

OTTOMAN CORSAIRS IN THE CENTRAL
MEDITERRANEAN AND THE SLAVE
TRADE IN THE 16TH CENTURY

A Master's Thesis

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OTTOMAN CORSAIRS IN THE CENTRAL

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MEDITERRANEAN AND THE SLAVE TRADE IN

THE 16TH CENTURY

To my beloved family



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of
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by
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to analyze the Ottoman corsairs and their role in the slave trade in the 16th century Mediterranean, and it concentrates on the corsair activity around the central Mediterranean during Suleiman I's reign. The historiography chiefly emphasizes the corsairs as an apparatus, a war-machine of the Imperial Navy (Donanma-yı Hümâyûn) against the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, scholars have given their primary attention to the political rivalry between the Habsburg and the Ottoman households, and the corsair concept lacks a social and economic consideration. Therefore, this study predominantly reevaluates this approach by focusing on the Ottoman corsairs' social and economic aspects, such as the slave trade carried out for the Sublime Porte. The research investigates the Ottoman-Venetian disputes due to the corsair activities through archival documents. Southern Italy and Sicily, under Habsburg rule, were open to direct threats throughout the constant wars between Spain, France, and the Ottoman Empire, and many people were reduced to slavery and sold in slave markets. Although the corsair activity around the Iberian-peninsula and the North Africa have been examined, the Adriatic coast should need more recognition by the researchers.

Keywords: Corsairing, Mediterranean, Slavery, The Ottoman Empire, Hayreddin Barbarossa

ÖZET

ORTA AKDENİZ’DE OSMANLI KORSANLARI VE 16. YÜZYILDA KÖLE TİCARETİ

Karzek, Saim Anıl

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Özer Ergenç

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Bu tez, 16. yüzyıl Akdeniz’inde Osmanlı korsanlarını ve onların köle ticaretindeki yerini analiz etmekte ve I. Süleyman döneminde Orta Akdeniz’de gelişen korsan faaliyetlerine odaklanmaktadır. Tarih yazımı, korsanları esasen Habsburg İmparatorluğu’na karşı verilen mücadelede Donanma-yı Hümâyûn’a eklemlenmiş bir savaş makinesi olarak kabul etmiştir. Dahası, araştırmacılar Osmanlı ve Habsburg hanedanları arasındaki mücadeleyi politik açıdan değerlendirirken korsanlık kavramı araştırmaları sosyal ve ekonomik değerlendirmeden yoksun kalmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma ağırlıklı olarak Osmanlı Devleti için yürütülen köle ticareti bağlamında yeniden değerlendirmek üzere Osmanlı korsanlarını sosyal ve ekonomik yönlerden incelemektedir. Çalışmada korsan faaliyetlerinden kaynaklı Osmanlı-Venedik anlaşmazlıkları da arşiv belgeleriyle incelenmektedir. İtalyan sahilleri ve adaları dönem boyunca doğrudan tehditlere hedef olmuş ve bunun sonucu olarak da pek çok kişi köleleştirilerek köle pazarlarında satılmıştır. Her ne kadar İber yarımadası ve Kuzey Afrika sahillerindeki korsan faaliyetleri incelenmiş olsa da Adriyatik’teki korsan varlığı araştırmacıların daha fazla ilgisine muhtaçtır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Korsanlık, Akdeniz, Kölelik, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Barbaros Hayreddin

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CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives of the Thesis

In this thesis, the Ottoman corsairs in the central Mediterranean and their role in the slave trade in the 16th century will be examined. While the corsair literature put extensive emphasis on political aspects, as well as the notorious European converts on the Barbary shores such as John Ward and Siemen Danziger, there is little focus on the slavery aspect. The image of the Ottoman corsairs has been embedded into ‘plunders’, ‘warriors of the faith-gazis’, and these views are mostly built upon the captive reports enslaved in the Barbary Coast, and thus, further romanticized by the western scholars. Therefore, the idea that the corsair institution existed within the framework of slavery has been understudied, and the diversity of the corsair concept is poorly illuminated. Our hypothesis is that those engaged in corsairing in the central Mediterranean did not aim only for maritime raiding or attacking the coastal countries, especially the Habsburg Empire, and corsairing played an important role in establishing Ottoman dominance in the region. In addition, there is the concern of creating extra human resources through

slavery, which was an important trade activity of the period. Despite the valuable researches on corsairing, the studies analyzing this argument are scattered and very limited. Thus, a literature review is essential in order to apprehend the situation and understand the dynamics in this period.

1.2 Literature Review

The 16th century is the age when the Ottoman Empire established superiority in the Mediterranean. The Ottomans had only acquired a navy after annexing the Karesioğulları (positioned in western Anatolia) in 1345 and thus crossed into European soil. Although the Ottoman Empire was a nomadic empire, it had come to a level that could compete with the great maritime powers of the Mediterranean in a very short time. Bayezid II especially has improved the naval organization to compete against the Venetians in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the conquest of Greece was thus completed. The recruitment of the freebooters into the state service formed the backbone of the Ottoman naval force and thanks to seafarers like Piri Reis, the Ottomans obtained know-how in maritime technology. This knowledge reached its zenith when Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha entered Ottoman service during the reign of Süleyman the Lawgiver. With Hayreddin's initiatives, the Sublime Porte not only established superiority over its rivals in the Mediterranean but also acquired slaves as booty.

The Ottoman maritime history is a subject that has not received the attention it deserves within Ottoman historiography. In the 1930s, the first important work of Turkish historiography in the modern sense examining the Ottoman corsairs was published by Aziz Sami İlter.¹ Using Turkish archival materials, İlter explored: the origins of the Turkish presence in North Africa, the origin of the Barbarossa brothers, and how the Ottoman administration gained momentum in the region. Another reason why İlter's work is essential in corsair studies is that it is the first general objection to the sources frequently used in western literature. For instance, Stanley Lane-Poole's *Barbary Corsairs* mostly refers to Joseph Morgan's renowned work *A Complete History of Algiers*, published in 1731.² On the other hand, Morgan based his historical narrative mostly on Diego Haedo's *Topography*, a first-person narrative describing the everyday life of corsairs on the Barbary Coast. This was widely circulated amongst European scholars in the early-modern period, and thus perpetuated a romanticized version of corsair literature.³ Due to Haedo producing his work during his captivity in Algiers, it became very popular, and in fact, the image of the Ottoman corsairs in western literature was shaped around his work. However, Poole also referred to Kâtib Çelebi's *History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*,⁴ introducing the Turkish primary sources to the western literature and addressing the subject from a broader perspective. As a result, it can be

¹ Aziz Sami İlter, *Şimali Afrikada Türkler* (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1937).

² Stanley Lane-Poole and Kelley J D Jerrold, *The Barbary Corsairs*, 4th ed. (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1890); Joseph Morgan, *A Complete History of Algiers* (London: J. Bettenham, 1728).

³ Haëdo Diego de, *Histoire Des Rois D'Alger*, trans. Grammont Henri Delmas de, 1881.

⁴ Kâtib Çelebi, "Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfârî'l-Bihâr", ed. İdris Bostan, (Ankara: TÜBA, 2018).

said that Poole managed to produce the first western study that attempted to break this vicious circle and, augmented the corsair studies to a comprehensive level.

Later, Braudel extensively investigates the corsairs and the role of the environment within the framework of *longue durée* in his study *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*.⁵ Although Braudel did not consciously intend to contribute to corsair studies, he expanded it further by examining corsair activities from a geographical perspective and examining the rise of corsairing in the Mediterranean basin more like a geographer rather than a historian. Prior to his work, historiography approached corsairs from an individual perspective, which categorized the corsair literature between saints and vagabonds. This reductive categorization underestimated the structural and environmental aspects of corsairing. However, after he revealed the complicated functioning of the Mediterranean, corsairing could not be investigated without considering the factors that created it. For instance in the Mediterranean basin (a region ravaged by frequent famines), the negative image of corsairs supplying the ports due to their ships bypassing the political authorities and eliminating the complex merchant network, limits the investigation of them to a pure 'evil' narrative. On the other hand, Andrew Hess repeated Paul Wittek's 'gaza thesis'

⁵ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1-2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

and evaluated the Ottoman maritime history within a religious motive.⁶ He considered Hayreddin Pasha and his lieutenants as gazi warriors who spread Islam in North Africa and rescued the Moriscos from the Spanish inquisition. However, Soucek discussed the Ottoman maritime policy from a broader perspective.⁷ He concentrated on the maritime wars and argued that the Ottoman administration failed to grasp the value of the Mediterranean supremacy and could not make policies in this regard.

By the end of the 1960s, Tayyib Gökbilgin published the Ottoman documents he found in the Venetian archives and a significant threshold in Ottoman maritime history studies was crossed.⁸ Until then, Ottoman historians preoccupied themselves with the land system and the imperial organization. Therefore, Gökbilgin introduced the Italian archives to the Turkish researchers. Later, Salih Özbaran investigated the Portuguese archives and focused on the Turkish maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Ottoman-Portuguese rivalry on the seas.⁹ However, the Ottoman Imperial Arsenal and the organizational structure were examined by İdris Bostan in *The Ottoman Naval*

⁶ Andrew Hess, "The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier", (University of Chicago Press; 2010).

⁷ Svat Soucek, "Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700", (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2015).

⁸ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler", *Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, V-VIII (1971); M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Külliyyatında Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri", *Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, I (1993).

⁹ Özbaran Salih, *Ottoman Expansion toward the Indian Ocean in the 16th Century* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009).

*Organization: Imperial Arsenal in the 17th century.*¹⁰ Bostan not only focused on the naval organization but also explained the Ottoman naval technology, questioned the naval strategy that insisted on galleys rather than galleons, the sailing ships appeared in the Mediterranean waters in the second half of the 16th century. Furthermore he continued to investigate the Italian archives, as did Gökbilgin, and examined the corsairing in the Adriatic shores.¹¹

Turkish maritime historiography has started to receive the attention it deserves in the last twenty years. Young historians such as Volkan Dökmeci, Serdar Tabakoğlu, and Emrah Safa Gürkan produced comprehensive and important works on the history of Ottoman corsairs and the imperial navy. Dökmeci examined the corsairing and maritime activities during the reign of Bayezid II and Selim I, using Venetian archival materials.¹² Gürkan, on the other hand, evaluated the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the context of corsairs in his Master's Thesis.¹³ Later, he also focused on corsairs' role in the Ottoman Empire by examining several foreign archival documents.¹⁴ Finally, Tabakoğlu studied the Spanish-

¹⁰ Bostan İdris, *Osmanlı Bahriye teşkilâtı: XVII. yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire* (Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu, 1992).

¹¹ Bostan İdris, *Adriyatik'te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575-1620* (Timaş, 2009).

¹² Dökmeci Volkan, *Akdeniz'de Devletler Ve Korsanlar: Venedik Kaynaklarına Göre II. Bayezid Ve I. Selim Dönemlerinde Osmanlı Denizciliği Ve Korsanlık* (İstanbul: Babil Kitap, 2019).

¹³ Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Ottoman Corsairs in the Western Mediterranean and Their Place in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, 1505-1535", Bilkent University, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 2006.

¹⁴ Gürkan Emrah Safa, *Sultanın Korsanları: Osmanlı Akdeniz'inde Gaza, Yağma Ve Esaret, 1500-1700* (İstanbul: Kronik, 2018),

Ottoman rivalry and the naval battles in the 16th century.¹⁵ Although these studies are considered remarkable for Ottoman naval historiography, they should be evaluated within the scope of military history. Therefore, Joshua White's latest work is essential in understanding the legal boundaries of Ottoman corsairs and how these boundaries shaped the legal space of the Mediterranean.

The literature on corsairing and slavery do not go hand in hand. Slavery studies in the Mediterranean are lagging as studies on slavery are mainly focused on the Atlantic slave trade. Therefore, Salvatore Bono's research is quite remarkable as he has proven that it is not possible to separate the concept of corsairing from slavery and that these two aspects must always be handled together. Also, Friedman and Davis touched upon the same subject but from a different perspective.¹⁶ In a general context, both authors have concentrated on the Christian slaves and handled the issue as if the corsairs were exclusively members of Islamic faith. However, Bono's work is essential to understand how Muslim slaves were captured by Christian corsairs and what practices the captives were subjected to in Christian lands.¹⁷ The main difference here is that Bono does not deal with corsairs and slavery from a Eurocentric perspective. Instead, Bono's studies

¹⁵ Tabakoğlu Hüseyin Serdar, *Akdeniz'de Savaş: Osmanlı-İspanya Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019).

¹⁶ Ellen G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1987); Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke (Hampshire): Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

¹⁷ Salvatore Bono, *Yeniçağ İtalya'sında müslüman köleler = Schiavi Musulmani Nell'Italia Moderna*, trans. Parlak Betül (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003).

approached the relationship between corsairing and slavery on an individual basis and understated the state initiative. With this in mind, this thesis aims to fill the gap within the literature and demonstrates that the Ottomans supported and enlisted the corsair crew not only for military purposes but also for the slave trade as well.

1.3 Methodology and Sources

The main methods used in this study are "content analysis" and "comparative analysis" related to the sources and documents on slaves and corsairs, by extracting the data to construct the historical narrative of the period and alter this data into historical data through the inductive approach. The corsairing in the early-modern period provided important primary sources in explaining and understanding the Ottoman Empire and Mediterranean basin. These sources are either written by captives or written by clerks sponsored by government officials. In this study, Ottoman archival materials and chronicles written by Ottoman and European contemporaries were used. The records that been sent from government officials, foreign witnesses, and envoys were found in the Topkapı Palace Museum Archival Documents. These documents are also verifying some episodes mentioned in different chronicles. Hayreddin Barbarossa's semi-biographical work contains detailed information about the arrival of the Ottoman corsairs to North Africa and their ventures under Ottoman protection. The contemporary chroniclers (such as Lütfi Pasha, Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, and Matrakçı Nasuh) also

compiled their own histories and thus these sources are valuable for 16th-century Ottoman history research.



CHAPTER II (1505-1540):

CORSAIRS ASSEMBLE

2.1 First Impressions of the Ottoman Maritime Expansion

The Ottomans had seized Çimpe Castle in 1353 during Osman I's reign. Having established in 1302, the Ottomans crossed to the European territories for the first time and penetrated through the Balkan soils. This humble principality grew at the Byzantine doorstep within half a century, annexing Christian dominions little by little. Eventually, the Byzantines had lost wealthy towns to the Turks such as Bursa (1326), İznik (1331), and Edirne (1361). Due to capturing Gallipoli (1390) and reconstructing the Byzantine shipyard here by Bayezid I, the Ottomans seized a critical shipyard for the first time and thus they began to counteract against the Venetian and Genoese navies.¹⁸ After the Timurid invasion of Anatolia and a crucial defeat in Ankara in 1402, an interregnum lasted for fourteen years. Thus, Constantinople was relieved for fifty years. Although the political integrity of the Anatolia was inconsistent, the Ottoman state did not fracture

¹⁸ İdris Bostan, "İmparatorluk Donanmasına Doğru: Tersane-i Amire'nin Kuruluşu ve Denizlerde Açılım" in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, ed. İdris Bostan and Salih Özbaran (İstanbul, 2009), 121.

thanks to their *istimâlet* policy in the Balkans.¹⁹ Throughout the 14th century, the Ottomans conquered the Balkans and implemented the *timar* system to consolidate their presence. Defeating Crusader armies consecutively in Varna (1444) and Kosovo (1448), the Ottoman expansion was secured in the Balkans. In 1453, Sultan Mehmed II conquered Constantinople and the Ottomans captured the Eastern Roman Empire's last stronghold. During these campaigns, the contemporaries mentioned the Ottoman land forces respectfully but the Ottoman navy was not in the picture until the first Ottoman-Venetian War (1463-1479). During the siege of Constantinople, the Ottoman navy could not prevent a Genoese relief force from entering the Golden Horn, albeit their superior numbers. Even though Bayezid II (1481-1512) is highly criticized because he could not expand the land borders like his father, during his reign the corsairs such as Kemal Reis entered into the Sultan's service. However, the Ottomans became a significant power on both the land and sea during this time by taking a further step toward creating an Imperial Navy. This step was taken due to the conquering of Eastern Anatolia, the Levant, and Egypt as well as the building of the Tersâne-i Âmire (Imperial Arsenal) in Konstantiniyye by Sultan Selim I.

Meanwhile in the Eastern Mediterranean, Italian maritime states were trying to hold on to their precious colonies in the Levant, Aegean, and Black-Sea shores. Venice and

¹⁹ Halil İnalcık, "Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar", (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1987), 139-185.

Genoa were anxious about the Ottoman expansion because they did not want to lose their long-time privileges. The Byzantine Empire had been the most significant client of these states. From the beginning of the 9th century the Byzantines granted commercial charters and trade colonies, such as Galata, to the Italian merchants. During the 4th Crusade, Venetians had played the leading part in Constantinople's sacking by the Latins in 1204. The Latin Kingdom for fifty years had ruled the city, the Byzantine throne moved to Nicea and thus the Venetians had replaced other Italian republics. The Byzantines were only able to retake Constantinople in 1261 with the help of the Genoese. According to the agreement, the Emperor would confiscate the Venetian possessions, hire the Genoese navy and allow them to expand their colonies along the Black Sea shores.

Despite Venice and Genoa abusing these concessions from time to time, the trilateral relationship lasted until the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Rather than flourish due to the overdependency on commerce, the Byzantine economy had weakened. Throughout the 11th century the Empire was under attack from multiple fronts, and the Anatolian peninsula was lost to the Turkish principalities. Throughout the 11th century, the Empire came under attack from multiple fronts and eventually, the Anatolian peninsula was surrendered to the Turkish principalities. On the other hand, the rebellions in the Balkans led to significant grain production losses whereas the civil wars interrupted a strong counter-attack against external threats. Furthermore, Andronikos II had decided to dissolve the navy in 1285 after an agreement concluded with Venice. Thus, as the

Empire did not maintain a navy in the 14th century, the Byzantine naval defense and sea trade became dependent on Italian merchant vessels. As the struggle in trade dominance increased in the Mediterranean, the two merchant cities had come to blows to increase their shares, which was the case in the battle of Chioggia (1380).

Meanwhile, Turkish pirates, such as Umur Bey, had become notorious through their raidings around the Aegean coast. From the 13th century onwards, perpetual assaults of the pirates diminished the Byzantine and Italian trade posts and disrupted the sea trade, which caused concern amongst Genoese and Venetians. Later, Pope Clement VI formed an alliance against Umur Bey and a Christian navy defeated his army in Smyrna. Thus, for the first time, the Turkish gazis had experienced the Holy War at sea, which was a new concept for the steppe people.²⁰

The Ottoman-Venetian rivalry started in 1416 with the naval war under the command of Çalı Bey. In this struggle, the Ottomans had benefited from Genoese sailors, who started friendly relations during the reign of Orhan Bey.²¹ However, the Ottomans not only recruited non-Muslim sailors but also built ships inspired by the Venetians and Spaniards.²² Towards the end of the 15th century, the Genoese gradually retreated from the Eastern Mediterranean as the Turkish expansion grew, but the Venetians did not abandon their colonial posts. Therefore, it was inevitable that as the Levantine sea trade

²⁰ Andrew C. Hess, "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries, 1453–1525," *The American Historical Review*, 1970, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/75.7.1892>, 1898.

²¹ İdris Bostan, "*Osmanlılar ve Deniz*", (İstanbul: Küre, 2007), 5.

²² Bostan, "*Osmanlılar ve Deniz*", 9.

volume increased gradually, the Eastern Mediterranean states began to fight to preserve their shares. However, the first Ottoman-Venetian wars (1463-1479) unveiled that the Ottoman navy was far from being a naval power.²³ In the last years of his reign, Mehmed II sent an expeditionary force to Otranto, situated in the southern part of Italy. The Ottoman forces overran the defenses and Gedik Ahmed Pasha successfully established an Ottoman offensive post in the Kingdom of Naples in 1481. At the same time, the rest of the fleet was assisting the operations of the island of Rhodes. Even though these military campaigns were promising for the navy's future, the struggle for the throne of Şehzade Bayezid and Cem interrupted the Empire's ventures after Mehmed II's death.²⁴

Plagued by the fight for the throne, Bayezid II could not support the Italian campaign and worked on the reorganization of the *Donanma-yı Hümâyûn*, for he understood the need for a well-established fleet. Nevertheless, as Kissling indicates in his article, finding experienced personnel in the navy made it challenging to establish a competent fleet. Crew recruitment was largely possible with converts and even foreigners hired by rent.²⁵

²³ İdris Bostan, "II. Bayezid Döneminde Osmanlı Denizciliği", in *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, 111.

²⁴ Svat Soucek, "*Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700*", 29-30.

²⁵ H. J. Kissling, "II. Bayezid'in Deniz Politikası Üzerine Düşünceler: (1481-1512)", *Türk Kültürü*, VII/84, 895.

First of all, the Ottoman-Mameluke rivalry accentuated how inferior the Ottoman navy was against her foes. Consecutively defeated by the Mamelukes, the Ottomans appealed to the Venetians and asked for permission to use naval bases in Famagusta in order to supply their army from the sea around the Cilicia region. By doing this, the Ottoman navy could reach Syrian shores within a day and attack the Mamelukes from the rear. Unsurprisingly, this request was rejected because the Venetians had never wanted to jeopardize their trade with the Mamelukes.²⁶ For the most part, the navy was considered an auxiliary part of the land forces in ground wars as it was primarily used in amphibious operations (such as its use during the Otranto campaign). However, the Mameluke conflict demonstrated that the galley fleets could be used not only against the sea vessels but utilized against the land units.²⁷ Another reason for Bayezid's desire to dominate the Çukurova basin was that the rich timber resources in this region were necessary for the new navy to be built.²⁸

Second of all, without a powerful navy, the Ottoman sphere of influence was unlikely to be stretched towards the central and western Mediterranean. For instance, when the Nasrid rulers of Granada and Andalusian Muslims requested Ottoman support against the Spanish conquistadors as they were about to expel from the Iberian peninsula, only the corsairs were able to help the Muslim population escape from the Spanish Inquisition. That is to say, due to logistical incapacibilities and geographical distance, the

²⁶ Bostan, "II. Bayezid", 114.

²⁷ Bostan, 113-115.

²⁸ Kissling, 896-897.

Ottoman involvement in the western Mediterranean remained minimal until the establishment of the North African regencies (Cezâyir-i Garb Ocakları). Furthermore, the Ottomans gave priority to the security of the inner seas rather than jumping into the distant territories. In this sense, the Venetian bases scattered through the Morea peninsula's strategic positions evoked that the inner seas had to be protected first. Thus, the Ottomans prepared for their next conquest in the Peloponnese by increasing the imperial arsenal capacity and hiring expert skippers such as Kemal Reis. As Dökmeci affirms, Bayezid taking Kemal Reis under his aegis in 1495 is important because this was the first time a pirate enjoyed state protection in the Ottoman Empire. This preference foreshadowed the Sultan's maritime policy conducted throughout his reign.²⁹ This demonstrates how the corsairs had integrated into the Ottoman naval organization.

However, the Venetians abstained from engaging in a full-scale war with the Ottomans. Although the Venetians were superior to the Ottomans on the seas, the latter was unrivaled in terms of materials and manpower. The navy composed of 300 sails travelled to Inebahtı with two cog-type ships which sheds light on the progress of the imperial arsenal during the reign of Bayezid II.³⁰ Conquering Modon, Koron, Navarin, Inebahtı, and Midilli by 1501 consolidated the Ottoman supremacy in the Aegean and the

²⁹ Dökmeci Volkan, *"Akdeniz'de Devletler Ve Korsanlar"*, 239.

³⁰ Kâtib Çelebi, *"Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr"*, 96. This account is contradicted by Soucek, see. Svat, Soucek, *"Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography"*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2008), 185-186.

Peloponnese.³¹ After losing important trade colonies to the Turks, Venetians sought to establish a Holy League under the leadership of Pope Alexander VI with the King of France Louis XII and Ferdinand of Aragon. The initiative looked promising but it remained inconclusive. Therefore, both parties agreed that the extension of war would be hazardous for sea trade and concluded a peace treaty on December 14, 1502. However, the Ottomans managed to keep all the possessions they had seized. Plus, Venice was sentenced to pay an annual tribute, including 300.000 gold ducats as compensation.³² That was the first major Turkish naval victory against Venice. According to İdris Bostan, the naval policy conducted from the second half of the 15th century had laid the foundations of the Ottoman naval dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean: "It is possible to say the following about the results of the sea policies implemented by the Ottomans at the end of the 15th century: The Conqueror (Mehmed II) and Bayezid II era navies dislodged Genoese colonies from the Black Sea region. Also, it dealt a great blow to the Venetian and Genoese power in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean. At the end of these wars, the victorious Ottoman navy managed to transfer the traditional naval technology in the Mediterranean from its previous owners to their own sphere and started to show up in the struggle for domination in the Mediterranean".³³

³¹ Kâtib Çelebi, *"Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr"*, 100-102.

³² Soucek, *"Ottoman Maritime Wars"*, 36-37.

³³ Bostan, *"Osmanlılar ve Deniz"*, 9.

Nonetheless, the Ottomans had evicted the Venetian garrison from Greece, which enabled them to use excellent naval bases such as Modon, Navarin, and Inebahtı. The full-scale conquer of Greece contributed to the ability of the Ottomans to expand their influence over the Adriatic and Italy by challenging the Venetian sea trade and Habsburg possessions in Naples and Sicily. As a result, the role of gazi corsairs had increased within the Ottoman state. Kemal Reis and his comrades journeyed in the central and western Mediterranean. This led to them becoming acquainted with the situations of the region, and hence, this formed the logistical and technological basis for the future expeditions of Donanma-yı Hümâyûn.³⁴

Moreover "maritime gaza", which was a new concept for the Ottomans who relied upon its territorial expansion through land warfare, had been introduced by the corsairs to the Empire. As Soucek pointed out: "On the international scale, what seaborne trade, exploration and colonization were to Italian city-states and, increasingly, to the kingdoms of Atlantic Europe, maritime gaza was to the Ottoman Empire ... Turkish gazi-corsairs became a distinctive and indispensable component of Ottoman sea power ... the growth of the Ottoman maritime gaza was tantamount to providing the empire

³⁴ Svat Soucek, *Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), 10. For instance, Pîrî Reis, nephew of Kemâl Reis, had accompanied his uncle during which the voyages and compiled his observations into one of the most valuable navigation books of all time, *Kitâb-ı Bahriye* (Book of Navigation). Also, as was the case with voyage of Columbus to the Americas, the corsair expeditions can be evaluated as exploratory voyages sponsored by the Sultan. After all, the corsairs needed patronage in order to set sail.

with a splendid, permanent and self-supporting ... naval academy training officers and men”.³⁵

2.2 Gazi Corsairs and the Transformation of the Maritime Policy

When Vasco de Gama circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 in order to divert the spice trade route, the news had alarmed the beneficiary states such as Venetians, Mamelukes, and the Ottomans. The Portuguese not only deflected the spice trade from India, but also their navies had begun to enter the Red Sea and threaten the Holy Cities as they tried to establish trade colonies in specific ports. However, the Mamelukes fell short in intervening in these initiatives taken by the Christians since the Portuguese carrack proved its superiority over the galley fleet. Therefore, the Egyptian Sultan appealed to Bayezid II for help building a competitive navy. As a result, Kemal and Selman Reis were sent to Egypt and came under the service of the Mamelukes. Although the Turkish sailors fought hard against the Portuguese, they could not deter them from the Red Sea.³⁶

Meanwhile, Selim I had dethroned his father in 1512 and challenged the Shia-Safavid dynasty in eastern Anatolia. After defeating Shah Ismail in Çaldıran, he embarked on an

³⁵ Soucek, “Maritime Wars”, 33.

³⁶ Soucek, “Ottoman Maritime”, 41.

expedition against the Mamelukes the following year. Conquering Syria and Egypt in 1516-1517, he opened a gateway through the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean coasts. Moreover, now that Selim had become the servant of the two holy cities (hâdimü'l-Haremeyn), the Ottomans had to protect the holy sites against the Portuguese aggression. Fortunately, Selim's conquests indirectly fertilized the Turkish expansion toward the western Mediterranean. Within half a century, the corsairs who served under the Ottoman and Mameluke Sultans would have established Ottoman domination over the North African regions.

2.3 Reconquista and the Morisco Influx into North Africa

The unification of the Iberian-peninsula concluded in 1492 after the last stronghold of the Muslim state fall to the Catholic kings, Isabella and Ferdinand. After the reconquest, the Spanish tried to establish a unified Christian Kingdom by implementing a forced conversion or expulsion policy. Yet, the Morisco expulsion seemed problematic because of their economic importance and large quantities among the population. Therefore, the Muslim community was granted religious freedom on the contrary of the Jews since “isolated and immobilized in the middle of a solidly Christian population, it was believed the Muslims would soon come to the faith through the good works and

suitable preaching of the church”.³⁷ However, in Cervantes' words, the unhappy "nation of the Moriscos"³⁸ did not give up on their cultures, and thus the assimilation policy had failed. Therefore, the Spanish Church, especially Cardinal Ximenez de Cisneros, introduced the forced conversion policy to the Moriscos. This act caused a full-scale revolt, which was the first chain of many rebellions. However, the Spanish government defeated the rebels and the Muslim population in the Iberian-peninsula eventually vanished.³⁹

The size of the Morisco refugee community in North Africa had expanded with the Christianisation of Spain. From 1493, the Moriscos had already started to cross Gibraltar and settled on the North African towns. Consequently, the antecedents prepared the ground for waging a Holy War against the Spanish crown. The Morisco population consisted of: artisans, traders, farmers, skilled sailors. Due to these being the prominent trades of the Morisco population in North Africa, the experienced shipwrights had engaged in the shipbuilding business where the migrants rallied in large numbers.⁴⁰ Their nautical knowledge about the Iberian coast gave them an immense opportunity for ravaging the Spanish towns as pirates. Although the division between Europe and Africa aided the Spanish in defending the peninsula, this did not prevent the human transitions

³⁷ Andrew Hess, *"The Forgotten Frontier"*, 131.

³⁸ Emilio Sola, "The Corsairs in the Service of the Grand Turk: Men of the Frontier", in *Seapower, Technology and Trade*, 254.

³⁹ Andrew Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain", *The American Historical Review*, LXXIV/1, 3-4.

⁴⁰ Hess, "The Moriscos", 7.

because it was a transparent boundary.⁴¹ Moreover, the political instability in the Maghreb and the inflow of newcomers further amplified the existing social and economic problems. Meanwhile, the Barbarossa Brothers had left the Ottoman lands to ensure their security when their protector Şehzade Korkud lost the throne to Selim. As Hess indicated, this political vacuum had brought corsairs, amongst whom were Oruç and Hayreddin Barbarossa, to the western Mediterranean⁴² and led them to establish a corsair hub in there. Thus, their occupation combined with the vengeful community in the region had yielded suitable conditions for changing Mediterranean history.

2.4 Barbarossas Arriving at North Africa (1513)

Turkish sailors had already traveled and acquainted with the North African region before.⁴³ It may well have been this acquaintance that catalyzed the venture of the Barbarossa brothers in the North African shores. However, before this discussion it is first necessary to examine a piece of background information about the brothers to

⁴¹ Hess, 7.

⁴² Hess, 8.

⁴³ Svat Soucek, "The Rise of the Barbarossas", in *Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography*, 78. Kemal Reis, for example, was hunting down Christian ships across Corsica and Sardinia, clashing with the Spanish navy along western Italy, and embracing by the Tunisian Sultan, for he returned with booty and prizes. However, he was also embraced by Bayezid II, for he reduced Italian nobles to slavery and brought them to the Sublime Porte. See the petition from governor of Bosna to Sultan Bayezid II: Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı [TS.MA.e]*, No: 6082/1.

investigate their origins and early years under the aegis of Şehzade Korkud as petty corsairs.

Born in Lesbos as the son of a sipahi and a Greek widow, the exact date of birth of the brothers is still unknown. Their father, Yakub, settled on the island during Mehmed II's reign. The name Barbarossa was first used for Oruç Reis, but after his death Hayreddin took that title. Although the standard agreement that the name means "Red Beard" (Barba Rossa), it might also be derived from "Baba Oruç".⁴⁴ The brothers were natives of an Aegean island and, because of this, they mainly occupied sea trade under the sponsorship of Şehzade Korkud.⁴⁵

However, there are speculations about the intentions of their venture in North Africa.⁴⁶ Although the popular view had portrayed them within a gazi framework, this view cannot go beyond a copy of Paul Wittek's famous "gazi thesis".⁴⁷ In *Gazavat*, Hayreddin Pasha's semi-biographical work written by Seyyid Murâdî, he explicitly states that the Barbarossa brothers arrived on North African shores because they were escaping from Selim I, who overtook Şehzade Korkud in the throne succession rather

⁴⁴ Gürkan, "Ottoman Corsairs in the Western Mediterranean and Their Place in the Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry (1505-1535)."

⁴⁵ Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Barbary Corsairs*, 36-39. İlder states that this is more plausible. Aziz Samih İlder, *Şimali Afrikada Türkler*, 71.

⁴⁶ Murphey, Rhoads. "Seyyid Muradî's Prose Biography of Hizir İbn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa: Ottoman Folk Narrative as an Under-Exploited Source for Historical Reconstruction." *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 54, no. 4 (2001): 519-32. Accessed May 11, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23658320>.

⁴⁷ Paul Wittek, "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire: Studies in the History of Turkey, Thirteenth–Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. Colin Heywood (Routledge, 2012), pp. 31-69.

than launching a jihad against the Spanish infidels.⁴⁸ Following his brother's advice, Oruç Reis left the Aegean for Alexandria and wintered there before heading towards the Tunisian shores. Since Selim was pursuing Korkud, sailing around the Aegean Sea was not secure.⁴⁹ The question raised then is: 'why did they not sail to Tunis before wintering at Alexandria?'. First of all, they potentially were waiting until Korkud's next move and thinking about how to act upon this, since the throne struggle had continued until 1514.⁵⁰ Secondly, Egypt was a haven for Turkish corsairs, and in fact, Oruç had previously served in Mameluke navy through Korkud's connections.⁵¹ He may have sought protection under the Mamelukes, but the war with the Ottomans may have caused him to reevaluate this policy and eventually brought him to Tunis. Therefore, Oruç left Alexandria prior to the Ottoman invasion of Egypt and appeared in Tunis, embarking on raidings under the aegis of the Hafsid Sultan Abu Abdullah Muhammed V.⁵²

⁴⁸ "... Sultân Selim Hân 'aleyhi-r-rahmet ve-l-gufran hazretleri tahta cûlûs eylemiş ve karındaşı Sultân Korkud ile hasm olmağın Sultân Korkuddur dahî ziyâde korkuya düşüb firâr eylemiş. Bu kerre Oruç Re'is bu ahvâl için vâfir ıztırâba düşdi. Ve büyük karındaşı İshâk ve Hayreddin Re'is eytdiler: 'Var imdi karındaşı Oruç Re'is şimdiki hâlde buralarda turmak sana gore 'ayn-ı hatadur, var bu kışı İskenderiyyede kışla, bakalım ne olur ne olmaz. Ana gore biz seni yine habersiz komayuz, zîrâ kim bilür bu tekne Sultân Korkudun imiş deyü tekneyi ve kazandığını elinden alurlar da dahî kazanacağına bile kefil isterler' didiler" Seyyid Murâdî and Mustafa Yıldız, *Gazavât-ı Hayreddîn Paşa (MS 2639 Universitätsbibliothek Istanbul)* ; *Kommentierte Edition Mit Deutscher Zusammenfassung* (Aachen: Shaker, 1993), 58.

⁴⁹ Murâdî, "Gazavat", 60.

⁵⁰ Korkud was strangled in 13th March 1513.

⁵¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "II. Bayezid Oğullarından Sultan Korkud", *Belleten* XXX (1966), 549-558. Murâdî also states that Oruç Reis entered the Mamluk service on the eve of the annexation of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517. Murâdî, 58-59.

⁵² Murphey, 522.

According to Lane-Poole, Oruç Reis arrived on the Barbary Coast around 1504,⁵³ but his arrival on the North African shores should be right after Selim I's accession around the spring of 1513.⁵⁴ Later, Hayreddin joined his brother due to Sultan Selim's ongoing persecution against Korkud supporters.⁵⁵ Arriving at the island of Djerba, Oruç began to search for a sponsor who would allow him to carry out corsair activities. Presenting their gifts to the Tunisian Sultan Muhammed V, Oruç was authorized to use the country's ports, and thus he acquired a corsair license. As a custom, he had to share one-eighth of the booty with the sultan and pay the port fee of two percent.⁵⁶ However, it may well have been that the ruler of Tunis was quite impressed by the corsairs' success and offered them a lower tax rate. Therefore La Goletta (Halkulvad) then became the headquarters of the Barbarossa brothers in their quest against the infidels. Muhammed had granted them a corsair nest and protection from any prosecution from the Ottoman realm. Hence, having secured themselves, they were able to accelerate their movement around the Italian shores, plundering the Christian vessels across Sardinia and Corsica. Indeed, Oruç did not fall short of the mark and earned a reputation by plundering two-royal galleys belonging to the Pope and rowing them back to La Goletta.⁵⁷ When Hayreddin entered the port, where the food shortage was at an extreme, they distributed

⁵³ Stanley Lane-Poole, *"The Barbary Corsairs"*, 32.

⁵⁴ Svat Soucek, see. *"The rise of the Barbarossas"*, 67-78. Aziz Samih İlter also brought the matter to the table, but Soucek speculated further on the issue by analyzing and comparing the western resources with the Turkish resources. See Aziz Samih İlter, *"Şimali Afrikada Türkler"*, 70.

⁵⁵ Soucek, *"The Rise of the Barbarossas"*, 74.

⁵⁶ Murâdî, 61. According to Islamic Law (Khums), the common share should be one-fifth of the acquired booty. The tax rate generally differed at the ruler's initiative between one-fifth and one-eighth. See Gürkan Emrah Safa, *"Sultanın Korsanları"*, 407.

⁵⁷ Lane-Poole, *"Barbary"*, 35.

half of the seized wheat to the poor out of charity. In this episode, the Barbarossas and their corsair comrades were portrayed as saviors who saved the poor from hunger.⁵⁸

On the other hand, during their first years under the Hafsid patronage, Oruç and Hayreddin worked in accordance with the gaza spirit by attacking Christian vessels as well as fighting against the Spanish presidios along the North African coast. Presidios were strategic garrison posts established in an attempt to control the Maghrib coast while leaving the interior to local chieftains. Even though the Spaniards had secured themselves in key positions such as Oran and Bougie, the presidios were excessively dependent on the mainland because they could not supply ammunition or food from the hinterland. Moreover, the presence of Spanish troops disturbed the Muslims within the region and inflamed the gaza spirit, more people supported the Muslim corsairs since the local rulers were unable to fight back against the infidels.⁵⁹ Therefore, Oruç had the opportunity to enlarge his influence in Tunis after the expelled ruler of Bougie demanded support for his restoration.⁶⁰ The operation had failed, however, and a cannonball took Oruç's arm off. On the way back to Goletta, the corsairs ambushed a Genoese galleot laden with prizes. This act provoked the Genoese Senate and they sent Admiral Andrea Doria, who would be the arch-rival of Hayreddin Reis in the future. Doria sacked the castle of La Goletta and took many of Hayreddin's vessels with him to

⁵⁸ “Ve ol buğdayun nısfını tekneler için beksimetlik alakoydılar ve nısfını fakîr fukaraya tasadduk eylediler. Şöyle ki Tunusun fakîr fukarâsı ‘Allâh yansurakum yâ mucâhidîn!’ deyü alkış idüb ‘Allâh Te’âlâ bu gâzîleri rahmet gönderdi. Kudûm-ı mübârekelerinde beledimüze bereket hâsıl oldı’ dirler idi.” Murâdî, 63.

⁵⁹ Jamil Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, 1975), 162.

⁶⁰ Abun-Nasr, “A History of the Maghrib”, 163.

Genoa.⁶¹ Following this Hayreddin moved his operations to Djidjelli, where he spent his time building new ships.⁶²

Meanwhile, Hayreddin made his first diplomatic contact with Sultan Selim I by despatching Pîrî Reis with valuable items to Istanbul.⁶³ It should be noted that Hayreddin had appealed to the Sultan when he was in dire straits, as Murphey underlined.⁶⁴ Up until then, the brothers had never turned towards the Ottomans, worrying that the Sultan might still be upset about their political views in the past. Nevertheless, Selim putting away the past, had welcomed this sign of obedience. Furthermore, the Sultan had furnished two firkates⁶⁵ for Hayreddin and Oruç and sent the envoy back to Tunis with all his blessings and precious gifts.⁶⁶ The second siege of Bougie should have occurred around 1514.⁶⁷ The Arab tribe sheiks, who lived in the castle, requested assistance from the corsairs to capture Bougie because they were living under Spanish oppression and could not practice Islam freely. This was a call for Holy

⁶¹ Lane-Poole, 43.

⁶² Lane-Poole, 44.

⁶³ Pîrî Reis was also mentioned as Muhiyiddîn Reis in different resources.

⁶⁴ Murphey, 522.

⁶⁵ Although Seyyid Murâdî mentioned the ships as “firkata”, they should be big galleys (başarda) from his descriptions, see. İdris Bostan, “Osmanlılar ve Deniz: Deniz Politikaları, Teşkilat, Gemiler”, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2007), 108.

⁶⁶ “Benüm lâlâlarum re’îsü-l-mücâhidînler, husrev-i pâdişâhâneme gönderilen hedâyâ u peşkeşlerinüz gelüb vusûl olub makbûle geçdi, berekât-ı Halîl birle Hak celle ve ‘âlâ sizleri her hâlde a’dâlarınıza mansûr eylesün!”, Murâdî, 78.

⁶⁷ There are contradictions about the exact date of the siege. Lane-Poole claims that the first attempt occurred in 1512 while the Barbarossa brothers did not arrive North Africa before 1513, see. Lane-Poole, 40-44. It may well have been that there is a short time period between the first and second Bougie campaigns.

War.⁶⁸ In the first phase, the siege continued successfully but the Spanish garrison within the inner castle maintained its resistance and repulsed the attackers. As the gunpowder reserves thinned day by day, the corsairs asked for gunpowder from the Hafsid sultan. However, the help never arrived. Therefore, the corsairs had withdrawn from Bougie because the desertion rates became intolerable and a relief force despatched from Spain had arrived before the town. The siege of Bougie was a notable failure which resulted in Hayreddin setting "fire to his ships that they might not fall into the hands of the Spaniards".⁶⁹

However, it seems that Muhammed was displeased by Sultan Selim's open support to the corsairs under his patronage. Hess also supports this view and adds that the aggressive policy conducted by Sultan Selim against the Mamelukes created unrest between the Islamic states, so Muhammed may have opposed Selim fearing that the next target would be his realm.⁷⁰ In fact, Selim had not intended to expand his borders towards the western Mediterranean. Conquest of Egypt and Syria had already given strategic positions to the Ottomans to curb the Portuguese ambitions in the Indian Ocean

⁶⁸ "... bu denl  cevr   cef ların  ek b       nam z kılma a ve evl dlarımıza Kur' n ta'l m itme e bir ve hile k dir deg ller z, yiraltında k stebek gibi birbirler m zi g zederek mahf  nam z kılaruz, hem n h lim z bir erhamu-r-r him ne kalmı dır. Y  ne var el-hamdu li-ll h kud m-ı m b reklerin z te rifatıyla gel b buraların isl m n r le m  erref eylesen z olmaz mı?" Mur d , 78-79.

⁶⁹ Lane-Poole, 44.

⁷⁰ Hess, 63.

and protect the two Holy cities.⁷¹ Sultan Selim had succeeded in restoring the Indian Ocean trade, which the Portuguese deflected in the late 15th century.⁷²

However, the main threat to Muhammed would not come from the Ottoman Sultan but the corsairs, especially Oruç. When the corsairs had taken shelter in Djijelli port positioned 60 miles east of Bougie⁷³, Oruç and Hayreddin had begun to carry out plunder missions independent from the Hafsid patronage. To consolidate their position, they had always maintained good relations with the local people and supplied the ports with food,⁷⁴ which was crucial task in the Mediterranean basin where the cities are mostly suffering famine due to uneven precipitations. Thus, Morgan particularly underlines the affection shown to the corsairs by the local people.⁷⁵ The political vacuum within the region had created such a suitable environment for the advent of Barbarossa brothers that their reputation rapidly spread across the Mediterranean. Therefore, they were invited to Algiers, where the Andalusian immigrants constituted a significant portion of the population.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Svat Soucek, "The Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf", in *Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography*, 86.

⁷² Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 33. See also, Murphey, "Seyyid Muradî", 525.

⁷³ Piri Reis vividly portrayed Bougie and Djijelli in his Book of Navigation. see. Reis Pirî, *Kitab-ı Bahriye*, ed. Arı Bülent (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı, 2002), 480-482. He stated that the distance between two ports as 80 miles, however it should be 60 miles, see. Kâtib Çelebi, "Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr", 108.

⁷⁴ Lane-Poole, 44.

⁷⁵ Joseph Morgan, "A Complete History of Algiers", 231.

⁷⁶ Abun-Nasr, 163. It should be noted that both enterprises (Bougie and Algiers) were conducted through the appeals made by the residents, and their motivation was ejecting the Spanish presidios in the region.

The Spaniards heavily fortified an islet off the Algiers (Penon), and Oruç was requested to displace the infidels from their fortress. First, he captured Cherchell on the road, then moved to Algiers and blockaded the harbor. After twenty days of bombardment, the light cannons could not even make a scratch on the walls. Meanwhile Nicolao Quint, the presidio commander, had requested immediate assistance and complained that the ships could not provide the necessary supplies due to the blockade.⁷⁷ In fact, the Spaniards were already preparing a counter-attack against the Barbarossa brothers as their advance aroused concerns in Spain. Yet, the aid was interrupted by the uprisings in Malaga.⁷⁸ The events had increased the anxiety that the Sultan's fleet will arrive at the Spanish coasts to help the Moriscos.⁷⁹

The corsairs arrived in Algiers as guests, yet Oruç wanted to seize the power. He murdered Sheykh Salim al-Tumi, the political leader of the city who was flirting with the Spaniards and planning a plot against the Barbarossa brothers.⁸⁰ However, Salim's son Yahya, continued his father's policy and moved to Oran, where he was received by the captain-general Marquis De Comares. Yahya was already exchanging letters with the Spanish cardinal Ximenes and Diego de Vera after his father got killed by Oruç

⁷⁷ Muzaffer Arıkan and Paulino Toledo, *XIV.-XVI. yüzyıllarda Türk-İspanyol ilişkileri Ve Denizcilik Tarihimize İlgili İspanyol Belgeleri = Las Relaciones Turco-Españolas En Los Siglos XIV y XVI. Documentos Españoles Relativos a La Historia Naval Otomana* (Ankara: Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Karargah basımevi, 1995), 144.

⁷⁸ Arıkan and Toledo, 170. See also, David Coleman, "Before the Comuneros: Castilian and Genoese Traditions of 'Liberty' in the 1516 Málaga Rebellion," *Mediterranean Studies* 21, no. 1 (2013): pp. 1-26, <https://doi.org/10.5325/mediterraneanstu.21.1.0001>.

⁷⁹ Arıkan and Toledo, 182.

⁸⁰ Morgan, 240.

Barbarossa. The Spaniards had been looking for local support in their expedition against the corsairs, so they assured Yahya that his father's vengeance would be taken.⁸¹

Furthermore, the Spaniards not only intended to drive the corsairs out of Algiers but also mentioned a campaign against Djerba.⁸² In the light of these developments, Oruç had to strengthen his position by repairing the citadel and granting certain privileges to the citizens, such as exemption from tribute.⁸³

Eventually, the Spanish navy arrived in Algiers on September 30, 1516.⁸⁴ After a successful counter-attack, Oruç defeated the Spanish troops and took 2700 captives.⁸⁵ It should be noted that, albeit the Spanish effort to lure the local population to their side, they fought against the Spanish garrison. The strong opposition against the Spaniards proves how potent the Morisco population in the city was at that time.

After fending off the Spanish threat in Algiers, Oruç seized Tilemsen in 1518 without difficulty. He then divided his forces to send them back to Algiers, not knowing that it would be a vital mistake. In the meantime, as the kingdom of corsairs was steadily growing, the young Emperor Charles V was making preparations. Later, he dispatched his forces in Oran to stop Oruç once and for all.⁸⁶ After six months of siege, the Turkish garrison decided to leave the castle but they had been compromised and most of them

⁸¹ Arıkan and Toledo, 146.

⁸² Arıkan and Toledo, 175.

⁸³ Morgan, 240.

⁸⁴ Mouloud Gaid, *Türkler İdaresinde Cezayir*, trans. Faik Melek (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi, 1996), 23.

⁸⁵ Murâdî, 90.

⁸⁶ Lane-Poole, 51.

got killed, including Oruç and his brother İshak.⁸⁷ In the letter sent by the Emperor Charles V, the incident is described elaborately. According to the document, due to the great damage and casualties, Oruç and his men abandoned the castle so to not to be killed by the soldiers that surrounded them. Although the Gazavat portrayed a different picture, the Emperor's letter far outweighs the narrations.⁸⁸

While the Spaniards trapped Oruç in Tilemsen, Hayreddin did not abandon Algiers, fearing that the corsairs could also lose this critical bastion. Hayreddin, as a foreigner to the Maghrib lands, had acknowledged that he was weak against the Arabs and the Spaniards. Also, Hayreddin could not rely on the locals either, considering the fact that he was betrayed before. Although the Spanish garrisons were vulnerable without assistance from the Habsburg lands, the corsairs likewise could not hold on in Algiers without the Ottoman assistance. Being the beylerbey of Algiers, under the wings of Sultan Selim, who had become the servant of the two holy cities (hâdimü'l-Haremeyn), could render Hayreddin the legitimacy he needed in the eyes of the locals and provide men and ammunition to fight against the infidels. Thus, Hayreddin first mentioned his intention and he got support from the notables.⁸⁹ Later, he sent Hacı Hüseyin Agha as an envoy to Konstantiniyye and officially declared his submission by rendering 25

⁸⁷ Abun-Nasr, 164.

⁸⁸ Arıkan and Toledo, 185-187. According to Gazavat, the Spaniards offered a safe passage if the Turkish garrison abandon the castle. Oruç accepted these terms and left it for Algiers, yet, the Spaniards infringed the agreement and then killed the corsairs. Murâdî, 101.

⁸⁹ A letter dated 10 Zilkade 925 (3 November 1519) was sent by the notables of Algiers stating that Oruç Reis was killed and replaced by his brother, Hayreddin Reis, and that they are still loyal to the Sublime Porte. “ve hâliyân du’â-yı devâm-ı Devlet-i Pâdişâhîyeye müdâvemet eylediklerini îlâm eylemiş” Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı* [TS.MA.e], No. 6456/1.

Christian slaves as “*peşkeş*” unto the Ottoman sultan.⁹⁰ It should be noted that this act was performed to symbolize the commitment between the sovereign and the vassal in the Ottoman Empire, where in return, the ruler offers expensive gifts such as: a robe, a horse with a saddle, or a sword as a sign of delegation.⁹¹ Sultan Selim too offered a robe to Hacı Hüseyin Agha and a sword to Hayreddin. Thus, Hayreddin had become the Beylerbey of Algiers.⁹² Moreover, receiving a berat from the Sultan⁹³, Hayreddin could now enjoy certain privileges as a licensed Ottoman corsair, such as to sail without being harassed by the Venetian vessels, according to the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Venice.⁹⁴ More importantly, the Sultan had sent him 2.000 janissaries and permission to recruit volunteers from Anatolia.⁹⁵

The integration of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire coincided with the Ottoman expansion in the Middle East. When Sultan Selim left the throne to his son Şehzade Süleyman, the Ottoman Empire had secured the Indian spice trade and maintained a peaceful relationship with the Venetians. Hayreddin and Oruç Barbarossa, as individual entrepreneurs, extended the Ottoman realm into the central and western Mediterranean by fighting against the Spanish Habsburgs, keeping the Ottomans out of the war.

Reinforced by the Ottoman sultan, Hayreddin had rebounded from the loss of Tilemsen

⁹⁰ Murâdî, 114.

⁹¹ Halil İnalçık, “V. OTTOMAN ARCHIVAL MATERIALS ON MILLETS,” *From Empire to Republic*, 2010, pp. 91-104, <https://doi.org/10.31826/9781463230098-006>, 447.

⁹² Gaid, 27-28.

⁹³ “BERAT - TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi,” TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi, accessed April 2, 2021, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/berat--belge>.

⁹⁴ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “*Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler*”, 50.

⁹⁵ Abun-Nasr, 164.

and continued his expeditions against the Hafsids and Kabylia tribe. However, Hayrettin could not secure his position and decided to leave Algiers for Djerba. It should be underlined that the ill-disciplined behavior of the janissary corps also played a role in making this decision since they had inflamed the sense of hostility towards the corsairs.⁹⁶

2.5 Accession of Süleyman the Lawgiver and Hayreddin's Struggle (1520)

The incorporation of Algiers into the Ottoman Empire did not happen overnight as the Sublime Porte had to focus on its own agenda. Süleyman I had ascended to the throne in 1520. He concentrated on consolidating his power by conquering Belgrade in 1521, and demonstrated what policy the Ottomans would pursue in the future against the Habsburgs. The following year he set forth to Rhodes, which has been threatening the Konstantiniyye-Egypt trade route for a long time under the rule of St. John Knights.⁹⁷ Ottomans had previously besieged the island in 1480 but could not overwhelm the inner castle. However, within six months, the Ottomans had captured the entire island with a successful operation and consolidated their dominance in Eastern-Mediterranean.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Gaid, 30.

⁹⁷ İnalçık Halil, *Devlet-i 'Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 149.

⁹⁸ Mahmut Şakiroğlu, "Rodos Adası'nın Fethinden 1540 Tarihli Türk-Venedik Antlaşmasına," in *Başlangıcından XVII. yüzyılın Sonuna Kadar Türk Denizcilik Tarihi 1*, ed. İdris Bostan and Halil Sahillioğlu (İstanbul: Deniz Basım Müdürlüğü, 2009), 133-134..

On the other hand, Emperor Charles V laid upon a crushing defeat to French Emperor François I and took him as a prisoner in Pavia, 1525.⁹⁹ Later, François was released on the condition that he would abandon his ambitions in Italy. Seeking an ally against the Habsburgs, François applied to Sultan Süleyman. On behalf of his request, the Sultan had decided to launch an expedition on Hungary in 1526 and in the battle of Mohacs, the Ottomans destroyed the Hungarian army. Hence, Sultan Süleyman not only claimed the Hungarian crown but also claimed the Roman crown since King Louis was one of the heirs claiming the Holy-Roman Empire crown. Therefore, Süleyman had inherited the Roman crown by the sword.¹⁰⁰ Since Mehmed the Conqueror's time, the Ottoman sultans had already pointed out their desire of conquering Rome by symbolizing it as the Red Apple (Kızıl Elma).¹⁰¹ After the conquest of Konstantiniyye in 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror had called himself Kayzer-i Rûm (Ceasar of Rome) and that had been an epithet used by the Ottoman sultans since then.¹⁰²

As the Ottomans were busy dealing with the war in central Europe, Hayreddin could not receive further assistance from the Sultan to solidify his corsair kingdom and waited until 1525 to return to Algiers. Until that time, the corsairs, taking advantage of the war between the Habsburgs and France, engaged in large-scale plunders off the coast of Italy

⁹⁹ İnalçık, 151.

¹⁰⁰ İnalçık, 153.

¹⁰¹ İnalçık Halil, "State Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Süleymân," in *Süleymân The Second and His Time* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1993), 68.

¹⁰² İnalçık Halil, *İki Karanın Sultanı, İki Denizin Hakanı, Kâyser-i Rûm, Fâtih Sultan Mehmed Han*, ed. Tayfun Ulaş (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019), 214.

and Spain, expanding their fleet day by day.¹⁰³ It may well have been that Hayreddin Reis had found trust in himself to strike against the Algiers after he had captured Collo, Bona, and Constantine with Banu Abbas assistance. Meanwhile, he got acquainted with reliable allies during his exile in Djijelli, surrounded by talented sailors such as: Turgut, Salih, Aydın, and Sinan the Jew.¹⁰⁴ They helped Hayreddin build a "slave army" and provided oarsmen to row his galleys during the raids. Thus, when Hayreddin finally entered the gates of Algiers, he had immediately executed local chiefs who collaborated with the Spaniards.

Nevertheless, the Spanish garrison was still resisting in the Penon, threatening Hayreddin's political future within the region. Hayreddin had offered peaceful terms for surrender but, presumably, the Spaniards refused him since they expected a relief force. Eventually, they were ejected from the Penon after a successful attack of Hayreddin's army in 1529. When the Spanish relief fleet finally arrived before Algiers, it was already too late. Plus, the corsairs pursued the fleet on its way back and captured them with its two thousand men.¹⁰⁵ Hayreddin's first project following the conquest to establish a sheltered anchor point was to build "an earth platform to connect the town with the four rocky isles facing it".¹⁰⁶ Having secured his position, he could finally station his navy in

¹⁰³ Lane-Poole, 56.

¹⁰⁴ Lane-Poole, 56.

¹⁰⁵ Gaid, 32.

¹⁰⁶ Abun-Nasr, 164. Sosa also explains in detail the function of the structure, see. Antonio de Sosa, *Early Modern Dialogue with Islam: Antonio De Sosa's Topography of Algiers (1612)*, ed. María Antonia Garcés, trans. Diana de Armas Wilson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 104-105.

a protected harbor and plunder the Spanish coast. Furthermore, the corsairs not only ravaged the Christian towns but also initiated rescue missions transporting the Moriscos to North Africa from Andalusia.¹⁰⁷ In one of these operations, six imperial galleys were captured and a portion of the revenue obtained was sent to Sublime Porte.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, King François I had concluded the treaty of Cambrai (1529) with Emperor Charles V, which prompted the Spanish attention on the North African frontier once again. However, the Ottomans had not given up on their cause in Hungary. In 1529, Sultan Süleyman entered Hungary and appointed John Zapolya to the Hungarian throne. Although the Sultan advanced his armies westward and besieged Vienna, he had to retreat after a while since the campaign season had come to an end. Yet, Süleyman's policy based on squeezing the Habsburgs together with France on two fronts did not yield since François signed a peace treaty with the Habsburgs on his own.

Notwithstanding, the Ottoman armies continued their expeditions to Austria until the peace treaty of Constantinople (1533).¹⁰⁹

It may well have been that the Habsburgs, knowing that they were still superior to the Ottomans, were willing to open a new front in their struggle. Therefore Charles V had planned to eradicate the corsair bases, which were pillaging the Habsburg towns and enslaving the Christian population on behalf of the Ottoman sultan. The Spanish

¹⁰⁷ Hess, "The Forgotten Frontier", 68.

¹⁰⁸ Gaid, 33.

¹⁰⁹ İnalçık Halil, "Devlet-i 'Aliyye", 154-156.

presence in Maghrib was reduced to only Oran and Bougie because of the corsair activities. Therefore, to stop the everlasting and financially destructive corsair raids, the counter-attack of the Spanish navy took place in Cherrhell. Admiral Doria, a Genoese nobleman fighting against the Habsburg Empire under the aegis of King François, had been disturbed by the French-Ottoman rapprochement and decided to fight for the Habsburg cause. His first attack caught the corsairs by surprise and cost them seven hundred Christian slaves. However, as the Spaniards lingered too much during the pillage, they did not hear the return signal and were driven out by the Turks and Moriscos. The result was a disaster. Nine hundred were killed and six hundred were reduced to slavery.¹¹⁰ The following year Charles' fleet had seized Koron, a vital port for the Ottoman navy in the Peloponnese, urging the Ottomans to call Hayreddin Reis to Konstantiniyye.¹¹¹ That was a successful move for Charles since Sultan Süleyman had to withdraw from the European campaign while leading his armies towards the gates of Vienna. The Sultan returned to Konstantiniyye, leaving his army in Belgrad and arranged a fleet on Koron.¹¹² Although the Ottoman army was quite superior in terms of military technology, organization and discipline, the navy was far from competitive against its European adversaries. For instance, Kemankeş Ahmet Bey's defeat against Andrea Doria on his way to reclaim Koron had revealed the deficits of the naval

¹¹⁰ Lane-Poole, 78.

¹¹¹ İnalçık, 156.

¹¹² "Andan Rûm Şâhı Sultan Süleyman göçüb Belgrad'dan 'azm idüb İslâmbol'a gelüb karar itdi. Ve târih hicretin dokuzyüz otuz dokuzu Pâdişâh-ı 'Âlem-penâh evvel bahâr olıcak nice pâre gemi donanmasın idüb dahî Koron üstüne gönderdi." Lütî Paşa, *Tevârih-i Âli Osman* (İstanbul: Matbaa-yi Âmire, 1925), 343.

organization.¹¹³ The reports of the Venetian observers on this subject are salient. According to this report, the admiral had no experience, the equipment was absent, and the sailors still used arrows instead of the arquebus.¹¹⁴ İbrahim Pasha, the grand vizier of the period, was aware of the shortcomings of the navy and had been working to overcome them since the Egypt expedition of 1524. Compared to other Ottoman bureaucrats, İbrahim also closely followed the developments in the Indian Ocean and took the first steps of the Ottoman administration to be established on the Red Sea.¹¹⁵ Moreover, as the Portuguese tried to shift the spice trade to the Indian Ocean, the Venetians and Ottomans had cooperated to eliminate the Portuguese, as customs revenues dwindled and trade was negatively affected. In this respect, a shipwright was requested from Venice who could build ships suitable for sailing in the ocean.¹¹⁶ Yet, this plan had never been implemented.

The execution of İbrahim Pasha in 1536 and Hayreddin Pasha's insistence on using galley-type ships in the Mediterranean¹¹⁷ postponed the transition of the Ottoman navy to galleon-type ships until the second half of the 17th century.¹¹⁸ Indeed, Hayreddin had

¹¹³ Hess, 72.

¹¹⁴ Alain Servante, "Giovanni-Francesco Giustiniani: Osmanlı Donanmasına Venedik Teknik Yardımı (1531-1534)," in *Türkler Ve Deniz*, ed. Kumrular Özlem (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 150-151.

¹¹⁵ Giancarlo Casale, *"The Ottoman Age of Exploration"*, 40.

¹¹⁶ Servante, 151.

¹¹⁷ Servante, 154-155.

¹¹⁸ The period when the Ottoman navy started the galleon construction corresponds to the beginning of the Cretan War (1645-1669). The Venetian navy blockaded the Dardanelles, cut aid to Crete, and later occupied Bozcaada, which paved the way for the Ottomans to turn to galleon-type ships in order to prevail over Venice. The Venetian navy generally used galleon type ships during this expedition. See, Bostan İdris, "Osmanlılar Ve Deniz", 41-51.

fit like a glove for the Ottoman Empire, who could not set sail on the ocean in the age of discoveries and spent all its resources to establish its supremacy in the Mediterranean.

2.6 Barbaros Hayreddin: Kapudan Pasha of Donanma-yı Hümâyûn (1533)

Hayreddin Reis had been called to Konstantiniyye by Sultan Süleyman's decree in 1533. During his absence in Algiers, he left Hasan Agha (a Sardinian renegade) as his viceroy. En route to the capital, he sacked Elba and captured some Genoese corn ships as looking for Andrea Doria.¹¹⁹ According to a Papal letter, Hayreddin's arrival should be dated November 9- December 15, 1533.¹²⁰ A flamboyant ceremony was held in his honor in which he offered "21 male slaves, 2 tavashish, silver artefacts such as decanters and mugs, coloured clothes, a crown of coral, two clocks, and velvet, satin, woollen, and brocade clothes to the Sultan".¹²¹ He was accompanied by Rashid, who took the Ottoman's side against his brother Mullay Hasan of Tunis.¹²² Bostan indicates that Hayreddin might have been appointed in January 1534 as the Beylerbey of the Aegean islands (Cezâyir-i Bahr-i Sefid) after he met İbrahim Pasha in Aleppo. Furthermore, he

¹¹⁹ Lane-Poole, 81-82.

¹²⁰ "Barbarossa arrived at Istanbul with 18 ships and many captives..." Arıkan and Toledo, 265.

¹²¹ İdris Bostan, "The Establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid," in *The Kapudan Pasha: His Office and His Domain*, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 244.

¹²² İdris Bostan, "The Establishment", 244.

was officially recognized as a "pasha"¹²³ when he received two gowns (hil'at) by the Sultan, a symbol of gratification.¹²⁴ Typically, the admirals were appointed from the sancakbeyi of Gallipoli since it was the most significant naval base until Sultan Selim I's time. However, the province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid was formed after his appointment and Hayreddin Pasha was titled as Vizier, rewarded with a beylerbeylik status.¹²⁵ Still, some Ottoman bureaucrats were not delighted with his promotion since the navy will be commanded by a vulgar corsair who was not raised within the palace school.¹²⁶ However, according to Gazavat, some Ottoman bureaucrats were not delighted with his promotion since they thought the navy would be commanded by a vulgar corsair who was not raised within the palace school.¹²⁷ Therefore in Gazavat, the close relationship between Hayreddin and Ibrahim Pasha was emphasized even more, drawing an analogy between those career paths to legitimize Hayreddin's appointment. İbrahim had also climbed to the rank of Grand Vizier thanks to his close relationship with Sultan Süleyman without being subject to the ordinary Kul system. Indeed, as a universal state, the Ottoman Empire had always been elastic in integrating talented bureaucrats within its body.

¹²³ "Hayreddin Paşa Mağrib'den İslâmbol'a gelüb Pâdişâh-ı İslâm'ın elin öpüb 'âli pişkeşler çıktı ve Pâdişâh-ı 'âlempenâh ona derya beylerbegiliğın virüb ve adı Hayreddin Reis iken Hayreddin paşa oldu" Lütfi Paşa, 344.

¹²⁴ Bostan, 245.

¹²⁵ Colin Imber and Colin Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," in *Studies in Ottoman History and Law* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), 35.

¹²⁶ "Zîrâ ba'zı münâfıkân hased yüzinden Hayreddîn Paşanın hakkında söylemişler idi ki: 'Şevketlü pâdişâhımız bu bâbda gayet tizlik eyledi, bir izbandud gidisine donanma virüb kapudan paşa eyledi.'" Murâdî, 204.

¹²⁷ Murâdî, 202-203.

Upon his arrival to the capital, Hayreddin Pasha started to work on reorganizing the navy and shipbuilding process.¹²⁸ He wintered in the imperial dockyards preparing for the naval season and left Konstantiniyye for Tunis with one hundred vessels in May 1534.¹²⁹ The brother of the ruler of Tunis, Rashid, had already paid homage to Sultan Süleyman in the Sublime Porte. During the talks, it was concluded that the pro-Habsburg Mullay Hasan of Tunis should be ousted, and thus, Tunis would be joined into the Ottoman realm by Hayreddin Pasha.¹³⁰ So, prior to the Tunis expedition, the Ottoman navy ravaged the Italian coasts so as to distract the Hafsids and not give a chance Mullay Hasan to organize its defenses.¹³¹ Hayreddin Pasha sacked both Reggio and San Lucido, took hundreds of slaves to the ships, and sent booty to Konstantiniyye.¹³² Following plunders, Ottoman soldiers with their arquebuses and artillery landed in Bizerte, positioned on the northeastern part of Tunis.

¹²⁸ Bostan, 246.

¹²⁹ "... ve yüz pâre kadirge donadub sene-i mezkûre [940] zilkadesinin evâsıtında deryaya gönderdi", Lütfi Paşa, 344.

¹³⁰ The narrative about the Tunis expedition in Gazavat should be worth mentioning. The Ottoman navy, which weighed anchor from the Sublime Porte for Italy, had to anchor off Tunis due to an adverse wind, and thus, Tunis was conquered with the sign of God. Since the Sharia Law prohibits an Islamic state from fighting another Islamic state without a just cause, the book legitimized this conquest by referring to persecuted people under Mullay Hasan, for an Islamic ruler should be just or else he is unlawful. See Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System," in *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix, 2000) and Özer Ergenç, "Osmanlı Klasik Düzeni Ve Özellikleri Üzerine Bazı Açıklamalar," accessed March 26, 2021, <http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/48008/Özer%20Ergenç%2C%20Osmanlı%20klasik%20düzeni%20ve%20özellikleri.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>, 34.

¹³¹ Haëdo Diego de, "*Histoire Des Rois D'Alger*", 47.

¹³² Lane-Poole, 84. Gazavat estimated sixteen thousand captives and four hundred twenty-five boxes of akça, yet that should be an exaggeration. See Murâdî, 203.

Meanwhile, having heard Hayreddin landed his soldiers, Mulla Hasan fled the city to prepare a counter-attack. However, he was ultimately defeated. The Ottoman victory did not last long after Hasan informed Charles V about the Turkish presence in Tunis as it was unacceptable to the Spaniards that an Ottoman garrison was positioned so close to Sicily and Naples.¹³³ Being informed that Sultan Süleyman was busy with the Safavids in the east,¹³⁴ the Emperor departed from Barcelona in the summer of 1535 to expel Hayreddin from Tunis and reinstate Hasan to the throne.¹³⁵ When Hayreddin learned that the Emperor was advancing on to Tunis with a large squadron, he sent some of his ships to Bône, a town located three hundred miles west of Tunis, and the same distance east of Algiers because the distance from this place made him think that his navy would be less exposed to attacks and that his vessels would be more secure. Plus, if the Emperor drove him out of Tunis (which he considered inevitable), Hayreddin would find refuge in Bône.¹³⁶ Even though Hayreddin Pasha strengthened the fortifications and took additional measures to stop the Christian army, he had to abandon the city after a fierce fight. Before leaving Tunis, Emperor Charles stationed a garrison at La Goletta that

¹³³ A letter to the Emperor is drawing his attention the situation in Tunis. Arıkan and Toledo, 218-219.

¹³⁴ Arıkan and Toledo, 267.

¹³⁵ In a letter from Charles V to Mulla Hasan: "Since you are neighbors of our kingdoms of Sicily and Sardinia, and in particular, I want to help you to protect you and your kingdoms from injustice." Arıkan and Toledo 220.

¹³⁶ Haëdo, 50.

would remain until 1574. On the other hand, Hayreddin Pasha had sacked Minorca Island to compensate his damages before sailing to Algiers.¹³⁷

2.7 War with Venice and the Battle of Preveza (1537-1540)

The foundations of friendly relations between the Ottomans and France had been laid in 1525 but the alliance had sealed after Jean de La Foret, the French envoy, arrived in Konstantiniyye in February 1536. The Ottomans had expected to get their share of southern Italy, as they had previously attempted in 1480. According to the plan, the French would penetrate Lombardy (Milan), while the Ottomans would invade Naples (Apulia). In a letter from François to Sultan Süleyman, the French King calls himself a loyal friend of the Sultan and after referring to the Habsburg threat, he asks the Ottoman navy to attack Naples, promising that the French navy would support the expedition with approximately 40-50 ships.¹³⁸ Therefore, the Ottoman navy, under Lütî Pasha's command, dispatched from the Sublime Porte to rendezvous with the French navy in the Adriatic. The Turkish forces stormed Otranto, ravaged the surrounding settlements, and

¹³⁷ Haëdo, 51.

¹³⁸ "İslâm Pâdişâhı Sultân Süleyman'dan temennâ budur ki bu muhib-i berâyânızı İspanya [kralı] denen mel'ûn hayli bî-huzûr idüb incitdi şöyle kim denizden donanma-i hümayûn Pâdişâh-ı İslâm-ı sa'âdetle karadan Avlonya iskelesine gelüb dahi Pulya vilâyetine ve denizden dahi kırk-elli pâre kadırgalarımız gelmek mukarrerdir" Lütî Paşa, 358.

many captives were taken.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, the Sultan was heading to Valona, the Albanian side of the straits of Otranto, to put down Albanian revolts. Later, Hayreddin Pasha joined the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn. However François broke the deal and did not show up, alleging that the situation in Flanders was worsening.¹⁴⁰

As the events unfolded in this direction, Süleyman decided to attack Corfu, a Venetian dominion. Kemal Reis had previously defined the island as the eye of the Adriatic¹⁴¹ but, at that time, the operational scale of the Ottoman navy was limited and an expedition to Corfu was unlikely. Then this provokes the following questions: ‘why did the Ottomans and Venetians cut each other's throats while enjoying a mutual friendship?’ and ‘had they not maintained a peaceful relationship during the period of Ibrahim Pasha?’. Ibrahim was of a Venetian origin and understood that preserving friendly relations with Venice would benefit both states; also, trade was secured with previous *ahidnâmes*.

On the other hand, Venice had to get along with the Ottomans since the previous wars cost Venice dearly. They were not involved in the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry in order to remain neutral, and avoid provoking both sides, during Hayreddin Pasha's Italian

¹³⁹ Lütü Paşa, 359-360.

¹⁴⁰ Soucek, “*Ottoman Maritime Wars*”, 58.

¹⁴¹ “Ammâ mezkûr cezârenün hakkında merhûm Kemâl Reis’ün dâyim cevâbı bu idi kim Venedik’ün iki gözü vardur sol gözü Moton kal’asıdur ve sağ gözü mezbûr Korfuz adasıdur diyüb” Reis Pîrî, 263.

campaign in 1534.¹⁴² However, the situation started to change, as can be seen in the letter by Ibrahim Pasha dated 1535. He complains that Venice did not convey the news that Charles arrived in Austria to Istanbul as required by the *ahidnâme* terms.¹⁴³ Furthermore, Ibrahim Pasha also remonstrates that the Venetians did not help when Hayreddin Pasha was attacked by his enemies.¹⁴⁴ Not only had Venice turned a cold shoulder to Hayreddin Pasha, but they had informed the Spaniards about every movement the Ottoman navy made during the Italian campaign.¹⁴⁵ Also Ayas Pasha, appointed as the grand vizier after Ibrahim's execution, had paid attention to preserving the friendship between the two states.¹⁴⁶

It may well have been that the violation of the *ahidnâmes* hampered the sea trade, and the corsair raids performed by both sides pushed Ottoman and Venetian administrations into the war. A petition sent to the Sultan regarding some corsairs violated the *ahidnâme*

¹⁴² Özlem Kumrular, "İspanyol Ve İtalyan Arşiv Kaynakları Ve Kroniklerinin Işığında Barbaros'un 1534 Seferi", in *Türkler Ve Deniz*, ed. Kumrular Özlem (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 192-193.

¹⁴³ "Şimdiki halde vilayet-i İspanya kralı olan müfsid yerinden kalkub cemiyet ile Alman vilayetine gelüb ol câniblerde girü fitne ve fesâda mübâşeret eylemek murâd edinir imiş eğer ki bu haber bize geldi işittik ama bunun gibi hâl olsa sizin devletlü padişah-ı alempenah hazretlerine olan doğruluk ile muhabbet göz ve sadakat üzere dostluğunuz muktezasınca gerçek ve sahih haber sizden gelir idi (...) imdi sizin bizim ulu ve sa'adetlü padişahımıza olan kemâl-i muhabbetinizden ve ahidnâme-i muktezasınca olan dostluğunuzdan umulan budur ki eğer ol müfsidin hareketi sahih ise kangı cânibe gitmek murâd edinmişdir ve fikr-i tedbîri nedir sıhhati üzere mufassalan i'lâm eylesin gerçek haber ve sahih sözleri sizden umarız." M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "*Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar*", 156-157.

¹⁴⁴ "sizin kadimî sadakatinizden dostluğunuzdan böyle mi umulmalıydı hakiki dostluk buydu ki bunun gibi haber malumunuz oldukda kat'an tahîr etmeyüb devletlü padişah-ı 'âlem penâh hazretlerinin uğrunda kemâl-i maddûrunuzu diriğ etmeyüb gereği gibi mu'avenet ve mezaherette buluna idiniz yoksa mücerred haber ile dostluk ma'lum olmaz yüce dergâhlarına her taraftan haber eksik mi olur" , M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "*Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar*", 162-163.

¹⁴⁵ Özlem Kumrular, 194.

¹⁴⁶ Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, trans. Mehmet Ata (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1990), 492.

by seizing the goods and killing the ship captains. This violation indicates that the Venetian vessels were not immune to the corsair raids.¹⁴⁷ However, Kâtib Çelebi claims that after the Venetian navy sank the galley carrying the shipyard's *kethüda*, the war was declared on Venice.¹⁴⁸

The Sultan was present at the war scene to watch the operation and boost his army's morale. However even after a few weeks, the Ottoman army could not overwhelm the Venetian garrison, which was very well fortified and updated with the latest technology.¹⁴⁹ The Sultan then gave the order to lift the siege due to the heavy casualties. Moreover, the campaign season was coming to an end,¹⁵⁰ and the Pope and the Habsburgs could reinforce the Venetian garrison. After Barbarossa left with his fleet, he captured many islands in the Aegean Sea, took a large amount of booty and sent them to the Sublime Porte. As Hayreddin Pasha had previously done while retreating from Tunis, he had embarked on a plundering operation to compensate his losses and distract his enemy from the war scene. Although the Pulya campaign was a setback, sweeping

¹⁴⁷ “Kulaksız Ahmed nâm re’îs ki Moton’un kapudânı idi nice gemilerimizi nâbedîd idüb ve iki pâre büyük gökelerimizi Moton yöresinde zâhire ve sâir metâ’alarla Venedik’e giderken tutub (...) Nadalin nâm re’îsin başın kesüb ve dâhi gemi yazıcısının ve yedi nefer rençberlerin bile başların kesüb” M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “*Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu*”, 143.

¹⁴⁸ Kâtib Çelebi, 129. There are other sources narrating the incidents. For example, Lütfi Pasha states that while attacking the fortresses around Pulya, Venetian galleys suddenly attacked his navy, and then he received the Sultan's orders imposing that the Venetians violated the agreement. Therefore, no Venetian vessels would be allowed to leave the straits, “Bu yakadan Venediklü ‘âsi olub ahdlerini bozdular donanma-i hümayûnu girmesin” Lütfi Paşa, 360. Matrakçı Nasuh also narrates this event from a different perspective, see. Matrakçı Nasuh, *Rüstem Paşa Tarihi Olarak Bilinen Târîh-i Âl-i Osmân (Osmanlı Tarihi 699-968/1299-1561)*, ed. Göker İnan (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2019), 376.

¹⁴⁹ John Francis Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys*, ed. John Keegan (London: Cassell, 2002), 130.

¹⁵⁰ Kâtib Çelebi reports that the Sultan ordered withdraw because he was deplored after a cannonball killed four of his soldiers. “Bir mücâhid kulumu böyle hezâr kal’aya bedel kılmam” Kâtib Çelebi, 130.

through the last Venetian holdings in the Aegean and presenting thousands of captives to the Sultan had covered up this failure. In a dynamic capital like Konstantiniyye, where cheap labor is needed, the price drop in slave markets was very important. The importance of naval expeditions and corsairs for the Ottoman Empire becomes apparent on such occasions. Therefore, Hayreddin Pasha had received compliments from the Sultan.¹⁵¹

Meanwhile, the Holy League was formed under Pope Paul III with an alliance of: Papal States, Venice, Genoa, Malta, Portugal, and the Habsburg Empire. The alliance was not reliable though, primarily because of Charles' suspicious attitude against Venice. There were disputes on who would be the admiral, what the aim of the war was, and the allocation of expenses and plunder. While Charles insisted on an operation in Algiers to exterminate the corsair bases for the security of southern Italy and Spain, Venice argued that the Turkish navy should be destroyed in order to protect its colonies in the Aegean. Nevertheless, a consensus was reached that it was necessary to destroy the Turkish navy.¹⁵² The enemy fleets met at Preveza strait on September 28, 1538. Although the allied fleet outnumbered the Ottomans, Hayreddin Pasha ordered a surprise attack which caused his foes to panic and the allied navy withdrew from the battlefield, moving towards Corfu.

¹⁵¹ Kâtib Çelebi, 131.

¹⁵² Büyüktuğrul Afif, *Osmanlı Deniz Harp Tarihi Ve Cumhuriyet Donanması*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: T.C. Deniz Basımevi, 1982), 277-278.

As Soucek indicates, Emperor Charles considered the enterprise as his own rather than Pope's and Venice's, as he desired to launch a crusade to Constantinople and save the city from the Ottoman Sultan.¹⁵³ While this claim is somewhat exaggerated, it is more plausible to suggest that Charles wanted to use the allied navy to conquer Algiers, for Charles would organize an expedition in 1541 to realize his project. According to the Emperor, the Ottoman navy could dominate the eastern Mediterranean and tussle with the Venetians as long as they would not threaten the Habsburg dominions around Naples. Algiers, however, was a different case. The Ottoman corsairs based in Algiers had become a thorn in Spain's flesh after cooperating with the Sublime Porte. Moreover the defeat at Preveza had proved that the Ottomans would be a menace not only in the eastern, but also in the central and western Mediterranean with the corsair support. In addition, Charles had also turned out to be right about distrusting the Venetians, as they came to terms with the Sublime Porte in secret and abandoned the Holy League in 1540.

¹⁵³ Soucek, 62-66.

CHAPTER III (1541-1571):

DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES

3.1 Charles V Disembarking Algiers (1541)

Emperor Charles was eager to put an end to the corsair ventures that took a toll on the Christian shipping along the western Mediterranean. He had already thought of capturing Algiers before the battle of Preveza but although it remained inconclusive, he tried to achieve it through diplomatic talks between 1537 and 1540 with Hayreddin Pasha and his viceroy in Algiers, Kara Hasan Agha.¹⁵⁴ Charles hoped that the conversations with Barbarossa would turn out to be positive, just as his negotiations with Andrea Doria in 1528 had yielded results. From the diplomatic correspondence, it seems that the Spaniards tried to come to an agreement with Hayreddin Pasha during the siege of Castelnuovo, and Hayreddin welcomed this proposal and conveyed his terms in later meetings.¹⁵⁵ Later, Andrea Doria met with Hayreddin Pasha and guaranteed that

¹⁵⁴ Abun-Nasr, 169.

¹⁵⁵ Arıkan and Toledo, 246-247.

Hayreddin aspired to serve the Emperor, and thus, his demands should not be rejected.¹⁵⁶

However, in a letter dated 22 September 1539, the Spaniards began to hesitate as

Hayreddin constantly delayed the negotiations.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the bilateral talks were

part of his plan to keep the Spaniards busy; meanwhile, he had enabled Hasan Agha to

gain enough time to prepare a defense for a large-scale landing operation. Thanks to the

French envoy, Jean de la Forest,¹⁵⁸ Hayreddin knew that Charles had been planning an

expedition on Algiers ever since the defeat of Preveza.¹⁵⁹

When Emperor Charles realized that the diplomatic channels had clogged, he landed in

Algiers on 20 October 1541.¹⁶⁰ However, the sailing season had already passed,¹⁶¹ and

Algiers was famous for its strong breezes, making things difficult for the vessels.¹⁶²

Moreover, as Admiral Jurien de la Gravière pointed out, "the climate of Africa was

evidently unsuited to deeds of chivalry".¹⁶³ There was no obstacle during the

disembarkation, but then it became impossible to unload supplies and ammunition from

the ships due to a sudden storm. While many ships sank in the storm, Muslim galley

slaves in the ships had been rescued by the local people.¹⁶⁴ Also, Hasan Agha harassed

¹⁵⁶ According to the letter dated 2 September 1539. Arıkan and Toledo, 249.

¹⁵⁷ Arıkan and Toledo, 253.

¹⁵⁸ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: the Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 117.

¹⁵⁹ These parts are absent in no: 2639 copy of *Gazavat*, published by Mustafa Yıldız. The events mentioned above were copied by Yılmaz Öztuna from manuscript no: 2459. Öztuna Yılmaz, *Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1989), 96-97.

¹⁶⁰ Hammer-Purgstall, 511.

¹⁶¹ Soucek, "Maritime Wars", 74.

¹⁶² Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Sultanın Korsanları", 275-276.

¹⁶³ Jurien de la Gravière quoted in Stanley Lane-Poole, "The Barbary Corsairs", 123.

¹⁶⁴ "ve gemiler içinde ne kadarı Müslümanlar bulunub onları dahi halâs itdiler". Lütü Paşa, 416.

his enemy and disrupted the Habsburg army making forays to their encampments during the nighttime.¹⁶⁵ Eventually, Charles ordered a retreat on November 1 because the hunger combined with the cold and rainy weather left no other option. The Emperor could only return to Spain after two months due to the weather conditions. While Hasan Agha presented one thousand slaves to the Sultan as a *peşkeş* of his victory, the Sultan rewarded him with the beylerbeylik of Algiers.¹⁶⁶

It may well have been that the Emperor had thought that he could easily conquer Algiers as the Spaniard army had outnumbered the corsairs, and also Hayreddin Pasha was supporting the Ottomans at the Austrian front. There were two main reasons for his failure. First of all, Algiers was not a topographically convenient port to unload the men and munitions, and for this reason, Hayreddin Pasha had built a mole in the harbor to make it suitable for dropping anchor. Thus, a sudden storm hurled the Spaniard vessels and made it impossible to landing. Secondly, despite his small contingent, Hasan Agha led his forces in discipline and used its tactical maneuverability thanks to his Arabic horsemen against unwieldy Habsburg troops. Also, it should be underlined that the corsairs managed to defeat the core of the Habsburg army without Hayreddin Pasha or Ottoman support. Thus, at the beginning of the 16th century, Algiers (no more than a tributary port city in which a Spanish presidio garrison stationed) had transformed into an Ottoman regency that could repulse the Habsburg army. The victory clinched the corsair presence in North Africa. It had proven that the corsairs were not only sea

¹⁶⁵ Öztuna, 100-101.

¹⁶⁶ Murâdî, 240-241.

thieves who disrupted Christian shipping but also a political power capable of commanding armies, forming alliances with the local population, and constantly terrorizing the Christian shores. Identically, this transformation can be found within the Ottoman maritime policy.

3.2 Last Campaign of Hayreddin Pasha: Siege of Nice (1543)

The death of King Zapolya of Hungary in 1540 had reinaugurated the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry over Hungary. Sultan Süleyman, who received the news that Archduke Ferdinand had besieged Budin, immediately departed from the Sublime Porte and defeated Ferdinand and annexed Budin.¹⁶⁷ While the Sultan was advancing to Hungary with his armies, Hayreddin Pasha sailed to the Mediterranean with Donanma-yı Hümâyûn to support French navy against the Habsburgs.¹⁶⁸ The request for naval assistance had been conveyed by Captain Poulin (Baron de la Garde), French ambassador to Ottoman Empire.¹⁶⁹ The ambassador succeeded in drawing the Ottomans into the war, convincing them this campaign would also be rewarding for the Sublime

¹⁶⁷ İnalçık Halil, "*Devlet-i 'Aliyye*", 159.

¹⁶⁸ İnalçık, 158.

¹⁶⁹ "Ve andan Françe elçisi dahi gelüp pâdişâhun elin öpdükde pâdişâhdan mu'âvenet içün donanma istedi" Matrakçı Nasuh, 391.

Porte.¹⁷⁰Originally, it was decided that the Ottoman navy would attack in the same year but it was only in 1543 that the navy could join the ally troops. Relying on the Ottoman support, King François had declared war on the Habsburg Empire in 1542, breaking the Truce of Nice signed in 1538. However, the French expeditions remained inconclusive as they could not make a coordinated offense with the Ottomans.¹⁷¹

France's policy during this period was purposed for weakening the Habsburgs by providing the support of Lutheran German princes. On the other hand, Charles V provoked the Christians that France collaborated with Muslims and thus betrayed Christians. Once drawing the German princes to his side, Charles was going to lunge at the Turks. Although France seemed to be allied with the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan knew that the French were hypocrites, as France intermittently made ceasefires with the Habsburgs and promised to join a crusade against the Turks. As Halil İnalcık stated, these deeds were done in order to achieve political domination over Europe.¹⁷²

Among all the complex diplomatic relations, Venice's position is also worth mentioning. Faced with economic crisis and famine due to bad harvests for consecutive years,

¹⁷⁰ Hammer-Purgstall, 512.

¹⁷¹ Verhaaren, 122-123.

¹⁷² İnalcık, 158.

Venice was torn between Charles and Ferdinand as well as François and Süleyman.¹⁷³

The Habsburg, French, and Ottoman diplomats made great efforts to pull Venice into their coalitions. Charles worried that the Venetian fleet would cooperate with the Ottoman navy, so he wished Venice to remain neutral, even if they would not fight on his side. That may well have been the reason the Habsburgs provided grain to Venetians to overcome the famine.

As the peace treaty concluded with the Ottomans in 1540, Venice had recovered the Levant trade but were obliged to pay a costly war indemnity amount of 300,000 gold pieces in addition to the islands surrendered in the Aegean. Sultan Süleyman on the other hand, exhorted Venice to strengthen the ties between France¹⁷⁴ and to help the French ambassador when he came to their country.¹⁷⁵ He also encouraged them to not assist Spain and Austria.¹⁷⁶ However, the Venetians were cautious about not offending the Sultan so they did not hesitate to provide food to the Ottoman navy en route to

¹⁷³ Migel Angel de Bunes Ibarra, "V. Carlos, Venedik Ve Babrâli: Diego Hurtado De Mendoza'nın Venedik'teki Büyükelçiliği," in *Muhteşem Süleyman* (Kâğıthane, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 144.

¹⁷⁴ "France Pâdişâhı ile 'alâkayı kesmeyib oldan idegeldiğinden dâhi ziyâde dostluk idüb" Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler", 146.

¹⁷⁵ "memleketine 'arz itdiklerinde her vechile mu'âvenet idüb", Gökbilgin, 133-134.

¹⁷⁶ "İspanya Kralı Karlo (Charles) ve Beç Kralı olan karındaşı Fernandoş (Ferdinand) câniblerine mu'avenet itmek münâsib değildir olmayasız" Gökbilgin, 153.

France.¹⁷⁷ Eventually, Venice managed to evade all these summonses by successful diplomatic maneuvers and remained out of the war.¹⁷⁸

Hayreddin Pasha left Konstantiniyye with 150 pieces of navy on May 28, 1543. His fleet invaded Messina and Reggio, with other positions in Sicily and Italy. On the contrary to what the western sources narrated,¹⁷⁹ the navy never intended to harm Papal territories and even Hayreddin paid for the provisions.¹⁸⁰ According to the agreement between the Sultan and François, provisions necessary for the Ottoman squadron would be provided by the King when the Ottoman navy arrived in France.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, Donanma-yı Hümâyûn was reinforced with 22 corsair galleots, including five vessels dispatched from Jerba.¹⁸² After their arrival, the King wanted Hayreddin's support to capture Nice, which was occupied by the Duke of Savoy, under Charles's auspices. The combined navies left Marseilles for Nice and besieged the city, but the allies could not seize the citadel despite their success in occupying the outer fortresses.

¹⁷⁷ Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı [TS.MA.e]*, No. 635/1.

¹⁷⁸ An imperial letter indicates that by obeying the Sultan's order, Venice would suspend military and commodity aid to Spain and improve their relations with France. However, because Spain is a neighboring country, they had to maintain a friendly relationship. "Françe Pâdişâhiyla dâhi dostluk üzere olmağı kabul eylediğimizi ʾlâm idüb ve İspanya memleketine vilâyetimiz muttasıl olmağıla anın mazeretinden havf ideriz anınla dâhi dostluk üzereyiz" Gökbiçgin, 132-133.

¹⁷⁹ Verhaaren asserts that Setton, in his *Papacy and the Levant*, omitted the section from the letter where Sultan Süleyman ordered Barbarossa not to harm Papal territories in order to reinforce the view that the Ottomans ravaged all the lands without discrimination. Verhaaren, 125.

¹⁸⁰ İnalçık, 159.

¹⁸¹ "ol câniblerde oldukları zamânlarda lâzım olan hususlarda mudâyaka çekdirmeyesin" Gökbiçgin, 119.

¹⁸² "Donanma-yı Hümâyûna levend tâ'ifesinden hiç gemiler geldi mi denildikde levend kayıklarından ve kalyeteden cümle yirmi iki kıt'a levend gemisi geldi deyü cevap virdi, (...) amma Cerbe'den beş pare levend kayıkları geldiği zikr olunan yirmi iki pare levend gemisinin beş kıt'ası anlardır deyü cevap virdi" BOA, *TS.MA.e*, No. 635/1.

As the sea season was coming to an end due to the delays during the siege, the navy could not effectively support land operations. Furthermore, Hayreddin could not rely on Nice's harbor because it was inadequate to drop anchor when a storm breaks out.¹⁸³ Thus, he sailed to Toulon. The fact that the Sultan wanted the navy to return to the Sublime Porte without harm, and gave orders in this regard, explains Hayreddin's caution.¹⁸⁴ Since the realization that wintering in Toulon was necessary, Hayreddin aimed to meet the basic needs of the soldiers (such as shelter and food). Besides, the soldiers had to be paid. That is why Captain Polin made efforts to find the necessary funds; keeping the Ottoman navy in France was crucial to defending the southern coast against Andrea Doria's navy. In addition to the provisions supplied by the French consuls, Hayreddin Pasha had also purchased provisions from Corsica, Sardinia, and Genoa, which were ruled by the Habsburg allies, ensuring that his soldiers did not suffer from food shortages.¹⁸⁵ It was already standard for the Ottoman army to pay for supplies during campaigns and Hayreddin Pasha, not as the corsair reis but as the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman navy, maintained this pattern. Therefore, 30,000 Ottoman soldiers wintered in Toulon without any major problems. However, the following campaign season did not yield a beneficial outcome for both sides.

The Ottoman navy continued to protect the French coast, ravaging the Spanish

¹⁸³ Verhaaren, 131.

¹⁸⁴ Verhaaren, 129.

¹⁸⁵ Verhaaren, 135.

archipelago and the Tyrrhenian Sea and preventing the Habsburg armies from crossing to Italy, but a joint operation with the French navy had never occurred before. As a result, François could not decide where to attack even though they had made preparations for an expedition to Genoa. Meanwhile, Hayreddin had received letters from Tunis reporting that Mulla Hasan was deposed and exiled by his son Ahmed for collaborating with the Habsburgs.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, Ahmed had requested military support from Hayreddin and Hasan and considered himself the son of Sultan Süleyman.¹⁸⁷ However, when Hayreddin asked the Sultan's orders, Süleyman ordered his return to the Sublime Porte.

Soucek indicates three crucial aspects of the campaign for Donanma-yı Hümâyûn. First, the Ottoman navy had proved that its operational scale reached into the western Mediterranean for the first time, with the exception of the individual corsair incursions. Secondly, despite the financial hardships, the captives and booties taken on this expedition were satisfactory in every respect.¹⁸⁸ Lastly, İnalçık also highlights that the Ottoman-French alliance prevented a Holy League, mangling the Latin Christendom in which the Pope and Emperor Charles envisaged.¹⁸⁹

In contrast to this, in the wars that lasted for years (from the Danube to Iran and North

¹⁸⁶ Matrakçı, 406.

¹⁸⁷ İdris Bostan, "Kanuni Ve Akdeniz Siyaseti 1530-1550," in *Muhteşem Süleyman* (Kâğıthane, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), 35.

¹⁸⁸ Soucek, 77.

¹⁸⁹ İnalçık, 163.

Africa to India), the human resource had exhausted in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Empire was having difficulties filling the ranks, especially obtaining the oarsman needed for its navy. Ibarra asserted that Hayreddin Pasha might have been considered enriching the slave markets in the Sublime Porte before sailing for France.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the request from Kapı Ağası Mahmud to which palace the boys and concubines sent by Hayreddin Pasha will be transferred confirms that the Ottoman navy had not only operated within conventional means but also performed within a framework that provided captives to the slave market with its plundering operations through the corsairs who filled the ranks.¹⁹¹ Hakan Erdem also highlights that the pirates were one of the leading slave suppliers to the slave markets.¹⁹²

François and Charles came to terms and signed the Treaty of Crépy on September 18, 1544. Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha had begun to prepare Donanma-yı Hümâyûn for the next year soon after he arrived in Konstantiniyye,¹⁹³ but he died in his residence at 1546. Meanwhile, Süleyman conquered key cities and inflicted a devastating blow to the Habsburg armies in Hungary. This loss compelled Charles and Ferdinand to make peace

¹⁹⁰ Ibarra, 157.

¹⁹¹ Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi Evrakı [TS.MA.e]*, No. 6590/1. *Oğlan* and *Cariye* are different from *Kuls*. See, Ehud R. Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 20-53.

¹⁹² Y. Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800-1909* (Basingstoke, Hampshire England: Palgrave, 1996), 24.

¹⁹³ Hayreddin Pasha was preparing one-hundred piece of navy for the following campaign season. Sahillioğlu Halil and İhsanoğlu Ekmeleddin, *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H.951-952 Tarihli Ve E-12321 Numaralı mühimme Defteri* (İstanbul: İslâm Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, IRCICA, 2002), 68.

with the Ottomans. Valid for five years, they signed the Treaty of Constantinople on October 8, 1547.¹⁹⁴

3.3 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn After Hayreddin Pasha Deceased and Conquest of Tripoli (1551)

Hayreddin Pasha's departure did not cause any disruption in the Ottoman navy. On the contrary, shipbuilding continued in *Tersane-i Amire*, which gradually turned into a solid structure during Hayreddin's presence. Also Mehmed Pasha, who raised from the Enderûn (palace school), was appointed to the Kapudan-ı Derya post. However, this assignment indicates that the Enderunites reduced the corsair influence in the Sublime Porte. As previously mentioned, there was a strong resentment among the palace bureaucrats when Hayreddin Pasha became the kapudan pasha. According to them, Hayreddin was a vulgar pirate who was not raised in Enderûn, and thus the navy should not be handed over to him. Moreover, Lütî Pasha's criticism against Hayreddin is striking.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Süleyman warns both Charles and Ferdinand not to attack Algiers and Maghrib as per the agreement. Anton C. Schaendlinger, *Die Schreiben Süleymāns Des Prächtigen an Karl V., Ferdinand I. Und Maximilian II.*, vol. 2 (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1983), 11-18.

¹⁹⁵ "Hayreddin Paşa Müslümanlara bu kadar zûlm ve bu kadar katl-i nefis itmiş iken Mağrib'e pâdişâh oldum deyü gurûr ile içi ve tâşı dop dolu olmuş iken ol gurûrun ve ol Müslümanlara etdiği zûlmün belâsı yoluna gelüb bu tarîkle yine zelîl oldu ki dil [ile] şerh olunmaz" Lütî Paşa, 356.

It was thought that Turgut would take Kapudan Pasha's post, as he was a corsair who tormented Christians throughout his career and deserved the title both in terms of career and talent. In 1540, Giannettino Doria of Genoa had captured Turgut, but Hayreddin later paid the ransom to release him.¹⁹⁶ Rüstem Pasha, who knew well how to eliminate his opponents in palace intrigues, secured the position for his brother Sinan Pasha in 1550. Rüstem openly expressed his discontent with Turgut since he frequently violated the agreement terms signed with the Habsburgs in 1547. His attack on Mahdia, and the later burning a Venetian ship, increased the distress Turgut created.¹⁹⁷ Although he was called to the Sublime Porte, he ignored the invitation and lived as a fugitive for two years as he feared that he would be executed.¹⁹⁸

However, raids initiated by Turgut Reis had put an end to the Ottoman-Habsburg peace. Andrea Doria had recaptured Mahdia, but it deeply disturbed Süleyman, and a 120 piece fleet with Sinan Pasha had left the Sublime Porte.¹⁹⁹ Then, he assembled with Turgut Reis and exchanged ideas regarding the possible targets of the navy. First, Malta and the

¹⁹⁶ Lane-Poole, 127.

¹⁹⁷ Gürkan, 475. This provocation obliged the Habsburg navy to show up and recapture the fortress. In a letter sent by Emperor Charles to Rüstem Pasha, he demanded to discuss the issue as Turgut violated the terms and encroached the Spanish territory. İdris Bostan, "Kanuni ve Akdeniz Siyaseti", 39.

¹⁹⁸ Kâtib Çelebi, 148.

¹⁹⁹ Lane-Poole, 134.

island of Gozo were swamped, and a vast amount of booty was collected.²⁰⁰ Then they moved to Tripoli, where Piri Reis praised the beauty of its castle.²⁰¹ Despite being a Spanish garrison since 1510, Tripoli had been ceded to Knights of St. John by Emperor Charles in 1530. The stubborn and determined resistance commanded by a French knight, Gaspard de Vallier, had turned the siege into a long haul. Finally with the intervention of D'aramont (the French envoy), the knights were allowed to go to Malta and they surrendered the castle as they had no other option.²⁰² Nakkaş Nigârî narrates that the booty collected from the fortress had overflowed from the ships.²⁰³

It should be noted that the conquest of Tripoli had recovered the loss of Tunisia in 1535. Moreover, Tripoli's vicinity to Sicily and Malta provided an advantageous situation in the future expeditions of the Ottoman navy. On the other hand, while Turgut Reis expected to become the Beylerbey of Tripoli, Murad Agha was appointed to the post. Later, Turgut was assigned to the Karlı-ili sancakbeyliği and became responsible for patrolling the Aegean Sea.²⁰⁴ Meanwhile Salih Reis, another protégé of Hayreddin Pasha, had been assigned as the Beylerbey of Algiers.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ Egüz Esra, *Nakkaş Nigârî'nin Kaptan-ı Derya Sinan Paşa Gazavatnamesi* (Konya: Palet Yayınları, 2020), 130.

²⁰¹ But the Spaniards had ruined it after they settled down since the castle was huge. Reis Pîrî, 506.

²⁰² Soucek, 80.

²⁰³ Egüz, "*Nakkaş Nigârî*", 142.

²⁰⁴ Arıkan and Toledo, 288.

²⁰⁵ Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, trans. Mehmet Ata, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1990), 65.

3.4 Donanma-yı Hümâyûn Presence in the Western Mediterranean (1551-1559)

King Henri II, who succeeded François I, had decided to maintain the alliance with the Ottoman Empire. By cooperating with the Ottomans, the Pope, and the German princes, the new king had insisted on his claims regarding Italy. This insistence demonstrated that he was seeking to undermine the Habsburg domination in Europe. The Sultan also encouraged the German princes to ally with France, affirming that French allies would never be harmed and warned them not to trust the Habsburgs.²⁰⁶ Besides, the Pope had suggested a French-Ottoman attack on Naples and Sicily, as he had expressed his discomfort towards Emperor Charles and his son (Philip II) to the Venetian ambassador and obviously could not forget the Sack of Rome 1527.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the Pope had even announced that he would launch a Crusade against the Habsburgs in unison with the Turks.²⁰⁸ Therefore, once again, the French-Habsburg struggle commenced in Italy.

The French envoy (D'Aramont) had urged Sultan Süleyman to undertake a joint naval operation, and he was successful in that. After the French navy wintered in the island of Chios, it was planned to conduct a naval expedition in the western Mediterranean in a

²⁰⁶ Feridun Ahmet Bey, *Mecmûa-i Münşeât-ı's Selatin Ferîdûn Bey* (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1848), 503-504.

²⁰⁷ Verhaaren, 43. Charles V abdicated the throne in 1556 due to health issues, and was replaced by his son, Philip II.

²⁰⁸ Verhaaren, 44.

coordinated manner.²⁰⁹ In the operations carried out by Turgut Reis and the Kapudan-ı Derya Piyale Pasha, Southern Italy was raided, the city of Reggio was taken, and the residents were reduced to slavery.²¹⁰

However, the operations projected for the summer of 1558 did not occur in accordance with the plan since the allied navies could not assemble. Matrakçı Nasuh reports that the Ottoman navy had to sail towards Majorca due to the bad weather conditions.²¹¹ Yet, Henri blames Turgut Reis and states that he had turned his course for no reason; thus, a great opportunity was missed. The Sultan, on the other hand, appeased Henri and said that the navy was sent with a sufficient number of soldiers and that they would defeat the enemy just like before.²¹² However instead of meeting with the French fleet, Turgut had changed his course to the Balearic Islands and enslaved around 4,000 people in the raids.²¹³ Presumably taking advantage of the unfavorable circumstances, he had made such an attempt and organized a highly profitable plunder campaign. Finally, the projects did not occur as expected, and with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrèsis (1559), the struggle between France and Spain came to an end.

²⁰⁹ Verhaaren, 42.

²¹⁰ Hammer-Purgstall, 71.

²¹¹ "Lâkin rûzgâr el virmeyüp havâ muhâlif olıcak ol hevâdan geçilüp dört gün gice ve gündüz gidilüp Mayorka nâm bir cezireye geldiler." Matrakçı, 474.

²¹² Feridun, 407. See also, Verhaaren, 45.

²¹³ Matthew Carr, *Blood and Faith: The Purging of Muslim Spain* (New York: The New Press, 2011), 140. Further reading describing the extent of the damage, see. Hakan Kılıç, "Osmanlıların Minorka Adası'Na Saldırısı Ve Ciutadella'nın İşgali (1558)," *Mülkiye Dergisi* 44 (2020): pp. 219-238, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1362391>.

On the other hand, the war continued at full speed for the Ottomans, for the theatre of war had already glided into North Africa when the Spanish presidios were raided by Salih Pasha. He had managed to capture Bougie, Fez, and Oran, yet, these attempts remained short-term gains. Then the Ottoman advance ultimately came to a stall with Salih Pasha's death. The Janissary corps in Algiers did not obey the new Beylerbey, Mehmed Pasha (appointed from the Sublime Porte) and killed him.²¹⁴ The political integrity at Algiers was achieved after Hasan Pasha's installment. While the Ottoman navy was ravaging the Balearics, Hasan Pasha had severely defeated the Spanish forces in Mostaganim.²¹⁵

Turkish advances in North Africa had posed a catastrophic threat to the Spanish defenses on the southern coast. Having secured his lands in Italy by eliminating France with the Cateau-Cambrèsis peace, Philip II had decided to recapture Tripoli as it was requested from the Knights of St. John and his viceroy in Sicily. The scale of the terror created by Turgut had become unbearable.²¹⁶ Soucek states that the operation was delayed because the Sicilian viceroy, Juan de la Cerda, lingered with recruiting troops.²¹⁷ On the other hand, despite the fact that the Sublime Porte was alerted in advance, Piyale Pasha had to

²¹⁴ Hess, 77. The Janissaries, who were paid by the treasury, could not take a share from the booty as they were not authorized to participate in the plundering operations. This tension was resolved only by allowing the janissaries to board the corsair ships at the end of the century.

²¹⁵ Hess, 78.

²¹⁶ Salvatore Bono, *Corsari Nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e Musulmani Fra Guerra, schiavitù e Commercio* (Milano: Mondadori, 1993), 18-19.

²¹⁷ Soucek, 82.

return Konstantiniyye because the campaign season had passed. The Christian fleet, which had only completed its preparations in late October, was despatched from Messina. However, when it was realized that the storms would not let them reach Tripoli, they took refuge in Djerba.²¹⁸

Turgut Reis had been informed regarding every movement of the Christian navy. Thus, he notified Piyale Pasha that the Christians had seized Djerba and were constructing the fortifications there, and upon hearing this, Piyale Pasha immediately moved to the island.²¹⁹ On the other hand, the Christians thought that the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn could not reach Djerba until the summer, and so they caught by surprise. After two months of siege, the fortress was overwhelmed, half of the troops were slaughtered, and the garrison commander was taken prisoner by the Ottomans.²²⁰ Kâtib Çelebi states that about four thousand prisoners, including the commanders, were presented to the Sultan.²²¹ Although the battle of Djerba was not as violent as the Preveza, the losses of the Spaniards were irreparable. In addition to the losses of their ships, the Spanish navy had also lost many experienced sailors in the battle.²²² Therefore, Spain could not send its navy on a large-scale expedition in the Mediterranean until 1571 so as to compensate for its losses.

²¹⁸ Soucek, 83.

²¹⁹ Soucek, 84.

²²⁰ Soucek, 85-86. "küffâr-ı hâksâr donanması Cezîre-i Cerbe kurbünde olup Trablus'a düşmeğe müterakkıbelerdir" Kâtib Çelebi, 153.

²²¹ Kâtib Çelebi, 158.

²²² Guilmartin asserts that the main incident that bent the Spanish navy's back at Djerba was the loss of experienced sailors. Guilmartin, 133.

3.5 Siege of Malta: The First Signs of Fatigue (1565)

Consecutive defeats on the North African coast forced Philip II to take action against the corsairs, and securing the southern shores of Iberia had become one of his principal policies. Until 1565, Philip and his advisors had worried that the Turks would invade Spain.²²³ Moreover, the Austrian-Ottoman peace concluded in 1563 and it had been declared that there were flourishing Ottoman activities in the Mediterranean.²²⁴ After Djerba, the corsairs had gotten a free hand off the Spanish coast and began embarking on plundering operations with Morisco support, who were under constant persecution by the Spanish Inquisition.²²⁵ Furthermore Turgut Reis constantly terrorized Naples and Sicily and, during one of his raids, he captured the bishop of Catania (Caracciolo) who was heading to the Council of Trent.²²⁶ Although some measures had been taken to ensure coastal security, the primary measure was to destroy the corsair bases from which the attacks were launched. In this context, protecting the North African Presidios against the Turkish advance had become a primary object. In 1562, Hasan Pasha had been repulsed in Oran, thanks to the well-fortified garrison and the quick response of the

²²³ Carr, 140.

²²⁴ Guilmartin, 133.

²²⁵ Carr, 142.

²²⁶ The bishop was ransomed after ten months of captivity in Tripoli. Bono, "Corsari nel Mediterraneo", 133.

Spanish navy.²²⁷ During that period, the royal fleet was only used in amphibious operations. Philip was cautious about avoiding the Ottoman navy until they build a full-fledged fleet.²²⁸

Furthermore in 1564 Penon de Velez, in which a Turkish garrison was stationed, was stormed. Penon was the westernmost settlement of the Ottoman Empire, and in those last couple of years, it had become seen as holding a threatening position as the corsairs frequently used its small harbor to launch raidings over the Spanish coast. Even though the Spaniards did not intend to draw his reaction, the Sultan could not ignore this act of aggression. Prior to this, the seizure of Mahdia by the imperial fleet had prompted the Sultan and that resulted in the conquest of Tripoli by the Ottomans. It should be asserted that the Sultan did not afford the slightest loss of land against Spain in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Spanish assaults on the corsair nests had never been legitimate in the eyes of the Sultan since the corsairs were under his protection. In this respect, the Ottomans had intended to capture a strategic point as a response to the Spanish aggression and Malta (which was positioned in a highly strategic location in the central Mediterranean) had long been on Süleyman's agenda as it posed a significant

²²⁷ Hess, 82.

²²⁸ Hüseyin Serdar Tabakoğlu, "The 1565 Malta Campaign According to Spanish Archival Documents," in *Süleyman The Lawgiver And His Reign New Sources, New Approaches*, ed. M. Fatih Çalışır, Suraiya Faroqi, and Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz (İstanbul: İbn Haldun Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2020), pp. 105-124, 109.

threat to Muslim shipping and pilgrims.²²⁹ Moreover, the navies that depended upon oar-type vessels on long-term operations needed safe harbors when a storm broke out.²³⁰

Thus, together with other strongholds in Maghrib, Malta was one of the most critical bases in order to dominate the Mediterranean sea-route, despite its smallness.²³¹

Meanwhile, the Knights of Malta were unprepared for a potential Turkish invasion due to the financial crisis. In addition to compensating their casualties at Djerba, the costs of reinforcing the fortification had demanded extra cash. Therefore, just like the Ottoman corsairs did, the Knights engaged in plunder operations on their own account, mainly seizing the pilgrim vessels when they were not occupied with joint operations with the Spanish fleet. Ransoming money had provided a steady income to the Knights.²³²

However, when they attacked a ship laden with precious items belonging to a high-rank Ottoman officer, the war became inevitable.²³³ Thus, Divân-ı Hümâyûn (Imperial Council) had gathered to discuss the matter. Grand vizier Ali Pasha held talks with

²²⁹ Kâtib Çelebi narrates that the preparations for Malta had already started in 1561, see Kâtib Çelebi, 158.

²³⁰ Gürkan, 271.

²³¹ Metin Kunt, Christine Woodhead, and Ann Williams, "Mediterranean Conflict," in *Süleyman The Magnificent and His Age the Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World* (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 39-54, 52.

²³² Bruce Ware Allen, *The Great Siege of Malta: The Epic Battle Between the Ottoman Empire and the Knights of St. John* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2015), <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42527/>, 74.

²³³ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), 5. Also, some historians have implied that Sultan Süleyman was under his daughter Mihrimah's influence, and his wife Hürrem also provoked him in the decision process. See Francesco Di Correggio Balbi, *The Siege of Malta, 1565*, trans. Henry Alexander Balbi (Copenhagen: Bogtrykkeriet Antikva, 1961), 31-32; Alphonse de Lamartine, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, trans. Serhat Bayram (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2011), 462; Hammer-Purgstall, 75. Moreover, there is a claim that the precious cargo was belonged to Mihrimah, Süleyman's daughter, and to be sold in the Venetian market. See. Allen, 76.

Kaptan-ı Deryâ Piyale Pasha as well as experienced sailors regarding the materials required for the expedition. The provisions were supplied as required, and many people hearing the Sultan's call for a Holy War were voluntarily enlisted in the navy.²³⁴ Turgut Pasha was primarily ordered to thwart the Spanish backup to the Maltese garrison.²³⁵ Eventually, composed of 240 pieces ships, Donanma-yı Hümâyûn left Konstantiniyye for Malta on March 29, 1565.²³⁶

During this time, the Spaniards were still pondering the next move of the Ottoman fleet, although several reports indicated that the fleet was preparing for Malta. According to the documents, the Spaniards thought that the Ottomans would land on La Goletta, a point that was strategically more important. Indeed, a renegade who later took refuge in the Maltese garrison had reported that the Ottomans' next objective would be La Goletta.²³⁷

The general opinion amongst historians about the siege is that the Ottomans had made a strategic error during the initial landing when they attacked Fort St. Elmo without Turgut Pasha's consent, so the siege had failed. Upon his arrival to the island, Turgut

²³⁴“Ez-în-câhib gereği gibi mühimmât u âlât u esbâb görilmekte ve Pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâh hazretleri ‘Gazâ vü cihâd ecr ü sevâbına tâlib ü râgıb olanlardan ve kapum kullarından yararlık idüp her kimse ki terakkî ve mertebe isterse varsunlar, rızâ-yı hümâyûnum vardır’ deyü fermân olunmağla Âsitâne-i Sa’âdet kullarından her sınıftan çok kimse şevk u zevk ile yazılıp donanmacı oldılar.” Selânikî, 6.

²³⁵ Tabakoğlu, “*The 1565 Malta Campaign*”, 114.

²³⁶ İdris Bostan, “Malta Kuşatmasından Tunus'un Fethine,” in *Başlangıcından XVII. yüzyılın Sonuna Kadar Türk Denizcilik Tarihi 1*, ed. Salih Özbaran and İdris Bostan (İstanbul: Deniz Basım Müdürlüğü, 2009), pp. 185-197, 186.

²³⁷ Balbi, “*The Siege of Malta, 1565*”, 51.

Pasha had also complained about Mustafa Pasha's strategy.²³⁸ However, some historians state that capturing St. Elmo was crucial to bringing the fleet closer to the shore so that the navy could support the land troops.²³⁹ On the other hand, the fleet had to be protected at all costs because recruiting experienced crew was always difficult.²⁴⁰ For instance, the Spanish had been following the same policy and were avoiding a clash with the Ottoman navy.

Nevertheless, the Ottomans had paid dearly for this strategy when they finally overwhelmed the fortress after a month. Even though pouncing St. Elmo had logic, the execution of the plan was meager. They had lost some six thousand soldiers, Turgut Pasha had been killed by a cannonball, and that encouraged the defenders even more.²⁴¹ Thus, the course of the siege did not change in the following months, and the Ottoman army had to leave Malta on September 12, 1565. There could be many reasons behind the defeat. However, Balbi, who was enlisted as an arquebusier at the siege of Malta, underlines two vital mistakes of the Ottomans. First of all, the misconception that St. Elmo will be overwhelmed in a short time. Due to the time consumed in St. Elmo, Don Garcia de Toledo (Spanish captain-general of the sea) had gained enough time to send a relief force before the Ottomans could breach the walls. Secondly, Balbi also refers to

²³⁸ "On Santarma (St. Elmo) binâ olunsa Malta hisârı alınmayınca zabt etdirilmek mümkün midir" Kâtib Çelebi, 161.

²³⁹ Tabakoğlu, 115.

²⁴⁰ Tabakoğlu, 118-119.

²⁴¹ Balbi, 87.

the decision to begin the assault prior to Turgut Pasha's arrival.²⁴² Notwithstanding, the most crucial mistake should be considered the lack of coordination among the general staff and the incompatibility of land and naval forces. For instance, Balbi narrates the disagreements between corsairs and janissaries. When some Christian soldiers surrendered to the corsairs, they had been claimed by Mustafa Pasha, yet the corsairs had held them for ransom money.²⁴³ On the other hand, the navy had remained ineffective throughout the offense and could not prevent the enemy navy's penetration through the siege zone and stop them from landing the reinforcements. Still, naval staff blamed Mustafa Pasha when investigated.²⁴⁴ Later, he was dismissed.

It would be more accurate to speculate on the consequences of the Malta siege rather than its causes. It was not the first time the imperial armies failed before their enemies. Nevertheless, the siege is rather important in terms of marking the limits of the Ottoman war machine. First of all, it is necessary to focus on the decision process. The historical accounts emphasize that the Sultan did not attack Malta within the framework of a broad Mediterranean policy but instead aimed to punish the Maltese due to piratical actions. On the other hand, Soucek questions why the Ottoman army returned to Istanbul instead

²⁴² Balbi, 56.

²⁴³ Balbi, 86.

²⁴⁴ "Kemâl-i hacâlet ve şerm-sârî ile İstanbul'a gelüp biri birin suçladılar. Top atıldıkça 'Serdâr uyur, sabr eylen' derlerdi, 'Topçu ve asker neylesün' deyü donanma halkı günâhı serdâra yükletdiler." Kâtib Çelebi, 161.

of wintering in Malta,²⁴⁵ disregarding the fact that the naval operations are expensive projects. However, when the Ottoman navy had previously wintered in Toulon, the expenses had been covered by the French treasury and Hayreddin Pasha's own pocket. Since the second half of the 16th century, with the changing warfare technology, small contingents had been emerged that could stop larger armies. Moreover, the wartime period of the western armies had extended to a whole year, whereas the Ottoman troops had to return when the summer season ended. The Ottoman Empire, which wanted to adapt to this situation, had augmented the Janissary corps so the deficit in the treasury increased.²⁴⁶ With the throne struggle between the Şehzades, and the wars with Safavids, the imperial finances had been worn out. The emphasis on the Red Apple in the early years of Süleyman's reign had been replaced by Safavids and Hungarian politics over the years. Therefore, the following year Süleyman did not send his navy to Malta but to Chios, where Donanma-yı Hümâyûn could compensate for this failure. The island of Chios, an Ottoman tributary under the Genoese rule, was accused of providing intelligence about Ottoman ships to the infidels and was subsequently occupied by Piyale Pasha in 1566 and turned into an Ottoman Sancak.²⁴⁷

3.6 Defeat at Lepanto: The Change in the Course (1571)

²⁴⁵ Soucek, 95-96.

²⁴⁶ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 132.

²⁴⁷ Niccolo Capponi, *Victory of the West: The Great Christian-Muslim Clash at the Battle of Lepanto* (New York: Da Capo, 2007), 91; Kâtib Çelebi, 162.

Accession to the throne had always been a complicated and fragile process in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Süleyman had witnessed his sons fighting for the throne in his last years. First he had to have strangled Şehzade Mustafa and later Bayezid, who took refuge in Safavid Palace. Thus, Şehzade Selim ascended to the throne as the sole heir in 1566 after a challenging period.

However before Selim officially took the throne, the Janissaries revolted. As is customary, they had asked for the *cülûs bahşışi*, a bonus upon Sultan's accession, and the Sultan fulfilled their requests. Though the Janissaries were not satisfied with this payment, the situation was settled by Sokollu Mehmed and Ahmed Pasha.²⁴⁸ As Hess stated, with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, new political elites were formed and the Janissaries had constituted one of the strongest elites within the bureaucratic organization.²⁴⁹ Indeed, the Janissary corps wanted to increase their income by participating in additional jobs during peacetime, yet this caused extra problems. Although they were forbidden to engage in a business other than military service, this was *de-facto* transformed over time. For example, from the early 17th century, the Janissaries would gradually increase their numbers among the tradesmen and guilds. In addition to this, they would also engage in trade and craftsmanship. That was also valid

²⁴⁸ Selânikî, 50-56.

²⁴⁹ Hess, 86.

in the North African regencies. As mentioned before, the janissaries had killed the beylerbey assigned to Algiers, and considering their salaries insufficient, demanded their share from the booty that the corsairs collected in the sea raids and that request was fulfilled in 1580. Furthermore, according to a Sultan's decree dated 1567, the Janissaries were too allowed to maintain the privileged "*yasakçılık*" duty that they had carried out since the Algiers conquest. Therefore, the Sultan had to favor the Janissaries although the marine-corps demanded the service.²⁵⁰

On the other hand the Muslims of Granada, unable to withstand the oppression of the Spanish administration, embarked on a large-scale rebellion in 1568. Furthermore, the Ottoman support sent by the Beylerbey of Algiers Uluç Ali Pasha had made things difficult for the Spaniards.²⁵¹ Thus, Philip II ordered Admiral Don Juan de Austria to stop the North African aid, although as Braudel stated, blockading the southern shores to foreign aid was a very laborious task. The aid from North Africa had reached a level where the corsairs exchanged a Christian captive for a musket.²⁵² Nonetheless a delegation from Granada arrived in the Sublime Porte to seek help from Sultan Selim but the Sultan, who mobilized his navy for the Cyprus campaign, promised that he could

²⁵⁰ Yusuf Sarınoy, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Cezayir* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2010), 16.

²⁵¹ The North African volunteers amounted to 4,000 alongside the Morisco forces. Carr, "Blood and Faith", 172.

²⁵² Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1063.

provide such assistance only after the conquest of the island.²⁵³ Hence, unable to find outside assistance, the rebellion was gradually suppressed and eventually the entire Morisco population was expelled from Spain in 1609.²⁵⁴

Apart from assisting the Morisco rebellion, Uluç Ali Pasha had annexed Tunis in 1570 by defeating the pro-Spanish Hafsid Sultan. However, the conquest remained incomplete as the Spanish garrison in La Goletta did not abandon the city. Uluç Ali requested additional support from the Sublime Porte in order to eject the Spaniards²⁵⁵ but the Donanma-yı Hümâyûn was put to sea for the Cyprus campaign and the conquest of Tunis could not be completed.

Even though the Ottoman corsairs had continued their activities in the western and central Mediterranean, the Viziers in the Sublime Porte had other priorities. While Sokollu Mehmed Pasha insisted on taking measures against the Russian threat, both Lala Mustafa Pasha and Piyale Pasha had supported the seizure of Cyprus.²⁵⁶ According to Ottoman sources, Cyprus was chosen as the primary objective since the Muslim

²⁵³ "Ammâ 'uzamâ-i erkân-ı devlet Cezîre-i Kıbrıs fethinin mühimmâtına mübâşeret sadedinde olmagın onlara cevâb gönderdiler. Hâlen kendümize akreb ve def'i husûsında ol kazıyyeden enseb bir mühimme dahi mübâşeret olunmuşdır. İnşa'allâh bu hizmet ber-taraf oldıktan sonar sizing mededinize dahi tonanma gönderelim deyu bildirdiler", 'Âlî Mustafa bin Ahmet and Çerçi Faris, *Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali Ve Kühü'l-Ahbâr'ında II. Selim, III. Murat Ve III. Mehmet Devirleri* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, 2000), 65.

²⁵⁴ Tabakoğlu Hüseyin Serdar, "Akdeniz'de Savaş", 240-241.

²⁵⁵ Haëdo, 143.

²⁵⁶ İnalçık, 164-165; Hammer-Purgstall, 123.

shipping was disrupted due to the pirate activity around the island.²⁵⁷ When inquired about this situation, Venice did not accept any responsibility for such incidents claiming that the pirate vessels came from Messina (i.e. Sicily) and Malta.²⁵⁸ Actually the events that support this view were based on the assault prior to the Malta campaign, where the St. John Knights had captured a ship where the sancakbey was also on board off Alexandria.²⁵⁹

It should be noted that these events occurred on a reciprocal basis. For instance, the documents demonstrate that the Ottomans frequently complained about the incompetency of the Venetian navy against the Uskok attacks.²⁶⁰ Eventually, in 1570, the Ottomans had declared war on Venice for the same reasons as in the Corfu and Malta campaign: to prevent the pirate attacks upon Muslim shipping. On the other hand, whenever the Ottoman shipyards made preparations for the naval season, the Venetians were alert for a possible Ottoman invasion. Indeed, after Sultan Selim's accession,

²⁵⁷ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Kıbrıs Fethi ile Lepant (İnebahtı) Muharebesi Sırasında Türk Devletile Venedik Ve Müttefiklerinin Faaliyetine Dair Bazı Hazinei Evrak Kayıtları," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 3 (2010): pp. 257-292, <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/172752>, 259.

²⁵⁸ "niçün böyle tugyân idersün dinildükde, bu fesâdâtı iden Misine ve Malta Cezîrelerinin gemileridir biz degiliz deyu ta'allul idüb" 'Âlî Mustafa bin Ahmet, "*Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali Ve Kühü'l-Ahbâr'ında II. Selim*", 67.

²⁵⁹ Balbi, 31. Selânikî mentions a different incident where Sultan Selim had already decided to conquer Cyprus before his accession: "şehzâdeliği hâlinde diyâr-ı Mısıryye'den murâd idindükleri tuhaf ve sükker ve pirinç ve at içün gönderdükleri âdemleri furtına ile deryadan halâs müyesser oldukda melâ'în-i bî-dîn sulh üzere iken atları vesâ'ir metâ'ı zabt idüp 'Şahzâdenün idüğü neden ma'lûm' diyüp ba'dehû niçe ihânetden sonra virmeğle vicdân-ı şerîfelerinde mukarrer olmuş idi."

²⁶⁰ See Gökbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler" and "Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar".

Venice was anxious if the Ottomans were going to attack Cyprus and only calmed when Piyale Pasha invaded Chios.²⁶¹ However, when the Sultan officially asked the Doge to surrender Cyprus, the Republic had no doubt. Thus, they would fight for their most valuable possession in the Eastern Mediterranean and seek allies from Europe.²⁶²

The first squadron of the Ottoman navy left Konstantiniyye for Cyprus in April 1570. Piyale Pasha, responsible for preventing enemies from landing their army on the island, and Kapudân-ı Deryâ Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha had sailed to Cyprus in May with an 84-piece fleet.²⁶³ Later, Serdâr Lala Mustafa Pasha, commander of the land forces, departed in May.²⁶⁴ Sultan Selim had warned Kapudan Pasha to listen to the experienced corsairs and to act unanimously.²⁶⁵ On the other hand, another Sultan decree ordering Pertev Pasha to recruit 300-400 oarsmen from each island (whether they were Christian or not) indicates that the oarsmen shortage in the navy had bothered the officials.²⁶⁶

²⁶¹ Capponi, *"Victory of the West"*, 119.

²⁶² Braudel, *"The Mediterranean"*, 1080.

²⁶³ Ali Pasha was appointed to the Kapudan Pasha post after his service as *Yeniçeri Ağası* at the siege of Zigetvar in 1566.

²⁶⁴ Selânikî, 77; Tabakoğlu, 241.

²⁶⁵ The Sultan must be addressing to the conflicts during the Malta campaign. "Donanma-i Hümâyûnum'da olan ümerâ vü ru'esâ ve sâyir ehl-i vukûf korsan kapudânlar ile istişâre eyleyüp hüsn-i ittifâk u ittihâd ile yek-dil ü yek-cihet olup" Binark İsmet and Osman Yıldırım, *12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978 - 979/1570 - 1572)*, vol. I (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 162.

²⁶⁶ "Donanma-i Hümâyûnum ile müteveccih oldugun taraflarda olan ba'zı cezîrelerden avârız ve kürekci henüz alınmayup zikrolan cezîrelerden keferesinün tahammüline göre her birinden üçer-dörder yüz kürekci alınup yanunda olan gemilerün noksân üzre olan kürekçileri tekmi'l olunmasın emridüp (...) Cezâyir-i mezbûrenün keferesin dahi harâc cem'ı bahânesiyle vech ü münâsib gördüğün üzre cem' u ihzâr itdürüp dahi elegireni kürege alıkoyasın", Binark and Yıldırım,

The Ottoman army had finally landed in Cyprus in July 1570. First, Nicosia was conquered after two months of siege. After this defeat, the whole island was overrun by the Ottoman troops (except Famagusta) which put up stiff resistance against the Turkish onslaught thanks to its well-fortified garrison. Finally as the winter season was approaching, the navy had returned to Konstantiniyye, leaving a small fleet behind. However, Lala Mustafa Pasha stated that there would be a mutiny among the soldiers since Famagusta could not be overwhelmed without proper naval support and requested additional artillery and ammunition from the Porte.²⁶⁷

Meanwhile, the corsair squadrons had been called to join the navy for the Cyprus expedition. They had ravaged the Adriatic coasts and through intelligence acquired from the captives who had been taken during the raids, the Sublime Porte had been informed about the enemy's movements.²⁶⁸ When the Porte found out that a Christian armada was forming under Pope Pius V's initiatives in order to assist the Venetian resistance in Cyprus, the Ottoman navy was ordered to search and destroy the enemy fleet.²⁶⁹ Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, on the other hand, tried to establish peace with the Venetians because he

"12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri", 236. Muslim oarsmen were generally preferred in galleys since non-Muslim oarsmen could often revolt.

²⁶⁷ "evvelki donanma gibi Donanma-i Hümâyûnum irişmez ise feth müyesser olmaduğundan gayri asker içinde küllî fetret ü ihtilâl zuhûrî mukarrer olup ve muhâsara içün altmış kıt'a top ve kırk aded kolonborna ve ana göre barut u âlât ve yarar topcı irsâli" Binark and Yıldırım, 164.

²⁶⁸ Dubrovnik, a tributary of the Ottomans, was also keeping the Sublime Porte posted about the latest developments in Europe. Binark and Yıldırım, 209.

²⁶⁹ The Sultan firmly ordered that the enemy navy, wherever it is, should be destroyed without hesitation. "küffâr-ı tugyân-âsârûn sefâyin-i hezîmet-karâyinleri her kande bulunursa tevakkuf eylemeyüp üzerlerine varup mukâbele vü mukâtele, muhârebe vü mücâdele idüp" Binark and Yıldırım, 283.

worried that a Holy League could be formed against the Ottomans.²⁷⁰ Indeed, Sokollu was right to fear this because the Venetians appealed to Pope Pious V to stop the Turkish invasion. For the Pope, who had been planning such a project, it was a golden opportunity. In fact, after his election in 1566, the Pope's priority was to bring together the Christian Kings under a Holy League against the Turks and invest money in the Spanish navy. Furthermore, the Pope believed that the only beneficiary of the past conflicts were the Turks since they had established an alliance with the French King and sown discord among the Christians.²⁷¹

Finally the Christian navy set forth to Cyprus but, after news reached that the Turks had overwhelmed the island and only a small Venetian garrison resisted in Famagusta, they had to alter the course. Although Philip II was obstinate about striking the North African regencies eventually, the allies decided to strike the Ottoman navy in the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁷² After a long and exhausting campaign season, the Ottoman navy had anchored in the port of Lepanto to rest and resupply before wintering in Konstantiniyye.²⁷³ Receiving the news, the Christian navy moved to Lepanto and the two navies met on 7 October 1571. Thus, the Ottoman war council was summoned so as to decide how to act against the enemy fleet. The corsair captains, including Uluç Ali

²⁷⁰ Uzunçarşılı, "*Kıbrıs Fethi*", 261.

²⁷¹ Braudel, 1029.

²⁷² Tabakoğlu, 253.

²⁷³ Soucek, 106.

Pasha, did not favor an engagement and warned Ali Pasha that the soldiers had been at sea for a long time and were preparing to return to their homes as the campaign season was coming to an end. Also, the ships were either in bad shape or lacked crew members.²⁷⁴ Therefore, if they fought, it would be better to stay in the harbor surrounded by the fortifications instead of fighting in the open sea.²⁷⁵ Neglecting the opposing views, Kapudan Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha had decided to engage in the Christian armada in accordance with the Sultan's orders.²⁷⁶ However, he was killed in the first phase of the battle. The collapsing of the center of the Ottoman navy manifested that the battle was lost for the Ottomans. Only Uluç Ali had managed to retain his squadron and reach the Sublime Porte.

3.7 Aftermath: Post-1571

The battle of Lepanto was a pyrrhic victory for the Holy League. While the Ottomans had lost over 30,000 men, the Christian fleet also suffered heavily: approximately 8,000 dead and 21,000 wounded. On the other hand, 3,500 Ottoman sailors were taken captive whereas 15,000 Christian oarsmen from Ottoman galleys were liberated. The allies had

²⁷⁴ "Uluç Ali Paşa cenge rızâ vermeyüp 'Donanmamız nâkısıdır, altı ay kadar deryâda gezmekle gemiler bozgunudur, sâbıkâ Körfez'den İnebahtı'ya dönüldükde dönüşdür' deyü sipâh ve yeniçeri icâzetli ve icâzetsiz dağılmışlardır" Kâtib çelebi, 173-174.

²⁷⁵ "Boğaz hisârlarından küffâr donanması içeri giremez, çıkılmak mahall-i hatardır"

²⁷⁶ "Ve kendüye gelen evâmirde 'Elbette küffârın donanması her kande ise üzerine varup mukâbil olasin ve illâ mu'âteb olursın' deyü fermân olunmağla cümle askeri kendi re'yine tâbî' kılup cengi mukarrer etdiler".

shared 130 Ottoman galleys as spoils in addition to the 70 vessels that they sank during the battle. At least Uluç Ali Pasha, due to bringing his 30-piece Algerian fleet back to Konstantiniyye, prevented the total annihilation of the navy and had then been rewarded with Kapudan Pasha's post and took the title of *Kılıç*.²⁷⁷ As a result, intensive work had begun to build a new navy in the shipyards. Despite the enormous losses of 1571, thanks to the vast resources of the Empire and efforts of Sokollu and Kılıç Ali, a 242-piece navy managed to set sail in the 1572 season.²⁷⁸

Besides the military efforts, it should also be noted that the Ottoman diplomats put great effort into splitting the Christian bloc. The Lepanto victory boosted morale in Europe, and using this as a tool, the Pope had started to negotiate with France and German princes to incorporate them into the Holy League. Yet, his efforts remained in vain. The French-Ottoman alliance especially bore fruit during the post-Lepanto era. France got involved in the Ottoman-Venetian peace talks and informed the German princes that if they stay neutral against the Turks, the Sultan will not harm them. Moreover, extending the eight-year armistice with Austria, Selim secured the western border of the Empire.²⁷⁹ The Venetians had already lost heart when they heard of the Ottoman recovery because the extension of war was beyond the means of the Republic as its lifeblood depended on the Levant trade. Hence, Venice signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1573 and the

²⁷⁷ Tabakoğlu, 265-266.

²⁷⁸ Kâtib Çelebi, 176.

²⁷⁹ İnalçık, 167-169.

Holy League was dissolved.²⁸⁰ Although the Ottomans had lost the battle, they revived through diplomatic maneuvers. Furthermore, the schism within the Holy League did not afford to carry out further operations to the Ottoman realm. Only the Spaniards applied their own agendas and recaptured Tunis in 1573. However, *Donanma-yı Hümâyûn* set sail in May 1574 and laid siege to Tunis. Finally, Tunis had been integrated into the Empire.²⁸¹

However, the defeat at Lepanto had revealed the deficits and the fragilities of the Ottoman maritime policy. Since Hayreddin Pasha's death, the Kapudan Pasha's office was given to the statesmen educated in the Enderûn who had zero experience in maritime matters. Since Piyale Pasha had worked in harmony with the corsairs and respected them as expert sailors, this policy did not create a problem during his term. Even though the Malta campaign had given the first signals of how fragile the Ottoman naval policy was when Kara Mustafa Pasha (also raised in Enderûn) led the campaign, this sharp contrast had surfaced in the battle of Lepanto once again and cost the Empire a lot. The Ottoman chroniclers unanimously agree upon the incompetence of Müezzinzade Ali Pasha and portray him as the scapegoat. For instance Kâtib Çelebi points out that although Ali Pasha was a competent and gallant commander, he was

²⁸⁰ Venice accepted the loss of Cyprus and guaranteed to pay 300,000 ducats as compensation. Soucek, 112.

²⁸¹ Tabakoğlu, 293-304.

restless as well as inexperienced in naval combats and had no idea about corsair's craft.²⁸²

Therefore Lepanto resulted from faulty maritime policies, which had not been reassessed after Hayreddin Pasha left the Kapudan Pasha office. The Ottoman statesmen raised from the Enderûn, which belittled Hayreddin Pasha as a vulgar pirate, also judged Turgut and Uluç Ali likewise and viewed them as pirates who provided nothing but slaves to the Porte. The slave flow to the Porte by the corsairs as *peşkeş* and quick victories such as in Djerba had covered up the fractures of the maritime policy.

²⁸² "Mezbûr kapudan nefsinde yarar ve mukdim idi lâkin deryâ cenglerini görmeyüp korsanlık fennini bilmez mütehevvir ve şedîd kimse idi" Kâtib Çelebi, 174. Mustafa Ali, another contemporary, also underlines that nobody is worthy of the Kapudan Pasha title unless he is a corsair. See. 'Âlî Mustafa and Şeker Mehmet, *Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Âlî Ve Mevâ'idü'n-Nefâis fî-kavâ'idü'l-mecâlis* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 228.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction, this thesis aimed to analyze the Ottoman corsairs and their role in the slave trade in the central Mediterranean, and the Ottoman maritime policy through the years between 1505 and 1571. The subject mainly covered Sultan Süleyman I's reign and renowned Ottoman corsair admirals such as Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha through archival documents and primary sources written by Ottoman and European contemporaries. The historiography particularly highlights the Ottoman corsairs as an auxiliary component. However, it is deduced that they constituted the backbone of the navy from the early years of the *Donanma-yı Hümâyûn*. Furthermore, although the researchers have produced significant studies on corsairs and slavery, the two notions are mostly handled separately; thus, further research is needed to shed light on the role of the corsairs in the slave trade. This thesis attempted to inspire future readers and researchers that there is much to investigate on this subject.

Since the Ottomans understood the necessity of becoming a naval power to survive against Christian rivals, they heavily invested in maritime policies (especially after the conquest of Konstantiniyye). During the reign of Bayezid II, freebooters were authorized

by the Sultan and became corsairs *en masse* to fight against the Venetians and eject them from their colonies in Aegean and Morea. This was crucial to secure the north-south sea trade, from the Black Sea to Cyprus and Egypt for the Empire's livelihood. Sultan Selim I achieved this goal in 1517 by eliminating the Mamelukes of Egypt. That was the beginning of the growing Ottoman maritime supremacy in the central-eastern Mediterranean and marked what would be the Ottoman maritime policy in the 16th century. Finally, until the Empire had a dispute with Venice in 1645 over Crete, Selim II managed to secure the eastern Mediterranean annexing Cyprus in 1571. What is more, after the Barbarossa brothers established their rule in Tunis and Algiers, the Ottoman administration penetrated the central and western Mediterranean, growing corsair influence fertilized the technical and strategic abilities of the navy together with increasing slavery activity for the Sublime Porte. Due to the Ottoman failure to build a competitive navy and thanks to handsome rewards to the Sultan, Hayreddin was called to Istanbul. He modernized Donanma-yı Hümâyûn upon his arrival at the Sublime Porte in 1533, but his presence disturbed the Palace bureaucrats as they did not want a vulgar pirate as the kapudan pasha.

The Ottoman perception towards the pirates/corsairs should be discussed here. For instance, there was no significant difference between pirate and corsair for the Ottomans and all kinds of raids were considered "*helal*" as long as the Sultan authorized them.²⁸³

²⁸³ Joshua M. White, "*Piracy and Law in the Ottoman Mediterranean*", 32.

Ottoman historiography has always evaluated the Ottoman corsairs within the "gazi thesis" and has portrayed them as holy warriors who spread Islam. The same goes for the western scholars who considered the Christian corsairs as anti-muslim warriors who defended Christianity against Islam. Therefore, corsairs were much more complex than it seems. As White puts it, we should ask "when" rather than "who or what" while defining a pirate.²⁸⁴

So much so that there is an inconsistency in Ottoman documents in this regard, and even the Ottoman vocabulary does not contain a definite expression of piracy while European sources clearly distinguish a pirate and a corsair. For example the word *levend* was frequently used for freebooters independent from the state authority but it was also used to describe a bandit in the second half of the 16th century, conveying a negative connotation.²⁸⁵ On the other hand Ottoman contemporaries' thoughts varied on corsairs, and instead of their religious missions, they assessed them in terms of their social effects and their function within the Ottoman state's body. Mustafa 'Âlî, a 16th century Ottoman contemporary, revealed his thoughts considering the illegal actions against Ottoman subjects imposed by the corsairs.²⁸⁶ Their negative reputation applied to Hayreddin Pasha as well, and the corsair admirals were not appointed to the kapudan pasha office after his death as they were banished from the center.

²⁸⁴ White, 2.

²⁸⁵ White, 32-33. See also, Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (İstanbul: Çelikkilt Matbaası, 1965), 170-188.

²⁸⁶ White, 30.

In the third chapter, the Ottoman strategy of appointing the kapudan pasha is discussed and demonstrated that the Ottoman administration had to appeal to the corsairs only in case of a calamity (such as the defeat at Lepanto). However, contrary to the standard view, Ottoman maritime policy revealed its fragility during the siege of Malta in 1565. A similar episode did not occur in Malta for two reasons. The first reason was the unpreparedness of the Spaniards. When Garcia Toledo proposed to strike the Ottoman navy, Philip II refused to do so and kept his fleet at all costs. After Djerba, the Spaniards had built up a strong fleet to confront the Ottoman navy until the opportunity had risen in 1571. The second reason was the neutrality of Venice. The Republic had remained neutral during the Malta campaign so as to maintain the Levant trade. They had only broken their neutrality when the Ottomans declared war and they joined the Holy League.

Moreover, although the Ottoman historians considered the conquest of Cyprus necessary due to pirate activities and the island's strategic location, they did not emphasize enough that the Ottoman state adjusted its goals in the central and western Mediterranean as the Empire had stretched too thin. It is true that, as Inalcık highlights, Sultan Süleyman's

idea to become God's shadow on earth to make the Empire a global power had collapsed.²⁸⁷

However it should be questioned how realistically this project is implemented, if nothing else, through corsair and maritime policy. For instance, Uluç Ali's efforts fueling the Morisco revolt to culminate the paranoia of a second Muslim invasion in Spain and the conquest of Tunis in 1570 were ignored on the excuse of the Cyprus expedition. The Ottoman Empire found a second chance to embark on a full-scale operation in Malta, clinching its superiority over the central Mediterranean, but that was not prioritized by the Porte.

Lepanto is the result of this political deviation. Ottoman sultans did not consider the Ottoman corsairs within the framework of a master plan. Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha could only place himself under the dome thanks to his political ability and exceptional commandership. He constantly terrorized the infidels at sea and provided slaves to the Porte. Therefore, the corsairs were integrated into the imperial structure as a profitable enterprise and thus the corsair initiative in North Africa found itself an aegis.

²⁸⁷ İnalçık, 168.

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APPENDIX




Figure 1: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi No: 635/1

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