

**REBEL GOVERNANCE AS A POST-CONFLICT
SURVIVAL STRATEGY: The Impact of Wartime Rebel
State-Building on Post-Conflict Power-Sharing**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Recent studies in civil war literature showed that insurgent groups engage in a rival institution-building process on rebel-held territories. They establish governing institutions and provide services for civilians in the fields of education, health, adjudication, and security. Previous research on rebel governance explains the variance in rebel groups' capability of governing the conflict zone. However, the literature still lacks studies evaluating the implications of rebel governance on the post-conflict order such as power-sharing between the government and the insurgent groups. This thesis aims at analyzing the relationship between the insurgent state-building and post-war power-sharing. In this study, I develop a theoretical framework to explain why some rebel groups are better than others in receiving a share of state power in the post-civil war order. First, I discuss the logic of the bargaining process among the warring parties and the challenges it creates in front of peaceful power-sharing. Further, I present my theory explaining the rebels' strategy of using wartime state-building as leverage in the bargaining process to convince the states to share power. I test my argument using logistic and OLS regression models based on two existing large-N datasets of rebel governance and power-sharing. The results indicate a statistically significant and positive impact of rebel governance on the likelihood and the level of power-sharing among former combatants.

ÖZETÇE

BİR SAVAŞ SONRASI HAYATTA KALMA STRATEJİSİ OLARAK İSYANCI GRUPLARIN BÖLGE YÖNETİMİ: İsyancı Devlet İnşasının Savaş Sonrası Güç Paylaşımına Etkisi

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İç savaş literatüründe yapılan son araştırmalar, isyancı silahlı örgütlerin kendi kontrollerindeki bölgelerde rakip bir kurum inşa etme sürecine girdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Birçok isyancı örgütün eğitim, sağlık, yargı ve güvenlik gibi alanlarda kurumlar inşa edip sivillere hizmet sağladıkları gösterilmiştir. Silahlı örgütlerin bulundukları bölgede rakip devlet inşasını inceleyen önceki araştırmalar çoğunlukla bu grupların çatışma bölgesini yönetme kapasitelerindeki farklılığı açıklamaktadır. Fakat literatür halen, hükümet ve isyancı örgütler arasındaki güç paylaşımı konusu gibi, örgütlerin kurum inşasının çatışma sonrası düzendeki olası etkilerini değerlendiren çalışmaların eksikliği içindedir. Bu tez, isyancı devlet inşası ile savaş sonrası aktörler arası güç paylaşımı arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, iç savaş sonrası düzende bazı isyancı grupların devlet gücünden pay alma konusunda neden diğerlerinden daha iyi olduğunu açıklamak için teorik bir çerçeve geliştirmektedir. İlk olarak, savaşan taraflar arasındaki pazarlık sürecinin mantığını ve barışa yönelik güç paylaşımının önünde yarattığı zorluklar tartışılmıştır. Devamında, isyancıların savaş zamanı sürdürdükleri kurum inşasını, güç paylaşımı pazarlığında devletleri ikna etmek için bir koz olarak kullanma stratejisini açıklayan teorimi sunulmuştur. Temel argüman, isyancı örgütlerin kurdukları yönetimler ve güç paylaşımına ilişkin mevcut iki büyük veri setine dayanan lojistik ve OLS regresyon modeli kullanılarak test edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, isyancı örgüt yönetiminin savaş aktörleri arasındaki güç paylaşımı olasılığı ve seviyesi üzerinde istatistiksel olarak anlamlı ve olumlu bir etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir.

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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

In August 2005, the Indonesian government, and Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace agreement ending the thirty-year-long deadly civil war. The agreement was a deal of power-sharing among the government and GAM which gave full autonomy to the Aceh region, granted 70 percent of the region's natural sources to Aceh people, and enabled former GAM members to compete in the provincial and district-level executive government elections (pilkada) held in December 2006 (Lee, 2020). Scholars mostly associated this reconciliation that came after many failed peace attempts with the devastating impact of the tsunami disaster happened in the Aceh region. However, another factor seems to be critical to explain the ex-adversaries' compromise on a final power-sharing agreement in 2005: the major shift in the war strategy of GAM after the fall of former leader Suharto in 1998. Under the new exiled leadership, GAM transformed its strategy from conducting guerilla warfare into being a popular movement with a political agenda. GAM rebels created a structure of government and started to provide civil services (Schulze, 2004). They issued ID cards for local people, put taxes on economic activities, opened schools, and created local courts for intra-civil issues (Albert, 2020). After Helsinki Agreement, GAM members had not only incorporated rebel institutions into the new political structure but also secured formal executive/legislative positions and had achieved turning their erstwhile insurgent organization into a functioning system of governance with plenty of supporters. Why did GAM change its wartime strategy after twenty years and did it play a role in GAM's presence and power in the post-conflict order? In fact, GAM is just one of many insurgent groups that build various governing institutions during the war and share power with the government at the

end of the conflict. This spurs me to inquire about a possible association between rebel governance and post-conflict power-sharing.

What is the post-war benefit for rebels of wartime institution-building and service-providing? How does rebel governance shape the power-sharing among ex-combatant political actors in the post-conflict setting? How effective are insurgents' quasi-state institutions at endowing rebels with the popular and international support and legitimacy they need to endure after the war? Does non-state service provision aggravate or mitigate the bargaining power of rebels at the negotiation table to end the war? Under what conditions do non-state militants' informal governance institutions co-exist with states' formal institutions? Despite growing interest in the non-violent governing activity of insurgent groups, these foundational and significant questions remain unanswered.

Previous research demonstrates that militia groups deliver a range of public goods and services to civilians in their self-proclaimed rebel governments (Arjona, Kasfir, & Mampilly, 2015). In general, scholars focus on explaining (1) why rebels create institutions and deliver public services, (2) what types of institutions they choose to build, and (3) how these institutions influence conflict processes and the post-war environment. It is perplexing why rebels, who are involved in bloody armed struggles, provide public services and build governmental institutions despite it would direct resources away from their military strength. Scholars' answers to this question can be categorized under two categories: controlling territory and gaining civilian support. While a body of research claim that rebel governance is about structuring rebel-civilian interaction to control the territory (Arjona, 2014, 2016; Kasfir, 2015; Johnston et al., 2016; Mampilly, 2011; Weinstein, 2007), others argue that rebels build institutions to gain legitimacy and provide

services to win civilian support (Kalyvas, 2006; Mampily, 2015; Stewart, 2018; Weinstein, 2007; Wickham-Crowley, 1987). When it comes to analyzing the different types of institutions rebels choose to create, scholars bring different explanations. Kalyvas (2015) claims that ideology matters and shows how communist groups create highly bureaucratic institutions to mobilize the masses. They also, together with religious groups, are more inclined to found court systems (Ginsburg, 2019). Similarly, Maoist communist groups are also found to create more effective governance systems (Mampily, 2011) and Chinese model revolutionary groups are shown to be good at maximal governance (Stewart, 2021). Last but not least, an emerging body of research investigates diverse impacts of insurgent institution building and service delivery in the post-conflict setting. Huang (2016b) and Knight (2018) examine a possible link between rebel governance and post-war democratization. While Huang (2016b) finds no relationship between rebel governance and democratization and argues that rebels' dependence on civilians for material needs is the factor behind democratization, Knight (2018) argues that rebel governance increases the likelihood of democratization as long as civilians are incorporated into rebel institutions. Kubota (2017) explores the impact of rebel wartime institutions on post-conflict identity and finds that when rebels engage in governance, it leads to the construction of a subnational identity among civilians. Lindsay Heger and Danielle Jung (2017) make a significant contribution to the literature by showing that rebels are more likely to sit at the negotiation table during the mediation process when they provide public goods and services at the time of war. Although growing research has investigated several aspects, rebel governance literature is still far from grasping the post-war ramifications of insurgent state-building comprehensively. Without considering the rebels' post-war projections and goals, it is not possible to analyze the wartime strategies of rebels and post-conflict political order. In this thesis, I aim to fill this gap and explain

how rebels' non-violent activity during conflict shapes post-conflict political structure. Having discussed what rebel governance scholars explored so far and what they do not, below, I will turn to power-sharing literature to review what aspects of power-sharing have been studied by scholars and how my thesis contributes to an overlooked part of it.

Power-sharing literature is mostly considered to commence with Lijphart's (1969, 1977) early theory of "consociational democracy". In his theory, Lijphart gives the formula of sharing power in divided societies as the elite cooperation in the political system. His studies mostly focus on plural studies of Europe like the Netherlands and evaluate the concept of power-sharing in the context of comparative political systems- not in the context of civil wars¹. Starting from the early studies of Walter and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), power-sharing has begun to be studied by conflict scholars. A vast majority of researchers focused on the impact of power-sharing on peace duration and post-war democratization while very few of them investigated the determinants of it.

As a means to compel rebels to lay down arms and give up their military goals, power-sharing is claimed to strongly contribute to the peace settlement (Walter, 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; 2007; Cederman et al., 2015; Gates et al., 2016). A group of scholars explained this positive relationship based on the power-sharing agreements' role in solving the commitment problem between warring actors (Mukharjee, 2006; Mattes and Savun; 2009). Accordingly, power allocation among adversaries, helps them to credibly commit to each other's de-militarization promises and in turn, leads to reconciliation. However, this approach does not consider the fact that power-sharing agreements are

¹ A detailed description of Lijphart's "consociational democracy" theory is provided in the literature review chapter of this thesis.

themselves deals to be signed with the trust of both parties. There must be a factor that convenes both parties – especially the state, that the other is sincere in its appeal for peace. As will be explained in the theory chapter, I argue that rebel governance is the factor that helps parties overcome the commitment problem by showing the government and the international actors that rebels might also have non-violent aims (i.e., state-building and service providing).

Another strand of research investigated the impact of power-sharing on democratic stability/democratization. Many scholars argued that power-sharing is a means of elite cooperation which mitigates societal cleavages and fosters democracy (Lijphart, 1969, 1977; Norris 2008; Graham, Miller, and Strom, 2017). An important number of scholars opposed the majority in the literature claiming that power-sharing gives rise to peace endurance and democratization. Accordingly, power-sharing does not mitigate but aggravates the societal cleavages through formalizing them and it does not compel rebels to lay down arms, rather, it makes them seek more concessions (Horowitz, 2003; Tull and Mehler, 2005; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008). All these discussions in the power-sharing scholarship are held on the post-war impact of power-sharing on peace or democracy. Just a couple of studies explored when or under what conditions ex-warring parties accept to share power. Wucherpfennig and his friends (2016) look at civil wars in post-colonial states and claim that the geographic location of ethnic groups under colonial rule matters for their power-sharing inclination. They find that if an ethnic group is located far from the center when the country is under colonial rule, it is less likely for that group to be included in the political system of the country in the post-colonial era. Nomikos (2021) explains insurgents' acceptance of a power-sharing agreement based on a threat approach. According to his theory, if a rebel group leadership is threatened by an

intra-group faction, it is less likely to accept to share power with the government. However, if there is not a “factionalist” threat and the only security threat is caused by the government itself, the rebels are likely to agree on power-sharing to eliminate the threat (Nomikos, 2021). Last but not least, Stephen Gent (2011) explains power-sharing likelihood based on the relative strength of rebels. Based on his quantitative analysis he finds that as the rebel group’s relative strength increases, it is more likely that the government accepts to share power with the insurgents (Gent, 2011).

As summarized above, the vast majority of power-sharing scholars focus on peace duration and democracy and do not investigate the factors leading to an allocation of power among actors. Very few numbers of scholars (i.e., Gent, 2011; Wucherpfennig et al., 2016, Nomikos, 2021) theorize about a determinant of power-sharing. Among them, only Gent’s (2011) theory of relative rebel strength considers the bargaining process between the government and the insurgents. It is very plausible to expect that stronger rebels are more likely to have concessions from the government as argued by Gent (2011). However, it is inadequate to analyze only the military capabilities of a rebel group when calculating its bargaining power. Rebels invest in wartime institution-building and public good delivery at the expense of a reduction in their military power since they have limited material sources. If they spend their money to provide public services and thus, give up a part of their military power, surely there is a benefit for them from such an investment in the long term. Therefore, a solid analysis of the bargaining power of rebels requires considering their soft power- which is the international and domestic support and legitimacy they gain through institution building and service provision. Power-sharing literature does not seem to answer the question of how and under what conditions is a government persuaded (or constrained) to share its power with its enemy. Likewise, this

aspect is also overlooked by rebel governance researchers who pay less attention to the post-war aspirations of rebel groups and their wartime strategies to be part of the post-conflict order. Few studies focus on post-war implications of rebel governance such as democratization and identity building which does not take into account rebels' and rebel institutions' existence in the post-war setting. In addition, not considering rebels' post-war plans leads scholars to explain rebel governance only with their wartime needs that they extract from local people such as fighters, money, food, or shelter. However, building institutions is too costly and should not be something attractive if rebels only seek wartime benefits from it. Thus, I believe, when deciding on governing activities, rebels make their plan and draw their strategy calculating its long-term/post-war benefits. At this point, my theory brings an alternative explanation to fill the gap that emerged due to both power-sharing and rebel governance literature's overlook.

I argue that rebels' institution-building and service-providing efforts turn them back with a share of the state's power in the post-war setting. Institution-building rebels gain civilian support and legitimacy by providing the services that local people need in their everyday life. They also garner international legitimacy by signaling worldwide that they care about their constituents' needs and well-being just as a state does. Moreover, they can have outside support by creating networks with foreign actors through the diplomatic institutions they create. In addition to bringing domestic and international support and legitimacy, rebel institution building comes with another advantage: reducing the cost of re-governance by the central government. In conflict zones, state institutions might be out of service because of the security threat to government officers or they can be physically destroyed by the war's devastating effect. Rebel institutions fill this gap and provide everyday life services to civilians such as education, healthcare, or policing. When the

conflict comes to an end the government needs to carry out the “re-governance” of the post-conflict territory by re-establishing service-providing institutions and making them function as soon as possible. Admittedly, it requires money and time which are very hard to find for the government considering its post-war devastated economy and local people’s immediate needs. Alternatively, the government can allow rebels’ governing institutions to stay in the post-conflict environment with their buildings and also personnel. In the post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo, a new police force was to be created and the government recruited ex-rebels in this force to meet the security personnel need (Davis, 2013). This is a pure example of military power-sharing in a post-conflict order.² The cost and the difficulty of re-governance, therefore, make already-founded rebel institutions a valuable asset in the hands of insurgents. These three benefits (domestic support, international legitimacy, and cost of re-governance) rebels obtain from choosing to govern translate into solid leverage at the negotiation table against the government and increase rebels’ relative bargaining capability. In turn, rebels have more power to compel the state to give concessions from its political, economic, military, and territorial authority and co-exist with the ex-rebels. Hence, I argue that rebels’ wartime governing activities enhance their likelihood of sharing power with the state in the post-war setting. This claim is tried to be justified throughout this thesis. In the next chapter, I will discuss what has been said by the literature on my dependent variable- power sharing, and what is still yet to be explained. I will also add a brief discussion of previous research on my explanatory variable – rebel governance and demonstrate what aspect of it has been overlooked by scholars. Then, I will show where my theory stands among other studies’ findings and talk about the gap it aims to fill. In the following (“Theory”) chapter,

² For the types of power-sharing, see the literature review chapter of this thesis.

I will describe how rebel governance leads to power-sharing and provide my hypotheses about the link between the two. While the “Research Design” chapter will describe my dataset and the variables that I used to test my arguments, the results will be discussed in the “Empirical Analysis” chapter. Finally, I will summarize my thesis and explain the contributions and limitations of this study in the “Conclusion” chapter.



Chapter 2: **LITERATURE REVIEW**

2.1 Introduction

Once a civil war starts, it is very hard to cease. Even if it reaches an end, it always has the risk of recurring in a short period. Power-sharing, mostly described as allocating the ruling power among political opponents, is believed to be a prominent instrument for conflict resolution. In this chapter, I will review the previous research on power-sharing. I will discuss how the literature studied power-sharing and what they disregarded. I will also explain how my theory contributes to exploring the disregarded aspect of power-sharing. In addition, since my theory lies on the nexus of power-sharing and rebel governance literature, I will provide a brief review of rebel governance research and the missing points in it at the end of this chapter.

By including the political elite in joint executive coalitions, power-sharing institutions are designed to foster peace in ethnically divided societies (Bormann et al., 2019). Today, sharing the state power among the former enemies is the prevailing idea in the international community's solution mechanism to end a civil war but scholars have not yet reached a consensus on whether power-sharing achieves its aim of conflict resolution. While a body of research suggests that post-conflict power-sharing has ultimately a "pacifying" effect on the civil conflict recurrence (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Lijphart, 1977; Norris, 2008; Walter, 2002), other scholars disagree with them claiming that power-sharing has a negative or no impact on the peace endurance (Mehler, 2009; Rothchild & Roeder, 2005; Selway & Templeman, 2012; Tull & Mehler, 2005). The main reason for the scholars' reaching such divergent conclusions on power-sharing is their lack of agreement on what power-sharing is, how it works and how to study it. Thus, the literature

has taken different approaches to conceptualization, operationalization, measurement, and impacts of power-sharing, which will be discussed below.

Apart from the absence of consensus on what power-sharing is and how to study it, the literature also lacks strong attention to the determinants of power-sharing. Following the early “consociational democracy” theory of A. Lijphart, the “father of power-sharing”, a large majority of the literature has investigated the existence and the functioning of the causal link between power-sharing and peace (Binningsbø, 2013). Few studies have substantially explored the motivation and rationale behind power-sharing (Sambanis, 2020). This review will also examine those empirical studies that question the determinants of power-sharing and try to show how these studies do not address the need of explaining the motives of rebel groups to share power.

2.2 Definition and Conceptualization of power-sharing

Power-sharing is a broad and contested concept that lacks a unanimous definition in the literature. While a body of research considers power-sharing narrowly as the involvement of the opposition groups in joint governments (Barbara F. Walter, 2002), others adopt Lijphart’s (1969) consociational democracy and consider a broad range of political, economic, territorial, or military institutions of power-sharing in plural societies (Norris, 2008). Some scholars include only short-term conflict-ending arrangements in their power-sharing understanding, others expand their power-sharing definition towards long-term practices which bring compromise among diverse groups (Bormann et al., 2019).

While some recent studies prefer to use a precise definition of power-sharing, many of them can still be regarded within Lijphart's path. For instance, Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2003, 2007, 2020) conceptualization of power-sharing in the post-conflict setting might

have been seen to have a different understanding from Lijphart's consociational democracy, however, the authors consider their perception in line with Lijphart's. Thus, understanding the essence of power-sharing in the literature requires one to comprehend Lijphart's early conceptualization of "consociational democracy", which will be discussed in detail below.

Being characterized as the "father of power-sharing" by his successors in the literature, Arend Lijphart (1969) is the first to describe power-sharing in divided societies with his theory of 'consociational democracy' (Binningsbø, 2013). In addition to his early work (1969) in which he evaluates power-sharing in a few plural European countries, Lijphart has continued to amplify the literature with his subsequent work (1977, 1985, 1999). He introduced power-sharing in his early studies (1968, 1969), but he elucidated on its theoretical perspectives mostly in his later work (1977). Lijphart builds his theory based on two aspects: a sociopolitical component indicating the pluralist quality of the society, and a political component focusing on elite cooperation in the political arena. He identifies elite cooperation by four different institutional elements which are "grand coalition", "mutual veto", "proportional representation", and "segmental autonomy" (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).

Lijphart presents the grand coalition as the most crucial one of these consociational elements (Binningsbø, 2013). This coalition gathers leaders from all major linguistic and religious groups who seek to reach a consensus. In different political systems this coalition may emerge in different forms such as a 'grand coalition cabinet' in parliamentary systems, a 'grand coalition of the president and top officeholders' in presidential systems, and 'broadly inclusive councils' with advisory function (Lijphart, 1985, p. 7).

Secondly, the mutual veto is another vital quality of Lijphart's theory since it provides shelter for the rights of minorities by endowing them with the power of blocking others' political decisions (1977). He also notes that this veto might also be formed through informal or unwritten veto structures such as a delaying veto that provide more time to solve the problem or through a fixed quota of votes for a decision to be made.

Proportional distribution is another leg of consociational democracy that enables different groups to influence the decision-making procedures proportional to their extent (Lijphart, 1977). It can be achieved through the proportional allocation of the seats in the parliament, positions in the judiciary and civil service, posts in the army, and even the offices in the state-owned companies which are primary financial sources of the state. (Lijphart, 1977, p. 38). It can be argued that proportional distribution has a basis on all four types of power-sharing (i.e., political, economic, military, territorial) which are conceptualized and studied by late scholars (Gent, 2011; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009).

Lastly, segmental autonomy, unlike the other three elements which contribute to a joint decision-making process, is a quality that leaves the decisions regarding the societal groups' exclusive concern such as issues related to their religion, language, or education, to each group's decision-making mechanism (Lijphart, 1977). Admittedly, a significant question here is "Where does a segment start and end?". According to Lijphart, segmental autonomy can be built upon group membership or territory relying on the demographic distribution of the population (1977). Altogether these four qualities- grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional distribution, and segmental autonomy construct the consociational democracy in a plural society that would lead to elite cooperation and consensus-building (Lijphart, 1977).

Within the literature, Hartzell and Hoddie's (2003) early study and their description of power-sharing have been followed by late scholars the most after Lijphart's (1969) pioneering concept of consociational democracy. Different from Lijphart who studied power-sharing in the context of plural societies, Hartzell and Hoddie examine the concept in post-conflict settings. The authors define power-sharing provisions as "rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power" (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, p. 320). By this broad definition, the authors mean all political, economic, military, and territorial arrangements among the civil war competitors that enable them to vanquish the commitment problems (Gent, 2011). With this understanding of power-sharing based on four different means of allocating state power, the authors assert that they not only include all elements of Lijphart's consociational democracy but also add economic and military aspects that Lijphart's conceptualization is short of covering (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2020). Many other scholars who seek to explain the impact of power-sharing on post-conflict peace rely on this definition by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) which is fundamentally based on Lijphart's (1969) theory of consociational democracy.

Following the early studies of Walter (2002) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) who introduced the concept of power-sharing to the conflict literature, many other scholars define and conceptualize power-sharing as typically the institutional mechanisms to distribute the state power among different former enemies. For instance, in their prominent study introducing an original power-sharing dataset – PSED – Ottmann and Vullers describe power-sharing as "any arrangements" between a government and armed

groups that ensure the “use of state power” (2015, p. 328). Similarly, a recent study by W. Nomikos restricts its definition to “post-conflict” power-sharing which is prescribed as a “political arrangement” agreed upon by former enemies to share “executive policy-making responsibilities” of the state (2021, pp. 249-250). He then distinguishes between the institutional and proportional power-sharing arrangements in which the former endows the political actors with veto power whereas the latter only gives them an electoral representation in the executive.

All in all, power-sharing is a debated concept defined by scholars in many ways. This heterogeneity in conceptualization inevitably leads scholars to draw different typologies and utilize different operationalization methods to study power-sharing. The next section will discuss various typologies of power-sharing from the pioneer study of Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) which is based on political, economic, military, and territorial dimensions to the emerging scholars’ alternative categorizations such as Strom and his friends’ (2017) three-group classification of power-sharing arrangements.

2.3 *Types of Power-Sharing*

A significant critique by the emerging scholars of the power-sharing literature is its deficient focus on the types of power-sharing (Nomikos, 2021). Power-sharing is a broad concept that may emerge in many different forms and these different types may have diverse impacts on peacebuilding or democracy. However, few studies distinguish between different types of power-sharing and explain their effect separately.

The most common typology of power-sharing is classifying them based on the field of arrangements (i.e., political, economic, military, territorial). Walter (2002) establishes

three types of power-sharing – political, territorial, and military – and analyzes their impacts independently. While she conceptualizes the political pact as offering rebels guaranteed positions in the cabinet or the government, a military pact implies a special quota for the rebel forces in a new national army. A territorial pact is explained as giving regional autonomy to the rebel-held autonomy and even in some cases creating a self-governing government for the insurgents (Walter, 2002, pp. 63-64).

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) also include economic power-sharing as a fourth type in addition to Walter's (2002) typology. However, the authors conceptualize and code these four types of power-sharing differently from B. Walter. The political dimension simply refers to the distribution of political power among the settlement parties and can take the form of electoral, administrative, or executive proportional representation. Territorial power-sharing determines the division of autonomy among different government levels based on federalism or regional autonomy provisions. While the military dimension implies the distribution of coercive power among the combatants, the economic dimension determines the allocation of the state's economic resources among the warring parties (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, p. 320). A wide range of researchers have followed completely this typology of Hartzell and Hoddie or used it after modifying it in certain manners. Cammett and Malesky (2012) for instance, adopt the four-part typology of Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) but conceptualize political power-sharing as distinct from the latter. The authors distinguish between the closed-list and open-list proportional representation and also include executive coalition, forced legislative coalition, specific veto rules, and proportional civil service appointment in their understanding of political power-sharing (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Similarly, S. Gent utilizes the typology of Hartzell and Hoddie's dataset but excludes economic power-sharing from his analysis (2011).

Another influential typology of power-sharing used in empirical studies is the three-part typology of Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017). The authors define ‘inclusive, dispersive, and constraining’ forms of power-sharing based on the functional quality of the arrangements. Inclusive arrangements ensure the involvement of different groups in the decision-making process so that the power can be exercised jointly by multiple recognized groups. Including warring parties in the policy-making mechanism ensures that a broader set of interests could be reflected in the policies. Dispersive arrangements allocate the authority among the antagonist actors to restrict the power of one group over the others. The authors consider territorial decentralization as an example of dispersive arrangements. The last type of power-sharing Graham and his colleagues describe is constraining arrangements through which the power of the political actors over the citizens is limited in a certain way. These institutions are designed to protect ordinary citizens from any abuse and encroachment by the actors and thus, they limit the political authority while maximizing citizens’ autonomy (Graham et al., 2017, pp. 688-689). There have been both followers and critics of this typology in the literature. While Bormann and his friends (2019) use the typology and the dataset of Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017), Sambanis (2020) criticizes their typology and reduces it to only two types - inclusive and dispersive – of power-sharing in his analysis.

Last but not least, W. Nomikos offers a new typology to classify the power-sharing forms (Nomikos, 2021). He distinguishes between institutional and proportional power-sharing arrangements. Institutional power-sharing is identified as the regime in which the former warring parties obtain the power of vetoing state policies using their seats in the executive offices (Nomikos, 2021, p. 250). An important distinction of his understanding of mutual veto from the previous research is the involvement of not only the explicit veto arrangements documented in peace agreements but also ‘informal or unwritten’ forms of

veto power that can inevitably emerge from the institutional arrangement. In this sense, Nomikos allies himself with Lijphart's original formulation of mutual veto as discussed in the conceptualization part of this literature review. Proportional power-sharing, differently, is a regime that forms its government based on the election results. In most cases, these regimes put certain quotas for ethnic groups in the legislature so that all major ethnic groups could be in the policymaking. However, this type of power-sharing does not ensure a veto power for the political actors and does not ensure the representation of all ethnic groups in the political power unless they succeeded in the elections (Nomikos, 2021, p. 250). Thus, the two types of power-sharing differ mainly in two qualities: their reliance on the election results and the provision of mutual veto. Institutional power-sharing guarantees the participation of different ethnic groups in political power without an electoral requirement and endows each group with the power to veto the chief executive's political decisions. The proportional one lacks both critical qualities that bolster the power-sharing among the political actors.

As discussed in detail above, the literature lacks a comprehensive empirical analysis of the types of power-sharing. The field-based typology that was introduced by studies of Walter (2002) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007) and followed by a great number of scholars does not classify power-sharing according to its functional qualities such as inclusive or dispersive characteristics of the provisions. On the other hand, emerging scholars' typologies brought a novel perspective to the literature by categorizing the power-sharing based on the operational properties but, they fall short of capturing the power-sharing arrangements that emerged in other fields other than the political one. For instance, as admitted by the author himself, one cannot analyze the foundation of the Mozambican Defense Force – a joint army including the members of two belligerent groups – after the end of the years-long civil war in Mozambique by only using the

typology introduced by Nomikos (2021). Therefore, the literature still needs to have an extensive typology to analyze different power-sharing forms that can include both the variance in the fields and the functional qualities of power-sharing institutions.

2.4 *Determinants of Power-Sharing*

Which factors determine the adoption of power-sharing arrangements? What conditions shape the political actors' decision and commitment to share power? Which elements impact the type and the degree of power-sharing institutions in a peace settlement? These empirical questions are vital to understanding the circumstances influencing the share of power among the antagonist actors at the end of a civil conflict. However, contrary to the impacts of the power-sharing institutions that have been studied extensively by numerous scholars, the causes or the determinants of power-sharing have yet to receive substantial attention from researchers. In the past five years, a few emerging scholars have investigated the determinants of power-sharing and contributed to the fulfillment of this gap in the literature (Nomikos, 2021; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, & Cederman, 2016). These significant theories that analyze the factors impacting the power-sharing setting will be discussed below with their shortcomings.

A persuasive argument regarding the conditions under which the former enemies are likely to accept a power-sharing is offered by Walter (1997; 2002; 2006) who relies on the reasoning behind the bargaining model in the international relations theory. According to Walter (1997), civil war actors at the negotiating table face a security dilemma that puts them in the fear of the defection of others (Ottmann & Vullers, 2015). Walter's 'credible commitment theory' argues that ending a civil war is very hard since political actors lack a credible ground enforcing the warring parties to commit to peacebuilding (2002). The underlying reasoning of this theory is that ending a civil war is paradoxical

since the rebel groups are required to disarm as a part of the peace agreements which also leads to disabling them to enforce and control the government's commitment to the agreement. She argues that the best way to overcome this security dilemma is a third-party involvement in the peace process as an enforcing power on both the warring parties (Walter, 1997; 2002). Although bringing important insights, this theory does not consider the fact that an agreement is an agreement even if it has power-sharing provisions in it. Parties need to overcome the commitment problem to implement the power-sharing agreement as well. How does a rebel group disarm without making sure that the government commits to its promises in the agreement? Here, my theory diverges from Walter's (1997) "credible commitment theory" in the way its acceptance of the power-sharing agreement itself as a deal requiring parties' commitment. My theory does not support the idea that parties will be more likely to commit to their promises when the agreement includes power-sharing promises. Rather, as will be discussed in the next chapter, I argue that rebel governance is the factor that helps parties to overcome commitment problems.

Another study that explores a determinant of power-sharing among ethnic groups is Wucherpfennig and his colleagues' research on the ethnic groups' geospatial qualities in the colonial context (2016). Considering the "political inclusion" of the ethnic groups as an indication of the power-sharing in ethnically divided societies, this study examines whether the geographic locations (i.e., the closeness to the center or the periphery) of the ethnic groups under the colonial rule have an impact on their post-colonial power status (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016, p. 888). The authors benefit from Cederman and his friends' EPR Dataset including the values of the politically relevant ethnic groups' access to state power worldwide from 1946 to 2009 (2010). Combining this dataset with ICOW Colonial

History Dataset (Hensel, 2009), the authors seek to explain a two-staged causal link: first, from the ‘peripheralness’ of the ethnic groups under the colonial rule to their post-conflict political inclusion in the state power, second; from the ethnic groups’ political inclusion to their likelihood of a civil conflict experience (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016, p. 883). The colonial empires’ strategies of rule combined with the ethnic groups’ geographic locations are regarded as ‘instrumental’ variables by the authors to overcome the long-debated endogeneity problem in the literature for the causal pathway between the political exclusion of ethnic groups and civil conflict onset. In their empirical analysis Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman find that in former French colonies, ethnic groups’ spatial closeness to the periphery (i.e., the coast) is negatively related to their post-colonial political inclusion in the state power (2016). That is, the more peripheral a group, the less likely it is to have a portion in the political power-sharing after independence. Furthermore, in the second stage of their causal pathway, which is from the political inclusion to conflict experience, the authors find a strong negative impact of ethnic inclusion on the civil war onset that is in line with the mainstream argument in the literature of ethno-nationalist civil conflict (Cederman et al., 2010; Gurr, 1993, 2000; Petersen, 2002).

A recent study by Nomikos seeks to explain the former combatants’ choice of sharing power in the post-conflict setting based on factionalism within the ethnic groups (2021). The main argument is that the level of institutionalization in the power-sharing arrangements depends on the source of a potential threat (i.e., in-group vs. out-group source) elites expect to face in the post-conflict setting. That is, political elites are likely to build power-sharing institutions when the most significant challenge to their power comes from an outside group contrary to from within the group. Institutionalization of power-sharing protects leaders of ethnic groups from the risk of out-group actors’ (i.e.,

main wartime rivals) defection in commitment to the peace settlement³. However, if the danger springs from an internal source due to factionalism in the group, then the political elites do not need to institutionalize the power-sharing and might even not desire it. In addition to his main hypotheses about the factionalism in an ethnic group, Nomikos also makes two more claims: first, the relationship between the size of the largest ethnic group and institutional power-sharing is negative; second, the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission on the conflict zone is positively associated with the probability of institutionalized power-sharing. The author tests these arguments using an original dataset he created including 186 cases of power-sharing negotiations that took place between 1946-2011. His empirical analyses present statistically significant results confirming all three claims discussed above (Nomikos, 2021).

Last but not least, Gent (2012) comes with a convincing theory arguing relative rebel strength has a positive relationship with post-conflict power-sharing. He argues that the stronger a rebel group militarily, the greater bargaining power it has. This, in turn, brings about more amount of post-conflict power for a rebel group. My theory broadens the bargaining power understanding of Gent (2012) which is only depending on the military strength of a rebel group, to a broader scope including a non-violent form of power: rebel governance. I argue that rebels' wartime governing efforts turn them back in the post-conflict era, as an advancement in their relative bargaining power against the state.

³ For the difference between institutional and proportional power-sharing, see Nomikos (2021) discussed in the 'types of power-sharing' part of this literature review.

2.5 *Impacts of Power-Sharing*

A vast literature has investigated the causal link between power-sharing to an expected outcome. A wide majority of the studies explaining the impacts of power-sharing have focused on peace endurance in the context of civil conflict. As a natural consequence of the long-debated link between peace and democracy, the literature has also examined the effect of power-sharing on democratic stability. Following from that, one can observe that the power-sharing concept has been studied mainly in two different contexts: first, as a means to build peace in the post-conflict context; second, as a contributor to a stable democracy in the context of divided societies (A. Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). Both these two strands of research will be discussed in this section.

2.5.1 *Power-sharing and Democracy*

The relationship between power-sharing and democracy has been studied by both democracy theorists and conflict researchers. Lijphart was among the earliest ones who examined the impact of power-sharing on democracy with his influential theory of ‘consociational democracy’ (1969; 1975; 1977, 1985, 1999). Lijphart looks at the divided societies in his work and observes that the division among different segments of society is too deep to have cooperation naturally. However, the leaders of these different groups will realize the necessity of consensus to keep their society alive. This need leads them to create power-sharing institutions (i.e., grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional distribution, segmental autonomy ⁴) since this is the only alternative for divided societies to have a stable democracy (A. Lijphart, 1977). The theoretical reasoning behind this link between power-sharing and democracy is the former’s contribution to the demolition of

⁴ To have a detailed explanation of Lijphart’s understanding of power-sharing institutions, see the “Definition and Conceptualization of Power-sharing” section of this review.

the societal cleavages among different segments. Lijphart argues that after a while, there will be no need for rigid consociational arrangements since cooperation at the political level will produce cooperation at the societal level with the influence of leaders on the masses. Like Lijphart, Norris (2008) also examines power-sharing within the democratization theory in the context of plural societies. Her theory argues that power-sharing institutions (PR elections, parliamentarism, federalism, and free press) foster democratic stability in a country. All four power-sharing institutions serve for ensuring minority representation in the policy-making process and incentivize negotiation and cooperation among different parties. These are the keys to democratic stability and make power-sharing essential to achieve it.

Graham, Miller, and Strom (2017) also theorized about the link between power-sharing and democratic stability in their recent prominent study. Different from Lijphart and Norris, Graham and his friends are conflict researchers and thus their study marks the differences between the post-conflict countries and the rest of the sample. The authors rely their analyses on their original dataset including a new typology of power-sharing: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining ⁵. According to Graham et al., the relationship between power-sharing and democratic survival differs depending on the type of power-sharing (2017). The study draws on the theory of democratic survival and uses a sample of democratic countries. Regarding the whole sample, the authors find that only constraining power-sharing institutions produce a significant and positive effect on democratic survival. However, this is not the case when considering only the post-conflict countries. In post-civil conflict cases, Graham, Miller, and Strom find that the positive

⁵ For a detailed description of Graham et al.'s tripartite typology, see the "Types of Power-Sharing" section of this review.

impact comes from inclusive power-sharing rather than constraining one; whereas the dispersive power-sharing harms democratic stability (Graham et al., 2017, p. 698). According to Sambanis (2020), this study would have overturned the existing policy implications of the power-sharing on democratic stability since the dispersive power-sharing arrangements such as autonomy concessions are seen as vital even to negotiate with the former combatants. However, when he retests the arguments of Graham and his friends (2017) replacing the UCDP/ACD data with a new dataset from his recent study (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2019), he finds the impact of dispersive power-sharing in the opposite direction leaving doubts on the effects of power-sharing on democracy (Sambanis, 2020).

Contrary to the aforementioned studies finding a positive relationship between power-sharing and democratic stability, some scholars were more suspicious of this link. Jung and Shapiro (1995), for instance, argued that including all parties in one government hinders the emergence of a solid opposition while Gates and Strom (2013) criticized the demolishing effect of pre-determined power-sharing institutions on the uncertainty principle of the elections- both are vital components of a functioning democracy. Likewise, Horowitz claims that power-sharing does not foster democratic stability; rather, several power-sharing institutions like PR electoral rules might strengthen ethnic divisions and deepen political differences in plural societies (2003). Similar concerns about the counterproductive effect of power-sharing on democratization have been stated in studies investigating war recurrence (e.g., Jarstad & Sisk, 2008; Sriram & Zahar, 2009). Jarstad and Sisk argue that providing pre-defined quotas for certain groups in the joint executive bodies as a part of power-sharing arrangements might lead to the exclusion of other minority groups in the country which in turn, deteriorates the democratic stability (2008).

2.5.2 *Power-Sharing and Peace Endurance*

Although democratic stability was the first potential outcome of power-sharing that received scholarly attention starting from the early studies of Lijphart (1969; 1977), it wasn't the most studied one. A vast majority of the conflict literature has tried to explain the impact of power-sharing on peace endurance/war recurrence in the post-conflict context. However, based on the diverse methodology they utilized in their studies; the scholars have reached various conclusions about the impact of power-sharing on peace endurance.

In one of the earliest studies on power-sharing and peace, Walter argues that former belligerents' concerns about being excluded from the policymaking mechanism cannot be addressed only by granting them participation in elections (2002). To convince the rebels to sign a peace agreement, the governments should give them guaranteed positions in the executive ensuring not to be overruled by their rivals (Walter, 2002, p. 30). With her empirical analyses based on an original dataset covering civil wars between 1940-1992, Walter shows a positive correlation between the allocation of power among former combatants and peace endurance (2002).

Hartzell and Hoddie, also highlight the influence of power-sharing arrangements on post-conflict peace (2003; 2007; 2010). The authors examine the power allocation among former combatants with its four dimensions: political, economic, military, and territorial power-sharing. The argument is that the more power-sharing dimensions a peace agreement includes, the more it is likely to create a stable peace. More power-sharing dimensions mean that rebel groups could influence more areas of decision-making and thus feel surer about the government's willingness to cooperate and more secure about the government's commitment to peace. Furthermore, more institutionalized power-sharing will lead to self-reinforcement for the implementation of the agreement

provisions because if power-sharing in one dimension fails to be implemented, other dimensions would continue to provide power for the conflicting parties. The authors test these arguments with their original dataset covering 38 peace agreements from 1945 to 1999. Their empirical analyses conclude that power-sharing prolongs post-conflict peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003)

Expanding Hartzell and Hoddie's (2003) data from 1999 to 2005, Mattes and Savun (2009) also try to explain the effect of power-sharing on peace endurance in the post-conflict setting. Different from Walter (2002), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) who touch upon the commitment problem in their theories of power-sharing, Mattes and Savun explain the causality between power-sharing and peace endurance exclusively based on the bargaining model and overcoming of commitment problem through power-sharing arrangements. Testing the impacts of all four types of power-sharing, the authors only find significant evidence for the effect of political power-sharing institutions on the prevention of conflict recurrence (Mattes & Savun, 2009).

Mukherjee (2006) also draws a 'bargaining model' to explain when political power-sharing leads to the settlement of civil wars and peacebuilding after conflict. Military victory/stalemate and civilian support for the insurgency are two main components of his model. According to Mukherjee, a stalemate in a military conflict allows a government not to reveal its military power and thus, deepens the commitment problem for both sides who are uninformed about each other's power. In this case, it is easier for rebels to find the necessary civilian support for their insurgency, and it is more likely to have a conflict recurrence. However, if the conflict ends with a clear victory by either side, both parties would be surer about each other's power, and this increases the credibility of their commitment to the political power-sharing agreements. This scenario pushes civilians to

lift their support for the insurgency and makes it more costly for the rebels. This explains the mechanism in which political power-sharing brings peace only if there exists a military victory. The author finds significant evidence for this model in his original dataset covering 111 civil wars' political power-sharing arrangements (Mukherjee, 2006). Another influential body of research on the effect of power-sharing on the conflict has emerged around the extensive data work that Cederman and his colleagues produced in 2010 and updated in 2014 and 2021 (Cederman et al., 2010; Vogt et al., 2015). As discussed before, EPR Dataset includes all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in all countries of the world from 1946 to 2021. Focusing more on the conflict onset rather than the war recurrence in the post-conflict countries, this body of research also generates vital policy implications for divided societies. A prominent study by Cederman and his friends (2015) evaluates the effect of involving ethnic groups in the central government and granting them autonomy concessions. Using the EPR dataset, the authors find a negative correlation between both two independent variables and the ethnic war onset. However, they note that autonomy concessions are effective when granted before turning conflict violent and most useful when accompanied by inclusive power-sharing arrangements.

Producing an original dataset based on a novel typology of power-sharing, Gates, Graham, Strom, Strand, and Lupu (2016) also investigate the long-debated argument of literature that power-sharing reduces conflict. As discussed in the types of the power-sharing section of this literature, this new typology differentiates among “inclusive, dispersive and constraining” power-sharing institutions which are coded on a global scale in IDC Dataset covering the 1975-2010 period (Strom, Gates, Graham, & Strand, 2017). Simply, while inclusive power-sharing refers to joint governments and dispersive one means territorial autonomy concessions, constraining power-sharing institutions are the

ones limiting the power of a party or social group in the policy-making bodies to protect minorities. Guaranteeing civil liberties and protecting civil rights with independent judiciaries, are some forms of constraining power-sharing which are designed to limit the governmental repression of minorities or vulnerable groups. Based on their global dataset, Gates et al., (2016) find that only constraining power-sharing arrangements have a pacifying impact on the conflict. The authors explain this impact with the power of constraining arrangements that minimize the incentives for mass mobilization and maximize the costs of conflict which in turn, reduces the risk of civil conflict (Gates et al., 2016).

A recent study by Bormann et al., (2019), combines the two aforementioned stripes of research around EPR and IDC datasets and theorizes about the impact of power-sharing on civil peace. The authors differentiate the direct and indirect effects of power-sharing. While direct effects are evaluated based on the formal power-sharing institutions, the indirect effects come from the power-sharing behavior (i.e., the implementation of power allocation among ethnic groups) (Bormann et al., 2019). In this sense, this study goes beyond the prior works in the literature that only examine the “de jure” power-sharing which are formal power-sharing institutions such as the peace agreement provisions, and analyzes the impact of de facto power-sharing which is the implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Based on their empirical analysis, the authors conclude that de jure power-sharing reduces the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset by inducing de facto power-sharing (Bormann et al., 2019).

While an extensive body of research theorizes about the bolstering effect of power-sharing (at least one type of power-sharing) on achieving stable peace, another body of research disagrees with this argument. Critiques in the studies of Horowitz (2003) and Jarstad and Sisk (2008) about the influence of power-sharing on democratic stability also

apply to its impact on peace endurance. Horowitz (2003) argues that power-sharing does not mitigate the cleavages, but rather strengthens them. Similarly, Jarstad and Sisk (2008) claim that the way political elites decide on which groups and leaders to include in or exclude from the political power matters substantially and might deteriorate peacebuilding. An influential argument for the negative impact of power-sharing on peace stability is put forward by Rothchild and Roeder (2005). They claim that power-sharing arrangements are the concessions designed to meet the needs and demands of the former rebels, and thus, strengthen the belligerents and encourage them to ask for more concessions by threatening to return to violence (now even with more power). Thus, power-sharing institutions produce means and incentives for ethnic leaders to rise civil conflict (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Another counterargument for the pacifying effect of power-sharing is that while the main belligerent groups of the conflict are granted concessions, minor groups who are excluded from the peace agreement might be induced to act antagonistically against the state seeking a commensurate share in the power allocation (Mehler, 2009; Tull & Mehler, 2005).

2.6 *Measurement of Power-Sharing*

The preceding sections reviewed the conceptualizations, types, determinants, and impacts of power-sharing and showed how literature is heterogeneous in these aspects. In this section, I will discuss different methods and operationalizations in the literature that are utilized to study power-sharing. After examining a bunch of quantitative studies and the different operationalization techniques they applied, this review will look at how case studies augment the literature and contribute to our understanding of power-sharing.

2.6.1 *Quantitative Studies on Power-Sharing*

The literature is quite abundant in terms of quantitative analyses of power-sharing which are based on large-N datasets. The main feature differing among those studies is their choice of operationalization to examine power-sharing. A wide majority of the quantitative studies operationalize power-sharing by looking at the provisions of peace agreements (Cammett & Malesky, 2012; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Mehler, 2009; Mukherjee, 2006; Walter, 2002). Other studies argue peace agreement provisions are the rules determined by the parties but do not have to be implemented in the process. Thus, they examine the behavior/practice of power-sharing rather than only looking at its promises (Bormann et al., 2019; Cederman et al., 2010; A. K. Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Ottmann & Vullers, 2015).

Early studies of Walter (2002; 2006), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007) are the first among others to produce large-N datasets to explore post-conflict implications of power-sharing. Walter (2002) codes 72 cases of civil conflict between 1944-1992 by looking at the political, military, and territorial power-sharing provisions of the peace agreements. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) add also economic provisions and code 49 cases of negotiated settlements signed from 1945 through 1999. Cammett and Malesky (2012) use the same case selection criteria as Hartzell and Hoddie and the coding period to 2010. They code 53 cases of power-sharing specifying the content of political power-sharing as closed-list PR, open-list PR, executive and legislative coalition, specialized veto rules, and proportional civil service appointments (Cammett & Malesky, 2012). Another influential study by Mattes and Savun (2009) examines 46 settlements by looking at the quality of provisions whether they are “fear-reducing” or “cost-increasing”. While Mukharjee (2006) only codes political power-sharing provisions for the inclusion of former belligerents in 111 civil wars that occurred during 1946-1999, Mehler (2009) restricts the

domain only to African peace agreements and codes political, military, economic, and territorial power-sharing provisions of 19 cases.

Another group of scholars, find coding peace agreement provisions inadequate to capture the causality between the power-sharing and peace endurance and code the implementation of power-sharing. Although Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007) note the distinction between power-sharing premises and their implementation and utilize a small sample of military power-sharing arrangements, it was Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) who first created a comprehensive dataset called Implementation of Pacts (IMPACT) including both the premises and practices of power allocation. They look at whether or not political, military, and territorial power-sharing arrangements have been implemented at the end of five years after the peace agreement (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Ottmann and Vullers (2015) criticize the IMPACT dataset for its insufficient focus on conflict actors and its implicit assumption of considering different armed groups from the same ethnicity as unitary and they come up with a new dataset – PSED – including both promises and implementation of power-sharing with a detailed focus on the conflict actors. PSED covers UCDP-identified civil conflicts from 1989 to 2006 and codes not only the implementation of promised rules at the negotiation table but also any power-sharing arrangements that occurred between the government and rebel dyads in the five-year-period after the end of the conflict (Ottmann & Vullers, 2015). Last but not least, Cederman and his friends compile Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset identifying all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power (Bormann et al., 2019; Cederman et al., 2010; Vogt et al., 2015). The last version of the EPR Dataset includes annual data on more than 800 ethnic groups from 1946 to 2021 and their share in the

executive power ranging from “total control” of the government to “overt political discrimination”⁶.

2.6.2 *Qualitative Studies on Power-Sharing*

The number of comparative case analyses in power-sharing literature is commensurate with the amount of large-N quantitative analyses. First, among others, Lijphart’s (1977) influential work on consociational democracy evaluates four plural societies – Austria (1945-1966), Belgium (1918-1963), the Netherlands (1917-1967), and Switzerland (1959-1977) – by looking at the cooperation among political elites. After power-sharing started to be studied by conflict scholars, the context of case studies also turned from plural societies to post-conflict countries and the peace agreements signed to end conflicts.

In parallel with the abundance in the number of peace agreements signed in the African continent, case studies of power-sharing have been mostly conducted with the African post-conflict countries (Binningsbø, 2013). While Sisk and Reynolds (Sisk & Reynolds, 1998) focus on the electoral rules and their impact on conflict management in particularly African countries, Mehler (2009) centralizes the peace agreements signed after 1999 in his analysis of power-sharing in 19 African civil conflicts. Moreover, Tull and Mehler (2005) compare the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire to explain how power-sharing arrangements reproduce the violent insurgent. Lebanon with its power-sharing Taif Agreement is the most studied post-conflict case following African countries. Hudson (1997) discusses Lebanon in the context of consociational theory and examines how its Taif Accord’s power-sharing institutions are likely to be implemented in the presence of two external forces in the country: Israel and Syria. Wantchekon (2000)

⁶ Information on the latest version is retrieved from the ETH website: <https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/>

compares Lebanon and South Africa concerning the credibility of their post-conflict peace agreements based on the degree of commitment problems they created. An influential study by Zahar (2012) examines democratization in the context of liberal peace interventions in the peace-building processes of conflict countries. She compares Lebanon and Sudan and explains how liberal peace projects help local elites to overcome the power asymmetry through power-sharing arrangements. This enables the local elites to resist democracy promotion through two strategies: disengagement and recuperation. Zahar (2012) concludes that local elites' disengagement is more likely to trigger violence. While Rosiny (2015) takes Lebanon's Taif Agreement of 1989 as a case to theorize about 'transitory power-sharing with its chances and risks for conflict, Rizkallah (2017) demonstrates how power-sharing settlements in Lebanon fail to transform the sectarian networks into peaceful structures and in turn, lead to the violence recurrence. Finally, a special issue of an academic journal edited by Nagle and Clancy (2019) was devoted to eight recent case studies investigating power-sharing in post-conflict Lebanon from different aspects. A recent book edited by Allison McCulloch and John McGarry (2017) also includes prominent case studies on power-sharing including Cyprus, Kenya, Northern Ireland, Fiji, Burundi, and Bosnia with their distinctive properties.

As discussed above, the literature is plentiful concerning both quantitative large-N studies and qualitative case studies. Although the majority of the studies using either quantitative or qualitative methods operationalize and measure the power-sharing as peace agreement provisions, other scholars analyze power-sharing by looking at behavior/practice in time rather than only looking at the promises given in the peace settlements right after the conflict. Having evaluated the previous research on power-sharing and explained how my theory aims to fill the points the literature overlooked, now I would like to provide a brief

overview of rebel governance scholarship since my theory lies at the nexus of these two bodies of literature.

Rebel governance is a recent concept that broadly refers to a set of various governing institutions and forms of service delivery. The early works of Kasfir (2002; 2005) discuss “guerilla governance” as a way of insurgents’ political institution building. While Weinstein (2007) theorizes about governance in civil conflicts based on rebels’ use or non-use of violence against civilians, it is later studied by Arjona (2009) and Mampilly (2011) the ones introducing the concept of “rebel governance” to the literature. Although the conceptualization of rebel governance varies among scholars, Kasfir’s (2015) definition is the one that literature accepts and uses the most. He defines rebel governance as a “set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants...” (Kasfir, 2015; Huang, 2016b; Albert, 2020). All these mentioned early works paved the way for the emergence of a trend in the literature: to study rebel governance in the context of rebel-civilian interaction for the sake of either material resources or popular support. Next, I will discuss previous studies shaped by this trend in the literature emphasizing the well-explained and also neglected aspects of rebel governance. Broadly, rebel governance studies can be categorized under three groups: the ones examining the causes/aims of insurgent governance, studies explaining types/forms of rebel institutions, and emerging research on post-war implications of rebel governance. Based on their relationship with this thesis topic, I will focus on the causes and post-war impacts of rebel governance.

Why do rebels govern? This question is vital to understand considering how costly it is for a rebel group to canalize a part of its limited sources from fighting to governing.

Scholars come with two different answers to this question: material sources and popular support. A body of previous research has explained rebels' efforts to build institutions based on material source vs physical violence dilemma. Accordingly, rebels establish service-providing institutions if they need to extract material sources from civilians. If insurgents have a natural source or an external funder to finance their activity, they do not govern civilians and rather they are more likely to use violence against local people (Weinstein, 2007; Keister, 2011). Another prominent argument in the literature stands against this approach claiming that rebels do govern not for the sake of but in the presence of material sources (Metelits, 2010; Huang and Sullivan, 2020). A separate strand of research claims that rebels found governing institutions and deliver public good to gain popular support. Scholars in this group assert that building institutions and service providing are qualities of a national state and when rebels engage in such activities they steal from the state's legitimacy in the eyes of civilians and win local people's hearts and minds (Wickham-Crowley, 1987; Kalyvas, 2006; Stewart, 2018; Berti, 2020).

Acknowledging how these seminal works contributed to the literature, now I turn to discuss what is missing in their analysis of rebel governance. Either for the sake of material sources or popular support and legitimacy, rebel governance has been mostly explained in the framework of the rebel-civilian relationship. All these studies discussed above theorized about rebels' choice of governing based on their approach to local people. Rebel governance is an activity that is inseparable from engaging in a relationship with civilians but considering only this aspect might lead us to neglect the possibility that rebels make strategic plans about their presence and position in the post-war setting. This is especially significant knowing that a vast majority of rebel groups are militarily weaker than governments and rebel victories at the end of conflicts are quite rare. Given that, it

is not surprising to see that rebels make calculations for the possibilities in which they do not defeat the government and need to put alternative survival plans for themselves. Post-conflict power-sharing is undoubtedly one of the few ways that rebels find themselves a place in the aftermath of the conflict. It is reasonable to expect that rebels might seek a power-sharing agreement if they are no longer able to or willing to pursue their violent struggle against the government. In that situation, rebels should produce a strategy that brings the most leverage for their post-war survival. I believe one major benefit of rebel governance is to provide that leverage to insurgents when it comes to sharing power with the government at the end of the conflict. As will be discussed in the next chapter in a detailed way, I argue that one reason for rebels' establishment of governing institutions and provision of services to civilians is to increase their likelihood of taking part in the post-conflict political order with a share of state power. By arguing and empirically testing this argument, my thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature caused by previous studies' approach to rebel governance only in the context of the rebel-civilian relationship. This trend in the literature also reduces the reward of insurgent institution-building and service delivery efforts to only wartime settings and omits its possible benefits in the post-war environment. My theory, therefore, also aims to broaden this limited approach and demonstrate the long-term profits of a costly investment like rebel governance.

Emerging research has started to examine the post-conflict ramifications of rebel governance. Although very low in number, these studies are significant as the pioneers of new research avenues on rebel governance. Huang (2016b) and Knight (2018) investigate the impact of rebel governance on post-conflict democratization. While the former finds no relationship between rebel institutions and democratization in the post-conflict setting,

the latter claims that rebel governance leads to democratization if rebels include local people in their governing institutions. When rebels build governing institutions, civilians develop a subnational identity, according to Kubota (2017), who examines the influence of rebel governance on post-conflict identity. By demonstrating that rebels are more likely to sit at the negotiation table during the mediation process when they provide public goods and services throughout a fight, Lindsay Heger and Danielle Jung (2017) make a considerable contribution to the literature. All these four studies study a post-conflict ramification of rebel governance as my thesis does. Yet none of them explores the role of rebel governing institutions in shaping the post-conflict power of rebel groups. The post-conflict power of rebels and the survival of their wartime institutions in the aftermath of the conflict has not still been examined by previous scholarship. This makes literature overlook the rebels' choice of governing as a strategic plan for their benefit and regard it only as their wartime need for material resources and popular support. My thesis intends to fill this gap in the literature by showing how rebel governance helps insurgents secure their post-war place in the system and bring them a share of state power. By doing so, it also aims to explain how rebel governance acts as a soft power in the hands of rebels against the government and broaden our understanding of relative rebel strength from the only military capability to both military and institutional capacity. Having discussed what previous research has claimed about power-sharing and rebel governance, in the following chapter, I turn to describe my theory about the relationship between the two.

Chapter 3: **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW DOES REBEL GOVERNANCE LEAD TO POST-CONFLICT POWER-SHARING?**

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework to explain why some rebel groups are better than others in receiving a share of state power in post-civil war order. First, I discuss the logic of the bargaining process among the warring parties and the challenges it creates in front of peaceful power-sharing. Further, I present my theory explaining the rebels' strategy of using wartime state-building as leverage in the bargaining process to convince the states to share power.

It is not always the case for civil war combatants to reach an agreement when it comes to sharing state power. In which cases warring parties agree to share power and when rebels are able to acquire more power in the post-conflict period are significant questions for both the literature and the policymakers who cares about peaceful conflict resolutions. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, much attention in the literature has been given to the effects of power-sharing arrangements on post-conflict democratization and few studies have investigated the factors that lead warring parties to agree to share power. Given that power-sharing contracts emerge after a bargaining process between a rebel group and a government, which naturally creates a commitment problem, Walter (2002) argued third party involvement in the negotiations enables the combatants to overcome their concerns about the defection of the other side to the determined arrangements. Wucherpfenning and his colleagues (2016) claimed that the geospatial location of the ethnic groups in ex-colonial countries differentiates their power-sharing in post-colonial order. Gent (2011) asserted relative rebel strength has a positive impact on power-sharing among warring actors. However, none of these theories looked at the rebels' use of

wartime state-building for their post-conflict aims and thus, fell short of explaining the variation among different power-sharing cases. My theory seeks to fulfill this gap in the literature by bringing an explanation of when rebels achieve to convince the government to give concessions from its power.

3.1 *Relative Bargaining Power and Power-Sharing Contracts*

To reach an agreement on a power-sharing arrangement, both the government and the rebel group are required to give their consent at the negotiation table. From a general perspective, one would anticipate that rebel groups are more eager to accept power sharing compared to the governments. This is mainly because of the asymmetry between the government and the rebel group- a defining characteristic of civil wars (Zartman, 1995). This asymmetry not only results from the discrepancy between the troop size of the government and the rebel group but also from the former's legitimacy, sovereignty, and access to resources which are possessions a rebel group has to work for immensely (Gent, 2011). Thus, at least initially, governments have a structural advantage over rebel groups and benefit more from the status quo. Usually, this makes a power-sharing arrangement a concession that is given by the government to grant some power to the rebel group. In a bargaining setting, the eagerness and ability of parties to give concessions depend on their relative bargaining power. Particularly, as the bargaining position of the government weakens, it is expected to be more likely to share its power.

The previous scholarship has evaluated the relative bargaining power by looking only at the military strength of the warring parties (Gent, 2011; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Svensson, 2009). The underlying logic of this approach is the rebel group's capability of defeating the government defeating government would determine the government's decision to concede power to the rebel group. Thus, a government is more likely to share

power if it has a strong probability of losing the war. If the rebels are not strong enough to pose a serious threat to the state rule, then the government may not consider a power-sharing arrangement in its interest. As a result, the government avoids giving strong concessions to its rival at the expense of taking a slight probability of losing the conflict (Gent, 2011). Although this theory seems consistent with the relative bargaining power approach, the previous empirical studies in the literature have not found this to be the case. Svensson (2009) finds no significant relationship between the government's military power and power-sharing in his analysis of peace agreements in civil conflicts. Similarly, Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) also look at the government's military power by measuring the size of the government army over the country's population and they find no evidence for the claim that weak governments are more likely to share power. Instead, their empirical analysis shows a positive relationship between the government's military power and the likelihood of power sharing. Only S. Gent (2011) finds a significant positive relationship between the relative rebel strength and post-conflict power sharing. However, like Svensson (2009) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), he also uses the troop size as the only indicator of military capability omitting many other significant components of military strength such as the artillery, territorial hold, external fund, access to resources, etc. Therefore, in addition to lacking a consensus among themselves, these studies are very limited in their understanding of relative bargaining power. In contrast to the previous studies which only consider hard power as a determinant of the bargaining capability, my theory examines the rebels' soft power that they acquired through their engagement with the civilians, their state-building and service provision activities, and its impact on post-conflict power-sharing.

3.2 *Commitment Problem in Conflict Ending*

Many scholars have argued that a strong obstacle to ending a civil conflict is the warring parties' inability to credibly commit to maintaining the agreed deal (Driscoll, 2012; Fearon, 2004; Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008; Walter, 2002, 2009). This problem creates more difficulty in civil wars compared to international wars due to the two different sides of the problem. The first is from the government side which typically faces an unconventional violent rival. Unlike sovereign states, armed groups usually lack legitimacy both inside the country to the nationals and outside the country to the international actors that can hold it accountable in case of a defection from the deal. In addition, armed groups are assumed not to have institutionalized unitary administrative structures as states have that might lead to the remobilization of a faction inside the group in case of a disagreement among them. Because of these two structural challenges, governments are highly concerned with rebels' defecting from their promises easily. The rebel side of the problem occurs due to the demobilization requirement of the agreements from only one party of the conflict: rebel groups. Usually, rebel groups are obliged to demobilize or disarm even to participate in the peace talks while the governments keep their guns and troops. Once rebels demobilize as a requirement of the conflict-ending agreement, they would be more vulnerable and less deterrent for desertion by the government. Thus, for rebels, demobilization means an increase in the possibility of the government's defection and a decrease in rebels' bargaining power on the negotiation table (Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008). Scholars of civil war have offered several solutions to overcome the commitment problem in civil wars such as third-party guarantees, peace-keeping operations, and security sector amendments (Nomikos, 2021; Walter, 2002). Although proven to be effective for peace endurance, these solutions cannot be initiated or controlled by rebel groups and thus, are not an ultimate guarantee for the rebels'

interest. However, rebels do need a solution that could both mitigate the commitment problem and increase their relative bargaining capability at the same time to benefit from the peace by gaining a part of the state power. In this thesis, I argue that rebels' wartime state-building and service provision helps to alleviate the commitment problem and bolster their relative bargaining capability which in turn leads them to acquire a part in power-sharing arrangements in the post-conflict setting.

3.3 *My Theory in Brief*

In this thesis, I argue that rebel governance helps armed groups to obtain a share from the state power by increasing their relative bargaining power and mitigating the commitment problem in the conflict-ending process. Rebels' wartime governance activities lead to power-sharing with the government by endowing rebel groups with civilian support and international legitimacy as well as replacing the state's service provision with rebel supplies.

Rebel institutions contribute to the overcoming commitment problem for both sides of the conflict. For the government's concern about rebels' defection due to lack of accountability, rebel governance provides rebels legitimacy in the eyes of local people as well as international actors (Stewart, 2018) that in turn, hold them accountable for their promises. Governments are also worried about spoiling by an internal faction of the rebel group if not the original group itself. Rebel institution-building also augments rebel centralization, giving rebel leaders greater control over their combatants to prevent them from using violence independently from central command (Heger, Jung, & Wong, 2017). On the other side of the problem, rebel institutions serve as soft power for rebels who are required to give up their hard power to be a part of the post-conflict order. Increasing

rebels' deterrence over the government, rebel governance also mitigates the armed groups' concerns about a defection by the government.

In addition to alleviating the commitment problem that civil war actors face on the bargaining table and making reaching an agreement more likely, rebel governance also leads to more power-sharing by increasing rebels' relative bargaining capability. High levels of rebel state-building and service provision convince governments to give concessions from the state power. Three benefits rebels gain from institution building enhance their relative bargaining power over the government. First, rebel service provision induces civilian support and legitimize the existence of rebel group in the eyes of local people (Heger et al., 2017; Kalyvas, 2006; Stewart, 2018). This civilian support gives the signal of potential recruits for the rebel group in the future (Albert, 2020). As a result, although rebels are required to demobilize to enter the power-sharing bargaining, the government would know this potential recruitment capability of rebels and calculates the principles of the settlement accordingly. Second, providing services to civilians brings about international legitimacy illustrating that rebels care about local people's well-being so they spend money to provide services for them (Stewart, 2018). In addition, rebels build diplomatic channels as a part of their governance and use them to gain international support and legitimacy (Coggins, 2015; Huang, 2016a). This international support and legitimacy, in turn, advances the bargaining strength of rebels creating pressure on the shoulders of the government to share power with this legitimate political actor. Finally, rebel governance increases the relative bargaining power of rebels by replacing states' service-providing institutions. Given that conflict territory is not an easy place for state officials to perform their duties, service provision by the government is expected to weaken or even in some cases, come to a complete end. Rebel institutions fulfill this gap

by providing services like education and healthcare to local people on the rebel-held territory. Although they are created without government consent, one should admit that rebel institutions usually take the burden of service provision from the government. Therefore, in the power-sharing negotiations, the government also calculates the cost of re-establishing state institutions like schools and hospitals to provide public services for its citizens. Usually, governments are already under a financial burden due to the severe cost of conflict and are not able to re-establish their institutions in a short period of time. This advantage also gives substantial leverage to rebels and strengthens their bargaining capability over the government. Therefore, I argue that rebels' wartime investment in governance increases their bargaining capacity and mitigates the commitment problem by endowing them with civilian support, and international legitimacy and expanding the government's service provision cost to the local people. This growth in rebels' relative bargaining strength and reduction in commitment problem, in turn, expands both the likelihood and the level of power-sharing among the ex-combatants in the post-conflict setting. I will elaborate on my argument in the following pages of this chapter.

3.4 Rebel Governance as a Non-violent Form of Strength in Power-Sharing Bargains

Power-sharing guarantees rival actors a role within the government advances their participation in the decision-making mechanism and grants them access to public resources. With these important functions, power-sharing helps keep civil war combatants' adherence to post-conflict peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Rebels' institution building enables them to acquire a share in the power allocation with the state. Albeit rebel institutions might not translate into battleground supremacy, they generate other forms of strength that are as critical to civil war. This encourages rebels to divert resources from improving their military capacity to providing

services to local people (Albert, 2020). Rebel governance translates into greater bargaining power for rebels with its three key benefits: civilian support, international legitimacy, and higher cost of services on the government budget which are discussed below.

Before delving into my theory, I provide the definition and the framework of the concept of rebel governance upon which I will build my theory. Broadly in literature, rebel governance indicates rebel actions related to governing the conflict territory (Albert, 2020; Arjona, 2014; Huang, 2016b; Kasfir, 2015). As the first among others, Kasfir's definition of rebel governance as "the organization of civilians within the rebel-held territory for a public purpose" is followed by emerging scholars. In this study, I adopt the definition of K. Albert (2020) for consistency purposes since her rebel governance dataset is one of the two main datasets I used in my empirical analysis. In line with prior definitions in literature (Huang, 2016b; Kasfir, 2015), Albert identifies rebel governance as a "set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants" (2020, p. 46). Similar to a state's governance, Loyle et al., (N.d.) describe rebel governance activities based on three dimensions: rule-making, rule-enforcement, and service provision. Rebel governance, therefore, includes a wide range of institutions from healthcare provision to holding elections, from border patrolling to attending diplomatic meetings. The details of rebel institutions will be provided in the research design chapter for the sake of space. The rest of this chapter discusses the theoretical framework of my thesis which is how rebel governance increases the relative bargaining capability of rebels and leads to power-sharing among warring parties.

3.4.1 *Civilian Support*

In an interview with Nepalese people living in conflict territories controlled by the Maoist rebel group CPN-M, one young man stated that “I thought that if the Maoists could be successful, conditions in our villages would improve” and one other describe Maoist group’s impact as “War educated the masses about politics, about standards of good governance, about the tax system, about policies.” (Huang, 2016b, pp. 211-212). Nepalese interviewees’ statements are just an example of many other locals’ “unreserved support” to the Maoist rebels who achieved to gain “total political legitimacy” in the districts they control (Adhikari, 2014, p. 121). Just as Nepalese CPN-M who engaged in state-building with their “people’s government” and service provision with their community hospitals, schools, and “people’s courts” (Sharma, 2004, pp. 42-43), many other rebel groups carry out governance on the conflict territory as a wartime strategy to secure civilian support and loyalty which in turn, helps them achieve their post-conflict goals.

Rebels can benefit from their institutions to increase popular support in several ways. First, just as states do, they can socialize civilians into their ideology through public education (Albert, 2020; Huang, 2016b). Educating students at younger ages with curriculums that are prepared consistent with rebels’ ideology is a way to generate support and loyalty among younger generations. A great example of non-state armed groups providing social services to transmit their political stance to civilians is Lebanon’s Hezbollah with its hundreds of schools and hospitals serving the public. S. Haddad finds that 88% of local people living in South Lebanon have received a form of social service from Hezbollah, making service provision the group’s main instrument to appeal masses in their movement (2013). Haddad also gives Lebanese professor Mona Fawaz’s observations on how Hezbollah’s social wing operates. Fawaz describes Hezbollah’s

social aid organizations as overtly political and charged by the leadership with the mission of building a “resistance society” (Haddad, 2013, p. 25). Surely, education is not the only way for rebels apply to spread their ideology. Creating media outlets and broadcasting ideologically oriented programs is undoubtedly another institution that helps rebels to justify their ideology. K. Albert finds that 107 out of 235 non-state armed groups in her study created media outlets for publishing information (2020). PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) created its first-ever Kurdish language broadcasting TV channel in 1995, MED TV (then renamed ROJ TV) via using satellite from Europe. This was undoubtedly a political move by the group with the aim of collective identity building among Kurdish ethnic groups both living in Turkey and abroad (Ayata, 2011; Ilgit & Pusane, 2018).

Through state-building and service provision, rebels also garner legitimacy in the eyes of non-combatants which brings about their support and backing. Rebel legitimacy can be engendered by building institutions of law and order such as a written constitution, rebel courts, and local governments with administrative bodies. Nepalese CPN-M created established public assemblies called “people’s committees” in their district-level “people’s governments” including under-represented groups like women, minority groups, and lower-caste people (Sharma, 2004). In certain districts, they also held elections to their “House of Representatives” which local people are required to vote for (Adhikari, 2014). Many locals preferred to apply rebel courts created by CPN-M instead of state courts since they are “very effective in settling village-level disputes and more accessible than government courts” (Huang, 2016b, p. 215). Just as CPN-M many rebel groups gained political legitimacy through their state-building and service-providing institutions while deeply undermining the legitimacy of the government (Ledwidge, 2017). This shift in people’s consideration of their legitimate governors, surely, translates into a shift in their approval and support for them.

In addition to the paths of ideology and legitimacy, rebels also garner their constituents' support and loyalty through the "winning hearts and minds" strategy (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 124). Rebel governance provides non-violent contact between rebels and civilians. Moreover, it gives non-combatants the signal that rebels care about their social welfare (Albert, 2020). Providing public school education, giving healthcare services in hospitals, organizing transportation facilities for daily life, etc., are all non-violent activities that illustrate to locals how rebels act like a state when it comes to its constituents' welfare. Even though it is almost impossible to find a rebel group that engaged in zero or no violent activities when taxing local people or recruiting new fighters from younger generations, the group's social service provision makes its violent aspect more invisible or tolerable by non-combatants. Eritrean EPLF was very good at convincing people that it cares about civilians. Their extensive welfare provision was "on offer to all people" in Eritrean territorial space, not only exclusive to their supporters. Their service provision was so effective that clearly showed Eritrean people that EPLF is ready to serve all the country's interests and work for increasing their level of welfare (Muller, 2012; Stewart, 2018). Encountering rebels on non-violent occasions impact civilians' perceptions of the rebel group. Further, if non-combatants get any benefit from these encounters, the positive perception of rebels grows. For instance, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka maintained mail delivery to local people, and New People's Army in the Philippines organized marriage ceremonies for engaged couples (Heger et al., 2017). In some cases, the rebel group even uses this service provision as a professional PR to attract civilians' appreciation. Hezbollah provided free oil that it imported from its sponsor, Iran, to the local people, hospitals, schools, charity organizations, and municipalities. This was truly a great advantage for Hezbollah to portray itself as a savior when the Lebanese government realizes maybe the worst of its performance with long periods of electricity,

water, and gas shortage throughout the country. As discussed above, rebels have multiple ways- spreading their ideology, gaining legitimacy, increasing welfare, and engaging in non-violent communication- through which they render their state-building and service provision into civilian support and loyalty. This civilian support and loyalty, in turn, constitutes one of the main pillars of their bargaining power in post-conflict power-sharing with the government. Another source of rebels' soft power on the bargaining table is the legitimacy and support they garner in the international political arena which will be elaborated on below.

3.4.2 *International Legitimacy*

Studies of civil war have investigated widely how rebel groups acquire political and material support from external actors to improve their military capability during wartime (San-Akca, 2016). However, non-state armed groups do need international support and legitimacy for their post-conflict aims as well. Increasing their relative capacity of bargaining to obtain a higher share from the state power at the end of the conflict is indeed one of those post-war goals causing rebels to seek international support and legitimacy. Rebel governance plays an important role in violent non-state actors' quest for international legitimacy enabling them to obtain political support from outside actors. Rebel state-building and service provision achieve this in several ways: First, it shows the international community that rebels get in non-violent contact with civilians and care about their needs. Second, as a part of service provision, rebels can cooperate with international NGOs who need rebels' help and in some cases permission to supply humanitarian aid in the conflict area. Finally, rebels establish diplomatic institutions as a part of their state-building attempts to engage in diplomatic relations with international actors. They found foreign affairs departments in rebel governments, opened offices

abroad, and send representatives to foreign capitals for lobbying purposes (Huang, 2016a). All these efforts, in turn, endow armed groups with the international sympathy and legitimacy they need and strengthen their leverage in the bargaining table over the government for a greater share of state power.

PYD, the Syrian Kurdish militant group, is a significant example of how rebel governance helps to gain international legitimacy. In the Democratic Autonomous Administration (DAA) located in the Northern part of Syria, PYD provides public services including education, health, and security. In addition to its fight against ISIS, PYD's local governance is indeed a substantial factor that brings about international legitimacy and recognition for Kurdish forces. Its relationship with the civilians and its governing structures were closely followed by Western powers and international agencies which portray the group as a non-violent political actor who is amenable to peace talks. The Obama administration insisted on the group's participation in the 2016 Geneva peace talks as a "major political actor" in the region which also could pave the way to guarantee a place for PYD in the post-conflict Syrian administration. Through providing services for civilians, rebels show international actors that they engage in non-violent contact with the residents and meet their demands as a state does. This helps armed groups to soften their violent image in the eyes of international actors and gives them a sign of the rebels' care for their people. Rebels' state-building and service-providing efforts demonstrate to the foreign audiences not only how they engage in non-violent contact with civilians but also the governance capacity of their rebel organizations which increases their credit as reliable political actors for the post-conflict reconstruction.

In addition to creating a responsible and capable political entity image of rebels in the global arena, rebel governance also helps armed groups gain legitimacy and recognition by producing cooperation channels between the rebels and the international

NGOs who intend to give humanitarian aid in the conflict area. Many foreign NGOs, international agencies (like World Bank and United Nations), diasporic organizations, and religious institutions are willing to or have to work with rebel authorities to ensure the passage of aid convoys and distribution of humanitarian resources to meet the basic needs of local people in war territory. Such recognition from foreign non-governmental actors can also legitimize insurgents' claims to represent their population and act in line with their interests (Mampilly, 2011, p. 87). Incorporating such actors into rebels' governance structures can further incentivize armed groups to invest in welfare provision to locals by transferring these organizations' material resources, and organizational expertise to the insurgents during wartime and building an international recognition to be used as an asset in the post-conflict period. Sudan's SPLM/A had its first formal relationship with relief agencies in 1989 with the launch of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) by the United Nations to deliver aid to both rebel and government-held areas. Over time, the partnership reached such a point that, as Podder argues, the OLS became like a "quasi-government" for rebel-held areas which showed how SPLM/A's state-building efforts turned a humanitarian crisis into an opportunity. This produced greater legitimacy for SPLM/A and augmented the confidence of external actors in the group's capacity to cooperate in post-conflict restoration.

Last but not least, rebel diplomacy represents another dimension of insurgent groups' state-building efforts to secure "visibility, credibility, and acceptance" in the global arena (Huang, 2016a). As previous scholarship has argued, in the short term, engaging in a relationship with external actors may provide material resources, training, guns, haven, or any kind of military support for rebels' battleground aims (Coggins, 2015; San-Akca, 2016). In the long term, external ties may bring even more strategic advantages such as signing trade agreements or participating in negotiated settlements and attaining political,

military, economic, or territorial power from the state. All these benefits, incentivize rebels to invest in the creation of diplomatic channels by dispatching representatives to overseas countries, opening headquarters in foreign capitals, and spending money for lobbying activities abroad. These efforts by insurgents intend to illustrate to international actors that they have the political capacity required to obtain state power, can act in state-like behavior, and are responsive to peaceful diplomatic talks (Huang, 2016a). Rebel diplomacy is a common practice among state-building rebels. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) established its rebel government's foreign ministry called Political Diplomatic Commission in 1981. The Commission appointed several rebel ambassadors across the world to attain recognition and support from foreign governments and international organizations (Montgomery, 1995). Surely, most of these diplomatic attempts by rebel groups are serving the purpose of gaining outside recognition if not always strong sympathy from the international actors. Three years after the Syrian opposition groups started an insurgency against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the head of the Syrian National Coalition -the political umbrella organization of opposition groups, visited the United States to appeal for any backing from the administration. Soon after the US State Department declared that the Coalition office in Washington DC will be recognized as a "foreign mission" and so granted insurgents diplomatic status in the United States. This was a clear example of how the diplomacy leg of rebel governance brings international legitimacy and recognition to insurgent groups. As discussed above, rebel governance leads insurgents to gain international legitimacy and, in many cases, political backing by illustrating to outside actors that rebels care about their locals, enabling warzone cooperation with international NGOs, and by establishing diplomatic institutions to tie with external political actors. As a result, this international legitimacy and recognition contribute to the political power of

rebel groups which in turn, increases their bargaining capability in post-conflict power-sharing negotiations.

3.4.3 *Cost of Re-Governance*

Institution building and public service provision do require money. Building schools, and hospitals, overseas embassies, and employing teachers, medical personnel, and diplomats working in these institutions demand a significant amount of financial source. Both national governments and self-claimed rebel governments devote a part of their budget to governance activities. Usually, when rebels strictly control the conflict territory where civilians live, it becomes almost impossible for governments to sustain the public service provision in rebel-held territories due to security concerns. When the conflict comes to an end and rebels bury their guns, one would expect that the government immediately re-establish its institutions on the post-conflict territories and resume welfare provision to its constituents. However, it might not be the case. Governments might not desire to re-launch public services due to their high cost on the state budget. Considering a post-war government that spent a considerable part of its financial sources on years of fighting with the insurgents, the re-governance of priorly rebel-held territories constitutes an extensive burden on the shoulders of the state. This burden might force governments who are responsible for delivering welfare to their citizens, to accept the continuation of rebel service provision -and so rebel institutions- in the post-conflict setting. Therefore, I argue that the expected cost of re-governance in the ex-rebel-held territories put governments in a tough position in the power-sharing negotiations and demystifies the relative bargaining power of rebel groups over governments. As a result, state-building

rebels would have a higher chance to obtain a share of state power in the post-conflict setting.

Literature showed how state-building is costly for rebels and which sources they rely on both internally and externally to meet their need for money in governance activities. Civil war scholars have built various theories explaining rebels' dependency on civilians' money, lootable sources, foreign sponsors, or illegal drug trade (Florea, 2020; Huang, 2016a, 2016b; Huang & Sullivan, 2021; Mampilly, 2012; Metelits, 2010; Revkin, 2020; Weinstein, 2007). However, none of these studies has investigated the financial difficulty governments have to face in post-conflict reconstruction. Rebel governance undermines the government's legitimacy as civilians become dependent on not the state but rebel administration for their needs, yet it favors the government by relieving the financial and organizational burden of service provision, at least for the rebel-held territories.

Civil wars take a heavy toll on the state's public welfare provision due to the physical destruction of buildings, desertion of government-run facilities with a security concern, and the government's lack of coordination in necessary supplies and personnel to deliver welfare goods to civilians. This rupture in the state's welfare provision can last for years or even for decades in some tenacious civil war cases. Insurgents' service provision activities partially fulfill this gap that emerged by governments' inability to perform caregiving duties and in those cases, the government's expenditure for welfare goods is expected to decline to a certain extent. When the conflict terminated after years of fighting, governments face the difficulty of re-establishing their facilities with their post-war financial capability. Surely, states with strong economies might endure this hardship and re-construct the post-war territories effectively. Yet, given that the majority of

conflicts erupt in “least developed countries”, the financial burden of re-governance is expected to be a significant determinant in governments’ calculation of post-war reconstruction planning.

In a post-conflict setting, if rebel public welfare institutions are dismantled by the government, residents of rebel-held territories would become initially deprived of insurgent services such as education, healthcare, security, and in some cases even electricity, oil, or clean water. Indeed, the government’s substitution of these services requires an extensive financial and organizational capacity in addition to the time that is necessary to reconstruct state institutions, procure the needed supplies, appoint public personnel to related positions and create a functioning network among institutions and constituents. Given the constrained funding a post-war government has, reconstruction is expected to take a long time during which citizens deprive of necessary public services like education and healthcare. Long-durée dispossession of basic welfare might lead to outrage among civilians toward the government that demolished their prior welfare sources and promised an effective substation. If civilians illustrate an effective organization capacity, their grievance might even turn into an uprising against the government. This would deteriorate the government’s legitimacy on its constituents who have been already harmed by insurgent governance activities. In addition, the resentment among local people might also overtly or covertly signal a recall to the rebels who have been dissolved but always has the possibility of remobilizing in the presence of substantial backing. Thus, when bulldozing rebel institutions, a government takes into account the material cost of restoring social welfare and a possible public outrage in the absence of service supply. The cost of re-governance, therefore, translates into a gain in the relative bargaining power of insurgent groups who seek to acquire more share from the state’s political, economic, military, and territorial power in the post-conflict setting. During the

Lebanese civil war, four militia groups, Christian Lebanese Forces, Druze Progressive Socialist Party, Shia Amal Movement, and Hezbollah created their social welfare institutions and provided services like education, healthcare, and transportation for people living in territories they control. In the post-civil war period, many of the social welfare programs of armed groups survived and developed into institutionalized welfare agencies with branch offices while the state was “hardly absent” in overall social service provision (Cammett, 2014, pp. 50). By the late 1990s, the state was accounting for only 20 percent of the health clinic dispensaries while the rest was organized by non-state agencies (Ammar, 2003).

As my theory suggests above, rebel governance helps overcome commitment problems among belligerents and increases the relative bargaining capability of insurgent groups. This, in turn, enables rebels to compel the government at the negotiation table to share its power to end the conflict. We can infer from this that state-building rebels have a higher chance to acquire state power compared to the ones who do not invest in local wartime governance. Thus, my first hypothesis is:

H₁: Power-sharing among the state and rebels will be more likely as the rebels engage in governance activities on the conflict territory.

In addition, I believe, more amounts of rebel governance translate into a higher rebel bargaining capability since both values are cumulative. That is, the more an insurgent group engages in local governance, the more they have legitimacy at home and abroad, and the more it costs the government to rebuild public service provision. As a result, rebel groups with a greater amount of institution building and service delivery

are expected to have higher levels of bargaining capability over the government which in turn, enables them to force the government to transfer larger shares of state power.

Thus, my second hypothesis addresses the impact of varying degrees of power sharing and asserts that:

H₂: The level of power-sharing among the state and rebels will grow as the level of rebel governance increases.

These two hypotheses present the general arguments of my thesis and need to be tested empirically to conclude the relationship between rebel governance and power-sharing. The next chapter will explain how I test my hypotheses based on empirical data from the literature.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework of my thesis from which two hypotheses are derived for empirical testing. Different from the previous theories of power sharing which identified structural determinants of power-sharing such as the “peripheralness” of the ethnic conflict (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016, p. 883), presence of multiple rebel groups (Walter, 2006), factionalism in the ethnic community (Nomikos, 2021), my theory utilizes an actor-based approach claiming the wartime rebel state-building influences the post-war power-sharing. Accordingly, insurgent groups’ local governance based on service delivery and institution building in the conflict territory increases their relative bargaining capability by bringing support and legitimacy both locally and internationally and rising the opportunity cost of re-establishing welfare provision institutions. It also helps rebel groups to overcome the commitment problem arising when belligerents are required to take action based on the other’s engagement with

given promises. Therefore, this chapter has argued that rebel governance has a positive impact on the possibility of sharing state power with the insurgents. Furthermore, the level of rebel governance also matters for the amount of power-sharing among ex-belligerent actors.



Chapter 4: **RESEARCH DESIGN**

Evaluating the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter requires a proper research design and data. In this chapter, I explain the data, variables, and methods that I use in my hypothesis testing. Before moving to the results of my empirical analysis in the next chapter, I will state the limitations of my design and the steps I took to minimize those limitations.

4.1 *Data*

Bringing two different kinds of literature (i.e., power-sharing and rebel governance) together in my theory requires me to use relevant and consistent data from each of them. Although power-sharing literature is abundant in terms of both qualitative and quantitative data, their qualities and relevance for this study vary. For large-*N* datasets, early studies of Walter (2002; 2006) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003; 2007) are the ones that are followed by the later studies in their understanding of power-sharing coding. Walter (2002) looks at the peace agreement provisions to detect three forms of power sharing: political, military, and economic. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) add economic power-sharing as a fourth type to what Walter has done and code 49 cases of power-sharing by looking at negotiated settlements between 1945-1999. Several late scholars also built new datasets based on their research interests. Jarstad and Nilson (2008), and Ottmann and Vullers (2015) produced their large-*N* datasets focusing not only on the power-sharing provisions in the peace settlements but also their implementation process. Svensson (2009) also developed a wide dataset in which he looked at the

power-sharing promises in the peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2003. UCDP included power-sharing variables in its wide peace agreement dataset which covers 1975-2018. Strom et al. (2015) differ from the previous scholarship and use a different typology to code power-sharing (i.e., inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power-sharing) in peace settlements that occurred between 1975 and 2010. Nomikos (2021) comes with his power-sharing which only focuses on political power-sharing and its institutionalization during the peace settlement processes of civil wars that occurred during 1945-2011. Last but not least, Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) updated their early datasets (2003; 2007) and came up with a broader dataset in several aspects. First, they increased their time frame to 1946-2007. Second, they did not only look at the peace settlements but also explored military victory cases of either side. Third, they enlarged their coding source from peace agreement texts to countries' constitutions and their case narratives by using archives. Finally, they coded every case annually from 1946 to 2007 so that they capture any change in the power-sharing over time.

In this study, I use Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) dataset since it is the most convenient one among others for my research. It includes all four types of power-sharing, uses a wide range of timing (1946-2007), and most importantly, has yearly observations that allow researchers to combine the power-sharing dataset with other annual datasets in their research. In this sense, Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) power-sharing dataset is the most consistent one to the rebel governance dataset that I utilize in this thesis in terms of the time scope and time-series coding. Following the Correlates of War criteria, the authors consider a conflict civil war if (1) the yearly battle-related death toll equals to or exceeds 1000, (2) the national government is one of the warring parties, (3) the conflict actors were able to produce an effective resistance, (4) the war took place within a defined political unit (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020, p. 4).

The authors define power-sharing institutions as “rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020, p. 47). They examine the incorporation of political, economic, military, and territorial power-sharing arrangements in the settlement of civil wars (all types will be explained in the next section). Their dataset focuses on 127 episodes of civil war occurring in 67 countries during 1945-2006 which have produced more than 1000 battle-related deaths.

Unlike the abundance of quantitative datasets in power-sharing literature, rebel governance scholars produced only a few large-N datasets mainly because it is a recent scholarship respectively. Huang (2016) introduces the first dataset on rebel governance, Rebel Governance Dataset (RGD) covering 127 civil wars between 1950 and 2006. The dataset shows a set of nine governing institutions built by rebel groups in the civil war context. However, this dataset does not differentiate among the rebel groups of the same civil war and considers them together as if they build their institutions together. Since different armed groups might have different interests and objectives that lead them to a different preference for building governing institutions, Huang’s (2016) dataset seems insufficient to capture discrepancies among the rebel groups of the same civil conflict. Stewart (2018) builds another original dataset on rebel governance focusing on the level of inclusivity of rebel service provision institutions. Although being a comprehensive dataset in terms of the number of rebel groups (over 300), this dataset is very exclusive in its coding that looks at only two rebel governance institutions: education and healthcare. Despite their importance in the rebel service provision, I believe that education and healthcare are inadequate to represent the whole governance attitude of

rebel groups. Since I need a dataset that shows all institution-building and service provision efforts by non-state armed groups, Stewart's (2018) dataset does not serve properly for this thesis. Heger and Jung (2017) come with another original rebel service provision dataset in which they code over 400 rebel groups' service provision activities. Although their coding method of *text analysis in Wordscores* in which they look at the news report word mentions is debatable in terms of its accuracy, the main reason for me not to use this dataset is its time range which starts in 1980. In this thesis, I use Karen Albert's (2020) Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset which covers 1945-2012 coding 235 rebel groups' governance institutions. Albert (2020) uses Kasfir's (2015) definition of rebel governance which is the "set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants..." noting that she uses the terms "action" and "institution" interchangeably (Albert, 2020, p. 46). Albert selects her cases from the UCDP dataset (Kreutz, 2010) however, she limits the rebel groups to those where the violence level is reached the 1,000 battle-death threshold of civil war (Albert, 2020, p. 13). She codes 25 key rebel institutions from holding elections to providing public transportation which she categorized as political, economic, social, or military institutions. All these institutions will be explained under the "independent variable" section of this chapter.

As discussed, for my hypotheses testing, I use Albert's (2020) Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset and Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) power-sharing dataset. These two datasets are consistent not only in their time range but also in their civil war definition criteria which are both based on 1000 battle-related death. The only inconsistency between these two datasets is their difference in their unit of observation. While Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) use a country-year unit of observation, Albert (2020) has a rebel

group-year unit of observation. This discrepancy can create a bias when merging this dataset since there are several civil conflicts in which there exist multiple rebel groups in a given country year. The limitation created by the aforementioned inconsistency is not specific to these two datasets but a general problem that might be faced by any researcher who would like to study power-sharing and rebel governance pieces of literature together (seemingly, this thesis is the first and the only one doing this until now). This is mainly due to the difference in power sharing and rebel governance fields' focus points. Although they both do their coding examining the belligerents in civil conflicts, power-sharing literature mainly cares about the post-conflict process whereas rebel governance scholars are interested in the wartime context. As discussed in the literature review chapter, scholars mainly study post-conflict impacts of power-sharing such as war recurrence, democratization, and peace duration. This focus leads the majority of quantitative studies of power-sharing not to include rebel groups' identities but rather to identify cases by noting countries and years. Few power-sharing datasets contain also rebel groups' names, however, they are either not coded time-series (i.e., A. K. Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008) or do not cover long periods as Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) do (i.e., Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Svensson, 2009). Thus, merging Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) dataset with Albert's (2020) Rebel Quasi Dataset still seems to produce the most comprehensive and consistent dataset for my thesis. To overcome the unit of observation discrepancy among the two datasets I use, I exclude the cases where there exists more than one insurgent group in a given country year. By doing this, I ensured that there is only a rebel group in the dataset corresponding to the power-sharing value of that country-year. After this adjustment, my dataset still contains 1767 observations which give enough number for my analyses.

4.1.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this thesis is the power-sharing arrangements among former combatants emerging after a conflict settlement. I follow Hartzell and Hoddie's definition of power-sharing institutions which is "rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power" (2003, p. 320; 2020, p. 47). I assess power-sharing with four types: political, economic, military, and territorial, and operationalize each of them in the way the authors did. Political power-sharing refers to "proportionality in the distribution of state authority" which requires groups to share power based on a demographic or political property such as ethnicity and ideology (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020, p. 48). This indicator is dichotomous and operationalized by looking at the presence of electoral proportional representation, administrative proportional representation, or executive proportional representation at the civil war's end. Military power-sharing mandates the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the state is and operationalized based on the existence of an arrangement for the integration of former combatants' fighters into the state army or allowing rivals to remain armed. Territorial power-sharing measures if the political influence is distributed among different levels of government by establishing forms of territorially based decentralized government. It is a binary indicator and scores "1" if the civil war's end leads to the establishment of federalism, confederalism, or regional autonomy. Scores "0" otherwise. Economic power-sharing creates rules and regulations for the allocation of wealth and income to impede any group from totally dominating economic resources. It is also a dichotomous variable operationalized based on the state's provision of disadvantaged groups with economic resources at the end of the

conflict. In addition, the “total power sharing” variable calculates how many of these four types of power-sharing arrangements are present in a civil war settlement. It takes values from “0” to “4” where “0” means the absence of any power-sharing measures at the end of the conflict.

4.1.2 Independent Variable

The independent variable of my thesis’s research design is the level of rebel governance during a civil war. The definition I use for rebel governance is Kasfir’s (2015) definition which is also used by Albert (2020) and as follows: set of actions insurgents engage in to regulate the social, political, and economic life of non-combatants. Since I use Albert’s (2020) Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, I operationalize my independent variable in the way she did which is based on 24 different governing institutions rebels built. The key variables/institutions included in the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset are summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4. 4.1 List of Rebel Quasi-State Institutions, (Albert, 2020)

Institution	Category	Institution	Category
Government	Political	Economic Treaty	Economic
Currency	Political	Education	Social
Join International Organization	Political	Health	Social
Border Patrol	Political	Welfare/Aid	Social
Constitution	Political	Housing	Social
Elections	Political	Infrastructure	Social

Diplomatic Mission Abroad	Political	Public Transportation	Social
Identification Documents	Political	Justice	Social
Political Party	Political	Law	Social
Media Outlet	Political	Policing/Security	Social
Negotiate Resource Rights	Economic	Constituency Politics	Social
Taxation	Economic	Armed Forces	Military

All rebel institutions in Rebel Quasi-State dataset are coded as dichotomous variables and score “1” in the presence of each related institution in the given year. I will give a brief explanation of each institution. For a full description, please see Appendix A and for the coding rules, see Rebel Quasi-State Institutions Dataset codebook.

The “Government” variable measures whether insurgents establish a form of government at the local or national level. The “Join International Organization (IO)” variable says if the rebel group is an affiliate of an international organization. The “Border Patrol” variable captures if the rebel group found a unit specialized in patrolling an established boundary. “Constitution” scores “1” when a rebel group writes its constitution (see the codebook for three essential conditions of a constitution). The “Election” variable measures whether rebels hold local, village-level, or national elections for civilian government seats in which civilians can also vote. The “Diplomatic Mission Abroad” variable captures when an insurgent group sends its representatives overseas to engage in diplomatic relations with foreign governments and

politicians. This variable does not require a rebel group to be formally recognized by the foreign state. The “Identification Documents (IDs)” variable measures if the insurgent group gives identification documents (i.e., passports and identification cards) to civilians. The “Political Party” variable scores “1” if a rebel group establishes a political party engaging in the political process of the national state. Political wings of armed groups are not counted. The “Media” variable captures when the insurgents own a media outlet that they can use to report information. The “Currency” variable shows when rebels create their currency whether or not it’s successfully circulated. The “Taxation” variable measures if the armed group taxes civilians or their businesses. Customs taxes, income, or wartime taxes are counted, and the tax does not have to be paid in monetary means rather, it can be paid in food or supplies. The “Negotiate Resource Rights” variable scores “1” if the insurgent group negotiates the rights to obtain or share a natural resource. “Economic Treaty” captures when insurgents sign an economic treaty with another state which does not have to have international recognition. The “Education” variable identifies rebel groups that provide (establish or direct) education for civilians in which basic skills like writing, reading, arithmetic, or professional skills are taught. There is no restriction on civilians’ age and rebel-exclusive education is not counted. “Health” variable measures if insurgent groups deliver health services for civilians such as medicine, doctors, or hospitals/health clinics. The “Welfare/Aid” variable captures whether insurgents assist civilians with welfare or aid like food, money, or agricultural aid. “Housing” shows whether rebels deliver housing services to civilians. This may take the form of building houses or giving abandoned houses to civilians. “Infrastructure” measures if insurgents provide infrastructure services such as building roads, bridges, or public buildings, and also electricity, water, trash collection, or sewage. “Public Transportation” shows if there is

transportation service available for civilians whether free or not. It may include bus shuttles or other transportation services provided by rebels for civilians. The “Justice” indicator identifies the existence of a justice system including courts, prisons, and means to enforce judicial decisions. This justice system’s jurisdiction must be over civilian crimes not just over rebel crimes. “Law” is an indicator showing whether insurgents create laws regulating civilian behavior. “Police” measures if rebels deliver policing services to the civilians in the village or the city. “Constituency Politics” is an indicator showing whether the rebel group hears civilian complaints about the government and engages in lobbying activities for the benefit of civilians to the state bureaucracy. Last but not least, the “Armed Forces” variable identifies the existence of a professional and conventional military force composed of aircraft, naval vessels, and mechanized weaponry like tanks. By professional, it is meant that not all the members of the insurgent group serve in the armed forces. In addition to these variables dedicated to rebel institutions, a cumulative variable is created to capture the total number of institutions rebels created in wartime. This variable is established to examine the degree of rebel governance. Accumulating all rebel institutions to have a degree of their governance level is used by other scholars in the literature (Huang, 2016)

Having explained the rebel institutions which are identified by Albert (2020), we can now look at how common these institutions are among non-state armed groups. Figure 4.1 plots the percentage for ten of the most common political and economic institutions built by rebel groups. Figure 4.2 plots the percentage of ten social institutions.

“Government” and “taxation” were two of the most popular institutions with over a third of the insurgent groups providing at least one year of them. Of the social institutions which can also be called public service provision institutions, education,

health care, law, policing and justice were also common institutions with over a quarter of rebel groups supplying them.




Figure 4. 1 Percent of rebel groups who provide at least one year of political and economic institutions.




Figure 4. 2 Percent of rebel groups who provide at least one year of social institutions.

4.1.3 Control Variables

I include seven control variables in my tests to see the real impact of my explanatory variable (i.e., rebel governance) on the dependent variable (i.e., power sharing). I chose these seven variables since either previous research claimed that they have or might have an impact on power-sharing among ex-belligerents or I suspect that they can be related to post-conflict power-sharing.

First, I control for *peacekeeping operations* conducted in the aftermath of the civil wars. Post-conflict power-sharing requires all warring parties to commit to sharing power with their ex-antagonists. Since it is very hard for ex-belligerents to credibly commit to their promises considering potential defections from the other side, researchers suggested that the presence of international actors might enable warring parties to access information about their enemies and thus help them to commit to the power-sharing agreement (Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2008). For instance, Nomikos (2021) finds that UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with the institutional power-sharing among the ex-warring actors at the end of civil conflicts. The sources of peacekeeping variable coding are Fortna (2004), Sambanis (2006), and Armed Conflict Database which are included in Hartzell and Hoddie's dataset.

Second, I control for *relative rebel strength*. Previous research suggested that the military power of the rebel group has an impact on post-conflict power-sharing. Since stronger insurgent groups pose a higher military risk to governments (Kalyvas, 2006), they are expected to convince the state authorities to make concessions when deciding the terms of peace agreements. If an insurgent group is stronger than or at parity with

the government forces, its capability of defeating the government will seem considerably high which in turn, might lead the government to share its power to prevent more costs when it lost against rebels. Gent (2011) finds significant evidence that a power-sharing arrangement becomes more likely as the military strength of insurgents advances relative to that of the government forces. Thus, I include relative rebel strength in my tests based on the coding of Cunningham et al.'s (2009) data which is used by both Gent (2011) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2020). The authors coded relative rebel strength as "1" if any rebel group's forces are at parity with or stronger than the government's military and "0" otherwise (Cunningham et al., 2009).

Third, I control for *external state support*. Prior studies have already shown that many rebel groups receive foreign state support in different forms including money, weapon, troops, safe-haven, etc. (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 2011; San-Akca; 2009; 2016). As a contribution to the political, military, or economic sources of rebels, external state support seems considerably plausible to have an independent impact on insurgents' bargaining capability in the power-sharing negotiations. Therefore, I control for the effect of foreign state support on post-conflict power sharing. I extract this variable from the NAG Dataset of Belgin San-Akca which codes direct and de-facto external state support to rebel groups that existed during 1946-2010. This dataset is very comprehensive in its capturing of many different forms of external support namely, financial aid, weapons, safe-haven, military training/training camps, and transport of weapons. Based on NAG Dataset, I created a binary control variable telling whether a rebel group received any form of direct or de-facto external state support in a given country year.

Fourth, I control for *war duration*. Wars of long duration are believed to create more difficulty and cost for the warring parties and thus incentivize them to give concessions in the form of power-sharing to end the conflict (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020). When the conflict lasts a long *durée* (especially when longer than the warring parties' initial estimation), it translates into an exhausted army, a battered economy, and millions of despondent citizens. Similarly, for rebels, long-duration wars create serious difficulty in terms of material needs and the belligerents' morale. Thus, warring parties are more likely to share power with their antagonists to end the conflict when the fight lasts longer than what their material capability and motivation for struggle allow them. This difficulty helps all warring parties to give concessions from their initial demands and accept to share power with their adversaries. This variable comes from Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) own coding based on Keesing's Contemporary Archive and Correlates of War Database. It is operationalized as the natural log of the number of months the war lasted.

Fifth, I control for *previous civil war experiences* among the warring parties. The presence of prior internal conflicts, as a cause of strong trauma on people's collective memory and destruction of the state's military and economic sources, is believed to be a factor that leads war actors to consider victory uneasy to reach and thus convince them to compromise (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020). In this situation, parties are likely to give up their initial goals and get inclined to share power to reach a reconciliation. Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) see previous civil war experience as a potential factor to increase the likelihood of post-conflict power-sharing and find evidence in their analysis to support this claim. I also include this variable in my test based on Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) own coding. They operationalize this variable as a dichotomous indicator which scores

“1” if adversaries have a previous civil conflict experience with one another, and “0” otherwise.

Sixth, I control for *previous democracy*. Democratic regimes are by definition pluralist states that allow and encourage different groups to take part in the political system. In the civil war context, a power-sharing agreement is a means to provide access to state power by different groups. It aims to bring proportionality in the distribution of state authority, national economic resources, the state’s coercive apparatus, and its territories. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect that democratic regimes are more likely to have power-sharing arrangements compared to non-democratic regimes. Thus, we need to control each state’s democratic status to have a more solid analysis of the role of rebel governance. The previous democracy indicator comes from Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) dataset. The authors code this variable based on the minimalist democracy criteria employed by Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) which scores “1” if a country meets the criteria for minimalist democracy within the five years before the outbreak of the civil conflict.

Finally, I control for *conflict mediation*. Warring parties are less likely to come to the negotiation table without any encouragement and assurance from a third-party mediator. Agreeing on a power-sharing peace agreement with their once-happened enemy and trusting their promises are not easy for war actors to achieve. Thus, mediators -by definition- are expected to play a key role in facilitating power-sharing agreements. Although there is not any strong evidence in the literature showing the positive association between the presence of mediators and signing power-sharing arrangements, researchers are suspicious about the impact of this indicator on power-sharing and thus

add it to their tests. I also would like to make sure to capture any potential impact of mediation on post-conflict power-sharing and so included this variable in my analysis. The coding of this indicator comes from Hartzell and Hoddie's (2020) dataset which is based on the information retrieved from the research pieces by Regan, Frank, and Aydin (2009) and DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011).



Chapter 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this section, I explain how I test my hypotheses and discuss the results of my empirical analysis. Before reviewing the test models that I employed and the results I get from them, I would like to recall the two hypotheses that I provided in the theory chapter of this thesis. As my theory suggests I argue that rebel governance increases the likelihood of having a power-sharing arrangement among ex-combatant political actors through overcoming commitment problems and rising the bargaining power of the insurgents. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: Power-sharing among the state and rebels will be more likely as the rebels engage in governance activities on the conflict territory.

Moreover, I expect that the more quasi-state institutions created by rebels mean more bargaining power at the negotiation table of conflict reconciliation. A higher level of bargaining power enables rebels to compel the government to give concessions from its power. Thus, my second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: The level of power-sharing among the state and the rebels will grow as the level of rebel governance increases.

To test Hypothesis 1, I employed a logistic regression model based on a dichotomous dependent variable. I treated *total rebel governance* as the explanatory variable and *any power-sharing* as the outcome variable to assess the impact of rebel governance on the likelihood of adopting power-sharing arrangements after the conflict is settled. For Hypothesis 2, I examined the impact of the degree of rebel governance on the degree of adopted power-sharing arrangements, I utilized an ordinary least squares (OLS)

regression model. For this test, I used continuous measures of both rebel governance and power-sharing which I explained in the research design chapter.

Table 5.1 Rebel Governance and Power-sharing, 1945-2006

VARIABLES	(1) anypowshar	(2) totpowshar	(3) extpowshar
totrebgov	0.0939*** (0.0339)	0.0160*** (0.00539)	
statesupport	2.142** (1.024)	0.137** (0.0580)	2.061** (1.032)
peacekeeping	3.905*** (0.745)	1.218*** (0.132)	2.334*** (0.572)
warduration	0.0679 (0.102)	0.00524 (0.0123)	0.181 (0.116)
mediation	3.113*** (0.436)	0.702*** (0.0717)	2.686*** (0.466)
prevcivwar	-0.719* (0.426)	-0.189*** (0.0601)	0.0932 (0.440)
prevdem	-4.270*** (0.983)	-0.182*** (0.0461)	-4.055*** (0.848)
relrebstrength	-1.952*** (0.541)	-0.182*** (0.0566)	-0.438 (0.531)
extrebgov			2.598*** (0.407)
Constant	-5.303*** (1.068)	0.0182 (0.0651)	-6.858*** (1.148)
Observations	1,083	1,083	1,083
R-squared		0.270	

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the tests for each of the three models appear in Table 2.1. Model 1 shows the results of Hypothesis 1. As I expect based on my theory, rebel governance seems to increase the likelihood of ex-antagonists' power-sharing at the end of the conflict. Results confirm that its impact on the presence of post-conflict power-sharing is positive and statistically significant. Among the other indicators which are claimed to be effective by previous research, several of them produced numbers in line with the expectations. *Peacekeeping operation* is manifested as highly impactful on post-conflict power-sharing as Nomikos (2021) argued. Numbers justify that a peacekeeping force helps adversaries trust each other and commit to their promises which in turn leads them to share power. Similarly, *mediation* is proven to be positively associated with the likelihood of power-sharing in the post-war setting. It can be inferred that both peace-keeping operations and mediation signal the presence of a third party (whether a state, an organization, or an individual) among war actors, and this helps parties to communicate with each other as well as to overcome commitment problems. As expected, the presence of any forms of direct or de-facto *foreign state support* to rebels is found to be positively associated with post-conflict power-sharing. Numbers in all three models confirm that when rebel groups have external state support, their bargaining power increases which then translates into a higher likelihood and also a larger degree of power sharing. These results for external state support are all statistically significant at 0.05 level. The impact of states' *previous experience of civil war* on post-conflict power-sharing does not seem positive based on the results. Previous civil war has negative coefficients in two models and the positive coefficient in model three is not statistically significant. This does not confirm the claim by Hartzell and Hoddie (2020) that previous civil war experience makes parties believe that it is not possible to reach a victory over the other side and convinces them to share

power to cease the fight. As opposed to my expectations, test results also do not justify that *previous democracy* led states to share power based on the plurality characteristic embedded in democratic culture. Rather, statistically significant results manifest that previous democracy is negatively associated with the emergence of power-sharing among parties. This result is interesting and should attract scholars' attention to conduct empirical research on the relationship between democracy and power-sharing from that angle. The literature mostly studied this relationship and vice versa: power sharing's impact on post-conflict democratization (i.e., Huang, 2015; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2020) however, apparently, more detailed and solid research is needed to analyze this puzzle. One might relate this negative association to other properties democracies mostly have such as military capability as a product of rich economies. Yet, states' and rebels' military capability is captured through *relative rebel strength* variable which seemingly does not have a positive impact on power-sharing. Relative rebel strength is found to decrease the likelihood and the level of post-conflict power-sharing based on Model 1 and Model 2. Although it has a positive coefficient in model 3 in which I looked at extensive power-sharing among parties, this result is not statistically significant. This empirical evidence contradicts Gent's (2011) claim that relative rebel strength increases the bargaining power of insurgents and helps them to compel to share power. Although there is not any other scholar who also finds empirical evidence on the impact of rebel strength on power-sharing, Gent's claim is still important since the relative military capability is the first factor that springs to mind when thinking of rebels' bargaining power to compel the state to share power. Here, my theory might bring new insights on and mind the gap left by the material capability factor. As I discussed in the theory chapter of this thesis, I believe that examining material capacity is not enough to understand the relative bargaining capacity of rebels. We also need to look at how

rebels engage in a relationship with civilians through institutions they built and their post-conflict impact. Moreover, the negative association might be related to rebels' commitment to sustaining fighting when they have more military strength making them unlikely to give up their initial insurgency objective like defeating the government or gaining independence. Results agree with my argument that wartime rebel governance increases the bargaining power of rebels by bringing international and domestic legitimacy and support.

I tested Hypothesis 2 which claims the levels of rebel governance and power-sharing go together, using OLS regression in Model 2. In this model, my cumulative variables total power sharing and total rebel governance are designed to capture different levels of independent and dependent variables. The test results justify my argument that as the degree of rebel governance increases, ex-warring parties agree on a greater number of power-sharing measures. Results showing the link between more rebel institutions and greater power-sharing are statistically significant. When we check other indicators, it can be seen that peacekeeping operations and mediation keep the significant positive impact they have in model 1. Likewise, the previous democracy also seems in line with its negative effect in model 1. While previous civil war experience keeps the direction of its coefficients, there is an increase in its significance level. Apart from this change in the significance level of the previous civil war experience, the results in model 2 are in line with the results in model 1.

I added another test to the two models addressing my two main hypotheses. This is to have more robust evidence for Hypothesis 2. In model 3, I run a logistic regression test using binary independent and dependent variables. I follow Hartzell and Hoddie's

(2020) understanding and use of “extensive power sharing” which denotes whether a civil conflict ends with two or more power-sharing measures. In line with that dependent variable, I created “an extensive rebel governance” indicator which is also a binary categoric variable addressing high levels of rebel institution building. In parallel to Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2020) categorization of extensive power-sharing, I used the same proportion (1/4 of the total number of power-sharing measures) to categorize my new variable. Thus, the extensive rebel governance variable scores 1 if a rebel group creates equal or bigger than 6 rebel institutions (1/4 of 24 rebel institutions). Model 3 shows the results of this additional logistic regression test. Results strongly support Hypothesis 2 which theorizes the positive association with higher degrees of rebel governance and post-conflict power-sharing. Extensive rebel institution building appears to help to have extensive power-sharing among war actors. Apart from a change in the previous civil war experience, this model also strongly confirms all the findings of model 1 and model 2. Previous civil war experience, unlike in model 1 and model 2, seems to be positively correlated to post-conflict power sharing, however, this result is not statistically significant at even 0.1 level, so it does not contradict any finding in the prior two models. Thus, my empirical analyses support my arguments about rebel governance’s influence on power-sharing when controlling for external state support, war duration, previous civil war experience, peacekeeping operation, mediation, and prior experience of democracy and relative rebel strength.

Since two of my three tests are non-linear models, I also would like to show the marginal effects of my independent variables on power-sharing. This will help us understand the relationship between rebel governance and power sharing in a more solid manner. Figure 5.1 illustrates the marginal effect of total rebel institutions on the

likelihood of post-conflict power-sharing. I used 0-24 values to have predictive margins since this range covers all values that the total rebel governance variable can take. It can be seen that the predicted proportion of signing a power-sharing arrangement by war actors rises from 11% to 29% (at $p=0.05$) when rebels build all quasi-state institutions defined by Albert (2020). It rises to 19% when the rebel group builds half of the twenty-four institutions. These results are calculated when all other covariates are set to their observed values. This finding confirms the argument I raised in the Theory chapter that rebel institution-building endorses the emergence of a power-sharing agreement by helping parties overcome commitment problems and increase the relative bargaining capability of rebels.




Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of Total Rebel Governance on Power-Sharing

Figure 5.2 demonstrates the marginal effect of extensive rebel governance on extensive power-sharing. We see that the predicted proportion of having extensive power-sharing

among parties increases from 8% to 15% (at $p=0.05$) when the rebel group has extensive rebel governance. This finding is in line with my argument that the degree of rebel institution-building is positively associated with the degree of post-conflict power-sharing. This link, I believe, is related to the cumulative structure of the bargaining power of rebels. When rebels build more state-like institutions to provide services to civilians, it means more support and legitimacy both at home and abroad. Also, the more rebels create their service delivery institutions, the more it becomes difficult and costly for the government to replace those institutions in the post-conflict setting. As a result, higher numbers of rebel institutions reinforce rebels' soft power if not the hard power. That is the bargaining power of a rebel group on the power-sharing table which in turn, enables rebels to compel the government to give concessions from their political, economic, military, and territorial power. Thus, more rebel governance translates into greater power-sharing among post-conflict actors.




Figure 5.2 Marginal Effect of Extensive Rebel Governance on Extensive Power-Sharing

In general, my empirical analysis supports my theoretical arguments on the association between rebel governance and post-conflict power-sharing which have not been studied by any other scholar/researcher by far. Results derived from three tests I employed, justify that rebel institution building helps them to acquire a share of state power in the post-conflict order. This means that institution-building rebel groups are more likely to engage in a power-sharing agreement with the government compared to groups who do not invest in governance. In addition, the empirical evidence agrees with the claim that the level of rebel governance matters for the level of power-sharing among parties. My analyses show that there is a significant and considerable increase in the level of power-sharing with the rise in the level of rebel governance. This implies that if rebels invest in governance more, it will return them as more amount of power is granted by the state in the post-war setting. All in all, these findings also bring an alternative answer to a more general and fundamental question: “Why do rebels govern?” I strongly believe in, and also my empirical analysis supports that rebels build political, economic, social, and military institutions during wartime to benefit from it in the post-war setting.

Chapter 6: CONCLUSION

6.1 *Review of the Thesis and Theoretical Contributions to the Literature*

In this thesis, I investigate the relationship between wartime rebel governance and post-war power-sharing among warring parties. As literature already showed, rebels build institutions and provide social services and public goods in the territory they hold. In addition to its previously asserted wartime benefits, I argue, rebel governance has also post-war implications. In my theory, I assert that insurgent state-building and service providing to civilians have a positive impact on the likelihood of post-conflict power-sharing among ex-adversaries. Through power-sharing with the government, rebels sustain their presence in the post-conflict order with a non-violent agenda. They can have political power in the post-war setting by participating in elections, having special quotas for representative seats in the parliament, and even entering the executive structure. Similarly, rebels may be granted a part of the military, economic or territorial power of the state at the end of the conflict. My thesis asserts that rebels who engage in governing activities in the conflict territory are more likely to sign power-sharing agreements with their prior enemy - the government.

Rebel governance makes post-conflict power-sharing more likely by mitigating parties' commitment problems and aggravating insurgents' relative bargaining capacity. By creating informal governments with a ruling elite and their constituents, wartime institution-building makes rebels more accountable to civilians and international actors for their actions. This helps rebels give the signal of having a low risk of defiance from commitment to their promises which in turn, facilitates insurgents to nourish trust from the government side. Rebel institution building and service provision also translate into

more amount of bargaining power in the negotiation process which increases their capability to convince the state to give concessions from its power. This happens through endowing rebels with support and legitimacy at home and abroad and creating an incentive for the government to let rebel institutions exist in the post-war era due to the cost of re-governance. Insurgents' state-building and service-providing efforts are already proven to bring about support and legitimacy among civilians and international actors. I argue that this support and legitimacy act as leverage for rebels against the government authorities who presumably do not desire to be confronted by either local people or international actors. This is mainly because popular support means more people to recruit in rebel forces and international support means more material sources to pursue fighting. A government wishing for ending a conflict is more likely to accept to share its power with rebels considering this local and international support and legitimacy. Moreover, given that a conflict is quite costly for warring parties, a state might have financial difficulty in destroying old (rebel) service-providing institutions and re-establishing its entities with the required number of personnel and public good to be delivered. Rebel governing institutions' existence in the post-war setting might benefit the state by relieving it from the financial cost of instituting a new governance structure on the post-conflict territory. Keeping the buildings, personnel and functioning mechanisms of rebel institutions will give the state more space and time to recover its wartime devastated economy and also help avoid facing local people's grievances when they are deprived of social services like education, healthcare, and policing. All these outcomes of rebel governance expand the relative bargaining power of rebel groups and consequently, lead them to acquire a portion of the state's political, economic, military, or territorial power. In addition, my theory is based on relative bargaining power, I safely argue that more amounts of rebel governance translate into a larger number of power-sharing provisions.

Accordingly, if rebels build greater numbers of institutions and so deepen their government structure, they are likely to have more portions of state power in the post-conflict order.

I test all these claims using a quantitative research design based on two large-N time-series datasets. The results confirm my hypotheses at statistically significant levels. My empirical analysis shows that institution-building rebels are more likely to sign a power-sharing peace agreement with the government compared to non-governing rebels. Furthermore, results present significant evidence that the degree of rebel governance matters for the degree of post-conflict power-sharing among warring parties. It means that when rebels engage in institution-building and service delivery activities more, they have greater bargaining capability and in turn, compel the state to give more concessions from its power.

With my theory and supporting empirical analysis, I aim to contribute to the literature by capturing a novel relationship that has been overlooked by both rebel governance and power-sharing scholars so far. Although there are multiple approaches to evaluating rebel governance, the majority of scholars have studied rebel governance in the context of rebel-civilian non-violent interaction. Either for material sources or popular support, rebels' choice of governing has been mostly explained by rebels' wartime benefits from civilian interaction. This has led scholars to pay less attention to rebels' post-war aspirations and their plans for their inclusion in the political system in the aftermath of the conflict. My thesis, alternatively, regards rebel governance as a wartime strategy for post-conflict desires. Therefore, my study contributes to the emerging research in the literature that investigates the post-war ramifications of rebels' governing institutions.

Different from a couple of recent studies exploring rebel governance's post-war impacts like democratization, post-conflict legitimacy, identity, and hybrid governance, my theory treat insurgent governance as a soft power that is strategically planned by rebel groups for their future ambitions.

A vast majority of power-sharing scholars have looked at the implications of war actors' power allocation on peace and democratic stability. Although producing invaluable knowledge on the most important aspect of power-sharing - the goal of bringing peace, literature has neglected to discover the determinants of actors' signing of a power-sharing deal. Very few studies have so far inspected the conditions and factors leading to a power-sharing agreement and found rebel strength, geographic location to the colonial center, and in-group factionalism impactful. However, none of these studies evaluated the rebels' strategic choice of institution-building as a factor leading to power-sharing. Rebel strength theory also explains power-sharing with relative bargaining capacity; however, it limits rebels' relative power against the state only to military strength. My theory, on the other hand, regards a non-violent aspect of civil conflicts (i.e., rebel governance) as a factor increasing the relative bargaining capability of insurgents. Therefore, my theory broadens the literature's understanding of rebel capability to also include non-material components of strength and shows how rebels achieve their goals with the help of non-violent wartime activity.

6.2 *Limitations of This Study and Future Research*

The main limitation of this study is related to the data which is used to test the hypotheses. As stated before, the power-sharing literature has not produced a considerable number of studies evaluating wartime determinants of power-sharing. This trend also leads the majority of scholars to produce large-N datasets without including wartime characteristics of a conflict such as the identity of rebel groups. Previous datasets often use country-year or peace agreement names as their unit of analysis and excluded any information on the rebels who are one of the parties signing that power-sharing agreement. Adversely, rebel governance datasets, provide information on rebel groups' identity and use rebel name-year as their unit of analysis. This discrepancy creates an inconsistency for studies including this thesis that aims to use datasets from both strands of research together. For instance, if there are multiple rebel groups for a year in the dataset, there is not enough information to differentiate these groups and whether they were included in the power-sharing agreement. To eliminate this bias, I exclude from my merged dataset the years in which multiple rebel groups existed in the same conflict. By doing so, I make sure that in a given year, one power-sharing value corresponds to one rebel group. After this adjustment, I had enough numbers to conduct a large-N analysis. However, it limited the rebel groups which I include in my empirical analysis. Presumably, having all rebel groups in my dataset would produce more realistic results. In my future work, I can handle this problem by collecting original data on each rebel group's power-sharing level individually. This can also allow me to also analyze any possible impact of having multiple rebel groups in the same conflict on post-conflict power-sharing. Another limitation of my study is related to its research design. It is a large-N quantitative analysis without any qualitative part. Although a large-N study makes researchers reaching to

conclusions that can be generalized to the whole universe of cases, it is inadequate in capturing case-specific details and properties. This study also needs to be supported by a case study including one or multiple civil conflict cases. A qualitative work using the process-tracing method would shed light process at the negotiation table and check whether the state makes concessions based on rebels' quasi-state institutions. Future qualitative work would be very supportive to reach out to more robust results given that civil wars are very unstable and distinctive in their properties, and they are hard to generalize.



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