



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**PRIVATIZATION OF WARFARE: A COMPARISON OF PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES OVER USA AND RUSSIA**

Master's Thesis

Damla Nur Özdemir

International Relations

January 2024



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ACRONYMS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRF	African Crisis Response Force
ACRI	Crisis Response Initiative
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
APRRP	African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership
BP	British Petroleum
CACI	California Analysis Center Incorporated
CAR	Central African Republic
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNP	Colombian National Police
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DoD	USA Department of Defence
DoS	USA Department of State
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAST	Eagle Aviation Services and Technology
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FSB	Russian Federal Security Service
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GRU	Russian Main Intelligence Directorate
ICoC	International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
ICoCA	International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers' Association
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
INL	The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS-K	Islamic State's Khorasan Province
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCATS	Joint Combined Armed Training System
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KBR	Kellogg, Brown & Root
L3Harris	L3Harris Technologies, Inc.
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Contract
MNCs	Multinational Companies
MoD	Russian Ministry of Defence
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPRI	Military Professionals Resources Incorporated

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSAA	Non-state Armed Actor
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PF	Private Forces
PMC	Private Military Company
PMF	Private Military Firm
PMSC	Private Military and Security Company
PSC	Private Security Company
PSSA	Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SC	Security Company
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service
TMG	The Mozart Group
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Committee
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
USA	United States of America
WFP	World Food Program

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ABSTRACT

There is a trend toward privatizing military and security-related services, such as armed and unarmed security, logistical support, operational support, training, intelligence gathering, and more in the international arena. Private military companies (PMCs) have become increasingly important providers of these services on a global scale. They are now being used by more and more actors, and the companies themselves are expanding their areas of operation. However, they have become a matter of debate in international relations because they also serve as combat forces in wars. A common code of conduct toward PMCs has not yet been developed internationally, and there are differences in the attitudes of states toward the companies. This difference requires investigating the approaches of states towards PMCs within the scope of the privatization of warfare. Utilizing the companies by the United States of America (USA) and the Russian Federation (Russia) has become increasingly prevalent for various purposes. These two prominent actors in international relations have a substantial influence on the military and security domains, which, as a result, affects the conduct of other states. This thesis argues that PMCs are the most concrete manifestation of the privatization of warfare and seeks to answer the question of how private military companies are used to privatize warfare. To achieve this, the study conducts a comparative analysis to identify the differences and similarities in the approaches of the USA and Russia towards PMCs in the context of the privatization of warfare.

Key Words: Privatization, Warfare, Private Military Companies, the USA, Russia

ÖZET

Uluslararası alanda askeri ve güvenlikle ilgili hizmetlerin özelleştirilmesine doğru bir eğilim bulunmaktadır, bu hizmetler arasında silahlı ve silahsız güvenlik, lojistik destek, operasyon desteği, eğitim, istihbarat toplama ve daha fazlası bulunmaktadır. Özel askeri şirketler (ÖAŞ'ler), bu hizmetlerin küresel ölçekte giderek daha önemli bir sağlayıcısı haline gelmiştir. Şirketler daha fazla aktör tarafından kullanılmakta ve faaliyet alanlarını giderek genişletmektedir. Ancak savaşlarda muharebe gücü olarak da faaliyet göstermeleri nedeniyle uluslararası ilişkilerde tartışma konusu haline gelmişlerdir. Uluslararası düzeyde ÖAŞ'lere yönelik yaygın bir davranış kuralları henüz geliştirilmemiş olup, devletlerin şirketlere yönelik tutumlarında farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Bu farklılık, devletlerin savaşın özelleştirilmesi kapsamındaki yaklaşımlarını araştırmayı gerektirmektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Rusya Federasyonu (Rusya) çeşitli amaçlar için giderek daha yaygın olarak şirketleri kullanmaktadır. Uluslararası ilişkilerdeki bu iki önemli aktör, askeri ve güvenlik alanlarında önemli bir etkiye sahiptir, bu da diğer devletlerin davranışlarını etkilemektedir. Bu tez, ÖAŞ'lerin savaşın özelleştirilmesinin en somut göstergesi olduğunu savunmakta ve özel askeri şirketlerin savaşı özelleştirmek için nasıl kullanıldığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Bu amaçla, çalışma ABD ve Rusya'nın, savaşın özelleştirilmesi bağlamında ÖAŞ'lere yaklaşımlarındaki farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri belirlemek için karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özelleştirme, Savaş, Özel Askeri Şirketler, ABD, Rusya

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The privatization of warfare is not a contemporary concept. Throughout history, there has been non-state actors offering military and security services in conflicts for financial income such as the Spanish Tercio, Swiss Pikemen, Reisläufer, Italian Condottieri, and mercenaries in general. In the process that started with the establishment of nation-states in 1648, states' exclusive use of force through their nation armies has been a foundational principle. As this historical process unfolded, the notion of engaging in warfare for financial gain, particularly in the 17th century, was broadly criticized. The conventional understanding has become the idea that soldiers fight for their country driven by patriotic allegiance. However, shifts in the global landscape following the Cold War have instigated profound alterations in political dynamics and the nature of conflicts, resulting in a more intricate framework. The conventional state-centric rationale for warfare has undergone transformations, expanding the concept of security to encompass diverse elements such as human security, environmental security, and cyber security. This evolution has empowered non-state actors, whose activities have surged due to the proliferation of states coupled with the incapacity of newly formed states to ensure internal security. Technological advancements have further diversified the arsenal of warfare. In the era of globalization, safeguarding national security alone is insufficient, prompting states to adopt more proactive security policies. In response to the escalating complexities of the security landscape, states increasingly collaborate with the private sector, leading to a trend of the re-privatization of warfare. This shift has been driven by various factors, including cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and the need for specialized expertise. As a result, the use of private sector services has become an integral part of modern military operations.

At this point, PMCs stand out as the most tangible expression of the privatization of warfare. In contrast to historical instances of private actors in warfare, PMCs are corporate commercial entities with substantial human resources and extensive operational reach. Notably, as common rules of conduct regarding the use of companies have not yet been established internationally, states have their own approaches. PMCs engage in a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from security and training to, notably, combating. It is their involvement in armed activities that renders them contentious figures in the realm of international relations.

The use of private military companies (PMCs) by nations like the USA and Russia has a significant impact on global security and can shape the perspectives of other countries towards these firms. The USA has extensively utilized PMCs primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to their widespread recognition. However, the involvement of American PMCs in human rights violations has sparked controversy. More recently, the use of PMCs in the Russia-Ukraine War, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, has renewed scholarly attention toward their role.

1.1 Research Question

The thesis aims to address the question, “How do PMCs privatize warfare?” In this context, the thesis has two research sub-questions to explain the main question “What are the approaches taken by the USA and Russia towards the PMCs in the context of the privatization of warfare”, and “What are the key similarities and differences in the approaches of the USA and Russia in this regard?”

1.2 Arguments

The thesis proposes that the PMCs are the manifestation of the privatization of warfare. Both the USA and Russia have increasingly utilized PMCs. However, the USA is the leading player in the global private military and security industry, with a wider range of applications and more extensive use of PMCs. In contrast, Russia is a relatively new player in the industry but has quickly gained significance.

1.3 Objective of the Study

Warfare is increasingly becoming privatized, with PMCs serving as the primary manifestations of this evolving trend. The central objective of this study is to elucidate the role of PMCs in contemporary warfare. To comprehensively address this phenomenon, the study aims to expound on the approaches taken by the USA and Russia towards PMCs in the context of warfare privatization, examining both the similarities and differences between their perspectives. The thesis identifies six variables that elucidate the relations of both countries with PMCs within the framework of warfare privatization. These variables encompass geopolitical strategy, proxy strategy, counter-terrorism strategy, counter-narcotics strategy, humanitarian assistance strategy, and direct military intervention strategy.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The existing literature mostly focuses on the USA's association with PMCs in the scope of their involvement in counterterrorism efforts. However, there is a noticeable lack of current discourse on this subject, despite the passage of several decades. On the other hand, the literature concentrates on Russia's connections with PMCs in the context of proxy warfare. It encourages the study of both countries' relations with PMCs and comparison across the two countries. This will contribute to the literature. Additionally, both the USA and Russia lead the other states in the military and security field with their practices. Revealing the approaches of these states toward PSCs is important for the predictability of PSCs proliferation in military and security activities.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

Due to the nature of military and security affairs, things happen in secrecy, making it difficult to collect comprehensive data. This is especially true for the cases of the United States and Russia. Government agencies and military entities are driven by national security concerns and inclined to keep operational details confidential, posing significant challenges to research. Obtaining comprehensive data on PMC activities can be quite challenging due to limited transparency, restricted access, and classified information surrounding their involvement in military operations.

1.6 Research Methodology

The focal point of this study revolves around the dependent variable, which is the PMCs in terms of the privatization of warfare. In order to unravel this intricate phenomenon, the thesis adopts a methodological approach that amalgamates case studies within a comparative framework. A case study, as defined by (Yin 2009:18), delves into a contemporary phenomenon with depth and within its real-life context. This research method is particularly suitable for inquiries seeking answers to “how” or “why” questions about contemporary events where the researcher has limited control (Yin 2009:8–14).

The primary objective of employing the case study method in this thesis is to offer a comprehensive and holistic understanding of PMCs in the context of the privatization of warfare. The comparative framework employed in this thesis entails analyzing and contrasting multiple cases (USA and Russia) to unveil patterns, differences, and similarities. The selection

of the USA and Russia is based on their significant impact on international relations, particularly in military and security affairs. Understanding their approaches provides insight into PMCs. The study delves into the historical background of privatization efforts in both countries, the dynamics of private military companies' industries and their relationships with governments, as well as the legal landscape governing these entities in the respective countries. By examining variations across these two cases, the study seeks to draw broader conclusions. To achieve this, six independent variables—geopolitical strategy, proxy strategy, counter-terrorism strategy, counter-narcotic strategy, humanitarian assistance strategy, and direct military intervention strategy—are used to compare both cases.

The thesis utilizes both primary and secondary sources, with a focus on the diversity of sources. Firstly, primary sources were predominantly derived from government documents, official reports, and statements. The study examines regulations related to PMCs at both national and international levels. Regarding cases, the USA has a significant concentration of resources compared to Russia. To gain insight into the USA's stance on PMCs, the study referenced reports from the Congressional Research Service and quarterly releases on private contractors in CENTCOM by the Department of Defense. Secondly, the firsthand insights about the activities, personnel, and overarching goals of these companies are directly sourced from the companies' official websites. This direct engagement with primary sources adds a crucial layer to the data collection process, providing valuable perspectives.

As secondary sources, the thesis draws on current literature on the privatization of warfare and PMCs. At this point, the studies of Deborah Avant (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2013; 2011), Christopher Kinsey (Kinsey 2006), David Isenberg (2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2023a), Percy, David Shearer (Shearer 1998), and Peter W. Singer (2004, 2007, 2008) made important contributions. Additionally, the study relies on reports from international organizations including Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). The annual thematic reports from the United Nations Working Group are of particular significance as they shed light on how mercenaries, mercenary-related activities, and private military and security companies impact human rights. Lastly, this thesis benefits from news sites and newspapers, especially in tracking current developments and ensuring the thesis remains abreast of the latest information. This variety of sources contributes to a well-rounded, nuanced understanding of the role of PMCs in the privatization of warfare.

This methodological approach not only enhances our understanding of the role of PMCs in the privatization of warfare but also offers detailed insights into how states engage with PMCs.

However, it is crucial to acknowledge the limited generalizability of findings to other countries due to contextual specificity.

1.7 Structure of the Study

The study consists of five chapters that aim to offer an in-depth analysis of the subject matter. The first chapter serves as an introductory section that presents the research question, hypotheses, and key objectives of the study. The second chapter, entitled “Privatization of Warfare,” presents a comprehensive conceptual framework for the study. The chapter includes a literature review that examines the privatization of warfare. It covers the historical background of the privatization of warfare, explores the underlying reasons behind this phenomenon, and outlines the specific services that are mostly privatized during warfare.

The third chapter, “Private Military Companies” explores the phenomenon of PMCs, which represent a manifestation of the privatization of warfare. In this chapter, there is a comprehensive review of the literature available on PMCs. It starts by addressing the terminology used for such companies, as there are many different terms. To introduce PMCs, the chapter provides a comparison between PMCs and mercenaries. It then focuses on the regulations regarding PMCs and their activities, both at the national and international levels. Additionally, it investigates the role of PMCs in warfare. The chapter further examines the actors that contract with PMCs, such as governments, the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and multinational companies (MNCs). Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion on PMCs.

The fourth chapter, “The Cases of the USA and Russia” specifically focuses on the relationship between these two states and PMCs. The chapter provides a detailed examination of the historical backgrounds of the privatization process in both countries, explains the industry of PMCs, and discusses the legal frameworks that govern them. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing how the USA and Russia deal with PMCs through the government strategies. The fifth chapter, “Findings and Discussions” tests the arguments of the thesis and showcases the research findings. It provides a comparison between the USA’s and Russia’s approaches to PMCs.

CHAPTER TWO: PRIVATIZATION OF WARFARE

This chapter presents the literature review of the study's conceptual framework for the privatization of warfare. It begins by examining the historical perspective of the privatization of warfare. Then, it delves into the reasons behind the privatization of warfare. Finally, it concludes by discussing the primary services that are privatized in warfare.

2.1 Conceptual Framework

The trend of privatization gained momentum in the late 20th century as a result of various socio-political and economic factors. The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) marked an end to the bipolar system, leading to the widespread adoption of liberal political institutions and a free market economy espoused by the USA (Calkivik 2018:289). This phenomenon was further accelerated through the policies implemented by Reagan's government in the USA and Thatcher's government in the United Kingdom (UK), which paved the way for liberalization and privatization trends at the global level.

Privatization refers to the transfer of government-run services or assets to privately owned enterprises that operate in accordance with market forces (Avant 2005:24; Novak 2009:23; Nolen n.d.). The underlying principle behind privatization is that competition within the private sector fosters efficiency, leading to improved service quality and products at lower prices. Governments implement privatization for various purposes such as reducing costs, generating profits, transferring risks, enhancing service quality, procuring professional expertise, and achieving greater flexibility.

Various methods of privatization exist, such as the sale of assets, service shedding, managed competition, franchising, public-private partnerships, and subsidies (Seidenstat 1999). Of all these forms, contracted out is the most prevalent, wherein governments maintain ownership and control while engaging private entities to deliver services (Seidenstat 1999). In recent years, privatization has even extended to the military and security industry, which have traditionally been considered core government responsibilities (Avant 2005:24; Cotton et al. 2010:11; Kritsiotis 1998:11). Governments have transferred services conducted in warfare to private companies through outsourcing or contracting. Privatization of warfare started with activities such as logistics, laundry, and construction and expanded to functions such as

intelligence gathering, training armies and fighting seen as core military activities. The main reasons behind the privatization of military and security affairs are cost reduction, risk transfer, better quality service, procurement of specialized skills, and flexibility in operations.

2.2 History of Privatization of Warfare

The notion of outsourcing military operations to private entities is not a modern idea. As Singer (2008:19) states the practice of foreign involvement in armed conflicts for economic gain has been present since ancient times. The emergence of conventional armies and the legitimate deployment of state power through national armies is a relatively modern occurrence that can be traced back to the Westphalian system's establishment and the rise of Nationalism.

Mercenaries have played a significant role in historical conflicts, often being hired by rulers or governments to provide additional fighting forces. The etymology of the term “*mercenary*” can be traced back to its Latin root, “*mercennarius*”, as noted by Manoilo and Zaytsev (2020:50). Its definition according to Britannica refers to a paid professional warrior who serves any country or government regardless of political affiliations or concerns (Britannica n.d.). Distinct designations were assigned to mercenaries in various geographical areas or groups contracted for hire. During the 14th century, *Condottieri* was utilized as a name for Italian mercenaries while *Landsknecht* was used to denote Germanic mercenary troops during the 16th century. Spanish *Tercio* and Swiss mercenary companies were referred to as *Pikemen* or *Reisläufer* (Kinsey 2006:35). Despite dissimilar appellations, they all fell under the category of hired soldiers or mercenaries driven by material gains whose roles and structure have changed over time (Percy 2011:260; Singer 2008:19).

Sarah Percy divides the history of the privatized military into two periods: pre-1600, where mercenaries were self-employed individuals and could work for anyone who had money and power, and post-1600, where mercenaries began to operate under state control with the establishment of the sovereign state system (Percy 2011:260–62). According to Kinsey (2006:34), private actors were a crucial part of armed forces from the Middle Ages through the Enlightenment, but their role came under scrutiny with the emergence of regular army during and after the French Revolution. The growth of trade and industrialization also played a significant role in promoting the re-privatized warfare (Kinsey 2006). Since the late 20th century, there has been a growing trend toward privatizing military services, which has resurged in the post-Cold War era. The next section explores the privatization of warfare throughout history in five headings. The early period: Self-regulated private forces; the era of state-

controlled private forces with the Westphalia; replacing private forces with national armies; re-emergence of private forces in the 1960s; new security actor emerging in the post-Cold War: Private military company.

2.2.1 The Early Period: Self-Regulated Private Forces

Private hired soldiers have been a part of warfare throughout history, from the Sumerians to the feudal era. The earliest record of hired soldiers dates back to King Shulgi of Ur, who reigned from 2094 to 2046 BC (Singer 2008:20). Hired soldiers played significant roles in historical battles such as the Battle of Kadesh, the first war known in the world (1294 BCE), Peloponnesian War (431 BCE), and Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) (Singer 2008). The use of foreign-recruited troops was also mentioned in the Bible when Pharaoh's army fought against the Israelites. During the Roman Empire, it was common to hire Germanic soldiers. In fact, there were more hired Germanic soldiers in the Roman Empire than actual Roman citizens were serving as soldiers (Singer 2008:20). This dependence on foreign mercenaries exemplifies their crucial role in ensuring stability and facilitating Rome's territorial expansion.

During the early period, private forces were employed due to a fragmented distribution of power and limited scope of warfare. In order to ensure their safety and protection, rulers frequently depended on private armies (Avant 2004a:27; Percy 2011:259; Serewicz 2002:79; Singer 2008:39). Firstly, before the Westphalia era, power was dispersed among various entities such as city-states, feudal lords and religious authorities. Early rulers lacked adequate political and economic authority to effectively maintain standing armies. As a result, hiring mercenaries proved more economical than forming permanent troops (Serewicz 2002:79). These fighters were recruited for specific battles and subsequently dismissed with payment upon the conclusion of their service (Kinsey 2006:36). Secondly, in the early period, warfare was limited in scale and relied on skilled warriors rather than sheer numbers (Serewicz 2002:79; Singer 2008:39). Since fighting was an occupation learned through long effort, the ability to fight had yet to spread to society then. The rulers met the needs of fighting people from mercenaries.

During the early period, mercenaries were used by rulers for protection, but their self-interest often caused problems. Mercenary groups formed and created temporary armies to achieve specific goals before disbanding, leaving many fighters unemployed and causing unrest (Percy 2011:265). Sometimes, to avoid being unemployed, mercenaries deliberately prolonged wars which resulted in devastating consequences. This kind of behavior poses a significant risk to the rulers or groups that hire them. During the Carthaginian empire, mercenaries started an uprising when they didn't receive their payment. The Mercenary War was suppressed by other

mercenary troops (Singer 2008:21). These undermined the credibility and trustworthiness of mercenaries. The Magna Carta (1215) promised to remove foreign soldiers after peace was restored, as stated in Article 51: “*We will remove from the kingdom all foreign knights, crossbowmen, serjeants, and mercenaries who have come with horses and arms to the detriment of the kingdom*” (The Magna Carta Project n.d.). Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), a resident of Florence where mercenaries were commonly hired, criticized their negative impact in his book the *Prince*. He deemed them unreliable and advised rulers to rely on citizen-soldiers instead (Machiavelli 2006).

2.2.2 The Era of State-Controlled Private Forces with the Westphalia

The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) marked the emergence of the modern state in international relations with the Peace of Westphalia. It established the norm of state sovereignty and concentration of power, making states sole owners of political and economic authority over their territories (Serewicz 2002:80). These changes also caused changes in the military affairs. Additionally, it was a pivotal moment for using private forces in armed conflicts.

Unlike the early periods, private forces didn’t just work for money and power, they began to acknowledge legitimate power (Percy 2011:262). This led to greater state control over them, which was a significant step toward states’ monopolization of power (Percy 2011:261). To maintain their authority, states utilized private forces to ensure stability within the country’s borders (Creveld 1991; Serewicz 2002:78). They also, developed organizational structures and raised professional standing armies instead of relying on temporary ones. Mercenaries played an important role in forming these standing armies due to their skills and experience (Serewicz 2002:78).

States with standing armies acted as providers of hired armies (Avant 2005:27). Examples include German states leasing their troops to the UK, France, Venice and Netherlands; the Dutch leasing their army to German princes during the Seven Years War; or the UK hiring Dutch regiments in both the 1701 war with France and the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion in the UK (Avant 2005:28).

Private forces have been used to protect trade routes and overseas territories, in addition to permanent armies. In the 16th century, states started using private actors for these tasks while trading abroad and building colonies (Kinsey 2006:38; Shearer 1998:70). As overseas trade grew over the following centuries, various nations established chartered companies, including the UK, Holland, Portugal, and France. The most prominent of these was England's East India

Company. Mercenaries employed within these companies provided armed and unarmed protection along with ensuring regional security (Avant 2005:27–28).

2.2.3 Replacing Private Forces with National Armies

The French and Industrial Revolutions led to the establishment of citizen armies, replacing mercenary troops. First, the French Revolution (1789) and with the spread of nationalism, brought about a change in people's perception of citizenship, state, and soldiers. This change created a favorable environment for the establishment of citizen armies. The motivation to fight for money has turned into the motivation to fight for patriotism. Consequently, this transformation brought about changes in the practice of warfare (Shearer 1998:70; Singer 2008:30). Military service became a primary duty of citizens, and nation-states began to form regular armies of their citizens. The French Revolutionary Army's victory despite being outnumbered and inadequately equipped, over hired warriors in Europe further accelerated the transition to citizen-armies expedited the transition to citizen armies (Kinsey 2006:43). Singer describes the change in perception in this period as "*wars of citizens, not wars of kings*" (Singer 2008:29). From this period onwards, hiring soldiers for money was condemned. For instance, the UK's use of German mercenaries during the American War of Independence (Avant 2004a:20; Shearer 1998:69; Singer 2008:30) was seen as incompatible with the mentality of the period and was criticized as a betrayal of the American people (Percy 2011:272; Tangör and Yalcinkaya 2010:132).

In a short, the state's right to use legitimate force was reinforced with the formation of national armies. Wars are considered a matter of states and their national armies. Hired soldiers almost disappeared until the 1960s (Percy 2011:262; Singer 2008:31). However, states have also used mercenaries along with citizens' armies for various reasons. Shearer (1998) argues that they were used in times of urgent strategic needs, while Kinsey (2006:43) asserts that states employed them beyond their borders to promote self-interests. Singer (2008:33) suggests that monarchs relied on mercenaries as a means of maintaining power and autonomy from citizens who sought greater participation in decision-making processes through conscription efforts.

2.2.4 Re-emergence of Private Fighters in the 1960s

Using private fighters in warfare gained momentum during the decolonization period. The decolonization process, especially in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, provided profitable occasions for private soldiers (Percy 2011:262; Singer 2008:37). After gaining independence,

many states experienced chaos as internal conflicts arose due to the vacuum left by colonial withdrawal. Mercenaries have served the governments of newly independent states to suppress separatist movements, and enhance national defense forces (Kritsiotis 1998:12). Examples include Rhodesia's reliance on mercenaries for survival after independence in 1965 and Congo's use of them to suppress the secessionist Katanga movement in 1960-1963. The deployment of mercenaries was seen as a way to increase a state's capacity to ensure both internal and external security while also facilitating control and extraction of natural resources.

Not only did newly independent governments employ mercenaries, but also external actors expanded the practice of mercenary activities throughout Africa and the Middle East. Governments employed mercenaries in covert operations due to their ability to provide indirect involvement and deniability (Kinsey 2006:44). The reasons for employing mercenaries differ depending on the parties involved. Former colonial states employed them as a means of maintaining influence in post-colonial regions, such as ex-colonial Belgium's support for the separatist Katanga movement to maintain its political and economic interests (Schmidt 2013:20–72). On the other hand, both the USA and the USSR, the two opposite poles of the Cold War, used mercenaries to support governments close to their ideologies in newly independent states. The Soviets supported pro-socialist governments while the Americans favored those who were pro-western during civil wars. During the Angolan Civil War, Cuba and the USSR supported the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was due to their shared Marxist ideology. On the other hand, the United States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), both of which had anticommunist views (Schmidt 2013:20-81-93–94). In Congo, while the USSR provided military aid to the pro-socialist side of the government, the United States assisted anti-Soviet groups (Schmidt 2013:62–63). The rapprochement of one side with the governments caused the concern that the opposing ideology would spread to the continent if they failed to support their allies. Ultimately, the Congo and Angola turned into a proxy war, where the USA and the Soviets did not meet directly but met through mercenaries. Even individual external actors have used mercenaries on the continent for their own benefit. Bob Denard's mercenaries involved in illegal activities and coup attempts against governments in Comoros Island and Seychelles (Kritsiotis 1998:12; Singer 2008:37).

The concentration of mercenary activities in Africa during decolonization has led to the continent being associated with mercenaries. The intervention of third countries in the region with mercenaries caused them to be associated with the apartheid regime (Singer 2008:37). Private fighters were seen as actors that hindered the right to self-determination (OHCHR n.d.-

c). All this has given rise to notoriety for mercenaries internationally and led to adopt anti-mercenary norms.

In 1977, the Organization of African Unity signed The African Convention on Mercenarism, which became effective in 1985 (ICRC n.d.). The Convention was the first attempt to define mercenary and impose obligations on signatory states to take the necessary measures to eradicate mercenary activities in Africa. In 1987, the United Nations Human Rights Commission appointed a special rapporteur to investigate the use of mercenaries to violate human rights and prevent people from exercising their right to self-determination (OHCHR n.d.-b). In 1989, the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries was adopted and it became effective in 2001 (OHCHR n.d.-a). These developments have led to a decline in mercenary activities; however, private military companies continue expanding their operations globally as new military service providers within the private security industry.

2.2.5 New Security Actor Emerging in the Post-Cold War: Private Military Company

Following the demilitarization policies that came after the Cold War, numerous soldiers found themselves without employment and many military equipment became abundant in the market. The surplus of labor and resources provided the necessary conditions for the establishment of PMCs, as free market principles became more widely adopted.

The inability of local governments to suppress the turmoil in their countries, the reluctance of the major powers to intervene directly, and the United Nations' (UN) inability to supply the necessary personnel for peacekeeping operations from governments have increased the demand for PMCs in the international market. Sierra Leone, and Angola have entered into agreements with PMCs to counterinsurgency. These PMCs engaged in diverse military operations, including active participation in armed conflicts, intelligence gathering, and logistical support. Executive Outcomes (EO) were well-known companies that provided military and security services for African countries (Howe 1998:307). EO played a pivotal role in countering the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency in Sierra Leone, providing vital military assistance that proved instrumental in reclaiming diamond mines and securing oil installations in Soyo, Angola (Avant 2005:153; Harding 1997:89; Howe 1998:307–12).

PMCs extend their activities beyond the African continent. The most cited reference in the literature is the training of the Croatian and Bosnian Armies by a USA-based PMC, Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI), in 1995 (Percy 2009:59). Despite operating in a

free market setting, it has expressed its commitment to the USA foreign policy (Singer 2008:119). According to Singer (2008:121), MPRI is an extension of the American army that operates privately.

The employment of PMCs entered a new phase following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the War on terror. During the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, the USA relied heavily on contracted personnel who formed the second-largest military force in Iraq, surpassing the number of USA soldiers at times in Afghanistan. Following the end of military invasion, the USA turned to PMCs to restructure the armies and police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackwater contractors massacred civilians in Iraq, causing social outrage in the country. In 2004, a convoy of Blackwater contractors was ambushed, resulting in the death of four contractors in Fallujah. In 2007, Blackwater contractors opened fire on an unarmed crowd in Nisour Square, killing 14 civilians, including two children, and injuring many more (Safi 2020). This massacre sparked international outrage and raised concerns about the PMCs. PMCs have been a prominent topic on the global agenda. The media heavily criticized PMCs after Blackwater company employees engaged in inhumane and illegal activities in Iraq.

The involvement of PMCs has increased during the Arab Spring uprisings and civil wars in the Middle East. Countries have employed PMCs in conflicts such as those in Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In Libya, Russian PMCs have worked with Khalife Haftar, while the USA has utilized PMCs to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. In February 2018, alleged Russian private military contractors clashed with USA soldiers in Syria's Deir al-Zour region, marking the first direct encounter between the USA and Russia in the conflict (Linder 2018:17; Spearin 2018:39).

Additionally, the demand for PMCs has increased due to the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. Russian government utilized PMCs in its military operation in Ukraine, as did for the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Schmitt 2022; Soldatov and Borogan 2022). In Ukraine, PMCs offer a range of services, from operational support to executing missions. PMCs are also hired by governments not involved in a conflict to facilitate the safe evacuation of their citizens from the conflict zone (Debusmann Jr 2022).

In short, the phenomenon of privatization of warfare is not unique to the present, the participation of foreigners in warfare for monetary gain has been throughout history. Their duties, organizational structures and legal status have changed following the demand over time. Although they lost power with the establishment of national armies, they were not erased from the international arena. The influence of private military actors is growing, and the privatization of warfare has become a global issue (Singer 2008:9).

Historical Periods	Mission	Organizational Structure	Legal Status
The Early Period: Self-Regulated Private Forces	Fighting	Self-ruled Ad hoc groups	Natural component of warfare
Private Soldiers Under State-Controlled	Fighting, forming state armies, security of trade routes and overseas territories	Under-state control Ad hoc groups	Fighting under legitimate authority was legal
Replacing Private actors with National Armies	Meeting urgent strategic needs, maintaining national interests	Under-state control Ad hoc groups	Fighting with motivation for financial gain was considered morally problematic and condemned
Re-emergence of Private Fighters in the 1960s	For Newly Independent Governments: suppress separatist movements, providing internal sovereignty, defending sovereignty from foreign armed attacks For Former Colonial States: maintaining influence in post-colonial regions For Third Countries: proxy actor acting in the interests of third countries	Under-state control Ad hoc groups	Measures began to be taken to end mercenary activities
New Security Actor Emerging in the Post-Cold War: Private Military Company	Security-related services, participating in armed conflicts, gathering intelligence, logistical support equipping and training national armies, execution missions	Hierarchically organized corporate enterprises that are registered locally and openly trade	Regulation lacking

Table 1. History of Privatization of Warfare

2.3 Reasons Behind the Privatization of Warfare After the Cold War

There are many hypotheses about the reasons for the privatization of warfare. Dino Kristsiotis (1998) associates the privatization of warfare with the transformation of conflicts from interstate to intra-state. According to David Shearer (1998:69–71), the proliferation of weak states, the changing interests of great powers after the Cold War, the structure of armies designed for conventional warfare, the reduction in the number of soldiers, reluctance of Western countries to send troops to the UN peace missions, and the spread of the liberal economic order are main reasons for the spread of private forces in 20th Century. According to Christopher Kinsey (2006:94–95), efficiency, technology, and shifting social perceptions of the role of state militaries in the twenty-first century led to privatization. Peter W. Singer (2008:49) claims the reasons behind the privatization are a new global security environment, changing character of war, and shifts in the private military market (2008:49). Sean McFate (2014:41–49), a former contractor of DynCorp International, believes that liberal ideas, the post–Cold War security vacuum, humanizing war, and the utility of private force play a significant role in the re-emerge of private armies in 21st Century. The next section will discuss the reasons and main driving factors behind the privatization of warfare under the eight topics.

2.3.1 New Global Security Environment

The first driving force behind the privatization of warfare is the new security environment which includes emerging threats and the expansion of global violence in the post-Cold War period. The balance of power between the USSR and the United States provided some stability and order in the international arena during the Cold War. However, with the disintegration of the USSR, international security has undergone structural changes. States found themselves in a new security environment, the balance of power between the USA and the Soviets disappeared, instability and global violence began to increase (Singer 2008:51). According to Singer, private military actors are more effective in transitional periods like this one. This makes the current security system favorable for privatizing warfare.

After the Cold War, security became more complex and broadened. The focus shifted from purely state-centered understanding to encompass individual safety and new issues such as ethnic tensions, nationalism, religious conflicts, and competition for natural resources (Calkivik 2018:289). In today's world, the distinctions between war and peace, as well as between soldiers and civilians, have become increasingly blurred. Civilians became the target of attacks in public spaces and their homes. The interconnectedness of the world due to globalization and

technological advancements has caused a blurring of the lines between internal and external security, making it impossible to separate national and global security. Any threat, regardless of its origin, has the potential to affect states around the globe (Avant 2005:33). Furthermore, in today's security landscape, it is vital to anticipate and prepare for potential dangers. Governments adopt proactive measures to address emerging risks, and timely engagement is crucial. Modern security policies are driven by risks instead of threats, emphasizing the importance of a risk-focused approach with a focus on anticipating unknown events that may occur in the future (Calkivik 2018:295–96; Krieg and Rickli 2019:48). In contrast to the previous threat-based approach, where the enemy was relatively clear, this new approach requires preparedness for threats from all angles and proactive measures to be taken before a possible threat arises. Governments are increasingly resorting to privatization to address the challenges encountered in the new security environment (Avant 2005:35). Private military organizations offer numerous advantages, such as the ability to operate across national borders, prompt intervention, and a high degree of professionalism.

On the other hand, in today's security environment, which is diverse and requires active intervention even beyond borders, governments face a daunting challenge known as “casualty sensitivity” or “body-bag syndrome”. These terms refer to the increased public sensitivity and scrutiny towards casualties or deaths resulting from security incidents. It leads governments to “risk-transfer” where states outsource their operational risks to other entities in order to prioritize minimizing casualties (Krieg and Rickli 2019:49–50). In the current global security landscape, the private sector has emerged as a crucial actors help to mitigate potential government scrutiny by taking on the responsibility of risk management.

2.3.2 The Rise of Non-State Armed Actors

The second factor behind privatization is the increase in the activities of non-state armed actors (NSAA) in the international security environment. NSAA are independent entities who engage in armed activities without being recognized as official military forces of a particular state. These actors include paramilitary groups, warlords, terrorist groups, organized criminal networks, and private military companies. NSAA have become significant global players due to various factors. One of the most significant factors is the weakening or collapse of central state authority in certain regions. This creates power vacuums that non-state actors are quick to exploit, leading to their growth and increasing influence. Furthermore, globalization and the development of communication technologies have enabled them to reach a wider audience and

form transnational networks. In addition, the development of global supply chains has facilitated their access to weapons, resources, and funding, thereby supporting their operations.

The rise of NSAAs has affected the privatization of warfare in two ways. One of the notable effects is the appearance of PMCs, which offer security and military services as a private or global good. This reflects the influence of privatization on contemporary warfare and security operations, making PMCs a tangible manifestation of the privatization of warfare. Secondly, NSAAs have grown increasingly capable of using force. They cause regime instability, political disorder, and violent conflicts at the national level. These groups not only challenge national power structures but also present regional and global security risks by engaging in violent acts against established authorities (Yeşiltaş and Kardaş 2018:4). The terrorist attacks of September 11th by al-Qaeda and the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria serve as clear examples of the regional and global risks posed by non-state armed actors.

Contemporary conflicts have witnessed a paradigm shift in the form of non-state actors playing an increasingly dominant role (Brayton 2002:303). The increase in the activities of non-state armed actors and diversified security threats have led to a change in the strategies of states to combat. Irregular and asymmetric warfare became common in the post-Cold War period since the NSAAs used these strategies in their struggle with states (Cordesman 2014). States do not use the same strategy use to combat with counterparts. States need to adopt a different strategy in response to the methods of non-state actors. Since the structure of armies conforms to conducting conventional warfare, it was not in the design to respond to irregular and asymmetric warfare (Kinsey 2006:96). Large troops with low maneuverability are replaced by special units that can adapt to various conditions instantly and move quickly (Calkivik 2018:292). At this point, privatization can be done for two purposes: The first is to purchase the special unit services to use directly; the second is to outsource training services to re-organize the army.

2.3.3 Increase in Weak Governments Across the Globe

Weak state regions are where the privatization of warfare is most common (Singer 2008:37). Many governments suffer from weak public institutions, a lack of accountability systems, and fragile structures. There has been an increase in the number of states with the decolonization process. However, only a few states are able to fulfill their responsibilities and ensure their internal and external sovereignty. State weakness can be caused by a lack of military or economic capability or problems with legitimacy. Regardless of the reason, weak states are unable to maintain order and ensure stability within their territory. It makes these

territories prone to activities of NSAAs. These groups take advantage of the instability in the region and cause the territory to become insecure (Gat 2011:42-43). They began to create their military power and influence area (Serewicz 2002:76). It resulted in a power struggle between state and armed non-state actors.

The conflict between state and non-state actors or the struggle between non-state actors is defined as intrastate wars. The rate of intrastate wars has increased with the number of weak governments. These are unconventional wars that occur within a country's borders (Jackson 2007:121). A general definition includes civil wars, independence wars, and fighting terrorists or criminal groups. Intrastate wars cause serious human rights violations such as deliberate mutilation, forced detention, torture, rape, and genocide. They can cause immigration problems, increase illegal economic activities, and terrorist activities may become widespread in the region.

Intrastate wars are mostly low-intensity and narrow-scale wars compared to interstate wars. Kristiotis (1998) and Singer (2008) interrelate privatization and the scale of the war. The qualities sought in the military in the war vary according to the scale of the war. If the war is on a small scale, the quality of the soldiers is more important than the quantity (Singer 2008:29–30). In intrastate wars, states do not mobilize all their forces as in conventional wars (Serewicz 2002:85). Professional units are more appropriate to utilize than conventional armies in intrastate wars. In intrastate wars, the private military market provides states a wide range of services. The weak governments experiencing intrastate wars on their borders and not having enough power to suppress internal turmoil get the military support they need through privatization. They apply privatization the most to increase their military capabilities. On the other hand, states do not direct part of the conflict, utilize private actors to provide security for citizens, assets, and economic interests. Not just states, the UN, MNCs also demand private security in intrastate wars for several reasons.

2.3.4 Re-structuring of Armies After Cold War

Changes in the structure of armies after the Cold War are the fourth force driving the privatization of war. This shift was driven by a number of factors, including the influence of social and political changes. Within the scope of political changes, there was a sense of hope that major conflicts had come to a close following the end of the Cold War. Governments worldwide took steps to reduce military spending and downsize their armed forces, leading to demilitarization and the creation of smaller armies.

There has been a significant increase in people's reluctance to engage in warfare due to societal changes, haunting memories of previous wars, and the threat of nuclear weapons (Strachan 2011:516). Mobilization of people causes social upheaval. Many societies are hesitant to participate in large-scale mobilization efforts (Venesson 2011:249). For instance, the Putin government declared partial mobilization in September 2022. It was met with dissatisfaction by the Russians. It also caused discontent in Putin's close circle (Soldatov and Borogan 2022).

Socio-political changes in the military have resulted in a smaller number of individuals serving in the armed forces, leading to the professionalization of military service. As a result, there has been a decrease in the number of citizens being conscripted into the army, emotional factors such as patriotism being limited in combat, and military operations being primarily carried out by professionals (Venesson 2011:249). In response to the need to professionalize armies, the private military market has emerged to provide professional military services that meet the needs of states. Through privatization, governments can acquire the competent power required to address their needs.

2.3.5 Advances in Technology

The fifth reason behind the privatization is the impact of technology on warfare. It directly affect warfare and its conduct (Calkivik 2018:292). This has led to the emergence of a new dimension of international politics known as the cyber domain. Cyberspace is now the fifth dimension of warfare, after land, air, sea, and space (Krieg and Rickli 2019:91). In this type of war, software is used as a weapon, and only a few capable people are required to conduct military operations. As a result, it is necessary to closely follow technological developments and develop new weapons (Gray 1998). It led governments to develop new military and operation strategies, change structure and organization, train and equip soldiers with new equipment in accordance with cyber threats (Calkivik 2018:292). States have added smart weapons, high-tech intelligence systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to military inventories (Calkivik 2018:292). In order to increase military capabilities, computer and satellite technologies, artificial intelligence, invisibility technologies that cannot be detected by radar, anti-missile missiles, electronic surveillance, and advanced communication networks have begun to be used by the armed forces (Heywood 2022:353).

Even though certain countries have the ability to effectively utilize advanced technology, others struggle with creating technological innovations, integrating them into their systems, and training their military. Fortunately, the private military market steps in to address these gaps

left by the government. By outsourcing to private military companies, governments can meet the professional needs of their military personnel, enhance their technological capabilities, and combat cyberattacks using advanced weapons. These companies also offer comprehensive cyber training to help states defend against cyber threats.

2.3.6 Cost-effective Strategy

The literature commonly highlights the economic cost factor related to the reasons for privatizing warfare. The primary assumption of those advocates that outsourcing military activities is more cost-effective is that standing armies have permanent expenses. Governments pay the national armies a salary whether they participate in the conflict. Outsourced personnel are hired on a case-by-case basis. When the job is done, the work of the contractor ends. Governments pay contractors only when they are on duty (Camm 2012:234). In addition to salaries, training military personnel is very laborious and expensive. The security environment is changing day by day. It reveals the need for qualified personnel. Private military companies supply personnel suitable for the nature of the job. According to those who argue that it is profitable to hire private military contractors, governments do not have to make high-cost investments in their personnel. They can meet their needs for qualified personnel from the market. Besides salaries and higher training costs, pensions, social benefits provided to soldiers and their families, or compensation given to the family of a soldier when they were injured or martyred is another expense item for national soldiers. On the other hand, except when working, governments do not provide social benefits to contracted personnel or their families. Proponents of cost-effectiveness argue that all these give a natural advantage to privatizing warfare. In this way, governments save money in these areas.

On the other hand, some are skeptical about the economic benefit of outsourcing rather than the government providing the service. Isenberg suspects that cost-effective deals can be made in the current situation. According to him, efficiency can be achieved in the case of perfect competition in the market, but a few companies dominate the current market. In this case, the price is determined by the companies, not the market (Isenberg 2009a). It may cause states to purchase a service that is much more expensive than it is. Stranger evaluates the economic benefit of privatization based on the type of outsourced service. According to her, outsourced logistics activities in warfare provide profit to the government. However, there is no cost-reducing effect of outsourced direct combating activities (Stanger 2009:95). Since the private military market is usually made up of retired soldiers or soldiers who left the military for better conditions, it cannot be argued that governments will save money from education costs and

pension payments by outsourcing (Stanger 2009:96). In the case of resigning personnel from the army, these soldiers have already received state training (DCAF 2006). They sell the service they acquired in the national army to the state. In the case of pension, drawing on the USA example, American PMCs are already recruiting American citizens. When these people retire, their pensions will be paid by the USA government. For the government to profit from pensions, PMCs must employ foreign nationals. This is not implemented adequately as it may be against the national interests (Stanger 2009:96).

2.3.7 Constraints on the Use of Power

The seventh factor behinds the privatization of warfare is that it allows states to participate in conflicts indirectly and maintain plausible deniability (Kinsey 2006:96). Domestic and international regulations restrict monopoly of states on the use of force. Domestic constraints may arise from procedure or public opinion. First, a legal process is necessary for states to use power or engage in a conflict. Because of the procedural approvals required for military interventions, governments must persuade parliaments and citizens. Although this permit process differs from state to state, it can take longer. This complicates the job of the governments and can delay military interventions. It is vital to respond quickly to threats in today's international system. At that point, the privatization of warfare upsets the balance between executive and legislative bodies in favour of the executive (Avant 2013:245).

Second, the attitude of society towards war has created internal restrictions in the initiation of wars, and most importantly, in the conduct of wars (Heywood 2022:364). Modern technology has brought warfare closer to people's direct experience, leading to greater sensitivity toward military casualties and a prevailing anti-war sentiment in society (Kinsey 2006:96; Strachan 2011:516; Vennesson 2011:246). Due to the anxiety of being elected in the next term, deputies cannot ignore society's opinion. If they get permission to intervene, parliamentary control on military interventions is stringent. In case states are directly involved in conflicts, the number of casualties can cause social reactions that turn into political unsustainability. Political unrest pushes governments to look for alternatives (Kinsey 2006:96). Privatization allows governments to intervene in conflicts where legal authorization or public support is lacking (Singer 2004:10). Governments see privatization as a way to reduce casualties in conflicts. Private companies can replace soldiers or provide support, resulting in fewer deaths and less media attention. It also allows governments to avoid taking responsibility for failed operations and to protect unsupported interests. However, it harms the transparency and accountability of the executive (Singer 2004:10).

States are subject to restrictions on the utilization of force in the international system. International law, although imperfect, provides a framework to assess states' actions. The UN binds the use of force to certain conditions. In addition to the UN Charter, customary laws have been developed that restrict particular weapons or methods of warfare, setting legal precedents against certain forms of aggression and violence. The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, and crimes of aggression. State leaders such as Muammar Gaddafi and Laurent Gbagbo have been charged by the court for their actions. On the other hand, nuclear weapons prevent states from engaging in conflicts due to fear of total extinction in a possible nuclear war (Gray 1998:23; Strachan 2011:516). In these circumstances, governments do not always engage in direct warfare but instead opt for indirect methods of confrontation such as low-intensity conflicts through proxies, political struggles, or economic competition with rival states (Gray 1998:23). The private military market offers an avenue for states to intervene in conflicts by using proxy armies similar to how mercenaries were utilized during the Cold War era in Africa. This approach enables states to advance their foreign policy interests even when they cannot or choose not to send their own armies due to political or strategic considerations within a simplified international legal framework (Kinsey 2006:42; Serewicz 2002:84).

2.3.8 Changes in Security Market

The developments in supply affected the international security market in favour of privatization. The changes in demand offered essential opportunities to the supply side for privatizing warfare and security. With the demilitarization policy, experienced soldiers suddenly found themselves unemployed and looked for new jobs. This has caused a labor surplus in the free market and resulted in lower labor costs (Krahmann 2010:9). Globalization and developments in military technologies caused an abundance of weapons in the market. Weapons have become the readily available international market. It resulted in lower material costs. On the other hand, the cost of establishing a private military company is also low. It does not require an expensive investment (Kinsey 2006:15). The demand for governments to receive more and more services to the private sector day by day increases in favour of the markets.

2.4 How are Warfare Privatized?

There has been a trend towards privatizing various services in warfare, ranging from training armies to providing logistics support, security services, and intelligence gathering. The

following section explores the privatized services in warfare under three categories: Operational Support; Security Services; Consultancy, and Training Services.

2.4.1 Privatization of Operational Support Services

Operational support services refer to the range of tasks that are associated with the execution of military operations on the ground. Such tasks may be classified as either combat or non-combat in nature, with the differentiation being made for practical purposes. While the tasks involved in operational support services may vary, they all share the common goal of supporting the military forces in their mission to maintain security and achieve their objectives. Combat jobs involve tasks that directly counter threats, such as counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, or counter-cyber operations. This category also includes roles such as infantry, artillery, and special forces. Governments tend to customize tasks that require special skills and experience which can have a power-enhancing effect on the success of these missions. Non-combat roles encompass a wide range of activities, including logistical support, construction, interpreting, laundry, food, cleaning, and healthcare. These non-combatant roles are also crucial to the success of military operations and enable armies to fight effectively. Governments often opt to privatize these non-combatant services. This practice allows soldiers to concentrate on their core competencies, which are military duties (Isenberg 2009a; Singer 2008:97). By privatizing mundane but necessary tasks to private companies, governments can ensure that their armed forces are more effective and efficient in carrying out their responsibilities.

2.4.2 Privatization of Security Services

Security services are the most privatized services during war times. These services extend beyond military activities and encompass both public and private domains. The private market has an increasingly important role in protecting government officials, citizens, military installations, diplomatic facilities, personnel, buildings, trade routes, and crucial underground assets. In addition to governments, international actors and multinational companies operating in conflict areas also resort to the private military market for security services. The motivations of governments vary depending on their involvement in a warfare. Those on a side of the war tend to privatize the security of the head of state, state assets, military bases, strategic roads, and energy resources. Governments are indirect part of the war, support any side of it, purchase security services on behalf of the side it helps. Governments that are not directly involved in

the war, on the other hand, tend to privatize the security of diplomatic buildings and personnel. They demand services to ensure their citizens can leave the country safely. For instance, China once applied to private military companies to safely remove its citizens from the country during the Libyan civil war. The UN and Humanitarian Organizations and MNCs, operate in challenging security environments, applies to the private military market to ensure the security of its personnel, assets. MNCs are typically driven by economic incentives, seeking to outsource security for raw material sources, trade routes, investments, personnel, and company assets (Singer 2008:80–83).

2.4.3 Privatization of Consultancy and Training Services

Private actors in the international security market provide consultancy and training services for governments. Direct participation of the private sector in conflicts highly criticizes. The private security sector mostly plays a role in delivering behind-the-scenes military strategy and training services. The disintegration of Soviets, technological innovations in military field, and the complex security environment increase the demand for consultancy and training services. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Eastern Bloc governments hired private contractors to train their soldiers for integration into the West. The training programs were tailored to meet each country's specific needs and aimed at fostering harmonious relations with Western counterparts by equipping soldiers with essential tools and knowledge. Governments with weak military capability purchase the services to develop the military. There have been significant developments in military technology. States follow the actions and add new weapons to their inventories. At the point of using advanced weapons, governments outsource training services. The complex security environment led governments to seek consultancy services from the market. Private firms provide professional services for the determination of military strategies (Avant 2005:93; Singer 2008:62).

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

International security is a dynamic system; its subject, scope, and actors are changing. The privatization phenomenon of military and security services on the battlefields has increased. The UN Human Rights Council defines military services as “*specialized services related to military actions, including strategic planning, intelligence, investigation, land, sea or air reconnaissance, flight operations of any type, manned or unmanned, satellite surveillance, any kind of knowledge transfer with military applications, material and technical support to armed forces and other related activities.*” (A/HRC/27/50: 3). On the other hand, security services refer to “*armed guarding or protection of buildings, installations, property, and people, knowledge transfer with security and policing applications, development and implementation of information security measures, and other related activities*” (A/HRC/27/50: 3). Although national armies are still the mainstay of military and security activities in warfare, PMCs are increasingly playing a role in the realization of these services. This chapter explores the role of PMCs in warfare, clarifies terminological differences, distinguishes PMCs from mercenaries, and discusses national and international regulations. It analyses the activities of PMCs and their relationship with governments, the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations, and multinational companies. It concludes with addressing the criticisms and controversies associated with PMCs. The chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of PMCs and their role in warfare, promoting a deeper understanding of the complexities and challenges associated with them.

3.1 Terminology

There is no consensus for terminology to describe corporate actors in the international military market that provide military and security services for governments. Different terminologies are used for the service providers: Private Military Companies (PMCs), Private Security Companies (PSCs), Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Private Military Firms (PMFs), Private Forces (PF), and so on. The uncertainty in terminology is seen in academic studies in this field. Sarah Percy (2009) uses Private Force; Deborah Avant has used both PSC (2005) and PMSC (2011) in his works; Peter W. Singer (2008) prefers PMF for the company and corporate warriors for employees of the company. Isenberg (2008) prefers

PMCs as a general term. Elke Krahman (2013) prefers PMC for all security and support firms working for states or participating in international military operations. She uses the term contractor to describe employees of the company.

Terminological differences are also observed in government documents. Governments mainly distinguish between private military and security terms because of the negative connotations. While the private security term is associated with providing defense services, the private military term is associated with offensive services. For instance, the USA Department of Defence (DoD) uses the term “security company” (SC) in the documents. Companies mostly prefer the term security company for the same reasons as states. Lockheed Martin describes itself as a global security and aerospace company (Lockheed Martin n.d.); USA-based G4S describes itself as a security and facility services company (G4S n.d.-a); Russian-based RSB Group defines itself as a private military consulting company (RSB Group n.d.). Oleg Krinitsyn, chief executive officer of the RSB Group, prefers the term private security company (RSB Group n.d.).

Regardless of how the companies describe themselves, the Montreux Document uses the term PMSC to refer to any company that provides activities, including armed protection and protection of persons and property, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, prisoner detention, and counseling or training to local forces and security personnel. The UN Human Rights Committee also uses the term PMSCs. The working group defines them as “*a corporate entity which provides on a compensatory basis military and/or security services by physical persons and/or legal entities*” (A/HRC/27/50). The thesis uses the term “PMC” to refer to corporate entities performing security and military-related services during warfare and “contractors” to describe their employees.

Academia	Sarah Percy	PF
	Deborah Avant	PSC and PMSC
	Peter W. Singer	PMF
	Isenberg	PMC
	Elke Krahman	PMC
Documents	the Montreux Document	PMSC
	The UN Human Rights Committee	PMSCs
	DoD	SC
Companies	Lockheed Martin	Global Security and Aerospace Company
	G4S	Security and Facility Services Company
	RSB group	Private Military Consulting Company

Table 2. Terminological Differences

3.2 Two Different Security Actors: PMCs and Mercenaries

PMCs are legal entities that provide a wide range of services such as logistical support, training, and gathering intelligence in international security market. PMCs can be confused with mercenaries, and the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Both PMCs and mercenaries are profit-motivated military service providers and not the primary parties in the conflict. Their personnel have military origins and in some cases have participated directly in combat (Shearer 1998:68). Although the difference between mercenaries and PMCs always is not so clear-cut in some cases, these two are different actors.

Protocol I, Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, provides a comprehensive definition of mercenary. Article 47 sets out criteria for defining mercenaries:

“1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war; 2. A mercenary is any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party; (d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.”(ICRC).

A person must meet all the above criteria to be defined as a mercenary. It narrows the scope of the mercenary concept. Special rapporteur on the use of mercenaries Enrique Bernales Ballesteros has stated that although the personnel working in private military companies take part in exchange for money, they are not legally classified as mercenaries (Shearer 1998:69).

The main difference between PMCs and mercenaries is that PMCs are corporate structures (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2013:796; Kinsey 2006:14; Shearer 1998:69; Singer 2008:40). Mercenaries are ad hoc groups in that a few individuals participate in military conflict with the loosely-connected small units (Krahmann 2010:6; Singer 2008:42). When the goal is achieved, these units demobilize. There is a limited hierarchy within the unit. There is no sense of unity. In contrast, PMCs are highly organized. They have corporate bodies and administrative structures.(Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2013:796; Kinsey 2006:14; Shearer 1998:69; Singer 2008:40). Mercenaries are typically ad hoc groups consisting of a few individuals who participate in military conflicts with loosely-connected small units. Once their goal is achieved, these units demobilize. There is a limited hierarchy within the unit and no sense of unity (Krahmann 2010:6; Singer 2008:42). In contrast, PMCs are highly organized, with corporate bodies and administrative structures. They have corporate bodies and administrative structures (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2013:798; Kinsey 2006:14; Krahmann 2010:7; Singer 2008:42). As business entities, PMCs can be acquired by other companies or merged with other companies. For instance, the British company DSL was founded by General Sir David Ramsbotham in 1981. In 1997 it was purchased by Armor Holdings than it became ArmorGroup. In 2008, ArmorGroup was acquired by G4S and finally in 2021, Allied Universal completed acquisition of G4S (G4S n.d.-b). G4S is serves as a subsidiary of Allied Universal. L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (L3Harris) purchased Military Professional Resources Inc (MPRI) in 2000 (Lanning 2005:204). In 2020 the American company DynCorp was acquired by Amentum (Gould 2020).

Almost all PMCs have web pages publicizing their services, corporate strategy, mission, vision, long-term and short-term goals. The companies openly publicize their job postings on their web pages (Singer 2008:46). For instance, Winnell Arabia published its job advertisement titled *“Respect for diversity and an inclusive culture are the core of our success”* and *“Join our team of professionals”* (Vinnell Arabia n.d.-b). The company categorizes recruitment applications as either Aviation or Non-Aviation Applicants. Upon selecting an option, applicants are prompted to provide their classification, directorate, requisition, and location information.

Mercenaries and PMCs deliver services for money, but the noteworthy difference is that while mercenaries are motivated personal profits, PMCs are after corporate profits (Palka 2020:4). PMCs are traded on the stock exchange and they are accountable to their shareholders (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2013:798; Kinsey 2006:14; Krahmann 2010:7; Singer 2008:42). Some of the companies are subsidiaries of Fortune 500 companies (Wayne 2002). According to the information obtained from their web pages, the annual revenues of some companies are as follows: SAIC has annual revenues of approximately \$7.4 billion (SAIC n.d.); California Analysis Center Incorporated (CACI) is a \$6.2 billion company (CACI n.d.-b); L3Harris has \$17 billion annual revenue (L3Harris n.d.); G4S has \$20 billion annual revenues (G4S n.d.-a).

Statistics about the market values of companies are quite limited. Although some degree of transparency is ensured, confidentiality is essential due to the nature of military activities (Kinsey 2006:2). In 2006, private military sector was estimated to generated revenue of approximately 100 billion US dollars (Kinsey 2006:2). By 2021, they generated a value of USD 241.7 billion. It is expected to grow by approximately 7.2% by 2028 to reach a value of USD 366.8 Billion (Vantage Market Research n.d.).

With the effect of globalization and institutionalization, companies provide services on a much larger scale and with a larger number of employees than mercenaries. PMCs carry out operations on every continent, from Asia to Europe, from Africa to America. They're everywhere except Antarctica, as Kinsey puts it (Kinsey 2006:2). While it estimated that PMCs operates in 50 states in 2006 (Kinsey 2006:2), today just G4S operates in over 90 countries (G4S n.d.-c); and L3Harris in 100 countries (L3Harris n.d.).

The companies are mostly founded by retired, high-ranking soldiers (Wayne 2002). The companies employ people with various abilities from many parts of the world. They have a wide range employee portfolio. Employees are people with military experiences, mostly ex-soldiers and veteran soldiers. The number of personnel of large-scale private military companies can exceed tens of thousands. According to the information obtained from the web pages of some companies, Approximately the personnel numbers are as follows: SAIC 26,000 (SAIC n.d.); CACI 22,000 (CACI n.d.-a); L3Harris 46,000 (L3Harris n.d.); G4S, one of the biggest on the market, 800,000 employees (G4S n.d.-a).

Another significant difference between mercenaries and PMCs is related to their legal status. Mercenary activities are forbidden with the 1989 United Nations Mercenary Convention. The Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries was enacted in 2001. However, despite these efforts, mercenary activity still exists and is typically

conducted in the black market (Kinsey 2006:95). On the other hand, the legal status of PMCs needs further clarification, but their activities are not currently prohibited.

	Mercenaries	PMCs
Structures	Ad hoc groups Loosely-connected small units Goal-based Limited hierarchy No sense of unity	Highly organized Corporate structure Business entities Long-term and short-term goals
Personnel	Military origins	Military origins
Motivations	Personal profit Personal Agenda	Corporate Profit Contractual Obligations Mission Accomplishment
Participation	Third parties to the warfare	Third parties to the warfare
Legal Situation	Illegal	International Regulations: Non-Binding
		Self-Initiatives: Non-Binding
		National Regulations: Different Attitudes

Table 3. Differences Between Mercenaries and PMCs

3.3 Regulations on PMCs

3.3.1 International Regulations on Private Military Companies

3.3.1.1 Montreux Document

The Montreux Document is the only international document that directly pertains to PMCs. The Document was signed on 17 September 2008 as a result of a joint initiative by the Swiss Government and the ICRC. It is a document created with the contributions of country representatives, academic experts, NGOs, civil society, and private military sector representatives. In the beginning, seventeen governments signed the document, including Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Ukraine, and the United States of America. Since Romania joined in September 2023, there are now 59 countries and three international organizations, namely, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, that are party to the document (Montreuxdocument.org).

The document does not create legal obligations for signatory states. It does not take a stance on the legitimacy of the PMCs. Whether the existence and activities of PMCs are legitimate or not, the document recalls the existing obligations of states under international law, particularly International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights law, regarding the activities of PMCs in armed conflict. It has a neutral attitude and does not encourage using or banning PMCs. The signatory states take a political stand that the utilizing PMCs must comply with existing obligations. The document prefers PMSC term, regardless of how companies providing military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings, and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel define themselves (Montreux, 2008: 9).

The document consists of two parts: (i) Pertinent International Legal Obligations relating to Private Military and Security Companies; and (ii) Good Practices relating to Private Military and Security Companies. The first part puts forth the existing international legal obligations of states drawn from international humanitarian law and human rights legislation and customary international law regarding PMCs. Pertinent International Legal Obligations are discussed under six headings according to the actors: (a) Contracting states, (b) Territorial states, (c) Home states, (d) All other states, (e) PMSCs and their personnel, (f) Superior responsibility.

All states have the same responsibility for general provisions: Protect human rights, monitor PMCs' activities and take measurements to prevent PMCs from misconduct activities, and ensure criminal accountability. The document underlines that governments cannot outsource services in tasks that international humanitarian law ascribes only to states. Since the contracting states contract directly with the PMCs, they can set conditions, they have a relatively strong position in ensuring that PMCs act in accordance with humanitarian law. In proportion to the position, the obligations are also higher. The contracting state is responsible for the human rights violations of the PMCs and contractors in cases that the PMCs act on the instructions of the state, are included in regular armed forces in accordance with the domestic legislation, are directly under the state hierarchy, and has the authority to use the government authority (Paragraph 7). The contracted states are responsible for compensating the sources of damage from the violation of rights (Paragraph 8). Although it mostly consists of monetary compensation, there are also types of compensation, such as apologies and restitution.

Although IHL and human rights law impose obligations on states, the document also encourages PMCs, contractors, and superiors to comply with international humanitarian law and human rights law during armed conflict. It recommends that PMCs obligate to carry out their activities in a way that does not violate international law and comply with the national laws of the states they are registered (Paragraphs 22-23). Regardless of their status, contractors must comply with humanitarian law (Paragraph 26). Superiors of PMCs can be government officials or directors/managers of the companies. They are responsible for crimes committed when they fail to manage their PMCs and personnel in accordance with international law (Paragraph 27).

The second part provides states with good practices for promoting compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law related to PMCs during armed conflict. It encourages states to regulate their relationship with PMCs. States have no obligation to adopt practices. They may adopt all good practices, choose among them, or may not adopt any of them. The practices are divided into three parts: Contracting states, territorial states, and home countries. Good practices for contracting states include the determination of services, the procedure for the selection and contracting of PMCs, criteria for the selection of PMCs, terms of the contract with PMCs, monitoring compliance, and ensuring accountability. Good practices for territorial states include the determination of services, authorization to provide military and security services, procedure with regard to authorizations, criteria for granting authorization, terms of authorization, rules on the provision of services by PMCs and their personnel, monitoring compliance, and ensuring accountability. Good practices for the home states include the determination of services, the establishment of an authorization system, procedure with regard to authorizations, criteria for granting authorization, terms of authorization granted to PMCs, monitoring compliance, and ensuring accountability.

A forum with the same name, Montreux Document Forum, was established to improve the governance of the PMC industry. The Forum aims to increase the dialogue between the participants, support the efforts of the states to the regulation of PMCs, and increase the number of member states in the treaty. Under the co-chairmanship of Switzerland and the ICRC, the participants hold annual meetings (Montreux Document Forum).

3.3.1.2 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)

The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers was formed by the self-initiatives of companies in 2010 and on December 2021 is amended. It is an initiative that aims to monitor the activities of PMCs. The document consists of eight titles, including a

preamble, definitions, implementation, general provisions, general commitments, specific principles regarding the conduct of personnel, specific commitments regarding management and governance, and review.

It prefers the term PSC includes private security companies and other private security service providers regardless of how the company defines itself. It addresses all companies conducting security services on their behalf or behalf of someone else. In the first version of the Code, security services are defined as *“guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their duties”* (ICoC 2010:5). On the other hand, with 2021 changes the definition of security services was expanded and it has been stated that it is not limited to these:

“guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed or unarmed); guarding and transporting prisoners, operating prison facilities and assisting in operating camps for prisoners of war or civilian detainees; the checking, detention, or searching of persons, searching of premises or containers, and seizure of objects; counter-piracy services, armed or unarmed maritime escorts or onboard vessel protection; operational and logistical support for armed or security forces, including training and advice, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities; crowd management; operating and maintaining weapons systems; guard dog services; the recruiting and training of security personnel, directly or as an intermediary, for a company that offers private security services; and any other protective activity for which the personnel of companies are required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their duties” (ICoC 2021: 5)

The Code sets out the principles that member and affiliate companies must comply with during their activities in conflicts in light of existing regulations. The companies give the undertaking to operate in accordance with the Code, IHL, human rights, applicable national or international law, or applicable local or regional law (Paragraph 20). They agree not to enter into contracts that would circumvent the UN Security Council sanctions (Paragraph 22). The initiative to make arrangements in accordance with the regulation belongs to the companies. All signatories approve the principles of the Montreux Document and also undertake to (a) carry out activities in accordance with the Code; (b) carry out activities in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and relevant corporate ethics standards; (c) support the rule of law, not violate human rights and IHL and provide their services responsibly to protect the interests of their clients; (d) establish a framework to deter, monitor and evaluate activities to

prevent human rights violations; (e) respond to and help resolve allegations of activity that violates any applicable national or international law or the Code; (f) cooperate in good faith with national and international authorities (ICoC 2021).

Companies undertake that they observe the principles of the code in their contracts with their personnel and subcontractors (paragraph 18). They are responsible for ensuring that their employees, subcontractors, and all other partners operate in accordance with the principles in the code (Paragraph 16). Within 18 months of approval of the rule, companies agree to work with states, companies, and affiliate companies to establish objective and measurable standards based on the code, establish external independent mechanisms for effective management and control and evaluate the development of additional principles and standards.

The section titled “Special Principles Regarding the Behavior of Staff” put forth detailed principles regarding human rights. These principles include:

- Following appropriate standards during the detention and detention of persons under IHL
- Prohibiting torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
- Prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse or gender-based violence
- Prohibiting human trafficking, slavery, forced labor, inhuman or degrading treatment
- Prohibiting sexual abuse and gender-based violence
- Prohibiting human trafficking
- Prohibiting slavery and forced labor, child labor, and discrimination
- Prohibiting the worst forms of child labor and discrimination

The Code underlines specific commitments regarding management and governance, including the selection and vetting of personnel and subcontractors, company policies and personnel contracts, personnel training, management of weapons, weapons training, management of materials of war, incident reporting, provision of a safe and healthy working environment, preventing of harassment, establishment of grievance procedures, and meeting liabilities.

The initial version of the document envisages a Steering Committee of 6-9 people to implement the Code. In 2013, The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA) replaced the ad hoc committee. With the 2021 amendments, the Code mentions the association as the governance and oversight mechanism. The association includes not only companies but also governments and non-governmental organizations (ICoC 2021: 6). ICoCA comprises the general assembly, the board of directors, the secretariat, and the advisory group. All members are natural members of the general assembly. 12 elected members,

four representatives from each group, consists of the board of directors. It is an executive decision-making body. Members have the right to equal representation on the board. The secretariat is an administrative and technical unit responsible for the operation of the association. The leading names of the field who carry out academic studies in the private military sector are on the academic board.

The mission of the association is to ensure that standards and practices that respect human rights are formed in the sector and that these are spread to the world (ICoCA). It provides capacity building, certification, monitoring services, handling complaints, and advisory services (ICOCA). Within the scope of capacity building, the association aims to increase the capacity of the companies to realize the principles in the Code. It guides companies, provides training to company personnel, reviews annual self-assessments of companies and prepares oriented feedback. The association creates a communication platform between member companies and provides them with a network. In this way, companies can share their experiences and methods with each other.

ICoCA investigates whether companies fulfill their obligations arising from the code and certifies that companies adhere to the principles in the code. It gives the title of the “certified” as a separate title under the title of a “member” to companies that meet the requirements of PSC.1 (U.S. standard for companies providing security services on land), ISO 18788 (International standard for companies providing security services on land), and ISO 28007 (International standard for companies providing maritime security services). There are 116 PMCs members of the association, 53 of which are certified companies (ICACA). Australia, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA are member states. there are 50 civil society organizations as a member (ICACA).

The voluntary commitment of companies to comply with human rights rules is a positive development considering the gap in international law (White 2012:16). White describes it as well-prepared with detailed human rights principles, although no code-binding provisions are presented (2012:15). He also criticizes the principles of the document on the use of force. The Code says that if force is used, it must be proportionate and not exceed the requirement and exceptions to the contractors’ prohibition on using firearms in cases where personnel protect themselves or others from death or serious injury or to prevent a serious crime involving serious life-threatening. White finds it questionable to instill the idea that a text that does not have binding provisions makes an exception to the situation regarding the use of force (White 2012:15).

3.3.2 National Regulations on Private Military Companies

The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of people to self-determination was established in 2005 by the Commission on Human Rights. The Working Group submits annual thematic reports on the human rights impact of mercenaries, mercenary-related activities, and private military and security companies. The Working Group conducted global studies on national legislation regarding PMSCs worldwide (A/HRC/24/45; A/68/339; A/HRC/27/50; A/HRC/30/34; and A/HRC/33/43). The reports determine differences among countries' regulations, standard points, good practices, and regulatory gaps. Based on these reports, states have different attitudes toward companies. States mostly prefer PSC terms in regulations. Most regulations include companies that provide private security services within the borders of the country and do not cover activities abroad. Few states have regulations regarding companies' activities in armed conflict.

There is no consensus among states regulating PMCs. Each state's regulatory approach to PMCs and its scope in international regulation differs. Some states adopt permitting regimes, while others adopt licensing regimes. Some unregulated states encourage companies in the industry to make their own standards. Among the countries that have regulations, South Africa stands out due to its detailed regulations. The reason behind this is the high rate of participation of South African soldiers in PMCs for high salaries and the expansion of South African PMCs' activities in the African continent. This has pushed the government to make regulations (Kinsey 2006:138). The South African government regulated foreign military assistance in armed conflicts with Foreign Military Assistance Act passed in 1998. Directly armed participation in conflicts for profit is prohibited. Providing military assistance is subject to the permission of the Ministry of Defense in consultation with the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. The government defined foreign military assistance as military services or military-related services or any attempt, encouragement, incitement, or solicitation to render such services. It includes (a) military assistance as (i) advice or training (ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence, or operational support (iii) personnel recruitment (iv) medical or para-medical services or (v) procurement of equipment. (b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their property (c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of a state (d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of a party to the armed conflict (Foreign Military Assistance Act, 1998).

According to Kinsey, the Act is problematic for several reasons. First, it defines foreign military assistance very broadly. Second, the required permit process may delay humanitarian aid. Third, the Act makes the South African government legally responsible for all the activities of South African PMCs (Kinsey 2006:138–39).

The Swedish government has adopted a prohibition regime with mandatory registration rather than a permit system, as the South African government has done. The Swedish government has adopted a compulsory registration prohibition regime Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad (PSSA), in effect in Switzerland since 2015, prohibits companies from directly participating in conflicts and serious human rights violations. Article four defines security and security relating services very broadly (Peter and Glarner 2016). The services include protecting persons, goods, and properties; the monitoring, detention, or searching of persons, searching of premises or containers, and confiscation of objects; the guarding, care, and transport of prisoners; operation of prison facilities; and assistance in the operation of camps for prisoners of war or civilian detainees. As long as companies are not part of direct participation in hostilities, they may provide operational or logistical support to war or security forces; operation and maintenance of weapons systems; consultancy or training to members of the war or security forces; intelligence activities, espionage, and counter-espionage services. Swiss-based PMCs are obliged to notify the federal government, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of their activities abroad in advance. The law makes many references to human rights violations. Companies must comply with the ICoC and also accept the ICoCA statutes. Companies submit annual reports on their activities to the Federal Council (PSSA 2015).

The UK, on the other hand, has not enacted any laws to regulate the activities of the PMCs support companies to create their own standards (A/HRC/30/34). The activities provided by UK-based companies in the international arena brought concerns about the regulation of PMCs (White 2015:1). The Green Paper was created at the request of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons. The Paper is a consultative document that has covered PMCs extensively for public discussion (Green Paper 2002: 44). It addressed the defining problem, the activities of the companies, the concerns about companies, and regulations in other countries. The paper presents six regulatory options for the British government could consider in order to regulate the activities of PMCs operating from the UK and its dependencies. These options include: 1. Prohibition of military activities overseas; 2. Prohibition of recruitment for military activities overseas; 3. Implementation of a licensing regime for military services; 4. Regulation and notification of PMC activities to the government; 5. Issuance of a general

license for PMCs and PSCs; and 6. Encouragement of self-regulation through the establishment of a voluntary code of conduct (Green Paper 2002:22-26). The paper presents arguments for and difficulties in the implementation of each option.

The paper highlights the need for regulating PMCs as follows: to control non-state violence, prevent the activities of companies from conflicting with the interests of the British government, prevent British companies from damaging the reputation of the country, and ensure the safety of British citizens working in these companies (Green Paper 2002: 20-21). According to Lilly, the Green paper provides a multidimensional regulatory approach to PMC discussion and regulatory options (Lilly 2012:10). Kinsey argues that while a comprehensive approach makes sense, too much caution could be counterproductive. If the UK delays regulating, it will be the target of international pressure to regulate (Kinsey 2006:150).

REGULATIONS			
	International Regulations	Self-Initiatives	National Regulations
Binding			States with Regulations: Permitting, Licensing, Encouraging
Non-Binding	X	X	States with no regulations

Table 4. Regulations Regarding PMCs

3.4 Activities of PMCs in Warfare

PMCs offer a broad portfolio of services in conflict areas. Security services, strategic planning, risk analysis, crime prevention, intelligence gathering, army training, logistical support, demining, combating, etc. Security service is the most common activity that many companies in the industry provide. It includes ensuring the safety of people, protecting precious metals, energy resources, and pipelines, ensuring border security, protecting facilities, protecting critical land and sea routes, ensuring convoy security, and more. In this context, PMCs provide security advice, threat assessment, threat mitigation, elimination of threats, and armed and non-armed secure support services. IDG Security mostly provides security services to international organizations and non-governmental organizations. NavSec Group, registered in New Zealand, specializes in Naval security (NavSec 2013).

The security environment is a highly dynamic environment. Warfare are constantly changing and transforming. The changes and transformations required the armies to adapt new strategies. PMCs provide professional military expertise for the training of armies and police

forces. Military training aims to strengthen the capability of military and police forces. PMCs provide a wide range of training services ranging from martial arts, marksmanship, advanced urban combat tactics, explosives handling, advanced driving skills, and skydiving to sophisticated flight simulations (Cullen 2008:239–41). PMCs have been involved in large-scale training activities since 1990. In the 1990s, companies provided military training services in more than forty-two countries (Avant 2005:9). In the 2000s, companies made a significant effort, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) purchased military training and assistance to train the Iraqi police force and the Iraqi army (Avant 2005:2). Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is one of the best-known companies that provide military training as well as battlefield tactics (Fulloon 2015:31). Saladin Security and Armorgroup are other well-known suppliers of military training and assistance services (Singer 2008:88).

Another service offered by PMCs is logistics services. It needs the capability to provide comprehensive logistics under challenging conditions. Ensuring personnel and their equipment are in the right place at the right time on the battlefield, armed escorts, and clearing the roads from explosives and mines are within the scope of this service. Brown & Root is the most well-known company that provides logistics services in conflict areas (Singer 2008:88).

PMCs participate in fewer combat operations compared to their other activities. Combat operations include all activities related to military actions, such as fighting, commanding troops, flying fighter jets and helicopters, gathering intelligence, reconnaissance, and observation (Singer 2008:98). The value of PMCs lies not in their quantity but in the quality of their services. They leverage their skills and battle experience to provide effective military support. Governments that are unable to deal with high threats usually rely on PMCs in emergency situations. For example, Executive Outcomes, Sandline, SCI, and NFD were used in Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia to combat serious threats. (Singer 2008:93). Additionally, powerful governments also prefer PMCs because they provide deniability in covert operations.

Intelligence is crucial in conducting successful military operations. It provides information about terrain and the enemy, including their intentions, forces, location, and equipment, which is essential for planning the strategy of the mission and determining tactical strategies (Lever 2012:236–38). Evaluating the acquired information regarding reliability, accuracy, and relevance is as crucial as gathering intelligence (Lever 2012:234). PMCs offer a wide range of activities related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). First, these companies provide human intelligence sources. They also use satellites, reconnaissance aircraft,

and UAV to gather intelligence. Many PMCs deliver advanced ISR technologies that provide critical data to operational commanders and guide ISR platforms and systems. Additionally, they analyze intelligence and open-source information to provide valuable insights. Finally, they conduct counterintelligence activities to ensure information protection and prevent UAV threats from capturing critical information.

Effective management of resources, appropriate decision-making, and adaptable strategies are crucial for successful warfare (Hopkinson 2012:259–62). PMCs offer consulting services, including strategic planning and risk assessment. MPRI, with its activities in the 1990s, has become one of the leading companies in this field. Last but not least, PMCs also provide mundane services in conflicts such as medical assistance, interpretation and interrogation services for prisoner, construction, food, laundry, housecleaning and dishwashing. These services are not core military activities but crucial for success of combatting and meet the needs of military personnel (Kinsey 2006:97; Singer 2008:94).

3.5 The Actors Contracted with PMCs in Warfare

Governments are the leading actors who primarily utilize PMCs in warfare on the other hand, actors operates in complex security environments just like the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational companies and even charities increasingly contracted with the PMCs (Avant 2005:3; Kinsey 2006:152–53). All actors have different motivations for purchasing services. PMCs provide many services that enable these actors to carry out their activities in conflict areas at low cost (Kinsey 2006:153).

3.5.1. Governments

The changing security environment has led governments to find solutions that will respond immediately to the challenges. Military downsizing, technological development, monetary efficiency, and political expediency have caused the privatization of warfare, and states are the most contracting actors with PMCs. The Montreux document examines states in four different categories: Territorial states, contracting states, home states, and other states (Montreux, 2008: 109).

Territorial states have states sovereignty over the territory in which the PMCs operate activities. Home states are the states where PMCs are registered, or the states where their headquarters are located. Often, there are close ties between some home states and PMCs. These companies mostly provide their services to the government. The bond between American

companies and the USA government is mostly in the form of close cooperation (Kinsey 2006:102). For instance, US based company CACI addresses job seekers on its website, *“Are you searching for a job where your work will have a direct impact on the national security of the United States?”* (CACI, n.d.). It is also stated on the web page that all positions require a DoD security clearance (Secret and higher) and valid DoDD 8140 certificates. Indirectly it acknowledges its close ties with the US government. Contracted states are the states that make contracts directly with PMCs. These states can be territorial or home states, or both at the same time. For instance, Blackwater, a USA-based PMC, has conducted activities on behalf of the USA in Iraq. The USA is both a contracted state and a home state in this case. Other states are the states that have not been categorized into these three categories but have signed the Montreux document.

PMCs provide professional manpower, rapid response to incidents, increasing the influence of the military, deniability, and cost advantages to governments. There are different national attitudes towards PMCs’ role in warfare. The strategies for using PMCs in warfare vary, including geopolitical strategy, proxy warfare strategy, counter-terrorism strategy, counter-drug strategy, humanitarian assistance strategy, and direct military intervention strategy.

3.5.1.1 Geopolitical Strategy

Geopolitical strategy refers to the long-term geopolitical interests of a country or region and the strategies implemented to achieve these interests. It is a key concept in international relations, which refers to the planning and implementation of long-term geopolitical interests of a country or region. Global power wants to increase their influence and secure their interests in different regions of the world through various means, including military, economic, and diplomatic strategies. Governments utilize PMCs to execute certain geostrategic objectives, which can range from increasing soft power to countering perceived threats to national security.

3.5.1.2 Proxy Warfare Strategy

Proxy warfare have been a common feature of international relations in the 20th and 21st centuries. These types of conflicts involve two or more external powers, often global or regional power, supporting direct or indirect one of the warring actors, state or non-state actor, in order to influence the outcome of the conflict in line with its strategic purposes (Hoffman and Orner 2021; Rondeaux and Sterman 2019). Within the scope of the proxy strategy, external powers provide combat or non-combat workforce, deliver military supplies such as weapons,

ammunition, and other military technologies, and supply financial support or non-military assistance, such as creating public opinion in favor of the belligerent (Mumford 2013:61–69). Governments resort to using one or a combination of these (Mumford 2013:69). In 21 century, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen are defined as multi-sided proxy battlefields (Rondeaux and Sterman 2019:3).

Governments have increasingly turned to PMCs to realize their interests in proxy warfare strategy (Mumford 2013:80–81). In this scope, PMCs deliver many services, such as combat, intelligence, military assistance, weapons procurement, and operational services. This strategy enables external powers to conduct covert military engagements without involving their own military forces directly. By contracting PMCs, governments can minimize the political and economic costs of conflict and can disclaim responsibility for any negative consequences. This approach allows governments to indirectly engage in conflicts to protect their interests.

3.5.1.3 Military Intervention Strategy

Military intervention refers to the involvement of armed forces or the use of military action by one or more countries in the affairs of another sovereign state. The reasons for military intervention can vary, but it is often done to exert influence or control over the target state's political, economic, or social affairs. In some cases, governments hire PMCs to conduct activities that national armies usually carry out during warfare. These companies act as force multipliers and can replace national armies. They can be under the authority of the national army or function as separate combat units.

3.5.1.4 Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Counter-terrorism strategy refers to a broad range of measures taken by governments to prevent, respond to, or combat acts of terrorism. These measures typically involve a combination of law enforcement, intelligence gathering and analysis, military action, diplomacy, international cooperation, public education, and awareness efforts to reduce the threat of terrorism. PMCs are often integrated into the counter-terrorism measures of governments. Private military contractors provide services such as security, training, logistical and operational support, intelligence and surveillance, critical infrastructure protection, crisis response and emergency services, as well as capacity building.

3.5.1.5 Counter-Narcotics Strategy

As in Latin America, the conflict between drug cartels and governments can escalate into an armed confrontation. It leads to a high level of violence and insecurity beyond the borders. To tackle this challenge, many governments implement strategies to combat narcotics effectively. These initiatives include steps such as increased law enforcement efforts to dismantle cartel operations, such as arrests and seizures of illicit drugs, disrupting their financing networks, improving intelligence sharing among regional security agencies, and social programs that aim to raise public awareness. At that point PMCs provide training, intelligence gathering, operational assistance, logistical support.

3.5.1.6 Humanitarian Assistance Strategy

Humanitarian assistance covers a broad spectrum of actions and interventions aimed at supporting, relieving, and protecting individuals and communities affected by conflict. This assistance includes providing essential needs such as food, water, and healthcare services, reconstructing infrastructure such as hospitals and schools damaged by armed conflict, and carrying out demining activities. Governments can provide humanitarian aid to conflict areas themselves, as well as participate in missions coordinated by international organizations such as the UN. Sending personnel to the UN peacekeeping force can be considered within the scope of this strategy. PMCs are increasingly being utilized by governments to support their humanitarian aid strategies. In this context, companies perform various tasks such as security, logistics, demining, training, infrastructure services, and so on.

Governments' Strategies and PMCs			
	Activities	Engagement	Purpose
Geopolitical Strategy	Capacity building, training, consulting, advisory, security, protection services, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, combat and security operations	direct/indirect	Developing military, economic, and diplomatic relations increasing soft power and national interests
Military Intervention Strategy	Participating in combat or security operations, independently or with military forces	direct/indirect	Achieving political, economic, or security goals
Proxy Warfare Strategy	Combating, intelligence, military assistance, weapons procurement, and operational services	indirect	Minimizing the political and economic costs of conflict and disclaiming responsibility for any negative consequences
Counter Terrorism Strategy	Security, training, logistical and operational support, intelligence and surveillance, critical infrastructure protection, crisis response and emergency services, capacity building	direct/indirect	Preventing, responding to, or combating acts of terrorism
Counter-Narcotics Strategy	Training, intelligence gathering, operational assistance, logistical support, security	direct/indirect	Dismantling drug cartels, law enforcement, disrupting financing networks, improving intelligence sharing, and raising public awareness
Humanitarian Assistance Strategy	Security, logistics, demining, training, infrastructure services	direct	Offering support in the aftermath of conflicts including medical assistance, evacuation, and logistical support.

Table 5. Governments' Strategies and PMCs

3.5.2 The United Nations

Insecurity environments, the complexity of peace operations, the need for qualified personnel, organizational inefficiencies, and the reluctance of states to join international efforts led to increased PMCs' engagement in UN missions. PMCs more frequently supply services such as security, logistics, training, demining, intelligence, strategic planning, and a range of

support services (Østensen 2013:36). Østensen (2013) divides the tasks that PMCs conduct in UN missions into two: services directly outsourced by the UN; services purchased by states participating in the UN missions. The UN outsources only security-related tasks to PMCs. On the other hand, states participating in peace operations can outsource a wide range of activities to the companies (Nebolsina 2020:64; Østensen 2013:36).

The most outsourced service that PMCs provides is ensuring security for UN personnel and assets of the organization, and planning security strategies. UN conducts humanitarian operations in a complex environment where violence is intense, the activities of non-state actors are widespread, and the civil-military distinction disappears. The UN personnel, convoys, and assets mostly become targets by combatants and armed groups in cases such as kidnapping, robbery, ambush, and murder (Lynch 2010). Host governments are responsible to ensure the security of UN personnel and properties (Lynch 2010). The countries where the UN force is located are economically, politically, and socially unstable. It is not always possible to expect a capable government to protect UN personnel and property. In cases where the government cannot provide security, the UN fulfills this responsibility. At that point, the UN contracted directly with PMCs for security-related activities.

Security services include risk assessment, site and personnel protection, armed convoy escorts, logistical support, transport security, and intelligence gathering. Within the scope of transportation security, clearance of the roads from mines and explosives is an outsourced job to PMCs. They fulfill demining activities in almost all UN operations (Nebolsina 2020:62–64). IDG is one of the leading companies that the UN has contracted with. The company provided a safe and secure environment for the conduct of UN missions in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar. According to the procurement department of the UN, between 2012 and 2017, the UN made 27 contracts with IDG security on security, unarmed security, and the Provision of security services for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for the Afghanistan mission (UNPD). These contracts are worth \$22.862.717 (UNPD). The company claims that it has been in Afghanistan since the 2000s and is the only international security company operating in the region even after the Taliban came to power (IDG Security n.d.).

The idea of utilizing PMCs directly in missions, apart from protecting mission personnel, gained momentum with the failures of peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Ruanda in the 90s. UN relies on governments for military capability and personnel. Governments appointed personnel for UN Peace missions after the decision was made to establish a peacekeeping mission. The decision for a mission, procurement personnel, coordination of them, and so on take considerable time. It is often more than six months from the date of the resolution to get

boots and equipment on the ground (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d.-a). In addition to this difficulty, the reluctance of states to send staff to conflicts prevents peace operations to be effective. The long procedures and the unwillingness of the international community to participate in the mission were two difficulties that caused the failure to prevent the massacre of large numbers of people in Rwanda in 1994. Contracting PMCs came to the fore in order to overcome difficulties faced. A feasibility study was conducted in the late 1990s to determine whether private military contractors could provide security in refugee camps set up in eastern Zaire following the Rwandan genocide (Lynch 2010). The idea that contracting PMCs in peacekeeping missions created political debate and it was abandoned. privatization of peace criticized and *“The U.N. General Assembly has passed a resolution urging the U.N. to take precautions that its hiring practices don’t alter the international character of the U.N. or endanger its staff”* (Lynch 2010). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan Kofi Annan expressed this situation with the words that *“But the world may not be ready to privatize peace”* (UN 1998).

States participating in UN missions can purchase services from PMCs. The most outsourced task is training activities. For instance, the USA under Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) utilized PMCs mostly. Private contractors conducted training activities in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and South Africa peace operations training centers. With the initiative, 75,000 peacekeepers were trained by 2010 (Serafino 2009).

There have been many academic studies on the involvement of PMCs in UN operations. While some argue that the use of PMCs in these operations increases the effectiveness of UN peace operations (Fitzsimons 2015; Singer 2008), some criticize the inclusion of PMCs in these operations. The most frequent criticism of the UN’s engagement with PMC is that their legal status is not clear, and a lack of accountability. The UN has hired companies notorious for *serious human rights abuses* and financial irregularities DynCorp, Armor Group, and Saracen Uganda. This has led to criticism. Former Deputy Secretary General Gregory B. Starr, who served between 2009 and 2013, argued that more PMC personnel should be deployed for the UN’s operation in Pakistan (Lynch 2010). Despite all these criticisms, the UN fills the gaps in peace operations capabilities with PMCs. The companies contribute increase international peacekeeping capacity. On the other hand, working with the UN makes a positive contribution to the formation of the legal status of PMCs.

3.5.3 International Non-Governmental Organizations

According to UNHCR's report, the number of civil wars nearly tripled in 2011, with a six-fold increase in war-related deaths compared to previous years. Conflicts peaked in 2016, with internal conflicts occurring in 53 countries (OHCHR 2020). The world is facing the significant humanitarian crisis since the end of the Second World War. More than 71 million people have been forcibly displaced by the violence. 20 million people in Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia and north-eastern Nigeria face starvation and famine as a direct result of internal conflicts (UN 2017). Civil Society groups from many parts of the world provide humanitarian aid activities in conflict areas. INGOs faces complex security challenges, providing humanitarian aid to conflict zones. They purchase private security services to overcome this difficulty. they purchase private security services, as did ABC News or the Research Triangle Institute, to meet challenges (Avant 2005:2). UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Food Program (WFP) are also benefit from the activities of PMCs. In Afghanistan, IDG Security maintains armed and non-armed guard forces and explosive detection dog teams for them (IDG Security n.d.).

3.5.4 Multinational Companies

With globalization, companies began to operate in many parts of the world. Companies registered or operating in more than one country are called Multinational Companies or transnational corporations (Britannica). Complex security environment complicate doing businesses, an event in one part of the world can disrupt their production. With the increase in civil wars and the spread of violence, MNCs need a professional service to ensure their security in order to carry out their activities.

In conflict areas, companies can be looted and attacked by the parties to the conflict in order to provide economic gain, even if they are not directly actors of the conflicts. Sectors that can bring significant returns, especially the energy sectors and the gemstone and mineral industry, are the sectors most affected by these conflicts. At this point, PMCs come to the fore. MNCs have increasingly resorted to PMCs to protect their economic assets and personnel in conflict zones.

G4S describes itself as a leading international company in the energy industry. It has a significant role in protecting Shell's energy and petrochemical facilities worldwide in more than 30 countries (G4S 2022). G4S provides security solutions by deploying highly trained security professionals to strategically cover areas that are at the highest risk for unauthorized

entry. The company also uses a system to monitor the guards, ensuring that patrolling is done efficiently and effectively.

DSL company provided security services for many MNCs such as British Petroleum (BP), Shell, Mobile, Bechtel, De Beers, Amoco, GOAL, Chevron, and CARE (Avant 2005:16). Additionally, DSL provided the protection service of Bechtel, an American engineering, procurement, construction and project management company involved in the work initiated for the reconstruction of Iraq after invasion (Avant 2005:16). Silver Shadow, a security company based in Israel, and DSL was contracted by BP to protect the Osenca pipeline in Colombia which carries oil in the 90s. The pipeline was frequently targeted by guerrilla attacks. To safeguard the oil fields and prevent attacks against Osenca, PMCs provided armored attack helicopters, anti-guerrilla special weaponry and ammunition, night-vision goggles, small robotic spy planes (drones), and secure communication equipment (Gillard, Gomez, and Jones 1998).

3.6 Discussions about PMCs

The primary concern with PMCs is their legal status. Montreux is the first attempt to regulate PMCs, followed by ICoC and ICoCA. Neither the Montreux document nor the ICoC contains binding provisions for states and PMCs. They guide states to fulfill their obligations under IHL and human rights. Companies do not even have any obligations arising from these documents. White describes both documents as soft law (White 2012:16). The lack of international regulation required the issue to be addressed at the national level for hard and binding regulations (Kinsey 2006:134). Until an international agreement is reached on PMCs, government regulation is critical. However, the current national regulations are insufficient to meet present requirements (Kinsey 2006:136). Regulation in a limited country is not enough to judge the transnational activities of PMCs. Singer emphasizes the necessity of making regulations regarding PMCs so that they do not harm the sovereignty of the state and the policies of governments, do not adversely affect peace, security, and conflict resolution, do not engage in acts contrary to human rights, determine the legal framework in which they can carry out their activities, and ensure transparency in their activities whenever possible (Singer 2008:135). Even if the government makes regulations independently, the transnational structure of companies requires supranational regulations or coherent national laws that overlap. The Working Group reports contribute to states making regulations by presenting good examples.

The Group's efforts are significant for establishing national and international binding decisions to regulate the activities of PMCs.

The absence of regulation also has a negative impact on companies and contractors, as they operate in intricate security environments that make it challenging to guarantee their own safety. It is stated that PMCs carry out their activities in the gray area, in the legal vacuum. The vacuum links the activities of PMCs with illegality. The industry wanted to change this perception and supported increased accountability. They helped and welcomed the Montreux Document and ICoC (Brooks and Streng 2012:314). PMCs also have their own initiatives for increasing legitimacy in different regions. For instance, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) was founded in April 2001 by twelve American PMCs during the ongoing USA's Iraq intervention (IPOA n.d.-b). British PMCs have also established The British Association of Private Security (BAPSC) for similar purposes. The purpose of the associations is to inform the public about the activities and role of PMCs, constructive dialogue, and advocacy with policymakers regarding the growing influence of the companies, and encourage PMCs to develop and comply with operational and ethical standards (IPOA n.d.-a). According to Mr. José Luis Gómez del Prado, a member of the Working Group, despite all efforts, self-initiatives in the sector remain insufficient (Nikitin 2009). An effective arrangement will benefit both PMCs and contractors.

The second concern about PMCs is the human rights damages companies caused (A/HRC/27/50: 19). Civilians suffer most directly from uncontrolled PMC activities. The lack of accountability for company actions poses a greater threat to civilians. Crime activities and human rights violations involving PMCs may go unpunished. With effective regulations, civilians will be protected against criminal acts by PMCs.

The third concern about PMCs is the erosion of state monopoly. Throughout history, there has been a constant struggle to control violence within collective structures such as rules, laws, norms, and institutions (Avant 2005:3). Today, PMCs carry out many activities that are required by the state by their nature (A/HRC/10/14). According to Singer, it is an exceptional situation for states to obtain a monopoly on using violence. He believes that future wars will come out of the public sphere and private actors will be more involved (Singer 2008:39). Effective regulation will prevent PMCs from violating the state's monopoly on the use of force. It provides states control over companies and strengthens state sovereignty, and it will prevent PMCs from harming government policies (Singer 2008:135). Similarly, Kinsey (2006:158) argues PMCs are very different from forms of private violence that have emerged in the past and they could contribute to international security as long as they were regulated. They are a

valuable resource for governments dealing with social, political, and security challenges. The companies provide an affordable solution for managing security by utilizing skilled and experienced contractors (Kinsey 2006:153).

The fourth concern about PMCs is that they damage the democratic process and transparency. The foundation of democracy lies in the separation of powers. However, the utilization of PMC increases the powers of the executive branch against the legislative branch. This negatively impacts the execution's accountability and limits society's involvement in the democratic process (Avant 2004b:155–56). Avant argues that they are the exercise of state control over violence by a different means (Avant 2004b:157).

Critiques of PMCs			
Legal Status	Human Rights	State Monopoly	Democratic Process
Regulatory Gaps: Discussions emphasize the need for effective regulation and oversight to address gaps in controlling and supervising PMCs. International Standards: Some suggest implementing international standards to regulate PMCs and increase accountability.	Abuses and Violations: PMCs often center on the need for safeguards and oversight to prevent alleged human rights abuses. Responsibility for Actions: Debates arise over who should be held responsible for human rights abuses, particularly when PMCs are involved.	Critics argue that the rise of PMCs may contribute to the erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of force, posing challenges to traditional concepts of sovereignty	Accountability: There are debates about the lack of clear legal frameworks governing the actions of PMCs, leading to concerns about accountability for their conduct. Transparency: Discussions often emphasize the need for transparency regarding the relationships between governments, PMCs, and other stakeholders.

Table 6. Critiques of PMCs

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASES OF THE USA AND RUSSIA

The chapter compares the cases of the USA and Russia with regard to PMCs. It examines the historical backgrounds of the privatization efforts of both countries, their legal frameworks regarding PMCs, and their strategic approaches toward PMCs. The USA employs strategies such as geopolitical, proxy warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and humanitarian assistance, while Russia's strategies include geopolitical, proxy warfare, and direct military intervention.

4.1 The USA and PMCs

4.1.1 Historical Background of USA's Privatization Efforts

Washington had always closely worked with the private sector (Avant 2005:29; Isenberg 2009b:5; Kinsey 2006:98). Up until the 1990s, the state and the armed forces had a well-defined understanding of their central functions. These functions included tasks that represented the sovereign power. Only a few services outside of core military tasks, such as warehouse maintenance, medical care, and family housing, were privately contracted out (Krahmann 2010:126). According to Kinsey (2006:98), since the early 20th century, the USA has been outsourcing non-core military responsibilities to PMCs. These companies, primarily in the engineering field, have provided technical solutions and managed military assignments for the government. The USA government started hiring contractors for military logistics and weapons supply tasks before World War II. During the war, these tasks expanded to include additional contracted services, such as airport construction and pilot training (Avant 2005:114).

The relations between the USA government and contractors improved further during the Cold War when there was a rivalry between the USSR and the USA on military and technological issues. In the 1950s and 1960s, defense contractors took an active role in military research and development, as they had the expertise and resources to develop advanced technologies that could increase military capabilities (Kinsey 2006:98). The term Military Industrial Complex was used to express the close relationship between the American military and the private sector, which grew by focusing on computer technology during the Cold War.

During the Cold War, American firms also took an active role in providing military assistance and training for foreign governments threatened by communist insurgent forces.

During the Vietnam War, the USA Army hired Vinnell Corporation to construct military bases, repair equipment, and undertake tasks that American troops were unable to do because of legal restrictions or inadequate resources (Avant 2005:114–15). In 1970, the Secretary of Defense contracted Booz-Allen to create a specialized training program for key communication and support personnel in Vietnamese armed forces' middle management positions known as Middle Management Training (Collins 1975:111).

The foundations for the outsourcing of military services in the United States were laid in 1966 with the introduction of special procedures under Circular A-76 of the Office of Management and Budget (Krahmann 2010:121). The A-76 process involved five stages: defining an outsourced function, notifying Congress, creating a job statement, inviting bids from private companies, and comparing bids. If a private bid is 10% or \$10 million lower than the military's bid, the contract is awarded. After the contract ends, the function is re-advertised among private firms. This procedure has contributed significantly to expanding outsourcing in military services (Krahmann 2010:121). The A-76 procedure has been predominantly used by the USA armed forces. Following neoliberal policies, the Department of Defense almost doubled its recruitment of military services from private companies in the 1980s (Krahmann 2010:122).

In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration took steps to apply neoliberal principles to the military, promoting the idea that the private sector could offer more efficient and cost-effective services than traditional government-run operations. Although it had a limited impact under Regan, the strategy was further expanded under George Bush (1989-93) and subsequent administrations (Krahmann 2010:119). This relationship was further solidified in the late 20th century. In its 1996 report, the DoD highlights the issue of privatization. The report, titled "Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing," identified three major challenges in the post-Cold War era: Readiness, quality of life for military personnel, and modernization. Prioritizing readiness was crucial, as USA forces must always be prepared for global threats, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts. Providing proper compensation and challenging work was essential for attracting and retaining top-quality personnel. Lastly, investing in advanced weapons was necessary for technological superiority and future readiness (U.S. Government Accountability Office n.d.). To come up with these challenges, DoD emphasizes the significance of privatization. By outsourcing, the DoD can efficiently decrease expenses while enhancing readiness through the encouragement of competition, flexibility, and access to specialized providers that offer economies of scale and management expertise. This method

promotes quality and efficiency, empowers managers to manage resources effectively, and facilitates access to cutting-edge technologies (U.S. Government Accountability Office n.d.).

Singer (2008:98), Isenberg (2009b), and Krahmann (2010:120) associate the use of PMCs with the decrease in the defense budget and the increase in the number of military operations. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a substantial reduction in defense budgets and military personnel, but at the same time, the number and extent of international military interventions carried out by the USA military increased. This led to meeting the growing demand for military services by outsourcing. Consequently, the privatization of certain military operations became inevitable, and the USA government turned to private military contractors to fill gaps in capabilities (Isenberg 2009b:5; Krahmann 2010:120; Singer 2008:98).

The American government contracted with companies primarily for essential services to assist combat operations. These services include logistics, education and training, base infrastructure operations, and maintenance support. For instance, in the Gulf War, the logistics and maintenance support for the Saudi army was largely carried out by private USA firms (Singer 2008:98). The growing influence of PMCs was most pronounced during the USA interventions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the 2000s. In its efforts to increase private sector provision of national security, the Bush Administration narrowed down the definition of core military functions, recruiting contractors for most of the remaining jobs (Krahmann 2010:128). Throughout various military interventions, the number of contractors in comparison to military personnel has notably risen. For instance, during the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the USA deployed one contractor for every fifty armed forces members, whereas by 2008 in Iraq, the ratio had increased to one contractor for every soldier. This trend continued in Afghanistan in 2010, where there were approximately 1.43 contractors for every American soldier (Avant and de Nevers 2011:89). By 2002, the USA couldn't go to war without using contractors, says ex-Dean of Army War College, Colonel Kevin Cunningham (Cited by Avant 2005:115).

4.1.2 American PMC Industry

BDM International Inc., Booz Allen Hamilton, Cubic Defense Systems Limited (DSL), DynCorp, Vinnel Corporation, and Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) are early examples of American PMCs (Avant 2005:9). According to Avant's (2005:16–21) categorization, American PMCs are divided into five categories based on the services they offer: Military advice and training, operational support, logistics support, site/personal security, and crime prevention/intelligence. Many companies excel in more than one category. Prominent examples of American companies providing operational support include MPRI,

DynCorp, AirScan, Eagle Aviation Services and Technology (EAST), ICI Oregon, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), and Sumairco. In logistical support, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), Bechtel, ICI Oregon, PAE, US Defense Systems, and Vinnell are notable American companies.

Vinnell is the first American PMC to train a foreign government army. In the mid-1970s, it was contracted to train Saudi forces to defend Saudi Arabian oil fields (Isenberg 2008:2). MPRI and DynCorp are well-known companies that offer training services. MPRI trained military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Shearer 1998:71). Additionally, although they primarily supply high-technology products, SAIC, Braddock, and Dunn & McDonald also specialize in the supply of military training and equipment. These companies and Vinnell provided training to strengthen the Saudi military and develop their ability to use American weapons (Shearer 1998:74). On the other hand, companies like Blackwater that provide operational services in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and other special military operations are difficult to reduce to one category (Avant 2005:21).

American PMCs are large commercial enterprises with hundreds to thousands of employees, and million-dollar turnovers providing military support services (Kinsey 2006:98). In 2019, the American industry alone accounted for 50% of the global private military services market (Nebolsina 2019:81). The companies have a diverse workforce that includes both American citizens and individuals from various countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, Fiji, South Africa, Nepal, the UK, India, and Iraq. These employees contribute to cost reduction and bring value to the company through their knowledge and connections in their respective areas (Avant and de Nevers 2011:95). The composition of their team varies depending on the situation and location (Avant and de Nevers 2011:91).

PMCs in the USA have established strong connections with government agencies. The majority of their revenues come from government contracts, particularly the contracts with the DoD and the USA Department of State (DoS) (Isenberg 2009b:7; Kinsey 2006:97). For instance, DynCorp primarily operates through government contracts, which account for 98% of its business. The company has partnered with over 30 USA government agencies such as the Department of Defense, State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Prisons, and the Office of National Drug Policy. Nearly half of its revenue is generated from the Pentagon, and a sizeable portion of its workforce comprises retired military personnel. The remaining contracts are primarily with various civilian government agencies (Bigwood 2001).

4.1.3 Legal Framework Regards PMCs in American Law

4.1.3.1 Domestic Regulations

PMCs and other armed contractors are subject to specific laws and regulations in the USA including OMB Circular A-76, OMB Procurement Policy Letter, The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), National Defense Authorization Act 2011 (Section 862), Title 32, Part 159 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48 (Federal Acquisition Regulations) Part 25.302, and The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 252, Subpart 225-7039 (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment n.d.-b). These key documents serve as guiding principles for procurement practices within the federal government, ensuring a comprehensive framework for oversight and compliance in the realm of private military and armed contractor activities.

OMB Circular A-76¹ originally issued in 1966 and revised in 1999, outlines guidelines for deciding whether a government service or function should be performed by federal employees or contracted out to private enterprises. The ITAR² was published on March 23, 2022, entered into force on September 6, 2022. It is a comprehensive set of regulations that govern the export and import of defense-related articles and services. Defense services encompass various activities such as training, design and development, technical assistance, and maintenance services associated with defense articles. The responsibility for overseeing these regulations is assigned by the Secretary of State to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (ITAR 2022: Section 120.1).

The National Defense Authorization Act 2011, Section 862³, mandates the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to establish regulations governing private security personnel in combat operations areas. It addresses key aspects such as personnel selection, training, equipment, and conduct, including standards for registration, weapon authorization, incident reporting, investigation procedures, and personnel qualifications. The Secretary of Defense is tasked with identifying combat operation areas, with Iraq and Afghanistan already included. Contractors are obligated to ensure that personnel engaged in private security functions are briefed on their obligations to comply with the Secretary of Defense's requirements, covering qualification, training, screening, and security. They must also be knowledgeable about relevant laws, regulations of the USA and host country, and any

¹ For details, see:(White House 1999)

² For details, see: (DoS Directorate of Defense Trade Controls n.d.)

³ For details, see: (The National Defense Authorization Act 2011, Section 862 2011)

applicable treaties or international agreements. Contractors are further required to fully cooperate with Department of Defense investigations into incidents involving their personnel, excluding intelligence community agreements for intelligence operations from these provisions.

Title 32, Part 159 of the Code of Federal Regulations⁴ implements the statutory requirements of Section 862, focusing on guidelines for contractors operating in contingency operations, humanitarian or peace operations, and other military exercises. It establishes policies, responsibilities, and procedures for regulating the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel engaged in private security functions under covered contracts. Private security contractors are defined as companies contracted by the USA government for such tasks, while personnel refer to individuals performing designated tasks under these contracts. The document specifies private security functions, including guarding personnel, designated sites, or federal property, and activities requiring the use of weapons as per contract terms. Contractors are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions. The policy emphasizes coordination between the DoD and DoS in selecting, training, equipping, and conducting private security company personnel through appropriate processes.

The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 252, Subpart 225-7039⁵ pertains to defense contractors performing private security functions outside the USA. This clause mandates compliance with regulations outlined in Part 159 (32 CFR part 159) and contract orders, including the registration of personnel and weapons, identification of vehicles, and reporting incidents. Contractors are required to ensure that their personnel are properly trained and briefed to comply with applicable laws, regulations, and international agreements. This encompasses adherence to security procedures specified in CFR part 159 and directives from combatant commanders or chiefs of mission concerning various aspects like force protection, weapon/equipment use, interactions with locals, safety protocols, and rules for using force during operations. Background checks on personnel must be conducted before deployment overseas, and in the event of investigations into incidents or misconduct, contractors must fully cooperate with the government, providing access to relevant employees and information. Additionally, adherence to quality management standards for private security companies, such as ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 or ISO 18788, is mandatory.

⁴ For details, see: (National Archives and Records Administration 2024)

⁵ For details, see:(Acquisition.gov 2023b)

The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 252, Subpart 252.225-7040⁶ outlines guidelines for contractors supporting the USA armed forces deployed outside the USA. It emphasizes personnel selection based on mission needs and compliance with relevant laws and regulations, including those of the USA, host country, and third-country nationals, as well as the law of war. Contractors must adhere to orders from combatant commanders and prioritize force protection, security measures, health safety, and interactions with local citizens. A program to prevent law of war violations, including training, is required. Reporting of alleged offenses under military law is mandatory. Contractors are restricted from wearing military clothing without written authorization, and if permitted, they must use distinguishable patches. Authorization may be granted for carrying weapons in designated areas, with specific assessment and approval criteria. Contractors must be properly trained and follow force-protection policies to avoid inappropriate use of force, which may result in legal consequences.

4.1.3.2 International Regulations

The USA government advocates efforts for global regulation and oversight of PMCs through endorsements. Since September 17, 2008, the USA has been a participant of the Montreux Document, and it currently chairs the ICoCA Working Group, which advises the International Code of Conduct Association on policy and regulatory matters. In 2021, the chair of the group representing the United States of America was Mr. Phillip Riblett (Montreux Document Forum n.d.). The American government supports voluntary industry initiative ICoC principles for private security. The guidelines set by the USA government for adhering to ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 or ISO 18788 align with the suggested best practices of the Montreux Document and uphold the promises made by PMCs in the ICoC (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment n.d.-a).

4.1.4 The USA's Strategies and PMCs

4.1.4.1 USA's Geopolitical Strategy

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the world's prominent power in terms of its economic, military, and political influence, surpassing its competitors. Its primary objective is to establish a liberal global order led by the USA, which emphasizes the

⁶ For details, see : (Acquisition.gov 2023a)

promotion of democracy, human rights, international collaboration, political and economic freedom (Ikenberry 2011:169–219). The United States has entered into various global commitments through partnerships, agreements, and institutions. These commitments aim to open markets, unite democracies, oppose authoritarian regimes, and establish a comprehensive security community (Ikenberry 2011:159). For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been created to provide security to its allies.

The USA's main goal after the Cold War was to maintain its dominant position in the world. Its foreign policy focused on strengthening and expanding the liberal global order while preventing any potential threats to its dominance in the international system (Brands 2018:135). Throughout history, the USA has been concerned about the potential of a powerful entity with more resources than itself in the Eurasian landmass, which could threaten the country (Posen 2014:70–71). Therefore, maintaining the balance of power in Eurasia is a crucial and ongoing geopolitical objective for the United States (Posen 2014:69).

September 11th terrorist attacks were a breaking point in American foreign policy. Preventing any attack on the American mainland by state or non-state actors has been a fundamental element of Washington's foreign policy. The USA has adopted a strategy of anticipating and preventing potential threats before they can be carried out in order to achieve this goal. Washington believes acting against such emerging threats is crucial before they become fully formed, as a measure of self-defense and common sense (National Security Strategy 2002). Second, The National Security Strategy of 2002 highlighted the fact that weak states can pose a significant threat to American national interests. Countries that are poor and have weak institutions, as well as widespread corruption, can be vulnerable to the influence of illegal networks, such as terrorist groups and drug cartels that operate within their territory. The United States believes active intervention is necessary to address these challenges (National Security Strategy 2002).

Furthermore, American foreign policy prioritizes protecting hydrocarbon energy resources to maintain economic and national security interests. Consistency in economic power is crucial to achieve its overall strategy. This entails the safe acquisition of energy sources. To enhance energy security, the United States has implemented numerous strategies, such as reducing its reliance on oil imports from the Middle East. Africa, mainly Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, is notable for its potential as an energy source (Aning, Jaye, and Atuobi 2008:622). Another approach is to extract energy resources and develop infrastructure in friendly nations.

4.1.4.1.1 USA's Geopolitical Strategy and PMCs

Washington has increasingly relied on PMCs to implement its foreign policy. This reliance on PMCs can manifest itself in various ways, including carrying out proactive foreign policy, expanding areas of influence and soft power, securing crucial energy resources and infrastructure, and promoting American values like democracy.

First of all, the foreign policy objectives of the USA compel the implementation of a comprehensive and proactive strategy in addressing global affairs. This approach necessitates maintaining military power and readiness at all times. PMCs present themselves as readily accessible sources of military force that can be employed whenever required. By engaging PMCs, Washington gains access to additional experienced personnel with specialized skills and training in various combat areas at low cost (Isenberg 2009b:5; Kinsey 2006:102). These companies offer tactical expertise, logistical support, intelligence gathering capabilities, and operational flexibility that can complement traditional armed forces. Additionally, PMCs offer the advantage of continuity as they can maintain programs by utilizing the same staff (Kinsey 2006:102). By using contractors, the USA avoids taking full responsibility for its actions and can shift the blame if necessary (Isenberg 2009b:5; Kinsey 2006:102). According to Isenberg (2009b:5), Washington has taken on the responsibility of ensuring global stability, even though the American public is not willing to provide the resources needed to support this plan. Private contractors have stepped in to bridge the gap between geopolitical objectives and public funding. Most importantly, the increasing dependence of the USA on military contractors to maintain its position as a global superpower enables it to take a one-sided approach to global crises (Isenberg 2009b:5).

Other major manifestation of this reliance can be seen in how PMCs are extensively involved in training partner forces abroad. USA-based PMCs such as MPRI, SAIC, Vinnell, DynCorp, Eagle Group International, and Omega Training Group have been instrumental in providing military training services to numerous countries across the Africa, Asia, Balkans and former Soviet regions, the Middle East, Latin America (Avant 2005:121–22). MPRI has trained military forces in dozens of countries, including Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Colombia (Schrader 2002; Singer 2008:130–79). DynCorp trained Iraqi and Haitian police forces, provided security services USA backed Afghan president, Hamid Karzai (Avant 2005:20–21). These training programs are designed to enhance combat tactics, intelligence gathering, and strategic planning skills. The military capabilities of these countries have significantly aided in enhancing the capabilities

and effectiveness of local allies, stabilizing fragile democracies and protecting American regional interests (Schrader 2002).

American PMCs play a significant role in developing bilateral relations between the United States and other countries. The relationship between the USA and Saudi Arabia is particularly noteworthy in this regard. In 1975, Vinnell, now operating under the name Vinnell Arabia, was contracted to train Saudi forces to protect vital sites and defend oil fields (Adams 2002:57; Kinsey 2006:99; Schrader 2002; Singer 2008:13). This marked the first time American civilians were allowed to sell military training to a foreign military (Schrader 2002). Currently, it provides USA-based training to develop Saudi Arabia's national capabilities (Vinnell Arabia n.d.-a). Their focus is on partnering with local companies, increasing their vendor base, and investing in the latest military technologies to achieve self-sufficiency in the military industry, aligned with the country's 2030 vision (Vinnell Arabia n.d.-c). SAIC provided training to the Saudi Navy and security services to the Saudi Royal Family (Adams 2002:57). BDM provided comprehensive services, including logistics, intelligence, training, advisory, and operational support to the Saudi Army and Air Force (Singer 2008:13).

Booz Allen Hamilton signed an agreement with Saudi officials in 2018 to provide training aimed at increasing cyber capacity while also training the Saudi Navy during the Yemen blockade (Forsythe et al. 2018). In 2012, the company was awarded a \$23.2M contract to provide support services to the Royal Saudi Navy Forces, encompassing training and education, engineering, program and financial management, plans and programs, communications, command, control, computers and intelligence, electronic warfare, naval operations, manpower and personnel management, technical support, logistics and supply, English-language training, special studies, and management support services. Booz Allen Hamilton will be responsible for fulfilling the Saudi Naval Support Program requirements in both the United States and Saudi Arabia (Booz Allen Hamilton 2012).

Additionally, PMCs have a significant impact in safeguarding American access to oil resources. PMCs helped capture and secure Iraq's oil fields in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the south, they worked with the Corps of Engineers to extinguish the oil well fires set by the retreating Iraqis (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers n.d.). KBR, subsidiary of Halliburton, has played a major role in restoring Iraq's oil production and capabilities. Since the start of the Iraq intervention, KBR has followed a contingency plan directed by the American government. This has included putting out any oil well fires and assessing and repairing the petroleum infrastructure (Halliburton n.d.; Singer 2008:247). On the other hand, MPRI provided guidance in creating a coast guard to safeguard the oil-rich waters where Exxon Mobil is conducting

exploration activities in Equatorial Guinea (Wayne 2002). In 2010, the government of Equatorial Guinea signed a contract with MPRI worth \$250 million to enhance the country's maritime security in order to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (Oritse 2010; de Pérez 2011:14).

Moreover PMCs have played a role in promoting American values. MPRI, for example, has stated on its website that one of its missions was “*..to assist foreign governments in converting their military into Western models that support democratic institutions..*” (Cilliers and Douglas 1999:113). For this purpose, within the scope of the program called “democracy transition”, MPRI provided training services in Nigeria, Bosnia, Guinea-Bissau, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Croatia and Macedonia (Aning et al. 2008:618; Wayne 2002). Through this mission, the company has provided training in American-style warfare, including war games, military instruction, and weapons training to various countries (Wayne 2002). Additionally, MPRI provided training to armed forces and police that incorporates education on human rights and provided guidance to the government on legislative reform (Nossiter 2011; de Pérez 2011:14). However, the reports submitted regarding human rights show that human rights violations continue in the countries where PMCs provide training, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia Equatorial Guinea, and Iraq (Aning et al. 2008:619; Wayne 2002). More strikingly, some of the PMCs, such as Blackwater and Dyncorp, have been directly involved in human rights violations. In Bosnia, for example, it was proven that that Dyncorp employees were trafficking women and girls in Bosnia (Simm 2013:88; Wayne 2002). Those who committed these crimes were simply fired. A spokesperson for the company said it “felt terrible!” and that they had launched an internal investigation at the company (Wayne 2002).

4.1.4.2 USA's Proxy Warfare Strategy

The American proxy warfare strategy has been a key component of the USA's foreign policy and military approach for decades. This strategy allows Washington to pursue its national interests without direct military involvement, which can be politically unpopular and financially burdensome. This strategy involves supporting various groups in conflicts around the world. For instance, the US has provided support to Syrian groups fighting against the Assad regime, as well as to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen (Fox 2019:51). The USA has also established proxy relationships with countries such as South Korea, Colombia, and El Salvador (Berman and Lake 2019). This approach was also evident in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein when the USA developed a relationship with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Lake 2019:238–62). These are just a few examples of the American proxy strategy in action.

In more recent times, American support to Ukrainian forces is considered a proxy war (Fox 2023). Since the beginning of the war, the USA has been closely working with the government of Ukraine. America provides security, economic and humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian government. According to the White House official statement made on the first anniversary of the war (2023), Washington has provided various forms of military equipment and weaponry to Ukrainian forces. These include 8,000 Javelin and 1,600 Stinger anti-armor and anti-air systems, 160 howitzers and 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket systems, air defense and counter-drone capabilities, 109 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and tanks, helicopters, Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels, and counter-UAV systems and equipment (The White House 2023). Economically, the USA has given \$13 billion as grant funding to Ukraine's budget and is set to provide another \$9.9 billion. In addition to USA support alone, Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which includes the USA, has promised \$50 billion in security assistance, including tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, rocket launch systems and defense systems (The White House 2023). The USA and its allies provided energy aid to Ukraine, which included the restoration of power, heating to homes and emergency repairs on the power system. According to the official statement, the USA granted Ukraine \$220 million to promote media freedom, democracy, and human rights, as well as \$1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance (The White House 2023). Additionally, the USA offered Ukraine intelligence on command posts, ammunition depots, and other crucial locations along Russian military lines. This real-time intelligence enabled the Ukrainians to target Russian forces, eliminating top generals and the appropriate relocation of ammunition stockpiles (Barnes and Cooper 2022). The Washington, with more than 30 of its allies, have imposed sanctions in favor of Ukraine that will limit Kremlin's access to resources and technology, weaken its finances and reduce its ability to fight. In conclusion, this strategy involves indirect military interventions and alliances with other nations or non-state actors to achieve specific political, security, or economic objectives that align with American interests.

4.1.4.2.1 USA's Proxy Warfare Strategy and PMCs

- The Mozart Group's Role in Ukrainian- Russian War

The Mozart Group (TMG) was established in March of 2022, just after the beginning of the Ukraine-Russian War. Its official goal is to enhance the ability of Ukrainian military and territorial defense units to protect the country from potential Russian invasion (Isenberg 2023b; London Politica 2023). It was founded by Andy Milburn and Andrew Bain, with Milburn

owning 49% of the company's shares and Bain owning 51% (Isenberg 2023b; Maass 2023). The company was officially registered in Wyoming and primarily received funding from private donors in the USA (Isenberg 2023b; Ram 2022). The name of the company comes as a musical reference to the Wagner⁷ (Maass 2023; Ram 2022).

The company played a significant role in Ukraine by offering services like training, intelligence gathering, battlefield clearance, and humanitarian aid support. The organization provides a range of services, such as teaching survival skills to military defense units, assisting with military planning, as well as training medical staff and other healthcare providers (Isenberg 2023b; London Politica 2023). From March to August 2022, the TMG trained 3,000 Ukrainian soldiers in centers located near combat zones in Donbas, Odessa, and Zaporizhia. In addition, they provided training on handling anti-tank systems to 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in the UK in June 2022 (London Politica 2023). TMG has provided intelligence gathering services to the Ukrainian special forces to assist them in targeting Russian military forces on the ground (London Politica 2023). The Mozart Group has cleared the area previously occupied by Russian troops of unexploded ordnance, mines, and booby traps (Isenberg 2023b). The Mozart Group played a crucial role in facilitating the delivery of aid and military equipment from the international community to Ukraine (London Politica 2023; Ram 2022). As well as, the company took active role in executing operations aimed at safeguarding vulnerable populations (Ram 2022). The company claims that their activities are not in violation of the U.S. Neutrality Laws, which prohibit American citizens from joining foreign armies or waging war against countries that are not at war with the USA, even that their employees are unarmed (Isenberg 2023b; Maass 2023).

The Mozart Group's activities in Ukraine have also been seen as part of the American proxy warfare strategy. The company has served as a force multiplier in Ukraine, significantly enhancing the capabilities of Ukrainian government forces by providing them with training and necessary equipment to counter Russian forces (Ram 2022). American proxy strategy through PMCs provide various benefits. First, Washington supports the Ukrainian army without deploying its own troops. Second, minimizes political and military risk and prevent the escalation of conflict with Russia (Cancian 2019; London Politica 2023).

⁷ Allegedly, Wagner takes its name from the German composer Richard Wagner. For detailed information see (Al Jazeera 2023; Mackinnon 2021)

4.1.4.3 USA's Counter- Terrorism Strategy

Following the 11 September attacks, the Bush Administration implemented extensive counter-terrorism strategies to prevent terrorist attacks, dismantle terrorist networks, and protect the American people and critical infrastructure. Immediately after the attacks, in October 2001, Washington implemented the Patriot Act. The Act expanded the government's jurisdiction to include surveillance, investigation, and detention of individuals suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. It was a significant shift in the government's approach to counter-terrorism, emphasizing proactive measures and improved surveillance capabilities.⁸ In March 2003, The Department of Homeland Security was created to consolidate and coordinate the country's various security agencies, such as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Transportation Security Administration, following the passage of the Homeland Security Act by Congress in November 2002 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2019, 2023). It is also involved in implementing counter-terrorism strategies through programs such as the National Terrorism Advisory System and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Additionally, the USA government restructured law enforcement agencies like the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), increasing funding for counter-terrorism initiatives and implementing enhanced security measures at transportation hubs and critical infrastructure.

According to David Perry (2012:44), the USA counterterrorism strategy is comprised of five main areas: Promoting democracy as a means to counteract terrorist ideology, preempting and preventing terrorist attacks, intercepting and obstructing terrorists' access to weapons of mass destruction or their alliances with rogue partners, depriving terrorists of support or refuge from states that aid them covertly, and hampering militants in establishing operational bases within national territories. David Hastings Dunn (2005), outlines three distinct strategies that Washington implemented in order to combat terrorism: The counter-terrorism strategy, pre-emption and pre-eminence strategy, and forward strategy for the democratization of the Middle East. Initially, Washington focused on counter-terrorism strategy includes traditional methods and this eventually led to military intervention in Afghanistan. The second strategy aimed to prevent the threat outside of American soil before it even appeared. This has been the basis of the military operations carried out by the United States in Iraq. The third approach sought to address both the underlying causes of terrorism and provide long-term solutions by promoting democracy in the Middle East region. In essence, these strategies represent different stages of

⁸ For detailed information: (USA Patriot Act 2001)


America's response to terrorism and reflect its evolving understanding of how best to confront this global challenge.

In the scope of the global war on terror, the USA officially conducted a counter-terrorism operation against al-Qaeda under "Operation Enduring Freedom" (2001-2014). In 2014, the military invasion came to a halt. The subsequent stated objectives under "Operation Freedom's Sentinel" (2015-2021) were preventing the resurgence of al-Qaeda and its remnants and, straightening the capacities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces by training, advising, and assisting (Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations 2015:4). Additionally, the USA contributed the largest number of personnel to the "Resolute Support Mission" (2015-2021) in Afghanistan was led by NATO. The official purpose of the mission was to help Afghan security forces fight extremists like the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) through guidance, training, and support. Additionally, "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (2003-2010) and "Operation New Dawn" (2010-2011) were launched in Iraq as part of the Washington's fight against terrorism. As a result of the activities of the ISIS in 2014, these operations were expanded to include Syria. "The Operation Inherent Resolve" (2014-2019) was conducted in order to prevent the activities of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

4.1.4.3.1 USA's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and PMCs

During the war on terrorism, the USA heavily relied on the contractor in the battleground. Over half of the personnel deployed by the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan have been contractors (Avant and de Nevers 2011:88; Congressional Research Service 2023). Starting in 2009, the proportion of contractors to troops in conflict areas has risen significantly, from a 1 to 1 ratio to approximately 3 to 1 (McFate 2016). They were involved in a wide range of activities from security services and logistical support through to intelligence gathering, training, interrogation, engagement in direct hostilities and many more (Hobson 2014:1441; Kinsey 2006:109–101; Nebolsina 2019:85). Their involvement is driven by an increased need for effective measures against terrorist threats, leading to a surge in demand for their services.

The demand for security and military-related services has surged tremendously, marking a significant turning point in the growth of the private military company market during the war on terrorism (Isenberg 2008:29; Kinsey 2006:108; Nebolsina 2019:85; Ortiz 2010:1). Some companies even witnessed their share price more than doubling, highlighting the solid economic outlook for this industry (Kinsey 2006:108). In the first year of the USA occupation of Iraq, Blackwater has grown over 600 percent in 18 months (Isenberg 2008:76).




Graph 1. Number of DoD Contractor Personnel (November 2008 – October 2021)

Source: Quarterly Published DoD Reports

- **Afghanistan**

The counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan launched by the United States was one of their longest wars conducted outside of its borders. It began in 2001 with “Operation Enduring Freedom” and lasted for a duration of 13 years. The primary official objective behind this military invasion was to target members affiliated with al-Qaeda, including their leader Osama bin Laden (Perry 2012:44).

The American military heavily depended on PMC for a variety of services in Afghanistan. The utilization of contractors to provide support for the USA military has been on a steady rise during the Bush administration. However, there has been a significant surge in the number of American contractors present in Afghanistan during Obama Administration (Perry 2012:45). In April 2012, the number of contractors operating in Afghanistan reached its peak with 117,227 contractors. The ratio of contractors to military personnel in Afghanistan was 1.18 to 1 (DASD 2012).



Graph 2. U.S. Armed Forces and DoD Funded Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan (Q4 FY2007-Q4 FY2020)

Source: Quarterly Published DoD Reports

First, PMCs played an instrumental role in providing operational support to American military invasions in Afghanistan. They assisted in reconnaissance, use of weapons systems, intelligence gathering and analysis, and other efforts that contributed to overall mission success. Blackwater, most notorious American PMC, has collaborated closely with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Special Operations Forces of the military (Perry 2012:46–47). The company has been actively involved in assisting the CIA’s drone operations targeting suspected terrorists and militants. Contractors have been charged loading and launching Predator unmanned aerial vehicles that are used for these missions, as well as providing security for the bases involved (Perry 2012:47). This close association enabled Blackwater to establish strong connections with the CIA, to such an extent that former intelligence officials believed that Blackwater was essentially operating as an extension of the agency (Perry 2012:46–47). Furthermore, the maintenance of complex battle systems and equipment in the USA military is carried out by civilian contractors. In Afghanistan, Global Hawk, one of the latest and most sophisticated systems used by the USA military, was initially operated by contractors (Kinsey 2006:101). The USA Air Force contracted SAIC for a multi-year contract worth \$49 million to analyze drone footage and other intelligence gathered from Afghanistan (Cloud 2011). During the invasion in Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that were captured were viewed as valuable sources of intelligence (Avant 2005:224–25). With their skilled interrogation and language skills, PMCs played a crucial role in interrogating these individuals. By actively

questioning them, PMCs aimed to gather vital information and insights into the activities, plans, and networks of these extremist groups. This approach was part of an effort to undermine their operations and disrupt their ability to carry out acts of terrorism. PMCs also took part in the execution of logistics in military operations. KBR was a well-known company that provided logistical services for the USA Army in Afghanistan. As well as, DynCorp and Fluor supplied logistical support for American military bases in the scope of the Army's logistics civil augmentation contract (Perry 2012:45). Additionally, PMCs offered armed operational support by participating directly in combat operations alongside the USA military (Kinsey 2006:100).

Second, PMCs were contracted to provide a range of security services in Afghanistan. These included static security services to protect fixed sites such as housing areas, government buildings, and reconstruction sites. Additionally, PMCs provided convoy security, safeguarding convoys traveling through unsecured areas. DynCorp provided security escorts for individuals and high-ranking officials. For instance, they provided security for Afghan president, Hamid Karzai (Avant 2005:20).

Third, PMCs provided specialized training to Afghan forces to bolster local capacity and improve overall readiness levels among different units within Afghanistan. In this scope, Dyncorp and other PMCs trained the Afghan National Police and Army forces (Perry 2012:45). DynCorp established training centers in Kabul (Malkasian 2021:141). As of August 2021, after the withdrawal of American military forces from Afghanistan and the subsequent takeover of the country by the Taliban, there are no contractor personnel funded by the Department of Defense remaining in Afghanistan (Congressional Research Service 2023).

- Iraq

The USA heavily relied on PMCs in its operations in Iraq, "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (2003- 2010) and "Operation New Dawn" (2010-2011). As the largest deployment of private military contractors in the history of warfare, over 60 firms contracted more than 20,000 private personnel to support the American efforts (DCAF 2006). AirScan Inc., Blackwater, CACI, DynCorp, KBR, MPRI, Titan, Triple Canopy, Vinnel were PMCs that played active roles in Iraq (Isenberg 2008; Singer 2007). According to the quarterly report from the DoD, the number of contracted personnel in Iraq reached its peak in November 2008 with 163,446 individuals (USD (AT&L) 2008). These contractors were exempted from the Iraqi legal process for acts under their contract as per Under Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 of 2004 (Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 2004).

PMCs involved in a wide range of operations in Iraq, including logistical support, risk assessment, convoy security, intelligence gathering and analysis, training local security forces,

interrogating detainees⁹, and even conducting full-scale military operations. PMCs also had the responsibility of upkeep, supplying, and equipping a variety of sophisticated weaponry, such as the Apache attack helicopter, F-15 fighter jet, F-117 stealth aircraft, and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. They were even involved in operating Global Hawk UAV and air defense systems (Singer 2008:247).

PMCs also provided logistical support including transportation and supply chain management. KBR has played a crucial role in the logistics activities carried out in Iraq under the LOGCAP contract (Avant and de Nevers 2011:89; Holan 2010). Under the scope of the contract, KBR provided services such as fuel and ammunition transportation, operating mess halls, building bases, cooking food, and doing laundry (Holan 2010; Singer 2007).

PMCs were hired to provide security services ranged from personal security details to guarding facilities and convoys for various entities in Iraq, including government officials, businesses, and non-governmental organizations (Kinsey 2006:56; Singer 2008:248). ArmorGroup, Aegis Defence Services, Blackwater, Control Risks Group, DynCorp, Erinys International, Kroll, MPRI, Oliver, and Aegis provided security services in Iraq (Kinsey 2006:56–105). Blackwater provided security for Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Singer 2008:248). PMC's have also been involved in the protection of oil infrastructure. AirScan, and Erinys International were leading companies contracted to guard oil installations and pipelines in Iraq (Hasham 2004:8; Isenberg 2008:74).

PMCs were also crucial in gathering and analyzing intelligence in Iraq, offering essential support for counterterrorism efforts. Their services included IT solutions, secure communication systems, force management, and aerial surveillance. They supplied technical expertise and human resources to various American government agencies such as the Joint Task Force, Theater Joint Intelligence Centers, Theater Component Commands, Coalition Commands, Allied Partners, Service and Unit Level Commands, DoD, and non-DoD national agencies (Kinsey 2006:101). They filled gaps in the intelligence network and offered real-time, actionable intelligence to enhance situational awareness.

In scope of training, DynCorp, Vinnell MPRI, SAIC, Eagle Group International, and Omega Training Group were leading companies contracted with the task of training the new Iraqi army and police forces (Avant 2005:122; Avant and de Nevers 2011:90). In this scope,

⁹ The memory of Abu Ghraib Prison lingers in our minds, haunted by the disturbing images of torture it holds. The human rights abuses, encompassing torture and beatings, carried out by CACI and Titan employees at Abu Ghraib Prison have stirred significant controversy. Multiple lawsuits have been filed against these companies in response to these egregious actions. For detailed information, see: (CBS News 2004; CorpWatch 2023; Cushman Jr. 2013; Chatterjee and Thompson 2004)

Vinnell was awarded a \$48 million Pentagon contract to train Iraqi forces over twelve years, starting in June 2003. Their goal was to initially have a force of about 12,000 men, eventually growing to 40,000 members (Aljazeera 2003).

Additionally, private contractors were employed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq to assist with various tasks such as interrogating detainees. CACI International and Titan Corporation provided interrogators and interpreters to the USA-run prison facility and collaborated closely with military personnel to coordinate (Kinsey 2006:101). At Abu Ghraib prison, all of the translators and half of the interrogators were hired by Titan and CACI, respectively (Singer 2007).


Blackwater, the most controversial American PMC, was heavily involved in Iraq and drew attention for its controversial actions. During the Iraq War, Blackwater served as Washington's primary partner in the coalition of the willing. The number of Blackwater contractors deployed in Iraq exceeded the total number of British troops in the country (Scahill 2007:18). The federal contracts awarded to Blackwater have experienced a steady increase in value over time. Specifically, their value grew from \$736,906 in 2001 to \$593 million in 2006 (Falconer 2007). Services provided by Blackwater include armed duties such as safeguarding facilities and bases, escorting convoys and individuals, crisis response operations, and maintaining internal security and stability (Avant 2005:21; Scahill 2007:18). In order to carry out their duties effectively, these contractors were armed and had access to their own fleet of helicopters. When confronting insurgents, their actions often resembled combat situations, making it challenging to differentiate between them and regular combat forces (Avant 2005:21–22).

- Iraq and Syria

The USA benefited from PMCs in “Operation Inherent Resolve” which it started in Iraq and Syria as part of the fight against ISIS. In July 2019, there were 7,475 contractors, which was the highest number recorded (ODASD 2019). Based on the most recent quarterly report released by the DoD in October 2023, the total number of private contractors employed by DoD in Iraq and Syria is 6565. Out of these, approximately 36% are American citizens, while 40% are third-country citizens and 24% are local citizens. According to the report, contractors in Iraq and Syria were categorized based on their mission. The largest category of contractors was base support, with 1884 (28.7%) individuals, followed by logistics/maintenance with 1562 (23.8%). Security employed 768 (11.7%) contractors, while translator/interpreter category had 486 (7.5%) individuals, and transportation had 466 (7.0%) contractors. Other categories include construction with 453 (6.9%), management/ administrative with 433 (6.6%), communications

support with 263 (4.2%), training with 20 (0.1%), medical/dental/social services with only 72 (1.1%), and other categories with 158 (2.4%) contractors (ODASD 2023).

While PMCs play a crucial role in America's counter-terrorism approach, the reliance on such contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq has faced criticism from Washington due to various scandals involving them (Hobson 2014:1442). For instance, in 2007, Blackwater contractors killed 17 civilians in Nisour Square, and investigators working for CACI and Titan were involved in abuses at Abu Ghraib prison (Avant 2005:2). The international community criticized the USA for its limited mechanisms and forms of accountability for human rights violations committed by PMCs (White 2012:11). The DoS and the DoD implemented measures such as developing a Memorandum of Agreement in December 2007. The agreement outlined interagency operating procedures, oversight, monitoring, accountability measures, and use of force agreements (Perry 2012:46). These steps aimed to increase the accountability of PMCs by ensuring proper oversight and regulation of their activities. Furthermore, in an attempt to enhance the accountability of PMCs involved in providing security services. Since 2008, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has been releasing quarterly reports regarding the contractors employed through DoD-funded contracts who are physically located in Afghanistan, Iraq (Congressional Research Service 2023). As of April 2018, data on Iraq and Syria are given together as part of the fight against ISIS (Congressional Research Service 2023).



Graph 3. Number of DoD Contractor Personnel in USCENTCOM (August 2008- January 2022)

Source: Source: Quarterly Published DoD Reports

4.1.4.4 USA's Counter-Narcotics Strategy

The United States faces a significant challenge concerning crime and violence perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations. One of the major contributing factors to this issue is the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as fentanyl, heroin, and other opioids, from overseas into the country. This has resulted in devastating consequences for both individuals and communities across the nation (U.S. Department of State n.d.). Washington utilizes a comprehensive and multifaceted approach known as the USA counter-narcotics strategy to combat drug trafficking, decrease drug consumption, and minimize the adverse impacts of drug abuse on society. This strategy involves several components, such as targeting drug trafficking organizations, increasing law enforcement efforts, disrupting the drug supply chain, dismantling criminal networks, and intercepting illicit drugs before they hit the market, all aimed at reducing drug availability. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) under the DoS is tasked with reducing the production and trafficking of narcotics (U.S. Department of State n.d.-a). Meanwhile, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotic and Stabilization Policy is responsible for formulating and implementing DoD policies to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime (U.S. Department of Defence n.d.).

The USA has played a significant role in this field and holds a high level of influence in upholding international drug prohibition efforts (Hobson 2014:1442). Washington involves international cooperation and collaboration to combat transnational drug trafficking. The USA works closely with other countries through intelligence sharing, joint operations, and capacity-building initiatives to disrupt drug trafficking networks at their source (Office of National Drug Control Policy n.d.-b). Latin America, particularly Colombia and Mexico, has been the main battlefield in the fight against drugs (Hobson 2014:1442). In the scope of the counter-narcotics strategy, the USA and Colombia launched Plan Colombia to combat drug trafficking in 1999. Since then, Washington has made a substantial financial commitment by investing more than \$10 billion in counternarcotic and security initiatives within Colombia (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2018). This collaborative effort has facilitated various programs focused on eradicating illegal drugs, intercepting smuggling operations, and promoting alternative development strategies as part of their overall approach (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2018). The USA provided military aid and equipment to Colombia in their fight against drug cartels such as FARC. In addition, they provided development aid to improve education for farmers, rebuild schools, and improve energy infrastructure. By working with the Colombian government, they trained police forces and assisted with land compensation reform.

In 2008, the USA launched the Merida Initiative as a response to the growing threat of organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico. The initiative is a partnership between the USA and Mexico that aims to combat organized criminal groups, implement reforms for maintaining law and order, uphold human rights, modernize border security measures, and promote resilient community development (U.S. Department of State n.d.-c). From the launch of the Merida Initiative until 2017, the United States Congress has allocated \$2.5 billion to it (U.S. Department of State n.d.-c). A collaborative effort between both governments encompasses a range of activities such as anti-corruption programs establishment, police personnel training in detecting illicit goods, providing air mobility to Mexican police forces through specialized aircraft and pilot and technician training. There is also support for secure cross-border telecommunications systems and agencies task forces while working on increasing community and government cooperation. Moreover, the initiative has delivered over 400 canines trained in the detection of narcotics, weapons, explosives, ammunition, currency, and human remains to Mexican federal agencies. Finally, the initiative has helped establish drug treatment courts in five Mexican states, providing a viable alternative to incarceration for drug abusers (U.S. Department of State n.d.-c).

Furthermore, Afghanistan has been part of America's war on drugs although very little Afghan heroin arrives in the United States (Office of National Drug Control Policy n.d.-a). Washington spent approximately \$8.62 billion on anti-drug operations in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2017 (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2018). Through various departments and agencies, Washington, aimed to discourage opium cultivation and trade in Afghanistan as part of its counter-narcotics strategy. Their goal was to strengthen the Afghan government's ability to combat narcotic-related activities and promote the growth of the country's lawful economy (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2018).

4.1.4.4.1 USA's Counter-Narcotics Strategy and PMCs

Military contractors have been operating in USA counter-narcotics strategy for over two decades. The drug war, especially in Colombia, served as a trial for their deployment (Hobson 2014:1442). PMCs supply highly trained individuals, including pilots and mechanics, to support Washington's initiative to eradicate coca and poppy fields in Colombia (Kinsey 2006:102). In this context, PMCs like DynCorp, California Microwave Systems (a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman), and Airscan have formed contractual agreements with the DoS (Avant

2005:19; Kinsey 2006:102). They provided over 100 pilots and mechanics to eradicate coca and opium poppy plantations in Colombia (Kinsey 2006:100).

DoS's Report on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia states that the DoS and DoD have both contracted with private military companies for services in Colombia, (U.S Department of State 2003). PMCs were granted complete immunity through military agreements between the governments of USA and Colombia (Perret 2013:47–56). DoS had several contracts with Lockheed Martin totaling \$8,787,171 to provide the Colombian National Police (CNP) with maintenance personnel, logistical support, and force protection systems. (U.S Department of State 2003). These contracts also included the maintenance and support of Black Hawk helicopters, installation of intrusion detection equipment at Villa Garzon and Guaymaral, and the procurement of spare and repair parts for CNP Air Service aircraft. The same year, the DoS also paid \$79.2 million to DynCorp Aerospace Technologies for pilots, technicians, and logistic support for the Colombian Army's drug eradication program, as well as \$4.8 million for personal services, including advisors, fuel specialists, and secretaries to various organizations. Moreover, ARINC received three contracts from the DoS. The first contract, worth \$1,146,826, was for maintaining and providing logistics support for the Colombian National Police C-26 aircraft and its surveillance equipment. The second contract, worth \$3,557,929, was for personnel training and logistics support for the aircraft involved in the Air Bridge Denial Program. The third contract, worth \$1,549,309, was for fuel systems upgrades at six Colombian National Police Airfields (U.S Department of State 2003).

On the other hand, the DoD signed 23 contracts with several private military contractors including Lockheed Martin, DynCorp, ACS Defense, and Alion. One of the contracts made was DynCorp valued at \$1,292,000 to provide UH-60 Blackhawk Night services. DoD made also four contracts valued totally \$10,329,478 with Lockheed Martin. The contracts include providing contractor logistics support within Colombia to support four C-130Bs and two C-130Hs heavy transport planes; as well as provision of UH-60 Blackhawk, Huey II and of UH-1H and Huey II instructor pilot supports to assist the Colombian Army. INS and ACS Defense were contracted to provide logistic support to United States Government personnel and operational assets deployed to the U.S. Embassy. Lastly, Alion was contracted to provide consultant support for senior representatives of the Colombian Armed Forces in order to improve the Colombian government's capability to collect and process intelligence (U.S Department of State 2003). Number of companies contracted with USA increased from eleven to twenty-five by 2006. Over \$1.9 billion was spent on anti-narcotics contracts in Colombia from 2005 to 2009, with

the majority going to five major companies: DynCorp, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, ITT and ARINC.

Similar to Plan Colombia, Washington contracted with PMCs through the Merida Initiative to combat drug trafficking. Several companies including ARINC, DynCorp, Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and U.S. Training have provided services as part of the Merida Initiative in Mexico (Hobson 2014:1448; Perret 2013:58). Their offerings encompass maintenance, logistics support, equipment, train local forces, intelligence gathering, and operational assistance, even in combat zones (Hobson 2014:1448; Perret 2013:58). The use of PMCs in the Merida Initiative differs from their role in Plan Colombia due to Mexico's focus on sovereignty. US contractors are not allowed to be armed within Mexico's borders and the primary concern is drug trafficking rather than production (Hobson 2014:1447).

Furthermore, PMC contractors have also been utilized to assist Afghan forces in their efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation (Kinsey 2006:100). They trained Afghan counter-narcotics units have been established within the Afghan military and police forces (U.S. Government Accountability and Office 2010). Due to the shortage of skilled Afghan pilots, all interdiction operations conducted by contractor pilots (U.S. Government Accountability and Office 2010). Thirteen contract employees, consisting of four intelligence analysts, four interpreters, and five administrative support staff were hired by the Drug Enforcement Administration to respond to the challenges presented by the narcotics trade in the region (U.S. Department of Justice 2014:2). The DoS outsourced most operational activities of the public information campaign to PMCs. These contractors collaborate with Afghan advisory teams to execute public information activities. They organized various public events and created printed and broadcast materials in both Dari and Pashto (U.S. Government Accountability and Office 2010). As well as, PMCs have been involved in monitoring and evaluation of American drug enforcement programs (U.S. Government Accountability and Office 2010).

PMCs activities in Colombia and Mexico raises some concerns about the respect for human rights and the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms (Perret 2013:63). For example, in 2004, contractors from the Tolemaida base were involved in creating a pornographic film featuring minors. Another deeply disturbing incident occurred in August 2007 when an American soldier and a PMC contractor reportedly committed rape against a twelve-year-old girl (Perret 2013:55). DynCorp has disregarded the legal prohibition set by the USA Congress on their participation in hostilities in case of Colombia (Perret 2013:55). The USA Embassy's responsibility is to oversee all contracts carried out under Plan Colombia. However, their focus is solely on the outcome of the services and activities outlined in the contract, rather than the

process of carrying out the contract which led to these incidents of misconduct and abuse (Hobson 2014:1446; Perret 2013:54).

Additionally, allegations suggest that PMCs have trained Mexican police in torture techniques, potentially linking PMCs to human rights violations in Mexico. Given Mexico's past human rights record during the war on drugs, using PMCs without proper oversight may not be effective in enhancing state capacity and regaining control over national territory (Perret 2013:64). Such cases underscore the need for increased oversight and accountability measures to prevent further abuses by PMCs participating in conflicts. Despite all the accusations and concerns, According to Kinsey (2006:102–3), PMCs prevent the USA's activities in the region from attracting attention, and allow the USA to intervene on the ground without deploying troops. It is expected that the Washington will continue relying on PMCs for its war on drug.

4.1.4.5 USA's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy

Events in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 resulted in significant changes to the United States policy toward peacekeeping and intervention. Escalating tension in Somalia after the downfall of President Siad Barre led to the United Nations launch of the two peacekeeping operations in Somalia, UNOSOM I (1992) and UNOSOM II (1993), to maintain peace and order (United Nations Peacekeeping n.d.-b). During the crisis in Somalia, the USA deployed a significant force to assist (Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:119). Washington initiated Operation Provide Comfort in August 1992, which aimed to provide essential food aid. Subsequently, Washington launched Operation Restore Hope, also known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992. This operation involved the deployment of around 25,000 troops as part of a larger international effort led by the UN. This mission transitioned into UNOSOM II in March 1993 involving joint efforts between USA and international forces (Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:119; U.S. Office of Historian n.d.).

In October 1993, Aideed's forces shot down two American Black Hawk helicopters and killed 18 American soldiers. This event had a significant impact on public opinion within the United States, and it resulted in the withdrawal of all American forces from Somalia in March 1994 (U.S. Office of Historian n.d.) and changes in the American policy toward peacekeeping and intervention (Aning et al. 2008:615; Kinsey 2006:96–97). Immediately after the withdrawal, in May 1994, the Clinton administration implemented Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PPD 25), which introduced a more restricted and selective approach to using military force in humanitarian interventions (U.S. Office of Historian n.d.). This policy shift

signaled a departure from broader peacekeeping efforts and emphasized the protection of American interests (Kinsey 2006:96–97).

The shift in American policy towards peacekeeping were not solely a result of the military defeat in Somalia. The downsizing of the army after the Cold War and the USA's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were also reasons for their hesitance in deploying ground troops for peacekeeping missions (Aning et al. 2008:614). As a result, the USA has focused on strengthening the capabilities of other countries to handle security challenges and participate in peace operations. To achieve this goal, the USA has initiated several bilateral training programs including African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). ACRF was an important initial step to meet Africa's urgent need for a rapid deployment force. Its primary objective was to enhance the capacity of African nations to manage and respond to crises, by promoting collaboration and cooperation among African nations to collectively address common security challenges and support stability (Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:120). ACRI and ACOTA were US government-led programs aimed at strengthening African nations' crisis response and peacekeeping capabilities. ACRI focused on improving the planning, execution, cooperation, and deployment, while ACOTA aimed to build military capacity in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance through training and mentorship (Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:120). The GPOI is a program initiated by the US government in 2004 to improve the capabilities of partner nations and enable their participation in UN and regional peacekeeping operations. The main aim of this initiative is to fill the gaps in the capacity and readiness of peacekeeping forces throughout the world by offering training, equipment, and other forms of assistance (U.S. Department of State n.d.-b). Additionally, APRRP aims to train peacekeepers from six partner nations in Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda within a period of three to five years. The training is aimed at enabling the peacekeepers to respond promptly to crises on the continent (U.S. Department of State n.d.-b).

4.1.4.5.1 USA's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy and PMCs

Washington has increasingly turned to private military contractors for their supporting humanitarian assistance instead of relying solely on American troops (Kinsey 2006:152). The contractors provide a range of services including training militaries, restructuring national armies, carry out security related activities and providing logistics for peace support operations (Aning et al. 2008:616). Blackwater, DynCorp, MPRI, PAE, Virginia and Logicon, now

Northrop Grumman are foremost PMCs provide services USA's humanitarian assistance programs (Aning et al. 2008:614; Karis 2009:17; Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:123).

PAE were contracted by the DoS to provide logistics support to regional and global organizations involved in peace operations. The company has played a critical role in providing logistical support to peacekeeping missions in West Africa, including those led by the UN, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Berman 2004:136; Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:123). Additionally, the company was responsible for constructing and managing camps, establishing supply lines, providing vehicle recovery and maintenance, and offering emergency accommodation in Darfur (Sarjoh Bah and Aning 2008:124).

The DoS and DoD hired MPRI to provide training under the ACRI and ACOTA programs. Among the contracts was one worth \$8 million that aimed to improve the professionalism of the Nigerian army (Aning et al. 2008:618). MPRI, as part of ACOTA, managed the Joint Combined Armed Training System (JCATS) training centers (Aning et al. 2008:619–20). This system simulates battlefield scenarios with computer software for military training purposes. As part of the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program in partnership with the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), seven MPRI contractors provided training at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana (Aning et al. 2008:620). Northrop Grumman was contracted to conduct computer-assisted exercises using the Janus simulation for training of battalion and brigade staff in African partner countries as part of the ACRI Initiative (Karis 2009:17). As part of the GPOI, the DoS awarded contracts to MRPI, Blackwater, and Northrop Grumman to provide military and peacekeeping training worldwide. The total cost of these contracts was \$200 million for five years, starting in 2007 (Aning et al. 2008:620).

During the Darfur crisis, Washington hired PMCs to provide logistics and security services. The government allocated over \$200 million to DynCorp and PAE for supporting the African Union Mission in Darfur with accommodation, transportation, communication equipment, and office supplies (Aning et al. 2008:624).

4.2 Russia and PMCs

4.2.1 Historical Background of Russia's Privatization Efforts

In 1991, the USSR collapsed and Russia underwent a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one. To implement sweeping economic reforms, including privatization initiatives, liberalization of prices, and the establishment of market mechanisms, the Program for Deepening the Economic Reform in the Russian Federation was adopted on July 17, 1992 (Angelov 1993:207). However, the core military and security functions in Russia remained primarily under the control of state-owned entities. The privatization of military and security activities in Russia has been proportional to global developments, but it remains under state control rather than being purely market-oriented. Private military contractors have become more prominent in Russia since the early 1990s, following a trend observed worldwide where privatization efforts were instituted for military purposes starting from the second half of the twentieth century (Jones et al. 2021:13–14; Nebolsina 2019:82). Following the collapse of the USSR, demobilized military personnel subsequently utilized their expertise to their advantage by joining military and security companies or even establishing their own businesses within the industry (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:3). Rubikon, a St. Petersburg-based security company allegedly coordinated by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), was the initial attempt to establish a Russian PMC for geopolitical purposes (Sukhankin 2018:296). Alpha Group and RusCorp were other PMCs established within the Russian sector, originating from former members of the Russian armed forces (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:3).

The emergence and growth of private military companies in Russia appear to align with global trends. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, coupled with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, presented a lucrative opportunity for PMCs worldwide (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:2). In 2003, the Russian Union of Paratroopers founded Antiterror, which later signed contracts to protect the oil and gas infrastructure of companies such as Tatneft, Energoinzhenering, and the Russian Engineering Company in the mid-2000s. In 2010, Lukoil established Lukom-A, a security company to protect investments in Iraq. Subsequently, Somali piracy emerged as a factor that significantly contributed to the expansion of the PMCs industry in Russia. Russian ship owners sailing in the Gulf of Aden faced security challenges, prompting the need for vessel protection services. Russian PMCs soon gained a bad reputation for their “shoot first” approach to deter pirates from attacking Russian-flagged ships in the first place (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:2).

In contemporary conflicts, Russia has extensively utilized PMCs in countries such as Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Africa, and the Middle East. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a turning point in Russia's engagement with PMCs (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:20; Jones et al. 2021:24). Russian PMCs, particularly the Wagner, have been deployed to assist separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, playing a significant role in ongoing conflicts. Russia's increasing use of PMCs can be associated with General Valery Gerasimov's military thinking. In accordance with Gerasimov's views on contemporary warfare and the need for new strategies, PMCs are well-suited actors as they possess the flexibility and distinct expertise, as well as their ability to access areas that traditional military forces cannot. The article *"The Value of Science is in the Foresight: A New Era of Warfare"* by General Gerasimov provides insight into Russia's understanding of modern warfare. He highlights the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. He argues that modern warfare blurs the line between war and peace, with new technology making military actions more dynamic. Frontal engagements are disappearing as long-distance actions become the primary means of combat goals throughout the enemy territory. The lines between strategic, operational, and tactical levels blur because high-precision weaponry is widely used. The new model of warfare involves asymmetrical tactics and emphasizes non-military methods like propaganda, economic pressure, no-fly zones, and sea blockades. Private military contractors also play a significant role in 21st-century warfare. By acknowledging the changing nature of modern warfare, Gerasimov highlights the need for a comprehensive approach that includes both military and non-military measures. He argues that military forces must adapt and incorporate cyberwarfare, information control, and special forces operations. PMCs are valuable actors adapting to modern warfare.

4.2.2 Russian PMCs Industry

The Russian private military company industry is made up of approximately 10 to 15 companies (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:131). Anti-Terror Group, Redut-Antiterror/Centre R, Moran Security Group, Slavonic Corps, Rossiskie System Bezopasnosti (RSB), E.N.O.T, Shchit, Mar, Patriot, Sewa Security Service, The Officers Union for International Security, Tigr Top-Rent Security, and Wagner Group (Wagner for short) are leading companies in Russian private military industry (Jones et al. 2021:15; Sukhankin 2018:296). The Russian PMCs industry is not fully commercialized, as some entities do not operate under free market conditions. Referring to them as companies may lead to misunderstandings and inaccuracies (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:131). Russian PMCs expand their activities from four countries

(Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Sri Lanka) in 2015 to twenty-one countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America by 2021 (Doxee 2022).

Østensen and Bukkvoll (2022:133) categorize the private military industry in Russia into three distinct groups: The first group is made up of Western-style firms like RSB-Group and Moran Security Group operating in the commercial market. The companies offer maritime and ground security services, convoying, training, consulting services, and demining operations worldwide. Despite having Russian roots, some of these companies, such as Sewa Security Services, have their headquarters located overseas, such as in the Central African Republic (CAR) (Nebolsina 2019:81). The second group includes PMCs affiliated with military divisions that allow soldiers to earn extra income without an official connection to operations. Shchit is an example of this type within the Russian private military sector (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:133).

The third group consists of companies that exclusively offer services to Russian state agencies or their associates, such as Wagner and Patriot. Category 3 companies are blacklisted by the USA and the UK. The USA recognizes Wagner as a “transnational criminal organization”, while the UK considers it a “terror organization” (UK Government 2023; U.S. Department of the Treasury 2023). It is claimed that Patriot and Wagner has close relations with the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (Lozovenko 2022; Varfolomeeva and Charters 2023). On the other hand, Wagner is the most controversial Russian PMCs that came to the fore with its activities in Ukraine in 2014. Wagner was believed to have been created in 2014 by individuals with close ties to the Russian military, including former GRU leader Dmitry Utkin (Jones et al. 2021:15; UK Foreign Affairs Committee 2023:7), but in 2022 Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he had founded the company (Preussen 2022). He remained at the head of the company until his death.

According to Marten (2019b), it does not fit into any existing PMC category in the literature. Wagner operates as loose networks of shell companies and financial intermediaries instead of singular entities (Doxee 2022). Wagner had gained so much power that it became an autonomous entity. She describes Wagner as an informal security organization with characteristics similar to those of a “semi-state.” The most concrete example of this is Wagner's armed mutiny on June 23, 2023. Wagner forces marched to Moscow, which Prigozhin called the “march of justice,” targeting the Kremlin and the Russian armed forces. The Wagner forces had seized control of the defense ministry’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, downing six helicopters and an Ilyushin IL 22M plane, resulting in at least thirteen casualties (International Crisis Group 2023). Ultimately, the mutiny was quelled through the intervention of Belarusian

President Alexander Lukashenko. On June 26, 2023, Putin addressed the citizens of Russia, announcing the neutralization of the emerging threat and assuring Wagner soldiers and commanders that they could either continue serving in Russia or return home freely (President of Russia 2023a). Some individuals aspiring to serve Russia joined Russia's National Guard (Rosgvardia) and became part of a unit led by Pavel Prigozhin, the son of the deceased Yevgeny Prigozhin (59.ru 2023). It is controversial that former prisoners convicted of "mild to moderate crimes," recruited by Wagner during the Ukrainian War, were allowed to join the National Guard, albeit without the eligibility for "leadership positions or even mid-level officer ranks." Additionally, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that Wagner Group's operations in Mali and the CAR will continue (Caulcutt and Kayalı 2023).

The FSB has initiated criminal proceedings against Prigozhin for his role in organizing an armed rebellion under Article 279 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Sputnik International 2023). Yevgeny Prigozhin and other senior leaders of the group died in a plane crash on 23 August following the armed mutiny, raising doubts about the circumstances of his death.

The Wagner mutiny holds great symbolic significance as it demonstrates that PMCs can potentially pose a threat to governments. The Kremlin linked the uprising to Wagner's senior officials and did not eliminate all Wagner employees. In his address to Russian citizens on June 24, Putin stated that the soldiers and commanders of the Wagner Group were fighting and sacrificing their lives alongside Russia's other military units and troops (President of Russia 2023b). He called them heroes who had liberated towns and villages in Donbass such as Soledar and Artemovsk. According to Putin, they had fought and given their lives for Novorossiia and the unity of the Russian world. This statement shows how crucial PMCs are for Russia despite the mutiny.

PMCs have close relations with Kremlin and Russian elites. The companies are a source of income for the Russian elites (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:131). On the other hand, companies' relations with Kremlin is quite complex. The Kremlin has long denied any involvement with the companies. The Kremlin's discourse towards companies changed when Putin congratulated Wagner after the occupation of Artemovsk, thanks to Wagner's efforts. On the Day of National Unity in November 2022, Wagner opened its first headquarters in St. Petersburg's Nevsky district with the mission to pioneer innovative strategies for augmenting Russia's defense capabilities (Euronews 2022; риа новости 2022).

Russian PMCs have special relations with the Kremlin, Ministry of Defense (particularly the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and FSB

(Jones et al. 2021:15). The companies are mostly founded by veterans of Russia's special forces and intelligence services. Moreover, retired Russian service members are being recruited by PMCs and deployed in multiple conflict zones around the world as contractors: in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Venezuela, and many states in Africa. Putin presented military medals to Utkin and another Wagner commander at a ceremony in the Kremlin in 2016, and the fighters have been buried with military honors (Marten 2019a). In 2018, Putin said that as long as Wagner obeys Russian laws, it can operate internationally without interference from the prosecutor general (Marten 2019a). These actions suggest that while Russia has officially disapproved of legalizing private armies and denied links to PMCs, it still employs them de facto.

4.2.3 Legal Framework Regards PMCs in Russian Law

There are no specific laws or regulations regarding PMCs in Russian Federation Law. Hence, the legal status of PMCs in Russia is uncertain. Some have deduced that PMCs are illegal due to Article 359 Mercenarism of the 1996 Russian Criminal Code, which prohibits participation in mercenary activities (Daher 2018; Doxee 2022). The article states that

“1. Recruitment, training, financing, or any other material provision of a mercenary, and also the use of him in an armed conflict or hostilities, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of four to eight years. 2. The same acts, committed by a person through his official position, or with relation to a minor, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of seven to fifteen years, with or without a fine in the amount of up to 500 thousand roubles or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years. 3. Participation by a mercenary in an armed conflict or hostilities shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of three to seven years” (The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation 1996: Article 359 1996).

A mercenary, as defined in the article, is someone who participates in armed conflict or hostilities outside of Russia for payment and is not a citizen, permanent resident, or official duty fulfiller of the state. The exclusion of those performing official duties has led to discussions about whether individuals sponsored by the government to participate in foreign conflicts for financial gain should still be considered mercenaries.

Since PMCs and mercenaries are different actors, it is inappropriate to apply the mercenary law clause to PMCs. As a result, PMCs in Russia do not fall under the classification of mercenary activities as defined by Article 359. In short, the legal status of PMCs in Russia remains uncertain as there are no specific laws or regulations aimed at regulating them. There were several attempts to regulate PMCs, but the government has refused to legalize private

armies despite pressure from proponents due to concerns about destabilization and the state's monopoly on violence (Marten 2019). The military is also skeptical of them, and both the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and FSB are hindering the passing of a law (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:9).

Moscow not only does not make national legal arrangements regarding PMCs but also does not participate in international efforts to regulate PMCs, such as the Montreux Document or the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. There are no legal mechanisms to hold PMCs in Russia accountable for their activities. To sum up, Moscow does not accept any responsibility for the actions of PMCs. In the absence of specific laws or regulations, PMCs in Russia operate in gray zones without any legal framework or oversight. They are under the control of the Kremlin and must obey their orders or risk being dissolved (Bukkvoll and Østensen 2020:10).

4.2.4 The Russia's Strategies and PMCs

4.2.4.1 Russia's Geopolitical Strategy

In the early 21st century, Russia adopted a more assertive foreign policy driven by the concept of "multipolarity" under President Putin with the aim to restore Russia's credibility as a global great power and diminish American global hegemony. Moscow's central global geopolitical strategy is balancing Western power and constructing a multipolar, anti-USA world order. In recent decades, Russia has pursued ambitious regional and global policies that oppose Western hegemony (Rezvani 2020:880). Russia takes an active stance in crises on the side of anti-American governments. In the Middle East, Russia has sided with the Assad Administration since the beginning of the Syrian civil war (Rezvani 2020:880). Moscow supports Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan crisis; Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. Russian engagement with Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro during his crisis with the USA government is an example of Russia's global strategy being implemented over long distances (Rouvinski 2019).

Russia's recent focus on Africa is part of its broader strategy, which aligns with Moscow's view of multilateral diplomacy. Russia aims to establish itself as a multipolar power and reduce Western influence in Africa by forging strategic partnerships with other countries on the continent. Russia is gradually increasing its influence in the region with the signed economic, political, and military agreements. Another key element of Russia's geopolitical strategy is its aim to maintain control over the Post-USSR states. This desire to maintain control over Post-USSR states is driven by a mix of historical, economic, and security considerations. Russia's regional priorities are cooperating with the former USSR countries and establishing regional

integration (Rezvani 2020:880). Pro-Russian governments in the region are rewarded with economic, political, and military by Moscow. Russia perceives the EU and NATO enlargements through Post-Soviet states as a “security threat”. Russian military interventions in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2022 are the most concrete examples of Russian reactions against enlargements.

4.2.4.1.1 Russia’s Geopolitical Strategy and PMCs

The increasing influence of PMCs in carrying out Russia’s geopolitical strategy is noticeable. PMCs are playing a significant role in Moscow’s efforts to attain great power status, both in terms of tangible achievements and intangible reputation across the globe (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:131). According to Østensen and Bukkvoll (2022:132), Russia aspires to be a major global player but faces a significant gap between this ambition and the means available to achieve it. To bridge this gap, PMCs offer a cost-effective solution for enhancing Russia’s status as a major power.

Throughout various conflicts, Russia aligned themselves with governments and actors that serves Russian interest in various regions. In this context, PMCs serve a vital role in offering military and security services to these governments and actors. Russian companies offer a range of services, including bodyguard protection, military instruction, and oil field defense for leaders such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela (Clarke 2023; Lister, Shukla, and Ward 2019; Schroeder et al. 2022). In the CAR, Wagner protected the regime of Faustin-Archange Touadéra against Malian insurgents (Salih and Burke 2023; Schroeder et al. 2022). Utilizing PMCs presents Russia with an opportunity to bolster their influence and counter USA influence in conflicts, all while maintaining a cost-effective and low-risk strategy.

Russian PMCs also conduct services in the Post-USSR region, such as Mar and Redut-Aniterror/Centre operated in Abkhazia; E.N.O.T. in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Serbia, and Tajikistan; MAR in Transnistria (Jones et al. 2021:15). E.N.O.T. Corp. has conducted activities such as preventing unlawful immigration and combating organized crime and drug smuggling in Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh (Dyner 2018). PMCs have had a significant role in Eastern Ukraine since 2014. They fight with pro-Russian separatists in Donbas. Slavonic Corps, ChVK Wagner, RSB Group, E.N.O.T, MAR have operated in Ukraine in this regard (Jones et al. 2021:15). Then, PMCs, especially Wagner, deeply engage Russian-Ukrainian War.

Russia’s influence around the world is increasing with its close diplomatic, economic, military, and security cooperation. PMCs have a privileged place in Russia’s geopolitical

strategy especially towards Africa. Russian PMCs especially come to the fore in cooperation in the field of military and security (Kavak 2022). Companies contracted mostly with resource-rich states that cannot cope with their security problems on their own. Russia's best-known military company Wagner operates in Angola, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Zimbabwe (Kavak 2022). On the other hand, Patriot operates in Burundi; Sewa Security Service operates in CAR (Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:140); and RSB operates in Senegal, Libya, and Nigeria (Kavak 2022). Companies conduct tasks such as training local armies, bodyguard services, protecting oil, mining and mineral areas, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, intelligence, and many other military and security services (Fasanotti 2022; Kavak 2022; Schroeder et al. 2022). In return for the services of corporations, host governments grant concessions for mineral and natural resources extraction rights and licenses to supply weapons, technology, and military assistance (Kavak 2022; Lister et al. 2019; Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:139). In return for Wagner's activities in Sudan, the Sudanese government granted the company gold and gemstone concessions (Doxee 2022; Sharife, Dihmis, and Klazar 2022). The CAR government granted exploration rights to Lobaye Invest, a company affiliated with Wagner, at seven fields for diamonds and gold prospecting (ISSAfrica 2022). With just Sudanese governments' concession, Russia is expected to generate 130 billion dollars in revenue (Doxee 2022). Doxee (2022) argues that PMCs' economic income softens the impact of the international sanctions against Russia.

Russian military assistance for African countries through PMCs contributes to increasing Russian political influence and soft power across the continent (Doxee 2022; Østensen and Bukkvoll 2022:139). Governments and their societies are getting closer to Moscow. For instance, posters in the CAR streets read, "*Central African Republic is hand in hand with Russia!*" and Russian language lessons are on the local radios (Lister et al. 2019). National armies undergo Russian military training and use Russian strategies and weapons. In this way, Moscow becomes an significant actor in international by outmaneuvering its rivals (Lister et al. 2019). Wagner is so important in Russia-Africa relations that Prigozhin gave a photo with African ambassador at the Russia-Africa summit held in Petersburg one month after the unsuccessful armed mutiny in June 2023 (BBC News 2023).

4.2.4.2 Russia's Proxy Warfare Strategy

Russia has a history of involvement in proxy warfare, utilizing various methods such as employing Cossacks in the past, and currently relying on pliable locals, mercenaries, and

foreign nationals to gain access and influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region (Fox 2019:49–50; Hoffman and Orner 2021). Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, aligned with separatists, have killed over 10,000 and wounded 24,000 Ukrainians in the Donets Basin since 2014, with reports indicating that Russian generals are leading the proxy army (Fox 2019:50).

Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s government to protect its regional interests during the Syrian civil war. Russia supports Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad using tactics like proxies and private military companies, while also manipulating the Syrian civil war to its advantage (Fox 2019:50).

4.2.4.2.1 Russia’s Proxy Warfare Strategy and PMCs

In recent years, the Kremlin has increasingly been using PMCs as proxies to minimize political consequences and avoid casualties while accomplishing strategic goals (Karagiannis 2021:554). This trend has been observed especially in conflicts such as Ukraine, Syria, and Libya, where global and regional powers are in conflict with each other. The Kremlin’s proxy companies have supported pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 on the other hand have a pro-government stance in Syria and Libya.

Russia’s utilization of PMCs in Ukraine is a prime example of proxy warfare (Katz et al. 2020). During the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbass in 2014, a group of individuals nicknamed “little green men” appeared. They wore Russian military gear but had no identifiable markings, and were later discovered to be associated with the Wagner group. The group acted as a proxy for Moscow alongside pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, despite Russia officially denying any involvement. Wagner and other contractors have provided extensive support to separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, including training, equipment, and logistical assistance. Additionally, PMCs have played a significant role in fighting against Ukrainian military positions, utilizing armor, artillery weapons, and other means. During the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian PMCs were reported to have provided aid that blocked Ukrainian military reinforcements. Wagner deployed their special forces and artillery which resulted in the Battle of Luhansk Airport where they are believed to be responsible for shooting down a Ukrainian transport plane. In early 2015, over 300 fighters from Wagner succeeded in capturing Debaltseve thus linking Donetsk and Luhansk separatist (Katz et al. 2020). The conflict in Donbas has presented a difficult challenge for the Ukrainian government forces due to the separatists’ use of drones, electronic warfare, and cyber activities facilitated by proxy companies with support from Russia (Hoffman and Orner 2021). Companies have also conducted covert operations such as intelligence gathering, sabotage, diversion, and

assassinations. Moreover, companies have established media entities, such as Prigozhin's Kharkiv News Agency, to disseminate false information in support of pro-Russian narratives (Katz et al. 2020). This has given the separatists an advantage in the conflict against Ukrainian military. In 2015, the number of contractors varied from 2,500 to 5,000 at the peak of the conflict (Katz et al. 2020). The presence of PMCs in eastern Ukraine proved helpful for Moscow, but their influence was limited after 2015, ultimately resulting in a frozen conflict that persisted until 2022.

The Syrian Civil War presents another instance in which Russia employed PMCs as a proxy force. Russian-affiliated PMCs, such as ENOT Corp, Wagner, and Morgan Security Group, fought with pro-regime forces against opposition groups. The number of contractors in Syria has reached 1,000-3,000 (Katz et al. 2020). Sukhankin (2018:307) claims that PMC members were directed by the GRU and FSB to carry out tasks in Latakia and Aleppo. They have been actively engaged, undertaking a wide range of operations including paramilitary support, intelligence gathering, combat and security services to bolster Bashar al-Assad's regime against rebel fighters. By offering training and advice to groups such as Syria's Tiger Forces or Liwa al-Quds from Palestine while providing protection for military installations like Hmeimim Airfield and energy infrastructure facilities across central-eastern Syria, these companies performed critical roles during this conflict (Katz et al. 2020). Notably, they also carried out ground-based assaults using special operations teams who conducted reconnaissance tasks which provided valuable battlefield information. Wagner's involvement was significant in supporting Assad's forces to regain control over certain regions of the country, including the successful recapture of Palmyra from the ISIS (Sukhankin 2018:307).

The utilization of PMCs by Russia enables them to disclaim involvement and avoid political repercussions. In a clash between US forces and Wagner, who attempted to seize control of a gas plant held by Kurdish militants near Deir-al-Zor, Russia denied any association with Wagner to their US counterparts present. Despite the loss of up to 200 contractors, the conflict did not lead to significant tensions between the USA and Russia, preventing further escalation.

A further instance of Russia's utilization of PMCs as a proxy was evidenced in the Libya's civil war between General Khalifa Haftar, his Libyan National Army (LNA), and the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tobruk. In 2015, Russia provided military and financial support to Khalifa Haftar. This included proxy PMCs to train and equip Libyan troops. In 2017 and 2018, Russia utilized the combat experience and capabilities of PMCs from Syria to export them to Libya. In the summer of 2019, Russian PMC activity increased significantly,

with up to 2,000 Wagner contractors on the ground in Libya (Jones et al. 2021:41–42). Since 2017, Russian PMCs have been deployed to the Sidi Barrani airfield in Egypt with the aim of assisting Haftar by providing joint Russian-Egyptian military support (Katz et al. 2020). Over time, this became one of Russia's largest combat deployments outside of Syria through PMCs with many personnel stationed at training sites, bases, and important energy and infrastructure facilities. They performed critical tasks to aid Haftar's campaign and uphold Russian objectives in the region. The objective is to support Haftar's campaign to gain control of the entire country, creating a strategic ally for Russia.

The utilization of PMCs by Russia in countries like Ukraine, Syria, and Libya has strengthened Moscow's geostrategic position in those regions. However, Russia's attempt at a "plausible deniability" strategy resulted in sanctions on officials and groups connected to both PMC entities as well as the Kremlin itself (Katz et al. 2020).

4.2.4.3 Russia's Direct Military Intervention Strategy

On February 24, 2022, Russia declared war on Ukraine as part of the official discourse of de-Nazification and disarmament. The city, known as Bakhmut in Ukraine and Artemovsk (Артемовска) in Russia, has been the site of long and deadly battles (Reuters 2023a). It is located in Eastern Ukraine, north of the Donbas region. Before the war, it had a population of 70,000-80,000, but most of its residents fled the area due to the ongoing conflict. Those who haven't left struggle to survive in the midst of conflicts (ICRC 2023).

The controlling of Artemovsk is strategically significant for Russia, as it would bring two major cities in the Donetsk region, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, within easy range of Russian artillery (Osborn 2023). It is important for Moscow to control both in order to take over the Donetsk People's Republic. On the other hand, another motivation for the capture of the city is to compensate for Russia's withdrawal from Kherson and Kharkiv. It has been argued that Artemovsk is not engaged in any coordinated military activities, and Wagner has assumed control of the operation (Loveluck and Dixon 2022).

4.2.4.3.1 Russia's Direct Military Intervention Strategy and PMCs

The actions taken by the Wagner group in Artemovsk were similar to those of national armies during times of war. In May 2022, Russian forces advanced towards Artemovsk after the Ukrainian withdrawal from Popasna. Wagner had an important part in capturing Popasna, and as a result, Prigozhin received the highest honor of Russia, the Hero of Russia medal (Loveluck and Dixon 2022). On October 8th, Wagner began conducting military operations in

Artemovsk on behalf of Russian forces (Reuters 2023a). In January 2023, Wagner forces invaded Soledar, north of Artemovsk, with the aim of surrounding the city from the north. On April 2, 2023, Prigozhin claimed to have raised the Russian flag at Artemovsk's city hall, implying that Moscow had captured the city legally. However, Ukraine denied the claim, citing uncertainty around the location where the flag was raised (Reuters 2023a). On April 11th, Prigozhin claimed that Wagner now has control over more than 80% of Artemovsk, despite opposition from Ukraine, who argue that they have jurisdiction over more than 20% of the disputed region's controlled parameters. Intense fighting continued in Artemovsk, with Ukraine and Russia constantly changing control of certain areas. On 20 May 2023, Prigozhin released a video on his Telegram account. He declared the Wagner forces successfully captured the control of Artemovsk (Reuters 2023b). He announced that they would hand over his positions to the Russian Ministry of Defense within 15 days, starting from May 25, until June 1 (Faulconbridge 2023). A day later, on May 21, the Kremlin press office announced Putin's congratulatory message to the Wagner assault units and other service members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces who provided necessary support and protection to the flanks during the successful liberation of Artemovsk (Presidential Executive Office 2023). It is worth mentioning that the statement indicates that any military personnel who displayed exceptional behavior during the operation will be suggested for state honors (Presidential Executive Office 2023). On the other hand, The Kyiv administration denied Wagner's and Kremlin's claims, and said the Ukrainian Armed Forces were persistently countering Russian forces within the city and making progress in its suburbs, creating significant obstacles for the enemy to sustain their position in Artemovsk (Goodwin et al. 2023).

Wagner's occupation of Artemovsk have had various consequences in Russian relations with PMCs and internationally. First, Russia for the first time acknowledged its relationship with Wagner. It is important as a discourse that Putin thanked Wagner for its efforts in Artemovsk. Second, Prigozhin for the first time admitted in September 2022 that he is the founder and current director of Wagner, which he had previously denied. In a video where Prigozhin is seen recruiting prisoners for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine on behalf of Wagner, Prigozhin promises freedom to the prisoners in exchange for six months of service in the war (Engelbrecht 2022; Sauer 2022). The involvement of prisoners in the war was highly criticized. Third, during the Battle of Artemovsk, it became evident the rivalry between Wagner and the Russian military forces, especially between Prigozhin and Sergei Shoigu (Brugen 2023). Prigozhin attributes the high casualties to the Russian army commanders', particularly Shoigu and Gerasimov, failure to send ammunition. He also accused a Russian brigade of deserting

their position in the city (Faulconbridge 2023; Tarasova et al. 2023). Artemovsk has suffered significant casualties, leading President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky to liken the destruction to that of Hiroshima after the atomic bomb was dropped. Prigozhin referred to Artemovsk as a meat grinder due to its devastating impact on human life and infrastructure (Goodwin et al. 2023). Russian casualties in the defense of Artemovsk were estimated to be five times higher than Ukrainian casualties (Tarasova et al. 2023). Prigozhin claims that over 20,000 Wagner contractors lost their lives during the battle in Artemovsk (Shankar 2023).

Russian strategy of deploying Wagner group in Artemovsk have strongly condemned. Several countries have branded the group as a terrorist organization. The French National Assembly adopted the Resolution no 111, calling on France and the European Union to include the Wagner in the list of terrorist organizations dated 9 May 2023 (French Nationale Assemblée 2023). America labels Wagner as a transnational criminal organization responsible for widespread human rights abuses in Ukraine. On January 2022, Washington imposed stricter sanctions against the Wagner (Psaedakis and Holland 2023).

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS and DISCUSSIONS

The primary inquiry of this study delved into the question: “How do PMCs privatize warfare?” The study has led to the conclusion that PMCs play a pivotal role in privatizing warfare by offering an extensive array of professional military and security-related services. This spectrum spans from everyday tasks such as laundry, cooking, medical assistance, and construction to armed and unarmed services directly linked to conflicts.

Within the realm of armed services, PMCs engage in providing security services, logistics, training, maintenance and utilization of military equipment, demining, intelligence gathering and analysis, strategic planning, and, in certain cases, direct combat. Their clientele extends to the UN, MNCs, international non-governmental organizations INGOs, and notably, governments.

It is crucial to highlight that PMCs are not limited to privatizing warfare solely during active conflict but also extend their services post-conflict. Primarily, they offer demining, security, training, and consultancy services in the aftermath of conflicts.

The advantages conferred by PMCs are diverse and contribute significantly to their role in the privatization of warfare. These include cost-effectiveness, providing a flexible approach to military solutions, offering specialized expertise, ensuring rapid deployment, allowing for plausible deniability, and possessing a global reach. In conclusion, the study underscores the multifaceted role of PMCs in reshaping the landscape of warfare, both during and after conflicts, by offering a wide range of services to various entities.

The thesis aimed to answer the following sub-questions: “What approaches have the USA and Russia taken towards PMCs in the context of the privatization of warfare?” and “What are the key similarities and differences in the approaches of the USA and Russia in this regard?” The study has led to the conclusion that the USA currently holds a dominant position in the global private military and security contractor industry with numerous PMC firms operating within its borders, and a history of extensive military interventions. The USA has successfully established itself as a leading force in this field worldwide. On the other hand, Russia is a newcomer in the field of private military companies but has quickly emerged as a significant player.

	Russia	The USA
Position	New Comer	Dominant
Legal Framework		
Domestic Regulations	No	Yes
International Regulations	No	Yes
Transparency	No	Deficient
PMC Industry	Narrower geographical area, few companies	Multinational character, wide geographic area, more companies
Relations with the Government	MoD GRU FSB SVR	DoD DoS and other government agencies
Motivations		
Cost-Effectiveness	Yes	Yes
Avoid Public Reactions	Yes	Yes
Operational Flexibility	Yes	Yes
Indirect Intervention	Yes	Yes
Strategies		
Geopolitical Strategy	Yes	Yes
Proxy Warfare Strategy	Yes	Yes
Direct Military Intervention	Yes	
Counter-Terror Strategy		Yes
Counter-Drug Strategy		Yes
Humanitarian Assistance Strategy		Yes

Table 7. Comparing the USA and Russia Regarding Their PMCs Approach

One of the critical distinctions between the USA and Russia is the legal standing of PMCs. The USA made a legal framework that provides oversight and regulation for the companies, contractors, and their activities. This framework includes laws and regulations that govern the hiring, deployment, and accountability of PMCs. It is important to note that contracts supporting intelligence activities by intelligence communities are excluded from legal regulations. The USA also has participated the international efforts to regulate PMCs, Montreux Document and ICoC. In contrast, Russia neither has any legal framework regulating PMCs nor is it a party to Montreux Document and ICoC. This legal vacuum causes Russia's relationship with PMCs to be loaded with pejorative meanings. It causes PMCs to be seen as mercenaries or Kremlin's, especially Putin's, shadow army.

In terms of transparency, neither country provides full transparency regarding PMCs. When comparing the PMC strategies of the two countries in terms of transparency, American practices seem more transparent compared to Russia. Even though the USA has made legal

regulations, it is far from providing sufficient transparency. The Congress reports and the quarterly reports on DoD-contracted contractors working in the USCENTOM area of responsibility is insufficient. Reports are limited to a very narrow geographic area and contracting government agency.

There are notable differences in the PMC industries of the two states. The industry in the USA has a multinational character in terms of their operational areas and employees. There are many American based PMCs operating in the international industry. These companies employ large numbers of people on a global scale. In Russia, the industry consists of relatively few companies. They serve in a narrower geographical area. While American PMCs operate within a relatively legal framework, PMCs in Russia lack a legal framework due to the legal status of these companies. On the other hand, the most important similarity between the two industries is that the companies have close relations with the American and Russian governments. They work closely with their countries' defense and intelligence agencies.

In terms of motivations, both the USA and Russia have similar motivations. The cost-effectiveness of utilizing PMCs has been a driving factor behind their increased use. PMCs allows the governments to leverage private-sector capabilities and expertise, often at a lower cost than maintaining a standing military force for all functions. Besides cost reduction, another economic return is economic gain. The private military industry is a growing industry. While the USA takes the largest share in this industry, Russia gains economic privileges in various parts of the world. Second, they provide an opportunity to employ military force outside with minimal risk to domestic troops not involved in defensive operations. PMCs provide avoid public reactions. Third, PMCS offer the operational flexibility. They are able to quickly mobilize and deploy resources, adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, and provide specialized services tailored to specific mission requirements. Fourth, PMCs are useful tools for indirect interventions. They offer plausible deniability, which can help to mitigate international and domestic reactions in the event of failure.

	Russia			
	Goal	PMCs	Places	Activities
Geopolitical Strategy and PMCs	Great Power Status, Anti-American Stance, Maintain Influence in Post-USSR Region	Mar, Redut-Aniterror/Centre, E.N.O.T., Slavonic Corps, Wagner, RSB Group, Patriot, Sewa Security Service	Abkhazia, Belarus, Serbia, Tajikistan, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Ukraine, Angola, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, CAR, DRC, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Senegal, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela	Military training, military and security advice, intelligence, military instruction, regime protection, preventing unlawful immigration, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, combating organized crime and drug smuggling, combating, protecting oil, mining and mineral fields, and many other military and security services
Proxy Warfare Strategy and PMCs	Indirect involvements	E.N.O.T. Wagner, and Morgan Security Group,	Crimea, Donbas, Syria, Libya	Military training and advice, equipment, logistical assistance, security services, combating, intelligence gathering, sabotage, diversion, assassinations, security of energy and infrastructure facilities, electronic warfare and cyber activities
Direct Military Interventions and PMCs	Occupation of Artemovsk	Wagner	Artemovsk	All military and security activities that conducted military army

Table 8. Russia's Strategies and PMCs

	The USA			
	Goal	PMCs	Places	Activities
Geopolitical Strategy and PMCs	Maintain its dominant position, Implement proactive foreign policy, Expand areas of influence and soft power, Protect energy resources, Promote American Values	MPRI, KBR, Booz Allen Hamilton, BDM, SAIC, Vinnell, Vinnel Arabia, DynCorp, Eagle Group International, Omega Training Group	Africa, Asia, Balkans and former Soviet regions, the Middle East, Latin America	Tactical expertise, training, logistical support, intelligence gathering capabilities, security of energy and infrastructure facilities, democracy promotion
Proxy Warfare Strategy and PMCs	Strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian Forces	Mozart Group	Ukraine	Training, intelligence gathering, battlefield clearance, and humanitarian aid support
Counter-Terror Strategy and PMCs	Prevent terrorist attacks, dismantle terrorist networks, and protect the American people and critical infrastructure, obstructing terrorists' access to weapons of mass destruction, cutting the economic and human resources of terrorists, hampering militants in establishing operational bases within national territories, promoting democracy,	DynCorp, Fluor, Blackwater AirScan Inc., CACI, KBR, MPRI, Titan, Triple Canopy, Vinnel, USIS	Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria	security services, logistical support, intelligence, military training and advice, interpretation, interrogation, combating, construction, security of energy and infrastructure facilities, IT solutions, secure communication systems, force management, aerial surveillance, other military and security activities
Counter-Drug Strategy and PMCs	Combat drug trafficking, decrease drug consumption, and minimize the adverse impacts of drug abuse on society	DynCorp, California Microwave Systems, Airscan INS, ACS Defense, Lockheed Martin, Alion, Raytheon, ITT, ARINC L-3 Communications, Northrop Grumman	Mexico, Colombia, Afghanistan	military and security training, intelligence, pilot, logistic support, operational support, maintenance and support of military equipments, pilot service, technical support

Humanitarian Assistance Strategy and PMCs	Strengthening the capabilities of other countries to handle security challenges and participate in peace operations	Blackwater, DynCorp, MPRI, PAE, Virginia and Logicon	Africa	restructuring of national armies, military and security training, logistic support, constructing and managing camps, establishing supply lines, providing vehicle recovery and maintenance
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Table 9. The USA's Strategies and PMCs

In terms of strategies, the geopolitical and proxy strategies of the two countries often overlap. Both Kremlin and Washington have increasingly using PMCs to achieve their geopolitical goals. With cost-effectiveness and qualified contractors PMCs are useful tools to fill the gap between geopolitics ambitions and resources. While the USA tries to maintain its current position, Russia tries to strengthen its geopolitical position. For this purpose, The USA aims to maintain its influence in the global arena, to prevent any possible attack on its country, and to ensure energy security in order to maintain its economic power. Several companies, including MPRI, KBR, DynCorp, Fluor, Blackwater, AirScan Inc., CACI, Titan, Triple Canopy, Vinnel, and USIS have played an important role in realizing the geopolitical goals of the USA. Russia, on the other hand, exhibits an anti-American stance, expands its sphere of influence in the world and aims to maintain its influence especially in the Post-USSR geography. Mar, Redut-Aniterror/Centre, E.N.O.T., Slavonic Corps, Wagner, RSB Group, Patriot, and Sewa Security Service have contributed significantly to achieving Russia's geopolitical objectives.

Both states employ PMCs in their proxy strategies. This enables them to achieve their strategic objectives without directly involving themselves in conflicts. They use PMCs to defend their own interests in conflict zones and to counter the threats posed by rival powers. This approach is politically acceptable, financially less demanding, and offers flexibility and adaptability for governments. USA utilized the newly established Mozart Group to provide training, intelligence gathering, battlefield clearance, and humanitarian aid support to boost Ukraine's position against Russia. On the other hand, Russia utilized E.N.O.T., Wagner and Morgan Security Group as part of its proxy strategy to support separatist movements in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, as well as to support pro-Russian governments in Syria and Libya. The companies provided military training and advice, equipment, logistical assistance, security services, combating, intelligence gathering, sabotage, diversion, assassinations, security of energy and infrastructure facilities, electronic warfare and cyber activities.

Although there are some similarities, there are also differences between the PMC strategies of the two states. Russia uses PMCs directly in warfare, while the USA utilizes them for counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and humanitarian assistance. These distinctions separate the approaches of the two states. The controlling of Artemovsk town marked a significant shift in Russia's relationship with PMCs. For the first time, Russia did not deny that Wagner fought on his side at the Battle of Artemovsk. This example caused Wagner's activities in Artemovsk to be evaluated as a direct intervention strategy rather than a proxy. Wagner was in charge of the military and security operations. The war between Ukrainian forces and the PMCs over the town ended with the company's "victory".

The USA extensively utilized PMCs in its counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. PMCs have provided a wide variety of services includes security services, logistical support, intelligence, military training and advice, interpretation, interrogation, construction, security of energy and infrastructure facilities, IT solutions, secure communication systems, force management, aerial surveillance, other military and security activities and even combat operations. Activities of PMCs has been the most discussed topic in the literature.

Another strategy differentiating the USA from Russia is using PMCs in the counter-narcotics. PMCs provided military and security training, intelligence, pilot services, logistics, operational and technical support, and maintenance in Mexico, Colombia, and Afghanistan. They supported the American efforts to combat drug trafficking, decrease drug consumption, and minimize the adverse impacts of drug abuse on society.

Finally, another strategy of the USA, different from Russia, is to use PMCs within the scope of Humanitarian Assistance. Blackwater, DynCorp, MPRI, PAE, Virginia, and Logicon have played a significant role in strengthening the capabilities of other countries to handle security challenges and participate in peace operations. They have provided services such as restructuring of national armies, military and security training, logistics, construction and management of camps, establishment of supply lines, and vehicle recovery and maintenance activities.

In conclusion, in terms of effectiveness, the specialized expertise offered by PMCs on warfare is primarily important. They offer a wide portfolio in this context. This specialization can contribute to the effectiveness of PMCs in certain roles and tasks. Additionally, they provide flexibility and rapid deployments in global reach. By privatizing certain military tasks to PMCs, governments can allow their official military forces to focus on core national defense responsibilities. However, it should be noted that the USA's long-term operations in Afghanistan, which relied heavily on PMCs, did not achieve the desired results. After the

withdrawal of the USA, the administration passed to the Taliban forces, and the Afghanistan army was not strong enough to maintain its dominance in the region. Additionally, the groups associated with terrorism by the USA were not cleared from the region. Similarly, expected results were not achieved in Iraq and Syria.

The autonomy of PMCs is an important matter that deserves attention. PMCs operate with a certain degree of autonomy from government bureaucracies in both cases, which allows for quick decision-making and implementation of military strategies. The Wagner Group in Russia is a good example that shows how some PMCs have an increased level of autonomy. The Wagner mutiny is an instance of such independence, which indicates that companies may follow their own agendas. Addressing the autonomy issue of PMCs requires a delicate balance between operational flexibility and accountability. It is important to establish well-defined regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms at both national and international levels.

The accountability issue surrounding PMC remains a complex challenge in contemporary international relations. The lack of internationally accepted standards and limited liability contracts makes it difficult to establish accountability mechanisms for PMCs operating in different countries and territories. Additionally, because PMCs are corporate entities, justice for their actions often falls within corporate legal frameworks, such as in the case of DynCorp, rather than traditional military justice systems. As the privatization of warfare continues, addressing the accountability issue is crucial to fostering responsible conduct and upholding ethical standards in private military operations. This requires international collaboration.

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