Intra-Party Competition & Party's Performance in Elections: The Leaders' Tenure

by

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This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a master's thesis by

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To my parents

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I focus on the intra-party competition channel of the democratic process in major parliamentary democracies. More specifically, I study the linkage between the election performance of the political parties and the tenure of the party leader. A cross-section time-series analysis from 1960-2007 of 117 major political parties in 29 parliamentary democracies, shows that there is a linkage between the political party's vote and the leader's tenure. In this analysis, I test whether the leader's tenure, measured by the years in office, is affected by the party's performance in the general elections.

Intuition says that party leadership has to be changed when the respective parties fails in elections. Nevertheless, our data on 29 countries and political parties show that several countries show a contrary trend. We argue that these negative cases lack intra-party democracy, and there is a need to establish proper institutions and check-balance systems in order to foster intra-party democracy in these countries. As a result, patron-client networks will dissolve, and the party leadership will have more incentive to follow common interests instead of private interests.

Key words: Institutions; intra-party democracy; law of political parties; and the political elite

ÖZET

Bu tezde, ana parlamenter demokrasilerdeki demokratik sürecin parti içi rekabet kanalına odaklandım. Özellikle, siyasi partilerin seçim performanslarıyla parti liderlerinin genel başkanlık sürelerinin arasındaki bağlantıyı inceledim. 1960'dan 2007'ye kadar 29 parlamenter demokraside ki 117 ana siyasi partinin enine kesit zaman dizileri analizi, siyasi partinin aldığı oy oranı ile parti liderinin parti genel başkanlığına devam etme süresi arasında bir ilişki olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu analizde siyasi partinin genel seçimlerdeki performansının siyasi parti liderinin genel başkanlıkta kaldığı yıl sayısını etkileyip etkilemediğini test ettim.

Genel kanı; parti liderinin başarısız bir genel seçimden sonra değişmesi yönündedir. Bununla birlikte; 29 ülkedeki 117 siyasi partiden topladığım veriler karşıt bir eğilim göstermektedir. Bu karşıt eğilimin sebebi parti içi demokrasinin olmayışıdır. Bu eksikliği kontrol edecek uygun kurumların kurulması gerekmektedir. Sonuç olarak patron-müşteri ağları zamanla kaybolacak ve parti liderliği kişisel çıkarlar yerine toplum menfaatini gözetecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumlar; parti içi demokrasi; siyasi partiler kanunu; siyasi elit

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INTRODUCTION

In democracies, political parties compete with each other in elections to receive the mandate to serve the people in the government. Aside from this inter-party competition, there is the intra-party dimension of the democratic political competition, without which the democratic process cannot generate enduring solutions to the political, social and economic problems of the country.

In the age of globalization, the major challenge for emerging markets is stabilizing macroeconomic indicators such as inflation rates and budget deficits. Yet, in an environment of uncertainty and short-term capital flows, the job of regulating the market and providing proper incentives requires a broader coalition more than one may think. The regulation of the market by the state and providing proper incentives are as important as the market dynamics. In this context, economists should not underestimate the importance of the political elite behavior. Hence, one should expect a better economic performance in countries where political elite cooperates with the market actors and behaves responsibly. Moreover, it is expected that the more success a party gets in elections; the more are the chances for the party leader to stay in charge.

Parallel to this premise, I have conducted a cross-section time-series analysis from 1960-2007 for 117 major political parties in 29 parliamentary democracies. This analysis shows the linkage between political parties' vote and the leaders' tenure clearly. Nevertheless, the results reveal that this positive correlation between success in elections and the tenure of the political elite does not hold when each country has been investigated separately. My data displays that Turkey, Japan, Italy, Cyprus, India, Iceland, and South Africa follow a different trend than others countries do. This paper is an institutional approach, which asks the question of *why?*.

In order to answer this question, this paper is organized as following. In the next chapter, I provide a literature review of the institutional approach. Chapter 3 briefly describes the method I followed, and presents our findings whereas the last chapter concludes the paper, and ends with some preliminary suggestions.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Olson correctly emphasizes that the problem of collective action should occupy a crucial place in our debates on economic development. According to Olson, it is very difficult to induce collective action in large and heterogeneous groups like nations given that people pursue self interest and they have a tendency to avoid costs of involving in collective action (free-rider problem). He argues that, in such groups, the goal of collective action is generally a public good of which people benefit from even if they do not participate. So, we need to provide people with selective incentives in the form of positive (such as tax rebates and subsidies) or negative (such as police force, regulatory and monitoring institutions) incentives in order to induce collective behavior.

Therefore, one deals with a major problem, which is the question of how to promote proper macroeconomic policies. Yılmaz (2001, p. 6) argues that, in democratic societies, there is a potential for political elites to transform themselves into an interest group if existing institutional and social norms are insufficient for regulating and monitoring behavior. Then, our major question becomes even more complex in a context where the elite, possessing material (the police force, economic resources) and non-material (legitimacy to govern) sources of power, has a tendency to be a free-rider.

Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) study on democratic consolidation tries to give some clues about how to overcome this dilemma and induce proper behavior from the elite. They argue that politics is an inherently conflictual process in which actors with well-defined preferences over outcomes contest for political power, and it is the political institutions that allocate political power. The most important political institutions in such a setting are those that determine which individuals take part in the decision-making process (pp. 19-22). They assert that the fundamental conflict is between elites (opposing democracy) and citizens (supporting democracy), and it is the balance of political power between two groups that determines whether the state transits to democracy. Sometimes, citizens have de facto power (coercive power: e.g. revolutionary threat) against the elite who has de jure political power (institutional power). The elite faced with such a challenge make credible commitment to future pro-majority policies since they want to avoid loss of power and threat of revolution. However, these acts by the elite are often not credible within the rules of existing regimes. Therefore, the political elite need to transform formal political power to the majority by changing the institutional structure, which is what democratic transition achieves. And, they assert if these institutional changes endure through time in a country, then democratic consolidation occurs.

Acemoglu and Robinson also provide us with a list of factors that affect the democratic consolidation process: a strong civil society, sources of income and composition of wealth, political institutions, the role of inter-group inequality, a strong middle class, shocks and crises (pp. 31-40). Especially, shocks and crises are important factors since exogenous shocks such as economic crises give the citizens opportunity to obtain de facto power for a certain period of time.

Nonetheless, experiences of several countries offer us a more complex picture than Acemoglu and Robinson present especially in cases where economic interests and political authority of the elite are at stake. Indeed, the experiences of African states and some emerging countries show that the elite possesses other means of overcoming conflict when the citizens challenge their authority.

For instance, in her research on the reasons of economic failure, Boone (1994, pp. 109-131) argues that the Africa elite grounded their government on populism and traditional sources of power. This choice, however, created a kind of African elite what Boone terms as a fusion of elites who lacks the cohesion and homogeneity necessary for the pursuit of common goals such as development. These alliances are characterized by focus on instrumental, short-term goals instead of public goals and lack of autonomy from society. Thus, instead of productive activities, the state chose to spend its resources on co-optation and patronage activities that are crucial for the elite to stay in power and to avoid danger of revolutions. In this sense, the African states acted like a resource distribution apparatus and use agricultural surpluses to appease various actors in their alliance while suppressing the productivity of agricultural sector via monopoly of state on agriculture sector and state marketing boards (buying cheap from agricultural producers and selling dear in international markets). Hence, the African elite avoided danger of loss of power via redistribution and patronage while the African economies were trapped into a vicious circle as a result of these policies. Bates (1981) also explains how the African state elite used the state revenues coming from the agricultural sector to appease the needs of the urban workers, industrialists, and big farmers. In this case, he claims, the political elite deliberately altered prices of agricultural products via the monopoly of marketing boards. This policy benefited the elite in at least two ways. First, the political elite assured the support of the industrialist and urban workers since suppressed agricultural prices meant cheaper food for workers and raw material for industrialists, which in turn contributed to the establishment of a coalition that would ensure the power of the elite. Second, the revenue supplied from the export of the agricultural products gave the African elite to use this revenue to finance their large-scale state projects although most of these projects failed to be a success story. On the downside, the distorted incentives (low prices for agricultural products) caused the production in African states to decrease, which meant lower revenue, taxes, and exports. The result was balance of payment crises, economic stagnation, and subsequent crises. This is another example of how the elite's desire to stay in power contributes to stagnation of economies and inefficient economic policies.

Onis (2003) also attracts our attention to the importance of populism for the elite to stay in power. He defines populism as using state resources and manipulating economic outcomes in ways to benefit select groups and classes whose strength is crucial for the elite to maintain its rule (p.2). Then, he goes on to explain how democratic governments of Turkey initiated populist cycles, especially after 1983, in order to establish broader electoral support. The fact that the extraordinary high ratio of public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) to GNP was central to the economics of recurrent financial crises in Turkey has been an example of how the elite wasted the state resources for their populist activities (p.

6). The result, however, has been budget deficits, high inflation, and balance of payments of crisis followed by subsequent economic crises culminating with the 2001 economic crises in which the Turkish economy lost 9.1% of its GDP.

Hence, the elite's desire to stay in power and benefit from the state resources seems to be a major impediment against a successful economic growth. In fact, this impediment to successful control of inflation and other macroeconomic indicators are even more difficult in countries like Turkey and Brazil, in which democratic consolidation has not realized fully.

Kohli (2005) also refers to these kinds of states as fragmented multi-class states. The state has some autonomy from the society, and the bureaucracy possesses a limited amount of competence to follow goals like economic development. Yet, the pressure to follow multiple goals and reliance on various social classes (e.g. worker class) for power prevents this type of states to channel all their resources for economic growth (pp. 9-12) since the elite feels the need to use state resources for redistributive activities in order to get elected in the next elections. This dependence on government resources, Yılmaz (2001) says, removes the incentives for the political elite to control macroeconomic indicators such as inflation under control. He indicates that reducing government spending is a must for inflation control, which would hurt the political elite along with other groups like farmers, industrialists, and government employees. Yet, he says, the leaders are aware of the fact that the cadres and social support behind leadership will start to dissolve if they try to control budget deficits; thus inflation (p. 7). Moreover, he states, the ability of local authorities to restrain the irresponsible behavior of the central elite and act independently from the center is also removed in the case of Turkey given the centralized government system, a problem which is not faced by Brazil and Argentina thanks to their federal systems (p. 17).

Then, the major question one faces is how to restrain the irresponsible behavior of the elite and ensure that the elite follows coherent macroeconomic policies such as decreasing budget deficit, increasing tax revenues, and giving the market actors proper incentives. The seminal work of North and Weingast (1989) on the Glorious Revolution of England in 17th century gives us important clues the merits of institutional control on political elite. The main point they present is the significance of institutional constraints for successful economic growth. They explain how the triumph of the parliament over the Crown of England resulted with institutional changes, which did change the decision-making process and restrict the arbitrary power of the King of England. For them, the victory of the parliament over the King guaranteed a less adverse political regime and power that were more conducive for securing property rights and decreasing transaction costs; hence contributing to economic growth. According to North and Weingast, the Glorious Revolution and institutional control of the parliament over the King made it possible for several reasons. First, the new system removed an archaic financial system and its subsequent financial crises. Second, the Revolution abolished the King's right to alter or abuse the rules to his own benefit by limiting his power. Third, the parliament assured the right to monitor the expenditures. Fourth, a check and balance system between the parliament and the King insured that no party would use the power they have to their own benefit. The result was a financial revolution and economic development.

Hence, even a limited institutional setting, like the one we witness at the end of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, has a capability to control the elite behavior, which also contributes to the well-being of economy via proper macroeconomic policies, decreased transaction costs and expenditures. Other studies also show us that limiting the arbitrary power of the elite contributes economic growth.

For instance, Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein (2005) illustrate how a democratic institutional setting assists economic development. Their data over 40 years show that low-income democracies are performing better than low-income autocracies. For example, they say, low-income democracies has an average growth rate of 1.9% while this figure was 0.9% for low-income autocracies (East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China are excluded) (p 30). Moreover, they indicate that democratic governments demonstrate less volatility in terms of economic performance while no democratic government in their dataset has experienced famine or disastrous economic crises while countries like North Korea had such experiences. In addition to these, democratic governments have higher rates of agricultural productivity, better socioeconomic indicators (e.g. higher literacy rates and average life expectancies), and higher scores of Human Development Index (pp. 29-42). Then, the question is why low-income democracies score better than their autocracies?

Halperin et al. (2005) point out three core characteristics of democracies spurring development: shared power, openness, and adaptability. By shared government, they mean, a system that is more representative with principles of check-balance on executive power and vertical accountability [emphasis is mine]. Adaptability refers to democratic governments' capacity to learn via deliberative discussion of policies and trial-error mechanisms. It also establishes a system in which governments are perceived as legitimate; and the system allows the power to change hand in a peaceful way. Lastly, openness refers to greater transparency and access to information by several actors. In addition, Halperin et al. argue that 'institutions, particularly those contribute to more predictable behavior in the marketplace, explain much of the historical differences in the level of development' (p.58) And, they assert that democracies are more successful at integrating those institutions protecting principles such as an impartiality of the legal system, freedom of expression, and free press. For example, they say, democracies with such institutions outperformed autocracies by at least 30% in average economic growth rates (pp.58- 60).

Hence, the conclusion we have arrived so far is concise: In an environment where political elites have a tendency to act like interest group, good economic policies require accountability of political leaders and transparency of the decision-making mechanisms which can be supplied only by proper political institutions and check-balance systems. Nonetheless, this result alone does not contribute to the original knowledge in the field. There is a need to add another dimension to the merits of institutional settings and check-balance system in order to limit the irresponsible behavior of the elite.

Chapter 3

POLITICAL PARTIES IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

This dimension is the presence of intra-party democracy. Political parties are the heart and soul of every political system including non-democracies. In this vein, this study will be exploring the relationship between duration of party leadership and success in elections. Intuition says that an unsuccessful party leader (losing elections or failing to foster economic growth when in power) should be replaced by another leader in democratic settings. Therefore, I argue, durable leadership of political elites even when their parties are unsuccessful is a sign of accountability and intra-party democracy. Moreover, I claim that there should be a negative correlation between failure in elections and duration of leadership in institutionalized democracies. In other words, political leadership should be replaced if the cadre fails to succeed in elections or produce meaningful policies.

Yılmaz (2001) also refers to this problem. He states that political elites belong to different parties depending on their ideological tendencies. Their main objective is to become the ruling party, produce solutions to the issues of their country, and get re-elected. They will lose the office in the next elections if they cannot succeed when they are in power. Such a situation, he concludes, also brings the result of leading cadres' replacement with other members of the party if intra-party system is democratic. However, he continues, the party members will not attempt to replace them if the leading cadre delivers to the party members during their administration, and they will perceive an election loss or a decrease in votes as a temporary failure. Yet, this circle creates a patronage network, which cannot be broken unless the party leadership changes. In addition, the lack of intra-party democracy removes two benefits of democracy Halperin et al. mentions: vertical accountability (possibility of losing leadership constraints irresponsible behavior) and adaptability (democratic governments' capacity to learn via deliberative discussion of policies and trial-error mechanisms).



Figure 3.1: Number of parties and party leaders for each country

In order to find support for the premises I have made, I have collected data about 117 political parties (parties with > %5 in overall) from 29 countries between the years of 1960 and 2007 with a particular focus on Turkey. Our first Figure presents number of parties and number of leaders for each country in our data while Figure 3 and Figure 3 show average number of leaders per party and average duration of leaders respectively.

In addition to the figures above, I have prepared another figure showing three dummies: Resign or Election, Promotion, Death or Health in order to show the reason of leadership change. First one is that party leader's resignation or losing of the party's leadership election. Second one is that does he or she take a promotion after he/she left the party leadership position. The last one is a sudden death or health reasons which forced him or her to resign.



Figure 3.2: Average Number of Leaders per Party for Each Country

In Figure 3, there are 551 resign or election, 14 promotions, and 38 death or health problems dummies totally 603 leader changes in the data.

Besides these dummy variables, I also add some other variables: ingov, unemp, gdppc. Ingov is 1 if the party is in the government and 0 otherwise. Unemp is the unemployment rate of the country. Gdppc is the GDP per capita, annual growth rate. For the unemployment rate data, I have benefited from International Financial Statistics and gdp data from World Resources Institute.

My expectation (Ingov X unemp) is negatively and (Ingov X gdppc) is positively correlated with the duration of the party leader, because I expect that higher GDP and low unemployment rates are indicators of success, which will contribute a longer duration of



Figure 3.3: Average Duration of Party Leaders for Each Country

party leadership.

3.1 Turkey

Along with my emphasis on Turkey, Table 3.1 presents the prominent parties of Turkey and their leaders. According to the table, there have been twelve leader changes in seven political parties in Turkey. Only five out of twelve leadership changes (41.6%) came after a decrease in the vote percentage. For the sake of simplicity, I omit some leaders, those who



Figure 3.4: Reason of Leader Change

served for a very short period time and the so-called puppet leaders. The reason of these adjustments to Turkish parties was forbidden party leaders' tendency to use and manipulate these puppets leaders behind the curtains. Totally there are twenty three drops in the vote percentage which show that only 21.73% of these decreases end up with a leader change in Turkey.

In Table 3.2 shows constitutional and legislative regulations for selected countries including Turkey.

Table 3.1: Prominent Turkish Political Parties

CHP	CKMP - MP - MHP	ANAP	AP - DYP	DSP	MNP - RP - SP	AP
İsmet İnönü	Osman Bölükbaşı	Turgut Özal	Süleyman Demirel	Bülent Ecevit	Necmettin Erbakan	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Bülent Ecevit	Alparslan Türkeş	Mesut Yılmaz	Hüsamettin Cindoruk	Zeki Sezer	Recai Kutan	
Deniz Baykal	Devlet Bahçeli	Erkan Mumcu	Süleyman Demirel			
			Tansu Çiller			
			Mehmet Ağar			

Turkish political party system is one of the systems regulated by constitutional and legal provisions along with Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Nigeria. Law of Political Parties which became effective in 1983 regulates several aspects of political parties including organization, membership process, eligibility for membership, financial issues, and intra-party elections. For our purposes, one aspect of this law is significant, which are the articles regulating the election of party leader and candidates for parliament. Actually, articles 15, 19, and 21 oblige parties to conform to the principles of majority rule when selecting the party leaders and party organizations in provinces. Nonetheless, the article (Article 37) regulating the election of candidates running for the parliament is ambiguous, and it is this article giving the leading cadre excessive powers once elected.

The original article stated that political parties should determine their candidates with a pre-election process in local party organizations. However, this article was amended in 1986, and the new article gave the party leaders more space for determining the candidate by allowing the parties to use the party's own regulations and rules for the selection of the candidate. Moreover, another amendment in 1998 allowed central organs of political parties to nominate candidates without an election (Law of Political Parties, 2008).

Table 3.2: Prominent Turkish Political Parties

Country	Constitutional Regulation	Regulation of Party Finance	Regulation of Candidate Pre-Selection	Regulation of other Internal Decision-Making Processes
Australia	No	Yes	No (except Queensland)	No
Germany	Yes - parties may be freely established and their organization should conform to democratic principles.	Yes	Yes - candidates must be selected by a properly-constituted assembly of party members (requirements outlined) by secret ballot.	Yes - German parties law provides detailed rules regarding membership rights, internal order, election of executives, and arbitration of internal disputes.
Portugal	Yes - a party must be governed by the principles of transparency, democratic organization and the participation of all its members.	Yes	No	Yes - regulation of names and party symbols.
Finland	No	Yes	Yes - candidate selection must take place by ballot of the membership.	Yes - parties are obliged to have written rules following democratic principles in internal decision-making governance.
Nepal	Yes - detailed rules regulating party registration.	Yes - but difficulties ensuring compliance.	Yes - must be democratic if codified within the party constitution.	Yes - democratic & periodic election of office bearers.
Spain	Yes - the internal structure and operation of parties must be democratic.	Yes	No - constitutional provisions rarely enforced.	No
United Kingdom	No	Yes	No	No
New Zealand	No	Yes	Yes - Electoral Acts require registered parties 'follow democratic procedures in candidate selection'.	No
Canada	No	Yes	No	No
United States	No	Yes	Yes - most preselections take place through statutorily-governed primaries.	No
Nigeria	Yes - provisions regarding party registration and restrictions on formation.	Yes - but rarely enforced.	No	Yes - democratic & periodic election of office bearers.
Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes - but not effective	Yes

Note: The template of this table is borrowed from another work. I added Turkey to the original table, which is borrowed from 'Gauja, Anika. 2006: Enforcing Democracy: Towards a Regulatory Regime for the Implementation of Intra-Party Democracy (Discussion Paper). Consulted on January 25, 2008. <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au>'

Wider space given to the political elite of the parties also broadened the prospects of an oligarchic structure. These prospects, in turn, allowed the party leaders to strengthen their power on the party organs and members since members were expected to oppose the leader less and not to question central policies if they want to benefit from being a member of a particular party (such as being allowed to run in the elections as a candidate). Furthermore, this system obliges MPs of a particular to follow the lead of their leading cadre once get elected since being an MP in the next term is an important consideration. Therefore, we face with a political party system, in which intra-party democracy is weak; control mechanisms on the leading cadres are nonexistent; and failed policies are hardly questioned.

The next table observes the effects of three variables on duration of tenure of party leaders. These three variables are Relative vote in election years , L tenure , and Relative vote in all years .

I measure the party performance by the percent of the votes the party received in general elections relative to the percent of the votes received by the top-performing party. As the general elections are not held every year, this led to loss of many observations in the data during the time gap, so alternatively I used the relative votes received in the election year for the following years and used it to explain the leader's tenure in the years following prior to the next election. The use of the relative performance measure in the election year is that high relative performance is a sign of successful political party. This is a meaningful approach as well because this way a leading party with an increasing vote percentage and decreasing relative performance can become second or third party in the next election. However without relative performance measurement we can't keep track of this party as a loosing party because their vote percentage increases. For example:

Although party A's vote percentage increases from 20% to 25%; it should be thought as an unsuccessful party in this election, because it became the second party in the election 2001. If we keep track of Relative vote in election years than we can see that they are parallel with the success of a party. Relative vote in all years is the ratio of last election's leading party's vote divided by a given party's vote in last election year. We need this variable,

Table 3.3: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance

Relative vote in election years	Relative vote in all years	L.Tenure	Cons	Obs	# of party	R^2	Log L.hood
Dependent variable: Tenure							
			All countries				
4.30**			2.15**	1138	117	0.02	-3238.04
[0.97]			[0.64]				
2.25**		0.68**	0.05	1096	117	0.51	-2733.33
[0.67]		[0.05]	[0.42]				
	4.58**		2.30**	3998	117	0.02	-11636.78
	[0.53]		[0.35]				
	1.49**	0.75**	0.41+	3955	117	0.57	-9861.22
	[0.37]	[0.02]	[0.23]				
		Countries with more than 2 political parties					
4.68**			1.90**	1001	103	0.02	-2813.44
[1.06]			[0.66]				
2.89**		0.68**	-0.28	964	103	0.52	-2362.84
[0.73]		[0.05]	[0.42]				
	4.60**		2.23**	3484	103	0.02	-10003.64
	[0.57]		[0.35]				
	1.59**	0.74**	0.37	3446	103	0.57	-8488.58
	[0.41]	[0.03]	[0.24]				
		Countries with more than 3 political parties					
4.43**			2.13**	870	88	0.02	-2427.52
[1.10]			[0.66]				
2.48**		0.70**	-0.04	839	88	0.54	-2020.18
[0.74]		[0.05]	[0.41]				
	4.72**		2.13**	2924	88	0.02	-8306.95
	[0.58]		[0.34]				
	1.53**	0.73**	0.44+	2892	88	0.55	-7092.3
	[0.44]	[0.03]	[0.25]				

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table 3.4: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance

Party	% vote in 2000	Relative vote in election years	% vote in 2000	Relative vote in election years
A	20	1	25	0.625
B	10	0.5	40	1

because when we try to analyze country by country we have huge loss of observations.

In Table 3.3, we have omitted countries with two and three party systems since relative votes are highly dependent to each other. In two or three party systems, if those parties' votes are very close to each other than Relative vote for a specific party is either 1 or close to 1 whereas in four or more party systems, Relative vote becomes a meaningful variable.

If we only observe the effect of Relative vote in election years on tenure, one unit of increase in Relative vote in election years results with 4.30 unit increase in tenure of party leaders. If we observe the combined effect of Relative vote in election years and L tenure, we see that the effect of Relative vote in election years decreases from 4.30 to 2.25, which is almost half of our first findings. Therefore, we can say that L tenure itself explains tenure of party leaders to some extent. In other words, longer the tenure of a party leader, higher the chances he or she will be in charge in next year. Lastly, we observe that one unit of increase in Relative vote in all years means 4.58 unit of increase in tenure. However, we see only 1.49 unit of increase in tenure if we add L tenure to our fixed effect model.

Table 3.5 is an attempt to capture specific patterns of countries. Denmark, Germany, Norway, Spain, Greece, New Zealand, Israel, Belgium, United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Trinidad Tobago, and Canada display significant and positive results whereas India has a significant but negative result.

Table 3.6 is a derivative of Table 3.5 with a new variable L tenure. In Table 3.6, I added L tenure to our fixed effect model. In the renewed model, we have seen that significance levels of Relative vote have decreased considerably, which means that L tenure has an im-

Table 3.5: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure								
Country	Relative vote in all years	std error	Constant	std error	Obs	# of party	R^2	Log likelihood
Denmark	8.33**	[2.13]	1.58	[1.03]	240	5	0.06	-692.55
Sweden	6.54*	[2.79]	4.28**	[1.12]	260	6	0.01	-804.39
Finland	2.29	[3.02]	2.52	[1.64]	258	7	0.00	-666.16
Germany	41.02**	[5.34]	-16.94**	[2.91]	188	4	0.16	-597.40
Norway	9.28**	[3.09]	1.03	[1.19]	304	7	0.07	-860.26
Spain	5.81**	[1.96]	1.05	[1.70]	62	2	0.06	-185.36
Portugal	1.22	[1.99]	2.31	[1.68]	66	2	0.01	-166.99
Greece	10.98**	[2.10]	-3.98*	[1.58]	68	2	0.14	-201.33
Netherlands	1.77	[1.22]	0.87	[0.74]	181	5	0.01	-365.51
Turkey	-3.54+	[1.90]	8.10**	[0.98]	203	11	0.01	-632.75
Austria	2.83	[3.30]	2.86	[2.18]	160	4	0.01	-454.62
Canada	9.06**	[1.30]	-1.25	[0.77]	152	5	0.14	-399.11
Australia	2.55	[4.92]	2.16	[2.96]	172	4	0.00	-472.50
New Zealand	10.93**	[2.07]	-4.37**	[1.47]	123	4	0.12	-323.19
Israel	15.03**	[2.24]	-5.91**	[1.76]	98	3	0.29	-271.21
Belgium	4.48**	[1.58]	-0.53	[0.82]	92	4	0.12	-178.78
Japan	-6.44*	[2.69]	7.33**	[2.63]	40	2	0.03	-64.86
Malta	40.87+	[20.96]	-25.00	[19.91]	92	2	0.04	-332.73
United Kingdom	10.09**	[2.25]	-2.91+	[1.61]	128	4	0.10	-343.37
Republic of Ireland	26.25**	[2.65]	-12.14**	[1.78]	141	3	0.25	-371.93
Italy	-0.39	[1.22]	3.91**	[0.98]	111	6	0.00	-275.75
Cyprus	-4.54	[3.97]	16.30**	[3.66]	112	3	0.01	-398.32
Luxembourg	5.98**	[1.86]	-1.37	[1.48]	132	3	0.06	-311.12
Switzerland	4.36**	[1.52]	-0.08	[1.30]	180	4	0.04	-458.02
India	-5.89**	[1.85]	6.41**	[1.45]	77	3	0.18	-155.11
Iceland	-15.58*	[6.85]	17.57**	[5.59]	90	2	0.09	-245.89
Sri lanka	5.17	[5.13]	2.38	[4.75]	96	2	0.02	-292.46
Trinidad Tobago	4.17**	[1.37]	3.73**	[1.06]	111	4	0.05	-325.61
South Africa	-2.51+	[1.50]	11.23**	[0.94]	61	4	0.01	-156.41

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table 3.6: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure										
Country	L.tenure	std err	Rel. vote in all yrs	std err	Cons	std err	Obs	# of party	R^2	Log l.hood
Denmark	0.67**	[0.09]	3.51*	[1.47]	0.12	[0.58]	235	5	0.49	-603.95
Sweden	0.73**	[0.08]	1.62	[1.87]	1	[0.89]	255	6	0.52	-697.67
Finland	0.58**	[0.10]	-0.21	[2.04]	2	[1.23]	257	7	0.35	-609.79
Germany	0.78**	[0.10]	13.49+	[7.55]	-6	[4.03]	188	4	0.7	-501.76
Norway	0.72**	[0.09]	0.87	[2.06]	0.96	[0.90]	298	7	0.54	-738.56
Spain	0.74**	[0.16]	1.53	[1.37]	0.41	[1.01]	61	2	0.6	-155.94
Portugal	0.65**	[0.17]	0.47	[1.08]	0.82	[0.87]	66	2	0.44	-148.39
Greece	0.77**	[0.17]	1.5	[1.36]	0.17	[1.03]	66	2	0.63	-166.79
Netherlands	0.26*	[0.11]	1.42	[1.25]	0.57	[0.77]	178	5	0.1	-350.01
Turkey	0.84**	[0.10]	0.69	[1.31]	1	[0.85]	201	11	0.71	-502.6
Austria	0.76**	[0.11]	-0.574	[2.88]	2	[1.73]	159	4	0.57	-386.39
Canada	0.62**	[0.11]	5.42**	[1.79]	-1.69+	[1.02]	151	5	0.5	-356.49
Australia	0.72**	[0.12]	-0.09	[3.32]	1	[2.10]	171	4	0.54	-404.35
New Zealand	0.69**	[0.12]	4.48*	[2.04]	-2	[1.34]	121	4	0.53	-280.16
Israel	0.82**	[0.11]	2.66	[1.72]	-0.78	[1.01]	96	3	0.76	-210.82
Belgium	0.32+	[0.16]	2.65+	[1.44]	-0.13	[0.79]	90	4	0.19	-170.7
Japan	0.34	[0.26]	-7.13*	[2.86]	7.65**	[2.79]	40	2	0.15	-62.39
Malta	0.83**	[0.10]	7.36	[9.62]	-5	[9.16]	92	2	0.69	-281.02
United Kingdom	0.64**	[0.12]	3.87+	[1.96]	-1	[1.36]	128	4	0.46	-310.41
Rep. of Ireland	0.61**	[0.12]	13.22**	[4.02]	-6.60**	[2.27]	141	3	0.56	-334.7
Italy	0.78**	[0.12]	-0.54	[0.69]	1.47*	[0.73]	109	6	0.6	-216.11
Cyprus	0.84**	[0.10]	1.22	[1.51]	1	[1.28]	109	3	0.71	-320.03
Luxembourg	0.36*	[0.14]	4.83*	[1.86]	-2	[1.32]	132	3	0.22	-299.22
Switzerland	0.66**	[0.11]	2.47*	[1.24]	-0.82	[0.86]	180	4	0.46	-405.4
India	0.55**	[0.16]	-3.19*	[1.57]	3.39**	[1.26]	76	3	0.41	-140.98
Iceland	0.51**	[0.16]	-8.14	[7.28]	9	[6.18]	90	2	0.36	-230.48
Sri lanka	0.76**	[0.13]	2.51	[3.71]	-0.39	[2.87]	94	2	0.6	-244.22
Trinidad Tobago	0.87**	[0.10]	0.93	[0.64]	0.58	[0.57]	110	4	0.76	-246.73
South Africa	0.71**	[0.15]	-1.73	[1.08]	4.22*	[1.74]	61	4	0.51	-135.17

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

portant explanatory power. In addition to these, I have observed that R squares of each correlation have increased enormously.

In Tables 3.5 and 3.6, compared to the Table 3.3 I have observed some lack of significant results. Because there is less cross-section variation in one country data due to the selection of the political parties of a country which are generally received greater than 5%. Therefore for some countries there is only a few parties in the dataset. In this regard, we use relative vote for sake of number of observations.

Constant term coefficient is usually positive and between 0 and 2 in Table 3.5 and 3.6. For example in Table 3.6 the constant term coefficients of Finland and Austria are 2. In these countries the expectation for duration of a new party leader is at least 2 years without looking at other variables.

According to Table 3.7, one unit of increase in Relative vote in election years results with 1.59 unit of decrease in tenure. When L.tenure has been added then the coefficient of the Relative vote in election years decrease to -2.22 which is meaningful if the higher relative vote less probability to occur a leader change in a given party is considered. The effects of Relative vote in all years are -1.79 and -2.10 respectively. All coefficients are significant at 1% level.

When we use random effect model than all the coefficients decrease but the sign is same. In this table I have observed some significance losses. Fixed effect analysis is more suitable for our model.

Statistically, fixed effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data because they always give consistent results; however they may not be the most efficient model to run. Because random effects will give better P-values as they are a more efficient estimator, we should run random effects if it is possible. In addition to my observations, I have also used hausman test to choose the best model which allows me to find more suitable for our data. We get a significant P value (Prob¿chi2=0) which is less than 0.05. So I needed to

Table 3.7: Leader's Election Performance and Leader Change (Fixed effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure					
Relative vote in election years	Relative vote in all years	L.Tenure	Obs	# of party	Log Likelihood
		All countries			
-1.59**			910	87	-318.54
[0.60]					
-2.22**		0.14**	843	80	-271.57
[0.79]		[0.03]			
	-1.79**		4197	112	-1601.11
	[0.51]				
	-2.10**	0.13**	3869	108	-1331.66
	[0.41]	[0.02]			
		Countries with more than 2 political parties			
-1.92**			783	74	-270.02
[0.72]					
-2.77**		0.14**	729	68	-231.24
[0.97]		[0.03]			
	-1.92**		3683	98	-1443.48
	[0.57]				
	-2.29**	0.13**	3360	94	-1190.52
	[0.46]	[0.02]			
		Countries with more than 3 political parties			
-1.66*			660	61	-223.73
[0.73]					
-2.77**		0.13**	622	57	-195.99
[0.91]		[0.03]			
	-2.00**		3095	83	-1247.44
	[0.64]				
	-2.40**	0.12**	2828	80	-1022.81
	[0.48]	[0.02]			

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table 3.8: Leader's Election Performance and Leader Change (Random effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure					
Relative vote in election years	Relative vote in all years	L.Tenure	Constant	Obs	# of party
		All countries			
-0.36			-1.48**	1139	117
[0.33]			[0.24]		
-0.49		0.07**	-1.94**	1096	117
[0.38]		[0.02]	[0.29]		
	-0.92**		-1.01**	4245	117
	[0.23]		[0.17]		
	-0.69**	0.06**	-1.75**	3969	117
	[0.23]	[0.01]	[0.16]		
	Countries with more than 2 political parties				
-0.51			-1.47**	1002	103
[0.36]			[0.25]		
-0.66		0.07**	-1.92**	964	103
[0.41]		[0.02]	[0.30]		
	-0.92**		-0.99**	3731	103
	[0.25]		[0.18]		
	-0.56*	0.06**	-1.76**	3460	103
	[0.24]	[0.01]	[0.15]		
	Countries with more than 3 political parties				
-0.31			-1.70**	871	88
[0.41]			[0.28]		
-0.53		0.07**	-2.06**	839	88
[0.45]		[0.02]	[0.32]		
	-0.93**		-0.97**	3143	88
	[0.27]		[0.18]		
	-0.45+	0.05**	-1.75**	2905	88
	[0.24]	[0.01]	[0.15]		

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

use the fixed effects as in the hausman test and our observations suggest. Next, we look at each country one by one with fixed effect analysis.

In Table 3.9 we see a few positive coefficients of relative vote although the expectation is negative. The expectation is negative for the coefficient of relative vote because a higher relative vote decreases the probability of a leader change in a given political party. In that sense I have investigated deeply the countries: Finland, Norway, Japan, United Kingdom, India, and Iceland. In Finland, when Centre Party is excluded (Agrarian League), the coefficient of relative vote has become -1.43. Because there are 4 party leaders in Centre Party from 2000 to 2003 however there is no election during this period. In Norway, when Conservative Party is taken out, the coefficient of relative vote has become -0.34. In United Kingdom, the lack of presence of first Liberal Party Liberal Democrats in the scale (party number=82) the coefficient of relative vote has been calculated as -3.61 due to the scandal in 1975 which caused Jeremy Thorpe to resign although party's vote was is increasing during his leadership. Other countries have 2 or 3 political parties therefore I didn't get exact results I have inteded to get when I have tried to exclude a party.

3.2 Exceptions

Table 3.5 shows that some of the democracies that would be named as consolidated by many commentators (India and Japan) have a negative correlation with Relative vote in all years, which may be peculiar considering the stability of democracy and relative strength of institutions in these countries.

Yet, a closer examination reveals that these two cases are outliers due to several cultural and institutional reasons. First, India and Japan are non-Western democracies and India includes hundreds of ethnic groups, which makes India a peculiar democracy with its own characteristics. India is the world's largest and most heterogeneous democracy. And, India was able to sustain its democracy, contrary to the expectations of many, since its independence in 1947. According to Lijphart (1996), Indian political system foresees a power-sharing system, thanks to which India was able to protect its democracy and integrity in such a divided society. He lists four characteristics of power-sharing system in India: a grand coalition of different groups, cultural autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto.

Still, one needs to make certain reservations while accepting the success of the Indian democracy. One may argue that these four tenets of Indian political system protect democracy and integrity of the state. However, first two pillars of the political systems affect the dynamics of leader change as well. Hoffman (1981, p.233) indicates that Indian political culture is characterized by primordial groups. Furthermore, roles and relationships are modeled after indigenous cultural models. Our first two tenets (grand coalition and cultural autonomy), therefore, strengthens loyalty to cultural groups rather than creating cross-cultural or cross-ethnical ties and ideologies. This, in turn, contributes to the establishment of effective and instrumental ties between the follower and the leadership on a non-ideological basis. In other words, the voter supports the leader irrespective of his/her success in the elections. Protection and promotion of group rights are more important than success in elections or leaders' success in economic area. Hence, the political elite in India have more chances of staying in party leadership compare to his/her colleagues in Western democracies.

Second, Japan is a one-party democracy (along with South Africa), which makes the leading party's share of votes meaningless. The Western understanding of democracy obliges multi-party system as a must for a consolidated democracy. In this context, many Western commentators would point out the Japanese case as an incomplete democratization. Indeed, from 1946 until 1993, except for a brief interlude in 1947-48, Japan's government was in the hands of the parties which in 1955 formally united themselves as the Liberal Democrats. However, it would be unwise to think Japan as a one-party dictatorship. Since its transition to democracy, Japan had regular and competitive elections, in which many parties competed for power (Economist 1996).

There are two important implications of such a picture for our purposes. First, we can argue that other parties have never been serious contenders for power. Hence, their successes or failures mean little considering the absolute dominance of the Liberal Party. Second, contest for power was going on within the Liberal Party rather than between parties. In such a context, power moved downwards, and bureaucracy gained an extra power, which is harder to attain in Western democracies. As Hoffman (1981, p. 233) explains, a sTable hierarchical order and a high degree of bureaucratization characterizes Japanese culture. Thus, it is the bureaucracy, rather than elected executives, determining the agenda and legislation to a large extent making the leader less important vis--vis Western democracies.

3.3 Two Cases: Germany and Turkey

As it is evident from Tables 3.5 and 3.6, Germany and Turkey display significantly opposite results. These results show that election results have an important effect on continuity of leadership in German political parties while election results does not effect the leadership in our Turkish case.

This fact is important for our purposes because, as Table 3.2 indicates, Germany and Turkey have similar constitutional and legislative arrangements in order to regulate political party systems and intra-party democracy. Both countries predetermine the process of candidate pre-selection and other internal decision making processes via their law of political parties. The aim of these regulations ensure a democratic political party system, in which decisions are not the results of the political elite decisions but deliberative processes. Yet, the practice suggests otherwise. Hence, there is a need for alternative explanations in order to explain the difference between these two cases.

One possible reason is the loose enforcement of rules in the Turkish case. As I have mentioned before, Article 37 regulating the election of candidates running for the parliament is ambiguous, and it is this article giving the leading cadre excessive powers once elected.

In its original form, Article 37 obliges political parties to follow a pre-election process in order to determine their candidates for elections. Yet, this article was amended in 1986, which gave the political elite more power for determining the candidate by allowing the parties to use the party's own regulations and rules for the selection of the candidate. In addition to that, amendment to Article 37 in 1998 gave central organs of political parties the right to appoint candidates without a pre-election.

These amendments, however, supplied the political elite to sustain and strengthen the oligarchic structure. As a result, respective party leaders widened their control on central organs of their parties, and members had weaker chances of challenging the elite's policies and decisions. Moreover, the intra-party has diminished significantly since the MPs abstained from criticizing party leadership and challenging their authority once elected because of their consideration of being appointed as a candidate for the parliament for the next term as well. Therefore, the political elite have higher chances of staying in power even in the cases of failures in elections and failures policies they apply. Hence, we face the establishment of a patron-client network between the political elite and members of respective parties in our Turkish case.

The second possible reason may be the federal structure of Germany. As Yılmaz (2001) argues, in federal political systems, local authorities has an ability to restrain the irresponsible behavior of the central elite and act independently from the center whereas such an opportunity does not exist in central states like Turkey. According to Benz (1999), Germany has a federal regime with a bicameral system: the Bundestag (lower house) and the Bundesrat (upper house). These two parliaments are responsible for legislation and they employ a check-balance role on executive branch of German political system. The Bundesrat members are members of their respective state cabinets, and the Bundestrat's authority is subordinate to the Bundestag. Nevertheless, the Bundesrat undertakes some important responsibilities, which are important for inducing responsible behavior on the side of the political elite in Germany. The Federal Government of Germany has to present all of its legislative initiatives to the Bundesrat first, before presenting the legislation to the Bundestag. In addition, the Bundesrat has a veto power in terms of all constitutional change proposals and some legislation concerning the Basic Law.

Thus, the German system achieves a check-balance system that is more effective compared to the Turkish political system. The Bundestag members are generally members of German political parties, and it is possible to think that the members of the Bundestag may have a lesser tendency to challenge the legislation presented their party leaders. Yet, the German political regime eliminates this danger by making the Bundesrat as a second-tier in the check-balance system. In Turkish case, however, there is only one chamber, in which the political elite have important powers determining who the members will be. In this context, the members of the Turkish parliament have little incentive to question the party leadership. Moreover, the centralized state structure makes local organs (governors and mayors) only minor players vis--vis the political elite. As a result, one is left with a system in which there is little control on the political elite, and other concerns (such as patron-client relations) determine the duration of party leadership rather than success in economic policies or elections.

Table 3.9: Leaders Election Performance and Leader Change (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure					
	Relative vote		# of		Log
Country	in all years	std error	Obs	party	likelihood
Denmark	-3.17+	[1.72]	240	5	-75.43
Sweden	-2.56*	[1.10]	260	6	-79.38
Finland	1.71	[2.21]	258	7	-100.04
Germany	-6.13**	[1.49]	188	4	-63.32
Norway	0.85	[0.93]	306	7	-117.45
Spain	-0.42	[0.96]	62	2	-18.74
Portugal	-0.89	[0.69]	66	2	-29.6
Greece	-2.42**	[0.47]	68	2	-20.49
Netherlands	-1.49	[1.32]	181	5	-96.16
Turkey	-0.29	[2.08]	281	9	-124.06
Austria	-0.65	[1.26]	160	4	-63.9
Canada	-5.21**	[0.40]	157	5	-51.49
Australia	-1.54	[2.43]	172	4	-77.43
New Zealand	-2.93+	[1.62]	123	4	-49.21
Israel	-2.98**	[0.57]	98	3	-34.74
Belgium	-3.58*	[1.73]	139	4	-63.36
Japan	19.24*	[7.66]	40	2	-22.24
Malta	-4.38	[5.75]	92	2	-13.81
United Kingdom	3.38	[4.19]	148	4	-65.66
Republic of Ireland	-8.47**	[1.64]	141	3	-40.36
Italy	-2.00+	[1.02]	125	5	-60.31
Cyprus	-1.53**	[0.47]	112	3	-20.53
Luxembourg	-2.49*	[1.17]	132	3	-49.95
Switzerland	-2.88**	[0.41]	180	4	-72
India	2.44	[1.70]	105	3	-46.06
Iceland	1.84**	[0.00]	90	2	-27.95
Sri lanka	-2.46*	[1.01]	96	2	-21.65
Trinidad Tobago	-2.33	[2.04]	116	3	-47.08
South Africa	-5.42**	[0.40]	61	3	-20.56

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table 3.10: Leaders Election Performance and Leader Change (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure

Country	L.tenure	std error	Relative vote in all years	std error	Obs	# of party	Log likelihood
Denmark	0.16**	[0.04]	-5.74*	[2.86]	235	5	-68.27
Sweden	0.16**	[0.04]	-4.91**	[1.36]	255	6	-71.72
Finland	0.22+	[0.12]	0.4	[3.93]	257	7	-90.5
Germany	0.03	[0.04]	-6.98**	[0.70]	188	4	-63.06
Norway	0.14**	[0.03]	-0.696	[1.80]	298	7	-106.22
Spain	0.11**	[0.02]	-1.2	[1.51]	61	2	-15.63
Portugal	0.06*	[0.03]	-0.96	[0.83]	66	2	-29.39
Greece	0.19*	[0.10]	-3.81	[5.44]	66	2	-15.31
Netherlands	0.38**	[0.10]	-2.15	[1.89]	178	5	-82.58
Turkey	0.06	[0.04]	-1.5	[1.15]	190	9	-54.02
Austria	0.03	[0.06]	-0.64	[1.36]	159	4	-62.49
Canada	0.22**	[0.08]	-6.21**	[0.92]	149	4	-43.9
Australia	0.04	[0.07]	-2.19	[1.99]	171	4	-75.72
New Zealand	0.09+	[0.05]	-3.76	[2.40]	121	4	-48.13
Israel	0.09	[0.16]	-3.13**	[0.63]	73	2	-29.63
Belgium	0.57**	[0.15]	-4.97	[3.11]	92	4	-40.37
Japan	0.34**	[0.11]	18.88*	[8.82]	40	2	-21.4
Malta	0.17	[0.13]	-13.73+	[7.73]	92	2	-11.13
United Kingdom	0.20**	[0.05]	-4.82+	[2.73]	129	4	-42.7
Republic of Ireland	0.23**	[0.07]	-13.87**	[0.97]	141	3	-35.34
Italy	0.26*	[0.10]	-2.17*	[0.99]	83	3	-37.21
Cyprus	0.14+	[0.08]	-1.67	[2.28]	109	3	-13.62
Luxembourg	0.42**	[0.09]	-4.58*	[2.14]	132	3	-39.53
Switzerland	0.17**	[0.06]	-3.37**	[1.01]	180	4	-68.24
India	0.36+	[0.21]	4.97	[3.10]	77	3	-35.41
Iceland	0.30**	[0.07]	5.75**	[0.87]	90	2	-21.6
Sri lanka	0.12**	[0.00]	-1.97**	[0.60]	94	2	-20.09
Trinidad Tobago	0.22**	[0.07]	-2.48*	[1.26]	94	3	-24.68
South Africa	0.9	[0.64]	-4.86	[3.11]	49	3	-7.51

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Chapter 4

CONCLUSIONS

The studies on the merits of institutional settings mostly focus on checking the power of the political elite at the government level. Indeed, as North and Weingast (1989) show even a limited check and balance system has the ability to control the irresponsible behavior of the political elite.

Nonetheless, establishing institutional check and balance system at political party level is as important as checking the power of the executive. Our data shows that there is a negative correlation between success in elections and duration of party leadership in developed countries whereas this correlation does not work in countries like Turkey. In other words, it seems that other concerns such as patron-client relations and presence of a strong hierarchy may be better determinants of duration of party leadership in less developed democracies. However, this situation harms two benefits of democracy Halperin et al. (2005) are referring: vertical accountability and adaptability. As they argue, absence of vertical accountability ensures the political elite their position as long as they deliver to their members. In addition, lack of intra-party democracy hinders political parties' and their leaders' ability to learn from their mistakes, which in turn creates a vicious circle of populism and inefficient policies.

Hence, it is important to start the consolidation of democracy at micro-level before dealing with macro-level. Every attempt to consolidate democracy should ensure that institutional check-balance systems are controlling the political elite at party level before dealing with the abuse of power at the level of government. Such an approach may have the capacity to establish a democratic culture within political parties which are main actors of every democratic regime in contemporary democracies.

Appendix A

ADDITIONAL TABLES

Table A.1: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure

Country	Relative vote in all years	std error	Constant	std error	Obs	# of party	R'^2	Log likelihood
Denmark	8.33	[5.41]	1.58	[2.61]	240	5	0.06	-692.55
Sweden	6.55*	[2.14]	4.28**	[0.88]	260	6	0.01	-804.39
Finland	2.29	[4.55]	2.52	[2.56]	258	7	0	-666.16
Germany	41.02+	[12.97]	-16.94	[7.54]	188	4	0.16	-597.4
Norway	9.28	[6.13]	1.03	[2.44]	304	7	0.07	-860.26
Spain	5.81	[2.76]	1.05	[2.33]	62	2	0.06	-185.36
Portugal	1.22	[2.51]	2.31	[2.03]	66	2	0.01	-166.99
Greece	10.98	[2.04]	-3.98	[1.83]	68	2	0.14	-201.33
Netherlands	1.77	[2.31]	0.87	[1.43]	181	5	0.01	-365.51
Turkey	-3.54	[3.43]	8.10**	[1.54]	203	11	0.01	-632.75
Austria	2.83	[5.11]	2.86	[3.24]	160	4	0.01	-454.62
Canada	9.06*	[2.38]	-1.25	[1.54]	152	5	0.14	-399.11
Australia	2.55	[2.59]	2.16	[1.51]	172	4	0	-472.5
New Zealand	10.93+	[4.62]	-4.37	[3.56]	123	4	0.12	-323.19
Israel	15.03	[6.58]	-5.91	[4.95]	98	3	0.29	-271.21
Belgium	4.48**	[0.52]	-0.53	[0.29]	92	4	0.12	-178.78
Japan	-6.44	[4.99]	7.33	[4.86]	40	2	0.03	-64.86
Malta	40.87	[23.58]	-25	[22.62]	92	2	0.04	-332.73
United Kingdom	10.09+	[3.80]	-2.91	[2.84]	128	4	0.1	-343.37
Republic of Ireland	26.25*	[6.10]	-12.14+	[4.02]	141	3	0.25	-371.93
Italy	-0.39	[2.96]	3.91	[2.35]	111	6	0	-275.75
Cyprus	-4.54	[7.88]	16.3	[6.53]	112	3	0.01	-398.32
Luxembourg	5.98	[2.14]	-1.37	[1.70]	132	3	0.06	-311.12
Switzerland	4.36+	[1.74]	-0.08	[1.42]	180	4	0.04	-458.02
India	-5.89*	[0.65]	6.41**	[0.47]	77	3	0.18	-155.11
Iceland	-15.58**	[0.00]	17.57**	[0.00]	90	2	0.09	-245.89
Sri lanka	5.17+	[0.79]	2.38	[0.70]	96	2	0.02	-292.46
Trinidad Tobago	4.17	[3.34]	3.73	[2.35]	111	4	0.05	-325.61
South Africa	-2.51	[2.06]	11.23**	[1.40]	61	4	0.01	-156.41

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.2: Leader's Tenure and Election Performance (Fixed Effect with robust option)

Dependent variable: Tenure

Country	L.tenure	std err	Rel. vote in all yrs	std err	Cons.	std err	Obs	# of party	R^2	Log l.hood
Denmark	0.67**	[0.03]	3.51+	[1.47]	0.12	[0.85]	235	5	0.49	-603.95
Sweden	0.73**	[0.02]	1.62	[0.81]	1.10*	[0.31]	255	6	0.52	-697.67
Finland	0.58**	[0.05]	-0.21	[2.63]	1.69	[1.35]	257	7	0.35	-609.79
Germany	0.78**	[0.04]	13.49+	[4.95]	-6.33+	[2.68]	188	4	0.7	-501.76
Norway	0.72**	[0.05]	0.87	[0.94]	0.96+	[0.40]	298	7	0.54	-738.56
Spain	0.74*	[0.06]	1.53	[0.83]	0.41	[1.03]	61	2	0.6	-155.94
Portugal	0.65*	[0.04]	0.47	[0.97]	0.82	[0.65]	66	2	0.44	-148.39
Greece	0.77*	[0.04]	1.5	[2.39]	0.17	[1.92]	66	2	0.63	-166.79
Netherlands	0.26+	[0.11]	1.42	[2.28]	0.57	[1.24]	178	5	0.1	-350.01
Turkey	0.84**	[0.03]	0.69	[1.01]	1.02*	[0.38]	201	11	0.71	-502.6
Austria	0.76**	[0.04]	-0.57	[1.49]	1.53	[0.84]	159	4	0.57	-386.39
Canada	0.62**	[0.04]	5.42*	[1.48]	-1.69	[0.98]	151	5	0.5	-356.49
Australia	0.72**	[0.08]	-0.09	[1.48]	1.07	[0.69]	171	4	0.54	-404.35
New Zealand	0.69**	[0.06]	4.48	[2.49]	-2.15	[1.71]	121	4	0.53	-280.16
Israel	0.82*	[0.12]	2.66	[1.41]	-0.78	[0.76]	96	3	0.76	-210.82
Belgium	0.32**	[0.03]	2.65*	[0.57]	-0.13	[0.30]	90	4	0.19	-170.7
Japan	0.34+	[0.05]	-7.13	[4.31]	7.65	[4.15]	40	2	0.15	-62.39
Malta	0.83*	[0.04]	7.36	[5.25]	-4.65	[4.44]	92	2	0.69	-281.02
United Kingdom	0.64**	[0.02]	3.87+	[1.57]	-1.25	[1.23]	128	4	0.46	-310.41
Rep. of Ireland	0.61*	[0.07]	13.22*	[2.48]	-6.60+	[1.57]	141	3	0.56	-334.7
Italy	0.78**	[0.11]	-0.54	[0.70]	1.47*	[0.47]	109	6	0.6	-216.11
Cyprus	0.84**	[0.02]	1.22	[1.04]	1.13	[0.97]	109	3	0.71	-320.03
Luxembourg	0.36	[0.16]	4.83	[2.12]	-1.69	[1.17]	132	3	0.22	-299.22
Switzerland	0.66**	[0.05]	2.47*	[0.70]	-0.82	[0.50]	180	4	0.46	-405.4
India	0.55+	[0.15]	-3.19*	[0.37]	3.39*	[0.56]	76	3	0.41	-140.98
Iceland	0.51	[0.13]	-8.14	[1.85]	8.91	[2.16]	90	2	0.36	-230.48
Sri lanka	0.76**	[0.01]	2.51	[1.24]	-0.39	[1.17]	94	2	0.6	-244.22
Trinidad Tobago	0.87**	[0.03]	0.94	[0.66]	0.58	[0.47]	110	4	0.76	-246.73
South Africa	0.71*	[0.16]	-1.73*	[0.43]	4.22*	[1.21]	61	4	0.51	-135.17

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.3: Leaders Tenure and Election Performance (Random Effect with robust options)

Dependent variable: Tenure						
Country	Relative vote in all years	std error	Constant	std error	Obs	# of party
Denmark	-0.12	[0.84]	5.65**	[0.53]	240	5
Sweden	5.17+	[2.74]	6.01*	[2.66]	260	6
Finland	2.68*	[1.28]	2.21**	[0.59]	258	7
Germany	13.77**	[3.80]	-1.1	[2.38]	188	4
Norway	7.98**	[2.66]	1.96	[1.39]	304	7
Spain	6.56**	[1.88]	0.42	[1.47]	62	2
Portugal	0.48	[2.04]	2.91+	[1.75]	66	2
Greece	8.15**	[1.99]	-1.44	[1.65]	68	2
Netherlands	-0.86+	[0.44]	2.49**	[0.34]	181	5
Turkey	-3.80*	[1.52]	7.65**	[1.17]	203	11
Austria	1.36	[2.31]	3.67*	[1.81]	160	4
Canada	6.41**	[1.29]	0.24	[0.97]	152	5
Australia	0.82	[1.58]	3.08**	[1.09]	172	4
New Zealand	4.07**	[0.73]	0.92+	[0.51]	123	4
Israel	-5.37**	[1.88]	9.45**	[1.74]	98	3
Belgium	2.64*	[1.10]	0.37	[0.58]	92	4
Japan	0.31	[2.39]	0.74	[2.26]	40	2
Malta	27.81+	[14.23]	-12.47	[13.49]	92	2
United Kingdom	0.81	[1.19]	4.04**	[0.89]	128	4
Republic of Ireland	7.27**	[2.17]	0.38	[1.65]	141	3
Italy	-0.53	[1.26]	4.61**	[1.31]	111	6
Cyprus	-4.34	[4.19]	15.08*	[6.83]	112	3
Luxembourg	2.32+	[1.24]	1.56	[1.02]	132	3
Switzerland	3.31*	[1.41]	0.78	[1.28]	180	4
India	0.01	[0.76]	2.14**	[0.62]	77	3
Iceland	-3.90+	[2.00]	8.25**	[1.69]	90	2
Sri lanka	1.75	[4.54]	5.42	[4.23]	96	2
Trinidad Tobago	7.01**	[1.32]	1.67*	[0.74]	111	4
South Africa	-2.99	[1.87]	11.41*	[5.12]	61	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.4: Leaders Tenure and Election Performance (Random Effect with robust options)

Dependent variable: Tenure								
Country	Relative vote in all years	std err	L.tenure	std err	Cons.	# of std err	Obs	Log party
Denmark	0.17	[0.61]	0.70**	[0.08]	1.55**	[0.37]	235	5
Sweden	-0.01	[0.82]	0.81**	[0.07]	1.18**	[0.46]	255	6
Finland	0.84+	[0.44]	0.60**	[0.10]	1.02**	[0.36]	257	7
Germany	0.33	[0.72]	0.84**	[0.08]	0.88*	[0.45]	188	4
Norway	-0.19	[0.54]	0.81**	[0.08]	0.97*	[0.38]	298	7
Spain	1.86	[1.19]	0.74**	[0.16]	0.13	[0.97]	61	2
Portugal	0.2	[1.06]	0.67**	[0.17]	0.96	[0.85]	66	2
Greece	0.72	[1.03]	0.81**	[0.16]	0.66	[0.88]	66	2
Netherlands	-0.72+	[0.40]	0.27*	[0.12]	1.86**	[0.32]	178	5
Turkey	-0.14	[0.51]	0.87**	[0.09]	1.18*	[0.52]	201	11
Austria	-0.45	[0.63]	0.78**	[0.11]	1.38**	[0.44]	159	4
Canada	1.50*	[0.74]	0.66**	[0.11]	0.63	[0.45]	151	5
Australia	-0.06	[0.51]	0.74**	[0.12]	0.99*	[0.50]	171	4
New Zealand	1.25*	[0.63]	0.71**	[0.12]	0.22	[0.42]	121	4
Israel	-1.48+	[0.77]	0.93**	[0.06]	1.73*	[0.69]	96	3
Belgium	1.24	[0.80]	0.38*	[0.16]	0.54	[0.48]	90	4
Japan	-1	[2.32]	0.35	[0.26]	1.65	[2.26]	40	2
Malta	3.93	[6.12]	0.83**	[0.10]	-1.41	[5.70]	92	2
United Kingdom	0.17	[0.95]	0.68**	[0.11]	1.33	[0.83]	128	4
Republic of Ireland	0.66	[0.85]	0.72**	[0.11]	1.13*	[0.47]	141	3
Italy	-0.98	[0.65]	0.89**	[0.10]	1.45*	[0.64]	109	6
Cyprus	1.71	[1.97]	0.88**	[0.09]	0.2	[1.70]	109	3
Luxembourg	0.58	[0.89]	0.38**	[0.15]	1.60*	[0.79]	132	3
Switzerland	0.78	[0.90]	0.70**	[0.11]	0.44	[0.74]	180	4
India	-0.01	[0.73]	0.67**	[0.15]	0.83	[0.58]	76	3
Iceland	-1.39	[1.71]	0.54**	[0.15]	3.37*	[1.61]	90	2
Sri lanka	1.41	[3.10]	0.77**	[0.13]	0.54	[2.40]	94	2
Trinidad Tobago	1.45**	[0.49]	0.90**	[0.09]	0.07	[0.33]	110	4
South Africa	-2.04+	[1.08]	0.94**	[0.04]	2.34**	[0.81]	61	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.5: Leaders Tenure and Election Performance (Random Effect with cluster options)

Dependent variable: Tenure						
Country	Relative vote in all years	std err	Cons.	std err	Obs	# of party
Denmark	-0.12	[1.61]	5.65**	[0.58]	240	5
Sweden	5.17**	[1.76]	6.01*	[2.43]	260	6
Finland	2.68**	[0.78]	2.21**	[0.75]	258	7
Germany	13.77+	[7.92]	-1.1	[5.89]	188	4
Norway	7.98	[5.37]	1.96*	[0.93]	304	7
Spain	6.56**	[2.55]	0.42	[1.89]	62	2
Portugal	0.48	[1.93]	2.91	[2.38]	66	2
Greece	8.15**	[0.10]	-1.44	[2.19]	68	2
Netherlands	-0.86+	[0.48]	2.49**	[0.38]	181	5
Turkey	-3.8	[2.74]	7.65**	[1.99]	203	11
Austria	1.36	[2.89]	3.67	[2.55]	160	4
Canada	6.41**	[1.98]	0.24	[1.71]	152	5
Australia	0.82	[1.03]	3.08**	[0.87]	172	4
New Zealand	4.07**	[1.08]	0.92	[1.01]	123	4
Israel	-5.37**	[1.26]	9.45**	[2.29]	98	3
Belgium	2.64+	[1.59]	0.37	[0.75]	92	4
Japan	0.31	[1.82]	0.74	[1.94]	40	2
Malta	27.81	[23.96]	-12.47	[22.01]	92	2
United Kingdom	0.81	[1.24]	4.04**	[1.21]	128	4
Republic of Ireland	7.27*	[3.24]	0.38	[2.44]	141	3
Italy	-0.53	[2.59]	4.61+	[2.68]	111	6
Cyprus	-4.34	[7.50]	15.08	[9.46]	112	3
Luxembourg	2.32*	[1.02]	1.56**	[0.33]	132	3
Switzerland	3.31*	[1.29]	0.78	[1.22]	180	4
India	0.01	[0.93]	2.14*	[1.08]	77	3
Iceland	-3.903**	[1.49]	8.25**	[0.85]	90	2
Sri lanka	1.75	[2.52]	5.42**	[1.56]	96	2
Trinidad Tobago	7.01*	[2.82]	1.67+	[0.90]	111	4
South Africa	-2.99	[2.58]	11.41+	[6.01]	61	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.6: Leaders Tenure and Election Performance (Random Effect with cluster options)

Dependent variable: Tenure								
Country	Relative vote in all years	std err	L.tenure	std err	Cons.	std err	Obs	# of party
Denmark	0.17	[0.60]	0.70**	[0.05]	1.55**	[0.26]	235	5
Sweden	-0.01	[0.49]	0.81**	[0.04]	1.18**	[0.17]	255	6
Finland	0.84**	[0.21]	0.60**	[0.04]	1.02**	[0.20]	257	7
Germany	0.33	[0.74]	0.84**	[0.01]	0.88+	[0.47]	188	4
Norway	-0.19	[0.44]	0.81**	[0.07]	0.97**	[0.15]	298	7
Spain	1.86*	[0.75]	0.74**	[0.05]	0.13	[0.81]	61	2
Portugal	0.2	[0.68]	0.67**	[0.03]	0.96	[0.74]	66	2
Greece	0.72	[1.64]	0.81**	[0.01]	0.66	[1.76]	66	2
Netherlands	-0.72+	[0.42]	0.27**	[0.10]	1.86**	[0.22]	178	5
Turkey	-0.14	[0.63]	0.87**	[0.02]	1.18**	[0.37]	201	11
Austria	-0.45	[0.44]	0.78**	[0.04]	1.38**	[0.34]	159	4
Canada	1.50+	[0.79]	0.66**	[0.03]	0.63	[0.57]	151	5
Australia	-0.06	[0.31]	0.74**	[0.06]	0.99**	[0.37]	171	4
New Zealand	1.25*	[0.55]	0.71**	[0.05]	0.22	[0.44]	121	4
Israel	-1.48**	[0.17]	0.93**	[0.09]	1.73**	[0.41]	96	3
Belgium	1.24	[0.88]	0.38**	[0.06]	0.54	[0.38]	90	4
Japan	-1	[1.68]	0.35**	[0.05]	1.66	[1.74]	40	2
Malta	3.93+	[2.32]	0.83**	[0.04]	-1.41	[1.87]	92	2
United Kingdom	0.17	[0.39]	0.68**	[0.03]	1.33**	[0.47]	128	4
Republic of Ireland	0.66+	[0.38]	0.72**	[0.03]	1.13**	[0.31]	141	3
Italy	-0.98	[0.75]	0.89**	[0.11]	1.45*	[0.71]	109	6
Cyprus	1.71	[1.36]	0.88**	[0.01]	0.21	[0.75]	109	3
Luxembourg	0.58	[0.71]	0.38*	[0.15]	1.60+	[0.83]	132	3
Switzerland	0.78**	[0.26]	0.70**	[0.03]	0.44	[0.28]	180	4
India	-0.01	[0.48]	0.67**	[0.09]	0.83**	[0.32]	76	3
Iceland	-1.39	[1.29]	0.54**	[0.10]	3.37*	[1.38]	90	2
Sri lanka	1.41	[1.52]	0.77**	[0.01]	0.54	[1.21]	94	2
Trinidad Tobago	1.45**	[0.40]	0.90**	[0.04]	0.07	[0.16]	110	4
South Africa	-2.04*	[1.00]	0.94**	[0.06]	2.34+	[1.24]	61	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.7: Leaders Election Performance and Leader Change (Random Effect)

Dependent variable: Tenure						
Country	Relative vote in all years	std err	Cons.	std err	Obs	# of party
Denmark	-0.09	[0.64]	-1.98**	[0.37]	240	5
Sweden	-0.51	[0.68]	-1.88**	[0.32]	260	6
Finland	-0.29	[0.50]	-1.48**	[0.32]	258	7
Germany	0.5	[0.60]	-2.18**	[0.43]	188	4
Norway	-0.29	[0.52]	-1.57**	[0.25]	306	7
Spain	-0.66	[1.58]	-1.52	[1.35]	62	2
Portugal	-0.45	[1.16]	-0.95	[0.97]	66	2
Greece	-1.77	[1.72]	-0.47	[1.51]	68	2
Netherlands	0.21	[0.50]	-1.10**	[0.35]	181	5
Turkey	0.29	[0.91]	-1.32+	[0.68]	296	11
Austria	-0.52	[0.56]	-1.28**	[0.39]	160	4
Canada	-4.00**	[1.44]	0.65	[0.99]	157	5
Australia	0.02	[0.50]	-1.38**	[0.35]	172	4
New Zealand	-1.29*	[0.63]	-0.53	[0.49]	123	4
Israel	0.83	[0.10]	-2.28**	[0.85]	98	3
Belgium	-2.44	[1.67]	1.54	[1.38]	139	4
Japan	4.87	[6.25]	-5.06	[6.12]	40	2
Malta	-3.24	[9.22]	0	[8.78]	92	2
United Kingdom	1.93	[1.66]	-2.66*	[1.34]	148	4
Republic of Ireland	-0.7	[0.90]	-1.68**	[0.61]	141	3
Italy	-1.54	[0.98]	-0.35	[0.85]	127	6
Cyprus	-2.07	[1.61]	-1.09	[1.24]	112	3
Luxembourg	-0.13	[1.16]	-1.62+	[0.96]	132	3
Switzerland	-0.68	[1.36]	-1.02	[1.09]	180	4
India	2.58	[1.70]	-1.91	[1.54]	105	3
Iceland	0.23	[1.57]	-2.27+	[1.31]	90	2
Sri lanka	-0.97	[2.44]	-1.69	[2.15]	96	2
Trinidad Tobago	-3.36**	[1.02]	0.4	[0.77]	133	4
South Africa	-5.03**	[1.47]	0.44	[1.54]	75	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

Table A.8: Leaders Election Performance and Leader Change (Random Effect)

Dependent variable: Tenure								
	Relative vote					# of		
Country	in all years	std err	L.tenure	std err	Cons.	std err	Obs	party
Denmark	-0.02	[0.68]	0.12**	[0.04]	-2.76**	[0.51]	235	5
Sweden	-0.54	[0.68]	0.05+	[0.03]	-2.22**	[0.40]	255	6
Finland	-0.91	[0.58]	0.18**	[0.05]	.-1.98**	[0.36]	257	7
Germany	0.54	[0.60]	-0.01	[0.03]	-2.11**	[0.46]	188	4
Norway	-0.42	[0.65]	0.06	[0.05]	-1.91**	[0.40]	298	7
Spain	-1.9	[1.79]	0.1	[0.09]	-1.35	[1.33]	61	2
Portugal	-0.45	[1.15]	0.02	[0.09]	-1.03	[1.01]	66	2
Greece	-0.79	[2.78]	0.07	[0.07]	-2.06	[2.43]	66	2
Netherlands	0.68	[0.55]	0.33**	[0.09]	-2.22**	[0.48]	178	5
Turkey	0.01	[0.75]	0.01	[0.04]	-2.11**	[0.51]	205	11
Austria	-0.4	[0.58]	0	[0.05]	-1.40**	[0.47]	159	4
Canada	-4.50*	[1.96]	0.19*	[0.07]	-0.3	[1.07]	152	5
Australia	0.09	[0.50]	0.03	[0.05]	-1.54**	[0.39]	171	4
New Zealand	-1.50*	[0.69]	0.06	[0.07]	-0.61	[0.50]	121	4
Israel	1.38	[1.68]	-0.04	[0.07]	-2.78*	[1.30]	96	3
Belgium	-1.37	[1.23]	0.39**	[0.14]	-1.08+	[0.66]	92	4
Japan	3.77	[6.38]	0.31	[0.27]	-4.31	[6.22]	40	2
Malta	-10.18	[10.66]	0.15+	[0.08]	3.79	[9.45]	92	2
United Kingdom	-0.12	[0.92]	0.15*	[0.07]	-2.46**	[0.80]	129	4
Republic of Ireland	-0.71	[0.92]	0.13*	[0.07]	-2.45**	[0.77]	141	3
Italy	-1.57	[1.29]	0.18	[0.12]	-2.39	[1.49]	111	6
Cyprus	-1.97	[2.00]	0.04	[0.04]	-2.09	[1.66]	109	3
Luxembourg	-0.361	[1.33]	0.36**	[0.10]	-3.02*	[1.18]	132	3
Switzerland	-1.72	[1.59]	0.15*	[0.06]	-0.78	[1.25]	180	4
India	-0.1	[0.98]	0.14	[0.13]	-1.28	[0.82]	77	3
Iceland	1.74	[1.74]	0.30**	[0.10]	-5.61**	[1.85]	90	2
Sri lanka	-0.42	[2.48]	0.11	[0.07]	-3.1	[2.48]	94	2
Trinidad Tobago	-4.26**	[1.34]	0.12	[0.09]	-0.37	[0.49]	111	4
South Africa	0.32	[1.36]	-0.01	[0.07	-2.41+	[1.45]	63	4

** significant at 1% level * significant at 5% level + significant at 10% level

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