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POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SUBMISSION IN
GEORGE ORWELL'S *NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR*
(GEORGE ORWELL'IN *BİN DOKUZ YÜZ SEKSEN DÖRT* ADLI ESERİNDEKİ
İTAATIN POLİTİK VE PSİKOLOJİK BOYUTLARI)

Neriman Ece BAYKAL

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Atalay GÜNDÜZ

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ÖZET

GEORGE ORWELL’IN *BİN DOKUZ YÜZ SEKSENDÖRT* ADLI ESERİNDEKİ İTAATİN POLİTİK VE PSİKOLOJİK BOYUTLARI

N. Ece BAYKAL

İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü

Yüksek Lisans

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Atalay GÜNDÜZ

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Bu tez, George Orwell’in *Bin Dokuz Yüz Seksen Dört* romanındaki baskın ideolojinin politik ve psikolojik boyutlarına odaklanmayı ve toplumun, baskıcı totaliter rejime itaatinin psikolojik nedenlerini sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bakımdan, ilk olarak; romandaki güç ilişkilerini ortaya koymak amacıyla, ana karakter Winston Smith’in sözde direnişi ve başkaldıran bir figür olarak toplumdaki konumu bağlantılı olarak sorgulanmaktadır. İkinci olarak; halkın egemen ideolojiye teslimiyetinin ideolojik boyutları “Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları” eşliğinde incelenmektedir. Üçüncü olarak, iktidarın “disiplin mekanizmalarının” halkı nasıl “itaatkâr bedenlere” dönüştürdüğünü ortaya koymak amacıyla, romanda uygulanan “panoptik kontrol sistemi” araştırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak; bu tez başlıca, “romandaki halkın, iktidardaki ideolojinin nesneleri haline nasıl dönüştürüldüğü” sorusu çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir.

AnahtarKelimeler: İdeoloji, George Orwell, Güç, Psikoloji, İtaat, Politika, Hegemonya, Panoptik

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SUBMISSION IN GEORGE ORWELL'S *NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR*

N. Ece BAYKAL

Department of English Language and Literature

Master's Degree

Thesis Advisor: Asst. Prof.Dr.Atalay GÜNDÜZ

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This thesis aims to focus on the psychological and political aspects of the dominant ideology in George Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) and to explore the psychological motives behind the society's submissiveness to the oppressive nature of totalitarianism. In this regard, firstly, the basis for the main character's, Winston Smith's, so-called rebellion and his position as a resistant figure in society are questioned in tandem to reveal the network of power relations in the novel. Secondly, the ideological ground of the citizens' subordination to the ruling ideology is explored in relation to the "Ideological State Apparatuses." Thirdly, the "panoptical control system" applied in the novel is examined to demonstrate how the "disciplinary mechanisms" of the government render the citizens "docile bodies." This dissertation is therefore primarily organized around the question of "how the people in the novel are turned into the subjects of the ruling ideology."

Keywords: Ideology, George Orwell, Power, Psychology, Obedience, Politics, Hegemony, Panoptic

Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak sunduğum “**Political and Psychological Aspects of Submission in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four***” adlı çalışmanın, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın, tarafımdan yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin bibliyografyada gösterilen eserlerden oluşup, bunlara atıfta bulunmuş olduğumu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.

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TEZ SAVUNMA SINAV TUTANAĞI

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Yrd. Doç. Dr. Papatya ALKAN GENCA


ÜYE
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Zafer PARLAK

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Introduction

The British author and journalist George Orwell (1903 –1950) is well-known for his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), which is a dystopian work depicting a submissive society under the control of an unseen suppression, the Big Brother. As a political writer who is inspired by his experiences that involved the totalitarian regimes of his time, Orwell demonstrates how a state's administrative structures interpellate citizens through ideological forces and turn citizens into the subjects of the ruling ideology. In this respect, in his last book *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell not only depicts a submissive society controlled by a totalitarian regime, but also demonstrates how modern totalitarian regimes exert their force through a series of political and psychological methods.

Dystopia, which is a term derived from the Ancient Greek for “bad place” (Gottlieb, *Dystopian* 26), can be defined as a form of satire depicting a futuristic universe in which oppressive societal control and the illusion of a perfect society are sustained through socio-political institutions, norms, bureaucracy and technology. According to Darko Suvin, dystopia is, “a community where sociopolitical institutions, norms, and relationships between its individuals are organized in a significantly less perfect way than in the author's community” (238). As a literary genre, dystopia appeared in the early 1900's which is also the period when, as a result of the rapid growth in industrialisation caused by Industrial Revolution, the modern capitalist state apparatuses increased their sphere of influence.¹ This situation destroyed the balance of social structures, thus led to significant social changes. As Erika Gottlieb states, “the world awaited a secular Messiah to redress the ills created by the Industrial Revolution in a double incarnation: first as science, which was to create the means to end all poverty, and second as socialism, which was to end all injustice. By eagerly awaiting the fulfilment of these promises, the twentieth century allowed the rise of a false Messiah: state dictatorship” (*Dystopian* 5). During this era, as Michel Foucault states in his book *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, “[s]omething had been born which was no longer repression but authority” (264). Moreover, Gottlieb observes that modern totalitarian leaders such as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler owed their absolute power to technology and mass

communications. Through technology and the systematic means of diffusing ideology, Joseph Stalin's perverted communist regime and Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party monopolized power and controlled all levels of life. It is the results of these developments and the birth of totalitarian states that are criticized in dystopias, such as *We* by Yevgeny Zamyatin, *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley and *Fahrenheit 451* by Ray Bradbury.

Nineteen Eighty-Four is a dystopian novel which begins with an energy crisis in a city where advanced technology is incorporated with urban decay; "the underclass proles are demoralized and the lower middle class—the lesser officials of the Party—live wretchedly, eating processed foods and drinking gin; the mass public is diverted by vulgar literature, the lottery, and the telescreen. Only the upper middle class, the Party's elite, enjoys anything like well-being" (McWilliams 133). The protagonist, Winston Smith reflects on the world of Oceania and reasons that "[t]he truly characteristic thing about modern life was...its bareness, its dinginess, its listlessness" (786). Erich Fromm posits that Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is a dystopian novel in that it reflects "the mood of powerlessness and hopelessness of modern man just as the early utopias expressed the mood of self-confidence" (259).

George Orwell portrays a dystopia with a setting of a totalitarian future and criticizes totalitarian regimes of his time, especially Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. The world described in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* parallels the Stalinist Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany in many ways. In both Hitler's Nazi regime and Stalinist communism, the respective totalitarian leaders were glorified as demi-gods and saviours entitled to the destruction of all individuality in the name of promoting their party over the individuals. All Party members were supposed to act in the same manner. Similar to these regimes, the Party in the novel continuously proclaims that "[b]efore the Revolution they had been hideously oppressed by the capitalists, they had been starved and flogged, women had been forced to work in the coal mines... children had been sold into the factories at the age of six" (784). Under these circumstances, the Party created the Big Brother as a "saviour" and implemented his ideology, Ingsoc. As in both Hitler and Stalin, the Party of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* consistently demonizes its enemies through the Two Minutes Hate, Hate Week, and daily mass propaganda.

Furthermore, the Thought Police can be seen as a reinvention of the Gestapo which organised large scale purges, and the Spies and Youth League as a reinvention of the Hitler Youth and the Little Octoberists, which indoctrinated young people and encouraged them to denounce disloyalty observed in their elders, even among family members. As Orwell states, the main purpose of his satire is “to indicate, by parodying them, the intellectual implications of totalitarianism” (qtd. in Gottlieb, *The Orwell Conundrum* 167).

Significantly, as Ian Slater underscores in his book *Orwell: The Road to Airstrip One*, Orwell observed that such states, in comparison to older tyrannies, are “less greedy for material possession but much more hungry for pure power”(194). He believed that “unlike the time in which he wrote his English novels, status will no longer be measured in terms of property and power, but solely in terms of power” (194). For this reason, throughout the novel Orwell emphasizes the “lust for naked power;” “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power... only power, pure power” (895). Modernity has transformed the symbolic and coercive power, to more effective forms of power, such as controlling every aspect of the individual’s life, thereby undermining his autonomy and rendering him impotent of making independent judgements upon the actions of the state. In this regard, Orwell compares older authorities with new totalitarian states and argues that the reason for the Spanish Inquisition’s failure is that it did not have the modern state apparatuses. However, the Oceania of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is a modern state, which not only exploits the citizens economically or physically, but also constitutes the individuals’ minds in such a way that the people act and think in the dictated way. Thought itself becomes a form of social control. With regard to the modern apparatuses’ influence on the individuals’ minds, Orwell reveals his concern over “human nature” in his review of “Russia under Soviet Rule” by N. de Basilyin 1939 as follows:

The terrifying thing about the modern dictatorships is that they are something entirely unprecedented. In the past, every tyranny was sooner or later overthrown, or at least resisted, because of human nature which desired liberty. But we cannot be at all certain that ‘human nature’ is

constant. It might be just as possible to produce a breed of men who do not wish for liberty as it is to produce a breed of hornless cows. The Inquisition failed, but then the Inquisition had not the resources of the modern state. The radio, press-censorship-standardized education and the secret police have altered everything. (*George Orwell: An Age Like This* 381)

Obviously, in this text, Orwell questions the “human nature” and how people are turned into “a breed of hornless cows” by the modern dictatorships. Totalitarianism is an unprecedented phenomenon in human history, more terrifying than any previous form of tyranny. At this point, the question arises: What kind of ideological and disciplinary techniques are employed by the authorities to keep the individuals submissive? The answer for this question can be analysed from two points; psychological and political perspectives.

To begin with the psychological perspective, the psychoanalytic theories formulated by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Jacques Lacan (1901 –1981) will be applied in this study. Sigmund Freud is the first psychoanalyst who theorized “unconscious,” and challenged the idea that humans are rationally autonomous beings. Freud revealed that the demands imposed on individuals by civilization generate the notion of “super-ego,” which regulates the actions of the people in the form of a “conscience.” Up through the end of the 1950s, Lacan expanded upon the developments of Freud in psychology and psychoanalysis and put forth the notion of “big Other.” David Rudd compares Freud’s superego and Lacan’s “big Other;” “Lacan develops the tyrannical aspect of the superego even further than Freud, emphasizing not only its prohibiting function but also its imperative to enact and enjoy not its own will and desires but the desires of the Other. In this sense, it inspires a sense of duty and submission to culture that Lacan deems perverse” (30). Similar to the Big Brother’ eternal and non-verifiable nature, the “big Other” “pulls the strings, the subject doesn’t speak, he is spoken by the symbolic structure” (Žižek “How to Read Lacan”). The fact that citizens of Oceania not only believe in the Big Brother, but also devotedly carry out their beliefs through activities, such as their jobs, the Two Minutes Hate, even their sexual relationships reveals that their social reality is constructed by the Big Brother

itself. In this regard, Lacanian “big Other,” the network that structures reality, can be seen as analogous to Orwell’s “Big Brother.” In the figure of “Big Brother,” George Orwell offers a generic version of the totalitarian leader-image, the face of an omnipotent and omniscient figure. Therefore, Big Brother can be regarded as the personified “big Other.”

As for the political perspective, twentieth century philosophers Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault’s theories concerning the functioning of the modern state and its effects on the individual will be applied in this thesis. Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1918–1990) applied French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s theories of the “big Other” and the “mirror stage” to his studies of ideology and reconstructed the correlation between the notions of “state” and “individual.” In an attempt to redefine the concept of “ideology,” Althusser concentrated on the interdependent aspects of political and psychological forces and sought to explicate how ideology functions and “transforms individuals into subjects” (*Lenin* 174). Althusser’s reflections on ideology in his essay “On Ideology and Ideological Status Apparatuses” (1971) had a profound impact on the works of an entire generation of critics and theorists including his most famous student, Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Similar to Althusser’s “Ideological Status Apparatuses,” Foucault deliberated on the psychological effects of cultural and social forces on the subjects and proposed the concept of “disciplinary institutions” so as to define the places where a series of techniques for “achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” are utilized (*History* 140).

On the whole, the aim of this study is to analyse the network of power relations and the psychological methods utilized by the ruling ideology in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. In this respect, with the help of the historical and theoretical ground, this thesis reveals how ideology penetrates into the citizens’ everyday life and produces compliant people.

CHAPTER 1

1. George Orwell's Ideas on Society and Politics

Eric Arthur Blair (1903-1950), later known by his pseudonym George Orwell, is first and foremost a political writer. His social awareness, resistance to totalitarianism, and commitment to democratic socialism rendered him a prominent figure in the twentieth century English literary canon. In his essay "Why I Write," (1946) Orwell underlines two important periods in his life concerning his political motives and views. Firstly, he focuses on the importance of his early years concerning his political and intellectual development and states that "I do not think one can assess a writer's motives without knowing something of his early development" (459). Secondly, he reveals the impact of the Spanish war on his political thought, "The Spanish war and other events in 1936-37 turned the scale and thereafter I knew where I stood" (461). Hence, to gain a better insight into Orwell's political standpoint, his early development and political atmosphere of his era should be explored successively.

1.1. George Orwell's Early Years

Being stigmatised² as a scholarship student, Orwell directly experienced class discrimination during the years he spent at St. Cyprians boarding school, in the years before and during World War I. The teachers' unfair attitude towards students highly influenced Orwell's outlook on politics. He would later lash out at these years in his autobiographical essay "Such Such Were the Joys" and define these years as "a preparation for a sort of confidence trick" (336). In this ironically titled essay, Orwell describes how he was constantly treated with "less dignity" by his teachers:

[...] a continuous triumph of the strong over the weak. Virtue consisted in winning: it consisted in being bigger, stronger, handsomer, richer, more popular, more elegant, more unscrupulous than other people — in dominating them, bullying them, making them suffer pain, making them look foolish, getting the better of them in every way. Life was hierarchical and whatever happened was right. There were the strong, who deserved to win and always did win, and there were the weak, who deserved to lose and always did lose, everlastingly. (359)

In *Enemies of Promise*, Orwell's schoolmate Cyril Connolly states that "[t]he remarkable thing about Orwell was that he alone among the boys was an intellectual, and not a parrot" (qtd. in Rodden, "A Political Writer" 105). Even at the age of eleven, Orwell presented the virtues of honesty and "thought for himself and rejected not only Crossgates [St. Cyprian's] but the war, the Empire"(qtd. in Rodden, "A Political Writer" 105). Moreover, Connolly compares himself with Orwell and states that "I was a stage rebel, Orwell was a true one" (qtd. in Rodden, "A Political Writer" 105).

Despite his rebellious character, Orwell portrays himself as the victim of an imperialist system in his autobiographical essay "Such Such Were the Joys." In *The Social and Political Thought of George Orwell*, Stephen Ingle relates Orwell's experiences at St. Cyprian's to his political thinking of imperialism as follows:

If the Head behaved with forbearance to the sons of the wealthy, he was almost brutal with the poorer scholarship boys. The relationship was purely an economic one, the boys' abilities representing a long-term investment and the governing principle of the relationship, as it was with the empire, was not love or even respect but, as Orwell portrayed it, fear [...] The depiction of his school days after nearly forty years represented one obvious illustration of the attempt to apply the imperialist model to a different setting. (39-40)

As Ingle maintains, the essay is preoccupied with the terror the students went through and the depiction of their sense of fear. Besides beating and canning, the two main techniques used by the headmasters to find out the "criminal" were to create a sense of guilt in all students and hold that "crime," which was mostly masturbation or homosexuality, against them by revealing the disappointment they caused because of their indecent act. Orwell recalls the "black rings round eyes" which is a so-called symptom by which masturbators could be detected, incident. He expresses the terror he went through when the teacher accused the students of getting involved the sexual act:

Once again the load of guilt and fear seemed to settle down upon me. Had I got black rings round my eyes? A couple of years later I realized that these were supposed to be a symptom by which masturbators could

be detected. But already, without knowing this, I accepted the black rings as a sure sign of depravity, some kind of depravity. And many times, even before I grasped the supposed meaning, I have gazed anxiously into the glass, looking for the first hint of that dreaded stigma, the confession which the secret sinner writes upon his own face. (“Such Such Were the Joys” 354)

Being this “masturbator,” was a humiliating thought for all the boys. So, for fear of being pointed out as a “masturbator,” all the students bowed down with shame. After a while of the incident, Orwell runs into the “ringleader,” the son of poor middle-class who was made a scapegoat and expelled from the school. Although he appears to be in good health, even happier to have escaped from the school, Orwell reveals that he was always tended to think him as a person “who at thirteen had already forfeited all hope of any decent future” (355) with an act like that.

Among all the boys, “the poor but ‘clever’ boys” (360), in other words, the scholarship boys were the ones who suffer from the strict school rules. They were made to realize that they gained their position thanks to the generosity of the schoolmasters, thus they were all obliged to repay them by being academically and socially successful. Under this heavy burden of “kindness and generosity” “to survive, or at least to preserve any kind of independence, was essentially criminal, since it meant breaking rules which you yourself recognized” (361). As all the boys were aware of that fact, they unquestioningly accepted what was imposed upon them as “right” and “wrong.” It is clear that what is right and what is wrong were placed by the authority, namely the teachers, in a binary system and thus the notion of truth, as Foucault posits, was “produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint” (qtd in Calhoun, 207). The two antagonists, the schoolmasters, penetrated into the boys’ heads to such an extent that “it might still be normal for schoolchildren to live for years amid irrational terrors and lunatic misunderstandings” (“Such Such Were the Joys” 332). This sense of guilt haunted Orwell and lied unnoticed in his memory “until quite recently” (334), so that he finally decided to pour these memories out in his essays.

With reference to Orwell’s statement in “Why I Write,” which is “I do not want, completely to abandon the world view that I acquired in childhood” (462), Michael

Carter argues in his book *George Orwell and the Problem of Authentic Existence* that Orwell's political position is "the ideological formulation of a point of view established in childhood" (3). Similarly, Frederick Karl compares the life of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* with the depictions of St. Cyprians boarding school and offers a Kafkaesque comment,

The prison life of *1984* merges with the enclosed life of the private school he attended as a young boy, both visions of what life offers. If the reader recognizes that for Orwell, as for Kafka, the nightmare is an inner one, then he can see the political matter as secondary to the personal content. This is not to relegate Orwell's politics to a less important position, but to retain perspective on the man's talents. (qtd. in Carter, 4)

In addition, Carter quotes Karl's statement on Orwell: "Orwell conveys, within his limitations, the pathos and terror involved in a man caught between what he wants for himself and what the political system has to offer him" (4). However, he rejects the view which considers *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as a novel written as a result of Orwell's illness and quotes R.A.Lee "the inevitable culmination of Orwell's development: that, in effect, he had been progressing inexorably towards this book since his first essay was printed in 1931" (5). Furthermore, even though connecting an author's life with his fiction has been generally considered dubious, Carter suggests that "many Orwell critics have stressed the importance of knowing both, because the novels have been heavily loaded with details drawn directly from experience" (4). An Orwell critic TheodorusHoening endorses this claim by saying "only in reference to Orwell's personality and life can his work be properly understood" (*ActaHistoriaeNeerlandica* 67). In sum, as well as Orwell's other works, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* should also be evaluated in relation to his personal life.

1.2. Orwell and Politics

In his essay "Why I Write," George Orwell clearly revealed that his ultimate aim as a writer was "to make political writing into an art" (247). Having experienced the corruption of power in the hands of imperialists, fascists and communists, Orwell witnessed several political and psychological strategies exploited by the totalitarian regimes during the '30s and '40s. Under these circumstances, Orwell believed that in

his age “there is no such thing as ‘keeping out of politics.’ All issues are political issues” (“Politics and the English Language” 397). Accordingly, it can be assumed that Orwell’s all novels and essays were shaped by his convictions regarding the political turmoil of his time. The concept of politics, according to Orwell, can be defined as “a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia.” Taking this stance, Orwell committed himself to be a “window cleaner of freedom,” the window through which “citizens can see what their rulers are really up to” (Ash xviii). Thus, Orwell dedicated his life to writing about the inequality, the manipulative use of political language and the pursuit of objective truth. This frame of mind is skilfully reflected not only in his most famous works, his dystopian novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) and the allegorical novella *Animal Farm* (1945), but also in all his novels and essays.

In his essay “Writers and Leviathan” (1948) Orwell points out the relation between literature and politics:

Of course the invasion of literature by politics was bound to happen. It must have happened, even if the special problem of totalitarianism had never arisen, because we have developed a sort of compunction which our grandfathers did not have, an awareness of the enormous injustice and misery of the world. And a guilt-stricken feeling that one ought to be doing something about it, which makes a purely aesthetic attitude towards life impossible. No one, now, could devote himself to literature as single-mindedly as Joyce or Henry James. (483)

Considering himself as a man of letters who has the awareness of political events of his time, Orwell summarizes that “literature should not be interested in just aesthetic considerations” (Chandra 110). As Paul Faulkner holds in his book *Modernism* (1977), “Orwell himself regarded the priority of politics as something to be regretted, but nevertheless inescapable for his generation” (67). In this regard, Orwell makes a distinction between his time and the past and regards his generation as more directly concerned with the political occurrences, which cannot be escaped or neglected in any way.

The most distinctive feature of Orwell's political thought is his pursuit of "objective truth," which, according to him, can be defined as "intellectual honesty." During his life, Orwell tried to become the voice of critical reason and the single genuine "human voice" instead of "fifty thousand gramophones are playing the same tune"(Orwell qtd. in Ash, xv). In this respect, Orwell differed from the majority of the scholars, journalists and writers of his time. According to Donald Crompton, this situation creates one of the difficulties that critics encounter while dealing with Orwell's works:

Here, however, the difficulty begins, for as so many critics have found, there is not one Orwell but many, and the act of recognition becomes not a simple matter of responding to a familiar presence but rather that of deciding which of the several Orwells one is dealing with in a particular work. Like the child in front of the camera, he just will not stand still; his image seems constantly to blur, dissolve, and reform so that one can never be quite sure in which guise he will appear next. (150)

Orwell rejected to accept any political doctrine blindly and did not hesitate to reflect his complex feelings concerning the three major political issues of the twentieth century; imperialism, fascism and communism. For example, in his essay "Shooting an Elephant" (1936), Orwell describes his feelings towards the Burmese when he served as a policeman between 1922 and 1927:

All I knew was that I was stuck between my hatred of the empire I served and my rage against the evil-spirited little beasts who tried to make my job impossible. With one part of my mind I thought of the British Raj as an unbreakable tyranny, as something clamped down, in saeculasaeculorum, upon the will of prostrate peoples; with another part I thought that the greatest joy in the world would be to drive a bayonet into a Buddhist priest's guts. (19)

On the one hand, Orwell was aware of the fact that he was serving for the "dirty work" of the British Imperialists, but on the other hand, he found a pleasure in what he was serving for. This passage reveals his honesty and refusal to belong to a one-sided

opinion. Another example of his honesty can be observed in his book review of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. In his controversial review, he states:

I have never been able to dislike Hitler. Ever since he came to power--till then, like nearly everyone, I had been deceived into thinking that he did not matter-- I have reflected that I would certainly kill him if I could get within reach of him, but that I could feel no personal animosity. The fact is that there is something deeply appealing about him. One feels it again when one sees his photographs-- and I recommend especially the photograph at the beginning of Hurst and Blackett's edition, which shows Hitler in his early Brownshirt days. It is a pathetic, dog-like face, the face of a man suffering under intolerable wrongs. In a rather more manly way it reproduces the expression of innumerable pictures of Christ crucified, and there is little doubt that that is how Hitler sees himself. The initial, personal cause of his grievance against the universe can only be guessed at; but at any rate the grievance is there. He is the martyr, the victim, Prometheus chained to the rock, the self-sacrificing hero who fights single-handed against impossible odds. If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it seem like a dragon. One feels, as with Napoelon, that he is fighting against destiny, that he can't win, and yet that he somehow deserves to. ("Review of *Mein Kampf* by Adolf Hitler" 84-85)

No matter how discomforting or shocking his opinions met by the majority, Orwell did not hesitate to make his readers face the essence of his feelings. This attitude formed his understanding of the notion of liberty. According to Orwell, "[i]f liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear" (qtd. in Rodden, 82). Therefore, such examples can be regarded as the proofs of Orwell's relentless pursuit of "liberty" as well as his daring personality.

Orwell's political standpoint was mostly determined by his experiences in the Spanish civil war which lasted from 1936 to 1939. Set out to Barcelona to join the POUM militia, the Workers' Party of Marxist Unification, Orwell witnessed the

classless society of Barcelona for a short time. In *Orwell's Politics*, John Newsinger reveals the impact of this atmosphere on Orwell:

He arrived in Barcelona at a time when the revolution was already coming under increasing pressure... What particularly struck him was that as far as he could see the rich has disappeared. This was, he recognized, something worth fighting for. What Orwell encountered in Barcelona was a working class that was becoming a class for itself. Later on he looked back at this time when 'people were acting consciously, moving towards a goal which they wanted to reach and believed that they could reach.' (45)

Orwell believed in the necessity of "a classless society" and wanted to fight against fascism as a member of POUM to reach this aim. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Orwell reveals this belief by saying "If there is any hope, it lies in the proles." His hope for "a classless society" (*Homage to Catalonia* 84) lied in the proletariat, the working class. However, as John Rodden states, the situation of Spain and the divisions within the communists in POUM were not the same as Orwell expected:

Orwell had not understood the bitter divisions within the Republican camp when he went to Spain, and he underestimated the determination of the Communists to control all the Republican forces. He was shocked when his comrades in the POUM were labelled as objectively pro-fascist and then ruthlessly purged. ("A Political Writer" 5)

Pro-Soviet Communists, the Stalinists, accused the members of this organisation of not only being Trotskyists, the followers of Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky, but also being in collaboration with the fascists. "A particularly nasty poster appeared, showing a head with a POUM mask being ripped off to reveal a Swastika-covered face beneath" (Bowker 218). Labelled as a pro-fascist, Orwell was shot through the throat by Stalinist communists. When he returned to Britain, Orwell declared how the cause of POUM was betrayed by the Stalinist regime and described the horror he observed in his personal account of experiences, *Homage to Catalonia*, "[n]o one who was in Barcelona then, or for months later, will forget the horrible atmosphere produced by fear,

suspicion, hatred, censored newspapers, crammed jails, enormous food queues and prowling gangs of armed men” (129). The absolute power was corrupted by the communists.

In his essay “Spilling The Spanish Beans” (1937), Orwell revealed the details regarding the process of the war, and declared that “as power slipped from the hands of the Anarchists into the hands of the Communists and right-wing Socialists, the Government was able to reassert itself, the bourgeoisie came out of hiding and the old division of society into rich and poor reappeared, not much modified” (43). In addition, Orwell defined this struggle as revolution against counter-revolution, “The real struggle is between revolution and counter-revolution; [...] Communism is now a counter-revolutionary force; [...] using the whole of their powerful machinery to crush or discredit any party that shows signs of revolutionary tendencies” (42). However, Orwell’s essays and views concerning the war in Spain were distorted by the communist press controlled by the Stalinist regime and found unacceptable by the majority in Britain. This situation strengthened his commitment to the cause of POUM, “a sort of microcosm of classless society” (*Homage to Catalonia* 84) and his unflinching position towards his first enemy, that is, “the blindness or intellectual dishonesty of those in the West who supported or condoned Stalinist Communism” (Ash xiii). Orwell viewed this situation as a test of intellectual honesty in his letter to John Middleton Murry:

Of course, fanatical Communists and Russophiles generally can be respected, even if they are mistaken. But for people like ourselves, who suspect that something has gone very wrong with the Soviet Union, I consider that willingness to criticize Russia and Stalin is the test of intellectual honesty. It is the only thing that from a literary intellectual's point of view is really dangerous. (“Conclusion to Letter to John Middleton Murry” 338)

The Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939 reaffirmed Orwell’s reviews and depictions regarding the process of the war. The Soviet Union under the dictatorship of Stalin turned into a cruel police state violating political and civil rights instead of establishing the promised classless society. All the people were forced to praise Stalin and demonstrate servile submission to his regime. This situation had enormous effect on Orwell’s works. Before

Spain, Orwell's moral and political views in such books as *Keep the Aspidistra Flying* were based on money and on the conflicts between the rich and the poor. However, after his experiences in Spain, Orwell's main focus shifted from money to power. "While Gordon Comstock [the main character of *Keep the Aspidistra Flying*] concludes that 'god is money'; Winston Smith [the protagonist of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*] concludes that 'god is power'" (Slater 165-166). As for the fact that his three well-known books, *Animal Farm*, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *Homage to Catalonia* are generally considered as the depictions of the events that led Stalin to absolute power, Newsinger defines these three works as "a unique literary Trotskyist trilogy" (xi). In *Animal Farm*, for example, the struggle between Snowball and Napoleon corresponds to the events between Trotsky and Stalin. In his book *Understanding Animal Farm*, John Rodden compares two differing ideologies as follows:

Trotsky was in favour of rapid industrialization, a program symbolized in the novel by the plan to build the windmill. Stalin, however, emphasized agricultural policy, as does Napoleon. Trotsky was in favour of exporting revolution worldwide...., while Stalin was more interested in protecting the Soviet Union from outside forces. In 1927, Stalin defeated Trotsky at the Communist Party Congress, encouraging his followers to shout Trotsky down to prevent him speaking, much as the sheep do to Snowball before he is driven off the farm. (8)

Even though *Animal Farm* is one of the most popular novels today, T.S. Eliot rejected the publication of this book. In his letter to Orwell, Eliot wrote that Orwell's view "which I take to be generally Trotskyite, is not convincing" (qtd. in Rodden, 126). Similar to *Animal Farm*'s Snowball, in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Emmanuel Goldstein, the dismissed Party member, is considered as analogous to Trotsky. In her book *The Orwell Conundrum: A Cry of Despair or Faith in the Spirit of Man?* Erika Gottlieb maintains that the scope of political allegory is wider in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and compares these two works to illustrate the similarity:

Both Big Brother and Napoleon represent Stalin (although Big Brother also bears resemblance to Hitler both in his physical and his political portrayal). Both Goldstein and Snowball represent Trotsky, at first

Stalin's rival and then his ritual scapegoat. The role of the dictator's propaganda machine is fulfilled by Squealer in *Animal Farm* and by the Ministry of Truth in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Stalin's continuous rewriting of the history of the Revolution is represented by Squealer's changing of the seven commandments [...] A similar function is fulfilled by Winston [...] who make the original record disappear down the "memory hole." (54)

Even though the characters and the stories of the books demonstrate similarities to the events between Stalin and Trotsky, John Rossi rejects the conviction that Orwell was a Trotskyist. In his essay "Orwell's Patriotism," Rossi touches upon this issue:

Despite his careful use of language Orwell rarely distinguished between Fascism and Nazism... For him these forms of totalitarianism were the final stages of the collapse of capitalism. By contrast, his analysis of Communism was original. Unlike many of his left wing colleagues, Orwell was enamoured of Communism neither as a theory nor by Stalin's unique perversion of it... The closest Orwell came to Communism was to flirt with what John Newsinger calls being a 'literary Trotskyist.' (89)

What Orwell was primarily concerned was not Marxism as a theory, but the violation of human rights and the distortion of the truth. In this respect, Orwell defined his political line not as "communism," but "democratic socialism." In "Why I Write," Orwell states that "[e]very line of serious work that I have written since 1936, has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism, as I understand it" (243). Furthermore, Orwell reveals his scepticism concerning communism in his essay "Spilling the Spanish Beans" and describes how communism could turn into a mirror reflecting fascism:

The logical end is a régime in which every opposition party and newspaper is suppressed and every dissident of any importance is in jail. Of course, such a régime will be Fascism. It will not be the same Fascism Franco would impose, it will even be better than Franco's Fascism to the extent of being worth fighting for, but it will be Fascism.

Only, being operated by Communists and Liberals, it will be called something different. (45)

In addition to his experiences in Spain, “the fact that Communism was fashionable among the left wing intelligentsia” (Rodden “A Political Writer,” 7) with a blind faith reinforced Orwell’s distrust of communism. In his essay “Orwell in 1984,” John Atkins reveals that “British Socialists disregarded the flaws of the Soviet Union under the pretext that although the system was not perfect, it was at least Socialist. They did not want to accept the fact that the imperfections overshadowed the virtues” (32). Atkins, moreover, claims that “Orwell was not an orthodox in this matter because he met some socialists who visited Russia and who were disillusioned by the Soviet myth” (32). In his essay on Arthur Koestler, Orwell maintains that the British intellectuals were mistaken to believe that the Russian Communists and the German Nazis were mutually exclusive, “[t]he sin of nearly all left-wingers from 1933 onwards is that they have wanted to be anti-Fascists without being anti-totalitarian” (qtd. in Meyers, 69). Therefore, Orwell committed himself to unravel the truth of Soviet regime and demonstrate how people were exploited because of their utopian dreams. Orwell’s reflections on fascism and communism can be observed in his book *Coming Up for Air* published in 1939. Disgusted by the left’s blindness about Stalin’s purges and the fact of Nazi-Soviet pact, Orwell manifested his concern over the new threat, totalitarianism. In this respect, George Bowling’s, the main character of his pessimistic book *Coming Up for Air*, comparison between older forms of power and new totalitarian states is analogous to Orwell’s accounts on modern dictatorships. For instance, according to Bowling, “[o]ld Hitler’s something different. So is Joe Stalin. They aren’t like these chaps in the old days who crucified people and chopped their heads off and so forth, just for the fun of it ... They’re something quite new—something that’s never been heard of before” (186). Similarly, in 1939, Orwell observes the societies of his time as follows:

The terrifying thing about the modern dictatorships is that they are something entirely unprecedented. In the past, every tyranny was sooner or later overthrown, or at least resisted, because of human nature which desired liberty. But we cannot be at all certain that ‘human nature’ is constant. It might be just as possible to produce a breed of men who do not wish for liberty as it is to produce a breed of hornless cows. The

Inquisition failed, but then the Inquisition had not the resources of the modern state. The radio, press-censorship-standardized education and the secret police have altered everything. Mass-suggestion is a science of the last twenty years, and we do not know how successful it will be. (*George Orwell: An Age Like This* 381)

The concept of totalitarianism forms the basis of Orwell's last book *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. His Spanish experiences and growing belief that the idea of objective truth was being undermined by totalitarian regimes played an important part in giving birth to his last book. A passage from Eugene Lyon's book *Assignment in Utopia*(1937), which was an analysis on Stalinism, deeply affected Orwell:

Optimism ran amuck. Very new statistical success was another justification for the coercive policies by which it was achieved. Every setback was another stimulus for the same policies. The slogan 'The Five-Year Plan in Four Years' was advanced, and the magic symbols '5-in-4' and '2+2=5' were posted and shouted throughout the land. (qtd. in Crick 367)

This passage became the inspiration for the most famous line of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, "Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four" (790). In the novel, the totalitarian Party agent O'Brien reminds Winston, the protagonist, that in his diary he has written "freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four" and tortures him until he sees five fingers, instead of four. This line can be regarded as one of the most well-known lines of Orwell associated with totalitarianism.

Nineteen Eighty-Four was an outstanding success and opened the eyes of the British Left to the truth of Stalinism and the Soviet system. Connelly compares Orwell to Voltaire and states his effect on the English Left: "His effect on the English Left might be compared to that of Voltaire on the French nobility; he weakened their belief in their own ideology, made them ashamed of their clichés, left them intellectually more scrupulous and more defenceless" (10). However, as political writing invites political criticisms, this book was interpreted as an attack to socialism by some scholars. Gottlieb claims that "[p]robably the most influential line of political attack was introduced by

Raymond Williams, who blames *Nineteen Eighty-Four* for creating the conditions for defeat and despair for millions” (“George Orwell: A Bibliographic Essay,” 195). According to Erika Gottlieb, “Williams wilfully and consistently misreads Orwell’s anti-Stalinism as anti-Socialism and thereby sets the tone for much of the New Left’s hostility to Orwell” (195).

Orwell foresaw these kinds of attacks to his book. He was distressed that the book was subject to misunderstanding and would be interpreted as an attack on Labour Party. Therefore, Orwell clearly stated his aim as follows:

My recent novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is not intended as an attack on socialism, or on the British Labour Party (of which I am a supporter) but as a show up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable and which have already been partly realized in Communism and Fascism. I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it could arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasize that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, if not fought against, could triumph anywhere. (“Orwell’s Statement on *Nineteen Eighty-Four*” 499)

Orwell’s works have been used, abused and misinterpreted many times. However, what Orwell strived after during his life, above all, was to be the voice of moral conscious and political courage among “the gramophones playing the tune” (Orwell qtd. in Ash, xv) and draw attention to the “new threat,” which is totalitarianism. In this regard, Orwell’s last book *Nineteen Eighty-Four* can be read as an attempt to depict a totalitarian regime and demonstrate how the authorities exert their force through a series of political and psychological methods.

George Orwell is one of the most important writers who skilfully portrayed the link between power and ideology. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell not only depicts a

totalitarian regime exerting brute force through Repressive State Apparatuses, but also reflect how power is maintained and perpetuated by ideology. While Michel Foucault's notion of power demonstrates the power relations in a society, Louis Althusser's concept of ideology describes how power is diffused throughout society. In this sense, Foucault's notions of "power," "resistance," "panopticon" and Althusser's concepts of State Apparatuses are fruitful in describing the link between power and ideology.

CHAPTER 2

2. Psychoanalysis and Ideology

In the twentieth century, the French Marxist theorist Louis Pierre Althusser (1918–1990) made his mark in history by redefining the role of the subjects' position in ideological paradigm. Drawing on the theories formulated by “the most influential psychoanalyst since Freud” (Homer viii), Jacques Marie Émile Lacan (1901 – 1981), Althusser represented a significant break from earlier Marxist thought, and built his work of ideology basically on Lacan's notion of “reality.” In his well-known essay “On Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” (1971), Althusser claimed that ideology functions on the unconscious level and thus, ““transforms’ the individuals into subjects” (*Lenin* 174).

Inspired by Jacques Lacan, Althusser incorporated his notion of ideology with psychoanalysis and published a ground-breaking essay entitled “Freud and Lacan” in 1964. Mostly as a result of his extreme criticisms against “Ego Psychology,” Lacan was expelled from International Psycho-Analytical Association, and at the invitation of Althusser, transferred his seminar “The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis” to the École Normale Supérieure, the most prestigious French school for humanities studies in 1964. During this period, the decades of silence within “orthodox” Marxist realm regarding the recognition of psychoanalysis as a science ended, and “psychoanalysis began to spread and become more accepted among Parisian intellectuals and cultural life” (Homer 10). Since then, Lacan has had enormous impact on contemporary psychoanalysis. According to statistics suggested by Sean Homer, today “[o]ver 50 per cent of the world's analysts employ Lacanian methods” (Homer 1). In addition to Lacan's insights on unconscious and psychoanalysis in general, Althusser's essays reflecting ideological interpretations of Lacanian psychoanalysis played a major part in the recognition of modern psychoanalytic ideas and their role in politics and ideology.

In “Freud and Lacan,” Althusser focused on Lacan's reinterpretation of Freud's works, and used the expression “return to Freud,” which Lacan had been using as a

slogan since 1951. In this essay, Althusser notes that Freud has discovered “that the human subject is de-centered, constituted by a structure which has no ‘center’ either, except in the imaginary misrecognition of the ‘ego,’ i.e. in the ideological formulations in which it ‘recognizes’ itself” (201). Taking this stance, Althusser praised Lacan for his position against “ego psychology” and for rejecting the concept of “homo psychologicus,” the idea that “human decision makers are rational, but only within the bounds of information available to them” (Breuning 52), and argued that psychology was “the site of the worst ideological confusions and ideological perversions of our time” (“Correspondence with Jacques Lacan” 149). Lacan, according to Althusser, comprehended and unconcealed the essence of Freud’s rejection of Homo psychologicus, which, he saw as analogous to Marx’s denunciation of the notion of “Homo oeconomicus,” “Humans are comprehensively rational actors” (Breuning 52). In “Freud and Lacan,” Althusser states this situation as follows:

Marx based his theory on the rejection of the myth of the “homo oeconomicus,” Freud based his theory on the rejection of the myth of the “homo psychologicus.” Lacan has seen and understood Freud’s liberating rapture. He has understood it in the fullest sense of the term, taking it rigorously at its word and forcing it to produce its own consequences, without concessions or quarter. It may be that, like everyone else, he errs in the detail or even the choice of his philosophical bearings; but we owe him the essential. (196)

“The essential,” for Althusser, can be regarded as Lacan’s concept of “mirror stage.”³ In her essay “Jacques Lacan: French Freud,” Edith Kurzweil states Althusser’s interest in “mirror stage:”

Althusser praises Lacan for his “scientificity,” and he looks to Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage as a possible revolutionary tool. To Althusser, the rooting of the self at such a pre-Oedipal stage represents a possibility of interfering in the socialization process. Because infants incorporate both parental and social values and beliefs almost from birth, Lacan’s focus on the preverbal formation of the self is said to hold out a new hope. (424)

Following Lacan's "mirror stage," Althusser asserts that although the subject recognizes itself as an autonomous and free-willed being, even before it is born, it is certain that "it will bear its Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived" (*Lenin* 119). Therefore, "what goes before the becoming-human of the small human being is what [Lacan] calls "the order of the symbolic" or what I would call, if you wish, the law of culture" (*PSH* 91-92). Terry Eagleton draws a parallel between Lacanian psychoanalysis and Althusser's notion of ideology:

The relation of an individual "subject" to society as a whole in Althusser's theory is rather like the relation of the small child to his or her mirror image in Lacan's. In both cases, the human subject is supplied with a satisfyingly unified image of selfhood by identifying with an object which reflects this image back to it in a closed, narcissistic circle. In both cases, too, this image involves a misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject's real situation. (*Literary Theory* 150)

As Eagleton suggests, similar to the infant recognizing itself as unified as the image in the mirror, the subject also recognizes itself as autonomous as it is reflected through a series of apparatuses in ideological realm. However, in both cases, the concept of "self" is the product of illusionary identification processes.

The notion of "misrecognition" is central to both Marxism and psychoanalysis. Sean Homer compares Marxism and psychoanalysis in terms of the notion of "misrecognition:" "Marxism and psychoanalysis converge upon a specific problematic, that is, a particular structure of mis-recognition. For Marxism, this is the misrecognition that individuals make history; for psychoanalysis, it is the subjects' mis-recognition of themselves as centred autonomous egos (111). Drawing on Lacan's subject formation, Althusser relates ideology to unconscious mental processes and explains how the subject's identity is constituted through ideology. In this sense, he rejects earlier Marxist understanding of ideology as a form of "false consciousness," a false system of ideas that mask the realities of exploitation and class struggles. For Althusser, by

contrast, as Slavoj Žižek contends, “The mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence” (*The Sublime* 25).

In addition to Lacan’s “mirror stage,” Althusser also draws on the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony.” In one of the central essays of his book *For Marx* (1965), Althusser poses the question of “Who has really attempted to follow up the explorations of Marx and Engels?” and states that “I can only think of Gramsci” (114). In this essay, “Contradiction and Overdetermination: Notes for an Investigation,” Althusser defines Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as “a remarkable example of a theoretical solution in outline to the problems of interpenetration of the economic and the political” (114). Thus, in an attempt to formulate his concept of ideology, Althusser integrates Gramsci’s notion of hegemony with Lacanian psychoanalysis and seeks to develop “a psychoanalytic theory of hegemony” (Pratt 30).

In his book *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to The Political Unconscious*, William C. Dowling summarizes the theory of ideological hegemony as follows:

Gramsci’s theory of ideological hegemony is that a ruling class establishes dominance not only by controlling the legal system, the prisons, and so on, but also by establishing a climate of thought in which the oppressed classes perpetuate their own oppression by learning the values of their masters. (129)

In the notebooks written during his imprisonment under Mussolini, Gramsci separated hegemony from ‘rule,’ or the direct coercion exploited in times of crisis by the ruling class to keep its position. Instead, “Hegemony is...usual complex of political, social and cultural forces which work to promote a consensus in society that the current system of social relations is the ‘natural’, inevitable, or the best realistically possible system (Ferreter 138). It can also be defined as the success of the dominant classes in constituting the “common sense” and thus establishing their definition of reality, their view of the world. Hence, as Raymond Williams discusses in his book *Marxism and Literature*, “hegemony” constitutes “a sense of reality for most people in the society”

(100)as well as the assumption of the only sensible way of seeing the world. According to Terry Eagleton, Gramsci and Freud share the same view of the notion of culture, “Culture for both [Gramsci and Freud] is an amalgam of coercive and consensual mechanisms for reconciling human subjects to their unwelcome fate as labouring animals in oppressive conditions”(179). In this respect, Althusser’s concept of “ideological state apparatuses,” a significant development of the Marxist theory of ideology, can be seen as analogous to Gramsci’s insights on the “non-repressive” institutions such as universities, churches, political parties, and so on.

Althusser sought to incorporate Marxism and psychoanalysis to explore how ideology functions in the unconscious mental process. In this sense, “[i]n Althusser’s work, the idea of hegemony is expressed in terms of a dominant ideology that is accepted as true, not because of an act of rational consciousness, or because it is received wisdom... but because of the ideology’s successful appeal to an unconscious” (Prattewing30).

2.1 Jacques Lacan’s “Return to Freud”

We are not following Freud, we are accompanying him. The fact that an idea occurs somewhere in Freud’s work doesn’t, for all that, guarantee that it is being handled in the spirit of the Freudian researches. As for us, we are trying to conform to the spirit, to the watchword, to the style of this research.

---Jacques Lacan, *Freud’s Papers on Technique*

Psychoanalysis was initially developed as a medical treatment by Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856 –1939) in the late nineteenth-century. The origin of Freudian psychoanalytic treatment, the “talking cure,” can be described as a therapy which aims to strengthen the “ego,” the “reason and common sense,” so that it could be potent enough to resist the insatiable drives of the “id,” “the great reservoir of libido” (Freud, *The Ego and the Id*25). The bottom line of this treatment lies in Freud’s famous phrase “Where id was, there shall ego be” (Freud qtd. in Eagleton, *Literary Theory* 139), in other words, “[w]here men and women were in the paralysing grip of forces

which they could not comprehend, there reason and self-mastery shall reign” (Eagleton, *Literary Theory* 139). Therefore, since the very beginning of its development, Freudian psychoanalysis has been mostly associated with bodily drives and the necessary dominance of the “ego” over the “id.”

However, in 1955, Lacan’s ground-breaking essay entitled “The Freudian Thing, or The Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis,” added a new dimension to prior Freudian readings. “The meaning of this ‘return,’” is, according to Lacan, “a return to the meaning of Freud” (*Écrits* 89). In his essay “Freud and Lacan,” Althusser clarifies this statement and claims that “The return to Freud is not a return to Freud’s birth: but a return to his maturity” (200). Therefore, it can be assumed that rather than directly adopting the origin of psychoanalysis, the “talking cure,” Lacan focused on Freud’s later works, such as “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920), *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1922), *Future of an Illusion* (1927) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), which were published towards the very end of his career in 1939. Significantly, these works prove the shift in Freud’s interest from the studies on the “ego” to make it more acceptable to the norms of the society, to the neurotic aspects of the society itself.

For example, in his essay “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920), which “can be regarded as introducing the final phase of his views” (Strachey, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” xx), Freud studied the neurotic patients suffering from painful traumatic experiences and witnessed that these patients were regularly “obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of [...] remembering it as something belonging to the past” (12). He continues as follows:

What psycho-analysis reveals in the transference phenomena of neurotics can also be observed in the lives of some normal people. The impression they give is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some ‘daemonic’ power; but psycho-analysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences (15)

Moreover, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud remarks that a person becomes neurotic “because he cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes on him in the service of its cultural ideals” (34). In *Future of an Illusion*, regarding the relationship between the civilization and individuals, Freud reveals that “every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization, though civilization is supposed to be an object of universal human interest” (15). Terry Eagleton compares Freud’s former and later works as follows:

In his later work, he [Freud] comes to see [that] the ego is a pitiable, precarious entity, battered by the external world, scourged by the cruel upbraidings of the superego, plagued by the greedy, insatiable demands of the id. Freud’s compassion for the ego is a compassion for the human race, labouring under the almost intolerable demands placed upon it by a civilization built upon the repression of desire and the deferment of gratification. (*Literary Theory* 139)

The shift in Freud’s views and his highly philosophical work “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” received a great amount of criticisms from scholars. Nonetheless, referring to these criticisms, Freud revealed that “[t]o begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here, but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way” (*Civilization and Its Discontents* 66). At this point, Lacan, as Ellie Ragland-Sullivan claims in his book *Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis*, can be regarded as “the first psychoanalyst to blur the distinction between a picture of psychoanalysis as the province of emotions and philosophy as that of mind” (xv).

With regard to Lacan’s engagement with Freud, Sean Homer underlines two important events. First, in 1930, Lacan read an article in a surrealist journal by a little-known painter Salvador Dali (1904–89) on ‘Paranoia.’ Second, in 1931 he began reading Freud. These two encounters led Lacan to a lifelong engagement with the field of psychoanalysis. Lacan, who later became Pablo Picasso’s (1881–1973) personal physician, was closely interested in Surrealist paintings of “the ‘reality’ of their [the artists’] dreams, which they saw as more ‘real’ than the prosaic reality of our everyday world” (Homer 4). Influenced by this artistic movement that emerged after the First

World War in Paris, Lacan viewed psychoanalysis as more associated with philosophy and arts, and in his doctoral thesis, *Paranoid Psychosis and Its Relations to the Personality* (1932), he opposed to “ego psychologists” who aligned psychoanalysis to medicine. Ego Psychology, which is a school of psychoanalysis focusing on the ways of strengthening the defence mechanisms of the conscious mind rather than the unconscious motivation of our actions, was, according to Lacan, the betrayal of Freudian revolution “suited to American values, giving the American people what they want” (Gallop 57). Lacan would later state regarding Freud’s daughter Anna Freud, who pioneered the school of Ego Psychology, that “Anna Freud, the plumb line of psychoanalysis. Well, the plumb line doesn’t make a building... [but] it allows us to gauge the vertical of certain problems” (qtd. in Miller, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II* 63).

In 1949, Lacan made his first contribution to the field of psychoanalytic theory. In his paper presented in Zurich at the Sixth International Congress on Psychoanalysis, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” Lacan demonstrated a new philosophical and linguistic reading of Freud’s works and replaced the subjects’ position in the world of culture, language and civilization as “an unnatural fit” (Hook 60). Lacan focused on the three terms that Freud originated: “ego-ideal” or “ideal-ego” (Freud was mostly using these two terms interchangeably) and “superego.”

The superego is, for Freud, the “advocate of a striving towards perfection” (“New Introductory Lectures” 67). While for children the formation of the superego begins with the realization of the moral values of the parental figures; in adults, the community takes place of these figures, thus the superego adapts itself to the realities of the external world. The ego-ideal or ideal-ego is, on the other hand, the ideal of perfection that the ego strives to emulate. It is “the precipitate of the old picture of the parents, the expression of admiration for the perfection which the child then attributed to them” (Freud, “New Introductory Lectures” 65). For Freud, the ego-ideal is closely linked with our super-ego, which is “the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfil” (“New Introductory Lectures” 65).

Lacan, however, made a distinction between the “ideal ego” and the “ego ideal.” Slavoj Žižek summarizes the difference between Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis concerning these terms as follows:

This simple... thesis encapsulates the way Lacan reads Freud. Freud uses three distinct terms for the agency that propels the subject to act ethically: he speaks of ideal ego, ego-ideal and superego... Lacan introduces a precise distinction between these three terms: the “ideal ego” stands for the idealized self-image of the subject (the way I would like to be, I would like others to see me); the Ego-Ideal is the agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image, the big Other who watches over me and propels me to give my best, the ideal I try to follow and actualize; and the superego is this same agency in its revengeful, sadistic, punishing, aspect. The underlying structuring principle of these three terms is clearly Lacan’s triad Imaginary-Symbolic-Real. (“How to Read Lacan”)

Lacan’s “ideal ego” can be described as the ideal of perfection that the ego strives to emulate. The “ideal ego,” in other words, the “imago,” occurs when the child sees himself in a mirror during the mirror stage, around 6-18 months of age. For Lacan, the “ego-ideal,” by contrast, is when the subject looks at himself as if from that ideal point; to look at oneself from the point of perfection. Hence, while the “ideal ego” is related to the imaginary order, the “ego ideal” is associated with the symbolic order. To clarify these concepts, Lacan divided human psyche’s workings into three phrases; the “real,” the “imaginary order” and the “symbolic order,” or the “big Other” and set out to question the concept of “self” in his essay “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1949).

According to Lacan, it is only in the earliest stage of development, between 0-6 months of age, that an individual is “closest to the pure materiality of existence, or what Lacan terms ‘the real’” (“on psychosexual development”). There is no distinction between the self and the other, namely, the baby and the mother. However, this union with the mother's body must be broken up in order to become a part of the society and culture. This separation from the original unity and wholeness creates an anxiety for the

child and during the subject's lifetime, the traumatic effect of the separation from the 'real' continues to erupt in some cases that threaten our "reality", the fantasy world which has been built around us.

At this stage, when the infant, who thinks its own body in pieces, looks in the mirror and misrecognizes the image which is not in pieces but a whole "self." According to Lacan, the "imaginary order," in other words, the "mirror stage," thus can be assumed as the subject's identification process:

We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image--whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term *imago*. (*Écrits* 2)

However, the fantasy image in the mirror, the "ideal-ego" or "imago" is nothing more than a compensation for the loss of sense of unity with the mother. When the infant sees the unified image in the mirror, it turns back towards the one who is carrying it, in other words, to the representative of the "big Other" (parent, relative, etc.), as if to call his or her approval. The infant, although not in a conscious way, assumes the person around it as the representative of the "big Other," which can be defined as "the virtual symbolic order, the network that structures reality for us" (Žižek, *Interrogating* 332). In sum, it can be assumed as the linguistic and ideological structures that define the subjects' position in society and organize not only their consciousness but the unconscious mental processes as well. When the infant realizes that s/he looks like what "others," the people around it, look like, the approval of the image in the mirror, as a result, enables the infant to invest this/her image narcissistically. Bruce Fink underlines the importance of such approval:

[T]he mirror image takes on such importance as a result of the parent's recognition, acknowledgment, or approval- expressed in a nodding gesture that has already taken on symbolic meaning, or in such expressions as "Yes, baby, that's you!" often uttered by ecstatic, admiring, or simply bemused parents." (*A Clinical Introduction* 88)

The mirror stage, for Lacan, proves the illusory nature of the dominance that the child experiences, while looking in the mirror, a mastery over her/his own body that the child does not have yet in reality. Lacan describes this process as follows:

The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. (*Écrits* 4)

“Facing his mirror image, the child misrecognizes himself ‘as king (all powerful, all seeing)’” (Felman 103). This identification enables the child to build up an ego, as Lacan puts, “characterizes the ego in all its structures” (*Écrits* 6). For this reason, the ego cannot be considered as an internal sense of separate whole identity. On the contrary, according to Lacan, the ego is the site in which the subject is alienated from itself, thus it is bound to remain on the level of fantasy. In brief, for Lacan, the concept of “self” is an illusionary product of the unconscious which is basically formed by the “big Other,” the ideological and cultural structures of the society.

Whereas the imaginary order is about identifications, the symbolic order is concerned with language and narrative. To become a part of the society, the infant enters into the system of language between 18 months to 4 years of age, accepts the rules and dictates of society and thus becomes a subject of the “symbolic order” or the “big Other.” The infant, in Lacan’s terms, accepts the “name of the father.” According to Lacan, “It is in the *name of the father* that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law” (*Écrits* 67). “Name of the father” can also be described as “the pact which links [...] subjects together in one action. The human action par excellence is originally founded on the existence of the world of the symbol, namely on laws and contracts” (Lacan, *Freud’s Papers* 230). This “world of the symbol,” consisting of ideological conventions and the cultural structures of the society, functions to veil the void occurred in the “real” and creates the subject’s “reality,” the fantasy world which

has been built around it. As Lacan demonstrates, “[T]he real supports the phantasy, the phantasy protects the real” (*Four Fundamentals* 41). So, it can be asserted that our perception of the world, our “reality,” only serves as a medium of protecting us from facing the traumatic loss of the wholeness in the real. At this point, Žižek offers an ideological critique of the real: “Ideology is [...] in its basic dimension, is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our “reality” itself. [...] The function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” (*The Sublime* 45). In this respect, the symbolic order “serves to cancel out the real, to transform it into a social, if not socially acceptable, reality, and here the name that serves the paternal function bars and transforms the real, undifferentiated, mother-child unity (Fink 56). The “real,” the “imaginary,” and the “symbolic” operate together to create the tensions of our psychodynamic selves.

Consequently, the most distinctive feature of Lacanian psychoanalysis is the convergence of the notions of “unconscious” and the “ego.” Alan Miller reveals the essential point for Lacan as follows:

[...] the unconscious not be taken as an interiority or container in which some drives are found over on the one side and a few identifications over on the other. . . . He took the unconscious not as a container, but rather as something ex-sistent – outside itself – that is connected to a subject who is a lack of being. (“An Introduction” 11)

Essentially, the “unconscious,” for Lacan, is not a separate psychic mental apparatus than the consciousness and “is not the reservoir of wild drives that has to be conquered by the ego” (“How to Read Lacan”). Instead, it is the discourse where the Other functions, “the discourse of the Other” (Lacan, *Écrits* 130).

2.2. Louis Althusser and Ideology

Inspired by Lacan’s return to Freud, Althusser returned to the texts of Karl Marx in his essay “On Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In this essay, Althusser claims that “the ideological hegemony indispensable to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production” (*Lenin* 152) and “no class can hold State power over a long

period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (*Lenin* 146). In an attempt to explain ideological hegemony, Althusser offered an ideological critique of the theories formulated by Lacan, particularly the “mirror stage” and the “symbolic order.” Ferretter compares Althusser’s notion of “ideology” with Lacan’s subject formation:

Althusser had argued that ideology interpellates us as subjects. Lacan also thought of the individual as a ‘subject’, split by its entry into language.... For Lacan, it is the ‘symbolic’ order of language and of all the codes, analogous to that of language, by which society functions, that determines the subjectivity of the developing individual. For Althusser, this order can be described primarily as that of ideology. (Ferretter 136)

In “On Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” Althusser begins with the emphasis on the indispensable feature of all ideological structures: “reproduction of the conditions of production.” Althusser states that “As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year” (*Lenin* 127). From this standpoint, he explains his notion of ideology based on two theses: “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” and “Ideology has a material existence” (*Lenin* 155).

To begin with the first thesis, Althusser suggests that ideology basically functions on the unconscious level of individuals and highlights the fact that ideology functions as a system of representations dominating the unconscious of the subjects, which, as a result, generates the assumption that this dominance is natural and lays the groundwork for subordination to the ruling system. Althusser describes this process as follows:

[I]t is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. (*Lenin* 164)

The subjects “misrecognize” their real conditions of existence, thus they become products of the imaginary representation of the real world. “We are always within ideology because of our reliance on language to establish our ‘reality’; different ideologies are but different representations of our social and imaginary ‘reality’ not a representation of the Real itself (“I: On Ideology”). In this sense, what the subject assumes as “reality,” is, in fact, the imaginary world constituted by the dominant ideology.

As for the second thesis, Althusser contends that ideology has a material existence, because “an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices” (*Lenin* 112). In Marxist theory, the State is regarded first and foremost as the ‘State apparatus,’ a set of institutions controlled by the ruling class that maintains its economic dominance, such as government, the civil service, the courts, the police, the prisons, and the army, and so on. Since the term “repressive” suggests that “the State Apparatus in question ‘functions by violence’ – at least ultimately (since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take non-physical forms)” (*Lenin* 143), Althusser replaces the term “State Apparatus” with the “Repressive State Apparatus” and in *Lenin and Philosophy*, points out to the two different aspects of State power. The first is the repressive and coercive state apparatuses, which he calls the “Repressive State Apparatus” consisting of “the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc.” (143).

The second is the “Ideological State Apparatuses” (ISAs). According to Althusser, these apparatuses are presented in the form of distinct and specialized institutions as follows:

- the religious ISA (the system of the different churches)
- the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private schools)
- the family ISA
- the legal ISA
- the political ISA

- the trade union ISA
- the communications ISA (press, radio and television etc.)
- the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports etc.) (137)

The fundamental difference between the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) is that the RSA functions primarily “by violence,” whereas the ISA functions primarily “by ideology” (138). Althusser elaborates the difference between the RSA and the ISA:

The (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology. (There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus.) For their part, the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if only ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus.) (*Lenin* 145)

While the RSA performs its social function of sustaining the position of the ruling class by means of force or threat, the ISAs perform the same function through various ideological discourses. For example, resisting arrest by the police results in more fines or more possible jail time. The individual, as a result, is left by no choice but accept the arrestment and submit to the repressive force, that is, the police. However, ISAs operate on ideological level. In a school, for example, children are taught to think and act in specific ways. They are required to learn certain amount of “‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology” (*Lenin* 155), otherwise they may be given low grades or, moreover, expelled from this institution. In this respect, it can be assumed that ideological discourses in all various ISAs are always controlled by the ruling ideologies which function first by ideology, then by repression.

Accordingly, Althusser argues that during its lifetime, starting from the family ISAs, the subject is taught how to think and act through ISAs, in return, it sees his/her

idealized place in the society through these apparatuses. Althusser exemplifies this situation:

[C]hildren at school also learn the ‘rules’ of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. They also learn to ‘speak proper French’, to ‘handle’ the workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the future capitalists and their servants) to ‘order them about’ properly, i.e. (ideally) to ‘speak to them’ in the right way, etc. (*Lenin* 132)

However, as it is in Lacan’s mirror stage, what the subject sees as a “self” in these apparatuses is nothing but an illusion. The order of the symbolic “deprives the subject of any constituting or originating function”, and “acts upon the biological and thus produces the effect of subject” (Choi 145). Therefore, the ruling ideology reproduces the conditions of production not only by means of “reproduction of its skills,” but also, with, as Althusser contends:

[The] reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words.’ (*Lenin* 132)

Ideology leads individuals whose lives are in reality formed by a complex series of interpellation processes to believe that they are free subjects, the origin and source of their thoughts, emotions and actions. As Althusser puts it, “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection ‘all by himself’” (*Lenin* 123). Althusser writes:

Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ (*Lenin* 162–63)

The important thing is that the subjects do not recognize this interpellation process. Since “ideology never says, ‘I am ideological,’ to be able to say ‘I’m in ideology’ is only possible by being outside ideology, that is to say, in “scientific knowledge” (*Lenin* 176).

Consequently, similar to Lacan, Althusser holds the view that once an infant enters into the symbolic order, it gets entrapped in the fantasy world in which s/he is constituted as a subject and becomes a subject of the ideological conventions and restrictions of the social forces. In this respect, Althusser resembles ideology to Lacanian understanding of “reality,” and proposes that the individuals’ “real conditions of existence” are guided by an illusion. As Žižek posits, “[w]hat they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity” (*The Sublime* 30). Therefore, according to Althusser, ideology does not reflect the real world, on the contrary, it is a fantasy world of which the subject considers itself as a part.

2.2 Michel Foucault and the Concept of the “Normalization”

Foucault’s narrative of disciplinary normalization is highly influenced by Althusser’s notion of “interpellation,” the process of the internalization of the societal norms. Through this operation “[i]deology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects” (*Lenin* 174). In his book *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault also focuses on the effects of societal norms on individuals and concerning the notion of “normality” claims that “[t]he perpetual quality that transverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it standardizes, normativizes, normalizes”

(*Discipline* 183). With regard to these disciplinary institutions, Foucault posits that “rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (*Power* 39). The norms inserted into individuals’ actions and attitudes through these institutions turn into a medium of controlling and administering both the bodies and minds of individuals. Consequently; “normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power” (*Discipline* 184).

The idea of “normalization” is an integral part of Foucault’s works. In his doctoral thesis, *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault begins questioning the notions of “normality” and “abnormality” by tracing the evolution of the concept of madness through three phases: the Renaissance, the Classical Age and the Modern experience. In the early periods, according to Foucault, madness had a connection with sanity and the “madman” was a figure of tragicomic wisdom. However, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the classical age, alongside the people suffering from mental illnesses, the poor, the sick, and the unemployed were stigmatized as the “other” and placed in ‘enormous houses of confinement’ (*Madness* 35). Under these moral and physical restraints, the so-called abnormal people found themselves segregated from mainstream society. The seventeenth century, then, became “the beginning of an age of repression emblematic of what we call the bourgeois societies,” in other words, became the period of “the subtle, modern techniques for dealing with the ‘individual to be corrected’ or the ‘incorrigible’” (*The History* 17). In the eighteenth century “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” took place: bio-power (*History* 140). Foucault describes this power as follows:

...the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called bio-power. (*The History* 140)

One of the great innovations in the techniques of power, bio-power, was presented as a concern over the fostering of life and the growth and care of population. With this regard, the development of bio-power took two important forms: “disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body” and “regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population” (*The History* 139).

The aim of the “anatomo-politics” involves the discipline of the bodies which are considered like machines. It realizes “its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” (*The History* 139). This form of the politics was embodied in institutions such as the army and the schools.

The “regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population,” on the other hand, involves “the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary” (*The History* 139). The emergence of population controls, demography, the evaluation of the relationship between resources and inhabitants, the constructing of tables analysing wealth and its circulation corresponds to this form of bio-power.

The proliferation of bio-power had two important consequences. Firstly, the bio-power “made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life” and thus modern man turned into “an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (*The History* 143). And secondly, the notions of law and norm became more closely associated with one other, as Foucault remarks “the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory” (*The History* 144). The repressive and the ideological run together and created “normalizing society,” which is “the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (144).

Consequently, while Althusser emphasized the implicit power of the ISAs whose function is to ‘transform’ the individuals into subjects, Foucault explored various

strategies of repressive and ideological forces which turn individuals into “docile bodies.” Individuals internalize cultural and ideological structures and regulate themselves according to the truths constructed by these structures. In this respect, both theorists tried to shift “the category of the subject from a constituting position to a constituted one,” and demonstrated that direct repression was replaced by various set of normalization and interpellation processes(Étienne 20).

CHAPTER 3

3.Truth and Counter Truth: the Party and Winston Smith

The story of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is mostly narrated through the protagonist, Winston, who is both “inside” and “outside” the body of Oceania. He is “outside” in the sense that unlike the people of Oceania, he realizes the oppressive nature of the Party ideology and decides to resist it. He is capable of excluding himself from the rest of the people thanks to his intellectual ability. However, at the same time, Winston is “inside” in that his growing hatred against the Party and his position as a resistant figure are reinforced by the Party itself. He is deliberately “individualized” for the sake of Party ideology and at the end of the story, it is revealed that Winston’s “resistance” only serves the Party regime to maintain its infallible position. Winston Smith turns out to be an exploited figure, similar to the rest of the citizens of Oceania. In this respect, Orwell utilizes the character of Winston, “a lonely ghost uttering a truth that nobody would ever hear” (758), to illustrate the power relations of Oceania.

The narration of the novel mostly revolves around Winston Smith, who lives in one of the three super-states, Oceania, ruled by the Party and its totalitarian ideology, Ingsoc. Even though the history of how the world is divided into three states is not clearly mentioned in the novel, the boundaries of these three powers; Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia are described as follows:

Eurasia comprises the whole of the European part of the European and Asiatic landmass, from Portugal to the Bering Strait. Oceania comprises the Americas, the Atlantic islands including the British Isles, Australasia and the Southern portion of Africa. Eastasia, smaller than the others and with a less definite western frontier, comprises China and the countries to the south of it, the Japanese islands and a large but fluctuating portion of Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet. (854)

These three states are in perpetual state of warfare and the enemy of the moment always represents the “absolute evil” (762) of Oceania. The novel is set in Airstrip One, a province of Oceania, which was called London before the division, “[e]ven the names of countries, and their shapes on the map, had been different. Airstrip One, for instance...it had been called England, or Britain, though London, he felt fairly certain, had always been called London” (761). The society of Oceania is split into three classes: the “proles”, ordinary citizens whose function is only “work and breed” (784)

and the Party divided into two parts: “the Inner Party”, which is referred as “the brain of the State” consisting of 2 per cent of the population of Oceania and “the hands” of the State, “the Outer Party” (863). Like all the residents of Oceania, the Party members are also ruled by the Party leader and the so-called hero of the revolution, “the Big Brother.” His position in Oceania is depicted as an “infallible and all-powerful” figure: “Every success, every achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom, all happiness, all virtue, are held to issue directly from his leadership and inspiration. Nobody has ever seen Big Brother” (863). Winston tries to remember how the Big Brother emerged and became the ultimate power in the first place:

He tried to remember in what year he had first heard mention of Big Brother. He thought it must have been at some time in the sixties, but it was impossible to be certain. In the Party histories, of course, Big Brother figured as the leader and guardian of the Revolution since its very earliest days. His exploits had been gradually pushed backwards in time until already they extended into the fabulous world of the forties and the thirties, when the capitalists in their strange cylindrical hats still rode through the streets of London... (763)

The Big Brother emerged as the leader of the Party ideology Ingsoc, or English Socialism. The Party continuously proclaims “Before the Revolution they had been hideously oppressed by the capitalists, they had been starved and flogged, women had been forced to work in the coal mines... children had been sold into the factories at the age of six” (784). Under these circumstances, the Party created the Big Brother as a “saviour” and implemented his ideology, Ingsoc. As Fredrick Jameson claims “The effectively ideological is also, at the same time, necessarily Utopian” (*The Political Unconsciousness* 286). Starting as a utopian dream, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* becomes a story of revolution which turns into an ideological ploy.

3.1. Power and Resistance

The Party distorts every fact, falsifies the history and manipulates the minds of the citizens. As revealed in the novel, the Party initiated “the substitution of one piece of

nonsense for another” and then “the chosen lie would pass into the permanent records and become truth” (786). Accordingly, in this horrific image of a loss of autonomy, the only “truth” is what the Party imposes as truth on the individuals. The reality of Oceania is formed by the Party; “[w]hatever the Party holds to be truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party” (886).

In *Power/Knowledge* (1980), Foucault focuses on the productive nature of “modern power,” and describes its relevance to the notion of truth, “power produces, it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (194). In this view, the notion of truth is directly linked to power, “[t]ruth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth” (*P/K* 131). As O’Brien, the Party agent, declares, the members of the Party are “the priests of power,” thus the “regime of truth” in Oceania is the Party ideology, Ingsoc which consists of some “sacred principles,” such as “Newspeak, doublethink, the mutability of the past” (757).

Although the notion of truth is controlled and manipulated by the Party, the novel abounds with oppositional truths. The coexistence of two languages, Newspeak, the fictional language fabricated by the Party, and Oldspeak, the standard English, proves that despite its unitary form, the system of Oceania still needs a definition through its opposite. For example, while the main principle of Ingsoc, which compels the citizens to hold two contradictory ideas in mind, such as “Freedom is Slavery,” “War is Peace,” is called “quite frankly, ‘reality control’” in Oldspeak, in Newspeak, it is called “doublethink” (763). On the one hand, the Party tries to reduce language and creates Newspeak “to make all other modes of thought impossible” (917); but on the other hand, it still allows the language of Oldspeak to be spoken among the Outer Party members. According to Carl Kerenyi, the interdependence of thought and speech, “makes it clear that languages are not so much a means of expressing truth that has already been established as means of discovering truth that was previously unknown. Their diversity is a diversity not of sounds and signs but of ways of looking at the world” (xxxix). Language is not a medium of mirroring a pre-existent truth, but a means of creating truth. The position of the creator is designated by the relations of power. In this regard,

Newspeak and Oldspeak are two different linguistic systems utilized for one aim: to implement the truth of the Party.

The power relations in Oceania can be conceived as a broader picture of the language systems. As an Outer Party member, Winston still uses Oldspeak and refuses to accept the truth of the super-state of Oceania. In the vicious circle of the ruling system, Winston ceaselessly strives to find out his past and his own truth throughout the novel. Nevertheless, just like the oppositional, yet interdependent aspects of Newspeak and Oldspeak, the survival of the Party depends on the survival of the figures similar to Winston. So, Winston only stands as an opposing component of the Party, whose opposition is a necessary condition for the survival of the Party regime.

At the beginning of the novel, Winston starts to keep a diary, and marks the date as “April 4th, 1984.” This decision is crucial in that keeping a diary is his first action of regaining past and creating his own truth. However, since he “did not know with any certainty that this was 1984. It must be round about that date” (743), this diary indicates that his attempt to create an opposing truth is doomed to failure from the beginning. His sense of helplessness is described as follows:

A tremor had gone through his bowels. To mark the paper was the decisive act. In small clumsy letters he wrote: April 4th, 1984. He sat back. A sense of complete helplessness had descended upon him. To begin with, he did not know with any certainty that this was 1984. It must be round about that date, since he was fairly sure that his age was thirty-nine, and he believed that he had been born in 1944 or 1945; but it was never possible nowadays to pin down any date within a year or two. (743)

Winston sets out to write an oppositional truth. However, he cannot remember the period before the revolution, before the party took over the control of Oceania. What he remembers is only some elusive memories related to his childhood:

He was struggling to think his way backward into the dim period of his early childhood. It was extraordinarily difficult. Beyond the late fifties everything faded. When there were no external records that you could

refer to, even the outline of your own life lost its sharpness. You remembered huge events which had quite probably not happened, you remembered the detail of incidents without being able to recapture their atmosphere, and there were long blank periods to which you could assign nothing. Everything had been different then. (761)

Unsure of his origin and unable to remember his parents, Winston believes that the more he traces the past, the closer he would be to the “real” truth, thus to his identity. In this respect, Winston’s rebellion can be regarded as a quest for gaining an identity. The first thing to do in this quest is to regain the past.

One of the main themes in the novel is the notion of “truth.” Throughout the novel, Winston struggles to reach the truth which, according to him, is hidden in the past. Winston’s relentless search for the truth can be seen as analogous to Orwell’s commitment to “objective truth,” “a manifest truth out there that he clung to amid totalitarian apologists and truth-deniers” (Cain 83). Orwell regarded the “distortion of truth” as an essential feature of totalitarian states and pointed that,

A totalitarian state is in effect a theocracy, and its ruling caste, in order to keep its position, has to be thought of as infallible. But since, in practice, no one is infallible, it is frequently necessary to rearrange past events in order to show that this or that mistake was not made, or that this or that imaginary triumph actually happened. (“The Prevention of Literature” 384)

In most of his works, Orwell underlined the importance of truth and the authorities’ role in the manipulation of truth in the form of tampering with history, “[h]istory is not being written in terms of what happened...the very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world;”and he insisted, “however much you deny the truth, the truth goes on existing, as it were, behind your back”(qtd. in Cain 83). Moreover, he viewed this situation as the most frightening thing about totalitarian regimes, “The really frightening thing about totalitarianism is not that it commits ‘atrocities’ but that it attacks the concept of objective truth: it claims to control the past as well as the future” (“As I

Please” 215). This point of view is also reflected in the Party’s slogan, “Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present controls the past” (762).

In the novel, Winston’s quest for the “objective truth” is represented with three symbols: the glass paperweight, the upstairs room of Mr.Charrington’s shop and the nursery rhyme. However, the symbols turn out to be formed by the Party itself, and the member of the Thought Police, Mr.Charrington only serves as a party agent who implicitly encourages Winston and lays the groundwork for Winston’s rebellion.

Winston meets Mr.Charrington, a self-proclaimed 63-year-old owner of the antique shop, while he passes by the second-hand store. The antiques and other remnants in the shop, especially the ones in the upstairs’ room, impress Winston to the extent of depicting the room as “a world, a pocket of the past where extinct animals could walk” (833), and Mr.Charrington as “another extinct animal” (833). Winston’s definition of Mr.Charrington as an “extinct animal” indicates the amazement that Winston experiences. Mr.Charringtonseems to Winston as a special man who has kept the junks belonging to a different age till that day. Among various junk, one thing particularly appeals to Winston; a glass paperweight containing pink coral. What attracts him is not its beauty, rather “the air it seemed to possess of belonging to an age quite different from the present one. The soft, rainwatery glass was not like any glass that he had ever seen. The thing was doubly attractive because of its apparent uselessness” (799).This item was useless. It was one of small number of things that the Party did not bother changing, “little chunk of history they've [the Party] forgotten to alter” (829).

Similarly, Charrington’s shop holds an “ancestral memory” for Winston. Mr.Charrington ensures Winston that there is no telescreen in the upstairs’ room. Dreaming of a place where he can live secluded from the Party, Winston dares to take the risk of renting the room. The reason for this decision is described as follows:

[T]he room had awakened in him a sort of nostalgia, a sort of ancestral memory. It seemed to him that he knew exactly what it felt like to sit in a room like this, in an arm-chair beside an open fire with your feet in the fender and a kettle on the hob; utterly alone, utterly secure, with nobody

watching you, no voice pursuing you, no sound except the singing of the kettle and the friendly ticking of the clock. (800)

The paperweight is identical to Charrington's upstairs' room. Both the paperweight and Charrington's upstairs' room belong to the period before "lie passed into history and became truth" (762). Similar to pink coral inside the glass paperweight, Winston feels secure, thus secretly meets Julia, his lover, in this room. The resemblance between the room and the paperweight is described as follows:

It was as though the surface of the glass had been the arch of the sky, enclosing a tiny world with its atmosphere complete. He had the feeling that he could get inside it, and that in fact he was inside it, along with the mahogany bed and the gateleg table, and the clock and the steel engraving and the paperweight itself. The paperweight was the room he was in, and the coral was Julia's life and his own, fixed in a sort of eternity at the heart of the crystal. (830)

Mr.Charrington is an "extinct animal" who provides Winston with residues from the past and makes him feel safe from the external dangers. Just like the glass protecting the pink coral from outside, the room protects Winston and Julia from the oppressive Party ideology.

Lastly, Mr.Charrington teaches Winston a nursery rhyme about the old church St. Clement's Dane. Since Mr.Charrington does not tell him the whole lyrics, Winston persistently tries to fill the gap in the lyrics. Similar to the glass paperweight, the "little chunk of history they've [the Party] forgotten to alter," Winston describes this rhyme as something "disguised and forgotten (801):"

It was curious, but when you said it to yourself you had the illusion of actually hearing bells, the bells of a lost London that still existed somewhere or other, disguised and forgotten. From one ghostly steeple after another he seemed to hear them pealing forth. Yet so far as he could remember he had never in real life heard church bells ringing. (801)

He writes down the first, “Oranges and lemons, say the bells of St Clement’s,” and the last, “Here comes a candle to light you to bed. Here comes a chopper to chop off your head,” lines of the rhyme in his diary (830). The ending of the rhyme foreshadows Winston’s inevitable end. Winston gets caught by the Thought Police in Charrington’s “safe” upstairs’ room and O’Brien reveals that Winston has been watched from the very beginning, “Don’t worry, Winston; you are in my keeping. For seven years I have watched over you. Now the turning point has come. I shall save you, I shall make you perfect” (883). Similar to his job at the Ministry of Truth, in which he follows the “estimate of what the Party wanted” (768) and revises the documents, the content of his diary turns out to be constructed by the Party in the course of time.

The implication of this encouragement is also evident in the description of Winston’s home, and the position of the telescreen: “For some reason the telescreen in the living room was in an unusual position. Instead of being placed, as was normal, in the end wall, where it could command the whole room, it was in the longer wall, opposite the window” (745). Even though Winston knows that keeping a diary could get him arrested if it’s discovered, since it suggests a desire for “ownlife,” the Newspeak word “meaning individualism and eccentricity” (791), he keeps the diary anyway. In his essay “The Subject and Power,” Foucault defines this kind of power as “tricky combination.” “The fact that the state’s power is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power. Never, I think, in the history of human society—even in the old Chinese society—has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and totalization procedures” (421). The Party allows Winston to stay outside the range of the telescreen. By deliberately encouraging his individualization, the Party prepares the ground for Winston’s opposition to the state.

In the “End of the Monarchy Sex,” Foucault contends on the interdependence of power and resistance and remarks “As soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance” (qtd. in Barrett 37). The Party is well-aware of this possibility. Regardless, until his final act of attempting to join “The Brotherhood,” a fictitious organization founded by the so-called enemy of the Party, named Emmanuel Goldstein, Winston’s hopeful search for the “truth” is supported and reinforced within the limits of

the Party ideology. Foucault reveals the relation between power and resistance as follows:

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power . . . [The] strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the network of power. (*The History*95)

In the novel, the resistance of Winston takes place under the Party's control. The three symbols representing his search for identity turn out to be formed by the Party itself and thus it is revealed that Winston's notion of truth is created by the super-state of Oceania, in other words, to the Big Brother.

3.2. Rebellion

By assuming the role of an anarchist, Winston attempts to organize an oppositional network of power. However, he fails in his both attempts and finally gets caught by the Thought Police. This situation indicates that even though there might appear counter-ideologies in totalitarian states, they are doomed to failure because "bourgeois ideology dominates other ideologies" (Althusser, *PSPS* 30).

Firstly, Winston tries to organize a network with the proles. Despite being unsure of his past, Winston believes that in the past "there was still privacy, love, and friendship" (760). Referring to the old times as an age when there was no falsification of history, Winston longs for the past, and everything from the past awakens a sort of nostalgia in him. With this idealized view of the past, Winston tries to establish a new network of power with proles, who make up eighty-five percent of the population of the state: "The proles, it suddenly occurred to him, had remained in this condition. They were not loyal to a party or a country or an idea, they were loyal to one another. For the first time in his life he did not despise the proles or think of them merely as an inert force which would one day spring to life and regenerate the world" (841-2). The people referred to as "proles" represent the majority of Oceania, the working class, who are completely devoid of intellect, "They can be granted intellectual liberty because they

have no intellect” (864). Since they know neither Newspeak, nor Oldspeak, the Party attributes animal-like traits to the proles. They are viewed as “natural inferiors who must be kept in subjection, like animals” (784). As the Party slogan puts it: “Proles and animals are free” (785). Although they are kept under surveillance like the other citizens, the proles are allowed to enjoy songs, novels and even pornography created by the Party:

[...] there was a whole chain of separate departments dealing with proletarian literature, music, drama and entertainment generally. Here were produced rubbishy newspapers . . . sensational five cent novelettes, films oozing with sex, and sentimental songs . . . There was even a whole sub-section . . . engaged in producing the lowest kind of pornography. (768)

Winston wants to establish an oppositional truth with the proles, but he cannot even communicate with them. When he tries to speak to an old prole about the past, he realizes the futility of his attempt: “A sense of helplessness took hold of Winston. The old man's memory was nothing but a rubbish-heap of details. One could question him all day without getting any real information” (797).

In his essay “On Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” drawing on Gramsci’s notion of “counter-hegemony” which is “an alternative ethical view of society that poses a challenge to the dominant bourgeois-led view” (Cohn 131), Althusser mentions the existence of different ideological tendencies within an ideological paradigm. So, instead of reducing the concept of ideology to that of the ideology of the ruling class, he claims that “[w]ithin ideology in general, we ... observe the existence of different ideological tendencies that express representations of the different social classes” (*PSPS*30). Therefore, the ISAs are not themselves ideologies, “but rather ‘the site of class struggle’ in which oppositional ideologies can find space to articulate their resistance to the dominant ideology” (Ferretter 154). Althusser reflects on the existence of different ideological tendencies, “...the working class cannot, by its own resources, radically liberate itself from bourgeois ideology; at best, the working class can express its protest and its aspirations by using certain elements of bourgeois ideology, but it remains the prisoner of that ideology, held in its dominant

structure”(PSPS 30). In Althusser’s view, even though the ISAs can be regarded as the “site of the class struggles,” the result of these struggles always turns out to be in the dominant ideology’s favour. In the novel, the Inner Party member O’Brien makes fun of Winston’s reasoning considering the proles: “perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The others are outside” (899). The proles sedated by cheap pornography, beer and gambling are the prisoners of the ruling ideology. So, the ideological tendency revealed by Winston’s attempt to organize with proles fails.

Another attempt of rebellion takes place after Winston meets O’Brien, the Party agent in a daily event called “Two Minutes Hate” in which Party members watch a film depicting the Party’s enemies, especially Emmanuel Goldstein, and express their hatred for them by chanting slogans like “[d]eathto the traitors” (834). However, Winston’s hatred is not turned against Goldstein, but, on the contrary, to the Big Brother. This is when his eyes meet O’Brien’s eye:

Momentarily he caught O'Brien's eye [...] It was as though their two minds had opened and the thoughts were flowing from one into the other through their eyes. ‘I am with you,’ O’Brien seemed to be saying to him. ‘I know precisely what you are feeling. I know all about your contempt, your hatred, your disgust. But don’t worry, I am on your side!’ (752)

O’Brien presents himself as a member of “The Brotherhood,” a fictitious anti-party organization founded by a man named Emmanuel Goldstein. Goldstein is the leader of “The Brotherhood” dedicated to overthrow the Party, thus he is the so-called ultimate enemy of Oceania. Members of the Brotherhood are required to read the book supposedly written by Goldstein, “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism.” Even though “The Brotherhood” is demonstrated as a threat, the Party does not remove the copies of this book and the rumours regarding the existence of Goldstein and his preparation of attacks go round the Oceania. O’Brien gives one copy of the book to Winston and ensures him to make a member of “The Brotherhood.” As Feder states, “Winston Smith is a prototype of man deliberately being remade by political and technological forces, the state’s evidence that not only culture but human

biology and psychology are its antagonists and its conquests” (2145). He is deliberately encouraged to resist against the Party from the very beginning and finally forced to confess his crimes.

3.3. Confession

In the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, Foucault put forth his thesis on confession and considered “the act of confession” as an essential component in the exercise of modern power. Since the Middle Ages, Western societies have established the confession as one of the main rituals for the production of truth. According to Foucault, “truth” is produced by multiple forms of constraint, namely the institutions in which the “people are taught that their liberation requires them to ‘tell the truth,’ to confess it to someone who is more powerful” (qtd. in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 72). In this sense, for the Party, confession of the “truth” is a kind of enforcement to impose their demands. Winston explains how “the criminals” were forced by the Party to confess their crime: “The great purges involving thousands of people, with public trials of traitors and thought-criminals who made abject confession of their crimes and were afterwards executed” (768).

In Oceania, the people detected as criminals by the Party are forced to undergo terrible tortures in a place called the “room 101,” which is “the worst thing in the world.” The room is described as a place where the individuals are “reintegrated” into society. O’Brien explains how they convert the “criminals” before the executions:

We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us: so long as he resists us we never destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul. We make him one of ourselves before we kill him. (890)

Winston reveals the story of three men named Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford who appear after being tortured in room 101:

They had vanished for a year or more, so that one did not know whether they were alive or dead, and then had suddenly been brought forth to

incriminate themselves in the usual way. They had confessed to intelligence with the enemy, embezzlement of public funds, the murder of various trusted Party members, intrigues against the leadership of Big Brother[...] They confessed to all their old crimes over again, with a whole string of new ones. They were executed, and their fate was recorded in the Party histories, a warning to posterity. (787)

This event foreshadows Winston's inevitable fate. Similar to the case of these three "criminals," the Party turns Winston into a submissive criminal before the public execution. In room 101, Winston is forced to face with his biggest fear in the world, as O'Brien states "the worst thing in the world" in Winston's case, the rats and confesses his crimes to O'Brien. In this situation, in Foucault's view, Winston can be likened to a "confessing animal;" "When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat. Western man has become a confessing animal" (*The History* 59). As a result of O'Brien's tortures, Winston turns into "a confessing animal," accepts the Party's truth and confesses his "crimes" in room 101:

He became simply a mouth that uttered, a hand that signed, whatever was demanded of him. His sole concern was to find out what they wanted him to confess, and then confess it quickly, before the bullying started anew. He confessed to the assassination of eminent Party members, the distribution of seditious pamphlets, embezzlement of public funds, sale of military secrets, sabotage of every kind. He confessed that he had been a spy in the pay of the Eastasian government as far back as 1968. (882)

In "George Orwell: a bibliographic essay" Erika Gottlieb argues that even though *Nineteen Eighty-Four* can be regarded as a general attack on totalitarianism, the details and confession scenes are predominated by Orwell's experiences and fears with Stalinist regime. Gottlieb explains the reason for Orwell's fear and its relevance with trials as follows:

Orwell had good reason to fear that he was on the 'hitlist' of the Stalinists when he fought in the POUM in Spain; that he was considered

by Moscow as a 'rabid Trotskyist', fated, most likely, to be eliminated at a rigged trial had the communists stayed in power in Spain. From the KGB files it is also clear that Orwell was followed by Comintern agents not only while in Spain, but also after his return to London. (196)

As W. J. West points out, Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* "criticised for generations by communist intellectuals as being an exaggerated fantasy by a terminally ill man, proved to be a precisely accurate account of a bureaucratic totalitarian state" (qtd. in Gottlieb). In addition to Gottlieb, David Seed also points out the similarity between the confession scenes in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Moscow trials in his book *Brainwashing: The Fictions of Mind Control*:

The Moscow trials were written into Orwell's novel as purges taking place in the mid-1960s to establish a pattern prior to Winston Smith's experiences. Although the novel combines allusions to contemporary Britain and Nazi Germany, it is Stalin's consolidation of his power in the 1930s that supplies the main history for *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Winston Smith's final "confession" was originally planned to echo the Moscow trials. (10)

Moreover, Seed also quotes John Rogge's explanation regarding Winston's gradual physical and emotional humiliation, "martyrdom and confessions are basically the same thing: they are both efforts to gain love (10). To gain love, the Party converts the criminals in room 101 and removes their rebellious spirit.

The connection between the confession trials and the "love" of the Party can also be explained by Foucault's insights in his book *Discipline and Punishment*. In this book, Foucault argues that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the method of public executions was transformed from entertaining public spectacles to "the representation of public morality" (*Discipline* 110). The agent of the punishment became more of an issue of moralizing propaganda and the last words of the convict gained importance as a scene of confession. During these confession scenes, the spectators not only witnessed the execution of the convict's body, but the execution of the crime as well. Foucault elucidates on these scenes as follows:

The law required that its victim should authenticate in some sense the tortures that he had undergone. The criminal was asked to consecrate his own punishment by proclaiming the blackness of his crimes; he was made to say, as was Jean-Dominique Langlade, three times a murderer: “Listen to my horrible, infamous and lamentable deed, committed in the city of Avignon, where the memory of me is execrable, for having inhumanly violated the sacred rites of friendship.” (*Discipline* 66)

Foucault posits that before this method, the criminals gave proof of a strength by not admitting their guilt during the confession scenes, “A convicted criminal could become after his death a sort of saint, his memory honoured and his grave respected” (*Discipline* 67). However, as O’Brien explains to Winston, the Party does not make this mistake:

Men were dying because they would not abandon their true beliefs. Naturally all the glory belonged to the victim and all the shame to the Inquisitor who burned him. Later, in the twentieth century, there were the totalitarians, as they were called. There were the German Nazis and the Russian Communists. The Russians persecuted heresy more cruelly than the Inquisition had done. And they imagined that they had learned from the mistakes of the past; they knew, at any rate, that one must not make martyrs. Before they exposed their victims to public trial, they deliberately set themselves to destroy their dignity. They wore them down by torture and solitude until they were despicable, cringing wretches, confessing whatever was put into their mouths, covering themselves with abuse, accusing and sheltering behind one another, whimpering for mercy. And yet after only a few years the same thing had happened over again. The dead men had become martyrs and their degradation was forgotten. Once again, why was it? In the first place, because the confessions that they had made were obviously extorted and untrue. We do not make mistakes of that kind. All the confessions that are uttered here are true. We make them true. (889)

The Party removes the rebels' sense of hatred to the state and finally forces them to "confess" their crimes in front of the public. It makes them not only accept the truth of the Party, but also "love" the Big Brother.

3.4. Collective Mind

Through the confession method, the Party maintains its infallible position in the eyes of the people and creates two different, yet interdependent notions of power: "us" and "them;" "We're trustworthy, peace-loving, honorable and humanitarian; 'they' are treacherous, warlike and cruel" (Frank 951). In his essay "The Psychology of Perpetrators," Erwin Staub notes the function of this separation:

A separation into us and them has many functions. By defining certain people as them, we create us, which can result in feelings of harmony and togetherness. In difficult times, this can be an essential gratification. Leaders frequently use a real or imaginary threat to create antagonism toward an "enemy," hoping thereby to increase internal cohesion and decrease dissatisfaction with themselves.(66)

This is what O'Brien tries to explain to Winston in the Ministry of Love, the place where he tortured Winston: "You believe that reality is something objective, external, existing in its own right . . . But I tell you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. Not in the individual mind . . . only in the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal" (886). O'Brien tries to make Winston understand that power comes to mean collectivism by saying: "The first thing you must realize is that power is collective. The individual only has power in so far as he ceases to be an individual" (896). The Party asserts its power through maintaining the collective body of the society. So, the state of war between the three states and the internal "threats" like Winston "help to preserve the special atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs" (Orwell 859). In his dialogue with Winston, O'Brien defines the power of the Party with regard to the "enemies":

The espionage, the betrayals, the arrests, the tortures, the executions, the disappearances will never cease. It will be a world of terror as much as a world of triumph . . . Goldstein and his heresies will live for ever. Every

day, at every moment, they will be defeated, discredited, ridiculed, spat upon—and yet they will always survive. (898)

As the text suggests, Winston is not the first to rebel against the State. There have been always figures like Winston in the history and they have been always defeated. These oppositions do not weaken the Party regime, on the contrary, empower its omniscient presence.

In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1922) Freud quotes Le Bon's description of the group mind:

There are certain ideas and feelings which do not come into being, or do not transform themselves into acts except in the case of individuals forming a group. The psychological group is a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each of the cells singly. (7)

Similarly, in his dialogue with Winston, O'Brien resembles the individual to a cell and regards Oceania as an organism:

Can you not understand, Winston, that the individual is only a cell? The weariness of the cell is the vigour of the organism. Do you die when you cut your fingernails?Alone- free- the human being is always defeated. It must be so because every human being is doomed to die, which is the greatest of all failures. But if he can make complete, utter submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can merge himself in the Party so that he is the Party, then he is all powerful and immortal. (896)

In his dialogue with Julia, Winston reveals that "I hate purity, I hate goodness! I don't want any virtue to exist anywhere. I want everyone to be corrupt to the bones" (817). In this sense, suffering from a varicose ulcer, Winston can be regarded as a virus constructed by the Party to vaccinate the "living body" of Oceania. The Party, which is

determined to maintain the “living body” of Oceania, creates and exploits figures like Winston to immunise the body of the Oceania.

The Party binds the citizens of Oceania with the “love” of Big Brother, and at the same time, with the hatred towards “The Brotherhood.” “Two Minutes Hate” is used as a tool of this kind of social control. According to Ross Walker, “Two Minutes Hate” can be seen as analogous to Hitler’s huge Nazi Party rallies. Therefore, for Walker, Big Brother represents Adolf Hitler as well as Stalin. He compares Big Brother and Hitler as follows:

The repression, terror and murder of the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945), only recently defeated when Orwell wrote the novel, must have been in the author’s mind as he wrote. The mass hysteria of the public rallies organised by the Party bring to mind Hitler’s huge Nazi Party rallies... It was characterised by fanatical nationalism, fierce anti-Semitism which ultimately resulted in the extermination of six million European Jews. Emmanuel Goldstein, the scapegoat for all ills in Oceania is Jewish. Anti-Semitism was also a prominent feature of Stalin’s regime. (4)

In the novel, the citizens’ fanatical nationalism is depicted in a similar fashion to Hitler’s Nazi Party rallies. In Hitler’s Germany, the enemy of the state was demonstrated as the Jewish people, who were seen as the source of all the troubles and the ills of the state. Similarly, in the novel, the Party demonstrates the images of the officially sanctioned enemies, pioneered by Jewish Goldstein and thus channels the sense of aggressiveness of the citizens onto these figures. The scene is described as follows: “A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one’s will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic” (750). In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud defines “hate” as an integral part of “love:”

It is clearly not easy for man to give up the satisfaction of his inclination to aggression. Men do not feel comfortable without it [...] It is always

possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness. It is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and those related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other. (114)

After the manifestations of hatred and fear, the image of the Big Brother, “an invincible, fearless protector, standing like a rock against the hordes of Asia, and Goldstein” (751) is demonstrated. The appearance of the Big Brother relieves the people and restores the confidence:

Big Brother seemed to persist for several seconds on the screen, as though the impact that it had made on everyone's eyeballs was too vivid to wear off immediately. The little sandyhaired woman had flung herself forward over the back of the chair in front of her. With a tremulous murmur that sounded like ‘My Saviour!’ she extended her arms towards the screen. Then she buried her face in her hands. It was apparent that she was uttering a prayer. (752)

The existence of enemy figures who receive the manifestations of the people’s aggressiveness is an indispensable feature of collectivism, thus a necessary condition for the survival of the ruling system of Oceania.

In brief, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* portrays how one man, Winston Smith, representing everyman, is controlled by the all-powerful physical and psychological forces of the state. At the end of the novel, released from the Ministry of Love, Winston spends his days by sitting at Chestnut Tree Café, the ill-omened place where “corpses [dismissed Party members] waiting to be sent back to the grave” before they are finally purged. It is also the place where the dissent from the Party ideology, Winston waits to carry out his final task: to be publicly executed and “lifted clean out from the stream of history” (890).

CHAPTER 4

4. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

We control life, Winston, at all its levels. You are imagining that there is something called human nature which will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature.

--George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

The primary function of an ideology is to reproduce itself through its constituent apparatuses. In the case of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the RSAs and ISAs function in tandem to instill the Party ideology into the society and thus reproduce the ideology of Ingsoc. From the very beginning of their lives, the citizens of Oceania are marked as the subordinate subjects of the Party and tyrannized by the ruling ideology. As it is exposed by O'Brien, the situation of the society can be imagined as "a boot stamping on a human face-- forever" (898).

In his attempt to develop the concept of "Ideological State Apparatuses," Althusser drew on Pascal's "wonderful formula:" "Kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you will believe" (qtd. in Althusser, *Lenin* 168). This "wonderful formula," Althusser writes, "will enable us to invert the order of the notional schema of ideology" (*Lenin* 169). According to this theory, it is the subjects' performance of their relation to others and to social institutions that continually constitutes them as subjects. The individuals distinguish themselves from others "as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence out of the raw materials of nature" (Marx qtd. in Ferretter, 13). In this respect, it is not the consciousness of man that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their conscious and unconscious life.

In the novel, the citizens not only believe the Party's truths, but also actively practice these truths through their actions. The Party ideology is "inserted into practices" (*Lenin* 181), thus the social reality is constituted on the fantasy level. For example, Winston lives in accordance with the fantasy world structured by the Party. His work entails historical revision and manipulation of records, a process in which he is engaged on a daily basis. He not only rewrites the past events, but also creates some

stories praising heroic actions of the citizens who sacrifice themselves for the Party's principles. By creating ideal citizen figures, he constructs his social being in the illusionary world of the Party. "In producing propaganda, he is himself censored, or censors himself, as he follows 'lines of policy' laid down anonymously and his 'estimate of what the Party wanted' him to say" (Yeo 51). Winston's relation to his job is described as follows:

Winston's greatest pleasure in life was in his work. Most of it was a tedious routine, but included in it there were also jobs so difficult and intricate that you could lose yourself in them as in the depths of a mathematical problem -- delicate pieces of forgery in which you had nothing to guide you except your knowledge of the principles of Ingsoc and your estimate of what the Party wanted you to say. Winston was good at this kind of thing. (768)

This text affirms Althusser's insights on ideology's manifestation through practices or jobs. According to Althusser, "an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices" (*Lenin* 156). In the novel, even though Winston Smith starts to keep a diary with a yearning for the truth at the beginning, "to a time when truth exists and what is done cannot be undone" (758), and decides to resist the falsification of the history, his satisfaction from his job demonstrates the dominance of the Party ideology in the minds of individuals and indicates the helplessness of Winston against this oppressive regime.

In addition to the works of the individuals, the Party ideology also resides in the efforts and actions of the citizens. For instance, the "Hate Week" is one of the most obvious examples of these practices. This annual event is organized by the Thought Police to increase the hatred for the current enemy of the Party. The events during this week include "[p]rocessions, meetings, military parades, lectures, waxworks, displays, film shows, telescreen programmes" (831). During this week-long festival, new banners are prepared, new songs are written and new slogans are coined. The theme-song of Hate Week, which is called the "Hate Song," is composed. The Party members voluntarily endeavour to demonize the enemies of the state and heighten their efforts for the sake of the Big Brother. In addition to the Party members, these events whip the

proles, who are normally apathetic about the war, into frenzies of patriotism as well. In this sense, "Hate Week" can be likened to a national holiday in Oceania. However, as with all other things there, the holiday is perverted to serve the Party's own ends. As a part of the economy drive for the preparation of the Hate Week, the electric is cut off during daylight hours and the people are obliged to work more hours, "[w]orking hours had been drastically increased in anticipation of Hate Week. It was more than a month distant, but the enormous, complex preparations that it entailed were throwing extra work on to everybody" (825). The media, for Althusser, operates by "cramming every 'citizen' with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, moralism, etc. by means of the press, radio, and television" (*Lenin* 155). By means of the telescreens, the Party manipulates the people and thus exploits them both physically and mentally.

Similarly, during "Two Minutes Hate," a daily ritual, the people of Oceania gather together to show their hatred towards the image on the screen, especially the face of Emmanuel Goldstein, the so-called "Enemy of the People" (749). The group's reaction to the image is described as follows:

In its second minute the Hate rose to frenzy. People were leaping up and down in their places and shouting at the tops of their voices in an effort to drown the maddening bleating voice that came from the screen. The horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate was not that one was obliged to act a part, but, on the contrary, that it was impossible to avoid joining in. Within thirty seconds any pretence was always unnecessary. A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic. (750)

The people in the rally lose their control to the extent of frenzy for the sake of the Big Brother. Winston, similarly, defines his job as his greatest pleasure in which he could "lose" himself. These two examples prove the fact that the citizens' relationship to their social reality is constructed by the Party itself. Althusser defines this kind of relationship as "imaginary:"

It is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that “men” “represent to themselves” in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. (Althusser, *Lenin* 163)

The very fact of ideology lies in the actions of the citizens. By working or acting for the Party the citizens become active parts of the ideology itself.

4.1. Educational Apparatuses

Another example of the State apparatuses in the novel is public schools. According to Althusser, the educational apparatus in an ideological paradigm is the most effective apparatus, “[w]hat the bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant ideological State apparatus, is the educational apparatus, which has in fact replaced in its functions the previously dominant ideological State apparatus, the Church” (*Lenin* 153). The schools, according to Althusser, indoctrinate children during “the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable,’ squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational” (*Lenin* 155). The education of the children through ideological apparatuses, such as “Spies” and “Youth Leagues,” is particularly emphasized throughout the novel. The schools and the clubs are portrayed as the places where children and young people are taught the Party doctrines and trained to watch the movements of their parents and neighbours. The Party teaches its principles at schools and the teachers serve to penetrate into the children’s “vulnerable” minds. Orwell’s depiction of the schools is similar to the “Hitler Youth,” which was an organisation designed to instil in German youth a sense of patriotism and devotion to Hitler himself” (Walker 13), in Nazi Germany. In the “Hitler’s Youth,” physical and military training took precedence over academic and scientific education and the children, who were separated by gender and age, were indoctrinated to follow the necessities of being an “ideal German.” Similarly, in the Youth League and Spies, also known as “The Young Leaders of Tomorrow,” children are taught the principles of the Party ideology. At these clubs, physical activities are prior to any scientific education. This priority is evident in Winston’s depiction of the house of the Parsons who have two children attending these schools; “Games impedimenta - hockey-sticks, boxing gloves a burst football, a pair of

sweaty shorts turned inside out - lay all over the floor, and on the table there was a litter of dirty dishes and dog-eared exercisebooks. On the walls were scarlet banners of the Youth League and the Spies, and a full-sized poster of Big Brother” (851). The schools, therefore, can be regarded as the basic material apparatuses which regulate the beliefs and the bodies of the subjects in the novel. Another example of the educational apparatuses is revealed when Winston, standing in a dim lamplight, relates the reason why he cannot have a real love affair to the education system of the Party:

The women of the Party were all alike. Chastity was as deep ingrained in them as Party loyalty. By careful early conditioning, by games and cold water, by the rubbish that was dinned into them at school and in the Spies and the Youth League, by lectures, parades, songs, slogans, and martial music, the natural feeling had been driven out of them. (782)

Chastity is encouraged and sex is seen as duty by the Party. As a result, the Party manages to destroy physical contact as well as emotional intimacy between people.

Winston’s dialogue with Julia on “frigid little ceremony” that his ex-wife Katharine forced him to go through reveals the ideological perspective of the schools as well (821). When Winston tells her about the stiffening of Katharine’s body as soon as he touched her, Julia explains him that the ceremony is taught as “their duty” to the Party at the schools, “I’ve been at school too, dear. Sex talks once a month for the over-sixteens. And in the Youth Movement. They rub it into you for years. I dare say it works in a lot of cases” (821). Clearly, they are taught that the only reason for sex is to produce a new material for the Party, and that sex for personal pleasure is a crime. As it is clearly put in “The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism,” the fictional book supposedly written by Goldstein, “All the beliefs, habits, tastes, emotions, mental attitudes that characterize our time are really designed to sustain the mystique of the Party” (863).

At this point, Winston’s fellow-employee at the Ministry of Truth, Tom Parsons and his family represent the perfect Party ideology. Tom Parsons is depicted as follows:

At thirty-five he had just been unwillingly evicted from the Youth League, and before graduating into the Youth League he had managed to

stay on in the Spies for a year beyond the statutory age. At the Ministry he was employed in some subordinate post for which intelligence was not required, but on the other hand he was a leading figure on the Sports Committee. (755)

Mrs. Parsons and Mr. Parsons, the devoted Outer Party member, had sexual intercourse only to reproduce. They recreated themselves by having a boy and a girl, so that they could produce a future generation that will take their place when they turn into non-functional components of the Party. Similar to their father, the children are also sent to the “Spies” where they are trained to monitor the movements of the parents and denounce them when they feel the “symptoms of unorthodoxy” (756), any signs of nonconformity. When Winston sees the little Parsons, he likens them to “little savages:”

With those children, he thought, that wretched woman must lead a life of terror. Another year, two years, and they would be watching her night and day for symptoms of unorthodoxy. Nearly all children nowadays were horrible. What was worst of all was that by means of such organizations as the Spies they were systematically turned into ungovernable little savages. (756)

Although Tom Parsons can be regarded as the most loyal Party member in the novel, her daughter catches him uttering “[d]own with Big Brother” in his sleep and immediately denounces him to the Thought Police. Imprisoned in the Ministry of Love, Parsons ironically boasts about his daughter’s behaviour, “[p]retty smart for a nipper of seven, eh? I don’t bear her any grudge for it. In fact I’m proud of her. It shows I brought her up in the right spirit, anyway” (776). The children turned into spies both by the school and the family do not abstain from denouncing their parents and leading their death.

4.2. The “Big Brother” and the “big Other”

The training at the schools and the clubs systematically turns the children into “ungovernable savages.” However, this kind of the training does not produce in them any tendency to rebel against the discipline of the Party. Their obedience to the Big Brother is described as follows:

On the contrary, they adored the HH Party and everything connected with it. The songs, the processions, the banners, the hiking, the drilling with dummy rifles, the yelling of slogans, the worship of Big Brother –it was all the sort of glorious game to them. All the ferocity was turned outwards, against the enemies of the State, against foreigners, traitors, saboteurs, thought-criminals. (756)

So, for children, as for the parents, the feelings of loyalty and devotion to the Big Brother are deeply embedded in their social and cultural lives. As Althusser puts it, this is a feature of all ideology, it “interpellates individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject” (*Lenin* 181). Therefore, the subjects of Oceania are “subjects” in a second sense, “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection” (Althusser, *Lenin* 182). Within the Christian ISA, for instance, the subjects are subjected to God. They are “subjected to the Subject” (Althusser, *Lenin* 179). In the novel, the concept of God is obliterated by the Party. Instead, the “Unique and Absolute Subject” is replaced with the figure of the “Big Brother,” which is regarded as “an invincible, fearless protector, standing like a rock against the hordes of Asia, and Goldstein” (751). Moreover, the Party agent, O’Brien’s statement reveals that the Inner Party members function as the priests of the Big Brother, “[w]e are the priests of power” (896). In this regard, each citizen of Oceania is “a subjected being, one who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (Althusser, *Lenin* 182).

However, the individuals do not perceive the process in which they are turned into ideological subjects. All the actions in the novel operate on the fantasy level. The subjects, who are exposed to the truths of ideology in every aspect of their lives, do not recognize this interaction. The Big Brother, whose posters spreading around the city and “eyes follow[ing] you about” (743), turn into the image reflected in the mirror. This reflection, which is constructed and controlled by the Party itself, is the root of every success, every achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom, all happiness etc. As Žižek asserts, “the big Other was always dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first place as a material thing” (“Key Ideas”). Similarly,

nobody has ever seen the Big Brother in the novel. The dialogue between O'Brien and Winston demonstrates that he does not even exist:

Winston: Does Big Brother exist?

O'Brien: Of course he exists. The Party exists. Big Brother exists. Big Brother is the embodiment of the Party.

Winston: Does he exist in the same way as I exist?

O'Brien: You don't exist. (893)

In *Lacan Reframed*, Steven Levine considers the "Big Brother" as a twin of the "big Other," "[t]he big Other of Lacan is a twin of George Orwell's unseen Big Brother whose framework of permissible meanings constitutes the linguistic coordinates of the social and political worlds" (39). The Big Brother, thus, can be regarded as the communal network of linguistic communication, social institutions and ideological conventions in Oceania. Citizens view themselves from the eyes of the "Absolute power," and strive to be just as perfect as that reflection. Furthermore, Althusser's ideological critique reveals why the subjects do not recognize this process:

what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology [...] That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, "I am ideological." (*Lenin* 175)

In this text, Althusser echoes Lacan's "mirror stage." In "mirror stage," the infant misrecognizes and epitomizes the image in the mirror. "[T]he apparent fullness of the image in the mirror is an objectification of the gaze which, in substantifying the image as an object, elides from it the very insufficiency experienced by the subject" (Felman 103). Facing his mirror image, the child perceives itself as king (all powerful, all seeing), in much the same way as the subjects in Oceania perceive themselves while looking at the posters of the Big Brother.

Each ISA in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, in particular “the family,” “the school” and “the media,” has a crucial role in the reproduction of individuals as ideological subjects. Through the process of interpellation, the subjects internalize particular meanings, values and take up the identity which is already determined by the pre-existent social structures. Controlled by the Party at all levels of their life, the people of Oceania continue to live in the illusionary world constructed by the Party and sustain the “reproduction of the production relations” (Althusser, *Lenin* 83).

CHAPTER 5

5. Propaganda and Surveillance in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

One of the main tools utilized by the Party is ubiquitously placed telescreens. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell reveals that technology, which is generally perceived as working toward moral good, can also turn into an oppressive force. There are two functions that the telescreens serve in the novel:

Behind Winston's back the voice from the telescreen was still babbling away about pig-iron and the overfulfilment of the Ninth Three-Year Plan. The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it, moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. (745)

Through the telescreens, the Party watches the people of Oceania and propagates its principles. Thus, the functions of these devices can be analysed under two headings: Propaganda and Surveillance.

5.1. Propaganda

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, propaganda can be regarded as the greatest instrument not only as a means of spreading a constant stream of lies as facts, but also as a medium of inundating the people with the values and the principles of Ingsoc. As Michael Yeo states in “Propaganda and Surveillance in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,” “[t]hat people believe certain lies to be facts is not what really matters to the Party; what matters is the beliefs they form about matters of political concern to which these facts persuade them” (52). In this regard, the telescreen is the chief tool for propagating slogans, such as “War is Peace,” “Freedom is Slavery,” “Ignorance is Strength” (758), celebrating the “victories” of the Party and demonizing current enemies. Through this device, the populace is led into the feelings of frustration and happiness in rapid succession, and thus becomes only non-thinking automatic machines dedicated and devoted to the state.

Oceania is in a constant state of war with other states and the role of the media is to keep the public satisfied with this warfare. For example, Winston listens to the “fabulous statistics” which are only the stream of lies:

The fabulous statistics continued to pour out of the telescreen. As compared with last year there was more food, more clothes, more houses, more furniture, more cooking-pots, more fuel, more ships, more helicopters, more books, more babies -- more of everything except disease, crime, and insanity. Year by year and minute by minute, everybody and everything was whizzing rapidly upwards. (777)

The media never reports on the “twenty or thirty [rocket bombs] a week falling on London” (757), but rather announces the “good news” about victories. At the beginning of the novel, for instance, Winston’s telescreen announces, “[o]ur forces in South India have won a glorious victory. I am authorised to say that the action we are now reporting may well bring the war within measurable distance of its end” (757). The telescreens continuously broadcast similar news and propaganda throughout the day, and the people cheer at these victories which are assumed as the signs of longed-for peace. In this regard, the Party slogan, “War is Peace,” proves the collapse of the distinction between the notions of “war” and “peace.” Paradoxically, in the novel, the state of peace is demonstrated as “the triumphant outcome of non-peaceful rather than peaceful actions/interventions [...] war provides the occasion and is guarantor of peace, just as peace is the reason and purpose of war” (Hodges 57).

5.1.1. Language

According to Lacan, the acquisition of language entails a radical break from the Real stage. In his seminar XVII, Lacan underlines this situation and states that “the real is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way” (145). The Real is impossible “insofar as we cannot express it in language because the very entrance into language marks our irrevocable separation from the real” (“Modules on Lacan”). By accepting the linguistic rules, the infant, thus, accepts the “Name-of-the-Father,” and becomes a subject of the fantasy world structuring the “reality.” For this reason, Lacan claims that “the unconscious is

structured like a language” (*Four Fundamental* 149). Since the subject consciousness, as well as unconsciousness, is constituted by language, s/he is dependent on linguistic and social version of “reality.” In his book *Welcome to the Desert of the Real* consisting of five essays on cultural critiques, Slavoj Žižek incorporates the Marxist and Lacanian elements of language and ideology:

We ‘feel free’ because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom [...] today, all the main terms we use to designate the present conflict – ‘war on terrorism,’ ‘democracy and freedom,’ ‘human rights,’ and so on - are false terms, mystifying our perception of the situation... In this precise sense, our ‘freedoms’ themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom. (2)

In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell presents the same view in its extreme version. The repeated abuse of language by the government and by the media reveals how language can be used politically as a mind-control tool. Obviously “[l]anguage is one of the key instruments of political dominations, the necessary and insidious means of the ‘totalitarian’ control of reality” (Rai 122) in the novel. Moreover, as C. W. Cassinelli remarks, “[t]otalitarian leaders pay notoriously scrupulous attention to details, particularly details of ‘ideology’” (“Totalitarianism, Ideology, and Propaganda” 83). The systematic insertion of the Party ideology, Ingsoc, into the linguistic system of Newspeak, whose objective role is to reiterate the phenomenon of “doublethink,” reveals the Party’s interest in the details of the language.

All the inhabitants of Oceania are compelled to hold two contradictory ideas in mind at the same time, such as “War is Peace,” “Freedom is Slavery,” “Ignorance is Strength.” This strategy is called “doublethink.” While Newspeak, the official language of Oceania, is the method for controlling thought by means of language; doublethink directly aims at controlling thought. The strategy of “doublethink” is described as follows:

To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in

both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself – that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink. (763)

The idea of “doublethink” can also be observed in the Party ministries’ names and their contradictory functions: the “Ministry of Plenty” is in charge of economic shortages, the “Ministry of Peace” wages war, the “Ministry of Truth” falsifies history, and the “Ministry of Love” is the place of torture and punishment. To make the people comply with what the state offers, the Party mystifies the individuals’ perceptions by reconciling contradictions. Through this technique, the citizens subjugate themselves to the truths of the Party, even while possessing information that proves the opposite of what they are being told.

At the Hate rally, for instance, the speaker suddenly replaces the name of the enemy with its diplomatic alliance in the middle of the speech, and makes the public feel ashamed of their reaction against its “ally.” Thus, the wars against other nations are altered so repeatedly that Winston questions if Oceania was actually at war: “The Party said that Oceania had never been in alliance with Eurasia. He, Winston Smith, knew that Oceania had been in alliance with Eurasia as short a time as four years ago. But where did that knowledge exist? Only in his own consciousness, which in any case must soon be annihilated” (762). Winston is surprised how people can “swallow” the blatant lies of the Party:

It appeared that there had even been demonstrations to thank Big Brother for raising the chocolate ration to twenty grammes a week. And only yesterday, he reflected, it had been announced that the ration was to be

reduced to twenty grammes a week. Was it possible that they could swallow that, after only twenty-four hours? Yes, they swallowed it. (777)

In his essay titled “Literature and Totalitarianism” (1941) Orwell declares how the totalitarian nations distort the objective truth and make the people reverse their emotions overnight:

It declares itself infallible, and at the same time it attacks the very concept of objective truth. To take a crude, obvious example, every German up to September 1939 had to regard Russian Bolshevism with horror and aversion, and since September 1939 he has had to regard it with admiration and affection. If Russia and Germany go to war, as they may well do within the next few years, another equally violent change will have to take place. The German’s emotional life, his loves and hatreds, are expected, when necessary, to reverse themselves overnight. (*The Collected Essays* 98)

Within this context, it can be asserted that once we accept the authority as an infallible figure, we obey “the senseless character of the Law;” “that we must obey it not because it is just, good or even beneficial, but simply because it is the law” (Žižek, *Sublime* 35). The citizens do not question the “truth” of the events. “[W]e find reasons attesting our belief [in the authority] because we already believe; we do not believe because we have found sufficient good reasons to believe” (Žižek, *Sublime* 35). In this sense “belief, far from being an ‘intimate,’ purely mental state, is always materialized in our effective social activity: belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality” (Žižek, *Sublime* 33). Accordingly, the citizens of Oceania believe whatever the Big Brother holds as true.

The aim of the notion of “doublethink” is to ensure the strategy of “orthodoxy.” As Winston’s philologist colleague at the Ministry of Truth, Syme explains: “Orthodoxy means not thinking -- not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness” (774). The first act of implementing the strategy of orthodoxy is the construction of Newspeak. Much of the telescreen programs are given in Newspeak, thus the citizens are continuously subjected to listen this fabricated language. The aim of Newspeak is described as follows:

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meaning and also the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meaning whatever. (917)

In this way, Newspeak would not allow any discontent regarding the existent social order to be expressed in a rational manner. It would be possible, for example, to say “Big Brother is ungood” (923). However, since the absence of necessary words, the statement would not be able to be sustained by reasoned argument.

Newspeak has two outstanding characteristics. The first of these is an almost complete interchangeability between different parts of speech. The word “thought,” for example, does not exist in Newspeak. Instead, its verb form “think,” functions both as noun and verb. Therefore, if they are of the same root, there is not any variation between the noun and the verb. Adjectives are formed by adding the suffix “-ful” to a noun-verb, like the word “speedful,” which means ‘rapid.’ And adverbs are formed by adding “-wise,” the word “speedwise,” for instance, means ‘quickly.’ In addition, any word could be transformed into its antonym by adding the affix “un-” or could be strengthened by the affix “plus-,” or, for still greater emphasis, “doubleplus-.” In his essay “Turning to Orwell to Understand Orwell’s Problem: A Sociolinguistic View,” Pedro Luchini exemplifies this feature by comparing Oldspeak and Newspeak:

It was also possible to modify the meanings of almost any word by prepositional affixes such as ante-, post-, up-, down-, etc. For example, the Oldspeak utterance ‘Mary cut the tempting bread carefully and enjoyed a fantastic meal’ could be translated into Newspeak as follows: ‘Mary knifed the temptful breadcarewise and enjoyed a doubleplusgood meal.’ (99)

The second feature of Newspeak grammar is its regularity. As revealed in the appendix of Newspeak:

Subject to a few exceptions... in all verbs the preterite and the past participle were the same and ended in-ed...All plurals were made by adding-s or -es as the case might be. Comparison of adjectives was invariably made by adding-er,-est (good, gooder, goodest), irregular forms and the more, most formation being suppressed. (919)

Therefore, for instance, the Oldspeak sentence "I spoke to the two most intelligent men in the world" would translate into the Newspeak statement "I speaked to the two undumbest men in the world."

In sum, Newspeak functions in such a way to exclude the faculties of reflection and thinking. According to Lacan, "[i]t is not only man who speaks, but in man and through man that it speaks, that his nature is woven by effects in which we can find the structure of language, whose material he becomes" (qtd. in Frosh, 70). As Syme plainly puts, "Ingsoc is Newspeak, and Newspeak is Ingsoc" (773) in Oceania. Imposed by the principles of Ingsoc, the citizens' behavioural patterns and linguistic-cognitive traits are defined by the linguistic regulations of Newspeak. In this sense, the ultimate aim set by the Party can be considered in relation to the aim of the linguistic system of Newspeak, "orthodoxy." The ideal of the Party with regard to the people of Oceania is defined as follows:

The ideal set up by the Party was something huge, terrible, and glittering -a world of steel and concrete, of monstrous machines and terrifying weapons-A nation of warriors and fanatics, marching forward in perfect unity, all thinking the same thoughts and shouting the same slogans, perpetually working, fighting, triumphing, persecuting- three hundred million people all with the same face. (786)

Similar to the linguistic system of Newspeak which is "characterized by grammatical regularity, syntactical simplicity" (Burgess 39), the social system of Oceania is aimed to be constructed as a sum of robotic machines thinking and acting in the same manner.

Consequently, the most important objective of the propaganda in the novel is not to make the people believe certain lies to be facts. With regard to the relation between language and reality, Jonathan Scott Lee contends that “[a]ll language allows us to speak of is the ‘reality’ constituted by the system of the symbolic [the big Other] (qtd. in Shepherdson, 33). Similarly, in the novel, since the reality of Oceania is constituted by the Party, the political propaganda only serves to support the values of the existent social structure. Accordingly, in spite of its obvious senselessness, the people do not question the incoherent aspects of “doublethink” or “Newspeak” and thus continue to believe the social reality constructed by the Party.

5.2. Surveillance

In addition to propaganda, the telescreen is also the symbol of political surveillance in the novel. In *Discipline and Punishment* Foucault maintains that homo docilis, that is, the disciplined body exists everywhere in society, “docile one that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved and that this docile body can only be achieved through strict regiment of disciplinary acts” (*Discipline* 136). Starting from the notion of “docility,” he draws on a model prison designed by Jeremy Bentham as a metaphor for modern “disciplinary” societies. “The Panopticon” is an architectural figure which is designed to offer a constant surveillance of inmates from an “unseen” central observation point. After describing the details of the structure, he points out:

All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. (*Discipline* 200)

The Panopticon is resembled to a machine in a peripheric ring where the individuals are completely seen, without ever knowing if and when they are being watched. In the novel, the Ministries of the Party can be regarded as Panoptic devices. All four ministries use the Telescreen. The Ministry of Truth exploits the Telescreen to inform the population of recent events, mostly by means of the Ministry of Plenty or the Ministry of Peace. The Ministry of Love employs the Telescreens as surveillance. In

addition, similar to the towers in the Panopticon, the ministries are always visible in the landscape of Oceania. The architecture of these ministry buildings is described as follows:

The Ministry of Truth... was an enormous pyramidal structure of glittering white concrete, soaring up, terrace after terrace, three hundred metres into the air... Scattered about London there were just three other buildings of similar appearance and size. So completely did they dwarf the surrounding architecture that from the roof of Victory Mansions you could see all four of them simultaneously. (745)

Their structural visibility manifests their role in the Panoptic society, as visibility is the most typical characteristic of the Panopticon. The architecture of the ministries, then, is also an emblem of the Panoptic society.

5.2.1. The Panoptic Society

The Panopticon in Foucault's Panoptic society requires an explicit location and cells for the inmates. In his book *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault elucidates the function of the separation of the individuals from one another:

Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication. (200)

As Foucault states, "[the 'docile body'] is a subject of information, never a subject in communication." Similarly, in the novel, to be able to keep the citizens in a reticent state, the authority draws invisible boundaries between people and turns Oceania into a prison-like state. As revealed in the novel:

We have cut the links between child and parent, and between man and man, and between man and woman. No one dares trust a wife or a child or a friend any longer. But in the future there will be no wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one takes

egg from a hen. The sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will be an annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We shall abolish the orgasm... There will be no loyalty, except loyalty toward the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face-forever. (898)

The Party cuts the links between people. This separation leads to a sense of alienation from each other, and thus a general distrust is created. The people of Oceania turn into a “crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities” (Foucault, *Discipline* 201).

The relationship between people is revealed in Winston’s statement regarding Syme: “It was his friend Syme, who worked in the Research Department. Perhaps ‘friend’ was not exactly the right word. You did not have friends nowadays, you had comrades” (771). The people do not have any friends. Instead, they have comrades, a term symbolizing the ideology of Ingsoc. Winston’s dislike for women also demonstrates how the Party ideology instils the feelings of distrust among the citizens:

[Winston] disliked nearly all women, and especially the young and pretty ones. It was always the women, and above all the young ones, who were the most bigoted adherents of the Party, the swallowers of slogans, the amateur spies and nosers-out of orthodoxy. But this particular girl gave him the impression of being more dangerous than most. Once when they passed in the corridor she gave him a quick sidelong glance which seemed to pierce right into him and for a moment had filled him with black terror. The idea had even crossed his mind that she might be an agent of the Thought Police. (748)

When Winston and Julia manage to escape the city, Winston confesses to Julia his emotions of revulsion he felt towards her:

‘I hated the sight of you,’ he said. ‘I wanted to rape you and then murder you afterwards. Two weeks ago I thought seriously of smashing your

head in with a cobble stone. If you really want to know, I imagined that you had something to do with the Thought Police.’ (814)

This “particular girl,” Julia, to whom Winston distrusts first, becomes his girlfriend. The love affair between Winston and Julia, which is asserted as a positive value in the book, according to Bernard Crick, is “clumsy and shallow” (“Nineteen Eighty-Four: context and controversy” 151). Since sexual repression supports political orthodoxy, sexual intercourse outside the Party limitations can be associated with political freedom. The portrayal of this affair can be regarded as a political act, rather than an emotional relationship. The dialogue between Winston and Julia reveals the nature of their relationship:

Winston: Listen. The more men you’ve had, the more I love you. Do you understand that?

Julia: Yes, perfectly.

Winston: I hate purity, I hate goodness! I don't want any virtue to exist anywhere. I want everyone to be corrupt to the bones.

Julia: Well then, I ought to suit you, dear. I’m corrupt to the bones.

Winston: You like doing this? I don't mean simply me: I mean the thing in itself?

Julia: I adore it. (817)

As sex for personal pleasure is a crime, Winston considers their relationship as a corruption and therefore some kind of rebellion against the Party: “Not merely the love of one person, but the animal instinct, the simple, undifferentiated desire: that was the force that would tear the Party to pieces” (817).

5.2.2. Facecrime

In Bentham’s Panoptic system, without being able to know the presence of the observer, the inmates begin to act as if they are being watched in their cells. Similar to this system, in the novel, Orwell depicts how the people are watched by the Party:

There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live -- did live, from habit that became instinct -- in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized [...] It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or within range of telescreen. The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself -- anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having something to hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was announced, for example) was itself a punishable offence. (744, 779)

As there's no reason or excuse for committing thoughtcrime, which is criminal act of holding unspoken beliefs or doubts against the ruling party, "discipline becomes self-regulatory" (Downing 82) for the people. The fear of committing "facecrime," a "Newspeak" word indicating that a person is guilty of thoughtcrime based on their facial expression, causes the people to regulate their gestures as well as thoughts. Lisa Downing points out that panoptic system not only controls the whole body, but gestures and attitudes as well:

It is not a matter of controlling the whole body, but of delimiting and constraining gestures, motions, attitudes etc. These must be as efficient and economic as possible. The modality by which this control is achieved is one of a constant and unyielding influence exerted over the body: not in the crude form of enslavement or of feudalism, but in the subtle operation of modern power. (79)

Orwell writes of Winston's "look of grim enjoyment which was considered proper during the Physical Jerks" (761), Winston's efforts to remain "completely inscrutable. Never show dismay! Never show resentment! A single flicker of the eyes could give

you away” (764) and the tendency to “set his features into the expression of quiet optimism which it was advisable to wear when facing the telescreen” (745). These examples demonstrate Winston’s attempts to control his facial features so as to avoid facecrime.

5.2.3. Thoughtcrime and Guilt

In addition to the “facecrime,” the Party aiming to control the thoughts of the individuals, also invents “thoughtcrime.” “Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be concealed for ever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you” (753). The fear of committing thoughtcrime is revealed in Parsons’ dialogue with Winston,

Winston: Are you guilty?

Parsons: Of course I’m guilty! You don’t think the Party would arrest an innocent man, do you? Thoughtcrime is a dreadful thing, old man. It’s insidious. It can get hold of you without your even knowing it. Do you know what I’m going to say to them when I go up before the tribunal? “Thank you,” I’m going to say, “thank you for saving me before it was too late.” (877)

Even though Parsons has not committed any “crime,” he considers himself as guilty because of uttering “[d]own with the Big Brother!” (877) in his sleep. Furthermore, he is planning to say “[t]hank you for saving me” which indicates the heavy burden of his guilt. According to Freud, this sense of guilt stemming from the authority can be explained with the concept of super-ego. Freud posits the effect of the establishment of super-ego in *Civilization and Its Discontents*:

A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt. Even when a person has not actually done the bad thing but has only recognized in himself an intention to do it, he may regard himself as guilty. (122)

In this respect, the function of Big Brother is similar to Freud's super-ego. The super-ego is conditioned by civilization which "is built up upon renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction...of powerful instincts [such as sex and aggression]" (84). After explaining the fear of external authority, Freud explains the case of super-ego as follows:

But with fear of the super-ego the case is different. Here, instinctual enunciation is not enough, for the wish persists and cannot be concealed from the super-ego. Thus, in spite of the renunciation that has been made, a sense of guilt comes about. This constitutes a great economic disadvantage in the erection of a super-ego, or, as we may put it, in the formation of a conscience. (74)

Similar to Parsons, Winston is also aware the consequence of thoughtcrime. Harold Bloom explains this situation as follows:

Even when Winston writes, "to the future or to the past" he has no confidence that anyone in the future will read his diary or know freedom, truth, and sociability ever again; and he enters the foreboding words: "Thoughtcrime does not entail death: thoughtcrime is death." Orwell is clearly saying that once one gets into a totalitarian regime there is no way out, no hope through conspiracy or rebellion. (76)

This view, according to Bloom, is not far-fetched: "the Nazis were only defeated externally by war, and it is unlikely that Orwell would have believed that the death of Stalin meant the end of totalitarianism" (76). As Orwell clearly states, "[t]he moral to be drawn from this dangerous nightmare situation is a simple one: Don't let it happen. It depends on you" (*The Complete Works of George Orwell*134).

CONCLUSION

In this work, the political and psychological reasons for the society's submissiveness to the totalitarian ruling regime of the Party represented by Big Brother are analysed. Instead of focusing on the Repressive State Apparatuses in the novel, I explored the ideological and disciplinary mechanisms employed by the Party and

revealed how people are conditioned according to the norms and needs of the system beginning since childhood. In order to constitute individuals as subjects and make them act in conformity with what the Party offers, the ideological apparatuses of the ruling system exist in every aspect of the individuals' lives.

The world of Oceania in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is a perfect totalitarian society. In his essay "Literature and Totalitarianism" (1941), Orwell compares totalitarianism with all the orthodoxies of the past and manifests his concern over this new form of control:

Totalitarianism has abolished freedom of thought to an extent unheard of in any previous age. And it is important to realize that its control of thought is not only negative, but positive. It not only forbids you to express — even to think — certain thoughts, but it dictates what you shall think, it creates an ideology for you, it tries to govern your emotional life as well as setting up a code of conduct. And as far as possible it isolates you from the outside world, it shuts you up in an artificial universe in which you have no standards of comparison. The totalitarian state tries, at any rate, to control the thoughts and emotions of its subjects at least as completely as it controls their actions. (135)

As Orwell clearly manifests, new modern totalitarian states not only aim to control actions, but also manage to control the minds of citizens through a series of psychological and ideological methods. These states constitute an artificial universe, isolate the societies from the outside world and create an ideology to govern the residents' mental and emotional life. This situation can be clearly observed in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Oceania is isolated from rest of the world and the society lives under the principles set by the ideology of Ingsoc. To be able to keep the citizens in a reticent state, the authority "cut[s] the links between child and parent, and between man and man, and between man and woman" (898), draws invisible boundaries between people and thus turns Oceania into a prison-like state. In addition, Big Brother's posters spreading around the city and the caption beneath it "Big Brother is Watching You!" indicate the panoptic control system in the novel. As Winston states, "[t]here was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was

guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time” (744). Enclosed in the artificial universe formed by the Party, the residents of Oceania devote “every success, every achievement, every victory, every scientific discovery, all knowledge, all wisdom, all happiness, all virtue” (863) to the representative of the ideology of Ingsoc, Big Brother.

The Party not only forbids the citizens to express any discontent regarding the Big Brother but also dictates how to think. Hence, as well as punishing the Party dissents, the authority also creates the language of Newspeak and the idea of “doublethink” so as to regulate the citizens’ minds in favour of the Party ideology. Moreover, the social activities of the subjects; “hate week,” schools, “two minutes hate” are determined by the Party itself. As the Party agent O’Brien clearly manifests “[w]hatever the Party holds to be truth, is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party” (886). Hence, Oceania can be regarded as an artificial universe which is created by the social realities constituted under the dictatorship of the so-called leader, Big Brother.

At this point, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s theory of the “mirror stage” and his notion of “reality” offer a psychoanalytic way of exploring the “realities” of Oceania. “The real” according to Lacan, is the stage of original unity and wholeness between 0-6 months of age. As this stage is beyond the “symbolic order” and belongs to pre-imaginary phase, “the real,” for Lacan, is “what resists symbolization absolutely” (*Freud’s Papers* 104). This pre-linguistic stage, thus, can be assumed as a hard core that cannot be penetrated through language. The “mirror stage” takes place between 6-18 months of age. The infant looks in the mirror and realizes that it looks like how the other people, the representatives of the “big Other,” look like. Since the image, the “imago,” is the “the ideal of perfection that the ego strives to emulate” (“How to Read Lacan”), the infant invests its image narcissistically. “Facing his mirror image, the child misrecognizes himself ‘as king (all powerful, all seeing)’” (Felman 103). This identification “characterizes the ego in all its structures” (Lacan, *Écrits* 6). To become a part of the society, the infant enters into the system of language between 18 months to 4 years of age, accepts the rules and dictates of society and thus becomes a subject of the “symbolic order” or the “big Other,” which can be summarized as the linguistic,

ideological and cultural structures of the society. It is the origin of the fantasy world structuring subjects' lives. The "big Other," according to Žižek, can be defined as "the agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image. It watches over me and propels me to give my best, the ideal I try to follow and actualize" (How to Read Lacan). It is, in a sense, our own social made-up eye. Accordingly, the function of Big Brother's "eyes following you about" is analogous to Jacques Lacan's notion of "big Other." Big Brother in the novel can be regarded as an omniscient and omnipresent figure, the communal network of linguistic communication, social institutions and ideological conventions in Oceania. Since the linguistic system, as well as the social realities of Oceania; the subjects' jobs and social activities, are constituted by the Big Brother, citizens view themselves from the eyes of the "absolute power," and strive to be just as perfect as that reflection.

According to Orwell, a totalitarian state creates an ideology. In the novel, the ideology of Ingsoc, which consists of some "sacred principles," such as "Newspeak, doublethink, the mutability of the past" (757), is created by the Party itself. With regard to the functions of ideology, the French Marxist Louis Althusser underscores that the basic feature of all ideologies is that they "interpellate[s] individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject" (*Lenin* 181). In the novel, in order to implement the ideology of Ingsoc, the Party penetrates into citizens' life through a series of ideological state apparatuses in the name of Big Brother. Althusser's thesis that "[i]deology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (*Lenin* 155) refers to this interpellation process. In this regard, each ISA in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, in particular "the family," "the school" and "the media," has a crucial role in the reproduction of individuals as ideological subjects. Through the process of interpellation, the subjects internalize particular meanings, values and take up the identity which is already determined by the pre-existent social structures. Controlled by the Party at all levels of their life, the people of Oceania continue to live in the illusionary world constructed by the Party. This situation, as a result, creates robotic machines dedicated to whatever the authority holds as true. For example, Winston observes the demonstrations to thank Big Brother for raising the chocolate ration to twenty grammes a week and questions how people can easily be deceived by the authority: "[O]nly yesterday, he reflected, it had been announced that the ration was to

be reduced to twenty grammes a week. Was it possible that they could swallow that, after only twenty-four hours? Yes, they swallowed it” (777). This situation demonstrates that it is not the truth of events that concerns the residents of Oceania. Similarly, in his book *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Slavoj Žižek asserts that obedience to authority does not stem from the belief that the laws are just, good or beneficial. People obey the law “simply because it is the law” (35). According to Žižek, the acceptance of the authority as “infallible” and the laws of this figure as “necessary” prevent subjects from questioning the blatant lies of the authorities:

What is ‘repressed’ then, is not some obscure origin of the Law but the very fact that the Law is not to be accepted as true, only as necessary-but the very fact that its authority is without truth. The necessary structural illusion which drives people to believe that truth can be found in laws describes... [the] supposition of a Truth, of a [m]eaning behind the stupid, traumatic, inconsistent fact of the Law. (37)

The people do not question the incoherent aspects of “doublethink” or “Newspeak” and continue to believe the social reality constructed by the Party. Therefore, it can be asserted that what the subject assumes as “reality,” is, in fact, an imaginary world constituted by the dominant ideology.

To conclude, the reason why the majority of the society does not question the truth of the events has been examined from political and psychological aspects. It is revealed that since the social reality in the super-state Oceania is constructed by the ruling ideology itself, Big Brother’s position as an infallible figure is already accepted by people. Thus, locked in a vicious circle, the society sustains the “reproduction of the production relations” (Althusser, *Lenin* 83) and continues to live in an illusionary world.

NOTES

¹ Miguel López-Lozano, *Utopian Dreams, Apocalyptic Nightmares: Globalization in Recent Mexican and Chicano Narrative* (United States: Purdue UP, 2008) 17.

² Tanya Agathocleous, *George Orwell: Battling Big Brother* (New York: Oxford UP, 2000) 10.

³ Jacques Lacan. *Écrits London : A Selection*. (London: Routledge, 2001). 2-10

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