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KÜÇÜKOĞLU

POWER POLITICS IN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF GÜRCÜ OSMAN PASHA (1789-1807)

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POWER POLITICS IN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF GÜRCÜ OSMAN PASHA (1789-1807)

A. Ph. D. Dissertation

by

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The Department of History

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Ankara

September 2019



To My Family

**POWER POLITICS IN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF GÜRCÜ OSMAN PASHA (1789-1807)**

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

By


LÜTFİYE SEVİNÇ KÜÇÜKOĞLU

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA


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
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
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ABSTRACT

POWER POLITICS IN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION: A CASE STUDY OF GÜRCÜ OSMAN PASHA (1789-1807)

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This dissertation examines Gürcü Osman Pasha, who was a promising military origin Ottoman state official at his early career stages, but then turned into a rebel sacking Rumelian districts in collaboration with the most unruly figures of the region. When his political, military and financial sources of power eventually evolved to pose a significant threat to the central authority, he ended up being executed by the government. Although he was not a primary figure of his time, both his political networks and dynamics of his rebellion refer that he had strong connections with many prominent characters of the period.

Through analyzing reasons behind Osman Pasha's rebellion, his patronage relations, alliances and conflicts, the dissertation depicts the volatile and delicate structure of the early modern Ottoman politics and places Osman among other prominent characters of the time. It also focuses on formation of Osman's household and his various revenue sources, discussing how they enabled him to become a prominent pasha without a powerful family, or a local notable origin, or a considerable wealth of his own at the beginning of his career.

As a conclusion this study attempts to explain Osman Pasha's career cycle with a vicious circle of acquiring power, behaving disorderly and power again, and so on. It also offers a principle that might help us comprehend the dynamics of the Ottoman politics and the shifting power from the center to the provinces and vice versa.

Keywords: Household, Military Resources and Financial Sources of Power, Patronage Relations, Political Networks, State official

ÖZET

OSMANLI TAŞRA YÖNETİMİNDE GÜÇ VE İKTİDAR ÇATIŞMALARI: GÜRCÜ OSMAN PAŞA İSYANI (1789-1807)

Küçükoğlu, Lütfiye Sevinç

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Bu tez çalışması, kariyerinin ilk evrelerinde oldukça umut vaadeden asker kökenli bir Osmanlı devlet adamı olan Gürcü Osman Paşa hakkındadır. Osman Paşa kariyerinin sonraki dönemlerinde Rumeli bölgesinin en asi figürleri ile işbirliği içinde kazaları yağmalayan isyancı bir karaktere dönüşmüştür. Paşa'nın politik, askeri ve finansal güç kaynakları gelişip merkezi otoriteye karşı ciddi bir tehlike oluşturmaya başladığında, Paşa takibe alınır ve sonunda hakkında idam emri çıkarılır. Her ne kadar döneminin çok öne çıkan karakterlerinden biri olmasa da, Paşa'nın hem politik bağlantıları hem de isyanının dinamikleri, kendi zamanının birçok önemli karakteri ile kuvvetli ilişkileri olduğunu göstermektedir.

Tezde Osman Paşa'nın isyanı, intisap ilişkileri, işbirlikleri ve çatışmaları analiz edilerek, erken modern Osmanlı politik dünyasının değişken yapısı incelenmekte ve Osman Paşa karakteri dönemin diğer önemli karakterlerinin olduğu sahaya yerleştirilmektedir. Tezin odaklandığı diğer konular Paşa'nın kapı halkı ve muhtelif gelir kaynaklarıdır. Ayrıca kapı halkı ve gelir kaynaklarının Paşa'yı nasıl güçlü bir aileye, veya ayanlık kökenine, veya hatırı sayılır bir servete sahip olmadan kayda değer bir paşa karakterine dönüştürdüklerine değinilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak bu tez Paşa'nın kariyer aşamalarını, güç elde etme, asi davranışlarda bulunma, tekrar güç elde etme ve sonra yine asi davranışlar kısır döngüsü ile açıklamaktadır. Ayrıca tezde dönemin Osmanlı politik dinamiklerini ve emperyal merkez ile taşra arasındaki güç kaymalarını anlamlandırmada yardımcı olabilecek bir model önermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri ve Finansal Gücün Kaynakları, Devlet Adamı, İntisap, Kapı Halkı, Politik İlişki Ağları

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This thesis is dedicated to my family, Naime Firuz and Bekir Küçükoğlu, Emine and Mustafa Baysal. I am especially grateful to my deceased grandpa Mustafa for his love and encouragement for learning.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Subject

In the 1790s, mentions of “mountain banditry” (*dağlı eşkıyalığı*) and “mountain rebellions” (*dağlı isyanları*), “bandits” (*eşkiya*) and “rebels” (*asi*), and “troubles” and “incidents” (*gaile / hadise / mesele / olay*) came to pervade Ottoman official documents and chronicles, marking the start of some two decades of social, political, and economic unrest in Rumelia, the Ottoman Balkans. This was the world of Gürcü Osman Pasha. Once a promising state official, rising to the high office of Governor of Rumelia at the peak of his career, Gürcü Osman turned rebel when he refused to give up this position, sacking Rumelian districts in cooperation with the most unruly characters of the region, Pasbanoğlu Osman and his bandit leaders. Stigmatized as a rebellious pasha, Gürcü Osman was eventually executed by the government he once served.

During his lifetime, Osman Pasha built up a domain of power through the effective management of patronage relations, political networks, and alliances with other state officials and local notables (*ayans*). Through this power, and the numerous irregular paid soldiers he kept in his service, he became a force to be reckoned with in the Ottoman Balkans. Yet he was never as major a figure as other prominent official

of his time, such as his patron Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, or Koca Yusuf Pasha, or Yusuf Ziya Pasha. He was not a local notable by origin like other considerable notables of his time, such as Pasbanoğlu Osman Pasha, Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, Tayyar Mahmud Pasha, and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.

As far as we know, he never received official training in Istanbul, but his military skills secured him a position at the house of Hasan Pasha, who was one of the most outstanding official figures of the time. Thanks to his influential patron, Osman was able to establish useful relationships and later rise up to the Rumelian governorship. His loyalty to Istanbul, however, was questioned several times, and the central government almost always saw him as a character to be carefully watched—most likely because the soldiers in his service were inclined to be unruly, especially when their salaries went unpaid, and because he seems to have had a tendency to financially oppress people in the provinces. But was he an official in distress who collaborated with rebels, and/or other local figures, and overcharged local people out of desperation and economic duress? Or was he a disloyal opportunist with his own ambitions and agenda who betrayed his imperial patron for the sake of his own interests?

Through a close examination of the story of his household, networks, alliances, practices, and failures, this dissertation offers a case study in Ottoman provincial administration and the power struggles in Rumelia during the reign of Selim III (1789–1807). Its focus, on this non-primary and non-*ayan* administrative figure, differs from that of most existing studies of the period, which generally concentrate on more prominent figures like grand viziers, notorious rebellious leaders, or grand local notables. This study thus aims to fill in the gaps that lie under and around these well-known figures, and in doing so to help produce a fuller and more robust picture of

power politics in Ottoman provincial administration during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Although his name was frequently mentioned in the reports of Ottoman officials, and although he was even suspected of conspiring against the sultan, Gürcü Osman Pasha and his story were overshadowed by other prominent rebels of the period. Ottoman historians studying the late eighteenth century have tended to focus on rebellious individuals like Pasbanoğlu Osman Pasha, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, Tirsinikli İsmail Aga, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, and Canikli-zade Tayyar Mahmud Pasha, all of whom were local notables. Gürcü Osman Pasha had no *ayan* origins, but his rise and later uprising were nourished by the rise of the *ayans*. As I will show in the following chapters, although he was a man of state with influential contacts in the center, his power lay mostly in his interactions with the local notables around him, and, more importantly, in his ability to “localize”, or even “notable-ize”,¹ in the Ottoman provinces. Before we get into the details of his story, we should first look at the historical scene of the eighteenth century and the political, military, and fiscal conditions that made his case possible.

1.2 Transformations Leading to the Realities of the Late Eighteenth Century

From the sixteenth century onwards, major changes occurred in the structure of the Ottoman land regime. Many factors contributed to these changes. Some were global, like the effect of the world economy and the increase in money supply after the

¹ Hülya Canbakal states that there are two trajectories in the interaction between the center and the provinces giving rise to local notables. The first involves officials appointed by the center and assigned to the provinces, where they then put down roots and become local, which process I refer to here as the “localizing” or “notable-izing” of these figures. The second involves local notables from the provinces who acquire official posts and titles from the center, thereby entering into the military class of the Ottoman political system and becoming “officialized” figures as part of the broader process of the “officialization” of the *ayans*. Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: Ayntab in the 17th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

discovery of the Americans. Some were specific to the Ottoman Empire, including financial troubles caused by inflation and devaluation, the burden of back-to-back wars on the central treasury, and the growing cost of salaries for paid soldiers, as well as other sorts of troubles relating to the growing demand for soldiers, the entry of the *reaya* (tax-paying subjects) into the military class, the Celali uprisings in Anatolia, high turnover rates among state officials, the rise of provincial notables (*ayans*), and the *reaya*'s exposure to exploitation and oppression by local powers. The process of the dissolution of the *timar* (classical prebendal taxation system) and the pressing need for more cash revenue led to some radical military transformations, which in turn led to major changes in the administrative, political, and economic realms. Through all these changes, the “centralist” character of the Ottoman state—that is, the centrality of governmental power and the means of production—underwent significant transformations at almost all levels.

In general, this process resulted in the transformation—and, in time, handover—of *timar* lands, together with the decentralization of provincial management. The preliminary signs of this transition first manifested in military and related fiscal institutions, especially in the military aspects of the *timar* institution. Already in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the *timarlı sipahi* cavalry, which constituted the most populous group of actors in the *timar* institution, was failing in battlefields against European armies, which were better organized and equipped with firearms. And since the *timar* system served not only military but also administrative and provincial-management functions, when this system began to lose its importance in the empire's military organization, its role also faded in the empire's

power structure, especially in the management of provinces.² As a result, the number of Janissaries increased in the capital and in the provinces, and more mercenaries with firearms started to be employed from among the *reaya*.³

The weakening of the *timarlı sipahis* as a military power led inevitably to the deterioration of the economic forms to which they were linked. With the disintegration of the *timar* regime and a pressing need for cash sources,⁴ the Ottoman state began to convert the *timar* lands of *sipahis* into *mukataas* (revenue districts). Through the implementation of this *mukataa* system, the state sought to create a more liquid financial sector that could in time guarantee greater cash revenue. Much of these *mukataa* revenues were destined to pay for the maintenance of armies, for either state or provincial troops, like units of paid irregulars (*sekban*).⁵

However, conversions into *mukataas* were not limited to *timar* lands alone. After the second half of the sixteenth century, the *hass* (appanage) holdings of higher state officials were also subverted and gathered under state *mukataas*. Thus, the central government turned to the *mukataa* system to seize control over lands and other income sources that had been in the hands of local officers and to re-distribute them under different financial conditions that it hoped would prove more favorable. These conversions expanded towards the end of the sixteenth century and continued to do so

² Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 283-337.

³ For a detailed discussion on the growth Janissary numbers, see Ariel C. Salzman, "Measures of Empire: Tax-farmers and the Ottoman Ancient Régime, 1685-1807," (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1995).

⁴ At the end of the sixteenth century, budget deficits rose and the need for a better cash flow emerged. Until 1597, budget deficits were closed with the accumulated budget surpluses of previous years, but by the beginning of the seventeenth century this was no longer possible. Instead, two classic methods were applied in order to close the deficits: reducing expenses and increasing revenues. Baki Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII)* (İstanbul: Kitapevi, 2003), 40; Evgeni Radushev, "Les Dépenses Locales dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVIIIe siècle", *Etudes Balkaniques* 16, no: 3 (1980), 74.

⁵ Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 42-43; Halil İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi* (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1992), 86.

over the following two centuries.⁶ *Hass* lands formerly assigned to military officers in the provinces were counted among state's *iltizam* (tax-farming) lands, which would then be given to the highest bidder, not necessarily to the provincial governors. Although some portion of these newly imposed tax-farms were assigned to *valis* or other military officers, this was no longer sufficient for them to sustain the large retinues which had traditionally supported their authority, so they had to find new revenue sources.⁷

Another problem faced by provincial but non-*ayan* governors was that when they were absent from their assigned posts because of campaigns or new appointments, or through their own choice, the business of tax collecting was delegated to deputies such as *mültezims* (*mukataa* tenants). Non-*ayan* governors generally stood somewhat removed from the local realities of the regions over which they presided, which made it difficult for them to assess the work of the deputies to whom they delegated these duties. This only exacerbated the problems of diminishing revenue due to the alienation of their *tımar* prebends. All this pushed these governors increasingly to resort to numerous illegal and arbitrary impositions on the *reaya*, eventually creating a serious administrative void in the provinces. Fueled by these governmental and fiscal situations, the tax-farming system empowered *mültezims*, most of whom were still state officials coming from the center in the second half of the sixteenth century. In time, some *mültezims* settled in the provinces to run their businesses, and these people joined the ranks of the local notables, first through tax-farming and then the *malikane* (life-lease) system.⁸

⁶ Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 44, 172; Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l-Vukuat*, vol. II (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1295), 91; İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi*, 86-7; Mehmet Genç, "18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş", in Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000), 211; Erol Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Uygulaması* (İstanbul: Kitapevi, 2003), 37-45.

⁷ Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans: 1699-1812" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, (1300-1914)*, Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds., vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 658-60.

⁸ Özcan Mert, "Ayan", *Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, vol. 4 (Ankara: TDV, 1991), 195-198; Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 60; Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study for of Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa Tokyo, 1976), 7.

Prior to the eighteenth century, few local figures had the power to undertake the management of tax-farming lands on their own. This role had traditionally been filled by state cadres trained at the palace or Istanbul and then assigned to the provinces. In time, however, the effectiveness of these cadres began to decline, just as that of the *timarlı sipahis* had. This threatened the ability of the central government to manage the provinces and forced it to become more reliant on powerful local intermediaries: the *ayans* (local notables/magnates).⁹ As the *ayans* took posts as *mültezims* or other provincial officers, they gathered sufficient wealth and power to claim *malikane* lands on their own account.¹⁰ And as they did so, they came increasingly, especially by the eighteenth century, to control the system of *mukataas*—whether through tax-farming or life-leases after the 1690s—that formed the basis of tax collection in the empire and served as a vital administrative instrument for regional control.¹¹

⁹ For general works on the *ayan* issue, see: Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ayanlık*, (Ankara: TTK, 1994); Deena Ruth Sadat, "Urban Notables in the Ottoman Empire: The Ayan," (PhD diss., Rutgers State University, 1969); Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41-68; Albert Hourani, "Rumeli Ayanları: The Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (1972), 343-63; Nagata, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık*; Yaşar Yücel, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Desantralizasyona Dair Genel Gözlemler," *Belleten*, XXXVII/152, (1974), 657-704; Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University, 2008), 242-63. See also Suraiya Faruqi, ed, *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. III: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), which includes several studies on the *ayans* and the Ottoman provincial administration in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power-Holders: An Analysis of the Historiography," 135-56; Fikret Adanır, "Semi-autonomous Forces in the Balkans and Anatolia," 157-85; Bruce Masters, "Semi-Autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces," 186-206. Also worth mentioning are Robert W. Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin in the Age of Ottoman Social Change, 1791-1815," (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2004); Ali Yaycıoğlu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812)," (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008); Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Vera Moutaftchieva, *L'Anarchie Dans Les Balkans A La Fin Du XVIIIe Siecle* (İstanbul: ISIS Yayıncılık, 2005); Mehmet Öz, *Osmanlı'da Çözülme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları: (XVI. Yüzyıldan XVIII.Yüzyıl Başlarına)* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1997).

¹⁰ Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 60; Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Ayanlık*, 112.

¹¹ Nagata, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık*, 9; McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans", 641, 661; Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (İstanbul: Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1965), 334; Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 60; Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman*

1.3 The Rise of the Local Notables

In this century of transformations, as existing state officials lost their efficiency in provincial administration, the Ottoman state came increasingly to rely on local magnates, *ayans*, to carry out the business of government. This practice was not entirely new—*ayans* had long served the state as officials in the Ottoman provinces. But as more and more came to do so, this altered the paradigm of the relationship between the two parties, and the *ayans* became powerful stakeholders in both the center and the periphery to a degree not previously seen. The central government grew dependent on these notables, who could access local information and maintain connections more easily than outsider officials. Better local contacts meant more efficient taxing, recruiting, and provisioning. Consequently, “ayanhood” gained a new meaning, and the state acknowledged the authority of notables and recognized them as formal and elected state officials. By taking up state posts, these people shifted from the *reaya* to the *askeri* class. Still, one should remember that the category or concept of *ayan* was not limited to formally elected locals, but rather denoted a mixed group of people that included wealthy people from the military or *ulema* class, state officials with or without a great household, and a diverse range of identities spanning the spectrum between formal and informal, central and local, and loyal and rebel.¹²

The history of the *ayans* reflects the socio-economic transformation the Ottoman state underwent from the late sixteenth through the nineteenth century.¹³

Provincial Government: 1550-1650 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Özer Ergenç, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri,” *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 10 (1986), 95-96.

¹² McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans”, 759-884; Halil İnalçık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration”, in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, T. Naft and R. Owen, eds., (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1977), 37-40; İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”; Mehmet Öz, *Osmanlı’da Çözölme ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları*; Ali Yaycıoğlu, “The Provincial Challenge”.

¹³ Robert W. Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, *History Studies, International Journal of History*, 3:3, (2011), 432.

They benefited greatly from the tax-farming system and life-leases while building their grand authority in the provinces in the eighteenth century. The center's distribution of its governmental authority to the provinces and provincial figures created a more decentralized state and a more powerful provincial class. This process could be read as a form of decentralization,¹⁴ but it was as much a matter of centralization. This is because decentralization in this context, sometimes even in extreme forms, could also be interpreted as an attempt by the center to stretch out towards distant provinces and to increase its control over them and their tempting local revenues and sources of manpower. The question here is, how effective were the control mechanisms of the state—that is, the means by which the center sought to stretch its power to encompass distant lands—over the people and practices in the provinces?

Regardless, whether as agents of centralization or decentralization, or even probably of both, the *ayans* and their rise shaped the eighteenth century. Their power straddled the great dichotomies of their time (local vs. central and non-military/*reaya* vs. military) and could be used to further both the state's interests and their own. Here “own” does not mean that they operated alone. On the contrary, despite their considerable prominence, *ayans* were but the most conspicuous agents in much larger networks that included the bankers/money-lenders (*sarrafs*) who financed their operations and investments and the judges (*kadıs*) and non-ayan provincial governors (*valis/viziers*) who supervised but also supported their administrative and fiscal actions

¹⁴ Debates on decentralization vs. centralization are critical in understanding the emergence of the *ayans*, and this issue has been addressed by many Ottoman historians. Among them one could mention Mustafa Akdağ, Halil İnalcık, Bruce McGowan, Karen Barkey, Dina Rizk Khoury, Jülide Akyüz, Ali Yaycıoğlu, Mehmet Öz, and Edhem Eldem. While Akdağ, İnalcık, and McGowan evaluate the rise of the *ayans* as the conclusion of a process of decentralization, others have questioned decentralization, and even centralist features of the empire. Barkey, for example, defines the whole process as an Ottoman-style centralization; Khoury states that the center strengthened itself by using locals' resources and power; and Yaycıoğlu sees this as the spreading of power from the center to the provinces. From another point of view, Öz and Eldem have criticized the presumption of an earlier, centralized period of the empire, claiming that centralization does not necessarily exclude a de facto decentralization.

and enabled them to run their businesses. *Ayans* and all other local and provincial figures formed substantial alliances that caused potential disputes in many local districts, disputes between different alliances and also with the center. Thus they collectively shaped the (de facto) management and governance of provinces in the eighteenth century.¹⁵ And not surprisingly, their rise was therefore closely connected with the problems of this significant period, especially the second part of it.

As the *ayans*' effective domain grew, their intermediary role between the state and the *reaya* gained more importance—and vice versa. They mostly favored their own prosperity over the state's interests in provincial matters, especially about tax-levying and tax-collecting. Despite their newly acquired military status, they were not complete state agents who owed their posts, revenues, or even lives to the state's authority (these local figures were, after all, strong representatives of the private sector).¹⁶ Eventually, the Porte came to view local notables empowered with governing positions as posing a real threat to the functioning of the taxation system and to the maintenance of justice in the land. Yet even so, the government still relied desperately on the troops levied by *ayans* in Rumelia and Anatolia and on the *ayans* themselves for managing the provinces.

Especially after 1726, the state increasingly relied on local notables to meet its military expenses and raise soldiers. As Özkaya has suggested, before that time, the state asked for military help from the *ayans* as well; however, documents show that it was only after 1726 that the state addressed them by their specific names.¹⁷ Thus, local

¹⁵ McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans", 642, 644; Vera Moutaftchieva, XVIII. Yüzyılın Son On Yılında Ayanlık Müessesesi, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, (Mart 1977), 177-178

¹⁶ Mehmet Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 101; Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 136; Michael Ursinus, "Zur Geschichte des Patronats: Patrocinium, Himaya und Deruhdecilik", *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, 23-24 (1984), 479.

¹⁷ Özkaya, *Ayanlık*, 113-114.

notables grew into autonomous power groups when they combined their military power with their economic and social strength. And as power holders, they contributed significantly to Ottoman warfare, and they could control the mechanisms of violence and the fighting units in their regions. Grand figures like Tepedelenli Ali and Pasbanoğlu could recruit large numbers of soldiers from among their own supporters and followers, from rebellious leaders, and from peasants in their specific domain.¹⁸ Needless to say, countless cases of conflict and negotiation took place between the provinces and the Porte, especially about taxation abuses and unruly soldiers in *ayan* retinues. Such disagreements and disputes about taxes and *sekbans* are mentioned in numerous decrees, orders, warnings, and even threats from the center, and in letters and complaints from local districts as well.¹⁹

1.4 Military and Fiscal Needs of Local Notables and Provincial Governors

In military terms, recruiting, inflated numbers of soldiers, desertion, provisioning, and paying soldiers' salaries and bonuses were significant problems of the eighteenth century. Unorganized mercenary soldiers and their leaders often delayed traveling to where they were ordered, instead lingering, harassing villagers, pillaging their goods and money, and conspiring with bandits or even sometimes engaging in banditry themselves. On the other hand, even these unorganized and bandit-like soldiers serving under their *ayan* or state-official patrons were strongly needed in order to sustain military campaigns.²⁰

¹⁸ Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Provincial power-holders and the Empire in the Late Ottoman World: Conflict or Partnership?" in Christine Woodhead, ed., *The Ottoman World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 436-452.

¹⁹ Yücel Özkaya, "XVIII. Yüzyılın Sonlarında Tevzi Defterlerinin Kontrolü", *Belleten*, vol. LII, 203 (1988), 135-55; Özkaya, *Ayanlık*.

²⁰ Virginia Aksan, *Savaşta ve Barışta Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamı: Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 136-138; Ahmed Resmi, *Hulasatü'l-İtibar*, Osman Köksal, ed., (Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi, 2011).

Mercenary *sekban* regiments were one of the main sources of military manpower in the households of *ayan* and non-*ayan* provincial governors. They were generally paid only during military campaigns and were left without enough revenue in times of peace. So, with the intention of finding other revenue sources, they either became bandits or sought out a patron whose retinue they might join.²¹ The Ottoman administration responded pragmatically to these realities, often using troops of rebels against other rebels and pardoning rebellious pashas to secure their help in handling chaotic situations, at least until an opportunity arose to kill them all.²²

Large numbers of mercenaries, namely, *sekbans*, *delils*, and other units, caused severe financial difficulties for their employers, especially non-*ayan* officials. Moreover, as I discussed earlier, the gradual transfer of *timar* revenues to the central treasury via *mukataas*, and the transfer of provincial revenues to local notables on a larger scale, made non-*ayan* provincial governors financially vulnerable. They were deprived of most of the revenue sources that they had used to finance their military and administrative duties and, unlike the *ayans*, they possessed few other revenue sources of their own. Therefore, new fiscal arrangements were necessary in order to maintain an effective and dependable army.

From the end of the seventeenth century, new revenue sources were allocated to provincial governors with the aim of compensating for their lost sources of revenue and to help them finance the great expenditures required to raise and maintain their mercenary forces. First, the extraordinary levies (*avarız*) that had earlier been collected

²¹ İnalçık, “Centralization and Decentralization”, 27-28; Halil İnalçık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East” in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 195-217; Mustafa Cezar, *Levendler*, 144-169, 256-89.

²² Mehmet Öz, “Kanun-ı Kadim: Osmanlı Gelenekçi Söyleminin Dayanağı mı, Islahat Girişimlerinin Meşrulaştırma Aracı mı?” in *Nizâm-ı Kadîm'den Nizam-ı Cedîd'e: Ölümünün 200. Yılında III. Selim ve Dönemi*, Seyfi Kenan, ed., (İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2010).

only in times of war became regular taxes in the early seventeenth century.²³ And then new taxes were levied to meet the needs of *sekban* units in both times of war (*imdad-ı seferiyye*) and times of peace (*imdad-ı hazeriyye*). Similar to *avarız* taxes, *imdad-ı hazeriyye* levies turned into a regular tax in time. They could be seen as the legalization of illegal taxations (*tekalif-i şakka*) on the *reaya* and as an effort to compensate for the decreased revenues of provincial governors.²⁴ However, in practice, the governors found other ways of charging the public in order to sustain their expensive retinues.

İmdadiye taxes were collected from local people—along with other impositions like fees paid to offset the expenses of the official local notables of a district (*ayaniyye*) and the miscellaneous expenditures of state officials—by means of public-expense registers (*tevzi defters*),²⁵ mostly in the eighteenth and nineteenth

²³ İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, 314-315; Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in Ottoman Empire: 1560-1660* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 92-93; Oktay Özel, “Changes In Settlement Patterns, Population and Society In Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)”, (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1993); Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Oktay Özel, “17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografi ve İskan Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: ‘Mufassal’ Avarız Defterleri”, *XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 12-16 Eylül 1994, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler*, vol. 3, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 735-743; Linda Darling, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?,” *The Journal of European Economic History*, 26/1 (1997), 157-179.

²⁴ Being a new source of regular revenue, *imdad-ıye* taxes played a role in decreasing *avarız* revenues in the central budget numbers from the end of the seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century. But although they did not appear in central budgets, they were applied as a new *avarız*-like tax, and in this way they could be seen as another step or phase towards the rise of a cash economy. See, Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985), 154, 260-8; Ahmet Tabakoğlu, “İmdadiyye”, *DİA*, vol. 22, (Ankara: TDV, 2000), 221-222; Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: XVIII. yy’dan Tanzimat’a Mali Tarih* (İstanbul: Alan Yayınları, 1986), 57; İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, 322-7

²⁵ For the main principles of public-expense registers, see Evgeni Radushev, “Les Dépenses Locales”, 74-94; Michael Ursinus, “Avarız Hanesi und Tevzi Hanesi in der lokalverwaltung des Kaza Manastır (Bitola) im 17. Jh.,” *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju*, 30 (1980), 481-92; Ursinus, *Regionale Reformen im Osmanischen Reich am Vorabend der Tanzimat: Reformen der Rumeliaschen Provinzialgouverneure im Gerichtssprengel von Manastir (Bitola) zur Zeit der Herrschaft Sultan Mahmuds II. (1808-39)* (Berlin: 1982); Ursinus, “Zur Geschichte des Patronats”, 476-97; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*; Yavuz Cezar, “18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Taşrasında Oluşan Yeni Mali Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü Üzerine,” *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 9 (1996), 89-143; Özkaya, “Tevzi Defterlerinin Kontrolü,”; Özkaya, *Ayanlık*, 268-71; Musa Çadırcı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 148-70; Christoph Neumann, “Selanik’te On sekizinci Yüzyılın Sonunda Masarîf-i Vilâyet Defterleri: Merkezi Hükümet, Taşra İdaresi ve Şehir Yönetimi Üçgeninde Mali İşlemler,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 16 (1998), 69-97; Yakup Akkuş, “Osmanlı Maliyesi Literatüründe İhmal Edilmiş Bir Tartışma: Tevzi’ Defterlerinden Vergi-i Mahsûsaya Geçiş,” *Tarih Dergisi*, 65 (2017), 29-61; L. Sevinç

centuries. These records were kept at district (*kaza*) level and prepared by local notables and the judge of a district. Cezar defines the use of *tevzi defters* in the eighteenth century as a “third/new financial sector”—that is, besides the central treasury and *timar* lands. This new sector indicated some kind of local initiative or financial autonomy in the districts and included both fixed, regular taxes and irregular, unforeseen expenditures.²⁶

The turn to these *tevzi* practices contributed to the rise of local notables and their accumulation of wealth and political influence in their regions. It also contributed greatly to the re-strengthening of the militarily and fiscally weakened non-*ayan* provincial governors. *Ayan* and non-*ayan* provincial governors sometimes struggled among themselves to secure the greater share from the *tevzi defters*, but also sometimes collaborated to further common interests.²⁷ *Tevzi defters* provided them a source of extensive potential revenue, because they allowed them to list irregular and unforeseen expenditure items. This gave them significant opportunity to assess levies on district people with almost no oversight from the central government. Until the fiscal regulations of Selim III in 1792,²⁸ the center had little chance to prevent fiscal abuse

Küçüköğlu, “New Fiscal Actors to Control Provincial Expenditures at the End of 18th Century,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, LIV (2019), 241-276.

²⁶ Cezar states that the revenues from the legal and illegal tax collections via the *tevzi defters* ultimately came to rival the revenues of the central treasury of the empire, which is why he terms this financial area a “new financial sector.” Yavuz Cezar, “Osmanlı Taşrasında Oluşan Yeni Mali Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü Üzerine”, 9, 80- 91, 96, 104-5, 110-120; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 71-73, 123-153.

²⁷ Christoph Neumann, “Masarif-i Vilâyet Defterleri” 69-97.

²⁸ For the details of Selim III’s decree aiming to establish control over the public-expense registers, see BOA, Cevdet Dahiliye (C.DH.), 10665; BOA, C.DH., 11881; Özkaya, “Tevzi Defterlerinin Kontrolü,” 144-46; Cezar, “Osmanlı Taşrasında Oluşan Yeni Mali Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü Üzerine”, 91-93; Musa Çadircı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, 148-70; Çağatay Uluçay, *18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkıyalık Halk Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi 1955), 52-55; Ali Açık and Abdurrahman Sağır, “Tokat Şeriyeye Sicillerine Göre Salyane Defterleri (1771-1840)”, *Tarih Dergisi*, 41 (2005), 101-3; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 123-53; Radushev, “Les Dépenses Locales,” 78-82.

in these *defters*, though it might attempt to do so, if informed in time. Otherwise, it had little recourse but to execute a punishment after the fact.

1.5 Studies on Eighteenth-Century Figures

In the eighteenth century, Rumelia was in great turmoil due to the long-lasting wars of the time with Russian and Austrian forces. With long wars, chaos prevailed: the state's central authority weakened, most farm lands were destroyed, fiscal revenues decreased, people ran away or joined or helped rebels, uprisings occurred more frequently, and some local leaders supported or became rebels. A power vacuum arose in the center, but local power holders were there to fill the void.²⁹ Both *ayan* and non-*ayan* provincial and district governors could be counted as local provincial power holders in this period. In the 1790s, there were many powerful local notables in the provinces, and several influential state-official characters both in the center and in the provinces.

Studies on these eighteenth-century figures focus mostly on grand local notables of the time, like Pasbanoğlu Osman, Tayyar Mahmud, Tepedelenli Ali, Tirsiniklizade İsmail, and Alemdar Mustafa. For instance, Robert Zens and Nagehan Üstündağ studied the major Rumelian figure of Pasbanoğlu. Zens's thesis suggests that Pasbanoğlu represents both a zenith and a turning point in the social and political evolution of the Ottoman state in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He adds that this transition had a major impact on the relationship between the state and its Balkan Christian subjects on the eve of their national demands. Üstündağ analyzed

²⁹ Aksan, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi*, s.124; Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Dağlı İsyanları (1791-1808)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Yayınları, 1983).

the life and power politics of Pasbanoğlu Osman with reference to the changes the Ottoman provincial administration experienced between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, looking at his relations with the Ottoman central government and the *ayans* of the region.³⁰

In his doctoral dissertation, Ali Yaycıoğlu focused on the significant historical conditions that created a new type of provincial elite in the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia. He examined the rise of this new sort of *ayan* and covered many notable figures as examples of different governance and power typologies. He looked in particular at the mechanisms through which authority was delegated from imperial authorities to local notables in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and he examined the constitutional orientation of the text of the Ottoman Deed of Agreement. He argued that the provincial challenge and the diffusion of power from the center to the periphery created a medium through which a more participatory polity became possible.³¹

Canay Şahin examined the rise and fall of the Anatolian Caniklizades dynasty within the context of the redistribution of political and economic resources between the center and the periphery in the second half of the eighteenth century. She analyzed the revenue sources controlled by the family and the leading characters of the household, with a specific focus on Tayyar Mahmud.³² Another Rumelian *ayan* figure, Tepedelenli Ali, has been treated by Hamiyet Sezer in a study detailing his famous

³⁰ Zens, “The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin”; Nagehan Üstündağ, “Power Politics in the Ottoman Balkan Provinces: A Case Study of Pazvandoğlu Osman,” (PhD diss., METU, 2006); Canay Şahin, “The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family in Eighteenth Century Anatolia: The Caniklizades (1737-1808),” (PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2003).

³¹ Yaycıoğlu, “The Provincial Challenge”.

³² Canay Şahin, “The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family”.

uprising in Rumelia, though her study is heavier on description than analysis.³³ Tirsiniklizade İsmail's life is the subject of a book written by Erdoğan, Ferlibaş and Çolak that tries to place Tirsiniklizade, the *ayan* of Ruse, among other *ayan*, non-*ayan*, and bandit characters. It focuses specifically on three rebellious people of the period, Pasbanoğlu Osman (an *ayan*-origin provincial governor and bandit leader), Cengiz Geray (an unruly Crimean prince), and Gürcü Osman Pasha (a non-*ayan*, military-origin provincial governor). This book also tries to draw connections between the uprisings and power politics of the time and Tirsiniklizade's reactions to them. Another outstanding feature of this study is that it addresses the patronage (*intisab*) relations of its protagonist and gives specific information on his proteges.³⁴

Another noteworthy study on *ayan* during the period is İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's book on three very closely related notables in eighteenth-century Rumelia: Tirsiniklizade İsmail, Yılıkoğlu Süleyman, and Alemdar Mustafa.³⁵ This study contains many details about these figures, but again stands out more for its descriptive than its analytical value, especially concerning how these figures related to one another and other figures of their time. Most of the other studies about *ayan* figures mentioned above did not have this problem, since they contain valuable analysis of relations between the state and the provinces and among *ayans* in the provinces. However, these studies on *ayans* inherently assume that local magnates were more powerful than centrally appointed / non-*ayan* state officials. I think this assumption undermines the rightful position and place of imperial agents in the power politics of the provinces. Furthermore, these *ayan* studies tend to evaluate state officials as a

³³ Hamiyet Sezer Feyzioğlu, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Hazin Sonu: Tepedelenli Ali Paşa İsyanı* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2018).

³⁴ M. Erdoğan, M. B. Ferlibaş, K. Çolak, *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi (1796-1806): Rusçuk Ayanı* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2009).

³⁵ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılıkoğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa* (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1942).

homogeneous group, as if they had no significant differences other than their titles and posts, and no conflicts or alliances among them except those too obvious to overlook.

When it comes to studies devoted to particular state officials of the period, the articles of Uzunçarşılı are quite definitive. He published several articles on non-*ayan* state officials / provincial governors from the eighteenth century, including Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, Halil Hamid Pasha, Koca Yusuf Pasha, Hakkı Pasha, and Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha. One of the most important administrative and military characters of the period, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, is also the subject of a recent doctoral dissertation by Ali Karahan.³⁶ All of these studies are again more descriptive than analytical. Another shortcoming is that they focus on the most prominent figures of the time yet mostly ignore less-prominent state officials. Uzunçarşılı's articles are all about figures from the reign of Selim III, which is the exact period of Gürcü Osman Pasha's rise and fall, but Osman Pasha has only a secondary role in his articles. The same holds for Karahan's study. In both cases, information about Osman is included in the stories only when necessary, with mentions of his posts and his uprising during the last years of life, but he is never represented as an important agent in his own right.

One exception to the overriding focus on the grand *ayans* and major state officials of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is the dissertation of Tolga Esmer on Kara Feyzi, a bandit leader under Pasbanoğlu Osman. Kara Feyzi was one of the main actors behind the endemic violence that marked the turn of the eighteenth century. Esmer challenges the common practice of studies in this area by

³⁶ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, VII-VIII/ 1, (1942), 17-40; Uzunçarşılı, "Halil Hamid Paşa", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 5 (1935), 213-67; Uzunçarşılı, "Sultan III. Selim ve Koca Yusuf Paşa", *Belleten*, vol. XXXIX, 154 (1975), 233-256; Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa", *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 6 (1936-1939), 177-284; Uzunçarşılı, "Nizam-ı Cedid Ricalinden Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa", *Belleten*, vol. XXXV, 138 (1971), 245-302; Ali Karahan, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri (1714?-1790)" (PhD diss., Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2017).

focusing on an “insignificant” actor—that is, one who did not hold official title in his early career or possess a fixed seat of power (unlike the *ayans* of the time). Esmer views Feyzi’s history through the corpus of official dispatches written about him, and he states that his mobility, lacking as he did substantial properties or provinces of his own, enabled him to be more flexible and establish different types of relations with various socio-political groups throughout Rumelia and beyond.³⁷

Relations among the *ayan*, state officials, and bandits in Rumelia at the turn of the century were quite complicated and intertwined. The military and administrative figure I focus on in this study, Gürcü Osman Pasha, stood amid a host of such figures and their networks. My reason for choosing Osman Pasha specifically and not another rebellious figure of the time is that, despite his lack of a dynastic tie, he still rose to very high-ranked posts in very troubled times in Rumelia, yet did so without becoming one of the major patron figures of his time. He was not from an established *ayan* household like Caniklizade Battal Pasha and Tayyar Pasha. He was not a grand *ayan* like Pasbanoglu of Vidin. And he was not a major leading actor like Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Yanya, either. He was instead a smaller, unruly figure, on par with Kara Feyzi the bandit, one largely eclipsed by other, grander, higher-ranking figures in studies on the eighteenth-century Ottoman Balkans, but with one difference—Osman was a state agent locally assigned, while Feyzi was a local agent from the beginning.

Coming from a humble and simple, yet successful, military background, Osman found a powerful patron and through him worked to advance himself. Later in his career, when he acquired the title of vizier, Osman Pasha stood between the center and the local: he had influential status, controlled major sources of revenue and

³⁷ Tolga Uğur Esmer, “A Culture of Rebellion: Newtworks of Violence and Competing Discourses of Justice in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1808”, (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2009).

military manpower, settled in and adjusted well to the localities where he was appointed, and became a notable-sized official. Gürcü Osman Pasha's story is thus the story of the basic realities and issues of this specific period. By learning who he was as a person, and by analyzing his relationships and the political, military, and financial sources of his power, one comes to better understand this time of transformations as a whole. This study will include a comprehensive analysis of his career steps, posts, political networks, and military and financial resources.

The second chapter will detail Gürcü Osman Pasha's journey from post to post and region to region in chronological order. In the third chapter, I will examine the various types of vertical and horizontal political relations Osman Pasha built—with the center, contemporary *ayans* and state officials, bandits, and members of his own household—and look for reasonable and meaningful explanations for his rise and ultimate fall. Doing so will reveal the true significance of this pasha, how major a player he was, and the ways in which he used banditry and rebellion as a political tool. The fourth chapter of this study will analyze the military and fiscal conditions that made Osman Pasha a powerful provincial governor. Throughout the dissertation, I will evaluate the military and financial aspects of his story together, since they are very much intertwined and interrelated.

The third and fourth chapters are going to have a brief summary and review at the end. Therefore in the conclusion, rather than simply recapitulating these summaries, I will instead focus on analyzing the life of Osman Pasha as a whole and what it tells us about power relations in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century and beyond.

1.6 Sources

The largest corpus of official Ottoman sources I use here to construct the life and practices of Gürcü Osman Pasha are in the Hatt-ı Hümayûn collection (documents sent to the sultan that often bear his own comments as well as those of his *divân*) and the Cevdet collection housed in the Presidential Archive in Istanbul. In addition to these, I use documents in other collections in the same archive, including the Kamil Kepeci, Ali Emiri, Ahkam, Mühimme, Şikayet, Sicill, and Topkapı Sarayı collections. For the financial analysis of Osman Pasha's economic growth, Maliyeden Müdevver documents, Baş Muhasebe folders, Divan-ı Hümayun folders (A.DVN.), and *tevzi defters* (A.DVNSTZEI.d.) all provide valuable information. As chronicles of the time, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, *Tarih-i Nuri*, *Enveri Tarihi*, *Edib Tarihi*, and *Baba Paşa Tarihi* are the major sources.

I devote space to several state officials and *ayan* figures in the second chapter of this thesis. Since they are not my primary focus in this study, I rely mostly on secondary sources on them for the information I provide on their profiles and relationships with Osman Pasha.

CHAPTER II

CAREER STEPS OF OSMAN PASHA

2.1 Period of Guardianships

The early stages of Gürcü Osman Pasha's³⁸ career within the Ottoman political system are not very clear. According to Sicill-i Osmani, he achieved the positions of *mirmiran*³⁹ (lord-of-lords) and *dalkılıç başbuşluğu* (leader of mobilized soldiers)⁴⁰ due to his successes during the conflicts of the Russo-Turkish War (1787-1792). In the third volume of the chronicle of Enveri (*Enveri tarihi*), there is a mention of Osman Pasha fighting against Russians in August 1789 around two thousand soldiers beside him.⁴¹ These details imply that he his political career started to advance through his military successes.

The later stages of Gürcü Osman Pasha's career could be followed through various archival documents. For example, when General Governor (*Serasker*) of

³⁸ The main characters' name Gürcü Osman Pasha will appear at different forms throughout this text such as "Osman Pasha" or "Pasha". These titles will only be used to mention Gürcü Osman Pasha, not for any other Osman Pasha of the period.

³⁹ Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, "Mir-i Miran", *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, vol. II (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), 545; F.A.K. Yasamee, "Mīr-i Mīrān", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (*EI*²), vol. I (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 95-96; V. L. Menage, "Beglerbegi", *EI*², vol. I, (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 1159-1160; Mehmet İpşirli, "Beylerbeyi", *DİA*, vol. 6 (Ankara: TDV, 1992), 69-74.

⁴⁰ *Serdengeçti*/ *dalkılıç* are military units that are responsible for forward battles in the Ottoman army. This term is used for soldiers recruited from local people in the 18th century, either to join state troops or bandit troops. Abdülkadir Özcan, "Serdengeçti", *DİA*, vol. 36 (Ankara: TDV, 2009), 554-555.

⁴¹ Filiz Bayram, "Enveri Tarihi: Üçüncü Cild (Metin ve Değerlendirme)", (PhD diss. İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü,, 2014), 590.

İsmail⁴² Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha⁴³ needed help during the battles with Russia in September 1789, Osman Pasha was among the officials ordered to go to İsmail and provide help for the defense of İsmail, İbrail (Braila) and Eflak (Wallachia).⁴⁴ The Osman Pasha mentioned here, must be Gürcü Osman Pasha.⁴⁵ Indeed, it can be proved from *Enveri tarihi* and other archival documents that Osman Pasha was *Delilbaşı* (leader of irregular cavalry) of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha (his patron) in İsmail and afterwards when Hasan Pasha appointed as the Grand Vizier.⁴⁶

A few months later, Osman Pasha appeared as the Guardian of İsakçı (*İsakçı Muhafızı*)⁴⁷ in the documents and he was appointed as the *mutasarrıf* (tax-collector) of Kayseri as a reward for his military success at the battles. Yet, he did not go to Kayseri himself, instead he sent a *mütesellim* (deputy governor); this district was given to the him as an additional source of income (*arpalık*). Then he was called to defend the fortress of İsmail.⁴⁸ Yet later on, whilst he was on his way towards his new assignment, his post was changed to Tutrakan,⁴⁹ because the defense of Tutrakan

⁴² İsmail (Izmail) is a fortress-city having extensive trade activities on the Danubian delta. From 1780 onwards, it became a major military base for the Ottomans against the Russians. Feridun Emecen, "İsmail", *DİA*, vol. 23 (Ankara: TDV, 2001), 82-84.

⁴³ Cezayirli Hasan Pasha will be discussed at length later on. He is an outstanding character from the last quarter of the 18th century. Gürcü Osman Pasha, and many more important political figure of the time were trained in Hasan Pasha's household.

⁴⁴ BOA, TS. MA. e. 437.23, 1789 September.

⁴⁵ However, there was another Osman Pasha lived at similar dates who was appointed to similar posts in the same region; Kürd Osman Pasha. It was often difficult to recognize which Osman Pasha was mentioned in the documents since Kürd or Gürcü words were mostly not used in the namings. Furthermore, these two Osman pashas sometimes were assigned to same posts consecutively, such as İsmail, İsakçı and Tutrakan. BOA, C. AS. 38953, 1789 October; AE.SSLM.III 19965, 1789 October; BOA, MAD.d.3173, 105b, 106a, 106b, February-August 1790.

⁴⁶ BOA, HAT. 15018, 1802 May (agyt: date is estimated by the archival personnel); BOA, C. AS. 26535, 1789 September; Bayram, "Enveri Tarihi", 680.

⁴⁷ İsakçı (Isaccea) is a fortress-city on the right coast of the Danube. There is also a port and storehouse used as a shipping point for provisions. Being a strategically important place for the Ottoman army, İsakçı was attacked by Russians in 1771, 1790, 1809 and 1818. Bogdan Murgescu, "Köstence" *DİA*, vol. 12 (Ankara: TDV, 2000), 489-490.

⁴⁸ BOA, AE.SSLM.III 12000, 1790 January (agyt); C.AS. 29700, 1790 April/ May (agyt); MAD.d.3173, 106a, April 1790; C.DH. 1242, 1790 April; C.DH. 13919, 1790 May; C. AS. 41816, 1790 June.

⁴⁹ Tutrakan is another fortress-city to the West of Silistre on the Danube. The geographical position of this town is to the south of the Danube and to the east of Rusçuk-Hezargrad-Varna. Machiel Kiel, "Deliorman" *DİA*, vol. 9, (Ankara: TDV, 1994), 141-144.

coasts was prioritized.⁵⁰ Osman Pasha resided in Tutrakan as a guardian pasha (*muhafız paşa*) and succeeded at the fights with Russian troops.⁵¹

After a couple of months, at the beginning of 1791, Osman Pasha was ordered to go to İbrail⁵² as the Guardian of İbrail.⁵³ As two guardianship positions were given to him with such close timing, one may ask whether or not Osman Pasha could be the guardian of two places at the same time. However, Hakan Engin who has conducted a research on İbrail, stated that *muhafız* pashas of fortresses had to reside in their assigned posts.⁵⁴ From this, we can infer that it is not possible for Osman Pasha to be the guardian of two different fortresses at the same date, such as İsakçı and Tutrakan, or İsakçı and İbrail.

Osman Pasha was promoted with the rank of vizierate in 1791, due to his significant military successes.⁵⁵ In the year of 1792, with the army moving from Şumnu⁵⁶ to Edirne, the region of Şumnu became more exposed to bandit assaults. So it was decided that an experienced and successful official should be appointed to the guardianship of Şumnu to prevent the bandits from causing trouble in the neighborhoods across Şumnu. Gürcü Osman Pasha was the official chosen for this

⁵⁰ Bayram, “Enveri Tarihi”, 680.

⁵¹ C.AS. 21311, 1790 April; C. AS. 23899, 1790 June; C. AS. 20380, 1790 August; MAD.d.3173, 106a, May 1790.

⁵² İbrail is both a fortress-city and a port-city that has a pier for the purpose of trade. It is to the left coast of the Danube. During the Ottoman-Russian wars beginning from the 18th century onwards, İbrail was exposed to Russian attacks and occupation from time to time. There were two thousands of soldiers that were tasked under the service of the guardian of İbrail in 1790. There were also storages for ammunition and provisions in the city too. Mihai Maxim, “İbrail”, *DİA*, vol. 21, (Ankara: TDV, 2000), 363-366.

⁵³ C.AS. 41308, 1791 January; C. AS. 50770, 1791 January; MAD.d.3173, 108b, April 1791.

⁵⁴ Hakan Engin, “1878-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sırasında İbrail Kalesi” (Master Thesis, Trakya Üniversitesi, 2013), 16-19.

⁵⁵ Bayram, “Enveri Târîhi”, 845.

⁵⁶ During wars between the Russians and the Ottomans that began from 1768 and lasted till the last quarter of the 19th century with certain intervals, Şumnu (Shumen) became the main military base for the Ottoman armies. From the 17th century onwards and especially during the 18th and the 19th centuries Şumnu was an active centre for heterodox İslam. The Bektashis started to be seen in Şumnu with the effect of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha in 1790. Hasan Pasha died in Şumnu in the same year, and his tomb is in this city. Machiel Kiel, “Şumnu“, *DİA*, vol. 39, (Ankara: TDV, 2010), 227-230.

position.⁵⁷ By March of 1792, Pasha was positioned as the Guardian of Şumnu and the military units under his command began to gain victories at the battles with the Russian troops.⁵⁸ Osman Pasha continued his position as the Guardian of Şumnu for a couple of months more, until his vezierate was removed and he was exiled to Keşan in Edirne. According to the *Enveri tarihi*, after Osman Pasha managed to maintain a relative control in Şumnu, the central government planned to send Osman Pasha to defend Rusçuk (Ruse) to eliminate the bandits. Yet this plan was not implemented.⁵⁹

2.2 Years of Exile in Keşan

Towards the end of July 1792, Osman Pasha left Şumnu and went to Keşan as a pasha as a demoted official (*merfuü'l-vüzare*). Süleyman Aga, a *mübaşir* (an agent sent from the center to handle state business) appointed by the central government, accompanied Osman Pasha and his men as they went to Keşan. It was as if the central government wanted to be sure that Pasha would arrive at his destination without troubling the districts they passed on their way.⁶⁰

There is no information in documents regarding why Gürcü Osman Pasha was dismissed from his position and exiled to Keşan. However, this decision may have something to do with the fact that Pasha had frequently asked for monetary and provisional help from the center, justifying his requests by excessive expenses of his soldiers. Besides the war with Russia was concluded in 1792 and there might have been less need for Osman's military power. Another reason of his demotion could be his patron's death and Osman's losing his patron's protection. Nevertheless, the

⁵⁷ Bayram, "Enveri Tarihi", 879.

⁵⁸ C.AS.7369, 1792 March; AE.SSLM.III 2334, 1792 June.

⁵⁹ C.DH.14037, 1792, July; C.DH.1443, 1792 July; Bayram, "Enveri Tarihi", 879.

⁶⁰ C.DH.1443, 1792 July; C.DH.14037, 1792 July.

decision of sending him into exile seems interesting, considering that his military power could still have been used to suppress the bandits in Rumelia. This point leads us to a suspicion that he might have been defied the orders of the center previously and thus he was sent to an exile in Keşan.

From 1791 to 1800s mountain banditry was one of the prominent issues that set the agenda for the Ottoman government in the Balkans.⁶¹ The years, that Osman Pasha had to reside in Keşan between July 1792 - July 1795, coincided with the period that these revolts had started to spread. At this period the bandit attacks caused a significant damaging effect on the Rumelian districts. Therefore the central government ordered local notables of many districts to recruit soldiers to defend their region and to serve under the commands of provincial governors if needed. The governors in charge were Ali Pasha of Yanya (Ioannina), Ismail of Serez (Seres) and Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga of Rusçuk, as well as state officials such as the Guardian of Vidin, the *Edirne Bostancıbaşı*, the *Mutasarrıf of Çirmen* (Ormenio), The Governor of Silistre (Silistra) and the Governor of Rumelia.⁶² However, recruiting soldiers and sending them to the required places appeared to be quite difficult. Local notables of some districts stated that they have no soldiers to spare, and that only farmers were left in their districts. Even when soldiers could be recruited in some other districts, these soldiers ordered to serve under the related officials, many of them escaped whilst on the way and returned to their districts. The *sekbans*, and especially the Albanian *sekbans* were the ones that created the biggest problems. Many Albanian *sekbans* were reported that they left the households of their patrons without permission, strayed around, harassed the district people, and illegally asked for food and money. Some

⁶¹ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 5-6.

⁶² SMHM.200.46, 160, December 1793; SMHM.200.161, 579, March 1794; SMHM.200.144, 489, May 1794; İSAM, Sc.VDN.S6, 51a-51b, July 1793.

even joined the parties of bandits. Many orders were issued to close down the critical pathways and roads with the object of preventing these unruly soldiers from wandering around freely.⁶³

Those who escaped or strayed around were not only soldiers. People of the districts, whose living conditions deteriorating, also left their districts with the hope of finding a better and a more secure place to live, such as Eflak. Besides the attacks of bandits or unruly soldiers, military costs of the state troops sent to the region to fight against the bandits, or expenses of state officials passing-by the districts were piling up the fiscal burden of the people as well. This is because the people of the districts were obligated to pay their own share in those expenses. The central government forwarded several men to the ports on Danube to stop the fleeing people. Offering monetary or in-kind help and temporary tax-exemptions were other ways the government tried to convince people to stay in their own districts, yet sources demonstrate that these offerings were appeared not enough to persuade them.⁶⁴

By the middle of 1795, after four years had passed from the preliminary campaigns organized against the mountain bandits, we see that Pasbanoğlu Osman of Vidin⁶⁵ became an important provincial figure and managed to draw the attention of the centre as a rebellious pasha.⁶⁶ Pasbanoğlu was very influential in Gürcü Osman Pasha's story as well since he played a major role in Gürcü Osman Pasha's rebellion in 1801. It is ironic that this rebellious Pasbanoğlu, whom Gürcü Osman Pasha was sent to suppress towards the end of 1790s, was the same Pasbanoğlu with whom the

⁶³ SMHM.200.128, 398, 1794 April; SMHM.200.24, 70, 1793 October; SMHM.200.27, 82, 1793 October; SMHM.200.45, 158, 1793 November; SMHM.200.143, 485, 1794 April; SMHM.201.114, 356, 1795 March

⁶⁴ ADVN.2214.7, 1794, January; SMHM.201.12, 15, 1794 September; ADVN.2234.39, 1795 July; SMHM.202.52, 171, 1795 August; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 26-28.

⁶⁵ Hereafter Pasbanoğlu Osman Pasha will be referred as Pasbanoğlu.

⁶⁶ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 22-24, 34-35.

very same Osman Pasha collaborated, after he was dismissed from the Rumelian Governorship in 1800 and when he led an uprising against the state.

2.3 Back to Guardianship in Vidin

In 1795 it was understood that defeating Pasbanoğlu with small local militias would not be possible. Therefore Selim III ordered larger forces of troops to be gathered for attacks against Pasbanoğlu. In the same year, Gürcü Osman Pasha, an exile vizier in Keşan who had been at several guardianship posts along the Danube coast, was appointed as the new Guardian of Vidin. In July 1795, while Osman Pasha was preparing to set off for his new appointment, Pasbanoğlu gathered some bandits for an attack on Belgrade; and another bandit group went across the Danube to raid the Eflak lands.⁶⁷ Therewith, Gürcü Osman Pasha was ordered to go straight to Niğbolu with all the men at his command. Meanwhile, the Governor of Rumelia Mustafa Pasha, was specifically assigned to discipline Pasbanoğlu and gain control in the Vidin region. When Osman Pasha arrived at Niğbolu, he went to the outskirts of Vidin with *mütesellim* (deputy governor) of Niğbolu and all the soldiers recruited from the related districts in the region.⁶⁸

The *ayans* of Rusçuk, Plevne (Pleven), Hazergrad (Razgrad), Osmanpazarı (Omurtag), İslimye and Hacıoğlupazarı (Dobrich) districts and the *voyvoda* (administrator of *mukataas*, financial agent in a district) of Zıştovi (Svishtov) were ordered to enter the service of the *mütesellim* of Niğbolu. The *ayans* of the districts

⁶⁷ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34-35; Zens, “The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha”, 123.

⁶⁸ MHM.ds.891.20, 1795 August; C.DH.3977, 1795 August; TSMA.e.784.26, 1795-6 (agytt).

were obligated to send as many soldiers as possible towards Vidin.⁶⁹ Whilst waiting for Osman Pasha to arrive in Vidin, one of III. Selim sent decrees addressing the *ayans* of the districts. It was mentioned in the decrees that Pasbanoğlu had attracted the *ayans* of districts in Vidin and Niğbolu to his own side via threat; and that their obeying to Pasbanoğlu was by sheer force. Therefore, the Sultan expressed that he intended to forgive these *ayans*. Yet, from that date onwards, since Pasbanoğlu had already been declared a rebel, it was stated that anyone acting beside him would also be counted as a ‘mountain bandit’ and punished accordingly.⁷⁰ This decree gives clues to the strategies implemented by the state for provincial figures of the region in order control and neutralize them through pardons. On the other hand, it also shows how hard it was for the central government to regulate and control the provincial power-holders.

In September, when Gürcü Osman Pasha finally arrived at Niğbolu, despite the orders of the *mütesselim* of Niğbolu to the districts, no one had yet arrived from the districts to join the *mütesselim*. The moment that Osman Pasha arrived at Niğbolu, he himself sent immediate orders to the districts to recruit soldiers so that they could join his troops.⁷¹ Yet, some *ayans* of the districts stated that they were scared of the possible attacks of ‘mountain bandits’ if they left their districts.⁷²

As the winter of 1795 approached, the Guardian of Vidin Osman Pasha was ordered to spend the winter in Lom and work together with the Governor of Rumelia, Mustafa Pasha, in order to catch Pasbanoğlu and repel his troops from the region. The Governor of Rumelia were to be in Sofya (Sofia) for the winter. Osman Pasha was to blockade Vidin and cut off its provisions in order to ensure that the people of Vidin

⁶⁹ MHM.ds.891.29, 1795 August; MHM.ds.892.36, 1795 September; SMHM.202.65, 204, 1795 September; MHM.ds.891.31, 1795 August.

⁷⁰ MHM.ds.892.33, 1795 September.

⁷¹ C.AS.49740, 1795 August; ADVN.2237.13, 1795 September.

⁷² ADVN.2237.411795 September.

would quit Pasbanoğlu's side. 15 thousands of *kuruş* was sent to Osman Pasha from the Imperial Treasury so that he might have to spend the coming spring there as well. This siege did not achieve its intended success and ended in winter.⁷³

At the beginning of 1796 Pasbanoğlu was pardoned by Selim III on the condition that he would not act together with the bandits any more. But as we know Pasbanoğlu did not keep his promises for this matter.⁷⁴ With this pardon, Gürcü Osman Pasha's guardianship position at Vidin became inappropriate, because these two did not get along well with each other. According to Halil Nuri, a few battles had occurred between their troops before and for this reason, it was not possible for them to work together again at Vidin. Therefore, it was not found reasonable for Osman Pasha to stay in Vidin.⁷⁵ In fact, Osman Pasha also desired to go somewhere else. He believed that due to the fightings that his men had previously experienced with Pasbanoğlu's men, would have led to great problems if they came across one another in Vidin.⁷⁶

The Grand Vizier who summarized this incident to the Sultan, expressed that he also agreed with the ideas of Osman Pasha for not to enter Vidin. It was understood that the intensions of the Governor of Rumelia Mustafa Pasha, who insisted for Osman Pasha to go to Vidin despite him knowing that it would have caused a lot of problems, were in fact to provoke more disorder in the region for his own sake. Eventually both Mustafa Pasha and Osman Pasha were discharged from their duties. Osman Pasha replaced the Governor of Silistre. This post came with a condition that Gürcü Osman

⁷³ MHM.ds.894.8, 1795 October.

⁷⁴ Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha", 123; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34-35; M. Erdoğan, M. B. Ferlibaş, K. Çolak, *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi (1796-1806): Rusçuk Ayanı* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2009), 99-105.

⁷⁵ Seydi Vakkas Toprak, *Nuri Tarihi* (PhD diss. İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2011), 355-58.; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34-35.

⁷⁶ HAT.10783B, January 1796; HAT.2793A, July 1796 (1210 Z 27).

Pasha should take all the *sekbans* at his service with him while going to his new assignment, and not to leave one of them behind.⁷⁷

2.4 Start to Rise Up in Silistre

On the first day of February in 1796, Gürcü Osman Pasha was officially appointed as the Governor of Silistre. He was ordered to gather his entire household, immediately go to his new post, and not to harm the people of the districts on their way. He was also asked to pay particular attention for ensuring that no soldier of him would run away and stray.⁷⁸ However, the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha, pointed out that some of his Albanians *sekbans* fled from Osman Pasha's retinue, despite the strict orders. Hakkı Pasha also noted that, some *kapisız* (not at a pasha's household at that particular period) soldiers who had been previously at the service of the former governor of Rumelia were also wandering around the Balkans. When a man of Hakkı Pasha came across these *kapisız* soldiers, he remained skeptical as to whether or not to take them under his service. This man claimed that even if he had accepted them under his own service, he would have never been able to trust them, yet if he had not taken them under his service, he was very concerned that they might probably have joined the other bandits in the region.⁷⁹

In the meantime, the *Mutasarrıf* of Yanya Tepedenli Ali Pasha was charged with the task of preventing strayed Albanians from passing towards Sofya and further, and guarding the roads, bridges and passes. Only Albanians carrying permission documents given by the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha or the *mutasarrıf* of Çirmen

⁷⁷ HAT.10783, January 1796.

⁷⁸ SMHM.202.210, 615, February 1796; C.AS.39694, February 1796.

⁷⁹ MHM.ds.897.15, February 1796.

Mehmet Pasha would be able to pass. It was ordered that information of the people passing such as who they were, where they were going and why, was to be recorded and notified to Istanbul. An additional note was given to pay particular attention to *kapısız* soldiers that had left the households of the Governor of Silistre Osman Pasha or the former governor of Rumelia Mustafa Pasha.⁸⁰

The fact that Osman Pasha was heading to Silistre together with numerous Albanian *sekbans* under his service, concerned the central government. It was thought that some of the soldiers would leave Pasha's side, roam freely and disorderly in Rumelia and start to attack the people either by themselves or among the bandits in the area. Towards the beginning of April in 1796, Gürcü Osman Pasha arrived at Silistre with a large group of soldiers - even though some had strayed on the way. In fact, the number of soldiers mentioned in documents had reached around four thousand, when previously it was reported to be three thousand.⁸¹ However, it cannot be said that the probability of these soldiers creating problems had diminished when Osman Pasha arrived in Silistre. In fact, Osman Pasha's soldiers did not settle in the centre of Silistre, but scattered around and created disturbances for the peripheral districts and villages. Hereupon, another order was sent for Pasha to call back the soldiers that came with him and to keep them all together in once place.⁸²

Meanwhile, Hakkı Pasha, the Governor of Rumelia mentioned in a report to Istanbul that the soldiers that had left Osman Pasha's side and joined the ranks of the bandits. The leader of the *bölükbaşı*s of the soldiers at Pasha's household, was called Bilic *Bölükbaşı*. This commander, Bilic, had previously been reported to generate

⁸⁰ MHM.ds.897.23, February 1796.

⁸¹ HAT.56802, July 1796 (agyt); C.ML.4433, May 1796.

⁸² C.AS.49626, May-June 1796; MHM.ds.901.3, June 1796.

problems during the time of Zihneli Hasan Pasha, the former governor of Silistre. And at this date, he had joined Kara Feyzi a couple of months ago, a prominent bandit leader (*ser-gerde*) of the ‘mountain bandits’. Hakkı Pasha believed that Osman Pasha presented some of his soldiers joining the bandits as an excuse for his own military failures. Hakkı was suspicious that if a larger incident broke out later, Osman would try to defend himself with this same excuse. As a solution to potential troubles Osman’s soldiers might have caused, Hakkı suggested sending some of them back to their hometowns. However, the unpaid salaries of the soldiers were a serious handicap in making this a reality. According to Osman Pasha and his *kapı kethüda* (steward/intendant) Süfyan Aga, the salaries of the Albanian *sekbans* had not been paid for almost six months and there was a high probability that if this money had not been paid soon, then the soldiers would have either revolted or transferred themselves to the sides of the bandits.⁸³ Yet, despite all the harms that Pasha’s soldiers did to the people, and despite him trying to legitimize not paying their salaries by financial difficulties, the central government still considered Osman Pasha to become the new Governor of Rumelia towards the beginning of 1797.⁸⁴

The government was looking for a new candidate to assign to Rumelia because the existing governor Hakkı Pasha had not achieved the desired results at the ‘mountain banditry’ issue, even though only a year passed from his appointment. According to Uzunçarşılı, Hakkı Pasha tried to repel the bandits and the Rumelian *ayans* backing them and took violent measures against them. Hereupon, the *ayans* came together and lobbied to expulse him from Rumelia. Due to the complaints and the requests of the *ayans*, and with the support of those opposing Hakkı Pasha, Hakkı was

⁸³ HAT.3888, August 1796; C.ML.2902, September 1796; HAT.10681, December 1796.

⁸⁴ ADVN.2243.59, January 1796; ADVN.2257.22, December 1796; C.ML.23180, December 1796.

dismissed from his post in May 1797. The Guardian of Belgrade Mustafa Pasha replaced Hakkı Pasha.⁸⁵ Osman Pasha, continued to remain as the Governor of Silistre for a while longer.

While searching for a new governor of Rumelia, Ali Aga, the former *voyvoda* of Selvi had allied with Pasbanoğlu, and together they had risen up and seized Tırnova.⁸⁶ As state officials were recruiting new soldiers to attack the bandits, the bandits were also recruiting paid *sebkân* units to fight alongside them just as the state officials. The alliances and formations of military units experienced at this period seem similar to the *Celali* rebellions in Anatolia almost two hundred years ago and *Celali* rebels often changing sides. In the 1790's Rumelia, *sebkân* soldiers would have fought against bandits under the service of a vizier, just as they would have joined the ranks of the bandits to fight against the state officials. Moreover, those changing sides were not only among soldiers. The *ayans* could also switch their allegiance between the state and the bandits, according to which side would be more fitting to their own interests. For example, it was suspected that the *ayan* of Ruşçuk Tirsiniklizade was in an alliance with Pasbanoğlu, while he was seemingly at the service of the state and collaborating with the state officials. It was thought that Tirsinillizade took sides with the bandits in order to take over the Niğbolu region.⁸⁷

When Mustafa Pasha replaced Hakkı Pasha for the governorship of Rumelia, Gürcü Osman Pasha, the Governor of Silistre, was sent to İslimiye (Sliven) for a new assignment. He was to reside in İslimiye, to follow the bandits that had escaped from

⁸⁵ HAT.9351, January 1797; Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa", 182-86; Toprak, "Nuri Tarihi", 451.

⁸⁶ HAT.2814, February 1797; HAT.2814D, February 1797; HAT.2846, February 1797; HAT.2846A, February 1797; HAT.2846F, February 1797.

⁸⁷ C.DH.13090, February 1797; C.AS.1384, February 1797; ADVN.2261.61, April 1797; HAT.11080, June 1797 (agyt); HAT.2717B, March 1797; HAT.2789, May 1797; ADVN.2263.57, May 1797.

the state troops and to destroy them.⁸⁸ After İslimiye, Osman headed to Dimetoka (Didymoteicho) to follow the bandits, yet when the bandits sieged Niğbolu, he was called back to Niğbolu in the month of November. While passing from Rusçuk on the way to Niğbolu with his soldiers, the bandits who had already seized Niğbolu region, had also occupied the fortress and managed to enter into the city. When the Grand Vizier received the news, he ordered both the Governor of Rumelia and Osman Pasha to reclaim the fortress. At that time Osman Pasha was at Rusçuk with around four thousand soldiers. In order to protect their district from possible bandit attacks, the people of Rusçuk had also gathered around five-six thousands of soldiers. The preparations for the great campaign against Pasbanoğlu had eventually begun.⁸⁹

Due to the fact that Gürcü Osman Pasha, who had been assigned to guard Niğbolu, would have to recruit a lot of soldiers, just as the time when he had been the guardian of Vidin, a considerable amount of money and provisions were sent to meet his military needs.⁹⁰ Some of the state officials and *ayans* that were ordered to recruit soldiers and then to enter the service of Osman Pasha were: the *Mutasarrıf* of Çirmen Hüseyin Pasha, the *Ayan* of Hazergrad Ömer Aga, the *Ayan* of Rusçuk Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga and the *Ayan* of Şumnu Çavuşzade İsmail Aga.⁹¹

Before going to Niğbolu, Osman Pasha engaged in battle with the bandits first in Rusçuk then in Zıştovi (Svishtov). Pasha was victorious and with eight-ten thousands of soldiers he managed to defeat several bandit leaders naming, Macar Ali, Gavur İmam, Aliş, Emincik, Arslanoğlu, Kara Mustafa, Muslı, Ramo, Boriçeli Tahir.

⁸⁸ AE.SSLM.III.3195, July 1797; AE.SSLM.III.2348, June 1797; AE.SSLM.III.2350, June 1797; AE.SSLM.III.2351, June 1797; AE.SSLM.III.2355, September 1797.

⁸⁹ AE.SSLM.III.2349, June 1797; C.AS.53076, November 1797; HAT.12477, November 1797; TS.MA. d. 4082, December 1797-January 1798.

⁹⁰ HAT.2293, December 1797; C.DH.41, December 1797.

⁹¹ C.AS.43601, December 1797; A.DVN.d.899M, June 1798 (agyt); HAT.2712, December 1797.

Defeated bandits fled and headed towards Zıştovi and Tırnova (Tarnovo). Many bandits were captured and killed on the way. Osman Pasha and those under his service, who were successful at the battles with the bandits in Rusçuk and Zıştovi, were rewarded by the central government with money, honorary gifts and titles.⁹²

In the year of February 1798, Osman Pasha, the Governor of Silistre, was in the region of Niğbolu together with the *Mutasarrıf* of Çirmen Hüseyin Pasha and Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga's soldiers in order to save Niğbolu fortress from the bandits.⁹³ The Niğbolu and Kulle fortresses, occupied by the bandits were surrounded by the state troops. Firstly the Kulle fortress, then the Niğbolu fortress were taken back. Gavur İmam and Otuzbiroğlu from Pasbanoğlu's men were captured and killed, Macar Ali and Emincik managed to flee to the neighbouring districts, and Bostancıoğlu was captured. All areas up till Vidin were cleared of bandits. Pasbanoğlu, who received these news, took action to attack the storehouse of provisions in Eflak, yet this plan appeared to be unsuccessful.⁹⁴

After winning Niğbolu back, there occurred a fight between Hüseyin Pasha and Osman Pasha over who was to take credit for this victory. In a letter the *Mutasarrıf* of Çirmen Hüseyin Pasha sent to Istanbul, he claimed that he had conquered the fortress by himself. What is interesting here is the way that Hüseyin mentioned about Osman Pasha. He wrote that "You are aware of Osman Pasha's lying habit, if he tells you he has conquered Niğbolu fortress, do not believe him." Hüseyin suggested that no matter

⁹² HAT.2293, December 1797; HAT.2724, December 1797; HAT.2752A, January 1798; HAT.2752, January 1798; HAT.2737, January 1798; HAT.2084, February 1798; HAT.2955, February 1798; HAT.2684, February 1798; HAT.2718, February 1798; C.DH.10344, February-March 1798; HAT.57547, June 1798 (agyt).

⁹³ C.AS.4814, February 1798.

⁹⁴ HAT.2716, February 1798; HAT.2718A, February 1798; HAT.2093, February 1798; HAT.2564B-C, February 1798; HAT.2794, February-March 1798; HAT.2706, February-March 1798; HAT.2662C, March 1798; HAT.2283, March 1798.

what Osman Pasha wrote or said, it should have been validated for the truth, and the government should have not trusted him. On the other hand Hüseyin was actually one of the officials assigned to serve Osman Pasha at the mission of re-taking and defending Niğbolu. For Hüseyin, trying to prove that the rescue of Niğbolu was actually his own victory, indicates that there might have been some sort of conflict between him and Osman Pasha. From later documents it is understood that when Osman Pasha wrote to Istanbul about the good news, he did not get any negative or not-trusting reaction from the government, on the contrary he won the favor of the Sultan, and those under his service were generously promoted.⁹⁵

Later on, Osman Pasha was ordered to gather provisions from the fortresses nearby and to join the forces at the siege of Vidin.⁹⁶ The siege of Vidin was very important for Gürcü Osman Pasha's career. Here we should remember that his political and military advance had begun at this same spot, with the Vidin guardianship position almost three years ago. With this siege in the middle of 1798, his career got into a new advancement wave; this would carry him to the his of his peak career, the governorship of Rumelia. The siege of Vidin was begun by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in May 1798 and the city was aggressively defended by Pasbanoğlu's forces.⁹⁷

However because of Napoleon's attack on Egypt, the siege did not achieve intended success and it was lifted after six months. In the end Pasbanoğlu was pardoned again. After the siege of Vidin, Gürcü Osman Pasha continued rising upwards in his career. Between 1798 July and 1799 May, he would firstly be appointed

⁹⁵ A.DVN.d.899M, June 1798 (agyt); HAT.2283-2283A, March 1798; HAT. 2650, March 1798; HAT.12142, March 1798; C.AS.31715, March 1798; CML.2133, March 1798.

⁹⁶ TSMA.E. 509.53, June 1798; HAT.7827, June 1799 (agyt); HAT. 7951, June 1799 (agyt); HAT.2982, August 1798; HAT.2077, August 1798

⁹⁷ Zens, "The Ayânlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa"; Rossitsa Gradeva, "Osman Pasbanoğlu of Vidin: Between Old and New" in F. Anscombe, ed., *The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), 115-161; Zens, "The Ayânlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa" 134-149.

as Governor of Anatolia, then, in order, assigned as Governor of Bosna (Bosnia), Governor of Selanik (Thessaloniki) and finally Governor of Rumelia. He would stay in this position for almost a year until he was dismissed. Before becoming the Governor of Rumelia, the only post he had that was not in Rumelia was the governorship of Anatolia. Yet, Osman Pasha was not sent to Anatolia for this post, he was charged again with catching Pasbanoğlu, and capturing Vidin. So he would appoint a *mütesellim* (deputy governor) in his place. It was as if this rank was a nominal appointment for Pasha, or a way to prepare him for the position of governorship of Rumelia. When Osman Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Anatolia in August 1789, Kürd Osman Pasha replaced him again, as the coming Governor of Silistre. Meanwhile, Seyyid Ali (Kürd Alo) Pasha became the new Governor of Rumelia.⁹⁸

2.5 Peak of His Career as the Governor of Rumelia

In the year 1800, Pasbanoğlu Osman Pasha intended to seize Sofya and Deliorman, and if successful, all of the regions up to Edirne. Cengiz Geray was in an alliance with Pasbanoğlu and Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga was suspected to collaborate with Pasbanoğlu. In fact, Pasbanoğlu had sent his own *delilbaşı* to Cengiz Giray. If Pasbanoğlu had seized the regions of Hazergrad and Şumnu as a result of Giray's assistance, it would have become even harder for him to be defeated and repelled out of the region. The Grand Vizier of the time, Yusuf Ziya Pasha planned to drive out Tirsiniklizade and Cengiz Geray from the region, therefore to weaken Pasbanoğlu. Meanwhile there was a need to assign another strong and experienced vizier as the Governor of Rumelia in order to deal with these incidents and fight against Giray's forces. The Grand Vizier stated that he could not imagine anyone else but Gürcü

⁹⁸ C.DH.12542, September 1798; HAT.11295, June 1799 (agytt); C.DH.15213, May 1799.

Osman Pasha being suitable for this duty. In addition, the fact that he had previously been the guardian of Vidin, was an advantage to deal with Pasbanoğlu and his men. After a while Osman Pasha was appointed as the Governor of Rumelia. He was assigned to capture Berkofça (Berkovitsa), to prevent bandits passing from Albania to Vidin and to attack upon Cengiz Giray. The *voyvodalık* of Tırnova was given to Tirsiniklizade İsmail and thus he was successfully sent away from Vidin.⁹⁹

After the new Governor of Rumelia was determined, recruitment of soldiers started.¹⁰⁰ The *Governor of Silistre* Mustafa Pasha was assigned to guard Niğbolu, the *Mutasarrıf* of Çirmen Palaslı Mehmed Pasha to Plevne, the Governor of Rumelia Osman Pasha to Berkofça and the *Voyvoda* of Eflak was assigned to repel the bandits from Eflaka. However, battles with the bandits were not sufficiently successful.¹⁰¹

In a letter to Istanbul, Osman Pasha assessed battles in Berkofça. He stated that some soldiers of both Palaslı Mehmed Pasa and *Mütesellim* of Niş Hafız Aga joined the side of the ‘mountain bandits.’ According to his claims, thousands of soldiers switched sides. He also referred to the fact that he could not gather enough soldiers, so he suffered significant losses and retreated when fighting against Manav İbrahim and his men. He requested additional military forces to attack the bandits once more. On these news, Pasbanoğlu’s men headed towards Berkofça to help the bandits in that region.¹⁰²

Following the battles in Berkofça, the bandits gathered at Niğbolu.¹⁰³ For the meantime, Osman Pasha's men reporting from Vidin told that the people of Vidin were under constant attacks by the bandits, and some of them were migrating and some

⁹⁹ C.DH.3640, May 1800; HAT.15802, May 1800 (agyt); TS.MA.e.475.24, June 1798 (agyt – wrong dating).

¹⁰⁰ HAT.5172, May 1800; HAT.3256A, July 1800; C.DH.17083, July 1800; C.AS.4718, July 1800; C.AS.42614, August 1800.

¹⁰¹ HAT.3254, September 1800.

¹⁰² HAT.2501A, August 1800; HAT.2501, August 1800; HAT.2508, December 1800.

¹⁰³ HAT.2754, September 1800; HAT.6510, September 1800; C.DH.16596 September 1800.

other joining the bandits. In addition, there was a mention of speculators selling provisions they brought from Eflak to the people, probably at a higher price than usual. This shows that the people were also struggling with procuring provisions.¹⁰⁴

Another pasha that had been assigned to fight against the 'mountain bandits', Tayyar Mahmud Pasha, described the battles took place in Filibe (Plovdiv), Pazarcık (Pazardzhik) and Hasköy (Haskovo). The bandit leaders Kara Feyzi, Cenkçioğlu and İsaoglu were reported to be escaped. Kara Feyzi, though grievously injured in combat, had not been dead yet. In addition, Tayyar Pasha also mentioned that the people were suffering due to the expenses of the high number of soldiers under Osman Pasha. In this report to the central government, Tayyar Pasha openly complained about Osman Pasha, and stressed the need for him to be sent out from the region.¹⁰⁵ Another complaint of Tayyar Pasha regarding Osman Pasha, was about the bandits asking for forgiveness and then joining Osman Pasha's side. Tayyar Pasha believed that these bandits that joining Osman Pasha's forces would cause severe problems in the future.¹⁰⁶

With the impact of defeats against the bandits, the central government started to discuss replacing the Governor of Rumelia Osman Pasha with another pasha, after a short time (less than a year) passed over his appointment. This issue of choosing a new Governor of Rumelia was argued in the Imperial Council in January 1801. The state officials at the meeting considered potential candidates for this post. It was stated that the vizier to become the next governor of Rumelia must have been strong and had a considerable military power. One of the names considered was Tepedelenli Ali

¹⁰⁴ HAT.2344A, May 1801 (agyt).

¹⁰⁵ HAT.2640K, December 1800.

¹⁰⁶ HAT.3098, January 1801; HAT.2492B, January 1801; HAT.3099, January 1801; HAT.3116, May 1801 (agyt).

Pasha. Ali Pasha was mentioned to be powerful and to have a large retinue at his household. Yet, it was thought that he did not want the Pasbanoğlu rebellion to come to a conclusion, because he had fears that he would be next to be disciplined. Furthermore, it was not a far off possibility that Ali would build an alliance with Pasbanoğlu. In addition, him becoming the governor of Rumelia might have meant him gaining too much power to control. The *Mutasarrıf* of Avlonya İbrahim Pasha also had enough strength and military force, yet he was hostile towards Tepedelenli. İbrahim Pasha was concerned that if he had left Avlonya for a new assignment, Tepedelenli would have attacked his region, so he did not want to leave. The third option was Mehmed Hakkı Pasha, yet, Rumelian *ayans* disliked him and Hakkı did not have enough soldiers for this post. When there was no agreement on any of possible candidates, it was decided that Osman Pasha should have continued with his position for a while longer. Even if Tayyar Pasha was not among the names discussed in this meeting, we know from another documents, that he was also considered as the next governor of Rumelia to be. However, in a letter Tayyar Pasha sent to Istanbul, he mentioned that he could not pay *caize* asked for the Rumelia province, so he thought that he was not fit for this position yet. Tayyar Pasha added that he could work together with Hakkı Pasha - if appointed as the next governor of Rumelia - but Osman Pasha should have not stayed in this position any longer.¹⁰⁷

Osman Pasha's dismissal was two months later. Within this two-month period, within the decrees that were sent to him, he was asked to fortify the protection of Berkofça and to send some soldiers to Eflak. Alongside this, he was also ordered to stop any passings from Albania and Bosnia to Rumelia and Vidin. The decrees addressing him seemingly had the intention of keeping him occupied and assuring him

¹⁰⁷ HAT.52160, January 1801; HAT.3388E, January 1801.

of his position if he heard anything about his dismissal. Most probably, the central government was trying to avert Osman Pasha from being rebellious. Osman, on the other hand, tried to justify his position by describing his successes in his reports. In his letters to Istanbul he placed all of his failures on his unruly soldiers who did not follow his orders.¹⁰⁸

After two months, in the month of April, Pasha was dismissed at last and replaced by the Governor of Bosna Mehmed Hakkı Pasha, and the Selanik province was assigned to Gürcü Osman Pasha. Osman pasha was ordered to leave Sofya immediately and to go to Selanik. This demotion of him would bring about one of the most important breaking points in his career. After this date, Pasha would not accept any appointments given to him, would be disobedient against orders, and be proclaimed a rebel by the central government; that would lead him to his inevitable end.¹⁰⁹

2.6 Denial of His Deposition from Rumelia

After the news of Osman Pasha's demotion from his top post, a major conflict appeared between Osman Pasha and his replacement Hakkı Mehmed Pasha. This conflict between two lasted longer than expected and kept the central government occupied for a long while. Although Hakkı Pasha and Osman Pasha had worked together in Rumelia previously, the dispute between them reached an unresolvable level. Hakkı Pasha tried to persuade Istanbul for ordering Osman Pasha to leave Sofya while Osman Pasha pressed to convince Istanbul so that he could stay in Sofya. At the beginning of their dispute, both of them used the reactions of the district people regarding their

¹⁰⁸ C.DH.17371, January 1801; HAT.3398, February 1801; HAT.3398A, February 1801; HAT.2621B, February 1801.

¹⁰⁹ AE.SSLM.III.6310, April 1801; HAT.3163, May 1801 (agyt).

appointments, to influence the central government with their own viewpoints. However, it was not clear that whether the people of the districts gave those reactions with their own free will or they were behaving under the influence of the pashas.

For example, the people of Bosnia wrote to Istanbul claiming how satisfied they had been with Hakkı Pasha's services in Bosnia and for that he should have continued to remain as the governor of Bosna. Hakkı Pasha presented the views of these people as a strong evidence for him being the right choice to be the Governor of Rumelia.¹¹⁰ The people in the region where Hakkı was recently posted, also asserted how happy they were with this appointment. For example, in *ilam* (official letter or sentence of a judge) of the deputy-judge (*naib*) of Berkofça district, it was stated that the district people were very pleased with the dismissal of Osman Pasha, and him being replaced by Hakkı Pasha. The *naib* of Kırçova wrote that Osman Pasha, alongside the Albanian bandit leaders, had seized Berkofça. Furthermore, the *naib* of Köstendil stated that during the time Osman Pasha had been charged with the defense of Berkofça, he had collected excessive amounts of money from the people of the district, presenting high expenditures as an excuse. All those writing the *ilams*, stated that the situation in their districts would certainly get better if Osman Pasha left the region.¹¹¹

When Osman Pasha received the news of his dismissal and appointment to Selanik, he immediately responded to the central government. In his letters, to plead his case, he reminded his services and sacrifices he had made during his post. He said he would leave some of his soldiers in Sofya and move to his new post. But later we see that would aggressively resist to leave Sofya. In another letter to Istanbul, he stated that he was unquestionably loyal to the state, and that he had not carried out any actions

¹¹⁰ HAT.2344E, April 1801; HAT.2344D, April 1801; HAT.2344İ, May 1801.

¹¹¹ HAT.2376İ, April 1800; HAT.2344K, May 1801; HAT.3034A, May 1801.

against the orders sent to him. Later Osman Pasha received news that Hakkı Pasha hasd arrived at the Köstendil district and that he was preparing to enter Sofya. Then Osman requested to extend his post as Governor of Rumelia for an additional couple of months, and asked for Hakkı Pasha to not to enter Sofya straight away. His justification for the requests he made was that his work regarding the fights against the bandits were about to be give results, yet, if Hakkı Pasha entered Sofya at that moment, all gains he had achieved or about to achieve could have been disrupted. Osman Pasha felt disappointed regarding his dismissal, yet he stressed his loyalty to the state and the Sultan in his letters. However, these expressions seem to be purely for show, because he immediately began to recruit more soldiers and form new networks and alliances that could benefit him in case of a more severe conflict between the government and himself.¹¹²

According to Hakkı Pasha, all of Osman Pasha's words were dishonest. Hakkı Pasha describes Osman as follows: 'Previously, during my time as Governor of Rumelia, I had him under my service. He was not very smart, but he was not a traitor either. With time, probably under the influence of the executed (Kürd) Alo Pasha and his unruly soldiers he employed, his behaviours changed. If he remains in Berkofça, he may harm the people. He draws men to himself with money. Even if he claims to have ten thousands of soldiers, this claim has no validity. He also should explain all the money he has collected from the people in Rumelia. There are plenty of *haşerat* (vermin/ unruly militia) as well as mountain bandits at his service. When it comes to his supporters from the region, it is highly possible that those Rumelian *ayans* and *agas* supporting him, so that they would not loose their revenue sources.' Hakkı Pasha's letter suggested that Osman Pasha had built alliances with the local notables

¹¹² HAT.2387, April 1801; HAT.2376D, April 1801; HAT.2528A, April 1801; HAT.2387A, April 1801.

based on mutual interests, like imposing unlawful taxes or imposition on the people to increase their own revenue sources.¹¹³

Some petitions supporting Osman Pasha's case were signed by many people from Sofya, and sent to Istanbul. The petitions of the notables from Sofya, depicted the situation as follows: 'Before all of this, the Governor of Rumelia Osman Pasha was appointed to guard the Berkofça region from bandits; he sent a lot of soldiers to save the attacked regions and naturally he has spent a lot of money for this mission. During his most effective time as the governor, the Rumelian province was taken from Pasha and handed to Hakkı Pasha. If Hakkı Pasha enters Sofya, and if Osman Pasha leaves Sofya, most of his soldiers will most probably scatter around and stray in the neighborhood. And Berkofça, saved by these soldiers, will fall back into the hands of bandits. For this reason Osman Pasha must remain here. Furthermore, Osman Pasha has also managed to transfer around four thousands of men from Pasbanoğlu's side to his own units, and continues to do so. Pasbanoğlu's men, asking for forgiveness, are now carrying out negotiations with Osman Pasha. If Hakkı Pasha enters the city, it is apparent that these men will return to Pasbanoğlu.'¹¹⁴

The *naip* of Sofya, further expressed that the rumours of Osman Pasha and his men having revolted and having been ordered to be captured, had an immense negative impact on Osman's reputation. He believed that Pasha had not gone against orders.¹¹⁵ It appears that the notables of Sofya, were trying to mediate, in order for Osman Pasha to acquire consent and approval of the central government. The question that needs to be asked here is whether or not these people wrote these petitions by their own free

¹¹³ HAT.2528A, April 1801

¹¹⁴ HAT.2344B, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2878E, May 1801.

¹¹⁵ HAT.2344B, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2878E, May 1801.

will or under Osman Pasha's coercive encouragement. Either way, as opposed to other documents, this document supported Pasha, and provided a perspective that implied value of him, and influence he held over regional politics.

This story appears completely different from Hakkı Pasha's point of view. At first, Hakkı Pasha wrote Osman Pasha regarding the situation and politely tried to convince him to leave Sofya. Hakkı Pasha, stated that his household consisted of 25 thousand people and that it was impossible for him to linger around on the way anymore with so many people, and required Osman Pasha to leave Sofya immediately. He also requested Osman Pasha to leave his soldiers with Karslı Ali Pasha.¹¹⁶

When Hakkı Pasha could not resolve this issue with Osman Pasha himself, he complained about him to the central government. In a letter Hakkı Pasha wrote, he claimed that Osman Pasha denied Karslı Ali Pasha's entry to Berkofça, who had been charged by Hakkı himself to guard Berkofça. Supposedly, Osman Pasha had in fact expressed that if Hakkı Pasha pushed him further, that he would have joined Pasbanoğlu and became a 'mountain bandit'. Hakkı also mentioned that Osman Pasha imprisoned Sofya judge (*kadı*), *müftü* and a few *sebkan* commanders, and started to dig trenches around the city, as a preparation to fight with Hakkı Pasha.¹¹⁷

Hakkı Pasha did not believe that Osman Pasha would hold in Sofya if he entered the city, but because of his concerns that Pasha would harm the people during this time, he thought that it was more appropriate for the central government to convince him to leave. Actually, upon Osman Pasha's reactions, the government decided that Hakkı Pasha should remain in Kostendil for a few more days before

¹¹⁶ HAT.2376A, April 1801.

¹¹⁷ HAT.2376F, April 1801.

entering Sofya. However, whilst in Köstendil, the local notables of the region pressured Hakkı Pasha to act more immediately. Hakkı, unable to cope with these pressures, did not want to wait any longer. In his letters Hakkı advised Osman Pasha to go straight to his new post and threatened him covertly of possible battles he would have faced if he had stayed.¹¹⁸

Hakkı Pasha saw Osman Pasha almost as an enemy, and he used quite a pejorative and contemptuous language for him, in the letters he sent to Istanbul such as ‘*cani, katil, ahmak, kafir herif, edepsiz, akli kalil, şer ve kanun bilmez, yalancı, deli, bukelamun mizaçlı, kaide-i devlet bilmez.*’ Hakkı Pasha believed that there was no difference between handing Rumelia to Osman Pasha or to the bandit leader Kara Feyzi. In fact, he claimed that Osman Pasha was even worse than Kara Feyzi and people of the region would have preferred being under the rule of Feyzi rather than of Osman.¹¹⁹ Alongside these views, Hakkı Pasha also questioned how the Rumelian province could have been appointed to such an official like him in the first place, and apparently criticized the governmental decisions. He also believed that Osman Pasha should not even be given another guardianship position in a fortress-city hereafter, and that he should definitely be kept away from Vidin, at where Hakkı saw that Osman Pasha’s military source of power lied.¹²⁰

The conflict between Hakkı Pasha and Osman Pasha turned into a rather impossible dispute. Indeed, according to Hakkı Pasha, when Osman Pasha learnt of the Rumelia province being handed to Hakkı Pasha, he spread rumours around

¹¹⁸ HAT.2376F, April 1801; HAT.3889A, May 1801.

¹¹⁹ “... Rumili kazâlarına eylediği zulmün keyfiyeti ve ahâlisi ne hale ve ne kıyafete girmiş olduğu ve Kara Feyzi’ye rahmet okutduğu ecilden, herkes bunun yeddine girmekden ise, Kara Feyzi eline girmekte bi’t-tav (sonunda ayn var - willingly submitting, consenting) ve’r-rızâ sığâr ve kibârî râzı olmuşlardır...” HAT.2396, April 1801.

¹²⁰ HAT.2376, May 1801 (agytt).

claiming that Hakkı Pasha was making this appointment up. Osman Pasha asserted that he had not been dismissed, and the post of Rumelia had actually been given to him for another three years and with complete independence, and that Hakkı was ordered to be located in Edirne, not in Sofya. He attempted to explain that he had not imprisoned anyone in Sofya and that he continued to serve for the protection of the people through defending them against the Berkofça bandits.¹²¹

In the meantime, the central government, with a pragmatic approach, chose to reconcile with Osman Pasha. As the central administrators found it more suitable that Osman Pasha's stay in Sofya in order to continue to fight against the bandits until Hakkı Pasha's arrival, they had decided not to declare his deposition openly. Even after the news were spread, they did not try to rush Osman Pasha to leave Sofya straight away. Indeed, in order to prevent a power gap from occurring, the method of allowing a dismissed state official to stay until the next appointee arrives is quite logical, especially during this time of period, when the bandits were using every opportunity to expand their power domain. Meanwhile, Selim III ordered gifts to be sent to Osman Pasha and approved the ranks Osman asked for his household members or family, to keep him loyal to the state.¹²²

After a while, upon Hakkı Pasha's insistent requests upon entering Sofya, and Osman Pasha insistently refusing to leave, Osman was ordered to leave Sofya.¹²³ The Grand Vizier wrote to the Sultan on this matter as follows: 'Osman Pasha refuses to leave Sofya and this refusal has negative impacts on Hakkı Pasha's influence and authority in the region. Due to Osman Pasha not leaving, Hakkı Pasha cannot enter his

¹²¹ HAT.2396, April 1801; HAT.2376D, April 1801.

¹²² HAT.2779, April 1801; C.DH.8682, April 1801; HAT.2878C, May 1801.

¹²³ HAT.2344, May 1801 (agyt); TS.MA.e.784.39, May 1801 (agyt).

new place of duty and cannot implement the orders that he has been given. Maybe Osman Pasha should leave Rumelian lands completely and be sent to another region, like Anatolia.’¹²⁴ Despite this idea of the Grand Vizier, the first post suggested for Osman Pasha was still in Rumelia.

After the position of governorship of Rumelia, Osman Pasha was appointed to the Selanik province, however the people of Selanik did not want Osman Pasha as their governor. Due to the fear and reluctance the people of Selanik felt towards Osman Pasha, they wrote to Istanbul several times and mentioned that he should have been appointed somewhere else. With a reference to his previous cruelty towards them during his time in Selanik previously, they expressed the fact that this appointment would have definitely made them miserable (*perişan* and *parekende*). According to the Grand Vizier, if Osman Pasha was sent to Selanik despite this strong rejection, people would have revolted. Under these circumstances, he stressed the importance of considering Pasha to be appointed elsewhere. There was a probability of him being relocated in Anatolia. Yet there was a concern that the *delil* (irregular cavalry) soldiers in Anatolia and Pasha’s own *delil* soldiers might have joined and harassed the people of Anatolia. Although there was no doubt as to Pasha’s ineffectiveness/uselessness when it came to matters of Rumelia, he was appointed to be the Governor of Silistre alongside with the guardianship of Niğbolu. If Pasha had accepted to leave Sofya, with this new appointment of his, he was to go to Niğbolu, if not, to Edirne, if he had not accepted any of these, another post would have been offered to him in Anatolia.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ HAT.12777, July 1796 (agyt – wrong dating).

¹²⁵ C.DH, 10603, May 1801; HAT.12777, July 1796 (agyt – wrong dating); HAT.4772, April 1801; HAT.4712, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.4777, May 1801 (agyt).

Indeed, the concerns about Osman Pasha had some strong reasons. The number of Osman's soldiers, which he had declared to be around ten thousand, mounted up to 15 thousand and then 20 thousand in only a couple of months, with the bandits had been transferred from Pasbanoğlu's side. After receiving the news of his dismissal, Osman Pasha tried to use these thousands of soldiers that he had drawn to his units, as a means to bargain with the central government. However Osman Pasha was not unaware of the fact that these bandits among his soldiers would have gotten out of his control when he had difficulties in paying their salaries, and even they would have threatened his own life. From another point of the story, Hakkı Pasha and the government had not acted completely honest towards Osman Pasha. First of all, Osman Pasha's dismissal was hidden from him, and then the orders to capture or kill him were kept in secret as long as possible. Despite the numerous correspondences between them, even when Hakkı Pasha did not act clear towards Osman Pasha, and naturally Osman started to suspect that he was being lied to.¹²⁶

However, whilst accusing Hakkı Pasha of dishonesty, Osman Pasha carried out his own deceptions. For example, he claimed that the central government had provided him with rewards and gifts, and that he was appointed as the *Serasker* of Rumelia (General Governor of Rumelia), yet only the first part of this claim was true, the second part was nothing more than a wish. In addition to this, he asserted that Hakkı Pasha had torched the districts surrounding Sofya. However, Hakkı Pasha, refuting Osman Pasha's claims, stated that it was in fact Osman Pasha who had burnt down the villages so that his own men could not settle in there. Osman Pasha aimed to weaken Hakkı Pasha's influence in the region. Osman put Hakkı Pasha in a considerably hard position by forcing Hakkı Pasha to wander around with his very large retinue. Osman Pasha

¹²⁶ HAT.2878B, May 1801; HAT.2528C, April-May 1801.

believed that if he could manage to stay in Sofya three or five months more and strengthen his military power through new recruits from the bandit, he would be able to convince the government for him to remain in this position. On the other hand, Hakkı Pasha criticized Osman Pasha's being rewarded by the center and his men receiving honorary titles and ranks, solely to prevent him from being rebellious. Hakkı claimed that some of the people could have and in fact already had believed some of his lies because of these aforementioned positive reinforcements of the government.¹²⁷

The tolerant and somewhat indulgent attitude of the central government towards Osman Pasha, was probably because of a need for Berkofça and Niğbolu to be defended against Pasbanoğlu and his bandits. In order for Osman Pasha to be successful in these missions, his refusal to leave Sofya, was tolerated at first. We can understand that even if Osman Pasha had not gained a conclusive victory in the defence of Berkofça, it was clear that the bandit ranks were diminished in size due to the soldiers that Osman Pasha managed to draw to his own side. For this reason, it was ordered for Hakkı Pasha not to be insistent with regards to entering Sofya and Berkofça.¹²⁸ However, the bandits, taking opportunity of the conflict between Osman Pasha and Hakkı Pasha, had spread across Rumelia. Even if Pasbanoğlu clearly supported the bandits, an army was not sent to face him as he did not revolt openly. And since Hakkı Pasha was unable to claim his position as the Governor of Rumelia, he had also not been able to call the *ayans* to form an army against the bandits. As a result of the increased number of bandit attacks, Hakkı Pasha was ordered to enter Berkofça to claim his post at last. In the meantime, Osman Pasha found it harder to

¹²⁷ HAT. 2344J, May 1801; HAT.2344H, May 1801; HAT.2535A, May 1801 ; HAT. 2344J, May 1801.

¹²⁸ HAT.3017A, April 1801; HAT.2344K, May 1801.

resist his dismissal because he was requesting money from the government due to the heavy expenditures of his increasing soldiers.¹²⁹

Even though Osman Pasha was appointed to the province of Silistre to continue the struggle against the bandits, he continued to stress his point of view that he must have remained in Berkofça for the bandit issue to be resolved. He alluded that the reason of his disobedience was his fear that Hakkı Pasha might have attacked him and it was also due to Hakkı Pasha's overtly aggressive attitude towards him. He expressed that such political conflicts would harm Rumelia greatly and for this reason he would accept to follow orders. However, he did not give up on complaining about Hakkı Pasha. According to one of Osman Pasha's letters, Hakkı Pasha tried to make contact with people in Sofya supporting Hakkı and his secret correspondences was caught by Osman Pasha's spies. By presenting captured correspondences between Hakkı and his supporters to the central government, Osman tried to soften the negative views of the government for himself. However, I do not believe that Osman Pasha naively thought that the government was not already aware of Hakkı Pasha's secret correspondence. By depicting himself as victim, he was most probably trying to convince the central government to accept his wishes; staying in Berkofça and keeping his post, and by extension of these, holding to his existing revenue sources in Rumelia.¹³⁰

2.7 Resistance and Rebellion

In a report written to the Sultan, the Grand Vizier made it clear that Osman Pasha having 20 thousands of soldiers or more was actually an overstatement. Yet, due to the

¹²⁹ HAT.2950, May 1801; HAT.3051, May 1801; HAT.3154, May 1801; HAT. 3034D, May 1801; HAT.2344G, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2743, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.14419, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.3122, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2657 May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2658 May 1801 (agyt).

¹³⁰ C.DH.16943, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2878A , May 1801.

importance of Pasha's going to Niğbolu to deal with the bandit issue, this exaggeration of him was ignored. It was declared that the same amount of salary payment sent to the former governor of Silistre Musa Pasha would be sent to him, and it was stressed that there was no need for 20 thousands of soldiers in that region any more. Furthermore, Musa Pasha's soldiers would also join his service and high expenditures of large retinues would not be tolerated because it was not time of war. He was ordered to keep only the necessary number of soldiers next to him and to send the rest of them back to their hometowns. These soldiers going their hometown were ordered not to pass through Vidin region where a high number of bandits were present.¹³¹

The central government believed that Osman Pasha was consented to head to the province of Silistre. In this way the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha would have the space he needed to take action and attack upon Pasbanoğlu. In the meantime Osman Pasha was appointed to work together with the Guardian of Belgrad Mustafa Pasha and the *Voyvoda* of Eflak Aleksandri to eliminate Pasnabanoğlu's bandits. However, things did not go as planned. The Governor of Silistre Osman Pasha, refused to go to his new post, and he continued lingering in Berkofça. It was suspected that he was trying to encourage the bandit leaders to join his side by luring them with money. Before long, it was determined that due to his own personel expenses and the expenditures made for his soldiers became a great burden to the people. Furthermore, certain signs have appeared indicating that there was a possibility of Pasha and his men threatening Istanbul in cooperation with the bandits from the Edirne region.¹³²

¹³¹ HAT.2878, May 1801.

¹³² HAT.3034, June 1801; C.AS.1896, June 1801; HAT.2219K, June 1801; AE.SSLM.III.5110, July 1801; C.AS.11007, July 1801; HAT.2195, September 1801.

In the month of August, the central administrators discussed possible places that Osman Pasha could be sent in order to be kept away from Edirne, and Istanbul. One of the possible options was to appoint him as Governor Bosna. However, due to the large number of soldiers at his service, and their excessive expenses, the people of Bosna did not want Pasha's coming to their city. In fact, they expressed that if Pasha ever had tried to enter Bosna then they would have blocked his way by closing the roads and would have even engaged in battle to ensure his turning back. The central government ordered Osman Pasha to reduce the number of his soldiers at his household. It was emphasized that wherever he would go to with this large retinue, the people would not accept him. In fact, it was hinted that if Pasha had obeyed decrees and down-size his soldiers, he might have been re-appointed as the Governor of Rumelia. Meanwhile, Hakkı Pasha had been dismissed from the position of governorship of Rumelia, so this development made this implied promise of the center more appealing. Yet Osman Pasha would not ever be appointed to this position again.¹³³

Pasha was well-aware of the high costs of the soldiers at his service, yet he expressed the difficulty of following the orders to reduce their number. He claimed that the soldiers refused to leave his side if their salaries were not paid, which added up to five thousand-*kese* of *akçes*.¹³⁴ In the correspondences between Osman Pasha and the central government, we can see the central government tried to convince both Pasha and the people of Bosna for this appointment. However, behind the scenes, the plan regarding Pasha was actually quite different. Through the request of the people to reduce the number of soldiers, the central government aimed to weaken Osman Pasha, then to trap him with the help of other pashas and state officials in Bosna and to kill

¹³³ HAT.3998D, August 1801; HAT.3879L, March 1802; HAT.3998, May 1802 (agyt).

¹³⁴ With the assumption of 1 *kese* = 50 bin *akçe*, this amount is 2 milyon 83 bin *kuruş*

him when he entered Bosna with less soldiers. If Pasha had accepted to go to Bosna and moved towards Bosna, even if the people did not allow him for entrance, he would have still been sent away from Edirne. Though either due to his strategic intelligence or to his fear of getting captured, he Osman did not fall for this trap, and refused to reduce his military units. Eventually he could not be sent to Bosnia.¹³⁵

Archival documents from this date openly expressed that Osman Pasha had been a rebel. Despite the orders he kept his soldiers beside him. In fact, he even continued to ask money for their salaries and provisions. On the one hand, he tried to justify his requests by claiming that him staying in Rumelia with a large household was necessary for the effective struggle against the bandits. However, Osman Pasha was not successful in the mission of eliminating the bandits; further, his soldiers were disorderly and their expenses were too much. After Bosna option failed, others alternatives for his next posts were considered. The government focused on the need for sending him away from Rumelia, for instance to Anatolia. However, this meant that if Pasha was assigned to Anatolia he would pass through Edirne, and this would bring up other concerns. It was a serious concern that the Albanian bandits around might have joined Osman Pasha's troops when Pasha arrived in the region.¹³⁶

During his mutiny, the first place in Anatolia suggested for Osman Pasha's new appointment was Diyarbakır. Yet Pasha continued to insist that if he was to go anywhere for a new appointment, he had one condition, which was to pay his soldiers their due salaries. Thereupon, it was decided that the *Voyvoda* of Eflak would pay for

¹³⁵ HAT.3998D, August 1801; HAT.3998C, August 1801; HAT.3998A, September 1801; HAT.3879L, March 1802; HAT.3998, May 1802 (agyt).

¹³⁶ HAT.3199, August 1801; HAT.3118, August 1801; HAT.3998A, September 1801; HAT.3998, May 1802 (agyt).

the Albanian *sebkans* at Osman Pasha's service so that they would return to their hometowns.¹³⁷

Despite the fact that some of the money Osman Pasha demanded had already been paid to him, he insisted upon not going to Diyarbakır. Then an additional 100 thousands of *kuruş* was given to cover his expenses, but this was not enough to make Pasha move to Diyarbakır. Osman Pasha's soldiers removed from Niğbolu and headed towards the region between Niğbolu and Zıřtovi. His soldiers headed firstly to Rahova and then to Tırnova. Even though it may appear that they had set off to go towards Diyarbakır, what happened at Tırnova would clearly reveal Pasha's rebellious intentions. During that time, Pasbanoğlu's men such as Manav İbrahim, Gavur İmam, Gorgoşefçeli Halil, Filibeli Kara Mustafa and Koşancalı Halil attacked the Tırnova district. Osman Pasha did not fight against these bandit units, instead he blocked the way of the state troops heading to counter-attack the bandits. Soon after, reports arriving to Istanbul stated that Pasha's soldiers torched down all places all the way to Tırnova and his *sekban* soldiers was harassing the people in the region. Osman Pasha also unlawfully collected money from the people upon entering Tırnova. It was clear that Tırnova incident would not be an individual case. Another report coming from İslimiye district suggested that people of this district were concerned that estimatey ten thousands of soldiers in Osman's household could attack their district after Tırnova.¹³⁸

Other news from other districts demonstrated that Pasha was acting in cooperation with the bandits, that he had engaged in battles and destroyed some villages in Zıřtovi, and he had plundered Filibe. Meanwhile the central government

¹³⁷ AE.SSLM.III.15543, September 1801; HAT.2183, September 1801; HAT.3203, September.

¹³⁸ HAT.3082, September 1801; C.AS. 3845, September 1801; HAT.2182, September 1801; C.AS.33944, September 1801; HAT.3858; October 1801; HAT.1822, October 1801; HAT.2298, October 1801; HAT 2298A, October 1801; HAT.2300İ, October 1801; HAT.2298B, October 1801; HAT.2300C, May 1802 (agyt).

was trying to eliminate the possibility of all Pasbanoğlu's men allying with Osman Pasha's side, but this possibility became reality. For example when one of Pasnaboğlu's bandit leaders, Kara Feyzi,¹³⁹ was about to be captured and eliminated by the state troops, he joined Osman Pasha's army to protect himself and thus he could continue attacking and pillaging the districts together with Osman's units. It was stated that Kara Feyzi's group consisted of around seven thousands of people at this date. Other bandit leaders like Manav İbrahim, Kuşancalı Halil, Gavur İmam, Celiloğlu, Kara Mustafa etc. did not directly help Osman Pasha while Osman Pasha attacked the villages, but they helped him indirectly by attacking the other districts in the region and creating a turmoil at which the state could not deal with Osman with full concentration. In the meantime Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga reported that there were around 15 thousands soldiers at Osman's command. He wrote that there was a clear alliance between Osman Pasha and Pasbanoğlu and that they had already consolidated their military forces.¹⁴⁰

Once it became clear and was confirmed by the central government that Osman Pasha had allied with the bandits, an immediate order was issued to send an army to fight with them and new soldiers were recruited for this army. First and foremost the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha, Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga, and also the *Voyvoda* of Gümülcine Tokadcıklı Süleyman Aga, Caniklizade Tayyar Mahmud Pasha, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, Palaslı Mehmed Pasha, the Guardian of Belgrad Ömer Pasha, Sirozlu İsmail Aga and the *Mütesellim* of Silistre Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga were all appointed to the task of eliminating Osman Pasha's troops. Moreover, Hakkı Pasha,

¹³⁹ For the role of the bandit leader Kara Feyzi in Osman Pasha's rebellion and the connection between them please see: Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion", 246-257.

¹⁴⁰ HAT.2613C, October 1801; HAT.2613D, October 1801; HAT.2207, October 1801; HAT.2300, October 1801; HAT.2743, October 1801; HAT.2282, November 1801; HAT. 2215, November 1801; ADVN.2344.55, June 1802.

tried to follow Osman Pasha's every move and even sent spies to seize the letters Osman sent to his family; and he managed to capture some and read them. Upon hearing about the seized letters, Osman Pasha's suspicions regarding a decree to have him executed were doubled.¹⁴¹

After a few months, despite all efforts, Osman Pasha was still not sent to Diyarbakır. Meanwhile, Halil Pasha¹⁴² wrote an interesting and supporting letter to Istanbul about Osman Pasha. Halil asserted that Osman was an experienced and useful vizier for Rumelia so he should have been valued accordingly. Consequently, it was decided for Pasha to remain in Rumelia and he was once again appointed to Bosna. This was in fact an effort to reconcile with Osman Pasha in order to prevent the situation from getting worse, after seeing that the bandits and Osman had joined forces. However, even if Pasha had accepted this position, the people of Bosnia would not have given consent to him entering Bosna.¹⁴³

Consequently the central government decided to remove Pasha's title of vizierate and send him to Yenişehir-i Fener.¹⁴⁴ Yenişehir was chosen because it was far away from the places where the banditry activities were high in volume. However, of course Pasha would also refuse to go there and afterwards would start attacking the regions of Tekfurdağı, Vize and Kırkkilise. According to another report, Pasha and his men intended to go to Zağra-i Atik and Zağra-yı Cedid. The central government

¹⁴¹ HAT.2321, October 1801; HAT.1788, October 1801; HAT.4714, November 1801; HAT.4754, November 1801; HAT.3861, November 1801; HAT.4277, December 1801; HAT.2513, November 1801; HAT.2284, November 1801; HAT.3879A, March 1802; HAT.2579, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2300C, May 1802 (agyt)

¹⁴² This Halil Paşa, may be the Halil Paşa that, just like Osman Pasha, was trained in the household of Cezayirli Hasan Paşanın and would be starting a rebellion soon.

¹⁴³ HAT.3859, January 1802; HAT.2932, January 1802; HAT.3880E, January 1802; HAT.2575, January 1802; HAT.3880D, February 1802; HAT.2001, January 1802; HAT.3998F, February 1802; HAT.2229B, March 1802; C.DH.1962, March 1802 (gtt); HAT.3880E, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.3998, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2051, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2300J, May 1802 (agyt).

¹⁴⁴ It is a district to the South of Selanik, known as Larissa today. Machiel Kiel, "Yenişehir", *DİA*, vol. 43 (Ankara: TDV, 2013), 473-476.

immediately ordered recruitment of a large number of soldiers, and them to join Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga and other officials, in order to close off the necessary passageways and to engage in battles if they came across Pasha's men. In addition, all pashas in the region were called to be alarmed for the possibility of Kara Feyzi and Osman Pasha's men entering Edirne. In the meantime, some people living in the districts was trying to migrate due to fear of being attacked by Osman Pasha and his men. However when the central government was informed about these movements of the people, fleeing and/or migration were strictly forbidden and it was ordered to provide provisional support for them.¹⁴⁵

Once Hakkı Pasha was dismissed from the governorship of Rumelia, Muhtar Pasha replaced him. The mission of capturing Osman Pasha was one of Muhtar Pasha's top priorities. He thought that Osman Pasha's execution must have been followed through immediately before his rebellion became contagious. Muhtar Pasha, ordered the *ayans* of the region to convince Pasha's men to leave his side, through threatening them or advising them or offering them appealing posts.¹⁴⁶

Afterwards Osman Pasha pillaged the areas around Edirne, the members of his household took provisions by force from the people of Filibe and Pazarcık, yet, he did not head towards Yenişehir to where he had been banished. At this point, a *serasker* (general governor) pasha with more authority (*bi'l-istiklal*) was appointed; Grand Admiral (*Kaptan-ı Derya*) Hüseyin Pasha. Tokadçıklı Süleyman Aga was among those

¹⁴⁵ HAT.2001; January 1802; HAT.2990, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2161, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.3921, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2255, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2176, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.15501, May 1802 (agyt); TS.MA.e.382.9, May 1802 (agyt); C.DH.9864, May 1802; HAT.3879, May 1802; HAT.3864, May 1802; HAT.3890F, May 1802; C.DH.1232, May 1802; C.AS.45000, May 1802; C.DH.16887, May 1802; C.DH.8547, May 1802; C.DH.16887, May 1802; C.AS.10045, May 1802; C.DH.3809, May 1802; C.DH.1645, May 1802; C.ZB.482, June 1802; ADVN.2342.32, May 1802; ADVN.2343.61, May-June 1802; ADVN.2344.34, June 1802; ADVN.2349.5, September 1802.

¹⁴⁶ HAT.3881A, May 1802.

who were assigned to serve under Hüseyin Paha. Süleyman Aga, would deal with the rebellion of Osman Pasha after he repelled over two thousands of mountain bandits heading towards Dimetoka. Meanwhile, it was reported that the number of soldiers by Osman Pasha's side were decreased to two thousands. However, in this instance, the power struggle between Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga and Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga had been escalated due to their fight over potential revenue sources. Furthermore, because of the continuing attacks of Kara Feyzi and the other bandit leaders on the districts, the government could not pay enough attention to Osman Pasha's rebellion. Once Kaptan Pasha was appointed as serasker to fight against Osman Pasha, Osman had to retreat. Later with the condition of Pasha sending away his soldiers to their hometowns, he was reinstated as vizier again. This time, Osman Pasha was appointed to Silistre.¹⁴⁷

One of the first problems that must be dealt with after Pasha was reinstated as the Governor of Silistre, was to deal with deferred salaries of his soldiers; three thousand *kese akçe* was ordered to be sent to his men. As understood from the documents, Osman Pasha's journey to Silistre did not come about in the way the center planned. While Pasha's soldiers were attempted to be sent to their hometowns, reports about them mentioned that his soldiers were seen in Tekirdağ, Pınarhisarı (a district in today's Kırklareli), Vize (a district in Kırklareli), Ahyolu (Pomorie), İslimye and Pazarcık and they were acting disorderly. Upon the people of Silistre refusing Osman Pasha due to his large household, Pasha promised to disperse his soldiers. However, in spite of his promises, Osman struggled to send away his soldiers and to obey the orders. Consequently an order for his execution was enacted. This time, fearing for his

¹⁴⁷ TS.MA.e.577. 28, May 1802; HAT.3857, May 1802; HAT.3879İ, May 1802; C.DH.10270, May 1802; TS.MA.E.450.10, June 1802; C.AS.37609, June 1802; C.DH.11429, June 1802; AE.SSLM.III.13956, June 1802; HAT.2279C, June 1802; C.DH.9224, May 1802; HAT.3060, May 1802; HAT.2279A, June 1802; HAT.12574, June 1802; ADVN.2344.20, June 1802; C.AS.4162, June 1802; ADVN.2344.22, June 1802; C.DH.6452, July 1802; ADVN.2348.20, August-September 1802.

life, Pasha accepted his appointment to Anatolia and in fact he requested this appointment himself, under the condition that he would not be harmed. The central government then appointed him as the Governor of Anatolia and ordered for him to arrive in Kütahya. In the year 1803 in April, Pasha finally arrived in Anatolia and came to Kütahya Simav.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile, there were negotiations going on about proper settlements in Rumelia for the bandit leaders. However, this attempt was appeared to be unsuccessful. The bandit leaders named Kara Feyzi, Ali Molla, İsaoglu, Manav İbrahim, Koşancalı Halil and their man engaged in battles with Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga, Tokadçıklı Süleyman Aga, Sirozlu İsmail Bey, Edirne Bostancıbaşı and their soldiers at the districts of Tutrakan, İvraca (Vratsa), Baba-yı Atik (Babaeski), Malkara, Bergos, Pınarhisar, Hayrabolu, Uzunköprü, Tekfurdağı. Whilst all these fights continued with the bandits, only six months had past from Pasha's latest appointment, and yet he was dismissed once more and appointed to Erzurum, an even further point in Anatolia.¹⁴⁹

Pasha would be killed before making it to his final appointment. It is debatable whether or not he ever intended to arrive at Erzurum in the first place, but after a couple of months from the news on his recent post, he started fleeing. According to the reports, Pasha found out the execution orders about him and tried to escape towards Erzincan. The task of capturing and eliminating (*ahz u izale*) Osman Pasha was given to the

148 C.ML.16799, June 1802; HAT.12574, June 1802; HAT.12574A, June 1802; C.AS.41508, June 1802; C.ZB.710, June 1802; C.DH.17317, July 1802; HAT.5121, July 1802; HAT.5214, August 1802; HAT.1850, September 1802; HAT.1837, September 1802; C.AS.11673, September 1802; HAT.2014, September 1802; HAT.1485.5, October 1802; HAT.11785, November 1802; HAT.2082, December 1802; HAT.4218, December 1802; C.DH.8049, December 1802; HAT.1485.30, February 1803; HAT.2012, April 1803; HAT.3022C, April 1803 (agyt); TS.MA.e.883.18, April 1803 (agyt)

149 HAT.2899, May 1803; C.DH.1351, June 1803; HAT.2623C, June 1803; HAT.2383B, June 1803; HAT.2339, June 1803; HAT.2355D, July 1803; HAT.2319, July 1803; HAT.2926J, June 1803; HAT.2791, June 1803; HAT.2388, June 1803; AE.SSLM.III.9002, June 1803; HAT.3865K, August 1803; HAT.2358A, August 1803; HAT.2618A, October 1803; HAT.2618C, October 1803; HAT.2615C, October 1803; HAT.12046, November 1803

Governor of Trabzon Tayyar Pasha. Sources demonstrate that Tayyar Pasha worked together with the governors and other state officials of Çıldır, Kars, Sivas and Van. Whilst information from the central government was that Osman Pasha was followed because he was declared a rebel, I came across a *sicill* from the district of Sivas that made me think ‘were things different at the provinces?’ In the *sicill*, it was stated that the Governor of Erzurum Osman Pasha sent orders to the district and asked for preparations about livestock, provisions and other necessary equipment to be made, and for the roads and bridges to be opened and repaired. In this register, Osman Pasha appeared as if he had been a duly state official preparing to reside in his new post, but certainly not a rebellious one on the run. In the reports of the central government however, Osman, who appeared to be an escapee, first hid in Zara-Sivas, and from there he headed to Kemah Boğazı and after defeating the *Voyvoda* of Kemah Sağırzade Abdülbaki there, he escaped to Erzincan. The central government blamed Tayyar Pasha for Osman Pasha’s escape. According to the Grand Vizier, since Tayyar Pasha was actually concerned with taking over the province of Erzurum, he had ignored Osman’s escape to Erzincan. It was suspected that Osman Pasha might go even further and escape towards Iranian lands. Since priority was given to Osman’s being caught, another chance was given to Tayyar Pasha to make up for his mistake. The roads that Osman would pass-by are closed up and soldiers were gathered from the districts to protect Kemah, Gercanis and Kuruçay surrounding Erzincan.¹⁵⁰

Upon finding out that Osman Pasha was heading towards Erzurum, that he planned to attack Erzurum and he arrived at the district of Kelkit, the Governor of

150 HAT.1890, July 1803; HAT.1953, July 1803; C.DH.1079, July 1803; HAT.3892İ, September 1803; HAT.3892D, September 1803; HAT.3892, October 1803; HAT.3892G, October 1803; HAT.3892B, October 1803; HAT.3892E, October 1803; HAT.3892C, October 1803; HAT.11847, October 1803; HAT.3892A, April 1804 (agytt); HAT.3892H, April 1804 (agytt); HAT.3892J, April 1804 (agytt); İSAM, Sc.SVS.182_007, 61, June-August 1803

Trabzon Tayyar Pasha, the *Mutasarrıf* of Muş Murad Pasha and the Governor of Çıldır Selim Pasha started to follow Pasha's moves. They made a plan to capture Pasha when he was left unguarded and ambush him. In the meantime, all local soldiers in Erzurum were armed and got ready waiting for Osman Pasha's attack. The reports noted that the people of Erzurum would not want to allow Pasha to enter Erzurum. Tayyar Pasha's men were around 20 thousand at this time, which was ten times more than Osman Pasha's. There was a local notable supporting Osman Pasha in his uprising, *İspir Derebeyi* Memioğlu Hüseyin. It was not stated in the documents how many soldiers Memioğlu Hüseyin had, but I do not believe it would be more than a couple of thousand. Once Osman pasha arrived at Erzurum, he and his supporters were completely surrounded. After a short while, in the battle between Osman Pasha and Memioğlu Hüseyin's men, and the state troops Osman Pasha's side lost. Then Memioğlu was killed yet Osman Pasha was captured alive. Tayyar Pasha told in one of his letters to Istanbul that he would be kept alive for a few days and then executed. Osman Pasha's cut-off head was finally sent to Istanbul after his execution was carried out by Murad Pasha and Tayyar Pasha. After Pasha's death, as can be expected, Albanian sebkans in his household became *kapısız* soldiers and continued to trouble the district people.¹⁵¹

While telling Gürcü Osman Pasha's story, it might seem that him being disobedient to orders, trying to bargain with the central government regarding his posts or that after being dismissed having other state officials run after him was particular to him only. However, analyzing his story, we can see that many viziers from that period

151 HAT.3869, October 1803; HAT.12035, November 1803; HAT.11779, November 1803; HAT.11918, November 1803; HAT.7583C, November 1803; HAT.11982, November 1803; HAT.7583A, December 1803; HAT.3883, December 1803; HAT.4136, January 1804; C.DH.3679, February 1804; C.DH.2278, February 1804; HAT.7583, April 1804 (agyt); HAT.7583D, April 1804 (agyt); HAT.3885, April 1804 (agyt); HAT.3871, April 1804 (agyt); HAT.3871A, April 1804 (agyt)

went through similar experiences. Indeed, pashas that lived at the same time as him, who were sent to follow him and even eliminate him also suffered the same fate as Osman Pasha. Even one of the most important characters of this period, the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha was exiled to Sakız island, his vizierate was taken from him and his properties was confiscated due to his failures at the mission to eliminate the bandits and because of his conflicts with the Rumelian notables.¹⁵² Another example would be Tayyar Pasha, a strong Anatolian *ayan*, who was the leader of the team that captured Gürcü Osman Pasha. A few years after executing Osman Pasha, Tayyar rose against the state as well and escaped when he heard the news that his vizierate was removed and an execution order about him was issued.¹⁵³

152 HAT.3998, May 1802 (agytt); HAT.3879, March 1802; A.DVN.MHM.997/9, 1216 Z Evasıt; A.DVN.MHM.997/28, 1216 Z Evasıt; A.DVN.MHM.997/35, 1216 Z Evasıt

153 C.DH.10642, July 180; C.DH.11196, October 1805; C.ML.2975, December 1805

TIMELINE OF OSMAN PASHA'S CAREER STEPS




Figure 1 – The Timeline of Gürcü Osman Pasha's Life

CHAPTER III

PATRONAGE RELATIONS AND POLITICAL NETWORKS

3.1 Patronage Relations

3.1.1 Overview of Patronage Relations

Factors establishing a sense of solidarity or communality in the Ottoman establishment of the 17th and the 18th centuries could mainly be identified as ethnic or regional origins, ties of an individual with his patron, his master or his tutor, and being members of the same family or household. Those factors played significant part in shaping a slave or a non-slave person's career path in the Ottoman political society. Therefore common origin, either in terms of ethnicity, or household, or family could create an experience of solidarity. Especially loyalties to a patronage (*intisab*) of a pasha/ *vali*/ vizier, or relations of young fellows raised at the same households were important as those ties were quite influential and could endure for a long time. People sharing a similar past in the early times of their career would be likely to feel a certain connection to their fellows.¹⁵⁴ And such experiences or feelings of solidarity have a definite potential to determine alliances built and conflicts broken out both in the center and the provinces.

¹⁵⁴ Metin Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1974), 233-239; Aksan, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi*, 30; Carter Findley, "The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, I (1970), 334-357.

Cornell Fleischer, in his book of an Ottoman bureaucrat of the 17th century, defined three specific modes of entry into the military (*askeri*) class; through becoming a *devşirme* (for non-Muslims), by being birth into an *askeri* family (military status by inheritance), and by education (for Muslims). And he mentioned another additional factor helping to bring individual advancement, *intisab*.¹⁵⁶ He defined *intisab* as a semiofficial career path at which a member of military class would help a candidate to secure entry into and advancement within the government system. Those proteges would support their patron and his interests in return.¹⁵⁷ Aspiring, talented and unexperienced men could go around regular promotion systems through the advantages of patronage relations, family ties and fortune.¹⁵⁸

As a young and ambitious man Gürcü Osman Pasha did not have an influential family or wealth that could provide him profitable and lucrative posts. What he had at the first of his career was his Georgian origin that could bring him alliances with other Georgian figures, then his relationship with his patron Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and later than that networks he built between other political and military figures of the time. In order to understand his rise it is essential to question potential benefits of his Georgian

¹⁵⁶ For more detailed information on *intisab* matter please see: Işık Tamdoğan, “Büyükleri Saymak, Küçükleri Sevmek: 18. Yüzyıl Adana’sında Ayanların İlişki Ağları ve İki Farklı İlişki Yürütme Üslubu”, *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, I (2005), 77-96; Bernard A. Lalor, “Promotion Patterns of Ottoman Bureaucratic Statesmen From the Lale Devri Until the Tanzimat”, *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, I (1972), 77-92; Richard L. Cahmbers, “The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey”, in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds., Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 1964), 301-327; Findley, “The Legacy of Tradition to Reform”, 334-357; Norman Itkowitz, “Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities”, *Studia Islamica*, XVI (1962), 73-94; Norman Itkowitz and Joel Shinder, “The Office of Şeyh ül-İslam and the Tanzimat – A Prosopographic Enquiry”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, VIII (1972), 93-101; Norman Itkowitz, “Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vezir”, (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1959); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires: the Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); H. Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience (1660-1815)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); Joel Shinder, “Career Line Formation in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, 1648-1750: A New Perspective”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, XVI, no: 2/3 (1973), 217-237.

¹⁵⁷ Cornell Fleischer, *Tarihçi Mustafa Ali: Bir Osmanlı Aydın Bürokrati* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), 18, 217-218.

¹⁵⁸ Lalor, “Promotion Patterns of Ottoman Bureaucratic Statesmen”, 77.

origin and to comprehend his political networks with Rumelian *ayans*, non-*ayan* provincial governors and bandits.

Not all the figures I chose to present here in this study had a direct relationship with Osman Pasha. But even when Osman Pasha did not have a direct connection with a figure from this group of people, that figure's indirect connections with Osman could still be traceable; mostly through his patron Hasan Pasha, or through another figure coming from the same household of Hasan Pasha. With that in mind, I tried to closely examine profiles of important *ayan* and non-*ayan* figures between 1780s-1800s. The profiles of figures include a short biography, direct or indirect relationships with Osman Pasha, relations with other figures of the time (either alliance or conflict), and patronage ties if any. Naturally since the protagonist of this thesis is Osman Pasha, his story is written based on both secondary and primary sources. On the other hand all other figures of the period I chose to present, are storied via mainly secondary sources; chronicles of Cevdet Pasha and Baba Pasha, monographic studies, encyclopedias, and books on the 18th century.

This sub-chapter begins with naming the prominent political (and surely military) figures in Rumelia from 1780s to 1800s. Their backgrounds, how they started their career, will be summarized in a table format. The suggestions about backgrounds¹⁵⁹ of these figures are based on the information gathered from chronicles and secondary sources. Then short biographies of each figure are presented, first the non-*ayan* state officials and provincial governors, secondly *ayans* who mostly became provincial governors. Also the story of a Crimean Prince is covered among these figures since his partnerships with the bandits and unruly figures of the time.

¹⁵⁹ Abou-El-Haj's categorization for backgrounds of highly-ranked state officials was helpful in forming the background table here. But I did not use all his category names and added some new categories in accordance to the stories of the figures. Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 94, no: 4 (1974), 438-447.

After all the figures are introduced shortly, I will combine all stories to visualize patron-protege relations in 1790s and early 1800s, Osman Pasha's estimated close network circle, potential relationships and connections between Osman Pasha and all the other figures of the time, Pasbanoğlu's network of violence and banditry, then alliances and conflicts discovered between all the figures in this period. By doing so, I intend to substantiate the possibility that Osman Pasha rarely casted as a single and alone figure, but he was drawn into factions formed both in the center and the provinces, and backed or acted in accordance with groups having similar or common inclinations and interests with him.

Table 1. Backgrounds of The Prominent Figures From 1790s to 1800s

Name	Background
Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha	Slave of a Merchant
Halil Hamid Pasha	Slave & Vizier household
Şahin Ali Pasha	Vizier household
Koca Yusuf Pasha	Vizier household
Yusuf Ziya Pasha	Slave & Vizier household
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha	One of the Sultan's favorite
Kürd Alo Pasha	Vizier household
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Vizier household
Halil Pasha	Vizier household
Melek Mehmed Pasha	Son of a Military Man
Eflak Voyvodası Mavriyani	Vizier household
Pasbanoğlu Osman Pasha	Local notable
Mehmed Cengiz Geray	Crimean Prince
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	Local notable
İşkodralı Mehmed Pasha	Local notable
Tayyar Mahmud Pasha	Local notable
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Local notable
Pehlivan İbrahim Aga	Vizier household & Local notable household
Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga	Local notable

PATRON AND PROTÉGÉ RELATIONS IN 1790S & EARLY 1800S

CEZAYİRLİ HASAN PASHA*

- Gürcü Osman Pasha (Georgian)
- Koca Yusuf Pasha (Georgian)
- Şahin Ali Pasha
- Eflak Voyvodası Mavriyani
- Kürd Alo Pasha
- Halil Pasha
- Ishak Bey

HALİL HAMİD PASHA**

- Yusuf Ziya Pasha (Georgian)
- Ahmed Resmi Efendi
- Sadullah Enveri Efendi
- Ebubekir Ratib Efendi

* Hasan Pasha could be Caucasian
 ** Halil Hamid's father is Georgian
 *** Küçük Hüseyin could be either Georgian or Caucasian

KÜÇÜK HÜSEYİN PASHA***

- Hakkı Mehmed Pasha

TİRSİNLİKLİZE İSMAIL

- Alemdar Mustafa Pasha
- Pehlivan İbrahim Aga

Figure 2. Patron and Protege Relations in 1790s and Early 1800s

3.1.2 The Prominent Figures From 1790s to 1800s: The Profiles

Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha: His ethnic origin is indefinite but estimated to be Caucasian. Known to be one of the most influential Kapudan Pashas of his time. He was born and raised in Tekfurdağı as slave of a Muslim merchant. When became 18 and started to fight he was set free and after that took party in Janissary campaigns. His outstanding military success in several naval battles brought him his first position of kapudan pasha in 1770, then second in 1774 and held this office for 15 years during the sultan Abdülhamid I. He was not appointed as grand vizier but on three separate occasions (1781, 1785 and 1786) he was entrusted with grand vizierate authority as deputy (*kaimmakam*), for short periods. He is said to be the most powerful character of this sultan's time, even more powerful than grand viziers of this period. For instance in 1785 he denounced Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Pasha for plotting against Abdülhamid I to depose him and made sure of his rival's fall. Though when this sultan died, new sultan Selim III dismissed him from the office of kapudan pasha and appointed him Serasker of Ismail. In spite of Selim's disfavor, Hasan Pasha's victory against Russian army and acting Grand Vizier's defeat, made Hasan Pasha receive the seal of grand vizierate in November 1789. He died after three and a half month in Şumnu in March 1790, where he carried on negotiations with Russian side. Although an officer reported his cause of death cold, there are rumours that he was poisoned by the order of Selim due to Hasan Pasha's previous murdering two important *sadaret* officers.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ J.H. Mordtmann - (E. Kuran), "Djezairli Ghazi Hasan Pasha" *EF*², vol. II (Leiden: Brill, 1983) 533-534; Uzunçarşılı, "Hasan Paşa, Cezayirli, Gazi", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5/1, (Eskişehir: MEB Yayınları, 2001), 319-323; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, Nuri Akbayan and Seyit Ali Kahraman, eds., (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), vol. 2, 638-639; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, (İstanbul: Hikmet Neşriyat), vol. II, 675, 1071, 1117-1123; Ali Karahan, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri"; Ahmet Kavas, "Hasan Paşa (Cezayirli Gazi)", *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi*, vol. I, (İstanbul: YKY, 1999), 542-43; Mahir Aydın, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa", *DİA*, vol. 7 (Ankara: TDV, 1993), 501-503; Uzunçarşılı, "Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 5 (1935), 228-244, 248-256.

If we look into Hasan Pasha's story in a more detailed way we see that Hasan Pasha had a very central position in terms of political networks in his time. Including Gürcü Osman Pasha, many state officials of the time was trained at Hasan Pasha's household and he secured several favorable posts, and thus revenue sources, for his proteges.¹⁶¹ For instance, Koca Yusuf Pasha and Şahin Ali Pasha rose up to the post of the grand vizierate, Mavriyani of the *voyvoda* of Eflak, Kürd Alo Pasha of the governorship of Anatolia, Ishak Bey of a protege of Selim III and then of Ottoman embassy in France, and Gürcü Osman of the governorship of Rumelia.

Halil Hamid Pasha was one of Georgian viziers who was appointed as the Grand Vizier during the reign of Abdulhamid I in December 1782. Hamid Pasha's father, Gürcü Mustafa Aga, had been a slave and later became treasurer of a pasha and his patron was Çelik Mehmed Pasha. He worked for breaking Russian influence in Black Sea and re-taking Crimea. And he paid attention and gave weight to make military reforms. Hamid Pasha became a significant opponent of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha, which was unfortunate, since this conflict between two costed him a lot and in the end Hamid Pasha lost his position in May 1785 as we have mentioned above. The cover of his disposition was a rumor saying that, Hamid Pasha cut off salaries of some Janissaries and caused an unrest among soldiers because he wanted to depose Abdulhamid I, with a hidden intention of enthroning Selim III. Ahmet Yüksel claimed that after the death of Hamid Pasha, his opponents started to rule in Istanbul. In his time Hamid Pasha was patron of Yusuf Ziya Pasha, another Georgian grand vizier, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, an important Ottoman bureaucratic figure, Sadullah Enveri

¹⁶¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair"; Uzunçarşılı, "Hasan Paşa, Cezayirli, Gazi", 319-323.

Efendi, one of the eminent chroniclers and historians of the period, and Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, another remarkable bureaucratic and embassy figure of the time.¹⁶²

Şahin Ali Pasha was a slave of Çelik Mehmed Pasha, thus he had the same patron as Halil Hamid Pasha did. Then he joined the retinue of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha. Ali Pasha was Hasan Pasha's *kapı kethüda*. After Halil Hamid Pasha's deposition from Grand Vizierate, Ali Pasha got this position. He was in Halep when he got the promotion and his later patron Hasan Pasha deputized Ali Pasha till he came back to Istanbul to take over his new post. He worked for strengthening Russian borders and Black Sea fleet. According to Kasap, he was deposed before one year of this post was over, because he was illiterate and his reading problem created security flaws in state business. However Uzunçarşılı, in his Cezayirli Hasan Pasha article, stressed that Şahin Ali Pasha was also a victim of Hasan Pasha's great political influence and defined his disposition as revenge of Hasan Pasha. Regarding that article, Şahin Ali Pasha was removed from his top post since he overruled Hasan Pasha's wish for one of his most reliable men, Koca Yusuf Pasha to get an important office in Istanbul. With Ali Pasha's efforts, Yusuf Pasha was moved away from the capital to Mora because Ali Pasha did not want Hasan Pasha's men to occupy important positions at the center of the state. And after five months after that event Ali Pasha lost his position for good.¹⁶³

¹⁶² Murat Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri* (İstanbul: Gürcistan Dostluk Derneği, 2010), 44-46; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa", 231-237; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. II, 578-9; Kemal Beydilli, "Halil Hamid Paşa", *DİA*, vol.15 (Ankara: TDV, 1997), 316-318; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair", 21-23; Aksan, *Ahmed Resmi Efendi*, 9, 178-80; Uzunçarşılı, "Tosyalı Ebubekir Ratib Efendi", *Belleten*, c. XXXIX, vol. 153 (1975), 50; Fatih Yeşil, *Aydınlanma Çağında Bir Osmanlı Katibi: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (1750-1799)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010), 36; Ahmet Yüksel, *Rusların Kafkasya'yı İstilas ve Osmanlı İstihbarat Ağı* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2014), 240.

¹⁶³ Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri*, 46; Uzunçarşılı, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair", 22; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. V, 1560; Uzunçarşılı, "Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa'ya Dair", 22.

The next Grand Vizier was yet another Georgian vizier, **Koca Yusuf Pasha**. He got his vizierate in 1785 with the position of the Governor of Morea. Yusuf Pasha held Grand Vizierate position twice, one in Abdulhamid I's reign in 1786 and one in Selim III's from 1791 to 1792. He was trained by Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and served as his treasurer and then represented Hasan Pasha in Istanbul as his *apı ketdüda*. He started a war against Russia during Abdulhamid's time, wishing to re-gain Crimea and healing the societal trauma by its loss. But this war drove a wedge between him and his patron Hasan Pasha, who was in Egypt at the time of war declaration. Jorga expressed that when Yusuf Pasha was on his way to the capital as the new Grand Vizier, he was thinking that Kapudan Pasha should not be charge of all foreign policies by himself but such issues should rather be controlled by Grand Vizier. This assertion may be counted as a breakthrough from Hasan Pasha's great dominance over the state. He was challenged by his former slave afterall. Yusuf Pasha openly dared trying to exercise his full authority and he even declared a war against his patron's opposition. Nonetheless new losses of the war ended his first Grand Vizierate. He was deposed by the new sultan Selim III, to be replaced by his patron soon. Yusuf Pasha's second Grand Vizierate came after almost two years of the first one, by the time his patron had already died a year ago. He was appointed to end the war he started years before and deposed again right after the war ended in 1792. Uzunçarşılı argued that his deposition was not a sudden decision rather because he had 3 thousands of Albanian soldiers with him. He was not a soldier only, but also a statesman who contemplated reformations, new regulations and conflict between old and new, he even presented a '*layiha*' about new order to his second Sultan as Grand Vizier. He died in mid-1800.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri*, 47-9; Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. V, 52, 76-79; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. V, 1698-9; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. IV, 1776; Enver

Yusuf Ziya/ Ziyaeddin Pasha was another Georgian figure of the period who helded the position of Grand Vizierate twice at two different Padişahs' reigns, like his namesake Koca Yusuf Pasha. Cevdet Pasha argued that this was a rare coincidence of Ottoman state.¹⁶⁵ Ziya Pasha was also a slave, of Mirahor Mustafa Pasha, he got education at household of Mustafa Pasha's son. Ziya Pasha's dramatic rise began with his days at Halil Hamid Pasha's service as his silahdar and mühürdar. He became Grand Vizier long after his patron Hamid Pasha was executed, during the beginning stage of French occupation of Egyptian lands in 1798 August. Roughly after three years of wars, Ottoman army under the command of Ziya Pasha and Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was able to retrieve Egypt. A few years later in 1805 Ziya Pasha excused himself of his duty because of growing tension between Janissaries and New Order Army. Ziya Pasha was still Grand Vizier when Gürcü Osman Pasha was dismissed his position of Governor of Rumelia. As the top official of the state, Yusuf Pasha officially thought that Osman Pasha gathered unruly military forces and stirred up rebellious figures so he assigned Tokadçıklı Süleyman Aga to get him under control. Although this order suggests that Yusuf Pasha was against Osman Pasha, Yusuf Pasha's rivalry with Hakkı Pasha was a better reference to Yusuf's side. The fight between Hakkı Pasha and Osman Pasha over the governorship of Rumelia was very hot at this time and there was a clear order of Osman's deposition and re-assignment. Yet Yusuf Pasha saw Hakkı Pasha as a powerful competition for grand vizierate so he probably supported Osman Pasha's claim in secret. Uzunçarşılı wrote that deputy of Grand Vizier Mustafa Pasha patronized Osman Pasha, sent him men and corresponded with him. Moreover Hakkı Pasha seized their correspondences on the road and sent them to Selim to reveal

Ziya Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedit, 1789-1807* (Ankara: TTK,1946), 35-36; Uzunçarşılı, "Sultan III. Selim ve Koca Yusuf Paşa", 247.

¹⁶⁵ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. IV, 1712-3.

the truth. Coming years passed with seclusion and smaller positions, especially after Selim III's dethronement. Four years later he was appointed as Grand Vizier again during the reign of Mahmud II in 1809 January. However Janissaries were against him holding that position because they believed that he was a strict supporter of the New Order soldiers. Ziya Pasha had some of Alemdar Mustafa's men killed who were known to be New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedid*) proponents, just to please dissatisfied Janissaries, but it did not work in the end. Ziya Pasha was dismissed of his post in 1811 while he was at war with Russians.¹⁶⁶

According to Kasap's research **Küçük Hüseyin Pasha** was also of Georgian origin, but Süreyya defined him Circassian.¹⁶⁷ Rumour had it that Hüseyin Pasha and Selim III were milk-siblings. It is also said that Selim III had a big affection for Hüseyin Pasha, and maybe such intimacy came from growing up together and sharing days during Selim's imprisoned princehood. This affection showed in Hüseyin Pasha's marriage. Sultan Selim decided his niece Esma Sultan – daughter of Abdulhamid I – to marry him. When looked at pasha's biographic story, it is seen that he started his career as a slave and then was presented to the palace. He was a slave of Silahdar Ibrahim Pasha. After Selim's enthronement his career began to advance. He became Kapudan Pasha a few years after Selim's reign commenced in 1792 March, and kept this position for twelve years. At the last years of the 18th century he fought at several campaigns against Rumelian rebels as chief commander of soldiers. He died relatively early at the end of 1803, and could not see Selim's dethronement or the Kabakçı

¹⁶⁶ Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri*, 50; Georg Oğulukyan, *Georg Oğulukyan'ın Ruznamesi: 1806-1810 İsyanları, III. Selim, IV. Mustafa, II. Mahmud ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, H. Andresyan, trans., (İstanbul, Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1972), 50, 54-5; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. V, 1701-2; Darendeli İzzet Hasan Efendi, *Ziyaname: Sadrazam Yusuf Paşa'nın Napolyon'a Karşı Mısır Seferi (1798-1802)*, M. İlkin Erkutun, ed., (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009), XXVIII-XXXIII; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa", 197-98, 210; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. IV, 1186.

¹⁶⁷ Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri*, 52; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. III, 724.

Rebellion or interruption of reformations which were years of efforts. Some researchers implies that Hüseyin Pasha's death in the beginning of the new century and his mother Mihrişah's loss two years later bereaved Selim of his two main supporters, especially in terms of New Order. Gürcü Osman Pasha served under Hüseyin Pasha's command against Rumelian bandits. Though years later during the fight over Rumelian Governorship, Hüseyin Pasha sided with Hakkı Mehmed Pasha against Osman Pasha because he was the patron of Hakkı. Hüseyin Pasha also took active part in the operations to catch Osman Pasha and repress him. Ironically one year after Osman was deposed, Hakkı suffered a similar fate. When his protégé Hakkı Pasha was deposed from the post of Rumelian Governorship for the second time in 1802, this upsetting news was kept from Hüseyin Pasha and the government tried to make a fait accompli once again.¹⁶⁸

Kürd Ali (Alo) Pasha was also from Cezayirli Hasan Pasha's retinue. His most significant position was the Governor of Anatolia. During campaigns against the grand rebellious pasha of Rumelia, Pasbanoğlu Osman of Vidin in 1796, Ali Pasha served in Rumelia to suppress Pasbanoğlu and bandits under his command. Ali Pasha's military troops were consisted of disobedient men and some pardoned old bandits thus caused problems quite often. In 1798 Ali Pasha was appointed under the command of Serasker Küçük Hüseyin Pasha but he did not obey his orders and failed to help Hüseyin Pasha's troops against Pasbanoğlu's men. According to Cevdet Pasha, Ali Pasha rejected to send out his men, almost 15 thousands, after campaigns and then started to communicate with Pasbanoğlu himself. When Hüseyin Pasha learned the possibility of these two building an alliance, he invited Ali Pasha into an ambush and

¹⁶⁸ Çağatay Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları* (Ankara: TTK, 1980), 111-112; Kemal Beydilli, "III. Selim: Aydınlanmış Hükümdar" in Kenan, ed., *Nizam-ı Kadim'den Nizam-ı Cedid'e*, 48; Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa", 195, 199; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 45, 56.

killed him in 1798 October. After his death, some of his men joined Gürcü Osman Pasha's troops and these men became an important military source of power during Osman Pasha's uprising.¹⁶⁹

Hakkı Mehmed Pasha was trained at Bab-ı Ali and he had positions in Rumelia after 1791. He became the Governor of Rumelia in the end of 1795 for the first time. In his article about this pasha, Uzunçarşılı mentioned that Selim III knew Mehmed Pasha closely and liked him. According to Uzunçarşılı it was quite possible that state officials in Istanbul disliking Mehmed Pasha's too critical and righteous personality could be the reason for sending him to the provinces. However he did not thrive well in there either. His very stern measures against bandits and local notables in the provinces made him loose his office after a year. His second time of the governorship of Rumelia came in 1801 and he was assigned to quell flaring risings and to take the deposed previous governor Gürcü Osman Pasha under control. Taking over his new office became a dispute hard to resolve as Osman Pasha refused to quit his office and to obey his deposal order. After struggling for months Mehmed Pasha held his office but then again ten-eleven months later he was dismissed from Rumelia and banished to Sakız island. His vizierate was reinstated in 1807 with a new appointment to Erzurum, then Konya and Diyarbakır. Deposed and banished again in 1809 and died in 1811. According to a chronicle-writer Hakkı Pasha was against policies of the New Order.¹⁷⁰

Halil Pasha was originally from Bozcaada. He was from retinue of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha. He held *silahdarlık* and *sipah ağalığı* positions under the command of his patron. Then during Koca Yusuf Pasha's grand vizierate, Halil was awarded the

¹⁶⁹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1612, 1651-2, 1658, 1667-8; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. I, 279; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 56-57.

¹⁷⁰ Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. II, 562-3; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1613; Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa"; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 22-23, 39-45, 74-79. Nagehan Üstündağ, *Balkanlarda Ayanlık 1790-1808* (Master Thesis, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2004), 104.

title of vizier and appointed as the Governor of Ağrıboz. After a short time he was dismissed from his titles because of oppressive ill-governing in the province and exiled to Gelibolu, then Tekfurdağı. When mountain brigands came near to his region, to Kırkkilise, he cooperated with them and his actions harmed the public. There was a severe punishment waiting for him but he was pardoned thanks to Tepedelenli Ali Pasha's intercession and got a new appointment first in Inebahti then in Karahisar-ı Sahib. In fact he was forgiven since rebellious Gürcü Osma Pasha was around the same region at this time and the government was avoiding the possibility of these two getting together and rise against the state. Only after Osman Pasha passed through middle Anatolia and proceeded towards Erzurum, Halil Pasha was ambushed by the Ayan of Karahisar-ı Sahib and murdered in 1803.¹⁷¹

Melek Mehmed Pasha was son of a grand admiral and Bosnian. He was also appointed as Grand Admiral in 1752 then deposed after two years and his vizierate reinstated in 1756. In ten years after that he held various offices such as Governor of Silistre, Aydın, Guardian of Belgrad and Vidin. In 1766 Mehmed Pasha was assigned to the leadership of the Ottoman navy for the second time and then at the beginning of 1774 for the third, for a short time. Mehmed Pasha's successor was Cezayirli Hasan Pasha. Yeşil states that Hasan Pasha was Mehmed Pasha's political opponent and with Hasan Pasha's rising, Mehmed Pasha's power was weakened. Grand Vizier of the time Koca Yusuf Pasha who had been from Hasan Pasha's retinue removed Mehmed Pasha's vizierate and banished him. Yusuf Pasha brought forward his elderness as an excuse for deposal but the reason behind the scenes was that Yusuf Pasha tried to push away pro-peace officers as he himself intended to start a new war against Russia.

¹⁷¹ Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. II, 583; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. IV, 1842, 1912-3.

Though with the enthronement of Selim III, Yusuf Pasha was dismissed from his office and Mehmed Pasha's vizierate was reinstated. The new Grand Vizier Cenaze Şerif Hasan Pasha was raised from Melek Mehmed Pasha's retinue, his old kethüda. After Şerif Hasan Pasha, Yusuf Pasha was appointed to the grand vizierate once again and he ended the war he had started. As Yusuf Pasha was held responsible for the defeat, he was removed from this position once more. Mehmed Pasha received the seal of the office as Grand Vizier in June 1792. Mehmed Pasha pursued rather a mild and engirding policy towards his opponents and due to his policy Yusuf Pasha was not killed only appointed to someplace else in Eastern Anatolia. Mehmed Pasha represented the political faction in favor of the New Order. During his grand vizierate, he prepared legal basis of the New Order, managed to take considerable extent of oppositions under control. He was married to Zeyneb Sultan, sister of the Sultan of that time, Mustafa III.¹⁷²

The Voyvoda of Eflak Mavriyani is another figure rose from Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha's retinue. He went to Istanbul with anticipation of better offices when he was young, and he became a member of Hacı Nikolaki's retinue who was moneylender/ banker (*sarrafi*) of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha back then. Mavriyani's language skills and craftiness earned him a position at the gate of Hasan Pasha. Hasan Pasha procure a position for his protégé even though this appointment was against the customary rules. Thanks to his patron Mavriyani was granted with the positions of *Derya Tercümanı* (translator for imperial docks) and then *Divan-ı Hümayun Tercümanı* (translator for Imperial Council), which were preliminary posts for the position of *Voyvoda* of Eflak (Intendant of Walachia). Cevdet Pasha stated a different

¹⁷² Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. IV, 1081-2; Fatih Yeşil, "Melek Mehmed Paşa", *DİA*, vol. 2 (Ankara: TDV, 2016), 246-247.

perspective about Mavriyani then Enveri and Vasıf claimed. Enveri and Vasıf wrote that Mavriyani reached the position of Eflak Voyvodalığı because his patron threatened the previous intendant. According to them Mavriyani rationalized his taking properties of the public with his high military expenses, sentenced to death because he failed to attend the imperial army in Vidin and murdered around Svishtov. He presented his soldiers unpaid salaries as an excuse of him not going to Vidin. However Cevdet Pasha found these claims baseless. He portrayed Mavriyani as a powerful military figure who defended Eflak successfully and spent all his fortune for this purpose. He also thought that the people of Eflak complained about him since Mavriyani obeyed nobody but Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. There was also rumors saying that Mavriyani was providing intelligence to someone from Austrian side but Cevdet Pasha did not believe into this allegation. He wrote that if Mavriyani had communicated as doubted, he would have ran to Austrian or Russian lands but he did not. Mavriyani was also stated to have Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga at his service against Austrian and Russian armies.¹⁷³

Pasbanoğlu Osman of Vidin lived between 1758-1807. His father Ömer Aga was a wealthy and influential local notable in Vidin. Ömer voluntarily joined the Ottoman forces during 1787-91 war with Austria but he was executed because he acted unruly and caused disturbances among the people. After his father's death, Pasbanoğlu ran away from Vidin for a while. Then due to his military successes in Wallachia against Austrian forces, he was pardoned and came back to Vidin. Some of his property was given back to him as well. He found many supporters and followers

¹⁷³ Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. V, 83; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Karlofça Anlaşmasından XVIII. Yüzyılın Sonlarına Kadar*, vol. IV.I (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1956), 526; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi : XVIII. Yüzyıl*, vol. IV.II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1959), 58-60; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. II, 1137-1138; *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1204-1208, 1656.

from disappointed people, bandits, and Janissaries. Rumelia experiencing a disorderly and unsafe state and various opportunities that could come with it, was probably the essential motivation of the people joining him. While Pasbanoğlu was getting back his power in Vidin, Selim III was newly enthroned, war with European armies was continuing, Austrians was moving forward towards the Ottoman borders, mountain bandits were raiding all through Rumelia, and local notables were getting stronger and richer. People of Vidin were complaining about taxes which were collected to finance new reforms of Selim's government. And landless people were looking forward to reach better sources and income by joining Pasbanoğlu. Also Janissaries were disturbed by military reforms that could harm their own benefits. Pasbanoğlu became a leader for complainants and disappointed ones in Vidin. Although he did not openly contradicted reforms, he reacted against new taxes imposed on people. In 1791, attacking and pillaging places in Serbia and Wallachia expanded his area of influence greatly. These attacks enriched him both economically and militarily.¹⁷⁴

Pasbanoğlu of Vidin conducted numerous raids from 1792 until his death in 1807. He aimed to weaken his competitor local notables and to enrich himself. Although the total number of people he employed is unknown, some significant bandit chiefs like Kara Feyzi, Macar Ali ve Gavur İmam were among his men. It could be guessed that he should have employed thousands of bandits to be able to send out several raiders within a very extended area in Rumelia and also to match the state officials he faced.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 32-59; Üstündağ, “*Balkanlarda Ayanlık*”, 51- 79; Robert Zens, “Pasvanoglu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade, 1791-1807”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. VIII, No.1-2 (2002),89-105, 91-2.

¹⁷⁵ Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, 445; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 32-34; Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 126.

There are some documents showing that some state officials managed to lure 2.600 of Pasbanoğlu's bandits to join the sultan's side¹⁷⁶ but there are no information about the total number of his men. However, Cevat Eren suggested that he had more than 100 thousands of men under his command to rule a very large territory around Vidin. Özkaya cited from Olivier and Driault that the number of Pasbanoğlu's soldiers varies between 80 and 100 thousand.¹⁷⁷ Özkaya claimed that this rebellious pasha had the goal of attacking Istanbul with his large military units, dethroning Selim and found a new government of himself. Even some foreign statesmen evaluated his power which was strong enough to claim Istanbul and the empire for himself. From another point Üstündağ states that Pasbanoğlu accepted every post the state offered to him after each time he was pardoned and he stayed in his limited power domain, and therefore he did not have an actual purpose to occupy Istanbul and found a new government.¹⁷⁸

By 1792 upon complaining reports of his raids from Wallachia, his expansionist policies got negative reaction of the central government and Selim responded with a decree ordering capturing Pasbanoğlu and his men. But he got his first pardon from the Sultan thanks to petitions for mercy on him. Zens argued that this pardon meant that Pasbanoğlu was more than a simple bandit but rather someone of greater importance and influence in the region, like a notable, or already a notable.¹⁷⁹ Though as it was soon discovered, Pasbanoğlu did not end his raids or give up his intentions.

¹⁷⁶ HAT.2604, February 1801.

¹⁷⁷ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34; Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin", 183; HAT.2559E, February 1801; HAT.2604; Cevat Eren, "Pazvand-oğlu Osman", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 9 (Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), 532-535; Nagehan Üstündağ, "18. Yüzyılda Vidin Şehrini Sosyo-Ekonomik Panaromasi" (PhD diss. Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2014), 268.

¹⁷⁸ Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 32-34; Nagehan Üstündağ, "18. Yüzyılda Vidin Şehrini Sosyo-Ekonomik Panaromasi", 268-269.

¹⁷⁹ Zens, "Pasvanoglu Osman Pasa and the Pasalık of Belgrade, 1791-1807", 92; Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin", 111-113; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34.

In 1795 the Vidin Guardian Osman Pasha, the Rumeli Governor Mustafa Pasha and some local ayans converged on Vidin and surrounded the city. Though the siege of Vidin did not succeed and when winter came the siege was ended. But gathered forces were not scattered and ordered to stay where they were during the winter. Meanwhile the previous guardian, the judge and the people of Vidin were sending petitions requesting a pardon for Pasbanoğlu. At the beginning of 1796 he was pardoned by the Sultan and the Sublime Porte, with conditions of not helping rebels or bandits and not harassing Wallachian lands. Requests for pardoning him were accepted to avoid greater disorder rising in the region. Though despite his promises, Pasbanoğlu ran another uprising later between 1796-98.¹⁸⁰

We see that after 1797 Pasbanoğlu took control of Niğbolu, Varna, Niş and Sofya came and the Belgrade Castle was rescued with great difficulties. As a solution to this threatening state, Selim III appointed Kapudan Pasha (Küçük Hüseyin Pasha) as Serasker to deal with of Pasbanoğlu and his bandits. Right before the siege of his headquarter, Vidin, Pasbanoğlu requested for mercy but it was refused. The siege of Vidin was begun by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in May 1798. The intended result (of Vidin siege) could not be achieved again, this time due to Napoleon's attack on Egypt, which occurred around these dates. So the siege of Vidin was lifted six months later it had begun. Selim came to terms with Pasbanoğlu because he felt the need to focus his attention on Egypt. Not surprisingly Pasbanoğlu was forgiven and given the rank of vizierate while the central government was dealing with French attacks. After he pulled through the attack and siege of the government he regained his power and not only he took the mountain bandits in the Balkans under his patronage, but he also helped Cengiz

¹⁸⁰ Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin", 123; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34-35; Erdoğan and et al, *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi*, 99.

Mehmed Geray, who led an uprising in Şumnu. There were rumours that these allies were to conquer Istanbul, and to replace the existing government with Cengiz Giray as sultan and Pasbanoğlu as grand vizier. Pasbanoğlu also had an alliance with the rebellious Gürcü Osman Pasha in 1800 and 1801. Osman Pasha got help from Pasbanoğlu's men at his unruly acts and he raided several villages with Pasbanoğlu's bandit chief Kara Feyzi. Later Selim revoked Pasbanoğlu's vizierate and sent forces against him and Pasbanoğlu sent soldiers to Walachia. The Sublime Porte reinstated his position in 1802 under the condition that he would retreat from Walachia. He accepted this condition, and became the ruler of the region again till his death in 1807.¹⁸¹

Mehmed Cengiz Geray was a member of Geray house of Crimea. When Russia annexed Crimea in 1783, he immigrated to the Ottoman Balkans with his other family members. The Gerays became well-integrated into the local politics and they established close relations to local notables through marriage. Cengiz Geray was married to the daughter of the ayan of Tırnova. He fought in a critical Ottoman stronghold during the war of 1787-92 and he successfully defended the fortress. He met with Pasbanoğlu Osman in 1790, a provincial Jannissary officer back then, later to be a powerful magnate of Vidin. When his estate was confiscated by the Ottoman Grand Vizier, he gathered an armed militia around himself and defied the Ottoman state. He raised a considerable amount of mountain bandits in Rumelia, even Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga was among his men in 1791. Due to his uprising, Cengiz Geray declared an outlaw in 1792. He went to countryside for some time as fugitive and then fled to Russia. He could come back to the Ottoman Balkans after 6 years when Selim III pardoned him in 1798. This date coincided with Pasbanoğlu's second

¹⁸¹ A. Cevat Eren, "Pazvand-oğlu, Osman", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 9, (Eskişehir: MEB Yayınları, 2001), 532-535; Zens, "The Ayânlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin"; Rossitsa Gradeva, "Osman Pasbanoğlu of Vidin", 115-161.

pardon wo would have been his ally later. While Cengiz Geray was away from Rumelia, his former man Tirsiniklizade increased his financial and military power and became another magnate in the region. In 1800 when a decree was issued to capture, him and Pasbanoğlu built an alliance, but Tirsiniklizade decided to work with the state officials to capture his former master. It was possible that Tirsiniklizade made this decision because him and Pasbanoğlu had a conflict of interests over Tirnova. Cengiz Geray's forces fought with the Ottoman troops and he was defeated. In 1801 his ally Pasbanoğlu appealed to the Sultan Selim to pardon him and Geray and they both received an amnesty with the help of Russian mediation. After Geray was pardoned he was asked to go to Bursa, but he stayed in Vidin and died there in 1803.¹⁸²

Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was son of Tepedelen Ayanı Veli Beg. One of his most known title was the *mutasarrıf* of Yanya. Hamiyet Sezer, who published her doctoral dissertation on Ali Pasha, called him 'the most powerful *ayan* in Balkans at the end of 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century'. In the 1790s he was influential over a wide region along the Adriatic coasts and Thessaly. During the rise of him and his family, he owned many *çiftliks*, became the Governor of Yenişehir (Larissa), Manastır (Bitola) and Selanik, and also *Derbentler Başbuğu* (guardian of roads and passes). He fought against Russians, Pasbanoğlu's bandits and he was assigned to lure Albanian *sekbans* in rebellious Gürcü Osman Pasha's troops. However Albanian *sekbans* he gained from either Gürcü Osman Pasha or Pasbanoğlu's troops happened to be problematic for himself as well. Cevdet Pasha referred Ali Pasha and Kapudan-ı Derya Hüseyin Pasha as allies. In 1798 they both fought to eliminate Pasbanoğlu, his bandits

¹⁸² Hakan Kırımlı and Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Heirs of Chinghis Khan in the Age of Revolutions: An Unruly Crimean Prince in the Ottoman Empire and Beyond", *Der Islam*, 94 (2), 496-526; Erdoğan and et al, *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi*, 105-110; Zens, "The Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha of Vidin", 154; Moutaftchieva, *L'anarchie dans le Balkans*, 64, 242-43.

and fellows. Tepedelenli had some worries that if Pasbanoğlu and his men were eliminated then his powerful position in Rumelia would have been challenged by the state. He even negotiated with Frenchs to stay indifferent to Pasbanoğlu but when French denied his requests he did not hesitate to face and fight with Pasbanoğlu. When he showed significant military success against French troops he was awarded with vizierate in 1799. He was subsequently appointed as the Governor of Rumelia in 1802 and he tried to rule Rumelia from his home base of power, Yanya. He stayed in this office less than a year. Later Ali and his family lost control over Thessaly but kept Adriatic coasts of Greece and Albania until the beginning of 1820s. Tepedelenli Ali run an uprising against the Ottoman state between 1820-22. He was quite a powerful notable figure in the Rumelia till the date he was killed by the order of the state in 1822 during the reign of Mahmud II.¹⁸³

Tepedelenli and Osman Pasha were both commanders at the siege of Vidin in 1797. Not interestingly, according to Esmer's citation of an intelligence report in 1798,¹⁸⁴ rumors were circulating that commanders of the siege of Vidin such as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, İbrahim Pasha, and even Sirozlu İsmail Aga were clandestinely meeting with Pasbanoğlu to discuss settlements among these men without the approval of İstanbul. Esmer notes that Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Yanya interacted with Kara Feyzi.¹⁸⁵ Tepedelenli was appointed as the governor of Rumeli in 1803, in the same year

¹⁸³ Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. I, 277; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1254, 1586, 1607, 1663-6; *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. IV, 1825-6, 1830-31, 1840; Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, vol. IV, 135; Entela Muço, *Yanya Valisi Tepedelenli Ali Paşa ve Emlakı* (İstanbul: Alem Yayıncılık, 2010); Hamiyet Sezer, "Tepedelenli Ali Paşa ve Oğullarının Çiftlik ve Gelirlerine İlişkin Yeni Bilgi – Bulgular", *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*, 18 (2005), 333-357; Hamiyet Sezer, *Tepedelenli Ali Paşa İsyanı*; Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 89-91; Ali Yaycıoğlu, "Sened-i İttifak (1808): Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bir Ortaklık ve Entegrasyon Denemesi", in Seyfi Kenan, ed., *Nizam-ı Kadimden Nizam-ı Cedid'e*, 682; Yaycıoğlu, "Provincial Power-Holders and the Empire", 436-452; İsmail Soysal, *Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diploması Münasebetleri (1789-1802)* (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 170-72; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 56

¹⁸⁴ Esmer, "A Culture of Rebellion", 191.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

Osman Pasha died who were fighting to re-gain this post. Shaw argues that Ali Pasha's success in handling with bandits made Pasbanoğlu and Tirsiniklizade scared and they feared that Ali Pasha might annex their lands in the name of the sultan. Therefore they complained about his oppression in the region and convinced the sultan to dismiss him.¹⁸⁶ Tepedelenli rebelled later than the date Osman Pasha died, during the reign of Mahmud II under the changed circumstances and balance of this period in Rumeli.

İşkodrahı Kara Mahmud Pasha inherited the title of the *mutasarrıf* of İşkodra from his father. He ruled over Kiga/ Northern Albania.¹⁸⁷ Cevdet Pasha introduced him as an unruly and defiant Albanian local figure whom the central government managed to control by punishing sometimes and tolerate and negotiate some other times according to the needs of the time. One of his uprisings was suppressed by Gazi Hasan Pasha in 1785 and later Hasan Pasha even vetoed his becoming a vizier. Other Rumelian notables Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and Ohrili Ahmed Pasha helped him fight state officials trying to suppress his forces. Though Ali Pasha and Mahmud Pasha had a volatile relationship that could easily turn into hostile attacks to each others' ruling regions. The state benefited from Ali Pasha's authority and power in order to restrain Mahmud Pasha. Cevdet Pasha stated that Mahmud Pasha had 30 thousand men under his command when he went to Vidin as the Guardian of Vidin in 1791/92. Mahmud Pasha was deposed several times due to his unruly behaviours till he was murdered in July 1796.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 313-314.

¹⁸⁷ Cevdet Pasha separated Albanian geographical regions into two sub-regions; Kiga and Toska. He defined Kara Mahmud Pasha as leader of Kiga Albanians and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of Toska Albanians. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. II, 935-941; *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1611-2.

¹⁸⁸ Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. III, 926; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. II, 935, 937, 985-6 ; *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1166, 1251, 1287, 1607; Uzunçarşılı, IV/I, 615-8; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 40.

Tayyar Mahmud Pasha was member of a grand dynasty dominated over Western Black Sea and North-Eastern Anatolia, Caniklizes. In order to understand Tayyar Mahmud we need to look into his father and grandfather figures as well. His grandfather Canikli Ali Pasha utilized wide range of opportunities Ottoman Russian war delivered him and his household prospered greatly in both economic and political terms. Ali Pasha had many appointments such as Muhassıl of Canik, *Serasker* for Crimean campaign, *Serasker* of Kars, Governor of Trabzon, *Mutasarrıf* of Amasya until he called a rebel in 1779. Then Ali Pasha and Battal Pasha escaped to Crimea which turned into a big problem for the state for one year. Ali Pasha was pardoned in 1781 and died four years later. When he died the control over this region was passed to his son Battal Pasha and his grandson Tayyar Pasha. Battal Pasha's first appointment was by his father, as the Mutesellim of Amasya, and the second was of Canik. When his father's death he was promoted to the rank of vizierate and appointed to Erzurum, then to Trabzon as the Governor. In 1787-92 Ottoman-Russian war he served together with his son Tayyar Pasha. When Battal Pasha as *Serasker* of Anapa defied his orders he was declared as a rebel, fled to Russia, and stayed there until 1799. After Battal Pasha's defeat in 1790, his **Kethüda Sarı Abdullah Pasha** had the offices of governorship of both Erzurum and Trabzon and became *Serasker* of Anapa. Abdullah Pasha had been his father's first slave then *Kethüda* and it is possible that Battal was in competition with Abdullah. This same Abdullah Pasha had been sent to Istanbul for security reasons when his patron escaped to Crimea almost ten years ago. Back then Abdullah Pasha had stayed at the house of Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha in Istanbul with Koca Yusuf Pasha who would later be Grand Vizier in the year of 1790. The relationship between Abdullah Pasha and Yusuf Pasha could be a determinant for Abdullah's appointments in 1790. However Abdullah Pasha did not go to Anapa either and when Russians invaded the fortress of Anapa he was killed due to his disobedience. Between the years 1792 and

1799 Battal Pasha was in exile with his son Tayyar Mahmud Pasha. They were pardoned in 1799 and Canik and Trabzon was passed to Tayyar Pasha this time. When his father died in 1801, Tayyar was in fight with Rumelian bandits. At the meantime Kara Feyzi, the significant bandit leaders of his time, came to Edirne.¹⁸⁹ A year later he was assigned to follow Gürcü Osman Pasha the rebel and capture him. Tayyar gave amnesty to Kara Feyzi and his men so that he could prevent Osman from joining forces with Feyzi. In order to provide Tayyar Pasha his need of revenue for this mission he was appointed as the governors of Diyarbakır and then Erzurum. He fulfilled this mission in a year as we know from Osman Pasha's story. At the beginning of 1800's a report of a state officials mentioned that Tayyar had several powerful alliances in the region and could succeed to collect 20 thousand soldiers under his command. He was also said to be supporting some people in Istanbul who were secretly opposing the New Order. The competition between Caniklizada and Çapanoğlu families over regional leadership turned into an open crises in 1802, and the central government learned Tayyar's collecting military forces and building networks in northeastern Anatolia against his rival family and military reforms of the New Order. In 1805 he was dismissed from his offices and declared a rebel, just like his father and grandfather had been previously, and he fled to Russia for the second time. After two years with the rebellion of 1807, when Selim III was dethroned and the New Order was ended, and Tayyar came back to Istanbul. First he appointed as the Governor of Trabzon. He even hold the office of Deputy Grand Vizier for a very short time. He died in 1808 when Mahmud II became the new Sultan.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ HAT.3122, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2657 May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2658 May 1801 (agyt).

¹⁹⁰ Şahin, "The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family", 48-82 Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, 101-103; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. V, 1626; *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. I, 82; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. II, 985.

Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga was one of the most important local notables of Rumelia in the 1790s. Uzunçarşılı referred him as the most brave and crafty local notable of Rumelia. He mostly ruled over a sub-district at the southern coast of Danube River, Rusçuk, which is a significant spot for naval battles. He was the Ayan of Rusçuk. Erdoğan, Ferlibaş and Çolak mentioned of him as a *sekban* soldier engaged in banditry from the mid 1780s to 1796. These times were the ones the state utilized local figures against each other and declared them as rebel when they got too strong or when they were not needed any more. For the campaigns against Pasbanoğlu Osman, Tirsiniklizade İsmail was assigned to follow and capture him and his followers. He served under the services of both the *Voyvoda* of Eflak Mavriyani for campaigns against Russians and Austrians, and of Gürcü Osman Pasha to eliminate Rumelian bandits. Mavriyani supported Tirsiniklizade when there was an execution order for him due to his unruly acts, before in 1795. Then in 1797 Osman Pasha (the Governor of Silistre of the time) asked a favor of İsmail for his military success against Pasbanoğlu's bandits. Here we should remember that Osman Pasha and Mavriyani had previously shared the same household of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha. The Ottoman central administration used Tirsiniklizade mostly as an instrument of balance against another powerful notable of the region, the *Ayan* of Deliorman and the *Mütesellim* of Silistre Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga. Due to Tirsiniklizade's expansionist moves towards Balkan's north-eastern lands, there was a conflict between him and Yılıkzade and the state mostly took side with Yılıkzade against Tirsiniklizade. İsmail had alliances with some bandit leaders of Pasbanoğlu Osman, like Gavur İmam, Molla Ali and Koşancalı Halil, even though such actions were quite risky and could easily bring dismissal and desposition. Interestingly, even though Tirsiniklizade established alliances with Pasbanoğlu's men, Pasbanoğlu himself was his rival. Uzunçarşılı evaluated İsmail's

such actions as opportunist policies of him. According to him, Tirsiniklizade was seemingly obedient to the state but he prioritized his own interests over the state's and took advantage of every chaotic and rebellious situation in Rumelia whenever he saw fit. We could see this pattern at his relation with Osman Pasha as well. He served under Osman's service until Osman was declared rebel by the state. Though when Osman Pasha was pardoned in 1802 for a short period and assigned to Silistre as governor, Tirsiniklizade did not see harm in cooperating with him again to enter into Silistre, because that region and its revenue sources attracted him. And later when Osman was sent to Anatolia as a strategic move to send him away from Rumelia and eventually to capture him, İsmail joined the team assigned to kill Osman. Tirziniklizade İsmail was shifty by his alliances with the bandits too. For example we know that he fought against Gavur İmam, an ally of him before, fiercely in 1798 at the very side of the state. In accordance with his ayanship, Tirsiniklizade built coalitions with other minor local figures as well, ending up with patronage-based alliances. Alemdar Mustafa and Pehlivan İbrahim were examples of such relations. **Alemdar Mustafa** was his close associate and known as a follower of Tirsiniklizade and Ayan of Razgrad. Alemdar Mustafa succeeded Tirsiniklizade İsmail as the *Ayan* of Rusçuk after his patron died then rose rapidly in the imperial hierarchy up to grand vizierate. In 1806 the central government was alarmed by Tirsiniklizade's increasing regional consolidation and his opposition to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* policies, so he ended up being murdered by *Nizam-ı Cedid* supporters at his ranch. It is important to note that he did not set an opposing position for the *Nizam-ı Cedid* policies until 1806, on the contrary he supported them. His shifting position suggested that he supported defended, at least publicly, of Selim as long as they did not conflict with his own interests. Yaycıoğlu noted that the

intention of establishing new order troops in Rumelia was a clear breaking point for the loyalty of all the Rumelian janissaries, agas and households.¹⁹¹

Pehlivan İbrahim Aga was one of Tirsiniklizade İsmail's proteges. He was known as Baba Pasha. Pehlivan became a volunteer at the Ottoman-Russian war between 1774-1789 then 1787-1792. In 1789 he served under the command of Alo Pasha at the army of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha when he was Serasker of İsmail. His first patron Alo Pasha helped him rise and Pehlivan Aga followed Alo Pasha for ten years went to Anatolia then Rumelia with his patron. They both participated the siege of Vidin in 1798 against Pasbanoğlu but the siege was a failure and Alo Pasha was killed because he was thought to be partly responsible for the defeat. After the death of Alo Pasha, Pehlivan Aga with his men hide and wandered around Tırnova without a patron until he met with Tirziniklizade. Tirsiniklizade İsmail, the *Ayan* of Tırnova faced with Pehlivan Aga as he believed him to be a danger to his own influence in the region. Though Tirsiniklizade was impressed by Pehlivan's military and organizational abilities and later Pehlivan joined among his men till the day this second patron of him died in 1806. In 1801 Pehlivan was assigned to stop Gürcü Osman Pasha and his men by the order of Tirsiniklizade and then fought against Pasbanoğlu's bandits. He was awarded with the rank of vizierate in 1809 and appointed as governor for several Anatolian districts. He died in 1830.¹⁹²

The conflict between **Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga** and Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga began when Süleyman was appointed as the Mütesellim of Silistre instead of

¹⁹¹ Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. III, 1656; Erdoğan and et al, eds. , *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi*; Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılıköğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, 8-32; Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, 92-97; Yaycıoğlu, "Sened-i İttifak (1808)" 682-85; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 47-51.

¹⁹² Gazzizâde Abdullatif Efendi, *Vekayi-i Baba Paşa fî't-târih*, Salih Erol, ed., (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 32-75, 112-142; Ali Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, 93.

Tirsiniklizade's man Battal Aga, due to his defiant acts. Tirsiniklizade perceived this desposal as a move of the state against him. Their dispute continued till Tirsiniklizade's death and was mostly about regional dominance. In 1802 when Gürcü Osman Pasha appointed to Silistre as governor, Osman Pasha and Tirsiniklizade allied to enter into Silistre by force, but Yılıkzade Süleyman blocked them. In the end the government offered another district to Osman Pasha so the case was precluded from becoming a bigger problem. Yılıkzade Süleyman sided with one of the Pasbanoğlu's bandit leaders, Manav İbrahim and Kara Feyzi, just like Tirsiniklizade did with Gavur İmam. Even after Manav İbrahim was captured and killed Yılıkzade took his bandits into his service. There were reports informing about Yılıkzade's corresponding with Kara Feyzi. However the state tolerated his unruly behaviours as long as he stopped Tirsiniklizade from gaining more power. After Tirsiniklizade's death and his follower Alemdar's new post in Silistre made Yılıkzade ran from Silistre but returned to his base when Alemdar got killed. A few years later he was declared an outlaw, captured and killed.¹⁹³

3.1.3 Concluding Remarks

Throughout this sub-chapter I examine several aspects of patronage relations and political networks of figures over twenty in number, who lived in the 1790s and in the early 1800s. Although the figures, except from Osman Pasha, were elaborated mostly from secondary sources, it is still possible to see significant patterns and tendencies in terms of patronages and networks between these people. Firstly when we look at the types of solidarities established, it is seen that ethnic-regional solidarities had the

¹⁹³ Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail, Yılıkoğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, 33-39; Erdoğan, and et al, eds., *Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağa ve Dönemi*, 40-50, 83-87, 116-17.

potential to be influential in career advancement of candidate officials but their importance seemed remaining secondary.

The main character of this study is clearly a Georgian by origin. Naturally it is a valid question to ask whether this origin led to a *cins* solidarity for him, and whether it provided any benefits for his career line, or not. A Georgian researcher Murat Kasap argues at his book on Ottoman Georgians that relationship between Georgians and Ottomans initiated at the second half of the 15th century and Georgian figures began to be more effective in the Ottoman state business since the 16th century.¹⁹⁴ Throughout the coming centuries, many Georgian people were trained as politicians, civilian and military officers in the Ottoman state and these people served the state and gained remarkable posts.

In Gürcü Osman Pasha's story we have not encountered any clear/ definite relationship between Osman Pasha and other Georgian figures of his time that could provide him certain individual advancement. In other words there is no evidence suggesting that Osman Pasha, for instance, had a post assigned or got off from a punishment distinctively because he was of Georgian origin and another Georgian figure helped him due to this ethnic (*cins*) solidarity. But when looked at the time span of this study, mainly between 1780s and 1800s, it is seen that there was a notable number of Georgian figures even at the highest ranks of the state, such as Halil Hamid Pasha, Koca Yusuf Pasha (who shared the same household and patron with Osman Pasha), Yusuf Ziya Pasha and another two guessed to be of Caucasian origin and possibly of Georgian, Cezayirli Hasan Pasha (Osman's patron) and Küçük Hüseyin

¹⁹⁴ Kasap, *Osmanlı Gürcüleri*, 8. His multi-biographical book focuses on this Georgian group of people under specific sub-parts, throughout the Ottoman history; Grand Viziers, Janissary chiefs, Kapudan Pashas, Religious officials, State officials, Palace officials, Artists and Royal Women.

Pasha (official assigned to capture the rebellious Osman). Kasap says that Georgian statesmen, maybe not overtly but still effectively, protected people from their own ethnic-regional group.¹⁹⁵ And as Kunt argued ethnic and regional origins of state officials played a meaningful role, in determining the career of a candidate official, slave or free.¹⁹⁶ However these origins were not the only influential factors for one's career as we mentioned above. Such a solidarity did not mean ever-lasting alliances and it certainly did not stop in-group conflicts from happening. Coming back to Osman Pasha, even though we could not prove this, he might have had some support since he was Georgian. On the other hand when Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had the task of capturing the rebellious Osman Pasha, his possible Georgian origin did not stop him from chasing up Osman. In Osman's case *intisab* was a much more important factor defining his career advancement.

Not only in Osman Pasha's case but also for other figures of the time, patronage-based relations and networks among people from a same household or a family appeared to be more determinant in the success of Ottoman officials, or notables. Within the figures studied, while patronage connections and household solidarities formed mostly among non-ayan governors, family line for career advancement was generally utilized by local notables as expected.

Surely patronage relations were long-lasting but not ever-lasting and they could be broken for many reasons. For example, when Koca Yusuf Pasha threatened his patron Hasan Pasha's overdominance and when Şahin Ali Pasha disobeyed the same patron's wishes, both lost their patron's support that led them to their deposition. Furthermore death of a patron or a patron's fall from favor of the center also cause a

¹⁹⁵ Kasap, *ibid.*, 26.

¹⁹⁶ Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity", 233-239.

break in patronage relationships. Death is a force-major factor here and forcing the protege to find another patron to serve. Though disfavor of a patron is a more complex situation. The protege could either decline together with his patron or he could maintain his advancement if he had a strong position or a source of revenue of his own. In Gürcü Osman Pasha's case we should assume that Osman had a strong position to continue his career advancement even after a three years of exile, and the lack of a fortune of his own.

If we evaluate patronage relations of the figures chosen here in more detail, we see that Cezayirli Hasan Pasha was a central figure among all other figures of the time, generally through direct patronage or through rivalry. Hasan Pasha had the most patron-protege connections till he died in 1790, and even after his death his proteges kept rising in their career. His proteges were mostly military figures. Hasan's arch-rival Halil Hamid Pasha had several proteges of his own, who were military and also bureaucratic figures. The only patronage I have come across among local notables is of Tirsiniklizade İsmail. One of his proteges was also a notable, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.

Coming to Osman Pasha, he was an ambitious man but he neither had a powerful family nor a vast fortune, so he had to find a solid patronage relationship to secure his future. His military skills must have provided him to catch attention of a powerful patron and thus his rise upward began. According to the documents, the only patron he served was Cezayirli Hasan Pasha, an outstanding figure of his time. It is not known how or when his patron Hasan Pasha and him met and matched but we could guess that it had happened during the wars against Russians, probably in the second half of 1780s.

From the 1780s onwards Osman's remarkable military talents and great ambitions turned out to be quite beneficial for a career at the Ottoman central administration offices. As a reference of his successful achievements within the administrative sector, we could take the initial steps of his advancements, as guardian along the Danubian shores. Then the governorship positions he occupied brought him significant military, fiscal and political power.

Patron of Osman Pasha, Cezayirli Hasan Pasha died in 1790, when Osman Pasha could not start up to his rise yet. One might think that after his patron's death his career trajectory could have taken a serious setback. At first his patron's death slightly set his career back around three years, but after we see a phase of rise in his career for long as ten years, till he reached the position of Rumelian governorship. On that matter we could say that Hasan Pasha's end did not have a significant negative influence on Osman's career path. Or maybe Hasan was so powerful that even after his demise he could protect his men, or the relationships between the fellows at his household were very strong and would have continued even after their patron was gone. We have no information that he found a new patron to serve after 1790. Yet after losing his patron Osman definitely formed new alliances and partnerships and established his own household and retinue.

I evaluate Osman Pasha's possible connections with all the aforementioned people through a table and a visual figure coming in the next pages. In the table the connections with Osman and other ones are listed in short. The figure presents Osman's estimated close network circle. Here I suggest three categories for Osman's relations, direct, indirect and implied. Direct relations are through patronage or serving under an official for a specific task, while indirect relations refer to ones could be connected through Osman's patron (Hasan Pasha) and his partner in his rebellion

(Pasbanoğlu). The implied category covers people shared the same household with Osman, his opponents, ones supported him or assigned to eliminate him. An implied connection means that there is no evidence of a connection between two people, but there is a high possibility that a personal connection might be experienced.

Table 2. Connections of the Prominent Figures with Gürcü Osman Pasha

Name	Connection to Gürcü Osman Pasha
Cezayirli Hasan Pasha	Osman Pasha's patron
Halil Hamid Pasha	Rival of Osman's patron
Şahin Ali Pasha	Shared same household with Osman
Koca Yusuf Pasha	Shared same household & Grand Vizier when Osman was guardian along Danube costs
Yusuf Ziya Pasha	Protégé of Osman's patron's rival (Halil Hamid) & Grand Vizier during Osman's rebellion & Supported Osman against Hakkı Mehmed Pasha
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha	Osman served under his command & Sided with Hakkı (his protégé) againsts Osman
Kürd Alo Pasha	Shared same household & After his death his soldiers were transferred to Osman's retinue
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Osman served under his command (1795-96) & Osman's biggest rival (1800-1802)
Halil Pasha	Shared same household with Osman
Melek Mehmed Pasha	Rival of Osman's patron
Eflak V. Mavriyani	Shared same household with Osman
Pasbanoğlu Osman P.	Osman's partner during Osman's rebellion
Mehmed Cengiz Geray	Partnered with Pasbanoğlu during Osman's rebellion
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	Allies with Osman's rivals Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and Hakkı Pasha & Joined the team assigned to face Gürcü Osman during his rebellion
İşkodralı Mehmed P.	Opponent of Osman's patron
Tayyar Mahmud Pasha	Tayyar's father's kethüda had been appointed to the household of Osman's patron & Assigned to capture and kill Osman during his riot
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Served under Osman's command in 1797-98 & Assigned to eliminate Osman during his rebellion & Allies in 1802 again to enter into Silistre
Pehlivan İbrahim Aga	Assigned to capture Osman during his rebellion
Yılıkzade Süleyman	Osman's opponent over Silistre dominance

Table 3. Connection Typology for the Connections between Osman Pasha and other Prominent Figures of the Time

Name	Connection Typology¹⁹⁷
Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha	Direct
Halil Hamid Pasha	Indirect
Şahin Ali Pasha	Implied ¹⁹⁸
Koca Yusuf Pasha	Implied
Yusuf Ziya Pasha	Implied
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha	Direct
Kürd Alo Pasha	Implied
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Direct
Halil Pasha	Implied
Melek Mehmed Pasha	Indirect
Eflak Voyvodası Mavriyani	Implied
Pasbanoglu Osman Pasha	Direct
Mehmed Cengiz Geray	Indirect
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	Implied
İşkodralı Mehmed Pasha	Indirect
Tayyar Mahmud Pasha	Implied
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Direct
Pehlivan İbrahim Aga	Implied
Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga	Implied

¹⁹⁷ Independent from the types of connection, it seems that there is a consolidation tendency of his connections with the people, who were either his ally or rival, but mostly rival.

¹⁹⁸ The implied connections need to be clarified and confirmed (with further researches) to see whether there was a direct connection between referred people and Osman Pasha.

OSMAN PASHA'S ESTIMATED CLOSE NETWORK CIRCLE




Figure 3. Close Network Circle of Gürcü Osman Pasha

Here I would like to present another figure referring to Pasbanoğlu's network of banditry, and two more tables elaborating the detected alliances and conflicts between the people of this study. Looking at connections established between Pasbanoğlu and Cengiz Geray, Tirsiniklizade İsmail, Tepedelenli Ali, Gürcü Osman Pasha, Kürd Alo Pasha, and Tayyar Mahmud Pasha we could see that their relationships were quite volatile and shifty. Except from Cengiz Geray, other ones were both joined the side of the state against Pasbanoğlu at one date and allied or tend to ally with him at another date. As far as I understand these figures were not Pasbanoğlu's rivals, but they rather obeyed the orders of the central government assigning them to face with him. But whenever, they have a possible benefit from allying with Pasbanoğlu they considered collaborating with him. In Gürcü Osman Pasha's case for instance, the benefits were military support against the state troops during his rebellion and extra revenues collected from the provincial districts through pillaging. Also the very story of Pasbanoğlu is a good example of shifty alliances and volatile connections. Pasbanoğlu had very fluctuating relations with the Ottoman state as he had more than one uprising and pardon from the state.

In the environment of competition over offices and revenue sources took place in the 18th century, the competing parts were not constant on the contrary they were quite variable, focusing on mutual interests or difference of interests. Shifty alliances and relations of local notables were generally fueled with the policies and regulations of the state that could harm their benefits and their ambitions to expand their power domain. As it comes to non-ayan provincial or central governors it appears that power struggles over revenue sources and posts were determinants.

PASBANOĞLU'S NETWORK OF VIOLENCE & BANDITRY




Figure 4. Pasbanoğlu Osman' s Network of Violence and Banditry

Table 4. Alliances in 1790s and Early 1800s

ALLIES		Motivations and Reasons
Gürcü Osman Pasha	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Against Pasbanoglu and his bandits & to win the government's appreciation and to get higher posts in 1797-98 In order to enter into Silistre & against Silistre Mütesellimi Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga in 1802
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Vidinli Pasbanoglu Osman	Expanding power domain & Supporting Rumelian bandits
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Eflak Voyvodası Mavriyani	Mavriyani supported Tirsiniklizade when there was a death sentence for him
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga	United their forces despite the feud between them to prevent Pasbanoglu from gaining too much power in Rumelia & Also collaborated against Nizam-ı cedid troops establishing in Rumelia
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	İşkodralı Mahmud Pasha	Combining their military forces to expand their power domains
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	Küçük Hüseyin Pasha	To catch and punish Gürcü Osman Pasha during his rebellion
Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Against Nizam-ı cedid troops establishing in Rumelia in 1806
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Tepedelenli Ali Pasha	To catch and punish Gürcü Osman Pasha during his rebellion - This alliance broke when Hakkı was dismissed from the Governorship of Rumelia in 1802
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	To catch and punish Gürcü Osman Pasha during his rebellion
Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Küçük Hüseyin Pasha	To catch and punish Gürcü Osman Pasha during his rebellion

Table 5. Rivalries in 1790s and Early 1800s

PARTIES OF RIVALRIES		Motivations and Reasons
Cezayirli Hasan Pasha	Halil Hamid Pasha	Power conflict & Hasan revealed Hamid's dethronement operation for Abdülhamid I in 1785, in favor of Selim III and the New Order policies
Cezayirli Hasan Pasha	Melek Mehmed Pasha	Mehmed Pasha represented the political faction in favor of the New Order and he was political opponent of both Hasan Pasha and his man Koca Yusuf
Cezayirli Hasan Pasha	Şahin Ali Pasha	Şahin Ali Pasha did not obey Hasan Pasha's (his patron) orders to provide a better position for Koca Yusuf Pasha (another protégé of Hasan Pasha) & Ali was overwhelmed by Hasan's over dominance
Cezayirli Hasan Pasha	Koca Yusuf Pasha	Yusuf Pasha's trying to exercise his full authority as the Grand Vizier between 1786-1789 & Declaring a war against his patron's opposition
Gürcü Osman Pasha	Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Fighting over the position of Rumelian Governorship between 1800-1801
Gürcü Osman Pasha	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	During Osman Pasha's rebellion İsmail Aga was mostly against him
Gürcü Osman Pasha	Tayyar Mahmud Pasha	Tayyar Mahmud Pasha was assigned to catch and kill the rebellious Osman Pasha & Mahmud also wanted to have governorship of Erzurum, which was Osman's post at the time
Gürcü Osman Pasha	Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga	When assigned as the Governor of Silistre in 1802, Osman tried to enter into Silistre by force despite Süleyman's refusal
Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Yılıkzade Süleyman Aga	Power domain conflict over Silistre region and its revenue sources
Yusuf Ziya Pasha	Hakkı Mehmed Pasha	Hakkı Pasha was powerful enough to be the next grand vizier and Yusuf Ziya Pasha (the acting Grand Vizier in 1800) saw him as a strong competition & Ziya and his Kaïmmakam supported secretly Osman Pasha during the fight between Osman and Hakkı over Rumelian governorship (1800-1801)

3.2 Vizier Households

3.2.1 Overview of Vizier Households and Their Structure

Kapı halkı (retinue/ household) is a term designating people in service of grand viziers, viziers and other important state officials such as guardians. The household members of a vizier looked after the military, administrative and financial affairs of state officials and their number was a strong reference to the power of their patron. The central government preferred officials with larger and stronger households when determining new appointments. A special expression was used for pashas with ideally perfect (large) households; *kapısı mükemmel*. However a disloyal or an unruly official with a large household also posed more significant threat to the central authority. Therefore when the Ottoman government felt uncomfortable against powerful household of a specific figure, it was asked him to send away some of his men.¹⁹⁹

The people of *kapı halkı* could be categorized into three groups; administrative members (*ağas*), military troops, and family (*aile* and *harem*).²⁰⁰ The group of *ağas* is divided into two sub-groups, as inner service (*iç ağalar/ enderun ağaları*) and outer service *ağas* (*dış ağalar/ birun ağaları*). These officials are responsible for administrative, financial and military services of viziers. Ones dealing with inner services are mainly; *Hazinedar ağa, Silahdar iç çuhadarı, Cephaneçibaşı, Mühürdar ağa, Divittar ağa, Kaftan ağa, Peşkircibaşı, Miftah ağası, Hazine baş yamağı, Tütüncübaşı, Kahvecibaşı, Sofracıbaşı, Makramacıbaşı, Buhurdanbaşı, Kilerçibaşı, Macun ağası, Seccadebaşı, Müezzinbaşı, Enderun başçavuşu, Gökrek bayraktar, Cündibaşı, İç mehterbaşı, Başçuhadar, Ser destari, Ehram ağası* and etc. Ones

¹⁹⁹ Mehmet İpşirli, “Kapı Halkı”, *DİA*, vol. 24 (Ankara: TDV, 2001) 343-344; Pakalın, “Kapı Halkı” *Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, vol. II (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1993), 172; Robert Mantran, “Kapi”, *EL²*, vol. IV, (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 568; Cezar, *Leventler*, 257-285.

²⁰⁰ I will discuss mostly the first two groups in this dissertation.

handling outer services are; *Kethüda bey*, *Kapıcılar kethüdası*, *Delilbaşı*, *Silahdar ağa*, *Tüfekçibaşı*, *Çuhadar ağa*, *Humbaracılar bölükbaşı*, *Selam ağası*, *Vekil-i harç ağa*, *İmrahorbaşı ağa*, *Mehterbaşı ağa*, *Başsilahşör*, *Arpa emini*, *Kethüda katibi*, *Masraf katibi*, *Kiler ağası*, *Et katibi*, *Yemeklik ağası*, *Alay başçavuşu*, *Mataracıbaşı*, *Şatırbaşı*, and etc.²⁰¹ We see military commanders in the second sub-group of outer-service *ağas*. Even though they are soldiers as well, I take them as administrative officials of Osman Pasha's household. The soldiers these commanders led would be discussed in the coming chapter, within the context of numbers of Osman Pasha's soldiers in years, the military and financial difficulties of having high numbers of soldiers. The categories here as administrative officials and military units are coinciding with Kunt's categorization of permanent household and temporary personel (*delils*, *bölükbaşıs* and *sekbans*).²⁰² Administrative officials, including high-ranked military commanders, could be called as the permanent or the core household members.

The household of a vizier should be consisted of enough number of competent servants and soldiers so that their patron could function properly. Surely the central government also expects loyalty and obedience from the household members as a condition to serve under service of a vizier. As mentioned before, the government's increasing dependence on the vizier households for military needs caused the viziers recruiting more soldiers and servants at their retinue. Increased numbers of soldiers at the households not only provided the governmental needs but also served personal benefits of the viziers. According to Uzunçarşılı both administrative and fiscal officials along with soldiers in a household of a vizier could add up to at least three hundreds

²⁰¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: TTK, 1984), 168-170; Pakalın, "Kapı halkı", 172.

²⁰² Metin Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Yıllık Gelir-Gideri: Diyarbekir, 1670-71*(İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1981), 54-58.

of people. This number could increase and jump to tens of thousands during the war times and while actively fighting against bandits.²⁰³ Naturally larger the retinue, greater the cost of the household would be. We could see examples of high expenditures of vizier households in income-expense records (*defters*) of viziers and also in public-expense registers (*tevzi defters*) of provincial districts. In the eighteenth century there were many complaints from the districts about excessive expenses of soldiers. Besides financial difficulties, large households also appeared to be challenging to organize and discipline, so better-skilled, experienced and strong military commanders became a great necessity.

The households of viziers should have developed like the imperial household at first with the object of serving its interests. With the changes in the *devşirme* and palace training systems, the Ottoman ruling elite started to recruit their own men more autonomously and in accordance with their own benefits more than of the states.²⁰⁴ Consequently the households of viziers grew importance at the late 16th and the 17th centuries and they appeared to unfold their own reasons for existence; to serve the patron of the household. The 18th century was full of cases where the needs and interests of a vizier superseded ones of the palace and the Sultan.²⁰⁵ Thus household of a vizier functioned as, not only servants for assisting their patron to deal with state or personal business but also, as the means of gaining power and ultimately as small partners in success getting their own share from achievements acquired. And being

²⁰³ Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, 207; İpşirli, “Kapı halkı”, 344.

²⁰⁴ Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980), 36; Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 32.

²⁰⁵ Rifaat Abou- El-Haj, “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households”, 447; Azize F. Çakır, “Households in Ottoman Politics: The Rivalry Between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt”, (Master Thesis, Sabancı University, 2013), 18-35.

member of a vizier household turned out to be an essential factor in the Ottoman politics, along with the patronage connections.²⁰⁶

But we should be aware that a vizier household is not a homogenous entity having a complete united structure, but it is generally consisted of people having different ideas, needs, aspirations and interests. For instance, while the military elements, soldiers, of the households could pursue better salary alternatives, administrative elements would mostly aspire to a more advanced career with higher appointments and promotions. In the case of Osman Pasha his rebellion and his fall from favor of the center and the Sultan, created obvious difference of opinions, as in maintaining their allegiance to their patron or leaving and betraying him.

At this part of the study, I will present members (except from military units) of Osman Pasha's household that I found out from the documents, explaining their duties, their relationships with their patron, which ones were more prominent or efficient and how they contributed to his rise and fall. It is also quite important to examine the changes in his household in order to get an understanding of interactions and power struggles between the state and its officials assigned to the provinces. With this aim the administrative members from Osman Pasha's household will be analyzed in detail.

3.2.2 Household of Gürcü Osman Pasha

3.2.2.1 Members of His Household During His Rise

I will examine the household of Osman Pasha in two basic periods of his life; his rise and his fall and rebellion. As discussed in earlier pages, Osman Pasha started his career at a

²⁰⁶ Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 83, 95.

vizier's household and then he got several guardianship positions via his military skills and probably through connections of his patron. After his guardianship posts he was in exile in Keşan for a few years. Then with the bandits attacks becoming widespread he was back to duty with another guardianship post in Vidin. When his vizierate is reinstated after his exile his household significantly enlarged. However this enlargement should have been at the temporary military personnel group. Sources confirm that he was ordered to recruit large number of soldiers when he was the Guardian of Vidin, as a preparation for attacks against Pasbanoğlu and the mountain bandits.

I have not encountered information about Osman Pasha's household for the period of his several guardianship positions. However previous researches suggest that *muhafız* pashas lived at mansions (*Muhafız paşa konağı*) allocated to them. Those mansions are also called gate (*kapı*) of a pasha and they are located in the most distinguished places in the city.

Income-expense *defters* in the archives provide us valuable clues about possible household members of a *muhafız* pasha. For instance, in an expense register belonging to *Anapa Muhafızı* in 1795 shows that here were; *divan katibi*, *kapıcılar kethudası*, *hazinedar*, *selam ağası*, *saman emini*, *mirâhor*, *mehterân*, *sancakdar*, *imam*, *hazine katibi*, *çukadar*, *dûhancı*, *ibrikdâr*, *berber*, *kilerci*, *mühürdar*, *kahveci* at the pasha's retinue.²⁰⁷ Here we could infer that Osman Pasha should have a similar household structure, during his guardianships along Danubian costs.

We encounter initial information about members of Osman Pasha's household in a document regarding Keşan's public-expense registers (*tevzi defters*). It seems that

²⁰⁷ Engin, "1787-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sırasında İbrail Kalesi," 16-19; BOA, D.BŞM. d 6364 (Mart 1795) Mahir Aydın, "Kaleler", in Gültekin Yıldız, ed., *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi: Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri, 1792-1918* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2017), 15-45, 39.

Osman Pasha, who was ordered to rush to Vidin with his mükemmel household, began to appear more often in the documents produced by the central administration. After this post, there are more documents addressing or mentioning him and his men. When he was sent to Keşan he was a demoted vizier (*merfuü 'l-vüzare*) without a considerable revenue source. The number of soldiers at his household at this date is not known but we can understand from other documents that his existing revenue did not suffice to cover needs of his family and household. The mentioned document about Keşan's public-expense registers gives names of some members at his household. According to this *Silahdar* (person responsible for weapons) Nuri Aga, *Başçukadar Ağa* (chief of pages), *Delilbaşı Ağa*, *Ağavat-ı enderun* (inner service ağas), *Tüfenkçiyân* (musketeers) ve *Delil* soldiers (irregular cavalry) were serving at Osman Pasha's household in 1795.²⁰⁸

A report from *hatt-ı hümayun* collection shows that Osman Pasha had a treasurer (*hazinedar*) name Menla/Monla Aga under his service while he was the Guardian of Vidin. We also find out that Osman Pasha appointed his old servant Ayan of Tırnova Memiş Aga as a deputy when he was leaving Vidin for his next post.²⁰⁹ Later when appointed as the Governor of Silistre in 1796, his house started to grow and become more institutionalized. For more than two years his political, military and financial power sources seem to be escalated immensely. The first mentions about the number of his soldiers are from this period, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. This period signifies a time when he took more roots in the local and stood as a more localized actor in the provinces. Financial needs stemmed from his increased number of soldiers had a significant impact on his localization process.

²⁰⁸ ADVN.2244.10, February 1796.

²⁰⁹ ADVN.2244.10, February 1796; HAT.14361, February 1796.

I would like to start examining his household members in detail, with one of his most important officials, his *Kapı kethüda* Süfyan Aga.²¹⁰ *Kapı kethüdas* were subordinates of provincial governors resided in Istanbul, to inform their governors about latest news in the capital, administer their correspondences and represent their all kinds of interests.²¹¹ As sources suggest these officials could be representatives of multiple viziers simultaneously.

A letter sent to Istanbul indicates that Süfyan Aga was recorded as *kapı kethüda* for more than one vizier. It seems that Süfyan worked with both the Governor of Rumelia Mehmed Hakkı Pasha and the Governor of Silistre Osman Pasha at the same time.²¹² Multiple posting of *kapı kethüdas* could be beneficial and practical in terms of providing communication between the state and the governors, for especially viziers serving at similar regions. On the other hand, multiple posting of these officials could easily cause problems when the viziers they serve have different interests, or even a conflict of interests. As a matter of fact, Hakkı Pasha and Osman Pasha were not getting along at the ends of 1790s and the conflict between them was heard by the government. At the verge of a new century the tension between these two escalated through a fight over the position of Governorship of Rumelia.

The possible effect of *kapı kethüdas* on their patron's rise and fall should be questioned here. There is not enough information about Süfyan Aga's role in the conflicts between Osman Pasha and Hakkı Pasha, when Osman was the Governor of Silistre. However, when the relationship between two turned into a serious dispute

²¹⁰ HAT.8731, April 1797.

²¹¹ For detailed analysis on responsibilities and functions of *kapı kethüdas* please see Cengiz Orhonlu, "Kethüda", *EF*, vol. IV (Leiden: Brill, 1978) 893-894; Mehmet Canatar, "Kethüda", *DİA*, vol. 25 (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2002), 332-333; Döndü Düşünmez, "Tanzimat Devri Osmanlı Mülki İdaresinde Kapı Kethüdalığı", (Master thesis, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2006), 2-12. (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1993).

²¹² HAT.8972, April 1797; HAT.8972A, June 1797 (agyt); MAD.d.7584, 24-25, March-April, 1799.

later, Süfyan Aga was reflecting the developments on this power play going on and he might have taken a slightly favoring position about Osman Pasha, in his reports. Though we cannot know how realistic Süfyan Aga's expressions in his reports and whether they ever represented his true opinions. Also there is no information of how these two pashas knew Süfyan Aga and under what circumstances they employed him as their *kapı kethüda*.

In fact procedures or rules for selecting *kapı kethüdas*, who mostly work in Istanbul and once or twice a year meet with their patron/s, are not very clear. According to Canatar, other *kethüdas*, who accompany their patrons in their assigned posts and also follow them to wars and battles, are selected by the viziers they serve. In his article about *kapı kethüdas*, Mehmet Zeki Pakalın suggests (with reference to *Lütfi tarihi*) that *kapı kethüdas* do not have attachments to a place or a specific post, but to an official, and they are chosen among relatives or acquaintances of that particular official by himself. Döndü Düşünmez adds to this evaluation that *kapı kethüdas* are not officials of the state but they belong to the viziers they serve and for this reason they are determined by their patrons.²¹³

The information suggesting *kapı kethüdas* could be chosen among viziers' family or acquaintances, makes it harder to understand the position of Süfyan Aga between Osman Pasha and Hakkı Pasha. If Süfyan Aga was in close relation with any of two, who would he be? Did these two pashas indeed have a connection we do not know of yet? Or providing that they used the same *kapı kethüda* as their representative in the capital, was there a time they had mutual benefits previously and was this an act of alliance? Unfortunately documents used in this study could not answer these

²¹³ Pakalın, "Kapı kethüdası", *Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, vol. II (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1993), 172-73; Canatar, "Kethüda"; Orhonlu, "Kethuda"; Düşünmez, "Kapı Kethüdalığı".

questions. Further researches about the practices of multiple posting for *kapı kethüdas*, and possible similarities between them and other broker agents, like *sarrafs* are needed for responding to such queries, and this may lead me to a follow-up study on *kapı kethüda* figures of the 18th century Ottoman politics.

The fact that multiple posting of Süfyan Aga is not a single case, could be inferred from *Vüzerâ Kanunnamesi* Selim III issued on viziers and their households and also from a doctoral dissertation on a grand local notable in Anatolia.²¹⁴ The *Vüzerâ Kanunnamesi* set the limits for the numbers of *kapı kethüdas* in the viziers' households, as six person at most. Considering that there were total 28 posts in Anatolia and Rumelia at this date, the number of six for *kapı kethüdas* seems not realistic. But whatever the real number was, the practice of multiple posting for the *kapı kethüdas* was definite.²¹⁵

The *Vüzerâ Kanunnamesi* specified that the *kapı kethüdas* and their patrons would meet once a year so that they could calculate income-expense data of the year, interchange news, and discuss recent matters. Looking at the nominal definition of the the *kapı kethüdas* and their responsibilities, we assume that they would enable the viziers to reach their requests and needs, and that they would search for suitable alliance opportunities in the name of their patrons. They were acting as if they were bridges between the center and the viziers, and if needed between the other political figures and the viziers. However, interestingly, the *Vüzerâ Kanunnamesi* mentions mostly costs of the *kapı kethüdas* rather than their benefits. Related article of the codebook demonstrates that the *kapı kethüdas* overcharge their expenses they have

²¹⁴ Please see Canay Şahin's doctoral thesis for a table of *Kapı kethüdas* in İstanbul and their patrons between 1775-1810: Şahin, "The Rise and Fall of an Ayan Family", 232.

²¹⁵ MAD.d.7584, 5-6.

when dealing with the issues and tasks of the viziers. The amount of money they request from the viziers could even pass the total income of them. As a result the viziers would require more lucrative posts to cover their expenses, and if they do not get a new and better post they could most probably not ensure their own stability. The article refers the high costs of *kapı kethüdas* as another reason for the viziers' often change of posts. As a solution the *kanunname* offers that the viziers should define the payment for their *kapı kethüdas* and notify this number to Istanbul, so that the *kapı kethüdas* could not ask for a higher payment.²¹⁶

At the beginnings of 1797 the tension between Osman Pasha and Hakkı Pasha presents itself at appointment of a new official to Osman's household. At that period the Governor of Silistre Osman Pasha was sent to Niğbolu and the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha to Edirne. We learn from two documents that Hakkı Pasha required an official sent from the center to provide interconnection and communication between him and Osman Pasha in Niğbolu, and also to mediate for making important decisions in the matter of repelling and eliminating the bandits. This request seems appropriate for two viziers residing in two different places and in frequent need for communication. Nonetheless, such a need does not explain Hakkı Pasha's specific demand for that official to be sent from the center. An it would probably be more practical that this official were selected from either Osman's or Hakkı Pasha's households. Perhaps, Hakkı Pasha was concerned that if this choice were in Osman's hands, he would have selected one from his own relatives or close acquaintances and this person would have prioritized Osman's benefits over Hakkı Pasha's or the state's. The central government approved Hakkı Pasha's this request and charged Abdullah Bey, one of the *çavuşbaşıs* from the capital, with the task of providing communication between Hakkı and Osman. The

²¹⁶ MAD.d.7584, 5-6.

reasons behind Abdullah's appointment are; him having been in Niğbolu before, and his close relations with Osman Pasha he established when he had been assigned to Silistre region to recruit soldiers from local people.²¹⁷

Hakkı Pasha's special request of this appointment suggests that Abdullah Bey could be assigned to watch Osman Pasha more closely, gather intelligence about his activities and to tell on him. Or Hakkı Pasha did not trust him to choose an objective agent to provide accurate inter-communication between them. Abdullah's previous acquaintance with Osman is also another essential factor in his appointment to Osman's household. Apparently as Abdullah had spent some time at his household previously and because he was familiar with personal character and temper of Osman, that experience would appear to be helpful for him to work with this quick-tempered vizier.

In the meantime, another critical official was appointed to Osman's household from the center. Hüseyin Aga was assigned to the army of Osman Pasha as a *nazır* (intendant or supervisor) and *defterdar* (financial director). Hüseyin was a palace officer; *kapıcıbaşı* (head of the palace doorkeepers/ imperial gate-keeper) in the capital. He was to handle *sekban* recruitments, provisions and military expenses. He was responsible for recording all the expenditures made for Osman Pasha's military troops and registering the revenue sources used for military needs of these troops. Controlling how money, provisions and ammunitions sent either from the center or the provinces and supervising spent and allocated were also among his duties. In order to assist Hüseyin Aga, three more officials were appointed to Osman Pasha's household; a *kasapbaşı* (chief of butchers), a *nuzül emini* (army supply master, trustee) and a *katip* (secretary, scribe) named Derviş Ahmed Efendi.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ HAT.12121, April 1797; HAT.58929, April 1797.

²¹⁸ C.DH.14712, April 1797; "Sen ki vezir-i müşârinileyhsin ma'îyyetine tenkîl-i eşkayâ zımnında asâkir-i vefîre tahaşşüd ideceğine mebni idâre-i umûr-ı lâzımeleri lede'l-iktizâ ol-havâli â'yânları

Another prominent official of the household of the Governor of Silistre Osman Pasha was his *Delilbaşı / Ser-delil* Aydın Aga. Aydın's military successes against the bandits at Rusçuk and Zıştovi battles in 1797 was seen as a substantiation of his loyalty and merits by the state and he was rewarded with a honorary rank of *dergah-ı ali gediklisi* (a honorary membership at the imperial gate). Some other members at Osman's household and his son also got their share from these military achievements gained at Rusçuk and Zıştovi battles. His son Ahmed Bey and one of Osman's relatives who had been with him for 15 years, *Silahdar* Mahmud Aga were recorded as *kapıcıbaşı*s. And Sadullah Efendi, serving at Osman's *divan* (council) as a scribe was promoted with the honorary rank of *Divan-ı Hümayun hocalığı* (hodja in the Imperial Council).²¹⁹

Other mentioned names of Osman's household during his Governorship of Silistre are; *Sertunacı* (a military commander responsible for organization of military troops and recruitments) Hüseyin Aga, *Nüzul emini* İsmail Aga, and *Başçukadar* Hüseyin Aga.²²⁰

3.2.2.2 His Household After His Disfavor and Rebellion

Osman Pasha was appointed as Governor of Rumelia in 1800 and occupied this position for almost a year. During this one year he kept asking for favors for his household members and relatives. For example, he requested bestowment of *malikane*

ma 'rifetleriyle aylıklı sekbân tahrîri ve zahîre mubâyâ 'ası hizmetlerine kıyâm ve ta 'yînât tevzî 'i misüllü fûru 'âta(?) nezâret ve ihtimâm eylemek üzere kapucibaşı mûmâileyh Hüseyin mecduhuya şeref-yafte-i sudûr olan hatt-ı hümayûn-ı şevket makrûnum mücebince başbâkikulluk mansabını tevcihât-ı hümayûnda zabt eylemek üzere yeddine ruûs-ı hümayûnum i 'tâsıyla sana müsteşâr ve Ordu Nâzırı ve Defterdâr nasb ve tayîn..." C.AS.8065, November 1797; C.DH.3164, December 1797; AE.SSLM.III.12758, January 1798; C.AS.15854, December 1797; C.ML.28349, December 1797.

²¹⁹ HAT.12535, December 1797; HAT.57547, June 1798 (agyt); C.DH.1335, December 1797-January 1798; C.AS.22144, December 1797; HAT.2707, June 1798 (agyt); HAT.2564A, December 1797; HAT.1786, January 1798; HAT.2739, January 1798.

²²⁰ TS.MA.d.2113.0006, March 1798; TS.MA.d.2113.0007, April 1798.

(life-term tax farm) revenues of a land from Tırhala (Trikala), Yenişehir-i Fenar (Larissa) to his son, that was usually allocated to the governors of Rumelia. Moreover he made another request for a *divan katibi* in his council, Ahmed Serveri Efendi an honorary rank of *haslar mukataacılığı* (finance official keeping books of *mukataas*).²²¹

His dismissal after this one year of Governorship of Rumelia was related to his failures in the battles against the bandits. However his demotion would not stop him from asking favors. Governor of Rumelia Osman Pasha accused Palaslı Mehmed Pasha in one of his reports to the capital, about what happened in Berkofça. According to his statements, Mehmed Pasha failed to follow up the bandits moving towards Berkofça and to eliminate them properly. Besides Osman complained about the *sancak* (sub-province) of Çirmen to be nest for the bandits due to bad governance of Mehmed Pasha. For these reasons Osman required a replacement for the *sancak* of Çirmen, with appointing himself or his son, or another suitable governor. Osman argued that if this *sancak* was given under his control, he would have been able to prevent Albanians from coming to that region and engaging in banditry.²²² Osman Pasha's setting his eyes on this *sancak* indicates how bold and daring he could be even at the edge of his dismissal. This request was also a strategic move to get off the hook and expand his power domain.

One might think that after Osman Pasha was removed from his post of Governorship of Rumelia in 1801, the state stopped accepting his favor requests. On the contrary the central administrators continued giving new appointments and honorary titles to his men so that he could be persuaded to go to his new post and he would not cause any

²²¹ HAT.57949, May 1800 agytt; C.DH.14136, July 1800

²²² HAT.2501C, August 1800; HAT.2501B, August 1800; HAT.2922, August 1800; HAT.3080A, September 1800.

disturbances that might lead to turmoil. Following his dismissal, his brother Mehmed Bey and his *Hazinedar* (of the time being)²²³ Mehmed Beg were granted with the honorary rank of *kapıcıbaşı*lık, his *Delilbaşı* (of the time being)²²⁴ Ömer Pasha of *mirmiranlık* (lord-of-lords), one of his *kethüdas* Mehmed Nuri Aga of *silahşoran-ı hassa* (men-at-arms for sultanic weaponry). Other members of his household at this period were; *Kethüda* Seyyid Bekir, *Tüfenkçibaşı* (chief of *tüfenkçis*) Osman Aga ve Halil Aga, *Hazine Katibi* (treasury secretary) Ali Efendi, *Mühimmat Nazırı* (supervisor for ammunitions) Hasan Efendi, *Humbaracıbaşı* (chief of bombardier troops) Süleyman Aga, *Divan Katibi* Besim Efendi ve *Kapı kethüdas* (at the time being)²²⁵ Seyyid Hüseyin Beg, and then Seyyid Mehmed Efendi.²²⁶

After being declared a rebel, Osman Pasha's household was neither as large or strong as before. The central government constantly tried to send his soldiers to their hometowns and sent stern orders to Osman Pasha to diminish the size of his household. Some of his men were indeed sent to their hometowns but others did not consent with leaving Osman Pasha's side unless they got their unpaid salaries. When it comes to administrative officials of his household, they were probably questioning their loyalty to their patron and looking for new patronage alternatives. Therefore actions like playing both sides (of Osman Pasha's and the state's), switching allegiances and negotiations with the state for avoiding possible punishments, or even complaining the patron to the state should be expected among his household members. I would like to examine three specific examples of reactions of Osman's household members to

²²³ Osman Pasha's *hazinedar* was Menla/Monla Aga when Osman was the *Governor of Silistre*. Thesis page 111

²²⁴ Osman Pasha's *delilbaşı* was Aydın Aga when Osman was the *Governor of Silistre*. Thesis page 117

²²⁵ Osman Pasha's *kapı kethüda* was Süfyan Aga when Osman was the *Governor of Silistre* and the *Governor of Rumelia* and when he was dismissed from this post. Thesis pages 33

²²⁶ HAT.3281, November 1800; HAT.3398, February 1801; C.DH.8682, April 1801; HAT.2878C, May 1801; HAT.2188, August 1801; HAT.2528D, November 1801; HAT.10143, May 1802 agytt, C.AS.22912, July 1802; HAT.2080, December 1801; HAT.3892G, October 1803.

their patron's disfavor. The first instance was of Karslı Ali Pasha's, the *Delilbaşı* of Hakkı Pasha (the Governor of Rumelia at the time being). Ali Pasha is mentioned in the documents as early as 1798. The next year he was rewarded with the title of mirmiranlık, together with Osman Pasha's *Delilbaşı* Aydın Aga.²²⁷ This Ali Pasha had actually been in the household of Osman at first. And several years later just after Osman's dismissal, Ali became one of the significant actors of the conflict between his previous and latter patrons. We should remember here that Osman Pasha rejected his dismissal and refused to leave Berkofça when he had the news of his demotion. Meanwhile, Karslı Ali Pasha, former member of Osman's household, was charged by Hakkı Pasha with the assignment of guarding Berkofça. Upon his assignment, Ali Pasha was planning to settle down in Berkofça and expand his military units with new recruitments and to exploit revenue sources of the region. However, when Osman Pasha's rejected leaving Berkofça, Ali could not enter in to the district. As a matter of fact Osman repelled Ali's troops out of Berkofça. Later Ali had to retreat to Şehirköy and stay there deprived of his potential military and financial sources.²²⁸ At this case Ali Pasha apparently took side with his new patron against his former disfavored patron. It appears that the promises of Hakkı Pasha for a new lucrative post and its possible political and economical benefits also had a great impact on Ali Pasha's siding behaviour.

The second case of reaction from Osman's household, was the reaction of his *Delilbaşı* Ömer Aga to his patron's demotion. Ömer Aga was a military commander who joined Osman's retinue during his *Governorship of Rumelia*. Ömer was promoted with the title of mirmiranlık in 1801 and called as a pasha afterwards.²²⁹ He had many

²²⁷ ADVN.2264.3, June 1797; HAT.12142, March 1798; C.DH.16372, March 1798.

²²⁸ HAT.2376K, April 1801; HAT.2376F, April 1801; HAT.3889, April 1801; HAT.2878E, May 1801.

²²⁹ HAT.3398, February 1801; HAT.2878C, May 1801.

delil soldiers under his command. When Osman Pasha lost his vizierate in 1802 May he was in Yenişehir. A messenger of the central government Derviş Aga²³⁰ brought Osman Pasha the bad news of his dismissal at this district. Derviş's report to the Istanbul about this matter summarizes the initial reactions of his men when they heard the orders of dismissal. At the time the central government was straining to convince Osman Pasha's men to leave his side via advices or threats. Surely the chances are high for his mutiny to go down, if his men gave up their unpaid salaries and quitted Osman's side. Nevertheless some of his commanders and soldiers, among whom there were Rumelian bandit leaders and bandits, resisted the idea of leaving without getting paid. These unruly and disorderly soldiers believed that Osman Pasha could still have new appointments, thus new revenue sources. The prospect of a new post were keeping their hopes up for getting paid in time, and even for continuation of being paid soldiers at a vizier's household. Some *binbaşıs* at Osman's retinue retorted with counter threats to the government's threats and they proposed that if Osman Pasha had not get his previous post or another suitable post and be pardoned, they would have joined Pasbanoğlu's troops. Though the threats of the government were able to persuade some of Osman's men to leave him.²³¹

It had been reported that some of Osman's soldiers and his *Delilbaşı* Ömer Pasha left their patron's household and took shelter at the house of another pasha in Edirne, Çelebi Ömer Pasha. With this act Osman's *Delilbaşı* Ömer Pasha switched to the imperial household. He was interrogated by the central government to provide intelligence about Osman Pasha. Ömer presented his patron's disobedient behaviors against the state as the main reason for leaving his side. In his statements he told that

²³⁰ C.DH.6453, July 1802; HAT.3864, May 1802.

²³¹ HAT.3867, May 1802 (agyt).

Osman Pasha did not stop his uprising even after he received some amount of money to pay the salaries of his soldiers which was his basic excuse for his rebellious actions. Therefore Ömer did not believe in his patron's causes and suspected that his rebellious behaviors would have harm his own benefits. Furthermore he mentioned that he could not have the power to convince soldiers to give up their unpaid salaries. Still he expressed some of inner service *ağas* and *delil* soldiers leaving Osman's household since they worried that this matter would get worse in time. According to Ömer, Osman's soldiers were diminished to around three thousands of Albanian soldiers at that time. The intelligence Ömer provided about Osman Pasha was counted as an evidence of his loyalty to the state and he was assigned to a post in Anatolia, to sub-province of Karahisar-ı sahip.²³² However it was worth noting that he was ordered to pass to Anatolia over Gelibolu. Like his patron Osman Pasha, Ömer was also offered to use an alternative route to Anatolia which was far away from Edirne. This orders shows that he was not trusted enough to use the route over Edirne.

We have already mentioned that Süfyan Aga was kapı kethüda of both Osman Pasha and Hakkı Pasha. When Osman got removed from his peak post in Rumelia in 1800, Süfyan was still at this household and possibly at Hakkı's household too. One of the first actions Osman took when he got the news of his dismissal, was sending Süfyan to Istanbul in order to verify the orders and to lobby for reinstating his position. As we know these lobbying acts did not end as Osman expected and he was assigned to Silistre. The order of his new appointment was delivered to Süfyan in secrecy and the government charged Süfyan with an assignment of mediating between Hakkı Pasha and Osman Pasha. At the meeting in Istanbul a decision made for Süfyan to meet Osman Pasha firstly so that Osman would not have startled by his new post. This plan

²³² HAT.3867, May 1802 (agytt); HAT.3879, May 1802.

suggests that the government was always aware of his high possibility to rise up. Yet this plan did not work and Osman did not accept leaving his post. Süfyan Aga thought that Osman deliberately used his debt to his soldiers as an excuse to convince the state for his wishes.²³³

After a while Süfyan Aga was asked to go to Osman Pasha once more, for presenting another offer of the government. In fact the Governor of Rumelia (of the time) Hakkı Pasha suggested Süfyan's going to Osman. Then the government accepted his suggestion and called Süfyan to Istanbul for his new assignment. Süfyan was to take decrees issued for Osman Pasha ordering him to go to Anatolia. However Süfyan was quite reluctant about this assignment. He stated that if he had gone to Osman Pasha would not have been a solution to the matter and Osman would have gotten suspicious of Süfyan's visit because it had not been long after their last meeting. Süfyan was almost sure that Osman's men would have murdered him if he had tried to go there.²³⁴

Upon Süfyan's statements the Grand Vizier quitted the plan of sending Süfyan to Osman Pasha, and offered another person to take on this assignment. The person offered was *Humbaracıbaşı* Süleyman Aga who had been at the same household of late Cezayirli Hasan Pasha once, with Osman Pasha. When Osman had served as *Delilbaşı* of Hasan Pasha, Süleyman Aga had been *Hazinedar* of this same patron so they were expected to have a strong sense of solidarity based on their common experiences during their early careers at the Hasan Pasha's household.²³⁵

This document demonstrates that even long after (almost 11 years) their patron Hasan Pasha's death, the members of his household had still powerful and functional

²³³ HAT.2344, May 1801 agytt; HAT.12777, July 1796 (agytt – wrong dating); HAT.3858, October 1801.

²³⁴ HAT.15018, May 1802 (agytt).

²³⁵ HAT.15018, May 1802 (agytt).

connections that would end up in potential alliances. In addition to this, the central government had intelligence about such connections and was willing to use them if needed. These established connections seem to be quite important to understand household politics and inner dynamics of *ayan* and non-*ayan* governors' households.

3.2.3 Concluding Remarks

Joining the household of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha was probably the first significant point in Osman Pasha's career advancement. He should have served and obeyed his patron's commands in order to reach administrative and military positions and to be able to keep them. Preliminary form of his own household must have appeared during his guardianships. Then as he achieved higher posts, his household grew and became powerful enough to provide him a strong place in the Ottoman power politics.

The most effective members of Osman Pasha's household were his *Kapı Kethüdası* Süfyan Aga, Chief of Finance and Intendant of his army (*Defterdar ve Ordu Nazırı*) Hüseyin Aga, and military commanders such as *Delilbaşı*, *Bölükbaşıs* and *Binbaşıs*. While military commanders would have been serving him from the beginning of Osman's career, Süfyan Aga was mentioned during his governorship of Silistre for the first time and Hüseyin Aga was introduced into his household at the period of this same post. This Silistre governorship was Osman Pasha's first governorship appointment and it coincided with preparations for a campaign *against* Pasbanoğlu in Vidin. On that ground Osman Pasha's soldiers increased in number and his military expenses accordingly. From this post to his rebellion and then his death, Süfyan Aga, Hüseyin Aga and military commanders were very influential in the negotiations and interactions between the state and Osman Pasha.

As a non-*ayan* provincial governor Osman Pasha was subjected to positive reinforcements for what the central government considered correct behaviour such as complying with orders, defeating rebellious officials and bandits. Naturally when he performed opposite actions, negative reinforcements were implied, and if necessary executed severely. Similar to the relationship between the imperial household and one of its subjects Osman Pasha, the relations between Osman and his own household demonstrated characteristics alike. For instance when Osman Pasha got promoted due to his success in defeating mountain bandits in battles during his governorship of Silistre, he gave positive reinforcements to his retinue. This shows that his own position became secure enough to require promotions, honorary ranks, rewards and gifts for not only himself, but also for his smaller partners in victory. All the positive reinforcements for both his military retinue fought beside him, and other members of his household incorporated a definite sense of assured reliance on him and loyalty to him.

In terms of loyalty to a patron, Osman Pasha's household members had possibly the hardest time when their patron failed to obey the orders of the state and eventually rebelled. They caught in a very hard place between the punishment possibilities of the state and the discouraging effects of leaving their patron's side. I observe two tendencies of reaction the members of Osman's household had when dealing with his rebellion. One kind of reaction to Pasha's rebellion is switching allegiance. New patron chosen could either be a household of another vizier, or the imperial household itself. A member from Osman's household Karşlı Ali Pasha was a good example of the switch from one vizier household to another. Right after Osman Pasha was dismissed from the governorship of Rumelia, Karşlı Ali Pasha transferred himself to Hakkı Pasha's side, who was the successor of Osman Pasha for this post. Osman was strongly opposing to this appointment and rejecting to give up his post. He should

also have been surprised by one of his men joining his rival's side. Hakkı Pasha should have convinced Ali Pasha with promises of better appointments. Accordingly Hakkı Pasha assigned his recent recruit Ali as his guardian to replace Osman Pasha. In reply to this appointment Osman blocked Ali's way so that he could not enter to the region and got deprived of new revenue sources.

Such a transfer could also be from Osman Pasha's side to the side of the imperial household. When Osman Pasha's vizierate was removed at the advanced stages of his uprising, some of Pasha's soldiers and his Delilbaşı Ömer Aga changed their allegiance directly to the state. As we know from the details mentioned above, Ömer Aga left his patron's household since he did not approve his unruly actions, and betrayed him by providing intelligence about him to the central government. As a result the government rewarded him with a higher post in Anatolia. However this promotion did not mean that the government accepted to adopt him as a undoubtedly loyal subject, it was rather a controlling strategy by sending away a potential bandit to Anatolia.

Second reaction to Osman Pasha's rebellion was taking a negotiative position between the government and Pasha. In parallel to his job definition, Kapı Kethüdası Süfyan Aga was very appropriate for such a positioning. Süfyan Aga was initially used by his patron Osman Pasha in order to convince the government to reinstate his post. When this demand was denied, Süfyan Aga was assigned this time by the government. Süfyan's mission was to persuade his patron to obey the orders and move to his new post. As we know Osman Pasha rejected this proposal. Although the central government belived, or hoped that Süfyan Aga could turn the course of events and prevent Osman's uprising and joining with the Rumelian bandits from happening, the negotiations failed. Later another official, who had been from Hasan Pasha's

household as Osman Pasha had been, was tasked as the agent of the state to negotiate with Osman. This attempt was turned out to be unsuccessful as well. Apparently Osman Pasha's own interests and also fear of being captured and execution bypassed his loyalty to the imperial household. However at the end of his story the very household which he had established himself diminished in size, collapsed with disorganization when running away from the state troops, defeated by them, and disbanded at last.



CHAPTER IV

MILITARY AND FISCAL RESOURCES OF OSMAN PASHA'S POWER

4.1 Military and Fiscal Environment

Vüzerâ kannunamesi, issued during III. Selim's reign as result of these developments, aimed to improve the financial status of viziers and control their households. They were trying to increase revenues of the viziers by means of post allocations from the central government and provide opportunities to provide for their households. However, as *ayans* started to get military status and become viziers, the number of viziers increased which created difficulties and forced viziers to pursue higher-income and more lucrative appointments or search for new revenue sources in order to feed their households.²³⁶

Pashas used to have military administrators such as *bölükbaşı*, *binbaşı*, *tüfenkçibaşı*, *alemdars* and *delilbaşı* under their service who were responsible for recruiting and managing the soldiers. These administrators led the military units such as *delil*, *sekban* and *tüfenkçi* at their retinue. According to the documents, *tüfenkçis*

²³⁶ Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 68; Fatih Yeşil, *İhtilaller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyoekonomik ve Sosyopolitik Değişim Üzerine Bir İnceleme (1793-1826)* (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: İstanbul, 2016), 15.

and *delil* soldiers are usual members of a retinue like *sekbans*,²³⁷ however they used to receive half the wages *sekbans* received. Military units in the household of *ayans*, who usually became pashas/ viziers in time, were structured like the household of other pashas.²³⁸

Loyalty and merits of these paid military units were problematic in many instances; in particular, high costs and expenses of these units for their households led to the questioning of their usefulness. These mercenaries, who were employed through contracts, did not feel a substantial commitment to their employers, either non-*ayan* viziers or *ayans*. They used to populate the battlefield in wars or fights against bandits, but they generally underperformed. It was difficult to form effective troops as they lacked standard military training. They used to boycott working when not paid, or rebelled against their employer to be paid, easily fled or strayed, and were reluctant to follow orders other than their leaders' (not employers). Furthermore, if state officials or local administrators did not employ them in wars or internal security affairs, even temporarily, they used to disperse and commit banditry to make ends meet. As the central army declined in power through the processes of transforming the Janissaries into tradesmen, inclusion to the force of those not conscripted, and weakening of *tımarlı sipahis*, central government, in a sense, was bound to these mercenaries in retinues. Increase in the number and importance of these mercenaries during the 18th century, although not favored by the central government, were based on several

²³⁷ *Levend* was used as a general term to refer to *sekban*, *sarıca*, *deli*, *faris*, *gönüllü* (volunteer) and similar others to refer to the mercenaries of 17th and 18th century who used firearms, and who were infantries in majority, yet could also be rangers. Whereas *Levend* was used to refer to marines in the navy during the 15th century, the term later expanded to cover other types of soldiers. For more detailed information on the *Levends*, mercenaries of 17th and 18th century please see: Cezar, *Levendler*, 3-22, 29, 349-356; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Levend", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6 (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1993), 46-47; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Sekban", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 8 (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1993), 326-327.

²³⁸ Yeşil, *İhtilaller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu*, 27-28.

reasons such as increase in military needs in uninterrupted periods of war, peasants becoming land-less and their decreased incomes. However at the end of the 18th century, it was evident that the problems caused by these mercenaries, or decentralized (*adem-i merkezi*) units as referred by Agoston, made it mandatory to adopt more orderly, statutory and trained armies.²³⁹ The *Nizam-ı Cedid*, and the reformations within this context, promulgated by Selim III between 1792-1807 were products of such developments mentioned.

Indeed, *sekban* units as auxiliary forces in the Ottoman army were employed through the mediation of *ayans* or independent *delilbaşıs*, *bölükbaşıs* and *binbaşıs* as of the 16th century. Albanians had a special place within *sekbans*. As mentioned, *binbaşıs* and *bölükbaşıs* played an important role in recruiting *sekbans*. As mediators, they used to provide the consensus between soldiers and employer non-*ayan* vizier or *ayan*. Monthly wages and provisions were dependent on whether they were employed during war or peace, and who employed them. These soldiers lost their retinue at the end of their employment term or when the vizier they served died or got dismissed; they either searched for a new retinue or engaged in banditry. While serving in a retinue (*kapılı olmak*), even temporarily, meant soldiers being under relative control with regular income, having no retinue (*kapısız olmak*) meant strays or bandits for Istanbul. Between the reigns of I. Abdulhamit and II. Mahmud, various regulations were introduced to keep the *sekban* units under control through employment of them under vizier households. Selim's *Vüzera kannunnamesi* was among these regulations. However, it made it exceptionally difficult to control these units due to vizier' frequently changing locations and to insufficient incomes of their appointments to

²³⁹ Gültekin Yıldız, "Kara Kuvvetleri", in Gültekin Yıldız, ed., *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi*, 55-68; Yeşil, *İhtilaller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu*, 27-28; Gabor Agoston, *Osmanlı'da Strateji ve Askeri Güç* (İstanbul: Timaş, 2012), 245-253.

provide for the soldiers, and their quick dismissals on grounds of failures.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, it was hardly possible to differentiate *sekbans* in the *Rumelia* district of the time from the mountain bandits (*dağlı eşkiyalar*, *dağlılar*). As it was in the *Celali* period, soldiers under the service of the state officials and bandits were quite intertwined. Bandits, known as mountain bandits, were considered almost as potential military human resources by the viziers in *Rumelia*.

Whether non-*ayan* provincial governors or *ayans*, their households' ascend was against the interest of imperial household, and even the sultan himself.²⁴¹ Throughout the 18th century, the connection between the military and financial needs of wars and rise of *ayans*, who were ready to pay for these needs – worked to the benefit of Istanbul in the short run, however ultimately resulted in favor of *ayans*. Within this relationship, needs of the army were well-met by the *ayans* who knew their region better, when compared to viziers who fell short to meet these needs, and thus *ayans* became strong opponents of viziers who were not of *ayan* origin. Furthermore, *ayans* used to acquire legitimate military status by being promoted to ranks such as *kapıcıbaşı* and vizierate. However, this relationship between the center and *ayans*, in its nature, meant the increase of *ayans*' military and financial power and a relative decline in Istanbul's executive power. Still, central government did not entirely rely on *ayans*, and continued utilizing viziers where necessary, as a balancing factor to keep the *ayans* under control. In the meantime, viziers who are not originally locals were dependent on the central government's consent and rewards, appointments, provisions and money to handle financial difficulties and manage sufficient number of troops.

²⁴⁰ Halil İnalcık, "Stefan Dušan'dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na: XV. Asırda Rumeli'de Hristiyan Sipahiler ve Menşeleri" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* (İstanbul: 1993), 195-217; Levy Avigdor, "Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century", *Middle Eastern Studies*, XVIII (1982), 227-249; Yeşil, *İhtilaller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu*, 29-35.

²⁴¹ Kunt, *Sultan's Servants*, 93; Rifaat Ali Abou El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 12-13, 44.

When central government revenues were not adequate, they chose to localize / notable-ize and develop cooperation with local actors to acquire more of provincial revenues as another source of income. In fact - viziers, who had inadequate military and financial resources, increased their bargaining powers against the center by legal and sometimes irregular means when they had enough leverage, and were not reluctant of insubordinate acts when they had a chance to gain more power.²⁴²

Ayans and other high-ranked officials in the provinces started to finance through local resources their needs and more, and expenditures of districts and provinces. Revenue sources from the provinces were fixed / pre-determined taxes such as *imdadıyye* (assistance / aid tax), and *ayaniyye* (fee of an official *ayan*), and sometimes irregular taxes or unlawful impositions such as *tekalif-i sakka*. *Tevzi* applications that emerged at the end of 17th century,²⁴³ and became more common in 18th century²⁴⁴ created appropriate opportunities for *ayans* and non-*ayan* viziers to have a share in provincial revenues. Public-expense registers (*tevzi defters*) kept in the districts reflected current district expenditures, as well as more realistic district production methods and tax-payer information. *Tevzi defters* were used to record pre-determined taxes, as well as not foreseen or that could not be foreseen expenditures

²⁴² Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 65; Nagata, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık*, 41, 48; İsmail Hakkı Uzuncarşılı, “Çapanoğulları”, *Belleten*, XXXVIII (1974), 215-261, 216, 230; Rıza Karagöz, *Canikli Ali Paşa* (Ankara: TTK, 2003), 87; Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları*, 123; Yeşil, *İhtilaller Çağında Osmanlı Ordusu*, 24-25.

²⁴³ For early examples of *tevzi* applications: Emrah Dal, “R-2 Numaralı Rusçuk Şer‘iyye Sicilinin Çeviriyazısı ve Tahlili (H.1108-1111/M.1696-1699) v. 1-58” (Master Thesis, Osmangazi Üniversitesi, 2018), 91, 95, 221; İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM), *Rusçuk Court Records (Sc.RUSC.)*, R-3, 19b, 34b, 43a; Çağatay Uluçay, *18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri* (İstanbul: Berksoy Basımevi, 1955), 52-55.

²⁴⁴ For the main principles of public-expense registers, see: Radushev, “Les Dépenses Locales”, 74-94; Ursinus, “Avarız Hanesi und Tevzi Hanesi”, 481-92; Ursinus, *Regionale Reformen im Osmanischen Reich am Vorabend der Tanzimat*; Ursinus, “Zur Geschichte des Patronats”, 476-97; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*; Cezar, “18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Tasarısında Oluşan Yeni Mali Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü Üzerine,” 89-143; Özkaya, “Tevzi Defterlerinin Kontrolü”, 135-55; Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Ayanlık*, 268-71; Musa Çadircı, *Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı*, 148-70; Neumann, “Masarif-i Vilâyet Defterleri”, 69-97; Akkuş, “Tevzi’ Defterlerinden Vergi-i Mahsûsaya Geçiş”, 29-61.

and to organize collection of them from the public. By this means, it enabled those who had the right to record expenses in the *defter* to inflate their expenditures to their benefit and to gain unlawful profits. District administrators managed the allocation of additional taxes and expenditures through *tevzi defters*. This system became somewhat of a solution to the arbitrary impositions and disturbing of the local people by numerous disorderly soldiers serving under high-ranked government officials at first. However when these provincial governors started to develop collaborations with district administrators responsible for organization of public-expenses and their distribution among the people, and when the district administrators started to use these resources independently to their favor, *tevzi system* became another method of exploitation. At the end of the 18th century, the local figures at the provinces (either *ayan* or non-*ayan*) had more authority over the district, and they started challenging the central authority by means of exercising these multi-dimension powers they acquired through their military and financial sources. Non-*ayan* viziers that were sent to the provinces, on the other hand, improved themselves through maximizing their revenues received from both the center and the districts and reflecting this increase to their military powers, localize without cutting their ties with the central government.²⁴⁵ The antagonist of this story, Gürcü Osman Pasha, was one of these non-*ayan* viziers.

In this section, we shall address the military units under the service of Osman Pasha and sources of the Pasha's financial power in chronological manner. It is not possible to separately analyze the military and financial aspects of the Pasha's story, as almost all instances and issues about the soldiers would tie to the Pasha's financial

²⁴⁵ McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, 105-70; McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans", 838-39; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 54; Radushev, "Les dépenses Locales", 75; İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation", 313-16; İnalçık, "Centralization and Decentralization", 49; Yücel Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985), 100, 184.

status and difficulties. We can address the financial resources of the power of Osman Pasha in two groups, namely; revenues directly sent from the center and provincial revenues. *Attiye*, *harçlık*, and *tayinat bedels* were among central revenues. While *mukataa* revenues, monthly salaries (*ulufe bedeli*), *imdadiyye*, *ikramiyye*, *konaklama*, *mekulat*, *avaidat*, *mubaşiriyye*, *kudumiyye* and similar revenues were among provincial revenues. Soldiers serving in Pasha's household comprised of groups such as *sekbans*, *delils* and *tüfenkçiyan*. Albanian *sekbans* had a special place and weight in Osman Pasha's retinue.

4.2 Guardianship Period

Being a *Delilbaşı* under Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha's service is the most prominent position in Gürcü Osman Pasha's career prior to the Guardianship period. When Osman Pasha's posts are analyzed between 1790 and 1792 after his patron's death, it is seen that the first years of the Pasha's career was spent as a state official positioned in the defense of Danube shores, as a "*Muhafız* Pasha". His places of duty İsmail, İsakçı and İbrail are fortresses along the Danube delta, Tutrakan is a castle along the Danube coast, and Şumnu is another castle in southern Danube. İsakçı is also a storehouse located between İsmail and İbrail fortresses. His first post after these guardianships, following his exile in Keşan would be the guardianship of Vidin, an important border region along Danube and one that was under the dominion of Pasbanoğlu Osman, an important and hard-to-control provincial actor amidst the great turmoils of Rumelia at the time.

These fortress-cities, which Gürcü Osman Pasha was a guardian to, are common along the shores of the Danube River under the dominion of the Ottoman

Empire. Almost all of these fortress-cities are logistic bases, where during times of war their military functions were utilized operationally, and which provided living spaces. Cities and fortresses along the Danube were primary targets for states like Austria and Russia during time of war with the Ottoman Empire. Especially Russia, which expanded rapidly as of mid-18th century, aimed to conquer these fortresses on the Danube as a strategy during wars with the Ottoman Empire. This aim of Russia also included seizing the Ottoman army's provision and ammunition supply routes and centers. This was because these fortress-cities were grain hubs at the same time, and met an important portion of Ottoman Istanbul's supply needs with this function. Many cities starting from where the Danube flew into the Black Sea to Kili, Karaharman, İsmail, Tulca, İsakçı, İbrail, Kalas, Maçın, Hirsova and Silistre were among the checkpoints on this line and thus were crucially important centers. The Ottoman Empire resorted to further reinforcing these locations as of the second half of the 18th century, when Russian threat intensified.²⁴⁶

Fortress *dizdars*²⁴⁷ and fortress *Muhafiz* Pashas were responsible for managing the troops in the fortresses. Although *dizdars* are the first to come into mind with respect to Ottoman fortress commanders, higher-ranking officers such as viziers or pashas were assigned to fortress commanderships in regions where strong defenses were required, such as borders, as of the 18th century. These officers, who may be referred to as "*Muhafiz* Pashas", were responsible for reconnaissances and repairs of the fortress, ammunition and meeting provisional needs of the military troops. These

²⁴⁶ Hakan Engin, "1878-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sırasında İbrail Kalesi", iii-iv; Mahir Aydın, "Kaleler", 15-45.

²⁴⁷ In the Ottoman Empire, *dizdar* was responsible for the fortress businesses and the commander of the fortress privates. *Dizdar*'s principal duty was the defense of border cities and fortresses where uprisings were encountered. Alongside this duty, *dizdar*'s jurisdiction covered fortress dungeons, storages used to keep valuable items and monies of tradesmen and arsenals. As of the 18th century, *dizdars* importance as military personnel declined, where they became the principal of specific troops in the fortresses located on border regions. Yusuf Oğuzoğlu, "Dizdar", *DİA*, vol. IX (Ankara: TDV, 1994), 480-1.

officers controlled *has*, *mukataa* and *cizye* (poll-tax) revenues of various regions. This post was assigned to *Muhafız* Pashas in different forms. For instance, when a state official is appointed to *Beylerbeyliği*, *Sancakbeyliği* posts or to governorship of any province, they are frequently required to guard fortresses on the borders within their region. Later, we shall observe that Gürcü Osman Pasha's appointment to *Governorship of Silistre* assigned to him with the condition to guard the Niğbolu Fortress. Guarding a fortress, especially during wars, were reinforced by assigning officials at pasha ranks to this duty. This was because *Muhafız* Pashas were obliged to reside in the fortress they were appointed to guard, along with their households.²⁴⁸

Alongside their military duties, *muhafız* pashas used to oversee administrative issues of a region to make use of their time during peace and also to create extra revenue sources. For example, the *Muhafız* of Faş was also charged as the *muhassıl* of Gönve and Canik and the *voyvoda* of Karahisar-ı Şarki. Annual salary of the Guardian of Vidin was 75 thousand *kuruş* and his retinue comprised of more than 1500 soldiers.²⁴⁹ In Osman Pasha's cases, Kayseriye sub-province was appointed as *arpalık* to create an additional income stream during his post of the Guardian of *İsakçı*.²⁵⁰

In the two years between the end of 1789 and 1791, Pasha was asked to move with his personal retinue and *mükemmel kapı* to the locations he was appointed. However in these locations, wheat, grain, and meat and bread allocation for soldiers' provisions, their salaries and other expenses of the pasha himself created frequent problems. Pasha often asked the central government for money, seeming as if he was

²⁴⁸ Engin, "1878-1792 Osmanlı-Rus, Avusturya Harpleri Sırasında İbrail Kalesi", 16-19. For another work referring to *Muhafız* Pashas of Hotin fortress in the 18th century, please see: Ömer Bıyık, "Osmanlı Hududunda Bir Kale: XVIII. Yüzyılda Hotin", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, XXIX/2 (2014), 489-513; Aydın, "Kaleler", 36-37.

²⁴⁹ Aydın, "Kaleler", 37.

²⁵⁰ C.DH.1242, April 1790; C.DH.13919, May 1790.

in constant financial distress.²⁵¹ Mentioning of the same kinds of financial problems in multiple posts of him, pointed to either Pasha's excessive demands, or that his revenue sources were indeed insufficient. Considering Osman Pasha's attitude in other instances in various future times makes it a reasonable possibility that he had excessive demands. Nevertheless, considering the conditions of the time, it seems natural that a pasha, with a high number of soldiers in his household during wars with Russia and fighting with the widespread banditry, experienced financial difficulties.

4.3 Exile to Keşan

We do not have the information on the number of soldiers under the service of Osman Pasha between July 1792 and July 1795 when he was exiled to reside in Keşan. However, since he was not on active duty, it is probable that he sent most of the soldiers under his service to their hometowns and he stayed in Keşan with his permanent household members. These dates refer to the times when mountain bandit rebellions picked up pace in Rumelia. For this reason, Pasha was not to remain in exile for a long time.

Immediately after he started residing in Keşan, Osman Pasha continued to ask the central government for money. Kayseri sub-province was taken away from him when he was ordered exile to Keşan. He sent letters to Istanbul stating he was under great financial difficulty, as he did not have a salary or any other revenue source from anywhere, and requested an appropriate salary to be allocated to him. State officials in

²⁵¹ C. AS. 20979, 1789 September and October; C.AS. 21311, 1790, April; C.AS. 29700, 1790 April/May (agyt); C. AS. 41816, 1790 June; C. AS. 22174, 1790, June; C. AS. 39075, 1790 August; C. AS. 20380, 1790 August; C. AS. 14653, 1790 September; AE.SSLM.III 6168, 1790 November; C.AS. 41308, 1791 January; C. AS. 50770, 1791 January; C. AS. 1225, 1791 April; C.DH. 2720, 1791, December.

the central government checked with *Başmuhasebe* to see whether any salaries were allocated for the pasha, and saw that there were no allocations indeed. Approximately one year later, a salary of 500 *kuruş* from Gelibolu *cizye* was allocated for Osman Pasha.²⁵²

Apart from information on the allocated revenue sources for Gürcü Osman Pasha, we did not encounter any other information in the central documents or in sicills of the district about him during his time in exile. Although this is partially related to the non-existence of Keşan sicills, it also entails that Osman Pasha was yet to be a considerable threat to fall under the radar of the state, although he was dismissed vizier.

However this allocated salary from *cizye* taxes was not his only revenue source during his exile in Keşan. *Tevzi defter* applications, which existed before but that, acted as a financial tool for viziers in need of new revenue sources due to decrease in their *hass* revenues in the 18th century. These *defters* created an additional revenue stream for Osman Pasha as well. As mentioned before, a *tevzi defter*, by principle, included all expenditures of a district, expenditures of state officials stationed in or passed through districts, and taxes such as *imdadiye* for provincial governors. All of these expenses were imposed on the people of the districts. After Gürcü Osman Pasha started residing in Keşan, he became one of the officials, which the Keşan district's people were obliged to pay the expenditures for. We understand through *tevzi defters* of Keşan that not only the expenditures of active state officials, but those in exile were also collected from the people. However these expenditures were required to be reasonable in the context of the time's fiscal regulations, their grounds were required to be legit and clear explanations as to why they were made were to be provided. Auditing

²⁵² HAT.14466, 1792, August; C.ML.1072, 1793 October; C.DH.1571, 1794 January.

regulations introduced for *tevzi defters* during Selim III's reign aimed to take 18th century provincial governors, *ayans*, district governors under better fiscal control.²⁵³

Alongside assaults of bandits and strayed soldiers, costs of soldiers deployed against bandits and state officials passing through the districts made the financial circumstances of the people living in Rumelia during 1790s even more difficult. District people who could not get into production, and even fled due to bandits, felt the fiscal weight of the precautions taken against bandits and assigned officials on their shoulders. Soldier wages, provisions, and officials who brought news, and stayed in the districts even for a few days were registered as new expense items on the districts' *tevzi defters*. For example, it is possible to observe many expense items made for suppressing and repelling mountain bandits in an annual *tevzi defter* recorded in the *sicill* of Sofya between the years 1792 and 1793.²⁵⁴ Items about by-passing state officials' service fees can be observed in another *tevzi defter* registered in Edirne *sicills*, covering public-expenses of the district between April 1795 and February 1796. The people of Edirne central district fled due to mountain bandits that plundered their districts. For this reason, judge of the district (*kadı*) ordered that *defter* sum of 80 thousand *kuruş* shall not be collected until district people returned to their homes.²⁵⁵ Similarly, district people of Filibe complained about mountain bandits, and requested from the *agas* of Filibe to postpone their hefty debts. They promised to pay their debts

²⁵³ About new regulations for public-expense registers and stages of fiscal supervision during the reign of Selim III, please see: Küçüköğlu, "New Fiscal Actors to Control Provincial Expenditures", 248-55

²⁵⁴ İSAM, Sc.SOFY.219_S023, 100-105, 1792 August.

²⁵⁵ "Edirne kazası mesarîfî hakkında - 1209 senesi Şevval-i mükerremîn gurreşinden işbu 1210 senesi Şabanü'l-muazzamanın 15. gününe gelince mahruse-i Edirne kazasında mürur ve ubur iden vüzera-yı azam ve mirmiran-ı kiram ve hizmet-i devlet-i aliyye vesari mübaşirana virilen hizmet ve mesarîf-ı saire bundan akdem ... sudur iden emir emr-i mezkura binaen der-alıyyeye irsal olunmak lazın iken, işbu sene-i mübareke ruz-ı kasımında mahruse-i mezbur kazası kurralarına Dağlı eşkıyası tasallutlarından naşı ekser kurralar perakende ve perişan olub, yine kurralarına iskan idinceye değin min-hayr(?) ve marifet-i şer ve cümle marifetiyle mesarîf-i mezkure ... 79 bin 302 gurus 3 ruba balığ olduğu defteridir ki ber-vech-i ati zikr olunur." İSAM, Sc.EDR.245, 28b-32a, 1796 April.

within a few years, and asked for installments.²⁵⁶ Certainly, these examples from when Gürcü Osman Pasha was in exile in Keşan are representative only, however it is important to mention that items of expenditures about mountain bandits are frequently encountered in many of the 1790s Rumelia districts.

Records about these expenses were kept in the *sicills* of the districts relatively more regular, however unfortunately *sicills* are not found for all districts, and even when found they may not be in the most organized manner. *Sicills* for the Keşan district, unfortunately, are not existing. Yet there are other alternative sources that might give information about those public-expenses made in the districts. For instance *Cevdet Maliye* and *Divan-ı Hümayun* files constitute documents on expenditures imposed on the people of Keşan district, and some items about Osman Pasha's expenses. However it is important to make a reminder at this point that, many alternative/ reflecting records found in the center about *tevzi defters*, were produced upon problems or complaints, and therefore they did not contain systematic and regular records on *tevzi defter* applications. Therefore we understand here that the documents found on a *tevzi defter* of Keşan district and Osman Pasha's expenses in it signifies that there would have been problematic issues and possible complaints about Osman Pasha and his expenses.

According to the relevant central government documents, there are expenditures pointing to Gürcü Osman Pasha in the public-expense *defter* of Keşan district produced for 6 months between May and November of 1795. These dates point to the time when Pasha's vizierate was reinstated after his exile for three years, he was assigned to as the Guardian of Vidin and as he was en route to his new post. The

²⁵⁶ ADVN.2213.65, 1794, January.

Defatir Nazır (Superintendants assigned to control and audit public-expense register of the districts) of Rumelia of the time was ordered to audit these expense items,²⁵⁷ which were identified to be quite high in their sum.²⁵⁸ The *Defatir Nazır* was a high-ranking financial officer stationed in Istanbul, appointed by the central government to audit the *tevzi defters* and authorized to make deductions on the expenses, when deemed necessary.²⁵⁹

Keşan district *tevzi defter* provides important clues about Gürcü Osman Pasha and the dynamics of the provinces of the time. Pasha, even as an exiled officer appointed by the center, was able to take out provision loans from the district tradesmen for his household. However, *Defatir Nazır* decided that these loans were not among expenses that could be recorded in the *tevzi defters* and deducted (*tenzil*) this item from the aggregate expenditures. One of the important reasons why these items were removed from the *defter* would be that no details about the expenses were given. However, on the other hand, items such as *ikramiyes*, nightly accommodations, *aidat* given to officials under Pasha's service were not removed from the *defter*.²⁶⁰

Audit of Keşan *tevzi defters* continued until mid-1796. Osman Pasha, the Governor of Silistre at the time, was asked for information about the matter. He stated that he paid more than half of his debt to the tradesmen and shall pay the rest of it as well. Fee of *ayanhood* recorded as an item to the *defter* was in fact Hacı Ataullah's fee. However, *ayan* Ataullah was deceased and Ömer, who wanted to become *ayan* after him, compiled the *defter* in a hurry, and recorded the fee of *ayanhood* for his own

²⁵⁷ C.ML.15756, December 1795; ADVN.2244.10, February 1796.

²⁵⁸ C.ML.15756, December 1795.

²⁵⁹ When scrutiny of *tevzi defters* was not efficient from the center, *defter nazırs* were sent to the districts for audits. These officials resided in the districts and became important actors in district administrations. For more information on *Defatir Nazırs* and *Defter Nazırs* please see: Küçükoğlu, "New Fiscal Actors to Control Provincial Expenditures", 255-72.

²⁶⁰ ADVN.2244.10, February 1796; HAT.14361, February 1796.

name. At the end of the investigation, Ömer was found as the responsible person, who had been barred from provincial duties due to former incidents of bribery, for recording all of Osman Pasha's mentioned debts in the *defter* although a portion of his debts were paid in reality. Furthermore, after this time *ikramiyes*, over-night accommodations and *aidat* fees paid to the Pasha's men were removed from the *defter*. However these discounts were made after expenditures had already been collected from the people, so discounted sums were recorded in the next *defter* as revenue on account for future district expenditures.²⁶¹

The aforementioned *tevzi* records for Keşan district were as follows:

According to the *tevzi defter* covering the 6 months of total expenses for the Keşan district between May 1795 and November 1795, the expenses for Osman Pasha, appointed to reside in Keşan, were 7.715 *kuruş*. Pasha's expenses constituted 45.28% of the total expenditures of the district for these 6 months. *Ayyaniye* fee in the same *defter* was 1.500 *kuruş*.

As per the following audits, *Rumeli Defartir Nazırı* decided to make a discount of 8.994 *kuruş* from this *defter*. Almost half these deductions made were Pasha's expenses. In addition to these, *ayyaniye* fees were also deducted. Hence, total discount rate made for this *defter* reached 52,8%.

²⁶¹ ADVN.2251.70, July 1796.

Table 6. Some of *tevzi defter* items covering expenses between 1795 May–1795 November for the Keşan district

	<i>Kuruş</i>	%
Half of Osman Pasha's debt to tradesmen	5.994,5	35,2%
Cost of wheat and barley for his household (290 <i>kuruş</i>)		
<i>İkramiye</i> given to his <i>Silahdar</i> Nuri Ağa (150 <i>kuruş</i>)		
Money given to his <i>Başçukadar</i> (35 <i>Kuruş</i>)		
<i>Avoidat</i> given to his household (369 <i>kuruş</i>)		
<i>İkramiye</i> of his <i>Delilbaşı</i> (15 <i>kuruş</i>)		
Accommodations expenses of his <i>delils</i> , <i>tüfenkçiyân</i> and <i>enderun ağavatı</i> (390 <i>kuruş</i>)		
One night of accommodation fee for his <i>Kethüda</i> and <i>Delilbaşı</i> coming from Anatolia to Vidin (479,5 <i>kuruş</i>)	1.720,5	10,1%
<i>Ayaniyye</i> fee	1.500,0	8,8%
Total expense amount in the <i>defter</i>	17.038,5	100,0%

4.4 Period of the Guardianship of Vidin

After 3 years in exile in Keşan, Osman Pasha's vizierate was reinstated to take part in the capture of Pasbanoğlu, and he was appointed as the Guardian of Vidin. Immediately following his appointment, funds started to come in for the Pasha to recruit sufficient number of soldiers in his household and pay for the expenses of them. The central government found it appropriate to allocate 10 thousand *kuruş* to the Pasha as allowance and to gather and prepare his household.²⁶² Gürcü Osman Pasha moved towards his post upon receiving his orders and reached Niğbolu in September 1795. While on his way to there he collected money from the districts he passed through for provisioning other expenses. Sources demonstrate that *Divan-ı Hümayun* files (coded as A.DVN) include *tevzi defter* records for the three districts Pasha passed through

²⁶² C.DH.7167, January 1796.

during these dates. However, Pasha should surely have passed through more than three districts and imposed his expenditures on the people of the districts.

According to the *tevzi* records of the three districts Osman Pasha passed through, namely, İvrace, Zagra-yı Atik and Malkara, a total of 9.215 *kuruş* was paid for his retinue and household. Relevant records for these districts are mainly as follows:

The Guardian of Vidin Osman Pasha's expenses shown in the *tevzi defter* of İvrace (covering the public-expenses between May 1795 – November 1795) are as follows: During Pasha's passage, 6.600 *kuruş* for the expenses of his own treasury, general household expenses and *mekulat*, and also 299,5 *kuruş* were paid for *imdad-ı hazeriyeye* of *Vidin Mıhafızı*. Total expenses of the district for these 6 months were 29.654 *kuruş*. Pasha's expenses represented 23,27% of the total expenses. *Ayyaniye* fee in the same *defter* was 600 *kuruş*.²⁶³

According to the *tevzi defter* of Zagra-yı Atik district (covering the public-expenses between May 1795 – November 1795), 400 *kuruş* were paid for the expenses of Osman Pasha during his passing. Total expenses of the district for these 6 months were 13.560 *kuruş*. Pasha's expenses represented 2.95% of the total expenses. *Hazeriye* fee for Governor of Rumelia in the same *defter* was 464 *kuruş*.²⁶⁴

According to the *tevzi defter* of Malkara district (covering the public-expenses between May 1795 – November 1795), 1.916 *kuruş* were paid for the expenses of the personal treasury of Osman Pasha and the expenses of men beside him during his passing. Total expenses of the district for these 6 months were 13.410 *kuruş*. Pasha's

²⁶³ ADVN.2240.47, December 1795. Please see Appendix A for full transcription of this document.

²⁶⁴ ADVN.2243.6, January 1796. Please see Appendix B for full transcription of this document.

expenses represented 14,29% of the total expenses. *Ayyaniye* fee in the same *defter* was 1.250 *kuruş*.²⁶⁵

Table 7. Ratio of Pasha's expenses to the total District expenses: Comparison of İvrace, Zagra-yı Atik and Malkara districts

	İvrace	Zagra-yı Atik	Malkara
The period covered in the <i>defters</i> : 1795 May - 1795 November	6-months	6-months	6-months
Total expense amount in the <i>defters</i>	29,654.0	13,560.0	13,410.0
<i>Hazeriyye</i> for Guardian of Vidin	299.5	0.0	0.0
Money paid for Pasha's own treasury and expenses of his household	6,600.0	400.0	1,916.0
Total expense amount for Pasha	6,899.5	400.0	1,916.0
Ratio of total expense amount for Pasha to Total expense amount in the <i>defters</i>	23.27%	2.95%	14.29%

When we examine the numbers in the *defters*, it is seen that expenses imposed via *tevzi defters* on the people of the districts during Pasha's passage through, comprise of *imdad-ı hazariyye* taxes and expenses of Pasha himself and his household. These expenditures probably comprised of provisions, accommodation and similar items. Although Selim's fiscal regulations about *tevzi defters* required detailed explanations of expenses items along with for what or whom the expenses were made, general statements are frequently encountered in *tevzi defters*. These details were especially important for the validitycheck of the expenses during financial audits. However, as seen in all 3 of these *defters*, expense items were recorded in a vague fashion to make it more difficult to audit. These vague expressions that made *defters* difficult to audit

²⁶⁵ ADVN.2243.7, January 1796. Please see Appendix C for full transcription of this document.

played to the advantage of district and provincial administrators, and were probably recorded in the *defters* intentionally by those who recorded them.

Pasbanoğlu was pardoned a short time after Osman Pasha was appointed as the Guardian of Vidin. Since Pasbanoğlu and Osman Pasha did not used to get along, it was not appropriate for Osman Pasha to stay in Vidin. As a matter of fact Osman Pasha wanted to go somewhere other than Vidin as well. In a petition he sent to the central government in January 1796, he explained in detail why entering Vidin would not be suitable for him. According to Osman, if he were to enter Vidin with his soldiers, it would create disturbance for the soldiers on both sides, as they had battled frequently with Pasbanoğlu's men before. On the other hand, there were those among Pasbanoğlu's men in Vidin that wanted to switch to Osman Pasha's side and enter his service. Osman Pasha explained that his men would not accept and adopt such men. If Osman Pasha himself would not allow such change of sides, these men becoming strays would create another problem as well. Additionally, he already owed his own *sekbans* 70 thousand *kuruş* for their salaries, and had difficulty paying them due to shortage of cash. During those dates, Pasha used to have approximately 3 thousand Albanian *sekban* soldiers by his side. He added, stating it was apparent that if he were to fail to pay these debts, his *sekbans*, who were quite fond of money, would either join mountain bandits or other strayed groups.²⁶⁶

The new Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha, foreseen on this date that the number of Albanian *sekbans* under Osman Pasha's service and their unpaid salaries would eventually bring about challenges. Hence, he made suggestions for preventing more Albanians to enter his service and even to reduce the number of those currently

²⁶⁶ MHM.ds.894.8, October 1795; HAT.10783B, January 1796; Vakkas Toprak, *Nuri Tarihi*, 355-58; Özkaya, *Dağlı İsyanları*, 34-35.

under his service.²⁶⁷ In a letter Hakkı Pasha wrote to the center, he explained that Osman Pasha was planning to make a move around Selvi and if he were to acquire those lands, more Albanian soldiers would join him. In order to keep Osman Pasha away from this region, Hakkı tasked him to repel the unruly soldiers, who abandoned the household of the former Governor of Rumelia. Hakkı Pasha even encouraged Osman to reduce his men with the reason that he would not need so many soldiers to face such a small group of unruly soldiers. One of Hakkı Pasha's men, who relayed his orders to Osman Pasha, stated that Osman Pasha sent approximately 1.000 of his men to their hometowns. At the end of January, Osman Pasha was dismissed from his post of the guardianship of Vidin and got appointed as the Governor of Silistre. Pasha was ordered to go to Silistre by gathering all Albanian *sekbans* along with his household in Niğbolu. He was also reminded not to harm the people in the locations he were to pass through and prevent *sekbans* from dispersing.²⁶⁸

4.5 Period of the Governorship of Silistre

In such a period, where there were constant reminders to pay extraordinary care for strayed military units in Rumelia, Gürcü Osman Pasha finally arrived at Silistre on the first days of April 1796. However, other matters created problems when he arrived to his post with his *mükemmel kapı halkı* including a high number of soldiers, even though some dispersed along the way. Finding the necessary amount of funds to pay for salaries and provisions was an important problem once more. Number of Albanian *sekbans*, which had been reported to be three thousand in previous documents, is now

²⁶⁷ HAT.10783B, January 1796; HAT.2793A, July 1796.

²⁶⁸ SMHM.202.210, 615, February 1796; C.AS.39694, February 1796; HAT.2793A, July 1796; HAT.10783, January 1796.

observed to reach four thousand. It is interesting to see that the number of soldiers increased compared to previous documents, as there were concerns about soldiers dispersing and becoming bandits while Osman Pasha was travelling to his new post. Osman Pasha wrote to the center that he did not have sufficient income for salaries and other expenses due to the high number of soldiers under his service. Under such financial difficulties, this increase in the number of Pasha's soldiers might point to his influence to gather more men, despite his financial distress. Or, this financial distress may be exaggerated.²⁶⁹ In one of the Grand Vizier's reports to the Sultan, he explained that unless funds (of 75 thousand *kuruş*) from the central government were sent to Osman Pasha for payment of delayed salaries, Pasha would have no influence on his soldiers. Ultimately, Sultan Selim approved the transfer of some portion of the money Osman requested, from *İrad-ı Cedid* Treasury.²⁷⁰

After arriving in Silistre, it is seen that Pasha's soldiers were restless here as well, as they started to harass the people of the region. It was also not a distant probability that the soldiers would join the ranks of bandits. Upon this, Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha proposed for some of the Albanians under Osman Pasha's service to be sent to their hometowns. However unpaid salaries of the soldiers constituted a substantial obstacle for realizing this proposal. According to the claims of Osman Pasha and *Kapı ketdühası* Süfyan Aga, six months of unpaid salaries for Albanian soldiers.²⁷¹

This high number of *sekban* soldiers, gathered during Osman Pasha's former duty for the fight against Pasbanoğlu, arrived at Silistre alongside the Pasha. Yet as

²⁶⁹ MHM.ds.897.15, February 1796; HAT.10783B, January 1796; ADVN.2247.25, April 1796; C.AS.27929, May 1796; C.DH.3976, August 1796.

²⁷⁰ HAT.56802, July 1796 (agyt); C.ML.4433, May 1796.

²⁷¹ HAT.3888, August 1796.

the daily provisions and monthly salaries of the *sekbans* reached substantial amounts, and funds were not sufficient enough to pay for these, Pasha (perhaps desperately) tried to impose this burden on the people of the region. Osman Pasha asked for 100 thousand *kuruş* from the *Hazine-i Amire* to pay for the accumulated salaries. In a report written for the Sultan, Grand Vizier said ‘we have no option but to allow it, it would be scandalous if we do not’.²⁷²

However an amount of 100 thousand *kuruş* seems not enough to pay for the unpaid salaries of six months. When we consider Osman Pasha had approximately four thousand Albanian soldiers in his service during this time, this amount is equal to less than half of the required/ estimated six months’ salaries. Monthly salary for each of the *sekban* soldiers in Osman Pasha’s service was 9,5 *kuruş*. This was almost two times the maximum salary allowed for *sekban* soldiers in the service of similar viziers of the time, which was five *kuruş*. As for the administrators of these soldiers, according to a document dated a few months back, one *bölükbaşı* for 15 to 20 Albanian *sekban* soldiers was allocated in Pasha’s retinue. According to this calculation, the minimum number of *bölük* and *bölükbaşı* for four thousand soldiers is 200. The minimum monthly salary for *bölükbaşıs* at the time was 25 *kuruş*, according to another document.²⁷³ However this amount was probably higher, as it was for Pasha’s regular soldiers. The following tables are produced, based on the information about soldier and *bölükbaşı* numbers in the documents and on some assumptions made.

²⁷² C.ML.2902, September 1796; HAT.10681, December 1796.

²⁷³ C.AS.27929, May 1796; C.ML.2902, September 1796; C.AS.1301, September 1796. Certainly, Osman Pasha was not the only pasha that paid his soldiers more than the minimum amount during this period. According to a document about monthly *sekban* salaries in Rumelia at the end of 1797, *Filibe Nazırı* Ahmed paid 10 *kuruş mahiyye* for each employed *sekban* soldier. It was stated that *bölükbaşıs* appointed for every 50 soldiers received 25 *kuruş* each, and *alemdars* appointed for every 50 soldiers received 15 *kuruş* each. C.AS.35037, April 1798.

Table 8. Osman Pasha's monthly and 6-month *mahiyye* expenses when each of the four thousand Albanian soldiers are paid 9,5 *kuruş*:

	Number	Mahiyye	Kuruş
<i>Nefer</i>	4.000	9,5	38.000
<i>Bölükbaşı</i>	200	25	5.000
TOTAL	4.200		43.000
TOTAL (6 month)			258.000

Table 9. Pasha's monthly and 6-month *mahiyye* expenses when each of the four thousand Albanian soldiers are paid five *kuruş*:

	Number	Mahiyye	Kuruş
<i>Nefer</i>	4,000	5	20,000
<i>Bölükbaşı</i>	200	25	5,000
TOTAL	4,200		25,000
TOTAL (6 month)			150,000

As observed from the tables, even when five *kuruş*, as duly determined by the rules, were to be paid for *sekbans* soldiers per month, unpaid salaries of four thousand soldiers for six months aggregated to more than 100 thousand *kuruş*. This number of 100 thousand *kuruş* might refer the maximum amount Osman Pasha thought he could ask from the central government.

However, it is important to make the reminder that, these numbers in the tables above are calculated for four thousand *sekbans*, as reported for the total number of *sekbans* under Pasha's service. This 100 thousand *kuruş* might have been the unpaid monthly salaries for the soldiers who were thought to be sent away from Pasha's household. On the other hand, since only paying for the soldiers that were to be sent away or even considering such an action would create discontent among the ones that

stayed, so this does not seem probable. Another possibility is that the actual number of Pasha's soldiers was three thousand as referred in previous documents, not four thousand. In this case, on the assumption that five *kuruş* was paid for each soldier, and 25 *kuruş* was paid for 150 *bölükbaşı*s (the estimated minimum number of *bölükbaşı*s), six-month salaries would be 112.500 *kuruş*, still more than 100 thousand.

The Grand Vizier had an interesting suggestion in the same report. He proposed to take hostage 15 to 20 of the respected Albanian *bölükbaşı*s under Osman Pasha's service. The remaining Albanian soldiers and *bölükbaşı*s were to be sent to their hometowns by appointing a *Kethüda* to lead them, and once the *Kethüda* confirmed their arrival to their hometowns without harming anyone on the way, the hostage *bölükbaşı*s were to be released.²⁷⁴ This strategy to take hostage the leaders of Albanian *sekbans* in order to prevent them from rebelling or behaving disorderly along their way to their hometowns, may prove the soldiers' strong sense of loyalty for their leaders, though probably not for their patrons Osman Pasha.

After a while Osman Pasha informed the center that he assigned his *Kethüda* Seyyid Nurullah Aga to lead his *sekbans* and take them to their hometowns. Osman stated that he paid 125 thousand *kuruş* sent from the center, a small amount of money from his own treasury and some of his weapons and belongings, but a 25 thousand *kuruş* was still left unpaid. He gave some of his furcoats and ornaments as hostage to his debts remaining in order to please his soldiers. This document confirms the calculations above that six-month deferred salary payments would definitely be over 100 thousand *kuruş*.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ C.ML.2902, September 1796; C.AS.1301, September 1796.

²⁷⁵ C.AS.5537, October 1796.

In the meantime the *kadı* of Silistre noted that Osman Pasha discharged all his debts of salary payments and he even took back his hostaged belongings.²⁷⁶ A possible response to the question of how Osman paid all his debts could be seen in other documents. For example a document from an A.DVN folder gives information about Osman's tax revenues. According to the document people of Silistre districts had been given tax-exemptions (except from *şeri* taxes) for three years with the object of easing the financial burden on people after campaigns. On that ground, they were exempted from *imdad-ı hazeriyye* tax within this period. Some districts in Silistre were claiming that this period of exemption was continuing so they refused to pay *imdad-ı hazeriyye* to Osman Pasha. After an inquiry on related financial records of the districts, it was discovered that the mentioned exemption period ended, and *imdad-ı hazeriyye* tax shares for each district were determined.²⁷⁷ However it appears that this lawful and pre-determined provincial tax were not enough to meet Osman's excessive expenditures and thus he collected extra unlawful money from the people in Silistre.

Two districts from Silistre *nezareti mukataası* would be a good example of such abuses of Osman Pasha. These districts were obligated to pay taxes to the mentioned mukataa. They were also used to pay annual *imdadiyye* taxes (206 *kuruş*) to the governors of Silistre. They were exempted from all other kinds of taxes. Yet Osman Pasha borrowed 1.600 *kuruş* from the people of these districts, and when they asked for repayment, Osman told them that 'he took this money as kudumiyye and he will not pay it back'. Then he torched down grasslands in the region. We do not know

²⁷⁶ ADVN.2257.22, December 1796.

²⁷⁷ ADVN.2243.59, January 1796.

if Osman obeyed the orders about this incident but surely he was ordered to pay this money back and compensate for the destroyed lands.²⁷⁸

Even though the government was aware of potential problems and abuses Osman's soldiers might have caused, diminishing their number especially when preparing for new campaigns against Pasbanoğlu was not a favorable option. In fact at the middle of 1797 while gathering soldiers to participate in the mentioned campaigns, Osman Pasha was ordered to rush to Niğbolu with his household and 100 thousand *kuruş* from *İrad-ı Cedid* Treasury and 30 thousand from *Hazine-i Amire* was sent to him for his expenses. Osman Pasha claimed in one of his letters that money sent was actually insufficient to cover all his expenses, but despite his financial difficulties he did not collect any unlawful money from the district people.²⁷⁹ Nonetheless we see in further reports that he took illegal money from the people in opposition to this statement of his.

Before arriving at Niğbolu, Osman Pasha engaged in several battles with the bandits in first Rusçuk then Zıştovi. When the bandits were defeated, Osman sent his *Delilbaşı* Aydın Aga with three-four thousand infantry and cavalry to go behind the fleeing bandits. In reference to this number we can assume that Osman Pasha should have more than four thousand soldiers at his service at this date.²⁸⁰

Osman Pasha himself and other officials, ayans and his soldiers who were under his command were all rewarded by the central government. The Sultan sent Osman Pasha and Rusçuk ayanı Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga and the households of them gifts and money. Tirsiniklizade was promoted with the honorary title of *kapıcıbaşılık*.

²⁷⁸ ADVN.2257.22, December 1796; C.ML.23180, December 1796; HAT.10681, December 1796.

²⁷⁹ C.AS.52795, April 1797; AE.SSLM.III.1402, May 1797; HAT.2789A, May 1797.

²⁸⁰ C.DH.10344, February-March 1798.

100 kese akçe *atiyye* was sent to Osman Pasha, 15 kese to Tirsiniklizade and 40 kese to their men. Moreover Osman Pasha asked favors for tradesmen and local soldiers of Rusçuk helped him to defeat the bandits. Osman Pasha took courage from his recent achievements and he asked for more money from the center to use in sieges of Kulle and Niğbolu fortresses. An additional amount of 60 thousand *kuruş* was sent to him.²⁸¹

Governorship of Silistre was the period at which Osman Pasha took money from the center the most frequent. When we examine an income-expense defter recorded by Hüseyin Aga, *Ordu Nazırı* and *Defterdar* of Osman Pasha, and several other expenditure registers found in Topkapı Palace documents, we could see the great extent of Osman Pasha's revenues, even though they do not show all of his provincial revenues at the time. One-year income registered in Hüseyin's defter between December 1797 and December 1798 the expenses listed for salaries, provisions and other expenses of Osman Pasha's soldiers was around 457 thousand *kuruş*. At the same defter Osman's annual revenue was recorded as approximately 409 thousand *kuruş*, so his income could not cover his expenses in this defter.²⁸²

In an allocation list showing money sent between February and March to significant state officials for the elimination of Pasbanoğlu and his men, the total money sent for soldiers and other household members of Osman Pasha was around 74 thousand *kuruş*. This amount was consisted of salary, provision, and gift items. For the

²⁸¹ "...Ni'met-i şâhânem sana ve Tirsinikli-zâdeye helâl ü hoş-güvâr olsun. Bu muhârebede yararlık idenlerin dahi iki cihânda yüzleri ağ olsun..." HAT.12535, December 1797; "...Gerek kendisi ve gerek kapısı halkı ve gerek Rusçuk ahâlisi merd ve gayûr 'ademler imiş... nasıl dürlü rütbe ister ise hemân Osman Paşa çerâğ eyleyub bu tarafa yazsun, makbûl-ı hümayûnum idüğü..." HAT.57547, June 1798 (agyt); C.DH.1335, December 1797-January 1798; C.AS.22144, December 1797; HAT.2707, June 1798 (agyt); HAT.2564A, December 1797; HAT.1786, January 1798; HAT.2739, January 1798; C.DH.10958, February 1798; HAT. 2762, February 1798.

²⁸² C.DH.10958, February 1798; HAT.13060, February 1798; C.DH.1133, February 1798; TS.MA.d.2113 0005, February 1798; HAT. 2762, February 1798; HAT.59035, February-March 1798; D.BŞM.d.6616, June 1800.

coming one-month period this amount was over 150 thousand *kuruş*. Both *İrad-ı Cedit* and the Central treasuries were used for these allocations. Meanwhile Hüseyin Aga was requesting more money immediately, claiming that the household expenses were very hefty and the existing revenues were not enough to meet them. According to him, Osman Pasha had 70-80 *kese akçe* (approximately 29-33 thousand *kuruş*, with the assumption of one *kese akçe* equals to 50 thousand *akçe*, and one *kuruş* equals to 120 *akçe*) of debt for salaries and provisions at this date.²⁸³

4.6 Between the Governorships of Silistre and Rumelia

The rise of Osman Pasha continued after the Vidin siege, with the governorships of Anatolia, then, Bosna, Selanik and Rumelia.²⁸⁴ The end of the Vidin siege and the pardon of Pasbanoğlu might have caused a decrease in the number of his soldiers. Sources demonstrates that his household diminished to one thousand soldiers when Selanik was assigned to him. At these dates his Albanian *sekbans* were paid eight *kuruş* per month.²⁸⁵ This number specified for *sekban* salaries was less than the number of three years before, which had been nine and a half *kuruş* per month.²⁸⁶

Even if the number of his soldiers diminished significantly (from four thousand to one), thusly his expenditures should have been decreased, the Governor of Selanik Osman Pasha was worried that the revenues of this post would have not been sufficient for his expenses. Wherefore he required revenues of Tırhala sub-province

²⁸³ CML.2133, March 1798; TS.MA.d.2113 0006, February-March 1798; TS.MA.d.2113.0007, March-April 1798; HAT.2982, August 1798; HAT.2077, August 1798.

²⁸⁴ C.DH.12542, September 1798.

²⁸⁵ HAT.11295, June 1799 (agyt); C.DH.15213, May 1799; C.DH.6636, May 1799; C.AS.33852, November 1798; C.DH.3343, May 1799; MAD.d.7584.24, April 1799.

²⁸⁶ C.AS.27929, May 1796.

as well. Upon his request a research was made and the report written on this matter stated that the income of Selanik post was not enough for a vizier, even with a small household. As a result, the revenues Tırhala sub-province were allocated to Osman.²⁸⁷

However the allocation of Tırhala to Osman Pasha did not solve his financial problems, because he lost another revenue source from Selanik after that. It had been previously determined that salaries of his soldiers (one thousand of Albanian *sekbans*) were to be paid by the Selanik districts. Nevertheless, in time it was understood that his salary expenses would have been a great burden for the districts. Besides, it was informed that his soldiers harassed the people of the districts. On this ground, the central government nullified the previous orders demanding salaries to be paid by the Selanik districts.²⁸⁸

This was not the only case resulting a decrease in Osman Pasha's revenue sources. Two months before the case mentioned above, another incident of Osman's collecting illegal money from the people came up. In the mid-1799 a murder was committed in Poliroz *karye* from *mukataa* of Hasha-i Lankaza. According to a report on the murder, the Selanik Valisi Osman Pasha, with the provocations of Selanikli Yusuf Bey, accused kocabaşı Yorgaki of the *karye* of being the murderer. Osman also claimed that the people of the *karye* was illegally producing *enfiye* (snuff). Based on these two statements of him, Osman unlawfully took 10.700 *kuruş cerime* (fine) from the people. The writer of the report noted that the people of the *karye* could not afford to pay this amount of fine. After an investigation it was understood that Osman Pasha's allegations were not true, so a payback was ordered. Furthermore, the local

²⁸⁷ HAT.14136, June 1799 (agytt); HAT.1475.39, January 1800; HAT.1476.18, March 1800; AE.SSLM.III.6386, May 1800.

²⁸⁸ C.DH.1575, August 1799; C.AS.37641, October 1799.

notable Yusuf Bey was sent to exile in the island of Limni. Eventually Osman Pasha repaid the money he took.²⁸⁹

Osman Pasha's collaboration with the local notable Yusuf Bey is a good example for the actions of corrupted officials, frequently mentioned in the literature about the 18th century Ottoman politics. Here Osman built a clear alliance with an *ayan* based on their mutual interests, at the expense of the interests of the district people. The government did not remove Osman from his post although his misuses were known, instead kept allocating new revenue sources, sending money and provisions to him. As a reaction to Osman's misbehaviors pushing the limits of the people, required orders like repayments were given but more severe punishments such as dismissal or exile were not preferred. Based on tolerations of the center, we could assume that Osman continued overcharging the people of the districts after that. The government protected Osman pasha till he rebelled openly or joined his forces with the bandits.

4.7 Period of the Governorship of Rumelia

In the year of 1800 Osman Pasha was appointed as Governor of Rumelia and ordered to go to Sofya.²⁹⁰ When he was leaving his previous post Selanik, tradesmen of the city proclaimed that Osman Pasha did not owe any money to them.²⁹¹ This statement indicates that they were somehow content with Osman and his management. Ironically the people of the very same region would have rejected Osman's appointment to Selanik due to past atrocities of him.

²⁸⁹ AE.SSLM.III.1391, July 1799; C.DH.6533, July 1799.

²⁹⁰ C.DH.3640, May 1800; HAT.15802, May 1800 (agyt); TS.MA.e.475.24, June 1798 (agyt – wrong dating).

²⁹¹ HAT.5172D, May 1800.

The first revenue source allocated to the Governor of Rumelia Osman Pasha, was *Sofya gebran cizyesi* and *Berkofça mukataası*. These sources used to be given to *Sofya Mutesellims* (financial supervisor in a sub-province) thus allocated to the *Mutesellim* of Sofya Haseki Mehmed Aga at first. However Mehmed Aga expressed that most of the people in the districts were fled due to the bandit attacks and so he made a loss. He demanded to give up his rights to collect tax-farming revenues from these sources in the end. The tax-farming revenues of these two sources are 187.500 *kuruş* in total and they are belonged to *İrad-ı Cedid* Treasury. After Mehmed Aga renounced these revenue sources, they were transferred to Osman Pasha, with undertaking pledge of his *Kapı kethüda* Süfyan Aga. Sources suggest that Rumeli Valis ususally could not interfere with the area of Berkofça although it was within the limits of the Rumeli province. Yet thanks to Mehmed Aga's renouncing these *mukataa* revenues, they became open to Osman Pasha's utilization. Later on Osman would have resist leaving Berkofça even after his dismissal. Another source Osman Pasha asked for was, revenues of a *malikane* in Yenişehir-i Fener district, which was subjected to Tırhala sub-province. This demand of him was made for his son.²⁹²

The first action of Osman Pasha as the Governor of Rumelia was recruiting soldiers to fight against Pasbanoğlu. The state troops took on the bandit units in Berkofça and engaged in skirmishes. Thousands of soldiers from the state troops change sides and joined the bandits. For instance one of Osman Pasha's *binbaşıs* Ibrahim was ordered to go to Pazarcık villages to spend the winter time. When Ibrahim entered into Pazarcık he faced with the bandits hiding in the region and he lost 300 men to the bandits. Switching allegiance among both the soldiers and the bandits were

²⁹² C.ML.2728, March-May 1800; HAT.57949, May 1800.

quite common at these dates. The battles in Berkofça ended up being a defeat against the bandits.²⁹³

After Berkofça the bandit groups gathered in Niğbolu. The bandit leaders such as Kara Feyzi, Sansalı Halil, Filibeli Mustafa, Celiloğlu, Hafizoğlu, Kara İbrahim, and Selvili Çolak came to Niğbolu with 1.500 men. In the meantime the Guardian of Vidin Pasbanoğlu was approaching Niğbolu with 400 cavalry, though not to fight against the bandits but to join them. There were bandit units among Pasbanoğlu's men. The bandits attracted supporters and recruited fighters from the local people of the districts as well. The Sultan issued a decree for forgiving these local people under the condition that they would have changed sides to the state troops.²⁹⁴

Although Osman Pasha stated that he could not gather sufficient number of men for the defense of Berkofça, he still complained about high military expenses, mainly salaries and provisions, that he could not afford to pay. The military expenses of Osman during the Berkofça defense reached approximately 91 thousand *kuruş*. As we mentioned before, the salary and provision expenditures of the vizier households stirred up many troubles for both the viziers and the state and eventually had negative impacts on the local people. It should be noted that such problems about household expenses were surely not specific to Osman Pasha and his household. For instance the *Voyvoda* of Tırnova (of the time) Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga also had difficulties in paying salaries of his soldiers under his command and asked for monetary help from the center.²⁹⁵

To illustrate another case of mentioned financial difficulties we could look at Tayyar Mahmud Pasha who were charged with repelling the mountain bandits in

²⁹³ HAT.5172, May 1800; HAT.3254, September 1800; HAT.2501A, August 1800; HAT.2501, August 1800.

²⁹⁴ HAT.2754, September 1800; HAT.6510, September 1800; C.DH.16596 September 1800.

²⁹⁵ HAT.2501B, August 1800; AE.SSLM.III.16245, November 1800; HAT.2679, December 1800; HAT.2621, February-March 1801; HAT.2989, March 1801; HAT.2508, December, 1800.

Rumelia. Tayyar Pasha mentioned in a letter that he spent a large amount of money for the bandit matter and needed extra money, but there was no one around him to lend him some money. He expressed that he did not want to collect any money from the district people so he asked for monetary aid from the center. I think that Tayyar Pasha implied by this statement that if the center did not send any money to him, he would have to harass the local people. Tayyar Pasha also mentioned that his soldiers plus Osman Pasha's men were too many soldiers for the region to pay for the military expenses of them. Tayyar made a suggestion of decreasing the number of soldiers, either of his own, or of Osman Pasha's. This suggestion would indicate that Tayyar saw Osman as an opponent and tried to weaken his military power.²⁹⁶

Even though Osman Pasha was not successful in the Berkofça defense, some of the bandits still required pardon and taking his side. Osman Pasha wrote to the center and requested permission to forgive two bandit leaders named Bekirlili Kara Mustafa and İbrahim, and their men and let them reside in Filibe. On the other hand the *Nazır* of Filibe (local notable of Filibe) Çelebi Aga suspected that these bandits would have acted orderly even if they were pardoned. Mustafa reminded of a similar incident that the bandit leaders Kara Feyzi and Kara Mustafa had pretended for amnesty, yet they deceived the state officials and ended up oppressing the local people using this opportunity. Therefore, Çelebi Aga did not want Bekirlili Kara Mustafa, İbrahim, and their men to stay in Filibe. The interesting thing was that Çelebi Aga asked for support from Tayyar Pasha in this matter. As a mediating agent for Çelebi Aga's concerns and demands, Tayyar wrote a letter to Istanbul and asked whether this pardon Osman Pasha mentioned was representing the pardon of the state, or not. Tayyar emphasized that he did not approve of their pardon since it was apparent that they would have engaged in

²⁹⁶ HAT.2640K, December 1800.

banditry again. However if they were to be forgiven, he suggested that these men should have been directly in Osman Pasha's household to be watched more easily, not to be sent to Filibe.²⁹⁷ Certainly Tayyar Pasha's worries and suggestions were quite appropriate. Thousands of bandits pardoned and joined Osman's units would have required a lot more military expenditures and more energy to oversee and discipline.²⁹⁸

4.8 Denial of His Dismissal and His Rebellion

From Osman Pasha's dismissal from Governorship of Rumelia to his death, the most frequently discussed matters about him, were the number of his soldiers and the abuses of them over the local people. If we look into the number of his soldiers we see that the numbers mentioned in the documents are varying. When Osman was removed from his post and assigned to Silistre, he claimed that he would have left seven-eight of his soldiers in Sofya and move to his new post. However he did not leave Sofya, and tried to prove his worthiness in the region to be able to keep his post. One of his statements in his defense was that he employed ten thousand of men to repel Manav İbrahim and his bandits. It is not clear that whether the two different numbers in two different documents were mutually exclusive or not, but we could still make a supposition of his soldiers to be at least ten thousands.²⁹⁹

After a couple of months passed from his dismissal, the *naib* of Sofya wrote a supporting ilam to Istanbul, stating that Osman Pasha was needed in the region. To his claim, Osman had four thousand of soldiers in his service who were transferred from

²⁹⁷ HAT.3098, January 1801; HAT.2492B, January 1801; HAT.3099, January 1801; HAT.3116, May 1801 (agyt).

²⁹⁸ HAT.2604, February 1801.

²⁹⁹ HAT.2387, April 1801; HAT.2528A, April 1801.

Pasbanoğlu units, and 15 thousand of men in total. The naib was worried that if Osman had been taken out from Sofya, these men would have returned to Pasbanoğlu's side and started harrasing the people again.³⁰⁰ To make a comparison, the Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha had 25 thousand of men at his household at the time.³⁰¹ As we know from the previous pages, Hakkı Pasha could not enter Sofya for some time due to Osman's refusing leaving. Hakkı thought that Osman's large household would have been a great financial burden for the people and if Osman had been pushed to his limits, he would have joined Pasbanoğlu and became a mountain bandit himself.³⁰²

Hakkı Pasha exemplified the financial and other damages Osman Pasha caused in the districts at his letters to the center, in detail. For instance, Osman took 170 kese *akçe* (around 71 thousand *kuruş*) from a small district Pirzenik. The *Voyvoda* of the district Yümni Efendi ran away from the district and sheltered with Hakkı Pasha, and proved Osman's abuses to Hakkı by showing *senets* (receipts) of the money paid. The Köstendil naib articulated that the money Osman had collected from the districts with the excuse of the Berkofça defense, passed the amount of 500 thousand *kuruş*, and that Osman confiscated properties of the people by force, collected excessive amounts of provisions and consequently many people left their homes and migrated to other places. Osman was reported to robbed and killed 15-20 people while he was on his way to Dubniçe. According to Hakkı Pasha, Osman Pasha committed all these abuses with the main excuse of highh expenses of his soldiers. However Hakkı Pasha did not believe in Osman's statement of having more than 15 thousand soldiers in his service. Hakkı argued that the cost of Osman Pasha and his soldiers to the Rumelian people

³⁰⁰ HAT.2344B, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2878E, May 1801.

³⁰¹ HAT.2376A, April 1801.

³⁰² HAT.2376F, April 1801.

was over 15 thousand *kese akçe* (6 million 250 thousand *kuruş*),³⁰³ even though Osman he did not achieve a significant success in Berkofça.³⁰⁴ So his costs were more than his benefits to the region.

In the meantime Hakkı Pasha asking money for five-six-months salaries since he had financial difficulties to pay his soldiers. He claimed that if he could get monetary assistance from the center, he could have pleased his soldiers and thus he could have defeated the bandits. The justification effort of Hakkı Pasha for his *mahiyye* (monthly salary) demands from the center probably lied behind the fact that Osman Pasha was not asking money for *mahiyye* payments to his own soldiers at that specific date. Hakkı implied that Osman was not pleading for money because he already fiscally abused the Rumelian districts and collected enough money to pay his soldiers, whereas Hakkı did not prefer such an illegal way and chose to apply to the center for his financial needs. According to him, the extent of Osman's misuses would have been seen if the *tevzi defter*s of the districts were examined. Hakkı also stated that Osman used the money he collected from the districts to lure more men from Pasbanoğlu's side to his own. Hakkı foreseen such abuses and disorderly behaviors of Osman would have been increased if he was allowed to stay in Berkofça.³⁰⁵

The first two provinces assigned to Osman Pasha after his dismissal from Rumeli, was Selanik, then Silistre. At this date Osman Pasha was about to move to Lom and Vidin and he claimed that he had more than 20 thousand soldiers beside him, and

³⁰³ This number is very high and we do not know for sure that if it is accurate of how long a period it covers. However in order to make a comparison with the public-expense registers from districts we could look at two examples from the central district of Selanik. According to a register showing one year of expenses of Selanik at June 1795, the total public expenses amounted to 34 thousand *kuruş*, and at another Selanik register from May 1798 this number was 190 thousand *kuruş* for one year. Neumann, "Masarif-i Vilâyet Defterleri", 73-80.

³⁰⁴ HAT.2376F, April 1801; HAT.2376İ, April 1801.

³⁰⁵ HAT.2396, April 1801.

the number was increasing day by day. He made a request for help in salaries and provisions for his soldiers. According to his statement, he was in debt over 600 *kese akçe* (250 thousand *kuruş*). Most of this amount was sent from the center to meet his needs.³⁰⁶

Later on the central government tried to send him first in Bosnia and then to Diyarbakır in order to deprive him of his military and financial sources. If he had accepted one of these assignments there was a plan to ambush and kill him. Though Osman did not agreed with either of the options with the excuse of his unpaid salaries. To him, he owed 5 thousand *kese akçe* (approximately 2 million *kuruş*) to his soldiers in the middle of 1801.³⁰⁷ If one nefer gets paid 10 *kuruş* per month, this amount would be equal to ten months of salaries of 20 thousand soldiers.

Before Bosnia was assigned to Osman Pasha, there were conflicting information on the number of his soldiers. Osman claimed he had around 20 thousand soldiers in his service, whereas a state official stated that he had 1.500 soldiers, and the *Voyvoda* of Eflak gave another number of four-five thousand soldiers. After a while, Osman Pasha asserted that this number increased to 26 thousand with the soldiers of the former Governor of Silistre Musa Pasha joining his units. Much as the number of 26 thousand is an exaggeration or overstatement of Osman Pasha, the number of 1.500 is not realistic either especially given the fact that Osman was recruiting bandits to his units. The accurate number at this time would probably around 5 thousand.³⁰⁸

At similar dates, Tirziniklizade İsmail Aga wrote a letter to Istanbul, when he found out that Osman Pasha was dismissed. He expressed his worries that 20 thousand

³⁰⁶ HAT.3122, May 1801 (agyt); HAT.2607A, April 1801; HAT.3035A, April 1801; HAT.3040A, May 1801; HAT.3035B, May 1801; HAT.3035, May 1801; HAT.2878B, May 1801.

³⁰⁷ HAT.3998C, August 1801. For the refernces of monthly salaries of the soldiers, please look at: HAT.2621, March-April 1798; HAT.2607A, June 1798; HAT.2511C, June 1798 (agyt).

³⁰⁸ HAT.3034, June 1801; C.AS.1896, June 1801; HAT.2219K, June 1801; AE.SSLM.III.5110, July 1801; C.AS.11007, July 1801; HAT.2183, August 1801; HAT.2195, September 1801.

soldiers at Osman's household would have not go to their hometowns if they did not get their unpaid salaries and therefore Tirziniklizade recommended the center to pay for his debts. Tirziniklizade's concerns about this matter was probably related with his motivation to protect his power domain and lands from Osman's disorderly and pillaging men.³⁰⁹

When Osman Pasha rejected to go to Bosnia, he was appointed to Diyarbakır. At this time Osman Pasha was repelled from Niğbolu but was still in Rumelia and the number of his soldiers was estimated to be ten thousand. These soldiers started to attack and plunder the districts openly from this date on. Even though Osman Pasha was whining about his high debts to his soldiers, ironically he continued to recruit soldiers with various excuses. Eventually his execution appeared as an inevitable solution to his uprising. But the execution was delayed to the nearest convenient time, as these dates would have required more energy and focus on the matter of elimination of the bandits. Therefore, it was decided that he was to pass to Anatolia.³¹⁰

Apparently to send Osman Pasha away to Anatolia would not have been easy. There began battles between Osman's men and the state troops, and many pashas and ayans were charged with capturing him. Osman Pasha claimed that he was moving to his new post and the news about him behaving disorderly and rebelling was lies. He expressed that he would definitely have liked to obey the orders to send his soldiers to their hometowns, but this was impossible without paying their deferred salaries. The amount he mentioned for unpaid salaries was around six thousand *kese akçe* (approximately 2,5 million *kuruş*). In the meantime, Tirsiniklizade İsmail who engaged in battles with Osman's troops in Ziftövi reported that Osman had 15 thousand soldiers.

³⁰⁹ HAT.31234, May 1801 (agyt).

³¹⁰ HAT.2661, October 1801; HAT.3858; October 1801; HAT.2205; May 1802 (agyt).

Osman tried to defend himself and his overcharging the districts by military needs that he could not have met only through his own means. He emphasized that all of the money collected from the people were recorded in detail and spent for executing the state's orders, not for his own personal needs. However, his excuses and defense were not found very convincing. Consequently the government decided to remove his titles and deposed him from his posts, and ordered him to go to Yenişehir-i Fener.³¹¹

As we mentioned earlier, unpaid salaries of soldier were not only Osman Pasha's problem. The Governor of Rumelia of this date Muhtar Pasha noted in a letter that stray soldiers deposed former Governor of Rumelia Hakkı Pasha needed to be repelled or to be placed at a proper place, but this required to pay the soldiers, which was not possible at the time being. When Muhtar Pasha was the Governor of Rumelia, the number of Osman's soldiers was noted to be ten thousand. In his reports to Istanbul Muhtar Pasha addressed an interesting point that differentiated Osman Pasha from other pashas on the time. Muhtar's letters gives us clues about why Osman's rebellion was difficult to suppress and how he managed to keep so many soldiers for so long at his side. Even though the large number of soldiers was not necessarily based on his military or managing skills, and sometimes Osman became a desperate and relatively powerless official exposed to pressing needs and ambitious of his bandit-like soldiers, the number his soldiers would have been affected by some of his personal traits. In Muhtar's respect, since Osman was originally a military figure, and was a *delilbaşı* himself at his early career, he would have known soldiers better and understood their needs better, so he could have sensed how to manage and manipulate them to his own needs.³¹²

³¹¹ HAT.2321, October 1801; HAT.1788, October 1801; HAT.4714, November 1801; HAT.4754, November 1801; HAT.3861, November 1801; HAT.4277, December 1801; HAT.2513, November 1801; HAT.2284, November 1801; HAT.3879A, March 1802; HAT.2579, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2300C, May 1802 (agyt).

³¹² HAT.3859, January 1802; HAT.2932, January 1802; HAT.2001, January 1802; HAT.2990, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.2161, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.3921, May 1802 (agyt); ADVN.2342.32, May 1802.

The most significant action of Muhtar Pasha on the matter of Osman's rebellion, was to be able to persuade some of his men to leave his side. With Muhtar's orders, the *ayans* of the related districts conveyed messages including advices and threats to Osman's men. As a result of these messages sent one of Osman's most important men, his *Delilbaşı* Ömer Pasha quitted his patron along with some of his soldiers. Certainly the quitters were also influenced by the news of their patron's demotion and they feared that they might have been punished too. Still some other soldiers of him stayed with Osman Pasha with the hope of receiving their unpaid salaries and even with the anticipation of new post assigned to him, hence the possibility of maintaining their status of being *kapılı*. After some of the soldiers left Osman's household, the number of his soldiers declined to two thousand.³¹³ A short while after Osman was pardoned when the bandit attacks increased and the tension between some local notables in the region escalated. Then he was appointed to Silistre again and three thousand *kese akçe* (computed as 1,5 million *kuruş* in the documents) was sent to him to pay his debts to his soldiers.³¹⁴ This was probably the last money sent him from the center.

From a defter record we learn the names and the titles of the ones left Osman Pasha's side. There were one *delilbaşı*, five *delilbaşıs*, one *tüfenkçibaşı*, 45 *binbaşıs* recorded in this defter. It was specified that 1.705 *nefers* and 53 commanders moved towards either their hometowns or towards the households of other viziers, such as Tirsiniklizade İsmail or Muhtar Pasha.³¹⁵

³¹³ HAT.3867, May 1802 (agyt); HAT.3879, May 1802; HAT.3864, May 1802.

³¹⁴ HAT.3060, May 1802; HAT.2279A, June 1802; HAT.12574, June 1802; ADVN.2344.20, June 1802; C.AS.4162, June 1802; ADVN.2344.22, June 1802; C.DH.6452, July 1802; ADVN.2348.20, August-September 1802; C.AS.22912, June 1802.

³¹⁵ C.AS.22869, August-September 1802.

A year from this date, conditions of Rumelia changed again and the time became more convenient to punish Osman Pasha, who was continuing his disobedient behaviors, then his execution was ordered. Even if he passed to Anatolia, he was running from a large army chasing him up. When he was leading to his new post in Erzurum, he faced with the state troops under Tayyar Pasha's command. Tayyar's army consisted of 20 thousand soldiers, whereas Osman's only two thousand. Eventually he was defeated and murdered by the government's orders.³¹⁶

4.9 Concluding Remarks

First characteristic of the number of soldiers at viziers' households is the increase experienced in number of soldiers whenever the center needed a pasha's military power. In the fights against bandits, or when a insubordinate state official or *ayan* was to be suppressed, central government's first order of business would be to increase the number of soldiers, order supply of troops and send money to relevant officials for expenditures. Viziers, who were not of *ayan* origin, were more unfortunate compared to *ayans* with respect to paying the wages and other expenditures of the soldiers under their retinue, because non-*ayan* viziers did not have personal wealth like *ayans*. Therefore, even the highest-ranking viziers requested money from the center to pay the salaries and for provisions of the increasing number of soldiers. When the central revenues fell short, they resorted to the provincial revenue pool to expand their resources.

Gürcü Osman Pasha used to accommodate a substantial number of soldiers starting from his position of *Delilbaşı*, which was one of his first ones. He had one to two thousands of soldiers under his service; even at the times the number of soldiers

³¹⁶ HAT.3869, October 1803; HAT.12035, November 1803.

was at a minimum. Increase in the number of soldiers under his service started when he passed from his guardianship posts to governorship of Silistre, and was directly related to the campaigns launched against Pasbanoğlu and his men. He had the greatest number of soldiers under his service in the two years following his dismissal from the governorship of Rumelia. The number of soldiers in his retinue increased above 20 thousands, with bandits switching sides from Pasbanoglu to the Pasha's side. His intention to gather more men due to his fear of assassination or ambition to acquire more posts were additional contributing factors on the number of soldiers.

Other factors that affected the number of soldiers under viziers' services were military units pleading for pardon and switching sides from rebels'/ bandits' to the state's side, and also switching allegiance between vizier households, searching for new households, or wandering without a household (*kapısız*) until they found a suitable one. Especially in the 1790s Rumelia, when banditry was frequent, it is clearly observed that military units had very high mobility capacities.

Number of Osman Pasha's soldiers kept the central government's agenda quite busy after Pasha was dismissed from the post of governorship of Rumelia. Number of his soldiers for this period are not clear, where frequent location changes are observed; nevertheless the central government appointed many officers to learn the number of soldiers under Osman's service to prevail against his military power. Information on the number of Pasha's soldiers is quite variable. According to Osman Pasha's claims and reports of some state officials and *ayans* who met or fought him, this number changes between 1500 and more than 20 thousand. This is quite a wide range, however both numbers seem exaggerated. This number may have surpassed 20 thousand in a period before his death when Pasha was still in the opposing team against Pasbanoğlu. Military units who abandoned Pasbanoğlu and joined the ranks of the Pasha with the

promise of pardon played an important role in this increase. Furthermore, there were other soldiers under the deceased Kürd Alo Pasha's and the former Governor of Silistre Musa Pasha's services that entered the service of Osman Pasha. However after Pasha was explicitly declared a rebel and an army was deployed against him, some of his men cooperated with the state with the expectation of pardon and new posts, and thus the number of his soldiers fell to approximately two-thousand. Osman Pasha, whose military power significantly declined, could not handle this grand army sent after him and ultimately got defeated.

Table 10. Number of Osman Pasha's Soldiers 1796-1803

Date	# of Soldiers	Reference Person for #	GOP's Post at the Time
Jan. 1796	3,000	Osman Pasha	Guardian of Vidin
May 1796	4,000	Osman Pasha	Governor of Silistre
Feb. 1798	5,000	Osman Pasha	Governor of Silistre
May 1799	1,000	A state official	Governor of Bosna
Apr. 1801	10,000	Osman Pasha	Governor of Selanik
May 1801	15,000	Deputy judge of Sofya	Governor of Selanik
May 1801	20,000	Osman Pasha	Governor of Silistre
May 1801	20,000	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Governor of Silistre
June 1801	26,000	Osman Pasha	Governor of Silistre
June 1801	1,500	A state official	Governor of Silistre
Sep. 1801	5,000	Eflak Voyvodasi	Governor of Silistre
Oct.1801	10,000	Judge of İslimiye	Governor of Diyarbakır
Oct.1801	15,000	Tirsiniklizade İsmail Aga	Governor of Diyarbakır
May 1802	10,000	Governor of Rumelia	Dismissed Vizier
May 1802	3,000	Delilbaşı of Osman Pasha	Dismissed Vizier
May 1802	2,000	Tokadcıklı Süleyman Aga	Dismissed Vizier
Nv. 1803	2,000	Tayyar Mahmud Pasha	Governor of Erzurum




Figure 5. Growth of Osman Pasha's Soldiers 1796-1803

Accommodating and meeting the needs of an adequate number of soldiers that could fight against bandits created substantial costs for viziers. In addition, these mercenaries, high in numbers, employed in pasha retinues could spin out of control at any time, and had the potential to add substantial military power to their current vizier, or another vizier chosen to be their next patro, or a bandit leader they would serve by abandoning their viziers. And they were aware of this power they possessed. Naturally, they bargained for the man and firepower they possessed, and probably fought for better provisions and salaries. We observe that Albanian *sekbans* under Osman Pasha's, and many other Pashas' service became disorderly, or rebelled time and time again to get paid. Certainly, uprisings of unruly soldiers may have been their patrons' strategy and excuses to defy the center's orders. These situations prone to conflicts may have risen as result of provincial viziers' ambitious/aggressive policies to acquire more share from the center's power.

Zihneli Hasan Pasha, a vizier appointed to repel the mountain bandits, constitutes a good example for this. In 1797, there was a search for a vizier who would

pay the expenditures and provisions of the soldiers under his service for fighting bandits. The central government appointed Hasan Pasha to this duty, and Hasan started moving from Filibe with approximately 15 thousand soldiers under his command. However the central government perceived his actions, which were not deemed in complete loyalty to the center, as well as the high number of soldiers he leads, as a threat. A decree of the Sultan addressed to the Grand Vizier about this matter displays the extent of these concerns. Selim wrote ‘I warned you about Hasan Pasha, I told you those mountain bandits would join him. What will you do if he gets frightened and will not send away those soldiers who he leads?’ and warned the Grand Vizier to immediately remedy the situation.³¹⁷

During these years, alongside viziers who were potential troublemakers, viziers who were appointed to prevent or catch their rebellious peers yet were unsuccessful to do so, also kept the central government busy. These unsuccessful viziers were quickly dismissed. Hakkı Pasha, one of the governors of Rumelia of the time, could be classified under the second group that was consisted of failed viziers, so was dismissed from his post in 1797.³¹⁸ Certainly, Hakkı Pasha’s story did not end there, however we could still say that Gürcü Osman Pasha’s story was more complicated than Hakkı Pasha’s. Starting from his vizierate, Pasha played in both groups, first an apparently loyal vizier appointed to discipline rebellious viziers and bandits, then a potential troublemakers to watch closely, and an unsuccessful vizier when he failed in his assignments, then at last when dismissed from his top post, became a rebel himself.

Like other viziers in the same period, Osman Pasha also resorted to all central and provincial revenues to pay for the expenses such as *ulufe*, accomodation, and

³¹⁷ HAT.13245, June 1797 (agyt).

³¹⁸ Toprak, “Nuri Tarihi”, 451.

provisions of the soldiers under his service, and was not reluctant to collect irregular and unlawful monies from the people, when needed. Soldier salaries among these expenses aggregated to a substantial amount. Pasha's revenues coming directly from the center, were provided mainly through Imperial Treasury (*Hazine-i Amire*) and New Treasury (*İrad-ı Cedid Hazinesi*). As to provincial revenues, *tevzi defters* of districts and *mukataa* allocations were crucially important sources for both regular and irregular tax revenues.

Osman Pasha asked the central government for money for monthly wages he could not pay during his many governorship duties, and collected money from surrounding districts. Pasha used these unpaid salaries as a leverage against the central government, because unpaid soldiers posed a significant threat of leaving their retinues without permission, joining bandits and harming the people. It seems that the center generally preferred to send money to pay for the wages or ignore Pasha's actions that created financial burden on the regional people rather than taking these risks.

Table 11. Amounts of Unpaid Salaries of Osman Pasha

Date	# of Soldiers	Unpaid Salaries Debt (<i>Kuruş</i>)	GOP's Post at the Time
January 1796	3,000	70,000	Guardian of Vidin
August 1796	4,000	100,000	Governor of Silistre
April 1801	20,000	250,000	Governor of Silistre
August 1801	5,000	500,000	Governor of Silistre
August 1801	20,000	2,000,000	Governor of Bosna
October 1801	15,000	2,500,000	Governor of Diyarbakır
January 1802	Not known	100,000	Governor of Bosna
July 1802	Not known	1,500,000	Governor of Silistre




Figure 6. Growth of Osman Pasha's Unpaid Salaries Debt

Certainly, there were attempts to send Albanian *sekbans*, who were mercenaries, back to their homelands when their numbers increased significantly and when such numbers were no longer needed; however both the Pasha and his soldiers were quite stubborn in defying these orders. Yet this stubborn attitude of the soldiers arose from financial interests rather than their loyalty for the Pasha. Many of these soldiers, who frequently changed sides depending on their interests, refused to leave the Pasha's retinue; that is until Pasha's defeat was definite. Hence, towards the end of the Pasha's story when he was permanently dismissed from vizierate and his execution was ordered, the majority of his soldiers abandoned him, even Delilbaşısı Ömer Aga. Nevertheless, it is not entirely realistic to think that Pasha was at the mercy of his soldiers. Osman Pasha made his rebellious soldiers an excuse and created scapegoats from time to time in his negotiations with the central government.

On the banditry issue, one should keep in mind that even state officials such as the former Governor of Rumelia Mustafa Pasha, Palaslı Mehmet Pasha, Gürcü Osman Pasha, as well as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha – all of whom were commanders at the armies

gathered against bandits – had to rely on bandits to fight bandits. These floating mainly *sekban* figures naturally formed unclear ties with rebellious leaders and some of the commanding Pashas, such as Gürcü Osman Pasha, as well as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, led their own rebellions. Recruiting and incorporating them into the system was bringing its own consequences on the political sphere of the empire at the turn of the 19th century.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In the effort to explain Gürcü Osman Pasha's case of rebellion, I imagine a pendulum, which is a stick with a weight at its bottom swinging back and forth between two opposite sides. The two opposite sides in the eighteenth-century Ottoman political context would be the imperial political center (including the sultan, the palace, and the members of imperial council in Istanbul) and the provinces (including *ayans*, non-*ayan* provincial governors, and district governors). And the stick would be a symbol of de facto power.

As a principle, the closer the stick goes to one extreme end, the greater the energy and speed with which it swings back to the other extreme, and then to the other side again. In other words, the more power the political center acquired, the stronger the provincial actors' response would be, and vice versa. One could describe the extreme realization of power in the political center as the over-centralization of power and as so-called "order." In turn, the provinces' gaining excessive and unstable power could be defined as crisis, decline, or decentralization, and disorder. This opposition of over-centralized center and decentralized and disorderly province may best characterize the centuries before the eighteenth century; in later centuries, the pendulum swung more lightly.

The turning point was the eighteenth century: a period marked more by negotiation mechanisms, collaborations, incorporations, and inclusionist policies than by extreme opposites. In this period, the pendulum of power still swung between one side and the other, but at a lower speed; it did not draw close to the extreme ends, but kept swinging in the middle area between the two opposite sides. This change could be taken to represent a more realistic and balanced state of order than had existed in earlier periods. We should remember here that the Deed of Agreement (*Sened-i İttifak*), introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the natural political consequence of this shift.

This new state of order indicated an attempt to build a sustainable and healthy relationship between the center and the provinces, one in which both parties cooperated and recognized each other's authority, interests, and needs. This could be read as an inevitable loss of control over the provinces for the center, one that would lead to provincial autonomy and possibly a complete loss of the center's control. However, the pendulum continued to swing. Also, the center's shift from exercising tight control over the provinces to exercising loose control does not mean that the provinces were detaching from the center for good. On the contrary, allowing a certain degree of local initiative in the provinces would often provided a more balanced relationship between the center and the provinces, one in which both sides were more intertwined and better-embedded into each other.

Yet as I stated above, the pendulum stick of power continued to swing, even though not between the extreme ends anymore. From my research, it seems new limits of power had come to be defined for each side by the second half of the eighteenth century. When these new limits/extremes were transgressed by actors belonging to either side, the political system once more fell out of order. If the pendulum swung

extremely far to the side of the provinces and pushed these limits, such an action would probably indicate that *ayans* and/or non-*ayan* provincial governors were conducting uprisings and rebellions, or at least engaging in severely disruptive behaviors. In response, the center would probably exercise a reaction of re-ordering, introducing new reformatations.

I could apply the model and the principles I have discussed in the paragraphs above to the main character of this study. Gürcü Osman Pasha lived at this very period of a newly defined, more-balanced order. As a non-*ayan* provincial actor of the time, his actions, negotiations, conflicts, and reactions fell under these newly defined power limits of the eighteenth century. In his specific case, throughout almost his whole career, the power pendulum swung lightly between one side and the other, between him and the central government. But when he tried to stretch the limits to expand his power domain, the central government responded with increasingly stern re-ordering actions, first declaring him a rebel, then sending military troops to confront him, and finally eliminating him for good.

Looking at Osman Pasha's character, one initially finds it difficult to make sense of his rebellion. One would think that a shifty, self-centered, benefit-focused, cunning person like him should have known better than to push the limits as he did. But in fact, he managed to keep his interactions with the state within the limits, albeit sometimes very close to them, for most of his life. It was only in his final years that he exceeded them. His dismissal from his favorite post was definitely a breaking point in his career, one that ultimately led to his downfall. However, his rising up must not be treated in isolation, but should be connected to a pair of other developments. On the one hand, the center at some point stopped recognizing Osman Pasha's interests and eventually decided to seize his power. And on the other hand, Osman ultimately

stopped serving the interests of the state, even though he portrayed himself as powerless in this regard and as an innocent victim of his unruly soldiers. Surely his rebellion was not directly against the state per se, but it certainly challenged the central authority.

Osman Pasha's story shows us that his career was a kind of vicious circle of acquiring power, then engaging in disorderly behavior,³¹⁹ then acquiring power again, and so on. He began his career utilizing his military skills and strong patronage relations and rose to many guardianship positions. He established his own household and military units. Then his patron's death and his possible disorderly actions set his career back for around some three years. When he was needed again, now to face Rumelian bandits, he was pardoned. His rise continued until his dismissal from his top position.

Until that date, his military and financial status grew, but his increasing number of soldiers strained him financially. In attempting to procure the revenues he needed, he became a burden upon the local people. Unable to control his soldiers and failing in his assignment to eliminate banditry, he was deposed. Afterwards, many negotiations and discussions took place between the government and him over new post offerings. He was later forgiven once more because of the need for another powerful vizier in Rumelia to face the bandits there. However, Osman could not take advantage of this final opportunity.

He could control neither the bandits nor his own soldiers. Instead, he tried to create a great turmoil in cooperation with rebellious pashas and bandit leaders so that

³¹⁹ Disorderly behavior does not mean only actions deemed unacceptable at the time but also failing to execute the orders of the state.

he could have a better chance of survival, hoping to force the central government to negotiate once again. But he failed, and eventually the vicious circle broke and he was demoted and declared a rebel. When he was forced to choose between his ambitions and saving his own life, he consented to an order commanding him to pass to Anatolia, a place far away from his ambitious will. Yet this offer was a decoy, a pretext for the state to ambush him on its own terms. He thus walked unawares into a trap and, as we know, was caught and killed while attempting to flee.

He may have begun his rebellion in an effort to regain his previous post in Rumelia, but the rebellion grew into something much larger. From the perspective of the center, this accentuated his unruly side and made his strong ties with bandits more and more noticeable. In fact, the state was always aware of relationships between the provincial governors (*ayan* or non-*ayan*) and the bandits, but these were tolerated for the sake of governmental interests. Yet in cases of particularly large uprisings, these relationships became so obvious and bold that the center could no longer overlook them. One might say that when Osman Pasha pushed the stick of the power pendulum too far towards its limits, he could not escape the extreme reaction of the state.

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APPENDICES



Appendix A. DOCUMENT ABOUT PUBLIC-EXPENSE REGISTERS OF İVRACE DISTRICT³²⁰

Mucebince ruhsatı havi hükmü buyruldu. Nezareti uhde-i çakeraneme ihale buyrulan Rumili kazaları defter tevziatından İvrace kazasının varid olan bir kıta defterlerinde 1209 senesi ruz-ı hızırından 1209 senesi kasımına gelince 6 mah müddetde vaki olan kaffe-i mesarıfları 29 bin 654 guruşa baliğ olmağla sadır olan ferman-ı alileri ve mukteza-yı memuriyyet-i çakeri üzere herbir maddesine yegan yegan imrar-ı nazar-ı iman olundukda, 4 bin 198 guruşu Lofça tarafına Dağlı eşkıyası geldikde gönderilen sekban ulufeleri ve memurlar mesarısı, ve 2 bin 776 guruşu dahi Selvi tarafına memur hala Silistre Valisi vezir-i mükerrer devletlü El-hac Abdi Paşa hazretlerine gönderdikleri zehair ve fişenk bahaları, ve 6 bin 600 guruşu dahi Vidin Muhafızı ezir-i mükerrer devletlü El-hac Osman Paşa hazretleri mürurunda hazinelerine ve dairelerine ve mekulat mesarısı, ve 4 bin 450 guruşu dahi menzil idaresi, ve 299 buçuk guruşu Vidin Muhafızı hazeriyesi, ve 600 guruşu dahi serdar mahiyyesi, ve 2 bin guruşu dahi akçe güzeştesi, ve 1346 guruşu dahi şehir kethüdalığı mesarısı, ve 600 guruşu dahi ücret-i ayaniyye, ve maada 6 bin 785 guruşu gerek taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden ve gerek vülat-ı azam hüzeratı taraflarından tevarüd iden mübaşiranın mübaşiriyyeleri ve harc-ı imza ve tahsildariyye mesarısı olub, mesarısı mezkurunekseri mesarısı mukarrerde olmayub, Dağlı eşkıyası mesarısından ibaret olmağla hatt ve tenzil kabul ider mevaddı olmadığı malum-ı devletleri buyruldukda, tevzi ve tahsile ruhsatı havi emr-i şerif ısdarı muvafık-ı rey-i samileri buyrulur ise, emr-ü ferman sultanım hazretlerininindir.

³²⁰ ADVN.2240.47 – 1210.Ca.21

Appendix B. DOCUMENT ABOUT PUBLIC-EXPENSE REGISTERS OF ZAĞRA-YI ATİK DISTRICT³²¹

Rumili defatiri Nazırı Seyyid Mustafa Beg'in işbu takriri mucebince hükmü buyruldu. Nezareti uhde-i çakeraneme ihale buyrulan Rumeli kazaları defatir tevziatından Zağra-yı atik kazasının varid olan bir kıta defterlerinde 209 senesi ruz-ı 210 (1209?) 1209 senesi ruz-ı kasımına gelince altı mah müddetde vaki olan kaffe-i mesarifleri 13 bin 560 guruşa baliğ olmağla, sadır olan ferman-ı alileri ve mukteza-yı memuriyyet-i çakeriye üzere her bir maddesine yegan yegan imrar-ı nazar-ı iman olundukda, 600 guruşu sekban mahiyyesi ve keزالık 600 guruşu dahi serdar-ı memleket kul kethüdası esbak İbrahim ağanın mahiyyesi ve 500 guruşu dahi Aydos menzil imdadiyesi ve 1054 guruşu dahi vezir-i mükerrer devletlü Ferhad Paşa hazretleri mürurlarında mesarifatı ve 400 guruşu dahi Vidin Muhafızı vezir-i mükerrer devletlü Osman Paşa hazretleri mürurlarında mesarifatı ve 464 guruşu dahi Rumili hazeriyyesi ve 1698 guruşu dahi tevarüd iden mübaşiranın mekulatları ve 820 guruşu dahi akçe neması ve 3000 guruşu dahi tahsis buyrulan ücret-i ayaniyye ve 320 guruşu dahi harc-ı imza ve maada 4104 guruşu dahi mevadd-ı müteferrika ve taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden vülat-ı azam hüzeratı taraflarından tevarüd iden mübaşiranın mübaşiriyye ve kahveleri mesarifından ibaret olub, hatt-ı tenzil kabul ider mevaddı olmadığı, malum-ı devletleri buyruldukda, fi-ma-bad dahi fukarayı teksir-i mesarıfdan sıyanet eylemeleri dercile tahsile ruhsatı havi emr-i şerif ısdarı muvafık-ı rey-i samileri buyrulur ise, emr ü ferman sultanım hazretlerindir.

³²¹ ADVN.2243.6 – 1210.B.15

Appendix C. DOCUMENT ABOUT PUBLIC-EXPENSE REGISTERS OF MALKARA DISTRICT³²²

Rumili defatiri Nazırı Seyyid Mustafa Beg'in işbu takriri mucebince hükmü buyruldu. Nezaret-i uhde-i çakeraneme ihale buyrulan Rumeli kazaları defatir tevziatından Malkara kazasının varid olan bir kıta defterlerinde 209 senesi ruz-ı hızırından 210 senesi ruz-ı kasımına gelince altı mah müddetde vaki olan kaffe-i mesarifleri 13 bin 410 guruşa baliğ olmağla, sadır olan ferman-ı alileri ve mukteza-yı memuriyyet-i çakeriye üzere her bir maddesine yegan yegan imrar-ı nazar-ı iman olundukda, 1247 guruşu kaza sekbanları mahiyyesi ile nehr-i Meriçin geçid başlarına muhafazaya tutulan sekban ulufeleri ve 1916 guruşu hala Vidin Muhafızı vezir-i mükerrerem devletlü Osman Paşa hazretleri Vidin'e memuriyyetlerinde hazinelerine ve tevarüd iden ademlerinin mesarifatları ve 365 guruşu cümle ittifakıyla mahkeme tamiri ve 700 guruşu Sariçe karyesinde eşkıyalar ile muharebede kaza-yı mezkura tabi Sultan karyesinin Edirne bostancıbaşısı ağaya ve nefir-i aam askerinin mesarifleri ve 1250 guruşu tahsis buyrulan ücret-i ayaniyye ve 150 guruşu tahsildariyye ve maada mesarifleri dahi mevadd-ı müteferrika ve taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden vülat-ı azam hüzeratı taraflarından ve Edirne bostancıbaşısı ağa tarafından tevarüd iden usta ve bölükbaşı vesair mübaşirlerinin mübaşiriyye ve ve mekulat ve kahve mesariflerinden ibaret olub, hatt ve tenzil kabul ider mevaddı olmadığı, malum-ı devletleri buyruldukda, fi-ma-bad dahi fukarayı teksir-i mesarıfdan sıyanet eylemeleri dercile tahsile ruhsatı havi emr-i şerif ısdarı muvafık-ı rey-i samileri buyrulur ise, emr ü ferman sultanım hazretlerindir.

³²² ADVN.2243.7, 1796 January

Appendix D. THE ALLOCATION LIST FOR THE ELIMINATION OF PASBANOĞLU (JAN. 1798)³²³

Some items from the list	<i>Kuruş</i>
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya harçlık	25.000
Ruşukta eşkıya ile muharebe eden Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa ve Rusçuk Ayanı Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağaya verilen	52.500
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa ve Tirsiniklizade İsmail Ağaya samur kürk vesair bahası	10.897
İslimyeye hareket eden Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya	15.000
Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşaya ordusu askerinin tayinat masrafları için gönderilen	100.000
Kapudan-ı derya ve Serasker Hüseyin Paşaya gönderilen	50.000
Defter toplamı	1.304.997

³²³ TS.MA.d.2113.0004, January 1798. Table produced from this defter, and the defters presented below, do not include all items in it. I prefer to show money sent to Osman Pasha, and to some other significant state officials of the time to be able to compare the allocations.

**Appendix E. THE ALLOCATION LIST FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
PASBANOĞLU (MARCH 1798)³²⁴**

Some items from the list	<i>Kuruş</i>
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya dakik ve şair bahası, nakliye ücreti, tayinat ve harçlık	30.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya giden kapud için	6.738
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki asakire bahşiş ve memurlara kürk için	10.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa dairesine sabık Eflak voyvodasından dakik ve şair için	10.075
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin tayinat masrafları için	15.500
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetinde olan Serturnacı Hüseyin ağa, yazıcılar ve çavuşlara atıyye için	2.000
Köstendil mutasarrıfı Osman Paşaya harçlık	25.000
Köstendil mutasarrıfı Osman paşaya dairesinin idaresi ve sekban mahiyyesi için	40.000
Kapudan-ı derya Hüseyin paşaya	100.000
Kapudan-ı derya Hüseyin paşaya dairesi masrafları için	100.000
Kapudan-ı derya Hüseyin paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin şair tayinatları için	5.000
Kapudan-ı derya Hüseyin paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin ekmek tayinatı için	10.000
Eşkîya maslahatına memur edilen Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşaya	100.000
Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşa maiyyetindeki sekbanların mahiyyesi	50.000
Defter toplamı	789.044

³²⁴ TS.MA.d.2113.0006, March 1798

Appendix F. THE ALLOCATION LIST FOR THE ELIMINATION OF PASBANOĞLU (APR. 1798)³²⁵

Some items from the list	<i>Kuruş</i>
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin tayinatı için	21.231
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya Niğbolu kalesinin zaptı için	50.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşaya tayinat ve diğer askeri masraflar	30.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin tayinatı için paşanın defterdarı ve ordu nazırına verilen	20.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki sergerdeler ve askerler için bahşiş, kürk ve kapud bahası	15.865
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin şair ve dakik tayinatı için Eflak Voyvodasından	10.649
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşanın Serdelili Aydın Ağaya atıyye	5.000
Silistre Valisi Osman Paşanın Enderun Serçavuşu ve Niğbolu kalesinde eşkıyaya memur Serbevabin olan Serçukadar Hüseyin Ağaya atıyye	850
Osman Paşanın maiyyetinde olan topçu ve top arabacıları neferatının tayinatı masrafları için	300
Pasbanoğlu maddesine memur Yanya Mutasarrıfı Tepedelenli Ali paşa maiyyetindeki askerlerin tayinatları	20.000
Seraskerlik idaresi için Kapudan-ı derya Hüseyin paşaya verilen	100.000
Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşanın maiyyetindeki sekban neferatı mahiyyeleri için	150.000
Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşa maiyyetindeki sekbanların mahiyyesi	100.000
Askeri işler için Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşanın defterdar ve ordu nazırı İsmail Efendiye	50.000
Rumeli Valisi Mustafa Paşanın defterdar ve ordu nazırının masrafları için	50.000
Defter toplamı	2.060.505

³²⁵ TS.MA.d.2113.0007, April 1798