

Political Opportunity Structures and Transnational

Activism: The Case of Iraqi Turkmen

by

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Political Opportunity Structures and Transnational Activism: The Case of Iraqi Turkmen

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I dedicate this thesis to my beloved family who was with me on each one of these steps, and my dear friends, Feyza and Zeynep. Without their support, I would have quit the program in the second week.



ABSTRACT

Political Opportunity Structures and Transnational Activism: The Case of Iraqi Turkmen

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This thesis offers an explanation on how immigrants mobilize in the political field across borders and questions how this mobilization interacts with the structural factors surrounding the immigrant communities with the case of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey. Dwelling on the transnationalism literature, the study aims at explaining that migrants engage with political activities at three different levels which are host country, home country and transnational space. Within this analytical framework, the study further addresses the kin state relation between Turkmen and the host country Turkey and questions the explanatory power of kin relations for transnationalism literature. The national and transnational contexts in which mobilization occurs offer opportunities and constraints for political actors. How wide or constrained these opportunity spaces, may determine the form, intensity level and success of the mobilization. Taking the political opportunity structures from social movements literature as the theoretical background, this study seeks an answer to the question of how opportunity spaces change in these three contexts over time and how this reflects over the mobilization patterns of Iraqi Turkmen. It tries to understand how these three opportunity structures interact and countervail each other while guiding the mobilization. It connects this discussion into the kin state relation between Turkey and Turkmen.

ÖZETÇE

Siyasi Fırsat Yapıları ve Transnasyonel Aktivizm: Irak Türkmenleri Örneği

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Bu tez, göçmenlerin siyasi alanda, sınırlar ötesinde nasıl mobilize olduklarına dair bir açıklama sunmakta ve bu mobilizasyonun göçmen topluluklarını çevreleyen yapısal faktörlerle nasıl etkileşime girdiğini Türkiye'de yaşayan Irak Türkmenleri örneği üzerinden incelemektedir. Bu analitik çerçevede çalışma, Türkmenler ile ev sahibi ülke Türkiye arasındaki akraba devlet ilişkisini ele almakta ve bu akrabalık ilişkilerinin transnasyonalizm literatürü için ne kadar açıklama gücü olduğunu sorgulamaktadır. Transnasyonalizm literatürünü temel alan çalışma, göçmenlerin ev sahibi ülke, anavatan ve ulus ötesi/transnasyonel bağlam olmak üzere üç farklı düzeyde siyasi faaliyetler yürüttüklerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasi mobilizasyonun ortaya çıktığı ulusal ve transnasyonel alanlar, siyasi aktörler için çeşitli fırsatlar üretirken aynı zamanda engeller de oluşturmaktadır. Bu fırsat alanlarının ne kadar geniş ya da sınırlı olduğu bu mobilizasyonun biçimini, yoğunluk derecesini veya başarısını belirleyebilir. Toplumsal hareketler literatürüne ait siyasi fırsat yapıları teorisini temel alan bu çalışma, ev sahibi ülke Türkiye, anavatan Irak ve transnasyonel alan olmak üzere bu üç alanda fırsat alanlarının zaman içinde nasıl değiştiği ve bu değişimin Irak Türkmenlerinin mobilizasyon şekillerine nasıl yansıdığı sorularına cevap aramaktadır. Çalışma aynı zamanda, mobilizasyona yön verirken bu üç alandaki fırsat yapılarının birbiri ile nasıl etkileşime girdiği ve birbirini nasıl dengelediğine dair de bir analiz sunmaktadır. Çalışma bu tartışmayı, nihai olarak Türkiye ve Türkmenler arasındaki akraba devlet ilişkisine bağlamaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

POS	Political Opportunity Structure
TPA	Transnational Political Activities
ITC	Irak Türkmen Cephesi
ITF	Iraqi Turkmen Front
ITKYD	Irak Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği
INTP	Iraqi National Turkmen Party
INC	Iraqi National Congress



Chapter: 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Purpose of the Study

Migration is an ever-expanding field in the academic literature, with studies focusing on a wide range of questions from security to integration. The current refugee crisis that the Syrian Civil War unleashed created devastating effects that reached the shores of Europe. As a result, forced migration, together with the economic and security implications of forced migration, moved to the forefront of academic studies that address migratory behavior. Although migration literature fields seem to be sidelined by the forced migration, a vital area slowly growing over several decades is transnationalism and migrants' transnational activities. Transnationalism emerged as a term to denote the durable and intense relations across the borders of at least two nation-states encompassing all sorts of cultural, social, and economic activities engaged by migrants as the primary agents (Faist, 2010). An important reason for the steady increase in the importance attached to transnationalism is the change of perception in academic studies regarding long-term identity formations as well as integration processes of migrants and refugees. Previously, migration literature considered two possible options for migrants. These were either migrants' returning to their homeland after a temporary migration process or successfully integrating into their host societies (Adamson, 2002). However, today, it is mainly accepted that migrants form their political identities over sustaining bonds that connect them with both their origin and host countries. Therefore, they articulate their political demands within a transnational context that is not confined to the borders of one particular nation-state (Adamson, 2002).

The subject of this research concerns one aspect of transnationalism. It focuses on the transnational space in which migrants formulate political demands pertaining to their host and origin countries and take action to realize them. Although transnationalism recently emerged as a newer concept within the migration literature, we can trace this term's origins back to diaspora studies, which have a considerable history. Diaspora is a term used to refer to dispersed peoples such as Jews and Palestinians who are away from their homelands. However, this term's usage enlarged to acquire a more transnational characteristic, and diaspora studies started to address continuous linkages and transnational mobility between homeland and destination countries (Faist, 2010). Therefore, research interests of transnationalism and diaspora studies primarily converge.

The literature that addresses diaspora politics or transnational political activities of migrants stands at the intersection of political science and sociology. Therefore, there is a substantial amount of literature that poses questions to investigate the relationship between diaspora politics and its implications for the host country, origin country, or immigrants themselves (Barry, 2006; Baser, 2015; Itzigshon, 2000; Koopmans & Statham, 2003; Koinova, 2013; Shain, 1999; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Sökefeld, 2006). However, with a few exceptions, most of these studies address the issue with a focus on host countries while neglecting the origin country approach (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016). The results in these studies mainly cover Western countries. As diaspora politics emerges within a transnational field, effectively reading this issue requires considering both host and origin countries and their interaction.

This research aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by providing an analysis of the transnational political activities of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey based on a triadic approach that considers the origin country Iraq, the host country Turkey and also the dyadic relation between these two countries. It analyzes these factors' effect on the transnational politics of Iraqi Turkmen. Apart from providing an analysis that does not remain limited to one level of study, it aims to elaborate on an immigrant group's experience outside of the Western context. Another critical point that this research contributes to the existing literature is the nature of the Iraqi Turkmen and Turkey's relationship. Turkey constitutes the host country variable in this research. However, it differs from other host countries in the previous studies as Turkey is a kin state for Iraqi Turkmen because of the ethnic and historical bonds that link Turkmen to Turkey. This situation provides the opportunity to examine transnational political activities by giving an extra dimension of kin state.

This research will draw on the framework of political opportunity structure, a concept borrowed from social movements literature within sociology and then applied to political science studies. The concept of political opportunity structure addresses the structural conditions within a specific legal, institutional, and political field that enable or prevent social movements' emergence (Sökefeld, 2006). It provides a helpful analytical background to analyze diasporic groups' political activities because immigrants are a group significantly affected by the structural limits defined to them within the field in which they are operating. The main research question that this study investigates is how changing political opportunity structures at the host country, origin country, and transnational context reflects upon the transnational political activities of Iraqi Turkmen

living in Turkey. Iraqi Turkmen have a long history of migration to Turkey dating back to the 1950s, and they have established political communities both in Turkey and Iraq (Danış, 2006). This provides ample opportunity to study this question from the triadic approach mentioned before. Each of the contexts that affect Iraqi Turkmen's transnational political activities underwent profound changes throughout several decades, including wars, refugee influxes and policy changes that affected both countries.

Political transnationalism is a broad literature studied by various scholars from different angles. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) offers a three-level analysis to divide the transnationalism literature according to the questions they aim to answer. The first level of studies focuses on the process of transnational politics and addresses why migrants or diasporic groups mobilize in the first place around specified political demands. One of the main questions analyzed within this literature is the role of origin countries in mobilizing their citizens and kin groups outside their borders. In this regard, studies analyze governments and political parties that engage with their diasporic communities based on various incentives (Gamlen, 2014; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Raggazi, 2009). These incentives may dwell on material gains such as remittances, developmental projects, and financial investments that countries seek to extract, or they may dwell on non-material gains such as lobby activities of diaspora communities within the host countries or social and cultural capital that they represent for the origin countries (Brand, 2006; Delano & Gamlen, 2014; Itzigsohn, 2000; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Waterbury, 2010).

The second level of the transnationalism literature addressed by the author focuses on how transnational political activities occur and which strategies are used for political mobilization within transnational space. These studies mainly discuss why certain diasporic groups choose a specific strategy to mobilize politically and what accounts for the change of their chosen strategy. This literature addresses whether transnational political activities use direct or more indirect methods, whether these activities target host countries or origin countries, why certain groups choose to follow more confrontational methods while others prefer more peaceful ones and finally, which constraints they face and which resources they dwell on (Adamson, 2013; Koinova, 2010; Koinova & Karabegovic, 2017; Moss, 2016; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001, 2002).

The third level of transnational politics literature addresses implications these political activities create for the various actors involved. Studies focusing on transnationalism provide a more in-depth look into the possible consequences of

transnational politics for both host and origin countries. These consequences may include positive impacts, such as the flow of investment, technological know-how, and human capital to the origin country or the development of multiculturalism and democracy in the host country, but also negative impacts, such as exacerbation of ethnic conflicts and their radicalization in the homeland with the political and financial support of diaspora (Koinova,2009; Orozco,2005; Shain,1999; Wayland,2004).

These three levels provide a useful framework to classify transnationalism literature; however, transnational activities are not confined to the political field. Apart from politics, an extensive literature addresses the relation of transnationalism to social, cultural, religious, and economic fields. This literature tries to answer various questions, such as transnational family networks, religious belonging, and identity formation (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007).

The concept of political opportunity structures can be situated within the first and second layers of the literature addressing why transnational mobilization occurs and which strategies and methods immigrant communities use for this mobilization. The structural conditions that provide opportunity space for transnational mobilization may determine which groups can mobilize in which contexts. They may also choose suitable strategies for this purpose. The history of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey provides valuable insight into this discussion. Therefore, this research aims to answer under which conditions transnational political mobilization occurs among Iraqi Turkmen, which strategies are deployed for this purpose, and how the strategy used during this mobilization changes.

Turkmen of Iraq constitute the third largest ethnic community of Iraq, with a population that reaches approximately two million. However, no census data gives a definitive answer to that (Taylor, 2004). Iraqi Turkmen constitute one of the significant diasporic groups of Turkey that remained outside of the homeland's borders. Because of the ethnic relation between the former Ottoman rulers and the Turkmen community in Iraq, they were often treated as an inorganic component of the Iraqi community; however, Iraqi Turkmen have a five-century-old history in Iraq (Taylor, 2004). The existing Turkmen community in Turkey emerged due to various migration waves that continued throughout several decades. If we are to provide a simplistic historical overview of the emergence of the Turkmen diaspora in Turkey, we can mention several determining events and periods. The first Turkmen immigration from Iraq started in the 1950s, with Turkmen immigrants coming to Turkey for educational purposes (Danış,2006). This

incremental migration flow from Iraq to Turkey continued until the First Gulf War. Approximately 80 percent of the total Turkmen migration from Iraq occurred after 1990, and following this period, each new wave of migration took place as a result of a significant political conflict or instability that emerged in Iraq (Sirkeci, 2008). Therefore, we can state that the Turkmen diaspora in Turkey started to merge into a more collective community after this date. The first Gulf War was a significant turning point for the Turkmen community in Iraq as it planted the first seeds of political mobilization of the Turkmen community (Tuzlu, 2019). United States' military intervention in Iraq in 2003 created another significant Iraqi migration wave to Turkey, including Turkmen. Economic conditions exacerbated the devastating effect of conflict, and these two created a twin pressure on people for outward migration (Danış, 2006). The last wave of migration toward Turkey took place among Turkmen due to Islamic State's increasing attacks targeting Turkmen regions such as Tal Afar and Tuz Khurmatu in 2014 (Tuzlu, 2019).

Like every Iraqi, Iraq's Turkmen community was greatly affected by the political and economic turmoil that was taking place in the country. They were subjected to the Arabization policy of the Iraqi state as other ethnic minorities in Iraq, such as Christians and Kurds, and this policy resulted in a variety of discriminatory implications such as a ban on Turkmen language or an embargo on Turkmen's being recruited in-state institution (Sirkeci, 2008). While they are creating a push factor for migration for Iraqi Turkmen, these incidents also created the mobilizing force for Turkmen's political activities both in Iraq and Turkey. Apart from being a kinstate and a migration destination for Turkmen, Turkey is one of the major factors that enabled the Turkmen political movement's institutionalization. Iraqi Turkmen Front, one of the first political bodies founded and aspires to represent the whole Turkmen population until today, was established due to the collaboration between the Turkish state and Iraqi Turkmen (Büyüksaraç, 2017). While Turkey stands at the very center of Iraqi Turkmen's transnational political activities, it is also one of the significant reasons for closing opportunity structures for these activities from time to time. Turkmen case stands at the intersection of foreign policy aims, domestic considerations, and security priorities for Turkey; therefore, tracing the changing trajectory of Iraqi Turkmen's transnationalism requires locating Turkey in this complex web of relations that includes both Turkmen and Iraq.

1.2 Analytical Framework

This research's main analytical framework will be dwelling on the political opportunity structure, which was addressed at great length in the literature. The concept of political opportunity structure was introduced to the literature to analyze social movements and their emergence. The underlying logic behind this concept is that collective movements and mobilizations are considered one version of politics; therefore, as in all political movements, these movements are encouraged and discouraged by a particular set of factors (Tarrow, 1988). These factors defined as political and institutional conditions that prevail in the specific context where a social movement emerges, directly affecting and guiding it, also constitutes the political opportunity structure (Meyer, 1993). Although there is not a clear-cut definition of which conditions and factors are accepted as components of political opportunity structure, there are several fundamental variables that were pointed out by scholars to be components of this concept. Tarrow (1988) reviews some of these variables cited in the literature as how open a political system is (Eisinger, 1973), how stable the alignments within this polity are (Piven & Cloward 1977), whether there are allies (Gamson 1975, Jenkins & Perrow 1977), and whether political elites are divided (Jenkins & Perrow 1977). This approach does not neglect the agency's role in the emergence of social movements. Instead, it tries to prove that strategies, actions, and targets are not determined in a vacuum by the leaders of a movement; therefore, the political context in which these actions are taken, and choices are made guides political mobilization by encouraging specific strategies while discouraging others (Meyer, 2004). The origins of this theory go back to a study by Eisinger (1973) in which he analyzed why certain American cities experienced large-scale protests due to poverty and racism in the 1960s while others did not based on the framework of political opportunity structures (as cited in Meyer, 2004). Therefore, the concept of political opportunity structure provides a practical analytical framework to analyze the emergence of political movements, especially within a comparative framework in which different contexts lead to various forms of mobilization.

As transnational politics is also a form of political mobilization, and the only difference is that it takes place in a transnational context involving more than one nation-state; the political opportunity structure was quickly adopted in this literature. These studies combined the analytical framework of political opportunity structure with the studies of transnationalism, whether in the form of case studies that focus on the mobilization of one diasporic group within one country or as a comparative study that

addresses similar migrant or diaspora groups in multiple national settings (Koopmans & Statham, 2003; Koopmans et al., 2005; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Morales & Giugni, 2011; Wayland, 2004).

This research's main analytical framework is based on Chaudhary and Moss's (2016) framework of triadic political opportunity structures, which analyzes how receiving country, origin country, and transnational contexts affect the transnational political activities of migrants. While dividing the general political opportunity structure into three levels, this framework also analyzes transnational activities at three different layers: electoral, organizational, and non-institutional transnational political activities (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016). While the electoral form of transnationalism refers to the activities such as voting and campaigning for elections, the organizational form refers to mobilization through political groups, foundations, and advocacy groups. Finally, the non-institutional form refers to protests, boycotts, and armed activities (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016). This conceptualization provides a comprehensive and valuable layout as immigrants engage in more than one uniform form of transnational activities. It is also vital in our analysis because as we investigate the impact of changing political opportunity structures on transnationalism, we will conclude whether there is a variation in the form and level of mobilization depending on immigrants' opportunity space. In the case of Turkmen immigrants, structural conditions underlying Turkey's opportunity structures change significantly throughout the various historical periods, from the 1950s until the 2000s. Therefore, this framework is helpful in observing whether certain forms of transnationalism were prioritized while others were sidelined in specific periods and under certain conditions.

As stated before, there is no clear-cut definition for the variables included within the definition of political opportunity structure. In this study, a combination of specific categories selected from Chaudhary and Moss (2016) and Morales and Giugni (2011) were used as determinants of three different layers of political opportunity structures addressed in the study. First, the variables that are chosen as constituents of the host country Political Opportunity Structure (POS) involve the individual rights of immigrants, which are nationality acquisition (Koopmans et al., 2005, p.35), access to short-term/long-term permits, labor market access, welfare state access and political rights (Morales & Giugni, 2011, p.47). The variables chosen as the constituents of the origin country POS are governing authority type, the relative stability of the origin country, and diaspora engagement policies, if there are any (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016,

p.8). Finally, the transnational POS involves the origin and receiving country's bilateral relations and foreign policy aims of the host country and the role of supranational institutions (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8). Together with its constituent variables, these three layers of POS provide a comprehensive picture of the main structural conditions constraining and opening space for immigrant transnationalism.

Based on this analytical framework combined with the historical and empirical analysis made on transnational activities of Iraqi Turkmen, this study aims to answer the following questions:

- How do the origin country, host country, and transnational context interact with each, and how this interaction is reflected in the transnationalism of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey?
- What are the primary forms of political mobilization among Iraqi Turkmen?
- What are the changes that took place in the Iraq, Turkey, and transnational context, and how do they affect the forms of mobilization in the form of transnational activities?
- Does any of these three contexts play a more decisive role in Iraqi Turkmen's transnationalism?
- How does Turkey's kin-state role matter for Iraqi Turkmen's transnationalism, and what explanatory power it has for our case?

1.3 Methodology and Research Design

This study is a case study that focuses on the transnational activities of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey. This research uses two primary qualitative data sources to substantiate their claims by analyzing secondary resources and field research. As this study investigates the changing structural conditions/ POS that exist in Turkey, Iraq, and the transnational context and their impact on Turkmen transnationalism, it requires careful examination of these conditions throughout different periods. Therefore, firstly, this study draws on secondary sources in the academic literature and a secondary review of documents, laws, and regulations to analyze the components of this study's triadic approach and observe the changes in these components. An essential part of this analysis will focus on Turkey as the host country context and the host country POS variables. It will also analyze Iraq and the transnational context carefully, together with the abovementioned variables for these contexts. This study covers the evolution of Iraqi

Turkmens' transnational activities over several decades, from late 1980s and early 1990s until today; therefore, archival research involving journals and political speeches will be used to substantiate the analysis.

The second important source of qualitative data came from the field research, which is based on the in-depth interviews conducted by the leading actors of transnational political activities in Turkey in the name of Iraqi Turkmen. As this study aims to discover the general evolution of Iraqi Turkmen's transnational politics, it was crucial to reach the prominent figures of the Turkmen community in Turkey. One of the main reasons for Iraqi Turkmen's being chosen as the main subject for this study is their being one of the oldest and most organized immigrant groups living in Turkey. Therefore, various social, cultural, and political associations engage in political transnationalism, such as the Kirkuk Foundation, Iraqi Turkmen Justice and Solidarity Association, Iraqi Turkmen Brotherhood, and Culture Association, and also representatives of Iraqi Turkmen's political parties such as Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) were included in this research for this purpose. The interviews conducted by the leaders and members of these organizations constituted the basis of the second part of this study. Examination of the qualitative data acquired from these interviews allowed us to elaborate on the evolution of Iraqi Turkmen's transnationalism. The interviews also shed light on immigrants' changing political opportunity spaces in these three contexts.

Elite interviews are a valuable method to obtain insider information about important periods of a political movement. However, it is crucial to recognize that elites do not provide information objectively but rather from their own worldview, political positions, and power relations with the researcher and the outside world. Therefore, instead of accepting the information provided by elites as absolute truths, it is important to acknowledge that it represents their perceptions and views that they wish to present. Political openings and closures not only exist in themselves but also impact political movements by shaping what the political elites consider as an opportunity or barrier. Therefore, despite being subjective, this data still offers valuable insights for the study as long as one considers the nature of the information and the power dynamics within which it is produced.

As this study covers a long-time span, the interviewees were selected among the people who could inform the research about various periods of Turkmen's political transnationalism. As it was essential to reach the people who hold important positions within the community, snowball sampling was used as the sampling method for our study.

1.4 *Organization of Thesis*

This thesis aims to locate Iraqi Turkmen's transnational political activities within three layers of analysis: the host country, home country, and transnational context. In this regard, Chapter 2 provides the analytical and theoretical framework of this analysis drawing on opportunity structure literature. The first section of this chapter explains what is defined as transnational politics and further elaborates on three primary variants of it as electoral, organized, and non-organized transnational politics. The second section provides a theoretical definition of political opportunity structure and elaborates on the components that constitute political opportunity structure in the host country, origin country, and transnational context.

Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the methodology and research design of the study. Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of Iraqi Turkmen's migration to Turkey and the transnational political activities they engaged in Turkey. Focusing on the period following First Gulf War provides a historical analysis of Iraqi Turkmen's political transnationalism concerning Iraq and Turkey. To connect this historical analysis to the theoretical framework of political opportunity structure, it covers the changing political conditions and policies in Iraq and Turkey concerning Iraqi Turkmen.

Chapter 5 is the part where the main findings of this research are presented based on the in-depth interviews conducted in the field with figures from Turkmen political and cultural organizations established in Turkey. This chapter provides a qualitative analysis of the data acquired from the interviews. It explains how Turkmen' political transnationalism was formed and shaped depending on the three dimensions established in the host country, origin country, and transnational context. It further analyzes these three dimensions' interaction with each other and the explanatory power each has concerning this study's research question.

Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter of this thesis, and it provides a general overview of the main questions addressed in this study and summarizes the findings reached at the end. It locates the discussions in this thesis within the literature and emphasizes the contribution of this research.

Chapter: 2

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND: POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM OF MIGRANTS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Analyzing the transnational politics of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey and connecting this analysis to the three contexts in which these political activities emerge requires an in-depth clarification of the concepts of transnationalism and diaspora, and an overview of the analytical explanations provided in the literature addresses these concepts. Therefore, this chapter will first clarify the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism and connect it to our discussion of the political transnationalism of migrants. Secondly, it will provide an overview of the theoretical perspectives that analyzes migrants' transnational political activities by dividing this literature into three categories: origin country-oriented, host country-oriented, and transnational context-oriented approaches. Finally, a discussion of the political opportunity theory, which constitutes the main theoretical background of this study, will be provided about these three branches of the literature.

2.1 *Transnationalism and Diaspora*

As stated earlier, transnationalism emerged as a relatively new concept within the migration literature; however, it is also possible to trace the origins of this term back to the studies that focus on diasporic communities. In a similar way to other concepts used in migration literature, transnationalism lacks a clear definition due to competing definitions remaining silent on the temporal and spatial borders of the term (Peter, 2001). Therefore, it is vital to set clear boundaries over the term's meaning and explain the points of convergence and divergence with the concept of diaspora. The emergence of transnationalism as a new analytical concept within migration dates back to the studies of cultural anthropologist Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues in the 1990s (Peter, 2001). The starting point of their research is the need to develop a new conceptualization on an emerging immigrant community that engages with their home and host countries in contrast to earlier assumptions that they permanently sever ties with their origin countries (Schiller et al., 1992). This new conceptualization stated that, the new immigrants who build and sustain religious, social, cultural, economic, and political relations across borders and communities are called transmigrants. While, the entirety of this web of networks is called transnationalism (Schiller et al., 1992). Several authors

agreed that transnationalism referred to a novel phenomenon emerging among immigrants, but there was a disagreement over what made it novel and what was the borders of transnationalism. Portes et al. (1999) set out three fundamental criteria to be able establish transnationalism as a new phenomenon in migration studies. Firstly, a considerable number of people in this phenomenon's defined universe should be engaging with it; secondly, it must have a certain level of persistence over time; and thirdly, the activities defined should not be covered by an existing concept (Portes et al., 1999). In this regard, Portes et al. (1999) criticize the transmigrant definition of Schiller et al. (1992), stating that transmigrant is a redundant conceptualization while the term migrant is adequate to define the agents of transnationalism. Peter (2001) further states that defining transnationalism as a new phenomenon is redundant. There is abundant evidence indicating that immigrants' engagement with their origin countries at the political, social, or economic level is not a new observation. According to Portes et al. (1999), what makes transnationalism a new concept is the “high intensity of exchanges, new modes of transacting and multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis” (p.219). Faist (1998) conceptualizes transnationalism as “transnational social spaces” and states that these spaces are composed of “social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations and networks of organizations” that emerge at least in two different national settings (p.216). This definition of transnationalism widens the approach that Portes et al. (1999) bring (Peter, 2001). This approach designates the individual as the central unit of analysis of the study of transnationalism and excludes migrant communities and institutions as agents (Peter, 2001). According to Faist (2000), transnational social space merges the borders of multiple countries into one social field in which not only people but also “goods, ideas, information, symbols” are exchanged (p.13). These various conceptualizations converge upon the point that transnationalism is composed of dense relations and networks created across borders despite the divergences of these approaches.

Although transnationalism emerges as a relatively abstract concept, covering a wide range of activities within the literature, some scholars address transnational activities under several headings according to their contents. One proposition of Smith and Guarnizo (1998) is to divide the concept into 'transnationalism from above' and 'transnationalism from below.' While the former refers to the activities of multinational cooperations and states, the latter refers to the grassroots activism of migrants. Portes et al. (1999) divide transnational activities into three categories. First is economic

transnationalism, whose agents utilize this complex web of relations and networks for economic purposes such as searching for suppliers. Second is political transnationalism, which focuses on political ends concerning either origin, host country, or both. Finally, third is socio-cultural transnationalism that focuses on activities that strengthen cultural or national identity. Levitt and Nadya Jaworsky (2007) make a similar categorization and divide the literature on transnationalism into economic, political, cultural, and religious domains. Vertovec (2011) puts forward a different take on the concept. He analyzes the term's meaning from various vantage points, such as transnationalism as a type of consciousness, an avenue of capital, or a site of political engagement. I can increase various categorizations made over transnationalism. However, it is noticeable that political transnationalism is one major branch of these categories.

As stated before, the transnational political activities of migrants constitute the focal point of our analysis in this study, as they constitute the most dynamic form of transnationalism that links migrants with their origin and host countries. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) proposes a general definition of political transnationalism. She defines it as the involvement of migrants and refugees in the politics of their home country across borders, either through direct mechanisms such as voting or indirect mechanisms involving the host country's institutions, such as lobbying. She further divides political transnationalism into five subtitles. These are immigrant politics, homeland politics, emigrant politics, diaspora politics, and translocal politics (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). It is important to note that these categorizations are not mutually exclusive because migrant groups usually do not engage in only one form of transnational politics. Therefore, the boundaries between the content of their political transnationalism are usually blurred. Itzigsohn (2000) proposes a more limited definition of transnational political activities without taking into account the role of the host country and refers to it as a field that involves institutionalized relations and activities that emerge between the political organizations of migrants and state institutions of their home country.

The literature addressed so far indicates that different definitions of transnationalism converge on several fundamental aspects regarding the concept, such as cross border, dense and sustained nature of these activities. Therefore, before coming up with the definition used in this study to refer to the political transnationalism of migrants, it is essential to touch upon the concept of diaspora and how it is relevant to our discussion.

As pointed out before that diaspora is a much older term than transnationalism because it first emerged as a term to denote dispersed Jews living outside of their homeland; however, over time, the scope of the term widened and acquired a general meaning of dispersion from the homeland. Sheffer (2003) defines what he calls "ethnonational diaspora" (p.9). He refers to it as a socio-political community that emerged as a voluntary or forced migration and linked to each other with a shared ethnic identity, residing in host countries as permanent minority groups but sustains solidarity networks with the entirety of their nation. The meaning conferred upon the concept of diaspora underwent substantial change today; however, the early usage of the term was mainly centered on ethnic identity, as stated in Sheffer's definition. Another important point of the initial descriptions of diasporic communities is that a strong attachment to an ancestral homeland is an essential dynamic of these groups; therefore, there is an ideal of an eventual return to this homeland which also negates the complete and permanent integration to the host societies (Safran, 1991). Therefore, transformation of a diasporic community's into a transnational community requires establishment of substantial social and symbolic relations with the host community (Faist, 2000). Otherwise, exile would be a more proper term to define this process (Faist, 2000). It is possible to come across with various usages of the term diaspora in the literature for a loosely defined category of different social communities such as followers of the same ideology, members of universal churches or certain ethnic identities such as Asian-American or Arab-American (Sheffer, 2003). Despite the fuzziness around the term, we can state that the newer usages of diaspora represent a departure from the old usages centering on the return to a homeland and they emphasize the transnational mobility and the linkages that diaspora members establish across borders in a similar way that concept of transnationalism does (Faist, 2010). The contemporary conceptualizations of diaspora and transnationalism converge on this essential dimension, but important differences remain between the two. The major difference is that transnationalism is a much wider concept because while the former refers to all cross-border social formations ranging from local solidarity groups to larger social movements, the latter confines these cross-border linkages with a specific ethnic or religious community that engage with them (Faist, 2010). Therefore the notion of identity constitutes an important component of diasporic activities, and cross-border mobility is a complementary part of an established common identity; however, transnational approaches put cross-border mobility at the center of the analysis (Faist, 2010). Therefore, we can conclude that the term diaspora widened its scope to include

circular interactions and ties across different borders; and a common identity remains as a defining feature of diasporic communities.

Establishing the theoretical discussions over transnationalism and diaspora provides us with the necessary background to develop the conceptualizations used in this study. Iraqi Turkmen can be defined as a diaspora as they carry several important characteristics of a diasporic community defined by Safran (1991). Firstly, most Iraqi Turkmen members came to Turkey due to forced migration, which renders them a community dispersed from their homeland. Secondly, what Safran (1991, p.83) calls “memory, vision or myth about their original homeland” still vividly exists among the Iraqi Turkmen community, especially through a strong attachment to the city of Kirkuk, which became the epitome of Turkmen identity in Iraq. The centrality of Turkmen's ethnic identity in the formulation of the political activities they engage is another demonstration of the diasporic nature of the Turkmen community in Turkey. Turkmen's being a minority group in Iraq that struggled to preserve its identity in the face of assimilation policies. This is a significant reason for Turkmen identity's being an important mobilizing force for Iraqi Turkmen. The other reason, which is as crucial as the first one, is the position that Turkey holds as a kinstate for Iraqi Turkmen, which creates an incentive for the community in Turkey to mobilize around the common ethnic identity that they share with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey plays a dual position for Iraqi Turkmen, first as the host country and second as a guardian kin state for its ethnic relatives. It was stated before that the concept of transnational communities covers diasporas, but not all transnational communities can be defined as a diaspora (Faist, 2010). Iraqi Turkmen community can be defined as a diaspora as well; however, for this study, I find it more useful to define the political activities of Iraqi Turkmen under the heading of political transnationalism as the concept of transnationalism provide a broader and multidimensional definition. I take Faist (1998)'s definition of transnationalism as a reference point which was cited above as a "combination of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations and networks of organizations that emerge at least in two different national settings" (p.216). He further states that transnational spaces involve "triadic relationships between groups and institutions in the host state, the sending state, and the minority group migrants" (p.17) in a compatible manner with this study's perspective. I narrow down this definition to confine it to political field. I use the definition of political transnationalism that refers to all forms of cross-border activities, ties, interactions of migrants concerning the political field either in the host or in the origin

country engaged through direct or indirect mechanisms dwelling on Østergaard-Nielsen (2003). Laying down this general description of political transnationalism, I borrowed the categorization made by (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016) to divide and analyze transnational political activities engaged by migrants. Chaudhary and Moss (2016) address transnational political activities on a continuous scale and prefer categorizing them concerning the level of institutionalization. Portes et al. (1999) in a similar view defines it according to high and low institutionalization of activities. Chaudhary and Moss (2016) take it further and divide political transnationalism into electoral, organizational, and non-institutional political transnational activities. While electoral form covers voting and other activities related to the electoral process, such as fundraising and campaigning for candidates, organizational form refers to all sorts of political activities organized at the level of an institution, such as migrant foundations, associations, or parties and finally, non-institutional form refers to political activities that remain outside of these two categories and organized without an institutional body such as demonstrations, armed struggles or boycotts which can be seen in Table 2.1 (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.7)

Table 2.1: Forms of Transnational Political Activities

Forms of Transnational Political Activities	Examples of Activities
Electoral	Voting, campaigning, campaign fundraising
Organizational	Advocacy groups, ethnic associations, charities, hometown associations, ruling party/opposition organizations
Non-institutional	Protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, covert actions, armed conflict, revolution

Note. Adapted from "Triadic political opportunity structures: Re-conceptualizing immigrant transnational politics," by A. Chaudhary and D. Moss, p.7

This categorization provides a continuous scale that covers a wide range of political activities that migrants engage with and offers a useful framework to analyze the dominant forms of political transnationalism depending on the various factors that will be addressed in this study.

2.2 Theoretical and Analytical Approaches to Political Transnationalism of Migrants

In this section, I will be addressing the literature on the transnational political activities of migrants by dividing it into three major branches origin country-oriented approaches, host country-oriented approaches, and finally as transnational context-oriented approaches. As the current literature tends to address transnationalism embedded in one particular context instead of focusing on the interaction across multiple contexts (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016), I will look at these studies and finally explain why an approach that combine these three contexts is needed.

2.2.1 Origin Country-Oriented Approaches

Origin country, although it is less at the center of analysis, plays an important role in the way that transnationalism emerges, and it is also affected by the consequences of these activities. In this section, I will address three main fields of transnationalism literature that center on the origin country: security, economy, and homeland engagement policies.

Security

Origin country constitutes an essential component of the studies that address political transnationalism engaged by migrants as their homelands emerge as one of the main centers of the transnational linkages established across borders. The realization on that migrants sustain much more complex relations with both their homelands and host countries as opposed to a more simplistic understanding of assimilation and detachment from the origin country required a closer look at the origin country as a center of analysis.(Guarnizo et al., 2003; Portes et al., 1999; Schiller et al., 1992; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998).

It is possible to divide the origin country-oriented approaches within the political transnationalism into three branches as those focus on the implications in the fields of security, economy and engagement policies between migrants and their host countries. However, the literature diverges on how desirable the implications of migrants' political transnationalism. Østergaard-Nielsen, (2006) highlights this issue over diaspora studies stating that the literature is highly polarized over the dark and positive sides of diaspora politics while the studies emphasizing negative implications have a clear dominance over the other. The approach that focuses on the dark side addresses diaspora groups as the agents that aggravate homeland conflicts through the financial and political support they

provide (Koinova, 2011; Shain, 2002; Wayland, 2004). This can be considered a direct consequence of migration's emerging as a highly securitized field of study.

Especially after the 9/11 attacks, regulating borders emerged as a top national security issue for governments due to the increased tendency to consider migrants potential agents of international terrorism (Adamson, 2006). Therefore, within the literature that addresses political transnationalism of migrants, security and conflict studies have an important predominance. Globalization is inherently linked to this discussion about the new means and opportunities it provides to sub-state actors. Globalization provides a larger and more connected space to organize for economic actors and political entrepreneurs who aim to mobilize their followers across states with the help of new technologies that allow for better communication and easier flow of funds (Adamson, 2005). A direct result of this process is a change in the understanding of national and international security with the increasing involvement of transnational political actors, which rendered the international system more like a domestic political realm in which states, together with violent and non-violent groups and movements operate (Adamson, 2005). The role of transnational actors is specifically important concerning migrants coming from conflict regions. Conflict-generated diaspora groups tend to be more prone to violence and less open to compromise as their traumatic relationship with the homeland leads to a high symbolic value attached to the cause for mobilization (Lyons, 2007). The relationship between transnational political actors and violence attracts the greatest attention regarding prolonged civil wars. This scholarly interest emerged due to the inadequacy of domestic factors to explain the duration or cessation of intra-state conflicts (Koinova, 2011). In her study on the radicalizing impact of diasporas, Koinova (2011) addresses the role that Armenian, Albanian, and Chechen diasporas played in the secessionist conflicts in Kosovo, Karabakh, and Chechnya in the 1990s. She emphasizes that two turning points result in diasporas' playing a more radical and militarized role in the conflicts. These are the major human rights violations committed in the homeland and local moderate elites' being sidelined as credible leaders of the goal of secessionism. This study is an important indication of the effect of political conditions in the origin country over the mobilization patterns of diaspora politics. It is important to note that regarding the entrenchment of conflict, the origin country and diaspora usually have a two-way influence over each other. Wayland (2004) explains the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora living in a Western European country and how diasporic groups can emerge as the main engine of a secessionist campaign that takes

place in the homeland. Sri Lankan Tamils living in Western countries such as Britain and Canada have access to financial and political means that are not available to their ethnic counterparts living in Sri Lanka. The ethnic networks established among diaspora members in these countries engaged in activities of information exchange, political campaigns to reach their host society, and fundraising, which in turn enabled the main military wing of the secessionist movement, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to sustain a formidable military campaign against Sri Lankan government (Wayland, 2004). This study indicates that apart from being influenced by the home country's political conditions, the diaspora can also transform into the main political power behind an intrastate conflict. Adamson (2013) lays down the causal mechanisms of diaspora involvement in intra-state conflicts over the example of a civil war between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. She argues that the Kurdish diaspora living in Europe acted as "transnational brokers" to connect migrant groups with conflict networks, then engaged in strategic framing to create a politicized Kurdish identity. She adds that finally they involved in the process of "ethnic outbidding," which resulted in PKK's emerging as the most powerful representative of the Kurdish movement (p.75-80). She states that mobilization for political and financial support comes later than these stages; therefore, it is important to note that diasporas' role in intra-state conflicts moves beyond mere financial or political support. The implications that the political transnationalism creates over the homelands is not limited to the militarized conflicts. Lyons(2007) explains that the Ethiopian diaspora living in the United States was very influential in determining the political strategies used by the opposition parties against the government in Ethiopia. An important example of this can be observed in the 2005 elections of Ethiopia in which the Ethiopian diaspora in the US decided to support electoral participation of the opposition as opposed to former elections (Lyons, 2007). This way, key diaspora leaders changing their political stance ensured the opposition parties' changing their strategies from boycotting to electoral participation (Lyons, 2007). However, diasporic groups may not always work in harmony with the homeland political organizations, even if they do not represent conflicting sides. It is possible to observe a similar case in Armenian and Jewish diasporas, one of the world's oldest and most established diasporas (Shain, 2002). Armenian diaspora conflicted with Armenia's first president Ter-Petrosian over his attempts to reconcile with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which eventually led to his forceful resignation due to the Armenian diaspora's portrayal of him as a traitor (Shain, 2002). In the same manner, the Jewish diaspora in the US

vehemently opposed Oslo Peace Accords between the Israeli government and Palestinians and pursued political campaigns against the government of Yitzhak Rabin and consequent leaders of his Labor Party. Therefore Shain (2002) argues that the diaspora should be considered a third-layer actor independent of the homeland in conflict resolution. However, it is also important to focus on the studies that address the constructive roles that diasporas play during conflicts. Cochrane (2007) explains how the Irish diaspora's role in channeling funds to militant groups in Northern Ireland from the US took a lot of attention. However, the funds channeled into non-violent objectives outweighed the others greatly. She further states that the Irish diaspora in the US used political and financial capital, transferred it into lobby power to raise awareness of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and invested in reconciliation projects with the aim of cross-border cooperation with peaceful means. Apart from investing in peaceful conflict resolution methods, diaspora groups can act as the main mediator between two conflicting sides (Baser & Swain, 2008). While diaspora groups may be considered as non-objective arbitrator, their engagement with the cause may act as an assurance mechanism, as it can be observed in the case of the Somali diaspora, which became a third-party negotiator in the peace talks in 2002 (Baser & Swain, 2008).

Economy

While political transnationalism of migrants and diaspora groups is heavily associated with security concerns of origin countries, if I move to the other camp of the literature, it is possible to see those migrant associations and their political mobilization is perceived from a more positive light with regards to the economic contributions that they can make for their homelands (Agunias & Newland, 2012; King et al., 2004; Patterson, 2006). Origin countries perceived the economic potential of migrants from a more limited perspective that focused on remittances for a long time. The flow of remittances has grown drastically in the last decades, and for most countries, the volume of remittances exceeds foreign aid and investment (Orozco, 2004). This also led to increasing awareness in receiving and sending countries regarding the positive economic impact that migration can create rather than being a mere security issue (Matsas, 2008; Orozco, 2005; Piper, 2009). Today, it is largely accepted that migrants and their economic potential are far beyond the remittances sent by workers. Migrants are accepted as agents of development for origin countries in three major fields as “flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas” (Faist, 2008, p.21). Therefore, while the flow of money represents the remittances, knowledge refers to the human capital that migrant migrants carry, and

the universal ideas represent the possible diffusion of democratic and humanitarian values to the origin countries. This emerging migration and development nexus is inherently linked to the political mobilization of migrants as hometown associations became one of the channels that connect migrants with their role in the economic development of their homelands. These organizations established by migrants often engage in transnational economic activities that involve investments and entrepreneurial activities that connect host and origin countries, making them suitable partners for co-development for the origin countries (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Faist (2008) indicates that the increasing importance of migrant associations as an agent of development is a result of a perspective change on development that emerged in OECD countries and international organizations. This new perspective considers community and civil society as the main agents of development instead of market and state. This elevates the migrant associations to the position of principal developmental actors. However, this perspective change did not lead to formulation of uniform policies and relations between migrants and their homelands. King et al. (2004) state that while China and India focus on a business-oriented model that prioritizes investment concerning the diaspora's economic contribution to the country, Taiwan aims at the human capital of its diaspora through return migrants. On the other hand, Mexico and the Philippines are more focused on increasing remittances which results in migrants' making their main contribution to poverty reduction at the household level rather than creating a larger impact on development. Migrants also engage in these transnational economic activities at various layers and levels of institutionalization. Landolt (2001) addresses Salvadoran economic transnationalism, explaining that these economic activities occur at three levels: household-level, medium-scale enterprises, and capitalist corporations. In the first level, we can observe small-scale and household-oriented economic activities such as sending remittances and purchase of real estate; the second level involves more institutionalized and larger enterprises operating across borders, and finally, the third level refers to the large transnational enterprises with the capital accumulation capacity that aims at capturing the migrant market.

The varieties of economic activities and the approaches that countries have toward them are also accompanied by conflicting views on the possible implications of outward migration in the literature. While one strand considers it a major economic source for both receiving and sending countries, the other claims that migration drains the productive force of these countries and makes them rentier states dependent on remittances (Portes, 2009). Patterson (2006) points out that through the case of the

African diaspora living in the US and states that lack of institutionalized and collaborative relations between African states and leaders of the diaspora, migration creates the risk of loss of human potential for African countries. The literature indicates that across different types and institutionalization levels, migrant networks, political diasporas, and hometown associations emerge as a central actors in the migration development nexus (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Faist, 2008; Popkin, 2003). What the home government prioritizes concerning the developmental role of migrants and what kind of relation it aims to establish with them also directly impacts the incentives and rights provided to the migrants by the origin countries. These incentives and rights extend or limit the space that migrants organize, whether for only political or economic reasons. This brings us to the third strand of the literature that addresses the political transnationalism of migrants based on the origin country context. The increasing engagement of origin countries with their diaspora communities and citizens outside the border is equally important for discussing migrants' political transnationalism.

Homelands and Engagement Policies

Migrants' emerging as important transnational actors are not only a one-way phenomenon that involves migrants themselves but more of a dialectic process that their homeland states play a substantial role. There is a wide literature that addresses how various states across different economic and democratic categories started to formulate policies to engage with their ethnic kin groups and extend citizenship rights to outside members (Brand, 2006; Collyer, 2013; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003) While for some of these states, migrant workers and policies target them constitute the main focus of their engagement, some other states choose to mobilize their members outside of the borders in both political, economic and cultural fields and recognize them a wide range of rights (Ragazzi, 2014). These policies used to reach these populations outside of the borders range across consular reforms, voting rights, dual citizenship rights, welfare services, policies to attract investment and cultural policies aiming to strengthen national identity (Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003). What motivates the homeland states to develop engagement policies is one of the main questions addressed by the researchers. Whether the targeted groups is an ethnic kin community remained outside of the borders or emigrants migrated from the homeland, these communities represent three main source of capital for homeland states as economic, political and social capital (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Waterbury, 2010) As discussed in the former section, the economic capital that migrants represent for the homeland governments whether in the form of

remittances or long term developmental goals, is largely addressed as one of the primary motives for governments to reach out citizens outside borders (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Itzigsohn, 2000; Ragazzi, 2014). For the Dominican state, recognition of dual citizenship right to Dominican migrants came as a result of the desire to channel their investments to homeland (Itzigsohn, 2000), and for the Tunisian and Moroccan states declining loyalty of their diaspora groups motivated these countries to develop engagement policies to ensure flow of remittances (Brand, 2006). Homeland governments may try to reach migrants to utilize the economic resources and the political support they represent. In times of political or economic crises, reaching out to those abroad may serve as a legitimacy source for governments (Waterbury, 2010). In the case of Mexico, apart from the importance of remittances, the government considered its citizens in the United States as an important lobby instrument for the passage of NAFTA, while for Turkey, its citizens in Europe transformed from being a source of remittance to a powerful lobby on behalf of Turkey especially with regards to accession to EU (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Immigrants also represent an important source of political support for political parties. In Salvador and the Dominican Republic, opposition parties tried to organize abroad by mobilizing the political support of immigrants during different periods (Itzigsohn, 2000). Finally, immigrants and ethnic kin groups may serve as an important social capital that states would like to capitalize on. They may represent a culture-linguistic source that the states can mobilize to strengthen the national identity (Waterbury, 2010). King and Melvin (1999) explain for the newly independent former Soviet Republics, diasporas, remained outside of borders, represented a crucial source for the nation-building process. In Ukraine, nationalist parties tried to reach Ukrainians remained in former Soviet states to strengthen weakly developed national identity. The Kazakhstani government also considered its diasporas a valuable source as ethnic Kazakhs constituted a minority in the newly established state. The forms of engagement policies and the motives underlying these policies directly influence the transnational political activities of immigrants. An important reason is that despite that all members of diaspora groups and immigrants are targeted at a discursive level, in reality, states co-opt who to engage or not (Waterbury, 2010).

Haitian government tried to engage with economically better immigrants in the United States and Canada while neglecting the ones in the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn, 2000). India mainly targeted professional-class Indians living in the US and Europe (Waterbury, 2010). While homeland states are co-opting with whom they will be

building better relations, some of these states also use engagement policies as a surveillance mechanism to control and constrain their citizens and to suppress political mobilization. The authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, such as Libya under Gaddafi and the Syrian regime, exerted control over the political activities of their diaspora groups in the most violent forms, including political assassinations (Tsourapas, 2020). In this sense, the regime type of both receiving and sending country plays a very important role in determining the dynamic of engagement policies. Moroccan and Tunisian communities, which mainly reside in Western democracies, found a much greater opportunity space for political mobilization, which in return led their home governments to establish a security-based relationship with them with the purpose of monitoring (Brand, 2006). Therefore, what kind of a resource or threat immigrants represent for the homeland state determines the policies they exert over them. As a result, these policies open up or constrain the space that immigrants organize politically.

Another important point that connects engagement policies to the political mobilization of immigrants is the size and organizational level of the immigrant community. Collyer (2013) states that engagement policies are most developed in countries with large emigrant communities. Gamlen (2006) states that the main condition to establish “citizen-sovereign relations with diasporas is the existence of a cohesive, state-centric national society at the transnational scale with a corresponding set of institutions” (p.22). Therefore, home governments may have certain motives to reach them; however, this requires a cohesive immigrant community. Hometown associations and immigrant organizations emerge as the central actors when homeland states want to reach their citizens and ethnic communities living abroad. In return, these states may play an enabling or constraining role for the immigrant communities and their political activities.

2.2.2 Host Country-Oriented Approaches

Host country constitutes the main center of analysis in most of the literature that addresses the political transnationalism of migrants. The main reason is that migrants' transnational activities are assumed to have important repercussions for the integration process of immigrants and the country's security concerns. Therefore, in line with the literature, in this section, I will be addressing the studies that focus on the host country under three headings as the studies focusing on political opportunity structures, integration, security, and their relation to transnational political activities.

Political Opportunity Structures

One of the major strands of the literature that addresses the transnational political activities of migrants focuses on the structural factors under which these activities emerge by dwelling on political opportunity theory. Although this theory provides a general framework to investigate the relationship between political structures and mobilization, it was widely used for the host country context and its impact on immigrant mobilization in the migration literature. As introduced in the first chapter, the political opportunity theory constitutes the main theoretical background of this study; therefore, it requires special emphasis. The theory of political opportunity is originally derived from the social movements literature and then applied to migration studies to analyze the political mobilization of migrants (Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales & Giugni, 2011; S. G. Tarrow, 1994). The main argument of this theory is that there are structural factors exogenous to every social movement that either limit or enlarge activists' ability to advocate certain claims, mobilize their supporters, pursue certain strategies or establish alliances and create an impact (Meyer, 2004). Therefore this theory suggests that political movements and their chance of success cannot be addressed with reference to the resources that the activists have but what kind of openings or barriers that the context offers for these resources (Eisinger, 1973). According to political opportunity theory, in a social movement, concept of agency and the choices brought with it can only be understood with respect to the structure surrounding this movement (Meyer, 2004). Depending on this analytical framework, this theory aims to understand why similar movements reach to different results or take different forms in different contexts and why contentious politics predominates in certain historical periods (Tarrow, 1988; 1994). As it can be seen in the literature, various studies address different variables as the components of political opportunity structure but it can be stated that in general openness of a political system, nature of political alliances, attitudes of elites and tolerance to protest are considered as essential variables of political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1988 as cited in Meyer, 2004).

As the term 'opportunity' implies, theory of political opportunity structure states a correlation between the openings that occur in the opportunity structure and the actors' ability to mobilize on the ground (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1994). However, the literature also points out that political openings have a curvilinear relation with political mobilization stating that the level of openness and closeness may determine whether the structure will encourage or discourage political actions (Eisinger,

1973 ; Meyer,2004). Application of the political opportunity structure to migration studies will reveal this complex relation in more detail.

Migration literature applied this concept to understand the divergence of forms and degrees of mobilization among migrants. Concerning transnationalism literature, as the host countries emerged as the main milieu that immigrants engage in transnational activities, political opportunities that exist in the host country are generally addressed as the main structural factor that affects the transnational political actions of immigrants (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016).

In extensive research, Koopmans et al. (2005) address political claims-making by immigrants living in five European countries: Germany, France, Switzerland, Britain, and the Netherlands. The authors conceptualize the political opportunities in each of these countries based on the concept of citizenship and nationhood, how they are practiced, and eventually shape the political claim-making of immigrants in these countries. They address two dimensions of citizenship regimes in these countries, firstly by looking at its ethnic or civic conception and secondly by its cultural aspect by looking at cultural requirements and rights included in the citizenship regime. Koopmans et al. find that migrants' transnational political activities respond to more exclusionary citizenship regimes that create barriers to their integration. Therefore, in Germany, which has an assimilationist citizenship regime, Kurds and Turks are much more invested in the politics of their homelands compared to the Indians and Pakistanis living in Britain, which has a multiculturalist and civic citizenship regime. In the case of France, despite having a civic notion of citizenship due to its restraining behavior towards the expression of cultural diversity, it led to mobilization among immigrants by emphasizing their immigrant or Muslim identity. Morales and Giugni (2011) move this inquiry to the local level. They investigate how immigrant's social capital together with institutional and discursive political opportunities of cities impacts political participation of immigrants. The study analyzes the political opportunity concept on the basis of three aspects as individual rights of immigrants, cultural group rights, and specific opportunity structures related to migration in the cities of London, Lyon, Oslo, Stockholm, Oslo, Zurich, Geneva, Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid, and Milan. The study results indicate that the expansion of the first category of political opportunity, which is individual rights, enhances the political participation of immigrants, as predicted by the literature. However, it is also important that the second component of the POS/political opportunity structure creates a curvilinear impact on participation as an intermediate level of openness increases

participation more compared to a high level of openness regarding cultural group rights. Finally, the third component of the POS creates an opposite effect. The closer the system concerning the specific opportunities provided in migration management, the higher the participation is. The results related to the specific opportunities provide evidence for the findings of Koopmans et al. (2005). The authors conclude that political opportunity structures have a decisive impact on immigrants' political mobilization. However, its effect may follow different logics depending on whether we address group or individual level opportunities. Giugni and Passy (2004) analyze France and Switzerland and compare the immigrants' political claim-making in these countries. They consider the general institutional opportunity structure as one separate component of POS and the citizenship regimes together with its cultural obligations as another one. These two countries provide an important example as Switzerland has more open institutional structures for social movements but with an ethnic conception of citizenship. In contrast, France has a closer opportunity structure with a civic definition of citizenship. The authors find that the percentage of political claims-making is higher in France as a reflection of the opportunity space and legitimacy that civic citizenship provides for such actions. They also point out that the action repertoire of immigrants in France is more radical and confrontational than in Switzerland, which reflects more closed institutional POS. This study is important as it indicates how different components of the political opportunity structure may have moderating effects on each other. Another aspect of this discussion is how local and national-level opportunity structures create a dialectic impact on immigrant transnationalism. Landolt (2008) investigates how the transnational politics of Salvadorian immigrants vary across two national contexts and three cities, Washington DC and Los Angeles in the US and Toronto in Canada. In Canada, the state played a more active role in managing and settling refugee flow and provided a more friendly environment through NGOs without pursuing any political agenda. Therefore, the grassroots activism of Salvadorians organized through loose networks focusing on a national scale and their Salvadorian-specific agendas were submerged into a general narrative of assimilation and integration. In the USA, as opposed to Canada, the state's hostile attitude towards Salvadorian immigrants created a dense network of solidarity between Salvadorian immigrants and grassroots organizations. It exacerbated more village-level loyalties and political identities. However, Los Angeles also diverges from Washington DC as there is a predominance of Latinos in Los Angeles, and the Salvadorian insurgent group FMLN has historically played an important role in the

mobilization of immigrants in this city. As a result, while Salvadorians have a clear presence in local politics in LA, Salvadorians' political presence is fragmented and sidelined by other groups in Washington, DC. These results indicate that both national context and divergences at local level create different openings and constraints for political transnationalism. Apart from the openness or closeness of the institutional structures or inclusiveness of citizenship regimes, the existence or lack of cleavages in society also determines the opportunity space for immigrant mobilization. Political opportunity structure may also function together with other variables that affect the political transnationalism of immigrants, such as social capital. Pirkkalainen et al. (2013) explain how the activities of Somali immigrant associations took two different forms in Italy and Finland. Italy provides a much stricter POS and fewer informal opportunities for the immigrant organizations, while Finland provides a more open POS with explicit and formal opportunities such as public funding. The authors point out that this divergence within the POS led to leaders of these associations' using their social capital in diverse ways. While the association leaders in Italy capitalized on their social capital to build cross-ethnic alliances and with the help of more informal networks, the ones in Finland invested in formal channels and bureaucratic procedures depending on the capacity and extent of their activities. In this sense, leaders also play a key role as the survival and success of these institutions depend on their ability to act in accordance with the opportunity space provided in each context. Ostergaard-Nielsen, (2001) also points out how immigrants may develop alternative channels of political mobilization through their networks to circumvent the constraining opportunity structure over the case of Kurdish and Turkish immigrants living in Germany and the Netherlands. She also indicates that the more pluralist and open opportunity structure that the Netherlands provides concerning immigrant political mobilizations is reversed when immigrants try to mobilize around homeland agendas as these issues are excluded from the national political discourse. This leads to homeland political organizations' taking similar forms in these two contexts with different opportunity structures. Therefore, it is also important to pay attention to whether immigrants mobilize for immigrant politics or homeland politics while addressing the impact of POS in the host country over these activities.

Integration

As immigrants' transnational political activities take various forms depending on the opportunity structure in the host countries, these activities have important implications for the immigrants and their host countries. The factors that lead to outward

migration and integration of the immigrants into their host environment constituted two central questions addressed by the migration literature (Portes et al., 2008). Therefore, the integration of immigrants became one of the center themes that this literature focused on (Portes et al., 2008). Transnationalism as a novel form of immigrant engagement that involves both host and origin country directly relates to the discussions of immigrant integration. The literature has provided various answers on the relationship between integration and transnational activities. While some studies considered it a disruptive force on the way to integration, others noted that it could support the integration within a more collaborative framework that involves origin countries (Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Mazzucato (2008) explains how Ghanaian immigrants in the Netherlands pursue a double engagement with both their host and origin country through transnational activities that they take part in. Cohen and Sirkeci (2005) point out that transnational engagements of Kurdish and Oaxacan immigrants living in the US and Germany led to a widening gap between immigrants and host society and ghettoization. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) offer a typology for the relationship between integration and transnationalism. The authors state that the nature of this relation can be 'additive' which means the result of the interaction between integration level and transnationalism is the sum of two parts, it can be synergistic, which means this interaction can create a greater whole through reinforcing each other. Finally, it can be antagonistic which refers to the situation that connections and engagement with one country may diminish the engagement with other. Guarnizo et al. (2003), in a study addresses the factors affecting the transnational political activities that Dominican, Salvadorian, and Colombians immigrants engage in the United States. He found that transnational political activities are greatly affected by individual factors such as age, gender, and human capital. And contrary to the classical view on assimilation, greater human capital, stability in the host country and higher length of residence increase transnational political engagements. This finding is an important indicator that falls doubt on the argument that transnational engagements go hand in hand with low socioeconomic status and lack of integration. Portes et al. (2002), in similar research on the same three immigrant communities residing in the United States, focus on the economic entrepreneurship of immigrants and state that transnationalism is a form of economic adaptation to the country. They also conclude that these activities are primarily engaged by the well-off and more educated elites of the respective communities, not the economically sidelined members. Dekker and Siegel (2013), in a study on Ethiopian, Burundian, Moroccan, and Afghan immigrants living in

the Netherlands, try to reveal the relationship between integration levels and socio-cultural, political, and economic transnational activities. An important finding of the study is that lacking basic needs is strongly and negatively associated with political and economic transnationalism. Another point that the results indicate is that political participation in the host country's institutions is positively associated with engagement with political transnationalism. These results can be addressed as such; political transnationalism requires a certain level of material and non-material resources, such as economic and political integration with the host country. However, the relations between integration and transnationalism may take different forms depending on the specific conditions immigrant groups face, such as their exit and political conditions in the origin country. Portes et al. (2008), in their study on the leaders of immigrant organizations of Colombian, Dominican, and Mexicans that engage in transnational activities in the US, also confirm that better-educated and better-established members have a more pro-integrative position, and they engage with more political activities. However, despite having the highest educational credentials, Colombian immigrants do not indicate a high level of engagement with political transnationalism. The authors consider it an indication of their traumatic departure from Colombia with an ongoing civil war in the home country and lack of proper channels for political participation. Contrary to the previously mentioned studies, Snel et al. (2006), in an extensive study on immigrants from the USA, Japan, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Morocco, and the Antilles living in Germany, found no correlation between transnational engagement and social status. Both better-educated immigrants with higher socioeconomic status and unemployed ones with a low level of education may engage with similar levels of transnationalism. While the authors conclude that transnationalism does not hinder integration in general, they also point out that culturally more distinct immigrant communities such as Moroccans and Antilleans were found to have strong transnational identification and low level of cultural integration. This situation cautions that transnational engagement may work with different dynamics for socially excluded groups. Morawska (2003) reaches a similar conclusion from a study made on the transnational activities of Dominican, Indian, Chinese, Cuban, and Jamaican immigrants residing in New York. He states that while assimilation and transnationalism exist simultaneously, each immigrant group finds a different combination of transnationalism and assimilation depending on their contextual conditions. These conditions include factors related to sending and receiving country and individual and intra-group dynamics. Depending on these various factors, Dominican

transnationalism appears to be much more intense and ethnically oriented, accompanied by a slower assimilation pace than Indian and Jamaican immigrants.

Security

I have discussed how refugees, immigrants, and diasporas can exacerbate the conflicts in their homeland through political mobilization over transnational networks (Adamson, 2005; Koinova, 2011; Lyons, 2007). However, transnational political activities directly affect the security of host countries. One of the prominent camps addressed how immigrants may jeopardize host countries' security in the field of terrorism. After Cold War, non-state actors largely replaced the state as the main threat of terrorism (Faist, 2005). However, 9/11 has been a turning point that led to labeling diasporas as an agent that spread homeland conflicts and terrorist activities to their host countries and also disrupt the social cohesion within them (Pirkkalainen & Mahdi, 2009). Apart from directly targeting the host countries, diasporas may harm the security of these countries through fundraising for the conflicts, procurement of weapons, and lobbying activities (Hoffman et al., 2007). The lobby groups mobilizing on behalf of the IRA managed to block arms sales to Britain through lobby activities in the US, and the Tamil insurgent group LTTE also lobbied the South African government to prevent arms sales to Sri Lanka (Hoffman et al., 2007). Immigrants and their political mobilization may also expand criminal networks, such as smuggling, when insurgent groups utilize them as material resources. (Adamson, 2006) It is possible to see an example of this case over the case of the Kurdistan Worker's Party, as the organization was deeply involved in human smuggling both to raise revenue for the ongoing conflict in Turkey and to transfer the followers to Europe (Koslowski, 2000 as cited in Adamson, 2006). Among all the groups that mobilize politically with illegal or violent means, stateless diaspora groups may pose a higher security threat to host countries. As these groups operate with a limited capacity, the center of their actions is usually to attract international attention to their cause (Sheffer, 1994). This includes creating pressure on the host governments and targeting the groups considered harmful to their movements, as observed in the cases of Palestinians, Sikhs and Jews and Armenians before the establishment of their states (Sheffer, 1994). Some studies pay emphasis on how civil wars are internationalized and spread to the countries hosting refugees and immigrants as a result of transnational political networks. In 2001, the influx of Albanian refugees to Macedonia altered the delicate ethnic balances in this country. Albanian National Liberation Army started targeting the government of Macedonia under the influence of the strong links that the

Albanians in Macedonia had with their fellow Albanians that was waging war in Kosovo (Gleditsch, 2007). The spread of the conflict does not always occur in the form of direct targeting of the host governments. Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), while in exile in Jordan, engaged in back-and-forth military confrontations with bordering Israel and transferred weapons across borders, eventually leading to Jordan's dispelling the movement from Jordan in the most violent manner (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). The process that led to the Lebanese civil war and subsequent Israeli occupation was also triggered by the conflict PLO in Lebanon brought with Israel and the discontent it created between the Muslim and Christian communities of Lebanon (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). The research on the relationship between transnational political mobilization and conflict also confirms the historical examples. Gleditsch (2007), in a study, finds that the existence of an ethnic group spread across borders increases the likelihood of this host country's experiencing civil war. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) also confirm this analysis by stating that refugees and displaced populations from neighboring countries spread civil wars to the host countries. Generally, the regional effect is very important as countries in troubled regions are much more likely to experience civil and ethnic conflicts (Gleditsch, 2007; Sambanis, 2001).

2.2.3 *Transnational Approach*

In the literature addressed so far, studies focused on various aspects of migrants' host and origin countries and their relationship with transnational activities in general and transnational political engagements of them. As pointed out before, transnationalism is a concept that emerged as a result of the realization that migrants' engagements, whether they are political, economic, or cultural, are not confined to one national context but rather connect several of them. As this perspective puts both origin and host country at the center of the analysis, I need to emphasize that transnational context also emerges as an important field that is separate from national contexts, whether it is origin or host, in terms of its effect on transnational politics. The number of studies that focus on transnational context and its relation to the political mobilization of migrants is very limited.

One of the major actors in the transnational context is international human rights organizations, NGOs, and supranational organizations. Østergaard-Nielsen, (2003b) claims that transnational political communities may appeal to international bodies and NGOs such as the UN and European Council to raise their voice when they can find the same opportunity in a national context. It is possible to see the examples of that in PLO's efforts to get Palestine recognized as a state by UN and in the case of Tibetans who

appealed to the international community to come against the persecution of China (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). Sikkink (2005) addresses the issue from the perspective of political opportunity and states that transnational space provides both constraints and opportunities for political mobilization in the same way theory suggests for national contexts. She states that domestic opportunity and transnational opportunity structures interact while constituting the general opportunity structure for movements. For example, when domestic opportunity structures are closed, and transnational opportunity structures are open, activists try to utilize these open structures by mobilizing on an international scale. She gives the example of how Chilean activists mobilized internationally and succeeded in arresting Pinochet in London when the domestic justice system in Chile did not provide the same opportunity. In a similar take, Soysal (1994) explains how the global framework of human rights turns into a force that constrains the actions of nation-states and also creates an impetus towards incorporating immigrants into their membership, although in divergent ways.

International organizations are assumed to provide a major opportunity structure for political mobilizations because of the normative framework that they dwell upon (Kastoryano & Schader, 2014). The Kurdish movement is one of the groups that managed to acquire legitimacy based on this opportunity structure at the supranational European institutions (Kastoryano & Schader, 2014). Koinova (2010) explains, apart from finding a larger opportunity space in the transnational space, how diaspora communities intentionally try to frame their nationalistic purposes within a democratization discourse to be able to appeal to the international community. For example, both Albanian and Lebanese diasporas addressed their political goals related to national sovereignty over their respective homelands as a struggle to make their countries more democratic and called for international support (Koinova, 2010). Therefore, utilizing from transnational opportunity structure also guides the claims-making of social organizations, as in the case of the national context. However, supranational organizations and NGOs are not the only component of transnational space. Transnational ethnic networks constructed between host countries of diaspora and homelands also create a new form of transnational opportunity space (Koinova, 2013; Wayland, 2004). Wayland (2004) explains how the Tamil diaspora living in mainly Western European countries provided a larger political opportunity structure to sustain the insurgency against Sri Lankan government through the political allies residing in these countries and the openness of the political system.

Another important point that widens and constrains the transnational opportunity space is the foreign policy considerations and political relations between the host and origin countries (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016). During the Cold War era, migrants living in the US could raise support for their cause if they were mobilizing against a regime supported by the Soviets, but their demands were largely neglected for the opposite cases (Shain 1999 as cited in Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). A prominent example of that is the divergence of treatment that Cuban and Haitian political exiles received in the US. American state considered the first group a vital source against Castro regime in Cuba, while the second group presented a potential threat to the good relations that the United States had with Duvalier regime (Scanlan & Loescher, 1984). While Iranians were unwanted refugees in Pakistan during the 1980s, Afghan refugees received warm treatment from the Pakistani state and India was much less tolerant of Afghan refugees while being supportive of Tamil ones (Zolberg et al., 1989). Foreign policy considerations can be much more decisive over a state's treatment of refugees when the respective state is directly involved in the conflict in the refugees' homeland (Zolberg et al., 1989).

Although transnational space was largely neglected in the studies that address migrants' political mobilizations, these limited studies indicate that factors such as foreign policy considerations and human rights regimes that govern transnational space appear as an important dynamic that impacts transnationalism. Moreover, as the origin country and host country both play an important role in the different forms that political transnationalism emerges, transnational context also appears as a third, fundamental dimension in this picture.

2.3 Immigrant Political Transnationalism from a Perspective of Triadic Political Opportunity Structures

I have addressed the literature on the political transnationalism of migrants by dividing it into three main contexts that transnational activities emerge. The literature addressed so far indicates that origin, host country, and transnational context impacts political transnationalism in divergent and complex ways; however, most of these studies tend to focus on one of the three dimensions and how this one specific context interacts with transnational mobilization. To fill this important gap in the literature, this study attempts to bring these three dimensions together and address their impact on political transnationalism by using Iraqi Turkmen immigrants living in Turkey as a case study.

As stated in Chapter I., the political opportunity theory, which was addressed in the literature focusing on the host country in this chapter, constitutes the theoretical

background of this analysis. Therefore, I will extend the political opportunity framework to cover the origin and transnational context together with the host country. The literature addressed creates a reference point to reveal the main opportunity structures that affect political mobilization. However, to be able to come up with a comprehensive theoretical framework of political opportunity structure that is embedded in origin, host, and transnational contexts, I dwell on the dimensions of political opportunity structure used by Chaudhary and Moss (2016), Giugni and Passy (2004) and Koopmans et al. (2005) in their studies.

Another important dimension of this study that aims to complement the gap in the literature is the temporal dimension it considers. This study does not compare various national or local contexts based on the divergence of their political opportunity structures. Instead, it aims to understand how political opportunity structures in these three contexts that I address change over time, within Turkey, Iraq, and transnational context, and how this change is reflected over the transnational political activities of Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey. The period that I will be addressing is late early 1990s onwards, starting from the First Gulf War, as it is one of the major turning points of Iraqi immigration to Turkey. This brings us to a final important point that differentiates this study from the previous studies on political transnationalism. Due to their common ethnicity, Turkey is an ordinary host country and a kin state for Iraqi Turkmen. This adds another layer to Iraqi Turkmen's political activities in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey's political opportunity structure for Iraqi Turkmen differs from other host countries as it can be affected by the ethnicity between Turkmen and the Turkish state. The field research of the study has shed light on how Turkey's kin state position was reflected in the political opportunity space that Turkey provided Iraqi immigrants with and considerable explanatory power of this dimension.

The studies addressed indicates that different citizenship regimes, the individual rights recognized by migrants, the host state's migration management, and the attitude of political actors towards immigrants created different opportunity structures and led to divergent forms of political mobilization among immigrants (Koopmans et al., 2005; Landolt, 2008; Morales & Giugni, 2011; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Further, I focused on the studies that address the relationship between transnationalism and integration. Most of these studies indicated a strong relationship between the level of integration and transnational engagements (Dekker & Siegel, 2013; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Portes et al., 2002, 2008). Therefore, for the host country's opportunity structure, I will consider

individual rights¹ Individual rights recognized for immigrants in the host country, which cover nationality acquisition (Koopmans et al., 2005, p.35), access to long-term permits, labor market access, welfare state access, political rights (Morales & Giugni, 2011, p.47). I have also addressed the role that homelands play in the political mobilization of their far away members and discussed how authoritarian states might suppress and monitor the political activities of their citizens while other homeland governments may provide opportunities for mobilization through engagement policies (Brand, 2006; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Tsourapas, 2020; Waterbury, 2010). Another important point discussed about homelands is how political conflicts in the origin country may create various effects over the mobilization patterns of immigrants and possible security implications that these mobilizations may bring for the host states (Adamson, 2013; Koinova, 2011; Lyons, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Therefore to analyze the origin country opportunity structure; I will be addressing the variables of governing authority type², relative stability³ and diaspora engagement policies of the origin country (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8). Finally, I briefly discussed the importance of the human rights regime of the era, international organizations representing it and foreign policy considerations of the countries and how they impact political mobilization in a transnational context (Koinova, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b; Sikkink, 2005; Soysal, 1994). In line with the variables pointed out by the literature, I will be addressing the bilateral relations between host and origin country, foreign policy aims of the host country and also the role of supranational institutions such as UN as components of transnational political opportunity structure (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).

I will be utilizing Chaudhary and Moss (2016)'s framework as the theoretical framework of this study. Their framework proposes a holistic approach to political opportunity structures that combines host and home country and transnational context. It further divides the transnational political activities into three level according to their legal and organization framework as electoral, organizational, and non-organizational forms. I have consolidated this framework, with additional variables used by Koopmans et al.

¹ The variables addressed under the heading of individual rights was operationalized based on Migration Integration Policy Index (Solano, Giacomo, and Huddleston, 2020).

² Polity V Project will be taken as a reference for the variable of governing authority type (Gurr&Marshall,2020).

³ World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index will be a reference for the variable of relative stability (Kaufmann et al.,2010).

(2005). Table 2.2 presents the overall theoretical framework of the study created based on the variables borrowed from Chaudhary and Moss (2016) and Koopmans et al. (2005).

To analyze the change of political opportunity structures in these three contexts over cited dimensions, a detailed qualitative analysis of the legal documents, policies, previous academic studies, documents, and speeches referring to the variables addressed in the subsequent section.

Dwelling on the literature of political opportunity structure, this research expects to see a correlation between more open opportunity structures and higher level/more developed political mobilization on the ground. In relation to this, I expect to see electoral and organizational forms in the contexts with open opportunity structures, while non-organizational forms in the contexts with closer opportunity structures. This research will also shed light on the more nuanced ways that opportunity structures work in a similar way to the examples shared from migration literature. Further it is expected to reveal how three contexts of opportunity structure interact with each other.

Table 2.2: Political Opportunity Structures

Political Opportunity Structure (POS)		
Host Country Political POS (Turkey)	Home Country POS (Iraq)	Transnational POS
Individual rights recognized to immigrants: nationality acquisition (Koopmans et al., 2005, p.35), access to long-term permits, labor market access, welfare state access, and political rights (Morales & Giugni, 2011, p.47).	Governing authority type (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).	Bilateral relations between the host and home country (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).
	Relative Stability (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).	Foreign policy aims of the host country (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).
	Diaspora Engagement Policies (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).	Role of supranational organizations (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016, p.8).



Table 2.3: Forms of Transnational Political Activities (TPA)

Electoral TPA	Organizational TPA	Non-institutional TPA
Voting, campaigning, campaign fundraising	Advocacy groups, ethnic associations, charities, hometown associations, ruling party/opposition organizations	Protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, covert actions, armed conflict, revolution

Note. Adapted from "Triadic political opportunity structures: Re-conceptualizing immigrant transnational politics," by A. Chaudhary and D. Moss, p.7

Chapter: 3

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This study aims to research the transnational political activities of Iraqi Turkmen and try to understand how political opportunity structures impact these activities. The study defines *political opportunity structure* as the structural political factors in the context in which actors engage with activities. As the research has a transnational perspective, it analyzes these factors in three primary contexts: home country Iraq, host country Turkey, and transnational context. The study tries to analyze how these political factors, called opportunity structures, have changed in these three contexts over time and what kind of effect they created over political mobilization. To decipher that, qualitative data was collected through a historical analysis, and fieldwork involved in-depth interviews conducted by Turkmen political elites living in Turkey. Migration and social movements literature were also reviewed to determine the components of political opportunity structures, which is the study's independent variable. Later the data acquired from the fieldwork was utilized to investigate these opportunity structures' impact on the political actors.

3.1 *Fieldwork*

The fieldwork of this study is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with Turkmen political elites living in Turkey. The oldest and most active Turkmen ethnic and cultural associations and organizations were determined, and people with managerial positions in these organizations were reached for interviews. Kirkuk Foundation, Turkmeneli Foundation, Turkmeneli Human Rights Association, Iraqi Turkmen Justice and Solidarity Association, Iraqi Turkmen Front, and Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association are the institutions chosen for study. The interviews were conducted in four cities: Ankara, İstanbul, Bursa, and Konya. Ankara and İstanbul carried the weight with 4 and 5 interviews as these are two cities the Turkmen political movement was cumulated. The researcher used snowballing technique and her networks to reach out to the key figures of the Turkmen political movement. The interviewees from Konya and Bursa were included in the study through these networks to extend the study's representativeness.

As elite interviews are the chosen methodology to collect qualitative data throughout this study, it is important to consider both the empirical advantages and disadvantages of this method. Elite interviews are useful as they allow researchers to

gather information that is not available through other sources and obtain first-hand information from decision-makers in certain historical and political phenomena (Richards, 1996). However, the exceptional closeness of the interviewees to the phenomena being investigated introduces bias to the information they provide and establishes a power relation between the researcher and the interviewee.

During elite interviews, interviewees are not obliged to provide pure reality to the researcher but rather present their version of the truth and their convictions (Berry, 2002). It is important to note that while investigating the changing opportunity structures and their impact on the Turkmen political movement, the empirical data obtained is based on the subjective understanding of the Turkmen elites on how these opportunity structures have changed and how they perceive their impact on their movement. As political opportunity structures are not quantified completely within the scope of this study, it must be considered that this study presents what is perceived to be a closed or open opportunity structure for the political decision makers.

An additional component of elite interviews that needs to be paid attention is the existing power relation between myself as the researcher and the Turkmen elites that I interviewed. The nature of elite interviews dictates a certain level of hierarchy between the researcher and interviewee, which brings the risk of the interviewee dominating the interview and controlling the information that the researcher seeks (Richards, 1996). To mitigate these issues, I tried to be conscious of the positions held by the interviewees and focused on areas where they were willing to provide information. Political opportunity structures are not abstract concepts that exist outside the perceptions of political actors. How they are perceived by the political elites inform us on their decision-making processes and assessments on the dynamics that affected the movement. Therefore, the subjective understanding of the open and closed opportunity spaces serves the purpose of the study. However, it is important to note the subjectivity that these power dynamics bring to the study.

3.2 *Operationalization*

The study tries to understand how political opportunity structures affect political mobilization. The political opportunity structures (POS) are defined as a set of political structural factors in three realms. Previous studies were taken as reference while determining the variables of POS (Chaudhary & Moss, 2016 ; Koopmans et al., 2005 ; Morales & Giugni, 2011). Migration Policy Index (Solano, Giacomo, and Huddleston, 2020) was also utilized for numerical operationalization of home country political

opportunity structure. First, the home POS was operationalized regarding the individual rights recognized by immigrants. Therefore, the interviewees were asked about their experience regarding access to rights, social integration, citizenship, residency process, and entry to Turkey. Host country POS was operationalized in terms of authority type, political stability, and diaspora policies of the home country. Therefore, interviewees were asked about the Saddam regime's policies, wars, and regime change process in Iraq and surveillance policies of the Iraqi regime over the citizens abroad. Finally, the transnational context was operationalized regarding Turkey's foreign policy, bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq, and the role of international institutions. Therefore, the interviewees were asked about Turkey's Turkmen policy, different periods of Iraq-Turkey relations, and their engagements with international actors. The interviewees were asked to explain whether the elaborated factors had an impact on their actions and political activities and questioned explicitly on the obstacles they faced and the resources they dwelled on. As the study also aims at how POS has changed in three contexts, the interviewees were asked to make comparisons across different periods.

3.3 Sample

The sample consisted of 11 political elites of the Turkmen community. The sample size was limited because the study was based on the elite interview technique. The snowballing method was used to reach interviewees. All interviewees were Iraqi Turkmen who were both Turkish and Iraqi citizens. The interviewees' age was between 31 and 79. The main criteria in sample selection were reaching out to people who could provide data on different periods of the Turkmen political movement since the 1990s. It was also essential to reach people who held critical positions within the movement. Therefore, interviewees included current and former presidents of Turkmen associations, founders of Turkmen political parties, including the Iraqi Turkmen Front, former political advisors in Turkey, and former Turkmen representatives of the Iraqi opposition. The interviewees not currently holding the same position were intentionally included to study to ease the political pressure related to their positions. The interviewees were chosen among both older and younger generations of Turkmen elites to be able to cover the history of Turkmen mobilization more accurately. All the interviewees were male due to the gender imbalance at the managerial level of Turkmen movements and organizations. The interviewees were chosen among the Turkmen figures who have received at least a primary level of their education in Iraq to ensure that they have a certain level of

socialization within Iraq that can provide accurate data. All interviewees were born in Iraq, and 10 of 11 received their undergraduate education in Turkey.



Chapter: 4

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES IN TURKEY, IRAQ, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT

This chapter analyzes how political opportunity structures (POS) have changed in the host country, home country, and transnational context starting from the First Gulf War in 1991 until today and for the Iraqi Turkmen and their political mobilization at the intersection of these three contexts. It begins with a brief historical overview of the Turkmen community in Iraq and their flight to Turkey; then, the chapter analyzes political opportunity structures. It firstly focuses on the host country POS that addresses the individual rights recognized by Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey, then moves to the home country POS which includes governing authority type, relative stability, and diaspora engagement policies in the home country, Iraq, and finally the transnational context that addresses bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq, foreign policy aims of Turkey and role of UN as the foremost supranational institution that affects the trajectory of Iraqi immigrants. These three contexts and the changes that occurred in them throughout three decades provide the main opportunity space for Iraqi Turkmen to mobilize at a transnational level. Dwelling on the analysis in this chapter, I will be addressing how these opportunity spaces interacted with immigrant mobilization in the next chapter.

4.1 Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey: A Brief Overview

Turkmen of Iraq has a tumultuous history marred with wars, persecutions, and subsequent displacements. Turkey is an important place in this history. Firstly, because it is one of the central locations where Iraqi Turkmen live outside of their homeland and secondly, Turkey is a kin state for Turkmen. To what extent this role translated into a meaningful policy and how it was reflected in the political mobilization of Iraqi Turkmen is one of the questions this study addresses. Therefore, a brief overview of the history of Iraqi immigration to Turkey and its political mobilization will provide the background that this study raises questions about.

Turkmen are one of the minority groups that faced similar ethnic cleansing policies and persecutions faced by other minorities in Iraq, such as Kurds; however, this could not get the same level of international recognition (Sirkeci,2011).

Turkmen is considered one of the offshoots of Turkish tribes, and their history in Iraq is traced back to the 7th century, starting from Umayyad Caliphate and followed by the Abbasids (Doğan, 2018). However, it is accepted that the main Turkmen settlement in Iraq came with the Seljuk rule and continued under the Ottomans (Oğuzlu, 2004). One of the main controversial issues regarding Iraqi Turkmen is their population size. In a country, the demography of a particular ethnic group represents its power and resilience against decades-old ethnic cleansing policies and its right to claim contested lands; it is understandable why the size of the population is such a politicized issue. The western sources mainly agree that the Turkmen population is approximately 2 percent of the overall Iraqi population, which is an estimation mainly based on sources of the Iraqi government (Oğuzlu, 2004). However, Turkmen sources claim that Turkmen constitute at least 10 percent of the population (Demirci, 1991; Oğuzlu, 2004). As the 1957 census of Iraq is one of the few reliable sources of Iraq's demography (Strakes, 2009), it is impossible to have an accurate date on the current Turkmen population in Iraq (Sirkeci, 2011).

Nevertheless, despite lacking a definite figure, it is believed that Turkmen are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq, coming after Arabs and Kurds (Strakes, 2009). Turkmen live in the northeastern part of Iraq, spreading towards central provinces, including Kirkuk, Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, Diyala, Salahaddin, Tal Afar, Altunkopru, and Baghdad (Oguzlu, 2002; Vahram, 2003). These areas, called Turkmeneli, lie across Kurdish lands in the North and Arab lands in the south (Oguzlu, 2002). This renders Turkmen's political destiny closely connected to Kurds, which is one of the main reasons why Turkmen emerge as a foreign policy priority for Turkey from time to time (Sirkeci, 2011).

With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Iraqi Turkmen remained within the borders of a new country, and Ankara Treaty (1926) that demarcated the borders between the new Turkish Republic and Iraq did not involve any clause that could give Turkey a protector role over Turkmen (Doğan, 2018). The Turkmen elites in Iraq tried to sustain their links with Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire based on their shared historical and ethnic ties, which contributed to the Iraqi state's suspicious perception of Iraqi Turkmen as the remnants of their former imperial rulers (Büyüksaraç, 2017).

Turkmen became a target of the Arabization policies from the very beginning of the British mandate, just like other minority groups in the country, such as Kurds and Christians Assyrians, and its scale deepened after the 1970s (Sirkeci, 2008). The coup that brought the Baath rule in 1968 marked the beginning of a full-scale campaign of Arabization targeting ethnic minorities, including Turkmen (Oğuzlu, 2004). The Arabization policies included a wide range of policies from forced ethnicity changes, forceful recruitments to military units, and, more importantly, expulsions (Mufti & Bouckaert, 2003). Although in 1970, Turkmen were granted several cultural rights, including the right to education and publication in mother tongue, these were never implemented on the ground (Oğuzlu, 2004). While forced displacement of Turkmen continued, Arabs were settled in emptied Turkmen towns and villages, and even speaking Turkish in public turned into a punishable act (Duman,2012). The roots of the Arabization policy date back to the discovery of oil resources in the 1920s, which motivated the state to Arabize especially oil-rich regions such as Kirkuk, through making demographic engineering (Mufti & Bouckaert, 2003). Apart from the state policies, Kurdification also emerged as a viable threat for Turkmen, especially after the fall of Saddam, which gave the Kurdish North substantial political power and leverage (Sirkeci, 2011). The Kurdish movement in Iraq considers Kirkuk as their historical capital, and its claims over Kirkuk and its surrounding regions, Arbil and Mosul, greatly disturb the Iraqi Turkmen as they also claim the same regions, especially Kirkuk, as a symbol of Turkmen culture (van Bruinessen, 2005). In the post-Saddam period, Kurdish parties used their political leverage and managed to put an article in the 2005 constitution calling for a referendum to determine the fate of the Kirkuk city, which prompted fierce rejection by both Arabs and Turkmen due to a possible result reflecting the demographic weight of Kurds (Rogg & Rimscha,2007). The mounting tension finally led to an indefinite hold on the referendum. However, the Kirkuk issue still constitutes one of the main friction points between Turkmen and Kurds and Kurds and the central government, which amounted to surface again in the 2017 independence referendum of KRG, as will be explained in the coming sections. Apart from these policies amounting to ethnic cleansing, the Iraqi regime targeted Turkmen. Saddam's regime's arbitrary persecution of Turkmen leaders in the 1970s and the Altinköprü massacre in which Saddam killed Turkmen during the rebellion broke out after the 1991 Gulf War are examples of the human rights violations that the Turkmen community faced in Iraq (Duman,2012; Şimşir, 2004).

Turkmen, while being targeted by the ethnic cleansing policies and political violence as a minority group, were also victimized by the overall deterioration of living standards and level of security due to successive wars and a regime change led by the US invasion. One of the significant consequences of this has been Turkmen's joining in mass emigration waves with other Iraqis. The first Gulf War marked the first era in which Turkmen left the country in masses, as almost 80 percent of all Turkmen emigration from Iraq occurred after the 1990s, and 45 percent left the country after 1997 (Sirkeci,2011).

Ongoing political and ethnic conflicts in the country created an environment of insecurity that has both material and non-material aspects (Icduygu et al.,1999). In each era that this insecurity deepened, the emigration wave of Turkmen made a peak (Sirkeci, 2008). Although the mass displacement occurred after the 1990s, Iraqi Turkmen's emigration to Turkey started in the 1950s for mainly educational purposes with the help of educational protocols between Turkey and Iraq that eased the process (Danış, 2006).

Ethnic affiliation, cultural and historical bonds, and geographical proximation unexpectedly made Turkey the top destination of Iraqi Turkmen (Sirkeci,2005; Sirkeci, 2011). The size of Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey is another controversial issue. This issue arose after an insufficient number of Iraqis registered for voting during the 2005 Iraqi elections, eventually leading to even lesser Turkmen votes (Danış,2006). Foreign Minister of that time, Abdullah Gül, called Turkmen to vote stating that there were around 30 thousand Turkmen in Turkey. ("Bakan Gül'den Türkiyeli Iraklılara Çağrı", 2005)⁴.

A report on Turkmen published in 2018 estimates that around 20 to 30 thousand Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey hold citizenship or residency, excluding refugees and those with short-term permits (Doğan, 2018). We do not have an exact number of those living in Turkey. However, Iraqi Turkmen has an established community in Turkey with entrenched networks supported by civil society organizations and their leaders. Turkey's unique position concerning the Turkmen case, both in terms of various governments' willingness to use Turkmen in Iraq as a foreign policy instrument (Danış & Parla, 2009; Karadeniz, 2011) and because of the Turkmen diaspora's perception of Turkey as a kin state (Büyüksaraç, 2017), rendered the country deeply engaged with Turkmen political mobilization both within and outside of the borders of Iraq.

⁴ <https://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/126707-bakan-gulden-turkiyeli-iraklilara-cagri>

As stated, Turkmen immigration to Turkey from Iraq had already started in the 1950s, with students coming for educational purposes (Danış,2006). Kerkük (2011) states that even in the 1940s, Turkmen students living in Ankara and Istanbul started to mobilize for political purposes in their community which eventually led to the foundation of the Iraqi Turks Culture and Charity Association in the 1960s (as cited in Büyüksaraç, 2017). Turkmen's first political organizations emerged in the 1970s in Iraq, which can be considered a very late period compared to the political mobilization of Kurds and Shia Arabs against the Iraqi regime (Yılmaz, 2006). Turkmen Brotherhood Association emerged as the first organization representing the Turkmen community's interests in 1960 (Strakes, 2009). Although it did not have a political focus in the beginning, its increasing engagement with opposition politics, led to the Baath party's violent oppression of the organization towards the 1980s (Strakes, 2009). The 1980s were decisive for the Turkmen community in Iraq. Several leaders of the Turkmen community were arrested, tortured, and eventually executed in 1980, including one of the former leaders of the Turkmen Brotherhood Association (Şimşir, 2004). Execution of some community leaders' exile of others created long-lasting damage to Turkmen mobilization and restrained their ability to defend their rights (Tuzlu, 2019). Iraqi National Democratic Turkmen Organization was founded in 1981 in protest of the execution of Turkmen leaders by the Baath regime, and this eventually led to the foundation of the Iraqi National Turkmen party in 1988 as the former organization was shut down by the regime (Oğuzlu,2004). During the 1980s, under the background of assimilation policies of the Baath regime, forced displacements of Turkmen, and violent suppression of their organizations, Turkmen mobilization gradually moved to places abroad where they could more freely (Tuzlu, 2019). Therefore, Iraqi National Democratic Turkmen Organization was founded in Syria, and later Iraqi Turkmen who migrated to Turkey founded the Iraqi National Turkmen party as the first political party of Turkmen (Tuzlu, 2019). From then on, Turkey became an important hub for the Turkmen political mobilization that emerged outside of Iraq.

The second Gulf War and emergence of an autonomous rule in Northern Iraq, where most of the Turkmen live, and Turkey's increasing influence in Iraq with its military provided an opportunity space for Turkmen, and the 1990s marked a new era of Turkmen politicization at a much higher level (Duman,2012; Oguzlu, 2004). The proliferation of Turkmen political organizations in the 1990s could emerge with the active political support of Turkey as Turkey was trying to balance the empowerment of Kurds

following the Gulf War by supporting its Turkmen relatives (Oguzlu,2002; Vahram, 2003). While new Turkmen parties started to be founded to give a more united political voice to the Turkmen community, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) was founded in 1995 as an umbrella organization that unites six different Turkmen parties (Şimşir,2004). Since its foundation, ITF emerged as one of the established voices of the Turkmen community in Iraqi politics as one of the most well-organized ones and considered itself an organization that represents all Turkmen (Duman, 2012). However, one of the contention points regarding ITF has also been its relation to Turkey. ITF is believed to be founded by the Turkish state (Jenkins,2008). Despite the overall support that ITF receives from Turkmen nationalists, it is considered a party among Turkmen mainly controlled by the Turkish government's political preferences (Büyüksaraç,2017, Strakes, 2009). Both political stances regarding Turkey and Kurds and sectarian differences led to fractures among Turkmen political organizations and the emergence of new parties (Strakes, 2009). In 2009, before the general elections, ITF declared itself as a political party, not an umbrella organization only, and this led to some Turkmen parties leaving ITF, such as Turkmen Nationalist Movement, Turkmen Islamic Union, Turkmen Justice Party, and Turkmen Independents Movement (Duman, 2012). After 2003, with the political transformation, Iraq went through, Turkmen political movements also increased in quantity, and currently, there are around 20 Turkmen political parties; however, it is difficult to mention the considerable political influence of those parties (Duman,2010).

Following the occupation, an interim Iraqi government composed of 25 members representing various ethnic and sectarian constituents of Iraq was instated in 2004; however, in this composition, Turkmen were represented by only one member (Uzgel,2020b). The overall weakness of Iraq Turkmen's political influence is also accompanied by ITF's failure to establish a sizeable Turkmen support base. ITF was represented by 3 Turkmen MPs among 12 Turkmen MPs in total in January 2005 elections that would elect the MPs who would prepare the constitution (Doğan,2018). In Kirkuk, assumed to be the center of the Turkmen support base, ITF got only 16 percent of votes as Turkmen chose not to run not from the ITF list but from other Kurdish and Shia coalitions' electoral lists (Uzgel,2020b). Turkmen political movement in Iraq diverges into three camps (Omar,2017). The first group is founded by the Shia political parties that receive Iranian support, and the second one was founded by the support of KRG and Kurdish parties and collaborated with them for political influence and finally,

ITF supported by Turkey that enjoys higher popularity among the others (Omar,2017). It is impossible to come up with a specific figure as in other cases; however, it is believed that around 50 to 60 percent of the Turkmen population in Iraq are Shia, while others are Sunni (Büyüksaraç, 2017; Uzgel, 2020b). This constitutes one of the sources of friction among the Turkmen community and a vital predicament for their political unity. ITF mainly appealed to nationalist and Sunni Turkmen while failing to reach Shia Turkmen, who define themselves more over their ethnic and religious identity, which indicates that sectarian identities carry an actual weight for Iraqi Turkmen (Uzgel, 2020b). In 2010 ITF made a rebuke and managed to have 10 MPs represented with three ministerial positions in the Maliki government (Duman, 2012). However, it is difficult to hail it as a critical victory for Turkmen's representation. ITC can increase its MP share only by joining other electoral coalitions, as in the case of 2010 and a united Turkmen list' to bring the same success seems unlikely (Duman,2010). Not having accurate data on demography makes monitoring Turkmen electoral behavior challenging; however, Turkmen's vote share remains very low even for the moderate estimates of the Turkmen population (Duman,2010). This indicates that either the Turkmen electorate chooses to vote for other parties, or they do not go to the ballot box (Duman,2010). The result is an even weakened representation of Iraqi Turkmen, who are already disadvantaged in terms of demographic balances as a minority group. In the recent Iraq general election conducted in 2021, ITF had 2 MPs from Kirkuk (Karaalp & Aydaoğan,2021) as an indication of ITF's ongoing low electoral performance.

Apart from the political organizations of Iraqi Turkmen in Iraq, there is a vibrant community living in Turkey, as stated. Iraqi Turkmen, with an old immigration history and a well-established diaspora in Turkey, has various associations operating in various fields, from human rights to cultural solidarity and economic activities. These organizations play crucial roles in the Iraqi community living in Turkey. While they provide humanitarian services to community members, more importantly, they act as an interlocutor between the Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey, the Turkish state, and Iraq (Bayraktar, 2008). The role of the solidarity associations and Turkmen organizations in general and their importance changed throughout periods, depending on Turkey's relation with the Turkmen community and its Iraq policy. In the post-1990 period, it became increasingly difficult for Iraqi Turkmen to get citizenship and settle in Turkey due to changing Turkmen policy (Danış & Parla, 2009). Therefore, these associations slowly moved their

primary function from being the vocal voice for the Turkmen cause to fulfilling more practical functions to ease the struggles of Turkmen living in Turkey (Danış & Parla, 2009). Turkmen immigrants were coming to Turkey mainly for educational purposes in earlier periods and were better off economically and faced more welcoming reception policies (Danış,2006). However, as the wars and armed conflict engulfed Iraq, the former immigrant profile was replaced by those from lower socio-economic backgrounds who entered the country or stayed without valid documentation as they faced much more restrictive receptions policies (Danış,2006). Research conducted by Sirkeci (2011) on Iraqi Turkmen flights concludes that in line with tightening reception policies, half of Iraqi Turkmen used extra-legal methods to come and stay in Turkey. As a result, these organizations' significant duties have been providing legal and economic help to Iraqi Turkmen and easing their settlement process in the country (Danış,2006). The Turkmen associations, like other immigrant organizations, provide networks of solidarity and a hub to protect the cultural heritage of fellow Iraqi Turkmen. However, apart from that, the kin-state relation between Turkey and Turkmen differentiates these organizations from other immigrant organization in other countries. These associations also retain a crucial political aspect concerning their activities. Turkmen elites living in Turkey are essential actors in "kin-state politics" through the lobby activities they conduct (Büyüksaraç, 2017, p.34). They are also active in mobilizing the immigrant votes for the election in the home country and cooperating with the state for this purpose (Danış & Parla, 2009). Iraqi Turkmen Front is one of the leading centers of these political activities. ITF, despite being Kirkuk-based, has several offices in Turkey, and as a political party, it performs a sort of diplomatic mission that represents Iraqi Turkmen, lobby in their name of them, and coordinate the relations between Iraq, Turkey and Turkmen for these purposes (Bayraktar,2008).

4.2 *Host Country POS: Turkey*

Turkey is the main center of our Iraqi Turkmen's political mobilization analysis. Although this study has a transnational focus, Turkey is the point of departure for the agents of this mobilization and is where the immigrant associations and solidarity networks are located as per the focus of this research. Before moving to the details of the political opportunity structure of Turkey, it is important to contextualize the migration policies that Turkey has pursued since the foundation of the republic.

As the case of Iraqi Turkmen will reveal, migration and the policies pursued to manage it has an intricate relation with the identity formation within the context of Turkey. Starting from 1920s, migration was used as an instrument for the Turkification of the newly founded state through the emigration of mainly Greeks and immigration of ethnically Turkish Muslim people from Balkans (Aksel and İçduygu,2013). In that sense, Turkish Republic pursued a much stricter migration policy compared to Ottoman Empire and placed ethnic and religious affinity at the center of its migration policy and who is defined as the ‘acceptable migrant’ (Kirişçi, 2000). This was also reflected in the official documents’ regulation migration as 1934 Law on Settlement defines the conditions of being accepted as refugee or migrant based on being Turkish origin and belonging to Turkish culture (Aksel and İçduygu,2013).

1980s onwards, Turkey faced with series of migration flows coming from Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran and other ex-Soviet republics mainly composed of irregular migrant escaping the political turmoil at home and also economic migrants (İçduygu,2004). Despite certain steps towards liberalization in 2000s, Turkey’s migration policy remained strict it retains the official stance on Turkishness and Turkish culture with the renewed settlement Law enacted in 2006 (Aksel and İçduygu,2013). Syrian crisis can be considered new chapter in Turkey’s migration policies. In line with changing political circumstances Turkey response to Syrian refugee crisis moved from a humanitarian open door policy to a stricter migration policy focusing on returns and border control (Aras and Mentucek, 2015).

Regarding the reflections of Turkey’s overall migration policy towards the reception policies on Turkmen, the ethnic identity of Iraqi Turkmen renders the group one of the acceptable migrant groups according to criteria set by Settlement Law. As in the case of emigration of Balkan Turks, Iraqi Turkmen’s migration to Turkey can be considered favorable from the Turkish state’s point of view. Daniş and Parla (2009) indicates that despite the emphasis on ethnic identity, Turkish state establish a hierarchal relation among its Turkish descent migrants and welcomes Balkan Turks, Iraqi Turkmen faces much less favorable reception policies centered on a securitized perspective.

If I move back to the political opportunity structures, in this section, I will try to conceptualize the host country POS, through the official policies, laws and regulation

exist in Turkey on Turkmen. The nuances of Turkey's migration policy towards Turkmen will be supplemented with the following sections.

The primary variable that measures the extent of the host country's political opportunity structures is the individual rights recognized by immigrants. In Chapter 2, an extensive overview of the literature indicated that social, economic, and political rights given to immigrants in the host country substantially affect the volume and form of immigrant mobilization (Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales & Giugni, 2011). Dwelling on this literature, I scrutinized the fundamental rights given to Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey and addressed how the extent of these rights has changed starting from the 1990s. Nationality acquisition (Koopmans et al., 2005, p.35), access to long-term permits, labor market access, welfare state access, and political rights (Morales & Giugni, 2011, p.47) constitute the main categories of rights chosen as host country POS. To operationalize these categories, the Migration Policy Index (Solano, Giacomo, and Huddleston, 2020),⁵ which measures the integration policies that countries pursue migrants, served as a valuable tool for this study. I borrowed the seven categories and their measurement scales used by the index with some adaptations. These categories are long-term permits and family reunification, which collectively measure the right to long-term permits; health and education, which measures welfare state access; labor market access; citizenship and political participation. Taking the measurement scales used by the Migration Policy Index (Solano, Giacomo, and Huddleston, 2020) as the basis, each category was assigned a score ranging between 0 and 100, and this allows us to see how each subcategory of host country POS scored starting from the 1990s until today. In the Appendix A, there is a detailed section on how the categories in Table 4.1 were operationalized and their measurement scales with references to relevant laws and regulations.

Table 4.1: The score for the Political Opportunity Structure of the Host Country

Categories	90- 93	93- 98	98- 01	01- 06	06- 09	09- 13	13- 15	15- 16	16- 17	17- 19	19-
Long Term Permit	25	25	29	29	29	29	41	41	41	41	41

⁵ <https://www.mipex.eu/>

Family Reunification	77	77	77	77	77	77	63	63	58	58	58
Health	0	0	0	0	50	50	50	66	66	66	66
Education	16	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	36	46
Labor Market Access	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Citizenship	75	75	75	75	75	58	58	58	58	70	70
Political Participation	17	17	17	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Average Score	40.7	42.1	42.7	43.2	50.4	48	50.7	50	49.2	52.4	53.8

Note. The last two digits represented the years (e.g., 1990 = 90, 2001= 01). The detailed operationalization of categories is in Appendix A.

The overview of the categories that constitute host country POS required addressing a series of laws and policies adopted in Turkey over the years regarding immigrants in general and Iraqi Turkmen in specific areas. The most general inference that can be made from this table is that the political opportunity structures in Turkey gradually increased starting from the 1990s Iraqi Turkmen. It is notable that despite the considerable increase from an average score of 40.7 in 1990 to 53.8 in 2019, Turkey overall scores relatively low on the political opportunity structure, with a score of around 50 out of 100. On the other hand, several categories persistently scored relatively low, and some scored high. Labor market access is one of them that belongs to the second category. With the help of the Law on the Employment of Foreigners of Turkish Descent immigrants who can prove that they are of Turkish descent have an important privilege regarding access to the labor market compared to other categories of immigrants in Turkey. (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981). Another category that scored high is citizenship, and except the period between 2009-2017, this category scores relatively high on the scale regarding POS. The most important reason is that the Settlement Law enacted in 1934 and re-enacted in 2006 with minor changes (İskan Kanunu, 1934; İskan Kanunu, 2006). The Settlement Law

states that the main criteria for being accepted as an immigrant to Turkey is being of Turkish descent and being attached to Turkish culture. The Law also states that those accepted as an immigrant under these conditions will acquire citizenship immediately. The Settlement Law (1934) reflects the state policies of the era that was trying to homogenize the population through ethnocultural references and change the country's demographic balance in favor of the Turkish and Muslim population (Ülker,2008).

In this regard, Iraqi Turkmen were on the winning side of the equation, at least on paper. Their ethnic descent gives them the right to settle and acquire citizenship in Turkey, unlike other immigrant groups. This was also confirmed by the Iraqi Turkmen themselves as most of the Iraqi Turkmen immigrated to Turkey before 1991, could quickly settle in Turkey, and got citizenship within months (Danış, 2006). However, as the political dynamics started to change in Iraq and Turkey with the First Gulf War, the Turkish minority in Iraq transformed into an essential foreign policy instrument for Turkey to counterweight the Kurds, and Iraqi Turkmen fleeing to Turkey became a less desirable outcome (Danış & Parla, 2009). This change was directly reflected in the reception policies of Turkey regarding Iraqi Turkmen, and after the 1990s, it became increasingly difficult for Turkmen to get residency and citizenship, which became almost impossible after 2003 (Danış & Parla, 2009). Although there has not been a change on the legal level regarding the right of Turkish descendants to settle in Turkey, a right reaffirmed by the Settlement Law (2006), the change of dynamics in other realms nullified the effect of an important political opportunity space. This indicates the importance of having a holistic approach regarding opportunity structures that involves the dynamics between the host and home country and the transnational contexts. An important category that scored very low persistently is political participation. This is an important indicator for this study as, throughout the years, the specific opportunity space provided for political participation remained limited, which may reflect upon the degree of political mobilization on the ground.

It can be inferred from the table above that, at the official level, overall POS Turkey provided to Iraqi Turkmen incrementally increased from 1990 onwards. However, this does not mean that the existing POS is a favorable one for political mobilization. The average score is around half of the scale at its highest currently. This also needs to be substantiated by the other components of the POS, as shrinking opportunities in one level can render the other ones meaningless.

4.3 *Home Country POS: Iraq*

The main categories included in the host country's political opportunity structures in this thesis are regime type, political stability, and diaspora policies. In this section, I will go over the main historical periods that Iraq underwent concerning major political phases. The historical overview will lay the background to assess these three components of the host country POS. Additionally, I will be dwelling on the Polity V data set (Gurr & Marshall, 2020) to provide a reference for the different regime categories that Iraq fell into throughout the period investigated. Finally, for relative stability, I will be referencing the political stability and absence of violence dataset by Kaufmann et al. (2010). The historical background and quantitative data together will provide us with a qualitative assessment of how these two variables in Iraq changed as a component of overall opportunity structures.

4.3.1 *The Historical Overview*

Gulf War

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 resulted in the emergence of an international military coalition led by the US and the subsequent defeat of Iraqi forces in 1991, called the Gulf War today (Katzman & Humud, 2015). Following the war, Iraq had to accept a UN monitoring mechanism over its Weapons of Mass Destruction program and a wide range of economic sanctions (Katzman & Humud, 2016). The war devastated Iraq, with economic sanctions' cutting both trade and oil as a source of revenue and war destroying the central infrastructure of the country (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). Another consequence of the war was a rebellion against that emerged in Shia-dominated southern cities and the Kurdish North against the regime, which resulted in the rebels' capturing these cities (Franzen, 2021). However, not before long, the rebellion proved to be a failure as the regime forces retook the cities violently while thousands of civilians fled the bloodshed (Franzen, 2021). Kirkuk was also one of the cities captured by the rebels and then retaken by the regime forces (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). As a result, the Turkmen living in Kirkuk took their share of expulsion and massacres committed by the Iraqi forces (Şimşir, 2004). As a result, thousands of Iraqi Kurds and Turkmen fled to Turkey, leading to the US and Britain creating a haven for the refugees (Danış, 2011). Therefore, the beginning of the significant exodus of Iraqi Turkmen toward Turkey occurred after the 1990s (Sirkeci, 2005). Throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi immigrants, composed mainly of

Kurds, continued to flow to Turkey in increasing numbers, reaching a peak towards the end of the decade (Danış, 2006). A civil war broke out between two main Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK, and continued between 1994-1998, followed by further armed clashes between PKK and KDP towards the 2000s and all these events contributed to overall instability in the country (Danış, 2006).

The most important consequence of the 1991 rebellion reassured the regime's survival and resulted in its restructuring and consolidation of the security apparatus and Saddam's control over them (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). The Baathist dictatorship led by Saddam Hussein in the 1970s created regime stability and an infrastructural capacity that depended on coercion, nationalism, and resource wealth (Dodge & Wasser, 2014). Towards the 1990s, Iran Iraq War, the Invasion of Kuwait, and the ensuing international sanctions imposed on the country tiered down the regime's institutional strength and capacity to provide services to people (Dodge & Wasser, 2014). However, the patronage network that Saddam spread over all state agencies, including its coercive apparatus, ensured the regime's survival throughout the 1990s (Dodge, 2003). Moreover, despite the wars and the impact, the sanctions created the regime's ability to impose violent control over society, which mainly remained intact until its fall (Dodge & Wasser, 2014).

Overall, the 1990s was a period of high instability accompanied by war and civil strife for Iraq; however, the regime managed to maintain its control over the state and society backed by its suppressive security apparatus.

2003 Invasion

The invasion of Iraq brought unprecedented violence and the demise of the Iraqi state with the removal of former political and military institutions, which mobilized ethnic and sectarian cleavages in the society (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). Three years after the occupation, by 2006, Iraq was on the verge of total collapse and becoming a failed state (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). After the fall of Saddam's regime, a US-run transitional authority ruled the country for one year, a new Iraqi constitution was drafted, and the first parliamentary elections were held in 2005 (Dodge, 2013). The US's disbanding all former components of the Iraqi state, especially the Iraqi army, with the purpose of de-Baathification paved the way for the ensuing violence and instability (Franzen, 2021). Arab Sunni insurgency mobilized by ongoing de-Baathification, Shia insurgency led by

religious cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, his Mehdi army, and Al Qaida's Iraq branch, which infiltrated the country engulfed political scene of post-invasion Iraq (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). The bombing of a critical Shia Shrine in a Sunni area unleashed a full-fledged sectarian civil war in 2006 (Katzman & Humud, 2015). This sectarian violence inflicted on Iraq from 2004 until 2007 (Dodge, 2013) was mitigated by the US deploying additional military forces in 2007 to tame the conflict (Katzman & Humud, 2015). Maliki came to power as prime minister in 2006 and started a new era in Iraq, whose effects will be felt even much later. Maliki advocated for a strong state and central government and followed policies that gradually personalized the power in his hands (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). Through the passage of several legislations, he addressed some parts of Sunni resentment and confronted his Shia and Sunni rival both politically and militarily, which eventually consolidated Maliki's power in post-2008 (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). Together with the US's military surge in 2007, Maliki's consolidation of power improved stability and decreased violence in the country (Katzman & Humud, 2015) up until the Arab uprisings. Maliki also created a patronage network that placed him at the center (Dodge, 2013). By bypassing the military command structure, he directly connected senior commanders to himself, effectively destroying the army's unitary structure (Dodge & Wasser, 2014). Therefore, Maliki's policies also sowed the seed for the subsequent periods of instability because of his personalizing power and sectarian policies. The beginning of this new cycle of war and civil strife came to Iraq with the Arab Spring that started in 2011. Although protests also rocked Iraq following Arab uprisings, the main challenge faced was not a demand for regime change but the uprisings' regional effects, which led to ISIS founding a fertile ground in Syria and spreading to Iraq (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017).

ISIS emerged as an insurgent group in 2003 under the leadership of Zarqawi, later joined with Al Qaida in 2004 and titled itself Al Qaida in Iraq and then in 2006 as Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). The group was composed of Sunni Iraqis who were radicalized during the Saddam rule and subsequent invasion (Katzman & Humud, 2015). Due to a lack of local support and US presence, the group remained a weak force up until 2011, which was reversed with the start of the Syrian Civil War ("The Islamic State", 2021). The civil war broke out in Syria in 2011 and provided a new gate for the ISI and a new base to recruit fighters and establish a Syrian branch of the organization (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). ISI renamed itself as firstly the Islamic State of

Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in 2013, then following its capture of Mosul, it declared a caliphate under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi by taking the name of Islamic State (Katzman & Humud, 2015). After 2013, leaning on Sunni tribes alienated by Maliki's sectarianism, Islamic State quickly expanded its control over Iraqi territory, capturing the cities such as Falluja and Mosul one by one in the face of a collapsing Iraqi army (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). To defeat the Islamic State, the United States started an operation called "Operation Inherent Resolve," based on cooperating with several other countries on the military front, conducting air strikes, and providing training and ammunition to the Iraqi forces (Katzman & Humud, 2015). As a result, by 2017, Islamic State had lost almost all the territory it held, including Mosul and Raqqa, majority of its fighters and leadership cadre; however, its ideology and sleeping cells remain a constant threat to the future (Alkaff & Mahzam, 2018). Islamic State's capture of significant cities and subsequent military operations created a tremendous human cost for Iraqis. While thousands of civilians were displaced and turned into IDPs (internally displaced people) with the advance of ISIS, both escaped, and the remained civilians were subjected to torture, rape, arbitrary killings, and forced disappearances (Eriksson & Khaleel, 2018). Islamic State militants were not the only party that tormented civilians. During and after the liberation of the captured cities, civilians were subjugated to similar practices of arbitrary detention, rape, and killings by the Iraqi forces, including both Shia militias called popular mobilization forces (PMU) and the Kurdish forces (Eriksson & Khaleel, 2018)

In 2014 elections of Iraq which were conducted under the shadow of a rising ISIS threat, gave Maliki enough seats to secure a third term; however, the assumed role of Maliki in the rise of ISIS, ongoing crises in the country, international pressure combined with the collapse of his domestic support led to the end of his era (Marr & Al-Marashi, 2017). Haydar al-Abadi replaced Maliki as the prime minister, who was perceived as a reconciliatory political figure (Katzman & Humud, 2015). However, Abadi's coming to power and subsequent defeat of ISIS did not bring stability to Iraq. In 2015, another series of protests started in Basra and expanded to other cities due to persistent problems in Iraq, such as poor public services, widespread corruption, and nepotism (Jabar, 2018). Abadi declared a reform package aiming to ameliorate a wide range of issues that the protestors demanded, such as improving public services and fighting corruption (Jabar, 2018). However, the structural factors underlying the Iraqi political scene, which are endemic

corruption built around a sectarian patronage network, did not prevent the emergence of another protest movement in 2018 organized around mainly similar demands for reform (Dodge,2018). Two thousand eighteen protests took place in the background of government formation struggles after the 2018 elections, which eventually led to Adil Abdul Mehdi's assuming the position of the prime minister only to resign a year after massive protests broke out in 2019, which resulted in the death of hundreds of protestors ("Iraq's Tishreen Uprising",2021). However, the latest episode of protests turned into the most significant and most enduring protest movement in the post-2003 era, led by young activists mobilized under the title of Tishreen (October) Movement ("Iraq's Tishreen Uprising",2021). As this brief overview provides an outline of Iraq's regime change and political stability, I will move to the quantified data on these two variables.

4.3.2 Regime Type




Figure 4.1: Revised Combined Polity Score of Iraq

Note. Polity V defines the scale -10 to -6 as autocracies, -5 to 0 as closed anocracies, 1 to 5 as open anocracies, and 6 to 9 as democracies. Adapted from *Polity5 Project Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018* (p5v2018; Version 2018) by Gurr, T.R. and Marshall, M. G. Center for Systematic Peace.

Polity V project is a project based on coding the main authority traits of countries, and in that sense, it offers a generalized trend over the institutionalized characters of a country's regime (Gurr & Marshall,2020). The polity score used by this data set which

presents a scale between -10 and 10 as strongly autocratic and democratic regimes, is a valuable tool for this purpose (Gurr & Marshall,2020). In addition, this variable considers executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and political participation (Gurr & Marshall,2020).

As Figure 4.1 indicates, depending on the score that a polity receives in the categories mentioned earlier, the overall score of the polity determines the regime characteristic of that polity. The polity project rate the polities on a scale starting from institutionalized autocracies, moving towards the less stable autocratic regimes with mixed characteristics called anocracies to fully democratic regimes (Center for Systematic Peace, 2021). Therefore, countries ranged between -10 to -6 categorized as autocracies, -5 to 0 as closed anocracies, 1 to 5 as open anocracies, and 6 to 9 as democracies (Center for Systematic Peace, 2021). It can be observed from Figure 4.1 that Iraq remained a full autocracy up until 2002. Therefore, according to Polity V, during this period, Iraq, with a score of – 9, was almost a fully institutionalized autocracy, a regime ruled by a personalistic leadership; the political participation of citizens was enormously curtailed, the chief executive exercised almost limitless power without no meaningful constraint from legislation or judiciary (Erzinga-Marshall & Marshall, 2017). The start of the American invasion in 2003, the subsequent fall of the Saddam regime, and the continued presence of American forces as a transitional authority and then as a military power put Iraq into a new category, which is anocracy. *Anocracies* are defined as a transitional phase between authoritarian and democratic regimes; they may have certain democratic features, such as having a political competition or competitive elections but combine them with authoritarian features, such as minimal checks over the executive branch (Erzinga-Marshall & Marshall, 2017). More importantly, these countries are volatile and weak in their governing capacity; therefore, the countries under occupation or where a foreign force or authority provides support to sustain authority are also listed under anocracies (Erzinga-Marshall & Marshall, 2017). Therefore between 2003 and 2009, Iraq was coded as a polity supported by a foreign power and listed as an anocracy for this reason (Gurr & Marshall,2020). With the gradual withdrawal of US forces between 2010 and 2013, Iraq is no longer coded as a country supported by a foreign authority and fell under the category of open anocracies with a score of 3. Finally, from 2014 onwards, Iraq, with a score of 6, can be defined on the borderline of a democratic regime.

It can be inferred from this graphic that Iraq remained an almost entirely authoritarian regime throughout the 1990s until the 2003 invasion. After the transitional phase of regime change, Iraq was settled as an anocratic regime, making it an unstable polity with mixed authoritarian and democratic characteristics. Finally, in 2014, Iraq was defined as a democracy. However, regime type is a very row category to analyze political mobilizations, especially in the case of a minority group like Iraqi Turkmen. To substantiate this data, it is also necessary to look at the stability factor within Iraq.

4.3.3 Relative Stability




Figure 4.2: Political Stability and Absence of Violence in Iraq

Note. The graph indicates the perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism, with a score ranging approximately between -2.5 to 2.5. Adapted from Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130)

Relative stability is the second important component of host country POS. While regime type gives an overall picture of the opportunity space within the country, stability is as crucial as the regime type. An unstable democratic regime can provide as little space as a stable autocratic regime for meaningful political mobilization. Graph X lays out the political stability of Iraq from 1996 onwards based on the Worldwide Governance

Indicators dataset compiled by (Kaufmann et al., 2010). As indicated in the graph, this variable range approximately between -2.5 to 2.5, from higher political stability and a lower likelihood of violence to the opposite. The data starts from the year 1996. Up until 2003, Iraq has a substantially low level of political stability, with a score ranging around -1.7. However, as can be seen, this period remains a relatively stable era for Iraq compared to the other episodes. 2003 and 2004 are recorded as the most violent and unstable years unexpectedly, as this is the year that US occupations started. After seeing the bottom point in 2004, in the following years, Iraq gradually increased its political stability score; however, only in 2011, its score reaches the level of 1996 with -1.8. In 2014, the graph saw another periodic bottom score of -2.5, again unexpectedly, as this was the year that ISIS surged to the surface. Despite the sporadic improvement after 2015, Iraq remains a highly volatile country up until today, with a stability score of around -2.4 and -2.5.

4.3.4 *Diaspora*

Despite being weak in Iraq, Diaspora policies constitute an essential component of the political opportunity structures in the country, especially before the regime's fall. How countries engage or not with their diasporas abroad is categorized under different titles depending on their level of engagement (Gamlen, 2006; Ragazzi, 2014). However, the country's regime type is another crucial factor affecting the engagement level (Tsourapas, 2018). The reason is that those authoritarian countries engage with their diasporic communities to control and tame a possible opposition abroad. The role that influential figures such as Ahmed Chalabi played in the road that led to the invasion indicates the importance of the Iraqi diaspora (Kadhumi, 2021).

Not many studies focus on the Saddam regime's engagement with the Iraqi diaspora. However, in one of the rare studies, Helfont (2018) explains how the Saddam regime was a transnational dictatorship disciplining its citizens outside of Iraq's borders based on extensive research made on the Baath party's documents. These documents indicate Baath party was the primary agent of the regime and was responsible for monitoring the citizens and dissent abroad and punishing them when deemed necessary. With the 1991 Gulf War and looming economic sanctions, the Iraqi diaspora quickly grew, and the regime tried to control the growing dissent abroad by either offering financial favors and gates to power to them or through direct methods of targeting their

families or sending assassination teams in more extreme cases (Helfont,2018). These examples indicate that Saddam's regime was no exception from the other authoritarian states of the middle east that used similar methods to suppress their citizens abroad through the most violent and extreme methods (Tsourapas,2020).

The fall of Saddam's regime ended such extreme applications, but it did not establish a healthy engagement between the new Iraqi state and its diaspora. Kurdish Regional Government can be separated from central Iraq in that it tries to reach its diasporic communities, is willing to dwell on the human and economic capital they represent and acts as a homeland state for the Kurdish diaspora (Başer, 2017; 2019). The other initiatives the central government engaged in to comprehensively reach the Iraqi diaspora are very recent. One of the main initiatives regarding diaspora engagement was implemented in 2017 with the participation of international actors such as UNDP and IOM under the project Iraq's Rebuilding Iraq (Russell & Noack,2017). Iraq also started a program of engagement with Iraqis abroad starting from 2019 to target the human capital of the diaspora and increase its contribution to the development of Iraq, which represents an important step in developing a long-term diaspora policy (Tittel-Mosser,2021). Both programs aim to return the Iraqi diaspora to their homelands and contribute to their country's development and democratization through the skills, networks, and human capital they endow (Tittel-Mosser,2021).

It is not easy to discuss the Iraqi government's comprehensive diaspora policy, and these initiatives are very recent and well institutionalized. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that there is a vast difference between the Saddam era which diaspora communities were fiercely controlled and targeted, and the current period where no such policies exist, at least at a systematic level. However, it requires further research to tell how much this regime change was reflected in the political mobilization of diaspora communities.

4.4 *Overview of Home Country POS in Iraq*

The data set does not cover the aftermath of the First Gulf War until 1996, but it can be inferred from the historical overview that it is one of the most violent periods of Iraqi history. As explained in the historical overview, the destruction came from war and sanctions aggravated by rebellion, which significantly hit the cities habited by Turkmen. The aftermath of the war and suppression of the rebellion was an authoritarian

consolidation by the Saddam regime. Therefore, what can be seen is that the relatively less unstable era before the invasion came with the brutal suppression of political mobilization against the regime. We can state that the early 1990s was an era in which Iraq had a relatively closed political opportunity space which continued until the invasion despite the relative stability. The 1990s was also the beginning of mass-scale Turkmen immigration toward Turkey. With the invasion and the regime fell, total collapse of the state and ensuing violence made the regime change almost meaningless. After 2007, the upsurge of US forces and Maliki's consolidation of power tamed the violence in the country. Despite Maliki's sectarian and anti-democratic rule, it can be stated that up until the ISIS surge in Iraq in 2014, the opportunity space improved compared to earlier eras. The defeat of ISIS did not completely resolve the instability and violence prevalent. As Graph X confirms, Iraq is still a highly volatile country grappled by sectarian violence. However, from 2014 onwards, Iraq is defined as a borderline democracy for which Maliki's departure and reform attempts should have played a role. A substantial political mobilization in Iraq's streets revealed itself as mass protests demanding change. Tishreen Uprising even had the chance to enter the assembly by turning the movement into a political force ("Iraq's Tishreen Uprising",2021). Overall, it can be stated that currently, there is an opportunity structure in Iraq with mixed traits that combine the prevailing instability and violence with a more open political regime and increased space for political mobilization.

I cannot mention any established diaspora policy for current Iraq. Although there are recent initiatives to pull the human capital that flew back to the country, these are ad hoc initiatives rather than full-fledged diaspora policies. However, authoritarian regimes' policies can have a much more significant effect than diaspora engagement policies. In this regard, during the decade that preceded the regime's fall in Iraq, the regime's security apparatus tried to control the Iraqi diaspora closely and targeted them through violent methods. Therefore, the pre-2003 period was much more difficult to mobilize the Iraqi diaspora with minimal opportunity space due to the state's control.

4.5 *Transnational POS*

4.5.1 *Turkey-Iraq Relations and Foreign Policy Priorities of Turkey*

Transnational POS as addressed in this study is composed of three components: Turkey-Iraq relations, foreign policy priorities of Turkey and the role of international

actors/institutions. The section below will provide an analysis on the first two components with the help of an historical overview.

Political Background Turkey-Iraq Relations Towards Gulf War

This thesis's main historical period starts with the First Gulf War in 1991. 1991 represents a significant turning point regarding Turkey- Iraqi relations and the role that Turkey started to play in the Middle East. Following First Gulf War, Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq has been intermingled with its domestic politics at an increasing scale. The main reason was that Kurdish separatism was taking an organized and violent form in the 1970s by the foundation of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Kumral,2016). PKK was a militant insurgent movement founded by Abdullah Öcalan, combining Marxist ideology with its nationalist aims of founding an independent Kurdistan through armed struggle in Turkey (Kumral,2016). A vital component that makes the Kurdish issue a top-priority foreign policy issue is the assumption that other states support Kurdish separatists to weaken Turkey (Gunter, 1988). Considering that the three neighboring countries of Turkey have Kurdish minorities as, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it is understandable that the Kurdish question did not remain a domestic security challenge for Turkey. Iraq constituted the center of Turkey's foreign policy guided by security concerns as PKK forces relocated to Norther Iraq following Syria's ending its support to the group as a result of Turkey's initiatives in 1983 (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). One of the essential precautions that Turkey has taken in this regard was a security agreement signed between Iraq and Turkey in 1984 that recognized Turkey and Iraq the right to conduct cross-border operations within the 5 kilometers depth of each other's borders (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). In 1984, PKK started attacking Turkish troops as an indication of moving the insurgency to a guerilla war phase against the Turkish state (Özcan, 1999). Following this period, Turkey conducted various cross-border operations in Iraq against PKK forces based on the security agreement made by Iraq (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Furthermore, during the 1980s, while Turkey was dealing with an insurgency within its borders, the ongoing Iran-Iraq War also rendered Kurds a valuable actor to play against Iraq for Iran (Kumral, 2016). These developments led to a quick securitization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey's foreign policy and pushed Turkey to develop its relations with Iraq, mainly over security cooperation during the period that led to the Gulf War (Kumral,2016).

Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, relations with Iraq on security cooperation entered a turbulent period that will continue for decades. With the end of Iran, Iraq War in 1988 Saddam regime turned all its effort to violently suppressing the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu,2020). The Iraqi regime's use of chemical weapons and massacres against Kurds led to thousands of Kurds fleeing Turkey and the Iranian border. Meanwhile, the Saddam regime requested to use its right to hot pursuit based on the 1984 security agreement to chase down those fleeing the regime; however, Turkey rejected this request (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu,2020). There was mounting international pressure on Turkey to open its borders to refugees and not to cooperate with Iraq. Özal government decided that considering its application to the EU for full membership in 1987 and the importance of Kurdish voters in the upcoming local elections, cooperating with the international community was politically a wiser decision. (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu, 2020; Kumral,2016). As a result, Turkey opened its borders to Kurdish refugees and settled thousands of refugees in the camps within its borders. This policy created two significant consequences (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Firstly, Turkey's good relations consolidated by security cooperation between Iraq and Turkey ended, and Iraq left the security agreement signed in 1984. Secondly, Iraq hardened its policy on Turkmen by subjecting them to forced resettlements and executing Turkmen people.

The Gulf War and Aftermath: First Period of Multilevel Engagement

Saddam Regime's invasion of Kuwait following the First Gulf War represented a rupture regarding Turkey's foreign policy and its relations with Iraq. Turkey has left its traditional foreign policy of neutrality and actively got involved in the Gulf War on the side of an international coalition led by the United States (Hale, 1992; Uzgel,2020a). The US demanded three major requests from Turkey (Abramowitz,1995, as cited in Uzgel, 2020a). The first one of these demands was allowing the US to use Turkish airbases during the war, the second one was the deployment of Turkish soldiers to the Iraqi border to alleviate the military burden, and the third one was Turkey's sending troops to contribute military coalition. President Özal was the leading political actor determined to provide full support to the coalition; however, parliament, the foreign ministry, and public opinion had an anti-war stance and supported Turkey's neutrality in the war (Hale, 1992). These divergences among the policymakers led to Turkey's fulfilling the first two demands of the US while declining the third one because the Turkish military objected to deployment (Uzgel, 2020a). There were several political and economic objectives that Özal pursued by taking an active role on the coalition's side (Uzgel, 2020a). On the

political side, Turkey's policy could elevate Turkey's position to an important regional actor, proving its strategic importance, while on the economic side, it would provide Turkey with financial favors from both United States and Gulf countries. Özal as the leading architect of the foreign policy during the Gulf War and its aftermath, considered Middle Eastern policy as a continuation of Turkey's foreign policy on the EU and the US and its desire to have stronger relations with the West (Altunışık,2009).

The following instability of the ceasefire and Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait led to the Kurdish rebellion in Northern Iraq and the subsequent suppression of the Iraqi army of the rebellion violently (Kumral, 2016). This created a second mass wave of refugee influx into Turkey's borders reaching around 500.000 people fleeing from the Saddam regime and leaving Turkey with a difficult choice to either face a humanitarian disaster or take refugees' responsibility (Hale, 1992). To deal with the pressing refugee crisis, Turkey' demanded the creation of a safe haven for refugees, and as a result, the UN adopted a resolution that imposed a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Northern Iraq, which successfully helped refugees to return (Müftüler-Baç, 2014). Under the Operation of Poised Hammer, a residual force was also deployed to Turkey's border town Silopi, including Turkish forces, to prevent any other attack by the Saddam regime against the Kurds (Hale, 1992). A direct result of the creation of safe heaven was the emergence of a de facto Kurdish government in Northern Iraq, followed by PKK's taking advantage of the power vacuum that emerged in northern Iraq to increase its capacity to strike Turkish security forces within Turkey (Hale, 1992). Turkey's foreign policy priorities were shaped around two main security concerns in Iraq during the 1990s. A weakened central authority in Baghdad could have emboldened PKK (Müftüler-Baç,2014), and the emergence of an independent Kurdish role in the North could have triggered similar sentiments for Turkey's Kurdish population (Kirişçi,1996 as cited in Müftüler-Baç,2014). During this period, PKK also received support from the Saddam regime as it was considered a bulwark against Turkish forces in Northern Iraq (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). In the face of these challenges, President Özal decided to engage with Kurdish political actors in northern Iraq to play a more decisive role (Oran, 2020). Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Masoud Barzani and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Jalal Talabani came to Turkey to meet with Özal, and Turkey provided them with diplomatic passports (Oran, 2020). This was followed by KDP's taking part in a military operation conducted by Turkey in 1992 against PKK in Iraq to appease Turkey's concerns about Kurdish rule in the North (Kirişçi, 1996). Therefore, up until 1993, Turkey followed a

two-tier policy that involved being engaged with Kurdish political actors and supporting the territorial unity of Iraq (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020).

Özal, in subsequent governments, assumed the position of both Prime Minister and President, and during these years, he was heavily involved in the foreign policymaking process (Altunışık,2009). Özal tried to change Turkish foreign policy from what he saw as a "reactive and cautious" position to a "reactive and risk-taking" one (Altunışık, 2009, p.181). As a reflection of this, Turkey tried to harmonize its divergent objectives in a multi-tier foreign policy over Iraq. Firstly, to contain the security threat that PKK posed, it conducted several military operations in Northern Iraq (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020), which was a prerogative conferred upon Turkey by the US, thanks to its role in the Operation of Poised Hammer (Oran,2020). Secondly, it continued its support for Iraq's territorial integrity and its objection to a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Thirdly, Turkey engaged with Iran and Syria, and foreign ministers of the three countries presented a unified opposition to a possible Kurdish state; however, Turkey also engaged with Kurdish political leaders and increased security and political coordination with them (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Finally, Turkey also encouraged Baghdad to increase its central authority, especially over Northern Iraq, while supporting Erbil in normalizing its relations with Baghdad (Kumral, 2016).

Özal's foreign policy was mainly based on building relations with the regional actors and trying to solve the problems through political engagement and economic relations (Altunışık,2009) instead of military ones. However, with Özal's death in 1993, Turkey returned to its old playbook of foreign policy in Iraq.

1993 onwards: Period of Re-Securitization of Iraq

In 1993 with the death of President Özal and his replacement with Süleyman Demirel, together with Tansu Çiller's assuming position of prime minister, Turkey returned to a securitized approach putting the military operations at the center (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). With PKK's renewed attacks on Turkish soil, military-dominated Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq was formulated around security concerns related to PKK separatism throughout the rest of the 1990s (Kumral, 2016). The military pursued its security-oriented approach through large-scale military operations, and by the end of 1997, three cross-border operations were already conducted in Iraq (Özcan,2009). As the ongoing PKK insurgency turned into a central domestic and foreign policy concern in the 1990s, it also legitimized the predominant role that the army played in foreign policy (Özcan,2009). As of 1996, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was determined as the leading

institution that coordinates Northern Iraq (Uzgel, 2009). Former Chief of TGS outlines the primary tenant of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s as such: "protection of the Iraqi territorial integrity, elimination of the PKK, normalization of political-economic relations with Iraq" (Torumtay, 1996 as cited in Kumral 2013, p. 92). In parallel with the securitization of Iraq's policy, Turkey's relationship with Baghdad gradually improved during this period. The beginning of this process started in 1993 when Turkey restored diplomatic relations with Iraq and followed diplomatic traffic between the two countries led by diplomatic delegations (Olson, 1995, as cited in Kumral, 2013). In 1996, Turkey welcomed the rapprochement between KDP and Baghdad against PUK as Turkey considered it a positive step for Iraq's unitary structure (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Turkey continued to advocate Iraq's territorial integrity, and this led to a divergence between the foreign policy priorities of Turkey and the US that favored a unified front between PUK and KDP against the Saddam regime (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2020). Iraq's allowing Turkey to conduct military operations in Iraq has been a facilitating factor, and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's capture in 1998 created a further motive for Turkey to engage directly with Baghdad (Demiryol & Pekşen, 2018). Turkey incurred a significant financial loss from the Gulf War due to the embargo imposed upon Iraq, the closure of the Kerkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, and stalled trade and economic transactions (Oran, 2020). As opposed to Turkey's expectations, US' and Gulf countries' material contribution to Turkey remained very limited compared to its financial losses (Oran, 2020). Therefore, starting from 1993, economic motives constituted another reason behind Turkey's initiatives to improve relations with Iraq and lift the embargo against Iraq (Oran, 2020).

The 1990s was a crucial period because Turkmen started to get involved in foreign policy considerations of Turkey despite its mild effect. Until the second half of the 1990s, Turkey refrained from taking action on behalf of the Turkmen minority in Iraq, not to give the image of intervening in the internal affairs of Iraq (Barkey, 2005; Uzgel, 2020b). Instead, Turkey started to provide support for the political mobilization of Turkmen and pioneered this process that started in the 1990s. The first political party that represents Turkmen was founded in Ankara in 1991, called Iraqi National Turkmen Party; then, an umbrella organization called Iraq Turkmen Front emerged with discrete Turkmen political parties coming together (Salihi, 2020). Iraqi Turkmen Front became Turkey's primary political agent to engage with Turkmen following decades (Büyüksaraç, 2017). Trying to engage the Turkmen community within the political processes by encouraging

their mobilization and emphasizing their identity as one of the constituent elements of Iraq constituted the center of Turkey's policy on Turkmen during that period (Karadeniz,2011). An important example of this is the Ankara process which is the series of negotiations to resolve the frictions between KDP and PUK that came to the surface in 1996 (Uzgel,2020a). Turkey involved Turkmen as a political party in those negotiations to make them a part of the ongoing political developments in the country (Uzgel,2020a).

However, Turkey's attempts to mobilize Turkmen to turn them a political actor that matters in the Iraqi equation came amidst Turkey's increased insecurity regarding Northern Iraq and served as a valuable strategy to exert influence over the political development regarding the North (Altunışık,2006). The Turkmen rights emerged as an essential argument in Turkey's hand to legitimize Turkey's involvement in Northern Iraq and defy Kurdish ambitions over Kirkuk, an oil-rich city with a sizable Turkmen population (Barkey,2005). Kirkuk has remained one of the contention points between Turkey and Northern Iraq up until today, not primarily because of its Turkmen population but mainly due to Kurds' desire to include it in Kurdish land and to control the oil revenue of the city (Vahram, 2003). In each period that the central authority in Iraq weakened in a way to embolden Kurdish ambitions regarding autonomy or independence, Turkey put forward its concerns related to the right of Turkmen as a way of exerting an influence (Vahram,2003). It is important to note that Turkey's increasing support to the Turkmen community was not in vain and created an actual difference for Turkmen voices to be heard (Vahram,2003) and provided increased security for the Turkmen community (Salihi,2020). However, Iraqi Turkmen became a factor in foreign policy when Turkey's security concerns heightened and sidelined whenever these concerns were appeased (Karadeniz, 2011).

Invasion of Iraq: Period of Decreasing Influence

In 1998 United States' Iraq policy started to be formulated around the overthrow of the Saddam regime, and in line with this policy, Congress passed the law of Liberation of Iraq, which aimed to provide financial aid to Iraq opposition groups who could bring Saddam down (Uzgel,2020b). On 8 November 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 laid the pretext of Iraq's possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) therefore setting the motion for coming to the Iraq War (Kumral,2016). Continuation of the political status quo in Iraq was not preferable for Turkey as de facto Kurdish autonomy emerged with the Gulf War in Northern Iraq was threatening Turkey's concerns for Iraq's territorial integrity (Altunışık, 2006). However, a possible war could also unleash a new

period of instability and have further consequences regarding Iraq's territorial integrity (Altunışık, 2006).

The most crucial domestic change that set the foreign policy formulation during this era was AKP (Justice and Development Party)'s coming to power by forming a government alone after the November elections in 2002. Following the change of government in Turkey, US undersecretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz and assistant secretary of state Marc Grossman came to Turkey to seek Turkey's political support with an extensive list of demands that included opening airbases to the US, hosting US forces in bases, and deployment of those forces on Turkish soil in addition to Turkey's contribution of combat forces (Altunışık, 2006). The new government assumed power in a highly indebted country ravaged by financial crises in 2001 and needed US financial and political help to ensure economic recovery (Kumral, 2016). Another primary concern for the AKP government was the fierce domestic opposition against the war, which reached almost 90 percent (Kumral, 2013). Concerned about Turkey's image in the domestic and international field regarding the role it will play in Iraq, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül engaged in last-minute diplomatic initiatives to convince Saddam (Altunışık, 2006; Uzgel, 2020b), but these attempts failed. Negotiations between Turkey and the US revolved around Turkey's demands on the "fight against PKK, the status of Northern Iraq, the status of Turkmen in the region and Turkish forces being deployed to region jointly with the US forces" (Uzgel, 2020b, p.271). In line with these demands, the National Security Council of Turkey also outlined Turkey's redlines in Iraq war as the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, the security of Turkmen living in Iraq, and the situation of Kirkuk and Mosul that cannot be crossed (Yetkin, 2004). However, the motion brought to the parliament, which was required to deploy US forces in Turkey and Turkish forces in Iraq, failed to pass on 1 March 2003 (Uzgel, 2020b). Failure of the 1 March motion created important consequences regarding the future of Turkey's US relations and Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq. The US took a much firmer stance on Turkey, sidelining Turkey as a political actor in Iraq while Kurds became a critical strategic ally for the US (Uzgel, 2020b). As a result of the Iraqi invasion, regime change occurred in Iraq, and the Saddam regime was overthrown. However, Turkey's foreign policy considerations were negatively affected throughout the following period, and many red lines it stated before the invasion were crossed (Uzgel, 2020b). Following the fall of Baghdad, Kurdish peshmerga forces entered the city of Kirkuk, then Mosul, with US forces (Kumral, 2016). The news of Kurdish forces looting the cities and destroying

the birth registers created great concern (Uzgel, 2020b), and the possibility of Kirkuk's being annexed turned into a significant foreign policy threat and security concern for policymakers in Ankara (Kumral,2013). The de facto Kurdish rule reinstated in Northern Iraq acquired legal character during the transitional period, a process finalized with adoption of the new constitution in 2005 (Uzgel, 2020b).

Furthermore, PKK ended the ceasefire in 2004 that it declared in 2000 which resulted in a new wave of attacks against Turkey (Pusane,2019). As the Qandil mountains, the center of PKK mobilization, fell under the borders of the Kurdistan Regional Governor, Turkey's relations with Kurds became highly securitized again in the post-2000 period (Pusane,2019) up until 2008. The invasion of Iraq resulted in two significant foreign policy consequences for Turkey : the collapse of central authority and the increased possibility of different fractions emerging as independent political units, mainly Kurds (Müftürler-Baç,2014). Turkey's weakening position in Turkey was also reflected negatively in the position of Iraqi Turkmen in the emerging state and Turkey's ability to dictate an influential political position for Turkmen in post-Saddam Iraq. 2005 constitution of Iraq did not regard Turkmen as one of the main constituents of the Iraqi community along with Arabs and Kurds, and this meant a significant political loss for Turkmen in Iraq (Salihi,2020). The city of Kirkuk has been another field that Turkmen lost ground in parallel with Turkey's decreasing influence. The Iraqi Constitution required a referendum to determine the status of Kirkuk; however, this referendum was delayed without setting a time frame (Uzgel, 2020b). The status of Kirkuk constituted a significant security concern for Turkey, as the oil wealth of Kirkuk could create the necessary financial leverage for a future independent Kurdish state (Barkey, 2011). Kirkuk was not included within KRG afterward; however, during the process following the invasion, Kirkuk was subjected to demographic change initiated by the Kurds and increasing Kurdish influence.

During this period, Turkey's decreasing influence in Iraq was also followed by a much less proactive policy on behalf of Turkmen. Following the invasion of Iraq, Iraqi cities with Turkmen populations, such as Tal Afar and Kirkuk, were inflicted civilian casualties and physically damaged due to military operations (Şimşir,2004; Yılmaz, 2006). However, Turkey refrained from taking any prominent action despite many red lines it cited regarding Turkmen security being crossed (Duman,2007). In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül declared that Turkey would halt its cooperation with the US in the face of ongoing attacks on the Turkmen community in the city of Tal

Afar ("Gül'den Powell'a Tel Afer Resti", 2004)⁶. However, Turkey's initiatives for the Turkmen community remained discursive despite these statements.

Post-2005: Period of Double Engagement

The Iraq invasion followed a period when Turkey's security concerns were hyped with the power vacuum that emerged in Iraq and PKK's increasing attacks. However, Turkey managed to turn this period into an opportunity for political engagement instead of turning the military operation into the main foreign policy instrument in Iraq, as was the case during the 1990s. However, this process of double engagement occurred gradually, starting with the central government in Baghdad and then moving to Northern Iraq even in a way to shadow the relations with the central government.

Starting in 2005, Turkey tried pursuing a comprehensive policy of engagement reaching various ethnic communities; Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds, and various power centers; Baghdad, Mosul, and Erbil (Kumral, 2013). As a result, Turkey convinced Sunni groups to feel politically excluded in post-war Iraq not to boycott elections in 2005 (Barkey, 2011). During 2005-2007, security was still a significant issue as PKK continued its attacks, and there was a perception of increasing relations between PKK and Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq (Kumral, 2016). In 2006, US, Iraq, and Turkey created a triple mechanism to enhance security cooperation and address Turkey's security concerns (Uzgel, 2020b). Turkey opened its consular general in Mosul in 2007 (MFA). The same year Iraqi prime minister Maliki made his first official visit to Turkey, followed by Abdullah Gül's return to Iraq (Kumral, 2013). During Maliki's visit, Turkey and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding and pledged their support to increase security cooperation and fight against terrorism together with deepening ties in the economic field (Uzgel, 2020b). PKK's attacks resulted in heavy casualties, followed by Turkey's cross-border airstrikes and ground operations towards the end of 2007, which continued until the first months of 2008 (Kumral, 2016). Operations coincided with another vital visit to Baghdad made by Turkish PM Foreign Policy Advisor Davutoglu, Special Representative for Iraq Murat Özçelik, and Turkey's Deputy Chief of National Intelligence Hakan Fidan (Kumral, 2016). During this period, Turkey's foreign policy was modeled on acquiring the support of all constituents of Iraq in its fight against terrorism, including Kurds, and having better cooperation with them in economic and political fields (Müftüler-Baç, 2014). Starting in 2008, Turkish foreign policy focused on increasing political

⁶ <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/14/gnd107.html>

engagement with Northern Iraq, which led to a meeting between Turkish foreign policy officials and Prime Minister of KRG, Nechirvan Barzani, and then with President of KRG, Massoud Barzani (Müftüler-Baç, 2014). 2008 marked the beginning of continued cooperation, and a series of meetings took place between Turkey and KRG and Turkey managed to take Kurds on its side in Iraq regarding its fight against PKK (Müftüler-Baç, 2014; Uzgel,2020b). Starting from this period, Turkey's relationship with the Kurdish North was de-securitized to a great extent up until 2017, when KRG conducted the independence referendum, and relations acquired a slowly more commercial focus (Pusane,2019; Robins, 2013). Turkey's change of Kurdish policy in Iraq was also triggered by the failure of the Turkmen policy, which Turkey considered a helpful bulwark against Kurds' rising political influence in Iraq (Barkey, 2011; Özcan, 2009). In the 2005 election, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC), which constitutes the leading agent of Turkey's political support to Iraqi Turkmen, performed poorly and could get only one MP in the parliament (Uzgel, 2020b). One primary reason ITC could not become a unified political actor was that ITC mainly appealed to Sunni Turkmen. At the same time, the Shia Turkmen, which constitute approximately 60 percent of Iraqi Turkmen, mainly voted for Shia parties (Uzgel, 2020b). This indicates that religious cleavages among the Turkmen of Iraq outweighed their ethnic identity and prevented them from being a unitary political actor that Turkey could rely on. Another critical factor in empowering the relations between KRG and Turkey was deepening economic relations. The growing Turkish economy with an increasing need for energy supplies rendered KRG a viable and affordable option for natural gas and oil for Turkey (Romano, 2015 as cited in Pusane 2019) 2007-2014 marked an era that Turkey KRG relations saw unprecedented development (Demiryol & Pekşen,2018). While Turkey made economic investments in Kurdish North, energy became a factor that created mutual interdependence as Turkey acted as a gateway to world markets for Kurdish oil (Demiryol & Pekşen,2018). Turkey's export to Iraq gradually increased in the 2000s, and Northern Iraq's share in this trade reached 60 percent in 2010 (Uzgel,2020b). Turkey's economic relations with the North provided an important economic source for its underdeveloped southern region and leverage to keep its southern border under control (Uzgel,2020b).

Turkey's policy of double engagement with Iraq during these periods resulted from certain systemic and domestic changes that changed Turkey's foreign policy priorities and the preferred methods to pursue these priorities. First, Iraq's weakening role in the region and the increasing security concerns of Turkey following the invasion

created motivation and space for Turkey to take a more active regional role (Altunışık & Martin, 2011). Second, with AKP's coming to power, civil-military relations underwent a serious change in Turkey, a process led by political reforms and the EU accession process, and this resulted in a substantial decrease in the military's influence over foreign policy (Pusane,2019). Third, AKP's foreign policy vision was shaped mainly by Ahmet Davutoglu, who was a chief advisor to the prime minister and then foreign minister, and he attached a central role to Turkey, especially as an important soft power who can act as a political mediator and power broker in the region (Altunışık & Martin, 2011). Fourth, an emerging class of medium-sized entrepreneurs which constituted one of the backbones of AKP's political support, created a further economic motive for the government as a more engaged Turkey in the region meant greater access to markets for them in the Middle East (Barkey, 2011).

While these structural and domestic factors created new motives for Turkey to engage with the actors in Iraq, they also eradicated certain predicaments, such as the military's tendency to approach Iraq from a militarized perspective that blocks rapprochement with Iraqi Kurds.

These policy changes were also reflected in Turkmen's policy overall. After 2005, Turkey developed a Turkmen policy that encouraged Iraqi Turkmen to create a unified stance regarding their common problems without emphasizing their political mobilization. (Karadeniz, 2011). Failure of Turkmen to present a unified political position overcoming their political and sectarian differences, performing poorly in the 2005 elections, and a change of Turkey's foreign policy priorities, including the Kurdish problem, led Turkish officials to realize that Turkmen provided little leverage as a foreign policy instrument (Karadeniz,2011). Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül stated that Turkey cooperates with all ethnic groups and sects in Iraq without making any separation ("Gül: Irak'ta Tüm Unsurlar Yer Almalı, 2005")⁷. This statement can be considered a reflection of Turkey's changing stance and Turkmen decreasing political value for Turkey. As a result, the Turkmen policy of Turkey is merged with its general policy of advocating the territorial unity of Iraq ("Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, 2008"). As a result,

⁷ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/gul-irakta-tum-unsurlar-yer-almali-3599321>

Turkey started following a low-profile foreign policy towards Turkmen, and the emphasis on ethnic relations as a justifier of Turkey's policy was sidelined (Karadeniz,2011).

2011-2017: Period of Weakening Relations with Baghdad

The period of double engagement that Turkey established through engaging at various levels with Baghdad and Erbil started to unravel with the emergence of a series of political crises between Turkey and Iraq.

Turkey was planning to play a more active role in Iraq as a regional player after the planned withdrawal of US forces in 2011 (Uzgel,2020b). In line with this purpose, Turkey provided political support for the al-Iraqiya electoral coalition, composed of mainly Sunni and nationalist Arabs (Erkmen, 2015). Despite emerging as having the highest share of votes, this electoral coalition supported by Turkey fell short of establishing a government, leading to Maliki's preserving his seat in his second term as prime minister (Erkmen,2015; Uzgel,2020b). While Maliki started to consider Turkey as a power that supports rival political blocs at his expense (Erkmen, 2015), Turkey also started to consider Iraq under Maliki's rule as a country that destabilizes the region with its sectarian policies (Kardaş,2018). The political rift among countries reached a whole new level when the former vice president of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi, was removed from power in Iraq and settled in Turkey before a death penalty sentenced to him (Müftüler-Baç,2014). Turkey's opening its doors to the fallen vice president, who is a Sunni Arab, resulted in Maliki's calling Turkey an "enemy state" (Kumral,2016, p.227). This gave the political crisis a sectarian tone as Turkey is perceived as a country that protects the Sunni in Iraq, governed by a sectarian Shia government (Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu, 2017). Turkey's rapprochement with Iraqi Kurdistan removed one of the common security interests that Baghdad and Ankara shared, and this dissolved one of the main areas of cooperation between the countries (Kumral,2016). Another major factor that strained the relationship was KRG's making energy deals with Turkey bypassing Baghdad after 2011 (Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu, 2017; Demiryol & Pekşen, 2018). As explained in the former period of double engagement, Turkey continued cooperating with KRG in political and economic fields in line with its changing foreign policy considerations. There was an ongoing peace process with PKK started in 2013 and aimed at ending PKK's insurgency with peaceful means, and the peace process made Iraqi Kurds a critical ally for the risky initiative that the government has undertaken (Pusane,2019). During this period, emerging crises accompanied KRG's sidelining central Iraqi government regarding the political and economic leverage it represented for Ankara, changing the political gravity from Baghdad

to Erbil for Turkey. The Syrian Civil War further complicated the Iraqi Turkish relations from 2012 onwards as Turkey has taken an active policy of supporting the opposition politically and militarily while Baghdad, under the Maliki government, sided with both Tehran and the Syrian regime as its Shia allies (Kumral, 2016). Maliki government's leaving power in 2014 did not help to improve the relations either (Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu, 2017). The Syrian Civil War, the instability it created in the region, and the emergence of the Islamic State created new challenges for Turkish Iraqi relations. Another major political crisis erupted in 2015 after Turkey deployed troops to the Bashiqa camp near Mosul to provide military assistance to the forces fighting against the ISIS militants ruling the city at that time (Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu, 2017; Kumral, 2016). When Iraq objected to the existence of Turkish forces on its soil, Turkey put forward Kurdish Region's invitation as a legitimizing factor (Kardaş, 2018). Therefore, in the wake of new security threats, while KRG preserved its place as a reliable security partner (Kumral, 2016), it also provided Turkey with the opportunity to present itself as the protector of both Sunni Kurds and Turkmen rather than being an actor moved by sectarian motives (Kardaş, 2018).

The period that Turkey's relations with Iraq slowly moved from a process of double engagement with Baghdad and Erbil to a period of cooling with Baghdad and continuing cooperation with Erbil ended in 2017 with KRG's attempt to hold an independence referendum. During this period, Turkey's relations with the Kurdish North occupied a central place in its Iraq policy, and Turkmen's decreased gravity as a foreign policy factor continued. Turkey's political and economic engagement with Iraqi Kurds at an increasing scale 2008 onwards was not welcomed by Turkmen; however, Turkmen approval was not a point of concern for policymakers during this period (Salihi,2020). The Turkmen community faced a fundamental challenge during this period: ISIS's advance on Iraqi soil after 2014. Most of the Turkmen population in Iraq lives under territories captured by ISIS, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tuzhkourmatu, which put both Sunni and Shia Turkmen communities at excellent security risk both from ISIS and the coalition fighting against it (Duman, 2014). Turkey did not take any active military role in the protection of Turkmen during ISIS rule, which led to a reproachment among Shia Turkmen with Iran, which helped the fight against ISIS through Shia militias linked to it (Salihi,2020).

2017 onwards: End of Kurdish Spring and Reproachment with Baghdad

While Turkey continued its cooperation with KRG, it also entered a period that it faced increasing security challenges both at domestic and international levels. The political turmoil that emerged out of Iraq's invasion, accompanied by the sectarian policies that alienated the Sunni population of the country, led to the emergence of a militant Islamist group called ISIS, which declared itself as the Islamic State after its capture of Mosul in 2014 (Gerges, 2016). Emboldened by the ongoing civil war in Syria, ISIS also expanded towards Syria, and by the end of 2014, the group captured almost one-third of Syria and Iraq's territories (Gerges, 2016). When Kurdish militia groups organized under the banner of YPG to push against ISIS's advance, Turkey found its southern borders surrounded by a terror organization gradually expanding its influence and an armed Kurdish movement mobilizing against it (Lawson, 2014). The settlement process between PKK and the Turkish state ended in 2015, leading to a new wave of attacks and violence on Turkish soil. This resulted in Turkey's strong opposition to YPG, as Turkey considers YPG as an offshoot of PKK (Pusane, 2019). Turkey's perception of the threat from Syrian Kurds intensified substantially when the US administration decided to militarily support YPG in 2015, as they were considered the most organized and viable force regarding their ability to fight against ISIS (Dursun-Özkanca, 2019). With a failed peace process at home and a Kurdish military organization on the other side of its southern border empowering itself militarily and politically, Turkey's decades-old Kurdish question moved to the top of the security agenda again. With the tremendous military and political investment that Turkey made in Syria, accompanied by the massive humanitarian and financial cost of Syrian refugees, Syria quickly became one of Turkey's most important foreign policy agenda topics, sidelining all other issues.

At this point, YPG was not a significant source of friction between Turkey and KRG as Barzani's KDP was also feel threatened by YPG's ascendancy in the Syrian Civil War, being its political rival within the Kurdish national movement (Pusane, 2019). In that sense, the continued cooperation between KRG and Turkey may have played a role in KRG's miscalculations on Turkey's response to an independence referendum (Kardaş, 2018).

In September 2017, following ISIS's defeat in Iraq, Kurdish Regional Government held an independence referendum despite the opposition from the international community and Baghdad (O'Driscoll & Basel, 2019). An essential point of discontent has been the inclusion of some disputed areas in the referendum, such as Kirkuk (O'Driscoll & Basel, 2019), which came under KRG's rule after peshmerga forces defeated ISIS in

these areas in the absence of the central government's army (Demiryol & Pekşen, 2018). Turkey vehemently opposed the referendum, and this opposition became a turning point in terms of a reproachment between Ankara and Baghdad at the expense of relations with Erbil. Kardaş (2018) explains several regional and domestic factors that moved Turkey from its deepened cooperation with KRG towards Baghdad's position. At the regional level, in the background of increasing insecurity and ongoing conflicts, while KRG started to be perceived as a weaker and less reliable partner by Ankara compared to Baghdad, the rise of Kurdish influence in both Iraq and Syria was also considered as a further destabilizing factor in the region with its revisionist ambitions and possible consequences for Turkey as well (Kardaş, 2018). KRG was considered not only impotent against the increasing influence of PKK in Iraq (Kardaş, 2012) but also a weak force in impacting the trajectory of the rising Kurdish movement in Syria (Pusane, 2019). At the domestic level, increasing challenges rising from PKK and ISIS attacks after 2015, and an attempted military coup in 2016, put security at the very top of the agenda in Turkey. Finally, the emergence of a new governing coalition from 2016 onwards that includes the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the AKP further fastened the securitization of Turkish foreign policy (Kardaş, 2018). Turkey's conducting of military drills with Iraqi forces before the referendum took place and the exchange of diplomatic visits between Ankara and Baghdad afterward signaled further improvement in the relations (Duman, 2019). As KRG's decreasing value in the eye of Ankara came with security challenges, improved relations with Baghdad were also mainly formulated around security cooperation (Kardaş, 2021). Starting in 2019, Turkey increased its military operations targeting PKK in Iraq, and its security cooperation with Baghdad facilitated this process. (Kardaş, 2021). It is also important to note that Turkey-Erbil relations improved again in 2019 with the declaration of an intent to continue cooperation from both sides (Mohamed, 2019). However, as the challenges that put the relations at risk still exist, mainly arising from Turkey's threat perceptions, the circumstances do not seem ideal to return to the former level of relations (Park, 2019).

As in the case of the period of double engagement, the change in Turkey's Iraq policy reflects a general change in Turkey's foreign policy triggered by both systemic and domestic factors. The political upheavals, civil wars, and emerging failed states that came with the Arab uprising from 2010 onwards pushed Turkey into a critical position in the region amidst shifting alliances and increased instability (Altunışık, 2020). The collapse of the Kurdish peace process in 2015, and the coup attempt in 2016, combined with

weakening relations with the US and EU, resulted in the formulation of a new foreign policy revolving around increased securitization and heightened threat perceptions while considering military might as the main instrument to reach its objective and sidelining traditional alliances (Altunışık,2020). Increased threat perception at home and abroad provided the perfect background for a government that has become increasingly authoritarian to justify its new foreign policy agenda. It is not difficult to see that starting from Saddam's era to today, the periods that Turkey improved its relations with Baghdad usually came in the background of a more securitized foreign policy, especially regarding Turkey's approach to the Kurdish question.

4.5.2 The Role of International Institutions: United Nations

UN Sanctions

The major international institution that played a decisive role in Iraq's transformation is, without a doubt, The United Nations. United Nations, firstly through the involvement of its Security Council and secondly with its mandate over refugees internationally through UNHCR, created a considerable impact on Iraq and the Iraqi people.

The UN's most long-lasting effects on Iraq came from the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Security Council resolutions that determined the course of actions of the member states.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, UN Security Council passed the resolution numbered 661 which set out comprehensive sanctions on Iraq that paralyzed all components of the Iraqi economy, from finance to transportation and trade (Alnasrawi,2001). However, the sanctions did not immediately result in Iraq's compliance and withdrawal from Kuwait. Then, a military coalition led by the United States started Operation Desert Storm, which pushed back Iraqi forces quickly from Kuwait and liberated the country (Chitalkar & Malone, 2017). Resolution 687, which passed in April 1991, further outlined a very detailed list of demands on Iraq's destroy all weapons of mass destruction and open its military sites to complete UN inspection to revise the sanctions imposed (Security Council Resolution 687,1991). This resolution also made an exception for allowing Iraq to import food for humanitarian purposes; however, as Iraq had to export oil to pay for the imported food, this clause proved for no use (Alnasrawi,2001). This had disastrous effects on the lives of Iraq's population, with effects that would be felt for many years. As the economic sanctions cut the primary revenue source of oil, a deepening economic crisis led to the collapse of essential public services and, eventually, a widening famine and increased child mortality (Dreze &

Gazdar,1992). The sanctions imposed on Iraq remained in place for 13 years until the regime's fall in 2003, and rather than being a punishment for invasion, it served as an instrument for regime change in Iraq (Dodge, 2010). It is estimated that one and a half million people lost their lives, including half a million children, because of the indirect effects of sanctions (Alnasrawi,2001). Even though the sanctions created widespread social deprivation and misery, they did not harm Saddam's regime in the intended way as Saddam focused on keeping his close circle that guaranteed his survival content and under control with the remaining scarce sources of the state while the rest of the society suffers (Dodge,2010).

Following the attacks on 9/11, UN Security Council did not authorize another military operation in Iraq, which resulted in the US invading Iraq without the backing of the UN (Chitalkar & Malone, 2017). This led to the UN's sidelining and confined its role to peacebuilding in the aftermath of the invasion, albeit unsuccessful (Chitalkar & Malone, 2017). Although UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) made significant contributions to the drafting of Iraq's new constitution and holding the elections of 2009 and 2010, Iraq remains a country stricken by political crises in which the UN could not play a meaningful role in solving (Chitalkar & Malone, 2017).

The first component of the UN's role in Iraq is based on the UN Security resolutions and ensuing sanctions that continued until the invasion. After the Gulf War, the sanctions made the daily life of an Iraqi person much less bearable. Eventually, they turned into the main impetus behind the migration flow out of Iraq. This brings us to the second component of the UN's role: the UNHCR's mandate in the international refugee regime.

1991 War

As discussed before, a rebellion broke out in the southern and northern parts of Iraq after the Gulf War. The regime's violent suppression of the rebellion created a massive flow of mainly Kurdish refugees toward Turkey's border. Turkey reluctantly opened its borders to approximately one and a half million refugees and settled them in the camps near the border; however, there was a fear of these camps creating a fertile ground for PKK's ongoing insurgency (Uzgel,2020a). Aggravating humanitarian disaster on the border and the Turkish government's pressure led to a UN Resolution calling Secretary-General to adopt any necessary measure to address the pressing humanitarian situation and stating that the situation in Iraq poses a danger to international security (Security Council Resolution 687,1991). Due to its concerns over national security, Turkey's preferred solution to the ongoing crisis was the establishment of a safe haven in Northern

Iraq for the resettlement of refugees, and this resolution provided the legal template for that (Kirişçi,1996). In April, the US declared the North of the 36th parallel of Iraq as a no-fly zone, and joint French, British and American forces started the operation to create a safe haven for refugees' repatriation (Uzgel,2020a). As a result, thousands of refugees returned to Iraq, and in a few months, the numbers that remained in Turkey decreased to only a few thousand (Kaynak,1992). Following the operation, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the UN entitled United Nations to take care of the relief and humanitarian assistance activities in Iraq and based on this agreement UN started to conduct major programs for the repatriation of the refugees and also to rebuild the villages destroyed by the war (Kirişçi,1996). The Gulf War and its aftermath marked the first time that the UN performed an action to deal with an unfolding refugee crisis (Loescher,2001). Although most of the refugees who fled were composed of Kurds, there were also minority groups escaping persecution, such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Turkmen (Kirişçi,1996). The Gulf War represents an important point regarding Turkmen migration to Turkey from Iraq. It was the first time Turkmen engaged in mass migration (Duman,2010). The safe haven in Northern Iraq also created an environment of security for the Turkmen, mainly living in the Northern part of Iraq, and a transitionary station for continued migration toward Turkey (Duman,2010). Therefore, while the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq made the conditions very difficult for Turkmen and Iraqi people in general, the UN's role in establishing the safe zone and rehabilitation services of UNHCR provided relative relief for those living in Northern cities. The relative security that was felt in Northern Iraq also provided the opportunity for better political mobilization of Iraqi Turkmen and contributed to the foundation of the Iraq Turkish Front (ITC); however, this mobilization also resulted in the Saddam regime's targeting the Turkmen outside of the safe area at an increased scale (Duman,2010).

2003 Invasion

Following the invasion of Iraq, UNHCR prepared emergency plans for another massive refugee outflow; however, as opposed to the expectations, even a return migration movement towards Iraq occurred (Jamal,2017). While the euphoria that the fall of Saddam brought among Shia and Kurds was a part of this decline, it was also related to the asylum policy that the Western countries adopted regarding Iraqis (Danış,2010). Between the years of 2003 and 2006, UNHCR stopped processing asylum applications of Iraqi people, and the Western countries justified this policy on the basis that Iraq was moving towards democracy (Danış,2010). However, as discussed in the relative stability

section, the fall of Saddam did not bring Iraq the desired stability and democratic regime. Iraqi people continued to leave the country for similar reasons to refugees, such as security and economic hardship but not in massive flows (Jamal,2017). Turkmen and other minority groups were among the first who left the country following the regime change due to continued persecution and insecurity (Danış,2010). When the civil war in Iraq broke out between Sunni and Shia factions and Iraq ended in bloodshed, UNHCR recognized all people fleeing Iraq (excluding three provinces in KRG) as prima facie refugees (Jamal,2017). This led to a substantial increase in the rate of asylum applications and acceptance rates, reaching 100 percent in 2007 (Danış,2010). Between the years of 2007 and 2009, UNHCR engaged in an extensive resettlement program that involved the settlement of seventy-five thousand Iraqi refugees (Jamal,2017). Although this resettlement surge decreased afterward, during an era of heightened insecurity and persecution, UNHCR provided legal protection for Iraqi refugees (Jamal,2017).

4.6 Overview of the Transnational POS: Home-Host Country Relations, Foreign Policy Priorities, and Role of International Organizations

An important part that affects the transnational POS regarding home-host country relations is how much influence Turkey can exert over Iraq and how engaged it is. As Turkey is regarded as a kin state for Turkmen, Turkey's way, and level of engagement with Iraq are crucial regarding the transnational context's opportunity structure. Turkey's engagement is mainly shaped by its security concerns related to the Kurdish issue and through which actors it chose to solve this.

Turkey was very engaged in Iraq in the 1990s, during and after the First Gulf War, on the opposite side of the Baghdad regime. This harmed Turkey's influence over Iraq following the war and further encouraged the Baghdad regime to infringe upon Turkmen rights. However, Turkey did not have a Turkmen policy until the mid-1990s to preserve its neutral position regarding internal affairs. Later Turkey started to encourage Turkmen political mobilization within Iraq and Turkey. This policy change only came with heightened security concerns regarding Kurds and the possibility of Turkmen's acting as a countervailing foreign policy tool for Turkey. However, Iraq's invasion weakened Turkey's position and led to Turkmen being sidelined in newly emerging Iraq. After 2005 Turkey gradually re-engaged with both Baghdad and Kurds in the North. This double engagement did not turn into an improved space for Turkmen in Iraq. While the Turkmen community in Iraq proved to be a weak political force to mobilize as a unified front, Northern Iraq emerged as a better partner to engage within various fields, including

security. As a result, Turkey's Turkmen policy remained limited to focusing on common problems that Turkmen have rather than encouraging them to take a more active position through political mobilization. Although the relations between Iraqi North and Turkey deteriorated after an independence referendum in 2017, KRG remains an important partner for Turkey. After 2014, the emergence of ISIS further complicated Turkmen's position in Iraq; however, Turkey refrained from acting to intervene on behalf of Turkmen targeted by ISIS. As a result, there was already a limited opportunity space for Turkmen at the beginning of the 1990s, which gradually widened in the second half of the decade with Turkey's increasing support and changing foreign policy. However, this opportunity space shrank again when Turkmen lost their place in the list of foreign policy priorities, especially after 2005. The subsequent engagement with other actors in Iraq (Kurds and Baghdad) further sidelined Turkmen.

The opportunity space in Iraq is mainly affected by the foreign policy priorities of Turkey and how much influence it can exert over Baghdad. Therefore, the worsening relations with the US (after the invasion) and later with Baghdad diminished Turkey's influence. However, better engagement turns into widened POS for Turkmen only if foreign policy aims back it. This was not the case after 2005 despite the increasing engagement with other actors apart from Turkmen in Iraq. Another crucial factor has been the Syrian Civil War. The war brought multiple challenges to Turkey in the form of migration flow, security challenges, and worsening relations with allies (Barkey, 2014). The failed peace process and the Syrian Civil War re-securitized the Kurdish issue (Gunter, 2016; Larrabee, 2016), but this time this did not lead to reprioritizing Turkmen as Syria became the main battlefield. As Syria has dominated the headline for almost a decade, this further made Turkmen in Iraq irrelevant to foreign policy considerations.

Finally, if we move to the impact of international organizations, the UN has been the leading actor in the case of Iraq. The most crucial role that the UN played was the imposition of sanctions following the First Gulf War. The economic devastation that the sanctions brought became a very important reason for the outflow of refugees from Iraq and worsening suppression. Therefore, the UNSC Resolution sanctions were a factor that hardened the POS in the transnational space. On the other hand, the no-fly zone acted as a mitigating factor for Kurds and Turkmen in the region. The relative security ensured in the North opened space for better political mobilization as the post-1990s marked the beginning of Turkmen political mobilization in Iraq. UNHCR's halting of refugee admissions from Iraq after 2003 was another factor that worsened the situation, although

this policy was reversed in 2007. Overall, the UN played two countervailing roles. At the same time, sanctions closed the opportunity space; the resolution established a fly zone, provided relative security for some portion of Iraqi Turkmen, and eased their immigration towards Turkey.

4.7 *Summary of POS in Three Contexts*

I will make a final overall analysis of the political opportunity space for the mobilization of the Iraqi Turkmen. In that case, it is more helpful to start with the host country, Turkey, because although the focus is transnational mobilization, the host country is the starting point of mobilization and where the agents are based.

As repeated before, regarding host country POS, our findings are based on the laws, regulations, and official policies; therefore, they reflect an opportunity space that officially exists, but this may not reflect the practice each time. It can be observed this in how getting citizenship and residency became increasingly tricky for Iraqi Turkmen after the 1990s (Danış & Parla, 2009), although the legal context remained the same. Therefore, based on the official findings, I can state that the opportunity space that Turkey provided to Turkmen gradually increased starting from the 1990s. In 2006, it substantially improved and remains around the same level with mild decrease and increases. Although Iraqi Turkmen legally have a much better opportunity space than other immigrant groups living in Turkey, the overall score indicates that Turkey still provides quite limited space for political mobilization.

Regarding home POS, Iraq had a very closed opportunity space throughout the 1990s, the 2003 invasion, and the following years. The situation in 1990s was also aggravated by the Saddam regime's direct and indirect methods of suppression of local and diaspora communities. The regime's fall removed the oppressive state apparatus, but the unprecedented violence and instability that followed this hardly allowed for a more improved opportunity space. Between 2007 and 2014, the political stability gradually improved, and Iraq's regime type slowly passed from the categories of regime change towards anocracy and democracy. Therefore, this era provided a better opportunity space for mobilization. However, from 2014 onwards, the rise of ISIS substantially increased violence and instability within the country. However, Iraq's regime remains a borderline democracy and increasing and continued political mobilization is observed on the ground. The findings from the field can shed light on how these two opposite dynamics were reflected in the mobilization level for Turkmen in the post-2014 era.

Finally, in the transnational space, what mattered the most was the foreign policy changes and bilateral relations between the home and the host country. Despite the difficult conditions at home, regarding the transnational context, the years following Gulf War up until the invasion was an era in which opportunity space was widened for Iraqi political mobilization because of Turkey's active support. However, following the invasion, the changing dynamics on the ground alienated firstly Turkmen as an actor and as a foreign policy priority for Turkey. Turkey's losing ground in Iraq, firstly after the US invasion, then after 2011 due to worsening relations with Baghdad, are important factors limiting the opportunity space for Turkmen when Turkey is considered a protector kin state. However, Turkey continued its engagement with other groups, such as Kurds, even at the lowest level of relations with Baghdad; therefore, I can confer that foreign policy priorities played a more critical role than bilateral relations. Therefore, after a brief period, from 2005 onwards transnational context again turned into a space with limited opportunities for Iraqi Turkmen. Additionally, the Syrian Civil War brought a new layer to these foreign policy priorities. It's possible implications for Turkmen mobilization on the ground are also worth further digging through field research.

In line with this framework, I can now evaluate how these changing opportunity spaces in three contexts were reflected upon mobilization level and forms.

Chapter: 5

IRAQI TURKMEN IN THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT :ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The present study tries to analyze how Iraqi Turkmen in Turkey mobilize in the political field and how they create this mobilization through transnational linkages between Turkey, Iraq, and the international context. The main question asked throughout the thesis is how political opportunity structure (POS), conceptualized as the political structural factors prevailing in these three contexts, shapes the mobilization patterns and their intensity. Dwelling on the analytical and historical background provided in the previous chapter scrutinizing the political opportunity structure in Turkey, Iraq, and the international context, this chapter analyzes the empirical data derived from the interviews conducted by the 11 influential figures of the Iraqi Turkmen community living in Turkey. These are Turkmen elites who are active in the political and social fields, and their experiences help us to show how these opportunity spaces interact with political mobilization. The analysis will start with an overview of the interviewees' profiles and continue with the main arguments explaining the empirical results reached with examples of passages from the interviews.

As the analytical framework used in this study explains, political mobilization occurs in specific contexts. These contexts disempower or empower, constrain, or enable the actors that engage in political activities. The political mobilization of migrants is not confined to the borders of the host state. As migrants interact with their home country, host state, and international context and actors, this study brings a transnational approach to the context of mobilization by combining these three fields. According to this argument, I expect the contexts that provide a more open political opportunity structure (POS) to be more conducive for political mobilization, while the closer contexts are hindering. This study also analyzes the mobilization patterns under electoral, organizational, and non-institutional categories. Therefore, while addressing how the opportunity structure determines the intensity level and success of mobilization, I also indicate how these opportunity spaces act as pull and push factors for certain forms of mobilization in specific periods. In this regard, it can be expected that a closer political opportunity space will give way to more confrontational or pacified and non-institutional forms of political mobilization while opened opportunity spaces will lead to more

organizational forms of political mobilization as the latter requires a certain level of legal basis and financial resources.

Regarding the forms of mobilization, I have reached a more nuanced analysis in line with the political opportunity literature addressed in Chapter 2. As expected, periodical openings in opportunity spaces lead to higher and more organizational forms of mobilization. On the contrary, closer opportunity spaces lead to underground, more confrontational, and militarized forms of mobilization. However, this relationship follows a more curvilinear relation regarding closed political opportunity spaces as severe pressure and completely closed POS lead to confrontational mobilization only up to a certain point. After this point, oppression causes any forms of mobilization to be completely pacified.

Another critical point addressed during the chapter is that transnational POS, host country POS, and home country POS do not shape, enable, or hinder mobilization with the same level and power of influence. As it will be addressed in detail, different components of these three layers of POS interact with each other, reinforce and countervail the effects they impose upon the mobilization that takes place on the ground. Nevertheless, throughout the period addressed in the study, specific components of opportunity spaces exert more influence over mobilization patterns than others. As this analysis is based on a case study on Iraqi Turkmen living in Turkey, it also allows us to address the kin-state relation between Turkey and Iraqi Turkmen and evaluate how this relation interacts with opportunity structures while making them more or less effective. Unexpectedly, the kin-state relation has an essential explanatory power within this study, especially regarding how transnational POS and host country POS are shaped around Turkey's policies regarding Iraqi Turkmen.

This study is based on the empirical data collected through 11 in-depth interviews conducted by Turkmen political elites. Interviewees are chosen among the officials affiliated with the well-known and established Turkmen associations operating in Turkey. Kirkuk Foundation, Turkmeneli Foundation, Turkmeneli Human Rights Association, Iraqi Turkmen Justice and Solidarity Association, Iraqi Turkmen Front, and three branches of Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association are the institutions chosen for study. The interviews were conducted in four cities, 4 in Ankara, 5 in İstanbul, and one in Bursa and Konya. Interviewees are all males with an age range changing between 31 and 79. The interviewees were chosen in a way to cover the period of the Turkmen political movement since the 1990s and especially among the people who took critical

positions at different periods. Interviewees include presidents of associations, founders of two different political parties, one military organization, one former advisor to the president, and one former advisor affiliated with the (previous) prime ministry. The profiles of the interviewees were chosen from different generations of Turkmen political elites to provide comprehensive empirical data on different periods of Turkmen mobilization. The results proved this point as the younger generations of Turkmen elites shed light on the more current struggles of the movement and presented a more critical and outspoken approach toward Turkey-Turkmen relations. In contrast, the older generation provided more information on the historical conditions that shaped the movement and presented a more discrete attitude on controversial issues.

In the subsequent sections of the chapter, the data acquired from the interviews will be analyzed under three main political opportunity structures addressed in this study.

5.1 The Effect of Host Country Political Opportunity Structure (Turkey)

As the profile of the interviewees reveals, the host country, Turkey, constitutes the geographical center of the analysis in this study. All the participants are people settled in Turkey, despite moving back in forth between Iraq and Turkey throughout different periods and sustaining relations with their home country Iraq. This study addresses the transitional nature of migrant mobilizations that are not bound by the borders of the host country of migrants. However, as Turkey is the starting point of any political activity they engage with, the opportunity space in Turkey and how it has changed can be expected to be a decisive factor in shaping political mobilization. The empirical data acquired through interviews point out that host country POS is indeed an essential factor shaping political mobilization; however, in a less similar way than addressed in the literature. This study has addressed the political opportunity structures in the host country with a similar methodology used by former studies (Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales & Giugni, 2011) and conceptualized the host country POS with the individual rights recognized by Iraqi migrants living in Turkey. According to Table 5.1 Turkey provides a limited POS regarding the individual rights recognized by Iraqi migrants, despite the improvements recorded since the 1990s. To analyze how this limited POS has affected Turkmen mobilization in Turkey and whether the improvement recorded over the years made any notable changes, the interviewees were questioned on their citizenship status, integration processes, and experiences accessing rights and services in Turkey. Further, it was investigated whether there is any link between these and their political engagements or advocacy activities within the political organizations and other associations.

Table 5.1 : The Score for Political Opportunity Structure of Host Country

Categories	90-93	93-98	98-01	01-06	06-09	09-13	13-15	15-16	16-17	17-19	19-onwards
Long Term Permit	25	25	29	29	29	29	41	41	41	41	41
Family Reunification	77	77	77	77	77	77	63	63	58	58	58
Health	0	0	0	0	50	50	50	66	66	66	66
Education	16	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	36	46
Labor Market Access	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Citizenship	75	75	75	75	75	58	58	58	58	70	70
Political Participation	17	17	17	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Average Score	40.7	42.1	42.7	43.2	50.4	48	50.7	50	49.2	52.4	53.8

Note. The years were represented by the last two digits (e.g., 1990 = 90, 2001= 01). The maximum score that can be received for each category is 100. The detailed operationalization of categories is in Appendix A.

One of the main results reached in this part was a notable change in the citizenship acquisition process for those who arrived in Turkey before the Gulf War in 1991 and those who arrived later. Out of 11 people interviewed, 5 of them arrived in Turkey after the first Gulf War and all had Turkish citizenship. The process of taking Turkish citizenship ranges from 4-5 years to 15 years for this group, while those who arrived before the 1990s describe the length of the process as "months ."The early comers also note the ease of the process while emphasizing that this was a prerogative that Turkmen naturally enjoyed. For example, official B from Kirkuk Foundation, who arrived in Turkey in 1981, says:

"I got my citizenship about a few months after coming to Turkey. The embassy also knew about our works and activities, and we are already of Turkish origin. So, it was not like getting a new citizenship but almost like getting our citizenship back."

On the other hand, official C who is a former president of the Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association and came to Turkey in 1991, states that it took 4 to 5 years for him to take Turkish citizenship.

"The process (getting citizenship) was very difficult. We had to renew our residency every six months. Back then, it was a big torture for us."

Interviewees noted that it was even more challenging to get Turkish citizenship for Iraqi Turkmen back in the 1990s, compared to the present day, due to Turkey's emerging policy on Iraqi Turkmen in the face of changing dynamics brought about by the Gulf War. Official A, who is a former member of the Iraqi Turkish Front (ITC) and a former president of the Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association (IYKYD), states :

"But back then, it was a bit more difficult than today. The current period has just gotten easier. But when our people want citizenship, they say we don't want the (Turkmen) region to be emptied. It is actually true; that's our policy as well. But for some reason, everyone outside us is easily given citizenship. And this upsets Turkmen."

These sentences point out the Turkish foreign policy pursued in Iraq starting from the 1990s that considers the Turkmen community in Iraq as a guarantee of extending its sphere of influence in Iraq. As a result of this, the citizenship procedures of Turkmen were hardened to discourage Turkmen from settling in Turkey and leaving Iraq. The same official makes these remarks on this policy:

"We also support this policy, but there is a nuance here. If someone came here more than five years ago, their return is not conditioned by citizenship anymore as he is settled. We used to make a guess on who would return if the regime fell, for ourselves and others. But in 2003, after the regime was overthrown, we saw that there were citizens among those who returned; there were those who had a residency and those who did not. Therefore, citizenship is one of many factors. Some of those people would definitely not have returned if it was."

Interviews indicate that, since the start of the Gulf War in 1991, which also unleashed one of the major Turkmen migrations out of Iraq, Turkey implemented a strict citizenship policy towards Turkmen. A reflection of the same policy can be observed from a more recent example of the migration flow of Iraqi Turkmen from Tal Afar led by ISIS's capture of the city right after Mosul in 2014⁸. A volunteer from IYKYD's Bursa branch who is 30 years old and has been living in Turkey since 2005 states:

"When Turkmen refugees first came here, Turkey did not give them an identity, did not register them to schools, did not accept them to hospitals so that they do not settle

⁸ <https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2014/06/15/isis-attacks-turkmen-city-in-northern-iraq>

here and when things get to calm down in Iraq, they'll be right back. We had a very difficult time with this issue. Even the women who will give birth were not taken to the hospitals...When we go to the officials for these problems, they say we make their procedures harder to prevent their settling here. But there is this humanitarian side as well."

Another point emphasized by the interviews is that, although the initial policy was on citizenship to prevent permanent settlement, it also reflected upon residency and subsequent access to rights and services. For example, another official from ITKYD, who is 31 years old and arrived in Turkey in 2009, states:

"There is such an understanding in our Turkish authorities. 'Turkmen should not be given citizenship'. In fact, it spreads from citizenship to residence, as well. It has existed for a long time. Not only Arab Turkmen but also Syrian Turkmen are subject to the same policy, so those regions should not be emptied of Turkish presence. Maybe it is not written, but they pursue this policy."

As the Table 5.1 indicates Turkey already provides a limited opportunity space for Iraqi Turkmen in terms of recognized individual rights. In addition, the existing opportunity space on citizenship is tightened even more with an unofficial policy on citizenship which is affecting residency as well. Therefore, when interviewees are questioned about their experience of living in Turkey and the obstacles they faced as a Turkmen community, citizenship and residency stand out as the main issue constraining them and their ability to access rights and services, especially for those who arrived after 1991. When the attitudes of the Turkmen figures on this policy are addressed, it is possible to note that there is more criticism among the younger generations of Turkmen elites who experienced the difficulties of citizenship policy personally and for other Turkmen groups at Turkmen associations. On the other hand, the older generation is more ardent about preserving the Turkmen's existence in Turkmeneli, therefore considering Turkey's policy a necessary evil. For example, official A from Kirkuk Foundation, who came to Turkey in 1971, states:

"I am personally against the discourse of our associations and NGOs saying why so many Syrians and refugees are granted Turkish citizenship while Turkmen are not. Because the arrival of four million people from Syria to Turkey would not destroy the Arabness of Syria, but if a hundred thousand Turkmen left Iraq and came to Turkey, it would destroy Turkishness in Iraq. If only you say that this man will die if he returns, he will go to the rope; then it is okay. But it's not good to open the door for that. Suppose a

person is in a very difficult situation. In that case, by changing the citizenship law, he can be given a conditional opportunity allowing them to do business and obtain residence here. But on a one-time basis and without granting citizenship."

However, it is notable that although the younger generations of Turkmen elites are open about criticizing the effects of citizenship policy, there is a widespread agreement within the community that the policy of discouragement pursued by Turkey, in its essence, has a purpose that they all share, which is preserving the Turkmen existence in Iraq. Therefore, the complaints about the issue are always accompanied by an assurance that they also share this perspective that Turkmen should remain in Iraq. Official B, who is a former member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) and who is 39 states:

"I think most of those retired Turkmen, or all of them, should spend at least three to four months in Iraq, guide Turkmen society and raise awareness. For example, some Turkmen figures reached the age of sixty or seventy. I say this to their faces as well. They should go back (to Iraq). What are they doing in here?"

The implied acceptance of the pursued policy and unanimous acquiescence on its consequences prevents the emergence of a political mobilization centering on the demands related to opening the POS in the host country, such as organizing politically in the form of lobbying or more confrontational ways such as protests. There is even disapproval of the issue's politicization and people's mobilizing around it. The same official from ITKYD, who is 31 years old and arrived in Turkey in 2009, emphasized the difficulties faced by the refugees from Tal Afar due to not being granted residency, stating that:

"What bothered us was that some political groups abused this situation. For example, some groups gathered some Turkmen children in front of the National Education Directorate and protested the government for the sake of their political parties and associations. This was not pleasant; our Turkmen cause was being abused this way."

This situation further prevents the Turkmen elites' from commenting on whether this tightened POS of individual rights is a factor on its own, weakening the Turkmen political movement and its success. Official B from Kirkuk Foundation, who was also a former presidential advisor, says, when asked about the significant obstacles faced by the movement states without giving any further details:

"We did not consider anything as an obstacle for us. When you do not consider anything as a barrier, there is no barrier in front of you."

Overall, the main impact of the limited opportunity space that the host country provides the Turkmen community with the legal framework and unofficial anti-settlement policy did not lead to mobilization centering on a demand to widen the POS. However, it created a further side effect that still guided the mobilization on the ground. As the Turkmen faced increasing obstacles in getting citizenship and accessing other rights and services, such as education and the labor market, since the 1990s, Turkmen associations in Turkey stepped in to fill the gap left by the Turkish state in terms of ensuring their access to these rights. The majority of officials of Turkmen associations interviewed for the study pointed out that one of the main functions of their association is easing the process of Turkmen accessing rights and services and acting as a negotiator between the public institutions and the Turkmen community for that purpose. Turkmen associations act as a gateway between Turkmen and the state to circumvent the problems arising from the illegality conferred upon them by the state. Official C from Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association, the oldest and the most prominent ethnic association built by Turkmen in Turkey, points out the role that their association plays in this regard:

"We have a system in our association. Whenever a Turkmen comes here, we open a file for him. We save their data. Because this person may need a job, s/he may need guidance regarding a health issue, or their child may need to go to school. In these cases, we write to the school's principal and say that this is a Turkmen kid and ask the principal to take the kid as a guest student so he can continue his education. Besides, there is another issue that our association pioneered. We were able to get a work permit for Turkmen from the Ministry of Labor. Let's say I have a residence permit. But I can't officially work anywhere. So, my employer must apply for a work permit on my behalf. We eased that process due to the negotiations with the ministry, as they also agreed. We say that this person is Turkmen. There is his residence permit, and he stays here legally. So, they prepare his paperwork, the layouts for the work permit."

Apart from helping Turkmen with educational, employment, or health-related issues, IYKYD also played an important as a de facto legitimizer institution for Turkmen living without citizenship and residency in Turkey. The most important way was through an ID given by the association to its member, although it had no official status or legal power. Official A, who is a former member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) states regarding this ID:

"The main thing about that identity was that it says, 'of Turkish descent .'But it had a much bigger impact than you might imagine. Let me give you an example. Once,

three friends from Tal Afar were walking in Ankara. Two of them had a residence permit, and the other did not; therefore, he issued an association ID for himself. The police stop them from checking their IDs on the road. Then he takes those two who have residence permits to the police station and leaves the one who had the association ID."

ITKYD and its headquarter in Istanbul stand out among other Turkmen associations in terms of performing this intermediary role in a much more effective and systematic way as being the most prominent Turkmen association that has the ability to reach and negotiate with the state; however, the other associations interviewed in smaller size such as Turkmeneli Human Rights Association, Iraqi Turkmen Justice and Solidarity Association and offices of ITKYD in Konya and Bursa also noted that one of the main focus of their activities is solving Turkmen community's problems related residency and access to other rights and services.

As Turkey is imposing an unofficial non-settlement policy on Iraqi Turkmen, the opportunity structure in Turkey also constrains Turkmen's street mobilization without imposing an official barrier on it. An official who is a former president of ITKYD states that the conjuncture in Turkey is not suitable now for street protests and marches, although they used to hold them before. When asked to explain further, he states:

"In general, in Turkey, so to speak, "taking to the streets" was started to be used by terrorist groups to a great extent. We would never allow such a thing to happen to our homeland. I have observed that everyone and other NGOs have taken a step back on that issue (protests). Because no matter how peacefully we march, it will be misinterpreted. It is like that all over the world. Whether it's a small march or not, the security forces will try to protect you. So why should I tire the Turkish State's security force out of the blue?"

This way, Turkey's domestic political dynamics act as a limiting factor on the existing opportunity structure in the country. Notably, this limitation is received with a tolerance for the necessities the homeland requires instead of resentment. The same official justifies the situation by stating that there are more practical ways to mobilize now to get their voices heard. Therefore, alternative forms of mobilization are preferred over pushing the limits for the older forms that are not viable anymore. He further emphasized that Turkmen are also ready to take the streets whenever it is "really" needed. He adds:

"There are more practical ways to do this now. Using social media is better than marching with a thousand people. You can march a thousand people, but we can raise ten million on social media. This is not taking a step back. It does not have to be related

to Iraq. If a big event occurs in Karabakh or Cyprus, of course, we will all protest; that's a separate issue, but it is not taking a step back. But as we said, different methods are outweighing now; social media spreads faster."

Official A, a former ITC member, further states that another aspect of the low-level street mobilization is the lack of appeal of it for the Turkmen community. As discussed in the subsequent sections, home country POS also plays a factor in that regard. During more tumultuous times in Iraq, street mobilizations are considered a more appealing and effective way of showing a reaction.

"Our people also have some laziness in this regard. Yes, they don't go out much. However, we are also looking at the fact that there is not much participation; it cannot produce the effect we expect. That's why it's better to hold press conferences with closed meetings... It seems like it's out of fashion now."

Overall, the conclusion that can be reached on the host country POS in Turkey is that it affects the Turkmen community living in Turkey considerably and constrain their sphere of action by making it more challenging to legalize their stay. However, it indicates that the limited opportunity space in the host country tightened even more after the 1990s and did not transform into mobilization because of the political dynamics brought by the kin-state relation between Turkey and Turkmen. This is also reflected in the decreased level of confrontational mobilization in the form of protests caused by the increasing disapproval of street mobilizations by the state. Turkey's standing in the position of "homeland" for Turkmen renders the tightened opportunity space more tolerable and understandable for the Turkmen community. The interviewees also refrain from commenting on how tightened opportunity structure affected the overall success of the political mobilization. Therefore, instead of turning this issue into a subject of mobilization, Turkmen associations devoted their efforts to acting as a shield for the Turkmen community against the official policies and finding ways to bypass and loosen the strict opportunity space imposed upon them instead of clashing with it.

5.2 The Effect of Home Country Political Opportunity Structure (Iraq)

The host country POS is conceptualized to be composed of three main components as the governing authority, relative stability, and diaspora engagement policies. The empirical results acquired from the interviews indicated that governing authority is the most decisive component of the home country POS followed by relative stability and diaspora engagement policies. However, the governing authority in the country has shaped the other two components as well. The invasion of Iraq and the

tumultuous regime change followed created long-lasting effects on the stability of the country and the way that the state engaged with its citizens.

5.2.1 Governing Authority

Governing authority type, as addressed in this study, refers to the regime type by which the country is governed. According to the Polity V index, Iraq remained a full fledged authoritarian regime until the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US, which led to the fall of Saddam's regime. Therefore 2003 was a significant breaking point that transformed the opportunity space that existed in Iraq for political mobilization. Iraqi Turkmen, like other constituents of the Iraqi people, had to organize under a very oppressive regime that rendered any sign of political mobilization a criminal act punishable by death. Official A, who is a former ITC member, state that:

"The Baath party was one of the cruelest and dictatorial regimes in the region and even in the world, especially Saddam. We used to say that Saddam acted justly in his cruelty. To all Iraqis, Shiite, Sunni, Turkmen, and Kurds. In other words, he would not forgive anything when it came to his power and regime. Of course, he was crueler to Shiite because he was Sunni and crueler to Turkmen and Kurds because he was an Arab, but in general, he even killed the members of his own tribe and relatives of his own."

Therefore, the early phases of Turkmen mobilization that started to emerge under the Iraqi regime were discrete, not well-organized initiatives mainly focusing on keeping 'national consciousness' awake in the face of assimilation policies that the regime pursued. Official A from Turkmeneli Association, and one of the founders of the first Turkmen political party, says on the mobilization attempts starting from Baath rule in the late 1960s:

"Some of our older brothers chose some of the Turkmen youth, and they trained us. They trained us to be knowledgeable about politics, to be cultured for the future of Iraq...They organized us and prepared a curriculum for us on how to learn Turkish and Turkish history. We were doing it in secret because there was pressure from security forces and Iraqi intelligence."

An important turning point regarding this dormant mobilization was the student boycott initiated by Turkmen in 1971 in response to the Baath regime's nullifying the cultural rights recognized by Turkmen in 1970. The remarks of the earlier generations of the Turkmen elites who witnessed the boycott indicate that it was a moment of rupture for the community. Turkmen showed a collective resistance that went beyond docile forms of underground mobilizations. The same official from the Turkmeneli Association,

who himself is one of the organizers of the student boycott, says on the regime's backlash following the student boycott:

"These kinds of pains matured us as a society. If you ask, I can tell all about our friends who were tortured in prison, but as our people continued to be persecuted and as our friends continued to be executed, we resisted even more. Because an action always creates a reaction."

However, the slowly emerging political mobilization among the Turkmen community halted with ever-deepening regime oppression in almost a decade. Another turning point that brought this for the Turkmen community was the execution of four Turkmen leaders, the most prominent being Necdet Koçak, by the Saddam regime in the 1980s due to their political activities. Official A from Kirkuk Foundation states:

"After the execution of Necdet Koçak, we had a severe social concussion. The word 'concussion' would not do the justice; we can call it an earthquake. Many of us have given up. We had to review all our basic principles, like we could have married Turkish girls now and gotten Turkish citizenship as we had to remain in Turkey. Some of our friends decided to return to Iraq, taking the risk of being executed. Indeed, a few of them were executed, but some were not. So, we had such an earthquake."

As an already minimal opportunity space in the home country became completely closed and non-existent, the slowly emerging mobilization within the Turkmen community, or the "reaction," as the interviewee put it, came to an end, at least within the borders of Iraq. While the home country POS was closed for Turkmen, Turkey, as the host country, also did not provide an avenue for mobilization. The same official from Kirkuk Foundation says:

"There was a secret consensus in Turkmen society that if someone wanted to work for the Turkmen cause, s/he would go and study in Turkey. Therefore, a class of Turkmen elites started to emerge in Turkey in the 1970s and continued until about the early eighties. That was until the execution of Necdet Koçak. It was a breaking point. Then, Iran-Iraq broke out, and the 1980 coup happened in Turkey. Therefore, when these three breaking points overlapped, this axis changed."

At the beginning of the 1980s, Turkmen were faced with closed opportunity spaces and uncertainties in two main centers of Turkmen mobilization, Iraq, and Turkey. In addition, the closed opportunity spaces blocked the ways of legal and organizational mobilization within and across borders. The continuing remark of the same official

explains these three breaking points faced and points out that sectarian differences within the Turkmen community are one of the fault lines of the community.

"The coup in Turkey created uncertainty. Because we did not know what this coup would bring us and what it would take away. The Iraq-Iran war, which broke out simultaneously, had a negative impact on the Shiite Turkmen. Moreover, Iraq's prohibition of Turkmen education in Turkey after the executions caused our human source to dry up. Therefore, some of the Turkmen fled to Iran and even to Europe at that time."

As pointed out by the literature, one of the significant effects of closed opportunity structures is the weakening of the movement and its radicalization due to moving towards more confrontational methods. These two patterns can co-occur, as they are not mutually exclusive. The official A from Turkmeneli Foundation says:

"We had to stop our organizations and pacify them because we could be caught and arrested at any time. After 1980, I could survive for six years by working in various provinces of Iraq, but hiding my identity and not crossing to Kirkuk. Our movement went to sleep due to pressure."

As the years followed, 1980 was the era in which the Turkmen movement faced the most severe oppression by the regime. That era pacified the movement and blocked legal and organizational ways of mobilization; it also led to the first militarized mobilization of the Turkmen as a part of an emerging military opposition against the Saddam regime in Syria. The same official from the Turkmeneli Foundation continues:

"When our leaders were executed in 1980, our friends in Ankara held a protest march towards Iraqi Embassy, but then they thought and decided that this cause would not continue with these kinds of activities. And Turkey did not allow Turkmen movements back then. These years, the Iraqi opposition, composed of Kurds and Arabs, was organized in Damascus, Syria. So, our friends secretly went to Syria from Turkey and established Turkmen Salvation Movement and Turkmen youth voluntarily joined this organization. Commando teams were created and sent back to Northern Iraq to fight with Saddam's forces."

Another official from the Konya branch of ITKYD who was one of the founders of the Turkmen Salvation Movement continues:

"We were recruiting the soldiers fleeing the war (Iran-Iraq) into the organization and directing them to Syria. The Iraqi opposition was receiving armed training in the Beka Valley in Syria. I directed the youth there, and they began to receive armed training

as well. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish authorities detained me for 21 days and declared me persona non-grata since I had all the organization documents. I had to leave Turkey, go to Syria, and from there, to Iraq. We fought with Saddam's army in northern Iraq for three years. Iran-Iraq War was continuing. We continued the (military) organization in Syria until 1985. We had bad relations with Turkey as well. In 1985, we improved the relations, and Turkey asked to freeze the organization and called us back to Turkey, and we did."

These remarks are critical because they indicate the interwoven relationship between the home and host country POS. The main factor that pushed the subtle and mostly civilian Turkmen mobilization to military confrontation was the overwhelming regime oppression that destroyed any possibility of political activity in Iraq. It could have been speculated that if Turkey did provide a more significant opportunity space for Turkmen back in the 1980s, the movement could have prioritized focusing on their ethnic associations and lobby activities in Turkey instead of military engagements in Syria and Iraq. The military movement's being dissolved after Turkey's call provides evidence for this hypothesis. The closing opportunity structure at the host and home country has led the Turkmen movement towards confrontational mobilization through the transnational linkages built over Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. However, it is essential to note that even the militarized/radicalized forms of mobilization were possible with a relative opening in another context, Syria. Syria's opening its lands to Iraqi opposition due to the skirmish between two rival Baas parties made this new form of mobilization possible. It can be noted that the transnational context provided a limited opportunity space in that regard for Turkmen and the overall Iraqi opposition.

Iraq remained a fully authoritarian regime until its fall in 2003, and its authoritarian nature was the main thing that regime kept its consistency on. Therefore, the main impact played by the governing authority component of home POS revealed itself during the time of crisis, mainly the wars that the regime got involved. Iran-Iraq War, the invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War, and the Invasion of Iraq were turning points for any politically active group as these incidents weakened the authoritarian stability and subsequently brought opportunities for some and more oppression for others. As explained in the previous chapter, The first Gulf War, subsequent Operation Provide Comfort, and the no-fly zone declared 36th parallel northwards in Iraq changed a central power dynamic in Iraq. It created a region in the north that the regime had no military power over, therefore, no mechanism of oppression.

Furthermore, the emergence of a safe haven in Northern Iraq that regime forces could not infringe on drastically changed the opportunity structure in Iraq, prominently for Kurds and Turkmen, without even a regime change taking place. For Turkmen, the 1990s onwards was an era that the opportunity structure gradually widened both in the home country, Iraq, and the host country Turkey as will be detailed in the subsequent section. Therefore, Iraq's widened opportunity space changed the intensity level and form of Turkmen mobilization. As a result, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of the first political parties of the Turkmen political movement.

Official A from Turkmeneli Foundation, and one of the founders of Iraqi National Turkmen Party, the first political party of Turkmen states:

"After Iraq entered Kuwait, we declared the Iraqi National Turkmen Party. When Iraq entered Kuwait, the entire world became opposed to Iraq, including the UN, so we wanted to take advantage of this world power and declared the party."

Remarks of official A from the Iraqi Turkmen Front explain how decisive the opened opportunity space in Northern Iraq was for the emergence of the first political party of the Turkmen movement.

"The northern Iraq region, today's federal Kurdish region, was outside of Saddam's control. At the time, Poised Hammer forces deployed from Turkey were protecting the area. Then it turned into a safe zone. If it were not so, it would not be possible to establish a second party in Saddam's region other than the Baath party. So leaving aside establishing a party, even dreaming about it, was treason."

So, the dynamics in the political structure of Iraq started to change in a way that allowed moving into a new phase of mobilization. The widened POS in Turkey that came as a result of the changing Turkmen policy in the 1990s further strengthened this process and helped to build the transnational links connecting the political movement that emerged in Iraq to Turkey. The same participant who is among the founders of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party adds:

"When we founded the party, the Turkish state gave us great support. They let us engage with politics. Back then, Saddam and Turkey were on good terms, so they may not have allowed it. ... At that time, Turkey had economic problems, and it could not stand against Saddam. But Özal allowed us, and the state ignored our activities. So that's how we started. We opened the headquarters of the National Turkmen party in Ankara. This was a great advantage."

With the establishment of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP), the combined opportunity spaces emerged in Iraq and Turkey, leading to an intense level of Turkmen political mobilization in almost all fields; political, cultural, and military. The same participant continues:

"We established our first military headquarters in the north, in Shaqlawa (Erbil)... We started our organization in Erbil when Saddam withdrew from there and set up our facilities. We opened the Turkmen radio. We demanded from the Turkish state a TV channel, and the Turkmeneli channel started broadcasting in Erbil...After opening our headquarters in Erbil, we started our activities to raise the national consciousness in the society. We have declared our persecution at the United Nations. There was UNPO for independent, non-state communities, and we registered there."

The overall mobilization that was taking place in the Turkmen movement and its increased organizational power also alleviated Turkmen's position as a political actor within the Iraqi opposition. He continues:

"Of course, we also started participating in the Iraqi national opposition. We joined the first opposition meeting held in Beirut as INTP. Subsequently, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) convened in Vienna. I attended that meeting as representing the party. There was also a Salahaddin meeting that conveyed all opposition in Northern Iraq in 1993; we also attended this one. One of our founders joined the 27-member executive board of INC, and I became a member of the ten-member shura council of the INC. We made a declaration of Turkmen's rights there. Iraqi Turkmen were given a six percent representation right in the name of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party."

When asked about the military headquarters and its purpose, official B from Turkmeneli Foundation, who was also among the founders of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, says:

"It was not there for conflict. You must have a presence there. To have a place in forming political movements and establishing the state in future Iraq."

While the safe zone created after the First Gulf War was a pivotal moment for Turkmen and the rest of Northern Iraq, the regime's fall after the invasion of Iraq changed the entire political opportunity structure for each actor, as can be expected. The limited opening in Northern Iraq widened to engulf all other regions and the rest of the Turkmen regions that remained south of the 36th parallel. Therefore, the most crucial impact of the regime change was that the Turkmen political movement could have been organized in all parts of Iraq now. The regime change also brought challenges, but most importantly,

it opened an era of legal, parliamentary politics for all constituents of Iraq. Official B, who is a former ITC member, states:

"Of course, it had a lot of positive effects. We had the opportunity to start all Turkmen political movements in Turkmeneli regions. Turkmen were able to establish closer relations and contact with each other. As I said, our regions were subjected to Arabization policies. Arab and Kurdish people were brought from the South to our regions. After 2003, the Kurds resettled seven hundred thousand people only in the center of Kirkuk. Therefore, it has both positive and negative consequences, but we want to perceive it from the positive side. Yes, Turkmeneli was able to establish relations with each other. The Turkmen political movement spread there. Turkmen schools were opened. Our flags were raised. Turkmen were mentioned in the constitution, and we acquired certain legal rights, although it was not enough."

With the establishment of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party and later the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Turkey became the official center of Turkmen political mobilization outside of Iraq. However, the Saddam regime was one of the main barriers to the transnational linkages that Turkmen were trying to build between Iraq and Turkey over this mobilization. The regime change removed this barrier. Official A from Kirkuk Foundation says:

"First, an unprecedented cultural explosion occurred in Kirkuk. Without exaggeration, dozens of magazines started to be published. Turkmen schools were established. We started watching Turkmen channels. My God, it was an unbelievable thing for us. Even Ibrahim Tatlis's tapes were banned during Saddam's time. Studying in Turkey and giving your child a Turkish name, these things were all forbidden. All of these became free. The Turkmen lived the drunkenness of this for a decade. Then, going and coming from Turkey was an issue. When a Turkmen family, who has a son in Turkey involved in politics, comes to visit Turkey, they would return in fear, wondering if they will be questioned. All these gone."

As it will be explained more in detail while addressing transnational POS, an essential portion of the enlargement that occurred in home country POS brought by the drastic impact of regime change was countervailed with other changes that occurred in transnational POS for Iraqi Turkmen. Therefore, the initial optimism brought by regime change does not reflect on the current assessments of Turkmen elites on their movements' success and prospects. Nevertheless, while noting the challenges the Turkmen cause faces, interviewees unanimously confirmed that the regime's fall opened a space for

Turkmen mobilization to the extent that has never existed before. Official B from Turkmeneli Foundation says, when asked about the effect of regime change:

"It definitely had an impact. We certainly would not be able to take action that easily. But we've been through a difficult situation; now we are in a difficult situation again. But of course, our situation is better; it is better in an incomparable way."

Regime change also changed the content of the activities. Under the Saddam regime, Turkmen were mainly in survival mode; therefore, preserving their identity and language was usually the main focus of their agenda and their advocacy in Iraq and Turkey. Official A, who is a former ITC member, says:

"During Saddam's period, our associations and our political parties in the region were working primarily on reducing the pressure of the regime on our people, and voicing their grievances to the world public opinion, and in this way, declaring that Saddam is a dictator, he oppresses all the people, and that this regime needs to be changed. We were working to prevent the Turkmen from assimilation."

After the regime's fall, the Turkmen movement leveled up as a political actor. Its target audience transformed into political elites in the emerging state and the focus of their activities became institutionalizing the widened opportunity space for Turkmen. An official from Turkmeneli Human Rights Association says:

"At that time in Iraq, the Saddam regime was gone, a new regime had come, and there was a new constitution. All our efforts were to take place we deserve in this constitution. We were partially successful in this but partially not. For example, Arabs and Kurds are mentioned as constituent elements in the Iraqi constitution. Turkmen are considered the third constituent in regions where they are present. Later, the decision of the Council of Ministers came out in terms of the Turkmen being the third constituent. We have worked a lot for this purpose. To gain political rights. We talked with politicians in Iraq, these sorts of activities..."

While Iraq was the heart of the Turkmen movement, Turkey slowly became its main operational center. This trend became increasingly apparent starting from the 1990s with changing foreign policy priorities of Turkey. Therefore, while influencing the political elites in Iraq was one component of solidifying the gains brought by the regime change, the other component was doing the same indirectly by influencing Turkey's political elites. This further intensified the transnational political mobilization between Turkey and Iraq. Official A, who is a former member of ITC/former president of ITCYD, says regarding the role of Turkmen associations in Turkey:

"Of course, our main target audience is to influence the political parties in Turkey, the ruling party first. We were trying to persuade them to adopt a policy that would protect the long-term national interests of the Turkmen. Because our cause is sometimes viewed from a security perspective and sometimes from an economic perspective, we say no, it shouldn't be like this. Turkey should have a national and a long-term policy regardless of the governments regarding the Iraqi Turkmen."

The regime changes also marked the beginning of an era of parliamentary democracy in Iraq. Therefore, while political lobbying became an effective tool used across borders by the Turkmen movement, it also required to be substantiated by an electoral presence and success. No matter how troubled the democratic experience of Iraq is, Turkmen associations in Turkey consider electoral mobilization as a natural component of their political mobilization. All associations interviewed noted efforts to mobilize the Turkmen community in Turkey to vote. Although some interviewees specifically noted that they only mobilize Turkmen to vote, the campaigning efforts conducted for Iraqi Turkmen Front and its candidates are also notable. Official A, who is a former member of ITC/former president of ITKYD, states:

"So, we voted here (Turkey) in all previous elections except the last one. Iraqi citizens could cast their votes abroad in about fifteen countries, including Turkey. Therefore, the associations and organizations here would do everything, such as mobilizing people for the elections, persuading them, printing posters of candidates, and overseeing the ballot boxes. In other words, they were the volunteer supporters of the Front (ITC). All kinds of support were given to the candidates. As I said, we even printed the election posters ourselves here. The policy is drawn in Iraq. Candidates are determined. After that, we would work here with the Front (ITC) in line with that policy."

The electoral mobilization of Turkmen associations does not remain confined to Turkey. Interviewees also noted contributing to mobilization and campaign efforts by personally going to Iraq and working in the field. For example, an official from Kirkuk Foundation says:

"In the 2018 elections, we went there (Iraq) and worked for the Front, and we supported the Turkmen MPs. We took a joint decision as the Foundation and went... We talked at the assemblies. We talked at coffee houses. We talked at dervish lodges. We talked on television, and we talked on the radio."

Notably, from the most politically involved to the least, all Turkmen associations emphasized their activities related to electoral politics. However, while noting the

increasing alienation of Turkmen from politics in the background of a highly corrupt state, associations continue their efforts to mobilize people for political participation. For example, an official from the Iraqi Turkmen Justice and Solidarity Association which is an organization mainly focuses on humanitarian aid rather than seeking political goals, says:

"Of course, we have these activities to communicate with people together with associations, to convey the election advertisement to our people, to introduce the voters, to show the election places and centers, to help them to reach the election places easily, to provide communication and so on."

The passages indicate the substantial impact of the home country POS on Turkmen's political mobilization. Although the home POS gradually widened for Turkmen regarding the regime's impact, other factors in the home were working in the opposite direction.

5.2.2 *Relative Stability*

Relative Stability is another component addressed as part of home country POS. Stability is an even more crucial factor in the case of Iraq because the interviews reveal that although regime change opened the way to an unprecedented POS, continuing civil strife amounted to multiple civil wars and limited the opportunity space brought by the new regime. *The political Stability and Absence of Violence* index was taken as a reference for relative stability in Iraq, and interviews were used to locate the impact of political stability on political activities. While acknowledging that fall of the regime made political mobilization possible at a legal and organizational level, the interviewees point out the nullifying effect of the severe violence and instability that engulfed Iraq. Official A who is a former member of ITC states:

"After the regime fell in 2003, the US made a promise during the invasion. They said we would bring democracy to Iraq immediately. We cannot say that they did not bring it at all because it was a complete one-party rule in Saddam's time. After him, we had a certain level of freedom, various parties, non-governmental organizations, etc. But the country devolved into such turmoil we didn't get to enjoy that thing. So what did it turn out to be? Is democracy such a thing? ... We experienced two things together during the period following Saddam's fall in Iraq. First, radical religious terrorism, Al Qaida, then Deash. After that, the invasion of our lands by peshmerga forces."

A critical reflection of this on the Turkmen community was the increasing street mobilization in Turkey as a reaction to the worsening security situation at home. Official

C who is the former president of ITKYD indicate that lack of political stability also triggers more confrontational forms of mobilizations such as marches and protests. When asked whether there was a specific era that Turkmen were more active in the streets, he says:

"The last years before the fall of Saddam. Because right before losing his rule, there was much more oppression. And, also after 2003, the government was still not properly formed in Iraq. There was so much chaos. There were many assassinations. Our Turkmen brothers were martyred, and their cars were detonated by the assassinations. They were shot etc. Since these things happened a lot, I can say that we had a protest march almost every month. There was a ban on assembly on Istiklal Street, but we made a protest march without caring about anything and breaking the law. Because our hearts were aching."

Another official from Bursa branch of ITKYD emphasized that the political freedom that was assumed to be brought by the regime changed immediately, accompanied by the loss of stability and security.

"I was in the 7th grade when Saddam was overthrown; the first explosions happened in Kirkuk. We encountered explosions and assassinations; it was not much relief. In terms of freedom of language, parties, channels, of course, there was a relief, and the democratization process has started, but in terms of security, we did not see any good."

Official A, who is a former member of ITC, adds:

"The pressure of the peshmerga and there was also terror next to it. Especially at Tuz Khurmatu, later Tal Afar, and the actions of the religious extremist groups... So, to speak, they completely turned the region into a fireball. Bombs are going off daily, and our leadership is being targeted there. Of course, because of these, we were trying to show a reaction against them."

Interviewees specifically pointed out the detrimental effects that the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse of state structure brought on the security environment. This has limited the opportunity space that regime change created. Although, stability is relatively restored in Iraq compared to the early years of the invasion, as Figure 4.2 indicates Iraq's political stability levels have been declining for the last decade and currently stand at one of the lowest points in Iraq's recent history. The lack of political stability, ongoing extrajudicial killings, and terrorist attacks accompanied by the protest movements that emerged in the face of increasing frustration of people with the political

system are prominent reasons for that. However, it was notable that there was not much emphasis by the interviewees on the current level of stability in Iraq or ongoing population movements within Iraq regarding the Turkmen community's role as an actor affected by it or getting engaged with it. For example, when asked about the Turkmen community's engagement with protests movements in Iraq, an official from the ITKYD Bursa branch says:

"Turkmen are living predominantly in Kirkuk and after two thousand and fifteen (Kurds) withdrew, and the Iraqi forces took back (Kirkuk), a level of peace, at least in terms of security, was restored there. But from that day until this hour, the Kurds have never given up. They want to take the smallest opportunity and enter Kirkuk... Let's say there is an explosion. They say, let's enter Kirkuk, be partners with the Iraqi forces, help them, and keep the security. Therefore, Kirkuk cannot handle any trouble. When there is a protest, like in Baghdad, it will not be the protests like in other regions, and I think it should not happen. Because, in case of the slightest trouble, the peshmerga forces, unfortunately, find the opportunity and want to enter the city. Therefore, we are not against protests. I'm personally not against it. Turkmen should join protests in Baghdad or elsewhere, but not in Kirkuk. That's the specific reason, as I said. In this sense, our authorities are not looking positively at Turkmen joining protests."

The quotation above indicates that the factors consisting of POS may produce different impacts when interacting with other political factors. In this case, while grievances of the Turkmen community related to political stability turned into political reactions in the early years of regime change, other political concerns prevent the emergence of that sort of mobilization today.

5.2.3 Diaspora Engagement Policies

Different components of opportunity space shape the field and actions with different strengths. Therefore, not all components of opportunity space create the same level of impact. As was discussed, regime change created the most drastic effect within the home country POS by opening the space for an organized and legal Turkmen mobilization. However, its effect was constrained by the second component of POS, relative stability. When it comes to the final part of home country POS, diaspora engagement policies, was observed to be the least influential component. In authoritarian regimes with Saddam's regime's level of oppression, transnational surveillance mechanisms may effectively constrain political activities outside of borders. All the participants noted the Saddam regime targeted them and their families in different ways

ranging from assassination attempts and execution orders to harassing their families through detentions and exiles. An official from Turkmeneli Human Rights Association states:

"They attempted to assassinate me at home when I was a student. But, again, the Iraqi government had a hand in it... But the worst, of course, was for our families there. For example, they exiled my family. They used to take my brothers and my father to the police station from time to time. They were telling them that I had to come back."

The main impact of these surveillance mechanisms was noted as "being more cautious" or taking extra precautions to hide their identities. A former president of ITKYD states while explaining his early involvement with Turkmen associations and political activities in Turkey:

"Because all this is forbidden in this Iraq when we came here, suddenly our eyes were opened. Our eyes had been opened, but we should not have made any mistakes. At that time, in the period before 2003, our families were still there. If we did take any wrong step here (in Turkey), our family would be harmed there. So we had to be careful."

Official A from Kirkuk Foundation adds:

"Some Turkmen would engage with politics openly; some would do it under a pseudonym. I also have many articles under a pseudonym as well from the eighties. Some are about academic issues, some are cultural, and some are political. But if you write with your name even on a cultural issue, it could have been used as evidence against you in Iraq during those years."

Interviewees do not point out the regime's diaspora surveillance policies as a factor that impacted their actions. However, it is notable that there is also a stigma over fearing the regime, which may have affected their answers. For example, a former ITC official says:

"Since I first came here, we have actively worked in the party, in the association, in all different ways. There is no such concern for the people involved in our case; it is only an excuse for people who stay away. Being afraid of the regime is okay, but to which point will you keep being afraid? After all, some people are against that regime and need to be involved. So, there is no concern for the people involved in the cause. But there is danger. There is always a danger. Sometimes they would go and get (our family). They would say that your child should leave and withdraw from the organization. Then our families would say things like that to get away with it. "We have rejected our son; he is not our son anymore. We do not call him either, as he rebelled against the regime."

The existence of a well-established Iraqi Turkmen diaspora in Turkey and the possibility of being able to live in Turkey for long years without being directly targeted by the state can be cited as an essential reason for the negligible impact of surveillance mechanisms over political mobilizations. Several interviewees pointed out that they had to remain in Turkey until the regime fell. The same official from Turkmeneli Human Rights Association says, when asked about for how long that regime continued to target his family:

"It continued until 2003. And from 1977 until 2003, I could not go back to Iraq. Then, after 2003, we could. I still do."

Official B from the Kirkuk Foundation state:

"On April 9, 2003, Baghdad was completely occupied by the USA, and the Baathist regime fell. Immediately after that, ten to fifteen days later, we arrived in Kirkuk. I personally did not go, could not go to my hometown for the last twenty-three years. Some friends within our group hadn't been to Iraq for twenty-five, twenty-six years."

Turkey has been a safe haven for the Turkmen political diaspora, especially since the 1990s, as explained in the subsequent section. However, even in the earlier years when Turkey had a relatively neutral Turkmen policy, the kinstate relation with Turkey led to the country's being perceived as a safe place. Turkmen could continue to live for long years without fear of deportation or facing possible consequences of Turkey's prioritizing its relations with Iraq at their expense. This is an explanatory factor for the interviewees' lack of emphasis on regime policies.

It was observed that home country POS was a very influential factor that shaped Turkmen mobilization within and outside of Iraq. Governing authority was marked as the most influential component of home country POS as it led to the complete closure of opportunity space and its gradual opening. The closure of opportunity space imposed by governing authority brought pacification and radicalization of Turkmen mobilization. In contrast, its opening brought more robust mobilization in the form of organizational and electoral political activities. It was also noted that the home country POS might change drastically even without a complete change within the governing authority, as the example of Northern Iraq indicates. Relative stability was assessed to have a significant but subsidiary impact that either consolidates or weakens the opportunity space initially created by the governing authority. And finally, the diaspora policies of Iraq were assessed as a relatively weak factor that shapes Turkmen mobilizations. This needs to be addressed concerning the Turkmen community's relationship with its host country

Turkey. Turkey acted as a sanctuary for Turkmen people, and this may have circumvented the impact and surveillance power of diaspora policies. Data addressed in this section provided evidence that political actors engage with their home and host countries within the political field. Further, open political opportunity spaces at home produce organizational, more potent, civilian, and legal mobilization forms, while close opportunity spaces lead to weaker and confrontational ones. Transnational linkages that political mobilization occurs over also improve with the extension of opportunity structure at home.

5.3 *The Effect of Transnational Context*

The transnational context was conceptualized under three components : foreign policy priorities of the host country, bilateral relations between the host and home country, and the role of international actors/institutions. These three components are considered the prominent elements that shape the transnational context of Iraqi Turkmen engagement in politics.

5.3.1 *Foreign Policy Priorities of Host Country*

Foreign policy priorities of the host country constitute the first and arguably most crucial component of transnational POS. While addressing political mobilization across borders, the host country has an essential place in these transnational linkages, as is the country where political actors are based. In the case of Iraqi Turkmen, Turkey being the kin state, plays an even more substantial role in determining how wide or constrained the opportunity space that the transnational context provides Turkmen people.

First Gulf War was a pivotal moment for Iraq's POS, as explained in the previous chapter. However, it was also a turning point for transnational POS, as it drastically changed the foreign policy calculations of the host country, Turkey. While the widened POS in northern Iraq paved the way for a more organizational and more vigorous political mobilization on the Turkmen front, the emergence of a de-facto Kurdish region pushed Turkey to pursue a more active Iraq policy and rendered Turkmen an asset for this purpose. This led to Turkey's initiatives to consolidate the emerging political revival of Turkmen, starting with the establishment of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC). Official A from Kirkuk Foundation says:

"The Front's (ITC) establishment was born out of necessity. Because, at that time, a security zone was created in Northern Iraq by the Poised Hammer Forces. After that, Turkey felt the urge have a presence there. And it was necessary for us to organize so

that we could take a role in the Iraqi opposition... Because different Turkmen groups, who share the same ideas but differ in their methods, started to emerge... At that time, Demirel was the president, and İhsan Doğramacı was a figure respected by all Turkmen in our neighborhood. With his efforts, the Iraqi Turkmen Front was established.”

While the widened opportunity space was an opportunity for a higher level of political mobilization, an unintended consequence was the newly emerging political movement's being divided into new fractions. As Turkey is slowly assuming the patronage of the Turkmen political movement, it fulfilled the requirements of its new position by making interferences at critical junctures. Official A from Turkmeneli Foundations says:

“When the year was ninety-four or ninety-five, more Turkmen parties began to emerge... And in the face of these situations, the political actors said that the Turkmen should establish the Iraqi Turkmen Front. In other words, they said that the Turkmen should unite under the banner of the Turkmen front, that is, all parties and our all-non-governmental organizations.”

It is important to note that Turkey's engagement with Turkmen's cause emerged as a complete top-to-bottom process and was created by factors outside of the Turkmen sphere of influence. This pattern starts to dominate the relationship between Turkmen mobilization and Turkey in the coming decades. Official A, who is a former ITC member, states:

"From the beginning of the nineties, Turkey started to get involved. The process pushed Turkey more than us; of course, we couldn't push Turkey that hard. However, the process forced Turkey to be more involved in this issue. Because, despite being seriously late, Turkey realized that it could not ensure its security by just protecting its borders. The limits of its security start far beyond its borders. Since it started to act with that logic, it inevitably got involved in our cause more. I mean, from the early nineties until today, we can say that there is an increasing interest in the Iraq and Turkmen issue."

Apart from being a political party, the Iraqi Turkmen Front emerged as a center that united leading Turkmen political organizations, including associations. Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association also became one of the Front's constituent parties as the oldest Turkmen association. While the widened POS in Iraq and Turkey was already pushing the movement towards a more organizational form of mobilization, Turkey's involvement further consolidated the ongoing process. As Turkey chose ITC as the operational center of its engagement with the Turkmen cause, the Iraqi Turkmen

Front, being a political party operating in Iraq with an office and representative in Turkey, gradually monopolized the Turkmen political field in Turkey and its transnational linkages in Iraq while sidelining others.

Official A from the Turkmeneli foundation states:

"They saw that there was disorganization among us. So then, what did they do? They intervened and said, then you should establish a Turkmen union. And what was that? It was Iraqi Turkmen Front...At that time Front consisted of Iraqi National Turkmen Party, Turkmeneli Party, Independent Turkmen Party, Iraqi Turkmen Culture and Solidarity Association, Turkmen Brotherhood Association...I mean five or six parties."

Iraqi Turkmen Front represents a nationalist line in Iraq's political field. However, not all Turkmen political identities are constructed over their ethnic identities. On the contrary, official A from Kirkuk Foundation, a former political advisor under the prime ministry at the time, points out that the Turkmen political field in Iraq is organized over three fault lines.

"However, these deputies (Turkmen) have three political directions. One is the nationalist line, which can never be the majority. The second is the Shiite line, the Iranian one, and the third is the Sunni line."

When asked whether this means that Turkey chose to engage with the minority strand within Turkmen political movements in Iraq, the same official adds:

"Yes, that is right. But Turkey also did this. Especially during the period when Abdullah Gul was Minister of Foreign Affairs, he brought together all the deputies many times, regardless of which party they belonged to or community they belonged to."

Although there is an emphasis that actors in Turkey are open to engagement with any political actor, it is evident that for Turkmen associations in Turkey, ITC is considered the primary and legitimate political representation body of Turkmen. Therefore, they overwhelmingly cooperate and organize around ITC and its political aims. For example, official B from the Turkmeneli foundation says:

"The Iraqi Turkmen front is the legitimate representative recognized by the state and Turkey. We cooperate deeply with the ITC... We also support other groups, such as Shiite groups. But our main partner is, of course, the Iraqi Turkmen Front."

Official A, who is a former ITC member and former member of ITKYD, adds:

"Since we were in the association, and since the Front was established, we were always a natural member of the Front since it was our biggest political institution. We

have always supported them in all their works, whether in their elections, both on an institutional and a personal basis."

Turkey's initiatives to unite the Turkmen political movement under the banner of a political party that Turkey spearheaded its formation also marked the Turkmen movement's starting to be monopolized by Turkey's political choices. With the help of ITC, Turkey chose a specific political strand to govern the rest of the movement and shape the movement around it. The official from the Kirkuk foundation stated he resigned from his advisorship position due to inevitable disagreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Turkmen policy and added that this disagreement was over Turkey's considering ITC as the only interlocutor of the Turkmen community. Regarding his disagreements, he says:

"...This policy was not true, and relations should be established with all Turkmen on the political scene. This relationship should not be just in the form of the president and prime minister bringing them together at dinner. I mean, Turkey should be getting engaged with them more. This is the first thing. The second is not to interfere with the internal dynamics of those organizations. When you get involved in its dynamics, all Turkmen people are deeply dependent on Turkey. Therefore, when Turkey wants something in a certain way, everything stops there. This inevitably hinders political mechanisms. This led even some of the Turkmen on the nationalist line to move away from Turkey."

In that way, while Turkey was choosing and limiting the number of actors representing the Turkmen movement, Turkey also started to direct the strategies followed by the movement and its actions. A striking example of this can be seen in the position that Turkmen took in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion regarding the federative governance of the newly emerging Iraq. Official B, a former member of ITC, states that Turkey's political concerns related to Northern Iraq and the Kurdish federation pushed Turkmen to refuse a federative system at the expense of their political interests after Iraq's invasion. And this has cost Turkmen losing their fair share within the new federative Iraq.

"I will be very clear, the reason for our refusal was that Turkey's policy had a unitary Iraq policy at that time, and there was an understanding that a federative structure would lead to the break up of Iraq. We also adopted this to pursue a coordinated foreign policy with Turkey and not contradict it. But decentralization was much more important to us. Because our regions were already divided... But we left this pragmatist stance aside and acted in coordination with the foreign policy and preferences of

Turkey... When we look at it from the Turkmen point of view, viewing federalism so badly and demonizing it to that extent, and not taking advantage of it was the wrong decision, from a pragmatistic perspective. Because then Turkey changed its policy. It established relations with Northern Iraq based on federalism. There, the president of the Republic of Turkey says that they (Northern Iraq) have the right in the 125. Article of the constitution to extract oil. On what basis does he say that? According to the federal system, he says that the federated region can do this. Well, if we had declared a federated region and established a federation for the Turkmen, our situation would have been very different today. This is due to both sides' lack of vision and political foresight. Both in Turkey and Turkmen."

Turkey did not always act as a factor constraining the elbow room of the Turkmen movement, but it also pushed the movement towards taking certain steps and pursuing specific policies. When Turkey started improving its relations with Kurds within and outside of its borders from 2012 onwards, the Iraqi Turkmen Front also started to engage with Kurds in Iraq, which can be considered an unlikely development without Turkey's encouragement. Official B, who is a former member of ITC, states:

"After 2013, I went back to Iraq again. There were elections for the Northern Iraq Regional Government parliament at that time... I participated in the elections for the first time from the ITC list. At that time, there was a political opening towards the north. ITC Erbil offices were opened in 2012... They were closed down from 2003 until 2012. After almost a decade of closure, they showed a slight softness as the KDP's relationship with Turkey improved. Because before, they saw the ITC as an actor working entirely for Turkey and inflicted Iraqi Turkmen as a punishment for their bad relations with Turkey."

Another vital strategy change brought by Turkey's influence was related to keeping a Turkmen armed force in Northern Iraq in the early 1990s. While Iraq National Turkmen Party had a small military force during those years, several interviewees emphasized that it was later dismantled, which was a big strategic mistake for Turkmen, according to their remarks. For example, official B from Turkmeneli Foundation states:

"For example, we had established an Akıncı force composed of a thousand people at that time. But then, in the early 1990s, it was disbanded... My target at that time was increasing it to ten thousand people. If we had an armed force of ten thousand people in Iraq today, we would be in a very different place. We would be in a different place in the Kurdish region and the central government. But it was not supported that much. That's to say; we have these kinds of problems with Turkish policies."

As Turkey's long-awaited involvement in the Turkmen cause finally occurred in the 1990s, it came at the expense of the movement's autonomy. Both younger and older generations of Turkmen elites have pointed out that one of the main problems with Turkey's policy is the Turkmen political movement's turning into a subject of Turkmen policy instead of an actor of it. Official B who is a former member of ITC points out the disturbance felt within the Turkmen community regarding this hierarchal relation while carefully defining the relation within the terms of brotherhood.

"Turkmen have a will. They are an independent society and nation there. It has a will. No one can disrespect this will. Our brothers in Ankara and other stakeholders in Iraq do not have the right have right to do this... For example, if your brother has a negative relationship with you and always humiliates you, do you want to continue this relationship? Or would you say stop? ... Therefore, everyone will respect the will of the Turkmen so that the other group and parties in Iraq will also respect me."

Turkey's disregard for Turkmen will also affect electoral success on the ground, according to remarks of Official B from the Turkmeneli foundation. Although we cannot disclose the details of Turkey's involvement due to confidentiality reasons, he says:

"Unfortunately, Turkey is making many mistakes in politics these days...Because of that, we suffered great losses in Kirkuk in the last parliamentary elections...In these situations, it ignores Turkmen will...and act as it knows."

Notably, there is an emphasis on making politics with dignity. While Turkey's support is welcomed and even awaited, interviewees noted that this support should not come at the expense of the movement's dignity. The same official adds:

"Turkey should review its policy. It has to show what it is going to do. In other words, it needs to make a stable policy. Also, it needs to leave Turkmen will to the Turkmen... We want Turkey's support but with the condition that it provides us with dignity. Saying, I fired this one, I brought this one. Then what happens when you do that? There is no stability in the cause."

A direct result of Turkey's, in a sense, "hijacking" the Turkmen movement was the emergence of a movement whose prospects and success are overly dependent on Turkey. In that sense, Turkey's policies and actions turned into the main factor that widens or shrinks the opportunity space that Turkmen are mobilizing at the transnational level. Official A, who is a former member of ITC, states:

"Turkey should have a national policy, a long-term policy, regardless of the governments regarding Iraqi Turkmen. Otherwise, whenever Turkey's policy makes zigzags, our situation in Iraq also zigzags with it."

It is worth noting that the overwhelming emphasis on Turkey's infringement on the movement's autonomy is accompanied by a discourse of inseparability or "a mother & child bond" between Turkey and Turkmen. While demanding their autonomy, Turkmen also emphasize that Turkey is the main factor that shapes Turkmen mobilization, guides its policies and prospects, and is bound to be that way. The same officials add:

"Before everything, Turkey affects us. In other words, just like a baby receives everything from the mother with a cord, I do not mean oxygen, food, or something; even all the genetic codes, happiness, unhappiness, everything comes from there. Ours is a bit like that. So we have that kind of bond with Turkey."

When asked about the primary factor that has an impact on the movement, Official A from Turkmeneli Foundation reiterates the previous remarks:

"Turkey has the biggest role. Turkey raises us at one time and lowers us at another time. All actions of Turkey affect us. Just like how you cannot separate from your twin sister. We cannot separate from Turkey like that."

It was observed from the interviews that, starting from the 1990s, Turkey became a significant factor that determined Turkmen's borders of opportunity structure. While the foreign policy priorities of Turkey are the first strand of Turkey's role, a more indirect way that Turkey continued to shape that opportunity space is through its bilateral relations with Iraq.

5.3.2 Bilateral Relations between the Host and Home country (Turkey& Iraq)

The bilateral relations between the host country and the home country concern Turkey and Iraq within the scope of this study. Therefore, the Saddam regime, the US, and the current political regime are three entities that need to be addressed within this scope.

In this regard, regarding Turkey's bilateral relations with any of these three entities, the most decisive moment that permanently shaped the opportunity structure for Turkmen was noted as the 1 March Military Motion by interviewees. The motion, which failed to pass the Turkish assembly in 2003, was to authorize the US forces to use Turkish lands to initiate Iraq's invasion. Turkmen political figures state that Turkey's failure to

pass the motion led to Turkmen's being excluded from the political system of new Iraq. Official A from Kirkuk Foundation states:

“If that motion had been passed, the Turkmen would have had a place as the third element in the political process, in the formation of the constitution, in taking part in the government, in determining the number of deputies in the regions where they lived densely. And Turkey would have gained a lot as well...In a sense, that motion is the moment that Turkmen has lost the game.”

The interviews have pointed out that the kinstate relation between Turkey and Turkmen led to the Turkmen community being punished by the US on behalf of Turkey's failure to pass the motion. Most interviewees note the difficulties that Turkmen face in current Iraq while acknowledging that the regime changes substantially changed the nature of political conditions in Iraq in a positive way. The main reason is the political equation's turning at the expense of Turkmen after 2003, as stated by Official A, who is a former member of ITC:

“Turkmen in Iraq completely went out of the political equation. Think of it this way. The country is being occupied. All the infrastructure of the state is being disbanded and re-established. Its army, state mechanism, and security. While everything is being built from scratch, the Turkmen are completely ignored. Therefore, Turkmen went through a very difficult process in newly established Iraq since the motion did not pass. In other words, the Turkmen suffered the first blow.”

This indicates that although the regime change that occurred in Iraq widened the opportunity space for Turkmen, a component of transnational POS scaled down this space without neutralizing completely. Moreover, this effect is not confined to the US but has become a recurring pattern for all political actors operating in Iraq, as stated by the Official C who is a former president of ITKYD:

“Whenever they come into conflict with Turkey on an issue, one of the Turkmen is assassinated. They touch our sore spot, or a Turkmen official is assassinated.”

Although the ethnic and historical relations between the Turkmen and Turkey are self-evident, it can be argued that Turkey's heavy hand on the Turkmen political movement further consolidated Turkmen's being considered Turkey's proxy. Official A from Turkmeneli Foundation says:

“Turkey made a serious mistake. We gave the impression that Turkey is behind the Iraqi Turkmen... This impression sometimes helped us in Iraq but sometimes harmed us. Everyone outside watches us, British, French, Germans, and when we want

something, they say to ask it from Turkey... They openly say it. It weakened our hand. Because of this, we cannot make dignified politics."

Concerning relations with Iraq's central authority and Turkey, the interviewees unanimously stated that good relations with Iraq also positively affect the Turkmen community. Without commenting much on the impact and nature of these relations, preference over good neighborly relations between two countries was presented as a general point of agreement. Official A from Kirkuk Foundation says:

"In other words, as long as Turkey and Baghdad's relations are good, Turkmen feel comfortable. For example, nobody wants Maliki. Turkmen don't want him, either. But during Maliki's first government, the Turkmen had three ministries. At that time, relations with Turkey were very good. But unfortunately, because of his stupidity a simple statement, relations with Turkey deteriorated. Therefore, the better our relations with the central government, the better it is for us. The situation is not very different with the Northern Iraqi administration."

When asked about Turkey's intense political and economic engagement with Northern Iraq, the interviewees also refrained from bringing direct criticism on that and sustained that their stance as Turkmen community is advocating good relations with all actors within Iraq. The absence of criticism worth noting as Turkey's engagement with Kurds is one of the primary reasons that sidelined Turkmen as a foreign policy tool. Official B, who is a former member of ITC, states:

"We do not want to be an obstacle or a hindrance in Turkey's relations with any party. On the contrary, the Turkmen has to assume the role of being the main bridge between Iraq and Anatolia... Therefore, we expect the trade between Turkey and Northern Iraq to reach ten billion, not only billions. Trade should continue, but where Turkmen stands in those relations...It is very important for Turkey to make its decisions with a will to increase Turkmen influence in Iraq."

It was observed that Turkey's current relationship with the current authority in Iraq is not considered a potent force shaping the opportunity space in the way that US-Turkey relations did. Turkey-US relations deteriorating at a critical juncture point in Iraq's history can be cited as an essential reason. It can also be added that Iraq's being ruled by non-stable and weak governments and the proxies of outside forces, such as the US and Iran, being more influential political actors in Iraq than its central governments, is the second factor that created this situation.

The below remarks of the official A from Kirkuk Foundations reflect complicated power dynamics within Iraq. However, it also indicates that the central Iraqi government does not have the authority to widen or constrain an existing opportunity space in Iraq for Turkmen.

"It is all about this sharing system what they call 'muhasasa'. I mean, even the slightest issue gets shared. Starting from the number of seats per community receives in a city to the number of ministers in the Council of Ministers. When you go down, the general distribution of general directorates in cities is shared. Even the distribution of university professor positions is shared when you go down further. In other words, as there are so many micro-level distributions, everyone tries to get their power from another country or another place. Therefore money or weapons decide this distribution."

5.3.3 Role of International Organizations/Actors

International organizations are assessed as the least effective constituent among all the components addressed within the political opportunity structure concept. Another point worth noting is that, as opposed to other POS components analyzed, there are contradicting views on how critical international actors are for the Turkmen political movement. Despite this, the general opinion is that civil society or outside actors are not crucial for the Turkmen cause precisely because these actors are indifferent towards Turkmen and their problems. No specific actor, organization, or body was pointed out in this regard, but the overall discourse is usually focused on the "west." An official from Turkmeneli Human Rights Association says:

"Four hundred thousand people were displaced from their homes, hundreds of people were massacred, and over five hundred women disappeared in Tal Afar. Yet, the West has always been a witness and never brought these up. The reason is obvious here. Because they are Turkish... Justice and democracy... The West always demands these for certain people. But unfortunately, when s/he is a Turk, they can't do anything. No western television has ever brought up this Tal Afar case so far. Therefore, the West always ignores us, no matter what we do. Yet, we still knock on their doors."

Another issue emphasized by the interviewees is the funding problems faced by associations. The international organization appears as a potential funder in this regard, but they point out that they also have a biased attitude toward the Turkmen community. For example, official C who is the former president of ITKYD states:

"We could not contact the funds in Europe. It is our shortcoming. Some institutions do it so masterfully, but the truth is, we couldn't do it. Because there seems to

be a circle in the world so that we are not helped... Our friends in Europe went and talked to the authorities on our behalf. Everyone says okay, bring me your file. Reports are prepared and sent; negotiations take place. But not a penny of aid will come."

A point brought up by one of the interviewees and worth mentioning is that despite all the shortcomings of Saddam's regime, the same official states that negative public opinion and Iraq's being high on the agenda made the Turkmen voice more hearable by the international actors.

"If we talk about the effect between the two periods, our voice was heard louder during the Saddam era. Because the world was focused on Iraq. There was a war and the desire to change the regime there. At that time, even the foreign press in Turkey would pay attention. They would follow carefully. But after 2003, the world press did not pay much attention to us. If you ask when they did pay attention, it is whenever there was a murder, an explosion, an assassination, a fire, or a terrorist incident, and then the world would pay attention. Of course, this inevitably affected the spread of our actions."

Official B from Turkmeneli Foundation can be noted as one of the few interviewees that emphasized the importance of engaging with international actors. Turkmeneli Foundation is an organization with a more international scope, and it is more Iraq-oriented. The foundation cooperates with other international organizations, including the UN, which may account for the more positive view of international actors.

"Of course, the international context is important for Iraqi Turkmen. At that point, we have cooperation with ITC. We must explain and introduce ourselves in the West... We must have the international public opinion behind us, not only Turkey."

The general conclusion derived from the impact of international organizations/actors is that they are not considered essential factors that shape the opportunity space in Iraq. An important reason for that is there are other actors much more involved in Iraq and the Turkmen community that does leave little space for other political actors to shape the opportunity space for Turkmen. Turkey comes at the top of the list and is followed by other countries such as US and Iran. Specifically, specific countries are considered the primary shapers of opportunity spaces, whether the US, Turkey, or the Iraqi regime. Although the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq and Iraq's invasion was brought by certain collective decision-making and with the involvement of international bodies, these are attributed to specific actors instead.

Regarding transnational POS, foreign policy priorities are assessed as the most crucial component of opportunity structure. The changing Turkmen policy of Turkey

starting in the 1990s initiated an era in which Turkey gradually picked certain actors and tried to unite the Turkmen movement behind those actors. At the same time, this improved the opportunity structure as Turkmen mobilization scaled up to a more coherent and professional level in terms of organizational power. An unintended consequence of this process for the Turkmen movement was the transformation of this widened opportunity structure into a constraining factor. Eventually, the Turkmen movement found itself with more organizational power and better political representation, accompanied by less autonomy to guide its actions within these widened POS. Bilateral relations are also found to be effective, despite being much less determining than foreign policy priorities. In that regard, Turkey's unique position on the Turkmen cause is also the main reason that shapes the POS for Turkmen through bilateral relations between Turkey and other actors that exert influence in Iraq. Turkey's larger sphere of influence in Iraq reflects a widened POS for Turkmen in Iraq. At the same time, its exclusion also excludes Turkmen, as the Turkmen community is considered Turkey's surrogate.

Overall, the main conclusion reached at the end of this study is that three of the contexts addressed here, Turkey, Iraq, and the transnational context, simultaneously shape the political mobilization of Iraqi Turkmen. Further, it was observed that this mobilization takes place across borders in different forms, from military organizations to protests and marches, lobby and awareness-raising activities, and electoral campaigns.

The study has revealed that opportunity structure is a dynamic concept. It widens and diminishes over time, and its influence over political mobilization also changes. One general finding of the study's overall conclusion regarding the impact of political opportunity structure affirms the literature and expectations of this thesis. It was observed that the wider the POS, the more extensive the mobilization on the ground take place. Better opportunity space brought better political representation, the establishment of political parties, and electoral mobilization for the Turkmen community. The widened POS at home and host country also improved the transnational linkages built across borders that those political actors utilize for political purposes. On the contrary, closed POS brought weaker and more confrontational political mobilization forms, especially in the home country.

It was concluded that these three components of POS exert various degrees of influence. Governing authority shaping the home country POS and foreign policy priorities shaping transnational POS are found to be of particular importance within the scope of this study. While home country POS was strictly closed, it greatly impacted

Turkmen mobilization with strict boundaries it imposed. It was observed that while the oppression of regime created a reaction in the form of mobilization in 1980s, further closure of the home POS pacified the movement at home and led to militarization of Turkmen movement outside of the borders. This brings a more nuanced analysis on the impact of close opportunity structures. However, once it started to widen and reached a level of openness that allowed a reasonable degree of political mobilization, transnational POS replaced the home country POS as the primary shaper of mobilization. Findings of this study indicated that there must be a certain level of openness at home for political mobilization to interact with other contexts. Within the scope of this study, as transnational POS involves Turkey as the host country, it also brought another important finding on the kin-state relation between Turkmen and Turkey.

The empirical data of this study revealed that Turkey did not act as a neutral space that provides opportunities or barriers for Turkmen mobilization as in the case of any other migrant community-host country relation. On the contrary, historical, and ethnic relations between Turkey and Turkmen brought another layer to the political opportunity structure surrounding the Turkmen political movement in the host country. Starting from the 1990s, this relationship improved the opportunity space in Turkey as Turkey devoted political and financial resources to the Turkmen community in line with its changing foreign policy priorities. However, this also brought another limitation and, finally, a shrinking opportunity space for Turkmen as Turkey's political influence transformed into a factor that shaped and limited the policies and mobilization choices of the Turkmen movement. The widening POS at the host country eventually resulted in the loss of autonomy of the Turkmen political movement.

The kin-state factor also impacted how Turkmen engage with the existing opportunity space within Turkey itself. An interesting finding was that the general discontent regarding the citizenship policy of Turkey did not lead to a form of mobilization that confronts the tightened opportunity structure. Instead, Turkmen focused on creating mechanisms to mitigate the effects of Turkey's Turkmen policy. The implied agreement that Turkmen and Turkey share the common goal of preserving Turkmen identity in Iraq was observed to be the main reason for that. Therefore, while grievances caused by Saddam's regime had led to various forms of mobilizations, such as protests and lobby activities in previous periods, the same situation was not observed in the case of discontent related to Turkey. This indicates that while the political opportunity

structure has great explanatory power, kin-state relation acts as an intervening variable that shapes the opportunity structure.

Finally, it is essential to note that different political opportunity structures interact and may create mixed opportunity spaces. It was noted that during the 1980s, transnational POS and home country POS acted as a double force that closed opportunity space for Turkmen in Iraq and Turkey. The opening in the home country POS starting from the 1990s also created an elbow room for the host country to exert more influence over Turkmen mobilization. As political mobilization has a transnational scope, complete closure at the home country POS constrains the possibility of political mobilization at the host country. Therefore, Turkey's hijacking of the Turkmen movement came only after Iraq provided a reasonable level of opening for any mobilization to emerge. Widened POS at host country Turkey in the form of greater political support also fastened the advent of parliamentary politics for the Turkmen movement and became a factor that moved the Turkmen political movement towards more legal and organization forms of political mobilization. This had further consequences for the movement's future electoral success, and political track in Iraq as Turkey's influence over the movement gradually increased to the point of taking over the guardianship of Turkmen political mobilization.

In addition to the research findings, it's important to note that there were certain fields that the findings of the study remained limited. One significant aspect of the relationship between Turkey and Turkmen is Turkey's political and economic engagement with the Kurdish Regional Authority. However, the interviewees provided limited information on the role of the Kurds in either widening or constraining political opportunities. The general stance was to indicate support to the Turkey's policy of developing multilayer relations with all actors in Iraq, including the Kurds, accompanied with limited criticism. This finding suggests that elites may be hesitant to challenge the established narrative and resistant to providing more information that could put this at risk.

Another issue that was largely absent from the findings was the impact of the Syrian Civil War. While the war had a catastrophic human cost, the interviewees did not indicate any significant impact of the war on Turkey's foreign policy priorities or the Turkmen movement. Interviews mainly focused on the human cost that Syrian Civil War has created for Iraqi Turkmen and how political elites have shifted their focus to respond to emergency needs of the people fleeing the war through solidarity associations. It is

unclear whether this finding is due to limitations in the elite interviews or a lack of impact, and further research may help to clarify this.

Ultimately, the study's scope was constrained when it came to transnational contexts due to the dominance of findings related to the bilateral relations between the host and home countries. The study primarily focused on Turkey's kinship with Turkmen and its political and military influence in Iraq, which likely shaped the extent of transnational activities and the opportunities available for such activities within these two contexts. Consequently, the study's findings offered limited understanding of a more comprehensive, multi-level form of transnational activities that involves various actors and contexts.



Chapter: 6

CONCLUSION

This study tries to analyze the Iraqi Turkmen political mobilization and how this mobilization interacts with and is affected by the three primary contexts surrounding the movement. Turkey as the host country, Iraq as the home country, and transnational context as the third context that combines the first two constitute the main centers of the analysis. The study takes the theory of *political opportunity structure* (POS) borrowed from popular mobilization literature as its primary theoretical basis. According to this theory, political mobilizations are shaped, constrained, and encouraged by the structural political factors prevalent within the context that mobilization emerges. This study also argues that migrants mobilize across borders and that their political activities have a transnational scope. Therefore, this study simultaneously analyzes the three contexts mentioned above while addressing how they affect mobilization on the ground. It further focuses on the kin state relation between Turkey and Turkmen while addressing host country-migrant community relations. Therefore, the study brings another important layer to the studies addressing migrant mobilization and transnationalism with its focus on kinstate relations.

It is essential to emphasize that the information analyzed in this study is based on the perceptions of Turkmen political elites and cannot be considered a complete and objective reality of the Turkmen political movement. The information provided by these elites is intricately linked with the power dynamics sustained by them within the movement, with each other, with Turkey, and with the researcher herself. When discussing political openings and closures, it is important to note that what Turkmen elites perceive as an opening or closure is also what they wish to present to the researcher. This is particularly evident in their responses regarding the Turkmen movement's kin state relations with Turkey. As they consider themselves as the representatives of the “Turkmen cause” their answers reflect this position. Rather than viewing political opportunity structures as rigid constructs, this study presents them as they are perceived by political elites and how they present them as either an opportunity or barrier. The subjective reality presented by Turkmen elites is aligned with the purpose of this study, as it informs us about the strategic actions taken by the movement based on their perceptions of what is possible or not and what is an opportunity or barrier.

The findings of this thesis indicate five main conclusions that can be drawn on transnational political mobilization of Iraqi Turkmen.

The first and main conclusion of the study is also the starting point of this research. Migrant politically mobilizes across borders. Their political activities are not confined to the national borders of one state, specifically the host country. Therefore, immigrant political mobilization has a transnational scope that involves host country, home country and the transnational space. The findings of the research revealed that Turkmen immigrants engage with Turkey and its institutions while its laws and policies enable and constrain Turkmen mobilization. But Turkmen immigrants also engage with their home country Iraq either as the target of their political activities or as a factor shaping these activities. Finally, they engage with the transnational space which includes bilateral relations between host and home countries, international actors, and foreign policy priorities of the countries. All these three contexts shape and guide the mobilization in different ways.

The second conclusion is that political mobilization of migrants does not emerge in a void but rather shaped by set of structural political factors defined as political opportunity structures throughout the study. These structural conditions that exist in the context that mobilization emerges determines the success of mobilization, its intensity, and forms. While the findings confirmed the impact of political opportunity structures upon mobilization, it also revealed that these opportunity structures do not shape the mobilization with same level of influence. In that sense, the study has indicated that different opportunity structures may play a stronger or weaker role in different periods. Moreover, the opportunity structures in these different contexts also interact by consolidating or circumventing the impact that each one of them creates. The findings of the thesis indicated that home country POS played a much more decisive role upon Turkmen mobilization before the regime change in Iraq, while Turkey as the host country gradually increased its impact and became the main determinant factor of Turkmen mobilization after the fall of the regime. It further revealed that political instability in Iraq worked as a countervailing factor to the opportunity space widened by the regime change. In a similar sense, the research indicated that Turkey's kinship role, while extending the opportunity structure for Turkmen movement, it simultaneously hampered the autonomy of the movement and eventually turned into another constraining structural factor for Turkmen mobilization.

The third conclusion reached is that closer opportunity structures that provides a limited sphere of action leads to confrontational and organizationally weaker forms of mobilization while open opportunity spaces lead to organizational and civilian forms of mobilization. Another important conclusion reached is that the closer opportunity spaces and confrontational politization has a curvilinear relationship. That is to say, closer opportunity structures lead to confrontational mobilization only up to a certain point. Therefore, if suppression or other political factors completely closes the opportunity space, this also pacifies the political activities. With the same logic, with open opportunity spaces, immigrant find sources and space to mobilize at a higher organizational level in the form of ethnic association and political parties. This was observed in how severe regime suppression completely pacified Turkmen movement during Saddam era while initial openings came with wars and foreign interventions led to militarized and confrontational mobilization forms. It was further noted how Turkmen political movement established political parties, engaged with parliamentary politics actively as a civilian actor once the opportunity space gradually widened at three contexts.

In line with the conclusions outlined above, one of the fundamental ways this study contributes to the literature is that it broadens the scope of political opportunity structure by combining three primary contexts in which political mobilization occurs. Although many studies focus on immigrant political mobilization, most studies take the host country as the primary and only analysis center. In that sense, this study combines the transnational approach to immigrant mobilization with the theory of political opportunity structures to provide a holistic approach. Therefore, the study provides the opportunity to address Turkmen mobilization across the borders of Iraq and Turkey and how political opportunity structures in these three contexts shape the mobilization.

The fourth conclusions that this thesis shed light on is that that opportunity structures undergo substantial changes over time, and they are not static concepts. Regarding the host country, the change was reflected through a numerical calculation of political opportunity structures. The other two contexts were qualitatively evaluated, and it was indicated that the opportunity structures in these three contexts did change substantially. The study reveals how the 1990s onwards, POS in Turkey, Iraq, and the transnational context did change and what kind of results these changes brought for the mobilization on the ground. The study indicates that while home country POS underwent substantial changes in the positive direction, host country Turkey and transnational space

had periodical openings and closures which was reflected as incentives and constraints for political mobilization on the ground.

Finally, the fifth conclusion reached by the study, which presents an essential contribution is on bringing the kin-state relation into a discussion of the transnational mobilization of immigrants. Being a Turkic ethnic group, Turkmen has a particular relation with Turkey due to its historical and ethnic relations with the Turkish state apart from its immigrant identity. The study has revealed that this relationship has been a significant factor in formulating Turkey's foreign policies on the Turkmen issue; therefore, it substantially shaped both host country POS and transnational POS for Turkmen. Moreover, this relation further shaped how Turkmen interacted with the opportunity structure imposed upon them. One of the main conclusions drawn regarding the impact of kin relations was that kin state relation prevented closer opportunity structures creating protest forms of mobilization at host country context. Instead, it led to another form of mobilization that Turkmen organizations tried to circumvent the limits imposed upon them through civilian initiatives. Therefore, Turkey does not act as any other host country context for Turkmen political mobilization. This relation creates mixed results for the Turkmen community as Turkey's involvement in Turkmen cause widens the opportunity space for Turkmen; it also diminishes the power of Turkmen's will over the movement and replaces it with the authority of a patronage state, Turkey.

As it was explained, the findings of this study dwell on 11 in-depth elite interviews conducted with Turkmen civil society and political actors living in Turkey. The interviews involved different generations of Turkmen elites from four cities and five organizations. Dwelling on the qualitative analysis of the political opportunity structures in Turkey, Iraq, and the transnational context, the study has concluded that POS shapes the political activities that migrants engage. In line with the literature, political opportunity structures act as pull and push factors for certain mobilization forms. The data collected confirms the expectation that closer POS leads to weaker and more protest or militarized forms of mobilization. In contrast, wider POS leads to more organized, institutional, and legal forms of political mobilization. The study's findings reveal that Turkmen political actors mobilize across borders without being confined to Turkey or Iraq; therefore, all three contexts simultaneously shape Turkmen mobilization. However, their power and impact vary over time depending on the political structure. Governing authority within home country POS and foreign policy priorities within transnational POS were the most decisive components of overall POS.

The study concluded that the kin-state relation between Turkey and the Turkmen community has substantial explanatory power within the scope of this study. The kin-state relation further shapes the existing POS that involves Turkey.

The study also noted the generational differences across Turkmen elites in their approach to a political movement. While the younger generations were more critical of the movement and Turkey's role and paid more emphasis to the current problems, older generations were reluctant to discuss the problems and bring criticism towards Turkey.

Limitations and future research

This study dwells on the qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews made by 11 Turkmen elites who are active in the social and political field of the Turkmen movement in Turkey. As the analysis is based on the process of Turkmen political mobilization, interviewees were selected among the people who held critical positions within the Turkmen community. To reach the key figures within the Turkmen community, the researcher has used her networks within the Turkmen community and the snowball sampling method to reach other members of the sample. As the methodology used is based on elite interviews, it was not feasible to have a large-N sample within this study's scope; however, snowball sampling reduces the generalizability of the study's findings.

Another limitation of the study related to this is that researcher had to exclude some political groups within the Turkmen community, such as groups mobilizing around Shia identity, due to their lack of representation by prominent associations/parties operating within Turkey. As a result, the nationalist line of the Turkmen community has a more extensive representation in the data collected. However, it is essential to note that this limitation also refers to one of the study's main findings, which is the domination of Turkey over Turkmen movements and its assignment of actors to represent the movement. Further research may shed light on other strands within the Turkmen political movement and their experience if included in the study with larger sample size and more rigorous sample selection.

A further limitation of the study was that due to intense political relations between the Turkmen movement and Turkey, interviewees remained discreet on politically contentious issues, especially in cases that directly criticized Turkey. This has introduced a bias to the research as interviewees may choose to convey what is considered politically

correct from a Turkmen point of view rather than what they think. These contentious issues included Turkey's relation with Kurdish authority in Iraq and possible impact of Syrian Civil War. The limited answers provided prevented the research's touching upon these issues and extending the scope of the study. The researcher has tried to avoid this through assurance of confidentiality and choosing the interviewees among former officials who are less likely to be concerned about their positions. Further research may mitigate this problem with a larger sample size and by choosing interviewees from a closer personnel network.

An important limitation to acknowledge is the dominance of bilateral dynamics and relations between Turkey and Iraq in shaping the transnational political opportunity structures, particularly in relation to the Turkmen political movement. Since the research was conducted in Turkey, my access to political actors operating outside of the host and home country contexts was limited. Consequently, the interviewees provided only limited information on transnational political engagement involving other countries in the West and the Middle East. Expanding the study sample and successfully reaching out to these political actors could broaden the scope of the findings on transnationalism and offer a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the Turkmen movement's transnational engagements. This could further uncover the influence of new actors and international contexts.

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APPENDIX A: Political Opportunity Structure in Turkey

Table 1: Long Term Residence Permit

Category	1950-1998 (Yabancıların Türkiye'deki İkametleri ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun,1950)	1998-2013 (Yabancıların Türkiye'deki İkametleri ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun,1950)	2013-onwards (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)
Residence period^a 100 - < 5 years 50 - 5 years 0 - > 5 years or no legal entitlement to permanent residence	Not defined = 0	Not defined = 0	8 years = 0
Language requirement 100 - No requirement 50 - Requirement to take a language course 0 - Requirement includes language test/assessment	No requirement =100	No requirement =100	No requirement = 100
Economic Resources 100 - None 50 - Higher than social assistance 0 - Income source linked to employment	Not having financial resources to live as a reason of rejection = 0	Not having financial resources to live as a reason of rejection = 0	Having financial resources to support him/herself and his/her family is a precondition = 0
Duration of validity 100 - > 5 years 50 - 5 years 0 - < 5 years	2 years= 0	5 years = 50	Unlimited = 100
Renewable permit 100-Automatically 50 - Upon application 0 – Depends on original requirements	It can be renewed up to 4 times = 50	It can be renewed up to 4 times = 50	No need for renewal (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) = 100
Period of absence^b 100 - ≥ 3 years 50 - 1 year<, < 3 years 0 - ≤ 1 year	Not defined = 100	Not defined =100	1 year = 0
Social security^c 100 - Equal access with nationals 50 - Priority to nationals 0 - Other limiting conditions apply	Not defined = 0	Not defined= 0	= 50

Average Score	25	29	41
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Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = {Residence period + (Language requirement + Economic resources)/2 +(Duration + Renewable permit + Period of absence)/3 + Social security}/ 3. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

^a Refers to the period that one needs to stay in the country to be eligible for long term residence permit

^b Refers to the period of absence from the country allowed without losing the permit.

^c Refers whether long term resident permit allows access to social security

Table 2: Family Reunification

Categories	1950-2013 (Yabancıların Türkiye'deki İkametleri ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun,1950)	2013-2016 (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)	2016-onwards
Residence period^a 100 - No residence requirement 50 - ≤ 1 year 0 - >1 year or no legal entitlement to family reunification	Not defined = 100	1 year = 50	1 year (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) =50
Dependent relatives^b 100 - Allowed for dependent children and parents 75 - Allowed for dependent children or parents 50 - Restrictive definition of dependency for both. 25 - Restrictive definition of dependency for either 0 - Not allowed	Not included = 0	The spouses, minor children of the sponsor or of the spouse and the dependent adult children of the sponsor or of the spouse are accepted as dependent relatives = 75	Children below the age of 20 and student in a high school or equivalent institution, children below the age of 25 and student in a higher education are accepted as dependent relatives (Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu,2006) ⁹ = 25
Language course /level requirement 100 - No requirement 50 - Requirement to take a language course 0 - Requirement includes language test/assessment	No requirement =100	No requirement =100	No requirement =100
Integration course/level requirement	No requirement	No requirement	No requirement

⁹ Article 30 of Implementation Regulation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2016) states that dependent children are determined according to Law on Social Insurances and General Health Insurance (2006).

100 - No requirement 50 - Requirement to take an integration course 0 - Requirement includes integration test/assessment	=100	=100	=100
Economic resources 100 - None 50 - Higher than social assistance 0 - Income source linked to employment	Not defined = 100	Sponsor is required to have a monthly salary not less than minimum wage =50	Sponsor is required to have a monthly salary not less than minimum wage (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013). =50
Accommodation 100 - None 50 - Appropriate accommodation meeting the general health and safety standards 0 - Further requirements	Not defined = 100	Compliance with general health and safety standards is required = 50	Compliance with general health and safety standards is required (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013). = 50
Duration 100 - Equal to sponsor's residence permit and renewable 50 - Not equal to sponsor's but ≥ 1 year renewable permit 0 - < 1 year renewable permit or new application necessary	Joint residence with sponsor = 100	2 years = 50	2 years (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013). = 50
Rejection causes 100 - No other than fraud in acquisition of permit 50 - Threat to security, fraud, break up of family relation 0 - other and not meeting initial standards	Not defined = 100	Not meeting initial conditions = 0	Not meeting initial conditions (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013). = 0
Autonomous permit^c 100 - After ≤ 3 years 50 - After $> 3 \leq 5$ years 0 - After > 5 years, upon certain conditions or no right	No autonomous permit = 0	With the conditions of being stayed in Turkey for 3 years = 100	With the conditions of being stayed in Turkey for 3 years (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013). = 100
Average Score	77	63	58

Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = (Residence period + Dependent relatives + Language course/level requirement + Integration course/ level requirement + Economic resources + Accommodation + Duration + Rejection causes + Autonomous permit)/9 Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

^a Refers to the period that one needs to stay in the country to be eligible for family reunification

^b Refers to members of family who can benefit from family reunification as dependent relatives.

^c Refers whether family member has right to autonomous permit.

Table 3: Health Coverage

Categories	Until 2006	2006-2015	2015 onwards
Coverage^a 100 - Inclusion is unconditional 50 - Some conditions for inclusion 0 - No inclusion	No coverage = 0	Legal immigrants with one year residence are covered (Lordoglu,2015). = 50	Starting from 2015: Iraqi foreigners who entered the country after 2014 are provided free health service (Cabinet Decision 7274, 2015). = 100
Administrative discretion and documentation 100 – Neither of the below 50 – Documents required are difficult for migrants reproduce or decision on coverage is uncertain 0 - Documents required are difficult for migrants reproduce and decision on coverage is uncertain	= 0	Provision of ID is required (Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu, 2006) = 100	Provision of ID is required (Sosyal Sigortalar Kanunu, 2006) = 100
Access to information on health entitlements 100 – Access 0 - No access	No= 0	No= 0	No= 0
Health education and access to information on health promotion 100 – Access 0 - No access	No= 0	No= 0	No= 0

Involvement of migrants in information provision, service design and delivery¹⁰	No = 0	No = 0	No = 0
A. Migrants are involved in service delivery			
B. Migrants are involved in the development and dissemination of information			
C. Migrant patients or ex-patients are involved in the evaluation, planning and running of services.			
D. Migrants in the community are involved in the design of services.			
100 - 3-4 of these			
50 - 1-2 of these			
0 - None of these			
Average Score	0	50	66

Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = (Coverage +Administrative discretion + Access to information + Health education + Involvement of migrants) /5. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

^a Refers to health coverage for legal immigrants. Iraqi Immigrants were included in this category as İskan Kanunu (2006) confers them the right to settle in Turkey.

Table 3: Education

Categories	Until 1993	1993-2017	2017-2019	2019- onwards
Access to compulsory education	No legal impediment but not compulsory (İlköğretim ve	No legal impediment but not compulsory (İlköğretim ve	No legal impediment but not compulsory (İlköğretim ve	No legal impediment but not compulsory

¹⁰ There are no legal restrictions preventing immigrants from taking part in information provision, service design and delivery in the health sector as the Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun (1981) ensures right to work to people of Turkish descent. There are also several legal steps taken to ensure participation of immigrants into health sector as service providers and facilitators. Migration Health Centers were founded in 2015 and necessary regulations were passed to ease the employment of Syrian medical staffs in those centers (Önder, 2019). SIHHAT project is another step taken in collaboration between EU and Turkish state which aims to increase integration of Syrian medical staff to Turkish health system and improve the health services provided to them (Özekmekçi et al., 2020). However, as these precautions taken are specifically targeted to Syrian refugees, I do not consider them as targeted measures that benefits Iraqi Turkmen immigrants.

100 - Explicit obligation in law to have same access as nationals to compulsory education 50 - No impediment to equal access in law for compulsory education 0 - Restrictions in law on access for compulsory education.	Eğitim Kanunu,1961). = 50	Eğitim Kanunu,1961). = 50	Eğitim Kanunu,1961). = 50	(İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu,1961). = 50
Access to higher education Support to access to university education: a. Targeted measures to increase migrant pupils' access to academic routes that lead to higher education. b. Targeted measures to increase acceptance and successful participation of migrant pupils 100 -Both of these (a and b) 50 - One of these 0 - None	See the measures in Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations Between Iraq and Turkey (1946) which fulfills criteria in b. = 50	In addition to the treaty, Great Student Project was put into effect in 1993 (Başkan and Kavak, 2001). fulfills the criteria in a. = 100	Great Student Project is replaced by Turkey Scholarships Program in 2012 (Türkiye Bursları, n.d.) = 100	= 100
Educational guidance 100- Provision of resource persons/centers for orientation of migrant pupils 0-No provision of systemic guidance	No = 0	No = 0	No = 0	No = 0
Measures to address educational situation of migrants	No = 0	No = 0	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education Program	Foreign Students Adaptation Circular (2019) fulfills a.

Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups: a. Systematic provision of guidance (e.g., teaching assistance, homework support); b. Systematic provision of financial resources. 100 - Both 50 - One of these 0 - None			was put into effect in 2017 (Kızılaykart, n.d.) and it fulfills b. = 50	= 100
Measures to bring migrant into teacher workforce Measures a. To encourage more migrants to study and qualify as teachers. b. To encourage more migrants to enter the teacher workforce. 100 - Both 50 - One of these 0 - None	No = 0	No = 0	No = 0	No = 0
Average Score	19.5	29.4	39.4	49.4

Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = (Access to compulsory + Access to higher + Educational + Measures to address + Measures to bring)/5. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

Table 4: Labor Access

Categories	1981 onwards
Access to Labor Market Immediate access to labor market: 100-Equal access to employment as nationals 0- No access	Yes (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981). = 100
Access to Public Sector 100-Equal access to employment as nationals	Yes (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel

0- No access	Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981) = 100
Access to Self-Employment 100-Equal access to employment as nationals 0- No access	Yes (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981). = 100
Access to Public Employment Services 100-Equal access to employment as nationals 0- No access	Yes (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981). = 100
Education and Study Grants Equal access with nationals to: 1) higher education and vocational training 2) study grants 100 - Both 50 - One of these 0 - None	Foreign students must pay different fees than nationals in higher education. General Directorate of Credit and Dormitories is the main institution that provides scholarship for the students that study at higher education and the website of the Directorate mentions that foreign students cannot benefit from the scholarships provided (Kredi ve Yurtlar Genel Müdürlüğü, n.d.). = 0
Recognition of Academic Qualifications 100 - Same procedures and fees as for nationals 50 - Different procedure than for nationals 0 - Ad hoc/No procedure for recognition of titles	Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations Between Iraq and Turkey (1946) recognizes this right to Iraqi nationals. = 100
Economic Integration Measures Do they have access to: a. Targeted training for immigrants (e.g. bridging courses, job specific language training, etc.) b. Programmes to encourage hiring of immigrants 100 - Both 50 -One of these 0 - Only ad hoc (mainly through projects implemented by NGOs)	There are several initiatives on economic integration of migrants, but they target Syrian migrants only. No = 0
Access to Social Security and Assistance 100-Equal access to social security and assistance as nationals 0- No access	Equal access wit nationals (Türk Soylu Yabancıların Türkiye’de Meslek ve Sanatlarını Serbestçe Yapabilmelerine, Kamu, Özel Kuruluş veya İşyerlerinde Çalıştırılabilmelerine İlişkin Kanun, 1981). = 100
Average Score	75

Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = (Access to labor+ Access to public+ Access to self-employment + Access to public employment + Education + Recognition +Economic integration + Access to social security)/8. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

Table 5: Citizenship

Categories	1964-1981	1981-2009	2009-2017	2017-onwards
Residence requirement 100 - After ≤ 5 years of total residence 50 - After $> 5 < 10$ years of total residence 0 - After ≥ 10 years of total residence	Not specified (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu,1964) = 100	Not specified (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu,1964) = 100	Not specified (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu,2009) = 100	Not specified (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu,2009) = 100
Citizenship right for immigrant children and wives/husbands (if they can't acquire citizenship based on İskan Kanunu) 100 – Wife/Husband and children 50 - One of these 0 - None	Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu (1964) recognizes citizenship right for the wives, and their adult kids for those of Turkish descent. = 100	The same conditions apply. = 100	Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelik (2010) abrogated the husband/ wife acquiring the citizenship based on marriage. = 50	= 50
Language level for naturalization 100 - No Assessment OR A1 or less set as standard 50 - A2 set as standard 0 - B1 or higher set as standard. OR no standards, based on administrative discretion	Specificized as enough to communicate (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelik,1964) = 0	= 0	No condition specificized (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelik,2010). = 0	= 0
Integration level for naturalization 100 - No Requirement OR Voluntary provision of information 50 - Requirement to complete a course 0 - Requirement to pass an integration test/assessment	İskan Kanunu (1934) specifies that being attached to Turkish culture is a necessity. = 0	= 0	İskan Kanunu (2006) specifies that being attached to Turkish culture is a necessity. = 0	= 0
Economic resources 100 - None 50 - Minimum income (e.g. acknowledged level of poverty	It is stated as enough to provide for himself and those dependent	= 0	Not specified in Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu(2009). = 100	= 100

threshold)/no income source is excluded 0 - Additional requirements	upon him/her (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelik,1964) = 0			
Criminal records^a 100 - Crimes with sentences of imprisonment for ≥ 5 years OR Use of qualifying period instead of refusal 50 - Crimes with sentences of imprisonment for < 5 years 0 - For other offences (e.g. misdemeanors, minor offenses, pending criminal procedure)	Having good morals is stated as a condition in the Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelik(1964) without putting a standard. = 0	= 0	Not endangering national security and public order is a condition (Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu,2009) = 0	= 0
Dual citizenship Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalization for first generation immigrants? 100 - No requirement for anyone 50 - Yes, but with multiple substantial exemptions: a. On humanitarian grounds (e.g. for refugees, stateless); b. On accessibility grounds (e.g. cost, distance, impossibility)) 0 - Yes, and no substantive exceptions	Dual citizenship is not allowed according to Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu(1964). = 0	With amendments made to Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu(1964), dual citizenship was allowed (Karademir, 2018). = 100	Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu (2009) brought a new clause stating that board of Ministers may require renunciation of the individual's current citizenship. It is up to their discretion. = 50	Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun (2017) abrogated the former article that gives discretion to board of ministers. = 100
Average Score	50	75	58	70

Note. This table take Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu(1969; 2009) which regulates the general conditions to acquire Turkish citizenship and İskan Kanunu (1934; 2006) which regulates the conditions to acquire Turkish citizenship for those of Turkish descent. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = {Residence requirement + Citizenship right for immigrant children + (Language level + Integration level + Economic resources + Criminal records) / 4 + Dual citizenship}/4. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

^a Refers to any condition regarding criminal records that may result in the rejection of citizenship application.

Table 6: Political Rights

Categories	1983-2001	2001/2002-2004	2013 onwards
Right to organize meetings and demonstrations 100- Foreigners are free to organize meetings and demonstrations 50- Foreigners are allowed to organize meetings and demonstrations with restrictive conditions 0- Foreigners are not allowed to organize meetings and demonstrations	It depends on the permit by Ministry of interior and having residency and being at the age of 21 are required (Toplantı Ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Kanunu, 1983). = 50	With an amendment made in 2002, the age requirement is decreased to 18 while keeping other conditions intact (Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Kanununun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik, 2002) = 50	Being age of 18 and having residency conditions were abrogated, with another amendment in 2013 however it still depends on the permit by Ministry of Interior for foreigners. (Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Kanununun Uygulanmasına Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik 2013) = 50
Right to form association 100- Foreigners are free to form organizations 50- Foreigners are allowed to form associations with restrictive conditions 0- foreigners are not allowed to form associations	Anyone at the age of 18 can form association (Dernekler Kanunu, 1983). = 100	Foreigners who have residency can form associations with fulfilling the principle of reciprocity (Türk Medeni Kanunu, 2001). =50	The reciprocity clause was abrogated with Dernekler Kanunu in 2004 (Çiçekli, 2014). = 50
Operating Internationally 100- Associations can operate internationally 0- Associations cannot operate internationally	Associations can't operate internationally (Dernekler Kanunu, 1983). = 0	Associations can operate internationally (Türk Medeni Kanunu, 2001). = 100	= 100
Right to vote 0 - No right to vote in local elections for foreigners 25 - Local right to vote but with major restrictions 50 - Local right to vote (without restrictions) and	1982 Turkish Constitution reserves the right to vote and stand in local or national elections to the Turkish citizens only (Çiçekli, 2014). Therefore, immigrants do not have the right to vote.	No = 0	No = 0

no right to stand in local elections 75 - Local right to vote (no restrictions) and unrestricted right to stand in local elections 100 - National right to vote (no restrictions): Equal rights as nationals after certain period of residence.	= 0		
Membership in political parties 100 - Equal access with nationals (no restrictions imposed by government) 50 - Restricted access to internal elected positions 0 - Other official/legal restrictions apply	1982 Turkish Constitution reserves the right to establish political parties and become a member to the Turkish citizens only (Çiçekli, 2014). = 0	= 0	= 0
Strength of national consultive body 100- Regular consultation, with members elected or appointed by foreign residents or associations 50 - Regular consultation of foreign residents on national level, with members selected/appointed by state only 25 - Ad-hoc consultation of foreign residents on national level 0 - No consultation at the national level	There are no national immigrant body that represent Iraqi Turkmens. ITF acts as the de facto representative of Turkmens living in Turkey and Iraq. No consultations at national level = 0	= 0	= 0
Active information policy 100 - Policy of information by state targeted at migrants on individual basis	No active policy of information. = 0	= 0	= 0

50 - Policy of information on general basis 0 - No active policy of information			
Public Funding for National Immigrant Bodies 100 - Funding or support (in kind) for immigrant organizations involved in consultation and advice at national level without further conditions than being a partner in talks 50 - Funding or support (in kind) dependent on criteria set by the state (beyond being a partner in consultation and different than for non-immigrant groups) 0 - No support funding	There are no national immigrant body that represent Iraqi Turkmen. ITF acts as the de facto representative of Turkmen living in Turkey and Iraq. = 0	= 0	= 0
Average Score	14	18	18

Note. The numerations below the categories that change between 0 and 100 determines the point that each category receives depending on the defined criteria. The average point = $\frac{\text{Right to organize meetings} + (\text{Right to form associations} + \text{Operating internationally})/2 + \text{Right to vote} + \text{Membership to political parties} + \text{Strength of national consultative body} + \text{Active information policy} + \text{Public funding}}{7}$. Adapted from, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas (2020).

Table 7: Score for Political Opportunity Structure of Host Country

Categories	90-93	93-98	98-01	01-06	06-09	09-13	13-15	15-16	16-17	17-19	19-
Long Term Permit	25	25	29	29	29	29	41	41	41	41	41
Family Reunification	77	77	77	77	77	77	63	63	58	58	58
Health	0	0	0	0	50	50	50	66	66	66	66
Education	16	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	36	46
Labor Market Access	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Citizenship	75	75	75	75	75	58	58	58	58	70	70

Political Participation	17	17	17	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AVERAGE SCORE	40.7	42.1	42.7	43.2	50.4	48	50.7	50	49.2	52.4	53.8

Note. The years were represented by the last two digits (e.g, 1990 = 90, 2001= 01).



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