

**Women's Parliamentary Representation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechia: The
Role of Women's Mobilization on Representational Gains**

by

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Women's Mobilization on Representational Gains**

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I dedicate this work to women around to world who fight against gender inequality in various areas of life.

ABSTRACT

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Why does women's parliamentary representation have been increasing in Poland and Czechia, and not in Hungary? The average percentage of women in three decades of democratically elected parliaments is 16% in Poland and Czechia, while the average is 9,4% in Hungary. Currently, 22,5% and 28,7% of MPs are women in Polish and Czech (lower) parliaments, and only 12% of MPs are women in Hungary. Based on a Most Similar Systems Design, this research investigates the causes of this variation. I first conduct process tracing and statistical analysis to test the observable implications of four potential theories: electoral system, right-wing government, traditional gender attitudes, and women's lower interest in politics. I suggest that these theories do not adequately explain stagnant levels of women in Hungarian parliament. Then, by comparatively analyzing the processes that lead to a substantive increase in women's parliamentary representation in Poland (2001 and 2011) and Czechia (1996 and 2010), I find that women's mobilization within and outside of the parliament for more representation explain these representational gains. I present evidence that in Hungary, women MPs' parliamentary activism for more representation has not been prominent, and women's political representation has not been a prioritized issue for women's civil society organizations.

ÖZETÇE

Polonya, Macaristan ve Çekya’da Kadınların Parlamenter Temsili: Kadın Hareketinin Siyasi Temsil Kazanımlarındaki Rolü

Ayşenur Değer Yanık

Uluslararası İlişkiler, Yüksek Lisans

10 Ağustos 2020

Kadınların parlamenter temsili Polonya ve Çekya’da artarken Macaristan’da neden artmıyor? Orta ve Doğu Avrupa’da son 30 yıldır gerçekleşen demokratik seçimler Polonya ve Çekya parlamentosunda ortalama %16 kadın milletvekili üretirken, Macaristan’da ortalama %9,4 kadın milletvekili üretti. Son seçimlere göre, kadın temsilciler Polonya’da parlamentonun %22,5’i ve Çekya’da %28,7’sini oluştururken, Macaristan parlamentosundaki kadın temsilci oranı yalnızca % 12’dir.

Bu araştırma, En Benzer Sistem Tasarımına dayanarak bu varyasyonun nedenlerini araştırmaktadır. İlk olarak dört potansiyel teorelin gözlemlenebilir sonuçlarını test etmek için süreç izleme ve istatistiksel analizler yürütüyorum. Bu teoriler, seçim sistemi, sağcı hükümet, geleneksel toplumsal cinsiyet tutumları ve kadınların siyasete daha az ilgi duymasındır. Önce, bahsedilen dört teorelin Macar parlamentosundaki kadın temsilcilerin durağan oranını yeterince açıklamadığını gösteriyorum. Daha sonra, Polonya ve Çekya’da kadınların parlamento temsiliinde önemli bir artışa yol açan süreçleri karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz ederek, parlamento içindeki ve dışındaki kadın seferberliğinin bu temsili kazanımları açıkladığını buluyorum. Macaristan’da kadın milletvekillerinin kadınların siyasi temsiliini artırmaya yönelik partiler üstü koalisyon kurmakta başarısız olduğuna ve Macar kadın sivil toplum örgütleri için siyasi temsiliin öncelikli bir konu olmadığına dair kanıtlar sunuyorum.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
ESS	European Social Survey
SMD	Single Member District
PR	Proportional Representation

Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

Neither descriptive nor substantial representation of women in politics has advanced to the extent once predicted by scholars of democracy. As of 2019, world average (average of 264 countries) of women in national parliaments is 24%. More optimistic side of the picture is that globally, this number is a result of a rising trend. World average of women MPs was 12% twenty years ago, which means that it is doubled. From 1997 to 2019, the average percentage of women parliamentarians increased from 17% to about 32% in European Union member countries, from 4% to 16% in Middle East & North Africa, from 10% to 24% in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 6% to 19% in South Asia, from 16% to 20% in East Asia & Pacific, from 15% to 25% in North America and from 16% to 32% in Latin America. (World Bank Indicators, 2019)

Why do some countries show a stagnant performance in women's presence in national politics, contrary to the global and regional trends? More specifically, why does Hungary have a persistent male monopoly in national politics whereas Poland and Czechia do not? In Poland and Czechia, the average percentage of women MPs in all the democratic parliaments is 16%, while the average has been 9,4% in Hungary. (Table 1) Contrary to the gradual increase of women's ratio in the lower parliaments of Poland and Czechia, percentage of women MPs in Hungarian parliament has been consistently stagnant over the last three decades.

Table 1: % of women MPs in the (lower) parliament.

Hungary		Czech Republic		Poland	
1990	7,6	1990	10	1991	9,5
1994	11,1	1992	8,3	1993	13
1998	8,3	1996	15	1997	12
2002	9,9	1998	15	2001	20,2
2006	10,4	2002	17	2005	20,4
2010	9	2006	15,5	2007	20,4
2014	9,6	2010	22	2011*	23,7
2018	12 ⁺	2013	19,5	2015*	27,4
		2017	22,5	2019*	28,7
Average	9,8		16		16

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Archives

*Introduction of 35% legislative gender quota in Poland. The average of all elections including 2011 and 2015 parliamentary election is 18,4.

⁺ Electoral change in Hungary. Excluding 2018, it is 9,4%

The interpretation of these ratios' points to a divergent trend across the three countries. According to Dahlerup (2018), parliaments with women MPs under 10% constitutes a "male monopoly" whereas 10 to 25% make up a "small minority of women" in the parliament. (Table 2) Considering that current world average of women MPs in

national parliaments constitutes “a small minority of women”, Hungary’s divergence as a country with a “male monopoly” appears substantial.

Table 2: Categorization of gender distribution in parliaments.

Degree	Percentage of Women Elected
Male monopoly	< 10
Small minority of women	10 - 25
Large minority of women	25 - 40
Gender balance	40- 60

Source: Dahlerup (2018)

To answer this research question, I first conduct a controlled case comparison by employing most similar systems design. The three countries demonstrate commonalities in multiple criteria except for the dependent variable- percentage of female in the (lower) parliament. Then, I do process tracing to deductively test the observable implication of three theories regarding to women’s underrepresentation in the region. I test i) electoral system, ii) right-wing government, and iii) prevalence of traditional gender attitudes arguments. I suggest that these theories do not adequately explain the variation in women’s descriptive representation across the three cases. Furthermore, by using three

waves of European Social Survey Data (2002,2010,2018), I investigate whether being female has a stronger negative effect on political participation in Hungary compared to Poland and Czechia, and whether political interest as an attitude account for this. My statistical analysis does not produce evidence in line with these two potential explanations.

By investigating the political processes that lead to a substantive increase in women's parliamentary representation in Poland and Czechia, I find that women's mobilization for higher representation within and outside of the parliament explains the representational gains. When women MPs pressure political parties by building cross-party women's coalition (as in Polish parliament in 2001) and/or when women's organizations engage in advocacy for gender parity in the parliament (as in advance of 2010 election in Czechia and as in advance of 2011 election in Poland), women's legislative representation increases substantially. In Hungary, I find that women's organizations prioritize activism in welfare issues over representational gains in formal politics, and that women parliamentarians from different parties fail to act collectively.

In the cases of Poland and Czechia, one facilitator factor for increase in women's legislative representation was voters' ousting career politicians from the parliament. This can happen with extant political parties winning substantially more seats in the parliament (as in 1996 Czech lower parliament election), with the advent of new parties that oust the existing parties from the parliament (as in 2001 Polish election), or with changes in electoral rules (as in 2001 Polish and 2010 Czechian lower parliamentary elections). Hungarian parliament, on the other hand, had lowest turnover rates compared to other CEE parliaments, which means same individuals winning seats repeatedly.

I offer several explanations as to why women's collective action within and outside of the parliament for higher representation has been weaker in Hungary. One of these explanations is the mode of transition to democracy. The opportunities and constraints surrounded women during democracy's foundational times have implications for the future democratic political institutions' gender inclusivity. While the transition period witnessed the sprout of social movements in Poland and Czechia, Hungary's transition to democracy was rather elite-driven and pact-based. Advent of the opposition movements in Poland and Czechia created space for civil society and new actors, including women. As a result, the transition process in Hungary did not open space for civil society, and for women, as much as the Polish and Czechoslovakian transitions did. I investigate the similarities and distinctives of transition of democracy in Hungary and infer that Hungarian transition to democracy was gradual because of the 'goulash communism' under János Kádár. For challenges in cross-party collective action by women MPs, one of the other explanations I present in the paper, regards to the high polarization in the Hungarian parliament.

There is a rich literature on the gender aspect of Central and Eastern European countries' transition to democracy and market economy. This literature asks i) what has changed for women by the simultaneous transitions to democracy and a market economy, and ii) how women affected these transitions and following consolidation of the new polity. In terms of the inclusivity of these new democracies, researchers observed near absence of women in most national parliaments, especially in the initial democratic elections. This was a compelling puzzle for the first generation of post communism scholarship. Although state socialist programs for women's emancipation failed and arguably never prioritized sexual equality in the first place, there have been some positive

legacies for women from the socialist period. Increase in women's educational levels and opportunities for occupational training are the most significant areas of improvement. (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2018, p.218) These achievements in education turn out to be persistent in the democratic era as well. All three countries rank high on females' expected years of education in Human Development Data. (United Nations Development Program, 2018)

Despite the initial elections' poor performance in producing women parliamentarians, percentage of women MPs gradually increased in the region. The case of Hungary has been a very stable exception to this. However, the majority of studies in the literature including the most recent ones continue to approach Central and Eastern European countries as if they show homogenous trends in women's presence (and absence) in politics. (Chiva, 2018) (Galligan, Clavero, & Calloni, 2007) This research aims to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on country differences with a Most Similar Systems Analysis.

Chapter 2:

REPRESENTATION THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Representation is central to modern politics and democracy. Many questions have been asked about representation in the political philosophy literature, including the very definition of the term, and the opportunities and boundaries of it. Simply put, representation means to act on behalf of another. Putting aside the perennial philosophical question of the extent to which one individual might act as if she was someone else, political representation is argued to be a practical necessity of modern politics. For some,

political representation as opposed to direct citizen participation is not just necessary but also favorable. Positive normative approaches to political representation emphasizes the ordinary citizens' lack of information, expertise, and time to deploy in policy making.

Whether or not political representation is best justified as an organizational necessity or as a rational conduct of policy making, the act of representation is not a mere translation of the pronounced interests and demands of the citizens. Representation is best understood as a dynamic relationship between representatives and their constituents. (Ruedin, 2016) Representatives have their career concerns, personal characteristics, and political reflexes. They also have the institutional power to influence what citizens see as in their best interests, regardless of whether representatives have more information and expertise about the policies have they work on.

The two major types of representation that has been studied most are descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation is the formal representation of various social categories, characterized by gender, ethnicity, race, class and etc. (ibid) It looks at the scope of match between the demographic composition of the society and demographic composition of the parliament. In other words, it regards the extent to which legislatures mirror the population. Substantive representation, on the other hand, implies the representation of citizens' diverging issue positions, political views and policy preferences. Generally, these are measured by the political right and left spectrum. (ibid, p.16)

Representation literature is vibrant with shifts in the type of representation it focuses on. Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation* (1967) and Phillip's *Politics of Presence* (1995) are two canonical works that caused significant shifts in the representation literature. "Arguably, after Pitkin no one regarded descriptive representation as important, while after Phillips no one regarded it as unimportant."

(Childs and Lovenduski, 2013, p.2) While Pitkin argue that descriptive representation might cause characteristics of individuals and groups to receive more attention than policy making, Phillips point out to the dangers of excluding groups from policy making. The main assumptions in the descriptive representation logic is that i) social groups have distinct interests, ii) some social problems are only recognized and can be solved by representatives who directly or indirectly experiences it, iii) representatives do not endeavor for policies that they are not aware of their necessity.

Moreover, “critical mass” theory implies that there is a positive relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of women. Female legislators are more likely to substantially represent women (by promoting women-friendly policies) when their descriptive representation (their numeric existence) is higher than a symbolic percentage. (Childs & Krook, 2008) (Dahlerup, 1988) Because female legislators will be able to “grow from a few token individuals” when they reach a critical mass, which will increase their impact as a group in the parliament. (Childs & Krook, 2008, p.725) Empirically, however, the literature presents mixed results. While some scholars find that more women in parliament lead to more bills passed on women’s issues (Thomas, 1991) (Vega & Firestone, 1995), other scholars find no such effect (Towns, 2003) (Tremblay, 2005) and they pointed out to the factors that inhibit women acting as a group. Some of these are individual factors such as (in)experience in politics, whereas others are more systemic factors such as partisanship/party affiliation and electoral system. (Childs & Krook, 2008, p.733) Relatedly, critics of the critical mass theory proposes venues other than the parliament that can increase women’s political representation such as “women's policy agencies (such as women's commissions or women's bureaus) and women's social movements”. (Weldon, 2002, p.1153) Others emphasize the importance of “critical actors” in legislators instead of a “critical mass” (Childs & Krook, 2009)

This work dwells on descriptive representation for two reasons. Firstly, descriptive representation has symbolic value. Seeing role models in the parliament can motivate young individuals from underrepresented groups to run for office (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006) which can create parliaments that are more reflective of the society. Secondly, I see theoretical merit in a positive relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Definitions of “women’s issues” contextually varies from one country to another. This is one of the reasons that research on the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation present mixed results. Moreover, women’s descriptive political representation in Hungary is not just lower than the world average, it is rather at a frozen level that implies structural underlying reasons. Percentage of female members of the parliament was never over 11% until 2018 elections, which demonstrates a representation deficit in the three decades long democratic period.

Theoretically and empirically, the possibilities and boundaries of the collective action by marginalized groups remain to be one of the crucial issues in democratic politics. Do women have distinct interests? What kind of obstacles socio-economic, ethnic, racial, sexual, ideological, and religious differences among female legislators pose for their collective action? Do women in parliaments share the social background of the women they *represent*? What degree of demographic association between representative and represented is necessary for political representation to work? Intersectionality theory, for instance, points out to the multidimensionality of social identities (gender, race and class), impossibility in identify a hierarchy among them, and reminds the multilayered sources of discrimination and oppression. “In some cases, extant research shows, women acting *as women* dominate or exclude other women; women have conflicting interests as women; women do not mutually identify as women.” (Weldon, 2006, p.237) For instance, was the suffragette movement in United States representing *all* women? The movement

achieved its goal, the right to vote, for white women only. Black women had to wait for four more decades.

As the intersectionality approach suggest, it is difficult to parse out the various sources of oppression based on social identities from each other. However, this does not mean that gender does not have an independent role in social life. Intersectionality is not the only way that gender class, race and ethnicity interact with each other. According to the Weldon's (2006) *intersectionality -plus* approach, there can be additive, multiplicative as well as intersectionality effects of gender, race, and class. (p.244) This approach gives more space for comparative analysis. It allows the possibility that "the ways that social structures affect one another vary over space and time... Some axes might be more salient or politicized in some contexts than in others." (ibid.) The gap between men's and women's political representation points out to the salience of gender in the Eastern European context, where societies are ethnically and racially highly homogenous.

I would like to acknowledge my positionality in this academic work. I am a women comparative politics scholar who has been observing women's political representation deficit in her home country as well, Turkey. While avoiding talking on behalf of Eastern European women, I investigate the structural reasons of women's political underrepresentation there. Research on a country by an "outsider" has several advantages such as ideological distance from the domestic political cleavages and not having certain interests and affinities that can potentially affect researcher's objectivity.

What are the predictors of variation in women's descriptive representation in parliaments? Women's political representation literature offers many explanations for the variations in the degree to which women are represented in politics. These include economic, cultural, and institutional factors. While economic factors focus on countries'

development levels, cultural factors emphasize the role attitudes on gender roles. (Matland, 1998) Institutional factors contain the role of electoral systems (McAllister & Studlar, 2002), party systems (Roberts, 2006) and gender quotas (Krook, 2009). These factors are not mutually exclusive. Especially economic development and societal gender attitudes seem to be closely correlated. Moreover, these explanations are too broad to produce meaningful implications for small n cross country comparisons where the countries have similar economic development levels and similar value orientations regarding gender. In Table 3, I show that these broad structural factors are common across three countries, which makes a Most Similar Systems Design favorable.

Middle ground approaches to women's legislative representation suggest that women are likely to be more represented in countries where women have more civil rights. Some of the operationalizations of women rights involve years passed since women's suffrage and the status of abortion rights. Others look at whether the country is signatory of international covenants on gender equality. Earlier research did not find a significant effect of abortion rights, (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999) (Arpad & Marinovich, 1995) (Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007, p.927) and being a signatory of international covenants (Paxton, 1997). Years since suffrage, however, correlates with the variation on women's legislative representation among three countries. Percentage of women increased in Polish and Czechian parliaments throughout the three decades of democracy, whereas in Hungary, it has been around 10%, consistently. Women achieved full suffrage latest in Hungary: While women's full suffrage become the law after World War I in Poland (1918) and Czechoslovakia (1920), Hungarian women achieved full suffrage after World War II, in 1945. (Acsády,2009) All three attempts for women's suffrage, in 1905, in 1908, and in 1913, failed to pass in the parliament. (Arpad & Marinovich, 1995, p.84)

Although a correlation exists, it is difficult to extrapolate more on this historical divergence. Theoretically, it is possible that women are highly represented in legislative politics despite late introduction of full suffrage. Empirically, Switzerland would be a country example for such a phenomenon. Despite the introduction of full suffrage as late as in 1971 in Switzerland, women's percentage in the parliament improved rather quickly. In 2001, women constituted about a quarter, 23%, of the parliament and 28,5% in 2011. As of 2019, women constitute 41.5% of the parliament members, which places the country at top ranks in 'women in national parliaments' lists. (World Bank Indicators, 2019) (Inter-Parliamentary Union)

Moving from country level analysis to actor level analysis, the literature tends to follow the supply & demand model. (Randal,1982) (Norris,1997). While supply side research looks at women's skills, efficacy, interest for politics and the conditions under which women are more (less) likely to enter politics, demand side research looks at the gatekeeping role of political parties. Supply side research suggest that women are more likely to enter politics when women have more resources, such as education, money, time, psychic space (Burns et al., 2009), support in housework and care, and encouragement (Fox & Lawless, 2004). Relatedly, scholars theorized that women are more likely to participate to politics when they participate to the labor force, since labor force participation is likely to improve skills, confidence and provide various resources such as network. (Stockemer & Byrne, 2012) (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008)

Demand side research focuses on the role of political parties. What makes political parties more likely to select women candidates? Scholars argued for party ideology (being on the left of the ideology spectrum), decision-making being central or loose (in other words, organizational structure), and the degree of institutionalization in the recruitment process. Theoretically, a centralized decision making within the political

parties might work better for women's representation since decision makers might feel more under pressure to select women to the lists. (Norris & Lovenduski, 1994) Also, parties with high institutionalization tend to have more clear rules and procedures regarding candidacy, which would make the process easier for aspirant candidates. Caul (1999) puts forward two additional factors, existence of women party activists and gender-related candidate rules. I find in my research that women's party activism is crucial in gathering cross-party support for steps toward more women in the parliament. Gender related candidate rules, as Caul (1999) maintains, tend to be a function of party ideology. Parties on the left are more likely to have party list quotas and more likely to have a separate women's caucuses. I show that, this expectation holds true in three countries under study in this work.

The literature on women's political representation in Central and Eastern Europe employ most of the women's legislative representation theories and approaches discussed above. The literature on CEE seems to agree that women's movements in the democratic period have been "weak" in the region. (Matland & Montgomery, 2005) (Chiva 2018) This implies that social movements including women's movements in CEE are recent, fractured, and not able appeal to broad segments of their societies. I observe that comparative politics researchers tend to take this observation for granted, which leads a disregard of (the achievements of) women's movements in CEE (and in other similar countries) as a nonsignificant avenue of research. Women's movements being weak(er) in one region compare to another does not mean that the former is insignificant and ineffective. Yet, there is limited number of studies in comparative women & gender studies literature that investigate women's movements in CEE. I show in this research that women's parliamentary activism and women's mobilization in the civil society brought change in improving women's legislative representation in Poland and Czechia.

In Hungary, I find that women MPs' attempt to have a parliament with gender parity did not succeed because of the lack of cross-party coalition among women MPs. In civil society, women's organizations in Hungary do not seem to prioritize women's empowerment in formal politics.

Other explanations regarding to the women's underrepresentation in the region are cultural factors (such as prevalence of traditional gender perspectives) (Tremblay & Galligan, 2005, p.30-31) (Galligan, Clavero, & Calloni, 2007, p.146), and weakness of civil society and women's movements (Gal & Kligman, 2000) (Chiva,2018). These two are among the most professed causes of women's underrepresentation in the region. The institutional explanations, again, include the role of election systems and party systems. (Matland & Montgomery, 2005) (Olson & Ilonszki, 2011). Party ideology and right-wing party success is another explanation regarding to women's depressed descriptive representation. (Chiva, 2005) (Matland & Montgomery, 2005) For the case of Hungary, party ideology and election system arguments are prevalent. (ibid) Hungary has mixed electoral system that has majoritarian tendency (ibid) whereas Poland and Czechia have proportional representation (PR) election systems. Interesting enough, some contend that women's representation in the Czech and Polish lower parliaments stayed low due to their electoral system, even though women's descriptive representation has been increasing in the two parliaments. High number of districts and low district size (as in Czechia) yield a small number of MPs from each district. Since women are more likely to be placed at the lower ranks, PR with these characteristics are not as likely to have a substantial positive impact on women's election. (Tremblay & Galligan, 2007) Moreover, "despite their consensus design, electoral systems in Eastern Europe seem to act in a majoritarian manner, with large parties receiving a considerable bonus in seat allocation."(Roberts, 2006, p.42)

I show in Table 3 below that I control for most of the factors discussed above, that could potentially influence women's legislative representation. I investigate election system, right wing political party, traditional gender attitudes arguments further to show that they are inadequate in explaining the Hungarian case.

Chapter 3:

RESEARCH DESIGN

Three cases examined in this work is selected based on Mill's method of disagreement or most similar systems design. The analysis across cases is an example of most different systems analysis because the three countries demonstrate commonalities in multiple criteria except for the dependent variable, percentage of female in the parliament. Controlled case comparisons are indispensable for political science research because they can generate both internal and external validity when they "i) craft arguments with general variables or mechanisms, ii) seek out representative variation, and iii) select cases that maximize control over alternative explanations." (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013, p.1301) For comparative politics subfield specifically, internal validity corresponds to "the validity of a causal argument within a case" whereas external validity refers to the validity of a causal argument "beyond a single case." (ibid., p.1305-1306) This work also benefits from "deductive theory testing side of process tracing" by examining whether the observable implications of earlier theories regarding to women's political representation in Eastern Europe explains the variation in cases. (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p.7) Table 3 below makes the case for three countries' constituting a most similar systems design.

Table 3: Most Similar Systems Analysis: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic.

Potentially causally relevant variables	Hungary	Poland	Czech Republic
Geography	Central and Eastern Europe/ Visegrad countries		
Post-communist states	yes	yes	yes
Political regime type (Freedom House, 2018)	2,5 (free)	1,5 (free)	1 (free)
EU membership	yes	yes	yes
Electoral system	Mixed (with a PR tier)	PR	PR
Legislative gender quota?	no	(until 2011) no	no
Women in top 25 companies' executive boards (The V4 Revue, 2016)	8,6%	6,4%	9,6%
GDP/capita, in thousands (World Bank, 2017)	\$16	\$16	\$23
Gini index (World Bank, 2015)	30,4	31,8	25,9
Dominant religion	Catholicism	Catholicism	Catholicism
<i>DV: proportion of seats held by women in (lower) parliament, average</i>	9,8%	16%	16%

Historically, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic i) were a part of Austria-Hungarian empire and then of Soviet space with state socialist regimes, ii) transitioned from socialism to market economy with a shrink in welfare state, iii) become EU members between 2003 and 2004 and relatedly, they observed the same conditionalities on closing the gender gap in politics by establishing enabler institutions throughout the process and aftermath of membership, iv) were the successful cases of European integration and democratization in the post-communist world until the recent rise of populism, v) share the same dominant religion, Catholicism. (see Table 3) Compared to the Western European countries, the three countries vi) share a conservative value orientation regardless of the differences in religiosity levels, vii) have majority of their societies hold traditional perception of gender roles, (Galligan, Clavero, & Calloni, 2007) viii) civil society in general and women's movements in particular are weak (Matland and Montgomery (2005), ix) because of the "flattened society" of communism, there is lack of clear social cleavages in politics (Linz & Stephan, 1996) and x) they have volatile party systems. (Semenova, Edinger & Best, 2015) Despite of all these similarities that potentially influence women's political participation, why does the Hungarian case diverge from Poland and Czechia? The theoretical reason for expecting a positive trend in women's political representation is that democracies tend to promote gender equality.

Earlier research measured gender attitudes with religiosity levels. Paxton & Kunovich (2003) suggest that public's "gender ideology" is a more direct measure of societal attitudes than proxies like religion and religiousness levels. Therefore, I operationalize social attitudes toward gender with more direct measures such as the opinion about women in leadership positions. Even if societal attitudes on gender is

operationalized by religiosity levels across the three countries, it does not provide a correlation in the expected direction. One would expect Hungarian society to be the most religious and Polish society to be the least, if women's parliamentary representation is expected to be lowest in societies with traditional value orientation. Contrary to expectation, belief in God is 59% in Hungary, 86% in Poland, and 29% in Czechia as of 2016. (Pew Research Center, 2017) If I operationalize religiosity as weekly church attendance, Hungary becomes located at the bottom with 12% whereas Czechia would be at the middle with 22% and Poland at the top with 45%. (ibid) That is, religiosity levels do not correlate with women's parliamentary representation levels across the three countries, though there might be such a correlation when higher number of countries is considered.

Chapter 4:

TESTING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

4.1 Electoral System & Right-Wing Government Arguments

The electoral system difference between Hungary (mixed) and Poland (PR) Czech Republic (PR) does not seem to account for the male monopoly in Hungarian parliament. Until 2014, Hungary's mixed electoral system was based on three tiers: single-member districts (majoritarian tier), multi-member districts with a regional list (the proportional tier) and a national compensatory list. Until 2014, the elections system worked liked this: 176 mandates were coming from 176 SMDs in two rounds vote, and the other mandates were either coming from the 20 regional closed PR lists or from the closed compensation national list. (Tremblay, 2012, p.213) The maximum number of regional list mandates is 152. The remaining 58 comes from the national list. Voters cast one ballot in SMD (for

an individual candidate) and one ballot for the party list in their PR district; they do not vote for the national list. The function of the national list is to allocate the remaining seats based on aggregated votes from SMD and regional list. (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2008, p.235) The rule for parties being able to establish a regional PR lists is to have at least two SMD candidates in that region. For parties to establish a national list, they need to

have established regional lists in at least 7 of the 20 PR regions. Moreover, parties cannot receive seats either from regional or from national list unless they receive at least 5% of the votes from the nationwide regional list. (ibid) These rules constraints small parties' entry to the parliament.

On average, the SMD tier produced 6,2%, and MMD tier produced 10,7% and national list produced 13% women MPs in the democratic elections starting from 1990 to 2014. (Table 4) The difference in percentage of women that each tier produced is in line with the theory that proportional representation is more conducive to the election of women and minorities. But even the proportional tier produced 10,7% on average, only 4,5% more than the SMD tier's average. The compensatory national list producing more women MPs in 1990,1994,2010, and 2014 elections makes sense when considering that parties only nominated a few women candidates in first democratic elections (not just in Hungary, but in most of the post-communist Europe) and given that right-wing FIDESZ won the two-third majority of the seats in both 2010 and 2014 elections. The compensatory national list producing more women compare to the other two tiers in these elections mean that parties that entered the parliament placed most of their female candidates at the lower ranks of the party lists.

Table 4: Women's representation in Hungarian mixed electoral system – % of women elected from each tier.

Year	Singlemember districts (SMDs)	Multi-member districts (MMDs) - regional list	Compensation National list
	%	%	%
1990	3,4	6,7	15,6
1994	8,5	12,8	14,1
1998	6,9	10,2	8,5
2002	7,4	11,4	8,6
2006	8,5	13	10,9
2010	5,1	10,3	17,2
2014	3,8	—*	16,1
Average	6,2	10,7	13

Source: (Chiva, 2018, p.105)

*Electoral system reform.

The election systems literature presents evidence in line with the theory that outside of Western Europe, PR systems and mixed electoral system (arguably a combination of the 'bests of the majoritarian and plurality election systems) do not enable the election of women and ethnic minorities as much as it does in Western Europe. (Moser, 2001) In CEE, although most countries including Poland and Czechia have PR

election systems with consensus design, the electoral systems act like majoritarian election systems in providing significant bonuses to big parties in seat allocation. (Roberts, 2006)

Mathland and Montgomery (2005) point out to the two features of the Hungarian mixed electoral system that makes it majoritarian. Firstly, with the low party magnitude (inability of parties to produce a high number of MPs from a district, because of small size of counties and the excess number of political parties) the MMD tiers with regional lists “become de facto SMDs”. Secondly, the prevalent practice of “dual or even triple listings” enables party gatekeepers to place same candidate in more than one tier of the electoral system. (Tremblay, 2012) Based on these two features of the electoral system, the authors argue that Hungary’s electoral system has a “hidden majoritarianism” .(Matland & Montgomery, 2005, p.110-112). However, the electoral system argument is only one of the three variables that they suggest in explaining female underrepresentation in politics, the other two being the weak mobilization of women and resurgence of right. Illonzki (2012) also argues that electoral system by itself does not explain why democratic consolidation did not facilitate women’s entry to the parliament. She argues that electoral system has been “used and abused” by the politicians in the wider inhibitor systemic context. (In Tremblay, p.221)

Similar to Mathland and Montgomery (2005), Ilonzki (2012) points out to the role of the right’s resurgence especially with FIDESZ after 2010. The table below shows the number and percentage of women parliamentarians until 2010 election. The table demonstrates that left-wing parties tend to have more women parliamentarians then the right-wing parties. For instance, as two old parties, MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party)

had more women parliamentarians than right wing FIDESZ across all the democratically elected parliaments in Hungary.

Table 5: The number and percentage of female MPs in Hungary, by party, 1990–2010.

Party	1990		1994		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
MDF	8	4.8	6	15.8	1	5.9	1	4.2	1	9.8	--	--
SZDSZ	8	8.5	11	15.7	3	12.5	2	10	2	10	--	--
MSZP	5	15.1	22	10.5	14	10.4	23	12.9	25	13.1	5	8.5
FIDESZ	2	9.1	1	5	10	6.7	9	5.5	11	7.8	20	8.8
KDNP	1	4.7	1	4.5	--	--	--	--	2	8.7	2	5.4
FKGP	3	6.8	2	7.7	3	6.2	--	--	--	--	--	--
MIÉP	--	--	--	--	1	7.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Jobbik	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	6.4
LMP	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	31.2
Total	28	7.3	43	11.1	32	8.3	35	9.1	41	10.6	35	9.1

* The sum is 28 for reason of an additional independent female MP.

Note: Bold: parties in government.

Party names: MDF _ Hungarian Democratic Forum; SZDSZ _ Alliance of Free Democrats, Liberal Party;

MSZP _ Hungarian Socialist Party; FIDESZ _ Alliance of Young Democrats, Hungarian Civic Association;

KDNP _ Christian Democratic People's Party; FKGP _ Independent Smallholders Party; MIÉP _ Party of

Hungarian Justice and Life; LMP _ Politics Can Be Different; Jobbik _ For the Right Hungary.

Source: (Tremblay, 2012, p.215)

However, even though FIDESZ and other right wing parties such as KDNP place less women in winnable positions and as a result had significantly less women its ranks compared to leftist parties in Hungary, there has not been a significant drop or jump as a result of government (and government ideology) change in the Hungarian parliament. For instance, Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) held the government after 1994, 2002 and

2006 elections. Yet, the percentage of women in the parliament stayed around 10% (11,1%, 9,9% and 10,4% respectively). “After 1994, when the Left regained its political space, the number of female MPs in the MSZP only minimally increased while more recently the party failure went in tandem with the deselection of women.” (Tremblay, 2012, p.214)

4.2 Gender Attitudes Argument

Despite their communist past, Hungarian, Polish and Czech societies hold traditional gender norms. One of the prevalent demand side arguments in the literature for female underrepresentation in politics has been about “culture”. Dominance of traditional gender role stereotypes has been argued to lie to at the heart of the problem of representation deficit. (Galligan, Clavero, & Calloni, 2007, p.146) (Tremblay & Galligan, 2005, p.30-31) However, value surveys conducted in the three countries (2008) demonstrate strikingly similar views on gender roles. In terms of the societal value orientation on gender issues, Hungary does not substantially differ from Poland and Czech Republic which could have potentially account for female underrepresentation if Hungarian society was more conservative than the other two societies. Table 6 below indicates responses that agrees with the statement “Man make better political leaders than women do”, which has been one of the conventional statements used in public opinion surveys to measure attitudes about women in politics.

Table 5 : “Men make better leaders than women do”, % of agreeing.

	Mid 1990s			2005		
	Women	Man	Total	Women	Man	Total
Hungary	45	55	49	40	53	45
Poland	46	57	51	32	51	40
Czech Rep.	43	56	47	44	57	50

Source: World Value Survey (1990s) and Eurobarometer Survey (2005) (as cited in Galligan, Clavero and Calloni, 2007, p.66) Percentages are rounded by the author.

Table 7 also shows the similarity of responses to the statement “A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children”, which posits another evidence about the shared value orientations on gender roles across the three countries.

Table 6 : “A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children”, % of agreeing.

	1990		2008	
	Women	Man	Women	Man
Hungary	72	81	64	68
Poland	87	89	67	70
Czech Rep.	82	85	68	74

Source: (The European Value Study as cited in Chiva, 2018, p.67)

The findings from the last round of the World Value Surveys discussed above was from 2008. According to the Life in Transition Survey III, conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2017, attitudes about female leadership did not change much in Hungary in the last decade. Respondents who agreed with the statement, “Men make better political leaders than women do”, is 40% for women and 44% for man. This survey does not involve Czech Republic but responses in Poland shows interesting results. Responses to the same statement (percentage of responses who agrees that “man make better political leaders than women”) drop significantly to less than 10% for women and man in 13 years. (Life in Transition Survey, 2017) Polish parliament adopted a legislated female quota (35%) in 2011. Thus, changes in survey responses and adaptation of a legislative gender quota seems to indicate a transformation in attitudes towards women’s participation in politics. This transformation itself is a part of the dependent variable (percentage of female representatives in parliament) and it supports the argument that there is a variation between the three cases. However, as mentioned before, public opinion surveys find a similar distribution on gender attitudes in Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic in 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, attitudes on women’s political participation do not vary until 2010s and they were consistently more traditional compared to Western Europe.

Does the female underrepresentation in Hungarian politics stem from voters’ persistent preference to elect male representatives? Since Hungarian, Polish and Czech societies are similar in their value orientation on gender issues, levels of societal demand (or lack of demand) for more women in politics should be similar. One way to measure if voters have a bias against female candidates is to look at whether open candidate lists

decreases the likelihood of women's election because voters might choose candidates who have male names over female names. Chiva (2018) founds that open candidate list does not have a negative effect on the election of female candidates in Poland and Czech Republic. (p.76-77) This finding does not directly speak for the Hungarian case, which has closed list mixed electoral system. However, it implies that voters might not have prioritized male candidates if Hungarian parliamentary election had open list system. In fact, Hungary having a closed list system tells that voters cannot vote based on candidates' sex, they rather vote for parties, which weakens the argument for voters not preferring female candidates in the ballot box.¹

4.3 Supply Side Argument

Does the female underrepresentation in Hungarian politics stem from women's lack of interest in politics? I find that such an argument does not explain women's representation deficit in Hungary.

One way to investigate supply side dynamics in Hungary is to look at women's candidacy in parliamentary elections. Women's ratio in the aggregate candidacy pool for the Hungarian parliamentary elections grow more and more through the last three decades. Table 8 demonstrates that there is a continuous increase of women's ratio in the candidacy pool. It raised from 9% (1999) to 14% (1998), and to 19% (2000). One fourth of the aggregate candidates were women in 2014 parliamentary election. Even though the percentage of women candidates has been increasing in Hungarian parliamentary

¹ Having said that, it is possible for parties to refrain from placing female candidates in winnable positions because of the fear that electorate might not want a female representative, which might lead parties to lose votes.

election, this did not translate to higher percentage of women in the parliament. There are multiple ways to interpret this aggregate candidacy data. This data does not contain information on the distribution of women candidates by parties. Firstly, the fact that women's ratio in the parliament do not increase might mean that parties that nominate more women than before are the ones that could not enter the parliament. Secondly, even if women are nominated by the parties that enter the parliament, they might be placing the women candidates to lower positions in the electoral list. Furthermore, the parties that do nominate more women and do enter the parliament might be entering the parliament with few seats. In short, Table 6 shows that women are more willing to enter the parliament, but parties do not seem as willing.

Table 7: % of women candidates in Hungarian parliamentary elections.

Election years	Female Candidate
	%
1990	9
1994	11,5
1998	14,2
2002	17,8
2006	16,7
2010	19,2
2014	25,5*
2018	26,8*

Source: (Várnagy, 2013, p.6)

**Source: International Parliamentary Union*

Another way to investigate whether supply side factors are explanatory for Hungarian case is to look at political interest by gender. Are Hungarian women less interested in politics compare to Polish and Czechian women?

Gender gap in political interest is a cross regional phenomena. It largely stems from gender stereotyping of occupations in the society. Other explanations regard the childhood political socialization, adult political socialization (in work, civil society, and family) and social psychological attitudes such as gender gap in internal political efficacy and gender gap in confidence in political knowledge. Research finds that for young

women to see more women role models positively affect their psychological engagement. Wolbrecht & Campbell (2007) find that young women are more likely to discuss politics and adolescent women are more likely to discuss and participate in politics when there are more female members of parliament. If I apply this finding to the Hungarian case, I can hypothesize that women in Hungary might be less interested in politics because they do not see a place for themselves when they look at the gender composition of the parliament. I find it significant to recognize the circular effect of having a male monopoly in politics. Male monopoly tends to perpetuate itself, and one reason for this path dependency is women getting discouraged when they see that politics does not have a space for them.

To address this hypothesis that women in Hungary might be less interested in politics compare to women in Poland and Czechia, I first look at the European Value Study data collected on the 1990 and 2008. Table 9 below shows gender gap in political interest across the three countries.

Table 8 : How interested would you say you are in politics: % of responses for “very interested” and “somewhat interested”.

	1990		2008	
	Women	Man	Women	Man
Hungary	44	60	34	43
Poland	35	65	30	51
Czech Rep.	67	81	35	53

Then, I examine the relation between political interest and gender by using European Social Survey Data (2018). I find that women tend to report lower levels of interest in politics, again, not just in Hungary, but in Poland and Czechia too. (see Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3)




Figure 1: Political Interest by Gender in Hungary, ESS 2018




Figure 2 : Political Interest by Gender in Poland, ESS 2018




Figure 3: Political Interest by Gender in Czechia, ESS 2018

To further investigate the supply side argument, I investigate whether gender has a statistically significant negative effect on political participation. I approach political participation as a spectrum. Voting, for instance, would be at the lowest point of the spectrum given that the cost and motivation is minimal in voting compare to other types of political participation such as protest. Running for political office is a type of political participation as well, located at highest end of the spectrum. Approaching women's underrepresentation in the parliament from the supply angle requires the question of why women do not run for political office (or why few women run for political office). The literature presents many arguments. Running for political office requires resources such as money, time, network, and encouragement as well as high levels of psychological engagement with politics. Research finds that women's internal political efficacy is lower, and women is less confident about their knowledge on politics. In addition to the institutional barriers and political parties' gatekeeping role, the traditional division of labor in household, gender stereotypes about occupations, and the minority status of women in politics make running for office more costly for women compare to man.

To understand the Hungarian case from the supply side, it would be ideal to have survey data on a sample consist of women who are eligible to run for office in terms of their education, occupation, and age. I would then compare the observations from three countries. In the absence of such data, I investigate whether there is a gender gap in other types of political participation by using European Social Survey Data (2018,2010,2002). I stop at 2002 survey because it is the oldest survey conducted by European Social Survey Research Infrastructure. If I find that being female negatively predicts political participation in Hungary, and not in Poland and Czechia, I could infer that supply side factors might matter more in Hungary than in Poland and Czechia.

Using European Social Survey Data, I first investigate whether there is a statistically significant association between gender and political participation by Pearson's chi-square test. I operationalize political participation as an additive index that contains six types of participation: voting, protesting, wearing campaign badge, contacting a politician, posting about politics online, and working in a political party.² Then, I compare the Pearson's chi-square test results across three countries and three European Social Survey waves (2018, 2010 and 2002). In 2018 data, I find that gender does not have a statistically significant association with political participation in none of the case countries. In 2010 and 2002 data, I find that gender is statistically significantly associated with political participation in Poland and Czechia, but not in Hungary. This is rather surprising. Given the male monopoly in national politics, one would expect the association to be significant in Hungary, and not necessarily in the other two cases. In the second step of the analysis, I build three linear regression³ models by progressive adjusting the first model. I test three questions across three countries: i) does gender negatively predicts political participation, ii) does political interest mediate the effect of gender on political participation and iii) does gender and political interest interactively effect political participation. To avoid snapshot fallacy, I analyze European social survey data from three waves (2018, 2010 and 2002). The regression tables on the 2018 data is presented in the paper, and the tables on 2010 and 2002 data is presented in the appendix.⁴

² The survey questions related to political participation ask whether the respondents did these acts in the past 12 months. The response options are dummies – yes or no. Only 2018 survey asks the respondents about their online political participation behavior. Thus, the additive index does not include the online political participation measure in 2010 and 2002 data.

³ Since my dependent variable is a political participation score from 0 to 6, I used linear regression instead of ordered logit, even though the dependent variable is not perfectly continuous.

⁴ The 2002 survey lacks income data on Hungary. Nevertheless, the regression analysis across three countries by using 2002 ESS survey is available at the appendix. The analysis on Hungary lacks the income variable, whereas the Poland and Czechia do not.

The first regression model, which I called the resource model, tests the effect of gender on political participation while controlling for education, income, and age. The regression output of this model demonstrates mixed results. For the case of Hungary, being female seem to negatively affect political participation, but this effect is not consistent across the three waves of survey data. The (negative) effect of gender is statistically significant only in 2018 data whereas 2002 data shows positive (and not significant) effect. In the case of Poland, I find consistent negative and significant effect of gender on political participation in in all three waves of the ESS survey data. In Czechia, I find that being female negatively contributed to political participation in 2002 and 2010 data, but it turned to a positive effect in the 2018 data (albeit not significant). Overall, I do not find consistent evidence that gender effects political participation negatively only in Hungary. The only consistent negative and significant effect of being female on political participation is in the Polish case.

The second model, called the attitude model, incorporates political interest to the resource model. Adding political interest to the model significantly improves R^2 , or the explanatory power of the independent variables. Political interest is a positive and significant predictor of political participation across all three cases and all three waves of survey data. Except in the case of Czechia, incorporating this political attitude to the model sweeps the significant effects of gender on participation. In other words, gender becomes an insignificant predictor of political participation once a core attitude such as political interest is included in the model. This is intuitive, given that sex is a broad category and there is a vast variation in factors related to political participation within women as a group or within men as a group. One's gender alone does not say much about one's political participation behavior. However, research also shows that gender and some of the political attitudes are endogenous: women tend to declare lower levels of interest

in politics than man or tend to have lower confidence in their political knowledge. To investigate if different levels of political interest effect political participation differently for females, I include an interaction term to the model. Political interest is operationalized as a 4-category ordinal variable that spans from “not at all interested in politics” to “very interested in politics”. The reference categories in this model is “not at all interested” and “male”.

In the third model, or the interaction model, I find that levels of political interest do not affect women’s political participation differently than man in Poland and Czechia. The interaction terms do not have a statistically significant effect on political participation in the two cases. The case of Hungary demonstrates interesting results. In 2010 and 2018 survey data, women’s higher levels of political interest seem to have a statistically significant *negative* effect on their political participation, compare to women who declare low level of political interest. This is counterintuitive. There might be many explanations regarding this negative effect. For instance, high levels of (declared) political interest might be correlated with higher participation to civic activities (such as volunteering to associations), which could mean less time to spend on political participation. This kind of effect is likely to be more salient among women, given the traditional household division of labor. Alternatively, other political attitudes might also explain this negative effect. Women who declare higher levels of political interest might be more cognizant of the gender disparity in politics and might resent the political system more than others. I have presented some qualitative evidence on Hungarian women in civil society organizations shunning away from formal politics. Regardless of all potential explanations, the negative effect of high political interest can be explained with variables that is not included in my models. My regression analysis demonstrates that i) being women negatively effects political participation in not just in Hungary but in all three

cases, ii) gender ceases to be a significant predictor of political participation when political interest as an attitude is incorporated to the model except in Czechia (2018 and 2002), and iii) lower levels of political interest do not effect political participation of women more than man across the three countries.

To illustrate the last point better, I demonstrate the predictive margins of gender and predictive margins of gender and political interest interaction. (Figure 4,5,6) Across the three cases, probability of political participation does not differ substantively between the two sexes at the low levels of political interest. In other words, not being interested in politics predicts lower probability of political participation regardless of sex. In fact, at the lower levels of political interest, the probability of political participation is slightly higher for women compare to man in six of the nine margins plot. Therefore, these regression analyses do not present evidence to suggest that women's lack of interest in politics explains women's underrepresentation in Hungarian politics from supply side angle.

Table 10: Predicting Political Participation in Hungary, Poland and Czechia, ESS 2018

	(HU) Resource	(HU) Attitude	(HU) Interaction	(PL) Resource	(PL) Attitude	(PL) Interaction	(CZ) Resource	(CZ) Attitude	(CZ) Interaction
educ	0.137*** (0.018)	0.101*** (0.017)	0.102*** (0.017)	0.152*** (0.019)	0.092*** (0.019)	0.091*** (0.019)	0.152*** (0.020)	0.084*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.019)
income_log	0.103*** (0.036)	0.090*** (0.035)	0.070** (0.034)	0.082 (0.058)	0.045 (0.055)	0.040 (0.055)	0.067 (0.043)	0.008 (0.043)	0.041 (0.040)
age_new	0.078*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	0.045** (0.019)	-0.045** (0.018)	-0.036** (0.018)
female	-0.148*** (0.046)	-0.046 (0.044)	-0.065 (0.086)	-0.145** (0.068)	0.011 (0.066)	0.034 (0.151)	0.008 (0.055)	0.177*** (0.053)	0.116 (0.099)
hardly interested		0.361*** (0.052)	0.319*** (0.086)		0.273*** (0.088)	0.252* (0.142)		0.632*** (0.060)	0.566*** (0.098)
quite interested		0.631*** (0.063)	0.591*** (0.093)		0.781*** (0.094)	0.816*** (0.141)		1.009*** (0.081)	0.938*** (0.116)
very interested		0.875*** (0.108)	1.074*** (0.137)		1.171*** (0.145)	1.337*** (0.200)		2.197*** (0.168)	2.079*** (0.221)
fem#hardlyinterested			0.055 (0.107)			0.045 (0.181)			0.046 (0.121)
fem#quiteinterested			0.081 (0.124)			-0.065 (0.184)			0.081 (0.153)
fem#veryinterested			-0.523** (0.226)			-0.309 (0.278)			0.064 (0.327)
_cons	0.006 (0.117)	-0.089 (0.113)	-0.061 (0.121)	0.118 (0.163)	0.149 (0.163)	0.137 (0.179)	0.220 (0.141)	0.316** (0.138)	0.261* (0.140)
Obs.	957	956	956	848	845	845	1563	1561	1561
R-squared	0.095	0.203	0.214	0.089	0.193	0.197	0.044	0.183	0.182

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$




Figure 4: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Hungary




Figure 5: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Poland




Figure 6: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Czechia

In this Chapter, I have presented evidences against four alternative hypotheses to the variation in women's parliamentary representation in Hungary, Poland and Czechia. All four of the alternative hypotheses - electoral system, right wing government, social attitudes on gender and women's political interest – are contemporary explanations that look at politics and society in the democratic period, namely, in the last three decades. Yet, the causes of variation in women's parliamentary representation across the three cases might lie in the pre-democracy period. Does the cause of women's underrepresentation in Hungarian parliament lie in the state socialist era? Was Hungarian socialist regime different from Polish and Czech socialist regimes in a way that would affect women's prospects for a career in politics? In Chapter 5 and Chapter

6, I demonstrate that starting with 1950s, Hungarian socialism was less rigid, and more gradualist compare to Polish and Czech socialist regimes, which also reflected to the mode of transition to democracy. Hungary underwent the least revolutionary transition to democracy compare to the other two cases. Yet, I argue that the peculiarities of Hungarian state socialism and mode of transition to democracy in Hungary do not explain Hungary's divergence in women's parliamentary representation. In the next two chapters. I show how Hungarian state socialist regime construed gender, the peculiarities of Hungarian socialism, and women's role in regime transition across the three cases.

Chapter 5:

A GENDERED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF HUNGARIAN POLITICS

5.1 Hungarian Women under State Socialism

“Do it all, the state told women, but never forget that paid labor is a calling, that which makes you complete.” (Haney, 1994, p.133)

This chapter is about the ways in which Hungarian state socialism construed and constructed gender. The women's emancipation program (1948-1956) started with Soviet controlled Hungarian Workers Party's accession to power. (Goven, 1994) The Stalinist “emancipation” aimed emancipating women from capitalist patriarchal social

order where women belong to private sphere and man belong to public sphere. The true way to emancipation was seen in women's inclusion to the workforce. "Idle housewives" were a danger for the society. Only working for a paycheck would have let women to realize themselves as equal members of the community. The socialist regime avoided recognizing the social tension resulting from unequal power dynamic between sexes. The differences and inequalities between genders was deemphasized. (Haney, 1994, p.118) "This contributed to an amnesic public erasure of body, sexuality and gender relationships as topic of social discourse." (Fábián, 2009, p.33) Regime's discourse on gender avoided recognizing the historical oppression of women in a way that attributes the responsibility to the state and men. The regime was trying to distant itself from Western feminism. In the context of post-World War II economic hardship and rapid industrialization efforts, the socialist state needed workforce. Yet expansion of labor force meant more money to be spend on the wages by the regime. The regime came up with the solution to drop man's wages to a level where one wage was not enough for a family to sustain. As a result, "women entered the labor force en masse: In the 1950s women constituted 30-35 percent of the labor force, by 1974 this increased to 44 percent and by 1988 to 46 percent. In 1970, 65 percent of Hungarian women worked outside the home, and in 1987, 80 percent." (Haney, 1994, p.119)

The regime's gender discourse revolved around emphasizing the unity and solidarity of the workforce that is comprised of men and women now. Put differently, it avoided discourses and policies that would "antagonize" working class or peasant man. Regime pointed out to the feudal period and held religion, church, aristocracy and capitalism responsible for women's oppression. (Goven,1994, p.8)

Did the regime "emancipate" Hungarian women? Firstly, regimes in the communist bloc, including the Hungarian regime, never intent to "emancipate" and

“liberate” women. Secondly, the emancipation program did not even reach its own goals. It neglected socializing domestic work, which created double burden for the women. A gender gap in pay persisted through decades to necessitate two working adults in each family. Women were trained for more “feminine” occupations and were not appointed to managerial position. For instance, women constituted “only 9 percent of the skilled manual workers, 27 percent semiskilled, and 24 percent unskilled by the late 1960s... In 1970s, 100 percent of nursery schools, 80 percent of elementary schools, 55 percent of secondary schools, and 30 percent of university teachers were women”. (Haney, 1994, p.119)

Regime’s vision on the “acceptable womanhood” contained women having children, doing the domestic care work, working outside home, and participating in the implementation of the state policies in the community. (Goven, 1994, p.9) It was illegal not to work; Hungarian passport was not granted until one is actively in the labor force. Only active employees were able to access social services. The state allowed three months for man and women to stay unemployed; after three months unemployed people were considered “publicly dangerous work avoiders” and were subjected to fines and imprisonment. (Haney, 1994, p.124)

The regime expected women to participate to public life, labor force and politics. But its expectations for women was gendered. Women were deemed incompetent to perform “high level” roles and duties. Two quotes from Politburo members below demonstrates how the regime perceived “women’s tasks”:

"There are a number of tasks, outside state and party politics, that we can only get working women to carry out.... Local politics is women's task. They should visit the hospital, check to see if there is a good road in the village, if they have childcare centers, what the schools are like, how well is the food store supplied." (Marosan, Politburo meeting, April 30, 1957; 288/5/24/p. 10) (As cited in Fodor, 1997, p.99)

"The women's movement should pay more attention to family issues, ...to the protection of children, schooling, education and should employ methods like tea parties and sewing or cooking courses. It should focus on "trivial" chores". (Feher Lajos, Politburo meeting, April 30, 1957, 288/5/24/p. 11) (ibid)

One of the patterns that state's emancipation program created in women's lives was *double burden* women faced as full-time employees and full-time housewives. (Galligan, Clavero, & Calloni, 2007) (Tremblay & Galligan, 2005) The literature also conceptualizes *triple burden*, to express women's state-defined triple duties as mothers, workers and agents of the regime. Neglect and failure in collectivizing the social reproduction was widespread in all socialist regimes of the time, including Hungary. For instance, in Hungary, "communal eating facilities were unheard of." The Hungarian state started "state-run laundry facilities in 1970s but they were extremely expensive... As a result, "the average Hungarian woman spent 4 hours a day on household tasks compared to men's 1.4 hours in 1980". (Haney, 1994, p.119-120) The only area that state was effective was reproduction. By 1960s decrease in the birthrate concerned the state. The fear of ethnic extinction, which has been vocalized in today's Hungary under the Orbán government, lead the Hungarian Communist Party to implement pro-reproduction policies: "In 1967, women were given three years paid maternity leave, with guaranteed re-employment... This offer was extended to men in 1985... In the late 1960s, a child care allowance was established, providing women with children a

monthly stipend to help cover the costs of child-rearing... In 1970, 50 percent of four-year-olds were cared for in state-run facilities, 85 percent in 1984". (ibid.)

How did Hungarian women respond to the top-down "emancipation"? What aspects of the state's gender ideology were internalized and what aspects faced resistance by Hungarian women? Based on fieldwork data, Haney (1994) argues that Hungarian women resisted to the exhaustion caused by triple burden and regime's gender blindness with embracing their gender roles as mothers and wives. These roles were 'differentiating' women and women's difference had "resistive potential". (ibid, p.133). Home was a safe space from state intrusion, which functioned as a micro civil society where there was relative freedom of opinion. "Domestic life became a cherished heaven from state interference, a site of moral and psychological refuge even for the women", who was performing almost all housework. (Fábián, 2009, p.33). Hungarian women resisted the idea that "motherhood or housework were simply jobs done to fulfill the 'plan', to fill the country with sufficient numbers of Hungarians... Instead of workers who happened to mother, they claimed to be mothers who happened to work".

It is an established observation in the literature that feminism has a pejorative meaning in the CEE. (ibid.) Hungarian women's groups and organizations today "often react to the heritage of communist past, and reject any association with feminism albeit erroneously, given that communism also disavowed feminism as a bourgeois epithet." (ibid., p.45) In their work on the effect of communist exposure in attitudes, Tucker & Pop-Eleches (2017) find that each additional year of living under communism, "women become less supportive of gender equality"⁵. (p.238) The communist regimes were

⁵ They find the opposite effect for men. (p.238) Men became less sexist with each additional year under communism. The effect of communist exposure on gender equality might be larger for men, given that they were initially more sexist than women. The authors interpret the finding with exposure to "gender equality rhetoric" vs. "gender equality reality" framework. While men were exposed to the rhetoric on gender equality, women experienced its "reality"- double burden.

committed to gender equality in principle. Yet, there was a significant gap between the principle and “the reality” of the regime’s gender equality policies. Relatedly, “childhood exposure to communism is associated with greater support for gender equality among both women and men” whereas “adult exposure effects are reversed for women but not for men”. (ibid., 220) Put it differently, children’s both rhetorical and practical exposure to gender equality in schools was effective in increasing pro-gender-equality attitudes. Living under communism as an adult woman, however, negatively affected support for gender equality.

In addition to forced emancipation by the regime and the gap between rhetoric and reality of emancipation, the token image of the women in politics might have further alienated Hungarian women from gender equality ideal.

5.2 Goulash Communism

As a result of the popular uprising (1956) against Soviet-imposed policies, Hungarian socialist regime shifted to a softer authoritarianism under the leadership of János Kádár (1956-1988). The Kádár regime aimed crushing the threats against regime’s existence while maintaining its “liberal” reputation in the eyes of the society. (Goven, 1994, p.11) Its position as a regime of compromise was reflected on its societal vision and gender ideology. The regime had a new type of conservatism that glorified family and genders’ “complementary role” to each other. The Kádár regime gave greater autonomy to families and encouraged “private, family based economic activity”. (ibid) While the party’s collective rhetoric stayed intact, the economic and social dynamics of 1960s and 1970s impelled the society toward privatism and individualism. (Arpad & Marinovich, 1995, p.79) This laid a foundation for the market

economy's development in Hungary earlier than in the other CEE countries. Contrary to Czechoslovak Communist party (Wong, 1995), the Hungarian Communist Party allowed some private enterprises gradually. The state had binary ideologies in the Kádár era. Alongside of the official Marxist ideology, Kádár pursued a "pragmatist everyday ideology" that involved discourses on traditional family values and gender relation, as well as plans of "gradual reform" in the economy. "To the degree that societal and everyday state ideology mutually reinforced each other, ideology was naturalized into invisibility". (ibid.,15) These features of the Kádárist lead Hungarian variant of socialism to be named as "goulash communism". (Nyyssönen, 2006). The soft authoritarianism, early growth of the private economy and the state's traditional gender discourse might have suppressed social resistance against the regime. This also might have suppressed women's motivation to be a part of the democratic politics, in a context without the energizing effect of revolutionary transitions.

Chapter 6:

WOMEN'S ROLE IN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHIA

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, the transition period witnessed the sprout of social movements, a labor movement in Poland and student and intellectual movement in Czechoslovakia. Advent of these opposition movements created space for civil society and new actors, including women. For instance, "in 1993, 73 per cent of women who made it into Polish parliament had been members of Solidarity in 1980." (Matland & Montgomery, 2003, p.219)

Perhaps because of the gradualism of the Hungarian socialist regime, its transition to democracy was not movement-based. Hungary's transition was rather

elite-driven and pact-based. New Hungarian political society (political parties) were formed even before the actual transition. (Linz & Stephan, 1996) Rather than drafting a new constitution for the new political regime, the constitution of the Hungarian Socialist Republic was amended, which shows the rather controlled (as oppose to the revolutionary) nature of the transition. Some communist systems collapsed, such as Czech, and some adopted, such as Hungary. (ibid., p.300)

I argue that neither gradualism of Hungarian socialist regime nor the elite-driven mode of transition to democracy in Hungary explain Hungary's divergence in women's parliamentary representation. Despite of the differences in modes of transition, democratic new governments' approaches to women's rights were similarly traditional and patriarchal in all three countries. The major issues women faced in the initial democratic era, such as decrease in women's unemployment, decrease in welfare benefits, and governments' call to women to return to the "private sphere" were similar across the three cases. Moreover, women achieved representational gains (such as introduction of a party gender quota and/or legislative gender-quota) in the democratic period in both Poland and Czechia. Even during the unsettling regime transition period, women were excluded from the political leadership. Despite that, women contributed to the social movement against the regime in Hungary, Poland and Czechia. The much smaller scale of social mobilization against the regime in Hungary might have prevented Hungarian women to gain experience in collective action, acquire discursive repertoire for mobilization, acquire social capital related to activism and network building. The transition process in Hungary did not open space for civil society, and for women, as much as the Polish and Czechoslovakian transitions did. But the way state socialist governments construed gender and the way democratically elected governments construed gender was similar across the three cases.

The opportunities and constraints surrounded women during democracy's foundational times have implications for the future democratic political institutions' gender inclusivity. In theory, democratization should improve women's access to political positions. However, democracy does not do much to improve women's legislative representation, and "it may even hinder women's access to formal political power". (Fallon et al., 2012, p.381) This is relevant for the periods of regime transition as well. In theory, the democratization processes leading to totalitarian regimes' breakdown should be inclusive to become a large enough movement that can bring political change. Even though women have found space to participate to the protest movements in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, women were largely excluded from the negotiation processes. (Waylen, 2007) This reflected to the gender makeup of the initial democratic institutions. To put it differently, women were excluded when political power was being redistributed (among men).

An analysis of the historical sources shows that women descriptively participated to the social movements that weakened the socialist governments. Polish grass roots labor movement, Solidarity, gave rise to a social movement against the regime. Solidarity was the broadest anti-regime movement in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and it led to the first regime transition in the region. Hungary (and even Czechoslovakia) did not have social movements that are "remotely comparable to Solidarity in Poland". (Linz & Stephan, 1996, p.300-301) One year after its establishment, women constituted almost 50 percent of the Solidarity's rank-and-file membership in 1981. (Chiva, 2018, p.34) This shows that women did participate to the movement from the beginning. Solidarity's emergence disturbed Kremlin, and Solidarity's leadership was arrested after the regime's military crackdown in 1981.

According to Penn (2016), Solidarity movement was able to sustain because of the efforts of Polish women activists that saved the movement from disappearing.

In Czechoslovakia, before the Velvet revolution and the peaceful protests that led to the communist regime's breakdown, the major dissident movement was Charter 77. This was an intellectual movement, started in 1977, that was against the regime's infringements of human rights. According to the movement's declaration, Charter 77 was "a loose, informal and open association of people of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world." Despite the risks of harassment, beating and incarceration by the state police (Bolton, 2014, p.181), women constituted 20% of the declaration's signatories. (Šiklová 1993, p.77) Furthermore, "one of the three rotating spokespersons of the Charter was almost invariably a woman". (Chiva, 2018, p.33).

Even though Hungary's social opposition movement was weak compared to the ones in Czechoslovakia and in Poland, many associational groups emerged during 1980s in Hungary. One of these was an environmental group, Danuba Circle, that organized demonstrations against a dam on the Danube. (Linz & Stephan, 1996, p.301) In 1988, "fifty thousand Hungarian stood outside the parliament building for the largest peaceful protest against the socialist regime." (Corrin, 1994, p.231) Hungarian women participated to this movement in large numbers. Moreover, a young group of women activists organized some of these demonstrations. (ibid)

There comes up a different picture when the gender composition of the movement's leadership is analyzed. In Solidarity, for instance, "only 7.8 per cent of the 881 delegates to the Solidarity Congress were women, and there was only one woman

on the National Executive Council” (Jancar, 1985, p.169). This is not necessarily surprising, given that women were grossly excluded from political leadership positions throughout the state socialist era, too. The quota system under the socialist regime meant “women in seats, rather than politically active women voicing demands in the decision-making areas”. (Corrin, 1994, p.218) Women occupied leadership positions seldomly. (Rueschemeyer, 1994, p.4) Being a female leader (manager, or parliamentarian) was not prestigious, it was rather considered as a “token” position of power that was occupied by “underqualified” women. (Fodor, 1997, p.59) In a way, women’s exclusion from power and decision making continued in the transition process. Because of women’s exclusion from decision making in the socialist era and in the transition era, women lacked leadership experience. This had implications for the gender gap in democratic politics.

Another important point about women’s participation to social movements against the state socialist regimes is that women did not organized as “women”. Women did not rally around issues traditionally perceived as women’s issues. This is not surprising, given the oppressive political structure these movements operated in. It makes sense for the social movements to channel the movement’s energy towards the sole purpose of weakening the regime. While the state socialist regimes were still in power, women were not allowed to have any grievances, since the state had already “emancipated them”. Unfortunately, women were sidelined from the process of designing the new democratic regime by their male partners in the opposition movements. The prominent ex-Charter 77 activist Jirina Siklova said “the men needed us and treated us well...now, there is a danger of male democracies’ ignoring women’s needs”. (Einhorn, 1993, p.148) A great example of that is Solidarity leadership’s disregard of its female members’ opinion toward an anti-abortion bill. In 1990, “when

the Solidarity women's section of Solidarity tried to oppose an anti-abortion resolution of the Party Congress on the grounds that this was a women's issue, and women, who represented 50 per cent of the movement's membership, had not been consulted, they were summarily dismissed by the party leadership." (Chiva, 2018, p.39)

Despite women's role in endurance of social movements against the regime, women were excluded in the roundtable negotiations between the regime and the opposition. In Poland, only one of the 60 participants in the roundtable negotiations was a woman. (Titkow as cited in Chiva, 2018, p.35-36) In Czechoslovakia, the talks aftermath of the resignation of the communist leadership included one woman among 35 participants on the regime side, and one woman among the 31 participants on the opposition side. (Čalda as cited in Chiva, 2018, p.35-36). In Hungary, women constituted 8 percent of the negotiators in the Opposition Roundtable (Bozóki as cited in Chiva, 2018, p.35-36).

To sum up, there was male dominance in the leadership of the anti-regime movements and in the process of designing the new regime. Chiva (2018) offers two sets of explanations regarding to the male dominance in the transition context. First, political actors used their pre-existing networks during the transition process, which meant male monopoly in the descriptive sense throughout the transition process. Second, political actors employed specific symbolic repertoires that "enabled them to portray themselves as representatives of broad social groups such as 'civil society' or 'the nation' rather than particular interests, and to construct women as citizens with gender-specific roles in the process of democracy-building". (ibid., p.24) This meant male dominance in the substantive sense of representation. Women's political underrepresentation in the transition process is inherently connected to women's descriptive and substantive underrepresentation in the new, democratic regime.

Aftermath of the transition to democracy witnessed the new political elite's call for 'women's return to home'. Patriarchal and exclusionary roots of democracy (Pateman, 1988) (Pateman, 1989) (Towns, 2009) and capitalism (Hartmann, 1976) have been established by theoretical and historical works in the literature. This time, political elites were defining women's lives based on democratic and capitalist ideals. Women's employment dropped in the initial democratic period because of three factors: parties' conservative discourse, economic turbulence, and freedom to not work after forty years of enforced labor. However, embracing home did not have the same "resistive" stand against state's gender agenda anymore. Hungarian women continued to participate to the labor force while attaching two function to it: financial independence and female solidarity. (Haney, 1994)

Looking at the agency side of women's political underrepresentation requires inquiring collective reflexes Hungarian women demonstrated after transition. Women's existence in parliament as well as in the labor market were depressed in the initial post transition period, which is a widespread phenomenon for nations in transition. After several years of decrease, Hungarian women's labor force participation started to increase by 1998. (World Bank Indicators, 2019) Why this did not reflect to the political sphere? There are structural and institutional answers to it. But regarding the agency side of the issue, I maintain that it seems comprehensible for women to dispose of the "politics" leg of triple burden. Politics was heavily male dominated in the socialist period and women's (enforced) political "representation" was merely symbolic. Women were not placed in the high ranks of the Hungarian socialist workers party. Therefore, among the three spheres of life (household, work, and politics), political sphere provided the narrowest space and least number of opportunities for women to gain skills.

Chapter 7:

WOMEN'S MOBILIZATION FOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN DEMOCRACY – HUNGARY, POLAND AND CZECHIA

One of the prevalent and generic observations in the literature on CEE is that women's movements are "weak" in the region and in Hungary. Most works make this argument based on comparing the women's movements in CEE with the one(s) in established (Western European) democracies. Albeit true, this observation should not be taken for granted. Women's activism being weak(er) in one region compare to another does not say much about the opportunities and constraints "weak" women's movements face. Moreover, scholars that make this observation do not always explain what they mean by "women's movement being weak" and why the strength of women's movements is important for women's political participation.

Women's movements in CEE "being weak" might imply that they are recent, fractured, and not able appeal to broad segments of their societies. Another implication might be that women's movements, represented by women's groups in CEE, have mixed stands on interpreting gender and gender equality. These largely hold true for Polish, Hungarian and Czechian women's movements. Regardless, Polish and Czechian cases show that women's groups are able to achieve political gains, especially on women's legislative representation. Hungarian women's groups have also been active in aiming social and political change, but they seem to be more focused on welfare goals.

In Poland and Czechia, how does women *as a group* manage to achieve political gains in the male dominated political system, given that women's exclusion from political power in the socialist period and in the transition period? Here, I particularly

refer to descriptive representational gains. I focus on descriptive representation because women are less likely to reach substantial political power when they constitute a small minority⁶. Therefore, improvement in women's descriptive representation can be considered as a step towards improvement in substantial representation.

Table 1 demonstrates that Hungarian parliament has mostly been a male monopoly, whereas Czechian parliament has been a parliament with small minority. Women constituted a small minority in the Polish lower parliament too, until the implementation of legislative gender quota in 2011.

The first dramatic rise in the percentage of women in democratic Polish parliament occurred in 2001. The percentage of women MPs rose from 12 percent to 20,2 percent. (Table 1) Matland and Montgomery (2005) finds that this political gain has been achieved by active campaigning of a cross-party women's movement that aimed to increase women's political representation. (p.323) Specifically, two actors were influential in improving the number of women in the parliament: Pre-electoral Coalition of Women and 'Women Run Women Vote' initiative. Pre-electoral Coalition of Women consisted of fifty women's organizations and groups that reached an open agreement to fight against gender discrimination, which was "demonstrated by unequal access to power and the labor market". Two of their famous slogans were "I have had enough of this —I support election of women" and "enough adoration—we want representation". (ibid., p.232)

⁶ According to Dahlerup's (2018) categorization, parliaments that have less than 10 percent women are male monopolies. When women MPs constitute 10 to 25 percent, this is a parliament with a "small minority of women". When women constitute 25 to 40 percent of the whole MPs, this is a parliament with a "large minority of women". A parliament has gender balance when women constitute 40 to 60 percent of the parliament.

Pre-electoral Coalition of Women was a movement that formed in civil society by civil society actors. “Women Run Women Vote Initiative”, on the other hand, was initiated by the female members of the Polish parliament. The women’s caucuses within the parliament, called Women’s Parliamentary Group, which was established in the beginning of 1990s, started this campaign despite the ideological differences among its members. (ibid.) They appealed to voters to not refrain from electing female candidates and to party leadership to nominate more women to candidacy. This pressure put on party leaderships worked: The two coalition partners at the time– the Alliance of Democratic Left and the Labor Union, and the centrist Union of Freedom agreed to introduce a 30 percent quota. (Siemienska, 2004, p.2) Even though right-wing parties such as the League of Polish Families officially rejected implementing such a policy, they still nominated more women on their candidate lists compare to their previous candidate lists. (ibid., p.3)

Polish parliament introduced a 35% legislative gender quota in 2011. Gender quotas have been trendy in world politics over the last two decades. (Krook, 2006) How does the political process that lead to implementation of a gender quota in the Polish parliament look like? Who were the actors and what were the strategies they employed? The main actor was Women’s Congress, which was formed in 2009. Małgorzata Fuszara (2017), who is one of the members of the Women’s Congress, depicts the role of Women’s Congress in bringing legislative gender quota. According to her, the motivation to establish the Women’s Congress came from the observation that women were excluded from the gatherings, conferences and events that were celebrating the two decades of democracy. Women were “only invited to fulfil the role of an audience passively absorbing the male narrative of the opposition movement, of the fight with the system, and of the final victory. Women noticed this exclusion and took offence to

the disregard for their role in the opposition's struggles and in the efforts to rebuild the country". (Fuszara, 2017, p.328) This awareness mobilized women from different backgrounds in terms of activism experience, occupation, location within the country, and ideology (both right-wing and left-wing). They decided that organizing a conference, where women could present their thoughts on the two decades of democracy, would be a way to fight against women's exclusion from political power. These ideas evolved into the Women's Congress. (ibid) More than 4000 women attended the first Women's Congress in 2009. There, the memory of female members of the opposition movement (whose contributions were disregarded) was celebrated. "Henryka Krzywonoś, the only woman among the signatories of the Gdańsk Accord⁷, received the award of the 20th anniversary of Poland's freedom...The award marked the starting point of her return to politics...Henryka Krzywonoś was elected to the parliament in 2015 and 2019 elections, "even though she had not even been offered a place on the electoral lists before." (ibid., p.329)

The first Women's Congress concluded that for women to have an impact on the issues they deem important, women need to be involved in the processes of decision making and policy implementation. This meant advocacy for a gender quota bill. Women's Congress employed a different strategy than individual women MPs proposing a bill in the parliament. "A special legislative procedure – that the constitution specified- was chosen... The bill was to be proposed by citizens themselves". (ibid) The Women's Congress collected 150,000 signatures in three months, gathering large scale social support. This strategy of gathering large support of

⁷ "On August 31, 1980, representatives of the communist government of Poland agree to the demands of striking shipyard workers in the city of Gdansk. Former electrician Lech Walesa led the striking workers, who went on to form Solidarity, the first independent labor union to develop in a Soviet bloc nation." (History.com, 2010)

citizens and public actors such as media and businesses, prevented parties that were against the bill to reject it. After the committee discussions in the parliament, 35% quota for persons of each gender on electoral lists (gender-neutral quota) has been decided in January 5th , 2011. Moreover, electoral lists that were failing to meet the quota requirement would not be registered. Perhaps, this rule was as significant as the quota itself. Because implementation of the quota would have been otherwise jeopardized. The bill received the full support of the ruling party, liberal-conservative Civic Platform and it was opposed by the right-wing Law and Justice party. The opposition's argument was that women were not interested in politics as much as men, and that it would be impossible to find that many women to fill the slots in the electoral lists. After the bill passed, political parties not only met 35 per cent minimum requirement but exceeded it. (ibid., p.329-330) So Polish women *were* interested in politics enough to become a politician, and more women did run for high political office when there is social and institutional support.

The Polish case of gender quota demonstrates the significance of women's mobilization and women's movement in achieving political gains. Women's grassroots movement for a gender quota is what differed this attempt from the other, unsuccessful attempts to bring gender parity in parliamentary politics. One of these failed attempts in Poland was in 2001, during a parliamentary debate on the electoral statute. "A female MP, Olga Krzyżanowska, from Unia Wolności (Freedom Union), proposed a bill that introduced gender quotas on electoral lists. The proposal was rejected by the parliament." (ibid., p.325)

A similar inconclusive attempt to bring gender quota took place in the Hungarian parliament in 2007. The Alliance of Free Democrats- Hungarian Liberal Party (AFD) has had "halfhearted efforts" to women's inclusion in politics. Even

though liberals recognized women's underrepresentation in politics, they believed in the liberal democracy to bring social change in the long run, by itself. This was challenged when two of the party members, Klára Sándor and Bálint Magyar, proposed two gender quota bills in 2007. The bills were introducing 50 percent electoral list quota and 30 percent government quota. Even though the bills received support from women's organizations and groups, it did not pass in the parliament. Because the AFD's coalition partner, The Hungarian Socialist Party, did not support the bill. “ ‘Women against women’, screamed the newspaper headlines when four notable female politicians⁸ voiced their support for the rejection of the bill that aimed to improve women's political representation”. (Fabian, 2009, p.187) One of the female politicians among them, Ibolya Dávid, who was the president of the right wing Hungarian Democratic Forum, pronounced that politics needed to focus on “more important issues.” Political observers argued that gender quotas were “illiberal and extremist”. (ibid.,188)

The same Hungarian Socialist party that did not support a legislative gender quota accepted 20 percent female candidate quota in back in 1998. This was a voluntary party quota that aimed to push the party leadership to select more women candidates. It was achieved by the efforts of the party's women's caucus. (ibid) However, “the party leadership did not fill this quota, and managed to field only 13 percent women candidates” in the next election. (Tremblay & Galligan, 2005, p.31)

Why did the Hungarian Socialist Party fail to support the two legislative gender quota bills in 2007? Left-wing parties are more likely to support pro-gender equality

⁸ “The four notable female political representatives who lobbied against the quota for women were Katalin Levai, the equal opportunity minister of the previous Socialist government and Hungary's representative in the European Parliament; Emese John, the leader of the AFD representatives from Budapest; Ibolya David, the president of the Hungarian Democratic Forum; and Rózsa Flöfmann, from the Christian Democratic People's Party.” (Fabian, 2009, p.330)

bills and Hungarian Socialist Party did implement a gender quota law within the party, even though the law did not fully translate into practice. The answer to this question might lie in the high degree of party polarization in the Hungarian parliament. Olson & Ilonzki (2011) looks at how the number of parties in the political system, concentration of votes, and the relationship between legislative and executive evolved in the first two decades of seven post-communist parliaments. They find that Hungarian party system became highly polarized by the end of end of 2000s. The high polarization of the Hungarian party system makes cooperation across parties difficult (ibid., p.238). This might potentially explain the Hungarian Socialist Party's lack of support to the two gender quota bills proposed in 2007 by the Liberal Party. If the Hungarian women's organizations that supported the bills could have been able to gather larger support from the public (as Women's Congress did in Poland), the Hungarian Socialist Party might have had to support the bills.

In the lower parliament of Czech Republic, women's descriptive representation significantly increased in two elections: it increased from 8,3 to 15 per cent in 1996 election, and it increased from 15,5 to 22 percent in 2010 election. How did these changes occur? Hašková & Křížková (2003) suggests that the 7 percent increase in women's parliamentary representation in 1996 election was due to the success of the left-wing political parties. (p.21) In 1996 elections, the Czech Social Democratic Party increased its vote share from 6,5 percent to 26,4 percent.

According to Mansfeldová (2011), change occurred in 2010 election as a result of the electoral reform in 2006: "The increase might be explained by higher use of preferential votes in 2010 elections... In the 2006 elections, the voters had two preferential votes to use, but in the 2010 elections, they had four preferential votes at their disposal." (p.136) In 2006, an electoral reform that made two changes was passed

in the parliament. First, the number of preference votes was increased to four. Second, the threshold for preference votes to change list order was “reduced to 5 percent of the party’s (or coalition’s) vote in the district.” (Renwick) In 2010, voters used this opportunity to circle up four candidates on the ballot, and they voted for the newcomer politicians. “Czechs used 3.7 million preferential votes in this election and made sure that outsiders beat some of the veterans of parliamentary politics.” (Richter, 2010) This is likely to positively affect women’s election. However, voters’ decision to cast more preferential votes (in favor of female candidates) did not take shape in a vacuum. Stegmaier & Vlachová (2011) point out to the role of Fórum 50%, a Czech women’s group, which “appealed to voters to give preferential votes to female candidates to move them up the party list”. (p.240) Forum 50% is one of the largest women’s organization in Czech Republic. It supports “equal participation of women and men in politics and in decision making.” The organization takes part in “the advisory bodies of the Czech government and provide expertise opinion to the media.” (Forum 50) According to their website, they have been campaigning about gender quota in electoral lists since 2012. (Forum 50, Projects) There might be multiple reasons for gender quota to fail becoming an agenda in the mainstream politics. It seems like organization could not find the political opportunities it needs to convince political parties.

There is reason to doubt that the 2006 electoral reform will always lead voters to vote for newcomers. Since 2010 election was the first parliamentary election after the reform, its impact might have been the largest in 2010 election. Because with this election, voters removed the longtime politicians they did not like from the parliament. Relatedly, Šprincová & Adamusová (2013) asserts that the electoral reform that worked in favor of women candidates in 2010 elections worked against women candidates in

2013 elections. (p.8) The percentage of women MPs dropped 2,5 percent in 2013. (Table 1)

Within the Czech Social Democratic Party, there exists the Social Democratic Women group. The group focuses on “families, issues related to the position of women within the party, and women’s representation in the party bodies.” (Hašková & Křížková ,2003, p.19) The Social Democratic Party is the only one that has “adopted quotas for the participation of women in party bodies and on the candidate sheets.” (ibid, p.21) In general, there seems to be low interest to the legislative gender quotas among the Czech political parties.

Women’s parliamentary representation stayed around 10% over the three decades of democracy in Hungary. Based on the comparison with Poland and Czechia, I find that two factors best explain frozen rate of women in the Hungarian parliament: Women’s movement not prioritizing advocacy for gender parity in parliament and women MPs not preferring to or not being able to form cross-party alliance to pressure the parties within.

Majority of the Hungarian women’s groups do not see to prioritize activity in the sphere of electoral politics. Activity or activism on electoral politics might include endorsing candidates in local or national elections and advocating for implementation or prevention of a law. Fabian (2009) finds that not just women’s groups do not engage in these kinds of activities. Moreover, “for most women's groups, and even for women's caucuses of political parties, the aim of increasing the number of women's representatives in local and national legislatures is seldom given priority and even less frequently realized.” (Fabian, 2009, p.183-184)

Women's groups in Hungary seem to prefer staying apart from "formal" politics. Politics has a particularly bad reputation in the Hungarian society. Even activists - people that we expect to have higher interest in politics and higher propensity for political participation - that work in women's civil society organizations, consider (formal) politics as a world that should be stayed away from. Many activist women that Fabian (2009) interviewed "empathetically and explicitly expressed a desire to stay away from politics." (p.147)

As a result, most women's groups in Hungary identify themselves as nonpolitical. They are more engaged in providing services to women. (ibid., p.146-147) Relatedly, Hungarian women's groups have mostly been pursuing welfare related goals such as reproductive rights and maternity benefits (ibid.p.205)

The 2001 Polish case (the 8% jump in women's parliamentary representation) shows the significance of women's parliamentary activism, or across-party coalition. Before 2001 election, women parliamentarians engaged in cross party solidarity to advocate gender equality and pressure the party leaderships. There is evidence that solidarity among female parliamentarians is difficult in Hungarian case. For instance, women's party caucuses in the parliament seem to lack collective action on the issue of raising retirement age in the 1990s. In the initial post transition era, most women either lost their jobs or received less wage as a result of the restructuring of the market. To mitigate the negative effects of transition on women's lives, women's groups pushed for increasing the retirement age. A female Christian Democratic' politician, who was the speaker of the party's women's caucus, points out to the lack of cooperation on this issue among women across parties:

“It is funny that in the past four years when the Socialist Party was in opposition, our government wanted to raise the retirement age. At that time, the Socialist women started to gather signatures to veto the bill. Now when they [the Socialists] are in power, they want the bill to pass. If we could indeed cooperate above party lines, the Socialist women should now give me those signatures to block that very same initiative! (interview, Hungarian Women's Union, February 1995)” (Fabian, 2009, p.106)

About one decade later, in 2007, when two parliamentarians from AFD proposed legislative gender quota, “not all women's party caucuses supported the proposal” even though many women’s groups supported the bill.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, the regime transition process in Hungary did not open space for civil society, and for women, as much as the Polish and Czechoslovakian transitions did. The much smaller scale of social mobilization against the regime in Hungary might have prevented Hungarian women to gain experience in collective action, acquire discursive repertoire for mobilization, acquire social capital related to activism and network building.

An institutional explanation regarding to the failed collectivity among women parliamentarians is about high polarization in the parliament. Olson & Ilonszki’s (2011) work on the party systems in CEE shows that Hungarian parliament is highly polarized in two dimensions: parties’ lack of coordination in legislation and uni-dimensional government formation. (p.238) For instance, they find that among Poland, Hungary, and Czechia, only Hungary never had a coalition government with a party from right and party from left. (ibid., p.243) This implies that party identities and ideologies are the salient factors that affect MPs parliamentary behavior, which could hinder women MPs acting together based on their gender identity.

Galligan & Clavero (2008) find in their interviews with women parliamentarians from seven post-communist countries -including Hungary, Poland and Czechia- that some of their respondents pointed out to the competition between women, given that parties nominate few women, and put even fewer women to top of the party lists. (p.164) Because of the persistent representation deficit of women in Hungarian parliament, women MPs are likely to regard their parliamentary positions precarious. This might make women MPs less willing to act for gender parity in the parliament, since newcomers' entry to the parliament might jeopardize the incumbents' seats. Relatedly, Fabian (2009) finds that "women candidates are rarely connected to their party's women's groups. They rather emerge nearly exclusively by working their way up to the parties' ranks". (p.184)

Some social psychological observations pointed out to the particularly conflictual relationship among women in the families in Hungarian society. (Arpad & Marinovich, 1995, p.80) Einhorn (1991) makes a similar point in her finding that "many Hungarian women express the view that there is something psychologically unhealthy about women who meet together without men." (p.30) Fabian (2009)'s work on Hungarian women's organizations support this too. In her participant observations among activists in women's organizations, she sees "women who were keenly aware of the need to discuss women's issues unfalteringly insist on including men and male-centered topics on the principle of maintaining an equal footing". (p.142)

More of sociological observations suggest that not just women's collective action, but collectivity in general is problematic in Hungarian society. (Arpad & Marinovich, 1995, p.80) In line with this observation, Chapter 8 on the Hungarian socialism pointed out to the atomization of civil society in Kádár era (1956-1988).

Finally, Hungarian parliament has an “extremely low turnover rates compared to all other CEE parliaments” and as a result, there is a “high personal stability” and “high professionalization” of the members of the parliament. (Ilonszki & Edinger, 2007, p.156) By 2007, the average turnover rate of the parliamentarians was 12% in Hungary, which was “by far the lowest” in the region and it was “more than five points below the average of nine post-communist countries.” (ibid.)

Chapter 8:

CONCLUSION

I find in this research that women’s mobilization and women’s collective action is crucial for descriptive representational gains. There is an ongoing debate in both theoretical and empirical strands of women and gender literature about the types of representation, their relationship to one another and their consequential effects on enhancing gender equality in politics. I contend that descriptive representation is still one of the most significant indicators that shows the opportunities for women’s further engagement in politics, business and civil society. “Politics of presence” is important because of the connection between sexual, ethnic, or racial identities of representatives and their “politics of idea” (or policy programs). (Phillips, 1998)

Three countries studied here, Hungary, Poland and Czechia, are post-socialist countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. They are newly established democracies that integrated to the market economy recently. Compared to Western Europe, they have been considered having weak civil societies and un-settled social cleavages. Moreover, international norm diffusion does not explain women’s representational gains (such as the adoption of party gender quotas and legislative

gender quotas) in these three countries, given that they have become part of European Union long before these representational gains are achieved. The findings of this research can be tested in countries that are relatively young democracies, such as the other post-socialist countries (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria). The findings of this research can also speak to Southern European countries with a recent history of repressive government (Portugal, Spain, Greece) and to Turkey.

This research has one negative and one positive implication. Similar to the line of work that disclose the exclusionary roots of democracies, this research shows that transition to democracy does not guarantee better representation for everyone. In the eyes of the parliamentary elites, who are dominantly man, more gender-inclusive parliaments can mean jeopardizing the future of their own seats. Even with the pressure of the international organizations and norms (such as entering EU), political parties can be slow and unwilling to act on improving gender parity in the parliament.

At the same time, this research emphasizes the role of social movement in changing politics. Despite the institutional barriers such as electoral systems with majoritarian bias and volatile party systems, women's mobilization can convince party gatekeepers to nominate more women in higher ranks of the party lists. Similarly, women's mobilization can convince parliamentary elites to adopt legislative gender quota. In doing so, women's organizations have the highest leverage against the male status quo when they are able to gather large support from the public. Comparative politics literature should focus more on within-case analysis of countries deemed to have "weak mobilization" to reveal women's activism for representation within and outside of the parliament.

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APPENDIX

Table 11: Predicting Political Participation in Poland, Hungary and Czechia, 2010 ESS

	(HU) Resource	(HU) Attitude	(HU) Interaction	(PL) Resource	(PL) Attitude	(PL) Interaction	(CZ) Resource	(CZ) Attitude	(CZ) Interaction
educ	0.102*** (0.017)	0.068*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.105*** (0.013)	0.074*** (0.013)	0.074*** (0.013)	0.115*** (0.015)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.064*** (0.015)
income_log	0.021 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)	0.039 (0.035)	0.028 (0.034)	0.024 (0.034)	0.180*** (0.035)	0.141*** (0.039)	0.135*** (0.033)
age_new	0.024* (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.042*** (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)	0.072*** (0.013)	0.016 (0.014)	0.011 (0.013)
female	-0.058 (0.046)	-0.017 (0.044)	0.116 (0.095)	-0.096** (0.042)	-0.022 (0.042)	0.104 (0.111)	-0.089** (0.040)	-0.018 (0.040)	0.083 (0.074)
hardly interested		0.261*** (0.059)	0.301*** (0.091)		0.164*** (0.061)	0.251** (0.102)		0.345*** (0.047)	0.363*** (0.070)
quite interested		0.424*** (0.062)	0.563*** (0.093)		0.430*** (0.064)	0.531*** (0.102)		0.816*** (0.063)	0.855*** (0.084)
very interested		0.963*** (0.092)	1.157*** (0.129)		0.637*** (0.096)	0.772*** (0.134)		1.135*** (0.120)	1.212*** (0.137)
fem#hardlyinterested			-0.059 (0.119)			-0.132 (0.127)			-0.052 (0.090)
fem#quiteinterested			-0.236* (0.121)			-0.156 (0.129)			-0.147 (0.117)
fem#veryinterested			-0.388** (0.180)			-0.214 (0.189)			-0.288 (0.234)
_cons	0.488*** (0.100)	0.437*** (0.099)	0.358*** (0.111)	0.392*** (0.091)	0.305*** (0.096)	0.229* (0.119)	-0.039 (0.102)	0.056 (0.107)	0.022 (0.107)
Obs.	1181	1180	1180	1202	1194	1194	1613	1611	1611
R-squared	0.038	0.127	0.133	0.073	0.127	0.130	0.070	0.173	0.178

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 12: Predicting Political Participation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechia, 2002 ESS

	(HU) Resource	(HU) Attitude	(HU) Interaction	(PL) Resource	(PL) Attitude	(PL) Interaction	(CZ) Resource	(CZ) Attitude	(CZ) Interaction
educ	0.185*** (0.018)	0.124*** (0.019)	0.122*** (0.019)	0.188*** (0.019)	0.148*** (0.019)	0.145*** (0.019)	0.136*** (0.034)	0.041 (0.034)	0.045 (0.034)
age_new	0.048*** (0.012)	0.034*** (0.012)	0.034*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.010)	0.058*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.031* (0.018)
female	0.010 (0.038)	0.027 (0.037)	0.078 (0.090)	-0.122*** (0.034)	-0.040 (0.034)	0.052 (0.089)	-0.196*** (0.055)	-0.189*** (0.054)	-0.024 (0.140)
hardly interested		0.146*** (0.055)	0.139* (0.082)		0.173*** (0.049)	0.268*** (0.083)		0.274*** (0.079)	0.350*** (0.126)
quite interested		0.386*** (0.057)	0.433*** (0.083)		0.374*** (0.052)	0.418*** (0.081)		0.606*** (0.091)	0.705*** (0.133)
very interested		0.633*** (0.082)	0.771*** (0.112)		0.717*** (0.087)	0.839*** (0.111)		0.967*** (0.132)	1.234*** (0.185)
fem#hardlyinterested			0.017 (0.109)			-0.151 (0.103)			-0.095 (0.158)
fem#quiteinterested			-0.083 (0.108)			-0.040 (0.105)			-0.145 (0.172)
fem#veryinterested			-0.311* (0.159)			-0.299 (0.192)			-0.462* (0.252)
income_log				0.123*** (0.038)	0.095*** (0.036)	0.093** (0.037)	0.249*** (0.076)	0.192** (0.078)	0.185** (0.074)
_cons	0.340*** (0.078)	0.305*** (0.083)	0.281*** (0.094)	-0.044 (0.080)	-0.127 (0.082)	-0.172* (0.100)	0.345** (0.172)	0.527*** (0.179)	0.387** (0.192)
Obs.	1573	1570	1570	1645	1638	1638	889	887	887
R-squared	0.066	0.115	0.118	0.097	0.149	0.151	0.061	0.136	0.145

Standard errors are in parenthesis

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$




Figure 7: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Hungary



Figure 8: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Poland




Figure 9: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Czechia




Figure 10: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Hungary




Figure 11: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Hungary




Figure 12: Predictive Margins of Gender and Political Interest in Hungary