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The Relation Between Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building

M.A.THESIS

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İNSANİ YARDIM VE BARIŞ İLİŞKİSİ

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**THE RELATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACE
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

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GAZİANTEP

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Abstract

The Relation Between Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Building

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Humanitarian aid considered as independent domain following humanitarian principles and deliver aid neutrally to people in need in different crisis –both natural and conflict born crisis – based on needs only without any linkages or ties to the political, military and peacebuilding/peacekeeping missions till the end of cold war in the nineties. After the end of the cold war and the establishment of the new political order and new war and context, two principal doctrines raised about the way of delivering humanitarian assistance. First doctrine says that humanitarian assistance should have drastic reformation and adapt to the new global context and being linked to the peacebuilding and political agendas to have more permanent solution for the conflict even with compromising on humanitarian principles including neutrality while the other doctrine says that humanitarian assistance should stick to the humanitarian principles and the roots and fundamentals of humanitarian assistance focusing on the vital role of humanitarian assistance in saving lives rather than serving political agendas. This study reviews both doctrines in different contexts and provides recommendations on which doctrine make more sense and should be followed.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, Humanitarian assistance, new global context, peacekeeping.

ÖZET

İnsani Yardım ve Barış İnşası İlişkisi

Yaman Salam

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İnsani yardımlar, insani yardım ilkelerini izleyerek bağımsız bir alan olarak kabul edilir ve herhangi bir bağlantıya ihtiyaç duymadan doksanlardaki soğuk savaşın sonuna kadar siyasi, askeri barışı inşa etme ve barışı koruma misyonlarına dayanan farklı kriz durumlarında – doğal ve doğuştan çatışmalı krizler – ihtiyaç halindeki insanlara insani yardım sağlar. Soğuk savaşın sona ermesinden ve yeni siyasi düzenin, yeni savaş ve bağlamın oluşturulmasından sonra insani yardım sağlama yolunda iki temel doktrin yükselmiştir. İlk doktrin; insani yardımın, şiddetli reforma kavuşması, yeni küresel bağlama adapte olması, barışa karşı ve politik gündemlerle bağlantılı olması ve tarafsızlık da dahil olmak üzere insani prensiplerden ödün vererek daha kalıcı bir çözüme sahip olması gerektiğini ifade eder. Diğer doktrin ise; insani yardımın, ilkelerine, köklerine, temellerine, insani yardımın politik gündemlerine hizmet etmek yerine hayat kurtaran hayati rolüne odaklanması gerektiğini belirtmektedir.

Bu tez, her iki doktrini farklı bağlamlarda inceleyip hangi doktrinin daha anlamlı olduğunu ve izlenmesi gerektiği konusunda tavsiyelerde bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Barış İnşası, İnsani Yardım, Yeni Küresel Bağlam, Barış Koruma

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AAP** – Accountability to Affected Populations
- ACBAR** – Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development
- AU** – African Union
- CAAP** – Commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations
- CAP** – Consolidated Appeal Process
- CAR** – Central African Republic
- CBO** – Community Based Organizations
- CEDAW** – Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.
- CERF** – Central Emergency Response Fund
- CHAD** – Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
- CHS** – Core Humanitarian Standards
- CIA** – Conflict Impact Assessment
- CIDA** – Canadian International Development Agency
- CIMIC** – Civil Military Co-Ordination
- CS** – Conflict Sensitivity
- CSA** – Conflict Sensitivity Analysis
- DFID** – Department for International Development
- DHA** – Department of Humanitarian Affairs
- DNH** – Do No Harm
- DRC** – Disaster Relief Co-coordinator
- DRR** – Disaster Risk Reductions
- ERC** – Emergency Relief Co-coordinator
- FGM** – Female Genital Mutilation
- FSA** – Free Syria Army
- FTS** – Financial Tracking Service
- GBV** – Gender-Based Violence
- GLCA** – Global Cluster Lead Agencies

HAP – Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HCT – Humanitarian Country Team
HPG – Humanitarian Policy Group
IASC – International Agency Standing Committee
ICRC – International Committee of Red Cross/Red Crescent
ICT – Inter Cluster Co-Ordination Team
IFRC – International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent
IHL – International Humanitarian Law
IOM – International Organisation for Migration
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JDCC – Joint Doctrine and Concepts Center
LGBTI – Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual, Transgendered, Intersex
LRRD – Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO – Non-Governmental Organizations
OAG – Opposition Armed Groups
OAS – Organization of American States
OCHA – Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA – Overseas Development Assistance
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OFDA – Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPT – Occupied Palestinian Territory
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBF – Peace Building Fund
PCIA – Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PKO – Peace Keeping Operations
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSI – Populations Services International
RBI – Resilience Building Initiatives
SAG – Strategic Advisory Group
SDF – Syria Democracy Forces
SES – Social-Ecological System

SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency

SRSG – Special Representative Secretary-General

TST – Technical Support Team

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNDRKO – UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

WaSH – Water and Sanitation and Hygiene

WFP/FAO – World Food Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization

WHO – World Health Organization

WHS – World Humanitarian Summit

WoS – Whole of Syria

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It is not easy to tear apart some related domains from each other such as politics and economy. In the same way, it is challenging to fragment politics from some domains directly affiliated with it such media, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and state building. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping are considered as activities under the political tent, while humanitarian assistance and development was considered until the nineties as an independent domain that is not linked or attached to politics without paying attention to the fact that the actors and decision makers in both domains are the same and serve the interests of their own state. At the end of the cold war in 1990, a new global context and political order started with a new concept of war and foreign interference in other countries focusing more on proxy war rather than the “traditional invasion” of other countries. within the new trend of the proxy war, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions started to take another shape and serve other purposes with different ways of getting the legitimization of such missions. Simultaneously, this new trend affected the humanitarian assistance domain directly and initiated the discussion about the feasibility of the current utilization of humanitarian assistance and how it was harmful or beneficial to conflict born crisis and started to examine the correctness of humanitarian principles to keep the humanitarian assistance neutral and not linked to the political agenda and

Following that, scholars, humanitarian organizations, governments and other stakeholders divided into two principal doctrines, the first doctrine supported conducting a drastic transformation review of delivering humanitarian assistance and reviewed the fundamental principles that guide this domain, and the second doctrine, pushed back the roots and principles of humanitarians and tried to keep the principles on which the whole humanitarian industry was built on.

The new global context after the end of the cold war characterized by radical changes in the shape of war and foreign state interventions in the domestic affairs moving and shifting from the direct invasions and wars during the colonization era to

more indirect approach through proxy war and supporting local groups to fight on behalf of external and foreign powers in addition to the economic form of war where international actors try to achieve and protect their economical and political interests without interfering directly in wars with reducing the cost in terms of soldiers and cost of direct war which support government positions toward their people on domestic level as well as show less direct interference with domestic matters and respect sovereignty of states in conflicts. Moreover, tying and linking the humanitarian assistance with political agendas reduce the pressure from people and parliaments of international powers on reducing the level of investment in international development and humanitarian assistance which serve the international power interests at the end.

Rwanda case considers one of the landmarks where humanitarian assistance participates directly in fueling the flame of the conflict and led to the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 where rebels invaded Rwanda and around one million people killed in around one hundred days. The genocide was a result of years of tension and conflict between two ethnic groups in Rwanda which are Hutu and Tutsi started in around 1918 where Tutsi – a minority group forming around 19% of total populations – ruling the country including the Hutu whom are the majority of the people – 80% of total population – the tension led to the genocide done by Hutu targeting Tutsi people and Hutu oppositions as well. Humanitarian assistance participates directly in supporting Hutu with foods for years which consider one of the main reasons to review the negative impact of the humanitarian assistance on the conflict and increasing the tension. (Farrell,2013, 6)

Conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm framework considered one of the frameworks that binding the humanitarian assistance delivery. The framework simply focusses on making sure that delivering humanitarian assistance would not negatively impact the conflict or social cohesion though supporting specific groups rather than others or instrumentalization of humanitarian aid by any warring parties to help them make advantages over others by benefiting or misusing the humanitarian assistance. Do No Harm framework should be applied during all stages of humanitarian program cycle management starting from assessment till the evaluation of the programs. Do No Harm and conflict sensitivity consider the first square or linking the humanitarian assistance to the political and social sphere and context where humanitarian assistance delivered. Understanding the context and all local dynamics socially and politically, and understanding the power balance, affiliations, interests and how humanitarian

assistance can change all these dynamics and aspects is crucial to ensure the positive or at least neutral impact of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Later on, the Do No Harm framework developed to include Do Good, with not only ensuring the neutral impact of humanitarian assistance but maximizing the benefits of delivering humanitarian assistance and utilize them in achieving sustainable and permanent peace and conflict resolutions. The first application of Do Good and Do No Harm framework for humanitarian assistance is linking the humanitarian assistance with other political, military and peacebuilding/peacekeeping missions and agendas where the integration of efforts and resources from both programs and missions reach the ultimate goal of creating and founding the permanent resolution of conflicts.

The importance of the study comes from the freshness of the research topic. The new political order and new context founded after the end of the cold war in 1991 which allowed a few years following to think about the impact on the affiliated political industries. Moreover, many of the transformation actions and the development of new mechanisms and bodies to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance only began in the 2000's, after an inflation in the scale and size of humanitarian assistance to different crisis' around the world prompted humanitarian organizations, the United Nations, donors, and governments to start thinking of better management systems and ways to maximize the benefits and deliver service in a better manner to reach objectives and not only follow principles. This research considers an additional piece in an area where there is more need for information, and analysis to improve it.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, and what is the proper way to deliver humanitarian assistance and maximize the benefit of the funds invested in humanitarianism by achieving the aimed objectives, creating and participating in developing sustainable peace, and reducing the negativity of conflict on people, either by keeping the humanitarian assistance neutral and separated from the political atmosphere or through linking the humanitarian assistance to political agendas and sub-ordered activities such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and military intervention.

The hypothesis this study come with are three main different hypotheses about the proper way of delivering humanitarian assistance and the relation between

delivering humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding and which doctrine consider better in delivering humanitarian assistance. The three hypothesis are:

1. Minimalism doctrine and keep the delivery of humanitarian assistance neutral and following the humanitarian principles is more proper way of delivering Humanitarian assistance
2. Maximalism doctrine and linking the humanitarian assistance to peacebuilding and political agenda is more proper way of delivering humanitarian assistance
3. Combination of minimalism and Maximalism depending on the context and conflict is more proper way of delivering humanitarian assistance

This study consists of an introduction, followed by five chapters with sub-sections and then a discussion and conclusion. This study started with literature review about humanitarian assistance and humanitarian response with many fundamental concepts that impact the approach and ways of delivering humanitarian assistance including the coordination mechanisms, structure of the humanitarian responses and the roles and responsibilities of each actor including the international structure for humanitarian responses and the United Nations involvements in crisis in addition to the external influence through humanitarian response from donors and foreign governments . The second chapter focuses on peacebuilding, and jointers tools and frameworks between peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance such as the *Do No Harm* framework, conflict and conflict resolutions and other grey areas relating to peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance, in addition to an intensive review about new trends and studies of the relations between peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, and military interventions; and how all three domains interact and how the results of different approaches and methods form different contexts. The third chapter reviews the new global context and international capacities regarding humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding including a review of the new global context and political order after the nineties, and how that impacted and affected the peacebuilding and involvement of the international community in legitimizing the foreign interventions and the international efforts that had taken place to modernize the humanitarian industry to match the new global context. The fourth chapter relates to the case study on how the interaction between humanitarian assistance and political agendas managed in specific complicated contexts such as Syria where a number of stakeholders and the complexity of the war are considered one of the biggest crises

after the second world war. The final chapter concludes the discussion of the different doctrines and perspectives.

In order to understand the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, this study reviews the relation and affiliation between humanitarian assistance and other domains such as politics, military operations, military force for peacebuilding and peacekeeping and how humanitarian assistance interact with these missions. Where they are serving the same goal of saving lives and participate in developing permanent solutions for conflict and how these relations confront one of the vital humanitarian principles which are the neutrality principle.

Under this study, review of specific contexts and landmarks where humanitarian assistance, directly and indirectly, impacted the conflicts positively and negatively followed by a chapter about the Syrian context as an example of large-scale, complex context which considers the most significant crisis after the world war II.

CHAPTER TWO

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

2.1. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

While there is no particular definition of humanitarian response, it can be defined as the provision of materials and services for people affected by a crisis to protect them from hazards, and facilitate the return to their regular life and livelihoods. All humanitarian response implementation follows humanitarian principles.

Even though there is no accurate definition of humanitarian response, the aim of it is defined according to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid as; *“to provide a needs-based emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity wherever the need arises if governments and local actors are overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act”* (European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 2007, 6). In other words, humanitarian responses mainly aim to save the lives of populations affected by a different type of crisis, either a humanmade conflict or natural disaster, and to reduce the level of suffering as well as increasing the capacity and preparedness for similar crisis’ that may occur.

Humanitarian response is made by four types of agencies, which are¹:

1) **Local relief structures and Community Based Organizations CBO** which include local organizations and community structures at a district level. This type of organization does not have a clear bylaw, governance structure or robust administrative functions, and most of the times, it is a community initiative and is non-registered.

2) **Non-Governmental Organizations NGO**; which could be divided into two types of organizations, the first one includes a national organization working at the county level with a minimum level of governance and organizational capacities,

¹ <http://www.buildingabetterresponse.org/>

registered within the country or with the proper legal formation. The second type of NGO's is the international NGO's that work on regional/ international levels covering many countries in the same region or in multi-regions. The international organizations have sophisticated structures including headquarters or secretary, regional offices, main country offices and country sub-offices.

3) **United Nation UN agencies**; all agencies and programs that manage and belong directly to the United Nations such as OCHA, UNDP, WFP, WHO, FAO, etc. UN agencies follow diplomatic approaches and have a different set of rules and bylaws. Most of the time, UN agencies play a higher role in humanitarian responses including the coordination and implementation of humanitarian interventions on a large scale.

4) **International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent IFRC and International Committee of Red Cross/Red Crescent ICRC**; IFRC is part of the ICRC movement which was established in 1919 after the world war one (WWI) as a humanitarian aid organization working in 190 countries with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and five regional offices around the world. IFRC/ICRC works to improve and support humanitarian responses and develop the local capacities to respond to disasters and conflicts.

Humanitarian actors deliver humanitarian assistance and development programs within a limited timeframe and work on building the capacity of local permanent actors, e.g., governments, local civil society organizations, etc., to take the programs forward, and one of the primary focus of humanitarian actors is not to substitute, but to supplement the government or permanent service providers.

Humanitarian response in different contexts and locations, regardless if it is a response to a human-made crisis or natural crisis follows four main humanitarian principles which are: (Humanitarian Principles 2012, 1)

1) ***Humanity***: *Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.*

2) ***Impartiality***: *Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.*

3) **Neutrality:** *Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.*

4) **Independence:** *Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.*

In addition to the humanitarian principles, there is another document that includes a set of principles that bind the delivery of humanitarian response and humanitarian actors which is the (ICRC) Code of Conduct CoC². The ICRC code of conduct is a document developed in 1994 by ICRC in Geneva, Switzerland to safeguard standards of behaviors for humanitarian workers and ensure the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the context of armed conflicts. The ICRC code of conduct was signed by 621 ³agencies by January 2017 and includes most of the international humanitarian actors in the world.

2.2. COORDINATION MECHANISM

Since humanitarian responses are completed by many different actors and agencies, and due to the limitation of resources in comparison to the needs, coordination between different agencies become a crucial necessity for humanitarian agencies and NGO's. The very early element of coordination started in 1991 with the UN General Assembly resolution 42/182⁴ in December 1991. The resolution comes as result of the response to the first Gulf War in 1991, where overlapping between relief agencies and humanitarian actors happened to the IDPs and sheds light on the need for coordination to be adapted and governed by coordination mandated organizations. The UN General Assembly resolution emphasised and expanded the authority of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator position (DRC) and changed the title to Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC role has the following areas of responsibilities:

- 1) Coordinating humanitarian assistance,
- 2) Facilitating access to emergency areas
- 3) Organizing needs - assessment missions
- 4) Preparing joint appeals
- 5) Mobilizing resources, among others.

² <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm>

³ http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/Copy%20of%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20UPDATED_January%202017.pdf

⁴ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/GA%20Resolution%2046-182.pdf>

Following that, in 1992, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was established to support the developed coordination measures. Then, in 1998, DHA transformed into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) after the report⁵ published by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan in 1997, with recommendations to transfer some of the operational duties to other UN agencies to have a more explicit focus on coordination and advocacy roles (General Assembly resolution 46/182, 2012).

Cluster approaches were established in 2005 after consultation between Humanitarian Coordinator and IASC following the earthquake in Pakistan. Within 24 hours, nine clusters were established. After that, the cluster approach was implemented in more than 30 countries/crises to improve the performance of coordination and give humanitarian agencies the forum to share information and coordinate (The Cluster Approach 2012).




Figure 1: Cluster coordination approach, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach>

According to figure 1: Cluster coordination approach, A cluster is a group of agencies including UN and non-UN agencies in each sector. Nine sectors and two service areas agreed with UN agencies leading each sector designated by IASC as

⁵ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/51/950

following: (IASC Guidance Note on using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response 2006).

Table1: List of sectors and leads

Sn.	Sector	UN lead	Type	Comments
1	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	IOM/UNHCR	Sector	UNHCR is the lead for Internal Displaced People IDPs from conflict while IOM is responsible in case of a disaster situation
2	Early Recovery	UNDP	Sector	
3	Education	UNICEF/ Save the Children	Sector	
4	Food Security	WFP/FAO	Sector	
5	Health	WHO	Sector	
6	Logistic	WFP	Sector	
7	Nutrition	UNICEF	Sector	
8	Protection	UNHCR	Sector	
9	Non-Food Items and Emergency Shelter	UNHCR/IFRC	Sector	UNHCR is the lead for Internal Displaced People IDPs from conflict while IFRC is responsible in case of a disaster situation
10	Logistic	WFP	Service area	
11	Emergency Telecommunication	WFP	Service area	

According to Table 1: List of sectors and leads, clusters aim to strengthen the preparedness and provision of technical capacities to humanitarian agencies by

ensuring the availability of leadership in each sector. While on a country level, the aim is to ensure a coordinated response implemented with high standards regarding predictability, accountability, and partnership in each sector. The cluster approach assists in developing a better strategic response building on prioritization of resources usage to meet the prioritized needs as well as more specific roles for each organization and give a central point of management with a full picture for the Humanitarian Coordinator.

To ensure technical capacities on a global level, Global Cluster launched an appeal for USD 39 million in March 2006, and the second appeal launched in 2007.

The primary responsibilities of global cluster leads are: (IASC Guidance Note on using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response, 2006)

- 1) *Standards and policy-setting*
 - *Consolidation and dissemination of standards; where necessary, development of standards and policies; identification of 'best practice.'*
 - *Building response capacity*
 - *Training and system development at the local, national, regional and international levels*
 - *Establishing and maintaining surge capacity and standby rosters*
 - *Establishing and maintaining material stockpiles*
- 2) *Operational support*
 - *Assessment of needs for human, financial and institutional capacity*
 - *Emergency preparedness and long-term planning*
 - *Securing access to appropriate technical expertise*
 - *Advocacy and resource mobilization*
 - *Pooling resources and ensuring complementarity of efforts through enhanced partnerships*

The cascading of the strategic overview of the coordination is done with the Humanitarian Coordinator or the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator playing the role of a strategic focal point and providing strategic direction for the humanitarian community. These strategic directions translated into a guiding plan delivered through the inter-cluster coordination team – representing OCHA as well – and through clusters coordinators to the cluster members which are the humanitarian agencies working in the respective sector to improve the delivery of relief assistance to the affected

populations efficiently and effectively. The role of the inter-cluster coordination team is to ensure the harmonization between different clusters and develop the strategic response plan which considers the core guiding document for all humanitarian agencies to prepare their interventions accordingly and certify their projects are matching the needs on the ground⁶.




Figure2: Humanitarian Coordination Structure, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/how-to/do-inter-cluster-coordination>

Figure 2 shows that Humanitarian Coordination structure shows the relations and reporting lines between The Emergency Coordinator, Humanitarian Country Team HCT, the Intercluster Coordination Team and the cluster leads and clusters members.

To ensure efficient responses among different agencies, humanitarian responses are implemented under a sophisticated and coherent structure where each actor has a role to play. Different roles for different actors are crucial for an effective

⁶ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/how-to/do-inter-cluster-coordination>

response. However, notable leading roles are restricted to specific positions and agencies in which most are UN agencies or their representatives.

To activate one cluster, a series of consultations and discussions between the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team are conducted and then communicated with the Emergency Relief Coordinator with the justifications and rationale behind activating the cluster including the response scale and coordination needed. After that, the request is shared with IASC principals and Global Clusters for their consent. After the approval, Humanitarian Coordinator is informed of the decision to start the establishment of the cluster. The main two criteria used to evaluate whether to activate cluster or not are:

- 1- Gaps in adhering the humanitarian principles and coordination capacity in the existing response.
- 2- Response and coordination gaps due to a sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation.

The cluster is a temporary coordination mechanism and should not be active forever. During the active cluster period, the humanitarian team should ensure the transferring of knowledge and capacity to another local structure to be able to move forward and have the capacity to respond to similar events in the future. Therefore, in a subsequent crisis following the discussion and agreement between Humanitarian Coordinator, Humanitarian Country Team, and a decision by the Emergency, Response Coordinator.

- 1- improvement in the humanitarian situation and reduce the needs for humanitarian response and gaps.
- 2- The national structure has the capacity to manage the coordination and humanitarian needs such as government for example.

The procedure to de-activate an active cluster starts with a review from the Humanitarian Coordinator with the Humanitarian Country Team about the needs for the cluster and then correspondence of the recommendation to the Emergency Response Coordinator for approval on which cluster should remain active and which one is to be deactivated⁷.

2.2.1 DIFFERENT TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES

⁷ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/activation-and-deactivation-clusters>

As mentioned previously, NGOs conduct three main types of programs which can be categorized by

- 1) delivery of humanitarian relief programs,
- 2) capacity building and development programs and

3) advocacy to policymakers. Depending on the needs and type of crisis, NGOs develop their programs to focus on the essential type of programs; which is why we see in conflicts and natural crises where humanitarian situation deteriorates significantly, the focus of NGOs becomes delivering humanitarian assistance with less concentration on capacity building and development programs. However, in 1990, the concept of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) emerged to develop sorting of arrangements to find a way to have a continuum of effective humanitarian relief and med-long term programs, and to have the integration between the two types of programs (Róisín Hinds, 2015, 1).

There are two fundamental notions of understanding the relations and gap between humanitarian relief and development programs. The first one comes from the specific time period point of view. This notion thought that humanitarian relief is a temporary period when the humanitarian situation needs immediate action and the development programs start when the humanitarian operations come to an end (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005, 2). The second notion takes the gap from the point of intuitional mandate and where the main difference is in focusing on priorities, culture, and objective rather than time constraints (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005, 3). Practically, both arguments are valid and do not contradict each other. However, regardless of these gaps, Hinds discussed four main common challenges which are:

1- **Conceptual, institutional and strategic gaps** where different mandates, focus, and priorities present a practical challenge to LRRD. In addition to the NGOs mandate, donor perspective and mandates create another layer of challenges when the fund has a specific focus and clear division between humanitarian relief and development works.

2- **Funding gaps**, as mentioned above, donor mandate and division in financing programs between humanitarian relief and development programs increase the distance between humanitarian relief and development efforts and generate another constraint on having LRRD approach.

3- **Partnerships and coordination:** this challenge refers to the capacity gap and ability of donor implementing partners and NGOs to implement various types of response and humanitarian operations in relief and development.

4- **Refugees and displaced persons:** the mandate of reaching and addressing the needs of displaced people can be done only through humanitarian relief prolong the crisis and reaching sustainability (Hinds, 2015, 2).

Another study published by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs tackling the LRRD proposed “Approaches favoring LRRD” which can be summarized as (Linking Relief and Development: More than old solutions for old problems? IOB Study, 2013, 52-63)

1- **Coordination and restructuring:** inclusive coordination mechanisms on field level and global level on a sectoral basis and beyond that cover cross-cutting and thematic aspects create the framework to integrate different actors. However, early recovery clusters as one of the thematic clusters activated in a specific crisis have two sides of integrating humanitarian relief and development programs and advancing the concept of LRRD, at the same time, mismanagement of this cluster could create a separated and isolated coordination structure for development operations and increase the recess between relief and development.

2- **Country (risk) assessments:** a notable improvement in the humanitarian need assessment during the recent years occurred, which helps to utilize the context and risk assessment process to breach the gap between relief and development by taking longer-term consideration in humanitarian relief works as well as creating mutual platform to bring both type of actors together to design and develop programs on same ground.

3- **Decision-making and funding at country level:** the localizing of the decision-making process to the country level produce another platform to overcome “the two worlds apart” and work on joint policies and tools to breach the gap. There are a few cases where a country-level move has taken place such as:

a. UNOCHA (United Nation Office of Coordination Humanitarian Assistance) Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP),

b. Common humanitarian funds managed on a country level such as Sudan, South Sudan, DRC

c. Even though donor funding decision still managed on HQ level, but the influence and role of the country program increased significantly such as UK Department of Foreign International Development DFID⁸

d. The country level UN structure under the leadership of Humanitarian Coordinator improve the integration between humanitarian relief and development programs

4- **Long-term engagement and combined funding at country level:** Globally, remarkable improvement in international community preference to understand and engage in tackling the long-term challenges that resulted in the crisis instead of focusing on the short-term situation. This new style of thinking is seen as an environment enabler for better LRRD.

5- **Regional programming:** Donor tendency toward regional programmes funding give opportunities to NGOs for longer-term program planning with larger budgets and develops a good starting point to integrate humanitarian relief and development program with a focus on resilience concept. In the Syrian context in 2016, the UK DFID (Department of Foreign International Development) funded many projects for four years, focusing on building resilience and merging emergency response with long-term activities and followed a Whole of Syria (WoS) approach rather than covering only particular part of the country. Another example from Syria, the last call for proposals initiated by Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OFDA belong to United States Agency for International Development USAID – even though they have an emergency mandate – requested two-year programs to be done through a consortium of several agencies instead of funding the individual organization.

6- **National authorities and local capacities:** linkages with government and local authorities to set up the coordination presence in affected regions was a lesson learned confirmed by many crises such as the tsunami of South Asia and the drought in the Horn of Africa. The engagement of governments and local authorities in the humanitarian relief created the fertilized ground to take over from NGOs in the development phase.

7- **Integrated approaches:** The second lesson learned from South Asia tsunami response is that integrated responses which respond to various needs with a focus on longer-term goals embedded in it are the most successful responses. This type

⁸ www.DFID.gov.uk.

of response challenged by the fragmentation of funding from donors as well as the sector base structure for most of the international NGOs.

2.2.2 RESILIENCE CONCEPT

2.2.2.1 Resilience concept

Resilience considers one of the new trends in the humanitarian industry with increasing attention in the international community about the concept of resilience. Resilience definition according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC is *“The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions”* (IPCC, Glossary of terms. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, 2012, 563).

The Government Office for Science discusses the four perspectives to understand the conceptual origins of resilience, which are: (Disaster Vulnerability and Resilience: Theory, Modelling, and Prospective, 2012, 9-11)

1) Engineering: The engineering perspective of resilience is the ability to “bounce back,” which means in social context, the ability of displaced people to return to their previous equilibrium or similar steadiness situation.

2) Psychology: resilience from a psychological perspective is about the ability to have a vibrant and genuine life, including the ability to “bounce back” and overcome the negative impact of the crisis, adopt positive coping mechanisms and adapt to traumatic situations and shocks (Rodríguez-Llanes et al, 2013, 3).

3) Disaster resilience: is the rejection of negative meanings or signs of vulnerability, in other words, conceptualized resilience is the opposite of the conceptualized vulnerability. It becomes like a closed cycle where it is vulnerable because it is not resilient and not resilient because it is vulnerable.

4) Social-ecological systems resilience: Social-Ecological System (SES) is providing a model to describe the aspects or relations between, and interaction within, the human-environment system. It offers guiding concepts about adaptive cycle anarchy, adaptability, transformability and, perhaps most importantly, resilience.

2.2.2.2 Resilience building initiatives RBI's

Resilience building initiatives (RBI) is an operation level method that allows NGOs to involve and build resilience at a community level during humanitarian relief interventions (Bosher and Kayaga, 2013, 4). As an example of RBI's:

A business model approach which helps in reducing previous resistance and boosts the service provision locally. The business model could be implemented through delivering emergency relief materials and services through distributing cash and vouchers that will help foster the local markets and local stakeholders. The business model should take into consideration the market and local actor's capacity, in order to ensure doing no harm and having a negative impact on the supplies available for all populations. Also, the business model requests a high level of local partnerships with different stakeholders including the private sectors and empower the local vendors and stakeholders to deliver the urgent needs and build their long-term capacity instead of doing that by NGOs itself.

A neighborhood approach which focuses more on the rehabilitation of damaged neighborhood where people displaced from or support and increases the capacity of hosting communities for IDPs by providing alternative durable shelter solutions and long-term service provision which impact relationships in targeted communities.

A demand-led approach which focuses on the high level of local community participation in all project management cycles that improve informed decision making and manage the expectations of the population with a focus on building and developing durable local mechanisms such as cost recovery and providing longer-term livelihood opportunities.

2.2.2.3 Mainstreaming Resilience

Enabling the implementation of RBI's needs to embed that in the framework of programmes and leading strategy on the sector base. That needs to include additional attributes on the organizational level as well as the humanitarian community level. On the organization level having flexible funding that supports agile programmes and the alignment between different sectors through the implementation of innovative interventions and makes the prioritization of needs between immediate relief needs and medium to long-term recovery. Another dimension is working on NGO's community level to have better coordination between organizations and

interventions similar to the organizational level efforts to coordinate inter-sectorial and increase the added value. Developing the strategic capacity of NGO's and coordination mechanisms to develop a strategic framework and best utilizing the capacity of Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) on the sectoral level and advocate for flexible funds and support the integration of RBI's (Bosher and Kayaga, 2013, 5).

2.3 HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURE

The cluster approach includes many actors and entities playing different roles in clear and organized architecture to ensure achievement of the cluster aims and objectives. As per the Figure3: Coordination Architecture in The Cluster Approach, it shows the relations and how all different players and actors work together.




Figure3: Coordination Architecture in The Cluster Approach,

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/who-does-what>

Inter-Agencies Standing Committee (IASC) is a forum for coordination between humanitarian agencies, responsible primarily for policy development, the division of responsibilities, and advocate for humanitarian principles. The IASC is considered the voice of humanitarian actors from non-UN agencies, the international coordination setting for evolving mutual rules, and minimum standards for humanitarian responses. However, the IASC role is more prominently on the delivery part but not playing a crucial role in the coordination or the management of humanitarian responses on a country level where UN agencies take the lead.

The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) reports directly to and works under the supervision of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian affairs are responsible for the oversight of all emergencies around the world that need UN assistance. ERC is assigning a Humanitarian Coordinator in each country hit by crisis after getting the endorsement of the IASC. After that, the Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for evaluating the crisis whether its required international response or not and ensuring humanitarian responses are well coordinated and organized, in addition to managing the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and liaise and coordinate with the government of the affected country.

Global Cluster Lead Agencies (GCLA) primarily play the role of technical expertise provider including the provision of technical surge team, technical training for cluster coordinators, developing and harmonizing tools for Cluster Lead Agencies, developing need assessment methodologies and approaches, developing best practices and lesson learned.

OCHA is playing the most crucial role in the humanitarian structure, by working closely with GCLA, Humanitarian Coordinator, Cluster Lead Agencies, humanitarian agencies to develop policies, coordinate humanitarian responses, sharing information about the crisis and operational guidance for humanitarian agencies on the field level. In addition to that, OCHA coordinates and liaises with the government of the affected country to provide support to the Humanitarian Coordinator and Humanitarian Country Team while the most critical role for OCHA remains to facilitate the inter-cluster coordination and ensure the coordinated response. Then, Cluster Coordinators coordinate interventions under their respective cluster, addressing the main challenges and concerns to be solved or escalated to Humanitarian Country Team to ensure the right applying of strategic decisions on an operational level by humanitarian agencies.

After all the coordination and leadership efforts mentioned above, Humanitarian agencies and Cluster Members roles are primarily to understand the responsibilities assigned to members of the cluster, and the commitment to continue engagement with cluster communal works as well as a commitment to implement and deliver humanitarian assistance following the humanitarian principles, mainstream protection and cross-cutting issues in program delivery, and ideal usage of resources.

From all above, the dominant role of UN agencies has become undeniable, especially the OCHA on the coordination and directing of humanitarian assistance by

geographic locations, sector, ... etc., as it is well-known that UN agencies – including OCHA – are not humanitarian agencies in the sense of humanitarianism, this becomes an entry point to understanding the role of policymakers and politicians in utilizing the humanitarian assistance and responses into delivery or political agendas and agreements⁹.

2.4 PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLES

Partnership considers one of the central elements in the humanitarian response, especially with long-term development projects. The partnership is the primary approach of transferring knowledge to local entities and builds their capacities through directly working with these entities, implementing and conducting emergency and developmental responses through local agencies and during this process, provide on-job training, coaching, mentoring and other types of direct training and capacity building activities. Most international NGO's and UN agencies work and implement through local partners to access local communities as well as to build their capacities to be able to take over and keep the work when international actors decide to leave.

Partnership approaches vary from one organization to another. However, most international organizations follow the partnership approaches endorsed by the Global Humanitarian Platform¹⁰. All organization participants of the Global Humanitarian Platform agree to adhere the following partnership principles: (Principles of Partnership, 2007,1)

1- **Equality**; *Equality requires mutual respect between members of the partnership irrespective of size and power. The participants must respect each other's mandates, obligations, and independence and recognize each other's constraints and commitments. Mutual respect must not preclude organizations from engaging in constructive dissent.*

2- **Transparency**; *Transparency is achieved through dialogue (on equal footing), with an emphasis on early consultations and early sharing of information. Communications and transparency, including financial transparency, increase the level of trust among organizations.*

⁹ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/who-does-what>

¹⁰ www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org

3- **Result-oriented approach;** *Effective humanitarian action must be reality-based and action-oriented. This requires result-oriented coordination based on effective capabilities and concrete operational capacities.*

4- **Responsibility;** *Humanitarian organizations have an ethical obligation to each other to accomplish their tasks responsibly, with integrity and in a relevant and appropriate way. They must make sure they commit to activities only when they have the means, competencies, skills, and capacity to deliver on their commitments. Decisive and robust prevention of abuses committed by humanitarians must also be a constant effort.*

5- **Complementarity;** *The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if we build on our comparative advantages and complement each other's contributions. Local capacity is one of the main assets to enhance and on which to build. Whenever possible, humanitarian organizations should strive to make it an integral part in emergency response. Language and cultural barriers must be overcome.*

The partnership principles focus and try to maintain equality in the relationship between the international organizations and local organizations. When access to funding is available only for international organizations, it creates an imbalance in power between local and international organizations and the stronger party – international organizations in this case – always tend to limit the role of local organization to the implementation, and transfer the risk of incorrect implementation, misconduct and misbehaviours to the local bodies which reduces the healthiness of the relationship and increase the empower. Partnership principles developed and endorsed to reduce the imbalance, increase the equality and emphasis on the importance of the building the capacity of local organizations and the vital roles they are playing in delivering humanitarian assistance and development programs.

2.4.1 CARE International Works Through Partners in Syria

As an example of multi-levels partners, CARE (Cooperative for Assistance Relief Everywhere) International started the humanitarian response in Syria from Turkey in 2013, where CARE has no presence at all inside Syria and depends 100% on local partners to implement and deliver humanitarian programs to vulnerable people. CARE started working with three local partners and expanded the number of partners to eight by 2018 to deliver programs in the sectors of Food Security and

Livelihoods, Health with focus on sexual reproductive health, Non-Food Items, Protection, and WaSH. CARE International plays a vital role in building the capacity of local partners regarding the operational and organizational capacities. Syria is a unique case since the civil society, and the third sector was almost non-exist before the crisis in 2011, after that, small initiatives and local organizations were established to provide support to the affected populations in the north of Syria. The main start of the local partners and organization was either through Syrian diaspora living abroad wanting to participate in supporting their people or through small CBO's started in the north of Syria and then expand their capacities and scale and become NGOs. The remote management was critical in the Syrian response for CARE and many other INGOs since the security situation in the north of Syria hamper INGOs from having staff in the field directly and made them depend heavily on local partners. That led to expanding the local partners significantly in a short period to be able to manage large-scale programs with tens of millions during the first few years of establishments (Interview with CARE International Partnerships Manager – LuBna Al Khaldi – 2018).

2.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE

Unlike the private sector and public sector, international NGO's have no shareholders to hold them accountable. At the same time, they receive funding from various sources which include but are not limited to institutional donors, private sectors, and private and individual donations. The donations are channeled through NGO's but not to them, the final owners of the donation are the vulnerable people that NGO's are committed to serving. Therefore, the NGO's are only one stakeholder – which have the most influence on managing the fund – but not owning the fund they have. This introduction shows the importance of the accountability and good governance applications in NGO's to

- 1) Final beneficiaries
- 2) Donors
- 3) Partners.

Michael Edwards and David Hulme studied the level of dependency on NGO's from governments in light of increased funding during the period of the 1990s where this dependency on NGOs gave the space and power to NGO's to implement and direct funds for purposes other than the agreed ones (Edwards & Hulme, 1996, 1-20)

Brown and Moore, emphasize the need to focus more on the accountability concept in INGO toward different participants and stakeholders. The main key stakeholders are the following:

- 1- Donors
- 2- Beneficiaries
- 3- NGO staff
- 4- Partners or local entities are participating in the project.

The study argues that the principal-agent model where the INGO take the principal role and decide which stakeholder they hold accountable is not the best model. As an alternative, the study recognized three types of programs for INGOs which are

- 1) Delivery of programs
- 2) Capacity building for local entities
- 3) Advocacy to policymakers.

Brown and Moore propose that NGOs should review and take into considerations the linked legal, moral, ethical, and political dues and build their strategic decision about which one should be in the central focus depending on the context and type of program (Hauser Ctr. for Non-profit Org., Working Paper No. 7, 2001).

The democracy accountability term refers to the connexion between the access to resources and power with the responsibilities and commitments toward those who have less (Bendell, 2006, 4). That means according to Brown and Moors that NGOs should be regulated and legitimized by the community and other less powerful stakeholders. Bendell goes further to say that community and other stakeholders should participate in decision-making processes along with NGOs to ensure the reflection of all stakeholders' interest, which makes NGOs accountable for their decisions.

In 2003, several NGOs with different mandates came together to form the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP International) as an initiative to improve the accountability of humanitarian organizations in the delivery of humanitarian responses. During the next decade of establishing HAP International, HAP standard considered the reference for all NGOs to ensure minimum accountability standards in place. Later, in 2015, HAP International merged with People In Aid to form Core Humanitarian Standards Alliance (CHS Alliance) with a

vision to *“Improve the effectiveness and impact of assistance to people and communities vulnerable to risk and affected by disaster, conflict or poverty, by working with humanitarian and development actors on quality, accountability and people management initiatives”*¹¹. CHS Alliance develops an essential guiding document regarding accountability called Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS)¹² which include nine commitments for all NGOs to ensure quality and accountability in delivering humanitarian responses. CHS standards developed in twenty-four languages and consider one of the minimum standards for NGOs to follow. The nine commitments are:

1. *Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs.*
2. *Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time.*
3. *Communities and people affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action*
4. *Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them.*
5. *Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.*
6. *Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.*
7. *Communities and people affected by crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organizations learn from experience and reflection.*
8. *Communities and people affected by crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff and volunteers.*
9. *Communities and people affected by crisis can expect that the organizations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.*

After that, the CHS Alliance published another useful document about applying CHS standard guidance notes and indicators¹³ which include practical

¹¹ <https://www.chsalliance.org/who-we-are>

¹² <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/>

¹³ <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/CHS-Guidance-Notes-and-Indicators.pdf>

actions, criterion, and an indicator on how to ensure CHS standards are applied and embedded in humanitarian program delivery.

In 2011, the IASC under the transformative agenda, created a guiding document for NGOs regarding accountability named Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) and develop the operational framework for AAP that includes in concise way the main steps and procedures for NGOs to ensure accountability on the field level toward the affected populations during all program cycle phases and endorse five Commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations (CAAP) which are: (Accountability to Affected Populations AAP The Operational Framework; IASC, 2011, 11)

1) **Leadership/Governance:** which illustrate the willingness and commitment to accountability by guaranteeing complaints and feedback mechanisms are integrated into their country strategy and successfully activated during all program management phases.

2) **Transparency:** by ensuring sharing information and information availability to affected populations about policies and procedures, structure and processes to ensure affected populations are able to make an informed decision and mobilize open communications between an organization and affected populations.

3) **Feedback and Complaints:** to ensure communication between an organization and affected populations are there, taking feedback from affected populations and ensure adapting and adjusting policies and procedures and programs designs according to feedback and ensure accountability mechanisms are in place and integrated alongside in all program stages.

4) **Participation:** by giving the space and the appropriate channels to affected populations to raise their voice and participate in the decision-making process and ensure the engagement and representations of affected populations and marginalized groups in the decision-making process.

5) **Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation:** complementing to the transparency, participation, and feedback and complains, last commitment focusses on learning from feedback and ensure the involvement and engagement of affected populations in designing programmes and evaluating the result in a constant manner.

In July 2012, the IASC continued working on the same document and developed additional operational guiding documents named Tools to assist in implementing the IASC AAP commitment. The document includes mainly brief about

the five commitments as well as three additional tools with full explanations about how to use them. The three tools are

- 1) The Accountability Analysis and Planning Tool.
- 2) The AAP Self-Assessment Tool.
- 3) The Rapid Cluster Accountability Review Tool.

(Tools to assist in implementing the IASC AAP commitment; IASC, 2012).

The IASC and CHS Alliance worked together to embed both CHS standards and AAP in all NGOs work, and IASC consider following the CHS standards as one of the tools to ensure accountability to affected populations, at same time, CHS Alliance disseminate an FAQ document on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) to provide an overview of the importance of AAP and how to apply the five commitments practically.

From the above; the importance of accountability in NGOs world it is apparent and the massive level of effort by different international organizations and bodies to develop and create all possible tools and guidance to ensure organization accountability and implementing minimum standards during the delivery of the humanitarian response.

2.6 GENDER EQUALITY AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Gender equality and gender-based violence considered one of the crucial and sensitive areas in the humanitarian domain since the delivery of humanitarian assistance create sort of imbalance in power between aid workers and beneficiaries and give privilege for aid workers over beneficiaries that put them in a position where they can abuse and exploit beneficiaries. While gender equality has a wider scope and has a reflection in many domains such as politics, social sciences, and others. In a humanitarian domain, the importance of gender equality and deliver gender sensitive relief programs come from the possible negative impact that humanitarian programs might occur if its delivered in wrong way and might negatively impact the social cohesion, social norms and empower specific groups over others and increase the marginalization of unprivileged groups.

2.6.1 Gender Equality

Scott mentioned in her study in 1986 that feminists started to use the term *gender* to refer to social structure and understanding of sex differences (Scott, 1986, 1053-1075), while according to the IASC the gender term refers to the social differences between women and men over their roles in life and society and the

difference in power which changes from culture to another and keep changing during time (IASC Gender Handbook, 2006,1).

The definition of gender equality according to the IASC Gender Equality Policy Statement is “equality between women and men, refers to the equal enjoyment by women, girls, boys, and men of rights, opportunities, resources, and rewards. Equality does not mean that women and men are the same but that their enjoyment of rights, opportunities and life chances are not governed or limited by whether they were born female or male.” (IASC Policy Statement Gender Equality in Humanitarian Action, 2008, 7). Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA defined gender equality as having equal rights, life perspective, opportunities, and power for men, women, boys, and girls (SIDA 2016, 1).

The importance and attention given to gender are driven by notable differences in the needs of women, men, boys and girls in emergency and conflict contexts, where typically, women are underprivileged, at more risk and the influence and impact on women are higher than men. However, the trend in gender regard increasingly tends to understand the different needs and increasingly recognizes the specific needs of men and boys in a crisis situation.

Promoting gender equality has become a crucial part of the NGOs work in both emergency responses and development and resilience programs. NGO's follow different approaches and methods to integrate gender into their programs and promote gender equality. Council for International Development proposes seven different approaches to promote gender equality which are: (Council for International Development Factsheet 6, 2012, 1)

1- Rights-Based Approach embedding of human rights in programs design and ensure the alignment of organization work with human right treaties that endorse gender equality and equity such as Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women CEDAW¹⁴

2- Gender Mainstreaming is having gender analysis as a standard exercise for all emergency and development programs, examine and test organization policies and procedures from a gender perspective and adapt policies and procedure accordingly and adding actions for mainstream gender in all organization operations.

¹⁴ <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/>

3- Communication with other NGOs and third sector agencies, working closely with the grassroots organization and small Community Based Organizations CBOs and support communal initiatives that focus on advancing gender equality.

4- Using proper language and avoid using terms and expressions that extend or encourage gender stereotypes.

5- Working hand in hand with governments and local bodies in supporting the disadvantaged people with their specific needs to be effective in their roles.

6- Support gender equality is promoting legalizations and backing full rights to all citizens irrespectively to their gender and advocate with policymakers to improve legalizations promoting gender equality.

7- Support and encourage CBOs and local entities in involving women in peace building and conflict resolutions and fertilize the ground for women involvement using real examples from previous experiences in other context and organizations.

2.6.2 Gender-Based Violence GBV

According to PSI Organization, Gender-Based Violence “is an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males and females. GBV primarily affects women and girls, although boys and men and sexual and gender minorities also experience it” (PSI, Evidence series Gender-Based Violence, 2016, 11). While the SIDA definition for GBV is “any harm or suffering that is perpetrated against a woman or girl, man or boy and that has a negative impact on the physical, sexual or psychological health, development or identity of the person. The cause of the violence is founded on gender-based power inequalities and gender-based discrimination” (Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence: Expressions and Strategies, 2015, 6).

GBV considered the extreme appearance of gender inequality in a society where the imbalance of power gives the social acceptance to one group to act in a violent way against other less privileged groups. GBV is widely spread around the world and in all communities with no exception, but of clearly in a different level and frequency. Displaced people and people affected by crisis considered the most vulnerable groups to GBV and obviously women and girls are the most unprotected group within the affected populations. In a survey done in Palestinian camp in Jordan covered 2590 households show that over 44% of wives been beaten once at least during

their relations (UNRWA, working with Gender Based Violence Survivors, 2012, 1).

The most common and obvious GBV actions are:

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) which is extensively common in Africa, is usually done for 50% of girls under age 5 or below and 50% aged between 5 to 14 years. The common reason for FGM is the social acceptance, and the consideration that this act is “normal.” FGM imposes high health risks on girls, especially given that most of the time it is performed without any medical support or medical personnel present but by women whom traditionally practice FGM (UNFPA, 2013).

HONOR VIOLENCE OR VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF HONOR: Honor crimes refer to any crime against family members - usually women and girls – that bring “shame” to their family and/or community/clan. Honor crimes are legitimized and accepted through the support of different backgrounds such as religion, ethnicity, nationality ...etc., honor crimes are usually protected and legalized by local laws in many countries in Africa and the Middle East.

EARLY/CHILD MARRIAGE any type of official or non-official marriage of children under 18 is considered as a GBV act since it deprives children of their rights in childhood, education, and security. UNFPA counted over than 140 million cases in a decade.

VIOLENCE AGAINST LGBTI PERSONS Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people are the most impacted and affected population of GBV globally. Most of the time LGBTI crime are legalized, and they are facing the lowest rate of legal protection, especially in third world countries. In 76 countries being LGBTI is a crime, and in 10 of them, LGBTI people risk a lifetime prison sentence or execution.

CHAPTER THREE

RELATION BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND PEACEBUILDING

This chapter is about reviewing the literature of peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm framework, in addition, to review the recent changes in the global context and the new war after the end of the cold war between the United States and dissolved the Soviet Union.

The first part about peacebuilding and conflict to give an overview about conflict and conflict born crisis and reflect the atmosphere of conflict and politics where humanitarian assistance delivered and how its impact and get impacted by this sphere with clarification of the Do No Harm framework and how it works to tie the humanitarian assistance with peacebuilding and conflict. While in the second part of this chapter, it is explaining the new global context and doctrines regarding linking/splitting the humanitarian assistance with political agendas and peacebuilding/peacekeeping missions in addition to reflect the overlapping between humanitarian assistance and other domains including, politics, conflict, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and state building.

3.1 PEACE BUILDING

Peacebuilding is a relatively broad concept which covers and compresses many sub-concepts or phases under it. The concept and term of peacebuilding emerged with Botrus Botrus Ghali report in 1992, An Agenda for Peace¹⁵, where peacebuilding is defined as “an action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict” many then in 2000, after the UN General Assembly fifty-fifth session¹⁶ Brahimi, defined peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something

¹⁵http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/an_agenda_for_peace_1992.pdf

¹⁶ <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf>

that is more than just the absence of war” (UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation, 2010, 5). Under the concept of peacebuilding, three main concepts are defined as phases of context where peace initiatives should take place. The three main phases are: (An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peace-keeping, 1992, 5)

1) ***Preventive diplomacy*** is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

2) ***Peace-making***: is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations

3) ***Peace-keeping***: is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well

Another concept which is linked to and similar to peacebuilding emerged in 2008 which is state-building. Statebuilding, identified by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state” (State Building in Situations of Fragility, 2008, 1), to differentiate between state-building and peacebuilding, peacebuilding is the process and actions of preventing conflicts and institutionalize peace which is crucial part of state-building, while state-building is more longer-term process that aims to build the “state” over generations to evolve and build profounded enduring state-society relation (Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges, international dialogue on peacebuilding and state-building, 2010, 22).

Peacebuilding globally is the responsibility of different stakeholders including United Nation, NGOs, donors, governments of states, other international organizations and local actors. However, even though we have many stakeholders and players in peacebuilding, the UN remains the big umbrella that underneath the efforts of all other sub-stakeholders (Browne and Thomas, 2015, 12).

Peacebuilding includes the activities and mechanisms that promote long-term stability and lasting peace during all different stages of conflict including, the emergence of conflict, during the conflict, and post-conflict. Peacebuilding could be

understood from three different dimensions which are: (Peace Building Overview, OECD, 2005, 2)

The security dimension which includes the general security situation of the state and country taking into that the security of people inhabiting the country. Under the security dimension, many activities should be considered such as 1) disarmament, dissolving of factions, re-integrate soldiers with community 2) demining activities, mine clearance, support of mine victims, and raising awareness about mine risks. 3) control and improve the legal measure of using light weapons, and 4) Security system reforms including promoting civil control, transparency, and accountability from different weaponry groups such as military and police toward civilians and people.

Governance and the political dimension Some of the root causes of conflict are the functioning situations, bribery and corruption, lack of human rights and good governance, and difficulties on participation and accessibility to political and administrative life. Therefore, as practices to improve the tackle the social and economic dimension should include:

- 1) Developing and supporting political and governance institutions and bodies through a transitional period to improve their performance and be more responsible and accountable.
- 2) Improve the social acceptance of peacebuilding within people through reconciliation and promote non-violence conflict resolutions between different groups including politicians, businessmen, and civilians.
- 3) Promote, improve and support state institution to provide more democratic and human rights based services and ensure inclusion of un-privileged groups in political life.
- 4) Support state institutions to adopt a peace-oriented approach and improve the role of third sector and media
- 5) Improve and support the judiciary parts and enhance the balance between justice, punishment, reconciliation, and impunity

The social, economic and environmental dimension unemployment, lack of opportunities, unequal distribution of resources, marginalized groups, regions, and scarcity of resources and lack of livelihoods means such as productive assets, water, electricity, and other infrastructures are factors that trigger conflicts and create a long-term impact on society. To tackle those socio-economic aspects, peacebuilding exercises should involve:

- 1) Involvement of refugees and internally displaced people and improve social cohesion
- 2) Rehabilitation of infrastructure and improve services for day-to-day life
- 3) Improve and develop sustainable projects and impactful long-term areas such as access to education and health services.
- 4) Sustainance and improve markets and productivity of private sector, initiatives the combat unemployment and mobilize trading and investment
- 5) Provision of support to improve the environment and resources management on a national level

In 2012, Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) conducted an evaluation of PBF performances in nine countries (Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Uganda) the primary aim of the evaluation was not to assess the performance of PBF programs but to reflect and provide practical examples that highlight the strategic issues and linking this issues to the finding in the country covered by the evaluation. The main findings from the evaluation were: (van Beijnum, 2013, 7-11)

Global versus in-country fund: the evaluation discussed the two tiers of decision-making for funding – global level and in-country level – and showed a requirement for in-country level funding capacity for both UN agencies and local actors. The report displayed low positive results about UN capacities to develop peacebuilding and has a central focus on the “normal” development projects. The division of funds was more according to agencies rather than on peacebuilding frameworks to contribute to the objective of peacebuilding. Moreover, the evaluation shows lack of capacity for peacebuilding within the local actors and lack of coordination and added value for scattered projects. One crucial aspect also reflected from the evaluation is designing programs based on context analysis not only taking into considerations the drivers of conflicts but also should take into considerations the areas where there is a potentially positive impact on peacebuilding.

Speed and flexibility generally, PBF is well-known as a fast and flexible provider of funds for post-conflict situations. The evaluation emphasis is on these capabilities of PBF and shows good accomplishments in all nine countries included in the study about the timeliness of funds balanced with the business model. However, it was not clear where the need for fast and speedy funds needs come from; the evaluation said that national actors were picked for longer-term peacebuilding actions rather than

immediate response. Another aspect that related to the speed of funds is about fast delivering of programs and having a quick impact or engaging local and national stakeholders in the peacebuilding process – taking into considerations the lack of capacity within national actors – the evaluation shows the capacity building for national actors is crucial component, but this focus was not always there.

Catalytic nature of the PBF a lengthy debate about the catalytic of PBF and what does it mean and how should be addressed. Financial wise, catalytic could be comprehended as financial follow-up OR activating national actors to support peacebuilding. From the evaluation, PBF has some success in pulling some follow up funding for peacebuilding projects, at the same time, the evaluation shows propensity from PBF toward having PBF funding to ensure the continuation of PBF projects. The risk of having unconvinced donors to embrace PBF projects are always there financially. Therefore, the recommendation comes about the needs of careful choice of activities and having a clear exit strategy. Another vital element related to the fund continuation is to distinguish between critical funding gaps and critical peacebuilding gaps where responding to the funding gaps does not mean automatically addressing the peacebuilding gaps.

Monitoring and evaluation the evaluation arguing about the reporting system of PBF the reports provides sufficient information to assess the impact of PBF projects and peacebuilding. The initial finding present lack of in-country monitoring and evaluation capacity

Complementarity of the Fund / PBF market-niche in the country due to the limited capacity of PBF projects in terms of fund scale and timeframe, the crucial element is to understand how other funding opportunities can complement PBF projects and peacebuilding. The evaluation shows the possibility of improving the coordination on the level of UN system as well as bilateral coordination with other donors and INGOs. Moreover, to guarantee the complementary, the evaluation shows the importance of involving and coordinating with other donors and INGOs in the design phase of PBF projects.

Role and function of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as part of the PBF business model the evaluation showed that in five out of nine countries of the study, no apparent effect or participation from peacebuilding commissions PBC to the PBF funded projects. The evaluation focus was on the PBC contribution to achieving peacebuilding in respective countries by supporting the effort to look for additional

funding rather than the role of PBC in implementing the PBF projects – since PBC has no role in implementation - and the findings from the evaluation shows that PBC has room for improvement in their performance in this regard.

3.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) definition by the International Committee for Red Cross/Red Crescent ICRC is “*a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. The international humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict*” (What is International Humanitarian Law? , ICRC, 2004, 1).

International law is the what controls, describes and governs the relations between states, including but not limited to conflicts, customary issues, and trading. The international humanitarian law is part of the International law and is mainly applied in conflicts (international and non-international conflicts) to 1) ensure the protection of civilians who are not participants in the conflict or part of the fight and 2) provide restrictions on the instruments of conflict including weapons, and methods of warfare. The restriction on warfare is primarily on weapons that cause superfluous injury OR causing long-term harm to the environment.

The international humanitarian law applied only during the armed conflicts while the measures for applying the law should be during both war and peacetime since several measures should be implemented during the peacetime. Implementing and applying the international humanitarian law is mainly the responsibilities of states which signed the Geneva convention. Therefore, states, through their parliament should take measures to ensure proper implementation of the international humanitarian law including:

- 1- Approve and confirm availability of resources: states and parliaments should make the necessary resources available for implementing programs to encourage the respect of international humanitarian law including training and implementation of work plans that support this aim.

- 2- Protect the emblems: states are obligated by the Geneva conventions to respect, protect and regulate the procedures to protect the red cross/red crescent

missions and individuals and support their missions to protect and provide the medical services and relief to both armed forces and vigilance during the wartime.

3- Spread the knowledge of the international humanitarian law: as part of Geneva convention requirements, states should take all the efforts to spread out and the information and understanding of international humanitarian law among the military forces and public during the peacetime to ensure the fundamental humanitarian principles are widely understood by nature. The broader understanding of the international humanitarian law will help and assist the implementation of the law not only by those whom should apply it but also by the public whom will be affected by this implementation.

4- Integrate international humanitarian law into doctrines, education system, and armed forces: linked to the point above of spreading out the knowledge of the international humanitarian law. States should be doing that in a systemic way and pay the efforts to integrate this knowledge into the state systems for both civilian and military forces.

5- Integrate the international humanitarian law within state legislation: states and parliaments should fit the international humanitarian law in the different types of states legislation to promote the implementation of the law and ensure other legislation is not confronting or contradicting the international humanitarian law.

(International Humanitarian Law Pantone, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 25, ICRC & Inter-parliaments union for democracy for everyone, 2016, 43-47).

3.3 DO NO HARM FRAMEWORK

The inception of Do No Harm (DNH) was in 1990 when groups of international and local organizations together collaborated on a project called “local capacity for peace project” or the Do No Harm project. The main aim of the project was to understand the impacts and interaction between humanitarian assistance programmes on the context and conflict. Since the humanitarian assistance program has a narrow focus on supporting people in need without taking into considerations the unintended results of the humanitarian assistance. While it is well known that many groups and institutions will utilize humanitarian assistance to serve their own interests which could be political or militant where humanitarian assistance ends up fueling the conflict, and the negative impact of the unintended results become much higher than the intended positive results on direct beneficiaries (Collaborative Learning Project,

The Do No Harm Handbook (The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict), 2004, 1).

The DNH framework is a broad term that could be tackled or understood from different perspectives such as the impact on conflict and conflict sensitivity, the impact of assistance programmes on human rights, humanitarian assistance impact on state building and peacebuilding, and the impact on gender and marginalized groups that include inclusion and exclusion of specific groups. The DNH framework steps and implementation remain the same but the understanding and types of dividers and connectors change according to the aim of implementing DNH framework, the focus of the program and the context.

3.3.1 Seven Steps to Implement Do No Harm

To implement DNH, according to the Do No Harm Framework, there are seven steps which should be followed: (The Do No Harm Framework: A Brief Description of Seven Steps, 2004, 1:3)

Step one: is about defining the scope of context, geographical area and demographic parameters for the programme, identifying the actors and groups involved in the conflict and how the assistance program fits in the context. Also understanding the local culture of the targeted communities is crucial to understand the context and the dynamics that drive these communities.

Analysis dividers and tensions

Step two: DNH analyzes the dividers and what keeps people and groups separated and created the tensions that might be a cause of the conflict. Dividers can be rooted in the community, the cause of the conflict or created after the conflict, internally issued by the community or imposed from outsiders. Understanding dividers are crucial to understanding how the assistance program is impacting the conflict.

Analyze connectors and local capacity for peace

Step three: is about understanding and analyzing the connectors, which factors keep people connected and grouped with the presence of the dividers. Even though people are in conflict, many factors keep them united and connected. Usually, connectors are values, attitudes, symbols, associations, leaders, systems, institutes ...etc., that the whole community accepts and adheres regardless of the conflict.

Analyze the assistance programme

Step four: is to analyze the overall assistance programme including all dimensions and delivery approach. The analysis of the assistance program includes a

better understanding of where program implemented, why, staff delivering the programme and from which background they are, direct beneficiaries from programme, selection criteria of beneficiaries, who are the excluded groups, what items and services provided, etc.

Analyze the assistance programme impact on dividers and connectors

Step five: is to understand the interlinkage between the first four steps, context, dividers, connectors, and assistance programme. The analysis of this interactions shows how the programme impact the dividers and connectors, does the assistance program influence the connectors or dividers? Does the assistance program support one group over others? Does the assistance programme exclude groups rather than others? What is the positive impact of assistance program on connectors? What is the negative impact of assistance programme over dividers?

Considering programme options

Step six: after the analysis of the impact of assistance programme on dividers and connectors should start developing options of how assistance programme could be delivered in a better way with a focus on increasing the positive impact on connectors and eliminate or reduce the negative impacts.

Test programme options and redesign the programme

Step seven: after listing all available options, humanitarian agencies should review the best option or options that lead to improve the positive impact on the conflict and adopt it by redesigning the assistance programme to be delivered in a better manner.

3.3.2 DNH and Human Rights

DNH framework is supporting better adherence to human rights in implementing assistance programmes through the normal process of DNH of understanding the impact of humanitarian assistance programmes on dividers and connectors and the impact on the conflict. DNH influence the local systems and capacities and can have a positive impact on reducing the causes of human rights violations, excluding and including groups also another mutual area where the DNH framework and human rights focus on. In addition to that, the main principles of human rights of participation, accountability, and non-discrimination are supported and improved by the DNH framework. From a human rights perspective, the DNH framework should take into considerations the dividers that cause conflict and

violation and abuse of human rights and connectors that promote human rights with a focus on the relations.

The DNH framework should also recognize the freedom of difference. Since not all dividers are causes of conflicts and some connectors utilize to abuse human rights, the DNH framework should analyze the impact of dividers and connectors on promoting human rights not supporting “all” connectors and reduce “all” dividers (Collaborative Learning Project, Guidance Note: Human Rights And Do No Harm, 2013, 4).

3.4 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

To understand conflict sensitivity, its important to start understanding the definitions of certain elements that consider parts of the conflict sensitivity concept

3.4.1 Key Definitions

Conflict Sensitivity (CS) *The ability of an organization to:*

- 1) understand the context it operates in*
- 2) understand the interaction between its intervention and that context and*
- 3) act upon this understanding in order to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on conflict.*

Conflict Sensitivity Analysis *Comparing conflict analysis information with key (project) parameters (who, what, where, when, how) and making (project) adaptations to enhance conflict sensitivity*

Conflict Analysis *A structured process of analysis to better understand a conflict (its background/history, the groups involved, each group’s perspective, identifying causes of conflict, etc.)*

Conflict *The result of parties disagreeing and acting on the basis of perceived incompatibilities.*

Conflict (violent) *Resorting to psychological or physical force to resolve a disagreement*

(Conflict sensitivity consortium, How to guide to conflict sensitivity, 2012, 2).

Context *The operating environment, which ranges from the micro to the macro level (e.g., community, district / province, region(s), country, neighboring countries).*

Social Cohesion *social cohesion is defined as a general condition of stable co-existence within communities, when IDPs, refugees, and host community members accept socio-ethnic differences, have equitable access to livelihoods and other community resources, and feel safe and secure in their homes.*

(Emergency Livelihoods and Social Cohesion & Cluster, A Principled Approach to Conflict Sensitive Do No Harm Programming in the context of Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, 2006, 2).

Stabilisation *one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability*

Fragile states *unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process* (GSDRC, Fragile states, 2016, 2)

Fragile state is the situation where state are unable to serve their people and lack the power, authority and control to apply laws and change the current situation that is not satisfying people.

3.4.2 Conflict Analysis In The Programme Cycle

Conflict sensitivity is a concept that should be mainstreamed during all programming stages rather than a standalone component. For practical using of conflict sensitivity in different programming phases, the primary considerations during each stage are:

Needs assessment during the needs assessment – if it happens prior to the design depend on the availability of resources and time – should take the following points to be conflict sensitive:

- 1) Manage expectation of targeted communities and not promising high deliverables from the programme
- 2) The entry point to the community and who is conducting the assessment and by whom introduced.
- 3) The staff conducting the assessment and their backgrounds, are they representing specific groups and how they are perceived by the community

4) Who is consulted and the information sources, are assessment take into considerations all groups, minorities, marginalized groups, are the consulted groups are representing specific groups only or the whole community?

5) The questions and language used in need assessment should be sensitive taking into considerations the local culture, symbols, religion and other localities

Design: to ensure conflict sensitive design of the programme, program team should focus on What, Who will implement, who will benefit, Where, When, and How. As practical steps and considerations, during the design phase, program team should:

- 1) Linking conflict analysis to the project design by considering the risks and opportunities for the program that imposed by context
- 2) Integrating conflict sensitivity in the logical framework and identify the main areas of risks and building mitigation measures for these risks
- 3) Considering conflict sensitivity during the design stage by having a participatory approach to design the activities.
- 4) Including conflict sensitivity in project work plans/ timelines to ensure having sufficient time and efforts for the conflict sensitivity during the implementation
- 5) Including conflict sensitivity in project budgets to ensure enough resources are available for conducting assessments, capacity building and mitigation measures for conflict sensitivity.

Implementation: during implementation, conflict sensitivity raised in different elements and steps during the implementation including

- 1) During the start-up phase, reconfirming the assumptions, risks, and opportunities if it's still valid and redo it if context changed from the design time.
- 2) Staff recruitment is a crucial area in the project to understand who will implement the program, which groups they are representing and how they can baize the implementation of the program toward their groups. Having balanced and adequate staff with no bias toward any groups is essential toward the preceding of the project from local communities.
- 3) Capacity-building for program staff and other stakeholders to have a clear understanding of conflict sensitivity and how to mainstream that during the implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases.
- 4) Identifying implementation activities that can reinforce community cohesion and reduce conflict

Monitoring: The monitoring phase usually focuses on program activities while with mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, the scope of monitoring should be expanded to include the monitoring of the context and the interaction of the program activities with the conflict and the impact of activities.

Evaluation: during the evaluation phase, organization and program teams, should take the following considerations:

- 1) Using external evaluators or organization could raise expectations of targeted communities for complementarity activities and new phases of the program.
- 2) The background and affiliations of the evaluators could impact the evaluations results depending on how they are perceived by local communities
- 3) Ensure more comprehensive consultation with all groups and ensure participatory approach in evaluation
- 4) Identify and share the knowledge of conflict sensitivity and context with other actors to be utilized in their projects.
- 5) Add the specific part to the evaluator's terms of reference regarding conflict sensitivity

(Conflict sensitivity consortium, How to guide to conflict sensitivity, 2012, 7:16).

3.4.3 Key Issues For Conflict Sensitive Programming

Conflict sensitivity should be considered and applied during the different stages and tasks of the humanitarian program management. Below, will list out what are the key issues and aspects regarding conflict sensitivity should be tackled

Targeting: Targeting is a crucial step in project cycle management and crucial as well from a conflict sensitivity perspective since the way of targeting beneficiaries form projects might create tension and increase the dividers within the targeted communities. To ensure conflict sensitive targeting, the following concerns should be taken:

- 1- Ensure need assessment and conflict analysis take into considerations the primary groups, as well as other marginalized groups.
- 2- Develop selection criteria for the participation of the local communities to ensure selection criteria includes all groups and not ignore specific ones.

3- Communicate, and disseminate information about selection and targeting approach as well as a decision with broader communities including the targeted and none targeted groups.

4- Educate and influence donors trends and draw their attention when they are not aware of specific targeted groups and possibilities of tension increase

Procurement: Procurement and transportation should be reviewed from a conflict sensitivity angle and ensure not only preventive of corruption but also how the procurement of goods impacts the markets and conflicts in environment with scarce resources and how the procurement of goods and relations with service providers influence the war economy and the affiliations of vendors and service providers with any armed groups or parties in the conflict.

Relationship with communities: Relations with communities should be managed carefully from a conflict sensitivity perspective to ensure all decisions are taken in the participation of local communities including the targeted and none targeted groups and develop clear selection criteria and be open about donor-restricted groups if any.

Feedback and accountability mechanism: having functional feedback and complain mechanism in place is critical to capture communities feedback related to conflict sensitivity and being able to handle and respond to communities feedback and adapt the implementation accordingly. Ensure safe spaces and confidential communications channels to receive feedback from targeted and none targeted groups and individuals through is critical for receiving feedback about sensitive issues and serious complains related to the programme. Also, it is essential to share information about feedback and complaint mechanisms with all groups and ensure that all people can have safe access to the mechanism and know how to communicate and share feedbacks.

Relationships with partners: in different contexts, many organizations work side by side with local organizations as partners and implement through them or in cooperation with partners. To ensure conflict sensitive partnerships, the following aspects should be considered:

1- Ensure transparent and systematic partner selection and take into consideration the results of the conflict analysis during the selection of partners, taking into considerations that each partner have specific backgrounds and could be biased to their own groups.

2- Recognizing partners position in the conflict and how they are impacting and impacted by the conflict and how partners received by the local communities.

3- Ensure the involvement of partners in the conflict analysis prior to the implementation.

4- Develop the agreement with partners participation and ensure terms and conditions of the agreement are suitable for both partners and promote an equitable and mutual benefit for both parties.

5- Ensure agreement has reference to the code of conduct and mutual values of both parties and ensure the minimum standards for implementation.

6- Consider the gaps in partners capacities and ensure mentioning of capacity building plans and efforts.

Relationships with governments: relationships with government is critical for humanitarian agencies especially from conflict sensitivity lens. The humanitarian response usually participates directly or indirectly in increasing the legitimization of specific groups where governments are one them usually. Also, humanitarian organizations should act differently with the government if the government is considered as one of the parties in a violent conflict taking into considerations donors prohibited groups. Its critical for implementation of humanitarian programmes to get “No objections” from authorities, therefore, organizations should coordinate with different levels and layers of authorities on national and local levels.

Relationships with donors similar to the relations with governments, donors relations should be carefully managed and on different levels, aspects to be considered for donors relations:

1- Maintain trust relations with donors through continues communications covering a broader scope of context update, conflict and impact of humanitarian programmes and not limit the communications to grants and fund management.

2- Robust conflict sensitivity analysis will help donors to understand the rationale of designed programmes and justify the request of the fund as well as keep them up to date about operation contexts.

3- Propose opportunities to donors to participate in different stages of project cycle through visits to the field, participate in conflict analysis and facilitate engagement with programme participants.

4- Report and share case studies and lesson learned to donors about what worked well and what not regarding conflict sensitivity.

The exit strategy is an essential step to make sure all communities members understand the exit strategy and when the program should finish and not raise the expectations of targeted communities with additional funds or programmes. Tension could be increased during the end phase of the project if targeted communities are not fully aware of the next steps and exit strategy for the programme. Therefore, the participation of communities in developing the exit strategy is essential to step to ensure proper exit and close out of the programme as well as clear understanding of targeted communities about the exit strategy. An exit strategy should be reviewed according to the conflict sensitivity analysis and ensure measures are in place for the risks of increased tensions due to programmes end (Conflict sensitivity consortium, How to guide to conflict sensitivity, 2012, 17-22).

3.4.4 Conflict Sensitivity In Emergency Responses

Regardless of the conflict sensitivity approach applied for all types of humanitarian responses and project cycle management, the emergency response still has some specific parameters such as the short timeframe. That does not mean conflict sensitivity is not applied to emergency response; conflict sensitivity remains beneficial for emergency response but with some considerations that complement other standards and norms in emergency response such as SPHERE. The considerations for emergency response includes:

- 1- Get the buy-in from the senior management to include the conflict sensitivity within the preparations for the programmes.
- 2- Sharing the assessment and analysis results with other agencies since most of the agencies don't focus on conflict sensitivity in emergency response due to time and resources constraints.
- 3- Try to get staffing with previous expertise and backgrounds in conflict sensitivity or try to ensure enough technical capacities for conflict sensitivity.
- 4- Regularly update the conflict sensitivity assessments during the preparation phase.
- 5- Consider the results of the conflict sensitivity assessment and risks related to conflict sensitivity in the contingency planning and ensure having an alternative for these risks.

6- Ensure proper induction for the surge and the local team about conflict sensitivity during the preparation for the program.

7- Consider the conflict sensitivity questions and risks into the emergency proposal checklist such as CARE International proposal checklist.¹⁷

8- Conduct “good enough” conflict sensitivity analysis during the design phase of the emergency program.

9- Develop a risk matrix that includes potential conflict risks and the mitigation measures for those risks.

10- Ensure conflict sensitivity principles in procurement and ensure national or local procurement will not impact the local market and create a shortage in the supplies in the market.

11- Coordination with other agencies and understand what they are delivering as programs that might create tension and try to balance that with emergency programmes.

12- Follow community-based participatory approach and ensure participation of all different groups and not exclude or marginalize any of them.

13- Ensure proper monitoring activities during and post the distribution to ensure sufficient feedback that includes conflict information.

14- Develop and ensure confidential feedback and complain mechanism in place to be able to receive and handle complains from communities.

15- Establish a clear communication strategy and mechanisms for relating to crisis-affected communities.

(Conflict sensitivity consortium, How to guide to conflict sensitivity, 2012, 22-27)

From the above, it become noticable that emergency response and limited time should not be a justification for not being aware of the conflict dynamics and understanding the indirect impact of humanitarian assistance and that conflict sensitivity should be considered and applied even in emergency responses.

¹⁷<https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http://spanish.careemergencytoolkit.org/Assets/Files/d614f8be-d609-4826-be08-cccbe9ce72ea.doc>

3.4.5 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodologies

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is an indicators based tool/methodology to assess the impact of the development programs on the social and political atmosphere in the countries of implementation. Initially, developed as Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) it then expanded to include peacebuilding objectives and has been utilized in peacebuilding. The CIA tool was mainly measuring the impact of development projects following the improvement in policy. After that, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) developed to include measures of overbearing impacts on peacebuilding.

PCIA depend on assumptions about the roots, volatility, and drivers of conflict and arrange those assumptions in a systematic way to provide a better understanding of the conflict for specialists.

PCIA tool used to provide:

- 1) Conflict risk analysis (macro level – the higher level of the conflict regardless of the details)
- 2) Early warning & early response tools (macro/micro-levels)
- 3) Strategic frameworks for assistance in conflict-prone regions (macro-level)
- 4) Sectoral programming tools (macro-level)
- 5) Programme evaluation tools (macro-level)
- 6) Project management instruments (micro-level)
- 7) Project monitoring and evaluation tools (micro-level)

Although CIPA is a useful tool to understand the way context, donors and governments appreciate and understand the complications linked to the use of CIPA due to the different types of war and contexts, approach inimitability, and uniqueness of political natures to apply it on a macro level and whole conflict scope. However, within NGOs, the outlook to follow best practices in conflict contexts to justify and evaluate the impact of their projects, still use PCIA with a bottom-up approach to understanding the localities of the conflict on the smaller scope to individual need or region. NGOs used the PCIA as a tool to mainstream conflict sensitivity through their programs (International Development Research Centre, Conflict sensitivity approaches to develop practices, 17-19)

As an example from Pakistan, from the needs of understand the context and identify and address the impact of development projects done by International

Development Agencies (IDAs), IDAs used PCIA as a tool to evaluate this impact. The PCIA results shows that IDA lacks conducting conflict analysis prior to the starting of the development projects to ensure peace and conflict sensitivity element in such projects. Then the evaluation of the using of PCIA in this case reflect that understanding of PCIA on grassroots level is not exist and lack the giving understanding on project level and shows the discrepancy between theory and practical implementation.

3.5 GOVERNANCE BUILDING

3.5.1 Governance in Situations of Fragility and Conflict

The fragile state remains till the moment the controversial concept with no one definition for fragility or what is a fragile state. Usually, fragility is measured by the inverse of idealized statehood. Some development agencies, measure fragility by individual indicators such as the world bank who measures fragility based on specific elements like rules of law, accountability and level of corruption, human rights, etc.

However, primary themes and vital elements of fragile states could be summarized in the following three points:

- 1- Fragile context is a continuation of previous actions and issues rather than a fix state. This describes the collapsed state, lack, and low capacity to prevent and recover, severe issues in trust and social contract between government and people or state with relative stability but at risk of deterioration and collapse.
- 2- Fragile context is impacted or at risk of being impacted by the crisis – regardless of the type of crisis if it's man-made or natural – and does not have the capacity and prevent or recover without extensive assistance.
- 3- Authorities are not the only entity with the privilege of having legitimate violence, the ability to provide public services and collected public revenues.

Policy makers in several events linked the governance in fragile context to peacebuilding and statebuilding. As an example, United Nations Secretary General's report "*Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*"¹⁸ positioned the post-conflict governance and building state capabilities as core things (Governance for peace, UNDP, 2012, 15-22).

¹⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/s2009304.pdf>

3.5.2 Challenges for developing governance systems

Building governance and recovery in post-conflict period is a complicated process for both governments and communities. The process of recovery is changing process which requires a high level of adaptability and improvement on different dimensions and aspects. The key challenges that obstruction the developing of governance system:

(UN DESA Discussion Paper - GPAB/REGOPA Cluster, Governance Strategies for Post Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development, 2007, 4:7)

1. **Legitimacy Trust and Authority of the State:** after conflicts, governments lose authority and legitimacy, especially in intra-conflicts. Even the remaining functioning structures lose legitimacy and need to rebuild it. This loss in legitimacy creates massive destruction in the community texture and the relations between governments and communities. The primary focus for governments in a post-conflict period is to recover the economy and political life and build up the legitimacy at the local, national and regional level.

2. **Political Will for Transparency and Accountability:** the fragile post-conflict phase is considered fertilized soil for corruption with a lack of trust between governments and communities, and lack of control from the weakened government during this phase. Lack of clear vision and implicit agreement between different governing bodies and people means different groups working for different objectives with no focus on the national interest.

3. **Rule of Law:** peoples culture of impunity and relying on other sets of rules and powers rather than the standard power of law during the peacetime reduce the legitimacy of the state, especially the police and judiciary departments. The new culture of impunity supported with memories about weak and feckless judiciary system make re-building/constructing the judiciary departments one of the primary priorities for the governments in the post-conflict period.

4. **Social Capital and Social Cohesion:** during the conflicts and due to the absence of the national governments and lack of services people start to create new belongings and form smaller groups on sectarian basis, during post-conflict the residual of the new sectarian groups and lack of trust between people and governments prioritize sectarian groups interest over the national interest. Continuing to exclude and marginalize specific groups will inflate the gap and deepen the divide.

5. Reconciliation due to the pressure of lack of humanitarian basic need, government and other bodies ignore reconciliations which create deep down risks and unresolved issues that surface later and impact the peacebuilding efforts and social cohesion. In many cases, reconciliations and peacebuilding committees established without the provisions of enough support, technically and financially, lead to counter results and increase the damage and divide in trust between different groups.

6. Economic Reconstruction and Service Delivery Structures: poverty is considered one of the most pressing challenges during the post-conflict period. Therefore, managing two processes in parallel to work on longer terms objectives, and rebuild the governance structures including government, social cohesion, and resuming trust as well as working on short terms gains of reconstruction of the economy to ensure quick wins and alleviate some pressures through supporting the private sectors and relying on businessmen. At the same time, war economy will keep threatening and impacting the process of economic reconstruction; many businessmen will prefer to keep the war economy instead which is more profitable for them rather than a healthy and robust economy where they have to obey laws and regulations and pay taxes. Therefore, an overarching process should be managed following a transformative approach to rebuilding the economy with the support that will take include enabling the regulatory environment and manage the usage and exploitation of natural resources.

7. Security and Cross-border Movements: the continuation of insecurity will impact governance building on a local level, and negatively impact the re-establishment of new bodies and provision of public services. Failure in the judiciary system will be a risk for regaining the trust and establishing a new trusting relationship between people and government institutes which will continue the cycle and increase the insecurity and violence.

8. Conflicts spilling across borders controlling the borders is a challenge on a national and regional level with the lack of capable government institutes to manage and regulate the border crossing efficiently. Continuation of regular illegal usage of borders during the conflict which includes human trafficking, light weapon smuggling, and other types of illegal smuggling create another challenge for building governance system correctly and impact the regional level of relations for the new government with neighborhoods countries.

The conclusion shows how developing governance system is complicated process and request a significant resources and capacities within the state to be able to overcome all these challenges.

3.5.3 Cross-Cutting Issues With Governance

Governance is not a standalone element and its interactivity impacts and is impacted by many other aspects, the main three cross-cutting issues that impact a durable peace and robust governance are: (Technical Support Team (TST): Issues Brief: Conflict Prevention, Post-conflict Peacebuilding and the Promotion of Durable Peace, Rule of Law and Governance, 2014, 9:10)

Natural Resources: 40% of the conflicts during the last six decades are based on contesting natural resources. However, the conflicts and competing over natural resources creates additional risks to the conflict by the exploitation of natural resources and increases the risks of climate changes, environmental damages and impacting the livelihoods of people (SDSN, Harnessing natural resources for sustainable development: challenges and solutions, 2013).

Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality: despite the fact that gender equality is an objective in itself, it massively affects the governance and rule of laws in states. According to the world bank, states where women are empowered and have access to public decision making, labor markets with equal rights shows lower levels of corruptions and the probability of involvement in internal and external conflicts (World Bank, Women, Business and the Law, 2014) that shows the interactions and relations between gender equality and women's empowerment and having good governance.

Inequalities: different types of inequalities such as economic, political, cultural, gender/age-based lead to disturbances in the system and have a negative impact on political life and participation in conflicts. Political exclusion, limited access to public services, lack of security will lead to increase the dividers between communities and create tensions and conflicts (Brinkman, Attree, and Hezir, 2012).

3.5.4 Principles Of Building Good Governance

Jayeoba in his paper states the main three dimensions for building, and sustainable state building and good governance are 1) security, 2) political and 3) economic. Jayeoba lists twelve principles behind the successful governance structure in the United States of America, which are: (Jayeoba, 2017, 3-7)

1. Fair Conduct of Elections, Representation, and Participation
2. Responsiveness
3. Efficiency and Effectiveness
4. Openness and Transparency
5. Rule of Law
6. Ethical Conduct
7. Competence and Capacity
8. Innovation and Openness to Change
9. Sustainability and Long-term Orientation
10. Sound Financial Management
11. Human rights, Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion
12. Accountability

Jayeoba emphasis the complication of process of building governance and listing out principles that directly participate in developing governance which each of them need huge and massive investment and capacities.

3.6 HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND DILEMMA

3.6.1 Current Debates on Humanitarianism, Conflict, and Peacebuilding

After 1990, there have been substantial studies about the new political economy and the large-scale emerge of new non-state bodies that manage and create war economies, basing the new economy on the diamond trade in Africa, drugs, cross-country smuggling and human trafficking. War becomes more rational in action and processes that specific groups and individuals benefit from these actions despite the fact that the rest of the communities do not. Regardless that on the surface war remains ideological and regarding identity, but the underlying drivers for all conflicts are the political economy. This understanding of the “new war” brought the humanitarian assistance to the picture to understand the relation and impact of the new war on humanitarian assistance as well as the impact of the humanitarian assistance on the new war model.

Due to that, different humanitarian stakeholders including practitioners, donors, and scholars long to reform the humanitarian industry and adopt new approaches that match the evolvement in context. However, all proposals and recommendations categorized into two broad categories:

- 1- Humanitarian maximalist

The maximalist recommends that within the new context, humanitarianism should not be a response to the surface needs and symptoms but focus more on the root causes of the conflict. In other words, expanding the scope of the humanitarian assistance to include, development, peacebuilding, democracy, and the old fashion humanitarian assistance. Based on that, with the newly expanded scope of humanitarian activities, it requires a broader framework and better-coordinated mechanism with other political instruments such as diplomacy, trade, and military to be able to prevent or resolve violent conflicts. That means on the ground, a grouping of three different types of actors with three different mandates which are the humanitarian, the development and the peacebuilding actors and merging them in a way to deliver three dimensions programming that response to the immediate needs, building livelihoods and economy and participate and work on stabilization and reconciliations. This school, reflected in institutional changes, as an example, the emergency department from the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK shifted to Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) (Macrae and Leader, 2000, 3)

2- Humanitarian minimalist

On the other side of the continuum, the minimalist agenda and main principles are to back to the basics of the humanitarian work and reaffirm the core humanitarian principles and beliefs. Minimalists come from the points that the main driver for humanitarian work is the first principle of humanitarianism which is humanity and giving the first priority to save human lives. The second point for minimalists are the other tools of delivering the humanitarian assistance which is the other principles neutrality, impartiality and international humanitarian law that govern the delivery of the humanitarian assistance and without these tools, humanitarian works compromise on the basics. Even though there is a recognition for the Do No Harm approach in the humanitarian work it remains an external framework and is not included in the humanitarian mandate or literature, and it doesn't mean that humanitarian work should do good, going beyond that and saying that doing good is corrupting the humanitarian principles and shifting the direction from the main core objective for humanitarian which is saving lives (Goodhand and Atkinson, 2001, p11-12).

3.6.2 Humanitarian Principles in a Divided World

After many brutal crises in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Bosnia, Myanmar, Burundi and many others, the humanitarian organizations found themselves involved in large-scale crises providing humanitarian assistance regardless of the geopolitics, and socioeconomic dimensions, without providing permanent solutions or tackling the root causes of the conflicts. From different crises and examples, provision of humanitarian relief without addressing the root causes does harm rather than good. Many humanitarian organizations reject the idea of keeping a human alive only to keep them suffering from same threatening elements in same crisis. It has been morally challenged to maintain impartial and neutral toward crimes themselves perpetuated.

However, in some cases, tackling the root cause of the conflict impacts the humanitarian principles as well. For example, provision of food for handover weapons would have an enormous impact on conflict, but at the same time it challenges the independence principle and allows some beneficiaries to get more assistance than others. At the same time, it is a justified, legitimate intervention means for establishing peace. This linkage between humanitarian and peacekeeping forces means relief agencies and organizations are no longer perceived as neutral, independent, or impartial and risks the viability of the humanitarian objectives. This dilemma of understanding the primary objective for humanitarian assistance and response to the needs should be questioned.

In other words, the paradox humanitarian organizations face is that designing a response and looking for durable solutions are contradicting and undermine the humanitarian principles since the durable solutions and linkage the humanitarian assistance with other agendas and missions contradicting the neutrality principles.

Taking into consideration that major donors contribute over than 90% of the humanitarian funds globally and have the power to shape the humanitarian agenda. The US government – as a single donor – contributed 36% of the global humanitarian fund in 2001. While the other major donors are western as well, including European countries and the UK. This dominance of western donors to humanitarian relief create doubts about the global shape of the humanitarian industry. At the same time, for the western world, it is difficult for them to avoid the comparison between the humanitarian industry in the current era and what churches and charities were doing in the overseas empires during the last era. Humanitarian principles are seen as the “cross and bible” that pave the road to intervene in other states affairs that are weaker

than the donors' states. For western donors, humanitarian values are promoted as the tie between political and development objectives.

The western world is often confused about paying attention to saving lives or eliminating the root causes of conflicts and crises. From their perspectives, the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence of humanitarian assistance have paradoxically opened the road to what called 'the right of humanitarian intervention.' In other words, if a weak government is unable to meet the needs of its own people, the international community has the right to intervene, not for political but for humanitarian reasons.

The United Nations has been seen by many donors as an agency supporting the promotion of principles that serve the interests of developed countries on account of the higher number of developing countries. Therefore, humanitarian principles are perceived by many developing countries as dividers between different classes of countries. As a consequence, understanding is needed from developing countries about the legitimatization of humanitarian interventions. Moreover, many developing countries feel that the UN Secretariats are growing the concerns with humanitarian affairs negatively impact the UN agencies importance as a political forum for its member-states (Kent, 2003, 440-442).

3.7 HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICS

3.7.1 Humanitarianism and Politics

Humanitarian assistance and political response are considered two sides of the one coin since both are matched in numerous cases and during the past decade there has been debate as to what extent these two types of interventions – with different backgrounds, objectives, and principles – should be aligned or integrated and have “coherence” under one framework that includes diplomacy, military and humanitarian to support the peacebuilding and avoid doing harm rather than good.

Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) discussed the issue in 2003 to review the implication of having this “coherence” and integration between humanitarian assistance and political responses. Human security opens the door to link humanitarian assistance with military intervention and become a part of the humanitarian agenda which is an ordinary thing – humanitarian assistance played a vital role during the cold war – while the extraordinary is using the humanitarian assistance as a tool to deliver security in an explicit way.

During 1990's, development agencies started to withdraw from the conflict-based crisis and humanitarian actors replacing them in such contexts. Therefore, humanitarian agencies started playing a more prominent role in preventing conflicts and increased the linkages with the military and political agendas and efforts. The Rwanda crisis showed the importance of having this integration between humanitarian and political efforts since the political and military interventions came after the genocide while the humanitarian interventions started before that and were accused of "feeding the killers." The coherence agenda objective is shifting the role of humanitarian assistance from reducing the suffering of vulnerable people and from soothing the conflict, to be part of solution and conflict resolutions. At same time, this integration will have a darker side for humanitarian assistance since it will impact the humanitarian principles such as neutrality, impartiality, and independence as well as the framework they usually work under, since they have to work collectively with other actors on the same conflict and under same frameworks which might be not ideal for the emergency response and humanitarian actions.

The other important and critical element is the developmental programs which are not apolitical but have a big role in building the civil society and building the relationship between state authorities and people, working on governance bodies and structures, support civil society ...etc. It is very clear that developmental programs have a direct impact on decision making and creating legitimacy for certain groups over the others. That means, developmental programs objectives are different from the humanitarian relief assistance programming objectives and first one – developmental programs – should be considered as part of securitization agenda but not the humanitarian relief one.

Such discussion about the humanitarian policy puts the NGOs in difficult situation to understand and choose between being part of the conflict resolutions with tradeoff on the humanitarian principles; which means drastic change and revisiting the main pillars of the humanitarian works or keep the current work and focus more on conflict sensitivity and ensure Do No Harm framework is applied in a manner for all different programs (Coherence in crisis? Re-examining the relationship between humanitarian and political responses to conflict-related crises, 2003, 2:3).

3.7.2 Matching Aid to New Conditions and New Players

Governments and donors with humanitarian organizations trying to match the structure of humanitarian assistance with political demands and activities due to the

changes in the environment to have a harmonized provision of humanitarian assistance alongside political activities and military interventions in some cases to protect human rights and have sustainable peace solutions to conflicts. The scope of humanitarian assistance here expands beyond the provision of food and non-food items to include democratization and civil society building. That means, internally, departments responsible for humanitarian assistance should work in coordination and more closely with the ministries and departments responsible for foreign affairs and defense. While on the ground, humanitarian staff, officers, and diplomats should work hand in hand to implement their activities under the same framework and sometimes have similar or overlapped roles. However, this synergy and coordination between different ministries and departments with humanitarian organizations still require improvement to have a real coherent approach. As the UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan mentioned: *“in national governments as well as international agencies, departments that are responsible for security policy tend to have little knowledge of development and governance policies, while those responsible for the latter rarely think of them in security terms.”*¹⁹

Even though it brings an added value of matching the humanitarian assistance with political and military activities, this approach still has many concerns. The most critical criticism for this approach is the bias and domination of political views where governments keep focusing on an unfair distribution of efforts. The most strategic crisis and emergencies for governments are ones that serve their own needs first, regardless of the humanitarian needs and those marginalized and neglected through the crisis. Under this unified framework, humanitarian assistance will be drowning in the mainstream of politics and the allocations of humanitarian funds will be controlled and influenced by the foreign policy (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000, An Independent Report Commissioned by the IASC from Development Initiatives, 2000, 55-57).

3.7.3 Instrumentalization of Humanitarian Action

In the peacekeeping operations (PKO), usually the interference and inter-linkages between both types of activities; humanitarian assistance and military operations, are high due to working in same geographical areas, with some civilian people and usually with groups. Having the separation between both types is not only

¹⁹ <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2358.html>

impossible but also not healthy. Even though it is a gray area whether humanitarianism and militia should work together or not, when humanitarians should use armed protection and to what extent military operations should be involved and what is considered as red lines to adhere and respect the humanitarian principles.

The relation between humanitarianism and military changes drastically during the time starting with the first generation of PKO after the cold war, which branded by limit military usage and relies on the consent of the conflict parties. While the second generation of PKO extend and expand the scope to include reconstructions activities and adding the political and development elements in addition to the humanitarian initiatives. Third generation of PKO which known as “peace operation” expand again the concept and give them the rights to change scene and impose peace and secure the environment under the name of universal values and spread democracy and human rights with the rely on military power without even acceptance or consent from conflict parties or even get legitimization of UN or international community (Ramsbotham, et al. 2006, 134-150).

During early nineties within the new global order, the international community was optimistic about being able to stand-in and expand the environment of global peace and security which did not stand for a long time and contested by the increase of the number of brutal and violent internal conflicts and civil wars with no security to the civilian people. The new responses were more about taking a comprehensive approach to include peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and state building and replace the old traditional peacebuilding and replace peacebuilding with state building and spread out the liberal values of the western world. The new shape of the peacebuilding of state building followed five main trends:

1- Using military power and violence without considering the consent or the will of the sovereign state or the legitimacy of the UN and the international community in the name of humanitarianism. This trend creates a space to use the name humanitarianism and justify military operations under this name which brought the debate to the curve-end on the responsibility of protection, and who is eligible to intervene and when the international power has the right to go beyond and against state sovereignty.

2- Within the changes brought by the second generation of PKO, they integrate the military and reconstruction, economy development and these dimensions under the name of humanitarianism with pre-assumption that all these various types of

interventions have same objectives and aims to produce peace and stable environment with no reason to avoid or escape from coordination between all those interventions since it is all integrated into one pot. This integration linked directly the humanitarian aid to the peace and security aspects and compromised the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence since humanitarian interventions had been already diverted from more significant political and military picture.

3- Since weak state are more exposed to violence and conflict, the new trend in security and peacekeeping focused more on boosting the socio-economic development for a country to have a better immunity of conflicts which impact directly the humanitarian assistance since in this case, humanitarian assistance will go to the people in high strategical value from security perspectives rather than going to the most in need for it according to the impartiality principle. In other words, humanitarian assistance instrumented by the military to serve politics might be non-humanitarian objectives.

4- Military operations without consent from conflicting parties or going against state sovereignty will increase the level of conflict and create additional conflicts and clashes which will require – in addition to the efforts to keep peace and secure environment – additional efforts to protect their troops and power. Usually, in such cases, the military relies on the minimum acceptance of local communities winning hearts and minds and tend to mainstream Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) which tie humanitarian assistance to military interventions and utilize the name and impact of humanitarian assistance – which should be used to help people – to support the military interventions and here again humanitarian assistance instrumented easily to serve political objectives.

5- Within the positive impact of integrating humanitarian assistance with military interventions, it has become the widely known approach with military doctrines to combine and instrumented humanitarian interventions under the new concept of “full spectrum forces (Caicedo, 2009. 8-9).

A clear example of instrumentalization of humanitarian assistance in military interventions is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that US army uses it in Afghanistan which combines the humanitarian assistance with military interventions and represents the full integrations between both types of interventions with same scope and objectives (Olson, 2006. 4).

3.7.4 Politics Perception of Humanitarian

As explained before, peacebuilding is a political activity conducted by different types of actors and interlinked with other intervention such as military and humanitarian. The main arguments for integrating the humanitarian assistance programs under the political framework could be briefed in two points reflecting the perception of the politics.

1- Conceptualization of neutrality

Donini argues that humanitarian interventions itself is not capable of bringing peace but should be part of the more comprehensive framework and work in close integrations with political efforts *“We cannot wait for peace in order to start reconstruction. We must take conflict for granted and integrate humanitarian action and development with politics.”* Therefore, humanitarian agencies should be more cooperative with other actors doing and implementing peacebuilding activities even if they are political and governments with different mandates and objectives (Donini, 1998 81-96).

At the same time, Egeland argues that lack of coordination between humanitarian agencies and political efforts is the “greatest obstacle” in peacebuilding. The agency understanding of neutrality and their perception of neutrality identify their direction (Egeland, 1999, 73-83).

Neutrality principle contested by different scholars and agencies, Laders argue that neutrality is the most controversial aspect related to humanitarian *“the most significant discussions, disagreements, confusions and conceptual developments have been around the idea of neutrality.”* Leaders also distinguished between three different understandings of neutrality. The first one is the classical neutrality that works as necessary to protect the rights of non-combatants “Neutrality elevated.” The second one is explicitly political humanitarianism that contributes to political objectives (“neutrality abandoned”). While the third concept is a “Third-way humanitarianism” which involves initiating constructive social change while upholding the imperative of not taking a side (Leader, 2000, 19:21).

Based on that, apparently, we can say that from the classical concept of neutrality, that neutrality is incompatible with peacebuilding and working with political agenda under the same framework since its impact the main goal task and mission of humanitarian agencies which is alleviation of suffering rather than building peace. While from the second and third understanding or concepts about neutrality, we

can say that there is a space for NGOs and humanitarian agencies to cooperate with political efforts and participate in peacebuilding activities positively with keeping the limited scope of neutrality that humanitarian agencies should refrain from taking sides in conflicts.

2- The political/non-political divide

Despite that humanitarian are not political actors. However, all humanitarian workers and scholars admit that humanitarian assistance has political consequences. Therefore, understanding of humanitarian agencies of their work as interlinked to the political environment in a way. Moreover, even though humanitarian agencies never claim they are political, they have to recognize the political actors and efforts without being part of it. However, since humanitarian assistance has political consequences, thus political efforts are redundant, and these efforts should be harmonized and integrated to have peace.

Its gray area for humanitarian agencies to say that they are working in a sphere distinct from politics. the practice of not condemning human rights violations is often justified by the humanitarian conviction that humanitarian work is non-political. That mean, condemning of human rights violation is non-humanitarian actors while it is at the same time at heart of humanitarian works. Conviction of humanitarian agencies to cooperate with political activities is a pre-requisition condition for successful integration between humanitarianism and political activities in peacebuilding.

The second crucial point is the ethical background and framework for humanitarian agencies, and the willingness to provide long-term structural changes. The conviction of separation between humanitarian and political activities always criticized and considered “a political naivety” which considered as a weakness point for humanitarianism (Schloms, 2001, 9).

3.7.5 The Relationship Between Aid and Economic Growth

Many types of research and studies about development and humanitarian aid focus on the issue if the humanitarian and development aid programs reach its aim which is improving and promoting economic development and welfare in developing countries or not. Limited amounts of saving considered as one of the biggest obstacles for development, with the well-known limited ability and availability of saving in the developing countries due to the low income per capita. Neanidis points out that assistance growth studies break it down into two main categories which are conditional and unconditional. The first one supports the idea that grouped assistance has an

average positive impact on economic growth with or without decreasing in returns while the second said that assistance has a positive impact only when certain conditions are in place (Neanidis, 2012, 27-61).

Hansen and Tarp recognizes three generations of studies in several countries. The first generation, propose that growth depends on investment which is capitalized by saving including the domestic and foreign ones. If assistance programs led to increasing the domestic saving, this would lead to expanding the investment, in this case, foreign assistance has a positive impact on economic growth if investment increased, otherwise, its harmful assistance or at least have no positive impact on economic development. The second generation, consider the relation between assistance and growth through investment or what called investment regression. While the third generation considers the relationship between assistance and growth through the capital accumulation or what called growth regression (Hansen and Tarp, 2001, 547-570).

Seblewengel, in his master thesis, review numerous number of studies and review different empirical and evaluations of the impact of development and humanitarian assistance on the economic growth and the final conclusion from the massive study showing that there is no clear evidence on the positive or negative impacts on humanitarian and development assistance on the economic growth of the developing countries and its vary from by individual case and have different results from crisis to another and from context to another as well as depending on the approach and conditionality of assistance delivery. Which means that the generalization of the idea said that international humanitarian and developmental assistance is improving the economic growth is wrong and could not be used as general cause and justification for the humanitarian and developmental assistance and should be carefully designed and evaluated per case (Seblewengel, 2014, 53).

3.7.6 Humanitarian Action and Peace: Overlapping Policy Spheres

The separation between humanitarian work and peacebuilding is getting more difficult to have clear and un-blurred lines. Moreover, the function of humanitarian assistance delivery such as food, medical supplies, ...etc. is considered as humanitarian organizations role sometimes, and during some other times as stabilization organization role, or peacebuilding and peacekeeping role, or sometimes considered as development activities depending on the context and the main objective behind the activity or the mandate of each type of actors. That means it is not only

about the activities themselves but more about the mandate and the objective of implementing such activities. The previous example shows the overlapping areas of humanitarian work and peacebuilding. Any strategic policy should take into consideration the differences between spheres where interact with humanitarian work, mainly those related to stabilization, peacebuilding, state-building, and development.




Figure4: Overlapping politics sphere, Source: Collinson, Sarah, Samir Elhawary and Robert Muggah. 2010. *States of Fragility: Stabilization and its Implications for Humanitarian Action*. HPG Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute, 11.

The humanitarian approach needs to take into consideration a longer-term strategy, that includes the potential negative impact of its works. The humanitarian work is not done separately or in isolation of other actions and works. Therefore, humanitarian work should include some capacities and objectives for peacebuilding since it's become justified to participate and conduct peacebuilding activities at any stage of the conflict and in parallel with the humanitarian interventions. Following that, the borders and limitation for humanitarian works can be expanded and linked to other spheres and widening the scope of humanitarian (Rossier, 2011, 26-27).

3.8 HUMANITARIAN, MILITARY, AND PEACEBUILDING

3.8.1 Military Policies and Doctrines

Different peacekeeping agencies and countries have different Variety doctrines, for example, Canada, Netherlands, and Belgium stresses the necessity of relief operations as core task for NATO while France, UK, and the USA still more hesitant (Bayman, 2000, 134).

Usually, national forces followed their own national doctrines even when they deployed in multi-national missions, and they act and behave differently according to their national doctrines. However, from the analysis of British, NATO, and UN doctrines the following general trends identified on the humanitarian policies and perceptions of humanitarian activities.

1- From the UK, and according to the UK Ministry of Defense's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), the fundamental principles of engaging in humanitarian activities are:

- a. First option and high preference for military forces are not to involve humanitarian assistance activities at all possible.
- b. IF UK forces must get involved, it should be with support from civil society agencies and the military should stay in the background with very low visibility and profile
- c. When there is no option, military forces will participate in humanitarian assistance programs mainly when the humanitarian programs are failing.

2- The NATO doctrine is more or less similar to the UK one, where policymakers believe that the best people to deliver humanitarian assistance program are the civil and relief agencies instead with an understanding of the needs to involve local populations for the sake of sustainability. However, NATO officials acknowledge that military forces in specific cases could come down to humanitarian programs under the following conditions:

- a. Military forces engagement should be always with civil and relief organizations.
- b. With limited and clear strict edges of what, when, and why to handover operations to the mandated organization.
- c. Keep the aim to withdraw from humanitarian activities as soon as possible.

3- The doctrine of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) regarding military engagement in humanitarian activities falls under the management of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) which give the procedures to compile all elements together. UN doctrine is somehow similar to NATO and the UK, there is a reluctance to engage in humanitarian work but without clear phases or stages when and how they accept the military engagement (Barry and Jefferys, 2002, 6).

3.8.2 Framework for Civil-military Relations and Principles of Engagement

Till the moment, no clear framework for the cooperation and engagement of military forces within humanitarian activities. However, Barry proposed some guidelines that could be used to guide and rule the relationship between humanitarian and military in the conflict zone. The guideline is based on three main pillars which are:

- 1- Humanitarian and relief agencies have the priority in delivering humanitarian assistance.
- 2- Civil organizations should never work under the command of military forces, working under direct commands of the military is breaching for one of the core humanitarian principles which are the independency principle
- 3- The main aim of having military peacekeeping or peace support forces are:
 - a. Develop and maintain order and security
 - b. Protection of civilians
 - c. Establish comprehensive resolutions for the conflict

Military activities in general circumstances

The general role for the military involvement is when humanitarian and relief organization fail to deliver humanitarian assistance, whenever a civil organization is able to implement and deliver in a proper manner with no risks on staff or humanitarian workers, it's not appropriate to have military forces engaged in humanitarian delivery. However, in often cases, national forces – since they are already on the ground – try to have some quick impact projects to achieve quick wins and win the hearts and minds of people such as repair of schools, health facilities, etc. these activities usually done for the publicity and media purposes. However, such activities should not be addressed as military interventions and should not be confused with the name of humanitarian activities since it is not following the main humanitarian principles.

Military activities in exceptional circumstances

In certain rare cases, when the humanitarian needs are on a scale more substantial than the capacity of the humanitarian and relief organizations and civil organization request short-term assistance, military and civil defense can step in and provide support for civil organization under one of the following two criteria: (Diverted from the Draft Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (Secretariat of the Oslo Guidelines Process, 2001).)

1- The military is the last resort, and there is no other humanitarian option, and the absence of assistance would result in unacceptable human suffering.

2- Level of humanitarian needs is significant, as determined by humanitarian and relief agencies, including the UN agencies.

During the involvement of the military in humanitarian, there are two conditions that should be always followed and obeyed which are:

1- Assets and interventions must always remain under the control of civilian organizations.

2- Military interventions are always clearly time bounded and short as possible.

The use of military escorts and protection for humanitarian staff and goods

Again, the general rule is no armed protection or armed facilitation for humanitarian staff, goods, or operations to maintain impartiality principle. In the extreme conditions, when there are no neutral forces to provide the protection for the humanitarian activities and the evaluation of civil organization that military escort is required. Humanitarian and relief organizations allowed to use military and armed escorting services under the following conditions: (diverted from OCHA and ICRC guidelines on the use of armed protection (OCHA 2001; ICRC 1995).

1- If the local sovereign authorities are unwilling or unable to provide a secure environment.

2- The decision to use armed/military escorting should be humanitarian organization decision without influence from other institutes, e.g., political, military, governmental, ...etc. or being their decision.

3- If the decision to have armed/military escorting, humanitarian organizations should not use any of warring parties including peacekeeping forces and should use neutral forces.

4- The use of military escorting does not compromise the impartiality of humanitarian organizations.

Sharing information

Certain types of information should be shared with militaries such as coordinates for humanitarian facilities and offices, while some other types of information should be protected and not shared out with any institutes such as beneficiaries' information. It is critical to understand what type of information could be shared and why and understand what the value is militarily and politically, of the information civil organizations provide. Information on the following issues could be shareable with military forces:

- 1- Security conditions affecting humanitarian operations and humanitarian situation
- 2- Conditions in shared spaces, e.g., transportation, goods movement,
- 3- The general estimation of emergency scope

While the above type of information is shareable, the following type of information should be protected and not shared with military forces:

- 1- Information that is threatening the security of communities and put them in danger
- 2- Information that is threatening the security of staff
- 3- Information that compromises humanitarian principles

(Barry and Jefferys 2002, 16-17).

3.8.3 Civil-military Cooperation

In many cases around the world, during the civil war and internal conflicts, it becomes challenging if not impossible to separate or differentiate between combating parties and civilians' populations. Thereby, creating a humanitarian space where relief and civil organizations can work easily and independently from the military influence. While in some cases, all international organizations, peacekeepers forces, and humanitarian NGOs recognized as "foreign invaders" and they all become a target for all or some of the conflict parties. This perception will hinder the relief organization form being able to reach out to people in need and provide the humanitarian assistance. In such cases, relief organizations should take one of two options, either to reject peacekeeping engagement in the humanitarian programs or to seek more protection from peacekeeping forces for the staff, operations, and warehouses contain relief items. However, even though the humanitarian organization is not always in need of

peacekeeping forces, the relation and demand of having such relationships are not for the protection of the humanitarian but also for better peacebuilding interventions. While the relief organizations main aim is to deliver the humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people, military roles are to protect international and local civilians and maintain security, peace, and order. Military forces and peacekeeping is in higher demand for a good relationship with relief organizations due to many reasons, one of this reason is the knowledge of relief organizations and the understanding of the local culture and relationships they have with local communities. Without this knowledge and relationship with relief organizations, military analysis of the situation might be inaccurate and risk the efforts paid to improve the whole situation and sustain peace. However, relief organizations and NGOs are not always open to cooperate and share information and knowledge. More specifically, NGOs usually hesitant and reluctant to share information and have relation or considered “affiliated” with military and peacekeeping groups to adhere to the impartiality and other humanitarian principles and keeping the right relations with communities. In fact, the real problem is when the relationship between NGOs and relief organizations and peacekeeping and the military is a blur and not clear for all parties including NGOs, peacekeeping, conflict parties, and local communities.

According to Harmer, good relations and cooperation between relief organizations and peacekeeping are not increasing the risk on the relief organizations, but the security behavior of humanitarian workers does when aid workers assume that peacekeeping forces providing better security and the humanitarian space is better protected. (Harmer and Adele, 2008, 528) while on the other hand, usually, local people believe that peacekeeping and humanitarian staff are more caring about their own security rather than the security of the local communities. However, it is tough to find and evidence-based understanding of the relation between civilians, military and peacekeeping, and humanitarian organizations (Johansson, 2011, 8).

3.8.4 Norwegian Model in Peacebuilding

Norway is an essential international humanitarian and peacemaker actor, after the Oslo peace accord in 1993, Norway started to position itself as a crucial player in global peacemaking. Norway considered the third biggest contributor of funds to the United Nations agencies for development as well as many other leading humanitarian NGOs with donations reaching over USD 4 billion for developmental actions in 2009. Norway’s priorities regarding the sectors and type of activities include economic

development, governance, social sectors, education, emergency response and environment and energy. By the end of 1990's, over than 20 Norwegian NGO supported by government provide and deliver, humanitarian relief programs, conflict prevention and human right activities in around 100 countries around the world.

Norway is involved in different peacemaking activities – including peacekeeping, disputes resolutions and peacebuilding - in different contexts. In 2007, Norway contributed financially to almost all peace processes globally and was directly involved in 13 of them. The Norwegian model refers to the way Norway works in facilitating the peace process and conflict resolutions. According to the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, explaining why the Norwegian model is successful, identified four main points:

- 1- Norway is not a significant power globally and not imposing a threat on any country.
- 2- Norway is peace country with no recent history of colonization or warfare.
- 3- The peace process is done and builds on a flexible combination of state representation and voluntary organization.
- 4- Linking peace process with longer-term humanitarian assistance where Norway is not small but medium donor country.

At the same time, the minister admits that Norway lacked the technical expertise in regarding peace and they only had enough fund to brought expatriate experts and rely on advanced NGOs and civil society organization as well as outsourcing of diplomacy and international conflict resolution. Moreover, the Norwegian government believes in the flexibility NGOs, and civil society organization has it in a better way than what official state bodies can do.

The Norwegian model had been criticized due to the idealization of NGOs and showing them as the independent international actors while they are creating NGO colonialism alliance that even in some instances working against the interest of the sovereignty of the country. Another criticism of the Norway model is the substantial involvement of church-based Norwegian organizations in contexts where Christians are minority such as middle east. That create cultural fears from the supported countries and expect hidden agenda behind the humanitarian assistance which is precisely contradicting the Norwegian model where the emphasis on promoting the pluralism and democracy. The last criticism about the Norwegian model is that the

diplomacy and peacemaking efforts are not about Norway, but it serves the interest of the big power namely the United States of America (Bandarage, 2011, 223-230).

3.8.5 Swedish System of Humanitarian Assistance

Valeria in her study evaluates the role of the Swedish NGOs in post-conflict contexts and reflection of the Swedish foreign policy. According to Valeria, the goal of Swedish humanitarian assistance programs is “to save lives, alleviate suffering and retain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations” the Swedish International Development Agency SIDA contribute over than USD 3 billion with 18% of them implemented through Swedish NGOs in conflict and post-conflict contexts. From a donor perspective, Swedish humanitarian policy – on paper – has a rigorous focus on the humanitarian principles while during the implementation, they support more moral guidance for the implementation based on individual cases and conditions. Swedish donors paid massive efforts to have a high level of coordinated and coherent approach between humanitarian and developmental assistance through what named “development humanitarian assistance” which focus on the provision of long-term and durable solutions to the emergency needs. Swedish mandate is unique in regarding consider the separation between humanitarian and development and they are not considered humanitarian is supplement assistance to the development but more having developmental objectives for the humanitarian programs. This new model united the development approach and humanitarian where both state-building efforts and humanitarian assistance are delivered and aimed to strengthen the local populations. Even though the new approach is supporting the coherence between humanitarian and development its undermine the humanitarian activities by obligating the humanitarian activities to follow the sophisticated rules of development grants processes.

Two main Swedish NGOs are actively working in Afghanistan and Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) for over than 30 years which are SCA and Diakonia. SCA is development agency while Diakonia is well-known as largest Swedish humanitarian actor. However, none of both of them regarding approach, scale period can be identified as pure “humanitarian” or “development.” The other common themes between both organizations are

- 1- Both are focusing on conflict-related crisis and working on off-camp locations

2- Delivery of unconditional assistance and continue regardless of changes in the political sphere

3- The high level of flexibility of programs

Both NGOs play a vital role in delivering the Swedish assistance in both contexts in on large scale starting with humanitarian relief assistance and then gradually moved to longer-term activities and development.

Also, commonly, both organizations declared the intention and willingness to play a political role through different declarations including the political paper Diakonia published previously which called “Diakonia position paper and similarly SCA, express political views on their 2011 annual report that Taleban is not the only and primary opposition group in Afghanistan in addition to their political position about not participating in programs funded by US government.

On edge between humanitarian and political, conflict prevention considered as one of the main priorities of Swedish foreign policy and was implemented on the ground as well as in the new structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFA and SIDA. Which is first, it is in line with the constructive initiatives of international security and the potential threat of any conflict situation and secondly, it let Sweden integrates to EU and NATO structures and not lose the identity of its own foreign policy. However, the two largest humanitarian NGOs and SIDA still withhold from joint military-civilian humanitarian operations in conflict areas. It may reflect that an internal struggle within the MFA and SIDA to deal with conflict prevention as a security issue or a development issue still not finished yet. Based on that, all humanitarian actors including the two big NGOs, SIDA and MFA should find a new path for more effective joint efforts with all actors “working in conflict and “working on conflict” (Agafonova, 2013, 73-76).

3.8.6 Mapping the Aid System, Afghanistan As a Case Study

For better understanding of the humanitarian response and peacebuilding, its crucial to understand the linkages between both which is the donors of humanitarian response – the main source of all humanitarian operations all around the world – and at same time – those donors – representing their stats and governments and have another political role in the international community. Even more, in some cases, same donors support and donate humanitarian programs as well as stabilization programs which in most of the times aims to support one party to the conflict. To understand this

matrix and roles, in this section will present a mapping for the aid system in Afghanistan in years between 1997 -1999.

In Afghanistan's case, donors agreed on significant policy and the shape of the solution objective which was: Peace through a negotiated settlement with respect for human rights and maintained the

integrity of aid in addition to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism with focus on refugee return and reintegration.

According to Atmar and Goodhand, the donor policy objective in Afghanistan breaks down into five areas: (Atmar and Goodhand, 2002, 29)

1- Peace, stability, and good governance

The international policy's main focus is on cessation of hostility, direct negotiations with the government and hiding agenda to secure access for new actors to the oil field and change the rout of oil pipelines. This objective was supported by Political efforts through supporting the UN 6+2 negotiations and other bilateral initiatives such as the Swiss one. Also, humanitarian aid was linked to these efforts through adding conditions for the continuation of the humanitarian aid such as support good governance, building the civil society and support the community level mediations and social cohesion.

2- Respect for human rights

The main concerns about human rights in Afghanistan case were about women rights, war crimes and rights of minorities. Similar to above it was supported with political efforts such as the UN security council resolution about trade sanction in October 1999²⁰ and again, related to humanitarian response, there was focus on mainstreaming human rights in humanitarian programs with UN special advisor on human rights and gender deployed as well as substantial efforts and investment on human rights training for aid agencies and staff.

3- Counternarcotics

Afghanistan is one of the most significant plots for drugs around the world with a tremendous impact not only on the country itself but also the western part of the world with drugs smuggled to Europe, in addition to the impact on applying law and development. Therefore, donors and the international community add this area to the key policy objectives and work closely with the neighboring countries to ensure

²⁰ <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1267>

border security in central Asia. Linkage to the humanitarian response was through adding clauses about opium and poppy in aid programs, conditionality on adding positive impact or reduce the negative impact of narcotics on communities, mainstream drug control objectives. And UNDCP established rehabilitation program (Hemani, 1998, 13).

4- Counterterrorism

Terrorism issue was top curve topic during the Afghanistan war and especially after eleven September attacks on the United States. International community and donors key objectives include fighting all types of sheltering, training and providing any type of support to the Islamic groups including Osama ben Laden and others in addition to a strong push to extradition of Osama ben Laden. That effort was accompanied by many political initiatives such as the Russian-central Asian alliance and UN security council resolution in October 1999.

5- Refugees return

Afghanistan people fled all around the world after the war with main pools in Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Europe. Political efforts to support this area were mainly about negotiation with host countries concerned about refugees' rights and voluntary repatriation as well as tightening the border, and the refugees' laws in Europe to stop the fled of people. A humanitarian response used as a way to tempt people to stay and not leave and return to Afghanistan the rough large-scale programs for returnees.

In the case of Afghanistan, all types of donors and humanitarian agencies present there to support and implement the response including

1. Donors
2. UN agencies
3. International NGOs and especially in Afghanistan this type of actor also split into two big groups which are: A) the ordinary – mostly western – International NGOs and B) International Islamic NGOs
4. International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement

The investment in the Afghanistan humanitarian response attracted almost everyone due to the crisis size, and other crises at the same time around the world, as well as the unique nature of the crisis that touched religious areas, sensitive economic opportunities and included big powers interest. The most prominent investor and funder of the humanitarian response during 1997-1999 were Canada, followed by

Denmark and third was the European Commission while US Government was ranked 13th. The total fund provided during the same period was 636,246,148 USD divided almost equally over three years according to the compiled data from appeal documents. However, it is not a very accurate number, and usually, the spent amount is much higher.

UN presence was massive in Afghanistan crisis with 14 UN agencies supporting different aspects and areas. Worthy to mention here that UN agencies considered one of the biggest donors for NGOs – despite that UN agencies also get fund from same donors – with 22% of donations to NGOs in 1998 were through UN agencies. To explain this point, it does not mean new money are invested into humanitarian activities, but the channel with UN agencies are longer where institutional donors donate to UN agencies, then UN agencies sub-donate to International NGOs – whom in some cases sub-donate to local NGOs – then to direct beneficiaries. This happened usually due to the confidence that institutional donors have about UN agencies capacities to manage large-scale grants as well as to cover their commitments to the international community.

NGOs working in the Afghanistan context were so diverse in terms of origin, size, scale, backgrounds. However, all these diversities could be concluded in three groups:

1. International NGOs
2. Islamic NGOs
3. Afghanistan local NGOs

Over 250 NGO worked in Afghanistan during 1997-1999, and according to ACBAR Directory of humanitarian Agencies, they register over 160 different NGOs initially from 17 with 23,413 staff working in Afghanistan – 22,377 of them local Afghani people and 331 Expat – manage operation on scale of USD 376,4 M during the same period came mainly from UN agencies 33% and EC 20%. NGOs operations were in the sector of Health, demining, Education, Food security, and livelihoods, NFI & Shelter with some other thematic areas such as rehabilitation of infrastructure, the emergency response type of interventions, as well as the environmental community development work. And as mentioned above, particular focus on the mainstreaming of human rights, capacity building, women rights and empowerment, peace and conflict resolutions were followed heavily in almost all response from different actors (Atmar and Goodhand, 2002, 30-36).

CHAPTER FOUR

NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT AND INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

4.1 NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

4.1.1 New Wars and New Context

Recently, the shape of war and conflicts after the cold war and nature of politics has changed. Now a day war less branded as “proxy” where belligerents get support from different superpowers. And the shape of inter-state war changed now to be intra-state, and these types of war are characterized as “civil war” or “ethical war.” Humanitarian activities and practices should be seen and understood within this new context of conflicts. Economically, the support for the warring parties reduced during the last decades and government start relying more on the private sector to fund the war activities, and that means, more support for warring parties are available in the state of war rather than in the state of peace. Clearly, the new wars aim about gaining new access to natural resources, international routes, and markets which mean reconfiguring the systems and structures of the victor's parties.

Within the new, globalized, and borderless world we require new strategies and ways of thinking to understand and respond. The new war is usually more chronic and prolonged crisis which require more than short-term humanitarian interventions and require longer-term developmental impacts. Humanitarian agencies and organizations have potential capacities to play a role in developmental and longer-term programs were addressing and tackling the root causes of conflicts. That means new contexts should be approached from different perspectives from humanitarian agencies and organizations. Keeping the old approach of working on short-term needs in prolonged crisis raises many issues and do harm more than good which becomes an area of criticism for relief organizations as they are providing short-term assistance without matching that with the political efforts. This criticism encompasses the

understanding of peace, conflict, and development by relief organizations where consider development is part of a broader network of political directions. Also, criticism reached the approach of peacebuilding and separation of humanitarian activities through relief and civil organizations from the political activities and substituted the political activities with the humanitarian interventions. As an example, in Afghanistan, humanitarian organizations changed the balance of power by working with rebellions and ignore and neglect the formal structure of the government. In Afghanistan, context NGOs and relief organizations criticized for doing that and accused of supporting the war economy by working mainly with rebellions. This example as with many other examples shows how humanitarianism could have a counter-productive impact on the situation if it was not aligned with political efforts. Nonetheless, humanitarian interventions could be the cause of conflict and participate positively in increasing the conflict and fuel it. A famous example from Rwanda was delivering food to refugees' camps regularly – which had been used as a military base – support the people whom then did the genocide and killed the people. Worthy to note here, that this example is unique and incomparable to other situations (Van Genugten and Bart, 2016, 3-4).

4.1.2 Security and Development After the Cold War – New Concept of Peacebuilding

The end of the cold war, considered as a turning point in the international order and international affairs and a start of a new political era. The changes in the political sphere were way beyond the demise of the threat of conflicts between the two poles of the cold war after the dissolving of the Soviet Union but also about several proxy wars that stopped and ended by the withdrawal of the external supporters or cut-off the support on warring parties. The primary approach of wars during the cold war era was not having a global war but more fighting and having multi-wars on small-scale fueled by the two polar. The results of peace that was expected to be for all the world did not reach to millions of people around the world, instead, immediately after the end of cold war, the level of violence globally increased including genocides and ethnic conflicts with high scale of casualties, massive refugees and displaced people within states or across the borders.

There was a disconnect between the peace that world was expecting within the end of the cold war and the insecurity that started in different regions around the world. These unexpected results, make the whole world re-prioritization of the

political issues in the new era. this new thinking includes the separation between development and security issues, the separation between civil wars and cross-states wars, and the separation between international and domestic sphere. After that, the concept of peacebuilding come as a solution to bridge all separations, bridging security with development at an international and local level as an integrated approach to deal with the broader range of issues that risk or threaten the peace and security.

During the era of cold war, two separated streams or set of structures were established. The first one to address the socio-economic development, and the second one for peace and security. Promoting socioeconomic and humanitarian needs falls under the national sovereign authority and is supported by multi-international and UN agencies. Under the same authority, social injustice, inequality, vulnerability all considered domestic issues managed by the national authority with financial and technical support from international organizations. At the same time and in parallel with that, the majority of resources – financially, military, and politically – were devoted to peacekeeping and security. Which has the limited consideration to keeping and maintain sovereignty and interest of national authority.

On national and international levels, a productive system of security instruments and institutions created to act and deal with the conflicts between states and between the two polar. All these investments are made to protect the international peace and security. UN role was limited regarding the security issues after the emerging of other security organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact.

The end of the cold war paved the road for international actors to rethink prominent concepts of security and development at the two level of national and international and find the solution through the integrated policy instrument to address conflicts from peacebuilding perspective. Peacebuilding mainly aims to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, that encompassed violent reductions, post-conflict reconstructions, avoid the revert into violent again.

Regardless, the traditional instruments from the cold war era such as military, diplomats, and security, peacebuilding go beyond that and aim to tackle the root causes of the post-cold war era conflicts on different dimensions structural, political, cultural, economic and environmental.

Regarding the development and security relation, knowing that not all development works impacts the security environment, at the same time, not all security

issues have consequences on development. When the two elements jointly activated to prevent or resolve violent conflict, this becomes the arena for peacebuilding on the domestic and international level. Taking the relations between the development and security, peacebuilding requires the ability to redesign the traditional limitations between these two domains and create additional space to include other elements such as international trade, natural resource, and governance to the extent that can positively reduce violence. Mainly the peacebuilding needs to rethink and invent new mandate for the institutions managing development, security, and policy (Tschirgi, 2003, 1).

4.1.3 War-Making, Peacebuilding and The United Nations

During the post-cold war era, and after heavily failures in different context, UN members start discussing the issue of legitimacy of sovereignty, which ones are subject to national or state and which one is subject to international interventions. During that period, UN security council approach was parasitical in general with high depend on UN charter chapter VII²¹ - ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION-, which give the international community the right to use force to stop conflicts that concerning the international peace and security. UN members recommend and support extreme expansion in the area of collective interventions around the world. Due to unfulfilled commitments and escalating the force usage incite crisis about peace enforcement. In different contexts from Somalia to Rwanda to Bosnia, proof of the catastrophic failure of UN missions to enforce peace and in several cases making war. UN records show that UN serves a decisive role in legitimizing international collective interventions between inter-states such as in Korea and Iraq, at the same time, very ineffective in enforcing peace in the intra-conflict and civil wars.

However, at same time, same resources proof that – despite the failure under the UN charter chapter VII in the intra-conflict – UN peace operations did very well in boosting up the peace through consent and relying on UN charter chapter VI²² - PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES – through peace-making negotiating, innovative approaches in transitional authorities resulted from peace agreements with success in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and East Timor. That does not mean,

²¹ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>

²² <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html>

consent is always worked well, weak implementation of the consents keeps agreements – regardless of the quality – meaningless or ineffective.

Since most of the conflict in the post-cold war were intra-conflict and within the territories of state sovereignty, civil wars considered one of the most critical issues for peacemaking for UN and international agencies charged for international peace, with several millions of casualties during the 90's (Doyle, 2005, 1).

Civil war or intra-conflict – even though its happened within state sovereignty only – had a negative impact on neighborhoods countries and external complications. Starting from death, refugees, and displacement issues, to worsening health levels, with a reduction in growth rates for the economy not only in the affected country but for the whole region (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, 91-110).

Moreover, usually, the intra-conflict starts between government and rebels, militias, or unorganized armies following in most of the time Guerrilla war type where civilians are the most affected directly during this type of wars (Doyle, 2005, 3).

Doyle, argues in his paper, that sustainable peace is the measure for peacebuilding efforts and the three main elements impacting the successfulness of solution for civil war are:

- 1- The hostility of factions and the impact of that measured by death, displacement, type of war and number of war participants
- 2- Remaining capacities after the war were measured by the economic ratios for example GDP per capita
- 3- Level of international assistance

The study proved that those three elements are the pillars for have peacebuilding. Under the same study, Doyle says that UN efforts including missions and the way of UN doing that participate positively in increasing the possibility of having peace after the war. Also, study says that there is no one template fit all cases, but in each case, it should be customized and adapted to the case including the international authority to make the transition. Moreover, supported cases with economic recovery and economic building program increase the chances for more stable and longer-term peace. Unexpectedly, study says that military victories in many cases lead the transition from war to peace after eliminating the opposition military powers entirely which can be lead to sustainable peace with no pockets or sleep cells for oppositions similar to what happens through truce or other peace agreements (Doyle, 2005, 10).

4.1.4 Regional and International Readiness to Address Cross-Border Humanitarian Issues

The cross-border issue from humanitarian perspective could be seen in two ways. First, several humanitarian crises, both natural or conflict based, create cross-border issues either due to the causes or the results of crisis which usually include an influx of people to the other border side. The ability to improve or mitigate this issue is included in the humanitarian business model. The second problem is the lack of state capacity to deal with such challenges. States – in most cases – don't have the capacity to prevent such issues or to deal with it without external support and assistance.

Without neglecting the role of development donors in support weak states to develop and improve their capacities to deal with their internal crisis and keep the impact limited within the state borders, its important as well to focus on the regional organizations that created to ensure the interest of multi-states such as the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Regional organizations should have the legitimate power to deal and play a vital role in responding to cross-border issues.

To give an example of how humanitarian crises can cross the borders, Kurdish people fled from north of Iraq in 1991 and Syrians fled Syria to Turkey in 2012. These are two clear examples from the middle east region. The impact of cross-border is high on hosting countries. Currently, there are a total of 14-16 million refugees globally, and number changed based on resource.

Regardless of the cause of the crisis; natural or man-made conflict, the challenge could be immediate and sudden or could be chronic and slow. Mainly there are four types of challenges as per the table below:

Table 2: Types of Challenges

	Slow onset	Sudden
Natural	e.g. draught	Earthquake
Conflict	Ethnic cleansing	Invasion

Regional efforts to mitigate and resolve the cross-border issue should be able to address and respond to the four types of crisis since all these types will have a negative impact on the hosting countries (A New Business Model for Humanitarian Assistance? International Alert, 2009, 21-23).

4.2 HUMANITARIAN TRANSFORMATION AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND CAPACITIES

4.2.1 World Humanitarian Summit - WHS Initiative

The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) is a new initiative from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon during the UN General Assembly number 66 in September 2011 as response to many issues including the high cost of humanitarian assistance, increasing the needs, inability to solve protracted conflicts with an objective for the WHS is to improve the efficiency of humanitarian actions.

The objective of the WHS through a three-year plan from 2015-2017, is to achieve the following two goals:

- 1- build consensus and ownership of the process and establish or reinforce networks that will develop the Summit outcomes
- 2- articulate a future agenda for humanitarian action and the modalities to implement Summit outcomes

WHS is not only aiming to promote collaborations and increase the efficiency but also to have a drastic change in the mandate of humanitarian work and shifting from response to prevent and mitigate and from managing crisis to managing risks.

During the preparation for the WHS, it followed world-wide inclusive system through four axes of consultation to ensure inclusion of all relevant stakeholders.

1) Eight regional consultations and one global consultation covering the whole world with the intensive inclusion of international NGOs, local NGOs, UN agencies, affected communities, regional and international civil society organization, International Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, private sectors, academia, media with the host by governments and logistical arrangements by WHS secretary. The five regional consultations are West and Central Africa, North and South-East Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Europe, and other groups.

- 2) Four thematic consultations and global consultation
 - a. Humanitarian Effectiveness
 - b. Reducing Vulnerability and Managing Risk
 - c. Transformation through Innovation
 - d. Serving the Needs of People in Conflict
- 3) A process of online consultation.
- 4) Link to global processes on Disaster Risk Reductions (DRR).

(Toward more effective global humanitarian actions: how the EU can contribute, the European Parliament, Directorate general for external policies, policy department, 2015).

4.2.2 Funding Humanitarian Aid

In 1991 OCHA started the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and kept facilitating this process to support and help relief organizations in fundraising, planning, implementation and monitoring their activities. Since the establishment of CAP, it became the primary tool for coordination and strategic planning. Since 1992, over 100 donor countries provided more than USD 42 billion to support humanitarian activities in more than 50 countries and crisis. the below chart Figure 1. Explain the map of fund flow between different agencies and bodies till reach the final beneficiaries.




Figure5: Resource flows within the international relief system. Source: Hallam (1998).

In 2005, the budget for humanitarian activities reached the curve end from the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) budget with 16.4%. after 2005, the general trend for the humanitarian budget as a percentage from ODA is decreased although within the increased in the ODA budgets, the fund for humanitarian activities kept increasing with an exception to some high-severe large-scale crisis. In 2001, donors contributed with USD 2.1 billion to 20 complex crises and USD 311 million to 49 natural disasters. Despite that, the number of natural disasters is much higher with significantly lower contribution from donors, but complex crisis and conflict-based crisis caused more harm and more cost for humanitarian activities. Regardless of the growth in humanitarian funding, its rarely met the 100% of the appeals, and critical sectors remain underfunded. According to CAP data, food aid mostly met the appeal through CAP while health, water, and sanitation rarely to reach even 50% of the appealed fund. The link and relation between those sectors are clear and visible, and the impact of the inefficient fund in one sector will be affecting the other one.

The increase in the frequency and changes in the crisis around the world cause inflation in the cost of the humanitarian assistance. The overall humanitarian expenditure of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member governments – which consider one of a significant contributor to the crisis – increased by USD 600 million between 2009 and 2010 and this massive increased made by three main countries which are USA, Japan, and Canada.

Regardless of the upward trend in funding the humanitarian activities, the government is facing more challenges and questioned by people to justify the substantial increase in humanitarian funding (Rose, O'Keefe, Jayawickrama and O'Brien 2013, 81-84).

4.2.3 Central Emergency Response Fund – CERF

In 2006, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) established by the UN general assembly to improve and enable the humanitarian response around the world and ensure enough minimum financial resources for that. The primary three goals according to general assembly from CERF are:

- 1- *Promote early action and response to avoid loss of life*
- 2- *Enhance response to time-critical requirements*

3- *Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.*

The fund is managed by UNOCHA and replenished annually from government and private sectors contributions. Till 2012, CERF raised over 2.8 billion USD, grants facilities over USD 450M and loans facilities over USD 30M. Out of the 2.8 billion, CERF allocates 2.4 billion to 85 different humanitarian country team since the establishment.

CERF fund is open to UN humanitarian agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) except for the UN OCHA since the ERC is the fund manager. WFP, UNICEF, and UNHCR are the top three recipients of the fund from CERF. NGOs are not allowed to directly access CERF according to the general assembly resolution. However, NGOs frequently receive funds from CERF as UN agencies implementing partners.

Sector-wise, CERF support all nine different sectors with no reservations on any sector as a rule. However, it is up to OCHA and ERC to decide on the allocation to cover which sectors and what is the highest priorities, distribution of fund on sectors and design the appeal with inputs from clusters coordinators the needs, gaps, and acuteness of the situation in their sectors (OCHA 2012, 1).

Under CERF, there are two main windows to give grants. First one is for the rapid response within 72 hours for the one-off emergency alert. And the second window is for the underfunded emergencies. The funds usually distributed two thirds for the rapid response and one third for the underfunded emergencies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SYRIA CONTEXT AS CASE STUDY

5.1 Syria Context:

The Syrian crisis started in March 2011 after demonstrations and transformation demands in political and economic life in Syria. After the brutal and violent response responses from the government, the peaceful demonstrations converted into a civil war between the government of Syria army supported by Iran, Russia, Shiaat Iraqi militant groups, Hezbollah and others against the armed opposition groups supported by Turkey, Qatar, Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, USA and others as well. The civil war resulted over 500,000 casualties till end of 2018 where only in 2017 10,204 people killed and and collapsing in country economy and people livelihoods.²³ in addition to that, Syria become the safe heaven for the extreme Islamic groups who came from around the world and establish new organizations and structure such as Islamic State in Iraq and Sham ISIS and Jabhat Al Nusra and many others that directly or indirectly affiliated with Al Qaeda. The country split into different controlled zones that impact the humanitarian response where some organizations have access, and others are not. The main areas in Syria can be summarized as follows:

1. The government-controlled area where some organizations gained access to work in this area. The government of Syria did not allow the humanitarian and relief organizations working in the opposition-held area to work in their territories.
2. The opposition held area which includes the territories controlled by different Opposition Armed Groups (OAG), where there were no measures on access in general.
3. The Kurdish controlled area which is in the northeast of Syria.
4. ISIS-controlled areas where few humanitarian organizations working there due to the condition and interference imposed by ISIS which consider a terrorist group and any type of interference is against most of the donors' regulations.

²³ <http://www.iamsyria.org/death-tolls.html>

This separation in the geographical access make the Syrian context a unique context from humanitarian perspective managed from inside the country for the government-controlled areas, cross-border operations from Turkey to respond to the north part controlled by the opposition groups, and cross-border operations from Jordan to respond to the needs in the southern area controlled by opposition as well. The humanitarian structure for this context was managed by three different OCHA offices in Damascus, Amman, and Turkey to coordinate the response in sub-regions and managed by another layer called Whole of Syria Coordination (WoS)²⁴. The humanitarian response was highly dominant by political decisions from local powers as well as international powers. The cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan were imposed and legitimized by the UN Security Council resolutions no /2191/2258/2332²⁵ which reflect the indirect political effect on the humanitarian response.

The other military operations in Syria that impacted the humanitarian response was the international coalition to defeat ISIS which conducted hundreds of airstrikes on ISIS locations and supports ground forces to defeat ISIS²⁶. The ground forces were mainly the Syria Democracy Forces (SDF) which consist of Kurdish forces primarily and some other brigades of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

In order to have one joint way of dealing with the armed groups, OCHA in Turkey developed with the participation of the humanitarian organizations what they called the Joint Operations Principles as a unified protocol for the engagement with parties to the conflict²⁷

In addition to the humanitarian response, there were other big stabilization programs and political programs to support the political governance structures in the opposition-held areas which known as local councils as well as to support the moderate military groups in same areas. The stabilization and political programs were managed in total separation from the humanitarian response with no coordination or mutual

²⁴ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/whole-of-syria>

²⁵ http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2393.pdf

²⁶ <https://www.state.gov/s/seci/>

²⁷ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/stima/document/joint-operating-principles-protocol-engagement-parties-conflict>

objectives at all even though both responses were funded by similar donors but through different government agencies.

5.2 Funding for Syria Response

According to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) website in 2014, the total appeal requested was 18.05 Billion USD, out of that only 61% which equivalent to 11.00 billion USD secured through 181 donors and implemented through 316 organizations across the whole country. The USA was the most significant contributor in 2014 with 443 million USD, followed by the UK with 107.6 million USD, and the European Commission third with 105.6 million USD. In 2018, the total requested appeal was 9.12 billion USD. Until now, only 2.78 billion has been secured through donors and remaining 6.34 billion USD is not secured yet. The most significant contributor in 2018 to date is Germany with 175.1 million USD, followed by the UK with 169.4 million USD, and the US with 89.4 million USD.

5.3 Peacebuilding Solutions in Syria

After seven devastate years of civil war supported by different external actors. Where Qatar and Saudia Arabia in addition to UK and France supporting the Free Syrian Army with light weapons, while Russia keeps supplies different types of weapons for the government of Syria and Iran keep supporting the government with soldiers, war seems endless with this balance. External interventions to remove Assaad regime will not end the conflict but increase the acuteness of it since many people will consider this as an external invasion instead of support for the opposition. At the same time, keep supporting the FSA to overcome Assaad will increase the support to the government and upturn the tension and intensity of the conflict. Knapp proposed that the only solution to reduce the humanitarian impact of the conflict is by declining the conflict as political issue and try not to solve the crisis but having substantial armed peacebuilding forces in different areas in north, south, central and northeast of Syria near to the borders to be safe heaven for the civilians that felt from the conflict. Having this safe zones under the protection of the UN will be widely accepted by people and create space for people want to avoid the conflict. The justification for this solution is the protection of human rights and reduce the violation of rights regardless of the long-term solution for the conflict as a political issue. (Knapp,2017, 3)

While Knapp proposed the UN peacekeeping mission as a solution, Vasconcelos discuss in his paper few alternatives or possibilities that have different likelihoods depend on the analysis of the conflict in Syria.

The first proposed solution is an internal resolution. With very low likelihood that Assaad is able to re-control the whole or majority of Syrian lands while small pockets and areas remain under the control of local groups, but the difference in power level will reduce significantly the intensity of the conflict.

The second solution is an external driving solution led by dominant international power and under the tent of UN which considered far away from reality since there is no consensus between international powers on humanitarian nor on political situation to be able to have such solution

Third and most possible solution is the regional led solution, where Turkey, Iran, Saudia Arabia and Qatar reach an agreement and guarantee their own affiliates on the ground. Such agreement will eventually reach support and accept from both Russia and United State of America, and this could be a long-term solution for the conflict. The solution will result in a fragmented country where each regional actor has a certain level of influence but the influence and conflict should be controlled by the agreement, and Syrian should keep the avoidance of fragmentation as crucial guidance in such solution.

At the same time, Vasconcelos talked about tow levels of any peacekeeping missions in Syria. Peacekeeping mission in Syria should be legitimized by the United Nation Security Council under the Chapter VII, where all powers agreed about the armed mission to enforce peace operations by power on all warring parties. Simuteniasly, the second tier of peacekeeping mission with stabilization forces to keep the peace operations maintained. Vasconcelos proposed that such combined mission for peace enforcement and peacekeeping would be more efficient than two separated missions. (Vasconcelos, 2015, 2:5)

5.4 Barriers to resolution in Syria

Since the beginning of the upraises in Syria in 2011, many attempts for mediation and political solutions take place starting with the Arab league in 2011, followed by the UN envoy Kofi Annan to reach a cease-fire between the government of Syria and specific opposition armed groups in 2012 followed by starting the series of Geneva negotiations which continued till 2017. UN efforts continue with Al Akhdar Al Ibrahimi and then by the last envoy Staffan de Mistura in 2014. However,

regardless of the number of tries and attempts to reach a political solution for the Syrian crisis in different stages of the conflict starting from the very early stage in 2011, Syria crisis show resistance to all different types of political solutions on both regional, and International levels. Lundgren said that the resistance in the Syrian conflict come from four main structured barriers.

First one is the lack of genuine desire for negotiation and reaching an agreement. Both warring parties in Syria believe in the war as a solution. The government of Syria believes that they can defeat the armed opposition and the armed opposition believe that fighting is the only way to have political future in Syria.

The second barrier to mediation is the absence of one body for the opposition. Syrian opposition still after seven years of the conflict scattered and splintered across regions, affiliations, clans ...etc. the absence of one representative for the opposition made the negotiation and mediations difficult mission for any party try to do that, having some opposition groups out of any agreement threatening the whole agreement since some groups are not recognizing nor obeying it, taking into consideration the first barrier, made finding a solution mission impossible.

The third barrier is the sectarian dimension of warring groups in Syria in both sides government and opposition which convert the conflict from “only” political conflict into “religious” and political conflict which make the whole situation much more complicated. Religious conflicts considered the most difficult conflicts to settle down since fighting for religious make people less tend to accept or seek negotiation and mediation.

Forth and the last barrier is the international disagreement about the solution and how peace should look like in Syria. From Geneva talks and UN security council resolutions, apparently, US and Russia fail to reach an agreement or even one direction for finding a solution in Syria. Taking into consideration the direct and indirect interest for US and Russia in Syria and the fact that each of them supporting different warring parties in this conflict, it shows that even the international disunity is directly impacting and not supporting reaching resolution and peace in Syria. (Lundgren, 2015, 5)

5.5 The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Peace and Civil War:

A massive debate about the nature of the conflict in Syria if it should be considered as a civil war between the government of Syria and rebellions or proxy war between international powers through local actors including the government of Syria

and other opposition groups. According to Abdulrahman Al-Masri, the devastating conflict in Syria consider more as proxy war due to the influence and support from external powers and government which care more about their own interest rather than just supporting local actors (Al Masri, 2015).

In the Syrian context, even though most of the humanitarian organizations and UN agencies tried to be neutral and follow the humanitarian principles, they ended up with the exact opposite. According to Jose, the food distribution in Syrian context was a vital reason to support sovereignty and political objectives.

From OCHA perspective, neutrality means “humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature” (UN OCHA, ‘OCHA on message’. This definition is modelled on the fundamental principles of the Red Cross, established in 1986 at the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross, Geneva.) while each of the humanitarian organization has their own relative understanding of the neutrality which is diverted from international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles. In Jose said that food distribution is crucial in general as an intervention in different contexts since its secure one of the most important basic needs for people. In the Syrian context, due to the massive subsidies that government of Syria used to provide to Syrians before the war, make the importance of the food distribution and the impact of the allocation of food per geographical areas higher than usual in other contexts. WFP and Syrian Red Crescent are considered the biggest two distributors of food in the Syrian context. From the WFP reports, it shows that food distribution and targeted areas were not neutral and regardless of the donors preferences and needs, many besieged areas and opposition-controlled areas were marginalized and disadvantaged from the food distribution and WFP and other actors could not overcome this challenges and accept to not reach vulnerable people in besieged areas due to political reasons and in order not to lose the access to other areas controlled by government. Based on that, Jose said that food distribution in Syria was benefiting the government of Syria and was not one hundred percent neutral as it should be. ²⁸From UN reports, it’s come many times that government of Syria denying food and another type of aid to be transported to opposition-held areas and the General Secretary Ban Ki-moon reported that to the UN

²⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/syria-defying-security-council-aid-access>

security council in 2014²⁹. The UN tried to through many channels and event to overcome this challenge but eventually, it has all come back to the government of Syria and make the efforts of UN fail till its solved through the security council resolutions to allow cross-border operations to reach the vulnerable people in the north and south of Syrian in the area controlled by opposition groups (Martinez and Eng, 2016, 155-157).



²⁹ <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/548545cc4.pdf>

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

It is clear there are two new doctrines related to linking humanitarian assistance with political agenda including peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions. The first one is the 'minimalist' which insists on keeping humanitarian aid neutral and focused on live saving and back to the roots and main principles of humanitarian work regardless of the impact – both positive and negative – on the context and how the humanitarian assistance can be more efficient and effective to reach beyond lives saving goal. While the second doctrine is the opposite – maximalist saying that primary aim of humanitarian assistance is to improve the lives of people and participate in permanent solutions and develop peace in conflict born crisis which can happen by linking humanitarian assistance to military interventions, political agendas, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions even with compromising on the fundamental humanitarian principles such as neutrality since maximalists believe that humanitarian principles and rules need transformation movement to keep the humanitarian industry up to speed and match it with the new global political order and new types of wars.

In brief, the argument is about the trade-off between having a sustainable impact and developing peace regardless to humanitarian principles or keep focusing on humanitarian principles and neutrality of humanitarian assistance regardless of the context and the impact of the assistance.

The primary contexts and events support the maximalists' argument are the famous genocide of Rwanda where the humanitarian assistance and food provided to the rebellion in refugees' camps fuel the conflict and support specific groups to be empowered and do the genocide later on. In the Rwanda example, it shows in a crystal-clear way the negative impact and the harm that humanitarian assistance can impose when it is not linked to political and longer-term peacebuilding agenda. The second supporting example for maximalists is Afghanistan context where the strong linkage

between humanitarian assistance and military interventions/peacebuilding activities and the positive impact and high boost give to that.

On the other hand, minimalists always back the roots of humanitarian assistance principles and discard the new changes claiming that neutrality is fundamental principle and it worked well in tens of contexts around the world during many decades and rejected the acceptance of the new global political context after the cold war and that world after 1990's is not the same place before and that humanitarian industry should adapt to that. Keep using rigidity approach that decline changes and insisting on the separation between politics and humanitarian and turning a blind eye to the close tie between both of them, at least that the funders and donors of humanitarian activities are basically political governments and focusing on their own countries interest as well.

In a natural crisis, neutrality works well especially when its bounded under the do no harm framework. However, in a natural disaster, where no political agendas exist, the whole argument linking humanitarian assistance with peacebuilding disappears, and we can consider natural disasters invalid cases for this research.

Despite the direct linkage between humanitarian assistance and political agendas, indirectly, humanitarian interventions could not be hundred percent neutral and work in an isolated environment from the political and military sphere especially in conflict-based contexts where contradicting political interest and social movements involve. The political impact and implications on humanitarian assistance are remarkable and cannot be ignored in almost all contexts. The five areas where politics influence humanitarian assistance are:

1- The respect of warring parties for the international humanitarian law: the main support for the neutral implementation and delivery of humanitarian assistance is the backup of the international humanitarian law which says that all conflict parties and armed groups should allow humanitarian agencies and organizations to work with full freedom to reach the most vulnerable people and save lives and should not interfere, impose, or influence the humanitarian assistance or getting benefits from it. However, it is not always the case, and it is one of the biggest challenges for humanitarian organizations in conflict born contexts to avoid interference from controlled groups.

2- Counterterrorism legislation: following to the previous points, especially after the 11th September attacks on united states and the extreme global

wave of countering terrorism create another layer of challenges for humanitarian agencies and organizations to ensure that humanitarian programs they deliver are not empowering or supporting terrorist groups in conflicts contexts. Taking into considerations the long list of terrorist groups in many contexts such as Harket Al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hamas movement in Palestine, Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria, ISIS in Syria and Iraq and many other groups making the separation between humanitarian and politics almost impossible.

3- The geographical accessibility to vulnerable people: the acceptance of controlled groups and governments to allow humanitarian agencies to work in territories under their control and other opposition territories is another challenge since most of the warring powers try to influence humanitarian agencies to take a side and work in specific areas and support vulnerable people in their own areas only.

4- The global politics and legitimization for specific groups: that includes the UN security council resolutions and other international coalitions regarding humanitarian response and how it might hinder or facilitate the responses which are usually controlled by few countries. the undeniable example of the international political implications is the cross-border operations resolution for Syria from Turkey and Jordan from the security council that facilitates the humanitarian response for the opposition-held areas in north and south of Syria.

5- The donor driven fund: despite the development process of the humanitarian response plan and identifying the needs on grounds, donors play a vital role in directing the fund and humanitarian assistance to specific locations, geographical areas, specific groups ...etc. that they would like to support and that does not impact of effect the neutrality principle since humanitarian agencies still delivering assistance to vulnerable people in a way but in the bigger picture, they are supporting only specific groups and might be with specific affiliations.

From the above mentioned, apparently, the minimalism doctrine is not suitable or applicable even without the direct linkage of humanitarian assistance with political agendas, and the concept or the idea of the delivering humanitarian assistance in full isolation of the conflict and political sphere cannot be applied in real life.

From the Syrian context, with the absence of peacekeeping missions or any international forces within the country, humanitarian organizations are following the minimalism doctrine by some means. The humanitarian programs in Syria are delivered with zero coordination with other peacebuilding, stabilization, and other

non-humanitarian programs even though same donors and governments are supporting both programs and found that an added value could be created by coordination of the unmatched programs. At same time, that creates confusion to the Syrian people and governance structures when they receive direct support through stabilization and political programs and get rejection from humanitarian agencies to coordinate/work with them because they are not legitimate authorities according to donor regulations – where in most of the cases the donors are same for both types – same thing happens with humanitarian organization staff – especially in the field – when they have compliance and regulations they have to obey and doesn't make sense for them due to their knowledge about other programs funded by same donors.

As an impact on the conflict, it is very difficult to say that humanitarian assistance in Syria was fuelling the conflict without a clear evidence, but it is very easy to say that humanitarian assistance did not participate at all in improving the social cohesion, reducing the level of conflict, building/creating sustainable impact or any other positive influence on the conflict except saving people live to participate and suffer from the conflict. Even though, there is no evidence within this research about the negative impact of the conflict, however, provision of food and other basic needs for the people in conflict zone where most – if not all – fighters are local people – which mean that beneficiaries from humanitarian assistance are fighters or their families – at least remove some burden from soldiers and armed groups, controlling powers, governance entities to take care of peoples basic needs and that mean indirectly, empowering them to keep fighting with guarantees that their families basic needs would be fulfilled. Probably the impact of the humanitarian assistance in Syrian context is not as harmful and evident as in the same way of the Rwanda context, but in the way or another, it is having the same negative influence on the conflict.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Yaman Salam 1987 yılında Şam'da doğdu. 2009 yılında, İşletme Yönetimi Yüksek Enstitüsü'nden Yönetim Bilimleri dalında lisans derecesiyle mezun oldu. Özel sektör ve insani yardım alanlarında insan kaynakları ve proje yönetimi başta olmak üzere 10 yılı aşkın deneyime sahip.

VITAE

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