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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANA BİLİM DALI

GÜÇ PAYLAŞIMI
LÜBNAN, IRAK VE SURİYE
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ÇALIŞMA

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

SAAD HÜSEYİN VEFAİ

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DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**POWER SHARING
LEBANON, IRAQ AND SYRIA
COMPARISON STUDY**

MASTER'S OF SCIENCE THESIS

SAAD HÜSEYİN VEFİ

GAZİANTEP
JANUARY 2019

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POWER SHARING LEBONON, IRAQ AND SYRIA COMPARISON STUDY

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Dedication

To the source of my inspiration... who was faithful about my dreams and ambitions, who supported me and made me an important person, she who formed and still forming me after God created me, the dearest and most appreciated...My mother.

To the man who told me about nearly everything happening now, who passed away a decade ago... the man who had a great vision and insight...My father.

To the woman who accompanied me through all hardships as if we were one person, the woman who God blessed me with her love... My wife.

To my five children with whom I try to make a promising future for next generations of Syria.

. إلى مصدر الهامي.. الى من صدقتني في طموحاتي وتطلعاتي، وأزرتني ورفعت من شأني الى من صاغتني
وتتابع صياغتي بعد أن خلقني الله الى الاغلى والأسمى الى أمي
إلى من كاد يخبرني بما يحصل الآن وقد توفاه الله منذ عقد من الزمن صاحب الرؤية والبصيرة .. أبي

الى عزي وسندي شذى، محمد وفيصل

إلى من ركبت معي الصعاب معي وكأنها أنا وقد رزقني الله حبها .. زوجتي

إلى خمسة اولاد احاول ان ارسم معهم وبهم مستقبلاً مشرقاً لأجيال سوريا



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إلى الدكتور الذي ساعدني ارشدي وصبر علي. لقد علمني أهمية التواضع وحسن الخلق.. الدكتور

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إلى من كانت معرفته تاريخ ومساندته شرف .. الدكتور محمد

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احترم آرائي والهمني .. مراد

وكلثوم

بيان

الفاضلتان

الاختان

إلى

ABSTRACT

POWER SHARING LEBANON, IRAQ AND SYRIA COMPARISON STUDY

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M. A. THESIS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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With the beginning of 20th century, countries have emerged in the region whose people have not had an opinion in their emergence and have not chosen to separate from their mother country (Ottoman Caliphate) and also haven't chosen the borders as they have been known today. Moreover, the peoples of these countries have had no choice with the political systems that have governed them to this day. The peoples of these countries have suffered from the rule of dictatorships, the prohibition of freedoms, prisons, and executions. All of this was in the milieu of economic backwardness, political isolation and military defeats. With the end of the first decade of 21st century and the spread of communications, the peoples of Arab countries have become connected to the world and the economic, social and political situation has become unbearable, for that Tunisia has revolutionized to depose the president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January, 2011. The revolutions of Arab Spring have continued to reach Egypt followed by Libya and Yemen and all of them have deposed their dictator presidents. Then this spring reached to Syria on March 15, 2011, but this time it has failed and could not remove the dictatorship from Syria and Bashar Assad, who inherited the position from his father is still the president and fighting the war of No victor and No vanquished. Until March 14, 2018, the number of people killed in this revolution has reached more than 300,000 since 15 March 2011, most of them are civilians, children and women. Half of Syria's population have left their homes, around 7 million are abroad. Turkey has hosted about 3.5

million of them. In July 2017, World Bank has estimated the cost of conflict losses at 226 billion \$ (183 billion €), 4 times the pre-conflict GDP (gross domestic product). With all the above, neither Syrian regime has been able to eliminate the revolutionaries nor the revolutionaries, in all their political, military and civilian forms, regardless of the reasons have been able to overcome the regime and depose the president. But the surest thing is that there are gaps of confidence have arisen among the components of Syrian people, between Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Alawites (the sect of President Bashar al-Assad), and between Sunni (the majority of Syrian people) and Christians (the most effective minority in Syrian scene). These gaps have turned into a real confidence crisis that needs an effective political system to solve it. At this time, the international community has agreed that the political solution in Syria is the only way after the failure of the military one by both sides. One of the proposals of the political solution is Power-Sharing form among all active parties in Syrian scene. Syria was not the first country in which Power-Sharing Form has been proposed to resolve the political crises, The international system, led by Western countries has established Power-Sharing Form, firstly in Lebanese Republic when it has been separated from Syria and declared as an independent republic. However, Lebanon experienced major political crises and a devastating civil war lasted for 16 years and did not enjoy long periods of stability. Then the west, in 2003, has imposed Power-Sharing in Iraq at the time of US invasion in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq with an unjust dictatorship and the one-party rule for decades. But once again we see a model of political disorder and a deepening of the division between the components of Iraqi people, and increasing the ethnicity and sectarianism which may not have existed before the adopting of Power-Sharing. The question raised in this research is why did not Power-Sharing Form help building the confidence among the various active components and how much was this form active in establishing the stability and achieving growth in Lebanon? And was Power-Sharing in Iraq an appropriate alternative to the dictatorship to turn Iraq into a democracy that achieves security, stability, the rule of law and growth in it? Another question is: What is the best form of Power-Sharing that allows Syria to achieve the political stability? This stability, which will lead Syria to move from dictatorship to democracy and from the one-party rule to the sharing of power and from political, economic and social disorders to the stability that leads to the growth?

This study trying to extract the most effective form, which could have a role in the success in Syria as a political solution to Syrian case.

Keywords: Power Share, Legislative, Judicial, Executive, Semi-Presidential, Parliamentary, Consociational, Integrative.



ÖZET

GÜÇ PAYLAŞIMI LÜBNAN, IRAK VE SURİYE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ÇALIŞMA

SAAD HÜSEYİN VEFAI

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ABD

TEZ DANIŞMANI: YRD. DOÇ. DR. MESUT ŞÖHRET

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20. Yüzyılın başlarında, bölgede bazı ülkeler ortaya çıktı. Bu ülkelerin halklarının, ülkelerinin oluşması hakkında hiçbir fikirleri yoktu. Ülkelerinin aldığı kararı, Osmanlı Halifeliğinden ayrılmayı ve şimdiki sınırlar içerisinde olmayı kendileri seçememişlerdir. Bunun daha kötüsü ise bu ülkelerin halklarının o zamanlardan bugüne kadar kendilerini yöneten siyasi sistemlerin seçiminde hiç bir rollerinin olmamasıdır.

Bu milletler diktatörlük yönetimi, özgürlüklerin kısıtlanması, cezaevi ve idamlar altında, zor şartlarda yaşadılar. Bunlarla birlikte ekonominin geriliğini, siyasi inzivaya çekilmeyi ve askeri yenilgiyi yaşadılar.

21. Yüzyılın ilk on yılının bitmesi ve iletişim araçlarının yaygınlaşması ile birlikte Arap milletleri dünyayla iletişim halinde oldu ve onlar için ekonomi, sosyal ve siyasi durum artık çekilmez bir hale gelmişti. Bunun etkisi ile Tunus halkı ayaklandı ve kendi cumhurbaşkanları Zein El Abidin'i 14 ocak 2011 tarihinde görevinden ettiler. Daha sonra o da Suudi Arabistan'a kaçtı. Böylece Arap baharındaki devrimler Mısır , Libya daha sonra da Yemen'de yaşandı ve diktatör başkanlarını görevlerinden aldılar.

Bütün bunlardan sonra bu bahar Suriye'ye 15 Mart 2011' de geldi. Ancak, bu defa halk bütün zorlukları çekip başkanını görevinden uzaklaştıramadı. Babasından sonra bu makama gelen Beşer Esed ne kazananı ne de kaybedeni olan bu savaşa

hala devam etmektedir. Bu devrimde 15 Mart 2011 tarihinden 14 Mart 2018 tarihe kadar çoğu sivil, kadın ve çocuk olmak üzere yaklaşık 300.000 kişi öldü. Suriye’de yaşayanların yarısı evlerinden ayrıldı. Bu kişilerin yaklaşık 7 milyonu ülke dışına çıktı, Türkiye 3,5 milyon kişiyi misafir ediyor. Temmuz 2017’de Dünya Bankası çalışmalarına göre çatışmalardaki hasarlar 226 milyar dolara (183 milyar avro) denk geliyor ve bu da çatışmalardan önceki gelirin dörtte biri demek oluyor.

Geçen herşeye rağmen Suriye rejimini devrimciler yenemedi. Sebepleri ne olursa olsun devrimciler de bütün askeri ve siyasi biçimlerine rağmen rejimi yenemedi. Ancak kesin olan şey Suriye halkının oluşumların da, Sünni olan Kürtler ve Araplar, Beşar Esed’in ait olduğu Alevi sınıfı halkın çoğunluğunu oluşturan müslüman ve hristiyanların arasında güven sorunu ortaya çıkmasına sebep oldu. Bu sorunun çözülmesi için yetkili, siyasi bir sistem gerekirken gerçek bir krize dönüştü. Buna paralel olarak uluslararası toplumda, her iki taraf da askeri çözümü başaramadıklarından siyasi çözümün Suriye için tek yol olduğu anlaşıldı. Siyasi çözüm önerilerinden biri de Suriye içerisindeki yetkili taraflar arasında güç paylaşımıdır.

Güç paylaşımı Suriye yönetiminde ve Arap bölgelerinde bir kaç ülkenin yaşadığı siyasi krizlerin çözümü olarak sunulan ilk öneri değildir. Bu ortak tarihe sahip , Fransa dışişleri bakanlığı Picot ve İngiltere dışişleri bakanlığı Sykes arasında 1916 yapılan Sykes-Picot antlaşması olarak adlandırılan antlaşmanın sonucunda gelmiştir. Bu antlaşmanın ülkeleri çeşitli demografilerinde ortak olmuşlardır. Batılı devletlerin yönetmesi ile Uluslararası sistem, Lübnan’ı Suriye’den ayırıp ayrı bir Cumhuriyet olarak duyurmasından sonra Lübnan’dan başlayarak yönetimde güç paylaşımı üzerinde çalışmışlardır. Bunun dışında da Lübnan büyük siyasi sorunlar ve 16 yıl süren yıkıcı bir iç savaş yaşamış ve uzun süre istikrara kavuşmamıştır. Daha sonrada 2003’te Batı, Amerikan işgali sürecinde de Irak’ta yönetim için güç paylaşımı olmak zorunda bırakıldı, böylece Irak’ta çok uzun bir süre diktatörlük ve tek parti rejimini altında bırakan Cumhurbaşkanı Saddam Hüseyin devrildi.

Bununla birlikte, bir kez daha, Irak halkının bileşenlerin de ayrılığın derinleşmesi, mezhepsel ve ırkçılığın yükseltilmesini görebiliyoruz. Belki de bunlar yönetimde güç paylaşımı olmasından önce yoktu. Bu çalışma bazı soruların cevabının araştırılmasıdır.

Neden güç paylaşımı, yetkili oluşumların arasında güvenliliği arttırılmasında yardımcı olmadı, bu yönetim şekli Lübnan'ın istikrarını gerçekleştirmek için ne kadar yardımcı oldu? Irak oluşumunda diktatörlük yerine demokrasi, güvenlilik, istikrar ve yasal kanunu gerçekleştirebilmek için güç paylaşımı iyi bir yöntem olabildimi? Çalışmanın ele aldığı diğer soru ise Suriye'deki diktatörlük yönetiminden demokrasi yönetimine, tek parti rejimden çok parti rejimine, siyasi ekonomi ve sosyal gerilimden, gelişmesini sağlayacak istikrara taşıyacak ideal güç paylaşım yönetim şekli nedir?

Bu çalışma, Suriye'nin başarısında Suriye olayına siyasi bir çözüm olarak rol oynayabilecek en etkili şekli belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güç Paylaşımı, Yasama Gücü, Yargı Otorite, Yürütme Otorite, Bağdaşıklık, Entegrasyon.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PYD	Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat party (Kurdish)
ISIS	Islamic state in Iraq and Sham
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
AC	Administrative Commission
WGI	The Worldwide Governance Indicators
UND	United Nations Development Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
AH	After Hijri
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
ORH	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
YPG	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (Kurdish)
NCS	National Collision of Syrian Revolution
SIG	Syrian Interim Government
SMC	Supreme Military Council
ACU	Assistance Coordination Unit
FSA	Financial Services Authority

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When conflicts arise between citizens of one country over the Power because of religion or ethnicity or because of gaps of confidence between the components of a state, Power-Sharing becomes a potential solution.

One of the essentials of Power-Sharing is that all active components of society shall participate in the power, and the decision-making shall be common and not affect the interests of any category in the society. In addition to that, any form of power-sharing shall protect the minorities as well as make the power closer to be decentralized. Power-Sharing can be defined according to Sisk:

"Power sharing defined as practices and institution that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society" (Sisk T. D., 2002, p. vii).

If Power-Sharing is an Integrative form and not a Consociational one, it will help to democratize the regime and guarantee the rights of minorities, unlike the rule by the majority which will be more susceptible to move to the political dictatorship.

Perhaps the first scholar to speak about power-sharing in the twentieth century was David Apter's 1961 "Study of Uganda Scholars" as mentioned by Arend Lijphart in his book *"Thinking about Democracy Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice"* (Lijphart, 2008, p. 3) referring to the case of Netherland as the first cases of 'Consociational Democracy'.

One of the first cases in which power-sharing has been applied in the Middle East was in Lebanon, when it separated from Ottoman state and established in the

National Charter Document of 1943 and reestablished in the National Charter document of Al Taif Agreement in 1989. The second case was in Iraq after US occupation in 2003 and the adoption of the first constitution after overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2005. Syria suffers from conditions similar to the two countries and suffers from a crisis of confidence among the components of Syrian people during the popular revolution in 2011 against the dictator regime of Bashar Al Assad, who inherited the power from his father, the most famous dictator Hafez al-Assad.

While Syrian opposition, armed and political, has not been able to overthrow Bashar regime, political solutions have been put forward in the diplomatic corridors. Among these solutions was Power-Sharing. In order to reach the optimal state of power-sharing, that will help to achieve the security under a democracy that involves all active components in Syrian society in order for Syria to be able to overcome a crisis that has been classified as the most severe after World War II, as described by many politicians, it must be compared by the former cases of power-sharing, provided that there are similar circumstances, as far as possible. It was not useful to compare Belgian or Nederland cases. Therefore, I examined both of the previous cases, first one was Lebanese case, as Lebanon itself was part of Syria and was not separated from it until recently under stressful international conditions. Both countries are very similar in terms of the social and economic structure and differ in the political situation, as Lebanon has always enjoyed a reasonable degree of economic freedoms and public and media freedoms, while Syria has lived in a state of freedom only for years, hardly a full decade. Second case was Iraq, as it is similar to Lebanon and Syria in terms of the demographic diversity and almost resemble in the economic structure before the discovery of oil. However, the most important similarity between Iraq and Syria was the dictatorial rule, which was imposed on the two countries through Arab Baath Socialist Party, which ruled Iraq from 1968 to 2003 and also ruled Syria since 1963 until now. The party in the two countries imposed the economic, social and political circumstances in a very similar way. Studying Power-Sharing in Lebanon and Iraq and comparing it with what can be applied in Syria will be useful to conclude an approximate image of what can be avoided in both countries and benefit from what can be considered positive.

The research assumes that power-sharing can be used to bridge the existing gap of confidence between Syrian parties and allow the restoration of civil peace between the components of Syrian people in the case that power-sharing form is derived from their culture and desires and in cooperation with the parties that have successful experiences in the region, such as Turkey and not outside the region. As the pre-solutions and appropriate solutions of a culture may not achieve the same results in a different community and different political, social and economic conditions.

As since 1916, the region has been subjected to pre-solutions made in the international corridors and imposed on it. The three countries, the subject of research, were the result of a secret treaty between British foreign minister and French foreign minister (Sykes-Picot) and the region itself and the three countries have suffered from the biggest crisis - Balfour Declaration crisis, which is a promise given by a British prime minister to a Zionist group. Therefore, pre-solutions that have been applied in a country may not be suitable for Syrian situation.

And if the settlement of the conflicts between the parties of one country needs a mediation, this mediation, if it was by one of the countries with regional influence and have a successful experience in democratizing, governance and growth such as Turkey, will be closer to success, especially if the community environment, the cultural backgrounds, and also the regional interests are similar between the country of conflict and the mediator one, as the distant countries may not be affected geographically from the continuation of the conflict in Syria or may benefit from it, as US President Donald Trump said in one of his tweets. While stability in Syria will often benefit the country with which it shares about 900 km of common borders and shares great issues such as Kurdish one and the presence of terrorist militias, like PYD, terrorist militia.

The research adopted the historical approach in studying the need of the three countries: Lebanon, Iraq and Syria for methods of governance that can provide the confidence among the active components in each country, and studying the international and regional conditions that helped to move Lebanon and Iraq to power-sharing. Then the research depended on the analytical approach in studying the success and failure of Lebanese and Iraqi experiments by adopting WGI, World

Governance Indicators, and analyzing its 12 indicators in both countries. Then, it depended on the comparison between the three countries in terms of the legislative, judicial and executive powers, as well as in terms of Army and Security Forces, which played an important role in creating the policies of the three countries politically and sectarian.

Then the research continued from the first chapter (Introduction) to the second chapter, which studied Lebanon historically beginning from Ottoman period, to the period of colonialism, to the period of independence and state building and then moved to study the reality, especially as the focus of the research is renewed and is still running. Then it moved to third chapter as it studied Iraq in the same historical sequence: Ottoman rule, then the period of colonialism rule, then the period of independence and state building and then the current reality. After that the research moved to the fourth chapter where it examined Syria in the same historical sequence and then the period of reality, beginning from 2011, Syrian revolution and the sequence of events to this day. In the fifth chapter, the research examined the situation in each country in terms of legislative, judicial, executive powers, army and the secret security services (Intelligence) and the impact of power-sharing in the three powers and the two institutions which have an exceptional importance. And then it tried to conclude the most appropriate form for Syrian situation.

The research has followed the historical sequence in its chapters, as Lebanon is the first country in which power-sharing has been applied, followed by Iraq and now the candidate state for power-sharing is Syria.

Then the study end with the conclusion and make a comparative analysis of Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, and conclude consensual formula of power sharing applied in both Lebanon an Iraq did not succeed to achieve the stability and citizenship in both countries so the integrative power sharing formula may be much more effective in Syria, this formula could be supported with juridical System like the “Millet System” one, which was applied in this geographic area up to the end of Ottoman empire and helped to unify the society with different components.

CHAPTER 2

LEBANON AND POWER SHARING

2.1 INTRODUCTION FOR LEBANON

Lebanon is a small country that has been divided, socially, by the disputes between the major powers.

It has the characteristics of the Middle East and is a small prototype of Switzerland. It is a mosaic of ethnic and religious sects in its geography, and people have not been able to form a nation for years. If we have to summarize Lebanon and its history in one sentence, we can say that it is a large number of doctrines and closed sectarian compositions, which have attracted the external forces to Lebanon during various periods and historical events and made it a goal of struggle for the sovereignty over the region by these forces since 10th century.

If we look at the history of Lebanon, we will find that it is not just external interventions, but rather it includes different doctrines in terms of the social composition, which in itself gives a different importance to the region. (ŞÖHRET, 2012).¹

¹ Appendix 1- A chronology of key events of Lebanon.

2.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR LEBANON

2.2.1 Power Share during Ottoman Period

Lebanon is characterized by its many sects due to its historical nature, in which Christians were present but in several sects of Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Maronites, and others. However, Maronite sect is the largest group in terms of numbers and the second largest one of the Eastern Christians after Coptic sect. After long disputes with Roman Catholic sect and Orthodox Jacobins one, Maronite sect moved, in the middle of seventh century, from Antakya to the outskirts of Aleppo, to a region called (Prophet Hory), and then from Aleppo to Mount Lebanon after the failure of several attempts to reform between Maronite and Orthodox Jacobins. The last unsuccessful attempt was before moving to Mount Lebanon when they judged to Caliph Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan “may Allah be pleased with him”.

Despite the disagreement of doctrine with Catholic Church and its most important authority -Vatican-, Maronite Church in Mount Lebanon continued to consider itself part of Catholic Church and Vatican. The Vatican still has a strong influence on Maronite Church, so that Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir submitted his resignation to Vatican before its announcement in 2011 (aljazeera, 2011). Maronites remained in contact with Christians of the West, where many of them, since ancient times, had a belonging to Christian West more than to the East, which was dominated by Islam. And automatically this belonging had been exploited politically especially by France since the reign of Louis IX, who carried out Crusade on the east to return Jerusalem to the authority of Christians, where it was under the authority of Ottoman Empire and fought Lebanese Maronite in Cyprus, who were expelled by Ottoman Empire from Mount Lebanon to Cyprus, where King Louis IX stored his supplies for the launch to Egypt. Louis IX thanked Lebanese Maronites who supplied him with 25,000 strong fighters and considered them as part of French nation. St Louis had an official regal charter drawn concerning France’s protection and favor upon the Maronites of Lebanon. It read:

"Chartre of King Louis, King of France, Given to the Maronites, at St Jean D'Acre on May 24 1250 A.D. From Louis the King of France to the Prince of the

Maronites of Lebanon and to the Patriarch and Bishops of the Maronite nation. Our hearts were filled with great joy when we saw Simon, your son, coming to us leading 25,000 men strong showing us your feelings of fraternity, friendship and bearing great gifts to us. The bond we first felt with the Maronites in Cyprus is now doubly reinforced here in Lebanon. And we have come to feel as though the Maronite nation, under the guidance of St. Maron, has come to be one in spirit with the French nation because the love and fraternity shown by your people to our people is as strong as the bond that the French feel among each other. Subsequently, it is only just that you be favored with the same rights, privileges and protection that we provide to our own nation. That is why we exhort you, most noble Prince of the Maronites, to do your utmost in serving the welfare of your people and that you seek out only the most noble of men to rule amongst the Maronite people as is done in France. As to you oh kind Patriarch, Bishops, leaders and Maronite people, our hearts rejoice in contemplating the great faith and fervor with which you uphold the Catholic faith and remain in allegiance with the Roman Vicar of Christ, the Pope, the successor of St Peter. We exhort you to maintain this unshakable faith and allegiance. As for us and our successors to the French Throne, we promise to give you and the Maronite nation our special protection just as we provide it to our own French people. And we shall do everything in our power to add to your well-being and prosperity in all circumstances. Stated May 24th, 1250 in the 24th year of our reign in St Jean D'Acre" (Medium, 2018).

This close relationship continued, as King Louis XIV in 1696, sent a letter to his ambassador in Istanbul to ask Ottoman Sultan to ask his rulers in Lebanon to be kind to Maronites. "I, Louis, by the Grace of God, who am the King of France and Navarre, salute all those who shall be the audience of this decree and letter. Let it be known that with the agreement of her highness the Queen, our honored and reigning lady, we both sign, agree and vow to favor and protect the Most Reverend Maronite Patriarch, the Maronite bishops, clergy and people in Lebanon. We would like for the Maronites to feel the full effect of favor and protection of France. For this end we send to the Maronites, our brethern in Christ, Lord Haye Ventelet who is our Chief-Counselor and Ambassador to the Levant and Holy Land. We charge him and all those that will succeed him in his position and duty to be certain that the Maronites are protected and favored in all their needs and circumstances as they are

our brthern, the faithful of Our Lord and Friend Jesus Christ, and as such that are to be free to practice their Christian Faith openly and without any inhibition. We also charge the present and future Council and Vice-Council of the French Nation and any present and future French power that bears the French Emblem in the Levant and Holy Land to favor with all their efforts the Maronite Patriarch the Maronite people of Lebanon. We also command these French officials in the Levant and Holy Land to have any Maronite, or any Christian for that matter, from Lebanon, embark openly on French ships that sail to France or anywhere else in Christendom, whether their reasons to come to France or Christendom are to study or other affairs. They are to be treated with kindness and charity. We also ask that the great and magnificent Lords, Dukes and Officers of her Highness. favor and assist the Archbishop of Tripoli, (Lebanon) and all the Maronite prelates and Maronite people, always offering them to do whatever we can to fulfill their requests and needs. Given in St Germain in Loie on April 28, 1649 in the 16th year of our reign" (Medium, 2018).

However, we can bring back the beginning of the real sectarian division in Lebanon to 1840, where the first civil war between Druze sect and Maronite sect took place. And with the advice of the European delegates, Sultan Abdul Majeed I, in 1942 had to give up his desire for direct rule of Lebanon and to accept the proposal of Austrian Prince Metternich of dividing Lebanon into two parts: northern provinces at the disposal of a Christian qa'im maqam and a southern one at the disposal of a Druze qa'im maqam, both of them were chosen by tribal leaders, and governed by the governor of Sidon resident in Beirut (marefa, 2018).

"The idea of dividing Mount Lebanon between Christians and Druze was a compromise proposed by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich between the British and the Ottomans, who backed the Druze demand for a Muslim governor, and the French, who insisted on the return of the Shihab principality.

Druze emir Ahmad Arsalan was appointed qa'im maqam of the mixed southern district and Christian emir Haydar Ahmad Abi-l-Lama` qa'im maqam of the predominantly Christian northern district.¹ Each qa'im maqam was to be seconded by two wakils, a Druze and a Christian, who exercised their judicial and fiscal authority over the members of their respective communities. Both parties

contested the new arrangement. The Maronite Church demanded that the Christians in the Qa'im maqamiya of the south (now around 60 percent of the population) be put under the jurisdiction of the Christian qa'im maqam of the north, wrenching them definitively from the authority of their Druze chieftains. The Druze, on their part, insisted on their traditional right to rule over the whole of Mount Lebanon. It did not take long before the Ottoman governor alienated both communities and the Druze chieftain Shibli al-Aryan took once again the path of revolt in Wadi al-Taym and the Hawran, backed by the 'Imads and the Jumblatts. The Christians, invited to join the revolt, did not budge: their condition was the return of the Shihab principality" (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, pp. 24, 25).

This division did not achieve peace for either side or for Lebanon. This strife was repeated more widely in 1860 after Catholic peasants' revolution against Maronites owners. The confrontations later expanded to become confrontations between Druze and Maronites, and this war intensified until it reached Damascus and caused thousands of deaths of both parties. (there is a considerable disagreement about the numbers of victims).

The fighting in the southern part of Mount Lebanon was initiated by the Druze leadership as a pre-emptive measure to ward off the possible repercussions of the Kisrawan revolt, but, more importantly, to overcome the social and political agitation of their 'own' Christian commoners. The 'events of 1860', as they were called, reportedly started in August 1859 in Bayt Miri, a village in the 'mixed regions' and spread in the Matn region with a series of assassinations and limited armed confrontations. The winter and spring of 1860 passed without newsworthy events, as the 'silk truce' held. Toward the end of May 1860, fighting resumed with a Druze attack in the Matn. In the Shouf and the Iqlims, neighbouring villages and towns were pitted one against the other. The fighting lasted two months, from the end of May to the end of July. Jizzin was the first Christian town to fall, but this was after an armed detachment of its inhabitants had attacked and burnt Druze farms in the Niha region. Besieged in early June, Dayr al-Qamar negotiated for some three weeks until it finally surrendered, but it was nevertheless attacked, looted, and its people massacred. A Druze version claims that the inhabitants of Dayr al-Qamar still possessed 4,000 firearms when the town was taken, which explained the killings

inside the town, while Christian sources maintain that the Ottoman authorities had already disarmed the inhabitants in return for assurances of official Ottoman protection and grouped them in the serail, where they were attacked. Whatever the case, the conquest of Dayr al-Qamar resulted in a massacre in which an estimated 900–2,000 Christians lost their lives. Christians who fled Jizzin and Dayr al-Qamar, and were lucky enough to evade the Druze fighters hunting for Christians on the roads, regrouped in Sayda, which had been neutral in the fighting. Many sought refuge in the Shi'i villages and were put under the protection of the Shi'i leaders of Zahrani, Nabatiyeh and Juba`. Other Christian refugees made it to Beirut, whose notables had managed to contain the rising tension between the two warring communities.

French claimed, without any evidence, that Ottoman gendarmerie did not prevent Druze from killing Christians, and the Western countries intervened, especially France, which was considering itself the main protector of Maronite sect in the east. When the strife between Druze and Christians reached Damascus, and although Ottoman government sent a force of 4000 soldiers to end it, and arrested the Ottoman governor Khurshid Pasha and the Druze leader Sa'id Jumblatt, and carried out arrests of rioters some of whom have been executed, some of whom have been sent to jail and some to Istanbul, but Napoleon III used this strife to send a military force of 6,000 fighters landed on the coast of Beirut, under the leadership of Beaufort d'Hautpoul and began to interfere in the internal affairs of Christians under economic motives which were re-stabilize the industries of interest to France, particularly the silk industry.

"The Sultanate viewed the 'events' in Mount Lebanon as a proof of the failure of the Qa'im maqamiya and an opportunity to re-establish its authority over Mount Lebanon. Beirut's wali, Khurshid Pasha, contented himself with administering the crisis but the Damascus killings projected the 'events of Syria' on the international stage, and the pressure of the European powers prompted the Porte to dispatch Fu'ad Pasha, minister of foreign affairs, to the region. The Ottoman official arrived in Beirut on 18 July and arrested its governor, Khurshid Pasha, as well as a number of Druze leaders including Sa'id Jumblatt. On 28 July he entered Damascus at the head of 4,000 armed men, arrested and executed Ahmad Pasha, the

city's governor and military commander, three of his officers and 117 Turkish soldiers and functionaries. Four hundred Damascenes accused of participation in the riots were arrested; 56 were hanged and the rest were condemned to prison on varied sentences. Around 40 notables accused of sedition were locked up and sent to Istanbul in chains. Nevertheless, Emperor Napoleon III insisted on armed intervention in Lebanon. In mid-August 1860, 6,000 French troops landed on the Lebanese coast under the command of General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, who had served for two years under Ibrahim Pasha in Syria. D'Hautpoul had been tasked with varied and contradictory assignments: to cooperate with the Ottoman authorities, restore peace, help the Christians, contribute to the reconstruction of Mount Lebanon and get the silk workers back to work, as well as help create an autonomous Christian enclave in Mount Lebanon. That was not all. Napoleon III, as if eager to confirm Karl Marx's accusation that he was just a farcical repetition of his illustrious relative, envisaged the Lebanon expedition as a re-enactment of Bonaparte's Egyptian venture and sent Ernest Renan on an assignment to investigate the country's distant Phoenician past. Cartographers were also dispatched to draft the first map of Mount Lebanon and its surroundings, which was to serve for future military purposes. Last but not least, d'Hautpoul was commissioned to buy pure-bred Arab horses from the Bedouins of the Syrian Desert to rejuvenate the French army's cavalry" (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, pp. 36,37).

France was not the only one who intervened, especially that the rivalry between French and British empires was at its height at that time, but also Britain joined the Druze side. It had ambitions and interests to fill the markets of "natural Syria" (current Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) with English goods.

Ottoman authorities at that time were unable to avoid Western interference. A committee consisting of England, France, Austria and Prussia has been formed with Ottoman Empire to punish the guilty. The Committee met in March 1860 in Beirut under the pretext of ensuring that the violence between Druze and Christian sects had stopped.

"An international commission of the consuls of Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Austria convened in Beirut with the participation of Fu'ad Pasha. It held meetings from 5 October 1860 to 5 March 1861 to supervise the punishment of the

accused, reparations and reconstruction, and to devise a new social and political status for Mount Lebanon. On 8 December 1860, a legal tribunal was set up in Mukhtara in which 300 people were tried. Twenty-five Druze were sentenced to death and executed; the rest were later reprieved. On 18 November 1860" (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, pp. 38, 39).

Some historians have argued that these interventions were the real beginning of Arab nationalist project by French and British because there were, at the same time, events in Arab Maghreb which was also affiliated with Ottoman Empire. Creating a gap between the people of the region began in order to form a basis to accept the projects of separation and division at a later stage. Maronite attempts to separate Mount Lebanon from the Ottoman state did not stop. Despite Ottoman governor Dawood Pasha allowed the church to appoint the seven Christian members, who are the majority in the administration council of the church which consisted of 12 members, and established the vice-president of AC, where he had to be Maronite, and forgave Youssef Beik Karam, who was in 1860 the agent of Qa'im Maqamiya of Christians and then denied to Istanbul, and later allowed to return back, but Youssef Beik Karam made an armed disobedience in an attempt to separate the Christians in Mount Lebanon and this attempt continued from (1864 - 1867). The disobedience failed and France again intervened and protected Youssef Karam and gave him a permission to go out to France by a war battleship and again he was used in Algeria to settle Lebanese farmers in Algeria to serve the French (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 45).

Although there was no real complaint from any people or religion in itself and the alleged complaints were not belonging to racism or sectarianism, but they were due to other reasons, such as the need of Ottoman state to the modernization imposed by the era of the machine at the time, but the wave of nationalism that spread in Europe and moved to the people who were citizens of Ottoman Empire, such as Turani, Arabs and Kurds later, supported the segregation on sectarian and ethnic bases. But those who adopted the Arab nationalism were Arab Christians, where they considered nationalism as a salvation from Ottoman state's control and at the same time a salvation from the domination of religion over society and they began to call for Arab and secular Nationalism through associations founded mostly

in the mid-19th century, in the same period we speak. Many sources have stressed that the idea of Arab nationalism began with Christian Arabs before Muslims (kharbotli, 1960). And also Dr. Fadwa Nusairat, in her book “Arab Christians and the idea of Arab nationalism in Levant and Egypt (1840-1918)”, mentioned that Arab Christians were the first to establish associations holding the idea of Arab nationalism and publishing it. Among these associations as Nusseirat mentioned in July 4, 2011:

1) Beirut Secret Association (1875): was founded by some students at the American Protestant Syrian College, and included members of different religions and sects, whose activities were confined to secret meetings to exchange views, draw up plans for students' work and publish their ideas, stick posters condemning Turkish revolution, and urged Arabs to revolt and demand independence.

2) Arab Rights Preservation Association (1881): was founded in Beirut by enthusiasts of Christians and Muslims. It called for defending the rights of Arabs regardless of their doctrines, preserving the rights of Arab nation, achieving equality between Arabs and Turks, carrying out the necessary reforms in Arab countries, and making each of Arab states achieve its independence in terms of its financial system and appointing an Arab magistrate or Arab assistant.

3) Arab National Association (1895): was founded by Khalil Ghanem, a Lebanese Christian and a member of the Turkish Parliament for Syria. He left to Europe after Sultan Abdul Hamid disbanded the parliament and founded the Association in Paris. It organized a revolutionary call against Turkish rule and distributed leaflets for this purpose.

4) Arab World League Association (1904): was founded by Najib Azouri, whose goal was to liberate Levant and Iraq and to call Arabs for the revolution against Turkish control and it distributed about 50 violent leaflets against Turk.

Of course, these associations were a simple example of reality, as there were many Arab nationalist intellectual activities whose leaders were Arab Christian who were in contact with the West. It was even said that Najib Azouri, a Lebanese Christian, was one of the first to set the foundations of Arab nationalist thought through his book “Arab Nation Awake” published in 1905, however the beginning of nationalist Arab thought began with Boutros al-Bustani and Nassif al-Yaziji when

they founded “Association of Arts and Sciences” in 1857 in Beirut (fakher, 2015) . Michel Aflaq, who is a Christian from Damascus and studied in Paris, has established Arab Socialist Baath Party, whose approach is Arab Nationalism. This party has ruled Iraq for more than 35 years and has not abandoned the rule until US invaded Iraq and caused disasters in the region. Also this party has ruled Syria since 1963 to the present day and caused great destruction in it and negative effects in the surrounding areas, such as Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. With scientific objectivity, we see that a part of the leadership of Arab Christians of Arab nationalist stream was due to their being impressed by the spread of nationalism in the West, in which they studied and affected by its reality, and the other part was the result of the failure of the process of modernizing the regimes in Ottoman Empire by Sultan Abdulhamid II God's mercy. However, we cannot neglect the strong support of the West for these nationalist tendencies and supporting their leaders whether by France, England, or even Russia, which was sometimes competing France and England, the initiators, for influence and supporting their treaties and international conventions aiming to divide Ottoman state and to share the influence on its territories, such as Sykes-Picot Treaty of share the land of Iraq and Levant, which were an integral part of Ottoman Empire, and earlier, they had completed their control of Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881.

The defeat of Ottoman Empire in Ottoman Russian War in 1877 revived the dreams of Maronites in Mount Lebanon of independence from Ottoman Empire. France and England believed that this defeat was an opportunity to implement plans to complete the dissolution of Ottoman Empire. France requested from its military attaché in Beirut to develop a plan to control the Lebanese coast and Mount Lebanon, or to support Maronites to establish a state in them (France Mini) in order to control Haifa port and Hawran Plain, in preparation for the official recognition of the division of Ottoman Empire (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 50). These attempts continued, with the assistance of the Lebanese expatriates and the requests of the French government to expand the Administration Council and some other features until Beirut became the capital of Arab and major Arab currents were emerged in which Christians played a major role. But as the study mentioned earlier, in Mount Lebanon there was a kind of self-government based on power-share.

2.2.2 Power Share During France Mandate

In November 1914, Ottoman Empire entered the war alongside Germany, and abolished the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and the sublime porte returned to control Lebanon directly in attempts to stop foreign intervention in it (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 51). During the war lost by Ottoman Empire, Sykes-Picot Treaty was concluded in 1916 which divided the region, where Syria and Lebanon were to French Mandate, and Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq were to British Mandate. In 1917 Balfour Declaration was concluded by which, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour gave Jewish the right to establish a state on the land of Palestine. World War I did not end until natural Syria was divided into two parts, one part which is Palestine and Jordan, was under British mandate and another part which is Syria and Lebanon, was under French mandate. These mandates were approved at San Remo Conference of Peace in Italy in 1920. It is not a long time until Lebanon was separate from Syria and Jordan from Palestine and natural Syria became as it known today:

- Syrian Arab Republic.
- Lebanon Republic.
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
- Palestine occupied by Jews who established the State of Israel and declared it in 1948 and world began to recognize this state and the conflict continues to the present day.

Lebanon was assigned by French occupation and the mandate advocates of Lebanese did not get what they hope to appoint a Lebanese ruler assisted by French to establish the state. But the French took over the management of affairs of the state in full and helped the Lebanese personalities they wanted, as *"Major Trabaud governor of Lebanon, helped by an executive of seven directors-general (of whom only two were Muslims), but real power in the administration was in the hands of the French 'advisers'. Gouraud also appointed an AC of 15 members, of whom only five were Muslims. Faced with a widespread Muslim boycott, the high commissioner enlarged the commission to 17 members (six Maronites, three Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Druze, four Sunnis and two Shi'ites)"* (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 88).

Thus, the period of French occupation began to establish the sectarian participation, which is a form of power share. This matter was later reinforced by articles of the Constitution set by French colonialism and approved by the representative council, where some of its articles stipulated sectarian participation in parliament *"Article 95 provided for the (temporary) fair distribution of government and administrative posts (but not of parliamentary seats) among the various sects"* (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 90).

Since then, the parliament has been elected by sectarian participation, which is a form of power sharing. There is no doubt that this power sharing couldn't build a national identity for Lebanon which remained until independence from French colonialism without a specific identity, is it Christian, Muslim, Phoenician, or Arab? Is it part of Asia belongs to European France or part of Arab World? Is it independent or unified in one way or another with Syria? this absence of identity led to conflicts and clashes between Sunni Muslim Basta district and Christian Maronite Jumaira district in 1936. The influence of radical parties was growing like, Syrian National Social Party founded by Anton Saada in 1932, which believed in the unity of natural Syria, Cyprus and northern Iraq, and Battalion Party founded by Pierre Jemayel in 1936. In 1937, Shiite businessman Rashid Beydoun founded a paramilitary organization "Al Ta'ae Organization" (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 103). These parties often had armed factions that played a role in the armed and unarmed conflicts to the present day.

2.2.3 Power Share & Independence

During World War II and under the pressure of Nazi occupation of France and the entry of British forces and free France forces to the French colonies in the Middle East to remove the French government departments of Vichy, French felt uncomfortable with the British policies, so they began to engage in military evacuations from Syria and Lebanon and all propositions of Lebanon, without exception, was depending on the sectarian participation. From the historian Fawaz Trabelsi in his book "History of modern Lebanon from Emirate to Taif Agreement" as he dated that stage by saying:

"The return to constitutional life was not implemented until late 1942, under pressure from General Spears, who insisted on the need to organize national elections and did not hide his sympathies for the independence of the two countries.¹⁶ When the French finally agreed to organize the elections, Ayyub Thabit, a Protestant politician close to Edde, was appointed to head an interim government. He decreed a ratio of 32 Christian to 22 Muslim seats and granted immigrants the right to vote (estimated at 160,000, mostly Christians). Both provisions were rejected by the Muslim politicians and Thabit resigned; he was replaced by a Greek Orthodox lawyer, Petro Trad .Upon the mediation of Nahhas Pasha, an electoral law was decreed in the summer of 1943. It dropped the voting by immigrants and set up a Parliament of 55 seats, 30 for Christians and 25 for Muslims. This ratio of 6:5 remained the guideline for the Christian–Muslim sectarian quotas until 1990, when it was replaced by parity (50:50) According to the Ta'if Agreement".

After the struggle with French colonialism and under international pressures on France, which was headed by General Charles de Gaulle, French government announced the independence of Lebanon and released the leaders who were arrested in Rachaya castle. The most prominent of them was Riad al-Solh, a member of Sunni sect, and Bishara al-Khoury, Maronite leader. The era of Lebanese Republic began with two documents, written one, which was the Lebanese Constitution and oral one, which was the National Charter. In the oral document, the two main parties, which were Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, agreed that the President of the Republic would be Christian and the Prime Minister would be Sunni and Head of Parliament would be Shiite and that was contrary to what was written in Article VII of the Constitution that the Lebanese are politically and legally equal.

"Article 7. All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges duties, without any distinction whatever "(Lebanon Constitution, 1943).²

² Appendix 2- Lebanon pact.

The two parties also committed that Sunni party would not seek for unity with Syria or for Arab unity (Baghdad Alliance), and Maronite party would not seek to get strengthened by France. Although both parties committed to keep public positions out of sectarian division, but this had not been achieved.

In any case, this formula of power share did not achieve the stability in Lebanon, and despite of the international and regional conditions in Lebanon, but their internal repercussions were always sectarian.

In 1958 there was a Christian division about the mandate renewal of President Camille Sham'un, while Muslims were feeling like second-class citizens.

"On 27 March 1958, 85 figures from the opposition and the 'third force', of whom half were Christians, met and elected a three-man steering committee: Henri Pharaon (president), `Abd Allah al-Yafi (vice-president) and Kamal Jumblatt (secretary). The meeting declared its opposition to a second mandate and accused Sham'un of promoting fears about the country's security to serve his personal ends. Sham'un was seen as trying to conflate patriotism with allegiance to him. 'A new political creed has been proposed to the Lebanese for the past eight months', wrote Georges Naccache:

'If you are not a Sham'unist, that means that you are a traitor or a Syro-Bolshevik' " (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 135).

These protests coincided with the fall of the monarchy in Iraq and the bloody events that accompanied this fall. So British and Americans decided to intervene in the region to protect their interests. British forces went to Jordan and US forces to Lebanon. American intervention took part in the suppression of the protests and the army commander Fouad Chehab took over the presidency instead of Camille Sham'un. The new President assigned Rashid Karami, the leader of the protests in Tripoli, to form the new government. The protests were renewed over the formation of the new government and Fouad Haddad, Maronite Christian and editor-in-chief of "work" newspaper was kidnapped, so areas with Christian majority went on strike and sectarian violence broke out over three weeks in which there were kidnapping according to identity and sectarian violence.

Perhaps the limited sectarian conflict of 1958 was the first after the power sharing form in Lebanon, although it ended with the slogan "no victor and vanquished" (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 138).

Sectarian strife remained in the era of Shihab, where he modified the proportion of jobs for the benefit of Muslims and especially Shiites, in an attempt to make a fair distribution of state functions, in the sense that sectarianism has always been a key factor in Lebanese politics and administration, regardless of the President of the Republic and the President of government who took over the power. In 1964, at mandate renewal for Fouad Shehab, Christians threatened to make protests similar to the protests of 1958 but for the benefit of Christians this time, considering that Muslims made their protests when there was an intention to renew for Sham'un, who was inclined to Christians. It ended with Shahab's announcement that he would not nominate himself without any protests, however, the sectarian tension remained clear and permanent in Lebanese situation, and power sharing form could not achieve security and stability for Lebanon. This situation continued until Arab defeat in June war in 1967 against Israel and Palestinians' asylum to Lebanon, and there was another asylum in 1970, where there was an armed and violent clash in Jordan between Jordanian army and Palestinian resistance that was active in Jordan. These events were known as "Black September". There were divisions in Lebanese society regarding Palestinian refugees, making Lebanon as an advanced base for Palestinian struggle and the liberation of Palestine, and this division intensified after Israel's process in Beirut airport, in which 13 aircraft from the fleet of Lebanese East Air were blown up as retaliation for kidnapping a plane implemented by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The method of sectarian power sharing also failed to manage the file of Palestinian refugees and Palestinian resistance, and even the foreign policy towards Arab issues, especially Palestinian one, which led Lebanon in 1975 to a civil war lasted for 15 years. That war caused so many damages and divided the country in a sectarian way to a Christian part controlled by Maronites led by the Lebanese Battalion Party and a Shiite Muslim, Sunni and Palestinian part.

2.3 LEBANON 1975-1990 CIVIL WAR PERIOD

During fifteen years of the civil war, Lebanese people of all sects witnessed major events, but the war was sectarian and about the identity, in which the international and regional powers played a major role. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and Israeli aircrafts didn't stop in Lebanese airs. The Syrian forces had entered Lebanon since 1967 and remained until 2005. During this period, they had fought wars to establish balances and its constant argument was to ease or end the conflict, but it was often a party in this conflict. Syria remained a key determinant in the internal and external policy of Lebanon. On December 28, 1985, a tripartite agreement had been held in Damascus between Walid Jumblat, Derzi, and head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Elie Hobeika, a Maronite Christian and the commander of the Lebanese Forces at that time, and he was directly involved in the massacre of Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila with direct support of Israeli, and Nabih Berri, a Shiite Muslim and leader of Amal movement. They were leaders of major militias in Lebanon. They agreed under the auspices of Damascus to end the war, to dissolve all the militias within one year and to make the equality among Christians and Muslims the rule instead of 6/5 rule, meaning that the political and administrative majority is for Christians, and to abolish the political sectarianism after a period of transition (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 232). Here are two points: first, the foundation upon which the establishment of political systems often takes decades before the possibility of discussing its change and this change takes times and perhaps blood, secondly, the sectarian power sharing often leads to unstable countries and may reach to civil wars as happened in Lebanon and later as we would see in the next chapter how it happened in Iraq.

In any case, the tripartite agreement did not come into force until the parties met in Al Taif, Saudi city, and concluded an agreement very close to the tripartite agreement. Al Taif Agreement led to the cessation of the civil war and the return of Lebanon as a single geographic unit, but it recognized the political sectarianism and this time by a written national charter rather than verbal (appendix1), in which it acknowledged that the House of Representatives is equally between Christians and Muslims and although it did not identify the religion of President of the Republic or Prime Minister or Head of the House of Representatives, but the political custom in

force since the emergence of Greater Lebanon remained in force. The position of President of the Republic remained for Maronites and the position of prime minister for Sunni and Head of the House of Representatives for Shiite. Article G of the National Charter, known as Al Taif Agreement, stated for “Abolition of Political Sectarianism” and the paragraph 7 of the article “II. Political Reforms” stated for establishing a Senate based on the distribution of sects after the first parliament elected on a non-sectarian basis (Accord, 1989).

Al Taif Agreement contained a contradiction between the adoption of sectarianism explicitly or as recognized in the political custom. And Lebanon, until the present day, has not yet abolished the political sectarianism, neither in parliament nor at the level of the three top positions in the state, nor even at the level of government jobs.

2.4LEBANON AFTER AL TAIF

Although General Michel Aoun (current president of Lebanon) began his sit-in in October 1988, when the term of President Amin Gemayel ended without electing a new president and as there was strife about the positions of the President and the Prime Minister, but he did not end his sit-in, because he didn't agree about Al Taif Agreement concluded in 30 September 1989 in Al Taif. General Michel Aoun argued that the agreement did not include a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territories, and it reduced the wide powers of the president of the republic (where it is assumed that these powers to be in favor of Maronite Christian sect) in favor of the prime minister (which means expanding the powers that are in favor of Sunni Muslims), and thus General here declared himself the only legitimate authority in the country.

At the time of concluding Al Taif Agreement, Rene Moawad was elected as President of the Republic on 5 November 1998 at a military base in the north, but General Michel Aoun refused to recognize him as president and sat in Baabda Palace (the traditional presidential palace). Rene Mouawad was assassinated on 22 November 1989 (Fawwaz, 2012 Second edition, p. 249).

The post-Taif era of Lebanon started with a political assassination of the President Rene Moawad, but the assassinations did not end and continued with the

assassination of the prominent Prime Minister in the post-Taif era, Rafiq al-Hariri in February 14, 2005 in a large operation that still affects Lebanon to the present day. The International court is still investigating and searching for the planners and executors of this assassination. (Table 2-1) shows the political assassinations that took place in Lebanon in the post-Taif era indicating that for the third time in the history of Lebanon, the form of sectarian power sharing couldn't achieve the political stability and economic growth and not even the national identity in Lebanon.

Table 0-1. The political assassinations in Lebanon

Assassination Date	Personality Name	Personality Position	Assassination Method
1989 22/1	Rene Mouawad	Ninth Lebanese president	Assassinated by an explosive device near the government palace in Sanayeh district in Beirut
1990 19/0	Elias Al-Zik	Doctor	In ashrafieh
1990 21/1	Dann Shamoun	Maronite leader Leader of Liberal National Party and the youngest son of former president Camille Shamoun	Assassinated in his house in Baabda town (near Beirut) with members of his family
1991 22/0	Michel Salhab	Former Chief of Doctors Syndicate	Assassinated in his house in Al Rabi'eh at night
1992 16/1	Abbas al Moussawi	Former secretary-general of "Hizballah"	Assassinated when an Israeli helicopter fired a missile into his car in southern Lebanon
1993 29/0	Omran Al Ma'itah	First Secretary in the Jordanian Embassy	Assassinated in Al Rawsha district in morning
1993 13/0	Taleb Al Suhail Al Tamimi (Iraqi)	Sheikh	Assassinated in his house in Sakeit Aljanzeer district in

			Beirut at night
1995	31/0 Sheik Nizar al-Halabi	Head of “Islamic Charitable Projects Association (Al-Ahbash),	Assassinated in front of his house in Al Tariq Al-Jadida district at the morning
2001	24/0 Elie Hobeika	Former minister and deputy Militia leader, politician	Assassinated by a bombed car in Al Hazmieh district (east Beirut)
2002	7/05 Ramzi Airani	Student, Representative of Lebanese Forces at the Lebanese University	
2003	21/1 Pierre Jmayel	Lebanese minister of industry and son of former Lebanese president and head of the Christian Battalion Party, Amin Jmayel	Shot dead by gunmen in Beirut
2004	1/10 Marwan Hamadeh	Former deputy and minister	First to be targeted by assassinations and miraculously survived from a bomb in Al Manara area in Beirut
2005	2/06 Sami Kassir	Journalist and Professor of political science at the Institut of Political Science Saint Joseph University in Beirut	Assassinated by an explosive device planted in his car in predominantly Christian area of Ashrafieh, east of Beirut.
2005	14/0 Rafiq Al-Hariri	Former Lebanese president	Assassinated by an explosive device loaded with tons of explosives in San George area, where 18 accomplices and some citizens were killed. Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services were accused

2005	14/0	Bassil Fleihan	Deputy	Assassinated with President Rafik alhariri
2005	21/0	George Hawi	Former secretary-general of Lebanese Communist Party	Assassinated near his house in “Wah al-Musaytaba” district by a wireless bomb planted under his seat his car. Lebanese Communist Party accused Israel and the Lebanese security services of being behind the assassination
2005	25/0	Mai Shidiac	Media	Targeted by a bomb planted in her car and escaped death, but she lost one of her hands and her leg.
2005	12/0	Elias Mor	Minister of National Defense	Targeted by a bomb planted in his car and escaped death but injured in his hands
2005	12/1	Gebre al-Tuwaini, who was called "Voice of Cedar Revolution"	Deputy and journalist and head Al-Nahar newspaper	Information reported that the Syria intelligence infiltrated Beirut airport security and planted the explosive device to be exploded the day after his arrival from Paris in the morning
2006	5/09	Samin Shehadeh	Colonel in Internal Security Forces and one of the officials responsible for the investigation in the assassination Prime Minister Rafik alhariri	Survived from attack with a sophisticated explosive device planted at the northern entrance of Sidon city, and four members of the Internal Security Forces were killed.
2007	13/0	Wali Eido deputy	Anti-Syrian parliamentary	Assassinated with his son and several

			others in an explosion Beirut.
2007	19/0	Antoin Ghanem	Member of parliament of anti-Syrian Christian Battalion Party Killed with six others in an explosion Beirut.
2007	12/1	Franc s El-Hajj	Dean and chief of operations the Lebanese army Assassinated with his driver in a car bomb in Baabda, the Christian suburb
2008	25/0	Wissal Eid	A senior intelligence officer the police Member of investigation team of Al Hariri assassination Assassinated with his bodyguard and four others by a car bomb in Beirut.
2008	10/0	Saleh al-Aridi	Leader in the Lebanese Democratic Party Assassinated by an explosive device planted inside his car near his house in Baysour town
2008	12/0	Imad Mughniyeh	Prominent member in Hizballah Assassinated in Kafarsousa district in (Damascus) by an explosive device planted in a car parked next to his car
2012	19/1	Wissal al-Hasan	Head of internal security Head of the information department of the internal security forces Killed after he proved the involvement of a pro-Syrian Lebanese politician in plot to blow up a bomb aimed to create a sectarian strife in Lebanon.
2013	4/12	Hassan al-Lakis	Military commander of Hizballah Assassinated by a silencer in front of his house in Al Hadath district
2013	27/1	Muhamad Shatah	Former Lebanese finance minister Assassinated with his companion Mohammed Tareq Ba

		One of the critics of Syria and Hizballah. A senior adviser to Sunni politician Saad Al-Hariri	by a car bomb in central Beirut, causing dozens of dead.
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Despite the fact that the political assassinations have stopped in 2013, however, from time to time, the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces issues lists of people and warning them of possible assassinations. The last of these lists was in early November 2018 as a result of the crisis of forming the current Lebanese government. Some personalities have been informed to be careful according to a phone call I made on 21 November with lawyer Nabil Halabi, Executive Director of the Lebanese Foundation for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE), who is close to Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri.

The disordered situation in Lebanon was not only due to the political assassinations, rather, there were political and service crises, where the Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri surprised the world by submitting his resignation from Saudi Arabia through a televised speech. This speech caused a major crisis for 19 days during which French president intervened to end statements about the detention of Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri in Riyadh. Saad Hariri has retreated of his resignation as a result of this intervention. This crisis continued from November 4, 2017, the day he submitted his resignation, and he did not return to Lebanon until October, 21 of the same year and retreated his resignation on December 5, 2017. New York Times reported about the resignation of Al-Hariri:

"BEIRUT, Lebanon Saad Hariri of Lebanon pulled back on Wednesday from his resignation as prime minister, another surprise move that seemed to bring to a close a three-week international drama and to stem the threat of new political turmoil in the country.

Mr. Hariri, speaking from the Presidential Palace in Lebanon during celebrations of the country's Independence Day, said he had agreed to delay his

resignation to allow for dialogue with other political leaders about the relations with the rest of the region.

Mr. Hariri had announced his resignation suddenly from the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on Nov. 4, saying that he had fled an assassination plot. He also warned that Iran was behind unrest in the region and said that Tehran's "hands" would be "cut off." His abrupt departure from Lebanon, uncharacteristically direct language, and the fact that he did not inform even his closest aides of his intention to resign convinced many Lebanese, as well as Western diplomats, that Saudi Arabia had forced Mr. Hariri to announce his resignation. The move appeared to be an effort to isolate Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia and political party, by collapsing the government it participates in with Mr. Hariri. The machinations were widely seen as part of the increasingly tense rivalry between Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab kingdom, and Iran, which is majority Shiite Muslim, that has been playing out across much of the Middle East.

A television interview with Mr. Hariri in Riyadh in which he denied that he had been forced to quit — and during which he appeared tired and scowled at a mysterious person onscreen who was apparently trying to get his attention — only broadened speculation that he was being held against his will". (Saad, 2017)

However, until today, Saad Al-Hariri is unable to form a new government after he is appointed as prime minister by President General Michel Aoun. The crisis of forming the current government was preceded by the crisis of electing a president which lasted from the end of the term of President (12) Michel Sleiman on May 24, 2014 to October 31, 2016, the day of the election of General Michel Aoun, the current president, meaning that the most important position in Lebanon, which is President of the Republic, remained vacant for two and a half years (Aljazeera net, 2016).

In fact, these successive political crises caused crises at all levels in the country, and as a quick example, the crisis of dealing with solid waste in Lebanon, which has emerged in 2015, but the roots of this crisis extended to decades that made Lebanon seem to be a failed state, according to the statement of Tammam Sallam, Prime Minister in 2107

"“In the first six months of last year, we had six cases of lung cancer,” said Ali Soufan, a pulmonary specialist at Alaa Eddine hospital. “In the past six months, we had 60.”

Dr Soufan blames the increase on the widespread burning of rubbish, an ad hoc solution to Lebanon's latest waste-disposal crisis which began more than two years ago when the country's main landfill closed, leaving refuse to pile up on streets.

The rubbish crisis has become a potent example of the Lebanese state's dysfunction. Former prime minister Tammam Salam called Lebanon a “failed state” in May last year after members of parliament failed to elect a government despite meeting more than three dozen times”. (Enders, 2017)

All this shows that the sectarian power sharing form was not able to achieve security, economic and social stability in Lebanon. In this study, I have relied on WGI.

2.5LEBANON STATE BY NUMBERS

Worldwide Governance Indicator based on a long-standing research program of the World Bank, The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2017, for six dimensions of governance:

- Voice and Accountability.
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence.
- Government Effectiveness.
- Regulatory Quality.
- Rule of Law.
- Control of Corruption.

These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety


of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.

This study, relied on this indicator to monitor the security and political stability, absence of terrorism, control of corruption, increase the effectiveness of the government and the role of law in the country during the years following the civil war and Al Taif Agreement. Results have not been as aspired by the Lebanese.


2.5.1 Voice and Accountability

Perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013).

Chart 0-1. Lebanon, Estimate, Voice and Accountability




According to (Chart 2-1), we see that Lebanon in the period from 1998, since the adoption of sectarian sharing power form, which approved in Al Taif Agreement to the end of 2017, did not achieve any improvement in voice and accountability indicator, meaning that the sectarian formula did not help improve the chances of the Lebanese citizen in participation in the selection of his governments and not even in questioning those responsible for the outcome of their decisions. Moreover, Lebanon was not able to get a better ranks compared to the rest of the countries and remained in low ranks in terms of voice and accountability in all twenty-five years of this sectarian sharing power form and (Chart 2-2) illustrates that.

Chart 0-2. Lebanon, rank ,Voice and Accountability

2.5.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism (Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013).

Chart 0-3. Lebanon, Estimate, Political Stability No Violence

This indicator measures the government's stability in the absence of coup attempts and change of the political system and the absence of terrorist operations in the country concerned, which helps the political stability that is reflected on the economy and society positively.


According to (Chart 2-3), Lebanon achieved very slow growth in the years following Al Taif Agreement, and then there was a political instability in 2003 and reached the lowest level in 2007. Despite Lebanon's return to stability somewhat, but it remained low, in the sense the sectarian sharing power form also couldn't improve the political stability of Lebanon or prevent the political violence, as I have already explained.

(Chart 2-4 **Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.**) shows the significant decline of Lebanon among the countries. And what happened in Lebanon in terms of Political Stability and Absence of Violence after Al Taif Agreement was not good in any way. In the sense that the sectarian power sharing form could not provide Lebanon with any political stability or more participation of Lebanese citizens in selecting their governments.

Chart 0-4. Lebanon ,rank, Political Stability No Violence



2.5.3 Government Effectiveness

Chart 0-5. Lebanon, Estimate, Government Effectiveness

"Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013).

We can note from (Chart 0-4Chart 2-5) that there has been no change since the civil war in 1996 until the adaption of power sharing form developed by Al Taif Agreement. The observer of power sharing forms can observe that ethnic or sectarian formulas often cause paralysis in the government decision. As each sect wants to use the part of authority which it controls to further empower itself, while the other sects want to obstruct the decisions and services that can benefit the other sects, and this paralyzes the state institutions. This made Lebanon unable to appoint a President of the Republic, the most important position in the state, for a period of two and a half years, and led the crisis of the disposal of solid waste to very bad stages and the crisis continues and worsens as clear in (Figure 2-1).

Figure 0-1. Garbage has piled up, even along streets, in Beirut's waste crisis (Martin Jay (Beirut) 2017)



It is clear that successive Lebanese governments have declined in the levels of effectiveness compared with other countries. (Chart 2-6) shows how Lebanon has declined compared to the other countries in terms of Government Effectiveness Indicator since the implementation of sectarian sharing power form in 1998 to 2017.





Chart 0-6. Lebanon, rank, Government Effectiveness

2.5.4 Regulatory Quality

"Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development"
(Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013).

Chart 0-7. Lebanon, Estimate, Regulatory Quality




As in (Chart 2-7) the indicator measures the regulatory quality that helps the private sector to grow, as private sector growth helps the overall growth of the state and helps it to assume its responsibilities. It is known that the private sector has been affected during civil war 1975-1990, but when the war has ended, the sectarian sharing power that resulted from Al Taif Agreement couldn't help to establish the regulatory that can support the private sector, or help to rebuild the infrastructure needed by the private sector to recover. The regulatory of the private sector remained, as shown in the chart, below the minimum, which led to significant declines in the growth of the private sector, according to UNDP report of Lebanese private sector published in 2015, in which reported:

"According to the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, Lebanon ranked 103rd out of 148 countries in the 2013-2014 period. The main hindering factors for doing business were inadequate supply of infrastructure, corruption, inefficient government bureaucracy, government instability/coup, policy instability, and access to financing. The entrepreneurial environment is vulnerable to all these challenges, in addition to the inefficient judiciary system that weakens

property rights and discourages any sort of entrepreneurial initiative" (UNDP, 2015).


We see in (Chart 2-8 **Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.**) a clear decline in Lebanon's rank compared with the countries studied in WGI indicator. Despite the strong need of Lebanon for its private sector in the reconstruction and restore stability, but the successive governments, with their sharing form, failed to formulate regulatory that could make Lebanon attractor to the local private sector or to foreign investments. **Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.**

Chart 0-8. Lebanon ,rank , Regulatory Quality




2.5.5 Rule of Law

Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013).


Chart 0-9. Lebanon, Estimate, Rule of Law

We can expect the data that Rule of Law indicator can provide, as in (Chart 2-9), because it is difficult, in the midst of the major political and sectarian-based disputes, to have an environment of trust by applying the laws equally among the citizens and institutions by the government. And it is difficult, in the midst of the political instability we have talked about earlier, for the police and the courts to be neutral, but crimes are expected in the absence of political stability. This is very clear in (Chart 2-9) and also in (Chart 2-10) which indicates to a significant decline of Lebanon compared with the countries included in this indicator, where it has declined from 40% in 1998 to 20% in 2017.

Chart 0-10. Lebanon, rank ,Rule of Law

2.5.6 Control of Corruption

Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. (Washington, DC. Patent No. CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO , 2013)


Chart 0-11. Lebanon, Estimate, Control of Corruption

Controlling corruption and restricting personal interests in making decision and using of government institutions are of the most important reasons for achieving governance in any country, where a specific group is prevented to control the country's resources and the citizen is allowed to question the officials. But Lebanon



is one of the most remote countries in controlling corruption. Knowing that the indicator of controlling corruption used in the study is concerned with political, administrative and economic corruption. (Chart 2-11) shows the decline of the indicator as of 1998, year of implementing Al Taif Agreement, the national charter based on sectarian sharing power.

(Chart 2-12) also shows that Lebanon's still declines compared to other countries in terms of controlling corruption, as it declined from 40.72% in 1998 to 14.90% in 2017. This is a clear indication that the sectarian power sharing form has not succeeded in Lebanon.

Chart 0-12. Lebanon ,rank ,Control of Corruption



(Chart 2-13) and (Chart 2-14) summarize Lebanese situation in terms of WGI indicator and the decline of Lebanon at almost all levels. Despite the cessation of the civil war and the multiple attempts by the international community to help Lebanon to recover, however, unless there is a way of ruling that can take advantage of the opportunities and develop methods that can overcome the disadvantages left by a long civil war, the situation will turn to what is happening in Lebanon now.

Chart 0-13. Lebanon, Estimate**Chart 0-14. Lebanon, rank**

Through the Lebanese case study we may be we can find, adoption of sharing power is an important form to stop civil wars and move to stability if this formula is integrative or what called “centripetalism” while the case of Lebanon and the type of power sharing was Consociational Power Sharing which led Lebanon to further deterioration and is now feared to reach the degree of failed countries.

CHAPTER 3

IRAQ AND POWER SHARING

3.1 INTRODUCTION FOR IRAQ

3.1.1 Ethnic and Religious Division in Iraq

Kurds are distributed among four regional countries which are Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, so any Kurdish disorder in any of these countries affect the remaining three countries, thus this disorder has an international dimension. Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslims, so no noticeable disorders had happened before the foreign interventions in Iraq and Kurds had involved in the society like other nationalities that entered Islam and participated in building its civilization in the various Caliphates that had ruled the region, whether Al Rashidiya, Umayyad, Abbasid or Ottoman, especially as they had wide local authorities granted to them by the Ottoman Empire under joint agreements concluded between the Ottomans and the various tribes of Kurds. Kurds had been affected by the Ottoman Safavid conflict which had been ended by dividing Kurdistan into two parts, Iranian and Ottoman. However, Kurds had been likely to stand by the Ottoman Caliphate, especially they had wide local authorities and Safavid regime was pressuring them with its Shiite doctrine where they were Sunni Muslims. "Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq were living together in one country. After "Jaldiran" war in which Sultan "Yavuz Salim" had won over "*Shah Ismail Safavi*" in 1514, the majority of the Kurdish tribes had become under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire. In the time of the Ottoman Empire, "Kurdistan" term had been used for the geographical area in which the Kurds had lived. After the Kurdish tribes had agreed to join the Ottoman Empire, within the state of Diyarbakir, 11 districts had been given to the Ottoman palace and 8 districts had been given to the Kurdish tribes. Kurds living in Iran had suffered from pressure of Shiite ideology

during the Safavid dynasty that had ruled the country from 1501 to 1736. For this reason, the Kurdish tribal princes had supported Sultan Yavoz Salim" (Brief of the history of Kurds in the Middle East, 2015). However, Dr. Jassem al-Shammari, in his research published in the Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, has noted that the name of Kurdistan had appeared only in the 17th century when the English ambitions of the region had begun to take place. *"Naming of northern Iraq by Kurdistan Iraq had dated back to the 17th century, when the British had tried to divide the Ottoman Empire, and the British Captain John McDonald Keys had been considered the first one who name Kurdistan in his book (Journey to Asia Minor, Armenia and Kurdistan) in 1818 AD"* (Jassim, Kurds and the Conciliatory System in Iraq. Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, 2017). Kurdish had not appeared as a nationality after their joining Islam in the time of the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab, where the Islamic conquests had reached the Persian Empire and Kurds were following it and their religion was Zoroastrianism. Kurdish nationality had appeared by British support at the end of the nineteenth century with the beginning of the dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate and specifically with Sever Treaty in 1920, taking advantage the rising of Arab nationalism and Turian nationalism. *"The historian MacDowell, a specialist in the history of Kurds had mentioned that Kurds had appeared as a nationality in the second half of the nineteenth century, while the historian Bernard Lewis had said that the sense of Kurdish identity, and then nationality had appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, and this feeling had developed rapidly for several factors, among which the British Empire had considered Kurds as an issue of an integrated nation for which the West had to defend. Kurd nationality had appeared among the Kurds in the early twentieth century as a reaction to the Turkish and Arab nationalities that began to be promoted for since the end of the nineteenth century"* (Jassim, Kurds and the Conciliatory System in Iraq. Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, 2017). British had been stirring up the strife between Kurds and Arabs and between Kurds and Turk, and Mahmoud Barzanji was not the only one who had been exploited by the British and deported to India and then returned to Sulaymaniyah to use him again, and when his role had ended, they had got rid of him.

Kurdish issue is one of the most important contemporary issues in Iraq, and Kurds are key players in the participatory power in Iraq. The following timeline shows the main stations in the Kurdish issue in Iraq.

3.1.2 Religious Division in Iraq

Despite the fact that Muslims constitute 95% of the population in Iraq, they are divided into Shiites by 60% and Sunni by 40%. Since the exact statistics are absent, the above percentages are the highest estimates. Many researchers say that the percentages of Shiites and Sunnis are very close, and some others say Sunnis are 60% and Shiites are 40%, due to the great tribal overlap and non-discrimination between Shiites and Sunnis before the separation of Iraq from the Ottoman Empire which had made the figures inaccurate. The real meaning is that there is no minority and the majority is Sunni Shiite.

Sunni governments had ruled Iraq sequentially, in addition Shiites had not received the modern education, which had made most of the employees of the administrations of Sunni rather than Shiites all the time. This may had made the Orientalists and the forces, that had wanted to have a share in Iraq, talk about the rule of Sunni minority to the Shiite majority and focus on the issue of Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and Arabs almost permanently in order to intervene in the affairs of the region in general and Iraq in particular, especially since the attacks of Europe to Iraq had been faced by resistance and standing with the Ottoman state as a single Islamic attitude not interested in any doctrinal differences, if any. Even nationalities or fanaticism of the race had no real existence as the belonging to religion was the most visible. Sheikh Dr. Mustafa Al-Sibai, may God have mercy on him, had mentioned in his book "Masterpieces of Our Civilization" examples of religious tolerance. He had quoted Khalaf bin Al-Muthanna as an example of the popular scientific seminars that had been held in the second century AH. As Khalaf says: *"We had seen 10 people in Basra gathering in a council, they were the most knowledgeable and intellect, they are: Al Khalil Ibn Ahmad Grammar Founder (Sunni), Al-Hamiri, a poet (Shiite), Saleh ibn Abdul-Qudus (irreligious), Bashar Ibn Burd (libertine and impudent), Hammad Ajrad (irreligious), Ibn Ra's Al Jalout (Jew), Ibn Nazir Almutakalem (Christian), Amr ibn al-Moiyad (magian), and Ibn Sinan Al Harrani (Sabee). They were meeting to read poems and share the news"*

(Mohsen, 2014) . These images had continued to the last era of the Ottoman Empire, in the sense that sectarian strife were an exception not a rule in the period before the fall of the Ottoman Empire. *"The researcher in the history of Sunni-Imam relations since the emergence of Islam until now would find that they were not break up relations in most stages of history, rather the social, political and intellectual communication had continued despite the deep differences between the two schools over the time. The most important features of the communication: the sense of participation in religion, history, identity, belonging, destiny, and stand in one row in front of the common enemy. I have illustrated in my book "Impact of the Crusades on Sunni – Shiite Relations" how the Crusade campaigns had united Sunni and Shia - Imams in the Levant"* (Mokhtar, 2015).

"Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law" (The Sunni-Shia Divide 'council on foreign relations, 2016).

The fact that Shiite-Sunni conflict had intensified and took its current form only after the success of the Iranian revolution and Khomeini's adoption of the Shiite doctrine as a political background to intervene in the affairs of the region. Knowing that the dispute over the rule in the region between Iran and the Ottoman state had passed through many stages but it has no a sectarian dimension. The emergence of Saudi Arabia as a country aspiring to play a key role in the region had contributed to the emergence of the sectarian dimension, as Saudi Arabia considers Sunni doctrine is a major background for its ambitions, especially that Mecca and Medina are part of it, and that the Kingdom has found another dimension in Arab nationalism, in the sense that it is a Sunni Arab state that has a conflict with a Persian Shiite state on the rule in the region. This conflict had led to the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war in 1980 AD and supporting Saudi Arabia to Iraq in this war which lasted for 8 years and ended with no winner or loser, but had been shown as a Sunni – Shiite war. Below there is a picture of the timeline for the growing Shiite-Sunni conflict in the modern era, although in some of its sentences there are some of fallacies like considering the rule

of Saddam Hussein is a rule of Sunni minority to a Shiite majority, but it illustrates important stations in fueling Sunni - Shiite conflict. Timeline is taken from the council on foreign relations. Source is in the references.

3.1.3 Modern Sunni-Shia Tensions

(The Sunni-Shia Divide ‘council on foreign relations, 2016).

1. **Jan. 16 1979**, Iran’s Islamic revolution, which brought Shias to power in 1979, and the Sunni backlash have fueled a competition for regional dominance. This timeline highlights Sunni-Shia tensions in recent decades. Iran's Islamic Revolution. Iran’s ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, flees the country after months of increasingly massive protests. Exiled Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns and leads an Islamic republic based on a constitution that grants him religious and political authority under the concept of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”). Khomeini is named supreme leader and starts to export the Islamic revolution, which is viewed with suspicion by Sunni rulers in countries with significant Shia populations, such as Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.
2. **December 24, 1979**, Soviet Army Invades Afghanistan. Soviet forces invade Afghanistan after the communist government in Kabul requests military aid to fight Islamist rebels. The insurgents, known as mujahadeen (“those who fight jihad”), attract mainly Afghan fighters and are augmented by thousands of foreign Sunni fighters, including a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden. Weapons and cash for the mujahadeen are supplied through Pakistan by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The war, which is framed as a resistance to Soviet occupation, raises the profile of fundamentalist Sunni movements.
3. **July 5, 1980**, Shia Protests in Pakistan Expose Sectarian Tensions. Tens of thousands of Shias protest in Islamabad against the imposition of some Sunni laws on all Muslims. Pakistan’s president gives Shias an exemption, but the sectarian confrontation becomes an important political issue in the country. Sunni groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba, funded by Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia, kill thousands of Shias over the next three decades. Smaller Shia sectarian militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Jafria also emerge but are responsible for fewer attacks.

4. **September 22, 1980**, Iraq Sparks a War with Iran. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, a Sunni ruling over a majority-Shia country who fears the spillover effects of the Iranian Revolution, sends his troops to occupy part of an oil-rich province in Iran. The move sparks an eight-year war, resulting in roughly one million deaths. Iraq is backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, the latter responding to hostility from Tehran's new government following the Islamic revolution and taking hostage of U.S. diplomats.

5. **February 28, 1991**, Saddam Crushes Shia Insurgency After Gulf War. Riots erupt in the Shia cities of Basra and Najaf after U.S.-led allies drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait and route them on the battlefield in the first Gulf War. The Shia protestors are in part motivated by a perception that they will receive U.S. backing if they turn against Saddam. U.S. officials say this was never promised. Saddam's forces mount a brutal crackdown, killing tens of thousands of Shias, shelling the shrines of Najaf and Karbala and razing parts of Shia towns.

6. **August 8, 1998**, Taliban Massacres Shia in Mazar-e-Sharif. Taliban militants, Sunni fundamentalists who seized power after the defeat of Soviet forces, capture the city of Mazar-i Sharif in northwest Afghanistan. The Taliban kills at least two thousand Shias in Mazar-i Sharif and Bamiyan in 1997 and 1998. The offensive in northwest Afghanistan, backed by Pakistan, helps the Taliban consolidate power in the country. Militants kill eight Iranian diplomats based in Mazar-i Sharif, prompting Tehran to deploy its troops to the border, but United Nations mediation averts a confrontation.

7. **September 11, 2001**, Al-Qaeda Strikes the U.S., Killing Thousands. In response to the attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. forces pursue al-Qaeda leaders and militants to their bases in Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban government. U.S.-led international troops help set up a new order in the country. The toppling of the anti-Iranian Taliban government in Afghanistan, followed shortly thereafter by the U.S. invasion of Iraq that brings down another Iranian foe, Saddam Hussein, fans Sunni fears in Jordan and Gulf states of a Shia revival.

8. **March 19, 2003**, U.S. Forces Topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq. A coalition led by the United States invades Iraq and ends Saddam's regime and centuries of Sunni dominance in Iraq. Sectarian violence erupts as remnants of the deposed Ba'ath party and other Sunnis, both secular and Islamist, mount a resistance against coalition forces and their local allies, the ascendant Shia community. Shia militias

also emerge, some of which also oppose the U.S. military presence. Foreign Sunni militants, many affiliated with al-Qaeda, flock to Iraq to participate in what evolves into a sectarian war. Iranian influence in Iraq grows dramatically as Tehran backs Shia militants, as well as the Shia political parties that come to dominate the electoral process.

9. **February 14, 2005**, Assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is killed in a car bomb after spearheading an effort to raise international pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces, which have been in Lebanon since 1976. His assassination is seen as a Syrian plot supported by Syria's Lebanese allies, including Hezbollah, and leads to massive demonstrations that convince Syria to withdraw. The assassination and subsequent mobilization pit the Lebanese Sunni community, whom Hariri had come to represent, against Hezbollah and Lebanese Shias, who remain allied with Syria. Lebanese Christians split, with some supporting the Hariri camp and others supporting Hezbollah.

10. **February 22, 2006**, Bombing of Shia Shrine Escalates Iraq Violence. Sectarian killings become normal in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shia militias targeting civilians across the country. The bombing that destroys the golden dome of al-Askari mosque in Samarra, home to the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Shia Imams, triggers a more intense wave of violence that almost doubles the monthly civilian death toll in Iraq to nine hundred.

11. **December 30, 2006**, Saddam's Execution Inflames Sunnis. Saddam Hussein, responsible for the deaths of thousands of Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, is executed amid taunts by witnesses who chant the name of Shia cleric and Mahdi army militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. The unruly scene, captured on video, elevates Saddam's status as a martyr among many Sunnis in the region and underscores the new reality of rising Shia power in Iraq.

12. **February 11, 2011**, Protests Erupt in the Middle East Exposing Sectarian Fault Lines. A wave of pro-democracy protests sweeps across the region, starting with the overthrow of Tunisia's president, and then Egypt's on February 11, eventually spreading to other Arab states in what is known as the "Arab Spring" or the "Arab Awakening." Iranian officials welcome the fall of long-term U.S. allies like Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, and unrest in Bahrain, home to an oppressed Shia majority. As protests reach Syria in March, Tehran backs the government,

which is dominated by Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect, while the opposition is dominated by members of the majority Sunni community. Dormant sectarian tensions in Syria are revived and a regional sectarian showdown begins.

13. **August 30, 2012**, Egypt's Morsi Visits Iran. President Mohamed Morsi's trip to Tehran, the first visit by an Egyptian leader since Cairo's recognition of Israel in the 1980s, signals the potential for a new relationship between Iran and Sunni Islamists. Iran tries to rebrand the remarks that Iranian officials criticize.

14. **October 1, 2012**, Hezbollah Commander Killed in Syria. Civil war divides Syrians largely along sectarian lines, with Sunnis supporting rebels, and Alawis, Shias, and other minorities backing the Assad regime. Foreign Sunni fighters trickle and then flood into the country, and signs of increased involvement from Iran and its Lebanese proxy militia, Hezbollah, emerge. The death of Hezbollah founding member Ali Hussein Nassif comes months before the group publicly acknowledges its role in the war. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries fund rebels, turning the fighting in Syria into a regional proxy war.

15. **April 8, 2013**, Al-Qaeda's Iraq Affiliate Expands in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda's affiliate in the country, extends its activities into Syria, creating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Known for its brutality against Shias and most Sunnis who oppose it, the group proves to be too extreme for al-Qaeda and is eventually expelled from the network. ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria add an additional layer of sectarian violence to the region, and its control of territory in both states threatens to dissolve borders and fracture countries in the Middle East.

16. **April 20, 2014**, Anti-Shia Sentiments Spread to Indonesia. Asian Muslims, influenced by the sectarian violence in the Middle East and Pakistan, aim to avoid potential tensions by suppressing the growth of their tiny Shia communities. Indonesian clerics and radical Islamists hold an "Anti-Shia Alliance" meeting in the world's largest Muslim country, which is more than 99 percent Sunni. Malaysia, where Sunnis are also dominant, has implemented laws forbidding the propagation of the Shia faith.

17. **June 20, 2014**, Shia Militias Mobilize as ISIS Advances in Iraq. ISIS militants and other armed Sunni groups seize Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, with little resistance from the Iraqi army. The Sunni insurgency, brewing for years in response to what it sees as exclusionary policies of Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, expands toward Baghdad and the borders with Syria and Jordan. ISIS

threatens to destroy sacred Shia shrines, prompting a call to arms by Iraq's top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Shia civilians respond to a mass recruitment drive that swells the ranks of militias and elevates sectarian tensions.

18. **February 21, 2015**, Houthis Storm Sana'a. Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, Yemen's president, flees Sana'a after the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group in the country, take over the capital Sana'a. Al-Qaeda uses the Houthi advance to attract recruits and improve its standing among Yemen's Sunnis. Tehran praises the Houthi takeover, and Iranian civilian flights land in Sana'a for the first time in twenty-five years. Saudi Arabia, backed by nine Sunni-majority countries and the United States, launches air strikes against Houthi targets in March.

19. **January 3, 2016**, Saudi Arabia Cuts Ties With Iran. Saudi Arabia breaks off diplomatic relations with Iran for the first time since 1988–90. The escalation comes a day after Saudi Arabia executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a Shia cleric who had led antigovernment protests in the country's east, where a Shia minority lives atop major oil reserves. Iran's leaders denounced the execution, and the Saudis broke off ties after Iranian protestors stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran and a consulate in Mashhad. The crisis threatens U.S. efforts to broker a settlement to the Syrian civil war with both Iranian and Saudi participation. Saudi allies Bahrain and Sudan break off diplomatic relations, and the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait downgrade relation with Iran.

These events continue to this day, and the Saudi-Iranian conflict is raging to the present day in Bab al-Mandab, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This conflict takes a form of Sectarian Shiite-Sunni conflict. In addition, there were popular uprisings in Iran, many of which had a form of Sunni - Arab that is anti-Persian - Shiite control, especially in the Iranian province of Ahwaz, whose majority is Arab.

3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR IRAQ

3.2.1 Iraq during Ottoman Period

"Iraq is considered one of the largest Arab Orient Countries, bordered to the north by Jordan, and from the west by Syria. Its area is 438,446 km², its capital is Baghdad and its most important cities are Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk. Its current

population is more than 38 million of which about 70% are Arabs, 15% are Kurds, 15 % are other minorities. Muslims are 95% of the total population: 40% Sunni and 60% Shiite. Iraq is the eastern half of the Fertile Crescent, while Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine are the western half, and this part had been known for centuries by Syria" (Suhail, 2015, p. 17).

In the late Ottoman Empire, the military and financial institutions had weakened and the conquests had stopped as well as the administrative and financial corruption had spread. European countries had made intensive attempts to intervene in various states, including Iraq, and despite the successful reform attempts by Sultan Mahmoud II to abolish Janissary institution to reorganize the army according to modern foundations, but Iraq had not benefit from these reforms because the Mameluke regime had controlled the local army. However, the successive reform attempts had succeeded in ending Mameluke rule completely. Although this had allowed for the modern reforms, but it had caused a gap that allowed the European countries to intervene to fill it. *"Whatever had been said about the two Ottoman reform decrees Gülhane Hattı Şerif (Supreme Edict of the Rose house) or Tanzimât Fermânı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) in 1255 AH / 1839 AD and Charitable Organizations Line in 1272 AH / 1856 AD, which had promised to carry out the reforms and to respect the rights of individuals, but these promises had come into force only during the reign of Iraq Governor, Medhat Pasha. Many Iraqi historians are dating the beginning of the renaissance of modern Iraq when Medhat Pasha had taken over the state of Baghdad, who had been considered one of the leading pioneers of reform in Ottoman state at that time. At that time the law of the States had issued in 1262 AH / 1846 to organize the process of participation of the people in the management of the country in cooperation with the governing authorities and the joint administrative bodies. Medhat Pasha had divided Iraq into two states: Baghdad and Mosul" (Suhail, 2015, pp. 96,97,98).*

For various reasons, it had been said that the English ambassador had played a role in this through the machinations that he had made against Mahdat Pasha at Sublime Porte. Mahdat Pasha had submitted his resignation and it had been accepted by Sultan, making the governors who had come after him start from where he had stopped. At that time, when the Western ambitions in Iraq were so great not only by

Britain, but also France, Austria and even Russia were waiting for opportunities to enter the region through Iraq, there was another interest which was German interest about Iraq, which had not carried expansionist ambitions, but had been looking forward to the economics. The forefront of this interest was the trip of Von Moltke to Iraq in 1835 AD who had participated later in a military campaign against Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali Pasha with the French colonel France Suleiman (Joseph Antelmi C). Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who had taken over the power in 1876, had inclined to have relations with the Germans because the English had had a wide influence in different regions of the Ottoman Empire, and Sultan Abdul Hamid wanted to limit this influence, so he had invited the Emperor Guillaume or Wilhelm II to visit the Ottoman Caliphate. The Emperor had met this invitation in October 1898 and stayed for about a month during which he had visited Istanbul, Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem, and had signed many agreements and the most important one was establishing a railway linking Berlin, Istanbul and Baghdad, which had been expected to arrive to the port of Kuwait. *"In fact, this privilege was mainly due to the diplomatic effort and activity of the German ambassador of Istanbul "Marshall von Bieberstein" (1897-1912). This project had aimed to give Germany the greatest influence and create German privileges for activities between the Mediterranean, Arab Gulf and along the banks of Degla and Euphrates rivers, where it had been benefited from the crops of the fertile land"* (Jordanian Journal of History and Antiquities, 2012). In addition, this privilege had allowed for minerals exploration at a depth of 20 km from either side of the railway. Granting Baghdad Railway privilege had made many European countries dissatisfied, and the most discontented country was England which had rushed to Kuwait and concluded agreements with Kuwaiti deputy under which he had been prevented to do anything in Kuwait without the consent of the British government, in addition, other agreements had been concluded later with Germany under which Berlin-Baghdad line had to stop in Basra and requests the consent of the British government for any extension of this railway. Soon World War I had begun in which the Ottoman Empire was with Germany, but they had both lost the war and the German dream of expanding to the east had ended. The results of this war had allowed the British to impose control of Iraq under Sykes-Picot Agreement. *"International conditions had existed in 1914, which helped Britain to impose its control over Iraq: World War I had begun and Turkey along with Germany were against Britain, France and Russia, which had*

given Britain justification to attack Iraq, so it had sent a military campaign from Bombay in India on 29 Dhu al-Qadah / 19 October, led by General Delamin, landed in Bahrain and bombed Iraqi locations in Shatt al-Arab in preparation for landing in Basra, and on 17 Dhu al-Hijjah / 6 November landed near Shatt al-Arab and took over the FAO" (Suhail, 2015, p. 114).

3.2.2 Iraq under British Mandate

Entry of Ottoman Empire alongside Germany in World War I in 1914 justified the British attack on Iraq and the attempt to control it, so the British commissioned the Government of British India to attack Iraq. Their first army landed in Bahrain and began bombing Iraqi territories from Bahrain, occupied Fao and arrived to Basra. The battles continued between British army and Ottoman – clan one for two years, but in 1916, the British had forced to surrender completely to Ottoman army without any restriction or condition. Again in 1917 they were able to occupy Baghdad, and from this year Ottoman state had not any control over Iraq with its current borders, especially after the British insisting on obtaining Mosul, which was for French according to Sykes-Picot.

Iraq was officially under British tutelage during Saint-Raymond Conference in 1920. This year was the start of Iraqi revolutions against British occupation, which suffered heavy losses. Historically, Iraqi rebels were Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Sunnis and Shiites without exception (Suhail, 2015, p. 116).

Although British Appointed King Faisal bin Al Hussein as a king of Iraq, in the sense that Iraq was declared as a monarchy in 1920, but Iraqis did not convince that the British stopped the occupation of Iraq and Iraqi-British disputes remained. Also Turkey intervened against British requesting to join Mosul to it considering it as a part of Turkish Republic, the successor of Ottoman Empire. Attempts to establish the State of Iraq continued until 1932, when it was accepted as a member of League of Nations.

3.2.3 Iraq under the Period of Independence:

Iraq remained as constitutional monarchy under the reign of King Faisal, who died in 1933, inheriting the power to his son, the young king Ghazi, who was

mysteriously killed in 1939, perhaps because he was resisting the British and obstructing the formation of pro-governments for them.

No real Iraqi States had been formed with its institutions for the past period and the military coups to control the governments in Iraq has continued, as well as the outbreak of World War II led to more British intervention in the most accurate details of the rule in Iraq under the terms of the treaty of 1930 between Iraq and Britain which lasted for 25 years. After the end of World War II in 1945, Iraqis were fed up with British intervention and the feeling of Pan-Arab nationalism increased until 1958, when Abdul Karim Qasim assisted by Abdul Salam Aref, the officers in Iraqi army began what they called a revolution.

3.3POLITICAL SYSTEM IN IRAQ AFTER US INVASION 2003

Royal Hashemite Monarchy had fell in Iraq in 1958 and the young king Faisal II and the guardian of the throne Prince Abdul-Elah bin Ali al-Hashemi had been executed and most of the royal family except the wife of the guardian of the throne, uncle of the prince Abdul-Elah, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said had been killed, by a popular uprising full of the nationalist spirit resisting the English domination, especially that the English had betrayed the Arabs in Palestine and offered all the assistance to establish the State of Israel after they had made Balfour's promise to the Jews. *"A council of sovereignty of three members had been formed: Lieutenant General Mohammed Najib Al-Rubaie, Colonel Khalid Al-Naqshbandi and Mr. Mohammad Mehdi Kubba. The ministry had been formed headed by Abdel Karim Kassem and Abdel Salam Aref as deputy, in which representatives of Independence parties, National Democratic Party, Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party and Communist Party had participated"* (Suhail, 2015, p. 268). *"Iraqi revolution had caused a violent shock in the Middle East, it had put an end to Baghdad's pro-Western coalition, and Iraqi government had become hostile to Shah of Iran, and threatened Hashemite rule in Jordan"* (Suhail, 2015, p. 267).

"The West had been afraid of a state that include Iraq, Egypt and Syria under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser that can control all Arab countries and threatens the interests of the United States and Europe in the Gulf region in general, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular, and be a rival to the Zionist entity and

Turkey. So the United States and Britain had prevented the revolution from expanding, and the Marines had come to Beirut and the British to Jordan to support the regimes of the two countries and prevent them from being controlled by the nation-states" (Suhail, 2015, p. 268). But Abdul Karim Kassem had reassured the West that he had no intention to join United Arab Republic and he had fulfilled his promise when he had prevented President Gamal Abdel Nasser from landing in Baghdad when Nasser was returning from the visit of Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev. The relations had continued tense between the two parties until the end of the reign of Abdul Karim Kassem in 1963, but this did not reassure the Americans because the political tensions inside Iraq had led Abdul Karim Kassem to get closer to Iraqi Communist Party, the largest Iraqi parties at the time, in addition Abdul Karim Kassem had begun a policy of diversifying the armament of the Iraqi army and desired to cancel the British and Western arming of the Iraqi army. *"After the revolution of 14 July 1958, the idea of cancelling the armament of the army ,which was West Britain, had appeared, and in mid-August 1958 a meeting had held in the Ministry of Defense headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and decided to send military delegations to the former Soviet Union, and on 31 October 1958, a technical cooperation agreement had been concluded in Moscow, under which the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Iraq with the weapons, aircraft and transport vehicles demanded by it by installments", and this had made US administration more worried about the status of Iraq and its closeness to the Soviet Union. In the middle of the Cold War the CIA took Iraq very seriously. In 1959 Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Iraq today is the most dangerous spot on earth. More specifically the danger to western interests came from an intense, unmarried army officer with a thin voice called General Abdel Karim Kassem, who had just overthrown the Hashemite monarchy installed by Britain to rule Iraq at the end of the First World War"* (Khalil, 2009).

At the same time, Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party was not comfortable with the approach of Abdul Karim Kassem of Iraqi Communist Party, especially Abdul Salam Aref, the second man in the government of Abdul Karim Kassem and his partner in the coup in 1958, was leading Arab nationalist trend, which was calling for Arab unity with the United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt headed by

Abdel Nasser. This had created common factors between US intelligence and Arab Baath Socialist Party and there are many indications that US intelligence began to deal with Saddam Hussein, especially in the period of his presence in Cairo. According to the author and National Security Council employee Roger Morris, he said to Reuters *"There in Cairo, CIA contacted with Saddam and others"* (Jalil, 2006, p. c1). Many Arabs, Americans and others writers had confirmed with the evidences the involvement of US intelligence in the Baathist coup in 1963 against Abdul Karim Kassem as a compromise between Iraqi Communist Party and Nasser's leadership in the Arab region. *"In 1996 Malek Mufti had published his book "Sovereign Creations" and the ninth section of this book whose title: "Renewed Unionism: 1963-1964-1963-1964(31)", had a lot of information. Mufti had summarized the information contained in Batato' book "Old Social Layers" and Penrose's book: "Iraq: International Relations and National Development ", then added information about the controversy between Syrian Baathists and Iraqi Baathists, which he got from an interview conducted with former Syrian Minister Jamal Atassi (32). This had provided further documentation of US cooperation in the coup 1963.*

Perhaps Saeed k. Abu Rish is considered one of the most prominent authors of the American intervention in Iraq from 1958 to 1963. His books, "A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite" issued in 1997, and "Saddam Hussein: The Policy of Revenge " issued in 2000, had acknowledged the research of earlier authors such as Malek Mufti, Hanna Batato, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Marion and Peter Sluglitt, but he had gone much further. His outstanding contribution is to add detailed information he has acquired with his personal experience, as well as by numerous interviews with personalities who played key roles in the coup 1963, such as James Critchfield, CIA Middle East official in 1963, and Hani al-Fakiki, member of the Baath Party leadership in 1963, and many Americans and other Iraqis, named by name or those whose names remain secret. "A Brutal Friendship" had quoted 58 interviews by name and 29 interviews without name (33). Also "Saddam Hussein" had quoted 67 interviews by name and 46 interviews without name" (Jalil, 2006, p. c2).

After the successful coup in 1963 led by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and executing Abdul Karim Kassem, Arab Baath Socialist party had dominated the rule of Iraq, but it had handed over the leadership to Abdul Salam Aref, the second man after former president Abdul Karim Kassem in the revolution in 1958 that had overthrew the monarchy, because Arab Socialist Baath party had realized that it couldn't govern Iraq alone due to the small number of its members who did not exceed the thousands at that time, in addition Abdel Salam Aref was famous in the army and among the people.

Abdel Salam Aref had appointed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as prime minister and Saddam Hussein as a member in the presidential office. Abdel Salam Aref had died on 13 April 1966, leaving a political gap, which his brother, Abdul Rahman Aref, tried to fill it as a President of the Republic, but he had not succeeded until Arab Baath Socialist Party had made a second coup, but not bloody, that ending the rule of Aref on 17 July 1968. *"Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr with a number of Baathists, led by the secretary of the country leadership, Saddam Hussein had entered in military uniform and awakened Abdul Rahman Aref, and when he did not find any chance for resistance, especially that he had deprived of his main basis, he had accepted to surrender and agreed to resign"* (Suhail, 2015, p. 315). Abdul Rahman Aref had chosen Istanbul as an alternative and final choice for him, and the coup seemed like the control of the falcon wing (Bake - Saddam) over the rule instead of the political wing, Aref's wing.

Two major changes had happened after the coup of Arab Baath Socialist Party against the rule of Abdul Karim Kassem:

1. Bias of power to the American influence leaving the Russian influence behind them, because the Baathist coup itself was the result of US intelligence connections with nationalists and Baathists young exist in Cairo, including Saddam Hussein. This relationship had reached to the extent that the revolutionists, after the success of the coup, had handed over Russian weapons to the American administration, including M-21 aircraft and T-54 tanks in order for the Americans to study the extent of Soviet military superiority at that time, and the Americans also have imported the weapons to the Baathists and nationalists.

2. At the time when British had used Kurdish movements to achieve their goals in fragmenting the Ottoman Empire and also when Americans had dealt with the Kurdish movements as a pressure card on any party in the region that they wish to pressure on it, the attitude of the Kurdish movement had changed after the Baathist coup in Iraq and after British and Americans had broken their promises to Kurd in obtaining a state or even a confederation or a federation. The Baathists had been assisted in launching the war against Kurds and the western turned blind to the military operations against Kurds, even to Anfal operation carried out by Baathist regime led by Saddam Hussein against civilians in the Kurdish areas in 1988 in which internationally banned nerve gas had been used causing death of large number of civilian in the Kurdish area in which the operation took place. The timeline NO 1 illustrates the Kurdish issue in Iraq and the continuous international intervention in it and its support to establish, train and arming of combat militias, which had led to make disorders in the region as a whole (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran). And the Kurdish issue had remained a source of unrest in the region as a whole until now.³

Saddam Hussein had seized power in 1970, when Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr had resigned for unclear reasons and Saddam Hussein had taken power in Iraq. Saddam Hussein directly had executed leaders in Baath Party, which could be his opponent or opposition to his rule. In 1980 a war had begun, which is the longest in the twentieth century, where it had lasted for 8 years between Iraq (Saddam Hussein) and Iran (Khomeini) and it had costed more than four hundred billion dollars and about one million dead and more of dead and wounded and massive destruction in the infrastructure of the two countries . America had remained neutral only for a very short period and then began to provide Iraq with weapons and information after it had afraid that the Iranian army might beat the Iraqi one. But also it had allowed Israel to provide Iran with weapons, making the war had no winner and no loser.

"The Reagan Administration secretly decided to provide highly classified intelligence to Iraq in the spring of 1982 more than two years earlier than previously

³ Appendix 3- Iraqi Kurdistan Profile;A chronology of key events.

disclosed while also permitting the sale of American-made arms to Bagdad in successful effort to help President Saddam Hussein avert imminent defeat in the war with Iran, former intelligence and State Department officials say. The New York Times and others reported last year that the Reagan Administration secretly decided shortly after taking office in January 1981 to allow Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of American arms and spare parts to Iran. That intervention and the decision to aid Iraq directly in 1982 provide evidence that Washington played a much greater role than was previously known in affecting the course of the long and costly Iran – Iraq war. U.S. asserted neutrality" (M. H. S., 1992) .

In the sense that America has been interfering in Iraq constantly, and it has filled the gap left by Britain after the end of the Hashemite monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. As soon as Iraq - Iran war has ended on 20 August 1988, Iraq had invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, that is less than two years after the end of the eight-year war with Iran, and had declared its full annexation to it. The invasion has taken place after 8 days of the meeting between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and US Ambassador April Catherine Glaspie, whose her statement to Iraqi president has been debated about considering it as a green light for the Iraqi president to invade Kuwait. But in fact, US ambassador's statement and US State Department's statement before that, which stated that there are no joint US-Kuwait defense agreements, indicate that the United States has given Iraq the permission to invade Kuwait, which has changed the region, its domestic policies and international policies towards it since then.

"In a now famous interview with the Iraqi leader, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam, 'We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait'. The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had 'no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait'. The United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did" (STEPHEN, 2011).

After that, United States had led 34 countries around the world, to the second Gulf War, called “Desert Storm”, which had started on 2 August 1991 and ended on 28 February of the same year. It had ended with getting Iraq out from Kuwait and

the American intervention became a tangible. This intervention had culminated by the American invasion to Iraq in 2003.

"AT 8 P.M. ON WEDNESDAY MARCH 19, 2003, the Bush Administration's 48-hour deadline for Saddam to leave Iraq expired. Shortly thereafter, the campaign to remove Saddam's regime by force -code-named 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' -began in earnest. More importantly, this date also marked the concrete beginning of a revolutionary foreign policy doctrine on the part of the U.S.-one that pledged to use preemptive war as a means of securing U.S. national security. Less noticed, but of equal significance, the attack on Iraq marked the first phase in a grand design for the moral reconstruction of the Middle East" (Gareth, 2004, p. 8/1).

At that time President George W. Bush had appointed Lewis Paul Bremer as President Envoy to Iraq on 6 May 2003, and prior to his arrival to Iraq on 12 May 2003, Paul Bremer had been appointed as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority.⁴

"President George W. Bush appointed Bremer to the position of Presidential Envoy to Iraq on May 6, 2003.2 The White House press release announcing the appointment noted that Bremer would oversee reconstruction and the creation of the institutions that would guide a democratic Iraq. CPA took ORHA's place just before Bremer's arrival in Baghdad on May 12 and his official designation as the administrator of CPA on May 13, 2003.3 With this appointment, Bremer became the senior civilian official in charge of all policy efforts in Iraq" (Bensahel Nara, 2008, p. 101).

On 16 May 2003, Bremer had issued his first decision to dissolve Arab Baath Socialist Party, the only ruling party in Iraq since 1968, as well as to liberate the past and current state institutions from Baath Party's power, in the sense Baath Party had been prevented to practice the political action. This policy had been later called by De-Ba`athification. On 23 May of the same year, about a week later, Bremer, as

⁴ Appendix 4- Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1

head of the ruling coalition (the occupying power), had issued the second decision to dissolve most of the state's institutions, with the possibility for any other institution to be subject to this decision later, and actually all state institutions had been dissolved and all expert employees of government work had been deprived from practicing their works because most of them or all of them were members of Baath Arab Socialist Party at Saddam's authority, knowing that joining Baath Party was a compulsory for state employees not an option.⁵

However, during the first two weeks of Bremer's arrival to Iraq, Iraq had no army, security forces, or any active state institutions, in addition the state officials with sensitive positions in the former state had now been considered escapee from justice due to their membership in Baath party. The first and second decisions exist in the attachments.

On 13 July 2003, Bremer had formed an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)⁶ consisting of 13 Shiites and 11 Sunnis, including 5 Kurds, 5 Arabs, 1 Turkoman member, as well as 1 Christian Assyrian member of a total of 25 members. The task of this council was not to rule, as the CPA, headed by Bremer, was the ruling power but it was an Iraqi front for the US occupation of Iraq. (The names of the members of the interim Governing Council are in appendix No. 4). It is noted, of course, the sectarian division by which the Council had been formed in terms of Shiites, Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians. In general, the sectarian issue in the rule was not clear in Iraq before the American occupation, especially for Sunnis and Shiites, so that Iraq was characterized by that there were Sunni and Shiite members in the same tribe, and the mating between Sunnis and Shiites was very natural in Iraq before 2003. The fact that Sunni were the ones holding power during Baath, is an unreal description of Iraqi reality at Saddam Hussein's time who had executed his sons of law, Hussein Kamel and Saddam, husbands of his daughters: Raghda and Rana, respectively, and they were Sunni and even from Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's

⁵ Appendix 5- Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2

⁶ Appendix 6- Iraqi Governing Council members(IGC).

hometown. After a dispute between Hussein Kamel and Saddam Hussein's son Uday, Hussein Kamel had escaped with his brother Saddam and their wives and children to Jordan and asked for asylum. King Hussein, King of Jordan had approved the asylum, but they had returned to Iraq after a letter from Saddam telling them that if they returned, they would be released, but Saddam Hussein had executed them after their return to Iraq a few days later. In the sense that the rule in Iraq was dictatorial and not sectarian in the true sense. Although the rule of Iraq was depending mostly on Sunni Community since the separation of Iraq from the Ottoman state, but the sectarian issue was not spread in the way that occurred after 2003, especially when Bremer formed the transitional Governing Council on the basis of ethnic sectarian, in which Shiites were the majority, Sunni Arab were the minority, and Kurds were shown prominently.

The political tradition in Iraq continued by the basis: a Kurdish president, a Shiite prime minister and a Sunni parliamentarian. The thing that played a role in settling the sectarianism was both an implied constitution and a foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose approach was to adopt Shiite Community wherever it was and to appear as the protector of this community, especially in Iraq, although Shiite community was not linked to Iran, neither historically nor geographically.⁷

Constitution of 2005, which is in force so far, did not explicitly state for power-sharing in sectarian or ethnic terms. However, the political tradition, as defined by Bremer in the Interim Governing Council remained the same, as the majority in taking the decision was for Shiite community, thus they hold the prime minister position and Kurds had a federal zone, which had its distinctly ethnic specificity, thus they had a legal (symbolic) position which was the President of the Republic, and Sunni Arabs had a less influential position than the Prime Minister, which was Head of the Parliament. This tradition had caused more problems and instability in Iraq at all levels, where it had not enjoyed stability since 2003, and caused great fluctuations in domestic politics that had enabled ISIS to enter Mosul in

⁷Appendix 7 Law Of Administration For The State Of Iraq For The Transitional Period

2014, after 11 years of occupation of Iraq. The army and security forces could not face “ISIS” militias, and could not liberate Mosul until the second half of 2017 after deep ethnic sectarian issues where Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) had tried to participate in the liberation of Mosul in order to preserve their share in the gains after liberation. The Shiite-dominated army forces, which was under the authority of the Shiite-affiliated prime minister, with the assistance of Shiite sectarian militia (Popular Mobilization Forces) had tried to limit the intervention of Peshmerga forces and had not accepted their support to specific areas and forced them not to exceed these areas. There was a long debate before the battle of liberation to limit any Turkish interference in order not to be any support to any priority of Sunni community in liberating Mosul. These interactions had existed at all levels of the state institutions and the permanent prime minister’s denial of the existence of the sectarian accounts has no solid evidence of the current reality of Iraq.

Iraq is still suffering from low levels of education, *"Teacher (Salman Ayef), from Aldor town in Salah al-Din province, north of Baghdad, says to “Yakeen Agency”: several classrooms in the mud school, in which he is teaching in one of the villages belonging to the area of Glam, had collapsed last year due to the strength of the rains, as well as, parts of the administration room had been damaged. Ayef asserts that this school and the schools in the neighboring villages had received over the past years many of the governorate officials who promised to rebuild them with bricks and renew them, but these promises were only electoral promises, as he said. And also the schools of the capital and the big cities do not look much better, so most of the buildings are old, some of them able to fall, they are not repaired for many years, lack for the basic necessities of modern schools, and dozens of students are accumulated in one class because there is no ability to build new classes. (Al-Ibba School) in (Al Sadr City) eastern of Baghdad is considered an example of the deteriorating educational reality in Iraq, whose ground has become a place for waste and rubble, and a large swamp of rainwater that remains until the end of the winter season. Dozens of students gather in her classes sitting on old seats that have not been changed or repainted since more than ten years"* (Education in Iraq. Problems and Challenges and Dark Future, 2017.).

As well as most sectors of the country suffer from the economic growth in addition to its suffering from further sectarian division and increasing the poverty rates, where it is reported that the area cultivated in Iraq does not exceed one quarter of arable land due to successive government policies after US invasion of Iraq. *"The economic expert 'Basem Jamil Antoine', on Tuesday, considered that the deterioration of the agriculture in the country is due to the old and bad irrigation and agriculture methods adopted by the Ministries of Agriculture and Water Resources, noting that Iraq is cultivating a quarter of arable areas and making a quarter of production compared to other countries of the same cultivated areas. He said that the rate of arable land in Iraq reaches to 40 million acres, while only 10 million acres is planting according to agricultural plans which is equivalent to a quarter of the arable area. He called for stop the policy of dredging the orchards and converting them into residential land because this has effects on the local production and increases the environmental pollutants"* (Iraq Uses a Quarter of its Area for Agriculture., 2018).

3.4 IRAQ STATE BY NUMBERS

As in Lebanese case, Worldwide Governance Indicator based on a long-standing research program of the World Bank, The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2017, for six dimensions of governance:


- Voice and Accountability.
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence.
- Government Effectiveness.
- Regulatory Quality.
- Rule of Law.
- Control of Corruption.

This study has relied on this indicator to monitor the security and political stability, absence of terrorism, control of corruption, increase the effectiveness of the government and the role of law in the country after American invasion to Iraq and implementing 2005 constitution didn't change the figures from dictatorship up to date.


Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

According to (Chart 3-1) we can see clearly that Iraq has not progressed in the indicator of the liberties, the freedom of media or Iraqis' selection of their successive governments. The indicator has remained at a weak level since Saddam Hussein' governance until after US invasion and even after the adoption of Power-Sharing form and the adoption of the Constitution of 2005 and continued under - 2.5 even 12 years after the adoption of the Constitution.

Chart 0-1. Iraq ,Estimate, Voice and Accountability




(Chart 3-2) also shows that Iraq is in the last ranks comparing to the countries measured in terms of Voice and Accountability Indicator.

Chart 0-2. Iraq, rank, Voice and Accountability

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.

According to (Chart 3-3), it is clear that the political stability in Iraq declined during US war and Iraq experienced a very bad situation which the indicator did not indicate how bad it was between 2003-2008, but it still indicates to the political instability, terrorism and violence cases until the end of 2017. Power-Sharing form could not help Iraq to reach even to the levels it had during Saddam Hussein's rule, including the years of the international siege of Iraq which lasted for 13 years since 1990.

Chart 0-3. Iraq, Estimate, Political Stability No Violence

(Chart 3-4) shows that Iraq has always been in a very late ranks of the political stability, terrorism and violence, and that the years that followed Power-Sharing form were in late ranks in comparison with the years in which Iraq has suffered from dictatorship.


Chart 0-4. Iraq, rank, Political Stability No Violence

Government effectiveness: Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.


Iraq experienced a bad reality expressed by Government Effectiveness Indicator (Chart3-5) and remained under - 2.5, which reflected the poor reality of

Iraqi governments in terms of their effectiveness and being away from political pressures and the ability of implementing the policies. This means that Constitution of 2005 and Power-Sharing form contributed to the further politicization of the successive governments after 2005.

Chart 0-5. Iraq ,Estimate, Government Effectiveness




According to Government Effectiveness Indicator (Chart 3-6), it is clear that the effectiveness of Iraqi governments had not made any significant progress since the rule of Saddam Hussein in 1996 to US invasion in 2003, and even until 2005 in which the constitution has been approved. In 2007 to 20017 there was very weak progress which kept Iraq at a low level comparing to the measured countries. Government effectiveness Indicator may indicate that the political Power-Sharing form implemented in Iraq and based on sectarian quotas is a consociational power-sharing case, for that the popular protests and the political crises are continuing.

Chart 0-6. Iraq, rank, Government Effectiveness


Regulatory quality: Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Despite the slight progress achieved by Iraq, it remained negative in the Regulatory Quality Indicator (Chart 3-7). Governments were unable to implement sound policies and regulations and encourage the private sector. It is clear that the political disputes, that the Power-Sharing form could not end, contributed to the weak implementation of any policies and regulations that can help in the advancement of Iraq at the level of Regulatory Quality.

Chart 0-7. Iraq ,Estimate, Regulatory Quality

Iraq has remained in late ranks comparing to the countries measured in the Regulatory Quality Indicator and has not make any significant progress since the dictatorship era to the Power-Sharing era (Chart 3-8).


Chart 0-8. Iraq, rank, Regulatory Quality



Rule of law: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.


Iraq has maintained its declining position to less than -2.5 in Rule of Law Indicator (Chart 3-9).since the dictatorship era until 2017. Power-Sharing form has failed to stop violence and enforce the law, as sectarian disputes have increased the violence and the interference in the property, and the existence of sectarian militias such as the Popular Mobilization has weakened the role of police.

Chart 0-9. Iraq, Estimate, Rule of Law




(Chart 3-10) shows that Iraq rank is very late comparing to the measured countries and does not make any progress in Rule of Law indicator since the dictatorship era.

Chart 0-10. Iraq, rank, Rule of Law



Control of corruption: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

The indicator in (Chart 3-11) shows, as explained previously in Iraq chapter, that the Power-sharing form established by the American occupation of Iraq did not prevent the existence of administrative and governmental corruption and the control of some influential people on the government. So Iraq remained in the same position as it was under the leadership of the single party and the dictatorship.

Chart 0-11 Iraq ,Estimate, Control of Corruption

Naturally, the rank of Iraq remained late in Control of Corruption Indicator (Chart3-12) and Power-Sharing form could not repair the corruption or make any progress in Iraq to further reduction of the corruption.




Chart 0-12. Iraq, Rank, Control of Corruption

Chart 0-13. Iraq ,Estimate**Chart 0-14. Iraq, rank**

According to (Chart 3-13, 3-14) which summarize the aggregate indicators of six broad dimensions of governance, we can say that Power-Sharing form adopted in the rule of Iraq and based on sectarian quotas did not succeed in taking Iraq out of what the dictatorship made during three decades in term of the loss of transparency, prohibition of freedoms, governmental corruption and other of the six indicators included in the WGI indicator. Thus, Power-Sharing form in the consociational form based on quotas caused in both Lebanon and Iraq more different crises rather than ending their crises.

Therefore, Iraqi model of the participatory in the power and the Federal have not achieved the goal in Iraq which is to achieve justice between the communities, stability and development in Iraq. Wars and battles are continued in Iraq at the military, administrative, sectarian and ethnic levels to the present day to the extent of threatening Iraq existence itself.

CHAPTER 4

SYRIA PROJECT OF POWER SHARING

4.1 INTRODUCTION FOR SYRIA

4.1.1 Syria: A Small House for Many Families

Around the time when Kessler, a former CIA expert on Syria, published her monograph on Syrian politics, her opening statement simply emphasized how small and poor the country was. *"Then, Syrian population was merely around 10 million (which was already doubled in 2011 when the Syrian revolution started)"*. Kessler's opening statement also mentioned *"the paradoxical nature of the Syrian population. Observing Syria's heterogeneous population produces religious ferment, social friction, and political ruthlessness"*, Kessler realizes *"makes it one of the least governable states"* in the Middle East (Kessler 1987: 3). In fact, it is very difficult to talk about Syrian nation as one coherent political unit. To put it bluntly, there is Syria, but hardly any "Syrian". Rather, from ethnic perspective, there are Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Assyrians, and Armenians. While there are Muslims and Christians, Muslims among themselves have sectarian differences mainly between Sunni and Alewite. All these different identities constitute the rich fabric of Syrian society, making Syria not a nation state, but rather a state-nation. In fact, when the Ottoman rule finally ended in the beginning of the 20th century after three centuries, there was no viable state structure was left, and the new French colonialists successfully exploited this gap. Despite absence of a Syrian state, Syrian geography has historically been the seat of ongoing Empires. We learn from Kessler that Ancient Greeks used the name *Syria* to designate the sand along the Eastern Mediterranean between the Sinai Peninsula and the mountains of southern Turkey (Kessler, 1987). According to the same source, the Arabs who conquered the region in the seventh

century called it *Bilad al-Sham* – "*The country on the left by referring to its position north of holy Mecca*" (Kessler, 1987, p. 5) (Table 4-1).



Country	Area	Government type	Population	Ethnic groups	Religions
Lebanon	• 10,450 sq km • country comparison to the world: 169	parliamentary republic	• 6,107,500 (July 2017 est.) • country comparison to the world: 110	• Arab 95% • Armenian 4% • Other 1%	• Muslim 57.7% (28.7% Sunni, 28.4% Shia, smaller percentages of Alawites and Ismailis) • Christian 36.2% (Maronites, Catholics are the largest Christian group) • Druze 5.2%, very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, and Hindus (2017 est.)
Iraq	• 438,317 sq km • country comparison to the world: 60	Federal parliamentary republic	• 40,421,600 (July 2018 est.) • country comparison to the world: 16	• Arab 75-80% • Kurdish 15-20% • Other 5% (includes Turkmen, Yezidi, Shabak, Kaka'i, bedouin, Romani, Assyrian, Circassian, Sabaean-Mandaean, Persian)	• Muslim (official) 95-98% (Shia 64-69%, Sunni 29-34%) • Christian 1% (includes Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Assyrian Church of the East) • Other 1-4% (2015 est.)
Syria	• 185,180 sq km • country comparison to the world: 90	Presidential republic; highly authoritarian regime	• 19,426,300 (July 2017 est.) • country comparison to the world: 100	• Arab ~50% • Alawite ~15% • Kurd ~10% • Levantine ~10% • Other ~15% (includes Druze, Ismaili, Imami, Nusairi, Assyrian, Turkoman, Armenian)	• Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili and Shia 13%) • Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) • Druze 3% • Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo)

Table 0-1. Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Comparison table

4.1.2 Understanding Syrian Mosaic: A Historical Institutionalism Analysis

Martha Neff Kessler (1987) called Syria as "*a fragile mosaic of power*" nearly three decades ago. Her “fragile mosaic” metaphor, even used when the Baathists were at the height of their political authority, describes Syria the best. After 2011, this fragile mosaic was broken powerfully with the outbreak of a civil war.

The Syrian civil war is one of the most complex in history, resembling 30-year wars in Europe, as so many actors are simultaneously involved (Kissinger, 2015, p. 129). To understand what brought 2011 revolution, how it failed and turned into a deadly civil war, one has to appreciate the historical evolution of Syrian power structure.

Historically Syria has a pivotal role shaping Arab views in dealing with the superpowers and to help preserve order throughout the region. Despite its importance, however, Syria had been a neglected topic for many researchers. Despite few key exceptions, Syria’s history and political dynamics did not receive attention unless the discussion was about Damascus’ role in Lebanon or its fights against Israel. Up until 2011, a scant attention was given to Syrian politics at least in the English-speaking world, except numerous works of handful experts (Hinnebusch, 2008, p. 15). By using what is available, this section aims to contextualize contemporary Syrian politics by examining definitive turning points in Syria’s history.⁸

4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR SYRIA

4.2.1 Syria under Ottoman Period

Syria transformed from the rule of Mamluks to the rule of Ottoman Empire in 1516 and it was not, at that time as known today in respect to its current geography, but it was called Levant including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Turkish

⁸ Appendix 8- A Chronology of Syria

province of Hatay. The Muslim jurists mentioned that Gaziantep and its geographical surroundings were from Levant mentioned in Al Hadith and the interpretation of Holy Quran "*Glory be to Him Who made His servant to go on a night from the Sacred Mosque to Aqsa mosque of which We have blessed the precincts*"

And “precincts” means according to some interpretations “Levant”. So Ottoman State considered Levant as states. The prominent states in the current geography of Syria were Aleppo Vilayet and Sham or Damascus Vilayet. Aleppo vilayet was known by its commercial activity and Damascus vilayet by its industrial activity. There were 40 Karvan Saray (Travelers' House) in Aleppo and 355 Khan, which is used as a hotel in our current time and about 50 public baths. Aleppo has a large cultural and religious diversity, it includes 16000 Roman Orthodox, 12,000 Gregorian Armenians and 10000 Siani and the same of Arab Maronite Catholics and a large number of Arabs and Turks (Öztuna, 1990).

The two states including Homs, Hama and others cities of Syria have enjoyed a very good life as their inhabitants still remember from their ancestors. But there was no political life in Syria, as the powers of the governors were administrative not political. And the political life began only when Syrian Arab joined the nationalist current and when Syria separated by Sykes-Picot.

4.2.2 Syria under French Mandate

The modern Syria was born after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Plans for dismembering the Ottoman Middle East territory started while the World War I was still continuing. Following a negotiation period for about six months, a secret treaty was signed between the Britain and France on 16 May 1916. Officially known as the Asia Minor Agreement, this infamous agreement that initiated the mapping of the contemporary Middle East is better known with the last names of its signatories: Mark Sykes of United Kingdom and François Georges-Picot. Tsarist Russia's assent was also taken. Although it was originally a secret document, the Bolsheviks later revealed the agreement in 1917 following the Russian Revolution.

The Sykes-Picot agreement divided the former Ottoman territory into different parts both compatible with Wilson Principles and Anglo-French colonial

ambitions (Figure 4-1). Generally speaking, according to the agreement there will be (1) An area that would be under the British rule, (2) An area that would be under the French rule, (3) An area under the Russian rule, (4) An area where an Arab state under British protection would be established, (5) An area where an Arab state under French protection would be established, and (6) Area of Jerusalem would be under British, French and Russian protection.

The detailed arrangement included the following provisions: (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018)

1) Russia should acquire the Armenian provinces of Erzurum, Trebizond (Trabzon), Van and Bitlis with some Kurdish territory to the southeast.


2) France should acquire Lebanon and the Syrian littoral. Adana, Cilicia and the hinterland adjacent to Russia's share that hinterland including Aintab, Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakır and Mosul.

3) Great Britain should acquire southern Mesopotamia, including Bagdad, and also Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Acre.

4) Between the French and the British acquisitions there should be a confederation of Arab states or a single independent Arab state, divided into French and British spheres of influence.

5) Alexandretta (İskenderun) should be a free port; and Palestine, because of the holy places, should be under an international regime.

Figure 0-1. Map of Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)



Sykes-Picot agreement not only mapped out the post-Ottoman Middle East, but also planted the seeds of conflict that became one of the sources of continuing civil wars both in Syria and Iraq a century later. Revelation of this secret agreement created stir in the Middle East. The British, in exchange of revolting against the Ottomans in Hejaz, had given pledge to the Husayn Ibn Ali, the Hashemite dynast and the sheriff of Mecca, to help to establish a large Arab state. Exclusion of Russia and inclusion of Italy led modifications on the Sykes-Picot agreement, but Turkish nationalist victory prevented its application in Anatolia. Still, Sykes-Picot had drawn the map for the Middle East, leading deep resentment, which persisted despite the modifications of its arrangements for Arab countries by the Allies' Conference April of San Remo in April 1920.

Boundaries initially set by the secret Sykes-Picot agreement was made official during the Conference of San Remo on 1920 where prime ministers of Britain, France and Italy convened to decide the future of the former Ottoman territories. What was decided in San Remo became the backbone of the ill-fated Sevres agreement between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, its propositions regarding Anatolia were never materialized as the Turkish national forces (*Kuwait*

Milliye) won the independence war, and secured the Turkish national borders according to *Misak-ı Milli* (Appendix: The National Pact).

While independent Armenia and autonomous Kurdistan were never founded in Eastern Anatolia as it was decided in San Remo conference and Sevres Treaty thanks to success of Turkish nationalist resistance, newly founded Republic of Turkey did not challenge obligation to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa. Thus, the “mandate” regimes decided in San Remo had become the base of the new distribution of the former Ottoman territory in the Levant and Mesopotamia. San Remo conference led to creation of two “A” mandates out of the old Ottoman province of Syria: the Northern half (Syria and Lebanon) was mandated to France, the southern half (Palestine) to Great Britain. The province of Mesopotamia (Iraq) was also mandated to Great Britain. A mandate regime was created through the Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, authorizing a member nation to govern a former German or Turkish colony arguing that they are not yet ready to govern themselves. Under the terms of an “A” mandate, the individual countries were deemed independent but subject to mandatory power until they reached political “maturity”.

4.2.3 Syria is a New Project of Power-Sharing

The San Remo conference along with Sykes-Picot agreement simply reflected the imperial mind set that dominated the world during the decade that followed the World War I. The victorious nations, Britain and France, carved former Ottoman territory in the Middle East in accordance with their imperial interest, disregarding ethnic, religious or sectarian diversity and sensitivities. Local actors, leaders of the Arab world, were given chain of promises by imperial Britain, which were hardly kept. One such key actor was Faisal, the third son of Hussein bin Ali, the Grand Sheriff of Mecca and the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. It was Faisal who received the Damascus protocol that designated the borders of greater Arab state that was anticipated to be founded after the Ottomans were expelled. The Arab forces under the command of Faisal captured Damascus in October 1918, and subsequently formed an Arab government there in March 1920 even though it was not received international support and recognition. As he opposed the French mandate and declared Arab Kingdom of Syria, following the defeat at

Battle of Maysalun (24 July 1920) French Army immediately expelled him. However, Faisal soon became the king of British controlled Iraq and his brother was made the King of Jordan. While Faisal's reign ensured a Sunni royalty to rule Shite majority Iraq, the French promoted mostly the Alewite minority in Syria to the colonial bureaucratic posts. This common and effective imperial administrative practice of cooperating local minorities to control the local majority had gradually become one of the key components of the political structures both in Syria and Iraq. Like many other examples throughout Africa and Asia, this policy had become one of the key reasons for post-colonial political unrest. In other words, not only imperial mapping did not respect or reflect ethnic or sectarian bases of the society, but also imperial administrative structures created privileged minorities at the expense of suppressed majorities that became the foundation of the post-colonial political structures: Alewites dominated Sunni Syria while a Sunni royalty ruled Shia Iraq.

The French mandate regime in Syria was installed in 1920 and consisted of six states: Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites, Jabal Druze, Sanjak of Alexandretta (autonomous) and the State of Greater Lebanon (Figure 4-2). This sectarian make-up of Syria had lasted for only two years.

Figure 0-2. Map of French Mandate in Syria (1920-1922)



In July 1922, France established Syrian Federation between the states of Damascus, Aleppo and the Alawite while Sanjak of Alexandretta was added to the state of Aleppo in 1923. While French divisive mandate policy based on sectarianism was strongly opposed by almost all Syrian sects, Sunni populations of Damascus and Aleppo were particularly upset. Consequently, on December 1, 1924 states Aleppo and Damascus were united into the State of Syria, but the Alawite state seceded. In the summer of 1925, a revolt against French administration erupted in the countryside of the Druze state under the leadership of Sultan Pasha el Atrash, but soon spread out throughout the Syria. During the revolt, Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, Druze and Christians get united around the common aim of ending French rule in Syria even though this was never became a fully coordinated front. It took two years to French to put down Syrian uprising.

The ideas of Syrian independence and Arab nationalism were spreading during the last decades of the Ottoman rule, and Syrian-Arab nationalists had continued to be effective during the French mandate era. These ideas were popular even among the Alawites and the Kurds as there was notable resistance against the

French rule during the initial years of the French control in Syria. For example, in 1919, prominent Alawite Sheihk Saleh al-Ali initiated a revolt in coastal mountain range while an Ottoman educated Kurdish nobleman, Ibrahim Hananu, was leading a revolution in and around Aleppo. Besides, Faisal's short-lived Kingdom of Syria left long lasting legacy and ideological influence to unite Arabs under one state.

The Great Syrian Revolt (1925-1927) revealed a number of important aspects of Syrian political structure. First of all, the particular administrative structure left by the Ottomans, namely the millet system, was based on social, legal and subsequently political fragmentation, and it therefore led to factionalism in Syrian socio-political structure. As a result of living under the Millet system for three centuries emboldened sectarian diffusion, which prevented any viable political unity despite strong nationalist sentiments that flourished among the Syrians during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Syrians were more capable of fighting a common enemy; let it be the Ottomans or the French, than they were being united around a common political (i.e. Syrian) identity. While weakening the common political identity, the Millet system also nurtured the reign of the local power holders. While trying to install the centralized authority of the Mandate regime, the French soon realized that there are countless strong local authority strongholds to be dealt with. The Ottoman millet system was not the reign of anarchy, but a partnership between the *porte* and the local notables. Unlike the Weberian state that monopolizes the legitimate use of violence, the Ottoman state diffused it. Perhaps, this policy not only paved the way for the eventual collapse of the Empire, but also left an ongoing legacy that still prevails in the former Ottoman Millet territories, most notably in the Middle East. In fact, both the Nationalists and the local power holders in Syria perceived the very idea of mandate as an insult. By definition, mandate undermined the political competency of the local administrators. However, despite their lack of experience of having their own state, Syrians were quite masterful politicians. In 1928, the Syrian National Bloc (الكتلة الوطنية) *Al-Kutlah Al-Wataniyah* was established under the leadership of Ibrahim Hananu. Instead of being a political party of a democratic setting, the National Bloc was a political coalition of Syrians who were opposing the French colonial rule, and thus, the Bloc included intellectuals, landowners, tradesmen, as well as representatives of powerful families of the Syrian society.

The political resentment of the Syrians towards the colonial administration forced the French to open a new phase in Syrian politics. On May 14, 1930, the State of Syria was replaced by the declaration the Republic of Syria (الجمهورية السورية *al-Jumhūrīyah al-Sūrīyah*), and a new constitution was introduced. Despite its declining power, French nevertheless tried to curb Syrian desire for independence by imposing a so-called “Treaty of Independence” in 1934, which was actually an attempt to continue its control over the Syrian territory. While the French was promoting the Treaty of Independence thanks to the puppet Syrian regime of President Mohammad Ali al-Abed, the National Bloc was vehemently objecting to it. The opposition of the National Bloc orchestrated by Hashim al-Atassi eventually led to the French recognition of Syrian independence in 1936. However, this was a bittersweet victory for the Syrians, because not only the full independence was officially delayed for another 25 years, but also Syria lost two of its original provinces. While the treaty ensured incorporation of Druze and Alawite regions into the Republic along with Aleppo and Damascus, Lebanon became a separate political entity of its own, and the Sanjak of Alexandretta was lost to Turkey in 1938 after a brief period of independence. Besides the territorial fragmentation, Syrian independence was, in effect, deferred until after World War II.

During the World War II, Syria initially became a part of the Vichy Government until the British and Free French seized Syria in July 1941. Syria once again attempted to proclaim independence, yet this attempt was not recognized until 1944. Syria secured its place as one of the founding members of the United Nations along with Lebanon in 1945. The French military intervention delayed full Syrian independence for another six months, but finally Syria became an independent state in April 1946 following the Nationalist resistance and the British diplomatic pressure against the French.

As the independence achieved, the National Bloc, the spearhead of the Syrian struggle for independence, was dissolved in 1947, giving birth to two political parties. The split actually reflected the regional rivalry as the National Party was based on Damascus whereas the People’s Party was based on Aleppo. There were also political differences, most notable on identification with the neighboring Arab states. While the People’s Party was having good relations with the ruling

Hashemite's in Jordan and in Iraq, the National Party was opposing to them. Both parties had played strong role in Syrian politics until Ba'ath Party came in power following the 1963 military coup.

Analysis of the formative years' experience of the national struggle for independence period is important to understand certain dynamics that had continued to dominate Syrian politics during the subsequent decades. The first point is that there is a split between those politicians who receive support from the external powers and the nationalists whose support came from the local constituencies. The tug of war between the two has been continuing even today between the two. Being at the opposition or holding the governmental powers mostly determined the roles played. While being opposition members, leaders were nationalist and more or less relying on the support of the domestic constituency. However, once in power, they shifted their source of legitimacy from Syrian people to the external powers, creating confusion and domestic political unrest.

4.3 SYRIA UNDER INDEPENDENCE

"(Syria) became as part of Ottoman empire in 1516 and remained a Turkish province until World War I. A secret Anglo-French pact of 1916 put Syria under the French influence. In the same time The League of Nations allowed the French mandate over Syria after World War I, but the French were forced to put down several nationalist uprisings. In 1930, France recognized Syria as an independent republic but it remained subject to the mandate. After nationalist demonstrations in 1939, the French high commissioner suspended Syrian constitution. In 1941, British and Free French forces invaded Syria to eliminate Vichy control. During World War II Syria was became an Ally. Again in 1945, nationalist demonstrations broke into in actual fighting, and British troops had to restore the power. Syrian forces faced many defeats during participation in Arab invasion of Palestine in 1948. In 1958, the United Arab Republic was formed between Syria and Egypt headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, Syria became independent again on Sept. 29, 1961 after a revolution" (Sandbox Networks, 2018). If we want to consider Sykes picot agreement as a beginning of the new Syria's history, while, in fact it is the date in which this geographic area has been recognized as a state under the name of Syria, and joined the United Nations as it is in recent situation. However, Syria is an old

name given to the area include Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. *"Syria did not have a definite territorial border. "Syria" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a geographic entity, known at various times as "Greater Syria," "Geographical Syria" or "Natural Syria." Geographical Syria consisted of a number of Ottoman vilayets (administrative divisions). The region was delimited by Aqaba and Sinai on the south, the Taurus Mountains on the north, the Syrian Desert on the east, and the Mediterranean Sea on the west currently comprising Jordan, Palestine/Israel, Lebanon and Syria. After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, new national identities, citizenship and social class came to coexist with, or challenge and even replace, the identities of clan, tribe and religion"* (Fildis, 2017). This new founded country was part of the politics but not independent country, and from historical point of view, Syria was part of Rashidun Caliphate, Umayyad Caliphate, Abbasid Caliphate, and Ottoman Empire, the thing which made Syria, all over the history, subject to central administration command. After World War I, the concept of modern state has been applied in Syria through Sykes Picot agreement but not according to the people's referendum in this geographic area nor the choice of the rest of the natural Syria (Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) people. This left Syria without any element of state other than to be modern state. When French troops left Syria at April 1946, Syria was politically, economically and socially unstable *"Great Britain and France transformed what had been relatively quiet provinces of the Ottoman Empire into some of the least stable and internationally explosive states in the world"* (Fildis, 2017).

4.4INTELLECTUAL APPROACH AND IDENTITY

One of the most important problems faced the newly founded state was the unclear identity which created disloyalty of Syrians to Syria, as, in the time Syrian's identity and loyalty was fully towered Sunni Muslims of Ottoman Empire known as caliphate in fully religious meaning, However, pan-Arabs was developing an intellectual approach as a rival for both the concepts of Caliphate, which faced a huge offensive at that time as part of offensive against Ottoman Empire which described as a sick man of Europe and a rival for pan Turk which was developing an intellectual and political approach between Turks inside Ottoman Empire causing

hostility of pan-Arabs and pan-Islamist in the same time. When Syrian Arab nationalism got the power over other political rivals, this cause real misunderstanding of the identity of Syria and Syrians. *"Most analysts saw the truncation of historic Syria as creating an identity crisis with deleterious effects on the stability of the state, an artificial creation that did not, at least initially, enjoy the full loyalty of its citizens"* (Hinnebusch, 2008, p. 1). Pan-Arab approach was growing and getting over the power in more than one newly founded countries such as Iraq, Syria, Libya and many other countries but Egypt was the most important and advanced Arab country at that time although, it was the most established Arab country under the role of Mohammed Ali's dynasty. It has an army, universities and governmental institutions. At that time Gamal Abdalnaseer, the most eminent Pan-Arab's leader took over the power in this country and his influence spread all over the newly created Arab countries, and in his second session established the political unity between Syria and Egypt headed by him. It was overseas, cross borders unity but had a short life. It affected negatively the political and economic life of Syria, however, Abdalnaseer preconditioned to settle all the Syrian's political parties before unity, and settle all free media, in other words, he wanted to rule the country without any opposition. Although, in his period intelligence had the upper hand in Egypt and Syria, and the works done by government firstly were political. Later this unity dramatically changed the economics, social, and political system, and all the governmental institutions, while the parliaments and ministries were unified in both countries and centralized in Cairo. Although the two countries had totally different social, economic and political conditions and were separated geographically, United Arab Republic lived for less than four years ended by Syrian military coup leaded by pan-Arabs known as (Infesalien) i.e. Separatists. In this period of history many intellectual streams appeared, the most important three were Pan-Arab, Pan-Islamist and secular liberalism.

These intellectual streams existed in Syria caused misunderstanding of loyalty extended beyond the border (Arab unity), not to Syria as a state, elite and peoples after they considered the newly founded borders as conspiracy, not as a real part of the nature of state after World War II. They did not expect that the world which started WW II was just few expanding imperials, but world after WW II established clear borders for about 220 state which recognized by others and a lot of

foreign politics and managed by newly founded worldwide institution called United Nation. Pan-Arabs spend more than 70 years looking forward utopian state called United Arab State. Syrian students from first grade up to 12th one was chanting for more than 40 years in every morning in their schools: Unity-Freedom-Socialism as a slogan, this slogan created by Baath party and believed by many. No doubt this would substitute the loyalty to Syria and loosen the Syrian Identity.

But Pan-Islamism was adversary of Pan-Arab. They were considered as enemies, but in real life Pan-Islamism was considering the borders as conspiracy from west against Islam, they were looking forward the lost Caliphate, but they did not realize the importance of Syrian Identity, as 90% of Syrians are Sunni Muslims attending to the mosques. They were hearing about Islamic Ummah, but didn't know anything about the role of Syrians in these Ummah, not even the presence of Syrians as a nation. They really lived since Ottoman "Caliphate" that dissolved while looking forward the next Caliphate without any realizing any role for Syrians in the coming Caliphate. Pan-Islamism also participated in loosening Syrian Identity.

There was another intellectual stream existed in the newly founded countries. It was not important as much as the last two, but it has an exceptional importance, where it supported, in way or another, what happening worldwide in general, in Europe and Turkey as neighbor countries. This intellectual stream is Liberalism or Secularism. There were an elite of secularists separated from their society and proposed to import what look like successful experiences. They have their own utopia again, they think if they imported any experience, it would be appropriate for 90% of Muslims society. They were not so big stream but they participated in loosening the Syrian identity. They considered every single problem in the state was done because of the religion (happened in Syria, that's mean because of Islam), and every solution would be applicable if we let Islam inside the mosques. Secularism, considered most of Syrians as enemies, this let them part of the conflict and prevented them to realize Syrian Identity.

4.5WHAT SYRIA IS?

Syrian revolution raised in this psychosocial conflict. They were calling for freedom, but not even realized what type of freedom could help all of Syrian not this sector or that one.

"A map marked with crude china graph-pencil in the second decade of the 20th Century shows the ambition - and folly - of the 100-year old British-French plan that helped create the modern-day Middle East.

Straight lines make uncomplicated borders. Most probably that was the reason why most of the lines that Mark Sykes, representing the British government, and Francois Georges-Picot, from the French government, agreed upon in 1916 were straight on. The map that the two men divided the land that had been under Ottoman rule since the early 16th Century into new countries - and relegated these political entities to two spheres of influence:

- *Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine under British influence.*
- *Syria and Lebanon under French influence.*

The two men were not mandated to redraw the borders of the Arab countries in North Africa, but the division of influence existed there as well, with Egypt under British rule, and France controlling the Maghreb" (Osman, 2013).

"The Middle East, as we know it from today's headlines, emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War. Great Britain and France transformed what had been relatively quiet provinces of the Ottoman Empire into some of the least stable and internationally explosive states in the world. As a consequence, the First World War agreements are at the very heart of the current conflicts and politics in the Middle East. The partition lines in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire originally laid down the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement in April-May 1916. The agreement gave Mesopotamia (Iraq), the Gulf and the regions bordering Palestine to Great Britain, and Syria and most of the eastern part of the region to France" (Fildis, 2017). "First World War agreements are at the very heart of the current conflicts and politics in the Middle East" Ayse Tekdal Fildis said. And many politician and scholars have the same opinion, however Sykes Pico agreement devises states without any state foundations or institutions. Although, Syria was as a province in Ottoman Empire for more than

four centuries, but before Ottoman Empire period, Syria was as province in many Empires, such as Abbasid Caliphate, Umayyad Caliphate and Rashidun Caliphate but not as independent state. It was a small country with area of (185,180 sq km) including the first and third oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world; its location on the Silk Road let the country multiethnic, multilingual, and multi-religion one.

Although Syria have Sunni Muslims as a majority talking Arabic language, however in Syria there were also Shiite, Christian, Jewish, Yazidi and many other religions. In addition to Arab, Kurds, Arminian and Assyrian, Turkmen, Sharkas and other ethnicities. also, Syrians are talking Arabic as first language but some of them talking Kurdish, Assyrians, and even Jesus language still existing in Syria.

"Arab ~50%, Alawite ~15%, Kurd ~10%, Levantine ~10%, other ~15% (includes Durze, Ismaili, Imami, Nusairi, Assyrian, Turkoman, Armenian, Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo)" (CIA, 2017)

"To understand the fractionalization of Syria, one must first understand the nation's demographics. Sunni Arabs, by far the largest ethno-religious group, make up approximately 65 percent of the population. The Kurds, non-Arab Sunnis with their own irredentist ambitions, compose eight percent of the total, though only representing 13 percent of the population; the Alawites sect of Shia Islam controls the state bureaucracy, almost in its entirety. Christians, accounting for 10 percent, compose the only other significant "ethnic group," as small smatterings of Druze, Turkoman, and other obscure peoples fill the remainder" (Gram, 2012).

At 1971 Hafez Assad assumed the power in Syria. "Ḥafiz al-Assad, Ḥafiz also spelled Hafez, (born in October 6, 1930, in Qardāḥa, Syria—and died in June 10, 2000, Damascus), president of Syria (1971–2000). He stabilized the country and established it as a powerful presence in the Middle East. Born into a poor family of 'Alawites, a minority Islamic sect, and joined Syrian wing of Baath Party in 1946 as a student activist. In 1952, he entered Hems Military Academy, and graduated three years later as an air force pilot" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019) Assad, the father,

depended in his rule during about thirty years on his minority ethnic (Alawites) especially in the armed and security forces.

4.6 SYRIA UNDER ASSAD

At 1971 Hafez Assad, arrive hold the power in Syria. "*Hafiz al-Assad, Hafiz also spelled Hafez (born October 6, 1930, Qardāḥa, Syria—died June 10, 2000, Damascus), president of Syria (1971–2000). Who brought stability to the country and established it as a powerful presence in the Middle East Born into a poor family of 'Alawites, a minority Islamic sect, Assad joined the Syrian wing of the Ba 'th Party in 1946 as a student activist. In 1952, he entered the Hems Military Academy, graduating three years later as an air force pilot*" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Assad father during about thirty years, depend in his rule of power on his minority ethnic (Alawites) especially in armed and security forces, sectarian point was main conflicting point on the internal Syrian level and international level, but also the Kurd Issue is main, it mean there is two dimensions for the conflict sectarian and ethnic.

4.7 SECTARIAN AND ETHNIC POINT OF VIEW (SUNNI, ALAWITES, AND KURDS)

4.7.1 Ethnic and Kurds

If we want to talk about the conflict in Syria from the point of ethnicity, we can see two major ethnics which are original Arab and Kurd and both of them have Sunni majority, but from sectarian point of view, Sunni are 74% and 9% are Alawites, that minority that controlled Syria since 1970. However, the Kurdish political activity was part of Syrian political life up to med of sixties of the last century when the Arab nationalist get the power in Syria in sixties of last century. They consider the only bond between the segments of populations is the Arabic nationalities This was very clear in article XV of Baath party constitution: Article XV: "*National bonds or association is the only one should be present in Arab state that will grantee the homogeneity among the populations and dissolve them in one Crucible, and fight the sectarian, tribal, ethnic, regional, and religious partnerships*" (Qais, 2017, p. 94). In other words, Arab nationalism considered all the ethnicity in Arab regions are Arabs, and they have no right to distinguish their own identity

whatever ethnicity, education, language or history. This push Kurds to start their own political life as Kurds nationalism; however, they adopted the communism through Syrian communist party, which failed because of the Chauvinistic Kurdish identity which was dominant inside the party. However, the Kurdish feeling in Syria inflamed by the news of Mullah Mustafa Al-Barzani in Iraq against the Iraqi government 1961, coincidentally with Syria-Egypt unity 1958-1961 and Arab nationalism hyperbole of Abed Al Nasser as the president of this unity and the most famous Arab nationalism leader. These Kurdish movements inflamed and supported by deferent Kurdish movements in neighboring countries, especially PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) movement in Turkey which founded by Abdullah Ojalan at 1978 and transferred to Syria at 2003 under the name of PYD. However, the Kurdistan state was as a dream, but became a little bit achievable after 2003. (BBC, 2017).

In addition, in 2005 the new constitution of Iraq declared Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous region. After Syrians uprising in 2011, PYD started to build their state in northeast of Syria, under the name of Self-management areas as a step to establish the confederal regime which PYD aspires to.

At the beginning of twenty-first century, our Kurdish society in western Kurdistan has considerable material and moral capabilities, derived from its great struggle of all its categories for more than thirty years, within the framework of the national liberation process throughout Kurdistan, in which it has made great steps in terms of intellectual change and national democratic revolution, and it has achieved a solid ground and a firm foundation for building its national, democratic, cultural, economic, and social institutions, which constitute the aspects of building the democratic confederation based on the society (Jusoor, 2018).

By this way, Sunni Syrians were divided into two main groups, Kurds under the control of PYD & YPG, the armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the self-management areas and opposition's rebels who were Sunni as a majority located in different locations in Syria. This opposition controlled what is considered as free part of Syria or "Free Syria".

Free Syria itself divided into two main parts:

a. Part controlled by many militias, whole of them known as free Syrian army, those have unstable relationship with political part of the opposition known as (NCS), and the institution resulted from NCS, like (SMC), (ACU) and other institutions. However, NCS recognized from more than 120 countries worldwide known friend of Syrian people. FSA and NCS forming the main body of opposition. We can call those as Syrian project organizations.

b. Extremist militias, ISIS and al Nosra Front, which declared itself as part of Al-Qaeda organization. Those we can call them as non-Syrian project organizations. Those organizations have different policies and different agenda. For these reason, in ISIS areas no more militia can stay, in addition there are many armed conflict between ISIS and FSA militias and these conflicts continue, but Al Nosra Front is living in the same locations of FSA and fighting in the same fronts most of times.

While Kurds areas has not been hit by Scud missiles from Syrian regime and has not been attacked by Russian military aircrafts, but Free Syrian army areas were experiencing very hard conditions like Scud missiles, explosive barrels, and lack of resources. *"According to a report issued by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the regime's forces launched 5,150 raids with explosive barrels since October 2012. The number of victims has reached 12,193 people, 96 per cent of them civilians"* (Monitor, 2015).

4.7.2 Sectarian Point of View

In the next door there is another Syria under the control of Bashar Assad and his security and military forces, this Syria and these forces are controlled by the minority of Alawites who were fighting for more than four years as if they were in one side and one front, but if we look in deep we can realize the conflicts happening there. If we want to examine Al Assad part of Syria geographically, we will see that it includes Damascus the capital, Mediterranean coastline, and the borderlines of Israel and Lebanon. While, Alawites constitute approximately 13% of total Syria.

(No accurate data about the population in Al Assad part of Syria), but Bashar Assad call it useful Syria. However, the most powerful positions in the government which are military and security forces are controlled by Alawites. Nowadays, the

international community recognizes this part of Syria as a Syria. But this part lacks the economical constituents, and oil located in the East province, large portion of industrial constituents located in Aleppo and the gate of Europe through turkey.

This part of Syria is under heavy security control. It is very difficult to have information about the relationship between the decision makers in Al Assad part. Nevertheless, a lot of incidence shows that there are conflicts happening in that part of Syria.

"Sharing their sect with President Bashar al-Assad, Alawites have long been the core constituency for the Syrian regime. As the civil war drags into its fifth year, opposition rebels see the minority sect as remaining unwaveringly loyal."

However, from inside the community, the picture looks very different: as their sons die heavily on the front lines, and the economic privileges and patronage cease, Alawites increasingly feel they are tools and not the beneficiaries of the regime. In a series of exclusive interviews, Alawites from Lattakia, the coastal province and the center of the sect, have told the Telegraph of how they are now trapped between jihadists who consider them apostates and a remote and corrupt regime that told them the war would be easy to win" (Sherlock, 2015) . This is not the only problem facing Assad part's, since long time until from beginning of Syrian uprising, the vice president Farouk Al-Sharea was rarely to appear, Mr. Al-Sharea is one of Assad father's regime pillars. However, Wall Street Journal telling us on Dec. 19, 2014 how the bobbing blast at July 2012 killed President Bashar al-Assad's brother-in-law and Deputy Defence Minister Gen Assef Shawkat, Defence Minister Gen Daoud Rajiha, former Defence Minister Hassan Turkomani and NSB chief Hisham Ikhtiar who was inside job. "Two dozen people, including past and current regime officials, opposition leaders, activists and rebels, and little bit in neighboring countries with ties to Mr. Assad told The Wall Street Journal the bombing grew out of a split between the Assad family and its hardline allies on one side, and officials seeking negotiations with opposition groups on the other. Acceptance of the theory by such a broad cross-section of Syrians highlights the ruthless reputation Mr. Assad has cemented since the conflict began more than three years ago. It also shows the dynamic of the president's inner circle as it struggled to keep a grip on power" (Dagher, 2014).

This type of job continuously happening in what Assad call it as “Useful Syria”. When they announced the death of Rustom Ghazaleh, Syrian military and intelligence officer and Ex-Syria spy chief in Lebanon, there was another conflict happening. Lot of news came from trustful resources such as The Daily Star which reported the case at Apr. 24, 2015: *"Ghazaleh was reportedly severely beaten in early March upon orders from Syrian military intelligence Chief Lt. Gen. Rafik Shehadeh. He was moved to the Shami Hospital in Damascus after the beating, which occurred at Shehadeh's office, sources had told The Daily Star at the time."*

The sources reported that the incident was a result of Ghazaleh's disagreement over the huge dispute of involving non-Syrian forces such as Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah in directing the war effort" (The Daily Star, 2015).

Conflict led to the assassination of Muhammad Tawfik al-Assad, Shaikh al-Jabal, because of his objection on the war led by Al Assad, the son while who says that Al Assad, the father brought the benefits for Alawites is just lying in his grave. These types of objections became very clear, although, protesting demonstration repeated in Lattakia and Tartus the heart line cities of Assad.

From one side, Alawites can make the peace building process easiest, but Assad brought foreign militias from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, and many other places worldwide, which made the process harder.

4.8IS ETHNICITY AND SECTARIAN ABLE TO SETTLE

"If ethnic relations are volatile and rapidly changing, they may be amenable to integrative mechanisms" (Sisk T. D., 2002, p. 13). History, telling us that Syrian ethnic relations was volatile and rapidly changing. As the only ethnic conflict triggered in Lebanon and arrived to Damascus and Aleppo was in 1860, but it did not affect the civil peace. After this Druze, Christiane conflict happened. In deferent time and deferent circumstances in 80's of the last century, Assad, the father did huge massacres under the name of his ethnicity, Alawites, with the participation of his brother Refa'at and his militias (Wehdat al Khassah) against Sunni Muslim ethnic in general and against Muslims Brother hood in particular, who lead the political oppositions and later the military ones. As soon as these incidences ended and while a lot of Muslims Brother hood member was in terrific prisons, no one

ethnic dispute happened. On the contrary, Sunni and Alawites were spending their summer vacations in same mountain place called Slenfah, and living in same cities Latikeya, Tartus and other places. Referring to history of Syria, we notice it is different from Lebanon, where the ethnicity feeling is a little bit higher than Syria.

But from 15 Mar. 2011 the date of Syrian revolution Assad regime went to explain this public uprising as a sectarian civil war, this started by *"Syrian authorities explained the recent events in the country as a "sectarian strife against Syria", while disorders in various parts of the country continued. In a meeting with journalists in Damascus on Saturday, March 26, Buthaina Shaaban, Syrian President's Adviser said that what is happening now is a "sectarian strife project" that has nothing to do with peaceful demonstration"* (RT, 2011). This statement was by the spokesman of the regime after about 11 days of the first demonstration calling for freedom, and at that time, there were not any signs of sectarian strife. On the contrary, there were opponents of all sects supporting these demonstrations calling for ending the era of tyranny. In an analytical article published by Carnegie Endowment for Research, the writer George Fahmy said: the attitude of Syrian Christians cannot be described as having one word, but, as he said, there is certainly a group of Christians, including most of the Syrian church leaders, supporting Al Assad regime because of their political and economic interests with it (Fahmy, 2016). Also there are others supporting it as it is a guarantee of the security of Christians in Syria. In contrast, many young Christians participated in the peaceful demonstrations during the first months of the revolution and engaged in various initiatives aimed to declare the demands of the revolution and mobilize the support for it, He added. In the Christian district of Bab Touma in Syrian capital, for example, a group of Christians young women and men distributed the posters to rally the support for the demands of the revolution and to confront the official speech of the regime which sought to spread the fear among Christians. These young people refused the speech of the pro-regime church leaders, and even a group of them decided to organize visits to the churches to declare their rejection of the attitude of the church, and to emphasize that it cannot represent all Christians. These young people did not stop at the borders of their Christian neighborhoods, but participated in demonstrations in predominantly Sunni areas. One of them, named Basil Shehadeh, chose to go to Homs to record the events of the revolution in an attempt to

change the negative image of the revolution at many Christians until he died during the bombing of the city in May 2012 (Fahmy, 2016).

Assyrian Opposition Democratic Organization, an ethnic Christian nationalist party, joined the movement since its inception. (Carnegie-mec, 2018). "Abd al-Ahad Stiefo, representative of Assyrian Democratic Organization said in his speech with Russia Today TV *"Organization's participation with the opposition is a national decision, pointing out that Syrian regime follows a very smart policy towards the minorities and considers itself as a defender for the minorities in Syria.*

"There is no systematic policy by any responsible party in Syria, but the regime uses Christians to provoke a sectarian strife among the various components of Syrian people" Stiefo said (Isteifo, 2014)

Using the sectarianism by Bashar al-Assad's regime was not limited to a particular sect, but it extended to Alawite sect, although many of them joined the demonstrations in the first period and before the military movement and some of their leaders were of the opposition leaders before 2011 and continued with their opposition approach during the Syrian revolution. As Syrian rebels used to name every Friday with a special name to be adopted by the demonstrations, which were launching after each Friday prayer from the mosques to all over Syria, they named one of Fridays by Saleh al-Ali Friday, Alawite historic revolutionary against French colonization, in a clear message that the Syrian revolution is not sectarian, but against dictatorship, especially there were traditional opponents of the regime before the demonstrations in March 2011, for example, Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Khayer, one of the large Alawite families in Syria, who was forcibly hidden on 20 September 2012 in Syria, and the regime has been accused of this as he was an important Alawite opposition symbol. Hayat Newspaper published on September 29, 2017 an article entitled "Abdul Aziz Alkhayer and Sochi" in which it mentioned *"Dr. Abdulaziz Al-Khaiyr was arrested on 20/9/2012 in Damascus airport road while he was back to Damascus from China. He was a leader of the Communist Labor Party, previously arrested in Assad's prisons for over 13 years, and a leading member of the opposition coordinating body formed after the revolution and visited Moscow before heading to China.*

Abdul Aziz had two concerns bigger than anything: US military intervention in Syria, and the issue of militarism and sectarianizing, as he said about the revolution 'If it had been militarized it would have been sectarianized'.

Al Assad had a concern about this respected figure who descended from Alawite sect and had a history of struggle against Al Assads" (Almefleh, 2017).

Later, opposition movements were formed against the regime within Alawite sect and were formed under different names. One of these clusters was “Alawite Syrian Cluster”, which was issued in 20-21 November 2015 (Eldorar Alshamiya, 2014), and also a cluster of Alawite opposition was formed under the name of “Ghad Syria” (Alkhaleejonline, 2015).

An unknown elite of Alawite sect (perhaps for security reasons) issued a statement entitled "Declaration of an identity reform document".⁹ The statement declared interesting points that indicate important political attitudes as it pointed out that Alawite sect is not Sunni, nor Shiite, as if the document refers to the rejection of Iranian control over Syria under the pretext of Iran's guardianship over Shiite sect, which considered Alawite sect to be part of it. The document also exculpated Sunnis over the ages of any sectarian massacres in the sense that what is going on in Syria should not be considered a historical retaliation of Alawite from Sunni as that the most military orders to suppress, kill and arrest the opposition parties were issued by the characters of Alawite sect (document Appendix 3).

All the previous points refer to that the popular protests "Syrian revolution" launched in March 2011 and continued to the present day were not sectarian events, but the massive interferences over eight years at all international, regional and internal levels, especially the entry of "Al Nosra Front" followed by ISIS "Islamic State in Levant and Iraq" to Syria caused gaps of confidence or we can say, in a more precise sense, they deepened the gaps of confidence that was already existed in the establishment of Syria among the various sects. These gaps were preserved by

⁹ Appendix 9- Alawite document

the dictatorship of Hafiz Al Assad and his son after him who benefited from these gaps. About the nature of power in both Syria and Iraq, Buquengs Institute mentioned:

"Syria and Iraq are a different kind of case. In each, Ba'th Party established a dictatorial regime in the 1960's that set about building a strong, overweening state. The core of the governing elite in each country was overwhelmingly from a sectarian minority – Sunnis in Iraq and Alawis in Syria. Over time, that core elite came to be identified more and more with a particular family from that sectarian minority. But the state did not govern as a sectarian state at the outset in either. Arab nationalism was the official ideology of the state, the focus of the state educational system and the approved discourse of the state media" (Gause, 2013).

That is why the sectarian situation in Syria was not so overwhelming.

The reality is that the conflict in Syria is not as sectarian as it is political, but the interference of Lebanese "Hezbollah", a Shiite-fighting party whose membership is only formed by Shiite sect and supported by Iran, in the conflict in Syria to fight with the regime created a sectarian strife and the entry of the Salafist jihadist groups that adopt the excesses in Islam helped in the spread of this strife. These groups claim that they are Sunni groups such as "Al Nosra Front" which was previously the branch of Al Qaeda in Levant and then announced its secession from Global Al Qaeda, but it preserved the same approach. Then later "ISIS" entered very strongly the conflict in Syria and both parties adopted an Anti-Shiite approach on a sectarian basis.

"Nonstate actors, including a number of groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and other governments, such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN, also known as al-Nusra Front), targeted Shia, Alawites, Christians, and other religious minorities, as well as other Sunnis, with indiscriminate attacks as well as killings, kidnappings, physical mistreatment, and arrests in the areas of the country under their control. Extremist groups, for example, launched multiple suicide bomb attacks in Latakia Province, aiming their attacks at Alawite Muslims, according to the groups themselves" (Freedom, 2017).

But the essence and content of the conflict remains, in one way or another, a political conflict.

"Across the Middle East, sectarianism has always been linked to the battle for power, resources and territory, Time was, across the Arab world, that it was simply rude to ask people their religion or sect, even if it was obvious from their name, their accent, from where they lived or worshipped or the pictures on their walls that they were a Sunni Muslim, Shia, or Christian.

In the glory days of the post-colonial era the focus was on creating an overarching Arab and national identity. Syria, with its mosaic of Sunnis, Alawites, Druze and many Christian communities, boasted of being the "beating heart of Arabism". Even in Lebanon, with its elaborate power-sharing arrangements, confessional identity remained a private matter. Intermarriage was common.

Ba'ath party, which ruled in both Baghdad and Damascus, was the creation of a Christian ideologue, Michel Aflaq. Two radical Palestinian leaders, George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh, were Christians. So was George Antonius, the great historian of Arab nationalism. Sectarianism reflects real religious differences and defines "otherness", but it has always been linked to power, resources and territory.

Over the past four years the vicious war in Syria has amplified sectarian sentiment so that Alawites are now identified with Bashar al-Assad and Sunnis with the opposition.

So sectarianism has certainly raised its ugly head in recent years but a lot of people have worked hard to make that happen. In addition, social media has made it easier than ever to spread toxic and intolerant messages. Yet sectarianism is not the main cause of divisions in the Middle East". (Black, 2015).

4.9 PRESUMPTION OF GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA

Over the past eight years, Syria has suffered from multifaceted fighting. In one hand, it was a fighting between a dictatorial government and an armed and unarmed opposition, and on the other hand, a fighting between nationalities. As PYD, (a party originating from PKK, and both have been classified as terrorist

parties in several classifications), adopted the Kurdish nationalism and fought the Syrians on national basis deepening the gap of confidence between Arabs and Syrian Kurds. On the other hand, there was Sunni Alawite and Sunni Shiite fighting due to the entry of Iran into the Syrian conflict and Syrian regime being strengthened by the sectarian militias adopting Shiite Doctrine, like “Asa’eb Ahel Alhak” and “Abo AlAbbas” militias. At the top of these militias is Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia supported by Iran. “The National Interest” magazine in an article entitled "Syria: The Largest and Most Important Conflict of the 21st Century" reported the multiplicity of aspects of the conflict in Syria which was considered the most dangerous conflict in 21st century.

"The conflict should be seen in a series of “acts” or phases. The Syrian rebellion grew out of the Arab Spring and began in 2011. By 2012 the rebels had become armed and countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia were voicing support for them. They were mostly Sunni Arabs opposing a regime led by Alawites, a minority group. Hezbollah stepped in to aid the Syrian regime and the United States and other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, began to tentatively support the rebels. By 2014 the Islamist aspect of the rebellion had carved out a power vacuum in Syria that Islamic State exploited and filled, using it as a Launchpad to attack Iraq. The creation of a U.S.-led coalition was a response to the rise of ISIS. Eventually almost seventy countries would be involved in fighting ISIS, and some of them would have boots on the ground in eastern Syria with the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led partner force". (Frantzman, 2018).

Therefore, we find that the solutions on the federal basis would cause more conflicts as happened in Iraq, and returning to a presidential regime could bring Syria back to the era of authoritarian dictatorship which would be difficult to be imposed on Syrians of all components. As well as, the parliamentary regime might be so weak that it would not be able to restore stability to a country torn apart by complex conflicts, as happened in Lebanon. So it is possible that the mixed regime is the most susceptible to the stability due to the existence of a central authority and the possibility of involving most of Syrian components in the power, which may help to satisfy all the components and build confidence between them in the long term.

Legislative responsibility: refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government. From office without cause (Golder, 2018, p. 455) (Table 4-3).

Table 0-2. Types of Government

	Pr dential	parliamentary	semi- presidential
Legislative Responsibility	NO	YES	YES
A Head Of State Who Is Popularly Elected For Fixed Term	YES	NO	YES
Voters Elect Prime Minister	NO	NO	Could YES
PM Give Large Parties More Office Than Small Parties	NO	A formateur is person designated to form government, and is often PM designate.	

In all kinds of political regimes there are three powers, legislative, executive and judiciary powers. In addition, there are two important issues in the Syrian case: the army and the security forces, both of which were the subject of the biggest dispute in Syria. Both sides have been involved in suppressing the Syrians throughout the rule of “Arab Socialist Baath Party”. Despite the importance of separating the authorities to achieve the freedom, according to Montesquieu:

"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty. There is no liberty if the

powers of judging is not separated from the legislative and executive, there would be an end to everything, if the same man or the same body. were to exercise those three powers". (Charles de Secondat, 1748, p. 181)

But the participation of the majority of the segments of society in these powers is the thing that can build the confidence between the various components of Syrian society. The research here seeks to find a form of Power-Sharing that maintain the speed and validity of government decision, as we have found in the previous chapters, Power-Sharing often causes clashes which lead either to conflict, as in Iraqi case in which there was a call to separate Kurdistan region from Iraq and hold a referendum on 25 September 2017 which was unilaterally held without returning to the central government (aljazeera, 2017), or lead to paralysis in decision-making as in Lebanon when there was a presidential gap between May 2014 at the end of the term of President Michel Suleiman and the election of the current President Michel Aoun in October 2016 (Aljazeera net, 2016).

CHAPTER 5

COMPARISON OF POWER SHARING IN

LEBANON, IRAQ AND SYRIA

5.1 INTRODUCTION

“Power sharing defined as practices and institution that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society” (Sisk T. D., 2002, p. vii)

Sisk has divided Power-Sharing into two types. The first type is *Consociational*, which is when the state's institutions are built in a way in which the agreed decisions are issued by all the participants in the power, but the decisions that are not agreed upon by any of the parties, the institutions cannot issue them. Although this way, theoretically, makes all parties satisfied, but it makes the issuance of decisions more difficult and lead often to paralysis in the state as happened in Lebanon and Iraq, where there was a period of time where Lebanon was without the high positions (President and Prime Minister), and in terms of services, there was a crisis of removing the garbage. Also in Iraq, the second chamber in parliament stipulated in the constitution wasn't formed and the crisis of occupation of Mosul by ISIS and liberating it.

The second type is *Integrative*. This type is close to the complementarity where the state's institutions complement each other and therefore, often there will not be a paralysis in the issuance of decisions despite the participation of all parties of the state's institutions. But the participated institutions have to monitor the impartiality of decisions issued in favor of one party without the other and monitor the right implementation of decisions. Generally, making incentives for politicians to act more impartially is better than to provide Veto. (Table 5-1) shows a comparison between Consociational vs. integrative power-sharing (Sisk T. D., 2002).

Table 0-1. Approaches of Power Sharing

	Consociational	Integrative
Characteristics	Elites cooperate after election to form multiethnic coalition and Manage Conflict; groups are Autonomous; minorities are protected	Parties encouraged to create coalitions before elections, creating broadly inclusive but majoritarian governments.
Principles	Broad-based or "grand" coalitions, minority veto, proportionality in allocation of civil service positions and public funds group autonomy.	Dispersion and devolution of power, promotion of intraethnic competition, inducement for intraethnic.
Institutions and practices to Promote the Principles and effects	Parliamentary government, proportional reservation of seats, proportional representation electoral system	Federalism, vote pooling, electoral system president elected by "supermajority".
Strength of approach	Provides groups firm guarantees for the protection of their interests.	Provides politicians with incentives for moderation-"coalitions of commitment"
Weaknesses	"Coalitions of convenience" Elites may pursue conflict rather than try to reduce it; communal groups may not defer to their leaders; system relies on constraints against immoderate politics.	Lack of whole-country empirical example of working systems; assumption that politicians respond to incentives and citizens will vote for parties not based on their own group.



The research assumes a form of power-sharing on the basis of integrative and by a manner appropriate for Syrian situation, depending on the three types of power:

- 1 Legislative Power.
- 2 Judicial Power.
- 3 Third: Executive Power:

However, Syria's special case in terms of the army and the secret security forces (Intelligence), which have played a major role in Syrian life since the establishment of Syrian state, makes the research incomplete unless it studies the neutralization of these institutions from political life, without losing their role in the stability of Syrian situation during the transitional period, which, often will be a difficult period due to the major external and internal interferences.

Table 0-2. Compare And Contrast

	Iraq	Lebanon	Syria
Historical	Rashidi-Umayyad-Abbasi-Ottoman	Rashidi-Umayyad-Abbasi-Ottoman	Rashidi-Umayyad-Abbasi-Ottoman
Colonial Period	England	France	France
Origin	Sykes-Picot	Sykes-Picot	Sykes-Picot
Power After Independence	Dictator - Individual	Pluralistic - Sectarian - Sharing	Dictator - Individual
Power Transforming	Pluralistic – Sectarian - Sharing (2003)	Established after 1989 (Al Taif)	Didn't transform
Demography	Multiple-Simple Shiite Majority	Multiple and approximate Sunni-Shiite-Christian Balance	Multiple-Sunni Majority
Kurd Issues	✓	X	✓
Minorities Issues	✓	✓	✓
Current Economic Crisis	✓	✓	✓
Social Status	Instability and Confidence Gaps between Components	Instability and Confidence Gaps between Components	Armed Revolution and Confidence Gaps

			between Component
Political Status	Continuing Political Unrests	Semi-permanent Political Spaces	The area is divided into two Parts: One is under the control of the Regime and the other is outside its control
External Interference	✓	✓	✓

5.2 FIRST: LEGISLATIVE POWER

Legislative power differs from the judiciary one in terms of the function in the state institutions. The legislative power legislates the laws and the judiciary implements these laws.

However, one of the most important pillars of building the power-sharing is to ensure the participation of all components of Syrian society in the legislative power. Despite the multiplicity of functions of the parliament, the legislative power remains the main task of parliaments of various forms. The research will study the legislative power in both Lebanon and Iraq and try to provide an assumption for Syrian case, which will benefit from both Iraqi and Lebanese cases and avoid their negative aspects.

5.2.1 Legislative Power under Power-Sharing in Lebanon

Although Lebanese National Charter 1990 has provided for the existence of two chambers of Lebanese parliament, but it has stopped the establishment of the second chamber, which is Senate Chamber, until the parliament avoids the sectarian distribution in the composition of the first chamber, (Mohamed ben Lolo, 2016). And as it has not avoided this distribution, the second chamber, which is Senate Chamber consisted of two members of each sect, has not formed and Lebanese Parliament has continued with one sectarian chamber. The one-chamber Lebanese parliament based on sectarian division has failed, as shown earlier, in achieving the stability and growth in Lebanon, and politically, it has allowed the states to intervene through the deputies and parliamentary bodies. And it has been unable to elect a President of the

Republic for more than two and a half years. It has represented the interests of the parliamentary bodies more than the interests of Lebanese people. Recently, Nabih Berri (Shiite), Parliament Speaker has asked to postpone Arab Economic Summit in Beirut and insisted to invite Syria to attend the summit ignoring Arab boycott imposed on Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad (RT, 2019) This is the attitude of Shiite Hezbollah. And postponing the summit is not good for Lebanon, which is trying to attract the Arabic investments.

5.2.2 Legislative Power under Power-Sharing in Iraq

Although Iraqi Constitution of 2005 provided for the existence of two chambers of the parliament, but the second one was not activated since then and there was a constitutional vacuum and Parliament remained with one sectarian chamber.

The research also declared that the Iraqi parliament in the manner of sectarian quotas was also unable to achieve the desired goals and remained objected by many sects, as well as it was an easy channel for the international intervention. As we notice, there are regional and international disputes in the platforms of Parliament and in its elections, as the success of a body means the influence of a state. (AlSaiede, 2018)

5.2.3 Presumption of Legislative Power under Power-Sharing in Syria

The study assumes in my research that the two-chamber parliament is the most appropriate for Syrian case, as the first chamber should be elected directly by the people without sectarian or ethnic quotas or any kind of quota and the chairs should be distributed according to the proportion of countries and governorates of Syria, especially since the majority of the Syrian regions have ethnic and religious mixture. In my research, the study suggested that the next parties law should provide encouraging policies for parties that maintain, in their electoral lists, a sufficient diversity between women, men, youth, sects and nationalities in order to reduce the control of majorities over the minorities. These policies should be supported by encouraging policies of the parties which adopted awareness campaigns of the importance of diversity in the stability and growth of countries.

The second chamber should be a quota chamber for the sects and races of the population of Syria in equal numbers regardless of the population ratios, so that all the components should be represented. The members of this chamber should be elected by each nationality or sect. The main function of this chamber should be the approval of the legislation concluded in the first chamber, so as not to be biased to race or sect at the expense of others and proposing the legislations to be discussed in the first chamber, which would help to further integration between all components.

This proposal is, in a way or another, developed from the General Assembly, the first democratic experiment in Ottoman Sultanate, which contained a highly diverse ethnic, religious and even sectarian composition.

5.3SECOND: JUDICIAL POWER

5.3.1 Judicial Power under Power-Sharing in Lebanon

Despite the fact that Lebanese judiciary gives the right of prosecution in the personal status according to the sect's doctrine and the prosecution to the civil judiciary in case the citizen does not belong to a particular sect, but the Millet Ottoman Regime remains more reconciled in the sect itself, as the members of the sect are prosecuted to who is agreed upon by them and only the issues that the sect cannot decide about are prosecuted to the public judiciary. However, Lebanese judiciary remains independent from the parliament and the presidency, (Shalhoub, 2007).

5.3.2 Judicial Power under Power-Sharing in Iraq

After 2005, Iraqi regime suffers from the non-independence of the judicial power from the executive one, as the constitutional articles contradiction raises doubts about the independence of the judiciary and also the parliament is distributed in a sectarian manner and has an overlap with Higher Judicial Council (Saadoon, 2015), which leads to sectarian overlaps in the judiciary, especially Iraq could not activate the Constitution and Iraqi parliament remained with one chamber despite the fact that Iraqi constitution provides for two chambers.

5.3.3 Presumption of Judicial Power under Power-Sharing in Syria

The law applicable to the judicial power was the subject of a historic dispute between the components of Syrian society even before the French occupier left Syria. This dispute has intensified since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. The Syrian armed opposition has been able to control a large part of Syria, making the Syrian regime withdraw the state institutions from these vast areas. The first of these institutions was the judicial institution. And because of the suffering of Syrians of many laws which were unfair to Syrian citizen, such as Law 29 of 1980, which provides for the execution of members of Muslim Brotherhood, the media law that prevents the freedoms of the media, the law of emergency which allows the security devices to control the personal freedoms and arrest people without judicial notes for an unlimited period of time and other laws reinforcing the dictatorship. There was a rejection of anything related to the dictatorial regime and this rejection combined what is good and what is unjust and pushed the activists in the opposition in areas controlled by them to search for a legal system to impose it as a judicial power in the liberated areas. The most prominent of these proposals was the application of the unified Arab law as an alternative to Syrian law.

"Therefore, the Syrian revolution inherited a heavy burden in this domain. Since the first year of the revolution, it has been working to form legitimate bodies in the liberated areas that would resolve the disputes and judge among the people. The provisions of these bodies were in accordance with Islamic law and according to their potential and capabilities, but there was a weakness in the judiciary staff in terms of quantity and quality. There were Bodies formed in early 2013 that had a role in the liberated areas, but soon their role declined. The establishment of (the Unified Judicial Council in Aleppo) is considered one of the oldest and most successful experiences. It included a number of prominent scholars and jurists, as well as most of the courts located in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib. This council, in consultation with the powers and specialists, adopted the unified Arab law and also (the legislative Court in Aleppo and its Countryside) adopted the same law in criminal and civil proceedings and it decided, by an issued statement, to apply this law as of 12/10/2015. The statement referred to the need to take into consideration the amendments of the law study committees that fit the revolutionary situation in Syria. Also the House of Justice in Houran adopted the unified Arab law as a general reference to the judiciary in its courts in November 2015, after

consulting many scientists, students and Syrian Islamic Council which called to adopt the unified Arab law as the basis for the judiciary in Sharia courts in Syria.

The Justice House in Houran, the Supreme Judicial Council in the Eastern Ghouta and the Supreme Judicial Council of Aleppo considered, in a joint statement, that their adoption of the unified Arab law is a first step in the implementation of the unified judicial project at the level of Syria" (AlSham, 2017).

This step has provoked many Syrian elements, such as secularists, liberals, Christians, Druze and other sects, for two reasons:

- Unified Arab law is a law based on Islamic law.
- This step is considered a control over the will of the Syrian people on the part of those who took it.

However, deep gaps have emerged between Syrians resulting from the formation of Shari'a bodies governed by sheikhs of Islamic jurisprudence without legalization, courts governing with the unified Arab law, courts wishing to arbitrate Syrian law, courts governing with a law specific for areas controlled by the terrorist forces of PYD which were called self-administered areas and other courts in the rest of liberated Syrian areas until it reached nine judicial bodies (Jalabi, 2016).

The study assume that the solution adopted by Ottoman Empire named "Millet System" which allows each sect to judge to its religious authority, allowing each sect to maintain its values under the central authority. As if there is a dispute within the sect, the reference will be to a central court included in Syrian constitution and the judges of the sect are chosen by a unified mechanism controlled by the central judicial authorities. This system has achieved in Ottoman state the justice and independence and preserve the identities of the components of the Ottoman state society. This system can be developed to meet the standards of the modern state, although it itself fulfills many of these standards.

The research assume development of this system will allow the great segments of Syrian society to have the desired judicial authority that fits their beliefs. The civil law can be considered as a segment of Syrian society that is governed by a civil law not a religious one, provided that this law does not violate

the values and customs of Syrian society, as the nature of the laws governing all societies. For example, there are limits to the laws of alcohol in all countries that adopt civil laws, such as not allowing those under 18 or 19 to buy alcohol, and also there are limits to the way of women appearance, such as being chest nude or not, and in any places.

In the sense that one of the civil law's objectives remains to preserve the community security, which makes it limited to the values and customs of the societies that apply the law.

Millet System is one of the frameworks through which legal authority can be formulated that will satisfy all components of Syrian society (majority or minorities).

5.4THIRD: EXECUTIVE POWER

5.4.1 Executive Power under Power-Sharing in Lebanon

The executive power in Lebanon has been divided into a republic presidency and a prime minister provided that the president of the republic should be a Maronite and the prime minister should be a Sunni Muslim. This sectarian division, with respect to the rest of the sects, has been applied to all sections of the executive power, including the local departments and councils and governmental bureaucracy, which spread the sectarian conflict throughout Lebanese history and often led Lebanon to the administrative failure and it is shown as a failed state or, at least it is always in the indicators of the fragile states.

5.4.2 Executive Power under Power-Sharing in Iraq

Executive Power in Iraq has been divided in a sectarian manner, as the most important position, which is the post of prime minister, was used to be a Shiite and the president of the republic used to be Kurd. The federal regime has complicated the executive power in Iraq, which caused a permanent conflict on two levels: a sectarian level (Shiite - Sunni) and a federal one (Kurd - Central), which caused continuous administrative crises in Iraq. The fall of Mosul by ISIS, liberating it, reconstructing it and returning its displaced people to their homes were not the only crisis, but the crises continue throughout the history of Iraq since 2005 to the present

day. The executive power of federal sectarian aspect was as a partner in deepening these crises.

5.4.3 Presumption of Executive Power under Power-Sharing in Syria

The complicated situation that emerged in Syria after 2011 will impose on any new executive power major challenges, where the international intervention has become an inevitable reality. As Russians have built two basic bases in Syria, Hmemim and Tartous, in the sense that Russian presence is no longer linked to the current crisis but it will have the subsequent consequences. Also Iran has intervened from the first moment of the beginning of Syrian revolution and then this intervention continued through the political, logistical and military support at the level of the experts and the sectarian militias, one of the most prominent ones was Lebanese Hizballah, the expert of the regional politics with strong relations with Syrian regime for decades. The policies of Hizballah in Lebanon have not been separated from those of Syrian regime since the era of former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad (Blanford, 2017). Hezbollah relationship with Syria has continued strongly in the time of Bashar al-Assad, and on the other hand there have been constant intervention by Western countries, whether by America which supports some militias classified as terrorist such as PYD, which controls part of Syria with direct US support or by the International Coalition for Combating Terrorism, which fights ISIS with its British, French and American airplanes. Also there has been an indirect Western intervention through the international organizations.

What make the situation in Syria more complicated is the existence of extremist militias such as ISIS (Islamic State in Levan and Iraq) and Al Nosra Front, which are difficult to be removed from any area they entered and they hinder the work of any executive power and the existence of the various opposition factions (Free Syrian Army), which needs a strong executive power to control its performance within the state departments in the future.

Therefore, the mixed regime and at the time in which the research proposed the SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL system to be more disciplined, the research assumes that the President of the Republic should be elected directly by the people for a defined

electoral period constitutionally, and that the post of President of the Republic should have an important part of the executive power and not to leave it completely to the post of prime minister, for example, the research suggests that the president of the republic should have the right in:

1. The partial veto, in the sense that if the veto is used against any legislation, this legislation will be returned to Parliament, to one of its chambers (the first or second chamber) to amend it before it is approved by the President of the Republic.
2. Request questioning of the Prime Minister or any of the Ministers through asking the Parliament to carry out such questioning about one of the works of government.
3. Power over the army, which should be prohibited from interfering in the politics.
4. Any international agreement must be verified by the President prior to enforcing it. And any dispute between the President of the Republic and the Foreign Ministry should be adjudicated by the Parliament by its two chambers or either, as provided for in the Constitution.

The above are examples of real executive powers for the post of President of the Republic so that not the whole executive power is only for the Prime Minister, who, also according to the research, should be directly elected by the people and then he should submit his proposed composition of the government to be given the confidence by the parliament through voting for each minister separately. This minister either gains the confidence or the Prime Minister is asked to nominate another one.

The research assumes that the government and the prime minister should have the full executive powers, except the power over the army and the armed forces, which should remain under the power of the president.

The research focuses on that the prime minister should be elected directly by the people because of the absence of party life in Syria, as shown in the research

since 1958 to the present time, meaning that the research does not expect that one of the political parties will have the majority in parliament which enable it to form the government. Forming successful governments needs a party experience which isn't available to Syrian parties. So the research assumes that both the posts of president and the prime minister should be directly elected by the people.

5.5 ARMY

5.5.1 Army under Power-Sharing in Lebanon

In 1943, Lebanese National Accord allocated the position of the commander of Lebanese army to Maronite Christians and specified 55% of the members of the army of Maronite Christians and 45% of the other sects, the thing which caused the failure of Lebanese army to stop the civil war in Lebanon in 1973 and some of the army divisions separated and joined their sectarian components, which lasted until 1989. Al Taif Agreement kept the position of army command to Maronite Christians, but it made the percentage between Christians and other sects 50%. But the sectarian tension continued to this day in terms of the army so that Hezbollah, totally Shiites, formed its militias and imposed them on Lebanon and these militias are still fighting the army over its national role at all levels (DW, 2017).

5.5.2 Army under Power-Sharing in Iraq

As shown in Iraq Chapter, Bremer had dissolved Iraqi army by one order and when the army had been reconstituted under the policy of Ba'ath exclusion, most members of the former army, under Saddam Hussein, were Baathists and dominated by Sunni component. Shiite component has dominated the composition of Iraqi army and, of course, was not competent enough to meet the challenges imposed on it, especially the fight against ISIS. Sectarian militias have emerged, the largest one was Popular Mobilization, which were Shiite militias close to Tehran. In the battle of Mosul, the government then announced the inclusion of the Popular Mobilization to the regular army, officially affiliated to the government, and again the sectarian structure became to Shiites and in all cases, there were military forces named "Peshmerga" in Kurdistan, which made the sectarianism under Power-Sharing in addition to federalism dispersed the military institution making it in many often a sectarian or ethnic element rather than a national one (Brammer, 2017)

5.5.3 Presumption of Army under Power-Sharing in Syria

According to Syrian chapter of this research, French mandate established the army in Syria but Hafez Assad, in the 1980s, turned it into an ideological army that followed Arab nationalist ideology, the ideology of Arab Baath Party (Alhatabah, 2018), and all its members were supposed to be of the members of Arab Baath party. So Syrian army plays a key role in politics and its intervention to suppress the peaceful demonstrations in Daraa, Homs and other Syrian cities in 2011 was not the first time, but in 1982 it destroyed a large part of Hama, where it killed about 3,800, most of them were civilians when they rebelled against Hafez Assad, the former president of Syria (Allouche, 2018). The research assumes that separating the army from political life is the basis for Syria's stability and its gradual transition to democracy.

The research assumes that there are constitutional articles that neutralize the army from any role in the politics, and make limits to the intervention of the military institutions in the politics, for example National Security Council.

Since Syrian army has been controlled by Alawite sects, the thing that provokes the rest of the sects, especially Sunnis, the restructuring of the army and the amendment of the legal structure to meet the Constitution and criminate the sectarianism is the basis in helping the executive power to stabilize Syria.

Also Syrian army ideology is an Arab nationalist one, and this is what provokes the other nationalities, especially the nationalistic Kurds. Therefore, neutralizing the army for the nationalities is the basis for ending the separatist calls or what is established for the separation like national military formations such as Peshmerga forces in Kurdistan and their forming the nucleus for separation. In addition, these calls constitute an important space for external interventions.

The research assumes that the criteria of successful experiments such as Copenhagen criteria approved by EU should be used to neutralize the army from politics and important democratic experiences such as Turkish experience which shares the cultural background and the geographical closeness with Syria should be guided by.

5.6 SECURITY FORCES

5.6.1 Security Forces under Power-Sharing in Lebanon

There are security departments in Lebanese institutions, including General Intelligence, State Security Administration and Information Service. However, Lebanon is characterized by free press, and media, and that the Secret Security Departments don't control the public and civil life (AlFalah, 2018). And, as in all institutions of Lebanon, sectarianism in the security services is taken into consideration significantly.

5.6.2 Security Forces under Power-Sharing in Iraq

As soon as Saddam Hussein took the power in 1980, he turned Iraq into a fully security state and also turned the Second Department, the only intelligence institution headed by Ahmed Bakr Sedki, to a security service consisting of more than 100,000 military and civilian person and established a number of services and departments up to 12 one, whose primary task was to maintain his rule from the internal and external enemies and these devices were:

- National Security Council/Bureau [Maktab al-Amn al-Qawmi].
- Special Security Committee 2,000
- Special Security Service – SSS [Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khas / Al Amn al-Khas].
- Iraqi Intelligence Service – IIS.
- General Intelligence Directorate – GID [Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Amma].
- Military Intelligence [Al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya].
- Project 858 [Al Hadi Project].
- Air Force .
- Military Security Service [Al Amn al-Askari].
- General Security Service [Mudiriyyat al-Amn al-Amma].
- Special Republican Guard (SRG).

- Republican Guard (RG) Saddam's Martyrs ["Men of Sacrifice"] Fedayeen Saddam (Security, 2011).

In 2003, Premier dissolved these services completely, and the Internal Security and Secret Security Services (Intelligence) were reorganized. And the Secret Security had only three branches

- Iraqi National Intelligence Service.
- Ministry of Security.
- General Security Directorate [Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Amma].
- Counter-Terrorism Service (Counter Terrorism Bureau) (Security, 2011).

Like other institutions established after US occupation of Iraq, most of them were dominated by Shiite component, which once again made them weak institutions that could not achieve their national goals and many often, played roles in the interests of the countries of the region. All of this was in the midst of the disputes of the Consociational form of Power-Sharing.

5.6.3 Security Forces under Power-Sharing in Syria

Secret Security forces (Intelligence) in Syria have been a major problem since the early rule of Arab Baath Socialist Party and rule of Hafez Assad. As the secret security forces have had various forms reached more than four main ones, including many departments. The main ones are:

- General Intelligence Branch (State Security).
- Political Security Branch.
- They are essentially subject to Ministry of Interior
- Military Security Branch.
- Air Security Branch.

Both of which are essentially subject to Ministry of Defense.

All of which have dominated Syrian civilian life under the Emergency Law, which has been in force since the coup of Baath Socialist Party and its taking over the power from 1963 to 2011. As it has suspended the work by Law of Emergency after the popular protests (AksAlSer, 2011). And the arrests, forced disappearances

and unprecedented torture at the human level and executions by field trials have become an integral part of the life of Syrians for nearly half a century. The regime has made Alawites the controllers of the secret security forces with no competitor, which has created a kind of sectarian mobilization against Alawite sect by the rest of the sects.

The research assumes that the issue of secret security forces needs the following procedures:

- Discharge the prisons of all branches of secret security.
- Return each branch to its position and ensure to enact laws that prevent them from the interference in the public life.
- Enact laws that criminalize the members of the security forces in the event of committing crimes of torture, as the legal articles such as Article 16 of 1969 and Article 74 of the same year and others, which protect those who work with these security forces from accountability in the event of torture or even murder while performing security function, are still in force (committee, 2008)
- Enact monitoring and accounting laws to prevent the control of the security bodies on the civilian life.
- Restructure the security bodies and stop the power of the dominating and beneficiaries to cleanse them of the administrative corruption.
- Rehabilitation of the security forces personnel so that they can work by the law after they have been working for decades outside the law.
- Enact laws that criminalize the bias to religion or race in the recruitment and promotion processes supported by executive mechanisms.

The research is concerned about the laws and institutions that work to properly activate Power-Sharing mechanisms. As Power-Sharing lacked its objectives in building a stable political system in Lebanon when the state functions were divided in a sectarian manner, and also in Iraq, when the military or security establishments were controlled by one component without another. Therefore, the research assumes that the integrative Power-Sharing form is capable of building a stable political system leading to democracy.

5.7POWER SHARING EMPOWERMENT

The research assumes that there is an environment help to activate Power-Sharing to be an active factor in which Syrians can build their state institutions and reach their goals of democracy, transparency and human rights so that Syria become an acceptable state in the region and the international community. And what helps to create this environment is the following:

- ✓ Municipalities directly elected by the people.
- ✓ Wide powers of these municipalities, so that they can provide their appropriate services without central bureaucracy disrupting.
- ✓ A modern legal structure that does not oppose the Constitution, serves the human rights and public freedoms, and preserves the rights of minorities. As well as laws of monitoring and accountability of various state institutions.
- ✓ Non-federalism in Power-Sharing: the research assumes that Federalism cannot help to end the fragile political, economic and social situation in Syria.

CONCLUSION

Despite the great attention of the western community in Lebanon and the continuing attempts to get it out of the catastrophic consequences of the civil war that it has suffered for more than fifteen years, but in 2018 (comprises data collected between January 1, 2017 and December 32, 2017), according to the fragile state index, which is an annual ranking of 178 countries indicator issued by the support of the fund for peace and measures: Cohesion Indicators which include (Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievance), Economic Indicators including (Economic Decline, Uneven Economic Development, Human Flight and Brain Drain), Political Indicators including (State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law) and finally Social And Cross-Cutting Indicators including (Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs. External Intervention), and according to the total points of these 12 indicators, whose points are from 0 to 120, where 0 is the best and 120 are the worst, Lebanon has got 86.6 and classified by the index as: High Warning State.

And Iraq got 102.2 which is very late rank and classified by the index as: High Alert State, which is the countries' pre-final classification.

As for Syria, is still suffering from daily internal and international conflicts, so it has got late ranks according to FSI index and followed only by four countries and classified as Very High Alert country, which is the lowest rank or, in other words, the most dangerous country.

In any case, the international community's proposals for solutions, could not achieve the political or social stability in Lebanon, as its results, after nearly 20 years of ending civil war through Taif Agreement, according to FSI's Cohesion Indicators of 2018 were: for Security Apparatus 8.4 (the worst is 10), this indicator considers the security threats of the state, such as bombings attacks and battles are related to death and also it takes into account the confidence of the citizens in domestic security, for Factionalized Elites, which mean fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as and brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites, 9,6 (the worst is 10), and for External Intervention 9.4

(the worst is 10). Meaning that the international solutions could not provide stability to Lebanon.

Also for Iraq, and according to the same FSI index, we find that Security Apparatus scored less than Lebanon and got 9 for the same year 2018, Factionalized Elites scored 9.6, and External Intervention scored 9.4 the same score of Lebanon. When there are many external intervention, government' sovereignty is violated, in other words, Lebanon and Iraq governments could not achieve the independence of the national decision, but actually the politicians and political parties in both countries were too close to other parties outside their countries, for example, Hezbollah in Lebanon is representing Iran interest more than the interest of Lebanese peoples and deeply intervenes in Syria conflict in accordance with Iran decision at the time when Lebanese official decision is isolating Lebanon (Self-distancing) from Syrian crisis. Also in Iraq Al Da'wa Party is very near to Iran decision makers.

The factors in Group Grievance indicator, which focuses on the divisions between different groups in society based on political or social issues, consider how much the leadership fairly elected and how much they represent the populations. In this indicator there are some questions like: Is there a political reconciliation process? Is there a sense of national identity? Lebanon, according to this indicator scored 8.2 over 10 and Iraq scored 9.3 over 10. Both countries have bad standards.

The results of Lebanon and Iraq according to Group Grievance indicator are compatible with their results according to External Intervention indicator.

The research concludes that the decision making processes of the leaderships are convenient with the interests of the regional and international communities more the interests of Lebanese people.

According to Human flight and Brain Drain indicator, which measures the human migration for economic or political reasons and considers the economic equality and the discriminatory economic system, Lebanon scored 5.3, which could be considered as average, but it still has brain drain after 20 years of reconciliation. Iraq also, after 15 years of replacement of dictatorship, was worse and scored 7.4 over 10. There are no accurate numbers about brain drain but "Yaqien News Agency" reported 800,000 physicians leaved Iraq after 2014, and despite Lebanon is

a small country but UN resources registered average 165,000 migration case every year, most of them are young.

In Legitimacy indicator, Lebanon scored 7.3 and Iraq 9.2. This means the governments in both countries represent the citizens poorly, but the representation of Iraq government is worse. Also this indicator considers the transparency of the government, which means the evidence of corruption of the government officials.

In public services indicator which refers to the existence of the basic functions of the state including the essential services such as infrastructures, health and electricity, Lebanon scored 5.4, it was better than Iraq which scored 8.3

In both Lebanon and Iraq, there are many reports talking about the lack of healthy drinking water, electricity, schools and public transportations and about the widespread government corruption which is still ongoing.

Both Lebanon and Iraq have their own experience in Consociational power sharing for more than a decade, but the results of the indicators like WGI and FSI indicate that both countries' governments have no real success with this form of Power-Sharing.

Research conclude that Power-Sharing form applied in both Lebanon and Iraq were not efficient and could be a reason for the paralyses in decision making processes, increase the sectarian and ethnicity divisions and create a gap of confidence between different components of the society. And it suggests that Integrative form of Power-Sharing could be more appropriate and achieve better results.

It also concludes that the solutions suggested by research centers, international universities, institutions of countries or even by United Nations, which are subject to many international pressures, are often incompatible with the nature of local communities, not even with the nature of the economy or the political history of these countries, which make these solutions as unsuccessful for them. Also it suggests that the solutions should be derived from the culture of the people and regional countries should be used, provided that those countries should have succeeded in establishing democracy and freedoms, compatible with the culture of

the local peoples, and have geographical closeness, which may often be a motive for stable countries to achieve stability on their direct and indirect borders.

The main challenge for Power-Sharing in Syria is how can it be done while the revolution (civil war!) is running? In general, Power-Sharing is a post-conflict topic. But, although, academically it cannot take place until the war is stopped, but we can conduct it on the basis that the war these days is minimal and it is part of the politics. As the war itself, is a political struggle for power.

The research examined the difficulties and possibilities of the particular situation in Syria and ending the conflict of the ongoing civil war. As there are two fighting sides: the regime which is supported internally and externally, and the other side includes Syria Free Army, Al-Nusra Front, Kurdish PYD and ISIS which also have their internal and external support.

The research also examined the two main power-sharing approaches which are Consociational (Sisk T. D., 2002), and Integrative (Horowitz), and examined Lebanese and Iraqi cases in comparison to Syria because of the similarities between the three countries demographically. Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are multiculturalism. They have Sunni Muslims, Shiites, Christian Catholics, Protestants and other Christian sects, as well as small sects such as Druze in Syria and Lebanon, and Yezidis in Iraq. All three countries were established after their separation from Ottoman state in the sense that they are modern countries forced to separate from their mother state under Sykes-Picot Agreement without the consent of the peoples of these countries. In addition, they all share the same history in one way or another. Lebanon and Syria are originally one country with Jordan and Palestine called Levant, and also Iraq is geography close to Syria and they participate the post-independence way of governance, as both countries were ruled by Arab Socialist Baath Party as a single party controlled the power. It concluded that the integrative form is the most appropriate one.

The research at the end suggested that Millet system of Muslim states, prevailed in the Middle East up until the collapse of empire will be effective and suitable for Syrian case. This system allows each sect to judge to its religious authority and to maintain its values under the central authority. As, if there is a

dispute within the sect, the reference will be to a central court and the judges of the sect are chosen by a unified mechanism controlled by the central judicial authorities. This system has achieved in Ottoman state the justice and independence and preserve the identities of the components of Ottoman state. So, according to the research, this system, which will solve the problem of the judiciary and preserve Syrian identity shall be adopted in Syria.



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CURRICULUM VITAE

Politician who is well-respected by the electorate in my native ward and beyond. Being heard and making a difference; those are the reasons I wanted to get into politics since I was a teenager in college. My passion for social justice, making a tangible difference in the community and resolving people's problems makes me the ideal candidate for a demanding position in politics.

- **Freelance Trainer Apr.2018 up-to-date**

- Prepare and build training material.
- Deliver the training and Coach the trainees to implement the training.
- Conflict resolution and consensus building
- Presentation skills.
- Communication skills.
- Team building.

- **Secretary General of Justice& Constitution National Party “WAAD Party” 2015-2017**

- Established a new Coalition for Syrian National Parties
- Design and Build WAAD's Party Project for the Future of Syria

- **Deputy Secretary General & President of Planning Office of Justice& Constitution National Party “WAAD Party” 2013- 2015.**

- Design a political resolution for the Syrian Conflict
- The political resolution produced international communications that resulted Astana Dialogue

- Played a major role Astana Dialogue.

- **Between 2009- 2011 Active Member Aleppo Call for One Syria Group.**

- **Between 2007 2011 I was Board Member – Aleppo City Syrian Human Rights Organization**

- **During 2006- 2009 I was founder and Board Member for activist group called “Aleppo Lovers Group”**

➤ Opposition active group in City of Aleppo.

➤ Prepared and supported multiple candidates for different positions in the city council, City Education and many other critical divisions to drive change from inside the government

➤ The group went under close monitoring by the Syrian intelligence.

- **EDUCATION & Professional Bachelor of pharmacy, King Saud University, Riyadh, KSA – 1993.**

Appendix 1

A chronology of key events of Lebanon

Seventh century CE
Arab Muslim conquest of Syria. Islamisation of southern tribes while northern ones remain Christian. Maronites split from the Byzantine Church.
Ninth–eleventh centuries
Spread of Shiism in Lebanese territories. Maronites pushed south Mount Lebanon by Byzantine advance. Development of the Druze sect and its spread in Syria.
Twelfth–thirteenth centuries
The Pope leads European powers in the Crusades. Maronites split over allegiance to the Pope, leading to a lasting schism.
Sixteenth century
Ottoman rule begins.
Nineteenth century
Sectarian conflict builds between Druze and Christians around Mount Lebanon. After the eruption of war in 1860 French troops intervene and a Maronite-dominated autonomous political entity in Mount Lebanon is declared.
Early twentieth century
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the League of Nations grants France a mandate over the empire's northern Arab Levant provinces in 1920. In response to demand from Maronite elites, France creates the State of Greater Lebanon, which includes the former autonomous district of Mount Lebanon as well as the coastal districts of North Lebanon (Tripoli), South Lebanon (Sidon and Tyr) and the Beqaa and Hermel Valley, all historically parts of the Ottoman province of Syria. A Lebanese Republic with its own constitution is declared in 1926, instituting a formula governing the proportional distribution of power. Independence is obtained on 22 November 1943.

1943
The National Pact is agreed. It is an unwritten agreement between the Maronite President and his Sunni Prime Minister constituting a grand bargain among Lebanon's Christians and Muslims. It sets out mutual guarantees in which Christians agree to accept Lebanon's Arab identity and Muslims agree to recognise the legitimacy of the Lebanese state.
1948
The state of Israel is declared. The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948–49 provokes the arrival of more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
1958
With growing domestic political tensions exacerbated by external interference, mainly from the Syrian part of the United Arab Republic, civil war breaks out. President Camille Chamoun asks US troops to reestablish order. The crisis ends with a 'no winner, no loser' agreement. Chamoun is replaced by General Fouad Chehab.
1967–69
Lebanon declines to participate in the Six Day War (1967) between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The decisive Israeli victory leads to a further influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon. In December 1968, Israel raids Beirut airport in response to Palestinian armed groups using Lebanon as a base. The following year the Cairo Agreement is signed between the Lebanese army and the PLO, legalising Palestinian armed groups' activities in South Lebanon. It also endorses Palestinian self-rule within refugee camps.
1970
The PLO relocates its headquarters from Jordan to Lebanon. Over the following years, hostilities between Israel and Lebanon-based Palestinian armed groups worsen, provoking Israeli reprisals and discord within the Lebanese ruling elite. All major groups in the country arm themselves.
1975–76
Fighting breaks out pitting Christian conservative forces led by

Kataeb (Phalangists) against Palestinian armed groups and their leftist and Muslim allies grouped under the umbrella of the National Movement. A major spark for the escalation is the killing of some 25 Palestinians by the Kataeb in a Beirut suburb in April 1975. Rounds of shelling and street fighting destroy the capital's centre, business district and harbour. Kataeb killing of several hundred civilians in December (also known as Black Saturday) ushers in all-out fighting, and massacres by both sides follow in January 1976. As fighting increases, Beirut is divided into sectarian enclaves. 'East Beirut' becomes homogeneously Christian, 'West Beirut' predominantly Muslim. In February 1976, following a Syrian-mediated ceasefire, President Suleiman Frangieh announces a Constitutional Document stipulating constitutional reforms, including the equal division of parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims. The National Movement rejects the proposals. Amidst renewed fighting, Frangieh formally approves the entry of Syrian troops in June. The first phase of intense fighting draws to an end with the defeat of the National Movement and their Palestinian allies. In October, the Arab League formalises the Syrian troop presence in Lebanon as the Arab Deterrent Force.

1978

The Christian leadership and the central Christian region revolt against the tutelage of Syrian troops, who bomb East Beirut in retaliation in July and September. Frangieh's Marada militia group sides with Syria and breaks its alliance with the Lebanese Forces. Israel launches a major military operation in Lebanon in March, occupying the southern areas of the country. The UN Security Council passes Resolution 425 calling for Israel's withdrawal and establishing the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Israel hands over territory not to UNIFIL but to a proxy militia group called Lebanon's Free Army, which is renamed the South Lebanon Army (SLA) in 1979.

1980

Syrian troops bombard the town of Zahleh in Beqaa in order to expel Christian militias who have entered the town with Israeli support.

1982

Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in June, defeating the Syrian air force and forcing some 14,000 Palestinian fidayeen to withdraw. Its attempt to establish a pro-Israeli government is frustrated when its ally President-elect Bachir Gemayel is assassinated. In response Israeli forces occupy West Beirut; their ally, the Lebanese Forces, massacres hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp. Bachir's brother Amin Gemayel is elected President. A multinational peacekeeping force consisting mainly of US, French and Italian troops arrives.

1983

Israel and Lebanon sign a US-sponsored agreement in May predicated on simultaneous Israeli and Syrian withdrawal and the establishment of a jointly-protected 'security region' in southern Lebanon. Syria rejects the plan, forcing Amin Gemayel's government to renege as well. The Lebanese Forces militia takes advantage of Israeli occupation and establishes a presence in mixed areas of Mount Lebanon. Conflict with the Druze PSP militia degenerates into the 'War of the Mountain' in September. With Syrian support the PSP defeats the LF and drives a number of Christians out of the Chouf region. At the same time, Amal and its leftist allies defeat the army in West Beirut in spite of US artillery shelling in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In September, Lebanese government and opposition meet in vain in Geneva for a national reconciliation conference under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and Syria. The Multinational Force leaves Lebanon after two deadly bomb explosions at their barracks. Islamic Jihad, a branch of the nascent Hezbollah movement, claims responsibility.

1984

A second national conference for peace and reconciliation is held under Saudi and Syrian auspices in Lausanne in March. It fails to achieve consensus between Amin Gemayel's government and his Muslim, leftist and pro-Syrian opponents on constitutional reforms. Militias consolidate their control of West Beirut and Amal fights for supremacy.

1985

In May, heavy fighting erupts between Amal and Palestinian militias for control of refugee camps around Beirut. Amal receives support from Syria and pro-Syrian Palestinian groups, and destroys large parts of several camps. In December, Amal, the PSP and the LF sign a Tripartite Accord in Damascus to organise militia power sharing under Syrian rule. It never comes into effect as the LF leader, Hobeika, is ousted the following month.
1986
The ‘War of the Camps’ reignites with further ferocious fighting between Amal and Palestinian groups supported by pro-Palestinian Sunni militias in May–June. Fighting spreads to Rashidiyye camp in Tyre, and Sidon’s Ain al-Helweh camp.
1987
Fighting spreads throughout West Beirut in February amid Amal’s continuing blockade of the camps, which is finally lifted in April.
1988
With no candidate elected to succeed him, outgoing President Amr Gemayel hands interim power to the Maronite Commander-in-Chief of the army, Michel Aoun. Aoun forms a six-member interim military government in a break with the National Pact. The three Muslims appointed to the council refuse to serve and Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss refuses to step down, leaving Lebanon with two governments: one in West Beirut led by Hoss and backed by Syria; and one in East Beirut, led by Aoun.
1989
LAF units loyal to Aoun clash with the LF in Christian central Lebanon. Aoun declares a ‘war of liberation’ against the Syrian presence in March. Heavy artillery exchanges with the Syrian army around Beirut follow. In October, Lebanese parliamentarians meet in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to discuss a Charter of National Reconciliation. The Taif Agreement is signed, reconfiguring the political system to give Muslims equal legislative representation vis à vis Christians, and dividing executive powers between the Maronite President and the Council of Ministers. The agreement also gives Syria political and military tutelage over Lebanon. Aoun rejects the

accord on the grounds that it does not lay out a clear timetable for Syrian withdrawal. In November, President-elect Rene Moawad is assassinated and succeeded by pro-Syrian Elias Hrawi. Aoun is replaced as Commander-in-Chief by General Emile Lahoud but refuses to leave the Presidential palace.
1990
Further rounds of fighting between Aounists and the LF, as well as between Amal and Hezbollah competing for control of Shia suburbs in Beirut. Under Syrian air force attacks, Aoun is forced to take refuge in the French embassy in October. He is later exiled to France. Armed hostilities officially end in October with a ceasefire between Amal and Hezbollah negotiated by Syria and Iran. A Government of National Reconciliation is formed, led by Omar Karami.
1991
March
Parliament orders the dissolution of all militias by 30 April, but Hezbollah is allowed to retain its arms, ostensibly to liberate southern Lebanon from Israeli control.
May
Lebanon and Syria sign a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, which allows Syrian political control over Lebanon. June Law 88 proposes the rehabilitation of 6,000 militiamen into army or security forces and recruits 2,000 into the civil service.
August
The Amnesty Law offers impunity for all war crimes except 'political crimes' committed before 28 February.
1992
February
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi is killed in an Israeli helicopter gunship attack. Hassan Nasrallah succeeds him.
August–October
The first parliamentary elections since 1972 are held. Many Christians boycott them in protest of Syrian control of the process. A large

majority of pro-Syrian candidates from all denominations are elected. Rafiq al-Hariri becomes Prime Minister.
1993
In July, Israel launches attacks on targets in southern Lebanon aimed at quelling Hezbollah ('Operation Accountability'). Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced.
1995
Under heavy Syrian pressure and in a break with constitutional rule, Elias Hrawi's presidential mandate is extended for three years.
1996
Israel again bombs Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, Beirut and the Beqaa Valley. 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' leads to the death of 170 civilians and displaces hundreds of thousands more. The US and France negotiate the Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding between Israel and Hezbollah, signed 26 April. An Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group is established to monitor the truce.
1998
Army Commander-in-Chief Emile Lahoud succeeds Hrawi as president. New Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss leads a cabinet with no militia leaders in it.
2000
May
Israel pulls out of southern Lebanon after its 22-year occupation. The withdrawal provokes the collapse of the SLA and a Hezbollah takeover of Shia border regions. The UN demarcates, and UNIFIL supervises provisional Blue Line separating Lebanon from Israel.
October
Rafiq al-Hariri becomes Prime Minister for a second time after his coalition gains a parliamentary majority in legislative elections in May and June.
2003
In December, the US Congress passes the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, calling on Syria to withdraw from

Lebanon.
2004
On 2 September UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calls for free presidential elections and all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon. The following day, under Syrian pressure, Parliament votes to extend Lahoud's presidential term by three years. Al-Hariri and his cabinet resign in October. Lahoud appoints Omar Karami as Prime Minister.
2005
February
Former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri is assassinated in a car bomb explosion in Beirut. Syria is widely suspected of being responsible. Karami and his cabinet resign. Over the following weeks, huge demonstrations break out against and in support of Syria are held in Beirut; on 8 March in support of Syria and 14 March, signalling Lebanon's 'freedom surge (intifada)'.
April
The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1595, which calls for an investigation into the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and establishes a 'independent international commission' to do so. The remaining 14,000 Syrian troops withdraw from Lebanon after 35 years. Karami steps down after failing to form a government. Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati forms a new government to organize legislative elections.
May-June
General Aoun and Amin Gemayel return from France. Parliamentary elections are held in three rounds. An electoral alliance between Hariri's block, Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Hezbollah wins a majority of seats. Fouad Siniora is nominated as Prime Minister-designate.
August
Four pro-Syrian security chiefs are arrested in connection with the investigation into Hariri's killing.
October
The first UN investigation's report on Hariri's killing points to Syrian involvement in the assassination. Investigator Detlev Mehlis is

criticised for reaching hasty, definitive conclusions.
December
The Security Council adopts Resolution 1644 asking the Secretary-General to identify the means to bring those responsible before an international tribunal.
2006
February
Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) signs a memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah, allying it with the Shia group 'in view of full return of Lebanon's sovereignty and improving bilateral relations with Syria'.
March
The National Dialogue talks take place between leaders of the main communities and political parties on issues of political reform and national security. The Security Council adopts Resolution 1664, in which it requests the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal.
July–August
The Israel–Hezbollah war. In response to Hezbollah killing seven Israeli soldiers and capturing two more, Israel launches airstrikes, naval bombardments and troop movements targeting infrastructure all over the country and flattening Beirut's Shia southern suburbs. UNSC Resolution 1701 calls for an end to hostilities and enlarges UNIFIL's peacekeeping mission across the border.
September
The first major reinforcement of UN forces arrives and Israel lifts its air and naval blockade.
November
The cabinet approves the establishment of an international tribunal to bring those responsible for killing Rafiq al-Hariri to justice. President Lahoud and Speaker Nabih Berri announce they will not approve the tribunal, pointing to a lack of Shiite representation (after the withdrawal of Shia ministers) in the cabinet.

December
Hezbollah launches a mass demonstration against the ‘unconstitutional government’. Hezbollah and FPM organise an 18-month sit-in, imposing a blockade on government offices.
2007
May
After being the target of deadly attacks in Tripoli by Fatah al-Islam, the LAF launches an all-out attack against the fundamentalist group based inside Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, near Tripoli. Thousands of Palestinian refugees are displaced to the Beddawi camp. The LAF achieves control of Nahr al-Bared on 2 September after using armed helicopters supported by the US and Gulf countries. After receiving a formal request from the Prime Minister, UN Security Council Resolution 1757 resolves to establish a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
July
At France’s invitation, 31 representatives from Lebanon’s 14 major political parties hold two days of closed-door talks inside the La Celle-Saint-Cloud Château outside Paris. They agree not to resort to political violence to resolve the crisis and to continue dialogue.
November
The term of President Emile Lahoud comes to an end. With no successor acceptable to both the major groupings, Siniora’s cabinet assumes temporary executive powers.
2008
May
Fighting breaks out between Muslim factions after Hezbollah announces that the government’s decisions to declare the group’s private telecommunications network illegal and to sack the head of security at Beirut International Airport (an alleged Hezbollah sympathiser) amounted to a ‘declaration of war’. Hezbollah’s forces and its pro-Syrian allies soon control West Beirut. The government revokes its decisions. A Lebanese National Dialogue Conference held in Doha under Qatari and French auspices concludes with the signing of the Doha Agreement. This gives t

opposition a greater share of seats in cabinet amounting to veto power. Parliament elects the LAF commander General Michel Suleiman as President.
July
A 'Unity Government' is formed by Fouad Siniora, as agreed in Doha, with a fragile majority for the 14 March coalition.
September
Sunni and Alawite leaders in Tripoli sign a reconciliation agreement to end fighting that has taken place since June.
October
Lebanon and Syria establish diplomatic relations for the first time
2009
March
The STL officially opens in The Hague.
April–May
The STL advises the Lebanese judiciary to release the four senior Lebanese security officials who had been arrested in 2005 on Mehlis's recommendation. The German magazine Der Spiegel names the suspected Hariri culprits, linking Hezbollah to the crime.
June
In parliamentary elections, the March 14 alliance wins 71 seats and the March 8 bloc 57 seats. The opposition demands a number of cabinet seats, which would give them a veto over key government decisions.
November
Saad al-Hariri forms a new government with 15 members from his March 14 Alliance, 10 from the Hezbollah-led March 8 opposition, and 5 appointed by President Suleiman.
December
The cabinet endorses Hezbollah's right to keep its arsenal of weapons.
2010
March
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt meets with the Syrian President in a

meeting that marks his move away from the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance
August–September
Nasrallah criticises the STL and suggests that Israel had a hand in the Hariri killing. The STL calls for Hezbollah to hand over evidence supporting this claim. Saad al-Hariri vows to stay committed to the STL. He withdraws his earlier claim that Syria was behind his father's killing.
October
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's controversial visit to Lebanon culminates in a rally at a Hezbollah stronghold near the Israeli border.
November
The US pledges another \$10 million to the STL.
2011
January
The Unity Government collapses with the resignation of Hezbollah and March 8 Alliance ministers over the government's refusal to distance itself from the STL. The UN prosecutor issues a sealed indictment for the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri. Jumblatt announces he will back Hezbollah's efforts to form a new government and Tripoli businessman Najib Mikati appointed Prime Minister.
June
Mikati finally succeeds in forming a cabinet. Hezbollah and its allies are given 16 out of 30 seats. The STL Pre-Trial Judge confirms the indictment against Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra. The accused are members of Hezbollah, which says it will not allow their arrest. International arrest warrants are issued on 8 July.
2012
February
The STL Trial Chamber decides to proceed to try the four accused in the Ayyash et al. case in their absence.

Appendix 2

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CHARTER of LEBANON

The following text is an unofficial English translation of the original Arabic version of the National Reconciliation Charter which is being provided for the convenience of the reader. In case of conflict, however, the original Arabic text shall prevail.

First: General Principles and Reforms

1 - General Principles

2 - The Political Reforms

a. Parliament

b. The President of the Republic

c. The Prime Minister

d. The Council of Ministers

e. The Minister

f. The Resignation of Government, Deeming it Resigned and the Dismissal of Ministers g. Political Deconfessionalization

3 - Other Reforms

a. Administrative Decentralization

b. The Courts

c. The Law of Parliamentary Elections

d. The Establishment of the Economic and Social Council for Development

e. Education and Instruction

f. Information

Second: Reinstating the Sovereignty of the Lebanese State over the Entire Lebanese Land

Third: The Liberation of Lebanon from Israeli Occupation

Fourth: The Lebanese-Syrian Relations

FIRST: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS

1 - General Principles

a. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, independent country; a final homeland for all of its citizens; a unity of people, land and institutions within its borders as defined by the Lebanese Constitution and recognized internationally.

b. Lebanon is of Arabic affiliation and identity; it is a founding and an active member of the Arab League and is bound by its charter; it is a founding and an active member of the United Nations and abides by its charter; and it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Lebanese State manifests these principles in all fields and domains with no exception.

c. Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect of public liberties, the foremost of which are the freedom of opinion and belief; and on social justice and equality in rights and in duties among all citizens without discrimination or distinction.

d. The people are the source of powers and the possessors of sovereignty which they exercise through the constitutional institutions.

e. The System is founded on the principle of separation of powers, their balance and their cooperation.

f. The economic system is a free system that assures individual initiative and private ownership.

g. The balanced, cultural, social and economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the pillars of unity of the state and of stability of the system.

h. To seek the realization of comprehensive social justice through financial, economic and social reforms.

i. The land of Lebanon is but one land for all Lebanese; and every Lebanese has the right to reside on any part thereof and to enjoy it under the supremacy of the law. No segregation of people on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever; no partitioning, no dividing and no settling.

j. No legitimacy to any authority which contradicts the charter of cohabitation. **2 - Political Reforms**

a. Parliament

Parliament is the legislative authority; it exercises comprehensive control over the policy of government and its affairs:

1. The head of Parliament and his deputy are elected for the duration of the term of Parliament.

2. Two years following the election of the head of Parliament and his deputy, and in the first meeting it holds, Parliament may, for one time only, withdraw its confidence from the head of Parliament or his deputy by a two-third majority of its members pursuant to a petition signed by at least ten deputies. Parliament must immediately in this case hold a meeting to fill in the vacant position.

3. Each project law referred to Parliament by the Council of Ministers which is classified as urgent shall not be issued except, after being listed on the agenda of a regular session and read therein, after the passage of the time delay mentioned in the Constitution without being acted upon and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.

4. The electoral unit is the Mohafazah.

5. Until Parliament enacts an election law which is not based on religious affiliation records; seats in Parliament shall be allocated according to the following rules:

- a) Equally between Christians and Moslems.
- b) Proportionally among the sects of each of the two categories.
- c) Proportionally among the region.

6. The number of members of Parliament shall be increased to (108) divided equally between Christians and Moslems. The newly created positions based on the present Charter as well as the positions which became vacant prior to its declaration shall, for once and by exception, be filled in by appointment of the anticipated Government of National Reconciliation.

7. Concurrent with the election of the first Parliament on a national rather than confessional basis, a Senate will be created wherein all spiritual families will be represented with its authority being confined to matters of destiny.

b. The President of the Republic

The President of the Republic is the head of the State and the symbol of the unity of the nation; he undertakes to secure the integrity of the Constitution and to preserve the independence of Lebanon, its unity and the safety of its land as mandated by the Constitution. He is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces which is subject to the authority of the Council of Ministers. The President exercises the following authorities:

- 1. He chairs the Council of Ministers at his discretion without voting.
- 2. He heads the Supreme Council of Defense.

3. He issues the decrees and requests their proclamation. He has the right to ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider any decision taken by it within a period of fifteen days from the time said decision is deposited with the Presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on the decision taken, or if the delay has passed without the decree being issued or returned, the decree or the decision becomes imperatively effective and must be proclaimed.

4. He issues the Laws as per the delays stipulated by the Constitution and requests their proclamation following their ratification by Parliament; and he has the right, following notification of the Council of Ministers, to demand the reconsideration of the Laws within the delays stipulated by the Constitution and in conformity with its mandates; and in the event the delays ended without their issue or return, the Laws become imperatively effective and must be proclaimed.

5. He refers project laws, submitted to him by the Council of Ministers, to Parliament.

6. He nominates the designated Prime Minister in consultation with the head of Parliament based on binding parliamentary consultations which he officially communicates to the head of Parliament.

7. He individually issues the decree nominating the Prime Minister.

8. He issues, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the decree constituting the Government.

9. He issues the decrees accepting the resignation of the Government or the resignation of Ministers or their dismissal.

10. He accredits ambassadors and accepts their credentials; and awards official State decorations by decree.

11. He assumes negotiation in entering into international treaties and their execution in agreement with the Prime Minister; which treaties do not become effective except after the consent of the Council of Ministers; and the Government shall, whenever national interest and safety of the State permit, present them to Parliament. As to treaties comprising terms that are related to State finance and commercial agreements and other agreements which may not be abrogated on a year to year basis, must not be executed except by consent of Parliament.

12. He addresses, when necessary, letters to Parliament.

13. He calls Parliament, in agreement with the Prime Minister and pursuant to a decree, into holding extraordinary sessions.

14. The President has the right to present to the Council of Ministers any emergency issue not included on the Meeting Agenda.

15. He exceptionally calls the Council of Ministers, as he deems it necessary, in agreement with the Prime Minister.

16. He grants private pardons by a decree.

17. The President shall not bear the consequences of carrying out his functions, except when violating the Constitution or in the case of high treason.

c. The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister is the head of Government, he represents it and speaks on its behalf, and is considered responsible for the implementation of the general policy established by the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following authorities:

1. He heads the Council of Ministers.
2. He conducts parliamentary consultations to form the Government and signs with the President the decree for its constitution. The Government shall, within a period of thirty days, present its Ministerial Address to Parliament to obtain its confidence; and it shall not exercise its authorities prior to acquiring the confidence of Parliament, or following its resignation or being deemed resigned, except in the narrow meaning of carrying out business.
3. He presents to Parliament the general policy of Government.
4. He signs all decrees, except the decree designating the Prime Minister and the decree accepting the resignation of the Government or of being deemed resigned.
5. He signs the decree calling for an extraordinary session and the decrees proclaiming the Laws and the request for their reconsideration.
6. He calls on the Council of Ministers to convene and draws up its meeting agenda; and informs the President, A Priori, of the subjects included thereon as well as of the urgent matters which will be discussed, and signs the original minutes of meetings.
7. He follows up the activities of the Departments and Public Agencies and coordinates among the Ministers, and gives general directives so as to ensure a proper flow of work.

8. He holds, in the presence of the Minister concerned, working sessions with involved parties in the State.

9. He is, imperatively, the deputy head of the Supreme Council of Defense.

d. The Council of Ministers

The executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, and among the powers it exercises are the following:

1. Formulating the general policy of the State in all domains, drawing out project laws and decrees and taking necessary decisions for their implementation.

2. Overseeing the implementation of laws and regulations and supervising the activities of all State agencies with no exception, including departments and civil, military and security institutions.

3. The Council of Ministers is the authority which the Armed Forces are subject to.

4. Appointing State employees, dismissing them and accepting their resignation in accordance with the Law.

5. The right to dissolve Parliament pursuant to a request by the President if Parliament has abstained from meeting during the term of a regular or an extraordinary session extending for a period of not less than one month despite being called in for two consecutive times, or if it turns down the national budget in its totality for the purpose of disrupting government activities. The exercise of this right may not be repeated for the same reasons which resulted in dissolving Parliament for the first time.

6. If present, the President heads the meetings of the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers convenes regularly in a specific quarter; and the legal Quorum for its meeting shall be two-third majority of its members; and it takes its decisions by consensus, and in the absence of consensus, they are taken by voting. Decisions are taken by simple majority of the attendants, except Major Issues which require the consent of two-third of the Council's members. The following subjects are considered Major Issues:

The state of emergency and lifting it; war and peace; general mobilization; international treaties and agreements; the national budget of the State; comprehensive development and long range plans; appointment of the employees of the first category and its equivalent; reconsideration of administrative divisions; the dissolution of Parliament; elections law; naturalization law; personal statute laws; the dismissal of ministers.

e. The Minister

The authority of the Minister shall be strengthened in line with the general policy of Government and the principle of collective responsibility, and he shall not be dismissed except by a decision by the Council of Ministers or by individually withdrawing confidence from him by Parliament.

f. The Resignation of Government, Deeming it Resigned and the Dismissal of Ministers

1. The Government shall be considered resigned in the following cases:

a) If the Prime Minister has resigned.

b) If it loses more than one-third of the number of its members specified in

the decree constituting it. c) Upon the death of its head.

d) At the commencement of a Presidential term.

e) At the commencement of a Parliamentary term.

f) Upon losing the confidence of Parliament as a result of the latter's initiative or by pledging it itself.

2. The dismissal of a Minister shall be pursuant to a decree signed by the President and the Prime Minister following the approval of the Council of Ministers.

3. Upon the resignation of Government or deeming it resigned, Parliament shall enter into an extraordinary meeting session until a new government has been formed and obtained confidence. **g. Political Deconfessionalization**

Political deconfessionalization is a principal national objective which must be pursued in accordance with a transitional plan, and Parliament, which is elected on the basis of equal sharing by Moslems and Christians, shall take appropriate measures to achieve this objective and to form a national commission headed by the President and contains political, intellectual and societal personalities in addition to the head of Parliament and the Prime Minister. The mission of the commission is to study and recommend the means of eliminating confessionalism and to present them to Parliament and to the Council of Ministers and to follow up the implementation of the transitional plan.

During the transient stage, the following shall be achieved:

a) The rule of Confessional representation shall be abolished and qualification and specialization shall be adopted in public offices, in the judiciary, in the military and security establishments, in public and mixed agencies and in independent authorities as may be required to achieve National Reconciliation, except for first category positions and their equivalent positions therein which shall be equally shared by Christians and Moslems with no position being confined to either sect.

b) Abolishing the mention of religion and sect in the identity card.

3 - Other Reforms

a. Administrative Decentralization

1. The Lebanese State is but one unified State with a powerful centralized authority.

2. The authority of Governors and of Deputy Governors shall be extended and all the departments of the State shall be represented in the Administrative regions at the highest level possible so as to facilitate the provision of services to the citizens and to respond locally to their needs.

3. Reconsidering administrative divisions so as to secure national fusion and to preserve cohabitation and the unity of land, people and institutions.

4. Adopting maximum administrative decentralization on the level of small administrative units (Kada' and below) by way of electing a council for each Kada' headed by a deputy governor so as to insure local participation.

5. Adopting a unified development plan encompassing the nation and able to develop the Lebanese regions economically and socially, and strengthening the resources of the Municipalities, the Unified Municipalities and the Municipality Unions with necessary financial means. **b. The Courts**

a) In order to secure the submission of all responsables and citizens to the supremacy of the Law and to secure the conformity of the Legislative and Executive authorities to the postulate of cohabitation and to the basic rights of the Lebanese citizens stipulated in the Constitution:

1. The Supreme Council stipulated in the Constitution shall be formed with its mission being the impeachment of Presidents and Ministers. A special law devoted to the Council's legal proceedings shall be decreed.

2. A Constitutional Council shall be established for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution and of monitoring the constitutionality of the Laws and to rule on all disputes and appeals relating to Parliamentary and Presidential elections.

3. The following parties have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and the monitoring of the constitutionality of the laws: a. The President of the Republic.

b. The Head of Parliament.

c. The Prime Minister.

d. Certain percentage of the members of Parliament.

b) To safeguard the principle of harmony between Religion and State, the heads of the Lebanese factions shall have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council with regard to:

1. Personal Statutes.
2. The freedom of belief and practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.

c) To strengthen the independence of the Judiciary, a determined number of the members of the Supreme Council of Justice shall be elected by the judicial body.

c. The Law of Parliamentary Elections

Parliamentary elections shall be conducted in accordance with a new election law based on the

Governorate (Mohafazah) and which considers the principles that guarantee cohabitation among Lebanese and which insures the accuracy of political representation of the various categories of people and their generations and the effectiveness of such representation, after the reconsideration of administrative divisions within the framework of the unity of land, people and institutions.

d. The Establishment of the Economic and Social Council for Development

A Social Economic Council shall be established to insure the participation of the representatives of various sectors in the formulation of the economic and social policy of the State through the offering of advice and suggestions.

e. Education and Instruction.

1. To put education at the disposal of people and to make it mandatory, at least in the elementary stage.
2. To emphasize the freedom of education in accordance with the laws and regulations.

3. To protect private education and to strengthen State control over private schools and the school textbook.

4. To rehabilitate formal, vocational and technical education and to strengthen it and to develop it in such a manner so as to fulfill and to suite the developmental and constructive needs of the nation. To rehabilitate the Lebanese University and to support it, especially in its applied faculties.

5. To review and to develop the curricula in a manner which strengthens national cohesiveness and fusion and spiritual and cultural openness, and to unify the textbook in the history and civil education courses.

f. Information

To reorganize all media under the Law and within the framework of a responsible freedom, and in a manner which serves the objectives of reconciliation and of ending the state of war.

SECOND: REINSTATING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LEBANESE STATE OVER THE ENTIRE LEBANESE LAND

Whereas an agreement was reached among the Lebanese parties on the establishment of a strong and able state founded on national reconciliation, the government of national reconciliation shall draw up a detailed one year security plan aiming at gradually reinstating the authority of the Lebanese State over the entire Lebanese territory by means of its own forces, with its broad lines being characterized as follows:

1. Disbanding all Lebanese and non Lebanese militias and surrendering their arms to the Lebanese State within a period of six months starting after the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter, the election of the President, the formation of the Government of national reconciliation and the adoption of political reforms in a constitutional manner.

2. Reinforcing Internal Security Forces through:

a) Opening the door to all Lebanese, with no exception, to volunteer and to commence their training centrally and then to distribute them to the units in the Mohafazah, and to subject them to periodic and organized training programs.

b) Strengthening the security system in such a way so as to be capable of controlling the entry and exit of persons across land, sea and air borders.

3. Reinforcing the Armed Forces:

a) The primary duty of the armed forces is to defend the nation and, if necessary, to protect national order whenever the danger exceeds the capability of the Internal Security Forces to individually deal with it.

b) The Armed Forces shall be used to support the Internal Security Forces in preserving security under the circumstances as may be determined by the Council of Ministers.

c) The Armed Forces shall be unified, prepared and trained so as to be capable of assuming its national duties in facing Israeli aggression.

d) The Armed Forces shall return to barracks at the time when the Internal Security Forces become ready to assume its security mission.

e) The intelligence activities of the Armed Forces shall be reorganized to serve military purposes only.

4. Fundamentally solving the problem of the Lebanese immigrants by approving the right of every Lebanese immigrant, who emigrated since 1975, to return to the place from which he or she emigrated; passing the necessary legislation securing this right and providing the necessary means for reconstruction.

Whereas the aim of the Lebanese state is to reinstate its authority over the entire Lebanese territory by means of its own forces, which is represented primarily by the Internal Security Forces, and out of the brotherly ties which bind Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian Forces shall, with due thanks, assist the legitimate Lebanese forces to reinstate the sovereignty of the Lebanese State in a definite time period of a maximum of two years starting after the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter, the election of the President, the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation and the adoption of political reforms in a constitutional manner; at the end of this period both governments, the Syrian Government and the Lebanese Government of national reconciliation will decide on the repositioning of the Syrian forces in the Bekaa area and the access to western Bekaa in Dahr - Elbeidar up to the

line of Hamana - Mdeirej - Ein Darah and, in case of necessity, in other points to be decided by a joint Lebanese Syrian military committee. Also an agreement shall be signed by both governments which determines the size and the duration of the presence of the Syrian Forces in the above areas and the relation of these forces with the Lebanese State authorities present in these areas. The Tripartite

Supreme Arab Committee is ready to assist the two States in reaching this agreement, if they so desire.

THIRD: THE LIBERATION OF LEBANON FROM ISRAELI OCCUPATION

Regaining the authority of the State up to internationally recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

- a) Pursuing the implementation of Resolution No. 425 and all Security Council's resolutions promulgating the total elimination of the Israeli occupation.
- b) Adhering to the Truce Agreement signed on March 23, 1949.
- c) Taking all necessary measures to liberate all the Lebanese territory from the Israeli occupation, extending the authority of the State over all its land, deploying the Lebanese Army along the internationally recognized Lebanese borders and pursuing the reinforcement of the existence of the International Security Forces in Southern Lebanon so as to ensure the withdrawal of Israel and to allow for the return of law and order to the border zone.

FOURTH: THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS

Lebanon, a country of Arab affiliation and identity, is tied to all Arab States with true fraternal relations; and there exist between Lebanon and Syria distinguished relationships which draw their strength from the roots of kinship, history and common fraternal interests, which is the concept on which the coordination and cooperation between both countries are founded and will be manifested in agreements between them, in various domains, and in the manner which serves the interests of both countries within the framework of sovereignty and independence of each of them. Based on that, and because strengthening the bases of security provides the needed atmosphere for the development of these distinguished ties, Lebanon shall under no circumstances be made a source of threat to the security

of Syria, nor Syria to the security of Lebanon. Therefore, Lebanon shall not permit itself to become a passageway or a dwelling to any force, state or organization which aims to undermine its security or the security of Syria. And Syria, which is keen on preserving the security, independence and unity of Lebanon and concurrence among its people, shall not permit of any act which may threaten Lebanon's security, sovereignty and independence.



Appendix 3

Iraqi Kurdistan Profile

(BBC, 2017)

A chronology of key events
1918 - After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, British forces occupy the oil-rich Ottoman province of Mosul, bringing extensive Kurdish-populated areas under British rule. 1919 - Mosul area is added to the new Iraqi state, which comes under a British mandate.
1920 - Treaty of Sevres, signed by the defeated Ottoman government, provides for a Kurdish state, subject to the agreement of the League of Nations. Article 64 of the Treaty gives Kurds living in the Mosul vilayet the option of joining a future independent Kurdistan.
1921 - Emir Faysal crowned king of Iraq, including Mosul.
Uprising
1923 - Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji rebels against British rule and declares a Kurdish kingdom in northern Iraq.
1923 - Kemal Ataturk's newly founded Turkish Republic gains international recognition with the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Sevres is not ratified by the Turkish parliament.
1924 - Sulaymaniyah falls to British forces.
1932 - Uprising in the Barzan region to protest at Iraq's admission to the League of Nations, while Kurdish demands for autonomy are ignored.
1943 - Mullah Mustafa Barzani leads another uprising, and wins control of large areas of Irbil and Badinan.
1946 August - British RAF bombing forces Kurdish rebels on the border into Iran where they join Iranian Kurds led by Qazi Mohamed, who founds an independent Kurdish state in Mahabad.
1946 - Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) holds its first congress in Mahabad. Within a few months, the "Mahabad Republic" collapses under

attack from Iranian forces, and Mustafa Barzani flees to the Soviet Union
1951 - A new generation of Kurdish nationalists revives the KDP. Mullah Mustafa Barzani is nominated president while in exile in the Soviet Union, but the real leader of the KDP is Ibrahim Ahmad, who favours close ties with the Iraqi Communist Party.
1958 - Overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy allows Kurdish nationalists to organise openly after many years in hiding. A new Iraqi constitution recognises Kurdish "national rights" and Mullah Mustafa Barzani returns from exile.
1960 - Relations between the Iraqi government and Kurdish groups become strained. The KDP complains of increasing repression.
1961 - KDP is dissolved by the Iraqi government after Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq.
Autonomy granted
1970 March - Iraqi government and the Kurdish parties agree a peace accord, which grants the Kurds autonomy. The accord recognises Kurdish as an official language and amends the constitution to state that "the Iraqi people is made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality."
1971 August - Relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government deteriorate. Mullah Mustafa Barzani appeals to the US for aid.
1974 March - Iraqi government imposes a draft of the autonomy agreement and gives the KDP two weeks to respond. Mullah Mustafa Barzani rejects the agreement, which would have left the oilfields of Kirkuk under Iraqi government control, and calls for a new rebellion.
1975 March - Algiers Accord between Iran and Iraq ends Iranian support for the Kurdish uprising, which collapses. Barzani withdraws from political life.
1975 June - Jalal Talabani, a former leading member of the KDP, announces the establishment of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from Damascus.
1978 - Clashes between KDP and PUK forces leave many dead.

1979 - Mullah Mustafa dies, his son Massoud Barzani takes over leadership of the KDP.
Iranian involvement
1980 - Outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq. KDP forces work closely with Iran, but the PUK remains hostile to cooperation with Tehran.
1983 - An Iranian counterattack opens a northern front in Kurdistan. With support from KDP fighters, Iranian troops take the town of Hajj Umran. Human rights organisations say Iraqi troops kill around 8,000 men from the KDP leader's home area of Barzan in revenge.
1983 - PUK agrees to a ceasefire with Iraq and begins negotiations on Kurdish autonomy.
1985 - Under increasing Iraqi government repression, the ceasefire begins to break down. Pro-Iraqi government militia men kill Jalal Talabani's brother and two nieces.
1986 - Iranian government sponsors a meeting reconciling the KDP and PUK. Now both major Kurdish parties are receiving support from Tehran.
1987 - Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani join forces with a number of smaller Kurdish factions to create the Kurdistan Front.
1988 - As the Iran-Iraq war draws to a close, Iraqi forces launch "Anfal Campaign" against the Kurds. Tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians and fighters are killed, and hundreds of thousands forced into exile, in a systematic attempt to break the Kurdish resistance movement.
1988 16 March - Thousands of Kurdish civilians die in a poison gas attack on the town of Halabjah near the Iranian border. Human rights watchdogs and Kurdish groups hold the Iraqi regime responsible.
1991 March - After the Gulf War in which US-led forces expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Iraq puts down a Kurdish rebellion. Around a million Kurds flee before the Iraqi onslaught, but Turkey closes the border forcing hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in the mountains.
Safe haven
1991 April - Coalition forces announce the creation of a "safe haven" for Kurds in northern Iraq.

haven" on the Iraqi side of the border. International aid agencies launch a massive aid operation to help the refugees. Meanwhile, Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani open negotiations with Saddam Hussein on autonomy for Kurdistan.
1991 July - Talks continue in Baghdad, but Kurdish peshmerga forces take control of Irbil and Sulaymaniyah, in defiance of Iraqi government orders.
1991 October - Fighting between Kurdish and Iraqi government forces breaks out in earnest. Saddam Hussein fortifies the border between Kurdish-held northern Iraq and imposes a blockade.
1992 May - Elections held in areas under Kurdish control give KDP candidates 50.8% of the vote, while the PUK takes 49.2%. The two parties are equally balanced in the new Kurdish government.
1992 September - Newly-established Iraqi National Congress (INC) which brings together a wide-range of Iraqi opposition groups, meets with Salah-al-Din in the Kurdish-held north. KDP and PUK representatives take part.
1994-97 - Civil war involving KDP and PUK forces.
1996 May - UN agrees "Oil-for-Food" programme with Baghdad. 13% of the proceeds from Iraqi oil exports are earmarked for the thirteen northern governorates, which are largely under Kurdish control.
1996 August - Masoud Barzani appeals to Saddam Hussein for help to defeat the PUK.
1996 September - With the help of Iraqi government troops, KDP forces seize the northern city of Irbil and take the PUK stronghold of Sulaymaniyah. A new KDP-led government is announced at the parliament building in Irbil.
1996 October - PUK forces retake Sulaymaniyah.
1997 January - PUK announces a new government based in Sulaymaniyah. Both the PUK and KDP claim jurisdiction over the whole of the Kurdish-controlled north.
1998 September - Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani sign a peace agreement in Washington, but government of the Kurdish region remains divided.

split between the two rival administrations.
2000 November - In a letter to the United Nations secretary-general, the PUK accuses the Iraqi government of expelling Kurdish families from Kirkuk.
2001 September - Fighting breaks out between the PUK and Islamic fundamentalist group Jund al-Islam, later renamed Ansar al-Islam.
Moves toward unity
2002 June - PUK and KDP officials take part in joint discussions with other Iraqi groups aimed at coordinating the work of the opposition to the event of a US-led military campaign against Iraq.
2002 October - Joint session of the Kurdish parliament convenes in Irbil. KDP and PUK parliamentarians agree to work together during "transitional session" until new elections can be held.
2003 February - US Secretary of State Colin Powell accuses Iraqi Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam of playing a pivotal role in linking Osama Bin Ladin's al-Qaeda network with the Iraqi regime.
2003 February - Kurdish leaders reject proposals to bring Turkish troops into northern Iraq as part of a US-led military campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Anti-Turkish demonstrators take to the streets of Kurdish towns.
2003 February - Failure of a parliamentary bill allowing US troops to deploy on Turkish soil hits American plans to open a northern front against Iraq.
2003 3 March - KDP and PUK create a "joint higher leadership" for the Kurdish-held north, under the chairmanship of the two party leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.
US-led campaign against Iraq
2003 20 March - US-led coalition forces invade Iraq and begin bombardment of Baghdad and other cities. Mosul and Kirkuk near Kurdish enclaves come under heavy fire.
2003 22 March - Coalition forces launch Cruise missile attack on bases held by Ansar al-Islam in the north. Dozens killed in the headquarters.

of the Islamic Group, an unrelated radical Islamist faction when a missile hits the Khormal area.
2003 27 March - Hundreds of US paratroopers land near Irbil signalling the opening of a northern front in the war on Iraq.
2003 9 April - US forces advance into central Baghdad. Saddam Hussein's grip on the city is broken. In the following days Kurdish fighters and US forces take control of the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.
2003 July - Interim governing council (IGC) meets for first time. Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay killed in gun battle in Mosul.
2004 1 February - At least 56 people die and more than 200 people are injured after a double suicide bombing at the offices of the two main political Kurdish parties in the northern city of Irbil. Several senior political figures are among the dead.
2005 January - An alliance of Kurdish parties comes second in Iraq's landmark national election, sending 77 deputies to an interim parliament.
2005 April - PUK leader Jalal Talabani is elected as interim Iraqi president by MPs.
2005 May - At least 50 people are killed in a suicide bomb attack on police recruits in Irbil.
Kurdish parliament
2005 June - First session of Kurdish parliament held in Irbil; KDPI's Massoud Barzani is president of autonomous region.
2005 December - News that a foreign firm has begun drilling for oil in the Kurdish north sparks new fears of secession among Iraqi Sunni leaders. Kurdish authorities later report a "major discovery" of oil.
2006 September - Massoud Barzani orders the Iraqi national flag replaced with the Kurdish one in government buildings. But Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki says: "The Iraqi flag is the only flag that should be raised over any square inch of Iraq."
2006 September - Five blasts caused by one suicide truck bomb and four car bombs kill 23 people in Kirkuk.

The BBC's Newsnight programme reports that former Israeli commandos secretly trained Kurdish soldiers in Northern Iraq to protect new international airport and in counter-terrorism operations.
2007 April - The head of Turkey's military says his country should launch an operation against Kurdish guerillas based in northern Iraq.
2007 May - The Kurdish regional government takes on responsibility for security in the three Kurdish provinces from the federal forces.
2007 July - Human Rights Watch gives details of torture and abuse in prisons run by the Kurds in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq.
2007 August - At least 300 people are killed in a series of bombings attacks on members of the Kurdish Yazidi sect in northern Iraq.
2007 September - Iran shells rear bases of Kurdish rebels in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran closes its border with Iraqi Kurdistan to protest at the detention of an Iranian by US troops.
Turkish attacks
2007 October - Turkish parliament gives go-ahead for military operations in Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels. Turkey comes under international pressure to avoid an invasion.
2007 November - A referendum on whether Kirkuk province should become part of Iraqi Kurdistan is due to be held, but is in the event put on hold indefinitely.
2007 December - Turkey launches air strikes on fighters from the Kurdish PKK movement inside Iraq.
2008 February - Turkish forces mount a ground offensive against PKK Kurdish rebel bases in northern Iraq.
2008 September - Iraqi parliament passes provincial elections law. City of Kirkuk, claimed by Kurdistan Region, is excluded from provision of law until its status is settled.
2009 April - Turkish warplanes bomb PKK Kurdish rebel positions in northern Iraq after Turkey accused the group of killing Turkish soldiers.

in two attacks.
2009 June - The Kurdish government begins crude oil exports to foreign markets. Contractors are to pump 90,000-100,000 barrels a day from two northern oilfields to Turkey. The central government is allowing its pipeline to be used in return for a share of revenues.
2009 July - Massoud Barzani is re-elected as president of Kurdistan autonomous region. Ruling two-party coalition wins parliamentary election, but with reduced majority. Recently-formed group Change Movement (Gorran) wins 25 seats in 111-seat regional parliament.
2011 February - Public protests against corruption and power held by KDP and PUK start in Sulaymaniyah city, heartland of opposition Change Movement; at least two protestors killed.
2011 August and October - Turkey launches air and ground assault on PKK militants in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Oil row
2012 April/May - Oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan are halted amid row with central government over contracts with foreign firms. The region says it expects to start exporting oil via a new pipeline to the Turkish border in 2013.
2012 June - Turkish air force strikes at Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebel bases in northern Iraq days after eight Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack in southern Turkey.
2012 September - Turkish air force says it kills 25 PKK rebels in further strikes on bases in northern Iraq.
2012 December - Jalal Talabani, Iraq's Kurdish president, suffers stroke. He undergoes treatment in Germany and makes progress.
2013 April - At least 31 people are killed and more than 200 others wounded in explosions in cities across the country, including Kurdistan.
2013 June - Iraqi cabinet holds a meeting in Iraqi Kurdistan in symbolic effort to reduce tensions over a range of political and economic disputes.

Refugee flood
2013 May - Flood of refugees from Syria prompts authorities to seal the border temporarily.
2013 August - President Barzani secures a two-year extension to second term of office.
2013 September - Regional parliamentary elections provide an upset to the government, as the opposition Change Movement wins 24 seats, pushing Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) into third place. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of regional President Massoud Barzani remains the largest bloc with 38 seats.
2014 March - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki blocks the transfer of revenues to the Kurdish authorities, leaving regional leaders unable to pay the salaries of officials.
2014 May - Kurdistan officially markets its first pipeline oil, despite opposition from the government in Baghdad.
2014 June - As the Sunni coalition led by the hardline Islamists ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) seizes control of much of Anbar Province and the approaches to Baghdad, Kurdish Peshmerga forces capture Kirkuk - the oil-rich city outside the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan that Iraqi Kurds have long regarded as their capital.
Independence plans
2014 July - President Barzani announces plans for an independence referendum later in the year, saying that independence is a "natural right"

2014 August - Islamic State conquers several Kurdish-held towns US jets support Kurdish Peshmerga forces by striking jihadist positions. Islamic State defeat Peshmerga forces defending town of Sinjar prompting an exodus by people of the Yazidi religious sect. US, Iraqi government supply Peshmerga fighters with weapons help them battle Islamists. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki - who had come to be seen as increasingly divisive figure who alienated the Kurds - is replaced by Haider al-Abadi.
2014 September - Kurdish leaders agree to put independence referendum on hold, on the grounds that fighting Islamic State is currently the top priority.
2014 October - The Iraqi Kurdistan government sends Peshmerga forces to the northern Syrian city of Kobane - via Turkey - to back fellow Kurdish fighters attempting to defend the city from attack by Islamic State militants.
2014 December - The Iraqi government and the Kurdish leaders sign a deal on sharing Iraq's oil wealth and military resources, amid hopes that the agreement will help to reunite the country in the face of a common threat represented by Islamic State. Peshmerga and Syrian Kurdish fighters retake Mount Sinjar from Islamic State forces.
Constitutional reform
2015 May - Iraqi Kurdistan parliament appoints committee to oversee revision of constitution. One of the issues under review is the number of terms the president should be allowed to serve.
2015 June - President Barzani's chief of staff announces that a presidential election will be held on 20 August, a day after Mr Barzani's current term of office expires. The president's critics accuse him of seeking

to pre-empt any revision to the constitution that would prevent him from serving a further term.
2015 July - Turkey joins the US-led military alliance against Islamic State but insists that air-strikes against IS should go hand-in-hand with operations against Kurdish PKK militants in northern Iraq. Ankara launches a bombing campaign against the PKK in northern Iraq - the first time that it has attacked the Kurds since reaching a ceasefire with them in 2013.
2015 August - Barzani's extended term in office ends. He is given another two years in a move described by the opposition as illegal.
2015 September - A US court rules in favour of an Iraqi government bid to block Kurdish oil sales to a US buyer.
2015 October - Gorran (Change Movement) expelled from coalition government following days of violent street protests against Barzani. Parliament is suspended.
2015 November - Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Turkish Kurdish PKK guerrilla fighters, backed by US-led coalition forces, recapture Sinjar town from IS.
2015 December - Iraqi parliament approves allocation of Kurdistan Region's 17 per cent share of the national budget despite opposition from the Dawa Party of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
2016 January - Barzani says era of Sykes-Picot agreement and Treaty of Lusanne that divided the Middle East has ended and international community needs to redraw borders to include a Kurdish state.
Financial crisis
2016 February - Regional government decides to cut the pay of public service employees to tackle a deepening financial crisis.
2016 April - US begins paying salaries of the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters taking part in the anti-IS battles.
2016 June - Regional government threatens to cut water supply from the Tigris River to the rest of Iraq after Baghdad buys smaller than expected quantities of wheat products from Kurdistan.
2016 June - Peshmerga forces report increasing use of "chemical weapons" against IS fighters.

weapons" by IS and plead for more weapons for fight the militants.
2016 July - US and regional government sign a memo understanding for Washington to provide more military aid to Peshmerga forces, a move which angers Baghdad.
2016 August - Germany resumes direct shipment of weapons to Iraqi Kurdistan after regional government pledges to prevent the weapons from ending up on the black market.
2016 August - Abduction and killing of Iraqi Kurdish journalist Wedat Hussein Ali in the KDP stronghold of Duhok Province draws widespread condemnation.
2016 September - Civil servants announce indefinite strike mainly in Sulaymaniyah Province over pay cuts and delays in salary payments.
2016 October - IS carries out a commando attack in Kirkuk's inner districts. Peshmerga and volunteers reclaim full control of the city after several days of street-to-street fighting.
2016 November - Peshmerga capture the mainly Christian town of Baashiqa from IS as part of operations to recapture Mosul. Peshmerga officials say they will not advance beyond the town.
2016 November - Human Rights Watch (HRW) accuses Peshmerga forces of systematically destroying Arab homes and villages in areas retaken from IS.
2016 December - The Kurdistan region says it will not abide by OPEC agreement to reduce oil production to help cut Iraq's overall oil output. American oil giant Exxon Mobil pulls out of half of the exploration blocks it operated across Iraqi Kurdistan.
Increased oil activity
2017 January - Russian Gazprom Neft plans to increase oil extraction in Iraqi Kurdistan despite the security threat posed by IS.
2017 February - Turkey raises the Kurdistan region flag during a visit by Barzani.
2017 March - The governor of disputed city of Kirkuk orders

Kurdistan regional flag to be flown over all government buildings, drawing condemnation from Baghdad as well as Iran and Turkey.
2017 April - Turkish jets carry out deadly air strikes on Peshmerga positions near Sinjar in Iraq and Syrian Kurdish fighters across the border in Syria. Russia's Rosneft reportedly pays 1 bn US dollars in advance for Iraqi Kurdistan's crude oil, signalling growing Russian interest in the region's natural resources.
Date set for referendum
2017 June - A cross-party meeting led by President Barzani agrees to hold an independence referendum on 25 September.
2017 August - Prominent Kurds establish the "No for now" movement, saying it would be wrong to hold a referendum under current security and economic conditions. The provincial council of disputed Kirkuk votes to take part in the referendum.
2017 September - Independence referendum goes ahead in the face of international opposition. Baghdad moves to assert its authority and imposes punitive measures.
2017 October - President Barzani resigns.

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Appendix 4

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 1

DE-BA`ATHIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and the laws and usages of war.

Recognizing that the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and depravations over many years at the hands of the Ba`ath Party.

Noting the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the continuation of Ba`ath Party networks and personnel in the administration of Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Ba`ath Party officials.

Concerned by the continuing threat to the security of the Coalition Forces posed by the

Iraqi Ba`ath Party.

I hereby promulgate the following:

Section 1 Disestablishment of the Ba`ath Party

1) On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority disestablished the Ba`ath Party of Iraq. This order implements the declaration by eliminating the party's structures and removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Ba`athist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to the people of Iraq.

2) Full members of the Ba`ath Party holding the ranks of 'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), 'Udw Far' (Branch Member), 'Udw Shu'bah (Section Member), and 'Udw Firqah (Group Member) (together, "Senior Party Members") are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct or threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of

criminal conduct shall be investigated and, if deemed a threat to security or a flight risk, detained or placed under house arrest.

3) Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba`ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security. Any such persons detained to be full members of the Ba`ath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those

CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01




and risk to security. Any such persons determined to be full members of the Baath Party shall be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior ranks of 'Udw (Member) and 'Udw 'Amil (Active Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members.

- 4) Displays in government buildings or public spaces of the image or likeness of Saddam Hussein or other readily identifiable members of the former regime or of symbols of the Baath Party or the former regime are hereby prohibited.
- 5) Rewards shall be made available for information leading to the capture of senior members of the Baath party and individuals complicit in the crimes of the former regime.
- 6) The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority or his designees may grant exceptions to the above guidance on a case-by-case basis.

Section 2 Entry into Force

This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.

Handwritten signature of L. Paul Bremer in black ink, followed by the date 5/16/03.

L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority

Appendix 5

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2

DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES

Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

Reconfirming all of the provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi

People of April 16, 2003,

Recognizing that the prior Iraqi regime used certain government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and as instruments of torture, repression and corruption,

Reaffirming the Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq regarding Ministry of Youth and Sport of May 8, 2003,

I hereby promulgate the following:

Section 1

Dissolved Entities

The entities (the "Dissolved Entities") listed in the attached Annex are hereby dissolved. Additional entities may be added to this list in the future.

Section 2

Assets and Financial Obligations

1) All assets, including records and data, in whatever form maintained and wherever located, of the Dissolved Entities shall be held by the Administrator of the CPA ("the Administrator") on behalf of and for the benefit of the Iraqi people and shall be used to assist the Iraqi people and to support the recovery of Iraq.

2) All financial obligations of the Dissolved Entities are suspended. The Administrator of the CPA will establish procedures whereby persons claiming to be the beneficiaries of such obligations may apply for payment.

3) Persons in possession of assets of the Dissolved Entities shall preserve those assets, promptly inform local Coalition authorities, and immediately turn them over, as directed by those authorities. Continued possession, transfer, sale, use, conversion, or concealment of such assets following the date of this Order is prohibited and may be punished.

CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

Section 3

Employees and Service Members

1) Any military or other rank, title, or status granted to a former employee or functionary of a Dissolved Entity by the former Regime is hereby cancelled.

2) All conscripts are released from their service obligations. Conscriptions is suspended indefinitely, subject to decisions by future Iraq governments concerning whether a free Iraq should have conscription.

3) Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity in any form or capacity, is dismissed effective as of April 16, 2003. Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity, in any form or capacity remains accountable for acts committed during such employment.

4) A termination payment in an amount to be determined by the Administrator will be paid to employees so dismissed, except those who are Senior Party Members as defined in the Administrator's May 16, 2003 Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, CPA/ORD/2003/01 ("Senior Party Members") (See Section 3.6).

5) Pensions being paid by, or on account of service to, a Dissolved Entity before April 16, 2003 will continue to be paid, including to war widows and disabled veterans, provided that no pension payments will be made to any person who is a Senior Party Member (see Section 3.6) and that the power is reserved to the Administrator and to future Iraqi governments to revoke or reduce pensions as a

penalty for past or future illegal conduct or to modify pension arrangements to eliminate improper privileges granted by the Ba`athist regime or for similar reasons.

6) Notwithstanding any provision of this Order, or any other Order, law, or regulation, and consistent with the Administrator's May 16, 2003 Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society,

CPA/ORD/2003/01, no payment, including a termination or pension payment, will be made to any person who is or was a Senior Party Member. Any person holding the rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a Senior Party Member, provided that such persons may seek, under procedures to be prescribed, to establish to the satisfaction of the Administrator, that they were not a Senior Party Member.

CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

Section 4 Information

The Administrator shall prescribe procedures for offering rewards to person who provide information leading to the recovery of assets of Dissolved Entities.

Section 5 New Iraqi Corps

The CPA plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian control, that Corps will be professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis. The CPA will promulgate procedures for participation in the New Iraqi Corps.

Section 6 Other Matters

- 1) The Administrator may delegate his powers and responsibilities with respect to this Order as he determines appropriate. References to the Administrator herein include such delegates.
- 2) The Administrator may grant exceptions any limitations in this Order at his discretion.

Section 7 Entry into Force

This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.



L. Paul Bremer, Administrator
Coalition Provisional Authority

CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

3

ANNEX

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2

DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES

Institutions dissolved by the Order referenced (the “Dissolved Entities”) are:

The Ministry of Defence

The Ministry of Information

The Ministry of State for Military Affairs

The Iraqi Intelligence Service

The National Security Bureau

The Directorate of National Security (Amn al-‘Am)

The Special Security Organization

All entities affiliated with or comprising Saddam Hussein’s bodyguards to include:

-Murafaqin (Companions)

-Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard)

The following military organizations:

regular -The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other
 military services -The Republican Guard

-The Special Republican Guard

-The Directorate of Military Intelligence

-The Al Quds Force

-Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari)

The following paramilitaries:

- Saddam Fedayeen
- Ba`ath Party Militia
- Friends of Saddam
- Saddam's Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam)

Other Organizations:

- The Presidential Diwan
- The Presidential Secretariat
- The Revolutionary Command Council

CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02

- The National Assembly
- The Youth Organization (al-Futuwah)
- National Olympic Committee
- Revolutionary, Special and National

Security Courts

All organizations subordinate to the Dissolved Entities are also dissolved.

Additional organizations may be added to this list in the future.

Appendix 6

Iraqi Governing Council members(IGC).

(source: BBC news;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3062897.stm) members of IGC

1. Samir Shakir Mahmoud (Sunni). Mr Mahmoud belongs to the al-Sumaidy clan which believes its origins can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammed. He is described as both a writer and an entrepreneur.

2. Sondul Chapouk (Turkmen). Ms Chapouk is one of just three women on the council. She is a trained engineer and teacher, as well as being a women's activist.

3. Ahmed Chalabi, Iraqi National Congress (Shia). Mr Chalabi is the leading figure in the Pentagon-backed INC, which he founded in 1992. It is thought he is viewed with suspicion by some Iraqis due to his proximity to the US administration and to the fact that he has been absent from Iraq for the best part of 45 years. Read more: Ahmed Chalabi profile.

4. Naseer al-Chaderchi, National Democratic Party (Sunni). Leader of the NDP, Naseer al-Chaderchi is also a lawyer who lived in Iraq throughout Saddam's regime.

5. Adnan Pachachi, former foreign minister (Sunni). Mr Pachachi served as a minister from 1965 to 1967 before Saddam Hussein's Baath Party came to power. He is a nationalist with a secular liberal outlook. He is thought to be particularly favoured by the US Department of State.

6. Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum, cleric from Najaf (Shia). A highly respected religious scholar viewed as a liberal. He fled Iraq in 1991 after several members of his family were killed by Saddam Hussein's regime.

7. Massoud Barzani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (Sunni Kurd). Mr Barzani has led the KDP through decades of conflict with the Iraqi central government and with local rivals, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (see below). He commands tens of

thousands of armed militia fighters, known as peshmerga, and controls a large area of north-western Iraq.

8. Jalal Talabani, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Sunni Kurd). The veteran Kurdish leader is a lawyer by training. He split from the KDP in 1975 to form the PUK, which controls the south-east of northern Iraq.

9. Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (Shia). Number two in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri), the sheikh is the brother of the council's leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim, who wants an Islamic regime in Iraq. He has returned to Iraq after 20 years in exile. Read more: [Key Shia leader returns to Iraq](#).

10. Ahmed al-Barak, human rights activist (Shia). Mr al-Barak is the head of the union of lawyers and human rights league in the central city of Babylon.

11. Ibrahim Jaafari, Daawa Islamic Party (Shia). Mr al-Jaafari is the spokesman for Daawa, one the oldest of the Shia Islamist movements. The party was banned in 1980 and he fled the country.

12. Raja Habib al-Khuzaai, southern tribal leader (Shia). Ms al-Khuzaai is in charge of a maternity hospital in southern Iraq. She studied and lived in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, before returning to Iraq in 1977. Little is known about her political allegiances.

13. Aqila al-Hashimi, foreign affairs expert (Shia). Ms Hashimi is a former diplomat who worked in the foreign ministry under Saddam Hussein. She holds a doctorate in French literature.

14. Younadem Kana, Assyrian Democratic Movement (Assyrian Christian). Mr Kana is an engineer who served as an official for transport in the first Kurdish regional assembly and then as a trade minister in the regional government established in Erbil.

15. Salaheddine Bahaaeddin, Kurdistan Islamic Union (Sunni Kurd). Mr Bahaaeddin founded the union in 1991 and became its secretary general three years later. It is the third most powerful force in Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq.

16. Mahmoud Othman (Sunni Kurd). Mr Othman held various posts in the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the 1960s before moving to London. There he founded the Kurdish Socialist Party.

17. Hamid Majid Mousa, Communist Party (Shia). Mr Mousa has been the secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party since 1993. An economist by training, he lived for several years in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

18. Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, northern tribal figure (Sunni). Mr al-Yawer is a civil engineer who spent 15 years based in Saudi Arabia. He is a close relative of Sheikh Mohsen Adil al-Yawar, head of the powerful Shamar tribe, which comprises both Sunnis and Shia.

19. Ezzedine Salim, Daawa Islamic Party (Shia). Mr Salim is the head of the Daawa Islamic Party, and is based in Basra.

20. Mohsen Abdel Hamid, Iraqi Islamic Party (Sunni). A prolific author on the Koran, Mr Hamid is the secretary general of the Iraqi Islamic Party - the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

21. Iyad Allawi, Iraqi National Accord (Shia). Mr Alawi set up the Iraqi National Accord in 1990. His group consists mainly of military and security defectors and for many years supported the idea that the US should try to foster a coup from within the Iraqi army. Its failure to engender this meant it became overshadowed by Mr Chalabi's INC.

22. Wael Abdul Latif, Basra governor (Shia). Mr Latif has served as judge since the early 1980s and is currently deputy head of the Basra court. He was imprisoned for one year under the regime.

23. Mouwafak al-Rabii (Shia). A British-educated doctor who lived for many years in London. He is also the author of a book on Iraqi Shia and a human rights activist.

24. Dara Noor Alzin, judge. A judge who was condemned to three years in jail under Saddam Hussein for ruling that one of his edicts on confiscating land was

unconstitutional. He served eight months of his sentence before being released under general amnesty in October 2002.

25. Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi, Hezbollah from Amara (Shia). Mr al-Mohammedawi has spent much of his life leading a resistance movement against Saddam Hussein in the southern marshes. He spent six years in jail under the regime.



Appendix 7

Coalition Provisional Authority

LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

8 March 2004

PREAMBLE

The people of Iraq, striving to reclaim their freedom, which was usurped by the previous tyrannical regime, rejecting violence and coercion in all their forms, and particularly when used as instruments of governance, have determined that they shall hereafter remain a free people governed under the rule of law.

These people, affirming today their respect for international law, especially having been amongst the founders of the United Nations, working to reclaim their legitimate place among nations, have endeavored at the same time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit of fraternity and solidarity in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, and to establish the mechanisms aiming, amongst other aims, to erase the effects of racist and sectarian policies and practices.

This Law is now established to govern the affairs of Iraq during the transitional period until a duly elected government, operating under a permanent and legitimate constitution achieving full democracy, shall come into being.

CHAPTER ONE – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1

(A) This Law shall be called the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” and the phrase “this Law” wherever it appears in this legislation shall mean the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period”.

(B) Gender-specific language shall apply equally to male and female.

(C) The Preamble to this Law is an integral part of this Law.

Article 2.

(A) The term “transitional period” shall refer to the period beginning on 30 June 2004 and lasting until the formation of an elected Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent

constitution as set forth in this Law, which in any case shall be no later than 31 December 2005, unless the provisions of Article 61 are applied.

(B) The transitional period shall consist of two phases.

(1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including the fundamental principles and rights specified herein, and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law.

(2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, which will take place after elections for the National Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if possible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, beyond 31 January 2005. This second phase shall end upon the formation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution.

Article 3.

(A) This Law is the Supreme Law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. Likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; delay the holding of elections to a new assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or affect Islam, or any other religions or sects and their rites.

(B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void.

(C) This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a permanent constitution.

Article 4.

The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.

Article 5.

The Iraqi Armed Forces shall be subject to the civilian control of the Iraqi Transitional Government, in accordance with the contents of Chapters Three and Five of this Law.

Article 6.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of the previous regime arising from forced displacement, deprivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons.

Article 7.

(A) Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period. This Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice.

(B) Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation.

Article 8.

The flag, anthem, and emblem of the State shall be fixed by law.

Article 9.

The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turcoman, Syriac, or Armenian, in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions, shall be guaranteed. The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the provisions of this Article shall be defined by law and shall include:

- (A) Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages.
- (B) Speech and expression in official settings, such as the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two languages.
- (C) Opening schools that teach in the two languages, in accordance with educational guidelines.
- (D) Use of both languages in any other settings enjoined by the principle of equality (such as bank notes, passports, and stamps).
- (E) Use of both languages in the federal institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region.

CHAPTER TWO – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Article 10.

As an expression of the free will and sovereignty of the Iraqi people, their representatives shall form the governmental structures of the State of Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government and the governments of the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations shall respect the rights of the Iraqi people, including those rights cited in this Chapter.

Article 11.

(A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed an Iraqi citizen. His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State.

(B) No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, in his application for citizenship, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was granted.

(C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizenship shall be deemed an Iraqi.

(D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.

(E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi.

(F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and naturalization consistent with the provisions of this Law

(G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of the provisions relating to citizenship.

Article 12.

All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts.

Article 13.

(A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected.

(B) The right of free expression shall be protected.

(C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to join associations freely, as well as the right to form and join unions and political parties freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed.

(D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the right to travel abroad and return freely.

(E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accordance with the law.

(F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.

(G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude with or without pay, shall be forbidden.

(H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy.

Article 14.

The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social security. The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the federal government, the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations, within the limits of their resources and with due regard to other vital needs, shall strive to provide prosperity and employment opportunities to the people.

Article 15.

(A) No civil law shall have retroactive effect unless the law so stipulates. There shall be neither a crime, nor punishment, except by law in effect at the time the crime is committed.

(B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the federal or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local administrations, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information provided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would render him liable to

punishment. Extreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed. In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law.

(C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.

(D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay.

(E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.

(F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.

(G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an illegal manner.

(H) After being found innocent of a charge, an accused may not be tried once again on the same charge.

(I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal. Special or exceptional courts may not be established.

(J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise.

Article 16.

(A) Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of every citizen.

(B) The right to private property shall be protected, and no one may be prevented from disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No one shall be deprived of his property except by eminent domain, in circumstances and in the manner set forth in law, and on condition that he is paid just and timely compensation.

(C) Each Iraqi citizen shall have the full and unfettered right to own real property in all parts of Iraq without restriction.

Article 17.

It shall not be permitted to possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in accordance with the law.

Article 18.

There shall be no taxation or fee except by law.

Article 19.

No political refugee who has been granted asylum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned forcibly to the country from which he fled.

Article 20.

(A) Every Iraqi who fulfills the conditions stipulated in the electoral law has the right to stand for election and cast his ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic elections.

(B) No Iraqi may be discriminated against for purposes of voting in elections on the basis of gender, religion, sect, race, belief, ethnic origin, language, wealth, or literacy.

Article 21.

Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society organizations or otherwise.

Article 22.

If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office, whether in the federal government, the regional governments, the governorate and municipal administrations, or the local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right to maintain a cause of action against that employee to seek compensation for the damages caused by such deprivation, to vindicate his rights, and to seek any other legal measure. If the court decides that the official had acted with a sufficient degree of good faith and in the belief that his actions were consistent with the law, then he is not required to pay compensation.

Article 23.

The enumeration of the foregoing rights must not be interpreted to mean that they are the only rights enjoyed by the Iraqi people. They enjoy all the rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations. Non-Iraqis within Iraq shall enjoy all human rights not inconsistent with their status as non-citizens.

CHAPTER THREE – THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Article 24.

(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, which is also referred to in this Law as the federal government, shall consist of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and the judicial authority.

(B) The three authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be separate and independent of one another.

(C) No official or employee of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office.

Article 25.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the following matters:

(A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating foreign economic and trade policy and sovereign debt policies;

(B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country's borders and to defend Iraq;

(C) Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq, drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy, and establishing and administering a central bank;

(D) Regulating weights and measures and formulating a general policy on wages;

(E) Managing the natural resources of Iraq, which belongs to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq, in consultation with the governments of the regions and the administrations of the governorates, and distributing the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country;

(F) Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum; and

(G) Regulating telecommunications policy.

Article 26.

(A) Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law.

(B) Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B).

(C) The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.

Article 27.

(A) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units, and elements thereof. The purpose of these forces is the defense of Iraq.

(B) Armed forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law.

(C) The Iraqi Armed Forces and its personnel, including military personnel working in the Ministry of Defense or any offices or organizations subordinate to it, may not stand for election to political office, campaign for candidates, or participate in other activities forbidden by Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban encompasses the activities of the personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or official capacities. Nothing in this Article shall infringe upon the right of these personnel to vote in elections.

(D) The Iraqi Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This Service shall be under civilian control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate pursuant to law and in accordance with recognized principles of human rights.

(E) The Iraqi Transitional Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons.

Article 28.

(A) Members of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and judges and justices of the courts may not be appointed to any other position in or out of government. Any member of the National Assembly who becomes a member of the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned his membership in the National Assembly.

(B) In no event may a member of the armed forces be a member of the National Assembly, minister, Prime Minister, or member of the Presidency Council unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank, or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving.

Article 29.

Upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraqi Interim Government in accordance with Article 2(B)(1), above, the Coalition Provisional Authority shall be dissolved and the work of the Governing Council shall come to an end.

CHAPTER FOUR – THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Article 30.

(A) During the transitional period, the State of Iraq shall have a legislative authority known as the National Assembly. Its principal mission shall be to legislate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority.

(B) Laws shall be issued in the name of the people of Iraq. Laws, regulations, and directives related to them shall be published in the official gazette and shall take effect as of the date of their publication, unless they stipulate otherwise.

(C) The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law and a political parties law. The electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.

(D) Elections for the National Assembly shall take place by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in any case no later than by 31 January 2005.

Article 31.

(A) The National Assembly shall consist of 275 members. It shall enact a law dealing with the replacement of its members in the event of resignation, removal, or death.

(B) A nominee to the National Assembly must fulfill the following conditions:

(1) He shall be an Iraqi no less than 30 years of age.

(2) He shall not have been a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Division Member or higher, unless exempted pursuant to the applicable legal rules.

(3) If he was once a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Full Member, he shall be required to sign a document renouncing the Ba'ath Party and disavowing all of his past links with it before becoming eligible to be a candidate, as well as to swear that he no longer has any dealings or connection with Ba'ath Party organizations. If it is established in court that he lied or fabricated on this score, he shall lose his seat in the National Assembly.

(4) He shall not have been a member of the former agencies of repression and shall not have contributed to or participated in the persecution of citizens.

(5) He shall not have enriched himself in an illegitimate manner at the expense of the homeland and public finance.

(6) He shall not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and shall have a good reputation.

(7) He shall have at least a secondary school diploma, or equivalent

(8) He shall not be a member of the armed forces at the time of his nomination.

Article 32.

(A) The National Assembly shall draw up its own internal procedures, and it shall sit in public session unless circumstances require otherwise, consistent with its internal procedures. The first session of the Assembly shall be chaired by its oldest member.

(B) The National Assembly shall elect, from its own members, a president and two deputy presidents of the National Assembly. The president of the National Assembly shall be the individual who receives the greatest number of votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and the second deputy president the next. The president of the National Assembly may vote on an issue, but may not participate in the debates, unless he temporarily steps out of the chair immediately prior to addressing the issue.

(C) A bill shall not be voted upon by the National Assembly unless it has been read twice at a regular session of the Assembly, on condition that at least two days intervene between the two readings, and after the bill has been placed on the agenda of the session at least four days prior to the vote.

Article 33.

(A) Meetings of the National Assembly shall be public, and transcripts of its meetings shall be recorded and published. The vote of every member of the National Assembly shall be recorded and made public. Decisions in the National Assembly shall be taken by simple majority unless this Law stipulates otherwise.

(B) The National Assembly must examine bills proposed by the Council of Ministers, including budget bills.

(C) Only the Council of Ministers shall have the right to present a proposed national budget. The National Assembly has the right to reallocate proposed spending and to reduce the total amounts in the general budget. It also has the right to propose an increase in the overall amount of expenditures to the Council of Ministers if necessary.

(D) Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to propose bills, consistent with the internal procedures that are drawn up by the Assembly.

(E) The Iraqi Armed Forces may not be dispatched outside Iraq even for the purpose of defending against foreign aggression except with the approval of the National Assembly and upon the request of the Presidency Council.

(F) Only the National Assembly shall have the power to ratify international treaties and agreements.

(G) The oversight function performed by the National Assembly and its committees shall include the right of interpellation of executive officials, including members of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and any less senior official of the executive authority. This shall encompass the right to investigate, request information, and issue subpoenas for persons to appear before them.

Article 34.

Each member of the National Assembly shall enjoy immunity for statements made while the Assembly is in session, and the member may not be sued before the courts for such. A member may not be placed under arrest during a session of the National Assembly, unless the member is accused of a crime and the National Assembly agrees to lift his immunity or if he is caught in flagrante delicto in the commission of a felony.

CHAPTER FIVE – THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Article 35.

The executive authority during the transitional period shall consist of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, and its presiding Prime Minister.

Article 36.

(A) The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The National Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy.

(B) It is a prerequisite for a member of the Presidency Council to fulfill the same conditions as the members of the National Assembly, with the following observations:

- a. He must be at least forty years of age.
- b. He must possess a good reputation, integrity, and rectitude.
- c. If he was a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party, he must have left the dissolved Party at least ten years before its fall.
- d. He must not have participated in repressing the intifada of 1991 or the Anfal campaign and must not have committed a crime against the Iraqi people.

(C) The Presidency Council shall take its decisions unanimously, and its members may not deputize others as proxies.

Article 37.

The Presidency Council may veto any legislation passed by the National Assembly, on condition that this be done within fifteen days after the Presidency Council is notified by the president of the National Assembly of the passage of such legislation. In the event of a veto, the legislation shall be returned to the National Assembly, which has the right to pass the legislation again by a two-thirds majority not subject to veto within a period not to exceed thirty days.

Article 38.

(A) The Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as well as the members of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall then seek to obtain a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assembly prior to commencing their work as a government. The Presidency Council must agree on a candidate for the post of Prime Minister within two weeks. In the event that it fails to do so, the responsibility of naming the Prime Minister reverts to the National Assembly. In that event, the National Assembly must confirm the nomination by a two-thirds majority. If the Prime Minister is unable to nominate his Council of Ministers within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime Minister.

(B) The qualifications for Prime Minister must be the same as for the members of the Presidency Council except that his age must not be less than 35 years upon his taking office.

Article 39.

(A) The Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the Presidency Council, appoint representatives to negotiate the conclusion of international treaties and agreements. The Presidency Council shall recommend passage of a law by the National Assembly to ratify such treaties and agreements.

(B) The Presidency Council shall carry out the function of commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces only for ceremonial and protocol purposes. It shall have no command authority. It shall have the right to be briefed, to inquire, and to advise. Operationally, national command authority on military matters shall flow from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defense to the military chain of command of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

(C) The Presidency Council shall, as more fully set forth in Chapter Six, below, appoint, upon recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, the Presiding Judge and members of the Federal Supreme Court.

(D) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Director-General of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, as well as officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above. Such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the National Assembly by simple majority of those of its members present.

Article 40.

(A) The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be responsible before the National Assembly, and this Assembly shall have the right to withdraw its confidence either in the Prime Minister or in the ministers collectively or individually. In the event that confidence in the Prime Minister is withdrawn, the entire Council of Ministers shall be dissolved, and Article 40(B), below, shall become operative.

(B) In the event of a vote of no confidence with respect to the entire Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall remain in office to carry out their functions for a period not to exceed thirty days, until the formation of a new Council of Ministers, consistent with Article 38, above.

Article 41.

The Prime Minister shall have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government, and he may dismiss ministers with the approval of a simple majority of the National Assembly. The Presidency Council may, upon the recommendation of the Commission on Public Integrity after the exercise of due process, dismiss the Prime Minister or the ministers.

Article 42.

The Council of Ministers shall draw up rules of procedure for its work and issue the regulations and directives necessary to enforce the laws. It also has the right to propose bills to the National Assembly. Each ministry has the right, within its competence, to nominate deputy ministers, ambassadors, and other employees of special grade. After the Council of Ministers approves these nominations, they shall be submitted to the Presidency Council for ratification. All decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority of those of its members present.

CHAPTER SIX – THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Article 43.

(A) The judiciary is independent, and it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive competence to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused pursuant to law, without interference from the legislative or executive authorities.

(B) All judges sitting in their respective courts as of 1 July 2004 will continue in office thereafter, unless removed from office pursuant to this Law.

(C) The National Assembly shall establish an independent and adequate budget for the judiciary.

(D) Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of federal laws. The establishment of these courts shall be within the exclusive competence of the federal government. The establishment of these courts in the regions shall be in consultation with the presidents of the judicial councils in the regions, and priority in appointing or transferring judges to these courts shall be given to judges resident in the region.

Article 44.

(A) A court called the Federal Supreme Court shall be constituted by law in Iraq.

(D) The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be as follows:

a. Original and exclusive jurisdiction in legal proceedings between the Iraqi Transitional Government and the regional governments, governorate and municipal administrations, and local administrations.

b. Original and exclusive jurisdiction, on the basis of a complaint from a claimant or a referral from another court, to review claims that a law, regulation, or directive issued by the federal or regional governments, the governorate or municipal administrations, or local administrations is inconsistent with this Law.

c. Ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be defined by federal law.

d. Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regulation, directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed null and void.

(B) The Federal Supreme Court shall create and publish regulations regarding the procedures required to bring claims and to permit attorneys to practice before it. It shall take its decisions by simple majority, except decisions with regard to the proceedings stipulated in Article 44(B)(1), which must be by a two-thirds majority. Decisions shall be binding. The Court shall have full powers to enforce its decisions, including the power to issue citations for contempt of court and the measures that flow from this.

(E) The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of nine members. The Higher Juridical Council shall, in consultation with the regional judicial councils, initially nominate no less than eighteen and up to twenty-seven individuals to fill the initial vacancies in the aforementioned Court. It will follow the same procedure thereafter, nominating three members for each subsequent vacancy that occurs by reason of death, resignation, or removal. The Presidency Council shall appoint the members of this Court and name one of them as its Presiding Judge. In the event an appointment is rejected, the Higher Juridical Council shall nominate a new group of three candidates.

Article 45.

A Higher Juridical Council shall be established and assume the role of the Council of Judges. The Higher Juridical Council shall supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. This Council shall be composed of the Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court, the presiding judge and deputy presiding judges of the federal Court of Cassation, the presiding judges of the federal Courts of Appeal, and the presiding judge and two deputy presiding judges of each regional court of cassation. The Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court shall preside over the Higher Juridical Council. In his absence, the presiding judge of the federal Court of Cassation shall preside over the Council.

Article 46.

(A) The federal judicial branch shall include existing courts outside the Kurdistan region, including courts of first instance; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq; Courts of Appeal; and the Court of Cassation, which shall be the court of last resort except as provided in Article 44 of this Law. Additional federal courts may be established by law. The appointment of judges

for these courts shall be made by the Higher Juridical Council. This Law preserves the qualifications necessary for the appointment of judges, as defined by law.

(B) The decisions of regional and local courts, including the courts of the Kurdistan region, shall be final, but shall be subject to review by the federal judiciary if they conflict with this Law or any federal law. Procedures for such review shall be defined by law.

Article 47.

No judge or member of the Higher Juridical Council may be removed unless he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or corruption or suffers permanent incapacity. Removal shall be on the recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Presidency Council. Removal shall be executed immediately after issuance of this approval. A judge who has been accused of such a crime as cited above shall be suspended from his work in the judiciary until such time as the case arising from what is cited in this Article is adjudicated. No judge may have his salary reduced or suspended for any reason during his period of service.

CHAPTER SEVEN – THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AND NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Article 48.

(A) The statute establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed. That statute exclusively defines its jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of this Law.

(B) No other court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases within the competence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, except to the extent provided by its founding statute.

(C) The judges of the Iraqi Special Tribunal shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of its founding statute.

Article 49.

(A) The establishment of national commissions such as the Commission on Public Integrity, the Iraqi Property Claims Commission, and the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission is confirmed, as is the establishment of commissions formed after this Law has gone into effect. The members of these national commissions shall continue to serve after this Law has gone into effect, taking into account the contents of Article 51, below.

(B) The method of appointment to the national commissions shall be in accordance with law.

Article 50.

The Iraqi Transitional Government shall establish a National Commission for Human Rights for the purpose of executing the commitments relative to the rights set forth in this Law and to examine complaints pertaining to violations of human rights. The Commission

shall be established in accordance with the Paris Principles issued by the United Nations on the responsibilities of national institutions. This Commission shall include an Office of the Ombudsman to inquire into complaints. This office shall have the power to investigate, on its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint submitted to it, any allegation that the conduct of the governmental authorities is arbitrary or contrary to law.

Article 51.

No member of the Iraqi Special Tribunal or of any commission established by the federal government may be employed in any other capacity in or out of government. This prohibition is valid without limitation, whether it be within the executive, legislative, or judicial authority of the Iraqi Transitional Government. Members of the Special Tribunal may, however, suspend their employment in other agencies while they serve on the aforementioned Tribunal.

CHAPTER EIGHT – REGIONS, GOVERNORATES, AND MUNICIPALITIES

Article 52.

The design of the federal system in Iraq shall be established in such a way as to prevent the concentration of power in the federal government that allowed the continuation of decades of tyranny and oppression under the previous regime. This system shall encourage the exercise of local authority by local officials in every region and governorate, thereby creating a united Iraq in which every citizen actively participates in governmental affairs, secure in his rights and free of domination.

Article 53.

(A) The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of the territories that were administered by the that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The term “Kurdistan Regional Government” shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region.

(B) The boundaries of the eighteen governorates shall remain without change during the transitional period.

(C) Any group of no more than three governorates outside the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves. The mechanisms for forming such regions may be proposed by the Iraqi Interim Government, and shall be presented and considered by the elected National Assembly for enactment into law. In addition to being approved by the National Assembly, any legislation proposing the formation of a particular region must be approved in a referendum of the people of the relevant governorates.

(D) This Law shall guarantee the administrative, cultural, and political rights of the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens.

Article 54.

(A) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region.

(B) With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this relates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43(D) of this Law and that fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government.

Article 55.

(A) Each governorate shall have the right to form a Governorate Council, name a Governor, and form municipal and local councils. No member of any regional government, governor, or member of any governorate, municipal, or local council may be dismissed by the federal government or any official thereof, except upon conviction of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law. No regional government may dismiss a Governor or member or members of any governorate, municipal, or local council. No Governor or member of any Governorate, municipal, or local council shall be subject to the control of the federal government except to the extent that the matter relates to the competences set forth in Article 25 and 43(D), above.

(B) Each Governor and member of each Governorate Council who holds office as of 1 July 2004, in accordance with the law on local government that shall be issued, shall remain in place until such time as free, direct, and full elections, conducted pursuant to law, are held, or, unless, prior to that time, he voluntarily gives up his position, is removed upon his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude or related to corruption, or upon being stricken with permanent incapacity, or is dismissed in accordance with the law cited above. When a governor, mayor, or member of a council is dismissed, the relevant council may receive applications from any eligible resident of the governorate to fill the position. Eligibility requirements shall be the same as those set forth in Article 31 for membership in the National Assembly. The new candidate must receive a majority vote of the council to assume the vacant seat.

Article 56.

(A) The Governorate Councils shall assist the federal government in the coordination of federal ministry operations within the governorate, including the review of annual ministry plans and budgets with regard to activities in the governorate. Governorate Councils shall be funded from the general budget of the State, and these Councils shall also have the authority to increase their revenues independently by imposing taxes and fees; to organize the operations of the Governorate administration; to initiate and implement province-level projects alone or in partnership with international, and non-governmental organizations; and to conduct other activities insofar as is consistent with federal laws.

(B) The Qada' and Nahiya councils and other relevant councils shall assist in the performance of federal responsibilities and the delivery of public services by reviewing local ministry plans in the afore-mentioned places; ensuring that they respond properly to local needs and interests; identifying local budgetary requirements through the national budgeting procedures; and collecting and retaining local revenues, taxes, and fees; organizing the operations of the local administration; initiating and implementing local projects alone or in

conjunction with international, and non-governmental organizations; and conducting other activities consistent with applicable law.

(C) Where practicable, the federal government shall take measures to devolve additional functions to local, governorate, and regional administrations, in a methodical way. Regional units and governorate administrations, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, shall be organized on the basis of the principle of de-centralization and the devolution of authorities to municipal and local governments.

Article 57.

(A) All authorities not exclusively reserved to the Iraqi Transitional Government may be exercised by the regional governments and governorates as soon as possible following the establishment of appropriate governmental institutions.

(B) Elections for governorate councils throughout Iraq and for the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be held at the same time as the elections for the National Assembly, no later than 31 January 2005.

Article 58.

(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

a. With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.

b. With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.

c. With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.

d. With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.

(B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an

arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.

(C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

CHAPTER NINE – THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Article 59.

(A) The permanent constitution shall contain guarantees to ensure that the Iraqi Armed Forces are never again used to terrorize or oppress the people of Iraq.

(B) Consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) and any subsequent relevant resolutions. This arrangement shall last until the ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a new government pursuant to that new constitution.

(C) Upon its assumption of authority, and consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, the elected Iraqi Transitional Government shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. Nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations under these agreements, or under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), and any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, which will govern the multi-national force's activities pending the entry into force of these agreements.

Article 60.

The National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent constitution of Iraq. This Assembly shall carry out this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.

Article 61.

(A) The National Assembly shall write the draft of the permanent constitution by no later than 15 August 2005.

(B) The draft permanent constitution shall be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be held no later than 15 October 2005. In the period leading up to the referendum, the draft constitution shall be published and widely distributed to encourage a public debate about it among the people.

(C) The general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.

(D) If the permanent constitution is approved in the referendum, elections for a permanent government shall be held no later than 15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 December 2005.

(E) If the referendum rejects the draft permanent constitution, the National Assembly shall be dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly shall be held no later than 15 December 2005. The new National Assembly and new Iraqi Transitional Government shall then assume office no later than 31 December 2005, and shall continue to operate under this Law, except that the final deadlines for preparing a new draft may be changed to make it possible to draft a permanent constitution within a period not to exceed one year. The new National Assembly shall be entrusted with writing another draft permanent constitution.

(F) If necessary, the president of the National Assembly, with the agreement of a majority of the members' votes, may certify to the Presidency Council no later than 1 August 2005 that there is a need for additional time to complete the writing of the draft constitution. The Presidency Council shall then extend the deadline for writing the draft constitution for only six months. This deadline may not be extended again.

(G) If the National Assembly does not complete writing the draft permanent constitution by 15 August 2005 and does not request extension of the deadline in Article 61(F) above, the provisions of Article 61(E), above, shall be applied.

Article 62.

This law shall remain in effect until the permanent constitution is issued and the new Iraqi government is formed in accordance with it.

<http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html>

Appendix 8

A chronology of key events of Syria

1918 October
Arab troops led by Emir Feisal, and supported by British forces, capture Damascus, ending 400 years of Ottoman rule.
1919
Emir Feisal backs Arab self-rule at the Versailles peace conference, following the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War I.
1920 March
National Congress elected the previous year proclaims Emir Feisal King of Syria from the Taurus mountains of Turkey to the Sinai desert in Egypt.
French control
1920 June
San Remo conference puts Syria-Lebanon under a French mandate and Palestine under British control. King Feisal flees abroad ahead of French occupation forces the following month.
1920-21
Syria is divided into three autonomous regions by the French, with separate areas for the Alawis on the coast and the Druze in the south. Lebanon is separated off entirely.
Uprising
1925-6
Nationalist agitation against French rule develops into uprising. French forces bombard Damascus.
1928
Elections held for a constituent assembly, which drafts a constitution for Syria. French High Commissioner rejects the proposals, sparking nationalist protests.
1936
France agrees to work towards Syrian independence and dissolves the autonomous regions, but maintains military and economic dominance and keeps

Lebanon as a separate state.
1941
British and Free French troops occupy Syria. General De Gaulle promises to end the French mandate.
1943
Veteran nationalist Shukri al-Kuwatli is elected first president of Syria, leads the country to full independence three years later.
Baath Party founded
1947
Michel Aflaq and Salah-al-Din al-Bitar found the Arab Socialist Baath Party.
1949-1954
Civilian government disrupted by repeated coups.
1955
Shukri al-Kuwatli returns to power, seeks closer ties with Egypt.
1958 February
Syria and Egypt form the United Arab Republic. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser heads the new state. He orders the dissolution of Syrian political parties, to the dismay of the Baath party, which had campaigned for union.
1961 September
Discontent with Egyptian domination prompts a group of Syrian army officers to seize power in Damascus and dissolve the union.
Rise of Assad
1963 March
Baathist army officers seize power.
1966 February
Salah Jadid leads an internal coup against the civilian Baath leadership. Hafez al-Assad becomes defence minister.
1967 June
Israeli forces seize the Golan Heights from Syria and destroy much of Syria's air force in the Six Day War with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
1970 November
Hafez al-Assad overthrows president Nur al-Din al-Atasi and imprisons

Salah Jadid.
1973
Rioting breaks out after President Assad drops the constitutional requirement that the president must be a Muslim. Suppressed by the army.
War with Israel
1973 October
Syria and Egypt go to war with Israel, but fail to retake the Golan Heights seized in 1967.
1975 February
President Assad says he's prepared to make peace with Israel in return for an Israeli withdrawal from "all occupied Arab land".
1976 June
Syrian army intervenes in the Lebanese civil war to ensure that the status quo is maintained, keeping its Maronite Christian allies in a position of strength.
Muslim Brotherhood rises
1980
After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Muslim groups instigate uprisings and riots in Aleppo, Homs and Hama.
1980 September
Start of Iran-Iraq war. Syria backs Iran, in keeping with the traditional rivalry between Baathist leaderships in Iraq and Syria.
1981 December
Israel formally annexes the Golan Heights.
Uprising in Hama
1982 February
Muslim Brotherhood uprising in the city of Hama suppressed by army, tens of thousands of civilians killed.
1982 June
Israel invades Lebanon and attacks the Syrian army, forcing it to withdraw from several areas. Israel attacks the PLO base in Beirut.
1983 May
Lebanon and Israel announce the end of hostilities. Syrian forces remain in Lebanon.

1984
President's brother Rifaat promoted to vice-president.
Return to Lebanon
1987 February
President Assad sends troops into Lebanon for a second time to enforce a ceasefire in Beirut.
1990
Iraq invades Kuwait; Syria joins the US-led coalition against Iraq. This leads to improved relations with Egypt and the US.
1991 October
Syria participates in the Middle East peace conference in Madrid and holds talks with Israel that founder over the Golan Heights issue.
1994
President Assad's son Basil, who was likely to succeed his father, is killed in a car accident.
1998
President Assad's brother Rifaat is dismissed as vice-president.
1999 December
Further talks with Israel over the Golan Heights begin in the US, but are indefinitely postponed the following month.
Assad succession
2000 June
President Assad dies and is succeeded by his second son, Bashar.
2000 November
The new president orders the release of 600 political prisoners.
2001 April
Outlawed Muslim Brotherhood says it will resume political activity, 20 years after its leaders were forced to flee.
2001 June
Syrian troops evacuate Beirut, redeploy in other parts of Lebanon, following pressure from Lebanese critics of Syria's presence.
2001 September
Detention of MPs and other pro-reform activists, crushing hopes of a break

with the authoritarian past of Hafez al-Assad. Arrest continue, punctuated by occasional amnesties, over the following decade.
Tensions with US
2002 May
Senior US official includes Syria in a list of states that make-up an "axis of evil", first listed by President Bush in January. Undersecretary for State John Bolton says Damascus is acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
2004 January
President Assad visits Turkey, the first Syrian leader to do so. The trip marks the end of decades of frosty relations, although ties sour again after the popular uprising in 2011.
2004 May
US imposes economic sanctions on Syria over what it calls its support for terrorism and failure to stop militants entering Iraq.
2005 February-April
Tensions with the US escalate after the killing of former Lebanese PM Hariri in Beirut. Washington cites Syrian influence in Lebanon. Damascus is urged to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, which it does by April.
Diplomatic overtures
2006 November
Iraq and Syria restore diplomatic relations after nearly a quarter century.
2007 March
European Union relaunches dialogue with Syria.
2007 April
US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi meets President Assad in Damascus. She is the highest-placed US politician to visit Syria in recent years. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets Foreign Minister Walid Muallem the following month in the first contact at this level for two years.
2007 September
Israel carries out an aerial strike against a nuclear facility under construction in northern Syria.
2008 July
President Assad meets French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. The vis

signals the end of the diplomatic isolation by the West that followed the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2005.
2008 October
Syria establishes diplomatic relations with Lebanon for first time since both countries established independence in 1940s.
2009 March
Jeffrey Feltman, acting assistant US secretary of state for the Near East, visits Damascus with White House national security aide Daniel Shapiro in first high-level US diplomatic mission for nearly four years. Meets Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. Trading launches on Syria's stock exchange in a gesture towards liberalising the state-controlled economy.
2010 May
US renews sanctions against Syria, saying that it supports terrorist groups seeks weapons of mass destruction and has provided Lebanon's Hezbollah with Scud missiles in violation of UN resolutions.
Nationwide uprising
2011 March
Security forces shoot dead protestors in southern city of Deraa demanding release of political prisoners, triggering violent unrest that steadily spread nationwide over the following months. President Assad announces conciliatory measures, releasing dozens of political prisoners, dismissing government, lifting 48-year-old state of emergency.
2011 May
Army tanks enter Deraa, Banyas, Homs and suburbs of Damascus in an effort to crush anti-regime protests. US and European Union tighten sanctions.
2011 June
The IAEA nuclear watchdog decides to report Syria to the UN Security Council over its alleged covert nuclear programme reactor programme. The structure housing the alleged reactor was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in 2007.
Opposition organises
2011 July
President Assad sacks the governor of the northern province of Hama after mass demonstration there, eventually sending in troops to restore order at the cost

of scores of lives.
2011 October
New Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of intern and exiled opposition activists.
2011 November
Arab League votes to suspend Syria, accusing it of failing to implement a Arab peace plan, and imposes sanctions.
2012 February
Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities.
2012 March
UN Security Council endorses non-binding peace plan drafted by UN envoy Kofi Annan. China and Russia agree to support the plan after an earlier, tougher draft is modified.
2012 June
Turkey changes rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish plane, declaring that if Syrian troops approach Turkey's borders they will be seen as a military threat.
2012 July
Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes parts of the city of Aleppo in the north.
2012 August
Prime Minister Riad Hijab defects, US President Obama warns that use of chemical weapons would tilt the US towards intervention.
2012 October
Fire in Aleppo destroys much of the historic market as fighting and bomb attacks continue in various cities.
2012 November
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces formed in Qatar, excludes Islamist militias. Arab League stops short of full recognition.
2012 December
US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognise opposition National Coalition as "legitimate representative" of Syrian people.
2013 January

Syria accuses Israel of bombing military base near Damascus, where Hezbollah was suspected of assembling a convoy of anti-aircraft missiles bound Lebanon.
Rise of Islamists
2013 September
UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were used in an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed about 300 people, but do not allocate responsibility. Government allows UN to destroy chemical weapons stocks, process complete by June 2014.
2013 December
US and Britain suspend "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports that Islamist rebels seized bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army.
2014 January-February
UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, largely because Syrian authorities refuse to discuss a transitional government.
2014 March
Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces recapture Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold near the Lebanese border.
2014 June
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria militants declare "caliphate" in territory from Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala.
2014 September
US and five Arab countries launch air strikes against Islamic State around Aleppo and Raqqa.
2015 January
Kurdish forces push Islamic State out of Kobane on Turkish border after four months of fighting.
2015 May
Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria and proceed to destroy many monuments at pre-Islamic World Heritage site. Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance takes control of Idlib Province, putting pressure on government's coastal stronghold of Latakia.
Russian intervention

2015 September
Russia carries out its first air strikes in Syria, saying they target the Islamic State group, but the West and Syrian opposition say it overwhelmingly targets an Assad rebels.
2015 December
Syrian Army allows rebels to evacuate remaining area of Homs, returning Syria's third-largest city to government control after four years.
2016 March
Syrian government forces retake Palmyra from Islamic State with Russian air assistance, only to be driven out again in December.
2016 August
Turkish troops cross into Syria to help rebel groups push back so-called Islamic State militants and Kurdish-led rebels from a section of the two countries border.
2016 December
Government troops, backed by Russian air power and Iranian-sponsored militias, recapture Aleppo, the country's largest city, depriving the rebels of their last major urban stronghold.
2017 January
Russia, Iran and Turkey agree to enforce a ceasefire between the government and non-Islamist rebels, after talks between the two sides in Kazakhstan.
US intervenes
2017 April
US President Donald Trump orders a missile attack on an airbase from which Syrian government planes allegedly staged a chemical weapons attack on the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun.
2017 May
US decides to arm the YPG Kurdish Popular Protection Units. These fight alongside the main opposition Syrian Democratic Forces, which captures the important Tabqa dam from Islamic State.
2017 June
US shoots down Syrian fighter jet near Raqqa after it allegedly dropped

bombs near US-backed rebel Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
2017 July
The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and the Syrian army launch a military operation to dislodge jihadist groups from the Aarsal area, near the Lebanese-Syrian border.
2017 October
The Islamic State group is driven from Raqqa, its de-facto capital in Syria
2017 November
Syrian army takes full control of Deir al-Zour from Islamic State. Syrian and Iraqi forces put IS under pressure in the dwindling areas still under its control
2017 December
Russian President Putin visits, declaring mission accomplished for his forces in the battle against Islamic State. Government troops, with Russian support, continue reclaiming areas from rebels in the north-western Idlib province.
2018 January
Turkey launches an assault on northern Syria to oust Kurdish rebels controlling the area around Afrin. It seizes the town in March.
2018 February
Government launches a ferocious assault on Eastern Ghouta, the final rebel-held enclave near Damascus.
2018 April
Claims of a new chemical attack in Eastern Ghouta's main town of Douma prompt the US, Britain and France to carry out a wave of punitive strikes on Syrian targets.

إعلان وثيقة إصلاح هويّاتي

مقدمة


نحن أهل الأرض السورية في جزئهم "العلويون"، مجموعة من الناس مُدمجة برابطٍ أوليّ ولكنه - الدين هنا - صميميّ يَبْلُغُ معه اختلافها عن نظائرها حدّ الهوية الذاتية.

العلويون، طائفة بين ثنائيات يُعطي تواجدها للمجتمع السوري عناصره الابتدائية، وللبلاد السورية أعطى تعايّشها نمطاً مشغولاً عبر قرون: دياراً للمُنوَّعةِ وصوفهم وفق الدين أو القومية أو القبيلة والعشيرة.

نحن العلويون، وعندنا أن الانتماء بالطائفة هو نوعٌ من أقدار الإنسان، مُطلَقٌ ولكنه آيلٌ إلى المجتمع، ذاك الذي يجعله نسبيّ، أما الدولة فهي ما يَحْيِيْده، ووَحْدَه الوطن ما يُلَاشِيه. كما وعندنا أن الدولة، إذ تضمّنْ للمُتَعَايِرِينَ كوناً مُشْتَرَكاً، آمناً وزاهراً، هي في آخر الأمر نظامٌ مُغالَبة الاختلاف في عناصر المجتمع الابتدائية، ونظام التوفيق المُنتَصِر، فهو الوطن.

مَزِيدونَ بِمفاهيمَ هكذا جوهرية عما هو، بالتجريد، "الكونُ الوادِعُ معاً" وبالتطبيق هو "الاندماج الوطني"، العلويون، وكم يُنْقِصُنَا أن نَراه اليومَ في سوريا يُكَابِدُ نَجْوَاهُ، وكم يُنْقِصُنَا أن يَرَانَا الآخرونَ دونَه، فنحن المُعْتَبَرُونَ، ومن جيلٍ إلى جيلٍ، على أساس "السّرانية" المُرتَبطة باعتقادنا الديني والمفهومية من بعض منّا و من بعض سوانا، على أنها مُوجِبَة لالتقاءنا غيرنا ثم لِكُفّه عنا، كما ونحن المُعَرَّفُونَ، ومن حقبة إلى أخرى، بطريقة "هؤلاء هم" العلويون، وليس بطريقة "هذا نحن".

واليومَ أخيراً، ها نحن، وحباً بالحياة التي يَهْمِزُ المجهولُ أصحابها إذا كان قادماً إليهم، ويُضْنِيهم، مثلنا، إذا كان سائداً عنهم، وحباً بما خلق الله من إنسانٍ، يَبْقَى من غير شراكة الآخر أقلُّ من نفسه، نُعْلِنُ ذاتنا خالصين من التقية ومن الخصوصية المُنَاهِزَة حدّ الاحتجاب عن غيرنا، ونقومُ إلى المجتمع الذي، لكونه انتِظامُ الحياة في اثنين وأكثر، هو سبب الحق وأساس فكرته، وأن الإنسان لو يُوْجَدُ واحداً على الأرض لما احتاجَهُ أصلاً، فَوَحْدُها السماء ما يَعْرِفُ مفهومَ الحق من الوجودِ في واحدٍ صَمَدٍ.



العلويون، وذات المعنيتين بالسّرانيّة، يَسْتَنْزِلُون منها في هذا الإعلان قوّة حُدُوثٍ جديد.

وذات شهود التقيّة، يصيرون، هنا، كُتّاب البُرُوغ فيما بعد الصميم الأول.

نحن المُفَوِّضُونَ، في طائفةٍ تلقينيّةٍ وإبْنويّةٍ، من ضمائر ناسها، والمُرْخَصُونَ، بحكم أعراف القرون، لتدبير مصيرها حين تصبح المصائرُ مُعلّقةً بالإجمال على نوع الهوية الأولى، ومعنا نخبة من الوازنين فيها، قد تأسسنا في هيئةٍ آمرةٍ على سبيل "سُلطة الضمير الجماعي" للعلويين.

وإننا باسم حقوقنا المضارعة بحقوق إخوة أرضنا السورية والمُشْتَرَعَةِ بها، باسم حفظ أجيالنا القادمة، باسم الحقيقة وباسم الله مُبتدى الحقيقة ومُنْتهاها، نرسمُ للعالم دستور هويتنا الجديد، هذا.

اشتراط خاص

هذا الإعلان الكياني لا يَنْزَعُ لابتدار إصلاح دينيٍّ سواء في معتقداتٍ أو في طرائق، وليس في بنوده التالية ما يمكن تفسيره كذلك.

محور أول: العلويون وذاتُهُم

مادة ١/ نحن في مَسَرى الإسلام على الأرض طائفةً مستقلة. لسنا من الإسلام النقلي، قطب التطيّف السني، ولا من العقلي، قطب التطيّف الشيعي، فكلاهما، والأول مثل الثاني، إسلام، حسب أصائلنا الدينية، فقهي. إننا من الإسلام العرفاني، قطباً ثالثاً له.

مادة ٢/ أخذاً بالاعتبار لاختلاف العلويّة عن الشيعية، في المعتقدات كما في الأعراف والطقوس والمفاهيم، فإننا نُلغي كلَّ إلحاقٍ لنا بها، أيّاً كانت وسائله أو أشكاله. إن جميع الفتاوى الخالصة إلى استتباع العلويين بالشيعية كفرعٍ من فروعها هي، لذلك، لاغية بالنسبة لنا وواقعة موقع العَدَم منا.

مادة ٣/ وفقاً لقيم المُوَاطَنَةِ وقيم الاندماج في مجتمعٍ طبيعيٍّ وذاتيٍّ الضمانة لمكوّناته، يُعلن العلويون إقبالهم على زمنٍ جديد لهم. ويقررون أنه، في مجتمع متنوّع الهويّات الدينية، ستكون خاصّتهم، من الآن فصاعداً، مصدراً من مصادر أخلاقيات التواجد والعيش فيه، وليس سبباً لتشكيلهم له أو حكمهم عليه أو التردّد حيال كليّته.

مادة ٤/ في زمنهم الجديد، يتوقّف العلويون عن جَعْل استمرارهم وتطورهم مقروناً بهاجس الزوال أو مطبوعاً بنزعة التضامن حيال المحيط الأغلب. يُقرّرون بأن "الجماعاتيّة" كانت رئيسياً من مظاهر تَكُونِهِمْ، وكذا من وسائل حفظهم وتعاقبهم في بيئة مشغولة عبر التاريخ من سواد الهويّات الدينية وتشاخبها. ليس الانعلاق العصوي من لوازم العلويين



المعتقدية ولكنه من شبهات مجتمعتهم. تزالُ عبر هذه الوثيقة بإعلانهم عن أنها مُنافية لمُقتضى التواجد المتوازن والموثوق في المجتمع وأنهم، بمعنى الهوية الأولية، طائفةٌ لا جماعة. يلتزم العلويون بالبراء من "الجماعية" ويتعهدون لذلك بإنشاء ميثاقٍ خاص على سبيل الشرح التفصيلي لتعريفهم الهوياتي الجديد، وبنفس الوقت على سبيل مُدونة السلوك.

مادة ٥/ :العلويون الجديدون يأبون صفة الأقلية أياً كانت معايير قياسها، ويُسقطوها عنهم كعنصر تعريف. حيث تكون هذه الصفة مُجدية للأخذ بها، فإنهم يتنازلون عنها وحيث تكون عائقاً لتناسبهم في المجتمع فإنهم مُنكرها. لا يمكن من الآن فصاعداً أن تكون سبباً لحمايتهم ولا، بالمقابل، للإضرار بهم.

مادة ٦/ :بمعنى محض ديني، العلوية هي ابتناء من الإسلام على منهج السرانية والتلقينية الإبنوية. وتؤمن بالعودات ولهذا فهم مفهوم الزمن وفقها يكتبها يكتسي فرادة خاصة وقد يُحمل المُتبعون على الاعتقاد بأن ابتداءهم في الحياة هو ممّا لا يُقاس له أو به زمن. إن العلويين في قيامهم إلى المجتمع، يُقرّون بزمنٍ مما قبلهم وبأن لهم - مثل باقي نظائريهم - قصة ظهور في حينٍ حَدَثٍ خاص. هم مجموع بشري قد ظهر في أواخر القرن العاشر للميلاد، من قلب سكان جزء دولة سنية، صار فيما بعد هذا الجزء شيعياً واستقر أخيراً أهلُه في العلوية.

مادة ٧/ :ليس من العلوية في حقبتها الجديدة أن يؤمنَ أبنائها بأنهم وحدهم من قد يظفرُ بالنجاة في امتحان المآل إلى الله. إن خلود الروح ليس، في العلوية، شأنًا لتدبير الحياة على الأرض وانتظامها بالعيش المُقتسم مع الآخرين في مجتمع. يقطعُ العلويون بأنهم عافونَ عن فكرة الطوائف الناجية والشعوب المُختارة ومؤمنون بفكرة وجود الأخيار والفضلاء من كل المِلل والنِحَل.

مادة ٨/ :العلويون في المجتمع، إننا لم نعد "نصيريّون"، نسبة ذات دلالة ضدية. فمحمد بن نصير المنسوبين إليه منذ مَطْلِعنا إن هو إلا بشيرٌ و مسبوقةٌ بآخرين لمبادئ الاعتقاد على نهج إسلام عرفاني. إنه آخرُ بناء النهج، وليس في حالٍ من الأحوال، مؤسس للمجتمعية العلوية، فليست بالتحديد دعواه ما استتبع نشوء مجموع بشري بذاته حتى يُنسب إليه.

مادة ٩/ :نقرُّ بأن تسمية "العلويون" في تعريف هويتنا، هي جِدٌ حديثة العهد وبأنها - فوق ذلك - ليست من دلونا الكياني الخاص، "العلويون" تسمية، رغم ذلك، تكتسي قيمة موضوعية في الدلالة وفي الخصوصية وقيمة عرفية ذلك.

مادة ١٠/ :إن تقوُّم المُتبعين للعلوية في طائفة بذاتها، أمرٌ يجدُ جذره فيما بعدُ "ابن نصير"، فالأب الجاعل من هذه العلوية، بناءً ملموساً وقابلاً لأخذه من عموم الناس هو "الحسين بن حمدان الخصيبي"، عارفاً ومؤسساً لطريقة عيش الإيمان العلوي، فهو بذلك



مُوجِدُ العلوية في بعدها الطقسي. يتواضعُ الخصبي مع سيف الدولة الحمداني، مَلِكاً زاهراً غالب، على حمل دعواه وترخيص شيوعها في مجتمع إمارته ويكون هذا بمثابة العهد المنشئ لطائفتنا. إن العلويين يأخذون في الملِك الحمداني معلماً لحدوثهم المجتمعي، وفي مَجده مصدرأ لفخرهم وإلهامهم.

مادة/ ١١: يؤمّن العلويون باختلاف طُرُق الفَهْم البَشَرِيّ للإسلام، ويُكرّسون في هذا الإطار اصطلاح "الإسلام الأول" هذا الإسلام - وفقنا - كان ومنذ القرن السابع للميلاد قد ابتُني على أصلين: الأول إيمانيّ ومعرفيّ عبر قواعد فقه، والثاني تنظيميّ وأمرّيّ عبر منهج حكم. في خضم نظام، هكذا مُعتقديّ وهكذا سلطوي، فإن أي حَيْدٍ بابتناءٍ جَدِيد، كان محكوماً بأن يُعْتَبَر مشروعاً ثنائيّ الشِقاق، ضد دينٍ ثم ضد حكم. إن الاضطهاد أو إلا الإذانة أو الإعاقة، كانت، لذلك، كلها، عاقبة شبه بديهية. يبني العلويون على رؤويتهم هذه مقتضاها ويُجمِلون قصة ظهورهم في حلب ثم خروجهم منها وتغرّيبهم بهويتهم المُجافية لسياق محيطهم، كانت في الأصل طريقة تلقى للإسلام مثل باقي الطرق البشرية، ولكن بالاختلاف المحفوف بالأخطار.

مادة/ ١٢: في دستور الهوية الجديدة هذا، يُؤكّد العلويون أن ظهورهم كان تَغْييراً عن أصل الانتظام السياسي والاجتماعي السائد حينه. لقد كان استمرارهم وحفظهم كمجموع، خَوْضاً في سياق لا بديل فيه عن البقاء أو الفناء. الانعزال والانغلاق صارا - لذلك - ملجأ بل ومنهجاً لحفظ الذات. عبر أحقابٍ اغترابهم عن مهدهم الأول وفي الأراضي الجديدة التي أتوها، لم تَنَلْ ضرورات التأقلم والتمازج مع الغير من نزعة الانعزال الممنهج، بل أصبحت ضرورة لتحقيق اقتضاء الذات بالإحساس الفعلي بهوية خاصة. في بيئتهم المحيطة. صَمَتَ العلويون بالانكفاء، أما في بيئتهم الداخلية وللتعبير عن الشعور بالرفض الجمعي المُتبادل بينهم وبين غيرهم، فقد نَزَعوا، وبمحض حكم الطبيعة البشرية، إلى المبالغة واستيحاء صور المظلومية في تكوين ثقافتهم حول ذاتهم وحول تنالي مراحلهم. لا يتردد العلويون المُتَجَدِّدون بهذا الإعلان، عن التأكيد بأن المبالغة الشعورية كانت مظهراً من مظاهر ثقافتهم الهويةية وبأنهم في بعض ماضيهم قد استطابوها لتعريف أنفسهم.

مادة/ ١٣: هذا الإعلان يُلغي التعريف المأثور للعلويين عن أنفسهم بأنهم لم يكونوا خلال قرون مَضَت إلا مُجرّد مجموع مُعاقبٍ من مُحيطه، وحصريّ العُرْضة للاضطهاد الديني والمجتمعي. ويُحِلُّ بدلاً عنه التعريف بأنهم شعبُ ألهم إيمانه وسبب نشوئه رغماً عن واقع مُضَاعَف السلطة دينياً ودنيوياً حوله، قُضِمَ مسؤولية الكفاح في ذلك وتحملوا بصبر وجَلَدٍ شقّاءه.

مادة/ ١٤: إصلاح الهوية، هو ساعة لقول الحقيقة بأن العلويين عاشوا يخلطون في تراكم ذاكرتهم الجمّعية بين التمييز الخارجي ضدهم بسبب الشقاق الديني، وبين العسَف الداخلي المُمارس بحقّهم على يد نظام إقطاعي، حاكم وطبقيّ التَغَوُّل. وهنا، وعلى سبيل الإصلاح، يتذكرون أنهم قد عرفوا، في أواسط وأواخر القرن التاسع عشر، وفي ثلاث مرات



مختلفة تحت العثمانيين، نظام إدارة مستقلة يُناهز نظام الحكم الذاتي. هذه التجارب ورغم جزئيتها الجغرافية والزمنية، تؤكد أن العلويين لم يكونوا محض مجموعة مُهمّشة أو مقصية من غيرها وتؤكد أن عمومهم قد عانى من جور داخله أكثر مما عانى من ظلم خارجه.

مادة/١٥: روح المبالغة في رواية العلوية لذاتها، يُعاد النظر في تشخيصها. هي ليست في هذا الإعلان مَحَطٌ تَخْطِئُهُ، إنما مَحَطٌ تعريفٍ مُرتَجَحٌ بأنها كانت التجاءً من ضميرنا الجمعيّ إلى نوعٍ من أنصاف الحقائق وتكميلها رسائل ضمنية لتوجيهها إلى الآخرين بأجبالهم عن مجموعة بشرية متضامنة حول قيمها، مكافحة للبقاء في روح نشأتها الأولى ومُتمسكة بنقاء خصائصها الجوهرية.


مادة/١٦: يَسْتَنْزِلُ العلويون تعريف ذاتهم الجديد من قلب الحقيقة وَيُسْقِطُونَ، في سبيل ذلك، بأنفسهم حكم الموت الصادر بحق جميعهم منذ قرون بعيدة في أمرٍ ديني مشهور بفتوى "ابن تيمية" والمؤسسة على ما قبلها من فتوى "أبو حامد الغزالي". هذه الفتوى - وكل الفتاوى الأخرى - لم تُعَدَّ تعيننا ولم تُعَدَّ سبباً من أسباب توجيه مُجتمعتنا ولا حتى دينيتنا. ندينها دائماً ولكن باسم القيم الإنسانية السيّدة، لا باسم الحفاظ على العلوية. العلويون، لم نُعَدَّ غافلين عن حقيقة أن تلك الفتاوى لم تُعرَف، خلال أكثر من سبعة قرون من عمرها، وعدا تطبيق محدودٍ وقديم، استقرارٍ منهجي أو فقهي. يتيمة ومعزولة، لم تأخذ بها "السُّنية السورية" التي حازت وخلال عهودٍ مديدة كل المقدرات المادية والسياسية لإجرائها في التطبيق وإهلاك العلويين. تلك الفتاوى وما شابها ليست من روح الإسلام في شيء وهي تُمثّل من أفتى بها وحسب وليس أهل السنة. من الآن فصاعداً، لا يُقيم العلويون اعتباراً لتلك الفتاوى وهي لم تعد ملجأ لهم في حجة، كما ولم تُعَدَّ مصدراً من مصادر قلقهم الجيلي.

مادة/١٧: وثيقة الإصلاح هذه، تَسْتَبْطِنُ بالإجمال روحَ التصالح مع الذات. يُعلن العلويون نهائياً أن سلايف الاضطهاد الديني التي تعرّضوا لها فعلاً، وفي كل مراحلهم، لم تُعَدَّ عنصراً من عناصر تعريف هويتهم، بل عنصراً من ذاكرتهم ليرفد قيمهم الراضة لكل أشكال الاضطهاد من أيّ كان وضد أيّ كان.

محور ثاني: العلويون وسوريا

مادة/١٨: إعلان الهوية الجديدة للعلويين في هذه الوثيقة، يُصادفُ التقاء مسيرين مشهودين نحو غدٍ وادع للأرض السورية. فبقية السوريين يبتدرون بالانتفاض، قوة الغضب المُحقّ، أما العلويون فيبتدرون بالإصلاح الهوياتي، قوة سلطة الضمير الجماعي.

مادة/١٩: يرى العلويون أن المجتمعية الطوائفية في سوريا ذات الطوق المُرهَف من الطوائف، وبالأخصّ دينية، تنزع كي تكون قاعدة تفضيل لأهلها وفي حالات الخلاف ترقى




إلى قاعدة احتكام بينهم. كل مجموعة تتخذ، بنوع من الروح العامة، حكماً مسبقاً قبل الأخرى. نعلن خروجنا من نظام التعايش بنزعة الأحكام المسبقة هذا، وننادي في عيشنا مع سوانا بنظام الاحتكام إلى قيم الإخوة الإنسانية والمساواة بالمواطنة والحرية.

مادة ٢٠: ينشئ العلويون، عبر هذه الوثيقة، وقوع مراجعة مصدريّة لسيرة النشوء الرسمي في مراحل المتتالية، لما هو حالياً الدولة السورية. إن من بين جميع القرارات المؤقّعة لتكوينها، منذ رحيل العثمانيين وحتى رحيل الفرنسيين، لا يوجد بينها ما هو صادر بالفعل عن محض الإرادة الجمعية لأبنائها، وحدهم ودون سواهم من شريك أو وكيل. يُذكر العلويون، هنا، بأن أهم تأسيسات هذه الدولة كالحدود وكالجنسية وحتى كالعلم الوطني، وكذلك أول دستور، قد صدرت عن غير توقيع سوري صرف. يَحَقُّ، لذلك، على هذه التأسيسات الرجوع عليها، إن لم يكن للتعديل فيها فلإعادة تكريسها وترسيمها بهيئة سورية مفوّضة ومحفّلية.

مادة ٢١: إن من قبيل إصلاح هويّتهم، أن يشهد العلويون بأن كل مُلِمّة قد تأتي بالسوء على كيانيّة الدولة السورية ستجد جذرها في إشكالية الاندماج الوطني. إن في تعريفنا للدولة كأداة لإدارة الاختلاف بتكوينات المجتمع، تأكيد على تمييز إدارة هذا الاختلاف عن تكريسه، أو بالمقابل عن إفنايه بالقهر أو بالتكاذب والنكران. كتطبيق وظيفي، لا رمزيّ لذلك، تكاملت قيمة "المواطنة" كضامن لحالة "التكؤن والانتظام والدوام" في المجتمعات الصائرة دولة. هذه القيمة الأميرة لا تتجسّد في معاني التضامن والتساوي والانتماء، بل في النظام الذي يكفل استمرار التضامن والتساوي والانتماء. فالاندماج الوطني ليس مُجرّد معانٍ بل نظام لاستمرار المعاني، ويكون مُسبق الوضوح والإدراك، وذاتيّ الدوام مهما تقلّبت الصروف والأحوال.

مادة ٢٢: يشهد العلويون بأن الأرض السورية، لم تعرف حتى العام ١٩٢٠ إلا النمط القهري والتذويبي لحالة "الكون معاً" متجسداً في الإمارات والسُلطنات والممالك من كل نوع، ثم بعد مرحلة الدولة الحديثة - وإلى اليوم - تمطاً مُبهماً، إجمالياً وتنكريّ، وذلك عبر فعل النظم الطغيانية أو فعل ثقافة الأحكام المسبقة. إزاء ذلك، وفي وعي الحياة اليومية المتلاحقة وتراكم الذاكرة قيد النشوء، كانت القيم السياسية ومعاني الاندماج الوطني عند مجموعات السوريين تتصنّع عبر غمراتٍ من القواسم الذهنية والنفسية المشتركة التي أنتجت رابطاً، هو في أقصى أمره تراكمي، عرقيّ وعاطفي كما ويشغل الدين - والإسلام بخاصة - حيزاً كبيراً بل وضميرياً فيه. الإسلام، وبقطبه السُنيّ تحديداً، لم يكن غالبية مجتمعية فقط، بل عاملاً قطعياً ومُلهماً في قبول العبور إلى مرحلة الدولة الموضوعية ذات الدستور وسيادة الشعب وانتخاب المُشرّع والعدالة المُفوّضة وفصل السلطات، وتفسير ذلك أن هذه المفاهيم الكبرى هي جميعها مستوردة من الغير البعيد وتُراها في سياق تكريسها كقواعد دستورية قد اقترنت بتلك القاعدة الشهيرة معنىً في دساتيرنا المتتالية وهي أن الإسلام هو دين الدولة الرسمي وملحقاتها النصية المتعلقة بدين رئيس الدولة ومصادر التشريع، قاعدة، إن صريحة أو ضمنية،



لا يمكن إدراك مغزى وجودها إلا لجهة التدليل على أن الإسلام هو - أو كان هو - المصدر التأسيسي لقيم الانتظام السياسي فضلاً عن الثقافي والذهني.

مادة/٢٢ - مكرر: طالما الإسلام يَتَنَوَّعُ إلى حدِّ التشاحن، وطالما يَمُضي الزمن طويلاً بعد توطين المفاهيم الكبرى المُستوردة ويتركّن إطار الدولة، فإن تلك القاعدة وملحقاتها تفقدُ لُزومَهَا، والعلويون في هذا الإعلان، يؤكّدون على تحييدها وعلى انقضاء علّة تضمينها في النظام الدستوري. يكون الإسلام بكل طيوفه مصدراً للقيم والمبادئ، إنما لا يكون أساساً لجمّع، باسم الدولة، من هم باسمه ذاته متخالفون.

مادة/٢٣: يَتَمَسَّكُ العلويون بقيم المساواة والحرية والمُواطَنة، وبفكرة أنها مبادئٌ فعلية لتنظيم الكيان الاجتماعي ولحِفْظِ أعضائه، وليس مجردُ مُثُلٍ سامية دون مضمون تطبيقي. يُنادون لذلك بـ"العلمانية" باعتبار كونها - كالديمقراطية - إحدى آليات تشغيل هذه القيم، لا رديفاً لها أو نوعاً منها، وباعتبارها فصلاً وظيفياً للدين عن الدولة، وليس جذرياً أو ضديّ. لا نؤمن - مع ذلك - بأيّ مُطالبةٍ "بالعلمانية" ما لم تقترن بتعريفٍ تأصيليٍّ لمفهومها ولمغازي فكرتها بمعرفة التوفيق بين الاعتقاد الديني الذي يعني تَمَثُّلَ الناس به، وبين القواعد التي تعني تسييرَ تَغَايُرِهِم وتَنَوُّعِهِم ووجودهم بحدّ ذاته ضمن الكيان الاجتماعي. هذه القواعد، خلافاً للقواعد المحض دينية، تقتضي كونها واضحةً ويقينية، ومباشرة التوسُّل بالنسبة للمحكومين بها، وكونها قابلة لتحقيق المسؤولية عن سَنّها وعن تنفيذها وكونها - بالتالي - من وضع المعنيين بها وفقاً لكلِّ مصادر استلهاهم لمعاني الخير والإنصاف:

- كل قاعدة وضعية تستمد مشروعيتها وصلاحياتها للنفاذ من توافقيها مع قاعدة أعلى تتوافق بدورها مع الأعلى حتى يتوقف التصاعد عند قاعدة أخيرة، كبرى وتأسيسية هي الدستور.

- هذه القاعدة لا سَنَدَ ملموس لها إلا ما هو نوعٌ من كل شيء يرضى به الجميع ويُبقيهم معاً، وإن في هذا الحيز الأثيري الصفة، يَجْدُ الدين مكانه.

- إن القاعدة الوضعية ليست بذاتها عنواناً لفضيلة، فهي في آخر الأمر وسيلة مثلى لحل النزاعات، أما الدينية فقد تكون مصدراً لها.

- لا يجوز الاعتقاد الديني أن يُشكِّلَ تهديداً أو انتقاصاً من شروط الانتماء للكيان الاجتماعي، ولا، بالمقابل، امتيازاً قِبَلَ الغير.

- يكون الدين، لكل ذلك، مصدراً معنوياً وقيمياً وثقافياً وغير مباشر للقواعد، ويستوي في هذا المصدر الدين الإسلامي مع المسيحي وباقي الديانات.

مادة/٢٤: إن العلويين وقد أبرأوا ذاكِرتهم الجماعية من سِيرِ الاضطهاد، فعليها ورمزيها، يُبادرون، حباً بالحقيقة ودونها شرف الوجود في الحياة، إلى إبراء "السنيّة السورية" من



كل فعل اقتَرَفَ ضَدَّهُمَ يوماً على سبيل الاضطهاد أو على سبيل العدوان أو التَّغْرِيب. فكلُّ ما وَقَعَ من ذلك، إن معنوياً أو مادياً، آتَتْهُ أيادي الغرباء اللذين مَرَّوا بالأرض السورية من غَزَاةٍ وطامعين. ليس السُّنِيُّونَ من إخوة تَرايهم السوري، مَنْ آذَى العلويين بل كان الغرباء عنه ومنذ مطلع القرن العشرين رَحَلُوا. لا يُخْطِئُ الشعبُ الذي كان في ذاتِ نشوئه ثورة ثنائية التحدِّي، هوية ظُلاميه، وإن شعباً قَبِلَ في سبيل ما آمَنَ به خوَضَ أخطارِ الفناء، لا يُقِيمُ بالأساس إيمانه على الشكوى ونَدَب ما لاقاهُ في مسيرة بقائه. عاش السُّنَّةُ السوريون شِقاقَهُمُ الديني مع العلويين، وكان بالطبع مُتَبَادِل، في نَمَطٍ ساكنٍ طوال قرون، ولم يَهْدَدُوا يوماً، وجودَهُم.


مادة/٢٥: في هذا الإعلان، يُسَبِّحُ العلويون على مسألة اشتِمَالِهِم، ضمن منطقة الساحل تحديداً، في كيانٍ سياسي من شبه دولة مستقلة أثناء الانتداب الفرنسي وتحت اسم "دولة العلويين" بين ١٩٢٠/١٩٢٢ و ١٩٢٥، واسم "دولة العلويين" بين ١٩٢٥ و ١٩٣٠، واسم "حكومة اللاذقية" بين ١٩٣٠ و ١٩٣٦، يُسَبِّغُونَ صفة العنصر من عناصر تعريفهم الهويّاتي. قصة هذا الكيان لم تُعَدَّ مصدرَ إشكالٍ لِسَمْعَةِ العلويين السوريّة، بل من الآن فصاعداً، هي مَحَطُّ استذكارِهِم وإقرارِهِم، وهي وفق حقيقتها، مصدرٌ لقرارة ضميرِهِم وثقتِهِم بقيَمِهِم. بمنطق الأمور وليس بأخذ الموقف منها، يُذَكِّرُ العلويون أن الأرض السورية المُبَيَّضَة، وابتداءً من ١٩٢٠، من الوجود العثماني، قد خضعت ليدِ الفرنسيين التي أجرت فيها ترسيماتٍ مُتَعاقِبة في خمسِ مَراحِل:

• ٣١ آب ١٩٢٠: ولاية "بيروت العثمانية" تصيرُ في قسمٍ جنوبي منها "دولة لبنان الكبير"، وفي الشمال المُتَبَقِّي، وهو ساحل سورية الحالية حيث يتَوَطَّن أغلب العلويين، يُقام وفي ذات اليوم ما سُمِّيَ حينها "حكومة اللاذقية المستقلة".

• ١ تموز ١٩٢٢: أقيمت، والهوية السورية لم تكن بعدُ قد أُحْدِثَتْ رسمياً، "الفيدرالية السورية" من أقاليم "دمشق" و"حلب" ومتصرفية الزور و"جبل الدروز" مع إعادة إدخال إقليم الساحل فيها باسم "اللاذقية".

• ٥ كانون الأول ١٩٢٤: قرار إقامة دولة "سوريا" رسمياً وإحداث جنسيّتها الخاصة. مع أول يوم من سنة ١٩٢٥، تَدخُلُ حيزَ السريان وضمن نفس الفيدرالية الخماسية مع استقلالية مُضافة لإقليم "جبل الدروز"، وكذلك لإقليم "اللاذقية" بِمَنَحِهِ صفة الدويلة ولكن بِمُسَمًى "دولة العلويين".

• ١٤ أيار ١٩٣٠: تتماوج الفيدرالية السورية بِمَنَحِ "دويلة العلويين" نظام حكمٍ خاص يُعَادَلُ دستوراً مُنتِجاً للسلطات ومع عِلْمٍ يرمز إلى ذاتيتها الخاصة ضمن الدولة الفيدرالية وباسم "حكومة اللاذقية" تحديداً. ونفس التطوير يجري على إقليم "جبل الدروز" الذي اختَصَّ بدوره بنظام حكم وبراية ذاتية. أما الأقاليم الثلاثة الأخرى فتُشكِّلُ فيدرالية متساوية بنظام حكم واحد وعِلْمٍ تَتَوَسَّطُهُ ثلاث نجومات، ترمزُ كُلُّ واحدة منها إلى إقليم.



• ٥ كانون الأول ١٩٣٦: ذكرى إقامة الدولة السورية، سلطة الانتداب تمنح السوريين استقلالهم وتقوم بتذويب التشكيل المتماوج السابق في اتحادٍ يُجرّد حكومتي اللاذقية وجبل الدروز من دستوريهما ومن عكسهما كذلك، وتعيدهما أقاليم متساوية مع أشقائها الأخرى إلى دولة سورية جديدة ومستقلة، ودائماً فيدرالية، كما ويتكرّس لها عكس النجمات الثلاث، كعكس لاستقلال الدولة ولكن ذات الأقاليم الخمسة.

ثم يخلّص الاستقلال مع جلاء سلطة الانتداب، ولكن البلاد تستمرّ على ذات رموز المنح الفرنسي في ١٩٣٦ من دستور وعكس ثلاثي النجمات، وتنظيم فيدرالي أيضاً.

وعلى ذلك، فإن الكيان العلويّ الخاص قد كان عنصراً مثل غيره مأخوذاً في السياق، ولم يكن تجسيدا سياسياً وجغرافياً لإرادة علويّة بالتخلي عن حاضنة الأرض السورية أو إعاقة تشكّلها نحو ما كان سيصير سوريا الدولة. كما أنه لم يبلغ حتى في أقصى مستوى استقلاليته (١٩٣٠) صفة الدولة الكاملة السيادة والهوية. يؤكّد العلويون في إصلاحهم هذا أن الموقف الذي يُعتدّ به لأسلافهم من قضية إعادة تجميع الأقاليم السورية في كيان مترابط وآيل إلى الاستقلال (١٩٣٦)، هو موقفٌ جموعهم الفعليين والمُعبر عنه في وثيقة كبرى موقّعة في ٢ حزيران ١٩٣٦ وموجّهة إلى مرجعية الانتداب، وتعلن تمسك طائفة العلويين بالبلاد السورية الموحدة وتعلّقهم بمدى ترابها. أما الوثيقة المشهورة المطالبة بالافتراق عن تلك البلاد، والتي يعتصم بها البعض لإعابة العلويين في سوريّتهم، فهي صادرة عن أعضاء المجلس التمثيلي لحكومة اللاذقية بمن فيهم غير العلويين، كما وأنها موقّعة بتاريخ أيام بعد تاريخ الوثيقة الأولى التي تدلّ على أنها هي ما جسّد الفعل، وأن الثانية كانت ردّ الفعل، وهي لا تعدو عن كونها، بذلك، لائحة استئناف سياسي لمجموعة من المُجرّدين من امتيازهم السلطوي وليست، كما الأولى، مُطالبة صادرة من خالص الضمير الجماعي للعلويين.

يُدمج العلويون في عناصر تعريف هويتهم المجتمعية، اعتزازهم بكيان حين حاز جهازه السلطوي الخاص في وقته، ماضى بدستور متضمن إعلاناً خاصاً للحقوق والحريات الأساسية، جعل من جميع السكان، ونصفهم إلا القليل كانوا من غير العلويين، مواطنين متساوين، ولم يشهد، فوقها، أن أحاداً من العلويين أو من جماعاتهم نادى باضطهاد البقية أو إقصائهم بحجة أنها دولتهم. وكذا اعتزازهم بتأييد إلغاء هذا الكيان حين امتحان وحدة التراب السوري ومجدّ غده، لهم.

مادة ٢٦: لا يأخذ العلويون من أيّ نظام سياسي كان، أسباباً لهويّتهم أو لسُمعتهم أو حتى لحفظهم واستحقاقهم، ولا هم يُعطوه، بالمقابل، سنداً أو مصدراً خاصاً لوجوده. كلّ نظام يُقاس في طابعه وفق حقيقة تكوينه وحقيقة اتفاهه مع المعايير الأمثل لقواعد إنتاج السلطة وممارستها. ننادي بأن تقوم السلطة السياسية وفق أصول تأسيسية ووسائل ديمقراطية. إنها وإن قامت كذلك، فلا تملك شرعية ذاتية بل شرعية مَفوّضة من مجموع القواعد والقيم والضرورات التي تجعل من المجتمع دولة. لا تملك حق الدفاع عن النفس وهي مسؤولة بالنتائج ودون الحاجة إلى رابط سببي. ليس القمع ولا السلاح من وسائل ممارستها ولا من وسائل معارضة ذلك. كما وليس من قواعد إنتاج السلطات في الدولة ما هو مفترض



مُسَبِّقاً في صوابه وصلاحيه، وما هو مُجْمَلٌ وغيرُ قابلٍ للتعبير عنه مُقَدِّماً بأحكامٍ مُدْرَكَةٍ من جميع مَنْ سَيَخضعون لهذه السلطات، وينطبق ذلك على الإيديولوجيات بأنواعها.

مادة/٢٧: من أجل سوريا وفي خصوص الكون منها ولها، هذا الإعلان لإصلاح الهوية العلوية هو في تكييفه الإجمالي، إجابةً على فئتين من الأسئلة: الأولى، تلك التي تناساها العلويون أو تغيب عنهم أو يتجاهلوها. والثانية هي تلك التي يطرحها غيرهم من السوريين وإن من شأن الإجابة بهذا الإصلاح عليها أن تكونَ باعثاً لطمأنينة المُتَطَلِّعين إلى بقاء العلويين معهم في "عهد اشتراكٍ جديد"، وللمُتَطَلِّعين إلى غير ذلك، باعثاً إلى قلقهم أو إلى ترددهم.

محور ثالث: العلويون والله

مادة/٢٨: لسنا في هذا الإعلان الكياني دعاءً دينيين، إنما شراحاً ونختص بتعريف استقلال العلوية عن الشيعة وعن السنة، سواهما. إنه في البدء استقلالٌ أصيلٌ ومصدريٌّ وغير ناجمٍ عن تطوُّرٍ أو تغيُّرٍ في تكييف العلوية لذاتها. ثم إن العلوية، إسلامٌ عرفاني إذا تُنبئ مناهجُه عن إن كل الجزئيات والكليّات تستبطنُ ملاً الله، ويكون المؤمنُ، لذلك، مُخْطِراً بنذير يهيمز داخله لاستقصاء هذا الملاً والعرفان به. أما مناهج الفقهي كما نراها، تخلصُ إلى أن الله قد دلَّ على ملاءه، فيكون المؤمنُ مُبَلَّغاً - وليس مُنْبَهأً - برسالةٍ مُحَدَّدة، يعقلها ويقرُّ بها داخله. إن ما يتولَّى الإسلامُ العرفاني هو الانشغال فيما "يكون" الله، أما الفقهي فهو انشغالٌ بما "يكون من الله".

مادة/٢٩: لا يجعلُ الاشتراك في بعض المصادر الشكلية أو الحداثيّة أو حتى التأصيليّة، من العلوية بالمعنى الديني والمُعتقدي، شيعيّة. إن الإسلام لتطبيقه الديني، قد تطلّب تدخلاً بشرياً بالتفسير والتأصيل على مصادره الصميّة وذلك لابتناء منهاج قابلٍ لإدراك عقول المُتَبَّعين وإلجاء قلوبهم، وفي هذا السياق اشتهرت مدرستان قطبان: هما السنة القائمة على مبدأ "تقديم النقل على العقل" بداعي الحفاظ على التماسك وعلى القداسة التي تأتي بطبيعتها منطق المُعايرة الذهنية، والشيعة، وعلى المبدأ المُعاكس من "تقديم العقل على النقل" بداعي الحفاظ على دَوامية الإسلام ولزوم إسباغ القداسة على التفسيرات والاشتقاقات التي يفرضها تجددُ الأزمان. يعني العلويين، هنا، تمييزٌ بين المدرستين مختلفٌ عن كل ما هو سائدٌ في بابِه، وهو الأسبقية الزمنية لظهور إحداها على الأخرى.

إنها الشيعة، ومع بدايات القرن الثامن، ثم أتبعَها السنة كمذهبٍ مُحَدَّد بذاته لتأصيل الإسلام وتطبيقه في الدنيا. قبلَهُما كان الجميعُ مسلمينَ دون أقطابٍ تَطْيِيف، ولكن بالمقابل دون منهاج متكامل التفاصيل. لأنها أولُ مَنْ أدخل الإسلام في نَمَطِ الحَلَقات والتدأرس، ومع ترخيصها الاجتهاد والتخليق في دلالات النصوص والقواعد، كانت الشيعة نوعاً من المَمرِّ أو المنطلق لكل من أراد الإسهام في ابتناء طرائق "أو" مناهج تطبيقه البشري، وذلك تكييفاً أو تجديداً أو حتى تسييساً. لم تخرج العلوية منها، بل مرّت عليها، وكان مِمَّنْ مرّوا بعضُ



مادة/٣٠: ليست الباطنية العلوية منهاج إيمان سري، بل إيماناً بالسر الذي يستبطن ملاً الله ومطلق كليته. هذه الباطنية مقصورة أبداً على التعبد إلى الله ولا ندافع عنها بل نفسرُها:

• يؤمن العلويون بأن الله يسمو على فكرة كونه ووجوده بذاته، وأنه - الجلال - لا يُقاس لإبتدائه إطلاقاً أو تصوّر. إنه سابق إذاً على كل تجلياته للبشر فيما أوحى به من كتب مبيّنة ومن رسل مبلّغين.


• يؤمن العلويون بأن الخلق مُعجزة ويَجِلُّ عن أن يكون محض منظومة حُكميّة بين راع يرسم التدابير، ورعيّة تنضبط بها. إن الحكم هو من مظاهر الخلق وليس من جوهره، ولا يُعرّف الخالق مُنتهاه ولا يُعرّف مُقدّمه منتهى الإيمان به، لكنّه يلهم أسرار الطريق إليه، فالباطنية طريقة اعتقاد بهذا التصوّر عن كيفية كون الإيمان بالغاً تمامه.

• يؤمن العلويون بتفسير باطني للنصوص القرآنية، وليس بنصوص موازية منه له، أو ثنائية الوجوه به أو متعدّدة الطبقات فيه. باطنية التفسير هذه، ليست تقوّضاً بما لا سند له، ولا تفوّجاً على معاني النصوص، بل تفسيراً استنشائياً للمعاني وليس مجرد استنباطها بذات المنهجية على نصوص اللغة البشرية. إن كلّ نصٍّ مَوْجّه لتنظيم مجموع غير مُعيّن من البشر، يكون بالضرورة مرمّزاً وبالغ التكثيف، فيلزم تفكيكه بشروح نافذة إلى أفهام وضمائر المُخاطبين به. فحتى نصوص القوانين الوضعية العادية، لولا قاضياً يستقرؤها ويُعيد تخليقها، لبقيت إجمالاً غير قابل للاستخدام والتوسّل من الجميع، فكيف - إذاً - بنصوص إلهية تُشعّ بما لا يُقاس في تكثيفه ولا في مدى شموله للمُخاطبين.

مادة/٣١: بحدّ ذاتها، فالباطنية طريقة يُعتَقَد أنها مثلى في اقتضاء كنه الأسرار المُعجزيّة للخلق والعرّفان بها، إنها إيمانٌ ومنهجٌ كذلك.

مادة/٣٢: ليس العلويون من يوصف بالباطني، بل العلوية في بعدها المُعتقدي، وبالذالة الإصطلاحية، تجدّ الباطنية جذرها في استبطان آيات الخلق لأسرارها، وليس في إبطان الإنسان لكنه ذاته وإضمارها في مجرد اعتقاده الديني. إن السرّ الإيماني وفق العلوية، لا يخصّ الحياة المجتمعية مع الآخرين وهو ليس شأنًا مجتمعيًا ولا يكون.

مادة/٣٣: إن القرآن المنزّل على "مُحمّد" و بنصّه الجاري بين أيدي جميع المسلمين هو الكتاب المقدّس الأوحد للعلوية والعلويين، وهو مناط نسبتهم للإسلام. لا تتمتع كتب



الشروح ووصوف المناهج والطرائق بصفة القداسة، إنها مصدرية ومُبدَّلة.

مادة/٣٤: ليس للسُرانيّة الخصيصة بالاعتقاد العلويّ، تطبيقات حياتية. لم تكن يوماً ولن تكون أساساً لرابطة برامجية أو تخطيطية تقودُ بطريقة مُمَنَّهجة شأن الطائفة العلوية بالإجمال في مُحيطها الاجتماعي والثقافي والذهني. ليس في العلوية ولا منها ما يمكن أن يجعلَ منها "منظمةً لله" بل طريقاً إليه.

مادة/٣٥: يُعلنُ أصحاب العلوية أن استبقاءها من باقي التوحيديات هو مصدرُ اكتمالٍ لها، وليس مَحَط تنويه وإشارة فقط. وأن هذه التوحيديات بالنسبة لها هي تبليغٌ وَحي من الله، ولكن مع اعتبار أن الله - سبحانه - يبقى مُنَزَّهاً في كُليَّته وفي تجلّياته عن تحديدات الزمان وتتاليه. يؤمنُ الإسلامُ الفقهيُّ - وفقنا - بأن الإسلام هو خاتمة الوحي الإلهي ومُنْتَهى تبليغه، ويؤمنُ الإسلامُ العرفانيُّ بأن الله لا يَتَتَالى في تبليغه ولا يَقْتَصِرُ فيه وَيَجِلُّ عن حاجة لاستلحاقه. إن العلوية تَغْتَنِي بالتوحيديات ما سوى الإسلام، وليست فقط تَتَأَكَّدُ غيرها.

اشتراط ختامي: إن إعلان إصلاح الهوية العلوية، صادراً ومُصادقاً في هذه الوثيقة، هو في جوهره رَجْعٌ لصوت الضمير الجماعي لأبناء العلويين، أبناء الأرض السورية وشقيقوا أهلها، هذا الصوت كان يقول: علويون جُدُّد، هم مَعْبَرٌ إلى سوريا جديدة.

