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**TEMPORALITY IN THE POSTMODERN TIMES AND THE
OTTOMAN NOSTALGIA IN TURKEY**



DOCTORATE THESIS

ZAFER ÇELER

Supervisors : Prof. Dr. Nilgün Tatal Cheviron

Prof. Dr. Gilles Dorronsoro

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ÖNSÖZ

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RESUME

En Turquie, il y a un intérêt croissant pour le passé ottoman au cours de la décennie dernière. Le désir pour le passé ottoman semble envahir la société turque. Les images, les objets et les discours liés à l'histoire ottomane ont fait leur apparition dans les séries télévisuelles, les discours politiques, les manifestations sur les médias sociaux, dans l'architecture et la décoration de maison. Cette étude vise à comprendre les raisons d'un tel essor pour le passé ottoman dans la société turque par rapport à la transformation de l'histoire, et les changements dans les modes d'engagement avec le passé dans les sociétés occidentales modernes. Elle tente d'analyser ce nouvel intérêt à travers les références à la fois à la dynamique interne de la modernisation turque et aux changements structurels plus généraux au sein des sociétés modernes. Les débats sur le néo-ottomanisme affirment que cet intérêt est le résultat de la stratégie politique turque dans la scène politique internationale, ou bien qu'il est une tentative délibérée du gouvernement conservateur pour mettre en place un nouveau discours historique. Cette étude, au-delà de ces arguments, soutient que l'intérêt trouvé vers le passé ottoman est une conséquence de la convergence des changements et des ruptures que la société turque a confronté depuis les années 1980 et des continuités au sein de la modernisation turque.

La transformation et les changements survenus après par l'intégration de l'économie turque au réseau néo-libéral mondial ne sont pas seulement limités au domaine économique, mais aussi ont affecté les structures sociales, culturelles et politiques. Cette formation sociale a provoqué la transformation des formes d'engagement avec le passé de la société turque. À cet égard, la montée de la nostalgie ottomane implique un changement structurel de la société, ce qui nécessite d'éclairer les changements que les sociétés modernes ont subi à la suite du capitalisme tardif et de son édifice néo-libéral. Cette transformation a provoqué un changement de la temporalité où le passé devient une réserve de références ahistoriques. La temporalité post-moderne provoque l'effondrement des structures sociales, politiques et culturelles dans un abîme des références vides ahistorique à la suite de detemporalisation de l'histoire. La nostalgie ottomane de la société turque peut être expliquée par rapport à ce changement temporal. D'autre part, parmi ces changements et la transformation, les continuités des caractéristiques fondamentales de la modernisation turque devraient également être soulignées. L'intégration de la société turque dans l'économie de marché néo-libéral a été réalisé par un coup d'État qui a créé une condition sociale dans laquelle une vaste autoritarisme de l'Etat et de l'économie de marché libre ont existé côte à côte. Cette étude affirme que la caractéristique fondamentale définissant la modernisation de la Turquie est un modernisme réactionnaire. Celui-ci est entendu dans ce travail comme une adaptation sélective de la modernité occidentales. C'est dans l'objectif d'éviter les complexités de la société moderne. Cela a causé une réduction de modernisation au développementalisme monolithique. Ce modernisme réactionnaire s'établit à travers une distinction fondamentale entre la civilisation et la culture. Dans cette distinction,

alors que la civilisation signifie un développement technologique, la culture se réfère aux caractéristiques innées de la nation comme des caractéristiques étrangères aux idéaux universels des Lumières. Du kémalisme organiciste, corporatiste et solidariste au néo-libéralisme autoritaire de la période post-1980, le modernisme réactionnaire se soutient comme une caractéristique essentielle et continue de la modernisation turque.

Pour analyser la nostalgie ottomane et la transformation de l'histoire et l'évolution des formes d'engagement avec le passé, les changements après les années 1980 et la continuité de la modernisation de la Turquie constituent les deux principaux points de l'épine dorsale de cette étude. À cet égard, le développement de la temporalité de la période pré-moderne à la modernité doit être envisagé pour une meilleure compréhension du nouveau motif social résultant de l'intégration de la société turque dans le monde néo-libéral, et les impacts de cette nouvelle structure sociale sur la temporalité et l'histoire. S'il y a un changement dans la structure temporelle désignée comme la temporalité post-moderne d'aujourd'hui, les formes antérieures de la temporalité doivent être analysées à travers une perspective historique. À ce stade, il convient de noter que cette étude ne conçoit pas la modernité et post-modernité comme des périodes historiques successives, mais il accepte plutôt qu'il y a un certain changement en ce qui concerne la constitution et la formation des sociétés modernes, d'autant plus que la post-modernité est utilisée pour désigner ce changement. Aujourd'hui, la modernité et post-modernité coexistent, et en termes de temporalité, la temporalité moderne n'est pas complètement effacée par la temporalité post-moderne. La post-modernité n'est pas considérée comme une étape historique dépassant la modernité, mais plutôt comme une condition qui co-existe avec des structures modernes.

Deux motifs conceptuels issus de la temporalité post-moderne, et définissant la nature de la transformation de l'histoire se manifestent dans la temporalisation de celle-ci et sa detemporalisation. Le premier chapitre de cette étude vise à découvrir les équivalents conceptuels de ces paires de motifs conceptuels au sein de la modernité. Dans ce cadre, la temporalité moderne est définie par «la dénaturalisation du temps», «la temporalisation de la vie» et «temporalisation de l'histoire». Les concepts de Reinhardt Koselleck «l'espace d'expérience» et «l'horizon d'attente» sont des outils importants pour comprendre le développement de la temporalité moderne. Dans la société pré-moderne, l'espace d'expérience et l'horizon d'attente ne représentent pas deux domaines distincts, mais ils constituent une seule condition unifiée et déterminée par la prédominance du passé. En période pré-moderne, le passé, le présent et l'avenir ont été expérimentés dans un cycle répétitif éternel du passé. Ainsi, au sein d'une structure temporelle dans laquelle le présent et l'avenir ne sont que les ombres du passé, il n'y avait pas de place pour un sens de l'histoire, mais seulement pour les tomes de chroniques. Ce premier chapitre a pour but d'analyser la naissance de l'histoire moderne en parallèle celle de la temporalité moderne. Celle-ci a émergé de la convergence des nouveaux horizons intellectuels de la Renaissance et des Lumières et les nouvelles forces économiques et sociales émergentes du capitalisme fraîchement surgit. Bien que les dimensions temporelles soient séparées les unes des autres, alors que le passé, le présent et l'avenir sont devenus des espaces et des horizons distincts, le passé a commencé à être considéré comme un pays étranger à visiter et à découvrir. Cette distance temporelle entre le présent et le passé a donné naissance au sens moderne de l'histoire. L'éloignement du passé du présent se reflète sur la relation entre le présent et l'avenir de l'autre bord du spectre temporel. Si le passé était différent du présent, l'avenir aurait également été différent,

et cela transforme l'avenir dans un horizon d'attente et des espoirs que les idéologies modernes ont inspirés de l'accent qu'elles mettent sur le nouveau.

Le deuxième chapitre vise à discuter de la relation entre l'histoire moderne et les idéologies nationalistes qui émergent au cours du XIXe siècle. On prétend que les idéologies nationalistes sont les produits de la temporalité moderne, mais elles visent également à transférer les structures sociales façonnées par ces idéologies sur le terrain de la temporalité moderne. Le processus de modernisation turque qui visait à transformer la société turque peut être analysé dans ce cadre. Les réformes kémalistes et le récit officiel de l'histoire peuvent être considérés comme les tentatives de placer la société turque dans la temporalité moderne par le moyen de destruction des structures traditionnelles de l'ancien régime. L'un des piliers les plus fondamentaux de la narration de l'histoire officielle, qui se présentait comme l'histoire biographique de la nation met l'accent sur la rupture avec l'Empire ottoman. Alors que l'espace historique a été délimitée par le récit officiel du régime, l'accent était mis sur la nouveauté du régime. L'histoire officielle dépeint une histoire téléologique de la nation, qui trouvera son incarnation ultime dans la nouvelle république turque. Bien que le récit officiel ait été basé sur la rupture avec l'Empire ottoman, le passé ottoman s'est intégré dans l'histoire officielle dans le temps aussi longtemps que cela a contribué à consolider les paramètres de la version officielle de l'histoire. Ce chapitre étudie la place du passé ottoman dans la thèse de l'histoire officielle à travers une analyse des manuels scolaires des années 1940, et son reflet sur l'écran de cinéma dans les années 1950. Dans ce chapitre, il est affirmé que l'imagerie ottomane sur l'écran de cinéma est une manifestation visualisée de cette thèse de l'histoire officielle.

Le troisième chapitre vise à porter la discussion du chapitre précédent sur la temporalité moderne et l'histoire à un autre plan de discussion sur la relation de la modernisation turque avec la modernité. On prétend que du régime kémaliste organiciste, corporatiste et solidariste à la théorie de la modernisation comme le paradigme dominant des années le deuxième guerre mondiale, le principal composant continu de la modernisation turque est son caractère modernisme réactionnaire. Même après les grands changements et les transformations après les années 1980, le modernisme réactionnaire a continué d'exister comme une caractéristique fondamentale de la culture politique turque, et cette continuité est importante pour comprendre une nouvelle forme actuelle de l'engagement avec le passé. Un climat politique et culturel égaliser la modernité avec le développement technologique et économique et en évitant ainsi les idéaux universels de la modernité par l'accent mise sur le caractère essentialiste de la culture turco-islamique qui est toujours vivant en Turquie. Cependant, la transformation néo-libérale a changé la ligne qui constitue cette continuité. Cette étude affirme que la nostalgie ottomane en Turquie résulte de la convergence de cette continuité et le changement. À ce stade, les facteurs qui ont conduit à des changements au sein de la société turque après 1980 devraient être analysées par des références à la transformation néo-libérale à l'échelle mondiale. Le concept de Fredric Jameson du capitalisme tardif est important pour comprendre la continuité et les changements au cours de la structuration néo-libérale des sociétés modernes. Depuis sa naissance le capitalisme se vit intrinsèquement des crises, elle a surmontées ces crises grâce à l'accélération comme stratégie de survie. En particulier, les crises des années 1970 a donné une impulsion beaucoup plus profonde des forces accélératrices du capitalisme, ce qui entraîne une production flexible, une formation de capital plus fluide, ainsi que la prolifération des technologies de la communication à la fois comme une conséquence et la force de la

reproduction de l'accélération. Jameson définit cette nouvelle phase du capitalisme comme le capitalisme tardif. Le néo-libéralisme comme la manifestation de la restructuration économique du capitalisme tardif a créé une alliance avec l'idéologie néo-conservatrice pour habiller la société capitaliste tardive ce avec cape hégémonique à part entière. Au sein de cette nouvelle forme de l'édifice social, la structure temporelle a été aussi l'objet d'une transformation. Le facteur le plus important menant à une telle transformation temporelle est l'augmentation de la vitesse de l'accélération provoquée par notamment avec l'émergence des nouvelles technologies de communication et la révolution numérique. Les dimensions temporelles comme passée, présent et future, ont été exposées à une des forces massives qui façonnent leurs interrelations en raison de la vitesse profonde du capitalisme tardif. La condition de l'immédiateté est devenue la principale forme d'existence sociale de la société néo-libérale où tout doit être accompli de la façon la plus rapide. Le présentisme définit la prédominance du présent sur d'autres dimensions temporelles dans l'immédiateté où la distance temporelle entre le passé, le présent et l'avenir sont en train de disparaître, c'est ce qui conduit à une situation du présent éternel. Le présentisme conduit à l'effondrement de la distance historique sur lequel l'histoire moderne s'est basée. Le detemporalisation de l'histoire et la transformation du passé comme des ingrédients de l'industrie des images commodifiés deviennent les principales manifestations de la condition post-moderne comme la logique culturelle du capitalisme tardif. Dans cette perspective, l'intérêt croissant vers le passé ottoman peut considérer comme le résultat de la transformation culturelle et sociale créée par la structuration néo-libéral après les années 1980. Ce chapitre vise à analyser cette reviviscence ottomane à travers ses manifestations dans l'architecture et la télévision. Les exemples d'architecture historiciste post-moderne qui a fleuri au cours des années 1990 fournissent un terrain fertile pour une discussion sur les caractéristiques de base de la nostalgie ottomane. Puis, au cours des années 2000, avec l'apparition du passé ottoman sur l'écrans, cet intérêt sur l'histoire est devenu beaucoup plus omniprésent. Dans ce chapitre, comme un exemple le plus important des séries télévisuelles historiques sur la base du passé ottoman, le Siècle Magnifique est analysé.

Cette étude affirme que le néo-ottomanisme utilisé par l'administration politique turque ne peut pas être considéré comme une tentative de construire un nouveau récit historique national sens moderne du terme. Mais il est un édifice composé de politiques populistes momentanés et soutenu par des changements structurels plus profonds dans les modes d'engagement avec le passé liés à de la transformation de la temporalité étant la condition postmoderne du capitalisme tardif.

La transformation de l'histoire en une représentation nostalgique des images du passé, résultant de la nature changeante de la temporalité, a transformé la structure politique en une scène ayant un caractère ahistorique. Les images commodifiées du passé sont devenues les principaux constituants du discours et de l'activité politiques. Dans cette structure sociétale de la trame temporelle postmoderne, il n'y a aucun motif possible de fonder un récit biographique soutenu comme c'était le cas dans les histoires nationalistes modernes. Les réactions apparemment nationalistes dans les sociétés en voie de développement utilisent la langue de la société du spectacle et de l'industrie de l'image dans leurs récits. Alors que le passé se transforme en un spectacle de signifiants vides, la politique elle-même se charge de ces structures et de discours qui ne se réfèrent pas à une signification conceptuelle importante.

Dans le capitalisme tardif, la disparition de la démocratie libérale, et la transformation des principes démocratiques dans des dispositifs rhétoriques vides purs peuvent être considérées comme des exemples d'un tel changement. En ce sens, le caractère moderniste réactionnaire de la modernisation turque trouve le meilleur terrain possible pour maintenir son approche sélective de la modernité dans le monde néolibéral d'aujourd'hui. L'accent mis sur seulement l'importance du développement économique et la suspicion croissante des valeurs démocratiques universelles gagnent un terrain beaucoup plus répandue dans la Turquie d'aujourd'hui. Bien que l'engagement avec le passé prenne une forme différente dans la temporalité postmoderne, le modernisme réactionnaire persiste dans le nouveau milieu social, politique et culturel.



ABSTRACT

In Turkey, there has been an increasing interest towards the Ottoman past in recent years. The appetite for the Ottoman past seems invading the Turkish society. The images, objects and discourses related to the Ottoman history have been appearing in from television series, political discourses and manifestations to social media, from architecture to house decorations. This study aims to understand the reasons for such a revival of the Ottoman past in Turkish society within the framework of the transformation of the history, and the changes in the ways of engagement with the past in modern societies. It attempts to analyse this new interest through the references both to the internal dynamics of the Turkish modernisation and to the more general structural changes within the modern societies. The debates over the neo-Ottomanism either claim that it is strategic policy in the international political stage, or assert that it is a deliberate attempt of the conservative government to establish a new historical discourse. This study, beyond these arguments, contends that the interest towards the Ottoman past is a consequence resulting from the convergence of the changes and ruptures that the Turkish society has been experiencing since the 1980s and of the continuities within the Turkish modernisation.

The transformation and changes brought by the integration of the Turkish economy into the global neo-liberal network were not only limited to the economic field, but also affected the social, cultural and political structures. This social constitution caused the transformation of the ways and forms of engagement with the past in the Turkish society. In this regard, the surge of the Ottoman nostalgia implies a structural change of society that can only be explained through illuminating the changes that the modern societies have been undergoing as a result of the arrival of late-capitalism and its neo-liberal edifice. This transformation brought up a change in the temporality in which the past becomes a reserve of ahistorical references. The late-modern or post-modern temporality causes the collapse of the social, political and cultural structures into an abyss of the ahistoric empty references as a result of detemporalisation the history. The Ottoman nostalgia in the Turkish society can be explained within this change of temporality. On the other hand, among these changes and transformation, the continuities of the fundamental characteristics of the Turkish modernisation should also be emphasised. The integration of the Turkish society into the neo-liberal market economy was brought up by a coup d'état which created a social condition in which extensive state authoritarianism and free-market economy have existed side by side. This study claims that the fundamental characteristic defining the Turkish modernisation is reactionary modernism which means a selective approach to modernity in order to avoid the complexities of the modern society by reducing the modernisation into monolithic developmentalism. Reactionary modernism establishes itself on a fundamental distinction between civilisation and culture. In this distinction, while civilisation means a technological development, culture refers to the innate characteristics of the nation as alien features to the universal ideals of the Enlightenment. From the organicist, solidarist

corporatism of Kemalism to the neo-liberal free-market authoritarianism of the post-1980 period, the reactionary modernism sustained itself as the continuing characteristic of the Turkish modernisation.

For the analysis of the Ottoman nostalgia, and the transformation of the historical and the change in the forms of engagement with the past, the changes after the 1980s and the continuity within the Turkish modernisation constitute the two major points of the backbone of this study. In this regard, the development of the temporality from pre-modern period to modernity should be considered for a better comprehension of the new societal ground resulting from the integration of the Turkish society to the neo-liberal world, and the impacts of this new social structure on the temporality and history. If there is change in the temporal structure which named as the post-modern or late-modern temporality today, then the previous forms of the temporality should be analysed through a historical view. At this point, it should be noted that this study does not conceive the modernity and post-modernity as successive historical periods, but it rather accepts that there is a certain change regarding constitution and formation of the modern societies, and then post-modernity is used to designate this change. Today, the modernity and post-modernity exist together, and in terms of temporality, the modern temporality is not completely erased by the post-modern temporality. The post-modernity is not considered as a historical step surpassing the modernity, but rather as a condition that co-exist with modern structures.

Two conceptual grounds stemming from the post-modern temporality, and defining the nature of the transformation of “the historical” are “the temporalisation of history” and “the detemporalisation of history”. The first chapter of this study aims to discover the conceptual equivalents of these pairs of conceptual grounds within modernity. Within this framework, modern temporality is defined by “the denaturalisation of time”, “temporalisation of life”, and “temporalisation of history”. Reinhardt Koselleck’s concepts “the space of experience” and “the horizon of expectation” are important tools to understand the development of modern temporality. In pre-modern society, the space of experience and the horizon of expectation did not denote two separate realms, but they constituted a unified, single condition determined by the predominance of the past. In pre-modern period, the past, the present and the future were experienced in an eternal repetitive cycle of the past. Thus, within a temporal structure in which the present and the future are just the shadows of the past, there was no place for a sense of history, but just for the tomes of chronicles. This first chapter aims to analyse the naissance of the modern history alongside the birth of the modern temporality. The modern temporality emerged from the convergence of the new horizons of the intellectuals of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and the new economic and social forces emerging from the freshly developing capitalism. While the temporal dimensions became separated from each other, while the past, the present and the future became distinct spaces and horizons, the past began to be seen as a foreign country to be visited and discovered. This temporal distance between the present and the past gave birth to the modern sense of history. The estrangement of the past from the present mirrored itself on the relationship of the present and the future on the other edge of the temporal spectrum. If the past was different from the present, then the future should have also been different, and this transformed the future into a horizon of expectations and hopes which the modern ideologies have inspired in their emphasis on the “new”.

The second chapter aims to discuss the relationship between modern history and the nationalist ideologies emerging during the nineteenth century. It is claimed that the nationalist ideologies are the products of the modern temporality, but they also aim to transfer the social structures, that they attempt to shape, into the terrain of the modern temporality. The Turkish modernisation process which aimed to transform the Turkish society can be analysed within this framework. The Kemalist reforms and the official history narrative can be considered as the attempts to place the Turkish society in to the modern temporality by means of cutting off from the traditional structures of the ancient regime. The one of the most fundamental pillars of the official history narrative, which presented itself as the biographical story of the nation, was its emphasis on the rupture from the Ottoman Empire. While the historical space was demarcated by the official narrative of the regime, the emphasis was on the newness of the regime. The official history depicted a teleological history of the nation developing to find its ultimate embodiment in the new Turkish republic. Although the official narrative was based on the rupture from the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman past became integrated into the official history in time as long as it helped to consolidate the parameters of the official narrative. This chapter investigates the place of the Ottoman past in the official history thesis through an analysis of the school textbooks of the 1940s, and its reflection on the cinema screen during the 1950s. In this chapter, it is claimed that the Ottoman imagery on the cinema screen is a visualised reflection of the official history thesis.

The third chapter aims to carry the discussion of the previous chapter on the modern temporality and history to another plane of discussion about the relationship of the Turkish modernisation with modernity. It is claimed that from the organicist, solidarist corporatism of the Kemalist regime to the modernisation theory as the dominant paradigm of the post-war years, the principal and continuous component of the Turkish modernisation is its reactionary modernist character. Even after the great changes and transformations after the 1980s, the reactionary modernism continued to exist as the fundamental characteristic of the Turkish political culture, and this continuity is important to understand today's new form of engagement with the past. A political and cultural climate equalizing the modernity with the technological and economic development and eschewing the universal ideals of modernity by means of its emphasis on the essentialist features Turkish-Islamic culture is still alive in Turkey. However, the neo-liberal transformation changed the line that this continuity flows. This study claims that the Ottoman nostalgia in Turkey results from the convergence of this continuity and change. At this point, the factors leading up to the changes within the Turkish society after 1980s should be analysed through references to the neo-liberal transformation in the global scale. Fredric Jameson's concept of late-capitalism is quite important to understand the continuity and changes during the neo-liberal structuring of the modern societies. Since capitalism is inherently laden with crisis, throughout its history, it has overcome these crises through acceleration as survival strategy. Especially the crises of the 1970s gave a much profound impetus to the accelerative forces of capitalism, resulting in flexible production, a more fluid capital formation, and also the proliferation of communication technologies both as a consequence and reproductive force of the acceleration. Jameson defines this new phase of capitalism as late-capitalism. Neo-liberalism as the manifestation of the economic restructuring of the late-capitalism established an alliance with neo-conservative ideology to dress the late-capitalist society with full-fledged hegemonic cloak. Within this new form of social edifice, the temporal structure has been undergoing a transformation, as well. The most important factor leading up to such temporal transformation is the

increasing level of acceleration caused by especially with the emergence new forms of communication technologies and the digital revolution. The temporal dimensions, past, present and future, have been exposed to a massive forces shaping their interrelationship as a result of the profound speed of the late-capitalism. The condition of immediacy became the main form of social existence of the neo-liberal society in which everything should be fulfilled in the fastest way. The presentism defines the predominance of the present over other temporal dimensions in the condition of immediacy where the temporal distance between past, present and future are fading away, leading up to a situation of eternal present. The presentism leads up to the collapse of the historical distance on which the modern history was born. The detemporalisation of history and the transformation of the past into an input of the industry of commodified images become the main manifestations of the post-modern condition as the cultural logic of the late-capitalism. In this perspective, the growing interest towards the Ottoman past can be considered as the result of the cultural and social transformation created by the neo-liberal structuring after the 1980s. This chapter aims to analyse this Ottoman revivalism through its manifestations in the architecture and television. The post-modern historicist architectural examples which bloomed during the 1990s provide a fertile ground for a discussion of the basic features of the Ottoman nostalgia. Then, during the 2000s, with the appearance of the Ottoman past on the TV screens, this interest on history became much pervasive. In this chapter, the most important example of the TV shows based on the Ottoman past, *Magnificent Century* is analysed. Finally, the utilisation of the Ottoman past by the political authority in Turkey is aimed to be analysed within a framework demarcated by the aforementioned continuities and changes. This study claims that the neo-Ottomanism utilised by the Turkish political administration cannot be considered as an attempt to establish a new national historical narrative in modern sense, but it is an edifice composed of momentary populist policies and the deeper structural changes in the ways of engagement with the past as a result of the transformation of temporality in the post-modern condition of late-capitalism.

The transformation of the history into a nostalgic representation of the images of the past resulting from the changing nature of the temporality turned the political structure into a scene with an ahistorical character. The commodified images of the past became the main reference points of the political discourse and activity. In this societal structure of the post-modern temporal frame, there is no possible ground for founding a sustained biographical narrative as in the modern nationalist stories. The seemingly nationalist reactions in late-modern societies use the language of the spectacle society and the image industry in their narratives. While the past turns into a spectacle of empty signifiers, the politics itself becomes loaded with such structures and discourses which do not refer to any substantial conceptual meaning. In the neo-liberal/neo-conservative alliance of the late-capitalism, the demise of the liberal-democracy, and the transformation of the democratic principles into pure empty rhetorical devices can be considered as the examples of such a transformation. In this sense, the reactionary modernist character of the Turkish modernisation finds the best possible ground to sustain its selective approach to the modernity in the neo-liberal world of today. The emphasis on the economic development, and the increasing suspicion towards the universal democratic values are gaining a much pervasive ground in the social, political and cultural structures of today's Turkey. Although, the engagement with the past is taking a different

form in the post-modern temporality, the reactionary modernism persists in this new social, political and cultural milieu.



ÖZET

Türkiye’de özellikle son on yılda Osmanlı geçmişine yönelik giderek artan bir ilgi gözlemlenmektedir. “Osmanlı”, televizyon dizilerinden, siyasi söylem, eylem ve gösterilere, sosyal medyaya, mimari biçimlere, ev içi dekorasyonlarından, süs eşyalarına kadar toplumsal alanın her köşesinde görünürlük kazanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Osmanlı’nın Türkiye’de kazandığı bu yeni görünürlüğün nedenlerini tarih kavramının geçirdiği dönüşüm ve modern toplumların geçmişle kurdukları ilişkide yaşanan değişim çerçevesinde hem Türk modernleşmesinin içsel dinamiklerine hem de modern toplumların yaşadıkları çok daha genel yapısal dönüşümlere başvurarak anlamayı hedefliyor. Türkiye’de yeni-Osmanlılık üzerine var olan tartışmaların genelde uluslararası ilişkiler çerçevesi içinde ortaya çıkan bir siyasal strateji olduğunu ya da muhafazakar hükümetin yeni bir tarihsel söylem yaratma çabası olduğunu öne sürdükleri görülmektedir. Bu çalışma bu tartışmaların ötesinde, Osmanlı’ya yönelik ortaya çıkan bu ilginin, Türkiye’de 1980’lerden beri yaşanan bir süreçte yaşanan değişimler sonucu ortaya çıkan toplumsal yapının getirdiği kırılmaların ve değişimlerin, Türk modernleşmesine içkin sürekliliklerle çakıştığı noktada ortaya çıktığını öne sürmektedir.

1980’lerde yaşanan kırılma Türkiye toplumunu küresel neoliberal ekonomik düzenin içine sürüklerken ortaya çıkan dönüşüm sadece ekonomik alanla sınırlı değildi, o zamana kadar var olagelmış toplumsal, siyasal ve kültürel yapıların da dönüşümüne işaret ediyordu. Bu yeni toplumsal yapı geçmişle kurulan ilişki biçimlerinin dönüşmesine, tarihsel olanın farklı bir yapı kazanmasına yol açtı. Bu çerçevede, Türkiye’deki Osmanlı nostaljisinin neoliberal dönüşüm, geç-kapitalizm ve modern toplumların yaşamakta olduğu değişimlere referansla açıklanabilecek yapısal bir dönüşüm olduğu görülmektedir. Bu dönüşüm tarih dışı bir anlayışı ortaya çıkaran yeni bir zamansallığın ortaya çıkmaya başladığı bir süreci imlemektedir. Bu geç-modern ya da post-modern zamansallık, tarihin zaman dışı bir zemine oturmasına neden olarak toplumsal yapının tüm siyasal ve kültürel veçheleriyle tarih dışı bir boş gösterenler dünyasının içinde doğru çökmesine neden olmaktadır. Osmanlı’ya yönelik Türk toplumunda ortaya çıkan ilgi de zamansallığın bu dönüşümünde bulunabilir. Öte yandan, 80’lerden beri yaşanan tüm bu değişimin ortasında, Türk modernleşmesine özgü temel bazı unsurlarının sürekliliği de gözden kaçırılmamalıdır. 1980’lerde yaşanan neoliberal dönüşümün Türkiye’de bir darbeye beraber geldiği ve sonraki yıllarda derin bir devlet otoritesi ve piyasa ekonomisinin yarattığı toplumsal altüst oluşun el ele yürüdüğü düşünüldüğünde bu süreklilik daha açık hale gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, Türk modernleşmesini tanımlayan temel kavramın gerici modernizm olduğunu iddia ediyor. Gerici modernizm kavramı modernliğin yarattığı toplumsal altüst oluşun yarattığı sorunlarla halleşmeden modernliği tekil bir kalkınma anlayışına indirgeyen seçmeci bir modernlik anlayışını dile getirmektedir. Medeniyet ve kültür ayrımı üzerinde şekillenen bir modernleşme anlayışı Aydınlanma’nın evrensel değerlerine ulusal kültürün özüne yabancı olarak görüp mesafeli yaklaşırken, medeniyeti kalkınmayla özdeşleştirir. Bu açıdan, Kemalizmin otoriter, tenasütçü ve organizmacı korporatizminden 1980 sonrasının

serbest piyasacı neo-liberal otoriteryanizmine uzanan tarihsel bir çizgide, Türk modernleşmesi gerici modernizmi kendisini tanımlayan temel bir unsur olarak günümüze dek korumuştur.

Türkiye’deki Osmanlı nostaljisini ve bu çerçevede tarihsel olanın ve geçmişle kurulan ilişki biçiminin dönüşümünü ele alırken bu iki nokta, 80 sonrası yaşanan değişim ve Türk modernleşmesinin içindeki süreklilik bu çalışmanın başat analiz noktalarını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’nin neoliberal piyasa ekonomisine eklenmesi ile ortaya çıkan yeni toplumsal zeminin, bunun kültürel yansımalarının ve sonuçta ortaya çıkan farklı bir zamansallık ve tarih anlayışının tartışılması için modern toplumların zamansallığa ilişkin geçirdikleri aşamaların anlaşılması gerekmektedir. Eğer şu an postmodern bir zamansallıktan ve tarihin zamansızlaşmasından bahsedilecekse, bu dönüşümün nasıl bir tarihsel aşamadan geçerek bugüne ulaştığının anlaşılması ancak modernliğe ve hatta modern öncesine yapılacak tarihsel-analitik bir ziyaretle mümkündür. Bu noktada, belirtilmelidir ki, bu çalışma modernliği ve geç-modernliği / postmodernliği doğrusal bir gelişme çizgisi içinde birbirini önceleyen bir tarihsel aşamalar olarak ele almamaktadır, temel tartışma zemini daha çok yaşanan bir değişimin var olduğu kabulü üzerinden yola çıkarak, iç içe geçmelerin, bir arada bulunmaların var olduğu bir toplumsal alanın içindeki bu değişimleri anlamlandırmak için belli kavramsallaştırmaların kullanılması üzerine oturmaktadır. Bu noktada, postmodern kavramı bir modernliğin aşılmasını imleyen, ya da ondan sonra geleni tanımlayan bir kavram olarak değil, modernlikle birlikte dönüşen ama ondan farklılaşan ve hatta ona karşı işleyen bir toplumsal durumu anlatmak için kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca, postmodern zamansallık denildiğinde anlatılmak istenen modern zamansallık anlayışının topyekün ortadan kalktığı bir durum değildir, daha çok modern zamansallıkla birlikte var olan farklı bir zamansallık düzleminin ortaya çıkmakta olduğudur.

Postmodern zamansallıktan kaynaklanan ve tarihselliğin dönüşümünü tanımlayan iki temel kavramsal düzey, “zamanın zamansallaşması” ve “tarihin zamansızlaşması”dır. Bu çalışmanın ilk bölümü, bu iki kavramsal düzeyin modernliğin içindeki kavramsal karşılıklarını aramayı amaçlamaktadır. Modernliğin içinde “Zamanın doğadan kopması”, “hayatın zamansallaşması” ve “tarihin zamansallaştırılması” olarak karışımıza çıkan bu kavramsal düzeyler modern öncesindeki zaman ve tarih anlayışından yola çıkılarak tarihsel bir gelişim ve değişim çizgisi boyunca analiz edilmektedir. Reinhardt Koselleck’in “deneyim alanı” ve “beklenti ufku” olarak adlandırdığı kavram çifti modern zamansallığın doğuşunu ve dönüşümünü anlamak için önemli araçlardır. Modern öncesi dönemde bu kavramların tekabül ettiği toplumsal durumların birbirlerinden ayrı olarak deneyimlenmediği, aksine birbirleriyle örtüşen zamansal boyutların oluşturduğu ve geçmişin egemenliği altından şekillenen bir zamansallık içinde daimi tekrardan oluşan bir zaman anlayışının bulunduğu tartışılmaktadır. Geçmişin gölgesinin bugünü ve geleceği belirlediği bir zamansallık içinde tarihsellikten değil sadece vakanivüslükten bahsedilebilir. Birinci bölüm modern öncesi dönemden modernliğe geçişle birlikte modern tarihin nasıl doğduğunu modern zamansallığın doğuşu çerçevesinde tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Entelektüel alanın yeni ufukları ve ortaya çıkan yeni ekonomik ve toplumsal güçlerin birleşiminden doğan bu modern zamansallık köklerini Rönesans perspektivizmine, Aydınlanma’nın gelecek ve geçmişe eleştirel bakışına ve yeni filizlenen ve gittikçe hızlanan bir yaşamı dayatan kapitalizmde bulur. Zamansal boyutların gittikçe birbirinden ayrılmasıyla, geçmiş, bugün ve gelecek birbirlerinden uzaklaşmaya başladıkça, geçmiş bugünden farklı yabancı bir ülke olarak görülmeye başlandı. Geçmiş, ziyaret edilip belli bir

metodolojik çalışmayla bilgisi edinilebilecek şimdiki zamandan farklı bir zamansal boyuta dönüştüğü nokta modern tarih anlayışının doğumuna işaret eder. Geçmişin şimdiki zamandan farklı olduğuna dair bakış modern zamansallığın diğer ucundaki yansımada geleceğin de farklı olacağına dair bir beklentinin doğmasına yol açmıştır. Böylece Koselleck'in deneyim alanı ve beklenti ufku kavramlarının birbirinden ayrılmasıyla tanımlanan modern zamansallık modernitenin yeni olana yaptığı vurguyu ve geleceği biçimlendirmeye talip modern ideolojilerin doğuşunu da açıklar.

İkinci bölüm, modern zamansallığın ve onun içinden doğan modern tarih anlayışının 19. yüzyılda ortaya çıkmaya başlayan ulus devletler ve milliyetçiliklerle girdiği ilişkiyi tartışmaya çalışıyor. Milliyetçi ideolojilerin hem modern zamansallığın bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktıklarını, ve hem de dönüştürmeye çalıştıkları toplumsal alanı bu modern zamansallığın içine taşımayı amaçladıklarını öne sürmektedir. Türk modernleşmesinin ve ulus devletinin yaratmaya çalıştığı yeni toplumsal yapının dönüşümü de bu çerçevede değerlendirilebilir. Kemalist reformlar ve resmi tarih söylemi Türkiye toplumunu eski rejimin modern öncesi zamansallığından çıkarıp modern zamana ve tarihe yerleştirme çabası olarak okunabilir. Ulusun yaşam öyküsünün belli tarihsel duraklar üzerinden serimlendiği bir anlatı olarak Türk tarih tezinin en temel öğelerinden biri kendisini geleneksel toplumu temsil eden Osmanlı'dan bir kopuş üzerine kurmasıydı. Böylece bir yandan tarihsel alan rejimin resmi söylemiyle sınırlanırken, öte yandan vurgu tarihin teleolojik olarak sürüklendiği Türk ulus devletinin yeniliği üzerineydi. Osmanlı, bu bağlamda, zaman içinde resmi tarih söylemine Türk resmi tarih tezinin izin verdiği ve onu desteklediği ölçüde girebildi. Bu bölüm Osmanlı'ya dair resmi tarih tezi söylemini 1940'lı yılların ders kitapları üzerinden analiz etmeyi amaçlamakta, ayrıca bu söylemin 1950'li yıllarda sinema sektörünün gelişmesiyle birlikte sinema ekranında nasıl görünürlük kazandığını da incelemektedir. Ekrandaki bu Osmanlı imgesinin resmi tarih tezinin içinde sunulan Osmanlı imgesinin bir yansıması olduğu iddia edilmekte ve Osmanlı geçmişi açısından kamusal alanın görece bir sterillliğe sahip olduğu öne sürülmektedir.

Üçüncü bölüm, önceki bölümde zamansallık ve tarih üzerinden yapılan tartışmayı Türk modernleşmesinin modernlikle kurduğu ilişkinin yapısı üzerine bir analitik düzeye taşımayı amaçlamakta ve buradan çıkarılan sonuçlar üzerinden bugüne ulaşan tarihsel dönüşüm üzerine düşünmeyi hedeflemektedir. Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarının korporatist yapısından İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasının egemen söylemi olan modernleşmeci bakışına uzanan bir yolda Türk modernleşmesinin temel paradigma olarak daha önce sözünü ettiğimiz gibi gerici modernizmin izlerini taşıdığı iddia edilmektedir. 1980 sonrası yaşanan tüm toplumsal altüst oluşa rağmen, bu paradigmatik çizginin belirli bir süreklilik sergilemesi günümüzde geçmişle kurulan ilişkilerdeki değişimin anlaşılması açısından önemlidir. Bir yandan modernliği teknolojik ve ekonomik kalkınmacılıkla eşitleyen, öte yandan modernliğin yarattığı toplumsal, kültürel ve düşünsel alanı tüm karmaşıklığıyla kenarından dolaşp bir Türk (ve artık İslam) özcülüğü temelinde bir evrensel demokratik değerleri yabancılaştıran bir siyaset ve kültür iklimi hala tüm canlılığıyla ayakta. Diğer yandan, neoliberal dönüşümün yarattığı yeni toplumsal durum bu sürekliliğin aktığı yatağın değişmesine neden olmuştur. Bu çalışma, süreklilik ile değişimin kesiştiği noktada ortaya çıkan geçmişle ilişkilenme biçiminin Türkiye'deki Osmanlı ilgisini doğurduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu noktada, değişimin nedenlerin anlaşılması dünya üzerinde neoliberal düzenin doğuşuna neden olan faktörlerin incelenmesini gerektirmektedir. Fredric Jameson'ın geç kapitalizm kavramı bu

sürecin anlaşılmasında hem kapitalizmin sürekliliğine hem de kapitalizmin yapısındaki değişimlere yaptığı vurgu nedeniyle önemlidir. Kapitalizme içkin bir özellik olarak giderek hızlanma ve krizleri hızlanarak aşma halinin, kapitalizmi dönüştürmesi ve sonuçta ortaya çıkan yeni bir iktisadi, toplumsal ve kültürel yapı neoliberal bir iktisadi bir zeminde, ve kültürel alanda ise postmodern durum üzerinde yükselmektedir. Bu bölüm ayrıca, Hartmut Rosa'nın hız kavramı üzerinden kapitalizmin dönüşümünü tasvir ettiği analitik zemine dayanarak neoliberal pazar ekonomisinin hem nedeni hem de sonucu olan hızın iletişim teknolojileri yoluyla nasıl daha yaygın bir şekilde toplumsal oluşun temel bir özelliği haline geldiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Gittikçe hızlanan teknolojik dönüşüm, toplumsal alanın da hızlanmasına neden olarak zamansallığın farklı bir nitelik kazanmasına yol açmakta, geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek arasında var olan ilişki boyutunu da dönüşüme uğratmaktadır. Hem gittikçe anlık bir çerçeveye sığmayan başlayan hem de bu anlık halin gittikçe tüm zamansal durumu belirlediği bir şimdilik yeni ortaya çıkan postmodern zamansallığın ana belirleyenisidir. Şimdiliğin egemenliğinde, deneyim alanı ve beklenti ufku arasında modern zamansallığı belirleyen mesafe gittikçe kapanmaya başlarken, geçmiş ve gelecek şimdiki zamanın üzerine çökmeye başlamaktadır. Bu noktada, modern tarih anlayışı dönüşüme uğrayarak, geç kapitalizmi tarih dışı biçimlerin, sözcüklerin, söylemlerin ve eylemlerin belirlediği bir toplumsal duruma tahvil etmektedir. Tarihin zamansızlaşması, geçmişin gittikçe artan bir şekilde piyasa ekonomisinin ve iletişim teknolojilerinin ortaklaşa beslediği bir imge makinesinin girdilerinden biri haline gelmesi geç kapitalizmin kültürel yansıması olarak post-modern durumun merkezine oturmaktadır.

Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye'de son yıllarda daha önce görülmeyen bir şekilde ortaya çıkan Osmanlı geçmişine yönelik ilginin 1980 sonrası ülkenin yaşadığı büyük değişimle birlikte içine girdiği neoliberal piyasa ekonomisinin yarattığı kültürel ve toplumsal ortamın sonucu olduğu iddia edilebilir. Bu bölüm, 1990'larda önce mimari alanda görünür olmaya başlayan Osmanlı ilgisini bu alandan çeşitli örneklerle tartışıp, sonrasında 2000'lerde bu ilginin televizyon ekranlarına taşmasıyla birlikte özellikle Muhteşem Yüzyıl örneği üzerinden giderek tarihsel olanın aslında piyasa ve yeni zamansallık tarafından biçimlendiğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı süreçte siyasal iktidarın Osmanlı geçmişini nasıl araçsallaştırdığı, bu açıdan mimari ve televizyondaki geçmiş temsilleriyle nasıl bir ortak bir zemine oturduğu tartışılmaktadır.

Türkiye'de son yıllarda Osmanlı geçmişine giderek artan ilginin sadece uluslararası ilişkilerden kaynaklı bir stratejik tercih sonucu ortaya çıkıp yayılan ve bu gelişmeye paralel bir şekilde muhafazakar hükümetlerin beslediği yeni bir tarihsel söylemle açıklanamayacağı bu çalışmanın göstermeye çalıştığı ana sorunsaldır. Tarihsel olanın pazar değerleri tarafından belirlenen bir toplumsal ilişkiler ağı içinde gittikçe şeyleşmiş bir imge yığınının dönüştüğü düşünüldüğünde Türkiye toplumunun tarihe olan ilgisinin nedenleri daha iyi anlaşılabilir. Bu imge yığını içinden çıkan Osmanlı tarihi değil fakat oldukça sınırlı bir imge dağarcığıdır. Bu imge dağarcığının mimari cephelerde birkaç süsleme öğesi olarak ve televizyon dizilerinde ise belirli birkaç imgesel öğeye indirgenmesi bunun tarihle bir karşılaşma olmadığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, gittikçe daha da gösterileşen bir siyasal alan da bu kendi dışında yaratılmış bu imge rezervini kullanmaktadır. Siyasal söylem ve eylem alanında görülen bu Osmanlı vurgusunun sonucunda karşılan durum tarihsel bir

söylemin sahip olduđu yapısal bir bütünlük değil, herhangi bir tarihsel referansı olmayan boş gösterenlerin dolaşıma sokulduđu popülist bir retoriktir.



I – INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the new millennium, images of a distant past have begun to saturate Turkish society. A culture of nostalgia and memory based on the Ottoman past have flourished in almost every nook and cranny of society, from TV screens and cinemas to museums, art galleries, works of literature and architectural projects. It is also salient in cyberspace such as in chat rooms, on blogs and in other forms of social media. It should be noted that this interest in the Ottoman past did not suddenly bloom in the 2000s, but was the result of a long term transition that Turkish society has been going through since the 1980s. But it goes without saying that such a passionate appetite for the Ottoman past has never before been experienced in any period of the Republic, and it has never been so clearly observable. Some describe this moment as a sign of the rising conservatism of Turkish society; others relate it to the new global ambitions of the state, especially in former Ottoman territories¹. However, it should be analysed within a larger perspective considering both the more comprehensive cultural, social and economic transformation of Turkey and a larger global perspective.

This study aims to analyse on the one side what some scholars call social amnesia stemming from the demise of historical consciousness in the period of late capitalism and the explosion of a memory culture and a desire for nostalgia on the other side². Amnesia and nostalgia can be considered as two sides of the same coin. Andreas Huyssen describes this double sided development as the outcome of the reorganisation of the structure of the temporality which is very much shaped by

¹ Dan Bilefsky, “As if the Ottoman Period Never Ended”, **The New York Times**, October 29, 2012.

² David Harvey, **The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change**, Oxford: Backwell Publishers, 1990. Fredric Jameson, **Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism**, London: Verso, 1992. Paul Connerton, **How Modernity Forgets**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

technological advances, especially in media and other forms of communication technologies³.

As David Harvey has emphasized, each historical epoch exists with its own conception of time. Scholars such as Reinhart Koselleck and David Landes have depicted the change in historical time in different periods in their seminal works⁴. The cyclical conception of time in accordance with the rhythm of nature was replaced by a linear conception of time in modernity. The invention of the clock and the calendar were the fundamental determinants of this linear time and they displayed a development in parallel with the needs of growing capitalism in the west. Modernity's ambivalent character is also at work here: On the one hand it aimed to create a regime of discipline of time which found its expression in the modern factory⁵, and on the other hand it sought constant change, speed and transformation. Marx designated the importance of speed and turnover time for the realisation of profit in the overall theory of the circulation of capital. Thus, for example, Marx writes in the *Grundrisse*: "*Thus whilst capital must on the side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and to conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another*"⁶

The annihilation of space by time, as a central characteristic of modernity was born out of the introduction of increasing communication and transportation technologies, especially in the 19th century. As David Harvey pointed out, capitalism can survive from its inherent crises through its ability to transform itself. And the speed of this change accelerated gradually throughout the lifetime of capitalism until today.

The social and cultural impacts of this constant change and increasing speed of life were experienced *en masse* for the first time in the 19th century. A new society was born out of the turmoil and chaos created by industrialisation. The old world was

³ Andreas Huyssen, **Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia**, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 8.

⁴ Reinhart Koselleck, **Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time**, trans. By Keith Tribe, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. David. S. Landes, **Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World**, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000.

⁵ E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism", **Past and Present**, No. 38, 1967, pp. 56-97.

⁶ Karl Marx, **Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy**, Harmondsworth: Penguin Publishing, 1973, p. 539.

torn down by modern society as indicated by Marx's well-known expression: "All that is solid melts into air". Modern ideologies tried to explain and illuminate this chaotic existence of the modern individual in a coherent historical narrative. The main concern of almost all early theorists of society was this new type of human, as in the case of Georg Simmel. In his well-known essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life", Simmel offers an analysis of the influence of the urban environment on the formation of a specifically metropolitan type of modern individuality. Key to this is what he describes as the blasé attitude, an incapacity to react to new sensations with the appropriate energy.⁷ The blasé attitude is a direct response to the increased pace of life in the cities- the intensification of nervous stimulation which results from swift and uninterrupted change in stimuli⁸. Like Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer described how a new environment was created by the rapid speed of capitalism- an environment that envelops the masses. For him, this new atmosphere blends widespread commodification with the increasingly powerful social role played by information and communication technologies⁹.

The twentieth century also witnessed very different perspectives regarding time and pace in modern societies. The Italian futurists, and in particular, Marinetti, established a reckless, celebratory discourse of machine speed which was very much intertwined with Italian Fascism's authoritarian policies. And later in the century, Paul Virilio's critical essays¹⁰ on speed, power and violence, almost mirror images in their contrast with Marinetti's perspective and are characterised by their idiosyncrasy. As the end of the century approached, this ambivalent perspective regarding time, pace and speed in modern society proliferated with the introduction of more advanced forms of communication technologies. These technological developments were so great and pervasive that some started to talk about the emergence of a new type of society. As Frederic Jameson points out, this perspective was very much marked by a sense of the end of this or that, such as the end of history, the end of ideology or the end of the welfare state. For Jameson, "the end" defines the beginning of a new form of society, mostly called a post-industrial

⁷ Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life", **Simmel on Culture, Selected Writings**, ed. by David Frisby and Mike Featherstone, London: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 178.

⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 175.

⁹ Siegfried Kracauer, **The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays**, trans. By Thomas Y. Levin, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.

¹⁰ Paul Virilio, **Speed and Politics**, trans. by Marc Polizzotti, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007.

society, but sometimes described as a consumer society, a media society or an information society¹¹. The arrival of a post-industrial society characterised by some distinctive features such as the rise of the service sector, a decline in numbers of workers employed in industry, as well as flexible production and employment was applauded by Daniel Bell in his work *The Coming of Post Industrial Society*¹². The theory of post-industrial society gained considerable recognition through some popular works like Alvin Toffler's *Future Shock*¹³. In such works, it was claimed that a new society was rising, one as different from industrial society as that society had been from agrarian society. Following the 1973 oil crisis, the debates over post-industrial society began to be articulated in line with neo-conservative policies. Right-wing parties preaching a return to Victorian values of the 19th century laissez-faire capitalism and practices of self-help gained popular support in the west. They called for the destruction of the 1945 post-war settlement and for the abandonment of central planning and state intervention. This political perspective became dominant as the fundamental framework of neo-liberal ideology from the 1980s onwards in the west.

The concept of the post-industrial society has been very much intertwined with the information society debates since its inception. In *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Bell states that “the *post-industrial society is an information society, as industrial society is a goods-producing society*”¹⁴. The increasing sophistication of communication technologies, the ascending power of media and the growing pace of the means of transportation inaugurated a new form of society which is very much different than the previous modern industrial society. Toffler saluted this new form of society as he defined the arrival of this new society as a great revolution and even compared it to the Neolithic revolution¹⁵. According to these scholars, the society would be more affluent, more democratic and more open with the help of a higher level flow of information. However, this optimism started to turn to a certain pessimism regarding the hopeful promises of the information society with the economic crises of the 1970s. The information society thesis attracted many critiques from different shades of the ideological spectrum. The post-industrial society was regarded as the survival strategy of capitalism as it adapted itself to changing

¹¹ Jameson, *op.cit.*, p.3.

¹² Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York: Perseus Books, 1999.

¹³ Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, New York: Bantam Books, 1970.

¹⁴ Bell, *op.cit.*, p. 467.

¹⁵ Toffler, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

conditions of history. For Scott and Urry, it marks the end of organised capitalism with its regulatory forms of the distribution of wealth among different segments of society¹⁶. Harvey and Jameson share a similar view about the ability of capitalism to transform and adapt itself to the changing conditions of time; for instance, Jameson describes this epoch of capitalist society as its pure form¹⁷.

Whether regarded positively or negatively, many accept that a change has been occurring especially since the 70s. The world has been undergoing an undeniable global transformation, and the very characteristic of this transformation lies in the conception of time. According to Jameson and Harvey, this new conception of time is an integral part of the new cultural climate of the new phase of capitalism. Jameson describes postmodernism as a cultural dominant of the late capitalism. In this formulation, postmodernism allows for the presence and coexistence of a range of very different, yet subordinate features. These features of postmodernism, Jameson writes, are: *“A new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary theory and in a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum; a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private temporality, whose “schizophrenic” structure will determine new types of syntax and syntagmatic relationships in the more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone-what I will call “intensities-which can be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime; the deep constitutive relationships of all this to a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system[...]”*¹⁸

Jameson designates this new form temporality as “presentism” characterised by a loss of historical consciousness in the societal psyche. This situation is characterised as a dramatic and alarming shrinkage of existential time and the reduction to a present and with the virtual effacement of the past and the future¹⁹. This is what John Tomlinson calls *“the principle of immediacy”* which is defined as the emergent cultural principle of contemporary globalised and telemediated societies. According to Tomlinson, speed as the defining characteristic of capitalism developed into a culture of immediacy with the development of new forms of communication. For him, the condition of immediacy is not smoothly continuous

¹⁶ Scott Lash and John Urry, **The End of Organized Capitalism**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

¹⁷ Harvey, **op.cit.**, Jameson, **op.cit.**

¹⁸ Jameson, **op.cit.**, p.6.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 16-25.

with the earlier modern culture of speed²⁰. The telematisation - the increasing implication of electronic communications and media systems in the constitution of everyday experience have made the world present and immediate for us. In mechanical modernity, for Tomlinson, there was a temporal gap between now and a future which might require waiting and patience, but which seemed predictable and approachable as a part of deliberate action. The condition of immediacy means the closure of these intervals, thus the collapse of the past and the future into a continuous present²¹. In the same way, Harvey points out that human experience is reduced to a series of pure and unrelated presents: *“The image, the appearance, the spectacle can all be experienced with an intensity (joy or terror) made possible only by their appreciation as pure and unrelated presents in time”*²². Since all grand narratives are rejected, postmodernism eschews the idea of progress and historical continuity and memory. But it plunders history and confiscates whatever it finds there. Within the narrow and suffocating space of the present, the only way to create cultural products for the producers of culture is to turn nowhere but to the past. Both Harvey and Jameson give the example of postmodern architecture’s “historicism” which takes pieces from the past and uses them eclectically, as Jameson call *“the random cannibalisation of all styles of the past”*²³. And they claim that the historicism of the postmodern architecture becomes the dominant feature of the conception of history. This appetite for the past is also very much connected to consumer society. History becomes the baggage of sheer images, pseudo-events and spectacles. As Guy Debord observed: *“[...]Individual experience of disconnected everyday life remains without language, without concepts, and without critical access to its own past, which has nowhere been recorded. Uncommunicated, misunderstood and forgotten, it is smothered by the spectacle’s false memory of the unmemorable”*²⁴.

Spectacle’s sea of image is a depthless surface. Harvey writes that this surface finds its particular embodiment in the television screen: *“[...] in the era of mass television, there has emerged an attachment to surfaces rather than roots, to collage rather than in-depth work, to super-imposed quoted images rather than worked*

²⁰ John Tomlinson, **The Culture of Speed: The Coming of Immediacy**. London: Sage Publications, 2007, p. 10.

²¹ **Ibid.** p. 94-98.

²² Harvey, **op.cit.**, p. 54.

²³ Jameson, **op.cit.**, p. 18.

²⁴ Guy Debord, **Society of Spectacle**, London: Rebel Press, 2005, p.90.

surfaces, to a collapsed sense of time and space rather than solidly achieved cultural artefact”²⁵.

The past is considered as a reserve of equally important events which are stitched together in a continuous flow of images on the television screen. Therefore, *“history becomes a mere costume drama, and a re-enactment than critical discourse”*²⁶, it becomes a *“pop history”*²⁷ which represents the stereotypes about the past. In this fashion show of the past, there remains no historical difference between Tudor England, the Ottoman Empire of the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, or the Roman Empire of the time of Spartacus; the only difference separating them are their costumes and the cosmetic colours glowing on the surface.

Jameson calls this interest in the past *“an omnipresent, omnivorous and well-night libidinal historicism”*²⁸. This libidinal historicism reveals itself as a desire for nostalgia. The pseudo-historical depth of postmodern nostalgia is not concerned with historical content or a critical approach to history; it is an approach to the past through stylistic connotation conveying “pastness” by glossy qualities of the image.

Similarly, Svetlana Boym also talks about a global epidemic of nostalgia all over the world. According to Boym, an admiration for cyberspace and global village goes hand in hand with a longing for a distant past²⁹. Nostalgia appears as a panacea for a world shattered by the annihilating speed of capitalism which devastates any sense of continuity. Boym writes: *“With the development of late capitalism and digital technology, the universal civilisation becomes “global culture” and the local space is not merely transcended but made virtual [...] What is crucial is that nostalgia was not merely an expression of local longing, but a result of a new understanding of time and space that made division into local and universal possible. The nostalgic creature has internalised this division, but instead of aspiring for universal and the progressive he looks backwards and yearns for the particular”*³⁰.

This is the reactionary character of nostalgia which is very much in line with the basic principles of postmodernism such as the universal values of the Enlightenment. The more the present of consumer capitalism prevails over the past

²⁵ Harvey, **op.cit.** p. 61.

²⁶ **Ibid.** p. 63.

²⁷ Jameson, **op.cit.**, p 25.

²⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 18.

²⁹ Svetlana Boym, **The Future of Nostalgia**, New York: Basic Books, 2002.

³⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 13.

and the future, the less stability or identity it provides for contemporary subjects³¹. This is why identity has become the main topic in recent decades. Nostalgia promises a sense of belonging and identity, but in a very similar way the goods of consumption offer satisfaction and identity to individuals in this society of late capitalism.

As can be seen, the collapse of historical consciousness and the rise of the mood of nostalgia is a global phenomenon stemming from the new dimension of temporality. Since capitalism has gained a more pervasive global characteristic, all societies in the world have been experiencing its cultural, social, political and economic impacts. Turkey has also experienced this change quite deeply, especially from the 1980s onwards. Neo-liberal policies which aimed to integrate Turkey into the global economy were introduced in tandem with the authoritarian cultural and political climate imposed by the junta established after the 1980 coup d'état. Turkey became a society of consumption with its pervasive effects over the cultural structure of the society. Rapid and unfettered urbanisation, the rise of a new middle class, the new patterns of consumption and the introduction of new life styles were accompanied by the break-down of the former hegemonic position of the official ideology and the proliferation of the articulation of ethnic, cultural and sexual identities. However, there was a continuous imprint of authoritarian state power on all these changes within society.

Views and concerns regarding history and the past in general were also subject to change during this period. Although the official view of history inculcated by the state was kept intact, different interpretations of history began to emerge; different segments of society claimed their roles in the history writing. Ottoman history was also under certain scrutiny and was opened to various different historiographical views. Kemalist ideology justified its existence by presenting itself as a kind of *estado novo* which was considered as an entirely new state different from the decadent Ottoman past. The official discourse history was based on this negation of history and the origins of the Turkish nation were transcended to Central Asia and even to the Hittites and the Sumerians. However, especially with the military intervention of the 1980, the influence of a particular type of conservatism which has some roots in both religion and nationalism started to gain ground in social, cultural

³¹ Connerton, **op.cit.**, p. 65-66.

and political life in Turkey. Thus, the Ottoman past became more prominent in the history writing of this conservative segment of society. However, the appearance of Ottoman history in the images, consumption and language of everyday life is a relatively new phenomenon. The appetite of consumption finds a good source in the reserve of the Ottoman past. Besides the effects of the society of consumption, the sense of insecurity and rootlessness as a result of the transformation that Turkey has undergone prepared a fertile soil for such nostalgia for the Ottoman past.

In this study, I aim to analyse the images produced by Ottoman nostalgia in Turkish society today. Television series, cinema films and other forms media dominating the visual culture and imagination of the social psyche will be the subject matters of this analysis. It will not involve a discourse analysis or a research of the content of these media or a study of historiography, but it will rather try to inquire about the place of this revival of the Ottoman past in 21th century Turkish society. The social, cultural and political changes in recent Turkish society such as consumption society, neo-liberal and neo-conservative state policies, nationalism and the question of identity will be the ground for this discussion. However, this study's main argument is that although the rise of Ottoman nostalgia is certainly a product of the conditions of this country, it can only be understood within a larger perspective considering the global tendencies around the world. The interest and appetite for the past can be observed in other societies, as well. This phenomenon can be best understood as the end result of the global forces of late capitalism and the social and cultural conditions created by it. Thus, this work will compare and investigate some of the cultural products created by the nostalgia culture through inquiring about their place in such a large perspective. As Siegfried Kracauer pointed out, the position that an epoch occupies in the historical process can be better determined from an analysis of its inconspicuous surface-level expressions than from that epoch's judgments about itself. The surface-level expressions provide unmediated access to the fundamental substance of the state of things.

In the first chapter of the study, the transformation of the conception of time and temporality during the development of modern society will be analysed. This transformation from the pre-modern temporal structure to the modern temporality is quite significant to understand the later developments during the late-modern times. Within this perspective, the relationship between the modern temporality and the

modern historical consciousness will be analysed. The time discipline imposed by the capitalist production on the one hand and the Enlightenment's emphasis on the development and its aspirations for building a better future around the universal values of freedom and equality will be inquired in a historical perspective.

The second chapter will analyse the connection between the modern historical consciousness and nationalist ideologies as the defining political, cultural and social units of the modern times. Within this frame, the Turkish modernisation will be evaluated in terms of its relation to the modern temporal structure and history with a specific reference to the Ottoman past. For this purpose, four cinema films will be selected and analysed to exemplify the reflections of this relation in cultural field.

The third chapter will be dedicated to the debates of Modernism and Post-Modernism as a fundamental key to understand the world we are living in today. The analysis will revolve around the question regarding whether we are living in a different society from the previous phases of the capitalism or not. The discussion will consider especially the debates around time, temporality and their effects in cultural structure of today's global society. Some questions such as "Do we need a different set of concepts and language different from the modernist concepts and language to understand the contemporary world?", "What are the implications of the relentless acceleration of the capitalism on the cultural structure of today's global community?" will be tried to be answered with reference to some discussions about consumption society, reification, popular culture-high culture and society of the spectacle.

In this chapter, the concept of nostalgia will be described within a historical perspective. The answer will be sought for the question of "why a culture of nostalgia has globally flourished in the world today". The rise of the culture of nostalgia in Turkey will be inspected in connection with the global changes regarding time and temporality in general, and also the Turkish society's transformation since the 1980's in particular. The reflections of this culture of nostalgia for the Ottoman past in the popular culture especially in the media will be analysed through the inspection of some television series, architecture and political discourse.

II - CHAPTER 1

THE PREMISES OF MODERN TEMPORALITY AND THE NAISSANCE OF HISTORY

A - Tempus Fugit! Time as the Constitutive and Elusive Element of Modernity

Three words constituting the title of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's 1954 novel *The Time Regulation Institute* reveal the cardinal features of the Turkish modernisation: The new structuration of the Turkish society through a bureaucratic state along a rupture in temporal plain. The novel creates an allegorical terrain where every protagonist and institution satirizes the transformation of the Turkish society within modernisation process. It presents itself as the biographical narration of Hayri İrdal, the assistant head manager of *the Time Regulation Institute* founded with the goal of synchronising all the clocks in Turkey, thereby driving the nation into the modern age. He is, like Tanpınar himself, represents the individual who was born in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and witnessed the transition to the Republican period. Time in this sense plays both a symbolic and a more concrete reference to this transformation of the society. It denotes two different societal life times demarcated by the foundation of the Republic, and also the introduction of the Gregorian calendar, European measures, and Roman numerals by the new regime. This break between two worlds created a bifurcated consciousness in Turkish People's psyche. This in-between situation resulting from the modernisation constitutes the main preoccupation of the earlier novel of Tanpınar, *A Mind at Peace* (Huzur) where this ambivalence is described through an existential melancholia of the characters in search of their place in time. Tanpınar deals with the same theme of the people suspended between two lives in a completely different, satirical setting in *The Time Regulation Institute*. The old clock that stood in the family house of the main character of the novel, representing the ancient regime's temporality never shows the time correctly. The real change appears with his apprenticeship to the wise old clock repairman, Nuri Efendi, representative of the honest values of the communitarian life of the old Ottoman society. But, with the demise of this old times, Hayri İrdal finds himself in an aimless

floating void which was filled with his encounter with Halit Ayarcı, a rational opportunist created by the modernising transition. Ayarcı manipulates İrdal to build up a totally unnecessary institution inspired by the wisdom words inherited from the sage man: *“regulation is chasing down the seconds”*. “Think about the implication of these words,” Ayarcı tells İrdal. *“We are losing half our time with unregulated clocks. If every person loses one second per hour, we lose a total of 18 million seconds in that hour... Now perform the calculations and see how many lifetimes suddenly slip away every year... Can you now see the immensity of Nuri Efendi’s mind, his genius? Thanks to his inspiration, we shall make up the loss”*³².

Hence will the *Time Regulation Institute* eventually be born with this idea of modern rationality of work and economy. Although Tanpınar accepts the importance of this idea of rational use of time for work, he criticizes the bureaucratic structure of the newly established Turkish state symbolised by the nonsensical existence of the Institute.

Another core point of the novel is the process in which Hayri İrdal gets to know the truth and history can be restructured and rewritten along the lines of certain interests. Naïve, old fashioned and pessimist character was inculcated by his mentor, Halit Ayarcı, to become a realist seeing the opportunities in life. Ayarcı says *“You’re going to change, Hayri Bey, change... above all else, the Time Regulation Institute needs you to believe”*³³. Eventually, he changes. He believes. With the order of the government, he writes a fictitious biography of a never-existed 17th century clockmaker philosophe from whom the Institute got its historical legitimation. The success of the Institute was dependent on this distortion of “the future and the past through the prism of the present”. By creating such a phantasmagorical temporal narration, the Institute prepares the way for a propagandistic state, reminding the official discourse of history of the Turkish State. Tanpınar offers a counter argument against this fictitious past effacing the history by making Hayri İrdal speak to himself: *“It is my past, and not my current position in life, that holds the key problems; I can neither escape from it nor entirely accept its mandate”*. It is a remedy weaving a link through the temporal continuity of the society against the Faustian destruction of the

³² Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, **The Time Regulation Institute**, trans. by Maureen Freely and Alexander Dawe, New York: Penguin Books, 2013, p.8.

³³ **Ibid.**, p. 128.

past by the modern nation-state as aptly described by Marshall Berman who defined modernity as a Janus in the maelstrom of the ocean of change³⁴.

In another geography and time, at the end of the 20th century, the ghost of this maelstrom was still haunting the imagination of some writers like Milan Kundera. In his 1995 novel, *Slowness*, he tells two parallel love stories lived in two separate times, reflecting the change in the human consciousness regarding to not only love but to the entirety of the world. Two lovers building a love story set in the 18th century, unbound from the ticking of the clock, theatrical acts of touching hands, hesitant eyes, “*the art of prolonging the suspense*”³⁵. “*By slowing their night, by dividing it into different stages, each separate from the text, Madame de T. has succeeded in giving the small span of time accorded them the semblance of a marvellous little architecture, of a form. Imposing form on a period of time is what beauty demands, but so does memory*”³⁶. In contrast to the slowness of this staged drama of art of desire, a love story from today narrated by Kundera in parallel pages suffers from the dizziness resulted from the hectic pace of life. For Kundera, there is no more time for building the edifice of love based on the moments to be remembered in an architectural manner, the desire is reduced to mere instinct of pornography: “*There is a secret bond between slowness and memory, between speed and forgetting. Consider this utterly commonplace situation: a man is walking down the street. At a certain moment, he tries to recall something, but the recollection escapes him. Automatically, he slows down. Meanwhile, a person who wants to forget a disagreeable incident he has just lived through starts unconsciously to speed up his pace, as if he were trying to distance himself from a thing still close to him in time. In existential mathematics, that experience takes the form of two basic equations: the degree of slowness is directly proportional to the intensity of memory; the degree of speed is directly proportional to the intensity of forgetting*”³⁷.

On the way from the 18th century to this day the modern society flourished in the western world. For Kundera, the speed emerges as the fundamental characteristic of the modern society. Today, everything turns into ashes in the thin air in an instant, so constant feelings of human sensation are only a distant memory of the past. This is the modern technology which has bestowed the speed on the man as a form of ecstasy. In

³⁴ Marshall Berman, **All That is Solid Melts into Air**, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1988.

³⁵ Kundera, Milan, **Slowness**, trans. by Linda Asher, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996, p. 36.

³⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 38.

³⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 39.

this ecstatic condition of humanity, constructing a narration of a love story is impossible, since the only material that we have is the crumbling bricks of a single instant. “*Our period is given over to the demon of speed, and that is the reason it so easily forgets its own self. Now I would reserve that statement and say: our period is obsessed by the desire to forget, and it is to fulfil that desire that it gives over to the demon of speed: it picks up the pace to show us it no longer wishes to be remembered; that is tired of itself; sick of itself; that it wants to blow out the trembling flame of memory*”³⁸. This description of our time as captive in the hands of the demon of the speed stemming from a coupling of two love stories is the revelation of something quite crucial about the modern society. Whether as drastic change as in the case of the Tanpınar’s novel or in the form of demonic forces of speed, the acceleration constitutes the backbone of modernity. However, juxtaposing slowness of the former times and the eternal acceleration of the modern society as dual opposites may constitute a basis for a longing for the past times as in the 19th century romantic conservatism as a reactionary confrontation against the turmoil resulted from the emergence of modern society. To avoid such a reactionary stance based on the negation of the existing societal structures, the relation between modernity and the acceleration must be clearly discerned.

In his colossal work, *The Decline of the West*, Oswald Spengler describes the cultures and civilisations through a biographical narrative of birth, life and death cycle. For him, the world of classical antiquity was a polis-centred, atemporal, spatially extended culture based on Euclidian understanding symbolised in the monumental forms of architecture. However, the modernity is characterised by the Faustian spirit of a restless age which is fundamentally temporal. Modern times started with the invention of the clock which reminded the individual his/her existence constantly within a temporal frame³⁹. Although, in a pessimistic expectation Spengler saw the demise of the western civilisation in this rise of modern society, the clock time brought a complete different set of mind with full of optimism and hope for the future, as well. Almost all the intellectuals of the early modernity were stricken with such a dual characteristic of the freshly flourishing society as Charles Dickens described in *A Tale of Two Cities*’ opening paragraph: “*It was the best of times, it was the worst of*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³⁹ Oswald Spengler, *The decline of the West: Form and Actuality*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.

times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way- in short, the period was so far like the present period”⁴⁰. The present period was the middle of the 19th century from where Dickens was looking back to the epoch just before the French Revolution. These observations producing such oscillating feelings acknowledge the nature of the early modern society in Europe. People were bewildered by the rapid transformation of their lives and the swift change in their surrounding world. As Dickens voiced it was a period of full hope and expectation, but at the same time, of obscurity and unrest. This was the bewilderment of facing a new world without precedent and of living in an entirely different fabric of time. This new fabric was woven with the springs of a new invention called clock. Long before the modern times, as early as the sixth century, some Benedictine monasteries organised the days according to hours to schedule the prayer hours. The invention of a mechanical device to make this regulation more precisely embodied the time as abstract units. The appearance of the first clocks in the monasteries and cathedrals in the European cities in the fourteenth century manifests the apparent connection between religious practice and abstract notion of time⁴¹. Pre-modern consideration of a cyclical time based on the movement of the celestial bodies and seasonal changes of nature were being replaced such an abstract temporal structure independent of the movement of the earth or nature.

B - Nihil Novum Sub Sole

The Platonic dual opposition between eternity and time remained the constitutive foundation of the western thought regarding the conception of time from the Antiquity through the mediaeval world. In *Timaeus*, Plato defines eternity as the perfect divinely feature of the Demiurge who forged the physical world of humans. Eternity is the end form of perfection that does not need to move or develop. The contrast set by Plato between the eternal and the time reflects the distinction between

⁴⁰ Charles Dickens, **A Tale of Two Cities**, New Jersey: Dover Publications, 2011, p.1.

⁴¹ Lewis Mumford, **Technics and Civilization**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Landes, **op.cit.**

being and becoming. In contrast to the eternal forms of being, the temporal world of becoming and change was created in the image of the heaven or in the likeness of being: *“When the father creator saw the creature he made moving and living, the created image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like the original; and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal, as far as might be. Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity, when he set in order the heaven, he made this image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity; and this image we call time”*⁴² For Plato, this temporal existence of becoming in this world is the reflection or the image of the eternal form of immovable being of god like the shadows on the wall of the cave as he described in *The Republic* where all sensible phenomena are depicted as the imperfect copies of the eternal forms. Thus, time mimics the movement of the heavenly bodies in the sky. Time is not a given frame; it is produced by the celestial revolutions which are themselves the work of the Demiurge⁴³. According to Plato, life comes into being, passes away and moves in the cycle of time. It is the wheel of becoming moving along birth, growth, maturity, decay, death and rebirth. Time has three dimensions, past, present and future that move along a numerical rationality. The indivisible and immovable being of the demiurge does not susceptible to this movement since he is the unity, he is “the one”: *“[...] that “was” and “will be” only spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same cannot be older or younger by time[...]*⁴⁴. So, only “is” alone attributed to the eternal being of the god.

This idea of the unity of “the one” was followed by the most prominent neo-platonist, Plotinus through the platonic distinction between eternity and time. For Plotinus, the One is a supreme principle which transcends the intellect and transcends knowing or being known. The One is the source of the universal intellect (Divine Mind), of life and of the cosmos. The higher intellectual principle is the guide by which lesser beings seek the way to reach to this higher principle. Time is the life of the soul, in which the life is constituted through a continuous series of acts. Being in time is different than being in eternity. Time is a changing reality, on the other hand

⁴²Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, London: Macmillan Publications, 1959, p. 14.

⁴³Francis MacDonald Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato*, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 1997, p.103.

⁴⁴ Plato, *op.cit.*, p.110.

eternity is an unchanging reality belonged to the Intellectual Principle. Plotinus identifies eternity with repose in unity, and time with movement⁴⁵. “*That which neither has been nor will be, but simply possesses being; that which enjoys stable existence as neither in process of change nor having ever changed- that is Eternity*”⁴⁶. “*Time is variously identified with what we know as Movement, with a moved object, and with some phenomenon of Movement: obviously it cannot be Rest or a resting object or any phenomenon of rest, since in its characteristic idea, it is concerned with change*”⁴⁷. Each soul seeks to become like the Intellectual Principle, and the Intellectual Principle seeks to become like the One. Thus the perfection of the universe is a process of such a continuous search for this eternal unchanging condition of the unity out of changing characteristic of time. Time is described as descent from the eternity, and it aspires to reach the eternity in a circular way⁴⁸.

In a similar vein, Saint Augustine in his Confessions portrays time and eternity as two distinct orders. He states that time is the horizontal movement of human existence which stretches out through the past, present and future. On the other hand, Eternity is described as the eternal present understood as the unchangeableness of God which transcends time. According to Augustine, the aim of time is to be caught up into this eternal present so that we can experience it while still bound by the temporal. So, we live the duration of time horizontally, whereas vertically we should aim at eternity of God which resides in our soul: “*Who now teacheth us, but the unchangeable Truth? for even when we are admonished through a changeable creature; we are but led to the unchangeable Truth; where we learn truly, while we stand and hear Him, and rejoice greatly because of the Bridegroom’s voice, restoring us to Him, from Whom we are. And therefore the Beginning, because unless It abided, there should not, when we astray, be whither to return. But we return from error, it is through knowing; and that we may know, He teacheth us, because He is the Beginning, and speaking unto us*”⁴⁹. Humans who find the eternal presence of God in them can reach the salvation truly. Being ever present with God, people experiencing God in the eternal present are there because they have no expectations for the future and no more desire for the past as they dwell eternally with God⁵⁰. Although the past and future should be dissolved

⁴⁵ Plotinus, **The Enneads**, London: Faber & Faber, 1930, p. 223.

⁴⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 225.

⁴⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 229.

⁴⁸ **Ibid.** p. 229.

⁴⁹ Saint Augustine, **The Confessions of Saint Augustine**, San Diego: Icon Classics, 2005, p. 204.

⁵⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 212.

into the eternal present of God, they play important roles in Augustine's thought on the way to salvation. Through the memory of the past, humans remembers the moments of their search for truth, so the past as the collection of the redeemed and enlightened moments to find the eternal existence of God paves the way towards salvation. The future is also defined as the promise of the eschatological redemption which is understood as the eternally existing present. Time is the means by the redemptive history is fulfilled. When Augustine was asked about what God was doing before the creation of the earth, he states that this question demands an answer which is beyond the knowledge of human being because God's eternal sublimation transcends the temporal existence of this world: "*Thou predest all things past, by the sublimity of an ever-present eternity; and surpasses all future because they are future, and when they come, they shall be past, but Thou art the Same, and Thy years fail not*"⁵¹. The beginning of life lays in this inconceivable sublime existence of God, and time is just the terrain of the mortal human beings, and it is destined to be decayed until they reach the ever present eternity of God in themselves. This eschatological salvation idea constitutes one of the primary pillars of the mediaeval Christian doctrine: "[...] *They works may praise Thee, which from time have beginning and ending, rising and setting, growth and decay, form and privation. They have then their succession of morning and evening, part secretly, part apparently; for they were made of nothing, by Thee* [...]"⁵². From this beginning, life follows up a predestined cycle of growth and decay, however redemptive end of salvation does not germ within this earthly temporality but in divine eternity. On earthly existence of human, there is nothing worthy of knowing or discovering, because everything needed for the vertical journey towards heavenly world was accorded at the beginning of life. The circular conception of time in antiquity was adopted and interpreted in Christian scholasticism by adding an eschatological feature to it, but it kept its unchanging and immovable characteristic until the secularisation of the time in modern ages.

C - Historia Magistra Vitae

This cyclical conception of time entailed an understanding of temporality where the past, present and future overlap into a single instant, since the past, present

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 271.

and future repeat themselves in a circular fashion. In this framework, the past becomes the one and only guiding light for present and the future as summarised by the ancient motto stating that history is the great teacher of life: *Historia Magistra Vitae*⁵³. As Reinhart Koselleck puts it: “...history is presented as kind of reservoir of multiplies experiences which the readers can learn and make their own; in the words of one of the ancients, history makes us free to repeat the successes of the past instead of re-committing earlier mistakes in the present day. This was the function of history for about two thousand years, a school in which one could come prudent without error.”⁵⁴ According to this understanding, we cannot ourselves experience, we have to follow the experience of the previous ones who set the examples for us. History is the index of moral, theological, legal and political doctrines. Even if there were a social change, it happens so slowly and during quite a long time that past examples retain their power and utility. Everything depended on the on the historical deductions, the pedagogic role of the history was coming from the changeless nature of the temporal understanding where a continuity connects the past to the future.

In 1159, John of Salisbury wrote in his *Metalogicon*: “*Nanos gigantum humeris insidentes*” which he attributed to Bernard de Chartres. This phrase was a metaphor literally depicting “dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants”. John of Salisbury elucidates this metaphor as: “We frequently know more, not because we have moved ahead by our own natural ability, but because we are supported by the [mental] strength of others, possess riches that we have inherited from our forefathers. Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne on their gigantic stature”⁵⁵. The present people can only find the truth on the knowledge of the old, not on their own experience. This duality between the old and new was corresponding to the opposition between giants and dwarfs. The old age of mankind was its age of wisdom and sage, while the time unfolds the mankind itself gets younger and should look for the wisdom of their ancestors to become prudent

⁵³ The idiom *Historia Magistra Vitae* was coined by Cicero who borrowed it from a Hellenistic pattern. Koselleck, 2004, p. 28. Another expression of Cicero also illuminates the exemplary role of history: *Plena exemplorum est historia* (History is full of examples) Koselleck, 2004, p28.

⁵⁴ Koselleck, **op.cit.**, p. 27.

⁵⁵ John of Salisbury, **The Metalogicon**, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955, p. 167.

and good. Nothing new can be experienced with danger and disturbance, so the best thing is to refer to the teachings of the old ways. The present is written in the deeds and wisdom and action of the past, and the future will also expand in the same way. No change was without its divine sense or naturally conditioned regularity. This understanding can also be found in The New Testament which itself was the fulfilment of the Old Testament: “Now, *all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet,...*” (Matthew, 1:22). “*He said, I [am] the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord, as said the prophet Esaias.*” (John, 1:23). In the stained glasses of the Chartres Cathedral, the four evangelists were depicted as on the shoulders of four Old Testament prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel). They can see farther than the prophets can see, because they witnessed the coming of Messiah about whom the prophets foresaw. It is obvious that the history is the fulfilment of the said and lived deeds in the past. It is a collection of instructive experiences which could be grasped by learning. But in terms of the temporal change, the past, present and future do not differentiate. The past, in this sense, contains the life of the present and the future in itself. Thus, the history is the history of this single moment combining these three forms of temporal terrain where the past and present and future collapsed into each other.

The Mérode Altarpiece (circa 1425, New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art) (Picture 2.1) attributed to the early Flemish painter Robert Campin or to the Master of Flémalle depicts an Annunciation scene where Gabriel announces Virgin Mary that she will conceive and become the mother of Jesus. In the central panel, Virgin reads a book in a room of a typical Flemish bourgeois house of the period. She also looks like an ordinary Flemish young lady who was unexpectedly caught by Gabriel in her daily repose. In the side panels depicted as the courtyard and the other room of the same house, there is the donor couple who were vaguely identified as a bourgeois family from the Flemish town Mechelen, and the other panel shows Saint Joseph working in his carpenter workshop whose window opens to a 15th century street surrounded by typical Flemish houses.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ János Véghe, **Les Primitifs Flamands: Les Maîtres du XVe Siècle**, trans. by Georges Kassai, Paris : L'imprimerie des Arts et Manufactures, 1977.

Picture 2.1: The Mérode Altarpiece, circa 1425, New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art



What is striking in this painting is that the temporal narration of the well-known story of the Annunciation is intertwined with temporality of the 15th century Flemish society. This is a pictorial rendering of the story of Mary and Joseph living in a 15th century Flemish town. This intentional anachronism was a strategy that enabled painters, patrons and spectators to make religious narratives seem actual, efficient and present.⁵⁷ For the people looking at this painting, this was not an awkward or bizarre experience, because their perception of temporal frame was completely in line of this juxtaposition of the different temporal layers. “*The present and the past were enclosed within a common historical plane.*”⁵⁸ The achronological narrative and the comprehensive sense of presence overlap with the idea of the unchanging and perpetual nature of time, thus while the past engulfs the present and the future, the present moment as the horizon of experience expands all over the historical time. In a stagnant world imitating the eternal present of the God, every moment turns into an all-encompassing present repeating itself in the perennial recurrence of the ever-same. As art historian Charles Tolnay once spoke on the Mérode Altarpiece: “*En vain chercherait-on Dieu le Père: celui-ci est pourtant présent, mais d’une présence diffuse, répandue sur les objets.*”⁵⁹ The eternal present of the God was there on every object and figure in the painting no matter they belong to 1st century BC Judea or 15th century AD Flanders.

⁵⁷ Michael Baxandall, **Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 46.

⁵⁸ Koselleck, **op.cit.**, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Quoted by Végh, **op.cit.**, p. 25.

The change between the classical antiquity and the Christian eschatological understanding was mainly on the nature of the eternal being, the eternal existence of cosmos in antiquity was transferred into the eternal presence of the god in the Christian theology. Hannah Arendt illustrates this perception as: *“No doubt this eternal recurrence “is the closest possible approximation of a world of becoming to that of being” but it does not, of course, make individual men immortal; on the contrary, embedded in a cosmos in which everything was immortal, it was mortality which became the hallmark of human existence.”*⁶⁰ However, while the antiquity bestows some form of eternal existence on the earthly temporal frame mimicking the eternity of the divine existence, for the Christian understanding the time was demarcated by an end. But, the theme of recurrence of the historical events of the past in the present and future remained the leitmotiv throughout ages.

Historia Magistra Vitae, in this respect, is the collection of the memories of the mortal human beings to reach a sense of the form of eternity of the divinely existence of cosmos or the god. According to Arendt, the distinction between mortality of men and immortality was the tacit assumption of historiography: *“All things that owe their existence to men, such as works, deeds, and words, are perishable, infected, as it were, by the mortality of their authors. However, if mortals succeeded in endowing their works, deeds, and words with some permanence and in arresting their perishability, then these things would, to a degree at least, enter and be at home in the world of everlastingness...”*⁶¹

This is why Arendt poetically and metaphorically thinks that the history started with the tears of Odysseus in Homer’s *Odyssey*. At the court of the Phaeacians, during a feast, their bard sings several songs including the poems like *Odyssey* itself. While everyone in the feast rejoices, Odysseus weeps when he listens to the story of his own life, *“now a thing outside himself, and an ‘object’ for all to see and to hear.”*⁶² “What had been sheer occurrence now became ‘history’.”⁶³ Odysseus weeps because he is told his own life as a story of the past, he thus is transformed into a third person for his own story, and he realises that he is already dead as an object of history. Illustrating the “presentness” encompassing the temporal plane, the

⁶⁰Hannah Arendt, **Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought**, New York: The Viking Press, 1961, p. 42.

⁶¹ **Ibid.**, p. 43.

⁶² **Ibid.**, p. 45.

⁶³ **Ibid.**, p. 45.

presence of Odysseus reveals this feature quite evidently by combining the actor, listener and sufferer in the same personality. For Arendt, motives of curiosity and sheer lust for new information which plays an important role for modern historical inquiry is absent in Odysseus.⁶⁴ This modern understanding of history opens up the development of our modernity. It was the philosophy of historical process which detached the early modernity from its past, with a new future, inaugurated the modernity where a consciousness of time started to flourish.⁶⁵ Thus, a new understanding of history emerged at the beginning of the 18th century by placing a temporal and critical distance between the past and present, in this way the past becomes an object of inquiry and critical contemplation and reasoning, not only a baggage of old stories of the past times.

D - O Tempora O Mores! New Times of Modern Society

In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville writes “*I go back century by century up to the furthest removed antiquity; but I perceive nothing that resembles what is occurring before my eyes: With the past no longer shedding light on the future, the mind advances in the darkness*”⁶⁶ The thing occurring was the emergence of a new society with a new social, economic, political and cultural structure which brought a complete upheaval to the western world. In the first half of the nineteenth century in which Tocqueville published his book, the modern society was already born in the womb of Europa, hurling a cry of joy, hope, change and fear in her bosom. Everything familiar was drifted away down into the abyss of the modern society, as Tocqueville says people were groping in the dark to find their ways, the old teacher left them helpless in this new world of constant change. Virgil was not there for Tocqueville, Dante took him as his guide when he got lost in a dark forest⁶⁷. In his journey through the nine circles of suffering in *Inferno*, Virgil the old teacher from the past enlightened the road for Dante. However, in the 19th century, *Historia Magistra Vitae* had already started to vanish long time ago.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁶⁵ Koselleck, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

⁶⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America**, trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 662.

⁶⁷ *Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita mi ritrovai per una selva oscura che la dritta via era smarrita.* (In the middle of the journey of our life, I found myself in a dark forest with the right road lost). Dante Alighieri, *La Divina Commedia*, *Inferno*, Canto I.

The ancient form of history was toppled down from its throne, and a new relationship between past, present and future came into being through a new temporal quality peculiar to modernity. This new temporality brought “the destruction of the exemplary nature of past events, and in its place, the discovery of the uniqueness of historical processes and the possibility of progress.”⁶⁸ For Koselleck, the horizon of experience and the horizon of expectation overlap in the ancient form of history. However with the arrival of modern understanding of history, the cliff between these two different horizons started getting wider and wider. As Lévi-Strauss pointed out the modernity generated a historical depth and critical distance between the past and the present.⁶⁹

The history was no longer solely a collection of examples, and the past was not the only guide for human action and knowledge. Secularisation of the mind opened a new understanding of the world, and launched a novel way of relating to the historical time. The past could not carry the absolute authority as the only source of the good life any longer. The present gained value and authority at the expense of the past. As Descartes asserted “...since God has given each of us some light to distinguish the true from the false, I would not have believed I ought to rest content for a single moment with the opinion of others, had I not proposed to use my own judgement to examine them when there would be time: and I would not have been able to free myself of scruples in following these opinions, had I not hoped that I would not, on that account, lose any opportunity of finding better ones, in case there were any.”⁷⁰ The legitimacy of the giants of the old times became discarded with these words, and dwarfs transformed themselves with their own reason into the new giants of their own time. The past can turn into a sinister trap which can devour the human reason and creativity: “...conversing with those of other ages is about the same thing as traveling. [...] But when one takes too much time traveling, one eventually becomes a stranger in one’s own country; and when one is too curious about what commonly took place in past ages, one usually remains quite ignorant of what is taking place in one’s own country.”⁷¹ Thus, the past became a long distant land that could be visited but settling there could make you forget your own land which is the present time. The past was no longer embedded within the present and

⁶⁸ Koselleck, **op.cit.**, p. 36.

⁶⁹ Claude Lévi-Strauss, **Regarder, Ecouter, Lire**, Paris: Plon, 1993, p. 29.

⁷⁰ René Descartes, **Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy**, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998, p. 16.

⁷¹ **Ibid.**, p. 4.

future, the cleavage between the horizon experience and the horizon of expectation started to be broadened. The history was now the terrain of the past human experiences to be searched, evaluated and critically appraised, not a mere source of endlessly repeated human activity. Several concepts complementing this understanding of this novel form of history were introduced into the lexicon of knowledge, such as revolution, progress, change and development. The political, social and cultural ideal were not in the past anymore, but it became the subject matter of the present and was transformed into an ideal which could be achieved in the future. In this sense, it is claimed that the modern understanding of the progress and development which extend into an undetermined future is the reflection of the old Christian eschatology. However, Arendt states this is completely a false perception of the modern form of history which is based on the secularism: “[...] *for the first time, the history of mankind reaches back into an infinite past to which we can add at will and into which we can inquire further as it stretches ahead into an infinite future. This twofold infinity of past and future eliminates all notions of beginning and end, establishing mankind in a potential earthly immortality. What at first glance looks like a Christianization of world history in fact eliminates all religious time-speculations from secular history [...] Nothing could be more alien to Christian thought than this concept of an earthly immortality of mankind.*”⁷² The rational prognosis of the modern political mind replaced the eschatological projection of the pre-modern period. While apocalyptic prophecy had been destroying the time by its fixation on the End, prognosis was producing the time through weaving it in an unforeseeable but predictable manner. This new temporal structure opened up a limitless future of potentials for the human mind and activity, the political ideal was placed into the future instead of in the past. While the future became the main focus of the aspirations of the society to achieve a good life, the past was turned into a subject of scientific inquiry. For instance, starting from the Renaissance, the Antiquity became a central ground of reference; however it was entirely different than the role played by the past in the previous centuries where the old had been taken as a source of eternal recurrence. A sort of transfiguration of the past into a field of curiosity of the human rationality marked the modernity. “...ultimate truth was no longer supposed to reside in a single book, whether the

⁷² Arendt, **op.cit.**, 68.

*Bible or some substitute for it. History itself was considered such a book...*⁷³ It was not the god who “moves in mysterious ways”, but the history whose structure and internal working were supposed to be investigated: “*History was no longer merely a collection of examples, but rather the sole path to the true knowledge of our own condition [...] history is no longer a teacher of the art of making political prescriptions, but it is ‘instructive solely in that it inspires and instructs independent creative judgement.’*”⁷⁴ This change in the form of history was only possible with a concomitant change in the temporal dimension. The cyclical conception of time was dethroned with the rise of new understanding of an abstract temporality based on the clock time. The time founded on the cyclical movement on the celestial bodies was no more the basis of the temporal change, but a temporality structured by human made organisation and division of time. So, nature and history could now separate conceptually from each other. This can be called the “temporalisation of history” which has arisen with the time detached itself from the naturally formed chronology.⁷⁵ This abstract partition of time into periods and ages, centuries, days and hours could make the historical time possible through a narrative based on change and progress. As Hartmut Rosa pointed the fundamental characteristic of the modernity cutting across all the modern periods is this temporal dimension. For him, “*modernisation is not only a multileveled process in time but also signifies first and foremost a structural (and culturally highly significant) transformation of time structures and horizons themselves.*”⁷⁶ With the emergence of the clock time, the new temporal structure did not only start to shape the historical understanding but also whole edifice of the human life. Within this new structuration, social acceleration came out as an entirely new social and conceptual entity of the modern society.

E - The De-Naturalisation of Temporal Experience

Reinhart Koselleck, in his study of the semantics of historical time, defines two specific temporal determinants that characterize modernity’s new experience of

⁷³ **Ibid.**, p. 68-69.

⁷⁴ Koselleck, **op.cit.**, p. 41-42.

⁷⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 37.

⁷⁶ Hartmut Rosa, **Social Acceleration: A new Theory of Modernity**, trans. by Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 4.

transition: “the expected otherness of the future and, associated with it, the alteration in the rhythm of temporal experience: acceleration, by means of which one’s own time is distinguished from what went before.”⁷⁷ For Koselleck, this new experience of transition lies at the core of the development of the modern history. This new time which shattered the temporal plain of the previous age led to the emergence of a historical consciousness: “The *neue Zeit* of history was impregnated with the difference which was torn open between one’s own time and that of the future, between previous experience and the expectation of what was to come.”⁷⁸ Acceleration as the key concept in explaining the truly historical experience of the modern society corresponds to a “denaturalization of the traditional experience of time.”⁷⁹

“Les fleurs au bord du champ ne sont plus des fleurs, ce sont des taches ou plutôt des raies rouges ou blanches ; plus de point, tout devient raie ; les blés sont de grandes chevelures jaunes, les luzernes sont de longues tresses vertes ; les villes, les clochers et les arbres dansent et se mêlent follement à l’horizon ; de temps en temps, une ombre, une forme, un spectre debout paraît et disparaît comme l’éclair à côté de la portière : c’est un garde du chemin [...]”⁸⁰ writes Victor Hugo in a letter to his daughter Adèle in 1837 after an exciting journey on a train. It was a time of great change created by the industrialisation symbolised by the expanding web of railroads throughout Europe. The dizziness, ecstasy, perplexity, hope and fear incited by the whirlpool of the ever increasing speed of this new age generated a completely different perception of the world in the eyes of the people. Victor Hugo’s words revealing this new sensation were heralding the broken brush strokes of the impressionism of the coming years. Both geographical and social landscapes were started to be seen from a different window constantly moving in an accelerating speed.

For Hartmut Rosa, the experience of modernization is practically equivalent to the experience of acceleration, and modernity is about the acceleration

⁷⁷ Koselleck, *op.cit.*, p. 241.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁷⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, “Is There an Acceleration of History”, **High-speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power and Modernity**, ed. by Hartmut Rosa and William E. Scheuerman, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009, p. 116.

⁸⁰ Tommaso Meldolesi, “De la Fenêtre du Train en Mouvement”, *Revue d’Histoire des Chemins de Fer*, vol. 26, 2003, p. 255.

of time.⁸¹ He claims that the development of technology, communication and technique constitute the basis of this acceleration; however they cannot be accounted as the sole source of the accelerative tempo of the modern life. Cultural, political and philosophical components of modernity in tandem with the technological development also propelled the motor of this society of speed.

The train in which Victor Hugo was looking through its window was rolling only in 40 km. per hour! Even that pace was enough to create such a novel sensation. Koselleck describes the situation of the generation of Victor Hugo as an unprecedented experience that cannot be compared to anything before and after: *“Even today’s generation, witnesses of trips to the moon and Sputniks, of live television coverage, of rockets and jet airplanes, has not undergone a revolution of experience like that of the pre-1848 generation.”*⁸² The train was the most prominent figure in the blazon of this new age, there even emerged locomotive poetry both eulogizing and condemning the iron horse⁸³. As Eric Hobsbawm put it, railway became a sort of synonym for ultra modernity in the 1840s.⁸⁴ This symbolic place became embedded within the language itself, in *The Class Struggles in France*, Marx described revolution as the “locomotive of history”. This metaphorical formulation illustrating revolution pulling history behind on the temporal track of modernity implies the acceleration of history as well.

Before Marx, in the second year of the revolution, deputy Abbé Henri Grégoire, one of the leaders of the French Revolution illuminated this accelerating feature of history: *“The French people have gone beyond all other peoples; however, the detestable regime whose remnants we are shaking off keeps us still a great distance from nature; there is still an enormous gap between what we are and what we could be. Let us hurry to fill this gap; let us reconstitute human nature by giving it a new stamp.”*⁸⁵ “Filling the gap” signifies the efforts to accelerate the effects of time, to bring the future to the present. This denotes a new characteristic of time,

⁸¹ Rosa, **Social Acceleration...**, p. 299.

⁸² Koselleck wrote these words during the 70s, in a period before the digital revolution of the 1990s. Koselleck, **Is There and Acceleration of History...**, p. 115.

⁸³ See: Marc Baroli, **Le train dans la littérature française**, Paris : Edition N.M., 1969.

⁸⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, **Industry and Empire: From 1870 to the Present Day**, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 111.

⁸⁵ Cited by Lynn Hunt, **Measuring Time, Making History**, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008, p. 70.

almost plastic that can be moulded by the efforts of human beings, which germinated in the midst of the early modern society.

This new conception of time in stark contrast with the previous conceptions of time shaped by nature, appeared with the development of mechanical clocks. At the turn of the twelfth to the thirteenth century, a strange and previously unheard desire sprouted in some European cities. They wanted to know the time.⁸⁶ First mechanical clocks began to appear in the monastic world of the European geography. The regulation of the working, praying and contemplation hours entailed a more dependable instrument than the movement of the celestial bodies. Clocks placed in the belfries of churches were initially used to indicate prayer times and to call people to worship. But with the development of industry and commerce, the use of the public clocks became more and more prevalent. The merchants of the fourteenth century, by building the first public clocks, created the regular, laicized hour, the urban hour, the hour of the opening and closing shops and workshops.⁸⁷ Jacques Le Goff described this transformation as the displacement of the old church's time by the new merchant's time or mercantile time. Public clocks became the prestigious symbols of the economic prosperity and the political strength of cities. When the Flemish town Kortrijk rebelled against the Burgundian rule, after their defeat in 1382 Philippe le hardi, duke of Burgundy, took the city clock of Kortrijk as a punishment and placed it in his capital city Dijon.⁸⁸ This metamorphosis of the religiously use of temporal mechanism towards a civil and secular form displays an evident relationship between metaphysical considerations of time, Christian theology and religious practice. *"This shift from an external divine attribute to an attainable personal trait coincided with the gradual internalization of the idea of clockwork discipline. Some of the earliest images of weight-driven mechanical clocks in paintings and engravings show the female figure of Temperantia⁸⁹ with a clock beside her."*⁹⁰ The popularisation of adage *Festina Lente* seemingly an oxymoron meaning "make haste slowly" also displays how the self-discipline was gradually

⁸⁶ Helga Nowotny, **Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 16.

⁸⁷ Gerhard Dorh-Van Rossum, **History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders**, trans. by Thomas Dunlop, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 127.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p., 136.

⁸⁹ Temperantia is one of the cardinal virtues in classical antiquity, associated with self-control, restraint and moderation.

⁹⁰ Adam Max Cohen, **Technology and the Early Modern Self**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 27.

internalized by the early modern self. Within time, this new urge became a fundamental necessity for the emerging modern individual, for example, in 1481, the citizens of Lyon demanded a clock to be built from the town council to help them live a more orderly life.⁹¹ Out of this mercantile / industry-based time discipline, a new temporal worldview started to flourish across societies and cultures in Europe. Through the secularization of the idea of time, a significant transformation which no more looked up to the heavens but forward to what could appear on Earth in the future infiltrated into the European psyche along the development of modern society.

By means of the confluence of the clock, industrialization and modernity, time was transformed from a mode of subjective experience into an abstract value. As Koselleck put it: “*The whole history of the measurement of time can also be described with regard to its social function as a story of increasing abstraction.*”⁹² This abstraction was the result of the denaturalization of temporal experience which liberated itself from the cycles of nature and the movement of the heavenly bodies. The denaturalized- abstract temporal order developed along the ascendance of rationalism in general and the rational structuring of the human labour in particular which was brilliantly analysed by Max Weber in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. As symbolically embedded in culture with *Temperantia* and the adage of *Festina Lente*, this new temporal order implied a rationally structured hardwork, thriftiness and moderation as later attributed as the fundamental traits of the early capitalism by Weber. However, the acceleration and speed entered into the vocabulary of capitalism in later stages through increasing mechanisation which led to the industrial capitalism and profound rationalisation supported by the Enlightenment. “Time is money” declared Benjamin Franklin to describe the essence of this development. “*The mechanical clock descended from the castle or church tower to the town hall, then to the living room, and finally its way into the vest pocket.*”⁹³ The clock-time became a mechanism for rationalizing the human work and also a custodian of discipline. In his insightful essay *Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism*, E.P. Thompson depicts the intimate relation between, industrialization, money and time: “*The employer must use the time of his labour,*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹² Koselleck, *Is There an Acceleration of History...*, p. 117.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 177-188.

*and see it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time when reduced to money is dominant. Time is now currency: it is not passed but spent.”*⁹⁴

With the nineteenth century, through the emergence of time as the essential element of the industrial economy, a growing acceleration became its permanent temporal mode. As early as 1848, Marx wrote: *“Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones...All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zone; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe...The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization.”*⁹⁵ The history of capitalism is the history of constantly seeking ways to speed up commodity production and eliminate the drag on their circulation. *“An accelerating rate of turnover of capital reduces the time during which opportunities pass by unseized, a reduction in turnover time releases resources for further circulation.”*⁹⁶ Time itself, in this sense, turned into a commodity. Circulation and exchange should be quite rapid so that profit can be realized immediately. Marx, in the *Grundrisse*, defines this process as *“the transition of capital from one phase to the next at the speed of thought [...] the renewal of the production process with its termination.”*⁹⁷ Reproduction of the capital and the whole system of production were dependent on this gradually accelerating speed which developed from a religiously framed time-thrift to a secular temporal consciousness. This temporal consciousness took centuries to be internalized by the people, Thompson shows how this internalization encountered profound resistance from the working class: *“[...] by the division of labour; the supervision of labour; fines; belles and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression of fairs and sports- new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline was imposed [...] Puritanism, in its marriage of convenience with industrial capitalism, was the*

⁹⁴ Thompson, **Time, Work-Discipline...**, p. 61.

⁹⁵ Karl Marx, **Communist Manifesto**, Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1965, p. 20-22.

⁹⁶ David Harvey, **The Limits of Capital**, Blackwell: Cambridge, 1982, p. 86.

⁹⁷ Marx, **Grundrisse...**, p. 631.

agent which converted men to a new valuations of time; which taught children even in their infancy to improve each shining hour; and which saturated men's minds with the equation, time is money."⁹⁸ Such a process of internalization of the new temporal structures can be considered from the perspective of disciplinary society as expressed by Michel Foucault. The disciplinary institutions of disciplinary society such as state, military, school, religious institutions, prisons, workhouses and factories functioned as hubs for the inculcation of the doctrine of the new time. However, this new time of modernity was not a single sided development like almost all façades of modern society which bears a much more complicated edifice. Weber saw the emergence of a bureaucratic iron cage in it, or the foucauldian approach regarded it as the development of an ever expanding prison system of panopticon. Yet modernity has been laden with a double character from its very beginning, the feeling in two different worlds constitute the basis of modernity and modernization. Berman refers to this ambivalent condition of modernity, when he writes: "*Our nineteenth-century thinkers were simultaneously enthusiasts and enemies of modern life, wrestling inexhaustibly with its ambiguities and contradiction; their self-ironies and inner tensions were a primary source of their creative power.*"⁹⁹ The whirlpool of the modern life created a constant nausea and vertigo through the accelerating speed of time. In Goethe's Faust, Mephisto responds bewildered Faust: "*You want to fly but you get dizzy*". Then this nausea and dizziness described as in the metaphors of cage and prison constitute only one side of the modern experience. The flying time was associated with reason, liberty and progress in the European minds long before the development of the industrial capitalism of the 19th century. The time that was unleashed from the ever-repeating cycle of the pre-modern world opened the gates of the future which was pregnant with endless hopes. In *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, the words of Condorcet explain this belief in the future "*Il arrivera ce moment, où le soleil n'éclairera plus, sur la terre, que des hommes libres, et ne reconnoissant d'autre maître que leur raison, où les tyrans et les esclaves, les prêtres et leur stupides et hypocrites instruments n'existeront plus que dans l'histoire et sur les théâtres...*"¹⁰⁰ This was the expression of a belief in future and present that was emancipated from the yoke of the past. The tyranny of

⁹⁸ Thompson, **op.cit.**, p. 90, 95.

⁹⁹ Berman, **op.cit.**, p. 24.

¹⁰⁰ Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat de Condorcet, **Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'esprit Humain**, Paris, 1797, 257-258.

darkness belongs to history for Condorcet, and the humanity escapes from this bleak dungeon which keeps the human reason in never-ending infancy: “*la raison humain dans un esclavage sans espérance, et dans une enfance éternelle.*”¹⁰¹ To see the daylight, the humanity should grow up by using all the instruments that the reason provides: “[...] *les instruments qu’elles (les têtes humains) peuvent employer se seront multipliés et perfectionnés; mais la langue qui fixe et détermine les idées aura pu acquérir plus de précision, plus de généralité; mais au lieu que, dans la mécanique, on ne peut augmenter la force qu’en diminuant la vitesse, ces méthodes, qui dirigeront le génie dans la découverte des vérités nouvelles, ont également ajouté, et à sa force, et à la rapidité de ses opérations.*”¹⁰² This is what Abbé Grégoire meant by saying filling the gap between today and the future. Through acceleration of time, the future of promising expectations can be projected nearer, and the human reason should use its full capacity to create the philosophical, social and technological foundation to realise this acceleration.

The French Revolution constituted the turning point, the ground for great leap forward to the future. Through the revolution, humanity broke from the barriers of the past and departed for realising the expectations that it had accumulated so far. The main protagonist of the revolution, the bourgeoisie, Marx says in *the Communist Manifesto*, played the most revolutionary role in the history. In a surprising way, he eulogises the greatness of the bourgeois class which “*has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that out in the shade all former exoduses of nations and crusades.*”¹⁰³ For Marx, none of the previous generations could have imagined that such a productive and creative force has been lying in the womb of the human labour, no one could have imagined that humanity is able to harness the forces of nature in such an extent by building steam ships, railroads and machinery in industry and agriculture. Such an impressive transformation of the world and human society could not be thought without the changing patterns of temporal understanding in which all these changes took place. The change that started with the introduction of mechanical clocks created an emancipatory power unchaining the forces within the stable world of the

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹⁰³ Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, p. 19.

pre-modern world. Modern mind and technology is both the cause and the result of such an overwhelming transfiguration of the temporal terrain.

The multiplying effects of the technological change, especially during the 19th century, in the field of transport of communication, had been profound. The introduction of railroad, telegraph and steam-ship massively reshaped geographic and temporal relationships. Marx, in the *Grundrisse*, described this process of reorientation as ‘the annihilation of space by time’: “*Capital by its nature drives every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange of the means of communication and transport- the annihilation of space by time- becomes an extraordinary necessity of it.*”¹⁰⁴ The mutual association between time and space was a fundamental tenet of the pre-modern society for centuries. As Zygmunt Bauman put it: “‘*Far*’ and ‘*long*’, just like ‘*near*’ and ‘*soon*’, used to mean nearly the same: just how much, or how little effort would it take for a human being to span a certain distance- be it by walking, by ploughing or harvesting.”¹⁰⁵ This association was destroyed by the development of technology and communication. Time, in that sense, was rather different than space, because it could be much more easily changed and manipulated than space, it could be made shorter, less costly, and so more productive. Time was transformed into an entity independent from space, or more generally speaking, from the nature itself: “*One can associate the beginning of the modern era with various facets of human practices, but emancipation of time from space, subordinating it to human inventiveness and technical capacity and setting it against space as a tool of its conquest and appropriation, is no worse a moment to start reckoning from than any other. Modernity has been born under the stars of acceleration and space conquest, and these stars form a constellation which contains all information about its character...*”¹⁰⁶ Thus, the de-naturalisation of the temporal experience and the constant acceleration embedded within modernity are both relational and closely associated phenomena. Clocks destroyed the intrinsic rhythms defined by nature and custom, in this sense they are a precondition for unleashing the acceleration and growth dynamic of modernity. The intrinsic temporality based on traditional event time which was subject to all kinds of fluctuations caused by natural forces, political and economic dynamics was replaced by a stable, fixed and abstract

¹⁰⁴ Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 524.

¹⁰⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, “Time and Space Reunited”, *Time & Society*, London: Sage Publications, Vol: 9 (2/3), 2000, p. 171.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

temporality. This new form of temporality transformed the habitus of the individual; it created a new way of relating to the world, a new sense of being-in-the world. This new topography of human world was shaped by a novel sense of temporal change which gave a new meaning to the three dimensions of time, the past, present and future. With this new consciousness, individual started to see himself/herself as a product of temporal experience and historical process.

F - The Temporalisation of History, The Scissors of Time: The Distinction between the Past, Present and Future

Hegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, attempts to organize the methods of treating history, and in this organisation, he defines the historians of the classical antiquity such as Herodotus and Thucydides within the category of Original History. For Hegel, the historical descriptions of these historians are “[...] *for the most part limited to deeds, events, and states of society, which they had before their eyes, and whose spirit they shared. They simply transferred what was passing in the world around them, to the realm of re-presentative intellect.*”¹⁰⁷ (Hegel: 2004, 1). In Hegel’s view, these historians were not able to elevate themselves over their period, and look at the temporal world from an exalted perspective. Such an historian surrounded by his own time which built up a barrier hindering further points in the temporal terrain. “*Only from such a position [elevated perspective] is it possible to take an extensive view of affairs- to see everything. This is out of the question for him, who from below merely gets a glimpse of the great world through a miserable cranny.*”¹⁰⁸ Hegel, in this sense, shared a common sensibility especially raised within the Enlightenment: The significance of distance in grasping reality and truth. In fact, this conception of distance was the basis of the historical understanding which emerged from a temporal transformation from pre-modern to modern times. Since the late eighteenth century at least, Europeans have seen that the distance and historical knowledge are closely bounded. Distance functioned as an axe which made a breach within the temporal unity of the pre-modern times. The modern understanding of history emerged from this breach in temporal plane, from the

¹⁰⁷G. W. Friedrich Hegel, **The Philosophy of History**, trans. by J. Sibree, New York: Dover Publications, 2004, p.1.

¹⁰⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 4.

breach between the past and the present. A past distant from and foreign to the present was the primary condition for the birth of modern history. History in this sense is the knowledge of the past, not the past itself. Because the past have always existed in epochal forms as prior to the present. But the past as the source and the object of the historical knowledge began to emerge only with modernity. There, it can be claimed that the past is an intellectual construction as many other modern constructions such as “-isms” of all sorts. And like all other intellectual constructions, it defines the mental framework of modern society.

Constantin Fasolt describes the significance of the alienating role of distance for historical understanding as: *“We need to put aside all of the usual ideas about what history is or ought to be and take a good look instead at the one thing that underlies all forms of history. That one thing is the distinction between past and present. This is so elementary, so necessary for the very possibility of thinking about the past at all, that it may be considered the founding principle of history.”*¹⁰⁹ This distinction between past and present gave way to the separate existence of these two temporal planes.

“The birth of the past” or more specifically “the birth of our idea of the past” was based on this primary distinction. This distinction brought a profound change in the perception of the past in modernity: The past was not simply prior to the present but different from it: *“A sense of the difference between past and the present implies a unitary conception of the past- an entity containing the people and events under consideration- which differs from all other such entities (Periclean Athens differs from Elizabethan England differs from the modern America).”*¹¹⁰ As Hegel pointed out, classical historians did not capture these differences. The history in this sense was a cluster of events happening in different time frames. These time frames could be shuffled in an appropriate manner suitable to the narration. They could not gather these pasts under a single entity as “the past”, because they were not able to integrate these time frames. The single temporal structure making past, present and future identical merged along the stillness of history avoided such a unified past different from present moment. The foremost example of such a conception of past is the Homeric epics. As we know today, the origin of these epics go to the early

¹⁰⁹ Constantin Fasolt, **The Limits of History**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ Zachary Sayre Schiffman, **The Birth of the Past**, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011, p. 5.

Mycenaean period, as far back as 1500 B.C. They were the embodiment of an oral tradition extending through centuries. This oral tradition as a living entity constantly exists in the present of the society by means of the storytelling activity of each generation. So, it concerns the present, fundamentally the continuity of the community. By collapsing the difference between past and present, these stories created an immediate connection to the past. The audience or the reader experienced this past as essentially timeless.¹¹¹ For him/her, this past was not about a particular event of a particular people living in a particular time. This is why they did not ever attempt to excavate the Mycenaean ruins surrounding them!

In the classical world, knowledge of what had been and the foreknowledge of what was yet to come stayed connected through a natural horizon of experience of generations, and within this horizon nothing essentially new could occur. *“No change was without its divine sense or naturally conditioned regularity[...] No prediction departed from the space of previous history and this was true in the same way for astrological and theological prophecies which remained tied to planetary laws or old promises.”*¹¹² Oedipus of Sophocles could not escape from the destiny fore-written by the Gods, and his Antigone also shared the same tragic faith drawn by the tradition and customs. Two major factors, religion and traditions, laid the ground of the temporal stage of the classical antiquity. Oedipus tried to escape from this scene, Antigone ran against it, but it was all vain.

This temporal world had been lived and experienced throughout centuries, from the classical antiquity, to the Roman period and the early and mediaeval Christian Europe. At the end of the mediaeval epoch, something unsettling happened, which Fasolt called “the Historical Revolt”: *“History jumped on the scene of European mental life with the force of a revolution against a specific form of governance.”*¹¹³ The history was not only the outcome of a certain form of intellectual curiosity, but also a reaction to the mediaeval universalism represented in the temporal unity. The power of religion and tradition embodied in the religious and political sovereignty of the emperor and the pope claimed that these two figures were in complete unity with eternity, they were the expression of the continuity of the past and present and future in an unbroken sameness. So the legitimacy of their power

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

¹¹² Koselleck, *Futures Past...*, p. 59.

¹¹³ Fasolt, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

was based on this timeless temporal continuity. The historical revolt made this world tumbled down. The change in the political scene of Europe which was started to be occupied by princes and republics brought a direct blow over this temporal unity. This political change together with the rise of a new economic field which propelled the technological development and the de-naturalisation of the temporal experience entailed the beginning of a new understanding of past and history.

G - The Individual of Perspective

The historical revolt which started to breach a distance between past and present was fortified by a new invention of the Renaissance. A certain architectural technique became pervasive all over the visual and mental frame of the European mind. All started at the beginning of the *Quattrocento*. The most brilliant of the Italian architects, Brunelleschi laid the principle that architectural structure should be designed, at first, from a single point of view, and the unity of the construction should be set upright through this point. Brunelleschi undertook to look at an object from a fixed viewpoint through a rectangular opening, tracing the appearance of the various parts of the object on a grid appended to the opening. He could establish that all the lines perpendicular to the opening appear to meet at one point, and this provided him with a mathematical system, known as linear perspective, for determining the relative size of objects in the picture space.¹¹⁴ The architect was no longer just an overseer of different parts of the architectural body, but by the use of perspective he became a creator of a sight and vision. He could foresee the architectural project in advance as a projected plan. This was the triumph of the reason, because devising a plan before the realisation of the construction entailed the predominance of reason over action. In his *De Pictura* written during the years of 1435 and 1436, Leon Battista Alberti wrote in the prologue addressing to Filippo Brunelleschi: “*I recognized in many, but first in you, Filippo, and in that our great friend Donato the sculptor, and in those other, who are so well praised for their intellect, Nencio, Luca and Masaccio, that they are not to be [thought] inferior to any who might have been in antiquity, however famous they could have possibly been in these arts. Thus I perceived that the possibility of acquiring distinction in*

¹¹⁴ Henri Dora, **Art in Perspective**, Santa Barbara: University of California Press, 1973, p. 105.

whatever [the] endeavour lies in our industry and diligence no less than in the good disposition of Nature and of the times. I confess to you that for the ancients, of course, it was less difficult to reach a degree of excellence in those arts most difficult for us to master, because they had many models to learn from and to imitate. But on the other hand, our fame should be greater if we, without teacher and [with] no example whatsoever, discover arts and sciences hitherto unheard of or never seen."¹¹⁵ Here, a new consciousness in perceiving the world through capturing the principles embedded within nature reveals the self-confidence of the Renaissance individual in comparison to the antiquity. This is the expression of the triumph of the new against the power of the old which lied at the core of *Historia Magistra Vitae*. Alberti's praise for Brunelleschi was mainly concerning this new venture of the Renaissance, and the discovery of perspective constituted a cardinal point in this new venture.

Alberti was the first Renaissance man who studied perspective scientifically. He expanded the discovery of Brunelleschi to the field of painting by theorising the relation between the vision and pictorial representation. Based on mathematically driven foundations, pictorial perspective allowed the individual to perceive the space both coherent and infinite. The basic principle of the *Quattrocento* painter was very simple: Parallel lines receding from the plane of the picture appear to meet at a single point on the horizon, the vanishing point; lines parallel with the picture plane do not converge. This was in complete contrast with the flatness and the space limited by the frame of the mediaeval painting. With perspective, the spectator became a subject regarding a window opening to infinite space purveyed by painting. The vision of the universe, thus, became detheologized.¹¹⁶ But perspective contained an intrinsic paradox in itself, as Panofsky put it, it was a "two-edged sword": "*Perspective creates distance between human beings and things ('the first is the eye that sees, the second is the object seen, the third is the distance between them' says Dürer after Piero della Francesca); but in turn it abolishes this distance by, in a sense, drawing this world of things, an autonomous world confronting individual, into the eye.*"¹¹⁷ Perspective calls the individual to look at a world organized by systematically, objectively and mathematically exact rules, but at the same time the positioning of

¹¹⁵ Leon Battista Alberti, **On Painting**, trans. by Rocco Sinisgalli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 17.

¹¹⁶ Erwin Panofsky, **Perspective as Symbolic Form**, trans. by Christopher S. Wood, New York: Zone Books, 1991, p. 66.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

the individual in regarding the object (painting) completely depends upon a subjective point of view. But this seemingly contradictory nature of perspective provides the individual with a liberating force. Although painting invites the individual to find the right position for the objectively drawn vanishing point, it is completely up to the individual to find this point: *“Il y a dans l'idée d'affranchissement, de dégagement, d'élargissement du regard qui contraint le 'regardant' à trouver une place qui ne lui est pas assignée. C'est à lui de la trouver, de l'inventer, de l'imaginer. Pour la penser, il doit s'activer et non pas simplement contempler.”*¹¹⁸ In this way, the inherent contradiction within perspective was a way of education for learning the distancing the self from the object to capture the reality objectified in painting. Perspective spurred the emancipation of space from its limits towards a widening infinity. This was not only the emancipation of and from the space but also from the authority of the religious and traditional forms of authority. Perspective, in this sense, was a means for widening up the limits of the world. The destruction of the confinement of the space allowed the individual to project into an open future¹¹⁹. So perspective did not only transform the spatial perception, but also the temporal structure of society. The broadening perspective of the Renaissance individual brought a revolutionary turning point regarding the visualisation of the temporal change in which the individual became the willing subject who could shape the flow of time with his own power.

The liberation of thinking from its real or symbolic spatial restraints allowed the individual to see and to think more broadly and comprehensively by enlarging his/her view over spatio-temporal plane. “Point of view” provided the individual with a certain consciousness pertaining his/her place in this spatio-temporal structure, in relation to past and to future. This was the point where perspective entered into the terrain of history. As Panofsky stated that modern view of history emerged during the Italian Renaissance in conjunction with linear perspective: *“In the Italian Renaissance the classical past began to be looked upon from a fixed distance, quite*

¹¹⁸ Zaki Laïdi, **Le Sacre du Présent**, Paris: Flammarion, 2000, p. 48.

¹¹⁹ The painting “Ideal City” (Galleria Nazionale delle Marche, Urbino) formerly attributed to Piero della Francesca, which was painted around 1470, can be considered one of the best examples illuminating the relation between perspective and the Renaissance imagination for creating a better future based on the force of the reason. The painting describes a meticulously planned and envisaged buildings probably inspired by the principles erected by Brunelleschi, and these buildings are placed to create a form of harmony and beauty reflecting the ideals of the Renaissance mind. The painting was not only the embodiment of a technic but at the same time a philosophical expression which would also be revealed in some humanistic pieces of the following century like *Civitas Solis* of Tommaso Campanella and *Utopia* of Thomas More.

*comparable to the distance “between the eye and the object’ in that most characteristic invention of this very Renaissance, focused perspective. As in focused perspective, this distance prohibited direct contact...but permitted a total and rationalized view.”*¹²⁰ The temporal distance transformed into the historical experience was the founding act of history as Fasolt indicated. Marking a demarcation in temporal flow of history is the result of a certain human action and consciousness born in the time of the Renaissance. The people of that period asserted themselves and thereby aimed to transform the world. It was an act of claiming a place for themselves in here-and-now and holding it in opposition to there-and-then. History is also the result of a growing sense of individual consciousness spawned with freedom and progress. It can be asserted that the founding principle of history is also a founding principle of politics. Freedom and progress also depends on the distinction between past and present as history does. The development of modern society is the development of time consciousness, in this sense modernity means a manner apprehending the world in its present possibilities and with its promise of change through an awareness of the past. Thus this time consciousness is a historical consciousness that orient itself toward the realisation of progress and reason.

It took several centuries before the notions of temporal and historical consciousness turned into the common property of the modern society. The naissance of perspective elevating the human being to the position of subject who is capable of projecting his/her own walking line in time also created, as Panofsky pointed out, a novel relation between present and past. By separating past from present, perspective created a fertile ground for the birth of history in the modern sense. Separation of past from present did not mean discarding the past into a dungeon of oblivion; contrary the past became an object of reflective and critical thinking. While it was receding away, it turned into “a foreign country”¹²¹ which should be visited and re-visited by the inhabitants of the land of present. The past became something fundamentally “other”. Expansion of the temporal distance increased rather than reduced the prospects for knowledge. This led to the exclusion of the eyewitness from his privileged position. The raising alien quality of the past transformed it into a special object of historical-critical activity. The past was no longer preserved in

¹²⁰ Erwin Panofsky, **Renaissances and Renascences in Western Art**, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 108.

¹²¹ “The past is a foreign country: They do things differently there” is the opening sentence of the 1953 novel *The Go-Between* by British novelist Leslie Poles Hartley.

memory by an oral or a written tradition, but rather was to be constructed through the process of criticism.

Although the invention of perspective brought a completely different view in apprehending the world in a three dimensional way corresponding with three dimensions of time, History had to wait until the eighteenth century to gain a temporalized character. Hegel described the ancient historians as chroniclers reporting the events around their immediate vicinity in both spatial and temporal terms. Until the eighteenth century, historical experience kept its characteristic of the immediate recording of the events based primarily on eyewitnesses. Koselleck depicts the importance of the immediacy for the pre-modern historical experience as: *“The methodological basis was the historical writing of the present or recent past. The signs of authenticity were centred around eyewitnesses [...] The metaphor of the mirror, of reflecting or of the naked truth was founded on a present state of experience[...] History as a continuing present exists through its eyewitnesses.”*¹²² For instance, in The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides asserted that his reporting was based on his immediate observations: *“[...] either I was present myself [or] ... I ... heard from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible.”*¹²³ But, this primacy of the eyewitness was dethroned by the temporal breach. The past was opened up to the critical interrogation of the present which was coined as the “history”.

The birth of the past implied the birth of the present as well. The historical consciousness meant an awareness of epochal uniqueness which emerged from the aforementioned temporal perspective. The individual started to see himself/herself as occupying a certain place in the temporal flow. By looking back to the past which was different from his/her time, the individual grasped the difference and the uniqueness of his/her own time. Hegel says that the substance of the people manifests itself distinctly within time according to their place in historical progress: *“Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone.”*¹²⁴ So, another consequence followed up this perspectival apprehension: If the past was different and unique, and the present also

¹²² Koselleck, **Futures Past...**, p. 132-133.

¹²³ Thucydides, **The Peloponnesian War**, trans. by Rex Waner, London: Penguin & Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 48.

¹²⁴ Hegel, **op.cit.**, p. 6.

carries its own characteristics in itself, then the future should be different than today and the past. This is what Koselleck calls the widening up between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation. Although these two temporal planes have been congruent for almost two thousand years, the cliff between them started to widen. Apparently, this widening up between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation corresponds to the notions of history and the progress. This can be considered as the backbone of the modernity: While these two notions seem contradictory, history and progress stem from the same root, that of the consciousness of time. The view fixed towards the open horizon is fed with the force that individual gained from the knowledge of the past.

For Hegel, the reason of the individual aims to grasp an understanding of the world around, his/her place in this world. The individual looks at the world rationally, and the world presents itself to him/her, so that he can realize himself/herself in harmony with the world. This revelation is only experienced through a reflective and “thoughtful consideration” of the historical process. This thoughtful consideration, according to Arendt, which takes place within the present time, represents a moment of self-discovery that the individual experiences in-between his/her past and the future. Arendt explores this self-discovery, and the moment of self-consciousness through a reference to a parable written by Franz Kafka: *“The first thing to be noticed is that not only the future- ‘the wave of the future’- but also the past is seen as force, and not, as in nearly all our metaphors, as a burden man has to shoulder and of whose dead weight the living can or even must get rid in their march into the future...This past, moreover, reaching all the way back into the origin, does not pull back but presses forward, and it is, contrary to what one would expect, the future which drives us back into the past. Seen from the viewpoint of man, who always lives in the interval between past and future, time is not a continuum, a flow of uninterrupted succession; it is broken in the middle, at the point where ‘he’ stands; and ‘his’ standpoint is not the present as we usually understand it but rather a gap in time which ‘his’ constant fighting, ‘his’ making a stand against past and future, keeps in existence.”*¹²⁵ The relation between the past and the future is a mutually creative interaction which can only be performed by the individual in the gap breached within the temporal flux. Clearly, for Arendt, the past

¹²⁵ Hannah Arendt, **op.cit.**, p. 10-11.

is not dead or something to be forgotten with the passage of time, on the contrary the future aspirations of the individual pushes him backwards to catch a driving force. By dividing the time into tenses, the individual indulged within an effort of a self-understanding and a consciousness regarding his/her existence through and within time.

In opposition to the contract theories, Hegel establishes that freedom does not reside in the state of nature which is in fact the home of the human caprice and passions. Instead, freedom should be gained through an intellectual process: *“Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and natural. Rather it must be first sought out and won; that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The state of Nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of human needs and feelings.”*¹²⁶ Freedom is the final aim, for Hegel, which can only be realised through “philosophical comprehension of history”, and this comprehension is fundamentally a political activity which finds its embodiment with the society and state. The self-realisation of human being as a free individual capable of using his/her full rational capacity to grasp happiness is only possible by means of the highest form of this political organism which Hegel calls the Spirit of the people. The spirit can be embodied through the revelation of the past, but it aims at the future to find its full expression. *“Thus is it with the Spirit of a people: it is a Spirit having strictly defined characteristics, which erects itself into an objective world, that exists and persists in a particular religious form of worship, customs, constitution, and political laws – in the whole complex of its institutions- in the events and transactions that make up its history.”*¹²⁷ The realisation of the freedom, that is the future, can only possible through a more comprehensive conception of history. Thus, this relation in fact constitutes the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel uses the Phoenix as the symbol to express this metamorphosis of the past into the future. This dialectical progress which corresponds to a change from comprehension of history to the creation of the future can be propelled by a self-consciousness that apprehends its own past and the present. Individual capable of seeing the world from a distance could succeed to apprehend all the dimensions of the world historical process according to Hegel. Contrary to the ancient historians as

¹²⁶ Hegel, **op.cit.**, p. 40-41.

¹²⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 74.

the chroniclers of the immediate time and space, he meant to develop such a more comprehensive and over-looking perspective to history.

Koselleck delineates this point as: “*Positional commitment has not been an objection, but rather a presupposition of historical knowledge.*”¹²⁸ Especially, the French Revolution came as a turning point in the temporalisation of perspective regarding the one’s position in historical-temporal plane. The total upheaval of the society in every sphere created a sense in the people that they were undergoing unparalleled, never seen times. They realized that they were standing in a certain point of time which was different than their past lives and the lives of the previous generations. It was impossible to draw examples and lessons from the past, because everything was changing in an incredible speed. For instance, as a faithful royalist and a conservative, François-René de Chateaubriand in 1797 aimed to write an analysis of the revolutions through drawing conclusions from the past examples in the typical methodology of *Historia Magistra Vitae*. However, he realised that it was impossible to make such a comparison, because whatever he had written during the day was already overtaken by new events by night.¹²⁹ Thus, the present came to be regarded as a terrain full of mist and fog, the true knowledge and reality was not here in this misty land. As Panofsky made it apparent in the 20th century: “*To grasp the reality we have to detach ourselves from the present.*”¹³⁰ The positional awareness in time as the consciousness of one’s place in his/her present and the historical consciousness regarding the past developed synchronously.

The traditional experiential space which had previously determined by the past became crumbled. The exemplary function of the past was destroyed by the temporal acceleration and the distance which gradually widened the space between the tenses of the time. So, the past became to be perceived as non-repeatable and unique in itself. As Hegel delineated the historical events began to be conceived as particular occasion specific for their own times. Koselleck coined this development as “*the axiom of the singularity of unrepeatability*” of the history.¹³¹ The singular character of the past which cannot be experienced in nor in the present neither in the future turned the historical experience into an intellectual activity that must be handled with a new methodology. This methodology was the critical reconstruction of the past

¹²⁸ Koselleck, **Futures Past...**, p. 136.

¹²⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 41.

¹³⁰ Erwin Panofsky, **Meaning in the Visual Arts**, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955, p. 24.

¹³¹ Koselleck, **Futures Past...**, p. 237.

through involvement in a laborious job of an intellectual endeavour. History then turned into something not repetitively experienced but something to be constructed and reconstructed through the independent creative judgment and a reflective representation. The rupture in temporal continuity swept the past away, whose increasing foreignness could be elucidated and recovered only through historical investigation.

The birth of a novel experience of history and a new form of historical consciousness rose over the ruins of the *Historia Magistra Vitae* which speaks directly to the present. The birth of the past was the result of the temporalization of historical experience in which time gained a historical character. “*The past is regarded, not in terms of universal norms, but through the lens of time, as the product of process of development that serves both to explain its fundamental ‘otherness’ and to link it to the present.*”¹³² This modern historical consciousness was labelled as “historicism” which was most comprehensively described by Friedrich Meinecke. In his *Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (Die Entstehung des Historismus)*¹³³ that was first published in 1936, Meinecke described historicism as the product of two ideas –individuality and development. As Hegel –they both shared the ideological baggage of German idealism- Meinecke also emphasised the uniqueness of the historical entities, and this individual character did not mean only people but also institutions, states, religions and culture. According to Meinecke, these entities develop in relation to their time and circumstances, so that they gain their unique character. For Meinecke, historicism as the junction individuality and development developed during the centuries, and found its full-fledged establishment in the nineteenth century where it became prominent in modern thought: “...*historicism, the recognition that all human ideas and values are historically conditioned and subject to change, had become the dominant, inescapable attitude of the Western world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries [...] it had become the very condition of modern existence.*”¹³⁴ In Meinecke’s formulation, historicism, uniqueness and individuality of historical experience resonates in the individual mind

¹³² Zachary Sayre Schiffman, “The Origins of Early Modern Historical Consciousness”, **Studies in Early Modern France: Signs of the Early Modern**, ed. by David Lee Rubin, Charlottesville: Rockwood Press, 1996, p.79.

¹³³ Friedrich Meinecke, **Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook**, trans. by J. E. Anderson, New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.

¹³⁴ Georg G. Iggers, “Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term”, **Journal of the History of Ideas**, vol. 56, no. 1, January, 1995, p. 133.

as such: I am unique, I was born at a particular and unrepeatable moment in time and space, and I have been surrounded by a continuous change which leaves its particular imprint in my-self which in turn shapes and affects the circumstances of this continuous change. Thus, all entities whether they are individual or social are historical, since they are constituted by their context. This is similar to Hegel's definition of the individual as "the son his age" (*Ein sohn seiner zeit*).¹³⁵

H - The Birth of the Sense of Anachronism

Although the modern historical consciousness as a juncture of individuality and development finds its full development and expression in the nineteenth century, an awareness of individuality emerged in an earlier phase of the modern society, in the Italian Renaissance. As a result of the Renaissance's discovery of the individual, the individual recognized himself as a unique entity defined by his self-conscious mind, not by his status as a member of a group. This new conception of individuality led him to appreciate the individual qualities of entities in the world around him. This new view of the world was expounded by Panofsky in the art historical terms as the integration of form and content in the Renaissance art.¹³⁶ According to Panofsky, Italian artists started to describe Virgil not as a mediaeval scholar seated at his study desk but as a classical Roman poet wearing a toga and crowned with a laurel.¹³⁷ For Panofsky, before the Renaissance, without a "perspective distance", it was impossible to conceive the previous civilisations as a coherent and individual cultural systems within which all things belonged together. *"To the high-mediaeval mind Jason and Medea were acceptable as long as they were depicted as Gothic aristocrats playing chess in Gothic chamber. Classical gods and goddesses were acceptable as long as they lent their beautiful presence to Christian saints, to Eve or to the Virgin Mary."*¹³⁸ Schiffman denotes that "a sense of anachronism" was the consequence of this raising consciousness about the individuality and distance during the Renaissance.¹³⁹ The growing consciousness about the distinction between the

¹³⁵ Hegel, **op.cit.**, p. 52.

¹³⁶ Panofsky, **Meaning in the Visual...**

¹³⁷ Panofsky, **Renaissances and Renascences ...**, p. 100.

¹³⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 111.

¹³⁹ Zachary Sayre Schiffman, "Renaissance Historicism Reconsidered", **History and Theory**, vol. 24, no.2, 1985, p. 178.

past and the present, and recognition of the uniqueness of the past events and past societies in general gave way to an awareness of anachronism starting from the 15th century. In *Modern Language Notes*, in 1937, Herman Ebeling, states that the word anachronism that comes from the Greek *ana* (against) *chromos* (time), can be described as “*an error in respect to dates; an error which implies the misplacing of persons or events in time.*”¹⁴⁰ It is the representation of someone as existing or something as happening in other than the historical order. However, the distinction between past and the present does not mean a simple priority in time in a flat chronological order. It entails an awareness that different historical entities exist in different historical contexts, rather than a mere chronological priority. The direct consequence of such awareness is a sense of anachronism or an awareness of anachronism. The Renaissance was the birth place of this awareness, but its full recognition as a concrete part of the historical consciousness was realised in the nineteenth century. As in the mediaeval times, in the Renaissance and in later epochs of the modern society, anachronism has been always a part of historical experience, both in historical narration and representation. However, the sense of anachronism was the main difference between the experiences of the pre-modern and modern societies. As Phyllis Rackin writes: “*Both medieval and Renaissance representations of the past use anachronism. What distinguishes the Renaissance is the sense of anachronism...Typically, medieval writers of history display no sense of anachronism, although they use it.*”¹⁴¹ This growing awareness within the early modern society found its embodiment in two new genres of artistic form: history painting and history play.

History painting emerged as new genre of painting in the Italian Renaissance. As mentioned before, this new genre developed in tandem with the growing sense of temporal distinction. Although the scenes from the past were depicted in the mediaeval painting, they were not represented with a historical sensibility, but rather as the figures and stories of the continuing present. During the Renaissance, together with increasing sense of the foreignness of the past and the awareness of

¹⁴⁰ Herman L. Ebeling, “The Word Anachronism”, **Modern Language Notes**, vol. 52, no. 2, 1937, p. 120.

¹⁴¹Phyllis Rackin, **Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles**, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 91.

anachronism, the past came out as a subject matter that Alberti regarded as “the noblest form of art” within the hierarchy of genres.

History play, as a theatrical genre, was the product of the Renaissance England, the Elizabethan period. The emerging historical consciousness found its embodiment in the stage as the performance of history. Shakespeare was the father of this genre; almost all of his plays take their subject matter from the past. In his study concerning the relationship between the theatrical temporality and historical consciousness, Brian Walsh states that the temporalisation of history and the historical time creating a sense of anachronism through breaching the distance in temporal terrain led to the creation of historical plays as the enactment of the past on stage, which was epitomised in the Shakespearean theatre. Walsh claims that the performance of history presents “...*performer in the face of the temporal gap between the now of the theatre and the then of history by suggesting that the actor in a history play is a witness to the historical event...the actors serve as a connecting link between the historical past and the fictional performed here and now of the theatre.*”¹⁴² Through the settings and decors and also the references within the text of the play, spectators were involved into dramatic recognition of the pastness of the events taking place on the stage. Thus, the stage and the space of the spectators became a symbolic equivalent of the separation of the past and the present. As in the textual construction of the past in historical writing, history play depicts history as generated and shaped over time.

The awareness of anachronism as an indispensable feature of the historical consciousness gained a growing prominence over the development of modern society. Koselleck, in the opening pages of his work on the historical time, presents a painting of 1528, of Albrecht Altdorfer, *Alexanderschlacht* depicting the battle of Issus fought between Macedonians and Persians as an example of the use of a conscious anachronism. In this painting, Altdorfer used anachronism consciously so that he could faithfully represent the course of the battle to the spectators of his time. The painting was depicting a war of the 4th century BC in a setting of a European topography with the 16th century combatants. This conscious anachronism left its place to the historically more accurate descriptions in time. The development of

¹⁴² Brian Walsh, “Theatrical Temporality and Historical Consciousness in the Famous Victories of Henry V”, *Theatre Journal*, vol. 59, 2007, p. 72.

historical consciousness with the increasing separation of the temporal planes reflected in the artistic representations of the past. For instance, the seventeenth century painters like Charles le Brun and Nicolas Poussin, or Jacques Louis David of the eighteenth century described the past in a historical distance different from their own time. The estrangement of the past and the sense of anachronism settled firmly in the social consciousness in the nineteenth century. A popular American art magazine of the 19th century, *The Art Amateur* describes this development, reflecting the expression of Panofsky regarding the integration of the content and the form in modern historical consciousness: “*Curious and, indeed, startling anachronisms are of very frequent occurrence in the world of nearly all great painters, except, perhaps, the leaders of the most modern school: and it is only within comparatively recent times that artists have begun to recognize that historical consistency must never be sacrificed for the sake of effect.*”¹⁴³

The transformation of the past from a timeless continuity of the sameness embedded within the recurrence of eternity into a foreign land that must be discovered through a reflective activity and intellectual endeavour marked the birth of the modern society. By means of the invention of the mechanical clocks, time which was emancipated from the constraints of its traditional limits and de-naturalised, turned into the domain of the creative rationality of the human being. The past was no longer a chain which shackled the individual to a repetitive present, but became an impetus throwing him to the future. The future was not an eschatological point that must be passively waited for any longer, but it emerged as a battleground where “the new” would declare its glory. On the other face of this development, the past, while being slipped into backward by the wind of the ceaseless acceleration, began to reveal itself in continuous construction and reconstruction through intellectual vigour which constituted the basis of the modern historiography. However, modern historical consciousness is not only composed of the high intellectual level of historiography. As other reflective and intellectual endeavours, historiography transformed the perception, the way of thinking and in general all life frame of the society. The people of the nineteenth century did not look to the history in the same way as their ancestors did in the twelfth century. Out of the transformation of the temporal structure, a new type of historical experience, a

¹⁴³Oscar Max, “Errors and Anachronisms in Art”, *The Art Amateur*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1883, p.70.

new view and regard, a novel perspective and perception, a different life form flourished in the bosom of the modernity. The power of the transformative and creative energy of the modern society lies in this new temporal experience.

Both in societal and individual level, modernity means the increasing responsibility of individuals and societies for shaping the life. Modernity is the recognition of the power of the individual and societies to discover their own selves which take root in the past, and to shape their identity and development which expand into the future. The temporalisation of history and the temporalisation of life in general turned this self-discovery into a reflective and reflexive project. Self as a meaningful and coherent story which unfolds itself in time by connecting the past to the future was the insignia of the modern. Although modernity is laden with unstoppable acceleration emanating from the motor of capitalism, and with the continuous whirlpool of change, being modern is to appreciate this change, but also to capture the eternal within this ephemerality of the change as Baudelaire said.

III - CHAPTER 2

THE MODERN HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATIONALISM

A - Historicism and Nationalism

The modern self as a meaningful and coherent story unfolding itself through time was the product of the modern historical consciousness. The birth of the individual as a conscious subject with a capability of narrating his own story within time was the result of the historical perspective emerging from the Enlightenment ideals. This narrative defined both the individual and society as historical entities created by historical conditions and open to change in the temporal flow. Therefore, history and progress was interconnected through an understanding of the importance of human emancipation. The unchangeable nature of the old society was challenged by this idea of progress based on the historical perception of the social structures through a rational investigation. This is what the Kantian idea of Enlightenment endorsed through the motto *sapere aude!*

The distinctiveness of the past as a field for human endeavour to grasp the human development also opened a limitless horizon to the future. The idea of progress was not only related to the 19th century industrialisation or rapid urbanisation, but also to the idea of freedom of imagining better worlds. This utopian idea constituted the backbone of the progressive ideologies of the early modern society. This hope rising over the progressive perspective was an indispensable counterpart of the 19th century historicism. Before historicism there was no science of history.

However the development of historical consciousness is closely connected with another development which shaped the West as a whole, the nation-state and its concomitant world view, nationalism. Nationalism can be regarded as the child of the modern historical outlook. Without a sense of history which locates the nation in a specific period of time different from the previous forms of human communities and

open to development through a modern temporal line, it would be impossible to imagine nationhood in any sense.

Historicist idea of temporally conditioned and historically shaped human existence was also captured by this newly emergent idea of nationhood at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In fact, the spread of history both as a form of investigation and as a popular consciousness was triggered by the nationalist ideology. The nation state in its emergent form necessitated a homogenous national identity based on shared values, common traits and traditions. The historicism provided such a coherent national narrative especially in countries such as Germany where the nationhood had gone through a much more ragged path than other western nations. German historicism as found in the works of Herder, Ranke and Niebuhr pointed out the uniqueness of each nation, and their characteristics, and this uniqueness was considered as the product of distinct historical developments and must be investigated by historical study. This was also a reaction to Kant's universalist ethics based on human rationality. History turned into a genealogical research of the national roots embedded deep in the national past. Together with German Romanticism, German Historicism flamed an insatiable interest towards the Germanic past, and they found it in its purest form in the Teutonic age of the mediaeval period.

German Romanticism, as an aesthetic movement, wished to be more than poetry, it was an interpretation of history and society, of the totality of human life, which was established on the fascination of the past.¹⁴⁴ They imagined a harmonious community, an organic folk, which would immerse the individual in the unbroken chain of tradition. This ideal folk-community seemed to have existed in the Germanic Middle Ages. They collected and eulogised the mediaeval sagas and poetry, folk songs and tales. In their imagination, mediaeval castles were the reminders of past national glories and beauty. The German romanticism was a reaction to the constant flow of change stemmed from the bosom of the modern society. The industrialisation, the continuous flux of the people from the countryside to the cities, the emergence of new social classes, and constant upheaval of the established social structures created a reactionary impact found its expression in

¹⁴⁴Hans Kohn, **Nationalism: Its Meaning and History**, Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1965, p. 34.

conservative movements such as romanticism. The speed produced by the continuously accelerating industrial world did not give the Romantics the thrill and excitement, contrary they were frightened by these developments surrounding them. Although it was a reaction to the change created by the modern society, romanticism was itself a product of modern conception of history. The past was regarded as an alien land of forefathers, the task of the romantics was to journey to that land and bring the forgotten relics to recreate the national identities. Thus, the nineteenth century saw the blooming of the medievalism in almost every nook and cranny of literature, art and architecture. For example, the rise of neo-gothic in Germany, England and France with their claim to the middle ages as the source of the naissance of their national identities. This romantic imagination was supported by the historicist historiography in recreation of the national pasts.

The advancement of the historical knowledge through the vigorous efforts of the historicist approach was colonised by the political apparatus of the period. The nationalism should invite the masses into history to create a more or less homogenous identity. A national community could be imagined by means of the excavation of the common historical roots deep in the past. The naissance of history and the roots of nationalism lay in the same ground of temporal change as Benedict Anderson pointed out.

Pre-modern temporality which is based on the continuous present tense containing both the past and future in itself was replaced by a modern perspective establishing a temporal distance between the here-now and the past. For a person living in the nineteenth century modern world, it was impossible to imagine a Virgin Mary dressed in the fifteenth century attire in a Flemish town as depicted in the Merode Altarpiece. The ahistorical conception of time which simultaneously contains the past and the present in a constant present labelled as “Messianic time” by Walter Benjamin was completely alien to the modern mind and eyes. As Anderson writes, *“in such a view of things, the word ‘meanwhile’ cannot be of real significance.”*¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵Benedict Anderson, **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**, London: Verso, 2006, p. 24.

The modern form of temporality that entailed the birth of history by separating the temporal dimensions from each other also helped the emergence of nationalism. This temporal change and nationalism were connected to each other in two seemingly contradictory but related ways: First, the collapse of the old temporal conception as the continuous present gave way to the possibility of imagining the nation as a completely new entity. This was very much attached to the idea of newness against the oldness of the past times, born from the heart of the new temporal experience. The newly emerging nations should have established themselves as the opposite of the old regimes. This distinction provided them with a justification to fortify their existence as the most developed form of the community in the progressive continuum extending from the past through present into the future. The first and the most important example of such a break from the past as the declaration of the newness was the introduction of the new revolutionary calendar designed by the *Convention Nationale*. The year zero indicating the proclamation of the Republic in 1792 was symbolically the declaration of the birth of new nation completely different than the decadent Old Regime. The ideals of progress and the desire for establishing a new future of the Enlightenment were quite evident in this act of the French Revolutionaries to open a new age.

Second, the modern temporal frame worked in seemingly opposite direction in relation to nationalism by going into the abyssal deepness of the past. The Nation had to invent itself through a temporal continuity. This was the point where history was utilised by the nationalist ideology as a tool to find the evidences of the continuity of the nation in time. This temporal narration of identity unfolding throughout time is one of the fundamental characteristics of the modern self. The novel as literary form was born from this transformation of temporal change. The concept of “*Bildung*”, at this point, can be regarded as the embodiment of the modern self, as the personal and cultural development of the individual within time. In pre-modern societies, social identity is seen as an eternal present, as an original state that has to be affirmed by individual agency. In contrast, modern man and the writers of *Bildungsroman* see social identity as something evolving, as a continuing discovery. Individual agency is likewise redefined; it becomes the most important instrument to make society and to create the future. The ‘novel of emergence’ illustrates a world in which ‘man’s individual emergence is inseparably linked to historical emergence. From Goethe to Thomas Mann, the authors narrated the development of the individual through

experience and reasoning while the life unfolds, this development defines a rather unified narration of the individual life in spite of its contradictions, hesitations, pains and contents. So, a parallel line can be drawn from this literary form to the nationalism's effort to found a narrative discourse unfolding from the past to the future. Anderson builds a similar parallelism between the individual and the nation: "*The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history.*"¹⁴⁶ Borrowing from Benjamin's terminology, the homogenous, empty time as the opposite of the Messianic time enabled the nation establishing itself as an imagined community by providing the individuals with a shared identity based on a common past and future.

The relation between modernity and nationalism is quite evident, since nationalism is described as a cultural construction born from the bosom of the modern society. The temporal dimension as the common basis of modernity and nationalism can be considered the most salient point of this relation. The modern temporality by freeing the individual from the traditional stasis of the pre-modern society created a limitless potential for the development of human progress. The temporal change constituted a threshold for the emergence of history as a productive and critical analysis of the past, so that a modern historical consciousness could be developed. By means of this historical consciousness, the individual could gain the ability to reflect on his/her existence as a self with the power to shape and transform the world. That individual was also able to tell his/her story and the also the story of the society in a coherent way, and this was only possible with a historical consciousness. The historical perspective resulted from the temporal break led to the study and investigation of the details of those stories. Nationalism was also born from this modern historical perspective. Therefore, as a product of modernity, it also contained ambivalent and contradictory features in it. On the one hand, as a progressive form of human community based on certain ideal of the Enlightenment, it became the motor for the dissemination of these universal ideas. In terms of history, as Georg Lukacs said, masses encountered the history by means of nationalism.¹⁴⁷ The development of the extensive education endowed the public with a historical consciousness. On the other hand, this historical consciousness was the

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷ Georg Lukacs, *The Historical Novel*, trans. by Hannah and Stanley Mitchell, London: Merlin Press, 1989, p. 25.

product of a quite pragmatic, selective use of the past in the hands of nation-state. As a result of this development, European landscape was filled with history reflecting from the monuments, buildings, paintings and novels. This is the development that bothered Nietzsche who despised the monumental history surrounding him in every point, and against that he emphasised the importance of forgetting.¹⁴⁸ In this regard, from the heart of modern society, another critical approach, modernism as a movement, was born against this monumental-antiquarian understanding of history. From literature to painting, from architecture to cinema, modernism aimed to revive a belief in human agency for shaping his/her environment and life through a critical approach to the existing form of modern society.

However, the spread of modernity throughout the world as taking the form of modernisation process predominantly aimed to avoid the inherent ambivalences, ambiguities, critiques, opposition inherent in modernity and to create a rather sterile way to become a modern society. In most of the non-western countries, the modernisation processes undertook by the nation-states developed hand in hand with the nationalist ideologies. Thus, their relations with history was also shaped by this ideology, mostly neglected or ignored other forms of social structures developed from the modern historical understanding.

B - Turkish Modernisation within Temporal and Historical Transformation

The temporal framework in which a society exists defines the social and cultural ground of that society. The relation of modern society of the nineteenth century to its own past was defined by its own temporal structure. The new form of temporal understanding which was born in the West seeped into the other corners of the world throughout the nineteenth century. This was the natural outcome of the expansion of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. Therefore, modernity as the concomitant social counterpart of capitalism became a political, social and cultural force majeure for all other societies outside the west. As one of them, the Ottoman society's encounter with the modernity at the beginning of the 19th century opened a quite long and rugged way of the Turkish modernisation process. However,

¹⁴⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, ed. by Daniel Breazeale, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

the introduction of the modern time conception and temporal structure into the Turkish society was a venture of the Republican era, because the past and the history became one of the major contested fields of the modernisation process during this period. In fact, the story of the Turkish modernisation can be described as a process of incorporation of the Turkish society into the modern temporality and the modern understanding of history through a certain vein that is nationalism.

The formation of a nation-state and westernisation are two fundamental constitutive features of the Turkish modernisation process. Although their roots go back to the first reform attempts of the Ottoman Empire, they became ideologically established foundations of the modernisation process for the first time with the Republic. A Turkish nation based on rather homogenous ethnic identity and the transformation of the cultural and social values into western standards were stated as the principal aims of the Turkish republic. Nationalism's two fundamental approaches to the past played quite a significant role in the fulfilment of these aims: first, a rupture from the past, and second, a search for continuity.

The Turkish History Thesis was introduced as the main instrument to create a national identity during the early years of the republic. Especially the 1930s was the decade where the nation-state building process, nationalism and construction of national identity became the principal concerns of the ruling elite. Thus, the official history was utilised as one of the fundamental devices to implant Turkish identity and a collective past into the society.

As all other nation-states, the newly established Turkish republic had to create an ideological justification for its own existence, and it found that justification in the negation of its predecessor. The Ottoman past was regarded the anti-thesis of all the features that the new republic possessed. A division was formulated as the "old" and the "new", and the former was described as distinctively different from the later. The old was defined as the bad, insufficient, decadent, corrupt and weak for the legitimization for the existence of the new republic. This new invented tradition found its complete narration in the Turkish History Thesis which was publicly introduced in the Turkish History Congresses in 1932 and 1937.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011.

The new regime presented the date of the proclamation of the republic as the year zero, so a national consciousness based on the principles of the new republic could be installed within this tabula rasa. The break from the Ottoman past was so salient that within the History Congresses, the Ottoman History was barely mentioned.

However, the negation of the Ottoman past was leaving the nation without a history upon which the national identity could be founded. So, through an overarching manoeuvre skipping the Ottoman past, Turkish History Thesis aimed to connect the Turkish nation to pre-Islamic era, The Central Asia, and the ancient Anatolian and Near-Eastern civilisations. In this context, The Turkish History Association as the hub of the official history production undertook researches to prove the ancientness of the Turkish nation. Although geographically the main focus was Central Asia, the historical narration was revolving around Anatolia. A mythical origin from the Central Asia was connected to the Anatolia through a Migration Theory. The date of Migration was stretched out to even to the Neolithic period. Then, by means of this migration embedded within the mists of prehistory, it was possible to prove the Turkishness of the most ancient civilisations such as Sumerians, and Hittites and even the Ancient Greeks. So, against the claims of the western historiography which argued that the Turks were not the autochthonous people of Anatolia, this narrative formulation could easily show the contrary.

According to Ersanlı, the Turkish History Thesis is pragmatic in its use of history for the political purposes of the day. But this pragmatism was not only peculiar to Turkey, this was a common practice of all nationalisms since the beginning of the nineteenth century. This pragmatism was a necessary derivation of the educational target of the national narrative of history. The new republic had to create a new nation, and a new historical consciousness regarding being a nation had to be built on this new historical narrative. However, this was not an easy task especially in the Turkish context, since the negation of immediate past of the six hundred years of the Ottoman Past, and searching the national roots in Neolithic or in the Hittite civilisation made the indoctrination of this narrative quite difficult. In other examples of national constructions of the past, the search of the historical roots were usually not that distant, so the connection between the targeted new nation and the historical past could be established with a relative ease. For example, the western

European examples of nationalism had to reach only to the Mediaeval ages which still existed in the daily surrounding of the people with churches, castles, sagas or tales. However, in the Turkish case, this construction took a much more effort to be installed within the general mind of the society. The ordinary people do not have any connection in their social memory to that distant land of Central Asia, and the ruins and monuments belonging to the Ancient Anatolian civilisation did not evoke any familiar cultural connection within the public. The mystification of the historical resources became the main tool in the utilisation of the past for the political and pragmatic purposes of the Turkish nationalism. However, this historical discourse defining the all ancient civilisations of Anatolia and its vicinity was not quite successful, and never embraced by the people, the main reason for that failure was the geographic immediacy of those civilisations in the Anatolian soil, their Turkishness remained as a fantasy of the Turkish History Thesis. But the Central Asia as the origin of the Turkish nation was relatively easier to be filled up with mythical narration because of its geographical distance, and it left its imprint in the official history up until today.

The temporal shift from the ancient regime to the new was quite clear in the utilisation of history for the formation of a new historical consciousness within society. The main target of the Turkish History Thesis was to create a “new man” as the subject of the “new state”. This new man was described as Turkish, secular and civilised (*medeni*). The close and necessary relation between modernisation and westernisation can be seen in these features attributed to the new Turkish citizen. The new men of the Republic should have the consciousness of living in a new age delineated by the modernity. The main purpose of the regime was to transform the temporal consciousness of the society. A quotation from Atatürk’s speech at the tenth anniversary of the republic reveals this purpose very clearly: *“We shall raise our country to the level of the most prosperous and civilised nations of the world. We shall endow our nation with the broadest means and sources of welfare. We shall raise our national culture above the contemporary level of civilisation. Therefore, we should judge the measure of time not according to the lax mentality of past centuries, but in terms of the concepts of speed and movement of our century. Compared to the past, we shall work harder. We shall perform greater tasks in a shorter time. I have no doubt that we shall succeed in this, because the Turkish nation is of excellent character. The Turkish nation is intelligent, because the Turkish nation is capable of*

*overcoming difficulties of national unity, and because it holds the torch of positive sciences.”*¹⁵⁰ These words of the founder of the republic affirm the objective of the new regime to bring forth the Turkish society from the pre-modern temporal terrain of the Ottoman Empire to the modern temporal frame. This objective was also tried to be realised through the changes and reforms made by the regime. They changed the daily experience of life of the ordinary people. The structure and organisation of the time was subjected to a metamorphosis through these reforms, such as the change of the weekend holidays in 1924 from Thursday and Friday to Saturday and Sunday; adoption of the international calendar and time instead of Islamic calendar in 1925.¹⁵¹ Therefore, all the references to time in daily language of the people were completely transformed on the basis of new temporal structure. However, as mentioned above, the real objective was not to change the material structure and the organisation of the time, a more fundamental shift in the temporal consciousness of the society was targeted.

The modern temporality by postulating the distinctiveness of the temporal dimensions and by creating the foreignness of the past seeped into the Turkish society. The most important component of this change was the historicization of the social formation. The time and the history became major elements in the definition of Turkish society. Although such a transformation started with the Tanzimat Reforms of the first half of the nineteenth century, the definite change was brought by the Republican regime. Because, the infiltration of history into the society through the indoctrination of generations by systematic educational programmes had never been undertaken by the previous reforms. This educative inculcation of historical narrative over the public left an authoritarian imprint on the historical consciousness of the society in Turkey. Because the encounter of the Turkish society with modernity at large had happened via nationalism. This encounter created rather the authoritative forms of history and identity.

The temporal change which happened during the eighteenth century in the west was the result of a whirlpool of different factors coming from the economic, social, philosophical and cultural worlds. This change as the basis of the modern

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.ataturksociety.org/about-ataturk/ataturks-speech-at-the-10th-anniversary-of-the-turkish-republic/>

¹⁵¹ Seçil Deren, “Kültürel Batılılaşma”, **Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 3: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık**, ed. by Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 386.

understanding of history had produced different methodologies, ways and understandings for dealing with history. This variety contained vigorous historical studies to grasp the past through the principles of possibility of truth, impartiality, and scientific research. However it contained romantic forms of history which was very much associated with nationalism. The Turkish modernity's approach to the past was in this regard quite one-sided, because it was formed by nationalist pragmatism with a reference to rather a combination of authoritarian positivist and romantic narration of the past. Other approaches to the past were either suppressed or ignored by the dominant official discourse.

Anthony Smith defines six main attributes of ethnic community as the basis of nationalisms:

1. a collective proper name
2. a myth of common ancestry
3. shared historical memories
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. an association with a specific 'homeland'
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of population.¹⁵²

The Turkish History Thesis was one of the major tools utilised by the political authority to fulfil these six main attributes of the Turkishness. The backbone of such a venture was history, because all these attributes merge at some point in history. Smith clarifies this point, "*An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. Such collectivities are doubly 'historical' in the sense that not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and dissolution.*"¹⁵³ The nation construction process in Turkey in the early decades of the republic was also a primarily a historical task. Nationalist history narration demarcated by the Turkish History Thesis prescribed the limits and topography of the social memory. That topography was drawn by a specific process of selection of particular periods, events, personalities and spaces. As mentioned before, while the pre-Islamic periods with a specific reference to the Central Asia was selected to be

¹⁵² Anthony D. Smith, **National Identity**, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 21.

¹⁵³ **Ibid.**, p. 20.

the background of the official history, the Ottoman past was swept into oblivion. As Renan wrote in his essay, “What Is a Nation?”, the construction of national identity should go through a process of forgetting as well: “*Yet the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common; and also that they forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century.*”¹⁵⁴ Turkish nationalism worked in the same vein, and however in the Turkish History Thesis case, the forgetting did not aim specific events or figures, but the whole chunk of the Ottoman period.

Nevertheless, as Smith pointed out, the nation building is not only historical in terms of its references to history, but also in terms of its character which is open to historical change and dissolution. In this regard, the Turkish History Thesis, as well had undergone a transformation from the 1930s to the 40s. Third Turkish History Congress in 1943 was an important event in this context because it represented a significant change in the official history discourse. The presentations made during the Congress demonstrated an explicit change in the historical understanding of the 1930s and the basic ideas of the Turkish History Thesis. The Anatolian, Mesopotamian and Near Eastern civilisations were no longer regarded as of Turkish origin. This view was also visible in the new school textbooks published and put into the curriculum in 1942 and 1945. While the Turkish History Thesis of the 1930s claimed that the Turks created the earliest civilisation of the world, and the other civilisations were derived from the Turkish civilisation, the new textbooks emphasised that the Turkish civilisation was great but not the origin of all civilisations in the world, it was classified as one among other great civilisations such the Sumerian, Egyptian, Persian, Greek and Roman. But, the most striking difference of the text books from the discourse of the 30s was their approach to the Ottoman past. They sought reconciliation with the Ottoman history. However, the main emphasis was still on the Turkishness, for example “Ottoman Turks” and “Turks” were used instead Ottomans. The textbooks included glorifications and essentialist descriptions concerning the Ottoman Turks, for example the expansion and fortification of the Ottomans in Anatolia and Rumelia were attributed to the

¹⁵⁴ Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation”, **The Collective Memory Reader**, ed. by Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 80.

superiority of Ottoman Turks, and perfection of Ottoman institutions, and it was asserted that Ottomans with qualifications such as courage, heroism and honesty were the representatives of the actual, genuine character of Turkish race. Especially the classical Age of the Ottoman Empire, known as the Growth Period (Yükseliş Devri), was incorporated into the official history. The figures like Fatih the Conqueror (Mehmet II), Suleiman the Magnificent (Suleiman I), Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha and Yavuz Sultan Selim (Selim I) were highly revered as the prominent characters who exalted the name of the Turk with their deeds and personalities.¹⁵⁵

Most of the fundamental features of the official discourse of history regarding the Ottoman past were established during this period, and remained essentially intact for the rest of the history of republic, such as the discourse of the tolerance of the Ottoman state and society towards the non-Muslim communities. In the school text book of *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi* that covers the Ottoman and European History between fourteenth and twentieth centuries, the Ottoman understanding of administration was presented as the core principle of the state is ruling Christians with tolerance and when compared to with the European counterparts, the rights given to Christians were the result of a mature policy beyond its time.¹⁵⁶ Another important change during this period was related to the narration of the conquest of Istanbul. During the 1930s, the word “*Fetih*” was not used due to its Islamic connotations. According to Etienne Copeaux, “*Fetih*” was completely non-existent the vocabulary of the 30s history jargon as a non-Kemalist word. In the textbooks of the 30s, a neutral verb, capturing (almak) was used instead of *fetih*. Moreover, there was no reference to the religious importance of the conquest or to the generous and tolerant attitude of the Turks towards the inhabitants of Constantinople.¹⁵⁷ There was only a very limited place in the textbooks for the narration of the conquest, and it was mentioned only as an ordinary historical event among others. However, this account was changed during the 40s, and left its place to a much more detailed and positive narrative about the conquest of Istanbul. *Fetih* became the defining word of this narrative. In the textbook of 1942, the conquest was described as a glorious victory, especially Mehmet the Conqueror was exalted as genius beyond his own time. The slide of the galleons over the land from the Bosphorus to the Golden Horn was

¹⁵⁵ Enver Ziya Karal, *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi, III. Sınıf*, Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1942.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁷ Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, trans. by Ali Berkay, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998, p. 182.

praised as “*a breathtaking wonderful job*”, and the whole event was defined as “*the most stunning action in the world*” shaking Turkish and Islamic societies with excitement.¹⁵⁸

The positive description of the conquest of Istanbul was also related to the incorporation of religion in a more positive manner to the historical narrative. For example, there was an attempt to reconcile the Turkish history with Islam. The textbook of 1942 explained that long contact with Muslims enabled the Turks to understand Islam more extensively and thus provided its acceptance among them. It was also claimed that the Turks became the protectors of Islam and saved the Muslims from the dangers. Moreover, the textbook was claiming that the “*this religion was spiritually more suitable for the Turkish nation than all others.*”¹⁵⁹ In this way, the Turkish identity and religious identity was connected through a natural affiliation.

There were several reasons for such a change in the composition of the official discourse of history in Turkey. First, the regime as a single-party rule became more consolidated within the years. The first two decades of the regime was still based on the shaky grounds, there were different opposition groups that the Kemalists had to fight. Moreover, the ideological and cultural premises of the regime had to be established from the ground zero. So, the new, fragile and insecure regime had to be more heavy handed and more authoritarian in its cultural and ideological discourse and policies, as well. The Turkish History Thesis contained all these characteristics reflected from the regime itself, as fragile, insecure but at the same authoritarian. As mentioned before, the assertions regarding the Turkish origin of almost all great civilisations of the world, or the direct lineage linking the Turks and Hittites and Sumerians, or the Sun Language Theory claiming a Proto-Turkic language was the mother of all languages in the world were not publicly embraced. While the regime got established its rule over the country on more stable and sturdy grounds, such excessive claims were gradually lifted out from the curriculum of the school textbooks and from the official discourse.

¹⁵⁸ Karal, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁵⁹ Cavit Baysun, *Ortaçağ Tarihi, II. Sınıf*, Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1942, p. 44.

Second, during the lifetime of Atatürk, the single-part regime was also a single-man rule. The image of Atatürk was exalted as a divine figure as the saviour and the founder of the country, he was the father of the nation. There was no place for any other historical figure in the national pantheon in which Atatürk stood alone. With his death, such a concern for the single-man cult was started to be slightly lifted¹⁶⁰. Thus, the other historical figures such as Fatih the Conqueror could enter the pantheon of the national heroes.

Third, international changes around the world, especially after the Second World War affected the Turkish politics quite deeply. The collapse of the authoritarian regimes, and the victory of the liberal democracies in the West, made Turkey move into less authoritarian policies in its internal affairs. The discourse of history was also affected by this gradually increasing freedom. The regime had never been popular with the masses.¹⁶¹ Within the changing international conditions, and facing the internal pressures, the regime had to decide to open itself to a more democratic structure and multi-party politics. To secure the support of the masses, it facilitated the more populist arguments and policies. The incorporation of the Ottoman history and Islam gradually gained a more established place within the official history discourse.

As a result of the socio-economic pressures, and the external pressures for democratisation, İsmet İnönü “*strongly emphasized the democratic parliamentary character of the Turkish political system in his speech at the opening of the parliamentary year on 1 November 1944. On 19 May 1945, he elaborated this theme and promised to make the regime more democratic...*”¹⁶² In the following period, the government let the formation of a parliamentary opposition group which would transform into the Democratic Party in 1946. The years 1946-1950 were transitional years during which the two parties struggled to acquire new identities so as to win over the electorate. The Democrats adopted the six principles of Kemalism, but they said that they would interpret them according to the needs of time.¹⁶³ They claimed

¹⁶⁰ The cult of Atatürk came to the foreground with the 1960 coup d'état, and after each military intervention it was more and more consolidated.

¹⁶¹ Erik J. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History**, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 209.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁶³ Feroz Ahmad, **The Making of Modern Turkey**, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 105.

that they are the real followers of the Kemalist ideology, and the main difference between two political parties remained mainly on economic policies. At the end of this transitional period, the 1950 elections brought a definite victory to the Democratic Party in the parliament.

The significant point here is the continuation of the fundamental principles of the regime in spite of the change of the ruling party. Secularism, republicanism, populism and nationalism as the main determinants of the republican structure were kept intact during the transitional period and after the election of the Democratic Party. In this regard, the discourse of history which had undergone a formation and transformation process during the 30s and 40s established itself as an official discourse of history which was also adopted by the Democrat Party, and its principal pillars of reference remained unchanged.

C - Turkish Cinema and the Official Discourse of History

Karl Deutsch defined nationalism in terms of its communicative feature. For him, the nation can be conceived as a communicative space. Nations and nation-states are strongly bounded by their socially communicative structures of interaction. People are held together from within by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members.¹⁶⁴ From this perspective, the national identity which denotes the belongingness to a national community should be seeded in the people through communication. Anderson also takes the similar point with Deutsch, and asserts that the mediated communication has the central importance in the formation of a nationalist consciousness. Anderson's view relates the naissance of nationalism to the rise of the print language as reflected in the novels and the newspapers. Then, it appears that the most important tool to convey the nationhood to the people is the extensive education. For example in the case of the Turkish nationalism, the education took a quite an important role for the dissemination of the nationalist ideas and ideals. Atatürk was not only the father of the Turks but also the teacher of them as he was called "the Chief Teacher/Headmaster" (Başöğretmen). It can be seen that the nation was

¹⁶⁴Karl Deutsch, **Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism**, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1966, p. 98.

infantilised and it was conceived as child to be inculcated and taught of how become a civilised, secular Turkish subject of the Turkish nation-state.

As a fundamental part of the national identity, the historical consciousness regarding the national past should be communicated to the people. As previously described, in Turkey the school textbooks were the primary sources of this communication. But, the extensive education was not the only tool for the nationalist inculcation, a variety of media from novels to theatre, from painting to cinema was put into the service of the nationalist ideology. As Smith wrote, “*the artist and the writer alike have been at the heart of this project of popular national representation and renewal, clothing the ideal of nation and its historical myths, memories and symbols in palpable, dynamic forms which are easily accessible to the mass of the “national membership”*”¹⁶⁵. Thus, in this regard, cinema is recognised as an important tool for the dissemination of the national historical consciousness in society.

Although cinema was utilised by the nation-states, and even institutionalised as state organs in some countries such as Germany, Italy or the Soviet Union, the Turkish Republic and cinema relations did not develop in this way. The regime did not take the cinema as a significant medium for the inculcation of nationalist history among the masses. Because, in the first decades of the Republic, the Turkish official discourse on history was still under construction. The Turkish History Thesis with its exaggerated claims was not applicable to the cinematographic narration. As Smith pointed out, “*the greater the pre-existing sense of ethnic community and the more intense the ties binding the people, the easier and more credible has been their [artists] task*”.¹⁶⁶ This was very much clear in the national cinemas of the West where the scope of history extended into a much immediate periods on which the national narrations referred, such as the Roman Empire in Italy, or the Mediaeval times or the period of the Friedrich the Great in Germany, or the Napoleonic past in France.

The limits and lines of the national history as formulated by the Kemalist regime were so vague but at the same were so authoritatively defended that it was

¹⁶⁵Anthony Smith, “Images of the Nation: Cinema, Art and National Identity”, **Cinema and Nation**, ed.by Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 43.

¹⁶⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 43.

impossible to put them into the screen: “*The principles of the Kemalist nation had only been thinly formulated, and film-makers were expected to give thickness and substance to these founding ideals. But, precisely because the basic principles remained so unelaborated, there was always then the possibility- in fact the probability, as it turned out- that any cinematic engagement with actual Turkish society might involve misinterpretations or betrayals of the Kemalist national project.*”¹⁶⁷ Turkish cinema was also subjected to a severe censorship. The Regulation Concerning the Control of Films and Scripts (Filmmlerin ve Film Senaryolarının Kontrolüne Dair Nizamname) introduced in 1939 put the films under the strict control of the Ministry of Interior, and the Regulation was implemented through a commission whose members were drawn from state departments, including the police and the military.¹⁶⁸

Thus, the distance between cinema and the regime remained wide. Since the regime’s rejection of the Ottoman past, there was no attempt to put the Ottoman history on the screen.

However, with the consolidation of the official history discourse, and the demise of the Turkish History Thesis regarding the over-comprehensive historical claims of the Turkishness, and the reconciliation with the Ottoman past, the national history gained a much more established ground within the society. During the 1940s especially after 1945, the official historical discourse obtained a more consensual basis with the more lenient political environment.

In this sense, the 1950s saw a rising interest in the past in Turkish cinema. Films on the period surrounding the Turkish Independence war constitute the majority of the films shot during this decade. Some of the film on the history of the Independence war were: *Ateşten G  mlek* (The Shirt of Flame) (1950, Dir. Vedat   rfi Beng  ), *  ete* (Gang) (1950, Dir.   etin Karamanbey), *Y  zbaşı Tahsin* (Lieutenant Tahsin) (1950, Dir. Orhan Murat Arıburnu), *Vatan İ  in* (For the

¹⁶⁷ Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy, “Deep Nation: The National Question and Turkish Cinema Culture”, **Cinema and Nation**, ed.by Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 198.

¹⁶⁸ Senem Duruel Erkili  , **T  rk Sinemasında Tarih ve Bellek**, Ankara: deki Basım Yayın, 2014, p. 87.

Motherland) (1951, Dir. Aydın Arakon), Hürriyet Şarkısı (The Song of Freedom) (1951, Dir. Faruk Kenç), Ege Kahramanları (The Heros of Aegean) (1951, Dir. Nuri Akıncı), Destan Destan İçinde (Legend of Legends) (1952, Dir. Seyfi Havaeri), Ankara Ekspresi (Ankara Express) (1952, Dir Aydın Arakon), Zafer Güneş (The Sun of Victory) (1953, Dir Seyfi Havaeri), Hürriyet Uğrunda Mukaddes Yalan (Sacred Lie for the Sake of Freedom) (1954, Dir. Muharrem Gürses), İstiklal Savaşı / Ruhların Mucizesi (The War of Independence/ The Miracle of Sprits) (1954, Dir. Hayri Esen), Bu Vatan Bizimdir (This Motherland is Ours) (1958,Dir. Nejat Saydam), İstiklal Uğrunda (For Independence) (1958, Dir. Rahmi Kafadar), İzmir Ateşler İçinde (İzmir in Flames) (1959, Dir. O. Nuri Ergün). As can be easily understood from their titles, these movies were mainly about the heroic glorification of the immediate past. Instead of Atatürk or the other important historical figures, ordinary people were the principal protagonists. The description of Atatürk on the cinema screen was an untouchable field because of the cult of Atatürk, and it remained so until the 1990s. The heroic acts of ordinary people within the struggle against the enemy was utilised to narrate and evoke the glorious story of the Independence War. There was no reference to the political or social events of the time. In this regard, those movies can be regarded as the part of the construction and consolidation processes of the national historical consciousness.

Apart from the movies on the Turkish liberation struggle, there was a sudden boom of the movies on a more distant past that is the Ottoman history. Starting from 1950, films on Ottoman past emerged on the screen, such as: Estergon Kalesi (Esztergom Castle) (1950, Dir. Vedat Örfi Bengü), İstanbul'un Fethi (The Conquest of İstanbul) (1951, Dir: Aydın G. Arakon), Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa (1951, Dir. Baha Gelenbevi), Lale Devri (Tulip Era) (1951, Dir. Vedat Ar), Cem Sultan (1951, Dir. Münir Hayri Egeli), Yavuz Sultan Selim ve Yeğeri Hasan (1951, Dir. Münir Hayri Egeli), Yavuz Sultan Selim Ağlıyor (Yavuz Sultan Selim is Crying) (1952, Dir. Sami Ayanoğlu).

At the first glance, this surge of the films with the theme of the Ottoman Past can be regarded as a deviation from the official discourse of history. As a reaction to the authoritarian modernisation process undertook by the regime, they can be seen as a different form of understanding of history with an emphasis on the Ottoman past.

However, this view follows up the easy chronological break provided by common political history. 1950 as the beginning of the power of the Democratic Party gives a seemingly a definite breaking point in terms of the opening of a new era. This point of view can be explanatory for some points pertaining to economic policies, composition of the political structure, but the continuities between two periods are also important to explain the certain characteristics of the Turkish society. The history of the Turkish modernisation process is a story of change but at the same time a process of continuities. One of the points that this continuation can be observed is the persistence of the official history discourse. As pointed out in preceding pages, the transformation of the historical understanding of the Turkish modernisation had gained its fundamental characteristics during the 1940s. The thinly defined and exaggerated claims of the Turkish History Thesis faded away within the years, and the Ottoman past especially the period of the classical Ottoman age was integrated into the official discourse. In this sense, the Ottoman past was interwoven into the pragmatism of the historical outlook of the Turkish nationalism. Especially the classical age of the Ottoman Empire reflecting the grandeur of the Turkish past became visible within the limits of the ideal of the Turkish nationalism. While Turkishness and secularism remained the core ideals of the Turkism modernisation process and its historical outlook, the Ottoman past was also placed into this framework.

D - The Ottoman Past on the Screen

The movies of the 1950s on the Ottoman past can be evaluated within this nationalist discourse of the Turkish modernisation. They can be seen as the products and producers of this discourse, as all other cultural entities. They reflect a historical narrative already established within the historical discourse of the Turkish nation-state. Pierre Sorlin describes this established historical narrative as “the historical capital”: “[...] *the existence of a system of knowledge that is already clearly defined-historical knowledge, from which film-makers take their material [...]* The cultural heritage of every country and every community includes dates, events and characters known to all members of that community. This common basis is what we might call *the group’s ‘historical capital’* [...]”¹⁶⁹ Within this perspective, these films with the

¹⁶⁹ Pierre Sorlin, **The Film in History: Restaging the Past**, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 20.

theme of the Ottoman past can be considered as the reflection of the historical capital which was established by the discourse of history of the Turkish nationalism. These movies are reflecting the nationalist ideals of history over the Ottoman past by recognizing the limits and narrative and points of reference established by this discourse. In this regard, they consolidated and fortified the nationalist cannon of history.

These movies did not only mirror the nationalist perspective on the Ottoman past, but they also helped to elaborate this perspective by propagating the nationalist imagery. Comparing to the nationalisms in the western world, Turkish nationalism's baggage of the visual imagery did not have a long tradition. In the west, the historicist painting of the previous eras provided nation-states with an ability to visualise their national ideals, however the Turkish case did not have such a source. Therefore, cinema played an important role for the development of such a visual imagery in the service of the nation-state.

To illustrate these claims in a clearer way, this study focuses on four of these movies due to their exemplary potential, they are: *İstanbul'un Fethi* (The Conquest of İstanbul) (1951, Dir: Aydın G. Arakon), *Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa* (1951, Dir. Baha Gelenbevi), *Lale Devri* (Tulip Era) (1951, Dir. Vedat Ar) and *Yavuz Sultan Selim Ağlıyor* (Yavuz Sultan Selim is Crying) (1952, Dir. Sami Ayanoglu).

The titles of these movies refer to a certain important historical figure, a significant event or a historical period of time in the Ottoman history. They can be considered as some of the most important reference points of the Ottoman History as embodiments of the success, grandeur, heroism of the Turkish past. Thus, with their subject matters, they fortify and reinstate the national catechism based on the glorious past, in this regard they can be regarded as picture-textbooks of history or as history textbooks on screen.

İstanbul'un Fethi (The Conquest of İstanbul) which was directed by Aydın G. Arakon in 1951 is a narrative of the story of the conquest of İstanbul. The film begins in Edirne in 1453 just in the eve of the conquest. So, the film is demarcated by the immediate time surrounding the conquest. As the main figure of the conquest, the

character of Mehmet the Conqueror is already developed with his sturdy and heroic features. He is the head of growing empire, and to enlarge and secure his empire he has to conquer the Byzantine Empire. The reasons necessitating such a conquest are clearly stated at the beginning of the film: First, the Byzantine Empire is already shrunk into its smallest territory, mainly Constantinople, and it stands as a hole surrounded by the Ottoman Empire, so it is necessary to capture the land for further growth. Second, The Byzantine Empire poses many threats to the Ottomans, because of its decadent and corrupt character. These are also the primary reasons of the conquest narrated by the official discourse of history. For example, in the national official discourse the enemy as the other is inherently and naturally evil and bad, in this movie too the evilness of the Byzantine Empire is a given feature. Mehmet the Conqueror proclaims that *“The Byzantine Empire, the nest of the devil, the house of the evil which poses threats to our state must be destroyed!”*. When he learned from a Byzantine messenger of the arrival of an army of Crusaders sent by the Pope to help the Byzantines, he declares that: *“Regarding the crusader army of four hundred thousand soldiers, big waves want to hit the huge rocks to become more majestic and grandiose. They (the crusaders) will not destroy our courage but on the contrary will strengthen our determination. Our aim is not to kill people or slay your people. Our desire is to give a fresh soul and bring justice to the musty Byzantine Empire which is a source of trouble just in the middle of our land and where morality and justice are non-existent. Go! and say these words to your emperor! I will capture the Byzantine Empire or it will capture me, there is no other way!”* Through this harangue, the spectator is informed about the reasons of the conquest. This is a geopolitical, strategic and political but at the same time a moral necessity. Because the Turks are the natural moral bearers against the immoral and fallen Byzantine state. The discontent and suffering of the Byzantine people of the decadent and unjust Byzantine rule is also given as another necessity which led to the conquest. It is related to this moral obligation of the Turks who have to save those people from this savage rule. The Byzantine clerics do not want to see the Catholic rule which would be imposed by the crusader army, so they prefer to see Turkish turban instead of Catholic mitre in Constantinople.

This is a morality intrinsic to the nation, it does not contain any religious tinge. However, among the reasons of the conquest, there is no allusion to the Islamic

reference about the conquest of Istanbul which will become the point of reference in the narrative of the conquest in later years especially after the 1980s. In this sense, the film follows the official canon of history through its secular code.

The film employs some other historical figures such as Hızır and Ulubatlı Hasan who are closely associated with the story of the conquest. As soldiers, they represent the bravery and devotion to the state in the social psyche. Through their characters, the Turkishness is connected to the Ottoman past. When Ulubatlı Hasan is captured and tortured by the Byzantine soldiers, he hears the sound of the Ottoman army from a distance, and says with excitement: *“Listen! This is the sound of the ones who vowed to capture the Byzantine Empire. This is the sound of the Turk! Long live the Turkish Army!”*. In this way, the nationalist claim about the primordial origins of the Turkish identity is reflected through description of the Ottoman identity as Turkish. In fact, throughout the movie, the word “Turk” is utilised to define the Ottoman state and people, this is also uttered from the mouth of the sultan himself: *“We are Turkish. We know how to fight against the impossibilities!”*.

At the final scene of the movie, after the victory of the Turkish army, while the sultan and the troops are entering to Constantinople through one of the gates of the town, Byzantine women and young girls welcome them by throwing flowers. This scene summarizes the narrative of the story of the conquest as not a brutal destruction of a Constantinople as exists in the western historical narrative but as its rescue as Turks bring justice and happiness to its own people.

The film contains all the reference points and moments pertaining to the established narrative of the conquest, such as the decadent Byzantine, the help of the crusader army, the discontent of the people of Constantinople, the chain blocking the mouth of the Golden Horn, the slide of the Ottoman galleys through land from Bosphorus to the Golden Horn, planting the Ottoman flag by Ulubatlı Hasan on top of the fortification walls of the city. By means of the narration of these moments, the film can be seen as a complete visualisation of the established narration of the conquest.

Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa which was directed by Baha Gelenbevi in 1951 tells the story of the life of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, the chief admiral of the era of Suleiman the Magnificent. It is an account of the life of Barbarossa rising from being a corsair in the Mediterranean to admiralship. However, the basic tenets of his character remains intact throughout the story reflecting the sturdy, moral, ethical, loving and brave, devoted and humble characteristic of a Turkish soldier.

The film begins with a scene of naval fight between the forces of Barbarossa and the forces of the lord of the Fondi castle on the Italian coast of the Tyrrhenian Sea. As a real reference to the historical records which tells that Barbarossa sacked the Castle of Fondi in 1534, the film aims at a certain level of verisimilitude by describing Barbarossa as a corsair and his involvement in a definite historical event. However, this historical reference is brought into the nationalist discourse. When the Italian ambassadors complain about the Turkish corsairs who are plundering the western coastline of Italy to the Grand Vizier, he answers the ambassadors via the dragoman with these words: *“Tell the ambassadors that Turkish corsairs do not plunder, they fight to save the people suffering in the hands of cruel lords”*. Thus, the Ottoman pirates are transformed into Turkish heroes with noble intentions through a nationalistic language which brings the past into the present.

The pinnacle of the film’s narrative is the Battle of Preveza which all the other events are leading to. Through this battle, the narrative of the life story of a national figure, Barbarossa is crowned, and the historical discourse over the associative link between Barbarossa and the Battle of Preveza is established. The importance of the Battle in the nationalist construction is related through these words, when Barbarossa addresses to his marines just before the battle: *“My captains, my sons, we are at the eve of a great fight. While the enemy is coming onto us with a fleet of six hundred warships, we have only one hundred twenty two ships. However, against this we have the noble and heroic blood that we inherited from our ancestors!”*. By emphasising the blood of the ancestors, this speech draws a line connecting the generations through an essentialist feature of ethnic identity.

The battle was a great victory of the Ottoman navy, and it marks a significant moment in the Turkish national history as a victory securing the Ottoman dominance

over the Mediterranean until the Battle of Lepanto. At the end of the battle, Andrea Doria, the Genoese Admiral of the Christian forces runs away. Thus, he is presented as an anti-heroic figure pointing to all the evil features such as the cowardliness, meanness and immorality as the opposite of the all positive features of the Turkish heroism epitomised in Barbarossa.

In this respect, the movie is overall an exposition of a certain heroic period of the Turkish history. Two fundamental pivots of the story, Hayreddin Barbarossa and the Battle of Preveza constitute the backbone of the narrative which corresponds to the dictum of the nationalist canon of history.

Yavuz Sultan Selim Ağlıyor (Yavuz Sultan Selim is Crying) was directed by Sami Ayanoğlu in 1952. With its long duration of two hours twenty minutes in comparison with other three shorter movies, it gives a more epic impression. This film can be considered as almost an encyclopaedic layout of all important points and moments in the period of Selim I. The movie begins with an external voice inviting the spectator into the history by explaining the date and the place: *“We are in Trabzon Province where Prince (Şehzade) Selim is the governor, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Sultan Beyazıd II”*. The viziers control Sultan Beyazıd because he is old and weak. The Grand Vizier wants to make Prince Ahmed (the brother of Selim) sultan, and directs the decision of Beyazıd in this way. When Prince Selim hears about that decision, he decides to move onto İstanbul to get his deserved right to be the head of the state. He arrives at the capital, captures the throne peacefully. After his ascend to the throne, the movie exposes the successive military victories marking the period of Yavuz Sultan Selim. With an accurate historical order, the Battle of Chaldiran with the Safavid Empire of Persia in 1514, the campaign to Egypt and the Battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 with the Egyptian Mamluks, and the Battle of Ridaniya as the final battle with the Mamluks in 1517. The film aims to depict these campaigns and the battles in a realistic way, and at a great extent it succeeds this aim through the grandeur of the battle scenes. The narration of these battles and campaigns are related to the natural desire of growth of the Ottoman Turks, and this narration does not refer to any larger political, social, economic and cultural aspects surrounding these military campaigns or battles. For example, there is no allusion to the Quizilbash rebellions and their bloody

suppression by the Ottoman state during the reign of Selim I. Within this frame, the movie mimics the official discourse of history on the Ottoman History which acts as a reserve of Turkish heroism revealing itself mostly in battle fields, naval wars or military campaigns.

The Turkish heroism is presented as an intrinsic feature of the Turkish identity, but it has a historical characteristic which is inherited from generation to generation in historical course. For example, before the Egyptian campaign, Selim talks to his son Prince Suleiman (Suleiman the Magnificent) with these words: *“Suleiman! You, as our only successor and the future possessor of the throne, must understand what we want to do. We dethroned our father for the sake of the world order, we did not hesitate to kill our brothers for the security and persistence of the state, we also did not hesitate to destroy Shah Ismail. And now, we intend to destroy the Egyptian state. Ah Suleiman! This world is only for a single ruler. For bringing peace to the people and wiping off all the wars from the face of the earth, a single flag should stand alone in this world. So far, we were able to realise this aim only in Anatolia. I expect you to follow up my way!”*. Suleiman responds *“My father’s way is my way!”*. These sentences reflect the *raison d’état* embedded in the Turkish state tradition, for the sake of the state everything is legal, moral and ethical, even the most unethical ones.. The *raison d’état* of the modern Turkish nation-state which has always used this kind of rhetoric regarding the sake of the state that demands devotion from its citizens is connected to a continuous tradition extending from the Ottoman past in this film. Selim does not go to wars and conquers the lands for his own power, but for the power of the state which will eventually bring peace and harmony to world.

The limits of the Turkish nationalism and official discourse of history is also visible in the almost non-existent Islamic references in the film. This is quite striking because Yavuz Sultan Selim is quite an important figure in an Islamic context, because he was the one who captured the Egypt and became the first Ottoman Caliph by seizing the relics and insignia of the caliphate. This event does not find a place in the movie, even there was no single reference to it. The only Islamic throughout the movie is the pray recited when Selim dies in his bed at the end.

Lale Devri (Tulip Era) which was directed by Vedat Ar in 1951 stands as a different movie than the other three movies, because it does not focus on a single historical figure but on a specific period of the Ottoman history. The Tulip Era was a peaceful period in the first half of the eighteenth century, and it is considered an important period for the fine arts especially poetry and painting. It can be claimed that the movie was shot just to present a bunch of historical figures that were closely associated with the Tulip Era, such poet Nedim, painter Levni, İbrahim Müteferrika who brought the printing press to the Ottoman Empire for the first time. In fact, the narrative structure of the film almost does not exist. It is composed of the scenes depicting the famous landscapes and personalities, but they are placed into a coherent historical narrative. There are scenes depicting the famous Sadabad feasts alongside the Kağıthane River are juxtaposed with the scenes where Nedim recites his poems about İstanbul to the sultan. There are some other figures of the period also appear occasionally such as Jean Baptist Van Mour, the French painter who painted the scenes of the era, or Patrona Halil who led a mob rebellion and ended up the Tulip Era. So, this movie can be regarded as an encyclopaedic article or a paragraph for a textbook pertaining to the Tulip Era. The names of the figures, and some scenes related to the era are sequenced in a historical timeline.

The melodramatic elements are also integrated into the narrative structure of all these movies, since they are not documentaries but popular media products targeting public. However, these melodramatic elements do not constitute the backbone or the core of this structure, they are rather utilised as conjunctive clauses connecting the historical moments through time. For example, the involvements of the historical figures in romantic relations do not change the course of the historical narrative, they look like attached ornamentations into the movies, because the women as the objects of these romantic relations appear at a certain moment and they disappear without leading any change in the course of the events. They are just used to reinforce the heroism, morality and the grandeur of the historical figures in these movies.

There is also a concern for the historical verisimilitude shared by all these movies, and this concern is also reflected in the romantic relations. The non-existence of the Ottoman muslim women in the public space so the impossibility of the romantic encounters in public spaces are taken into account, therefore the objects

of these romantic relations are non-muslim women. Such a formulation serves a dual function; first it satisfies a concern for historical accuracy and also reinstates the moral foundations of the national character. For example, when Barbarossa attacks on Fondi Castle, the wife of the Lord, Guilia Gonzaga waits for Barbarossa impatiently: *"I will be saved! He is going to be here tomorrow, he will certainly capture the castle, and he will save me!"*. Thus, this scene reinforces the image of the Turks liberating the people from the yoke of the enemies but also emphasises national masculinity through capturing the woman of the enemy and leaving him impotent. However, the national heroes do not loose themselves within these romantic relations, because they have more important national missions. After Barbarossa captures Fondi castle, and the Lord is killed, Guilia welcomes him joyfully and says *"please take me with you!"*. Barbarossa answers: *"You are the most beautiful woman of all the Mediterranean, you may give dizziness to my head, but it should stand firm over my shoulders. I want to have all the Mediterranean as my bride. I want to put the Turkish flag on its face as a bridal veil."* The sturdiness of the national character that even resists to the charms of the most beautiful women values the heroic desires over anything else. This scene is at the beginning of the movie, after it fulfils its function as the reinstatement of the national character and then the film focuses solely on the narration of historical events such as the Battle of *Preveza*.

Yavuz Sultan Selim also involves in a romantic relationship with a Greek girl when he is at Trabzon as the governor of the province. During the movie, the romantic exchanges between the Greek girl and Selim are scattered between the historical events as conjunctive points of the narration. She dies in the middle of the movie, however movie does not show the reaction of Selim, she simply dies and it does not change the course of the narrative of the movie. In sum, the melodramatic elements within these movies do not destroy profoundly didactic narrative conveying the principal moments of the national history.

The most significant function of these films is the visual representation of the national identity regarding the distant Ottoman past. Their importance can be more clearly understood when it is stated that these films were the first films presenting the images of the Ottoman past within the nationalist discourse. All of these movies share a concern for a historical verisimilitude and a distinctive sense of historical

atmosphere through a visual narrative and certain historical references. They create a certain visual vocabulary through some references to earlier forms of visual representations and convey them to the public. Thus, they evoke and represent the panorama of nationhood in its historical variety. Smith denotes that the “ [nationalist] cinematic portrayals stand firmly in the tradition pioneered by the history painters of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both in the portrayal of national virtues being inculcated and in their use of *exempla virtutis*”¹⁷⁰. These *exempla virtutis* are the crucial moments or crucial figures in which a public moral choice is realised through portrayal in painting. For Rosenblum, the development of *exempla virtutis* is very much related to the historicist understanding of the past in the visual field: “...the new retrospective approach towards the historical past that appeared in the mid eighteenth century and that continue to be elaborated... is found most often in modern German historical studies.”¹⁷¹ Smith contends that the national cinema utilises these *exempla virtutis* as a baggage of visual reference in its representation of the national ideals, such as courage, self-sacrifice, heroism, patriotism, chastity or generosity. Once these images in the paintings are established as examples of these ideals, they can be grasped and used by the cinemas of different countries. The Turkish nationalist cinema, too, utilised such exemplary images taken from the painting for the creation of visuality of the nationhood.

¹⁷⁰ Smith, **Images of the Nation...**, p. 46.

¹⁷¹ Robert Rosenblum, **Transformations in Late Eighteenth Century Art**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, p.106.


Picture 3.1: Napoleon Crossing the Alps, Jacques-Louis David, 1801, Château de Malmaison



Picture 3.2: Poster, İstiklal Harbi, 1954



Picture 3.3: Poster, İstanbul'un Fethi, 1951



These three images show the relation between the historicist painting and its international influence of the visual formation of the nationhood. Jacques Louis-David painted Napoleon crossing the Alps (Picture 3.1) with certain references to classical figures of the Roman emperors as the embodiment of the heroism and courage, and this image as an example of these virtues was grasped by the Turkish national cinema, as well, as can be seen in these film posters. The descriptions of Atatürk in the poster from 1954 of *İstiklal Harbi* (Picture 3.2) and Mehmet the Conqueror in the poster of *İstanbul'un Fethi* (Picture 3.3) use the same gesture taken from the historically established example of the vocabulary of the modern nationalism.

The historical movies provide a 'historical map' of the national past in order to bind the spectator more firmly to the national identity. The search for epic grandeur is established around a reconstruction of key events which follow an accepted sequence of episodes, visualising the movement of the nation forward in the temporal line as Anderson described. The movies on the Ottoman past follow the same structure by visualising the Ottoman history's significant moments which are folding out in a certain temporal order. Thus, the movies play an important role for the inculcation of the temporality and the historical consciousness regarding the national narrative.

These movies about the Ottoman past also have a common concern for the verisimilitude in the representation of the past. The visual descriptions of the historical figures and moments are based on the certain pictorial references, in this sense they contain a claim to the historical reality. For example, the visual representations of all the important figures are related to the historical portrayals of these figures in painting. The use of historicist painting by the western nationalisms mimics itself in the Turkish nationalism. However, the Turkish case does not have such rich source of visual references, so the Turkish national cinema has to collect certain images already associated with the Ottoman past. For example Selim I. is visualised as in his portrays in some paintings (Picture 3.4, Picture 3.5, Picture 3.6, and Picture 3.7).


Picture 3.4: Scene from “Yavuz Sultan Selim Ağlıyor”, 1951



Picture 3.5: The portrait of Selim I, Konstantin Kapıdağlı, circa 1804-1806



Picture 3.6: Selim I, painter unknown, Topkapi Palace Portrait Gallery



Picture 3.7: Scene from “Yavuz Sultan Selim Ağlıyor”, 1951



Mehmet the Conqueror and Barbarossa are also portrayed in the films through references to their portrayals in certain paintings. Thus, the visual canon of the national discourse of history is both put into their place in the narrative of the past and also conveyed to the public. Especially the paintings of Fausto Zonaro, the court painter of the Ottoman Palace at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, who was famous of his historicist paintings on the Ottoman history, provide an important source for the visualisation of the narrative of the conquest (Picture 3.8 and Picture 3.9). The claims to the historical verisimilitude in both textual and visual narrative show the power of the already established historical narrative in the official historiography. The allegiance to the premises of these historiographical limits, the films could assert themselves as the conveyors of a true national past.

The visualisation of the historical narrative is also used to establish a connection between the past and the present of the nation. The temporal persistence of the primordial features of the national character is inculcated on the public through this kind visual connection. For example, at the end of the *İstanbul'un Fethi*, the image of the actor playing the Mehmet the Conqueror and the famous painting of Mehmet the Conqueror by Gentile Bellini are juxtaposed (Picture 3.10, Picture 3.11), this is an open assertion of the movie's claim to visual verisimilitude. Moreover, an external voice calls the audience to the reality of the past: *"You closed an age, and inaugurated another one. You gave your nation an indestructible country. They will call you the Conqueror! The Conqueror! Your children should be worthy of you!"*

Picture 3.8: Scene from “İstanbul’un Fethi”, 1951



Picture 3.9: Mehmed II Entering to Constantinople, Fausto Zonaro, 1903, Dolmabahçe Palace Collection



The connection established between the visual representation of the past and the present over the national continuum is also delivered in Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa through the juxtaposition of the image of Barbarossa and the sculpture of Barbarossa in the monument in Beşiktaş. Then, the troops of modern Turkish marines march in front of the monument, and an external voice emphasises this connection: *“O! The conqueror of the immense seas! The memorable symbol of the Turkish marines, Great Barbaros! Your grandsons will always carry the flag in the roads of victory by following you! Rest in peace in your eternal tomb in the Turkish heart!”* (Picture 3.12, Picture 3.13, Picture 3.14, Picture 3.15). Thus, the image of Barbarossa in the film and the monument which was erected in 1944 as one the few monuments dedicated to a figure from the Ottoman past are related to emphasise the historical continuation of the national identity by establishing a visual canon.


Picture 3.10: Scene from “İstanbul’un Fethi”, 1951



Picture 3.11: Mehmed II, Gentile Bellini, 1480, The National Gallery, London




Picture 3.12 and Picture 3.13: "Scenes from 'Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa', 1952



Picture 3.14



Picture 3.15: Portrait of Barbarossa.



E - The Ambivalent Existence of History within the Turkish Modernisation

The story of the Turkish modernisation is also a story of the nation building and westernisation. While the late nineteenth century where the encounter of the Ottoman Empire with modernity turned into a more complex and close relationship, the Turkish modernisation became subjected to the discussions revolving around the identity and technical / industrial development. The emergence of the new Turkish republic meant a certain solution to these discussions; this solution was the creation of a national identity within an authoritarian form of modernisation of the Turkish society under a strong state tutelage. The transformation of a mostly rural society into a modern nation was the fundamental purpose of the modernising policies of the republic.

In the West, the emergence of the western historical consciousness in the eighteenth century based on the distinctiveness of the past resting upon a perception of historical distance and perspective was transformed and developed by the continuous change caused by the rapid industrialisation fuelled by capitalist machine. The birth of this historical consciousness and its colonisation by the nation-state left their marks on the ideological construction of nationalism. However, modernity itself produced its own critics, different views on history regarding its nature, political uses or constructions constitute an important part of the western intellectual climate during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a society remaining outside of this transformation of industrial capitalism, rapid urbanisation and the effervescent ideological and intellectual atmosphere concomitant with these social and economic and cultural transformations, the Turkish encounter with modernity was principally through the filter of nationalism. The construction of a new modern national identity was heavily depended upon the creation of a modern historical consciousness. The peasant society of the early republic should be endowed with a new historical perspective. The state elite of the republic aimed to build up a modern temporal continuum by placing the nation in the present, dressing it up with a historical past and opening up a future horizon of development. Thus, the main purpose was to take the society into the historical and temporal structure of the modern world¹⁷². This

¹⁷² The difficulty of the realisation of this purpose was recounted in the 1932 novel “Yaban” (The Strange) of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. In the novel, a Turkish intellectual suffocated in the British occupied İstanbul during the Armistice years after the First World War goes to central Anatolia with noble intentions to be a part of his people rather than staying in the corrupt capital. However, what he

could only be succeeded through a programme of education based on the premises of the nationalism. Accordingly, a national history was set to be designed, which would be named as the Turkish History Thesis based on the rejection of the Ottoman past and the glorification of the far extended roots of the Turkishness in distant civilisations. As discussed previously, this historical design had gone through certain changes during the years of the 1930s and 1940s, and finally established well-defined pillars of the outlook of the official discourse of history. The ottoman past was integrated into this official discourse, but shaped according to the limits of the ideals of the nation-state. The lines of the Ottoman past referring to certain moments and figures in the Ottoman history were demarcated and curved in parallel to the lines of the official discourse of history which emphasised the national identity. Thus, it can be claimed that the relationship of the Turkish society with history was principally defined by the state.

The movies selected within the scope of this study display how the Ottoman past defined by the official discourse was visualised on screen. Within this frame, they were utilised to establish the official view of the Ottoman past in a visual narrative and to convey this narrative to the public. Their discursive structure mimic the official discourse already established in the textbooks as the main educational tools of the nation-state. These movies as the first films concerning the distant Ottoman past in the republican history developed a canon of national imagery regarding the Ottoman history. By means of the references to the images created in earlier times, they also contain a claim to the historical verisimilitude which supported their role in the national historical discourse as the true contributors in the national history. Certain moments, and prominent historical figures of the Ottoman history were inculcated on the public through the visibility in these movies. The place of these movies in the national education for constructing a certain view towards the Ottoman history can be seen in the example of İstanbul'un Fethi which was shot in 1951. This movie was shown in the schools as part of the curriculum during the year 1953 which was the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul.¹⁷³

finds is a flock of people living under the mist of thousands of years, without any historical consciousness or any coordinates necessary for a national identity. He is rejected by these people as a stranger coming from a totally different world. Thus, his optimism leaves its place to a complete despair. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, **Yaban**, İletişim Yayınları, Ankara, 2004.

¹⁷³ Duruel Erkiş, **op.cit.**, p. 93.

Although a modern historical consciousness providing a certain position history regarding the temporal dimensions of the past, present and future was aimed to be inculcated on the public, the limits and the fundamental pillars of such a consciousness was always kept under the control of the state. Developments of other perspectives of history, such as the social history of the Annales School could never find a way to infiltrate into this domain of history guarded by the state. Thus, the existence of “the historical” within the society remained within the limits of the pragmatism of the official discourse of history of the nation-state. This pragmatism utilised the history as a productive tool to create a nationhood based on the ideals of the Turkish nationalism, above all senses of loyalty to the state and belonging to the nation. The Ottoman past as a part of the national narrative of history was also tackled through this pragmatism. As long as the pieces of the Ottoman past could be integrated into the national discourse, they could exist in the public, but this existence found itself a limited place the public space demarcated by the state. Thus, the visibility of history whether related to the Ottoman past or earlier periods remained quite residual in this sense. The newness of the Turkish nation-state continued to be fundamental pivotal point of the official discourse.

The uneasy and ambivalent relationship between history and the Turkish republic was also salient in many other fields, such as architecture. The architectural canon of the early republican period was installed as the architectural modernism. The modernism in architecture in line with other modernisms in literature, music or fine arts, emerged as a critique to the established and authoritarian forms of the modern society defined by industrial capitalism and conservative bourgeois values. It aimed to provide the larger segment of populations with more healthy, liveable and more humane forms of habitation. The modernists wanted to build up a new culture in which form would not refer to earlier forms of styles, but would be founded on practicality, simplicity, economy, materials, rational construction and function. Western modernism emerged from the conditions of “*especially the industrial city, capitalist production, and the autonomous bourgeois subject*”¹⁷⁴. The Turkish republican modernisation by adopting the architectural modernism as the basis of its official programme of architectural renewal of the country bypassed these

¹⁷⁴ Sibel Bozdoğan, “The Predicament of Modernism in Turkish Architectural Culture”, **Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey**, Washington: The University of Washington Press, 1997, p. 136.

fundamental critical attitudes embedded within modernism. The Turkish modernism in this sense was “*not grounded in a radical thinking of the discipline of architecture in the context of profound historical, social and technological transformations. Rather, it was primarily a form of ‘visible politics’ or ‘civilising mission’ that accompanied official programs of modernization, imposed from above and implemented by the bureaucratic and professional elites of paternalistic nation-state*”¹⁷⁵. This essentially formalist understanding of modernism rather than a more sophisticated conception of its critical content became the main ground of the Turkish modernist architecture. So, this formalism was fundamentally visible in the Turkish modernisation’s embrace of the general attitude of modernism against the stylistic anti-historicism. Modernism’s claim for a radical rupture from the past styles was welcomed by the Turkish nation-state which found there a convenient parallelism with its own claim to be new state. This modernist programme under the pragmatic use of the state helped creating a rather sterile public space cleaned of “the historical” in Turkey. This approach to architecture continued in the following decades, “the international style” which was adopted into the Turkish urbanisation in the form of apartment blocks during the 1950s.

The pragmatic and political use of modernist architecture by the Turkish republican ideology was mainly utilised to stress the newness of the modern Turkish nation state as a new slate or new beginning in history. This modernist programme created a public space without any historical reference especially to the Ottoman past as much as possible. This architectural programme reveals the complicated nature of the relationship between history and the Turkish modernisation. In certain fields, It pragmatically aimed to emphasise the character of the new state by creating a space free from the historical references, and in other fields where this pragmatism necessitate to include the historical references as in the case of the establishment of a national identity it utilised the historical references in a quite selective way by incorporating them into the defined limits of the national discourse as can be seen in the visual representation of the ottoman past in the cinema of the 1950s.

As Jacques Rancière put it, the cinema of a certain period is the product of the historicity of that period: “*Il appartient à un temps spécifique déterminé par une certaine idée de l’histoire comme catégorie d’un destin commun. Il appartient à une*

¹⁷⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 136-137.

idée de l'art liée à cette idée d'histoire."¹⁷⁶ (Rancière, 2008: 45). In this respect, the Turkish cinema of the 1950s with the theme of the Ottoman past belongs to a certain historicity and temporal structure introduced by the Turkish nation-state. The modern understanding of time based on the distinction of the temporal planes, the distinctive characteristic of the past, a modern historical consciousness were aimed to be seeded upon the newly emerging Turkish society coming from a rather pre-modern temporal frame of the *ancien régime*. According to Marc Ferro, the film reveals more about the time and society of its time than its historical content. For him, the films with strong themes of ideological inculcation also participate in the history of their own time and they display the political and cultural texture of the societies in which they were produced.¹⁷⁷ The movies analysed above as the products of a certain period of the Turkish society expose the relationship of the Turkish modernisation to the field of history.

The regime of historicity of the Turkish modernisation can be basically defined in terms of emergence of the new form of temporality based on the modern time discipline and a modern historical consciousness defined and inculcated by the state which suppressed some parts of history but highlights other moments as can be seen in its approach to the Ottoman Past and its ideological preference to the architectural modernism. However, this space of "the historical" started to change while the Turkish society had undergone radical transformations especially since the years of the 1980s. A new society with different references in particularly in economic and cultural fields gave way to a different sort of relationship with the past.

¹⁷⁶ Jacques Rancière, "L'historicité du Cinéma", **De l'histoire au Cinéma**, ed. by Antoine de Baecque and Christian Delage, Paris : Editions Complexe, 2008, p. 45.

¹⁷⁷ Marc Ferro, **Cinéma et Histoire**, Paris : Folio, 1993, p. 28.

IV - CHAPTER 3

REACTIONARY MODERNISM: FROM CORPORATISM TO NEO-LIBERALISM

A - From Corporatism to Modernisation Theory

The relationship of the Turkish modernisation with history constitutes a multifaceted and complex edifice founded upon an uneasy amalgam of a will to create a totally new society dressed up with western cultural values and a desire to find the roots of this society in a bottomless past. The rejection of the Ottoman past constituted one of the façades of this edifice which found its foundational legitimacy in the new regime's newness and difference from the decadent *ancien régime*. This emphasis on the newness of the regime was also an important feature of the authoritarian corporatist regimes of the period following the World War I. For example, in Portugal, the state created under the rule of Oliveira Salazar was named as *Estado Novo* (the New State). In the rhetoric of Salazarist regime, this new state marked a rupture from the corruption, disorder and all other negative features of the old republican regime in Portugal.

For Taha Parla, generally speaking the Turkish political thought and state structure during the twentieth century is corporatist¹⁷⁸. As the father of the Turkish social and political thought, Ziya Gökalp's understanding and analysis of the society had basically a solidarist and organic approach which was the fundamental characteristic of the corporatism¹⁷⁹. This understanding, as pointed out by Parla, became the backbone of the Turkish public and political philosophy. As one of the basic constituting element of the corporatist thought, the organic conception of

¹⁷⁸ Taha Parla, Ziya Gökalp, **Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹ Corporatism was a reaction and a response to the development of the industrial capitalism in Europe. With the vanishing of *ancien régime*, corporatist thought emerged as a response to the ethical and organisational problems of laissez-faire industrialisation and liberal political institutions. It came out in societies where conservative classes were threatened by rapid and modernising social change. Those who suffered from the development of the liberal capitalism, Catholics and aristocrats, were the first theorists to create the genesis of corporatist thought. With its reactionary character, corporatism was a modern distinctive political programme to heal the maladies of industrial society.

society sees society as an organism alike human body. Within this analogy, individual is just a cell of a body that is an integrated whole composed of organs. Corporatists contended that society is a complex organism with each part playing a vital role in the maintenance of a natural harmony of society¹⁸⁰. The state was considered at the top of the hierarchical structure of the societal organism. Higher purposes of society serving nation were represented by the state. It had the moral authority to maintain the harmonious and ordered social existence.

The corporatist regimes lived their heydays especially during the post-First World War period. Fascist Italy, Salazarist Portugal and Francoist Spain established corporatist regimes with organic, solidarist and populist tones regarding the social organisation¹⁸¹. Inspired by these regimes, the Kemalist cadre in Turkey also aimed to found a regime with corporatist references, such as authoritarian statism (*devletçilik*) fortified by an organic societal structure (society as a classless and integrated mass / *sınıfsız, kaynaşmış bir kitle olarak toplum*) based on a populist solidarism (*içtima-i tesanüd*). In this political mentality, the New State represented a new beginning as a rupture from the corrupt *ancien régime* which was not able to sustain an ordered, harmonious and integrated society. In this hierarchically ordered society, its relationship with the past is also shaped and dictated by the state as the head of this societal corpus. The historical narrative is articulated in an officially demarcated frame linking the society to a past depicted in line with the features articulated in organic and solidarist terms¹⁸². This description of history is quite selective in terms of its references to the past through a narrative about the perennial character of the organic community and the emphasis on its re-emergence or re-birth in the modern conditions by means of the efforts of the new regime.

¹⁸⁰ John Weiss, **The Fascist Tradition, Radical Right-Wing Extremism in Modern Europe**, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967, p. 11.

¹⁸¹ Being against both liberalism and socialism, corporatist theorists described their programme as the “third way” which would be different from the cut-throat competitive egoism of liberalism and the soulless materialism and class antagonism of socialism. The third way was claimed to be *sui generis* ideology that aimed to be the salvation of the modern society. Especially, the inter-war era saw a salient increase in the political emphasis on the consideration of the third way. The political and economic crises of liberalism and threat posed by the Russian Revolution triggered this emphasis.

¹⁸² The incorporation of the organic conception of society into national values has become a leitmotiv in the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth century German Romanticism. Ideas of corporation and community (*Gemeinschaft*) were constructed into a national ideology. So, the character of *gemeinschaft* of the small town was transplanted in the national level as *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The authoritarian corporatist regimes emerged as alternatives to the liberal and socialist forms of development and modernisation especially during the period between two world wars. The Turkish modernisation's emphasis on populism and statism as indispensable republican values instead democracy and pluralism can be considered as the most salient features shared by other corporatist regimes of the same period. The social harmony against the class antagonism and the corporation of different segments of the society against the competitiveness of individual interests were proclaimed as the basis of the social and economic development of the Turkish society¹⁸³. The organic conception of society was especially quite salient in the cult of the peasantry promoted by the Kemalist regime, which presented the rural life and the peasantry as the embodiment of the real virtues of the Turkish nation¹⁸⁴. The “*Halka Doğru*” (To the People) as a motto taken from the teachings of Ziya Gökalp was adopted by the new regime, it echoed the movement of “*Andere Verso Il Popolo*” (Going out to the People) put into practice by Mussolini in 1931 in Italy to integrate the segments of the Italian society which could not be integrated to the Fascist regime yet¹⁸⁵. Both in Turkey and Italy, such populist nationalist policies and strategies aimed to create a certain type of individual that was identified as an ideal citizen who is conscious about his/her duties and place within the harmonious and coherent unity of the nation¹⁸⁶.

The emphasis on the unity of the nation and the existence of the individual citizen as a component of this organic entity was one of the main features of the

¹⁸³ Zafer Toprak, **Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak: Muasır Bir Medeniyet İçin Seferberlik Bilgileri, 1923-1950**, İstanbul: YapıKredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1998.

¹⁸⁴ Asım Karaömerlioğlu, **Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006.

¹⁸⁵ Philip Morgan, **Italian Fascism, 1919-1945**, London: MacMillan, 1995, p. 114.

¹⁸⁶ Beside the influence of Romantic conception of corporatist perspective, the Turkish context was also influenced by Durkheimian solidarist conception through the works of Ziya Gökalp. For Durkheim, two main types of society can be distinguished depending on whether solidarity was “mechanical” or “organic”. Mechanical solidarity existed in primitive societies which were divided into segments, such as clans and tribes. These segments are like the cells of organic life and each are self-sufficient and identical in structure. In these societies morality is determined by *la conscience commune* which is the set of beliefs and values shared by all members of a single society. Mechanical solidarity requires a generalised conformity from everyone in the society. On the other hand, advanced societies are less homogenous, being divided into specialised organs. The division of labour is the reason of this differentiation and specialisation. According to Durkheim, under the division of labour, there is an occupational morality for each profession. In modern society, as social functions became specialised, people became members of not a single undifferentiated society, but specialised and differentiated groups. So, the common conscience lost its place, and the division of labour filled its place, it became the main bond of social groups of modern society. Organic solidarity stems from the division of labour, which cannot be considered as a mere mechanism for the maximisation of economic profits, but it has a moral importance and it is the principal source of organic solidarity.

Turkish modernisation inspired by the corporatist thought. The history was one of the fundamental joints welding the Turkish nation into an organic entity. For example, in the *Medeni Bilgiler*¹⁸⁷ (Civic Instructions), the natural and historical factors leading to the formation of the Turkish nation were stated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as:

- “ a) Unity in the Political Structure
- b) Lingual Unity
- c) Territorial Unity
- d) Racial and Ancestral Unity
- e) Historical Kinship
- d) Moral Kinship”¹⁸⁸.

In this definition of the Turkish nation, the emphasis on unity attributes almost a primordial existence to the Turkish nation embedded in the depths of history. This existence had continued without any contamination from external influences until it found its culmination in the modern Turkish Republic. In this historical narrative, this continuous existence was jeopardized by the incompetent, decadent, theocratic and cosmopolitan Ottoman policies, but the core, organically inherent characteristics of the Turkish people managed to survive. One of the most prominent figures of the single party regime, the Secretary General of the Peoples’ Republican Party between 1931 and 1936, and the Prime Minister between 1946 and 1947, Recep Peker explains this point: “[...] while the human history opened up into the twentieth century, the western part of the broad Turkish mass stretching all over the world was dormant under the stagnation of the Ottoman Empire which became ridiculous, weak and chaotic and lost all the cohesion among its constitutive elements. Fortunately, the Turkish blood, the only thing that could resist all forces of destruction without falling into decay, remained completely pure and clean amongst this muddle. The western Turks preserved the purity of their blood in that condition of turmoil [...] Ottoman Empire was not capable of uniting its constitutive elements. When other people looked at us at the end of the Great War, they were not expecting a resurrection from us, they were thinking that we were even deprived of the means for a bare survival. The whole homeland was wasted and barren. What kind of precious seeds could have

¹⁸⁷ A. Afetinan, **Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları**, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969. “Medeni Bilgiler” (Civic Instructions) was first published in 1930 by Prof. Dr. A. Afetinan. It was used as a textbook for secondary schools and high schools upon the decision of 1931 by the Ministry Of Education. With its proper title “Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler” (Civic Instructions for the Citizen) was mainly based on the writings of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

¹⁸⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 22.

been planted in this desert? How a glorious nation could have been created in this barren land?

Well, my friends, the opportunity of creating a new and glorious state out of this rubble was granted to the Turkish nation and its revolution. And behind this heap of ashes, the radiant sun of the Turkish revolution raised..."¹⁸⁹. Peker's speech perceives history as a continuous process in a teleological frame. In this narration, the Turkish people form a body organism which is endowed with certain perennial features, and this organism evolves through time without losing its strength and essence to reach its final and most perfect form which was the new Turkish Republic. In a similar vein of such a description of teleological evolution of the nation as an organic unity, Cinar defines the historical narrative adopted by the Turkish Republic as "the organicist form of narrative"¹⁹⁰. In this form of narrative, "*...[p]articulars within the historical field are viewed as elements of synthetic processes. The whole is more than sum of its parts. Explanation is integrative and goal-oriented. The final structure is the telos at the progressive steps of the process aim*"¹⁹¹. The unidirectional development of the social body finds its teleological epitome in the present condition. As stated by Recep Peker, the whole history of the Turkish people followed up a historical path leading to the liberation under the victorious Turkish Revolution. This path is unidirectional in its destination towards the establishment of the new Turkish state and society, although some potholes and bumps appeared on the road such as the corrupt and decadent Ottoman Empire, the innate characteristics of the Turkish people managed to revive themselves in the modern age.

The epoch in which the authoritarian corporatist regimes expressed themselves in self-confidence and audacity came to an end at the end of the Second World War. The victory of the Allied Forces meant also the victory of the liberal democracies in the western world. The inherent anti-communism of the single party regime made the other option -i.e. the Soviet Block- unthinkable for Turkey in the new two-polar world.

From the American point of view, the world was divided into two parts: democratic-capitalist, free world and the communist bloc. Within this divided world,

¹⁸⁹ Recep Peker, *İnkılab Dersleri Notları*, Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935, p. 5-7.

¹⁹⁰ Meral Ugur Cinar, *Collective Memory and National Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

the old idea of progress was captured and reformulated as “modernisation” within the ideological atmosphere of the post-war world. For the “free” developed western world led by the American superpower, the security and stability of their bloc could only be achieved by the inclusion of other countries outside of this developed world as allies. Thus, the most prominent perspective on the development emerged as “the modernisation theory” within the conditions of the post-war, and naturally tainted by the ideological topography of the period, most significantly by American liberalism and anti-communism. The main target was to incite change in the developing world to make them more like the Americans and less like the Russians.

One of the highly reputed members of the modernisation school, Edward Shils gives a very concise definition of “modern” in one of his articles addressing to the elites of the new states of the non-western world. In this definition, he contends that “*Modern means being Western without the onus of dependence on the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus [...]*”¹⁹². By means of detaching the condition of modernity from its geographical specificity, it seems that modernisation theory claimed the universalization of modernity. In this itinerary of modernisation, the western nations, particularly the American society were considered as the examples to be followed. As stated by Gilman, this was the universalization of the Americanism: “*materialism without class conflict, secularism without irreverence, and democracy without disobedience*”¹⁹³ rather than the universalisation of the modernity. In this respect, the fundamental features of the Kemalist modernisation process in Turkey seem quite in harmony with the credo of the modernisation theory. Thus, the international political conditions imposed by the post-war world did not deviate the Turkish state’s fundamental characteristics from their path except the increasing push for a change from the single party regime to the multi-party politics. However, the concern of the modernisation theorists was not the promotion of the democracy in its substantial form, procedural democracy was seen as sufficient enough for a developing country. In this sense, basic tenets of the corporatist understanding of the Turkish political apparatus could be integrated into the framework of the modernisation theory’s approach to the Turkish society with

¹⁹² Edward Shils, “Political Development in the New States”, **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, Vol. 2, No. 3, April, 1960, p. 267.

¹⁹³ Nils Gilman, **Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America**, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 13.

certain ease. The difference was the shift of the narrative explaining the Turkish development from as a more freely articulated authoritarian and peculiar development project to an example of modernisation project which fits into the discourse of the modernisation theory quite well.

Modernisation theory was very much enthusiastically embraced by both foreign and domestic eyes in their regard towards the Turkish case, because, this outlook was providing an ideologically usable and intellectually facile frame for an analysis of historical development. According to Gilman, “[b]y defining a singular path of progressive change, the concept of modernization simplified the complicated world historical problems of decolonization and industrialization, helping to guide American aid and military intervention in postcolonial regions. Unfortunately, the story concludes, modernization theory was hopelessly reductionist in its conception of change abroad, fundamentally conservative in politics, and blindly reflective of the political and social prejudices of the mid-century American Establishment”¹⁹⁴. This reductionist conception can be seen in the straightforward development prescribed by W.W. Rostow in his well-known *The Process of Economic Growth*¹⁹⁵ where the stages of economic growth are described in a five-step progress: The traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. These stages as already experienced by the developed Western societies are presented as the steps that have to be followed up by developing countries. Thus, the whole complex historical process of modernity is reduced into a simplified formula of linear development as a law of progress. In this itinerary, Rostow lays a great importance on the role of the local *élite* and the nationalism as the promoters of modernisation. Within this frame, he gives the Turkish case as an example for the transition from the traditional society to the preconditions of take-off stage: “*Ataturk’s role in Turkey-and his motivations-constitutes a more typical case of the preconditions process than, let us say, the role and motivation of the innovating British nonconformists of the eighteenth century*”¹⁹⁶. The transition from traditional society to modern society through the authoritative power of the nation state was a common feature shared by other

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁵ W. W. Rostow, *The Process of Economic Growth*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

modernisation theorists. At this point, Daniel Lerner occupies a very significant place regarding the modernisation theory and its approach to the Turkish society.

The title of Lerner's widely known work *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*¹⁹⁷ reveals the fundamental dichotomy of traditional society and modern society standing in the core of the modernization theory. Lerner devotes a whole section of his book to a comparative description of a grocer and a chief of a village called Balgat near Ankara of the 1950s, as a parable illuminating the traditional-modern society dichotomy.

Lerner's book depicts the Turkish society under the Democrat Party rule during the 1950s, this was the period of multi-party politics experience just after the long years of the single party regime, and it was also heavily marked by the economic, geopolitical and ideological atmosphere of the cold-war years at international level. Through the lenses of these factors, Lerner perceives the story of the Turkish modernisation as a single developmental line started by Atatürk who embarked on the transformation of the country from a traditional society to a modern one. In this sense, Lerner tries to find a perfect example of the developmental case as offered by the modernisation theory. The chief of the village and the grocer represent two different temporal terrains for Lerner. While the chief was an individual of the traditional society, the grocer was a new man heralding the arrival of a modern society emerging from the bosom of the Turkish modernisation process.

For Lerner, the individual of the traditional society is defined by constrictive personality which is temporally and spatially attached into a changeless geotemporal universe, he quotes from Morrison to describe this constrictive self: "*The Anatolian peasant is singularly incurious about almost everything that does not directly concern his daily life. To the average peasant, anything that happened more than fifty or sixty years ago is 'çok eski' (very old), regardless of whether the event took place one hundred or one thousand years earlier. Asked how old his village is, he will answer with exasperating vagueness not unmixed with satisfaction 'çok eski'*"¹⁹⁸. The vagueness regarding the temporality in the traditional society is supported by the

¹⁹⁷ Daniel Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East**, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958.

¹⁹⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 131.

established institutions of this traditional society like family, religion and rural community which are authoritarian, patriarchal and changeless. They demand loyalty, obedience and inertia. The constrictive personality is not curious about the world, different lives and foreign universes, he/she always tries to remain as he/she is within the walls of his/her familiar universe of the village, mosque or the family. The absence of change is the main characteristic which defines the traditional societies and the constrictive self. This constrictive self of the traditional society is not capable of constructing connections between himself/herself and the larger world, everything around this personality type is composed of the familiar time-space compositions. The constrictive self does not have the capability of imagining himself/herself in an unfamiliar place and time or identity. Thus, the traditional society is “[...] *a society where units of time and space are hardly known; and [...] a population who see the future as always strange, hence ominous, and the past only as a diffuse as ‘çok eski’*”¹⁹⁹. In this respect, the traditional society does not contain a sense of history which is a product of modernity. The vagueness of the past devours everything which modern society values as history.

Lerner contends that contrary to the constrictive personality of the traditional society, modern society is composed of the individuals with emphatic personality which is defined with the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow’s situation²⁰⁰. This empathy cannot be restricted to the other person’s place, but it includes the capability of imagining the other times, different places, and different roles. This emphatic capability is only possible through the emergence of mobility in modern society as in the forms of physical and psychic mobility: “*The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience*”²⁰¹. Therefore, mobility induces the development of emphatic self that can adopt itself into different conditions and situations. The most significant part of this personality type emerged within the modern society, for Lerner, is the ability of imagining oneself in different temporal and spatial contexts.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49-50.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

According to Lerner, the psychic mobility is the most important factor in bringing out such emphatic personality that is open to different lives, experiences and ambitions. In the emergence of psychic mobility, the mass media occupies a colossal importance, Lerner asserts : *“The expansion of psychic mobility means that more people now command greater skill in imagining themselves as strange persons in strange situations, places and times than did people in any previous historical epoch. In our time, indeed, the spread of empathy around the world is accelerating. The earlier increase of physical experience through transportation has been multiplied by the spread of mediated experience through mass communication.”*²⁰² Communication technologies and mass media- radio, television, cinema, etc. in the conditions of the 1950s- enabled people to imagine different lives, to encounter different worlds, so it created a sound basis for the desire for change which is the fundamental characteristic of the modern society.

Lerner delineates three phases of the evolution of the secular modern society:

- 1) Increase in urbanisation
- 2) Spread of literacy
- 3) Expansion of mass communication and media²⁰³.

These three steps required for establishing a modern society provide a more participant individuality which secures a community that is more dynamic but also politically more stable. Through the spread of the communication and media technologies, people are integrated into the structures of the modern society, for example they become more participant, more open minded, physically and culturally more mobile, and they also get economically more productive and also better consumers (the final stage of Rostow’s development scheme is the stage of mass consumption).

Within this framework, Lerner’s two figures - the village chief and the grocer- from the small Turkish village near Ankara represent the constrictive personality of the traditional and the empathic personality of the modern society respectively. The chief as the representative of the constrictive personality type is completely attached into the unchanging patterns of the village life where change is considered as evil; on the other hand the grocer as the harbinger of the empathic personality in an emerging

²⁰² **Ibid.**, p. 52.

²⁰³ **Ibid.**, p. 60.

modern society wants to move beyond the borders of his village and is inspired by new life styles and modern ways of living. Daniel Lerner states that this transformation from the constrictive personality to the empathic personality within the Turkish society is the result of the Atatürk's revolutions, because, for Lerner, one of the most important changes that Atatürk brought into the Turkish society was the introduction of mass media. This was as important as urbanisation or the literacy campaign. *"The growth of media, along with the parallel growth of literacy, provide the production-consumption reciprocal for a commodity which lay at the heart of the Turkish revolution: i.e., Enlightenment. It was to spread information and opinion, and thereby participation through consensus, that Atatürk engineered the Republic largely as a 'communication revolution.' In his conception, this was the essential companion of urbanization, designed to transform the Turkish psyche as cities transformed Turkish behavior."*²⁰⁴. According to Lerner, the modernisation process launched by Atatürk aimed to transform the traditional Ottoman society, in which the oral communication was the rule, into a modern society where the mass media and the modern communication technologies dominate the scene. Although there was still a huge cliff between two segments of society as one still living in the conditions of traditional society and the other one already adopted the modern ways of communication, this cleavage would disappear on the way of modernisation. More and more people were exposed to newspapers, radio broadcasts and movies. These Turkish moderns started to imagine themselves in different places, time and roles through the widening scope provided by the expanding media. They were more willing to move to different geographies especially big cities, wanted to have better living conditions and desired to control their own lives' paths. This is the outcome of development of the empathic personality defined by Lerner as peculiar to modernity.

This portrayal of two different ideal personality types provides an effective frame to understand the transformation of the individual from the traditional society to the conditions of modernity. Especially the description of the ways connecting the individual to the temporal structures of different social and historical conditions explains the change of the temporality throughout the modernisation process in the new states outside the west. Lerner's rendition of the constrictive personality in the *ancien régime* of the Ottoman society as spatially and temporally confined within

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

his/her limited world discloses this personality's relation to the past as peculiar to the pre-modern societies where the history does not exist in modern sense and the past is a vague and endless pit. Lerner denotes that the Turkish modernisation process was also an attempt to transform this temporal disposition of the traditional society into a modern temporal structure in which the past appears in historical character through a temporal distance. This transformation was realised through the help of the inculcation of a certain interpretation of history embodied in the form of Turkish official history discourse and its spread by means of education and the use of communication and media.

Although the description of the change from the *ancien régime* to the New State by the modernisation theory provides a useful outline to understand the transformation of the individual regarding to the societal and temporal change from pre-modern community to modern society, the overall perspective of the modernisation theory, as mentioned before, is ideologically conservative in its conception of change and stability and theoretically reductionist in its perception of the social structures and forces. Even though the change seems to occupy a fundamental point in the modernisation theory, in the final analysis the problems caused by the rapid pace of change in developing countries appear the main concern for the modernisation theorists. The authoritarian elitism was prescribed as a panacea for sustaining a more stable social system and for confronting the chaos resulting from social change²⁰⁵. In spite of his emphasis on the role of the communication and

²⁰⁵ The core idea of “the structural functionalism” of Talcott Parsons who can be considered as the founding father of the modernisation theory reiterates this emphasis on the stability of the social systems. For the structural functionalist paradigm, all the social and cultural phenomenon have certain functions within the social organism, if a social institution continues to exist, then it operates in a certain function which serves the sustainability and the stability of the social system as a whole. In this sense, stability and order are the central tenets for the preservation of the social system (Parsons, 1951). The modernisation theorists following Parsons reinforced this emphasis on the maintenance of order and stability within society. For example, Samuel Huntington, although he is not formally included within the modernisation theory, can be regarded one of the foremost voices which value the stability and order. For Huntington, the forces of modernisation put too much pressure over the developing countries in terms of their political stability, and this creates domestically and internationally a chaotic environment which jeopardizes the *Pax Americana*. Thus, he thinks that the only reliable social institution to provide stability in such societies is the military. He denotes that the West Point epitomizes such a force of stability: “West Point embodies the military deal at its best; Highland Falls the American spirit at its most commonplace. West Point is a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon. Yet is it possible to deny that the military values – loyalty, duty, restraint, dedication- are the ones America most needs today? That the disciplined order of Westpoint has more offer than the garish individualism of Main Street? [...] today America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America. Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a heavy responsibility. [...] If the civilians permit the soldiers to adhere to the military standard, the nations themselves may eventually find redemption and security in making that standard their

media as modernising forces, Lerner's later writings on the Turkish case put stress over the importance of the military as a modernising force. In his article published after the 1960 coup d'état, *Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as Modernizing Force*, the psychic mobility which was mainly considered as the product of the communication technologies earlier, was designated as a process carried out by the Turkish military: *"In the most profound sense, they (Turkish men) acquired a new personality. Along with the physical and social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of psychic mobility. The military corps became, in this decade, a major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this key sector of the population a new sense of identity- and new skills and concepts as well as new machines. Young Turks from isolated villages now suddenly felt themselves to be part of the larger society"*²⁰⁶. Written in the immediate aftermath of the 1960 coup, this paragraph reveals the deep sympathy of the modernisation theorists towards the military rule. The military rule or other forms of authoritarian administrations were regarded as the inevitable by-products of the modernisation process in a non-communist way. This sympathy became more openly articulated in other cases of authoritarian rule in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world in the coming years. Since the developing countries were supposed to follow the path drawn by the Western societies from a shortcut according to the modernisation theory, then this heightened pace of development should be controlled by a strong and sturdy institution which was obviously the military. In Lerner's analysis of the Turkish modernisation, the distrust towards the political institutions for their incapability to manage the modernisation is quite salient: *"The Turkish experience vividly illustrates the constant challenge to civilian leadership posed by a rapidly developing society in which the democratic tradition new. The striking past accomplishments of the Turkish Republic enhanced, but obviously did not automatically assure, its prospects for a creative civilian leadership in the future. The new nations-in-hurry seek to accomplish in decades the modernization that was achieved over centuries in the West. Their great need is to accelerate mobility while maintaining stability. The military institution, historically the chosen instrument for imposing stability, can be transformed into an agency that promotes mobility within the framework of civilian ingenuity and innovation. But*

own." Samuel P. Huntington, **The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations**, New York: Vintage Books, 1957, p. 465-466.

²⁰⁶ Daniel Lerner and Richard. D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as Modernizing Force", **World Politics**, Vol. 13, No.11, Oct., 1960, p. 32.

when the civilian leadership fails to maintain the tempo and balance of social change, when dynamic growth is crippled by partisan nepotism, a frustrated military is likely to take control.”²⁰⁷ As can be seen in this paragraph, for Lerner and other modernisation theorists, the social change necessary for the modernisation is a too serious task to be left to the political institutions which cannot handle it in a proper manner because of their nature prone to corruption. Within this perspective, the military appears as the only stable and strong institution to sustain an ordered way of modernisation.

The authoritarian way of development as a necessary by-product of modernisation, and the military as the most trustable institution to maintain the modernisation process as described and prescribed by the modernisation theory was very much embraced by the Turkish political perspective as an official standpoint. The corporatist mentality embedded within the Turkish political structure established before the Second World War was captured and adopted by the modernisation theory within the post-war conditions. The organic conception of society as envisaged by corporatism which endorses an ordered social and political system headed by the state authority was maintained by the discourse of the modernisation theory which privileges a stably sustained and controlled development. Since the authoritarian corporatist regimes ruled by single party regimes became unacceptable within the parameters of the post-war period's western block, the modernisation theory re-baptised these regimes with a more democratic tinge. However, democracy in the modernisation theory's perception was not a priority; democracy could be an obstacle for sustaining a stable development so it could be sacrificed for a more ordered modernisation under an authoritarian political regime. Thus, the change in the international politics after the Second World War did not cause a fundamental transformation within the *raison d'état* of the Turkish political system. Evidently, the transition to multi-party politics from a single-party regime marked a very significant change in this period; however, as Parla pointed out, the Turkish political outlook remained primarily corporatist. The continuation and combination between the corporatist mentality and the perspective of the modernisation theory became more evident with the 1960 coup d'état in which the unity of the nation as an organic entity was claimed to be protected by the military as the sole loyal guardian of the

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Turkish modernisation and the ideals of Turkish revolutions. In this way, this discourse became the leitmotiv of the Turkish political system and was reiterated in successive coups in later years.

Within this political frame, the organicist historical narrative stemming from the organic conception of society articulated by the corporatist thought emerged as the principal form of historical narrative adopted by the Turkish official discourse. The organicist historical narrative, that conceives the society as an organic unity, delineates the history of this unity as a teleological development towards the existing national form. This national form i.e. the Turkish nation state as envisaged by the ideals of the Turkish modernisation is the telos that is also affirmed by the modernisation theory. The story of the organic unity of the nation growing up into a modern nation under the aegis of the authoritative tutelage of the state constitutes the core of this historical narrative.

This organicist historical narrative of the Turkish official discourse which emerged during the first decades of the Turkish Republic was reinforced by the perspective of the modernisation theory after the Second World War and remained the fundamental approach to history in Turkey.

The modernisation defined as “reaching the level of western societies” since the first decades of the Turkish Republic was based on the principles of the single-party regime which were designed to fortify the perpetuity of the Turkish nation-state in a corporatist perspective. The unity of the nation under the guidance of the modernising force of the state was the main element in this understanding of development. After the Second World War, the modernisation theory sustained this understanding in a different political and ideological climate, but provided a justification for the continuation of the authoritarian structure of the Turkish nation state.

Modernisation theory, as the dominant perspective of development, dominated the look toward the Turkish modernisation during the post-war period. The ideology of the Turkish modernisation as inspired by the positivism and *volkisch* nationalism of German romanticism and organic conception of society of corporatism was very

much in parallel with the modernisation theory's perspective on development. Although formal democracy and political participation were designated as the ultimate goals of modernisation, modernisation theory privileged the stable and well controlled development over democracy and political participation. In this regard, The Turkish modernisation which was based in the corporatist mentality started to look at itself through the lenses of the modernisation theory which was became the dominant paradigm in development and change after the Second World War.

The Turkish modernisation, in its emphasis on the break with the traditional society, was a modernist venture. The rupture from the Ottoman Empire, marking the newness of the Turkish Republic, was at the centre of this project. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, this modernity was quite selective in its aspirations regarding the principles of Enlightenment as the source of modernity. Jeffrey Herf, in his work on the technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich, defines this selective embrace of modernity as “reactionary modernism”²⁰⁸. Different from the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School who described the alienation, authoritarianism and domination as the outcomes of the Enlightenment, Herf conceives these results as of such a selective embrace of modernity which rejects the reason of the Enlightenment thought but adopts the instrumental reason of technological progress. Regarding the German case, Herf defines the reactionary modernists as the cultural revolutionaries combining the anti-modernist perspective of the German romanticism with its aspirations of the mythic past and the technological development. This is what he defines as “the paradox of the reactionary modernism”: “ [...] *it is paradoxical to reject the Enlightenment and embrace technology at the same time, as did the reactionary modernists in Germany. Their claim was that Germany could be both technologically advanced and true to its soul. The whole anti-Western legacy of German nationalism suggested that such a reconciliation between soul and technology was out of the question, for nothing could be more at odds with German culture. But the reactionary modernists recognized the antitechnological views were formulas for national impotence. The state could not be simultaneously strong and technologically backward. The reactionary modernists insisted that the Kulturnation could be both powerful and*

²⁰⁸ Jeffrey Herf, **Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

true to its soul."²⁰⁹. Herf quotes Thomas Mann to define the reactionary modernism in the German case: "*the really characteristic and dangerous aspect of National Socialism was its mixture of robust modernity and an affirmative stance toward progress combined with dreams of the past.*"²¹⁰ Within this framework, the Turkish modernisation can be seen as a form of reactionary modernism in its seemingly paradoxical approach to modernity, rejecting the fundamental ideals of the Enlightenment such as the supremacy of reason over the mythical conceptions in explaining and understanding the world, the betterment of human condition through extending freedom and liberties of the individual while embracing an instrumental reason for technological development and creating a mythical vision of the past. In fact, the reactionary modernism's selective embrace of modernity is also present in the corporatist thought where modernity is seen as a technological progress in an organically conceived social structure fortified by a mythical essence of nationhood. This corporatist perspective can be found in the writings of Ziya Gökalp, the founder of the Turkish nationalism, who perceives the modernity in a selective manner. For Gökalp, the culture and civilisation (*Hars* and *Medeniyet*) are two separate forms, and being modern can be described within the limits of technological progress which refers to civilisation. Culture, on the other hand, is defined as the primordial characteristics of the nation that founds its revelation in the organic social unity: "[...] *modernity is the product of technology. Those people are 'contemporary' who make and use all those machines made and used by the peoples most advanced in the techniques of the age. For us today modernization [being contemporary with modern civilization] means to make and use the battleships, cars, and aeroplanes that the Europeans are making and using. But this does not mean being like them only in form and in living. When we see ourselves no longer in need of importing manufactured goods and buying knowledge from Europe, then we can speak of being contemporary with it. [...] The idea of modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and techniques from Europe. There are certain moral needs which will be sought in religion and nationality, as there were in Europe, but these cannot be imported from the West as if they were machines and techniques.*"²¹¹ Gökalp's view was in very much in the same vein of the German

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.2. (Thomas Mann, "Deutschland und die Deutschen" in *Thomas Mann: Essays*, Band 2, *Politik*, ed. Herman Kunzke (Frankfurt, 1977)

²¹¹ Ziya Gökalp, **Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization**, trans. and ed. by Niyazi Berkes, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 75-76.

reactionary modernists who perceives the modernity in a selective way. Modernity was considered as a technological reserve that must be exploited. Jeffrey Herf's description of reactionary modernism and Gökalp's categorical separation of culture and civilisation overlap considerably. When Herf talks about the German experience, he denotes: "*The accomplishment of the reactionary modernists was considerable. In the country of romantic counterrevolution against the Enlightenment, they succeeded in incorporating technology into the symbolism and language of Kultur- community, blood, will, self, form, productivity, and finally race – by taking it out of the realm of Zivilisation- reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism and finance.*"²¹² So, this selective encounter with modernity created a modernist form of development avoiding certain tenets of modernity such as the principles of democracy and individual rights and freedoms, because they were considered as alien forms of civilisation. Reactionary modernism was fundamentally contemptuous of politics, and privileged an illiberal, authoritarian form of state. Politics was approached with suspicion, and it was seen as a dirty, selfish business of give-and-take. The state as the epitome of the national spirit was considered above the party politics. These characteristics of the German reactionary modernism are also the fundamental tenets of the Turkish public and political structure not only during the single party regime but also the successive decades.

The selective embrace of modernity by reactionary modernism of the Turkish modernisation process was also supported by the modernisation theory after the Second World War. Jürgen Habermas points out this connection quite clearly: "*[The theory of modernisation] dissociates 'modernity' from its modern European origins and stylizes it into a spatio-temporally neutral model for processes of social development in general. Furthermore, it breaks the internal connections between modernity and the historical context of Western rationalism, so that processes of modernization can no longer be conceived of as rationalization, as the historical objectification of rational structures.*"²¹³ Habermas's portrayal of the modernisation theory echoes the perspective of reactionary modernism on the selective embrace of modernity. The modernisation theory, by stripping the modernity off its origins in the

²¹² Herf, **op. cit.**, p. 16.

²¹³ Jürgen Habermas, **The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity**, trans. by Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, p. 2.

Enlightenment, tried to import a sort of technological progress without the cultural and political progress promised by the modern reason.

The Turkish modernisation process kept the paradoxical and selective approach of reactionary modernism as its defining characteristic from the corporatism of the single-party regime to the multi-party politics and the military coups of the post-war period where the modernisation theory was the principal perspective of the discourse of the national and the international politics.

The relationship of the Turkish modernisation with history and past appears paradoxical and ambivalent, and it is in tandem with its paradoxical and selective embrace of modernity. On the one hand, by westernising the calendar, and other time measures, it sets the basis of the modern temporal structure within the society. Such a change was seen as a prerequisite for catching the level of the modern western civilisation. It also created a temporal frame for a modern form historical narrative by placing the past in a certain temporal distance and by casting an account of development flowing in a certain temporal line. On the other hand, this modern historical narrative was moulded in accordance with the national spirit which distinctively formed the basis of the Turkish culture. The Turkish *Innerlichkeit*²¹⁴ drew a definite line between the civilisation and the culture by describing the Turkish culture specifically peculiar with its own characteristics and development. This emphasis on the peculiarity of the Turkish culture was the main demarcation line separating the historical narrative of the Turkish modernisation from the universalistic claims of the modernity. The historical narrative creating a mythic past surrounded by organic conception of society, the strong state tradition, primordial origins of the nation and the illiberal and authoritarian political structure persisted as the fundamental public and political culture of the Turkish society up until today. However, the changes experienced in the political, social and cultural texture of the world in global scale especially since the 1980s left its imprint in the Turkish society, as well. Thus, although there is an apparent continuity within the fundamental tenets

²¹⁴ *Innerlichkeit* means “inwardness” in German, and was one of the fundamental concepts adopted by the German Romanticism. At the individual level, it was interpreted as the inward looking and spiritual contemplation, but at the societal level *deutsche Innerlichkeit* was used to denote the peculiar German characteristics of the nation. (Encyclopedia of German Literature, ed. By Matthias Konzett, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers: Chicago, 2000, p. 829).

of the Turkish political and cultural context, the changes since the 1980s have been producing novel forms of political, social and cultural structures.

B- Late- Capitalism: The Change and The Continuity

Friedrich Nietzsche, in his *Untimely Meditations*, complains about “a malignant historical fever” spreading over the German society of his time. He states that the German land is invaded by monuments, objects, tomes and discourses of history making the society suffer from “the malady of history”²¹⁵. This malady was the product of the German reactionary modernism’s obsession with the mythical past. This fever of history occupying every corner of the society, for Nietzsche, was choking the life. *“Excess of history has attacked the plastic power of life, that no more understands how to use the past as a means of strength and nourishment. It is a fearful disease, and yet, if youth had not a natural gift for clear vision, no one would see that it is a disease, and that a paradise of health has been lost. But the same youth, with that same natural instinct of health, had guessed how paradise can be regained. It knows the magic herbs and simples for the malady of history, and the excess of it.”*²¹⁶ According to Nietzsche, this remedy was: *“[...] the art of forgetting, and of drawing a limited horizon round one’s self”*²¹⁷. “The productive forgetting” offered by Nietzsche was a panacea for the romantic nationalism’s obsession with history.

More than a century later, Andreas Huyssen, another German, wrote that we suffer from the malady of amnesia today instead of too much remembering. He offers a remedy for this disease, but this time it is “the productive remembering”²¹⁸. So, what is the reason for such a drastic change? What happened on the way from the time of Nietzsche to today to produce such a different malady which requires opposite remedies? Apparently, these questions call an overall look to the transformation of the modern society in general, and to its relation to the temporality and history during this transformation in particular.

²¹⁵ Nietzsche, **op.cit.**, p. 60

²¹⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 120.

²¹⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 120.

²¹⁸ Andreas Huyssen, **Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p.27.

After the Second World War, the post-war political consensus between different political fractions and the economic boom created a golden age in the West. During these glorious years of the western capitalist democracies, different voices started to talk about the coming of a different form of economic, social and political structure in the west especially with the beginning of the 1960s. Scholars and writers such as Daniel Bell and Alvin Toffler claimed that the western societies were experiencing a transformation, and a new composition of social and economic structures was emerging. Daniel Bell named this new composition as the post-industrial/ information society, and Toffler tagged it as the third wave. Although the names were different, it was certain that there was an ongoing change in western societies.

For Bell, the industrial society of the earlier phase of capitalism was now followed up by a post-industrial society. While the basis of the industrial society is the commodity production, the post-industrial society is defined by the significance of information and knowledge: *“Industrial society is the coordination of machines and men for the production of goods. Post-industrial society is organized around knowledge, for the purpose of social control and directing of innovation and change; and this in turn gives rise to new social relationships and new structures which have to be managed politically”*²¹⁹. The industrial society which was born with the industrial revolution was now overcome and replaced by the post-industrial society where another revolution, the revolution of information, was being born. While the human labour organised around detailed temporal framework in a Taylorist manner was the basis of the industrial society, the information which escapes from the constraints of the clock time became the fundamental value of the information society. The temporal solidity, structured and organised labour, and the industrial production were being replaced by the temporal fluidity, flexible labour and the primacy of information.

In the same way, Alvin Toffler’s portrayal of this new form of society was the harbinger of a new revolution. He called this revolutionary change in the western societies as the “third wave”: *“A new civilization is emerging in our lives and blind men everywhere are trying to suppress it. This new civilization brings with it new*

²¹⁹ Bell, **op.cit.**, p. 20.

family styles; changed ways of working, loving, and living; a new economy; new political conflicts; beyond all this an altered consciousness as well. Pieces of this new civilization exist today. Millions are already attuning their lives to the rhythms of tomorrow. Others, terrified of the future, are engaged in a desperate, futile flight into the past and are trying to restore the dying world that gave them birth. The dawn of this civilization is the single most explosive fact of our lifetimes. It is the central event- the key to understanding the years immediately ahead. It is an event as profound as that First Wave of change unleashed ten thousand years ago by the invention of agriculture, or the earthshaking Second Wave of change touched off by the industrial revolution. We are the children of the next transformation, the Third Wave.” ²²⁰ According to Toffler, the Third Wave meant a complete upheaval of the existing society with its all economic, social, cultural and political structures. This new phase of the civilisation is in contrast with the industrial society of the previous phase. This is phase is technological and anti-industrial. Almost ten years earlier, Toffler was much more cautious about the changing conditions within the modern society. In his book, *Future Shock* ²²¹, he was warning the society about the novel forms of cultural and social relations such new types of friendship, and family values, and life styles. Ten years later, he became more vigorous in welcoming the arrival of this new society.

Both Bell and Toffler laid the foundations of their accounts on a developmental line starting from the agricultural revolution. So, through a large stroke of a historical brush, they painted a seemingly comprehensive picture of the human development. For them, as agricultural revolution and industrial revolution, this new revolution of information society, post-industrial society or Third Wave also created totally new economic, social, cultural and political relations. Such a perspective depicting the information society as a revolution as significant as the agricultural revolution of the neolithic age and the industrial revolution is clearly conservative in its efforts to try to conceal the real forces of this transformation and in its celebration of this transformation. As Krishan Kumar pointed out, the changes experienced since around the 1960s cannot be considered as revolutionary transformation changing the fundamental forces of the social and economic composition of societies : “*There is no new age, no new revolution comparable to the Industrial revolution of the*

²²⁰ Alvin Toffler, **The Third Wave**, NewYork: Bantam Books, 1980, p. 12.

²²¹Toffler, **Future ...**

*nineteenth century. The information society is a myth developed to serve the interest of those who initiate and manage the “information revolution”: the most powerful sectors of society, its central administrative elites, the military establishment and global industrial corporations. It is no more than the latest ideology of the capitalist state. Capitalism is still the name of the game. If there is a revolution, then it is certainly around the hub of capitalism. Capitalist industrialism has not been transcended, but simply extended, deepened and perfected.”*²²² Celebratory approaches as that of Toffler towards the rise of the post-industrial society hides the continuity within the capitalist nature of the modern society. However, this continuity does not mean that there is a constant transformation and change inherent in capitalism itself; and post-industrial society is the result of such a change. The continuity and change within capitalism is clearly designated by David Harvey: “[...] *social reproduction of the capitalist sort required their deep implantation in the world of ideas as well as in the realm of social practices. Capitalism is, however, a revolutionary mode of production, always restlessly searching out new organizational forms, new technologies, new lifestyles, and new modalities of production and exploitation.*”²²³ In this sense, capitalism has to transform itself to survive. The crises that capitalism faces in certain periods have to be overcome by adopting new forms of social, cultural, economic and political structures. So, hailing the coming of the post-industrial society as a complete rupture or a revolution like the industrial revolution masks the persisting character of capitalism.

Thus, both the continuity and change have to be emphasized when the changes experienced under the rubrics such as the post-industrial society, information society. While there is continuity in terms of the ongoing domination of the capitalist economic structures, it is evident that societies have been experiencing a transformation and change at different levels since the 1960s. Fredric Jameson’s analysis of this transformation provides a powerful insight depicting this change within capitalism itself. Jameson builds his analysis on Ernest Mandel’s triptych portrayal of the stages of capitalism. These three stages of capitalism, according to Mandel, are market capitalism, the monopoly stage or the stage of imperialism, and our own multi-national capitalism or late capitalism which Jameson thinks that is

²²² Krishan Kumar, **From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World**, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 57.

²²³ David Harvey, “Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination”, **Annals of the Association of American Geographers**, 80 (3), 1990, p. 429.

wrongly named as post-industrial capitalism: “[...] *Mandel’s intervention in the postindustrial involves the proposition that late or multinational or consumer capitalism, far from being inconsistent with Marx’s great 19th-century analysis, constitutes on the contrary the purest form of capital yet to have emerged, a prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas. This purer capitalism of our time thus eliminates the enclaves of precapitalist organization it had hitherto tolerated and exploited in a tributary way: one is tempted to speak in this connection of a new and historically original penetration and colonization of Nature and Unconscious: that is, the destruction of precapitalist third world agriculture by the Green Revolution, and the rise of the media and advertising industry.*”²²⁴ In Jameson’s analysis, the labels such as the post-industrial society or the information society are presented as the wrong naming because they cover up the capitalistic nature of the change and transformation. According to Jameson, this new form of social structure is actually the spread of capitalism into other areas of life which was formerly out of its reach. The augmentation in information and the rise of new technologies are the means of this novel appearance of capitalism to colonise the uncommodified corners of life and invade the nooks of the unconscious. So, instead of describing it as a complete rupture from the former economic, social and political structures, Jameson places this new form societal metamorphosis into the timeline of capitalism’s life story.

This metamorphosis gained much more momentum with the oil crisis of 1973 and the following turmoil in economic and political areas in its aftermath. With this crisis, as Harvey contended, capitalism had to organise itself to survive this crisis. Thus, the changes started since the 1960s became much more visible in the western societies. The passage from the fordist form of production to the post-fordist production, from organised labour to disorganised labour, from temporally and spatially structured working conditions to the flexible ones, from heavy industry to information technology dominant industry were the markers of this change. These changes in the organisation of the economic structure and composition of the labour force were accompanied by new economic, political, ideological formations. The late 70s witnessed the rise of a new political economy distinctively different than the previous decades’ Keynesian policies which aimed to create welfare state to maintain

²²⁴Jameson, **Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic...**, p. 26.

a societal consensus of different economic classes and political forces. While the post-war consensus created and maintained by the Keynesian policies was crumbling due to the crises of the 1970s, the liberal democracy confidently established in the western societies after the Second World War started to lose ground, as well. Martin Hewitt provides a clear description of this process: *“Throughout Western nations, traditional class struggles have abated, social alliance fractured and labour markets restructured, resulting in increased insecurity for the employed, growing poverty, and widening inequalities in income and wealth [...] These changes have undermined earlier policies that met common basic needs by providing universal provision in health, national insurance and education.”*²²⁵

The new economic paradigm started to develop its hegemony during the 1970s in the West, and became the dominant global economic ideology in the 1980s, that was named as neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism was mainly a reorganisation of the economic field around privatisation, deregulation of production and market, fiscal austerity, reduction in public spending, and globally free flow of trade. Neo-liberal perspective suggests that the role of the state in the economic field must be minimal. These features were in contradiction with Welfare state economic policies of the previous decades which necessitated a regulated production and market, organised labour-capital relations, controlled trade, and government’s active participation in the provision of public facilities such as public education and healthcare. Neo-liberalism aimed to destroy this edifice which was seen as a burden destroying the natural working of the economic system and causing problems and crisis like the ones of the 1970s. In this sense, neo-liberalism came out as a panacea to the problems of capitalism by unleashing the global markets from their borders formerly protected by national economies, feeding up the transnational corporations to a monstrous scale, tearing down the social welfare state and its cultural and social institutions, and destroying the tradition of organised labour. Neo-liberalism, in this respect, can be regarded as the epiphenomenon of the late-capitalism.

Although neo-liberalism appeared as a paradigm of economy, it is not solely confined into the economic field. It also represents the fall of the liberal democracy which was based on equality, liberty, universality, citizenship, the rule of law and

²²⁵ Martin Hewitt, **Welfare and Human Nature: The Human Subject in Twentieth Century Social Politics**, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 6-7.

free press. Evidently, these ideals emerging from the Enlightenment have never been perfectly and fully realised, but they constituted the foundation of the western democracies which were established after centuries-old struggles. Liberal democracies of the twentieth century were the product a long time struggle for equality, and freedoms as the ideals of the Enlightenment. Obviously, liberalism, as an ideology, does not contain democratic principles in itself. In fact, the perspective of “negative freedom” which means to be free from something rather to positive assertion to freedom as the Enlightenment claims. Thus, the Enlightenment’s belief that humankind has the will and the power to determine its own destiny was imposed on liberal ideology’s rather thin understanding of freedom and equality. In this sense, Welfare state in the West can be regarded as the outcome of this struggle and one of the means to maintain the marriage between liberalism and democracy.

These ideals began to be seen as impediments in the arena of free market where the bulldozing forces of corporations run amok. The “market rationality” became pervasive not only in the economic field but also in every corner of life as a result of the rise of neo-liberalism. Wendy Brown puts the invasion of life by the market rationality quite clearly: *“Neoliberalism casts the political and social spheres both as appropriately dominated by market concerns and as themselves organized by market rationality. That is, more than simply facilitating the economy, the state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic actors in every sphere of life. Familiar here are the many privatization and outsourcing schemes for welfare, education, prisons, the police, and the military, but this aspect of neoliberalism also entails a host of policies that figure and produce citizens as individual entrepreneurs and consumers whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’- their ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions, whether as welfare recipients, medical patients, consumers of pharmaceuticals, university students, or workers in ephemeral occupations”*²²⁶. This market rationality promoted by neo-liberalism infiltrates into each and every point in social, economic and cultural life. Modern liberal democracy’s promises and ideals are sacrificed to the idea of profitability. The market rationality has become a so natural part of life that it is impossible to imagine

²²⁶ Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization” *Political Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 6. Dec. 2006, p. 694.

alternative forms of rationality. “Self-help” became the fundamental motive of late-modern society. The political culture based on public deliberation and struggle is immolated by this idea of self-help which sends every social problem to the private sphere of the individual.

The political structure and political culture has been also plundered by neo-liberalism. As Brown explains: “[...] *neoliberal political rationality produces governance criteria along the same lines, that is, criteria of productivity and profitability, with the consequence that governance talk increasingly becomes market-speak, businesspersons replace lawyers as the governing class in liberal democracies, and business norms replace juridical principles. [...] The saturation of the state, political culture, and the social with market rationality effectively strips commitments to political democracy from governance concerns and political culture*”²²⁷. The language, mentality, way of thinking and morality of the business were adopted by the political culture. The profit-oriented action and language of the free-market became the sole political legitimacy. Thus, protection of human rights and freedoms, provision of fundamental needs of the public, the economic equality, and justice are subject to the valuation according to their profitability.

The ideal of liberal democracy destroyed by the market rationality radiating from neo-liberalism resulted in a pervasive “de-politicisation”. In neo-liberal atmosphere of the late-capitalism, citizenship is depreciated to self-care, and is restrained from participation in public good. The demands for equality are redefined as the equal right to inequality. Within the harsh truth of rampant free market system, everyone is left to his/her own, so the success in the competition is the only legitimate ground for demanding more rights, and more equality. The consumerism pumped by neo-liberal economy turns everything including the political values of the liberal democracy into objects to be used or to be discarded according to their use value in market rationality.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 694-695.

C- The Post-1980 Period: The Marriage of Neo-Liberalism and Authoritarianism in Turkey

Neo-liberal policies germinated during the 1970s became the dominant economic ideology in the 1980s. The global re-structuring of the global economic system according to the principles of the neo-liberalism made impossible for national economies to stay outside of this system. Consequently, the consumerism, the market rationality, de-politicisation, and the depreciation of individual rights and liberties started to infiltrate other societies in a global scale. Evidently, the depreciation of individual rights and liberties was a concern for the western liberal democracies where these ideals, at least formally, constituted the basis of the political systems, countries with undemocratic political tradition or precarious democracies encountered the neo-liberalism in much more devastating way. Turkey was one of these countries which faced the effects of neo-liberalism through a traumatic process.

Turkey experienced the passage into the new neo-liberal economic system through a double tremor. The transformation into a new economic system was a dislocating experience even for the western societies, and Turkey, in addition to that, went through this process with the blow of a coup d'état. Turkish economy had been working mainly on an import-substitution model.

After the coup d'état in 1960, the establishment of the State Planning Organisation aimed to create a planned economic development under the guidance of the state. This institution became the primary organising body of the economic policies of the import-substitution. From the 1960 coup to the 1980 coup, the governments aimed to promote import-substitution through industrial development. Although the governments targeted a planned economy based on the protection of the domestic production and industry, and tariff barriers, this strategy of import-substitution became successful for a short period of time by producing a high level of industrialisation during the 1960s. However, the Turkish economy was still dependent on the import of the manufactured food stuff, basic industrial raw inputs such iron and steel, and almost all durable products²²⁸. As a result of this dependence on the import of the industrial and consumer goods, the trade balance deficit increased gradually during the 1960s and 1970s. The governments tried to fill this

²²⁸ Zürcher, *op.cit.*, p. 265-266.

deficit by foreign indebtedness. Especially after the 1973 global oil crisis, this fragile economic situation got worsened and towards the end of the 1970s the economy gained a chronic unstable and fluctuating character. The international capital forced the governments to make a deal with IMF on the basis of a stability programme. The reforms imposed by IMF and the World Bank to obtain more credits were finally declared by Turgut Özal, the under-secretary for economic affairs in charge of planning, in 24 January 1980. The January 24 Decisions can be outlined as follows:

- a) Liberalisation of imports,
- b) Devaluation,
- c) Promoting exports,
- d) Elimination or decreasing the support for agricultural sector,
- e) Decreasing public expenditure,
- f) Restructuring, privatisation, closing State owned enterprises,
- g) Liberalising interest rates and reorganising monetary policy instruments²²⁹.

These decisions were taken in accordance with the requirements of IMF and World Bank to integrate the Turkish economy into the realm of the neo-liberal economic system. But, because of the resistance from the trade unions, and the populist policies, first the Ecevit government and later the Demirel government did not put this deal into full practice²³⁰. Zürcher recounts the aftermath of the promulgation of these reforms: *“In January 1980 he [Özal] launched the reform package, after which the credits began to arrive. Part of the package was a drastic 48.6 per cent devaluation of the lira. During the spring of 1980, however, it became clear that there was widespread resistance to what was called the ‘Chilean solution’ (a reference to the policies General Pinochet had introduced in Chile after his coup against President Allende). The continued activity of the unions, and especially DİSK²³¹, made it impossible to implement Özal’s economic package. Members of DİSK occupied a number of factories between January and April and there were strikes everywhere, often accompanied by clashes with the police or the army”*²³².

²²⁹ Hasan Saygın and Murat Çimen, **Turkish Economic Policies and External Dependency**, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 6-7.

²³⁰ Korkut Boratav, “İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)”, **Çağdaş Türkiye- 1908-1980**, ed.by Sina Akşin, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997, p. 341-342.

²³¹ DİSK: Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) was founded in 1967 and is still one of the large trade union bodies in the country.

²³² Zürcher, **op.cit.**, p. 268.

Adding up to this political turmoil, the deadlock in the presidential elections also stirred the graveness of the situation further. Finally, in 12 September 1980, the Turkish army took the power once again.

The following three years after the coup was the period of the direct rule of the military junta which cleared the political scene from the so called radical elements, but the main target was the left. The year of 1982 saw the adoption of a new constitution, the most authoritarian one of the Turkish history. In this way, the authoritarian and undemocratic character of the Turkish political life of the following decades was established. The 1982 constitution drew a framework diminishing the political participation and strengthening the state institutions and organs. The role and influence of the military were much more profoundly installed in all three branches of government. The army legitimised its heightened role in all segments of the political life through claiming the role as the saviour of the country from a probable civil war. Thus historically and traditionally established role of the army as the guardian of the state was much more deeply reinforced by this legitimising rhetoric. Moreover, the 1982 constitution laid the foundations of political regime of perpetual military rule, and made this military rule the norm of the political scene.

After the period of the direct rule of military junta, the parliamentary elections were held in 1983. The winner of the elections was the *Anavatan Partisi* (The Motherland Party) which was led by Turgut Özal who was the master builder of the January 24 Reforms. As his mentors, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan did in UK and USA, he left his imprint in all segments of the Turkish society by transforming the economic policies into a neo-liberal system where the free-market is dominant. Thus, the years of Özal were a period in which the January 24 Decisions were put into practice in a much unbridled way. A major privatisation programme was implemented by the government, and many important public enterprises were privatised in large numbers.

The economic structure of this period can be defined as “unorganised market economy”²³³. In this economy, the state was still an important player, but free-market and the integration with the global markets were the main concerns of the economy.

²³³ Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, *Türkiye’de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset, Din ve İş Dünyası*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014, p. 86.

However, the market and the economy was “unorganised” rather than “free”, there was no proper regulation regarding the functioning of the economy. Therefore, such a policy led to a regime of corruption in both economy and politics. According to Buğra and Savaşkan, the Özal period left two important marks in the Turkish society, first, an unprecedented culture of corruption replaced the traditional clientelistic relations of the Turkish politics; second, since the economy was not organised through a regulatory framework, this unorganised market produced an economy prone to crises²³⁴. These characteristics became embedded within the economic and political system, and persisted even up until today.

As can be seen from this portrayal, Turkey experienced a rough transition to the neo-liberal economic terrain. The iron hand of the military junta crashed all the opposition within the society such as political parties, trade unions, universities, and intellectuals. In this way, it created a clean slate to plant the seeds of neo-liberal policies and institutions.

The co-existence of unbridled, unorganised, and largely chaotic market economy, and the authoritarian state institutions produced a new form social and cultural structure which can be outlined around the emergence of a consumer society, a rise of new white collar workers in the blooming finance sector, the birth of novel forms of life styles mostly determined by consumerism’s requirements, the appearance of new demands of identity recognition such as Islamism and Kurdish identity, and an increasing nationalism and conservatism. Although this seemingly paradoxical mixture of different forms of identity demands, and cultural formations are peculiar to the social, political and cultural conditions of Turkey, it can be much clearly understood by a reference to the a larger perspective covering up the other examples of neo-liberal practice.

The naissance of neo-liberalism in the West especially in the United Kingdom and the United States was accompanied by a form of political ideology: Neo-conservatism. Although they are seemingly contradictory in their perspectives on society, they formed a strange alliance to create the larger edifice of the late-capitalist society. Evidently, the Turkish context has its own historical background,

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 89-90.

its integration into the global neo-liberal system created many similar results as experienced in other countries.

Setting off the American case, Wendy Brown questions how these two different ideological perspectives, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism came together to create what she calls “the American Nightmare”: *“How does a rationality that is expressly amoral at the level of both ends and means (neoliberalism) intersect with one that is expressly moral regulatory (neoconservatism)? How does a project that empties the world of meaning, that cheapens and deracinates life and openly exploits desire, intersect one centered on fixing and enforcing meanings, conserving certain ways of life, and repressing and regulating desire? How does support for governance modelled on the firm and normative social fabric of self-interest marry and jostle against support for governance modelled on church authority and normative social fabric of self-sacrifice and long-term filial loyalty, the very fabric shredded by unbridled capitalism? And what might be the role of evangelical Christianity on one side and hyper-demonized enemies of the American state on the other in facilitating this marriage?”*²³⁵ Brown finds the answer of these questions in two fundamental characteristic of the late-modern society: “de-politicisation” and “de-democratisation” of the society. In these two features, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism emerge as allies, and Brown defines four aspects of de-politicisation and de-democratisation:

The devaluation of political autonomy: Neo-liberalism reduces the democratic principles into the existence of formal rights. So, the active political participation of demos- as it was at least ideally accepted by the western liberal democracies- is seen as a futile and unproductive activity. Choosing among political parties or representatives is presented as choosing among different goods in the market.

The transformation of the political problems into individual problems with market solutions: In neo-liberal perspective, every individual is responsible for his success or failure in this life, and this is considered as a private problem of individual. The inherent economic inequalities within the society are presented as natural and necessary. Thus, by sending social problems that should be publicly

²³⁵ Brown, **op.cit.**, p. 692-693.

discussed and solved into private sphere, neo-liberalism kills the public and political life.

The production of the consumer-citizen as available to a heavy degree of governance and authority: Neo-liberalism defines the citizen in terms of a model of entrepreneur and consumer, and it builds a structure of governance and authority around this consumer-citizen. Needs, choices, desires, ways of satisfaction are regulated through an extensive disciplinary power of neo-liberal ideology.

The legitimization of statism: Although in the neo-liberal rhetoric the state is envisaged as a watch-guard, minimal state, in practice it continues to facilitate and legitimate arrogations of power that would be unacceptable to a democratic culture or within a democratic table of values²³⁶. The state is associated with entrepreneurial and managerial terms; and effectivity and profitability are the only criteria to assess the government policies whereas accountability and truthfulness are discarded.

These characteristics of the de-democratisation of the society by neo-liberalism are fortified by the neo-conservative ideology which provided a moral flesh over the neo-liberal corpus. The neo-conservative moralism provides the consumer-citizen with a baggage with values in the selfish competitiveness of neo-liberal market. Furthermore, since the de-politicisation of the society removed the public space and active political life, this empty space is filled by the neo-conservative communitarianism which supplies networks and connections between individuals. The networks of the conservative communitarianism replace the function of trade unions and organised political activism.

Within this intertwinement of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism is especially salient in the rise of religion in every area of life as Brown states: *“if the de-democratizing effects of neo-liberalism prepare the ground for the authoritarian features of neo-conservative governance, the political mobilization of religious discourse is an important fertilizer [...] a religiously interpellated populace, and an increasingly blurred line between religious and political culture, and between theological and political discourse, facilitates the reception of the de-democratizing*

²³⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 705.

forces of neoconservatism and neoliberalism.”²³⁷ Religious calling to submissive acceptance of the authority creates a general indifference to interrogation, deliberation and discussion of political public issues. The indifference to active political reasoning takes the form of anti-intellectualism as a pervasive norm in the late-modern societies. Consumerism and family life and other forms of religious affiliations substitute the democratic participation. The political indifference and anti-intellectualism generates a firm ground for the legitimization of inequality as natural, good and inevitable. This legitimization, ipso facto, functions as the basis of the free-market rationality of neo-liberalism. Brown emphasizes this reinforcing connection between neo-conservatism’s religious discourse and neo-liberalism: *“neoconservatism does valorize power and statism, and when those energies are combined with the moralism and market ethos, and when a public is molded by the combination of these energies and rationalities, a fiercely anti-democratic political culture results. This is a culture disinclined to restrain either statism or corporate power, and above all one that literally comes to resent and even attack the classical principles and requirements of constitutional democracy.”*²³⁸ This alliance between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism found its embodiment in the transformation of the western liberal democracies into a late-modern societies where the mishmash of free-market, consumerism, anti-intellectualism, and religiosity is the dominant in different degrees. It goes without saying that this alliance infiltrated the whole world while the domination of neo-liberalism was growing in a global scale.

The transformation of Turkish society can also be read from this perspective regarding the alliance of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. Evidently, the Turkish case has its own dynamics and displays important differences from the western experiences, however the common points are quite numerous to neglect. In the West, the neo-liberal / neo-conservative alliance undermined the established values and institutions of liberal democracy, whereas liberal democracy has never been properly secured in any period of the history of the Turkish Republic. Thus, in Turkey the transformation into a neo-liberal/neo-conservative terrain fortified and strengthened the reactionary modernism rather than leading to the demise of a liberal democratic culture.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 705-706.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 710.

Although the liberal democratic institutions and values had never been the fundamentals of the Turkish political culture, there was a significant network of labour and trade unions and a growing political participation which put a strain on the political system²³⁹. The 1980 coup d'état removed this strain and made the already democratically weak political system more undemocratic and authoritarian. The authoritarian political system was established in tandem with the so-called "liberalisation" of the whole society. "The great transformation" as named by the prime-minister of the period, Özal, was built upon the liberalisation of the economy, minimal state, privatisation and destroying the taboos.

The business circles supported the internationalisation and opening up of the economy. The state used its authoritarian means to suppress the opposition and to sustain the order. IMF and World Bank drew the outlines of the economic policies that must be followed by the government. The de-politicisation of the Turkish society was pursued within this collaborative working of these bodies. The market rationality became the dominant form of social interaction in every segment of life. It was not only confined into the economic field, but also infiltrated into the rhetoric and practice of politics. This rationality was not only source of de-politicisation but also strengthened the corruption of every form in politics and economy. "*Köşeyi dönme*" (personal achievement despite the social and ethical costs) as the emblematic embodiment of the market rationality became the motto of the period. "*Benim memurum işini bilir!*" (My civil servant knows how to survive well!), the prime-minister Turgut Özal's famous response to a question about the insufficient salaries of civil servants, was also a significant marker of the legitimate corruption culture functioning at every level of the society. In this way, the political and public problems such as economic situation of the civil servants were transferred not only to private sphere of individuals but also considered legitimate to be satisfied through unethical ways.

²³⁹ In spite of being the result of a coup d'état and fundamentally authoritarian, the 1961 constitution produced a relatively more fertile soil for the political organisation of different segments of the society, especially labour movement gained an important strength as a result of this political atmosphere and also the increasing industrialisation during the 1960s. The growing demands from the labour movement and especially from the left in general resulted in a tension within the political system and led to the military interventions during the 1970s.

The combination of the pervasive market rationality and corruption was also an important element in the composition of the new consumer-citizen. The integration of the Turkish economy into the global market accelerated the birth of this citizen type defined in terms of his/her role as a consumer. This citizen type, at the beginning, found its embodiment in a new class as the product of the post-coup period. This new class was composed of well-educated white collar workers of the industrial sector and most importantly the newly emerging financial and service sector. This new class, the Yuppies (Young Urban Professionals) became the carrier of the values of the new social and economic system. They adopted the styles of global consumer behaviours, and became the conveyers of a new life style fashioned on consumerism and political aloofness. Yuppie should be considered as a symbol or a caricature of a certain cluster of values such as selfish individualism against publicly motivated common concerns and conformism against rebellion or criticism towards the existing system²⁴⁰.

Within time, this consumer-citizen epitomized in the yuppie symbolism invaded the whole society with the help of growing media and means of communication which promoted the neo-liberal values, consumption and other cultural manifestations of the late-capitalist society such as an insatiable desire for the exposure of the private lives, and constantly changing forms of lifestyles. As Nurdan Gürbilek states in her book analysing the cultural atmosphere of the 1980s, two different cultural strategies dominated the society during this period. On the one hand, this decade was a period of restrictions and oppression, on the other hand there was another cultural strategy which aimed to provoke and include instead of oppression and exclusion. On the side, there was a Turkey without rights and liberties, on the other side there was another Turkey which was constantly incited to “talk” about the petty details of private lives, fashion, the latest model of technological products, and sexuality. Cultural identities were not articulated by means of political mediation any longer, because the public sphere as the meeting and negotiation place of these identities was devastated by the power of the coup. However, cultural identities became to be articulated through the market forces

²⁴⁰ Hayri Kozanoğlu, **Yuppieler, Prensler ve Bizim Kuşak**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 7-8.

during the 80s.²⁴¹ The rise of Islamic identity during the 1980s can be considered within this perspective.

The “return of the repressed” theme was utilised for a long time as the main explanatory framework for describing the rise of Islamism in Turkey. According to this narrative, the social engineering employed by the Kemalist modernisation project repressed the Islamic identity to create an authoritarian secular modernity. The introduction of neo-liberalism into the Turkish society toppled the hegemony of the Kemalist modernisation, and created a vacuum for the expression of Islamic identity in Turkey. So, the neo-liberalisation of the society and the 1980 coup d’état as its catalyser are seen as positive developments. Nilüfer Göle comes forward among the defendants of such a perspective. For her, 1980 coup, by bringing down the positivist and Jacobin tradition of the Turkish modernisation, started a new epoch in which repressed identities could find opportunity to express themselves. Göle claims that for the first time in Turkish history the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a real public sphere, because the social and cultural identities were unleashed from the yoke of the monist political ideologies whereas before 1980 the political used to dominate the social²⁴². Göle reads the Turkish modernisation as a development from state dominated modernisation to the post-1980 modernity based on society. In this sense, Islamist identity came out as an important component of such modernity founded on civil society rather than state authority. Göle proposes the concept of “non-western modernity” as an explanatory tool to understand the development of modernity in societies outside the West. According to this perspective, modernity developed in its own cultural, social and economic background in different way in different countries, so labelling these societies as unmodern or outside modernity is completely fallacious. Against the universalistic, totalising claims of modernity, these local modernities can claim their distinctive experience regarding being modern.²⁴³ Hence, Göle asserts that Islamism as civilian movement can contribute to the establishment of a local modernity in Turkey without the authoritative dictations of the elitist state authority. For Göle, the technocratic cadre of the Motherland Party

²⁴¹ Nurdan Gürbilek, **Vitrinde Yaşamak: 1980’lerin Kültürel İklimi**, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007, p. 8-10.

²⁴² Nilüfer Göle, **Melez Desenler: İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine**, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2002, p. 42.

²⁴³ Nilüfer Göle, “Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine”, **Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007, p. 59.

which was mostly composed of the engineers with Muslim faith and the Islamic movement collaborated to create a modernity freed from the domination of the ideologies of the previous period. Instead of ideological convictions, the “policy” was the new tool of politics in this new modern formation which was based on the combination of market forces and conservative values²⁴⁴.

Göle’s perspective became quite fashionable within the conservative circles that tried to find an academic rhetoric to ground their existence. However, her thoughts reflect a certain ideological perspective echoing the alliance of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. First, it is evident that the Islamist movement in Turkey is not a purely civilian force detached from the state, especially with the 1980 coup Islamism and Islamist circles were started to be supported by the state institutions. A combination of nationalist and religious discourses, known as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) was adopted and bred by the state itself. This discourse aimed to integrate the Islamic values into the Turkish nationalism²⁴⁵. Furthermore, in terms of economy, Islam worked as a “network resource” among conservative Muslim entrepreneurs in their integration into the neo-liberal free market economy. In this way, the Islamist capital functioned in accordance with and gained much from the state’s new economic policies.²⁴⁶ So, Göle’s claim about the character of the Islamist movement as outside the state authority does not reflect the reality. Her belief on the power of the collaboration of neo-liberal market forces and Islamism for the creation of a genuine local modernity echoes the neo-conservative perspective since for her religion would supply the moral basis that the free market lacks. Her rejection of the universal ideals of modernity as oppressive and totalising, and her equation of these ideals with the Turkish modernisations values are themselves quite totalising. She tries to detach modernity from its historical roots, in this sense she reinstates the reactionary modernism of the Turkish modernisation by emphasising the cultural specificities and negating the values of the Enlightenment as totalising. She tries to cleans the political sphere from the ideologies since she perceives them as monist and oppressive, breeds a belief in the power of the technocratic cadres, market forces and Islamism for the establishment of an authentic modernity. As shown earlier in

²⁴⁴ Göle, **Melez Desenler...**, p. 46-47, 54.

²⁴⁵ Tanıl Bora, Kemal Can, “12 Eylül’ün Resmi İdeolojisi, Faşist Entelejensiya ve ‘Türk-İslam Sentezi’”, **Birikim**, Ekim 1990, p. 24.

²⁴⁶ Buğra, Savaşkan, **op.cit.**, p. 44-45.

previous parts of this study, search for authentic modernity was a significant part of reactionary modernism both in the German and the Turkish cases. The distinction between civilisation and culture was used as a tool to negate the universal claims of modernity including freedoms and rights as the basis of democracy. Thus, Göle's perspective falls into the continuum of the reactionary modernism in Turkey, and still keeps the civilisation and culture distinction.

The story of the integration of Turkey into the global network of neo-liberalism, and the authoritarian state structure strengthened after the 1980 coup, and the rise of Islamism all overlap with the de-democratising effects described by Wendy Brown: The devaluation of political activity, promotion of technocratic policy making, de-politicisation of social problems, and integration of religion into political culture. Nilüfer Göle's position and perspective are quite important at this point, because she provides the most refined and sophisticated version of neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinking in Turkey. The 1980 coup d'état and the neo-liberal integration generated a great change and transformation within the Turkish society, however this transformation did not contain the positive forces leading the society towards a new form of modernity as Nilüfer Göle claimed, on the contrary, the merger of the military rule, free market and Islamist conservatism sustained the fundamental characteristics of reactionary modernism. The Turkish modernisation's emphasis on the national culture inherited from Ziya Gökalp's teachings, and its selective approach to the values of modernity on the basis of exclusion of the values of democratic society gained a different momentum after 1980. The political, social and cultural consequences of the late capitalism which Turkey was integrated in gradually as of the 1980s produced a fertile ground to sustain the technological adaptation of the modern world and the negation of the democratic values. So, it is important to understand the social and cultural climate of late capitalist society for a better grasp of the transformation of the Turkish society the 1980s onwards.

D- The Post-Modern Condition: The Cultural Ground of Late-Capitalism

Nilüfer Göle writes regarding the new cultural forms in her essay on non-western modernity: *"The relations between modernity and tradition in non-western societies will keep surprising us. At the time that we think that the de-*

*traditionalisation of modernity reached its peak and the globalisation devours the local life styles, a new interest toward tradition, forgotten tastes, nostalgia for the past emerge in different forms and in an unexpected moment. The despised “Allaturca” style is being appreciated. And Islamism can be regarded as the example of this development. This, instead of turning back to the past, is a search for a harmony (ideal) between subjectivity and modernity through re-building the past within the present.”*²⁴⁷ The positive and optimistic style of this look towards the cultural consequences of the new political and economic structuring in Turkey after 1980 is quite striking. For Göle, the new interest in history and nostalgia for the past emerge as a result of the social forces such as Islamism unleashed from the domination of the authoritarian state, so these forces try to face with the past and history without the mediation of the official history. Such nostalgia for the past, for Göle, can be considered as the basis of more genuine and local form of modernity in harmony with tradition. However, this straightforward and naive reasoning misses the cultural and social repercussions of neo-liberal structuring, and avoids being critical in considering the effects of the combination of free-market forces and neo-conservatism both at the global and national levels.

Fredric Jameson’s analysis of late-capitalism provides a subtle explanatory framework to understand the cultural consequences of the changes brought out by neo-liberal economic structuring. As mentioned before within the discussion of the post-industrial/ information society, Jameson sets his analysis on Ernest Mandel’s description of the development of capitalism in three stages:

- 1) market capitalism
- 2) monopoly stage or stage of imperialism
- 3) late-capitalism or consumer capitalism.²⁴⁸

For Jameson, the terms such as post-industrial society or information society imply a fundamental break from the previous social, economic and cultural structures. Although Jameson accepts that there has been a certain transformation in the composition of social, economic and cultural structures especially since the 1980s, he underlines the fundamental continuity in the capitalistic character of today’s societies. In fact, what has been happening through the development of flexible post-fordist production, the rise of the service sectors, the demise of the

²⁴⁷ Göle, **Batı Dışı Modernlik...**, p. 66.

²⁴⁸ Jameson, **op.cit.**, p. 26.

Keynesian policies and the welfare state, is the deepening of capitalism. Jameson states that capitalism became much more pervasive and started to invade the uncommodified corners of life. The enclaves and spaces that capitalism had hitherto not touched now are being colonised, such as the invasion of the untouched nooks and crannies of the unconscious by the rise of the media and information industry.

The cultural repercussion of this deepening capitalism is post-modernism. Jameson defines post-modernism as the “cultural dominant” of the late-capitalism, not simply as a style²⁴⁹. Post-modernism, as an artistic expression or a style, started to gain importance in the 1960s as a reaction to the formalism of high modernist literature. But it was only during the 1970s post-modernism gained a wide range acceptance from architecture, to dance, music, painting and film. Especially architecture became the most important field where post-modernism revealed itself in a much more assertive manner, this was because of the nature of architecture as both an artistic form and an economic venture. Architect Robert Venturi, in his 1972 book *Learning from Las Vegas*, which became the bible of the post-modern architecture in later year, criticised the modernist architecture’s detachment from its surrounding space. For Venturi, the enthusiasm of the modernist architecture to transform the space through the form led to a breakdown of communication between architecture and space. So, he offers an architectural form to communicate the symbolic world of space through architecture, and within this framework Las Vegas appears as the perfect example for his proposition. Las Vegas with its billboards, neon lights, roadside fast food restaurants, casinos, and nightclubs is reflected in its architecture. As the Mecca of the American consumer, Las Vegas as a city exists for the satisfaction of myriad different desires of people visiting it. The symbolism of consumerism diffusing from the entertaining commercialism of Las Vegas finds its reflection in the buildings. *“Symbol dominates space. Architecture is not enough. Because the spatial relationships are made by symbols more than by forms, architecture in this landscape becomes symbol in space rather form in space [...] The sign is more important than the architecture. This is reflected in the proprietor’s budget. The sign at the front is a vulgar extravaganza, the building at the back, a modest necessity. The architecture is what is cheap. Sometimes the building is the sign: The duck store in the shape of a duck, called ‘The Long Island Duckling’, is a*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

sculptural symbol and architectural shelter.”²⁵⁰ The exploding symbols of commercial space of Las Vegas echo themselves in the architectural forms, as in the case of the duck store in the shape of a duck. If the symbols are the only dominants of the space, then the mishmash of the symbolic structure of the city should be found in the fluidity of symbolic styles in architecture, as well. Therefore, a store in the shape of duck stands along side of a casino in the shape of an Egyptian temple or a hotel in the style of a medieval castle.

Modernist architecture’s emphasis on form as the reflection of the importance of the reason was a part of the modernist movement which aimed to shape and change the space through new forms. The rejection of old architectural forms, and the desire for creating novel forms to stimulate the social change through rational planning and functional design were the fundamental tenets of modernist architecture. Post-modernist architecture, by rejecting these tenets as monotonous and uniform, offers a juxtaposition of different and incoherent elements as the manifestation of plurality, inspired by Las Vegas. In this regard, post-modern architecture aims to reflect the existing spatial structure through symbols without any inspiration for creating a novel form. This is the death of modernist utopianism.

If the purpose of post-modern architecture is to embrace the existing spatial structure, then the inspiration of the architecture is not in the future, but in the present or in the past. The past contains a symbolic repertoire to be used by post-modern architecture. Against modernism’s radical break from the past forms, post-modernism’s one of the most important features is its desire to capture the architectural styles of the past. This interest in the past takes two forms, one is the “straight revivalism” which is the direct adaptation of the historical styles and forms; the second one is what Charles Jencks calls “radical eclecticism” which brings together incoherent and unrelated historical styles together.²⁵¹ Thus, this re-adaptation of historical styles in revivalist or eclecticist manner means the endless repetition of the past through plundering the former forms and techniques. Post-modern architecture celebrates this patchwork of historicism as the recognition of

²⁵⁰ Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, Steven Izenour, **Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form**, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977, p. 13.

²⁵¹ Charles Jencks, **The Language of Post-Modern Architecture**, London: Academy Editions, 1991, p. 132.

plurality, difference and hybridity against the so-called monotonous and uniform universal rationality of high-modernism.

Against modernism's rupture from the tradition and the past, the celebration of hybridity through historical eclecticism and revivalism claims to rebuild the traditional styles and historical forms in architecture through using the symbolic references to the past. The purpose is to convey the existing local traditions of historical forms into the new architectural language through a symbolic communication. However, the historicism of post-modern architecture does not contain any critical dialogue with history in a creative way to build novel architectural and spatial forms, it aims to form a collage of historical styles without a historical context but with purely cosmetic concerns. Then, history is reduced to a reserve of gothic ornaments, baroque façades, oriental cupolas, or Greek pediments that can be used freely to satisfy the aesthetic populism of consumer culture. The universal rationalism of modernist architecture is replaced by the aesthetic populism of universal consumerism: *"The 'hybrid', 'complex' and 'dual-coded' language of postmodernist architecture ought to testify to a new sense of rootedness or locality, but when hybridization itself becomes universal, regional specificity becomes simply a style which can be transmitted across the globe as rapidly as a photocopy of the latest glossy architectural manifesto. Paradoxically, the sign of the success of the anti-universalist language and style of architectural postmodernism is that one can find it everywhere, from London, to New York, to Tokyo, and Delhi. The same relationship between plurality and universality is to be found in the critical discourses of postmodernism itself, in architecture and elsewhere. Postmodernist theory reproduces everywhere, and with everywhere increased allure and potency, the story of the dissolution of the universal perspective."*²⁵² Thus, post-modernist architecture's challenge to the universalism of modernism creates another form of universalism but this time not on the basis of the reason but on the market rationality of consumer culture. Its appetite for the past means the globalisation of local historical styles.

The features of post-modernism in architecture, from the 1980s onward, started to be seen in almost all cultural products in a global scale. This is the process of

²⁵² Steven Connor, **Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary**, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997, p. 87.

globalisation of post-modernism or the condition of post-modernity²⁵³ in tandem with the globalisation of neo-liberalism. This is what Jameson implies when he says post-modernism is not just a style but the cultural dominant of late-capitalism. So, through this connection, Jameson does place the post-modernism within an economic and political framework, and refuses to consider it as a purely cultural affair. He gives a concise definition of post-modernism by pointing to its several constitutive features: “*a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum; a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our relationship to public History and in the new forms of our private temporality, whose ‘schizophrenic’ structure will determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the more temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone [...]; the deep constitutive relationships of all this to a whole new technology, which is itself a figure for a whole new economic world system [...]*”²⁵⁴

It goes without saying that late-capitalist society is the realm of image. Not only the physical world, but also the psyche of the human being is colonised by the industry of image. So, this primacy of image changes the nature of all forms of social relations, and also the inner world of the individual. The transition from the print media’s Gutenberg Galaxy to the global village of digital communication resulted in the breakdown of the relation between education and literacy. Today’s information society, post-industrial society or late-capitalist society, whatever it is called, produces a social and cultural condition where the activity of reading is considered belong to the past. Especially, with the rise of the digital technology, this link between the literacy and education was profoundly destroyed.

In the cultural terrain of the post-modernism, the image does not reflect the reality any longer, but it precedes the reality it is supposed to represent. Reality turns

²⁵³ Although post-modernism denotes a certain perspective in arts, or a philosophical approach that is generally defined in terms of rejection of universalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment ideals, and the grand narratives of modernity, and the unified self; and the condition of post-modernity is used to define the composition of social, cultural and political structures in certain historical period influenced by post-modernism, the terms of post-modernism and post-modernity are mostly used interchangeably. For example, Jameson uses postmodernism for both perspective and condition.

²⁵⁴ Jameson, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

into a “pale reflection of the image.”²⁵⁵ It is not possible to distinguish reality from the image. As the market rationality of late-capitalism penetrates into the tiniest cells of the social corpus, the commoditisation reaches to the unconscious of the individual. And in this regard, as Guy Debord pointed out that the image has become the ultimate form of commodity reification²⁵⁶. The boundary between artistic image and the commodity-image became blurred. While the artistic image, whether it was realist, impressionist or cubist, etc., was composed of references to reality in different artistic languages. The post-modern image of the information society has the reference to itself or to other images. Richard Kearney describes this feature of the post-modern image through “the mirror metaphor” which denotes an endless play between inter-reflecting mirrors: *“The individual subject is no longer considered the maker of communicator of his own images. There is a growing conviction that images we possess are reproduced copies of images already there before us. The image which is has already been. Like every commodity of our mass communication society, the postmodern image has itself become an interchangeable consumer item, a pseudo-imitation which playfully celebrates its pseudonymity, parades its own superficiality and derivitiveness [sic] [...] Postmodern culture jibes at all talk of original creations. It exclaims the omnipresence of self-destructing images which stimulate each other in a limitless interplay of mirrors [...] the mirror of the postmodern paradigm reflects neither the outer of nature nor the inner world of subjectivity; it reflects only itself – a mirror within a mirror within a mirror...”*²⁵⁷

The image floats on the flat surface of the mirror reflecting only an absolute depthlessness, since it does not contain any allusion to anything but itself. As an example, a British fashion, youth, art and music magazine, *I.D.*, first published in 1980, instantly became the iconic illustration of the post-modern image. Its August-1985 cover (Picture 4.1) can be seen as the propagation of the 1960s’ pop-art style during the 1980s. The prints of Andy Warhol, that are the multiplications of the images of iconic figures such as Marilyn Monroe, John Lennon or a commodity product such as a canned soup, are imitated in this cover. The figures in Warhol’s prints are themselves commodified personalities or objects, and Warhol transform them into another commodified form in printable copies in an ironic manner emphasising their mass production. However, this irony, as another feature of post-

²⁵⁵ Richard Kearney, **The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture**, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p. 2.

²⁵⁶ Debord, **op.cit.**

²⁵⁷ Kearney, **op.cit.**, p. 4,5,6.

modernism, does not call for an activity of questioning, but it rather celebrates their reified character. Then, the images of an already reified disposition are reproduced in prints which themselves turn into commodity-images, confirming the mirror metaphor. Furthermore, these pop-art prints are reborn in a cover of a popular magazine in 1985 as emphasising the re-usable feature of the post-modern image. The image on the cover itself does not refer to anything, but only itself. The collage of coloured patches on the face creates an effect of *pastiche* and *bricolage* that constitute an important aspect of the post-modern image. This image can be considered as emblematic example of the emerging post-modern culture of the 1980s, and its features, depthlessness, flatness, pastiche, bricolage, and commodification infiltrated into other layers of the social structure.

Picture 4.1: The cover of I.D. Magazine, August, 1985.



However, the dominance of the image in the late-capitalist society does not mean that everything produced today's world is exclusively in post-modern character. As Jameson pointed out, post-modernism as the cultural dominant of late-capitalism is not simply a chronological necessity of moving from one epoch to another, but it is rather a paradigmatic shift in certain disposition of economic, cultural, and social structures²⁵⁸. For instance, the cover of I.D. magazine resembles the mediaeval icon in terms of its impersonal iconography and its two-dimensionality. However, different from the mediaeval icon, it does not aim to invoke any feeling or thought through some reference to a divine being. It is impossible to involve in any larger layer of meaning, the colour patches are colour patches, and the V-sign is a V-sign. So, the cover of the I.D. magazine is the product of a new paradigm that Kearney calls "parodic paradigm"²⁵⁹ of postmodernism. And for Kearney, this paradigmatic shift does not concern only the realm of image but refers to change in the nature of imagination of the human being. He distinguishes three different paradigmatic realms regarding the imaginative capability of the human: 1) "Mimetic paradigm" of the pre-modern cultures which imitates the original activity of the Creator; the work of the craftsman, as the symbol of this paradigm, is evaluated in comparison to its mimicry of the divine works of the Creator. 2) "Anthropocentric" or "productive paradigm" of modernity which is the paradigm of the "original inventor" who does not accept the world as it is, and wants to change and transform it through his/her imagination. From Renaissance to the Enlightenment, and modernist movements of fin de siècle all were the products of this force of imagination. 3) "Parodic paradigm" of post-modernity in which the *bricoleur* replaces the creative inventor. The *bricoleur* plays with the disconnected fragments which he himself has not created through his own imagination. He gathers them in an anonymous, impersonal manner through a game of signs²⁶⁰. The whole world turns into a realm of sheer images and spectacle without depth. There is no depth or deeper meaning since the copies are reproduced through copies and through copies and so on by means of communication and media technologies. Here again, the mirror metaphor constitutes the basis of this paradigmatic shift to the post-modernism's lack of imagination.

²⁵⁸ Jameson, **op.cit.**, p. 36- 37. Kearney, **op.cit.**, p. 17-19.

²⁵⁹ Kearney, **op.cit.**, p. 17.

²⁶⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 12,13.

Modernism's aspiration for newness and creative imagination is being discarded in the post-modern times. While the future as the predominant tense of modernity was marking the desire to change and to transform the existing conditions, the demise of the imaginative power in post-modern condition envisages only a recycling of already produced ideas, images and actions. Then, the disappearance of the future from the horizon of the human development leads to the rise of the present tense as the sole temporal terrain of the human existence. As a result of this hegemonic position of the present time, the apocalyptic pessimism replaces the utopian yearnings of modernism, since there is nothing to hope or expect. The existing structures of societal and individual existence appear as the only possible condition. Therefore, the annihilation of the earth by a huge meteorite or by a vast epidemic seems much more possible than the end of late-capitalist society. This fantasy of apocalyptic end invades the post-modern imagination by filling the empty space left by modernist hopes and struggles for creating a better world. This is the natural outcome of the pervasion of the reactionary modernism as the late-capitalism is being globally embedded in the world in post-modern times. While the ideals of the betterment of human condition and the improvement of liberties and rights are jettisoned, the only thing left is a pure "technologism" which produces both fascination and fear. On the one hand, the insatiable appetite for novel technological developments and products is constantly blew up by consumerism as an important pillar of the post-modern edifice, on the other hand a ceaseless fear about the technological catastrophe is leading to a feeling of end²⁶¹.

The exhaustion of utopianism, hopes and expectations is also a symptom of the transformation of temporal structure in late-capitalism. As discussed previously, late-capitalism is identified with the rise of the information technologies, the post-fordist flexible production, the predominance of the service sector against the industrial production, the globalisation of multi-national capital and the demise of the welfare state policies; and this transformation of capitalism, as David Harvey denoted, is the outcome of "*the very laws of motion of capitalist development*"²⁶². These laws of motion are based on the general trend towards constant acceleration of production,

²⁶¹ The apocalyptic pessimism produces a culture of fear and panic; and it is quite visible in cultural products of the post-modern condition. For example, the fear of nuclear power, unbridled technological development, and aids is revealed in the movies and TV serials about zombies, vampires, or survivors in a desolate world after a global technological catastrophe.

²⁶² Harvey, **Between Space and Time...**, p. 425.

exchange and consumption and a shrinking horizon of space. Changes in temporal and spatial configuration results in the eradication of ways of life and social practices founded upon previous temporal-spatial paradigm, then it leads to the birth of different ways of social practices and ways of life. In this regard, the post-modern condition is the product of such a change in temporal structure, stemming from the constant acceleration of capitalism. The transformation of the temporal structure naturally leads to a change in the articulation of society with the past and history.

E- Acceleration

Speed has been the integral part of capitalist mode of production since the naissance of mercantilism. Profit as the fundamental motive was based on constant acceleration of production and trade. The economic system had to expand itself exponentially to survive by means of faster production and rapid transportation. In this perpetual speed, everything became obsolete quickly, so technology was utilised to create new methods of faster production. In *Grundrisse*, Marx explains the connection between production and speed subtly: *“Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. Only in so far as the direct product can be realized in distant markets in mass quantities in proportion to reductions in the transport costs, and only in so far as at the same time the means of communication and transport themselves can yield spheres of realization of labour, driven by capital; only in so far as commercial traffic takes place in massive volume – in which more than necessary labour is replaced – only to that extent is the production of cheap means of communication and transport a condition for production based on capital, and promoted by it for that reason.”*²⁶³ Especially during crises of capital accumulation, the obliteration of spatial limits and the demand for “the annihilation of space by time” becomes much more intense. Then, acceleration became one of the fundamental tenets of the modern society in its relation to space and temporality. Technology played an important role in this increasing acceleration; the technological innovations of the industrial revolution painted a completely different social landscape than the previous centuries. The 19th

²⁶³ Marx, *Grundrisse...*, p. 524- 525.


century was the age of great speed causing the greatest social transformation that the human kind had hitherto witnessed. The ephemerality produced by speed perplexed Alexis de Tocqueville as revealed in his conversation with a sailor: “*I meet an American sailor and I ask him why his country’s vessels are built to last a short time, and he replies to me without hesitation that the art of navigation makes such rapid progress daily that the most beautiful ship would soon become almost useless if its existence were prolonged beyond a few years. In these words pronounced at random by a coarse man concerning a particular fact I perceive the general and systematic idea according to which a great people conducts all things.*”²⁶⁴ This ephemeral texture gradually pervaded the whole social fabric. The perpetual change sweeping away all established societal structures.

Modernism as an aesthetic and artistic movement was a reaction to this ephemeral character of the new age. Different from the anti-modernist, reactionary movements such as the medievalism that was much adored by the German Romantics, Modernists tried to both celebrate and transcend the novel forms of experience resulted from constant acceleration. From Baudelaire, to James Joyce and Proust, modernists criticised the alienation and the blasé feeling of the modern individual created by modernity, but they also involved in a venture to deal with the modern conditions and to provide novel ways for grasping and transcending the existing structures. While the old society was dying, the former sensational and intellectual forms were not enough in the new conditions of life. Proust’s that *petite madeleine* soaked in a cup of tea was both an expression of the novel forms of relation of the modern individual to the past within the swirling world of modern times. The “streams of consciousness” of Virginia Woolf were trying to go with the flowing time, but also wanted to rise above the horror of the flow and find a new layer of existence. New ways of seeing the perpetual flux of life in the works of impressionists, cubists and expressionists was aimed to create a revolutionary sensation in the modern individual’s psyche. For example, Umberto Boccioni’s sculpture *Unique Forms of Continuity in Space* (Picture 4.2) aims to embody the perpetual movement propelled by the speed of the modern life. The inert moment of the stand-still, for Boccioni, could not grasp the flowing moment of acceleration. Georges Braque depicted two women in the quietness of a musical moment in his

²⁶⁴ Tocqueville, *op.cit.*, p. 422.

painting called *the Duet* (Picture 4.3). Both the figures and the room are described from a composition of different angles and perspectives, since the modern society does not let the individual stay in the same moment and place long. The lines overflow and exceed the frame of the painting, the space is not the fixed container any longer. Despite the supposed quietness of the musical moment, the multiple perspectives and exceeding lines convey the sensation of the music filling the room. At this point, the cover of the I.D. magazine with its flatness appears in stark contrast with these modernist works. The magazine cover reflects another form of being, seeing, and understanding which denotes a change in the configuration of social forces. This change also emerged from within the very same accelerative forces that created the modern society and modernist movement.

Picture 4.2: Unique Forms of Continuity in Space, Umberto Boccioni Picture 4.3: The Duet, Georges Braque



Since the exponential acceleration is an integral part of capitalism, the rapid pace of change became much more salient during the twentieth century. Paul Virilio defines this integral character of acceleration as “dromology”. For him, the industrial revolution is a dromocratic revolution, and the whole development of the human society has followed the order of dromology which refers to the accelerative nature of capitalism²⁶⁵. For Virilio, the military and the communication technologies and media are the most important engines by which the speed is produced. Throughout the twentieth century, the technological speed had been increased in a vast measure,

²⁶⁵ Virilio, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

and this constant acceleration resulted in the transformation of the social, political, cultural and economic structures.

Although the technical and technological acceleration are the main engines of the dromology, Hartmut Rosa describes the technological acceleration as only one of the constitutive forms of larger structure of social acceleration which means increased speed of all social processes. He distinguishes three forms of acceleration as analytically distinct but interconnected phenomena: technical acceleration, the acceleration of social change and the acceleration of the pace of life.²⁶⁶ In this perspective, these three forms of acceleration propel and reinforce each other. Although the technical acceleration can easily be noticed because of its tangible nature, the acceleration of social change and the acceleration of the pace of life are not so easily noticeable due to their impalpable, elusive and uneven nature.

The end result of the increasing social acceleration is a shift in temporality from the temporality of classical modernity to the temporality of the post-modern condition of the late-capitalist society. Robert Hassan explains this shift by defining two empires of time based on our historical relationship with temporality as mediated through politics and through the logic of capitalism²⁶⁷. The temporal empire of classical modernity which was fundamentally based on the clock time aimed to create a mode of production, a culture and a way of life synchronised by the clock. The machine and the factory of Fordism in classical modernity- or heavy modernity as described by Zygmunt Bauman²⁶⁸- necessitated a disciplined, limited, organised and scheduled temporal structure determined by the clock time. This temporality of classical modernity shaped the whole lives of people, cultures and societies as engraved in the routinised and planned rhythm of the mechanistic movement of the clock. With the crisis of the Fordist production in the 1970s, the clock time became inefficient to combat this crisis, so a new rhythm based on the time of network started to develop. *“And so it is that the temporal empire that was metered by the clock, helped generate the Enlightenment, modernity and industrialization is now being superseded. The rule of the clock as the even and constant regulator and scheduler of societies and industries around a world divided into time zones no*

²⁶⁶ Rosa, **op.cit.**, p. 71-80.

²⁶⁷ Robert Hassan, **Empires of Speed: Time and the Acceleration of Politics and Society**, Leiden: Brill, 2009.

²⁶⁸ Bauman, **op.cit.**, p. 174.

longer fits with the new Information Age. The old model is now too slow in its maturity and has outlived its usefulness as a generator of profit. Today a new form of temporality is becoming dominant: this is 'network time'. It is founded on, and rises up from, the proliferation of digital networks. These are networks that are based on a singular logic, but importantly they also generate open-ended and multi-speed processes and applications."²⁶⁹ The information technology revolution setting the ground of the new temporal structure has developed in tandem with the expansion of the neo-liberalism all over the world. Neo-liberalism strategy of post-Fordist flexibility became embedded in life through this new temporality. Rosa defines three important historical moments which whipped up the acceleration and the emergence of new temporality: First, the political change culminated in the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, second, the economic opening of the Eastern Block, and the consequent triumphal globalisation of the neo-liberal market economy based on the economic revolution of flexible accumulation of post-Fordist production and finally the digital revolution propelled by the establishment of the Internet²⁷⁰. These determinant moments are interconnected and reinforced each other, while the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the political boundaries on the way of the globalisation of the economic structuring required by neo-liberal capitalism, the digital revolution helped this restructuring accelerate in an immense speed.

Different from the old temporal structure of the clock-time, the network-time is fluid and pervasive as it recognizes no limit and penetrates into the minutest details of life. In a similar manner of Jameson's analysis of the late-capitalism, this new temporality infiltrates into the spaces hitherto untouched by the clock time, it is not only experienced by a small entrepreneurial group or globally mobile business class. Although, the inequality and poverty remains and even getting much more grave and extensive, and the huge part of the world population remains outside the mobility and fluidity generated by the acceleration of the neo-liberal economic system, the network temporality seeps into lives, cutting across the class, cultural or national boundaries. Digital revolution and computerisation emerging from the core of the information society buried the clock-time temporality almost within a decade. Evidently, this does not mean that clock-time disappeared from the face of the earth, it still exists as a basic measure of time beside the new network time, but it has lost

²⁶⁹ Hassan, **op.cit.**, p. 68.

²⁷⁰ Rosa, **op.cit.**, p. 213.

its dominant position as the main determinant of the political, cultural and social structure of society.

F- Temporalisation of Time and Situational Identity

Fyodor Dostoyevsky, in *Crime and Punishment*, relates the story of Raskolnikov who is the embodiment of the intellectual from the Russian petite-bourgeoisie. Living in misery and destitute, Raskolnikov faces the harsh necessities of life for survival, and the moral and ethical exigencies of being. His existential dilemma between hunger, humiliation and basic ethical foundations of being human leads him to question his own place in this life. And love offers a solution by creating an epiphany embracing all the misery and the glory of life. Dostoyevsky paints a figure full of contradictions vocalised by Raskolnikov's inner voice, but in spite of his contradictions, hesitations and dilemmas, Dostoyevsky tells a story of an individual throughout a plot developing towards an ultimate goal that is the love as the panacea for the human misery. Raskolnikov, with his misery and glory, is the modern individual as an exile trying to find his place in the world. The novel as a literary genre narrates the development of the individuals in specific period and place; this can take the form of a whole life time development of an individual or individuals as in the case of the genre of *Bildungsroman*. This narrative takes its root from the modern conception of self as a stable, *a posteriori* identity. Stable does not refer to an unchanging characteristic, but rather to an identity changing and developing by means of the decisions, desires and aspirations of the individual him/herself. In this sense, modernity can be defined as a process of individualisation of the man, liberation from the pre-given structures of the traditional society such as the rural community or religion. In pre-modern world, the tradition and religion used to provide the man with the *a priori* coordinates of its place in the society. With the rise of modernity, these predefined parameters started to be questioned, and the individual in modern sense was born with the responsibility to find his/her place in the world. The modern individual is envisaged as being endowed with the capability of shaping his/her life throughout his/her lifetime. His/her identity is no longer determined by traditional values and roles but open to development through his/her efforts. This formation of modern identity was based on "temporalisation of life" which means a perspective on one's own life as a project to be given shape in time.

In terms of Koselleck's formulation of the horizon of expectation and the space of experience, the modern identity is based on a separation of the space of experience and horizon of expectation; however the horizon of experience should be stable enough to allow long-run time perspectives to sustain. So the modern individual could develop a biographical pattern through his/her life-time. Against, the angst, constant change and alienation brought up by the modern society, modern individual try to establish a stable, substantial, and coherent life story. As Douglas Kellner pointed out: "[...] in modernity, the problem of identity consisted in how we constitute, perceive, interpret, and present our self to ourselves and to others."²⁷¹

With the transformation of the temporal ground as a result of the changing economic, social and cultural structures in massive acceleration, the constant efforts of the modern individual to try to a stable and coherent identity on the face of changing social forces became futile and inefficient. The emergence of the postmodern identity is the declaration of vanishing of these efforts of the modern individual to establish a stable and coherent biographical story. Postmodern identity of late-capitalist society is composed of flexible, easily changeable, and fragmentary choices. The market rationality of the last-capitalism is also salient in the formation of identities by reducing the biographical endeavour of modernity into a game of selecting among different choices in the market of identities. *"Postmodern identity is constituted theatrically through role-playing and image construction. While the locus of modern identity revolved around one's occupation, one's function in the public sphere (or family), postmodern identity revolves around leisure, centred on looks, images, and consumption. Modern identity was a serious affair involving fundamental choices that defined who one was (profession, family, political identifications, etc.), while postmodern identity is a function of leisure and is grounded in play, in gamesmanship."*²⁷² The capability of the individual to develop a coherent and continuous biographical story extending from past to future has been eroded at a great extent. The political affiliations and opinions, friend groups, romantic commitments, educational and professional preferences lose their determinant positions in identity formation, because they do not constitute fixed

²⁷¹ Douglas Kellner, "Popular Culture and the Construction of Postmodern Identities", **Modernity & Identity**, ed.by Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 143.

²⁷² **Ibid.**, p. 153.

points in the individual's life. The course of life is determined and shaped in the instantaneity of the moment according to the necessities of the events.

Instead of “the temporalisation of life” in classical modernity, post-modernity is identified with “the temporalisation of time” which means that “*the duration, sequence, rhythm, and tempo actions, events, and relationships are first decided in the course of their execution, that is, within time itself. They no longer follow a predefined time schedule.*”²⁷³ So, the life course of the individual in the late-capitalism is defined by the dominance of the moments, contrary to the predefined schedule of the life expectations and projects in the classical modernity. Thus, the temporalisation of time does not allow the individual to develop a life-time project for a meaningful biographical story. Following up a coherent life trajectory becomes both meaningless and unattainable among the demands of the instantaneous events. The post-modern individual should be flexible and malleable, and easily adoptable to the changing necessities of life. In this event-oriented life, it is not possible to have predefined goals and projects to be followed all through the life.

Since under the compulsions of the society of acceleration the idea of an identity oriented toward the long-term realisation has faded away, the individual has to found his/her identity according to the changes of the situational events. As a result of this situationality, the post-modern condition produces a situational identity changing according to the moments, events and situations without any attachment to specific coordinates in life. The situational identity does not recognise any effort to search for a place in life for the individual by connecting the episodes of life, past, present and future become completely detached from each other. In this fragmented temporal ground, a biographical coherence is both unrealisable and undesirable.

G - The Detemporalisation of History and the Presentism

The situational identity rises upon the “condition of immediacy” produced by the accelerative character of late-capitalism. The condition of immediacy refers to “[...] *ideas of a culture of instantaneity- a culture accustomed to rapid delivery, ubiquitous availability and the instant gratification of desires. And of course*

²⁷³ Rosa, **op. cit.**, p. 233.

underpinning this, an economy and an associated work culture geared not just to sustaining but constantly increasing this tempo of life."²⁷⁴ Apart from the changing conditions of production and work, expansion of flexibility and precarity, the most important factor leading to the condition of immediacy is the "telemediatisation of culture" which refers to the increasing significance of electronic communications and media systems in the composition of everyday life and experience. Watching television, typing, clicking, scrolling, browsing at the computer, talking, texting, playing on a mobile phone, loving, missing, desiring through the phone or computer screens, shopping, travelling, cheating through the cyber space, etc., create a different terrain of cultural practices. These telemediated activities are integrated into the flow of the everyday life, and experienced alongside the face to face activities.

The media and associative telemediated activities are in the centre of the condition of immediacy. Because by dissolving the temporal and spatial barriers between the established limits of identities, they elicit a different temporal structure where the dimensions of time, past, present and future interrelate to each other in a different way than before. The modern temporality, which is also accompanied by a spatial separation of here and elsewhere, denotes localities in which the stable identities can be developed, be means of placing individual in a certain time and space. The modern temporality, as Koselleck aptly described, was based on a specific separation of the temporal dimensions, past, present and future, to provide the modern individual with a certain place in the temporal/historical plane. The temporal gap between past, present and future is a indispensable feature of modernity, because the modern sense of history and the future projections can only rise upon the certain differentiation between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation.

The power of the communication technology makes the temporal structure of the post-modern world different than that of the previous generations. It is not possible any longer to feel the same sensation of Marcel Proust when he remembered his childhood in Combray. Proust, Woolf or Joyce, they were trying to establish a different temporal structure which was quite personal in the midst of the public temporality of modern life, theirs was an effort to capture the eternal moments within the floating time. However, today, the temporality of the late-capitalism as the public

²⁷⁴ Tomlinson, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

time frame is penetrating into the personal imagination and into the shadiest corners of the private sphere of the individual. The immediacy created by the ever increasing speed of the late capitalist economic structure and its cultural and social correlative the post-modern society does not allow to a little pause to reflect upon the substantial parameters necessary to form a stable identity. Under the pressure of the high speed society, the individual of the post-modern society has to resort to what Hassan calls the “abbreviated thinking”: *“This is to think and act quickly because the pressure of social acceleration compels one to do so. As a result, the time needed to think critically and reflectively, the time needed to understand an issue or problem or subject, is reduced through the combination of information overload and speed.”*²⁷⁵ And this abbreviated thinking is not strictly limited to the inhabitants of the cyber space, but is something affecting the whole world through the interconnected networking of the world, and its socio-economic processes. The sense of temporal immediacy surrounds the daily life from all corners of life, and forces us to be integrated into its orbit, because remaining outside this temporal structure means to be culturally, economically and socially dead.

If the condition of immediacy means the instant gratification of the desires and needs, the constant and instantaneous interaction with the world, and the struggle for catching up the latest, then the present emerges as the dominant tense of the temporal structure of today’s society. François Hartog defines this characteristic as the “presentism”²⁷⁶ which can be defined as the thickening and shrinkage of present at the same time in comparison to past and future. Thickening of the present, because it pervades and determines all the structures of the society, the sense of “now” becomes the predominant ground of social interactions and individual existence, so the present appears as a long and continuous moment devouring the other temporal dimensions. Shrinkage of the present, since the life changes in rapid speed, nothing seems durable in the instantaneity of the present, this is what Herman Lübbe calls *“the contraction of present.”*²⁷⁷ The presentism produced a certain type of individual that Zaki Laïdi names as *“l’homme-présent”*: *“Le présent a cessé d’être une brèche entre le passé et*

²⁷⁵ Hassan, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

²⁷⁶ François Hartog, *Régimes d’Historicité: Présentisme et Expérience du Temps*, Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2012.

²⁷⁷ Hermann Lübbe, “The Contraction of the Present”, *High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity*, ed. by Hartmut Rosa and William E. Scheuerman, University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2009, p. 159-178.

l'avenir. Il s'apparente désormais à une nasse décidée à s'affranchir symétriquement de ces deux bornes du temps. Le présent veut et prétend se suffire à lui-même. Il construit de sa genèse comme de son épanouissement. C'est sur cette nasse d'un temps présent autosuffisant qu'il faut porter de notre regard. Car c'est là que se loge le nouveau locataire du temps : l'homme-présent. Sa condition est frappée du sceau de l'incertitude, d'une part parce que la jeunesse de sa condition l'expose aux fragilités d'une nouvelles vie, d'autre part parce que l'autarcie temporelle traduit un refus nécessairement inquiet de l'idée de liaison. L'autarcie renvoie toujours à un acte de déliaison, à une volonté de rupture avec l'autre, que cet autre soit une communauté, une histoire ou un récit."²⁷⁸ This temporal autarchy rising upon the present destroys the temporal distance between temporal dimensions as the basis of the modern temporality. In modernity, the distance opening between the past and the present transformed the past into foreign land to be discovered, and this led to the emergence of the modern sense of history. And since the modern man began to see the past as different from today, then the future also began to be seen as a space full of hopes and expectations, for it could be as different as the past and the present. Although the old style utopias, such as *Utopia* of Thomas More, or *Civitas Solis* of Tommaso Campanella was depicting imagined ideal communities in spatially and geographically different places in contemporaneous time, the modernity placed the expectations and hopes in the future which was pregnant with the rejuvenating force of the new. However, the autarchic temporality of the presentism devastated the future oriented hopes and expectations by eliminating the temporal distance between past, present and future. All wants, desires and expectations of *l'homme present* have to be satisfied within the immediacy of the instantaneous moment. In the condition of immediacy, all the temporal dimensions collapse over the single temporal plane of the present. While the present moment turns into past instantaneously, it fades away into the abyss of oblivion as a result of the immense acceleration of life. Although this portrayal seems quite metaphorical and abstract in its constitution, the fugitive character of the ephemerality of the present is everywhere, epitomised in the chronic forgetfulness as a result of the heavy overload of the present moment with images, events, occasions and news.

²⁷⁸ Laïdi, *Le Sacre du...*, p. 101.

This quick death of the present moment through the accelerative force of the pace of life creates a myopic look over the past, since the past is too near but at the same time too far, it is in our hands in a moment but slips away to thousands years away. So, the temporal distance necessary for critical thinking and contemplation over the past to connect it to the present and to the future is getting blurred and slithery. While the past is tumbling down rapidly off the chasm of the oblivion, the future also becomes a distant and dark threatening obscurity: “[...] *le présent s’est trouvé marqué par l’expérience de la crise de l’avenir, avec ses doutes sur le progrès et un futur perçu comme menace. Le futur ne disparaît pas, nullement, mais il apparaît obscur et menaçant.*”²⁷⁹ The modern individual who was envisaged as a subject capable of changing and shaping his/her world is replaced with the politically indifferent and socially apathic individual of the post-modern times. The future, just like the past, is crushed by the juggernaut of the presentism.

The pervasive powerlessness and pessimism regarding the future is quite salient in the perspectives of the “end of history” and “*posthistoire*”. Although the end of history debates can be traced back to the claims of Daniel Bell about the end of ideologies in the 1960’s, Francis Fukuyama’s well-known work *The End of History and the Last Man* rekindled the debate during the 1990s. For Fukuyama, the liberal democracy came out as the winner from the war of ideologies and regimes of the cold war era after the collapse of the Soviet Block. This triumph of the liberal democracy proves that it is the best ideology and regime for the whole humanity. Since the history evolves and develops along a dialectical relationship between different ideologies and perspectives according to Hegel, Fukuyama asserts that the history came to an end because there is no rival to liberal democracy any longer: “*We who live in stable, long-standing liberal democracies face an unusual situation. In our grandparents’ time, many reasonable people could foresee a radiant socialist future in which private property and capitalism had been abolished, and in which politics itself was somehow overcome. Today, by contrast, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially **democratic and capitalist**. Within that framework, of course, many things could be improved: we could house the homeless, guarantee opportunity for minorities, and women, improve competitiveness, and create new jobs. We can also imagine future*

²⁷⁹ Hartog, **op.cit.**, p.261.

*worlds, that are significantly worse than what we know now, in which national, racial, or religious intolerance makes a comeback, or in which we are overwhelmed by war or environmental collapse. But we cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from **the present one**, and at the same time better. Other, less reflective ages also thought of themselves as the best, but we arrive at this conclusion exhausted, as it were, from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than liberal democracy.”*²⁸⁰ Fukuyama’s assertion about the triumphal position of liberal democracy as the final form of the development of the human society seems quite bizarre especially in a period where the liberal democracy was in decline. However, this strange assertion can be demystified, if it is known what Fukuyama means by liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, in Fukuyama’s language, means a formal, minimal and procedural democracy rather than a substantial liberal democracy as the political ideal of the western societies, stemming from the ideals of the Enlightenment. In fact, when Fukuyama talks about liberal democracy, he implies free-market neo-liberal economic structure. Evidently, this is not an unconscious *lapsus linguae*, but an ideological mystification. For example, his equation liberal democracy with capitalism reveals itself in his analysis of the problems of democracy in developing countries. He claims that the problems of the developing nations do not result from the inequalities of capitalist development, but rather from the lack of capitalism: *“These new, democratically elected leaders started from the premise that underdevelopment was not due to the inherent inequities of capitalism, but rather to the insufficient degree of capitalism that had been practiced in their countries in the past. Privatization and free trade have become the new watchwords in place of nationalization and import substitution.”*²⁸¹ In Fukuyama’s terminology, the triumph of liberal democracy, in fact, means the victory of free-market neo-liberal structuring diffusing all around the world. So, for Fukuyama, this globalisation of the neo-liberal economy is the final and ultimate achievement of the humanity, and there is no way going beyond it, it is the end of history of the human development.

Fukuyama’s the end of history thesis is a sort of revised version of modernisation theory which fell from grace during the 1970s, he declared that

²⁸⁰ Francis Fukuyama, **The End of History and the Last Man**, NewYork: The Free Press, 1992, p. 46.

²⁸¹ **Ibid.**, p. 42.

ultimate aim of the modernisation theory as the teleological development of all humanity towards an American style capitalistic society has been finally realised with the end of the cold-war. For Fukuyama, this is the end of history, and of course this does not mean that there will be a complete silent and emptiness in society. From this point onwards there are only events arising out of the births, deaths and social interactions of humankind²⁸², but real historical changes or transformations will vanish completely from the horizon of the humanity, because there is no need for such changes any longer. Since there will be no change or struggle for the betterment of the human life – since the present condition is the best of all possible worlds –, the result would probably be a constant boredom of humanity. Although the Fukuyama's the end of history thesis seems as a fantasy of a scholar about a certain period, it actually embodies the general outlook of the neo-liberal / neo-conservative ideological apparatus regarding the history and its relation to society. The general feeling of stillness and temporal imprisonment collapsing upon the humankind leaving no imagination and expectation for the future became embedded in the tiniest cells of society.

The temporal autarchy of the presentism based on the “contraction of present” (Lübbe), or “eternal present” (Robins and Webster)²⁸³, or “hyper now” (Hassan) undermines the relations of the individual and the society with past and future. *“History and the past take time to research and to reflect on for their patterns and possible lessons, but time compression and acceleration render these less relevant to a logic that clamours for immediacy. In a live-coverage society with no future and no past, and where alternatives to what immediately confront us seem difficult to imagine or impossible to achieve [...] When past and future cease to be strong anchors on which one's subjectivity is tied, then the sense of one's life as an ongoing and coherent narrative project becomes more difficult to imagine and sustain. Social acceleration acts to lock us into a temporal postmodernity that is present-oriented.”*²⁸⁴ While future appears as a bleak territory which promises nothing but catastrophe²⁸⁵, past loses the historical distance and perspective - the fundamental

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁸³ Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, **Times of the Technoculture: From the Information Society to the Virtual Life**, London: Routledge, 1999.

²⁸⁴ Hassan, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

²⁸⁵ Susan Buck-Morss, in her work “Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West”, explains that modern expectations, and utopias about future contained both the creative force to reach a dreamworld in the future, and also the manipulation of these dreams for the

pillars of the modern sense of history – as a result of the collapse of the modern temporality. The accelerative force created by the neo-liberal economic structure and the telemediatised culture destroyed the position of history as a nexus connecting the past to the present in which the biographical narrative of the modern individual and society is established.²⁸⁶ So, if the modern sense of history has lost its predominance within the late-capitalist society, then what will be the place of the past in this post-modern cultural ground?

The historicism of the nineteenth century rose upon the claim that every social phenomenon is a product of its historical context, thus the existing social structures should only be understood through references to the historical analysis to create a comprehensive picture of life. This is the role attributed to the history by modernity, and the role of a nexus connecting past to future. However, with the erosion of the modern temporal structure, history loses its role as a nexus. Jameson claims that a new form of historicism appears in the post-modern society, and this new historicism effaces history in its modern sense. Although the modern history is losing ground, the past in various forms and shapes is invading every corner of life in post-modern times. On the one hand, there is a deep stream of amnesia stemming from the acceleration and speed; on the other hand there is an insatiable appetite for the past.

The reason for such an appetite for the past in a culture of amnesia is intellectual aimlessness and the imprisonment of the social imagination within the walls of the present moment. For him, the end of history thesis of Fukuyama shows the pervasive blockage of the historical imagination²⁸⁷. And if there is no place to speak from – modernity used to speak from the future -, the only remedy is to resort to the past. In this way, the past is reduced to a mere reserve of styles and images that can be used without historical reference. David Harvey describes this situation as the plunder of history: “*The reduction of experience to ‘a series of pure and unrelated*

control of the masses by the authoritarian powers. She says that the post-modernist theory and post-modern condition approach to the modern utopias with suspicion, and see them as the reflection of authoritarian grand-narratives of modernity. For Buck-Morss, although we absolutely need to criticise the authoritarian use of modern utopias, this totalising approach by post-modernism to modernity leaves no room for imagination for betterment of human life. Susan Buck-Morss, **Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in West and East**, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000, p. xiii- xiv.

²⁸⁶ Ernst Breisach, **On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and Its Aftermath**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

²⁸⁷ Fredric Jameson, **The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998**, London: Verso, 1998, p. 91.

presents' further implies that the experience of the present becomes powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and material: the world comes before the schizophrenic with heightened intensity, bearing the mysterious and oppressive charge of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy. The image, the appearance, the spectacle can all be experienced with intensity (joy or terror) made possible only by their appreciation as pure and unrelated presents in time. So what does it matter if the world thereby momentarily loses its depth and threatens to become a glossy skin, a stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without intensity? The immediacy of events, the sensationalism of the spectacle (political, scientific, military, as well as those of entertainment), become the stuff of which consciousness is forged. Such a breakdown of the temporal order of things also gives rise to a peculiar treatment of the past. Eschewing the idea of progress, postmodernism abandons all sense of historical continuity and memory, while simultaneously developing an incredible ability to plunder history and absorb whatever it finds there as some aspect of the present.”²⁸⁸

The cannibalisation of the past by means of reducing it into mere images and styles also results from expansion of the sphere of culture. In the late-capitalist society, the sphere of culture has expanded and became concordant with the market, so it has lost its place in traditional or experimental forms. Although, the erosion of the old high-low culture distinction of modernity was joyfully applauded as an important step towards democratisation of cultural sphere, at least today the result of such a development is not the democratisation, but the commercialisation of the cultural sphere through the diffusion of market rationality. Thus, the past is also put into circulation in the market as an amalgam of representations of the styles and images.

H - The Surge of Nostalgia

Jameson describes the primary form of engagement with the past today as “nostalgia mode”. The retro style as a part of marketing strategy becomes the fundamental logic behind the postmodern society’s relation to the past. Although the retro style is usually applicable to the images and styles of an immediate past, such as the 70s retro hair styles, or the 50s retro furniture, the retro mentality covers both the immediate and the distant past in postmodern condition. It refers to a reductionism which turns the past into glossy images of stereotypes, interchangeable

²⁸⁸ Harvey, *The Condition...*, p. 54.

surface appearances, and marketable objects. Nostalgia is a sensation rather than a critical position of thinking about the past, and it does not contain any structural coherence suitable to sustain a historical narrative in modern sense. Thus nostalgic sensation is quite consonant with the market forces turning everything into pure sensations to be consumed.

Obviously, nostalgia is not a novel form of sensation. It comes from two Greek roots, *nostos* (return home) and *algia* (longing). But nostalgia, as a word, does not come from the ancient Greece, but from the seventeenth century Switzerland. It was invented to describe the sickness of the Swiss soldiers fighting in foreign armies abroad. It was the name of a medical sickness resulted from the displacement and sentiment of loss, and was believed that it could be cured by opium²⁸⁹. With the demise of the traditional society and the great upheaval of the social status quo as result of modernity, nostalgia became a cardinal form of sensation of the modern individual. Svetlana Boym distinguishes two different types of nostalgia: the restorative and the reflective. *“Restorative nostalgia is at the core of recent national and religious revivals; it knows two main plots the return to origins and the conspiracy. Reflective nostalgia does not follow a single plot but explores ways of inhabiting many places at once and imagining different time zones; it loves details, not symbols. At best, reflective nostalgia can present an ethical and creative challenge, not merely a pretext for midnight melancholias.”*²⁹⁰ Reflective nostalgia is the creative energy radiating from the works of Proust and other modernists. This was not lamentation over the paradise lost, because the reflective nostalgia is aware of the passing time, and remembers the past as a source of contemplation over itself. However, restorative nostalgia is based on the return to origins and the conspiracy which are the most distinctive features of right-wing reactionary populist ideology. The *nostos* in this form of nostalgia does not compose of the memories of the past, but of collective delirium based on a fantasy of establishing a home in the hazy abyss of the past. The conspiracy provides a cultural intimacy based on a primitive distinction between good and evil, and the collective delusion for establishing home in the homogenous intimacy of “us” against “the others” can be sustained through this conspiracy plot. Although the restorative nostalgia has been and is still an integral part of the nationalist politics and discourses, nostalgia has gained a different

²⁸⁹ Svetlana Boym, “Nostalgia and Its Discontents”, *The Hedgehog Review*, Summer 2007, p. 7.

²⁹⁰ Boym, *The Future of...*, p. xviii.

characteristic in recent years. Apart from the fantasies about an imagined home of the origins inculcated by the political discourse of the nationalism, nostalgia acquired a “pop” characteristic by means of the diffusion of market rationality of global capitalism, this is what Boym calls the “global industry of nostalgia”: *“Nostalgic longing was defined by loss of the original object of desire, and by its spatial and temporal displacement. The global entertainment industry of nostalgia is characterized by an excess and complete availability of desirable souvenirs [...] objects of the past are everywhere for sale. The past eagerly cohabits with the present. Americans are supposed to be antihistorical, yet the souvenirization of the past and obsession with roots and identity here are ubiquitous. One could speak about “inculcation of nostalgia” into merchandise as a marketing strategy that tricks consumers into missing what they haven’t lost. Arjun Appadurai defines it as “ersatz nostalgia” or armchair nostalgia, “nostalgia without lived experience or collective historical memory.” Obviously, any nostalgia has a utopian or atopian element, but commercialized nostalgia forces a specific understanding of time. Time is money. The present costs as much as the past. Transience itself is commodified in passing. All artifacts of civilization are made available and disposable through mass reproduction; thus the consumer enjoys both the modern convenience and primitive pleasure of fetish possession. Ersatz nostalgia promoted by the entertainment industry makes everything time-sensitive and exploits that temporal deficit by giving a cure that is also a poison.”*²⁹¹ The commodified, ersatz nostalgia turning the past into a product in the market signify the principal form of engagement with the past in late-capitalism. The post-modern nostalgia erases the temporal distance between the past and the present. The past can be captured through images, objects and styles, so the difference between past and present is flattened out through the images springing out television, internet or movies.

The modern historical narrative, whether it was a critical, social history as in *L’École des Annales*, or the nationalist discourses of the nation-states, aimed to create a biographical story for individuals, communities or nations, along a coherent structure using history as nexus connecting past, present and future. This narrative was based on temporal construction of a story. However, the post-modern temporality which results in the temporalisation of time and detemporalisation of history destroyed the possibility to build such a coherent historical narrative. In this

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41-42.

regard, post-modern, ersatz nostalgia replaces the role of the modern historical narrative. The past is no longer a foreign country, but is ubiquitous, and omnipresent. In modern form of *nostos*, the return to home was an ideal of longing, but today it became a medium for amusement and entertainment. The history, in post-modern times, is reduced into mere visual styles, and the “spectacle of pastness”. The post-modern engagement with the past does not aim to approach the past to capture it whether in a critical or imagined fashion, it aims to produce just a representation of the visual imagery about the past, so it can be claimed that this is not the past, but at best “the effect of pastness”. So this form of engagement with the past is then above all a celebration of styles, consumer items and images associated with the past, as Jameson puts it “*the imaginary style of a real past*”.²⁹² This imaginary style uses the past forms in a repetitive manner, juxtaposing the former styles as is in a display of department store. The past forms and styles become the “empty signifiers”. In Ernesto Laclau’s terms, empty signifier means a signifier without a signified²⁹³. Empty signifiers are based neither on reality nor on a specific signified, they are identified without a specific, or a solid meaning.

I- The New Form of the Engagement with the Past: The Rise of Ottoman Nostalgia in Turkey

As of the 1990s, nostalgia started to be a visible social and cultural phenomenon within the Turkish society. Two competing forms of nostalgic yearning have come to dominate the cultural and political scene: The nostalgia for the early Republican period of the 1930s, and the nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. At first glance, these two forms of nostalgia evoke a quite simple formulation as an explanation: Since the Kemalism as a secular, westernising project was eroded by the rise of Islamism and the Kurdish demands for cultural and political recognition, the weakening position of the old secular elites resulted in such a nostalgia for the early period of the Republic as a glorious past in their imagination. And the rising Islamist identity called the Ottoman past as a ground for the counter-hegemonic cultural politics replacing the old Kemalist discourse. Although such an explanatory

²⁹² Fredric Jameson, **Signatures of the Visible**, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 85.

²⁹³ Ernesto Laclau, **Emancipation(s)**, London: Verso, 2007, p. 36.

framework can illuminate some aspects of the surge of nostalgia in Turkish society, it does not consider the commonalities shared by these two nostalgic aspirations.

At this point, the assertion by Nilüfer Göle, within the framework of her non-western modernisation thesis, regarding the rise of nostalgia for the past perceives the rise of the interest in the past as an effort to find a harmony within society against the authoritarian westernisation erasing the connections of the society with its past. This perspective that can be summarised as the “return of the repressed” became quite fashionable both within the academic milieu and in the larger cultural and political circles. For example, Hakan Yavuz describes the rise of the Islamist identity as an important indicator of the democratisation and liberalisation of the Turkish political structure after the 1980s: *“During the Özal years, the Turkish government came, for the first time, to reflect the diversity and cultural pluralism of the nation as a whole. This new elite, with its more traditional cultural values, threatened the political status and values of the Kemalist elite [...] The politics of Ottoman-Islamic identity function as a form of nationalism to restructure state-society relations. This new Islamism, which motivated by the desire for equality and social justice, struggles for a modern-populist social contract in order to reconstruct the relations between the state and society and therefore to open up more free spaces for expression by marginalized popular groups. In other words, Islamic groups characterize political liberalization in terms of creating alternative spaces for critical discourses and competitive organizations in the context of modern Turkey.”*²⁹⁴ Such perspectives conceive the rise of Islamic identity and its concomitant discourse of neo-Ottomanism as the outcome of the democratising process of a post-Kemalist era where the repressed identities began to find ways to express themselves. Others see the rise of neo-Ottomanism as a critical and democratic movement against the reductionist dichotomies of the Kemalist modernism: *“[Neo-Ottomanism] has two main characteristics: 1) the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past; 2) the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle East countries, but respecting the political boundaries of the countries in the ex-Ottoman space. Both these characteristics of neo-Ottomanism are clearly seen in the efforts of Özal, who emphasized the necessity of constructing a new common cultural identity*

²⁹⁴ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism”, **Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies**, 7:12, 1998, p. 32.

*binding groups with different particular affiliations in Turkey, and who attempted to unify the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, especially by pragmatic and cultural means. But neo-Ottomanism is not an anti-Western, counter hegemonic movement that challenges the universal ideals of the West. It rejects naive dichotomies between the West and the rest, between modernity and tradition, emphasizing political and economic globalization (the prevalence of liberal democracy and free market economy) together with a localized common identity.”*²⁹⁵ So, the picture appearing in these perspectives regarding the neo-Ottomanism of the new Islamism in Turkey is a rosy one which is painted by the democratic forces emerging from the bosom of the society that had been long time repressed by the Kemalist ideology. Neo-Ottomanism, in this perspective, emerges as a genuine confrontation with the past, a sort of a critical search for the real roots of the Turkish that was lobotomised by the Republican modernisation. The return to the Ottoman past was regarded as a more democratising process for establishing a new national history in place of the exclusionary and undemocratic characteristics of the Kemalist official history. This eulogising perspective which is completely ideological in its view on the post-coup period does not take into consideration of the close connection between the political structure of the state and the rise of Islamism in Turkey. The integration of the Islamic elements into the nationalist discourse was not a new phenomenon, since the 1970s the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” had been nurtured in conservative circles (*Aydınlar Ocağı* – Intellectuals’ Hearth) with close connections to the state, and after the 1980 coup d’état this ideological outlook became the official discourse of the state. The Islamic identity was cherished by the military junta and the following civil governments by economic, political and cultural policies such as the introduction of the compulsory courses of religion in the school curriculums, and the immense increase in the number of *İmam Hatip* schools (High schools of theology) all over the country. Moreover, as previously discussed, the introduction of neo-liberal policies and the rise of the neo-conservative ideology taking the Islamic values into its centre were the cardinal developments that shaped the post-1980 Turkey. In this sense, describing one of the most authoritarian periods as a period of democratisation and political liberalisation is should be considered as a blind analysis, and regarding the Islamist movement as a part of this so-called democratising process misses the authoritarian and reactionary roots of this movement. Consequently, the neo-

²⁹⁵ Yılmaz Çolak, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42: 4, 2006, p. 588.

Ottoman aspirations of the new Islamism, contrary to the claims of Göle, Yavuz and Çolak, cannot be regarded as a genuine way of dealing with the past, but rather a new form of colonisation of the past by means of a political and cultural vehicle of combined forces of the politics and the market.

Apart from these celebratory views, another perspective regarding the rise of neo-Ottomanism comes from a more critical and analytical explanatory framework. This perspective considers the neo-Ottomanism as an attempt to establish a new historical narrative- but this time not democratic, and not pluralistic or liberalising- just as the Kemalist historical narrative was. It is just another authoritative, modern form of nationalistic narrative with different historical references. For example, Alev Çınar, in her essay on the commemoration of the Conquest of Istanbul, states that: “[...] *the unofficial commemoration of the Conquest of Istanbul on may 29 by Islamist circles in Turkey, whose large-scale demonstrations and parades celebrate an alternative history that contests secular Turkish national history. May 29 celebrations do not only glorify the Ottoman past, but also make a connection between the conquest of Istanbul and a prophecy made by the Muslim prophet Mohammed, thereby making the event a part of Islamic history as well. I argue that these Islamist performances of history serve to construct an alternative national identity which is Ottoman and Islamic, evoking a civilization centered in the city of Istanbul, as opposed to the secular, modern Turkish Republic centered in the capital city of Ankara [...] It undermines secularist conceptions of the modern nation-state, and calls into question the official date of the founding of the Turkish nation, set as October 29, 1923.*”²⁹⁶ Çınar describes the commemoration of the Conquest of Istanbul as an attempt to establish a new “founding moment” for the national history. 29 may 1453 as the new founding moment of the national history provides the national identity with a new reference point connecting it to the past instead of October 29. This perspective has an important explanatory power for describing the change and transformation in the discourse of national history, and its effects on the national identity formation, it misses significant features of this process by defining it without any consideration for temporal change. For Çınar, the national history construction in the 1920s and 30s, and the one in the 1990s and 2000s should be considered in the same analytical ground, as if nothing has changed during this time

²⁹⁶ Alev Çınar, “National History as a Contested Site: The Conquest of Istanbul and Islamist Negotiations of the Nation”, **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, vol. 43, issue 02, April 2001, p. 365.

period. So, the change in the founding moment of the historical discourse of the national identity is a straightforward shift from a moment in history to another one. The building of national identity, the formation of national history, and the invention of tradition within the national narrative still keep their importance in the explanation and theories of the nationalism, however there are novel forms of social, economic, cultural and political factors influencing the emergence and transformation of nationalism. Juxtaposing an early twentieth century nation building with a twenty-first century nationalism, in this regard, avoids taking these factors into consideration, because both the continuities and changes should be emphasised.

As Hartmut Rosa states the classical nation with its centralised economic political and cultural mechanism is too slow to catch up the accelerative forces of the late-capitalist society: *“The state and the military represent immensely powerful, historically central factors of acceleration that performed a decisive “maieutic” function for the birth of the modern dynamic of escalation and the development of corresponding temporal practices. However, [...] all the other “classical modern” institutions: in late modernity they are threatened with erosion by the very forces of acceleration they set free because their functioning and their own intrinsic forms of stability have gone from being accelerators to being brakes or hindrances to speed.”*²⁹⁷ The nation states of the first half the twentieth century, and their respective ideological and historical discourses face a different set of economic, cultural and political structures and values at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This does not mean that nation states has lost their power in terms of their monopoly over the authoritative use of force, and over shaping the political institutions, however at this phase of history they are much more factors other than the centralised power of the nation state influencing the societal formation than a century ago.

The Turkish nation state is still there with its authoritarian political structure, and the reactionary modernism is now much more fortified than before as a result of the more fertile ground provided by global neo-liberal / neo-conservative alliance. However, the national identity and the national discourse of history are being transformed, and this transformation is not solely structured by means of the state’s ideological apparatus. The erosion of the Kemalist official history, and the emergence of another form of historical discourse based on the Ottoman aspirations

²⁹⁷ Rosa, **op.cit.**, p. 195.

are facilitated by the coalition of different social, economic and cultural factors. The state institutions of the Kemalist Republican period as the only appointed actors for shaping the official history and the moulding the ideal citizen with a historical conscious in line with the official catechism are not the only players in the ground any longer. The integration of the Turkish society into the global neo-liberal economic structure, the rise of the market forces, emergence of a new urban class, the rise of the neo-conservative policies centred upon the Islamic values and life styles, the changes in the international political environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they all contributed into the formation of a novel structure of societal formation in Turkey. So, the engagement of the society with the past also developed and gained a different and new character as a result of the emergence of these forces.

The “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as the official ideological discourse of the military regime of the 1980 coup became embedded in the cultural policies of the state during the period following the coup. In fact, this perspective was a continuation of the fundamental characteristics of the Kemalist official discourse of history. The predominance of the state as the head of the organic unity of the nation, the importance of militarism as the pivotal force for the maintenance of the social cohesion, and the traditional distinction between the western civilisation and the Turkish culture were also the cardinal points in the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as they were in the Kemalist discourse. However, with the changing conditions of the cold war years, and with the rise of the leftist ideologies, and the social movements in the Turkish society, the conservative elements became to be more profoundly emphasised in the official discourse. And after the 1980 coup, these conservative elements such as the deeper accentuation upon the Islamic values and the Ottoman past became intertwined with a cult of Atatürk, constituting an amalgam of the historical narrative with references to the Turkish heroisms and successive around the Islamic values and a hero-worship based on a single-man cult, known as *Atatürkism* (Atatürkçülük). As the basis of the politico-cultural structure, the elements within the *Atatürkism* became the subject matter of the contestation of different segments of the society, while the Ottoman-Islamic elements were favoured by the rising Islamist movement, the cult of Atatürk was put into the centre of ideological discourse of the Kemalist Laicists, although the central features of militarism, the predominance of the state over the rights and freedoms of the individual, a thin definition of democracy were the common parameters.

As Çınar pointed out, the national history, then, became a field of contestation between Islamists and Kemalists as two main segments of the society, however this contestation takes place in a ground where the old framework of the discourse of national history as demarcated by the language of the state no longer works. The nostalgic language appears as a new form engagement with the past replacing the strictly controlled official language of the state.

The Republican ideology aimed to create a rather sterile public space in terms of the references with historical connotations. The official discourse of history was mainly based on the commemoration of the present tense, and the newness of the Republican regime, as can be seen in the celebrations and commemorations of important dates such as April 23, May 19 or October 29. These dates covered a period from 1919 to 1923, and were still fresh and living memories of the generations following the establishment of the Republic. And the discourse of history indoctrinated in schools and performed in the stadiums used to emphasise this newness of the regime. Apart from the repetitive forms of Atatürk monuments and busts that could be seen almost in every square of every town and in every public office, the historical references in the public space were quite rare. The visibility of the Ottoman past was also very much determined by this official discourse as can be seen in the visualisation of this past on the movie screens during the 1950s. However, especially during the last decade, the Ottoman past became quite visible from architecture, TV screens, movies, public demonstrations, and political discourses to home decorations, paraphernalia and fashion. So, the history overflows off the limits of the traditional area drawn by the official ideology.

In this respect, the transition experienced in the engagement with the past should be evaluated at two levels: 1) The increasing emphasis on the distant past of the Ottoman Empire in the education and the political discourse of the state. 2) The rise of the interest in the Ottoman past at the level of the general public where this interest is very much shaped by the concerns of the market. Although these two levels seem to belong to two different analytical grounds of temporality, the first one is very much determined by the modern temporal structure of the nation-state, and the other one is much more open to the post-modern temporality of the market, in fact they both are affected by the nostalgic fever created by the post-modern sense of history. The reduction of the history into a reserve of mere signs, styles and empty

references that can be used interchangeably in place for one another, the visualisation of the political scene with the help of the “effect of the pastness”, and the appearance of the consumer items and commodities evoking and carrying the sensation of the past became the common denominators of the engagement of the political structure and the general public with the past.

The architecture appears as one of the most important areas where this surge of nostalgic engagement with the past can be seen in its various forms, as Jameson claims: *“Of all arts, architecture is the closest constitutively to the economic, with which, in the form of commissions and land values, it has virtually unmediated relationship. It will therefore not be surprising to find the extraordinary flowering of the new postmodern architecture grounded in the patronage of multinational business, whose expansion and development is strictly contemporaneous with it.”*²⁹⁸ So, the special characteristic of the architecture as both an expressive form and an economic venture tightly linked to the market makes it quite a revealing surface reflecting the nostalgia mode in Turkey.

The ambivalent character of the nation building process as on the one hand emphasising the inherent characteristic of the nation defined as the *innerlichkeit* of the Turkishness, on the other hand accentuating upon the newness of the nation-state rising on the edge separating it from the Ottoman period was also visible in the cultural politics of the new Republican regime. In the field of architecture, modernism provided the regime with a convenient solution both to display the newness of the regime with its aspirations to catch up the level of the Western civilisation, and also to create a clean slate untainted by the Ottoman past. Architectural historian Sibel Bozdoğan explains the reasons behind this modernist adaptation: *“With its predilection for social engineering and top-to-bottom modernization and its self-declared revolutionary premises, the Kemalist regime embraced the high modernist faith as one of its founding ideologies. The architectural culture of the early Turkish republic amply illustrates how high modernism as an ideology appealed particularly to ‘planners, engineers, architects, scientists and technicians’ who ‘wanted to use state power to bring about huge, utopian changes in people’s work habits, living patterns, moral conduct and worldview.’ Modern architecture was imported as both a visible symbol and effective*

²⁹⁸ Jameson, **Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic...**, p. 5.

instrument of this radical program to create a thoroughly Westernized, modern, and a secular new nation dissociated from the country's own Ottoman and Islamic past. In this respect, architecture in early republican Turkey can be looked at as a literally 'concrete' manifestation of the high modernist vision."²⁹⁹ This embrace of the modernist architecture by the Republican regime exerted its influence over the architectural production over a long time during the history of the Turkish republic. However, with the 1980s, Turkish landscape began to encounter another form of architectural language with its emphasis on playful coexistence of different styles, the references to past forms and the predominance of ornamental signs with empty allusions.

Post-modern architecture entered into the language and the production of the architecture after the neo-liberal structuring of the Turkish economy during the 1980s. The commodification of the culture and the rise of the consumer society affected the nature of the architecture, and also transformed its stance regarding the past and history. *"Since the 1980s, particularistic discourses of identity and difference have irreversibly undone the earlier republican certainties regarding modernization theories and homogenous nation-states. The official ideology, cultural norms and mental habits of the old republican elite, as well as of the traditional left, have been challenged in unprecedented ways by groups ranging from liberals, feminists and civil society advocates to Kurdish activists and Islamists. In all expressions of culture (from art and architecture to literature, music and cinema) the austerity, paternalism and universalistic claims of official republican modernism have been challenged by a plurality of postmodern stylistic experiments and by diverse expressions of popular culture, such as incorporation of vernacular and historical references in architecture..."*³⁰⁰ The appetite for the styles and forms began to appear in the architectural field with the 1980s in Turkey. This development was very much in line with the Jameson's observation about the return of the same in the temporal deadlock of the presentism. If there is nothing left for imagination, then the only way to produce the "new" is to repeat the same borrowed from the past. So, discussions about the possibilities of the modernist architecture in the previous generations of the architects left their place to the discussions and productions of the

²⁹⁹ Sibel Bozdoğan, **Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic**, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, p. 6.

³⁰⁰ Sibel Bozdoğan and Esra Akcan, **Turkey: Modern Architectures in History**, London: Reaktionbooks, 2012, p. 204.

eclectic historicism based on the so-called Turkish vernacular or the Ottoman architecture.

After the 1980s, with the help of the virtual media, and the architectural press, the post-modern examples inspired by the nostalgic sensationalism became widespread in Turkey. The preliminary examples for such nostalgia appeared in the upper class gated-community enclaves. This gives an important clue about the close connection between the neo-liberal market economy and post-modern values, since the upper class and the upper middle class were the first ones having the initial contact with the new market economy was. Various apartment housing plans and residential areas were developed according to demands of the market values with eclectic references to traditional Turkish housing style. For instance, *Konak*, the Turkish word meaning a large single-family house in Turkish vernacular architecture especially of the Ottoman period began to be used to designate the privileged status of the dwellers of gated-communities such as *Kemer Country Konaks* built between 1996-1997. *Kemer Country Konaks* were designed and planned according to the housing style of the ancient Ottoman town Safranbolu which is considered as the best preserved example of the Ottoman vernacular architecture. Kemer Country is planned to evoke the nostalgic feeling of living in a traditional *mahalle* (neighbourhood) composed of traditional houses. However, in terms of architectural design and structure, the *Kemer Country Konaks* have only ornamental and stylistic points in common with the original examples in Safranbolu such as projecting bays (*cumba*), wide roofs (*saçak*) and round tiles.³⁰¹ In the official site of the Kemer Country, cohabitation of the nostalgic consumption of the past and the latest style of comfort offered in the market is presented as: “*While the windows with cumbas, ornaments, and carved stones on façades of the konak houses reflect the traditional Turkish architecture, the internal architecture displays the best features of the modern life style [...] These konaks are, in every sense of the word, “a complex of privileges.”*”³⁰² There is also a *kasır* (Picture 4.4)- Turkish word to designate the large mansions especially for royal use or the other high-ranking state officials- in *Kemer Country*, which is composed of 28 houses. The *kasır* complex is connected to the nostalgic language of the project through a tower which was built in the style of the *Adalet Kasrı* (Picture 4.5), the only remaining part of the old Edirne Palace.

³⁰¹ Nuray Ozaslan and Aysu Akalın, “Architecture and Image: The Example of Turkey”, **Middle Eastern Studies**, 47:6, 2011, p. 916.

³⁰² <http://www.kemercountry.com/tr/living/mahalleler/mahalleler-living>

Picture 4.4: Lale Kasrı, Kemer Country



Picture 4.5: Adalet Kasrı, Edirne



Picture 4.6: Kemerköşk Houses, Kemer Country



As can be seen in these examples, the past is summoned to invoke a “sense of pastness” through the collage of the architectural forms and styles of the past. So, the past is reduced to a form of commodity that can be sold because of its historical qualities providing the upper middle class with a sense of living a privileged life (Picture 4.6). The past is invoked through certain names such as *cumba*, *saçak*, *avlu*, or *muqarnas* (honeycomb-like units used as a decorative device in Ottoman architecture), this is what Jameson defines as: “*[The cultural production in post-modernity] can no longer gaze directly on some putative real world, at some reconstruction of a past history which was once itself a present; rather, as in Plato’s cave, it must trace our mental images of that past upon its confining walls [...] we are condemned to seek History by way of our own pop images and simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of reach.*”³⁰³ The reduction of the past to mere names and to the forms and styles denoted by these names creates a depthless and flat ground of engagement with the past. The heaps of fragments and the random selection of fragmentary and disconnected pieces becomes the only nexus conveying the past to the present.

³⁰³ Jameson, **Postmodernism or, the Cultural...**, p. 25.

The appetite for “historicist” post-modern architecture was especially visible in the tourism industry, because the connection between the post-modern temporal structure, its concomitant way of engagement with the past and the forces of the market is much more salient and direct in the tourism sector than any other part of the social life. The use of the past elements particularly in ornaments of the buildings with the purpose of conveying a sense of pseudohistorical feeling can be considered from framework of the concept of “disneyfication” which denotes the bowdlerisation of literature, myth and history in a simplified, sentimentalised way, a process of sanitising culture and history.³⁰⁴ The sanitisation of history through summoning the fragmentary pieces of the past in a playful and unthreatening context creates a sensation of the past as if in a Disney wonderland, and this effect was what Venturi wanted to create in post-modern architecture in which the sings and illusions of the entertainment industry are mirrored. In this regard, the disneyfication is the process of creating the sense of hyperreality and search of authenticity in the absence of reality and authenticity. In the American context, Umberto Eco defines this search for reality and authenticity as the search for the “completely fake” : *“there is a constant in the average American imagination and taste, for which the past must be preserved and celebrated in full-scale authentic copy; a philosophy of immortality as duplication. It dominates the relation with the self, with the past... To speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these things must seem real. The ‘completely real’ becomes identified with the ‘completely fake’. Absolute unreality is offered as a real presence... the sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference, the mechanism of replacement...the philosophy is not ‘We are giving you the reproduction so that you will want the original,’ but rather, ‘We are giving you the reproduction so you will no longer feel any need for the original.’ But for the reproduction to be desired, the original has to be idolized...”*³⁰⁵ The connection between the past and present is completely broken, because the distance between these two temporal realms no longer exists. The past turns into a very large reserve of all the things have happened previously, so the temporal distance which identifies these things of the past in a historical perspective collapses upon the eternal present. The past emerges in the form images signifying the idolised moments, monuments or individuals. In this sense, post-modern historicism in architecture as epitomised in

³⁰⁴ Alan Bryman, **The Disneyization of Society**, London: Sage Publications, 2004, p. 5.

³⁰⁵ Umberto Eco, **Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality**, trans. by William Weaver, London: Vintage, p. 6, 7, 19.

Las Vegas becomes the embodiment of the novel form of engagement with the past (Picture 4.7). The search of authenticity and reality leads to the condition of “staged authenticity”³⁰⁶ in which the stereotypes pertaining to the past are staged or performed to create a feeling of authenticity or reality. However, this authenticity is a display of the copy whose original copy has never existed.

The theorists of the post-modern architecture, such Venturi and Jencks, claim that the historicist approach in the post-modern architecture is a parodic challenge in a playful manner to the aridness and seriousness of the high-modernist architecture. For them, the post-modern architecture should be aware of the irony and parody in its language, however this parody or irony turns into a quite serious business when this parody is succumbed by the market forces into a commodified cultural terrain that aims to create the sense of reality and authenticity. For example, many hotels have bloomed in the touristic resorts in Turkey since 1990s in historicist post-modern style, and they claim to offer the real authentic experience created by their historical space. One of the pioneers, WOW hotels presents its Topkapı Palace Hotel in Antalya (Pictures 4.8 and 4.9) which was designed as a replica of the Topkapı Palace as: *“Are you one of the people who has realised what it means to live in the ages of great Ottoman architecture while making a journey through the history? You can be assured that WOW Topkapi Palace (inspired by the great Topkapı Palace in Istanbul) will let you feel those emotions. When you enter Topkapı Palace, you will stay in the Harem, have your food from the great Palace Kitchens and Hagia Irini, drink your tasteful wine at the Justice Tower, taste your delicious Turkish desert flavoured rosewater at Mecidiye Chalet.”*³⁰⁷ In the third sentence, the Topkapı Palace replica replaces the real Topkapı Palace, it presents itself as the true experience of living in an Ottoman palace without sacrificing the contemporary pleasures of life. This architectural formula of the post-modernism aims to create a pseudohistorical depth, in which the history of aesthetic styles displaces “real” history.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ The concept of “staged authenticity” is introduced by Dean MacCannell in his analysis of the touristic experience. The concept refers to the staged quality of the certain touristic experience which craves for the consumption of the supposedly authentic features of the visited space, seen object, or experienced occasion. For MacCannell, the staged authenticity lends the touristic experience an aura of superficiality, albeit a superficiality not always perceived as such by the tourist. Dean MacCannell, **The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class**, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 91-107.

³⁰⁷ <http://www.wowhotels.com/Topkapi-Palace/>

³⁰⁸ Jameson, **Postmodernism or, the Cultural...**, p. 20.

Picture 4.7: The Venetian Hotel, Las Vegas



Picture 4.8: The WOW Topkapi Palace Hotel



Picture 4.9: The WOW Topkapi Palace Hotel



During the 2000s, under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the historicist post-modern style in architecture became the official architectural form promoted by the state. The appropriation of the historicist post-modern architecture by the state from the realm of the free-market, as presented in the Kemer Country Houses and the touristic hotels, can illuminate the nature of the Ottoman nostalgia promoted by the hands of the state. The claims about the introduction of Ottoman nostalgia by the AKP to restructure the nation in a new ideological basis with certain references to the Ottoman-Islamic identity are based on the dual formula of the Kemalist nation building and the Islamist nation building. It is true that the AKP rule of the last fifteen years aimed to transform some basic premises of the Turkish society, and the outcomes of such a transformation in politics and daily life are visible from the Islamisation of the political discourse, the increasing emphasis on the Islamic values in political and cultural spheres to pervasive conservatism in daily life. However, seeing the policies of the AKP as the counterpart of the Kemalist nation-building project misses important differences. While the Kemalist modernisation project and nation-building process was dominated by the presence of the state as the sole moulder and mobiliser of the social transformation, the Islamist government of today's Turkey works in a completely different economic, political and cultural structure where different forces pose their influence. The attempt of the AKP rule to transform the social, political and cultural structure has to take place within a completely different historical and temporal structure than the Kemalist attempt; therefore it consequently produces a different landscape rising over a different topography. AKP rule can be understood through a consideration of the previous period preparing the hegemony of the neo-liberal / neo-conservative alliance in Turkey after the 1980 coup. The opening of the economy, the integration of the Turkish society en masse into the global neo-liberal ideology, the proliferation of the communication technologies, the boom of the media organs, the moral and ideological ground for the neo-liberal economic policies prepared by the neo-conservative discourse of the Islamism, all these factors created a novel form of social, political and cultural ground where the venture of forming a new national identity bears the stamp of these factors. So, the discourse of the neo-Ottomanism as an attempt to bolster a novel form of identity are also influenced and shaped by the *zeitgeist* of the late-capitalist society which is characterised by the detemporalisation of the history. Both the growing interest towards the Ottoman Past in society and the

AKP's project for establishing a political and cultural discourse with the references to the Ottoman past operate within these novel conditions produced by the changes and transformations that the Turkish society has been experiencing for more than 35 years. Within this framework, the historicist post-modern architecture which had already germinated within the parameters of the free-market economy was integrated into the policies of the state. The first step of these policies was declared as the project of "from tradition to future" which was announced by the government in 2005. According to this project, instead of school buildings without identity, character and without aesthetic, the government will aim to build school buildings in accordance with aesthetic tastes, national values and with "towers".³⁰⁹ (Picture 4.10)

Picture 4.10: A school building in Isparta



The specific emphasis on the "towers" in the official statement reveals the government's perspective regarding the Ottoman architecture. The complexity of the character of the Ottoman architecture is reduced to some fragmentary elements, such as towers, eaves, roof fringes, decorative eave supports, and curved windows or doors. And these elements are randomly used to create a sense of historicist feeling on the façade of the buildings. The structural elements of the buildings are not affected by this historicist approach, everything reminding the so-called past are displayed on the crust of the building. This can be much easily grasped if the more

³⁰⁹ Haber 7, Eğitimde Osmanlı'ya Dönüş: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Eğitimde Osmanlı ve Selçuklu Döneminin İzlerini Taşıyan Projeler için Düğmeye Bastı. Geleneksel Çizgiler Ön Plana Çıkacak., 03.02.2005, <http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/74843-egitimde-osmanliya-donus>

recent implementations of this campaign of the Ottoman nostalgia. The municipality of Bağcılar in Istanbul started a project in 2013 for cladding the façades of the school buildings with the elements of the Ottoman-Seljuk architecture.³¹⁰ So, this is the open declaration of the perspective of the central and local governments conceiving the past as only fragmentary pieces that can be only used as decorative display on the façade of the buildings.

In 2006, the Ministry of Justice declared a similar project for building the new justice palaces or cladding the old ones in the Ottoman style. And in time, such projects became an integral part of the policies and the discourse of the central and local governments. After the justice palaces, the police headquarters, local government buildings (hükümet konakları), or the buildings of the municipalities were added into this process of Ottomanisation of the public architecture in Turkey. (Pictures 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14)

Picture 4.11: Kuşadası Justice Palace



³¹⁰ <http://www.haberler.com/bagcilar-daki-okullarin-dis-cepheleri-yenileniyor-5082254-haberi/>, 19.09.2013.

Picture 4.12: Yozgat Justice Palace



Picture 4.13: Konya Justice Palace



Picture 4.14: Kahramanmaraş Justice Palace



As can be seen in these examples, the architectural elements that are used to invoke a sense of pastness regarding the Ottoman architecture are quite few, tower like conical roofs, eaves, curved windows and doors, and porticos. Thus, the names and associated forms and ornaments appear as “empty signifiers” as Laclau defined, they aim to refer to the Ottoman architecture as a whole, but in fact such architecture had never existed in this form. The complexity and the historicity of the Ottoman architecture which evolved throughout the centuries never displayed such a coherent, homogenous unity. Reducing this edifice of architectural history into several disconnected, and randomly selected stylistic elements turns the buildings established under the AKP rule into a stately form of disneyfication of history.

Since the signifiers regarding the Ottoman architecture are quite few to be utilised in the hands of the government, then the Seljuk architecture is added to this vocabulary. This move provides the government with a discourse covering Turkish-Islamic history of Anatolia as a whole, but at the same time with a larger vocabulary regarding the architectural elements. However, this addition only makes the emptiness of these signifiers much more blurred. So, the whole Ottoman and Seljuk architectural histories which have distinct peculiar characteristics are squeezed into a limited dictionary of styles.

Since the historical distance is completely collapsed over a thick present, and since this situation destroys any genuine intellectual interrogation with the past, which is rendered much graver by the pervasive anti-intellectualism propagated by the neo-conservative ideology; the façade historicism of the neo-Ottoman architecture is devoid of any substantial knowledge on history. Although these architectural campaigns of the government claims to represent the Ottoman-Seljuk past to evoke the innate and pure Islamo-Turkish “*innerlichkeit*” uncontaminated by the western modernity, the architectural elements applied in these new building supposedly invoking the genuine Ottoman past themselves are the products of the modernity. For example, most of the ornamental elements used in the new buildings are the forms adopted by the modern orientalist architecture of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire or the I. National Architecture Movement of the early twentieth century. Facing the Western modernity, the Ottoman modernisers of the nineteenth century wanted to create a national architectural language and form, and they adopted the orientalist forms which were invented by the West in stylised forms with

references to especially the Andalusian Muslim architecture. Although the classical Ottoman architecture was mainly based on the emphasis on the architectural structure, the orientalist architecture also accentuated upon the ornaments and decoration. So, the orientalist forms and ornaments were adopted via the mediation of the west³¹¹. The First National Architectural Movement aimed to eliminate this western mediated orientalism, and wanted to create a vernacular and national language in architecture through combining the modern use of space and the supposedly vernacular and national architectural elements. These attempts were not incompetent and senseless imitations of the occidental aesthetics or simple eclectic revivalist experiments. Although, they reflect the contradictions and conflicts of the Ottoman modernisation process, they were genuine intellectual attempts to establish an architectural language based on interrogative debates about eclecticism, historicism and orientalism. So, they have to be considered as the constitutive parts of the long history of the Ottoman-Turkish modernisation.³¹² Then, more than a century later, these modern architectural forms, which were accused of being foreign, alien and imitator during their time, became the ultimate forms of the absolute, innate forms of pure Ottoman architectural spirit (Pictures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18). The presentation of the Taksim Artillery Casern which was the most important example of the Ottoman orientalist architecture as the embodiment of the Ottoman spirit, and the debates over rebuilding it can be read within this lack of historical distance to conceive the historicity of the buildings, objects, people or events. So, such a wholesale of the history in the market- both in the sense of economic market, and in the market of political discourses- totalises the past into a single image of “the Ottoman”.

³¹¹ Turgut Saner, **19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Mimarlığında Oryantalizm**, İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 24.

³¹² Ahmet Ersoy, “Topçular Kışlası ve Bir Kitlesele Tüketim Aracı Olarak Tarih”, **Toplumsal Tarih**, 232, Nisan, 2013, p. 74.

Picture 4.15: Taksim Artillery Barracks



Picture 4.16: Computer generated image of a possible use of the Taksim Artillery Barracks (**Hayalet Yapılar**, Sergi Kataloğu, İstanbul: PATU Mimarlık, 2011, p.119)



Picture 4.17: The Head Office of Ziraatbankası, Ankara, Gulio Mongeri, 1925-1929.



Picture 4.18: Biga Government Office, 2015



The effacement of history by a pop historicism which was embodied in the rise of the post-modern architecture began to reveal itself in other spheres of life. The central role of the communication technologies and the media in triggering the temporal acceleration and in leading to the detemporalisation of history, the vanishing of the historical narrative into disconnected, floating momentous expressions within the condition of immediacy, and the collapse of history into a heap of images makes the spaces of media the most fertile ground where the transformation of history into a nostalgic façade was the most visible.

In 2011, a fever of history began to spread over the Turkish society. A television series titled “the Magnificent Century” (Muhteşem Yüzyıl) started to be aired in a private television channel, and immediately became a sensational phenomenon attracting the attention of almost every segment of society. It prompted a widespread interest in the Ottoman Empire, and such a popular interest in the past was completely a new phenomenon for the Turkish society. The Ottoman past had never been so visible in any period before, it infiltrated into almost every nook and cranny of the life.

The Magnificent Century can be considered as an outcome of the cultural and social transformation of the Turkish society experienced since the 1980s, and also as a cultural product magnifying and reproducing this transformation. In fact, this reproductive force of a TV series stems from the role of television screen as a medium breeding the post-modern cultural repercussions of the late-capitalist society. In this sense, the television and its roles as a medium of engagement with history shows the global connections of the transformation of the Turkish society

within last three decades. This perspective can illuminate the nature of the rising Ottoman nostalgia in Turkey, since it cannot be considered as an outcome of the internal political preferences towards Islamisation and conservative values searching a founding ground in the Ottoman past, but it should be considered within a larger transformation of the temporal structure as the result of the late-capitalist restructuring. So, television as a medium of communication was an integral part of this temporal transformation.

In this respect, the success of the *Magnificent Century* should be considered within the recent general increment of the historical dramas on the global screens. From “the Tudors” and “the Borgias” to “Spartacus”, “Reign”, “The Pillars of the Earth” and “Versailles”, the historical dramas have proliferated in the television screens globally. This increasing interest of television in the past can be explained through a reference to the pervasive amnesia created by the accelerative forces of the late-capitalist society where the imagination cannot have access to the future but only revolves around a continuous return to the past styles and forms. These styles and forms function as floating, empty signifiers of the past which becomes identified with the condition of the “eternal return of the same”, and *l’homme présent* is constituted through the fragments of these floating images and in return he demands them as commodified objects. Then, history is presented in utterly conventional and melodramatic way on television to be marketed and sold to consumers as commodity.

Apart from the feature of television turning everything on it into a commodified image, according to Gary Edgerton television as a medium has technical and stylistic features that make it one of the reproductive forces of the presentist temporal structure. The most important one of these inherent features is “immediacy” which strongly influences the content and the form of the historical representations that are produced for TV screen. For Edgerton, TV is incapable of rendering temporal dimensions with precision, and it has no grammatical analogues for the past and future tenses of written language and, so amplify the present sense of immediacy.³¹³ So, Television as a medium becomes a principal facilitator of the

³¹³ Gary R. Edgerton, “Television as Historian: A Different Kind of History Altogether”, **Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age**, ed. by Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001, p. 2.

“condition of immediacy” which is the existential ground of the post-modern temporality.

The inherent feature of immediacy makes TV a perfect medium for presenting history as collage of past images. Jameson’s metaphor of flatness and depthlessness regarding the post-modern culture become a concrete embodiment on TV screen. Harvey explains this collapse of the sense of history into a cosmetic juxtaposition of images of the past on the flat screen of TV without any deep interrogation with the historical subject: *“Television is the first cultural medium in the whole history to present the artistic achievements of the past as a stitched-together collage of equi-important and simultaneously existing phenomena, largely divorced from geography and material history and transported to the living rooms and studios of the West in a more or less uninterrupted flow. It posits a view, furthermore, who shares the medium’s own perception of history as an endless reserve of equal events. It is hardly surprising that the artist’s relation to history has shifted, that in the era of mass television there has emerged an attachment to surfaces rather than roots, to collage rather than in-depth work, to super-imposed quoted images rather than worked surfaces, to a collapsed sense of time and space rather than solidly achieved cultural artefact. And these are all vital aspects of artistic practice in the post-modern condition.”*³¹⁴ The representation of the past on TV equalises the historical periods, event or people, because they are disconnected from their historical context. These ahistorical or de-historicised images are attached together in a form of glossy patchwork. Then history is reduced to a cosmetic display, or to a fashion show where the historical characters are cat-walking on the podium. This is the reason why the sensations evoked by different historical dramas set in different past periods are almost the same. The metaphor of the “inter-reflecting mirrors” can be utilised to explain the sameness created by the television’s commodification of the past, and how this sameness is spreaded out by the network of the global market. For example, the commercial advertisement photographs of different historical dramas use almost identical sets and frameworks creating the sensation of the mass-produced history. (Pictures 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21)

³¹⁴ Harvey, **The Condition of...**, p. 61.

Picture 4.19: The Tudors commercial ad



Picture 4.20: The Borgias commercial ad



Picture 4.21: The Magnificent Century commercial ad



The visual language produced by the western historical dramas and its identical adaptation by a Turkish historical drama shows the globalised character of the visual representation of the past. The differences in the costumes are so little to neglect as if they belong to the same royal household of the same country of the same period. So, Lucrezia Borgia, Anne Boleyn or Hürrem Sultan can walk in the fashion show of the same designer. This is important to display that the imagination regarding the historical distance and perspective is completely collapsed in the presentist screen of television today.

All these historical dramas revolve around some important historical characters, such as Rodrigo Borgia, Henry VIII or Suleiman the Magnificent. It seems that the conservative historical approach to the history based on the great men is living a revival in the post-modern screen. However, there is an important difference between the conservative history of the nineteenth century and the post-modern TV dramas which mainly focus on the private lives, not on the great political

and military deeds of the important men. So, the past is presented in a soap opera format of intrigues, gossips, love affairs, lust, and greed.

The Magnificent Century, which had been aired between 2011 and 2014, was set on the reign of the Sultan Suleiman I / Suleiman the Magnificent of the sixteenth century, the longest reigning monarch of the Ottoman Empire. It begins with a declaration of the grandeur of his own image from the mouth of Suleiman as the head of the Ottoman Empire. The show repeats this Ottoman heroism, grandeur and success throughout all the episodes. For example, in the first episode, after he sits on the throne after the death of his father, he exclaims with a bold prophecy: “My rival is not Shah Ismail, but Henry Tudor, and Charles Quint. We will go beyond the Caspian Sea. Not a single bird will fly over the Mediterranean without our permission!” In the fourth episode, he shows the traditional Ottoman-Turkish heroism, humility and tolerance to the inhabitants of Belgrade after the city fell into the hands of the Ottoman army: *“Don’t be afraid! Turks do not do any harm to the people who ask for mercy. Belgrade is an Ottoman land from now on. And I am your sovereign. You, too, will see the justice of Suleiman. If you obey my rule, I protect you, I do not discriminate you from my other subjects, and I assure that you live prosperous lives!”* So, the Magnificent Century seems to fit into the long tradition of heroic presentation of the past in Turkish TV or cinema screen as demonstrated in the movies of the 1950s previously. However, if this is the case, it is hard to explain the political fuss emerged over this TV show.

The Magnificent Century differs from the previous TV shows and movies which project the national historical narrative into the screen by taking the story into another level, to the level of the private sphere. The plot revolves mainly around the harem life of the palace where the focus is Hürrem Sultan, a Ukrainian slave who was sold to the Harem and later became a concubine and then reached the level of the favourite mistress of Suleiman. The wars, the military expeditions, heroic successes remain relatively in the margin, however the intrigues within the harem, the backdoor complots, love affairs, jealousy and revenge constitute the backbone of the story. The main protagonists of the show are depicted as quite ambitious and passionate, and they do not follow any ethical or moral value to reach their aims. For example, when Hürrem finds out that her best friend in the harem, another Ukrainian was converted to Islam, she gets extremely angry, because she thinks that her friend

will be a rival to her in climbing the hierarchy of the harem. In another episode, when Hürrem is poisoned by another favourite of Suleiman, she says *“I know who poisoned me, and I would do the same if I were in her position.”* The mother of Suleiman, Hafsa Sultan is also drawn as a tricky, intriguing and immoral character. This description is not only limited to Hürrem or Hafsa Sultan, almost all characters, including Suleiman, are burning with passion to realise their aims in the game of power within the labyrinths of the palace. They can do alliances with other, and can change their positions according to the new and changing conditions. Such a description of characters is quite in harmony with the social and cultural values propagated by the neo-liberal market rationality. The halls of the palace appear as the corridors of a huge business office where women and men walk in rush. Suleiman resembles a business mogul or a CEO sitting behind a desk in front of a map. So, the individual of the neo-liberal world is dressed up with Ottoman costumes and turbans, and placed in the setting of the Topkapı Palace. For Kellner, the post-modern representation of the individual on TV screen describes a volatile subject in terms of his/her place in relation to other individuals in quite calculative ways: *“The chief characters all have multiple identities and multiple pasts which intersect in unstable ways with the present. In each case, their identity is fragmented and unstable, different and distinctive in each character, yet always subject to dramatic change [...] For identity is often constructed in contemporary society against dominant conventions and morality; thus there is something amoral and morally threatening about postmodern selves which are fluid, multiple, and subject to rapid change.”*³¹⁵ From this perspective, the characters in the Magnificent Century are the manifestations of the situational identity with its fluid ground fluctuating according to the changing necessities of rapidly shifting base of life. This strategic rationality is clearly disclosed in an interview with Meryem Uzerli who was in the role of Hürrem Sultan in the show, she told to a glossy magazine that modern women could learn a lot from the character of Hürrem: *“The most important thing is having strategy. If you have those kinds of skills, you can get whatever you want.”*³¹⁶ In a similar manner, a blog writer in an internet site of a newspaper writes about the Magnificent Century: *“The stories of beautiful, rich, powerful people are always interesting. The Magnificent Century, with its powerful acting, wonderful costumes, jewels, settings, music, and special effects is glorious, because it satisfies our desires*

³¹⁵ Kellner, *op.cit.*, p. 151, 156.

³¹⁶ “Meryem Uzerli Hürrem ile Gelen Anı Şöhreti Anlattı”, *Tempo*, Mart, 2011, p.34.

to be rich, powerful, and beautiful.”³¹⁷ These words confirm how the Magnificent Century presents the historical characters in the cloaks of the contemporary market oriented values. This predominance of the present over the presentation of the history is in fact propagated and supported by the academic post-modern historiography, as well.

Post-modernist historians like Hayden White and Keith Jenkins claim that since the history is always the product of the present concerns, historiography should get rid of the false claims of writing an impartial account of the past³¹⁸. They argue that historiography is more about telling stories inspired by contemporary perspectives than capturing and conveying of objective truth about the past. “*The postmodernists are influenced by “New History” in their quest for an alternative to the more established versions of this discipline. New History employs deconstruction, subjective interpretation, an a symbolic construction of reality, rather than quantitative, structural, or functional methods [...] it seeks to unravel texts, raise questions about meaning in the text, and invent micro-narratives as alternatives to history.*”³¹⁹ Thus, for post-modernist historians, the historians, so far, claimed that they reflected the past in an unmediated way, and such a claim is hiding an authoritative ideological perspective, since they impose their own perspectives upon the past. However, Ernst Breisach states that this is a simplified and caricaturised description of modern historiography, because the modern historiography is not unified and homogenous body: “*Practicing historians have always protested that such a picture of their theory of truth was an idealised one. Even Leopold von Ranke had recognized the reflection of wie es eigentlich gewesen was never quite complete or pure. History cannot like other sciences be ‘satisfied simply with recording what has been found; history requires ability to recreate.’ Yet such fallibility need not compromise the historian’s work beyond repair if the impurities and resultant failures were acknowledged properly and always remained open for recreation by the collective judgement of historians. Incompleteness and perspectivism disturbed but did not negate the ideal of correspondence*”.³²⁰ So, the ideal of conveying the past, with a consciousness of the temporal distance and the influences of the present

³¹⁷ Radikal, 13.11.2015.

³¹⁸ Hayden White, **Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism**, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Keith Jenkins, **Re-thinking History**, London: Routledge, 2003.

³¹⁹ Pauline Marie Rosenau, **Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions**, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 66.

³²⁰ Breisach, **op.cit.**, p. 90.

moment on the historian, remains an ultimate point for the historian. However, the post-modern historians claim that such an ideal is meaningless, and the efforts for reaching such an ideal are futile. This perspective gained a significant momentum in some segments of the historians, calling into question whether or not there is an authentic, knowable history at all beyond the subjectivity of the present. And “television producers and filmmakers take this postmodernist viewpoint one step further. They tacitly embrace presentism through the back door by concentrating only on those people, events and issues that are most relevant to themselves and their target audiences.”³²¹ In this cultural milieu backed up by the intellectual ground of the post-modern historiography, the infinite relativism of narrating the past becomes the main argument for representing the history.

The relativism creates a double headed exit from the constraints of the so-called conventional history. As Tom Betteridge suggests on the case of the Tudors: “*The Tudors is an exemplary piece of postmodern history. It desires authenticity, makes it a fetish, while at the same time denying its possibility.*”³²² That means, on the one hand TV historical dramas has a claim to be representations of the past, on the other hand they negate this very claim. While echoing and shaping the perspectives of the public regarding the past, they can avoid the responsibility of such a particular narration. For example, at the opening scene of the each episode of the Tudors, the voice of Henry VIII repeats confidently: “*You think you know the story, but you only know how it ends. To get to know the heart of the story, you have to go back to the beginning.*” This can be considered as a proclamation of the TV show as the true narrator of the historical story. It asserts that the rest of the narrations are flawed. However, when the writer of the show faces the criticisms about the distortions of the fundamental historical facts, he reacts by claiming that “*Tudors is soap opera, not history.*”³²³ In a similar way, the Magnificent Century, as well, aims to create a sense of historical accuracy by specifying the exact dates and places of historical events. However, this narrative with a claim of historical accuracy was denied several times by the script writer and the directors of the series. In interviews, the show’s directors and actors insisted that the serial was apolitical.

³²¹ Edgerton, **op.cit.**, p. 3.

³²² Tom Betteridge, “Henry VIII and Popular Culture”, **Henry VIII and His Afterlives**, ed. by Mark Rankin, Christopher Highly and John N. King, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 215.

³²³ “Tudors is soap opera, not history, writer says” **New York Times**, March, 27, 2008.

“*There is no political message or any other cultural message*” said Halit Ergenç who was in the role of Suleiman, and he continued “*This is a TV series. It is a soap opera.*”³²⁴ Then, everyone can claim to narrate any period of the past in its own way, because the history is a product of the present anyway. They can have the assertion for the authenticity in serious way, but on the other hand they can easily get rid of this claim by negating the heavy burden of being a narration of the past. This is how the “sense of pastness” is produced through a mishmash of pseudo-historical knowledge and the masquerade of the so-called past images.

For post-modernist historians working on the representation of history on TV, such as Robert Rosenstone, in a post-literate age we need other mediums to engage with history: “*The challenge of film (and TV) to history, of the visual culture to the written culture, may be like the challenge of written history to the oral tradition, of Herodotus and Thucydides to the tellers of historical tales [...] In a post-literate world, it is possible that visual culture will once again change the nature of our relationship to the past.*”³²⁵ Or Steve Anderson emphasises the potential powers of the TV show about history: “*Part of the power of these texts may lie precisely in their incomprehensibility and potential threat to more conventional historical forms, forcing- or allowing- viewers to choose their own path through massively complex array of historical imagery and ideologies to which they are exposed. Rather than simply learning new ways to forget, TV viewers may be acquiring a much more specialized and useful ability- to navigate their own past with creativity and meaning, even when it goes against the design of historians.*”³²⁶ These perspectives of Rosenstone and Anderson evaluate the position of television in isolation from the economic, political and cultural structures of today’s world. For them, if the given condition of today’s society is being post-literate, then TV can be used as new medium for the engagement with the history in such a social condition. However, it is obvious that TV as an important medium of communication is the both the product and reproducer of the post-literate society of the late-capitalist phase. Contrary to what Anderson claims, television rises upon the annihilation of the creative

³²⁴ David Rohe, “The Islamic World’s Culture War, Played Out on TV Soap Operas”, **The Atlantic**, March 9, 2012.

³²⁵ Robert A. Rosenstone, “History in Images/History in Words: Reflections on the Possibility of Really Putting History onto Films”, **The American Historical Review**, Vol. 93, no 5, December 1988, p. 1184.

³²⁶ Steve Anderson, “History TV and Popular Memory”, **Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age**, ed. by Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011, p. 34.

production of the meaning with its emphasis on newness in which every meaning fades away after each image. *“Television operates much more as an absence of memory, the recorded material it uses instituted as actual in the production of the television image. This transformation of record into actuality or immediacy is a function of a generalized fantasy of live broadcasting.”*³²⁷ The immediacy of the flowing images radiating from TV screen destroys the necessary distance for the intellectual interrogation over the past. Within the overload of the images, the past is travestied in the TV dramas. It is a history stripped down and sexed up in stiletto heels and glitter.³²⁸

So, if the TV historical dramas are just soap operas displaying the travestied past images in glitter, why they should be seriously taken into consideration? First, they are the part of the cultural production of the neo-liberal economic system of the late-capitalist world. As Jameson stated, the most important difference of late capitalism from the previous phases of capitalism is the colonisation of the hitherto untouched spaces including the unconscious. So, the representation of the past on TV screen shows both how the transformation of the sense of history in to pure pop images reveals itself in cultural products in visualised world of post-modern culture, and how the reproduction of such a transformation through the repetitive exposition of this visual depthlessness is maintained over the society through television. However, this visualisation is not confined to the parameters of the telemediatised past, it infiltrates into the other segments of societal structure, including politics. This is why a TV show caused such an important debate and fuss in the society with the participation of the highest level of the government, because, the image production and the visual world are the new ground of the politics and political struggle in today's world.

The first furious reaction to the *Magnificent Century* came from the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he angrily criticised the show for disgracing the heroic past of the Ottoman Empire, he said that *“What does the opposition say? What are you doing in Gaza? Why are you interested in Syria, Lebanon, Kosova and Myanmar, which are none of your concern? Excuse me, we live in a world of seven billion. We know well what our responsibility is. We will go wherever our ancestors*

³²⁷ Mary Ann Doane, “Information, Crisis, Catastrophe”, **The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media**, ed. by Marcia Landy, London: The Athlone Press, 2001, p. 255.

³²⁸ Sheila Marikar, “Tudors: History Stripped Down, Sexed Up”, **ABC news**, March 29, 2008.

went on horseback. We will take care of all of these places. But I guess they believe our ancestors are similar to the portrayal on television, on *Muhteşem Yüzyıl*. We don't recognize these ancestors. That's not the Süleyman we know. Thirty years of his life passed on horseback. His life didn't pass in a palace, as you are led to believe. It didn't happen. You should know it well. You should understand it well. Before my nation, I condemn both the director of this drama and the owner of the television station. We have alerted the authorities, and we are awaiting a judicial decision.”³²⁹ In another occasion, the president of the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) expressed his rage against the show: “The series depicts the Turks as a nation drinking alcohol, having immoral sexual activities, throwing bastard children to the streets.”³³⁰ These reactions coming from the prime minister or from other public authorities were considered as the conservative governments' authoritative assault against a simple TV show.³³¹ It is definitely true that these reactions were the part of the authoritarian policies of the conservative government which is trying to impose a strict control over the functioning and discourse of the media institutions in the country. However, this does not explain why a prime-minister of a country creates such a fervent dispute over a television drama. Up to that point, the state or the government could have regulated the television programs through the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK) which was established in 1994 after the private televisions station became widespread in Turkey, and acts mainly as regulatory and censorship body of the state. But, a prime-minister or any high level politician or public official have triggered such a debate about the content of a TV show. This is because the politics itself turned into a space of spectacle in Turkey in gradual steps after the 1980s³³², and today this politics of spectacle or political spectacle becomes a rival to the other discourses of the spectacle society including television. So, television and dramas

³²⁹ Dilek Özhan Koçak and Orhan Kemal Koçak, “Glorfying the Past on the Screen”, **Bringing History Life Through Film: The Art of Cinematic Storytelling**, ed. by Kathryn Anne Morey, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 77; Alexander Christie-Miller, “Turkey: Television Drama Generates Official Angst”, **EurasiaNet's Weekly Digest**, January 11, 2013, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66394>; Piotr Zalewsky, “Why is Turkey's Prime Minister at War with a Soap Opera?” **Time World**, December 26, 2012, <http://world.time.com/2012/12/26/why-is-turkeys-prime-minister-at-war-with-a-soap-opera/>; “The Turkish Soap Opera That Has Enraged the Country's Politicians”, **The Guardian**, 9 december, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/09/turkish-soap-opera-enraged-politicians>.

³³⁰ “Muhteşem Yüzyıl Krizi Devam Ediyor”, **Beyazperde**, 27 November, 2012, <http://www.beyazperde.com/haberler/diziler/haberler-54343/>.

³³¹ “Last Ottoman disputes PM Erdoğan on TV series”, **Hürriyet Daily News**, November 27, 2012.

³³² Ali Ergur, “Gerçeklik Tanımlayıcısı Olarak Görsellik ve Türkiye’de Siyasetin Gösterileşmesi”, **Toplum ve Bilim**, 93 Summer, 2002.

such as the Magnificent Century by using the Ottoman past and turning this past into a serial of empty signifiers constitute a threat to the political spectacle of the government using the same past references as empty signifiers.

The language of the soap opera style historical dramas has a similar plot. As Tim Stanley pointed out in his analysis of “The Borgias”: “*The series promises to do for the Italian Renaissance what The Tudors did for the English Reformation: explore a period of political and religious change through the medium of kinky sex and comic book violence. And yet, while the drama is certainly not censorious, it does confirm to a new morality of popular history, The Borgias, The Tudors and the HBO series Rome all seem to conclude that the reputation and beliefs of historical figures are invalidated by their personal misbehaviour [...] This trend is worrying because it seeks to personalise history to the point of sordid anecdote.*”³³³ In a similar manner, the Magnificent Century speaks with the same language produced by the same sense of historical collapse into the presentist ground fortified by the market rationality. The history is a commodity to be marketed and to be consumed, and must be packed in a certain form. This commodity form of the history within the parameters of the spectacle society and the history in the hands of the political spectacle within the same parameters clash for determining the limits of the forms of the empty signifiers utilised in the spectacle. Although they function in the same ground of the spectacle society where the history turns into mere images without reference, and where these images refer only to themselves, the government wanted to impose a more conservative form into these images in accordance with its own political ideology.

This spectacle politics became a defining characteristic of the Turkish politics especially in last 15 years, and the Ottoman past became the main ground of this spectacle. For example, in January 2015 during the visit of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to Ankara, the Turkish president Erdoğan welcomed him in the newly built palace by passing between the lines of soldiers dressed in the manner of representing the ancient Turkish states (Picture 4.22). An article in *the Guardian* on this ceremony gives a quite illuminating description of the nature of the spectacle: “*Spear-carrying guardsmen, warriors bedecked in chainmail, gleaming golden helmets and even a few fake moustaches thrown in for good measure. Mahmoud*

³³³ Tim Stanley, “Give the Borgias a Break”, **History Today**, Vol. 61, issue 2, February 2011.

*Abbas, the Palestinian president, could have been forgiven for thinking he had walked on to **the scene of a historical costume drama or far-fetched ballet** as he arrived for talks in Ankara with the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As Abbas shook hands with Erdoğan, the main staircase of the Turkish leader's controversial new presidential palace was occupied by 16 warriors dressed in historical armour, carrying spears, brandishing shields and clutching fearsome-looking swords.”³³⁴*



³³⁴ “Abbas Welcomed at Turkish Presidential Palace by Erdoğan – and 16 Warriors”, **The Guardian**, 12 January 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/abbas-erdogan-16-warriors-turkish-presidential-palace?CMP=share_btn_fb.

Picture 4.22: Official welcoming ceremony for Mahmoud Abbas, 2015



In a ceremony at the highest level of the state, these 16 soldiers representing the 16 ancient Turkish states seem like that they popped out off a TV screen. Apparently, there is nothing to distinguish their costumes in terms of historical difference. They belong to the same depthlessness and empty signifying ground of the Magnificent Century. More importantly, the visual language created by the Magnificent Century obviously influenced “the historical drama” atmosphere created on the stairs of the presidential palace. Nobody knows which soldier represent which state, but it does not have any importance, because they have the reference only to themselves as the images referring to a vast and empty so-called past. They are the mannequins of a fashion show mimicking the “sense of pastness”.

Another similar form of similar spectacle was also displayed during the celebrations of the 563rd anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul. The posters appearing in every corner of Istanbul were announcing that this was not going to be a memorial ceremony dedicated to a moment in history, but an ostentatious show and spectacle in a very much post-modern sense. (Pictures 4.23 and 4.24)

Picture 4.23: The poster for the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul, 2016



Picture 4.24: The poster for the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul, 2016



The posters invites the people to experience the “the magnificent show or the spectacle of the Conquest” (Muhteşem Fetih Gösterisi), and to re-experience the Conquest in the world’s biggest 3-dimensional scene. So, this staged show backed up by the latest technology is a self-declared disneyfied spectacle. That day, the stage background was set in the shape of the Istanbul’s fortification walls made of fibreboards although the stage was set up in a square just beside the original walls. The main part of the scene was a large group of people dressed up with the Janissary costumes, and they were standing still as if they were an extension of the fibreboard walls (Picture 4.25). At some point of the show, two actors from a TV series “Ertuğrul, Diriliş” which was set in the founding years of the Ottoman Empire came to the stage and recited a poem from a modern Turkish poet on the Conquest of Istanbul. The actors were in their costumes from the TV show, and they were like two warriors from a fantastic movies and TV series such as The Game of Thrones or The Vikings which have been quite popular on TV screens lately (Picture 4.26).

Picture 4.25: Scene from the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul, 2016



Picture 4.26: Scene from the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul, 2016



These two characters in the costumes of a fantastic TV show, representing the 13th century Ottomans in a stage set up for commemorating a 15th century event appear as the manifestation of the post-modern birth of the past in Turkey as disconnected images with no substantial reference to anything historical. This is a new period where political ideologies influence and shape the imagination, discourses and visual language of the cultural life, but today the floating signifiers, empty references, images juxtaposed on the flat surface of television, cinema or computer screens shape and transform the political discourses and the political activity into a form of spectacle.

Outside the stage of the celebration of the conquest, there was a huge crowd of watching the show as if they were in a pop concert, and there were some group of people wearing some long gowns supposedly looking like kaftans and turbans, and some fake beards. When they were asked who they were representing, the answer was “the Ottomans” (Picture 4.27).

Picture 4.27: A group from the celebration of the conquest of Istanbul, 2016



The Ottoman past is reduced to few pieces of garment, and their random display can denote the representation of the Ottoman history. Such a random display bloomed almost in every corner of the Turkish society, for example during the political campaigns for the parliamentary elections in 7 June 2015, the several candidates have launched quite interesting “Ottoman-themed” campaigns to be nominated for the AKP in the upcoming elections. The candidates presented themselves in so-called Ottoman attires in their posters.³³⁵ (Pictures 4.28 and 4.29)

³³⁵ “Ottomans Enter Turkish Elections Race, Stoking Social Media”, Hürriyet Daily News, 26 February, 2015,
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nlID=78900&NewsCatID=341>.

Pictures 4.28 and 4.29: Posters from the political campaigns for the parliamentary elections in 7 June 2015



Other than the premises of the political arena, the “Ottomania” as called by some media organs³³⁶ appeared in public spaces as monuments, statues, or in private spheres as furniture ornaments, decorative pieces or fashion designs (Pictures 4.30 and 4.31).

Picture 4.30: Entrance of a hotel in Sirkeci, Istanbul



³³⁶ Elif Batuman, “Ottomania: A hit Show Reimagines Turkey’s Imperial Past”, The New Yorker, February 17, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/ottomania>.

Picture 4.31: Yeni Cami Meydan Parkı, Istanbul



Picture 4.32: The entrance of an apartment building in Elmadağ, Istanbul



Picture 4.33: A real estate agency in Harbiye, Istanbul



The replicas of the Ottoman Coat of Arms which was designed at the end of the nineteenth century during the reign of Abdul Hamid II appear in many public and private places from coffeehouses and restaurants to business offices and apartments. One of these two pictures above was taken in a real estate agency office and the other one in a corridor of an apartment building in Istanbul (Pictures 4.32 and 4.33). When the owner of the agency and the inhabitants of the apartment building were asked what this picture is, the answers were: “*It is the emblem of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent*” or “*It is the emblem of the Ottoman Empire*”. So, these emblems on the walls do not have a specific referential substance in terms of their historical character. They appear as just Chinese ideograms that cannot be read but can be known that they are something Chinese.

The Ottoman past is everywhere in Turkey today, however its omnipresence is visible through the repetition of a very limited vocabulary of a certain set of images and some cases the sounds such as janissaries, the end of the nineteenth century-Ottoman coat of arms, sultans’ tughras (calligraphic signatures of Ottoman sultans),

stylised turbans and kaftans, and *mehter* music (Ottoman military music, especially that of the Janissary bands). These fragments are supposed to invoke a vast period of history. However, these images which do not refer to any historical period are produced through the network of communication technologies and the media working in accordance with the necessities of a larger framework of neo-liberal market structure. As Jameson put it, the image in today's society has become the final form of commodity reification. History, as well, has transformed into a set of self-referential empty signifiers which denote nothing but a randomly changing images on the ground of a thick present.

Within this framework, considering the neo-Ottoman surge in Turkey as a new political strategy to establish a novel form of national historical narrative based with an emphasis on the Ottoman past seems a quite bold assertion. Even the government have such intentions to form a different historical narrative, a new way to invent a novel form of tradition, in this new ground of temporality and economic and social structure, such a well-established modern historical edifice cannot be possibly founded on a foundation where even the politics turns into a spectacle.

According to Eric Hobsbawm, "*Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms or behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. A striking example is the deliberate choice of a Gothic style of the nineteenth-century rebuilding of the British parliament, and the equally deliberate decision after World War II to rebuild the parliamentary chamber on exactly the same basic plan as before.*"³³⁷ The invention of tradition as a part of modern nationalisms was an ideological edifice composed of deliberate efforts to build a narrative connecting the past to present and to future. As other modern constructions, they were constructions which aimed to create an ideological and political basis for a national biography. As Hobsbawm indicated, Britain experienced a Gothic revival in the early twentieth century, however, this revival as a reconstruction necessitated a modern sense of history placing the nation in a certain moment of temporal structure, and it required a vast investment of intellectual effort. However, today where the historical distance

³³⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, "Inventing Tradition", **The Invention of Tradition**, ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 1.

collapsed, and where a new temporal structure arose in ground of an extensive present, the history is just an image that can only be utilised to create a show effect. So, even the political attempts to use the past for a new rhetoric can only bring together the pieces from Janissary costumes or The Game Thrones in front of a 3-dimensional laser show.



V - CONCLUSION

The appetite for the Ottoman past seems invading the Turkish society. The images, objects and discourses related to the Ottoman history have been popping out from every corner especially during the last decade. This revival of the Ottoman past is usually considered as a part of the deliberate policies of the conservative AKP governments for building a new national historical narrative replacing the old Kemalist official history. According to this explanatory framework, the new ideological hegemony of the Islamist AKP rule tries to write a new historical biography for the nation by pointing out to new founding moments in the Ottoman past. In this sense, this attempt of the government echoes and mimics the establishment of the national narratives by the modern nation states. However, such a use of the concepts and points of references borrowed from the theories of nationalism tries to explain all formations of historical narratives in the same temporal ground, as if the national ideologies and their engagement with the past keep the same parameters along the change of time. In fact, the Turkish society had undergone an enormous upheaval with the 1980s; the integration of the Turkish economy into the global neo-liberal economic system resulted in the emergence of a different composition of social, cultural and political structures in the following decades. Therefore, it is not possible to understand the revival of the Ottoman past in recent years in Turkey with a sole reference to the conservative character of the government regarding the historical narrative. Although the changes and transformations within the Turkish society created the conditions and the cultural and political ground for such a pervasive interest towards the Ottoman past, these changes cannot be clearly understood without grasping the cultural and political repercussions of the neo-liberal structuring at a larger level, because the neo-liberalism created not only new economic ground but also transformed the cultural,

political and social structures including societies' engagement with the past at a global scale.

Neo-liberalism as the pedestal of the new social formation that has been coming into being globally since the late 1970s should be taken into account to avoid pure culturalist or political explanations of the changing sensibilities towards the past and history. However, neo-liberalism itself became a catchword in journalistic and academic literature, explaining everything in today's society with a large stroke of a conceptual brush. As the saying goes: "If you give a small boy a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, neo-liberalism, apart from referring to a colossal transformation of societal structures within more than thirty years all around world, became an all-encompassing and banal concept. To remove this banality off the concept of neo-liberalism, it should be considered within a larger historical perspective, not as a concept defining a given condition. In this regard, the social, political and cultural edifice rising upon the global neo-liberal economic network needs to be evaluated through a historical perspective paying regard to changes and continuities leading up to the neo-liberal society.

If the Turkish society is claimed to be integrated into the neo-liberal world, then the adjective of "neo-liberal" should be considered within its historical development with a reference to its predecessors in economic, political and cultural terms. In this sense, the neo-liberal cannot be considered as an economic structuring imported from the West, and added adjective to the internal set-up of the Turkish society. Then, not only the end-results and repercussions of the neo-liberal structuring in Turkey, but also the historical development leading up to this phase of capitalist transformation are profoundly significant to conceive the picture of the Turkish society properly.

In terms of the novel ways of the engagement with the past, neo-liberalism as the ideological manifestation of the late-capitalism and the post-modern condition as its cultural logic produce two basic premises regarding the transformation of temporality which is the basic ground for shaping the ways of dealing with past: the temporalisation of time and the detemporalisation of history. To understand these two defining premises that determine the sense of history in today's society, this study aimed to analyse their historical background. Although such an analysis is basically a western centred approach to the concepts of temporality and history, such

an approach is imposed by the nature of the capitalist development which leaves nothing untouched especially in its late phase. Since the Turkish society has been struggling with modernity for more than a century, and today it is completely soaked in the waters of the post-modern/late modern structures, then the only way to understand the effects of these structures on the Turkish society is to look at the historical developments of these structures in the West, but of course without losing the contact with the peculiarities of the Turkish modernisation.

While the temporalisation of time and detemporalisation of history are the two fundamental manifestation of the post-modern temporality in late-capitalism; and equivalently classical modern temporality had two basic manifestations: the denaturalisation of time and temporalisation of history. An analysis of these two pairs of concepts comparatively is quite important to demonstrate that the transformation that societies have been experiencing since the late 70s results in a structural change in the temporality. As pre-modern temporality left its place to the modern temporality as a result of a more than four-hundred-year of transformation, the modern temporality is giving way to a different form of temporality. This is a change that today's societies are still experiencing, so it is not quite easy to grasp this change while still living surrounded by it. The manifestations of this change such as the emergence of nostalgia as a mode of engagement with the past can be observed. So, the changes the Turkish society is undergoing today, pertaining to the engagement with the past and history, can be considered as a part of this larger transformation of temporality.

The story of the Turkish modernisation can be read along the line of the transformation of temporality, as well. The Kemalist reforms aimed to open the gates to a new temporal terrain which had already germinated within the reforms of the nineteenth century in the bosom of the Ottoman society. While the reforms of time regulation and calendar set the structural transformation of the temporal coordinates of the Turkish society, the new historical narrative as a biographical story of the nation created a novel consciousness about the existence of the society as historical being. Through the modernisation process, the Turkish society was brought into the land of history where the past is no longer conceived as “çok eski”, but through a historical distance to certain points of references in the past.

This transmutation of the temporal world from the temporality of the rural society of the *ancien régime* to the modern temporal structure took place under the tutelage of the state as the self-proclaimed moderniser of the society. The main emphasis was on the rupture from the Ottoman Empire as the corrupt and decadent *ancien régime*. The new Turkish republic was justified through this accentuation on the idea of “newness”, and also the developmentalist perspective leading up to an open-ended future which is defined as the “reaching up the level of Western civilisation”. In this sense, these fundamental pillars of the discourse of the new regime place it into the modern temporal terrain. However, the characteristics of this temporal transformation should be considered within the parameters and limits of the Turkish modernisation. The historical narrative established by the new nation-state was demarcated by the selective approach of the Turkish modernisation process to the modernity.

The reactionary modernism inherently containing the distinction between the civilisation and culture can also be utilised as a defining characteristic of the selective approach of the Turkish modernisation process towards the modernity. The reactionary modernism was a way to deal with the chaotic and ambivalent features of the modern world. While embracing the technological advancements of the modernity and their concomitant structural changes regarding the social and cultural repercussions, rejection of the universal values and ideals set by the Enlightenment such as the supremacy of the individual rights and liberties over any kind of authority constituted the backbone of the reactionary modernism. Thus, from the beginning of the Turkish modernisation process, the democratic values, individual liberties and rights had never occupied a primal position, the modernisation was considered as a process shaped and led by the state authority.

The corporatist mentality which dominated the political philosophy of the early years of the Kemalist modernisation was based on an organic conception of society where the individuals were conceived as the subordinate organs to the larger societal corpus headed by the state. This organicist conception of the society led to the creation of an organicist historical narrative in which the particulars are only meaningful within the whole. The biographical story of the nation is established on a narrative where the intrinsic Turkishness of the nation had been transmitted through generations to reach the final form of the nationhood which is the new Turkish nation

state. Different political or cultural elements and particularities are considered as the parts of the larger whole of the Turkish nation. So, while the nation is placed into a modern temporal structure and brought into the scene of modern history through a biographical narrative of the nationhood; the emphasis on the inherent and changeless character of Turkishness, and the organicist conception of the society constituted the reactionary characteristics of the Turkish modernisation. This study claims that this reactionary modernist character of the Turkish modernisation process was sustained throughout the different episodes of the twentieth century, and still makes up the fundamental feature of the Turkish political structure today in a different economic, cultural and political setting.

After the Second World War, changing international political conditions created a different world where the modernisation theory came out as the main paradigm both to explain and to draw the line of development for the countries outside the developed West. Although for modernisation theory, the western liberal democracy as an ideal was the ultimate point to be reached by the developing countries, the stability of the political structures of these countries on the way to modernisation was much more important than their commitment to democratic principles of the liberal democracy. So, modernity was stripped off its universal ideals set by the Enlightenment, and reduced to a product to be imported to anywhere in the world. Modernisation as an economic and technological development was considered as a sufficient way to promote the stability of the American hegemony during the cold war years. Thence, within this ideological atmosphere of the post-war period, the reactionary modernist character of the Turkish modernisation could find a quite a fertile ground to sustain its selective approach to modernity. In this continuation of the basic premises of the Turkish political, cultural and social structures, the organicist narrative of national history persisted to exist after the Second World War during the multi-party politics. The established premises of this organicist historical narrative with its emphasis on the Turkishness emerging from the depths of the history and journeying throughout the history to find its ultimate embodiment in the new Turkish republic, and with its selective approach to the Ottoman past continued to exert its influence as the fundamental official biographical story of the nation. The Ottoman past, although it was rejected by the new regime, became a part of the official history in a very selective way, only through some references to the important heroic figures. This representation of the Ottoman past

became visualised in the 1950s' historical films. These films were mimicking the official history's approach to the Ottoman past which could be considered as a visualised form of the organicist historical narrative. Apart from the filmic representations of the prominent historical figures, and the indoctrination of the official history through education, the public space in Turkey remained sterile in terms of the existence of the past, especially the Ottoman past, because the emphasis on the creation of the societal memory and the public consciousness revolved around the idea of "newness". The national day commemorations were celebrating the "new" character of the republic.

While the emphasis on the newness and the rupture from the past, and on the future orientedness aimed to established a modern temporal framework as a basis of the Turkish society, the consideration of the modernisation as form of development detached from its substantial essence based on the values and ideal of the Enlightenment continued to dominate the Turkish political, social and cultural life. And this dominant feature of selective approach to modernity revealing itself in the reactionary modernism became much more embedded with the upheaval of the Turkish society as a result of the 1980 coup d'état.

The 1980 coup marks a rupture in the history of the Turkish society different from the previous coups which had reinforced the existing political structure with more authoritarian policies. However, the 1980 coup led to a profound transformation of the Turkish society. The adoption of the neo-liberal policies aimed to integrate the Turkish economy into the global network of free-market capitalism through devastating the long tradition of economic structure based import-substitution. This economic transformation of the society had its repercussions on the political, cultural and social structures of the Turkish society. This new societal structure contained the emergence of new life-styles, new ways of thinking and engagement with the political and the social, the emergence of a consumption society, new level of communicative network propelled by the flux of the new communication technologies and the media, and consequently a new temporal structure and a new ways of engagement with the past. Since this transformation was the result of the opening up of the Turkish society to the global network capitalism, it is necessary to understand the changes that have been happening within the capitalism at large.

In the West during the 1960s, a new discourse claiming that the Western societies are entering to a new economic, social and cultural world mainly defined by the rise of the new communication technologies and the media. Scholars and writes such as Daniel Bell and Alvin Toffler asserted this new form of society- defined as post-industrial society or information society- refers to a revolutionary change as a total transformation of the earlier form of industrial society into a new form societal edifice. However, some others, such as Fredric Jameson and David Harvey, claim that this perspective conceiving the information society as a revolutionary break conceals the continuity within this transformation that is the persistence of capitalism. Although they accept that there has been certainly a change in terms of the organisation of the production, the composition of the relations of work, the cultural and political repercussions of such novel forms of economic relations and new information technologies, they claim that these changes and transformations take place within the deep flowing current of the capitalism.

Since capitalism is inherently laden with crisis, throughout its history, it has overcome these crises through acceleration as survival strategy. Especially the crises of the 1970s gave a much profound impetus to the accelerative forces of capitalism, resulting in flexible production, a more fluid capital formation, and also the proliferation of communication technologies both as a consequence and reproductive force of the acceleration. Jameson defines this new phase of capitalism as late-capitalism. Neo-liberalism as the manifestation of the economic restructuring of the late-capitalism established an alliance with neo-conservative ideology to dress the late-capitalist society with full-fledged hegemonic cloak. The consequences of this alliance were: the devaluation of political economy, the reduction of democratic rights into pure formal rights and freedoms, the transformation of the political problems into individual problems with market solutions, the production of the consumer-citizen as available to a heavy degree of governance and authority, the legitimization of statism in terms of its affectivity within the market rationality. The most important outcome of the late-capitalist phase is the infiltration of the market rationality into every corner of life. As Jameson pointed out, the most important difference of this new phase of capitalist development is the invasion of all fields of life by the forces of the market hitherto untouched by capitalism. So, this pervasive market rationality became the only criteria of all activity in political, economic and

cultural life, leading up to a profound and dark anti-intellectualism, and commodification of every object, values, and ideals.

Within this new form of social edifice, the temporal structure has been undergoing a transformation, as well. The most important factor leading up to such temporal transformation is the increasing level of acceleration caused by especially with the emergence new forms of communication technologies and the digital revolution. The temporal dimensions, past, present and future, have been exposed to a massive forces shaping their interrelationship as a result of the profound speed of the late-capitalism. The condition of immediacy became the main form of social existence of the neo-liberal society in which everything should be fulfilled in the fastest way. The presentism defines the predominance of the present over other temporal dimensions in the condition of immediacy where the temporal distance between past, present and future are fading away, leading up to a situation of eternal present.

The presentism and the changing temporal structure effect the conditions and ways of the engagement with the past, as well. As opposed to denaturalisation of time and temporalisation of life in modernity, the late capitalism and its consequent cultural logic, post-modern condition created the situation of temporalisation of time. Temporalisation of life means a perspective on one's own life as a project or a biographical story to be given shape in time. However, in the post-modern condition, the duration, sequence, rhythm, and tempo actions, events, and relationships are first decided in the course of their execution, that is, within time itself. They no longer follow a predefined time schedule. And as opposed to the temporalisation of history in modernity, the post-modern condition creates a condition of detemporalisation of history. Temporalisation of history was the precondition of the naissance of the modern sense of history. The perspectivism, the temporal distance between past, present and future supplied the basic coordinates for the creation of the history. The past emerged as a different country to be discovered, and future also began to be conceived as different horizon full of promises. This is what Koselleck calls the difference between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation. In the post-modern condition of immediacy and presentism, the difference between space of experience of the horizon of expectation is vanishing, resulting in detemporalisation of history. The past loses its distance from the present, necessary

to conceive the past as different temporal dimension. On the other side of the temporal spectrum, the future turns into a dark emptiness which contains no change and no expectation, as revealed in the perspectives of the end of history and post-histoire.

Since the future does not offer any promise of change, and since the present is the repetition of the same, then there is only one way to reproduce the human imagination, that is the past. However, since the past loses its distance from the present to be conceived as an object of critical interrogation, it turns into a reserve of images to be used in the present. In the predominance of the market rationality, the image is the ultimate form of the commodity reification, so history is also transformed into a nostalgic façade of the stitched images taken up from the reserve of history. The commodification of the past reveals itself in the juxtaposition of images with no historical references as empty signifiers refereeing to anything but themselves. The post-modern history is a mere reduction of the past into a spectacle of disconnected images. But, as Virilio pointed out, this spectacle character is not only limited to history, the whole society has been turning into a stage of spectacle including the politics.

This general picture of the late-capitalism and post-modern condition as its cultural manifestation provides a historical- analytical ground to understand the changes that the Turkish society has been undergoing since the 1980s. Since, to grasp the continuities and changes within the nature of the Turkish society, both the global factors and internal structures should be considered in an interconnected manner. The integration of the Turkish economy into the global neo-liberal market network created a totally different social structure in Turkey. The old forms of life-styles, the traditional ways of political activity, the established ideological discourses, the previous modes of production started to give way to the new structures created by the free-market economy and its invading market rationality. Although this new political and cultural environment provided a ground for the articulation of different cultural, political and ethnic identities, and critical approach to the Kemalist past, it did not produce a democratising force en masse in Turkey. Because, as already mentioned, the neo-liberal/neo-conservative alliance meant the demise of the liberal-democracies even in the West, a society without a strong democratic tradition like Turkey became an easy victim for the neo-liberal ideology where the democracy is not a norm. So,

the Turkish modernisation's selective approach to modernity as developmentalism with a strong estrangement from the universal democratic ideals found its unchallenging fertile ground in the global ideology of neo-liberalism. This marks a deep continuous current of the character of the reactionary modernism within the Turkish political, social and cultural structure. The rise of the technocratic administration, management style of politics, and the transformation of the political activity into a spectacle removed any prospect of the democratic ideals from the horizon of the politics in Turkey.

Within this picture of the Turkish society which has been developing since the 1980s, the rise of the pervasive Ottoman interest within the society can be explained through the aforementioned development of the detemporalisation of the history within the post-modern condition. The amnesia caused by the condition of immediacy resulting from the accelerative forces of the late-capitalism, and the rise of the interest in the past constitute two sides of the same coin which is the changing temporal structure in the post-modern times. The interest in the Ottoman history in Turkey started to show up during the 1990s especially in the field of architecture. Then, it invaded other corners of the society, becoming a major cultural and political matter during the 2000s. Some explained this development as the manifestation of the democratisation of the Turkish society that started to face its past in more open way. Some others claimed that it is a part of the political initiative of the conservative administration to replace the Kemalist historical narrative with a new official historical discourse emphasising the Ottoman past. However, the interest in the Ottoman past is neither a product of democratising forces, nor a well-designed official historical narrative produced by the political administration. It should be considered as the consequence of the new cultural and political climate created by the neo-liberal edifice which has been built up in Turkey since the 1980s. The collapse of the official Kemalist historical narrative as a biographical story of the nation is not replaced by a more heterogeneous and pluralist democratic history. The result is the reduction of the past into a mere collage of the images disconnected from its historical references. As it is summarised in the post-modern historicist architectural examples, the Ottoman past is dwarfed through a limited vocabulary of few fragmentary cosmetic ornaments.

The transmutation of history into nostalgia *en façade* became much more salient during the 2000s especially through television screen. The craze of “Ottomania” pervaded almost every television station. Especially, the TV series “Magnificent Century” became the epitome of this Ottoman nostalgia in society. The global effects of the commodification of history, and the global transformation of the history into mere images in the market are quite salient in the representation of the Ottoman past on TV screen. The common language used to represent the past was imported from the international screens to the Turkish context. By effacing the historical distance and cultural particularities, the post-modern representations of the past depicts a juxtaposed cosmetic images brought together on the flatness of a depthless surface. The Ottoman past is represented through a few references such as turbans, kaftans or some decorative oriental ornaments which have no real historical reference.

In terms of the larger political and social framework, the importance of such a transformation of the historical consciousness is revealed in the reaction of the political administration against the representation of the past on TV screen. Up until that point, no political authority in Turkey reacted to a TV show in such a strong way creating a pervasive political and social discussion. This reaction was seen as an authoritarian response to a cultural product. Although this explanation is partly true, it does not reflect the whole picture comprehensively. The reaction of the government stemmed from the common ground of the sense of the past shared with the language of TV. The transformation of history into a pure spectacle composed of mere images as empty signifiers becomes the discursive feature shaping the political structure in Turkey. The extensive use of the Ottoman past in political rallies and demonstrations, in political speeches and public debates shared the same structural ground of historical references with the language of TV. However, the political authority does not accept the global commercial pattern of soap opera style in the use of these past references. So, it tries to control the use of these past images in its own limited ideological circle. However, the vocabulary of the past references of the political authority is also imported from the visual language of television. So, except the more conservative tinge, the baggage of the images as empty signifiers used by the Turkish government are quite similar to the one used in the visual media. Thus, the Ottoman aspirations of the government cannot be considered as well-designed and properly structured national narrative as the biographical story of the nation in

the modern sense replacing the Kemalist official ideology, but it is just a loose populist language based on a very limited vocabulary of images without any historical reference. In this language, the characters from the Magnificent Century or from The Game Thrones can come together with the mannequins in Janissary costumes on the stage. This study claims that the neo-Ottomanism utilised by the Turkish political administration cannot be considered as an attempt to establish a new national historical narrative in modern sense, but it is an edifice composed of momentary populist policies and the deeper structural changes in the ways of engagement with the past as a result of the transformation of temporality in the post-modern condition of late-capitalism.

The transformation of the history into a nostalgic representation of the images of the past resulting from the changing nature of the temporality turned the political structure into a scene with an ahistorical character. The commodified images of the past became the main reference points of the political discourse and activity. In this societal structure of the post-modern temporal frame, there is no possible ground for founding a sustained biographical narrative as in the modern nationalist stories. The seemingly nationalist reactions in late-modern societies use the language of the spectacle society and the image industry in their narratives. While the past turns into a spectacle of empty signifiers, the politics itself becomes loaded with such structures and discourses which do not refer to any substantial conceptual meaning. In the neo-liberal/neo-conservative alliance of the late-capitalism, the demise of the liberal-democracy, and the transformation of the democratic principles into pure empty rhetorical devices can be considered as the examples of such a transformation. In this sense, the reactionary modernist character of the Turkish modernisation finds the best possible ground to sustain its selective approach to the modernity in the neo-liberal world of today. The emphasis on the economic development, and the increasing suspicion towards the universal democratic values are gaining a much pervasive ground in the social, political and cultural structures of today's Turkey. Although, the engagement with the past is taking a different form in the post-modern temporality, the reactionary modernism persists in this new social, political and cultural milieu. And the new parameters of this new form of engagement with the past fortifies the selective approach to modernity of reactionary modernism by providing much volatile ground of politics composed of empty ahistorical references.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Manisa'nın Akhisar ilçesinde 1974 senesinde doğdu. İlk, orta ve lise eğitimini aynı ilçede tamamladıktan sonra. Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü'nden 1997'de mezun oldu. Yüksek lisansını aynı bölümde 2000 yılında tamamladı. 2000 ile 2005 arasında Bilkent Üniversitesi ve Kanada Ottawa'da Carleton Üniversitesi'ndeki siyaset bilimi bölümlerinde araştırma görevlisi olarak çalıştı. 2008'den 2010 yılına kadar Tarih Vakfı'nda çalıştı. 2009 ve 2010 yıllarında Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Bölümü'nde öğretim üyesi olarak çeşitli dersler verdi. 2010'da Galatasaray Üniversitesi Medya ve İletişim Çalışmaları programında başladığı doktora eğitime 2014 yılında Paris 1 Sorbonne-Panthéon Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi bölümünde müşterek doktora programıyla devam etti.

TEZ ONAY SAYFASI


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Enstitü	Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Adı Soyadı	Zafer Çeler
Tez Başlığı	Temporality in the Postmodern Times and the Ottoman Nostalgia in Turkey
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
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
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