

**T.C.
UNIVERSITY OF GAZIANTEP GRADUATE
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND
IMMIGRATION INFLUX IN EUROPE**

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IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**SUPERVISOR:
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UNIVERSITY OF GAZİANTEP
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ABSTRACT

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION INFLUX IN EUROPE

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This study weighed renaissance in European nationalism and the challenges of influx in Europe- France. It attempted to find out the attitude of French towards immigrants and the reason why immigrants face intolerance and discrimination from the French. The French government on the other hand engage in political rhetoric to induce nationalism in France. immigration to Europe in general and to France in particular is on the rise and it has been a discursive phenomenon in world politics but France is a different case, owing to the fact that North Africans and French colonized Africans in West Africa especially always resort to France as heaven of opportunities.

This happen though both legal and illegal channels, a process that pushed France into taking stringent policies against immigration over time. This research adopted the theories of nationalism as rhetorical pedestal to study nationalism and immigration influx in France, also those policies did not integrate the immigrants nor stabilized the situation in France.

The policies failed to that even through it was capable of doing it and also the study also confirmed that France is turning into one of the toughest countries in western Europe concerning its immigration laws and measures. Furthermost, there no change in welfare system to facilitate the organization of immigrants the way that is beneficial to the economy of France.

The study conclude that there is paradigm shift in understanding of immigration as a concept, throughout the 20th century it was considered to be a positive factor that proves France's attractiveness, with that changed the perception of nation and citizenship. France should lessen its policies, laws measures on immigration, the influx , of course must be controlled yet it should be put to better economic use as not all immigrants are liabilities - Mamoudou Gassama ,an illegal immigrant who recently saved a four year old is a case in point.

Keywords: Nationalism, Europe, France , Immigration, Influx

ÖZET

Avrupa'ya göçler ciddi anlamda artmıştır. Hatta Avrupa'ya göç, dünya siyasetinde bile söylemsel bir fenomen olmuştur, fakat Kuzey ile birlikte Fransızların sömürgeleştirdiği Batı Afrika ülkelerinin Fransaya ve Avrupa Bu çalışmada Avrupa milliyetçiliğinin rönesansı ve Avrupa(Fransa)'daki göç ile birlikte doğan zorluklar ele alınmıştır. Avrupalıların tarafından kalmalarının nedenlerini göstermeyi hedeflemektedir.

Öte yandan Fransız hükümeti, Fransa da milliyetçiliği teşvik etmek amacıyla siyasal girişimlerde bulunmaktadır. Genel olarak Avrupa'ya ve özellikle ülkeleri her zaman fırsat cenneti olarak görmelerinden dolayı Avrupa'daki göç meselesi anlamda öneme taşımaktadır. Avrupa'ya olan göçün hem yasal hem yasadışı yollardan gerçekleştiğinden dolayı, Avrupa göç ve göçmenlere karşı katı politikalar almaya iten bir süreçten geçti diyebiliriz.

Bu araştırma, Avrupa'daki milliyetçilik ve göç akımlarını incelemek için Milliyetçilik teorileri dayanağı olarak benimsemiştir. Bu çalışma, Fransız politika oluşturma sürecinin ve politik söylemin Fransa'daki durumu istikrara kavuşturmasını beklerken başarısız olduğunu tespit etmiştir. Ayrıca bu çalışma Fransa'nın Batı Avrupa'daki göç yasaları ve tedbirleri konusunda en sert ülkelerden birine dönüştüğünü doğrulamıştır. Dahası, göçmenlerin Fransa ve Avrupa ekonomisine fayda sağlayacak refah sistemi mevcut değilken refahlarını kolaylaştıracak herhangi bir değişiklik de olmamıştır.

Bu çalışma, göç kavramında paradigma kaymasının var olduğu sonucuna da varmıştı; 20. yüzyıl boyunca Fransa'nın çekiciliğini kanıtlayan olumlu bir faktör olarak bilinen göç kavramının paradigma kayması millet ve vatandaşlık algısının değişmesini sağladı. Sonuç olarak Avrupa göçmenlik konusundaki politikalarını, yasalarını ve önemlerini değiştirmeli, elbette göç akımı denetlenmeli, ancak tüm göçmenlerin sorumlu olmadığına ve daha iyi bir ekonomik kullanıma sokulması gerektiğine yakın zamanda dört yaşındaki bir çocuğu kurtaran yasadışı Mali göçmeni olan Mamoudou Gassama bir örnektir.

Anarhtar kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Avrupa , Fransa , Göç , Akın

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CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

In almost a century now, the West had strived towards integration and interdependence through collective economy and political ends. This bond was cemented through globalization, however, the stratification therein is varying with strands of populism and nationalism such transformation has the tendency of negatively affecting the security and unity of Europe. The refugee crisis which re-emerged in the year in 2011 in Europe is associated with an increase of anti-migrant sentiments, which are often manifested in nationalistic rhetoric and an anti-immigrant climate. This study investigates nationalism, which has been brought to the surface because of the large immigration flow into the EU. These aspects led to the rise of discrimination, intolerant attitudes towards immigrants and emergence of radical right policies. Thus, the concepts as discrimination, nationalism, and xenophobia are elaborated and instances are recorded in this study.

This study will also explain how large non-European immigration affects economic, cultural, social and even political aspects which trigger the nationalistic sentiments among Europeans and portray the obvious and clear ways on EU. Upon assessing the new policies ways of integration by some EU members and the corollaries of migrating to Europe the study delineate current areas that need further elaboration and improvement. As a case study of my research, the nationalism in France will be investigated from the local newspapers, magazines, mass media, which clearly expose my study issue. The data will be evaluated, analyzed by a scrutiny, which will allow me to put better review of this study.

The study mostly focuses on the rise of neo-nationalism especially in Western Europe, because of huge African immigration flow. I am going to bring out and emphasize the initials and causes of nationalistic sentiments in France. The rise of radical right parties is the significant contributors in the emergence of anti-

immigration policy of state authorities. The media specifically the election campaigns of Front National will be profoundly studied and the results will be brought out.

Due to lack of access to official government documents and information the study will be discussed and explained with secondary data and factors.

Nationalism has been a failure since after the WWII but nowadays with the cases such as immigration flow into the Europe once again it is back at the stage. The step out of UK from EU and rising far right parties across the Europe are the prominent indicators of rising nationalism. In this context, in my research I will answer these questions:

1. What are the impacts of immigrants in the emergence of nationalistic sentiments in European nations.
2. What are the attitudes towards immigrants in Europe?
3. What makes Europe highly intolerant (xenophobic) towards immigrants?
4. What are the political rhetorics of far right parties in Europe, in triggering nationalistic sentiments?

The purpose of this research is study of the impacts of immigration flow into the Europe and the consequences, the reactions of EU citizens in such states as UK and Germany, toward immigrants. The study analyses the background of this influx and compare the impacts of nowadays aspects. So objectives of this research will be the following:

1. To find out the impacts of immigrants in the emergence of nationalistic sentiments in European nations.
2. To investigate the attitudes towards immigrants in Europe.
3. To examine the reasons of intolerance and discriminations towards immigrants in Europe.
4. To find out the political rhetoric of far right parties in France, in triggering nationalistic sentiments.

The main discuss of paper is the study of immigration influx into the Europe and the neo-nationalism as one of the consequences of this influx. The following hypothesis will be tested:

1. Immigrants have an impact on the emergence of nationalistic sentiments in European nations.

2. Immigrants in France face attitudes such as intolerance, racism and chauvinism.
3. Economic and political reasons make French people intolerant towards immigrants.
4. National Front of France's political rhetoric is the main trigger of nationalistic sentiments in France.

Nationalism has remained an influential and strong belief nowadays. However, being emerged in the epoch of Modern Era, the nationalism in the stretch of long period remained unnoticed. No one from the past scholars could predict the emergence and subsequent development of nationalism. Moreover, in distinct to other ideologies, the nationalism didn't have outstanding scholars who could have provided consistent and non-contradictory description of its doctrinal principles, but most scholars consider paradoxical that the combination of distinct ideological "misery" of nationalism with its enormous impact to the social and political life is essential basis of this ideology. Despite the acknowledgment of the combination of nationalism with other ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, nonetheless, it remained unexplained in the modern social theories.

All in all, there is need for scrutiny of nationalism because this ideology is always relevant and important in every period of time. Nationalism always emerges in different concepts. As we are witnessing it nowadays in Europe, it is called neo-nationalism, which has big impact over European nations, especially France, UK and Germany. The rise of immigration influx into the core states of Europe emerged nationalistic sentiments in indigenous nations. So the reason of studying this issue is that I think this a relevant issue that needs to be made profound research. This thesis will have potential for empirical and theoretical contributions in the study of emerged neo-nationalism in Europe- France.

The study used qualitative research approach, which allows the administration of secondary source to generate data. This chapter thus, outlines the research methodology applied in carrying out this study. It explains the objectives upon which the research method was used to study the rise of nationalism in Europe in the context of migration influx – a case study of France.

Indeed, research issue of neo-nationalism in Europe being conducted does require primary-data source. But the scope of this thesis is not feasible to carry out

the research with gathering primary data in France and other Western European countries where the nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments highly exist. Due to the lack of time, fund and French (for instance to create effective questionnaire and interpret them) my research relies on secondary data.

Thus, I've collected data for this study through the use of secondary sources. The raw materials from academic journals, books on nationalism and sources that deals with migration issues such as the UNHCR, World Bank, IMF, global trends will be collected and analyzed.

The case study of France and nationalistic sentiments within it will be investigated from newspapers, magazines, mass media that clearly expose my study issue. The data will be evaluated, analyzed by a scrutiny, which will allow me to put better review of this study.

This study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter introduced the topic of this study where fundamentals of research are addressed. Here, nationalism which has been brought to the surface treats dialectically the flow of immigration as a phenomenon which plummet the frequency of discrimination, intolerant attitudes and thus subsequent policies. The chapter also entails the aim of this study, its significance, and scope after rising some vital questions and propositions. Chapter two treated related literature, dwelled on theories of nationalism, its history and also visited some theoretical framework and different perspectives on the subject matter. Chapter three explains how non-European immigration affects economic, cultural, social and even political aspects which trigger the nationalistic sentiments in European societies. Chapter four contains a summary of the study, its conclusion and some recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Historical Background

Within the last decades we have been witnessed the rise of far-right movements in Europe. The increasing anti-minority and anti-immigrant sentiments have risen to a quite dangerous phase. After the economic crisis and the globalization, the collapse of communism, which was a great obstacle for any nationalistic movements, played a crucial role in boosting the nationalistic sentiments.

Two devastating wars in Europe broke out due to the nationalism, which after the World War II and the following cold war period was tried to be forgotten and was aimed to blame for these events. The world divided into two spheres, the communism has emerged as an obstacle for nationalism. The collapse of Berlin wall, the reunification of Germany and the fall of Soviets caused the development of nationalism again. Nationalism in Europe was emerged after the French Revolution in 1789 has spread over the European Continent rapidly after the revolution. The revolution overthrown the old regime and the possession of king was nationalized. Jean-Jacques Rousseau advocated that the sovereignty was directly belonged to a nation that was not given to the king and the church by God, and established the bases of nationalism. However, France, which was the home for numerous ethnic groups such as Basques, Vikings and Catalans, chose the civic or liberal nationalism instead of ethnic nationalism which Germans did. The emerged nationalistic and chauvinism led to the Napoleonic wars throughout the Europe. It was believed that after the fall of USSR the globalization would wipe the class discrimination and belongings to the various confessions out from the world. The global capitalism was quite successful in gathering the world under unique economic system. It was accepted easily by the states. However, it could not unite the nations under the

homogenous structure. Because the differences among nations became more obvious and was craved for distinction. It brought the cultural elements of nations to the fore and provided once again the national identity. In this case the nationalism in Europe once again emerged as a significant power. The economic crises, the ideological emptiness and the rise of the flow of immigrants triggered nationalistic sentiments all over Europe. While in Eastern

Europe was busy by establishing the nation-states, the Western Europe beard enmity toward foreigners, because it was believed that the immigrants was the only reason of grown crime rates and unemployment. In this case France is a relevant example.

In the analysis of Propert (2011) as in similar countries in the West, France is experiencing major shift in demography which politics and discrimination found unsurmountable. We witnessed in history the civilizing missions of France in colonized countries, which led to the destruction of local economy and created dependent economy. Thus, for attaining stable economy immigrants from former colonies moved to France. After this immigration boom, French employers preferred immigrants who were worked for significantly less wages than ordinary Frenchmen, which means a few work places for natives. Thus, these conditions left French employees intolerant toward immigrants. In response to these issues the French government took some actions, enacted laws and increased bureaucracies which were deterring the immigration flow into the France.

The November riots of immigrants in 2005 exposed many issues pertaining social conditions immigrants in France. Immigrants dwelling in impoverished suburbs struggling social discrimination and continual unemployment reacted in opposition to police brutality by means of torching cars and public homes. In her study, Pleshunova (2014) stated that, commonly, there is high level of worries toward non-European immigrants which is seen today and lack of simply welcome and integrate with new comers could be hard to realize, as culturally France was a colonial state and always known for its civic nationalism high degree of tolerance towards the foreigners. She also added, that, generally the statistics of immigration flow into the France are heightened that is nowadays not such high. Thus, what is the reason of antagonism in the direction of the immigrants? Does the country of origin matter (as the most of the immigrants come from North and Western Africa which

are distinctive conservative and firmly stick to their moral and cultural values), or is it all about the politics?

2.2. Nationalism

Nationalism has many definitions from various sources that entails one's love for his fellow country people, their custom and traditions, manners and mannerisms, work of art and craft, it derives nationals to excel in their endeavours. In this section of the study discusses about the concept nationalism examining various works on ethnicity and nationalism.

2.3. Nations and Nationalism

Wimmer et al posits that activities of society and their history take place in the geographical boundaries of the nation-state. Here the authors argue that the social and historical processes are contained within the geo-graphical borders of the nation-state (Schiller & Çağlar, 2008). Others call this the 'container' theory of society, where scholars including Durkheim and Weber have confined their analysis of society to the geographical and institutional boundaries of the nation-state. In this conception, societies are 'subordinate' to states and the authority structures therein (Beck, 2000:3)

This is in distinct contrast to the dynamic complexity of influences that actually shape the interaction of migrant and country of settlement; however, it is useful to explore collective identity in the way that it was assumed in the nation-building developments, for it is in this way that it is incorporated into national institutions and influences national immigration and integration policy (Christine, 2012:36).

Defining the elements of a 'nation' is particularly challenging, as it is highly reliant on cultural and political context. One author defines a 'nation' as a collection of natives sharing a sense of belonging, fate or community; they are not necessarily bounded within the borders of a state, and they often have cultural boundaries or recognized features, physical or otherwise, that separate them from other groups of society (Hosking, 1997).

Such definitions among many illustrate two specific trends. The first definition focuses on the basic elements that serve to form a community with an emphasis on the static nature of this community and the criteria by which it is defined. Anderson's definition, by contrast, focuses on the origin and motivation of

such distinctions. Sometimes, nations are geographically bounded. Other times, a state forms the cohesive fabric for the institutional framework. It might find its borders in its mode of communication, i.e. language. A culture that is united or defined by the means of communication may use this unifying factor as an 'instrument of distinction' to legitimize and subordinate other cultures (or subcultures) to the 'dominant culture' (Bourdieu 1977:115).

Rather than trying to define the nation, however, it may be more useful to examine the foundational components of the national collective identity. Grillo (1998:15) posits that the nation could be defined as broadly 'Gesellschaft', a community by consent or association, or broadly 'Gemeinschaft', community based on blood. In a community defined as 'Gesellschaft' or having a civic conception of identity, the group has certain unwritten rules or codes that the group knows, and even after many years of change, the core identity will have some elements or hints of these 'original references of codes' (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995:76).

Rather than being these boundaries are made up of mostly unwritten rules that, to a member of that community, are common sense. Outsiders are recognized by their unfamiliarity in these routines. Meanwhile, this clearly define these routines may appear as simply a matter of daily habits, but they are formulated around the society's institutions, thus 'constituted' by those who live in the society, demarcating the social and cultural boundary (Eisenstadt and Giesen: 1995:80).

While a community by descent may seem much more clear-cut than one by consent, it is important to keep in mind that descent is also subject to contestation, particularly in cases of for-mal membership for those living abroad for multiple generations. The 'Gemeinschaft' or primordial conception of collective identity emphasizes the givens of a particular group. In some societies, a sense of kinship, ancestry, or blood relations is key to cultural cohesion and belonging. This conception of collective identity would be classified as primordial. The primordial approach to identity formation focuses on the 'givens' or shared parts of a culture and emphasizes the 'archaic' cultural basis of identities, making the crossing of boundaries extremely difficult (Young, 1983: 659).

Regardless of the basis for the national identity, rising national awareness combined with increasingly stable borders led to the development of nationalist movements across Western Europe and beyond. The ideological aim of nationalism was to align the state with the nation. Thus, geographical spaces became, not a

starting point of contestation or a stable constant of discussion, but a product of social and political identities. Far from being arbitrarily determined, territory intersects with structures of power, culture, and nature. Further-more, implicit in nationalist movements was the distinction between those who belong (legally and culturally) and those who do not (Berezin and Schain, 2003).

Alter (1994:19) divides nationalism into two general manifestations: 'Risorgimento' and 'internal' nationalism. The goal of Risorgimento nationalism is to include as many people groups as possible on the basis of some unifying element such as language. Integral nationalism is the exclusive nationalism that unites the majority population of the state and excludes those minorities who are trapped within the borders but not part of the majority community. In both cases, however, a group is formed on the basis of certain criteria for citizenship with the illusion of homogeneity, whether based on ethnic characteristics, such as language, heritage, or an ancestral homeland, or founded on civically defined norms, such as personal freedom of speech or religion. (Difato:2012: 37).

Whether entwined with ethnic conceptions of identity, as in Germany, or territorially-defined as in the Great Britain, the 'institutionalization of social relations' in the nation-building projects served to crystallize the distinction between members and non-members, or more appropriately, nationals and non-nationals (Silverman, 1992:33-34). In every act of inclusion, there is an act of exclusion. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the increasing trend is of conflict within states rather than between them (Buchanan, 2003:204). When violence or denial of claims is introduced to the situation, those who wish to 'assert' a given identity are compelled to take an "absolute position" (Weller:2005:4), thereby limiting the fluidity and negotiability of political and cultural boundaries.

Culture may be defined as responding to and acting in accordance with certain social and institutional rules that have been ingrained in perceptions and worldview since an early age. In a cultural context, actions and reactions are defined by a frame of reference, which the others in the cultural context can interpret to obtain a fairly accurate understanding of intention and meaning. The ideas and attitudes of many people within a society are not drawn or based upon pure observation but are ideas that are adopted in a cultural context. These cultural norms manifest themselves in certain institutions and practices that define cultures from one another, giving them unique perspectives and traits that form their societal fabric.

However, like community, the manifestation of culture is elusive and the conception of a monolithic culture in any context, nonexistent (Mounce & Winch, 1973).

If culture emanates from the shared 'customs' or 'civilization of a group or people', then each number of people who consider themselves, or are considered by others, to have something in common has a culture (Kymlicka 1995:18). By extension, basically every local and state could be considered multicultural because of the contested and diverse claims made by its members. This arises because of the implicit diversity of individual interactions with social norms, not to mention the flows of material and ideas on a global scale. Understood as the cultural dynamics of 'deterritorialization', which refer to ethnic entities, sectarian affiliations, and political structures, along with transnational corporations and the like, these patterns of movement and information-sharing transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities, effectively loosening the connections between people, wealth, and territory (Appadurai, 1996:49). The incorporation of terms like 'deterritorialisation' is useful to develop our theoretical framework. In International Relations, the nearest term is 'extraterritorial', which is generally related to the jurisdiction of international law in economic matters beyond state borders (Maier, 1982).

This term is not quite sufficient to capture the redefinition of the role of territory. Bringing the concept of deterritorialisation into IR helps us to grasp the shifting claims of groups and individuals on the state but also the international system. It highlights the transnational space beyond the actions of NGOs, MNCs, or international organizations and draws attention to the uneven and sometimes unpredictable actions and inter-actions of groups and individuals across the levels of analysis. Yet, these changes in the relationship to territory are in tension with national definition. (Difato:2012: 39).

The memory informs the nation's past and shapes a nation's present and future. However, for the immigrant and the minority community, memory plays an exclusionary role. On the part of the country of settlement, memory encircles the native or majority population to create an exclusionary and homogenizing effect on the minority communities within its borders (Huyssen: 2003: 149). Immigrants may have a different memory and experience, a different 'homeland' and territory to which they may perceive themselves (and may be perceived) to belong. The way that one exits the homeland also impacts the memory of that land and the relationship to the present and future in the new as well as the ties to a person's past life. More

often than not, Diaspora memory, whether of immigrants or refugees, forms a contrasting discourse to that of the national memory. Thus, in order for integration to occur, rigorous means of anti-discrimination have to be in place including legal protection in addition to the representation of immigrants and foreigners in the media, government policy documents, and textbooks (Kymlicka:1995:96).

2.4. Theories of Nationalism

In the many discourses of nationhood and definitions in scholarly narratives, debate is still on between the constructivist and conservatives on nationalism. In historical studies, we can have a plain and positive push in the evolution of the exact notion of nation, it entails the political might and thought destituteness (Özkirimli :175). For Anderson, there is no objectivity in primordialist thought due to the fact it did not withstand historical arguments. Likewise, the Marxist notion fails to consider thought destituteness of the nation. Anderson may fall a victim in his own view; racial and ethnic sameness, industry and print language also have impact on the meaning or conceptualizing a nation. For instance, the universalism shared by all nations and different uniqueness thereof. His inclination was due to the studies he had and the not very clear propensity he has then [Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities :6].

For Gellner, nation is a social conception, constructed by man to give a social identity, this process is a continuum crystallized by the efforts of the elites in a nation (Gellner: 624-5). According to him, nation and nationality are not historically hatched but constructed concepts. He states that,

A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non- members (özkirimli:174).

Gellner opined that nationalism is a product of recognition with no historical antecedents, this idea is in contradiction to the pre-constructivist view which claims that nations were there before their current appearance. As a post-modern scholar, he dwells more on viewing it as recognition instead of monolithic identity, as such he stands on a different foot with constructivist on nationalism.

Gellner is of the opinion that modernization and industrialization who are bedrocks in nationalism needs frictionless mingling of social and political circles. Its existence is not a natural being, but it fuses state and culture. In essence, the formation of a nation happens not via ideology par say, more to that, there is a concordance of modernism, industrialization and advance society(londra:Croom helm 1978 :55-61).

Thongchai maintains that nationalism implied a definite form of a nation with geographical limits. These boundaries limit what belongs to the nation and what does not, thus defining the extent of national identity. This idea of a nation can be linked to the entity's sovereignty and what the entity stands for. Sharing same territory forms “ self” of the nationals and the geo-body is a construct of geographical representation (Thongchai, 1994).

Thongchai's discourse is anti-nationalist having had an ordeal in the hands Thai nationalist forces, as a student he was incarcerated after a student protest that incident shaped his view. His concept and understanding of nation are therefore impaired due to his separatist inclination (Thongchai, 1994).

Eric Hobsbawm, a staunch advocate of Marxism wrote “any abundantly large body of people, whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such” (hobsbawm, the age of revolution:337). His view is largely constructivist, distinct people do not make a nation without a recognized link and feeling that crystallizes to a legitimate entity. In his word:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent ... political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality(Elliot, 2010).

The work which is attributed to the constructivist school of thought were on the classic conception of the nation had a great influenced by a number of social, political, and historical factors that affected their respective augmentations to the academic field. The strong over dominance of the modern constructivist school resulted in an importance academic liberal bias against the primordial notion of the nation and nationhood. The specifications of the case study was used to generate theories of nationalism which also served as a bias, due to the difficulty inherent in a universal theory of defining the nation derived from unique and specific cases.

Also other perspectives of migrant and transnational scholars also had a great influence to their work. Personal experiences with nationalist and primordial's forces served to further push scholars to the constructivist camp. In addition, nationalist and anti-nationalist political motives in the scholars' home countries influenced their level of antagonism towards the mythologizing of the nation and the conservative primordial's school of thought.

The constructivist school of thought is in no way a uniform reaction to the jingoist nationalism of primordial thinkers. Constructivism is a blanketed philosophy encompassing all scholarly thought on nationalism derived from the premise that the nation is not mythical nor is it a pre-existing, God-given relationship between men. It is a construct, a fabricated entity whose existence is a result of its own recognition and not any ethnic, racial, or ideological commonality existing in a people group. It is a shifting phenomenon and the result of social thought.

Benedict Anderson changed the way the debate between primordialism and constructivism was framed by introducing his three paradoxes of nation defining and then navigating those paradoxes with his notion and terms of an imagined, limited, and sovereign community. Gellner introduced a new type of constructivist theory by upholding the essential artificial nature of the nation and the creation of the nation by recognition and not existing commonality, while still asserting the legitimacy and even necessity of the nation in the modern industrial world. Thong cha expanded the idea of artificiality as a component of the nation by applying it to what is arguably the most important aspect of the nation, its borders and territory, driving and connecting the debate even further away from the conservative primordial explanation. Hobsbawm attempted to rework methodological practices of constructivist academics by viewing and explaining nationhood from the bottom-up and redefining the nation as a concept lacking in uniformity throughout the classes. These academics have helped to grow the constructivist school of thought from blanketed liberal reactionism in response to rationalized jingoism to an expansion on the thinking surrounding what constitutes a nation, how a nation is formed, and what that means in the context of modern nation-states.

2.5. Concepts of Ethnicity and Nation

According to the French Revolution, nationalism, wrote by Eriksen (2010:47), ‘expresses the cultural comparisons of its advocate and, by implication, it draws borders and also others, who thereby directly become strangers’. This discussion of nationalism and however the arrangement of a ‘national’ ethnic group or the nation which is connected to the understanding of ethnicity explained earlier above. Both group national and ethnic – are socially designed and constructed to create and maintain boundaries of a certain group people.

Guibernau and Rex (2010:5) predicated this uncertainty in a unique and different way; their argument was that the concept of ethnicity is deeply connected and inserted in the concept of nationalism since the nation is natural assumed to ‘determine continuity with the past and common descent’. The common ancestry, culture, language and history belief which in a particular connected to a nation works to determine, what Eriksen (2010) discusses as the ethnic/cultural nationality, which is strongly opposed to the civic nationality. Civic nationality, which being argued by Smith (1998), need a very strong a political commitment, rooted in a shared political history but which is not bound to time; the civic nationality can be acquired with time.

This is specifically what Castles and Davidson (2000) in their discussions on migration was about. They argue also that in a globalized world, legal membership – through official citizenship – can no longer determine boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, and also their main argument was about re-defining traditional understanding of citizenship, which should not be based culture/ethnic group and/or geographical area (but can, for example, be political).

In the historical context of post-war labor migration, this understanding and discussion is very important. Wihtol de Wenden (2007:48) rightly also argues that ‘the myth of national homogeneity and indivisibility’ broke out with the arrival of labor workers in the mid -20th century, which brought cultural specificities and ultimately created a huge overlap of differences between the civic and the ethnic/cultural nationalities. With an example in this study of children of immigrants who do not share ethnicity with the white majority group, but as British/French-born second generations may well share national/civic identities.

2.6. Religion and the Nation

During the Enlightenment period, as religion was gradually rejected philosophically through rationality and science and practically through industrial revolutions, so the nation began to replace religion as a main objective of identity in European consciousness. A new conception of the relationship between fatality and continuity had to be explored and restructured through a secular lens (Anderson, 1991:11). Yet, as secularism moved into first place, the religion was still in power. Whereas the developments of modernization critically restrained the power of religion in political life, relegating it to a 'subsystem of the cultural realm and superstructure-as mere ornament or as the opium of the people' (Minkenberg, 1997: 63), the symbols of religion in modern political life are all but absent.

With the rise of national movements and the strengthening of political aims, the nation adopted various symbols of religious identity. The process of nationalism led, in many cases, to the secularization of religion alongside a parallel different idea of the nation (Alter, 1994:5). While some have argued that the secular nation entirely left behind the religious associations and traditions of the pre-Enlightenment era, it is a more accurate reflection to see an intermingling of religious and secular, where the motifs of religious institutions are maintained in the context of rejecting some of the practices and ideas, such as imminent salvific promises(salvation). (Smith, 2003: 18).

Beyond dividing the world into an artificial binary of traditional and modern, nationalist movements disguised the incorporation of religious symbols and the celebration of religious festivals. Through these, the place of religion within nationalism became almost invisible to the majority community, raising an even stronger contrast to the religious activities and symbols of minority communities. As such, religion became an integral part of the discourse of belonging, whether recognized or not, encircling the members of the community with the sense of having found a universal feature of their society. Such was the case when great musical festivals in Germany celebrated well-known biblical narratives throughout the late nineteenth century, drawing people together to participate in their heritage. (Difato, 2012: 40).

Though religion has long been underestimated as a player in international politics, the dynamics of church-state relations, the role of Islamist movements, and

securitization have brought religion to the fore of immigration and integration discussions, demonstrating the salience of this issue for the majority and minority community alike (Fox & Sandler, 2005: 317). While religion as a practiced faith may have faded in European society, the historical influence of Christian traditions is implicitly present in European culture and legal and political institutions (Silvestri, 2007: 15).

The emphasis on Christianity as a shared European heritage has been reiterated by right-wing politicians, as exemplified by Angela Merkel's statement on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the European Economic Community in 2007: 'the Judeo-Christian values...sustain the EU' and 'we are marked by this Judeo-Christian past' (Yilmaz, 2007: 298). It is perhaps not necessary to point out the essentialism inherent in this statement and its explicit connection to a national, even continental, memory (Martiniello, 1995: 16).

However, such ideas are not unusual in the discussions of immigration, integration, and European identity. Essential-ism refers to the assignment of a 'fundamental, basic, absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious community, or nation'; it entails a sense of timeless continuity, implying 'internal sameness and external difference', excluding any form of dependence or contingency on external relations, 'autonomous and separate, as if such a subject could be demarcated out of context, unrelated to an external other or discursive purpose' (Werbner, 1997: 230). Such processes of othering are a typical part of popular and political discourse and easily influence preconceptions and worldviews.

In contrast to Christianity, however, Islam is not always celebrated as a component of cultural diversity, but rather, adherence to Islam is sometimes construed as 'reactionary' or as 'evidence of an unwillingness to integrate' (Geddes, 2003:92-93). At the same time, the ethnicities within the Muslim community are blurred as religion becomes the primary discourse in the country of settlement. The assumption of an unwillingness to integrate and the potential to control membership through citizenship led to a rise in various citizenship and integration tests, imposed likewise on long-time residents and newcomers in a number of European countries (Boukhars, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2008). As Gary Younge puts it: 'in the west, Muslims have been asked to commit to patriotism, peace at home, war abroad, modernity, secularism, integration, anti-sexism, anti-homophobia, tolerance and

monogamy ...But Muslims are not being asked to sign up to them because they are good or bad in themselves, but as a pre-condition for belonging in the west at all' (quoted in Meer: 2008: 68).

In part, this mistrust can be credited to the connection between Muslims and political Islam, particularly since 9/11 and 7/7, though several other factors are involved (Silvestri, 2007: 17). Religion has the capacity to unite people as an identifying feature, not necessarily involving faith or allegiance to a set of beliefs, but rather, simply to a cultural sense of religious tradition (Agadjanian, 2001:480-482).

Religious identity acts as a consolidator of ethnicity especially when national identity and religious identity overlap or act to represent the boundaries of insider and outsider for majority and minority groups alike. In Germany, religion was incorporated as a part of historical tradition, linked closely to the national memory discussed previously. In the UK, religion also played a deep role in the history of the country that is preserved even as the secular dominates social and political agendas. In Germany, numerous holidays are openly named after Christian religious days, similar to the naming of holidays in France (Silverman, 1992: 114).

In the UK, the Church of England plays a continued role in politics through such institutions as the House of Lords and the head of state also being the official head of the Church. One author goes as far as to point out that Christian symbols suffuse the majority culture in such a way that churches have been 'elevated' from the private to the public sphere, and the state has played a significant part by facilitating the Church's role in politics and the definition of public institutions, such as schools, as following a 'Christian orientation' (Simel:1996: 28, 30-31). While this may be true at least in part, the more relevant aspect of this comment is the analysis of the grey area between public and private.

2.7. Immigration Issues

Mass non-European immigration to the EU is a process that has shaped and continues to shape Europe's demographic development as well as Europe's societies. Started with little public debate it has become a part of Europeans everyday life. The study depicts the immigration flow into the Europe taking into account the causes and origins of migration.

2.8. EU and Immigration from a Critical Perspective

EU officials working with the carrying out and application of immigration policies which are two distinctive factors that impact the immigration policy. These are: push factors, in the other words the exact motives that forces nationals to migrate to EU; and the pull factor which in other means drawing their attention. Over the years, in order to achieve a more corresponding EU immigration policy by putting these factors together, the EU put into the action a so called “global approach to migration” (Brady, 2008: 13). Taking into account the research by Georgiev (2011), it is tough to cease the pull factors, mainly because these involve financial prosperity, better living standards, well-paid jobs and working conditions etc., the global institutions on migration should focus on push factors.

Regardless of fact that EU will be need even more immigrants in the future, the surveys of Georgiev (2011) show that Europeans see immigrants as a problem rather than as an opportunity. The EU leadership somewhat floating between these two thoughts has been unable to carry out definite political aims. Even though, European leaders have emphasized the urgency of “circular migration and co-operation platforms” they’re unable to clarify the actual essence and how the platforms would be implemented (Brady: 2002: 2).

Circular migration addresses to the diversification of immigration flow and to stop the depletion of highly skilled professionals from less developed countries because it would drive to the case in which economic prosperity of these countries would stagnate. Thus, enlist of labor force for a certain period of time is needed, that they would return home after that period of time, with an alternative to travel back to EU, well-equipped and well-skilled. But even though there are contradictions within EU, which are observed that the member-states consider “circular migration” on its own understandings. Some of them want it to apply to only highly skilled immigrants; others are willing if it was carried out in a broader view welcoming even seasonal workers in tourism and agricultural sectors (Georgiev, 2011:30).

If EU were to create a coherent immigration policy, it should work in closer cooperation with the governments of the immigrants’ origin. It is indispensable to understand the roots of the problems, the reasons of nationals leaving their countries in order to improve the living and working conditions. The EU considering the issues related to certain country individually, should invest in whatever is needed the most.

For instance, investing in farming and agriculture in Africa since majority immigrants come from Africa because of food insufficiency, could reduce the number of illegal immigrants. Despite that, EU invests lucrative quantity to the border security (Georgiev, 2011: 29).

Another aspect better to consider from a critical point of view is the Development Aid EU gives each year. Despite it is the main grantor, mostly money is granted by UK, France and Germany; it is discussed that Development Aid is not integrated with EU's immigration policy basically carries to failure the set aims in regard to immigration. Not just that but the remittances of immigrants, take into account of the Development Aid dealt by the EU as the element of the official development aid (ODA), "The growing importance of remittances as a source of foreign exchange is reflected in the fact that remittance growth has outpaced private capital flows and official development aid (ODA) over the last decade." (European Commission, 2007: 7).

Integration is one of the main difficulties of immigration into the EU. It has to be mention that the member-states are responsible on their own for integrating foreign settlers. Yet, however they are reluctant to deal with the situation. Just last year Angela Merkel declared that German multicultural society has failed. Unluckily similar thought was claimed by UK Prime Minister David Cameron addressing at the Munich Security Conference on 5th of February 2011 "Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values." (EurActiv, 2011).

Often, when certain immigrant minorities are maltreated in an EU member-state they might simply migrate to another one. It is believed that giving citizenship is the shortcut towards integration, but there are member-states that totally close chances for citizenship for migrants and others ask 10 years of residence to issue one (Georgiev, 2011: 31).

In Europe it is a composite of political, historical and cultural views, an example are the colonies that some member-states once had. These experiences were handed over at European level under the MEPs (Member of European Parliament), which are appointed, by each member-state governments or alliances making MEPs fully dependent on national political parties. Today, the most powerful political

groups are the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, center-left and the European People's Party (EPP), center-right. "Parliament has grown over and competition between the groups is mainly structured along left-right rather than pro/anti-Europe lines.... This consequently suggests that when voting on migration and related issues, MEPs are more likely to act on their personal ideological opinions or the voting instructions of their national or European party leaders than the specific migration policy preferences of the citizens in their member state or the supporters of their national party." (Hix&Noury, 2007:7).

Simon H. and Abdoul N. (2007) studied variables and models that impact MEPs ideas and choices; MEPs theoretical history is their main root of idea and not economic determinant. Immigration policies at EU level are yet quit affected by national policies because member-states are the primary influential player in decision making. The root of the problem is that they must act a two level game. In internal platform, national authorities impacted by voters' opinion aswell as NGOs being good instance. On European platform, it necessary for member-states strive and comprehend their way by assembling coalitions and negotiation to support policies, therefore impose them on member-states on both level: "[A]t the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments." (Georgiev:2011:32).

2.9. Asylum and Immigration in the EU

The nationalist movements of the 19th century combined with industrialization instituted the exchange of strong centers with porous borders for a more horizontal consciousness and distinct state controls of territory. Yet, given the development of immigration policies, the Schengen area, and the mistrust of the borders of newly acceded member states, the European Union asylum and immigration policy is a distant echo of the multi-national and porous-bordered regional unions of the past. Even as postwar economies acknowledged the need for workers, issues of security paralleled the increasing presence of migrants and asylum-seekers. This left the nation-states to maintain and re-assert their sovereignty through border controls and their own sets of immigration restrictions (Caviedes,

2004:289). With the introduction of Schengen and the increasingly restrictive policies on Europe's borders, the term 'fortress Europe' began to be used to describe the external controls (Phillimore and Goodson, 2009:11).

Thus, at the same time as workers were being invited to fill the gaps in labor throughout northern and central Europe, the borders of countries, and moreover, the social boundaries within them, were increasingly tightened with the justification of higher demands for security. Huysmans (2000:752) calls this process the 'spillover of the economic project of the internal market into an internal security project'. The security discourse has enabled states to govern their citizenry and maintain the sovereignty of the state (Kaya:2005: 4-5). It also justifies the suspension of human rights and indefinite imprisonment (Yuval-Davis: 2005: 516).

In the period of Cold War, security referred to traditional instruments of the state such as the military and ideological threats. Yet, as immigration and related issues of identity are cast as a disruptive and possibly violent phenomenon, the focus of security measures has shifted from the state and its borders to society and individuals (Difato: 2012:99).

In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, asylum and immigration was moved from the third pillar to the community pillar (Kostakopoulou:2000:498). This shift stemmed from the increasing concerns of countries of settlement as relations extended eastward following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. EU member states saw increasing convergence on asylum and immigration policy, aligning more and more with those countries who were known for restrictive policies (Phillimore, 2009: 11).

Moving asylum and immigration policy to the first pillar did not resolve all the problems. Rather than formulating a coherent and integrated policy with consideration for the future of European citizenship and identity, national executives uploaded national policies, building on domestic experiences and national restrictive laws to design international policy. In this respect, the EU adopted some of the policies and goals of member states (Kostakopoulou: 2008: 498).

In a bid to regulate the movement of migrants, particularly asylum-seekers, the EU increased its emphasis on protection against discrimination and the integration of third-country nationals through the development and better regulation of issues relating to asylum. The Dublin Convention attempted to limit asylum-shopping by stating that asylum must be sought in the first EU country that a person

enters. Based on the ‘first host country principle’, the examination of the asylum application or return of illegal immigrants is the responsibility of the first state that allowed entry (Lavenex:2001: 29). It is also aimed to stop the application for asylum in more than one country at once. While these policies are framed as protection for asylum-seekers, they often are a re-packaging of border controls and regulation of third-country nationals. Where integration used to be concerned with citizenship, it is now more closely aligned with the idea of restricting and discouraging further migration (Kostakopoulou, 2008).

The cooperative framework of EU policies does not tend to empower the individual or transnational communities, but rather, it is a way of ‘returning arbitrary powers over individuals and populations back to the nation state’ (Favell and Geddes: 1999:26-27). Not unlike other member states, the EU assisted Germany in regaining some state control that was taken away by court rulings. Yet, this reassertion of state rights was accompanied by an enhanced cooperation on immigration policies, evidenced in the application and involvement of EU integration policies (Guiraudon: 2003: 264).

The amendment of Article 16 in the Asylum Compromise of 1993 brought German practices and law into line with other governments of EU member states and with the Dublin Convention of 1990 (later replaced by the Dublin Regulation of 2003) (Geddes: 2003: 87). The buffer zone, that was constructed around the EU by designating some countries like Poland and the Czech Republic as safe third countries, and the signing of bilateral affairs with Germany’s eastern neighbors helped to reassert governmental control over its borders. In attempting to combat organized crime and terrorism, coordination across the police, judiciary and customs was improved alongside the development of the Schengen Information System to exchange data on people’s identities (Phillimore and Goodson: 2009:11). The UK, on the other hand, as always insisted on protecting and maintaining its own border, policing all entries to the UK in spite of the goal of no internal barriers within the EU (Joppke, 1999:135).

Even as security concerns heralded the closing of borders, the Amsterdam Treaty included a new article 13 that gave the Commission power to ‘introduce proposals to combat discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation’; while this did not directly forbid certain forms of discrimination as previous treaty articles had done, the legal basis at the EU level

raised the possibility for action toward the social inclusion of migrants (Geddes, 2000:220). In 2000, the EU passed anti-discrimination laws to protect EU citizens of immigrant and ethnic minority origin as well as third-country nationals. In a way, this would enable a new form of 'citizen', as predicted by Hollifield (1992), who would be able to invoke rights and seek protection at the European (supranational) level under the European Court of human Rights or the European Court of Justice. With regards to family reunification, this is already in place to some extent, protecting the rights of EU citizens and third-country nationals. These directives do not apply across all EU member states, however, specifically excluding Ireland, Denmark, and the UK (Groenendijk, 2006:216).

In 1999, the European Council in Tampere, Finland laid the framework for a common EU immigration policy. The framework, adopted in 2004 with the Hague Program on Strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, emphasized objectives including the fair treatment of legal third-country nationals, the exercise of a more 'powerful' integration policy, brought into the action to grant third-country nationals the rights and obligations comparable to citizens, and to enhance measures against social, economic, or cultural discrimination (Carrera: 2006: 3). At this point, EU member states also agreed to coordinate best implementations of integration policy and incorporate these eleven common best practices [CBPs] into their national integration plans (Leise, 2007).

In September 2005, the European Commission adopted the communication 'A Common Agenda for Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union', which motivated the member states to develop comprehensive integration strategies (COM 2005: 389).

Among the good practices to promote integration, it explicitly suggested education as well as various forms of intercultural dialogue, including dialogue with religious minorities. Between 2004 and 2007, the EU supported these national developments with three annual reports that provided overviews of migration trends along with an analysis of changes and actions taken in the area of admission and integration of immigrants at the national and EU level. The European Commission also published two editions of the 'Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners', which was supposed to facilitate the exchange of information and good practice by detailing national integration programs in different member states. These policies evolved into a noticeable emphasis on integration of peoples and

communities in order to enhance the social cohesion and identity of Europe. Most recently, the focus has centered on intercultural dialogue as a means to encourage third-country nationals to integrate and become citizens of Europe (Difato, 2012:107).

2.10. The Current Labour Market Situation of Migrant Men and Women in France

When they first came, labor workers (predominantly men) were restricted to manual and unskilled jobs, which placed them at the bottom of the social hierarchy and class of the society. In the following decades, an increase in self-employment among the first generation in both Pakistani and Algerian groups improved their financial situation (Ram, 2000). In their quantitative study of entrepreneurship trends in France, For instance, through their qualitative work carried out with restaurant owners in Birmingham, Ram and his colleagues (2000) argued that in addition to the rise in unemployment during the post-industrial era, cultural preference and a response to a lack of employment opportunities in the labor market, particularly due to racist and discriminatory practices experienced by the group in the hiring process, contributed to the development of small Pakistani entrepreneurship.

Ansari (2002) strictly argued, that social mobility varied amongst South Asian communities; despite an overall increase in small businesses, Indian migrants were more likely than Pakistanis to ex-colonies and the major migrant group came from Maghreb, especially Algeria and Morocco (Marthaler: 2008: 383).

Furthermore, in order to reduce the illegal flow of immigration was enacted so called “Pascua Law” in 1993 characterized “[tougher] visa requirements, a reduction in the number of visas issued, an expansion of police enforcement powers, an extension of the permitted detention period, and a narrowing of the administrative review scheme.” In addition, this law brought many immigrant families into the legal difficulty: unrecorded parents of French citizen children cannot be legally expelled, however were legally limited from obtaining residency. The 1993 laws, the restrictions for immigration tightened and the number of undocumented immigrants grew constantly (Kanstroom: 2010: 96).

These legislations are faulty which put immigrants in problematic situations where they simply forced to reside in France illegally. Although, government increased the number of illegal immigrants in their effort to reduce illegal

immigration. Another the same attempt on this issue was taken in 2007, and this try fought the rights of illegal immigrants to demand legal status after 10 years in country. In conclusion, the quantity of illegal immigrants who got legal residence since mass amnesties was much lower than in other member-states of EU, but it just made simple a large number of illegal immigrants again (Pleshunova:2014:64).

The process of getting visas was again difficult for certain countries. Because in June 1, 2005 another “filter” was added: the Centre pour des études en France (CEF), an office of the French embassy in Morocco, which chooses the candidates who has higher education diploma. They also verbally discourage applications, by suggesting for instance that a lot of financial resources are necessary to study in France. The very fact that this is another bureaucratic procedure with an oral interview may also serve as a deterrent itself (Guiraudon:2008: 371).

British immigration officers had exploited similar practices – they arranged interviews with the students prior to granting them a visa, to find out students’ real intentions. And these kinds of actions make foreign students feel unwanted and might influence the country’s attractiveness for the overseas students. The fact that foreign students bring certain profit to the national budget, it was probably not the best idea to act this way and take these measures. On the other hand, there are many stories about students who only used the purposes of studies to reach the country for the labor opportunities (Pleshunova: 2014: 65).

Other humanitarian immigrants are asylum seekers, i.e. refugees, but very often they are confused with illegal immigrants. A good example here might be the camp of illegal immigrants in Calais, where both the media and the local population began to refer to the immigrants as "refugees." However, this term indexed their residential situation and their universal condition rather than a legal status that the state authorities were not eager to grant them (Fassin: 2005: 363). This is probably the most vulnerable group of immigrants as they are less secured, and no state stands for their interests and rights. Whereas not so long ago France was generous enough for the asylum seekers, but the situation had been considerably changed in the last five to seven years (Pleshunova:2014:65).

The Ministry of Interior Affairs reported that, since 2007 the obtaining the asylum dropped nearly to 10%, and if in 2008 27% acquired the asylum, then in 2013 the number fell down to 17.3%, while the applicant number increased twice. Thus, in 2007 was counted 35520 applicants, while in 2013 there were 65894 applicants,

however, the number in reality was even more bigger than this report, since counted only adults (Schain:2012:68).

Although frequently used a description “asylum crisis” shows that European states which welcome refugees and asylum seekers are exhausted and they reluctant to help them anymore. Usually there are lack of reasons to give the asylum, as their economy, domestic policy could be acceptable, in the other words, these certain immigrants and asylum seekers came in France for a better life, salaries, etc., i.e. the motive is not political and social, but economic. The Geneva Convention is by that brought in a much more limited way by state authorities who claim that it had to be rewritten (Fassin: 2005: 369).

What is ironic is that it is more likely to get asylum if the person suffers from some serious disease and in their home country there is no medical access to the cure of this particular illness, rather than if someone was prosecuted, tortured or threatened for the political, social or ethnic reasons in their home country, which is basically “lesser of two evils” principle (Pleshunova: 2014:67).

Our world is thus characterized by "the separation between humanitarianism and politics" (Fassin:2005:367) and it is clear, that France is not very enthusiastic nowadays in assisting the refugees and asylum seekers, as the burden is too heavy to carry. The recognition of the refugee status by European nations appears as an act of generosity on the part of a national community toward a "suffering stranger" rather than the fulfillment of a political debt toward "citizens of humanity" (Fassin:2005:376).

It could easily be compared to Marshal Aid to the Western European countries after the World War II. But back then Americans had economic interest and benefited from the recovering European market, whereas now investing into the refugees in Europe, there is very little possibility that the sending country is going to be economically strong and loyal ally in, let's say, 20 years. So despite during the process people lose their status of citizenship, which is unfortunately above the status of a human being nowadays (despite the commitment to fundamental rights for all human beings in French society) and are in a state of limbo, putting their life on stake, hoping for a better future – they might be rejected, as state, still being a major political actor has its interests, which should not be undermined or criticized. Also, the idea, that by accepting the immigrants from Third World countries certain (developed) states help to fight with the world's poverty and hunger is also

inaccurate. With 154,000 new refugees in 2002 and a total of 4.2 million refugees, Europe is only taking a limited share of the global distribution of the estimated 17 million victims of forced displacement in the world under the UNHCR responsibility (2004). And with 102,000 recognized refugees and 47,000 asylum seekers living in France, the so-called "crisis of asylum" is quite minor compared to small African countries such as Guinea, where more than 400,000 refugees are packed in camps (Fassin:2005:380).

Of course, it can be said that the perspectives in Europe are much more promising than the opportunities people might expect in Guinea, and that the lives of those 102 000 recognized refugees might dramatically change for better, but still help on this scale does not really make any considerable change for the planet. And back to Marshal Aid, it would probably be more efficient and profitable to invest into the African economy, to open workplaces and to assist the fight with corruption (Pleshunova: 2014: 68).

2.11. Local Policy-Makers in the Direction of the Immigrants

Migrants usually prefer to live in cities because cities have a great variety of opportunities, from housing to jobs, for migrants. Therefore, at the present time, more and more municipalities embrace an increasing number of migrant populations, and they have to respond to the needs of these migrants with their policies (Dalgakiran: 2014:34)

Local policies or municipal policies, to some extent, are related to national immigrant and integration policies. In other words, what municipalities can do for the integration of migrants is affected or defined by the national framework. However, local authorities can take initiatives that are different from national integration policies, or they can implement national policies in a different way. If a local authority implements a national policy towards migrants, it is not being considered as local policy. If a local authority sets and implements its own policies, for example, distribution of funds in accordance with municipal criteria, or implementation a national policy in a different way, it is called as "local policy." (Alexander:2003: 37).

Local policies might be related to different policy domains like political, socio-economic, etc. Each policy domain has several policies towards migrants. For example, legal-political domain, firstly is related to migrant civic status. Though

naturalization, citizenship status or legal residence is a responsibility of the national governments and, in some cases like Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany, it may be a local policy matter. On the other hand, the right to participate in local referenda might also be the responsibility of municipalities like Amsterdam and Stockholm. The socio-economic domain includes a large variety of policy areas such as newcomer reception services, welfare services, labor market services and education (Dalgakiran:2014: 36).

Welfare services can include specific services or programs for migrants, especially for youth and women, or they can be more general like health services to migrants. Policies related to migrant participation in the labor market might include language instruction, vocational training, supporting for migrant entrepreneurs. Education, on the other hand, is one the foremost issue area in the cities. Local policies might include support for extra-curricular projects like tutoring after school, attempts at school desegregation etc. Keeping in mind that local education policies might ignore the migrant pupils because they “treat all children equally.” (Pennix, Dmitrina& Van Hear:2008:5).

The cultural-religious domain includes policies mainly based on the cultural differences of the migrants. Local authorities can neglect or support religious institutions and practices, religious education of the migrants through their policies. On the other hand, sensitizing the local public to cultural differences is important, so communication policies might be developed through media campaigns, employee seminars, building multicultural centers, etc. (Penninx: 2008: 4).

The spatial domain includes housing policies like social housing. These policies may target the migrants or may not. Local housing policies are important, especially where the municipalities control a valuable percentage of the housing stock. Apart from housing policies, spatial domain also includes the issue of uses of space in the city. In Europe, the most salient example is mosques. Cities have different policies in that area. Some of them discourage or limit the building permits while some provide financial support. In sum, municipalities’ responses involve different policy domains, and their reaction towards migrants is different from each other. For example, in the political domain, local policies may support migrants’ organizations or exclude them. In the socioeconomic domain, local policies directly support or ignore the needs of migrants in schools and health services. Concerning their migrants’ cultural and religious needs as places of worship, municipalities may

treat them as equal as the majority and give them particular resources. However, migrant associations are significant conciliators when the local authorities implement integration policies (Dalgakiran:2014:36).

2.12. Efficiency of French Immigration Policy

The protests in France exposed the hatred of second and third generation immigrants and their feeling of rejection from French society. Thus, the riots demonstrate the weakness of the integration and immigration policy of France. The dominant republican immigration policy in France eliminates the chance of the idea of hyphenated nationals (Algerian-French). Haddad and Balz argued that the policy believes that multiculturalism brings to ghettoization and boosted racism, as apparent in Anglo-Saxon practice. The immigration policy of France is highly assimilations and broadly considered as the least flexible in Europe. (Haddad & Balz:2006:26)

So the idea stands for removing the traditional and cultural roots of immigrants and force them to give up if they willing to live and assimilate in France. On the other hand, erode the concept of multiculturalism. Thus, French “melting pot” is lagging in its creation and faulty in its operation which makes French society homogenous and chauvinistic (Pleshunova:2014:59).

Vincent Tiberj demonstrated 3 types of integration models, which show the manner in France: “multiculturalists” (10%), “republicans” (36%) and “assimilationists” (46%). Multiculturalists and republicans, associate the inability of harmonization to French people rather than to migrants and are willing to cut the discrimination and inequality. On the other hand, assimilationists attribute the immigrants for their reluctance to the integration. This idea makes French republican model of integration of migrants exceptional, which is in contrast to other liberal democracies. This “uniqueness” often disregards the reality, while it merely regarded on the ideal model of public philosophy (Marthaler: 2008:395).

Once, Marine Le Pen gave interview, in which she emphasized that she is not a racist and has nothing toward Arabs or Africans, however she was concerned with French citizens that describe themselves as Algerians or Senegalese rather than French, and there is a bit reality. For instance, the famous French actor Jamel Debbouze that was born in France but has the Moroccan ancestors, co-produced a film “Indigenes”, narrating the story of soldiers from the colonies which fought the Nazi Germany in World War II (Guiraudon: 2008: 367).

First of all, he sees himself as Moroccan even though he was born in France. So, he invests into his country of origin and works to develop the cultural and historical ties between Morocco and France, rather than investing in education and health service in suburbs. It illustrates that non-ethnic French, usually don't feel that France is their home because they feel excluded from French society. Thus, certain steps towards the integration and assimilation should be done. At least it is expected comprehensive actions from Left wing politicians (Pleshunova:2014: 60).

However, it is not easy to consider the variety of social, ethnic, religious and cultural aspects of French immigrants. According to the statistic bureau of France, stated in 2006, more than 8% of French populations is foreign. Most of them come from North Africa and the number is rising. Every year, who receive French nationality, about 60% are from Africa, 20% come from Asia and 16% from Europe (Guiraudon: 2008:369).

In 2010, it was believed that 15% of French population is the immigrants. Accepting the fact that the French society religiously and culturally belongs to the Christianity, but most of the immigrants are Muslims, which means conflicts are not prevented and assimilation is uneasy as French paradigm describes it. There weren't riots and clashes in the course of immigration influx after the World War II, because most of them came from European countries and shared the same cultural and religious values with French people, unlike nowadays migrants (Pleshunova:2014:60). but yet, according to the French ideological concept directed to the integration of immigrants is not to comprehend them as such. Discrimination is banned, i.e. official statistics does not give information on the religion and ethnicity of the population. Furthermore, French authorities do not officially engage in "positive discrimination" in order to progress the chance of groups to fix past discrimination (Schain& Macmillan: 2012: 13).

Though, this concept makes new citizens give up their traditions to which they might be and mostly are emotionally attached. A great example for that is the issue of veils (hijabs). It was prohibited to wear these at public school to make Muslim girls respect more of the French values of the religious secularity (*laïcité*) and this rule created a huge clash among the people and provoked social controversy – does secular and democratic state stands for the freedom to choose your religion and express your choice freely, or it means imposing certain attributes of modern Western civilization and makes people follow them? Richard Thompson Ford of

Stanford University Law School finds that "the right to a cultural difference is now widely (if not universally) understood to be a basic human right, on par with rights to religious liberty and racial equality" (Dougherty: 2013: 81).

French negative reaction against Muslim adherence to the religion is understandable, as France has a very old history of secular state, which is precious for the country as one of the major cultural values and self-determining factor. It was nicely illustrated in an article in *The Economist* magazine: "It would be unthinkable in France, for example, to hold a nativity play in a state primary school, or for a President to be sworn in on a Bible" (Pedder, 2014).

But on the other hand, for the Muslim population of France, Islam is one of the reminders of who they are and where they came from: an important component of their identity. Also, very often in the families there are very strict rules on that – for example girls are obligated to wear a hijab and if they stop they are breaking family's protocol and as a result, they face double pressure – both at school and at home. Also, the reaction on the caricatures of Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers all over Europe by the Muslim communities served as a great example to illustrate cultural differences and diversity in perception. Later, in 2006 the "l'affaire Redeker" also showed the differences in perception and lead to serious discussions on Islamophobia and freedom of speech. Apart from demonstrating differences of Western and Oriental values encountered in France, it also demonstrates that the effort to take away from discrimination is neglected as the constraint of the feature of a certain religions already is a separation of this particular religion. Therefore, it is easy to deal with integration within the laws on religion than on ethnicity (Macmillan: 2012:86).

Thus, it points on ambiguity of policy-makers themselves, as they fail to find a distinct feature between French national identities in particular and in general, in addition it is uneasy to commence the debate on national identity without being alleged of intolerance or xenophobia (Pleshunova: 2014: 61). demonstrate the weakness of the integration and immigration policy

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2.13. Great Britain: The Current Situation of Immigration Within The Legal Framework

UK's immigration policy is the impact by the fact that is addressed to ex colonials. From the point of law enforcement of British Parliament "has no constitutional limits to its law –making powers" therefore, making a situation in which Parliament has to consider the public opinion which has been intolerant towards immigrants and yet today keeps in mind that the immigration should be decreased. Why this should be considered? First of all it represents it and then it is a voting tool for future goals (Joppke&Christian:1999:103).

Coming to Britain is not a right.....And even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people have no place here (Fleishman, 2005).

Considering the attitudes of British towards immigrants Transatlantic Trade conducted a survey in 2010 which demonstrates: "66% of those polled felt that immigration was more of a problem than an opportunity, the highest of all countries.... British citizens estimated the percentage of immigrants living in their country is 27%, but adequate percentage is 10%...49% of those polled in UK see that the reluctance is the biggest obstacle of immigrants to integrate into society, disagreed to 32% who see that discrimination by the natives is the biggest difficulty...54% of British citizens believe that immigrants take jobs from native workers. The 48% in United Kingdom believe that the wages are being reduced because of immigrants." (Transatlantic Trends:2009: 1-2).

After the dissolution of British Empire, United Kingdom failed to bring a comprehensive citizenship policy for its ex-colonial countries. Regardless of National Act of 1948, the nationals of the New Commonwealth holding British passports, easily entered the country because of their passports was issued by the UK. With the Immigration Act of 1971, immigration was limited, yet the right to abode was included. It is important to emphasize that the UK is one of the main antagonists the immigration at EU level. The immigration policy of UK is always considered by trying to restrict to certain group of immigrants. Despite the all

restrictions, still the Great Britain remains attractive for immigrants from all over the world and according to the Office for National Statistics “immigration is expected to contribute 56% to the increase of UK population by 2029.” (Fassmann: 2009: 91).

If we look at London, the immigrants are an important element of city’s economy since they play role in activities such as real estate, catering, services and restaurateur business. All these small scale businesses family owned so immigrants prefer to give job to their family members, often hired illegally, thus keeping a climate in which they abound local enrollment, in their own business that is, that no changes through the period of bringing the “ethnic economy” (Panayiotopoulos:2006: 142).

Thus, using the statistics provided by Panayiotopoulos (2006) it is vital to acknowledge that 27% of work force in London are immigrants, but majority of them work on low-paid jobs. This could intricate us just because is famous that unemployment among immigrants is high enough as the percentage of child poverty increases too to minorities. This doesn’t alternate the fact that immigrants’ business, mostly small-scale, blooms in London (Georgiev :2011: 40).

For many years, immigration has been on political agenda of UK, because of the hostility by its natives because of terrorist attacks and other types of extreme manner are correlate with immigrants. It needs to be emphasized that Great Britain has deviated from the immigration and asylum arrangements that brought the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Actually, not only UK deviated, but they carried out to negotiate selective partnership at EU level. This communication between UK and EU is vital to describe certain characteristics of immigration policy of Britain. On the other hand, Britain “signed up to all 7 EU measures on asylum agreed 1999-2004” (Geddes:2005: 724).

It has decided on economic migration by its own. The UK Border Agency under the UK Home Office is responsible to deal with immigration within Great Britain. UK has one of the most well-planned immigration policy strategy, implemented by the UK Home Office. This is mainly accomplished by the formation of a well-working statistical database which gives needed to the Home Office data in order to follow demographic changes and migration flows changes in the country. In addition, when recommendation and assessment is necessary, an Inter-Department Task Force on Migration Statistics takes the stand (Van Selm: 2008: 44).

There is some criticism despite this statistical database. The UK government has put some methods to better integrate immigrants, for instance the “Britishness test”, and its legitimate basis belong to the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act of 2012. Nationals who pass this test are issued citizenship or settlement visa. The test is done to identify the eligibility of nationals to live in the UK. In addition, the knowledge of English language is required. This mean realized by British government has been heavily criticized since the test consists of “questions not only about everyday life, but also about British history and law.” (Fassmann, Heinz:2009:92)

Regardless endless arguments about who and how can be acquired British citizenship, government believes that without immigrants the economy of UK would not bloomed as it did, therefore making immigrants essentials of British economy. This is the primary reason why the authorities have been seeking to enlist highly skilled work force, such as IT specialists and medical practitioners (Georgiev: 2011: 41).

From 1970s British immigration policy was directed to recruit skilled labor force and restricting the low-skilled immigration. However, over the period of time, the UK became more open for immigrants, particularly was easier for the families who wanted the reunification. It is considered that family reunion is not significant, but statistics shows that the highest percentage of immigrants are the family members who reside the nationals. All over the years UK defended its own national immigration policy regardless of sharing definite views and competences on immigration in the framework of asylum and irregular immigration, with the EU. It directs the idea that Great Britain regardless national interest in immigration confronts some issues with other EU member-states. On the other hand, the whole Europe lacks of well-functioning immigration policy to reduce the negative effects and increase the advantages of this aspect which illustrates that the immigration policy of the UK altered from post-imperial focused directly more European oriented (Geddes:2005:740).

2.14. France: The Current Situation of Immigration within the Legal Framework

There are 5 million immigrants living in France as of 2018, which make about 8% of its total population of the country.

However, these numbers does not include the foreign immigrants born in France or those who acquired French citizenship. About 60% population of immigrants in France are not European and furthermore, France is country with the Muslim population member-state of European Union.(Marthaler:2008: 383).

If you want to belong, there are rules. If you don't like them, you don't have to join. If you want to play by different rules, find another club. That's why, once again, the expression "France-love it or leave it" sounds fair to me. In a wide-open world, there's no reason you can't go elsewhere. Nobody is required to love his country or the values it proclaims. But if you choose a country, you have to accept it (Caldwell: 2009: 282).

Unlike in UK, since 2004 National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies recorded annually a census on French population. According to the statistics "The stock of population can be distributed by citizenship, country of birth or by a combination of both in order to identify 'immigrants'. The definition is as follows: an immigrant is a person born as a foreigner abroad and residing in the country. This means that a person who has acquired French nationality since arriving in France is still counted as an immigrant. Conversely, a person born a French national abroad is not an immigrant" (Fassmann and Heinz:2009:70).

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Moreover in 2009 by the advisor of Sarkozy, YazidSabeg, for the first time in its history France started committee to determine the ethnic composition in France. This idea opposed by French population, but not immigrants who were claiming that this is not acceptable because it is a discrimination of people by their race or ethnicity. This composition for very friendly atmosphere which shows fair statistics for policy-makers on immigration issues (Georgiev:2011:44).

I should mention that in France exists a tradition of assimilation, unlike in UK which adopted multicultural policy rather than assimilation. But by the time France moved closer to the British example which depends on race. For instance discrimination, in agreement with the EU instructions and regulations in 2000, has been put to meet the French integration policies and even contributed to the creation of the High Authority for the Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE, 2000).

In principle, the French model recognizes the legitimacy of collective identities only outside the public sphere. This has come to mean that ethnic and religious groups are accorded no special privileges in public policy, nor are they granted special protection (Schain:2010:207).

Recently, French immigration policies are directed more at the characteristics of immigration rather than regulating and controlling the number of the immigrants because of its current immigration flows which were aroused by family reunification. French immigration policy was restructured with the law which was adopted in 2006 by changing particular rules such as giving a right to the government to interfere highly skilled immigration in order to fight against illegal immigration, likely to decrease family reunification. There were many people negatively affected from this law like victimizing. Because, the law was carried into action beginning of 2007, and 13 000 people were deported in 2006 because of not possessing the necessary documents. These cases caused protests by the leadership of French nationals, which implies that the transition to selective immigration seems tough than expected. The main aim of the new approach to immigration consists two platforms. Firstly, underlying idea of increasing economic immigration at the expense of around 113 000 immigrants annually is to reunite with a family member. Secondly, to carry on a struggle and campaign against illegal immigration. A long time after political and social debates, President Nicolas Sarkozy who is the current presidents of France was the main compelling factor behind the taking a step toward a selective immigration. (Georgiev:2011: 46).

The above noted laws give the authorities the privilege do decide which immigrants could settle on its territories. The government takes criticism from many NGOs defending the human rights of immigrants, as well as French nationals and African leaders. The criticism mainly aimed at the limitation for family reunification

and the critical problem concerning to issue legal status to illegally residing nationals. Even though to all attempts authorities believe that French immigration policy is faulty. Since 1974 the immigration transformed from labor immigration to stimulated by ideological and political aims or not, instances illustrate that both Mr. Seehofer and Mrs. Merkel are close to the truth. The number of immigrants residing on the prosperous country and the number of unemployment among immigrants is significantly higher when compared to natives. Although, majority of immigrants don't even speak Germany which causes discrimination. The figures confirm this case: "60% of those polled in Germany believe that immigrants' unwillingness to integrate is the greatest barrier to integration, as opposed to 27% who believe that discrimination by society is the greatest barrier. Germany has the largest majority of people who support the view that it is the immigrants' fault." (Transatlantic Trends:2009 : 1).

Unlike in other European states, acquiring citizenship in Germany until 2000 was planned on just "sanguinis" meaning that you could become a German citizen only if you had German parents. Since that year however "children born in Germany of foreign parents will automatically become Germans at birth if one parent has been permanently and legally resident in Germany for at least eight years at the time of the birth, and has an entitlement to residence or has had for at least three years an unrestricted residence permit. These children will become German nationals at birth – with all accompanying rights and duties." Furthermore, they must choose what citizenship to have till the age of 23. Also, the "sanguinis" is just citizenship standard, basis of jus soli was assigned to it. This literally means that Germany now, like other member-states of the EU citizenship can be acquired on the principle of place of birth. Many consider that this draft makes integration and assimilation more easy and faster (Georgiev: 2011: 49).

The obscurity of German administrative implementations and legislation is clear from the only fact that the various Federal States of Germany (Länder) practiced different principle. Bavaria for example provided for the applicants of naturalization not mere to speak but also read and write fluently German. Although, since 2008 aside from knowing German, immigrants must know the essentials of German culture and sometimes even Constitution. All these improvements to German Nationality Law might seem as making friendlier ambient for those who

want to get German citizenship but the fact is that it is still restrictive (Hofhansel:2008: 176).

The year 2000 is important to understand the German immigration policy from another point of view. After realizing the fact that Germany a country of immigration a new regulation, Green Card, was ratified allowing non-European nationals (third-country nationals) to take place in the German work market. It was addressed at highly-skilled professionals to occupy the empty places were necessary mainly in certain sectors of German industry and economy. Those who possess Green Card were granted up to five years permit for living along with their work permits. Moreover, it “provided work permits for spouses after a one-year stay and was also available to foreign students of corresponding academic subjects, making it easier for them to stay in Germany immediately after ending their studies.” (Von Stritzky:2009:4).

In 2004 the Green Card program was not operational and it was available to use. However, the program triggered Immigration Act debate, which was in newly process of adoption. Simplifying already active immigrant regulations was basic feature of Immigration Act. For instance, there were five types of resident permits before the adoption of the act. For now, there are only two types of resident permits, such as, one is permanent which is lasting long, and another one is temporary ones which is lasting for only limited period of time. Actually, there are advantages of obtaining temporary residence permit. For instance, spending certain amount of time spent in Germany together with temporary permit, and having particular criteria will be enough for nationals to apply for a permanent one. Important aspects of both legislative and social point of view on this Act is, integration and assimilation were introduced first time in German immigration history regulations. Absence of competent introduction of efficient ways of reach and entering to the German labor market seems as the most serious critique of the Act (Georgiev: 2011: 51).

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Before 2005 Germany did not have statistical data of nationals with immigrant history, since ethnic Germans and naturalized ones were just addressed as Germans. Since that year, this is not the fact agreeing with new laws small census is done to determine nationals with immigrant history. The primary one of these had 2 types of classifications:

1. First, second and third generation foreign nationals and;
2. German nationals who have foreign background.

This is absolutely significant development from the German government in order to manage immigration because it helps to regulate integration, identifying the quantity and type of immigrants assists policy-makers in create integration plans. Also they may have confidence on which other nations can be found. These nations and imagined communities are sovereign because the concept was born when Enlightenment destroyed thoughts of divinely ordained legitimacy and hierarchy (Anderson, 1991). These nations are defined as a community because the nation is conceived as a deep fraternity between people and the nation is based on this

fraternity, not the shared characteristics that may have created this fraternity in the first place.

Benedict Anderson understanding of both primordialist thinking and Marxist constructivist philosophy which cannot endure in the face of the fundamental paradoxes and policies of defining the nation, which he also specifically believes to be the objectivity and aim of historical treatment and subjective antiquity for nationalists and jingoists, the formal existences of universality among all nations versus the main uniqueness of each nation's manifestation, pedigree and the political power of a nation versus its philosophical poverty (Anderson, 1991). For Anderson, primordialist thinking regarding the nation fails to stand up to the objectivity of historical treatment while Marxist thinking regarding the conception of the nation doesn't take into account the philosophical poverty of the nation.

Anderson classified within the context of a dominant constructivist narrative on the topic of nationalism and with an academic focus on example of Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular. This colored his observations because the formation of Southeast Asian nations was, in large part, independent of racial or ethnic homogeneousness. Industry and print language played an important role, which would make it easy for Anderson to fall into the trap of his own paradox of national definition, the existence of formal universality among all nations versus the uniqueness of each nation's manifestation. His opinion is influenced by his chosen specialty and case study as well as by the existing constructivist sentiments at the time.

Ernest Gellner presents the idea of a nation as only a socially conceived "construct," an artificially formed created entity with the possibility of continued co-existence contingent upon the continuation of the perpetuation of the concept by the nation's elites (Walicki, 1998:615). He believes also that nations and nationalism are not somehow revealed by historical events, but rather that they are fabricated concepts. He states that, "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognized certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared

attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members.” (Walicki:1998:616).

To Gellner, nationalism comes from the fabrication of recognition, not any shared pre-existing characteristics. This is in direct conflict with the pre-constructivist idea that nations already existed before their more tangible manifestation. Gellner is a postmodern thinker, preferring an explanation that is a result of self-determination, as opposed to a set and unchanging identity. While Gellner is at odds with the idea of the pre-existing nations of the primordial school of thought, his theories are in no way wholly agreeable to traditional constructivist thought regarding nationalism.

His idea of the realness of the nation does not undermine the validity of or need for the nation as a construct. Gellner stipulates that nationalism is a completely necessary mechanism in the process of modernization because he believes that industrialism requires that social and political boundaries become congruent. The nation is not natural or pre-existing, but it is necessary for uniting state with culture. Gellner also states that nations are not formed through ideology or proto-jingoism, but through its necessity for the existence of a modern and industrialized society.

While Gellner attempts to disabuse people of the notion of a “perennial” or mythologized nation, he also holds with the atypical (for a national constructivist) idea that the nation is necessary and legitimate (Walicki,1998: 618). He believes that nations are conceived and perpetuated in large part by societal elites but does not agree with the widespread constructivist notion that nations are deliberately created to empower the self-serving elites. To Gellner, homogenization of culture is a societal necessity, not a calculated power grab. The creation of a modern civil society and the transition from an agrarian lifestyle to an industrial one requires cultural standardization that can only be achieved by fabricating a nation. This conflicts with the traditional constructivist view that civil societies can exist outside the bounds of a nation.

Ernest Gellner’s conception of the nation through a semi-constructivist lens was in large part due to the historical and social context in which he wrote. A part of the massive Western constructivist machine that was building momentum during the decades in which Gellner first published, he was disabused of any primordialist sentiments he may have felt towards his home country of Czechoslovakia by the violent and anti-Semitic takeover of communism. The social constructivist

movement heavily influenced him during the spread of socialism and its subsequent collapse and his work must be viewed in this political context. His views are also influenced by his personal experiences; as a migrant, he has an outsider's perspective on nationalism.

Thongchai Winichakul subscribes to the constructivist philosophy of the nation set forth by Anderson and Gellner, that there is nothing inherent or pre-existing about the nation. He agrees with the idea of the nation as an imagined community, one defined by its recognition of itself and not any tangible bond (Winichakul, 1994). Thongchai's contribution to the field of nationalism academia lies in his interpretation of the nation through what he terms the "geo-body," the delineation and formation of a nation's territory (Winichakul, 1994).

Thongchai states that nationalism is dependent on the finite nature of a nation demarcated by its borders. These borders define what is of the nation and what is not and identifies the outermost limits of national identity. The study of nationhood through the lens of territory is vital in explaining the formation of the nation through political geography, as the concept of nation cannot be separated from that of sovereignty and the value of territory. Territoriality is a vital component in the creation of the collective 'self' of the nation and the geo-body is, in and of itself, just another construct artificially created through cartography and discourses of geographical representation (Winichakul, 1994).

Thongchai's discourse on the falseness of both the nation and its territory exists in a blatantly anti-nationalist and anti-jingoist historical context. As a student, Thongchai was imprisoned by Thai nationalist forces in a paramilitary assault on a student protest (Winichakul, 1994). His conception of the nation as a result is actually more anti-primordialist than traditional constructivism as it has the added element of an artificial and unreal territory and geography his interpretation of nationalism is affected by the Thai history of nationalism and his experiences as a dissenter.

Eric Hobsbawm was a proponent of a distinctly Marxist, anti-primordial view of the nation. He wrote "any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such." (Elliott, 2010) This is a deeply constructivist view of nationalism and puts forth the idea that pre-existing and homogenous characteristics of a people group in no way define a nation; rather, it is the recognition of a bond, a fabrication and an artificial entity, that

legitimizes the nation. He rejects the idea that nations exist because of any existing bond between peoples. He states that:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent ... political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality (Elliott, 2010).

The primordial conception of a nation as something inherent in a people group is absurd. Hobsbawm started that, nations are fundamentally “situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation.” (Genovese:2012: 627). They only exist within the context of social and economic development and evolve because of this development and the mass standardization of practices, nations are not a pre-existing bond between a people group. Hobsbawm states that, in order to understand the nation, it must be analyzed from a bottom-up perspective.

This perspective reveals that national ideology at the top is not reflective of national ideology of the working class, that national identity can be secondary to other forms of self-identification, and that the conception of a nation can and does change, sometimes quite rapidly. Hobsbawm’s special brand of Marxist-constructivist thought precludes the existence of objective nationalism or a nationalist historian, as nationalist thought is fundamentally unsound. For Hobsbawm, the idea of a pre-existing nation is a myth and those who subscribe to that school of thought are unfit for scholarly activities. His Marxist bottom-up view of the nation portrays the nation and nationalism as lacking uniformity in society and being susceptible to change apolitical context, Hobsbawm formulated his theories directly before and during the Cold War and was a part of the liberal and constructivist wave of thought regarding nations. His Marxist philosophies colored his perception of the working class as having an agency of identity independent from the power of the elites. Hobsbawm worked under the cloud of “a lesser McCarthyism” existing in the United Kingdom during the Cold War and his Marxist theories were considered radical enough to preclude him from receiving offers of university positions (Duff, 2006).

These four scholars and contributors to the constructivist school of thought on the conception of the nation were influenced by a number of social, political, and historio-graphical factors that affected their respective contributions to the academic field. The dominance of the modern constructivist school resulted in an importance academic liberal bias against the primordialist notion of the nation and nationhood. The case studies used to generate theories of nationalism also served as a bias, due to the difficulty inherent in a universal theory of defining the nation derived from unique and specific cases.

Other perspectives of migrant and transnational scholars also influenced their work. Personal experiences with nationalist and primordialist forces served to further push scholars to the constructivist camp. Additionally, nationalist and anti-nationalist political climates in the scholars' home countries influenced their level of antagonism towards the mythologizing of the nation and the conservative primordialist school of thought.

The constructivist school of thought is in no way a uniform reaction to the jingoist nationalism of primordialist thinkers. Constructivism is a blanketed philosophy encompassing all scholarly thought on nationalism derived from the premise that the nation is not mythical nor is it a pre-existing, God-given bond between men. It is a construct, a fabricated entity whose existence is a result of its own recognition and not any ethnic, racial, or ideological commonality existing in a people group. It is a shifting phenomenon and the result of social thought.

Benedict Anderson changed the way the debate between primordialism and constructivism was framed by introducing his three paradoxes of nation defining and then navigating those paradoxes with his notion of an imagined, limited, and sovereign community. Gellner who introduced a new type of constructivist theory by upholding the inherently artificial nature of the nation and the creation of the nation by recognition and not existing commonality, while still asserting the legitimacy and even necessity of the nation in the modern industrial world. Thongchai expanded the idea of artificiality as a component of the nation by applying it to what is arguably the most tangible aspect of the nation, its borders and territory, driving the debate even further away from the conservative primordial explanation. Hobsbawm attempted to rework methodological practices of constructivist academics by viewing nationhood from the bottom-up and redefining the nation as a concept lacking in uniformity throughout the classes. These

academics have helped to grow the constructivist school of thought from blanketed liberal reactionism in response to rationalized jingoism to an expansion on the thinking surrounding what constitutes a nation, how a nation is formed, and what that means in the context of modern nation-states.

The limitations to theories of Nationalism as Gellner states in his notion is that he argued as functionalist saying that nationalism is useful or even necessary for industrial societies but useless for agrarian ones. However convincing this point might be, it cannot explain why nationalism emerged. Functions do not have much to say about causes. All that nationalist ideology purports, as aforementioned, is utterly wrong in Gellner's eyes: 'It claims to defend folk culture while in fact it is forging a high culture; it claims to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society ... It preaches and defends continuity but owes everything to a decisive and unutterably profound break in human history.'

CHAPTER THREE

3. TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONALISM IN FRANCE

The aim of this chapter is to explain how large non-European immigration affects economic, cultural, social and even political aspects which trigger the nationalistic sentiments in European societies and to show that if more coherent measures on EU. After evaluating the devised policies and integration mechanisms by the selected EU member-states as well as the consequences of immigration to Europe I will present the areas that in my opinion need further elaboration and improvement. As a case study of my research, the nationalism in France will be investigated from the local newspapers, magazines, mass media, which clearly expose my study, issue. The data will be evaluated, analyzed by a scrutiny, which will allow me to put a better review of this study.

3.1. Emergence of Nationalism in France

Nationalism, in new aspect, is back on the stage. Its most observable manifestations are, firstly, a stronger purpose on the part of governments to defend their national integrity and self-interest within the EU which the main and common goal of every EU member state and, secondly, the rise and occurrence of rightwing populist nativism.

3.2. Transformation From Radical Right to Neo-nationalist Movement in France

Kitschelt and McGann (1995) discusses that parties currently describes that radical right belong to two group party of families, moreover the fact that they often have direct connections or have shared names. One set of parties is generally rightist on various characteristics considered right-wing: free-market liberalism, anti-tax

attitudes, and authoritarianism. These are the parties that began to appear around 1970. They shared a preference for neo-liberal economic policies, including lower taxes and reduced social expenditure, and a strong state in terms of militarism and law and order. Beginning in the 1980s, these parties also began to campaign on promises to reduce immigration rates. Not every radical right party prioritized all of these issues, be culturally or economically right-wing (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).

Langue (2007) argued that their successors, what we call neo-nationalist parties, constitute a distinct party family. Although their stances on social issues are similar—most notable is their ardent opposition to immigration—we contend that their economic positions differ fundamentally. We are not the first to note a decline in neo-liberal preferences (de Lange, 2007); however, this is the first study to examine this phenomenon using data from a large sample of Western European countries over an extended period. We argue these parties can be increasingly characterized as economically left-wing, as contemporary anti-immigrant parties do not take a weak-state stance on taxation, re-distribution, or government intervention in the economy (de Lange, 2007).

Understanding the economic positions of these parties is important given class-based cleavages reflected in the traditional left-right spectrum has long been considered the prominent political divisor in developed countries. Downs (1957) identified preferences regarding the extent of government intervention in the economy as the dominant political cleavage of the modern era, and empirical work confirms the persistence of economic interests in politics (Kim and Fording, 2000). Analyses of voting behavior also indicate that while economic cleavages remain significant, cultural issues have also increased in salience (Achterberg, 2006).

However, when scholars speak of social or cultural dimensions along which political ideologies may also be classified—such as libertarian-authoritarian or conservative-progressive—they consider these orthogonal to the traditional economic left-right axis, rather than a replacement for it. Plotting political parties or party families along two dimensions allows us to disentangle economic from socio-cultural concerns and, therefore, more accurately locate party families in political space. We argue that divergence on economic issues is significant enough to separate neo-national parties from the radical right. We hypothesize that radical right parties made strong claims for free markets in the 1970s and 1980s, but by the late 1990s

adopted pro-welfare state platforms as nationalist claims became of primary importance (Fiorina, 2005).

Eger (2015) contend that changes in economic policy preferences are indicative of an underlying political ideology consistent with anti-EU and anti-foreigner sentiment: neo-nationalism. To demonstrate that this analytic distinction between parties is well founded, we compare the policy preferences of parties considered radical right and show they have substantively changed over the past few decades. Contemporary parties constitute a new party family not because every one of their ideological stances is unique, but because they possess a constellation of political preferences that is both consistent with a coherent political ideology and distinct from both their predecessors and other party families in the Western European political landscape (Eger:2015:118).

Further, Eger (2015) hypothesize that voters who are anti-EU, anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalists, and welfare chauvinist (but not necessarily anti-redistribution) are more likely to vote for a neo-nationalist party. Voting analyses confirm that current supporters' political attitudes are consistent with modern party platforms rather than with platforms of their radical right predecessors. The fact that individual and party preferences are aligned across issues indicates that voters who support these parties are aware that the parties have shifted their positions over time and do not simply vote for them out of habit. Moreover, consistency in the attitudinal profiles of voters across Western European countries suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment alone does not drive voting. Instead, our results provide evidence of a new party family with a coherent multi-dimensional political ideology centered on nationalist concerns (Eger: 2015: 119).

3.3. The Leadership of Sarkozy (2002-2012) and the Rise of the National Front

During the early years of migration, France's engagement and relationship with her Muslim groups (mainly composed of North Africans) has largely been based on the perception of the groups as unable to 'integrate' and get fit into in French society (Deltombe, 2007). In the analysis of Deltombe the French media from the years 1970 to 2000, describes how the French society perceive a great threat from Muslims entered the France. This perception which the author argued, is partly due to rather immigration but Islam in France in the media since the 1970s, portraying Muslims as an inassimilable group. This perception of inassimilable was

because Muslims were been targeted by extremist nationalist parties and most especially the National Front (Deltombe, 2007).

Founded in 1972, the National Front campaigns was based on national interests over international goals and the interests of white French citizens as a priority over foreigners' interests. In doing so, it basically promoted anti-establishment and anti-immigrant conception. National Front steadily remained widely marginalized for over a decade after it was founded but achieved growth and popularity by 'transforming and reframing the social and economic crises of the early 1980s into a crisis of national identity'.

According to the anti-Islam phobia support group, this violence increased by 139% from 5 reported attacks in 2008 to 136% in 2012 (CCIF, 2013). It is worth noting here that the very fact that France has a Ministry of Immigration, Integration and National Identity links all three notions together in ways that is exclusionary for Muslims.

Further political action under Sarkozy's leadership, particularly implemented during the revolutionary wave of 2010 in Northern Africa and the Middle East, included: hardened anti-immigration policy with record number of deportations of illegal migrants in 2011; tighter conditions for naturalization and work and study visas; restrictions on asylum seekers' and refugees' applications for leave to remain and lower quotas for legal migration (Naseem: 2016: 60).

These reforms triggered strong opposition from human rights and anti-racism groups. For instance, S.O.S Racism, one of the oldest anti-racism groups in France, opposed the systematic deportation of immigrants to meet official targets in 2011 and launched a no-vote campaign against Sarkozy's candidacy for the 2012 Presidential elections. Several marches were also organized to protest against anti-immigration and anti-racist measures. For example, in March 2012, Sortir du colonialisme, a support group for the rights of migrants, called for a nation-wide protest against Sarkozy's anti-immigration policies and the growth of far right groups. Some scholars judged Sarkozy's policies as drawing on national extremists' ideology in order to secure votes for the 2012 Presidential election by winning over National Front's supporters (Murrey, 2010) acculturation was directly associated with perceptions of threat: realistic threat, symbolic threat, and intergroup anxiety. Thus, the host population's perception of how immigrants are adjusting to their new

culture also influenced general attitudes towards immigrants and perceptions of threat (Rohmann, Florack, and Piontkowski 2003).

Since assimilation strategy plays a role in the host population's acceptance and perceptions of immigrant groups, it is perhaps worth mentioning that different groups have adopted different assimilation strategies at different times depending on the cultural or historical context.

For example, empirical data and statistics can be a powerful tool toward shaping one's perceptions. In a society that places high significance on such information, numbers provided and portrayed as —scientific are often readily accepted as fact and seldom questioned by those not in the particular field of study. Even with direct access to statistical data from local law enforcement, empirical data can be incomplete, inaccurate, or ambiguous. Recent disagreement over the —actual numbers in Utah sparked a debate that caught media attention. The nightly news story on the issue brought into focus some statistical loopholes by pointing out that one legislator simply discarded any arrests whose ethnicity was —unknown (Tindall:2011:10).

Relying on ethnicity alone also fails to accurately separate and account for immigrants versus non-immigrants in the count. Furthermore, his information was based on arrests rather than convictions for homicide, which could easily skew data where any kind of profiling was in practice. Another group used prison statistics to measure the proportion of undocumented immigrants in the incarcerated population, which provides a snapshot but not a long-term picture.

Whatever the statistical reality may be, my study focuses instead on the range of perceptions of those who most directly relate to or affect immigration, rather than the reality. While the reality of the situation is, of course, important, it is the range and nature of the perceptions that I found fascinating and revealing (Gonzales, 2010).

Apart from all spheres of integration, a good attitude towards immigrants is very important for actual integration. Integration is not a one-side process; both immigrant and recipient need to take part in this process. In order to feel at home in the new host country immigrants need a good atmosphere and good attitudes from native citizens. In this respect, racism and xenophobia generally provide good tools for measuring attitudes towards immigrants from the receiving society (Haque:2006: 47).

3.4. France, Racism and Integration of Immigrants

Racism became a vibrant and important issue in public and political discourse in France when radical right party, the Front national, was second after first round of presidential election in 2002. An opinion poll that was carried out following the success of the Front National indicates that “widespread acceptance of some of the core ideas and values of the Front National ... regarding immigration, 59% expressed the opinion that there were too many immigrants in France” (Feedman:2004: 41). This kind of opinion shows that a large number of French nationals’ had bad reaction towards immigrants and it effects their actual integration.

Table 1: French Perceptions of minority ethnic groups, 1984 Question: Here is a list of communities living in France. For each of them can you tell me whether they are on the whole well or badly integrated into French society?

Nationality	A well %	B badly %	C no reply %	D A-B
Italians	81	9	10	+72
Spanish	81	9	10	+72
Poles	75	8	17	+67
Portuguese	70	18	12	+52
Piedes-noirs	66	21	13	+45
West Indians	57	20	23	+37
Jews from E. Europe	49	16	35	+33
Yugoslavians	43	20	37	+23
Asians	47	25	28	+22
Armenians	37	28	35	+9
Tunisians	37	42	21	-5
Black Africans	36	48	16	-12
Moroccans	33	48	19	-15

Source: Haque A. (2006). Do Different Models of Integration Affect Actual Integration? The Cases of France and Great Britain Revisited.

Table 1: indicates that according to French perceptions only European immigrants can be integrated well. This number is very high among West European, especially among Italian, Spanish and Poles. West Indians and Jews are in the middle position among all. Asian and Armenians are in the bottom in terms of positive level of integration. While all African immigrants are in the negative level of integration and Algerians are in the bottom (Haque:2006:48)

3.7. Political Rhetoric in France

The impact of the major political parties in France (center-right Union for a Popular Movement - Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), center-left Socialist Party - Parti Socialiste (PS) and extreme-right party National Front – Front Nationale (FN)) on the immigration policy between 2002 and present by analyzing their rhetoric and approaches on this issue, alongside with the analysis of its reflection on immigration flows and moods in the society.

3.8. Rhetoric on Immigration by PS and François Hollande in 2012

As the current French President is a representative of the Socialist Party, I think it is reasonable to start from the PS and François Hollande. There is no doubt that it is the most tolerant and flexible party when it comes to immigration and nationalism discourse. But under the pressure of society, which opposes the expansion of immigrants' rights in France, François Hollande was also obliged to express stronger positions. Nevertheless, his presidential program and the program of PS for 2012 looked more than tolerable and very welcoming. In addition Hollande emphasized the importance of legal working migrants and students from abroad and was going to provide voting rights to the legal residents who had been living in France for more than 5 years ("J'accorderai le droit de vote aux élections locales aux étrangers résidant légalement en France depuis cinq ans") (Élection Présidentielle: 2012: 37).

He also stressed that he was going to secure legal immigration ("Je sécuriserai l'immigration légale"), which means that limiting migration was not his primary goal. But this positive attitude is only towards the legal immigrants. On illegal immigration, he stated that he will fight against this phenomenon and the routes of illegal employment, arranging effective regularizations and approaching everyone individually, i.e. on "case by case" basis. This is the basic overview of the PS. Ségolène Royal in 2007 was going to apply the same measures and used the same rhetoric when she was a presidential candidate, which means that Hollande was not an innovator and did not try to take unconventional measures, even though immigration was one of the most important issues for the French people (Pleshunova: 2014: 15).

Also, the Socialists released the project in 2012, called "Arguments/Immigration", which presented the idea that the fears about the

immigration are overestimated by the center- and extreme- right parties and the number of the immigrants is highly exaggerated, saying: “Mass immigration is a fiction invented and maintained by the right-wing parties and can be easily invalidated by the reality of numbers”. It was also claimed that the number of the immigrants in France during the last 20 years is stable, unlike in Norway, Italy or UK, and it also said, that France itself is a country with a high number of emigrants abroad and today it is over 2, 5 million French citizens are living outside of France. But this notion is a bit misleading, as even on the streets of Paris or Marseille it can be seen that the number of immigrants is high, which is not that noticeable on the streets of London or Liverpool. It might be because immigrants from Northern and Western Africa are not equally distributed across France, but rather overrepresented in certain areas due to the tight community feelings and certain industries where they mostly work.

Also, France is a country with the biggest Muslim community in the EU, which means that numbers are not as innocent as the party tries to represent (Pleshunova:2014:16).

Another prominent French Socialist politician, currently Prime Minister of France, Manuel Valls, made his proposals in 2011. He proposed quotas which affects the countries which have historical, economic and political relationships with France, which directly affects the Maghreb states, especially Algeria. But immigrants from these countries are those who, in majority of the cases, create problems, dissatisfy and even frighten the society. In addition, the hostile rhetoric of the other parties is against the representatives of these states, which puts his proposal contrary to theirs and contradicts directly with the other two major political parties and the majority of population (Favell, 2001).

In the presidential programs of Hollande there is very small attention paid to the immigration, and the proposals he made are very soft and basically encourage the immigration, but surprisingly during his presidency, the number of immigrants and number of people who obtained French citizenship slightly decreased, unlike during the presidential term of Sarkozy, who was against immigration and built his presidential campaign mainly on this issue (Pleshunova:2014:17).

Also, the generosities in expenditures on the illegal immigrants have been reduced during Hollande’s presidency. The funding for humanitarian aid and funding for the repatriations of the immigrants without the identity documents was

considerably cut, according to the order of the Manuel Valls, Minister of the Interior. The humanitarian aid for Europeans, of 300 EUR for adults and 100 EUR for children, was reduced to 50 EUR and 30 EUR respectively, whereas for the non-EU citizens who are expected to be deported from 2013 are receiving 500 EUR for the adults and 250 EUR for the children. This sum was reduced to accommodate the European standards for the repartitions (JORF, 2013).

But during his presidency, Monsieur Hollande faced a challenge - so called “Affaire Leonarda” (“Dibrani case”), when 15 years old illegal Roma immigrant and her family (born in Italy, but originated from Kosovo) had been expelled to Kosovo in October 2013. This case had huge media coverage and ambiguous social reaction, whereas Hollande’s response was very hesitant, which caused critique even from his party associates. The critique was from Manuel

Valls, who back then was a Minister of the Interior and a key figure in this issue. He played a central role resolving the dilemma. In the report of the Ministry of the Interior on this case, it was stated that when the agents of the French Office for Immigration and Integration came for the negotiations with the family, they faced strong resistance. Dibrani family were trying to resist the deportation and even despite generous financial assistance proposal (8500 EUR at first, and later – 10 000 EUR), the head of the family brutally refused. It demonstrates that the opportunities that they were provided with in France (such as financial aid and educational and housing provision) were better than the 18 500 EUR to start new life back home, in Kosovo (Pleshunova: 2014:18).

French media created the impression of strong social controversy. It was said that French public was deeply dissatisfied with the case and that there were numerous protests in the French major cities. But in the report (“Les Français et l’affaireLeonarda”) constructed by the BVA (Marketing and opinion insights) on the opinion of French people on the Dibrani case showed that the majority was in favor of the deportation. According to this opinion poll, 65 percent of the participants disagree, that this expulsion must be invalidated and that the family of LonardaDibrani should come back to France. Also, the actions and decisions of Manuel Valls were strongly supported by 74 percent of the respondents. This obviously weakened the positions of President Hollande, as he was not a key figure in resolution of this issue and did not take any determined measures. And as this case had massive media coverage and social cognitive dissonance, it was expected for the

leader to speak out. Whereas the active position of Manuel Valls demonstrated the power which Socialists can apply when needed and this might positively influence the position and strength of Socialists among French electorate and predetermine the results of next presidential elections (Pleshunova: 2014: 19).

3.9. Rhetoric on Immigration by UMP and Nicolas Sarkozy before 2012

Sarkozy's approach towards the immigration was always strict and his rhetoric was far from flexible and welcoming. In his presidential program in 2012, he emphasized the importance of the issue and showed that he is determined to solve the immigration crisis, telling: "Those who do not accept the full opening of borders were immediately accused in extremism or racism." (Lafranceforte, 2012)

He also emphasized that if he is elected, he is going to strengthen the politics of immigration that was imposed while he was a Minister of the Interior (2002 – 2004). The fact that it had been told in 2012 indicates that these measures, despite being implemented long ago (during all his presidential term and partially while he was a Minister of the Interior), were not very effective or not fully implemented. Basically, Sarkozy's rhetoric on the immigration in 2012 was not very different from the one in 2007. In any case, often demonstrated by European politicians repeated rhetoric and the same goals year in year out creates the impression that nothing has been done and their presence is more or less, but meaningless. Talking about the family reunification, Sarkozy said that family reunification will be possible only if the person fulfills housing requirements and has a job that enables them to support his/her family without consideration of family allowances and various social benefits. In addition, the knowledge of the French language is among the necessary conditions as well. But if someone is new in France, it is very complicated to accomplish all these requirements (Lafranceforte, 2012).

France is historically a place attractive for the immigrants and such preventive measures are contrary to the historical background and immigration culture, which was formed during the last decades. It would be unfair to say that immigrants are exclusively a problem and have solely negative impact on French economy and culture, as there are numerous merits that immigrants gave to France. French industrial revolution would be impossible without the immigrants' contributions, for example. West European countries abolished large-scale labor

recruitment in the 1970s and have not renewed them it since. It could be argued that Europe is still going through a prolonged recession characterized by high unemployment or that illegal migration and asylum seekers have replaced the traditional labor migration (Meyers:2000: 1250).

But speaking on the TV show “Des paroles et des actes” (“Words and actions”) on France 2 channel on March 6, 2012 former Président de la République said that “there are too many immigrants in our country”, and in my opinion it is too radical and careless for the head of state, especially taking into account the historical context and the collective memory of Vichy France or the European occupation by the Nazis. In addition, it contradicts the principles of equality (Pleshunova:2014:20).

Nowadays it is obviously a different context and due to the economic crisis and the rise of unemployment there is a demand to reduce social benefits for the immigrants and to contribute more into their integration into French society, as there are already many immigrants who were accepted into the society formally, but in fact (culturally and linguistically) they are not its members yet. Nevertheless, Sarkozy in his program intended to halve the number of legal immigrants (from 180 000 to 100 000) and to reinforce the control of the national and European borders but did not emphasized the importance of their integration. In addition, he said that France should pull out of the Schengen zone in an effort to stop undocumented immigrants from entering the country (Tovrov, 2012).

Also, UMP party in their program of 2012 highlighted the importance of Méhaignerie Law on nationality which limits naturalization process and does not grant French citizenship to those who were born in France, but their parents are foreign nationals. And all these measures impose ethnic nationalism, eliminates *jus soli* principle and does not facilitate integration, but on a contrary, prevent immigrants to integrate and naturalize. Moreover, he did not propose any measures that would contribute immigrants’ integration; he only emphasized the importance of their own initiative to be a part of French society. The kids of the foreigners can only apply for the French citizenship at the age of 16, being foreigners until then, even thought they were born and raised in France. Nevertheless, French electorate seems to appreciate the hostile rhetoric applied by Sarkozy, rather than opposed it. N. Sarkozy has bounced back in the French presidential election polls after launching an attack on European Union immigration policies. With the first of two rounds of voting due to take place on April 22, it is a morale boost for the current President

who has been widely predicted to lose. In the poll, 28.5 per cent of voters said they would back him in the first round, with 27 per cent opting for his main rival, Socialist Francois Hollande (Allen, 2012).

So now, seeing French public's acceptance and appreciation of xenophobic statements, it is interesting to expect the results of the next presidential and parliamentary elections, and see if the extreme-right party is going to gain more power and votes, changing country's public order. If so, then France is going to fall into right-wing ideology by giving up its liberal values, strengthening the immigration laws and regulations. But if not, then the republican model with its strong belief in the equality is going to remain the dominating one (Pleshunova:2014:21).

There is an assumption expressed by the French and an international political analyst that the reason of Sarkozy's harsh rhetoric on immigration be it legal or illegal, is the attempt to get the EN's electorate. And meanwhile Sarkozy and UMP in general are against immigration, they are not radical and accept the positive aspects of labour immigrants and incoming students, whereas FN and Marine Le Pen see the root of all the current economic, social and cultural problems in France in immigrants. But despite parties and Le Pen's radical rhetoric and openly racist and anti-Semitic reputation of her father, former leader of the party Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN is stable third popular political party in France for few decades (Pleshunova:2014:21).

3.10. Rhetoric on Immigration by FN and Marine Le Pen before 2012

In 1997, the Front National had exceeded all expectations of its success: in that election it earned 14, 9 percent of the vote and the title of the third most popular party in the French political system. The party got this title only due to its open discussion on immigration in very harsh, malevolent way. Obviously, FN's and its leader's approach towards the immigration is very negative and Le Pen was going to apply the "zero immigration" policy in France, in case she won the elections. Marine Le Pen aimed to nullify the illegal immigration and dramatically minimize the number of legal labor immigrants (Meguid:2008:142).

Also, she insists on systematic expulsion of all the people, who entered or settled in France illegally and to suppress all the governmental centers and organizations that help to illegal immigrants, such as State Medical Aid

(l'Aide Médicale d'Etat). Obviously, it is all directed to limit the access immigrants have to various social aids and benefits so that France would not look as an attractive place for the newcomers anymore. In addition, the party insists on impossibility to regularize illegal immigrants and to prohibit all the manifestations by illegal immigrants and those, who might support their rights. This proposition undermines basic democratic principles of the freedom of will, speech and expression, as well as of French Republicanism (Pleshunova:2014: 22).

However, even though Marine Le Pen is considered to be an extreme-right political actor, since her leadership over the FN, party reestablished its role, major ideas and principles and it seems that now the party is more economy-oriented and less radical in its views on national identity and so called "Frenchness". But still the xenophobic and nationalistic orientation remains and in the program of the party even in the goals and paragraphs which were not related to immigration, the ideas of nation and disadvantages of immigration were imposed. For example, in the paragraph Which was devoted to housing problems in France, it was said that the immigrants are one of the main causes of the housing crisis in France, as when social housing is distributed, there is a "preference of the foreigners", and taking into account that there are 200 000 legal immigrants per year, plus the growing number of illegal immigrants, this problem is considerable (Pleshunova:2014: 23).

Also, talking about politico-religious provocations and then immediately about the islamization indicates, that the only religion FN and Marine Le Pen opposes is Islam. Taking into account that the biggest Muslim community in Europe is in France, this precaution does not reflect the reality and is contrary to approximately 5 million people in the country (there is no exact data, as French census does not include such characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, etc. to avoid the discrimination). But at the same time, the acknowledgement that France fails to assimilate its new society members is a step forward. In my opinion, the new methods and ways to assimilate immigrants is the direction that should be developed (Pleshunova:2014: 24).

In a certain way, communitarianism and diversity in society might create certain problems and clashes between the representatives of different confessions and beliefs. It is hard to expect a vegetarian to understand and celebrate together with the Muslim the sacrifice of the goat during the Eid al-Adha, and so far bright and luminous ideas of multiculturalism did not work perfectly anywhere in Europe. This

could be explained by the racial security: it has to do with the protection of a European, Christian, and white civilization against Third World, Muslim, or black populations, as the debates surrounding the entrance of Turkey to the European community and the contestation about Islamic veiling in public institutions in France have revealed (Fassin:2005:381).

But the idea of absolute limitations and extermination of certain ideas, religions or communities does not sound “healthy” and rightful. In addition, the party proposes introduction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Immigration and Secularism (Laïcité) for the joint coherence, coordination and efforts of the public politics of these three domains. And this ministry is going to publish the statistical data on the number of issued residence permits, granted citizenship and deported illegal immigrants each trimester. Basically, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice and the few statistical agencies are working on that now, but mostly they do annual reports. The expenses are going to rise, in case that these measures are taken. Do French taxpayers really need to spend money on that?

Back to the general content of the FN manifesto, another aspect that does not seem clear is that in many dimensions it is based on the critique of the opponent instead of a more independent and solid line. The paragraph devoted to the immigration program refers to Sarkozy all the time (as he was the President before the last presidential elections in France took place and, obviously, the major opponent). It was said in the program, that the immigration policy of Nicolas Sarkozy is the most lax in the history of the Fifth Republic and that in the sphere of immigration, his promises were the biggest lie to the French people ever.

Another critique on the former French President in the political program of FN was that despite the majority of his voters chose him for the promise to put an end to the “sufferings from the immigration”, it is clear that nothing has been done. On the contrary, immigration is stronger than ever under presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. The FN program gave certain numbers to prove its sustainability, like according to the Interior Ministry, in 2010 France issued 203 000 of residence permits, which is 28 000 more than in 2009 and 78 percent more than in 2000. But this data is misleading, as it only reveals one aspect of the immigration. It is also known, that during the presidency of Sarkozy the number of granted asylums in France was steady while the number of the demands had grown, according to National Court of Asylum (Cour nationale du droit d'asile – CNDA). Also, the number

of expulsions has risen since 2007 and during the presidency of UMP's former leader.

According to the report of Ministry of Interior, in 2008 about 30 000 people were expelled and throughout the presidential term of 5 years, this number grew. For comparison – in 2001, 9 000 people were forced to leave the country, and in 2013 it was about 21 000 of illegal foreigners. So, Sarkozy started to accomplish his mission, just probably without the high level of efficiency. In addition, the number of the detentions of the illegal immigrants during Sarkozy's presidency increased considerably. It does not mean that he solved the problem successfully, and it is more likely that these measures and detentions were done only for the publicity, to prove that he is going to keep his promises, but it definitely means that he made an effort. There is obviously a place for the critique of immigration policy of Nicolas Sarkozy but it supposed to be more rational and equitable.

Since surveys have been taken, through good times and bad, even as public policies on immigration have varied considerably, only small percentages of publics in France had favored increasing immigration. Not surprisingly, when governments have promulgated restrictionist immigration policies, these policies have been widely supported by mass opinion (Schain: 2012: 9).

And Sarkozy was not a founder of this method – A major shift in policy took place during Mitterrand's (Socialist!) second term, between 1990 and 1991. The number of people detained for expulsion more than tripled, while the percentage of those actually expelled was more than halved. This approach of mass roundups, while expelling about the same number of people, has created the impression of greater effectiveness, even if the constraints on actual expulsions have remained the same (Brèchon:1992:64).

So, basically the government just used human beings to prove their reliability to the other human beings and the only difference between these human beings was a passport. But the results are exactly the same, in addition, the tax payers are carrying the expenses for the detention of illegal immigrants and there are no actual retrenchments on this outlay. And if we look at it in a very simplified way, we will see that these actions are just a jugglery, a very cold-blooded manipulation, and the results of these actions are unpredictable. It does not decrease the actual migration flows, nor does it deal with the integration of the immigrants who are already settled in France, it does not cut the expenses on immigration, but it presents

France in the international community as a country which does not respect the substructure of human rights and freedoms. This therefore puts the country in a very disadvantageous position (Pleshunova:2014:26).

In August 2010 within a few weeks, many illegal travelers' camps had been dismantled. ... While such operations were nothing new, their number and intensity were surprising. [...] Beyond the strong feeling it aroused in mainland France, this move attracted international criticism. On 22 August, Pope Benedict XVI exhorted several thousand of the faithful to "extend hospitality to people of all origins". Then the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination spoke out on 27 August, The European Commission followed a few days later, represented by its president, José Manuel Barroso, and, most notably, by Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, who evoked World War Two deportations, describing and the clashes in the society, without any tangible results. There is undoubtedly a problem of immigration in France and it must be solved. But what matters is the way this problem is going to be solved, and the way of dividing the society, creating clashes and provoking conflicts is not the optimal one (Pleshunova:2014:28).

CHAPTER FOUR

4. CONCLUSION

Nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments caused clear divisions among the citizens of France, Great Britain, and Germany and generally in Europe wide. These tendencies seem to have led to a major drastic change in the political landscape, causing a rise in right-wing political parties and total political upheaval. Looking back to the main research question, nationalism, which illustrates that key public figures introduced campaigns and rhetoric that focused on nationalism. When major incidents occurred regarding immigrants, those helped to reinforce and then amplify the rhetoric of the key figures. As new incidents occurred, public sentiment was influenced, which in turn influenced governments to introduce domestic laws that penalized migrants, and in some cases, violated international law. These actions by governments then reinforced and amplified key figures and rhetoric, creating a loop of rising nationalist sentiments.

Polarizing rhetoric by key individuals, inflammatory campaign posters, and targeted marketing drove nationalistic tendencies in Britain, leading to the momentous Brexit. With EU governance pushing member states to take in certain quotas of Syrian refugees, Britons became fed up with their lack of control over domestic issues and wanted out of the Union. Thus, with a rejection of globalization, rising anti-immigrant sentiments and a rejuvenation of nationalism, Britons chose to reclaim their solely British identities and take back their sovereignty. This move marked the beginning of an anti-establishment, nationalistic wave that has swept through Europe as right-wing parties have gained ground and citizens continue to embrace nationalism and nationalistic ideals.

Populist parties and nationalistic agendas are rising rapidly throughout Europe, and what happened in Germany and in UK the French citizens followed suit by supporting extreme right ideologies. A right-wing populist-party is gaining

ground in France with Marine Le Pen's National Front who prompted center-left French president Francois Hollande not to seek reelection due to his unpopularity among French citizens. He stepped down to mitigate a situation that might garner more support for Le Pen.

Nationalistic, xenophobic, and extremist ideologies have become deeply rooted in European societies and that is a fact that cannot be ignored, especially with notoriously xenophobic nations like Hungary and Romania that are already part of the Union. Rising nationalism is not only a concern for individual countries, but for the EU in its entirety because as each country becomes more patriotic, xenophobic, and isolated, intense Euro sceptic sentiments are taking shape which have the ability to destroy EU solidarity with massive consequences in the long run.

In answering if the French policy-making process and political rhetoric influenced the immigration flows, integration of the immigrants and stabilized the situation in the country – it can be said it did not, despite the fact it is capable of doing so. The examples of laws ("Pasqua Laws", for examples) and measures (strengthening visa regulations and DNA test procedures for the family reunification purposes), which were taken to somehow limit the access of immigrants to social welfare and the abolishment of the right of obtaining a legal residence permit after 10 years of illegal stay in France in 2007, or perceptible decrease in granted visas for those of Maghreb and African states, shows that policy-makers tried their hardest to lessen the number of immigrants in France using their leverages and authority. But the results are not evident yet, either due to the inefficiency of their measures, or because still not enough time passed to see the tangible results. Anyhow, we are witnessing France turning into one of the toughest countries in Western Europe concerning its immigration laws and measures. The level of tolerance towards strangers is lower than it was 5 to 7 years ago, which put its liberalism and liberality under threat and its colonial past makes this fact even more uncommon.

The main conclusion of this study is that the impact of the rhetoric on immigration does not necessarily influence the immigration flows, changes in welfare system or facilitate the organization of immigrants the way that is beneficial for the economy of the country (for example, stimulation of the student immigration or the immigration of well-educated, young professionals), but rather it comes from the personal perspectives and opinion of the political leaders who often fall into populism and hypocrisy. As it was stated and shown previously, the number of the

asylum seekers, those who acquired French citizenship, labor and family reunification immigrants did not change dramatically with the change of cabinet. And it is understandable - official rhetoric is hermetic and often exaggerating, whereas the reality is something that not always reflected by the intentions of the perfectionist speeches of the politicians. In addition, very often this complicated, relatively new topic becomes a tool for achieving political goals and turns into the discourse of loss of national identity or ineffectiveness of multiculturalism, instead of searching for the optimal institutionalized framework. And this type of rhetoric, where national identity is threatened by the immigrants, basically puts national identity against the immigration and increases the aggression, tensions, instability and xenophobia, which was decided to be eliminated or at least decreased. But at the same time to find an optimal solution is not an easy task. For example, political representation, as it is practiced in many European countries that face problems with national minorities, is considered to be a good method of integration. But French historically constituted rejection of positive discrimination and any other sort of segregation, even though banlieues and overrepresentation of the immigrants in certain industries proves the opposite, may not let it happen.

During, the 20th century immigration was considered to be a positive factor, which proved country's attractiveness to most of the world, but lately the concept transformed and the rhetoric on immigration and its perception dramatically and drastically changed, as well as the concept of the nation and citizenship. The immigration is voluntary and economic in nature, and widely perceived as beneficial to the nation. In so far as it causes social order or integration problems, they are subsumed under the general problematic of class conflict and inequality. Immigrants indeed are associated as new members of the working class (Favell, 2001: 23). So, the concept of the nation and citizenship has never been absolutely clear and lacked one and only conventional definition now has changed its narrative towards the more ethnic and identitarian interpretation in France as this new narrative seems to be more welcoming in the society.

The same could be said about the rhetoric of the political leaders on these issues. Firstly, the fact that the third major party in the country is extreme-right already reveals certain xenophobic and radical beliefs and sentiments in the society. But even among the politicians from the leading ruling parties (PS and UMP),

intolerant, anti-Semitic and Islam phobic statements can be expected. The extreme here is when these statements come from the head of state. Like in the case of Sarkozy and his numerous humiliating speeches, which helped him to win the elections in 2007 and gave him an image of a strong and honest man, i.e. was highly supported by the French public. It points out, that the grand French ideal of *égalité*, the equality of all citizens of the Republic, itself a by-product of France's colonial past, demonstrated its incompatibility with twenty-first century reality (Schain:2012:23).

The influx of immigrants into any country is a phenomenon that no country can put a stop to, given the troubles of poor governance across the globe, some travel out of their countries seeking asylum, others in search of greener pasture. All said and done, regulations and policies must be put in place to regulate such influx. Such processes influence nationalistic sentiments that trigger political rhetoric. It impacts the attitude of French towards immigrants, some intolerant and discriminating others accommodating and understanding. After studying the rise of nationalism in the context of immigration influx in Europe, this study recommends that France should lessen its stringent policies, laws and measures and be more accommodating to immigrants after vetting their potentialities and also immigrants could be in France illegally but humanity dictates kindness, tolerance and indiscrimination, beside most of the immigrants in France are from French speaking and colonized countries. The French should devise ways adequately utilize the influx of immigrants into France, especially in economic activities and if immigrant could be positively use as a labor force then France will really benefit in terms of labor force and productivity.

Due to the strict laws and restrictions of immigration in Europe, the Europe in general is yet to benefit from the high influx of immigrants because immigrants are still yet to be given the opportunity in order to exploit their potentials. With the recent example of a Malian immigrant who came to the rescue of a child, other European countries should take example of how the Malian immigrant was rewarded by the French president and with that kind of gestures the Europe will adaptable for immigrants to settle and also contribution to the European development and economy.

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Benim adım OTHMAN ABDULLAHI LIMAN, ben doğuştan bir NİJERYEN ve Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi dalında lisans derecem var.



