

SECURITY REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

A Master's Thesis

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of this thesis is to provide an examination of regional security cooperation in Central Asia. The last resurgence of regionalism became a driving force for regional cooperation in Central Asia. In this process, the role of major powers, regional security threats and international system is very crucial. The aim of this thesis is to provide a deep assessment of these determinants.

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and small Central Asian regional security initiatives were evaluated in this thesis. Due to that, the role of three major powers, Russia, the US and China in Central Asian regional security is studied in this work.

This thesis emphasized on the current developments especially after the September 11 attacks. The US operation on Afghanistan following September 11 attacks accelerated regional cooperation in Central Asia.

Contrary to the mainstream literature based on realist theory, focus on the competition between major powers for influence in the Central Asian region. This thesis argues that Central Asian security needs and major powers pragmatic concerns in the region coincide with the increasing regionalism approaches in the world politics. This coincidence will increase regional cooperation on security affairs. Moreover, major power cooperation will replace major powers competition in order to provide stability and security in the world and particularly in Central Asia.

Key Words: Regionalism, Security Regionalism, Central Asia, Regional cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, NATO PfP.

ÖZET

ORTA ASYA’DA GÜVENLİK BÖLGESELLİĞİ

Akın, Berivan

Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Hasan Ali Karasar

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Bu tezin amacı Orta Asya’da bölgesel güvenlik işbirliği incelemesi sağlamaktır. Bölgesellik kavramının en son yükselişi, Orta Asya bölgesel işbirliği için bir itici güç oldu. Bu süreçte, büyük güçler, bölgesel güvenlik tehditleri ve uluslararası sistemin rolü çok önemlidir. Bu tezin amacı bu belirleyicilerin bu süreçteki rolünü değerlendirmektir.

Kolektif Güvenlik Antlaşması Örgütü (KGAÖ), Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü (ŞİÖ), NATO’nun Barış İçin Ortaklık (BİO) ve küçük boyutlarda Orta Asya bölgesel güvenlik girişimleri bu tezde değerlendirildi. Bu nedenle, üç büyük güçler, Rusya, ABD ve Çin’in, Orta Asya’nın bölgesel güvenliğindeki rolü bu çalışıldı. Bu tez son gelişmeleri, özellikle 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonrasındaki dönemin atlı çizildi. 11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından yapılan Afganistan’daki Amerikan operasyonu, Orta Asya bölgesel işbirliği hızlandırmıştır.

Orta Asya bölgesinde nüfuz rekabetinin büyük güçler arasındaki çatışmaya sebep olacağını iddia eden hakim literatür realist teoriye dayanmaktadır. Bu tez Orta Asya güvenlik ihtiyaçları ve büyük güçlerin faydacı çıkarları ile dünya siyasetinde giderek artan bölgesel yaklaşımların ortak paydada buluştuğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu tesadüf güvenlik meseleleri üzerinde bölgesel işbirliğini artıracaktır. Öte yandan, Dünya’da ve özellikle Orta Asya’da istikrar ve güvenliği sağlamak için büyük güç işbirliği büyük güçler rekabet yerini alacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgesellik, Güvenlik bölgeselliği, Orta Asya, Bölgesel işbirliği, Kolektif Güvenlik Antlaşması Örgütü, Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü, NATO'nun Barış İçin Ortaklık.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to provide an examination of the regional security cooperation in Central Asia that considers current developments especially September 11 attacks to the United States. The dissolution of the Soviet Union overlapped with the last resurgence of regionalism and this became a driving force for regional cooperation in Central Asia. However, especially the US operation on Afghanistan accelerated regional cooperation. Old regional security cooperation such as Collective Security Treaty (CST) and Shanghai Five reorganized and became new security organizations for being suitable to the new security environment in the region. Furthermore, NATO PfP program increased its bilateral relations with Central Asian partners.

The research question of this thesis is that of whether Central Asia could be evolved into a regional security complex and whether regional cooperation organization and major powers play positive or negative roles in this process. A regional approach that covers major power politics and organizations sponsored by them is necessary for a region, which shares mutual security threats. Mutual security threats connect Central Asian states to each other. The aim of this thesis is to provide

a deep assessment of the role of major powers and regional organizations to the security regionalism in Central Asia.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of fifteen new states in diverse regions of Eurasia. In Central Asia, five new nation-states declared their independence consecutively: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. These declarations ended nearly 130 years of Russian and Soviet rule; however, uncertainty was widespread in the aftermath. By signing Alma-Ata Declaration, Central Asia's newly independent states became founding members¹ of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which replaced the Soviet Union in December of 1991.² This declaration defined the CIS as "a community of independent and sovereign states" and underlined that the commonwealth was not to be "a political union, federation or confederation."³ The euphoria of independence flourished in such circumstances, but the old system ended with many new questions unanswered. For this reason, independence was not an end in itself, only a means in the hands of those newly emerged nation-states.⁴

In a certain sense Central Asian states were alone and faced with difficulties in the transition to democracy and market economies as part of an international system which was itself passing through a period of transformation. This coincided with the international resurgence of regionalism. The last resurgence of regionalism in 1980s, which is called second wave of regionalism, provided an opportunity for regional cooperation in Central Asia. Central Asian states welcomed this

¹ Only Turkmenistan decreased its full membership to associate member in August 2005. See Valentinas Mite, "Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty." August 29, 2005. <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/26DAB4C9-5BA1-4193-86E7-62FC991F8A6C.html> (accessed April 7, 2008).

² Roy Allison, and Christoph Bluth, *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 1.

³ Gregory Gleason, 'Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.53, No.7, 2001, pp. 1077-1095.

⁴ Gregory Gleason, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, (Colorado: Westview Pres, 1997), p. 4.

development with a view to overcoming the difficulties of political and economic transition. However, regional cooperation was neither a remedy for all the problems in the region nor did the establishment of effective regional cooperation come easily. This troublesome period was affected by several different dynamics. Cooperative and conflicting dynamics within the region combined with regional power politics and major powers created a prototypical region with respect to the examination of regionalism a phenomenon.

Power politics was one of the central determinants in this process. Central Asian states were historically bound to each other and dependent on Russia. Moreover, as an area secluded from the Western bloc during Soviet rule, Central Asia's untapped energy resources and newly opened markets drew international attention. Regional security threats, which threatened world stability, posed another concern for global and regional powers. For this reason, Central Asia was closely observed by the major powers: Russia, China, the EU and USA, and regional powers such as Iran and Turkey and to some extent Pakistan and India.

During the 1990s, the academia experienced a boom regarding the subject of regionalism. Broadly defined, regionalism involving political, economic and security cooperation began to be used as a concept by many different fields. In international relations, regionalism has specific consequences for politics, economics and security. However, this thesis emphasizes regional cooperation on security issues while nonetheless observing that the conceptualization of security is difficult and changes over time. This thesis aims to survey emerging security challenges in the world, which exceed the limits of a realist conceptualization of security.

Many theoretical studies have appeared on the topic of security-based regionalism while regional case studies have also considerably increased in number.

One of the most important regions in the post-Soviet period was Central Asia. The most comprehensive study of this area is “Central Asian Security: The New International Context” by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson. This work aimed “to analyze the changing security policy challenges in Central Asia since Russia became more disengaged from the region in the mid-to late 1990s, and to discuss the security policy relevance of the expanding network of relationships between Central Asian states and regional and international powers”.⁵ It broadly emphasizes the internal and external dynamics in this process. It analyzes major powers and regional powers and extends the scope of security concerns to new challenges such as radical Islam, the problem of sharing natural resources, and energy security. However, this valuable study, written in 2001, tries to clarify security cooperation in the region. However, it overlooked some crucial events for Central Asia such as the September 11 attacks and the recovery of Russian power in the region. For this reason, their claims are based on the disengagement of Russia from the region. However, in a recent article Anna Matveeva explains the Russians’ return to the region by underlining changes in the foreign policy from less intensive “Near Abroad” policy to the more assertive stance adopted by Russia especially in the second term of President Putin with the overall improvement of conditions in Russia.⁶ The author claims that the return of Russian power to the region is related to the increasing American and Western advances toward the area after the September 11 attacks. Neil Macfarlane’s article also deserves attention concerning this point. He emphasizes American foreign policy in the region and notes on American attitude towards regionalism in Central Asia. He suggests that American policy could not develop regionalism in Central

⁵ Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2001), p. 4.

⁶ Anna Matveeva, “Return to Heartland: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia”, *The International Spectator* 42:1, March 2007, pp. 43-44.

Asia. The author summarized American aims as “to the limited extent that the United States displays interest in structures of regional cooperation, and in a manner similar to other external powers, it seeks to promote structures of multilateral cooperation which enjoys a dominant position. It largely ignores cooperative structures emerging within the region, and is wary of structures where other powers are preponderant”.⁷ In 2004, Roy Allison renewed his approach towards the Russian role in Central Asia in his article, “Regionalism and regional structures and security management in Central Asia”. The author took into consideration the reassertion of Russian power and used this development in his assessment of security-related regionalism in Central Asia. He concluded that the weakness of security-related regionalism is not only related to local states and their leaders but to the factors beyond their control.⁸

China, another major power in the equation, has attempted to consolidate its role by developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China had tried to demonstrate to the world community that its presence is indispensable for Central Asian security. In his article, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” Russell Ong underlined this assessment particularly in China’s approach towards security issues. He advocated a broader concept of security beyond military security: his study covers political and economic security as well. Furthermore, he stresses great power competition and the role of China in this competition for understanding Chinese security interests in the region.⁹

This great powers competition in the region is known as the “New Great Game,” a reference to the 19th century competition between the British and Russian

⁷ Neil S. Macfarlane, “The United States and regionalism in Central Asia”, *International Affairs*, 80, 3, 2004, p. 460.

⁸ Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structure and Security Management in Central Asia”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No.3, 2004, pp.482-483.

⁹ Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interest in Central Asia”, *Central Asian Survey*, (December, 2005) 24 (4), pp. 425-437.

Empires. However, this comparison is not based on concrete evidence or on an academic approach. It is rather a speculative assessment that aims to increase the world's attention to the region. With respect to this point Lutz Kleveman's "The New Great Game: Blood and Oil" should be mentioned. This book tries to associate current competition for energy resources in the region with the historical Great Game. Although, the author did attempt to prove his assessments to some degree, the work is speculative, not academic.¹⁰

Contrary to the mainstream literature based on realist theory, which focuses on the competition between major powers for influence in the Central Asian region, this thesis argues that Central Asian security needs and pragmatic concerns of major powers with respect to the region coincide with the increase of regional approaches in world politics. This coincidence, I argue, will further increase regional cooperation on security affairs. Moreover, I believe the cooperation of major power will replace competition in order to provide stability and security both generally and especially in Central Asia.

The present thesis contains five chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter provides an overview of regionalism and security-based regional cooperation. The resurgence of regionalism is an important determinant in the development of Central Asian security and for this reason, it is crucial to understand its historical and theoretical background. Furthermore, before undertaking a case study of regional security cooperation in Central Asia, it is necessary to deeply investigate the theoretical base of regional security cooperation. A detailed analysis of Barry Buzan's "Regional Security Complex Theory" provides the required groundwork for responding to the question of whether Central Asian States can

¹⁰ Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia*, (New York: Grove Press, 2003)

create a regional security complex. A part of this chapter evaluates Central Asian security threats such as radical Islam, terrorism, the sharing of natural resources, and trans-border organized crime. Furthermore, a detailed examination of role of these issues in the evolution of a regional security complex and their impact on the relations of Central Asian states is necessary to answer the question of whether Central Asia could become a regional security complex without the sponsorship of external powers.

The third chapter discusses the evolution of regional security cooperation in Central Asia. Regional organizations will be divided into two parts: the cooperative regional security structures in Greater Eurasia, and Central Asian regional cooperative structures. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are sponsored by major powers, while the Central Asian Economic Community and some smaller organizations are Central Asian States initiatives. In this chapter, the historical background of such organizations, their aims, and the most recent events is examined. This chapter also considers response these structures to regional security challenges, a key determinant in understanding the role of these structures in the development of a regional security complex in Central Asia.

Chapter four analyzes the role of major powers in Central Asian security structures. It emphasizes the place of Russia, China, and the USA as major powers. Hegemonic sponsorships have had different effects on the regionalism in Central Asia. Therefore, the role of USA, Russia and China is significant in this process. Some academics have defined the relations between these powers as competitive and termed this competition a “New Great Game.” The conclusion responds to this claim.

Chapter six, by way of conclusion attempts to join the theoretical background with the historical realities.

CHAPTER II

REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL SECURITY:

A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Regionalism

After the end of the Cold War, regionalism became one of the outstanding subjects in academic circles. In the social sciences, this led to the increase in the study of regionalism in many different fields such as international relations, international economics, European studies, and international political economy. The conceptualization of regionalism differs widely in these spheres. Regionalism is a concept that evokes different things to different people.¹¹ This thesis based its assumptions of regionalism on those adopted in the area of international relations.

In this context, many old terms and phenomena have increased in importance and renewed the meaning of regionalism as being suitable to the new international sphere that was shaped after the end of the Cold War. In this process, the concept of a “New Regionalism” attracted considerable attention. To understand the concept of

¹¹ Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, *New Political Economy*, Vol.1, No: 4, Dec. 2005, p. 543.

“New Regionalism” it is crucial to appreciate the path of regionalism’s progress. The second part of this chapter considers the historical background of regionalism. Before analyzing the historical background, it is critical to understand the conceptualization of regionalism. Therefore, the first part of this chapter summarizes the definitions of regionalism by different academics and offers an original conceptualization of regionalism. Academic circles have disregarded the theoretical developments of regionalism and so theories of regionalism newly separated from the classical theories of international relations have developed. The third part of this chapter provides a brief summary of theoretical background of regionalism. In the concluding part, the different dimensions of regionalism are summarized by way of explanation before the final section on security regionalism.

2.1.1 The Conceptualization of Regionalism

It has to be underlined that defining concepts of region, regionalism, and regionalization is often complicated. What emerged from these concepts is that region and even region does not have a standard definition. After summarizing the main approaches to these concepts, I offer a coherent conceptualization.

The notion of a region in international relations is different from its pure geographical definition context based on a simple territorial concept. A basic definition of a region is a limited number of states connected to each other by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence.¹²

¹² Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544.

A more comprehensive approach as defined by Björn Hettne includes in addition to the definition mentioned above, the sharing of common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds.¹³ Louise Fawcett argues for a more flexible definition and defined regions as “units or zones based on groups, states or territories whose members share some identifiable traits. A central character of such zones is that they are smaller than the international system of states but larger than any individual state or non-state unit; they may be permanent or temporary, institutionalized or not”.¹⁴ In this respect, the definition of regions ought to incorporate commonality, interaction, and the possibility of cooperation.¹⁵ Additionally, Andrew Hurrell claims that there are no natural regions or natural definitions of region. The critical point is how political actors perceive and interpret a region because “all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested”.¹⁶

An important contribution to the definition of region appeared in a study of Raimo Vayrynen. He divided regions into physical and functional categories. According to Vayrynen physical regions refer to territorial, military, and economic areas that are primarily controlled by states, while functional regions incorporate non-territorial factors such as culture and markets that are often under the influence of non-state actors.¹⁷

The present thesis bases its assumptions on a minimal definition of region as a specific geographical area, whether designed according to national territories or not. A region according to this definition is required to possess a mutual interdependence

¹³ Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544.

¹⁴ Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective” in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove, (eds), *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.24.

¹⁵ Fawcett, “Regionalism from a Historical Perspective”, p.24.

¹⁶ Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in theoretical perspective’ in Louise Fawcett, and Andrew Hurrell (eds), *Regionalism in World Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 38-39.

¹⁷ Raimo Vayrynen, ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, *International Studies Review*, (2003), 5, p. 27.

within these units. The level of interdependence is not important, this only affects the level of regional integration not the existence of a region itself. Regions are not limited by the territories of states; rather it is possible that they will include only some parts of a state. One should note that regions are not natural or given but they are creations. Therefore, they might disintegrate and reintegrate due to changes at the national, regional, or international level.¹⁸

At this point, it is important to distinguish a region from a regional organization. Regional organizations are formal, state creations that promote cooperation in an arena for their shared interests. However, regions are real, not merely formal.¹⁹

Generally, the terms “regionalism” and “regionalization” are used interchangeably. Consequently, it is desirable to distinguish regionalization from regionalism even though there is no consensus on the conceptualization of these terms. Andrew Hurrell defines regionalization as “the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction”.²⁰ He argued that regionalization is not necessarily a conscious policy of state(s) and could overlap with national boundaries.²¹

Björn Hettne defines regionalism as a both a tendency and a political commitment to arrange the world in terms of regions: clearly, regionalism is a specific regional project and that project can be based on states or not.²² According to him, regionalization is more complex than the processes of forming regions consciously planned or spontaneously occurring. Moreover, he has augmented the

¹⁸ Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Söderbaum, ‘Theorizing the Rise of Regionness’, *New Political Economy*, Vol.5, No: 3, 2000, p. 461-462.

¹⁹ Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544.

²⁰ Hurrell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, p. 39

²¹ Hurrell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, p. 40

²² Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, p. 545

scholarly literature by formulating the concept of region building. This signifies “the ideas, dynamics and means that contribute to changing a geographical area into a politically constructed community”.²³

According to Andrew Hurrell; “Regionalism is an extremely complex and dynamic process founded upon not one but a series of interacting and often competing logics – logics of economic and technological transformation and societal integration; logics of power-political competition; logics of security (both interstate and societal); and logics of identity and community”.²⁴ To understand the process of regionalism and to predict the outcome of this process is difficult because of these multiple and competing rationales. Within the process of regionalism, there are states and non-state actors that complicate the process of this project. The target of this policy is to pursue and promote common goals in some areas of concern.²⁵ However, because of its complexity, it is not easy to predict the result.

Two concepts that are generally confused are “regional cooperation” and “regional integration.” Regional cooperation is based on individual nation states’ interests, and this process involves the accommodation of those interests by all partners. Regional integration on the other hand includes the idea of sharing national sovereignty.²⁶

The present thesis views regionalism as a state-led program and strategy, which may or may not lead to formal institution building and regionalization. This process paves the way for patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity, and convergence in a geographical area exceeding the territorial delimitation of states.²⁷

²³ Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, p. 545

²⁴ Andrew Hurrell, ‘One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study of international society’, *International Affairs*, 83:1 (2007), p. 130.

²⁵ Fawcett, “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective”, p.24.

²⁶ Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, p. 545.

²⁷ Hettne, and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness”, p. 458.

However, it is crucial to stress that in this world order, regionalism projects are generally limited by state territories; however, the increase in globalization will alter this.

2.1.2 The Historical Background of Regionalism

Regionalism became a prominent concept in the study of international relations after the end of the Second World War. Although very few regional groupings existed before the Second World War, it would be premature to talk about a conceptualization of regionalism. After the end of the war, the Cold War replaced the old European order. Three centuries of a multipolar structure of the international system focused on Europe disappeared and a bipolar system emerged.²⁸ The world was divided between two camps headed by two superpowers – the USA and USSR–, which were competing for areas of influence.

Initially this world system increased not only the importance of regions for the superpowers but also the assertiveness and self-consciousness of regions themselves.²⁹ The increasing importance of the region as a unit of analysis also appeared in the charter of the United Nations (UN) that tried to encourage new hopes that had evaporated because of the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the war. Idealist approaches drew a picture of a new world system in which regional

²⁸ Birthe Hansen, and Bertel Heurlin, *The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 1.

²⁹ Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 12.

agencies would be the first resort in dealing with disputes among its members and would support the UN.³⁰

A subordinate and secondary role was assigned to regions and regionalism in post-war period, which generated a reaction towards nation states and nationalism.³¹ However, the UN was paralyzed by East-West rivalry, and puppet regional agencies replaced early utopian expectations with a realist understanding that international agencies could perform only modest services when everything is bound to a power struggle.³² Even regional organizations were dependent on the superpowers and their roles in the game were determined by their rivalry. This remains an important precedent for regionalism.

The main effect of bipolarity on regions and regional powers was to deprive them of independence and self-sufficiency.³³ Nevertheless, the steady growth and expansion of interdependence during the Cold War period unquestionably generated an institutional and regional momentum that has enveloped the world and influenced each state's behavior at some level.³⁴ This momentum continued to spread into new and diverse fields.³⁵

Under the Cold War system, regionalism and regionalization demonstrated some fluctuations and consequently the metaphor of regional "waves" emerged.³⁶ This is a reference to waves of democratization. This idea suggests the first major

³⁰ Fawcett and Hurell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, p. 12.

³¹ Hurell, p. 129.

³² Fawcett and Hurell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 12-13.

³³ Richard Rosecrance, "Regionalism and the post-Cold War era", *International Journal*, summer 1991, p. 373.

³⁴ Louise Fawcett, "Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism", *International Affairs*, 80, 3, 2004, pp. 430-431

³⁵ Fawcett, "Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism", p. 431.

³⁶ See e.g. Fawcett and Hurell *Regionalism in World Politics*, Mansfield, Edward D., and Milner, Helen V., "The New Wave of Regionalism", *International Organization* 53, 3, summer 1999, pp. 589-627, Farrell, Hettne and Langenhove, *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, Hurell, "One world? Many worlds? : The place of regions in the study of international society", pp.127-146

wave of regionalism occurred during 1960s and the second one that we know as the “new regionalism” started in the late 1980s. However, this is an oversimplification. Regional activities increased when the international system was more ambiguous and uncertain in Cold War period. During these times, countries were searching for new foreign policy options that were independent of superpowers. Indeed, these power vacuums were generally not lasting. As a result, such waves of regionalism involved dreams and disappointments. Under a rigid bipolar system, regional organizations are usually under the influence and control of one superpower. Although in a unipolar or multipolar world system regional settings have more room to maneuver, this does not mean that they are independent of the international system.

The notion of “waves” of regionalism did not take into consideration the resurgence of regionalism in Third World during 1970s under the Cold War system but contrary to its fundamental structure based on East-West rivalry. This was an appeal for an independence movement in Third World countries, which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned movement and the Group of 77.³⁷

Generally, regionalism was seen as a “southern” concept because under-developed and developing states needed regional organizations to acquire a seat and the right to speak. “For weaker states regionalism has provided a point of entry into a western dominated order in which their interests are often perceived as marginalized, and also a forum where interaction and agenda setting are possible”.³⁸ However, Third World regionalism is different because this challenges the system, as a whole while on the other hand the aim of those countries in the latter example is to become a part of the system. In addition, it is a common belief that regional organizations are always disposable for major powers when their national interests are at stake. Still,

³⁷ Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism”, p. 437.

³⁸ Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism”, p. 439.

regionalism is currently a trend and for this reason, states take part in this process because “regionalism may provide a mere veneer of respectability and legitimacy to traditional state endeavor”.³⁹

The Cold War was a key period for regionalism and regionalization. These concepts were instructive not only in economic integration and in institutional development, but also in balancing power, non-alignment and the development of security communities. During this time, many new actors entered the international scene, which also had a regional focus, such as transnational and non- governmental actors, multinational corporations, and aid agencies, which together shifted the normative frame of regional operations. Many regional organizations of the time survived the end of the Cold War and they adapted their agendas and even their charters to the new international system, which was evolving new economic and security architecture.⁴⁰

At the end of the Cold war, the world displayed simultaneous examples of integration and fragmentation. On the one hand, the Soviet Union collapsed and new states emerged, on the other, an intensified interest in regionalism caused the appearance of cooperative arrangements and resulted in integration through either formal or informal institutions.⁴¹ Although the end of the Cold War offered new scope and opportunity for regional organizations, limitations and constraints on regional behavior did not disappear. The number and range of regional organizations increased when the international system was decentralized and the overlay of superpower dominance was removed. The USA emerged the winner of the Cold War but the establishment of a new international system takes time. Whether the present

³⁹ Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism”, p. 439.

⁴⁰ Fawcett, “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism”, p. 438.

⁴¹ Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove, *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p. 1.

international system is unipolar or multipolar is yet unclear. Nonetheless, the end of the bipolar system led to the restoration of regional sovereignty.⁴²

At the end of the 1980s, the success of European integration and changes in the international system resulted in a favorable environment for regional initiatives. Regional options became appealing to leaders and the number of regional structures increased. This latest resurgence of regionalism in the late 1980s was termed the “New Regionalism” and has different traits from the “Old Regionalism.” However, it is important to emphasize that regionalism did not reveal sharp distinctions. Rather this process was similar to an evolution. Under a different international system, the effects of globalization shaped the New Regionalism.

The number, scope, and diversity of regionalizing structures grew significantly in this period.⁴³ The resurgence of interest in regionalism after the end of the Cold War was not limited by the European example. Instead, momentum increased in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.⁴⁴ The New Regionalism has a multidimensional, multiactor and multilevel character in a globalized context. One of the main differences from the Old Regionalism is this structural complexity.⁴⁵ During the Cold War, every level of analysis – national, regional, international– was bound to the international system. With the end of the Cold War, both the character and functions of regions experienced a major transformation. Changes in the international system have had tremendous effects on the structural relationship between the global, regional and national context.⁴⁶

In this new international system, small powers are not mere puppets of superpowers and the foreign policy options of these powers were enlarged. The Old

⁴² Rosecrance, p. 374.

⁴³ Fawcett and Hurrell, *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 11-12.

⁴⁴ Farrell, Hettne, and Langenhove, p. vii.

⁴⁵ Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 543.

⁴⁶ Vayrynen, p. 25.

Regionalism had specific objectives but the New Regionalism is multifaceted and more comprehensive than the older paradigm.⁴⁷ On an institutional level, the new regionalism is also different from its predecessor. In some cases, the formal and in other cases, the informal structures of institutions are important characteristics of the New Regionalism.

The international system was under the remarkable influence of globalization during the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s. The relationship between regionalism and globalization is an important determinant in the success of regionalism. There are two different ideas regarding the relationship between regionalism and globalization: regionalism is described either as a challenge to globalization or as an element of globalization.⁴⁸ It is clear that regionalizing initiatives retain the fear of negative effects of globalization but this is not in itself a challenge. The New Regionalism is not based on mercantile policies that try to protect national interests, but rather aims to increase the national role in the new international system by means of regionalism. This characteristic likewise distinguishes the New and Old Regionalisms. Moreover, the relationship between regional structures is also crucial for the success of regionalism. Cooperative relationships instead of conflicting ones will provide opportunities for regional initiatives. However, it is impossible to be free from the competitive nature of international relations. Nevertheless, conflicts will harm regional structures and will lead to protectionist policies.

To sum up, regionalism has demonstrated fluctuations due to changes in the international system and according to the region that is analyzed. Consequently, it is

⁴⁷ James H. Mittelman, 'Rethinking the "New Regionalism" in the Context of Globalization', *Global Governance*, 2 (1996), p. 192.

⁴⁸ Mittelman, p. 189.

necessary to understand the historical evolution of regionalism in order to analyze instances like the Central Asian regional security structures.

2.1.3 Theoretical Background of Regionalism

Without touching upon the debate about theory, this section will provide a brief assessment of theories on regionalism. Such theories are divided in two parts like the so-called “waves” of regionalism that is the models of the Old and New Regionalism.

Early debates regarding regionalism were guided by three theories: federalism, functionalism, and neofunctionalism.⁴⁹ These theories or approaches are European-based because they did not include a global understanding because of the fact that in this period, European integration alone represented a successful project of regionalism. However, in the New Regionalism, it is essential to have a global theory of regionalism. It is important to note that academic circles do not in fact adequately study the theoretical background of the New Regionalism. Case studies are more popular. For this reason, it is too soon to talk about a theory of regionalism but we can indicate what we should expect from it. A theory of New Regionalism cannot include only emerging regions. It must refer to world order in transformation and the emergence of a multilevel pattern of world governance. “The New Regionalism Theory has to explain the world order that makes processes of regionalization

⁴⁹ Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, p. 546.

possible or even necessary and the world order that may result from new regionalisms in interaction.”⁵⁰

Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw made a valuable contribution to the theorizing of regionalism in their books *Theories of New Regionalism*. In the introduction, Söderbaum enumerated two different categories of theories. The first one distinguishes theories of international relations as having either a rationalist or reflectivist approach. Rationalist theories are represented by neorealism or neoliberalism, whereas reflectivist theories cover a range of theories such as critical theory, post-structuralism, normative theory, historical sociology, postmodernism and feminism. The other system of categorization classifies theories of international relations as problem solving and critical, like that of Robert Cox., Söderbaum further explores theories of regionalism. He defines the dominant approach in the study of regionalism as that of rationalist problem solving with an emphasis on national interests, security, and regional power politics. On the other hand, the neoliberal, institutionalist approach places an emphasis on the role of institutions and regional organizations for managing interdependencies and achieving collective interests in a region. Neorealists put forward structural and power-oriented variables, whereas neoliberal institutionalists ground their assumptions on the regulating of institutions, particularly in intergovernmental regional organizations. Reflectivist and critical approaches increased their share in this discussion since the mid-1990s.⁵¹ “These approaches challenge core rationalist/ problem solving features, such as the separation of subject and object, fact and value, state centric ontology and rationalist epistemology. There are a large number of different critical/reflectivist theory on

⁵⁰ Hettne and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness”, p. 458.

⁵¹ Fredrik Söderbaum, and Timothy M. Shaw, *Theories of New Regionalism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 9-10.

regionalism, their common denominator is their dissatisfaction with mainstream and rationalist theories.”⁵²

2.1.4 Types of Regionalism

The main subject of Old and New Regionalism was economic regionalism, namely trade blocs. However, with the resurgence of new regionalism there appeared new dimensions such as monetary regionalism, developmental regionalism, and security regionalism.⁵³

2.1.4.1 Trade Blocs

The role of trade blocs in the regionalizing process is shaped by its aims. Some trade blocs aim to develop protectionist policies, while some trade blocs support integration with global trade and the development of a market economy. Under the New Regionalism, the generally protectionist policies of Old Regionalism were replaced by integrationist policies because of the necessities of the new international system. In this period the relations between trade blocs is crucial. For the success of a regionalism project, they must be cooperative rather than conflicting.

⁵² Söderbaum, and Shaw, pp. 9-10.

⁵³ Hettne, pp. 550-551.

2.1.4.2 Monetary Regionalism

The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 showed that a financial crisis could have a global effect in a globalized world and necessitate global responses. However, developing a global response is not easy. Moreover, global responses are generally serve the major powers and do not really take into account the circumstances of weak countries. Therefore, for the first time in history regional organizations outside Europe developed regional approaches to financial issues.⁵⁴ This crisis played an important role in monetary regionalism.

2.1.4.3 Developmental Regionalism

Developmental regionalism means a regional grouping, which aims to enhance the economic complementarity of the constituent political units and capacity of the total regional economy.⁵⁵ “Development is a multidimensional phenomenon, which depends on positive spillover and linkages between different sectors of an economy and society; it can be said to require a regional approach, whereby trade integration is coupled with other forms economic and factor market integration, as well as various types of economic cooperation in specified sectors”.⁵⁶ The multidimensional and comprehensive structure of a regional organization is one of the main obstacles for developmental regionalism because developmental aims are thought to be insignificant and can be disregarded. Organizations that only have developmental

⁵⁴ Hettne, pp. 551-552.

⁵⁵ Hettne, p. 552.

⁵⁶ Hettne, p. 552.

aims are seen as generally non-essential due to the fact that they are not noticeably successful.⁵⁷

2.1.4.4 Security Regionalism

The present thesis grounds its assumptions on security regionalism and mainly on Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex theory. For this reason, the next section will provide a general overview of security regionalism.

2. 2 Regional Security

Early debates concerning regionalism were related directly to economics. Later, security and peace became the main forces driving the regionalizing process. Due to the effects of globalization, spillover of conflict increased and this development forced states to cooperate in security affairs. This section will focus on Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex theory, one of the most comprehensive theories in regional security studies.

⁵⁷ Hettne, pp. 552-553.

2.2.1 Security Paradigms: An Overview

Man's most basic instinct is survival, and similarly the most fundamental concern of the state is its survival and maximization of its interests.⁵⁸ States try to protect themselves from any threat to their security. A state's perception of threats state determines its understanding of security and in this way shapes its security policies. Every state has different threat perceptions, different understandings of security and due to this, different security policies.

The international system is one of the most important determinants in threat perception and a state's security understanding of. To this end, it is important to comprehend the international system that affects a state's security policies. We can understand how a nation's security understanding influences its policy with respect to the establishment of a "Regional Security Complex".

For the present argument, the distinction between Cold War and post-Cold War security understandings is critical. The importance of the regional level of security accelerated in real terms after the end of the Cold War. Although sharp differences exist between these periods, it is important to note that there is still certain continuity between them. Moreover, the rise of globalization is another factor that affected states' security understanding in this period.

During the Cold War, realism was the dominant theory and the state was the primary actor in the international arena. States were primarily concerned with the military dimension of their security. Their aim was to protect the status quo, the stability that nuclear deterrence and balance of terror provided.⁵⁹ At that time, the political and conceptual framework, this simplified most issues while magnifying

⁵⁸ Kostas Ifantis, 'International Security: A Paradigm Shift?', *SAM Paper*, No.1/2006, p. 14.

⁵⁹ Pinar Bilgin, *Regional Security in the Middle East*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), pp.17-19.

some and obscuring others shaped security understanding. However, the most important characteristic of this period was a search for militarized solutions to problems that might have been solved through non-military means.⁶⁰

Due to the waxing and waning of the Cold War, some criticisms of the realist approach to security appeared in security studies. The behaviouralist movement in the 1950s and 1960s sought to establish a practical approach in order to solve conflicts and tensions between the two camps. This movement's most significant contribution to international relations was the modeling of regional cooperation initiatives.⁶¹ Another approach, still state-centered but urging on the involvement of other international actors in security matters was Neorealism. This theoretical approach takes into account international actors other than states and encourages international organizations to specify some rules for the anarchic world-system.⁶²

Pınar Bilgin divided the alternative ways of security thinking that emerged during Cold War into three categories. The first was the alternative security thinking that challenged the zero-sum conception of Cold War security. Peace research was another critical approach to security understanding, and challenged state centered approach of realism and gave place to individual and non-state actors. They introduced a very different security understanding: non-military, non-zero-sum, and non-violent. The third was Third World security thinking, which was critical of the role of domestic sources and non-military dimensions of security.⁶³

Although some critical approaches were formulated, realist theory continued to enjoy a dominant position as did state-centered and military solutions in security affairs. However, these emerging critical approaches were the seeds of the post-Cold

⁶⁰ Bilgin, p. 18.

⁶¹ Beril Dedeoğlu, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, (İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2008), p. 56.

⁶² Dedeoğlu, p. 57.

⁶³ Bilgin, pp. 20-24.

War system, which parted from a realist approach and led to the increase in security cooperation, security regionalism, and the roles accorded to actors other than states.

However, other than the international system the globalization has vital impacts on states' security understanding, in the contemporary world. The impact of globalization on security can be divided into three principal aspects. First, globalization decreased state capacity and autonomy as designated by its relative power vis-à-vis non-state actors, social forces, and market pressures. With its immense impact on state relations, globalization changed the balance of power while decreasing state capacity and caused a reshuffling of relative capabilities. Another effect of globalization was its provocation of new conflicts between states, and it is offering new opportunities for entrepreneurs of political violence. The costs and benefits of both warfare and conquest changed with the effect of globalization. This means the forces of globalization recast the nature of armed conflict.⁶⁴

Globalization decreased the capacity of states with respect to new security threats that do not acknowledge boundaries. Moreover, some new threats, such as environmental problems, cannot be solved by military means. The broadening of threats and actors complicated the security agenda and forced states to cooperate on security affairs.

The end of the Cold War ended bipolar stability. The threat perception of states changed. In this new system, non-military factors balance the military dimensions of security because non-military factors are increasing in their influence on the survival of communities.⁶⁵

After the end of the Cold War, there appeared a need to define new security challenges. These new nontraditional or unconventional security challenges include

⁶⁴ Jonathan Kirshner, *Globalization and National Security*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.6.

⁶⁵ Brian Hocking and Micheal Smith, *World Politics: An introduction to International Relations*, (London: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 147.

international terrorism, ethnic strife, environmental degradation, food and energy scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth, uncontrolled migration, and organized crime.⁶⁶

Barry Buzan divided these new, non-military security challenges into four groups: political, economic, environmental and societal security.⁶⁷ It is important to note that while these problems are not new, their explicit characterization and treatment as security issues is a new development. Previously, only military and defense-related concerns shaped security agendas.⁶⁸ For peace and security in the international system, it is important to preserve these new threats from military solutions. Fortunately, in the post-Cold War security understanding, military solutions began to lose their importance as policy options.

Two important developments affected this process. First, developments in military technology have lessened the relevance of defense because borders are more open to external attacks and because of nuclear weapons technology. Thus, providing security by military means lost its meaning. Second, military means are generally used to press territorial aims but territory itself is losing its significance in this new world order.⁶⁹ Furthermore, military solutions are too costly for solving non-military problems. The price that a state pays for a military solution should not be calculated in terms of economical dimension alone. It is necessary to add the cost to the social dimension.

While broadening the security agenda, the new security threats challenge the role of state as the main actor in security affairs. In some cases, states are not willing

⁶⁶ Paul B. Stares, *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey*, (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 11.

⁶⁷ David A. Lake, and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 21.

⁶⁸ Stares, p. 11.

⁶⁹ Hocking and Smith, pp. 134-135.

to cope with some kind of threats; in other cases, states are not able to overcome these threats.⁷⁰ The maximization of interest is another instinct of a state as previously mentioned. Accordingly, states do not bother to undertake all responsibilities against global security threats that are not in their interest. They prefer to share the cost and where the cost exceeds their power, they became indifferent towards the issue.

It is arguable that global problems generally need global responses. However, it is clear that global responses are not easy to achieve. The regional level of security can provide opportunities for solving new security threats peacefully. Moreover, regional responses are easier to attain.

2.2.2 Regional Security

Decolonization increased the hope of autonomy at the regional level of security but the Cold War period slowed this process with its focus on regional relations. The end of the Cold War accelerated this process.⁷¹

The Cold War had an extraordinary impact on the security policies of every state in the world. Policy options were evaluated according to the rivalry between East and West. Regional options that excluded superpowers were doomed to failure. Even so, a Third World regionalism that generated new hopes for underdeveloped countries did not change the fate of regional security.

⁷⁰ Bilgin, p. 35.

⁷¹ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3.

Other than this impact, the Cold War had a dual effect on regional conflicts. On the one hand, it internationalized many conflicts. Local conflicts were considered to lie within superpower competition. Local combatants appealed for assistance to one of the superpowers or their allies. This assistance expanded conflicts as well as driving superpowers to provide ever-greater resources to opposing clients. On the other hand, due to the fear of escalation the superpowers also restrained local conflict. In some cases, superpowers exercised a degree of management to counteract increased regional tensions, keep conflicts contained, and occasionally even imposed settlements.⁷²

However, in the post-Cold War international system, the tension between the superpowers was replaced by conflicts that exploded around the world. The stability that the bipolar system provided disappeared, and in this new system, major powers are generally reluctant to accept heavy burdens of conflict management in remote areas of the globe. In some cases, even when the cost is limited and they have long-standing ties, they prefer to remain outside of these conflicts.⁷³

Barry Buzan defines three theoretical perspectives regarding the post-Cold War security order. The neorealist perspective based its assumptions on state and power polarity. The neorealist approach interprets the post-Cold War structure of international security as experiencing a change of power structure at the global level. This approach tries to understand the nature of that change in order to evaluate its effects on security.⁷⁴

Contrary to neorealist state-centric approach the globalist perspective, acknowledges the independent role of both transnational entities – corporations, non-governmental social and political organizations of many kinds – and

⁷² Lake, and Morgan, pp. 3-4.

⁷³ Lake and Morgan, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁴ Buzan and Waever, p. 6.

intergovernmental organizations and regimes. This approach accepts the role of state but rejects the idea that states control global factors.

This perspective approaches the security issue in two ways. On one hand, the idea is based on economic liberalism and considers globalization as a means to the steady erosion and eventual elimination of the traditional security agenda. On the other hand, the non-liberal perspective emphasizes the non-military areas of security. This perspective focused on the instability and inequality created by the liberal economic order. This perspective stresses the dilemma between the pursuit of capitalism, the sustainability of the planetary environment, and the homogenizing pressures of global culture while underlining the threat created by globalization to other cultures, languages, and identities.⁷⁵

Lastly, the regional approach has two assumptions for the post Cold War. Firstly, the disappearance of the East-West rivalry decreased the penetration of the major powers in the rest of the world. Secondly, Buzan describes the major powers of post Cold War period as 'lite powers' among which domestic pressures prevent their military engagement and strategic competition. This provides more room to maneuver for regional powers.⁷⁶

Why do we need a regional approach in order to understand security? Global governance in security affairs is the target of the international community. In some issues, like the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the international community is close to this ideal. However, a universal understanding of global security is not foreseeable in the near future. On the way to this goal, we need a regional approach for security. Regional security cooperation will increase entities capacities and potentials and this will facilitate world peace. Regional structures necessitate regional approaches.

⁷⁵ Buzan and Waever, p. 9.

⁷⁶ Buzan and Waever, pp. 10-11.

To understand national security, it is essential to analyze international security. National and international levels are inseparable for security. However, this interdependence does not necessitate binding security dynamics. Rather, a security dynamic would exist even if the other level did not influence it. “No one level will, by itself, be adequate to understand the security problem as a whole, and the full meaning of each will only become clear when it is seen in relation to the others.”⁷⁷

The regional level of security plays the role of mediator between states and the international system.⁷⁸ The regional level of security is binding for all states that constitute this system and this level reflects the influence of international system to the state. Geographical proximity is crucial for security affairs because boundaries have lost their meaning with the rise of globalization and threats can easily travel across neighboring states.

Barry Buzan’s significant contribution to the theory of regional security, Regional Security Complex Theory allows an understanding the new international system in the Post-Cold War period and an assessment of the relative balance of power, and mutual relationship between regionalizing and globalizing trends.⁷⁹ The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) will be evaluated below.

2.2.3 The Regional Security Complex

Barry Buzan is an adherent of Copenhagen School of security studies. He has proposed a new framework for regional security studies. In this new framework,

⁷⁷ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 187.

⁷⁸ Buzan, p. 188.

⁷⁹ Buzan and Waever, pp. 3-4.

Buzan challenges the traditional security approach that is state-centered and military-based. Buzan wants to broaden the security agenda of the post-Cold War environment by recognizing new security challenges and new actors to understanding security. The importance of territory and the role of state do not disappear in the regional perspective. Instead, the regional security perspective is transitional towards a global approach. The regional approach only accepts the role of other actors, non-territorial perspectives, and non-military problems and solutions.

Buzan first defined the Regional Security Complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another”.⁸⁰ He then reevaluated his definition and reformulated it as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”⁸¹

The main determinants in the establishment of a Regional Security Complex are the anarchic structure of international system, geographical proximity of states and regional patterns of amity-enmity relations. The relationship within a RSC can be categorized as rivalry, balance of power, and alliance formation. This relationship is influenced by major powers’ policies whose penetration is critical for a RSC. A member of an RSC can have an alignment with a major power for balancing another regional power.⁸² Buzan argued that an RSC resembles the balance of power because they can exist regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognize them.⁸³ In

⁸⁰ Buzan and Waever, pp. 44.

⁸¹ Buzan and Waever, p. 44.

⁸² Buzan and Waever, p. 46.

⁸³ Buzan, p. 192.

different ways, major power penetration in the complex exists in some cases for balancing and in other cases for regional securitization.

For the Central Asian states, the importance of Regional Security Complex Theory is that they have to acknowledge their interdependence on security issues. They must evaluate the impact of major powers' penetration in their RSC. Accordingly, they must determine their perceptions of threats, their security understanding, and their security policies. Finally, they must evaluate the role of cooperation inside the RSC and the role of major powers outside the complex in their security policies.

2.2.4 Problems of Regional Security in Central Asia

The previously mentioned changes in the international system such as the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, which influenced international and regional security also deeply affected Central Asia. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, five new states emerged in Central Asia. This unexpected sovereignty caught national leaders unprepared. Nearly 130 years of Russian rule made the establishment of an independent security and defense policy unrealistic immediately after the independence. Central Asian states preferred to ally with the Russian Federation for their security under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This choice was also a remedy for that Russian imperial pride which was broken by the disintegration of Soviet Union. However, early expectations were replaced by disappointments among Central Asian states. Despite the signing of bilateral and multilateral treaties between the Central

Asian states and Russia, the latter could not fulfill its responsibilities due to a lack of financial means and qualified personnel.

The emergence of five new states in Central Asia also evoked international interest towards the region. Central Asian states disappointed by Russian disengagement from the region turned to states that could provide them better opportunities such as the USA, the Peoples Republic of China, and regional powers like Turkey and Iran. These developments led to the growing engagement of these powers in Central Asia.⁸⁴ The relation between these states and Central Asia led to bilateral treaties and the establishment of regional cooperation organizations. Security structures sponsored by outside powers other than the CIS were the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), and certain regional organizations as well. These structures and regional power politics remain key determinants for security in the region. Power politics in this context signifies relations between external powers and the Central Asian states and relations between the external powers themselves. Security structures established by external powers and by the Central Asian states are analyzed in the next chapter while an assessment of the role of major power policies in Central Asia will be examined in the fourth chapter.

2.2.4.1 Regional Security Dynamics

With respect to Central Asian security, other important determinants are regional security dynamics both conflicting and cooperative dynamics. Cooperative

⁸⁴ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 3.

dynamics prevent conflicts, motivate cooperation, and establish peaceful relations between Central Asian states. Meanwhile, conflictual dynamics heighten conflicts and tension. A distinction is to be made between internal and external dynamics.⁸⁵ Many internal and external threats complicate Central Asian security. Those threats could be conflictual or cooperative. The security understanding of individual Central Asian states determines this. This process shapes their security policies as well.

The engagement of external powers to Central Asia complicates internal the dynamics of the region. This engagement can direct the region to conflictual or cooperative relations. Rivalry and tension between external powers can likewise affect the relations between Central Asian states.⁸⁶

Some internal threats in the region necessitate cooperative policies such as resurgence of Islam, problems of controlling energy and water resources, border problems, illegal migration, and drug smuggling. The Central Asian region inherited some of its internal problems from the Russian and Soviet periods. Boundaries that were drawn without taking into account ethnic diversity continue to cause border problems and tension between states. Border problems and enclaves in the Ferghana Valley are particularly vital for the stability of the region. The Ferghana Valley was transformed to a base for radical Islamist groups. Radical Islamism is one of the most important threats that internal and external players are concerned with.

Other than the radical Islamist threat, porous borders of the region provide an opportunity for flows of insurgents, drugs, weapons, and refugees, which have become an acute threat to regional security. Borders that cannot be guarded adequately have caused tension between Central Asian states. For example, Uzbekistan chose unilateral policies for protecting its borders and this act has

⁸⁵ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 10.

⁸⁶ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 10-11.

increased tension between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Other than the Central Asian states' weaknesses in controlling their borders, instability in Afghanistan has also contributed to this problem. Borders between Afghanistan and Central Asia could not be guarded effectively. Afghanistan remains a key player in the world narcotic market. Central Asian states are often used as transit counties in this trade.

Ethnic diversity within each state has been a major concern of national leaders during the first years of the independence, but this tension only transformed into a conflict in Tajikistan. Tajikistan suffered from a devastating civil war during 1992-97. This conflict threatened the stability in the region but Central Asian states, with the help of Russia, were able to manage the spreading effects of this civil war.⁸⁷

2.2.4.2 Regional Security Perceptions

Perceptions of regional security in this region is excessively determined by trans-borders and trans-ethnic dynamics.⁸⁸ Another security dimension to this regional ethnic diversity is nationalist pressure that states impose on their minorities. The reason for this pressure is the growing importance of ethnic identifiers for access to resources, be it political power or desirable standard of living.⁸⁹ Pressure on ethnic minorities could potentially damage relations between Central Asian states. Furthermore, economic problems of minorities can cause instability that might

⁸⁷ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 13.

⁸⁸ Allison, and Bluth, *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, p. 231.

⁸⁹ Shahram Akbarzadeh, 'Keeping Central Asia stable', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.4, June 2004, p. 693.

threaten regional security. The unstable structure of the region necessitates attaching importance to human rights practices for regional stability and security.

Other internal problems of Central Asian states, such as political pressure and economic problems, also pose significant dangers for the stability of Central Asia. The collapse of Soviet Union had a devastating effect on the economies of the Central Asian states. Hyperinflation and high levels of unemployment not only threatened the economic situation but social stability as well throughout 1990s. However, national leaders chose to suppress potential upheavals through political pressure. The economies of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan recovered from this stagnation thanks to their natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas. However, it is not yet possible to argue for lifting of political pressure in these countries.

After independence, national leaders tried to establish a national awareness and consolidate their nation building. Each state in the region used different paths to this end. The consolidation of states is essential for the stability of region. Turkmenistan preferred to remain aloof of regional organizations, disrupting the process of the creation of a Regional Security Complex. Central Asian security possesses a level of integrity but neutral Turkmenistan's neutrality and to some degree, Uzbekistan unilateralism compromise this integrity.

The suppression of religion during Soviet period led to interest in Islam after independence. Political and economic difficulties caused reactions in the public sphere. Dissatisfaction increased public support for radical Islamist groups in the region in the absence of a secular opposition. At the same time, this development coincided with the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. With outside support, radical Islamist groups in Central Asia increased their activities in

the region. The leading organizations of the radical Islamist movement in the region were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (later the Turkestan Islam Party) and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Both are active in Uzbekistan and especially in the Ferghana Valley. Central Asian states have used every available means to suppress radical Islamism. Consequently, it has been argued that Central Asian leaders used this threat in order to justify their heavy-handed, authoritarian governments.⁹⁰ However, it is clear that radical Islamist movements and the terrorism that they use are primary threats to regional security.

The inherited Soviet integrated economic structure has created the problem of sharing natural resources after the independence of the five Central Asian states. Energy and water resources are not abundant in this new system and these countries have become part of the market economy. The problematic sharing of these resources has increased tension in some cases. However, in 1996 a water-sharing regime was established between Central Asian states considered a major accomplishment. However, this regime excludes Afghanistan, which endangers much of the region's water flow due to its lack of political stability.⁹¹

Historical ties have connected Central Asian countries to each other and to Russia at the same time. During Soviet Union, infrastructures of Central Asian states were connected to modern Russia. In particular, Central Asian oil and natural gas are exported through pipelines that connect these states to Russia. It is not easy for the Central Asian states to break this connection and have not been able to accomplish it but rather have tried to diversify their customers. This development is important for global energy security. Energy security is one of the most important motives for the engagement of external powers this region's power politics.

⁹⁰ Akbarzadeh, p. 697.

⁹¹ Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, 'New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia', *Foreign Affairs*, Mar/Apr 2002, Vol. 81, p. 4.

2.2.4.3 Threat Perceptions

The internal dynamics of Central Asia play a fundamental role in its security affairs. Meanwhile, external dynamics complicate this domestic structure as well as regional and global power politics. It is necessary to stress that internal and external dynamics demonstrate that Central Asian states display integrity in their security affairs. These dynamics may become conflictual or cooperative due to the policy options of internal states. The perception and practices of individual states in the region will shape regional policy. A state's threat perceptions determine its security and defense policies. Threats are divided into three concentric circles, one within the other. Domestic or internal threats are the core circle in this model. Next regional threats and lastly international threats comprise the two outer circles. Crucially, every circle's content depends on state and region.⁹² In Central Asia, the security of regimes is the main problem in every state. However, in developed countries this is not an internal problem. Terrorism is an international problem for some of Western states, but for Central Asian states, it is both an internal problem and a regional one. When we look at the general picture of the Central Asian security, international threats have become internal or regional threats.

As the other regions in the world, Central Asia is also deeply affected by the international system and the policies of major powers. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states constituted the first phase in the threat perception and security understanding. Meanwhile the September 11 attacks against the United States opened a new page in the region's security affairs. In addition to the change in American policies, the change of Russian policies under

⁹² Dedeoğlu, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, pp. 63-64.

President Putin's administration and the increasing Chinese interest towards the region have also played important role in regional security.

One of the determinants of security understanding and threat perception is political leadership. In this region especially, national leaders direct policymaking. Since independence, there have not been major changes in leaders' mentality and policies throughout the region the main concern, is regime security above all, which generally means protection of the seat of the leader. Other problems rank second to regime security.

The Central Asian states, excepting Turkmenistan, prefer to cooperate on security issues with major powers on a bilateral or multilateral basis. They have also attempted some regional initiatives but these have been relatively ineffective. The most important factor behind this cooperative approach is the significant lack of capacity to solve internal, regional, and international problems.

CHAPTER III

SECURITY REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

After their independence, the Central Asian states were with various security challenges such as terrorism, radical Islamism, drug trafficking, and environmental problems. As mentioned before, these problems threatened their survival. To cope with these problems, Central Asian leaders gave impetus to bilateral and multilateral relations and cooperation. The Central Asian states have joined or sponsored a variety of regional cooperation structures. Global powers have supported security initiatives in order to increase their influence in the region. This chapter will evaluate security structures sponsored by major powers and their role in Central Asian security: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). In addition, other security initiatives sponsored by Central Asian countries are analyzed in the following section.

3.1 Regional Cooperation Structures in Greater Eurasia

3.1.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

By signing the treaty of Minsk on 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Eight newly emerged states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined this new entity on 21 December 1991 when they signed on to the Almaty protocol as charter members. Azerbaijan did not ratify the treaty in its parliament but became a member with Georgia later in 1993.⁹³ With this accession, the number of members represented twelve out of the original fifteen successor states. The Baltic States did not join this organization because they valued their relations with Western states and especially with the European Community.

The unexpected dissolution of Soviet Union caught the members of the CIS unprepared. All the successor states had different expectations from this new organization and from this new environment. Generally, they believed the CIS could provide a smooth transition to the new international system. Some countries like Ukraine described the CIS as a temporary institution for a civilized divorce.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the establishment of the CIS expressed the ambitions of the Russian Federation, which was still the dominant power in the region. Russia imagined this

⁹³ Fırat Purtaş, *Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara: Platin Yayınları, 2005), pp. 64-66.

⁹⁴ Purtaş, pp. 84.

organization could provide the natural integration of former USSR, economically, politically and militarily.⁹⁵

However, some of Russia's aims such as the preservation of economic ties with various parts of the former Soviet Union and the maintenance of a common security area for safeguarding its military power were unfeasible.⁹⁶ Russian power was not sufficient to achieve these ambitions. On the other hand, the CIS contained diverse countries with different capacities and aims. For these reasons, the Russian policy of integration within the new CIS fluctuated according to its capabilities.

In the beginning, Russia followed a moderate path in its foreign policy towards successor states. At the end of 1992, Russia announced its new Foreign Policy Doctrine covering its "near abroad" policy towards the new successor states. Although this doctrine comprised all CIS members, it had greater impact on Central Asian and Caucasus countries than the other CIS members. Many countries from the CIS and foreign powers as well perceived this declaration as a post-imperialist policy. This approach caused deep concern in those countries.⁹⁷

Following this declaration, Russian economic insufficiencies revealed the Russia's inability to follow a multilateral policy towards its Near Abroad countries that could provide security and stability in those regions. Central Asia's needs were extensive and Russia did not have the capacity to assume all responsibility or the economic burden for those problems. For this reason, Russia slowed down its multilateral policies and began to foster bilateral relations with these countries. However, after the economic recovery in the second term of President Putin, Russia

⁹⁵ M.B. Olcott, A. Aslund, and S. W. Garnett, *Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press), p. 77.

⁹⁶ Allison and Bluth, *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, p. 281.

⁹⁷ Mustafa Aydın, *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayın, 2005), pp. 44-45.

accelerated its multilateral relations. The extension of regional relations in Central Asia made significant progress for security regionalism in the region.

Out of the fifteen independent states, which emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, twelve were members of the CIS. Different states from diverse areas with divergent aims and goals could not establish effective political structures. This divergence led to sub-regional organizations and bilateral relations within the CIS.⁹⁸

The USSR had a common security and defense structure, which extended all over the country. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, this system was dissolved and in general, states bordering the Soviet Union formed the substantial part of this structure.⁹⁹ At first, some of the newly independent states were not ready for the establishment of a joint system while some of them consistently rejected this notion. Russia's aim was to establish a common security policy and defense structure under the CIS umbrella. Therefore, a Collective Security Treaty was emerged. However, only a limited number of CIS members wanted to take part in this treaty. For this reason, this became a sub-regional initiative under the CIS, which was advanced and became an international regional organization in 2002 known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

⁹⁸ Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, "The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, No.3, (May 1999), p. 380.

⁹⁹ Azhdar Kurtov, "The CSTO, Guam: Transformation of the Post-Soviet Area" *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 51-52. 3-4 (2008), http://www.ca-c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-03-04/25.shtml. (accessed October 9, 2008).

3.1.1.1 Peacekeeping in CIS

In December 1991, CIS heads of state decided to establish a joint command and signed an agreement on strategic forces. However, this goal never materialized and six months after the signing of the CST, the aim of creating unified armed forces removed from the agenda of the CIS countries as whole. Meanwhile, the CIS continued to take steps in security affairs especially concerning its nuclear arsenal and peacekeeping operations. The nuclear issue was the main problem of four successor states of USSR in particular. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia retained a Soviet nuclear arsenal even after their independence. The primary problems represented by this nuclear arsenal were command and control, proliferation, safety and storage, and the fulfillment of international disarmament commitments. Complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia was achieved in November 1996 and Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine became parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states. A single command was established under Russian authority but this was open to CIS consultation.¹⁰⁰

Russia was eager to establish a peacekeeping force under the CIS umbrella because this would improve its capacity to become involved in the internal affairs of member states. The legal ground of peacekeeping force operations was first established by an agreement on military observers and collective peacekeeping on March 1992 in Kiev.¹⁰¹ Turkmenistan was not a party in this agreement and Azerbaijan and Ukraine accepted it with the proviso that they would evaluate every case individually.¹⁰² It was first used during the civil war in Tajikistan on July 1993. Then, in June of 1994, another peacekeeping force was established in Abkhazia. CIS

¹⁰⁰ Sakwa and Webber, pp. 381-382.

¹⁰¹ Purtaş, p. 99.

¹⁰² Purtaş, p. 99.

peacekeeping forces were withdrawn from Tajikistan in 2000 but their role in Georgia become complicated after Russian intervention in South Ossetia in 2008.¹⁰³

Russia played a central role in these peacekeeping operations. In Abkhazia, Russia was the sole source of finance, command and personnel. In Tajikistan, Central Asian military units (Uzbek, Kazak and Kyrgyz) contributed to the operation.¹⁰⁴ Two other peacekeeping operations were undertaken within the boundaries of CIS under the arrangements of Kiev Agreement. Russia signed bilateral treaties with host states that are with Georgia in the case of South Ossetia and with Moldova in the case of the Trans-Dniester Republic. Another document that extended relations in peacekeeping activities was the “Concept for Prevention and Settlement of Conflict in the Territory of Member States” of the CIS. This document aimed to broaden and deepen cooperation on peacekeeping within CIS area and was signed in Moscow on 19 January 1996.¹⁰⁵

It is difficult to establish that the Russian role in these peacekeeping operations was appropriate according to international law. Neither the UN nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approved these operations but rather sent observers and humanitarian missions that meant *de facto* legitimization. Ultimately, the CIS peacekeeping mission entered a new stage after 1997. Russia lost its desire for military cooperation within the CIS because of internal conflicts and economic insufficiencies.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Purtaş, pp. 99- 101.

¹⁰⁴ Sakwa and Webber, p. 385-386.

¹⁰⁵ Purtaş, pp. 102-103.

¹⁰⁶ Purtaş, p. 104.

3.1.1.2 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Military and security cooperation based on the Collective Security Treaty (CST) continued to develop in spite of the aforementioned events. For member states, the CST was an important step forward, especially regarding Central Asian security. In 1992, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the CST in Tashkent and later, in 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus became parties to the treaty. After its ratification, the treaty went into force in April 1994. Of the twelve members of the CIS, nine of them attended this new creation under the umbrella of the CIS.¹⁰⁷ Only Turkmenistan in Central Asia refused to take part in this treaty due to its neutrality policy.

The aim of the CST was to guarantee the fulfillment of the fundamental military political responsibilities that faced the newly independent republics: to ensure external stability in order to advance state development and to establish national armed forces.¹⁰⁸ The most important feature of this treaty was that if a third party attacked one of the member states, signatories of the treaty would help their partners with every means available including military intervention.¹⁰⁹

The CST terminated in 1999 but the members desired its renewal except Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan who resigned the membership. The reason for this withdrawal was the perceived ineffectiveness of the organization and the extreme politization of its role.¹¹⁰ The reasons behind Uzbekistan's withdrawal were

¹⁰⁷ A. L. Rekuta, 'The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Averting Security Threats in Central Asia', *Military Thought*, October 2006, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Rekuta, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Purtaş, p. 97.

¹¹⁰ Şatlık Amanov, *ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikaları*, (İstanbul:Gökkube, 2007), p. 286.

obstacles originating from Russia in armaments sales, such as supplying out-dated equipments or delays in delivery.¹¹¹

The withdrawal of these three countries demonstrated changes in their foreign policy. However, even, Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the membership, one month after its withdrawal, bombing in its capital; Tashkent caused a process of reevaluation on its relations with Russia. China and Russia backed Uzbekistan in this period while western countries were criticizing human rights violations. For this reason, Uzbekistan increased its bilateral relations with Russia in order to balance its relations.¹¹²

However, even bilateral relations were increasing, Uzbekistan joined to GUAM that Georgia and Azerbaijan were founding members. GUAM became GUUAM after Uzbekistan's accession in 1999. This organization was not regional security cooperation but one of its aims has been integration with Europe, especially with NATO on matters of security. Indeed, these countries wanted to find a new path apart from Russia. However, GUUAM has not been able to provide the necessary means for Uzbekistan's security and Uzbekistan has subsequently withdrawn its membership in GUUAM. Uzbekistan renewed its membership in the CSTO in 2006.¹¹³

The CST was approved by all member parliaments, came into force on 20 April 1994, and was registered with the UN in 1995.¹¹⁴ The first and second articles of the new agreement were very important with respect to security regionalism. The first article described collective security as “the CST signatories pledged not to join

¹¹¹ Annette Bohr, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission impossible?’, *Helsinki Monitor*, no: 3, 2003, p. 256.

¹¹² Hasan Ali Karasar, “Bağımsızlık Sonrası Türkistan’da Rus Siyaset”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Rusya Özel, Kış 2001, Cilt:6, sayı:4, pp. 234-235.

¹¹³ Azhdar Kurtov, “The CSTO, GUAM: Transformation of the Post-Soviet Area” *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 51-52. 3-4 (2008), http://www.ca-c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-03-04/25.shtml. (accessed October 9, 2008).

¹¹⁴ Purtaş, p. 91.

military alliances or any groups of states aimed against another CST member country.”¹¹⁵ Article two further emphasized collective response: “In case of a threat to the security, territorial integrity or sovereignty of one or several CST member states or a threat to international peace and security, member states pledged to use without delay a mechanism of joint consultations to coordinate their positions and implement measure to eliminate such a threat.”¹¹⁶

However, even, Uzbekistan criticized CST in 1999. Uzbek leader, Kerimov was supporting this system when Taliban came to power. Taliban seized the control of Kabul in September 1996 after many attacks.¹¹⁷ This caused a panic in Central Asian states. In Troika summit¹¹⁸, the Russian prime minister was also attended in September 1996, the role of CST in Central Asian security was remembered. In this meeting, Kerimov played a major role.¹¹⁹

Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz defense ministers decided to work mutually on intelligence sharing, to gather public defense structures of anti-terror and anti-narcotics in 1996. Another structure proposed against the Taliban threat was Troika plus Russia but this was not a challenge to CST, this was only a specific grouping smaller than the general CST organization.¹²⁰

At first glance, the CST model was near to NATO, but CST was accused of being imprecise in conflicts among CST members and some analysts even argued

¹¹⁵ Azhdar Kurtov, "The CSTO, GUAM: Transformation of the Post-Soviet Area" *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 51-52. 3-4 (2008), http://www.ca-c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-03-04/25.shtml. (accessed October 9, 2008).

¹¹⁶ Azhdar Kurtov, "The CSTO, GUAM: Transformation of the Post-Soviet Area" *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 51-52. 3-4 (2008), http://www.ca-c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-03-04/25.shtml. (accessed October 9, 2008).

¹¹⁷ Ahmed Rasid, *Taliban: İslamiyet, Petrol ve Orta Asya'da yeni Büyük Oyun*, (İstanbul: Agora kitaphı, 2007), p. 65.

¹¹⁸ Troika meetings were diplomtic initiatives that Kazakhstan, Ozbekistan and Kyrgyzstan leaders came together in order to cooperate on economic politic and social issues. This is a pure regional initiatives to integrate Turkestan between 1993 and 1998. (See. Hasan Ali Karasar, Sanat K. Kuşumbayev, *Türkistan Bütünleşmesi: Merkezi Asya'da Birlik Arayışları 1991-2001*, (Ankara: Ötüken, 2009), p. 43).

¹¹⁹ Karasar, and Kuşumbayev, p. 90.

¹²⁰ Karasar and Kuşumbayev, p. 92.

that there was no concrete statement concerning external threats.¹²¹ Russian foreign policy was evolving when the CST was established. However, Russia had taken mature steps after 2002 to increase integration and institutionalization.

Russia needed the CSTO because of the US presence in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks. Russia backed America in its war on terrorism in the beginning because this occasion legitimized its own “war on terror” inside and outside the Russian Federation. However, flourishing relations between the US and Central Asian states and widening operations in Afghanistan and Iraq disturbed Russia. To balance the US presence in the region, Russia gave priority to its bilateral and multilateral relations with Central Asian states. Multilateral initiatives increased and this led to the development of the CST, which then increased its role in Central Asian security.

In May of 2002, the organization was renamed and reorganized. The Collective Security Treaty became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).¹²² Not only did the name change but also the organization’s targets were broadened in order to be suitable for the new security environment. The CSTO aims to be an international regional organization, responding effectively to terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, organized crimes, arms smuggling, and so on. During this period, the organization gave priority to the institutionalization process to establish an appropriate framework for CSTO activities.¹²³

Terrorism is one of the biggest problems in Central Asian region. At the beginning, Central Asian states tried to find solutions under the aegis of CIS structures. After the attacks by radical groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999, Russia and Tajikistan undertook a joint military exercise with these states. The CIS

¹²¹ Purtaş, pp. 91-92.

¹²² Bohr, pp. 256-257.

¹²³ Rekuta, pp. 2-3.

“Southern Shield 99” of 1999 was the first joint exercise within the CIS structure. In April 2000, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the CIS anti-terrorism center in Russia with the support of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 2001, a Collective Rapid Deployment Force was formed that aims to solve regional crisis and to protect borders against terrorist attacks.¹²⁴

In 2003, at the leaders’ meeting in Dushanbe, six members of the CSTO resolved to reshuffle the organization’s structure and the creation of a joint military command for the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. The joint command was initiated in January 2004 and its headquarters is in Moscow.¹²⁵

As a response to the US-Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan and the threat of terrorism, Russia established an airbase in Kant in October 2003 under CSTO auspices. In addition, the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan was transformed to a permanent airbase in 2004.¹²⁶

The cooperation between CSTO members intensified in 2004 and 2005 especially in countering international terrorism. At the Minsk summit of June 2006, CSTO members decided on new proposals and resolutions. Central Asia was declared a nuclear weapons free zone. The CSTO leaders decided to extend cooperation on fighting terror and drug trafficking by signing new agreements. New steps were taken on the development of the CSTO’s military and economic components.¹²⁷ In addition, a crucial development for Central Asian security was the readmission of Uzbekistan to the organization.

Caspian security was another priority for Russia and the CSTO members. In August of 2006, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan initiated a CSTO

¹²⁴ Amanov, p. 287.

¹²⁵ Bohr, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission impossible?’, p. 257.

¹²⁶ Matveeva, p.46.

¹²⁷ Rekuta, pp. 3-4.

joint military exercise in order to prepare the ground for a Caspian Force (CASFOR) joint operational group.¹²⁸

The aims of the CSTO are to restore a unified security space and to increase its capacity for collective efforts in combating terrorism, extremism, and the drug trafficking. In order to reach these goals, the organization decided to establish its own parliamentary assembly in 2006. This will not only improve CSTO's prestige but also will facilitate the approximation and harmonization of security legislations of the member-states.¹²⁹

The organization plans to establish a comprehensive system of auxiliary bodies and appropriate collective forces and assets in order to manage a variety of security threats.¹³⁰ Central Asian states situated at the center of emerging global problems: terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and environmental degradation. Progress in structure and content will mostly help the securitization of the region.

At this time, CSTO intends to become a global international security structure that is capable to overcome new global security challenges. To achieve this, CSTO needs to improve and to strengthen the military and military-political mechanisms for cooperation between the member states in the sphere of national and collective security.¹³¹ Uzbekistan's changing policies have complicated regional security cooperation but its return to CSTO strengthened the role of organization in the region. The Turkmen neutrality policy has also affected regional security in Central Asia.

The Establishment of a common security or foreign policy under the aegis of the CIS for Central Asian states and beyond is not certain. Because only their relative

¹²⁸ Matveeva, p.47.

¹²⁹ N. Bordyuzha, "CSTO: Counteraction Tool against New Threats", *International Affairs*, No.002, Vol.53, 2007, p. 54

¹³⁰ Bordyuzha, p. 56.

¹³¹ Bordyuzha, p. 55.

proximity and their Soviet legacy constitute a binding force between these countries and this is not enough to establish a coherent institutionalized organization.

Indeed, despite the formal membership of Armenia and Belarus they are inactive members of this organization. Russia and the Central Asian countries display regional integrity within this organization.¹³² CSTO's role with respect to the security affairs of the Central Asian states is significant. Only Turkmenistan, which decreased its membership in the CIS to associate member status, is not a member of CSTO. Other states in Central Asia are full members in the CIS and CSTO. With the rejoining of Uzbekistan to CSTO, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan create an internal integrity in security affairs, under the CIS structure. The acceleration of CSTO institutional organization and coordination on extremism, terrorism, and organized crime are important steps for security regionalism in Central Asia.

3.1.2 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was built upon the Shanghai Five established in 1996 which aimed to solve border problems that appeared after the disintegration of Soviet Union among five countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. After frequent diplomatic talks, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and China reached an agreement on deepening military trust in border regions on 26 April 1996.¹³³ During the meeting, these countries decided to deepen their relations in order to cooperate on other mutual

¹³² Leszek Buszynski, "Russia's New Role in Central Asia", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Jul-Aug 2005), p. 552.

¹³³ SCO website. 2004-2005. <http://www.sectsco.org/html/00030.html> (accessed November 14, 2008).

concerns and interests.¹³⁴ At this meeting, participant states recognized the need for establishing a mechanism that would promote confidence and security in the military sphere within these states. In addition, they came to an arrangement that each state will notify each other about military exercises undertaken within 100 kilometers of each other's borders.¹³⁵ These were the first steps that established an international organization, which continued to increase its power with respect to contemporary international politics.

A second meeting was held in Moscow in April of 1997. At this meeting, heads of states signed an "Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions."¹³⁶ These confidence-building measures were steps for establishing trust in a region that shares common interests on many different issues. Security and economy were two dominant problems in the region and which mutually influenced each other. Poverty in the region was inversely proportional to security. As a consequence of this environment the Shanghai Five group first paid attention to security and then to economic cooperation.

In the Kazakh capital one year later in 1998, the Shanghai Five continued to deepen its relations appropriate to these new security concerns. In the "Almaty Declaration," the group's member states decided to cooperate in order to combat transnational security threats such as religious fundamentalism, ethnic separatism, terrorism, arms smuggling and drug trafficking, and other cross-border crimes.¹³⁷ They decided to increase economic cooperation as well.

At this meeting, they shaped their relations and stressed that the Shanghai Five members would be respectful of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its

¹³⁴ Chien-peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia", *The China Quarterly*, No: 180, December 2004, p. 990.

¹³⁵ Chung, p. 990.

¹³⁶ SCO website." 2004-2005.<http://www.sectsco.org/html/00030.html> (accessed November 14, 2008).

¹³⁷ Chung, p. 990.

members. The clause of non-interference in internal affairs of members is a most important characteristic of the grouping.¹³⁸ Members of this group criticized Western attitudes towards the region. In this way, Shanghai Five tried to establish a shield against western critics of their democracies and of human rights issues.

The Shanghai Five leaders emphasized their wish for a multipolar world and for the stability of the international system.¹³⁹ In the following years, the desire for a multipolar system played an important part in many SCO documents. Nevertheless, SCO members do not challenge American power. Instead of a unipolar world system, SCO members prefer a multipolar world with powerful international organizations and with an efficiently operating United Nations. These aims and wishes are the framework of the cooperation between these states, which became the basis for the SCO. They emphasize the causal relationship between cooperation and peace.

In the beginning, the group was inward looking, that is their concerns were limited to issues such as border disputes, demilitarization, cross-border activities of minority groups, and economic development. However, the Alma-Ata and Bishkek declarations in 1999 showed signs of improving coordination on foreign policy. The group decided to cooperate on the threats of separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism that they defined as the “three evils.” Later, these threats became the central pillars of the founding document of the SCO.¹⁴⁰

In 2000, at the meeting of heads of states in Dushanbe, President Karimov of Uzbekistan joined to the group as an observer for the first time. At this time, the

¹³⁸ R. Kutay Karaca, *Dünyadaki Yeni Güç Çin: Tek Kutuptan, Çift Kutuba*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık), p. 106.

¹³⁹ Joint Statement of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan on the Almaty Meeting, July 3, 1998, <http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/joint-statement980703.html> (accessed November 14.,2008).

¹⁴⁰ S. Hansen Flemming, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 39, no.2, July 2008, p. 219.

leaders decided to transform Shanghai Five to an institutionalized organization and named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).¹⁴¹ The organization was enlarged with the membership of Uzbekistan, and the SCO appeared on the international political scene on 15 June 2001.¹⁴²

In 2000, the organization decided to establish a Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) at first based in Bishkek. Then, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan, the group chose Tashkent instead. However, RATS could not become operational until 2004. RATS analyzes regional terrorist groups, shares information about terrorist threats and recommends on counter-terrorist policies.¹⁴³

At the Shanghai meeting that gave birth to SCO, the heads of member states signed the “The Shanghai Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.”¹⁴⁴ In 2002, the charter of the organization was announced in St. Petersburg. In this charter, it is noted that this organization is not directed against a third party. The aim of the organization is defined as the respect for mutual interest and common approaches to deal with regional and global problems.¹⁴⁵ SCO has generally been compared with NATO or the Warsaw Pact. However, it is important to distinguish Cold War institutions, needs, and interests from the post-Cold War period. Furthermore, the basic difference between these institutions is that the SCO does not target a third party. The aim of the organization is to increase cooperation within member states on the areas of security, economy, environment and culture in order to achieve peace, stability and prosperity.

¹⁴¹ Flemming, p. 220.

¹⁴² Chung, p. 991.

¹⁴³ Marcel de Haas, “The Shanghai Cooperation and the OSCE: Two of a kind?”, *Helsinki Monitor: Security and Human Rights*, no: 3, 2007, p. 248.

¹⁴⁴ Haas, p. 247.

¹⁴⁵ Marc Lanteign, “In Medias Res: The Development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization as a Security Community”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 79, No.4, winter 2006-2007, p. 611.

The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States had profound effects on geo-strategic and power politics in the SCO region. The US and Western deployment in Central Asia and Afghanistan operation changed the balance in the region. American and allied forces were deployed to Manas in Kyrgyzstan and to Khanabad in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted the use of their airspace for military flights by allied forces. Kazakhstan allowed the US the use of its three airports: Almaty, Chimkent, and Jambyl.¹⁴⁶

In the first instance, members of the SCO could not adopt a common attitude towards US policy because member states did not want a confrontation with the US and western countries. It is important to note that the major powers of the SCO, China and Russia, have close relations with the West that they did not want to jeopardize. At the same time, the ongoing American presence and the Colored Revolutions, especially the most recent in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 created anxiety within the SCO member states. Due to these developments, the SCO tightened its relations within the organization and fastened its institutionalization.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, the SCO issued a declaration in July 2005 demanding that a final timetable be set for the use of Central Asian bases by international forces in Afghanistan.

In Moscow in 2003, member states decided to institutionalize the organization and to establish a permanent secretariat in Beijing, which was opened in January 2004.¹⁴⁸ The first secretary-general was China's Ambassador to Russia, Zhang Deguang.¹⁴⁹ This achievement, while suggesting the strengthening of the organization, is proof of the role of China in the organization. China has played the leading role in the deepening of SCO relations. For China, multilateral initiatives in

¹⁴⁶ Chung, p. 996.

¹⁴⁷ Lanteign, p. 606.

¹⁴⁸ Lanteign, p. 611.

¹⁴⁹ Chung, p. 989.

which it plays a crucial role should increase its position in global power politics. Moreover, good relations with its neighbors in Central Asia will provide to China security and stability in its far west, the East Turkestan region. Energy security is another motive that pushes China to Central Asia and Russia.

To enhance confidence among SCO members and to coordinate a common military policy against potential threats, member states designed joint military operations firstly in 2002, in China and Kyrgyzstan, then in 2003, with all members participating, in China. Lastly, in 2005, Operation “Peace Mission” was held and Iran, India and Pakistan sent observers to the operation.¹⁵⁰

In 2004, Mongolia obtained observer status in the SCO and the next year Iran, Pakistan, and India became observers. Including observers, the SCO encompasses nearly half of the world’s population. Two members, China and Russia, and two observers, India and Pakistan, are nuclear powers. The territory of the SCO comprises 3/5 of Eurasia. Russia and China are in the top three in terms of the size of their armed forces.¹⁵¹ This data shows only SCO member capabilities but act together is not a function of capability. It is more likely connected with the willingness of member states and the situation in international system.

The Central Asian members of the SCO are in a period of transition to democracy and a market economy. During this painful period, the SCO clause of non-interference in domestic affairs and sovereignty protect those countries from western critics. However, the economic and social problems in Central Asia also threaten security in the SCO region. For this reason, the SCO should improve economic cooperation by influencing the domestic social and political situation in member states without violating its non-interference principle. Due to these

¹⁵⁰ Lanteign, p. 611.

¹⁵¹ Haas, p. 246.

necessities, at the Astana summit in July 2005, the SCO specified its intend to work more actively in strengthening Central Asian stability and economy to oppose new challenges and threats to international and regional stability for creating conditions conducive to sustainable development and to eradicate poverty.¹⁵²

At the Shanghai summit of 2006, member states underscored their determination regarding the continuation of mutually advantageous economic cooperation in the SCO's "Declaration of Five Years".¹⁵³ Energy resources are the trump card in the hands of Central Asian states. Their energy resources give them advantages in economic cooperation within SCO countries. Energy security has become vital in the globalized world for every industrialized country. In order to coordinate energy strategies and strengthen energy security, Russia proposed an "Energy Club" that will unite energy producers and consumers, transit countries, and private companies. On 3 July 2007, the Energy Club was established in Moscow.¹⁵⁴ Increasing cooperation in the energy sector is a valuable step for Central Asian security. Stability, peace, prosperity, and security are closely interconnected to each in this area.

The SCO is a new type of cooperation that appeared due to needs of the new global system. In some instances, the effects of the September 11 attacks were excessively exaggerated. However, it is clear that it was evidence for the necessity of cooperation in solving global problems. Unilateral actions are not adequate and disturb other countries. The old type of regionalism, exemplified by the European Union, is identity-based and dictates liberal democratic values. However, SCO that

¹⁵² Gennadii Chufrin, "The SCO: Changing Priorities", *International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No.1, 2007, p. 59.

¹⁵³ Chufrin, p. 59.

¹⁵⁴ Haas, p. 249.

espouses the new regionalism is a functional, interest-based cooperation, which take measures against the negative effects of globalization.¹⁵⁵

The SCO is based on “Shanghai Spirit” that means for SCO members, principles of mutual trust, benefit, and equality.¹⁵⁶ The most important characteristic of the SCO is that it is not an alliance but rather a partnership. It does not target a third party while aiming at multipolar world order. The main “enemies” of the member states are extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Moreover, their guiding principal is the non-interference in internal affairs.

The membership of Russia and China is the most important advantage for the Central Asian countries. As a result, these two major powers can balance each other in the organization. There will not be a dominant power that dictates its agendas. Although, Chinese and Russian military capacity seems to be a threat for Central Asian region, they are major supporters of peace and stability in Central Asia. These two nuclear major powers have the capacity and the tool to change the geo-politic and geo-economic competition in the region to a peaceful approach.¹⁵⁷

Every characteristic of SCO anticipates its aim to establish a multipolar world order. In a multipolar world, international organizations will increase its importance and superpowers will not dictate the agenda to regional powers. This will increase stability and security in Central Asia. The SCO is an important player in the security and economy in Central Asia. This type of organization is appropriate for the current structure of the region. The leadership in Central Asia supports SCO because this provides a basis for the security of existing regimes.

¹⁵⁵ Chung, p. 993.

¹⁵⁶ Matthew Oresman, “Catching the Shanghai Spirit,” *Foreign Policy*, May/Jun 2004, No.142, p. 79.

¹⁵⁷ Karasar and Kuşkumbayev, pp. 290-291.

3.1.3 NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)

All Central Asian states are NATO PfP partners, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan since 1994 and Tajikistan since 2002. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) seeks to provide cooperation between NATO member states and NATO partners. In this way, partners establish bilateral relations with NATO in order to cooperate according to their own security priorities. With PfP, NATO members desire to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace, and to support security relationship between partners and members.¹⁵⁸

NATO PfP was designed to adapt NATO to the new international system after the end of Cold War. After the disappearance of Soviet threat, NATO 's *raison d'être* began to be questioned. The defense organization lost its adversary but a short interlude demonstrated that the NATO members were still not secure in a world without the Soviet Union. New security threats entered the agenda of NATO. Moreover, the most important effect of globalization on security was that the new threats do not recognize borders in the contemporary international system. As a result, the security around NATO members' boundaries became crucial and so NATO established the Partnership for Peace in January 1994 during the Brussels summit.¹⁵⁹

PfP does not anticipate a multilateral base for cooperation. Rather it provides a bilateral relationship between partners and NATO members. This program cannot provide a security guarantee to its partners but it ensures measures for confidence

¹⁵⁸ "North Atlantic Treaty Organization." October 1, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html> (accessed November 14, 2008).

¹⁵⁹ Partnership for Peace, *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 67.

building, preventive diplomacy, and coordination for new security challenges.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, one should note that, this program aims to facilitate the process of transition to democracy and market economies in partner states.¹⁶¹

The basis of the relationship was designated in the framework document that determines comprehensive commitments for each Partner country:

To preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.¹⁶²

The allies also give assurance that they will consult with any partner country if there is a direct threat towards its territorial integrity, security, or political independence.¹⁶³ The NATO PfP program does not provide mechanisms for peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in Central Asia. However, NATO encouraged Central Asian partners for the establishment of Central Asian Battalion (*Centrasbat*) under the umbrella of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). *Centrasbat* is not a NATO PfP program. The reason for this potential confusion is that some bilateral relations of NATO members were maintained as NATO PfP activities. NATO accepts these pure bilateral assistances as programs “In the spirit of PfP.”¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 231.

¹⁶¹ Hikmet Erdoğan, *Avrupa'nın geleceğinde Türkiye'nin Önemi ve NATO İttifakı*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2004), p. 213.

¹⁶² "North Atlantic Treaty Organization." October 1, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html> (accessed November 14, 2008).

¹⁶³ "North Atlantic Treaty Organization." October 1, 2008. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html> (accessed November 14, 2008).

¹⁶⁴ R. Bhatti and R. Bronson, 'NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia', *Survival*, Vol.42, No.3, Autumn 2000, p. 132.

Since 1997, NATO has continued to develop its relations with the region through military exercises under *Centrasbat* and through training assistance. To this end NATO established a PfP center for military training in Turkey to train military personnel from Central Asian states.¹⁶⁵ However, the region's importance increased after American operations in Afghanistan commenced and especially after the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took control in Afghanistan in 2003.¹⁶⁶

Central Asian partners have supported the US and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Uzbekistan has provided airbases for flights of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF. Kyrgyzstan supported ISAF and Kazakhstan gave support to Poland for demining operations in Iraq and gave the permission for over flight and the transport of supplies through its territory. Moreover, in this period, USA established air bases in Uzbekistan (Khanabad) and in Kyrgyzstan (Manas).¹⁶⁷

The NATO PfP does not promise future NATO membership to its partners in Central Asia. Ten partners of the PfP program have become NATO members but the remaining partners are either not interested or not likely to enter the alliance.¹⁶⁸ For Central Asian countries with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, which has deepened its relationship with NATO, to become a member of NATO is a distant dream. Consequently, this program is not currently promising for Central Asian states in their struggle with the new security challenges. The NATO PfP program has increased coordination between Central Asian states and NATO but this is not a

¹⁶⁵ Amanov, p. 282.

¹⁶⁶ Amanov, p. 289.

¹⁶⁷ Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era", *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, Vol. 9, No.2, June 2004, p. 33.

¹⁶⁸ Simon, p. 28.

practical force for solving regional problems. The PfP can be only the first step in the relationship between NATO and its Central Asian partners.

The relationship between the Central Asian states and NATO was established on a bilateral basis. In fact, these relationships show variations from country to country in the region. Therefore, the NATO PfP program does not enhance regionalism initiatives in the region. The real contribution of this program is to improve regional development in security by its training programs and to increase coordination between Central Asian partners and NATO members. The NATO PfP and especially the US support democratic initiatives and market economies in Central Asia. However, NATO carefully abstains itself from criticizing Central Asian states about their domestic problems.

The future success of the relationship between NATO and the Central Asian states under the PfP program depends on the NATO's capacity to adopt its structure to an enlarging area and to new the security challenges of the 21st century. To be effective, NATO has to transform itself. It has to redefine its priorities and calibrate its budget according to these priorities. NATO PfP should focus on the development of capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats by enforcing bilateral and especially regional initiatives.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ Simon, p. 28.

3.2 Central Asian Regional Cooperation Structures

This section will focus on four structures: the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ).

3.2.1 The Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC)

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan formed Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in 1994. This organization had some security targets in addition to economic goals, such as to resolve water management, combat drug trafficking, and to increase military and security cooperation.¹⁷⁰ CAEC decided to establish joint Council of Defense Ministers for regional security and defense coordination, including the coordination of military exercises, air defense and defense supplies. *Centrasbat* was created at this time.¹⁷¹ As mentioned above, *Centrasbat* is not an initiative sponsored solely CAEC. However, has received the support of the NATO PfP program as well.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participate in the *Centrasbat* series of exercises in order to improve interaction on peacekeeping or humanitarian operations and exercising command, control, and logistics within a multinational framework. Tajikistan joined *Centrasbat* in 1998. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, United

¹⁷⁰ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 220.

¹⁷¹ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, pp. 220-221.

Kingdom, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia also participate in some of the activities of *Centrasbat*.¹⁷² In Central Asia, only Turkmenistan remained outside this organization. This was not an obstacle to its being a purely regional organization because Turkmenistan was following a policy of neutrality in its foreign affairs.

The function of *Centrasbat* is undetermined but in addition to military assistance, the NATO PfP program provides Central Asian states with the tools to balance the role of Russia in the region.¹⁷³

Centrasbat military exercises continued from 1997 to 2000. These occasions have also had practical importance for NATO in that they test in practice their theoretical calculations for a military operation in the region and provide intelligence about local conditions, logistical lines, and terrain.¹⁷⁴

The main regional problems, Islamic resurgence and terrorism, were weakening all members of CAEC and were damaging relations between them. These threats were increasing suspicion among the Central Asian countries. In 2000, CAEC leaders signed an agreement on cooperation in fighting terrorism, extremism, and trans-border organized crime. However, initial expectations gave way to the seeking of new partners in solving regional problems after the incursion of armed Islamist groups into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the summer of 2000. Depending on that, four CAEC leaders appealed to Russia to join to their agreement and to the CIS Collective Security Council to plan action for countering the terrorist threat.¹⁷⁵ In 2001, Kerimov declared that the stability of a state in Central Asia is dependent on

¹⁷² "Global Security org." April 25, 2005.<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm> (accessed November 16, 2008).

¹⁷³ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, pp. 231-232.

¹⁷⁴ "Global Security org." April 25, 2005.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm> (accessed November 16, 2008).

¹⁷⁵ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 222.

the stability of other Central Asian states. In this period, security concerns started to replace economic concerns that were the driving force in the CAEC.¹⁷⁶

3.2.2 Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)

In 2001, CAEC altered its structure and became the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). On paper, this arrangement intended to increase cooperation but the overall record of effective cooperation during 2002-2004 decreased with respect to economics, trade, and security affairs. The president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov called upon Russia to be a member of CACO in order to solve problems within the member states. In 2004, Russia became a member in CACO.¹⁷⁷ This was the end to regional initiatives without an external partner. This development also demonstrated the changing role of Russia regarding the Central Asian countries. After the September 11 attacks, the Central Asian states were impressed by Western engagement in the region and they wanted to balance Russia's role through fostering Western involvement. However, this call for Russian membership shows that Russia remained the most important determinant in regional security calculations.

Nevertheless, Russia was not ready to become deeply involved in the intricate disputes between Central Asian states. Russia pushed CACO members to merge with the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The merger was declared in October

¹⁷⁶ Karasar, pp. 232-233.

¹⁷⁷ Roy Allison, "Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.27, No.2, June 2008, p. 191.

2005 and the reason for this merger was declared a move to rationalize two institutions with largely overlapping goals.¹⁷⁸

After this failure of a purely regional structure, Kazakh leader Nazarbayev introduced new proposals on the regional level. In 2001, he proposed a single space in Central Asia that would create an area of prosperity, to prevent international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Then, in 2005, he suggested the revival of the historical aim of the Central Asian Union. However, these proposals did not materialize because of disagreements between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.¹⁷⁹ Kazakh leader, Nazarbayev underlined in a speech in 2005, the necessity of “United States of Central Asia” for the economic development of the region that will increase stability, security, economic and military independence. Currently, his support to this idea and to this initiative continues.¹⁸⁰

The most important barrier to regional structures in this area has been the lack of resources to solve huge internal and external problems. Conflicts between Central Asian states prevent regional cooperation without an external party as well. Competition especially between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is the main obstacle. Kerimov rejected the initiatives backed by the Kazakh leader due to this competition. Kazakhstan is the largest country in the region while Uzbekistan’s population is close that of the remaining four countries in the region combines. This competition is also obvious in their relations with major powers. There are various problems between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan too. However, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are weak states lacking resources. They support cooperative initiative in regional level in order to solve their problems.

¹⁷⁸ Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia”, p. 191.

¹⁷⁹ Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia”, p. 191.

¹⁸⁰ Karasar and Kuşkumbayev, p. 170.

3.2.3 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)

Other than purely Central Asian security structures, there are some initiatives that have arisen from the Central Asian region such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan initiated this international security forum in 1992. Nazarbayev's aim was to erect an effective and universal security system in Asia. An organization that other regions had already acquired was lacking in Asia.¹⁸¹ CICA's broad membership includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Palestinian National Authority, Pakistan, Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. The UN, OSCE, League of Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Qatar, Vietnam, Ukraine and USA have observer status in these periodic meetings.¹⁸²

CICA covers a huge geographical area comprising different cultures, ethnicities, and religions. Nearly half of the world's population lives in this zone, whose economic leverage increases day by day. On one hand, , there are developing countries in this region whose energy needs increase continuously, and on the other hand, major energy providers are likewise members of CICA. Security in this area is essential for development, and so CICA took the OSCE success in Europe as an example in preventive diplomacy and disarmament. Like the OSCE, CICA tries to strengthen measures for preventing conflict and confidence building in the Central Asian region and its neighbors.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Farkhod Khamraev, 'Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia: prospects and potential', *Central Asia and the Caucasus Analyst*, 17: 5, 2002, p. 54.

¹⁸² "CICA." 2008.http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1 (accessed November 20, 2008).

¹⁸³ Amanov, p. 274.

CICA stresses disarmament and aims to sanitize some areas of nuclear weapons. Another threat to security that CICA considers important is instability. CICA has also tried to establish the necessary dialog between civilizations and religions. Lastly, the biggest problem of the region is also on the CICA's agenda, terrorism and the future of Afghanistan.¹⁸⁴

Two summits were held in 2002 and 2006 and three ministerial meetings in 1999, 2004 and 2008. The aim of these quadrennial meetings is to conduct consultations, review the progress of CICA activities, and set priorities for the future..¹⁸⁵

The Almaty Act that was issued in 2002 is CICA's first step of towards becoming an international organization. However, it is too soon to talk about the success of this forum. Broad membership complicates the system but the forum will serve to build confidence between member states. This initiative is helpful for Central Asian security overall.

3.2.4 Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ)

Another cooperation functioning in Central Asia is the initiative to form a dialogue for a Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). In 1993, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan proposed this idea in a session of the UN assembly. Despite Turkmenistan's neutrality policy, this initiative compromises all five states

¹⁸⁴ Amanov, p. 274.

¹⁸⁵ "CICA." 2008. http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=10&lang=1 (accessed November 20, 2008).

in the Central Asian region. China and Russia are also informally engaging in the process.¹⁸⁶

Some proposals of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan proved fruitless from 1994-1996. In 1997, the five leaders of Central Asian states signed the Almaty Declaration. Leaders met again in 2002, and in 2005, the final draft of CSNWFZ was signed.¹⁸⁷ This treaty forbids signatories to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile, or otherwise acquire, possess, or control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.¹⁸⁸ This treaty serves mainly to build confidence between Central Asian states. The membership of Turkmenistan is especially meaningful for regional security. Indeed, although this treaty is not really effective because CSTO members; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are protected under the Russian nuclear umbrella, it contributes to regional security.

¹⁸⁶ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 224.

¹⁸⁷ Amanov, pp. 276-277.

¹⁸⁸ "James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies."
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060905_canwfz.pdf (accessed November 23, 2008).

CHAPTER IV

GLOBAL POWERS IN CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY

4.1 The Russian Role in Central Asian Security

Since the disintegration of Soviet Union, two different schools of thought have shaped Russian foreign policy. The Euro-Atlanticist perspective based its assumptions on western values and western forms of development. This perspective stresses the importance of partnership with the US and the Europe. This approach requires a closer security relationship with the West rather than a cooperative policy in the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asian region. As for Central Asian security, this perspective favors a western approach, which characterizes Russia as an agent of containment on behalf of the Western world against Asian security threats.¹⁸⁹ The Euro-Atlanticist perspective intends to break the historical ties that connect Central Asia to Russia which entail certain responsibilities. According to this understanding, Russia could only achieve its development if it turns to the West and its role should be to secure the Western world from Asian threats.

¹⁸⁹ Mohiaddin Meshabi, "Russian foreign policy and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus", *Central Asian Survey*, 1993, 12:2, pp. 182-184.

On the other hand, the neo-Eurasianist perspective is established on the assumption that the success of reform in Russia toward its reassertion of Russian statehood and the recovery of lost ground after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁰ This approach rejects unipolar world stability and encourages Russia's role in world affairs. Neo- Eurasianists advocate bilateral and multilateral security initiatives led by Russia generally in the CIS region, but particularly in Central Asia.

Russian foreign policy immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union demonstrated sharp inclinations towards a Euro-Atlanticist perspective. At this time, Russia's primary aim of in foreign affairs was to reorganize relations with the West. The CIS, especially the Central Asian states were seen as a burden to the devastated Russian economy, which was. Confusion and disengagement characterized Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia in the aftermath.¹⁹¹

In mid 1992, Russian foreign policy changed its approach toward the CIS countries. Russia tried to find a balance between Euro-Atlanticist and Neo-Eurasianist perspectives in foreign policy. Following this shift, Russia announced a new framework of its foreign policy towards Central Asia in its Near Abroad Policy in April 1993. Even after signing the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, all Central Asian countries chose to enhance their relations with Russia on bilateral bases by series of friendship treaties.¹⁹²

Many different dynamics affect foreign policy options. Leadership and internal dynamics are very important but this chapter only examines the most significant changes. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Russia continued to follow the strategy of Mikhail Gorbachev. This strategy was rested upon three

¹⁹⁰ Meshabi, p. 185.

¹⁹¹ Nazım Cafersoy, *Güvenlik ve Bağımsızlığın Gölgesinde Rusya-Özbekistan İlişkiler (1991-2001)*, *Avrasya Dosyası Özbekistan Özel*, cilt 7, sayı 3, 2001, pp.164-165.

¹⁹² Meshabi, p. 196.

pillars: economic and political reforms, international cooperation, and a rapprochement with the West.¹⁹³ This understanding alienated Russia from Central Asia and was criticized by the Russian military after the emergence of conflicts in the CIS region. Russia's reluctance to intervene changed and in 1993 the Near Abroad policy for CIS countries was introduced.

4.1.1 Near Abroad and Russia as a Great Power

Russia returned to the use of great power rhetoric and rejected any other structure than CIS in this region. In Central Asia, Russia began to play a zero-sum game.¹⁹⁴ At this time, bilateral and multilateral relations increased between the Central Asian states and Russia. However, in 1996 the gap between Russian ambitious policies and its capacity became clear. Russian economic and political power was not enough to make it a military and economic integrator and guarantor of security in former Soviet territory. Consequently, Russia decided on a more pragmatic and low profile policy in order to diminish the gap between policy declarations and actual capability.¹⁹⁵

It is necessary to define divergences in Russian foreign policy within the CIS region. After its disintegration, Russia withdrew politically, economically and militarily from Eastern Europe, the Baltic, and the western CIS states. Military cooperation was not on the agenda, but rather economic cooperation especially in the energy sector became prominent in its relations. However, in Central Asia Russia

¹⁹³ Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 5.

¹⁹⁴ Cafersoy, p. 166.

¹⁹⁵ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, pp. 5-6.

wanted to maintain a role as a security guarantor and a leader in economic integration. Central Asia was defined as part of the Russian sphere of influence.¹⁹⁶ Russia's biggest fear in the Central Asian region was that its disengagement would lead to a power vacuum, which might be filled by a state unfriendly to Russia.¹⁹⁷

Two important incentives pushed Russia into the Central Asian region: first, strategic concerns about the growing engagement of foreign actors in this region, and second, the increasing concerns over regional security that threatened greater Eurasian security. Economic concerns are inscribed within all these motives.¹⁹⁸ The threat of the spread of radical Islamism into Central Asia was one of Russia's major security concerns. The civil war in Tajikistan gave rise to this fear. The war between local Tajik clans separated the country between the Communist and democratically backed Islamists. Russia feared the toppling of secular governments in a domino fashion if Islamists in Tajikistan came to power.¹⁹⁹

Inter-clan conflict in Tajikistan did not expand in the region and the Russian concern shifted to another issue, drug trafficking.²⁰⁰ The permeable borders of Central Asia provided an opportunity for drug dealers coming from Afghanistan to Europe using Central Asian states and Russia as transit countries. In the mid-1990s, Russia suggested the concept of a "double border" between the CIS and Russia, which would generate a forward security barrier along the old Soviet border with Iran and Afghanistan. However, this suggestion never materialized.²⁰¹ Central Asian countries insisted on independent policies on border problems. Only Tajikistan accepted Russia's help in order to control its borders and to train its border staff.

¹⁹⁶ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁷ Allison and Jonson, *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, p. 98.

¹⁹⁸ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 10.

¹⁹⁹ Dmitri Trenin, 'Southern Watch: Russia's Policy in Central Asia', *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2003, vol. 56, no.2, p. 119.

²⁰⁰ Trenin, p. 122.

²⁰¹ Trenin, p. 127.

Border control is a major security problem for Russia because Russia and Kazakhstan have the longest extant continuous land border, and is not monitored. Except for a few check points and customs offices along the major roads, there is no real barrier from Afghanistan until Russia. This causes problems in controlling illegal migration, drug trafficking, and other forms of smuggling.²⁰²

4.1.2 The Taliban, IMU and Russian Foreign Policy

The Taliban took the control of Afghanistan in 1996 and this increased security concerns in Central Asia. This event increased Central Asian expectations from Russia concerning their security. However, Russia was also experiencing a separatist uprising in Chechnya and Russia had to accept the de facto independence of Chechnya until 1999.²⁰³ Another internal problem was the Russian economy that had been devastated in 1998. Due to internal problems, Russia could not respond effectively to the demands of Central Asian countries until 1999 when Vladimir Putin came to power.

The 1990s were the period of Russian disengagement from Central Asia and this power vacuum in the region was gradually replaced by other powers. At this time, Russia failed to establish a coherent strategy towards the region encompassing the full complex of military, economic, political, and humanitarian spheres.²⁰⁴

Russian foreign policy underwent many policy shifts during the presidency of Putin. During this period, Russia solved some of its internal problems and increased

²⁰² Trenin, p. 126.

²⁰³ Trenin, p. 122.

²⁰⁴ Boris Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, (New York: M. E Sharpe, 2005), p. 73.

its capabilities. The problem of Chechen separatism was suppressed and was partially solved. In 2000s, Russia witnessed considerable economic growth due to increasing energy prices and due to its growing role as a supplier in the energy sector. Domestic opposition was silenced under Putin's strict rule.

In 1999, the IMU under Juma Namangani (its military leader) made incursions into the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan from bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and took hostages, including four Japanese geologists. The events in Batken and the Chechen attack on Dagestan in 1999 shaped Russian foreign policy towards Central Asia. These events paved the way for improving military and security cooperation between the Central Asian states and Russia.²⁰⁵ The Batken events and the Chechen problem allowed Russia to adopt rhetoric of terrorism. One of the main determinants in foreign policy became the threat of international terrorism.

In this period, President Putin gave priority to relations with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the CST but responded positively to Russian proposals for cooperation and a series of bilateral agreements on security and military technical cooperation. President Putin described relations with Uzbekistan as a 'strategic partnership'.²⁰⁶

For Russia during this period, the best option to improve relations with other Central Asian states was a collective option because Russian capabilities were not sufficient to provide bilateral guaranties to all Central Asian states. The Russian economy was recovering from the recent effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and the increase in energy prices in 2000. This recovery helped Russia to apply its

²⁰⁵ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 63.

²⁰⁶ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 65.

foreign policy towards Central Asia. Russia's collective efforts of were mentioned under the CIS title.

The September 11 attacks were of significance for Central Asian politics. The US declared "war on terrorism" and targeted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which supported Al-Qaeda. The Taliban was a security concern for Russia and Central Asian states ever since it came to power in 1996. In Central Asia, only Turkmenistan engaged in relations with Afghanistan.²⁰⁷

4.1.3 The September 11 attacks and Central Asia

Four years prior to the September 11 attacks Russia had established a base in Tajikistan for supporting the anti-Taliban Northern Coalition, supplying weapons and materials to Ahmed Shah Masoud's Tajiks and Abdul Rashid Dostum's Uzbeks.²⁰⁸ However, Russian capabilities were not enough to remove Taliban from power. Operation Enduring Freedom, initiated by the US and western allies, fulfilled its mission but the role of Russia was also crucial to this operation.

After a period of assessment, President Putin announced Russian support for the war on terrorism. In a declaration on 24 September 2001, Putin proposed to cooperate through special services in exchanging intelligence and opening Russian airspace for transit flights carrying humanitarian assistance. Russia increased its support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and backed the decision of the Central Asian states to make their airfields and military bases available for the use of

²⁰⁷ Trenin, p. 126.

²⁰⁸ Trenin, p. 130.

the US military. Lastly, Putin declared Russian support for search and rescue missions.²⁰⁹

Russian assistance in the operations in Afghanistan was meaningful for world affairs and particularly for Central Asian politics. In this way, Russia demonstrated that its policy of seeking integration and cooperation with the West was irrevocable. Russia's action was pragmatic. This decision shows a determination to restore Russia's position in its traditional spheres of influence.²¹⁰ Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan, were foremost advocates of the US position. Russian support preserved the relations between Central Asian countries and Russia. Another motive for Russia's support of for the US operation was the Russian war in Chechnya, because the US decreased its pressure on Russia with regard to its internal problems. Russia started to use the rhetoric of "war on terrorism" with respect to Chechnya.

The US operations in Afghanistan increased the importance of Central Asia in world politics. The Central Asian states, especially Uzbekistan, acquired the chance to diversify their security partnerships. Moreover, the IMU suffered a devastating defeat in battles around Mazar-i-Sharif in November 2001.²¹¹

At the end of the 2001, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan opened their territories to the US army and the United States established airbases in these countries. Russia did not oppose this development but hoped that this presence will be a temporary presence within the framework of anti-terrorist operations.²¹² Russian concerns were observed in meetings of multilateral security initiatives in which they demanded along with China a timetable for the withdrawal of the US from Central Asia.

²⁰⁹ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, p. 98

²¹⁰ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, pp. 79-80.

²¹¹ Pavel K. Baev, 'Assessing Russia's card: three petty games in Central Asia', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17:2, p. 273.

²¹² Baev, p. 274.

The increasing US presence and influence in Central Asia forced Russia to return to the region, which occurred along three axes: the establishment of military bases, active efforts within the framework of multilateral security organizations, and the development of bilateral interstate military and security relations.²¹³

Russia opened its military base in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003 close to Manas airport where US forces were deployed.²¹⁴ Russia signed a 15-year agreement for the use of the Kant airbase as a part of the CIS Collective Security Rapid Reaction Force.²¹⁵ Russia increased its efforts toward the institutionalization of SCO and CSTO. Russia supported these organizations in their restructuring for becoming attuned to the new international environment and to the new security threats. Moreover, Russia started to revise its bilateral relations with Central Asian states, especially with Uzbekistan, which was deteriorated after US engagement in the region. Thus, Russia signed a “Treaty on Strategic Partnership” with Uzbekistan in June 2004. The aim of the treaty was the development of cooperation in the military sphere.²¹⁶ In June of 2004, Russia also reached an agreement with Tajikistan and this agreement converted Russia’s existing military deployment into a permanent base.²¹⁷

The US operation in Iraq was one of the reasons why Central Asian countries became suspicious about the US intentions in the region and returned to view Russia as a reliable partner. Even though they supported the US operation in Iraq by way showing their loyalty to their partner, the Central Asian countries started to question the agenda of the US.²¹⁸ This was a good opportunity for Russia. In this period, Russia increased its capacity for playing a major role in the region but it was still

²¹³ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, p. 83.

²¹⁴ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, p. 81.

²¹⁵ Buszynski, p. 556.

²¹⁶ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, p. 84.

²¹⁷ Hiroshi Kimura, “Russia and the CIS in 2004: Putin’s Offensive and Defensive Actions”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.45, No:1 (Jan-Feb.,2005), p. 62.

²¹⁸ Rumer, *Central Asia at the End of the Transition*, p. 88.

impossible for Russia to solve all the problems of the region. Therefore, Russia stressed multilateral cooperation and for Russia, China was preferred as an ally to the US in the regional context.

4.1.4 Russia, the US and Central Asia

Russia not only increased its relations in security affairs but also paid greater attention to the economic aspects of its relations with Central Asian states. Energy especially became an issue of security was centered on the agenda of relations.²¹⁹ Russia started to use energy as a tool in its foreign policy. Energy resources, especially oil and natural gas, become political levers because the prices in energy market rose steadily.²²⁰ Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan held energy resources in the energy game. They were landlocked and needed Russia for the transportation of their resources. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were small countries in need of energy. For Russia, the main problem was to prevent alternative routes that would bypass Russia and that will challenge its historical role. Russia signed treaties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for twenty-five years to transport the majority of the energy produced from these countries. This development is a real indicator of the role of Russia in the region.

Developments in the US-Russian relations in Central Asia were hampered by two important events. First, the “Colored Revolutions” that flourished in the CIS region increased the tension between these countries. Meanwhile, these revolutions

²¹⁹ Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy*, p. 117.

²²⁰ Kimura, p. 62.

changed the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries to strengthen their relations with the US in the aftermath of September 11. Especially after the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan that overthrew President Askar Akayev in 2005, and the “Colored Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, which followed, Uzbekistan began to feel threatened. At this juncture, the Andijan events of May 2005 were harshly suppressed by the Karimov regime. China and Russia backed Uzbekistan in its actions while the US after some hesitation called for an international inquiry into the events in Andijan, as did the EU. Uzbekistan immediately demanded the US evacuate the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base in Uzbekistan because of the critical stance of the US on the Andijan events.²²¹ The US departure from the K2 base coincided with an intense rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia.²²² This improvement was interpreted as the escalation of competition between the US and Russia for Central Asia.

Second, Russian operations against Georgia in August of 2008 changed strategic understandings in the region. Since the Rose Revolution, which brought the young, Western-oriented leader Saakashvili to the head of the government, Russian-Georgian relations became tense. Russia warned the Georgian leader because of his pro-Western actions such as advocating Georgian candidacy for membership in NATO and the EU. For Russia, these actions challenged Russia’s regional role. In August of 2008, Russia began operations in two separatist regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a response to Saakashvili’s attempt to reintegrate these separatist regions. Russia’s action was seen as a punishment for Saakashvili’s

²²¹ Alexander Cooley, ‘Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia’, *International Affairs*, 84: 6 (2008), pp. 1175-1177.

²²² Eugene Rumer, ‘The US Interests and Role in Central Asia after K2’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:3, summer 2006, p. 142.

government for its western orientation and its alienation from Russia.²²³ The US and the West criticized Russia for its operation and its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. However, the most important impact of this operation to the Central Asian region was the increased fear of Russian imperialism, but this did not lead to a setback between the Central Asian states and Russia

Within the CIS, the Central Asian states are weak in terms of economy and political stability. Generally, they are close allies of Russia because of their security and economic needs. The Georgian operation was a show of force to the Central Asian states that were searching for Western allies to balance Russia. The Colored Revolutions estranged the Central Asian states from the US. Meanwhile, the Georgian operation increased Central Asian fear of Russia's reaction if they wished to increase their relations with the West.

Internal security threats like the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May of 2005 and the upheavals in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and November 2006 demanded that Russia pay greater attention to the region.²²⁴ Possible anti-regime upheavals in the region endangered stability, a national security interest for Russia. Central Asian leaders sought after Russia as the best option for their regime security. Roy Allison described this type of protective integration as "virtual regionalism." According to Allison, this is a form of collective political solidarity with Russia to prevent the influences of international political process or agendas, which challenge regional political leaders and their regimes.²²⁵

The role of Russia in Central Asian security cannot be underestimated. Russia is the major external player in Central Asian security affairs. On the one hand, historical ties and the current international system forced Russia to assume the role of

²²³ Svante E. Cornell, 'War in Georgia, Jitters All Around', *Current History*, October 2008, p. 312.

²²⁴ Matveeva, p. 48.

²²⁵ Allison, Virtual Regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia, pp. 185-186.

integrator in the region. On the other hand, Russian national interests necessitate engagement with the Central Asian security because the stability in the region is vital for Russia. Because of its inadequacies, Russia cannot take on the entire burden of Central Asian security. Russia supports multilateral initiatives in order to share the burden of solving security problems. Russia prefers the CIS structure and particularly the CSTO for Central Asia. However, Russia also supports the SCO structure as an alternative. Security regionalism accelerates with Russian assistance. However, this assistance is a pragmatic approach that Roy Allison termed virtual regionalism. Nevertheless, Russian support of regionalism had increased stability and security in the region.

4.2 The US Role in Central Asian Security

The five Central Asian states, which had emerged after the collapse of Soviet Union, attracted world attention because Central Asia had been closed to outside world during the Soviet rule. The mysterious region had attracted some attention but it remained a low priority in US foreign policy throughout the 1990s. The September 11 attacks were a turning point in the relationship between Central Asian states and the US. The US increased its security relationship with the region in order to support its operation in Afghanistan. Another motivating force that drove the US towards the

region was increasing energy prices. For energy security, the US turned to the region's resources to diversify its energy imports.²²⁶

US foreign policy towards Central Asia was not specifically regional but was a part of a larger foreign policy understanding towards the former Soviet States. The US has supported democratic, market-oriented reforms, encouraged their rapid integration into international political, economic, and security institutions, promoted conflict resolution and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and forwarded U.S. business interests in the new republics. The goal of US policy in the successor states of USSR has been to promote the rise of peaceful, stable and democratic states.²²⁷

At the beginning of 1990s, the US foreign policy was focused on the Gulf War, the future of NATO, peace in Middle East, and ethnic problems in Balkan region. In the US foreign policy, these regions and Russia took priority over Central Asia.²²⁸ During this period, the US encouraged Turkey to assume an important role in this region as a key US ally. The US wanted Turkey to assume a central role in the transportation of Caspian energy to western markets as a bridge between the west and the southern republics. Another reason for the US support for Turkey was the fear of Iranian influence in Central Asia.²²⁹ Although the US has backed a Turkish role in Central Asia, the US continued to have a "Russia First" policy and it was careful not to estrange Russia with its foreign policy.²³⁰

However, the declaration of Russian "Near Abroad" policy, the ineffective policies of Turkey, the increasing interest of other external powers, and the demand

²²⁶ Cooley, p. 1173.

²²⁷ Michael P. Croissant, 'U.S. Interests in the Caspian Sea Basin', *Comparative Strategy*, 16:4, 1997, p.354.

²²⁸ Amanov, p. 96.

²²⁹ Croissant, p. 355.

²³⁰ Croissant, p. 359.

of American energy markets pushed the US to revise its foreign policy towards the Central Asian states.²³¹ Caspian energy resources and their accessibility became a national interest for the US after the mid-1990s. Under the effect of this concern, the US-Central Asian relationship developed on the basis of a economics and trade. In 1998, the White House identified in the National Security Strategy paper independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic- political reforms in Central Asia as in the American national interest. This paper underscored the importance of Central Asian politics for stability and security in the entire Asia.²³² American energy companies were seeking access to the region's oil and gas resources while the US administration was supporting independence, sovereignty, and stability in the region.²³³

Even though the US did not develop any coherent strategy and practices towards Central Asia during 1990s, it encouraged Central Asian states to become members of OSCE, NATO, and other western international organizations. The US backed Central Asian states in cooperation with NATO by Partnership for Peace program as well.²³⁴

4.2.1 Democracy, Uzbekistan and the US

The relationship between Central Asia and the US was developed under the shadow of US criticism on the promotion democracy until September 11. The events

²³¹ Amanov, p. 96.

²³² Amanov, p. 98.

²³³ Buszynski, p. 547.

²³⁴ M. S. Erol and Ç. Tunç, "11 Eylül Sonrası ABD'nin Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Orta Asya", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Küresel Değerlendirme Özel, 2003, Vol.9, No. 3, p. 11.

of September 11 were the turning point in the US-Central Asian relations. After September 11, the US put aside its criticism of democratic deficiencies in order to preserve their access to strategically important fixed assets: military bases, hydrocarbon resources, and pipelines in the region.²³⁵

After September 11, the US requested military cooperation from the Central Asian states for the Operation Enduring Freedom. Uzbekistan was the first to respond to US needs. On October 5, Uzbekistan and the US agreed upon the use of Khanabad Airport for cargo flights to Afghanistan. Then, Kyrgyzstan opened its Manas Airport to NATO's use and lastly Kazakhstan consented to the use of three airports and over flight rights by the US and NATO forces. Turkmenistan gave permission for over flights and the transport of humanitarian cargo to Afghanistan.²³⁶

After September 11, Uzbekistan became an indispensable ally for the US and whose cooperation was desperately needed for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan.²³⁷ Meanwhile Uzbekistan was trying to cut its dependence on Russia in security affairs, having withdrawn from the CST. Although it established close bilateral relations with Russia, it was trying to diversify its relations. Uzbekistan has ambitious aims for regional leadership. However, Russia has always tried to maintain the balance between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The war on terrorism was a chance for Uzbekistan to become a major regional ally of the US. US-Uzbekistan relations improved dramatically during this period. In March 2002, they signed "United States- Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework" in which the US was first to offer a security guarantee to a country in the former Soviet region.²³⁸

²³⁵ Cooley, p. 1174.

²³⁶ Buszynski, p. 547.

²³⁷ Rumer, p.144.

²³⁸ Rumer, p.145.

However, this close relationship fell apart after the US criticism on the Andijan events. The US was encouraged by the success of the Colored Revolutions in the former Soviet region and responded critically to the Uzbek government's use of force during the uprisings. The US and the West demanded an independent international investigation but the Uzbek government rejected international involvement. Uzbekistan claimed that the force was the appropriate response against this terrorist uprising and the incident investigated by Uzbek authorities.²³⁹

Uzbekistan responded to the US critics on Andijan harshly because Uzbekistan was suspicious about the US intention to promote democracy and revolutionary change in this area. For Uzbekistan, liberal ideas were the worst possible prescription for their regime and their country.²⁴⁰ In order to prevent the US from doing so, Uzbekistan immediately demanded the evacuation of the K2 air bases.

The US evacuated its bases in Uzbekistan in 2005 following the Andijan events. However, Uzbekistan took a new step in early 2008 to allow US nationals to use its Termez airbase, which the Germans were also using. This approval covers individuals from the civil-advisory and administrative structure of the alliance, and grants access only on a "case-by-case" basis.²⁴¹ Even this development represents considerable progress in Uzbek-US relations. This does not demonstrate a real tendency for repairing the relations that were damaged after the Andijan events.

Real progress has been seen in relations between the NATO and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan put aside its strict neutrality policy with the new

²³⁹ Rumer, pp. 141-146.

²⁴⁰ Rumer, p. 146.

²⁴¹ Roger McDermott, "The Jamestown Foundation." March 10, 2008. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33446 (accessed February 10, 2009).

government and the new President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has allowed NATO the use of its installations for supporting missions in Afghanistan.²⁴²

Uncertainties about the duration and scope of the US presence in Central Asia were a source of worry for Russia and China. They demanded a clear timetable for the withdrawal of the US forces from Central Asia. The Colored Revolutions of 2003-2004 and the Andijan Uprisings of 2005 generated the conditions for Uzbekistan to demand from the US the evacuation of Karshi-Khanabad airbase. The backing of Russia and China was one of the most important determinants in Uzbekistan's decision. Due to Russian and Chinese pressure and economic problems, Kyrgyzstan first demanded the increase in rents.²⁴³ Manas airbase is a major source of income for economically poor Kyrgyzstan. Lastly, in February 2009, after the promise of Russian economic support, Kyrgyzstan's parliament has approved a government order for the evacuation of the Manas Air Base.²⁴⁴

It is important to note that in these developments, the backing of China and Russia play a crucial role but the US policies towards the region was another significant factor. The democratic statements of the US and its supportive role in Colored Revolutions alienated the autocratic leaders of Central Asia. Domestic and external factors have been two determinants that identify the US foreign policy towards Central Asia. In domestic factors, liberal values are the key element. In some cases, the even US put aside its demands on economic and politic reforms; its liberal approach is always a shadow over its relations with Central Asian states.

²⁴² Cooley, p. 1180.

²⁴³ Stephen Blank, 'U.S. Interests in Central Asia and Their Challenges', *Demokratizatsiya*, June 22, 2007, p. 317.

²⁴⁴ "radio free europe radio liberty." Feb 19, 2009.

http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Approves_US_Air_Base_Closure_Threatening_Afghan_Supply_Chain_/1495890.html (accessed March 5, 2009).

4.2.2 Energy Security and the US

Energy security is another driving force that pushes the US to engage in Central Asian politics. The US excessively depends on the Middle East in the energy sector. Iran is one of the largest oil and gas producers but the US applied sanctions on Iran because of its regime established after the revolution in 1979. The US has criticized Iran for supporting terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and undermining the Middle East peace process. For this reason, the US cannot use Iranian energy resources. The US is over-dependent on a small number of producers in the unstable Middle East.²⁴⁵ Due to this Caspian energy resources have vital importance for the US and western countries in order to diversify their energy supply.

Although, energy resources in Central Asia provoked international interest and a notion of a “second Middle East,” the reserve capacity of this area is not certain.²⁴⁶ First explorations show that this area cannot challenge the capacity of Middle East. New investment and technical capacities will improve the supply. However, other than the supply problem, transportation is another difficulty in Central Asia, which is a landlocked area. Moreover, Russia has a monopoly for transferring Central Asian energy to outside world because of its formerly Soviet infrastructure. Iran is another alternative route that transports Central Asian energy. For the US foreign policy, to establish other routes for the transport of Central Asian energy is a matter of national interest.

From the beginning, the US advocated that the transportation of the Caspian region energy resources to the world market is a matter of geopolitics and not

²⁴⁵ Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The US-Iranian Relationship after 11 September 2001 and the transportation of Caspian Energy’, *Central Asian Survey*, 22 (2/3), June/September 2003, pp. 151-154.

²⁴⁶ Tomas Valasek, ‘US Policy toward the Caspian and Black Sea Region’, *The Quarterly Journal*, No.1, March 2003, p. 16.

necessarily of economics and engineering.²⁴⁷ In this regard, , the US sponsored Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline for bypassing Russia and Iran in spite of Russian objections. The US has long urged Kazakhstan to construct a pipeline under the Caspian that would be connected to BTC. Another alternative route supported by the US is Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP), (or trans-Afghan natural gas pipeline) which could be extended to India. The aim of the US in the diversification of transit routes converge with Central Asian aims to break their dependence on Russia.²⁴⁸ However, even if US firms have been successful in maintaining access to Central Asian energy market, diversification of transit routes is still an unrealized goal, after the most recent last energy deals Central Asian states are now even more dependent on Russia.

4.2.3 Iran, Radical Islam and the US

One of the main goals of the US in Central Asia is to protect the region from the influence of Iran and to prevent Iran from having a regional role. The Iranian Islamic revolution created paranoia in US foreign policy. The US tries to persuade Central Asian states to avoid the Iranian model. For this reason, the US supports the Turkish model of secular government as an alternative to the Iranian model.²⁴⁹

It is difficult to identify the US's interest in Central Asia but it is even more difficult to determine its policy implications. Two main American interests in this region are the accessibility to energy resources and the prevention of terrorism.

²⁴⁷ Ehsan Ahrari, "The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A view from Washington", *Journal of International Affairs*, spring 2003, vol. 56, no.2, p. 162.

²⁴⁸ Blank, p. 317.

²⁴⁹ Ahrari, p.161.

However, many different determinants affect the policy options of the US in the region and the results of these policies can create unintended results.²⁵⁰ As in the case of Uzbekistan, the US did not want to alienate Uzbekistan but its liberal values created such a result nonetheless. This does not mean that the Andijan events are the end of the Uzbek-US relations. This demonstrates that the predicting the course of relations is not easy in this context.

The presence of the US has deeply affected the region. The Afghan threat was a major security threat for the stability of the region. Russia and China were not willing to deal with Afghanistan. The US operations in the Afghanistan and NATO presence in this country increased stability in Central Asia. During these operations, terrorist groups operating in Central Asia, such as the IMU supported by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban suffered losses and lost their power. The leader of IMU, Namangani was even killed during these operations.

Increased US and international interest in the Central Asian region increased assistance and international aid but they are still limited to solving regional social and economic problems.²⁵¹ Terrorism and radical Islamism are the main security threats towards the regional and global powers. Social and economic problems of the region trigger these regional security threats. The situation in Afghanistan is vital for Central Asian governments. Terrorist groups in the region use drug trafficking as their source of income. Central Asia is the primary conduit of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe.²⁵² For this reason, the US operation to Afghanistan and reconstruction process is fundamental for Central Asian security.

²⁵⁰ Macfarlane, p. 449.

²⁵¹ Fiona Hill, 'The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran', *Speech Given at Aspen Institute Congressional Program*, August 15, 2002. http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2002/0815russia_hill.aspx (accessed in April 4, 2009).

²⁵² Hill, "The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran".

The US role in Central Asian security is crucial but the US does not support a regional approach in the region. The NATO PfP program backed by the US in Central Asia is based on bilateral relations. The US is not a driving force for multilateral initiatives in Central Asia. Its Afghanistan operation is losing its influence on US foreign policy. This is affecting its relations with the Central Asian countries. However, Central Asia is also an important determinant in global power politics. Accordingly, the US will not want to abandon the region to Russia or China or other regional states. The US must develop a coherent foreign policy towards the region to provide necessary support for the stability in the region.

4.3 China Role in Central Asian Security

To analyze the Chinese security approach towards Central Asia, it is vital to understand the concept of comprehensive national strength. Chinese long-term strategy is based on a concept that foregrounds the vitality of the military, politics and economics in analyzing Chinese security.²⁵³

According to this concept, four major factors became prominent in Chinese foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. China aims for stability around neighboring regions, the improvement of economic, technologic and military capacities while protecting its socio-politic structure and stability, the satisfaction of energy demands in order to sustain economic development and the improvement of

²⁵³ Ong, p. 425.

its status in post-Cold War world system.²⁵⁴ These four factors deeply influence Chinese-Central Asian relations.

To sustain its peaceful rise and domestic economic development, China requires internal and external stability. Accordingly, Central Asian states have an important place in Chinese foreign policy as a neighboring region. China wants to establish good relations with Central Asia. Moreover, China considers major powers in the world such as the US and Russia and their role in Central Asia. China tries not provoking major powers and to eliminate the notion of a “China threat”²⁵⁵, which appeared because of its immense economic growth and military might. China has good economic relations with the US and the Russia and it does not want to harm this relationship due to the competition in Central Asia. Major power relations have a priority over Central Asian states.

China established diplomatic relations with the five newly independent states of Central Asia immediately after the dissolution of Soviet Union. China shares a lengthy border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moreover, Eastern Turkistan is accepted as part of geographical and cultural Central Asia. Due to this geographical proximity, China is an important player in Central Asian security.

The first objectives of China towards the Central Asian region right after their independence were to achieve economic openness mostly in non-energy trade and cheap consumer goods and to sustain stability in East Turkistan region.²⁵⁶ Non-energy trade was a top priority for Chinese economic security because China was not a net oil importer until 1993. Energy security has influenced China’s relations with Central Asia since the end of 1990s. Trade was important for the sustainability of

²⁵⁴ Aydın, pp. 70.

²⁵⁵ Kevin Sheives, ‘China turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia’, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol: 79, No.2, summer 2006, p. 206.

²⁵⁶ Sheives, pp. 207-208.

Chinese economic growth and Central Asian market was newly opened to the world and was full of opportunity for China. However, economic bottlenecks in Central Asian countries limited the Chinese entrance to the Central Asian market.

4.3.1 Eastern Turkistan and Chinese Security

In the first period of Chinese-Central Asian relations, Chinese concerns about Central Asia determined the progress of the relationship. The common ethnic and cultural structure of Eastern Turkistan and Central Asia led to growing anxiety for Chinese authorities after the independence of Central Asian states.

Central Asian countries do not offer any conventional threats towards China but the demographic similarities were a potential threat towards Chinese internal stability. The end of USSR and the emergence of new independent states has been a promising example for the minorities in Eastern Turkistan.²⁵⁷

China was afraid of the spread of the demand for independence and a resulting secessionist movement. Ethnic and religious movements started to influence the Eastern Turkistan region. In order to prevent the spread of these movements, China increased its border security and its relations with Central Asian states.²⁵⁸

China, Russia, and the Central Asian states had unresolved border problems inherited from the Soviet era. These problems were resolved with the participation of five players in consecutive meetings that encourages mutual confidence. During

²⁵⁷ Aydın, pp. 76-77.

²⁵⁸ M. Turgut Demirtepe, *Orta Asya & Kafkasya Güç Politikası*, (Ankara: USAK, 2008), p. 162.

these meetings China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan termed themselves the Shanghai Five. The Shanghai Five became Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the membership of Uzbekistan in 2001.

Apart from defining borders, China applied different policies in order to prevent secessionist movements. China applied political pressure to Eastern Turkistan. Meanwhile China planned projects for the economic reconstruction of the region in order to prevent the poverty that feeds secessionist movements. Other than these precautions, in order to change ethnic structure of Eastern Turkistan, China supported Han immigration to this province.²⁵⁹ However, these policies are a point for discussion outside the framework of this thesis.

The ethnic minority in Eastern Turkistan, mainly Uighurs, escaped to Central Asia. The Uighur diaspora found a safe haven for their organization in Central Asia after independence especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, Central Asian leaders could not endanger their relations with China. China encouraged Central Asian states to prevent or cancel political events of the Uighur diaspora in their countries while pushing SCO to focus on Uighur separatist networks. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan declared their support and they acknowledged that national separation is a harmful destructive force.²⁶⁰ Moreover, these groups demonstrated tendencies towards radical Islamism. Islamic movements in Central Asia began to threaten the regimes' security. For this reason, Central Asian leaders restricted the rights of Uighur émigrés and deported suspected Uighur separatists.²⁶¹

The main point is the role of Eastern Turkistan on China-Central Asia relations. The fear of the secession of Eastern Turkistan is the origin of the SCO. The

²⁵⁹ Demirtepe, pp. 164-165.

²⁶⁰ Ong, p. 430.

²⁶¹ Sheives, pp. 208-2009.

Shanghai spirit aims to prevent terrorism, separatism, and extremism. China chose the path of cooperation with Central Asia for solving its internal security problems. Therefore, China for the first time in its history participated to a military exercise outside its borders in the framework of SCO. An anti-terror exercise was first held in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and then in Kazakhstan and China in 2003.²⁶²

4.3.2 China and SCO in Central Asia

The SCO resulted from a Chinese diplomatic initiative and this is the first organization in which China assumes a leading role.²⁶³ Russia has close multilateral and bilateral relations with Central Asia both in economic terms and in security affairs. However, China started to develop its relations with the region in mid-1990s. The region is crucial for the Chinese economy and security. Although Russia is less interested in improving economic cooperation in the framework of SCO, China directs the organization to develop its economic cooperation. China 's aims are to improve its trade with the region, to facilitate the supply of energy, to assist the development of the western part of the country and in part to help remove the low level of development in Central Asia that nourished extremism.²⁶⁴

Chinese foreign policy towards Russia and the US affects its relations with Central Asian region. Sino-Soviet relations had begun to recover after the mid-1980s. However, Russian foreign policy towards the West and especially towards the US

²⁶² Demirtepe, p. 165.

²⁶³ Peter Ferdinand, 'Sunset, sunrise: China and Russia construct a new relationship', *International Affairs*, 83:5 (2007), p. 855.

²⁶⁴ Ferdinand, p. 854.

affected its relations with China. Its pro-western attitude estranged China, which is anxious about the US containment policy regarding China. However, after 2004 the China-Russia rapprochement influenced Chinese relations with Central Asia particularly in the framework of SCO.²⁶⁵ China's desire to improve its role in the international system and support of multilateralism accelerated its cooperation with Central Asian states.

The close relationship with Central Asia will provide China with many opportunities. First, in this way China will break its containment by the US. Second, China has problems with Russia in the supply of energy resources. Pipeline projects materialize slowly and cannot satisfy the growing Chinese energy thirst. Indeed, the Chinese aim is to provide one-third of its oil imports from Central Asia and Russia, with twenty percent coming from Russia. However, China is anxious about dependence on Russia, and for this reason, it is developing its relations with Kazakhstan on energy issues.²⁶⁶

Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asia also depends on American positions. The region increased its strategic importance after September 11. The US military settled in Afghanistan and the game in the region has complicated. Therefore, China developed a strategy that aims to ensure limiting any superpower's impact on Central Asia.²⁶⁷ However, China avoids provoking superpowers because of its general strategy of a peaceful rise. China has very close economic relationship with the US. Although, the permanent American presence in Central Asia has disturbed China, China avoids criticizing the US openly. Meanwhile, the Russian

²⁶⁵ Ferdinand, pp. 842-850.

²⁶⁶ Ferdinand, pp. 851-852.

²⁶⁷ Murat Laumulin, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as Geopolitical Bluff? A view from Astana*, Russie. Nei Visions no:12, July 2006, p. 10.

return to Central Asia increased Chinese concerns. China wants to balance Russia by increasing the institutionalization of the SCO.

China has many different policy objectives in Central Asia other than to ensure stability in its western provinces. Regime security, the reduction of ethnic strife, territorial integrity, and even the economic development of the region is crucial for its strategy of internal and external stability.²⁶⁸ Accordingly, China is aware of the fact that Central Asian states cannot solve their problems alone. For this reason, China accelerated cooperation with these countries on a multilateral basis.

China as an economic giant under a communist rule is an example of successful authoritarian structure to Central Asian leaders. Moreover, China supports authoritarian regimes in Central Asia for the stability in the region. Russia also appears as the guarantor of regime security in Central Asia. Russia is a democratic country that still possesses a Soviet authoritarian legacy. China criticizes the role of foreign powers in fomenting internal dissent within the framework of the SCO. Non-intervention in domestic politics is a crucial clause supported by both Russia and China.²⁶⁹ This makes the SCO a preferred option for cooperation among Central Asian leaders trying to protect their regimes against the criticism of the West and the US. Moreover, China is a reliable ally that supports their regime against external and internal threats.

²⁶⁸ Sheives, p. 210.

²⁶⁹ Ong, p. 428.

4.3.3 Energy Security, China and Central Asia

Chinese economic security is a vital part of consolidating its international status as a major power in economics, politics, and security areas. Chinese strengths depend mostly on its economic growth and its internal stability. Economic security is closely related to its capability of securing access to raw materials and global markets.²⁷⁰

Recently China has surpassed Japan and became the second higher consumer in the world. China mostly relies on the Middle East for oil imports.²⁷¹ However, the diversification of suppliers is the main goal of China for their energy security and for its continued economic growth. The geographic proximity of Central Asia and its rich resources make this region a good opportunity for China. As a neighbor, Russia has this capacity as well and China has increased its energy relations with Russia. However, historical problems and the unstable flow and highly competitive nature of Russian oil exports to Northeast Asia encouraged China to look for secondary sources of foreign energy beyond the Middle East.²⁷²

In energy relations with Central Asia, other than gas and oil, China looks for electricity for its Northwest regions. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess hydroelectric power for electricity production, which is their only natural resource. While Kyrgyzstan is exporting its electricity to China, Tajikistan could not because of technological and economic problems.²⁷³

Lastly, the Central Asian region does not have an important role in today's Chinese energy import but the excessive investment in Central Asian energy sector,

²⁷⁰ Ong, p. 431.

²⁷¹ Sheives, p. 214.

²⁷² Sheives, p. 215.

²⁷³ Sheives, pp. 216-217.

in pipeline construction, and in improvement of road and rail transportation demonstrate the long-term Chinese strategy towards the region.²⁷⁴

The Chinese model of economic modernization impresses Central Asian leaders because this shows them the way of pursuing market reforms without relinquishing state control.²⁷⁵ Close political systems increase the chance of cooperation between Central Asia and China in the current circumstances. China supports regime security in Central Asia. Moreover, China provides a suitable opportunity for Central Asian security regionalism by supporting SCO. The Chinese pragmatic approach to sustain stability around its borders has helped solve Central Asian regional problems. To cooperate with China increases Central Asian security while diminishing the Central Asian fear of the “Chinese threat.” China is a balancing power in the region against the excessive influence of other major powers, the US and Russia.

²⁷⁴ Sheives, p. 218.

²⁷⁵ Ong, p. 432.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: MERGING THEORY WITH HISTORY

This thesis accepts Central Asia as a regional security complex. Barry Buzan's Regional Security Complex Theory defines RSC as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another".²⁷⁶ Mutual security threats connect Central Asian states to each other. Central Asian states geographically land locked in Asia try to cope with various kinds of security problems such as terrorism, radical Islamism, ethnic conflict in Ferghana valley, illegal migration, drug trafficking, environmental problems son on. Central Asia was seen as a remote region from major powers competition right after their independence. However, international developments increased its importance in global security. Especially, after September 11 attacks, world attention turned to this region.

These developments increased the security regionalism. In this thesis, development of security regionalism in this regional security complex was examined in accordance with the major power politics and security regional cooperation

²⁷⁶ Buzan and Waever, p. 44.

organizations. Different from many studies, this work emphasized also to the September 11 attacks and its impact on the Central Asian security regionalism.

The effect of the September 11 attacks on the development of the security regionalism is crucial. New Regionalism theory based its assumption mainly on the post-Cold War international system settings. However, September 11 attacks, the US operations on Afghanistan and Iraq have tremendous impacts on the security understanding in international relations. In chapter III, this thesis evaluated the effect of these changes in international system to the regional organizations in Central Asia. These changes accelerated institutionalization and organizational structure of CST and Shanghai Five. In chapter IV that studied major powers' politics towards Central Asia, demonstrated the changing foreign policies of major powers according to the changes in international politics and balance of power.

The second chapter assessed historical and theoretical background of regionalism and security. In this part, it is important to understand new regionalism theory that based its assumption on the new security threats emerged after the Cold War. These security threats are very crucial for Central Asia, these newly emerged security challenges became clear, and their importance increased for major powers after the September 11 attacks. Terrorism became the most important security threats and shaped the international agenda. Major Powers started to take measures for preventing security threats that nourish terrorism such as drug trafficking that provides the necessary economic power to the terrorist groups. Major Powers had taken many different types of steps in the name of preventing terrorism. New regionalism theory does not pay sufficient attention to September 11 attacks.

Especially, September 11 attacks influenced deeply the security agenda in Central Asia. The US operation on Afghanistan increased the role of Central Asian

states in international politics. Historical role of Russia in its traditional sphere of influence started to be challenged by the US. In response to the US's entrance to the region, China and Russia started to use regional organizations in order to increase their engagement in the region. Mainstream literature on Central Asian politics claims that major powers interest to Central Asia will cause competition and conflict in the region. Major Powers, the US, Russia and China try to increase their role in Central Asia. However, fragile structure of the regional security reveals clearly that any conflict in the region will threaten global stability and peace.

In this Regional Security Complex, five Central Asian states struggle with various security threats. Their perceptions understanding of security and policies differ. However, their security and stability is interconnected. Although, Turkmenistan continues to have a neutrality policy towards regional cooperation, it also shares the same concerns with the other Central Asian states. Current political regime in Turkmenistan stays away from any regional groupings but this does not demonstrate that Turkmenistan will always continue to apply this policy.

Central Asian regional security problems necessitate regional measures and responses. However, Central Asian states have economic and political problems that made unrealistic to think a regional cooperation without a major power can establish an essential security policy that can solve these problems. Firstly, economic cooperation is necessary in order to increase economic level of Central Asian states. Economically powerful region can create the necessary situation for establishing a security regional cooperation.

In this point, Central Asian states call for external powers for assistance. Vice versa, external powers want to engage in regional politics because of various national interests mentioned before. However, Central Asian states took lessons from their

history. Although, Central Asian states are dependent on Russia because of historical ties, they always fear from the return of Russian imperialism. For this reason, they try to balance Russian role in Central Asia with other external powers. In this point, the role of China and the US come into prominence.

Increasing security threats in the region, growing major powers' interest coincide with the "second wave" of regionalism. This increases the role of multilateral initiatives rather than bilateral, one for providing security and stability in Central Asia. Due to that, SCO and CSTO increased their role in the regional security. However, it is too early to claim that the members of these organizations are secure but the agenda settings and institutionalization of these organizations demonstrate that they try to increase stability and security. Indeed, bilateral relations of regional states with major powers increase tension in the region. The US, Russia and PRC cannot afford to provide security guarantees to every states in Central Asia. When bilateral relations analyzed, it is obvious that major powers favor some countries in the region. As a result, the actions of major powers complicate regional balance. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan is powerful in terms of demography, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have energy resources, which increase their economic situation but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are small and poor in terms of economic capacity. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are competing for the regional leadership role. Bilateral assistance of major powers can augment this competition and this competition will threaten regional security and stability.

Many different external and internal dynamics affect the security regionalism in Central Asia. It is important to underline that current capacities of Central Asian states are not enough to provide security and stability in the region. Regional multilateral security initiatives increase mutual confidence but Central Asia has

greater security problems that needs technical, military and personnel assistance. For this reason, Central Asian states have to focus their energy to improve multilateral cooperation that covers major powers. Meanwhile they have to balance the presence of external powers in the region.

The pragmatic concerns of Central Asian states and major powers; The US, Russia and PRC lead them to increase cooperation on security in the region. Accordingly, the label of New Great Game in terms of security is not appropriate for the situation in Central Asia because competition will damage pragmatic concerns of external and internal powers.

Russia and China have more room for maneuver in security affairs than the US in Central Asia because of their geographic proximity. Even the US presence in Afghanistan did not change this reality. For this reason, future prospects gave more chance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SCO is preferential for Central Asian partners because two neighboring major powers China and Russia balance each other. Member states of SCO do not intervene to the internal affairs of other member states. Close political systems of member states provide regime security to Central Asian autocratic leaders. Furthermore, SCO reject unipolar world system and support multipolarity. The success of SCO in establishing security in an institutionalized manner will challenge unipolar world system that the US encourages. Multipolarity will increase world stability and security.

In conclusion, this thesis argues that Central Asia is a Regional Security Complex that security threats in the region cause dependency between the members of this complex. Moreover, regional security threats cannot be resolved by individual states, cooperation is urgently required. Regional states without major powers cannot create the necessary organization because of its internal deficiencies and the

complexity of security problems in the region. The pragmatic interests of major powers lead them to share the burden of Central Asian security problems. Due to this regional settings, this thesis claim that security regionalism will increase in Central Asia. Especially, SCO will increase its role in the region in security affairs.

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APPENDIX I

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION CHARTER²⁷⁷

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan being the founding states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter SCO or the Organization),

Based on historically established ties between their peoples;

Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation;

Desiring to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic and information globalization;

Being convinced that the establishment of SCO will facilitate more efficient common use of opening possibilities and counteracting new challenges and threats;

Considering that interaction within SCO will promote the realization of a huge potential of good neighborliness, unity and cooperation between States and their peoples;

Proceeding from the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration to joint development that was clearly established at the meeting of heads of six States in 2001 in Shanghai;

Noting that the compliance with the principles set out in the Agreement between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996, and in the Agreement

²⁷⁷ China Daily Website, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm (accessed April 4, 2009)

between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area of 24 April, 1997, as well as in the documents signed at summits of heads of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the period from 1998 to 2001, has made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region and in the world;

Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other commonly acknowledged principles and rules of international law related to the maintenance of international peace, security and the development of good neighborly and friendly relations, as well as the cooperation between States;

Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of 15 June, 2001,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Goals and Tasks

The main goals and tasks of SCO are:

to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member States;

to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic international order;

to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;

to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and economy, defense, law enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of common interest;

to facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership for the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and improvement of living conditions of the peoples of the member States;

to coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy;

to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member States and their national legislation;

to maintain and develop relations with other States and international organizations;

to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful settlement;

to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 21st century.

Article 2

Principles

The member States of SCO shall adhere to the following principles:

mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas;

equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for opinions of each of them;

gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;

peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;

SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;

prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;

implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other documents adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.

Article 3

Areas of Cooperation

The main areas of cooperation within SCO shall be the following:

maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region;

search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including issues arising within international organizations and international for;

development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;

coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control;

support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in various forms, fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a view to gradually achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and technologies;

effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, improvement of transit capabilities of member States and development of energy systems;

sound environmental management, including water resources management in the region, and implementation of particular joint environmental programs and projects;

mutual assistance in preventing natural and man-made disasters and elimination of their implications;

exchange of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within SCO;

development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, education, health care, culture, sports and tourism.

The SCO member States may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual agreement.

Article 4 **Bodies**

1. For the implementation of goals and objectives of the present Charter the following bodies shall operate within the Organization:

The Council of Heads of State;

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers);

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies;

The Council of National Coordinators;

The Regional Antiterrorist Structure;

Secretariat.

2. The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the Regional Antiterrorist Structure, shall be governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the Council of Heads of State.

3. The Council of Heads of State may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New bodies shall be established by the adoption of additional protocols to the present Charter which enter into force in the procedure, set forth in Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 5

The Council of Heads of State

The Council of Heads of State shall be the supreme SCO body. It shall determine priorities and define major areas of activities of the Organization, decide upon the fundamental issues of its internal arrangement and functioning and its interaction with other States and international organizations, as well as consider the most topical international issues.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council of Heads of State shall be chaired by the head of State organizing this regular meeting. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall generally be determined in the Russian alphabetic order of names of the SCO member States.

Article 6

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)

The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) shall approve the budget of the Organization, consider and decide upon major issues related to particular, especially economic, spheres of interaction within the Organization.

The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the head of Government (Prime Minister) of the State on whose territory the meeting takes place.

The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall be determined by prior agreement among heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States.

Article 7

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall consider issues related to day-to-day activities of the Organization, preparation of meetings of the Council of Heads of State and holding of consultations on international problems within the Organization. The Council may, as appropriate, make statements on behalf of SCO.

The Council shall generally meet one month prior to a meeting of the Council of Heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be convened on the initiative of at least two member States and upon consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member States. The venue of a regular or extraordinary meeting of the Council shall be determined by mutual agreement.

The Council shall be chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, during the period starting from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council.

Article 8

Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies

According to decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member States shall hold, on a regular basis, meetings for consideration of particular issues of interaction in respective fields within SCO.

A meeting shall be chaired by the head of a respective ministry and/or agency of the State organizing the meeting. The venue and date of a meeting shall be agreed upon in advance.

For the preparation and holding meetings the member States may, upon prior agreement, establish permanent or ad hoc working groups of experts which carry out their activities in accordance with the regulations adopted by the meetings of heads of ministries and/or agencies. These groups shall consist of representatives of ministries and/or agencies of the member States.

Article 9

The Council of National Coordinators

The Council of National Coordinators shall be a SCO body that coordinates and directs day-to-day activities of the Organization. It shall make the necessary preparation for the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. National coordinators shall be appointed by each member State in accordance with its internal rules and procedures.

The Council shall hold its meetings at least three times a year. A meeting of the Council shall be chaired by the national coordinator of the member State on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.

The Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may on the instruction of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent the Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of National Coordinators.

Article 10

Regional Antiterrorist Structure

The Regional Antiterrorist Structure established by the member States of the Shanghai Convention to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism of 15 June, 2001, located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, shall be a standing SCO body.

Its main objectives and functions, principles of its constitution and financing, as well as its rules of procedure shall be governed by a separate international treaty concluded by the member States, and other necessary instruments adopted by them.

Article 11

Secretariat

Secretariat shall be a standing SCO administrative body. It shall provide organizational and technical support to the activities carried out in the framework of SCO and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organization. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Secretary-General to be appointed by the Council of Heads of State on nomination by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the nationals of member States on a rotational basis in the Russian alphabetic order of the member States' names for a period of three years without a right to be reappointed for another period.

The Secretary-General deputies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on nomination by the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot be representatives of the State from which the Executive Secretary has been appointed.

The Secretariat officials shall be recruited from among nationals of the member States on a quota basis.

The Secretary-General, his deputies and other Secretariat officials in fulfilling their official duties should not request or receive instructions from any member State and/or government, organization or physical persons. They should refrain from any actions that might affect their status as international officials reporting to SCO only.

The member States shall undertake to respect the international character of the duties of the Secretary-General, his deputies and Secretariat staff and not to exert any influence upon them as they perform their official functions. The SCO Secretariat shall be located at Beijing (the People's Republic of China).

Article 12

Financing

SCO shall have its own budget drawn up and executed in accordance with a special agreement between member States. This agreement shall also determine the amount of contributions paid annually by member States to the budget of the Organization on the basis of a cost-sharing principle.

Budgetary resources shall be used to finance standing SCO bodies in accordance with the above agreement. The member States shall cover themselves the expenses related to the participation of their representatives and experts in the activities of the Organization.

Article 13

Membership

The SCO membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and principles of this Charter and to comply with the provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in the framework of SCO.

The admission of new members to SCO shall be decided upon by the Council of Heads of State on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in response to an official request from the State concerned addressed to the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

SCO membership of a member State violating the provisions of this Charter and/or systematically failing to meet its obligations under international treaties and instruments, concluded in the framework of SCO, may be suspended by a decision of the Council of Heads of State adopted on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. If this State goes on violating its obligations, the Council of Heads of State may take a decision to expel it from SCO as of the date fixed by the Council itself.

Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the Depositary an official notification of its withdrawal from this Charter no later than twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising from participation in this Charter and other instruments adopted within the framework of SCO shall be binding for the corresponding States until they are completely fulfilled.

Article 14

Relationship with Other States and International Organizations

SCO may interact and maintain dialogue, in particular in certain areas of cooperation, with other States and international organizations.

SCO may grant to the State or international organization concerned the status of a dialogue partner or observer. The rules and procedures for granting such a status shall be established by a special agreement of member States.

This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the member States under other international treaties in which they participate.

Article 15

Legal Capacity

As a subject of international law, SCO shall have international legal capacity. It shall have such a legal capacity in the territory of each member State, which is required to achieve its goals and objectives.

SCO shall enjoy the rights of a legal person and may in particular:

- conclude treaties;
- acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it;
- appear in court as litigant;
- open accounts and have monetary transactions made.

Article 16

Decisions-Taking Procedure

The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions shall be considered adopted if no Member State has raised objections during the vote (consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of membership or expulsion from the Organization that shall be taken by "consensus minus one vote of the Member State concerned".

Any member State may expose its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.

Should one or several member States be not interested in implementing particular cooperation projects of interest to other member States, non-participation of the above said member States in these projects shall not prevent the implementation of such cooperation projects by the member States concerned and, at the same time, shall not prevent the said member States from joining such projects at a later stage.

Article 17

Implementation of Decisions

The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member States in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation.

Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement this Charter, other agreements and decisions adopted within SCO shall be exercised by the SCO bodies within their competence.

Article 18

Permanent Representatives

In accordance with their domestic rules and procedures, the member States shall appoint their permanent representatives to the SCO Secretariat, which will be members of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of the member States in Beijing.

Article 19

Privileges and Immunities

SCO and its officials shall enjoy in the territories of all member States the privileges and immunities, which are necessary for fulfilling functions and achieving goals of the Organization.

The volume of privileges and immunities of SCO and its officials shall be determined by a separate international treaty.

Article 20

Languages

The official and working languages of SCO shall be Russian and Chinese.

Article 21

Duration and Entry into Force

This Charter shall be of indefinite duration.

This Charter shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification.

For a State, which signed this Charter and ratified it thereafter it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary.

Upon its entering into force this Charter shall be open for accession by any State.

For each acceding State, this Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of receiving by the Depositary of appropriate instruments of accession.

Article 22

Settlement of Disputes

In case of disputes or controversies, arising out of interpretation or application of this Charter member States shall settle them through consultations and negotiations.

Article 23

Amendments and Additions

By mutual agreement of member States this Charter can be amended and supplemented. Decisions by the Council of Heads of State concerning amendments and additions shall be formalised by separate protocols which shall be its integral part and enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided for by Article 21 of this Charter.

Article 24

Reservations

No reservations can be made to this Charter which contradict the principles, goals and objectives of the Organisation and could prevent any SCO body from performing its functions. If at least two thirds of member States have objections the reservations must be considered as contradicting the principles, goals and objectives of the

Organisation or preventing any body from performing its functions and being null and void.

Article 25
Depositary

The People's Republic of China shall be the Depositary of this Charter.

Article 26
Registration

Pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Charter is subject to registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done at Saint-Petersburg the seventh day of June 2002 in a single original in the Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the Depositary who will circulate its certified copies to all signatory States.

APPENDIX II.

CHARTER OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY

ORGANIZATION²⁷⁸

The State-Parties of the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (henceforth referred to as Treaty),
acting in strict accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the decisions of the Security Council of the UN, and based upon the universally acknowledged principles of international law;
striving to create favourable and stable conditions for the overall development of the Treaty State-Parties and guaranteeing their security, sovereignty as well as territorial integrity; confirming their adherence to the goals and principles of the Treaty and to international agreements and decisions that are taken in its framework;
determined to develop and deepen military-political cooperation in the interests of guaranteeing and strengthening national, regional and international security;
put before themselves the goal to continue and enhance tight and broad friendly relations in the fields of foreign policy, the military and military-technological issues, and also in the sphere of opposing trans-national challenges and threats to the security of nations and people;
acting upon the intent to increase the effectiveness of the activities in the framework of the Treaty
have agreed on the following:

Chapter I

Establishment Of The Collective Security Treaty Organization

Article 1

The State-Parties of the Treaty establish the international regional Collective Security Treaty Organization (henceforth referred to as Organization).

Article 2

The provisions of the Treaty and international agreements as well as decisions of the Council on Collective Security that have been taken in the development of the Treaty are obligations for the member-states of the Organization (henceforth, referred to as member-states) and for the Organization itself.

²⁷⁸ J. H. Saat, *The Collective Security Treaty Organization*, (UK: Conflict Studies Research Center, 2005), pp. 12-19.

Chapter II

Goals & Principles

Article 3

The goals of the Organization are the strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection - on a collective basis - of the independence and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member-states. In order to accomplish these goals the member-states give priority to political resources.

Article 4

In its activities the Organization cooperates with states which are not members of the Organization and maintains relations with international intergovernmental organizations active in the field of security. The Organization contributes to the formation of a just, democratic world-order, based on the universal principles of international law.

Article 5

The Organization operates based upon deep respect for the independence, the voluntary participation and the equality of rights and obligations of the member-states. It also acts on the basis of non-interference in affairs that are subject to the national jurisdiction of the member-states.

Article 6

This Charter does not affect the rights and obligations of the member-states with respect to other international agreements in which the member-states participate.

Chapter III

Direction Of Activities

Article 7

In order to accomplish the goals of the Organization, the member-states take joint measures to establish - within its framework - an effective system of collective security, to set up coalition (regional) armed troops (forces) and organs to control these, to develop the military infrastructure, preparation of military personnel and specialists for the armed forces and to supply them with the necessary armaments and military technological equipment.

The State-Parties take decisions on the deployment on its territories of armed troops (forces), objects of the military infrastructure of states, who are not members of the Organization after the conduct of immediate consultation (agreement) with the other member-states.

Article 8

The State-Parties coordinate and unite their efforts in the struggle against international terrorism and extremism, against illegal trade in narcotics, psychotropic substances or arms, against organized trans-national crime, illegal migration and other threats to the security of member-states.

The State-Parties will implement their activities in these directions – also - in close cooperation with all interested states and international inter-governmental organizations under the aegis of the UN.

Article 9

The State-Parties will agree and coordinate their foreign-policy on international and regional security problems – also - by making use of the consultative mechanisms and procedures of the Organization.

Article 10

The State-Parties take measures to develop the Treaty's legal base, that provides the regulations for the functioning of the collective security system and to harmonize national legislation on issues, such as defence, military development and security.

Chapter IV**The Bodies Of The Organization****Article 11**

The bodies of the Organization are:

- a: the Council on Collective Security (henceforth referred to as Council)
- b: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (henceforth referred to as CMFA)
- c: the Council of Ministers of Defence (henceforth referred to as CMD)
- d: the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils (henceforth referred to as CSSC)

The Secretariat of the Organization (henceforth referred to as Secretariat) is the Organization's body that is permanently operational.

The functions and order of work of the above mentioned bodies is regulated by this Charter and also by individual Provisions that are confirmed by the Council.

Article 12

The decisions of the Council, the CMFA, the CMD and the CSSC on issues, with the exception of procedural matters, are taken on the basis of consensus.

Any of the member-states has one vote during voting. The order of voting, including on procedural issues, is regulated by the Rules of procedure of the bodies of the Organization, that are confirmed by the Council.

Decisions of the Council and decisions taken in its implementation by the CMFA, the CMD, and the CSSC are obligations for the member-states and will be implanted in the order established by national legislation.

Article 13

The Council is the highest body of the Organization.

The Council reviews principal issues concerning the activities of the Organization and takes decisions aimed at the accomplishment of its goals and tasks. It also guarantees the coordination and joint action of member-states to accomplish these objectives.

The Council consists of the heads of the member-states.

Sessions of the Council may be attended by ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of defence, the secretaries of the security councils of the member-states, the Secretary-General of the Organization and invited parties.

The Council has the right to set up permanent or ad hoc working groups or subsidiary bodies of the Organization.

The Chairman of the Council (henceforth referred to as Chairman) is the head of state of the country on whose territory the given session of the Council is taking place, unless the Council decides otherwise. The powers and obligations of the Chairman remain in place until the next session of the Council takes place.

If the Chairman is not able to fulfil his functions, a new Chairman will be elected for the remaining period.

In the period in between Council sessions, the Permanent Council with the Organization (henceforth referred to as Permanent Council) deals with the coordination of interaction between the member-states, during the implementation of decisions taken by the bodies of the Organization.

The Permanent Council consists of Authorized Representatives (henceforth referred to as AUR) that are assigned by the member-states in correspondence with the Provision confirmed by the Council.

Article 14

The CMFA is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of foreign policy.

Article 15

The CMD is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of defence policy, military development and military-technological cooperation.

Article 16

The CSSC is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of their national security interests.

Chapter V**Secretariat**

The Secretariat is responsible for the organizational, information, analytical and consultative actions necessary for the activities of the bodies of the Organization.

The Secretariat - in interaction with the Permanent Council - prepares drafts of the decisions and other documents of the Organization.

The Secretariat consists of citizens of the member-states on the basis of quota (functionaries) that are proportionate to the size of the contribution of the member-states to the budget of the Organization and also of citizens, who are hired on the basis of an employment contract (co-worker).

The functions, the order of formation and work of the Secretariat are defined by the corresponding Provision confirmed by the Council.

The Secretariat is located in the city of Moscow, Russian Federation. The conditions of the presence of the Secretariat on the territory of the Russian Federation are regulated on the basis of a corresponding international agreement.

Article 18

The Secretary-General of the Organization (henceforth referred to as Secretary-General) is the highest administrative functionary of the Organization and is the head of the Secretariat.

The Secretary-General is appointed by decision of the Council for the duration of three years from among citizens of the member-states on the proposal of the CMFA.

The Secretary-General is accountable to the Council and participates in the sessions of the Council, of the CMFA, of the CMD, the CSSC and the Permanent Council.

The Secretary-General, in accordance with decisions of the Council, coordinates the compilation of drafts of corresponding proposals and documents of the bodies of the Organization. The Secretary-General also establishes working relations with other international intergovernmental organizations and states that are not members of the Organization.

The Secretary-General is the Depositary with regard to this Charter and other international agreements and documents that were reached in the framework of the Organization.

Chapter VI

Membership

Membership of the Organization is open to any state that shares its goals and principles and that is willing to take upon itself the obligations contained in this Charter and in other valid agreements and decisions that exist in the framework of the Organization.

The decision on admittance to the Organization is taken by the Council.

Each member-state has the right to withdraw from the Organization. After it has dealt with its obligations in the framework of the Organization, such a state will submit an official notification on its withdrawal to the Depositary of the Charter, not later than 6 months before the date of withdrawal.

The order of admittance and withdrawal from the Organization is defined by the corresponding Provision, confirmed by the Council.

Article 20

In case of non-fulfilment by a member-state of the provisions of this Charter, the decisions of the Council and of other bodies of the Organization, the Council can suspend its participation in the activities of the bodies of the Organization.

In case of continued non-fulfilment by the member-state with regard to the stated obligations, the Council may decide on its expulsion from the Organization.

Decisions on these issues in relation to a given member-state are taken without regard for its vote.

The order of suspension of participating of a member-state in the activities of the Organization or its expulsion from the Organization is defined by the corresponding Provision that has been confirmed by the Council.

Chapter VII

Observers

Article 21

The status of observer with the Organization can be granted to a state that is not a member of the Organization and also to an international organization, in reaction to an official written request sent to the Secretary-General. The Council decides on the allocation, the suspension or the annulment of the status of observer.

The participation of observers in the sessions and meetings of the bodies of the Organization is regulated by the Rules of procedure of the bodies of the Organization.

Chapter VIII

Legal Capacity, Privileges & Immunities

Article 22

The Organization has on the territory of each member-state the legal capacity necessary for the accomplishment of its goals and tasks.

The Organization can cooperate with non-member states and uphold relations with international intergovernmental organizations that are active in the field of security. It can come to international agreements with these parties, aimed at the establishment and development of such a cooperation.

The Organization has the legal rights of a juridical person.

Article 23

The privileges and the immunities of the Organization are defined by the corresponding international agreement.

Chapter IX

Financing

Article 24

The financing of the activities of the Secretariat is done at the expense of the budget of the Organization.

The budget of the Organization is based upon the individual contributions of the state-members that have been confirmed by the Council.

The budget of the Organization does not have a deficit.

The draft budget of the Organization for each budget year is compiled by the Secretariat in agreement with the member-states and in accordance with the Provision on the Order of formation and implantation of the budget of the Organization. The budget of the Organization is confirmed by the Council.

The member-states are independently responsible for the expenses incurred with the participation of its representatives and experts in meetings and sessions of the bodies of the Organization and other events that are conducted in the framework of the Organization, and also for the expenses related with the activities of the AUR.

Article 25

If a state-member does not comply with its obligation to pay its debts with regard to the budget of the Organization within two years, the Council will decide on the suspension of the rights of citizens of that state to apply for quota vacancies in the framework of the Organization and also on the deprivation of the rights to vote in the bodies of the Organization until the debt has been fully paid off. **05/09** The Collective Security Treaty Organization 19

Chapter X

Concluding Provisions

This Charter is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the date that the Depositary will receive the last written notification on ratification from the states that have signed.

The Charter can - with the agreement of all member states - be updated with changes and annexes, which will be contained in separate Protocols.

The Protocols of changes and annexes to the Charter will be an integral part of the Charter and will enter into force according to the order established by Article 27 of this Charter.

Reservations to the Charter are not admissible.

Any discussions regarding the interpretation and the application of the provisions of this Charter will be decided by consultation and negotiations between the interested state-members. In case it proves to be impossible to come to agreement on this issue, the matter will be referred to the Council for review.

Article 28

The official and working language of the Organization is Russian.

Article 29

This Charter will be registered with the Secretariat of the UN in correspondence with the provisions of article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Completed in Kishinev [Moldova] on 7 October 2002, in one authentic copy in Russian. The original is kept by the Depositary, who will send a certified copy to all states that have signed this Charter.

