



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE RISING SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION TOWARDS THE WEST UNTIL ITS
ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA**

Master's Thesis

Osman Tekin

Master of Arts in International Relations

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Osman Tekin

Signature:



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Academic studies require great dedication and effort. Because, academic studies are not only a part of job, it has become part of a life for researchers. Research period of this thesis has contained tough conditions and special endeavor. Therefore, support of all people, who is in my life, was so special in this research period.

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ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
RF	Russian Federation
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
CFE	Conventional Arm Forces in Europe
MAP	Membership Action Plan
SALT I	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
PJC	Permanent Joint Council

BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIS	Common Independent States
CSTI	Common Security and Treaty Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
IR	International Relations
CSIS	Center for Strategic International Studies
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
BSF	Black Sea Fleet
NED	National Endowment of Democracy
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement

THE RISING SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TOWARDS THE WEST UNTIL ITS ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

ABSTRACT

Title: The Rising Security Concerns of the Russian Federation towards the West until its Annexation of the Crimea

Author: Osman Tekin

This study aims to argue the rising Russian security concerns and dilemmas towards the West due to Western powers' political attitudes against the Russian Federation starting from the end of the Cold War and until the annexation of the Crimea by the Russia in 2014, from the Russian perspective. The fundamental research question of this study with analyzing Russian perspective is whether the main reason for rising Russian security concerns and dilemmas towards the West and aggressiveness of foreign policy of Russia has resulted from the careless and irrational policies of the West towards Russia. Therefore, to understand these issues, literature review is used as the main method. Definition of security concept, security dilemma theory within the framework of defensive realism and scrutinizing security perceptions of states are chosen as theoretical background. From the Russian perspective, The Russian Federation attitudes against inconsiderate and unreasonable policies of Western powers' towards her within the framework of security perceptions of states are analyzed, by using primary and prominent resources. Furthermore, turning points and chronic problems, such as Kosovo Intervention of NATO, the enlargement policy of NATO and Ukraine's membership attempts at NATO, between the West and the Russian Federation are chosen to scrutinize the main reasons of growing Russian security concerns towards the West. At the end of this study, it is argued that the aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy and rising Russian security concerns and dilemmas towards the West are a consequence of Western

powers' irrational and careless policies towards Russian Federation after the end of the Cold War.



KIRIM'I İLHAKINA KADAR RUSYA FEDERASYONU'NUN BATI'YA YÖNELİK ARTAN GÜVENLİK KAYGILARI

ÖZET

Başlık: Kırım'ı İlhakına kadar Rusya Federasyonu'nun Batı'ya Yönelik Artan Güvenlik Kaygıları

Yazar: Osman TEKİN

Bu çalışma Rus perspektifini analiz etme kaygısı güderek Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminden Kırım'ın 2014'te Rusya Federasyonu tarafından ilhakına kadar, Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik yükselen güvenlik kaygıları ve ikilemlerini ele almaktadır. Bu çalışma, Rus perspektifinden bakıldığı zaman Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik yükselen güvenlik kaygılarında, Batılı güçlerin bu süreçte Rusya'ya karşı takındıkları siyasi tutumun önemli bir payı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu yüzden çalışmanın temel araştırma sorusu, Rusya'nın yükselen güvenlik kaygılarının ve agresif dış politika anlayışının ana sebebinin, Batı'nın Rusya'ya yönelik dikkatsiz ve irrasyonel politikalarının olup olmadığı hususundadır. Metodoloji bakımından, Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik uyanan ve yükselen güvenlik kaygılarını analiz edebilmek için ilgili husus ile alakalı literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Güvenlik kavramı ile güvenlik ikilemi teorisinin defansif realizm anlayışı çerçevesinde tanımlanması ve devletlerin güvenlik perspektiflerinin incelenmesi çalışmanın teorik altyapısını oluşturacak unsurlar olarak seçilmiştir. Rusya Federasyonu'nun sahip olduğu anlayış çerçevesinde, Batı'nın Rusya'ya karşı takındığı dikkatsiz ve irrasyonel politikalarına karşılık Rusya'nın takındığı tutum, birincil ve önemli kaynaklar kullanılarak devletlerin güvenlik algıları çerçevesinde analiz edilmiştir. Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik büyüyen güvenlik kaygılarını analiz etmek için, bazı dönüm noktaları ve iki taraf arasındaki bazı kronik problemler, NATO'nun Kosova müdahalesi, NATO'nun genişleme politikası, Ukrayna'nın NATO üyesi olma arzusu vb., araştırma konuları olarak

seçilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın sonunda, Rus perspektifinden bakıldığı zaman, Rus dış politikasının agresifleşmesinin ve Rusya'nın Batı'ya yönelik artan güvenlik kaygılarının ve ikilemlerinin, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden sonra Batılı güçlerin Rusya'ya yönelik irrasyonel ve dikkatsiz politikalarının bir sonucu olduğu kanaatine varılmıştır.



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Security has always been the most important issue for states since the beginning of international relations. States generally categorize their political priorities as high or low political issues, and security has always been a top case for high political issues of states throughout history. The attitude of states towards protecting their national security and promoting their national interests rely on conjuncture of the international relations at certain times. There was a clear international system along with the Cold War, which was shaped by a power struggle between two blocs: Western Bloc (NATO) and Eastern Bloc (Warsaw Pact). Security perceptions of states depended on that bipolar system in the world throughout the Cold War. The Soviet Union was one of the superpowers of that bipolar system in the world as the leader of the Eastern Bloc. During the last years of the 1980s, a dramatic transformation occurred in the Soviet Union, regarding interior and foreign issues of state. That transformation process of the USSR resulted in the bloodless dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself, and the Cold War ended with the dissolution of one pole of the system. Therefore, after this major event, the necessity of establishing a new international order in the world emerged.

“How should the new world order of international relations be arranged?” was one of the most critical questions of the first years of the post-Cold War period. NATO was the most powerful military organization with the leadership of the United States. Besides, the US remained the sole hegemonic power in the world after the dismantling of the Soviet Union. In this state of affairs, the first years of the 1990s witnessed the US attempts to settle a unipolar neoliberal world order as the victor of the Cold War. On the other side, there were different expectations and concerns from the Russian Federation. As a purpose of this study, transformation of Russian stand against Western powers since the end of the Cold War will be analyzed. Main frame of this analyze was emerged with evaluation of Russian perspectives on this issue.

From the Russian perspective, the new world order should be as follows:

- ❖ There was no defeated side in the Cold War.

- ❖ The Cold War ended peacefully due to the initiative of the Soviets. Giving consent for the reunification of Germany and retreating the Soviet military forces from Eastern and Central Europe were historical actions for that.
 - ❖ Russia remains a great power in Europe.
 - ❖ The West should show respect to Russia.
 - ❖ The West should cooperate with Russia as a gratefulness act for ending the Cold War.
- (Suslov, 2016, 3)

As Suslov discusses these arguments, Russian elites in the 1990s thought “*Russia dismantled the Soviet Union in order to rule the world with the US*”, while the US and its European allies had comprehended Russia as a defeated and even failed state. Russia was expecting respect to be perceived as an equal or crucial partner for establishing a new Europe and World order (Suslov 2016, 4). An immediate post-Cold War situation could have been conceived briefly on those terms. In this thesis, I would like to analyze the changing Russian perceptions towards the West at the time by emphasizing some turning points, which are the enlargement process of NATO and Kosovo intervention of NATO in 1999.

The security concerns of states and the security dilemma concept of defensive realist theory are chosen as a theoretical background to explain the growing Russian threat perception against the West after the end of the Cold War. Russian desires to be part of the new European security order and to be counted as an equal or respectable partner like the United States could be evaluated as reasonable requests by Western powers. Russia had given some crucial concessions to prove its sincerity for cooperation with Western powers, such as approving the reunification of Germany, withdrawing military forces from Eastern Europe, consenting UN intervention to Iraq and Bosnia with Western powers, and even showed low reactions to the first enlargement process of NATO in the central Europe, etc. However, NATO did not evaluate these events as Russian consent and goodwill for the cooperation with the West. Especially, the United States tried to establish its unipolar world by promoting democracy with neoliberal values and advocating an open-door policy for NATO to expand its alliances towards the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian weak and complicated situation after the dissolution of the USSR was also one of the most important reasons for

NATO's careless policy towards Russia. However, with the gradual amelioration of the Russian economy and the solution of geopolitical understanding of the state, Russia has started to show vocally its grievances about foreign policies of the United States and its European allies. In this aspect, this research was tried to examine the gradual rising of Russian security concerns towards the West since the end of the Cold War in a chronological order.

The focal point of this thesis is the awakening and rising of Russian security concerns towards the West due to Western careless and irrational policies against Russia. The effects of Western failures for the transformation of the Russian political stand from cooperation to conflict with the West will also be analyzed chronologically. In this case, the fundamental question of this thesis is "Is the main reason of the aggression of Russian foreign policy towards the West because of the West's careless and irrational policies towards Russia?" There are also some other questions to examine in this study:

- ❖ What kind of developments caused the awakening of Russian security concerns towards the West through the last period of the 1990s?
- ❖ What kind of developments can be considered as a turning point for changing Russian policies towards the West?
- ❖ What kind of security perceptions has been embedded in the Russian security understanding since the end of the Cold War?

The main argument of this thesis relies on analyzing the Russian perspective of the post-Cold War period to look at clashes between the West and the Russian Federation from different perspectives which do not include no intention of the legitimization of Russian' political behaviors towards the West. One of the main aims of this thesis is explanation of Russian understanding about controversial cases between Russian Federation and Western powers. Most studies about their disagreements and conflicts have been examined from the Western perspective. This one-sided research approach of blaming Russia for all conflictual cases with using pro-Western researches, therefore, cannot help to understand the main reasons of these problems. In this study, it will be tried to highlight Russian rising hard power approaches to regional and global problems as the main competitor of Western powers.

This master thesis consists of four main parts: the explanation of the concepts of security, main security concerns of states and security dilemma concept of defensive realist approach; the post-Cold War conjuncture of the Russia-West relationship; the emerging Russian hard power: from Munich Speech of Putin to the annexation of the Crimea by Russia and road to Russian military intervention to Ukraine; and finally, conclusions. As mentioned above, the first part of this thesis includes a theoretical background of this study, which is related to all of the other parts' issues.

In the first part of the thesis, the security concept and security concerns of states are explained. Besides, what kind of reasons and conditions caused emerging security dilemmas with rising security concerns of states? Firstly, conceptualizing studies for security concerns of states originated from studies of the leading figures for this issue such as Kenneth Waltz, Baldwin, John Herz, and Robert Jervis. Their works will be comparatively evaluated to find an actual concept for that theoretical approach. Firstly, the conceptualizing process of the security concept and studies over it will be analyzed. Then, it will be detailed reasons for rising security concerns of states, and finally, analyzed these raised concerns about how to entail the security dilemma understanding of defensive realism in policies of states.

The second part of this study attempts to explain post-Cold War conjuncture in the international arena, alterations in geopolitical situation of former Soviet regions and near-abroad of Russia after the end of the Cold War, and finally, what kind of events or developments caused awakening and gradual rising of security concerns and dilemmas of Russia towards West. In the first subpart of this chapter, post-Cold War situation with changed actors, new real political measurements, and power struggles between global and regional powers are explained. The transition from the bipolar international system to the unipolar absolute US hegemony will be evaluated with truths and mistakes corresponding to certain times in the 1990s. Then, this research mostly points out the critical impacts of the enlargement policy of NATO over the transformation of Russian post-Cold War geopolitical understanding. Statements of prominent political figures from Western powers and Russia about the crucial effects of NATO's careless enlargement towards Russian borders for rising escalations between the West and Russia are presented. After describing geopolitical

codifications of the first half of the last decades of the post-Cold War period, Russian Federation's concerns increased role of NATO with the leadership of the US for international issues, exportation of Western neoliberal values, and the building of a new world order without taking into account Russian concerns have entailed serious consequences, which still affects Russian foreign policy attitudes towards West. The final arguments of this chapter intensified the Western failures and explained the chronologic process of NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War. The enlargement policy of NATO and the humiliation of Russia with the Kosovo Intervention of NATO without the United Nations Security Council's approval was one of the turning points for changing Russian attitudes towards the West. If we examine the changes of Russian military doctrines from the first military doctrine of the Russian Federation in 1992 to the new military doctrine at the beginning of the millennium, it could be seen that NATO's status as the biggest threat for the Russian Federation is present.

In the third part of this thesis, explicitly gained Russian disturbances towards NATO and the United States will be explained. The discourse of Russian President Vladimir Putin to delegations of NATO countries in Munich Security Conference in 2007 will be chosen as the beginning point, for the rising disturbances of Russia about Western careless policies, from implicit to explicit level. Firstly, in this research, Putin's attempts to increase cooperation with the West as a result of political and economic issues are mentioned. Later, Putin's speech at the Munich Conference will be analyzed. Some experts associate it with the Iron Curtain Speech of Winston Churchill because according to the some experts, the Munich Speech of Putin is referred to as the beginning of the new Cold War period between the West and Russia. However, expectations of the beginning of the new Cold War era were decreased with the reset policies of the Obama administration with the Russian Federation. Russia and NATO with the leadership of the US started to re-settle relations for both sides, which were damaged with the Russian-Georgia War in 2008. Most critical problems, such as Anti-Ballistic Missile project of the US in Europe, taking NATO membership attempts of Ukraine and Georgia, and NATO's enlargement policy; were on the table as chronic problems, which needed to be solved. However, temporary solutions have not helped to

improve cooperation between the two sides and these chronicle issues brought about the inevitable and expected result: the rupture of relations between the West and Russia.

For the final chapter, the most dangerous crisis between NATO and the Russian Federation will be analyzed that is Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Events and developments that paved the way for the military intervention of Russia to Ukraine from the Black Sea Fleet Agreement between Russia and Ukraine in 1997 will be explained. After the explanation of the process of retaining the Black Sea Fleet as Russian Federation Naval Center in the Black Sea, this thesis primarily, focus on the critical importance of Ukraine and Crimea for the Russian Federation, which provides us the understanding of Russian aggressiveness for the Ukrainian case and Crimea. As the biggest land in Europe, the importance of Ukraine as a buffer zone for Russian security, the indispensable place of Crimea for Russian Black Sea-power, and the Russian national history also could help us to understand why Russia used hard power in Ukraine.

Finally, this study evaluate a long process of awakening and rising of Russian security dilemmas and concerns towards the West. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the de-facto separation of Eastern Ukraine from the West part of the country are explained as the bitter results of blowing up Russian patience and its hard power-using against Ukraine.

In the conclusion part of this study, in the light of the examined documents, articles, books, news, and speeches of political leaders, this thesis academically claims that the permanent and insistent failed policies of NATO with the leadership of the US, implementing careless and irrational policies towards Russia, has been one of the considerable reasons for the awakening and rising Russian security concerns towards the West, that resulted in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

1.1.THE PROBLEM STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH

Relations between Russia and the West are one of the most important pillars of the developments in the balance of power, security, peace and cooperation in the world. After the end of the Cold War, a new world order was intended to be established with this

awareness. Relations between the Russian Federation and the West were established on a new level in this context. However, throughout the post-Cold War relations, although main aims were the cooperation and integration, relationship between Western powers and Russia had significant breaks over time. So, what kind of developments are main reason to come to this point about relations between Russian Federation and West? Although the main answers to this question are about Russian aggression and aggressive Russian foreign policy, this study has different arguments. It is essential to solve the problems between Russia and the West, as well as many regional and global security ones and to ensure peace in the world. In order to achieve these, it is necessary to look at the problems from many perspectives. Furthermore, rather than overlooking of the Russian perspective about related issues, it is essential to reach **at** the basic point where the problems emerged. In this study, it is aimed to analyze the reasons of Russia's aggressive policies against the West in the process from the end of the Cold War to the Russia's annexation of the Crimea in 2014. In addition that, it is aimed to contribute to the related academic literature, in order to understand the development of the relations between Russia and the West after the end of the Cold War.

1.2.RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- ❖ Is the main reason of the aggression of Russian foreign policy towards the West because of the West's careless and irrational policies towards Russia?
- ❖ What kind of developments caused the awakening of Russian security concerns towards the West through the last period of the 1990s?
- ❖ What kind of developments can be considered turning points for changing Russian policies towards the West?
- ❖ What kind of security perceptions has been embedded in the Russian security understanding since the end of the Cold War?

1.3.RESEARCH AIMS

Research aims of this study are;

- ❖ Analyzing reasons how and why Western and Russian Federation relations have become the worst situation since the end of the Cold War in this period.
- ❖ Trying to explain responsibilities of both sides about how relations have reached lowest level since the end of the Cold War, from the Russian perspective.
- ❖ Analyzing Russian perspective that Russian Federation is not the main and sole responsible for making the controversial relations between West and Russia.
- ❖ Diversifying perspectives on this issue with analyzing Russian perspective, blaming Russian Federation to explain main crises between West and Russia can not help to understand reasons of why and how relations have worsened.
- ❖ Explaining the aggressiveness of Russian Federation against West stem from the careless and irrational policies of Western powers with the leadership of US towards Russian Federation.

According to the Russian perspective, Russian aggressive foreign policy against Western powers generally relies on defensive realist understanding of Russian Federation. That's mean, Russia has no any greedy intentions towards Western powers and its allies, rather its aggressive policies are not offensive, but reactive. The main purpose of Russian Federation is the maximization of its security, not its offensive power.

1.4.SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH

After the end of the Cold War, the development of relations between Russia and Western powers have dramatically transformed, from the establishment of warm relationship to the broken almost all political and military contacts with each other. Many researchers, writers and academicians study about this issue with different perspectives. Many of them stated Russian Federation as main responsible of the escalations and deterioration relations between Russia and Western power. Aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy, using hard

power tools as the elements of foreign policy, robust expression of its security concerns and desires in many platforms and armament inside and outside of Russia are substantial reasonable data to adjust Russian Federation as a main responsible. However, in this research, it will be analyzed the reasons of transformation of Russian stand toward Western powers with analyzing Russian perspective. Main purpose of this research is explaining reasons from Russian perspective, why political understanding Russian Federation towards West have transformed from integration and cooperation to the separation and competition, since the end of the Cold War. This study tries to explain from Russian perspective, what kind of developments have pushed Russian Federation for using hard power elements in the foreign policy. As a main purpose of this research with analyzing Russian perspective, this study focuses to understand main reasons of transformation of Russian attitude towards West since the end of the Cold War to the annexation of Crimea by it. Because, when Russian Federation established as a heir of Soviet Union, it proclaimed the main state policy as cooperation with the West; on the contrary, that state policy has dramatically turned to protection Russian interests from Western powers in the near abroad, Middle East, Europe, Asia and Arctic.

As indicated earlier, looking from the Western perspective and analyzing pro-Western researches cannot contribute to understand reasons of deterioration of relations. Therefore, the significance of this research lay down to understand necessity of looking different perspectives to reach objective arguments and results and aims to contribute this issue by approaching it at contrasting side which has been overlooked from the experts.

1.5.RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this part of the study, the research design and research methods used in this study will be explained. The main argument of the thesis was advocated with quantitative and qualitative method pillars. As qualitative methods pillar, statements of former and contemporary political figures about related issues; academic studies and arguments from experts of the international relations field, news from newspapers and internet sites about

related issues, discourses of official associations of states, signed agreements between states, draft papers, and doctrines of states and alliances were used. In addition to qualitative methods, this thesis also contains some statistics about the development of military power of states, economic improvement, and the existence of military assets in some regions, as a quantitative method. Moreover, graphics and surveys, related to the main argument of this study, are included as well as other quantitative method elements.

The main argument of the thesis relies on the elements of these used qualitative and quantitative methods. The research question of this thesis is not novel. However, it has not been answered clearly and academically as a master thesis so far. This study try to follow the chronologic method to explain the process of changing Russian foreign policy attitude from the cooperative and soft approach to the competitive and aggressive attitude in time. In this chronological method, analysis focus on the changing of arguments of experts and political figures in time, according to developments in international relations. Therefore, levels of critics or arguments have changed positively or negatively in time. This thesis follows up on the tone and effects of these statements to support the main argument of this study.

1.6.LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review of this study presents how Russian security concerns raised toward West from the end of the Cold War to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Additionally, it illustrates the transformation of Russian perspective to the relations between Western powers. While many studies claim that the main reason of broken relations between Russia and West is Russian political attitudes, this study explains Russian perspective as the main reason of broken relationship is Western powers' careless and irrational policies toward Russian Federation. In this context, this research focus on analyzing issue-related books; Change and Continuity of Russian Foreign Policy-Andrei Tsygankov, The theory of International Politics-Kenneth Waltz, State and Beyond-Atilla Eralp, etc. , articles from Sergey Rogov, Dmitry Suslov, Andrei Tsygankov, Olga Antonenko, Sergei Lavrov etc., reports, political statements from Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris

Yeltsin etc., surveys, news from newspapers and websites, and discourses of official associations. This study includes studies and researches of leading and most prominent figures of this research field.

1.7.RESEARCH SCOPE

In this research, the main argument of this research is consistent with analyzing development of relations between Russian Federation and Western powers until the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. This research focus on analysing the years between the end of the Cold War and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in this study. In this long period, there had been many developments in the Europe and near abroad of Russia, which were also within the scope of the study. To understand all these broad range of disagreements, security concept and security concerns of states were searched for as the theoretical background. Besides, this study contains developments in the studied period, which have effected main actors of this research. In this context, some crucial developments are chosen as choke points to be analysed in depth to figure out how and why relations have become the worst situation. This research had been written through more than a year period.

1.8.THE LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

Many sources have been used throughout the research process of this thesis. Although the opportunity to access resources is very advanced today, it is not possible to access every desired resource. Therefore some books like Joseph Grieco - Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade, Fareed Zakaria - From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role or studies of Yury Nazarkin about Russian geopolitical situation and articles in English remained inaccessible through open sources. While some sources were out of print or not available online. In terms of the objectivity of the study, the studies were examined both from the Russian perspective and from the Western

perspective. However, for some of the topics covered in the study, reaching to qualified studies reflecting both perspectives were not be possible. Although some of the analysis of Russian sources like news from online resources were made, it was not probable to search all Russian sources especially the ones requiring advanced Russian having no translation in either Turkish or English. Finally, mostly online resources had to be used, due to pandemic conditions in the country.

1.9.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Throughout this study, the concepts of security, security concerns of the states, and security dilemma will appear quite frequently. Thus, before focusing on the characteristics of the rising security concerns of the Russian Federation towards the West until its annexation of Crimea, a clear understanding of the concepts of security, security concerns of the states, and security dilemma is a necessity. Therefore, in this chapter, the first step is to clarify the meanings of these concepts as they are used in this thesis. As will be seen, once the concepts are defined, the framework of analysis for this thesis will also be drawn, given that the definitions of security, security concerns, and security dilemmas that will be used in this study will determine the main focal points.

1.10. STRUCTURE OF THESIS

This master thesis consist of six chapter with introduction and conclusion parts. Security dilemma theory and security concerns of states are studied as theoretical background of thesis. Russian Federation is chosen as one of the main unit of this study that will be analyzed transformation of its security perspective against Westerns powers. From the Russian perspective, how security concerns and security dilemmas of Russian Federation have grown toward West until the annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation. This research presents the development of relationship between Russia and West from Russian perspective because, looking from the Russian window to the developments of this issue provide a broader perspective.

CHAPTER 2: SECURITY CONCEPT, SECURITY CONCERNS OF STATES AND SECURITY DILEMMA

Security is one of the most well-known concepts in international relations literature: Individual security, the security of societies, national security, regional security, security property, investment, production security, etc. Throughout history, individuals have formed societies and societies have formed states. Later in history, there was a transfer of authority from the individual to society and from society to the state. The primary goal of states has always been to ensure the security of the societies they govern. The concept of security and the studies on it seems to be the field of study of the realist perspective. However, security studies have taken place among the studies of all traditional and critical theoretical approaches under different subheadings. Barry Buzan quotes from Adam Smith's "The Wealth of Nations" as follows; "In a community where the state cannot guarantee security, it is not possible for individuals and societies to enrich." (Buzan & Hansen, 2007, 56) Alexander Wendt states that social norms and values have an important role in determining the security policies of states from a social constructivist perspective. In critical theories, there are security studies under different subheadings such as women's safety and environmental safety.

Depending on the relations between states and the state of the international conjuncture, a security perspective can be created for almost every phenomenon existing in international relations. For example, after the first quarter of the 19th century, the emerging liberal and globalization-oriented policies along with the discourses of goods and trade security have been covered in the literature. The balance of power created under the leadership of Metternich and Castlereagh after the Napoleonic wars in Europe also created the security of the balance of power in Europe. On the other hand, after the rising demands of workers since the protests in 1840, the concept of security of workers entered the literature or concepts such as environmental security that called national security threats arising from climate change have entered the literature due to the increase in the effects of global warming.

However, although the World Wars in the 20th century and the Cold War that followed immediately caused liberal and idealist periods in international relations, it has recently been a period in which studies and policies regarding the security of nations have come to the fore. This process, which caused the security concerns and threat perceptions of states to rise to a very sensitive level, led us to evolve into an international relations system where every national, regional, and global development is evaluated under the concept of "national security". Realists call this system an order, which is dominated by anarchy and chaos. Sovereign nation-states have become noticed as the dominant actors in international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648. Nation-states have been preserving their existence as the main actors in the international system for about 370 years since the powers transferred by individuals and societies to states and the right to govern the society do not go beyond their limited transfer from states to any other authority. States have the power to make laws in their internal affairs and to punish those who do not obey the laws. Since this authority is given to states by the societies themselves, the legitimacy of state decisions cannot be unquestionable. The system that regulates the relations between states as legitimate actors of individuals in societies cannot be achieved in international relations, since there is no authority over the states. This creates an anarchic system in international relations stemming from an authority gap over states, as the classical realist understanding indicates. In this case, according to the realist perspective, the policies followed by the states generally have two purposes: maximizing security and making its presence sustainable by maximizing power. However, as a result of the states following these policies, rather than cooperation between states, competition initiative comes to the fore. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about the existence of national, regional, and global peace.

The concepts of power and peace can be considered the most prominent concepts in security studies. When we look at the years of the 20th century full of hot and cold conflicts, it is a normal result that there are many studies on security, the security of states, and security of international relations. By the 1980s, with the change of the international conjuncture, different fields of study related to security began to emerge. With the end of the Cold War, we can talk about the existence of an atmosphere in the new world order as if there is almost

no need to work on the concept of security. However, the troublesome process in which the unsustainability of the unipolar world system was understood after the Cold War, and the evolution towards a multipolar system caused security studies to spread more, rather than decrease. This expansion enabled new security studies to be introduced into the literature with the transformation of the classical realist view via English School, the Copenhagen School, and neo-realist approaches. The new studies conducted by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Buzan, and Ole Waever brought about new perspectives to the literature of international relations. Their evaluations were added to the existing data about the security concept in the literature. While searching the literature on security studies, theorists with new theoretical approaches led by names such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever found that there were serious deficiencies in the conceptualization of the security phenomenon. Is it not strange that there is such a deficiency in the literature regarding the conceptualization of security, which is one of the most used concepts in academic studies on international relations. What are the reasons for this deficiency?

The biggest reason for the lack of studies in the literature about the concept of security can be sought in that most of the studies on security focus on national and international security issues. The discipline of international relations is a field of study in which studies on how inter-state relations are and should be, take place as a primary field of study. Topics such as the security of individuals, society, genders, nature, or property have also entered the literature of international relations. After these new fields of work on security have entered the literature, they have often continued their existence as secondary issues in addition to inter-state relations. In this study, I will generally evaluate the developments arising from the problems underlying the perception of security in the relations of a state with other states. Therefore, after a brief explanation of the ambiguity of the definition of security, I will make the definition of the concept, which is accepted generally in the literature. Later, I will evaluate the concept of security dilemma in terms of national and international security concepts and try to analyze the process of changing and developing security perceptions of the Russian Federation against Western powers until the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014.

One of the most important studies on the concept of security in the literature belongs to Arnold Wolfers. A. Wolfers emphasized the incomplete and ambiguous points in security studies with the article published in 1952 under the name of "National security as an uncertain symbol". (Wolfers, 1952) The concept of security used to be analyzed around national security, the security of states, and the maximization of military power until the end of the Cold War. In the process leading up to the end of the Cold War and after its end, as I have mentioned above, these concepts were taken out of security studies and the field of work was expanded. However, the power policies of the states have not lost their priority area of work under the title of "national security", which is one of the most important phenomena in the international relations discipline. So, what is national security? Which issues should be considered as national security issues? What factors are necessary for an issue to be a national security issue? Does the fact that an issue is a national security issue vary according to national, regional, and global values in international relations? Arnold Wolfers draws attention to these and similar questions in his study in 1952. Since 1648, the concept of national security has been the concept of the highest political priority for nation-states, which are the constant and most important actors of international relations. Whether an issue, situation, or action is a matter of national security is a phenomenon in which each state can have different opinions within its political understanding. For example, while the issue of climate change can be considered as a national and international security problem for the Scandinavian countries which have a high level of welfare, on the other hand, it does not have a significant political value for the countries of the Middle East region, that have not completed their development, and where continuous national and regional conflicts are on the agenda. Even though the concept of security has an objective definition, the way states perceive the issues they face, instead of objective definition, emphasizes the importance of subjective perceptions. For example, the existence of defeated Germany after World War I was still an important national security problem for France. However, it did not pose a national security problem of that scale for Britain. (Wolfers 1952, 12)

One of the most important determinations made by Wolfers on the uncertainty of the national security perception is the evaluation of national security perception and national

interest perception in the same plane. Although these concepts are not the same, they are phenomena that need to be studied by dividing them into different areas. By interpreting the concepts of national interest and national security as stated by Wolfers in the same meanings, states can lead societies to hot conflicts and cause polarization in them. Policies to be followed by the states as to whether an issue is a national security issue or not determines the direction of the security studies of the international relations discipline. So, which situations do states evaluate from a security perspective? How should the definition of the security concept be made? What definitions do governments attach more importance to security-related? How does the threat perception of states have a place in security definitions? What is the link between international security and national security? How does the threat perception of states change over time?

As we have stated before, the first scholar to approach security studies theoretically was Arnold Wolfers with his work in 1952. Wolfers made a simple definition of the concept of security in his work about the ambiguity of the concept of security. According to Wolfers, security is a state of no threat to earned values. (Wolfers 1952, 12) Wolfers also stated that the objective conceptualization debates on the concept of security can also be examined scientifically through this definition. If we act on this objective definition, the security understanding of states can be evaluated as an effort to minimize the threats against their values. According to Wolfers, states may have unnecessary security concerns due to the subjective interpretations of the concept of security. This understanding causes states to engage in complex behaviors related to security concerns and experiencing security dilemmas based on fear. According to the classical realist understanding, elements of domestic and foreign politics should be evaluated separately from each other. However, according to objective and subjective interpretations, threat perceptions and security concerns are also reflected in the states' internal policies.

On the other hand, Oktay Tanrisever made a definition that indicates the security understanding of political realism as another definition of security. Emphasizing the understanding of separating domestic and foreign politics as we mentioned, according to Tanrisever, in the political realist understanding, the state is perceived as a whole structure

together with the society. From this point of view, the security of states is also perceived as the security of societies and all individuals. The security of the state is also the security of society and individuals. (Eralp 2014, 109) Oktay Tanrisever states that the security understanding of political realism has an attitude towards the maximization of power and security by military power. The two world wars that took place in recent history and the process of the Cold War that followed show that most of the studies on security in the international relations literature are carried out with a political realist understanding. According to Oktay Tanrisever, if an issue for states tends to be a military problem, this issue is a security issue for states, but if it does not, it is perceived as a political issue. (Eralp 2014, 110) Classical realist understanding focuses on studies about the security concerns of nation-states in the anarchic world order due to the absence of authority above the nation-states. Therefore, according to this understanding, the globalization process, accelerated with the development of technology after the Cold War, was perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of nation-states. With globalization, we can see a growing disjuncture between the notion of a sovereign state directing its future, the dynamics of the contemporary global economy, and the increasing complexity.

On the other hand, the structural realist understanding led by Kenneth Waltz focused on the structure of the international system rather than a security understanding focused on states, which are considered the most important subjects of international relations. According to all the interpretations of the realist theory, the primary aim of the states has always been the protection of their existence in the international system, which has an anarchic structure. However, the structural realist understanding has claimed to approach the existing security problems in the international system with more scientific arguments rather than traditional arguments. According to the security understanding of the structural realist understanding, the national security system has a structure that is intertwined with international security. It is not possible to put the security of a state completely apart from the security of other states. In this order, states compete just like companies. This competition is the effort of states to reach the best security conditions for themselves. It is not possible to talk about the existence of such a thing as absolute security in the international system. In the international system,

some states consider their strength to be sufficient and insufficient in terms of their perception of threat. Consequently, some states feel safer or less secure. To eliminate the distrust of states towards each other due to their military power, all states must have absolute equality in terms of military capacity. However, as Wolfers stated, this equality is not possible because the size of the values of states is not the same. Having the same values is a utopian idea so it is not possible in the current international system. According to the structural realist approach, security is an attitude developed by individual states according to their positions emerging in parallel with their power in the international system. According to this approach, the international system has a zero-sum game structure. States want to protect their values, develop their interests, and have absolute power. Although the efforts of the states to achieve these goals do not provide the opportunity to reach absolute security, they aim to reach a structure in which the relative security and security concerns are minimized with power. The structural realist understanding stated that security is the most important aim of the states in the current anarchic system. However, Kenneth Waltz emphasizes the efforts of states to increase their power even if they feel secure enough. Here, the aim of the state is not to have the best possible security facilities, but to be able to shape and design the current world order according to its understanding. (Waltz 2001, 27) Although states try to justify these policies with security concerns, these are power maximization rather than security maximization efforts.

Another theoretical approach to security studies is the critical security insights that emerged in the last period of the Cold War. Critical approaches have an interpretation that has been at the forefront of international relations studies from the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks and develops arguments against the structural realist approaches and neoliberal values. Critical approaches claim that the focus of security studies on military power capacity causes other national and international values to be ignored. They think that the international system of the structural realist understanding can be a system based on a win-win relationship rather than a zero-sum playground. With the increase in globalization with the developing technology, states become more dependent on each other. In the new world order, there is no risk of conflict between the great powers as in

the Cold War era. In this new order, states should bring together new international organizations based on a win-win relationship. Oktay Tanrısever states that this understanding has been adopted as a policy by the European Union. The EU's efforts to spread its values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, regionally and globally, with the understanding that military power is not used as an element of foreign policy is given as an example. According to the policies of the EU, the dissemination of these values and their adoption by the international community is the ideal way to create conditions that will minimize the security concerns of states. (Eralp 2014, 118) Another important interpretation of the critical security understanding is the works of experts such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, who work about the concept of "securitization" and aim to save security studies from the dominance of state-centered understanding. They think that, in the new world order, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, security efforts should be liberated from nation-state centrism and spread to different areas such as security of society, individual, gender, environment, international. Buzan, Waæver, and Jaap de Wilde's article "Security; A New Framework for Analysis" has deep and wide studies about these new issues of the security concept which emerged after the end of the Cold War. Despite the existence of many studies about the security concept and security concerns of states, some questions have not clear and certain answers. For example, is it possible for states to get rid of their security concerns in an absolute way? Can states attain absolute security? If not, what is an adequate security rating for states? Is it possible to determine this?

Although ensuring security is the highest priority for states, it is not possible to ensure absolute security. There is no definition of absolute security because it is not possible to talk about an objective definition of the security interests of states. However, if absolute security is not possible, how much security is enough for states? Can we talk about such a thing as the adequacy of security? Baldwin refers to General Jacob L. Devers in his work on the debates about ratification of security for states. Devers was a senior officer in the American Army in Europe during World War II. He argued that security cannot be rated. General Devers said: "there can be no such thing as less secure or half-secure for a state; you are in safety or you are not." (Baldwin 1997, 5) Buzan states that, since there is no objective

definition of the concept of security, this situation remains a question without an answer. Operating on the definition of economics, Buzan states that security is a scarce resource and should be well managed by governments. (Baldwin 1997, 15) As Buzan pointed out, security is a scarce resource. It may turn to irrational policies for states, such as the tendency to resort to excessive military spending and harsh foreign policy elements to secure a state. In this case, other states will want to take countermeasures against this state, because the first state, which goes beyond normal security measurements for obtaining more security, made a mistake by using security which is a scarce resource. For this reason, other states have been exposed to dwindling resources of the scarce resource of security. In this case, they will try to take precautions against the first state at least with the same extreme within their power and means. This situation will cause the first state, which tries to achieve more security, and the other states that took measures against it, to face a situation less secure than the first situation. This, as a vicious circle, will cause states to fall into the security dilemma trap that includes a realist understanding. That is, a state of desiring more security while becoming less secure. For instance, during the Cold War period, second-strike capability and mutually assured destruction were the most considerable notions for both sides to deter each other through security perceptions.

2.1. SECURITY DILEMMA CONCEPT IN DEFENSIVE REALIST APPROACH AND SECURITY DILEMMAS OF STATES

Security has been one of the main concerns for human nature and state nature in history. People and states always give priority to the security concerns to survive in an anarchic world. We could follow the human nature understanding of Thomas Hobbes to elevate the source of security concerns of the states. People have tried to take some measurements to maximize their security. For example, settling at low crime rates places to live, putting iron bars to windows or fencing the land, etc. These are some measurements of the people to maximize their security and protect their lives and properties. These are some

ways to refrain from criminal and dangerous factors in the world. States also take some measurements to refrain from security problems and maximize their security to be alive and strong. That is the instinctive stands of the states and people. However, a state taking some measurements following its security concerns could incite other states and they could feel less insecure after these measurements are taken by the first state. Consequently, other states could feel the need to take some measurements against the first state to avoid a disadvantaged position concerning the first state, which took some measurements in the first place. Finally, it becomes a vicious cycle among states in the international system. So, we could evaluate this vicious cycle as a result of the security dilemmas of the states.

Security dilemma theory is one of the main arguments of defensive realist approach. According to Waltz, states generally seek to maximize their security, not to their power (Person, 2017, p. 48). Main aims of states to be ensure maximization of their security and survival in the anarchic structure of international system. Defensive realists generally argue that;

- ❖ Seek to maximize their security
- ❖ Preserving the existing distribution of power
- ❖ Not inherently aggressive
- ❖ Avoid relative losses due to shifts in their relative position and ranking (Lobell, 2010)

Kenneth Waltz claims that maximization security is the most important purpose of states in anarchy. When states reach high-level of protection for their security and survival, they can follow policy, which is more assertive. (Waltz, 1979, s. 126) However, they never accept that the main aim of their policies is the maximizing their power. According to the realist approach, the way of seeking maximization security of a state is generally following a way of maximizing its power. Besides, although according to offensive realist understanding states that great powers are generally assertive, not reactive, while defensive realists defend that states are primarily reactive against perceived threats from other great powers. On the other hand, despite defensive realists advocate against imperialist and aggressive policies, they also defend power projection when perceive any threats from other states to deter them

because, international relations have an anarchic structure and states have to provide their security and survival by themselves (Lobell, 2010).

Balance of threat theory of Stephen Walt is one of the main supportive arguments of defensive realists. Walt argues that states take action against possible threats, according to the threat levels determined by four main attributes of a competitor or rival states which are; aggregate power of rival state, offensive power, proximate power and offensive intentions (Person, 2017, p.45). Maximization of power against that possible situation is the most primary reaction of states. However, there are other ways to decrease possible threat perceptions of states. Robert Jervis explains these ways as:

- ❖ Choosing win-win policy and increasing common gain with cooperation
- ❖ Increasing the costs, if states were not follow cooperative policies
- ❖ Reducing unilateral gains with preventing disproportional gain of a possible rival state
- ❖ Increasing the costs from mutual defection (Jervis, 1978, p.184).

Maintaining balance in the international system is well-known argument of defensive realism. However, in order to protect balance of power in the international system, great powers have to defy from intervention to other great powers' indispensable interests and act together regarding their global political, economic and social issues. Cooperation is necessary to prevent conflicts between great powers (Tüysüzoğlu, 2013, p. 70). If cooperation is not provided among states and they generally sustain a policy regarding maximization of their power, they usually end up with security dilemma understanding against possible rival states.

However, what is the security dilemma? What kind of conditions causes states to face the conditions of the security dilemma? Is the security dilemma an inevitable result of the state's behaviors in international relations? In this chapter of the thesis, I shall examine the security dilemma concept and its existence in the international relations theoretical approach, to understand states' behaviors.

2.2. CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY DILEMMA

Security Dilemma is a concept that was first used by John Herz in an article in 1950, to evaluate states' behaviors and attitudes. (Herz, 1950) For the conceptual analysis of the security dilemma understanding, scholars in the international relations discipline have done many explanations. As I said above, John Herz was the first scholar who tried to use "security dilemma" as a concept for explaining the attitudes and relations of the states. He explains the logic of the security dilemma as:

"Security dilemma of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on." (Herz 1950, 157)

Herbert Butterfield explains security dilemma as a cause of all conflicts and wars, even though the intentions of states do not like that. (Butterfield 1952, 19-22) Besides that, Robert Jervis defined the security dilemma as "*many of how a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others*" (Jervis 1978, 169) Randall L. Schweller conceptualize security dilemma as a structural theory that purports to explain that wars can happen even among states that seek nothing more than their security. (Schweller 2010, 289) Glenn Snyder also has some arguments about security dilemma while evaluating arm race, transition, and transformation from a bipolar world to a multipolar world and the anarchic structure of the international system. (Snyder 1971, 75) Arnold Wolfer briefly placed the security dilemma concept instead of other notions of the struggle for power as an alternative theoretical approach. (Snyder 1971, 74) Charles Glaser claims that military deployment or enforcement of a state to increase its security cause feelings of less insecurity by other states. This is the emergence of the security dilemma concept in international relations literature. (Glaser 2011,

1) Finally, Shiping Tang define security dilemma with the common points from the security dilemma definitions of Butterfield, Herz, and Jervis as;

“I define the security dilemma as follows: Under a condition of anarchy, two states are defensive realist states—that is, they do not intend to threaten each other’s security.³¹ The two states, however, cannot be sure of each other’s present or future intentions. As a result, each tends to fear that the other may be or may become a predator. Because both believe that power is a means towards security, both seek to accumulate more and more power. Because even primarily defensive capability will inevitably contain some offensive capability,³² many of the measures adopted by one side for its security can often threaten, or be perceived as threatening, the security of the other side even if both sides merely want to defend their security. Consequently, the other side is likely to take countermeasures against those defensive measures.”(Tang 2009, 594)

I tried to show some of the substantial scholars’ arguments on the studies about the security dilemma concept in the international relations discipline. Taking into account all the previous discussions, we can clarify our definition as follows: Security dilemma is the theoretical approach that mostly relies on the realist values of understanding an anarchic structure of the world, the permanent concerns for the security of states, the never-trusting anyone and the maximization of the own power. Unchangeable concerns of the states about these issues cause taking reciprocal measurements by states until, in the end, one of them is demolished or given up.

2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA CONCEPT

States have faced security dilemmas since the times of Ancient Greece. We could base our arguments about the security dilemma on Thucydides’s narrative for the Peloponnesian War. If a state becomes a rising power, it causes worries over an established power. Sparta was worried about the rising of Athens for its hegemony. Graham Allison named that as “Thucydides Trap” which mostly focuses on the possible conflicts between the rising and established superpowers’ competition. (Allison, 2017) However, the security dilemma is a

trap or inevitable fate for all states in the international system because it includes basic concerns such as fear, uncertain intentions, survival, maximizing power, and feeling safe.

What kind of factors influences the implementation of security dilemma policies by states? Scholars generally categorize these factors into two groups: psychological factors and material factors. I shall try to clarify the implications of the security dilemma concepts with these categorizations. Firstly, I would like to focus on psychological factors, which are fear, misperception, worst-case scenario forecasting, ethnocentric biases, ideological policies, and doctrinal policies, etc. When we check the literature about security dilemmas in the context of mainstream and critical theories, fear, misperception, and calculating worst-case scenarios are generally common elements of the psychological factors. Ethnocentric or cultural biases, doctrinal realist policies, and ideological factors are generally used as critical approaches by other perspectives against realist understanding, that is the main theoretical approach using security dilemma as a theoretical perspective.

Fear is one of the main concerns of the security dilemma stuck in the states; fear for any possible attacks coming from other states. Therefore, states always feel responsible to become powerful states. Developing new weapons and missile systems, deploying soldiers in some special territories which are important for national security, etc. All of them could just be taken as some measurements of a state for feeling safe. These would not contain any greedy intentions to any other states. However, it would not be perceived as pure defensive actions by other states, even if they have only pure defensive intentions. As a result of that, other states can perceive these actions as a threat to their national security and they would also start to take some counter-measurements against that. States pursue that policy until they feel safe. However, they never feel safe in this race because these taking measurements and counter-measurements create a vicious cycle. That is why Jervis uses the “spiral model” when he mentions the security dilemma. As neo-realist scholars say, states never reach pure safety in this anarchic international system and they always struggle for more power to feel more secure. There is no limit to this seeking pure security race. Therefore, it becomes a race to be the hegemonic power on the territorial and global scale.

In the Cold War period, fears were certain for two blocs. There were certain sides: the Capitalist Western Bloc with the leadership of the United States, and the Communist Eastern Bloc with the leadership of the Soviet Union. Besides them, there were also non-allied states like Ghana, Indonesia, Egypt, etc. Certain sides, certain actors, and certain rules. So, states generally have known where threats to their national security could come from. That is why I emphasized the allocated structure of the bipolar system. However, if we look at the transformation from the bipolar system to the multipolar system with the transition period of the unilateral US hegemony, threats have become more ambiguous for states. Uncertainty over the hegemony and power could create some greedy desires for potential states. Some fearful concerns simultaneously emerge for some other states. As a result of that hypothesis, we can claim that after the end of the Cold War, a lack of the common enemy or incontestable hegemonic power of the bipolarity, multipolarity caused arising fears of the states regarding the power struggle and it pushed states to more security dilemma cases.

Cooperation and competition are the two basic causes of the fears and desires of the states. States could choose to cooperate with other states and institutions to overwhelm their concerns about national security. Creating some territorial and global alliances or win-win relations are some of the examples of that. Cooperation has mostly looked like a rational and well-directed way but, it could also cause a disadvantaged position of a state when a competitor becomes more powerful even if both win at the same scale. In that situation, states would choose a zero-sum game and competition, instead of cooperation. Even if a state feels rivalry against a competitor at a certain time, it cannot be sure of its future with them. States always feel responsible for the sudden and unexpected enmities from other states.

The uncertainty about the hegemonic power and uncertainty about the intentions of the states is one of the substantial sources of the states. Glenn Snyder argues that, given the uncertainty regarding opponent intentions, responsible decision-makers feel impelled to ensure against the worst. (Snyder 1971, 75) Why statesmen always feel responsible to think the worst? I would like to explain this with the following argument of Thomas Hobbes about the evilness of human nature. In classical realist ideas, states have human nature and contain natural evilness inside of them. They have huge potential to follow greedy policies when there is an

opportunity. Therefore, states never feel insecure in the international system due to this instinctive evilness. However, the security dilemma case is mostly explained by the structural problems in the system, especially by neo-realists. The international system has an anarchic structure and the power struggle is the only reality in this system. There is no higher authority over states. In these conditions, states can not be committed to the fairness of a system that creates lots of uncertainty. Uncertainty over intentions always has reciprocal understanding. That would cause a chain of misperceptions by states and they could immediately find themselves in a conflictual situation, which could become into war. I believe the transformation of some disputes between the Austrian Empire and Serbia into the First World War with the assassination of the heir of the Emperor of Austria is an important example of that argument. Uncertainty entails simultaneous misperceptions for states. As we mentioned above, some defensive reactions could be perceived as offensive policies, and that causes their perception as a wrong understanding. Therefore, a pure security seeker state could be perceived as a greedy state by other states.

On the other hand, a pure security seeker state would try to show its defensive understanding to other states by implicating some constraints over its offensive power. For instance, it could decrease its military personnel numbers, close some military bases, or stop improving new weaponry systems. These policies, which are followed by pure security seeker states should be perceived as cooperative policies and benign intentions. However, it would not be understood by other states as benign actions. Instead of that, that could be perceived as a weakness of the pure security seeker states and would invite other states to follow greedy and imperial policies against pure security seeker states. In this situation, states feeling responsible to think worst-case scenario should be understandable, from a realist view. To avert that misperceived situation, states generally follow cooperative policies on the understanding that these should be simultaneous and reciprocal. Constraints over some mass destructive weapons, long-range missile systems, or prohibitions of production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons with some agreements are generally accepted on a global scale, such as the case of SALT I.

As is known, we live in the knowledge and technology age. In this century, access to units and information has been facilitated by states and international institutions with the freedom of obtaining knowledge understanding. The power of the internet and media are other important actors to reach knowledge. However, states generally choose to conceal some knowledge about their power capacity or limits due to national security concerns. That entails uncertainty and misperceptions for each state against its adversaries or competitors. For this reason, if states have a transparent and accountable structure, their intentions could be perceived as more intelligible and comprehensible by other states. In this way, misperceptions between states could be prevented and uncertainties on their knowledge about each other would be stemmed.

One of the main responsibilities of the states to their citizens is providing their security against possible and unexpected threats. In this context, states have to calculate many scenarios to adjust their policies and strategies on behalf of the national interest. The international system has an anarchic structure, and it has structural problems. The new perspectives of mainstream theories mostly focus on cooperation or competition between states. Neorealist scholars have argued that power accumulation and maximizing power are the most important factors to survive in this anarchic system. On the other hand, neoliberal thinkers claim that the anarchic structure of the system can be resolved with the international institutions established by states and transferring some competencies of nation-states to these international institutions could avert distortions in the system, which are caused by anarchy. However, prevailed understanding has a changeable structure in the context of conjuncture. After the end of the Cold War, competition became a global power transformer for power struggles resulting in territorial power in the multipolar system. In this situation, uncertainty over the hegemonic power and the capacities of states, push the states to calculate worst-case scenarios for national security. Therefore, states generally follow cautious policies and strategies when they set up relations with other states, even in cooperation. Rationality is one of the important factors of the states and following rational policies means calculating all scenarios on behalf of the national interests, but that rationality level should not be a paranoid stage. If it has become that stage, a paranoid state never establishes trustful and healthy

relations with any state and in time, it causes some unintentional conflicts. Therefore, tragic implications immediately emerge due to that, as John Herz emphasized. (Herz 2003, 413)

Tragic implications of unintentional wars are the most undesired results of the security dilemma between states. As it has been stated above with examples, World War I is one of the important cases for that. Historians and scholars in the international relations and political science fields still discuss and study the war that could have been prevented. I do not have strong arguments for that, neither it is the issue of this study. However, I could say that, probably, arose tensions would have been averted with the diplomatic interventions of superpowers at that time, after the assassination of the heir of the Austrian Empire. That was implemented many times by the British Empire, France, or Germany in the last period of the nineteenth century. When statesmen realized the quickness of the occurring great war between superpowers, it was late to choose diplomacy or meetings as a peaceful solution. There is no doubt that millions of people died with this tragic end. Moreover, states tried to refrain from tragic results for themselves by choosing some clash methods like pre-emptive and preventive interventions. The advantage of being an argument's first striker was one of the main concerns for the states in the first period of the Cold War. However, that advantage vanished almost completely with the developments in arms technology. If a state has no power to destruct wholly its enemy, a possible second strike facility of the adversary would result in a simultaneous disaster for them. Therefore, a possible nuclear tragedy entailed confrontations between great powers and tragic results as in the Great War. When we consider that, we could understand better claims of neorealist thinkers about the order of the bipolar system for security dilemma case. However, we could see a preventive or pre-emptive strike example from Israel. In 1967, Israel successfully implemented a preventive war concept against Egypt and Syria, that destroyed the Air Forces of these states with huge intelligence success and well-done operations. Also, the Bush Doctrine of the US has been followed with the military operations in Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and some other Middle Eastern countries in the name of war against terrorism. Possible mass destructive weapons annihilation of Saddam's Iraq was also used as an argument to the international society for the legitimization of the pre-emptive strike to Iraq. The central question then becomes into:

how did security dilemma understanding affect these pre-emptive or preventive war decisions of Israel and the US? Can we claim that these wars were forged due to the security dilemma concepts of the states? I cannot argue as Herbert Butterfield did. He claims that all the conflicts among states in history are caused by the security dilemma understanding of the states. (Tang 2009, 589) On the other hand. Robert Jervis and John Herz opposed that idea. I could summarize their arguments as “yes, security dilemma is one of the important reasons for wars in history but, not all of them.” John Herz advocate his idea with that question; “Where was the security dilemma from the attacks of Adolf Hitler?” (Tang 2009, 591) After that counter-argument of Herz against Butterfield, we should emphasize other psychological factors of security dilemma as ethnocentrism, ideological fundamentalism, and implicit enemy imaging, where Ken Booth’s and Wheeler’s thoughts are, regarding the security dilemma.

The nation-state phenomenon is generally perceived as one of the important reasons for security dilemmas of states by scholars like Herz, Jervis, Glaser and Barry Buzan, etc. The ethnocentric structure and ideological ground of nation-states have entailed different confrontations in the world. Clashes after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, ongoing clashes in Africa, and the transformation from the ideological fundamentalist governmental structure of former Soviet countries to nation-states, can give us some examples for that claim. Defining an identity for a society to create a nation-state bring about bloody conflicts between societies on behalf of maximizing the security of people. Greedy desires and creating an enmity sense to other societies has caused following offensive realist policies by some states and counter-defensive realist policies pursuing by some other states. That must be a self-defeating road in the end. In the 2010s, Greece faced a recession period in its economy. Excessive military expenditures were one of the main reasons for the economic crises of Greece. According to some claims, which rely on politicians and bureaucrats, Greece had to invest huge shares in military expenditures from its budget, to avoid a disadvantaged situation against Turkey. That claim supports the regulations of the European Union and Germany for the allocation of Greece’s budget for state institutions. That is some ethnocentric and

ideological fundamentalist understanding of Greece against Turkey with some kind of historical biases and territorial disputes between these states.

For the final words about security dilemma theory, we must mention the studies of the securitization field. Securitization has become one of the important research fields for realists, especially after the end of the Cold War. At the end of the ideological conflicts between the two blocs, as an acknowledgment, the world has been transformed into a global village. That brings some new threats to the new world order and scholars have studied these new possible threats at the roof of the securitization concept. After the end of the Cold War, the security dilemma and many other realist approaches to international relations have been criticized as outdated and ineligible by neoliberals and neo approaches in the new century. Barry Buzan is one of the leading figures in the securitization studies for the international relations discipline. He has a robust stand to the critics about security studies. Buzan emphasizes the suitable ground of the multipolar world for the development of the new security dilemmas between states on the regional and global level. Since the last years of the twentieth century, colossal developments of technology have been made and military technology has also become one of the substantial research fields for nation-states. In this sense, Buzan highlights the intensification of the security dilemma when two conditions are held;

“When offensive and defensive military forces are more or less identical, states can not signal their defensive intent –that is their limited objective- the kind of military forces they choose to deploy.

Effectiveness of the offense versus defense. If offensive operations are more effective than defensive operations, states will choose offensive if they wish to survive. This may encourage pre-emptive war in the event of a political crisis because the perceived superiority of the offensive creates incentives to strike first whenever war appears likely.”(Buzan & Hansen 2007, 339)

Lack of information or disguising of the military capacities of the states from adversaries and the possible imbalance between offensive and defensive powers of the adversary states.

These conditions are underlined by Barry Buzan as the indication of dangerous conditions of the security dilemma through the states. Although we live in the digital age, the intelligence services of the states can not reach all information about their adversaries. That entails emerging suspicion about the possible dangerous hard power capacity of the adversary. Therefore, a state might become skeptical about military power, which includes possibly some kind of mortal weapon of the adversary. In the final case, pre-emptive wars could be implemented by the skeptic state. One of the reasons for the United States to occupy Iraq was the many claims of the US about ventures of developing mass destruction weapons by Iraq with the order of Saddam Hussein. However, one of the main reasons for the British Empire's participation in the French-Russian alliance against Germany was the enormously improved maritime power of Germany with the leadership of Kaiser II. Wilhelm. Germany was already a land of great power and if its maritime power had surpassed the maritime power of Britain, it would have changed the balance of power in Europe in favor of Germany. Britain tried to implement an appeasement policy to Germany due to its imperialistic policies as a newborn imperialist state. A strong Germany would have stabilized French and Russian claims over Europe. However, when the offensive power of Germany started to exceed Britain's power, Britain started to perceive Germany as the most important adversary. That is why Britain decided to stand against Germany during the First World War.

To summarize the analysis of the security dilemma concept, we should emphasize the main reasons why the states find themselves in this dilemma. The nature of the states contains greedy desires, evilness, worries of survival, skepticism about intentions of adversaries, and fear. These are the main reasons of the classical approaches for states to find themselves in a security dilemma. On the other hand, there are also many structural reasons for that, as is the anarchic world order. The lack of higher authority over the nation-states is the most important reason for that. Furthermore, the unlimited power struggles of the states to become hegemonic, cause current power poles in the world to have a substantial role for other states to always feel under a threat and insecure. Power struggles of the states have always maximized security and power. Therefore, the security dilemmas of the states are the unsurprisingly inevitable results of their nature and structure of the international system.

CHAPTER 3: POST-COLD WAR RUSSIA-WEST RELATIONSHIP UNTIL MUNICH SPEECH OF PUTIN

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the Cold War ended bloodlessly. The changes had been made in domestic and foreign policy by Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the last president of the Soviet Union, which was officially dissolved in the last days of 1991. Under Gorbachev's rule and last years of the Cold War, Soviets began to pull their conventional and nuclear power elements from Eastern Europe, show their consent to the reunification of Germany as a new member of NATO, and signed the Conventional Arm Forces in Europe (CFE) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. The Russian Federation was recognized as the successor state of the USSR and by establishing good relations with Western states; it expressed its willingness to take place on the stage as an indispensable power with the USA in determining the new European security concept. Also, before its dissolution, the Soviet Union acted with NATO in the military intervention in Iraq, which had occupied Kuwait, at the roof of the UN Security Council. The Russian Federation was seriously trying to integrate with the West in the domestic and foreign policy context. According to the Russians, the consent to the reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of the existing USSR military power in the socialist states in Eastern Europe, the abandonment of Brezhnev's interventionist doctrine, the transition to the capitalist economic system, and the cooperation with the West regarding the military intervention to Iraq in 1990 were indications of the goodwill of Russia to establish compatible relations with West for establishing the new world order. In response to these political and military developments, Russians have expected to be counted as one of the crucial allies of the Western bloc. They expected to be seen by the Western powers as the new and reliable partner of the European security context. Because Russians thought, the bloodless end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the efforts to integrate with the West was a policy chosen by the Russians rather than an imposed policy by the West. Therefore, as the successor state of the USSR, Western states should be grateful to the Russian Federation for its peaceful policies, or at least, they must show respect to Russia for these. In the Russian mindset, they still have

a huge land, a glorious history, and nuclear weapons, so the West must show respect and treat Russia as a great power. Although the end of the Cold War was interpreted by the US as the victory of the liberal and capitalist bloc, there was no winner or defeated side for Russians. These were the opinions of the military and political elites in the Russian Federation about the end of the Cold War. If we look at one of the prominent contemporary political figures of Russia, current Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said:

“The myth about the victory in the Cold War, so popular in the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is groundless. In fact, it was the result of our people’s will for change coupled with unlucky circumstances.” (“Russia’s Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective”, 2016)

Therefore, they thought that the power vacuum in Europe due to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact would be filled by the Organization for Security of Europe, because it is the sole organization in which Russia and Western powers have almost the same privileges. Kristen Anne Lasica, who has an academic study about the post-Cold War Russia-West relationship from the Naval Post Graduate School of United States Navy, claims that Russians had an “inferiority complex” in the immediate post-Cold War period. That inferiority complex contained:

- financial bankruptcy of Russian Federation,
- dependence on the Western credits to fix the economy,
- military inferiority,
- lack of respect from Western powers,
- trying to show itself as a country with great power,
- muting Russian voice in the world’s affairs and disregard for it,
- losing of allies,
- permanent defensive and paranoid feeling about possible Western intervention to the Russian land. (Lasica 2001, 50)

There was traumatic containment fear of Russians since the establishment of the USSR. They had always felt isolated and encircled by capitalist Western powers. That trauma could not

disappear immediately, after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Russians saw the ongoing existence of NATO and US foreign policy activities via NATO as the continuation of anti-Russian attitudes of Western powers. The Russian Chief of General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, explained these Russian security concerns and traumatic containment fear after the beginning of the enlargement policy of NATO throughout the last years of the 1990s as “The approaching of NATO’s infrastructure to Russian borders is a direct increase of NATO’s combat possibilities, which is unfavorable for our country in a strategic sense. We will regard the approaching of NATO’s tactical aviation to Russian borders as an attempted nuclear threat.” (Lasica 2001, 53) Russians blame the US and its European allies for the transformation of the geopolitical structure of Eastern Europe from a peaceful transition and integration to the western world, to the zero-sum game field. The Director of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense, former Major General Vladimir Dvorkin explains threat understanding of Russians more clearly with these words:

“Strategically important targets, including command posts and weapons of strategic nuclear forces are within striking range of NATO’s tactical aircraft. Modern aircraft in the NATO arsenal can strike deep into Russia. Currently, they have sufficient range to strike against fifty to sixty percent of facilities Russian’s nuclear arsenal and practically all command posts of the government and high command.” (Blank, 2000, p. 15)

On the other hand, when American President George H.W. Bush addressed the US Congress in 1992, he gave a speech thanking God for finally making the US victorious in the Cold War. (“STATE OF THE UNION; Transcript of President Bush’s Address on the State of the Union”, 1992) In the same year, the Pentagon released a paper which described American desires in the new world order as; “... a unipolar world in which the remaining superpower, the US, would guarantee global order while deterring any other nation or group of nations from challenging its primacy.” (Lauren, Craig, & George, 1995, p. 140) Regarding Russia, the US thought that its multipolar world understanding was a threat for US hegemony, and threat perception of Russia was transformed from the danger of communism dissemination to the imperialist desires of an authoritarian Russia. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, America was considered an unrivaled hegemonic power. The

relationship between Russia and Western states began to be built on such a political plane; on a crippled plane based on mutual misunderstandings, trust issues, and fears. Therefore, Russians had to think of worst-case scenarios and prepare for them. Sergey Lavrov evaluated the immediate post-Cold War period as a missed chance to establish peaceful integration of the European continent. He stated that:

“There emerged a real chance to finally overcome the division of Europe and realize the dream about a common European home advocated by many European thinkers and politicians, including French President Charles de Gaulle. Our country had fully embraced this chance and put forth numerous proposals and initiatives. It would be logical to lay a new foundation for European security by strengthening the military-political component of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In his recent interview with the German newspaper Bild, Vladimir Putin quoted German politician Egon Bahr who has similar views. Unfortunately, our Western partners chose a different path to follow by expanding NATO eastward and moving the geopolitical space under their control closer to Russia’s border. This is the root cause of the systemic problems that afflict Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe. Interestingly, George Kennan, who is considered to be one of the authors of the American policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, at the end of his life described NATO’s enlargement as a tragic mistake.” (“Russia’s Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective”, 2016)

The relationship between Russia and the West includes many ups and downs and it broke off almost completely political and militarily after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014. I will try to analyze this twenty-five-year period by dividing the changes in Russia's attitudes towards NATO into three separate periods as follows: from the end of the Cold War to Putin's speeches at the Munich Security Conference in 2007; and Putin's speech in 2007 to the annexation of the Crimea with Russia's military intervention and analyzing consolidation of Russian military power and reasons of Russian military intervention to Ukraine in 2014.

3.1. TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS AND WESTERN ATTITUDE

Destruction of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November 1989 meant the official end of the Cold War in Europe. The dissolution of the Soviet Union on the 26th of December 1991 followed the end of the Cold War; the bipolar system ended and the geopolitical system changed in international relations. Power struggles between hegemonic powers on the global scale had transformed into power struggles between middle powers and great powers along with regional scales in the world. In this changed conjuncture, Eurasia became one of the new power competition areas with the transformed and new actors in the region. The Soviet Union had been the precious hegemony in the region throughout the Cold War with its military and political supremacy.

The first years of the post-Cold War period had started with attempts of integration of old Eastern European countries to Western Europe and the capitalist world. The beginning of the transformation of the Eastern Bloc and former Soviet Republics were coordinated with the partnership of Russia. After the dissolution of the USSR, all of the former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries revolted against communist ideology. They tried to open their economy to the new globalized world and tried to change their political systems from authoritarian governments to democratic systems. As one of the separated states from the USSR and as the heir of it, the Russian Federation had a confusing situation in the political arena during the last decade of the twentieth century; there was confusion about what should be the new strategy and geopolitical understanding of the state should be. Firstly, Atlanticism was adjusted as a new political understanding of Russia with the leadership of Boris Yeltsin between 1990 and 1993. Alexander Kozyrev was the architect of this pro-Western policy, as a Prime Minister. However, it changed dramatically, after the Yevgeny Primakov arising in Russian diplomacy and bureaucracy. (Aliyev 2019, 4) Boris Yeltsin, who was the first president of the Russian Federation, addressed the US Congress in June 1992 by asking: *“why don’t you address us as an ally?”* (Ferhati 2019, 111) That was the expectation of political elites of the Russian Federation from the US and its European allies. Russians thought that they deserved to be seen as one of the great powers and Russia must have a

strong voice about crucial issues of post-Cold War European security. It was Russia who provided a bloodless transition from the Cold War atmosphere to the free liberal world with its prominent decisions for peace. However, Western leaders and political elites' ideas were not similar to Russians'. They thought generally that Russians were defeated by the Western alliance and as a defeated great power, Russia could not demand or ask anything from Western powers. They just should try to be integrated into the new world order, which had been designed by Western powers with the leadership of the US.

Attempts for the implementation of pro-Western and Atlanticist outlook to the Russian people were responded with counter-reactions by them in time. Poverty was one of the biggest problems for the USSR during the last years of the superpower. Russian public thought that integration with the Western economic system would finish poverty in the country. However, privatization of substantial important assets and gradual humiliation of the pride of the Russian nationalist thought, as being a well-known great power, by the Western countries had caused the rising national values in the Russian Federation. Russian pro-western and pro-democratic post-Cold War understanding changed to suspicion and alienation towards Western powers. Partnership attempts with Western powers transformed into adversary attitudes due to their ignoring and disregarding Russian concerns from NATO and the US. That led Russia to walk in its nationalist way and establish close relations with other anti-Western powers like China, Iran, and North Korea. In these conditions, the Eurasian geopolitical understanding was raised under the leadership of Yevgeny Primakov, who was the former foreign minister and prime minister of the Russian Federation during the second half of the 1990s.

The rising of the Eurasian political understanding of Russia was nurtured from anti-Russian attitudes of Western countries over Eastern Europe, Baltic region, Black Sea region, and Central Asia. Moscow perceived Western political attitudes as a containment policy against Russia with the leadership of the US via NATO. The ongoing enlargement policy of NATO against Russia was one of the biggest security concerns for Russia. Russian arguments relied on the following: NATO was established with the leadership of the US after World War II against the dissemination of the communist ideology of the USSR and its allies

towards Atlantic and Western Europe. It presents itself generally as a defensive international organization. In this context, the ongoing existence of NATO was interrogated by international authorities. Russia has always been a prior state for these grievances about pursuing the existence of NATO as a military alliance. Boris Yeltsin, who was the first president of the Russian Federation, emphasized the problem about that case. He identified Russian stand against NATO as: *"NATO have to end its existence or it must transform from military organization to political organization like the European Union. If this happens, Russia also would be part of NATO."* (Lazarević 2009, 36)

However, NATO was not abolished. Its threat understanding transformed from Cold War rhetoric to new threats like global terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal migration, the refugee crisis, narcotic trade, and proliferation of mass destruction weapons. (*The Madrid Summit: July 1997*, 1997) Russian Federation did not stand against NATO for these threats; on the contrary, it proclaimed its position, similar to the Western countries' against these threats. Russia just warned its Western allies and the US that they should defy any intervention to Russian natural influenced areas, which were indicated as former Soviet lands. (de Haas 2001, 7) Besides, Russia was still a great nuclear power and it would protect its great power status with that identity. Therefore, Russia wanted more respect from Western countries as a great power. Russian political understanding was adopted as geopolitical understanding since Yevgeny Primakov.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR brought about new hot and cold conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus regions. The Western policy towards these conflicts had entailed a gradual awakening and rising Russian security concerns against its European partners and the US. In these terms, clashes of interests between Russia and NATO will be analyzed due to their importance for gaining Russian security concerns about its rivals' intentions. There are important cases, which I will analyze as turning points for gained Russian security dilemmas and concerns against the West. I can put them in order as the enlargement process of NATO towards Eastern Europe and former Soviet states, the intervention of NATO to Kosovo in 1999 without the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and NATO enlargement through the Black Sea region.

3.2. ENLARGEMENT POLICY OF NATO AND AWAKENING RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS TOWARDS WEST

In order to analyze re-gaining Russian threat perception of the West from the dismantling Soviet Union to Putin's Munich Speech, I will begin with the impact of the enlargement process of NATO on Russian security concerns. NATO had a cautious attitude about the enlargement policy after the dissolution of the USSR. In 1991, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner stated that;

"...neither want to be neutral nor components of a buffer zone, and nor do we.... NATO did not want a shift of balance or an extension of its military borders to the East. Our security spills over and contributes to deterring to the idea that the use of force, directly or indirectly, might lead to results." (Solomon, 1998, p. 8)

Generally, the enlargement process of NATO started from the reunification of Germany in 1990 with the clear consent of the USSR. The main discussion over the reunification of Germany was the consent of the USSR, was it conditional or not? If we look to Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's arguments about that issue, the Soviet Union consented to the reunification of Germany, provided that no more enlargement would happen after the membership of unified Germany to NATO. However, German and US officials have refused that claim many times. Also, neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin presented any official documents about that agreement, which were claimed by them. Sergei Karaganov, who is one of the well-known experts about Russia and West relations, identify the Russian thought in that time about this issue with these words:

"In 1990, we were told quite clearly by the West that dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees, because, in the euphoric atmosphere of that time, it would have seemed almost indecent, like two girlfriends, giving written promises not to seduce each other's husbands (Powaski, 1998, p. 22)."

Russia expected that the vacuum of power in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the USSR would be filled by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), because the peaceful transition from Warsaw Pact Order to the post-Warsaw Pact Order in Europe should be shaped by all sides for peaceful integration of all European continent. Russians claimed that the Warsaw Pact was not ended by any military threat or military intervention; the decision of dissolution of the Communist Alliance was taken independently by USSR. Therefore, one of the strong voices for the establishment of a new European security order must be Russia with the US. Sergei Lavrov explains the essence of OSCE and how it happened in practice with these words from his articles:

“The OSCE, which emerged when the world was divided into two blocs, was established on the basis of consensus and generally acceptable approaches to cooperation in the fields of security, economy, and human rights. It would seem that now that the bloc system has ceased to exist the OSCE could fully realize these qualities. In practice, however, and rather paradoxically, this organization is erecting a wall within itself, artificially dividing its members the NATO and EU members and the rest. ...We all need an OSCE that would actually strengthen security and cooperation on the continent in all dimensions, bringing in an added value and relying on its real comparative advantages. We want to see a strong and effective OSCE guided by international law.” (“Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order”, 2005)

However, a continuation of the existence of the NATO alliance, as a military alliance, was the most critical question for Russians. As Schuman stated, since the Cold War led to the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the end of the said war might have brought military alliances in Europe to an end. The major agreements concluded under the OSCE in 1990. Paris Charter for a New Europe and Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, organized for the disarmament process of the European continent, were not followed by the disappearance of NATO, unlike the Warsaw Pact. The military structure of NATO has been preserved by the West for the peaceful integration process of Eastern Europe to the West. (Schuman Article) Preserving the existence of NATO as a military alliance followed the decision of the beginning enlargement policy of NATO officially taken at Brussel Summit

of Alliance in December 1994. (Brussel Summit) From this time, NATO enlargement became chronic and the most important rift between the alliance and Russia. The image of the US and NATO from Russian public and Russian political and public elites has changed dramatically from partner to competitor and adversary, since 1994. According to a census, in 1994 only 18% of Russians had any interest in NATO. However, by 1997 that number had sharply increased to 80%. In effect, Russians were beginning to see the West as profit-takers from their national weakness while strengthening itself and Russia's surrounding nations. (Lasica 2001, 64) 1996 presidential elections of the Russian Federation also showed clear effects of the enlargement policy of NATO over the Russian public.

Presidential candidate	Vice Presidential candidate	Party	Votes	%
Boris Yeltsin	Alexander Rutskoy	Independent	45,552,041	58.6
Nikolai Ryzhkov	Boris Gromov	Communist Party	13,395,335	17.2
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy	Andrey Zavidiya	Liberal Democratic Party	6,211,007	8.0
Aman Tuleyev	Viktor Bocharov	Independent	5,417,464	7.0
Albert Makashov	Alexey Sergeyev	Independent	2,969,511	3.8
Vadim Bakatin	Ramazan Abdulatipov	Independent	2,719,757	3.5
Against all			1,525,410	2.0
Invalid/blank votes			1,716,757	—
Total			79,507,282	100
Registered voters/turnout			106,484,518	74.7
Source: Nohlen & Stöver, University of Essex , FCI				

Figure 1. Presidential Elections in Russian Federation, 1991

We can see the first presidential election results of the Russian Federation in 1991, above. Nikolai Ryzhkov was the presidential candidate of the Communist Party in that election. In this election, the Communist Party just took almost 14 million votes from the Russian public. On the other hand, Yeltsin came to power with three times more votes than Ryzhkov by giving westernization promises to the Russian public. That is one of the clear proves to see Russians' will for transformation in favor of westernization. However, Western powers' anti-Russian policies with the leadership of the US affected prominently the decisions of Russian people in the 1996 presidential elections in Russia, as seen below.

Candidate	Party	First round		Second round	
		Votes	%	Votes	%
Boris Yeltsin	Independent	26,665,495	35.8	40,203,948	54.4
Gennady Zyuganov	Communist Party	24,211,686	32.5	30,102,288	40.7
Alexander Lebed	Congress of Russian Communities	10,974,736	14.7		
Grigory Yavlinsky	Yabloko	5,550,752	7.4		
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy	Liberal Democratic Party	4,311,479	5.8		
Svyatoslav Fyodorov	Party of Workers' Self-Government	699,158	0.9		
Mikhail Gorbachev	Independent	386,069	0.5		
Martin Shakkum	Independent	277,068	0.4		
Yury Vlasov	Independent	151,282	0.2		
Vladimir Bryntsalov	Russian Socialist Party	123,065	0.2		
Aman Tuleyev ^[A 1]	Independent	308	0.0		
Against all		1,163,921	1.6	3,604,462	4.9
Invalid/blank votes		1,072,120	—	780,592	—
Total		75,587,139	100	74,691,290	100
Registered voters/turnout		108,495,023	69.7	108,589,050	68.8
Source: Nohlen & Stöver, ^[69] Colton ^[70]					

Figure II. Presidential Elections in Russian Federation, 1996

Votes of the Communist Party increased more than two times with the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov when compared with the results of the 1991 presidential elections. There are many reasons for these dramatic changes of the Russian people but I claim that wrong and miscalculated political movements of the West towards Russia was one of the crucial factors. One of the well-known NATO research fellows, Professor J.L. Black expresses the effects of NATO enlargement over Russian public and Russian political elites as;

“No one doubted that NATO expansion would have a powerful impact on the Russian political arena and Moscow’s political elite. In short, NATO’s decisions about enlargement and “out of zone” policing activities were made in the full knowledge that the Russian government would be unpersuaded and angered. The degree to which anti-NATO and anti-American feelings would well up in Russia’s public domain, however, was unexpected at both the government and pundit level in NATO countries. Furthermore, it is ironic that the old Soviet image of rapacious West has resurfaced on Russian streets, and this time the sentiment is more spontaneous and orchestrated” (J.L.Black, 2000, p. 242)

On the other hand, there were also strong criticisms from the US about NATO's enlargement policy and democracy promotion and its effects on Russia. Senator Kempthorne from US Congress stated that;

“Whether NATO, as a military alliance, was the right vehicle to foster democracy, and whether enlargement would create a situation where we would have to defend these new members because we have inadvertently caused this sense of isolation with every country, that still has the capability of destroying the United States of America.” (Lasica 2001, 85)

However, one of the strongest criticisms about the enlargement policy of NATO comes from George Kennan, who is known as the father of the containment strategy of the US against the USSR. He stated his counter-arguments about enlargement policy in the following words;

“The most fateful error of US policy in the entire post-Cold War era. The expansion will inflame nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion, adversely affect the development of Russian democracy, restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to East-West relations, and impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking... There was a total lack of necessity” (Solomon, 1998, p. 124)

After the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the relinquishing of the communist ideology by Eastern Bloc states, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the existence of NATO was interrogated by Russia. NATO was established as a defensive international organization against the dissemination of communism towards Europe and Atlantic regions, with the leadership of the US in 1949. In this situation, why has NATO still existing after the end of the Cold War? There would be no more threats from the Eastern Bloc, as the dissemination of communist ideology used to be. Therefore, should not NATO end itself as the Warsaw Pact did, or transform from a military alliance to a political alliance?

These questions are asked normally by Russia and several peace study centers. There were no more threats from the East towards the West, as there had been through the Cold War. In addition, according to Russian arguments, the Organization for Cooperation and Security of Europe (Russia is also one of the members of it, according to the Helsinki Accord) could fulfill any security concerns of Europe. The motto of the Security umbrella for Europe

and Atlantic regions from Vancouver to Vladivostok has been reiterated many times by Russia for the integration with Europe, since the end of the Cold War. NATO also knew the fair share of counter-arguments about its ongoing existence. Therefore, member states of NATO decided to change the strategic concept of NATO in the Washington Summit in 1999. (*NATO SUMMIT*, 1999) Threat perceptions and mission of alliance were re-identified by members in this new concept. Besides identification of new missions and responsibilities, “humanitarian Intervention”, “out of space operations” and “protection of western liberal values around the world” were adopted as new strategies of the alliance. These were the most important alterations, which caused the increase of Russian security dilemma understanding through West, especially after the implementation of these new strategies as a humanitarian intervention to Kosovo, enlargement towards Russian borders and operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries. The new strategic concept of NATO was adjusted according to new threats in the world as global terrorism, ethnic and regional conflicts, statehood and democratization process of former Eastern Bloc countries in Europe, preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, refugee crises, and pursuing disarmament process of great powers in Europe. On the other side of the coin, Russia stated that there is a sole logical solution for the preservation of the existence of NATO: that is the transformation of the organization from a military alliance to a political alliance like the European Union. Russia even could want to be part of such an organization. Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin claimed these arguments later. However, NATO preserved its structure as a military alliance and continued to take some security measurements against Russia in Europe. Nevertheless, it does not mean NATO would never like to cooperate with Russia. To develop cooperation with Russia, firstly, Russia joined the North Atlantic Treaty Council in 1991. In 1997, that forum transformed into Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. At the political level, cooperation between Russia and NATO started with the Russian joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to help stabilization attempts of NATO in Eastern Europe. The establishment of a formal basis for bilateral relations between Russia and NATO provided with the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997. Finally, Russian and NATO’s common reactions against contemporary security threats like global terrorism and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons in the world resulted in creating the NATO-Russia

Council (NRC) in 2002. (Rühle 2016, 6) However, Russians interrogated the functionality of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Although using Russian containment to the NATO decision process by Primakov to enhance his reputation as a nationalist political figure, the Founding Act or NRC was never useful to resolve common resolution attempts of NATO and Russia. The involvement desire of Russia in the decision process of NATO appeased the foundation of these organizations. Former Ambassador of NATO, Robert Hunter stated the mission of the Founding Act from the eyes of the West as;

“The symbolism of the Founding Act – Russia’s acquiescence in NATO’s involvement in Central Europe in exchange for some Russian role in discussing security issues at NATO- was more important than the substance; so too was the role the PJC, at least so far in its history.” (Lasica 2001, 100)

The dysfunctionality of the Founding Act was proved along the decision process of the Kosovo intervention of NATO. Russia had the right to state its arguments but, it did not have the veto right in the decisions of NATO. Therefore, NATO took an intervention decision to Kosovo, despite the Russian opposition. J. L. Black also expressed the testing role of Kosovo Intervention of NATO for the degree of role to the Founding Act. (Lasica 2001, 99) Enhancing cooperation between both sides was congested due to the reach of the enlargement process of NATO towards Ukraine and Georgia, after the official memberships of Baltic States to NATO in 2004. Awakening and gaining Russian security concerns simultaneously raised with the change and implementation of security threat perceptions of NATO with the new strategic concept. Gradual increase of Russian military expenditures and armament since 1999 showed the dramatic arising of security dilemma understanding of Russia towards the West.

3.3. EFFECTS OF KOSOVO INTERVENTION OF NATO TO THE RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS TOWARDS THE WEST

Russian President Vladimir Putin answered questions of journalists, after the BRICS Summit on the 28th of October 2016. When journalists voiced American claims that Russia's

interventionist and aggressive understanding of foreign policy was the cause of the deterioration of Russian and Western relations, Putin said; *“You are mistaken. Think about Yugoslavia. This is when it started.”* (Vladimir Putin Answered Questions from Russian Journalists, 2016) Besides that, we have to look at another speech of Putin, after the annexation of Crimea. Putin stated that:

“Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by the international law... but the rule of gun.” (Putin says U.S. guided by “the rule of the gun” in foreign policy, 2014)

Furthermore, his speeches for defending and justifying the annexation of the Crimea contained these words:

“They have come to believe... They can decide the destiny of the world. This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well.” (Vladimir Putin Answered Questions from Russian Journalists, 2016)

I prefer to begin the evaluation of this part of the study under the shadow of these speeches of Russian President Vladimir Putin, because, these quotes still represent Russian policy towards the West, especially towards the US, about the controversial issues in the international arena.

Kosovo's intervention of NATO was one of the turning points about Russian counter-stand against the US and its European allies since the end of the Cold War. Boris Yeltsin and his pro-Western bureaucrats, such as Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yegor Gaidar, were the ones who sat on the chauffeur seat of the Russian policy with the huge support of the people for the westernization of Russia. Russia was still beaten economically and politically since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russian nationalists and right-wing political members had always blamed the US and its European partners. They thought that Western powers were consolidating their positions against Russia, while Russia was suffering serious problems of the post-Soviet period. However, despite nationalist attempts to rise anti-western ideology in Russia, the most important thing for the ongoing integration attempts of Russia to the West was the support of the Russian public. Nevertheless, ignoring disturbances of Russia and

China, swamping the refusal decision of United Nations Security Council, and using NATO for the desires of the US has entailed the changing of Russian attitude, on account of the political elite and Russian public opinion. (Yesson 1999, 4) Security concerns of Russia have increased gradually after the controversial intervention to Kosovo by NATO.

Russian security policies have been shaped by doctrines since the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation proclaimed two substantial military doctrines in 1993 and 1999, which were useful documents to understand the changing of Russian policy towards the West. Regional conflicts, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, human trafficking, narco-trafficking, and the statehood process of former Soviet countries were emphasized as security concerns for the Russian Federation, instead of possible threats from the West in these military doctrines. (Bakshi, 2000) On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War, attitudes of the US and its allies to Russia such as advocating uncontrollable privatization in the Russian economy, controlling attempts of the Russian economy with credits, tempts to reach Russian natural influenced areas such as Central Asia and the Caucasus and ignoring Russian great power and nuclear power status, were perceived as disrespectful and degrading behaviors by some Russian military and political elites in that period towards Kosovo Intervention of NATO. (Bakshi 2000, 1271)

Kosovo Intervention of NATO was the top and eruption point for the dramatic increase of Russian security dilemma understanding against NATO. Russia gave some signals of that critical change about its foreign policy before the Kosovo Intervention. Boris Yeltsin appointed Yevgeny Primakov, instead of Andrey Kozyrev, as foreign minister on the 9th of January 1996. Kozyrev was a well-known pro-Western political figure in Russia; on the contrary, Primakov was the Eurasianist and Russian nationalist political figure. Therefore, the appointment of Primakov to the foreign ministry was a clear message about the changing of Russian foreign policy understanding. This appointment was also a change coming from the Russian people's demands. The arising of Yevgeny Primakov in Russian diplomacy as the crucial figure was one of the considerable signals about changing the Russian political thought against the West. Sergey Lavrov explained the effects of Primakov to reshape Russian geopolitical understanding as a radical departure from the Western road

to the own Russian road. Primakov was one of the important figures during Kosovo Intervention Crises. His Eurasianist and nationalist ideas had extended in the Russian public and political elites. His first reaction against NATO's air bombing to Serbia was turning the back from the ways of Washington. That was the first and strong reaction, which was greatly supported by the Russian public. Yevgeny Primakov's political ideas mostly focused on the re-gaining Russian great power status, emphasizing Russian nuclear power as a foreign policy tool for deterrence and protection of Russian natural influenced areas, which was called later a "near abroad". I identify his political stance as "Make Russia great again in the eyes of Western powers." Primakov also gave importance to the re-integration of former Soviet republics with comprehending economic and political relations with Russia. So, Common Independent States (CIS) was established for that purpose by Russia in 1996. (Bakshi 2000, 1273) Besides that, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and Common Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO) were also established with the leadership of Russia to enhance Russian interests along with former Soviet republics. However, the US followed the policy, ignoring Russian security concerns and taking more advantages against Russia by using NATO as a foreign policy tool. Therefore, the Russian security dilemma understanding against possible threats from the West raised throughout several regions like the Baltic region, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

NATO started air bombing Yugoslavia (Serbia) on the 24th of March 1999. The operation was developed until Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic accepted the conditions adjusted by NATO. During seventy-two days NATO bombed Serbia, including Belgrade. In the end, Milosevic came to the table with the Russian inter-mediation between both sides. Russia's official reaction to the air bombing of Serbia by NATO, was the strong condemnation of NATO's aggression in violation of the United Nations Security Council improvement and Helsinki's act on the preservation of sovereignty, suspension of participation in the Founding Act agreement, suspending military partnership programs with NATO, and proclaiming NATO representatives as persona non grata in Russia. (Tsygankov 2018, 4) There was also a peculiar event in this process regarding the Russian position over the conflicts. The Russian position was near NATO's stand. Russia included the peace

attempts and its soldiers occupied immediately Pristina Airport as a stationed place. Boris Yeltsin explained the policy of Russia with these words; *“it was the best option instead of being out of the conflicts.”* (Yesson 1999, 7) Besides that, Yeltsin appointed one of the well-known pro-western Russian political figures Viktor Chernomyrdin as an envoy for the Kosovo case. However, this policy which was followed by Boris Yeltsin did not receive a positive response from the Russian public. Even pro-Westerners in Russia resented deeply NATO’s actions in Kosovo. Some of the well-known pro-Westerners and reformist political figures, as Yegor Gaidar and Viktor Chernomyrdin, warned that belligerence movements of NATO were endangering the transformation of political balance in favor of nationalists in Russia, who would like to pose Russia against West. Yegor Gaidar said:

“If the conflict is prolonged, I’m absolutely sure that in a short period of time, you will have strongly anti-Western Cold War oriented regime in Moscow.” (Yesson 1999, 5)

Chernomyrdin also warned the West about the Kosovo Intervention. He identified the effects of NATO’s attacks on Serbia in Russia as:

“That operation is feeding the arguments of Communists and radical nationalist movements who have always viewed NATO as aggressive, have demanded sky-rocketing defense expenditures and have backed isolationist policies for Russia.” (Gobarev 1999, 11)

Russian analyst Sergey Rogov, who is a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences put his ideas about the impacts of Kosovo Intervention of NATO in Russia as;

“NATO’s war in Yugoslavia had produced a strong anti-Western backlash, helping those who want to take back to the traditional patterns of authoritarianism and xenophobia. Their success in forthcoming battles could lead to a protracted new geopolitical confrontation.” (Yesson 1999, 21)

The last leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, explains his ideas over Kosovo Intervention of NATO in his book as;

“This war provides evidence that the US, which plays a commanding role in NATO, is willing not only to disregard the norm of international law but also to impose on the world its own

agenda in international relations and, in fact, to be guided in world relations solely by its own “national interests”, taking the UN into account only if UN decision and actions serve US interests.” (Gorbachev, 2000, p. 256)

For the final citations, to explain clearly the Russian mindset about the Kosovo Intervention of NATO, we can look at the statements of former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He warns of the dangerous effects of reckless behaviors of NATO in the Eastern European land in the future. He said;

“This long-suffering region was just chosen as a kind of a test-site for trying to NATO-centrist concept of world order, where a group of states would misappropriate the right to dictate by force its will to the world community.” (Lasica 2001, 102)

Lavrov and Putin have reiterated statements of Gorbachev and Ivanov many times, especially after the Iraq occupation of the US in 2003. On the other hand, Western officials thoughts on the possible effects of Kosovo Intervention of NATO in Russia are, according to Erik Yesson;

“Western officials recognized that ultranationalists will seek the reformers’ downfall regardless of what NATO does. NATO officials had little reason to believe their actions could destabilize Russian politics when ultranationalists were already trying to impeach Yeltsin for dismantling the Soviet Union and waging war in Chechenia.” (Yesson 1999, 21)

In order to look at the effects of the Kosovo Intervention of NATO on ordinary Russian people, Olga Antonenko’s words should be mentioned. Antonenko argues that many Russians perceived NATO’s actions and the weakness and involvement of their government with almost the same side as NATO during negotiations to establish peace in Kosovo, the humiliation of the Russian Federation. Serbia was the sole ally of Russia in Eastern Europe and Russia could not protect its ally from threats. Furthermore, it coerced Serbia to knuckle under NATO’s demands. Besides that, Antonenko emphasized the Russian ongoing weakness and incapability of defending its allies, militarily and economically, highlighted with the Russian passive attitude along with the Kosovo Crisis. (Antonenko, 2007, 13) Antonenko also claimed that 90% of the Russian people opposed NATO’s intervention in Serbia and they thought the actions of NATO were a threat to the Russian Federation.

(Tsygankov 2018, 4) Anne Lasica emphasized the effects of the Kosovo Intervention on the Russian public by citing Sovetskaya Rossiya, which is a leftist Russian newspaper, as follows:

“The tumultuous protest rallies around the US Embassy mark the entry into the political arena of hitherto ‘slumbering’ social forces. The bombing of Serbia has led to the radicalization of youth. The US has suffered a massive political defeat in Russia; the fruits of its efforts over many years and many billions spent on indoctrinating Russian youth in the spirit of ‘Western values’” (Johnson, 1999, p. 3)

For the final words about the impacts of Kosovo Air-bombing of NATO on the Russian security concerns towards the West, we should look at the arguments of historian Viktor Gobarev from the Russian Federation Military Institute. Firstly, in his article, he argues that after the end of the Cold War, many Russians felt like to squeeze themselves out of Europe and Serbia was the sole connection of Russia to Europe. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and the weak stand of Russia were perceived as a betrayal of Russia to its sole ally in Europe. Perceptions of squeezing Russia out of Europe by the West increased after the military intervention in Serbia. (Gobarev 1999, 3) One of the most critical assessments in his article is:

“The war in Yugoslavia, however, dealt a decisive blow against the Russian perceptions of NATO as the least likely adversary. At the very moment NATO bombs and cruise missiles rained down on Yugoslavia, the Russians altered their priority lists of perceived threats to their national security drastically and literally overnight.” (Gobarev 1999, 11)

Gobarev highlighted the dramatic impacts of shifting Russian threat perception on its results: improving new weapon systems with the help of observing NATO-bombings to Serbia. Russia pointed out the importance of air defense for a possible conflict with NATO. Therefore, after the Kosovo Intervention of NATO, Russia focused on developing air defense systems like S-300 and S-400 and improving old Soviet systems like Pantsir air defense

systems. In that conjuncture, Russia organized military exercises under the name of “Zapad-99”¹ between the 21st and the 29th of June 1999, to study and develop its air defense capability and prepare nuclear weapons for the possible need of using them. (Gobarev 1999, 15)

In conclusion, we could say that the intervention of NATO to Kosovo without the approval of the UN Security Council, and ignoring Russian warns caused the rising anti-Western, nationalist and right-wing political ideas in the Russian public. Dissemination of these ideas towards the Russian public resulted in the projection of rising political figures who were anti-Westernist, nationalist, and authoritarian characters. Although pursuing cooperation and warm relations between the West and Russia during the first presidential period of Vladimir Putin, would give the reason to Yegor Gaidar and Viktor Chernomyrdin about their warnings in the following years of the second presidential term of Putin.

3.4. ENLARGEMENT PROCESS OF NATO FROM EUROPE TO THE BLACK SEA REGION

As stated above, the enlargement of NATO started with the reunification of Germany in 1990. In practice, East Germany can be understood as the first state joining the alliance of NATO since 1952 (if we do not count the coming back of Greece to NATO in 1980 as a new membership). After that, the European Union and NATO simultaneously focused on the integration of Eastern European countries into Western alliances. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members of NATO. They were called *Visegroud Groups* with Slovenia. However, Slovenia wasn't accepted as a member due to not completing the membership essentials as stated in the 10th pillar of the alliance. NATO also tried to show its selective attitude for accepting new members by rejecting Slovenia's application for membership in 1999. However, Slovenia started re-invitation talks for membership with six countries in the Prague Summit of NATO in 2002. Ignoring escalation with Russia about the Kosovo Intervention, NATO showed its decisiveness to expand borders of the alliance towards the Baltic region, despite Russia's serious grievances. However, NATO

¹ “Zapad” means “west” in Russian language

accomplished the biggest enlargement of the history of the alliance in 2004 at the Istanbul Summit. The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the Black Sea countries of Romania and Bulgaria and the European countries of Slovenia and Slovakia accomplished a successful membership process to be members of NATO. In this new situation, NATO got less than one hundred kilometers closer to Saint Petersburg, when compared to the 1600 km during the Cold War period. (Mccgwire & Clarke, 2008) Russia identified that expansion of NATO as a big mistake for the security of Europe. The membership of the Baltic States in NATO had special importance because that region would be out of the scale of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1999). That means NATO could deploy anything necessary according to its consideration to that region, except nuclear weapons. There is nothing more logical than rising Russian security concerns regarding the membership of the Baltic States to NATO if we think the position of the region in the CFE Treaty.

Proclaiming of expansion of NATO towards the Baltic region and the Black Sea region was almost simultaneous with the color revolutions in the former Soviet states, Ukraine and Georgia. In 2003, the Rose Revolution happened in Georgia with the great support of Western-funded non-governmental organizations in the country. As a result of mass protests, Edward Shevardnadze, who was one of the former Soviet bureaucrats, resigned and pro-Western leader Mikhail Saakashvili became the new leader of Georgia. The great support of the Georgian people for Georgia's integration with the West was also highlighted with these events. Their willingness to be part of the Europe and Atlantic alliance was brought to the fore with mass protests in Georgia. Furthermore, one year after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, another pro-Western revolution happened in Ukraine, which was called as Orange Revolution. In these events, Viktor Yanukovich's victory over general elections was canceled by the Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) due to allegations of fraud in elections that favor Yanukovich in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. Finally, pro-Western leader Victor Yushenko was elected as president in repeated elections in 2005. Following the pro-Western revolutions, NATO membership became one of the most important foreign policy goals for these countries. In conclusion, Russia decided to act against the careless

policies of NATO regarding Russian borders. Putin's speeches at the Munich Security Conference were a solid and explicit reaction against NATO. After those speeches, we could argue that Russian implicit anti-Western attitudes towards the West were transforming to an explicit structure.

3.5. AWAKENING RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS AND DILEMMAS AGAINST NATO

The last period of the Soviet Union and the first years of the Russian Federation staged on warm relations between Russia and the West, with the initiatives of Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Separation of the USSR and revolts against communist ideology by all of Soviet Republics had brought about dramatic transformation for these countries to integrate to new capitalist world order. The policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* (openness and transparency) were the first attempts of the opening of Soviet Republics to the capitalist world. After these, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact happened in a short period. Especially, economic integration, following the establishment of peaceful political and military relations increased expectations of people from Russia. Clear support and high hopes of Russians to re-gain Russian western character should be counted as proof of the sincerity of Russians for westernization. There had been huge demands for westernization in Russia from the Russian public and political elites. As a result of that, Atlanticist and Westernist political groups and figures appeared during the confusing times of adjusting the new geopolitical understanding for the Russian state. Yegor Gaidar, Boris Yeltsin, Alexander Kozyrev, and Viktor Chernomyrdin were the famous figures of the pro-Western policies in Russia during these years. The first years of the 1990s witnessed the high and newborn hopes for a new Westernist Russia.

In this political situation, the security understanding of the new Russian state changed. That was not the desire of the transformation process for Russia, but Western policies with the leadership of the US pushed Russia to go back to the end of the Cold War. In this research, it will be analyzed awakened Russian security concerns to the West, with the observation of changed and transformed Russian military doctrines through the first decade of the post-Cold

War period. Besides that, Russian counter-reactions to the West in this process also will be stated in this part.

Why should we look at the military doctrines of Russia to understand the rising security concerns of Russia towards the West? What is the importance of the military doctrines for the Russian Federation's security understanding? Doctrines have generally been used to explain Russian attitudes, stands, behaviors, policies, and geopolitical understandings for external and internal affairs, since the Soviet Union. The doctrinal policy can be understood as a heritage of the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. Therefore, to address Russian geopolitical and security concerns, it must be looked at the military doctrines, which were proclaimed in the 1990s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the cancellation of the Warsaw Pact, as the successor of the USSR, Russian Federation followed a policy, which relied upon keeping close the former Soviet states through economic and military cooperation. The Common Independent States (CIS) was established by Russia with that purpose (de Haas, 2001, 4), and in 1992, there was a double doctrine: the first one being the last military doctrine of USSR, and the second one, corresponding to CIS military doctrine and security perspective.

However, CIS members followed their national policies instead of bandwagoning the Russian Federation as they did in the past. Therefore, the 1992 military doctrine was born dead. When we compare with old military doctrines of the USSR with the 1992 and 1993 military doctrines of Russia, we can see historical and dramatic differences among them. "Any country or any alliance not perceived as a security threat by Russian Federation" statement was the most crucial statement of these doctrines. (Bakshi, 2000) That expression refers to the United States and NATO. Russia showed its new attitude towards the West with the extraction of Western countries and allies from Russian threat perception. However, as we noted before, there were disturbances of Russia about the ongoing military alliance structure of NATO. There was no military threat from the East anymore and it should be transformed from a military organization into a political organization like the European Union. However, counter-arguments from the US and changing concepts and missions of NATO showed that NATO would not destroy itself like the Warsaw Pact. In this situation,

Russia sought consultation with NATO, when it took into account its weakness regarding conventional military power and economy. From that thought, some cooperative organizations and meetings established for Russian participation provided already existent missions like PfP and NATO-Russia Council, which mentioned previously. (*Relations with Russia*, 2019)

On the other hand, arising of Russian grievances from Western attitudes towards it had increased due to the Western disregard of Russia in global and regional issues, treating Russia as an ordinary middle power, and giving critical speeches about Russian internal cases like the Chechen problem in North Caucasus. These and similar cases had caused the rising of Eurasianist right-wing figures like Yevgeny Primakov and Gennady Zyuganov in the Russian political environment. Yevgeny Primakov was the former foreign minister and prime minister of the Russian Federation through the second half of the 1990s. He was one of the most important figures of the last decade of the twentieth century in Russia. Although addressing Primakov's geopolitical understanding as a doctrine after years by his successor Sergei Lavrov, I must mention the effects of Primakov's thoughts on the transformation of Russian geopolitical understanding and security perspective. (Rumer 2019, 5) From Russian perspective, humiliation of Russia and overlooking of Russian security concerns by the West entailed the raised Russian imperialist geopolitical desires. What kind of things were included in Primakov's geopolitical understanding? Firstly, Russia should re-take and protect its great power status. Subsequently, the world must be reminded that Russia is a great nuclear power. Therefore, Russian nuclear capability and its operational level must be improved to protect Russian national interests. In this context, Russian attitude about "no-first-use" for possible conventional or nuclear conflicts changed as "*when Russia perceive any threat for its national security and interests inside and 'near abroad', using of conventional and nuclear weapons always is an option.*" (Pietkiewicz, 2018, 511) If we think of the vulnerability of Russian conventional power as a lack of professional and rapid reaction forces, using the nuclear weapon as a deterrence tool for Russian foreign policy was an expectable action from the former super-power. NATO's intervention in Kosovo with the justification of humanitarian intervention to the independent state increased enormously the

concerns of Russia about possible intervention attempts of NATO to Russian lands (North Caucasus – Chechnia) or former Soviet states like Georgia, which is one of the countries under the “near abroad” concept of Russia. We could support the realities of increased Russian security concerns against the West by looking at the “Zapad-99” military exercise of Russia in September 1999, after the Kosovo air bombings of NATO. In this military exercise, Russia tried to improve its air defense systems and exercised its nuclear attack capability. Besides that, the coordination level between the Belarusian and Russian army was tested in this military exercise. (Gobarev 1999, 15) Russia knew it could not contest with the West regarding new military technology investments, due to the conditions of its economy at the time. Therefore, Russia decided to emphasize its nuclear capability and focused on modernization and improving the profession of its army with careful expenditures due to its fragile economy.

We analyzed the substantial effects of the Kosovo Intervention of NATO under the previous title. The 1999 military doctrine of Russia and Primakovist geopolitical understanding emerged as a consequence of that. In this conjuncture, Vladimir Putin became the second president of the Russian Federation and he addressed immediately relations with the West with geo-economic pragmatism and cooperation against global threats. After the 9/11 attacks, Russia was one of the first supporters of the US to fight global terrorism with Putin’s statement of absolute commitment and solidarity with the US. NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan with the support of the UN Security Council and Russian consent for the establishment of a US military base in Kyrgyzstan for managing operations in Afghanistan were some of the concrete steps about the supports of Russia to the US. However, the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, ignoring international law and norms provided developing Russian arguments about the need for a multipolar world for international order, instead of the unipolar world of the US. We could address that as “support of military doctrines with political propaganda”. After the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of NATO towards the Baltic region and the Black Sea region in 2004 entailed dramatic rising of Russian national security concerns towards the West; at the public and political elites level. Robust stands and speeches of Putin against the West had taken serious support from Russian citizens and we could see

that from the beginning second term of Putin in 2004, after his great victory in general elections. Votes of Putin's United Russia Party increased dramatically when compared with the election results in 2000. (*Electoral history of Vladimir Putin*, 2019) In 2004, the US continued ignoring Russian grievances towards the West but it did not want to see rising security concerns from it. The expansion of NATO through Ukraine and Georgia after the color revolutions in these countries proved reckless policies of the US and NATO towards Russia.

In conclusion, the membership of the Baltic States to NATO and the signals to reach Ukraine and Georgia as part of its enlargement process, pushed Russia to show its disturbances explicitly to the West. Amelioration of the Russian economy with the considerable rising of oil and gas prices resulted in a simultaneous increase of Russian military expenditures with its arising GDP. Awakening Russian security concerns and dilemmas were shaped with this background until Putin's Munich speech in 2007.

CHAPTER 4: RISING RUSSIAN HARD POWER; FROM MUNICH SPEECH OF PUTIN TO ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

After the end of the Cold War, the Russia-NATO relationship had generally followed a remittent course until the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014. I argue to analyze the last decade of the twentieth century as a controversial period about the Russian state for this relationship, as we elevated previous chapters. Russia had always tried to be an equal partner and respectful actor, on the contrast that, NATO generally behaved to Russia as a defeated adversary and it was expected Russia should play what NATO gave to her as a role in the new world order. According to the attitude of the Western alliance, If Russia would like to integrate the European and Atlantic alliance; she has to admit the values and supremacy of the alliance (D. Suslov 2016, 2). In the first years of the 1990s, Russia tried to follow this understanding of integration with Europe. There was huge public support for that to pro-Western politicians, like Kozyrev and Yeltsin, also. Russia had tried to prove that she is not a threat to European security. Participation in the Bosnia Operation of UN Security Council, Partnership for Peace program of NATO, and extracting NATO as the main threat for Russian national security from military doctrines were some efforts of Russia for integration with West. However, NATO's ignoring and humiliating policies with the leadership of the US towards Russia have caused the emergence of anti-Western movements, like right-wing nationalists and Communists in the eyes of the Russian public and elites. Through the second half of the 1990s, the starting of the enlargement process of NATO towards Eastern Europe and Kosovo intervention of NATO as behaving gendarme of the world without the need of UNSC's justification were two main aspects of awakening and rising Russian security concerns towards West.

Although, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton reached an agreement about economic and political issues in Helsinki on 21 March 1997, NATO's enlargement policy was not ended by the US. Russians thought that NATO will be cared for Russian security concerns after the Yeltsin-Clinton negotiation in Helsinki but, NATO has pursued expansionist policy towards

former Soviet states and Russian borders. According to statistics from Zimmerman's study, in 1993, less than half of the Russian public, political, and security elites perceived the US and NATO as a threat. However, it raised five of six in 1999, due to the enlargement of NATO towards Eastern Europe and Kosovo air bombings by NATO. (Yesson 1999, 13) Vladimir Putin was elected as a second President of the Russian Federation in these conditions in 2000. However, Putin had followed the Russian attempts to improve relations with Europe and North-Western America, though anti-Western values had arisen in Russia. Throughout the presidential campaign period, pro-Western oligarchs like Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Alexander Berezovski had worked actively in favor of Vladimir Putin. Putin is a clever man, he knew Russia can not struggle with the US and NATO with the weak, corrupted, de-organized, and outdated structures of political and military elites of Russia. He decided to consolidate the unity of Russia by going over the Chechen problem.

4.1. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS UNDER THE SHADOW OF CHRONIC PROBLEMS

Russia was one of the first countries showing its support to the US, after the 9/11 attacks. Putin stated robust expressions about the solidarity of Russia with the US against terrorism on 12 September 2001. Russia also actively supported operations of NATO in Afghanistan with permission of using Russian air space and showing its consent to the establishment of a US airbase in Kyrgyzstan for operations in Afghanistan. Besides that, Russia joined the Operation Active Endeavour of NATO in the Mediterranean Sea in 2004. On the other hand, Russia also had caught an opportunity to pursue hard operations against Chechens on the behalf of the struggle with terrorism during this period.

However, despite the constructive attempts of Putin's Russia for improving relations with the West, the West had pursued anti-Russian policies as;

- Starting of the biggest enlargement process of NATO in 2002 with inviting seven countries for giving Membership Action Plan(MAP) as following the open-door policy of NATO,

- Invasion of Iraq by the US,
- Continuation of NATO enlargement – Memberships of Croatia and Albania in 2009
- Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003,
- Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004,
- US withdrawal from ABM in 2002,
- Reaching towards Russian borders of NATO in 2004 and
- Ongoing Missile Defense System plans of the US for deploying missiles to Eastern Europe etc.

Throughout that period, mostly, Russia and the US had succeeded in pursuing warm relations, especially with the close personnel relationship between G. Bush and V. Putin. In addition, both countries have tried to focus other problems like the Chechen case, modernization army, transformation of political elites, and establishing new relations with CIS countries for Russia; on the other side, NATO and the US had decided mostly focus on new rising threats from China and Iran, global terrorism, promoting democracy to the Middle Eastern countries. Ignoring Russia's policies of NATO had continued with enlargement towards the Baltic States, starting missile defense projects in Europe and attempts to reach the Black Sea region. Russian concerns about NATO's containment attempts of Russia were higher than in the last period of the 1990s in this period.

Firstly, attempts for influence to Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century, after that, expansion towards Baltic Sea and finally, plan for expansion NATO's borders towards Ukraine and Georgia after Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea. If we think Russian lack of trust in NATO together with all of these developments, Russian feelings about contained by NATO must not be seen as a ridiculous conspiracy theory or paranoia of Russia. Briefly, Putin's Russia had come from that bumpy way to the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

4.2. MUNICH SPEECH OF PUTIN

According to some politicians and scholars, the Munich speeches of Vladimir Putin have some similarities with the Falcon speeches of Winston Churchill. Words of Putin

created sensational effects in international relations. Its similarity with Churchill's arguments was the entailing affairs about beginning the new Cold War between West and Russia. Actually, Putin's speech at the security conference was not genuine and newly discovered words. Many academicians, experts in international relations discipline, and politicians has used similar evaluations with Putin, for ongoing relations between West and Russia since the beginning of twenty first century. However, when these words used as a security conference paper by Russian President and referring to these words directly to US and its European partners were given special care to these words, which stated by Russian President. In addition that, after the end of the Cold War, that was the most hard and concrete movements of Russia against NATO and US until that time, in the IR arena.

In this famous speaking of Putin stated that what kind of developments had been affected Russian security concerns, which behaviors entailed increasing lack of trust between each side, and what would happen, if something will not be changed in the future. In this part of the third chapter, I will be analyzed Putin words as, their importance of highlighting past developments between Russia and the West and foreseeable arise concerns for the future from the Russian perspective, which stated by Putin in the conference but, I try to analyze these developments from Russian window to that case in this study.

In order to analyze the Munich Speech of Putin, I outline it as some substantial titles from this long speech. I prefer to outline it with these emphasized issues:

- ❖ Unipolar polices of US
- ❖ Emphasize the essentials of effective international organizations such as the UN and OSCE.
- ❖ Violations of international law by Western countries.
- ❖ Warning for the growing arms race.
- ❖ Offer for establishing a new European Security Organization with including the Russian Federation.
- ❖ Missile Defense System crisis
- ❖ Given words from the West, which were forgotten and not kept.
- ❖ Enlargement of NATO towards Russian borders.

❖ Reducing mutual trust.

I would like to follow a chronological way for the beginning of the scrutiny of the speech. Therefore, firstly, Putin's reminding of the words of NATO's General Secretary Mr. Woerner in 1990 could be a genuine start point for that, Putin stated that;

"I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that "the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee." Where are these guarantees?" (Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

These words of Putin pointed out that the forgotten and no keeping words, which were given by the West to Russia, after the end of the Cold War. Putin pursued his words with the enlargement of NATO towards Russian borders and reducing mutual trust by adding other words about these issues for the comprehensive analyzing.

"The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times." (Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

After the statement of these forgotten and no kept actions of NATO, he added that subsequently;

“But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfill the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

He passed the enlargement policy of NATO after opposite words for the armament of NATO. Putin also criticized the new security concept understanding of NATO with the slamming to enlargement policy of alliance. For the final evaluation of these words, Putin shows Russian disturbance to NATO’s new out of space operation understanding, since the Afghanistan operations. He said;

“NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?

... why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question?”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

As we stated in the first chapter of this study, lack of trust, low-level mutual trust, no sharing of information, and knowledge are some of the considerable notions of security dilemma understanding of states. These notes were addressed by Putin to Western counterparts of Russia to explain them dramatic rising of Russian security concerns due to their behaviors towards Russia. In this context, he also warns them about the triggering role of the arms race of that policy. One of the questions, which were asked to him, after his address to more than forty nation’s leaders or ministers of countries about Russian claims about the armaments of NATO. Before the question, the person who asked the question to Putin

criticized Russian new missile testing of Topol-V(long-range missile) and stated no new workings for the missiles of the US. So, he asked the Russian intention and reliability for disarmament in this situation. In brief, Putin emphasizes the lack of information about US missile works. He said, *“we know they have some works and we have taken our measures for that with our works.”*(*Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy*, 2007)

After the 9/11 attacks, the US proclaimed a global war against terrorism, and G.W. Bush, who was the president of the US at that time, sent the robust message to the other countries in the world as; “Choose your side! Will you with us or against us?” That was so controversial stance, which embodied US foreign policy bring about many critics even from European partners such as France and Germany. However, any country can not stand powerfully against unipolar activities of the US such as the invasion of Iraq, air bombings in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Pakistan in favor of anti-terrorist operations. Actually, some critics from Russia, France, and Germany were considerable reactions against the US, especially against the invasion of Iraq by the US but, as we stated above, none of them had any power to deter US from implementing its unipolar policies.

On the contrary, the rising of new regional and global actors like Russia, China, and India has caused arising these critical voices in the US. Munich Speech of Putin was the most powerful discourse of Russia, though Russian officials’ slams had been until 2007, occasionally. Putin slams the directly US about its unipolar actions, using hard military power on behalf of universal values, like promotion and protection of democracy and humanitarian issues, using NATO and EU for its national interests, ignoring international law and international organizations, which we mentioned before. Unipolar understanding of the US was the main target of Putin and he pursued his words from the around of this context. He started as;

“It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.”

...

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

...

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

He continued his words by adding European partners of the US for blames with the slams of promotion and importing democracy to the other countries as a foreign policy attitude, which has been followed by the US with its Western partners' support. He said clearly that;

“For some reason (who cited words, which we noted above) those who teach us do not want to learn democracy themselves.”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

Subsequently, the identified foreign policy of the US along the post-Cold War period as high-handed, arbitrary, and illegal. Choosing military elements for the solution of problems instead of political solutions and diplomacy, ignoring and humiliating other regional and global powers and intergovernmental organizations such the US, UN, and OSCE for the international relations issues as a competent authority were great blames to the US and its European partners. His words were like that;

“Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

...

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

...

It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasize this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course, such a policy stimulates an arms race.

...

Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime – a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

Finally, he ended his words with the direct answer to the Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, who spoke before Putin. He defended the policy of the EU and NATO as their legitimacy discussions. Putin's answer to him also was spectacular counter-words to the defenders of NATO's and EU's policy. They were:

“In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn't hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain

for international law, then the situation will be able to change.”(Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2007)

4.3. BUCHAREST SUMMIT OF NATO IN 2008

Bucharest Summit of NATO in April 2008 was important to see the membership process of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. There was a critical question that NATO will give the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia or not? MAP is known as the last step before the membership to NATO. Russia warned many times NATO about the dangerous results of possible MAP given to Georgia and Ukraine. However, NATO didn't give MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, although the desires of the US to give MAP to these countries. Nevertheless, European powers in NATO, especially France and Germany, did not want to anger Russia with that decision. In the draft of decisions in Bucharest Summit, instead of giving MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO proclaimed that these countries would be a member of NATO one day in the future. Russia denounced that explanation from NATO and identified it as a “huge strategic mistake” in Reuters news about the Russian reaction to the summit. (Staff, 2008) In the same news, Reuters claimed that with relying on one diplomat from the alliance, giving MAP to Ukraine and Georgia will be re-evaluated in December 2008. However, Russia gave a clear message to the West before December 2008 with the military intervention to Georgia in August 2008. Russian pressure to prevent giving MAP to Ukraine and Georgia was successful. However, the US desires about that issue has continued. Russian perspective after the summit was stated by Putin as;

“We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders...as a direct threat to the security of our country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. National security is not based on promises.” (Tsygankov 2018, 7)

Tsygankov claim in his article with relying on a report of Russian news agency Interfax that the Russian public too reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the alliance's enlargement towards Russian borders. 74% of Russians polled in March 2008 said that Ukraine's possible accession to NATO posed a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, and

77% expressed a similar attitude towards Georgia's possible membership in the organization. (Tsygankov 2018, 7) Putin warned the ongoing possible arms race if any missile defense system will be established in Europe without Russian involvement. Therefore, he cited Reagan's Speech in 1983 for sharing missile defense technology with the Soviets to prevent the increasing of arms race between them. Scale and structure of deployment of missile defense systems to Europe and controversial positions of Russia have remained unresolved question between Russia and West. It will be the most important tackle of the reset policy of NATO-Russia relations with the leadership of Medvedev and Barack Obama.

4.4. RESET POLICY, ONGOING TACKLES AND RE-BREAKING RELATIONS

Throughout the last period of the second term of Vladimir Putin as Russian President, relations of NATO and Russia were the worst situation after the end of the Cold War. Although, there had been good friendships between G. W. Bush and V. Putin, Russian and US relations had gone gradually to the breaking down, due to an increased lack of trust between them which we stated in the previous chapter. However, last few years of the first decade of the twenty-first century both great powers' changed and newly elected presidents brought about rising hopes for possible warming of relations between great powers, due to the political character of newly elected presidents of both countries. On 8 May 2008, Dmitry Medvedev came to power in Russia as a president, and V. Putin was appointed as prime minister by Medvedev. He was a different figure when we think about Putin's anti-Western attitude during his last year as a president. Medvedev looked like as a more cooperative and communicable for Western countries' leaders to re-establish good relations with Russia. Because, Medvedev is known as a political figure among Russian political elites, who believe Russia should be a more cooperative and west-oriented country. On the other hand, on 4 November 2008, Barack Obama was a candidate of democrats, who won the general elections in the US and he took over the presidential seat from G.W. Bush. Bush was the Republican Party's leader and his party well-known as the hawkish side of US political culture, which mostly tends to use hard power as a foreign policy attitude. On the contrary, Democrats are generally known to follow foreign policy by using soft power and diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. In this situation, as expected, NATO-Russia relations were reset by the

commitments of both countries' leaders. Reset Policy was proclaimed by Vice President of US, Joe Biden, at Munich Security Conference in 2009. He stated that new relations with these words;

"It's time to press the reset button and revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia" (Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2009)

Therefore, in 2009, the Russia-NATO relationship had caught acceleration with reciprocal positive steps taken by both countries. Some experts called that time a honeymoon period of the NATO-Russia relationship. As provided that honeymoon period of relations, US-Russia signed a new START agreement, Russia agreed to implement UN sanctions to Iran, US gave new guarantees that the establishment of Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe was reconsidered, accordingly Russian concerns, were one of the new cooperation and culmination of NATO-Russia new established partnership. The final example of that gaining cooperation between both sides was the signing agreement about using Russian airspace for the logistic support to NATO operations in Afghanistan. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan Parliament decided to terminate American Airbase in Manas, which was using as a plot area for the operations in Afghanistan by NATO. After that decision of Kyrgyzstan, NATO and Russia reached an agreement with the Russian offer to the US about using Russian air space for NATO's anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. As a result of that, Russia became an active partner of NATO in Afghanistan. (Freire 2014, 376)

In addition, these improvements, the NATO-Russia Council meeting was restarted in the spring of 2009, which were halted by NATO after the Russian military intervention to Georgia in 2008. The giving last instance as a positive development between Russia and NATO was the implementing joint air exercise between the alliance and Russia in 2013, which were called as "Vigilant Sky" (*NATO and Russia hold joint counter-terror exercise 'Vigilant Skies', 2013*). Although happening of these positive actions from both sides in this period, there was still potential rift points between the alliance and Russia, which has been refrained from both sides to solve these unresolved cases. Uncertainty about deploying missile systems to Eastern Europe, Russian attitudes about recognition South Ossetia and

Abkhazia as independent states, which are separated areas of Georgia, future of “NATO-Ukraine and EU-Ukraine” relations were the most well-known chronic problems for relations between NATO and Russia. In addition, these potential problems emerging Arab Uprising in Middle Eastern countries and changing conjuncture in Ukraine, in favor of Russia, after coming power of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine on 25 February 2010 endangered certain warm relations between NATO and Russia. In the final stage, the Ukrainian Crisis and annexation of the Crimea by Russia with the military intervention was the bitterest result of these culminated unresolved and newborn problems between both sides.

4.5. SURFACING CULMINATED PROBLEMS AND BREAKING DOWN OF WARM RELATIONS

Missile Defense System Project of the NATO had been the most severe problem between NATO and Russia since when it started in 2002. The project contains a deployment of anti-missile systems to Eastern Europe with the leadership of the US for the security of Europe. Although many stated official explanations by NATO about the mission of the project that, it is not against Russia, on contrary; Russia has always perceived the project as a real threat to eliminate its nuclear attack capability. Russia many times ask official document about that mission of the project is not against Russia. It has to contained legal binding for NATO. But NATO did not also accept that offer of Russians. Any possibility of losing its nuclear attack capability for Russia was not acceptable. Because, it means losing the most powerful balancer pillar against Western powers for Russia. Therefore, Russia has always objected to any projects about missile defense system without Russian involvement as an equal partner. Russia also argued that the project violates the ABM and INF signed agreements between the US and Russia about European security. Russian disturbance reached the top level after NATO’s European allies calls for the deployment of the American national missile defense systems to Eastern Europe. US, Poland, and the Czech Republic took concrete steps about deploying Patriots in Poland and radar systems in the Czech Republic. Russia warned NATO about its serious intention to retreat from CFE Treaty and deploying middle-range Iskandar Missiles to Kaliningrad. (Rogov 2009, 52) Russia even

threatened Poland with nuclear intervention. However, as we noted above, after the restarting and revisiting policy period between the US and Russia, deployments of missile systems to Europe and deployment of Iskandar Missiles to Kaliningrad as a counter-reaction not go-ahead than threats of both sides. On the contrary to NATO's arguments about the mission of the system against the Iranian threat, Russia offered a new proposal to NATO to test NATO's trusty. That offer was the establishment of a new security concept for Europe with the participation of Russia as an equal partner and deploying common Russian-US made radar systems to Azerbaijan against missile threats from Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explain the Russian proposal for common missile and radar system project as;

"The Russian president's proposal to the United States for joint operation of a radar facility based in Azerbaijan's Gabala, and his recent proposals made in Kennebunk port for the creation of a regional monitoring and early warning system, provide an opportunity to find a way out of the current situation while taking into account the sentiments of all parties involved" ("Containing Russia", 2007)

However, the US and its European allies in NATO did not accept the Russian offer and they suggested two separated but coordinated systems, which will be established by Russia and NATO. For this offer, the answer of Russia was given clearly by President Medvedev in 2011, he said that Russia never accepts any projects of missile systems in Eastern Europe without the participation of Russia to project as an equal partner. (Ratti 2013, 146) In this situation, discussions over that problem have continued as like that, until the irreversible breaking down of relations in 2014.

A second separation between Russian and NATO was the de-facto situations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. After the Russian military intervention to Georgia in 2008, S. Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaimed their independence from Georgia and Russia recognized immediately their independence as revenge for the recognition of Kosovo's independence by NATO members. That was also the punishment way of Russia to Georgia due to its attempts for being a member of NATO with the leadership of Mikhail Saakashvili. Besides that, Russia also took an opportunity to deploy Russian troops with the wills of South Ossetian and Abkhazian assurance governments in the South Caucasia region. Therefore, the

South Ossetia and Abkhazia cards of Russia did not give up easily by her, because of their usefulness to prevent Georgia's NATO membership desires. Although attempts to improve relations between NATO and Russia, NATO pursued to enhance relations with Georgia. In 2011, NATO identified Georgia as an aspirant country in a joint community of foreign ministers of NATO. NATO has always denounced Russian attitude about South Ossetia and Abkhazia and reiterated its calls to Russia the reversing its policy towards these separated areas from NATO's close partner Georgia, in time. (Antonenko, 2009) Sergei Lavrov warned NATO about its Georgia policy. He identified Georgia policy of NATO as "bewilderment, regret and alertness" (Forsberg & Herd 2015, 12)

As we noted above, besides these unresolved problems, the erupting Arab Uprising in Middle Eastern countries has become another interest conflict area for the NATO countries and Russia. Russian stance towards uprising in Middle Eastern countries to protect its economic earnings from special connections with some anti-Western dictators like Moammar Qaddafi and Bashar Al Assad in Libya and Syria. However, during the beginning of mass protests, Russia posed itself near the West with the leadership of Dmitry Medvedev, despite Prime Minister Putin's opposition. Putin anticipated these mass protests in Middle Eastern countries similar to mass protests in Ukraine and Georgia during color revolutions. He claimed these protests had been funded by Western countries with their non-governmental organizations to change conjuncture in favor of the West in the region. Nevertheless, Medvedev pursued corporation with NATO and Russia showed its consent for the military intervention of NATO in Libya. As a result of that, on 19 March 2011, NATO began military operations in Libya in order to protect civilians from the bombardment of Qaddafi's Air Command by creating a no-fly zone. Qaddafi will be forced to sit table for a political and peaceful solution in Libya. Resolution 1973, which was given by the UN Security Council to NATO for accomplishing these purposes in Libya. Russian consent for NATO's intervention was just for these duties and missions in Libya. However, NATO's operations had transformed to toppling Qaddafi Regime mission in Libya in the process. Furthermore, it finished with the cruel extermination of Qaddafi by protesters in his hiding place from NATO air bombings. From the Russian perspective, a lack of trust in relations with NATO

re-gained after these unreliable actions of NATO in Libya. Anti-Western discourses of Putin and other political elites had raised considerable dimensions in this period. After the re-election of Putin, Russia did not nominate an ambassador to NATO and Putin did not join the Chicago Summit of NATO in 2012.

For the final words of unresolved and newborn problems between NATO and Russia was the influence attempts of both sides to Ukraine. After Yanukovych's victory in Ukraine in 2010, the Ukrainian pro-NATO policy genuinely turned into a more balanced and pro-Russian political position. Although I will be analyzed in detail in the last chapter of this study, we should be mentioned briefly the paving stones to the breaking down of the NATO-Russia relationship in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovych's first actions mostly focused on the halting of the membership attempts of Ukraine to NATO, which was one of the first goals of the previous government and he said that, the lack of absolute will of Ukrainian people for the membership of NATO can not be ignored. Therefore, according to him, Ukraine should not be part of NATO in these conditions. Besides that, he signed an agreement with Russia to prolong the leasing of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea through 2042. Finally, the refusal for signing the Association Agreement with the European Union, which was one of the crucial steps for absolute integration of Ukraine to EU, was the last development for the beginning of the civil war in Ukraine. In brief, these were the current and last developments to the way for Euromaidan Protests and Russian military intervention to Ukraine in the Crimea. In conclusion, Yanukovych runs away to Moscow, and counter-reactions of pro-Russian and Russian ethnic peoples in Eastern Ukraine to the new West-oriented government caused to start conflicts at the beginning of 2014.

CHAPTER 5: ROAD TO RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION TO UKRAINE

5.1. RETAINING BLACK SEA FLEET OF RUSSIA IN THE CRIMEA

The Crimea had been hosted Russian maritime power in the Black Sea region for imperialist purposes of the Russian Empire until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. After the establishment of the new communist empire as the Soviet Union, it had also represented the southwestern flank of the Soviets. However, the Black Sea had been one of the most peaceful zones throughout the Cold War, due to its situation as an accepted natural influenced area of the USSR. (Özdamar 2010, 347) In the final stage, separation of Soviet republics as independent states, the situation of the Ukraine and Belarus had become a problem in this process. Russia did not want to accept the existence of Ukraine and Belarus as independent states. Because, according to Russians, Ukraine and Belarus are part of the Russian land and they can not separate from Russia. If these countries would like to separate from Russia, they should agree to Russian demands as open borders, integrated economy, and special alliance at least like the European Union, between Russia and these countries. Belarus had integrated itself with Russia with acceptance of almost all of the Russian demands. On the other hand, Ukraine adjusted to follow a different way, unlike Belarus. Ukraine adopted political strategy as absolute separation from Russia and full integration with Europe. In this situation, one of the indispensable questions comes up: What will be the fate of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR and the statue of the Crimea?

After the resolving nuclear arsenal problem in Ukraine in 1994, (*Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1994) Ukraine and Russia had started the negotiations to solve the problem about Black Sea Fleet of the USSR in the Crimea. Actually, the situation of the Crimea was not one of the discussion issues for Ukraine. It was just a problem that was raised by Russia. The Crimea was gifted to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev for the celebration of joining Ukraine to the Soviet Republic. Russia asserted the presenting of the

Crimea to Ukraine was not the official decision of the Russian Soviet Republic. It was just the personnel decision, which was given by N. Khrushchev without ratification of the Politburo. Therefore, during the negotiations between the two countries from 1994 to 1997, the Russian High Court canceled the validity of the official decision of the Khrushchev about the Crimea, due to lack of the ratification of the Politburo at that time. Counter-reaction of the Ukrainian Parliament, which is called as “Rada”, was strong. Rada announced that if any violation will be happened to Ukrainian borders by Russia, it causes cancellation of the destruction of the nuclear weapons agreement, which was signed between USA, Britain, Russia, and Ukraine. Besides that, Ukraine has a decisive attitude to protect its borders and Ukraine will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against any attack. (Sherr 1997, 37) That was a horrible and real threat. Ukraine was the second most hosted nuclear weapons of the USSR. After becoming an independent state, Ukraine came forward as the third biggest nuclear power in the world. After this robust stand of Ukraine, Russia stepped back its allegations about the statue of the Crimea and negotiators focused only on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea.

The main base of the USSR in the Black Sea had been located in Sevastopol, Crimea. After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine gave Russia five years to transport naval assets of the USSR from the Crimea to one of the new Russian harbors in the region. Russia started to construct new naval bases in Novorossiysk, which is one of the littoral cities of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea. However, Russia did not want to give up its naval bases in the Crimea. It started negotiations with Ukraine to stay in the Crimea by leasing naval bases. At the same time, it pursued construction tempts for a new naval base in Novorossiysk. The Black Sea Fleet of the USSR had also contained Ukrainian Military Forces in naval bases but the share of the Ukrainian Forces was not many when we compare with Russian assets. In this situation, Russia offered to Ukraine to grant 53 naval assets, which were warships, vessels, submarines, etc., as one of the payment processes for leasing naval bases in the Crimea. All of the bargains between Russia and Ukraine for Russian naval bases in the Crimea completed as an agreement with these results:

- ❖ Conclusive resolution of the legal status of the Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea Fleet.
- ❖ No reference is made to Ukraine's non-alignment.
- ❖ The principal concession to Ukraine is the implementation of joint basing: the completion of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) division
- ❖ 52 naval assets (one submarine, three frigates, and 48 small vessels) were granted to Ukraine by Russia
- ❖ In principle, the BSF's lease of 20 years (renewable for a further five) represents a compromise between Russia's initial bid for 40 years and Ukraine's desire for 5-7. (Sherr 1997, 36)

Russia had accomplished to keep handle naval bases in the Black Sea region at the end of the stressful process. I can argue that, when we think of Russian political and military image at that time, the agreement would be evaluated as an advantage for Russia, especially for the establishment of new security arrangements of Russia in the Black Sea. The political and economic results of the agreement could be counted as a success for Ukraine; protection of its national borders, even the Crimea, borders was accepted officially by Russia without giving substantial concessions to Russia as Belarus did. On the contrary, when we look at the agreement from the military and security window, Russia almost took what it wants from the negotiations. According to the agreement, eighty percent of the naval bases and assets will be used by Russian forces in the Crimea. Granted naval assets to Ukraine were mostly outdated types of equipment. According to Admiral Kravchenko from Russian Naval Command stated that *"%60 of the assets in the in the Black Sea were outdated and can not be used actively for the operations"* (Sherr 1997, 41) If we take the considerable arguments of the quotes of the admiral, we could say that Russia did not lose remarkable military assets in this compromise. Russia has already known that, if it would like to compete with the modernized maritime power of Turkey in the Black Sea, it must reform and reinforce its maritime power in the Black Sea. Therefore, Russia will be started a military modernization program in the army from 2011 to 2020 and one of the crucial parts of the budget will be

spent for the Black Sea Fleet. *“The Russian SAP 2011–2020 provides a general framework for the buildup of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. Moscow plans to spend €500 billion for the modernization of its army, and the Navy should benefit from €112,4 billion that will turn it from an ageing Soviet fleet into a modern one by 2020. The buildup of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea is one of the highest priorities of the Kremlin: up to 18 new units are expected to be commissioned by 2020.”* (Delanoe 2014, 6) For the final arguments of this part for that chapter, Russia took almost what it wants in the 1997 Accord Agreement about leasing naval bases in the Crimea. She also protects its presence in the historical city of the Crimea, Sevastopol. Finally, she has started to study for the professionalizing and modernizing military power in the Black Sea region by deploying new weapon systems.

5.2. CONTAINMENT FEAR OF RUSSIA

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation emerged as the heir of it. It was a fragmented, weak and so complex situation at that time. For this reason, Russia had tried to rally itself along the first decade of the post-Cold War period. In this period, it had expected something from West like the respect of its great power status, no violation of its natural influenced areas, which was identified as a “near abroad” on latter, and be counting as an equal partner for fostering new European security context. However, developments in the first decades of the post-Cold War period had not happened like what Russians expect. Western policies had caused the rising security concerns of Russian political-military elites and Russian people with the following controversial policies by the Western countries through this period. Actually, Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 was a considerable warning to the West about Russian sensitivity for its near abroad. More important than this, Russia showed its regained confidence, better economic situation, and great military power to the West, via intervention to Georgia. There was a clear message from Russia to the West with the punishment of Georgia; “There will be no Russia as feeble, poor, weak and passive against enlargement and containment policies of NATO.” Memberships of Baltic States, Romania, and Bulgaria to NATO, increasing presence of US

in Central Asia like construction of an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine had entailed rising of Russian perspective that was the containment of Russia by NATO with the isolation attempts. If we look at the map and we can not say that Russian concerns were just paranoid conspiracy theories. NATO in Baltics, the US in Central Asia, NATO in the Black Sea, and NATO at the southwestern borders of Russia with enlargement attempts towards Georgia and Ukraine.




Figure III: NATO's Eastern Expansion Map, Source: www.nato.int

That means the absolute containment of the Russian most industrialized cities and capital of Russia from west, southwest, and south. As we stated above, the Russian reaction to Georgia in 2008 was a clear message for this raised security dilemma of Russia towards the West. How Western countries did ignore these growing Russian security concerns to the

West? Why Georgia was not enough warning for NATO to understand the essential of creating a new consistent policy towards Russia? Actually, NATO looked like understand Russian messages from the Georgian War, when we consider the amendment of the “reset and revisit” policy of the US and its Western partners towards Russia in 2009. However, as we noted the previous chapter, not finding exact resolutions for the chronic problems like deploying missile systems to Eastern Europe by the US, status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, ongoing open door policy of NATO in favor of enlargement towards East and out of space operations of NATO. These had shown that the honeymoon period of NATO-Russia relations from 2009 to 2012 was just the well-known side of the iceberg. Therefore, these chronic problems arose the surface of the water after the beginning of the third term of Vladimir Putin in 2012

The main reason for the Russian intervention to Georgia was the massive desire of Saakashvili for joining NATO. Besides Ukrainian politicians before the Yanukovich government also had great willingness for the taking membership of NATO. There was also another threat to Russian security understanding about Ukraine. That was the Eastern Partnership Program of the EU. It was as important as for Russian interests in Ukraine. (*The Eastern Partnership*) Russia had tried to establish its policies with geopolitical and geo-economical parameters since the second term of Vladimir Putin. For this purpose, Russia has tried to resurrect the Eurasian Union idea with the purpose of economic integration at the former Soviet republics in the second decade of the twentieth century. Ukraine was the most crucial country for Russia due to its importance for the Russian economy. In contrast, there were also ongoing negotiations between the European Union and Ukraine since 2009 and it will be resulted in November 2013. While the closing to November in this period, Russia had tried to persuade Ukraine for choosing Russia by implementing a carrot and stick policy to this country. Ukraine was asking for 20 billion Euros in loans and aid from the EU, in contrast, the EU was just willing to offer 610 billion Euros with the conditions, which were about some regulations at laws and releasing of Yulia Tymoshenko from jail. On the other side, Russia offered Ukraine 15 billion Dollars in loans with discounts for the gas price (almost %15 discount) without conditions. That was the carrot for Ukraine, which was

offered by Russia. However, Russia also showed stick to Ukraine with warning quotes from high-level political figures of Russia. (Mearsheimer, 2014) As an instance for that, we could look at the expressions of one of the advisors of President Vladimir Putin, Sergey Glazyev, at Guardian. He stated that; *“Ukrainian authorities make a huge mistake if they think that the Russian reaction will become neutral in a few years from now. This will not happen.”* (*Ukraine’s EU trade deal will be catastrophic, says Russia*, 2013) He warned Ukraine that the Russian reaction will not be passive and silent. He pointed out the default possibility of the Ukrainian economy with implanting Russian economic sanctions. If the agreement will be done between Ukraine and the EU, although the existence of Russian warnings about taking counter-reactions, Russian measurement will be harder. He continued his arguments by showing stick to Ukraine as; *“If the Ukrainian economy will be a crisis, Russia will not help. Russia is the main creditor of Ukraine. Only with customs union with Russia (He means Eurasian Economic Union) can Ukraine balance its trade. Russia has already slapped import restrictions on certain Ukrainian products and it will be critical level if the agreement was signed between Ukraine and European Union”*. (*Ukraine’s EU trade deal will be catastrophic, says Russia*, 2013) His final words as possible Russian punishment policy towards Ukraine almost like a projection of the future destiny of Ukraine in 2014. He said; *“We don’t want to use any kind of blackmail. This is a question for the Ukrainian people. Nevertheless, legally, signing this agreement about an association with the EU, the Ukrainian government violates the treaty or strategic partnership and friendship with Russia. When this happened, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine’s status as a state and could possibly intervene if pro-Russian region of country appealed directly to Moscow”* (*Ukraine’s EU trade deal will be catastrophic, says Russia*, 2013) Beyond EU attempts to settle an agreement with Ukraine, there was also controversial activities of Western powers in Ukraine as before happened Orange Revolution. Mearsheimer accuses the US and its European anti-Russian activities of them using some civil society organizations and political figures with anti-Russian understanding. Mearsheimer strongly criticizes US political figures as Victoria Nuland, who was US Assistant Secretary of State, and Senator John McCain due to their clear supports for the anti-Russian protests in Kyiv. (Mearsheimer 2014, 4) Funding pro-Western individuals and groups with the hand of the National Endowment of Democracy

(NED) were so provocative movements against Russia. Especially, Mearsheimer argues writing of NED's President Carl Gershman in Washington Post in September 2013 showed legal and rightful concerns of Russians about that the next target of NATO and EU will be Russia and Vladimir Putin government. Carl Gershman write in the Washington Post;

"Ukraine's choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents. ...Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself." (Former Soviet states stand up to Russia. Will the U.S.? - The Washington Post, 2013)

Beyond these words of Gershman, as a leaked telephone recording of Victoria Nuland, while pro-Western protests were pursuing in Kyiv. She wants to regime change in Ukraine and sees Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the new Prime Minister of Ukraine. (Mearsheimer, 2014, 4) That is a clear intervention to the interior affairs of independent states, violation of international law, and norms. In his article, Mearsheimer gave possible anti-US and pro-Chinese activities in Mexico or Kanada as an example to explain Russian rightful security concerns about pro-Western activities in Ukraine. However, I will give example, which will be had direct contact with Russia. If Dmitry Peskov, who is one of the advisors of President Putin, and Gennady Zyuganov were joined pro-Russian and anti-Western protests in Mexico or If Russia was tried to persuade Mexico to join CIS or If Mexico was an exit from NAFTA to join the Eurasian Union, What would be the reactions of US against these developments?

Yanukovych's government in Ukraine rejected the EU's offer and agreed with Russia for 15 billion dollars credit and discounts from gas prices. That was the main trigger element of the erupting Euromaidan Protests against the government. Protesters accused Yanukovych of being a puppet of Russia and turning on the face of Ukraine from the West to Russia. Protests had became uncontrollable level in days and Yanukovych fled from Kyiv to Moscow. Because he was afraid for his life. That was mean the joining of Russia to the Ukrainian crisis as an active great military power in the field. Russia and Yanukovych did not recognize the new government in Ukraine, which was brought by protesters. Russia was still accepting Yanukovych as Ukrainian President. In this situation, according to the Russian arguments, Russian military intervention had been realized in the Crimea on the behalf of the

protection of Russian speaking and Russian ethnic groups with help calls of Yanukovych as Ukrainian President on 1 March 2014. From the Russian perspective, Russian intervention in Ukraine was legal. Because there was the official calling from the recognized and elected Ukrainian President. Responsibility for Protection understanding for Russian speaking and ethnic groups and happening “illegal” coup in Ukraine were other arguments of Russia for justifying the annexation of the Crimea as a legal act.

In summary, the paving way for Russian military intervention to Ukraine and the Crimea had developed in this process. However, why the Russian bear showed its claws explicitly in Ukraine? Why it did not happen during the NATO membership of the Baltic States in 2004? These countries also close Russian borders as Ukraine. The Baltic region also important strategically for Russian security as well as the Black Sea region. Furthermore, why Russia did not annex any territory from Georgia in 2008? What was the importance of the annexation of the Crimea for Russia? What has changed in Russian military power from the Georgian War to the annexation of the Crimea? Finally, how has the Russian stance towards the West transformed drastically to explicitly showing its military power?

5.3. UKRAINE AS A BUFFER ZONE

Out of the cultural and historical importance, Ukraine also carries great importance for the security of Russian land. It has been seen as a buffer zone or shield of vast lands, which is the biggest in Europe. For Russian national security, the length of its land has always been one of the substantial strategic defensive pillars along with history. All of the great wars in Russian history like the Great North War, Napoleon Wars, World War I, Civil Wars in the Bolshevik Revolution, and World War II had staged on the Russian defensive tactics. Russia had used vast major lands as a defensive weapon against its adversaries along with these great conflicts. This strategy had been always useful with the help of heavy conditions of weather in the Russian land. In this case, Ukraine was one of the most crucial territories for that Russian strategy. It had been always posed as a buffer zone between Russian and contemporary Western great powers. In this context, if we look at the current geopolitical

situation, Ukraine still has considerable importance as a buffer zone for Russia against Western powers. Therefore, its absolute loss is perceived as facing great threats directly and that means losing essential time for the emergency and losing advantage to exhaust adversary in a possible great war in this biggest land of Europe. In addition, that means also almost the exact loss of the Black Sea region, which is known as one of the weakest bellies of Russian military power since the end of the Cold War. Russia can not ignore these cases for its national security strategy and concerns. Therefore, keeping the Ukraine side of the Russian stand has always been one of the premiers of Russian national security understandings. “If can not keep Ukraine near of Russia, prevent its integration with West.” could be counted as a Russian attitude towards Ukraine through the post-Cold War period. Sergei Lavrov emphasized the words of the General Secretary of NATO to explain Russian threat perception about policies of NATO;

“NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said at a conference in Munich on February 6, 2010, that territorial defense remains NATO “core task” and added: “In an age of globalized insecurity, our territorial defense must begin beyond our borders.” I wonder how NATO would react if Russia’s conceptual documents contained something of this kind.” (“Containing Russia”, 2007)

Actually, the words of Stoltenberg were honest explanations of the security policies of both sides since the beginning of the millennium. Ukraine had always been one of the buffer zones between Western powers and Russia. Therefore, both side had begun the defense security interests of itself from Ukraine –beyond their borders-. However, the policies of NATO and the EU since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had attempted to change that situation in the security context around the Eurasia region. Attempts for the establishment of the full economic integration of Ukraine with following EU Eastern Partnership Program and possible NATO membership of NATO were real threats for a possible change of status quo in Ukraine against Russia.

5.4. GEOPOLITICAL AND HISTORICAL MISSION OF THE CRIMEA FOR RUSSIA

One of the critical aspects of Ukraine for Russia is the Crimea. As we analyzed previous chapters of this study, a statue of the Crimea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was one of the considerable geopolitical cases for the Russian Federation. Therefore, Ukraine and Russia had negotiated the destiny of the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet of the USSR along six years after the separation. In the end, both countries reached an agreement about the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet of the USSR in 1997. Road to Euromaidan Protests also had been related with this issue. Because signed 1997 Accord Agreement between Ukraine and Russia will be finished in 2017. After the victory of Yanukovych for the general election in Ukraine in 2010, Russia accelerated negotiations with Ukraine for the extension of leasing of naval bases in the Crimea until 2042. Before Yanukovych, pro-Western leaders Yushchenko and Tymoshenko always showed their opposition to the reiteration of the leasing agreement with Russia for naval bases in the Crimea. For this reason, Russian leverage reached top-level to renew the agreement with Ukraine for the Black Sea Fleet Naval Bases of Russia in the Crimea, when Yanukovych was elected as a president in Ukraine in 2010. In the end, Russia obtained what she wants in 2011, with the signing new agreement with Ukraine to the extent of the leasing agreement with new conditions towards 2042. There were huge protests against signing this agreement in Ukraine by pro-Westerner politicians and civil society groups. Their protests mainly focused to overthrow Yanukovych from the presidential seat and broke the deal with Russia. On the contrary, Russian understanding about these protests was perceived as a threat of using possible indirect Western intervention to Ukraine like happening in the Orange Revolution.

The Crimea has been always one of the most crucial centers of Russia to pursue the imperial strategy and desire for reaching warm waters since the last period of the 18th century. Besides that, it was also the center of the great power statue of Russia with the projection of military power towards Mediterranean and Middle East territories. When we think of these historical realities, the geopolitical importance of the Crimea for Russia must be counted as vital national security and national interest issue from a Russian security perspective.

Furthermore, there are also Russian traumatic security concerns about possible foreign intervention from the Black Sea region by foreign powers, as happened during the civil wars between the pro-tsarist White Army and Red Bolsheviks throughout 1922. There was critical support from Western powers with naval assets to the White Army against Bolsheviks in the Black Sea region. Russian high sensitivity for the security of Turkish straits during the Lausanne Peace Agreement's negotiations and signing Montreux Convention about the statuses of straits came from those chronic security affairs of Russia. The Black Sea region has been seen as a weak belly of Russian national security from the Russian perspective. In this term, protection of the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea and consolidation it with new modern weapon systems was essential for Russian security though. By the way, the special statue of the Sevastopol in Russian history as a national heroic city due to sacred resistance during the Crimean War in 1853-1856 also another crucial aspect for Russia to keep control of the Crimea in its hands. (M. D. Suslov 2014, 593)

The new strategy of the US to struggle with terrorism on a global scale with the assistance of its European allies, after the 9/11 attacks, 1999 intervention of NATO to Kosovo, and out of space operations of NATO towards the Middle East were awaked security concerns of Russia towards West. US temptation for enlargement Operation Active Endeavour towards the Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea was blocked with the commitment of Turkish-Russian authorities for the preservation of the status quo of the Montreux Convention and prevention of massive foreign powers' existence in the region. Although the existence of reliable common policy with Turkey along post-Cold War period, NATO's and EU's attempts to reach the region with other littoral states, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine, has caused the increasing Russian security dilemma understanding towards West because of perceived belligerent intentions of West. The military intervention of Russia to Georgia in August 2008 and short-precise victory was the first active reaction that raised Russian security concerns against possible threats from the West in the Black Sea region. However, the Georgian War also showed ongoing critical deficiencies of the Russian Army, immediate essence of modernization of military equipment, and limited using facilities of Black Sea Fleet due to Ukrainian control over the Crimea. Georgia was not a

proper field for real testing of Russian military capacity and Russian short-precise victory should not be deluded Russia about its hard power. (Baev & Institut français des relations internationales 2015, 7) Therefore, Putin and Medvedev started to huge modernization project for the Russian Army in all units. As we noted before, Black Sea Fleet was the most outdated and less cared military unit of the Russian Federation and almost one of third of the enormous military modernization budget of the Russian Army will be used for Navy and Black Sea Fleet will be taken biggest share from this budget. (Delanoe 2014, 371) After the annexation of the Crimea, the scale of the huge deployment of Russian military units in Ukraine can explain that Russian arose security concerns and dilemmas towards NATO and European Union. According to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the presence of the Russian military in the Black Sea region had already passed Soviet times.

5.5. PROVING CONFIDENCE TO THE WEST AND CONSOLIDATION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER

Throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, Russia generally had felt humiliated, ignored, and hurt its national pride due to Western attitudes towards it. Especially, ignoring Russian concerns with the continuation enlargement process of NATO, Kosovo Air Bombings, out of space operations of NATO, and color revolutions in the former Soviet republics had caused the elimination of political elites and Russian people's peaceful integration with the West. As I analyzed throughout this study, these are rising Russian security concerns and security dilemmas towards the West. Projection of that Russian gained concerns has shaped gradually increasing hard power, military power and attempts for regaining Russian great power statue with fore mentioning its nuclear power identity. In addition, improving conventional forces and modernization them, professionalizing military troops addressed as the national security policy for preserving and developing national interests of Russia.

That process started with the narrowing Russian influenced areas as “near abroad” (Lepingwell 1994, 73) , due to its limited capacity and bringing the fore nuclear power statue

for deterrence ability of Russia. Primakov and his pro-Eurasian followers were the leaders of that policy. The purpose of that policy was to re-gaining the Russian great power statue and protecting the backyard territories of Russia from the Western enlargement via NATO and the EU. Despite its robust opposition for several steps of Western countries with the leadership of the US, Russia could not respond proportionally to the West because of its fragile and indigent economy and outdated, the amateur structure of its army. Weak protests for air bombings of NATO to Serbia, NATO's enlargement towards Baltic States and Black Sea region, and out of space operations of NATO were based on the unprepared situation of Russia to robust stand against the disturbing policy of West, until the last years of the first decade of the millennium. The Russian development process for increasing its military capacity started with studying for air defense systems and preparing readiness for the possible use of nuclear weapons, after the NATO air bombings and its adjusted new concept in 1999 towards out of space mission. One of the Russian fear of that time was the possible military intervention of NATO to the conflicts in Russian borders, Chechenia, on the behalf of humanitarian intervention as happened in Kosovo. Therefore, Russia had started studies for the consolidation of its military power capacity. Sharply increased oil and gas prices after NATO's military intervention to Afghanistan with the leadership of the US and the invasion of Iraq by the US had been the most helpful pillars for the pursuing Russian re-armament process. Consolidation unitary structure of the federation, resolving the Chechen problem with using hard power, nationalizing of huge companies of oligarchs in several sectors like natural resources also other factors for the gained Russian military expenditures with the ameliorated economy.




Figure 4. Military Expenditures of States in the Black Sea Region 1998-2007
(SIPRI 2009)

In this table, we could see the changing military expenditures of the countries in the Black Sea region from 1998 (Kosovo Crisis) to 2007 (Munich Speeches of Putin). During the Kosovo crisis period, Russian military expenditures were looking less than 15 billion \$ in the table, on the contrary, that, Russian military expenditures in 2007 -in this year, Putin's defiance towards the US and its European partner and just one year ago of military intervention of Russia to Georgia- exceed 35 billion \$. It means more than two times increasing of Russian military expenditures only in less than ten years. By the way, Russian GDP since 1999 had gained almost eight times until 2008. According to the data of the World Bank, Russian GDP was 195, 9 billion \$ in 1998, on the contrary, that, Russian GDP reached towards 1,666 trillion \$ in 2007. (*Dünya Kalkınma Göstergeleri - Google Halka Açık Veriler Gezini*.) Before the Russian military intervention, Russia consolidated the fragile structure of its economy, if the state faces a crisis like a war. Therefore, Russian confidence and decisiveness for the commitment of the military intervention to Georgia provided with gained

economic power. No refrainment of Russia due to possible negative results of the using hard power based on that amelioration of its economy.

Russian smashing of Georgia in 2008 emerged substantial results for Russia. One of them was exposing the under-equipped, undermanned, undertrained structure of Russian Ground Forces. Although there had been Russian propaganda about the short and precise victory of Russia in the international arena, Russia realized the deficiencies of its army and started a quick reform program with the leadership of defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov in October 2008. Russian long-standing process for re-armament and modernization of its army initiated by Anatoly Serdyukov and has been pursued by Sergei Shoigu with the orders of presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. (Baev & Institut français des relations internationales 2015, 7) The purpose of this process was to equip all segments of the Russian troops with state of art weapons and systems along 2020. However, according to Sanders, the Russian budget for this project is 500 billion Euros. (Delanoe 2014, 371) However, the Russian project was interrupted because of the erupting global economic crisis in the world throughout the last years of the first decade of the millennium. Even so, Russia had tried to keep the high-level share of its military expenditures in the national budget. After showing some indicators of the re-gaining Russian economy in 2011, Russia pursued the increase of military expenditures. The share of the defense budget of the Russian GDP in 2010 was 1.5 % but it increased dramatically to %3.2 in 2013 and %4.1 in 2014. (Baev & Institut français des relations internationales 2015, 8) Beginning of distortion of honeymoon period between Russia and NATO (revisit and reset policy) most important reason for that re-gaining military expenditures. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Russian military expenditures had reached %31 in this period. It reached 68, 2 billion \$ in 2013, although the presence of painful effects of the 2008 economic crisis.

Ukraine became the test field for the understanding success level of the initial five years of modernization and re-armament studies of Russia. Russia also tested its new military strategy, which calling as a “hybrid war”, in Ukraine. William Herdt from the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) evaluated the Russian Army’s role in Ukraine as a military intervention with these words:

“In Ukraine, Russia applied and tested what it learned. It deployed a broader selection of tools, achieved military objectives and projected land power abroad in precisely the manner Russian leadership wanted; it took Crimea without a fight, it created hosting instability throughout Ukraine and, most importantly, it deterred Western intervention in the region beyond military aid. Russia brought its nuclear forces to a heightened state of readiness.” (Renz 2016, 9)

As we noted before, works for the readiness of using nuclear weapons for possible threats from Western powers started with military exercises, after the Kosovo intervention of NATO in 1999. In this case, the deterrence ability of Russian nuclear power bring to the fore in the proclaimed military doctrine in 2006 and 2014. Russian weakness for helping Serbia as a powerful ally was one of the disrespectful results of NATO’s intervention to Kosovo for Russians. However, the Russian last military doctrine stated clearly that, protection of the national interests of Russia and its allies would be provided even with nuclear weapons if it will be necessary (*THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION*). Russia also left the policy that inherited from USSR about no-first using nuclear weapon and response for the attack with the same type. Besides, it proclaimed that it could respond to conventional attacks with nuclear weapons, too. Putin’s remark at the press conference on 18 December 2014 about “the teeth and claws of Russian bear” was identifying Russian nuclear deterrence attitude. (Baev & Institut français des relations internationales 2015, 11)

Although dramatic reactions against itself, the possibility of the military, political, and economic harsh conflicts between Western counter-parts, Russia separated the Crimea from Ukraine in a day. The rapid reaction of the Russian army and political regulations shocked the West. In conclusion, Russia gave the second clear message to the West about the Russian decisive attitude to protect Russian interests near abroad.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The topic of this study is the analysis of reasons rising Russian security concerns and security dilemmas towards the West after the end of the Cold War from Russian perspective. In this direction, unlike most of the studies about this topic, it is tried to focus on Western powers' careless and irrational policies against Russia, instead of blaming Russia as an offensive, imperialist and dangerous state in this research. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is that "Is the main reason of the aggression of Russian foreign policy towards the West because of the West's careless and irrational policies towards Russia?" was answered. The argument of the thesis with analyzing Russian perspective is Western careless policies towards the Russian Federation with the leadership of the US has caused to implement aggressive foreign policy attitudes by Vladimir Putin for Russia. In accordance with this main argument, according to the Russian perspective, using hard power elements for preserving and promoting Russian interests has stemmed from Western failures, which have been implemented via NATO and EU since the end of the Cold War.

As corroboration of the main argument of this thesis, qualitative and quantitative methods are used in all parts of the thesis. As qualitative methods, analyzing prominent figures of security dilemma theory of defensive realist understanding, crucial statements of political leaders, scholars, authors, and leading figures. As quantitative methods, I gave some statistical information like surveys of some associations about Russian public opinions against Western attitudes, Russian and other regional powers' armament, and Russian improvement as economic and military power since 2000. Some graphics and map materials are also used as visual elements. Furthermore, crucial turning points were adjusted to support the main-argument and sub-arguments of this thesis, which are the; enlargement policy of NATO, the Kosovo Air Campaign of NATO in 1999, Munich Speeches of Vladimir Putin in 2007, and Military Intervention of Russia to Ukraine. That chronologic and event-centered approach provided us to shape the skeleton of this study in order.

If we going to be detailed of this thesis, It contained four major chapters which are the security concerns and dilemmas of states, post-Cold War conjuncture of Russia-West

relationship and effects of enlargement policy of NATO to Russian foreign policy attitude, rising Russian hard power; from Munich Speeches of Putin to the Crimean annexation by Russia and road to Russian military intervention to Ukraine and a conclusion. In the first chapter of the thesis, explaining the security concept and rising security concerns and dilemmas of states within the framework of defensive realist approach in international relations and showing its essence for evaluating relations between states. When states perceive threats from other states, their security concerns grow and states can find themselves in security dilemmas or what kind of conditions push states to implement security dilemma attitudes explained with examples and academic arguments of leading figures of that theoretical approach like John Herz and Robert Jervis. Actually, some crucial factors were stressed as main points of security dilemma understanding of states which are that; fears for national security, distrust for each other, stereotypes and prejudices for each other and can not be sure for the intention of other states which are benign or malign?

In the second part of the study, firstly, we tried to explain the new geopolitical situation of the post-Cold War world and how Russia and Western powers see the new world order and each other from their perspectives. After the dissolution of the USSR, the bipolar system ended and emerged vast power vacuum in the international arena due to the separation of Soviets and was revolted from communist ideology by owners. Russian expectations and NATO's desires have been impaired in this period and these discrepancies between Russian Federation and Western powers have brought us to the indispensable conflicts, which are that Russian-Georgian War and Russian military intervention to Ukraine. After the analysis of the geopolitical situation of the post-Cold War term, we focused on Western policies that we claimed as reckless, overlooking, and humiliating Russia. Enlargement policies of NATO and Kosovo intervention of NATO have been chosen as turning points for rising Russian security concerns towards the West. These developments were evaluated as reasons for awakening and growing Russian security concerns and dilemmas towards the United States and its European allies.

For the third part of this study, we mostly emphasized the transformation of Russian grievances towards the West from implicit structure to explicit discourses. Therefore, we

pointed to the discourse of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. He explicitly stated Russian concerns over NATO's unipolar policies as expansion without paying attention to the sensitivities of other states, the insistence of promotion democracy policy, and improving missile defense systems to Europe. These were the most influential arguments against the United States and its European allies from Russia since the end of the Cold War. The final case of that chapter tried to explain the re-engagement efforts of new governments in the US and Russian Federation with the initiatives of Barack Obama. Although someone called that period a honeymoon between Russia and the United States but that period also ended as a fiasco with a military intervention of Russia to Ukraine. Many attempts to resolve chronic crises between Russia and NATO just delayed not solved.

In the fourth chapter of this thesis, through analyzing almost the last two decades tensions between Russia and the West until Russian military intervention to Ukraine, we sought to reasons of Russian hard power using in foreign policy. However, in this chapter, we focused on the importance of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea for Russia and the Ukrainian special place for Russian security understanding. Historical and political reasons included in this evaluation also. Ukrainian strategic location between Russia and Europe, the existence of Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine and its recently growing importance for Russian foreign policy and Russian no tolerance for the dare of NATO explained with notes from historical events and quotes of political figures. The final part of the fourth chapter of this thesis showed the bitter result of that failed period of the relationship between NATO and Russia. That is the annexation of the Crimea and the de facto separation of Ukraine as east and west. Western ignorance of Russian robust warnings about no intervention to Ukraine with civil society groups or other ways like in Orange Revolution in 2004.

In conclusion, from the Russian perspective, those fundamental rifts between the West and Russia have caused unchanged anti-Russian and anti-Putin attitudes of Western powers. That has caused the rising escalations gradually in time. NATO has pursued its policies by overlooking Russia or any regional powers with the leadership of the US. Russia could not rising its disturbances explicitly due to its weakness and fragile economy that

remained from the Soviet Union. When Putin coming to power, the considerable rising of prices of oil and gas, which are the most important sectors for the Russian economy, and the amelioration of the Russian economy through the second half of the 2000s, Russia has begun to stand against unipolar world assertion of the United States and its European allies. That pushed Russian Federation to follow more active and assertive policies towards West. Gideon Rose argues, *“greater security bred greater activism and expansion”* (Gideon Rose). Russian active and expansionist policies could be explained with that defensive realist argument, if Russian perspective is taken an account regarding relations of Russian Federation with West.. Actually, the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008 was a clear message from Russia to the West as showing its decisiveness to protect Russian interests near abroad. Nevertheless, NATO and the EU continued to be a blunder for Russian concerns and this ignorance brought us to the Russian military intervention to Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. John Mearsheimer who is known as one of the leading figures of realist understanding in international relations wrote an article for stating Western failures about Russian military intervention to Ukraine, after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in March 2014. He blamed West about blundering Russian concerns for the policies of NATO and the EU. He stated that;

“geopolitical 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory.”(Mearsheimer 2014, 5)

In addition, he added George Kennan’s words about reckless expansion policies of NATO as;

“I think, it’s a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.” (Mearsheimer 2014, 5)

I limited the scope of analysis with the annexation of the Crimea by Russia because that was the last turning point and most game changer development for the relationship between the West and Russia. From the annexation of the Crimea to that time, there has no possibility to change the recent structure of broken relations in current conditions. After the annexation of the Crimea, Jens Stoltenberg, who is the General Secretary of NATO,

proclaimed Russia as the most important threat to the security of Europe with ISIS. On the other hand, Russia identified activities of NATO and EU as the most important threats for Russian security in the 2014 military doctrine.



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