why Norway's role was rather marginal.⁸⁹¹

Also, a pragmatic approach, indicating to ignore the historical background and causes of this conflict and deep-rooted grievances, was followed by the negotiators. This decision was supported with the approach suggesting to prioritize some issues with a high level of possibility for the arrival of an agreement and to postpone the most challenging issues to be addressed in the future negotiations. With the avoidance of the historical roots of the conflict and delaying the most difficult aspect, it was hoped that the parties would be able to develop confidence and trust. Norway emphasized that its role was oriented at making arrangements rather than arbitration. An informal style and the creation of opportunities for the development of personal connections between the parties were also embraced by Norway.⁸⁹²

However, this pragmatic approach contradicts its process-oriented approach, which requires to develop an understanding towards the underlying roots of the conflict by the third-parties and warring parties as well. The decision to deal with the challenging issues in the future negotiations denotes a process-oriented approach. Hence, there is a contradiction regarding pragmatic and process-oriented approaches. In essence, ignorance of the historical roots, along with the effects of peace spoilers, can jeopardize the creation of mutual trust between the parties, let alone the efficiency and sustainability of peace practices. Further to this, this pragmatic approach can also be problematized given the need to address the underlying roots of the conflict as part of the outcome-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation.

There can also be a misjudgment since the delayed issues can evoke the underlying roots of the conflict, despite the consensus upon a transitional period. Moreover, the content of the DoP entails such arrangements and objectices that transcend beyond pragmatic considerations and require engaging with the underlying roots of the conflict as well. For this reason, aligning with the aforesaid approaches

⁸⁹¹ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 66.

⁸⁹² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East"; For the illustration of the DoP, see: Bercovitch, "Conflict Management and Oslo Experience...", p. 229.; Following the DoP, there were three agreements related to the implementation of the DoP. See: Tamar Hermann, and David Newman, "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking", in John Darby, and Roger Mac Ginty (Eds.), *The Management of Peace Processes*, London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000, pp. 113-115.

can be considered as contradictory and flawed in the context of peace mediation and facilitation and of different expectations and time frames of the warring parties.

With that being said, there were important contributions grounded in the utilized techniques. According to *Zartman*, the approaches, such as ripeness, process, and mediation, explain the outcome of the Oslo peace process.⁸⁹³ Regarding the link between ripeness and the arrival of DoP, the conditions that catalyzed direct talks and negotiations between Israel and the PLO can be reaffirmed as follows: the formation of a Labour government in Israel, led by *Yitzhak Rabin*; the political and economic challenges of the PLO related to the loss of support from the USSR and major financial contributors; and the role of Hamas as an opponent for both Israel and Palestine. All of these factors can be characterized as ripe for settlement, which was further exploited through a channel by Norway.⁸⁹⁴ Also, family connections that existed within the Labour Party and personal interactions between the realms of academics and politics were compelling factors for the initiation and successfulness of the Oslo process.⁸⁹⁵

Hence, the connections of the Labour Party and the interplay between academics and politics played a facilitating role and reinforced this ripeness. The conditions associated with ripeness have already been addressed in the prior sub-section. Nevertheless, what made Nordic peace diplomacy distinctive has been grounded in directing ripe conditions and developments for direct contact and negotiations between the parties. The peace process that led to mutual recognition and the arrival of DoP required persuasive and well-calculated approachment from the Nordic academicians and practitioners.

It can be argued that various conditions and developments for ripeness were instrumental not only for the third-party role of Norway but also for the modification of constraints that prevented direct talks. Hence, there is a connection among ripeness, the inauguration of peace dialogue, and Norway's third-party role. As a result, there have been critical process-oriented contributions, including the alteration of restrictions, arrangement of meetings, indirect and direct communication between the

⁸⁹³ Zartman, "Explaining Oslo", pp. 195-196.

⁸⁹⁴ Dean G. Pruitt, Jacob Bercovitch, and I. William Zartman, "A Brief History of the Oslo Talks", **International Negotiation**, Vol. 2, No. 2, Jan. 1997, p. 178.

⁸⁹⁵ Waage, "Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...", p. 600.; For some, these connections and interactions can be attributed to the population of Norway or can be questioned due to nepotism. Nevertheless, the effects of academic and political interminglings and personal connections cannot be sidelined in understanding the diplomatic capability of Norway that materialized in forming a synergistic group of people, who achieved to bring the warring parties together. Corbin, **Gaza First: Secret Norway Channel...**, p. 19.

parties, facilitation of mutual understanding and negotiations, the promotion of a compromise, persuasion, requests for peace mediation and facilitation, and triadic cooperation.

The mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO has especially been important since Israel did not recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians until 1993.⁸⁹⁶ Hence, direct talks as indicative of the alteration of communication patterns between the parties, mutual recognition, and the DoP can be listed among the critical outcomes in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. In the DoP, it was also decided that the parties would negotiate for an interim agreement with the purpose of determining the executive authority, legislative authority, structure, and number of the members of the Council; power and responsibility transfer from Israel and the judicial organs. Also, the promotion of economic growth has been assigned to the functioning of the Council.⁸⁹⁷ However, distrust could not be undermined in relation to the effects of peace spoilers. Power asymmetry and imbalance were not effectively addressed in relation to leaders-oriented peace diplomacy.

As reflecting the recognition of process- and outcome-oriented achievements, on the other hand, *Arafat*, *Peres*, and *Rabin* were awarded to the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Nobel Committee. *Brundtland* considered this award as an appreciation and incentive for the peace agreements and progression of the peace process.⁸⁹⁸ Hence, such rewarding actions can also be approached as a peace mediation and facilitation technique directed to the advancement of peace talks and encouragement of the main warring parties.

With that being said, it is important to note that Norway considers the DoP as a gradual framework and road map towards peace rather than a well-defined peace agreement. The Interim Agreement (Oslo II agreement), on the other hand, has been the most comprehensive agreement in the conflict between Israel and Palestine. With the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, also

⁸⁹⁶ Pruitt, Bercovitch, and Zartman, "A Brief History of Oslo Talks", p. 178.

⁸⁹⁷ United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article VII, p. 6.; As reflecting the importance and means of development, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee was decided to be established for the implementation of the economic growth through cooperation. Economic cooperation was considered beneficial not only the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but also for Israel. United Nations General Assembly, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, Article XI, p. 7.

⁸⁹⁸ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Prime Minister Expresses Pleasure" (Press Release), **The Office of the Prime Minister**, 14 October 1994, <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/tidligere-pressemeldinger/1994/prime-minister-congratulates-rabin-and-arafat.pdf> (accessed 12.05.2024).

known as the Oslo II agreement, the purpose has been directed to the expansion of the Palestinian self-government in the West Bank; the withdrawal of Israel; the regulation of the regrouping of Israel; and democratic elections. There have also been provisions that focused on and outlined Palestinian institutions, the election of the Palestinian Council and President; and the division of the West Bank, along with the confidence-building and security measures.⁸⁹⁹

Importantly, the Oslo II agreement could not reflect the two-state solution as advocated by Norway. Thus, the peace process entailed many contributions but failures in terms of the inclusion of the two-state solution. As a result, prior efforts and addressing of the underlying roots of the conflict were jeopardized. In engaging with such protracted cases, it is important to provide consistent frameworks that align with the main grievances and objectives of the warring parties. Because inconsistencies can negatively affect the loyalty of the parties to peaceful efforts and engagements while reinforcing protracted peace rather than transcendence of the existing relations. Despite process- and outcome-oriented contributions, as primarily exemplified by direct contact and Oslo I-II agreements, these inconsistencies can obstruct efforts for further process- and outcome-oriented achievements and materialization of conflict transformation.

In essence, the Oslo channel entailed procedural and substantive processes. What is meant with the term procedural is the shift from informal to formal process. Accordingly, a formal commitment underpinned the evolution of negotiations. But prior to this, informal diagnosis was marked by the involvement of the Israeli academics and the observer role of *Uri Savir* in negotiations. In contrast to the involvement of the PLO, the official Israeli involvement was commenced in June 1993 as *Rabin* was informed and *Joel Singer*, as his representative and legal advisor in the Foreign Ministry, arrived. The official Israeli involvement coincided with the seven rounds of negotiations in practice. The substantive process, on the other hand, is concerned with the efforts and actions that account for the outcome.⁹⁰⁰ However, outcomes and points that stem from agreements could not be effective in resolving the roots of the conflict and incompatibilities while reducing violence.

⁸⁹⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East".

⁹⁰⁰ Zartman, "Explaining Oslo", pp. 199-200.; For the procedural characteristics in the Oslo negotiations, see also: Kelleher, and Taulbee, "Bridging the Gap: Building...", pp. 483-486.

With the shift from informal to formal process, momentum was added to peace mediation and facilitation. In the aforesaid Oslo II agreement, matters such as the transfer of Israel's powers and responsibilities to the Council and maintenance of Israel's powers and responsibilities as not transferred to the Council; the exercise of powers and responsibilities by the Palestinian Authority in line with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the phased transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force as established by the Council; the withdrawal of Israel following the initiation of the Council; the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the civil spheres; the promotion for coordination and cooperation between the Council and Israel in the context of civil affairs, and the installation the Council's offices and *Ra'ees* and its Executive Authority offices, along with the other committees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas belonging to the Palestinian jurisdiction were formulated for authority transfer.⁹⁰¹

In the Oslo II agreement, the following complex and sensitive issues were decided to be resolved in the final status negotiations: the status of Jerusalem, final borders and Israeli settlements, and the status of Palestinian refugees. According to Norway, Jerusalem cannot be accepted as the capital of either Israel or Palestine if its status still persists in a deadlock condition. Norway has also been aligned with the condemnation of UNGA's resolution directed at the Israeli settlement in Jerusalem. Importantly, Norway's coordination for a project titled as people-to-people cooperation has been directed to further contact between the Israelis and Palestinians at the individual level. Fafo was also involved in the management of this project.⁹⁰²

This postponement approach was also reflected in the jurisdiction of the Council, which, along with the non-transferred powers and responsibilities, excluded the

⁹⁰¹ **Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)**, United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Agenda Item 10, A/51/889, S/1997/357, 28 September 1995/05 May 1997, Annex, Article I, p. 10, <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/9434> (accessed 12.05.2024).; There were also measures oriented at preventing the acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities by both sides; confidence building measures such as the release of the Palestinian detainees and prisoners, who will be allowed to return to their homes located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. See: **Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)**, Article XV-XVI, pp. 20-21.

⁹⁰² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway's Involvement in the Peace Process in the Middle East"; In response to the recognition of the Jerusalem as capital of Israel by USA, *Ine Eriksen Søreide*, as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, expressed their concerns and stressed the importance of negotiations. With the reaffirmation of their support for negotiations grounded in two-state solution, it has been emphasized that the Jerusalem issue needs to be addressed and resolved through negotiation. See: Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, "Deeply Concerned over Decision on Jerusalem", 07 December 2017, <https://www.norway.no/en/missions/un/news/123/peace/deeply-concerned-over-decision-on-jerusalem/> (accessed 22.08.2024).

following issues, decided to be discussed in the negotiations related to permanent status: *“Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis”*.⁹⁰³ In addition to the jurisdiction of the Council, its legislative powers, power and responsibility sharing/cooperation/transfer between the Council and Israel, relations with Israel, including economic interactions, and the means for the settlement of differences and disputes were also elaborated in this agreement. Of critical importance is that both the exercise of powers and responsibilities by the Council and Israel were linked to the compatibility with international norms, human rights, and the rule of law.⁹⁰⁴

There were also arrangements for the elections; the structure, size, the executive and legislative authority, powers and responsibilities of the Council; the formation of committees under the auspices of the Council; framework, the functioning and modes of the meetings in the Council and its committees; the conditions and objectives in applying to the Palestinian Court of Justice; the phases for the redeployment of the Israeli military forces and deployment of the Palestinian Police; the protection of the integrity and status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; security and public order-oriented formulations, including the responsibilities of Israeli military forces and Palestinian Police.⁹⁰⁵ All of these complex arrangements make the implementation process more challenging and demanding, which also contradicts the pragmatic attitude.

Rather quick euphoria associated with the post-Oslo Accords was dissipated due to backwards and failures of the negotiations. In this regard, it was revealed that the transformation of the state of war into a state of peace required much more than the approval and signing of formal documents. The reason for the setback in the peace process differed between the Palestinians and the Israelis. For the Palestinians, the rise

⁹⁰³ **Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)**, Article XVII, p. 21.; There was also another Swedish initiative, spearheaded by *Sten Andersson*, in 1994. This initiative was directed to the commencement of the permanent settlement of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. This process led to unofficial and secret dialogue between the parties. In this context, the Olof Palme International Center played a critical role. Also, Sweden utilized critical third-party techniques such as maintaining financial and political incentives, establishing a guiding basis/framework for negotiations about a permanent settlement, encouraging cooperation and further interactions between the parties, accelerating mutual understanding on the core issues, such as Jerusalem's status, and gathering information through the Olof Palme International Center. Crucially, they aimed to safeguard their role and participation in the Oslo peace process. However, this soft power initiative, namely the “Stockholm Channel”, could not be successful. Levitan, **Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...**, pp. 101-113.

⁹⁰⁴ **Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)**, Article XVIII-XXIV.

⁹⁰⁵ **Ibid.**, Article II-XIV.

to power of the Netanyahu government and the continuance of the expansion of the West Bank settlements, accompanied by provocative actions, affected the peace process adversely. For the Israelis, some Palestinian organizations refused to abandon terror, and the Palestinian Authority was not willing to be helpful for the prevention of terror. Hence, both of the parties had different perceptions towards the cessation of the peace process.⁹⁰⁶

As already encountered, there have been problems surrounding the approaches and techniques of Norway. In this regard, it is argued that the utilized methods have been derived from the legacy of peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was grounded in peacemaking between states. But the problem is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essentially an intergroup conflict. The exhibition of this bias by the conflicting parties and the outsiders with interest to the conflict was rooted in the hegemonic notions of conflict and peace, which were oriented at the prerogative of sovereign states. Hence, the legacy of Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been evaluated as a component of the Oslo Process in connection with the hegemonic implications of interstate peace theories.⁹⁰⁷

Moreover, it is also asserted that the policies and balancing strategy of Norway, in particular, may appear as ambiguous pertaining to the relationship between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The policies of Norway, *Michelle Pace* argues, actually enhance and deepen the relationship with Israel as the occupying power. This is also supported with the assumption that Norway's approach towards issues pertaining to Israel can be read as divergent from the EU. In this context, unilateralism and an independent line of Norway regarding its approach towards Israel may be connected with changing governments as well. Despite the historical attempts at the demonstration of a balanced approach towards both the Palestinians and the Israelis and a more pro-Palestinian position by the head of Norway's public opinion, in which the latter took place more recently in comparison to the former, Norway's policies have been in opposition to these developments and traits.⁹⁰⁸

Hence, the problems and inconsistencies in the balancing strategy of Norway can be considered accountable in the failures regarding the sustainability and institutionalization of the Oslo peace process, let alone its further improvement. There

⁹⁰⁶ Tamar Hermann, and David Newman, "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking", in John Darby, and Roger Mac Ginty (Eds.), **The Management of Peace Processes**, London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000, p. 107.

⁹⁰⁷ Barak, "Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace...", pp. 720-721.

⁹⁰⁸ Pace, "Norway's Ambiguous Approach...", pp. 65-66.

were notable contributions of Norwegian diplomats and practitioners, mainly from the Labour Party. Nevertheless, practitioners and leaders-oriented approaches need to be supported with comprehensive and long-term strategies. The reason is that adherence to pragmatic and temporal approaches, albeit flawed, can generate protracted peace and can reinforce the underlying roots of the conflict and the ontological insecurities of the parties.

The controversies in the policies of a third-party can jeopardize the embracement of long-term strategies while decreasing the level of confidence and trust of the warring parties in outsider interventions and the prospects of peace. Despite informal efforts, the effects of governmental alterations upon Middle Eastern policy and peace diplomacy can also undermine one's credibility, but not necessarily.

As observed by the disrupted involvement of Sweden, changing governments can generate disruptive outcomes for the processes of peace mediation and facilitation. In response to such disruptive outcomes, Sweden chose to benefit from its cooperation with Norway. Norway, on the other hand, maintained informal contacts. In both cases, the approval of the USA was sought. Hence, the effects of domestic political alterations, along with the systemic conditions, the USA's consent, and the negligence of historical background of the conflict confirm that the main warring parties, as being shaped by their past grievances and traumas, were not adequately prioritized amidst the efforts for the compensation in forms of Nordic cooperation and informal diplomacy. This assessment related to the de-emphasis of the underlying roots also reveals a gap between the incorporation of political psychological approaches and third-party roles.

It is crucial to emphasize that negotiations concerning permanent arrangements and postponed issues came to a breakdown. This was due to the political climate in the years of 1995 and 1996.⁹⁰⁹ Despite process, outcome, and even conflict transformation-oriented achievements such as problem-solving approach and efforts for the creation of conflict management systems and peaceful co-existence, Norway could not be effective in addressing the underlying roots of the conflict. Of critical importance is that ontological insecurities of the parties were also sidelined at the expense of the opposition towards the peace dialogue and transgenerational traumas of the parties.

⁹⁰⁹ Hermann, and Newman, "A Path Strewn with Thorns...", p. 117.

In this process, influencing the actions and mindsets of the warring parties was also proven to be ineffective, let alone the development of a broader perspective towards peace. Norway was also unsuccessful in changing the nature and intractability of this lingering conflict. Despite these failures, Norway acquired worldwide recognition due to its facilitative role in the peace agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993. Further to this, Norway received a string of requests in order to assist other conflicting groups.⁹¹⁰

Therefore, one can contend that the failure of Norway was not capable of damaging its peaceful recognition and the reflection of diplomatic capabilities. This was also observable in the case of Sri Lanka, on which Norway was invited for third-party involvement. The reason for the maintenance of Norway's worldwide appreciation can be linked to the primary role assigned to the warring parties, the emphasis on a process-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation, the problem of peace spoilers, and the variety of internal/external actors in the case of Palestine.

However, the inclusion of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation, in particular, reveals both contradictions and weaknesses with regard to perceptions towards the third-party role of Norway and its performance, respectively. As emphasizing this, the following sub-section will examine the third-party role of Norway in the case of Sri Lanka.

Section IV - The case of Sri Lanka in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation

In this sub-section, the conflict between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government and the third-party role of Norway will be explored. In essence, deteriorating large-group relations, grievances and hostilities, the deprivation of basic human needs, and the escalation of ethno-religious tensions led to a civil war on the island. The civil war and the pursuit of Tamil separatism could not be peacefully addressed and resolved. It is for this reason that Norway's third-party role needs to be addressed more comprehensively so we can learn more from failures.

In response to this protracted conflict, Norway provided assistance through the practices of peace mediation and facilitation between the years of 1997 and 2006. However, Norway's peaceful efforts failed to resolve the underlying roots of the

⁹¹⁰ Daniel Lieberfeld, "Small is Credible: Norway's Niche in International Dispute Settlement", **Negotiation Journal: On the Process of Dispute Settlement**, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1995, p. 201.

conflict. Further to this, the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in the year of 2004 could not be compelling in ending violence and establishing peace dialogue, let alone conflict resolution and conflict transformation. As a result, the failure of third-party mechanisms was followed by the military defeat of the LTTE. The following sub-sections will look into the dynamics and third-party role of Norway surrounding the case of Sri Lanka.

a. Historical background of the conflict in Sri Lanka: The conflict between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and a glimpse of the Nordic monitoring

The case of Sri Lanka can be characterized by a protracted ethnic conflict⁹¹¹ that could not be peacefully resolved. Rather, military victory of the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE was advocated as the elimination of this conflict, allegedly grounded in terrorism. However, this restrictive perspective fails to recognize the underlying roots of the conflict and obstructs avenues for reconciliation. In essence, discriminatory governmental policies, failure for the establishment of a national unity, nationalism, efforts for Tamil separatism, and military confrontation through the LTTE affected the relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils, as the main large-groups, in the island country.

Facilitation of peace settlements between parties involved in a civil war entails various challenges for decision- and policy-makers. Despite the grave consequences of civil wars, including the risks of spilling over national boundaries, massive refugee flows, complex humanitarian crises and genocide, and the relatively high frequency of civil wars, there has been a lack of knowledge and consideration for the management of civil wars.⁹¹² In response to this negligence concerning the management of civil wars, the case of Sri Lanka deserves critical elaboration in understanding the factors behind the peace process as brokered by Norway.

With the occurrence of civil war, political efforts for conflict settlement became more elusive. In this process, different forms of aggression, humanitarian crisis and human rights violations were intensified. Both home-grown, regional, and

⁹¹¹ However, this conflict was also approached from a class perspective rather than an ethnic perspective. For example, see: Siri Gamage, "Radicalisation of the Tamil Middle Class and Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1994, pp. 161-178.; Nevertheless, the author of this Thesis approaches this conflict from an identity perspective that entails the effects of ethnicity. However, it is acknowledged that this perspective does not negate class perspective.

⁹¹² Greig, and Regan, "When Do They Say Yes?... ", p. 759.

international efforts for peace and conflict resolution could not be successful against the complex dynamics of this protracted conflict. Despite some notable process- and outcome-oriented achievements of Norway, the underlying roots of this conflict and the incompatibilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government could not be addressed in such a manner as capable of leading to peaceful co-existence.

In essence, an inter-ethnic conflict broke out between the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka following the independence of the country. The Sinhalese, as constituting the majority, are mainly Buddhists, whereas the Tamils, as constituting the largest minority, are mainly Hindus. The Tamils have resided in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island. Despite such differences, the relationship between these communities was actually characterized by peaceful co-existence. Hence, the conflict can be placed into the twentieth century, especially the period following the independence. These large-groups have been differentiated in terms of the constitution of the majority and of the largest minority in the island, language, and religion.⁹¹³ Such differences affected the trajectory of the conflict and large-group relations.

With that being said, some of the foundations of this protracted ethno-political conflict were also established during the colonial period on the island.⁹¹⁴ The differences between the Tamils and Sinhalese were enhanced, diversified, and institutionalized under the auspices of the colonial rulers.⁹¹⁵ Therefore, the Sinhalese and Tamil conflict can be positioned into the period of British rule or to the conditions at the independence of Sri Lanka depending on one's predilection.⁹¹⁶ Nevertheless, it can be contended that the colonial past and political conditions following the independence of the country affected the genesis of this protracted conflict while reinforcing the aforesaid differences between the Sinhalese and Tamil large-groups.

⁹¹³ Bendigt Olsen, **The Sri Lanka Conflict: A Study of Elite Perceptions**, Bergen : Development Research and Action Programme (DERAP) Publications, Department of Social Science and Development of Chr. Michelsen Institute, No. 251, 1989, p. 1.

⁹¹⁴ Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, and Gunnar Sørbo, **Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009**, Oslo, Norway : Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), September 2011, p. 3.

⁹¹⁵ Olsen, **Sri Lanka Conflict: A Study...**, pp. 23-24.

⁹¹⁶ Marshall R. Singer, "Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic Conflict: Alternative Solutions", **Asian Survey**, Vol. 32, No. 8, Aug. 1992, pp. 712-713.; For a study that focuses on the effects of pre-colonial, and colonial periods, inherited political animosity, and the encountered problems in the process of the independence, please see the following book that also suggests further readings: Sinnappah Arasaratnam, **Ceylon**, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., A Spectrum Book, 1964.; For the historical background of the conflict, see also: Kingsley Muthumuni de Silva, **Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985**, Lanham, Md. : University Press of America, 1986.; For a summary of the background of this conflict, see: Howard Wriggins, "Sri Lanka: Negotiations in a Secessionist Conflict", in I. William Zartman (Ed.), **Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars**, Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 36-38.

In response to governmental policies and communal riots, there were concerns about the achievement of national unity in the country. From the outset, it was apparent that national disunity was intensifying. Further to this, poverty, poor economic development, and unemployment were other sources of grievances following the period of independence.⁹¹⁷ In this process, constitutional alterations, including the “Official Language Act of 1956” caused grievances among the Tamils. With this act, socio-economic opportunities were strengthened for the majority while the rights of the minorities were deprived. Moreover, the Sri Lankan political structure obstructed efforts to change this act unless the Sinhalese lawmakers, who approved this act in the beginning, support such change.⁹¹⁸

The exclusion and repression of the minority rights have reflected the failure of national unity and the incompatibility between the ontological security of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. In response to this failure and incompatibility, concerns and resentments of the Tamils were intensified against the Sri Lankan government. Such reactions were materialized in political and military efforts and culminated in the demand for a separate state. Separation was considered a necessity to restore the damaged large-group identity of the Tamils and to meet their basic human needs.⁹¹⁹ In this process, national disunity outgrew with regard to governmental policies, discontentment, and counter-reactions. Taken together, there was a widespread disappointment grounded in both national and class disunity.

It was apparent that the democratic system of Sri Lanka was unsuccessful in the processes of state-building and national identity construction in an inclusive manner. Efforts for inclusiveness were critical in addressing and meeting the rights of the minorities. However, national identity politics of the Sri Lankan government were grounded in marginalization and economic, political, and social inequalities and

⁹¹⁷ William Howard Wriggins, **Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation**, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 4-5.; With that being said, there were also problems and established guerilla groups prior to the independence. This is compiled and assessed in the following article: Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “The Tamil ‘Tigers’ in Northern Sri Lanka: Origins, Factions, Programmes”, **Internationales Asienforum**, Vol. 17, No. 1/2, 1986, pp. 63-64.

⁹¹⁸ Neil DeVotta, **Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka**, Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 73-74.; In addition to the relations between the Sinhalese and the Tamil, there are two distinguishable ethnic groups as the Moors and the Burghers in the island. See: Wriggins, **Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation**, p. 23.

⁹¹⁹ The deprivation of the basic human needs and rights is also evident in the reactions against governmental policies. Accordingly, governmental policies were considered as a threat against the identity and survival of the Tamils. As a result, it is emphasized that class unity was also prevented between large-groups on the island. See: A. S. Balasingham, **Liberation Tigers and Tamil Eelam Freedom Struggle**, No. 4, Political Committee of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, August 1983, pp. 3-4.

disproportionality associated with the core-periphery relations.⁹²⁰ Peaceful protests of the Tamils could not be successful in bringing a meaningful political change. These protests were due to broken agreements and inconsistencies in the governmental policies. In this regard, the riots in July 1983 were violent for the Tamils, including civilians. This is why the LTTE, as a prominent separatist armed group, persisted in its militant actions.⁹²¹ In this regard, the conflict spiral was deepened in the island.

According to information obtained by the UCDP, an intra-state conflict emerged between the Tamil militant groups, dominant of which became the LTTE and devoured its weaker Tamil opponents, and the Sri Lankan government in 1983. This intra-state conflict was actually followed by a low-intensity conflict. The purposes for non-discrimination and equality were pursued due to the centralization of power by a Sinhalese elite and detrimental laws against the Tamils. The demands of the Tamil groups, which were transformed into self-government and independence, were especially observable in the areas in which they hold the majority.⁹²² In response to the deadlock of this conflict, efforts for self-government and independence were thus intensified.

The main driver of this confrontation has been ethno-political rather than religious. Although different religious affiliations, such as Buddhism for the majority of Sinhalese people and Hinduism for the majority of Tamils, played an important role. In this context, Buddhist clergy was instrumental in the mobilization of support towards Sinhalese nationalism. Further to this, both the Sinhalese and Tamil people have been divided on the basis of caste, class, and regional affiliations. Actually, internal divisions have sometimes been more critical compared to ethnic divide. As a result, it has become more challenging to reach a political settlement.⁹²³

In the light of these remarks, the approachment to this conflict through main large-groups in the country can be restrictive given the importance of internal divisions in terms of caste, class, and region. Nevertheless, a framework grounded in large-

⁹²⁰ Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, **Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...**, p. 3.

⁹²¹ Singer, "Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic...", p. 713.

⁹²² The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Sri Lanka", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/780> (accessed 12.11.2022).

⁹²³ International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process**, Asia Report N°124, 28 November 2006, p. 1, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-failure-peace-process> (accessed 12.09.2023).; For the role of religion in this protracted conflict, please see: Bardwell L. Smith (Ed.), **Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka, 1927-47**, New Delhi : Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1995.

group identity can be important in understanding how negligence and repression of one large-group can generate detrimental consequences and humanitarian crises.

Also, a group consisting of Sinhala militants disrupted national administration in the south and west areas of the island. Hence, not only the armed Tamil groups but also this group referred to as the People's Liberation Front (*"Janata Vimukti Peramuna"*, JVP) threatened the authority of the Colombo government. Taken together, political crisis and violence were embedded in the country following forty years of its independence from Great Britain. Large sections of its north and east areas were, on the other hand, were controlled by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). There was a regular threat to this force from Tamil groups.⁹²⁴

In essence, the reason for the emergence of this confrontation has been grounded in discriminative governmental policies, which caused grievances among the Tamils. These policies have been considered as deliberate efforts oriented at undermining the equal status and political and economic rights of the Tamils. Further to this, counter-efforts and proposals for the accommodation of the Tamil rights and negotiation of a settlement were prevented by the Sinhalese political party in opposition. There were also anti-Tamil riots against the negotiated agreements and proposals. This process led to frustrations and resulted in Tamil separatism, military resistance, and civil war.⁹²⁵

Also, the absence of an overarching national image played a catalyzing role for the path towards Tamil separatism. Accordingly, the Sri Lankan government constructed and established such a national identity as linked to only one group and religion, which corresponded to the Sinhala people and Buddhism.⁹²⁶ Drawing from these remarks, the underlying roots of this protracted conflict can be explained in terms of discrimination, failure to address ethno-political grievances and frustrations, power

⁹²⁴ Jonathan Spencer, "Introduction: The Power of the Past", in Jonathan Spencer (Ed.), **Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict**, London and New York : Routledge, 1990, p. 1.

⁹²⁵ Bendigt Olsen, **Sri Lanka Conflict: A Study...**, p. 1.; The impediments for the resolution of this conflict also entailed the prejudice and suspicion of the Sinhalese towards federalism; the effects of the competition between the ruling and the opposition Sinhalese political parties, referred to as United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), respectively, in advocating for the Sinhalese Buddhists; the militaristic approachment of the Sri Lankan government to this conflict; distrust of the Sinhalese towards the LTTE; mutual distrust between the Sinhalese and the Tamils; the greater division of the Tamil groups compared to the Sinhalese; the adherence of the LTTE to an independent Tamil state, and to stand as the only representative of the Tamil people that also affected the radicalization of this organization; distrust of Tamils, including non-LTTE members, in the LTTE's commitment to any deal. Additionally, the Tamil militant groups' approach to the Tamil homeland as a political unit, with the integration of the Northern and Eastern provinces, has been met with opposition from many Sinhalese and lacks endorsement from moderate Tamils and Muslims in the East. Singer, "Sri Lanka's Tamil-Sinhalese Ethnic...", pp. 713-716.

⁹²⁶ Spencer, "Introduction: Power of the Past", p. 9.

centralization against the large-group identity of the Tamils, the effects of Sinhalese nationalism, the nationalist response of the Tamils, and efforts carried out by the Sinhalese opposition parties and by the protests that prevented political initiatives oriented at improving the Tamil rights, among others.

In this process, LTTE evolved from a prior group named as Tamil New Tigers, that was established in 1972. With the purpose of the creation of a separate Tamil state in the north and the east of Sri Lanka, the LTTE was created in 1976 and led by *Vellupillai Prabhakaran*. The LTTE has been characterized by Tamil nationalism with a tendency towards socialism. In its inception, this organization was also supported by India in terms of arms and training of Tamil Tigers and protection for guerrillas and operatives. Also, Tamil Nadu, as a state of India, offered a shelter for Tamil Tigers. Nevertheless, the support was ended with the deployment of IPKF in 1987 and LTTE's assassination of *Rajiv Gandhi*, former Prime Minister of India, in 1991.⁹²⁷ The support towards the LTTE and relations with the LTTE reveal spill-over effects of this conflict.

Importantly, the LTTE became the dominant group among the Tamil militant groups. In this regard, there were several underground groups aimed at pursuing an independent Tamil Eelam.⁹²⁸ What made the LTTE distinctive was, (i) its alliance with the opposite Tamil groups, which entailed the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) and lasted between the years of 1985 and mid-1986; the abandonment of this strategy and the demolishment of its Tamil rivals that led to the proliferation of non-state conflicts; the creation of its Black Tigers unit that utilized suicide bombing, and created a *de facto* state.⁹²⁹ Such actions further consolidated the distinction between main large-group identities on the island.

Suicide bombing and the establishment of a *de facto* state revealed the deepened direction of this conflict and animosities that were not necessarily limited to the main large-groups on the island. Accordingly, hostile actions also took place among the Sinhalese and Tamil groups. This is evident in the activities of the JVP that threatened

⁹²⁷ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "LTTE", n.d., <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/320> (accessed 12.11.2022).; Despite the formation of different groups, commitment to a Marxist-Leninist ideology, on top of a Tamilar ethnic consciousness, affected these guerilla groups and strands. See: Hellmann-Rajanayagam, "Tamil 'Tigers' in Northern Sri Lanka...", p. 65.

⁹²⁸ Robert N. Kearney, "Sri Lanka in 1985: The Persistence of Conflict", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 26, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1985: Part II, February 1986, p. 219.

⁹²⁹ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "LTTE".

the government and the strategies of the LTTE regarding the demolition of its rivals in other Tamil groups and organizations.

Towards the purpose directed to an independent state, which was practically materialized, there was a commitment to the use of violence by several underground groups, collectively known as the “Tiger Movement.” In this process, the conflict between the well-armed bands of Tiger guerrillas and military forces of the government escalated into pitched battles by the year of 1984.⁹³⁰ Taken together, constitutional, economic, political, and social problems led to the escalation of conflict and the emergence of civil war that has caused displacement, human rights violations, the loss of lives, and transgenerational traumas. No doubt that the 1972 constitution, which altered the name of the country from *Ceylon* to Sri Lanka while assigning Buddhism a foremost role, played a critical role in the increased tensions on the island.⁹³¹

In this regard, the demand for a separate Tamil state was raised and pushed by the political party of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).⁹³² Underlying the purpose for an independent Tamil Eelam was grounded in the assumption that a predominantly Sinhalese state would never guarantee the rights of the Tamils. Therefore, the Tamil Tigers pursued an independent Tamil state as “Tamil Eelam.”⁹³³ Actually, the demand for independence was further intensified following the riots in the election year of 1977.⁹³⁴ Separatist efforts were accompanied by increasing levels of mistrust and suspicion towards the government.

As a result of the national elections, the government of *J.R. Jayawardena* was brought to power. TULF was in favour of the conclusion that the resolution of the Tamil question could not be achieved within the *status quo*. For this reason, the creation of a state, namely *Eelam*, was seen as imperative. With that being said, the path towards the Tamil state was actually designed as peaceful and non-violent by the

⁹³⁰ Kearney, “Sri Lanka in 1985: Persistence...”, p. 219.

⁹³¹ International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process**, p. 3.

⁹³² Kearney, “Sri Lanka in 1985: Persistence...”, p. 219.

⁹³³ Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescou, “Counselling and Training for...”, p. 137.; There have also been several separatist Tamil militant groups, led by the Tamil Tigers. See: Bryan Pfaffenberger, “Sri Lanka in 1986: A Nation at the Crossroads”, **Asian Survey**, Vol. 27, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1986: Part II, Feb. 1987, p. 155.

⁹³⁴ Hellmann-Rajanayagam, “Tamil ‘Tigers’ in Northern Sri Lanka...”, p. 66.; In the year of 1977, there was parliamentary election as held in Sri Lanka. For the results of this election and failures of the minor political parties, see: Vijaya Samaraweera, “Sri Lanka’s 1977 General Election: The Resurgence of the UNP”, **Asian Survey**, Vol. 17, No. 12, Dec. 1977, pp. 1202-1206.; As for the TULF, on the other hand, there was only one discernible failure regarding the inability for the obtainment of support from the Tamil speaking Muslims. Samaraweera, “Sri Lanka’s 1977 General Election...”, pp. 1205-1206.

TULF. However, the failure of this purpose and repression by the government in return affected armed movement and militancy. Of critical importance is that the military response of the government was directed towards the whole northern people.⁹³⁵ As a result, peaceful handling and resolution of this conflict became more elusive.

Despite the worsening relations and increasing aggression, the year of 1977 also marked the commencement of negotiations. But the negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE that began in 1977 have been protracted in character. Originally, the LTTE pursued a minimum of decentralization against a highly centralized government.⁹³⁶ Militant Tamils were not satisfied with the outcomes of the 1979 and 1982 negotiations. Moreover, fears and mistrust were intensified towards the government.⁹³⁷

In essence, the Tamil separatist crisis has been marked by intractable issues. This is why achieving a negotiated settlement was quite challenging. This was also true during the 1986 negotiations.⁹³⁸ Concerning the failure for the arrival of a negotiated settlement, protractedness, both in the context of the nature of this conflict and of peace processes, has characterized the case of Sri Lanka.

Moreover, the period following the 1977 elections increased grievances and deepened violence. During the *Jayawardena* regime, for example, goon squads began to be systematically utilized against activists and supporters in opposition. The goon squads resorted to violence, killing, and terror while repressing student protests.⁹³⁹ In August 1978, a new constitution was passed in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the effects of minorities in the elections were aimed to be reflected through the introduction of a preferential voting system, and the Tamil language was added to the national languages of Sri Lanka. However, dictatorial powers were provided to the president. Moreover, *Jayewardene* and the United National Party (UNP), who obtained a

⁹³⁵ The Social Studies Circle of the Sri Lankan Worker-Peasant Institute, "Anti-Tamil Riots and the Political Crisis in Sri Lanka", **Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars**, Vol. 16, No. 1, Jan. - March 1984, p. 27.

⁹³⁶ Howard Wriggins, "Sri Lanka: Negotiations in a Secessionist Conflict", in I. William Zartman (Ed.), **Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars**, Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 35.; For information on the initiation of negotiations, the role of India as a third-party, and the outcomes that signify protracted peace initiatives, please see this chapter: Wriggins, "Sri Lanka: Negotiations in...", pp. 35-58.

⁹³⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 43.

⁹³⁸ Pfaffenberger, "Sri Lanka in 1986: A Nation...", p. 155.

⁹³⁹ The Social Studies Circle of the Sri Lankan Worker-Peasant Institute, "Anti-Tamil Riots and Political Crisis...", p. 28.

majority in the 1977 elections, were not willing for the accommodation of the Tamil demands.⁹⁴⁰

Within this framework, the year of 1985 revealed how the termination of an ethnic conflict was more difficult compared to the emergence of an ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.⁹⁴¹ During the 1980s, the conflict was escalated and complicated. Further to this, peaceful efforts could not be effective, thereby consolidating the protracted nature of the conflict. As reflecting this, the peace process of Norway oriented at exploring opportunities for peace dialogue between the years of 1997 and 2001 could not be successful in brokering a ceasefire or in facilitating talks between the warring parties.⁹⁴² In the following sub-section, the efforts of Norway and the commencement of its third-party involvement will be addressed.

b. The inception of the peace mediation and facilitation and the involvement of the Kingdom of Norway

In the case of Sri Lanka, Norway was invited for the role of peace facilitation in the year of 2000.⁹⁴³ In the fall of 1998, on the other hand, the LTTE representatives reached out to *Erik Solheim*, who established contacts with some Sri Lankan politicians and Tamil Tigers during his limited time in Sri Lanka, in the *Storting* (Norwegian Parliament). The LTTE representatives informed *Solheim* about their proposal directed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway with the objective of the initiation of a peace process. Accordingly, they suggested that Norway could help *Anton Balasingham*, as the chief ideologist and one of the prominent leaders of Tamils. As a result, it was designated that *Balasingham* could play a critical role in the negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities. Following the contact between *Solheim* and *Knut Vollebæk*, Norwegian Foreign Minister at the time, Norway provided a two-folded contact with the main warring parties in secret.⁹⁴⁴ This process was followed by the request of the Sri Lankan authorities.

⁹⁴⁰ DeVotta, **Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional...**, p. 143.

⁹⁴¹ Kearney, "Sri Lanka in 1985: Persistence...", p. 219.

⁹⁴² Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, **Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...**, p. 3.

⁹⁴³ International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process**, p. 5.

⁹⁴⁴ Erik Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville ("Politics is Wanted")**, (in collaboration with Marit O. Bromark), First Edition, Oslo : Cappelen Damm, 2013, p. 119.; The original text in Norwegian.; In this process, Norway also approached to the GAM for several times in the case of Aceh. See: Djuli, and Rahman, "Helsinki Negotiations...", p. 28.

Thus, in response to the request of Sri Lankan President *Kumaratunga* and the LTTE, Norway assisted the parties in resolving this ethnic conflict.⁹⁴⁵ Norwegian Diplomat *Erik Solheim* was involved in the peace negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.⁹⁴⁶ According to *Solheim*, the demands of the Tamils in the North-Eastern Sri Lanka for autonomy and independence, wide support of Tamils for these demands, and the objection of the Sinhalese underpin the conflict in Sri Lanka. Hence, the case of Sri Lanka is actually about discussions and issues directed to the co-existence of the Sinhalese and Tamils on the island.⁹⁴⁷

As emphasized in the previous sections, there can be different ideas regarding the emergence of this protracted conflict. In this context, *Solheim* frames the emergence of this conflict within the period following the independence of Sri Lanka from Great Britain. Hence, the underlying roots of the conflict have been grounded in the linguistic and religious repressions of the government. This is why the conflict escalated into a civil war and could not be resolved.⁹⁴⁸

In response to this, the facilitative role of Norway was commenced with the objective to support the parties following the invitation of the Sri Lankan authorities and the LTTE. According to the Norwegian government, Norway functioned as an impartial facilitator for the negotiations that were carried out between the years of 1999 and 2006. In the year of 2002, a ceasefire was signed and monitored by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The SLMM, as a civilian observer mission, was led by Norway. The ceasefire agreement resulted in the conduction of six rounds of peace negotiations.⁹⁴⁹

⁹⁴⁵ Anne Kristin Sydnæs, "Celebrating 50 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Sri Lanka and Norway", Speech/Statement, 25 October 2000, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2000/celebrating_50_years_of_diplomatic/id264035/ (accessed 12.07.2024).; With that being said, there were earlier occasions that entailed Norway's offerings for its peaceful engagement. There were also peace mediation requests directed to Norway in the 1990s. See: Ada Nissen, "The Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace Diplomacy since 1989", **PhD Dissertation**, Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History, Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, 2015, pp. 124-129.; For the motivations and reasons of Norway, including its self-interested motives and its pressures, in its third-party intervention in Sri Lanka, see: Asoka Bandarage, **The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy**, London and New York : Routledge, 2008, pp. 181-182.; See also: Höglund, and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", pp. 182-183.

⁹⁴⁶ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway Daily No. 65/00", **Aftenposten, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Oslo Press Division**, 31 March 2000, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2000/norway_daily_no-65-00/id233086/ (accessed 12.07.2024).

⁹⁴⁷ Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 118.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁹⁴⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "National Reconciliation in Sri Lanka", 06 July 2022, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation->

Taken together, the ceasefire and peace negotiations underpinned the essence of process- and outcome-oriented contributions of Norway. Drawing from such remarks, which provided a glimpse into the materialization of the third-party role of Norway in Sri Lanka, it is important to understand the factors that affected the suitability of Norway for this challenging task, along with the conditions that led to peace mediation and facilitation exercises and notable achievements in terms of process- and outcome-oriented lenses.

Among these conditions were military defeats, economic crisis, the results of the December 2001 elections and the victory of the UNP, which campaigned for conflict settlement in Sri Lanka, the initiation of a bilateral process led by *Ranil Wickremesinghe*, the new Prime Minister of Sri Lanka at the time, for the role of Norway, war weariness, the LTTE's need for time and obtainment of political recognition, and the Sri Lankan government's need for economic reinvigoration favoured the outcome of this process in terms of the arrival of a ceasefire.⁹⁵⁰ All of these conditions and developments also accounted for ripeness in the case of Sri Lanka.

Importantly, the ceasefire, which took hold in February 2002 between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, was arranged through the facilitation of Norway rather than direct dialogue between the warring parties.⁹⁵¹ The ceasefire was a historic achievement to which Norway played an enabling role. As highlighted in the

[efforts/norways_engagement/srilanka_process/id2522246/](https://www.norway.no/en/efforts/norways_engagement/srilanka_process/id2522246/) (accessed 16.05.2023).; Norway's role has also been explained in terms of facilitation and/or mediation. For example, see: Ada Nissen, "Troublesome Peace Making: How American Views on Terrorism Affected Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka, 2000-2009", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2018, pp. 522-542.; Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...*, p. 13.; Höglund and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", pp. 175-176.; Nissen, "Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace...", pp. 149-151.; Sarah Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka*, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 77-105.

⁹⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process*, p. 5.; Norway was also considered as more suitable actor for peace mediation and facilitation compared to India. See: Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and Resurgence of War...*, pp. 77-78.; For the circumstances and factors that affected the initiation of the peace process, see: Rajat Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2004, pp. 904-910.; It is also important to note that ideas suggesting the LTTE was weak, thereby decided to initiate peace negotiations are not accurate. *Erik Solheim* stresses that the LTTE had significant political and military influence in the years of 2000 and 2001. Actually, their military power was never as strong as it was in 2001. Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, pp. 123-124.; In this regard, their acceptance of a mediator should be seen from their efforts to improve their legitimacy and recognition. Höglund, and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", p. 181.

⁹⁵¹ Kristine Höglund, and Isak Svensson, "The Peace Process in Sri Lanka", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2002, p. 109.

previous sub-section, the initial peaceful efforts of Norway were not successful.⁹⁵² Nevertheless, the ceasefire cultivated optimism and generated hope for the preparation of further initiatives.

In this process, the willingness of the Sri Lankan government for dialogue and negotiations can be explained by referencing increasing recognition regarding the solution of this ethnic conflict through non-military means. The LTTE, who experienced a psychological blow when the Jaffna peninsula was captured by the Sri Lanka Armed Forces in January 1996, also became aware that military strength and defence do not lead to victory on the battlefield. They were trapped in a cycle since there was neither military defeat nor military victory. These recognitions favoured the initiation of dialogue and negotiations that could be carried out under the presence of a valid spokesperson, including Norway. The presence of such a valid spokesperson could allow for the creation of a perception as an alternative to destruction and war.⁹⁵³ In this regard, Norway's peaceful reputation and its status as a distant and small state rather than as a colonial power played enabling roles.⁹⁵⁴

In this regard, all of these considerations coincided with the expanding undertakings of Norwegian peace diplomacy. Accordingly, the late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed the expansion of Norway's peace diplomacy. This expansion was illustrated by the increasing number of peace projects to which Norway was involved.⁹⁵⁵ Prior to the request of the warring parties for Norway's peace facilitation, development cooperation between Norway and the Sri Lankan government, Norway's reputation in relation to its role in peace processes, and the invested time by the Norwegian team in establishing contacts and promoting trust with the decision-makers from both parties also positively affected its involvement.⁹⁵⁶

These efforts, initiatives, and cooperation at the governmental level strengthened the credibility of Norway. Therefore, it can be contended that the combination of the aforesaid conditions/purposes, increased attention upon the third-party roles of

⁹⁵² Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbø, **Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...**, p. 3.; A detailed account of the initial efforts can be found in the following publication: Nissen, "Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace...", pp. 137-144.

⁹⁵³ Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", pp. 72-73.

⁹⁵⁴ Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville**, p. 120.; For the reasons that affected the choice of Norway as a third-party, see also: Nissen, "Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace...", pp. 144-145.

⁹⁵⁵ Nissen, "Peace Architects: Norwegian Peace...", p. 135.

⁹⁵⁶ Vidar Helgesen, "Peace and Reconciliation. Norway's Experience", Speech/Statement at the Indonesian - Norwegian Human Rights Dialogue Seminar on Transitional Justice and Human Rights, Jakarta, 29 April 2002, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2002/peace_and_reconciliation-norways/id266112/ (accessed 12.08.2024).

Norway, and the efforts of Norway for the creation of contacts and trustworthy interactions affected its acceptability as a third-party by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. This process resulted in the arrival of a ceasefire as signed between the main warring parties.

With that being said, Norway was also attacked both by the media and politicians in its third-party role. There were views that suggested the Norwegian approach was not realistic and was limited due to deficient knowledge towards the politics in South Asia. From another and more positive perspective, Norway was considered committed to bring the warring parties together amidst the harsh challenges.⁹⁵⁷ In response to such critiques, on the other hand, one can contend that the underlying roots of the conflict were understood by Norway.

As reaffirming the underlying roots of this conflict, *Vidar Helgesen*, as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway at the time, for example, emphasized that this protracted conflict has been grounded in the discrimination as faced and perceived by the Tamil minority against the policies of the Sinhalese state. Discrimination was felt since the independence of the country. The conflict was escalated with the involvement of the LTTE in armed fighting and war. The mutual hostilities and violence could not be prevented through the efforts for conflict settlement and military means. Of critical importance is that more than 60,000 lives were lost since the year of 1983. In response to this, Norway was asked to support the parties for a political solution.⁹⁵⁸

Consequently, Norway facilitated and supported the peacemaking process in Sri Lanka. Economic aid, development, and recovery were prioritized during the period of ceasefire and peacemaking.⁹⁵⁹ This is why Norway sought a high level of internationalization.⁹⁶⁰ These objectives were also evident in the Sri Lankan government's *Regaining Sri Lanka: Vision and Strategy for Accelerated Development*. In this program, the importance of conflict resolution and ethnic reconciliation has been emphasized for the reduction of poverty in Sri Lanka. It has been stressed that the conflict has caused the loss of lives, displacement, and infrastructural deterioration while damaging productive assets and social capital. Both war-torn areas and rural poor youth have been affected by this conflict adversely. This process also witnessed discrimination as faced by ethnic minorities. Taking the comprehensive effects of two

⁹⁵⁷ Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...*, p. 6.

⁹⁵⁸ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Peace and Reconciliation. Norway's Experience".

⁹⁵⁹ Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and Resurgence of War...*, pp. 4-5.

⁹⁶⁰ Höglund, and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", pp. 176-177.

decades of conflict into account, restoring peace has been considered the most important challenge to reduce conflict-related poverty.⁹⁶¹

In this process, Norway contacted not only the warring parties but also those with knowledge of Sri Lanka in India and the USA.⁹⁶² With the ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, dated 22 February 2002, the purpose has been oriented at solving this protracted conflict. As a result, both parties have recognized the importance of terminating the hostilities and improving living conditions. Further to this, ending the hostilities has been linked to the establishment of a conducive atmosphere for a lasting solution. In this context, the parties agreed to implement a ceasefire; to refrain from conduct that jeopardizes the noble intentions and violates the spirit of the agreement, and to apply confidence-building measures. Of equal importance is that a consensus has also been developed about how groups, particularly the Muslim population not involved in the conflict, have also been affected by this conflict. Therefore, civilian security measures covered all inhabitants in Sri Lanka.⁹⁶³

The implementation of the ceasefire was strengthened by SLMM, which functioned as an observer rather than as a peacekeeping force.⁹⁶⁴ During the peace process, Norway acted as an arbitrator between the warring parties in Sri Lanka. Also, Norway permitted the Tamils located in Norway to raise donations for the LTTE. This is critical given the consideration of Tamil Tigers as one of the terrorist organizations in Great Britain, dated April 2001.⁹⁶⁵ Prior to the ceasefire, Norway established a communication channel between the parties. Actually, the LTTE's unilateral decision for a ceasefire was ratified with the aforesaid ceasefire agreement. This decision was taken after the elections in Sri Lanka.⁹⁶⁶ Taken together, the third-party role of Norway entailed arbitration, peace facilitation, peacemaking, and peace mediation.

⁹⁶¹ Government of Sri Lanka, **Regaining Sri Lanka: Vision and Strategy for Accelerated Development**, December 2002, p. 47.

⁹⁶² Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 120.

⁹⁶³ **Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**, Sri Lanka Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), United Nations Peacemaker, 22 February 2002, Preamble, <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/lk020222ceasefireagreementgovernment-liberationtigerstamil-eelam.pdf> (accessed 15.05.2023).

⁹⁶⁴ Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and Resurgence of War...*, p. 78.

⁹⁶⁵ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway Daily No. 67/01", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Oslo Press Division**, 05 April 2001/21 October 2006, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2001/norway_daily_no-67-01/id233312/ (accessed 12.06.2024).

⁹⁶⁶ Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and Resurgence of War...*, p. 79.

With Norway's third-party assistance, signatory parties agreed to the cessation of military actions, bombardments, and operations with the exclusion of the safeguarding task of the Sri Lankan armed forces for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also, the forces of the warring parties have been separated. Maintaining an absolute distance while reserving the right of movement has been complementary with the cessation of military activities.⁹⁶⁷ Hence, the ceasefire entailed the termination of military actions and the separation of forces, along with the expanded right of movement for the unarmed troops from both parties.⁹⁶⁸

According to *Jan Petersen*, Foreign Minister of Norway at the time, a ceasefire was an important step given the distrust between the large-groups and their leaders. With the ceasefire, the parties demonstrated their willingness for the political solution of this conflict and the establishment of confidence. It is also affirmed that the parties were aware of the challenges for peace, reconciliation, and development. Concerning Norway's actions, *Petersen* contended that the configuration of this agreement reflected step-by-step, realistic, and practicable approaches. Also, an international monitoring mission led by Norway was asked for by the parties. This request can be seen as the demonstration of the commitment of the parties. Of equal importance is that the ceasefire also focused on the improvement of living conditions. Hence, humanitarian and developmental efforts were also embedded in this process.⁹⁶⁹

Efforts associated with confidence-building have been evident in the ceasefire. Accordingly, the cessation of hostile acts targeting civilians and their cultural or

⁹⁶⁷ United Nations Peacemaker, **Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**, Article 1.2-1.4.

⁹⁶⁸ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Announcement of Sri Lanka Ceasefire", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 22 February 2002, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2002/announcement-of-sri-lanka-ceasefire/id248788/> (accessed 18.05.2023).; For the freedom of movement, the parties agreed upon unrestricted passage of unarmed governmental troops between Jaffna and Vavuniya through the use of the Jaffna-Kandy road. Also, the visits of unarmed and non-uniformed combatants to areas controlled by the other party were permitted. However, such visits were confined to seeing family and friends for six days every two months. Despite a two-month restriction, the aforesaid individual combatants were allowed to visit their immediate relatives for unique occasions, such as weddings or funerals. Unarmed LTTE members, as limited in terms of the number of individuals with further additions in relation to the entry of the agreement into force, were also permitted freedom of movement in the areas resided in the North and the East of the country and controlled by the government for political works. With that being said, the parties had the right to deny access to specified military areas. See: **Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**, Article 1.10-1.13.

⁹⁶⁹ Jan Petersen, "Foreign Minister Jan Petersen's Statement to the Storting on Foreign Policy", Speech/Statement at the *Storting*, Oslo, 26 February 2002, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2002/foreign-minister-jan-petersens/id265571/> (accessed 18.05.2023).

religious sensitivities was agreed upon by the warring parties. As reflecting another step to restore normalcy, it was decided that occupied school buildings needed to be vacated. The parties agreed to reestablish conditions as aligning with the essential purpose of school buildings. The latest provision also applied to all other public buildings.⁹⁷⁰ These considerations and decisions reveal the determination and willingness of the parties.

Despite the invitation from the main warring parties, Norway's involvement was also protested. In the year of 2000, for example, there was a demonstration led by the Sinhalese nationalists. Accordingly, Norway's efforts for peace mediation and the role of *Erik Solheim*, as Norwegian peace negotiator, were protested by the demonstrators gathered outside of the Norwegian embassy in Sri Lanka.⁹⁷¹ In this regard, there were challenges reflected in the asymmetrical positions of the warring parties, terrorism, and nationalist critiques and protests. Despite such challenges, a ceasefire was signed between the parties.

Following the ceasefire agreement, the leader of the LTTE held a press conference for the first time after twelve years. In this context, *Velupillai Prabhakaran* explained that the LTTE pursues peace and political settlement in this ethnic conflict. Prabhakaran also stated that the LTTE can renounce the armed struggle in connection with an acceptable solution for the Tamil people while considering to abandon their demand for a separate Tamil state. These statements have been interpreted as meaning that *Prabhakaran* aims to improve the image and reputation of the LTTE as a liberation movement rather than as a terrorist organization, especially following September 11. In this regard, it is argued that *Prabhakaran* aims to change his guerrilla image by reinventing himself as a mainstream political leader.⁹⁷² This objective was also supported by Norway. As it will be revealed, Norway aimed to rectify the position of the LTTE. But this purpose could not be successful due to effects resulting from September 11.

⁹⁷⁰ **Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam**, Article 2.1-2.4.

⁹⁷¹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway Daily No. 222/00", **NTB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Press Division**, 17 November 2000/21 October 2006, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Stoltenbergs-1st-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2000/norway_daily_no-222-00/id233172/ (accessed 18.05.2023).; For the criticisms and protests directed to Norway, see also: International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process**, p. 18.

⁹⁷² Luke Harding, "Tamil Leader Signals the End of Civil War", **The Guardian**, 11 April 2002, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/11/srilanka> (accessed 18.05.2023).

Nonetheless, it can be argued that Norway influenced the firmly established positions of the warring parties for some time. This is reflected in the explanations of *Prabhakaran*, who took the abandonment of the demand for a separate state into consideration. With that being said, the LTTE was actually open to the discussion of possible solutions rather than separation for several years. This willingness, on the other hand, was grounded in governmental offerings as capable of meeting the fundamental aspirations of the Tamil people.⁹⁷³ However, it was not until the involvement of Norway that a formal ceasefire agreement was concluded between the parties. As reflecting this, Norway supported the parties in overcoming distrust and in establishing mutual confidence, security, and stability.

In announcing the ceasefire, *Jan Petersen* explained how this agreement would lead to further initiatives for peace negotiations through the commitment of the parties for the resumption of normalcy in the country. It was emphasized that this ceasefire represented both a critical step and the commencement of a long path for conflict resolution through political means, determination, and courage. In this announcement, it was also stressed that the assistance of Norway entailed the mobilization of political and financial support at the international level. Solidarity with Sri Lanka has been considered a necessity for peace and reconciliation.⁹⁷⁴ Drawing from such remarks, humanitarian aid can be considered one of the prominent techniques embedded in Norway's peace mediation and facilitation in the case of Sri Lanka. Aid is also regarded as the reinforcement of the link between peace and reconciliation.

Before the ceasefire, there were constructive talks, which lasted for eight hours between Norwegian ambassador *Jon Westborg*, embassy Second Secretary *Tomas Stangeland*, and *S. P. Tamilchelvan*, as the Head of the political wing of the LTTE, dated April 2001.⁹⁷⁵ Taking the role of such constructive talks into account, it is demonstrated that dialogue with all parties, who have been in search of a political solution, is required for the establishment of trust and improvement of mutual understanding.⁹⁷⁶ Hence, it can be contended that Norway navigates the willingness of the parties for a political solution into its efforts to create an atmosphere in which

⁹⁷³ Höglund, and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 113.

⁹⁷⁴ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Announcement of Sri Lanka Ceasefire".

⁹⁷⁵ Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 74.

⁹⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, "Hallmarks of Norway's Peace and Reconciliation Work", Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2024, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/innsiktsmappe/norway-peace-work/id446704/> (accessed 19.07.2024).

parties can develop mutual trust and understanding despite the protracted nature of the conflict. This is why dialogue is a prerequisite for further efforts directed to outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented achievements.

As an example of the importance of dialogue, Norway decided to no longer align itself with any list that has not been published by the UN that entails persons, groups, organizations, and entities, to which particular measures can be utilized in order to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorism. On 05 January 2006, it was announced that this decision was based on the efforts to avoid obstacles upon the neutral facilitator role of Norway and restrictions upon the opportunities for contact in the peace process with no disregard for cooperation and engagement in the fight against terrorism.⁹⁷⁷ Given the challenges related to the position of the LTTE, the approach of Norway can be considered as critical in promoting peace dialogue as long as the parties demonstrate tangible efforts for dialogue and a political solution.

In addition, renewed calls for Norway's peace facilitation confirmed Norway's acceptability and contributions in the peace process as well. In a letter, which was written by *Velupillai Prabhakaran* to *Kjell Magne Bondevik* as the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time, for example, a call was made for the involvement of Norway as a facilitator. The engagement of Norway was sought for the arrival of a stable peace and permanent settlement in the conflict. In this letter that was addressed on 01 January 2002, the LTTE leader expressed his gratitude for the efforts and assistance of Norwegian government oriented at negotiating a political settlement for the past two and a half years. In this letter, the approach of Norway was appreciated for its impartiality and neutrality in the practices of peace facilitation.⁹⁷⁸

Following the ceasefire in early 2002, six rounds of talks were held between September 2002 and March 2003 in Sri Lanka. This process witnessed the peace facilitation role of the Norwegian government between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.⁹⁷⁹ Taken together, Norway enabled a channel for the arrangement of a ceasefire and negotiations between the parties. In this process, Norway had both international support and an official invitation. With the international support and official invitation, the involvement of Norway had considerable legitimacy. *Erik*

⁹⁷⁷ Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Norway's Cooperation with the EU on the Fight against Terrorism" (Press Release), No.: 02/06, 05 January 2006.

⁹⁷⁸ TamilNet, "LTTE Leader Calls for Norwegian Engagement", 02 January 2002, <https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6594> (accessed 20.05.2023).

⁹⁷⁹ John Stephen Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States: Norway in Sri Lanka", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 385-386.

Solheim, as peace envoy, contributed to this process, along with the complementary roles of State Secretary *Vidar Helgesen*, Ambassador *Jon Westborg*, and Foreign Minister *Jan Petersen* at the time.⁹⁸⁰ Norway also asked for the assistance of the international community.⁹⁸¹

As reflecting this, government representatives from the Asia-Pacific region, North America, and Europe declared their support for the peace process on 25 November 2002. In the *Declaration in Support of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka*, government representatives from the aforementioned regions expressed their commitment to provide financial assistance. In this context, the emphasis was given to a donor conference, which was planned to be organized in Tokyo in 2003. The government representatives called for further efforts with no recourse to violence, the resolution of political issues, and the promotion of an inclusive peace process. These steps, as corresponding to promptive and systematic efforts and the resolution of deep-rooted and complex issues, were critical to reach a political settlement. In this process, the role of the SLMM, as responsible for maintaining the ceasefire agreement, was also appreciated.⁹⁸²

Regarding the link between financial assistance and peace, it is explained that international financial assistance can be critical given the humanitarian needs and obstacles/hardships related to economic and social progress in Sri Lanka. As a result, government representatives appreciated the establishment of a joint Sub-Committee on Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs and the creation of a Fund oriented at enhancing donor activities. The Sub-committee was established in the North and East, which experienced the most widespread destruction in Sri Lanka. Hence, financial support was pledged for the ongoing peaceful efforts in Sri Lanka with no disregard for the coordinative role of the Sub-committee in its reconstruction and confidence-building activities.⁹⁸³

Despite these efforts, more than 2,500 people, many of whom were civilians, were killed, and more than 200,000 people were displaced between the beginning of the year of 2006, which marked the collapse of the ceasefire, and November 2006. In

⁹⁸⁰ Höglund, and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 112.

⁹⁸¹ Petersen, "Foreign Minister Jan Petersen's Statement to the Storting on Foreign Policy".

⁹⁸² Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Declaration in Support of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka" (Press Release), Oslo : Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 25 November 2002/23 October 2006, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/2002/declaration-in-support-of-the-peace/id248415/> (accessed 20.05.2023).

⁹⁸³ **Ibid.**

this process, fighting and human rights abuses were further escalated.⁹⁸⁴ According to data obtained from UCDP, the total number of deaths in Sri Lanka was 65,628.⁹⁸⁵ Thus, the third-party role of Norway could not be effective for the implementation of the ceasefire and the promotion of further initiatives leading to positive peace. This was also due to the slow pace of peace negotiations and contradictory attitudes from the warring parties.⁹⁸⁶

Challenges in addressing the underlying roots of conflicts, in preventing human rights abuses and sufferings, and in sustaining peace agreements affirm why mainstreaming conflict transformation-oriented approaches into peace mediation and facilitation practices is necessary. In this regard, the third-party role of Norway could not be effective in compelling parties to change their mindsets as capable of supporting peaceful co-existence and to work on further means towards conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

Despite peaceful efforts and initiatives, Norway could not be successful in bringing an end to this conflict and in addressing the underlying roots of the conflict. The commitment of the warring parties to ceasefire collapsed. In this regard, the conflict was escalated while grievances and transgenerational traumas have deepened. That is why both conflict resolution and reconciliation became more elusive. The case of Sri Lanka reveals how ceasefires and the termination of war cannot be adequate in addressing the underlying roots of the conflict and in accommodating grievances and incompatibilities through the military defeat of one of the parties as involved to the conflict. But what were the reasons that affected the third-party role of Norway adversely? In the following sub-section, the strengths and weaknesses in the peace mediation and facilitation practices of Norway will be discussed.

c. The Peaceful Contributions and Failures of the Kingdom of Norway

Despite its prior failed attempts, Norway contributed to the Ceasefire Agreement dated February 2002 between the parties. However, protractedness embedded in the peace process could not be undermined. This is reflected in the deadlock of the peace process, the failure to reach a settlement following six rounds of talks, military

⁹⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process**, p. 1.

⁹⁸⁵ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Sri Lanka"; In response to the war crimes against the Tamil civilians, there was an unsuccessful initiative involving Norway in January 2009. This initiative was grounded in the call for an organized end to this war. However, this call caused anger from both sides. For more information about this, see: Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville**, p. 130.

⁹⁸⁶ Rajat Ganguly, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: At a Crossroad between Peace and War", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2004, p. 910.

confrontation, and violence. Efforts for the resumption of the negotiations could not be effective in bringing parties together. Of equal importance is that the impacts of the tsunami disaster in December 2004 could not lead to peace dialogue and negotiations. Therefore, added tensions resulted in the open warfare, and the conflict was framed as a terror by the new Sri Lankan government, which was elected in 2005. The LTTE was defeated due to military means of the government. This resulted in the loss of thousands of civilian lives.⁹⁸⁷ As explained, Norway was applauded for its brokering role in ending direct confrontation between the warring parties in this intractable civil war for some time.⁹⁸⁸ However, the collapse of the ceasefire and open warfare eliminated all peaceful efforts, along with the process- and outcome-oriented contributions of Norway.

Despite the failures, the involvement of Norway, as a peace-broker, strengthened the avenues for peace in Sri Lanka. In this regard, it is important to understand the contributions of Norway amidst the failures and problems. The distinctiveness of the involvement of Norway was grounded in its role as a mediator and an independent channel functioning with the confidence of the parties. Previously, governmental evaluations stressed this ethnic conflict as an internal issue. For this reason, the third-party involvement was not sought. However, it was difficult to overcome the mistrust and misunderstandings between the parties. As a result, the third-party involvement oriented at communication facilitation was required to overcome such problems between the parties.⁹⁸⁹

In response to this, Norway provided a common channel for communication between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE while reporting to India, the USA, and other European nations and stakeholders. The role of Norway entailed the arrangement of venues for negotiations; guardianship of the ceasefire agreement; leadership of the SLMM with regard to monitoring and observation of the ceasefire without being partial and invasive; avoidance of controversies that might jeopardize the ceasefire agreement; mobilization of political and financial resources to ensure peace and reconciliation while committing to strengthen its assistance to Sri Lanka as announced in the donors' conference organized by Norway in late 2002; participation in Tokyo donors' conference; and coordination of various activities to maximize the impacts upon the peace process. Importantly, other Nordic countries also participated

⁹⁸⁷ Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...*, p. 3.

⁹⁸⁸ Höglund, and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", p. 175.

⁹⁸⁹ Höglund, and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 112.

in the SLMM. Despite the role of warring parties and various actors related to the peace process and the SLMM, in particular, blames were directed at Norway in case of ceasefire violations.⁹⁹⁰

Within this connection, the successfulness of the ceasefire ended with the late 2005.⁹⁹¹ Nonetheless, Norway's peace mediation and facilitation strengthened communication between the parties while linking peaceful efforts with developmental and humanitarian initiatives. In this process, the assistance of the international community was also pursued. With the SMMM, the Nordic cooperation and grouping were also materialized in ensuring the commitment of the parties and contributing to the sustainability of the ceasefire agreement. Despite the mistrust and prejudices between the warring parties, Norway pursued a peaceful settlement and resolution of this protracted conflict. But the warring parties returned to armed conflict.

Actually, the forms of war endings can be explained in terms of absorption; extermination/expulsion; withdrawal; the functioning of international organizations as a third-party, and capitulation. This classification has been formulated in response to the question investigating the causality between war endings and fighting endings. In this regard, extermination/expulsion indicates that the termination of fighting is the result of the incapability of one party over its opponent rather than a decision. Accordingly, the aforesaid form of war endings indicates the rendered capacity of fighting by the opponent party, either by extermination, which can be directed to individuals, organized forces, or troops, or expulsion from the country in which war took place.⁹⁹²

In this connection, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka can be explained in terms of extermination/expulsion.⁹⁹³ UCDP defines intra-state conflict as “*a conflict*

⁹⁹⁰ Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States...”, pp. 396-397.; Following the ceasefire, there were human rights concerns, and issues related to ceasefire violations. For these violations and the critiques directed to the inadequate response of Norway in relation to its evenhanded approach, the following chapter can be recommended: Alan Keenan, “The Trouble with Evenhandedness: On the Politics of Human Rights and Peace Advocacy in Sri Lanka”, in Michael Feher with Gaelle Krikorian and Yates McKee (Ed.), **Nongovernmental Politics**, Brooklyn, NY : Zone Books, 2007, pp. 88-117.

⁹⁹¹ International Crisis Group, **Sri Lanka: Failure of Peace Process**, p. 6.; Another notable failure occurred prior to both the formation and end of the ceasefire. In 2001, *Thorbjørn Jagland's* private meeting with the President and Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka without involving or consulting the representatives of the LTTE caused problems. This was reflected in the distrust of the LTTE. Hence, the peace process as initiated by *Knut Vollebæk* in 2000 collapsed. Nonetheless, *Jan Petersen* reinitiated the peace process in the year 2001 following the election and change of government in Norway. If it weren't for the change of government, *Solheim* emphasizes, Norway's third-party role in Sri Lanka would have already been over. See: Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville**, pp. 124-125.

⁹⁹² Paul R. Pillar, **Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process**, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 13-15.

⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 21.

between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries".⁹⁹⁴ The case of Sri Lanka has been characterized as an intra-state conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The LTTE has been fighting for an independent Tamil state, referred to as Tamil Eelam. In 2006, intra-state conflict reignited following a four-year period of relative calm.⁹⁹⁵ This period was the outcome of the willingness of the parties and peaceful efforts of Norway.

After the ceasefire, the economic sanctions were eased in the LTTE-held areas. The ban imposed on the LTTE was also removed. The inauguration of political offices was allowed for the rebel group in the areas of the north and north-east as controlled by the government. In this background, the meeting between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government representatives, which took place in Thailand in mid-September 2002 oriented at the initiation of negotiations, generated high expectations for peace.⁹⁹⁶ The government of Norway played a facilitator role in the peace negotiations. This was the official narrative.⁹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, this role also entailed peace mediation. According to *Erik Solheim*, the third-party role of Norway was actually peace mediator despite the narratives regarding peace facilitator.⁹⁹⁸

Importantly, face-to-face meetings between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government were the result of patient diplomacy led by Norwegian peace facilitation. Despite the slow process, there were optimistic views among the commentators

⁹⁹⁴ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Definitions", n.d., 29 May 2024, <https://www.uu.se/en/department/peace-and-conflict-research/research/ucdp/ucdp-definitions> (accessed 12.11.2024).

⁹⁹⁵ Ekaterina Stepanova, "Trends in Armed Conflicts: One-sided Violence against Civilians", *The SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Solna, Sweden : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2009, pp. 52-53.

⁹⁹⁶ Höglund and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 104.; However, there were also weaknesses that affected the ceasefire agreement. In this agreement, there was not such particular designations and provisions surrounding the eventual resolution of this conflict. Hence, this ceasefire agreement was a regulation rather than a peace agreement. See: Höglund, and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 109.; Also, President *Kumaratunga* was not involved in the conclusion of this agreement, which was one of the weaknesses of the agreement. *Solheim* shares that they needed to put more effort in involving her despite the defeat of her party in elections. In addition, the regulation of this agreement did not focus on the sea dimension that stemmed from the arms smuggling by the LTTE. As a result of this problem related to military balance, a moderate approach was demonstrated. Thus, both parties would allow the other for weapons transportation while putting efforts for prevention. However, this approach created challenges and pressures. This is expected given the fact that there were already incidents for shooting at sea even during direct peace negotiations. See: *Solheim*, *Politikk er å Ville*, pp. 126-127.

⁹⁹⁷ Kjell Magne Bondevik's Second Government of Norway, "Promising Start, Practical Steps for Peace", Speech/Statement, 18 September 2002, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2002/promising_start_practical_steps/id265682/ (accessed 12.11.2023).

⁹⁹⁸ *Solheim*, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 120.; Actually, the term facilitator was deliberately preferred in order to restrict critics and nationalistic responses towards peace process. *Solheim*, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 120.; This preference can be read as a strategy directed to peace spoilers. But it can be seen that this strategy also failed.

regarding the possibility for the satisfaction of the self-determination of Tamils and the protection of Sri Lanka's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁹⁹⁹ In the first round of talks, the bargaining range between the warring parties was expanded, and the framework for further rounds of talks was determined. In this context, the focus was largely directed to the improvement of the situation in the areas affected by war.¹⁰⁰⁰

In the formal talks, the parties affirmed their willingness to address the issues and to resolve this ethnic conflict through a step-by-step approach, which was already followed in the formulation and implementation of the ceasefire. The commitment to the ceasefire and the expansion of confidence-building measures were also affirmed. The parties addressed issues about displacement, High Security Zones, humanitarian conditions, and settlement while agreeing to the creation of joint initiatives to tackle and solve such issues.¹⁰⁰¹ At this stage, parties reiterated their willingness to work together and address some of the crucial issues of this conflict.

In this process, relative peace grounded in the ceasefire played an encouraging role in compelling parties to move towards a political settlement of the conflict. With that being said, it was stressed that this process needs to be supported through the inclusion of parties, the government of Norway, and the international community. Nevertheless, the parties had the main responsibility. According to *Vidar Helgesen*, as Norwegian State Secretary at the time, the objective of the parties was directed to the development of democratic and peaceful means; the restoration of normalcy in the daily functioning of lives; and the promotion of human rights and dignity. Peace, as an objective and as a means, entailed the aforesaid components while ensuring financial and political support from the entire international community. Such support has been linked to peacebuilding in practice.¹⁰⁰² Hence, there was an emphasis on the necessity of peacebuilding through Norwegian peace mediation and facilitation practices.

In the subsequent rounds of talks, Sub-committees were arranged to be established for the promotion of structured dialogues in the areas as follows: “(1) de-

⁹⁹⁹ Ganguly, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict...”, p. 903.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Höglund and Svensson, “Peace Process in Sri Lanka”, p. 113.

¹⁰⁰¹ Kjell Magne Bondevik’s Second Government of Norway, “Promising Start, Practical Steps for Peace”.

¹⁰⁰² Vidar Helgesen, “Address at the Inaugural Session of the Sri Lanka Peace Talks”, Speech/Statement at Sattahip, Thailand, 16 September 2002, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2002/address_at_the_inaugural_session/id266254/ (accessed 12.05.2024).

escalation and normalization, (2) immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation in the north and east, and (3) political matters".¹⁰⁰³ In this process, the creation of peace from below and negotiation of peace at the top affected the Norwegian approach to peace practices.¹⁰⁰⁴

With the last day of the third round of talks, which took place in Oslo, dated December 2002, the parties reached a consensus associated with internal self-determination. Internal self-determination was formulated as a federal model solution within united Sri Lanka. Despite the prejudices shared by the Sinhalese majority towards the concept of federalism with regard to connotations in terms of separatism and destruction, a federal model-based solution was accepted by both parties.¹⁰⁰⁵ Despite these promising developments, peaceful efforts could not be sustained.

The escalation of war throughout the years between 2007 and 2009 resulted in the Sri Lankan government's declaration of victory over the LTTE dated 19 May 2009.¹⁰⁰⁶ *Mahinda Rajapaksa*, as the President of Sri Lanka at the time, declared that the country was liberated from the LTTE terrorism. Further to this, it was also addressed that the solution of this conflict needs to be home-grown, acceptable by all the communities, and grounded in the philosophy of Buddhism. *Velupillai Prabhakaran*, as the chief of the LTTE, was shot dead, according to information obtained from Sri Lankan army.¹⁰⁰⁷ The emphasis on home-grown solution of the conflict eliminated the political maneuver of Norway.

Taken together, the case of Sri Lanka is important in explaining how the termination of war and the declaration of military victory do not indicate the achievement of peace and conflict resolution between the parties. After the declaration of the victory over the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government applied to such discourses, which demonstrated that the conflict is solved, the problem, framed as terrorism, is eradicated with the total defeat of the LTTE. Thus, there was no need for reconciliation. In this regard, the annihilation of the LTTE largely annihilated the interest of the Sri Lankan government in engaging with Tamil demands through

¹⁰⁰³ Höglund and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", p. 113.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Helgesen, "Address at the Inaugural Session of the Sri Lanka Peace Talks".

¹⁰⁰⁵ Höglund and Svensson, "Peace Process in Sri Lanka", pp. 113-114.; According to *Solheim*, agreeing upon a federal state solution with autonomy for the Tamils was a breakthrough. See: *Solheim*, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 127.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Holt, *Aid, Peacebuilding and Resurgence of War...*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Matthew Weaver, and Gethin Chamberlain, "Sri Lanka Declares End to War with Tamil Tigers", *The Guardian*, 19 May 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/18/tamil-tigers-killed-sri-lanka> (accessed 12.06.2023).

dialogue and negotiation.¹⁰⁰⁸ Framing the conflict as a terrorist activity and the war against the LTTE as a counter-terrorism strategy restricted avenues for accountability, peace, and reconciliation.

For this reason, the gradual failure of the ceasefire between the LTTE and Sri Lanka resulted in favour of the Sri Lankan government in connection with the delineation of the conflict as a war against terrorism. In this process, the LTTE's ceasefire violations and withdrawal from peace talks also affected the Sri Lankan government while damaging the legitimacy and international support of the LTTE. In addition, the victory of the Sri Lankan government in May 2009, as followed by the capture of the LTTE-held territory and killing of the LTTE leadership, was linked to the split and military weakening of the LTTE.¹⁰⁰⁹

Hence, the violations and withdrawal of the LTTE can be seen as disruptive for peace mediation and facilitation techniques of Norway in terms of the elevation of its credibility and legitimacy. It is affirmed that Norway's peace mediation and facilitation practices do not avoid non-state and armed actors/organizations as long as there is a willingness for political solutions. With that being said, the withdrawal of the LTTE damaged the inclusive approach of Norway in its third-party practices.

Further to this, Norwegian mediators were already evaluated as loose in responding to human rights abuses committed by the government and the LTTE. In addition, Norwegian mediators were perceived as passive third-parties in their peace attempts.¹⁰¹⁰ With that being said, it is also contended that one of the reasons for the attacks of critiques regarding the role of Norway has been its expanded foreign policy role and involvement in comparison with its indirect involvement in the Oslo back channel. As a result, it is stated that "*if Norway's involvement were indirect, as in the Oslo back channel, it would not have been the subject of such criticism*".¹⁰¹¹

Simply put, there were stated critiques and problems in the Norwegian approach to this protracted conflict. Given the widespread human rights violations, taking a loose approach can be problematic for the credibility of third-party practices and

¹⁰⁰⁸ Kristine Höglund, and Camilla Orjuela, "Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention after a Victor's Peace in Sri Lanka", **Contemporary Social Science: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences**, Vol. 6, No. 1: Post-conflict Societies, 2011, p. 24.

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.; Ceasefire violations by the LTTE have been addressed in this chapter: Keenan, "Trouble with Evenhandedness...", pp. 88-117.; Following the year of 2003, in particular, there was an increasing number of incidents at sea and also on land that affected the peace process adversely. While the LTTE postponed the formal peace process, President *Kumaratunga* reestablished power over the military forces. See: Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville**, p. 127.

¹⁰¹⁰ Höglund, and Svensson, "Mediating between Tigers and Lions...", p. 175.

¹⁰¹¹ Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States...", p. 397.

reconciliation. Also, this approach can be inadequate given the effects of transgenerational traumas, peace anxieties, and time collapse. However, there were also critiques for the scope of Norway's active role. Despite such contradictory remarks, it was acknowledged and hoped that the ceasefire would lead to deepened initiatives as capable of preventing the loss of lives and suffering while paving the way for conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and reconciliation.

Of equal importance is that the position of the USA following 11 September also negatively affected the third-party role of Norway in the peace process. In this regard, Norway's political maneuver and diplomatic capabilities were restricted. This was due to Norway's impartial approach towards both parties despite the designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Moreover, Norway's efforts were also directed to the establishment of the credibility and legitimacy of the LTTE. This approach was linked to its efforts in assisting the peace process. Hence, this strategy failed due to the effects of 11 September and the USA's view towards terrorism.¹⁰¹²

In essence, Norway has not widely been viewed as an imperialist country. However, its close alliance with the major Western powers, especially the USA, might restrict its initiative ability and legitimacy in connection with the interpretations and perceptions of the warring parties.¹⁰¹³ This was also evident in the case of Sri Lanka. With the effects of the 11 September and the alignment with the approach of the USA, Norway's diplomatic capabilities were restricted. This, together with nationalist critiques and the unwillingness of the parties, affected the third-party role of Norway adversely.

Therefore, an unbridled military campaign and outright military victory led to the termination of war in Sri Lanka. The end of this civil war has actually been attributed to various conditions in terms of the constellation of factors at systemic, regional, and national levels. These distinctive conditions were conducive to an unbridled military campaign. At the systemic level, the conflict was evaluated as wearisome by the major powers, including the USA and key European nations. India and PRC chose to support the massive military onslaught of the Sri Lankan regime

¹⁰¹² Ada Nissen, "Troublesome Peace Making: How American Views on Terrorism Affected Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka, 2000-2009", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2018, pp. 523-525.; Norway's strategy regarding the empowerment of the LTTE has also been criticized. For the assessment and compilation of these critiques, see: Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy*, London and New York : Routledge, 2008, pp. 180-181.; Norway's objectivity has also been subject to critiques: Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka...*, pp. 192-194.

¹⁰¹³ Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States...", p. 397.

against the insurgents or to remain aloof or detached from the conflict in relation to differing reasons. At the domestic level, an opportune moment was seized to release maximum military power of the regime against the insurgents.¹⁰¹⁴

With the effects of the tsunami, on the other hand, Norway aimed to facilitate an agreement referred to as the “Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)” to renew the peace talks. However, the warring parties decided to engage in war rather than the resumption of the peace process. The domestic politics in Sri Lanka and inadequate political will accounted for the failure of the peace process.¹⁰¹⁵ As a result, P-TOMS could not play a catalyzing role in compelling parties for peace negotiations.

According to *Solheim*, this was their last chance for the creation of a lasting peace. During January and February 2005, there were negotiations for the formation of an agreement related to relief mechanisms with both parties. However, the negotiated agreement could not be implemented, and peace talks could not be revived. In this process, the agreement related to relief mechanisms was even declared as illegal by the Supreme Court. This generated frustration among the Tamil Tigers, who had consented to operate within the framework of Sri Lankan national structures as stipulated in the agreement. In response to the declaration of this agreement as illegal, *Lakhsman Kadirgamar*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka at the time, was assassinated by the Tamil Tigers.¹⁰¹⁶

In the case of Sri Lanka, disaster diplomacy and disaster response could not be effective in compelling parties for the resumption of peace talks and the arrival of a peace deal. In this context, the main reason has been grounded in the absence of such pre-existing and incentive conditions as capable of supporting peaceful interactions in contrast to the case of Aceh. There was already opposition to the peace process. Importantly, the warring parties did not pursue disaster diplomacy. This is why military means and violence were utilized for the conclusion of this conflict. Following the end of the war, there was no need for disaster diplomacy. Hence, it can be seen that the link between disaster diplomacy and peace varies with regard to perceptions and willingness of the parties, along with the pre-existing impetus for peace.¹⁰¹⁷

¹⁰¹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, “Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War”, *Dædalus*, Vol. 147, No. 1: Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Possibilities, Winter 2018, p. 78.

¹⁰¹⁵ Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...*, p. 6.

¹⁰¹⁶ Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 128.

¹⁰¹⁷ Kelman, *Catastrophe and Conflict: Disaster...*, pp. 62-64.

On 17 May 2009, *Seevaratnam Pulidevan* contacted *Solheim* for the assistance of Norway. *Pulidevan* was the head of the LTTE's peace secretariat and Norway's primary liaison in the peace process. This indirect contact was made when the LTTE was already surrounded by the forces of the Sri Lankan government. Hence, the military defeat of the LTTE was imminent. *Solheim* stresses that there were many offerings for the conclusion of the war prior to this contact. But these offers were rejected by the LTTE. As for the government, their efforts were directed to the military annihilation of the LTTE.¹⁰¹⁸ These remarks also affirm the unwillingness of the main warring parties for the resumption of the peace process.

Therefore, it is demonstrated that Norway's position was not conducive to altering the outcome.¹⁰¹⁹ From another perspective, on the other hand, one could argue that Norway was unable to change the parties' goals, attitudes, and priorities such that they would see the tsunami disaster as an opportunity for cooperation, different possibilities, and peace negotiations. Despite the conditions related to the tsunami disaster, Norway's third-party role was not enticing enough in affecting the mindsets of the parties.¹⁰²⁰ That is why this disaster could not generate a ripeness from the perspective of the warring parties. Also, the reason for the end of the peace process and civil war in 2009 was also linked to Norway's overestimation of its diplomatic abilities in changing the patterns in this conflict while ensuring the assistance of India and the USA. This miscalculation was due to the effects of its peacemaker image, along with prestige and status-seeking efforts.¹⁰²¹

In response to the request for Norway's assistance, dated 17 May 2009, the Sri Lankan government was informed about the willingness of the LTTE to surrender. The government was also asked to engage with this process in a proper manner. However, there was no answer.¹⁰²² In this regard, military confrontations and the defeat of the LTTE marked the conclusion of Norway's third-party efforts. With the utilization of

¹⁰¹⁸ Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 117.

¹⁰¹⁹ Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...*, p. 6.; In the spring of 2006, there were two rounds of negotiations and meetings as well. The aim was to revive the peace talks. In this process, *Jon Hanssen Bauer* was the new peace envoy of Norway. But these efforts were unsuccessful for the resumption of peace process. Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 129.

¹⁰²⁰ Mitchell, "Right Moment: Notes on...", pp. 44-46.; This enticement model or enticing opportunity model indicates how an opportunity can be perceived as enticing for the ripeness. Mitchell, "Right Moment: Notes on...", p. 48; In the case of Sri Lanka, the tsunami disaster could not be perceived as enticing enough for a ripeness by the warring parties. In this regard, Norway could not change their views.

¹⁰²¹ Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 96.

¹⁰²² Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, pp. 117-118.

military means, the underlying roots of the conflict were replaced by the depiction of this incompatibility in terms of terrorism.

One of the failures resulting from the third-party role of Norway was grounded in its inattentiveness towards conceptual boundaries and differences between the concepts of conflict settlement and conflict resolution. As already emphasized, the Norwegian approach was encapsulated within the narratives, such as conflict settlement and political settlement. But *Jan Petersen*, as Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, considered the achievements in the case of Sri Lanka as the demonstration of Norway's decisive role for protracted conflict resolution.¹⁰²³ However, the objectives corresponding to settlement and resolution of protracted conflicts differ from one another. While the first denotes conditions associated with negative peace, the second denotes a more ambitious agenda in the field of peace and conflict resolution. As explained, settlement is not oriented at dealing with the underlying roots of conflicts. Such confusions can also affect peace processes adversely. This was also reflected in the conflict regulation-oriented framework of the ceasefire.

Of critical importance is that the conflict in Sri Lanka has primarily been viewed as a terrorist problem and/or an ethnic conflict. The focus has been directed to the military defeat of the LTTE when this conflict has been portrayed as a terrorist problem. Regarding the link between the portrayal of this conflict in terms of ethnicity and relations between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority, on the other hand, the focus has been directed to the establishment of an autonomous Tamil region in connection with the Tamil ethno-nationality.¹⁰²⁴ In this regard, Norway was unsuccessful in changing this view, which has been further consolidated with the effects of the 11 September at the international level.

¹⁰²³ Jan Petersen, "Norway's New Security Policy Framework", Speech/Statement at Oslo Military Society, 30 September 2002, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2002/norways_new_security_policy_framework/id266313/ (accessed 12.02.2024).

¹⁰²⁴ Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka...*, p. 14.

PART III - ANALYTICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE SELECTED CASES AND THE EFFECTS OF THE NORDIC IDENTITY ON THE PEACE MEDIATION AND FACILITATION PRACTICES

As reflecting the contributions and challenges obtained from Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the selected phases of cases, one can observe a link between these third-party practices and the identity of Nordic countries in world politics. Accordingly, peaceful contributions of the Nordic countries resonate with the perceptions directed to the Nordic countries and their large-group identity. However, there have also been challenges and problems that reveal the incompatibilities between Nordic large-group identity and relevant third-party initiatives.

Understanding these challenges and problems will be decisive not only for the improvement of third-party roles of Nordic countries in protracted cases but also for Nordic peace diplomacy, which has been one of the prominent dimensions of Nordic identity. Despite the failures as identified in the selected phases of cases, Nordic large-group identity continues to be approached as suitable in the third-party initiatives. This has been demonstrated in the general dataset of the Thesis.

The endurance of the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries stands both as a reason for their preferability in third-party roles and as an outcome that stems from inadequate understanding of challenges and problems. This inadequate understanding can be linked to process-oriented emphasis within peace mediation and facilitation literature. Accordingly, the occurrence of mediation can be considered a success by itself. But the enrichment of process-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation and the inclusion of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses reveal the incompatibilities in relation to the implications of Nordic identity.

In this regard, the strengths, weaknesses, and characteristics of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be provided through the introduction of a particular dataset. Following that, the overall assessment of Nordic peace diplomacy will be connected with the hallmarks and typologies of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. Then, the formation of the reputation of the Nordic countries related to third-party roles will be analyzed through the dimensions of Nordic identity. In order to understand the prominent role of Nordic countries, the link between the reputation

of Nordic countries and Nordic identity will be complemented with the inclusion of the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Following that, the expertise and guidance of the Nordic countries will be grasped through the reflections of being small states and being members of a Nordic security community as well.

**Chapter I - Peaceful attempts and engagements of the Nordic countries:
Particular dataset from the phases of selected cases**

Drawing from the experiences of the Nordic countries in the selected cases, it can be asserted that the formulation and development of Nordic identity affected the techniques as utilized in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation and vice versa. In this context, capability in transforming the violence during the Viking era, and militaristic approach of Sweden; distancing from European affairs; taking leading roles in international and regional organizations; managing fear and uncertainty with regard to systemic circumstances and conditions; establishing peace research institutes and centers; cultivating various prominent Nordic pioneers as peace scholars and practitioners into the field of peace and conflict resolution, and playing a guiding role in this field can be considered as relevant in the formulation and utilization different techniques as elaborated in the presentation of cases, and particular dataset of this Thesis.

This Thesis takes the dimensions of Nordic identity both as the reason for the prevailing reputation of the Nordic countries in third-party roles and as the main motivation in the acceptance and/or pursuit of such roles. The reasons for the prominent role of Nordic countries regarding peace mediation and facilitation practices overlap with the dimensions of Nordic identity. Exploration of this overlap has particularly been evident in the case of Cyprus. By linking peace research centers and institutes with the development of Nordic identity, one can understand how the functioning of PCC also exemplifies the reflections of Nordic identity and distinctiveness. This distinctiveness was grounded in the formal consolidation and engagement in a time during which the international community chose to retreat from the issue due to the failure of the Annan Plan.

The involvement of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and CMI, along with the application of Fafo in the Palestine case, reinforces the Nordic identity by incorporating Nordic practitioners, research institutes, foundations, and NGOs. In the case of Aceh, there was also an instructive approach as materialized through the experience sharing of *Ahtisaari*. This instructive approach also stemmed from the self-

identification of Nordic countries as guiding actors, who utilized peaceful means for the resolution of conflicts and disputes.

In particular, efforts for direct communication; approaching knowledge, civil society, and religious dialogue initiatives as means for the improvement of equal interactions and mutual understanding between main large-groups, progression and peace; the emphasis on human rights; diplomatic approaches grounded in a win-win-oriented framework; humanitarian aid; and linking foreign aid and reconstruction with peace can be considered as the demonstration of liberal values that have been part of Nordic identity as well. However, failure to meet basic human needs in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka contrasts with the perceptions towards large-group identity of Nordic countries.

Therefore, the overall effects of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation will be evaluated separately and comparatively. As a result, both the contributions and failures will be brought together. The idea is that understanding Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in the mixture of the contributions and challenges might be important for the development of a functional framework in the field of peace and conflict resolution. As starting from a deductive approach concerning the implications of the reputation of Nordic countries, an analysis of selected phases of cases reveals challenges upon the advancement of Nordic peace diplomacy. Also, such analysis will inevitably be connected with various dimensions of Nordic identity.

In the following particular dataset, a comparison surrounding selected cases is conducted between selected stages of four protracted cases. This comparison allows for a more comprehensive approach to Nordic peace diplomacy, utilizing process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses for peace mediation and facilitation. In this dataset, the cases have been listed in accordance with the emergence of the conflict from a historical perspective. Taken together, the strengths and weaknesses as explained in this dataset can be a source in scrutinizing the potential of Nordic countries for the development of such a distinctive model that can play a guiding role while enriching the assessment and functioning of third-party practices in the field of peace and conflict resolution.



Table 3.1: The elaboration of the selected cases in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.¹⁰²⁵

Selected Cases as Conflicts and Controversial Issues in World Politics	Phases of Conflicts and Controversial Issues in the Context of Nordic Peace Mediation and Facilitation	Main Warring Parties in Selected Cases	The Commencement of Nordic Peace Mediation and Facilitation in Selected Cases	The Entry of the Nordic Countries into the Phases of Conflicts and Controversial Issues in the Context of Peace Mediation and Facilitation	Prominent Nordic Countries Involved in the Processes of Peace Mediation and Facilitation in the Selected Phase of Conflicts and Controversial Issues	Prominent Nordic Actors Involved in the Processes of Peace Mediation and Facilitation during the Selected Phases of Conflicts and Controversial Issues	Objectives and Focal Points of Nordic Peace Mediation and Facilitation	Prominent Diplomatic Approaches and Techniques Utilized by the Nordic Countries	Achievements and Failures in the Context of Process- and outcome-oriented Lenses to Peace Mediation and Facilitation	Achievements and Failures in the Context of Conflict Transformation-oriented Lenses to Peace Mediation and Facilitation
Israeli and Palestinian Conflict	Swedish Background of the Oslo Accords; Oslo Accords.	Israelis and the PLO	The appointment of UN mediator <i>Folke Bernadotte</i> with UN Resolution 186 (S.II) of 14 May 1948 ¹⁰²⁶ ; The proposal as delivered by Egypt’s Ambassador <i>Mustafa Kamal</i> to Norway in taking a part as secret messenger and bridge-maker in the Middle East; <i>Arafat</i> ’s proposal for the third-party role of Norway; Obtainment of tacit consent from the USA; Cooperation between Sweden and Norway.	<i>Arafat</i> ’s proposal; The efforts and initiatives of <i>Sten Andersson</i> ; Informal contact between the PLO and Norwegian authorities in 1976; Academic interest of <i>Terje Rød-Larsen</i> .	Norway; Sweden.	<i>Gro Harlem Brundtland</i> ; <i>Hans Wilhelm Longva</i> ; <i>Jan Egeland</i> ; <i>Johan Jørgen Holst</i> ; <i>Mona Juul</i> ; <i>Reiulf Steen</i> ; <i>Knut Frydenlund</i> ; <i>Sten Andersson</i> ; <i>Terje Rød-Larsen</i> ; <i>Thorbjørn Jagland</i> ; <i>Thorvald Stoltenberg</i> .	Compatibility between security needs of the Israelis and Palestinians; Cultivation of confidence; Communication and direct dialogue; Reciprocal recognition; Development of trust; Replacement of violence with political talks and political solution; Satisfaction of basic human needs, large-group identity, and political rights of the Palestinians; Security and peaceful existence; The end of terrorism; Two-state solution.	Academic efforts and academic diplomacy experiment; A conduit role between <i>Arafat</i> and USA led by Sweden; <i>Andersson</i> ’s inauguration of dialogue between the PLO, and Jewish academics in USA; Confidence-building measures; Cooperation between <i>Andersson</i> and <i>Stoltenberg</i> ; Coordination, facilitation and mediation through the role of <i>Andersson</i> ; Direct contact between the main warring parties; Efforts for the promotion of the legitimacy of PLO; Establishment of alternative and informal track; Formulation of a transitional formula and period; Modest and minimalist approach; Negotiations with <i>Arafat</i> ; Nobel peace prize; Pragmatic approach; Prior informal contact with the PLO; Problem-solving workshop; Procedural and substantive processes; Providing a point of secret contact between <i>Arafat</i> and the Israeli Labor Party through <i>Thorvald</i> ; Quiet diplomacy by <i>Andersson</i> ; Step-by-step approach rather than a comprehensive plan; Structured peace; The shift from informal to formal channels; The utilization of Fafo; Secret channeling and diplomacy;	Arrival of the Stockholm Document; Direct contact and communication; Disregard for past/history/memory; Facilitating dialogue and negotiations; Failure in addressing and meeting basic human needs of the Palestinians; Failure in terms of implementation diplomacy; Failure related to legitimizer role; Failure to deliver survival, and identity-based worldviews; Failure to end the conflict and violence; Failure to change intractability of the conflict; Failure to handle the problem of peace spoilers; Failure to reconcile different positions and time-frames of the warring parties; Failure to adequately reflect intergroup dynamics of the conflict; Failure to reflect resolving formula; Failure to reflect two-state solution in agreements; Failure to resolve the conflicting interests; Failure to resolve the status of Jerusalem in a fair manner; Inadequate criticisms for the actions and policies of Israel; Mutual recognition; Oslo I-II agreements;	Failure in providing a non-war setting, let alone positive peace, stable peace, and peaceful existence; Failure in terms of reconciliation; Failure in terms of transcendence; Failure to address the underlying roots of the conflict; Failure to change the emotions, and perceptions of the warring parties. Failure to change power imbalance; Failure to deliver a fundamental change; Failure to produce constructive, fundamental, and normative change between the warring parties; Failure to promote equality, human rights, and justice; Failure to redefine the interests; Failure to reflect just and unity-based peace worldview; Failure to resolve the dilemma between peace and security; Inadequate consideration for the effects of past grievances and traumas due to the utilization of pragmatic approaches; Return to armed conflict in Palestine; refusal of the peace process by Israel and

¹⁰²⁵ The information in this table has been compiled and reflected from the references as utilized by the author in this Thesis. Also, a few resources have been added to provide readers with further knowledge.

¹⁰²⁶ On 20 May 1948, Swedish Count *Folke Bernadotte* was appointed as the UN Mediator in Palestine, which was the first official mediation in the history of the UN. On 17 September 1948, *Bernadotte* was assassinated by members of a Zionist paramilitary group of Lehi, known as the “Stern Gang.” In addition, Colonel *André Sérot* was also assassinated by this Zionist paramilitary group. Following the end of the First Arab-Israeli War, the roles for the monitoring and implementation of the Armistice Agreements, which were signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, were transferred to UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) as first peacekeeping mission of UN. See: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, “Learn More About UNTSO”, n.d., <https://untso.unmissions.org/learn-more-about-untso> (accessed: 13.05.2023).

								Track II diplomacy; Unofficial and official visits to <i>Arafat</i> .	USA's removal of prohibition regarding direct contact with the PLO.	irregular Palestinian forces. ¹⁰²⁷
Cyprus Conflict	Post-Annan Period	The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots	The appointment of <i>Sakari Severi Tuomioja</i> as the UN mediator in Cyprus; The contributions to peacekeeping and mediation mechanisms under the auspices of the UN; The inception of the PRIO Cyprus Centre.	The assistance of Nordic mediators and facilitators to the peace and conflict resolution efforts of the UN; The activities of PRIO Cyprus Centre.	Nordic countries; Norway in particular.	The efforts of Nordic peace mediators and facilitators such as <i>Sakari Severi Tuomioja</i> and <i>Espen Barth Eide</i> ; PRIO Cyprus Centre.	Information generation and sharing; Research, dialogue facilitation, contribution to political decision-making, and informed public debate and understanding with regard to the eventual settlement of the Cyprus issue, influencing the processes of negotiations and reconciliation positively, the promotion of civil society; ¹⁰²⁸ Tackling information asymmetry.	Confidence and trust-building measures; Conflict settlement through the efforts of <i>Espen Barth Eide</i> ; Coupling and decoupling roles through the projects of the Centre; Dialogue facilitation; EEA funds; Efforts for the transcendence of elite-level approach to peace and conflict resolution; Information dissemination, offering of analysis, dialogue and debate facilitation, cooperation between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, collaboration with civil society groups, universities and individuals; ¹⁰²⁹ Multilingual and social approaches; Promotion of peace and conflict resolution through art, culture, and history; Reinforcement of the link among information, knowledge, and human needs; Religious dialogue through RTCYPP and its transformation into peacebuilding; The utilization of the channel of EU.	Addressing direct/indirect implications of human needs; Contribution to the UN peacekeeping; Completing such projects as directed to the core issues of this protracted conflict; Demonstration of economic benefits; Developing a permeable understanding directed to the dynamics of unrecognised and <i>de facto</i> states; Encouragement of intercultural and interfaith dialogue; Finland's efforts through the channels of the EU and the UN; Public awareness, joint research, dialogue, policy recommendations, civil society engagement, and platforms for exchange of ideas through the functioning of PRIO; ¹⁰³⁰ Strengthening the engagement of the PCC when the international community withdraws following the failure of the Annan Plan; Supporting negotiations.	Deviation from system maintenance; Disruption of a linear perspective towards process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses through conflict transformation-oriented contributions of PCC; Efforts for conflict transformation; Failures in terms of conflict resolution; Failures due to persistence of intractability, protracted nature of the conflict, and power imbalance between the main warring parties; Promotion of awareness for broader understanding of peace and conflict transformation.
Aceh Conflict	The Helsinki negotiations between the Indonesian Government and the GAM	The Indonesian Government and the GAM	2003-2005 for peace mediation and facilitation by Former Finnish President <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> and the "Crisis Management Initiative"	The offering of mediation by <i>Juha Christensen</i> ; Appointment of the former Finnish President <i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> and "CMI" in response to the official request.	Finland; Sweden through dialogue facilitation role of the "Olof Palme International Center"; Norway's finance and implementation-oriented assistance.	<i>Martti Ahtisaari</i> ; CMI.	Conflict settlement; Conflict resolution; Political participation and rights of Aceh; Human rights and amnesty; Reintegration; The end of violence.	<i>Ahtisaari</i> 's convening, facilitating, and managing capabilities; Capability regarding effective exercise of ripeness; Confidence-building measures; Cooperation and coordination; CMI's efforts for the limited dissemination of information and reliable press statements; Disruption of a linear understanding in relation to lack of a prior ceasefire before the MoU;	Addressing issues about human rights and reintegration; Addressing and resolving the underlying roots of the conflict; Altering the position of the government for self-government; Autonomy for Aceh; Communication between the parties; Conflict settlement; Conflict resolution; Contribution to peace through federacy;	Accommodation through interactive processes; Achievements in terms of the transcendence approach; Challenges and failures related to the implementation process following the enactment of the LoGA;

¹⁰²⁷ Anthony Wanis-St. John, "In Theory: Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows", **Negotiation Journal**, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2006, p. 120.

¹⁰²⁸ The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, "About the PRIO Cyprus Centre".

¹⁰²⁹ **Ibid.**

¹⁰³⁰ **Ibid.**

								Experience sharing with regard to reflections of the Åland Islands dispute resolution; Facilitation of constructive rounds of negotiations; Finnish Government’s financial and in-kind support, along with the provider role for the venue of talks, and security of the delegations; Five negotiation rounds of talks; Giving responsibilities to the parties while putting pressure on them; Good offices; Inclusion of peace psychology through experience-sharing; Initiation of peace negotiations through win-win-oriented approach; Linking the achievement of peace with reconstruction; Monitoring the implementation process for a time, and assessing its efficiency; Norway’s support for monitoring; Ownership by the warring parties; Procedural approaches; Shuttle diplomacy by <i>Juha Christensen</i>; Settlement as a necessity for the implementation of negotiations; The efforts of “Olof Palme International Center” for the organization of meetings between GAM civil society and GAM elite; The establishment of cooperative relations; The sequential solution of the core issues; The utilization of political aid and international support.	Converging the warring parties in terms of special autonomy and self-government; Facilitating dialogue and negotiations; Failure in neglecting linguistic differences between special autonomy and self-government; Meeting basic human needs; Realization of survival and identity-based worldviews, Reflecting the learned lessons from prior peace process that collapsed; Successful in terms of implementation diplomacy; The alignment of the warring parties for self-government; The arrival of MoU; The establishment of a monitoring mission; The consolidation of Aceh’s autonomy; The end of violence; The withdrawal of the military forces from Aceh.	Challenges related to peacebuilding and transitional justice;¹⁰³¹ Change from survival and identity-based views; Creation of a common ground through federacy; Stable peace; The assessments and suggestions through the Aceh Peace Process Follow-Up Project of CMI; The formation of a framework towards the analysis of the conflict; Transformation of the perceptions and relations of the warring parties.

¹⁰³¹ See: Edward Aspinall, and Fajran Zain, “Transitional Justice Delayed in Aceh, Indonesia”, in Renée Jeffery, and Hun Joon Kim (Eds.), **Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 87-124.; Edward Aspinall, **Peace without Justice? The Helsinki Peace Process in Aceh**, Geneva, Switzerland : The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, April 2008, <https://hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/56JusticeAcehfinalrevJUNE08-May-2008.pdf> (accessed 17.06.2023).

Sri Lanka Conflict	The Involvement of Norway in peace mediation and facilitation of negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE	The Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE	Norway's efforts for the commencement of third-party role; The invitation from the warring parties.	The Invitation of the LTTE and Sri Lankan authorities	Norway	<i>Erik Solheim;</i> <i>Jan Petersen;</i> <i>Jon Hanssen Bauer;</i> <i>Jon Westborg;</i> <i>Knut Vollebæk;</i> <i>Thorbjørn Jagland;</i> <i>Vidar Helgesen.</i>	Communication; Ceasefire; Conflict resolution; Development; Reconciliation; Restoration of normalcy; The end of violence.	Arbitration; Confidence-building measures; Cooperation and coordination; Facilitation of Norway oriented at the achievement of a ceasefire between the parties; Humanitarian aid; Monitoring of the ceasefire; Nordic peacekeeping; Patient diplomacy; Preference for the usage of the term facilitation rather than mediation against peace spoilers; Realistic and practicable approaches; Secret meeting with <i>Prabhakaran</i> ; ¹⁰³² Secret two-folded contact; Six rounds of peace negotiations following the ceasefire; Step-by-step approach; The approach regarding peace from below and peace negotiation at the top.	Ceasefire agreement; Close alliance with USA, but failure in protecting its strategy for the position of the LTTE; Creation of a communication channel between the parties; Critiques regarding the silence and passivity against violations; Facilitating dialogue and negotiations; Failure due to non-involvement of <i>Kumaratunga</i> in ceasefire; Failure for the delivery of a federal model-based solution; Failure of efforts related to the resumption of peace talks; Failure related to legitimizer role; Failure that stemmed from the actions of <i>Thorbjørn Jagland</i> due to having meetings with only one party to the conflict; Failure in meeting the basic human needs of the Tamils; Failure in terms of implementation diplomacy; Failure in the protection of the ceasefire agreement; Failure to benefit from the approach of soft settlement; Failure to realize survival and identity-based worldviews, Failure to reflect the resolving formula; Loose approach against human rights abuses; Negligence of sea dimension; Organization of a donors conference; Peace dialogue; Relative calmness in the island; Relative peace; Reporting to India, the USA, and other European nations and stakeholders; Suspension of war only for a limited period of time; The arrangement of venues; The collapse of ceasefire and the escalation of war.	Adherence to system maintenance; Failure to address and resolve the underlying roots of the conflict; Failure to change the dominant views surrounding the underlying roots of the conflict with regard to the position of the USA and structural dynamics; Failure to create such conditions as supportive for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence; Failure to improve the large-group interactions and relations in the island; Failure to reflect unity-based worldview; Return to armed conflict; Shift from relative peace to violence; Slow pace of negotiations; The inadequate consideration regarding distinction between protracted conflict resolution and conflict settlement; Victor's peace.

¹⁰³² The Tigers and the Sri Lankan Government were not previously informed about this visit. Hence, there were significant security risks. See: Solheim, **Politikk er å Ville**, pp. 120-121.

Section I - The assessment of Nordic countries in the selected cases

The utilization of organizations or inclusion of NGOs and research institutes has been one of the important techniques that stemmed from Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. This has been evident in the cases of Aceh, Palestine, and Cyprus. As reflecting another relevant example, Norway aimed to prevent violence against women through the organization titled as “Care” in Sri Lanka. This endeavour has been considered critical for women’s empowerment and participation in peace processes and peace operations.¹⁰³³

In this case of Aceh, it was “CMI” that played the role of peace mediator and facilitator between the GAM and the Government of Indonesia. Also, the Swedish-based “Olof Palme International Center” organized meetings with the objective of assisting interactions between GAM civil society and GAM elite. The roles of CMI and the Olof Palme International Center reveal the importance of NGOs in the peace processes. In the case of Cyprus, the activities of PCC have been crucial in terms of communication, peace dialogue, encouragement of comprehensive and critical understanding towards the underlying roots of the conflict, and the improvement of communal group relations on the island. In the case of Palestine, Fafo was utilized in establishing a secret channel between the primary warring parties to the conflict. The role of Fafo was complementary with the academic exercises prior to the arrival of DoP.

In the case of Aceh, one can argue that the third-party engagement was more direct given the pressures upon the parties and substantial suggestions as obtained from the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute. Further to this, the underlying roots of the conflict and concerns of the parties have been reflected in the formulation of the MoU. In the case of Palestine, on the other hand, there were failures in reflecting the two-state solution in the outcomes of peace mediation and facilitation practices. Hence, both content and implementation process related to agreements were problematic. Also, there was a confusion concerning the emphasis on more practical solutions, de-emphasis on the past grievances, and prioritization of process-oriented achievements.

¹⁰³³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Questions and Answers about Women, Peace and Security”, **Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway**, 15 November 2018, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/the-un/wps/qanda_women/id2365104/ (accessed 10.05.2023).; For the role of the NGOs in the case of Sri Lanka, which has been part of the Norwegian approach and model, along with its critical assessment, see also: Bandarage, **Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka...**, pp. 178-181.

In this regard, such selection and exclusion make outcome-oriented achievements more critical in relation to the embracement of practical lenses. Therefore, justification through process-oriented lenses is not just since a practical approach was adopted. That is why failures for the implementation and sustainability of outcome-oriented achievements and for the utilization of further complementary and deeper approaches reveal the confusion between the attachment to process-oriented peace mediation and facilitation and more pragmatic considerations. Failure in converging different time-frames of the parties related to final status negotiations also problematizes the efficiency of pragmatic considerations. Thus, the underlying roots of conflict could not be addressed.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the ceasefire agreement led to peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In the cases of Aceh and Palestine, on the other hand, agreements were followed by direct talks and negotiations. In the case of Cyprus, peace negotiations under the chairmanship of *Espen Barth Eide* could not make a difference and generated a workable formula in the protracted nature of this conflict and peace initiatives.

In particular, a step-by-step approach was observable in the cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka. The case of Palestine also reveals a step-by-step approach to a considerable extent. With that being said, the case of Palestine demonstrated inclusion and exclusion related to the underlying roots of the conflict. Such an approach was considered necessary for the abatement of conflict and the advancement of the peace process. However, this approach could not be effective due to inadequate efforts in managing peace spoilers while developing mutual trust between the parties.

In the case of Aceh, one can draw the conclusion that disaster diplomacy played an enabling role in the context of process- and outcome-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. In the case of Sri Lanka, on the other hand, peace talks could not be reinvigorated. With that being said, the link among peace, construction, economic development, and international support was advocated in both cases. By the same token, the link between economic development and peace was also demonstrated in the cases of Palestine and Cyprus.

In the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka, the consent of the USA was obtained. However, the case of Sri Lanka revealed the adverse effects of the prioritization of structural dynamics. Given the posture of the USA towards terrorism following 11 September, Norway could not be successful in improving the legitimacy and status of

the LTTE, which resulted in the negligence for the underlying roots of the conflict. This has also been reflected in the motivations of Norway's peace diplomacy regarding system maintenance.

According to *Herman Schmid*, the need to ally with rich and powerful actors in the international system has been one of the most important challenges and problematics that have affected peace researchers. It is argued that the field of peace research cannot be isolated from the requirements of power and influence. As a result, the interests of peace researchers and of rich and powerful actors intersect at the maintenance and control of the international system. This intersection reflects system-oriented perspective.¹⁰³⁴

That is why Norway's peaceful efforts could not be autonomous and sufficient in delivering stable peace between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Norway's efforts were already affected by the violations of the ceasefire, which was also inadequate due to negligence of the sea dimension in this conflict. The combination of ceasefire violations, mutual distrust of the parties, criticisms towards Norway's approach to such violations, the effects of peace spoilers, including Sinhalese nationalists, and the policies of the USA following 11 September made more challenging for Norway to sustain peace dialogue. As a result, the peace process collapsed and could not be revived by Norway.

Despite these challenges and failures, especially observable in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka, there was a Nordic cooperation that underpinned the controlling and monitoring of the agreements. Examples include the case of Aceh and Sri Lanka amidst the failures in the latter. Also, Nordic countries contributed to UN peacekeeping forces in the case of Cyprus. In the case of Sri Lanka, controlling and monitoring efforts of Nordic countries were materialized. However, these efforts could not prevent the reoccurrence of violence, let alone conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

As demonstrated, the Nordic countries integrated negotiations and peaceful resolution of conflicts into their political culture and Nordic peace diplomacy. As for Norway, peace diplomacy, along with gender equality, has been described among the prominent areas for its national self-identification. However, there has also been a hesitation in incorporating gender equality into Norway's peace mediation practices.

¹⁰³⁴ Herman Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Papers Prepared by Swedish Peace and Conflict Research Groups, 1968, p. 221.

This is due to efforts directed to neutral facilitation.¹⁰³⁵ The inclusion of gender perspective increases the level of quality peace through equality. However, this perspective was not reflected in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

The participation of women in peace processes, including mediation, has been a critical objective for the Nordic countries.¹⁰³⁶ But this objective could not be reflected in engaging with peace mediation and facilitation in the selected phases of cases, such as Aceh, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. However, the engagement of PCC entailed notable achievements. Hence, in the case of Cyprus, there were such completed projects with a focus on the activities related to the UNSC Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security.”¹⁰³⁷ This is evident in the completed project of the Center called Gender Rights and Peacebuilding. In the case of Aceh, on the other hand, failure in including women in peace practices decreases the level of quality peace.

As emphasized, regional and international consensus cannot be avoided in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. However, such manifolded consensus should not be obtained at the expense of the resolution of the core issues and prioritization of the warring parties. The problems that stemmed from this consensus affected the techniques of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation and resulted in the failure of the creation of a new reality for the relationship between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. For this reason, the case of Sri Lanka reveals failures due to system-maintenance and the prevailing role of regional and international actors at the expense of conflict resolution and prioritization of the parties.

It is important to note that the escalation of conflicts is embedded in intergroup conflicts. Perceptual and cognitive limitations of human beings generate misperceptions, distortions, mistakes, and self-fulfilling expectations. As reflecting this, the conflict spiral associated with mutual mistrust and threats can be intensified. The intensification of conflict spiral can be destructive when large-groups with

¹⁰³⁵ Inger Skjelsbæk, and Torunn L. Tryggestad, “Protecting the Brand?: The Hesitant Incorporation of Gender Equality in the Peace Nation”, in Eirinn Larsen, Sigrun Marie Moss, and Inger Skjelsbæk (Eds.), **Gender Equality and Nation Branding in the Nordic Region**, London and New York : Routledge, 2021, pp. 113-114.

¹⁰³⁶ As reflecting this, see: Nordic Women Mediators, “Objectives”, n.d., <https://www.nordicwomenmediators.org/> (accessed 15.06.2023).; The Government and the Government Offices of Sweden, “Women’s Participation Helps Ensure that Peace is More Sustainable”, **Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs**, 29 October 2015, <https://www.government.se/articles/2015/10/womens-participation-helps-ensure-that-peace-is-more-sustainable/> (accessed 15.06.2023).

¹⁰³⁷ For the UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, see: United Nations Security Council, **Resolution 1325 (2000) / Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th Meeting, on 31 October 2000**, S/RES/1325(2000), New York : United Nations, 31 October 2000, pp. 1-4, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/426075?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024).

competitive and ethno-centric traits are under threat. This process leads to such decisions that are in line with controversial and escalatory tactics. With poor approaches for conflict handling, such as the inclusion of win-lose-oriented perspectives, a deadlock can emerge that is linked to inadequate contact between the parties and counter-productive dispute resolution. Therefore, third-party activities are especially important in such protracted intergroup and international conflicts fueled by fear, hostility, and suspicion.¹⁰³⁸

In this regard, the Nordic countries failed to undermine the conflict spiral in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. Also, the adherence of Nordic countries to human rights could not be reflected in these cases since injustices and past wrongdoings that have stemmed from the warring parties were not included due to the future-oriented character of mediation. Because of this, threats resulting from ontological insecurities and time collapse were not effectively handled. All of these threats also damaged third-party efforts in creating common ground between the positions of the parties and in focusing on reconciliation.

Following the Oslo Accords, Norway's contribution to the case of Palestine has been marked by its chairing role for international aid, namely the "Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC)", humanitarian aid, assistance to the PA, NGOs, and the "UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)." With the AHLC, the objective of Norway has been directed to the development of a sustainable economic and institutional basis for a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution. Hence, Norway's position has advocated a link between negotiations for the resolution of final status issues, economic and social improvement of the Palestinians, and a lasting peace. In Norway's aid policies, there has been a notable concern for education, energy, and health. Also, there has been a commitment to gender equality and human rights.¹⁰³⁹ These efforts reflect the liberal identity of Norway in the forms of humanitarian aid and peaceful initiatives.

Protracted conflicts and involved parties, along with their large-group identities in conflict, call for the inclusion of political psychological mechanisms, such as making peace with the past, constructive and effective conflict resolution, preparations for the reflections of time collapse, understanding collective psychology in times of

¹⁰³⁸ Fisher, and Keashly, "Third-party Consultation as a Method of...", p. 211.

¹⁰³⁹ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Israel – Palestine: A Negotiated Two-state Solution", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 06 July 2022, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/israel_palestine/id2522237/ (accessed 05.05.2024).

drastic changes and crises, and averting the adverse impacts of peace anxieties upon peace processes. This is especially evident in the psychology of large-groups, especially against a real or perceived threat.

In response to such threats, it is critical for the large-groups to maintain their difference from the adversaries and to protect the physical and psychological borders. In times of regression, physical borders represent large-group identity, along with its protective functioning for the ones who belong to them. As an example of the intertwining physical and psychological demarcations, one can examine both physical and psychological implications of the border issue in Israel. Such psychological implications can intensify when large-groups are regressed. The ambiguity and indistinctiveness towards physical and psychological borders can trigger anxiety. This is also evident in the processes of peace negotiations, as capable of threatening the efforts for the maintenance of large-group difference and borders. When warring parties are close to making an agreement, the risks for the collapse of the peace process may be particularly high.¹⁰⁴⁰

These were also observable in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. In this context, this Thesis considers the inclusion of political psychological approaches as inadequate and inefficient in assessing the functioning of Nordic peace diplomacy in these cases. It is also because of this that dehumanization and violence could not be prevented. In essence, efforts that stemmed from Nordic peace diplomacy for direct communication and recognition between the parties reflect attribute importance directed to large-groups in pursuit of a political solution. However, problems related to restrictive inclusion of political psychological approaches, including negligence of the past, postponement of the core issues, and failure to manage and alter distrust, jeopardize the amelioration of large-group relations. Examples include the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

In peacemaking processes, there cannot necessarily be a linear connection such as the arrival and implementation of ceasefire, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. This is evident in the case of Cyprus regarding the role of conflict transformation-oriented practices through dialogue facilitation of the PCC. The case of Aceh also revealed the disruption in the linear approach towards peace mediation and facilitation. Hence, both linear and non-linear approaches underpin the typology of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices in these cases. In addition to

¹⁰⁴⁰ Volkan, "Large-group Identity, International...", p. 210.

disruption of a linear approach, the cases of Aceh and Cyprus also share a commonality in terms of being attentive to propaganda and misinformation. As a result, there have also been efforts to offer reliable information in both cases. In relation to these assessments, the strengths and challenges of Nordic peace diplomacy will be captured in the following section of this Thesis. Hence, more comprehensive perspectives will be developed rather than primarily optimistic considerations towards Nordic countries.

Section II - The strengths and challenges for the Nordic diplomatic abilities

The examined cases demonstrate the third-party engagement of the Nordic countries at governmental and non-governmental levels and the shifts from unofficial to official involvements. Taken together, the strengths obtained from peace mediation and facilitation-oriented efforts and engagements of Nordic countries in the particular phases of selected cases can be stated as follow: Efforts for the creation of direct contact between the parties; the utilization of NGOs and research institutes; the promotion of trust and confidence; partial, controlled or complete secrecy on the practices of peace mediation and facilitation as exemplified by the cases of Aceh, Palestine, and Sri Lanka; the disruption of linear understanding and approach towards the practices of peace mediation and facilitation as exemplified by the cases of Aceh and Cyprus, and monitoring peace agreements as exemplified by the cases of Aceh and Sri Lanka.

Also, experience sharing can be approached as one of the strengths of Nordic peace diplomacy. In the case of Aceh, sharing the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute proved to be effective in compelling parties to the path towards self-government. It is contended that the effectiveness of mediation may be promoted when there is a commonality in terms of an experience between the mediator and the warring parties.¹⁰⁴¹ Hence, *Martti Ahtisaari*'s emphasis on the case of the Åland Islands can be considered as a means oriented at consolidating his credibility and positive influence upon the parties.

In essence, the involvement of Finland in the case of Aceh reveals the benefits of empathy, along with the demonstration of similar experience regarding the autonomous status of the Åland Islands. In addressing the underlying roots of the conflict, empathy towards the warring parties was strengthened with the historical experience of Finland related to the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute. Hence, capability in understanding and reflecting one's grievances and sorrow can

¹⁰⁴¹ Bercovitch, and Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics...", p. 302.

generate positive outcomes in the processes of peace mediation and facilitation. In this context, the case of Aceh emphasizes that there can be a valid and sound foundation for the delivery of empathy.

The challenges observed from the phases of selected cases entail adversarial and asymmetric relations between the main warring parties, the protracted structure of the conflict, and failures in addressing the underlying roots of the conflict. In particular, failure to provide and secure national sovereignty for the Palestinians through Oslo peace processes; failure to end the acts of authoritarianism, terrorism, and violence in Palestine; and failure to resolve the underlying roots of the conflict in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka affirm the problems for conflict resolution, let alone positive peace and reconciliation. These cases also demonstrate a gap between the objectives of Nordic peace diplomacy and outcomes.

Of critical importance is that the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka reveal how Nordic peace diplomacy may not be directed to conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In the case of Palestine, a paradox regarding pragmatic and future-oriented approaches and emphasis on process-oriented achievements can be linked to failure for conflict resolution, let alone conflict transformation. In the case of Sri Lanka, the collapse of the ceasefire and the effects of 11 September damaged third-party efforts for conflict resolution.

Sufficient to say that agreements and regulations were not designed in such a way as to be capable of leading to practices related to conflict resolution and conflict transformation. For this reason, the involvement of Sweden and Norway could not be effective in encouraging a sustainable path towards peace in the case of Palestine. This also applies to the case of Sri Lanka since there were weaknesses in the ceasefire due to the avoidance of the sea dimension and non-inclusion of President *Kumaratunga*. These mark problems related to the legitimizer role of Norway in this agreement. This is why process- and outcome-oriented achievements could not be sustained, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses could not be integrated.

Also, the failure to address the underlying roots of the conflict and to reflect conceptual differences can prevent the development of a workable framework for the analysis of the conflict. These weaknesses can damage the efforts to explore a common ground between the warring parties involved to a protracted conflict. It is also critical to stress that alignment with structural dynamics/tendencies and ripeness do not indicate successfulness in resolving the core issues of the conflict. This is evident in

the case of Palestine in which modest, minimalist, and pragmatic considerations could not be transformed into a comprehensive approach that ensures conflict resolution and peace while offering avenues for conflict transformation. Importantly, in the case of Sri Lanka, alignment with structural dynamics/tendencies affected the third-party role of Norway adversely.

Regarding the role of Nordic countries in the case of Cyprus, the failure of the Annan Plan does not indicate that efforts associated with conflict transformation cannot be exercised. As an example of the exercise of conflict transformation, the PCC contributes to reconciliation process.¹⁰⁴² In the case of Cyprus, peaceful and informative efforts of Norway not only persisted but deepened despite the structural dynamics oriented at retreating from the practices of peace and conflict resolution on the island. Such efforts were crystallized with the formal initiation and functioning of PCC. Hence, the failures and problems associated with process- and outcome-oriented approaches to mediation cannot be indicative of the absence of the efforts and offerings directed to conflict transformation between two communities. In this process, the peaceful image of the Nordic countries has also been supportive.

According to *Mete Hatay*, the Nordic countries usually demonstrate a straightforward approach, which is both a strength and a weakness. As reflecting its strength, they do not have a hidden agenda. As reflecting its weakness, on the other hand, they do not think beyond their mission. Nevertheless, it is observable through their involvement in different peace processes that Nordics have quite a bit of experience in the field of peace negotiations. In many senses, they can be impartial and preferred by the parties involved in the conflict. They are perceived as more trustworthy. This has also been beneficial for the functioning of the PCC, which is located in the conflict zone. This also makes the experience of PCC quite distinctive.¹⁰⁴³ In essence, a long-term approach is critical, especially in protracted cases. As a result, the functioning of PCC is also important in emphasizing how straightforward and contextual approaches of the Nordic countries need to be supported with conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

In the case of Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the third-party role of Norway could not be adequate and effective due to the effects of 11 September. As a result of close relationships with the USA and structural dynamics/tendencies, the core issues

¹⁰⁴² The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, "About the PRIO Cyprus Centre", n.d.

¹⁰⁴³ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

surrounding the conflict could not be addressed, and solutions, including autonomy for the Tamils, could not be reflected. Importantly, there is a delicate balance between the obtainment of external support and resistance towards any outsider pressures. Given the policies of the USA following 11 September, one can contend that this balance was broken in the third-party engagement of Norway. Also, the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka reveal issues in terms of content and implementation of agreements as well.

The legitimacy of third-party intervention has been grounded in the primary objective associated with influence, alteration, reduction or resolution of a particular conflict.¹⁰⁴⁴ Failure to reflect such objectives also jeopardizes the practices of peace mediation and facilitation and the credibility of third-parties. Nevertheless, the Nordic countries have continued to engage in different conflicts and controversial issues, as evident in the dataset related to the post-Cold War period.

The variety of the cases affirms that the guidance and third-party roles of the Nordic countries have been pursued and/or accepted. For this reason, it is necessary to link process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches with the large-group identity of Nordic countries. As a result, the solid foundation for Nordic peace diplomacy in contributing to the development of an authentic peace and conflict resolution model can be improved. Hence, in the final part of the Thesis, the implications of Nordic identity will be included in order to understand how third-party experiences have shaped the identity of Nordic countries, albeit faultily and incompletely.

In essence, it can be contended that Nordic countries hold high value for direct contact and communication between the warring parties. In this regard, direct dialogue through peace mediation and facilitation can be considered one of the prominent approaches in capturing the typology of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. Accordingly, facilitative and formulative approaches to peace mediation and facilitation can be demonstrated in engaging with the typology of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation as well. These strengths are in line with the perceptions towards the Nordic countries in terms of a widespread tradition of Nordic diplomats with effective skills for dialogue and persuasion in international and regional organizations.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Bercovitch, "Introduction: Thinking about Mediation", p. 3.

As for the facilitative approach, the emphasis can be given to the case of Cyprus and the activities of PCC. Regarding the formulative role of the Nordic countries and peace mediation and facilitation practices, examples include the cases of Aceh and Palestine. In relation to the case of Sri Lanka, this Thesis considers the efforts of Norway as the combination of facilitative and formulative approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. This is also evident in the explanations differing in terms of the mediator and facilitator role of Norway. In this regard, Norway's role was initiated through peace facilitation. However, peace mediation also marked the efforts of Norway.

With that being said, it can be contended there were shifts between peace facilitation and peace mediation. As reflecting this permeability, third-party engagement through peace dialogue, the establishment of a communication channel, and efforts to understand and address problems can be considered as necessary but not sufficient for the task of mediation. Actually, the link between peace facilitation and peace mediation becomes more solid when parties reach a settlement, which is exemplified by the ceasefire. Following that, efforts can be directed to conflict resolution and transformation-oriented practices. As for the case of Sri Lanka, the ceasefire could not be sustained and the parties could not be compelled to returning to peace dialogue.

Importantly, the confusions surrounding the idea of a neutral facilitator in the Asian culture also affected the peace process. As a result, critiques were directed to Norway. In essence, mediation has been a conventional form of third-party assistance in the collectivist culture of Asia compared to facilitation. There were also different perceptions towards peace, which was treated as contested and divergent in the discourse of conflict resolution pertaining to the case of Sri Lanka. Justice has actually been a more primary concern for the Tamil militants compared to peace. From the perspective of Sinhala nationalists, peace has been evaluated as the absence of violence resulting from the activities of organizations, including the LTTE. Hence, Sinhala nationalists chose to attribute violence to the Tamil militants. Different attributions and perceptions towards peace made the search for commonality and mutual understanding quite difficult.¹⁰⁴⁵

Hence, there were ambiguities and different ideas not only for objectives related to peace and justice but also for third-party instruments, including peace mediation

¹⁰⁴⁵ Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States...", pp. 397-399.

and facilitation. For the LTTE, a more broader conception of peace was preferred. This preference was reflected in terms of justice. For the Sinhala nationalists, who opposed the peace process, negative peace was advocated rather than positive peace. Norway could not fill this gap and reconcile different objectives and perspectives while undermining the effects of peace spoilers. In framing Norway's role as a peace facilitator, on the other hand, contextual approaches and tendencies should also be taken into consideration. Confusions related to peace facilitation and the accustomed role of peace mediation in Asian culture might have affected social adaptability to the peace process adversely. Hence, the strategies for peace spoilers should not be formulated at the expense of the emergence of conceptual confusions at the societal level.

According to *Erik Solheim*, these reasons have primarily accounted for the failure of Norway in the case of Sri Lanka. First of all, their contact with the leader of the LTTE was restricted due to the attitude and behaviours of the international community and the Sri Lankan government. As a result, they could not persuade *Prabhakaran* for federalism. Second of all, the Sinhalese political elite lacked a political vision and strong political cooperation for the creation of a state that is multi-cultural and multi-religious as modeled through India. Also, Norway's efforts were inadequate in terms of inclusiveness, which affected the support to the peace process adversely. Therefore, it is stressed that the conflict in Sri Lanka can emerge again as long as the Tamils in Sri Lanka are treated as second-class citizens.¹⁰⁴⁶ Despite these weaknesses, Nordic countries are preferred for third-party roles. Therefore, the following chapter will focus on the dimensions and reflections of Nordic identity in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

Chapter II - The implications of Nordic identity for the promotion of peace mediation and facilitation

Peaceful engagements of the Nordic countries have been explained in terms of Nordic understanding of peace, diplomatic relations, humanitarianism, Nordic internationalism, the Nordic model, Nordic identity, the Nordic brand, Nordic peace, Nordic balance, and the role of geographical and physical features, such as being small states and being located between East and West. In this regard, Nordic countries have been described as exceptional, peaceful, progressive, egalitarian, solidaristic, and

¹⁰⁴⁶ Solheim, *Politikk er å Ville*, p. 133.

internationalist actors.¹⁰⁴⁷ These traits have been part of Nordic identity and affected their acceptability in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

In understanding the implications of Nordic identity, it is important to be aware of the cultural, historical, and regional components linking Nordic countries. According to *Mikko Lagerspetz*, the identity of Nordic countries is based upon cultural and historical commonalities. In addition, there are also regional characteristics that distinguish the Nordic region and their societies in the international area. Nordic countries share deeper commonalities from a Nordic point of view. Furthermore, the commonalities stem from the domestic policies of the Nordic countries rather than perceptions.¹⁰⁴⁸

One can link the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy with the construction and reflection of Nordic identity, albeit the inadequate role of Denmark and Iceland as illustrated in the general dataset of Thesis. Within this connection, the identity of the Nordic countries can be grasped at the level of Nordic peace diplomacy. As a result, the implications of Nordic identity actually vary with regard to different levels, including the international system, institutional affiliations, and national contexts.

From the lenses of the international system, for example, Nordic countries demonstrate both the commitment to system-maintenance and relative autonomy from the system as well. This was evident in the third-way approach and bridge-maker role of Sweden during the Cold War. From the lenses of institutional affiliations, the implications of Nordic identity with different alliances can be linked to the development of Nordic balance. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO,

¹⁰⁴⁷ As putting these aspects and descriptions together, please see the following articles and books, which cover or investigate these aforementioned labels and features about the Nordic countries, along with the challenges: Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", pp. 489-496.; Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl (Eds.), **Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.; Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role...", pp. 11-23.; Browning, "Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...", pp. 27-51.; Clive Archer, and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), **The Nordic Peace**, Hampshire : England, Burlington : USA, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003.; Mikko Kuisma, "Social Democratic Internationalism and the Welfare State After the 'Golden Age'", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 42, No. 1: Special Issue on Nordic Internationalism, March 2007, pp. 9-26.; Peter Lawler, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 565-594.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Mikko Lagerspetz, "How Many Nordic Countries? Possibilities and Limits of Geopolitical Identity Construction", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 55-56.; In this article, *Lagerspetz* examines the importance of Nordic identity for the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in stressing their difference from Russia and from the other parts of the former USSR. In this connection, there might be an increasing tendency to demonstrate their differences from each other as well. These efforts have led to the recognition of five Nordic countries as significant alternatives, particularly Estonia. Lagerspetz, "How Many Nordic Countries?...", p. 53.

it is more apparent how the dynamic nature of identity cannot be neglected in understanding the connotations of Nordic large-group identity. From the lenses of national contexts, there have been differences in terms of the reflection of peaceful Nordic identity into peace mediation and facilitation practices.

Nonetheless, the central elements of the Nordic image, identity, or brand have been framed in ideas, which illustrate the Nordic countries as ethical, altruistic, responsible, and activist actors open to solidarity with the developing world. It is contended that this image is apparent through the embracement of environmentalism, active humanitarianism, and development aid policies and practices of conflict mediation/resolution and peacekeeping contributions.¹⁰⁴⁹ Building on this understanding, peace mediation and facilitation have also been important components of Nordic identity.

As highlighted, this understanding has been reflected through the Nordic brand and the Nordic image. Efforts for the promotion of peace and peacemaking have been an indispensable part of the creation of the Nordic brand and the Nordic image.¹⁰⁵⁰ In addition to the promotion of peace, the policy areas that demonstrate the distinctive contributions of the Nordic countries have been explained as the environment, international security, and global welfare.¹⁰⁵¹ The contributions to these areas have also affected the implications of Nordic identity. Accordingly, a broad recognition suggesting the suitability of Nordic countries for third-party roles in conflicts and controversial issues has emerged and been firmly established.

For most of the third-parties, it is important to achieve a stable and durable resolution of conflict in connection with their interest and reputation.¹⁰⁵² Thus, this explanation reveals how reputation can be a source of motivation and of credibility for third-party processes. Reputation plays a guiding and encouraging role in the processes before, during, and after peace mediation and facilitation. Hence, the following section will look into the reputation of Nordic countries in relation to their hallmarks and typologies in third-party practices.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Christopher S. Browning, "Fantasy, Distinction, Shame: The Stickiness of the Nordic "Good State" Brand", in Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl (Eds.), **Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021, p. 14.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", pp. 81-82.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role...", p. 13.

¹⁰⁵² Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of...", p. 14.

Section I - The hallmarks and typologies of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation

In essence, the hallmarks of peace and reconciliation engagement of Norway can be explained as follow: Ownership by the conflicting parties and their responsibility for the achievement of sustainable peace; long-term approach to ensure the continuity of peace and reconciliation efforts; willingness for the engagement and dialogue with all conflicting parties pursuing a political solution; acceptance of failure and benefiting from unsuccessful attempts; ensuring the availability of human and financial resources; cooperation between diplomats, different actors and organizations; relevant experience and knowledge acquired across diverse cases; impartiality in the processes of peace facilitation with no disregard for the promotion of international law and human rights, and inclusiveness with a focus on the inclusion of women, transitional justice and the rights of victims.¹⁰⁵³

As emphasized, there have been problems in terms of the implementation of a long-term approach in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. Regarding the role of women, Sweden's and Norway's third-party roles were also not successful in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. This also applies to Finland's role in the case of Aceh. It can also be contended that there were inadequate formulas and responses against injustices, victims, and obstacles for reconciliation. Despite notable achievements in terms of mutual communication, dialogue, recognition of the parties, and the inclusion of various actors and organizations, Norway could not be successful in promoting conflict transformation-oriented typologies through its aforesaid hallmarks and techniques in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. Also, ownership by and main responsibility of the conflicting parties can restrict the efforts of Norway in learning from its unsuccessful involvements. Therefore, a more attentive approach that transcends process-oriented typologies is required in balancing the roles between conflicting parties and peace mediators and facilitators.

For Finland, the creation of a foundation oriented at establishing political, economic, and social institutions has been critical for peace mediation, which plays a supportive role for a lasting peace. In this process, assistance to grass-roots actors; dialogue between conflicting parties, and consolidation of mediation activities can be pursued to decrease violence while ensuring a lasting peace and stability. Finland also

¹⁰⁵³ Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Hallmarks of Norway's Peace and Reconciliation Work".

puts an emphasis on the role and responsibility of conflicting parties for sustainable conflict resolution as well. Further to this, the permanency of conflict resolution necessitates to focus on the underlying political, economic, and social problems. The participation of women, young people and religious actors; the development of normative and institutional basis; cooperation on issues associated with mediation; partnerships with the NGOs; the pursuit of activities in multilateral forums; the implementation and funding of projects oriented at supporting mediation; and investments in measures as capable of strengthening capacities and competencies for national mediation have been important hallmarks for peace mediation diplomacy and policy in Finland.¹⁰⁵⁴

Importantly, Norway's approach to conflict resolution is not pacifist. This is due to its non-neutrality and the NATO membership. For this reason, Norway's peace and conflict resolution efforts are closely linked to its security policy. In this process, development, humanitarian relief, and human rights are also prioritized.¹⁰⁵⁵ Despite its non-neutrality, there have been efforts to engage in conflicts and controversial issues as a neutral facilitator. In this regard, Norway puts an emphasis on peace facilitation rather than peace mediation in its third-party interventions.¹⁰⁵⁶ This was also observable in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, its activities also encompass peace mediation.

Additionally, academic diplomacy can be considered as another hallmark of Nordic peace diplomacy. By referring to academic diplomacy, this Thesis links the activities of Nordic peace research institutes, centers, and Nordic pioneers as demonstrations of Nordic expertise and guidance with the creation of favorable conditions for peaceful engagements, including peace mediation and facilitation. Examples include the academic diplomacy experiment of Sweden¹⁰⁵⁷, along with the role of academic research of *Terje Rød-Larsen*¹⁰⁵⁸ in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation oriented at the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. Also, academic activities of the PCC affirm the importance of academic diplomacy.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Peace Mediation as a Stronger Priority in Foreign Policy", **Centre for Peace Mediation**, n.d., <https://um.fi/peacemediation> (accessed 19.05.2023).

¹⁰⁵⁵ Støre, "Norway's Conflict Resolution Efforts – Are They of Any Avail?".

¹⁰⁵⁶ Lieberfeld, "Small is Credible: Norway's...", p. 204.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Wallenstein, "An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy...", pp. 254-262.

¹⁰⁵⁸ For a detailed explanation of this role, see the following book: Jane Corbin, **Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO**, London : Bloomsbury, 1994.

In particular, the NGOs have been considered critical in establishing contacts. By engaging in activities related to development, humanitarian relief, and human rights, the basis for peacemaking can be created. Hence, Norway utilizes the NGOs as an agent for its peacemaking initiatives and official involvement. That is why credible, flexible, and unobtrusive NGOs with the required expertise and knowledge are of utmost importance for Norway's peace diplomacy.¹⁰⁵⁹ In addition, support for grass-roots actors and peacemaking, along with religious actors, is also a discernible hallmark of Nordic peace diplomacy. This is reflected in the priorities of Finland and Norway.

Also, the interactions between peace research and peace mediation and facilitation practices cannot be avoided in the Nordic context. By relying on the interviews conducted with Nordic peace scholars and practitioners, the impacts of peace research upon peace policy and practice have been identified in terms of the researchers, students, theories, and empirical findings. In a study, dated 2023, it is contended that this methodology allows us to appreciate the shared experiences and perceptions that focus on the impact of peace research on politics and policies. From the perspective of Nordic peace practitioners, we can comprehend the value and usefulness of peace research in practice.¹⁰⁶⁰ Hence, Nordic countries provide an area of focus in understanding the connection between theoretical and practical reflections of peace research.

In relation to the benefits of Nordic peace practitioners and scholars, the Nordic countries established a peaceful image while being preferred for the third-party roles. Nordic practitioners and scholars, along with the Nordic peace research centers and institutes, provided expertise and guidance while strengthening the peaceful image of the Nordic countries. In the said study, it is demonstrated that the aforementioned categories, as researchers, students, theories/concepts, and empirical findings, travel between peace research and peace practice.¹⁰⁶¹ These interconnected categories are also relevant for the value of academic diplomacy as embedded in the hallmarks and usefulness of Nordic peace diplomacy.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Lieberfeld, "Small is Credible: Norway's...", pp. 202-203.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Isabel Bramsen, and Anine Hagemann, "How Research Travels to Policy: The Case of Nordic Peace Research", *International Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 5, September 2023, pp. 1953-1956.

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1958-1959.

Building upon this understanding, Nordic peace research institutes and centers, development and social service projects can be considered among the hallmarks of Nordic peace diplomacy as well.¹⁰⁶² The hallmarks and usefulness of Nordic peace diplomacy can also be identified by looking into the cases as conflicts and controversial issues that have been subject to peace mediation and facilitation engagements of the Nordic countries. As highlighted, Norway played a leading role in the brokering of the Oslo Accords and in its more discreet involvement in the peace processes as exemplified by the cases of Guatemala, Haiti, Sudan, Cyprus, Kosovo, and Colombia. Norway has become well-known through its role in such peace processes.¹⁰⁶³ Hence, small cases-specific, along with process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented perspectives, can enrich one's understanding about the hallmarks of Nordic peace diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a connection between the hallmarks and usefulness of Nordic peace diplomacy and recognition of the Nordic countries.

There have been proposals and calls to strengthen peace diplomacy and mediation. In a debate referred to as "Internationell Medling Kräver Mer Resurser" ("International Mediation Requires More Resources", the translation of the author), *Peter Wallensteen* and *Isak Svensson* contend that Sweden needs to strengthen its capacity for peace diplomacy ("*fredsdiplomati*") and mediation ("*medling*") due to the continued increase in the armed conflicts, as demonstrated in the UCDP.¹⁰⁶⁴ In an analysis titled as "Sverige bör Satsa på Medling i Väpnade Konflikter" ("Sweden should Invest in Mediation in Armed Conflicts", the translation of the author), the call for Sweden in terms of peace diplomacy and mediation was reaffirmed by *Peter Wallensteen* and *Isak Svensson*.¹⁰⁶⁵

Hence, there is a need for further utilization of these third-party practices due to increased conflicts and controversial issues. Not only Norway and Sweden but also

¹⁰⁶² For example, see: Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 77.

¹⁰⁶³ Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 76.; For further examples that entail Norway's peace efforts, see also: Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbo, **Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of...**, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, "Internationell Medling Kräver Mer Resurser" ("International Mediation Demands More Resources"), *Svenska Dagbladet*, 20 October 2016, <https://www.svd.se/a/GAyb6/internationell-medling-kraver-mer-resurser> (accessed 24.09.2022).; The original text in Swedish.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, "Sverige bör Satsa på Medling i Väpnade Konflikter" ("Sweden should Invest on Mediation in Armed Conflicts"), *Utrikes Magasinet*, October 2016, <https://www.ui.se/utrikesmagasinet/analyser/2016/oktober/sverige-bor-satsa-pa-att-medla-i-konflikter/> (accessed 24.09.2022).; The original text in Swedish.

Finland aim for the promotion of mediation. This is reflected in its previous experiences, such as in Northern Ireland, the Western Balkans, Aceh, the Horn of Africa, the South Caucasus, and among others.¹⁰⁶⁶ Drawing from these various examples, peace mediation and facilitation practices themselves can be considered among the hallmarks of Nordic peace diplomacy. Consequently, there have been particular approaches oriented at analyzing Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices.

According to *Melanie Greenberg*, the values of dignity, justice, and voice, which might be effective to start the process of peacebuilding, can be demonstrated as the hallmarks of Nordic mediation in discussing whether there exists a Nordic style of mediation. In this regard, these values have been emphasized in relation to Nordic elements of mediation. The role of *Ahtisaari* in the case of Aceh, for example, has been emphasized in terms of dignity, which has been described as an element of both the Nordic way of mediation and any successful mediation.¹⁰⁶⁷ These explanations not only refer to hallmarks of Nordic mediation but also signal the idea for an authentic form of Nordic mediation.

Justice, along with the reconciliation, has also been evaluated as critical to ensure peace. The potential incompatibilities between the resolution of conflicts and justice have been demonstrated as a complex and overlooked area, especially while executing peace agreements. Voice, on the other hand, has been explained in relation to legitimacy, representation, and inclusion of actors, the challenges resulting from the power asymmetries in the processes of mediation, communication, and responses from the outside world. The dimensions of secrecy and multiple voices have also been emphasized in the context of the term voice.¹⁰⁶⁸

It can be argued that these values and dimensions affected the achievements of Nordic countries in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. In response to asymmetrical relations, giving voice to non-state groups through direct communication, representation and the promotion of legitimacy and prestige was observable in the case of Aceh and particularly in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. However, there were problems related to inclusiveness in these cases. In the case of Cyprus, further efforts are also required to undermine the effects that stem from the

¹⁰⁶⁶ Joenniemi, "Peace Mediation and Conflict...", p. 110.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Melanie Greenberg, "Dignity, Justice and Voice – A Reflection on 'Nordic' Mediation", *Development Dialogue*, No. 53, Responses to Mass Violence – Mediation, Protection, and Prosecution, November 2009, pp. 50-51.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-56.

international non-recognition of the TRNC. Nonetheless, tackling asymmetric information and challenging elite-peacemaking can be seen as contributions of the PCC in the case of Cyprus.

As explained, engagement with all conflicting parties has been critical for peace and reconciliation efforts of Norway.¹⁰⁶⁹ Central to Nordic peace diplomacy is the flexibility in the processes of communication and dialogue. To achieve this, peace mediation offers critical values in connection with the straightforward approach and usefulness of Nordic peace diplomacy. Mediation, as a malleable mechanism, can be utilized in different contexts by different actors. Further to this, Track II Diplomacy can be utilized in the need of the creation of informal and secret communication between the parties.¹⁰⁷⁰ Examples of Track II Diplomacy were particularly observable in the cases of Cyprus and Palestine.

In a speech/statement, titled as “Norway’s Engagement in the Middle East”, facilitating political dialogue between states or between the authorities and non-state armed actors and ensuring confidentiality, caution, and trust-building in the processes of political dialogue have been emphasized as critical in bringing the conflicting parties together. It is explained that Norway’s approach does not disregard the involvement of rebel groups listed as terrorist organizations in the political dialogue on the understanding that they are also a relevant party seeking a political dialogue.¹⁰⁷¹ This approach has been reflected in the cases of Aceh, Palestine, and Sri Lanka.

Foreign aid can also be considered one of the hallmarks of Nordic peace diplomacy. As reflecting this, it is argued that the international posture of Norway has been strong in the areas of foreign aid, the global environment, and peace negotiation, including in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, and Columbia. For Norway, these areas have been described as “*moral policy of engagement*”.¹⁰⁷²

The establishment of generous foreign aid has been oriented at the Third World countries. As a result, it is explained that foreign aid contributed to the political status of the Scandinavian countries. Later on, this status has been persuasive for the

¹⁰⁶⁹Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, “Hallmarks of Norway’s Peace and Reconciliation Work”.

¹⁰⁷⁰Tarja Väyrynen, “‘The Higher Cause of Peace’: What Could and Should the Nordic Countries Contribute to the Development of Conflict Mediation in the EU Context?”, in Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, and Bengt Sundelius (Eds.), **The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy**, Solna, Sweden : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); New York : Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 222.

¹⁰⁷¹Huitfeldt, “Norway’s Engagement in the Middle East”.

¹⁰⁷²Øyvind Østerud, “Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway”, **West European Politics**, Vol. 28, No. 4: Norway: The Transformation of a Political System, September 2005, p. 705.

agreement of the distant countries into the processes of Scandinavian mediation.¹⁰⁷³ In this regard, financial aid has also been instrumental and persuasive for the Nordic peace mediation and facilitation activities in distant countries.

Peter Wallensteen, and *Isak Svensson* explain that Nordic mediators have not applied the force of violence as a means of pressure in mediation practices. Having said that, there were several Nordic cases that entailed peacekeeping forces. Peacekeeping forces can be seen as a pressure on the parties, including the governments or non-governmental rebel groups. As proven, mediation has also been accompanied by the achievements pertaining to the development aid, humanitarian efforts, peacekeeping, and multilateral negotiations. Given this background, mediation has been an important peace policy instrument of the Nordic countries in connection with the aforementioned achievements.¹⁰⁷⁴ This explanation highlights the link between peace mediation and relevant achievements, including development aid, humanitarianism, peacekeeping, and negotiation.

According to *Levitan*, the distinctive mediation approach of Scandinavian countries to conflict resolution may be evaluated as a form of soft power diplomacy.¹⁰⁷⁵ Moreover, Scandinavian soft power diplomacy can be considered a form of preliminary diplomacy since the purpose has been oriented at preparing summits and permanent agreements.¹⁰⁷⁶ Hence, soft power diplomacy, along with the NGOs, can be considered one of the distinguishable hallmarks of Nordic peace diplomacy. This approach has manifested through content- and relations-centered efforts. However, there is a need to improve this preliminary approach. In this regard, the integration of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses can play a crucial role in the advancement of Scandinavian soft power diplomacy.

As emphasized, academic initiatives and diplomacy can be considered as important efforts and typologies surrounding the processes of peace mediation and facilitation. Such efforts were pursued by Norway and Sweden in engaging with the case of Palestine. The reason for the implementation of such efforts has been justified in the Nordic expertise and guidance that affected and even guided the fields of peace research and conflict resolution and in the protracted and asymmetric nature of conflicts and controversial issues.

¹⁰⁷³ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Wallensteen, and Svensson, *Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

In addition, economic development and humanitarian aid can be considered as prominent typologies of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. These mechanisms have been encouraging in compelling parties for the direction of positive peace. The implementation of these mechanisms can be expected given the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy and the development/promotion of Nordic identity and the link between economic problems and being prone to the emergence of protracted conflicts in multi-ethnic societies. However, these approaches could not be effective in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

Section II - Then and now: Tracing the reputation of the Nordic countries as peace mediators and facilitators

Nordic countries have generally been considered peaceful actors specialized in the field of peace and conflict resolution. In order to acquire this reputation, Nordic countries have developed a peaceful culture grounded in conflict resolution and conflict transformation capabilities, management of challenges related to their geographical positions and the effects of systemic conditions, the establishment of peace research institutes and centers, along with the role of Nordic pioneers. Diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries related to conflict resolution and conflict transformation have primarily been evident in the peaceful dissolution of union between Norway and Sweden, the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute, and the peaceful secession of Iceland from Denmark. Also, Nordic countries have supported various organizations in the nexus of multilateralism and the promotion of peace and security.

Reputation can be considered as a crucial component pertaining to the acceptability of mediators. During the third-party practices, individuals as mediators can be represented by individuals themselves, the NGOs, or international organizations. As for the individuals representing themselves, it is important to have relevant diplomatic experience for former officers; to specialize in the field of conflict resolution for academics; and to be associated with pacifism and peaceful dialogue for the members of a group.¹⁰⁷⁷ Thus, it can be contended that the reputation of Nordic countries through peace research institutes, NGOs, and pioneers also consolidated the acceptability of Nordic countries in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. In

¹⁰⁷⁷ Jacob Eriksson, "Mediation by Small States: Norway and Sweden in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", in Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel (Eds.), **Handbook on the Politics of Small States**, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, p. 208.

the following sub-sections, the development of the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries will be examined.

a. Nordic countries in retrospect

In the seventeenth century, conceptions directed to the North contained such traits, including “*an Arcadia, fertile and sane and valuable in its uncorrupted originality*”.¹⁰⁷⁸ These traits were especially emphasized by the Kingdom of Sweden during the period between 1630 and 1720. In this period, Sweden was considered to be one of the Europe’s great powers. Additionally, it is also noted that the North can sometimes be represented in terms of peacefulness and serenity. According to *Matti Klinge*, such romantic representation entails escapist and conservative traces. Despite close historical, psychological, and economic interactions with the Continent and historical participation in European civilization, the Northerner self-conception puts an emphasis on its peripheral status and closeness with nature. The geographical position and socio-economic background of the Nordic countries also account for the traditional self-identification of the Northerners.¹⁰⁷⁹

Further to this, the distinctiveness of the North can also be explained by referencing less pervasive influence of the “Peace of Westphalia.” The Westphalian principles were applied to Swedish-Danish-Polish relations. However, the Baltic littoral states were committed to dismembering Sweden, as a guarantor of Westphalia. For this reason, the area remained as a major zone of war until 1721. By the end of this century, Russia, which had such ambitions as inconsistent with the integrity of Sweden, became a major player in the northern system. In essence, the Westphalian arrangements and the elements that governed the affairs in Western Europe could not affect the North and also the East.¹⁰⁸⁰ This relative exceptionality supports the distinctiveness of the Nordic countries and internal/external perceptions directed to the North from a historical perspective.

In a broader framework, the identification of the North indicates a relation mainly with the Continent. This identification was grounded in being poor and peripheral in relation to the Continent. Such characteristics were often accompanied by the presence of youthfulness and of parvenu. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Northern self-identification was grounded in an idealized image that focused on the man of the hinterlands and the surrounding harsh conditions. The poor

¹⁰⁷⁸ Klinge, “Aspects of the Nordic Self”, pp. 257-258.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts...*, pp. 44-45.

peasant played a critical role in national self-consciousness. Further to this, the Nordic image was also characterized by the capability to undertake and master difficult conditions and wilderness, coupled with a deeply and naturally religious and loyal ethos. Such aspects were actually more observable in Finland and Norway compared to Denmark and Sweden.¹⁰⁸¹

In relation to the Continent, the perception of the Nordic peoples has demonstrated no part in the exploitation by Europe. For this reason, their purpose has been oriented at compensating the injustices and wrongdoings of the Europeans. This purpose can explain the activist role of the Nordic countries, coupled with the Netherlands, Canada, and the Republic of Ireland, among others, in the UN. Accordingly, it is argued that the economic and political success of the Nordic nations has been connected with their ability to distance themselves from neighbours, especially Germany and Russia.¹⁰⁸² This background and efforts to remedy sufferings can also be linked to their diplomatic capabilities in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. There have also been other traits that affected the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy.

From a historical perspective, Denmark's loss of its great or middle power status and its shift from colonial ambitions were also linked to being an agrarian and peripheral society in the context of self-identification and pursuit of internal stability. Sweden also possessed an old capital, a court, and a rich military heritage. However, geographical and religio-aesthetic national romanticism affected the self-identification of Sweden, which, in this respect, demonstrated a middle ground. Hence, the traits, such as being agrarian and peripheral, affected the self-identification of Denmark and Sweden.¹⁰⁸³ Despite its military heritage, Sweden has been approached as a peaceful actor in world politics.

For Finland, its proximity to St. Petersburg affected its consciousness in engaging with world affairs. In the nineteenth century, many Finns took part in high posts within the Russian Imperial army. As a result, they developed global ideas, which marked a tradition that still persists. Examples related to the role of Finland include the Helsinki Conference, dated 1973-1975, in response to the European security and diplomatic activities at the UN level. In this regard, these activities reveal

¹⁰⁸¹ Klinge, "Aspects of the Nordic Self", pp. 260-261.

¹⁰⁸² Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", pp. 25-26.

¹⁰⁸³ Klinge, "Aspects of the Nordic Self", p. 261.

the persistence of this tradition as responding to calls for peaceful initiatives resulting from great power tensions in contemporary politics.¹⁰⁸⁴

In addition to non-violent resistance and political skills of Finland against the Russifying attempts, as highlighted in the first part of the Thesis, along with their engagement in the European security and diplomatic capabilities, a few following cases can be emphasized due to their non-conflictual course: the division between Norway and Sweden, the Åland Islands dispute, the East Greenland, which was given to Denmark, and South Schleswig, which remained German. The non-conflictual course in these cases was chosen by the decision-makers with the avoidance of the use of force by the Nordic governments. Exceptions include Finland and the Continuation War.¹⁰⁸⁵

In particular, the dissolution of the Union between Norway and Sweden has been evaluated as an important case for the maintenance of peace. It is argued that nationalist states might learn from this experience in which the discipline of national pride and some sacrifice of interests led to peaceful separation. As explained by S. Shepard Jones, *“Sweden did not save the Union, but she saved the peace and prosperity of the Northern peoples”*.¹⁰⁸⁶ With the cases above, it can be seen that Nordic countries aimed to distance themselves from violence as a means for self-interested objectives.

Exceptions regarding the distance and isolation of the Nordic countries from European affairs include the effects of major European conflicts on Finland, the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Nazi Germany, and the occupation of Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroes by Great Britain and the USA. Nevertheless, geographical conditions, political choices, and lessons learned from the nineteenth century have played important roles in non-involvement in most European conflicts.¹⁰⁸⁷ This attitude also holds relevance for the efforts and initiatives in the context of conflict resolution and conflict prevention.

Taken together, the reputation of Nordic countries has been connected with their ability for peaceful settlement of grievances. With that being said, the recognition of

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.; The Helsinki Accords were also important in terms of the promotion of paths for humanitarianism and cooperation, as well as the “People’s Diplomacy.” For more information about this and the implications of People’s Diplomacy, see: Guha, **Peace Diplomacy**, pp. 21-22.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Archer, “Introduction”, pp. 11-13.

¹⁰⁸⁶ S. Shepard Jones, **The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations**, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, New York : The American Scandinavian Foundation, 1939, p. 7.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Østergaard, “Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...”, pp. 26-27.

the Nordic countries as the constitution of special grouping challenging the ordinary character of international relations in terms of settlement of grievances without resorting to war over a long period of time poses some issues and challenges.¹⁰⁸⁸

In historical terms, Joenniemi explains that *“joint values, vicinity and cultural closeness have sometimes fuelled rather than reduced the risk of war. Actually, the non-wars since 1815 are in stark contrast with a previous period of incessant and often ferocious warfare”*.¹⁰⁸⁹ In this context, the record of non-wars since 1815 indicates the ability of the Nordic countries in transforming the warfare culture into a peaceful culture that has also been important for their reputation and security.

In addition to these aspects concerning the underpinnings of the reputation of mediators, there has also been an emphasis on impartiality in connection with the acceptability of mediators. In this regard, it is important for mediators to be perceived as impartial with the objective to work for the best interests of the parties. Further to this, subjective impartiality is actually more crucial compared to objective impartiality. Regarding the link between the acceptability of mediators and small states, the suitability of small states has often been explained by referencing the position of the small states in the international system and the reputations associated with skilled diplomacy, impartiality, or regional expertise. As reflecting these, Norway and Sweden have been emphasized as prime examples in the nexus of the acceptability of mediators and small states.¹⁰⁹⁰ Hence, historical, geographical, and physical conditions affected not only the reputation of Nordic countries but also their acceptability in third-party practices.

b. Internal and external reflections of the reputation of the Nordic countries

Within this framework, peace mediation and facilitation experiences have both accounted for and strengthened the reputation of the Nordic countries. Importantly, facilitation has been an important instrument for peace engagement of the Nordic countries. The Oslo peace process, for example, has been demonstrated for the emergence of the specialization of Norway in the facilitation of peace negotiations. The facilitation experiences of Norway have further been exemplified in the cases of Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹¹ These cases reveal external reflections of Norway's peaceful reputation.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Pertti Joenniemi, “Norden Beyond Security Community”, in Clive Archer and Pertti Joenniemi (Eds.), *The Nordic Peace*, Hampshire, Burlington : Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, p. 198.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Eriksson, “Mediation by Small States...”, p. 209.

¹⁰⁹¹ Hagemann, and Bramsen, *New Nordic Peace: Nordic...*, p. 19.

This reputation has also been consolidated with the functioning of PRIO. As the world's first peace institute, PRIO has also played a supportive role in facilitating workshops in disputes. In essence, the involvement of Norway, described as a small Scandinavian country with no specific geopolitical and ex-colonial interests, also entailed development, and social service projects held in Sri Lanka with the agencies, including Cey-Nor, Worldview, Redd Barna, and NORAD.¹⁰⁹² Such projects also reflected/consolidated Norway's humanitarian and peaceful reputation.

Actually, Norway frames itself as an appropriate and impartial third-party mediator in involving such conflicts outside of Europe.¹⁰⁹³ Norway's posture signaled an arrogant, ideal, and harmless small state with the objective to improve the world while protecting its interests.¹⁰⁹⁴ The interactions between peaceful interventions, interests, and peaceful national image creation also apply to Finland and Sweden. In this regard, Finland and Sweden played active roles in negotiations between the East and West since 1945 and in the establishment of new security institutions in Europe, including the OSCE.¹⁰⁹⁵ As a result, one can argue that the developments in the Cold War period also affected the diplomatic capabilities of Finland and Sweden in terms of bridge-making roles and negotiations. These roles can also be linked to their reputation and historical experiences.

Actually, Sweden was a prominent actor in embarking on a neutrality policy grounded in the geopolitical conditions and its diplomatic tradition. In the wake of the Second World War, the allocation of prestige and resources in the UN, further reinforced with the appointment of *Dag Hammarskjöld*, the "growth for peace" doctrine through trade liberalization, the efforts oriented at bridging the gap between East and West, and creating a Nordic defence alliance were pursued by Sweden. It was assumed that physical means would be adequate to resolve differences between the two blocks. But the accession of Denmark and Norway to NATO led to the abandonment of the creation of a Nordic defence alliance.¹⁰⁹⁶ This background related to the bridge-maker role of Sweden was also reflected in the case of Palestine.

Taken together, the peaceful tradition of the Nordic countries still persists. In the "Global Peace Index (GPI)" for 2023, the high level of peacefulness of Nordic

¹⁰⁹² Bullion, "Norway and the Peace Process...", p. 77.

¹⁰⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Østerud, "Introduction: Peculiarities of Norway", p. 713.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role...", p. 13.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Martin Peterson, *Stockholm: Nonaligned and Nervous*, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1980, pp. 187-188.

countries has been demonstrated. By relying on qualitative and quantitative indicators, totaling twenty-three, GPI assesses the peacefulness of one hundred sixty-three countries in terms of “Societal Safety and Security”, “Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict”, and “Militarization.” In this regard, it is stated that “*Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world, a position it has held since 2008*”.¹⁰⁹⁷ Following that, Denmark has been ranked as the second country with a very high state of peace. Finland has been ranked as the thirteenth country with a very high state of peace, while Norway and Sweden have been ranked as the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth countries, respectively, with a high state of peace among one hundred sixty-three countries.¹⁰⁹⁸ Thus, Denmark’s and Iceland’s very high state of peace could not be channeled into peace mediation and facilitation practices.

Nonetheless, this data affirms the reputation of the Nordic countries in terms of peacefulness that has been approached through the parameters of “Societal Safety” and “Security, Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict”, and “Militarization.” Regarding the link between the Nordic countries and the domain of Societal Safety and Security from most to least peaceful, Finland has been ranked as the first and most peaceful country. Iceland, Norway, and Denmark have been ranked as the third, fifth, and sixth countries, respectively. Sweden has been ranked as the fourteenth country. As reflecting Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict domain, Iceland has again been ranked as the first and most peaceful country. It was followed by Denmark, which was ranked as the twenty-seventh country. Finland and Norway were ranked as the fiftieth and fifty-fourth countries, respectively. Sweden, on the other hand, was ranked as the sixtieth country.¹⁰⁹⁹

As reflecting the domain of militarization from most peaceful to least, Iceland has been ranked as the first country. Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have been ranked as the sixteenth, thirty-fifth, and one hundred and second countries, respectively. Norway, on the other hand, has been ranked as one hundred forty-first among one hundred and sixty-three countries.¹¹⁰⁰ This assessment indicates that the military domain decreases the level of peacefulness of the Nordic countries, particularly for Norway and Sweden. Nonetheless, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have more distinguishable positions in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation compared

¹⁰⁹⁷ The Institute for Economics & Peace, **Global Peace Index 2023: Measuring Peace in a Complex World**, Sydney, June 2023, p. 2, <http://visionofhumanity.org/resources> (accessed 17.09.2023).

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

to Denmark and Iceland. Also, this data signals that Norway and Sweden have a peaceful reputation amidst militarization.

Despite the decisive effects of the Cold War upon Nordic peace diplomacy, relevant assessments associated with the distinctiveness and reputation of the Nordic countries were formulated before the Cold War. Drawing from the note of *Lewis F. Richardson* regarding the exceptional behavior of Switzerland and Sweden during 1820 and 1939, for example, *David Wilkinson* concludes that the following characteristics surrounding these states can be considered as plausible for their exceptionality and infrequency in war participation.¹¹⁰¹

“(...) relative prosperity, neutrality (or isolationism, or a policy of no alliances), absence of territorial claims, lack of colonies and overseas colonization, faint ideological commitment, markedly restrained sympathy with foreign subject classes or peoples, reasonably good defensive geographic situations, strong defensive war preparations, strong international trade ties, constitutional government, and less than major power status”.

Despite its distinctiveness as traceable in the views and perceptions, the Nordic region has not been researched very thoroughly. In contrast to dominant views and perceptions about the region, the endurance of the Nordic case might not be seen as an isolated and *sui generis* phenomenon and as a unique form of political space, which might partly explain the lack of broader discussions and debates on the Nordic experience. According to *Pertti Joenniemi*, the Nordic case has often been examined as a societal model. The security and peace implications, on the other hand, have been sidelined in IR.¹¹⁰²

In addition to the presentation of the small cases in this Thesis, this negligence can also be compensated by looking into the Nordic contributions at the level of international and regional organizations. In this regard, Nordic countries have played guiding roles in international and regional organizations. It is argued that acting as international mediators and problem-solvers and holding central positions in international organizations, as the demonstration of effective public administration, have indeed been important in the foreign policy agenda of the Nordic countries.¹¹⁰³

¹¹⁰¹ David Wilkinson, **Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War**, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London : University of California Press, 1980, p. 60.

¹¹⁰² Joenniemi, “Norden Beyond Security Community”, pp. 199-200.

¹¹⁰³ Wivel, “What Happened to the Nordic Model...”, p. 490.

Membership in and close relationship with the organizations have also been reflected in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation.

Nordic countries have contributed to international security by participating in military operations as undertaken by the UN, NATO, EU, and other security organizations. Nordic countries sometimes participate in *ad hoc* coalitions of willing states. The participation of Nordic countries in military operations has been identified as a key task for the armed forces in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.¹¹⁰⁴ In conformity to these remarks, the reputation of the Nordic countries also corresponds to multilateralism, as evident in the general dataset of the Thesis. Accordingly, Nordic countries have supported various organizations, including the EU, NATO, OSCE, and UN, as illustrated in the general/particular dataset. They also shaped the approaches of these organizations.

As an example, the Nordic countries, particularly Finland and Sweden, have been active for the development of a holistic approach in the context of conflict management. In this regard, they have insisted on the improvement of the civilian crisis management of the EU, which has been a neglected and limited element of both the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and international policy thinking.¹¹⁰⁵ Hence, the civilian crisis management-oriented contributions of the Nordic countries also exemplify the Nordic multilateralism at the EU level. As evident in the general dataset of the Thesis, the role of Nordic countries in international and regional organizations has allowed them to promote their peaceful image as part of the Nordic brand that underlies Nordic peace diplomacy as well.

With that being said, the development of a distinctive Nordic identity has also been subject to scepticism. According to *Maria Strömvik*, the argumentation concerning a distinguishable Nordic identity would be quite challenging considering the probability of greater differences rather than similarities, as demonstrated by the Nordic countries in international politics. Despite cooperation, as exemplified by the “Nordic Council”, *Strömvik* argues that the Nordic countries seldomly coordinate their policies surrounding the management of international security, especially with regard to the presentation of Nordic initiatives. With that being said, adaptation and

¹¹⁰⁴ Håkon Lunde Saxi, **Nordic Defence Cooperation after the Cold War**, Oslo Files on Defence and Security, Oslo : Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), March 2011, p. 10.

¹¹⁰⁵ Väyrynen, ““Higher Cause of Peace’...”, p. 215.

contribution to peace-building efforts of the EU have been emphasized as one of the commonalities between Nordic countries.¹¹⁰⁶

Despite the challenges and problems, it is clear that Nordic countries have created a peaceful reputation that has also been linked to third-party practices. However, this is hampered by the marginal role of Denmark and Iceland related to peace mediation and facilitation. In the following section, chronological and systemic factors that enabled self-identification of the Nordic countries will be provided.

Section III - The effects of fear and uncertainty in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation: Chronological and systemic circumstances

This Thesis suggests that the diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries can also be linked to efforts in managing fear and uncertainty in world politics. Accordingly, the Second World War generated critical outcomes for Nordic countries in terms of peace mediation and facilitation. In this section, it will be argued that the threats and invasions by the Nazi government of Denmark and Norway and by the USSR to Finland during the Second World War affected Nordic countries in terms of active involvement in the processes of peace diplomacy. In this regard, concerns and insecurities have been channeled into the active role and third-party assistance, including peace mediation and facilitation.

The Nordic approach to peace mediation and facilitation has been crystallized with the efforts to challenge the fear resulting from the threats and invasions of the Nazi government and of the USSR during the Second World War. Peace diplomacy of Nordic countries might be evaluated as the management and transformation of such threats and insecurities, which culminated with the block rivalries, conflicts, controversial issues, and nuclear competition during the Cold War. These counter-efforts provided valuable lessons in engaging with protracted social conflicts grounded in animosity, hostility, and the threat of destruction.

For this reason, the reflections of Nordic identity also entail the following examples: the management and transformation of fear and polarization as experienced during the Interwar, Second World War, and Cold War periods; academic contributions and guidance in relation to Nordic peace research institutes and centers; and Nordic pioneers. Further to this, being small states and being approached through

¹¹⁰⁶ Maria Strömviik, "Starting to 'Think Big': The Nordic Countries and EU Peace-building", in Alyson J. K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, and Bengt Sundelius (Eds.), **The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy**, Solna, Sweden : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); New York : Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 199.

the lenses of the security community also affected the development of Nordic identity and their credibility in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. These factors consolidated the link between Nordic identity and peaceful reputation.

In the following sub-sections, this Thesis reveals how the formulation and development of Nordic identity have been affected by the struggles in the Interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. In response to various struggles, Nordic countries have developed such diplomatic capabilities as reflected in various conflicts and controversial issues.

a. Interwar period and the Nordic countries

Actually, the echoes of the First World War have been critical for the humanitarian role of Nordic countries, which has been one of the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy. In this regard, the issues related to PoWs and the protection of minorities and refugees affected the Nordic countries in terms of humanitarianism and effective diplomatic communications between the warring parties. However, there have also been challenges and failures that affected the security and values of the Nordic countries adversely. The Second World War threatened the peacefulness of the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation.

War creates mutual interests and common problems between parties, as enemies, concerned with the destruction of the other. Wars also undermine diplomatic communications, thus complicating the problems, as in the case of the First World War. In this context, warfare produced crises concerning the civilian detainees, captives, and the PoWs in hostile territories, especially on the Eastern front. In this unprecedented turmoil, the dissolution of Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires affected the conditions of war captives adversely in terms of their protection and repatriation. For this reason, the amelioration of the conditions of PoWs provided reciprocal cooperation and arrangements between belligerent powers, which gave rise to protective actions of neutral countries. The representatives of neutral countries pursued their interests while handling communications between the enemy governments.¹¹⁰⁷

As revealed in the previous part of the Thesis, Nordic countries played important roles grounded in third-party engagements and humanitarianism. This period also

¹¹⁰⁷ Gerald H. Davis, "National Red Cross Societies and Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914-18", **Journal of Contemporary History**, Vol. 28, No. 1, Jan. 1993, pp. 31-32.; Of critical importance is that there was a mediation attempt by *Nathan Söderblom*, Swedish archbishop, directed to the belligerents of the First World War. Hans Mouritzen, "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, p. 301.

witnessed the cultural creation of the Scandinavian model and its images and the posture of Sweden as a middle way. Of critical importance is that the distinctiveness of Nordic countries became more crystallized with the efforts of *Fridtjof Nansen*; peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute and the third-party role of Norway in the exchange of populations between Türkiye and Greece. In conformity to these remarks, Nordic countries were also active actors in the LoN.

In this regard, *S. Shepard Jones* argues that the history of the LoN demonstrates a considerable agreement among Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and grouping of these countries as the Scandinavian bloc since 1920. The authorized delegations of Scandinavian countries posed a similar outlook at Geneva in which important questions were discussed. The similar outlook of the Scandinavian delegates was one of the reasons for the emergence of expressions such as the Scandinavian bloc, Scandinavian representatives, and Scandinavian proposals. Despite the commonalities of the Scandinavian states, their common attitude did not lead to identical policies, activities, and collective responsibility.¹¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, differences did not prevent Nordic countries from taking important roles in the context of peace and conflict resolution. In this regard, it can be valid and sound to focus on the relationship between the Nordic countries and the LoN. In brief, the relationship between Nordic countries and the LoN can be examined through the periods of 1920-1927 and 1928-1939. During 1920-1927, the assistance for prisoners of war and refugees has been a critical component for the development of Nordic peace diplomacy under the auspices of the League. This was also illustrated in the general dataset of the Thesis.

Drawing from the LoN Refugees Mixed Archival Group, the cases that entail the contributions of Nordic countries might be classified in terms of the repatriation of PoW in various geographies; Russian refugees; famine in Russia; and refugees from Asia Minor between 1920 and 1927.¹¹⁰⁹ This classification has been extracted through the Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds) collection of the archives of the LoN. In this collection, the activities undertaken by *Fridtjof Nansen* as the LoN High

¹¹⁰⁸ Jones, *Scandinavian States and the League...*, p. 3.; Nonetheless, they were seen as the most committed and passionate supporters of the LoN. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way*, p. 181.

¹¹⁰⁹ For these cases, please see: "Fonds - League of Nations Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds)", Geneva : **United Nations Library & Archives**, <https://archives.ungeneva.org/refugees-mixed-archival-group-nansen-fonds> (accessed: 14.07.2022).

Commissioner for PoW from 1920 and as High Commissioner for Russian Refugees from 1921 were listed and shared.¹¹¹⁰

Nordic countries provided important contributions for the foundation and functioning of the League. In terms of the contributions of the Nordic practitioners, for example, there have been key actors, who have been involved in the activities of the League. As reflecting this, *Åke Hammarskjöld*, who worked in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and in the Secretariat of the League, played a critical role for the preparations related to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In this context, Swedish *Åke Hammarskjöld*, as an international civil servant, world court registrar, and judge, has been evaluated as one of the founding fathers of the Permanent Court.¹¹¹¹

In essence, the Interwar period was decisive for the establishment of generalizations directed to the Nordic countries. These generalizations paved the way for the distinctiveness and third way approach of Nordic countries in world politics. In this regard, dynamic contents and connotations surrounding the Nordic model can be linked to pursuits of Nordic countries and their credibility in the context of peace mediation and facilitation. It is explained that the 1930s have usually been the targeted time period concerning the formation of the twentieth-century image associated with Sweden and Norden.¹¹¹² As emphasized in the first part of the Thesis, this period witnessed the promotion of Nordicism over Scandinavism, which also took a part in the trajectory of the large-group identity of Nordic countries.

In this process, intergovernmental cooperation was also steadily pursued and developed by the Nordic countries. What made the Nordic intergovernmental cooperation important has been its informal and natural type of formation.¹¹¹³ Hence, Nordic countries obtained experience in developing informal types of contacts and interactions that might be considered as a relevant competence for third-party roles in

¹¹¹⁰ "League of Nations Archives", Geneva : **United Nations Library & Archives**, <https://archives.ungeneva.org/lontad> (accessed: 14.07.2022).

¹¹¹¹ Ole Spiermann, "Fighting for Justice: Åke Hammarskjöld at the Permanent Court of International Justice", in Ola Engdahl and Pål Wrange (Eds.), **Law at War: The Law as it Was and the Law as it Should Be**, Leiden, The Netherlands : Brill | Nijhoff, 2008, p. 245.

¹¹¹² Andersson, and Hilson, "Images of Sweden and the Nordic...", p. 222.; By relying on various resources, the authors draw the conclusion that there are other recognizable periods such as 1990s that also equally affected the Nordic identity. Andersson, and Hilson, "Images of Sweden and the Nordic...", pp. 222-224.

¹¹¹³ Halvard Lange, "Scandinavian Co-Operation in International Affairs", **International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)**, Vol. 30, No. 3, Jul. 1954, p. 286.; In this process, the NGOs, such as the "Norden Association", particularly promoted Nordic cooperation at the citizens level. See: von Bonsdorff, "Regional Cooperation of the Nordic...", p. 33.

conflicts and controversial issues. Hence, capabilities for informal cooperation were reflected in the practices of peace mediation and facilitation. As regards the phases of selected cases in this Thesis, informal elements and techniques were utilized in order to initiate and support peace dialogue.

There were also challenges and contradictions that shaped the foreign policy of Nordic countries. Accordingly, the Nordic countries were considered successful in relation to the combination of rapid industrialization, the periods that witnessed social democratic rule as longer and more uninterrupted compared to Europe, and the construction of the most egalitarian and prosperous societies. This process has also been affected by internal stability and the absence of major rivalries among the Nordic countries. Despite such achievements and fortunate conditions, Denmark and Norway were occupied between 1939 and 1945. The traumatic years associated with the Nazi Germany invasion revealed the inability of Nordic countries regarding isolation from international conflicts and protection from external attacks and pressures. Sweden was the only Nordic country that avoided being involved in the Second World War. Nevertheless, Scandinavian values were challenged during the first half of the twentieth century.¹¹¹⁴ In response to this, they became more involved in the peaceful practices. These practices focused on identity construction and security concerns. As it will be demonstrated in the following sub-section, the invasion of Denmark and Norway particularly affected their foreign policies and organizational affiliations during the Cold War.

b. Cold War period and the Nordic countries

Marko Lehti explains that modern peace mediation practices were established in the years following the Second World War.¹¹¹⁵ Despite the importance of prior engagements, the Cold War played a vital role for the malleability of Nordic grouping as bridge-makers, humanitarian, and peaceful actors in world politics. As explained in

¹¹¹⁴ Patrick Salmon, **Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890-1940**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 1-2.; In this regard, Sweden's neutrality was perceived as a facade. The reason is that Sweden contributed to the victory of the Allied powers, albeit quietly and covertly. Also, Sweden continued to send Germany crucial items. This led to attacks and criticisms directed at Sweden. Moreover, there was resentment in the occupied Denmark and Norway towards Sweden. Because of this, not only Sweden's neutrality but also Nordic cooperation was affected adversely. Childs, **Sweden: The Middle Way**, p. 180.; The fact that Sweden continued to send Germany crucial items also contradicts its humanitarian and peaceful image. See also: Huntford, **New Totalitarians: Terrifying Portrait...**, p. 30.; *Roland Huntford* explains that Professor *Gunnar Myrdal* was also a Nazi sympathizer at the time. Due to the attraction of Nazism for advocates of an authoritarian regime, particularly until the mid-1930s, and the historical impact of German intellectualism in Sweden, the Swedes were also susceptible to the influences of the Nazi thought. Huntford, **New Totalitarians: Terrifying Portrait...**, pp. 62-63.

¹¹¹⁵ Lehti, **Era of Private Peacemakers...**, p. 6.

the first part of the Thesis, Nordic balance was materialized with regard to different institutional affiliations, relative stability in the Nordic region, and structural dynamics during the Cold War. Admittedly, this period affirmed further expansion of Nordic peace diplomacy, as reflected in the general dataset of the Thesis.

During the Cold War, Finland and Sweden remained outside any alliance, whereas Denmark, Iceland, and Norway were members of NATO. Despite the diverging affiliations, Nordic countries were evaluated as regional and distinctive entity. The development of effective structures for cooperation over a range of policies, the commonalities in terms of history, language and culture, and the creation of the Nordic Council, along with the associated governmental and non-governmental Nordic institutions, have been important for this special treatment. This has also been the case in the European context regarding the evaluation of Nordic countries as a regional entity. In terms of the levels of the UN and other international organizations, Nordic countries were also described as a group through peacekeeping operations, trade negotiations, and institutional arrangements.¹¹¹⁶

Hence, a distinctive Nordic dimension and entity were traceable in various practices, including peacekeeping. This was also evident in the undertakings of peace mediation and facilitation as well. During the Cold War, Sweden played a bridge-building role between two blocs. According to *Ada Nissen*, Sweden considered itself as a portrayal of a third way between the East and West. Representatives from Sweden undertook mediators roles in the Suez crisis, the Vietnam War, the Western Sahara conflict, and the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, Norway, as a loyal member of NATO, also played facilitative roles in conflicts, including the Korean War, the talks and discussions with Poland regarding *détente*, and the alleged Ohio channel of communication in the Vietnam War.¹¹¹⁷

As regards the internal level, intergovernmental cooperation between the Nordic countries was intensified and formalized to a substantial extent. Further to this, the consultations among the foreign ministers of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden also consolidated their cooperation in various organizations, including the UN, OSCE (OECE at the time), and the Council of Europe. There were meetings among justice, social affairs, and education ministers of the Nordic countries with the inclusion of Finland. Such inter-Nordic meetings were held on a regular basis. Of critical

¹¹¹⁶ Archer, "Introduction", p. 2.; please see: Archer, "Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", pp. 451-452.

¹¹¹⁷ Nissen, "Historical View on the Nordic Peace...", p. 84.

importance is that there was constant direct contact among the Nordic countries at the governmental level. In this process, both cooperation and similar administrative and legislative regulations played a contributing role in deepening discussions and interactions. As a result, the resolution of a few internal problems was resembling or identical with one another. The Nordic cooperation also entailed an economic dimension, which was strengthened as well.¹¹¹⁸ Hence, it can be stated that Nordic cooperation was intensified despite their differences in terms of alliances and security policies.

While the security position of Iceland, as an American base, was complete engagement, Sweden adopted complete disengagement in terms of non-alignment with regard to bloc systems. In this context, Sweden chose to undertake no joint security arrangements. The position of Finland was partial disengagement with regard to its neighbor, the USSR. *Andrén* argues that NATO membership of Denmark and Norway may be read as the violent shift from their traditional attitude of disengagement to engagement in terms of obtaining security by the membership in a grand international security system. The tension between the principles of engagement and disengagement, *Andrén* emphasizes, still persists. In this context, this tension is reflected through their decision concerning the non-receipt of both foreign and allied troops and the refusal of atomic war-heads to be stationed in their countries.¹¹¹⁹

As emphasized, diverging affiliations have been critical during the Cold War. Following the Cold War, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have become members of the EU, whereas Iceland and Norway have remained outside. The diverging affiliations have thus been reflected after the Cold War. With that being said, it is contended that there was a duality in the position of Finland. This was due to its participation in the Nordic Council in 1955, a couple of years after the other founders, and its relationship with the USSR.¹¹²⁰ All of these affirm Nordic identity in grounded in the combination of both converging and diverging aspects.

There have been efforts by the Nordic countries to ameliorate the harsher aspects resulting from the strategic configurations in the Cold War period. In this regard, keeping Great Power presence in the Nordic region to a minimum, which is acceptable to all sides, was consciously important for Nordic countries. In the post-Cold War period, there have also been efforts to prevent new uncertainties in European security

¹¹¹⁸ Lange, "Scandinavian Co-Operation...", p. 286.

¹¹¹⁹ Andrén, "In Search of Security", p. 222.

¹¹²⁰ Archer, "Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", p. 451.

from spreading into the Nordic region. Accordingly, creating and supporting the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Council of Baltic Sea States and assisting Baltic states, which was led by Finland, together with Sweden and Denmark, within the EU framework have been important. The objective has been directed to the improvement of peaceful transition in the Baltic Sea region.¹¹²¹ This adds another layer to Nordic identity. Nonetheless, experiences related to support for peaceful transition can also be linked to the diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries.

During the Cold War, the prominent threat to regional stability of the five Nordic countries, *Steve Hoadley* argues, was external rather than internal in nature. In this context, the reasons for internal regional stability can be explained as follow: The lack of outstanding conflicts between these five democratic countries; the peaceful resolution of the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden; the absence of land frontiers defence concerning the boundary rivals between Norway and Sweden; the transcendence of dynastic rivalries and secessions; the acceptance of national sovereignty and boundaries; the distinctive military postures and alignments of Nordic countries as a solution towards bloc confrontation, and the successfulness in protecting the Nordic region from bloc conflict and manipulation compared to other regions in the world.¹¹²² It can be asserted that such components have stimulated the reputation of the Nordic countries as well.¹¹²³

Andrén explains that “(...) *national defence since 1945 has never been a matter for any serious political conflict in the Nordic countries*”.¹¹²⁴ There have been different opinions concerning the extent of the necessity and justifiability of defence. But still, maintaining a strong defence was not disputable among the Nordic countries. While Sweden was distinguishable through neutralism, Norway and Denmark found protection through an alliance offered by other powers. In addition, Finland’s position needs to be evaluated in terms of its peace treaty after the Second World War and its eastern neighbor. The impacts of the position of Iceland, on the other hand, were

¹¹²¹ Archer, “Introduction”, p. 7.

¹¹²² Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact...”, p. 23.

¹¹²³ Also, it was stressed that the ability of Nordic countries for regional stability can be tested due to the superpowers’ interests directed to the polar region and neighbouring seas mount. See: Hoadley, “NATO, the Warsaw Pact...”, p. 23.; Hence, the Arctic region can be approached as one of the critical areas that will test the diplomatic capabilities of the Nordic countries.

¹¹²⁴ Andrén, “In Search of Security”, p. 222.

evaluated as restrictive to make any form of military defence possible or worthwhile, albeit the exception concerning the protection of its rights on crucial fishing water.¹¹²⁵

In order to challenge concerns over national and regional security, the relationship between the UN and Nordic countries also reveals contributions in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Examples include the involvement of Nordic countries in the peacekeeping operations of the UN. The catalyzing factors for the Nordic contributions can be explained in terms of their suitability and qualification with regard to principles of UN peacekeeping; common interests; different national interests; compatibility between national interests, values and the goals and ideals of the UN; and a success narrative.¹¹²⁶

Actually, Sweden has played a prominent role in peacekeeping missions of the UN. In this regard, Sweden obtained firmly established and longstanding experience associated with peacekeeping operations. It is explained that approximately 70,000 men and women have served under the auspices of the UN between 1948 and 1995. Sweden has thus been recognized as one of the countries that have contributed most frequently to peacekeeping missions. From 1948 to 1995, Sweden mainly participated in traditional forms of peacekeeping missions.¹¹²⁷ In relation to these developments, Nordic countries further consolidated their peaceful image. However, the collapse of the bipolar international system has generated further challenges for Nordic countries.

c. Post-Cold War period and the Nordic countries

The uncertainty about a system of world order and the absence of commitment pertaining to the enforcement of norms and limits upon deviant behaviors accounted for the rise of conflicts in the 1990s. In this process, the decrease of the Cold War tensions resulted in the loss of interest for mediation and engagement by the world leaders. The uncertainties surrounding the world system and boundaries between allies

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222.; It is worthy to mention that the neutrality of Sweden was rooted in its maritime and territorial policies prior to the Congress of Vienna. Hence, territorial neutrality and especially maritime neutrality shaped Sweden's posture in the period of post-Vienna Congress. For more information about the historical roots of Sweden's neutrality, Nordic maritime neutrality and the shifts in the neutral policies, the following chapter is highly recommended: Leos Müller, "‘Long Peace’, Neutrality and Sweden-Norway's Foreign Policy, 1794-1856", in Nevra Biltekin, Leos Müller, and Magnus Petersson (Eds.), *200 Years of Peace: New Perspectives on Modern Swedish Foreign Policy*, New York, Oxford : Berghahn Books, 2022, pp. 17-37.

¹¹²⁶ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Nordic Peacekeeping Model: Rise, Fall, Resurgence?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006, p. 382.

¹¹²⁷ Eva Johansson, "The Role of Peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish Experience in UNPROFOR", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 452.

and enemies negatively affected the interest rooted in mediation and engagement as means of response and restraint.¹¹²⁸

The period from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War was relatively clear and predictable compared to the post-Cold War period. The interactions and roles between allies and enemies, and between official and unofficial actors, were mostly determined by a bipolar system. In this context, conflicts were largely affected by proxy wars between super-powers. The end of the Cold War, on the other hand, has marked the rise of violent disorders, suppressed passions, and increased uncertainties and complexities across the globe. For this reason, it has become more critical to understand the dynamics of conflicts and disputes and means oriented at the prevention, management, and resolution of such conflicts.¹¹²⁹ However, there was a loss of interest in the practices of mediation amidst alterations in the civil wars.

The end of the Cold War also affected the characteristics of civil wars. In 1975, most civil wars were located in Asia and were mainly guerrilla wars that entailed asymmetric rebel challenges. In 1993, on the other hand, most internal conflicts were located in sub-Saharan Africa and were mainly conventional or primitive wars. In this context, only less than half of these conflicts were guerrilla wars. For this reason, it is argued that this dual geographic and military shift might be explained in terms of the impacts of the end of the Cold War, which demonstrated a major structural change in the international system.¹¹³⁰ This shift also required to make significant changes in the third-party practices.

With that being said, there has also been a common misconception in explaining the prevalence of civil war as a post-Cold War phenomenon. In this regard, the Cold War period witnessed a steady increase in the number of civil wars in progress. The 1980s were critical due to the greater increase of civil wars compared to the 1990s and to the period until the 2010s. Importantly, there was a rapid increase around the period surrounding the end of the USSR, which shaped and reinforced the perception that the prevalence of civil wars was a new problem belonging to the post-Cold War

¹¹²⁸ Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of...", p. 6.

¹¹²⁹ Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First Century", pp. 23-24.

¹¹³⁰ Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3, August 2010, p. 415.

international area. But there has been a fair decline in the prevalence of civil war after the high point of forty-eight ongoing wars as witnessed in 1992.¹¹³¹

The impacts of the post-Cold War period have also been important for small states and their institutional affiliations. While the autonomy of neutral states was acceptable during the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, which is characterized by unipolarity, risks, and a high level of security institutionalization, makes the defensive stance of small states counter-productive. For this reason, their autonomy is evaluated as a security free-riding in a unipolar strategic environment. In this connection, it is argued that the security strategy of small states must favor cooperation in terms of membership in institutions or participation in coalitions.¹¹³² This perspective created further challenges in terms of neutrality and the offering of an alternative way.

In addition to cooperation, orientations directed to expeditionary operations have also been emphasized for the military policies of neutral countries following the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, Finland and Sweden, along with Austria, have abandoned their defensive stance in favour of a cooperative strategy with regard to the EU after the Cold War. The commitment of Sweden in becoming the framework nation of the “Nordic Battlegroup” also demonstrates the shift in the Swedish armed forces compared to the traditional Cold War defence stance.¹¹³³

This process also witnessed challenges related to the relevance of the Nordic model.¹¹³⁴ This deepened efforts for the reformulation of Nordic identity. As highlighted in the section on Nordic humanitarianism, Norway deepened its third-party engagements in response to turbulence resulting from the end of the Cold War. The purpose was grounded in the efforts directed to system institutionalization and systems-maintenance. These efforts cannot be isolated from concerns and objectives over peaceful identity construction. For Finland and Sweden, EU membership can be read as another means of protecting their image while dealing with systemic uncertainties.

¹¹³¹ James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System”, *Dædalus*, Vol. 146, Number 4, Fall 2017, p. 19.

¹¹³² Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, Number 3, 2008, pp. 315-316.

¹¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 320-321.

¹¹³⁴ For the reasons behind the abandonment of the Nordic model, for example, see: Mouritzen, “The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy...”, pp. 9-21.; See also: Ringmar, “Re-Imagining Sweden: Rhetorical Battle...”, pp. 45-63.

Of equal importance is that the NGOs and small states have played a more prominent role in peacemaking in the post-Cold War. It is explained that “*small states, such as Norway, Canada, Sweden, and Finland, once considered peripheral players at best, have become mediators in protracted violent conflicts*”.¹¹³⁵ In this context, peace engagement of Norway, Canada, Sweden, and Finland has been explained with regard to being small states.¹¹³⁶ Drawing from such remarks, the peacemaking role of small states can also be considered as the reflection of the efforts oriented at challenging their vulnerability against conflicts and systemic transformations.

In relation to the active participation, mediation, and mission of Nordic countries in conflicts and controversial issues ranging from the Middle East region to Southeast Asia and to Latin America, Nordic countries demonstrate a history of peacemaking. In this regard, it is argued that mediation has been a central element in the peacemaking history of Nordic countries. Despite the restrictions in terms of systematic comparison with other areas of the world, it is argued that there are reasons to regard the peace experiences and efforts of the Nordic countries as “*(...) a unique phenomenon for such small states*”.¹¹³⁷ In the post-Cold War period, these experiences and efforts have deepened in different but connected areas. There were also accomplishments in terms of Nordic cooperation.

Following the failures in Croatia and Bosnia, for example, Nordic countries were asked to send their troops to Macedonia by the UN Secretary-General. Nordic countries responded positively, and the UN presence was distinguished by the participation of the Nordic countries, even after the arrival of the 300 US troops in Macedonia. The involvement of Nordic countries can be considered as the continuation of the long history of Nordic contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations. Further to this, this contribution can also be considered as the reflection of the liberal institutional framework for European security, which puts an emphasis on

¹¹³⁵ Kelleher, and Taulbee, “Bridging the Gap: Building...”, p. 479.

¹¹³⁶ For another publications, which explain peace efforts and multilateralism of Norway as a matter of status-seeking by a small power, suffering from status insecurity, please see: Benjamin de Carvalho, and Jon Harald Sande Lie, “A Great Power Performance: Norway, Status and the Policy of Involvement”, in Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver B. Neumann (Eds.), **Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, pp. 56-72.; Iver B. Neumann, and Benjamin de Carvalho, “Introduction: Small States and Status”, in Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver B. Neumann (Eds.), **Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, pp. 1-21.; Niels Nagelhus Schia, and Ole Jacob Sending, “Status and Sovereign Equality: Small States in Multilateral Settings”, in Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver B. Neumann (Eds.), **Small State Status Seeking: Norway’s Quest for International Standing**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, pp. 73-86.

¹¹³⁷ Wallensteen and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk...**, p. 219.

civility, conflict prevention and solidarity. These views have been evaluated as aligning with the particular interests of small states.¹¹³⁸

In an article by *Jan Egeland*, foreign policy has been considered as the area that needs to promote the interests and ideals of Norway. Accordingly, consensus on the promotion of such aspects associated with security, trade, environment, aid, and human rights policies has been inherited and handled by successive Norwegian foreign ministers. The post-Cold War period, particularly the 1990s, has provided greater maneuver for Norway to focus on such actions, including peace, human rights, and democracy. Despite the exceptions resulting from the political right in the Norwegian Parliament, a broad majority wished for the increasing level of Norwegian activism linked to ideas regarding peace, human rights, and democracy. Such ideas have been considered as morally correct while aligning to the self-interests of Norway. It is widely recognized that efforts for peace and development can lead to greater security and predictability for a small and vulnerable society.¹¹³⁹

However, the post-Cold War period, which has generated challenges and insecurities, reveals contradictions directed to Nordic countries in terms of increasing populism and controversial military operations as well. Importantly, it is contended that the contribution of Denmark to peace shares characteristics with traditional great power politics. This is especially observable in the period following the end of the Cold War.¹¹⁴⁰

Regarding the peaceful self-image of Norway and its relationship with the USA, it is claimed that the close relationship between Norway and the USA has been a prerequisite for realpolitik, security, and Norway's peace facilitative role, including in the Middle East. Hence, close connections with the USA also affect Norway's peaceful image by consolidating its role in peace processes. Considering the dual-role of such impact and the prominence of being a peaceful country in the Norwegian self-image,

¹¹³⁸ Clive Archer, "Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of the Nordic States and Macedonia", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1994, pp. 374-376.; With that being said, it is also claimed that the Nordic countries can be positioned in the nexus of the liberal institutionalist and realist perspectives as corresponding to their security policies, the European security and memberships in the Alliance. For the details and discussions about this claim, please see: Archer, "Conflict Prevention in Europe...", pp. 376-381.; For the importance of this mission in Macedonia with regard to conflict prevention, see also: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, **Preventing Violent Conflict: Swedish Policy for the 21st Century**, pp. 51-53.

¹¹³⁹ Jan Egeland, "Hvordan Fremme Våre Idealer?" ("How to Promote Our Ideals"), **Dagbladet**, 08 December 1997, <https://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/hvordan-fremme-vare-idealer/65426465> (accessed 21.09.2022).; The original text in Norwegian.

¹¹⁴⁰ Anders Wivel, "From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark's Great Power Politics", **Swiss Political Science Review**, Vol. 19, Issue 3, Special Issue: Natural Born Peacemakers? Ideas and Identities in Foreign Policies of Small States in Western Europe, 2013, p. 298.

balancing disadvantages is advised.¹¹⁴¹ However, this advice could not be implemented in the case of Sri Lanka.

Galtung also explains that Norway has subjugated itself to the USA, and therefore, any conflict between the foreign policy of Norway and that of the USA can not be expected.¹¹⁴² In accordance with the scope of the Thesis, the relationship with the USA has also affected the establishment of the Oslo back channel and the arrival of the Oslo Declaration of Principles.¹¹⁴³ Nonetheless, it is postulated that the brand of Norway as a peace nation was not harmed as a result of this process.¹¹⁴⁴

This Thesis contends that one of the reasons for the maintenance of the peaceful image of Nordic countries has been grounded in process-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation. Accordingly, process-oriented contributions have played an instrumental role in protecting the peace brand and in de-emphasizing any subjugations related to foreign policy. Nevertheless, subjugations in foreign policy can jeopardize third-party engagements. In this process, it is critical to navigate the overall effects in such a manner as capable of cultivating peaceful efforts while not jeopardizing the underlying roots of conflicts and warring parties.

Following the end of the Cold War, there has also been a tendency to externalize some of the values of the Nordic political life in connection with the liberal institutionalist view. This view has acquired greater momentum and expression in the security policy statements derived from the prominent Nordic decision-makers. According to *Clive Archer*, examples include “(...) *respect for the rule of law, arbitration of disputes, consensus settlements, the diminution of economic and social differences by social solidarity, and the preference for dealing with the roots of conflict rather than just its manifestation*”.¹¹⁴⁵ This is why improving Nordic peace diplomacy has been part of Nordic political life and Nordic culture as well.

¹¹⁴¹ Leira [Ed.], Borchgrevink, Græger, Melchior, Stamnes, and Øverland, *Norske Selvbilder og...*, p. 35.

¹¹⁴² Johan Galtung, “Inspiration from a Father: Johan Galtung”, By Henrik Urdal, in Stein Tønnesson (Ed.), *Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories*, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Singapore : Springer, 2022, p. 14.

¹¹⁴³ Waage, “‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’: Norway...”, pp. 170-175.

¹¹⁴⁴ Lehti, and Saarinen, “Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts: A Survey...”, p. 53.

¹¹⁴⁵ Archer, “Conflict Prevention in Europe...”, p. 377.

Section IV - The role of peace research institutes and centers, and pioneers as peace scholars and practitioners in the Nordic context: A shared commitment to a peaceful world?

Particularly, peace mediation and facilitation experiences of the Nordic countries can be advocated as distinctive and inspiring points of reference to follow, and to execute in the field of peace and conflict resolution despite challenges and different orientations within Nordic countries.¹¹⁴⁶ Correspondingly, both theoretical and empirical approaches of the peace research institutes and centers and peace scholars and practitioners of the Nordic countries have been described as important, recognizable, and traceable in promoting international peace and in offering models that entail Nordic characteristics and values for peaceful resolution of conflicts and controversial issues both within the Nordic region and within world politics. Simply put, there has been a strong emphasis on peaceful and humanitarian contributions of the Nordic countries.¹¹⁴⁷

In this process, peace research institutes and centers have been effective in developing and disseminating academic expertise and knowledge in the field of peace and conflict resolution. In a broader framework, this Thesis connects the creation and functioning of peace research institutes and centers with the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries. In particular, peace research institutes and centers also reflect the

¹¹⁴⁶ See: Hagemann, and Bramsen, **New Nordic Peace: Nordic...**, pp. 19-21.; Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role...", pp. 11-23.; Marko Lehti (Ed.), **Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation: Research, Practices and Policies**, Tampere, Finland : Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), No. 101, 2014.; Greenberg, "Dignity, Justice and Voice...", pp. 50-59.; Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk Medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari** ("Diplomats of Peace: Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari"), Stockholm, Sweden : Santérus Förlag, 2016.; The original text in Swedish.; Peter Wallensteen, "The Evolving Field of International Mediation—Reflections on the Uppsala Mediation Days 2008", **Development Dialogue**, Responses to Mass Violence – Mediation, Protection, and Prosecution, No. 53, November 2009, pp. 27-31.; Stein Tønnesson (Ed.), **Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories**, Evidence-based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Singapore : Springer, 2022.

¹¹⁴⁷ For relevant examples, see: Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée, and Kristian Bjørkdahl (Eds.), **Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.; Archer, "Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", pp. 451-467.; Christine Ingebritsen, **Scandinavia in World Politics**, Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.; Greenberg, "Dignity, Justice and Voice...", pp. 50-59.; Helge Pharo, "Den Norske Fredstradisjonen—Et Forskningsprosjekt", **Historisk Tidsskrift**, Vol. 84, No. 2, November 2005, pp. 239-255.; Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role...", pp. 11-23.; Levitan, **Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...**, pp. 9-35.; Marko Lehti (Ed.), **Nordic Approaches to Peace Mediation: Research, Practices and Policies**, Tampere, Finland : Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), No. 101, 2014.; Stein Tønnesson (Ed.), **Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories**, Evidence-based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, Oslo : Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Singapore : Springer, 2022.; Wallensteen, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, p. 12.; Wallensteen, "Evolving Field of International Mediation...", pp. 27-31.

efforts of Nordic countries oriented at managing fears and traumas in relation to geographical position and political conjunctures of the Interwar and Cold War periods. Accordingly, this section will explain relevant examples of peace research institutes and centers in the Nordic context. Following that, the narrowed focus will be directed to PRIO, SIPRI, TAPRI, COPRI, and CRIC.

a. Nordic peace research institutes and centers

Regarding the link between peace research and the role of Finland, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, was created in 1947. *Kaarle Nordenstreng* was the Head of the Department. The Department focused on the discipline of mass communication with connected research areas, including but not limited to the new international information order, freedom of speech, and immigrant information. Department of Political Science, University of Tampere, was created in 1945. *Osmo Apunen* was the Head of the Department. The research areas of the Department included but were not limited to political science, international security, foreign policy, integration, the neutrality arms race, disarmament, *détente*, dependency relations at the international level, and development problems. Also, the Finnish Peace Research Association, as a private and non-profit organization, was created in 1971. *Raimo Väyrynen* was the Head of Association. Its aim was oriented at improving peace research within universities and the scientific community.¹¹⁴⁸

Regarding the link between peace research and the role of Norway, Christian Michelsen Institute-Development Research and Action Programme was created in 1965 with a focus on Africa and Asia. The Institute has addressed development research and strategies, rural development, industrial development, and relations between industrialized and developing countries. *Just Faaland*, as the Director, was the Head of the Institute. Importantly, PRIO ("*Institutt for Fredsforskning*"), which was created in 1959, has engaged with the study of direct violence and structural violence as two main research areas. The focus of the Institute has also entailed peace research, the new international economic order, and the militarization of civilian institutions. *Asbjørn Eide*, as the Executive Director, was the Head of the Institute.¹¹⁴⁹

NUPI was created in 1959 with a focus on the security issues, resources, international economics, developing countries, development aid, foreign policy, and decision-making processes and problems. *John Christian Munthe Sanness* was the

¹¹⁴⁸ UNESCO, **World Directory of Peace Research Institutions, 1981**, Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences, Vol. 49, Paris : UNESCO, 1981, pp. 53-55.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-119.

Head of the Institute.¹¹⁵⁰ The Norwegian Parliament created NUPI in 1959. The research activity of NUPI has entailed security, development, and international economy. NUPI has also provided information and guidance surrounding foreign policy issues in Norway.¹¹⁵¹

The history and development of peace research, as an academic discipline, in Europe were also examined by *Håkan Wiberg*. In this regard, it is explained that PRIO, as the focal point for Norway and the Nordic countries, played a training role for the first generations of peace researchers in the Nordic countries and contributed to scientific exchanges. In addition to PRIO, Oslo University has also been important for peace researchers. NUPI, the Christian Michelsen Institute, and Tromsø University have also been emphasized in explaining the development of peace research.¹¹⁵²

Regarding the link between peace research and the role of Sweden, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research (*“Avdelning för Freds-Och Konfliktforskning”*) was created in 1966 to deal with armament, imperialism, peace, and conflict. *Håkan Wiberg* was the Head Director of the Department as affiliated to Lund University. Prior to this, the Research Institute of National Defense (*“Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt”*) was created in 1945 to deal with IR, technological progress, military, and peace research. *Nils-Henrik Lundquist* was the Head Director-General of the Research Institute.¹¹⁵³

The Institute of Peace Research and Human Ecology (*“Institutionen för Fredsforskning Och Humanekologi”*) was created in 1978 to deal with development research, interdisciplinary research for peace, social change, and development in the Third World. *B. Hettne* was the head of the Institute as affiliated to University of Gothenburg. Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (*“Institutionen för Freds-Och Konfliktforskning Vid Uppsala Universitet”*) was created in 1969 to deal with IR and peace, conflict theory, non-violent conflict resolution, armament, and disarmament. *Peter Wallensteen* was the Head Director of the Department.¹¹⁵⁴ All of these practitioners and scholars provided important

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹¹⁵¹ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, “NUPI’s History”, **NUPI**, 03 January 2022, <https://www.nupi.no/en/about-nupi/nupi-s-history> (accessed 05.06.2023).

¹¹⁵² *Håkan Wiberg*, “The Development of Peace Research in the Universities of the Europe Region”, **Higher Education in Europe**, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1984, pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁵³ UNESCO, **World Directory of Peace Research...**, pp. 127-128.

¹¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

contributions for the development of peace research. These contributions affected the self-identification and reputation of the Nordic countries.

Peter Wallensteen explains that the focus has been directed to research and academic teaching in Uppsala and Göteborg. Relevant issues, which were not covered by the SIPRI and traditional defence and security studies, such as the causes of war, connections between disarmament and development, and global militarization, drew interest in Uppsala. Moreover, the creation of a peace research chair named after the Swedish UN Secretary-General *Dag Hammarskjöld* following his death on a peace mission was evaluated as a breakthrough and the reflection of a national plan aimed at developing peace research.¹¹⁵⁵

The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies ("*Nordiska Afrikainstitutet*") was also created in 1962 to deal with Afro-European relations, small-scale industry, socio-economic development, rural development, and transnational corporations. With the creation of this Institute, the aim was also oriented at providing information documentation center about Africa. *Carl Gösta Widstrand* was the Head Director of the Institute. With this in mind, Research Policy Institute ("*Forskningspolitiska Institutet*") was created in 1966 to deal with science technology, and society, technological development and its economic and social effects; and policy-making in developing countries. *J. Sigurdson* was the Head Director of the Institute. Swedish Institute of International Affairs ("*Utrikespolitiska Institutet*") was created in 1938 to deal with IR, international conflict, and international relations. *A. Sparring* was the Head Director of the Institute.¹¹⁵⁶

Peter Wallensteen, as one of the Nordic pioneers in the field of peace and conflict resolution, explained that peace research milieus were largely outside of the universities in the early 1970s. The institutions such as PRIO, SIPRI, and TAPRI were foundations or special units. As a result, they faced limitations, political pressures, and fluctuations. In this regard, *Wallensteen* contended that it is a necessity for peace research to reside within the universities. It is also explained that the idea to have peace research within the universities was supported by *Alva Myrdal*, the first chair of the board of the SIPRI, which was established with government support and began its

¹¹⁵⁵ Peter Wallensteen, "Making Peace Researchable", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Theory and Practice**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, pp. 6-7.

¹¹⁵⁶ UNESCO, **World Directory of Peace Research...**, pp. 129-131.

operations as a peace research institute in 1966 while focusing on the decommissioning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁵⁷

In addition to the differences concerning the concentrated or prioritized research fields, there were also methodological differences among the peace research institutes. In *Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories*, it is also brought up how the orientation of SIPRI was different from the orientation of PRIO. *Galtung* explains that the approach of *Gunnar Myrdal* and *Robert O'Neill* was oriented towards numbers and data concerning the expenditure on armaments. *Galtung*, on the other hand, was interested in confirming or falsifying this hypothesis, but in his view, this hypothesis was wrong. *Galtung* emphasizes that this numerical orientation is still carried out by SIPRI.¹¹⁵⁸

The growth of the peace movement in Nordic countries, largely rooted in the established peace organizations, can be explained in relation to the prioritization of nuclear disarmament and nuclear issues. In this regard, the consciousness towards the nuclear arms race and awareness towards the position of Europe, described as a hostage of the superpowers, have been evaluated as an impetus for the peace movement, which has campaigned for a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the North. A Nordic NWFZ also contributed to *détente*.¹¹⁵⁹ Upon witnessing the development and functioning of the peace research institutions, the increasing awareness and consciousness have thus affected the peace movement in the Nordic countries. As a result, it is clear that the Nordic peace movement and peace research were engaged with the efforts against nuclear competition and insecurities. The following sub-sections will look into the prominent peace research institutes and centers in the Nordic context.

i. The Peace Research Institute Oslo:

PRIO, as established in 1959, was the earliest peace research center among the Polemologisch Instituut in Groningen and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in Ann Arbor. The institution was part of the Institute for Social Research

¹¹⁵⁷ Wallensteen, "Making Peace Researchable", pp. 5-6.; For more information about the role of universities in the context of peace research in Nordic countries, please see the following sources: Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Peace Research and International Relations in Scandinavia: From Enduring Rivalry to Stable Peace?", in Stefano Guzzini, and Dietrich Jung (Eds.), **Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research** (The New International Relations), London and New York : Routledge, 2004, pp. 15-26.; Wallensteen, "Making Peace Researchable", pp. 3-12.

¹¹⁵⁸ Galtung, "Inspiration from a Father...", pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁵⁹ Jon Grepstad, "The Peace Movement in the Nordic Countries: Policies, Forms of Action, Impact", **International Peace Research Newsletter**, Vol. XX, No. 4, 1982, pp. 10-11.

in Ann Arbor. In 1963, PRIO became an independent institution. *Galtung*, as the predominant figure of Nordic peace research, obtained academic support in order to initiate PRIO as a section of the Institute for Social Research. In this process, some of the founders of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution and the book titled as *Gandhi's Politiske Etikk* ("*Gandhi's Political Ethics*"), co-authored with the philosopher *Arne Næss*, were sources of inspiration for *Galtung*.¹¹⁶⁰

Galtung fairly describes PRIO "(...) as the first institute after the Second World War openly professing a dedication to the study of 'peace' in its very name".¹¹⁶¹ With this in mind, it is also confirmed that the creation of PRIO, which also stands for priority, inspired the creation of SIPRI and COPRI as well.¹¹⁶² In this regard, it is plausible to contend that PRIO played an inspiring role for the institutionalization and the dissemination of peace research.

The benefits of PRIO can be explained in terms of scientific and institutional perspectives. Within this connection, *Wiberg* emphasized the Journal of Peace Research (JPR) and Bulletin of Peace Proposals in terms of the publications of the Nordic countries while tracing the history and development of peace research movement within each Nordic countries. In this regard, the creation of SIPRI by Sweden to commemorate its sesquicentenary peace period, dated 1964, the efforts and attempts of Denmark to establish research institutes, the creation of TAPRI, in close connection with the Tampere University, dated 1970, and the foundation of the Finnish Peace Research Association, dated 1971, were important developments for peace research in the Nordic context.¹¹⁶³

The research fields of PRIO, as established under the direction of *Galtung*, have been explained in terms of social aspects of technical assistance, personal relations in conflict situations, racial and ethnic conflicts, armament, disarmament, balance of power, diplomacy, news communication, peace corps, public opinion on international affairs, international police forces, international civil service, foreign policy decision-making, non-military defence, international interaction patterns and peace

¹¹⁶⁰ Håkan Wiberg, "Nordic Peace Research", in Nigel J. Young (Ed.), **The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace**, Vol. 3, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 188.

¹¹⁶¹ Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 22, No. 2, Jun. 1985, p. 141.

¹¹⁶² Galtung, "Inspiration from a Father...", p. 9.

¹¹⁶³ Wiberg, "Development of Peace Research...", pp. 19-20.; For the Finnish Peace Research Association, see also: UNESCO, **World Directory of Peace Research**, p. 55.

hypotheses.¹¹⁶⁴ With the PCC, there have also been positive effects on the process of negotiations and reconciliation in Cyprus.¹¹⁶⁵ Hence, the focus has also been directed to *de facto* states and protracted cases.

According to *Mete Hatay*, the history of PRIO and Norway's peace diplomacy and peaceful image, as means of soft power, positively affected the functioning of PCC in terms of its credibility and posture. Although it is an international institute, PRIO's history is linked to the development of peace research with a Norwegian patent. PCC benefits from PRIO through its expertise and logistics. Importantly, PRIO provides a shield for PCC, which is differentiated through its semi-think tank and semi-research institute functioning. In essence, PCC has three pillars as follows: academic output that is reflected in policy papers; interactions with diplomats, embassies, and international institutions, and a multi-layered approach to the public. This is why the PCC is not an isolated centre.¹¹⁶⁶ The benefits of PCC affirm not only the link between Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy through a peace research institute but also the reflections of this link upon a protracted conflict.

ii. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Frank Blackaby explained that SIPRI did not claim to cover the whole area of peace research and chose to concentrate on armaments, arms control, and disarmament. In this regard, *Gunnar Myrdal* and *Alva Myrdal* were important and influencing figures within SIPRI. While *Gunnar Myrdal* was in favour of factual studies and critical of sociological theorizing, *Alva Myrdal*, who was back then the Swedish Minister for Disarmament, was in favour of scholars focusing on the military sector, and challenging their military opponents for the arms control or disarmament. Hence, *Blackaby* evaluated SIPRI as a problem and specific issues-oriented institute rather than a high theory-oriented institute.¹¹⁶⁷ SIPRI has also been effective in demonstrating Swedish contributions to peace research.

¹¹⁶⁴ Nils Örvik, "Norwegian Activities in the Study of International Relations 1960-1964", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1965, p. 80.

¹¹⁶⁵ The Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre, "About the PRIO Cyprus Centre", n.d.

¹¹⁶⁶ Interview with *Mete Hatay*, 11 July 2024.

¹¹⁶⁷ Frank Blackaby, "SIPRI", **Medicine and War**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, pp. 133-134.; For more information about the roles of *Gunnar Myrdal* and *Alva Myrdal*, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament and world peace, please see the following publications: *Alva Myrdal*, "The International Control of Disarmament", **Scientific American**, Vol. 231, No. 4, October 1974, pp. 21-33.; *Jenny Andersson*, "Choosing Futures: Alva Myrdal and the Construction of Swedish Futures Studies, 1967-1972", **International Review of Social History**, Vol. 51, No. 2, August 2006, pp. 277-295.; *Peter Wallensteen* and *Armend Bekaj*, **Alva Myrdal: A Pioneer in Nuclear Disarmament**, (forewords by *Margot Wallström* and *Izumi Nakamitsu*; prefaces by *Thomas Graham Jr.* and *Rolf Ekéus*), *Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice*, Vol. 31, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament and Springer, 2022.

iii. Tampere Peace Research Institute

TAPRI was created by the Finnish Parliament in 1969 and commenced in 1970.¹¹⁶⁸ This institute was established as the Peace and Conflict Research Institute. Initially, its focus was directed to research on the proliferation of arms, arms control, and structural violence with regard to conditions during the Cold War. In this process, there were also efforts with a focus on Nordic cooperation and cooperation with the UN and its agencies through engagement in research projects. Following the Cold War, peaceful change and globalization prevailed in its research policy. As of 1994, the institute was integrated into the University of Tampere, which became Tampere University as of 2019. As a result, the institute became an independent research unit.¹¹⁶⁹

With its research activities and programs, TAPRI has promoted not only the field of peace and conflict resolution but also encouraged discussions for the link between Nordic countries and mediation in IR. In a seminar program, titled as “Approaches to peace mediation: Is there space for a Nordic approach”, organized by TAPRI, University of Tampere, Professor *Tuomo Melasuo*, former director of TAPRI, for example, it is contended that there is a space for a Nordic approach in mediation. In this regard, it is argued that “*mediation reflects well the Nordic way of thinking about international relations*”.¹¹⁷⁰ As reflecting this, the Nordic way of thinking has been approached in relation to Nordic peace diplomacy and the techniques of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in this Thesis.

iv. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

COPRI was created by the Danish Parliament in 1985.¹¹⁷¹ But prior to this, a peace research centre was established in Denmark. The centre had an independent status and was stationed at the Copenhagen University following the decision of the Danish Parliament regarding the funding of this centre in 1983. This decision was taken against the approval of non-socialists and liberals in the parliament. In the centre, there was factionalism with the ability to intensify. As a result, the need for a director

¹¹⁶⁸ Kriesberg, “Evolution of Conflict Resolution”, p. 23.

¹¹⁶⁹ Tampere Peace Research Institute of Tampere Universities Community, “About”, n.d., <https://research.tuni.fi/tapri/about/> (accessed 09.11.2022).

¹¹⁷⁰ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “In Search of Guidelines for Nordic Peace Mediation in Tampere”, **The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland**, 19 August 2013, https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/pohjoismaisen-rauhanvalityksen-suuntaviivoja-haettiin-tampereelta (accessed 07.09.2022).

¹¹⁷¹ Kriesberg, “Evolution of Conflict Resolution”, pp. 23-24.

was recognized, and accommodated with the appointment of *Håkan Wiberg*, which dates back to August 1988. In this process, the centre was referred to as COPRI.¹¹⁷²

With the leadership of *Wiberg*, the Institute was strengthened and its achievements were repeatedly appreciated. As highlighted, *Wiberg* had a contributing role in Uppsala.¹¹⁷³ Hence, one can contend that Nordic practitioners were beneficial for the promotion of Nordic peace research and Nordic cooperation. However, the case of COPRI deserves further attention since the Institute was on the verge of being closed due to a decision of the Danish government at the time.

During the period between 1988 and 2001, the performance of COPRI was exceptional. This has also been reflected in the emergence of Copenhagen School in the IR discipline, which can also be attributed to the success of the Institute under the enabling role of *Wiberg*. However, *Anders Fogh Rasmussen's* government suggested ceasing the activities of the Institute. This suggestion was eventually avoided. But COPRI, along with the other institutions, merged into the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). This process dates back to late 2002.¹¹⁷⁴ Hence, the successful functioning and exceptional performance of COPRI could not be adequate in securing its position against governmental decision. In comparison to other Nordic countries, the case of COPRI holds relevance for the rather the marginal role of Denmark in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

v. Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts

With the support of the Danish Council for Strategic Research, the Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC) was established in August 2013. The Danish Council for Strategic Research is now referred to as the Danish Innovation Fund. With its projects, CRIC focuses on human rights and peacebuilding. The projects of the Centre are related to academic and policy environment. Prof. *Ole Wæver* is the Coordinator of the Centre.¹¹⁷⁵ In this regard, CRIC can be considered as critical given the cessation of COPRI. However, there is no direct usage for the term peace research.

¹¹⁷² Gleditsch, "Peace Research and International Relations...", p. 21.

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹⁷⁴ The Peace Research Institute Oslo, "Håkan Wiberg", <https://www.prio.org/people/3684> (accessed 21.09.2022).; For a detailed account of this process, the following book chapter is recommended: Stefano Guzzini, and Dietrich Jung, "Copenhagen Peace Research", in Stefano Guzzini, and Dietrich Jung (Eds.), **Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research** (The New International Relations), London and New York : Routledge, 2004, pp. 1-12.

¹¹⁷⁵ University of Copenhagen, "Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts", n.d., <https://politicalscience.ku.dk/research/centres/cric/> (accessed 09.11.2022).

b. The role of Nordic pioneers as peace scholars and practitioners

In essence, Scandinavian diplomacy reflects a tradition of mediation carried out by various diplomats, including *Trygve Lie*, *Dag Hammarskjöld*, *Count Folke Bernadotte*, *Gunnar Jarring*, and *Martti Ahtisaari*.¹¹⁷⁶ The distinctiveness of the Nordic countries can be explained by referencing Nordic diplomats and politicians, who have played quite visible roles in world politics. In addition to this tradition, the military personnel, police, and civil servants of these countries were also involved in important roles as peacekeepers, truce observers, and emergency administrators. The prominent figures of *Dag Hammarskjöld* and *Folke Bernadotte*, who have sacrificed their lives, further strengthened the distinctive role of these countries.¹¹⁷⁷

There have also been prominent scholars, who affected not only Nordic peace diplomacy but also the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries. In this context, *Galtung* was the founding father of the peace research. *Nils Petter Gleditsch*, as another Nordic pioneer, explained how *Galtung* initiated and headed the Section for Peace and Conflict Research at the Institute for Social Research in 1959, which later became a fully independent institute, dated 1966. As highlighted, *Galtung* also launched JPR in 1964. In this regard, the ambition and dedication of *Galtung* have been important for the autonomy of peace research.¹¹⁷⁸

Gleditsch puts an emphasis on the late 1950s and the early 1960s for the emergence of peace research in Norway. In this process, the efforts of *Galtung* to build a cross-disciplinary research environment and a focal point in sociology can be linked to the emergence of peace research. In these pioneer days, quantitative methods and non-violence played inspiring roles for peace research. The tendency to evaluate the implications of political science as state-centered, essayistic, politically conservative, and methodologically backward and to see the teaching of IR as the illustration of unhealthy combinations was also influential for the development of peace research as part of behavioural revolution in sociology. In the process, the ambitions of *Galtung* were critical for the development of peace research as a separate discipline from sociology.¹¹⁷⁹

In addition to *Galtung*, *Kenneth Boulding* and *Elise Boulding*, as North American peace researchers, also played a major role for the development of the field

¹¹⁷⁶ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, pp. 10-11.

¹¹⁷⁷ Einhorn, "Just Enough ('Lagom') Europeanization...", pp. 269-270.

¹¹⁷⁸ Gleditsch, "Peace Research and International Relations...", p. 16.

¹¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

of peace research in the international context.¹¹⁸⁰ The contributions of *Elise Boulding* have been materialized through the creation of the “International Peace Research Association (IPRA)”, “Peace Studies Association”, “World Orders Models Project”, “U.S. Institute for Peace, Friends Peace Teams”, and “United Nations University”. She also served as International Chair of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and on the board of the American Friends Service Committee. In this regard, she played important roles both as an activist and as a scholar.¹¹⁸¹ As one of the contributing figures, *Elise Boulding* played an important role for international peace research and peace activism.¹¹⁸²

Håkan Wiberg, who worked for PRIO and who served on the editorial committee of JPR, can also be described as a major influence in peace research, both in the Nordic and in the international contexts.¹¹⁸³ In addition to the scholar contributions, Nordic facilitators have also played important roles in the context of the peace facilitation. Drawing from the case of Aceh, *Martti Ahtisaari* has been emphasized among the grand facilitators.¹¹⁸⁴ Indeed, diplomatic capabilities and the reputation of *Ahtisaari* were effective for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Aceh and psychological influence upon the main warring parties.

The contributions of Nordic practitioners were also reflected in peace research institutes and centers. *Alva Myrdal*, as a Swedish disarmament negotiator, was a critical leading figure whose efforts largely paved the way for the creation of SIPRI. This institute began its work in 1966 with a primary focus on the collection of verifiable and relevant data for negotiated reductions of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.¹¹⁸⁵ Prestige can be considered one of the elements determining

¹¹⁸⁰ Ian M. Harris, Carol Rank, and Larry J. Fisk, “Western Europe”, in Ian M. Harris, Carol Rank, and Larry J. Fisk, **Peace Studies in the West**, Peace Education Reports No. 16, Malmö, Sweden : Department of Educational and Psychological Research, School of Education Malmö, Lund University, July 1997.

¹¹⁸¹ International Peace Research Association Foundation, “Presidents of the IPRA Foundation: Elise Boulding, pres. 1989-1996”, **IPRA Foundation**, <https://iprafoundation.org/elise-boulding-2/> (accessed 17.11.2022).

¹¹⁸² Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle, and Håvard Strand, “Peace Research – Just Study of War?”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 51, No. 2, Anniversary Special Issue, March 2014, p. 146.

¹¹⁸³ The Peace Research Institute Oslo, “Håkan Wiberg”, <https://www.prio.org/people/3684> (accessed 21.09.2022).

¹¹⁸⁴ Simon A. Mason, and Matthias Siegfried, “Mediation & Facilitation in Today’s Peace Processes: Centrality of Commitment, Coordination and Context”, Presentation by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), The Swiss Peace, 15-17 February 2007, p. 9.

¹¹⁸⁵ Peter Wallensteen, “Foundational Debates for the Study of Societal Problems: Lessons from Peace Research”, in Peter Wallensteen, **Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable**, (with a foreword by Jan Eliasson; a preface by Raimo Väyrynen), Cham : Springer, 2021, p. 67.

the high-ranking of third-parties. Actually, a mutually reinforcing relationship has already been detected between the rank of mediators and the successfulness of the outcome of mediation.¹¹⁸⁶ In this regard, the prominent Nordic practitioners can be considered as added strengths to the credibility and peaceful reputation of Nordic countries.

As highlighted above, the practitioners from Nordic countries played important roles in the field of peace and conflict resolution. *Fridtjof Nansen*, for example, was an important figure for the coordination of international assistance to refugees. *Ivor C. Jackson* explained that *Nansen* played a fundamental role for the definition of principles related to the international protection of refugees.¹¹⁸⁷ As the first High Commissioner for Refugees of the LoN, *Nansen* was also involved in the exchange of populations negotiations between Türkiye and Greece in 1923-1924. That is why it is contended that Scandinavian countries, as active neutrals and small-states, advocated for international justice within the League framework.¹¹⁸⁸ These contributions related to peace and justice have also been observable in the UN.

During the Cold War, it was more challenging to approach conflicts and controversial issues with a stronger focus on the conflicting parties due to restrictions as imposed by the power blocks. In terms of prevention and resolution of conflicts by

¹¹⁸⁶ Bercovitch, and Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics...", p. 317.

¹¹⁸⁷ Ivor C. Jackson, "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen: A Pioneer in the International Protection of Refugees", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fridtjof Nansen and the International Protection of Refugees, 2003, p. 7.; With that being said, there have been such prominent figures in contrast to the peaceful image of the Nordic countries. *Hjalmar Rosting*, as the first Dane who worked in the Secretariat of the LoN, for example, became the director of the minority section of the League following his works for minority protection and the international administration of the Saar, Danzig (*Gdansk*) and the Near East. He also settled some disputes between Poland and Danzig while participating in negotiations between the new Nazi Senate in Danzig and the Polish government. However, it appears that he developed a supportive attitude towards the Nazi Party. This caused him to resign from the League in 1936. During the Second World War, he was appointed as the director of the Danish Red Cross office for foreign affairs and PoW assistance. In this process, he also organized relief work for Finland, Norway and PoW at large. Following the invasion of Denmark, he appeared as a sympathizer of Hitler Germany while advocating the transformation of Danish government in a Nazi direction. See: "Helmer Rosting", **Dansk Biografisk Leksikon ("Danish Biographical Dictionary")**, http://denstoredanske.dk/Dansk_Biografisk_Leksikon/Samfund,_jura_og_politik/Myndigheder_og_politisk_styre/Embedsmand/Helmer_Rosting (accessed 15.05.2022).

¹¹⁸⁸ John F. L. Ross, "Fridtjof Nansen and the Aegean Population Exchange", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2015, pp. 133-134.; However, there is no a consensus on the views, which describe Nordics as small states in international area. In a study titled as "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda", for example, Denmark and Norway have been described as middle power states. See: Ronald M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2005, pp. 305-342.; With this in mind, it is important to stress that Norway has routinely been regarded as a middle power. See: William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, "Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2018, p. 531.

the UN, *Dag Hammarskjöld*, as the second Secretary-General of the UN, explained that it is a challenge for the UN to exercise an influence on the problems and conflicts, especially when taking place in relation to power blocs that divided the world. As a result, *Hammarskjöld* explained that the influence problem of the UN renders the status of the Security Council in terms of inactivity, inefficiency, and inability to follow relevant considerations directly. For this reason, *Hammarskjöld* demonstrated the importance of keeping newly arising conflicts outside of the bloc differences or in bringing conflicts, on the margin of or inside in the power blocks, outside of the bloc differences.¹¹⁸⁹ As described by *Hammarskjöld*,¹¹⁹⁰

“This clearly defines the main field of useful activity of the United Nations in its efforts to prevent conflicts or to solve conflicts. Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the United Nations should seek to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localization. In doing so, the Organization and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will then not be for one party against another, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate”.

In this regard, *Hammarskjöld* demonstrated the importance of preventive diplomacy, which is aimed at reinforcing and directing the efforts of the UN for the maintenance of the international peace and security. *Hammarskjöld* was a critical figure for the functioning of the UN in the context of international peace and security. In addition to preventive diplomacy, the *Hammarskjöld* administration has been effective in the context of international peacekeeping.¹¹⁹¹ Drawing from the general

¹¹⁸⁹ United Nations Digital Library, **Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1959 – 15 June 1960**, Fifteenth Session Official Records, Supplement No. IA (A/4390/Add.I), New York : United Nations, 1960, p. 4, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/714842?ln=en> (accessed 04.01.2023).

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹⁹¹ Oran R. Young, **The Intermediaries: Third-parties in International Crises**, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 4.

dataset of the Thesis, it can be seen that the third-party involvement of *Hammar skjöld* was influential in different contexts.

Taken together, various officials, civil servants, and political personalities from the Nordic countries contributed to the works of the UN. Examples include the second Secretary-General of the UN, *Dag Hammar skjöld*, who played inspiring and important roles for international cooperation, peace, and security. His predecessor, *Trygve Lie*, also served as the first Secretary-General until 1953. In the 1960s, the former Finnish Foreign Minister *Sakari Tuomioja* was the UN mediator for Cyprus conflict. In addition, *Thorvald Stoltenberg*, from Norway, acted as the Special Representative of the UN in the former Yugoslavia Conference. As reflecting another cooperative efforts, *Carl Bildt*, as the EU mediator from Sweden, and *Uffe Ellemann-Jensen*, as the OSCE representative from Denmark, also played important roles. Former Finnish President *Martti Ahtisaari*, as a winner of the Nobel Peace Award, was the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo and a mediator in many other conflicts.¹¹⁹²

Further to this, it is contended that the achievements of *Dag Hammar skjöld* are still relevant with international diplomacy. In this regard, the 1990s experienced more peace agreements compared to any periods in the entire twentieth century. For this reason, it was suggested that *Hammar skjöld*'s diplomacy, concerned with the peaceful handling of armed conflicts, and his experiences in the midst of the Cold War might provide important lessons for comparison with the period after the 1990s.¹¹⁹³ Thus, the contributions of *Hammar skjöld* can be approached as a model that guided the field of peace and conflict resolution.

In 2008, Norway contributed to the Cyprus negotiations in terms of funding most of the costs of the standby experts of on-call UN mediation teams. These experts tried to provide different inputs into the negotiations from time to time. In this process, there was also an administrative partnership with "The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)." Prior to this, NRC had assisted a humanitarian standby team for the UN. Hence, Norway contributed to on-call UN mediation teams through funding and NRC. Importantly, Norway also had a direct input with the UN's good offices mission led by *Espen Barth Eide*, who tried to mediate the Cyprus issue. *Eide* was successful in bringing people together from both sides under the auspices of the UN. He had party

¹¹⁹² Ove Bring, "Dag Hammar skjöld and the 'Ambetsmanna' Approach to UN Cooperation", in Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (Ed.), *Nordic Approaches to International Law*, Leiden, The Netherlands : Brill | Nijhoff, 2017, pp. 33-34.

¹¹⁹³ Peter Wallensteen, "Dag Hammar skjöld and the Psychology of Diplomacy", in Peter Wallensteen, *Peace Research: Theory and Practice*, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 154.

meetings in Crans-Montana in 2017. He was close to a breakthrough, but the process ultimately collapsed.¹¹⁹⁴

Moreover, the political personalities have also strengthened self-identification of Nordic countries as peace nations. *Count Folke Bernadotte*, who was murdered by the Israeli terrorists during his UN mission for peace and reconciliation in the case of Palestine, the obscure death of *Dag Hammarskjöld* in 1961 while serving as the Secretary-General, and the death of *Raoul Wallenberg*, who rescued thousands of Jews from late war Budapest and was abducted by the Soviets in 1945, have been regarded as “martyrs for peace.” The murder of the former Swedish Prime Minister *Olof Palme*, who defended the rights of the weak and oppressed people during the disarmament negotiations, dated as 1960s, and the murder of former Foreign Minister *Anna Lindh* also renewed the emphasis on the sacrifices for peace. In this regard, it is argued that these evaluations have strengthened the self-image of Sweden as a peacemaker and as a peace-power.¹¹⁹⁵

It can be seen that mediation tradition has been reflected in the works of diplomats, including *Trygve Lie*, *Dag Hammarskjöld*, *Count Folke Bernadotte*, *Gunnar Jarring*, and *Martti Ahtisaari*, in international disputes. Given the historical background of the Norse peoples, which demonstrates their involvement in many wars and ruling in remote areas, the process pertaining to the establishment of peacemakers image required a long and winding road.¹¹⁹⁶ As a result, mediation might be seen as a compatible instrument to capture the attachments upon the Nordic countries in the world politics and successful transformation of a violent image into a peacemaker image. Hence, the reputation of the Nordic countries can be linked to mediation tradition as established through the contributions of various pioneers.

As reflecting this, *Zartman* acknowledges the active role of Scandinavia in mediation while arguing that some of its best traits and salient characteristics can be found in Scandinavian mediation.¹¹⁹⁷ In this regard, it is contended that there is not exclusively a Scandinavian style of mediation but rather a Scandinavian vocation of

¹¹⁹⁴ Interview with Mete Hatay, 11 July 2024.

¹¹⁹⁵ Anders Jarlert, “The Myth of Sweden as a Peace-power State and its Religious Motivations”, *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 27, No. 2, Mythen – Nationale Grenzen – Religionen / Myths – National Borders – Religions, 2014, pp. 260-261.

¹¹⁹⁶ Levitan, *Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian...*, pp. 10-11.

¹¹⁹⁷ I. William Zartman, “Conflict Mediation - Challenges from Experiences and Practices”, *Development Dialogue*, No. 53, Responses to Mass Violence – Mediation, Protection, and Prosecution, November 2009, p. 60.

mediation.¹¹⁹⁸ Drawing from these explanations, a sort of Nordic dimension of mediation has been emphasized in terms of hallmarks, values, and/or vocation-oriented perspectives. Parallel to the latter argument, it can therefore be argued that peace scholars and practitioners of the Nordic countries have played an important role for the development and autonomy of peace research and Nordic peace diplomacy, which will be evident in tracing the expertise and guidance of Nordic countries in the context of peace research and conflict resolution. The expertise and guidance will also affirm the strengths of Nordic peace diplomacy.

Chapter III - Tracing Nordic expertise and guidance in the context of peace diplomacy

It is important to understand the Nordic approaches and initiatives in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. As elaborated, the Nordic countries have been renowned for the promotion of peace and conflict resolution both internally and externally.¹¹⁹⁹ In a seminar on Nordic peace diplomacy, which was organized by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland on 09 March 2018, the strengths of Nordic countries associated with mediation have been explained by referencing Nordic expertise, impartiality, and independence from the great powers. As reflecting these strengths, successful peace diplomacy has been connected with the requests for Nordic mediation.¹²⁰⁰ This request has also been linked to empirical and theoretical contributions of Nordic countries.

Drawing from various sources, it can be observed that there have been Nordic pioneers, scholars, and practitioners as affected the development and the dissemination of peace research and peace studies. It might be asserted that the field of peace and conflict resolution is heavily guided by the contributions of Nordic pioneers and Nordic peace diplomacy.¹²⁰¹ Both the individuals, as peace scholars and practitioners,

¹¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.; The Nordic dimension of mediation can also be approached as an inspiration for the development and dissemination of mediation traditions. The following book discusses the insights and reasons for it: Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk Medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari** (“**Diplomats of Peace: Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari**”), Stockholm, Sweden : Santérus Förlag, 2016.

¹¹⁹⁹ Hagemann, and Bramsen, **New Nordic Peace: Nordic...**, p. 9.

¹²⁰⁰ Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Nordic Countries are Superpowers in Mediation – Expertise and Impartiality are their Strengths”, 12 March 2018, https://um.fi/news/-/asset_publisher/GRSnUwaHDPv5/content/pohjoismaat-rauhanvalityksen-suurvaltoja-vahvuuksina-osaaminen-ja-tasapuolisuus (accessed 12.12.2022).; However, independence can be problematized. This is due to the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka that are illustrative of the role of the USA.

¹²⁰¹ Please see the following publications that explain the development, and institutionalization of peace research and conflict resolution within the Nordic and Scandinavian contexts or within the context of the each countries, and the historical background of the Nordic peace diplomacy: Gleditsch, “Peace

and peace research institutions and centers have played guiding and inspiring roles regarding the interactions between the Nordic diplomatic abilities and the field of peace and conflict resolution.

In hindsight, academic, practitioner, and institutional backgrounds of the Nordic countries might be read as the demonstration of the Nordic competence and knowledge in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Building upon these points, it might be contended that Nordic peace mediation and facilitation efforts might represent a step forward for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and controversial issues, which requires further elaboration.

Evidence for the Nordic expertise and guidance can be traced by looking into the contributions of Nordic countries in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. In this sense, it is important to unpack the impacts of Nordic countries concerning the emergence and reflections of the two fields as sharing commonalities and differences. Engaging with these fields through the prism of Nordic countries can reveal the sources and rationale behind Nordic peace diplomacy and their acceptability as third-parties.

The Machiavellian heritage and the Utopian ideas have been effective for the development of peace research.¹²⁰² The purpose of peace research has been oriented at resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner. In this regard, the focus has inevitably been directed to the exploration of war and peace. The efforts to prevent intense wars, to increase the consciousness of the politicians and general public towards non-violent alternatives, the cessation of war and peaceful ways of conflict resolution have been critical for peace studies and peace education.¹²⁰³

Research and International Relations...”, pp. 15-26.; Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, **Peace Research in Scandinavia, 1959-1986**, Aldershot, Brookfield, USA : Avebury, 1990.; Kriesberg, “Evolution of Conflict Resolution”, pp. 20, 23-24.; Peter Wallensteen, and Isak Svensson, **Fredens Diplomat: Nordisk Medling från Bernadotte till Ahtisaari** (“**Diplomats of Peace: Nordic Mediation from Bernadotte to Ahtisaari**”), Stockholm, Sweden : Santérus Förlag, 2016.; The original text in Swedish.; Peter Wallensteen, **Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable**, (with a foreword by Jan Eliasson; a preface by Raimo Väyrynen), Springer Cham, 2021.; Peter Wallensteen, “The Growing Peace Research Agenda”, **Kroc Institute**, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #21:OP:4, December 2001.; Stein Tønnesson (Ed.), **Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories**, Evidence-based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Singapore : Springer, 2022.; Unto Vesa, “Miten Rauhan tutkimus tuli Suomeen?”, Tampere, Finland : **Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI)**, No. 3, 1980.; The original text in Finnish.

¹²⁰² Peter Wallensteen, “The Origins of Contemporary Peace Research”, in Kristine Hoglund, and Magnus Oberg (Ed.), **Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 14.

¹²⁰³ Harris, Rank, and Fisk, **Peace Studies in the West**, para. 1.

These efforts and concerns have been reflected in the discipline of the IR. With that being said, the definition of the notion of peace, the problematization of war and normative approaches have been considered as more appropriate for the distinctiveness of peace studies.¹²⁰⁴ In many ways, Nordic countries have enhanced the distinctiveness of this field. Examples include the firm institutionalization of peace research, which took place in Scandinavia, along with Germany and Japan.¹²⁰⁵

As explained in the prior section, Nordic countries provided expertise and guidance through the engagement, devotion and works of the Nordic pioneers, peace research institutes, and centers that also affected the development of the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Norway and Sweden were the first countries supporting the institutionalization of peace research. The Scandinavian peace research community achieved further prominence through the establishment of JPR under the editorship of *Galtung*, who was quite influential for the distinctiveness of peace research from conflict studies. The pioneer roles of Norway and Sweden have been explained by referencing their social-democratic welfare state characteristics and the commencement for the development of a distinctive international dimension in the realm of foreign policy.¹²⁰⁶ This statement also affirms the link between peace research, the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy related to underlying explanations that stemmed from the Nordic model and Nordic values, and the

¹²⁰⁴ Peter Lawler, "Peace Studies", in Paul D. Williams (Ed.), **Security Studies: An Introduction**, Second Edition, London and New York : Routledge, 2013, pp. 77-78.; However, it is also contended that peace research, which is not limited with International Relations, cannot be discussed in the sphere of the theories and approaches in International Relations since it is neither theory nor an approach. The peculiarity of peace research does not mean that peace research is in fixed, and indifferent relationship with social science. Given the developments, initiations and institutionalization, it is suggested that peace research is concomitantly in a symbiotic relationship with International Relations. As reflecting this suggestion, it is explained that peace research can enlighten the theoretical, methodological, value-free social science and discussions in International Relations. See: David J. Dunn, "Peace Research", in Trevor Taylor (Ed.), **Approaches and Theory in International Relations**, London and New York : Longman, 1978, pp. 257-258.; Management of conflicts, as one of the essentials of International Relations, leads to the conclusion that the fields of peace research and International Relations are mutually compatible and supported. However, that has not been the case in reality. The relationship between two fields is characterized by combativeness and divergence in connection with the marginalization of peace research within the field of International Relations. This marginalization has been explained by referencing the tension between universal obligations and communal duties of human beings in relation to *Andrew Linklater's* dichotomy in **Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations**. See: Beverly Neufeld, "The Marginalisation of Peace Research in International Relations", **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1993, p. 165.; For the aforementioned book of *Linklater*, which focuses on the tensions between the concepts of obligations with regard to the humanity and modern sovereign state, see: Andrew Linklater, **Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations**, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 1982.

¹²⁰⁵ Barry Buzan, and Lene Hansen, **The Evolution of International Security Studies**, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 37.

¹²⁰⁶ Lawler, "Peace Studies", pp. 82-83.

distinctive reputation of the Nordic countries. Also, there were efforts to reflect this distinctiveness into the realms of foreign policy and identity construction.

Engaging with the causes of war and remedies against the recurrence of war has been described as a central theme in peace research.¹²⁰⁷ War has been treated as the ongoing central problem in the context of peace research. In response to this and historical traumas, critical and intellectual perspectives and the pursuit of alternatives have shaped the field of peace research.¹²⁰⁸ In this process, the changes in the field of IR, which experienced its formative phase between two world wars, the strong impulse to focus on the problems of violent conflicts, and the increasing social and political consciousness have been effective for the development of peace research. The social and political consciousness has been illustrated by the willingness of researchers and the close interactions and connections between peace researchers and peace movements, which have inevitably separated, though, as peace research has evolved as an academic discipline.¹²⁰⁹

According to *Bramsen* and *Hagemann*, the Nordic countries present a strong case associated with peace research due to the following reasons: the Nordic peace research community has been noticeable in connection with the susceptibility and influence of peace research to policy communities. Peace research has been a state-supported initiative in the Nordic countries. These initiatives have also been institutionalized. There have been close connections between peace research and practice in relation to being fairly small countries. Drawing from all of these, the tradition for peace research led to the creation of strong peace research institutes and communities located in Finland, Norway and Sweden.¹²¹⁰ In this regard, it is important to comprehend the role of Nordic countries in the fields of peace research and conflict resolution.

¹²⁰⁷ Peter Wallensteen, "War in Peace Research", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Theory and Practice**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 23.

¹²⁰⁸ Peter Wallensteen, "Introduction", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges**, Boulder and London : Westview Press, 1988, p. 1.; For the illustration of these traumas, see: Peter Wallensteen, "The Origins of Peace Research", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges**, Boulder and London : Westview Press, 1988, p. 20.; See also: Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, p. 6.

¹²⁰⁹ Ho-Won Jeong, "Peace Research and International Relations", in Hon-Won Jeong (Ed.), **The New Agenda for Peace Research**, London and New York : Routledge, 1999, pp. 3-4.

¹²¹⁰ Bramsen and Hagemann, "How Research Travels to Policy...", pp. 1954-1955.

Section I - Peace research and conflict resolution: The case of the Nordic countries

It might be contended that the development of peace research in IR and in Nordic countries appears to be comparable, especially due to relevant Nordic contributions. Both the academic discipline of IR and peace research were established earlier in the Nordic countries compared to the Continent states. The institutionalization of IR and peace research dates back to the late 1950s and early 1960s in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Despite this commonality in terms of the period pertaining to the institutionalization of IR and peace research in these countries, the formation of a network of research cooperation by the first generation of Scandinavian scholars encompassing all over the region was not the case. Rather, political decisions driven by national research agendas were effective for the creation of the first IR chairs in the Scandinavian states.¹²¹¹

Peace research might be seen as the research to move closer to a general and complete peace state or at least to refrain from engaging with the general and complete war, as described by *Thomas Hobbes*. In this regard, there are two separate aspects, branches, or dimensions of peace research as negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace indicates the absence of war and violence, whereas positive peace indicates the integration of human society. Accordingly, peace research simultaneously needs to focus on the reduction of violence and promotion of integration.¹²¹² Peace research has thus been rooted in the pairings of negative and positive aspects of peace.

Peace research has been concerned with the study of armed conflicts, conflict resolution, armament and disarmament, under-development and development, human deprivation, imperialism, social justice, repression of violence, and affirmation of human rights.¹²¹³ This is why peace research is also linked to basic human needs. With this in mind, the variety of areas also affirms that peace research is oriented at

¹²¹¹ Jörg Friedrichs, **European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions**, London and New York : Routledge, 2004, p. 67.

¹²¹² An Editorial, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1964, pp. 1-2.; Regarding the link between positive aspect of peace and the promotion of integration, it is asserted that peace research should actually engage with the critical degree of polarization of conflicts, as challenging the present international system, rather than the achievement of integration. Moreover, it is also asserted that peace research should provide explanations concerning the demonstration of the latent conflicts rather than the manifested conflicts. In this process, it is important to focus on the suppressed and exploited groups and nations rather than the international and supranational institutions. See: Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", p. 219.

¹²¹³ Marek Thee, "Scope and Priorities in Peace Research", **Bulletin of Peace Proposals**, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1983, pp. 203-204.

transcending negative peace. Taken together, addressing the roots of both direct and structural violence, peaceful means of dispute settlement and violence prevention, non-violent transformations of situations, which have been marked by potential or actual violence, the mitigation, conclusion, and the recurrence of war have been important characteristics of peace research. In this process, comparison between peaceful and non-peaceful processes that lead to political and social changes has been an important undertaking as well. Albeit the significance of non-violent transformations, the legitimacy and efficacy of the use of force were subject to discussions and debates.¹²¹⁴

Integration, as a task of positive peace, has also been emphasized in connection with the different theories, including conflict resolution. According to *Schmid*, the theory of integration as a typical type of internal vertical control is connected with various theories. Examples include conflict resolution, theory of balance, social control, and administration. It is contended that the development of peace research science has been oriented at internal vertical control with a focus on the international system. Consequently, peace researchers aim to control, integrate, and save the international system from the perils of conflict, violence, and war. This is also the outcome of the application of the functionalist perspective to the international system.¹²¹⁵ Drawing from this explanation, integration has been considered as connected with the theory of conflict resolution. It is asserted that the focus of peace research has been oriented at securing the integration of the international system.

Galtung's introduction of the distinction between personal violence and structural violence has been connected with the critical understanding towards the pairings of negative and positive peace.¹²¹⁶ According to *Galtung*, violence indicates

¹²¹⁴ Paul Rogers, and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Then and Now: Peace Research - Past and Future", **Political Studies**, Vol. 47, No. 4, September 1999, pp. 740-741.; As an example to discussions regarding the relationship between violence and peace research, see: Giuliano Pontara, "The Concept of Violence", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1978, pp. 19-32.; According to *Kenneth E. Boulding*, violence and non-violence, which can be approached as conflict strategies, are not wholly and rigidly different since both of them entail the use of threat. For the classifications of violence and non-violence, see: Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Power of Nonconflict", **Journal of Social Issues**, Vol. 33, Number 1, Winter 1977, pp. 23-25.

¹²¹⁵ Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", pp. 218-220.

¹²¹⁶ Håkan Wiberg, "JPR 1964-1980-What Have we Learnt about Peace?", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 18, No. 2, Special Issue on Theories of Peace, 1981, p. 112.; For the discussions concerning the meanings and formulations of the notion of peace, coupled with the critical approaches towards positive and negative peace, see: Wiberg, "JPR 1964-1980-What...", pp. 112-115. See also: Félix E. Martín, "Critical Analysis of the Concept of Peace in International Relations", **Peace Research**, Vol. 37, No. 2, November 2005, pp. 45-59.; According to *Schmid*, positive peace can be considered as too diffuse in functioning as a basis for a precise definition of peace. Negative peace, on the other hand, has been

a gap between the actuality and potentiality of human beings. As a result, actual somatic and mental realizations of human beings are at a lower level than their potential realizations. The distance and lacuna between what is and what could have been need to be formulated broadly enough, especially in contrast to the narrow conceptualization of violence.¹²¹⁷ In this regard, understanding peace and peace research also requires to focus on the dimensions of violence. With that being said, it can be argued that peace research needs to capture the complex realities and dimensions of political struggle, violence, and non-violence while being grounded in the distinction between positive and negative aspects of peace.

In a broader framework, these aspects have also been covered by peace studies. It is emphasized that negative and positive peace aim to expand the field of peace studies from the prevention and control of war to the fruitfulness of peaceful relations. In this context, the latter also requires the constructive development studies. Nevertheless, the expansion from negative peace to positive peace cannot be sufficient. For this reason, structural violence has been offered in relation to social-political consciousness. This is also accompanied by critical and transformative perspectives. The emphasis on structural violence has been evaluated as critical in the context of peace research strategy.¹²¹⁸

Galtung explains that direct or personal violence indicates the violence committed by an actor. Indirect or structural violence, on the other hand, might not indicate a direct harm by a person.¹²¹⁹ The distinction between direct violence and structural violence has affected peace research traditions as well. It is explained that

central for peace research, which revolved around the vagueness of the term peace. See: Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", p. 224.; *Giuliano Pontara* offered to further examine the dimensions of peace to avoid a restrictive framework with regard to methods of struggle. See: Pontara, "The Concept of Violence", pp. 19-32.; See also: Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", pp. 217-232.; The following publications can also be useful in providing another critical perspectives: Kenneth E. Boulding, "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1977, pp. 75-86.; Necati Polat, "Peace as War", **Alternatives: Global, Local, Political**, Vol. 35, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2010, pp. 317-345.

¹²¹⁷ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, p. 168.

¹²¹⁸ Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research...", pp. 145-146.; As reflecting the agenda of positive peace, it is also explained that efforts for the prevention of violence and sustainable peace building are connected with sustainable development. See: Luc Reyckler, "Challenges of Peace Research", **International Journal of Peace Studies**, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2006, p. 1.; For the relevance of concerns directed to the environmental depletion in connection with the agenda of peace research, see: Lothar Brock, "Peace through Parks: The Environment on the Peace Research Agenda", **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 28, No 4, 1991, pp. 408-409.; For the offering regarding the peace ecology paradigm, see also: Christos N. Kyrou, "Peace Ecology: An Emerging Paradigm in Peace Studies", **International Journal of Peace Studies**, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2007, pp. 73-92.

¹²¹⁹ Galtung, "Violence, Peace...", pp. 170-171.

the pursuit of peace research at Uppsala University organized as the Department of Peace and Conflict Research indicates, a larger focus on the causes of war and peace against violence. The pursuit of peace research at Göteborg University, as organized in a milieu for Peace and Development Research, focuses on the structural issues, including economic conditions, international dependencies, and the formulation of strategies directed to peaceful development.¹²²⁰

According to *Peter Wallensteen*, the traditions of peace research can be explained in terms of dialectical process and utopian thinking.¹²²¹ According to *Schmid*, peace research is a reaction with regard to external horizontal control theory. This theory can be described as traditional research corresponding to maximization of interests, competition, game theory, and the theory of regulated conflict.¹²²² Despite different ideas, concerns about major wars have been fundamental for peace research. As a result, the prevention of a new world war and the fear of nuclear war after the Second World War have been compelling for peace research.¹²²³ With that being said, the implications of personal and structural violence, which have been illustrated in the following figure, have been crucial in developing a comprehensive framework in the context of peace research.




Figure 3.3: A typology of violence.¹²²⁴

This typology reveals many different types and evaluations pertaining to personal and structural violence, which require more nuanced reading with regard to peace research. In this context, the reflections and measurements of structural violence have further been examined not just in terms of the gap between the actuality and

¹²²⁰ Peter Wallensteen, "The Origins of Contemporary Peace Research", in Peter Wallensteen, **Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable**, (with a foreword by Jan Eliasson; a preface by Raimo Väyrynen), Cham : Springer, 2021, p. 82.

¹²²¹ Peter Wallensteen, "The Origins of Peace Research", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges**, Boulder and London : Westview Press, 1988, pp. 19-20.; For information about the expansion of peace research, along with peace action, in twenty-first century, see: Guha, **Peace Diplomacy**, pp. 55-72.

¹²²² Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics", pp. 218-219.

¹²²³ Peter Wallensteen, "Widening the Researchable: Conflict, Resolution and Prevention", in Peter Wallensteen (Ed.), **Peace Research: Theory and Practice**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 105.

¹²²⁴ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace...", p. 173.

potentiality of human beings but also of the gap between the optimal and actual life expectancy of social groups in connection with the impacts of wars and the distribution of wealth, power, and medical, organizational, and financial resources. Simply put, the various forms of structural violence can affect the shortening and lengthening of average life expectancy.¹²²⁵ This is why economic and development, along with humanitarian aid, has been an important technique of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.

Galtung reaffirms and discusses the two sides of peace and peace research as negative and positive peace in relation to personal and structural violence. While negative peace is connected with the absence of violence, positive peace is concerned with social justice, as egalitarian distribution of power and resources resulting from the absence of structural violence. This connects peace theory with conflict theory and development theory. In terms of peace research, as researching the conditions stemming from the past, present, and future to realize peace, negative and positive aspects have thus been demonstrated for the connection of peace research with conflict research and development research.¹²²⁶ Failure to bring these aspects together was one of the reasons for the failure of Norway in the case of Sri Lanka.

As expected, the approaches towards security and survival have also been influential in the context of peace research. Political approaches to security have been reflected in the realms of peace research and security research schools. In this regard, the focal point of peace research has been related to the creation of an international system. Ensuring strong, flexible, just and equitable international system has been important for peace and security. But this objective has been treated as an utopia.¹²²⁷ Drawing from this explanation, it might be argued that the emphasis on international system characterized by the aforementioned traits has been important for peace research.

With that being said, the relation and tension between peace and security have been captured in the approaches towards peace research. In this regard, it is explained that peace might be read as a process and as an objective in critical terms. But if peace were framed as a strategic goal, then the focus would be directed to mutual preservation and would not transcend beyond the preliminary stages as related to

¹²²⁵ Johan Galtung, and Tord Höivik, "Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1971, pp. 73-74.

¹²²⁶ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace...", p. 183.

¹²²⁷ Andrén, "In Search of Security", pp. 220-221.

security. This would result in the avoidance of further and more inspiring possibilities.¹²²⁸

Of critical importance is that peace culture has also been a crucial component of peace research. *Galtung* asserted that peace research and the peace movement have focused on the quest for peace culture with the efforts for its internalization and institutionalization.¹²²⁹ It can be seen that this has been the case for the Nordic countries, albeit challenges and problems. The embracement of a global and multi-cultural approach, which can be important to identify global, regional and local sources of violence, has been suggested in utilizing cultural perspectives oriented at the achievement of peace and non-violent transformation.¹²³⁰ As reflecting existential and vital effects of direct and indirect violence, the various dimensions of violence can be illustrated in the following fabric:

Exhibit: The Fabric of Violence.¹²³¹

Physical means of violence: Terrorism, guerilla and conventional warfare	Psychological means of violence	Cultural means of violence / epistemic violence
Visible direct-intentional		
Structural means of violence: political, economic and cultural exclusion. Less visible indirect-intentional	Violence is about shortening life or significantly lowering the quantitative and qualitative life expectancies of particular group(s)	Bad governance -Maladministration -Corruption -Indifference and neglect -Greed and self-interest -Religious and ideologically inspired misgovernance -Unintended negative impacts of well-intentioned interventions
Organized crime	Extra-legal economic activities	Environmental violence

¹²²⁸ Oliver P. Richmond, *Peace and International Relations: A New Agenda*, London and New York : Routledge, 2008, p. 2.

¹²²⁹ Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Aug. 1990, p. 291.

¹²³⁰ Rogers, and Ramsbotham, "Then and Now: Peace...", p. 741.

¹²³¹ Luc Reyhler, "Challenges of Peace Research", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2006, p. 4.; It can be seen that identity-oriented conflicts can also be approached as examples of cultural violence.

Positive and negative peace have been approached through three more or less schools. In this regard, the minimalist school provided the narrowest definition of peace as the absence of international war and military confrontations. Against the restrictions of this approach, the middle school provided more comprehensive understanding by evaluating peace as the absence of war and of threat systems. In this connection, there has also been an emphasis on the doubts surrounding the relationship between the prevention of war and the processes of deterrence and coercion. As a result, the definition of peace also entails the absence of instruments and institutions of war. The maximalist school, on the other hand, has embraced all kinds of violence with regard to a broader definition of peace.¹²³² Thus, concerns over the causes and prevention of direct violence and structural inequalities resulted in a debate between the proponents of a minimalist and minimalist agenda.¹²³³

During the Interwar period, *Quincy Wright*, *Pitirim Sorokin*, and *Lewis Richardson* undertook major quantitative efforts pertaining to the causes of war. *David Singer* explains that the establishment of the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan can be considered as the burgeoning of peace research. In this process, the USA, Western Europe, Scandinavia, Japan, and India, with relevant centers, journals, research projects, and training programs, were the hubs for the dissemination of peace research. Distinctive commonalities that characterized this process were ethical commitment and normative concerns aimed at the reduction or elimination of violence.¹²³⁴

According to *Helena Rytövuori*, the Cold War can be evaluated as the period for the commencement of peace research in Scandinavia. In particular, the latter half of the sixties and seventies was also important for the primary development of peace research.¹²³⁵ In this process, Nordic peace research institutes and centers have played important roles for interdisciplinary and reflective development of peace research. In engaging with the development of peace research and peace studies, PRIO and SIPRI played supportive roles for the emergence of this field. This is reflected in the following paragraph:¹²³⁶

¹²³² Asbjorn Eide, "A Value-based Approach: Methods and Problems in Peace Research", *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1974, pp. 120-123.

¹²³³ Rogers, and Ramsbotham, "Then and Now: Peace...", p. 741.

¹²³⁴ David J. Singer, "An Assessment of Peace Research", *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1976, pp. 119-120.

¹²³⁵ Helena Rytövuori, "Peace Research as Critical Research? Reflections on the Scandinavian Experience", *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1990, p. 87.

¹²³⁶ Harris, Rank, and Fisk, "Western Europe", para. 4.

“Although the roots of European peace research can be traced at least as far back as the 18th century Enlightenment, the emergence of peace studies as a distinct field in Europe can be said to have come about with the establishment of the first peace research institutes in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), along with other European peace research institutes, helped lay the intellectual groundwork for the field”.

Håkan Wiberg describes the conditions of peace research in the Nordic countries as relatively good and argues that the following factors affected this standing: political support from each Nordic countries, the creation of a joint environment, manifested by biennial Nordic peace research conferences since 1964, joint conduction of several research projects and the creation of Nordic Co-operation Committee for International Politics, including Conflict and Peace Research.¹²³⁷ The Nordic Co-operation Committee for International Politics, including Conflict and Peace Research, ceased to exist, and the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA) has continued its networking activities.¹²³⁸ The Journal of Cooperation and Conflict has been published under the auspices of NISA.¹²³⁹

Despite the earlier relevant initiatives, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the predecessor of the PRIO, founded by *Galtung*, can be considered as the beginning of formal peace research. As reflecting the earlier initiatives, on the other hand, the emphasis is given to a letter, which was published by *Arthur I. Gladstone*, and *Herbert C. Kelman* in the *American Psychologist* dated April 1951 in connection with the Korean War at the time. This process resulted in the publication of the “Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War” dated 1952.¹²⁴⁰

¹²³⁷ Wiberg, “Development of Peace Research...”, p. 20.

¹²³⁸ The Union of International Associations, “Nordic Cooperation Committee for International Politics, including Conflict and Peace Research”, n.d., <https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100042221> (accessed 12.09.2022).

¹²³⁹ Nordic International Studies Association, “About the Journal”, n.d., <https://nordicisa.eu/about-the-journal/> (accessed 12.09.2022).

¹²⁴⁰ Rogers, and Ramsbotham, “Then and Now: Peace...”, p. 743.

In the aforementioned letter, the pacifist arguments towards the relationship between frustration and aggression; counter-aggression and aggression; force or threat of force and aggression; objectivity and perception of reality; therapeutic approach; and habituation related to the embracement of mass murder techniques and authoritarian patterns have been examined with the objective to stimulate further discussions from a psychological perspective.¹²⁴¹ This examination can be considered as enriching regarding the incorporation of psychological insights into the realm of peace and conflict resolution.

Peace research institutes and centers of the Nordic countries reflect the variety of organizational expressions of peace research. In this regard, particular initiatives, academic, and political climate at the time, the ideas and motives of initial founders, and local responses were also influential for the organizational expressions of peace research in the Nordic context.¹²⁴² One of the contributions of peace research institutes has been grounded in increasing awareness concerning the need to stop the arms race and to avoid a third world war.¹²⁴³

Regarding the link between Nordic pioneers and peace research, the influence of *Galtung* has been critical for the development and distinguishment of peace research. However, it is contended that ensuring the distinctiveness of contemporary peace studies from other scholarly fields, including IR and critical security studies, remains to be a problem.¹²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Nordic pioneers and the PRIO have played crucial roles as affecting the history and the dissemination of peace research.¹²⁴⁵ The importance of Nordic pioneers, coupled with the role of Nordic peace research institutes and centers, also affected Nordic identity.

In addition to positive and negative peace, there have also been different approaches that have been formulated and utilized. According to *Nathan C. Funk*, conflict resolution can be considered one of the approaches towards peace. In this context, conflict resolution indicates a pragmatic approach along with the skills, effective communication strategies, abilities associated with co-existence, and trainings for the achievement of peace. Actually, conflict resolution, coupled with

¹²⁴¹ Gladstone, and Kelman, "Pacifists vs. Psychologists", pp. 127-128.

¹²⁴² Wallensteen, "Foundational Debates for the Study...", p. 67.

¹²⁴³ Frank Blackaby, "SIPRI", *Medicine and War*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, p. 136.

¹²⁴⁴ Lawler, "Peace Studies", p. 83.

¹²⁴⁵ See: Stein Tønnesson (Ed.), *Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories*, Evidence-based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, Oslo : The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Singapore : Springer, 2022.

power politics (or coercive power); world order; non-violence, and transformation through love, have been formulated as approaches towards peace. The approachment of conflict resolution paradigm towards peace entails direct interaction with the other.¹²⁴⁶ This was followed by Nordic practitioners in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

According to *Wallensteen*, conflict resolution can be defined as follows: “(...) *a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other*”.¹²⁴⁷ It is clear that the objectives of conflict resolution, particularly direct communication, have been embraced by Nordic peace diplomacy. The development of conflict resolution has been one of the most important phenomena in the research, education and action contexts of peace studies. Given the rapid development of conflict resolution, it is claimed that there should be a collaboration between conflict resolution and peace studies rather than the replacement of the perspectives of peace studies.¹²⁴⁸ Hence, discussion related to disciplinary autonomy and boundaries should not prohibit mutual interactions between conflict resolution and peace studies.

As expected, historical interactions associated with the field of conflict resolution and its components predate its epistemological development. Conflict resolution entails processes characterized by the removal of causes and manifestations of a conflict and the elimination of the roots of the incompatibilities between the parties. Conflict management refers to the elimination of violence and violent means while allowing the conflict to be dealt with purely through political channels. Conflict transformation indicates the replacement of conflict with positive relationships between the parties.¹²⁴⁹

Consequently, there have been different choices for the usages, including conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation, and conflict

¹²⁴⁶ Nathan C. Funk, “Peace Paradigms: Five Approaches to Peace”, *Gandhi Marg*, Vol. 24, No. 3, October-December 2002, pp. 299, 301-302.; For power politics (or coercive power), world order, non-violence and transformation through love-oriented approaches, see: Funk, “Peace Paradigms: Five Approaches...”, pp. 298-306.; For a glimpse into the approaches of mainstream and critical theories towards peace, please see: Oliver P. Richmond, “Peace in International Relations Theory”, in Oliver P. Richmond, Sandra Pogodda, and Jasmin Ramović (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace*, London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 57-68.

¹²⁴⁷ Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, p. 8.

¹²⁴⁸ Neil H. Katz, “Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 504, No. 1, 1989, p. 15.

¹²⁴⁹ Zartman, “Towards the Resolution of...”, p. 11.

regulation. In this regard, *Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall* assert that the choice of any label would not matter due to adequate coherency associated with the advocacy and engagement within the field. Nevertheless, the usage of conflict resolution as the overarching term has been preferred since it has been the earliest term as utilized to define the field. The term conflict resolution also retains its status as being the most widely used term by conflict analysts and practitioners while being the most familiar term in the media and general public.¹²⁵⁰

Despite differences, the management and mismanagement of conflicts have been connected with the purposes of positive peace and negative peace as well. In this regard, positive peace has been evaluated as a skill to manage conflicts and to develop a larger order beyond the warring parties, who have been involved in the conflict. According to *Kenneth E. Boulding*, positive peace indicates debate and dialogue, drama and confrontation in an evolutionary process connected with human development and learning. The conditions of war, or not-peace, on the other hand, have demonstrated the inability to manage conflicts. For this reason, such conditions entail disruptive dialectic, confusion, quarreling, and immature political form. But still, positive peace can result in a more troubled setting. Therefore, *Boulding* chooses to focus on the narrower sense of peace defined as the absence of war. Such choice has been assessed as easier to comprehend and more susceptible to research and policy recommendations.¹²⁵¹

Drawing from this explanation, the inference is that management of conflicts has underpinned both negative and positive peace. But the latter aims to combine the management of conflicts with a broader order, as extending beyond the conflicting parties. According to *Peter Wallensteen*, positive peace has entailed the use of conflict resolution, equal integration, and justice. All of these aspects can be considered as the additions of positive peace. In this regard, the convergence between positive peace and

¹²⁵⁰ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention....*, pp. 8-9.; However, it is also contended that conflict resolution and conflict management need to be distinguished. In this regard, *John Burton* argues that the purpose of conflict resolution is oriented at resolving the problem despite the necessity of change. The difference of conflict management, on the other hand, lies in the efforts oriented at avoiding the escalation of conflict. Such efforts are usually initiated by the *status quo* party to the dispute. See: Burton, "Theory of Conflict Resolution", p. 125.; According to *Elizabeth Waterston*, the methods of conflict and conflict management approaches range from coercive methods, including the use or threat of use of the deadly force to cooperative methods. See: Elizabeth Waterston, "A Brief History of International Conflict Resolution: A European Viewpoint", *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, Vol. 15, No. 2, April-June 1999, p. 158.

¹²⁵¹ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, pp. 5-6.

conflict resolution has produced additional remarks for the term peace, which has often been rooted in negative peace.¹²⁵²

Actually, the term conflict is derived from the Latin word “*confligere*”, meaning striking together and clashing with the indication of an encounter, a fight and struggle in various spheres, including human affairs, wars and natural processes.¹²⁵³ Conflict might be described as “(...) *the resolution of the tension between the contraries*”.¹²⁵⁴ The term encapsulates various areas and actors, including war and legal industries, armed groups, soldiers, families with clashes, and human beings themselves. Further to this, ritual conflicts, as exemplified by competitive exercises and democratic elections, can also be encapsulated within the term of conflict.¹²⁵⁵ Hence, what we consider to be a conflict can be something personal or can be performed through competitive activities and elections.

Conflict also consists of different stages, which do not necessarily indicate a form of violence. In *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, the stages of conflict have been illustrated as difference, contradiction, polarization, violence, war, ceasefire, agreement, normalization, and reconciliation.¹²⁵⁶ This classification affirms that what we call conflict can be constructive, and conflicts can be a source of functional practices such as normalization and reconciliation.

¹²⁵² Peter Wallensteen, “The Origins of Contemporary Peace Research”, in Kristine Hoglund, and Magnus Oberg (Eds.), **Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges**, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 15.; *Jack S. Levy* also explains how the term peace has usually been described as the absence of war. See: Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace”, **Annual Review of Political Science**, Vol. 1, 1998, p. 141.; By the same token, there has also been an emphasis on the war rather than peace. In this regard, *Kenneth E. Boulding* explains that human beings intend to value struggle, strife, turmoil, excitement and triumph over peace. This is why peace can be underestimated. See: Boulding, **Stable Peace**, pp. 4-5.

¹²⁵³ Kurt Singer, “The Meaning of Conflict”, **The Australasian Journal of Philosophy**, Vol. 27, No. 3, December 1949, p. 145.

¹²⁵⁴ Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Conflict. I”, **American Journal of Sociology**, Vol. 9, No. 4, Jan. 1904, p. 490.

¹²⁵⁵ Boulding, “Role of Conflict in Dynamics...”, p. 99.; Conflicts can also be approached in terms of contestations and the imposition of unilateral solution between the parties; cost-benefit analysis and calculations, and changes in the world order or world regime patterns or evolutionary changes. Hence, the latest approach requires to undertake evolutionary efforts and actions in terms of conflict reduction. See: Zartman, “Conflict and Resolution: Contest...”, p. 12.

¹²⁵⁶ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, p. 14.; According to *Johan Galtung*, wars along with crimes and revolutions can be considered as one of the extreme forms of the phenomenon of aggression. Aggression in its extreme forms causes to harm the others. The pervasive and catastrophic impacts of aggression multiply with the development of modern technology. Social contexts are also relevant in understanding the emergence of aggression. Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Aggression”, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1964, pp. 95-97.; In this Thesis, war was recognized as a stage of conflict and as an extreme form of aggression.

In this Thesis, contradiction, polarization, violence, and war were evaluated as stages of conflict with different forms of aggression, non-humanization, deprivation, and restriction of basic human needs. Ceasefires and agreements were approached from the lenses of outcome-oriented peace mediation and facilitation, albeit there have been process-oriented implications. As for the normalization and reconciliation, these stages were rather to be considered as the reflection of conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

As parallel to this explanation, *Galtung* emphasizes a fundamental point drawn by *Gandhi* suggesting that conflicts should unite the conflicting parties rather than separating them. The reason is that there is a shared commonality in terms of having incompatibilities, which might encourage efforts oriented at arriving a solution through contact, positive acts and accepting attitudes. In contrast to conflictlessness that stems from religions, utopias, political philosophers, and social scientists, while indicating a state of death, conflicts might be demonstrated as important and inevitable for the needs and maturity of human beings and societies.¹²⁵⁷ Hence, approaching conflicts through constructive lenses is also compatible with conflict transformation.

Thus, violence and war have played prominent roles for both peace research and conflict resolution practices. Having said this, *J. David Singer* argues that understanding the causes of war has been the central, but not the entire concern of peace research.¹²⁵⁸ According to *Paul Wehr*, it is also important to bear in mind that “not all peace research concerns conflict processes, nor is all conflict research peace oriented”.¹²⁵⁹ As reflecting this, the distinctiveness of peace research has been explained by referencing its existential purpose. This can be stated as the reduction of latent and manifest violence in the present and future while improving human condition and societal development.¹²⁶⁰

In support of this explanation, *Galtung* argues that the usage of peace may in itself be effective to produce peace, to foster a common basis and a feeling of communality, and to project an image of harmony of interests, which can be especially

¹²⁵⁷ Johan Galtung, “Conflict as a Way of Life”, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1970, pp. 13-14.

¹²⁵⁸ J. David Singer, “From a Study of War to Peace Research: Some Criteria and Strategies”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Dec. 1970, p. 528.

¹²⁵⁹ Paul Wehr, “Peace and Conflict Processes: A RESEARCH OVERVIEW”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1979, p. 467.

¹²⁶⁰ Wallenstein, “Origins of Contemporary Peace Research”, in Kristine Hoglund, and Magnus Oberg (Eds.), *Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges*, London and New York : Routledge, 2011, p. 17.

important against the use of terms that have been included in the vocabulary of one of the conflicting groups while excluding the other.¹²⁶¹ Hence, the usage of the term peace can place the conflicting groups in a better position while addressing the underlying elements of conflict and creating a common ground. The term peace can be evaluated as empowering in dealing with conflicts and controversial issues.

From a historical perspective, *Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall* have outlined intergenerational development and practice of conflict resolution in terms of its precursor period up to 1945; its foundational period in the 1950s and 1960s; its further construction and expansion period in the 1970s and 1980s; its reconstruction period between 1985s and 2005s in relation to accommodation of the post-Cold War world and a new wave of conflict theory and practice, described as more sensitive and reflective through the first quarter of the twenty-first century.¹²⁶²

Hence, the Interwar period was decisive for the identification of the field of conflict resolution. Despite having roots in the history of human interactions, the components of conflict resolution, such as prenegotiations, conflict management, positive-sum outcomes, ripeness, and formulas etc., have been labeled in the past few decades. Negotiation was also identified in the eighteenth century.¹²⁶³ *Peter Wallensteen* explains that despite the connotations rooted in international law, conflict theory, cooperation, and integration, the conceptual and systematic study of conflict resolution is rather recent. Moreover, conflict resolution has acquired increased significance and centrality during the 1990s.¹²⁶⁴ This added momentum has also been reflected in the practices of Nordic peace diplomacy, as evident in the general dataset of the Thesis. Despite the loss of interest in mediation, peace mediation and facilitation have been utilized by the Nordic countries during the post-Cold War period.

This process has revealed the increasing complexity surrounding the management of conflicts as well. As a result, the restrictions of traditional means oriented at managing, settling, or resolving conflicts have been more apparent. For this reason, both pressures and opportunities have emerged to provide more innovative means associated with third-party practices and conflict resolution in the context of

¹²⁶¹ Galtung, "Violence, Peace...", p. 167.

¹²⁶² Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention...**, pp. 32-33.

¹²⁶³ Zartman, "Towards the Resolution of...", p. 11.

¹²⁶⁴ Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, pp. 6-7.

international conflicts.¹²⁶⁵ In response to the increasing need and importance of peace and conflict resolution mechanisms, including mediation, Nordic countries also engaged in various peace processes.¹²⁶⁶

Taken together, it can be argued that peace research can entail a compromise regarding its fundamental connection with conflict and war.¹²⁶⁷ But still, this compromise cannot lead to the marginalization of peace research compared to conflict resolution. Rather, attention to peace research and its interactions with conflict resolution can be effective in strengthening peace and conflict resolution mechanisms, including peace mediation and facilitation. Therefore, this Thesis approaches the relationship between peace research and conflict resolution as supportive and complementary rather than as a troubled relationship.

In essence, sophisticated perspectives on peace and conflict have been essential. Peace has been rooted in the efforts to perform and promote peaceful actions, which have been directed to truth, love, harmony, happiness and cooperation. It is explained that ethnic, racial, religious, and national borders do not exclude cooperation between human beings. Therefore, the promotion of peace, relevant training and the encouragement of civilized and dignified approaches towards peace and conflict have been described as a responsibility.¹²⁶⁸ In this context, Nordic countries have provided such qualities as capable of reflecting a commitment to and responsibility for peace and conflict resolution. This responsibility was materialized through their contributions to the fields of peace research and conflict resolution.

As reflecting these qualities, Nordic countries have been noticeable actors for the resolution of conflicts and disputes through diplomacy. Various disputes among the Nordic countries themselves and between the Nordic countries and others were

¹²⁶⁵ Mark Hoffman, "Third-Party Mediation and Conflict-Resolution in the Post-Cold War World", in John Baylis, and Nicholas J. Rengger (Eds.), **Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World**, Oxford : Clarendon Press; New York : Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 262-263.

¹²⁶⁶ For the peaceful contributions and engagements of Norway since the year of 1993, for example, please see: Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, "Norway's Engagement in Peace Processes since 1993".

¹²⁶⁷ This has produced problems in the establishment of the PRIO as well. *Galtung* explains that "conflict and peace research," as the envisaged name for the PRIO in 1959, was a compromise. This was due to ideological identifications of the term peace in relation to political conjuncture and scepticism towards peace research. Also, *Galtung* asserts that the broader implications of peace studies and peace not only relate to conflict but also to development studies, which has also been exemplified as less limiting compared to the term research. Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research...", pp. 141-142.; Hence, there have also been differentiations not only for the terms peace and conflict research but also for the terms peace studies and peace research.

¹²⁶⁸ Shaheen Showkat Dar, "Disciplinary Evolution of Peace and Conflict Studies: An Overview", **International Journal on World Peace**, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2017, pp. 45-46.

resolved through means as distant from violence and warfare. Examples include low or minor scale of incidents associated with land-based borders. *Clive Archer* describes such incidents as few and far between the Nordic countries. Importantly, maritime frontiers, fisheries, and maritime border demarcation have generated problems and disagreements. Nevertheless, the tendency has been oriented toward diplomatic resolutions and political processes, coupled with a restricted level of violence and no allowance for the escalation of conflicts.¹²⁶⁹ This tendency was also reflected in the practices of Nordic peace diplomacy despite the failures and problems. That is why there has also been Nordic activism in world politics.

It can be argued that diplomatic resolution of conflicts and disputes has been one of the important qualities that affected the Nordic expertise and guidance in the field of conflict resolution. According to *Anders Wivel*, multi-dimensional Nordic activism; welfare state values-based content as affecting domestic and foreign policymaking processes, and well-endowed, effective administration and organization have been decisive for the contributions of the Nordic countries to international peace and security. Values encompassing egalitarianism, peaceful conflict resolution, the rule of the law and collectivism with regard to the welfare state have been prominent values that underpinned the activism of Nordic countries. Further to this, the lack of armed conflict between Nordic countries since 1815 also characterized the peacefulness and stability of the region. Various issues and disputes did not produce warfare. As a result, the Nordic region has proven to be more peaceful compared to other regions. Such peaceful co-existence has also become a foreign policy goal while distinguishing the region.¹²⁷⁰

Despite the major and minor scale of civil war experiences, the Nordic region has experienced calmness and a low level of conflicts as corresponding to violence, civil war, and terrorism. Of critical importance is that the Nordic countries also demonstrated their competence in handling communal and ethnic violence, which has become protracted in various regions across the globe. These countries have been perceived as more peaceful actors with a low tendency for involvement in conflicts and military interventions. Exceptions include war, civil war experiences, and increased participation in peacekeeping operations. In essence, the role of Nordic countries in peacekeeping operations can be read as the demonstration of a willingness

¹²⁶⁹ Archer, "Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", pp. 455-457.

¹²⁷⁰ Wivel, "What Happened to the Nordic Model...", pp. 490-491.

to create such an international society, which is stable and peaceful. In this context, *Archer* argues that Nordic countries can be evaluated as peaceful but not pacifist.¹²⁷¹

Conflict resolution has been a critical component in the national action plans and peace strategies of Nordic countries. The following examples are indicative of the commitments and holistic approaches of Nordic countries in the field of peace and conflict resolution. In “Women, Peace and Security: Finland’s National Action Plan 2023-2027”, Finland affirms its commitment to the improvement of the role of women in the processes of conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding.¹²⁷² Hence, it can be argued that Finland aims to strengthen the connection between different approaches, including conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding through the inclusion of women in the peace processes.

In “Strategic Framework for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund 2023-2027 of Denmark”, the emphasis is given to the “Peace and Stabilisation Fund”, which aims to improve the conditions for the prevention of conflicts, as aligning with the foreign and security policy of Denmark. In this regard, the Fund coordinates various Danish instruments with the objective to prevent the emergence, escalation, persistence, and recurrence of conflicts. It also supports Denmark. This Framework has been grounded in the international lessons, as derived from the peacebuilding and stabilization experiences of the past two decades. In relation to these lessons, Denmark emphasizes the importance of realistic ambitions and long-term commitments and perspectives for sustainable peace and stabilization.¹²⁷³

In “Norway’s National Action Plan: Women, Peace and Security (2023-2030)”, Norway commits to increasing the role of women as peace mediators, facilitators, and negotiators for conflict prevention and conflict resolution. In this context, Norway aims to encourage and strengthen a sound gender perspective in the processes of peace initiatives, in a number of which Norway has been involved. This example affirms the importance of the incorporation of gender balance into conflict resolution

¹²⁷¹ Archer, “Nordic Area as a ‘Zone of Peace’”, pp. 455-457.

¹²⁷² Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, **Women, Peace and Security: Finland’s National Action Plan 2023-2027**, 2023:13, Helsinki : Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 15 September 2023, p. 17, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/165144/UM_2023_13.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 15.05.2023).

¹²⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence of Denmark, and Ministry of Justice of Denmark, **Strategic Framework for the Peace and Stabilisation Fund 2023-2027**, File No. 2022-10154, March 2023, pp. 3-4.

mechanisms.¹²⁷⁴ By the same token, conflict resolution has been supported through gender-sensitive perspectives.

Contribution to effective conflict resolution has been emphasized as part of the “Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017-2022 of Sweden.” Coupled with the prevention of armed conflicts, inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding, statebuilding, improvement of human security, and the empowerment of excluded groups, Sweden aims to increase opportunities for peace. In this process, the efforts of Sweden have been grounded in prevention, handling, and resolution of conflicts at various levels while adopting holistic approaches. Such approaches entail humanitarian aid, development cooperation, dialogue, and mediation for the promotion of sustainable peace.¹²⁷⁵

In this spirit, it can be argued that the theoretical contributions, diplomatic competencies, and peacefulness of Nordic countries can be considered as internal/external reflections of their self-cultivation in the field of peace and conflict resolution. All of these factors have enabled the development of Nordic guidance and expertise regarding the link between institutionalization of peace research and effective conflict resolution. Importantly, the Nordic countries demonstrate holistic approaches to these fields. All of these qualities and mechanisms are also related to the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy.

Section V - The reflections of being small states in the context of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation: The utilization of peace mediation and facilitation as influence and status-seeking strategies in world politics?

Transcendence of the chains and restrictions in relation to the implications of being a small state has also been one of the reasons that affected and molded Nordic identity in terms of peaceful efforts and engagements. As a result of third-party practices, the status of Nordic countries has been elevated. It is valid and sound to state that the elevation of status has been affected by third-party engagements and vice versa. In this process, being small states has played a part in the motivations of peace diplomacy directed to international influence and status-seeking. Also, being small

¹²⁷⁴ Norwegian Ministries, **Norway’s National Action Plan: Women, Peace and Security (2023-2030)**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 14 September 2023, pp. 9-10, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/norways-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security-2023-2030/id2993862/> (accessed 12.04.2023).

¹²⁷⁵ Government Offices of Sweden, **Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017-2022**, Stockholm : Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 26 January 2018, pp. 2-4, <https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2018/01/strategy-for-sustainable-peace-20172022/> (accessed 12.04.2023).

states affected acceptability, and credibility of the Nordic countries in third-party practices. Because of the link between being small states and elevation of status, one can identify different but connected characteristics related to reflections of being small states.

The term status encapsulates the actual position or identity of a country. According to *Jonathan Renshon*, status combines three important attributes positional, perceptual, and social. Status commonly refers to standing, which indicates the rank or position of an actor in a hierarchy and to identity or membership within a group. Status and status-related issues can cause concerns in order to gain, strengthen, salvage, and protect one's status. These concerns may result in status-seeking behaviors or actions oriented at gaining status, preserving the current position, or slowing the decline. With that being said, neither of these objectives and concerns can accurately be captured by status-seeking. There is an orthogonal relationship between status concerns and status itself. Not only low-ranked actors but also high-level actors may evince concerns about their status.¹²⁷⁶

However, it is also argued that there should be a distinction between the insecurities of smaller and middle powers and established great powers. In this context, the distinction of status-seeking of small and middle powers from greater powers is considered a requisite.¹²⁷⁷ That is why the Nordic brand and Nordic identity related to third-party practices can be placed in the realm of the literature concerning the conditions of small and middle powers, and their status-seeking activities in IR.¹²⁷⁸

As reflecting this, *Ronald M. Behringer* argues that the leadership of middle powers, exemplified by Denmark and Norway, along with other non-Nordic countries on the human security agenda, might be seen as a challenge to the realist reading of middle power states in which middle powers were neglected and described as mere followers of great powers.¹²⁷⁹ Bluntly put, it can be argued that the concerns and

¹²⁷⁶ Jonathan Renshon, *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2017, p. 4.

¹²⁷⁷ William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and Iver B. Neumann, "Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2018, p. 528.

¹²⁷⁸ For example, see: Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver Neumann (Eds.), *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing*, London and New York : Routledge, 2015.; Iver B. Neumann, and Sieglinde Gstöhl, *Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?: Small States in International Relations*, Oddi, Sturlugata : The Centre for Small State Studies (CSSS), Institute of International Affairs, University of Iceland, Working Paper 1-2004, May 2004.; Goetschel, "Introduction to Special Issue....", pp. 259-278.

¹²⁷⁹ Ronald M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2005, pp. 305-307.

insecurities about status have been reflected through the Nordic brand and Nordic identity with no disregard for the involvement of Nordic countries in third-party practices.

These concerns have also been connected with the geographical position of Nordic countries. From a geographical perspective, Scandinavia corresponds to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, while the Norden corresponds to Scandinavia with the extension of Finland and Iceland. With that being said, Scandinavia and Norden transcend such geographical classifications while carrying political connotations as accompanied by controversies. In Greenland, the Faeroes and Åland Islands, for example, strong opinions have been raised in order to be contained by the concept of Norden.¹²⁸⁰

It is also contended that the strategic interests of Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands, described as Atlantic islands or West Norden, might easily be distinguished from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.¹²⁸¹ Nonetheless, there have been binding aspects that affected Nordic countries amidst differences. According to *Uffe Østergaard*, Lutheran monarchical heritage can be considered a Nordic commonality even though Finland and Iceland are republics.¹²⁸² In essence, the languages, religion and community of race have been considered as contributing factors for the unity of the Northern people. With that being said, the role of such factors should not be overestimated.¹²⁸³ Hence, what we consider to be a Nordic commonality cannot be seen as completely homogeneous. This also applies to being small states and being members of the Nordic community in world politics.

Still, geographical location of the Northern countries has been a crucial factor for their close association. It is not surprising that geographical location has also accounted for differences. Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden compose a close group with the omission of Iceland. Finland, Norway, and Sweden establish parts of a continuous territory. Iceland, which is located in the North Atlantic, is farther distant from other Nordic countries in comparison with the British Isles. In addition to the geographical location, the sea has also been one of the factors that links all of the

¹²⁸⁰ Sørensen, and Stråth, "Introduction: Cultural Construction...", p. 20.

¹²⁸¹ Archer, "Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'", p. 451.

¹²⁸² Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 69.

¹²⁸³ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 10.; Despite the shared similarities, there have also been certain national differences resulting from the pattern of thinking and approaching to the world problems. *Rowland Kenney* explains that such differences have been emphasized through their geographical position, economic structure, historical circumstances and the imposed influences by the external world. Kenney, **Northern Tangle: Scandinavia and...**, p. v.

countries. The sea has proven to be effective in providing inter-communication, connection, and wealth for the Northern people.¹²⁸⁴

From a geographical and geopolitical perspective, most of the Nordic countries belong to the Baltic region. With that being said, they are also located in the northern part of Europe. *Uffe Østergaard* emphasizes how Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have been prone to reducing Baltic and European aspects of their national identifications over the past 150 years. For many Scandinavians, social democrats, and liberals, there has been an attitude suggesting that their political culture, social structure, and mentality are fundamentally different from Europe. As illustrating this, the term “Norden” has been used over the term “Northern Europe” when referring to Nordic countries. The perceptions directed to the term Norden have entailed non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Rome, anti-imperialist, non-colonial, non-exploitative, peaceful, small, and social democratic attributes.¹²⁸⁵ Such attributes, including being small states, were utilized in evoking the distinctiveness and peacefulness of the Nordic countries. Of equal importance is that these traits also strengthened the suitability of Nordic countries in third-party roles while affirming different but connected Nordic characteristics.

Despite the formation of a geographic region and shared cultural and linguistic links, there have been differences among the Nordic countries. Examples include/included incoherencies in the foreign policies of the Nordic countries; the distinctiveness of the Atlantic islands of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands in relation to the European peninsula countries; divergent strategies; the NATO membership of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway and non-membership of Finland, and Sweden until the years of 2023 and 2024, respectively, and the EU membership of Denmark, Finland and Sweden. However, the skepticism of Denmark towards EU as exemplified by its opt-outs from the European common security and defence policy¹²⁸⁶, and the involvement of Norway in the EU Common Defence Fund can, to some extent, bring Norway closer to EU compared to Denmark.¹²⁸⁷

¹²⁸⁴ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 1.

¹²⁸⁵ Østergaard, “Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...”, p. 25.; See also: Østergård, “History of Europe Seen...”, p. 288.

¹²⁸⁶ As of 01 July 2022, Denmark abolished its opt-out from the EU cooperation on security and defence. For this reason, Denmark can contribute to joint military missions and operations of the EU. Such decisions have been grounded in voluntary participation with the involvement of the Danish Parliament. See: Danish Ministry of Defence, “Denmark and the EU”, 20 November 2023, <https://www.fmn.dk/en/topics/international-cooperation/eu/> (accessed 18.07.2023).

¹²⁸⁷ Hagemann, and Bramsen, **New Nordic Peace: Nordic...**, p. 10.

Regarding the link between institutional affiliations and the Nordic countries, this dynamic process will inevitably be affected by the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. Analysis and discussion of this process, as also subject to concerns and uncertainties, are beyond the purpose of this Thesis. However, NATO membership of Finland and Sweden can produce further challenges for the heritage of Nordic balance as explained in engaging with the underlying explanations for Nordic peace diplomacy. As a result, it is important for the Nordic countries to respond to such challenges as capable of affecting peace mediation and facilitation practices both in perceptions and reality.

In engaging with commonalities among the Nordic countries, being small states has usually been quite important. As reflecting this, it is emphasized that Nordic countries share similarities in terms of being small and highly developed countries with a high score of land/water interface; the operation of stable democratic governments; the position between the East and West; and being away from the ethnic dividing lines in southeastern Europe. With that being said, there are also observable differences in terms of physical characteristics, alliance membership, attitudes towards the European Community, and military production in the economy, which affects military defence and security.¹²⁸⁸ This statement affirms how being small states cannot be isolated from economic, geographical, physical, political, security, and alliances.

Despite differences, the similarities between Nordic countries have been utilized for Nordic cooperation. Accordingly, the constitution of linguistic, cultural, economic, social, and political-ideological areas by the Nordic countries has underpinned Nordic cooperation from a pragmatic perspective. With that being said, Nordic cooperation can also be approached from an idealistic and emotional perspective, which has been grounded in a sense of duty. These efforts might be connected with Nordic nationalism or contemporary interpretations of Scandinavianism ideology.¹²⁸⁹ Nonetheless, being small states, both a concern and a similarity, can also be seen as a factor upon Nordic cooperation. For this reason, similarities between the Nordic countries can be linked to not only the Nordic brand and Nordic identity but also Nordic cooperation.

This cooperation, whether grounded in pragmatic considerations or ideological aspirations, can be important considering different impacts of physical characteristics

¹²⁸⁸ Nils Petter Gleditsch, Håkan Wiberg, and Dan Smith, "The Nordic Countries: Peace Dividend or Security Dilemma?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Special Issue: Defence Spending after the Cold War, December 1992, p. 334-337.

¹²⁸⁹ Nils Andrén, "Nordic Integration", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1967, pp. 8-9.

on the military defence. Denmark, for example, has been evaluated as militarily more vulnerable due to being a small state with limited territory and dense population, as demonstrated by Germany's invasion in 1940. In comparison to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, on the other hand, have been evaluated as militarily less vulnerable due to being medium-sized states with very sparse population. This argument has been grounded by referencing Denmark's invasion as completed in a day; Norway's invasion in 1940; and two wars of Finland in 1939 and 1941.¹²⁹⁰

In this regard, Denmark is considered a small state, whereas Finland, Norway, and Sweden are considered medium-sized states. *Michael I. Handel* argues that Finland might be approached within the middle powers category despite the limitations in their freedom of action, which has been considered a proper behavior given its powerful neighbor.¹²⁹¹ *Handel* also argues that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden perceive themselves as weak states rather than middle states with regard to their current national goals and ambitions.¹²⁹² Iceland, on the other hand, has been evaluated as a weak state with considerable strategic importance.¹²⁹³ These remarks affirm the permeability between being small and medium-sized states while demonstrating that both identification and self-identification matter for such classifications.

Despite the different and dynamic ideas, it can be argued that being small states has been one of the prominent classifications in engaging with the traits associated with the Nordic countries.¹²⁹⁴ As reflecting this, Northern countries have generally been treated as minor world community members. However, this treatment contrasts with the aggregation of the territorial size of Northern countries.¹²⁹⁵ Within this contrast, it is important to transcend territorial lenses in understanding the role of small states in world politics. Although territorial size is relevant and useful, it is not capable of revealing the traits of small states in a broader framework and in the context of peace and conflict resolution.

¹²⁹⁰ Gleditsch, Wiberg, and Smith, "Nordic Countries: Peace Dividend...", pp. 334-335.

¹²⁹¹ Michael I. Handel, **Weak States in the International System**, London and New York : Routledge, 1990, pp. 23, 28.

¹²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹²⁹⁴ For example, see: Baldur Thorhallsson, and Jóna Sólveig Elínardóttir, "The Nordic States: Keeping Cool at the Top?", in Godfrey Baldacchino, and Anders Wivel (Eds.), **Handbook on the Politics of Small States**, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, pp. 113-130.; Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver B. Neumann (Eds.), **Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015.; Godfrey Baldacchino, and Anders Wivel, "Small States: Concepts and Theories", in Godfrey Baldacchino, and Anders Wivel (Eds.), **Handbook on the Politics of Small States**, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, pp. 2-19.; Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 25.

¹²⁹⁵ Nelson (Ed.), **Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns...**, p. 2.

Also, the term small state has been used by the representatives of Nordic countries. In the fifth session of the UN General Assembly, dated 27 September 1950, for example, *Halvard Lange*, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway at the time, described Norway as a small nation compelled to allocate its limited resources to national defence and military forces.¹²⁹⁶ In the fourteenth session of the UN General Assembly, dated 24 September 1959, *Lange* states that he represents a small country.¹²⁹⁷

By the same token, the representatives of Sweden also embraced this term during the general debates of the UNGA, including its eighth and eighteenth sessions.¹²⁹⁸ Similar statements were also made by the representatives of Finland. In the twenty-fifth session of the UNGA, dated 23 October 1970, for example, *Urho Kekkonen*, as the President of Finland at the time, described Finland as a small neutral country committed to the UN and its collective security system. It is explained that Finland aims to obtain security through the formulation of such foreign policy as capable of keeping Finland outside of international conflicts rather than military alliances or one power's protection.¹²⁹⁹

Importantly, states were usually referred to as powers, and this attribution was an accustomed practice until well into the twentieth century. The term power is still utilized in engaging with different categories of states as great, middle, and small powers. In this process, small powers are labeled as small states. Such usage further denotes the absence of power measured in a quantitative sense.¹³⁰⁰ The usage of weak states also encloses prominent characteristics of small states.¹³⁰¹ However, the

¹²⁹⁶ United Nations General Assembly, **Fifth Session Official Records: 287 Plenary Meeting**, Flushing Meadow, New York : United Nations, 27 September 1950, Article 120, p. 152, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/735607?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.04.2024).

¹²⁹⁷ United Nations General Assembly, **Fourteenth Session Official Records: 807th Plenary Meeting**, New York : United Nations, 24 September 1959, Article 149, p. 172, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/738278?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.07.2024).

¹²⁹⁸ United Nations General Assembly, **Eighth Session Official Records: 443rd Plenary Meeting**, New York : United Nations, 24 September 1953, Article 10, p. 116, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/728766?v=pdf> (accessed 05.04.2024); United Nations General Assembly, **Eighteenth Session Official Records: 1222nd Plenary Meeting**, New York : United Nations, 01 October 1963, Article 128-132, pp. 12-13, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/731777?v=pdf&ln=en> (accessed 05.04.2024).

¹²⁹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, **Twenty-Fifth Session Official Records: 1881st Plenary Meeting**, New York : United Nations, 23 October 1970, Article 3, p. 1, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/539996?ln=en&v=pdf> (accessed 05.04.2024).

¹³⁰⁰ Iver B. Neumann, and Benjamin de Carvalho, "Introduction: Small States and Status", in Benjamin de Carvalho, and Iver B. Neumann (Eds.), **Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing**, London and New York : Routledge, 2015, p. 7.

¹³⁰¹ For example, see: Marshall R. Singer, **Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships**, New York : Free Press, 1972.; Michael I. Handel, **Weak States in the**

characteristics of small states do not necessarily entail the absence of power. As emphasized, Norway's peace diplomacy has also been a form of soft power. Being small states has also been linked to interactions between peace research and practice, which was touched upon in the introduction of this chapter.

According to *Kristian Stokke* and *Elin Sæther*, Nordic geography can be read in relation to “(...) the specific geopolitical experience or tradition of a ‘small-state’”.¹³⁰² Being small states has been demonstrated when referring to the role of Norway in the Oslo peace process. Thereby, *Hilde Henriksen Waage* emphasized both secret diplomacy and the disproportionality between the size of Norway, and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the achievement of the Oslo Agreement.¹³⁰³ Being small states did not prevent Sweden and Norway in engaging with this protracted conflict with systemic effects. Rather, it fostered their acceptability, with a sense of trust.

According to *Jean-Marc Rickli*, the definitions about small states can be classified in terms of realist, neoliberal, constructivist and relational approaches. While there have also been rejections in evaluating small states as a conceptual tool of analysis, a relational approach offered a dynamic orientation while analyzing the term smallness with regard to the relational perspective of power. *Rickli* contends to support this dynamic orientation, which demonstrates relativity and contextualism.¹³⁰⁴

It can be contended that the relational approach as adopted by *Rickli* is compatible with vertical approaches to weak states. In that sense, *Handel* classifies methodological approaches towards the weak states in terms of horizontal and vertical amidst the risks. Horizontal approaches attempted to provide general theories for the weak states. Vertical approaches, on the other hand, attempted to provide periodic, contextual, and actor-oriented limitations while looking into the foreign policy of one

International..., London and New York : Routledge, 1990.; But this approach can easily be problematized given the inadequacy of the tangible elements of power in engaging with the increased influence of small states. See: Robert L. Rothstein, **Alliances and Small Powers**, New York : Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 21.; Therefore, this Thesis followed the usages of small powers, or small states rather than weak states. Nevertheless, the term weak states was also included in order to be faithful to the usage in the original material benefited from and to understand the commonalities and divergences between the terms small state and weak state.

¹³⁰² Sami Moisio, “Introduction”, in Sami Moisio, Kristian Stokke, Elin Sæther, Henrik Gutzon Larsen, Richard Ek, Anders Lund Hansen, “Interventions in Nordic Political Geographies”, **Political Geography**, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2011, p. 241.

¹³⁰³ Waage, “Explaining Oslo Backchannel: Norway's...”, p. 598.; Being a small state also affected Norway's acceptability and confidence in the case of Palestine. See: Bercovitch, **Theory and Practice of International Mediation...**, p. 143.

¹³⁰⁴ Rickli, “European Small States' Military...”, pp. 308-309.

or a few weak states.¹³⁰⁵ Despite different approaches, it is clear that small states require a more nuanced approach towards IR. In this regard, the experiences of Nordic countries also affirm the reflections of this nuanced approach.

The traditional literature of IR has tended to obscure the differences between great powers and small powers. The negligence towards small powers was grounded in the utilization of tangible power factors in grading or ranking states. In comparison to great powers, the adjustments directed to small powers tended to build upon their differences in terms of size and degree rather than kind. The hierarchical and narrowed approach positioned small states at the lowest ranges. Exceptions to this negligence included the danger of a general war, which might require the addition of minor powers. As a result of this understanding, it was emphasized that small powers can be courted by the great powers.¹³⁰⁶ Despite restrictions related to this hierarchical and narrowed approach, the perils that stem from this approach require to improve diplomatic capabilities, to undertake leading roles in international and regional organizations, and to influence world politics. Nordic peace diplomacy signals the exercise of these requirements.

In addition to the negligence towards small states, or powers, there is no consensus on the definition of small state, and the term is poorly defined. According to *Maass*, the divisions regarding the definitions of small states can be approached through quantitative and qualitative criteria. Despite this approach, *Maass* actually favors the variety in the conceptualization and definition of small state. In this regard, the variety and flexibility can allow us to appreciate all kinds of small states in IR.¹³⁰⁷ As reflecting this variety, there have been different definitions in engaging with small states.¹³⁰⁸

From a historical perspective, the period between 1815 and 1914 provided opportunity for the rise of the status of small states. In relation to the alterations in the

¹³⁰⁵ Handel, **Weak States in the International...**, pp. 3-4.

¹³⁰⁶ Robert L. Rothstein, **Alliances and Small Powers**, New York : Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 2-3.

¹³⁰⁷ Matthias Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State", **International Politics**, Vol. 46, 1, 2009, pp. 65-66.

¹³⁰⁸ For notable examples regarding the definitions and depictions of small states, see: Baldacchino, and Wivel, "Small States: Concepts and...", pp. 3-7.; Baldur Thorhallsson, and Alyson J. K. Bailes, "Small State Diplomacy", in Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp (Eds.), **The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy**, London : SAGE Publications, 2016, pp. 296-297.; Jelena Radoman, "Small States in World Politics: State of the Art", **Journal of Regional Security**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, pp. 181-183.; Matthias Maass, **Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648-2016**, Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2017, pp. 18-44.; Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models", **World Politics**, Vol. 25, No. 4, Jul. 1973, pp. 556-560.; Rothstein, **Alliances and Small Powers**, pp. 21-30.

international system and intellectual realm, the position of small states was elevated. The power, presence, and influence of small states were enhanced, particularly after the First World War. With the emergence of the LoN, simple distinctions between great powers and small powers became enigmatic. The LoN provided an opportunity for the promotion of small states in terms of security, survival, influence, and international responsibility to some extent. In this process, some of the statesmen had the opportunity to raise their voices as well.¹³⁰⁹ It can be stated that Nordic countries also benefited from this political atmosphere.

The impacts of the First World War played an important role for small states, namely the weak states, according to *Handel*, in the international area. The end of the First World War was also an important turning point for the position and recognition of the weak states in the international system. The further improvement in the position of the weak states can be explained in relation to legal equality in the LoN and the decrease of great powers. However, the rise of revisionist powers in the 1930s challenged the security and survival of the weak states. The challenges and threats in the 1930s were evaluated as the lowest point in the security of weak states since the Napoleonic wars.¹³¹⁰

From a conceptual perspective, the size of states is important and relevant for the definitions and studies of small states.¹³¹¹ As expected, military factors have also been decisive for the classification of states. However, the clear distinction as adopted for the great and small powers has been obscured due to the developments related to military technology in the twentieth century. Therefore, it has become more challenging to define the elements of strength through the utilization of purely military factors. Accordingly, the link between tangible power and national purposes has also become obscure since a larger army, weapons, and economic factors might not assure the achievement of desired outcomes.¹³¹²

With that being said, the definition and identity of the great powers were not as self-evident as assumed even for the periods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hence, the literature regarding great powers is also ambiguous and contradictory. Following the Second World War, the distinction between great powers and others has become more blurred.¹³¹³ Both world wars thus affected mainstream understanding

¹³⁰⁹ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 15-17.

¹³¹⁰ Handel, *Weak States in the International...*, p. 5.

¹³¹¹ Maass, "Elusive Definition of the Small...", p. 70.

¹³¹² Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 18-20.

¹³¹³ Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power...*, pp. 10-11.

towards great and small powers. This is expected given the dynamic and responsive nature of states in the IR and such developments that cannot be explained through power politics-oriented lenses.

The following criteria have been proposed to classify and define great powers while demonstrating that these criteria are not statistic, and subject to often rapid and unexpected changes with regard to various conditions, developments, and perceptions.¹³¹⁴ The possession of nuclear weapons; armed forces; military expenditures; population size; area; Gross National Product (GNP); GNP per capita; steel production; energy production and consumption; energy consumption per capita; energy reserves; motor vehicle industry and production; pig iron; crude steel; ship production; and merchant marine have been evaluated as critical for the identification of great powers.¹³¹⁵

As emphasized, the end of the First World War and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires have been the first wave for the proliferation of small states.¹³¹⁶ *Jelena Radoman* also affirms that the twentieth century has been important for the proliferation of small states in world politics. The de-colonisation, secession wars, and the disintegration of former federal states were critical for the growing number of small states.¹³¹⁷ In response to these changes, conflict resolution and peace diplomacy have gained further importance.

Drawing from the literature, the approaches and criteria regarding the state size utilize quantifiable data while focusing on visible traits, which, according to *Maass*, may lead to a lack of appreciation for the complexity of small states.¹³¹⁸ A thorough review of small states is not our purpose. Rather, it is important to understand how a more nuanced approach towards the influence, power, and status can be effective in appreciating the complexity and prominent policies of small states, including neutrality and adherence to peace and security.

¹³¹⁴ Handel, **Weak States in the International...**, pp. 11-12.

¹³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-18.; For the compilation and interpretation of definitions about great powers, see: Levy, **War in the Modern Great Power...**, pp. 10-19.

¹³¹⁶ Baldur Thorhallsson, and Alyson J. K. Bailes, "Small State Diplomacy", in Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp (Eds.), **The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy**, London : SAGE Publications, 2016, p. 295.

¹³¹⁷ Jelena Radoman, "Small States in World Politics: State of the Art", **Journal of Regional Security**, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, p. 179.

¹³¹⁸ Maass, "Elusive Definition of the Small...", pp. 71-72.; Therefore, alternative factors have been formulated in terms of strength, power, and security. See: Maass, "Elusive Definition of the Small...", pp. 72-74.

In this context, the policy of neutrality has been important for the posture, peace, and security policies of some small states in world politics. Accordingly, This Thesis follows vertical approaches as capable of offering critical insights into the motivations and policies of small states. Therefore, peace mediation and facilitation can be framed as status-seeking strategies that can be utilized by small states, including the Nordic countries. Importantly, these strategies contribute to international status and influence while enhancing peace and security.

Regarding the link between peace and security policies and small states, the policy of neutrality has also been pursued in world politics. However, there were also cases that proved the policy of neutrality as invalid and unsound for the security of small states. As relevant with the scope of this Thesis, Finland, for example, could not avoid the aggression of the USSR. Sweden, on the other hand, maintained its neutrality and independence.¹³¹⁹ Nevertheless, Finland, described as a small state, managed to survive the period of 1939-1944 in contrast to Estonia and Latvia.¹³²⁰ Norway, as a member of NATO, has engaged in various conflicts and controversial issues through peace mediation and facilitation. Taken together, Nordic countries with different policies related to alliances and neutrality demonstrated notable achievements through these third-party practices.

The 1907 Hague Convention's definition of neutrality affected the security policies of armed neutral countries, including Finland and Sweden during the Cold War. Accordingly, the choice of neutrality indicates to abstain from war while not engaging in military alliances or collective defence agreements. The choice of the neutrality also indicates the need to problematize the connection between the obtainment of greater security and the participation in a defence alliance or a collective security organization. In this regard, the policy of neutrality compels neutral countries to autonomously defend themselves for the maintenance of their choice of neutrality and territorial integrity and a non-aggressive policy.¹³²¹ As a result, the neutrality of Finland and Sweden also affected the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries. The effects of this policy were particularly observable in the critical posture of Sweden and its bridge-maker role.

¹³¹⁹ Matthias Maass, **Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648-2016**, Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2017, p. 176.

¹³²⁰ Østergaard, "Geopolitics of Nordic Identity...", p. 69.

¹³²¹ Rickli, "European Small States' Military...", p. 311.

In addition to neutrality, small states have a particular interest in adhering to international laws, institutions, and norms. In this regard, small states are particularly vulnerable in a world characterized by conflicts.¹³²² This is why neutrality and adherence to international laws, institutions, and norms have also been linked to concerns over security. Also, *Handel* explains that the lack of strength of weak states does not indicate peacefulness, non-aggressiveness, and preference for the maintenance of the *status quo*.¹³²³ It can be a mistake to assign the offensive capabilities and aggression only to great or super-powers.¹³²⁴

As connected with the scope of this Thesis, status has also been one of the critical policies and motivations that affected small states suffering from status insecurity to an extent that great powers are not affected. It is argued that status has actually been more important for small powers compared to great powers. The achievement of status signals to be useful and recognizable by greater powers while being appreciated as a good power. Drawing from the insights of the English School, it can be concluded that status-seeking actions require taking responsibility in the matters of international order, peace, and security.¹³²⁵ This process is also linked to the expansion of their influence in world politics. Both status and influence-seeking behaviours are important sources not only for the recognition as a moral power but also for the development of a peaceful tradition.

As explained in the first part of the Thesis, status-seeking behaviours of Nordic countries have primarily been grounded in friendship. In relation to these behaviours, there have been different orientations regarding the utilization of peace mediation and facilitation among the Nordic countries. Outside the areas of foreign policies, geographical positions, converging/diverging strategies, and institutional memberships, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have primarily developed a mediation tradition compared to Denmark and Iceland.¹³²⁶ In this regard, the link between status-seeking behaviours and peace mediation and facilitation practices is not traceable for Denmark and Iceland.

¹³²² This argument has also been important in discussing the involvement of the Nordic peacekeeping forces in the Macedonia operation of the UN. See: Archer, "Conflict Prevention in Europe...", p. 376.

¹³²³ Handel, **Weak States in the International...**, pp. 37-38; After the Second World War, the Nordic countries also sought to maintain the *status quo*. von Bonsdorff, "Regional Cooperation of the Nordic...", p. 33.

¹³²⁴ Handel, **Weak States in the International...**, p. 39.

¹³²⁵ Neumann, and de Carvalho, "Introduction: Small States...", pp. 1-2.

¹³²⁶ Wallenstein, and Svensson, **Fredens Diplomater: Nordisk...**, p. 17.

Section III - Nordic cooperation and the framework of the Nordic security community

Some political communities, functioning as social groups, achieve to eliminate war and the expectation of its occurrence within their established boundaries. According to *Karl W. Deutsch* et al., a security community indicates the integration of a group of people, who are capable of providing an assurance that they will not engage with physical fights and settle their disputes accordingly. In this process, the term integration refers to the obtainment of a sense of community and institutions, as well as the implementation of strong and widespread practices that ensure peaceful interactions. Importantly, these expectations need to be durable and dependable. Also, the obtainment of a sense of community demonstrates a belief among the members of a group, which agrees to resolve common social problems through peaceful change rather than physical force.¹³²⁷

In this context, Nordic countries provide such assurance given their reputation and practices as obtained from peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes at internal and external levels. *Ole Waever* also explains how Scandinavia, or Norden, stands for the standard example of an uncontested security community. With that being said, *Waever* emphasizes that the Nordic identity could not have led to the emergence of the security community.¹³²⁸ Rather, the Nordic case demonstrates how there is no a priori in terms of a close connection between the security community and formal institutions, or self-conscious security efforts. For this reason, *Waever* argues, Scandinavia can probably be considered as an unintended peace.¹³²⁹ Nonetheless, there is a commonality between the reasons that accounted for the Nordic security community and Nordic peace diplomacy.

As explained, Nordic balance contributed to regional security and stability during the Cold War. Accordingly, the Nordic area was characterized by relatively low tensions. In this regard, Hans Mouritzen argues that the primary reasons for the Nordic balance were not Nordistic concerns over Finland's circumstances, but rather bilateral concerns about the USSR and resistance against hosting nuclear weapons. The

¹³²⁷ Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, **Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience**, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5.

¹³²⁸ Ole Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community", in Emanuel Adler, and Michael Barnett (Eds.), **Security Communities**, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 72-73.

¹³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

formation of a security community by the Nordic countries can be considered successful due to its persuasiveness in both practice and public-relations lenses. Taken together, Nordic balance, traditional Scandinavianism, the profile of Nordic countries at the UN and the Swedish led-Nordic model of society not only supported one another but also the Nordic security community and peacefulness. According to *Mouritzen*, it was actually Sweden as initiated the Nordic security community.¹³³⁰

Drawing from this comprehensive inference, Nordic balance, Nordic multilateralism and Nordic model, as underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy, also affected the Nordic security community and peaceful reputation of Nordic countries. In particular, *Deutsch et al.* illustrate the relationship between Norway and Sweden as an example of a pluralistic security community.¹³³¹ The pluralistic security community after 1907 continued even at the times in which Sweden was not balanced by the strength of Norway. Accordingly, Denmark and Sweden can be considered as one of the successful pluralistic security communities since the early twentieth century. This period can also stretch to the late nineteenth century. This assessment applies to the relationship between Denmark and Norway since the aforesaid time.¹³³² Hence, there is both a bilateral and a regional foundation for the Nordic security community.

According to *Wæver*, a powerful program oriented at securing peace among the Nordic countries was actually absent. As a result, the security community was created and consolidated by other aspirations of Nordic countries, as generated transactions, institutions, and community feelings. In this context, the security community can rather be described as a side-effect.¹³³³ By the same token, *Håkan Wiberg* also argues that the Nordic security community differs due to the strong role of ideology in forms of Scandinavianism, which subsequently appeared as Nordism, rather than military or economic cooperation as characterized other security communities.¹³³⁴ These statements acknowledge that there is a Nordic distinctiveness in the formation of the Nordic security community, albeit unintentionally or as a side-effect.

¹³³⁰ Hans Mouritzen, "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2001, pp. 297-299.; For the distinctiveness of Sweden compared to Denmark, Finland, and Norway, see: Mouritzen, "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea...", pp. 299-302.

¹³³¹ Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, Lee, Jr., Lichterman, Lindgren, Loewenheim, and Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic...*, pp. 6-7.

¹³³² *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

¹³³³ Wæver, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity...", pp. 76-77.

¹³³⁴ Håkan Wiberg, "The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future", in Bertel Heurlin, and Hans Mouritzen (Eds.), *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000*, Copenhagen : Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), 2000, p. 125.

From a historical perspective, both Denmark and Sweden have a long experience of statehood that dates back to their emergence as unified kingdoms. Norway was unified about a millennium ago or even earlier. The Danish Crown ruled Norway from the mid-fifteenth century to 1814. In this process, Sweden forced the Danish Crown to cede Norway and arranged a forced union by reversing Norway's declaration of independence. Norway gained its independence through a unilateral declaration in 1905. Sweden accepted the independence of Norway following negotiations and political gestures.¹³³⁵ That was one of the reflections of Nordic peace culture. In 1905, the amalgamated security community between Norway and Sweden failed.¹³³⁶ But this process did not result in turbulence and in the deterioration of the relationship between these countries.

Leading on from this, *Deutsch et al.* argue that Norway and Sweden developed a pluralistic security community since 1907. The relationships between Denmark-Sweden and Denmark-Norway have also been characterized by a pluralistic security community framework starting from the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. It is also argued that Britain-Norway, Britain-Denmark, and Britain-Sweden developed pluralistic security communities since the year of 1910. This period can also date back to earlier 1910. Drawing from various examples, *Deutsch et al.* reveal the chances of survival for pluralistic security communities have been higher compared to amalgamated security communities.¹³³⁷ Hence, concerns over security and stability also affected the Nordic security community.

As reflecting another interpretation, *Christopher S. Browning*, and *Pertti Joenniemi* argue that the development of the security community and the causes of Nordic peace differ from the mainstream explanations in the literature of the security community. Accordingly, the Nordic case and Nordic peace might be explained not in terms of the transcendence or replacement of differences, resulting from a considerable anxiety, but rather in terms of the reinterpretation of differences. This leads to plurality and tolerance between the Nordic countries.¹³³⁸ This process has also been affected by Nordic cooperation amidst the challenges. Nonetheless, the management of challenges

¹³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹³³⁶ Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, Lee, Jr., Lichterman, Lindgren, Loewenheim, and Van Wagenen, **Political Community and the North Atlantic...**, p. 30.

¹³³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

¹³³⁸ Christopher S. Browning, and Pertti Joenniemi, "From Fratricide to Security Community: Re-theorising Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2013, pp. 490-491.

related to differences in an innovative and peaceful manner underpinned Nordic peace, which also extends to Nordic cooperation and the Nordic security community.

Nils Ørvik explains that integration and cooperation-oriented Nordic efforts date back to the middle of the nineteenth century. In this regard, joint efforts and arrangements for organized cooperation focused on trade, defence, and politics, especially since the 1840s. Despite such efforts, *Ørvik* argues, Nordic countries could not be able to, or willing to, integrate as much as countries in continental Europe.¹³³⁹ Linking such explanations, one can contend that the embracement of differences and comparatively low level of integration can be effective for the development of plurality and tolerance in the Nordic context. The distinctiveness of Nordic countries is also grounded in the delicate presence of both differences and similarities, all of which have been approached by mutual understanding.

As reflecting this, it is argued that Nordic communality is the product of internal dialogical processes, which demonstrate kinships among the Nordic countries and is rather indifferent to the outside. There is also a more flexible behavior directed to national claims and matters. Therefore, it is not necessary to rely upon bordering or “othering” approaches for the Nordic countries.¹³⁴⁰ The aforesaid internal dialogue also accounts for informal and formal forms of Nordic cooperation, which was observable in the case of Palestine. Accordingly, the initiation of the Oslo Accords is also grounded in the cooperation between Sweden and Norway to an important extent.

From a historical perspective, the processes in which Norway had alternatives in terms of being united under the auspices of the Danish Crown or being divided due to Swedish rebellions or secessions between 1389 and 1523, and the recurrent wars that took place between Denmark and Sweden for three centuries were eventually followed by initial reconciliation. Following the year of 1814, a gradual process of cooperation affected the Nordic countries. This process resulted in the constitution of a security community, which, from the lenses of *Karl Deutsch*, indicates military violence as unthinkable in resolving conflicts in the Nordic context.¹³⁴¹ Hence, reconciliation and cooperation actually underpinned the crystallization of the Nordic security community. It can be argued that such constituting elements have been reverberated in the diplomatic capabilities of Nordic countries as well.

¹³³⁹ Nils Ørvik, “Nordic Cooperation and High Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter, 1974, pp. 61-62.

¹³⁴⁰ Browning, and Joenniemi, “From Fratricide to Security...”, p. 494.

¹³⁴¹ Wiberg, “Nordic Security Community: Past...”, p. 122.

With that being said, internal/external peaceful engagements and the sphere of Nordic peace diplomacy can also be linked to the development of security community framework and security policies, albeit the role of non-Nordic-oriented reasons. As an example of internal dimension, Norway and Sweden did not face any other critical quarrel following their separation as the abandonment of partial amalgamation. In this regard, the transition from an amalgamated security community to a pluralistic security community occurred with no bloodshed between these countries.¹³⁴² This peaceful transition is evidence of the Nordic culture of peaceful negotiations. External dimension has been exercised through peaceful third-party efforts, despite the marginal roles of Denmark and Iceland.

Taken together, the Nordic area has been characterized by a long track of non-wars, even in conflict situations. Relevant examples included the peaceful secession of Norway from Sweden; the solution of the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden through the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; the determination of *Svalbard's* status and its demilitarization through an international treaty as recognized Norway's sovereignty with the assurance directed to the exploitation of natural resources by all other signatories to treaty; the solution of sovereignty dispute between Denmark and Norway over an area in the Eastern Greenland through the Permanent Court of Arbitration; Iceland's independence from Denmark; the settlement of the Faroe Islands issue through compromise by home rule, and the arrival of home rule for Greenland in 1979.¹³⁴³

In addition, the framework of the security community also generated some challenges. In contrast to assumptions of the security communities framework of *Emmanuel Adler* and *Michael Barnett*, for example, it is argued that Norway ended up being involved in a war with Serbia. This was linked to being part of the security community of Western European and North American states.¹³⁴⁴ Hence, the security community was also approached as a reason for Norway's involvement in this war.

¹³⁴² Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, Lee, Jr., Lichterman, Lindgren, Loewenheim, and Van Wagenen, **Political Community and the North Atlantic...**, pp. 75-76.

¹³⁴³ Wiberg, "Nordic Security Community: Past...", pp. 122-123.

¹³⁴⁴ Morten Bøås, "Security Communities: Whose Security?", **Cooperation and Conflict**, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2000, p. 312.; For another study that critically scrutinize the foreign policies, approaches and encountered challenges of the Nordic countries in connection with the theoretical frameworks that have an explanatory power regarding the distinctiveness of the Nordic countries, see: Browning, "Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity...", pp. 27-51.

A close look into direct/indirect implications of Nordic identity reveals that Nordic countries were successful in establishing a reputation that is grounded in the capability regarding peaceful resolution of conflicts, peace culture, and peaceful transformation given their historical background, the leading role of Nordic practitioners and scholars, Nordic multilateralism, the reflections of being small states as indicating a trustworthy image in connection with the lack of colonial interests in retrospect, and of being an example of a security community. All of these demonstrate that there is a strong connection between the underlying explanations of Nordic peace diplomacy and Nordic identity. Following these, the concluding chapter will analyze this connection while bringing both enabling and jeopardizing factors together for the development of a peace and conflict resolution model through the contributions of Nordic countries.



CONCLUSION

In times of crises, suffering, and other types of violence, it is essential to explore comprehensive third-party mechanisms that can assist decision-makers in enhancing human conscience and dignity. Protracted social conflicts and controversial issues are inevitably linked to this investigation, as they test and challenge various third-party experiences and techniques. In this process, engaging with complex third-party involvements in cases that exemplify both failures and successes may be informative and enriching. Therefore, failures and successes, along with issues inherent in protracted peace processes that have exacerbated damage, must be scrutinized to facilitate more profound endeavors in conflict resolution and transformation. Despite tragedies that engender pessimism and despair, addressing failures and challenges is essential for the resolution and transformation of many conflicts. The reason is that the lessons learned from failures can guide us in formulating innovative techniques.

The escalation of conflicts and controversial issues and the inadequate response of international society against injustices and deprivation of basic human needs remind us that world politics and the IR discipline are in need of a fundamental change. In order to take a role in the change, one cannot neglect approaches and formulas that stem from the fields of peace and conflict resolution. Accordingly, different approaches and formulas that have been utilized in various protracted cases need to be revisited. This is due to the encouragement of opportunities for the development of renewed models. This urgent need places responsibility on actors and large-groups, especially those who have been renowned for their significant contributions to the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Nordic countries, among these actors, warrant special attention for their peaceful engagements since they have been involved in many conflicts and controversial issues. Importantly, these engagements have influenced and shaped their national and large-group identity construction processes, and vice versa.

As observable, Nordic countries have generally been viewed as laudable and reliable actors with diplomatic competencies and third-party techniques. These competencies and techniques have been utilized in different contexts. In respect to the scope of this Thesis, the distinctive reputation of the Nordic countries stems from their

roles as peace mediators and facilitators in conflicts and controversial issues, the humanitarian and peaceful contributions of Nordic practitioners and scholars, the role of peace research centers and institutions, and the construction of a progressive Nordic identity at large. Concretely, Nordic countries have formed a special large-group in the international area. In this regard, the widely held perceptions towards the Nordic countries have been overwhelmingly optimistic. Importantly, this reputation has been a means of identity construction for Nordic countries. The construction and consolidation of this distinct identity, marked by peacefulness, has served as a source of motivation for their third-party initiatives.

The Nordic countries received numerous positive attributions and expectations, which were also part of their dynamic self-identification. These include humanitarianism, multilateralism, the Nordic balance, the Nordic brand related to altruistic and peaceful identity construction, the Nordic dimension of mediation, socio-political and economic reflections that stem from being small states and geographical position between the East and the West, the development of the Nordic model as a third way, and third-party efforts. These efforts, ranging from the Interwar to post-Cold War periods, have been illustrated in the general dataset of this Thesis. As a result, one can observe that there is a solid foundation for the development of a peaceful reputation of Nordic countries.

In this context, the reputation of Nordic countries for their effective third-party skills and peacefulness, both internally and externally, serves as the foundation for this Thesis. Following that, the objective has been directed to the improvement of the field of peace and conflict resolution through more comprehensive understanding of third-party roles of Nordic countries in forms of peace mediation and facilitation. With this in mind, the diplomatic abilities of the Nordic countries have been scrutinized by approaching Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, as a primary case-study, with the relevant experiences as small cases with a protracted nature. Thus, both the achievements and failures of Nordic countries have been analyzed and mapped with a focus on Nordic peace mediation and facilitation through the presentation of small cases. The acknowledgement for this analysis and mapping lies in the neglect of explaining and comparing both the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy.

In response to the need for the advancement of peace research and conflict resolution, this study has examined third-party experiences of the Nordic countries in

the phases of cases such as Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. Also, this study has indirectly contributed to enhancing Nordic identity, given its strong connection to Nordic peace diplomacy. Nordic identity has been linked to the dimensions and motivations of Nordic peace diplomacy, as well as the acceptability of Nordic countries in their third-party practices. In this context, the challenges and problems that stemmed from utilized techniques related to Nordic peace mediation and facilitation are related to both Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy. Taken together, these third-party practices, which can be approached as components of Nordic peace diplomacy, have generated failures in different conflicts and controversial issues, such as the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. There have been discussions about the disenchantment with Nordic peace diplomacy, as well as the marginal role of Denmark and Iceland in peace mediation and facilitation practices.

Within this connection, this Thesis has identified that peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries can be criticized with the utilization of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses to peace mediation and facilitation experiences. However, process-oriented emphasis on mediation and ownership by the warring parties in negotiations and peace processes, *inter alia*, has played an instrumental role in the construction and endurance of the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries. The foundation for the validity and soundness of the peaceful reputation of Nordic countries, which has also positively affected their third-party involvements and vice versa, cannot be neglected. However, more nuanced assessments are also required if we wish to contribute to the field of peace and conflict resolution through the reflections of Nordic peace diplomacy.

Nordic peace diplomacy, which consists of many instruments, has marked both positive and negative effects upon many protracted conflicts. But there has been an inadequate understanding regarding the third-party engagements of Nordic countries in peace brokering. Neglect and de-emphasis on the critical implications of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, along with a primarily process-oriented approach to mediation, have resulted in this inadequate understanding. In relation to the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries, much less attention has been directed to critical analysis. As a result of this problem too, one can find the support to focus on Nordic peace diplomacy for the development of a peace and conflict resolution model. There are compelling reasons to develop this model, drawing upon the benefits of Nordic peace diplomacy. Concerns about the limits and suitability of mediation and

facilitation for protracted social conflicts are one reason for this. Another reason is that there can be ambiguities in assessing the success of these third-party instruments due to the case- and context-specific considerations. As a result, this model is characterized by the prioritization of the underlying roots of conflicts and the integration of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches.

By taking Nordic peace mediation and facilitation practices as prominent components of Nordic peace diplomacy, an assessment of the overall effects of Nordic countries in the concentrated phases of protracted conflicts in Aceh, Cyprus, Palestine, and Sri Lanka reveals the following finding: There is a deeper potential for the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model through the dissemination of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation. However, issues have been identified through not only process but also outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses in peace mediation and facilitation. In order to develop a peace and conflict resolution model and to improve the maneuverability of Nordic peace diplomacy, both strengths and weaknesses obtained from diplomatic approaches and third-party techniques of Nordic countries need to be taken into consideration.

In spite of various contributions, the following challenges and problems restrict the distinctiveness of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation and peaceful large-group identity of Nordic countries: The reliance on the USA and the political structure in the international system undermines the credibility and distinguishability of the Nordic countries while simultaneously demonstrating a *status quo*-oriented approach to peace mediation and facilitation. The alterations in the alliances have the potential to disrupt the heritage resulting from the traits of Nordic balance and the Nordic model. There are also observed contradictions regarding process-oriented emphasis in response to the failures resulting from peaceful initiatives and pragmatic approaches. Adopting pragmatic approaches requires notable outcome-oriented contributions to support this choice, rather than emphasizing process-oriented contributions. This incompatibility was particularly observable in the case of Palestine. In this context, the intergroup characteristics and political psychological aspects of this conflict were also overlooked by Nordic peace diplomacy. There were inadequate considerations and mechanisms against the problems resulting from peace spoilers.

The failures related to conflict transformation-oriented lenses exemplify the inadequate adoption of a long-term approach to peaceful initiatives. Problems in differentiating human needs and interests among the warring parties were also

observable. Moreover, inadequate inclusion of outcome and transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation put process-oriented contributions at risk and led to protracted peace processes. Additionally, endorsement and participation in controversial military operations and missions, along with the increasing populism in the domestic political contexts, can jeopardize the culture for peaceful handling of conflicts and controversial issues and negotiations.

In particular, the performance of Nordic peace diplomacy was not effective in addressing the underlying roots of conflicts, which is necessary for the development of a resilient peace and conflict resolution model. In the case of Aceh, on the other hand, the underlying roots of this conflict were addressed, and Nordic peace mediation and facilitation were successful with regard to process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. Given the long-run indications of conflict transformation, the third-party role of Finland is not completely conducive for a complete assessment. Nevertheless, there were critical conflict transformation-oriented contributions, as exemplified by the development of common ground between the parties, constructive and normative changes, and follow-up efforts by CMI.

However, Nordic peace diplomacy could not be successful in addressing the underlying roots of conflicts in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka. Third-party efforts were not adequate in changing the protracted nature of these conflicts and in leading to positive peace. As a result, while there were notable process- and outcome-oriented successes, there were also critical failures and problems. The peaceful efforts of Sweden and Norway proved unsuccessful in resolving conflicts, let alone transforming them. Examination of the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka reveals incompatibilities with prevailing perceptions directed to Nordic countries. In the case of Palestine, distrust, the security dilemma, and problems related to peace spoilers, *inter alia*, could not be effectively managed. In the case of Sri Lanka, Norway's performance in peace mediation and facilitation was hindered by system maintenance and close relationships with the USA. Both the achievements and failures, along with the utilized techniques, have been illustrated in the particular dataset of this Thesis.

In this context, one can understand why negligence of conflict transformation can have detrimental effects in protracted cases. The term conflict transformation carries connotations with the Transcend approach, as coined and demonstrated by *Galtung*. Within this framework, peace mediators and facilitators must prioritize the creation of a reality that accommodates and transcends survival and identity-oriented

issues. Efforts to address and resolve underlying issues, along with further efforts directed towards human rights, peaceful co-existence, and social justice, establish the foundation for this accomplishment. In this process, inclusion of political psychological approaches is also a must for third-parties. However, the implementation of these approaches was inadequate, particularly in the cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

In the case of Cyprus, the functioning of PCC has been oriented at challenging negative attitudes and psychological boundaries between intergroups. Importantly, the Centre generated conflict transformation-oriented contributions through its dialogue facilitation-oriented initiatives and projects, albeit indirectly. Nevertheless, PCC experience is important since it resonates with interactions between process and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. This experience illustrates how dialogue facilitation and information dissemination roles can generate conflict transformation-oriented contributions and exercises. Of critical importance is that the Centre addresses protractedness in both conflict and peace processes, as it concentrates on a variety of conflict-related issues and proposed plans/solutions. Hence, Hence, the Centre's functioning and its grass-root approach also address protracted peace processes.

What makes the link between PCC and the Cyprus issue worthy of further examination is that the Centre aims to influence decision-makers and large-groups while transforming perspectives and narratives in the whole society. In this process, dialogue facilitation-oriented projects have played a consolidating role. Having said that, the Center's role in dialogue facilitation is necessary but not sufficient, as Turkish Cypriots face constraints on basic human needs related to various issues, such as recognition and structural violence, which cannot be undermined. Therefore, it is important to deepen the influence upon decision-makers while guiding large-groups in terms of awareness, knowledge, and peaceful coexistence.

Taken together, third-party involvement of the Nordic countries in the selected phases of Palestine and Sri Lanka failed to create favorable conditions for conflict resolution, nor could they accommodate and transcend survival and identity-based worldviews. This Thesis links such failures with inadequate addressing of the underlying roots of conflicts and incapacibilities in terms of the integration of process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. Also, this Thesis considers peace mediation and facilitation as part of political psychological mechanisms. However, the role of Nordic countries in selected

case phases reveals challenges and inadequacies in incorporating political psychological approaches. The cases of Palestine and Sri Lanka challenge not only peaceful third-party efforts but also the humanitarian abilities of the Nordic countries.

Despite their failures, Nordic countries continue to be considered suitable third parties in conflicts and controversial issues. This is clearly evident in the post-Cold War period-oriented general dataset of the Thesis. The reason for this can be traced back to the literature's process-oriented emphasis on mediation, the fundamentals of mediation, which reflect the parties' ownership and primary responsibility, and the implications of Nordic large-group identity. Also, there was a negligence for adequate addressing of the weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy.

This negligence stems from the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries, which are considered more suitable for third-party roles. This is reflected in the attitude of the warring parties towards the suggestions of *Martti Ahtisaari*; the reflections of Norway's peaceful image in strengthening the posture of PCC; *Arafat's* proposal for Norway's third-party role, and the contact as pursued by the LTTE with *Erik Solheim*. Therefore, these cases demonstrate a connection between Norway's peaceful reputation and its accessibility and acceptability in conflicts and controversial issues.

Also, it is important to note that this Thesis does not impose an end-thinking approach over a process-thinking approach by demonstrating the importance of outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses. Rather, this three-folded framework denotes mutual interactions that can guide decision-makers in utilizing approaches and techniques and in assessing the overall effects of peace mediation and facilitation. Therefore, decision-makers can mainstream such a comprehensive framework to assess third-party performances and overall effects, with the inclusion and exclusion of further indications. Importantly, there are no hierarchical and linear interactions between this three-folded model. This was clearly reflected in the case of Cyprus.

In addition, the preference for the term peace mediation over mediation has been oriented at emphasizing the ultimate goal of third-party practices and at encouraging a normative perspective. This preference was also important in improving restrictions imposed by a traditional understanding of mediation. As highlighted, one can learn not only from successes but also from failures. Drawing from the utilization of three-folded assessment directed to Nordic peace diplomacy, it has been observed that there have been both supportive and contradictory aspects in relation to the peaceful

reputation of Nordic countries that entails third-party capabilities as well. Taken together, both supportive and contradictory aspects lay the ground for Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.

However, the contradictory aspects have been neglected. As expected, problems result not only from peace mediators and facilitators but also from the warring parties. The necessity of the decisiveness of the warring parties does not indicate that techniques and approaches of peace mediators and facilitators are not directly relevant to the efficiency and successfulness of third-party practices. Therefore, learning from the achievements and failures of Nordic peace diplomacy can be effective in contributing to not only peace mediation and facilitation practices but also the evolution of Nordic identity.

Drawing from the third-party roles of the Nordic countries in the selected phases of cases, the contributions of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation can primarily be positioned into process- and outcome-oriented approaches. Having said that, there have been notable contributions in the context of conflict transformation-oriented approaches to peace mediation and facilitation. This is evident in the functioning of PCC. Accordingly, the completed projects of the PRIO Cyprus revealed how the Centre aimed to generate constructive and positive effects by directly or indirectly targeting the underlying roots of the conflict. With this in mind, more efforts are required for the position of the TRNC. Knowledge generation, dissemination, and discussion should also be attentive to different ideas and counter-ideas about the means of the resolution and settlement of this protracted conflict.

Taken together, the presentation of these cases challenges the optimistic perceptions of Nordic countries, even though these perceptions have a solid foundation. Additionally, these cases demonstrate the peaceful contributions and weaknesses of the Nordic countries. Therefore, we should address the failures and problems that arise from Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in order to channel this strong foundation into further contributions.

In this regard, the selection of different cases, as provided in the general dataset, can generate different outcomes towards the effects of the third-party roles of the Nordic countries. Selecting cases that have yielded successful contributions from the Nordic countries would confirm the widely held understanding of these countries. Additionally, adopting only process-oriented lenses would confirm the positive attributions directed towards the Nordic countries. Therefore, we should select cases

that capture both the strengths and weaknesses of Nordic peace diplomacy. We should also support the theoretical framework with outcome- and conflict transformation-oriented lenses.

It is also important to be attentive to the effects of dominant narratives and views, along with the external dynamics. In this regard, process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses allow us to enrich our cases and assessments. These cases served as both affirmative and contradictory reflections of the peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries. In this regard, it is affirmed that focusing solely on successes and process-oriented considerations, as they overlook the complexities, challenges, and opportunities for learning from mistakes, needs to be avoided. As a result, one must be careful in the selection of cases if the objective is aimed at providing a more nuanced understanding towards Nordic peace mediation and facilitation.

There have already been internal challenges to the endurance of Nordic large-group identities. For example, Denmark and Iceland's marginal role in these third-party initiatives has negatively impacted the distinctiveness of Nordic identity. In order to enhance the recognition and peaceful reputation of the Nordic countries through their diplomatic skills, negotiation capabilities, peace mediation and facilitation efforts, and their role as Nordic pioneers, it is crucial to address the insufficient initiatives of Denmark and Iceland, as members of the Nordic community. Otherwise, these challenges can threaten the validity and soundness of Nordic identity.

Protection and promotion of Nordic identity should encompass efforts to strengthen peaceful engagements of Denmark and Iceland. As a result, one can understand that the potential for the development of a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model links the advancement of Nordic peace diplomacy with Nordic cooperation in terms of peace mediation and facilitation practices and the inclusion of Denmark and Iceland. Strengthening the third-party capabilities of Denmark and Iceland is necessary to promote the relevance of Nordic identity. In this process, cooperation between Denmark and Norway can be deepened in terms of assistance to conflict-affected, failing, and failed states and the human security agenda. As a result of this cooperation, Denmark and Norway can play a stabilizing role that can be conducive to conflict resolution and transformation.

In essence, the development of a peace and conflict resolution model has primarily been grounded in the ability to address and tackle the underlying roots of

conflicts and to synthesize process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches. However, not only challenges and weaknesses as experienced in different cases but also pressures and problems surrounding the Nordic identity need to be addressed and ameliorated. To sum up, issues related to close relationships with the USA, engagement and presence in controversial military operations, inadequate third-party efforts of Denmark and Iceland, increasing populism, and Denmark's power politics orientations as observed in its peaceful contributions need to be addressed. The increasing populism jeopardizes the peace culture and progressive image of Nordic countries, along with Nordic communality.

As it is revealed in the general dataset of the Thesis, there is no quintessential emphasis on the practices of peace mediation and facilitation that stem from third-party roles and peaceful engagements of Denmark. This negligence poses a challenge to the competence and large-group identity of Nordic countries when it comes to peace mediation and facilitation-oriented diplomatic capabilities, which fall under the framework of Nordic peace diplomacy. Also, inadequate peace mediation and facilitation experience restricts deeper cooperation between Denmark and other Nordic countries in the context of peace diplomacy. This also holds true for Iceland, which plays an outsider role in the Nordic peace mediation and facilitation context. As a result, the development of a peace and conflict resolution model obtained from Nordic peace diplomacy becomes more challenging. This also jeopardizes Nordic cooperation in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

In addition, discussions focusing on the distinctiveness of the Nordic countries have gained momentum with the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO. Consequently, the focus has shifted to the effects of NATO membership, specifically the shift from peace diplomacy to security diplomacy. Given the tensions in the Atlanticist and pacifist images of Norway, the power politics orientations of Denmark, and peace research/security research schools in literature, it is critical to handle ambiguities and controversies, as they have the potential to negatively impact Nordic identity. Failure to handle these ambiguities and controversies can cause the prioritization of security and survival-oriented understanding at the expense of peaceful undertakings.

Importantly, Norway's loyalty to NATO did not prevent it from engaging in peace mediation and facilitation. The reason for the endurance and promotion of third-party activities finds support with the historical background of Norway. During the

Second World War, both Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany. Following that, the fear and trauma associated with occupation and major power rivalries led to deepened engagements and responsibilities not only in the field of peace and conflict resolution but also in defence against bloc confrontations. As a result, there were challenges that were contradictory with the peaceful posture and status of Norway in world politics, which have been prominent motivations behind peace diplomacy. Reinforcement of the link between foreign policy and third-party efforts has been oriented at tackling such challenges.

While Denmark plays a marginal role in third-party efforts, there is a significant gap in comparison to Norway's contributions. Failure to address this gap has already generated tensions regarding a coherent Nordic character grounded in peacefulness and humanitarian actions. Currently, the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden has added ambiguities and controversies to these tensions. With the increasing populism that deepens systemic effects, the relevance and peaceful implications of Nordic identity need to be restrengthened through the fields of peace research and conflict resolution. Also, this process should not result in the prioritization of national and regional defence at the expense of creative and innovative approaches in the context of peace mediation and facilitation.

The development of peace and conflict resolution model(s) through Nordic peace diplomacy is thus linked to efforts of the Nordic countries in balancing and managing uncertainties. Failure to integrate NATO membership of Finland and Sweden in such a way that does not jeopardize the achievements of Nordic identity related to peaceful involvements, let alone the promotion of inclusion of Denmark and Iceland into the widespread functioning of Nordic peace diplomacy, can generate harmful outcomes. As a result, there can be criticisms suggesting that the Nordic countries, as humanitarian, like-minded, peaceful, small, and tactful actors are not powerful against the international system. These criticisms can affect the approachability and credibility of Nordic countries adversely.

The adaptability of the Nordic identity to these new conditions will be linked to capabilities of the Nordic countries in responding to such criticisms, coupled with uncertainties. The form, motivations, and techniques of peace mediation and facilitation are linked to the identity of third-parties, among many other factors. Regarding the link between third-party practices and Nordic identity, these added challenges need to be addressed and managed in fulfilling the gap between the

potential of Nordic countries in developing a distinctive peace and conflict resolution model and actual results that stem from process, outcome, and conflict resolution-oriented lenses. Therefore, a coherent Nordic identity and the obtainment of security should be linked to efforts in the context of peace mediation and facilitation practices. Also, Denmark and Iceland should benefit from relevant third-party experiences of Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

In this process, interactions between Nordic identity and Nordic peace mediation and facilitation need to be consolidated in order to advance approaches and techniques in protracted cases. Also, cooperation with Denmark and Iceland needs to be promoted in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Nordic cooperation through third-party initiatives can be useful not only for the improvement of Nordic identity and Nordic peace diplomacy but also for burden-sharing among the Nordic countries. Sharing roles and responsibilities can be effective in synthesizing process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented approaches that require time and long-run commitments. Also, burden-sharing can be effective in preventing contradictions within Nordic identity and overlapping efforts in peaceful initiatives.

The reflections that stem from NATO membership of Finland and Sweden can intensify contradictions within the Nordic identity that has been constructed in terms of exceptionality with the tendency for the promotion of peaceful interactions and third-party efforts as demonstrated in the general dataset of the Thesis. Also, this process can be approached as an opportunity to rectify contradictions within the Nordic identity, through which improvement of Nordic peace diplomacy has a critical role. Unwavering trust in the alliance of NATO through physical and psychological considerations should not be carried out by the pursuit of dualistic and Machiavellian understanding towards world politics. Because of this understanding, peace research can be restricted to preliminary techniques that cannot be adequate to ensure negative peace, let alone positive peace.

Reinforcement of the link between Nordic identity and Nordic cooperation deserves further elaboration for future studies, which can also be approached through role theory. Nevertheless, this Thesis contends that addressing and tackling the aforesaid challenges and uncertainties can be effective in realizing the potential of the Nordic countries for the development of a peace and conflict resolution model. One can observe that identity construction of the Nordic countries was also marked by security concerns, efforts in differentiating themselves from Russia, and a third-way

approach towards world politics. This identity process was also reflected in peaceful third-party engagements and solidarity amidst the marginal role of Denmark and Iceland. Hence, challenges and problems are not recently emerged. But now, the endurance and promotion of Nordic peace diplomacy and its link to Nordic identity should not be neglected in the world reality.

Drawing from these remarks, it is important to be attentive to Nordic peace diplomacy that has been materialized through various third-party involvements, the reflections of Nordic identity, and approachment towards peace and conflict resolution in terms of a sort of Nordic-oriented values and vocations. The latest example is evident in the contributions of Nordic practitioners and scholars, along with the functioning of peace research institutes and centers. Taken together, the upshot is that the contributions, distinctiveness, as guidance, and creativity of the Nordic peace mediation and facilitation, and achievements remain to be restricted, disintegrated, and modest as long as the aforesaid challenges are not properly addressed.

These challenges restrict the contributions of the Nordic countries and lead to a complex pragmatism with inner contradictions. Therefore, it is important to understand these challenges in order to discuss the authenticity and relevance of Nordic peace mediation and facilitation in developing a model. Only then we undermine obstacles and problems behind the development of this distinctive model related to peace mediation and facilitation in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Despite the strong foundation for generic perceptions and statements directed to the Nordic countries, more nuanced approaches through process, outcome, and conflict transformation-oriented lenses can be important to provide more complete assessments and to improve authentic contributions of Nordic countries.

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