



REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE

ALTINBAŞ UNIVERSITY

Institute of Graduate Studies

Political Science And International Relations

**ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES: THE CASE OF QATARI POLICY
MAKERS AND THEIR ROLE CONCEPTIONS**

Mohamed Lemin ABDOULI

Master's Thesis

Supervisor

Asst. Prof. Dr. Eylem AKDENİZ GÖKER

İstanbul, 2024

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2024

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Signature

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DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my entire family and close friends who invariably uphold and motivate me to attain all my goals.



ABSTRACT

ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY STUDY: THE CASE OF QATARI POLICY MAKERS AND THEIR ROLE CONCEPTIONS

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Date: May/2024

Pages: 97

In foreign policy studies, Kal Holsti's national role conception framework, as developed by Le Prestre (1997), tends to be employed widely for studying policymakers' representation of their country's roles in the regional and international systems, as well as the sources of these roles. Within the milieu of Qatari foreign affairs, this thesis utilizes Holsti's seminal framework to discern (a) the predominant roles that are articulated in Qatari decisionmakers' speeches from 2009 to 2015; (b) the change and/or continuity within these roles; and (c) the origins of these role conceptions in a non-causal manner. Using content analysis of Qatari top decisionmakers' statements, the study identified 11 roles that are represented by these decision-makers on behalf of their state in international systems. After identifying the most prevalent roles and their evolution, how Qatar's identity and status correlate with the eleven roles indicated by the decision-makers has been analyzed. Based upon their relative frequency and their content, Qatari roles and status are found to have a relatively strong association. Among the findings that can be drawn from this study is that in the Qatari decision-makers' foreign policy speeches, there are plenty of various roles that go rather beyond the role of mediation and liberation supporters, which are commonly considered the most essential pillars of Qatari foreign policy.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Role Theory, National Role Conceptions, Status, Identity, Qatari Foreign Policy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
ABSTRACT	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF CHARTS.....	x
ABBREVIATION.....	xi
1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE	1
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE	3
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION	3
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN (SAMPLING, METHODS, DATA COLLECTION and DATA ANALYSIS)	3
2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	7
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY	7
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS	8
2.3 HOLSTI'S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS FRAMEWORK and PROCEDURES	12
2.4 STUDIES DEVELOPING AND EMPLOYING HOLSTI'S NRC FRAMEWORK IN FOREIGN POLICY	18
2.5 THE NATURE, EVOLUTION, AND ORIGINS OF ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY	28
3. FOREIGN POLICY OF QATAR	31
3.1 FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS OF QATAR	34
3.1.1 Diplomatic Mediation	34
3.1.2 Public Diplomacy.....	35
3.1.3 Humanitarian Aid and Foreign Investments	36
3.1.4 Entering Alliances and Blocs.....	37

3.1.5 Interventionist Foreign Policy.....	37
3.2 ANATOMY OF QATARI FOREIGN POLICY	38
3.2.1 The Main Themes of Qatari Foreign Policy	38
3.2.2 Change and Continuity in Qatar’s Foreign Policy	44
4. FINDINGS.....	51
4.1 QATAR’S DEFINITION OF ITS ROLES: ROLES’ CONTENTS and STRUCTURES	51
4.2 STATUS CATEGORIES: THEIR CONTENTS and STRUCTURES.....	61
4.3 DENTITY CATEGORIES: THEIR CONTENTS AND STRUCTURES	64
4.4 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF STATUS AND IDENTITY AND THE DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL ROLE.....	69
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	76
REFERENCES	78

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Pages</u>
Table 4.1: Roles Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies).....	57
Table 4.2: Status Perception as Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies).....	63
Table 4.3: Identity Perception as Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies).....	67

LIST OF CHARTS

	<u>Pages</u>
Chart 4.1: The Dominant National Role Conceptions.....	58
Chart 4.2: The Dominant Categories of Status.....	64
Chart 4.3: The Dominant Categories of Identity	68
Chart 4.4: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Liberation supporter (NRC-6) and Solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab especially Palestinian people (ST4) for Qatar, 2009-2015*	70
Chart 4.5: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC-10) and Economic relations (ST2) for Qatar, 2009-2015*	71
Chart 4.6: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC-8) and Principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3) for Qatar, 2009-2015*	72
Chart 4.7: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), Anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), and An Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) for Qatar, 2009-2015*	73
Chart 4.8: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Mediator Integrator (NRC-7), Cooperation/collaboration (ST1), and Prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) for Qatar, 2009-2015	74

ABBREVIATION

NRC	:	National Role Conception
FPA	:	Foreign Policy Analysis
IR	:	International Relations
ID	:	Identity
ST	:	Status
IS	:	Islamic State
QIA	:	Qatar Investment Authority
GCC	:	Gulf Cooperation council
IR	:	International Relations
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organization

1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

In the study of foreign affairs, there are groups of theories and frameworks that tend to analyze states' foreign policy. Among such groups, there is Kal Holsti's framework of national role conceptions. This framework is considered so far as being highly convenient in foreign policy analysis. The national role conception framework is borrowed from a theory in psycho-sociology and sociology called role theory. Sociologically speaking, the interaction of an individual's (a) own perception of himself or herself and (b) own position inside the social system, along with society's expectations of the individual, resulted in social behavior (role performance), according to role theory. That is to say, role performance, society's expectation of the individual (alter's role prescription), the individual's understanding of what his position-based function ought to be (ego's role conception), and individual position inside society's structure are the salient components of role theory (Holsti, 1970; Başer, 2015). Focusing exclusively on the relation between an individual's own perceptions of himself (say, the ego's role conceptions) and role performance, Holsti (1970) argued for the useability of role theory in foreign policy analysis (FPA). Specifically, in role theory national role conception, role performance refers to a country's general foreign policy behaviors. These behaviors might include decisions, reactions, and obligations concerning outside entities (e.g., states, regional, and international organizations). National role conception alludes to policymakers' understanding or perception of their country's role performance. The main argument of this framework is that policymakers' own perception of their country's role performance on a regional and/or international stage can be perfectly correlated with the country's foreign policy conduct. Since the development of this framework by Kal Holsti (1970), many studies by various scholars from different backgrounds have been published using it. Extending the scope of this typology, many proponent scholars have employed this framework in varied contexts. Particularly among these scholars are those who focus on the effect of national role conceptions on foreign policy performance and those who concentrate solely on national role conceptions (NRCs) and their sources, claiming that the link between NRCs and foreign policy behavior is obviously problematic (Oweke, 2019: 11; Grossman, 2005: 337; Le Prestre, 1997b: 12; Thies, 2010: 34; Başer, 2015: 292). This paper tends to join those who investigate national role conceptions and their sources, wherein the focus is primarily on policymakers'

representation of the role that their states should play in the regional and international systems and the sources of these role conceptions. An example of this faction of researchers is Le Prestre's edited volume (1997a). In this volume, the national role conception framework is applied to the foreign policy of Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Canada, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the United States, specifically to the change and continuity in these countries' foreign policy. This paper, in a similar manner, will aim to apply such framework to the foreign policy of Qatar since it has not yet been applied to this country's foreign affairs. More explicitly, this framework will be employed to identify (i) the predominant roles that are articulated in Qatari decisionmakers' speeches and (ii) the change and/or continuity within these roles.

During the period of this thesis, many studies have been analyzed, investigating the change and continuity in Qatari foreign affairs from a period ranging from 2009 to 2015. Some of these studies claimed that Qatari foreign policy, due to regional geopolitical developments that eventuated in 2011, has witnessed a change from mediation to intervention, whereas others contended that after the arrival of amir Tamim in June 2013, Qatar readopted the mediation policy that it had performed prior to 2011. Some, on the other hand, reported that with the advent of emir Tamim, the focus of the country's foreign policy shifted from intervention policy to internal development, where the focus became on domestic issues (Barakat, 2014; Steinberg, 2023; Abdullah, 2014a; Abdullah, 2014b; Jargūn, 2016; Shoaib, 2016; Álvarez-Ossorio and Garcíal 2021). Nevertheless, along with the fact that these studies did not study this change and continuity from the perspective of Kal Holsti's national role conception framework that was developed by Le Prestre (1997a), they also did not focus on the continuity and/or change of foreign policy activities in terms of other roles that fell under various aspects of foreign affairs. In lieu of that, they solely emphasized the changes that specifically took place in intervention and mediation policy while neglecting others. Therefore, this paper, by adopting Kal Holsti's national role conception model that was developed by Le Prestre (1997a), will seek to examine all the preeminent potential roles that are represented by Qatari policymakers in their foreign policy speeches from 2009 to 2015 and the evolution (i.e., change and/or continuity) of these roles during the examined period. Also, an attempt will be made to determine, in a non-causal manner, the origins of these role conceptions.

1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

In a more clear manner, this paper will use a content analysis of Qatari decisionmakers' foreign policy speeches with the aim of analyzing the content and evolution (say, change and/or continuity) of the dominant national role conceptions that are articulated or represented by Qatari top decision makers, as well as identifying how these roles relate to a country's identity and status by measuring their relative frequency distributions and their content. Put simply, after identifying the evolution of Qatari decision-makers' presentations of their country's international roles, the thesis will seek to determine whether identity and status perceptions are correlated with the evolution of the roles that the decisionmakers tend to represent on behalf of their country.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

This paper seeks to answer the following questions: (i) What are Qatar's main national role conceptions from 2009 to 2015? Have there been changes and/or continuity within these roles during the studied period? And (ii) to what type of factors (status- or identity-related, or both) can these roles be associated with?

1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN (SAMPLING, METHODS, DATA COLLECTION and DATA ANALYSIS)

The corpus of our paper, on which our analysis is based, is made up of 93 official speeches and interviews presented from 2009 to 2015. All these 93 speeches and interviews were given by Amir Tamim and his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa, and taken from the official website of the administrative office of the Amir of Qatar, called The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, except 9 of them were delivered by the ministers of foreign affairs and were taken from Al-Jazeera, Gotham House and other trusted sites. The targeted speakers are Amir Hamad bin Khalifa and his foreign minister Hamad Bin Jassim, along with Amir Tamim and his foreign minister Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah. We selected for each year no less than nine speeches and interviews. 451 statements were assembled from the corpus. Only statements that are related to foreign policy were gathered. A total of 463 assertions (recording units or themes), from these statements, were found. Of these 463 assertions, 302 are registered to NRCs, 110 to status, and 51 to identity.

Qualitative content analysis is adopted, as a tool, for analyzing foreign policy statements and speeches delivered by Qatari policy makers. According to Holsti, national role conceptions (NRCs) can be identified by analyzing speeches and statements made by the leaders of the nation about their foreign policies (1970: 256). In their research, researchers employ content analysis to characterize and document the perceptions, beliefs, and goals of individuals and large or small groups (Akin, 2021: 28). Krippendorff defines content analysis “as a research technique to make systematic and objective assumptions from texts to the contexts” (2004, cited in Akin, 2021: 28). According to Mayring (2010, cited in Drisko & Maschi, 2016), qualitative content analysis is a methodical approach for analyzing various types of texts. This approach not only examines the manifest content but also the latent content, whereby it looks into the underlying themes and fundamental ideas present within the texts. Accordingly, the paper will adopt latent content analysis, which means that instead of simply noting the frequency of particular words and/or phrases, it will take into account the whole context. That is to say, the context of the whole text was taken into account in order to correctly identify Qatar’s roles, identity, and status.

The sentence is the context unit, while the assertion or theme within a sentence is the record unit. By manually categorizing sentences (i.e., context units) that were initially identified by their use of the words “I,” “us,” “we,” “our,” (ourselves), “Qatar,” “Qatari,” “country,” and “state,” it was possible to identify the themes or assertions (i.e., the record unit) of roles, status, and identity. Such words were used to select context units containing themes about status, identity, and role variables from the entire corpus or body of speeches for this study.

By encoding all the statements pointing to the conceptions that decision makers represent—in their speech—about their country’s duties and responsibilities in the international system, roles will be identified. More specifically, the paper will discuss the roles that Qatar plays in the international community by alluding to a set of duties and responsibilities that Qatari policymakers have assigned to their nation—following Grossman (2005), and Le Prestre’s (1997a) edited volume. Statements like (a) “we will,” “we should,” “we have to,” and similar expressions that carry an obligation on the part of the state to intervene in—military, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, etc.—spheres of international relations (Donneur and Alain, 1997: 231); (b) plus “I think,” “I consider it necessary to,” “I wish,” “I am concerned,” “I pray that,” and similar expressions that allude to particular undertakings that the

decisionmakers had in mind for his country or to obligations he recognized (Thumerelle and Le Prestre, 1997d: 143) can both serve as indicators of role-related assertions.

The assertions or themes related to the term "status" will be identified via the statements that indicate the country's (i) relations with other international actors (say, states and regional and/or international organizations); (ii) commitments that it tries to respect or honor in relation to these international actors; and (iii) position on the international stage. More plainly, the country's position here points out the subjective perception that leaders have about the "position of their country rather than to a more objective assessment of the actual power position their country enjoys in the system" (Le Prestre, 1997b: 8). Viz, Qatar's position is alluding to the view that Qatari decision-makers have of their country's place in the outside world (Andre & Alain, 1997; Thibault & Levesque, 1997; Macleod, 1997).

Identity, in this context, is the self-perception that is rooted in the understanding of decisionmakers about themselves and what they represent of their nation—in terms of the values it represents, its history, or the characteristics of its polity—in the world (Le Prestre, 1997b: 9, 11). For instance, in western nations, the values of "individual freedom, civil liberties, national self-determination, independence, and economic progress" would be frequently referred to in policymakers' speeches. Likewise, in developing countries, values such as "rapid economic development, national unity, freedom from foreign control, and national prestige" would be regularly seen in the statements of policymakers (Holsti, 1983: 322). Thus, the assertions or themes related to the term "identity" refer to the perception of a nation's values and history held by its leaders. Which is to say, in the Qatari context, what traditions and values would become the main characteristics of Qatar that its leaders envisioned?

The process of qualitative content analysis will be conducted as follows: identifying the pertinent official speeches and statements—published both in Arabic and English during 2009-2015—of Qatar's top decision-makers that are relevant to foreign policy and international relations, i.e., only the passages related to foreign affairs will be analyzed. All the sources will be imported into the ATLAS.ti software for the sake of analysis. In order to simplify the identification of a source that includes the specified categories of national role conceptions, status, and identity to be studied, keywords such as "I," "us," "we," "our" (ourselves), "Qatar," "Qatari," "country," and "state" will be set forward. Accordingly, the

potential sources will be discerned by searching in Text Query Search ATLAS.ti for the keywords. Then, the themes in the sources will be coded inductively, if found necessary, or deductively in accordance with the previous related research—Holsti (1970) and his successive academic proponents such as Le Prestre's (1997a) edited volume, Chafetz et al. (1996), Mehtap & Sözen (2016), and others—to identify categories of national role conceptions, status, and identity that the decision makers mention in their speeches. To elaborate further, in order to answer the research questions, the following steps will be taken: The first one will seek to describe separately the content of each of the found roles and the categories established for both identity and status. Afterwards, the structure of Qatar's roles for each of the examined years will be illustrated by examining the preeminent ones among them and focusing on the relative frequency of their assertions (coding units), so that we can identify the primary roles during each period along with their respective evolution from 2009 until 2015. Respectively, the same will be done for the categories of identity and status in terms of their structures in each year—to shed light on the structure of these categories and identify the dominant ones among them and their evolutions as well. Having done that, the paper will endeavor to set up the relative frequency distribution within each category of NRC, status (ST), and identity (ID); subsequently, the evolution of the relative frequency distribution within each NRC's category will be compared individually with the evolution of the relative frequency distributions within each individual category of ST and ID to reveal whether there is a correlation between them during all the studied years. Thereupon, the relationship between Qatari national role conceptions and the categories of its identity and status will be based on their annual relative frequency and their content as well.

Nonetheless, according to Le Prestre (1997b: 13-14), one might argue that speeches are not prepared by the speaker and serve only a practical purpose. As a result, they would not provide light on how the speaker conceptualizes the issue at hand or the values that guide their thinking and behavior. However, sometimes the speaker writes the speech himself or at least compiles and edits it before delivering it. That is to say, speechwriters don't put words in the speakers' mouths. Instead, they explain ideas and feelings better than the speakers would be able to. They offer technical knowledge rather than making up content.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY

[I]n a broad sense, everything in international relations speaks to foreign policy issues (Neack et al., 1995, quoted by Adigbuo, 2005: 50).

As Hermann (1990: 6) mentions foreign policy “is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers' political jurisdiction. In other words, it is a program (plan) designed to address some problem or pursue some goals that entails action toward foreign entities”. Furthermore, according to Kaarbo et al. (2013), in order to define foreign policy, we need three things. 1) we ought to distinguish between the concept of “foreign” and “domestic”. The former signals out to the policy that deals with the external entities (which include but it is not limited to countries, multinational corporations, international organizations, and terrorist groups); while the latter alludes to the internal policy within the state. Yet, by the emerge of globalization and economic interdependence, the line that separate foreign and domestics policies become not a smooth task to be drawn. That can be manifested plainly in the Arab uprising, whereby the severe actions of government forces towards the rebellion peoples moved from being a domestic policy issue to a foreign policy issue. That is, by all sorts of media that reveals the atrocity of context to the external world, which eventually lead to international intervention under the aim of securing and saving the rebels' human rights. Thus, once the interaction between states in the system get affected by the country's domestic policy, the difference between domestic policy and foreign policy would be complicated to see; particularly, in the case of multiple policies such as environmental policy. 2) “policy” is broad but can include certain plans and actions that are adopted by an individual or groups of people in the form of deciding to sign or approving a deal with others. 3) “who makes policy?” Government institutions and government officials are the entities that implement and decide about the policy.

Furthermore, we have different descriptors in foreign policy such as choice, decision, and behavior. *Foreign policy choices* are the available options through which the decision-makers will tend choose among. *Foreign policy decision* signals the choice or option that are

chosen by decision-makers. Whilst the implementation of the foreign policy decision is labelled as *foreign policy behavior*. Put differently, foreign policy is the procedure by which a country acts internationally toward other countries or groups in order to reach certain goals during a certain time period, in accordance with strategies made by the country's leader (Breuning, 2007).

What is more, Holsti (1983) defines foreign policy as the actions or ideas devised by policymakers to address a problem or promote a change in the environment, i.e., in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states. Based upon the scope ranging from general to specific, Holsti (1983: 97) divided the concept of foreign policy into four parts: 1) foreign policy orientations; 2) national roles conceptions; 3) objectives; and 4) actions.

The scope of this paper centralizes on the second components, national role conceptions.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS

National role conception, the core concept of role theory as represented by Holsti (1970), is deemed to be one of the widely accepted frameworks for studying states' foreign policy. According to role theory, generally, social conduct is the result of the interaction between society's expectations of the person, the individual's own perceptions of himself or herself, and the individual's position within the social system. Using the role theory, "role" refers to an individual's appropriate behavior or activities. With regard to this theory, there are four essential components. Firstly, "position" refers to an individual's position within the greater social or societal structure. Being a mother, an attorney, or a man are examples of many positions. Second, "ego's role conceptions" relate to an individual's conception or understanding of what his or her position-based function should be. Thirdly, "alter's role prescriptions" are society's expectations of the person. The fourth and final concept is "role performance," or the actual actions of the person (Başer, 2015: 294-295; Sekhri, 2009; Holsti, 1970). Role theory, which has a prominent place in the studies of social-psychology and sociology, has been used as a theory in international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA) since the early 1970s, when Holsti's "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" (1970) was published and gained a remarkable reputation in the international relation community. As a result of his contributions, a significant body of literature has emerged, and other researchers have developed ways for classifying the roles of nations in foreign policy (Akin, 2021: 16).

Holsti's version of role theory for the study of foreign policy replaces individuals with states; the international environment substitutes the social system; the "role conceptions" of individuals are replaced by "national role conceptions" of policymakers; and position is replaced by status (Holsti, 1970: 244-245; mentioned also by Başer, 2015: 295).

Albeit national role conceptions are the primary focus of this paper, it is also essential to comprehend the broader context of role theory by discussing it from Holsti's and successive proponents' viewpoints. This covers the notion of the role along with its associated four main components that are salient in analyzing foreign policy, which are: role performance, national role conceptions, role prescriptions, and, last but not least, position or status.

While symbolic-interactionist role theorists (Wehner, 2020: 2) consider "role" as a social position, "[r]ole, according to the original theory, refers to behavior or actions that are suitable for a certain individual" (Başer, 2015: 294). In Turner's words, the concept of "role" refers to behavior rather than position, so that one may enact a role but cannot occupy a role" (1956: 316, quoted in Holsti, 1970: 238). Similarly, Holsti (1970: 239) subscribes to the same line of thought by deeming the "role" as *role performance*, which is to say that it refers to decisions and actions (behavior).

Holsti (1970) emphasized that role theory provides a framework for describing national "role performances" and "role conceptions" as well as for examining the roots of such role conceptions. National role performance is a country's overall foreign policy behavior. It consists of "patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments toward other states". He refers to these "patterns or typical decisions" as national roles, as he also refers to the conception of these national roles as incorporating the policymakers' conceptions of the basic types of decisions, obligations, norms, and actions appropriate to their state, as well as any ongoing responsibilities their state should carry out in the international system or subordinate regional systems. It is their "perception" of how their state should be oriented or functioning in relation to the outside world, as Holsti (1970: 245-246) literally states:

A national role conception includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international

system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.

In another place, Shih (1988: 602, quoted in Montenegro, 2021) deems NCR as a national self-image, which is "an image states hold about what ought to be". Wish (1980: 532) considers NRCs as the perceptions that foreign policy decision-makers have about their nation's position in the international stage.

The *role prescriptions* (emanate from the external environment) are the norms and expectations that cultures, societies, organizations, or groups ascribe to certain positions (Holsti, 1970: 239). From Stephen G. Walker's perspective (1978), role prescriptions include cues and demands which emanate from the external environment. Cues are "actions performed by others in the situation which either reinforce or discriminate against the enactment behavior associated with a role initially selected by an actor" (Walker, 1978: 11-12, quoted in Wish, 1980: 534; Adigbuo, 2005: 56-57). Demands are "additional features of the situation, such as the composition of the audience, that influence an actor's role selection and enactment" (Walker 1978: 12, quoted in Wish, 1980: 534; Adigbuo, 2005: 57). From a constructive's perspective, role prescriptions refer to norms and expectations that are intersubjectively shared which tend to create the social structure of the international system (Beneš, 2010: 6). According to Holsti (1970: 239), these *role prescriptions* can be analytically distinguished from the concept of role (*role performance*), which pertains to actions and decisions (behavior).

According to role theory, the position, standards and expectations that the other assigns onto the position (i.e., role prescriptions) serve as the basis for human behavior. The connection between the role prescribed by the others (alter) and the role performed by the person of a position (ego) is therefore highlighted by role theory. Nevertheless, in conformity with Holsti's argument, in the study of international politics and foreign policy, the role performance (decisions and actions) of governments can be primarily explained by reference to the (ego) policymakers' own conceptions of their nation's role in a region or in the international system as a whole. Holsti (1970: 239-240) argued, based on Lane's argument, that governmental role performance (decisions and actions) may be explained, in large part, by policymakers' own conceptions about their country's roles in the area or the international system. Lane's argument states that "a *role is defined not only by others' expectations but*

also by an actor's own conception of his role (Lane, 1964: 44). For Holsti (1970), the focus is on the individual's own perception of his positions and functions, and the conduct suited to them—what we can call a *role conception*—while role prescriptions of the other might be seen as parameters whereby national role conceptions are related to. Thus, the actor's perceptions become the most important independent factors in analyzing role performance. Sidelining *role prescriptions* (the structural source of national roles) to the background, he emphasizes "role performance results from, is consistent with, policymakers' conceptions of their nation's orientations and tasks in the international system or in subordinate regional systems" (Holsti, 1970: 244-245). As Grossman (2005: 336, citing Jönsson & Westerlund, 1982: 131) emphasized, researchers who are following Holsti's national role conceptions tend to rely on "self-defined role conceptions at the expense of" the role prescription of alter or other.

Holsti (1970, cited in Başer, 2015) contends that the *principle of sovereignty* in the international arena and the *weak social ties* between states in the international system make it impossible for (alter's) role prescriptions to be as helpful in explaining state foreign policy behavior as compared to the (ego's) state's national role conceptions. In the same line of thought, Le Prestre (1997c) stated that one cannot assume that all nations share the same notions of the right behavior of a superpower or would read and react to the confusing external cues in the same manner due to the weakness and divergence of the international community. Because of national sovereignty, the influence of prescriptions from outside the country is minimal (Holsti, 1970, cited in Grossman, 2005). So, sovereignty indicates that role performances originate primarily from policymakers' role conceptions, or putting it in Holsti's words, "[i]n international politics, [...] the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) derive primarily from policymakers' role conception" (Holsti 1970: 243).

In lieu of the position concept that is widely used by role theorists in sociology and social psychology, Holsti (1970) uses the concept of status. That is because positions are based on clear role prescriptions, which are sometimes expressed in the form of rules or regulations outlining permissible behavior. Positions contain well-defined and typically specialized sets of duties. It is challenging to apply the notion of position—in foreign policy studies—as it has been defined in a social context because nation-states are multi-functional collectivities that act within countless sets of bilateral and multilateral partnerships in a somewhat

disorganized environment. Instead, we may utilize the concept of status, as it has come to be known in studies of global stratification. Any international system has a pattern of stratification that reflects differences in levels of engagement in the system's activities, the extent of external obligations, military capabilities, reputation, economic-technological levels, and other factors. Status just represents an approximation of a state's ranking within the global system, and, in this sense, it may or may not have significant effects on how policymakers define what they perceive are the right international tasks or orientations for their country. Even though Holsti acknowledged that the external environment and status are crucial to the analysis of (role performance) foreign policy, he treated them as constants, not emphasized in his study (Holsti, 1970: 244-245).

2.3 HOLSTI'S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS FRAMEWORK and PROCEDURES

Thinking about foreign affairs – like any other kind of thinking – requires a conceptual map which, as maps do, simplifies the landscape and focuses on the main features (Cooper, 1996: 8).

Since this paper intends to use *the national role conceptions framework* that was initially developed by Holsti (1970) and applied thereafter by many scholars from different perspectives in diverse contexts, it will be beneficial to establish a firm foundation for the paper by elaborating a bit more on this framework and its procedures.

Holsti (1970) studied a vast number of speeches, legislative debates, radio broadcasts, official communiques, and press conferences in order to develop a typology of national role conceptions. The list of national conceptions that he discovered is based on statements made by the most senior policymakers of 71 states that were discovered in 972 distinct sources. These sources offered proof of 17 role conceptions that were put out between 1965 and 1967. In an effort to make the data as trustworthy and comparable as feasible, he came up with a number of criteria. *First criterion*, he only used statements from the most senior policymakers. Such statements reflect presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers' ideas about foreign policy and conceptions of their different responsibilities. The sole exception was when a speech or remark by an ambassador or other official clearly represented the opinions of the senior leadership. This would encompass basic foreign policy reviews delivered at the start of General Assembly sessions each year or broadcasts produced

by radio stations under government control. Only direct quotes or official paraphrases are used in the recorded utterances. *The second criterion*, all the sources from which role conception evidence was gathered were about reviews or statements about general foreign policy. *The third criterion* required that at least 10 sources be accessible in order to collect a representative sample of national role conceptions for each state. This chaar was established in the middle of the investigation. Ten sources were only a minimum; thus, for governments that gave several speeches or announcements, all the important sources were included. *The fourth criterion*, the primary sources for the data were from the time period from January 1965 to December 1967.

Following these guidelines, his research procedure involved reading a large number of sources, some of which included the full or partial texts of statements or speeches made by high-level foreign policy personnel, and taking note of any themes that suggested the presence of a national role conception (Holsti, 1970: 256-260).

Having examined numerous speeches, parliamentary debates, radio broadcasts, official communiqués, and press conferences from 71 governments that were found in 972 different sources, he arrived at a typology of 17 national role conceptions (NRCs). He organized them—NRCs—based on the degree of activity or passivity reflected in the role conceptions.

i. *Bastion of revolution-liberator*. The themes for this national role conception refer to some governments believing it is their responsibility to plan or direct certain forms of revolution movements overseas. According to them, one of the duties of their state is to liberate others or serve as the "bastion" of revolutionary movements, i.e., to offer a place where foreign revolutionary leaders may go to get physical and emotional support as well as inspiration for their ideologies (Holsti, 1970: 260-261; Holsti, 1988: 117).

ii. *Regional leader*: The assertions for this conception of a nation's role allude to obligations or unique responsibilities that a government sees for itself in regard to other nations in an area with which it identifies, or to transversal subsystems like international communist movements (Holsti, 1970: 261; Holsti, 1988: 117). Sekhri (2009: 425) adds that it is about a state which perceives that it possesses sufficient resources and capabilities to dominate within a given regional sphere.

iii. *Regional protector*: The theme of this role conception emphasizes the need of protecting neighboring regions, even if it may imply particular leadership obligations on a regional or issue-area basis (Holsti, 1970: 261; Holsti, 1988: 117).

iv. *Active independent*: The theme of this role conception signals placing equal emphasis on independence, self-determination, potential mediation responsibilities, and ongoing initiatives to expand diplomatic and commercial ties to many regions of the world; alongside, “foreign policy decisions will be made to serve national interests rather than the interests of others” (Holsti, 1970: 262; Holsti, 1988: 117). It includes aggressive efforts to foster relationships with as many governments as possible and periodic intervention or interposition into bloc problems, in addition to avoiding long-term military or ideological commitments, i.e., in favor of the non-alignment concept. As Adigbuo (2005: 63-64) claims, referring to this theme, it signals “to governments that felt that non-aligned policies should not mean isolation or non-involvement in matters that affect others. Efforts were therefore made to establish diplomatic relations with as many states as possible and occasionally to become involved as mediators in bloc conflicts” with a goal, as Sekhri (2009: 425) argues, to augment and expand interactions with various international entities.

v. *Liberation supporter*: The theme of this national role conception does not suggest official obligations for organizing, leading, or physically assisting liberation movements overseas, in contrast to the *bastion of the revolution-liberator* national role conception. The majority of pro-liberation movement utterances seem regular and conventional; they convey very unstructured and ambiguous attitudes about the activities necessary to carry out the role conception (Holsti, 1970: 263; Holsti, 1988: 117).

vi. *Anti-imperialist agent*: This theme refers to many governments—not only those in communist party nations where imperialism is viewed as a real threat—that consider themselves as participants in the “struggle” against this menace (Holsti, 1970: 264; Holsti, 1988: 118). In another words, Sekhri (2009: 425) argued that due to the states’ historical circumstances, such as having been a victim of colonial power, or as a result of promoting specific ideologies, like communism, a state may adopt the role of being anti-imperialist.

vii. *Defender of the faith*: This theme is about how some nations see their goals and obligations in foreign policy as safeguarding ideologies rather than specific areas, i.e., it is about a responsibility to uphold and advance particular values and ideologies. In order to

ensure ideological purity for a group of other nations, those who support the defender of the faith national role conception apparently take on extra duties (Holsti, 1970: 264-265; Holsti, 1988: 118). Sekhri (2009: 425) says that these believes may be political, such as the defense and advancement of freedom and democracy, or religious, such as the defense and advancement of Islam, Judaism, and/or Christianity.

viii. *Mediator-integrator*: This theme for this national role conception connotes the perceptions of a permanent duty to assist rivals in recognizing their discrepancies. A sizable percentage of governments—in the Holsti's sample of seventy-one states—believed they were capable of, or accountable for, carrying out or completing unique responsibilities to resolve disputes between other states or groups of states (Holsti, 1970: 264-265; Holsti, 1988: 118). When a state is referred to as a "mediator," it signifies that the state has adopted policies, decisions, and objectives pertaining to recognized international or regional mediation duties and obligations, while perceiving itself as capable of carrying out these recognized duties and obligations in order to settle conflicts and/or sand misunderstandings between nations, blocs and/or individuals as third party (Mehtap & Sözen, 2016: 52; Sekhri, 2009: 425; Adigbuo, 2005: 64).

ix. *Regional-subsystem collaborator*: The themes in this conception of the national role differ from those in the mediator-integrator category in that they indicate far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities or to cross-cutting subsystems like the Communist movement, rather than merely occasional interposition into conflict areas or issues (Holsti, 1970: 265-266; Holsti, 1988: 118). As Chafetz et al (1996: 734) define it, it is to undertake far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states in region to build wider communities.

x. *Developer*: The themes in this national role conception indicate that there is a specific duty or responsibility to help developing nations. There are also several references to unique abilities or benefits for performing such ongoing duties (Holsti, 1970: 266; Holsti, 1988: 118).

xi. *Bridge*: The policies that, if any, are derived from this conception of the national role are frequently presented in imprecise form. The bridge notion is considerably more ephemeral than the mediator-integrator role which suggests different types of diplomatic intervention into conflict-affected regions or issues. Themes frequently allude to a communication role,

i.e., functioning as a "translator" or conveyor of messages and information between individuals from various cultural backgrounds (Holsti, 1970: 266-267; Holsti, 1988: 119).

xii. *Faithful ally*: The theme that connotes faithful-ally role conceptions is only employed when one government specifically commits to back the policies of its fraternal allies. Holsti, in his study, differentiated between alliance partners to arrive at his chosen term. Alliances, which are created via mutual aid and other sorts of treaties, may be helpful for many governments for protective purposes. Yet, the states that get an external guarantee through this alliance can be segmented into two facets: (i) those that do not reciprocate or return the favor by actively supporting the foreign policy goals of the state providing the guarantee. That is, their leaders' foreign policy statements contain almost no references to alliances or support for their diplomatic goals. (ii) those that their leaders' foreign policy statements contain a commitment to support the policies of their fraternal allies. Wherefore, the faithful-ally role conceptions allude to the latter one in which the state has commitment to support policies of its guaranteeing state (Holsti, 1970: 267-268; Holsti, 1988: 119).

xiii. *Independent*: The themes in the independent role conception emphasize the policy of self-determination. It is an indication that the government will make choices on the state's policies based on the interests of the state itself rather than in support of the goals of other states (Holsti, 1970: 268; Holsti, 1988: 119).

xiv. *Example/model*: The theme in this conception of a nation's role emphasizes the significance of advancing prestige and obtaining influence within the international system by enacting certain domestic policies (Holsti, 1970: 268-269; Holsti, 1988: 119). Simply put, this role refers to a state that tends to promote or pursues certain policies in order to get prestige and increase its influence in the internal system as well as to be model for other state in the a given region or international system as whole (Sekhri, 2009: 425; Adigbuo, 2005: 71; Mehtap & Sözen, 2016: 52).

xv. *Internal development*: The emphasis here is on the need for the government to focus its efforts primarily on issues related to internal growth rather than any specific role or function within the international system. The statements imply a desire to avoid getting engaged in international political issues, but they do not rule out different types of international collaboration, especially with regard to economic and technical issues (Holsti, 1970: 269; Holsti, 1988: 119).

xvi. *Isolate*: While the theme in the conception of the internal development role frequently alludes to external collaboration, especially in the economic and cultural spheres, the theme in national role conception of the isolate calls for a minimal of foreign interactions of any kind (Holsti, 1970: 269).

xvii. *Protectee*: The theme of this role conception refers to some governments that pass references or signals to other nations' obligations to defend them, but they do not otherwise provide any specific indications regarding their roles, responsibilities, or orientations toward the outside world (Holsti, 1970: 269). As Adigbua (2005: 63) states, these types of states are “convinced that it is the responsibility of other states to defend them”.

More explicitly, Holsti reaches, in his analysis, a number of conclusions concerning national role conceptions. His findings indicate that countries frequently play multiple roles in the international arena, which are sometimes even contradictory. He claims that it is common for policymakers to have numerous role conceptions that may be appropriate in different international settings, institutions, or issue areas because individual governments may have a varied set of established ties in the globe or within a region. In addition, he found that states that are more prominent in the international system tend to have more national role conceptions and assume more active roles. In other words, in conformity with Holsti's argument, governments that perceive many active role types tend to be much more engaged in the affairs of the system or subordinate systems than governments that perceive few passive role types (Holsti, 1988: 119; 1970: 280-289, 277, cited in Maloverjan, 2021: 13; Aras & Gorener, 2010: 77). Thereupon, subscribing to such finding, Aras and Gorener (2010) analyze nine different role kinds based upon a scale ranging from "active international participation" to "passive foreign policy behavior.". From the high level of the scale, there are “Active roles associated with leadership include: ‘regional protector’, ‘bastion of revolution’ and ‘bloc leader’. From the middle of scale, there are other roles associated with a more collaborative orientation toward other states including: ‘regional sub-system collaborator’, ‘mediator-integrator’ and ‘bridge’. At the lower level of the scale, they find ‘isolate’ and ‘protectee’ role types” (Aras & Gorener, 2010: 77-78). After they have endeavored to demonstrate how many of the very few national role conceptions that a state may play in the international system fit the policy statements of the AKP entities that they have looked at, Aras & Gorener (2010) found that the AKP foreign policy elite has been shown to have many role conceptions, which is in line with the Holsti theory's assertion that

various roles are connected to foreign policy activity. Thus, consequently, they were able to elucidate the conceptual underpinnings of current Turkish policy activism in the Middle East by delineating the numerous national role conceptions of the governing elite.

2.4 STUDIES DEVELOPING AND EMPLOYING HOLSTI'S NRC FRAMEWORK IN FOREIGN POLICY

Holsti's seminal contribution has laid the foundation for subsequent scholars to extend the body of literature on role theory as a tool for analyzing foreign policy. Many initiatives, including Chafetz et al. (1996), Le Prestre's (1997a) edited volume, and many other proponent researches, have been made—since then—to enhance Holsti's typology and make it more applicable to the post-cold war international context. In general, as Oweke (2019: 11) emphasized, role theory, after the seminal Kalevi Holsti's work (1970), has been applied in several different perspectives and diverse contexts as well; namely, "some scholars within role theory scholarship focus on sources of NRC, while others focus less on the [national role] conception and more towards its translation into foreign policy performance [or at least its reflection and/or implication in foreign policy orientation or in foreign policy in general]. Some scholars tend to adopt an individual point of analysis, looking at one state or one NRC, stressing the ego, while others look at NRCs from a systemic perspective and focus on social interaction". Specifically, in this part of the paper, the focus will be on (i) those who studied national role conception and their reflection or effect on foreign policy performance and/or orientation; and (ii) those who studied role conceptions and their sources. Having said that, this thesis will endeavor to highlight some of the studies that fell under such groups, in the following.

Chafetz et al (1996), like Holsti, contends that foreign policy elites frequently articulate a national role conception that establishes the limits of the proper actions and responsibilities that their state should undertake within the framework of the international system. Chafetz and his colleagues begin with the assumption that any investigation into a state's preferences for foreign policy must take into account how the policymakers perceive their country's place in the international system. Following the work of Holsti—in which they employ role theory as an instrument to predict compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime in particular and foreign policy in general—they correlated the national roles articulated by Belarussian and Ukrainian leaders with their nations' subsequent behavior. They discovered that the use

of national role conception as an independent and mediating variable explains more instances of compliance and noncompliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime than the prevalent theories of proliferation. In their study, they added two categories that Holsti had left out: *global-system collaborator* and *global leader*, which they discovered to be expressed by both Belarussian and Ukrainian decision-makers. The themes for national role conception of *global-system collaborator* refer to “undertake far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states to support the emerging global order” (Chafetz et al (1996: 734). The themes for national role conception of *global-system leader* refer to “lead other states in creating and maintaining emerging global order” (Chafetz et al (1996: 734). They noted that Holsti found only a small number of articulations of global roles, noting only subsystem collaborator and subsystem leader. They think that the disparity between their categorization and Holsti's categorization results from the significance of the Cold War in role conceptions. Leaders may imagine their jobs on a global systemic scale rather than just a sub-systemic one without the tight distinctions of the Cold War.

Using a content analysis of speeches by 29 decision makers from 17 nations, Wish (1980) classified a large sample of national role conceptions—based on the conceptions of status, motivational orientation, and issue and substantive problem area—and empirically investigated the relationships between these conceptions and numerous aspects of foreign policy behavior in terms of international participation, hostility, independence of action, and resource commitment. She concludes, among other things, that there is a significant correlation between numerous characteristics of national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. For instance, nations whose decision-makers communicated roles motivated by competition and/or roles concerned with high-level policies (territories or ideologies) were more likely to engage in hostile behavior. Participation in the international arena was more likely among nations whose leaders perceived dominant roles.

Walker (1981) examines the link between foreign policy rhetoric and behavior in order to test Holsti's typology of national role conceptions and his claim that these national role conceptions are more influential in influencing foreign policy behavior than role prescriptions emanating from the external environment. He uses methods that are significantly more rigorous to examine roles that include the United States or the Soviet Union targets. He argues that, for third nations and superpowers in their dyadic relationships, there is a congruent relationship between role conception (foreign policy

rhetoric) and role enactment (foreign policy behavior). Despite this, he adds that role prescription can also influence role performance or foreign policy behavior. Despite the fact that Holsti places a stronger focus on the ego component of role conceptions as opposed to the alter component (role prescription), both he and Walker assume that national role conceptions are significantly connected to the nation's overall foreign policy behavior, which is conceived of as role performance (Wish, 1980: 533-535; Adigbuo, 2005: 56-57).

In a study by Adigbuo (2005), Holsti's framework of national role conceptions is used as a theoretical framework to look at Nigeria's foreign policy toward the independence of Namibia in the context of Nigeria's help for the liberation of white-ruled territories in Southern Africa. After reviewing a variety of IR paradigms and FPA theories, he argues that NRCs are the finest analytical instrument for analyzing foreign policy in African states. His inquiry is directed by Nigeria's national role conceptions, i.e., the policymakers' own definitions of the external environment. A detailed analysis of scholarly publications, media accounts, foreign policy statements, and official records was conducted to analyze Nigeria's foreign policy towards the independence of Namibia. In his dissertation, Nigeria's foreign policy has been broken down into six sets of roles—role set is a group of separate roles that are linked to each other in a certain way, and several actors are expected to play those roles. These six roles are: active independent role with defender of the faith, developer, and regional protector role conceptions; alongside liberation supporter and bastion of revolution-liberator.

With a claim that national role conceptions, operating as an intervening variable, can serve to explain the changes in foreign policy, Michael Grossman's study (2005) explores changes in Russian leadership's national role conceptions during the 1990s and relates them to changes in Russian foreign behavior. The objective of his study is to discover if behavioral changes were preceded by shifts in articulated roles (2005). This research mainly relied on the NRCs frameworks provided by Holsti (1970) and Le Prestre (1997) in order to assess if the national role conceptions articulated by the Russian leadership altered prior to the shift in Russian foreign policy actions. Specifically, he replicated their use of content analysis of foreign policymakers' speeches to determine the government's national role conceptions. In order to investigate the transformation of Russia's foreign policy in a more systematic manner, his research examined the voting patterns of Russian diplomats at the United Nations. His research begins by analyzing the foreign policy declarations of the Russian

leadership. Presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers were the only top-level foreign policy leaders whose statements were analyzed. There were exceptions made for their official spokespersons, diplomats, and other officials who were clearly articulating the views of their superiors. Then, each statement was analyzed to discover which conceptions of the national role were articulated, and coding the statements that allude to the conceptions that decision-makers have about the obligations and responsibilities of their state within the international system allowed for the identifying of roles (Grossman, 2005). The list of specified national role conceptions, in this study, for Russia is a blend of those identified by Holsti (1970) and Thibault and Le'vesque (1997), with additional roles—identified by him—unique to Russia for the complete time period included. The analysis of Russian foreign policymakers' speeches showed a total of eleven national role conceptions which include: member of the commonwealth of independent states, active independent, mediator-integrator, member of the western world, independent player, example, instrument for changing the state, arms control and disarmament agent, co-patriot protector, anti-hegemon, and defender of democratic principles and human rights. In his finding, he indicates that a state's foreign behavior reflects the national role conceptions it holds. For instance, in his study during the period in which the relative frequency of expression of the *member of Western world national role conception* was greater than the combined intensity of the more independent roles of independent player, active independent, and anti-hegemon, the Russian delegation tended to vote with the United States on issues deemed significant by Washington. Yet, as the pro-Western role decreased and the more independent roles (independent actor, active independent, and anti-hegemon) grew in prominence, the voting pattern shifted to reflect the change (Grossman, 2005: 348-350).

Aras and Gorener wrote a paper in 2010 that had two main goals. The first goal is to clarify the ruling AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) elite's national role conceptions through a content analysis of statements by prime minister Erdogan and the Party's chief foreign policy architect, foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The second goal was to see how well the national role conceptions variable can explain Turkish foreign policy's new focus on the Middle East. This study concentrated on a thorough content analysis of the speeches, interviews, books, and articles of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his former foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu to find indicators of their national role conceptions. They concentrated on any statements expressing a policy vision, a motivational orientation, or a

perception of state status and categorized them using the *role categories* that are developed by Chafetz et al (1996). They have been able to ascertain the existence or absence of a certain role conception by connecting each statement to a *specific role category* (Aras and Gorener, 2010) The findings of this study show (i) that the two AKP actors' most common role statements fall into the categories of: regional leader, regional protector, regional sub-system collaborator, global sub-system collaborator, example, and bridge; and (ii) that these national role conceptions have found clear and consistent manifestations in Turkey's foreign policy initiatives towards the Middle East (Aras and Gorener, 2010: 78–86, 90–91).

Başer (2015) conducted a study under the purpose of evaluating three points that summarize the shift-of-axis thesis about the Turkish foreign policy orientation: (i) Turkey's foreign policy orientation underwent a major transformation under the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) government; (ii) the AKP changed Turkey's foreign policy orientation by distancing the country from the West; and (iii) there is unprecedented activism in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. Thus, the claims are about the fact that the AKP's accession to power in 2002 is said to have resulted in (i) a complete reorientation of Turkish foreign policy; (ii) a drift away from the West; and (iii) unprecedented activism and ambition. Examining the statements, speeches, and interviews of the most prominent Turkish foreign policymakers reveals the foreign policy roles of Turkey, which are used to evaluate these claims. To this end, the top Turkish policymakers' conceptions of Turkey's national role in the international arena from 1992 to 2012 are identified— based on their statements— and evaluated to determine if the AKP leadership's conceptions of Turkey's national role vary significantly from those of previous regimes. Using Holsti's typology (1970) while consulting the ones that are developed by (Thibault & Levesque 1997; Grossman 2005; Chafetz et al, 1996), he arrived at the following national role conceptions: *regional leader, regional sub-system collaborator, global system collaborator, active independent, mediator/integrator, bridge, faithful ally, example, member of the western world*; alongside, he added two additional roles for turkey that were not included in the other works: *integration with the Turkic world* and *great power candidate* (Başer 2015). Based on his findings, Başer (2015) argues that although there has been a change in Turkey's foreign policy roles since the AKP came to power in 2002, this change is primarily attributable to Turkey's level of activism in the international arena (i.e., the third point), as determined by

the AKP foreign policy elite. That is, the roles' pattern suggests a gradual shift toward a more active and ambitious Turkish foreign policy (third point).

In a study conducted by Mehtap and Sözen (2016), role theory is utilized, as a theoretical framework, to disclose and evaluate Turkey's role in international affairs. Based on the policy statements of eighteen Turkish foreign policymakers, this article examines Turkish national role conceptions (NRCs) during 1980–2014. It evaluates the pre-AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and AKP periods to assess continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy. In order to reflect the static and changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy behaviors, the main focus of their paper is on disclosing a number of NRCs that leaders under successive administrations implemented. The article is composed of two phases. The first step involves the accumulation of pertinent official policy speeches, press conferences, and interviews from 1980 to 2014. In the second stage, leaders' policy statements are analyzed using qualitative content analysis based on the typology of NRCs. The national role conceptions (NRCs) that Turkish policymakers adopted over these different time periods demonstrate that there has been both a shift and a continuity in Turkish foreign policy since 1980. They listed 33 NRCs, in which twelve of them are from Holsti's typology of NRC, while the rest have been formulated by authors based upon the official statements of Turkish leaders. The authors' 21 NRCs are: *central country, military power, soft power, strategic partner, peace promoter, global actor, energy hub rising power, facilitator, antiterrorism agent, trading state, kin-country, regional integrator, leader of Muslim world, pro-American, virtuous power, global sub-system collaborator, regional power, defender of the Muslim world and developing country* (Mehtap & Sözen, 2016: 53).

Akın (2021) employs role theory, as a foreign policy analysis (FPA) instrument, to examine national role conceptions of Turkey and their implications in the Eastern Mediterranean. She intends to establish a connection between Turkish national role conceptions and its political and economic objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean region. She contends that using role theory rather than conventional IR theories makes it plausible to explain Turkey's foreign policy decisions toward the region. In her research, she uses content analysis for three reasons: first, to simplify Turkey's national role conceptions in light of foreign policy events; second, to exhibit these roles as a collection of findings using software techniques; and third, to provide conceptual analysis for FPA and IR research. Her study consisted of foreign policy-related speeches delivered by Turkey's highest-ranking policymakers and published

on the Turkish and English official websites of the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between 2018 and 2020. More explicitly, in her thesis, she treats all official speeches as the subject of Turkish Foreign Policy, including 640 speeches by president Erdoğan and 27 speeches by Çavuşoğlu ; president Erdoğan and Çavuşoğlu as the actors of analysis; Speeches in Turkish (440 Turkish speeches by President Erdoğan and 24 Turkish speeches by Çavuşoğlu) and English (200 English speeches by President Erdoğan and 3 English speeches by Çavuşoğlu) as the analysis languages; official websites as the source of analysis. In her finding, she states that the national role conceptions of Turkish decision-makers as regional leader, rule-maker, and protector have been found to be highly congruent with foreign policy initiatives for the Eastern Mediterranean and MENA region.

Oweke (2019) uses role theory to evaluate Kenya's foreign policy in the eras of 1965–1975, 1978–88, and 1990–2000. He believes that the NRCs that officials possess within the state can serve as an explanatory factor for foreign policy behavior because it is within NRCs that states decide what form parameters of acceptable foreign policy behavior. Therefore, he uses role theory—specifically by looking at NRCs— as an analytical tool that can explain the foreign policy behavior of the Kenyatta administration and the Moi administration. In his finding, he mentions that there has both been permanence and variation in the foreign policy of the Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002) administration.

Maloverjan (2021), in her study, conducted a comprehensive content analysis in order to comprehend Korea's role conceptions in its foreign policy toward Europe. The thesis demonstrated how Korea portrays itself to Europe through a variety of role conceptions spanning from economic cooperation to ideological values. The thesis does a content analysis on sources from three levels of government—the president, the Foreign Ministry, and the embassies—to find out what conceptions South Korea has about its role as a country when it communicates to Europe. In her finding, she concludes that South Korea tends to portray itself to Europe as (a) an economic cooperator, which "demonstrates the willingness of South Korea to cooperate in economic fields"; (b) a protectee, which was "used in instances when it was said that other countries should also cooperate or support Korea in resolving the issue on the Korean peninsula"; (c) an advocate for peace, which "expresses South Korea's peace-loving nature, mostly towards resolving the issue of the Korean Peninsula in cooperation with others"; (d) a cultural powerhouse and cooperator, which "shows themes of South Korea emphasizing its cultural power in the form of music, movies,

language, etc. This code also contains references made to cultural cooperation and exchange as well as elements of tourism"; and (5) a regional protector, which was "used in instances when Korea's role as a resolver of the conflict on the Korean peninsula, especially instances when South Korea has contributed to peace in the region" (Maloverjan, 2021: 22, 23).

Extending Kal Holsti's early work on the usefulness of the role conceptions in foreign policy studies, Le Prestre's edited volume (1997a) tends to examine the nature, evolution, and origins of role conceptions in the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Canada, respectively. More specifically, in order to study the evolution (change and continuity) in foreign policy role conceptions after the Cold War, the contributors present the major foreign policy debate that took place in their eight-selected countries at the end of the Cold War and examine— through an analysis of major speeches— the relative frequency of identity, international status, and the definition of the national roles, as well as their relationship. Given that there are numerous NRCs that are developed inductively for each of these eight states separately, we cannot refer to them all in this paper; instead, one of them—the first one, the Soviet Union/Russia (Thibault and Levesque, 1997)—will be taken on behalf of the rest.

In light of the major changes that occurred in the USSR, the study of Thibault and Levesque (1997: 18) tend to endeavor to (i) define inductively the content of the major national role conceptions that are articulated by presidents and ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR and Russia; (ii) identify general trends of these roles; and (iii) determine in a non-causal manner the influence of status and identity variables on both the definition and evolution of these roles. In light of the fundamental developments that occurred in the Soviet Union, the sample is divided into two sub-corpus encompassing, respectively, the end of the USSR (January 1989 to December 1991) and the commencement of Russia (January 1992 to December 1993), and then these two sub-corpus are treated separately. The corpus is comprised of the entirety of thirty-seven speeches and interviews delivered by presidents and ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR and Russia. Analysis of the roles of the USSR and Russia is based specifically on official references to the duties and responsibilities that the leaders invest in the state they represent on the international stage.

For the Soviet Union, Thibault and Levesque (1997) identify six major roles that arise from the Soviet leadership's discourse in accordance with their importance of determining main

directions of Soviet's foreign policy: promoter of arms control and disarmament, international collaborator, reformer of the international order, reformer of the regional European order, defender of universal human values, and supporter of international organizations. *Promoter of arms control and disarmament* points out "the strengthening of trust, the guaranteeing of predictability in military activity, and promotion of the arms limitation and disarmament process and of monitoring of compliance with obligations in this sphere" (pp. 23–24). *International collaborator* alludes to "obvious wish to expand the international community and to master new forms of international cooperation" (p. 24). *Reformer of the international order* signals to the looking "ahead to a positive evolution of today's world and to its stability" (p. 24). *Reformer of the regional European order* "setting up effective mechanisms for pan-European interaction which, taken as a whole, would allow the security of all peoples in Europe to be assuredly maintained" (p. 25). *Defender of universal human values* "strictly [observing] in relations between states the principles of equality, freedom of choice, tolerance, mutual respect, and consideration of one another's interests." (p. 26). *Supporter international organizations* "institutionalizing the importance of international organizations [and the] desire to participate at a more active level in various international organizations" (p. 26).

In the aftermath of the various geopolitical shifts that led to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the intended function of its (i.e., the USSR's) successor underwent observable reversals. Russia's duties and responsibilities reflect a clear allocation. For this phase, Thibault and Levesque (1997) represented the following NRCs—in accordance with their importance of determining main directions of Russian foreign policy since 1992: promoter of a regional geopolitical order, integrator of Russia into the western world, promoter of international cooperation protector of the Russian state and independent player, instrument for changing Russia, defender of democratic principles and human rights, supporter of international organization, supporter of arms control and disarmament (Thibault and Levesque, 1997: 26-30). Since 1992, the first four roles appear to have defined the primary orientations of Russian foreign policy: *Promoter of a regional geopolitical order* refers to the issue of transforming the space occupied by the CIS into a region of good-neighborliness and partnership, laying solid foundations for relations with the CIS countries, which could become a material factor in ensuring Russia's security in all spheres: military-political, economic, humanitarian, ecological, scientific-technical, and legal. *Integrator of*

Russia into the Western world signals to the theme that the main aim of Russian foreign policy is to strengthen connections with the West and integrate into Europe and Western international organizations. *Promoter of international cooperation* indicates that Russia's position in the modern world is determined less by its nuclear capability than by its confidence-building and cooperation policies. *Protector of the Russian state, and independent player* demonstrates the leadership's desire to maintain Russia's uniqueness and identity while respecting its natural and historical characteristics. *The instrument for changing the state* has a lot more to do with domestic policy than it does with foreign policy. When it comes to how a country acts toward the rest of the world, it stresses the need to create conditions that will help the country's economy and politics, as well as the need to make promoting internal development a key part of foreign policy. This role is shown by statements that say economic interests should be at the center of foreign policy—at the expense of security and that specific policies should be put in place to get economic and political support from other countries for reforms. This role is a clear sign that the needs of security are less important than political and economic change. As Yeltsin emphasized: “Russia's power is not measured against the number of its missiles but, rather, against the standard of living of its citizens” (Thibault and Levesque, 1997: 29). Then, *NRCs of defender of democratic principles and human rights, supporter of international organization, supporter of arms control and disarmament* are revealed, too, respectively based upon their significance to Russia foreign policy.

According to their study, the definition of roles was influenced by status in the case of the Soviet Union and by identity in the case of Russia (Thibault and Levesque, 1997: 38-39).

Wish (1987), hypothesizing that national attributes (which include size or capability, economic development, and political orientation or accountability) serve as one of the many sources of national role conception, tends to investigate the relationship between them and national role conceptions. Using content analysis of twenty-nine political elites from seventeen nations who were heads of state or top foreign policy makers between 1959 and 1968, she mentions that national attributes have provided a primary source for the formulation of national role conceptions. Her findings indicate that certain national characteristics are the primary sources for national role conception. Also, there is most likely an indirect relationship between national attributes and foreign policy conduct, with national role conceptions serving as mediating variables.

Regarding these previously mentioned studies associated with Holsti's National Role Conceptions in role theory, this paper will tend to mingle itself with those that address the NRCs and their origins, particularly following the study of Le Prestre (1997a). That is simply due to two things: first, the correlation between NRCs and foreign policy behavior is widely reported as being "problematic" (Le Prestre, 1997b: 12; Thies, 2010: 34) and/or, at least in the words of Grossman, "national role [is] rarely posited as the sole explanatory factor" for state behavior (Grossman, 2005: 337) because foreign policy performance "is a product of numerous endogenous and exogenous factors [... in which] many of them have little to do with the current foreign policy elite" or their perception (Başer, 2015: 292). Second, Holsti (1970: 295 cited in Wish, 1987: 95) did not "reveal the origins of various national role conceptions," which might indicate when and how national roles evolve and change. He suggested that an investigation of these sources is crucial and identified them as a major gap in his original study.

2.5 THE NATURE, EVOLUTION, AND ORIGINS OF ROLE CONCEPTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Given that Le Prestre (1997a) adheres closely to Holsti's study, his edited volume deviated from correlating or connecting NRCs with foreign policy actions—due to the lack of “immediate theories that would help build a direct link between role and behavior” (Le Prestre, 1997b: 5)—to policymakers' representations of the role that their country ought to play on the international stage. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the lack of immediate correlations between role and behavior should not be one's obstacle to lay the 'ground' for future advancements—where Stephen Walker (cited in Le Prestre, 1997b: 7) specifies that this 'ground' could commence with examining the nature, evolution, and origins of role conceptions—this study follows in the footsteps of the Le Prestre (1997a) edited volume by focusing on the nature, evolution, and origins of role conceptions in foreign policy. That is, we are focusing on “decision makers' representations of the role that their country should play on the international scene”, not on foreign policy actions that may express these conceptions, nor on the connections between role and behavior (Le Prestre, 1997b: 10-11).

Decision-makers have more freedom to make choices that are compatible with their personality, traits and perceptions, and many of these perceptions will influence the decisions they tend to make in terms of foreign policy (Wish, 1980: 535). In the field of

foreign policy, policymakers envision and assume that their nation ought to take on and fulfill a variety of responsibilities, obligations, and commitments within the international system or subordinate regional systems. According to proponents of the role approach, these responsibilities, tasks, and/or obligations are known as "roles" conception in the field of foreign policy (Sekhri, 2009: 424; Mehtap & Sözen, 2016: 48-50). According to Le Prestre (1997b: 5), the general directions of foreign policy options or choices can be explained by role conception, that is, because when a state articulates or represents its national role conceptions, it discloses "its preferences and image of the world, triggers expectations, and influences its definition of the situation and of available options". In the study of Le Prestre (1997a), national role conceptions are used to connote the conception that decision makers have about their country's duties and responsibilities in the international system.

Holsti (1970: 240, cited in Le Prestre, 1997b) has placed an emphasis on agent sources (ego's conception) by emphasizing the policymakers' own perceptions of their country's place in the region or the international system. Nonetheless, it has been widely highlighted by both sociological role theorists (who claim that roles have their structural roots in the expectations and behavior of others, based on shared norms) and structural realists (who believe roles are primarily defined by capabilities and the distribution of threats) that national role conceptions have structural origins (Hermanns, 2013: 69). Thereupon, Le Prestre (1997b: 8-9) mingles agent sources with structural ones by considering the latter—implicit or explicit expectations or demands by others, role expectations—in the manner in which it is mediated by the perceptions of decision-makers. Thus, he comes up with the internal and external origins of NRCs.

To illustrate, Le Prestre's volume (1997a) incarnated these internal and external origins for NRCs in the concepts of identity and status, respectively. The latter (e.g., external origins or status) signals the country's position on the international stage or its relationship with any other state (Thibault & Levesque, 1997: 18). More specifically, the status alludes to (a) the subjective perception that leaders have about the "position of their country rather than to a more objective assessment of the actual power position their country enjoys in the system" (Le Prestre, 1997b: 8); (b) relations that country has with other international actors; (c) commitment that it tries to respect or honor in relation to these international actors (Andre & Alain, 1997; Thibault & Levesque, 1997; Macleod, 1997). The former (e.g., internal origins or identity), as Breuning (2011: 22) claims, "is often akin to national role conception

[...] although it is sometimes also used as a constitutive element of role conception". Identity, in this context, is the self-perception that is rooted in the understanding of decisionmakers about themselves and what they represent of their nation—in terms of the values it represents, its history, or the characteristics of its polity—in the world (Le Prestre, 1997b: 9, 11). For instance, in the western nations, the values of "individual freedom, civil liberties, national self-determination, independence, and economic progress" would be frequently referred to in the policymakers' speeches. Likewise, in developing countries, values such as "rapid economic development, national unity, freedom from foreign control, and national prestige" would be regularly seen in the statements of policymakers (Holsti, 1983: 322). More distinctly, "identity" refers to the perception of a nation's values and history held by its leaders. Which is to say, in the case of Qatar, what traditions and values would become the main characteristics of Qatar that its leaders envisioned?

3. FOREIGN POLICY OF QATAR

According to Rahman (2005, cited in Barakat, 2014: 6), Qatar did not emerge as a distinct political entity until Sheikh Muhammad bin Thani (1850–1878) led a successful campaign against the remaining remnants of the Bahraini Al-Khalifa dynasty's ambitions to control the peninsula, and it won international recognition as an autonomous sheikhdom under the tacit protection of Britain. Prior to the mid-1990s, Qatar was a small, insignificant, and almost unknown Persian Gulf state. After gaining independence in 1971 and especially during the reign of Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani (1972-1995), Qatar looked internally, relying on Saudi security guarantees against perceived threats like the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war. Which is to say, the foreign policy of Qatar was coinciding with Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, as was the case with other Gulf states. However, in the mid-1990s, when the crown prince, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, overthrew his father, Emir Khalifa, in a bloodless coup, Qatar's foreign policy dramatically deviated from Riyadh's foreign policy. Since then, Qatar has emerged as an autonomous and high-profile regional player (Abdullah, 2014b; Steinberg, 2023: 7–10; Roberts, 2012: 234–235; Saanun, n.d.: 26–36).

The 1995 bloodless coup that brought Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to power in Qatar was met with a lack of welcome from the GCC countries and some Arab countries, which led to a semi-hostile regional environment surrounding Qatar. Nonetheless, reformulating the country's foreign policy in a way that would give it a special status in the region unlike the one it had before was the vital goal for the new Emir to exert. So, the new emir, realizing this, based his foreign policy on ensuring protection from external forces that would first help him stay in power and then assist in implementing his project of raising the status of his country on the world stage (Jargūn, 2016: 5; Saanun, n.d.: 32). According to Barakat (2014), there was a significant change in Qatar's foreign policy stance in the early 1990s as a result of (i) three connected events: the end of the Iran-Iraq war, which allowed the development of Qatar's North Field gas reserves in Gulf waters; the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which revealed the vulnerability of small Gulf states; tensions with Saudi Arabia, which opposed any greater autonomy for Qatari policy; and (ii) Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa's rule.

Before he became ruler in 1995, Emir Hamad possessed considerable power and experience in state leadership. In 1972, he was promoted to major general in the Qatari army after graduating from the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He was named heir in 1977 after earning the respect of his relatives through his efforts. In the 1989 cabinet change, Hamad appointed several of his loyalists to high posts. A second cabinet change in 1992 gave Hamad even more power consolidation, and the event was widely seen as the beginning of a coup. When he assumed power, he was prepared to lead Qatar in a new direction with ambitious plans and strong new policies at home and abroad. The emir sought to diversify Qatar's international relations and build a reputation for the state as an impartial and neutral mediator, as well as one of the most dynamic and forward-looking entrepreneurs in the Arabian Gulf, as opposed to seeking security by existing quietly under Saudi Arabia's protection. Hamad bin Khalifah initially appeared preoccupied with demonstrating Qatar's independence from Saudi Arabia. Thus, under his leadership, Qatar expanded its educational system in accordance with the American model, in contrast to the restrictive, reactionary Saudi example. The remarkable visibility and influence of his second wife, Sheikha Moza bint Nasser al-Misnad, is also an obvious contrast to Saudi Arabia's systematic disempowerment of women. In terms of foreign affairs, he adopted an open-door policy to communicate with all parties, whether they were Sunni (Hamas), Shia (Iran and Hezbollah), Zaydi (Houthis), or Jewish (the Israeli government). This further differentiated him from the conservative Saudi position. However, one of the decisive events that has been deemed to be the turning point in the history of Qatar and Saudi Arabia's relationship was the invasion of Kuwait. At the end of the day, this was just another instance of a small, energy-rich, and naturally defenseless Gulf nation (Kuwait) coming under attack from a much larger neighbor (Iraq) while facing greater difficulties in bilateral relations. There is no doubt that unexpected events such as this one might take place with Doha. In addition to the fact that Qatar was unable to avoid viewing the invasion as a warning by analogy, the Kingdom's helplessness in appealing for Western military support in the face of the invasion was not only humiliating but also destroyed any idea that Saudi Arabia would provide Qatar any kind of security. These challenges resulted in Hamad bin Khalifah's determined efforts to revive Qatar's traditional approach to its foreign policy, which consisted of looking for a central alliance that it could depend on. The international context in the Persian Gulf witnessed a dramatic shift as a direct result of the military operations known as Desert Shield and Desert

Storm. This operation—in which 35 countries' forces under the command of the United States fought against Iraq's invasion to defend Saudi Arabia and ultimately liberate Kuwait—consisted of two phases. The first was designated Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990–17 January 1991) and consisted of operations leading to the deployment of forces and the defense of Saudi Arabia. The second Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991–28 February 1991) was the combat phase to liberate Kuwait (Naval History and Heritage Command, n.d.). Instead of being seen as a potentially questionable ally (mostly due to its strong ties with Israel), the United States of America became a vital ally and source of implicit security assurances. As a result, Qatar built Al-Udeid Air Base, the U.S. forward headquarters of Central Command (CENTCOM), and it signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States (Álvarez-Ossorio & García, 2021: 101–102; Roberts, 2016: 5-8; Roberts, 2012: 234–235; Barakat, 2014: 6-7; Salem & de Zeeuw, 2012; Steinberg, 2023: 7–10, 22; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 85).

Even though Hamad bin Khalifah's basic foreign policy precept was to base Qatar's security on one major alliance, which has been a key element of constancy in Qatar's foreign affairs since the late 18th century, he explored new and innovative techniques and policies as well. Indeed, he revolutionized many facets of the state of Qatar and completely repositioned it internationally. He managed and directed a comprehensive reorganization of Qatar's energy economy. From 1995 to 2000, oil production increased from 3.7 million barrels per day to 16.9 million barrels per day. The crucial facilitators of the blueprint or master plan that bolster Qatari vast policies have been attributed to these energy developments, particularly the investment in LNG (Liquid Natural Gas), for three reasons. Firstly, the LNG boosted Qatar to be an extremely rich state owing two hydrocarbon-based streams, allowing its emir, Hamed, to perform a range of costly policies during the 2000s and 2010s. For instance, with this fiscal strength, Doha, besides spending remarkably innumerable billions on education enhancement by constructing education cities, including notable western universities, was also able to carry out many expensive diplomatic mediations (2008 Lebanese and multi-year Darfur negotiations are among some examples). Not far from that, in the context of boosting Qatar's prestige and status in the world, the emir generously spent huge amounts of money not only on Al-Jazeera but also on hosting miscellaneous international conferences and sporting events, as well as constructing museums that have the highest degree of excellence in the world. Secondly, vis-à-vis various significant states around the globe, Qatar plays a

crucial role owing to its developing capability to become a central supplier of gas to countries around the globe. In 2013, Qatar supplied Argentina with 14% of its LNG, Belgium with 40%, Brazil with 4%, Canada with 83%, Chile with 5%, China with 38%, France with 19%, India with 85%, Japan with 18%, South Korea with 33%, Kuwait with 86%, Mexico with 23%, Spain with 23%, Taiwan with 50%, Thailand with 74%, the UAE with 86%, the United Kingdom with 93%, and the United States with 8%. For that reason, Qatar is vital for a group of economically, militarily, and politically potent nations (that rely significantly on its continued prosperity and safety) such as Belgium, China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, despite the fact that it does not supply the countries' entire LNG imports and that LNG is not the countries' merely energy source. Thirdly, this liquid natural gas-infused wealth brought forth fiscal overflow, which thereafter led to the creation of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) in 2005 (Roberts, 2016: 5-8).

On June 25, 2013, Qatar was ushered into a new political dimension due to the resignation of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and the transfer of authority to his son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani. Because of their adoption of liberal thought in their ruling government, both two emirs, the father and his son, possess the same vision for outlining and organizing the foreign policy of Qatar. The international reputation and economy of Qatar have noticed enormous progress under the rule of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and his son, Tamim (Roberts, 2016: 10-12; Saanun, n.d.: 26-40)

3.1 FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS OF QATAR

In general, according to Alrantisi (2014: 41–43), two main strategies have been adopted in Qatari foreign policy: survival and the desire to gain high prestige and influence in regional and international affairs. To realize these goals, Qatar acquired a set of tools, which include diplomatic mediation, public diplomacy, investment and foreign aid, allying with others, and military tools (Alrantisi, 2014: 43-47; Antwi-Boateng, 2013: 7-11; Álvarez-Ossorio and García, 2021: 108-109; Al-Tamimi et al, 2023; Khatib, 2013: 225-228).

3.1.1 Diplomatic Mediation

In an attempt to list many types of diplomacy, Abdurahmanli (2021: 285-286) defined mediation diplomacy as referring to the policies that are taken by a third state in an effort to solve the problem between two or more states that are unable to reach an agreement on a

particular issue. Diplomatic mediation is considered one of the most important executive tools for Qatari foreign policy. Through diplomatic mediation between the conflicting parties, Qatar has aimed to strengthen its position in the region as a neutral mediator who can be relied upon and is interested in peace and stability (Alrantisi, 2014: 43-44). Put it another way, as literally mentioned by Emir Hamad in his speech in the UN General Assembly in 2007, “[t]he world’s major conflicts have become far too big for a single power to handle them on its own. This active involvement has been very useful to Qatar for building its global image and gaining international recognition “(quoted in Álvarez-Ossorio and García, 2021: 108).

3.1.2 Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is defined as government communication through the press and other media outlets in an effort to persuade foreign audiences in the target country to exert pressure on their government to alter its foreign or domestic policy (Al-Tamimi et al, 2023: 17-23). Qatar uses public diplomacy through the media as its second mode of diplomacy, positioning Aljazeera as the voice of the people and a source of an open platform for those who have no voice (Alrantisi, 2014: 44-45; Antwi-Boateng, 2013: 7). Al Jazeera, founded in 1996, became the media network with the largest audience in the Arab world. According to some estimates, at least 140 million people in the Arab world and the rest of the world watch Al Jazeera. The presence of Al Jazeera is not limited to the broadcasting and screens that people see; rather, it extends further than this since Al Jazeera has evolved from being only a media channel that broadcasts news and events into an integrated network of many media, research, and training institutions. The expansion of this media network's offerings—including Al Jazeera English, Al Jazeera Sports Channels, Al Jazeera Children's Channel, Al Jazeera Mubasher/Live Channel, and Al Jazeera Documentary Channel—led to a rise in the network's level of impact. In addition to this, Al Jazeera has broadened the scope of the activities it engages in. It is no longer like a typical TV network since it has built strong and prominent affiliates such as yearly festivals, the Al Jazeera Training Center, the Human Rights Department, the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, and aljazeera.net in Arabic and English, amongst others. This has caused it to no longer be comparable to other television networks and consequently increased Qatar’s popularity considerably. It was able to convert this popularity into political influence (Álvarez-Ossorio and García, 2021: 108–109; Al-Tamimi et al., 2023: 55–59). As mentioned by Al-Tamimi et al (2023: 58), with the aim of

putting pressure on a given regime to alter its position or policy concerning certain matters, Al-Jazeera, as an efficient and potent tool, is employed to meet such an aim. This is exactly the role of public diplomacy and the spearhead of its tools, i.e., the media". Also, in the context of its public diplomacy efforts, Qatar also uses partnerships with regional bodies, international conferences, and major events, such as hosting the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in 2003 (Al-Tamimi et al., 2023: 51).

3.1.3 Humanitarian Aid and Foreign Investments

Humanitarian aid and foreign investments can be deemed one of the most significant instruments of Qatari foreign policy for achieving its objectives and advancing its interests, according to Alrantisi (2014: 45). As Barakat (2014:1-2) states, "Qatar possessed the financial resources to [...] build credibility through extensive humanitarian work and pledges of investment to support eventual peace agreements".

Regarding foreign investment, Qatar's capacity to carry out its role in foreign policy is significantly dependent on its economic resources. It has utilized natural gas as part of its policy to integrate into the global economy and has benefited from its economic abilities by achieving success in several mediation files involving multiple conflicts. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) was founded in 2005 with the aim of managing its global investment activity, which incorporated vast investments in Europe and Africa.

With the establishment of QIA, Qatar's foreign policy, diplomacy, and regional influence have been significantly bolstered by this foreign investment. The preponderance of investments was made in Europe's largest corporations as well as a significant portion of Qatar's investments in the Middle East as foreign aid and in many nations, such as Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Eritrea, and Indonesia, are essential for infrastructure, health, energy, and communication development projects. It has spent years attempting to diversify its foreign investments away from the oil and gas industry by using its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority, to acquire assets in Europe, Africa, Asia, and other regions. These investments span the service, financial, finance, and real estate sectors, as well as the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Although their stated primary objective is "economic diversification," it is evident that the Qatar state's investments on a global scale,

particularly in Western nations, are primarily "foreign policy" oriented (Alrantisi, 2014: 45-48; Al-Tamimi et al., 2023: 59-62; Telci and Erel, 2021: 4; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 86, 90-91).

Concerning foreign aid, in the words of Holsti (1988: 226) “[f]oreign aid—the transfer of money, goods, or technical advice from donor to recipient—is an instrument of policy that has been used in foreign relation for centuries”. The scope of Qatari aid has expanded to include a variety of geographical regions. Namely, numerous significant disasters received emergency aid, such as the floods in Pakistan, the earthquake in Haiti, and the drought in the Horn of Africa, as well as humanitarian crises involving Palestine and Darfur (Alrantisi, 2014: 45; Roberts, 2012: 236). Among the most important humanitarian relief and development assistance organizations operating in the state of Qatar are the following: Reach Out To Asia (ROTA), a non-profit organization established in 2005 with the aim of building the future by allowing access to education at different levels for all the world’s youth; The Sheikh Eid Bin Muhammad Al Thani Charitable Foundation, a humanitarian organization established in 1995 that is concerned with the welfare of people in Qatar and abroad; Qatar Charity, a non-governmental organization founded in 1992 for the development of Qatari society and other needy communities; and the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), a public development institution established in 2002 that is committed, on behalf of the State of Qatar, to implement international development and foreign aid (Al-Tamimi et al., 2023: 64-68).

3.1.4 Entering Alliances and Blocs

Due to its inability to defend itself on its own, Qatar considers self-protection to be one of its top priorities by concluding security and military agreements. After Saudi Arabia declined to support the new government in Doha in the mid-1990s, Qatar determined that it would be safer with an American security umbrella on its territory (Alrantisi, 2014: 45-46; Lawson, 2016: 33-43).

3.1.5 Interventionist Foreign Policy

In its interventionist foreign policy, Qatar has relied on financial, logistical, and media support, as well as military intervention, as in the cases of Bahrain and Libya. In the case of Bahrain, Qatari forces were dispatched as part of the Peninsula Shield forces that supported the ruling regime in Bahrain in March (Alrantisi, 2014: 46-47; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 95-96).

3.2 ANATOMY OF QATARI FOREIGN POLICY

The goal of this section is to examine the literature on Qatari foreign policy in order to (i) identify the main themes in that policy, (ii) discuss the change and/or continuity in that policy over the course of the thesis's coverage period, and (iii) situate this thesis within any existing gaps or areas of contribution.

3.2.1 The Main Themes of Qatari Foreign Policy

Based on the study of (Steinberg, 2023; Al-Tamimi et al., 2023; Álvarez-Ossorio and García 2021; Çavuşoğlu, 2020; Habraken, 2017; Shoaib, 2016; Alrantisi, 2014; Khatib, 2013; Khatib, 2013) the main themes in Qatari foreign policy can be deemed as: high level of global engagement and open-door policy, International developmental aid, Mediator-integrator, Independent foreign policy, Pragmatism, Interventionist role.

3.2.1.1 High level of global engagement and open-door policy

Notably, high level of engagement with many miscellaneous international entities from mid-1990s to the present is known for the foreign policy of Qatar. This involves participation in official multilateral and international as well as regional forums, such as the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In contrast to the often-restricted scope of foreign affairs that small nations tend to have, Qatar's foreign policy behavior went well beyond its boundaries; this is perhaps because of its great economic potential, which enables it to pay for the expenses of diplomatic work, yet it remains less involved in the military field due to its limited military capabilities. More importantly, activating its membership in various international organizations has been a priority for Qatar as it seeks to make the most of its participation in global initiatives. In 2001, it was elected to the United Nations Economic Council; from 2000 to 2003, it served as president of the Organization of the Islamic Conference; and in 2006 and 2007, it was chosen as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Qatar was accepted into the Francophone Organization in October 2012. Along with, it has hosted international conferences, summits, and sport events including the World Trade Organization's 2001 negotiations, the United Nations Summit in 2006 (which had as its theme suggested "Sustainable Peace in the Middle East," the Asian Games in 2006), the Asian Cup in 2011, and many other sport events. In addition, it hosted the United Nations Conference on Climate

Change in 2012, as well as international conferences on agricultural security and sustainable development. Furthermore, Qatar has been performing network of extremely complex and conflicting relationships with a wide range of countries and groups who conflict with one another, such as Iran and the United States or Hamas and Israel as well as Taliban and the west. While it was hosting the Israeli trade office— which closed in 2009 due to the latter's attack on Gaza strip— it was supporting Hamas movement and hosting the leadership. Also, in the Arab and middle east milieu, Qatar has strong ties to most of the major powers. It is not a member of the stability group, which consists of conservative monarchies commanded by Saudi Arabia, or the axis of resistance, which comprises Iran and its Syrian and Lebanese allies. Instead, it had relatively good relations, at least in a certain sense, with countries on both sides. That is, it established closer ties with Iran in the early 2000s, which is considered as a significant regional counterpart to Saudi Arabia albeit such relations initially shaped by Qatar's geographical position, which compelled Doha to collaborate with its influential neighbor due to the shared North Field/South Pars gas field. Therefore, once the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with their respective allies, began to deteriorate significantly starting in 2005, Qatar assumed a more prominent role as an intermediary between the two factions. Similarly, the case is true when it comes to USA and pro-Western governments in the Middle East versus Iran, Taliban and the like. Despite the fact that the United States views Qatar as a close ally since it is home to the largest US air base in the region, Qatar has outstanding ties not just with Iran and its state and non-state partners in the area but also with more independently minded militant organizations like the Taliban (Alrantisi, 2014: 47; Peterson 2006: 746-747; Shoaib, 2016: 260; Bazaz, 2008; Steinberg, 2023: 6, 22; Barakat, 2014: 6-7; Khatib, 2013: 420).

3.2.1.2 International developmental aid

Qatari international humanitarian and developmental assistance is a key element of the state's policy in the field of international cooperation. It has allocated funds for international developmental aid. These funds were designated for international humanitarian initiatives and the improvement of education in various regions and nations. Between 2005 and 2009, the state of Qatar provided aid and development assistance to approximately 106 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Americas, and other regions of the world. The government spent funds on humanitarian initiatives in Sudan, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Syria. In addition, in the year 2020, the Emir of Qatar donated more than \$100 million to aid small island

developing nations and underdeveloped nations combating the effects of climate change. In addition to supporting green employment opportunities, the food industry, and agriculture in GCC nations, Qatar financed a variety of additional initiatives. Additionally, it constructed healthcare facilities in Mogadishu, Ethiopia, and Gaza. Likewise, in the construction of a school in Tirana, wherein more than 800 instructors and students benefited, Qatar contributed \$1.3 million in that matter. It also constructed a new, fully equipped, multi-facility school with 58 classrooms in the Akimat district of Astana, Kazakhstan. This project's budget was greater than \$12,7 million, and more than 1,200 students benefited. In the same manner, in an endeavor of facilitating Mali students' access to education, Qatari government contributed \$40 million to the completion of the "Education Above All (EAA)" projects in Mali by providing the government with a \$24.5 million concessional loan and a grant of \$15.5 million. In addition, for the development of a Palestinian studies institute, Qatar contributed \$5 million. As it also signed a \$1.5 million, three-year contract with the Unite Lebanon Youth Project in 2015 to fund the education of 42 Palestinian students at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the Lebanese American University (LAU). Similarly, as part of its QFFD program, it assisted with the development of housing and infrastructure in various nations. As part of a program to improve education and infrastructure in the region, it built Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Hospital for the Rehabilitation and Artificial Limbs in Gaza. Qatar also assisted with road construction in the Sultanate of Oman and participated in Somalia's reconstruction by creating two highways for a total of \$165 million. Besides, it contributed approximately \$70 million to the reconstruction of ten villages in Darfur's five states. In addition, \$2 million was spent to train public health personnel in Sudan. As part of its humanitarian efforts, Qatar also assisted victims of vehicle bombings in Somalia (Al-Tamimi et al., 2023: 51-55, 64-68).

3.2.1.3 Mediator-integrator

United Nations (2012, cited in Barakat, 2014: 4) defined mediation as “a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements”. The role of mediator is the key feature of Qatar’s foreign policy (Khatib, 2013: 418-420). Since 2005, Qatar has stepped into the role of mediator for a number of nations. Its reputation as a credible mediator in the Middle East has grown, both among regional and western countries. It continued working on a plan to mediate talks between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian territories.

It was also the catalyst for the first-ever US-Taliban discussions. In 2011, Qatar hosted peace negotiators from Darfur, Nigeria, Djibouti, and Libya; in February of the same year, the Qataris mediated a national reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah. Alongside with, the Taliban movement opened an office in Doha to facilitate talks with the United States and the Afghan government (Alrantisi, 2014: 49-50; Kamrava, 2011: 539; Barakat, 2014: 10-20; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 86-87). To elaborate more, given the existing international circumstances and the developments and transformations in the international system—which have made the Arab region hotter than ever before due to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the tensions in Yemen between the Houthis and their counterpart, the disputes between the Lebanese parties, and the attempts to divide Sudan, followed by the Arab revolutions and the continuation of the Palestinian issue as it is without a solution—the Qatari role has emerged on the regional and international stage with an active foreign policy acting as a mediator to end the dispute. Its diplomatic efforts to mediate conflicts in Yemen, Western Sahara, Darfur, Lebanon, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Palestine, and Libya prompted to be determined as peacemaker on the global stage (Jargūn, 2016: 6; Roberts, 2012: 236; Alrantisi, 2014: 14-15). Since 2005, Doha has primarily served as a mediator in disputes involving Palestinians (PLO and Hamas), the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels, the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels, and the Lebanese conflict. The most effective mediation by Qatar has long been regarded as the one that occur in Lebanon in 2008. In May of that year, combat broke out in West Beirut and other locations as the Saudi Arabian allies and the Iranian proxy Hezbollah clashed. A government of national unity was established in Beirut as a result of a deal made soon after in Doha, which stopped the violence from worsening (Steinberg, 2023: 22; Al-Tamimi et al, 2023: 50-51). The most notable negotiations were those that occurred between Hamas and its adversaries in the Israel/Palestine region, between the Taliban and the United States, as well as those in Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and Djibouti-Eritrea (Kamrava, 2011: 539; Steinberg, 2023: 23). Qatar's role as a mediator pursued even after the reign of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa. This was evident during the period of ceasefire in July and August of 2014 between Israel's occupied forces and Palestinians. The development of Qatar's role as a mediator between the United States and the Taliban exhibited similarities. The significance of Qatari relations with the Taliban was realized no later than 2010, when the administration of former President Barack Obama of the United States opted to engage in preliminary discussions with the

group. In June 2013, the Taliban office was formally established in Doha, as a result of early support from the US government. In 2014, negotiations between American officials and the Taliban in Doha led to a prisoner exchange, which marked the initial instance of the Taliban leadership's ability to effectively communicate and produce outcomes through their representatives. In 2017, Doha regained prominence as the primary site for discussions between the Taliban and the Trump administration, with the aim of expediting the removal of US military personnel from Afghanistan. The Doha Agreement of February 2020 yielded an outcome whereby the United States committed to the withdrawal of its troops by May 1st, 2021, and in turn, the Taliban vowed to sever its connections with al-Qaeda (Steinberg, 2023: 24).

3.2.1.4 Independent foreign policy

Qatar adheres to the Gulf environment's characteristics, such as location, social characteristics, systematic, political, and historical similarities. Surprisingly, by the mid-1990s, it developed a more autonomous and proactive foreign policy under emir Hamad. It has made a priority of its foreign policy to dissociate itself from any external influence from the Middle East's leading nations—acquiring an independent role. As Peterson (2006: 746) says, it” has adopted a high-profile independent stance within the GCC”. Because it has pursued an independent foreign policy, it has been able to diversify its security agreements among regional and extra-regional powers. Qatar's outstanding relations with the United States, its agreement to lease the Al-Sialia base and the port of Al-Udeid to the US army under the 1992 joint defense agreement, and its permission for the opening of an office to represent Israeli commercial interests enabled Qatar to assert that it pursues policies that are independent and consistent with its supreme interests (Alrantisi, 2014: 52-54; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 86). Obviously, the Qatari government's stance with Iran is a prime example of a state truly autonomous foreign policy. Both states are important partners for a number of reasons, including geography, history, and oil. Particularly, their shared economic and strategic interests in the 'North Field/ South Pars' natural gas field can be accounted as a salient example behind their friendly relation. Yet, its affiliation with Iran posed a serious threat to its relations with regional and global hegemonic powers, including Saudi Arabia and the United States (Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 87-88).

3.2.1.5 Pragmatism

According to Shoaib (2016: 259), many researchers who have attempted to comprehend and study the foreign policy performance of Qatari state concur that Qatar's foreign policy is primarily motivated by pragmatism, and that this principle has played a significant role in directing Qatar's foreign policy. Far from ideological influences, particularly in countries that are undergoing political and social change and are subject to profit and loss calculations, pragmatism pertains to the study of the regional and international balance of power, as well as the attempt to anticipate its developments and determine Qatar's position and weight within it. This trait is obviously visible in its total distinction between its Salafist ideology and its Hanbali school of thought, which necessitates not diverging from the ruler, and between analyzing its interests in the nations involved and backing anti-government movements in them. That is, this feature is clearly evident in its support for anti-government movements in countries where it operates. Put another way, as Iman (2012, cited in Alrantisi, 2014: 57) argues, the dominantly pragmatic nature of Qatari foreign policy explains the country's seemingly contradictory stances on various issues, such as its support for the Palestinian case and its hosting of many Hamas leaders while it maintains (before it has closed Israel's trade office in Doha, 2009) good relations with Israel, in contrast to the position of the Cooperation Council, of which it is a member, on the issue of normalization with Israel. Qatar's pragmatic approach to foreign affairs was also shown by its efforts to improve ties with Israel. After a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Doha in 1996, Qatar became the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to recognize Israel de facto, and an Israeli trade office was opened there. When Sheikh Hamad was in charge, unlike other Gulf States, Qatar did not hide the fact that it was interested in the Palestinian cause and was building open relation with Israel (Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 88).

3.2.1.6 Interventionist policy

As a result of Arab Spring incidents beginning in 2011, Qatar's primary foreign policy emphasis switched from mediation to more actively political and military interventionism, notably in the wars in Libya and Syria. Qatar has been a major supporter and financial backer of rebel organizations in both Libya and Syria, and in Libya it has taken a direct military role. It was also essential in Libya by acting as a conduit or canal between the Arab League and the Arab governments who wanted to intervene in the country. It took a same proactive

position in Syria wherein its endeavor to create a coalition of rebel factions were seen critical. Qatar's support for Islamist groups across the Middle East, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the more controversial Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al Nusra, is a key aspect of Qatar's interventionist policies (liberation-supporter) and one for which it is often criticized in the international community and by other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states (Álvarez-Ossorio and García, 2021: 111-112; Steinberg, 2023: 23, 25-28; Barakat, 2014: 2, 5; Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 95-96).

3.2.2 Change and Continuity in Qatar's Foreign Policy

Due to the fact that the primary role of Qatar's foreign policy is to play the role of a mediator, the country has developed positive relationships with all of the political poles in the area. Furthermore, it has endeavored to adopt a policy of open doors, not only with Iran and Syria but also with various and, occasionally, conflicting political entities in the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Taliban, Muslim Brotherhood as well as with Israel (Shoaib, 2016: 260; Steinberg, 2023: 6; Khatib, 2013: 420). According to Kamrava (2011: 539), Qatar—since the middle of the 2000s—has emerged as one of the world's most active mediators in intra-national and regional conflicts throughout the Middle East and areas of Africa. The most notable of these have been efforts to mediate conflicts in Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen, with similar efforts in Palestine and the Djibouti-Eritrea border conflict. In this way, Qatar has worked to show that it is a trustworthy mediator who wants peace and security.

Although in recent decades the Qatari foreign policy has been characterized by neutrality and the role of mediation, it has begun to give way to interventionist role in response to regional geopolitical developments that began in 2011. With the beginning of the wave of change in the Arab region 2011, the Qatari foreign policy witnessed a shift in its response to regional geopolitical developments, i.e., it shifted from conflict mediation to aggressive action. The interventionist strategy tries to vitalize their position by using both coercive and facilitative tools, depending on the situation. Not only that, with the advent of emir Hamad's son, emir Tamim, it is reported that the country shifted from intervention (liberation supporter role) to internal development role whereby the focus centered on domestic issues (Barakat, 2014: 2; Shoaib, 2016: 260).

To elucidate further, many studies were conducted regarding the shifts that occurred in Qatar's foreign policy, with the beginning of Arab Spring. Among such studies are the following ones.

A study conducted by Álvarez-Ossorio and García (2021)—under the title of “the foreign policy of Qatar: From a mediating role to an active one”—contends that the Arab Spring compelled Qatar and the other Gulf monarchies to restructure their foreign policies. Addressing the change in Qatar's foreign policy direction towards an active-independent role during the Arab Spring from 2011, Álvarez-Ossorio and García (2021: 99-105) state that “Qatar has been acquiring different roles that have defined its foreign policy [... its] role as mediator-integrator gradually shifted to a more independent-active one, which it would fully take up in the context of the so-called Arab Spring”. The transition from a mediating role to an active one necessitated renouncing soft power instruments and adopting hard power instruments, as evidenced by its support for various armed militias in Syria and Libya.

In an attempt of studying the change in Qatar's foreign policy, Abdullah (2014a) argues that during the initial decade of the 21st century, Qatari foreign policy was marked by a stance of neutrality and mediation for fifteen years since the advent of Emir Hamid in 1996. However, following the onset of the Arab Spring, there was a notable shift in direction towards a more interventionist approach, i.e., it was viewed as an active supporter (liberation supporter) rather than a reconciliatory mediator on the international stage. This was evidenced by the provision of overt support to Arab populations who were engaged in rebellion against authoritarian regimes, and who were advocating for increased freedoms, dignity, and the right to self-determination. It participated in military action against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's forces in Libya in April 2011 as part of a NATO-led international coalition. As a member of the Arab League, Qatar also called for Arab troops to be sent to Syria to halt the carnage there. Abdullah (2014a) attributed the shifts to series of geopolitical events in the surrounding region, which include Arab Spring, the regional expansion of the Islamic State (IS), and Palestine-Israel conflict.

Under the title "Qatari Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: From Mediation to Intervention: Changing Roles, Fixed Objectives", Shoaib (2016) claimed that since the beginning of the new millennium, Qatar has increased its diplomatic efforts and acted as a mediator in

numerous regional conflicts, attempting to brand itself as a regional peacemaker. However, with the beginning of the wave of change that swept the Arab region in 2011, the role of Qatari foreign policy changed rapidly, suggesting contradiction, and its interventionist role began to be revealed little by little as the political and social movement expanded.

In a study by Jargūn (2016) with the purpose of investigating the change in Qatari foreign policy, he identified two changes: The first one occurs with the arrival of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (1995), who reformulated Qatari foreign policy to a defensive and influential policy, aiming to create a complex network of economic, political, military, and media relations (through the Al-Jazeera network) with the various regional and international powers so that these forces form the real umbrella protecting Qatar, as well as ensuring a regional leadership role that augments its strategic size in a region. The second change occurred with the beginning of the Arab Spring, which resulted in a reformulation of Qatar's policies as well as its network of regional alliances. As a result, Qatar moved away from playing a "neutral" position and toward playing a "biased" one, with the intention of gaining greater influence and influencing the strengths of the region.

In regard to this interventionist role—i.e., “pro-change policy” in Rezeg’s study; or active role in Álvarez-Ossorio and García’s study, though this thesis would prefer to call it *liberation-supporter role* since this role centralized highly on the support of liberation-seeking movements—Qatar supported Tunisia financially throughout its transitional period, praised the Tunisian Revolution, and acted similarly in the situations of Egypt and Yemen that followed. Also, it tried to get Arab and foreign support for intervention in Libya and Syria, and it gave both financial and military support to the rebel forces there (Rezeg, 2021: 181; Barakat, 2014: 30).

Libya

Steinberg (2023) states that from 2011 to 2013, the Qatari leadership seized the initiative in Libya, and the emirate momentarily ascended to the top of the Arab world. Qatar assuming an important role among Arab nations in the global efforts to get rid of the Gaddafi regime, it asked members of the Arab League to call for a "no-fly zone" over Libya and, by extension, a military invasion. The UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011, made this possible. After that, it sent six fighter jets to help with the intervention and, in agreement with the US, UK, and France, sent special forces to help fund, arm, and train rebels fighting

against the Gadhafi government. At the end of March 2011, Qatar was also the first Arab country (and the second country ever) to recognize the National Transitional Council in Benghazi as the real government of Libya. Shipping oil or diesel, trading the rebels' oil on international markets, supplying them with light weapons and an assortment of communications equipment, and providing on-the-ground and back-in-Doha training of rebel forces all constituted significant physical support on Qatar's part (Steinberg, 2023: 26; Khatib, 2013: 420; Mohammadzadeh, 2017: 20; Barakat, 2014: 2, 30; Roberts, 2012: 237).

Syria

When peaceful demonstrations in Syria's spring and summer of 2011 turned into a violent rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad's government, the Qatari leadership adopted the same firm stance through its initiatives to mobilize Arab and global support for a humanitarian intervention in Syria and by its well-known provision of armed troops and financial assistance to the Syrian rebel force. It suspended its embassy in Damascus in July 2011 and led Arab League moves to exclude Syria from the organization. In addition, it made repeated attempts to gain Arab and international support for military action in the country (Steinberg, 2023: 26; Rezeg, 2021: 182; Barakat, 2014: 30). According to (Agencies, 2017; Barakat, 2014: 30) in addition to hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian supplies, Qatar has given as much as \$3 billion to Syrian opposition organizations since the rebellion began.

Egypt

While Qatar initially provided some \$500 million in aid to Egypt in the year following the uprising, that amount quickly increased after Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi was elected president in the summer of 2012 (Barakat, 2014: 30). Furthermore, regarding its interventions policy in Egypt, Doha became— in 2012 and 2013— the most significant foreign donor for Egypt (Steinberg, 2023: 28). Harb (2017) mentions that in June 2012, following the election of Mohamed Morsi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, as president, Qatar pledged to invest \$18 billion over five years in Egypt's tourism (to build a \$10 billion megaresort on the Mediterranean coast) and industrial projects (to invest \$8 billion in gas, power, and iron and steel plants). In addition, it pledged an additional \$3 billion in April 2013 when Cairo requested a \$4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (p. 4).

In short, as Barakat (2014: 30) mentions, once we compare Qatar's involvement in conflicts as a third-party mediator prior to the Arab Spring, this phase would signal a dramatic shift.

Nevertheless, as elsewhere emphasized by Abdullah (2014a)—who claimed the continuity of the mediator-integrator role—that mediation role, which was incorporated into Qatar's foreign policy during the first decade of the new century, continues to be one of its most essential components, with Doha being recognized as a model for the resolution of regional and international problems. Albeit Qatar has adopted interventionist role (liberation supporter) whereby it has taken a financially and militarily supportive stance toward the Arab revolutions and hosted pro-revolution Arab intellectuals since the beginning of “Arab Spring” (Rezeg, 2021), it readopted the mediating role that it had taken before 2011, as Steinberg (2023: 8) literally says:

[T]he young Emir has pushed through changes in Qatari foreign policy, cautiously moving away from the activist regional policy pursued by his father and his father's foreign minister. Emir Hamad had sided with the opposition in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria during the Arab Spring and turned against the regimes there. In many cases, Qatar supported Islamist groups, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and related organizations, but also militant Salafists and jihadists. Emir Tamim now tried to return to the mediating role Qatar had taken before 2011. He accepted the Egyptian military's coup against President Muhammad Mursi and his Muslim Brotherhood, which took place in July 2013, only a few days after Tamim took office. Support for militant groups in Syria and Libya was significantly reduced by 2015.

In accordance with that, one can say that, when the Arab Spring started, Qatar renounced its mediation role in a number of disputes and provided support for the Islamist groups and protest movements in Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, and other nations. Following the arrival of Emir Tamim in June 2013, the Qatari government gradually resumed its pre-2011 foreign policies of mediation (Steinberg, 2023: 22).

Additionally, after the Arab Spring, Qatar's foreign policy has changed from an active role to an internal development role, as mentioned by Barakat (2014), who says that the transition of power from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to his son Sheikh Tamim in June 2013 coincided with the grievances of a population—troubled by the near absence of a civil society, a lack of participation in decision-making, an overcrowded healthcare system, and

alleged employment discrimination in favor of foreign workers—has led the new emir to prioritize internal affairs (at least publicly) over the active foreign policy pursued by his father. Barakat contends that in the first speech of the new emir, Sheikh Tamim, addressing the Qatari Shura Council, the emir largely addressed domestic development issues, and his current prime minister, Abdullah bin Nasser Al Thani, is also the minister of the interior rather than the foreign minister (2014: 5, 32–33).

From all the above discussion regarding change and/or continuity in foreign policy of Qatar, one can infer that while some of these studies reported that in response to regional geopolitical developments that began in 2011, Qatar's foreign policy (which in recent decades has been characterized by neutrality and the role of mediator) has shifted to an interventionist role, some, on the other hand, claim that after the advent of Emir Tamim in June 2013, the Qatari government gradually readopted the role of mediator it had played prior to 2011. Whereas others reported a shift from an interventionist role to an internal development role.

Notwithstanding, these studies did not mention the continuity and/or change of foreign policy activities in terms of other roles that fell under various aspects of foreign affairs; instead, they rely merely on the changes that specifically occur in intervention and mediator roles while neglecting others. Along with that, they did not study this change and continuity from the perspective of Kal Holsti's national role conception framework that was developed by Le Prestre (1997a). Thus, this study aims to investigate both changes and continuity in all significant facets (say, roles) of Qatari foreign policy from 2009 to 2015 while adopting Kal Holsti's national role conceptions role theory model that was developed by Le Prestre (1997a). That means all the roles that are articulated by Qatari policymakers in their foreign policy speeches would be targeted. Thereupon, this paper will, first, tend to identify prominent potential roles that Qatari policymakers represent in their speeches on foreign policy from 2009 to 2015 and the evolution (i.e., change and/or continuity) of these roles during the examined period. Second, an attempt will be made to determine the origins of this dynamic, in a non-causal manner, which is to say, whether the evolution in Qatar's national role conceptions is correlated with its identity perceptions or status perceptions or both.

The reason for selecting this period of time is based on the fact that Qatari foreign policy, according to the studies examined in this thesis, has undergone significant shifts due to

regional geopolitical events (such as the Arab Spring in 2011) and changes in leadership (the ascension of Emir Tamim in June 2013)



4. FINDINGS

4.1 QATAR'S DEFINITION OF ITS ROLES: ROLES' CONTENTS and STRUCTURES

After analyzing the content of the Qatari decision-makers' statements concerning foreign affairs, 302 assertions out of 463 ones were identified for 11 roles that these decision-makers tend to represent for their country. This number of assertions accounted for 65.2 percent of the total assertions found in the corpus. The identified roles are as follows: Active independent (NRC1), anti-terrorism agent (NRC2), anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), defender of faith (NRC4), developer (NRC5), liberation supporter (NRC6), mediator Integrator (NRC7), promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC8), promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), and the global sub-system collaborator (NRC11).

In the upcoming sections, the paper will aim to depict the content of each one of the previously mentioned roles. Also, it shall endeavor to describe the role structures while focusing on their annual frequency.

NRC1: *Active independent*. The theme of this role conception, as it has been defined previously, alludes to placing equal emphasis on independence, self-determination, potential mediation responsibilities, and ongoing initiatives to expand diplomatic and commercial ties to many regions of the world; alongside, “foreign policy decisions will be made to serve national interests rather than the interests of others” (Holsti, 1970: 262; Holsti, 1988: 117). The following quotes from Foreign Minister of Qatar Hamad bin Jassim and emir Tamim can account for that:

We are not determined by anything but the Qatari national interest. We assist in any Arabic sphere that we can assist in. This is the policy of His highness (Al-Jazeera 2009, 25 Jun: 37:03).

We pay great attention to defending Arab and Islamic causes, achieving international peace and security, adhering to international legitimacy and building friendly relations that respect common interests with world countries and which are based on mutual

respect and non-interference in internal affairs (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2015, Nov 03).

NRC2: *Anti-terrorism agent*. As it has been defined by Sekhri (2009: 425), it refers to the fact that a given country intends to take on its shoulder the duty of fighting terrorism because of its transnational and malicious threats. In the context of Qatari decision-makers, fighting terrorism is announced to point out to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and its threats to the region, hence Qatar deems itself as an integral part of the international alliance against terrorism. The following quote from, the emir Tamim's speech at the 69th Session of UN General Assembly, can illustrate that:

The international community agrees with the diagnosis of terrorism as an imminent threat that we must therefore make combating it a priority (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2014, Sep 24).

NRC3: *Anti-Zionist/Israel agent*. In an attempt to define and classify the anti-imperialist agent role, Holsti (1970: 264, 271) mentioned that once governments—not exclusive only to communist ones—perceive themselves as being threatened by imperialism, they would consider themselves struggling agents against this menace. Then, he classified this agent as an anti-revisionist agent (for Communist China and Albanian governments), an anti-Zionist agent (for Arab countries), and an anti-communist agent (for Western states). Regarding the anti-Zionist agent role in the context of Qatari decision-makers' statements, it refers to the severe opposition and the need or necessity to stop Israel's aggression towards the Palestinian people, its occupation of Palestine and other Arab territory, as well as its policies towards the Palestinian peoples, specifically. The following quote from emir Hamad bin Khalifa can elucidate that more:

The siege turned the Gaza Strip into a detention camp, and when it failed in breaking the will of the Palestinian people the military aggression began to continue this siege. This aggression should be stopped, and a cease-fire should be implemented to avoid more bloodshed in a way that ensures the lifting of the siege. For this siege is inhumane and illegal, as is any justification for it and any collaboration with it is illegal and immoral; and we are surprised that cooperation with an illegal siege is justified as being legal (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, 04 Jan).

NRC4: *Defender of faith*. In line with what has been specified above regarding the definition and nature of this national role conception, this role, in the context of Qatari decision-makers' statements, refers to promoting and defending Islam. This took place coinciding with the bad reputation that had attached to Islam by ISIS's terrorist deeds. The following quote from Emir Tamim can explicate that:

[T]hose who are lurking around with ill intentions against Islam take terrorist groups' acts as a pretext to attack and distort the image of Islam, and hold all Muslims accountable for acts that they have nothing to do with – but are rather their first victims. This requires us to stand up to address these fallacies and highlight the genuine spirit and tolerance of Islam and its respect for one another, and educate the youth of the Umma that it is not enough to take pride in the attributes of our religion, which generally converge with human virtues and which are synonymous with high ground ethics but we also must exercise them (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2015, Dec 9).

NRC5: *Developer*. Since we identified this role as being utilized by Qatari decision-makers in their speech, that means the willingness of assisting developing countries, as has been mentioned above in the definition of this role, was recognized in policymakers' speeches. The upcoming quote from emir Hamad bin Khalifa can reveal that:

Qatar has [...] stressed its commitment to earmark a proportion of the total national income for development aid, with the allocation of 15% of the same to the least developed countries (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2010, Sep 20).

NRC6: *Liberation supporter*. This role, in the context of Qatari decision-makers' statements, centralized highly on the support of liberation-seeking revolutionary movements in the Arabic sphere. According to the analyzed statements under the scope of this study, this support is not dedicated merely to revolutionary movements in the Arab Spring but also includes support for Palestinian people to liberate themselves from Israel occupation. The next two quotes, which are both from emir Hamad bin Khalifa can illustrate that:

Out of the human and nationalistic responsibility, we must stand beside our brothers in Arab Spring countries to overcome the difficult transition phase, which follows any popular revolution (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2012, Feb 26).

To the Palestinian people I say: We, in the State of Qatar, stand by your side and support your resistance in Jerusalem, your legitimate demands to establish the independent Palestinian State, and your confrontation with the acts and agenda of the Government of Israel (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2013, Mar 26).

NRC7: *Mediator integrator*. This role, as stated above in its definition, involves the task of resolving or reconciling conflicts and misunderstanding through dialogue or any other peaceful means between states or other international actors. The following quotes—first from emir Hamad bin Khalifa (2011, Apr 8, at Los Angeles World Affairs Council) and second from emir Tamim (at the 69th Session of UN General Assembly)—can be found as explicitly apparent examples of this role:

We, ourselves, have made many mediation efforts in our region to solve conflicts peacefully. We mediated in Lebanon during hard times, which led to the Doha Agreement among the Lebanese factions. We have also mediated between Eritrea and Djibouti. We are continuing our efforts in Sudan between the central government and Darfur's groups. What is needed in such efforts is that the different parties believe in the goodwill of the mediator who should retain balanced relationships with them and have no hidden agenda or interests (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2011, Apr 8).

The State of Qatar will also continue its active policy in providing a space for dialogue in areas of conflict and to mediate between the various parties because we do believe in solving conflicts by peaceful means, and because we have established the tradition of peaceful mediation. We will also continue to provide a platform for dialogue among political currents, cultures and religions (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2014, Sep 24).

NRC8: *Promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exports*. This refers to the commitments that the decisionmakers had in mind for their country or to obligations they recognized regarding the development of the energy sector, not only including LNG (liquified natural gas) but also solar energy and the like of renewable energy such as wind power or hydropower. In this role, the need for cooperation and the coordination of efforts to enhance the energy sector is repeatedly observed in Qatari decisionmakers' statements.

The next two quotes, which are both from emir Hamad bin Khalifa, are examples of this role.

We are fully aware of the huge responsibilities that we should shoulder towards the international gas markets, which requires commitment to the supply of gas in a sustained and secure manner. This entails huge investments not only in the production process but also in all the phases of LNG industry, including infrastructure in consumption centers (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Oct 19).

The State of Qatar is aware of the enormous potential that lies in the sources of clean and renewable energy, particularly solar energy, which is abundantly available in our climate. The Government has encouraged the existing industries, educational establishments and scientific research centers to develop renewable energy technologies that would contribute to improving efficiency and performance and be suitable for local conditions (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Sep 23).

NRC9: *Promotor of justice and peace*. This role has two axes: one refers to the willingness that the decision-makers have regarding the necessity of providing justice along with comprehensive and lasting peace for all, particularly for Arabs and Palestinians. The other one refers to equity and justice in terms of economic opportunity. This role is invariably referred to by using what Holsti (1979: 258) mentioned about "some governments appear to focus attention almost exclusively on specific conflict or issue areas, but rationalize their attitudes and decisions in general language indicating a broader frame of reference or role conception". That is done here by switching from the specific issue (say, most often Palestine case) to "rationalize their attitudes and decisions in general language indicating a broader frame of reference or role conception" which includes promotion of justice and peace. In the following, two quotes from emir Tamim and his father, emir Hamad bin Khalifa, respectively can be taken as examples of the given role.

The Palestinian cause comes in the forefront of these challenges. Peace, stability and security could only be achieved in our region by reaching a just and comprehensive peace based on the resolutions of international and Arab legitimacy and in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution. A just and comprehensive peace is our

strategic choice that we have maintained for decades (Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2015, Mar 28).

The time has come to reformulate the global economic system in order for it to achieve justice and equal opportunities for all (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2010, Sep 23).

NRC10: *Regional-subsystem collaborator*. This national role conception points out the far-reaching commitments and/or willingness that Qatari decision-makers have in mind for their country to cooperate with other states to build better and wider communities or cross-cutting subsystems. Collaborative efforts within a regional sphere that involve promoting investments, trade, and economic cooperation, as well as security and stability, can all be listed under this role. The two following statements, which are from emir Tamim and his father, are deemed to be associated with this role's context.

I put emphasis here on continuing our efforts with our brothers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to strengthen our collaboration at all political, economic, social, and security levels, and on developing the Council's action mechanisms, so as to be able to face the regional and global challenges and changes, and to achieve the interests of our peoples (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2015, Nov 3).

One of the major goals of your Conference [of the Heads of State and Government of the States members of the Economic Cooperation Organization] is to upgrade the economic and living standards of the member states, removing intraregional trade obstacles, and developing infrastructures to facilitate the movement of goods and individuals, in addition to other development, economic and investment goals that will undoubtedly benefit the peoples of this vast geographic region, with estimated populations of 400 million people, at a time when the world is witnessing an acute financial and economic crisis with unpredictable negative consequences on our countries and peoples. Therefore, palliating such consequences requires cooperation, efforts as well as exchanging ideas and visions (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Mar 11).

NRC11: *The global sub-system collaborator*. This role conception refers to undertaking far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states in either bilateral or multilateral form to support in incubating the international system's structure and dynamics. As Aras and Gorener (2010: 84) stated, the fair indicator of this role can be incarnated in the active engagement in international and regional arrangements and peace initiatives coupled with the assent or conformity with international norms and rules, as well as the willingness and/or commitment to set potent economic and political links with other states. In the following, two statements by Hamad Bin Khalifa and, his son, emir Tamim can reveal that.

[W]e reiterate our commitment to supporting your efforts towards building a secure, stable and just world order. In this context, I wish to express our support for all the initiatives that help implement the resolutions of the Brasilia Declaration of 2005 and the Doha Declaration of 2009, which consolidate relations among the countries of our two regions (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2010, Jan 18).

We must work together to strengthen the collective security system to effectively deal with international and regional problems to maintain the rights of peoples, and to persistently face any attempts to impose temporary solutions to address the side effects of the problems rather than touching their roots (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2015, Sep 28).

Table 4.1: Roles Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies).

	Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa										Emir Tamim					
	2009		2010		2011		2012		2013-H		2013-T		2014		2015	
	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel
NRC-1	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	2	6.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2.9
NRC-2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	24.4	8	23.5
NRC-3	9	14.5	5	11.9	2	5.7	5	15.2	1	4.2	1	3.7	7	15.6	4	11.8
NRC-4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	8.8
NRC-5	1	1.6	6	14.3	0	0	0	0	6	25.0	2	7.4	2	4.4	0	0
NRC-6	2	3.2	0	0	8	22.9	15	45.5	6	25.0	6	22.2	9	20	6	17.6
NRC-7	3	4.8	8	19.0	7	20.0	0	0	0	0	8	29.6	4	8.9	0	0
NRC-8	19	30.6	1	2.4	5	14.3	0	0	0	0	1	3.7	0	0	0	0
NRC-9	5	8.1	4	9.5	2	5.7	4	12.1	1	4.2	1	3.7	2	4.4	1	2.9
NRC-10	10	16.1	7	16.7	4	11.4	4	12.1	6	25.0	3	11.1	5	11.1	4	11.8
NRC-11	12	19.4	11	26.2	8	22.9	3	9.1	4	16.7	5	18.5	5	11.1	7	20.6
Total	62	100	42	100	35	100	33	100	24	100	27	100	45	100	34	100


2013-H refers to the period from Jan 1 to Jun 25, 2013
2013-T refers to the period from Jun 26 to Dec 31, 2013

NRC1: Active independent	NRC2: Anti-terrorism agent
NRC3: Anti-Zionist/Israel agent	NRC4: Defender of faith
NRC5: Developer	NRC6: Liberation supporter
NRC7: Mediator Integrator	NRC8: Promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting
NRC9: Promotor of justice and peace	NRC10: Regional-subsystem collaborator
NRC11: The global sub-system collaborator	

For the sake of identifying the primary roles and their evolution, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, from 2009-2015, the structure of these roles in each one of the years under the scope of this study will be examined by relying on their annual relative frequencies. That is to say, for each year from 2009 to 2015, the dominant roles will be discerned. Roles whose relative frequencies fluctuate between 10 percent and more will be deemed as the dominant ones.

As we can see in both table 4.1 and chart 4.1, in 2009, Qatari decision-makers' national role conceptions tended to emphasize in their foreign policy statements promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC8), anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), and global sub-system collaborator (NRC11). Albeit NRC8 joined higher frequency among the other NRCs in 2009, it witnessed a severe decrease in the following year.

Chart 4.1: The Dominant National Role Conceptions.



Throughout the year 2010, the role of regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), the global sub-system collaborator (NRC11), mediator integrator (NRC7), developer (NRC5), and anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3) were considered as the predominant ones in the statements of Qatar's decision makers. Although the latter role (NRC3) experienced a great frequency, it did not reach its level in 2009, yet what is indeed surprising is that the same role in 2011 got a noticeable decrease ranging from 11.9 percent to 5.7 percent. The two former roles (namely, NRC10 and NRC11), along with being inserted among the dominant ones,

witnessed a higher growth than in 2009. While the statements of the policymakers, from 2009 to 2010, regarding the promotor of justice and peace (NRC9) exhibited relatively a frail increase ranging from 8.1 to 9.5 percent, active independent (NRC1) and liberation supporter (NRC6), on the other hand, presented a significant decrease ranging from 1.6 to 0 and 3.2 to 0 percent respectively. One thing that is very salient to keep in mind regarding the latter role (namely, NRC6) is the fact that assertions or statements of liberation supporter role in the context of this paper denote the support of liberation-seeking movements in the Arab world; that is, they did not only include the support of revolutionary movements in the Arab Spring but also the support of Palestinian people to liberate themselves from Israeli occupation.

During the year 2011, the dominant national role conceptions (NRCs) in the Qatar's policymakers' speeches were regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), global sub-system collaborator (NRC11), liberation supporter (NRC6), mediator integrator (NRC7), and promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC8). When compared to 2010, a modest decrease can be noticed in (NRC10) and (NRC11) along with upswing in (NRC7) and (NRC8) albeit the latter one did not attain its level in 2009. Yet, as both table 4.1 and chart 4.1 illustrate, we need to be aware of the fact that NRC11 and NRC7 would drop steeply in the following year, reaching its lowest level and excluding them, as well, from being among the dominant national role conception for 2012.

In the year of 2012, regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), liberation supporter (NRC6), and anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3) emerged as the preeminent ones, as the table 4.1 and Chart 4.1 1 shows. Contrary to its frequency in 2009 and 2010, NRC3 enjoyed a slight increase in its frequency despite its dramatic decrease in the following year. Comparing it with its level in 2011, a negligible climb can be observed for NRC10. Accounting for almost the half of the entire collected statements for 2012, NRC6 significantly experienced its highest frequency in all years studied, reaching, along with that, the highest frequency for all other categories of NRCs. The emergence of the NRC6 (Liberation Supporter) in 2011 and 2012 as being among the dominant roles, despite its lower level in the preceding years, along with the NRC7's total absence in 2012 and 2013 under the regime of emir Hamad Bin Khalifa, can be partially associated with the stance that Qatar adopted during the Arab Spring.

For (2013-H) the period from January 1 to June 25, 2013, referring to the emir Hamad's abdication of power, the predominant national role conceptions in the collected statements emerged as regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), global sub-system collaborator (NRC11), developer (NRC5), and liberation supporter (NRC6). Whereas NRC11 and NRC6 did not reach their frequency level in a previous year, a noticeable upward trend in the frequency emerged for NRC5 and NRC10, reaching, along with that, their highest frequency in all the studied years. Nonetheless, NRC5 will experience a sharp decrease in the remnant of the studied years.

For (2013-T) the remainder of 2013, beginning with the commencement of emir Tamim's regime on June 26, 2013, the decision-makers in their speeches portrayed four roles as being the dominant ones: promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), global sub-system collaborator (NRC11), liberation supporter (NRC6), mediator integrator (NRC7). Despite statements regarding NRC11 exhibiting an increase in contrast to 2013-H, the opposite tendency was exhibited for NRC6 and NRC10, reaching, by that, their lower level in comparison with all previously examined years. Although NRC7 will gradually experience a noticeable decreased level in following year, it registered its highest level of frequency in 2013-T. This evolution regarding NRC7 can be in a given sense cope with what Steinberg (2023: 22) and Barakat (2014: 5) stated concerning Qatar's resumption of pre-2011 foreign policies of mediation after the arrival of emir Tamim on June 26, 2013. NRC8 witnessed from 2013-H to 2013-T a relatively significant increase ranging from 0 to 3.7 percent; by contrast, NRC9 and NRC3 equally experienced a general tendency towards a decline.

As what can be plainly notified in the table 4.1 and chart 4.1, the year 2014 witnessed five dominant roles, including regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), global sub-system collaborator (NRC11), anti-terrorism agent (NRC2), anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), and liberation supporter (NRC6). The reported statements for NRC3 were at their highest level compared to prior years. On the other hand, the reported statements for NRC11, NRC6, and NRC10 were at their lowest levels compared to previous years, except for NRC10, which stayed at the same value compared to the 2013-T value. Whereas NRC1 and NRC4 exhibited, from 2014 to 2015, a general tendency towards an increase, the opposite direction

towards a decline was assigned to NRC9 and NRC7, though the latter (NRC7) witnessed a severe decline ranging from 8.9 to 0 percent.

Finally, throughout 2015, the role of regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10), global subsystem collaborator (NRC11), liberation supporter (NRC6), anti-terrorism agent (NRC2), and anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3) are represented as the dominant ones. By comparison with previously examined years, a decline can be recognized in the statements regarding NRC3 and NRC6 in 2015. On the other hand, an increase can be seen in the frequency of NRC2, in relation to the preceding year; NRC11, relative to all the previous years except for 2010 and 2011; and NRC10, relative to the two preceding years.

4.2 STATUS CATEGORIES: THEIR CONTENTS and STRUCTURES

Representing about 110 (23 percent) of the total assertions in the corpus, four main categories were identified for status. They are cooperation/collaboration (ST1), economic relations (ST2), principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3), and solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab (especially Palestinian) people (ST4). As same as we have done for role categories, we will endeavor to give an account for the structure of these four categories after elucidating their contents.

ST1: *Cooperative/collaborative relations*. This includes the statements that are articulated by the Qatari decision-makers in their speeches that imply the bilateral and/or multilateral cooperative or collaborative relations that the state of Qatar enjoys with other international entities, such as states and regional and international organizations. Such relations may sometimes take various forms, which include, but are not limited to, signing and/or ratifying bilateral or multilateral agreements and joint cooperation in miscellaneous fields with international actors.

The relations between our two countries [Qatar and Cyprus] are based on a set of common principles and interests calling for cooperation in all political and economic spheres, the restoration of international peace, and solving outstanding problems between countries through dialogue and resorting to international legitimacy [a statement from emir Hamad bin Khalifa] (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2010, Apr 21).

We have established cooperation relations based on common interests and mutual respect with many countries of the world in the West and the East, in America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and in the region [a statement from emir Tamim] (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2013, Jun 26).

ST2: *Economic relations.* This signals the relations and interactions that are marked by economic collaboration and activities such as investment, trade, and joint ventures that the state of Qatar has either bilaterally, with a state, or multilaterally, with a group of states, or within a regional or international organization. The next statement from emir Hamad bin Khalifa can be found associated with this category.

The State of Qatar has doubled its efforts towards the achievement of more investments with many of the member states of the [Islamic Conference] organization (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Nov 9).

ST3: *Principal LNG exporting and developing country.* This category of status refers to the representation of Qatari decision-makers regarding their country's position as one of the biggest LNG exporting countries and its outstanding contribution to the development of LNG. The following quote from Hamad bin Khalifa can be considered as an example of this category.

The State of Qatar played a pioneering role in the development of gas liquefaction projects. Several factors have contributed to bringing the State of Qatar to the top of the list of LNG exporters. Among these factors are the massive proven natural gas reserves amounting to 900 trillion cubic feet, as well as encouraging investment climate, flexible business environment and political stability (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Mar 9).

ST4: *Solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab people.* This refers to the repeated indication that Qatari decision-makers signal regarding their corroborative and/or solidarized stance towards Arab people. In the context of its sympathy relations towards Arab revolutionists, this category is represented in the form of condemning the actions that tend to harm or go against the revolutionists. Emir Hamad bin Khalifa's following statements can account for that.

Your steadfastness in the face of the assault has been a source of glory for all Arabs when we see you confronting the invaders with your bare chests and high heads, afraid neither of their aircraft nor of their internationally-banned weapons nor of their queues of tanks. We have always been with you, through the least we can do, before and after the aggression (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2012, Oct 23).

As for the brotherly Yemen, we declare our solidarity with the Yemeni people and their efforts to move to democracy (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2012, Nov 6).

Qatar's dominant status categories will be identified by examining the relative frequency of the identified categories. More specifically, for each year from 2009 to 2015, the dominant category will be specified based upon its relative frequency for the year. Categories whose relative frequencies oscillate between 20 percent and more will be considered dominant ones.

According to data presented in table 4.2 and chart 4.2, in spite of the fact that the frequency of cooperation/collaboration (ST1) predominated relatively in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013-T, 2014, and 2015, it returned in the opposite direction towards a severe dropdown (reaching 0 percent) constantly during the period of 2012 and 2013-H. More specifically, ST1 did not reach its observed value in 2010, 2013-T, and 2015, despite being evidently in a significant position in 2011 and 2014 following ST4, as well as in 2009 following ST2.

Table 4.2: Status Perception as Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies).


	Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa										Emir Tamim					
	2009		2010		2011		2012		2013-H		2013-T		2014		2015	
	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel
ST1	9	25	11	61.1	3	27.3	0	0	0	0	6	60.0	3	30	2	50.0
ST2	7	19.4	4	22.2	0	0	0	0	1	25	0	0	2	20	1	25.0
ST3	13	36.1	1	5.6	1	9.1	0	0	0	0	1	10.0	0	0	0	0
ST4	7	19.4	2	11.1	7	63.6	11	100	3	75	3	30.0	5	50	1	25.0
Total	36	100	18	100	11	100	11	100	4	100	10	100	10	100	4	100

2013-H refers to the period from Jan 1 to Jun 25, 2013

2013-T refers to the period from Jun 26 to Dec 31, 2013

ST1: Cooperation/collaboration ST3: principal LNG exporting and developing country
ST2: Economic relations ST4: solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab (especially Palestinian) people

Chart 4.2: The Dominant Categories of Status.



Regarding solidarity/sympathized relationships with Arab (especially Palestinian) people (ST4), it was indisputably dominant among all the other categories. However, from 2009 to 2010, before it went on a unique upward trend, ST4 experienced a notable decrease in relation to the other represented categories. In fact, we cannot miss to say that, during the interval of 2013–T and 2015, ST4 was appearing in second place.

When it comes to economic relations (ST2), the frequency of the statements regarding it gained a second crucial value, in an inconsistent manner, in 2015, together with ST4, and in 2013-H as well as in 2010. Despite that, it witnessed a severe decrease, ranging from 20 to 0 percent irregularly in other years.

As what can be observed in table 4.2 and chart 4.2, the principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3), even though it experienced the highest frequency in 2009, it witnessed a sharp decrease in the other years.

4.3 DENTITY CATEGORIES: THEIR CONTENTS AND STRUCTURES

Comparing it with the roles and status categories, identity categories came in lowest level representing merely 51 (11 percent) with the total assertions. Four categories have been

discerned for identity, and they are as following: An Islamic-Arabic state (ID1), prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2), supporter of a people's right to self-determination and a refuge for the oppressed (ID3), tiny, impoverished state to modern, rich state (ID4). In the following passages, the content and structure of these categories will be clarified.

ID1: *An Islamic-Arabic state*. This category refers basically to the affirmations that Qatari decision-makers tend to represent about their nation in terms of the internal aspects (of the Qatari state) that signify the affiliation of Arabic and Islamic values. Two statements, as in the following, from emir Tamim and his father can allude to that.

We are Muslims and Arabs, respect the diversity of religious schools of thought and respect all religions in our countries and abroad (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2013, June 26).

Through our reform and development process, we are establishing a state of institutions and law and adopting the principles and values of freedom, people's participation, human rights and women's empowerment, which go hand in hand with our Arab and Islamic culture and values... (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Jun 22).

ID2: *A prosperous state with an open and participatory political system*. This category refers to the adoption of certain liberal values such as respect for the rule of law, protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, citizen participation, enabling women to participate in public life on an equal footing, principles of good governance, and combating corruption, along with the reflection of prosperity and development that is marked by vigorous growth and well-being.

To guarantee people's participation, a permanent constitution has been adopted to regulate rights and duties, lay the foundations of a state of institutions, and guarantee freedom of expression and belief for all. It provides for establishing a permanent parliament and gives women the right to run and vote in elections and to be appointed in public positions where Qatari women assume ministerial and top academic positions and represent their country in international committees [a statement from emir Hamad bin Khalifa] (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2011, Apr 8).

[T]he country [...of Qatar] experienced an outstanding development leap. According to the World Bank, maternal mortality in Qatar is now one of the lowest in the world. Our country enjoys high literacy, low unemployment rate and very low level of crime. Young men and women in Qatar have full exposure to advanced learning through the establishment of top-level education and culture in the city of Doha. The 2013 United Nations Human Development Report ranked Qatar at the top of the Arab world and 36th overall out of 186 countries. The human advancement, along with many other individual rights – including personal liberty, private ownership and access to education – are secured through our country's permanent constitution, which was adopted in 2003 by public referendum [a quote from Qatari foreign affair minister, Al-Attiyah] (Chatham House, 2013, Dec 4).

ID3: *Supporter of a people's right to self-determination and a refuge for the oppressed.* This category of identity is composed of one of the salient historical values coupled with constitutional value. The former is a refuge for the oppressed, as Al-Attiyah (2013, 13 Dec) said, "[i]n the words of our founder, Sheikh Jassim: Qatar is the destination of the oppressed" and confirmed by Amir Tamim (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2013, 26 June), whereby he says, "Qatar would remain a refuge for the oppressed; these words were uttered by the founder of the state, Sheikh Jassim Bin Mohammad Bin Thani, and have been reiterated by His Highness the Father". The latter is about the support of a people's right to self-determination. As literally stated in the Article 7 of Qatari institution, which emphasizes that the state of Qatar "shall support the right of peoples to self-determination". This is supported by Al-Attiyah (in a meeting at Chatham House 2013, Dec 4) in which he confirms "[a]s stated in our constitution, another key principle of Qatar's foreign policy is to support a people's right to self-determination and collective aspiration".

ID4: *A tiny, impoverished state to a modern, rich state.* This is denoting to the historical development that the country has witnessed in terms of its transition from a small, poor state into a modern, prosperous state. Naturally, this development occasionally is ascribed to the rapid

Table 4.3: Identity Perception as Expressed in Qatari Decision Makers, under both Emir Hamad and Tamim's governments, 2009-2015 (absolute and relative [%] frequencies)

Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa																	Emir Tamim					
	2009		2010		2011		2012		Jan1-Jun25, 2013		Jun26-Dec31, 2013		2014		2015							
	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel	Abs	Rel						
ID1	3	60	2	22.2	1	14.3	3	60	2	67	2	13.3	4	57.1	2	50						
ID2	1	20	7	77.8	6	85.7	1	20	1	33.3	5	33.3	3	42.9	2	50						
ID3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20	0	0	5	33.3	0	0	0	0						
ID4	1	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	20	0	0	0	0						
Total	5	100	9	100	7	100	5	100	3	100	15	100	7	100	4	100						

2013-H refers to the period from Jan 1 to Jun 25, 2013


2013-T refers to the period from Jun 26 to Dec 31, 2013

ID1: An Islamic-Arabic state **ID3:** Supporter of a people's right to self-determination and a refuge for the oppressed
ID2: Prosperous state with an open and participatory political system **ID4:** Tiny, impoverished state to modern, rich state

development of the LNG that the country has been enjoying. The following quote from emir Hamad bin Khalifa can be an instance of this role.

Until the 1940s before the discovery of oil, Doha was a small town with an economy based on fishing and trade in the pearls that divers used to find in the Arab Gulf. Its neighborhoods were composed of one- or two-floor houses built according to the Qatari style with walls covered with engravings on gypsum. Doha was also distinguished by its popular market, Souq Waqif. Upon the discovery of oil, Doha expanded, prospered and assumed features of modern cities. Today, Doha is witnessing unprecedented development and renaissance in construction, economy, industry, health, education, tourism, sports and culture. In 1970, its population was only 85,000, while now it is nearly one million (The Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar, 2009, Jun 23).

Chart 4.3: The Dominant Categories of Identity.



Qatar's major identity categories will be discerned as the same as NRCs and status categories as well. That is, the structure of these categories will be identified by examining the relative frequency of the identified categories, namely, an Islamic-Arabic state (ID1), a prosperous

state with an open and participatory political system (ID2), a supporter of a people's right to self-determination and a refuge for the oppressed (ID3), and a tiny, impoverished state to a modern, rich state (ID4). More specifically, for each year from 2009 to 2015, the dominant category will be specified based upon its relative frequency for the year. Categories whose relative frequencies oscillate between 26 percent and more will be considered dominant ones.

Among the categories of identity, the Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) and a prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) arise obviously over the others.

In comparison to other categories, an Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) clearly dominated—in the statements of Qatar's decision-makers regarding their perception of their state—in five years: 2009, 2012, 2013-H, 2014, and 2015. Nevertheless, along with the fact that this dominance was inconsistent, there was a sharp drop in its frequency, ranging from 22.2 percent in 2010 to 14.3 percent in 2011 to 13.3 percent in 2013-T.

Statements referring to a prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) dominated notably in an irregular fashion, joining the first position in 2015, together with ID1; in 2013-T, together with a supporter of a people's right to self-determination and a refuge for the oppressed (ID3); in 2011 and 2010 singularly. On the other hand, in 2009 and 2012, ID2 came in second place, along with ID3, and in 2013-T and 2014 separately.

Conversely, for ID3, in 2013-T, it appears as a basis concern together with ID2. However, in other years—except 2012, where it came in second place with ID2—it disappeared entirely from policymakers' statements. While ID3 remained in a crucial position during the years 2009 and 2013-T, it did not appear totally in other years.


4.4 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES OF STATUS AND IDENTITY AND THE DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL ROLE

As has been stated priorly, in this part of this thesis, the relation between national role conceptions and the categories of status and identity will be studied based on the relative frequency distribution within each national role conception and category of status and identity and their content. Simply put, we would compare each single role with each category of status and identity in terms of relative frequency distribution and content.

As what can be seen in chart 4.4, whereby the evolution of the relative frequency distribution within each NRC6 and ST4 for 2009–2015 is compared, a strong association between ST4 and NRC6 is clearly evident. In 2009, the relative frequencies of NRC6 and ST4 were nearly 5 and 20 percent, respectively.

Similarly, both categories dramatically increased in 2012, reaching their highest peaks following a sharp decline in 2010. In the same fashion, they remained steady throughout the periods of 2013–H and 2013–T before they substantially slowed down in 2013–H. Equally, ST4 and NRC6 witnessed a markedly considerable decline in 2015, reaching around 2.5 and 12 percent, respectively, after a relatively modest surge in 2014.


Chart 4.4: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Liberation supporter (NRC-6) and Solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab especially Palestinian people (ST4) for Qatar, 2009-2015*



* Relative frequencies within each category have been weighted to allow for the difference in the number of speeches selected for each year.

When it comes to the link between liberation supporter and solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab people in terms of their content. We can observe a clear association between the two, as long as the type of relation—which indicates the solidarized stance towards Arab people, which includes condemning actions that tend to harm or go against liberation-seeking revolutionary movements, both in the Arab Spring and Palestine context—that ST4 represents parallels well with the representation of liberation supporters in decisionmakers' speeches. The liberation supporter national role conception, as articulated by Qatari decisionmakers, emphasizes helping the liberation movements that seek liberation both in the Arab Spring and Palestine contexts as well.

Chart 4.5: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC-10) and Economic relations (ST2) for Qatar, 2009-2015*



* To allow for the difference in the number of speeches selected for each year relative frequency distribution within each category have been done.

Chart 4.5 illustrates in a clear manner how the distribution of the assertions for each year within the categories of regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC-10) and economic relations (ST2) pursues the same trends, indicating obvious associations between the two.


Both ST2 and NRC10 started the recorded period at approximately 46 and 24 percent, respectively, in 2009 and fell down steeply in 2011. There was then a modest climb in 2013–H after they leveled off between 2011 and 2012. Uniformly, each ST2 and NRC10 stood at nearly 6 and 9 percent, respectively, in 2015 after they experienced a joint decrease in 2013–T and an increase in 2014.

Although regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC-10) and economic relations (ST2) associated strongly in terms of their assertion’s relative frequency, they might be partially deemed correlated because the type of relation that the status category represent (namely, economic relations) is exclusively related to economic collaboration and activities such as investment, trade, and joint ventures with a state, regional or international organization. While Regional-subsystem collaborator is stated in the Qatari decisionmaker’s statements as

not including only the promotion of investments, trade, and economic cooperation, but also security and stability.

As can be observed in chart 4.5, there seems to be a significantly noticeable link between the categories of promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC-8) and the principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3). The observed categories tend to have remarkably the same distribution throughout the studied period. For example, ST3 and NRC8 together decreased over the span of the graph period, along with the same volatility between the intervals of 2010 and 2012 as well as 2013-H and 2014. What is more, they leveled off during the same periods, namely, from 2012 to 2013-H and from 2014 to 2015 as well.

Chart 4.6: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC-8) and Principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3) for Qatar, 2009-2015



The relation regarding the contents of promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting (NRC-8) and the principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3) is the same as their relation in terms of the relative frequency distribution. That is to say, the position that Qatar's decisionmakers perceive for their country concerning the contribution that Qatar intends to offer in terms of LNG's development and exportation goes in line with their statements regarding the promotion of energy's prosperity and development. However, in the statements about the role of promoting the prosperity and development of energy and its exporting, we have occasionally observed the development of another energy sector like solar energy, wind power, and/or hydropower. Whereas the category of principal LNG exporting and developing country centers solely on their prestigious position regarding liquified natural gas.

In accordance with their annual assertions, chart 4.7 manifests how the category of the Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) is associated both with the categories of promotor of justice and peace (NRC9) and anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3). For instance, with ID1 together, both NRC3 and NRC9 from 2009 and 2011 decreased, reaching nearly a low of 5 (ID1), 6 (NRC3), and 10 (NRC9) in 2011. Identically, each category of NRC3 and NRC9, along with ID1, experienced relatively similar fluctuations ranging from 2011 to 2014, remaining steady between the 2013-H and 2013-T intervals until they witnessed a general tendency towards a decline at the end of the graph period.

Promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), Anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), and An Islamic-Arabic state (ID1). The relationship between an anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3) and an Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) is immensely obvious once it comes to their theme. One cannot be surprised when he observes that the representation of Qatari decisionmakers for their state's identity as being an Islamic-Arabic state is similarly associated with the definition of their anti-Zionist agent role since Zionism is deemed, imperialistically speaking, as "Arab counterpart" according to Holsti (1970: 271). Besides, this identity category can be paralleled with promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), as long as the latter hems in the decision-makers' eagerness regarding the necessity of providing justice and comprehensive peace for all, particularly Arabs and Palestinians.

Chart 4.7: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Promotor of justice and peace (NRC9), Anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), and An Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) for Qatar, 2009-2015





Chart 4.8: Comparison of the Evolution of the Distribution of Relative Frequencies within the Categories of Mediator Integrator (NRC-7), Cooperation/collaboration (ST1), and Prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) for Qatar, 2009-2015



Notably, a clear association has been found between mediator-integrator (NRC-7), cooperation/collaboration (ST1), and a prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2), based upon their annual assertions as illustrated by chart 4.8.

From the beginning of the studied periods, by the same token, both categories of cooperation/collaboration (ST1) and prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) together with mediator-integrator rose in 2010, then fell sharply from that point onwards in 2012, reaching their lowest level. Undistinguishably, all of these categories had been remaining steady between 2012 and 2013-H before they notably climbed in 2013-T, which then once again registered a steep decline in 2015.

Now, we have noticed that both status (ST1) and identity (ID2) are correlated identically with NRC7 from their assertions' relative frequency angle. Nonetheless, their content or theme's perspective seems somehow different, although one might tend to claim that the cooperative and/or collaborative relationship (ST1) that Qatar enjoys with other international entities such as states and regional and international organizations can, in a certain way,

facilitate the fulfillment of mediator integrator (NRC7) whereby reconciling or resolving conflicts and misunderstandings between states or other international actors are met.

Thus, according to the presented data, the strongest associations can be seen obviously between the status and national role conceptions and that is based upon their relative frequency and their content as well. However, we cannot ignore the association that identity has with national role conceptions.



5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In broad terms, role theory is centered on four prominent ingredients, which are role prescription, role conception, role performance, and position. This theory was exclusively employed in the sociology and psycho-sociology fields. In 1970, Holsti was the first one who apply role theory to the foreign policy sphere. In his study, which is under the title of *national role conceptions in the study of foreign policy*, he zeroed in on role conception and role performance specifically. In Holsti's *national role conceptions framework*, role performance simply connotes the general foreign policy behavior of the state, and role conception refers to the decisionmakers' understanding or conception of their state's role performance. Due to the fact that *national role conception role theory* has been disseminated famously after Holsti's study (1970), many studies employed such framework looking at various angles. Among these studies, there is Le Prestre's edit volume (1997). In this volume, the focus was laid merely on role conception—where policymakers' representation of their country's role in the international system was analyzed—and the sources of these role conceptions, moving away from role performance and its correlation with role conception. Correspondingly, in the same line of thought, this paper has adopted Le Prestre's developed framework and used it in the context of national role conceptions that were represented by Qatari decisionmakers' in their foreign policy speeches from 2009 to 2015. Also, the sources of the found national role conceptions have been investigated in a non-causal manner. More clearly, the main purpose behind adopting this framework was (A) to identify the main national role conceptions in Qatari foreign policy since they have not yet been tried by other studies; (B) to study the change and continuity in the dominant national role conceptions; and (C) to endeavor to examine, in a non-causal manner, the source of these national role conceptions. Since national role conceptions can be identified by analyzing foreign policy speeches of a state's decisionmakers, according to Holsti (1970: 256), a content analysis of Qatari decisionmakers' foreign policy speeches has been conducted.

From the analysis, many conclusions can be discussed right here. Eleven *national role conceptions* are identified for Qatar foreign policy during the period of 2009-2015. It is found, however, that the dominant roles that have consistently dominated through all the examined years are regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC10) and global sub-system

collaborator (NRC11) except 2012 the latter role did not dominate. Followed respectively by liberation supporter (NRC6), which predominant from the interval of 2011-2015; anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3), dominating in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2015; and mediator integrator (NRC7), which dominated in the period of 2010, 2011 and 2013-T. Building on that one can say that there are plenty of various roles that—are articulated in Qatari decisionmakers' foreign policy speeches—go rather beyond the role of mediation and liberation supporters, which are deemed by some studies to be the most essential pillars of Qatari foreign policy. Regarding the role of mediation and liberation supporter that have been exclusively debated in some of the studies that have been discussed under the section of *anatomy of Qatari foreign policy studies*, there are three basic remarks that can be drawn from our result, which can be observed in chart 4.1 and table 4.1. First, despite the fact that almost all the studies discussed in this paper prescribed the mediation policy (i.e., mediator integrator role) as the main pillar in Qatar's foreign policy, this policy in 2009 has registered relatively little existence in Qatari decisionmakers' representations of the role that their country ought to play on the international stage. Second, the total absence of mediator integrator role (NRC7) in the statements of decisionmakers during the interval of 2012 and 2013-H and the predominance of liberation supporter (NRC6) in 2011, 2012, and 2013-H can go hand in hand with the study of Álvarez-Ossorio and García (2021), Abdullah (2014a), Shoaib (2016), and Jargūn (2016), whereby all of them agreed on the change from mediation to liberation supporter in this period. Third, with emir Hamad's abdication of power (indicating the end of the 2013-H period) and the arrival of emir Tamim (indicating the beginning of the 2013-T interval) up until 2015, the role of liberation supporter (NRC6) witnessed a gradual decrease. This decline in NRC6 from 2013-T to 2015, coupled with the highest level of frequency that the mediator integrator role (NRC7) has attained in 2013-T from emir Tamim and his foreign minister's speeches can be in part associated with the claims of Barakat (2014), Abdullah (2014a), and Steinberg (2023).

What is more, once it comes to the correlation that the national role conceptions have with status and identity in terms of the relative frequency distribution and content, we found that liberation supporter (NRC6) attains a clear correlation with solidarity/sympathized relationship with Arab people, especially Palestinians (ST4). Also, the same is true with regional-subsystem collaborator (NRC-10) and economic relations (ST2). Similarly, an obvious relation has been observed between the role of promoting the prosperity and

development of energy and its exporting (NRC-8) and the principal LNG exporting and developing country (ST3). That was about the correlations that status categories have with role conceptions. When it comes to the categories of identity and their associations with the role conceptions, it was found that the category of an Islamic-Arabic state (ID1) has correlated strongly with both promotor of justice and peace (NRC9) and Anti-Zionist/Israel agent (NRC3). Surprisingly, the categories of cooperation/collaboration (ST1) and prosperous state with an open and participatory political system (ID2) have been associated both with the role of mediator integrator (NRC7) in terms of their relative frequency distribution; nonetheless, from their content perspective, ST1 has been deemed to be relatively compatible with NRC7 in the sense that Qatar's collaborative relationship with other international entities, such as states and regional and international organizations, can, in some ways, facilitate the fulfillment of mediation. Thus, while taking in consideration relative frequency and the content of the national role conception and the categories of status and identity, the paper found that Qatari policymakers' representations of their country's roles in foreign affairs have been greatly associated with status categories.

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