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MASTER’S THESIS

THE ROLE OF REGULATORY FOCUS IN
INTERPERSONAL TRUST

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

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Master Thesis titled as “**The Role of Regulatory Focus in Interpersonal Trust**” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ABSTRACT
Master's Thesis
The Role of Regulatory Focus in Interpersonal Trust
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Department of Business Administration
Master of Business Administration Program

This study examined the influence of regulatory focus on interpersonal trust among strangers. An experimental design was used to test cause and effect relationship between individuals' regulatory foci and their trusting behavior in a subsequent and unrelated domain considering the potential influence of *regulatory closure*. According to the results, people with a promotion focus (those who were exposed to nurturance need activation) showed higher trusting behavior in an independent domain (trust game) than did individuals with a prevention focus (those who were exposed to security need activation). The other finding is that people whose security needs were satisfied in a completely unrelated domain trusted strangers more than did individuals whose security needs were activated but not satisfied.

Findings of the present thesis make an important contribution to the literature by identifying the role of self-regulatory focus, psychological safety and regulatory closure in interpersonal trust in a causal design. Different from the previous studies which have predominantly used less malleable factors to explain trusting behavior among strangers, this study employed a situational variable which allows opportunity for manipulation and adaptation.

Taking into consideration the fact that trust among strangers in Turkey is quite low and requires immediate action; in light of the findings of this study, priming individuals with a promotion focus or satisfying salient security and safety needs in a domain unrelated to social interactions could be used to develop policies for improvement of trust in Turkey.

Keywords: Regulatory focus, trust, regulatory closure, need satisfaction, activation

ÖZET
Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Kişilerarası Güvende Düzenleyici Odağın Rolü
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Bu çalışma, düzenleyici odağın birbirini tanımayan kişiler arasındaki güvene olan etkisini incelemektedir. Deneysel bir tasarım kullanılarak kişilerin düzenleme odakları ile manipülasyon ile ilişkisiz bir alanda gösterdikleri güven davranışı arasındaki neden sonuç ilişkisi düzenleyici kapatma (regulatory closure) açısından test edilmiştir. Bulgulara göre, yükselme odaklı kişiler (doyum ihtiyacı aktivasyonu yapılan kişiler), önleme odaklı bireylere (güvenlik ihtiyacı aktivasyonu yapılan kişiler) kıyasla bağımsız bir alanda (güven oyunu) daha fazla güven davranışı göstermişlerdir. Diğer bir bulgu ise güvenlik ihtiyacı tatmin edilen kişiler, güvenlik ihtiyacı aktifleştirilen ancak tatmin edilmeyen kişilere göre aktivasyon ile tamamen ilişkisiz bir alanda daha fazla güven davranışı göstermişlerdir.

Bu çalışmanın bulguları, öz düzenleme odağı, psikolojik güvenlik ve düzenleyici kapatmanın kişiler arası güvendeki rolünü nedensel bir tasarımla belirleyerek literatüre önemli bir katkı yapmaktadır. Birbirini tanımayan kişiler arasındaki güveni açıklamak için çoğunlukla değiştirilmesi kolay olmayan faktörleri kullanan önceki çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışma manipülasyon ve adaptasyona izin veren durumsal bir değişkeni ele almıştır.

Türkiye’deki birbirini tanımayan kişiler arasındaki güvenin çok düşük olduğu ve acil bir müdahaleye ihtiyaç duyulduğu göz önüne alındığında, bu çalışmanın bulguları ışığında kişilere yükselme odağı ile hazırlama (priming) yapılması veya sosyal etkileşim içermeyen başka bir alanda kişilerin güvenlik ihtiyaçlarının giderilmesi yoluyla Türkiye’deki güveni iyileştirecek politikalara yön verilebilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Düzenleyici odak, güven, düzenleyici kapatma, ihtiyaç tatmini, aktivasyon

THE ROLE OF REGULATORY FOCUS IN INTERPERSONAL TRUST

CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
FUNDING BODY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vii
CONTENTS	ix
TABLE OF FIGURES	xi
TABLE OF APPENDICES	xii

INTRODUCTION	1
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CHAPTER ONE

TRUST

1.1. DEFINITIONS AND MULTI-DISCIPLINARY VIEWS OF TRUST	9
1.2. GENERAL TRUST	12
1.2.1. Determinants of General Trust / Propensity to Trust	15
1.2.1.1. Macro Level Determinants of Trust	15
1.2.1.2. Individual Level Determinants of Trust	17
1.2.1.3. Situational Determinants of Trust	19
1.2.2. Measurement of Trust	21
1.3. SPECIFIC TRUST	23
1.3.1. Models of Specific Trust	23

CHAPTER TWO

REGULATORY FOCUS

2.1. SELF-REGULATION	29
2.2. SELF-DISCREPANCY THEORY- PARENT OF REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY	30

2.2.1. Self-state Representations and Self-regulation Regarding Ideal and Ought Self-guides	31
2.2.2. Sensitivity to Different Psychological States for Ideal and Ought Self-regulation	32
2.2.3. Self-discrepancies and Emotional Sensitivities	34
2.2.4. Availability and Accessibility of Self-discrepancies	36
2.2.5. Relation of Self-Discrepancy with Regulatory Focus	38
2.3. REGULATORY FOCUS	40
2.3.1. Self-Regulation in relation to Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus	40
2.3.2. Emotional Sensitivity of Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus	41
2.3.3. Distinct Strategic Inclinations of Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus	44
2.3.4. Regulatory Focus Goal Fulfilment (Regulatory Closure)	47
2.4. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON REGULATORY FOCUS	49
2.4.1 Regulatory Focus in Social Psychology Literature	49
2.4.2. Regulatory Focus in Organizational Behavior / Psychology Literature	51
2.5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATORY FOCUS AND TRUST	55

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

3.1. PARTICIPANTS	62
3.2 INSTRUMENTS.	62
3.2.1. Regulatory Focus Manipulation	62
3.2.2. The Measurement of Trust	65
3.2.3. Control Measures	65
3.3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE	66
3.4. RESULTS	68
3.4.1. Control for Alternative Explanations	70
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	72
REFERENCES	79
APPENDICES	

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Model of specific trust	p.24
Figure 2: Model of trust	p.27
Figure 3: Leaders' Motivation to Lead as Mediating Among Leaders' Regulatory Focus, Values, and Leadership Behavior	p.53
Figure 4: Trusting Decisions According to 4 Different Conditions	p.70

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Regulatory Focus Manipulation	app. p.1
Appendix 2: Ego Depletion and Mood Scale	app. p.3
Appendix 3: Trust Game Decision Scale	app. p.5

INTRODUCTION

"You must *trust* and believe in people or life becomes impossible." - *Anton Chekhov*

Defined as "*a psychological state comprising the intentions to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the actions of the trustee*" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998: 395), trust is essential to everyday living of human beings. We have to trust others almost every moment of our lives. For example, we trust the pilot that she will take off and land the plane safely when we get on a plane, the surgeon that she will perform a surgery properly, the bank that it will keep our deposits securely and perform honestly, our work organization that it will remunerate our labor at the end of the month, and the state that they will use our taxes ethically for the society's best interest.

Interpersonal trust among strangers plays a crucial role for the well-being of social relationships, organizations, and even societies (Welch, Rivera, Conway, Yonkoski, Lupton and Giancola, 2005: 453). In their famous work "Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy" (1994), Putnam and his friends analyzed North and South Italy in terms of level of development and claimed that differences between the two regions were due to their different patterns and levels of trust, cooperation, and civic activation, all of which in turn caused these two regions to have different levels of governance quality and prosperity. In numerous studies trust among strangers was found to be positively associated with economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004: 526; Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1265 ; Knack and Zack, 2002: 105; Zack and Knack, 2001: 308), income per capita, government efficiency (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995: 295), judicial efficiency, anticorruption actions, tax compliance of citizens and civic activation in society (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 315; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005: 50). Moreover, in his well-known study Fukuyama (1995: 7) emphasizes the important role of trust for societies stating that "*... a nation's well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society*". According to Fukuyama, trust within a society helps decrease transaction costs and prosper links and relationships that are essential for

democratic participation and good governance. Besides these society level outcomes, trust is important for organizations as their viability is attributed to their ability of building trusting relationships and networks (Fukuyama, 1995: 7). Further, trust within economic organizations is important because it influences organizational effectiveness (Kouzes and Posner, 1995: 163; Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis and Winograd, 2000: 35), solidarity towards shared organizational goals (Hardin, 2001: 23) and higher performance and productivity (Fukuyama, 1995: 7; Miller, 2001: 329).

Last but not least, trust among strangers has several impacts at individual level. According to Yamagishi (2001: 139-40) trusting individuals develop some kind of “social intelligence” that facilitates trusters to be more open to trust related information and process trustworthiness of others more precisely. Since distrusting individuals are deprived of this form of intelligence, they approach people with caution and suspicion and also they prefer to stay in close quarters and socially detached from others to protect themselves from being betrayed or fooled. Trusting individuals also have more tolerance to minorities and develop more empathy (Putnam, 2000), respect others’ views and rights (Rotter, 1980: 6), have high internal locus of control (Uslaner, 2002a: 12), optimism and higher life satisfaction (Ekici and Koydemir, 2013: 1042; Helliwell, 2003: 338; Rotter, 1980: 6; Tov and Diener, 2009: 164). Further, they utilize more opportunities for social interaction such as joining voluntary associations, serving on jury, doing community work (Putnam 2000) and exhibit less unethical behavior-like lying, stealing or cheating (Rotter:1980:6).

Despite such high importance of general trust for societies, organizations and individuals, trust among strangers in Turkey has been consistently reported to be quite low according to World Value Survey (WVS) scores. These scores are calculated as the percentage of people answering yes to the question of “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. According to the last analysis period of WVS, wave 6 (2010-2014), only 11,6% of Turkish participants agreed that most people could be trusted; while 3 most trusting countries according to survey were Netherlands, China

and Sweden, and in these countries the percentages of participants who responded “yes” to the above question were 66 %, 60,3 % and 60,1 % respectively.

Low interpersonal trust in Turkey has been reported in other studies as well (Erdoğan, 2008: 18; Esmer, 1999, as cited in Erdoğan, 2008: 13). Only 5% of young people in Turkey have been found to be agreeing with the statement that in general most people can be trusted. This situation is called as a distrust illness and related statistics are addressed as an indicator for immediate action to restore trust.

Objective and Significance of the Present Thesis

Motivated by the previous research indicating the importance of interpersonal trust among strangers for the proper functioning of society and organizations, and the apparent lack of such trust in Turkey, the first objective of the present thesis is to examine the role of an individual level construct, regulatory focus, in trust behavior among strangers in Turkey.

Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 2011) is a self-regulation theory suggesting that people have different motivations and ways of achievement for realization of their goals. It is already known that people approach pleasure and avoid pain (Carver and Scheier, 1990: 3). Regulatory focus theory explains what kind of strategic means people employ while they approach desired end states and avoid undesired end states. According to regulatory focus theory, individuals chronically have one or both of two distinctive modes of regulatory focus: promotion focus versus prevention focus. Each focus is stimulated by different kinds of needs of individuals. Salient needs while realizing a goal are nurturance and nourishment for promotion focus individuals; whereas security and safety needs are salient among people with a prevention focus. Also, while promotion focused people use more eager means of goal pursuit and engage in risky behaviors, individuals with prevention focus act in vigilant and conservative ways during goal pursuit and hence, become much less willing to take risks.

Regulatory focus theory further argues that while individuals have a preferred (chronic) regulatory focus based on their history of success with each mode of regulatory focus, regulatory focus can be situationally activated in individuals

(Higgins, 2011). Accordingly, at a given time an individual should be either in a promotion state or a prevention state. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2, the present research argues that relative to promotion needs (nurturance, advancement, growth etc.) when prevention needs (safety, security, responsibility) are made salient via situational priming in a domain unrelated to a social interaction, this will lead to reduced trust in people's subsequent interaction with a stranger (hypothesis 1). Relative to promotion focus activation, prevention focus activation should be associated with decreased trust because prevention focus emphasizes concern for security and safety and individuals with prevention focus prefer to act in precautious and vigilant ways so that they avoid from negative outcomes and attain safety and security. On the other hand, promotion focus underlines concern for nurturance, growth and advancement and in order to realize these goals individuals with promotion focus employs eager and enthusiastic means of goal pursuit and become more willing to take risk. Provided that trust is about accepting being vulnerable and taking risk (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995), which conflicts with risk averse inclinations of prevention focus, it is plausible to expect prevention focused individuals in pursuit of safety and security to trust less compared to promotion focused individuals.

In a new study conducted by Keller, Mayo, Greifeneder and Pfattheicher (2015), prevention focus has been found to have a negative association with generalized trust. Accordingly, as the strength of prevention focus self-regulation increased the generalized trust of the participants decreased. Although the negative association of prevention focus with generalized trust was supported consistently through different operationalizations of the variables (chronic and manipulated regulatory focus, behavioral and attitudinal measurement of trust), this study did not compare induced prevention focus with promotion focus in terms of trust behavior. Yet, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 2011) argues that a person would be in either a promotion focus or a prevention focus in a specific situation. Further, the tasks the authors employed in the prevention focus condition and the control condition were different. More specifically, in their treatment condition the authors used different tasks to manipulate prevention focus prior to the trust game while they made subjects directly play the trust game in the control condition. This difference may have

influenced their results beyond the effects of regulatory focus. For instance, the tasks employed to manipulate prevention focus may have increased ego depletion among subjects, thus potentially leading to reduced trust compared to trust in the control condition (see, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Ariely and Vohs, 2014). The present thesis aims to fill these gaps by activating each regulatory focus and comparing their relative influences on trusting behavior while controlling for differences in experimental tasks across conditions.

Furthermore, this thesis extends the literature on the regulatory focus and trust association by investigating the role of regulatory closure in trust. According to the regulatory closure argument (Baas, De Dreu and Nijstad, 2011), the influences of fulfilling (regulatory closure) and not fulfilling salient needs and relevant goals differ according to regulatory focus of individuals. While promotion focused individuals' activation and motivation as well as the significance of salient needs continue during subsequent goal pursuit irrespective of regulatory closure, for prevention focused individuals fulfilling and not fulfilling of a goal have different impacts on motivation and activation levels of individuals for subsequent goal pursuits. Accordingly, when prevention focused individuals actively pursue but do not achieve their regulatory goals (avoiding a negative outcome) and fulfill salient needs (safety and security), then in subsequent goal pursuits activation and motivation level of individuals persist and their salient security needs keep pending to be satisfied. However, when prevention focused individuals actively pursue and achieve prevention related goals or fulfill salient needs of security and safety, their activation and motivation level decreases so that their previously salient needs lose its effect and significance for subsequent goals pursuit. In other words, once prevention related goals have been satisfied, their impact on behavior in a subsequent situation is reduced.

Based on this argument on regulatory closure, the present research claims that achieving security and safety in a completely unrelated domain will decrease relevance and significance of previously salient security needs and thus increase trust in a stranger in a subsequent domain. Thus, we predict that individuals whose security and safety needs are satisfied (through fulfilling a prevention related goal) would show more trust in a subsequent and independent domain than individuals whose security and safety needs are activated but not satisfied (actively pursuing but

not fulfilling a prevention related goal) (hypothesis 2). In other words, , when individuals satisfy their salient security and safety needs in other domains that are unrelated to social interactions (e.g., securing a home for themselves, , getting a job), this would have positive influence on their trust in strangers in subsequent social interactions relative to a situation where individuals' security needs are salient but not satisfied. Consistent with great majority of trust and social dilemma research, the present thesis focuses on anonymous interactions among strangers for two reasons. Firstly, anonymous interactions are hardest to elicit trust and cooperation; and secondly, these interactions have been increasingly frequent and important for the well-being of society (De Cremer, Snyder and Dewitte, 2001: 94-96).

These predictions of the thesis were tested through an experimental design with 146 participants from Dokuz Eylül University Faculty of Business. Regulatory focus of individuals was manipulated semantically through four different maze tasks each of which represented either fulfilling or not fulfilling promotion related needs (nurturance need) or prevention related needs (security need). After regulatory focus manipulation individuals' trusting levels were measured through the "trust game" (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). Mood and ego depletion were also measured for control purposes. According to the results of a univariate analysis of variance test involving a 2 (Regulatory need activation: security needs activation vs. nurturance needs activation) x 2 (Need satisfaction or regulatory closure: need satisfied vs. need NOT satisfied) between-subjects design, the first hypothesis was supported; such that, individuals who were induced prevention focus but who did not satisfy the goal of security produced less trust than individuals who were induced promotion focus but who did not satisfy the goal of nurturance. The second hypothesis was also supported such that individuals who satisfied security needs trusted more than those who actively pursued but did not fulfill security needs. Mood and ego depletion did not provide any alternative explanation regarding the influence of regulatory focus on trusting behavior.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions of the Present Thesis

The present thesis has important contributions to the literature. Prior research has predominantly examined macro factors (i.e., society level factors) or demographic factors as determinants of trust. Both approaches study factors that are hard to change, thus allowing little opportunity to influence trust behavior by manipulation of these factors. Macro level analyses of antecedents to trust generally assume that factors that cause social polarization in a society and create distance among citizens may lead trust to decrease. Accordingly, low average income (GDP), income inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002: 218; Knack and Keefer, 1997:1267; Knack and Zak, 2002: 95; Leigh, 2006a: 272; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005: 71; Smith, 2008: 20; Uslaner, 2002a: 28; Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 889; Zak and Knack, 2001: 312), ethnic heterogeneity and group unfamiliarity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000: 10; Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1282; Leigh, 2006b: 273; Smith, 2008: 20) are associated with lower trust levels. Second view examines determinants of trust at individual level. At this level demographic factors like education (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002: 218; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000: 818), age (Sutter and Kocher, 2007: 364; Whiteley, 1999: 40), gender (Croson and Buchan, 1999; Patterson, 1999: 173), mobility (Leigh, 2006b: 275) are found to predict trust levels of individuals. Also, in Ainsworth et al's (2014) study the role of self-regulatory processes on trusting behavior was examined with an experimental design. Accordingly, individuals whose self-regulatory resources were depleted (experienced ego depletion) through situational manipulation in an unrelated domain showed decreased trusting behavior to a stranger in trust game. However, studies regarding the influence of different self-regulatory processes on trust behavior are limited in number and diversity. Hence, to our knowledge the present thesis is the first to investigate the causal association of regulatory focus with trust behavior considering the potential influence of *regulatory closure*. Thus, the present thesis enhances our understanding concerning the roles of self-regulatory processes in trust behavior. It shows that regulatory closure matters among people in prevention focus.

The present thesis has also a practical contribution. Unlike antecedents examined in prior research that are less malleable (i.e., macro level factors that

cannot be changed), regulatory focus is an individual level factor that can easily be manipulated by situational cues and hence could be used to induce trust behavior (state trust) in interpersonal interactions. For example by activating a promotion focus mode with questions related to one's ideals (Higgins, Roney, Crowe and Hymes, 1994), security and safety needs of an individual could be made less salient and more obscure hence s/he could be less vigilant about being exploited and more willing to trust. Research shows that national culture would influence which regulatory focus is active or dominant in individuals through its influence on situations people may find themselves in (Kurman and Hui, 2011: 5). Accordingly, in collectivist cultures, like Turkey, security and safety needs are more salient and people are more prone to have prevention focus, while in individualist cultures advancement and growth needs are more prominent and therefore people have higher tendency to have promotion focus. Thus, according to the findings of the present thesis, situational manipulation of a promotion focus relative to a prevention focus may lead to increased trust within interactions among strangers. Further, the findings suggest that another strategy to increase trust may be developing policies to enable individuals to achieve safety and security in other domains, which, in turn, may increase trust among strangers. Accordingly, the findings of the present research might help develop strategies to increase general trust level (propensity to trust strangers) in the long run by influencing situational trust (or state trust) in interactions among individuals.

The present thesis is comprised of three chapters. In the first chapter, trust literature and especially the research related to trust among strangers have been examined. In the second chapter, self-discrepancy theory and regulatory focus theory have been examined and the hypothesis development on the relationship between regulatory focus and trust has been explained. In the last chapter the methodology employed for hypothesis testing and findings of the analyses have been presented. Also, the discussion of the arguments based on the findings and important implications and contributions of this thesis have been presented in the last chapter.

CHAPTER ONE

TRUST

In this chapter different definitions and multifaceted nature of the trust have been examined. Macro level, individual level and situational determinants trust have been presented. Also in this chapter, different ways of measuring trust and most known models of trust regarding specific trust have been mentioned.

1.1. DEFINITIONS AND MULTI-DISCIPLINARY VIEWS OF TRUST

Trust is defined as “*a psychological state comprising the intentions to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of the actions of the trustee*” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). In this framework, there are three parts, A trusts B to do X. What A (trustor) has for B (trustee) is the trust and it is distinguished from trustworthiness, which consists of attributes and characteristics of B (ability, benevolence, and integrity of a trustee, Mayer et al, 1995: 715) that encourage A to trust B.

Trust is essential for social functioning, communication and economic behavior. Accordingly, almost all disciplines in behavioral sciences study trust, which makes trust a multi-disciplinary construct. Scope of trust extends from psychology to sociology, from economics to organizational behavior. Also, since trust is a complex and multifaceted construct and different disciplines attempt to understand and uncover different aspects of it, it emerges as a multi-level and multi-dimensional construct (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Öztürk, 2011).

In psychology discipline, trust is examined mostly in context of interpersonal relations and communication. Psychologists consider trust as a dispositional or trait based element (propensity to trust) and try to understand dispositional characteristics of trustor and trustee. These dispositional characteristics are thought to develop during childhood and be shaped by upbringing style of parents. It is considered that developing trust between a child and parents during childhood is crucial for the existence and nurturance of the child and this earlier form of trust becomes part of personality during adulthood. (Reyhanoğlu, 2006: 28). In economics, trust is examined in a cost benefit context. Neo-classical economists address trust concept as

irrational. According to their view, humans are purely self-interested and concerned with maximizing their own utility and people should not trust others as long as it is against their own material interest. However, behavioral economists believe that rational human can trust as they assume that trust may still serve as an outcome of rational thinking when it is possible to reach utility maximization by calculative forms of trust (Fehr and Schmitt, 1999: 817; Williamson, 1993: 463). From sociological point of view, trust is examined in the context of community, institutions, and social relationships. Trust is believed to be a part of formal and informal social structures and is promoted by social mechanisms like norms, laws and regulations, since it is seen as essential for the proper functioning of social and economic institutions (Hosmer, 1995). From a societal perspective, trust serves to encourage cooperation among individuals by communicating that others will not take advantage of one which helps formation of a good society. Also, trust is seen as the main part of social capital, which involves shared norms, values, bonds and links among individuals, families and groups that makes it less demanding to get along, cooperate and work together. Societies rich in social capital are able to integrate and cooperate more easily (Fukuyama, 1995)

In organizational settings as well, trust is seen as a necessary factor for functioning of the organization, the realization of organizational goals and relations in the organization. For an effective organization, trust is deemed necessary since it may affects performance and behaviors of individuals positively. Organizational research examines the role of trust in positive employee behaviors and attitudes including trust. Accordingly this research has found that trust in the organization and its representatives has direct or moderating influences on several employee outcomes including organizational citizenship behaviors, cooperation, superior levels of performance, unit performance, job satisfaction, communication and information sharing (Callaway, 2006: 112; Davis, Schoorman, Mayer and Tan, 2000: 569; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001: 455,456; Hwang and Burgers, 1997:72; McAllister, 1995: 47, 48; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman and Fetter, 1990: 276; Rich, 1997: 325; Velez and Strom, 2012: 46).

As seen from multi-disciplinary view of trust, scholars handle the construct in different levels and in varied dimensions. Although there have been attempts to

synthesize this diversity to find some common ground for the construct (Bigley and Pierce, 1998; Mayer et al, 1995; Hosmer, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Rousseau et al, 1998; Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007), no consensus could be reached over what trust is or how it is defined. Hence there exist different definitions for trust. For example, Mayer et al (1995: 712) defines trust as the willingness to be vulnerable, while Robinson (1996: 576) describes it as expectation, assumption or belief about another's favorable actions. For Kramer (1999: 571) it is a psychological state and involves a risk or vulnerability due to uncertainty. According to Gambetta (1988: 217) it is the sufficient probability that the other person will not be detrimental for the trustor to cooperate; while it is a positive attitude toward the trustee's goodwill and reliability for Das and Teng (1998: 494) and it is the degree of confidence and willingness to act upon the words and actions of others for McAllister (1995: 25). This divergence and uncertainty in meanings of trust and lack of integration and clarity in the conceptualization of it unsettle trust scholars (Barber, 1983: 7; Luhmann, 1980: 8; Shapiro, 1987: 624; Zucker, 1986: 58), since this disagreement is deemed to be an inhibitor in front of scientific advancement and a barrier for complete comprehension and grasp of the concept (Bluhm, 1987: 334; Butler, 1991: 647). However, efforts for a unique way of conceptualizing or modeling the huge trust literature in certain schemes to solve this disagreement are also criticized as being impractical since it might turn out to reach a conceptualization either meaninglessly complicated for practical implications or excessively vague and shortened for theoretical purposes (Bigley and Pierce, 1998: 408). In other words, for the sake of a universal abstraction or definition of trust, neither degrading exhaustive knowledge and research into a few classifications or typology nor accumulating collective work and constructions into the same modeling so as not to leave anything out would promise feasible and reasonable outcomes. While discipline-based view emphasizes theoretical differences and disciplinary roots and attempt to degrade conceptualization into a compact model, problem-based view deals with literature in a different manner. Problem-based view favors to take into account specific problem foci rather than tap on each and every theory relevant to the concept of trust. Bigley and Pierce (1998: 416) propose a problem focused approach as an effective way of handling conceptual diversity in trust for the reason that “*since definitions or theories*

of trust have developed to address different kinds of organizational problems, general criticisms of this sort typically are not beneficial". Presence of a specific problem focus first of all, sets limits to enormous literature in trust and it directs scholars and researchers only to problem-relevant theories and models of trust to deal with and understand which trust definition to employ and when, rather than produce new definitions for trust. Additionally, defining problem foci helps to understand where to have debate over disagreements is useful and fruitful and where it is not. With specific problem foci, researchers can have courses for juxtaposing different concepts and theories in relevant level and categorization; thus can involve in productive debates and argumentation.

Thus, following a problem-focused approach, this thesis utilizes trust conceptualization only relevant to its research question since this approach requires that *"scholars should not be compelled to discuss definitions and theories focused on problems far removed from their own, simply because those also use the word "trust"*" (Bigley and Pierce, 1998: 416). Consistent with this view, this thesis takes trust as "interpersonal trust among strangers". Because the influence of a situationally induced variable (regulatory focus) is investigated this thesis operationalizes trust as state or situational trust among strangers in an interpersonal context. Previous research supports the notion that influencing immediate situations may have positive consequences for state trust (Ainsworth, Baumeister, Ariely and Vohs, 2014). The next section reviews the relevant literature on general trust.

1.2. GENERAL TRUST

Trust broadly could be defined under two main categories: particularized and general trust. According to Berggren and Jordahl (2006: 143) *"the former entails trusting people you know or know something about; the latter trusting most (but not all) people you do not know or know anything about"*. According to this categorization, while particularized trust is person- situation- task specific and arises from face to face interactions, general trust is the trust towards strangers that one has no direct information about. General trust is also labeled as propensity to trust since

it reflects how trusting an individual will be in any situation when there is no situational influence (Axelrod, 2004: 65; Mayer et al, 1995: 715).

In the literature one of the obvious examples regarding the difference of particularized trust and general trust is depicted in Banfield's study (1958). In this study although he does not name it as we label it today, the author shows that in a Southern Italy village in their close neighborhood people are strongly linked to one another but these firm bonds do not extend to the whole society. He describes this society as being family centered in that individuals only care and concern about their family members but behave in a self-interested way in their interactions with people outside family circle. His study illustrates a society with high particularized but low general trust in that people only trust members of their group but they do not trust others with whom they have no family bond or connection. Yet, he labels this situation as "amoral familism" A resembling situation is depicted in Putnam's study (1993) in which he states differences of Northern and Southern Italy regional governments in terms of governance performance and regional development. He identifies that governments in the Northern part perform and develop way better compared to those of the Southern part due to the differences in social capital. He argues that existence of social capital is partly based on the impersonal (general) trust among individuals and voluntary civic participations. Putnam considers trust and norm of reciprocity to lubricate social interaction by causing individuals to extend their connections and norms of reciprocity beyond their particularized community to a larger community of unknown others. Individuals of a society rich in social capital asset would have the "*ties, norms and trust transferable from one social setting to another*" (Putnam, 1993: 4) causing social cohesion and unity.

Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994: 132), on the other hand, give a broader definition of general trust as "*an expectation of goodwill and benign intent*". In other words, general trust shows the extent to which people believe in the unconditional goodwill of humanity. They also postulate that if expectation of goodwill is grounded in all but the benevolence of others, then by definition it is not trust but assurance. According to Yamagishi and Yamagishi, assurance arises when it is possible to rely on incentive structures enclosing relationships, yet general trust requires making inferences regarding others' personal traits and intentions. Thus, relative to assurance

general trust involves social uncertainty. The authors support this distinction between assurance and general trust in several studies (Yamagishi, 1988; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1989; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Importantly, they showed that general trust levels of Americans are significantly higher than those found in the Japanese. Contrary to expectations, rather than general trust, mutual assurance is common among Japanese people since it arises from long-lasting interpersonal relations that are lacking in uncertainty. On the other hand, among Americans the lack of such long-lasting relations and the existence of uncertainty in social life have evolved general trust for the proper functioning of society.

According to Fukuyama (1995: 26), industrial countries like Germany, USA and Japan are economically more successful compared to countries like France, Italy and China at least partly due to their differences in terms of general trust. Accordingly, Germany, USA, and Japan have higher general trust levels that allow people to build social and economic relationships extending over to the entire society. However, France, Italy, and China tend to develop close knit social and economic relations mainly with family members, relatives or well-known affiliations leading to less efficient use of economic resources and hence lower economic performance in these countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1258). This latter group of countries is labeled as familistic societies and has a low radius of trust, an unwillingness to go into or initiate relationship with outsiders of familiar neighborhood and group members, which cause these societies to have low level of general trust. When looking at the studies investigating general trust levels in Turkey, it is found that while trust in people that are unfamiliar is quite low, trust in family members and relatives is as pretty high as 86% (Uğuz, Örselli and Sipahi, 2011: 23). Since in Turkey trust in family members, relatives and close acquaintances is quite high but trust in strangers is very low, Turkey has a low radius of trust and is characterized as a country with low general trust level (Uğuz et al, 2011: 34).

1.2.1. Determinants of General Trust / Propensity to Trust

Determinants of general trust have been studied under two broad categories in the literature. First category involves country level and institutional factors; whereas the second category includes individual level factors.

1.2.1.1. Macro Level Determinants of Trust

From a society-level point of view, people constantly assess their society and update their trust perceptions according to their experiences and changing conditions. According to this view, trust is determined by others' trustworthiness and others' trustworthiness is gauged by societal and contextual factors. If people evaluate others and their society as trustworthy, they will develop trusting feelings (or distrusting feelings if they evaluate the society as untrustworthy) and demonstrate trustworthy (or untrustworthy) behaviors. On the other hand, from an individual-level point of view, general trust does not merely ground on societal and contextual variables. In this view, trust is seen as a property of individuals and individuals become trustor or distruster depending on their childhood socialization or adulthood experiences.

General trust levels vary across countries. For instance, according to World Value Survey (2014) 66.1% of people in Netherlands stated that most people could be trusted, yet only 3.2% of people in Philippines stated so. Despite this variation among countries, general trust levels for countries across time seem mostly stable (Bjørnskov, 2007: 17). This stickiness of trust levels for long periods of time provides other insights as to possible determinants of general trust. For example, stability of trust was demonstrated as a cultural characteristic of society in Bjørnskov's study (2007: 17). Also, Uslaner (2008: 738) argues that people learn to trust through culture. Specifically, Uslaner found that people from different ethnicities living in the United States reflected their ancestors' trust tendencies, suggesting that trust is transmitted across generations as a cultural inheritance. If a person's ancestors are from a country with high general trust it is highly likely that person would have higher general trust. According to this explanation stability of trust supports a macro level study of determinants of trust. However, other studies

suggest that general trust is learned during very early years of an individual's developmental period; and although later updated to some extent, it stays relatively stable throughout adulthood (Lewicki, Stevenson and Bunker 1997; McKnight and Chervany 1996). Katz and Rotter (1969: 659) demonstrated that parents' attitudes of trust affect their children's trust levels and this effect continues even during young adulthood, which again supports the view for stability of trust. This second view stands for an individual level approach to the study of antecedents of trust. The following section will discuss research on antecedents of trust based on these two views.

Scholars investigating the influence of macro level factors on general trust argue that general trust is a property of society rather than the individual (Delhey and Newton, 2003: 96) and the outcome of systematic and institutional factors some of which have been mentioned previously. For example income inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002: 218; Knack and Keefer, 1997:1267; Knack and Zak, 2002: 95; Leigh, 2006a: 272; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005: 71; Smith, 2008: 20; Uslaner, 2002a: 28; Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 889; Zak and Knack, 2001: 312), ethnic heterogeneity (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1282; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000: 10; Leigh, 2006b: 273; Smith, 2008: 20) were proposed as important predictors of general trust in a society. Another macro determinant is the quality and goodness of formal institutions. Trust is promoted through legal structure and security of rights (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006: 161; Knight, 2001: 363; Rothstein, 2000: 491). Perceived fairness and effectiveness of legal system assures individuals that it is reasonable to trust other actors for their voluntary contracts since rules and agreements are implemented properly (Levi, 1998: 85).

Another determining factor is the type of religion embraced by the majority in a society. Hierarchical religions (Catholicism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity) have been found to have negative effects on general trust (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006: 153; La Porta et al, 1997: 318; Zak and Knack, 2001: 310) while Protestantism and non-hierarchical religions influence general trust positively (Uslaner, 2002b). In hierarchical religions distribution of responsibilities in a vertical way causes unity among ranks or classes to decrease leaving less room for interaction among each other and generation of trust.

1.2.1.2. Individual Level Determinants of Trust

While scholars examining country-level and society level determinants of trust suggest that trust is the product of society related factors, those who investigate individual level determinants of trust contend that trust is determined by an individual's traits, experiences, demographic factors. One aspect of individual-level determinants of trust concerns more about demographic factors. Education, for instance, is suggested to increase trust levels (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002: 218; Glaeser et al, 2000: 818; Leigh, 2006b: 274). Different underlying mechanisms are suggested for this effect. One reason is that through education individuals can gain positive attitudes regarding people that they know very little. Other possible explanation is that by having more education people can learn how to understand and process knowledge about others and they become more aware and mindful about in what ways their and others' acts can result in (Bjørnskov, 2007: 7).

There are also studies showing that people who are more "lucky" in life have more trust to strangers compared to unlucky ones. Putnam (2000: 138, as cited in Delhey and Newton, 2003: 96) supports this view stating that "haves" are more trusting than "have-nots". People having higher levels of income, social status, life satisfaction, optimism and happiness are found to have higher trust levels (Newton, 1999; Whiteley 1999; World Values Survey, 2010; Zak, 2006). Banfield (1958: 110) argues that trusting behavior is a risky one by which poor people have proportionally more at stake and it is more risky for them to trust compared to richer people. At this point, a question could be asked whether the reverse causal relation could exist, in that, whether trusting makes people happy and rich or rich and happy people become more trusting. In the literature there are studies showing this opposite direction that trust indeed could affect a person's life satisfaction (Ekici and Koydemir, 2013: 1042; Helliwell, 2003: 338; Tov and Diener, 2008: 324). However, since this view asserts that trust is shaped by an individual's life experiences and other demographic variables, the first causal direction- life success and satisfaction causes trust- seems more accurate. Also, it is more plausible to expect that people who experience benevolence and kindness feel more trust compared to people who experience hardship, biased treatment, poverty or unemployment. Yet, because these studies are

all correlational in nature, arguments concerning the direction of causality can be made only at a theoretical level.

Although majority of individual level antecedents of trust are related to demographic factors, there are a few studies investigating the role of personality traits in trust. For example, in Ben-Ner and Halldorsson's study (2010) individuals with higher extraversion and optimism were found to show higher trusting behavior and higher attitudinal trust. Another study (Evans and Revelle, 2008) supporting the variance of trust levels based on individual traits has examined the relation of Big Five personality traits with trust attitudes and trusting behavior of individuals. Accordingly, individual traits of high extraversion, high agreeableness, high conscientiousness and low neuroticism were found to have positive associations with behavioral and attitudinal trust.

Thielmann and Hilbig (2014) have examined underlying individual differences of individuals' trustworthiness expectations. In the study, individuals with higher Honest –Humility dimension of personality (a dimension in HEXACO model of personality structure indicating a person's cooperativeness regarding sincerity, greed avoidance, and modesty; Ashton and Lee, 2007) expected trustees to show more trustworthiness behavior which in turn influences trust and cooperation levels based on social projection mechanism. Similarly Frost, Stimpson and Maughan (1978), emphasizing the dependence of one's trust on the belief and expectancy that others would be beneficial, examined trusted person's traits as determinants of trust. Accordingly, individuals were found to trust more when the other person had internal locus of control, high self- esteem, and a lower need to control others.

Emotional intelligence and emotional competence were found to be predicting one's trust level, as well (Barczak, Lassk and Mulki, 2010; Downey, Roberts and Stough, 2011; George, 2000; Prati, Douglas, Ferris, Ammeter and Buckley, 2003). Since emotional awareness and evaluation are required for cognitive and emotional processing of information about a trustee, individuals with higher emotional intelligence were found to be high trustors (Christie, Jordan and Troth, 2015).

Another way of handling individual-level determinants of trust is based on a socio-psychological view. Different from adult-experience oriented standpoint explained above, this view proposes the idea that individuals learn trust during childhood and trust level does not change easily with experience except traumatic ones. According to this view, some people trust others more and it is because of their “*general willingness to trust others*” or propensity to trust (Mayer et al, 1995: 714). This view regards trust as part of the personality and as being determined by the relationships between caregivers and infants and affected very little by adulthood experience (Erikson, 1963; Klein, 1963, as cited in Axelrod, 2004; 48, 53). Trust is seen as “a stable within-party factor” (Mayer et al, 1995: 715) and thus called dispositional trust.

One of the supporters of this dispositional view is Uslaner (2002b) who states that people learn trust in family through socialization during very early ages of childhood- contrary to Putnam’s view that people learn norms regarding trust from other members of society and then extend this to other contexts. Uslaner supports his argument showing that in USA individual level of trust is quite stable through periods. He also shows that trusting behavior is unrelated with adulthood experience by presenting that people who were treated more kindly by others are not more trusting than people who were not treated kindly and caringly during early years. According to this view, rather than demographic factors of one, personality traits and the way one is brought up is more influential on trust of oneself. Hence, in the light of dispositional determinants of trust it is expected that in a given situation a person’s propensity to trust or general willingness to trust others would have an impact on trusting behavior/state trust of her.

1.2.1.3. Situational Determinants of Trust

In addition to society and country specific determinants and antecedents related to one’s personality or demographic features, situational factors could influence trust level of individuals. One of these situational factors of trust is risk. Risk is a primary component of trust and trusting behavior naturally involves risk since trusting individuals allow themselves to be vulnerable to others’ behaviors

(Bigley and Pearce 1998; Currall and Judge, 1995; Das and Teng 1998; Deutsch 1958; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995; Schlenker, Helm and Tedeschi 1973). Some scholars assert that presence of a risky situation engender trust (Deutsch, 1958) and the higher the degree of risk the higher the trust (Koller, 1988), while others claim that risk taking is the outcome of trusting behavior and one takes risk by trusting (Baier 1986; McAllister, 1995). Das and Teng (1998) have integrated all these views suggesting that trust and risk function reciprocally, one breeds the other.

In the study of Ainsworth et al (2014), situational antecedents of trusting behavior were measured through manipulation of these factors one of which was risk level. The study firstly examined the impact of self-regulatory resources on individuals' trusting behavior and found that individuals whose self-regulatory resources were depleted through situational manipulation in an unrelated domain showed decreased trusting behavior to a stranger in trust game. In other words, individuals who experienced ego depletion trusted less since they were lack of a sound self-control which provided the required will and determination to withstand the temptation of abusing and exploiting. The same study also found that in situations that were relatively risky the influence of ego-depletion on trusting behavior increased. Accordingly, the detrimental impact of ego depletion on trusting behavior disappeared when participants were matched with receivers that they would meet after the trust game (versus receivers they would not meet) or receivers who were biologically similar to them (versus receivers they were given no information about). Conditions of matching with a receiver that subjects would meet afterwards and a receiver that subject was quiet similar to (almost like a sibling or twin) represent less risky situations and through manipulation of risk level individuals who experienced ego depletion and hence tended to trust less were made to show higher trusting behavior.

Another study where situational factors were manipulated to influence trust is the study of Huang and Murnighan (2010). In the study, by unconsciously presenting participants names of people they like or dislike, participants were made to access relational schemas of those people. Activation of a positive relational schema by priming positive relational cues through names of liked people increased participants' trust behavior to a complete stranger in a subsequent unrelated trust

game, while activation of negative relational schema by priming names of disliked people in an independent domain decreased participants' trusting to a stranger in a subsequent trust game.

Abovementioned studies demonstrate that apart from an individual's traits and experiences or societal and institutional features, situational factors and cues have power to influence trust behavior of individuals so that by priming and manipulating particular factors one's trust level could be increased or detrimental impact of an antecedent could be neutralized.

1.2.2. Measurement of Trust

Although there are some scales developed simply for measuring general willingness and dispositional tendency to trust others (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994: 147), most of the studies, especially those involving cross-country analyses, use this one single question to compare countries' trust levels: "In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?". This question has been used in General Social Survey in the United States since 1950s and also in World Value Survey since 1981 (Bjørnskov, 2007: 2). Yet, measuring trust with this question has some shortcomings since when answering this question people could have different mindsets due to ambiguity the question has. Phrase "most people" does not explicitly specify who those people are and which groups of people should be included or excluded within this frame. Thus individuals may bring to mind different references and descriptions for "most people". Likewise, domain of trust is not clear for this question. It is possible that while someone trusts another to look after his dog when he is away for business trip, he may not trust the same person to care for his child. Hence people may tend to answer this question according to their own specification regarding situation and context of trust, and interpret it in their own way. As a result of these concerns individual answers to this single trust question may be disproportionate and validity of this single trust question could be doubted (Glaeser et al, 2000: 815; Nannestad, 2008: 417; Ostrom and Walker, 2003: 345).

Besides employing survey, trust is also measured behaviorally through experiments. There are doubts whether answers to trust questions are not adequate indicators of trusting behavior (Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp and Wagner, 2002: 523) and gauging trust through experiment overcomes these doubts and helps understand trusting behavior under certain circumstances. Additionally, experiments allow researcher to adapt conditions according to specific research question and demonstrate causal impacts by testing relationships under controlled relationships.

One of the most known and employed instruments is the “investment game” or “trust game” (Berg et al, 1995). There are varied types of the investment games modified in terms of amount at stake, receiver endowment, rate of return, player types (virtual or real), anonymity in accordance with the research question (Johnson and Mislin, 2011: 868-70); hence what this game measure is actually the state trust or behavioral trust demonstrated under particular conditions. Classical investment or trust game is played as follows:

There are two subjects both of whom provided \$10 at the beginning of the game. Each subject is assigned to one of the roles of sender or receiver by chance. At the first step, sender decides whether to send receiver any amount of \$10 or not which is labeled as x ($0 \leq x \leq 10$). x is tripled by the experimenter before it passes to the receiver so that receiver gets $3x$. At the second stage, receiver decides whether to send back to sender any amount of money s/he receives which is labeled as y ($0 \leq y \leq 3x$). While the amount of money sent by the sender to the receiver measures trust, the amount returned by the receiver to the sender reflects the receiver's trustworthiness. Trusting the other person causes total money to increase so that it could generate more value for both parties. Yet, sender (truster) carries the social risk that the receiver will not return any amount.

Additionally, although it is not a common method, Knack (2001: 17) conducted an experiment in which several wallets with \$50 and contact information inside were ostensibly dropped in different European and American cities. The number of returned wallets was used to calculate trust levels in these countries as an alternative to asking people whether they thought others could be trusted in general. Since it is not always practical and economical to conduct this experiment every time, following Knack, other studies utilized this method by turning it into a survey

question and asking people the likelihood that other people would return their wallets intact in case of that they lose it with some money in it and found comparable results (Helliwell and Wang, 2010: 2; Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales, 2007:8).


1.3. SPECIFIC TRUST

Specific trust is the “*willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular action*” (Mayer et al, 1995). While generalized trust is independent of task, person or situation, specific trust is the trust an individual has for a particular person or group in a particular situation concerning something that is important for the individual (Deutsch, 1958, Luhmann 1979; Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, 1992). Specific trust is task-specific such that the person could trust someone to look after his plants and another to handle his money transactions. Specific trust is person specific such that the person could trust someone with personal secret but not another with the same secret. It is also situation-specific such that the person could trust someone to pay back and lend him 1000 TL but not 100.000 TL.

1.3.1. Models of Specific Trust

A person’s specific trust for someone is also based on the expectations regarding trustworthiness of that person. As Flores and Solomon (1998: 209) stated “*one trusts someone because she is trustworthy, and one’s trustworthiness inspires trust*” trustworthiness of the trustee is of particular importance for trusting behavior to emerge. Although in literature a variety of characteristics have been proposed to predict trustworthiness of an individual, the well-known model of Mayer et al (1995) examined repeated characteristics under three main attributes: ability, benevolence and integrity (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Model of specific trust



Source: Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, 1995: 715

According to this model, ability is the required set of skills and abilities for performing a specific task or job. Accordingly, an individual who has good language abilities is trusted for his performance in related areas like making simultaneous translation, proofreading of a translated book but not for unrelated areas to his abilities such as making sells or developing strategic supply chain relationships. Other than Mayer et al's model, ability (Cook and Wall, 1980; Deutsch, 1960; Good, 1988) has been proposed as an important predictor of under names of expertness, expertise and competence (Giffin, 1967; Kee and Knox, 1970).

The second factor of trustworthiness is benevolence of the trustee. Benevolence represents trustee's goodwill and intention to be good to the trustor without selfish purposes (Mayer et al, 1995). Benevolence requires an emotional attachment between trustor and trustee where trustee's purpose is to be helpful to the trustor even though trustee does not get direct external benefits from this help. Some authors (Larzelere and Huston, 1980; Solomon, 1960; Strickland, 1958) suggested benevolence as the determinant of trust as well, while others expressed the same construct with synonyms like loyalty, openness, caring, altruism, supportiveness, goodwill (Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Farris, Senner and Butterfield, 1973; Frost,

Stimpson and Maughan, 1978; Gabarro, 1978; Hart, Capps, Cangemi and Caillouet, 1986; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).

The third factor of trustworthiness as antecedent of trust is the integrity of trustee. Integrity means the degree of trustee's adherence to a set of moral and ethical values which are congruent with trustor's values and principles. Integrity requires trustee's actions to be both consistent (persistence) and acceptable by the trustor (McFall, 1987). For example, when a person acts in a self-centered manner and pursues his self-interest consistently across different situations, this shows his consistency but not his integrity; since trustee's acting selfishly is not acceptable for the trustor. The trustee's integrity is perceived higher when his actions and words are compatible with each other, his current actions are consistent with his past acts, and he is believed to have justice and fairness. In literature there are a plenty of scholars (Butler, 1991; Hart, Capps, Cangemi, and Caillouet's, 1986; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Sitkin and Roth, 1993) proposed integrity or similar constructs like fairness, justice, consistency, value congruence, moral integrity, and promise fulfillment as determinant of trust.

These three dimensions of trustworthiness are independent but related to each other. Each of the dimensions represents a unique part of the trustworthiness. Existence of only one or two of the dimensions does not guarantee the trustworthiness of trustee. For example an employee observes that his manager's words and actions are consistent and perceives he has high integrity. Yet, being consistent and having acceptable principles does not suffice to make the employee trust his manager if the manager does not have required skills and abilities. If the manager has the benevolence but does not have abilities to lead the employee, he could do more harm than help the employee when the manager gives inaccurate information and misleads the employee even with good intentions. For the opposite case where the manager is quite capable and proficient but does not have any attachment to the employee (low integrity) or does not act consistently or morally acceptably, again the manager does not meet all three components of trust and could not be deemed trustworthy from the employee's perspective. If an individual is perceived high in all ability, benevolence and integrity than he is considered as trustworthy (Mayer et al, 1995). Uniqueness and complementarity of these three


dimensions have been examined and supported empirically (Colquitt, Scott and Lepine, 2007); such that, all three dimensions of trustworthiness possess have unique and meaningful relationship with trust.

According to Mayer et al's model, the characteristics of the trustor have important impact on trust as well as perceived features of trustee. Individuals' general willingness to trust others or general expectation about trustworthiness of others is called as the propensity to trust. It is a dispositional within-party factor that individuals carry from one trust situation to another. Trustor's propensity to trust has substantial impact when the trustor has very limited or no information about the trustee and could not evaluate his ability, benevolence and integrity. Those who have high propensity to trust are more willing to give benefit of doubt to the trustee before obtaining relevant information. While characteristics of the trustee (ability, benevolence and integrity) are more domain and individual specific, characteristics of the trustor (propensity to trust) are stable across situations.

In the model trust is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable. Yet, the model makes a distinction between the willingness to be vulnerable and actually becoming vulnerable. When an individual accepts the willingness to be vulnerable or trusts others, then he does not necessarily risk anything. However, when the individual engages in trusting behavior then he undertakes risk. This means that trust is the precursor of risk taking and the extent to which the individual engages in risk taking is influenced by the amount of trust the individual has for the other individual.

Another widely accepted model of trust is that of Rousseau et al (1998) depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Model of Trust



Source: Rousseau et al, 1998: 401

Although not depicted in the model, the first trust form introduced in the study is deterrence based trust. It is not integrated in the model hence some scholars do not consider it as a trust but more like a control mechanism (Sitkin and Roth, 1993). Deterrence based trust emerges when trustor believes that trustee will act in a trustworthy manner because sanctions function as a disincentive against any possible opportunistic behavior or break of the trust. In such a relationship sanctions substitute for trust rather than bolstering it, hence control mechanisms step in the absence of trust. For example, in the possibility of cheating each other parties draw a detailed contract which could deter and prevent opportunistic behavior by controlling actions of parties. In such a case parties do not need to trust each other since actions and behaviors of the other party are controlled through sanctions in the contract.

Another form of trust is the calculus based trust where trustor chooses to trust trustee not just due to the presence of deterrence but also it is for the interest of both parties. Economic exchanges are good examples for this type of trust where trustor obtains information about trustee's intentions and abilities from external sources (reputation or official credentials) to build a perception that it is for the best interest of the trustee to be trustworthy. In such a relationship trust is limited to specific situations and tends to be short term and hence, parties constantly monitor each other with regard to possible risks and opportunities. Contrary to calculative trust, relational trust is built upon long term and frequent interactions of parties where an understanding and embracing of concerns and interests of both parties are developed.

Unlike in the calculative trust, trustor gathers information regarding intentions and abilities of trustee from the relation itself and repeated interactions, not from the external sources. Proof of reliability and consistency of trustee comes from the previous interactions and based on these, trustor builds positive expectations about the integrity and intentions of trustee. Proved positive expectations promote further interactions, encourage parties to put more resources at risk and help develop good faith and attachment reciprocally. The attachment between parties and the expanded resources protect relational trust from being destroyed after a breach of positive expectations occurs especially when parties attempt to re-build previous attachment and faith.

The last form of trust in the model is the institutional trust. It serves as a facilitating base for calculative and relational trust to flourish and encouraging parties to take more risk and trust others. Like in the deterrence based trust, institutional trust is also questioned whether it is a control mechanism or a form of trust support (Shapiro, 1987). However while control mechanisms function as a deterrent against opportunism, institutional trust acts as a facilitator or a catalyst to form a basis for trust to emerge (Rousseau et al, 1998). A study by Hagen and Choe (1998) suggests that institutional trust backed by a combination of institutional and societal sanction mechanisms would function both to control opportunistic behavior and facilitate the development of trust.

On the other hand, institutional mechanisms could weaken interpersonal trust especially when rules and procedures for managing conflict situations are so strict and formalized that they inhibit flexible and personal (individual) treatment of relationships. For example in the study of Zucker (1986) institutional mechanisms were proposed to create standardized and formalized forms of interpersonal trust through the rational bureaucratic structured organizations.

CHAPTER TWO

REGULATORY FOCUS

In this chapter, two self-regulation theories have been introduced. Firstly, self-discrepancy theory- the parent of regulatory focus theory- and its basic associations and sub-dimensions have been explained. Afterwards, regulatory focus theory and emotional, motivational and strategic outcomes of distinct regulatory modes have been explained. Following that, regulatory closure concept and its differentiated outcomes with regard to different regulatory modes have been examined. Lastly, previous studies in social and organizational psychology literature have been examined and proposed hypotheses on the relationship between regulatory focus and trust has been presented.

2.1. SELF-REGULATION

In the motivation literature hedonic self-regulation -also known as pleasure principle- has been used widely in a variety of disciplines from decision making in organizational psychology (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to conditional learning (Mowrer, 1960). According to this principle people approach pleasure and avoid pain.

Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a self-regulation theory bringing new explanations to this well-known hedonic principle of approaching pleasure and avoiding pain (Higgins, 1997). RFT attempts to extend the span of hedonic principle by suggesting new ways of understanding goal pursuit, motivational consequences and emotional experiences regarding approach and avoidance behavior. According to this theory people have two distinct regulatory modes which are promotion focus and prevention focus, and if people with same goals and objectives have different regulatory modes, they will employ different ways and strategies for attaining their goals.

In order to understand regulatory focus, first some background information should be visited, which is the self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987). Self-discrepancy theory is a self-regulation theory as well but is different from previous self-regulation theories (e.g. Carver and Scheier, 1990; Mowrer, 1960) which

proposed approach and avoidance as the main motivational distinction. Self discrepancy theory proposes different ways and strategies within approach and avoidance systems that individuals employ to regulate pain and pleasure.

2.2. SELF-DISCREPANCY THEORY- PARENT OF REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY

Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT) is a self-regulation theory which distinguishes between different self-concepts of individuals and examines the impact of different self-states on motivation and emotion (Higgins, 1987). In previous literature, many theories of belief compatibilities and consistencies regarding self-evaluation were examined like cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), balance theory (Heider, 1958), congruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955). Yet, none of these theories elucidated different kinds of emotional discomfort arising from belief incompatibilities. Different from these previous theories SDT explains both sources of discrepancies for different types of self-states and differentiated emotional and motivational consequences of self-discrepancies. SDT demonstrates the link between belief inconsistencies and emotional discomfort; and also, makes a distinction regarding what kind of belief incompatibility triggers which kind of emotional problems.

The fundamental concern of SDT is to find out which kind of incompatible beliefs regarding one's self induce which kind of emotional vulnerabilities. It attempts to understand the reason why people experiencing the same event produce different negative emotions. For example, in the presence of job loss or failure of an important task, an individual could suffer from depression, while another could struggle with anxiety. SDT proposes that although people could have the same goals and standards, the way that they represent their goals differ and this difference of representation is the source of variance in emotional vulnerabilities (Higgins, 1987).

2.2.1. Self-state Representations and Self-regulation Regarding Ideal and Ought Self-guides

According to SDT, there are three basic domains of self: actual self, ideal self, ought self. Actual self represents the attributes that someone (self or other) believes the person *actually* has. Ideal self stands for the attributes someone (self or other) would like the person *ideally* to have (someone's hopes, aspirations and wishes for the person). Ought self indicates attributes someone believes the person *should* or *ought* to have (the person's duties, obligations) (Strauman and Higgins, 1987).

Other than these basic domains, there are two main standpoints for the self: own standpoint and other's standpoint. A person's own standpoint is the self-state representation perspective that one has for herself. Other's standpoint is the self-state representation perspective one has from the eyes of significant others (e.g., parents, spouse, friends). Considering three different domains and two different perspectives, six different self-representations emerge: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other. Actual/own and actual/other self-representations correspond to the *self-concept*; while other four self-representations reflect one's *self-guides*. Self-guides are the desired end-states or goals that guide one's self-regulation. Individuals constantly compare their self-concept with their self-guides to see how their current self is doing in terms of reaching or exceeding their self guides. When the actual self is lower than the ideal self or ought self, then a negative self-discrepancy emerges. Negative self-discrepancies are assumed to be the cause of different negative emotions and thus these discrepancies motivate individuals to approach their current self to their desired end state of ideal self-guide or ought self-guide in order to reduce the difference and regulate negative emotions. When actual self is equal or higher than ideal or ought self, then individuals experience self-congruency which in turn leads positive emotions like satisfaction, happiness, relief, calmness. (Strauman, 1990; Strauman and Higgins, 1987). According to SDT individuals are motivated to reach desired end state of ideal or ought self-guide but they vary in terms of the type of the self-guide they employ; while some people could use both of self-guides (ideal or ought self guide), some others could use just one of them or none of them. In the literature four self-

discrepancies that were predominantly studied are actual own - ideal own, actual own - ideal other, actual own - ought own, and actual own - ought other (Higgins, 1989):

- Actual own- ideal own discrepancy: This kind of discrepancy stands for a mismatch between the attributes a person thinks that she currently has and the attributes that she ideally would like to have or wishes and hopes to possess.
- Actual own- ought own discrepancy: This kind of discrepancy represents a mismatch between a person's current attributes or state from her point of view and the state or attributes that she thinks she has to attain or have as a duty.
- Actual own- ideal other discrepancy: In this discrepancy, a person's attributes or state from her standpoint do not match with the ideal attributes or state that she thinks significant others hope or wish that she would realize.
- Actual own- ought other discrepancy: In this discrepancy, a person's attributes or state from her standpoint mismatch with the attributes and state that she believes significant others think she should or ought to have or possess.

2.2.2. Sensitivity to Different Psychological States for Ideal and Ought Self-regulation

Desired end states for ideal self-guides are addressed as hopes, wishes and aspirations and they are perceived as the maximal goals to attain. When there is match between actual and ideal self-guide with regard to hopes and aspirations, this situation is represented as the presence of positive outcomes. In the opposite situation, where actual self and ideal-self guide do not match and a self-discrepancy occurs, then the psychological situation that emerges is called as the absence of positive outcomes (Brendl and Higgins, 1996). On the contrary, desired end states for ought self-guides are represented as duties, obligations and responsibilities and they are perceived as the minimum goals and standards that one must attain (Brendl and Higgins, 1996). When there is a mismatch between actual self and ought self-guide, in other words one falls short of standards that she must meet, then this discrepancy to minimal standards represents the psychological situation of the presence of negative outcomes. In the opposite situation when one could fulfill the

duties and obligations that she must fulfill, then this congruency represents the absence of negative outcomes.

According to SDT, in ideal self-regulation individuals become more sensitive to events characterized by the presence and absence of positive outcomes; while in ought self-regulation, sensitivity to events representing the presence and absence of negative outcomes is higher.

To better understand this distinction in sensitivity to particular events with reference to ideal and ought self-regulation, study of Higgins and Tykocinski (1992) could be noted. In this study, few weeks prior to the experiment, subjects' self-discrepancies were measured through Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al, 1985). For the experiment only those who were high in actual-ideal discrepancy but low in actual-ought discrepancy and those who were high in actual-ought discrepancy but low in actual-ideal discrepancy were invited to create two groups (individuals who were lacking in terms of reaching their ideals and those who were lacking in terms of fulfilling their obligations). In the experiment subjects were given an essay about life of a person experiencing different events each of which were representing different types of psychological situations (presence and absence of positive and negative outcomes) (Higgins and Tykocinski, 1992, as cited in Heckhausen and Dweck, 1998:99):

- *The presence of positive outcomes: "I found a 20-dollar bill on the pavement of Canal Street near the paint store."*
- *The absence of positive outcomes: "I've been wanting to see this movie at the 8th Street Theatre for some time, so this evening I went there straight after school to find out that it's not showing anymore."*
- *The presence of negative outcomes: "I was stuck in the subway for 35 minutes with at least 15 sweating passengers breathing down my neck."*
- *The absence of negative outcomes: "This is usually my worst school day. Awful schedule, class after class with no break. But today is election day- no school!"*

After reading the essay, subjects were asked to remember the essay. According to results, subjects who were high in actual-ideal discrepancy (i.e., who failed to reach their ideals) remembered events involving presence and absence of positive outcomes better compared to individuals with predominant actual-ought self-discrepancy (who failed to meet their obligations). Yet, subjects who were high in actual-ought discrepancy remembered events involving the presence and absence of

negative events better than subjects with high actual-ideal discrepancy (Higgins and Tykocinski, 1992).

2.2.3. Self-discrepancies and Emotional Sensitivities

SDT proposes that each self-discrepancy is the indication of a specific negative psychological situation which is associated with a certain negative emotion. In other words, when there is a mismatch between self-concept and self-guides then a particular type of negative emotion arises. Accordingly, there are two main types of negative psychological situations associated with different negative emotions (Roseman, 1984). First situation is the absence of positive outcomes which includes dejection-related emotions like disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness (Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Spindel and Jose, 1990). Second negative psychological situation is the presence of negative outcomes which involves agitation-related emotions like fear, threat, nervousness, and worry (Erikson, 1963). For main self-discrepancies related negative emotions are stated as follows (Higgins, Klein and Strauman, 1985; Higgins, 1987; Strauman, 1989):

- Actual own- ideal own discrepancy: This self-discrepancy emphasizes the absence of the positive outcomes due to non-fulfillment of hopes, aspirations, and increases individuals' vulnerability to dejection related feelings like disappointment and dissatisfaction.
- Actual own- ought own discrepancy: This kind of self-discrepancy underlies the presence of the negative outcomes due to her belief that she violated an internally accepted moral rule. Individuals experiencing this mismatch become vulnerable to agitation-related emotions like guilt, self-contempt, and nervousness.
- Actual own- ideal other discrepancy: This mismatch represents the absence of positive outcomes, which arises because the person believes that she loses her esteem in the perspective of significant others. This discrepancy induce the person to be susceptible to dejection-related emotions like shame, embarrassment and sadness.

- Actual own- ought other discrepancy: This discrepancy emphasizes the presence of negative outcomes because she thinks that she failed to fulfill the duties and obligations that significant others expected her to fulfill. This mismatch leads the person to experience agitation-related feelings like fear, anxiety and threat.

In a study of Higgins and his colleagues (Higgins, Bond, Klein and Strauman, 1986), the impact of self-discrepancies on emotional vulnerabilities were examined. In the study, it was predicted that a perceived negative event (either absence of a positive outcome or presence of a negative outcome) would lead to different negative emotions depending on individuals' predominant self-discrepancy. Few weeks before the experiment, self-discrepancies of participants were measured through Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al, 1985). For their actual self, participants were asked to identify 10 traits they believed they actually had. For their ideal self, they were asked to identify 10 traits they ideally would like to have or in other words attributes representing their hopes for themselves. For ought self, they were asked to state 10 traits they should or ought to have, in other words their duties and obligations. For the calculation of self-discrepancy of individuals, attributes they listed on actual self were compared with the attributes in the ideal and ought self-guides. If both lists have the same attributes it meant a match, if an attribute in actual self list is the opposite of an attribute in a self-guide then it is a mismatch. Magnitude of self-discrepancy was calculated by subtracting total number of matches from total number of mismatches. During the experiment participants were asked to imagine either a positive event or a negative event for four minutes. After imagination task they were given a writing-speed task and at the last stage their feelings were measured with a mood scale. According to the results, the participants with higher actual own - ideal own discrepancy felt more dejection related emotions compared to positive event condition; while the participants with higher actual own - ought own discrepancy felt more agitation related emotions when they imagined a negative event compared to the condition where they imagined a positive event. Results of this study indicated that emotional change caused by a perceived negative event differed according to the dominant self-concept discrepancy of a person.

2.2.4. Availability and Accessibility of Self-discrepancies

As indicated above, a person could have no self-discrepancy, just one of them or a combination of them. If the person has more than one self discrepancy, it does not necessarily mean that all discrepancies are active at the same time or in the same magnitude. Understanding which of the discrepancies an individual has and which of them is active in a given time depends on the accessibility and availability of the self-discrepancies.

The availability of a self-discrepancy (actual - ideal self discrepancy or actual-ought self-discrepancy) is the extent to which attributes of two compared self-representations differentiate from each other. A person, after comparing attributes in his actual self (actual own) and attributes in his self-guide (ideal or ought self), labels each compared attribute as a match or a mismatch. The greater the number of mismatches in a type of self-discrepancy, in other words the greater the difference between two self-representations, then the greater the magnitude of the self-discrepancy and availability of it to the person. As the availability and magnitude of a self-discrepancy increase, the strength of corresponding emotional vulnerability of that particular type of self-discrepancy increases as well (Higgins, 1989).

Accessibility of a self-discrepancy first depends on the recentness of the activation of the self-discrepancy. If a self-discrepancy is activated in a recent time, then the accessibility of it is expected to be higher. Other than recency, frequency of activation of self-discrepancy influences accessibility as well. The more frequently a self-discrepancy is activated, the more the accessible of that particular self-discrepancy. Lastly, accessibility of a self-discrepancy is related with applicability of it to the relevant event. In the presence of a certainly positive event, self-discrepancy will not be used to interpret that event and hence be less accessible (Higgins, 1989). Accordingly, at any given time through manipulation and priming different self-guides (ideal self or ought self) of individuals and associated emotional sensitivities could be made more accessible.

For example, in the study of Higgins et al (1986) subjects were exposed to contextual priming, through which one of their self-discrepancy made more accessible. In the first stage of the study a few weeks before the experiment,

participants' self-discrepancies were measured through Selves Questionnaire. Participants who were high in both ideal and ought self-discrepancy (subjects who felt they fell short of both their ideals and obligations) and participants who were low in both ideal and ought self-discrepancy (subjects who felt they have fulfilled both their ideals and obligations) were invited for the second stage of the experiment. Half of the invited subjects were exposed to ideal priming; such that, they were asked to define attributes that they and their parents would ideally like them to have and the attributes they and their parents hoped and wished for them to have and whether any of these hopes and wishes had altered through years. This ideal priming condition was expected to increase participants' accessibility to their actual-ideal discrepancies. Other half of the invited participants were induced ought priming; such that, they were asked to list attributes they and their parents considered they ought to have as their duty and obligation. They were also asked whether these obligations and duties had changed through the years. This ought priming condition was expected to increase participants' accessibility to their actual-ought discrepancies. Before and after the priming manipulation participants' mood was measured. According to the results, participants who were both high in actual-ideal discrepancy and actual-ought discrepancy felt dejection-related emotions more when they were primed ideal standards but their agitation related feelings increased when they were primed ought standards. However for participants who had low actual-ideal and actual-ought discrepancies neither ideal priming nor ought priming increased emotional discomfort associated with the primed self-discrepancy. This variance between participants who were high in both discrepancies and participants who were low in both discrepancies suggested that priming itself did not increase emotional discomfort by creating self-discrepancies since participants low in both discrepancies did not feel more agitated or dejected. Hence the results of this study show that providing accessibility to different types of self-discrepancies that already exist or making one type of self-concept discrepancy temporarily more accessible can determine which kind of emotional discomfort individuals would experience.

In another study, Strauman (1989) conducted a similar experiment but this time with clinical participants. Participants who were high in both actual-ideal self-discrepancy and actual-ought self-discrepancy were primed either ideal self-guides or

ought self-guides. Participants whose actual-ideal self-discrepancy were made more accessible through activation of ideal self-guide felt sad, disappointed and their speaking speed reduced which was a depression related behavior. However participants whose actual-ought self-discrepancy were made more accessible through activating ought self-guides felt anxious, nervous and talk more quickly which is typical of anxiety related behavior.

In light of the abovementioned studies, it could be proposed that emotional discomfort is influenced by both availability and accessibility of self-discrepancies. The intensity of an emotional discomfort an individual would have is influenced by the magnitude of available types of self-discrepancies; such that, as the magnitude or availability of a self-discrepancy increases, the intensity of emotional discomfort related with that self-discrepancy increases, as well. Also, intensity of an emotional discomfort is influenced by accessibility of available types of self-discrepancies; such that, as the accessibility of a certain type of self-discrepancy increases, intensity of emotional discomfort associated with that self-discrepancy increases, as well.

2.2.5. Relation of Self-Discrepancy with Regulatory Focus

In order to survive, children have to satisfy certain needs through external environment. Two of the fundamental needs are nurturance and security; and children develop and maintain certain kind of relationships with their caretakers to satisfy these needs (Bowlby, 1973 as cited in Higgins, 1998). According to Higgins and Silberman (1998) it is the interaction between children and their caretakers where children learn how to regulate pleasure and pain for fulfillment of nurturance and security needs. According to Regulatory focus theory (RFT), self-regulation with regard to different needs vary according to regulatory focus; such that, nurturance-related regulation entails a promotion focus while security-related regulation includes a prevention focus. In order to understand how children learn to regulate pleasure and pain and develop distinct self-guides and regulatory focus their interactions with their caretakers should be examined.

When parents encourage and reward a child for desired behaviors (e.g. showing affection, hugging and kissing for the good behaviors and encouraging for

dealing with difficulties) but discipline undesired behaviors by removing love and other positive treatments (e.g. taking away the chocolate when the child throws it, stopping the travel when the child starts to cry); this kind of treatment makes the child experience the pleasure of “presence of positive outcomes” (love, rewarding) and the pain of “absence of positive outcomes” (lack of love and rewarding). This emphasizes to the child that what is important is attaining accomplishments, hopes, aspirations and gives a message about the “ideal” behavior in order to meet nurturance needs. This treatment leads the child to develop strong ideal self-guides (Manian, Papadakis, Strauman and Essex, 2006). Since a promotion focus is also about hopes, aspirations and the presence and absence of positive outcomes, ideal self-guide has a promotion focus (Higgins, Shah, Friedman, 1997) and the strength of promotion focus increases with the strength of ideal self-guide (Higgins, 1998). Thus, the regulatory focus in this type of interaction is promotion, which emphasizes a concern for growth, advancement and accomplishment (Keller, 2008).

Oppositely, when parents manage desired behaviors of the child in a prudent style (e.g. taking precautions and guiding safety rules against possible dangers for the well-being of a child, teaching good manners) but criticize or punish the child for undesired behaviors (e.g. yelling at the child or criticizing the child for being irresponsible); this kind of treatment make the child experience the pleasure of “absence of negative outcomes” (lack of punishment) and the pain of “presence of negative outcomes” (punishment). This underlines that the child should be responsible, meet expectations and obey “oughts” of parents to fulfill security needs. This treatment leads the child to develop strong ought self-guides (Manian et al, 2006). Since a prevention focus is also about responsibilities, oughts and the presence and absence of negative outcomes, ought self-guide includes a prevention focus (Higgins et al, 1997) and the strength of prevention focus increases with the strength of ought self-guide (Higgins, 1998). Hence, the regulatory focus in this type of interaction is prevention, which highlights the concern for responsibility, safety, and security (Keller, 2008).

These distinct upbringing styles are the primary determinants of chronic regulatory focus that the child would have as a grown-up. However, an individual

does not necessarily have just one type of regulatory focus; a person could have a chronic promotion focus or a chronic prevention focus or both foci at the same time.

2.3. REGULATORY FOCUS

In SDT, self-discrepancies are considered as stable personality construct and could be primed situationally only if individuals have self-discrepancies already. Yet later studies have shown that it is possible to prime individuals with ideal self-guides or ought self-guides independent of the magnitude of their self-discrepancies (Higgins et al, 1997). Irrespective of whether or not individuals have chronic self-discrepancies, they could be primed to be in a state of ideal self-regulation or a state of ought self-regulation. Hence, although self-discrepancies were deemed as stable and person specific (chronic), self-guides could be primed through chronic accessibility (through stored individual differences) or situationally (through contextual factors). At any given time ideals (hopes and aspirations) or oughts (obligations and responsibilities) of individuals could be activated through priming. Within RFT, it has been proposed that under the difference of ideal self-guides and ought self-guides lies the difference between promotion focus and prevention focus, respectively.

Promotion focus is concerned with hopes, aspirations and accomplishment and thus ideal self-guides have a promotion focus. Yet, prevention focus is concerned with security, protection, responsibilities and thus ought self-guides have a prevention focus.

2.3.1. Self-Regulation in relation to Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus

As previously mentioned, ideal self-guide includes promotion focus. Individuals with promotion focus are concerned with advancement, growth and accomplishment; and desired end-states are represented as ideals, hopes and aspiration. Also salient needs regarding goal attainment is nurturance and nourishment needs for promotion focused people.

Additionally, ought self-guide involves prevention focus. Individuals with prevention focus are concerned with maintaining safety, protection, fulfilling responsibilities; and desired goals are represented as obligations, duties and oughts. Underlying needs during goal attainment is safety and security for prevention focused individuals. Despite these common variables, regulatory focus differs from ideal and ought self-regulation by being more than an individual difference variable (person specific). Although chronic regulatory focus is a stable personality factor, active regulatory focus (promotion or prevention) could change from one situation to another, independent of the individual's chronic regulatory focus (Higgins, 2011:488). Strength of regulatory focus could change from person to person (chronically) and also from situation to situation (momentarily). It is possible to induce promotion or prevention focus by increasing accessibility through manipulation of situational cues.

Previous research (see Higgins, 2011 for a review) has shown that in a given situation accessibility to one of the regulatory foci could be increased by *priming*. Since priming regulatory focus situationally rather than working on chronic inclinations foci provides researchers with more experimental control, in the literature studies mainly employ the inducement of regulatory focus by priming it through exposure to situational cues of prevention or promotion. There are a number of priming or inducement methods to change one's situational regulatory focus; such as, asking a person to think about his/her past/current ideals or responsibilities or imagine previous successes or failures regarding one's hopes/aspirations or duties/obligations, or by describing a task through gain/non-gain or loss/non-loss perspective (Higgins, 1997: 1284-86).

2.3.2. Emotional Sensitivity of Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus

In SDT, when individuals experience ideal self-discrepancies or congruencies they feel dejection-related or cheerful-related emotions; whereas when they experience ought self-discrepancies or congruencies they have feelings of agitation or quiescence (Higgins et al 1986).

Similar to distinct emotional sensitivities of ideal and ought self-regulation, one's regulatory focus has significant impact on what kind of pleasure and pain that he

experiences when he succeeds or fails the goal pursuit. Individuals with high promotion strength (that is, high chronic promotion focus) experience cheerful-related feelings (joy, happiness or satisfaction) when they are successful at promotion related goals (growth, advancement, accomplishment) or ideals and hopes of their own or others; yet, they feel dejection related emotions (sadness, disappointment) when they have failure on these goals and ideals. On the contrary, individuals with high prevention strength feel quiescence-related emotions (calm, relief) when they are successful with prevention related goals (safety, security, responsibilities) or oughts and duties from their own or others perspective; yet, feel agitation-related emotions (anxiety, fear, uneasiness) when they have failure on these goals and oughts (Higgins et al, 1997).

Nevertheless, the impact of promotion focus or prevention focus on generating certain emotions is not constrained to chronic regulatory focus or strength of promotion or prevention focus. In other words, since at any given time one's active regulatory focus could be changed independently of his chronic regulatory focus, it is possible to manipulate which emotions one would feel in success or failure conditions. Through manipulation of momentary situations one could be induced to engage in goal pursuit with a promotion focus or prevention focus at any time. If one's promotion focus is activated through manipulation or he is induced to pursue his goals with a promotion focus, then he would feel cheerful-related emotions when he succeeds but dejection-related emotions when he fails. If an individual is primed with a prevention focus or induced to self-regulate with a prevention focus, then he would feel quiescence-related feelings when he succeeds but agitation-related feelings when he fails. For example, in Roney et al's study (Roney, Higgins, Shah, 1995), individuals' regulatory focus was manipulated through task instructions and feedback through which emotional experiences of individuals were influenced. In study 1, individuals were informed that they would do two tasks. First task, an anagram task, was difficult enough to be solved by all participants so that participants could pass on the second task. There were two alternatives for the second task. The first alternative was a popular funny "wheel fortune game", the second alternative was named as "unvaried repetition task" to give the impression that it was a boring task. Participants were told that although for

the first game they all would get the anagram task, which alternative they would get as the second task depended on some contingencies. For half of the participants contingencies were explained with promotion-framing (positive outcome focus); such that, they were told that if they solved at least 22 of 25 anagrams, they would get the wheel of fortune game, otherwise they would get the unvaried repetition task as the second task. For the other half of the participants, contingencies for the second task was expressed with a prevention focus framing (negative outcome focus); such that, they were told that if they did 4 or more anagrams wrong out of 25 anagrams, they would get the unvaried repetition task, otherwise they would get the wheel of fortune game as the second task. All participants accomplished the first task. When their emotions were measured at the end of the first anagram task, participants induced promotion focus felt more cheerful whereas subjects who were primed with a prevention focus felt more quiescent for successful goal attainment.

Again in the same research paper in study 2, Roney et al manipulated active regulatory focus of individuals through patterns of feedbacks. Subjects were asked to participate just one task, anagram task; yet this time difficulty of anagrams were arranged in a way that at the end of the trials all participants failed the task. For each trial participants were given feedbacks. Half of the participants were induced promotion focus; such that, their feedback was delivered as *“Right, you got that one”*, when they succeeded to solve an anagram and *“You didn’t get that one right”* when they failed to solve an anagram. Other half of the participants were primed with prevention focus; such that, they were given feedback of *“You didn’t miss that one”* for successful attainment and *“No, you missed that one”* for failure. At the end all participants failed the overall task. When their feelings were measured participants who had a promotion focus activation felt more dejected and prevention primed participants felt more agitated after failing at solving anagrams.

In the light of abovementioned studies it is clear that promotion and prevention focus are two distinct systems. Also, since at any time one could be primed to self-regulate with either promotion focus or prevention focus regardless of one’s chronic regulatory focus or predominant self-guides, it is possible to influence what kind of pleasure and pain an individual would feel for goal attainment and failure.

2.3.3. Distinct Strategic Inclinations of Promotion Focus and Prevention Focus

Although RFT agrees with the hedonic principle that people approach pleasure and avoid pain, it suggests different ways and strategies within approaching and avoiding behavior. RFT proposes that since promotion and prevention self-regulation work as two different systems, even though people pursue the same goal they employ different strategies to attain their goals. For example two students one with a promotion focus and the other with a prevention focus desiring to have A from the same course (same desired end-state) are expected to employ different strategies to attain this goal. Accordingly, promotion focused student chooses to study hard enough to go through all the course materials and spending the day before at the library (approaching a state that matches to the desired end-state), whereas the prevention focused student prefers to decline offers to go out for having something to drink the day before the exam (avoiding a state that mismatches to the desired end state) (Higgins, 1997).

RFT suggests that for the same desired or undesired end-states, the strategic inclination of an individual with promotion self-regulation differs from an individual with prevention self-regulation for how to pursue goals. Accordingly, for attainment of a desired end-state, a person with a promotion focus has an inclination to favor the strategy of approaching self-states that match to that desired end-state; while a person with a prevention focus is inclined to choose the strategy of avoiding self-states that mismatched to that desired end-state. With reference to an undesired end-state, a person with a promotion focus has a tendency to single out the strategy of approaching self-states that mismatch to that desired end-state whereas prevention focused person has the tendency to prefer the strategy of avoiding self-states that match to that undesired end-state (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, and Hymes, 1994).

For example, in the study of Higgins et al (1994), students whose chronic regulatory foci were measured beforehand were presented 6 different friendship tactics half of which included strategies of approaching matches and the other of which involved strategies avoiding mismatches. Approaching tactics were (a) *"Be generous and willing to give of yourself"*; (b) *"Be supportive to your friends. Be emotionally supportive"*; and (c) *"Be loving and attentive."* while avoiding tactics

were (a) *"Stay in touch. Don't lose contact with friends"*; (b) *"Try to make time for your friends and not neglect them"*; and (c) *"Keep the secrets friends have told you and don't gossip about friends."* (Higgins et al, 1994: 283).

When participants were asked which friendship tactics they preferred, participants with predominant promotion focus favored approaching tactics of friendship more compared to participants with chronic prevention focus. Also, prevention focused participants chose avoiding tactics more compared to promotion focused participants.

Higgins et al (1994) examined the distinctiveness of regulatory strategies also through manipulating regulatory focus of individuals in order to demonstrate that preferred strategies were not constrained to personality. For the manipulation of regulatory focus individuals in promotion activation were asked to write down their current hopes and goals and also state how their current hopes were different from the ones they had had when they were younger. Individuals in prevention activation were asked to write down their current duties and obligations and also state how their current duties and obligations were different from the ones they had had when they were growing. After the activation, participants were given 16 different episodes representing 4 days of a person. Each day included 4 different episodes each of which related to either desired end-state or an undesired end-state. For reaching desired end-states the person was using either a strategy of approaching matches to that desired end-state or a strategy of avoiding mismatches to that desired end-state. For undesired end-states the person was employing either a strategy of approaching mismatches to that undesired end-state or a strategy of avoiding matches to that undesired end-states. Episodes from one day of the individual are as follows (Higgins et al, 1994: 281):

1. *Approaching matches to desired end states: "Because I wanted to be at school for the beginning of my 8:30 psychology class which is usually excellent, I woke up early this morning."*
2. *Avoiding mismatches to desired end states: "I wanted to take a class in photography at the community center, so I didn't register for a class in Spanish that was scheduled at the same time."*
3. *Approaching mismatches to undesired end states: "I dislike eating in crowded places, so at noon I picked up a sandwich from a local deli and ate outside."*

4. Avoiding matches to undesired end states: "I didn't want to feel tired during my very long morning of classes, so I skipped the most strenuous part of my morning workout."

After reading the episodes participants were asked to remember episodes as accurately as possible and write them down. According to results, individuals who were induced promotion focus recalled episodes with approaching strategies better compared to episodes with avoiding strategies; whereas participants who were primed with prevention focus were better at remembering episodes with avoiding strategies than remembering episodes with approaching strategies.

In the light of these studies it is clear that for self-regulation in a promotion focus the predominant strategy for goal pursuit is to use approaching strategies while for self-regulation in a prevention mode the predominant goal pursuit strategy is avoidance strategies.

Crowe and Higgins (1997) examined further the distinct strategic inclinations of different regulatory modes by employing premise of signal detection theory (Tanner and Swets, 1954). The natural tendency of promotion focus to employ approaching strategies to make progress towards desired end-states motivates the person to be in an eagerness state. A promotion focus makes the person to be eager to attain accomplishment and gains. On the contrary, the predominant avoidance strategy of prevention focus to be prudent and precautionary against mismatches to desired end-states puts the person in a vigilance state. A prevention focus makes the person to be vigilant to guarantee security and nonlosses. Taking into consideration these previously evidenced principles of regulatory focus, Crowe and Higgins proposed that the eagerness state of promotion focus leads individuals to attain “hits” and avoid “misses” (failure to realize a hit) while the vigilance state of prevention focus directs individuals to realize correct rejections and avoid making mistakes (errors of commission). By using these terms of signal detection theory the strategic inclination of promotion focus is to insure hits and insure errors of omission while for prevention focus it is to insure correct rejections and insure against errors of commission.

2.3.4. Regulatory Focus Goal Fulfillment (Regulatory Closure)

An important but very recent distinction between promotion and prevention focus self-regulation is related to the motivational consequences of goal fulfillment or in other words regulatory closure. Regulatory closure occurs when goals (either promotion or prevention related goals) are successfully pursued and satisfied. The opposite of the goals successfully achieved are the goals actively pursued but not fulfilled. Fulfilled and unfulfilled goals in relation to promotion and prevention focus result in different activation levels, which consequently influences further motivation. Accordingly; when a promotion goal or a prevention goal is unfulfilled then this goal keeps pending to be satisfied (Förster, Liberman, and Higgins, 2005). In other words, *unfulfilled goals remain activated and motivation to goal fulfillment is maintained* (Baas et al, 2011: 796). Unfulfilled goals give the message that goals are not realized yet so that greater effort, energy and activation are required to complete unfinished goals. Accordingly, for promotion focused people if related goal or need (e.g. advancement, growth, nurturance) is not satisfied then this goal or need is still pending to be achieved and individuals are still activated and show effort to satisfy this goal. Similarly for prevention focused people if related goal or need (e.g. obligation, safety, security) is not satisfied, again this goal or need remains activated and individuals are still activated and motivated for further attainment of this goal. However, after fulfillment of goals (regulatory closure) activation states differ for promotion and prevention focus. Since promotion focus is concerned with attaining desired end-states, after achieving a goal, the individual continues to pursue new goals and keep his activation and persistence to reach more desired end-states (Förster, Higgins and Idson, 1998, 2001; Idson and Higgins, 2000). On the contrary, since prevention focus is concerned with avoiding from negative states, when individual attains this goal or successfully avoid from negative outcomes then the individual feeling relieved becomes deactivated and detached. Relief conveys that the individual has met the minimal goals related to the obligations or provided the required security so that there is no need for activation, energy or effort for further goal pursuit. Hence after successful fulfillment of prevention goals relevant needs and goals become less relevant and engaging (Carver, 2004). This distinction

between promotion and prevention focus was examined in study of Baas et al (2011). In the study, regulatory focus of individuals were manipulated by using a maze task where individuals are asked to help a mouse find the way out of a maze and there is either a cheese at the end (activates nurturance needs promotion focus condition) or an owl hovering over the maze ready to eat the mouse (activates security need prevention focus condition) (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Wan, Hong and Sternthal; 2009; Gino and Margolis, 2011). There were 4 different conditions: 2 (fulfilling of goals vs not fulfilling of goals) x 2 (promotion focus vs. prevention focus). For fulfillment of promotion or prevention goals, individuals finished the maze task in computer and attained the goal successfully. For those in unfulfilled goals condition, when individuals were solving the maze task in the computer, the maze task got frozen and a message appeared in the screen stating that due to technical problems they would continue the maze task later. Not finishing the maze task caused promotion and prevention goals to be unfulfilled and remain activated. According to results, for those who could not finish the maze task due to technical problems activation level for promotion and prevention focus statistically were not different. In other words, both promotion and prevention focused people remained motivated and activated for further goal attainment and their goals and needs were still pending for fulfillment. Yet, those who finished the maze task, activation levels differed. Accordingly activation level of promotion focused people was significantly higher than activation level of prevention focused people. This result indicates that although promotion focused people kept enhanced effort and energy for further and new desired end-states after successful achievement of goals, prevention focused people became deactivated and disengaged for further goals since once they achieved the state of security and fulfilled necessities they were relieved and less motivated (Baas et al, 2011).

2.4. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON REGULATORY FOCUS

2.4.1 Regulatory Focus in Social Psychology Literature

In social psychology and organizational behavior literature, RFT was employed to explain different constructs. For example, regulatory focus was found to be associated with creativity in study of Friedman and Förster (2001). Authors theorized that tendency of promotion focus to employ exploratory and riskier ways of cognitive processing would increase performance on creativity and memory based tasks relative to prevention focus associated with more risk averse cognitive processing. Their hypotheses were supported such that individuals with both primed and chronic promotion focus showed higher performance on tasks like visual insight, recognition-memory, and generation of creative solutions compared to individuals with both primed and chronic prevention focus.

In another study Crowe and Higgins (1997) examined the impact of regulatory focus on task performance when individuals experienced difficulty and regulatory focus has been found to be associated with motivation to persist on tasks. The study found that regulatory focus of an individual could explain the persistence on a task and readiness to quit after a difficult task or a failure on the task. In the study, when participants came to the experiment, they were given instructions and contingencies about which study they would take as the final task depending on their performance. By framing contingencies in relation to either promotion focus (positive outcome focus) or prevention focus (negative outcome focus), individuals' regulatory focus was manipulated. Following the regulatory focus manipulation individuals performed 5 different tasks (characteristic listing, counting backwards, sorting, embedded figures, and anagrams). According to the results; individuals primed with prevention focus found fewer solutions in the anagram task after failing on an unsolvable diagram, performed less fluently during difficult sequences of counting backwards task and quit more readily in difficult embedded figures than promotion focus induced individuals. A similar result was found in the study of Roney et al (1995). Individuals given the task instructions with a prevention focus spent one third less time on unsolvable anagrams and demonstrated less persistence

compared to individuals who were induced promotion focus. Also, within the same study in another session, regulatory focus of individuals was manipulated by giving promotion or prevention focus framed feedback. Similarly, individuals who had prevention focus induced feedback quitted 19% of the unsolvable anagrams before the time was up, whereas those who had promotion focus induced feedback quitted only 4% of the unsolvable diagrams before the time limit. These results indicate that the eagerness of promotion focus leads individuals to be persistent on difficult tasks to accomplish as much hits (gains) as possible while vigilance of prevention focus causes individuals to be cautious against making mistakes and insure against any possible losses and hence quit readily in the presence of failing probability.

This underlying mechanism of regulatory focus on motivational persistence influences individuals' idea and alternative generation as well. For example in Crowe and Higgins's (1997) study in a sorting task where participants were asked to categorize 12 fruits and 12 vegetables separately into subgroups with different criteria or dimensions, regulatory focus had a significant impact on number of subgroups generated. Individuals who were induced promotion focus were more likely to generate different subcategories across fruits and vegetables while prevention focus induced individuals tended to repeat the same categories across fruits and vegetables and simplify the categorization criteria (like green vegetables, not green vegetables). The inclination of prevention focus to generating less alternatives and less complex ideas were examined by Liberman, Molden, Idson and Higgins (2001) and they found that individuals with both predominant promotion focus and induced promotion focus generated more hypotheses than individuals with both chronic prevention focus and induced prevention focus. These studies indicate that promotion focused individuals' inclination to generate more ideas and alternatives arise from their desire to make as much as possible and avoid missing any potential gain (hit). Yet, since generating more alternatives increase the possibility of generating a wrong alternative or hypothesis, prevention focused individuals' desire to avoid making a mistake (generating a wrong alternative or hypothesis) leads them to produce less ideas and alternatives.

In another study, regulatory focus was associated with how one feels and behaves toward ingroup and outgroup members (Shah, Brazy and Higgins, 2004).

Although both promotion and prevention focus tended to have ingroup bias, the way of showing it differentiated considerably according to regulatory mode. Through different experiments, individuals with promotion focus either primed or chronic were found to express their ingroup bias by approaching their ingroup members behaviorally and showing more cheerful emotions to ingroup members. On the other hand, prevention focused individuals, either situationally or chronically, expressed their ingroup bias through avoiding outgroup members and showing more emotions of agitation toward outgroup members. As an interesting example, in one of the experiments in Shah et al's study, ingroup and outgroup bias were measured as the distance one preferred to put between his/her chair and other group members' chairs. While one's promotion focus was found to predict how close s/he sat to ingroup members (teammate), one's prevention focus was found to be a predictor of how far s/he preferred to sit from outgroup members (competitors). Hence, promotion focus individuals were found to be more willing to recognize ingroup members, exhibit approaching behaviors to ingroup members; hence, demonstrate positive forms of ingroup bias (*promote us*). On the other hand prevention focused individuals preferred avoiding outgroup members thus showing negative form of ingroup bias (prevent them) (Shah, Brazy and Higgins, 2004).

2.4.2. Regulatory Focus in Organizational Behavior / Psychology Literature

In organizational behavior literature, regulatory focus has been examined in relation to different variables like job values, organizational commitment, job satisfaction, productivity and organizational citizenship behavior etc.. For example, individuals with chronic promotion focus were found to put more emphasis on job values of taking responsibility, holding power, working independently, adding something from oneself and doing challenging tasks; whereas, prevention focused individuals cared more about having job security, establishing good relationships with colleagues, and having beneficial work experiences (Sassenberg and Scholl, 2013).


Regulatory focus was analyzed within job demands-resources model as well (Brenninkmeijer, Demerouti, le Blanc and Hetty van Emmerik, 2010). In the study,

having salient growth (promotion related) or security (prevention related) needs were proposed to moderate the influence of job resources and demands on organization related outcomes. Accordingly, individuals with high prevention focus were proposed to be more susceptible to negative effects of job demands. Since prevention focus people are more sensitive about negative outcomes and have a strategic inclination of avoiding failures and mistakes, in the presence of heavy work load and additional obligations they may spend much more resources to be vigilant and careful about the failures, which consequently causes them to experience negative feelings like emotional exhaustion in the long term. According to the survey results, individuals with predominant prevention focus were found to be experiencing more emotional exhaustion in the presence of job demands like workload and interpersonal conflict. Furthermore, promotion focused people were proposed to be more reactive to job resources. Since individuals with promotion focus are more concerned with growth and making progress, they are sensitive to factors that may facilitate their advancement and accomplishment. Thus individuals high in promotion focus people were suggested to respond job resources like autonomy and support from colleagues by developing work engagement, affective commitment and job satisfaction.

Regulatory focus theory was examined in scope of leadership studies as well. In study of Kark and Van Dijk (2007) a conceptual framework combining regulatory focus theory and transformational and transactional leadership theories was proposed. In this framework leadership style is attributed to the both chronic and situational regulatory focus of leaders; such that, leaders with values of openness to change, self-direction and stimulation are expected to have chronic promotion focus and strong ideal self-guides, whereas leaders with values of conservation, safety, conformity and tradition are expected to have prevention focus and strong ought self-guides. In terms of situational regulatory focus; dynamic, change oriented, organic organizations are proposed to induce leaders with situational promotion focus, while mechanistic, stable and bureaucratic organizations prime leaders situationally with prevention focus. Also promotion focused leaders are proposed to have motivation to lead due to the enjoyment they take from leading while prevention focused leaders are proposed to be motivated to lead due to complying with social norms or external motives like social responsibility, obligations etc. Lastly, promotion focused leaders

are suggested to have charismatic transformational leadership style due to their openness to change, pursuit of ideals and aspirations, which ultimately induces followers to have promotion focus. On the contrary, prevention focused leaders are argued to have monitoring transactional leadership style due to their concern for fulfilling duties and obligations and maintaining status quo and routines, which consequently induces followers to have prevention focus. These proposed relationships and mechanisms are depicted in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Leaders' Motivation to Lead as Mediating Among Leaders' Regulatory Focus, Values, and Leadership Behavior



Source: Kark and Van Dijk, 2007: 504

Although most proposed relationships among constructs in the theoretical framework in Figure 3 have not been empirically examined yet, a study by Hamstra, Van Yperen, Wisse, and Sassenberg (2015) provided empirical support for the relationship between leadership style and regulatory focus of followers. Accordingly,

transformational leadership style emphasizing ideals and high expectations for advancement and growth was proposed to stimulate followers to perform in a promotion focused fashion and produce a fit for individuals with predominant promotion focus self-regulation. On the contrary, transactional leadership style emphasizing rules, duties and accurate fulfillment of responsibilities was predicted to induce followers to work in a prevention focus and thus elicit a fit for individuals with high prevention focus. Also, the mentioned fit between leadership style and followers' regulatory focus was suggested to decrease turnover intentions of followers. These predictions were supported empirically and as a consequence, designing leadership behaviors according to regulatory focus of followers to create a fit have been recommended in order to sustain workforce retention and organizational effectiveness.

Other than abovementioned studies regulatory focus has been investigated in relation to different organizationally relevant outcomes. For example, promotion focused individuals were found to have higher affective commitment relative to prevention focus and prevention focus individuals were found to be higher in continuance commitment compared to promotion focused counterparts (Markovits, Ullrich, Van Dick, and Davis, 2008; Lanaj, Chang and Johnson, 2012, Meyer and Becker and Vandenberghe, 2004; Van-Dijk and Kluger, 2004). Promotion focused individuals were found more affectively committed since their motivation is driven by internal forces and ideals and because of this internal motivation is inner directed and independent of external forces. On the contrary, prevention focused individuals are driven by the need of fulfilling necessities, obligations and duties, their motivation is depended on external sources that is why they are more sensitive to social pressures regarding satisfying obligations. Other than having more affective commitment, individuals with chronic promotion focus were also found to have higher organizational citizenship behavior (De Cremer, Mayer, Dijke, Schouten, and Bardes, 2009; Wallace, Johnson, Frazier, 2009), higher job satisfaction (Brockner and Higgins, 2001; Pierro, Cicero, and Higgins, 2009) and work engagement (Lanaj et al, 2012). In terms of task performance while prevention focus was found to be positively associated with safety performance (Wallace and Chen, 2006) due to their concern for safety and inclination to avoid from mistakes, errors and losses,

promotion focused individuals were found to have higher innovative performance due to their tendency for being risk tolerant, and persistent on difficult tasks (Crowe and Higgins, 1997).

Lastly, prevention focus was found to be positively associated with counterproductive work behavior (CWB) (Lanaj et al, 2012). Although underlying reason for this relationship is not confirmed empirically, two main reasons are suggested. The first one is the tendency of prevention focus to experience agitation related emotions in the presence of negative outcomes or failures. Since agitation related feelings (anxiety, tension, fear, etc.) are considered as a primary cause of CWB (Douglas and Martinko, 2001; Fox, Spector, and Miles, 2001; Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, and Haynes, 2009), the emotional sensitivity of prevention focus could be the reason for its tendency to CWB. The second reason could be self-regulatory resource depletion. Constant scrutinizing and vigilance towards possible mistakes and errors could probably deplete self-resources of prevention focused individuals more rapidly, thus leading them to be susceptible to probable loss of self-control, which is seen as another cause of CWB (Christian and Ellis, 2011). As seen from this brief literature review, regulatory focus was associated with a wide range of constructs; yet, there is little research examining the causal influence of regulatory focus on interpersonal trust among strangers taking into account regulatory closure. The following section further reviews the relevant literature on regulatory focus to develop testable hypotheses for the influence of regulatory foci on trust among strangers.

2.5. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATORY FOCUS AND TRUST

Association between regulatory focus and trust has drawn little attention (see Keller et al, 2015 for an exception), and existing research has some limitations as mentioned in previous chapters. On the other hand, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect a causal association of regulatory focus and regulatory closure with trust. A study by Das and Kumar (2011:705) studied underlying motivations for interfirm alliance from a regulatory focus perspective. Although not examined directly, authors proposed regulatory focus as a determinant of trusting behavior of

allied firms. For example; compared to prevention focused ones, promotion focused companies are suggested to tolerate opportunistic behavior in an alliance more, enhance commitment faster to the partner firm and be more willing to share sensitive information with the allied firm, thus indicating a higher trust. Although trust is treated as an organizational level construct in the mentioned study, its conclusions still provide guidance for the direction of relationship between regulatory focus and trust at individual level.

Apart from this insight, different strategic inclinations during goal pursuit for each regulatory mode suggest implications for trust. Using signal detection theory, a) “*hit*” is recognizing that signal is present b) “*miss*” is failing to recognize that signal is present c) “*false alarm*” is failing to recognize that signal is not present d) “*correct rejection*” is recognizing that signal is not present. For promotion focused people in an “eagerness” state, the goal is to reach gains or with terms of signal detection theory, to maximize situations of “hits” and minimize situations of “misses”. This inclination to insure hits and insure against misses (failing to recognize a hit/gain) of promotion focused people causes them to have a risky bias (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). Risky bias suggests that when there is a possibility of a miss, in other words failing to recognize a hit, promotion focused people have a tendency to favor alternatives that might be wrong over omitting an alternative that might be correct in order to insure realizing as many gains as possible and in order not to miss a chance of being correct. For example, in recognition memory, individuals were shown 20 nonwords to keep in their minds. Afterwards they were showed 40 nonwords half of which were previously shown nonwords and the other half were new nonwords. When participants were asked to remember which of 40 nonwords they had seen before, promotion focused people tended to recognize new nonwords as they had seen before. This means that promotion focused people were more likely to say yes to memory question in order to increase number of hits (gains) and minimize number of misses. This inclination to overestimate number of previously shown nonwords caused promotion focused people to have risky response bias. On the contrary, for prevention focused people who are in a “vigilance” state, the goal is to ensure non-loss, in other words to guarantee situations of “correct rejections” and minimize situations of “false alarms”. This tendency to insure correct rejections and insure

against errors of commissions (failing to avoid a false alarm) of prevention focused people causes them to have a conservative bias. Conservative bias indicates that when there is a possibility of making a mistake, prevention focused people have a tendency to reject alternatives that might be correct over accepting an alternative that might be wrong in order to insure non-losses and avoid possible mistakes (Crowe and Higgins, 1997: 130). Again, in recognition memory, prevention focused people were more likely to saying “no” to memory question in order to avoid making mistakes (false alarms) and behaving in a conservative way to guarantee correct rejections. This inclination to underestimate number of previously shown nonwords caused prevention focused people to have conservative response bias. These strategic inclinations impact risk attitudes and behaviors such that promotion focused people are prone to be risk tolerant (Molden and Higgins, 2004), engage in risky behaviors more (Gino and Margolis, 2011: 151; Hamstra, Bolderdijk, Veldstra, 2011:136) while prevention focused people tend to be more risk averse and act more conservative regarding risky behaviors (Gino and Margolis, 2011: 151; Hamstra et al, 2011:136). Since risk is a primary component of trust (Schlenker, Helm, and Tedeschi 1973, 419; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995) and furthermore *trust and risk are regarded as mirror images of each other* (Das and Teng 2004), promotion focused people are more willing to take risk and thus should trust to a higher degree compared to prevention focused people in general.

In addition to differences in risk tendencies of the two regulatory modes, differences in valence and intensity of gains and losses between two kinds of regulatory focus may influence trust behavior. First of all, in the light of regulatory focus theory, in case of a positive consequence, people feel gain more intensely than they feel nonloss. Yet when it is about a negative result, then people sense loss more strongly than nongain (Idson, Liberman and Higgins, 2000). Secondly since promotion focused people are motivated by positive outcomes and more sensitive about what they might gain rather than lose (Idson et al., 2000; Idson et al, 2004), when confronted with trusting decision they would concentrate on what they could gain by trusting others and what might be possible positive outcomes. Also, when taken into account the fact that promotion focused people predict pleasure of positive outcomes more strongly but pain of negative outcome as less intense compared to

prevention focus ones (Idson et al, 2004); they could concentrate on positive consequences and related pleasure of trusting behavior and it might seem more rewarding and pleasing for promotion focused people to trust others and gain more. For prevention focused people it is vice versa. Since prevention focused people are motivated by negative outcomes and think more about what they might lose (Idson et al., 2000; Idson, Liberman, Higgins, 2004), in case of a trusting decision they could give attention to possible negative consequences and possible losses that might arise by trusting others. Also, since prevention focused people imagine pain of possible negative outcomes more strongly but pleasure of possible positive outcomes less strongly compared to promotion focused individuals (Idson et al, 2004), when trusting someone they might consider more about negative results and miscalculate the pain of loss as being more intense than it should be; thus become less willing to trust others.

Furthermore, in literature low trusting behavior was explained by different motivations two of which are betrayal aversion and safety concerns. Betrayal aversion stems from the desire to avoid from betrayal costs. Betrayal costs are perceived to be higher than monetary costs and emerge when there is the possibility that trustor could be betrayed by the trustee and thus feel deceived and silly (Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2009: 266). Since prevention focused people are more concerned about their social status (Gu, Bohns and Leonardelli, 2013), being betrayed and appearing silly would hurt them more compared to promotion focused people. Prevention focused people thus should have more sensitivity regarding betrayal and prone to show less trusting behavior not to experience such a pain.

Other underlying motivation for showing less trust is the underlying needs of safety. Axelrod (2004) proposed that low trusters' desire for safety causes them to be risk averse which makes them less willing to trust. In the same vein, prevention focused people have similar need for safety and security and thus tend to be more risk averse to insure against any potential loss. Hence, people with a prevention focus are expected to show less trusting behavior.

In the view of abovementioned studies, it is predicted that through inducement of prevention focus, security and safety needs and conservative bias inclinations could be made salient, thus people primed with prevention focus could

be less willing to trust and show less trusting behavior compared to promotion focused people.

Previous research has shown that exposure to situational cues of prevention or promotion in a completely unrelated domain influenced people's a variety of behaviors in subsequent domains such as decision making, problem solving and creative thinking (Higgins, 1998: 27; Friedman and Förster, 2001: 1001). Accordingly; based on the above arguments the activation of a prevention focus emphasizing security and safety needs and a state of vigilance through an independent task in an unrelated domain is expected to lead to less trust in a stranger in a subsequent decision making task, relative to the activation of a promotion focus involving nurturance and growth needs. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this thesis is as follows:

H1: Manipulation of regulatory focus will influence trusting decision in a subsequent unrelated domain such that individuals primed with a prevention focus will show less trust in their interactions with a stranger than will individuals primed with a promotion focus.

Previous research suggests that induced (primed) psychological states in one domain would influence individuals' behavior in subsequent domains. For instance, exposure to short video clips with positive or negative emotional valence was found to influence subjects' subsequent behaviors in various unrelated domains including risky decision making (Mohanty and Suar, 2014; Laborde and Raab, 2013), trust (Lount, 2010), and creativity (Hirt, Devers and McCrea, 2008). Further, a recent study (Ainsworth, Baumeister, Ariely and Vohs, 2014) induced in subjects' psychological state of "ego depletion" through an independent task and examined the influence of ego depletion on trust in a subsequent trust game. The authors found a negative association of ego depletion with trust.

It remains an interesting, yet untested, possibility that inducing the satisfaction of prevention needs in an independent domain; in other words bringing people into a state of psychological safety and security may have positive carry over effects on people's trust behavior in their subsequent social interactions. As we know from a study on regulatory closure (Baas et al., 2011), satisfaction of promotion and

prevention related goals and needs have different consequences with regard to motivation for further goal pursuit. While activation and motivation level of promotion focused individuals continue even after the fulfillment of goals, individuals with a prevention focus get deactivated and their activation and motivation level to satisfy their security needs in subsequent domains decrease right after the fulfillment of prevention goals. When an individual in prevention focus satisfies his goal of safety and security then his activation and awareness level regarding this goal decreases and his safety and security needs become less relevant and significant in subsequent domains. To be more precise, when prevention focused individuals feel that their need of safety and security is satisfied, then their concern for safety and security should decrease and they should feel safe and secure in subsequent domains.

Thus, the present thesis argues that inducing the satisfaction of salient psychological safety and security needs (fulfilling prevention related goals) in an unrelated domain may increase trust among people with a prevention focus whose security and safety needs are salient (those who actively pursue prevention goals but not fulfilled). Because in the context of trust security and safety needs against the risks of betrayal and exploitation are more relevant, I argue that primarily the satisfaction of these needs in an unrelated domain should have positive influence on trust. However for promotion focused people activation level does not vary significantly according to whether goals are successfully fulfilled or pursued but not fulfilled. Because of that reason when a promotion focused individual satisfies related goals of nurturance, growth and accomplishment his activation and motivation in subsequent domains of goal pursuit stay almost the same as the situation where he pursues the same goal but does not achieve it. In other words, promotion focused people put the same level of emphasis on nurturance and growth even after they fulfilled related goals. For that reason I expect very little difference between trusting level of those whose nurturance needs are salient (those actively pursue but do not fulfill promotion goals) and trust level of those whose salient nurturance needs are satisfied (those fulfill promotion goals). However, in an exploratory fashion the present thesis still investigates the influence of the satisfaction of salient promotion needs on trust in a subsequent social interaction.

In the light of these explanations, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H₂: Satisfaction of security and safety needs of prevention focus primed individuals will increase trusting behavior compared to those whose security and safety needs are made salient but not fulfilled.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this chapter, design measurements and experimental procedures employed in the study have been presented. Following that, results of the hypothesis testing, interpretations and implications of results, limitations and suggestions for future studies have been explained.

3.1. PARTICIPANTS

Participants were selected from students of Dokuz Eylül University Faculty of Business. 156 students participated in the study. 10 students were excluded from further analysis due to incomplete data or failure to understand the instructions. Thus, analyses were performed on a sample of 146 participants who were native speakers of Turkish (55% female). Participants received course credit for their participation. Gender did not have any main or interaction effects and therefore, was not included in the final statistical analyses.

3.2. INSTRUMENTS

3.2.1. Regulatory Focus Manipulation

For regulatory focus manipulation a maze task developed by Friedman and Förster (2001:1003) was employed. It has been used successfully for regulatory focus manipulation in previous studies (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Wan, Hong and Sternthal; 2009; Gino and Margolis, 2011). Previous research (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Gino and Margolis, 2011) suggested that this task can effectively be used to incidentally induce regulatory focus independently of actual domains where outcome variables are measured. In the original version of the maze task for promotion focus manipulation, a mouse trapped in the middle of a maze and a cheese at the exit of the maze are depicted. Also there is a hole over a wall across the exit of the maze. This

maze represents the goal of making progress and advancing towards cheese (food) and activates nurturance needs semantically. For prevention focus manipulation, a mouse trapped in the middle of a maze and a hole on the wall are depicted, but this time instead of cheese an owl is cartooned flying over the maze, presumably aiming to catch the mouse. This maze implies the necessity of being cautious about the danger of the owl, and thus activates the needs for security and safety semantically. Participants in both conditions are given the same explicit goal of helping the mouse find the way through the maze. This task was also a suitable manipulation instrument to test the hypotheses of this thesis as it allowed to make the promotion and prevention related needs salient and then also to enable to satisfy these needs within the same task. In other words, while cognitive processing of cheese or owl depictions would activate nurturance or security needs, solving these mazes would symbolize satisfaction of correspondent needs by helping mouse reach desired end state of nurturance or security.

Hence, to test the hypotheses of the present thesis 4 experimental conditions concerning regulatory focus were employed: 1) promotion need satisfaction (promotion closure; reaching desired end state of nurturance), 2) prevention need satisfaction (prevention closure; reaching desired end state of security), 3) promotion need (nurturance) activation but no closure, 4) prevention need (security) activation but no closure. Only in the 1st and 2nd conditions participants were instructed to solve the maze, which presumably would enable the satisfaction of promotion and prevention related needs.

In the original version of the maze task (Friedman and Forster, 2001), subjects are not given explicit information concerning the owl and the cheese in the task. A pilot study was conducted to test if the original maze task would work in the same way as in the research of Friedman and Förster (2001). To check if subjects could complete the maze without any problem and paid attention to the owl and the cheese which would activate prevention and promotion focus, the original maze task was given to an independent sample of students (n=17). As in the original task students were told that the task aimed to investigate problem solving skills under time pressure. Almost all students were able to complete the maze in less than 4 minutes. However, almost half of the students (n=7) reported that they had not paid

attention to the owl (in prevention condition) or cheese (promotion condition). Specifically, some participants responded that they did not see the owl or cheese, some stated that they felt under pressure of being tested and thus only cared about completing the maze, or that they did not know that owls would eat mouse. It was clear that there were cultural differences in Turkish students' judgment of the maze task, since in Friedman and Förster's study there were no explicit explanations regarding owl or cheese but participants still cognitively comprehended the nurturance and security cues. After correspondence with Wan (Wan et al, 2009), who employed the maze task in an Asian culture (Hong Kong) successfully, their way of explanation for the maze task was used. Accordingly, participants were told that the task aimed to understand how they viewed events. In this version the task was untimed and there was a reference to owl and cheese in written instructions. However, consistent with the original research, participants were not given explicit goals related to attaining the cheese or escaping the owl. For the conditions 1 and 2 (nurturance or security needs satisfaction, respectively) the written instructions were as follows:

- For promotion focus:

Imagine you are the mouse in the picture. There is a delicious cheese outside the maze. As a mouse what emotions would you feel? Please express your feelings.

Now using a pen help the mouse find his way through the maze.

- For prevention focus:

Imagine that you are the mouse in the picture. There is a hungry owl flying over the maze. As a mouse what emotions would you feel? Please express your feelings.

Now using a pen help the mouse find his way through the maze.

For condition 3 and 4 (nurturance or security needs activated but not satisfied, respectively) the written instructions were as follows:

- For promotion focus:

Imagine you are the mouse in the picture. There is a delicious cheese outside the maze. As a mouse what emotions would you feel? Please only express your feelings.

- For prevention focus:

Imagine that you are the mouse in the picture. There is a hungry owl flying over the maze. As a mouse what emotions would you feel? Please only express your feelings.

3.2.2. The Measurement of Trust

For the measurement of trusting behavior, the trust game (Berg et al, 1995) was employed. The rules and instructions about trust game that were explained in Chapter 1 were introduced through a power point presentation with an embedded audio recorded to make sure that all participants were informed in a standardized way. All participants were asked to imagine that they were senders during the game and were matched with a person (receiver) they did not know or would not knowingly meet in the future. They were also asked to imagine that both the sender (the participant) and the receiver (other person) were given 15 TL for the game. All participants were provided with various examples to make sure they understood the rules of the trust game. For their trust decision, participants were given sheets where they were asked how much money they would like to send as the sender, and chose among binary variables with a range between 0 TL to 15 TL.

3.2.3. Control Measures

In order to rule out alternative explanations concerning the effect of the maze task, consistent with prior research (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Gino and Margolis, 2011) mood and ego depletion were measured after the maze task. Mood was measured with 10 items (happy, cheerful, content, nervous, jittery, gloomy, irritated, fed up, sad, calm) obtained from two scales which were Brief Mood Introspection Scale (Mayer and Gaschke, 1988) and mood measure (Fairbairn and Sayette, 2013). Ego depletion was measured with 6 items from Self Control Capacity Scale (Ciarocco, Twenge, Muraven and Tice, 2004). Also for conditions 1 and 2 in which

maze tasks were completed ego depletion was measured with two more questions where participants were asked to rate difficulty of the maze task (1=not difficult at all, 7= very difficult) and the extent to which the maze task required cognitive effort (1=it does not require at all, 7=it requires very much).

Ego depletion items (6 items from Self Control Capacity Scale) were put into a factor analysis with oblique rotation and principle axes factoring. Scree plot suggested the existence of one factor with a total variance of 47% (Cronbach's $\alpha = .839$).

For mood items another factor analysis with oblique rotation and principle axis factoring was run. Scree plot suggested the existence of three factors with a total variance of 58%. The first factor was labeled as negative mood due to higher loadings of nervous, jittery, gloomy, irritated, fed up, sad items. This factor explained 40% of the variance ($\alpha = .856$). The second factor was labeled as positive mood because of the high loadings of happy, cheerful, content items. This factor explained 11% of variance ($\alpha = .801$). An item ("Feeling Calm") did not load on any of the two factors and thus, was treated as a separate factor in further analyses.

3.3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

Experiments were held in groups of 20 to 35 participants in a large classroom. In all sessions, the same experimenter conducted the study. Participants were told that they would participate in two different studies that belonged to two different research assistants. After a general introduction, instructions about both the maze task (labeled as the first study) and trust game (labeled as second study) were given through a Power Point presentation with an audio recording embedded to make sure that all participants were informed in a standardized way.

For the first task, participants were told that the aim of the study was to examine participants' viewpoints on events. For the second task (trust game) the aim of the study was expressed as an examination of people's economic decisions and interactions.

After the presentation of instructions ended, students were distributed paper files in which there was a maze task, the mood scale, the ego depletion scale, and

for conditions 1 and 2 questions measuring the difficulty and cognitive effort of the maze task. Students were required first to work on the maze task, and subsequently respond to these scales.

For the manipulation of regulatory focus, a 2 (Regulatory need activation: security needs activation vs. nurturance needs activation) x 2 (Need satisfaction or regulatory closure: need satisfied vs. need NOT satisfied) between-subjects design was employed. In each session either need satisfaction (conditions 1 and 2) or need activation (conditions 3 and 4) conditions were employed. Then students were randomly assigned to either promotion cue (cheese) or prevention cue (owl) condition. In other words, in some sessions there were only participants randomly assigned to condition 1 or 2, while in other sessions there were only participants who were randomly assigned to condition 3 or 4.

In the first session, where 35 participants were assigned to conditions 3 and 4 and thus were asked only to state their feelings, it was found that 23 participants completed the maze even though they were not asked to do so in the instructions. Because conditions 1 and 3 and 2 and 4 were not different except for completion of the maze, and also because the trust decisions of these 23 participants were not significantly different from those assigned to a corresponding maze completion condition (condition 1 or 2), $F(1, 63) = 2.47, p > .1$, these 23 participants were included in condition 1 or 2 in further analyses. Also, to improve the understanding of participants in conditions 3 and 4, in subsequent sessions they were given the explicit verbal instruction that said “please do not solve the maze” at the time they were given paper files.

The maze tasks were distributed in a paper file and the same file included the mood and ego depletion scales (and difficulty and cognitive effort questions for the maze task in conditions 1 and 2) employed for control purposes.

After they were done with the first task and responded to relevant scales, participants were given the second task where they reported their trust decisions as the sender in trust game. At the end of each session participants returned all materials on a closed file on which they also wrote their student IDs for identification purposes to receive course credit. Students were then thanked and informed that they would be sent debriefing emails after all the study sessions were completed.

Materials used during the experiments could be found in appendix.

3.4. RESULTS

A univariate analysis of variance was conducted to test the model of 2 (Need activation: security needs activation vs. nurturance needs activation) x 2 (Need satisfaction: need satisfied vs. need NOT satisfied) with trusting decision in trust game as the dependent variable.

There is a main effect of need satisfaction or *regulatory closure* (that is, completing or not completing the maze task) on trust decision, $F(1, 142) = 5.78$, $p < .05$. Accordingly, completing the maze task ($M = 6.935$, $SD = .601$) led to higher trust in the trust game than not completing the maze task ($M = 5.002$, $SD = .534$). This indicates that those whose needs were activated (both nurturance and security needs) and then satisfied (by completing the maze task) trusted more compared to those whose needs were activated but not satisfied (by not completing the maze task).

There is no main effect of need activation (that is, having promotion cue or prevention cue) on trust decision, $F(1,142) = .395$, $p > .05$. Accordingly, although individuals having the maze tasks with promotion cues (condition 1 and 3) showed higher trust ($M = 6.221$, $SD = .558$) compared to those having the maze task with prevention cues (condition 2 and 4) ($M = 5.716$, $SD = .579$), this difference was not significant.


Importantly, the interactive effect of need activation and need satisfaction on trust decision was found significant, $F(1, 142) = 4.290$, $p < .05$. Accordingly, individuals who did not complete the maze task with a prevention cue trusted much less ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 3.055$) compared to those who did not complete the maze task with a promotion cue ($M = 6.09$, $SD = 5.015$), $F(1, 142) = 4.12$, $p < .05$. This indicates that individuals whose security needs were activated but not satisfied produced less trust than individuals whose nurturance needs were activated but not satisfied. This finding supports the first hypothesis that prevention focused individuals whose security needs are salient show less trusting behavior compared to

promotion focused individuals whose nurturance needs are salient. In Figure 4, this difference is depicted with bars 3 and 4.

However, the difference between promotion cues and prevention cues was not significant for those who satisfied their salient needs (i.e., completed the maze task), $F(1, 142) = .93, p > .05$. In other words, trust levels of individuals who completed the maze task with a promotion cue or whose nurturance needs were satisfied ($M = 6.35, SD = 5.263$) and trust levels of individuals who completed the maze task with a prevention cue or whose security needs were satisfied ($M = 7.52, SD = 5.552$) did not differ significantly. This means that satisfying nurturance needs and satisfying security needs yield similar trusting levels. This finding can be graphically seen in Figure 4 where bar 1 and bar 2 are not significantly different.

Importantly, as seen in Figure 4, comparing bars 2 and 4 within prevention focus, only activating but not satisfying the security need (Bar 4) and satisfying the security need (Bar 2) have different effects on trusting behavior, $F(1, 142) = 9.66, p < .05$; such that, individuals who satisfied their salient security need (i.e., completed the maze task with a prevention cue) showed higher trusting behavior ($M = 7.52, SD = 5.552$) than individuals who did not satisfy their salient security need (i.e. did not complete the maze task with a prevention cue) ($M = 3.92, SD = 3.055$). According to this finding the second hypothesis is supported, suggesting that satisfying security needs of individuals makes them more trusting compared to those whose security needs are activated but not fulfilled. On the other hand, as seen from Figure 4 activating but not satisfying promotion related needs (Bar 3) and satisfying promotion related needs (Bar 1) did not lead to any difference in trust levels, $F(1, 142) = .06, p > .05$. Accordingly, among individuals who were presented a promotion cue those who completed the maze task ($M = 6.35, SD = 5.263$) did not trust significantly more than those who did not complete the maze task ($M = 6.09, SD = 5.015$).

Figure 4: Trusting Decisions According to 4 Different Conditions



3.4.1. Control for Alternative Explanations

In order to rule out the alternative explanation that the maze task might influence trust through its effect on mood and ego depletion (Friedman and Förster, 2001), A 2 (Need activation: security needs activation vs. nurturance needs activation) x 2 (Need satisfaction: need satisfied vs. need NOT satisfied) multivariate analysis of variance was conducted with ego depletion, positive mood, negative mood and feeling calm as the dependent variables. Univariate results revealed only a main effect for need satisfaction (completion vs. noncompletion of the maze task) on ego depletion, $F(1, 142) = 4.663, p < .05$; negative mood, $F(1, 142) = 5.181, p < .05$; and calm factor, $F(1, 142) = 7.433, p < .05$. Accordingly, participants who did not complete the maze task (i.e., did not satisfy their salient needs) had higher ego depletion ($M = 3.428, SD = 0.143$) than those participants who completed the maze task (i.e., satisfied their salient needs) ($M = 2.958, SD = 0.160$). Further, participants who did not complete the maze task ($M = 2.315, SD = .109$) experienced higher negative mood than those who completed the maze task ($M = 1.940, SD = .123$). Also, participants who completed the maze task felt calmer ($M = 4.196, SD = .127$) than those who did not complete the maze task ($M = 3.734, SD = .112$). We repeated the same hypotheses tests this time involving negative mood, ego depletion and calm

factor as covariates. Results indicated that none of ego depletion, $F(1, 139) = .890$, $p > .05$, negative mood, $F(1, 139) = .270$, $p > .05$, and the “calm” factor $F(1, 139) = 3.075$, $p > .05$, had significant effects on trust. Further, all significant effects remained significant. Finally, among participants who completed the maze task no significant difference in terms of experienced difficulty and cognitive effort was found between prevention cue and promotion cue conditions (p 's $> .05$). These findings all together suggest that the findings that support the hypotheses of the present research cannot be explained by differences in ego depletion, mood and experienced difficulty of the maze task as a function of differences in maze task instructions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The findings of this study indicate that manipulation of regulatory focus of an individual could influence his/her trust in a stranger in a subsequent and unrelated domain. According to the results, individuals whose security needs were activated but not satisfied showed less trusting behavior in the trust game than did individuals whose nurturance needs were activated. In other words; relative to the inducement of a promotion focus via priming nurturance needs, the inducement of prevention focus through making the security need salient led to decreased trust in a stranger in an independent domain (hypothesis 1). Also, according to the results, individuals whose security needs were satisfied in a completely unrelated domain (i.e., a task in which they take the perspective of a mouse) showed higher trust in the subsequent trust game than did individuals whose security needs were activated but not fulfilled. To be more precise, satisfying salient security and safety needs in a domain which did not involve social interaction led to increased trusting behavior in a subsequent interaction with a stranger compared to the situation where security needs were not satisfied (hypothesis 2). Consistent with prior research (Baas et al., 2011), the findings suggest that regulatory closure matters only for prevention focus but not for promotion focus in terms of influencing trust.

The findings of this thesis contribute to the literature in two ways. Although regulatory focus has been examined in relation to different constructs and concepts such as creativity, unethical behavior, in-group favoritism and job related values and attitudes (Friedman and Förster, 2001; Baas et al, 2011; Gino and Margolis, 2011; Shah et al, 2004; De Cremer et al, 2009; Sassenberg and Scholl, 2013); there is limited research on the association of regulatory focus with interpersonal trust (see, Keller et al, 2015). The present thesis addresses the aforementioned limitations of this research by activating both regulatory focus and comparing their relative influences on trusting behavior while controlling for differences in experimental tasks across conditions. In addition to that, the present thesis also extends the literature on the regulatory focus and trust association by investigating the role of regulatory closure in trust. Accordingly, in consistent with previous research (Baas et al, 2011), regulatory closure of prevention focused individuals through satisfaction

of security needs reduced individuals persistence, effort and motivation in subsequent domains compared to the absence of regulatory closure where individuals actively pursued but did not satisfy security needs. Regulatory closure of security needs increased trusting behavior as predicted, presumably because following goal fulfillment, the significance of salient security needs reduced and individuals did not need to seek for more safety and security in subsequent domains. Hence, the first contribution of this thesis is to enhance our understanding about the role of self-regulatory processes on trust through regulatory closure perspective.

Secondly, the findings of the present thesis provide important practical implications. Prior research has examined mostly less malleable trust antecedents such as macro level factors like income inequality, formal institutions, culture etc. (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Leigh, 2006a; Uslaner, 2008) or individual level factors like age, gender, education, propensity to trust, personal income (Croson and Buchan, 1999; Leigh, 2006b; Mayer et al, 1995; Patterson, 1999; Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Zak, 2006). Different from above-mentioned studies which examined antecedents that were difficult to change, this thesis has employed an individual level factor-regulatory focus- that allows manipulation through momentary situations and hence could be used to increase trust among strangers. Therefore, results of this thesis provide practitioners and institutions with more feasible and practical means to increase interpersonal trust.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

This study has some implications, particularly for collectivist countries like Turkey. In collectivist cultures due to concern for security and safety, people tend to have prevention focus whereas in individualist cultures advancement and growth needs become more relevant and people tend to employ promotion focus (Kurman and Hui, 2011: 5). According to the results of this study, one strategy to weaken salient safety and security needs and their detrimental effect on interpersonal trust is to induce promotion focus and make nurturance, advance and growth needs more salient through situational factors like proclaiming rewards for accomplishments, emphasizing ideal course of actions and exemplars. The other strategy is to satisfy

salient security and safety needs in other domains like having job security, buying a house etc. so that this satisfaction would further increase trusting behavior during interaction with strangers.

In addition to two above-mentioned strategies-activating nurturance needs and satisfying security needs-, it has come out that satisfying nurturance needs could be another strategy to increase trust among strangers. According to the results, satisfaction of both needs (in other words completion of the maze task in both of the regulatory foci), led to a significantly higher degree of trust compared to non-satisfaction of needs (i.e., non-completion of the maze task). Additionally, satisfying nurturance needs and activating nurturance needs yielded almost the same trusting levels and also satisfaction of nurturance needs did not produce significantly different trusting levels than satisfaction of security needs. Hence it could be argued that satisfaction of needs either security or nurturance in an unrelated domain would increase trust in strangers. This finding is consistent with Putnam's view (2000: 138) that "haves" are more trusting than "have-nots" and with the finding that individuals with highest social trust are also those who have achievements in terms of money, status, life satisfaction etc. (Delhey and Newton, 2003: 96). Similarly, in this study "haves", those who realized nurturance and safety showed more trust compared to "have-nots" those who could not achieve security. The main reason for this differentiation could be that rich people take relatively less risk by trusting because they have more of something and they could tolerate negative outcomes of distrust (Banfield 1958: 110). However, it is more risky for those people with lower economic power resources to satisfy their nurturance and security needs to trust because they have less resources and in case of a distrust they would put relatively more at risk. This may make it more difficult for these people to pay for the negative outcomes of distrust. Practitioners could benefit from this result by using nurturance need satisfaction as a strategy tool to increase trust. For example, based on our findings providing individuals with recognition and career development in the job and rewarding those who accomplish goals with monetary benefits would be some strategies to foster interpersonal trust

Yet, it is important to delineate the conditions under which the satisfaction of one type of regulatory need over the other leads to greater trust. In order to clarify

whether nurturance need satisfaction or security need satisfaction would produce higher trust an ongoing study led by Dr. Gökhan Karagonlar and funded by TÜBİTAK should be noted. As evidenced in the mentioned study, rather than fulfilling nurturance needs, satisfaction of security needs led to increased trust among strangers, primarily for those people whose propensity to trust was low. Hence, for countries like Turkey where people have low propensity to trust and relatively high prevention focus, compared to promotion focus inducement or nurturance related need satisfaction, satisfaction of security and safety needs in unrelated domains may help increase trust among strangers. For example, government policies to protect legal rights of citizens, to subsidize collective housing, support retirement bonds and plans, and encourage capital-protected funds etc. may help foster trust among people. Further, increased job security or family support provided by companies may increase trust as well.

Last but not least, findings of this thesis have important implications for organizations. High trust has been associated with increased organizational effectiveness (Kouzes and Posner, 1995: 163; Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis and Winograd, 2000: 35), solidarity towards shared organizational goals (Hardin, 2001: 23), higher performance and productivity (Fukuyama, 1995: 7; Miller, 2001), increased job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Alder, Noel and Ambrose, 2006), decreased turnover intentions (Wong, Ngo and Wong, 2003) and higher organizational citizenship behavior (Wong, Ngo and Wong, 2006).

In order to influence these organization and employee related outcomes, organizations could benefit from three main strategies mentioned above. Pertaining to the first strategy, organizations could benefit from activation of promotion focus through setting clear goals and rewards through HR policies. In order to induce individuals with promotion focus, HR policies could set appealing rewards in clear and well-defined ways. As in the philosophy of Management by Objectives employees could be involved in the goal defining process through which involvement and engagement with the goal increases. By defining goals as ideals to achieve and aspirations to realize, engagement and willingness of employees could be increased further by keeping these goals (promotion related goals) activated for a longer time. In addition to that, with reference to the Expectancy Theory (Vroom,

1964), it is important to clarify the link between goals and rewards. If employees are provided with clear rules and procedures on the road to rewards, it would increase the instrumentality or in other words their belief that they would obtain the reward with a certain performance. Hence, defining aspiring goals and ambitions and also describing path from performance to rewards could help activate promotion focus of employees.

Distributing rewards in terms of paying bonuses, commissions or giving promotion or recognition represent the other strategy, satisfaction of promotion related goals and needs. Herein, one the significant points is to pay attention to fairness, justice and equity which have been found to influence trust (Bekoff, 2001; Saunders and Thornhill, 2003; Wong et al, 2006). As in the Equity Theory (Adams, 1963), employees keep observing their organization and its reward system and evaluate the fairness of the system by comparing their and others' inputs (efforts, loyalty, commitment etc.) with their and others' outcomes (rewards as salary, benefits, reputation etc.). By maintaining equity among inputs and outcomes of employees, satisfaction of promotion related goals could have fruitful and enhanced influence on trusting behavior of employees.

The last strategy that could be employed in organizations for influencing trust is the satisfaction of prevention related goals and needs. As mentioned in previous sections, satisfaction of security and safety needs increases trust of individuals; hence, every action and effort for making individuals feel safe and secure could influence trust of employees positively. Organizations could engender security and safety feelings for example by providing job security. By opening permanent positions rather than temporary ones, preferring outsourcing to a lesser degree could help to increase safety and security. Additionally, as an HR policy preferring to promote from within for new positions and giving priority to employees inside for higher positions could increase both justice perceptions and safety and security feelings. Similarly, providing employees with sound and credible career plans and helping them draw career paths through the company make employees to see and plan their future in company and feel themselves safer and more secure for coming years. Further, procedural justice may enhance employees' psychological safety among prevention focused individuals, thus leading to increased trust in the

organization and its members. Lastly, compensating employees with benefit pension plans or funding ongoing retirement plans of employees could contribute feeling safe and secure and hence, influence trust in a positive way.

Limitations and Future Research

The present thesis did not examine mediating mechanisms by which regulatory focus (and regulatory closure) influences trust. For example, risk tendency of individuals could be affected by regulatory focus manipulation such that through nurturance need activation individuals may become more risk tolerant and trust more readily; likewise through security need activation individuals may become more risk averse and hence be more cautious about trusting others. The possible intervening effect of risk perception in regulatory focus and trust relationship might be examined in future research.

In the current study, drawing on prior research (Baas et al., 2011) the maze task was used as the manipulation tool and it successfully served for the inducement of promotion and prevention need activation and satisfaction. Although the maze task was effective for providing supportive and reliable results for the theoretical suggestions of this thesis, in order to increase the generalization of the results findings should be replicated through utilization of other manipulation tools; such as, asking individuals about a situation regarding positive outcomes they realized or could not realize (promotion activation and satisfaction) and negative outcomes they avoided or could not avoid (prevention activation and satisfaction) (Baas et al, 2011). Future research might examine whether other manipulation tools of regulatory focus produce the same results regarding trusting behavior.

There are some other limitations of the current study. First of all, the trust game was played with imaginary money and an imaginary receiver. Although this is not an uncommon practice in the literature (Evans and Revelle, 2008; Evans and Krueger, 2011), future research might repeat the same study with real money and a receiver to validate the results suggested in this thesis. A second limitation is the absence of a control group in the study. Due to the fact that promotion focus and prevention focus are orthogonal constructs and as a result of manipulation one could

be either promotion focus or prevention focus, the existence of a control group is not possible in research involving regulatory focus. As a consequence, the influence of regulatory focus on trust could be ascribed to promotion inducement as much as to prevention inducement. Thus, our finding supporting Hypothesis 1 would only mean that trust behavior in prevention focus is less than that in promotion focus. Lastly, the sample of the study was comprised of only students of Dokuz Eylül University Faculty of Business. For the generalization of the results, the study should be repeated with a sample which is more representative.

Also in the study individuals satisfied their needs of security and nurturance directly by themselves. This brings to mind the question that whether similar effects would be obtained if someone else (e.g., government or the work organization or parents) satisfies these needs. We suggest that this is an important topic that should be examined in future research.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Regulatory focus manipulation


Condition 1

1

TALİMATLAR

Arka sayfada yer alan resimde görülen fare olduğunuzu hayal edin. Labirentin sonunda lezzetli bir peynir var. Fare olarak ne duygular hissederdiniz? Lütfen duygularınızı ifade edin:

2) Şimdi kalem kullanarak farenin labirentte yolunu bulmasına yardım edin.



Condition 2

1

TALİMATLAR

Arka sayfada yer alan resimde görülen fare olduğunuzu hayal edin. Labirentin üzerinde uçan aç bir baykuş var. Fare olarak ne duygular hissederdiniz? Lütfen duygularınızı ifade edin:

2) Şimdi kalem kullanarak farenin labirentte yolunu bulmasına yardım edin.




Condition 3

1

TALİMATLAR

Arka sayfada yer alan resimde görülen fare olduğunuzu hayal edin. Labirentin sonunda lezzetli bir peynir var. Fare olarak ne duygular hissederdiniz? Bu çalışmada lütfen sadece duygularınızı ifade edin:



Condition 4

1

TALİMATLAR

Arka sayfada yer alan resimde görülen fare olduğunuzu hayal edin. Labirentin üzerinde uçan aç bir baykuş var. Fare olarak ne duygular hissederdiniz? Bu çalışmada lütfen sadece duygularınızı ifade edin:



Appendix 2: Ego depletion and Mood Scale

1) Lütfen, yaptığınız labirentin zorluk derecesini belirtiniz.

Hiç zor değil						Çok zor
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2) Lütfen, yaptığınız labirentin ne kadar zihinsel çaba gerektirdiğini belirtiniz.

Hiç Gerektirmiyor						Çok gerektiriyor
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

1) Lütfen, aşağıdaki maddelere ne kadar katıldığınızı belirtiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Hiç katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum					Tamamen katılıyorum	
1. Zihinsel olarak tükenmiş hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Şu anda bir şey üzerinde yoğunlaşmam için fazladan çaba göstermem gerekir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Motive olmuş hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Enerji seviyem oldukça yüksek	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Bitkin hissediyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Şu anda zihnimi odaklayamıyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2) Lütfen, aşağıdaki maddelerin şu anki ruh halinizi ne kadar yansıttığını size verilen ölçeği kullanarak cevaplayınız.

	Hiç hissetmiyorum		Ne hissediyorum ne hissetmiyorum		Çok hissediyorum
Mutlu	1	2	3	4	5
Gergin	1	2	3	4	5
Neşeli	1	2	3	4	5
Bıkkın	1	2	3	4	5
Memnun	1	2	3	4	5
Endişeli	1	2	3	4	5

Morali Bozuk	1	2	3	4	5
Üzgün	1	2	3	4	5
Sakin	1	2	3	4	5
Hayal kırıklığına uğramış	1	2	3	4	5

Appendix 3: Trust Game Decision Scale

Gönderici olarak elinizde bulunan 15 TL'nin ne kadarını alıcıya göndermek istersiniz?

(Göndereceğiniz miktar 3 ile çarpılarak alıcıya gidecektir.)

- ☐ 0 TL
- ☐ 1 TL
- ☐ 2 TL
- ☐ 3 TL
- ☐ 4 TL
- ☐ 5 TL
- ☐ 6 TL
- ☐ 7 TL
- ☐ 8 TL
- ☐ 9 TL
- ☐ 10 TL
- ☐ 11 TL
- ☐ 12 TL
- ☐ 13 TL
- ☐ 14 TL
- ☐ 15 TL