

AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MANIPULATION

A Master's Thesis

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To Rengin and Ümit, for their endless love and support



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By Aleyna Tutku Bağcı

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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As Weber argues, the main threat of the bureaucratic state is the excessive limitation of individual autonomy. The individual autonomy will always be restricted by state authorities, either for the individual's benefit or to his detriment. This outcome is an economical and sociological necessity. What does "autonomy" mean? I argue that there are two types of autonomy: the objective and the subjective. Wolff stresses that the autonomous person is not subject to the will of another; he is self-legislating. So, objective autonomy can be understood as self-governance. However, objective autonomy has no prudential value; only subjective autonomy does. A person is autonomous if he thinks that he is autonomous. How is this going to be achieved, though? The main problem which creates the inconsistency between individual autonomy and state authority is the use of coercion. Sunstein proposes the use of "nudges" instead of coercion. As he emphasizes, the use of nudges leads people towards making better choices without restricting their freedom of choice. However, nudges can only be applied on a small scale. What I will propose is a revised bureaucratic state, the rule of selected and very well-trained experts purged from

politicians, which does not penetrate into individual matters – except for the use of nudges to direct people to the best possible option for them from a paternalistic perspective – and consists of citizens who trust the expertise of the bureaucrats because of their unique education and their commitment to the legal system. Even though this model reminds of Plato’s Kallipolis, it will be explained in the thesis how the two states differ from one another. The revised bureaucratic system is one way to cut the Gordian knot of authority and autonomy.

Keywords: Objective autonomy, subjective autonomy, state authority, manipulation, bureaucratic system



ÖZET

ÖZERKLİK, OTORİTE VE MANİPÜLASYON

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Weber'in savunduğu üzere, bürokratik devletin oluşturduğu temel tehdit bireysel özerkliği aşırı derecede sınırlandırmasıdır. Bireysel özerklik, bireyin yararına ya da zararına olacak şekilde, devlet otoritesi tarafından her zaman kısıtlanacaktır. Bu netice ekonomik ve sosyolojik bir gerekliliktir. Öte yandan, "özerklik" ne anlama gelmektedir? Ben iki tür özerklik olduğunu savunuyorum: nesnel ve öznel. Wolff, özerk kişinin bir başkasının iradesine tabi olmadığını, kendi kendini yönettiğini vurgular. Dolayısıyla, nesnel özerklik kendi kendini yönetme olarak anlaşılabilir. Bununla birlikte, nesnel özerkliğin ihtiyatı bir değeri yoktur; yalnızca öznel özerkliğin vardır. Bir kişi özerk olduğunu düşünüyorsa özerktir. Peki bu nasıl sağlanacaktır? Bireysel özerklik ile devlet otoritesi arasındaki tutarsızlığı yaratan temel sorun devlet otoritesinin baskı ve zor kullanımı ile sağlanmasıdır. Sunstein, baskı ve zor kullanma yerine "dürtme" (nudge) kullanımını önermektedir. Dürtme teorisine göre, dürtmeler insanları seçme özgürlüklerini kısıtlamadan daha yararlı seçimler yapmaya yönlendirir. Ancak, dürtme yalnızca küçük ölçekli uygulanabilir. Benim önereceğim, siyasetçilerden arındırılmış, bireysel meselelere – paternalist bir bakış açısıyla insanları kendileri için mümkün olan en iyi seçeneğe yönlendirmek

iin drtmelerin kullanılması dıřında – nfuz etmeyen ve zel eēitimleri ile hukuk sistemine baēlılıkları nedeniyle halkın gvenini kazanan brokratların ynettiēi revize edilmiř bir brokratik devlet modelidir. Bu model, Platon'un Kallipolis'ini hatırlatsa da, iki rneēin birbirinden nasıl farklılařtıēı tezin ilerleyen ařamalarında aıklanacaktır. Revize edilmiř brokratik sistem, otorite ve zerkliēin oluřturduēu Gordion dēmn kesmenin bir yoludur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nesnel zerklik, znel zerklik, devlet otoritesi, maniplasyon, brokratik sistem



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INTRODUCTION

The first part of this thesis is about the state as an actor that exercises authority and the obedience of people to this authority. Obedience will not be the sole focus of this thesis. Rather, it will serve as an introductory section to the main theme. Alongside obedience, important definitions will be given, and several concepts will be analyzed; various definitions of state, the philosophical anarchist's view, the necessity of the state, and the forms of autonomy are among them. I will build a major philosophical and theoretical discussion, with the usage of mostly political and psychological claims when necessary so that the arguments that will be supported are enriched.

The *problématique* can be divided into four. Firstly, what is the state, and how is the state's authority defined? This section is a must for the purpose of this thesis. Hobbes', Aquinas', Nozick's, and Weber's definitions of state will be addressed in this section. While defining the concept of the state, the arguments of the aforementioned philosophers on the components which make the state a necessary notion will also be argued. The arguments on necessity are quite significant, as this paper will subsequently advocate that, unlike the philosophical anarchist's view, the state is necessary. Besides, I picked Weber for the main definition of the state that I will use because I think that this theory is the most relevant one as it describes the modern state, and in political studies, it is actually used as the primary definition for the modern state. I will turn back to Weber's bureaucratic state in the core section of this thesis.

Secondly, why do people consider the state as the legitimate authority to exercise legitimate power on them and, after all, obey the rules that are decided by it? There are plenty of reasons coming to mind when these questions are asked, but I will

concentrate on specific ones, like the feeling of piety and gratitude, contract, and negative personal consequences of non-obedience. The philosophers who will be discussed at this point are Plato, with his work *Crito*, where he addressed five sources of obedience to the state, and Locke, with his contract theory.

So far, I referred to the state's definition and necessity and the sources of people's obedience to it. Section three will play an important role in this paper and shape my thesis statement, as in the part where I will argue my proposal, I will respond to the anarchist challenge. I will introduce the theory of philosophical anarchism, which underlines that autonomy and state authority cannot coexist. Therefore, if a person is influenced by state authority, he is not autonomous. This theory also supports that the state is not necessary either, so why do people obey a power that limits their autonomy when it is not even a necessary arrangement? I will focus on particularly Wolff's, Huemer's, Raz's and finally, Simmons' works.

In section four, I will address the anarchist challenge. This brief section will serve as the transitionary one to my proposal, as I will argue that there are two forms of autonomy in order to cut the Gordian knot of authority and autonomy, which is highlighted by the philosophical anarchist. Finally, in the fifth section, I will keep Weber's bureaucratic state as the most inevitable – therefore also ideal – form of state; I will suggest that it is the coercion that should be eliminated; address the use of nudges instead of coercion but argue that they are small-scale; and finally, I will propose the revised bureaucratic state which is immune to political ambition and power politics and does not penetrate to the individual business of citizens except for sometimes nudging them for their own good. I argue that this model is reasonable in ensuring subjective autonomy and, therefore, addresses the anarchist's critique.

This study aims to solve my personal philosophical curiosity on this matter. During my literature review on philosophical anarchism, I found out that it is definitely not that understudied as a theory, but the different argumentations supporting it have important gaps, like the claim that with the abolishment of the state, we would do just fine, and this is why they can mostly be refuted. In this thesis, I intend to propose a solution for the authority and autonomy oxymoron. I want to show that authority and autonomy can coexist. What should be done is a change in the means of

authority and an alteration in the meaning of autonomy. A weighty theoretical debate is inevitable before making my own claims.



CHAPTER 1

THE STATE

As in all social sciences, before making a claim on anything of a theoretical manner in my paper, I should first define the concepts I will use. In this very first section, I will dive into the concept of state by providing different definitions of it according to four philosophers: Hobbes, Aquinas, Nozick, and Weber.

I chose these four philosophers' views because they all spotlight many different properties of the notion of the state. I will begin with Hobbes, whose theory focuses on the dangers of the non-state condition and has components, such as the concepts of social contract and gratitude, which are quite relevant to section two, as well. Besides, Hobbes concentrates on human nature and composes his theory around wicked nature and constant fear. Furthermore, his political theory about the security dilemma and his overall view on human nature has been studied in philosophy, political science, and international relations.

After Hobbes, I will turn to Aquinas, who links the political state to an eternal, divine power and explains this linkage in the framework of law and obedience. Among the four philosophers that I will refer to, Aquinas is the one who prioritizes the religious component and constitutes a whole political theory in the shadow of God.

After Aquinas, I will refer to the theory of Nozick, who introduces a state – the minimal state – which is not actually using its power and authority oppressively on citizens but rather exists to put people's lives in order by giving them the necessary

protection and autonomy. It is important to highlight that Nozick proposes the minimal state as an opposition to the a priori anarchist's view of no state at all.

The last philosopher that I will discuss in detail is Weber, as in his various works, he draws the borders of the modern state. The definition I will revisit in section five is neither the imaginary state of Hobbes, Nozick's utopian dream, nor Aquinas's deeply Christian state. Weber's modern state is the one that we live in right now; this is why I will revisit his views in section five and try to shape my argument around it. Thus, the absolute sovereign, God's eternal law, the state with limited power, and the legitimate use of physical force are among the key features of the definitions that will be analyzed. This diversity of ideas among philosophers shows the changeable circumstances and understandings according to the timeframe and political context in which they lived.

1.1 Hobbes

In *Leviathan*'s frontispiece, it says, "Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei," meaning "there is no power on earth that is compared to his." This power is the sovereign's, and the sovereign decides all social and political matters in the state. Absolute obedience to the sovereign is the key to maintain the social and political order, as according to Hobbesian theory, life without an order is horrendous. The non-existence of a political society – a sovereign, more precisely – is the condition of nature (Hobbes 183). In the condition of nature, everyone is exposed to dangers; all men are equal by nature, as even if X is physically stronger, Y has the reason to establish a secret mechanism and kill X. Moreover, if X and Y desire the same particular thing and cannot own it simultaneously, it means that they will battle for this (184). Nature is a place where nobody can trust no one, there is great competition and diffidence among people and all these gradually lead to the state of war. Thus, to avoid this condition, there needs to be a Commonwealth; the higher entity that will ensure people's property and security.

More specifically, Hobbes defines the concepts of the sovereign and sovereignty (230-1). He says that the sovereign is the person or the group of people endowed

with sovereignty by the social contract. The sovereign is the head of the Leviathan, the maker of laws, the judge of first principles, the foundation of all knowledge, and the defender of civil peace. Sovereignty, on the other hand, is the supreme authority over the Commonwealth. It owns complete obedience by its subjects and is the soul of Leviathan. Hobbes argues that the sovereign has the absolute power to ban anything he finds necessary but is advised not to, as extreme oppression could make citizens upset and ready for a revolt (262). However, even at this point, to begin a rebellion is an objectionable action, as it results in the rebel's disqualification from being a citizen anymore, and he is left to the state of nature, enjoying no protection from the sovereign (270).

It is clear that the Commonwealth is not the best society in which a person can enjoy autonomy. There is an absolute "leader" who exercises unlimited power over the state, and when someone opposes some sides of the way he exercises it, it is the citizen who is punished, not the oppressor. So, even if the sovereign is an unpleasant tyrant, all tyrannies are better compared to a civil war (228). In the Hobbesian framework of political power, it is significant to comprehend that the sovereign has neither duty nor obligation to implement the power he holds. The sovereign's power is a gift from the citizens, who make a covenant to form the political community to prevent the state of nature. So, the covenant is between the people and the people. What the sovereign gets in return is gratitude, which is one of the virtues in the natural condition (227). The sovereign is always in the state of nature; he is not himself a member of the political community, and the feeling of gratitude that is shown to him by the people is sufficient for him. Therefore, there is a connection of gratitude between the people and the sovereign, and this is why the rebel accepts being expelled from being a citizen.

Hobbes' argumentation in *Leviathan* has indeed instrumental points which have been the basis for many theories built after. However, it is definitely not possible to hold this theory as a reasonable or rational one, as it completely disregards humans' autonomy; it makes people feel like any other solution rather than obeying the supreme power leads to countless dangers and misfortunes. It is mostly like a handbook dictators or monarchs should use in order to find various ways to intimidate people so that they obey them. *Leviathan* can be read as a place where

people's self-esteem and free will are minimized just to survive. It pretty much gives two options to the citizens: either to die in the state of nature or to obey the Leviathan to death. When we think about the way that states function today, we can see components of Hobbesian theory, as states always have the tendency to build their defense systems more and more so that they intimidate the other states and feel much more secure this way. However, in this paper, the discussion is about the relationship of the citizen with the state, not the manners of the state apart from the citizens. This is why Hobbesian theory is inefficient in this paper's continuing parts.

1.2 Aquinas

Aquinas' theory has similarities with the Hobbesian approach. However, he puts God on top and everything else to the skirts of God. Aquinas, one of the most influential thinkers of medieval scholasticism, is known for his works of Christian tradition, dominated by Aristotelian philosophy. Besides his purely religious theories, we see in his writings that he has an interest in connecting these to the political dimension of the people's lives. In *Summa Theologiae*, he draws a framework about a state closely parallel with religion. His understanding of "obedience" plays an important role in his work, as he argues that obedience is the guiding virtue and that the subjection of the lesser to the greater is the divine will (Aquinas 57-8). As a theologian, he puts Christianity and the religious component to the core of his theory, explaining that all else is functioning around this divine entity. More specifically, Aquinas underlines that eternal law is the rational pattern of all things and divides it into the divine law, the *lex naturalis* (natural law), and the human law.

Divine law is based on rationality, like human law, but on general principles of nature and things that make sense (83). This is the highest form of law and the Old Testament is an example of it. Divine law complements *lex naturalis* and offers additional guidance to man-made human law.

Lex naturalis is the law that guides man in his natural state (85). An example of that is "Do good, avoid evil". This law is derived from the eternal law and is rational and morally objective. It comes from the God and shapes the human behavior.

Human law is the man-made laws for civil-secular purposes (87). These are the guidelines on how to act in a society, which are formed from the *lex naturalis* by practical reasoning. While making this law, the divine doctrine should be esteemed, and it should not oppose the *lex naturalis*' guidance. This is the condition to produce just and valid human law.

According to Aquinas, everyone must obey God only (57). Everything in the world is created based on hierarchy, with God being on top. The guiding principle, as has been already mentioned, is obedience, so the virtuous behavior of a human being is to obey the power which is higher than him in this hierarchical pyramid (58). This means that the political authority should obey God's law and make the human law based on the principles ordered by God. What is interesting about Aquinas' theory is that he attaches importance to the rationality of people. In his forms of law, he talks about rational thinking and argues that what is rational for the citizens is to be virtuous by obeying God first and then the political authority, the latter obeying God, as well. He advocates for human rationality as he regards obedience as a natural necessity justified by free will.

According to Aquinas, God is the owner of everything; he owns life and death. If, for instance, there is an instance where the king says you should kill while God has cursed killing, you should proceed to obey God's command; this is how he contextualizes the separation of powers between the Church and the state. Therefore, the political ruler is legitimate only and only if he has justice as the basis. This seems like a great approach, giving some space of autonomy to the citizen at first sight. However, I think that Aquinas' view on free will does not fit his overall argumentation. The matter that this thesis deals with is not justice or the morality of the citizens' actions. It deals with the coercive attitude of the state, whatever this coercion is for, and the restricted autonomy of citizens in the face of this coercion. The fact that in Aquinas people have the legitimate right to obey God over the state does not mean that they act according to their absolute free will. They again obey the doctrine that is commanded by holy scripture. This is why I think that Aquinas talks about human rationality; this way, he tries to show that when people think with

complete rationality, without any pressure, they will find it rational to act in the ways the divine law proposes.

We understand here that Aquinas differs a lot from Hobbes in his perspective of human nature, but in the end, what they suggest to people ends up being similar. Hobbes, as I mentioned above, argues that when we leave people on their own in the state of nature, their lives are nasty, poor, solitary, short, and brutish (Hobbes 186). This happens because of human nature, which is itself nasty, covetous, and competitive. So, then they are left alone their reason works in this way. Aquinas, on the other hand, believes in the nature of humans in the way that through critical thinking, they will always be led to the manners that divine law expresses. Even though these are quite different approaches from the aspect of human nature, obedience is the most important component of both. While in Hobbes obedience to the sovereign is the escape from the nasty life, in Aquinas it is the rational result. Once again, I do not think that Aquinas' argument on free will is well-established, as it seems like a pretext to prioritize God's commands.

1.3 Nozick

Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* provides a detailed insight into his ideas on the legitimate authority of a state. He begins by questioning whether the state is really necessary (Nozick 4). He refutes the anarchist view that there should be no state at all by arguing that a minimal state can be a just one that prospers people's rights without really coercing them or oppressing them. More specifically, Nozick likens the minimal state to a night watchman (26). What this kind of watchman does is to protect citizens against violence, fraud, and theft and to prevent the enforcement of contracts. It can be understood that Nozick is also against the legitimate state coercion approach like the anarchists, but why does he still propose a state with limited powers some elbow room? This is because Nozick, just like Hobbes, believes in a state of nature which is not preferable to a minimal state. The state of nature which he expresses is the Lockean one.

More specifically, Nozick describes the state of nature as a place where each person enforces his rights, defends himself, and punishes others if he manages it (10). The law of nature commands that no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, or property, but some people transgress these. Nozick argues that Locke regards the dangers that arise from the negative human nature and unstable state of nature as inconveniences. Through time, people established various associations for their protection, and now we are living in such an association, but in a much greater, more powerful, and more complicated sense.

Nozick underlines that the state is legitimate to the extent that it restricts its activities to the protection of the rights of the citizens. The key aspect in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* is that Nozick puts forward the entitlement principle. This principle is a clever way to make people key parts of the societies they live in as they pull their own strings. More clearly, Nozick regards humans as ends in themselves and justifies the redistribution of goods, with the only condition being consent (150). The distribution of holdings in a society is just iff everyone in that society is entitled to what he has. To make it clearer, Nozick argues that person A should be in full recognition of what he owns, and also what his neighbors own. If everyone acted in accordance with the entitlement principle, there would not be hostilities. In a minimal state, the state respects people's autonomy, but there is indeed a need for humans to live in a self-disciplined way so that there is no need for a higher power that regulates interrelations.

So, Nozick states that writers in the tradition of Weber treat having a monopoly on the use of force in a geographical area, a monopoly incompatible with private enforcement of rights, as crucial to the existence of a state (23). However, he argues that even if the state does not hold such a monopoly, it can still exist with deliberative inhabitants. In international relations, there is the view, which has its roots in Hobbesian theory, that an anarchic world system is impossible, as it would mean constant wars, constant external or even internal threats, and continuous security dilemmas. Even in organizations which were created in order to strengthen the supranational power, it is proven that the nation-states have always made sure that in the very end, they decide for their sake, like in the United Nations with the veto power or in the European Union with the European Council.

In these examples, we see that states give much importance to their autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty and dislike the idea that they give their rights to the hands of another, higher power. This should be the people's way of thinking, as well. It is clear that the world's system will not change from today to tomorrow, or maybe it is even too late to expect such a change ever, but from a purely theoretical perspective, the only way that the citizens are not oppressed by another power, is when they decide for themselves in a rational way and try to get along with the others, again in a rational way. We saw how much importance Aquinas gave to rational thinking; if there is such an embedded, objective way of rational thinking, then the ideal for the citizens would be to create a society that by any means harms the freedom of its citizens.

1.4 Weber

Weber in his discussion of political communities in *Economy and Society* argues that in order to call a community political, there needs to be territory; availability of physical force for its domination; and "social action which is not restricted exclusively to the satisfaction of common economic needs but regulates the interrelations of the inhabitants of the territory" (Weber 901). What is the dominant power that exercises legitimate physical force and regulates the inhabitants' relations? Simply, the state. Political power is then a necessary notion of the state, and this means that the members of it are the objects of coercion.

As Weber puts it, the community imposes the relevant obligations on the individuals, as they know that if they do not obey, physical coercion awaits them (902). This 'training' develops the pathos through time and creates the emotional foundations of the members' state obedience. So, the comprehension of physical coercion leads to the enhancement of ties with the people of the same group. This builds the emotional basis of obedience, and the ensemble political struggle of life and death leads to the community of memories, which is the ultimate element of national consciousness (904).

Moreover, Weber argues that there is no specific national consciousness, and members' obedience is not practiced in the same way everywhere. Then, each state has its own dynamics as regards coercion, obedience, and group interest. Lastly in this part, Weber gives great importance to the bureaucratic system and supports that this system must have the necessary power to control the state; he is quite skeptical regarding the excessive growth of bureaucratic power, though. This concern will be addressed in section five.

Weber, in his discussion on discipline and charisma, argues more on the variety of 'obedience types'. For instance, obedience does not appear simultaneously; there is no exact large mass that obeys to the same extent at the same time. Here, he introduces another concept that is quite important: rational uniformity (1149). Up until this point, I mentioned the emotional basis, the pathos, etc., but he ultimately connects obedience to discipline and advocates that what is decisive for discipline is the rational uniformity of the people. According to him, discipline appeals to firm ethical motives, presupposing a sense of duty and conscientiousness, on the other hand.

Then, if I understand him correctly, he supports that obedience is not irrational; contrarily, especially the organizational discipline – of the people who hold political power – has a completely rational basis (1156). The discipline expands its power as the satisfaction of political and economic needs is increasingly rationalized. Thus, in an order, the satisfaction of such needs is rationalized – avoiding the physical coercion and caring not only about the group but also about personal interest – and with this rationalization, there the discipline comes.

If we say that a person is rational and understands the possible coercion and the importance of living together in cohesion against the rivals – other states – then he assumes discipline, which is the key to preserving this obedience. Discipline is the ultimate point that a member of a political community should reach, and people are trained for that from a very early age. Therefore, in the bureaucratic state, discipline is internalized.

What is strange is that, as I mentioned above, he says “the community imposes obligations that individual members of it fulfill only because they are aware of the probability of physical coercion backing up such obligations” (902-3). Such an approach might be rational because it is the personal choice of each to fulfill the obligations or not, but is there really another option? The concept of discipline becomes fair in this context and is shown as what society needs to function properly. This means that people are becoming puppets of the system just to enjoy relevant rights, and this is ‘sold’ as the ultimate way to live properly and avoid any suffering. It can be tacitly understood that Weber considers the state necessary, the people rational and normalize their obedience to authority. However, in any case, it is worth mentioning that Weber perceives excessive bureaucracy as the greatest threat. So, he does not advocate a state-citizen relationship that is extremely oppressive and abusive.

CHAPTER 2

OBEDIENCE TO STATE

Up until now, the various perspectives on what the state is and how it exercises its power have been discussed in section one. Initiating the research with a classic question like “What is the state?” can be considered cliché, but it was necessary in order to show that the state is not a sole straightforward notion that does not show any distinctness. Hobbes in *Leviathan* gives us the structure of the Commonwealth with a sovereign and explains how such a state should function, but his starting point is to show that we need such a state so that we can avoid the dangers of the condition of the state. Therefore, he claims that the state is definitely necessary, not for its own sake, but for the citizens’ sake.

After Hobbes, I highlighted Aquinas’ ideas in *Summa Theologiae*; here, even if Aquinas does not openly argue that the state is necessary as otherwise we could have a life not worth living, his argument about the hierarchical pyramid, with God being is on top, state under God and the citizens being in the base as the submitters, and his general framework of the eternal law seem that he finds the state necessary in order to make sure that the human beings’ actions are observed and regulated so that they are in line with God’s commands and *lex naturalis*.

Moreover, Nozick’s view on the state, which is a minimal one that exists only to secure the freedom and rights of its citizens, can be regarded as the ideal view when the people’s autonomy is prioritized. In his work, it is comprehended that he is against an anarchic society, as he supports that life would be like the Lockean state

of nature in this case. In the Lockean state of nature, there are points that are similar to the Hobbesian state of nature. The difference is that Nozick, even though he finds the existence of some kind of a state necessary, he does not find absolute power of the state and absolute obedience of the citizens necessary.

Lastly, Weber, with his realistic discourse on the modern state, proposes a bureaucratic system in which citizens are disciplined to follow the rules, and the people who exercise power in the bureaucracy are the experts in that field. It is important to highlight here that Weber, instead of justifying citizens' obedience, or better, their rule-following attitude, tries to understand the process by which this relationship was constructed – the internalization of authority. He has not written much regarding the non-state option and if a state would be necessary in such a world, but it can be understood from his other writings that it is dangerous to live in such a society; the liberal ideas can survive in a state, so a non-state world is not an ideal one to be autonomous.

After the discussion of the state's definitions, I will focus on obedience to the state in this section. I will discuss Plato and Locke's views regarding obedience, as the former introduces several reasons why citizens should obey their state no matter what, while the latter states that it is the contract that ties the state and the citizens. Plato's argumentation has a psychological component, as well, while Locke's type of obedience has a more formal basis.

2.1 Plato

So, I would like to begin the discussion on obedience with Plato's *Crito*, as Plato successfully provides four major reasons why a citizen should obey the state. The reason I chose *Crito* is because it proposes ideas regarding the psychological component of obedience, as well. In Ancient Greece, the moral code had three components: honor, justice, and virtue. Firstly, honor is composed of trust, loyalty, and truth. Secondly, justice is composed of truth and the principle of reciprocity. Thirdly, virtue is the end goal for human beings. The end goal, according to Plato, is to have a good life; a good life means a just life. A good, just life is the only and

highest value (Plato 51). Plato writes that his teacher Socrates supports that one must act justly even in response to injustice (52).

In *Crito*, Socrates is charged by the state with corrupting the youth of Athens and impiety – questioning these teachers, meaning the sophists, who do not question accepted beliefs about the Gods. As a result, he faces execution, and quite interestingly, even though this verdict is erroneous, as Socrates always teaches obedience to the state to his students, he neither opposes it nor accepts the proposal of his student to run away (45). The dialogue he has with his student shows the importance and respect that Socrates gives to the state.

More specifically, Plato argues that Socrates obeys the verdict of the state for four main reasons. These are the tacit agreement between the state and Socrates; piety and gratitude; bad personal consequences; and lastly, bad precedent. Especially piety and gratitude play an instrumental role in Socrates' justification, and actually, these two concepts as sources of obedience show up in many other philosophers' writings. What I particularly regard in *Crito* is that Socrates makes an analogy between the state and the parents (53). To be more exact suppose that:

- Mary was given birth, nurtured, and educated by the state.
 - This is what a person usually gets from his parents.
- So, the state is like a super-parent.
 - You should never do injustice to your parent.
 - So, you should never do injustice to the state.

Why should a person never do injustice to his parent? Because of the piety and gratitude that he feels for all the effort, affection, and consideration his parents gave to him from the time he was born. This seems like a great example when I think about my relationship with my parents. But is the state really an entity that deserves this piety and gratitude? For instance, the state includes the police authorities in case that I need protection from danger or preclusion of a negative situation. Besides that, there are legal courts where my wrongdoer can be charged and punished so that I do not have to take some kind of revenge and endanger my own life. Furthermore, the state provides its citizens public schools so that no child is excluded from the right of

education. These are all examples of why the state deserves some kind of gratitude, but there is an important matter here that distinguishes the state from the parents: just the feeling of gratitude is not enough for the state.

State receives taxes to operate these schools; it provides you all this security iff you are its citizen; even when you are a citizen, this does not guarantee you equal access to state authorities and facilities, etc. With parents, the person has a direct connection; most of the time, parents are altruists for the sake of their child. Parents also punish, but as they do not expect injustice from you, their actions towards you are not unjust, as well. If they are unjust, though, why would a person feel gratitude and piety for his parents? This is not a rational view. It is, instead, a way to make obedience to the state seem fair.

Moreover, the fact that a citizen unquestioningly does anything the state orders, means that he actually is a bad precedent (49). Socrates avoids being a bad precedent to his students, but in this way, he paves the way for more and more unjust actions against his students. To be fair, I do not feel like I made some kind of tacit agreement with the state when I was born. I am a citizen of this state as I was born here, my parents were born here, and the legal system makes the newborns here automatically citizens of the state. So, actually, the whole process is quite circumstantial, but what is expected from the citizen is to be bonded with his state to the extent that he obeys it no matter what. On the other hand, signing the identification card at a specific age might be considered a contract you make with the state, but do people have other options? One response could be that they sure have; they can request asylum from a different state, but this is a vicious circle. This new state will have other guidelines to follow, other decisions to obey... Being heimatlos might be a solution, but this will lead to a life where even basic human rights are not guaranteed. Therefore, to enjoy rights, you have to obey rules.

This is quite a problematic approach, as it gives people no free choice. It looks like in Plato's state, the people are regarded as just citizens rather than human beings with personal perspectives, goals, and freedom. This whole dialogue Socrates has with Crito is a way to make absolute obedience to the state a great, important, and sacred behavior. The analogy with parents and the tacit "bad example" threat are all

supporting arguments used to glorify obedience and legitimize the state's infinite power over the citizens. Thus, I think that *Crito* does not provide a sound, rational, and reasonable basis for obedience. What it provides instead is a successful example of severe brainwashing.

2.2 Locke

The social contract theory is widely discussed, especially in Hobbes', Rousseau's, and Locke's works. I will highlight Locke's account of the social contract theory, as his views on the nature of the contract based on consent are significant for the purpose of this thesis and also highlighted in Nozick's section. In the second of *Two Treatises of Government*, titled "An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government" Locke argues that the state of nature is governed by the law of nature, which orders that all are equal and independent and no one should harm the others in his health, autonomy or property (Locke 107). Locke states that all people equally belong to the Maker – God – and this is the main reason why the law of nature does not allow harming one another; everything is His. Therefore, the people in the state of nature are living relatively peacefully compared to the state of nature described by Hobbes because they are supposed to avoid violence and injustice. Indeed, respect for the law of nature does not guarantee the absolute prevention of the state of war. Especially the threat to private property leads to a state of war, which is difficult to cease (112-3).

At this point, Locke proposes a social contract that emerges as a necessity to stabilize people's lives within a society, and the key feature of this contract is the consent of the people. People consent with each other and transfer the executive power to punish the people who act against the law of nature to the commonwealth, submit themselves to the will of the commonwealth and, on the other hand, become subject to the will of the majority (146-7). Therefore, obedience to the commonwealth is a product of individuals' consent to keep the commonwealth alive. The state's duty is to protect and preserve individual property, liberty, and equity, and people give up their executive power to the state and obey it to the extent that it fulfills its duty.

However, if the actions of the ruler are not directed to the protection and preservation of liberty and property of the people, but to fulfill his own ambition and passions, the people who by consent brought him up also have the legitimate right to bring him down and dissolve the social contract (192-3). Locke states, “it is one thing to owe honor, respect, gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission” (133). Thus, Locke's social contract theory differs from the Hobbesian contract, as the Hobbesian one claims that even if the ruler reaches the degree of being a tyrant, all tyrannies are better than the state of nature.

On the other hand, it differs from the Platonian argument as in *Crito*, Socrates supports that the people should obey the ruler even if the decision of the ruler is unjust. Locke does not advocate absolute obedience to the state; he believes that the state should exist if it sincerely prioritizes people. He does not regard the state as a sacred notion as Socrates claims, or he does not consider the state of nature so wicked as Hobbes to support that anything is a better option compared to that. In both Plato and Locke, state coercion is an important part of their framework of state and obedience to the state; while in the former the state coercion should be obeyed because of all the reasons I mentioned in the relevant section; in the latter, it should not be tolerated if it diminishes the individual liberty, justice, and private property.

It is clear enough that in sections one and two, what causes the main concern in the definitions of state and the basis of obedience to the state is the state authority's inconsistent nature with individual autonomy because of its use of coercion. Especially in the modern bureaucratic state, which is the state that we live in currently, the main threat, as Weber also argues, is the excessive limitation of autonomy as the state imposes more and more rules and penetrates everywhere. One reaction to the modern state is philosophical anarchism.

CHAPTER 3

PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM

In sections one and two, definitions of state and sources of obedience were discussed. All the discussed theories supported the necessity of the state for different reasons. Now, it is time to touch upon philosophical anarchism, a school of thought that criticizes the views on the state's essentiality, legitimate state authority, and rational obedience to it. I will state and analyze four philosophers at this point: Simmons, Wolff, Huemer, and Raz.

First and foremost, I find the use of the word “anarchism” as an inclusive concept an inaccurate expression, as in the philosophical sense, not all anarchists support the complete abolishment of the existing states and act for it. The distinctions that Simmons makes between a priori and a posteriori, as well as the weak versus strong anarchism, show that it should be comprehended that not all philosophical anarchists are anarchists in the way we know it. In Greek, anarchism is a word composed of *αν* + *αρχή* which can be translated as “without order, without authority.” When we look at the actions of political anarchists, we see that they are quite aggressive and reactional towards the state system. This is why anarchism as a concept has an aggressive and reactional connotation. What should be distinguished is that philosophical anarchists mostly keep their arguments in theory; they do not take part in counterstate activities. So, on the one hand, there surely are philosophical anarchists who turn their philosophical views into political realities as well, but on the other hand, there are also defenders of this school of thought who are distant from the idea that all “no order” is better than “any order.”

Regarding my catch on the philosophical anarchist, I understand his effort to ensure human autonomy and eliminate illegitimate coercion; however, I am not quite sure about the view that we would just do fine without the existence of the state. The existence of the state is effective and it is useful to have such an arrangement. Not because human nature is so nasty that people never can get along together in an anarchic environment, but because it is for the good of the people to trust some of their responsibilities with a regulative system. Moreover, the modern state is an economical, sociological and historical necessity. I will highlight my framework in section five in more detail, but first, it is necessary to discuss the philosophical anarchism's well-known advocates' views – except for Raz, though, as he is a liberal philosopher with views similar to the a posteriori weak anarchist, but he is not clearly putting himself in this camp.

3.1 Simmons

Simmons, in the very beginning of his article “Philosophical anarchism,” makes it clear that philosophical anarchism, unlike political anarchism, does not have the aim to develop a strong moral imperative to eliminate the state because of its illegitimacy (Simmons 3). According to him, what the philosophical anarchist aims for is to use the state's illegitimacy argument as the basis of eliminating the views that are in favor of citizens' obedience to and compliance with the state. More specifically, Simmons proposes that philosophical anarchism has two forms: the a priori anarchism and the a posteriori anarchism. This distinction plays a significant role as their supporting arguments, starting points and final claims deeply differ.

On the one hand, Simmons mentions a priori anarchism and argues that this form maintains that all possible states are morally illegitimate. It is for granted that the state has a coercive character and a hierarchical nature, and these features make it impossible for the state to be legitimate. Therefore, the inconsistency of the autonomy of individuals with the authority exercised by states leads to the idea that there is no state that could be respected and complied with (4). This first camp of philosophical anarchism is the critical and, to a certain extent, the extreme approach. An a priori philosophical anarchist has no trust in any kind of foundation that

controls human behavior. As Hobbes is quite pessimistic regarding human nature, the a priori anarchist is quite pessimistic about the state nature.

A posteriori anarchism, on the other hand, advocates that all existing states are illegitimate, not all possible states (4). This means that there might be a legitimate state authority that is consistent with the autonomy of the individuals. Nozick can be considered as a posteriori anarchist, as he supports a limited state which protects and ameliorates people's lives without oppressing their freedom. Simmons is an advocate of a posteriori anarchism, as well. Instead of encouraging the view that all states are wicked, he thinks that it is much more realistic and effective to have an essential state with no coercive authority on the citizens.

Simmons argues that philosophical anarchists defend their central judgments about state illegitimacy on either a priori or a posteriori grounds and they take this judgment to entail the nonexistence of general political obligations – that is, the removal of any moral presumption in favor of compliance with and support for the state. However, he clarifies that philosophical anarchism is distinctive as its judgment of state illegitimacy – even of necessary state illegitimacy – does not translate into any immediate requirement of opposition to existing illegitimate states (8). Even though I agree that philosophical anarchists are generally not the same as political anarchists, as their curiosity is limited to theoretical discussion, this does not mean that there is no philosophical anarchist with such political views. More specifically, how I perceive it, the a priori anarchists like Wolff or Huemer concentrate on the negative sides of a state and are much more critical to any effort to legitimize the state's actions – even the most reasonable ones. It could be a good solution to find another term for the a posteriori anarchists, as putting both a priori and a posteriori in the same equation results in criticism which will be addressed in the following sections.

Simmons suggests that philosophical anarchists hold that there may be good moral reasons not to oppose or disrupt at least some kinds of illegitimate states, reasons that outweigh any right or obligation of opposition (10). Even illegitimate states, for instance, may have virtues unaffected by the defects that undermine their legitimacy, which are relevant considerations in determining how we ought to act with respect to

those states. And the refusal to do what the law requires is, at least in most even illegitimate states, often wrong on independent moral grounds. So, there may be a variety of sound moral reasons not to oppose or not to act contrary to the laws of some illegitimate states (9).

Thus, Simmons highlights that the general duties to our fellow citizens as human beings, our general duties to promote justice and other values, and our other moral reasons to treat others well will all often be good reasons not to disrupt the state's functioning or to act contrary to its laws (10).

3.2 Wolff

In contrast with Simmons' tolerance of the existence of a state, Wolff is a prominent a priori anarchist. In the first section of *In Defense of Anarchism*, Wolff defines authority as the right to command and, consequently, the right to be obeyed (Wolff 4). He argues that, especially today, in the bureaucratic and institutionalized state, just the sight of a uniform is enough for people to automatically feel that the other person holds an authoritative feature over them (6). After the brief introduction with what authority is, Wolff focuses on the matter of autonomy and proposes that a man is autonomous if he is self-legislating and does not submit to the will of another (8). The underlining point here is that the autonomous person might do what another person says, but not because this other person tells him to do so. He is determinate in the view that authority and autonomy cannot coexist.

Wolff's essay on authority and autonomy can be regarded as a reflection of Weber's concern regarding the bureaucratic state. He argues that there is a great paradox in the modern world: as a person more and more comprehends his right and duty to be his own master, on the other hand, he is more and more bound to the technology and bureaucracy that maximizes its authority (10). Therefore, he agrees with Weber in his idea that bureaucracy is the greatest threat to individual autonomy, but what Wolff adds to this approach is that it is actually not just the bureaucracy that threatens autonomy.

The issue is not what threatens autonomy either. From a defining distinction, Wolff highlights that authority is the right to rule, while autonomy is the refusal to be ruled. Therefore, if a man is autonomous, he should refuse to obey the laws of the state because they are the laws of the state. He might obey them, not because they are imposed though, but because he believes in them and chooses to obey them. The solution, according to him, is either to become a political anarchist or to give up your autonomy to the mightiest authority. He overviews the direct, representative, and majoritarian democracy and comes to the conclusion that democracy is not a better option than dictatorship (20). They both restrict individual autonomy to some extent; in neither case can an individual be his own master with zero intervention.

Therefore, the a priori anarchist emphasizes that all possible states are morally illegitimate, as they have a coercive character and a hierarchical nature, features which will not change in any form of state. This is why no state can be respected or complied with if a man wants to be autonomous. I agree with Wolff in the sense that objective autonomy is inconsistent with the state authority. Individual autonomy will always be restricted, either for the individual's benefit or to his detriment. The coexistence of autonomy and authority will always result in a deadlock. This outcome is an economical and sociological necessity, as it is observed today.

Still, I find the a priori anarchism more relevant in comparison with the a posteriori anarchism, as it does not make an effort to draw an unrealistic state authority that never restricts individual autonomy. As I said, even for the benefit of the person, his autonomy will be affected by the state. In the next chapter, though, I will propose a different perspective on autonomy, which I consider the only realistic account of the possibility of autonomy and authority's coexistence.

3.3 Huemer

Huemer states that "power is self-validating" (Huemer 134). According to him, even if the authorities are chosen randomly and everyone is aware of this, the mere assertion of authority tends to be accepted by the people. This is an interesting claim which I think has roots in human nature. There is the obvious general tendency of

citizens to accept whatever the state imposes because the state has this authority. Even when a policy is clearly not a constructive or effective one for society, we never see the whole population of a country on the roads protesting against the policy. Many state policies are widely accepted as legitimate even if they are not (136). This may be happening because of the fear of negative personal consequences, like a lawsuit or physical violence, but from personal experience, I can argue that these are not the only reasons. I think that compliance with the higher authority is some kind of social evolution and quite difficult to amend, but this does not mean that unquestioned compliance is a reasonable or rational way of living. Even if the current state-citizen situation never changes, it is quite important to show that another arrangement is always possible.

More specifically, Huemer argues that one of the sources of state illegitimacy is the paternalistic laws it imposes (139). Some of the examples that he proposes at this point are:

- Preventing someone from committing suicide,
- Stopping individuals from voluntarily exchanging money for sex,
- Bringing prescription drug laws into force,
- Giving grants and low-interest loans for college education,
- And the system of social security, especially as an investment for the time of retirement.

Huemer argues that such paternalistic laws implemented by the state are not justified at all (140-1). These are all against the autonomy of the citizens. There is a higher authority that acts like he knows better the good for everyone. The problem, though, is not just the fact that the state is arrogant, but also that in order to finance its oppressive activities, it uses the method of coercive extraction of money from the population, namely the taxation (145).

In order to prove taxation's coercive character, Huemer makes an analogy with doctors. More clearly, he argues that doctors provide medical care for a price and that they do not provide care to those who do not pay them, but, on the other hand, they are not coercing everyone who does not buy their service. It is a simple

equation: if you do not hire a doctor, a doctor will not come to you. Or if this specific doctor does not fit your financial situation, you can always find another one whose pricing is preferable.

The taxation system, unlike the fee-for-service model as in the doctor example, is like a system in which doctors coerce the people to hire them and if they cannot pay them, they put diseases into their system (147). These diseases, in reality, can be understood as the punishment for not paying your taxes. Here, it is important to highlight that Huemer's complaint is not about the efficiency of taxation but about its justification. He believes that taxation is never justified normatively. So, the concern for him in his overall discussion on state authority is whether its policies are justifiable.

3.4 Raz

In the previous sections of this paper, we saw that the supposed societies in Hobbes, Plato, Aquinas, and even Weber are all building iron borders for personal goals to blossom. Humans in these societies must respect the state's views and obey the lines it draws for them. However, this is not how a society that really minds its citizens acts. Human beings must have the freedom to decide what they will do with this freedom and how they will continue their lives. The states they live in should be supportive of these decisions with the relevant mechanisms. In *The Authority of Law*, Raz first and foremost argues that a person's well-being depends on his ability to pursue personal goals (Raz 169). To what extent can a woman, for instance, living in a sharia government, pursue her dreams and give meaning to her life in the way that she desires? In *The Morality of Freedom*, Raz does not support that the abolishment of the state is a way to secure well-being (101). Instead, he argues that human goals—and, therefore, human well-being—are conceived through and depend on "social forms" (308-9).

More specifically, Raz suggests that to pursue dreams, have goals, and therefore give meaning to life, there needs to be some kind of social forms, which are ways of being and acting that are developed socially and make sense only in the context of a given

society (310). The argument's second premise is that people need autonomy to occupy many social forms in liberal societies and achieve the goals that these social forms set out (398). So, the existence of social forms is not enough alone, as there needs to be autonomy to have them formed. In such a social environment, there needs to be some kind of a state for Raz to secure the autonomy of the people so that they can coexist in social forms. Such a state is the so-called liberal state (157).

Raz's view that political institutions are justified by virtue of their contribution to well-being and his argument that human well-being depends on social forms, lead to the outcome that autonomy is necessary for well-being and social forms require autonomy. If liberal societies' social forms require autonomy, then liberal societies should support autonomy. This will lead to well-being. According to the Kantian Triangle, democracy, international organizations and economic interdependence lead to peace. This is the liberal motive in international relations. What I think about Raz's argument is that he also draws a liberal triangle, but this triangle is composed of the social forms, autonomy of individuals and liberal societies leading to well-being.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, Raz is not a philosophical anarchist, and he does not really find the existence of a state illegitimate or inconsistent with people's autonomy. Contrarily, he finds the liberal state necessary so that the people can enjoy their autonomy of establishing social forms within that state. The reason why I mentioned Raz in this section is because he is opposed to state coercion and the negative use of authority. He proves with his theory that it is possible to have a state that prioritizes citizens' autonomy and gives them the opportunity to follow their objectives. This view can be considered as a counterargument to the view of the a priori anarchist who does not believe in the coexistence of autonomy and state legitimacy.

CHAPTER 4

AUTONOMY

This thesis will not focus on the duty of the state but on the proposal that will take the anarchist challenge seriously. The question in this chapter is, what practical solution can be found to possess autonomy, and how is this solution connected to the bureaucracy? To answer this question, I will first discuss what autonomy is and whether there is a version of autonomy that can coexist with state authority.

Psychologist Jim Taylor in his article “Perception Is Not Reality” refers to perception as “the way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something; a mental impression,” while he observes reality as “the world or the state of things as they actually exist...existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subjective to human decisions or conventions.” After all the research and thinking on the matter of autonomy, I came to the conclusion that the existence of absolute a priori human autonomy – in the way that autonomy is traditionally perceived – within the state is not plausible – as the possibility of their coexistence always results in a deadlock. By the time the state exists, people automatically have duties within the state, and they exist as part of the state.

Moreover, both with their permission and without, they are influenced by state authority, and their actions are affected by it. Limiting the state authority is not plausible, especially at the current time. So, why not find a solution where the state authority is not coercive and excessively controlling – if this is possible – while it still influences the citizens’ decisions and actions for their good? In order to propose

this framework, I will in this part argue that even if it is a controversial idea for the reasons I will address, autonomy can be assumed a posteriori, as well. Maybe the argument that I will propose can challenge the anarchist's strong opposition to state authority. Thus, in order to solve the clash of the traditional autonomy and authority that the anarchists criticize, I will propose two understandings of autonomy: the objective and the subjective.

4.1 Objective autonomy

The first understanding, the traditional as I call it, is objective autonomy, whereas people *are* autonomous. A person is objectively autonomous if there is zero intervention from external actors to any of his conscious or unconscious actions and decisions. The autonomous person of this kind is not subject to the will of another; he is self-legislating. Objective autonomy cannot coexist with state authority; even in a very limited state, as Nozick describes, there will be an intervention to private autonomy. Objective autonomy is self-governance. The only framework where objective autonomy can exist is the state of nature. While in the state of nature, there are no political arrangements at all, every man is the architect of his own fate, to the extent that this feature can be enjoyed within this state. This kind of autonomy is indeed quite important in itself, but it has no prudential value. Subjective autonomy does.

4.2 Subjective autonomy

The second understanding, therefore, is subjective autonomy, whereas people *think that they are* autonomous. The only version of autonomy that can coexist with state authority is the subjective one. If a person thinks that he is the master of his choices, he will think and feel that he is autonomous, and this is where this thesis gives an effort to reach. Why would it be a problem not to be objectively autonomous while you are subjectively autonomous if you do not even perceive the fact that you are not objectively autonomous? Besides, as I already mentioned, it is the subjective autonomy that has prudential value – the value of well-being. So, if a person feels well and autonomous to the extent of his perception, the objective autonomy should

not be that surmounted. The question that arises at this point is, what practical solution can be used to achieve subjective autonomy? Definitely not coercion.



CHAPTER 5

MY PROPOSAL

As I highlighted in section one, Nozick, in his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, proposes a “minimal state” which protects its citizens against violence, fraud, and theft and prevents the enforcement of contracts. These alone, however, will not be enough for a community that grows each day. Philosophical anarchists generally propose their ideal state models as states which govern small communities rather than large populations. However, it was proven in human history that these small communities have a tendency to augment continually – as today we experience the drawbacks of overpopulation – therefore, Nozick’s minimal state is not plausible at all.

On the other hand, this does not mean that a fully empowered state that holds all powers and autonomies in its hands is the best option. Max Weber in his analysis of bureaucracy – the system which narrates the modern state – was concerned about the tendency of bureaucracies to become excessively powerful and coercive. In particular, he was critical of the potential of bureaucracies to stifle individual autonomy and initiative. I am critical of this potential of bureaucracy as well, and this is why I will propose a bureaucratic state immune to political ambition, which does not coerce but nudges instead.

To reach the discussion on nudge, I will first address Weber’s modern state in detail. I will do so to show that it is not a flawless state but can be developed with some changes. In the previous sections, I argued why the state of nature does not work and

why the philosophical anarchist's extremely limited state is not an alternative to the state of nature. On the other hand, the bureaucratic state is a reality with flaws.

5.1 Weber's Bureaucratic State

In "Bureaucracy", Weber explains various reasons why societies were led to the bureaucratic system. Firstly, Weber states that the ever-growing complexity of culture and the development of the finance sector were some of the reasons for the societies' bureaucratization process (94). Such cultural development and growth and the increasing availability of consumable and usable belongings made it necessary to enhance the administrative capacity. According to Weber, the initial and main reason for the bureaucracy's emergence was the rising need for order and protection (95). Therefore, the security dilemma, the complexity of culture and financial possessions, and the population growth were the key reasons that opened the gate for the modern bureaucratic system. A minor note here is that, as I mentioned earlier, the modern bureaucratic state was an economical, sociological and historical necessity. It is proven that the minimal state which is proposed by Nozick has no chance to survive the economical, sociological and historical transformations in the future either.

Some features of the fully developed modern bureaucratic mechanism are the technical superiority, division of labor based on objective considerations, special training for particular tasks and the existence of experienced and specially educated bureaucrats (96-7). These can be considered as the positive features of bureaucracy, but according to Weber, the bureaucratic mechanism definitely has some relatively negative features, as well. For example, the bureaucratic mechanism is a dominating structure which is immune to sentiments like love, hate and any other personal feelings, holding a "dehumanizing" character, which is argued that it makes it work better (98). The well-trained bureaucrats-experts just do whatever their duty is in the best manner, without attaching importance to their private feelings regarding the duty.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that bureaucracy is actually superior to any kind of mass, and the people who live once in this mechanism cannot undo it (110-1). The

interesting point is that even the person who invented bureaucracy in his country is changeable, but the bureaucratic system is not. Weber gives the example of Bismarck (112). At some point, Bismarck left his duty, but the bureaucratic system he created did not. Thus, the well-trained bureaucrats-experts change, the political ruler changes, but bureaucracy remains still with new actors on stage. This catch is another reason why I support bureaucracy as the most viable system; it is notably difficult to abolish it. The governed people, most of the time, have neither courage nor aspiration to abolish it.

Weber is actually a supporter of the bureaucratic system; he believes that a well-functioning bureaucracy and the growing discipline and rationalization within the society are quite important. However, while he supports some parts of the bureaucratic mechanism in general, he also argues that this mechanism is the most threatening one against individual autonomy and self-determination. He says that the bureaucratic system has a tendency to exclude the public (116). Not only does it exclude the public, but it also does so in a ruthless way.

In *the Protestant Ethic*, Weber uses the phrase “iron cage” for the modern bureaucratic state (xviii, 123). The modern state imposes more and more rules, penetrating everywhere. The philosophical anarchism, as I addressed in chapter three, is a reaction to the modern state, but as I argued a structure in the way that the anarchist proposes is not plausible at all. The bureaucratic state, on the other hand, is surely quite restrictive in the classical way that we experience it today, but I believe that there could be a version of it that is not so. The problem for Weber is the increasing power, the absolute dehumanization, and the state coercion, which makes society an iron cage. At this point, I will discuss Cass Sunstein’s terms of nudging and choice architecture as alternatives to coercion. The proposal here is, what about a state which instead of coercing people, nudges them with the main objective being the governed people’s good?

5.2 Nudges

As Sunstein states in *The Ethics of Influence*, “nudges steer people in particular directions but also allow them to go their own way” (Sunstein 20). Reminding people

what audience will see what they are about to post on social media, sending people SMSs regarding the effects of drug addiction, and putting warning images and quotes on cigarette boxes are some examples of nudges. Sunstein accepts that nudges are ethically controversial, as they are on the margins of deception and manipulation. However, he states that some kinds of nudges, especially the ones that are developed from paternalistic laws, are definitely acceptable, constructive and necessary, while the choice architecture cannot be wished away (35).

Even if Sunstein perceives it understandable that nudges and choice architecture are ethically controversial, he argues that raising ethical objections to them is pointless, as a world without them is not plausible (199). Also, I do not see the reason to object to nudge and choice architecture if it is for the good of the people. If I enjoy my autonomy, feel well and decide for what is good for me in the end, it does not bother me being nudged by the state. One reason for that is that I will not even be in the state to understand that my deliberation process was, in a way, influenced by the state.

What I support might sound like an experience machine, but what I mean here is not that the bureaucratic state will do whatever it likes to the people governed, undermining their needs, thoughts and good. What is aimed with nudging is that the governed people come deliberately to the result which is best for them and for the society. So, when the state nudges people against drug addiction, theft, traffic misconduct, etc., it does direct them toward what is morally and practically good for them. Instead of doing so with the use of coercion, this state uses nudging, as the feeling of pressure and being ordered generally make people less attracted to the option which is actually the best for them.

So, the use of nudges in the aforementioned state can result in the right policies and happy citizens. My “right policies” claim comes from the fact that the rulers act on the basis of both individual and common good. My “happy citizens” claim, on the other hand, comes from the fact that even if the citizens are “nudged”, the point of using this means is to orient them towards the best option for them from a paternalistic point of view, beside to also giving them the feeling that they are autonomous.

However, even though the use of nudges seems reasonable and effective, as it is a way to ameliorate people's lives without putting pressure on them by directing them to the best possible option, in the end, it is local. I think that the use of nudges would be quite successful in Nozick's minimal state, but I already rejected the feasibility of it, as what we experience today is Weber's bureaucratic model that, through time, has been proven as an economical, sociological, and historical necessity. This is why I will stick to bureaucracy, as I do not believe that nudges can be used in a bureaucratic system and that there can exist global nudges. They can still be effective for small-scale policies, but the SMSs, the public service announcements, etc., will not lead to the subjective autonomy that is the objective of this thesis.

What might guarantee it, though, is the frank belief of the ruled to the ruling. How would the people believe in the expertise and the goodwill of the bureaucrats, though? With a high education system, properly working checks and balances, and a well-structured law system, the bureaucratic state would flourish, and so would the well-being of people – this way, their subjective individual autonomy would not be harmed either.

At this point, I will address a concern that could be raised based on what I said so far. I argued that I will stick to the bureaucratic system, because I do believe in the rule of well-trained experts and simply this is the modern state – our reality. I argue that bureaucrats should be considered experts in the field of policy-making and execution, similar to how doctors are regarded in the field of medicine. I trust the doctor's therapy because I believe that he is a well-trained expert in a field that I do not know much about. The same applies to the bureaucrat. They know better about state authority and which policy would be better for the common good. So, the criticism that might occur is that the system I support is basically Plato's state, as there are two groups, the ruling and the ruled, that are sharply distinguished from one another. In order to show in which way this thesis' revised bureaucratic state is different from Plato's state, I should briefly discuss Kallipolis first.

5.3 Plato's Kallipolis

Plato in Book III of *Republic* describes his ideal city, the Kallipolis, saying that the core virtue of this city and the philosopher-king is the truth; the education is selective, censor-based, specialized, and until the age of 18, as after that age the most loyal are chosen to be trained as the Guardians; deceit is forbidden except for the Guardians – who are good for Kallipolis; the good of the city is superior to the good of individual and teaching loyalty towards state is the job of the education system; and lastly, only morally correct literature is taught (Plato 60-93).

Furthermore, according to Plato in Book IV, the goal of Kallipolis is not that one group is superior to another, but to make all satisfied with what they have in and from life; everyone should be as happy as life – according to the system – allows. If everyone follows their given nature, according to the given education, and fits in, society will function properly and be virtuous. Moreover, in *Republic* Plato states 4 virtues of an individual that should exist in Kallipolis. These are wisdom, the main feature of the Guardians; courage, the main feature of the warriors-auxiliaries; moderation, the main feature of the workers-citizens; and finally, justice, the feature that everyone should possess (94-121).

In Plato's *Republic*, people are not even in a place to question whether they are autonomous or not. The ruling system is so manipulative that people are trained from an early age to have deep loyalty toward the rulers. And actually, in Kallipolis, manipulation is not limited to the citizens. Especially in the education of the Guardians, censorship is greatly applied to the “morally incorrect” things. Also, in Kallipolis, there are not just the Guardians as the rulers; Guardians are actually the executors of policies, but the main ruler who is in the policy-maker position is the philosopher-king. This state prioritizes education, this is for sure, but the type of education gains importance. Furthermore, in Kallipolis, people believe in the philosopher-king because he owns a unique kind of wisdom and virtue by nature. Expertise and efficiency are indeed important, but the main purpose of Kallipolis is to achieve justice, wisdom, and virtue.

5.4 Revised Bureaucratic State

What I propose in this thesis is not a state that applies deliberate manipulation and censorship to the education of the bureaucrats and the citizens. Besides, I do not propose a state where the policy-makers and policy executors are distinguished. I want to portray bureaucracy as the expertise in politics. The people who are gifted in this field will be selected and trained with all shades of state governance. This is the way to know which policy is best. And actually, the fact that bureaucrats are impersonal and distanced to the citizens, is not always a negative thing.

On the contrary, the rule of bureaucrats who make an effort to ameliorate people's lives and the state's interior and foreign policies according to common good, and law – like treaties, conventions, etc. – without really getting engaged with the citizens' lives microscopically, will result in the increase of prudential value. It would not be rational to let a normal citizen decide which policy should be applied regarding the China-Taiwan dispute. Not deciding on this policy does not really restrict individual autonomy. Would being autonomous in selecting this policy somehow increase the prudential value? I do not think so.

On the other hand, if there is no political ambition and competition between parties in a state, if ideologies are not used in order to gain power and for personal interests to be fulfilled, and if the policies are always made based on law, I do not think that there would be a reason for the citizens to oppose. What matters here is that the state does not penetrate everywhere in a microscopical way. Rather, citizens should feel autonomous within a state that respects their being and their value. So once again, to grant this, firstly, the bureaucrats should be highly educated; secondly, they should apply the most effective and constructive policies for people and the state, sometimes by using nudges to orient people to the best option – this should be the only way to engage with citizens' individual lives; thirdly, they should never harshly coerce individuals and try to penetrate into their private lives; and finally, the citizens should really believe the bureaucrats and trust their expertise. The only environment where people are objectively autonomous is the state of nature. After this long discussion, the final point that I reached is that if all these prerequisites are fulfilled, subjective autonomy will be achieved, as well.

A concern can be, what about the ethos of these bureaucrats, though? If the people are not that sophisticated enough, if they do not have the capacity to comprehend the bureaucratic system's inner circle, would a feedback mechanism survive in such a ruling system?

First and foremost, I totally agree that a model which advocates total belief in bureaucrats can raise pessimism. As I said, I am quite critical of political ambition. The system will not work properly if there is political ambition, personal interest, clash of ideologies, and eventual societal degradation. In a state divided into two camps 51% and 49% respectively, there will always be some policy that will bother some citizens' well-being. This is why there is no place for politicians in this revised bureaucratic model that this thesis defends. The impersonality of the bureaucrats is not always a worth-criticizing feature.

On the other hand, there is always the possibility that without a feedback mechanism, the bureaucratic system can become flawed with the entrance of corrupt people. As I said, special education is a prerequisite for a proper system, and the possibility of being corrupt is decreased after such an education from an early age. As I would not believe that a doctor would intentionally implement a wrong therapy, I would also not believe that a bureaucrat would make use of his powerful position to the detriment of the ruled.

Regarding the feedback mechanism, the existence of a judiciary branch can act as such. The judiciary branch – which consists of another set of bureaucrats with expertise in law – will apply checks and balances on the executive and legislative branches. However, then some other concerns can be raised. For instance, who will give feedback on the judiciary branch? How can we be sure that the legal bureaucrats will act justly? Who decides that the law on which these bureaucrats will base their decisions is serving the common good? Who defines the common good? These are endless questions about the functioning of a bureaucratic state.

One response to address the concerns above is that in the revised bureaucratic state, we do not need any feedback mechanism. The bureaucrats will receive feedback

from reality. If their policies do not give the desirable result, they will address the flaw and improve themselves. Therefore, the feedback mechanism will be self-correcting.

In this thesis, I mainly respond to the philosophical anarchist, who complains about individual autonomy being suppressed by the state. What he means is that the rational judgment is suppressed by the state. In the revised bureaucratic system, I advocate for rationally educated bureaucrats. These are individuals whose rational judgment will not be affected. They will develop reason and judgment through the unique education they will receive and as dedicated experts, they will continue throughout their lives to ameliorate their decision-making capacity and their ability to identify the common good. They will be in place to make self-criticism, try to make better decisions and apply more efficient policies. It is not necessary that in a state everyone is rationally judging everything. If all human beings owned the same potential for critical thinking, the state of nature would not be a brutish place and people would not feel the necessity for a state. Therefore, I implement the idea of the philosophical anarchist defending rational judgment, but differently.

The President of the Reich, the philosopher-king, the minimal state, the state of nature, and all other models that I discussed throughout this thesis are either not competent or realistic enough to become the ideal system that will grant subjective autonomy. Regarding the revised bureaucratic system that I propose, though, I am pretty confident that it is both competent and realistic. The fact that politics is significantly enhanced throughout the world does not mean that the state I propose is an implausible one. The revised bureaucratic state attaches importance to the citizens' well-being, does not penetrate into their private stuff, and always works based on the legal system and the unique education they received. This is the only way to cut the Gordian knot of state authority and individual autonomy.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

To sum up, in this thesis, I first discussed the state and obedience to the state to show that there are several frameworks of how the state is established and formed and for what reasons people obey the state. After this quite theoretical discussion which I used as an introduction to the main parts of the thesis, I turned to the philosophical anarchist's point of view, which prioritizes autonomy among everything else and argues that such a state where authority and autonomy coexist is impossible at all.

As I agreed with the philosophical anarchist at the point that objective autonomy cannot exist within the state structure, I disagreed with the anarchist at the point that the state can be abolished and people would just do fine without it. As I took the anarchist challenge seriously, I proposed a solution to cut the Gordian knot: subjective autonomy as a form of autonomy that can actually exist within a state structure, as what I prioritized is the prudential value of autonomy. However, just suggesting subjective autonomy and claiming that it can exist in the modern bureaucratic state as we know it would not be enough to cut the knot; this is why I analyzed Weber's bureaucratic state in detail, showed the reservations that Weber had regarding it and then asked the question, why not use nudge, instead of coercion? Coercive power is the main problem for the philosophical anarchists who perceive it as a threat to individual autonomy, and such a perception is what Weber also holds about the growing excessive state authority which penetrates everywhere, leaving no space for personal initiative. So, the use of the nudges, the concept which was introduced by Sunstein, and choice architecture, by the rulers of the bureaucratic

state, so that the governed people are given the freedom to choose their own course of action can be regarded as an alternative to coercion. However, nudges are local, they are small-scale policies. A global nudge does not seem plausible, and this is why the authority system should be changed in order to leave more space for individual autonomy.

The prudential value of subjective autonomy should be deemed important, and this can be granted with a revised bureaucratic system, which will be ruled by experts who were justly selected and uniquely trained for that position with their main goal being the better function of the society and the preservation of the state and the citizens' prosperity and security based on law; with citizens who will believe in the expertise, competence, dedication and goodwill of the bureaucrats; and a well-functioning legal checks and balances system on the executive and legislative power to prevent power politics and political ambition. The checks and balances will play a significant role, but in the end, what I argue is that the feedback mechanism in the revised bureaucratic state is self-validating.

In such a state, people will be subjectively autonomous, feel valuable, and the state will function appropriately without leading to societal degradation and a constant fear of coercion among the citizens. So, absolute objective autonomy is only plausible in the state of nature, but the state of nature is historically what human beings tried to avoid. This is why the only autonomy people can enjoy within the state authority is subjective, and to grant it the mode of authority and the features of the rulers should change.

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