

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS
HISTORICAL LEGACY

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ABSTRACT

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS HISTORICAL LEGACY

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This thesis analyzes the Russian public diplomacy within both historical and contemporary contexts. To this end, discussion on public diplomacy concept, the history of the Russian public diplomacy and a comparative analysis on the public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation with regards to the Ukrainian Crisis and Syrian Civil War will be presented. This thesis seeks to find out the main goal/theme of the public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation, the impact of the historical legacy of the Russian polity and the continuities therein. Within the framework of this thesis, it is argued that historically the main theme of public diplomacy conducted by the Russian polity is to mitigate the negative repercussions of its aggressive/expansionist policies. Impact of this historical legacy is also visible in the contemporary Russian public diplomacy. The comparative analysis conducted on the two recent cases showed that the main objective of public diplomacy implemented by the Russian Federation is to provide a justification for the re-emerging Russian assertiveness in the international arena.

Keywords: Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union

ÖZ

RUSYA FEDERASYONU’NUN KAMU DİPLOMASİSİ VE TARİHİ MİRASI

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Bu tez Rusya’nın kamu diplomasisini tarihsel ve çağdaş bağlamlarda incelemektedir. Bu amaçla, kamu diplomasisi konsepti üzerine tartışmalar, Rusya’nın kamu diplomasisinin tarihi ve Rusya Federasyonu tarafından Ukrayna Krizi ve Suriye İç Savaşı kapsamında uygulanan kamu diplomasisinin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi sunulacaktır. Bu tez, Rusya Federasyonu tarafından uygulanan kamu diplomasisinin ana hedefi/teması, Rusya devletinin tarihi mirasının etkileri ve bu etkiler bağlamındaki devamlılıkları ele almaktadır. Tarihi olarak Rusya devleti tarafından uygulanan kamu diplomasisinin temel temasının, devletin saldırgan/yayılmacı politikaların olumsuz yansımalarının yumuşatılması olduğu bu tez çerçevesinde ileri sürülmektedir. Aynı zamanda, bu tarihi mirasın etkisi Rusya’nın çağdaş kamu diplomasisinde de görülmektedir. Mevcut iki vaka üzerine yapılan bu karşılaştırmalı analiz, Rusya Federasyonu tarafından uygulanan kamu diplomasisinin temel hedefinin uluslararası alanda yeniden ortaya çıkan Rus baskınlığına meşrutiyet kazandırmak olduğunu göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamu Diplomasisi, Yumuşak Güç, Rusya Federasyonu, Sovyetler Birliği



To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECU	Eurasian Customs Union
EU	European Union
IR	International Relations
i.e.	in example
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOKS	Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitse (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The concept of public diplomacy is one of the most controversial subjects in the discipline of international relations. While both practitioners of diplomacy and scholars acknowledge its existence as a tool in international relations, views on its scope, utility, correct practice and theoretical basis vary significantly. As I started my study on this thesis, I faced with a conceptual chaos on public diplomacy as scholars of different disciplines have elaborated on the subject within a wide range of different conceptualizations lacking solid theoretical framework. Though I make this criticism, I certainly realize that public diplomacy and its related concepts are hard to conceptualize and theorize. There are several reasons behind this, but in my opinion, there are two fundamental difficulties. First and foremost, there is a negative correlation between the visibility of the actor (which is conducting public diplomacy) and efficiency of the public diplomacy policy. In other words, the more visible the actor conducting public diplomacy the chance of pursued public diplomacy as being perceived as a propaganda which overall reduces its effectiveness. Due to this fact, successful public diplomacy policies are usually hard to notice and study since the link between the actor and policies pursued by the actor is not easy to trace. In addition, it is not easy to measure the effects of public diplomacy policies simply due to the sheer size of their recipients. In other words, the target audience of the public diplomacy policies is so large that it is difficult to study the effects of these policies on public through classical field research methods like surveys. Due to this fact, prominent scholars making research in this field tends to employ policy-based case studies. This approach has both strengths and weaknesses. Case studies help scholars to overcome the problem related to large sample sizes by measuring success of the policies through focusing on policies and their outcomes. However, this approach also undermines the theoretical basis of the concept, since these studies are unable to probe the underlining mechanism of public diplomacy. Though weakness of this approach will be criticized several times throughout this thesis, I will not be able to

partake in such an endeavor, as it would be overly ambitious subject within this master's thesis.

The practice of public diplomacy can be traced back to the appearance of political entities as international actors. Starting from the antiquity followed by rise of empires and age of nation states up until today political entities always had a need to relay a message towards the other be it friendly or hostile. This need increased with appearance of notion of nation, as the identity and the description of what other is significantly codified through this process. Throughout the modern era and onwards international actors (primarily states but also other actors in contemporary international arena) developed the practice of public diplomacy. Russian polity as a significant actor throughout this period has also been an actor that utilized public diplomacy extensively. Like other actors, this experience has led to lasting impact in the state tradition of Russian polity. From the "Third Rome Doctrine" to ideological contest during the Cold War period as well as more recent examples of public diplomacy conducted by Russia as a foreign policy tool in Ukraine and Syria, the effects of this expanding tradition are still visible pursuant to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this thesis, I aim to find out the Russian Federation's main objective in conducting public diplomacy. The Russian Federation has increasingly become an assertive actor in the international arena in the recent decades, which is accompanied by an increase in the number of statements targeting foreign publics. I aim to analyze how such policies are related to each other and what could be the driving force behind them. In order to do this, I will examine the Russian public diplomacy within a historical framework and try to define continuities within a large time span starting from the late imperial period up until 2019. In addition to that, I will specifically focus on analyzing the main themes of the Russian public diplomacy in relation to the two important contemporary Russian foreign policy issues, namely the Ukrainian Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. The main strength in this historical approach is that it will allow me to analyze public diplomacy policy from different perspectives in relation to the main components of it. Though there are similar theoretical approaches in the literature, unique contribution of this thesis will be the analysis of the main concerns

of Russian public diplomacy in different periods and defining continuities with the hope of making predictions on possible future policies.

As I will discuss extensively in the second chapter, analyzing public diplomacy is a challenging endeavor as effects of public diplomacy initiatives are hard to measure in terms of their success due to the multi-layered structure of the subject. Power based approaches towards public diplomacy overcome this hurdle through conceptualizing hard to measure aspects of a country (i.e. culture or positive image) as resources and measuring a country's capability with regards to these resources. One such example of this approach can be "The Soft Power 30", "The Soft Power 30" is a global annual report which ranks top 30 countries in the World in terms of their soft power.¹ The reports have been prepared by the University of Southern California Centre of Public Diplomacy and Portland (a Strategic Communications Consultancy Firm?) since 2015.² The reports take two main components into account for measuring soft power, namely, objective and subjective metrics. In objective metric the research team measures culture, digital literacy (access to and impact on the digital area such as internet or social media), education, engagement, enterprise and government as the main components through various data such as total number of tourist arrivals, percentage of internet users or total overseas aid. Subjective metrics on the other hand are composed of polling in a substantial number of countries with simple questions on the culture, politics and appeal of other countries. Both metrics compile a vast amount of data from various sources in order to measure soft power.

Diplomacy based approaches, on the other hand, employ a less rigid approach when analyzing public diplomacy cases and their methodology is much more diversified ranging from policy/historical/discourse analysis, media review to factual fieldwork and data analysis (similar to what will be presented in the example for power based approach). However, all the studies reviewed (from both of these approaches) are somewhat only able to grasp a small portion of the reality. The reason for this fact is twofold. First the multi-faceted nature of public diplomacy owing to its consistence

¹ All of their annual reports can be accessed through their website <https://softpower30.com/>

² For more info visit <https://portland-communications.com/> and <https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/>

of a web of intricate relationships and second the lack of a solid interdisciplinary framework needed for grasping public diplomacy fully. While making this criticism, one must be aware of the fact that there is no such thing as a perfect study or analysis (especially in social sciences) which would be able to cover a phenomenon (no matter how small of its part focused) through all its aspects simply due to the sheer complexity of all social science related subjects. Thus, it is perfectly natural to focus on few perspectives when conducting research of a similar nature. In order to answer the research question of this study, I aim to select the most suitable perspective most relevant for both the task at hand and criteria aimed to be focused.

In the second chapter, I have elaborated on some of the main components of public diplomacy namely “public”, “attraction”, “power” and “credibility”. In the light of the sections on “credibility” and “public”, I have decided to prioritize a historical viewpoint when making my analysis on the public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation. There are three main reasons for this decision. First (as it will be argued in the second chapter), such a historical study does not exist, and I believe it would provide a good understanding on the continuities/discontinuities of the Russian public diplomacy in terms of its general themes and objectives. This approach would also provide an alternative narrative to the ideological competition one during the Cold War, which can be defined as the heydays of public diplomacy practice. The second reason for this decision is that this approach will allow me to incorporate the factors of credibility and the image of the Russian polity into the analysis. This will be possible due to the longer span of the period, which will be analyzed. This will allow me to assess the effects of the actions of previous period in the next one. The third and final reason for this approach relies on the assumption that “collective memory” is one of the main mechanisms, which influence public decision-making, and the mechanism through which public diplomacy initiatives influence the public opinion. Since the collective memory of the public takes longer to form, a historical perspective would be an essential part for our analysis on the case study. When I consider the elaborations on “power” and “attraction” on the other hand, they would require a more detailed discourse or policy analysis in order to determine the main objective of public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation. This is due to the relationship between the concept of power and

alternative (neutral and negative) uses of public diplomacy. In order to analyze the message (and through it the objective) of the Russian public diplomacy, I will conduct a brief discourse/policy analysis within the context of the recent initiatives in relation to the Russian foreign policy with regards to Ukraine and Syria.

The combination of these two methods will help me to respond to my research question. Though the depth of both approaches will be limited due to spatial concerns, I believe that combination of these two perspectives would give the best results for understanding the main goal of the Russian public diplomacy. Thus, in the third and fourth chapters, I will present a historical analysis of the Russian polity (starting from the late imperial period until today) and a discourse/policy analysis of the Russian statements/policies in the contemporary period respectively with the examples of Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine and Syria. The reason behind selection of these examples is twofold. First the Russian foreign policy with regards to these countries is the pinnacle example of the emerging Russian assertiveness in the international arena after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and restructure of Russian foreign policy in its aftermath thus these examples allow me to analyze the effects of this restructuring and help me to assess effects of the historical legacy. Secondly since the Russian foreign policy with regards to these cases were also part of the broader politics between the European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation these developments were followed up by the global public hence they were priority areas for the Russian public diplomacy to relay its message and try to influence foreign publics through it.

To this end, this thesis will be composed of five chapters including this one and conclusion at the end. The second chapter, which will be built upon three main components, has the aim of familiarizing audience with the concept of public diplomacy and theoretical discussions revolving around the concept as well as forming the basis of the methodology of this thesis. First, I will try to present a brief historical oversight on both the study and practice of public diplomacy. This section will be followed by a comprehensive literature review on public diplomacy (as well as related concepts) and classification of main approaches towards public diplomacy. In the final part of the second chapter, a detailed theoretical discussion on the main

topics concerned with public diplomacy will be presented. This part will be a constructivist analysis of public diplomacy, as these main topics will be gathered through the deconstruction of the public diplomacy concept itself. This theoretical discussion along with the literature review will be forming the basis of the methodology discussion and the eventual building of methodology for this thesis (presented in the introduction chapter). The third chapter will discuss a historical overview on public diplomacy of the Russian polity starting from the late imperial period up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union with a focus on its main goals. In the fourth chapter, a general analysis and a comparative contemporary analysis of the Russian public diplomacy will be presented on two selected cases while in the fifth conclusion chapter both the historical and contemporary analyses will be inspected in order to find an answer for my research question as I will try to understand whether or not there is a continuity with regards to the historical and contemporary Russian public diplomacy policy.

CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: DEFINITION, CONCEPTS AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter will review the historical background and existing literature on public diplomacy as well as similar related concepts and try to present different approaches towards public diplomacy. While presenting these approaches, I will also elaborate on how they are related with international relations theories and try to understand what the key concepts are and how they are understood from the social sciences perspective. In the final section of this chapter, I will analyze which approach would be beneficial for explaining/modelling the historical analysis of Russian public diplomacy in relation to the methodology of this thesis.

2.1 Public Diplomacy: Definition and a Short History of Its Practice

The concept of public diplomacy is a relatively novel one in the discipline of international relations (IR). Although the basis for it was somehow present, lack of academic interest and systematic research left the concept 'underdeveloped' least to say. Public diplomacy can be briefly defined as "diplomacy conducted in order to influence foreign public opinions". The first use of the term in this sense is usually attributed to Edmund Gullion (1965). According to Gullion:

"Public diplomacy...deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is

communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications."³

However, the definition of the term is very much contested, and a clear and well-accepted definition is yet to be produced. The main cause of this is that for many years, scholars rejected considering the methods and concepts outside the realm of official diplomacy as part of diplomacy. This was due to the fundamental question of defining actors in international relations. Many scholars who belong to the realist school of international relations perceive the state (and sometimes international organizations formed by states) as the sole actors. Therefore, it was only logical to brand public diplomacy as a propaganda tool and perceive the public as something acted upon, rather than as an actor. Constructivist and liberal approaches on the other hand realize public as an actor in international relations. While liberal approach highlights the importance of public opinion through its effect on national decision-making, constructivist approach puts agency of public and emergence of an international public sphere into the center.⁴ Although arguments by realist school are consistent with their basic assumptions, such a view of public diplomacy is quite reductionist. Branding public diplomacy as a mere propaganda tool inherently carries the assumption that public is a passive actor of international relations, which cannot exert influence in international arena and whose views are shaped by their respective states. It is certainly true that the public opinion can be manipulated, however, public appears more and more as an actor in international relations through international organizations as well as due to the vast improvements in the means of communication and mass media. Therefore, we must recognize public as an entity which interacts in the international arena and which both influences and is influenced by other actors. Nancy Snow supports this view by differentiating traditional public diplomacy and contemporary public diplomacy. She argues that while traditional public diplomacy was about governments influencing public, recently it includes both governments, individuals, and groups influencing public opinion and foreign policy decisions (Snow 2009: 6). It is feasible to argue that not only public

³ Edward R. Murrow USC Centre of Public Diplomacy ““Public Diplomacy” Bioregulator: The Evolution of a Phrase” Accessed August 2019 <https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase>.

⁴ See works by Marc Lynch or Jennifer Mitzen on “International Public Sphere”

diplomacy is not a phenomenon to be labeled as mere state propaganda, but also it is one of the most important indicators of rapidly changing international diplomacy.

While the concept of public diplomacy is, the debate on new diplomacy (referring to the increasing relevance of public diplomacy) is not a novel phenomenon. The changing nature of diplomacy was a topic of interest throughout the 20th century and gained impetus after the Second World War as well as the Cold War. The growing importance of the public opinion and the appearance of mass media were pivotal arguments in these debates. For instance, E. H. Carr, despite being from the realist school of international relations conceptualized “power over the ideas” during the Cold War Period (Carr 1964: 108). However, the rigid nature and tradition of diplomatic conduct was a major obstacle preventing adaptation to the new environment. Although the theory around new diplomacy proliferated, the practice failed to keep up at the same pace. The main driving force behind the adaptation of practice was probably initiated as a reaction to the spread of the Soviet influence. The containment policy, Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were all signs of this adaptation to the new diplomacy in which the public opinion played an important role. Similar to the developments during the space race, the West adopted and improved the Soviet mechanisms of this new diplomacy, which were very effective especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, throughout the Cold War period. While the influence of the West expanded, the Soviet Union started to fall behind both due the tenacious initiatives by the West (especially the US) and the Soviet Union’s inability to improve its own policies. We can safely assume that the US public diplomacy was more tenacious in adapting to this new environment.⁵ Soviet diplomacy was able to spot the rising influence of public opinion after the Second World War. However, it was not able to tap the full potential of this new source of power due to the reasons we have discussed in the third chapter.

Jan Melissen brings public diplomacy definition closer to the classical definition of diplomacy, since he defines it as, on the one hand, goal oriented (much like the classical diplomacy) and on the other hand, having long term effects of trust and

⁵ For a detailed account of U.S. public diplomacy initiatives during the Cold War Period see; *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency* by Wilson P. Dizard Junior.

understanding building (Melissen, 2005a). Instead of creating a brand-new area of study, Melissen's definition puts public diplomacy and related concepts under the discipline of diplomacy. My views on the definition of public diplomacy will be presented in the summary section at the end of this chapter but whichever the case in the broadest terms public diplomacy definition can be summarized as, the act of an international actor to interact with a foreign public with varying purposes.

So far, I have elaborated on the definition of public diplomacy and how it was handled theoretically by social sciences and argued that its practice lagged behind the theoretical approaches during the initial Cold War period. Although this was the case for that period as it was also argued in the introduction, currently the theoretical definition and study of public diplomacy is lagging behind its practice. Thus, I will present a brief historical development of public diplomacy practice in the remainder of this section, which can also be used in combination with the literature review in order to understand the reason behind this problem.

In order to understand the subject of public diplomacy, one definitely has to start from analyzing its practice. The main reason behind it is the fact that long before the academy took interest on the subject, polities were already practicing public diplomacy for centuries. Thus, this section will try to present a brief overview on the history of public diplomacy practice in addition to the initial part on the definition of public diplomacy. A view on the historical evolution of public diplomacy practice would clarify difference in approaches, which I have encountered during my literature review. This would also be beneficial in spotting main components (with regards to its theoretical aspect) and continuities (with regards to its practical aspect) both of which will be invaluable towards understanding/supporting main research question and argument of this thesis.

The practice of influencing foreign publics through diplomacy can be traced back to as early as classical antiquity. One of the earliest examples can be League building efforts of Athens and Sparta before and during the Peloponnesian War, which included attempts of influencing citizens of other city-states.⁶ Although practical

⁶ See Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War

examples like this can be found throughout pre-modern period, they would not fully correspond with the concept of modern public diplomacy. In order to be able to address a historical example with the label of “public diplomacy” we should be able to verify existence of a “public” or “public sphere” in a modern sense. Although a thorough discussion is presented on the section titled “Public and Individual”, the appearance of public space is attributed to the early modern period (Habermas, 1989). Through growing importance of public opinion and increasing availability of information as well as institutionalization of the diplomatic conduct, diplomats started using actions for influencing foreign publics for foreign policy goals (Helmets, 2016: 402-403). Example of institutionalized public diplomacy can be traced back as early as Dutch Nassau Dynasty, which planned to form a transnational network among the states, governments, and people of the protestant Europe (Helmets, 2016: 407-408). However, the actual practice of “public diplomacy” in a cohesive and specialized form started in the Cold War period. The evolution of the US public diplomacy was the pinnacle of its practice as well as appearance of public diplomacy as a subject. The containment policy and later ideological contest during the Cold War period has led to progressive invention of instruments of public diplomacy such as the US Information Agency, Voice of America and the Radio Free Europe (Lord, 1998: 58-59).

Although practical knowledge on conducting public diplomacy has been improved significantly during the Cold War period, debate on public diplomacy and soft power concepts has taken impetus after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the fight against terror by United States of America as decision makers realized that they are facing a threat (global terrorist organizations) which both influence and is supported by a transnational reactionary movement and in order to eradicate this movement US had to influence this audience through interaction. Thus, winning over hearts and mind became a motto of American public diplomacy policy during this period (Nye, 2008: 1). US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan became the testing ground for this policy with mixed results. For Iraq this policy was somehow successful in undermining local resistance (though sectarian and other internal divisions of Iraqi society may have played a more important part, American public diplomacy was successfully able to influence the Iraqi elite) but mainly unsuccessful in negating or

softening the international reaction. As it took place after the experience in Iraq, the US public diplomacy efforts were more focused on international area during the US intervention in Afghanistan. With formation of an international force, US presence in Afghanistan was somehow legitimized but the same success could not be achieved in relation with the local population as thousands flocked to the banners of the Taliban instead of the Afghan government which was seen as a puppet of Americans. These practical implementations as well as arising debate on public diplomacy has created an academic interest mainly in the discipline of international relations. Though this interest leads to significant conceptualization efforts, such as Joseph Nye's soft power concept, it is clearly visible that these efforts still require a more systematic theoretical approach as well as research efforts to test these conceptualizations.

Public diplomacy literature often focuses on the US public diplomacy, especially in the Cold War period. It is quite natural that as a success story US public diplomacy would pose as a better alternative than Soviet one in order to polish the concept. However, failures are also valuable, especially in analyzing concepts hard to conceptualize such as public diplomacy. In this regard, the existing literature has a huge gap on the Soviet or Russian public diplomacy policies. The Soviet Union, being one of the two main belligerent powers in the Cold War, offers significant case study on the practice of public diplomacy. Similarly, as the main successor of the Soviet Union and as one of the most influential actors in the international arena, the Russian Federation would also offer a crucial case in terms of public diplomacy practice. In the next chapter, I will analyze public diplomacy practice of Russian polity within a historical perspective starting from the late imperial period all the way to the contemporary period. My analysis in the third chapter of this thesis aims to fulfill this gap in the existing literature, as well as offering a new perspective into the public diplomacy concept in general in addition to answering my initial research question.

2.2 The Review of Literature on Public Diplomacy

In this section, I will present a review of the existing literature on public diplomacy and related concepts. First, I will discuss two main approaches on the concept of public diplomacy through analyzing and comparing the works of three prominent

scholars in the field. I categorized these approaches in order to differentiate between the approaches that view public diplomacy as an instrument of power and other approaches, which define public diplomacy from a broader perspective. The factor for this dividing line is the prominence held by “soft power” concept created by Joseph Nye in the existing literature. Through this discussion, I will be presenting strengths and weaknesses of the both approaches while at the same time define my own approach to the subject of public diplomacy. Following this section, I also aim to present different approaches towards the concept of public diplomacy (although they may have different names) as well as the studies which I find helpful in understanding key concepts, methodologies and research questions related to subject of public diplomacy. The review of the literature and analysis of the prominent approaches will help us to determine the main components of public diplomacy concept, which will also be analyzed in order to build my framework for understanding public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation. Additionally, the variance of perspectives presented in this section would further support my views of the conceptual confusion in the current literature.

2.2.1 Power Based Approach

Power based approach towards public diplomacy was developed by mainly the scholars of International Relations with an attempt to merge the concept of power with diplomacy to this end scholars define public diplomacy as another method of exercising power by an international actor in line with the relevant resources such as culture and credibility. This approach defines public diplomacy as a one-way goal-oriented interaction between an international actor and a foreign public, which the actor attempts to influence.

One of the major theoretical concepts regarding public diplomacy is Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” which is the canonical power-based approach towards public diplomacy. In his book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”, Nye theorizes this concept while analyzing the United States’ position after the Cold War. He considers the U.S. having the capability of both hard and soft power to maintain its dominant position. His argument is based on a phenomenon what he calls as “the great power shift” in which he argues that the power in the international

area would be more about leading other countries in the direction of a state's aims through persuasion (Nye, 1990a, 55). He supports these arguments with his writings on globalization and terrorism, in which he supports his arguments on this power shift through evolving interdependence and cooperation (Nye 2014: 151).

He conceptualizes the causality of the soft power in two models, namely in direct and indirect versions. In the direct model, the country channels its resources on the target governmental elites in order to promote their support to achieve the desired outcome (Nye 2011: 95). Whereas in the second model resources are channeled into the foreign public to promote their support in order to create the desired outcomes? (2011, 95). First model can be more affiliated with the soft power in classical diplomacy, whereas the second model is a direct representation of the public diplomacy itself.

Nye (2003: 9) also argues that a country's soft power rests mostly on the following three sources: culture, political values and foreign policy. Then he defines each of these sources with their respective instruments and historical examples. The main weakness of Nye's argument is that he gathers all these sources and instruments under the vague concept of soft power, instead of conceptualizing them separately, unlike other diplomacy-based approaches.

There are three important points that Nye sheds light upon. First of all, he shows that the concept of soft power is not incompatible at all with the realist school of thought or the basic concept of power in International Relations discipline by also giving examples of hard power countered by a soft power from history (2011: 81-83). Secondly, he puts forward the impracticality of the soft power by pointing out its reliance on the initiative of the target and the long time it takes for seeing the results (2011: 83). Nye finally discusses soft power's dependence upon the credibility of the country that applies it (2011: 83). All of these points are applicable to the public diplomacy and its sub instruments in general.

Many of the case studies and research concerning public diplomacy are focusing on the economic, military and foreign policy relations and how they affect the public opinion in the receiving countries in line with this power-based approach. There are

two main reasons behind this; firstly, it is easier to conduct data driven research regarding these issues and secondly the global prominence of these instruments when conducting public diplomacy. Giray Sadık in his book named “American Image in Turkey” compares the volumes of military and economic aid with the public opinion of the US in Turkey. He came up with some correlations and makes logical assumptions about the possible reasons behind the correlations. He found strong correlation between military aid and public opinion, which he explains through high publicity of such agreements and the attentive nature of Turkish public to the military and foreign policy issues (Sadık 2009: 28-31).

While Nye's arguments have both its merits and flaws, he was the pioneer in observing the patterns of change in international relations. He was also one of the first scholars who sought to conceptualize this change. He argues that neither hard nor soft power guarantees to achieve the outcome that a country aims; with the example of the Vietnam war in terms of hard power capabilities (2004, 9). Nye later incorporates hard and soft power with the concept of “smart power”, which defined as the combination and efficient use of these resources together (2013, 47). He is also important in terms of popularizing the concept and enriching the existing IR theories with a new area of study.

Nye's focus of incorporating hard power into his modeling can be attributed to the case studies conducted by other scholars. For example, before Nye's shift towards the smart power concept, David Snyder points out to the anachronism between soft and hard power with the case of the Netherlands during and aftermath of the Second World War. He argues that the lack of actual hard power to enforce the outcome that was desired, in this case the protection of status quo in the Indonesia, undermined the public diplomacy efforts towards the United States which were aimed to protect the Netherlands' influence on Indonesia, which might direct us to a more symbiotic relationship between soft and hard power (Snyder, 2010: 78). In order to achieve a goal (especially in an area which requires a hands-on approach; in this case the protection of a privileged position in an overseas soil) through soft power, a country has to have the actual hard power to back it up. This brings us to the dilemma of power in soft power and public diplomacy. Starting from Snyder's point we can

easily argue that in the case of a foreign policy goal, lack of actual hard power is an important obstacle for the utilization of soft power or public diplomacy policies. Thus, in order to achieve the desired outcome through soft power a country has to have both soft and hard power capabilities.

There are three points of criticism that can be put forward towards Nye. The first criticism (albeit somewhat more towards the critical theory) can be about his heavy reliance on the notion of power. This reasoning puts much emphasis on conflict rather than cooperation. Cooperation is usually seen as temporary and goal oriented by the realist school (It still probably is for most of the time). Although Nye is not a scholar from the realist school, his conceptualization of soft power focuses on the goal-oriented aspect of public diplomacy more than its fair share. Whereas global issues like terrorism and climate change slowly but steadily shifting the inter actor relations towards a more cooperation-oriented approach. Though it is important to observe this power shift from a power centric perspective there can be multiple different viewpoints regarding this shift itself. Second point which is overlooked in Nye's conceptualization is disregard towards the agency of the public itself as he presents exercise of soft power as a one-way communication. As argued earlier in the section on the definition of public diplomacy, public also holds an agency both over the domestic and international politics. The final criticism which can be put forward towards the concept of soft power is in parallel with the author's general criticism towards the existing public diplomacy literature. The concept of soft power focuses on the goal and means to achieve it which disregards how public diplomacy functions in its essence. Meaning that it does not delve into the question of "how?" in term of transformation of interaction into the influence over the foreign public and what are the underlying mechanisms behind the effects of culture and ideals.

2.2.2 Diplomacy Based Approach

Second approach towards public diplomacy is diplomacy-based one, which creates an alternative to the power-based approach and takes steps in order to take a more constructivist approach to understand it with a different methodology. This approach is due to IR scholars' efforts to integrate public diplomacy with the liberal and constructivist approaches in international relations theory. Some of the criticisms,

which were directed to the Nye's soft power concept (such as one-way communication and focus on conflict), have been answered in this approach. In order to solidify the main aspects of this approach I will analyze views presented by Nicholas Cull and Jan Melissen, who are two prominent scholars in the field of public diplomacy.

In his work named "Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past" Cull frames the concept of public diplomacy in terms of its core aspects and its position with relation to the classical diplomacy. Cull defines the core aspects of public diplomacy as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and psychological warfare (Cull 2009, 17). Cull argues that each of these aspects both constitutes public diplomacy with their common purpose of engaging diplomatic relations with a foreign public and serving as the main instruments of public diplomacy at the same time (Cull 2009 18-21). He frames each of these constituents in terms of their conceptual timeframe (short, medium and long term), the direction of information flow (inward and outward), the required infrastructure, and the source of their credibility (Cull 2009 25). He also frames each of these instruments in terms of their credibility sources, and their credibility in relation to their proximity to government (Cull 2009 26). Cull's classification regarding the ways to conduct public diplomacy, provides an excellent opportunity to consolidate different approaches towards public diplomacy concept such as nation branding and cultural diplomacy. Also, unlike Nye, Cull's classification does not rely on the concept of power. Therefore, it is easier to implement Cull's classification in an interdisciplinary approach. Despite including psychological warfare as an instrument of public diplomacy, Cull comments on its controversy in literature. He refers to it as a parallel activity and defines it as the public diplomacy towards an enemy during a war in his later works (Cull 2009 58).

As for his approach towards different concepts related to public diplomacy, his classification of cultural diplomacy would be a good example. Cull defines cultural diplomacy as a way of conducting public diplomacy, in which the actor attempts to manage the international environment through spreading its cultural resources and achievements (Cull 2009 19). He also frames cultural diplomacy as a long-term

instrument, with an outward flow of information, which acquires credibility through its proximity to cultural authorities and distance from the government (Cull 2009 25-26). As a successful cultural diplomacy campaign, Cull gives the example of USA's Family of Man exhibit of 1955-1963. The exhibit was composed of 503 pictures throughout the world showing the daily life of people. The exhibition travelled to 91 locations in 38 countries, which is visited by huge crowds, (Cull 2009 35). The time period is also of importance in this campaign, Cull argues that this campaign (along with many other cultural campaigns) was mainly for countering the USA's image as a force of economic and political status quo against the Soviet Union's efforts to associate international communism and class solidarity with progress (Cull 2009 34). This exhibit had two main goals, on the one hand it countered the image of the working class outside of the iron curtain (which was supposed to be impoverished and unhappy) and on the other, it elevated the United States' and capitalism's prestige as capable of achieving artistic and cultural preeminence through producing social art (Cull 2009 35). The long-term effect of the exhibit actually was more important. In the long term, the exhibit encouraged the citizens of the iron curtain to demand more art and culture from the capitalist world. According to Cull the strength of the exhibit was that "it was telling the story of the World (not America) to world", therefore it could influence the people through high credibility (Cull 2009 35-36).

Nicholas Cull examines film as a medium of public diplomacy by studying USIA (United States Information Agency) films in different phases of the Cold War. He argues that films as a medium of public diplomacy are the most suitable tools for cultural diplomacy (as an instrument of public diplomacy) whereas it was mainly used as an advocacy tool (Cull 2010, 281). He argues that the use of the film as an advocacy tool has two main problems, first it takes longer to produce and second it is more expensive than a written publication, which could get feedback easily (Cull 2010, 281). While probing a public diplomacy tool, it is important to take note on which instrument it is the most suitable for the given circumstance. This rule is applicable to both the practice of and research on public diplomacy.

The second scholar whose views will be analyzed in this section is Jan Melissen who defines public diplomacy as on the one hand, goal oriented and on the other hand,

having long-term effects of trust and understanding building (Melissen, 2005a) as referred to in the previous section. Jan Melissen, who is a prominent scholar of the discipline of diplomacy, focuses on the changing patterns in public diplomacy again through diplomacy-based approach. He argues that the new public diplomacy⁷ is evolving in a way that states no longer talk about themselves implicitly, they rather prefer focusing on the common interests as public (common) good (Melissen 2011 21). He puts forward three points that the public diplomacy studies should bear in mind at all times. First, it is not only a state centric subject (although still is dominated by it); second, that public diplomacy term should be limited to the relation with foreign publics (domestic diplomacy should be excluded) and third, public diplomacy is not a one way flow of information but a two way, which also includes the listening and feedback elements, rather than telling a story and influencing the foreign public (Melissen 2005a: 12-14). He finds defining public diplomacy as yet another foreign policy tool problematic. He argues that the utility of public diplomacy in such a perspective is reduced severely due to its close ties with a foreign policy goal (Melissen 2005a: 14-15). This remark coincides with my views about cooperation versus conflict in the concept of public diplomacy. Melissen also elaborates on the issue of credibility in public diplomacy. He argues that since public diplomacy deals fundamentally with an audience, credibility is essential for its success (Melissen 2005b: 15). Apart from credibility, he also defines transparency, accountability and integrity as important elements for building public trust, thus for public diplomacy (Melissen 2005b: 22).

Melissen differentiates public diplomacy from propaganda. He argues that the long term and the two-way nature of public diplomacy separates public diplomacy from propaganda both in theory and practice. He then gives the example of public diplomacy during the Bush administration as being conducted with a short-term goal and lack of feedback, which in return led to a loss of credibility and bore no fruit (Melissen 2005a 17).

⁷ The term "New Public Diplomacy" is often used by scholars of diplomacy-based approach to define public diplomacy (including both Cull and Melissen) in order to differentiate themselves with the power-based approaches as well as referring to the changing international arena.

Both Melissen and Cull separates public diplomacy from the power-based approach and pave the way for a different theoretical formulation. Cull's classifications of different aspects related to the public diplomacy and Melissen's separation of public diplomacy from domestic politics along with his argument on the two-way interaction are significant developments in the field. While both scholars clearly distinguish public diplomacy as a subject which requires a broader approach in order to study thoroughly, Melissen's views in this regard answers most of my criticisms for the power based approach except it does not delve deep enough into the question of how public diplomacy functions at the grassroots level.

These three authors looking at the subject through different perspectives provide an important basis for the theoretical framework of the public diplomacy concept. As it was said earlier the lack of a solid theoretical framework inhibits the study of this concept and an interdisciplinary approach can only cover the concept in full. In the next part, I will review the works of more scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds.

There are various scholars who study the concept of public diplomacy through different perspectives. These perspectives are ranging from cultural relations, cultural diplomacy, public relations to brand making and national image. Some of the work of these scholars helped me immensely to understand the complexity of the subject as well as the necessity of a broader interdisciplinary approach for studying public diplomacy related topics. To this end, I will first delve into the concept of cultural relations and cultural diplomacy and elaborate these two in relation to public diplomacy. After that, I will present several works by various scholars whose views would help us to build a methodology for our case study.

The concept of cultural relations in the International Relations discipline is even more novel than the concept of public diplomacy. Questions like what culture is and how it affects different aspects of humanity have always been intriguing questions for the social sciences. In the late 20th century, the field of humanities has become increasingly interested in cultural concepts. In sociology and anthropology, the main

issue was the relationship between identity and culture.⁸ In political science the focus was ethnic conflicts and resurgences.⁹ The dominant approaches of treating the state as a black box as well as other rationalist theories in International Relations led to the neglect of culture for a long time. After the 80's, with the emergence of critical theory, this started to change. The disintegration of the post-communist states and the following ethnic violence (especially in the former Yugoslavia) compelled International Relations scholars to produce and embrace new perspectives in order to understand this new period. Previously, the studies of culture in Political Science mainly focus on political culture while International Relations engaged itself with the identity issue (Mokre 2011: 65).

International Relations discipline borrowed concepts related to culture mainly (and merely) from the prominent sociological and anthropological studies. However, IR has much to offer to these concepts in its own way. The main reason for this assumption lies within the anthropological definition of culture, arguing that culture was a series of invented traditions, which was mainly used for further alienating a distinct identity (Barth 1969: 9). Thus, a discipline which focuses on the relationship between polities, that in fact mainly the result of the same identity building process, has much to add to the concept itself.

A new term named cultural relations was coined in order to fill this gap. "Cultural relations" is the field of study which has many overlapping areas with public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. Therefore, it is important to identify the differences between cultural relations and other related concepts. At first glance, one notices the difference of wording, meaning that the cultural relations refer to an existing state of relations rather than a relationship building or influencing. Whereas, the other terms, which includes the word "diplomacy" refer to a goal (whether long or short term) oriented policy building.

Cultural diplomacy, however, unlike public diplomacy, is not goal oriented. It is also a term of many misconceptions. Scholars from the realist school, treat it as a tool of

⁸See works by Anthony Giddens and Fredrik Barth on Social identity.

⁹Ex. Donald Horowitz and Ian Lustick.

propaganda and psychological warfare¹⁰. In fact, cultural diplomacy is a byproduct of international communication on the one hand and has influenced it through deliberate government policies on the other. Many states have started to form their cultural diplomacy policies by establishing cultural foundations and cultural centers in foreign countries. As the focal point of this research, these foundations and state sponsored centers are the main tools for cultural diplomacy mainly through offering language courses and through the promotion of the country's culture and arts in general.

It is also important to note how such organizations define their activities. For instance, the British Council defines the main aspect of cultural relations as improving the reciprocal understanding (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004). The British Council highlighted the concept of "mutuality" in their interpretation, which corresponds to both mutual understanding and mutual benefit (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004: 5). As an institution, which handles both public diplomacy and cultural relations, it is really important to observe how the Council defines and differentiates these concepts. Their understanding of cultural relations seems more goals oriented than long-term relation building. But another point in their understanding was rather important. They define public diplomacy as the relations between a state and a foreign public, whereas cultural relations are defined as the relations between nations or so to say the people (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004: 36).

Thus, while cultural relations can be defined as the existing state of understanding between two nations especially in the field of culture, including philosophy, arts and worldview; cultural diplomacy refers to a government's deliberate policy, which in turn may influence future relations and cooperation between countries.

Cultural Diplomacy is a concept, which is widely considered as a part of Public Diplomacy or as one of the instruments of it. In order to clarify the relationship between these two concepts, I will refer to the work of Eytan Gilboa "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy". As I argued in the previous parts, Gilboa highlights

¹⁰ Ex. F. A. Ninkovich 1996 *U.S. information policy and cultural diplomacy*, T. Van Dinh 1987 *Communication and diplomacy in a changing world*

the lack of proper theoretical framework for the concept of public diplomacy. While he realizes Nye's efforts to channel the subject towards the changing concept of power, he criticizes him for not explaining the relationship between the two (Gilboa 2008: 62). Gilboa refers to three public diplomacy models as the basic Cold War, the Non-state Transnational, and the Domestic PR models. These models are based on five variables, namely major actors, initiators, goals, types of media, and means/techniques (Gilboa 2008: 59). While there is a major flaw in terms of neglecting the state influence even in the transnational model, Gilboa's model still offers the public diplomacy literature a guide for models. Gilboa's views are useful in understanding the long-term relationship building element (to use Melissen's terminology) of public diplomacy practice.

György Szondi is another scholar who analyzes the link between cultural and public diplomacy through the Central and Eastern European countries' public diplomacy policies and practices after the Cold War. Szondi blames the ill governance of what he calls as the pillars of "national reputation management" namely; destination branding, country branding, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and perception management. These policies all target repairing the negative perception of the "Eastern Europe" (Szondi 2009: 298-310). Szondi is a scholar who is closer to the nation branding literature. Therefore, he classifies all these pillars under the roof of the national reputation management¹¹. He also defines public diplomacy as goal oriented whereas cultural diplomacy as a way to create mutual understanding between publics and/or cultures (Szondi 2009: 299). Although scholars like Szondi separates these concepts, I think that it is more plausible to study the concept of cultural diplomacy under the roof of public diplomacy, since it is only logical to assume the goal of creating a mutual understanding is for helping to achieve the specific goals of public diplomacy in the long run. Szondi also contributes to my thesis with his analysis of the image of post-communist states in the international arena. His argument on the need for country branding for the Eastern and Central European countries mostly focuses on the corrupt and non-democratic image of these

¹¹ Nation branding is an area of study which combines the disciplines of marketing and international relations in theory and aims to promote the image of a country or a nation in terms of tourism and culture. See "Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice" by Keith Dinnie for more information.

countries in relation to their communist period (Szondi 2009: 300). Thus, when analyzing public diplomacy practice of the Russian Federation, we have to be vigilant about a similar image for this country.

John Brown argues that neglecting high arts in the U.S. cultural diplomacy practice is an important cause for the decline of its public diplomacy (Brown 2009: 58). Brown differentiates between cultural diplomacy privately funded popular culture and high culture funded by state. He explains in detail why the U.S should engage in (or in general, countries with a significant cultural tradition) arts diplomacy (diplomacy through high culture). He argues that the high culture is both practical and efficient in telling the American story to the foreign public and there is a significant demand for demonstration of American high culture overseas (Brown 2009: 57). He gives the example of his inability to give a monthly program of cultural activities when asked, unlike the French embassy, during his career as a diplomat, which significantly reduced his ability to conduct cultural diplomacy (Brown 2009: 59). High culture (especially classical music and ballet) is one of the significant resources of the Russian Federation and holds great potential for the long-term influence through public diplomacy.

Sherry Mueller introduced the concept of citizen diplomacy. This concept was one of the starting points for choosing public diplomacy as an academic interest for me. She defines citizen diplomacy as an individual citizen's actions in a personal contact with a foreign individual, which in sum creates an immense relation between two nations (Mueller 2009: 102). This concept includes official exchange programs as well as business relations. The author argues that citizen diplomacy is beyond the public diplomacy as being both complementary to it, as well as a consequence of it (Mueller 2009: 106). This concept offers a whole new area of study for the image/brand making approaches as well as for the field of public diplomacy through its inclusion of the image and experience of the ordinary citizen. Another argument towards this concept is that, it is natural to expect the adaptation of a practice, which owes its very existence to the improvement of information technology (such as public diplomacy), to the inventions such as the use of internet and social media (Bjola, Corneliu & Cassidy 2019). A case study conducted on both a state sponsored programme and a

simple social media website shows the extent of transformation that the public diplomacy practice has gone through (Payne, Sevin & Burya 2011). Because of these inventions today, it is easier for an ordinary citizen to be both a subject and a practitioner of public diplomacy.

Giles Scott-Smith's work on Exchange Programs as a Public Diplomacy tool is also important. Exchange Program as a public diplomacy tool offers the most personal and psychological experience that no other instrument can (Scott-Smith 2009 50). Scott-Smith argues that the exchange programs are especially useful for reinforcing existing opinions; therefore, it is essential to use other public diplomacy methods beforehand in order to create a pre-opinion about a country (Scott-Smith 50).

Robert H. Gass and John S. Seiter touches upon the concept of credibility as an important variable in public diplomacy. They define the concept of credibility as potential to persuade and in terms of its traits of being a perceptual, dynamic, situation-specific, culture-bound, and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Gass and Seiter, 2009 155-157). They give the example of American public diplomacy especially after the invasion of Iraq as being unable to adapt to a reduced credibility situation. They argue that policies affect the credibility more than all public diplomacy instruments combined (Gass and Seiter 155). They further de-construct the credibility concept into primary dimensions of expertise, trustworthiness and goodwill and while mentioning secondary dimensions like composure, dynamism (Gass and Seiter 160-161). Gass and Seiter conclude that since credibility is dynamic, situation specific and culture bound; public diplomacy has to employ an audience-centered, flexible and region-specific approach (Gass and Seiter 162). The issue of credibility is certainly one of the important components of public diplomacy.

Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge in the introductory chapter of the book "The United States and Public Diplomacy" argue that the literature needs to focus on other countries and expand the topic beyond the traditional Cold War perspective (Osgood and Etheridge 2010, 7). Both of his arguments call for a new focus on the subject and through analyzing Russian Federation, I will be contributing to fill this gap in the literature.

Jessica Gienow-Hecht in "The Anomaly of the Cold War: Cultural Diplomacy and Civil Society Since 1850" analyzes the cultural diplomacy under three periods; pre-Cold War period starting from the mid-19th century, the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period. As the name of the article suggests she argues that the Cold War period was an exception in terms of its intense public focus on cultural diplomacy unlike the other two periods (Gienow-Hecht, 2010: 45-48). In the pre-Cold War period, she gives the German and French examples of art export through government supported individuals without necessarily a diplomatic title. She compares the strengths and weaknesses of a direct involvement of the state apparatus versus an indirect involvement (Gienow-Hecht 2010: 44-45). She concludes the article arguing that the Cold War era was an exception in terms of its massive public investment in cultural diplomacy and predicts a shift of more indirect public involvement in the 21st century (Gienow-Hecht 2010: 55). This article is important for reminding us that there is a huge tradeoff between a publicly funded and organized public diplomacy with a more private one. While public funds enlarge the scale of a campaign and its audience, it also reduces the credibility of it because of the high visibility of the government. Therefore, it is important to find a suitable equilibrium for a public policy campaign in terms of this tradeoff regarding its main objectives and goals.

The literature on public diplomacy is growing. The writings of scholars like Cull, Nye and Melissen lay the foundation for a theory of public diplomacy. Scholars of public diplomacy need to build on the existing literature through formulating theoretical frameworks for the concept. Despite the growing interest, the lack of theoretical framework discourages young scholars to work on the related issues and reduces the credibility of the concept in the academic field.

My initial curiosity concerning the subject was mostly related to two major questions: one being "why and how people would be attracted towards a foreign culture and polity" and second being "to what degree a foreign public be influenced by an international actor". However, I found out that the literature does not sufficiently address these questions.

Any attempt to build a theory should be supported by case studies in order to both test its validity and develop it further. But measuring the effects of public diplomacy which may take long years to result in observable outcomes is a difficult task. As it was argued earlier, while there are some concept building efforts in the field of public diplomacy, no comprehensive theory or model has been built upon so far. It is an important task to build a theory and support/expand it with tailor-made focused research, which in return would pave the way for alternative theories and views even if the initial theory is discredited. In the following section, I will analyze the main components of public diplomacy with the goal to understand some of the main concerns discussed in the literature and their relevance to existing international relations theories. All these endeavors are hoped to facilitate the understanding on the main objectives of the Russian public diplomacy.

The main socio-political components revolving around the concept of public diplomacy are Public and Individual, Attraction, Credibility, Diplomacy and Power. Therefore, in this part I will discuss the issue under these titles in relation to public diplomacy and then elaborate on their importance in relation to the existing literature.

2.3 Public and Individual

The first main component to be analyzed in order to understand concept of public diplomacy is “public”. This analysis will look at the concept of public and its relationship with public diplomacy. While looking at this I will also elaborate on a secondary issue namely the relation between public and individual due to two main reasons. First, this elaboration, through further deconstructing the concept of public itself, will help us to understand the concept of public better. Second, this elaboration will contribute to the discussion on the methodology of this thesis through pointing out the weakness of it.

The public is made up of individuals. Even in public spaces, individuals still possess their personal values and opinion. Public and individual constantly interacts. Therefore, it is actually reductionist to approach the public opinion as a whole. Jost and Hunyady (2005: 261), for example, argue that individual ideologies, preferences and attractions act as justification for the political system. We can safely assume that

the same individual view may very well justify or unjustify an outside foreign policy, thus influence the public opinion itself.

“Public Diplomacy” literature mostly treats the public as a whole and builds on the principle of the whole is more than the sum of its parts. This approach is more in line with the liberal theory of international relations, which assumes the public consciousness would ultimately direct the foreign policy. Although this approach has its merits undeniably, in order to understand “the whole” in detail, it is essential to understand its parts. Most studies in the field of public diplomacy focuses on “public” naturally. But I argue that the “public” and “public opinion” have to be deconstructed in order to understand how it works.

2.3.1 Kant, Rousseau, Mill and Habermas on Public and Individual

The strength of public opinion is recognized by almost all scholars of social sciences. Starting from the 18th century with Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* and Rousseau’s *Social Contract* as well as later works by David Singer and Michael W. Doyle social sciences have built and elaborated on the rising power of the public opinion¹².

The Kantian concept of publicity relies on an openness both in domestic and international politics. He uses the term publicity as a prerequisite for a just and moral policy\law, which would also counter secrecy in relations among states and thus would lead into perpetual peace (Kant 1795: 195). This view of idealized system of international relations has laid the foundation for democratic peace theory of the liberal school of international relations. However, Kant’s arguments relied on the assumption that there is a common morality among humans and with openness; public opinion would create peace among states.

¹² See Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Jean Jack Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, David Singer’s “The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes” and Michael W. Doyle’s *Liberalism and World Politics* for more information.

Rousseau's question on public opinion (or general will as his term) asks whether acceptance by general a legitimate base for decisions is and is it always right and correct?¹³ He answers:

“There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences.”¹⁴

Rousseau's view explained in the above quote is quite important in pointing out the weakness of holistic approach towards public opinion. John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, generally saw the public opinion in clash with individuality, which is clearly visible from his arguments on limiting the majority's influence on the representing minority in order for the representative democracy to function properly (Mill 1986: 502). As opposed to Rousseau, Mill (and Kant to a certain degree) conceptualizes public opinion as a single common interest in order to adapt it into the representation environment. When we consider the public opinion in an inter-state relational environment, Rousseau's definition of public opinion is more suitable in encompassing both realist and liberal approaches. However, as it was present in the literature review section and will be elaborated on in the methodological arguments in this thesis, incorporating this definition to the public diplomacy concept of international relations discipline would require a new and a more comprehensive theoretical approach.

On relation between the state (as the international actor) and public opinion, Habermas lays down the structure of public opinion in terms of the relation between the state (or the sphere of public authority), private realm, public sphere and where the interaction between the individuals forms the public opinion and relayed to the public authority and the institutions like media, civil society and specialized public institutions (Habermas 1962: 30). He argues that the nature of this relation relies on the ability of these intermediary institutions to enter into the public sphere as the more

¹³ Jean Jacques Rousseau *Social Contract*, Book II Chapter III “Whether the General Will is Fallible”

¹⁴ Ibid, Book II Chapter III “Whether the General Will is Fallible”

they merge themselves with the common concern the more they can channel it towards the authority (Habermas 1962: 36).

All of these scholars have pointed out important aspects on relation between public and individual, however, none of them except Habermas were able to observe the advances in statecraft and information technologies in the 20th century. In a literal sense, one can easily argue that international relations are more public today. Although in a way, the public (through intermediary institutions, which influence it) became yet another area of competing ideas, views and moralities. Public diplomacy efforts of a foreign polity is yet another competing view in this area and effects of its success and failure might be hard to notice solely through focusing on the outcome. So, in which way this would help us to make sense of the literature review? By deconstructing the notion of public and public opinion (through analyzing three main approaches by different scholars), I do point out the interaction on the basis of public diplomacy. And in the light of views by Rousseau and Habermas, the existing literature on public diplomacy has two main weaknesses. First as mentioned earlier this section, the literature mainly treats the public opinion as a whole whereas in reality the public opinion holds each and every person's view not necessarily as the mean of them. Second, public sphere is a wide area with many competing views and as such when analyzing the effects of a specific public diplomacy policy, scholars might overestimate the sway that policy holds over the public opinion. While reviewing the existing literature on public diplomacy the readers should always be vary of these two weaknesses and consider them with a critical viewpoint. With that in mind, view on public in the existing literature mostly matches with Kant and Mill's holistic approach hence are more inclined towards the liberal theory of international relations.

Views on the changing nature of public diplomacy can be considered as reasoning for this argument. In this circumstance, it is no surprise that individual is becoming more and more relevant for the decision makers. However, one still has to consider the socio-political structure of the polity in which the public diplomacy to be conducted. Individual focused diplomacy practice or research might not always be the most optimal choice of conducting public diplomacy in more community-focused

societies. Gregory Payne (2009) argues that conducting individual focused public diplomacy would prove to be a challenge for the US Department of State, which adopted a more individual focused public diplomacy effort in the post 9/11 period, in the post-soviet republics of Russia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan while it had mixed results in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is essential to consider the circumstances both in practice and in research of public diplomacy.

In order to summarize the above discussion and criticism towards the existing literature on public diplomacy, I will present a simplified model to demonstrate this additional layer, which was not utilized in depth in the current literature.




Figure 1: A simplified modelling of Public Diplomacy

In a simplified environment an actor may try to influence the policy of a foreign polity through classic diplomacy or public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, in itself, may be implemented through foreign public as a whole and/or individual. A simple scheme explaining the relationship is presented below with the indication of all of the possible relationships.

Path 1 represents the classical diplomacy and interstate (or inter actor) relations. An actor can influence the foreign policy through direct relation with the target policy using its power and/or other available resources.

Path 2 represents classical public diplomacy which focuses on the public sphere and tries to influence foreign policy through addressing foreign public as a whole through mass instruments such as extensive campaigns and foreign aid.

Path 3 represents the individual layer of public diplomacy which aims to reach individual first through various means including cultural attraction. After that there are two routes which the new public diplomacy takes its course; individual or individuals given that they are part of the state elite, may influence foreign policy of the polity directly and/or in the case of non-elites through influencing public and spreading attraction (4th and 5th paths respectively).

2.4 Attraction

As it was argued in the section on the history of public diplomacy the evolution of public as an international actor has paved the way for a new tool called public diplomacy in inter-state relations. The aims of this tool can be brought under two broad categories of short-term goal oriented and long-term effects of trust and understanding and image building (Melissen 2005: 12). Both of these aims require attracting the foreign audience as Nye formulizes “The strength of the soft power¹⁵ lies in attraction” (Nye 2004: 30). This attraction may be in the form of guaranteeing support or neutral approach from a foreign public towards an action taken by an actor through justifying that action (short term) or creation of a general positive view towards an actor. If we deconstruct “attraction”, it consists of two sides one of which is the person or entity that is attracted and the other one is the thing that the previous one attracted to. In order to understand how attraction functions in international relations, one must consider both sides of it. Attraction (or Interpersonal Attraction as often used) is a concept which used by social psychologists in order to explain positive interaction between persons which draws them together. The discipline of psychology has offered a significant number of models for interpersonal attraction¹⁶ but none of them inquires about attraction towards foreign culture. However,

¹⁵ “Soft Power” is a term coined by Joseph Nye in order to encompass an actor’s capability of attracting and persuading other actors in order to achieve its goals in foreign policy. A detailed discussion on his works will be presented in Literature Review part.

¹⁶ See Works by Donn Byrne, John E. Lydon, Mark Zanna i.e.

scholars of public diplomacy use the term for the interaction between a public as a whole and a foreign international actor. This approach jumps several steps ahead of actual flow of information as similar to what was argued in the previous part on public. To summarize briefly, flows of information between the international actor and individual as well as individual and public were overlooked in the current public diplomacy literature. Again, although this is not a question which this thesis tries to answer, these relations would be the key points for understanding what really lies at the bottom of public diplomacy and should be the subject of a comprehensive interdisciplinary research. Another important aspect, which is not analyzed adequately in the current public diplomacy literature, is the two-sided interaction within the context of attraction. Social psychology studies show that a person is more likely to be attracted to another when the interaction/attraction is two sided; meaning that people are prone to be attracted to someone who is also attracted to them. This hypothesis can also be seen in the contemporary public diplomacy practice as many states, which are prominent practitioners of public diplomacy, have started to employ two-way communication methods. One good example for this is the “mutuality” initiative of British Council. British public diplomacy (through British Council) encourages and listens to the inputs from the target audience and supports a two-way flow of information (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004: 47). The argument beyond this approach is that this will increase the communication and establish open relations which would in turn flourish a mutual understanding (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004: 21-22).

I would like to discuss the actors’ expectations through “Attracting” a foreign public. Scholars contributing to the public diplomacy literature often build on the assumption that public opinion would influence foreign policy of the state through internal political dynamics in such a way that would support the pursued goal of the international actor. While the concept of attraction functions similar to this basic assumption, it is important to note that public diplomacy may also aim to form different kinds of relations with the foreign public in order to achieve the desired outcome. These are not necessarily positive as the concept of attraction but more neutral and negative relations, which in my view may only be effective for the more short-term goal-oriented use of public diplomacy. The neutral alternative of

conducting short-term public diplomacy would be justification of foreign policy actions taken or planned to be taken in the eyes of foreign public; thus, ensuring supportive or at least a neutral approach towards that policy. The other and the one involves higher risks would be coercing/threatening a foreign public to a more supportive or neutral approach towards a policy taken by the actor conducting public diplomacy. Although these aspects (coercion and justification) of public diplomacy was previously elaborated on by few scholars (Gilboa 2008: 61) (Nye 2008: 94) (Cull 2009: 17), who were already covered under literature review, none of them perceive these aspect of public diplomacy in terms of their relation to the concept of attraction. From the attraction perspective, categorizing them as positive, neutral and negative methods of conducting of public diplomacy has two main advantages. First and foremost, this categorization includes them well into the subject of public diplomacy thus rather than inventing new terms they can be presented as part of the public diplomacy, which will be justified shortly. Secondly this classification while supporting the central position of attraction in public diplomacy subject, also offers alternative scenarios for relaying the message of an actor in the absence of attraction. Although it can be argued that these methods cannot be considered as part of the public diplomacy, they are well within the definition of public diplomacy because of they are practiced for influencing the public opinion (and thus reactive foreign policy) of a different actor in order to align it with the policy of the actor that is practicing public diplomacy. At first look integration of these methods into the public diplomacy could be interpreted as concept stretching as they do not incorporate well with the theme of attraction and more suitable with the classical diplomacy. Another criticism towards the inclusion of justification as a public diplomacy method can be the dichotomy between “need for justification” and “existing public image of an actor”. It can be easily argued that acceptance of an actor’s policies as legitimate by others can be due to its existing image in the eyes of a foreign public (Kalin 2011: 9). This dichotomy would be somewhat problematic regarding a public diplomacy of an actor, which already holds a significant “soft power” at hand if we were to utilize Nye’s terminology. However, justification would be an indispensable tool for an actor, which does not hold such sway in the eyes of the international community (such as the Russian Federation). To sum up, within the context of expanding

communication technologies these methods of justification and coercion can very well be integrated into the public diplomacy concept as these messages may be relayed to the foreign public in order to influence foreign policy of another actor. Practical use of these methods within the context of public diplomacy will be presented more clearly in our case as public diplomacy of the Russian Federation resort to these methods more often than the positive attraction of building a long-term alignment towards the foreign policy pursued¹⁷.

The sole use of the term “attraction” for defining interactions between an actor and its target public would not be enough to encompass the practice and theory of public diplomacy as it is biased towards a more positive interaction. Revisiting the Cull’s public diplomacy tools and their taxonomy, public diplomacy would require a wider metrics of analysis such as interaction instead of attraction or recognition of flows of information instead of one-way transition. In a world with thousands of international actors with varying capabilities, presentation of attraction as the sole way of conducting public diplomacy would be neither practical nor realistic, as each international actor would interact with a foreign public in accordance to their capability as well as its preferred method. It is important to define what the term actor entails within the context of this thesis. Although the focus of thesis will be on the state as an actor, the scope of theoretical discussions presented in the second chapter encompasses a broader definition of the term. In this regard the international actor includes states and other institutions acting in the international arena such as International Organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) and International Corporations.

2.5 Power

The third component that would be analyzed in this section is power. As commonly known power is a well-established concept in international relations discipline and the canonical concept of the realist theory. This section will be focusing on how this concept was integrated into the existing public diplomacy literature.

¹⁷ This will be presented as one of the side arguments in the second chapter.

The most prominent conceptualization of power into the public diplomacy literature is made by Joseph Nye with the soft power term. Nye (2003: 9) argues that a state's culture, political values and foreign policies shapes its soft power capability hence its ability to persuade other actors in the same direction of the pursued foreign policy goals. His later writings also incorporate "hard power" into this equation and come up with the term "smart power" which is born out of the necessity for an actor to also hold the necessary "hard power" capability, hence the "stick" as the famous "carrot and stick" analogy goes, in order to realize its foreign policy goals (Nye: 2013, 47). Though not essential, power in the classical sense holds a significant part in practice of public diplomacy of states. If public diplomacy, in its essence is interacting with the foreign public, it is natural that power in its classical sense (meaning military, political and economic power) would constitute part of the resources, which are used for public diplomacy, in addition to culture, and other means of interaction. It is however important to differentiate between actual use of these power elements and usage of information of this power. Information of power in this regard refers to the knowledge of the public on the "hard power" capabilities of the actor conducting public diplomacy. Usage or rather effects of this information, since mostly this information would be already available and passively affect the interaction between the actor and the public, would be most prominent in the coercive use of public diplomacy. While the long-term relationship building type of public diplomacy would also be influenced by the aspect of power, its role would be secondary compared to the other resources such as culture.

In the literature review, I had criticized Nye for his focus on conflict rather than cooperation as expansion of public diplomacy literature is stimulated by the increase in the number of issues requiring international cooperation. I still argue that conceptualization of public diplomacy resources as "soft power" is problematic as classical notion of power; culture and credibility are some of many variables in interaction with foreign publics hence public diplomacy. Categorization of "soft" and "hard" power undermines the study of public diplomacy as this categorization integrates public diplomacy into a power-based approach, which completely disregards agency of the public and mechanics behind the interaction between an international actor and a foreign public. However, returning to the categorization

presented in the previous part on attraction, classical notion of power would play a pivotal role in short term goal oriented public diplomacy approach through coercion. To summarize briefly the power is always there and information of power (hence the power itself) can be utilized in coercive public diplomacy attempts, however power is not the central concept in defining and utilizing public diplomacy as public diplomacy in essence is two way communication and interaction between an international actor and a foreign public.

Diplomacy based approaches on the other hand though seem to underutilize power they present it as one of many concepts which influences interaction between the public and international actor. In the final analysis place of power in the public diplomacy practice would depend on the context of the interaction while having varying degrees of constant effect in the background. Effects of power would significantly increase for short-term goal oriented neutral and negative interactions between a public and an international actor.

2.6 Credibility

Credibility is the final component, which will be analyzed in this section. Studies on the notion of credibility and/or reputation are vital in the area of public diplomacy. Although it can be modified depending on the type of actor, credibility can briefly be defined as the image of an international actor in terms of relationship between its statements and actions. An international actor would be deemed credible so long as its actions overlap with its statements. While credibility is important while conducting classical state-to-state diplomacy, damage by loss of credibility would be much more manageable for a state practicing classical diplomacy as actions precede over the statements due to the very nature of classical diplomacy. However, credibility damage for an actor which practice public diplomacy can be catastrophic in terms of its future initiatives since the image of an international actor is one of the main variables in its interaction with a foreign public. Credibility is important for all three practices of public diplomacy namely; positive, neutral and negative, which were covered previous section. The main reason for this fact is related to the message of interaction between the actor and the public. In order for the message of the actor to be effective, the public should think that the actor's future actions would

correspond with the message. This is especially important for neutral and negative practice of public diplomacy (which would rely on a more short-term goal-oriented interaction) in which the public should be convinced that the actor would act in accordance with its justification or carry out with the action, which is used as a threat. Although credibility is mainly related to this equation, the factors that influence credibility are numerous. For example, the article by Jessica Gienow-Hect, which was covered under literature review section, relates credibility in cultural diplomacy conducted by states to the nature of the conduct hence concludes that publicly funded (and visible) initiatives would have less credibility than the private initiatives (Gienow-Hecht 2010: 44-45).

Another important study on the relationship between credibility and public diplomacy is conducted by Ben D. Mor within the context of escalation and conflict between Israel-Lebanon in 2006. In his work called “Credibility talk in public diplomacy” Mor reviewed the literature on rhetoric and credibility and came up with a model to categorize statements made by international actors which then applied to the statements made by the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and State of Israel (Mor 2012). Through this categorization he shows through which directions an actor engages in what he calls “credibility talk” such as denial, disassociation and justification (Mor 2012: 402-410). His views clearly strengthen credibility as an end in itself for public diplomacy practice in a way much more sophisticated than our simple taxonomy in the previous topic (positive, neutral and negative conduct of public diplomacy). However, he does not take credibility into account also as a resource which an actor has that is influenced through its actions. Indeed, credibility can be a goal in itself when conducting public diplomacy, but it can also be classified as a resource, which influences an actor’s other public diplomacy actions in general. Credibility as a resource could be affected by numerous dynamics but in my opinion, the most important factor would be the actors’ previous actions. Thus, it is essential to hold a historical perspective when analyzing an actor’s effects of public diplomacy due to the long-lasting effects of actions taken in the international arena. Here it is safe to assume that the effects of previous actions would be amplified in correlation to the developments in the communication technologies since it is relatively easier to access the past actions and statements of an international actor compared to few

decades ago. Also, a secondary factor that can influence credibility of an actor would be its domestic actions. Again, in relation to developments in information technologies, it is easy to follow up on a state's domestic politics or disciplinary measures taken in a non-governmental organization. Therefore, a discrepancy between an actor's statement and its domestic action could undermine its credibility in the international arena.

To sum up, an actor's credibility would play an important part in its public diplomacy practice in two major ways. First, it would directly affect the impact of a public diplomacy initiative in relation to its image; thus, credibility can be classified as a resource, which modifies the overall effectiveness of the interaction between the foreign public and the actor. Credibility as a resource would increase with the overall consistency between statements; actions of the actor as well as the ideals promoted by the actor and would decline in the opposite. Secondly, in light of Mor's study, credibility can also be the goal of a particular public diplomacy initiative especially in the neutral conduct of public diplomacy explained in the section on attraction. Due to these facts, credibility have played an important role in methodology design of this study.

In this chapter, I aimed to familiarize the reader with the concept of public diplomacy and specify the components, which are crucial to understand it. In the literature review, I presented various approaches from different standpoints towards the public diplomacy concept. I classified the literature on public diplomacy under two major approaches as power based and diplomacy-based ones. Though both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses, in the end their use would rely heavily on the context, which they were applied to. Later I elaborated on four major points (public, power, attraction and credibility) in their relation to the concept of public diplomacy.

Due to the lack of a solid theoretical framework in public diplomacy studies and variation in terms of the scope of public diplomacy, approaches towards it and even the definition of public diplomacy itself, I feel the need to specify my own definition of public diplomacy as: "the targeted interaction between an international actor and a foreign public with the goal of influencing each other into a certain action or inaction". As argued previously this interaction may have different forms (positive,

neutral, negative) that would require various tools and approaches (cultural diplomacy, nation branding, broadcasting, justification, coercion i.e.). All these things considered, prioritizing some of these aspects in relation to both the situation and the goal is necessary. Likewise, it is also essential to consider the context when analyzing a specific public diplomacy case.



CHAPTER 3

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PRACTICES OF THE RUSSIAN POLITY

One cannot probe anything without first regarding its past, especially a polity. A new polity is always influenced by its predecessor whether through retaining its ways or altering them to adapt. In this chapter, transformation of Russian public diplomacy will be analyzed briefly, starting from the late imperial period, focusing on the main concern of this thesis, which is the public diplomacy objectives of Russian polity. However, this approach should be taken critically by being aware of concept stretching. Although many differing views on the history of public diplomacy were presented in the second chapter, I think that the period which is going to be covered in this chapter would not stretch the concept of public diplomacy. Regarding that, this chapter will try to evaluate previous similar policies and find continuities. This in turn combined with the section on the contemporary period would help us immensely during the analysis on priorities for public diplomacy of Russian Federation.

3.1 The Imperial and Soviet Legacy

The Russian Empire had mainly three diplomatic goals in pursuing public diplomacy. These were minimizing the local resistance/reaction for constant expansion/aggression, to be accepted into the European State System and finally influencing all Slavs through a Pan-Slavist ideology. These goals can be attributed to a proto public diplomacy effort since they, more or less, include an image making for the country. Also, it is important to note the time period while inspecting these elements, since the 19th century was the time when today's diplomacy (along with its basic concepts like security and international community) was starting to form. I will

focus on the analysis of these three major goals as the basis for Russia's future public diplomacy.

From the Grand Duchy of Moscow to the end of the Russian Empire, the country grew more than 1000-fold in terms of territory (Ragsdale 1993: 3). Initially this expansion was mostly for regaining the lost homeland, but it expanded beyond that achieving it. This was almost inevitable in two aspects namely, time and space, which is brilliantly explained by Alfred Rieber with the term *permeable frontiers* (Rieber 1993: 330). Although Rieber does not focus on the time aspect of this term, it is important to note that the initial period of this expansion correspond to the late medieval and early modern era when the war making was seen almost natural by all polities of the time. Though the notion of international stability was produced later, Empire's expansion did not easily pace down except for several short periods. Space aspect is usually connected to the existence of three general directions with more or less different political spheres, namely west, south and east. Russia could expand through them one at a time while reducing their effects on its diplomatic reputation (Rieber 1993: 335). In addition to that, when the concepts of international stability started to form on its western and southern frontiers, eastern frontiers were still open to further colonization and expansion. Thus, just like the United States, the Russian Empire had the opportunity to expand without suffering any repercussions (Kissinger 1995: 232). In all directions however, the empire used all its diplomatic assets to prevent any kind of coalition against it. For example, most of the western expansions during the reign of Peter the Great were seen as a defensive measure (These wars were fought primarily with an alliance of Prussia and Denmark) against Sweden; while the initial eastern expeditions were involving a delicate diplomacy between the three Kazakh Hordes and their enemies (Rieber 1993: 346). It can be easily argued that these acts included immense political considerations. While the western and southern expansion staggered by Russia was clearly balancing a coalition against itself, while still chipping away small parts when it was able (Rogger 1983: 168).

Second related subject is the Empire's ambition is to become a part of the European State system and overall to be recognized as a European polity. The Russian Empire, by being in the cultural margin (As term used by Rieber) of both East and West, (or

Asia and Europe in another sense) went through a serious identity crisis both internally and externally (Rieber 1993: 347). This crisis transformed into a European integration process after the Petrine reforms -again both internally and externally-. Thereon, the diplomatic façade of the Empire gradually took a more western form on issues regarding the other European nations (Asia was still an exemption). Starting from the 18th century, the Russian Empire was an inseparable part of the European politics, but nevertheless it was not seen as a complete member of Europe (Still not seen). Three Emperors' Alliance is a remarkable example of this effort. Though Russian Empire formed many alliances before, Empire was seen as an external balancing partner in much of these (Rieber 1993: 347-350). However, Three Emperors' Alliance was actually a project, which accepted Russian Empire as a counter revolutionary empire of the European system (Rogger 1983: 168). Being a European state was an essential image of being a great power at the time for the reason that, all of the great powers were European, and these two images went hand in hand for a long period of time.

Last but not least, it is important to note the Pan-Slavist ideology that influenced the Russian diplomacy from time to time after 19th century. Pan-Slavist ideology can be arguably influenced by the Slavophile vision. Slavophiles, were very important part of the so called the Russian enlightenment period and they had a conservative and romantic school of thinking, which presumably caused by the Russian economic backwardness compared to other European powers (Also some scholars spot it as the start of the Russian nationalism) (Rabow-Edling 2006: 10). Though Pan-Slavism basically envisioned a polity which would include all Slavs, one can easily deduce such a policy would be impractical in the age of nationalism. This was very much in line with the notorious Third Rome Doctrine as well as the Balkan policy of the Empire during 19th century (MacKenzie 1993: 221). To this end, the Empire tried to create an image of a big brother (which could also be found during the Soviet and the Post-Soviet period) through various means (Moscow Patriarchate mainly). Regarding the internal effects of this approach Dietrich Geyers argues that the actual impact of Pan-Slavism was very little even in the upper-class circles; for instance, total membership to these "Pan-Slavic" Societies were close to only 2000 people during heydays (Geyers 1987: 108). It would be sensible to argue that Pan-Slavism had little

impact on the actual policy decision of the Empire, but it was certainly a great cover for justifying abysmal relations with the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in the eyes of the other European great powers.

3.2 Public Diplomacy in the Age of Ideology

When the Soviet Union was formed, the public diplomacy goals of the Imperial period were mostly changed on the facade although there were significant continuities. The initial challenge was the recognition of the new regime. Many states were reluctant to recognize the Soviet Union due to its alien ideological foundation. Perhaps the most obvious demonstration of this challenge was the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States, which only became possible in 1933, a decade later than the formation of the polity, which was overcome by President Roosevelt's personal efforts.¹⁸ Apart from this initial challenge there were two main foreign policy goals pursued by the Soviet Union, which were related to its public diplomacy efforts. These were the support of communist revolutions throughout the globe and dampening the adverse effects of aggressive/expansionist policies conducted by the Soviet Union (both military and ideological). Although this transformation was seen as a break from the Imperial Russia's previous ambitions by many scholars¹⁹ my research indicates significant parallels between the two, the recognition as a European state was replaced by recognition as a state while limiting the effects of aggression more or less continued with an ideological façade as the Soviet Union adopted an expansionism through its sphere of influence rather than direct annexation (except for a few cases) that still needed to be justified and balanced in the international arena.

3.2.1 Lenin's Foreign Policy, Decree on Peace and the Basis of the Cold War

Soviet foreign policy was shaped mainly by four sources, which were the Tsarist foreign policy tradition, the Russian revolutionary traditions, the writings of Marx and Lenin, and the operational code (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 45). Ideological

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State official website, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ussr> access date 11.02.2016.

¹⁹ See Tsygankov 2013 or Sergunin&Karabeshkin 2015

aspect of the Soviet foreign policy was mostly shaped through Marxist-Leninist worldview, which focused on the antagonism and inevitability of the conflict between capitalist and communist system. However, it also left room for flexibility in order to survive. This flexibility manifests itself in Lenin's notion of "peaceful coexistence" in his Decree on Peace, in which he calls for peace with all countries while agitating the working class of the capitalist countries at the same time (Lenin 1917).

... We shall not bind ourselves by treaties. We shall not allow ourselves to be entangled by treaties. We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these. ... (Lenin 1917: 255)

This quotation summarizes the flexible (paradoxical at the same time) nature of the Soviet foreign policy. This is the theoretical middle ground that Lenin had found in order to reconcile Marxist determinism with realpolitik. It is a solid summary of the notion of peaceful coexistence in the Soviet foreign policy.

Lenin realized the dire situation of the Soviet Union (encircled by capitalist countries) and he sought competition in areas of strength and cooperation in areas of weakness (Lerner 1964: 866). He mounted its foreign policy onto a rail between peaceful coexistence and world revolution. In this context it is appropriate to explain these two notions and their contents. The notion of world revolution foresees a communist revolution in every country which from the perspective of Russian foreign policy means directly or indirectly meddling with the internal politics of all countries by any means necessary.

... While addressing this proposal for peace to the governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia appeals in particular also to the class-conscious workers of the three most advanced nations of mankind and the largest states participating in the present war, namely, Great Britain, France and Germany. ... (Lenin 1917: 251)

In the above quote, Lenin calls for the working classes of the belligerent countries in order to achieve peace immediately. While it symbolizes the pragmatic side of the Soviet foreign policy, it is also largely influenced by the world revolution doctrine. He urges the working class of other countries to take initiative for peace. In an

ideological perspective this was a suitable way to raise the class consciousness in these countries. Hence it was also a step towards the world revolution doctrine.

The early doctrine of world revolution can be exemplified by the Russo-Polish conflict in 1920. In the summer of 1920, the Red Army was marching towards Warsaw and it had already installed a revolutionary committee in the city of Bialystok in order to serve as a basis for a future Polish Soviet Republic (Lerner, 868). The doctrine of world revolution can be seen as the basis of the Cold War. It is a reflection for the hope of simultaneous revolution in all countries, which arguably can be attributed to Trotsky's foreign policy, whereas peaceful coexistence foresaw a state of peace between the capitalist and communist countries until the final inevitable conflict. This state of peace was seen as a period of preparation for the actual conflict; therefore, it had to acquire every possible advantage for the times of conflict.

These changing patterns in the foreign policy, while having their periodic, situational and geographic appliances, more or less can be applied to the entirety of the Soviet foreign policy while analyzing it. One other important point is that they are not mutually exclusive doctrines. While they are more influential and observable in certain periods or instances, most policy decisions are a combination of these doctrines (Especially the ones regarding foreign publics). Lenin's reign was characterized by this duality in the foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy sought "peaceful coexistence" through business relations, while at the same time Comintern resumed its propaganda for "world revolution" which was seen as a destabilizing factor by the western powers (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 54). This duality can be further exemplified by the trade relations with Britain starting in 1921 and broken down in 1927 due to the alleged operations of Comintern in British colonies (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 55). The Soviet Union's desperation for recognition and cooperation is clearly seen in the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany. Soviets tried to increase their foreign relations through the isolated Germany with whom the relations were abysmal after the treaty of Brest Litovsk and further inhibited because of the Comintern activities.

My research topic focuses more on the periods of peaceful coexistence, since the world revolution periods were more inclined towards military interventions, espionage and propaganda rather than public diplomacy (Although the relation between public diplomacy and propaganda is one of many debates). These periods usually correspond with the détente period.

Regarding the early Soviet Foreign policy, E. H. Carr argues that the Soviet Foreign Policy was composed of three main areas of interests with their corresponding institutions. The “official” diplomacy was conducted through People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (NKID), organization of the world revolution through Communist International (Comintern) while the public diplomacy (as the third pillar) was simultaneously handled by numerous Soviet organizations including institutions like VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) and any other institutions concerned with an area that could be part of public diplomacy, including ministry of health or sport federations (Fayet 2010: 34). As it was argued in the second chapter this state centered approach towards public diplomacy had both its advantages and disadvantages. But one can easily argue that the focus on state apparatus while conducting public diplomacy, gradually inhibited the Soviet Union’s ability to appeal foreign publics. The evolving nature of the international public diplomacy further inhibited this capacity as it was more and more conducted through private and/or semi-private institutions. The contradictory notions of foreign policy axis of world revolution and peaceful coexistence is another problematic aspect of the Russian public diplomacy. The legacy of shifting duality between these policies had adverse effects on the credibility aspect of the Soviet public diplomacy in the long run.

3.2.2 Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev: Foreign Policy on the Rail

In the previous part, I discussed the notions of “peaceful coexistence” and “world revolution”, how they emerged and laid the foundation of the Soviet foreign policy. Although Lenin found the theoretical aspect of the foreign policy, Stalin was the leader who put it into practice. As one can argue practice requires varying degrees of realism, and Stalin was the leader of hardcore realism who implemented the flexibility aspect of Lenin’s theory of international relations in a strict manner.

Stalin saw the universal revolution being at the door as a myth. Also, the Soviet Union was seen as a rogue state in the international system. These led to a series of foreign policy initiatives to create a climate of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist countries. When these initiatives failed, the Soviet Union turned its face towards Germany that was also experiencing similar problems. The relations with Germany in the period prior to the Second World War affected the image of USSR adversely. Effect of this event lingered on even after the Second World War as the image of the Soviet Union as a country that divided Poland together with Germany was still alive in the minds of the European Public (the image was probably more drastic for the citizens of Poland and other Eastern European countries).

Extending support to the anti-imperialist nationalist regimes in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan was another part of these policies. In 1925, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of neutrality with Turkey, which provided further technical and economic assistance for an underdeveloped country for the first time (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 51). The official relations were cordial until 1939 when Stalin requested heavy concessions from the new republic in exchange for prolonging the treaty, where on another instance in Finland he forced his demands through war.

Increased tensions in international politics during the period of Second World War (before, during and aftermath) has led Soviet Union to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in order to get every possible strategic advantage over an anti-Soviet alliance. This shortsighted and sudden shift of policy severed diplomatic relations hence the possibility of any public relations. Then on, no other possibility of public relations existed until the death of Stalin due to the survival approach of the Second World War and “the world revolution” approach, which was characterized by the establishment of satellite polities in Eastern Europe during the initial phase of the Cold War. While the Soviet Union was creating, (disputably) exploiting and incorporating the economic systems of the puppet regimes of the Eastern European states into the Soviet Union, the United States was conducting a similar policy with the Truman Doctrine with a different façade (Petro & Rubenstein 1997: 57). This difference is closely linked to our subject matter and explains effectiveness of public diplomacy conducted by the US and fragileness of the Soviet counterpart. The boots

on soil approach of Soviet Union as well as its actions before and during the Second World War inhibited its ability to win over “hearts and minds”. One can argue that Stalin’s over emphasis on realpolitik, balance of power and war gains dissuaded potential Soviet friends and forced the Soviet Union to a self-induced isolation within its sphere of influence. As most of the scholars of public diplomacy and soft power argue actions matter more than words. The effects of these years were felt in every public diplomacy initiative taken in the second half of the 20th Century. There is also one final important aspect of the period after Second World War. The USSR expanded its sphere of influence through use of its military means; however, this did not cause a major reputation loss except for the countries which were invaded? This was mainly due to a good marketing of the Soviet losses during the Second World War. This is not to mean disrespecting enormous losses suffered by the Soviet citizens against Hitler’s Germany. However, the Soviet expansion after the war was legitimized through this; even by the Allied leaders. It is disputable whether it was a propaganda or not but the Soviet expansion after the Second World War was not questioned by the Allied leaders nor the people of these countries. In my opinion this was the most important public diplomacy achievement in the Stalinist era.

Foreign policy started to shift its rail after the death of Stalin. Donaldson and Noguee argue that leaders after Stalin were aware of the fact that it was not possible to persist on the “stick” in order to protect the legitimacy of the system and some kind of reform was needed in order to ensure the continuity of the polity with all what it had achieved (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 72). Although I tend to agree with them on general terms, I also think that the Stalinist system was relied heavily on his personal cult along with other things. State terror and repression were not fully institutionalized they were mostly carried out through the personal decrees of Joseph Stalin. Therefore, not only they were to carve out a source of legitimacy for themselves, but also, they had to uninstall the personal legitimacy of the deceased leader. This required a stable international climate both in order to be able to focus on the internal developments and also in order to undermine the confronting approach of the Stalin in the internationalist area, which was also a major source of his personal legitimacy. I argue that shift of “peaceful coexistence” was not only a policy decision but also a source of legitimacy for the successor leaders.

As far as the public diplomacy concerned, this shift also opened up the way for the third world advancement. Stalin's focus on "communism in one country" was also abolished along with colonialism and the emergence of the third world. After the 60's the third world more and more became the area of contest where two superpowers tried to present their political and economic systems as the superior one. To this end public diplomacy became more relevant in relation to this aim. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev opened up the game to the public sphere (Except for the several escalations, both in Europe and Third World). Karen Dawisha looks into the Soviet public diplomacy towards Egypt, Iraq and Syria between 1955 and 1970. Dawisha makes several good comments on Soviet public diplomacy as well as the public diplomacy practice during the Cold War in general. She argues that the public diplomacy and the messages it entails are prone to be mostly shaped by the recipient country's government, who may distort or direct the constituency of the initiative (Dawisha, 1997: 419). The examples in these countries show that the official conduct of public diplomacy limited the base recipient population. Also, since the official public diplomacy was conducted through foreign government officials, the recipient country might have shaped its message through their own interests (Dawisha 1997: 439).

Frederick Barghoorn argues that the main area of contest was the concept of "peace" during this period and Soviet Union was the active contestant in this area against both the US and the UK (Barghoorn 1958: 41). He gives the expanding nature of the cultural exchange institutions after the death of Stalin with the examples of, "Soviet Relations Committee" in Britain, "East-West Contacts Staff" in the US Department of State, and "Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society" or "All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries" in Soviet Union (Barghoorn 1958: 41). Formation and expansion of these institutions signifies the heightened importance of the public diplomacy during these periods.

There were three main reason behind these approaches of the Soviet Union. First and foremost, it was the aim of dissemination of the technological progress in the west (Barghoorn 1958: 50). Second, Soviets wanted to appeal to the foreign public in order to initially break the negative image of communism in the west and finally

produce a positive opinion which may be used later for the Soviet interests. And third, utilizing the opportunity of espionage from the cultural and scientific exchange programs (Barghoorn 1958:53-54).

This shift in the field of contest may also be attributed to the possibility of the “Mutually Assured Destruction”. Any kind of military escalation between the two superpowers may have led to the apocalypse of the human race from the face of the earth. Both the politicians and the public were aware of this at the time. The area of contest was shifting without the control of the any one of the two polities and the Soviets were the ones who initiated the contest in order to break the Western monopoly on “peace”. Here it is also important to note that the people, especially the new generation, was heavily influenced by this rise in the dangers of armed conflict and became disillusioned by the respective ideologies in their countries (Clark 2015: 6-7). This in turn made this contest harder for both sides of the Iron Curtain.

In the end Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed in this game of image. There were numerous reasons for this failure however it is possible to name three main problems. First and foremost, the Soviet system failed in terms of economy and welfare due to various economic and political reasons. This laid the foundation of the failure since no amount of advertisement is able to present your system as the superior one when people have difficulty in accessing basic consumer goods and the infant mortality is way above the European countries. Second the Soviet bureaucracy failed to adapt to the changing nature of this field of diplomacy. During the 70’s the scene of public diplomacy was changing mainly due to the decline of state as both an actor and a sponsor, as the example of the simple man exhibition suggests. People did not want to see state telling the story of its constituents. Instead they wanted to hear the story of the people by the people. The intellectual monopoly of state in the Soviet Union (which was tried to be loosen by the Stalin’s successors without success) ultimately inhibited its ability to adapt to this changing nature. And third, the lack of commitment into the peaceful coexistence. Inability to gradually adapt to the changing nature of international climate made the Soviet foreign policy inconsistent within itself in terms of actions. The influence of the old guard hardliners in both the party structure and the state bureaucracy made the Soviet state

to react every emergency situation with a confronting approach which sent mixed signals to the foreign public. The most notable example of this was the Poznan riots of June 1956 and how Moscow reacted to it.

3.2.3 Adapting to the New Environment

At this point an elaboration on the notion of adaptability would definitely provide us with an important aspect of public diplomacy. In the previous section, I have argued that one of the flaws of the Soviet public diplomacy was inability to adapt to the changing environment as well as its inconsistency. These two notions seem to contradict with each other. However, the contradiction resolves itself with their distinct areas and tools of both notions. Soviet inconsistency resulted from its actions rather than its public diplomacy initiatives. As it was argued before, one cannot expect reliable results from public diplomacy while your traditional diplomacy and/or actions contradict with your friendly relation building. One of the clearest examples of this can be Soviet-Turkish relations of Stalin's reign²⁰. Competition over Turkey between the Soviet Union and the USA was swayed greatly towards the US's favor due to the threats made on straits and eastern provinces. These actions had an irreversible impact on the Soviet public diplomacy capabilities on Turkey. Although Turkish foreign policy used Soviet friendship as a means for economic development (either through getting direct economic aid or for getting concessions from the US) previous policies (as well as historical background) have reduced the effects of any public diplomacy initiative conducted by the Soviets.²¹

The Cold War was in a sense a battle over the people's minds and ideologies. As it was argued previously in this chapter, the Soviet Union had a great advantage in its initial years; and it was offering change and an alternative for people due to its revolutionary ideas. That is why leaders like Lenin and Trotsky were planning to tap this resource through their world revolution policy. In a retrospective approach this might be unrealistic and naïve in short term, but this vision might be implemented as a long-term plan which could offer immense power of influence for the Soviet Union

²⁰ See Chapter III.

²¹ This might bring us to another discussion on the effectiveness of economic aid in public diplomacy.

instead of short-term territorial gains. However, as the alternative ideology became a force of status quo (socially) it lost its initial advantage over the foreign publics. Instead it became a competing ideology to capitalism with different trade-offs and lost its advantage in an era when the public opinion was getting more and more important. After this period the field on which battle for the people's opinion was raging on has went through several transformations which are in fact very much related to the change of generations. In example during the initial years of the Cold War an average person was more interested in the economic conditions which directly affected public policy efforts of the superpowers. As the war wearied Europe started to recover (both in the east and west of the iron curtain) the concerns limited to bread, and butter become more complex with arising needs. As more people having less problems in meeting their essential needs they moved on to the higher steps of the pyramid and became concerned about self-realization. This also created a shift in the public diplomacy as people were more impressed with a cultural product more than a food can with the US brand on it. Although change in the field has reduced the short-term benefits of the public diplomacy initiatives; it affected them in several ways. First of all, it reduced the state visibility because now the brands were not countries but people with actual names scientists, musicians, directors and artists. And secondly through encouraging critical thinking the public diplomacy became more brittle. Before, it was probably easier to notice the effect of a public diplomacy activity (i.e. with an actual treaty of friendship or a concession). The new public diplomacy also required less state visibility as people started thinking more critically. A concession or a policy shift by an aid program started to hurt national pride and result in negative public opinion instead (both in domestic and international politics). Inability to fully adapt to these changes started to affect Soviet public diplomacy adversely. In most instances the Soviet Union started to be seen as "only" an alternative for those who cannot access American products. Although the Soviet public diplomacy was relatively successful in the third world where Soviet economic and political model were more appealing for the emerging industries it never reached its initial impetus in Europe. Even in Soviet satellites and the Soviet Union itself US's image continuously improved with its strong public diplomacy.

3.2.4 Gorbachev and Yeltsin – Cultural Defeat and Its Aftermath

When Gorbachev ascended to the position of being the Soviet Premier, the war over the “hearts and minds of the people” was already a lost cause due to the reasons given in the previous part. The country’s reputation was abysmal both in the international area and inside. The windows of opportunity for the communication were opening up more by the each passing year, which allowed people of the both camps to be influenced more. People who are living in the east of the iron curtain started to think about two things; first, the things were going better on the other side of the curtain and second, it was because of the political/economic system. From that point onward, every attempt of opening up the political system fed the people’s image of the ineffectiveness of the Soviet economic system. The dilemma faced by the leaders after Stalin were that they have to open up to political system in order to implement economic reforms (Donaldson & Noguee 2005: 95). This probably led people to be further disillusioned by the comparative living standards on the other side of the curtain. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, along with other premiers who were in office for relatively short periods were unable to attain a significant increase in the average living standards of Soviet citizens. It is a topic of another discussion whether it was due to lack of commitment or the inability to reform the cumbersome Soviet bureaucracy, but the attempts definitely increased the communication channels between east and west as it was argued before.

When Gorbachev started perestroika and glasnost, he implemented the reforms in a fierce manner due to the urgency of an already declining political polar. This manner and reforms themselves were subject to a controversy for decades, however to me this manner was resulted from the panic of a crumble which was already underway at that time. This crumble was not only due to the failure of the Soviet Union but also success of the US public diplomacy which unlike the Soviet one has adapted (also could be one of the driving forces) well to the changing nature of public diplomacy and international climate in general.

The US public diplomacy on the other hand was consistent and more specialized. In music, for example numerous jazz troupes were sponsored by the state during 50’s and 60’s (Clark 2015: 16-17). The new generation of the Cold War started to produce

their own culture through both rock and popular music. Especially the rock music was heavily influenced by the new generation's disillusionment with the ideological polarization and the threat of the "mutually assured destruction" (Clark 2015: 36). This change in trend has also adapted well into the new public diplomacy. Instead of the government-sponsored tours, the music industry relied more on personal contacts. There are many personal accounts on Clark's thesis about the meaning of Western culture and music for the youngsters of both the eastern and western countries, most of which were associated with the disillusionment with the government and hostility between the two camps. However, the dissemination and the growth of the appetite for these music types, could not be attributed to any deliberate action by the diplomatic and political actors. Both in US and in Soviet Union these music types were censored and tried to be controlled by the official authorities. Therefore, in this regard it would be logical to argue that the official channels are only should be used for the introductory purposes while conducting cultural diplomacy. In an open society the rest could be left to the invisible hand of the market. However, in the cold war era context censorship and the official sentiment against this music type made it more popular (Clark 2015: 40). The American public diplomacy has learned its lesson from this following the Cold War and reduced the official interference towards the cultural products in general (Clark 2015: 47).

One would think that the importance of winning the hearts and minds of people would be learnt by the biggest successor of the Soviet Union which is the Russian Federation (and the US as well). Although the importance has been grasped, the ways of implementation, communication and the messages themselves are still under a process of development.

The succession of Yeltsin a good example of the relation of domestic policy with foreign policy and how it interacts also with public diplomacy. Boris Yeltsin utilized Gorbachev's policies of opening up and setting satellite countries free; in order to gain support from the army and other conservative elements in society. This internal look can be explained by Russia's identity problem after the dissolution of the empire, which left its population and state demoralized and aimless (Donaldson &

Nogee 2005: 110). Gorbachev was trying to salvage what is left of the superpower and keep together at least the Union Republics in some kind of confederation. His foreign policy entailed a vision of cooperation and integration with the western system to a degree. Among other things the internal struggle with the Yeltsin was one of the key reasons, this plan also failed. However, there were two clear messages that Yeltsin gave in both internal and external politics: to the Western countries he gave the signal of liberalization (both political and economic) and international cooperation; to the domestic constituent however, the menu was consisting of the restoration of the position as a superpower and a strong/unified polity. One example of this policy can be seen during the Yugoslavian civil war and the NATO interventions which followed. During the war conservative constituents of the Russian society were sympathetic towards the Serbian aggression which contradicted with Yeltsin's policy of cooperation with the Western system because of which; in the end he tried to manage the situation with a conciliatory approach toward the US while at the same time trying to protect Serbia from a full-scale intervention (Donaldson & Nogee 2005: 223).

CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This chapter is composed of three sections. In the first section, a general analysis on the contemporary Russian public diplomacy will be presented followed by a comparative analysis on the Russian public diplomacy in action with regards to the cases of Ukrainian Crisis and the Syrian Civil War.

The general analysis of the contemporary Russian public diplomacy is designed as a follow up on the historical analysis presented in the previous chapter. The Russian Federation as an international actor went through a significant institutional restructuring after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This restructuring process caused the Russian Federation to take a rather passive stance in the international arena. However, in the more recent period the Russian Federation appeared as an active and assertive actor in the international arena. This general analysis aims to present the effects of this restructuring as well as continuities in relation to the historical legacy in the previous chapter with a focus on the main public diplomacy goals and themes.

The comparative analysis on the Russian public diplomacy with regards to cases of Ukrainian Crisis and Syrian Civil War is designed to present solid examples (or brief case studies) for demonstrating if public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation is following through the goals and themes presented in the previous section and if so how it functions in practice.

4.1 Putin and Russian Public Diplomacy Today

The historical frame presented in the previous section provides a good background on the theme and continuous objectives of Russian public diplomacy. In the remaining section of this chapter, I will be analyzing the developments observed in

the 21st century Russian policy with regards to the public diplomacy and try to understand effects of the historical background of Russian image as well as continuities in terms of its objectives. I will first present an overall assessment of contemporary Russian public diplomacy and then a more detailed analysis of Russian public diplomacy with regards to Ukraine and Syria in a comparative manner.

Although the main argument of my thesis will oppose that, many scholars²² who will be referred to in this section attribute the conceptual focus and interest to public diplomacy (as well as soft power) by the Russian Federation to Putin's presidential campaign in February 2012 and the official concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (Rotaru 2015: 1-2). Tonality of statements in the presidential campaign and the concept note indicate that the related institutions of the Russian Federation and Putin evaluate Russian foreign policy outdated in terms of utilizing this instrument and attribute the use of it to western powers in an interventionist manner towards the domestic policy of sovereign countries (Rotaru 2015: 1-2). Although dichotomy between the notion of sovereignty and interventionism will be presented as one of the central point for the comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, Putin's remarks with regards to the notion of soft power is an important indicator how Russia perceives public diplomacy as an instrumental tool for Russian policy and a dangerous weapon at the hands of western powers. While these documents are presented as signs of Russian focus of public diplomacy, it is safe to assume that the background work has been conducted on this topic beforehand. In 2003, a state commissioned survey was conducted regarding the image of Russia in the eyes of American citizens, which resulted with negative connotations, which could be identified with the cold war period like communism and KGB (Evans, 2005). This survey showed Putin the existing image of Russia in the western public opinion was problematic. However, the same article argues that while Russia opens up its walls and warm smiles to the west and the western journalists, in the domestic sphere the windows are sealed towards the journalist and no opposition could be heard or organizes politically (Evans, 2005). This study

²² See referenced works by Dmitri Trenin, Vasile Rotaru or Andrei Tsygankov i.e.

brings the discussion to the one of the main challenges of the emerging public diplomacy of the Russian Federation, which is the image and credibility.

The image of the Russian Federation in the eyes of foreign publics is another aspect, which should be regarded when analyzing contemporary Russian public diplomacy. While the image of the Russian Federation as an undemocratic, corrupt, aggressive polity can be attributed to the Soviet image of “the other” during the Cold War, the impact of the foreign policy used can be presented just as important in terms of low credibility. This again brings us to the discussion about the relation between foreign and domestic policy as well as the importance of implications rather than the advertisement in the field of public diplomacy. Katherine Avgerinos mentions two recent example of Russia’s failed public diplomacy; one is the gas negotiation with Ukraine and the other one is the Ossetia conflict with Georgia (Avgerinos 2009: 119-120).

Ukrainian conflict, starting in 2014 was another instance which contributed towards the image of an aggressive Russian Federation. Russian occupation of Crimea has shattered the international image of Russia, which is seen as a rogue state by more and more countries and their citizens. Russian image in the European Union was tarnished greatly as Putin commented on the weakness of NATO’s Eastern European partners of Poland, Romania and the Baltic States (Elizabeth Pond, 2015). Another event which was problematic for Russian public diplomacy efforts was the shooting down of a civilian airplane, which raised a huge outcry from the international community for which the Russian state remained silent (Probably due to being an illegal supporter of an insurgency). The ongoing dispute in Eastern Ukraine still prevents Russia to make any move towards fixing its image due to its image of being an unlawful and aggressor state.

The final input for the analysis on the international image of Russian Federation is in relation to the image of Vladimir Putin. A recent study conducted by Greg Simons argues that Russian Leader holds a small but significant appeal towards the foreign publics (Simons 2019: 19). According to Simons conservative and traditional image of Putin, and his challenging approach towards the existing international political system are two main sources of this appeal with regards to their respective audiences

(Simons 2019: 19). In relation to the second point raised by Simons, Putin's emphasis on national sovereignty and his criticisms towards US interventionism are what constitute the basis of his appeal. As it will be presented through various examples in the comparative analysis of the Russian foreign policy on Ukraine and Syria, Russian leader is often very vocal with respect of the Russian Foreign policy towards the sovereignty of states (though there are significant deviations in practice). My view towards this discussion is twofold. First, this appeal towards a conservative figure is not a phenomenon unique to Putin but is part of the global reactionary movement, which is opposed to the rising identity politics and excessively liberal agenda. Similarly, this phenomenon can also be attributed to other conservative leaders such as Donald Trump or Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Second, it would be oversimplification to attribute image and/or statements of Vladimir Putin to the Russian foreign policy as the political structure of postmodern states are far too complex to do so. Although it can be argued that the image of its leader would play some part in public diplomacy practice and image of a polity the extent of this effect would be rather limited. The foreign publics (as subject of public diplomacy of an international actor) would take the leader of the international actor conducting public diplomacy into consideration more in cases which the leader holds a significant power over the actions of the actor. Considering the more autocratic state structure and legacy of leader's cult (most notably Stalin), the Russian Federation could be an example in which effect of its leader would be maximized within this limitation.

Another point which needs addressing in relation to my general analysis on contemporary Russian public diplomacy is its institutionalization. In line with the emerging focus on public diplomacy, Russian Federation went through a substantial institutionalization process. Russian Federation has many institutions that are regulating its public diplomacy efforts. One of which is "Russian Centers of Science and Culture Abroad", formed by the Russian Ministry of Education and Science. There are currently over 70 of its branches throughout the world majority of which were laid out according to the geographical priorities, which will be mentioned shortly.²³ The main goal of these institutions is to facilitate academic exchanges.

²³ For the information about their locations see the official website of the Russian Ministry of Education and Science <https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/>

However apart from these centers also coordinating projects that will enhance the existing relations. For example, the Russian Center of Science, Culture and Cooperation in Turkey facilitated a public diplomacy school for the children of Russo-Turkish marriages (Demir, 2015). Focus on the Russian speakers in this project, shows us their preference of choosing them as the primary target population, which is very much in line with the geographical priorities. Another similar institutional example is *Russotrudnichestvo*²⁴, formed by President Medvedev in 2008 that acts as a coordinating institution for Russian foreign humanitarian activity as well as promoting Russian culture and language through educational cooperation. Russia Today and RIA Novosti can be presented as international news agency examples for the institutionalization process (Simons 2014: 446-447).

This institutionalization process is a significant indicator of increasing focus of Russian foreign policy on public diplomacy while at the same time geographical focus of these institutions towards the ex-Soviet countries will support the argument of this thesis on the main objective of this focus and the general theme of contemporary Russian public diplomacy that will be presented at the final chapter. As for the formation of news agency institution it is again can be attributed to the objective of negating or buffering two inhibiting factors of Russian public diplomacy. One of them is countering or reducing the effects of existing negative image that country suffers in the international arena through promoting various public diplomacy initiatives for improvement of Russian image abroad. The other one can be presented as justification of foreign policy actions taken by the Russian Federation through explaining the Russian perspective and reasoning for taking those actions. The latter one can also be read as negating the negative impact caused by the aggressive, hostile or assertive policies such as intervention in Ukraine.

The focus of contemporary Russian public diplomacy efforts can be categorized into four geographical and thematic categories. First, the former union republics, second eastern European countries, third some key countries of the developing world like Turkey, Iran and the third world countries which had significant relations with Soviet

²⁴ Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation

Union and fourth the US and other western countries. Each of these categories holds significance in terms of their differing strategic importance for Russian Federation. The importance and prominence of the first two in terms of the institutionalization process can be attributed to the existence of substantial Russian minorities and Russian speaking elites in countries belonging to those categories. The third and fourth categories however did not have any of those constituents.

In order to understand this tendency to target Russian speaking population it is important to note the Soviet Union's existing sphere of influence and how it relied heavily on the Russian speaking elites in the local party apparatuses, both in the Union Republics and the satellites in the Eastern Europe. This tendency somehow may transcend to the policy of the new polity. After the dissolution, the Russian Federation for example tried to prevent the ethnic Russian population from the other Soviet Republics (Kolsto 1995: 125). This probably had two main reasons. First of which is the economic turmoil that the Russia was dealing with right after the disintegration, which simply could not afford a sudden migration of millions of people; and second, to keep this population there as a leverage for the future politics.

Another supporting factor for the geographical focus can be the argument that the ideals and vision of post-soviet Russia are more similar to the imperial period compared to the Soviet period with emphasis on Orthodox Christianity Ideals and a strong state that provides for its citizens (Tsygankov 2013: 260). As the main argument of this thesis, I argue that this transformation has little to no effect in terms of the main objective of public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation. This transformation on the surface can be interpreted as a shift from the Soviet Marxist-Leninist world revolution to a more imperial and religious façade as the justification for the Russian re-expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence. It is argued that the adoption of public diplomacy concept into Russian foreign policy was not a uniform linear process but a competitive process in which different approaches were considered. Tsygankov argues that there were three different approaches during this process by Russian academic circles he names as Westernizers, Imperialists and Stabilizers (Tsygankov 2006: 1080). While Westernizers and Stabilizers focus on the long term positive relationship building aspect of public diplomacy (or soft power),

Imperialists argue that Russian Federation should utilize all of its aspects including neutral and negative conduct of public diplomacy as formulized in the section where the topic of attraction was elaborated upon (Tsygankov 2006). Perhaps most strikingly, the common focus of both the Imperialists' and Stabilizers' was the former Soviet geography (Tsygankov 2006: 1087).

As it was mentioned earlier, the Russian initiatives of public diplomacy were mainly focused on the countries with substantial number of Russian speakers like Estonia, Kazakhstan and Poland. Therefore, it is plausible to think that language holds an important part in the Russian public diplomacy. However, there are no apparent efforts from the Russian state to expand the base of these recipients. In Turkey for example, there are four associations teaching Russian, which has solid cultural bonds with Russia in İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Antalya. The first three provinces are the biggest cities in Turkey and the fourth one is the favorite holiday destination of Russians many of whom bought properties from. Apart from these associations there are several institutions including the Education and Culture Cooperation Associations (with ties to the Russotrudnichestvo) which organize cultural events like concerts and exhibitions.

4.2 Russian Public Diplomacy on Ukraine and Syria

In this section, in order to further my analysis on the main focus of the Russian public diplomacy, I will be looking at the two contemporary foreign policy issues of the Russian Federation and what role the emerging public diplomacy focus played on these issues; namely the policies of Russia towards Ukraine and Syria. As it will be presented in depth in the following sections, Russian foreign policy and public diplomacy in relation to these issues are highly contradictory. In terms of public diplomacy, the Russian Federation tries to justify its intervention towards Ukraine while at the same time condemning international intervention, in the Syrian civil war. This duality supports the main argument of this thesis strongly in relation to the consistent themes and objectives of Russian public diplomacy.

4.3 Russian Policy towards the Ukrainian Crisis

4.3.1 Background for the Ukrainian Crisis

Ukraine is one of the countries, which Russian Federation regarded as an inseparable part of its sphere of influence due to historical, cultural and strategical reasons. Historically Ukraine is seen as the cradle of Russian polity due to the emergence of Kievan Rus as the first political entity for the Eastern Slavs. Similarly, Ukrainians and Russians share a deep cultural bond in terms of ethnicity, language and religion in addition to the significant Russian speaking minority in the eastern part of Ukraine. While strategically, access to Ukrainian coastline constitutes a significant part of Russian capability in Black Sea especially considering the existing naval bases in Ukrainian soil (especially in Crimea). The tensions between the two countries go back to European Union's Eastern Partnership Programme initiated in 2009. Ukrainian sway between EU approach as well as Russian counteroffer of Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) led to a period of internal turmoil for Ukraine that resulted with President Yanukovich, who was supported by Russian speaking minority, leaving the country (Reuters 2014). Deposition of Russian supported Yanukovich and Ukrainian approach towards the EU led to an armed uprising (supported by the Russian Federation) in the east and southeast regions of the country, which are largely inhabited by the Russian speaking minority; as well as to the annexation of Crimea following a referendum made under the Russian occupation. Despite Russian claims centered on the right to self-determination, referendum was not recognized by the UN and related resolution indicated the referendum as unlawful.²⁵ The Russian occupation and the armed conflict between Ukrainian Army and the Rebels supported by Russia is still ongoing to this day while Ukraine attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict by inviting Russian Federation to the table (CNBC 2019).

²⁵ See "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014" http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_262.pdf accessed 03.11.2019

4.3.2. Russian Public Diplomacy throughout the Ukrainian Conflict

After presenting the background of the conflict, I will analyze this process through a public diplomacy perspective. For this, I will be looking at the message of the Russian public diplomacy with regards to both Ukraine and the western powers including the EU and NATO.

Although, the focus of this section will be on the discourse and policies of the Russian Presidents throughout the crisis it would also be beneficial to comment on the non-political aspects (though links for some of which can be traced back to the Russian state apparatus) of the Russian public diplomacy both prior to and during the conflict in order to have a better understanding of the recent history of Russia-Ukraine relations within a public diplomacy perspective. The Russian public diplomacy had an objective of discrediting distinctiveness of Ukrainian identity. The main drive behind this approach was making the Ukrainian public associating itself with Russian culture in order to have a long term positive effect in future policies. The Russian public diplomacy aimed to realize this objective through various means including culture and religion. Before delving into our actual discourse analysis I will present two solid examples for this initiative by the Russian public diplomacy. First of these examples (from the cultural side) is a film made in 2009 (supported by the Russian Ministry of Culture) “Taras Bulba”²⁶ in which there was a strong message on the Russians and Ukrainians belonging to the same *narod*, which can roughly be translated as nation or folk (De Maio 2016:10). Another important element of this initiative was (and probably still is) the Russian Orthodox Church. Especially after the appointment of Patriarch Kirill I, the Russian Orthodox Church has been pursuing a policy of limiting the autonomy of Kyiv Patriarchate through registering new parishes under the Moscow Patriarchate (Bogomolov&Lytvynenko 2012:12). Though impact of these examples has significantly reduced after the escalation, it can be argued that similar initiatives can be used for normalizing (rebuilding) of relations in the future. Complementary to this initiative, it is also important to note the approach by Russian media after the start of the conflict. The Russian media took a

²⁶ Taras Bulba is name of the novel created by Nikolai Gogol and its main protagonist. In the book Bulba is a Cossack leader who fights against Polish invaders.

critical position towards Ukrainian turn to west either through a demonizing approach by calling them Nazis or saying that Ukraine is deceived by EU's false promises (De Maio 2016: 10-11). As a final point for this discussion, I would like to exemplify the activities of Russian World (Russkii Mir) and Russian Red Cross from the cultural and humanitarian aspects. As it was argued earlier after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the focal area of interest has been the post-Soviet space where large Russian speaking communities already exist. Russian World as well as other youth/cultural organizations²⁷ is the pivotal instrument of this focus who were (and still is) targeting Russian-speaking minority in order to strengthen their ties with Russia (Purvis: 3-4). Throughout the conflict, Russian Red Cross took an active role in humanitarian relief of people fleeing the eastern Ukraine which again supports the Russian focus on the related communities in near abroad²⁸.

During the initial phase of the dispute in relation to the competition between the EU's Eastern Partnership Programme and Eurasian Customs Union, Russian approach towards the Ukrainian public had a more positive and neutral nature. Russian public diplomacy initially focused on outcompeting European initiative through explaining and justifying the benefits of their alternative in terms of being a decision maker rather than a latecomer junior partner to an already established system (Dragneva & Wolczuk: 2012: 9-10). This was a justified explanation for Ukraine to comply with Russian policy. After Ukrainian stall and several unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to reconcile both sides, Russian public diplomacy evolved into a carrot and stick approach. As a punishment for stalling, Russian Federation imposed increased trade barriers while offered a significant aid package if Kiev to align its policies with Russia (Trenin 2014: 5). This approach seemed to bore fruits at the time (at least for a short time) as Yanukovych suspended the pre-agreement with the EU (Interfax-Ukraine 2013). However, this could not be interpreted as a success of Russian public diplomacy as this policy led to the civil

²⁷ In the Ukrainian case organizations such as "Russian Community of Crimea" and "People's Front: Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia" can be presented as examples.

²⁸ Related articles published by the Russian Red Cross: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-helps-ukrainian-families-russia>, <https://www.ifrc.org/es/noticias/noticias/europe/russian-federation/red-cross-local-authorities-and-private-donors-in-rostov-on-don-coordinate-efforts-in-providing-support-to-refugees-from-ukraine-----68436/>.

unrest that resulted with Yanukovych's impeachment and Ukraine's further drift from the Russian policy. Looking at it retrospectively, although the Russian diplomatic move was successful in the short term from a public diplomacy perspective this threatening message, or the negative conduct of public diplomacy, proved counterproductive in the long run. Armed uprising by the Russian speaking population, referendum and eventual annexation of Crimea not only further escalated the conflict but also led to yet another shift in the Russian public diplomacy. A study conducted by Sofiia Bogdanova provides a really good discourse analysis on the Russian public diplomacy with regards to the Ukrainian Crisis which encompasses the period between 2012 and 2015. I will be referencing her work and utilize some of her analyses for the remainder of this section for the ease of reference and preventing overlapping as her work almost encompasses all the statements I decided to include in my preliminary research. Bogdanova argue that the Russian discourse on Crimea much like the general soft power discourse of Russia focuses on justification and explanation of the Russian perspective (Bogdanova 2016: 64). Her analysis includes statements from President Putin, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Konstantin Kosachev (Head of Russian Foreign Relations Committee) and these statements can be categorized under two dominant themes. These are remarks/criticisms towards western powers (particularly EU) and justification of Russian annexation of Crimea. The main arguments of the first theme are EU's unlawful interventionism and illegitimate use of soft power, smearing campaign on Russian image, and rising escalation due to deliberately ill-minded foreign policy. While the main arguments of the second theme are historical/cultural ties of Crimea to the Russian Federation, legitimacy of the referendum and the occupation (which is presented as presence of Russian troops in line with the international agreement on naval bases) before the referendum, and protection of Russian speaking population. In the following section solid examples of Russian public diplomacy will be presented in relation to Ukrainian crisis through the statements of made by President Dmitry Medvedev and President Vladimir Putin.²⁹

²⁹ A similar method will also be used for Syrian Civil War.

As argued earlier Ukrainian stall for the Customs Union has led the Russian Federation to take an “us or them” narrative in order to push them to join the customs union hence towards a more integrated position towards the Russian Federation.

... The only point I want to stress is that the Customs Union is a higher form of integration, and we really would like to see Ukraine join it as a large European country with which we have such friendly and fraternal ties. But we cannot agree to Ukraine joining under some kind of formula of a 3+1 type, taking the line of signing 20 documents, say, but not 30. Our position is that if they join, they must do so wholeheartedly, signing at all stages and becoming full-fledged members of the Customs Union with all of the ensuing advantages and obligations. They can choose a different path, but this would also have its consequences as far as conditions for developing our relations are concerned, and in a number of cases we would have to apply different customs rules to Ukraine. Our Ukrainian partners understand this.... (Medvedev 2011)

... But look at what is happening here. After all, we are not dragging Ukraine anywhere; we have a free trade zone with Ukraine. We are not saying we will discriminate against Ukrainian goods. On the contrary, we are saying that if Ukraine signs this document, will we be forced to cancel all preferences. We cannot maintain them. That will undermine our own economy. But as I already said, the Ukrainian goods will enjoy the most-favored nation treatment. It's just that there will be no incentives.... (Putin 2013)

This pressure bore fruits on Ukrainian high politics in the short term as the talks with EU stalled which in the long term caused eventual civil unrest and impeachment of President Yanukovych. Change in Russian tonality in these regards is significant as it directly targeted alleged western intervention in the form of a coup d'état. This blame was then used as a justification for the incidents in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in which Russian intervention was underway. The Russian public diplomacy referred to the impeachment of Yanukovych as unconstitutional and undemocratic while at the same time constantly referring to the self-determination principle for the Russian actions in Crimea as well as armed uprising in the eastern Ukraine where ethnic Russians constitutes significant portion of the population. Russian statements also try to blame the new Ukrainian government as the aggressor towards the Russian ethnic minority. Another minor undertone in these statements were the economic threat towards the EU in terms of supply of Russian natural gas which constitutes significant portion of EU's energy supply. In the following section

several examples of this message were presented through various statements made by the Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2014.

...I think that what is happening now shows us just who was really directing this whole process right from the outset. Initially, the USA preferred to stay in the shadows, given that US interests converged to some extent with those of their European partners, seeing as the European Union, led by the European Commission, wanted to sign the agreements we know with Ukraine, agreements that I think did not offer advantageous terms for Ukraine. The former government attempted to resist this and do something about it, but as I said, the Western community decided to take another road and use force, bring about an anti-constitutional coup and armed seizure of power, and it seems they miscalculated as to what this would actually lead to. Some liked the idea, gave it their support, and probably a good number of people in Ukraine support it too, as we see. But more people do not like it and do not agree with this form of power. There is nothing democratic about it. These people's views must be taken into account too, and their lawful rights respected. That the USA has now taken the lead in trying to settle the crisis suggests that it was they who headed the process from the start, but are only now stepping forward as the leaders in the whole thing. ... (Putin 2014a)

...This question should be addressed to the EU and the United States, whose reasoning is hard to understand. Any unbiased person knows that it was not Russia who staged the coup d'état in Ukraine, which led to the grave internal political crisis and a split in society. An unconstitutional seizure of power was the starting point for the subsequent events, including the ones in Crimea. The people of Crimea, seeing the complexity and unpredictability of the situation and in order to protect their rights to their native language, culture and history, decided to hold a referendum in full compliance with the UN Charter, as a result of which the peninsula re-joined Russia. Our partners should be well aware that attempts to put pressure on Russia with unilateral and illegitimate restrictive measures will not bring about a settlement, but rather impede the dialogue. How can we talk about de-escalation in Ukraine while the decisions on new sanctions are introduced almost simultaneously with the agreements on the peace process? If the main goal is to isolate our country, it's an absurd and illusory goal. It is obviously impossible to achieve it but the economic health of Europe and the world can be seriously undermined. ...Everything that has happened since the beginning of this year is even more disturbing. Washington actively supported the Maidan protests, and when its Kiev henchmen antagonized a large part of Ukraine through rabid nationalism and plunged the country into a civil war, it blamed Russia for provoking the crisis. Now President Barack Obama in his speech at the UN General Assembly named the "Russian aggression in Europe" as one of the three major threats facing humanity today alongside with the deadly Ebola virus and the Islamic State. Together with the sanctions against entire sectors of our economy, this approach can be called nothing but hostile. ... (Putin 2014b)

... Russian public opinion holds that what is now happening in southeast Ukraine is actually a punitive operation, but it is conducted by the Kiev authorities and not the other way around. The self-defence fighters of the

southeast were not the ones who sent troops to Kiev. On the contrary, the Kiev authorities amassed their military forces in the southeast of Ukraine, and are using multiple rocket launchers, artillery and fighter jets. What is the problem here and how it can be solved? I'll try to answer this question as well. The problem is that after the government coup (and no matter how others call it and what is being said in this respect, a government coup was carried out in Kiev by military means) part of the country did not agree with these developments. Instead of at least trying to engage in dialogue with them, Kiev started by sending law enforcers, the police force, but when that didn't work out, they sent in the army, and since that didn't work out either, they are now trying to settle the issue by using other forceful methods, the economic blockade. I believe that this path has absolutely no future whatsoever and is detrimental to Ukraine's statehood and its people. I hope that by engaging in dialogue – and we are ready to assume the role of intermediaries in this respect – we will succeed in establishing a direct, political dialogue, and by employing such methods and political instruments we will reach a settlement and restore a single political space. ... (Putin 2014c)

A similar narrative went on through the following period as it reached the stalemate currently in affect with ongoing negotiations through Minsk protocol established in September 5, 2014. The Russian Federation's message towards the international public throughout the following period can be summarized within several key aspects:

- "The responsibility of crisis and following events (including the Russian reaction) are caused by interventionism and expansionism of Western Powers".
- "The armed uprising in Donbass Region and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation are in line with self-determination principle"
- "Crimea is part of the Russian Federation now and it is not up to debate"

... I would like to remind Egyptian readers that the Ukrainian crisis was not caused by the Russian Federation. It has emerged in response to the attempts of the USA and its western allies who considered themselves 'winners' of the cold war to impose their will everywhere. Promises of non-expansion of the NATO to the East (given yet to the Soviet authorities) have turned out to be hollow statements. We have seen how NATO's infrastructure was moving closer and closer towards Russian borders and how Russian interests were being ignored. Moreover, in the framework of the EU Eastern Partnership Program there have been attempts to tear states which had been parts of the former USSR off Russia and to prompt them to make an artificial choice "between Russia and Europe." The Ukrainian crisis has become a high point of these negative trends. We repeatedly warned the USA and its western allies about harmful consequences of

their interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs, but they did not listen to our opinion. Last February the USA and a number of EU member states supported the coup d'état in Kiev. The ultranationalists who seized the power using military force put the country on the edge of disruption and started the fratricidal war. ... (Putin 2015a)

... As for Crimea, you should remember that a year ago, when I spoke to the Federal Assembly deputies about this, I said that Crimea has always been and remains Russian, as well as Ukrainian, Crimean-Tatar, Greek (after all, there are Greeks living there) and German – and it will be home to all of those peoples. As for state affiliation, the people living in Crimea made their choice; it should be treated with respect, and Russia cannot do otherwise. I hope that our neighboring and distant partners will ultimately treat this the same way, since in this case, the highest criteria used to establish the truth can only be the opinion of the people themselves.... If – again, I've said it before and I'll repeat it – if the Minsk agreements are implemented, I am confident that the situation will gradually return to normal. And I imagine that Europe is just as interested in implementing the Minsk agreements as Russia. Nobody needs a conflict on the periphery of Europe, especially an armed conflict. ... (Putin 2015b)

... Friends, I congratulate you on this holiday – the anniversary of Crimea and Sevastopol's reunification with Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that millions of people looked forward to and desired this historical justice. It took place following the people of Crimea and Sevastopol's free expression of their will in a referendum two years ago. We can achieve more now that we are together. I also congratulate you today on this major construction project to build the Kerch Strait Bridge. This is a much needed and important project that will be completed towards the end of 2018 and will become another symbol of our unity with Crimea and Sevastopol and a symbol of our possibilities. ... (Putin 2016)

Overall, it is important to note that the Russian foreign policy with regards to Ukraine took an “act first and justify later” approach which significantly hindered its public diplomacy goal of negation of negative repercussions. The initial “carrot and stick” approach in order to keep the option of Ukrainian rapprochement led to the late adoption of neutral/justifying conduct of public diplomacy, which combined, with serious breach of international law reduced its effectiveness. The contradiction of accusing Western Powers with interference while supporting uprising in the Eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea with an unlawful referendum hold under an occupation were the additional impeding acts for the Russian public diplomacy as well as already low Russian credibility.

4.4 Russian Policy with regards to the Syrian Civil War

4.4.1 Background for the Syrian Civil War and the Russian Involvement

In 2011, anti-government protests were held in Syria in order to protest the authoritarian practices of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Britannica 2019) and demands for reform. The Syrian government used violence to suppress the demonstration and the civil war is still ongoing since 2011 between the government and opposition groups. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Russian foreign policy aimed to support the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Russian Federation advocates that regime change in Syria is instinctively destabilizing (Abdelal & Vacroux 2018). Beyond the Russian foreign policy in Syria, the geopolitical importance of Syria and the historical relationship between two countries have particular places. Two countries have important historical bonds for fifty years as the Soviet Union cultivated a relationship with Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar. Strategically, Syria has one of Russia's only two military bases outside the former Soviet Union borders and its only access to the Mediterranean (Abdelal & Vacroux 2018). In line with these interests, the Russian Federation has been actively involved in the conflict both militarily and diplomatically. Important milestones in Russian involvement can be listed as a period of diplomatic countermeasure against actors supporting the rebel factions (2011-2012), chemical weapon crisis (2013-2014), start of Russian military operations against anti-regime belligerents (2015) and acquisition of a mediator role and initiation of Astana Process (2016-onwards). In the following section, transformation and main themes of public diplomacy narrative of the Russian Federation will be analyzed in line with these milestones.

4.4.2 Russian Public Diplomacy throughout Syrian Civil War

Similar to the previous section on Ukrainian conflict I will be presenting a brief analysis on the message and theme of Russian public diplomacy with regards to the Syrian Civil War before delving into a comparative analysis including both contexts. Unlike the section on Ukrainian crisis there is no prior study compiling Russian statements on involvement in Syrian Civil War in its entirety. Therefore, I will also present several solid examples in addition to the studies, which cover limited periods

of time in order to make a comparative analysis on the contemporary Russian public diplomacy.

Again similar to previous section on Ukrainian Crisis an overview of the non-political aspects of Russian public diplomacy in Syria will be presented prior to analysis on messages given by Russian Premiers`. Russian Center for Science and Culture in Damascus can be presented as the pivotal institution facilitating cultural aspect of the Russian public diplomacy in Syria.³⁰ The main contribution of the institution in Russian public diplomacy is facilitating educational programmes and Russian language education. Official website of Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation exclaim a huge increase in the number of Syrian students in the Russian Federation from 2,298 students in 2011-2017 to 18,550 in 2018-2019 academic year while at the same time informing reopening of Russian Language Courses in Damascus Center (Study in Russia 2019). It can be argued that this increased interest in Russian language and receiving higher education in Russia is in correlation with the Russian influence (Al-Monitor 2019). As a final point of Russian-Syrian cultural relations can be agreement on restoration of ancient city of Palmyra. Russian and Syrian state museums signed two agreements on restoration of ancient city of Palmyra, which was heavily damaged by Islamic State during its control (Moscow Times 2019). The Russian Federation also organized an international press tour and a concert in the city in April 2016 by Sergei Roldugin (Moscow Times 2019). While this is presented as part of the non-political aspect of Russian public diplomacy the referenced news article has highly political language which supports Russian justification/narrative on fight against terror (more detailed analysis will be presented through political analysis in the following section) with an explicit statement of “Islamic State is a terrorist organization banned in Russia” at the end of the article (Moscow Times 2019).

The Russian approach (thus public diplomacy message) towards Syrian Civil War in the initial period of the conflict was of a reconciliatory nature. Russian diplomacy

³⁰ Official Website <http://syr.rs.gov.ru/ru>

(including public diplomacy) in this period focused on dissuading a large-scale foreign intervention through promoting the regimes appeasement actions.

... We believe that a clear and unambiguous signal has been sent to the Syrians about the need to end all violence. This signal is also for the opposition, which should enter into dialogue with the authorities and dissociate itself from extremists. Outside encouragement of the radical forces that incite tension in the SAR, we strongly believe, is inadmissible. Based on these considerations, we would like to point out that we do not share the US and EU point of view concerning President Bashar al-Assad and will continue to pursue our consistent and principled line on Syria. (Medvedev 2011)

This theme more or less stayed stable during 2011 and 2012. However, the arising vocal suspicion by western powers on Russian steadfast position beside the regime and President Bashar Assad in relation to the Russian interests in Syria caused a counter argument to be raised by Kremlin in relation to these allegations. The change of tonality was subtle but visible as Russian public diplomacy attempted to disassociate itself with interest-based support to the regime in Damascus while at the same time promoting a discourse on a durable solution for the conflict.

... We are not that preoccupied with the fate of al-Assad's regime. We understand what's going on there and that his family has been in power for 40 years now. Without a doubt, change is required. We're worried about something else, about what happens next. ... Of course we are interested in Russia's position in this part of the world: it is close by. But our main preoccupation is not so much our own interests, which are really not that much, practically nothing. ... We advocate finding a solution to the problem which would spare the region and the country from disintegration and never-ending civil war. That is our proposal and our position; not that al-Assad and his regime remain in power at any cost, but that people first agree among themselves about how they will live, how their security and participation in government will be assured. ... (Putin 2012)

The most significant development in the 2013-2014 period was related to the international crisis caused by the alleged use of chemical weapons by the regime forces. Russian official and public diplomacy during this crisis was very successful as in the end Russian public diplomacy prevented a large-scale international intervention much similar to the one in Libya through operating international cooperation and dialogue on the expense of Syrian chemical weapon arsenal (Lund 2019: 23-25).

... Russia's position on the issue is well-known: we are against the proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction, including both chemical and nuclear weapons. Given the current situation in Syria, this issue is particularly pressing, and we did discuss this matter on the margins of the

G20 summit in St Petersburg. In fact, the matter of bringing Syria's chemical weapons under international control has long been a subject of discussion by experts and politicians. ... We agreed to step up these efforts and instruct the Secretary of State and the Russian Foreign Minister to work together and see if they can achieve some progress in this regard. ... We will work together with Syrians and our US partners, and, like I said, I hope this will be a big step forwards towards a peaceful resolution to the Syrian crisis. (Putin 2013)

2015 was marked by another important milestone for Russian involvement in Syria as direct military engagement by Russian armed forces started on the side of the regime forces. While the public diplomacy initiative by western powers started a campaign in order to illegitimize this sudden change of reality through reports of humanitarian organizations, Russian public diplomacy took a fully defensive legitimization approach through a discourse on fight against terror and call for international cooperation on this issue (Lund 2019: 28-29). Russian public diplomacy also took the chance of counter offensive when these calls for international cooperation bore no solid outcomes.

... President Obama and I discussed various aspects of a settlement in Syria in general and combatting terrorist organizations on that country's territory in particular. As for Russia's participation in these efforts, we are considering what we could do additionally to support those who are on the ground, as it were, resisting and fighting terrorists, including ISIS. These are not many: on Syrian territory, this is primarily the Syrian army and Kurdish resistance units, as I said in my address. We are considering what kind of additional support we could give to the Syrian army in fighting terrorism. ... (Putin 2015a)

... Why is it that the efforts of, say, our American partners and their allies in their struggle against the Islamic State has not produced any tangible results? Obviously, this is not about any lack of military equipment or potential. Clearly, the United States has a huge potential, the biggest military potential in the world, only double crossing is never easy. You declare war on terrorists and simultaneously try to use some of them to arrange the figures on the Middle East board in your own interests, as you may think. ... (Putin 2015b)

From 2015 until today Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War became a reality that more and more people consider legitimate (or at least less illegitimate). As the regime started to gain upper hand in the conflict, in which Russian intervention played a significant part, leverage of United States has shrunk considerably which paved way for the Tripartite Astana Process with participation of Iran and Turkey in order to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict ongoing for almost a decade. Throughout this period Russian public diplomacy continued its legitimization approach and arguably achieved its main objective.

... We discussed the situation in Syria and did substantial work on agreeing approaches to the key questions of the Syrian settlement. The Joint Statement we adopted reflects the commitment of Russia, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany and France to further expansion of cooperation in the interest of normalizing the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, launching an effective intra-Syrian dialogue and conducting necessary government reforms and transformations. ... It is in this context that we discussed the prospects for joining efforts within the Astana format and the so-called small group. In our view it would contribute to the launch of a real political process in Syria and attract an increasing number of interested and constructive minded representatives of Syrian society. ... (Putin 2018)

The fifth meeting of the guarantor states of the Astana process on the settlement in Syria was very successful and productive. The joint statement we adopted on its results has sealed our commitment to continued efforts towards a sustainable and viable peace in the Syrian Arab Republic. We are convinced that this goal can only be achieved through political and diplomatic methods based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. As the guarantors of the Astana process, our three countries stand for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria. ... (Putin 2019)

As it was presented through statements made by the Russian premiers, narrative of Russian public diplomacy throughout the involvement in Syrian Civil War was consistent in its theme and objectives. Its messages were clear “intervention against the legitimate rule in a sovereign country is immoral”, “Such an intervention if successful may cause global security risks in the future”, “Territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic should be preserved”, “Opposition demands should be negotiated through dialogue”, and “The regime transition should be through peaceful means”. In addition to these messages, Russian public diplomacy constantly aligned the Russian involvement and actions in Syria in line with these messages and diluted the arguments on pursued interest of Russian Federation, which were quite successful in legitimizing the involvement.

4.5 Comparative Analysis on Russian Public Diplomacy in Relation to Ukrainian Crisis and Syrian Civil War

In the previous sections, background in relation to Russian involvement in Ukraine and Syria as well as the Russian public diplomacy approach towards these involvements are presented in a brief yet concise manner. With their almost parallel timelines and thematic proximity (conflict between and insurgency and existing state apparatus), these examples proved to be both comparable and suitable for the

research question of this thesis due to important role played by public diplomacy in both instances.

Russian public diplomacy embraced a legitimizing role in both involvements however, the nature of involvements was varied. Involvement in Ukraine entailed support to insurgent movement and unlawful annexation of a region of a country whereas in Syria it entailed support to the existing regime and protection of territorial integrity. Although legitimization of these involvements required significantly different approaches, narrative of Russian public diplomacy was very similar except few nuances. In both cases, Russian public diplomacy criticized western involvement through notion of sovereignty while legitimizing its intervention through international law and self-determination principle in Ukraine, and global security and peaceful transition in Syria. In this regard, Russian approach is contradictory as it supports an insurgent movement in one country while intervenes against one in the other. The picture is further complicated as Russian Federation takes action against the territorial integrity in one country while upholding it as an essential part of its public diplomacy in another. Although I have argued that Russian public diplomacy was successful in Syrian case it would contribute little to none in long term to the relationship building (positive conduct) aspect of its practice. This means that the short-term goal orientation of Russian public diplomacy, such as justifying its intervention in the Syrian Civil War, can limit the negative repercussions in the short run. However, this approach would not build up the Russian image and credibility in the long run which would require a long-term comprehensive investment.

In line with my elaborations in theoretical discussion on credibility, this contradictory approach will hurt Russian image and credibility in the long run. As an additional point for consideration both of these interventions were essentially can be regarded as expansion of Russian sphere of influence (or protection of the existing sphere in a different perspective) and thus reviewed public diplomacy initiatives can be categorized as a justification for this expansion hence the neutral conduct of public diplomacy in line with my elaborations presented in the part on the concept of attraction. While the narrative of Russian public diplomacy involved mentioned themes, the reality was probably much more complicated considering the untold

interests of Russian Federation in these countries. Although some of these interests were mentioned in the related backgrounds (such as historical ties and sphere of influence) I did not delve into a detailed analysis of them as it would require a separate and a more focused study on the matter than the theme of this thesis. Therefore, our analysis was limited to the Russian public diplomacy and its narrative.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis I aimed to answer the main research question: “what is the main objective of contemporary Russian public diplomacy?”. In order to answer that question this thesis first delved into the question of what public diplomacy is. To this end, I have presented a brief discussion on the description and historical development of the concept as well as the practice of public diplomacy in the initial section of the second chapter followed by a literature review on the subject and an in-depth analysis of the key concepts of public diplomacy. I have categorized the existing approaches towards public diplomacy as “power based” and “diplomacy based”. The first categorization, which was mainly in line with the “soft power” conceptualization by Joseph Nye focuses on the short-term goal oriented aspect of public diplomacy whereas the second one (albeit in a less structured way) incorporates a broader approach including aspects such as long term relationship building and cultural relations. Although I hold the view that, the second approach is stronger in reflecting the actual complexity of the subject, the lack of structured conceptualization has led to the popularization of the soft power concept. Following the literature review, I have analyzed the concepts of public, attraction, power and credibility focusing on their relation to the subject of public diplomacy while also aiming to locate their place in social sciences. With regard to the concept of public, I have elaborated the relationship between public, individual and public opinion and argued that the public is not just an entity to be acted upon by the international actors but is also an international actor in itself. I have also argued that the view of public as a coherent concept in international relations is problematic, as the building block of public- individual should also be examined as how it is affected by the public diplomacy policies of other international actors and through which mechanisms these effects relay onto the public opinion as a whole.

In the following section, we have analyzed the concept of attraction and how it was integrated into the subject of public diplomacy. In this section, I have categorized the conduct of public diplomacy into three approaches as positive, neutral and negative in relation to its utilization of attraction and argued that attraction would play a pivotal role in the first approach while the last approach would undermine the attraction. On the concept of power, I have come to the conclusion that the relevance of power would depend on the context in relation to the three approaches presented in the section on attraction arguing that there is a negative correlation between attraction and power. Meaning that the concept of power would be more relevant in neutral or negative conducts of public diplomacy compared with the positive ones. Finally, I discussed the concept of credibility in terms of its importance and its impact on public diplomacy. After this analysis, I have come to define public diplomacy as “the targeted interaction between an international actor and a foreign public with the goal of influencing each other into a certain action or inaction”. This definition is broader than some of the definitions in the literature, but due to the current conceptual chaos (about which my criticisms were presented several times throughout this thesis); I believe such an approach would be more suitable in order to clarify the basic aspects of the subject. Findings in this chapter also allowed me to formulate the methodology (presented in the introduction chapter in detail) of the third and fourth chapters, in which the initial research question of this thesis was answered, as a combination of historical analysis and a brief comparative discourse/policy analysis. The main reason behind this formulation was my conclusion (from elaborations on the key aspects of credibility and public) that an analysis on effects of public diplomacy as well the public diplomacy policy of an actor would require a historical perspective due to the long term influence of image/credibility of the actor on a foreign public.

Throughout the third and fourth chapters, I have tried to present an analysis on the Russian public diplomacy efforts starting from the late imperial period until the present day in line with discussion on the methodology of this study. The historical analysis disclosed that there were significant continuities in terms of public diplomacy and image concerns of the Russian polity. The most striking and consistent of these concerns was the negation of possible reactions against the

expansionist policies pursued by Russian polity throughout approximately 200 years of its history. The echoes of this concern are still resonating with the contemporary policies of the Russian Federation. The brief experience acquired through the third world initiatives of the Cold War period and the opening up process during final years of Soviet Union, as well as the initial years of the Russian Federation; provided the basis for the following public diplomacy initiatives. In order to further support this argument a comparative analysis on Russian Public diplomacy during the Ukrainian Crisis and the Syrian Civil War was presented. Although actual motives of Russian policy were not analyzed in depth for this section, considering the solid interests of the Russian Federation in these countries, it would be safe to define the goal of Russian foreign policy as expansionism in a contemporary setting. The analysis bore two important results. First, the Russian public diplomacy in both involvements mainly utilized an approach for justifying Russian intervention through similar narratives. Secondly, utilization of similar themes for both of these actions created a contradiction, which I expect to affect Russian diplomacy adversely in the future. As argued previously public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation aims to justify Russian intervention in Ukraine while at the same time criticizing/condemning intervention by western powers in Syria. The first deduction was crucial in supporting the outcome of my historical analysis. In light of these findings I argue (and answer my initial research question) that the main theme or objective of contemporary public diplomacy conducted by the Russian Federation is justifying the aggressive/expansionist policies pursued by Kremlin through explaining foreign policy actions in a harmonious way with the commonly accepted norms in international politics such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination. As argued in the general analysis on the contemporary Russian public diplomacy these aggressive/expansionist policies are usually directed towards the former Soviet countries or countries that were under the Soviet sphere of influence. This argument is not a unique one as Bogdanova (2016: 67) also mentions it as one of the fundamental aspects of the emerging Russian public diplomacy as part of its aim of explaining the logic of Russian actions. However, as my historical perspective supports, this is not only part of the contemporary Russian approach towards public diplomacy and is a result of the restructuring process that the Russian foreign policy

went through in the early 2000s (Bogdanova 2016: 65) but also the result of a practical continuity and accumulated the experience of its predecessor Russian States.



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APPENDICIES

A.TÜRKÇE ÖZET/TURKISH SUMMARY

Kamu diplomasisi, yakın zamanda özellikle de Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde çokça tartışılan bir konu olagelmıştır. Yumuşak güç, ulusların markalaşması ve kültürel diplomasi gibi üretilen kavramlarla birlikte kamu diplomasisinin kapsamı genişlemekte ve her geçen gün uluslararası aktörlerin gündemindeki yeri gittikçe artmaktadır. Bu artan önceliğe rağmen uluslararası aktörlerin farklı toplulukları belirli amaçlar uğruna etkilemesi aslında yeni bir olgu değildir ve tarih öncesi dönemden bu yana kullanılagelmıştır. Rusya Federasyonu yakın dönemde uluslararası sahnede etkinliğini arttıran bir aktör olarak kamu diplomasisini birçok örnekte etkin olarak kullanmaktadır. Bu tezin araştırma konusu da Rusya Federasyonu'nun kamu diplomasisini hangi bağlamda kullandığı ve temel hedeflerinin ne olduğudur. Tezin giriş bölümünden sonraki ilk kısmı olan ikinci bölümde kamu diplomasisi kavramı teorik ve pratik açılardan incelenmiştir. Bölüm, kamu diplomasisi pratiğinin ve akademik başlığının tarihi bir analizi ile başlamaktadır. Bu bölümün sonrasında mevcut literatürde kamu diplomasisi üzerine yaklaşımlar sınıflandırılmış ve bir literatür taraması sunulmuştur. İkinci bölümün son kısmında ise kamu diplomasisi başlığı altında sıklıkla incelenen kavramlar üzerine bir tartışma sunularak tezin geri kalan bölümlerinde izlenecek metodun ön hazırlığı yapılmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde Rus Devleti'nin geç imparatorluk döneminden günümüze değin uyguladığı genel kamu diplomasisi politikaları karşılaştırmalı ve tarihi bir bakış açısıyla sunulmuştur. Tezin dördüncü bölümü Rusya Federasyonu'nun güncel kamu diplomasi politikasını Ukrayna Krizi ve Suriye İç Savaşı üzerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak bir analizini sunarak ve bunun tarihi sürekliliğini tartışmaktadır. Bu bölümlerden elde edilen bilgilerle beşinci yani sonuç bölümünde Rusya Federasyonu'nun izlediği güncel kamu diplomasisi politikasının ana hedefinin izlenen saldırgan ve yayılmacı politikaları uluslararası arenada

meşrulaştırmak olduğu ve bazı yazarların savunduğu üzere bu olgunun yeni bir politika değil Rus Devletinin geçmişinde de izlenen politikalarla paralellik gösterdiği görüşleri savunulmuştur.

Artan akademik çalışmalara rağmen kamu diplomasisinin kapsamlı bir teorik altyapısı olduğunu söylemek ne yazık ki güçtür. Bu olgunun başlıca iki sebebi vardır. Birincisi uygulanan bir kamu diplomasisi politikasının etkilerini ölçmek; olası örneklem havuzunun çok geniş olması ve kamu diplomasisinin altında yatan mekanikler üzerine henüz bir çalışma gerçekleştirilmemiş olması sebeplerinden ötürü oldukça güçtür. İkinci sebep ise etkili bir kamu diplomasisi politikasında aktörün geri planda hatta görünmez bir durumda olması sebebiyle uygun vakaların analiz edilmesindeki zorluktur. Bu nedenle bu tezin ana araştırma sorusu ve argümanının bir parçası olmamasına rağmen kamu diplomasisiyle yakından ilişkili kavramlar da yine bu tez kapsamında incelenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Kamu diplomasisi tanımı ve kamu diplomasisi kavramının ve pratiğinin tarihsel süreci ele alındığında kamu diplomasisini “bir uluslararası aktörün başka bir uluslararası aktörü kendi amacı doğrultusunda bir politika izlemeye veyahut izlenen bir politikaya kayıtsız kalmak adına etkilemesi” olarak tanımlamak mümkündür. Literatürde kamu diplomasisi kavramına olan yaklaşımların farklılığı göz önüne alındığında bu tarz geniş bir tanımın kamu diplomasisi gibi henüz teorik olarak fazla geliştirilmemiş ve bu sebeple birçok farklı yaklaşımın mevcut olduğu bir konu üzerinde yapılacak çalışmalar için daha uygun olacağı düşünülmüştür. Kamu diplomasisi başlığı üzerine halihazırda literatürdeki yaklaşımları “Güç Bazlı” ve “Diplomasi Bazlı” olmak üzere iki ana kategoride toplamak mümkündür. Joseph Nye tarafından üretilen yumuşak güç konsepti başta olmak üzere, “Güç Bazlı” yaklaşımlar, kamu diplomasisini uluslararası aktörlerin sahip oldukları kültürel sermaye benzer çekici unsurların kaynak olarak kullanıldığı bir çekişme alanı olarak tanımlamaktadır. “Diplomasi Bazlı” yaklaşımlar ise kamu diplomasisini güç ve kaynak gibi realist yaklaşımın üzerinde durduğu bakış açıları yerine literatürde yer alan farklı bakış açılarını da içeren daha bütüncül bir açıdan ele almaktadır. “Güç Bazlı” yaklaşımların kamu diplomasisi üzerine veriye dayalı araştırma yürütme açısından avantajı yadsınamaz olsa da alternatifine nazaran üç ana eksende dezavantajlı olduğu yazar tarafından ileri sürülmüştür. Bunlardan birincisi (her ne

kadar yazar tarafından da kamu diplomasisi dahil olmak üzere uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin bakış açısında ana kavramların başında geldiği düşünülse dahi) güç kavramına haddinden fazla verilen önemdir. Bu durum, “Güç Bazlı” yaklaşımların uluslararası alandaki çatışmaya, işbirliğine kıyasla daha fazla önem vermesine sebep olmakta dolayısıyla kamu diplomasisini tam anlamıyla ele alamamaktadır. İkinci dezavantaj “Güç Bazlı” yaklaşımların kamu olgusunu edilgen ve üzerine politika yürütülen bir uluslararası unsur olarak görmesidir. Bu yaklaşım kamunun da etkileşime girdiği (ya da onunla etkileşime giren) diğer aktörleri etkileyebilecek bir aktör haline geldiğine dair yaklaşımları ve kamu diplomasisi pratiğinde giderek artan çift yönlü etkileşimi kapsamasına mani olmaktadır. Son olarak “Güç Bazlı” yaklaşımlar sınırlı yaklaşımları sebebiyle özünde çok disiplinli bir yaklaşım gerektiren kamu diplomasisi konusunu uluslararası ilişkiler bakış açısıyla sınırlandırmakta ve kamu diplomasisinin altında yatan mekanizmaları göz ardı etmektedirler.

İkinci bölümün son kısmında, yapılan literatür taramasında öne çıkan kavramlar ve bu kavramların kamu diplomasisi konusunun teorik altyapısıyla ilişkileri ele alınmıştır. İlk olarak kamu kavramının kapsamı, sosyal bilimlerdeki yeri ve kamu kavramının kamu diplomasisi literatüründe ne şekilde ele alındığı incelenmiştir. Bu incelemede mevcut kamu diplomasisi literatürünün kamu ve kamuoyu kavramlarının genel olarak kapalı bir kutu olarak ele aldığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Literatür, kamunun uluslararası aktörlerin karar almalarına nasıl etki ettiğini ya da kamunun kendi içerisinde kamu diplomasisi politikalarından nasıl etkilendiğine dair kayda değer bir açıklama getirememektedir. Yazar bu soruların öncelikli olarak bireysel bağlamda araştırılmasının kamu diplomasisi teorisine büyük bir katkı sunacağı fikrini savunmuştur. Bu başlık altında son olarak kamu diplomasisi politikalarının kamuyu hem doğrudan hem de bireyler üzerinden etkileyebileceğini öne sunan bir modelleme sunularak gelecek araştırmalar için katkı sunmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak ele benzer şekilde ele alınan kavram “çekicilik” tir. Bu kısımda çekicilik kavramı literatür taramasında da değinilmiş olan kamu diplomasisinin hem kısa vadeli ve amaca yönelik hem de uzun vadeli iyi ilişkiler kurmaya yönelik bir araç olduğuna dair Jan Meliessen tarafından ortaya atılan argüman bağlamında incelenmiştir. Yazar çekicilik kavramının kamu diplomasisinin iki tür kullanımında da etkili olacağını

kabul etmekle birlikte kamu diplomasisi pratiğinin “çekicilik” kullanımına göre pozitif, nötr, ve negatif olmak üzere üç farklı şekilde sınıflandırılabilceğı argümanını ortaya atmıştır. Pozitif sınıflandırma Meliessen’in de belirttiğı uzun vadeli iyi ilişki kurmaya yönelik uygulanan kamu diplomasisi politikalarını kapsarken, nötr ve negatif sınıflandırma kısa dönem ve amaca yönelik uygulamaları kapsamaktadır. Nötr sınıflandırmada çekicilik kavramı çok sınırlı bir ölçüde de olsa kullanılabilecekken, negatif sınıflandırmada çekiciliğın yerini tamamen tehdit almaktadır. Daha detaylı bir şekilde ele aldığımızda nötr sınıflandırma bir uluslararası aktörün uyguladığı bir dış politikayı meşrulaştırması veya başka bir aktörün kendisine karşı bir hareket almasına engel olmayı kapsarken; negatif sınıflandırma başka bir aktöre cebren bir hareket aldırılmayı veya hareket almasına engel olmayı kapsamaktadır. Üçüncü ele alınan kavram kamu diplomasisinde güç kavramı olmuştur. Bu bölümde Joseph Nye tarafından ayrıştırılan yumuşak ve sert güç kavramlarının kamu diplomasisindeki yeri üzerine kısa bir tartışma sunulmuş ve çekicilik kavramının tartışıldığı önceki bölümde ortaya atılan sınıflandırmalarla olan ilişkisi irdelenmiştir. Yapılan irdilemede, sert güç kavramını oluşturan askeri, ekonomik ve siyasi kaynakların kamu diplomasisinin özellikle nötr ve negatif sınıflandırmalarında etkili olabileceğı bu sebeple de hem yumuşak hem de sert güç kaynaklarının kamu diplomasisi pratiğinde şartlara bağılı olarak kullanımının söz konusu olabileceğı yorumu yapılmıştır. Dördüncü ve son olarak kamu diplomasisi kapsamında itibar kavramı ele alınmıştır. Kamu diplomasisinde itibar kavramı kısaca uluslararası bir aktörün beyanları ve hareketleri arasındaki ilişkiye bağılı imajını ifade etmektedir. İtibar kavramı hem devletlerarası klasik diplomaside hem de kamu diplomasisinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Lakin kamu diplomasisi açısından bakıldığında itibarın öneminin klasik diplomasiye göre daha büyük olduğı öne sürülebilmektedir. Sunulan tartışmada kamu diplomasisinde itibarın, duruma göre hem aktör ve yabancı kamu arasındaki ilişkiyi etkileyen bir kaynak hem de özellikle nötr sınıflandırmadaki uygulamalarda kamu diplomasisinin bir amacı olabileceğı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Kısaca toparlamak gerekirse tezin ikinci bölümünde: kamu diplomasisinin genel olarak kapsamı, mevcut literatürdeki tartışmalar ve eksiklikler, ve kamu diplomasisi etrafındaki ana kavramlarla değinilmiştir. Bu bölümdeki araştırmalar ve tartışmalar

göstermiştir ki kamu diplomasisiyle ilgili gerçekleştirilecek çalışmalarda her durumu uyacak teorik bir formül mevcut değildir. Kamu diplomasisi araştırmaları (hem teorik hem de pratik) disiplinler arası bir yaklaşımla ele alınması gereken geniş kapsamlı bir konudur. Bu sebepten ötürü, gerçekleştirilecek her çalışmanın kapsamına göre bir metodolojinin ve ona uygun teorik altyapının oluşturulması elzemdir.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, geliştirilen metodolojiye uygun olarak Rus Devletinin kamu diplomasisi genel bir bakış açısıyla geç imparatorluk döneminden günümüze kadarki zaman dilimi içerisinde incelenmiştir. İncelenen dönemde Rus kamu diplomasisinin belirli dinamikler çerçevesindeki amaçlarında bir süreklilik gözlenmiş ve bu sürekliliğin devletin yapısının değiştiği durumlarda dahi devam ettiği savı öne sürülmüştür.

Geç imparatorluk döneminde Rus kamu diplomasisinin incelendiğinde iki ana tema öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi Rusya İmparatorluğu’nun bir Avrupa Devleti olduğuna yönelik bir algının oluşturulması ikincisi ise kurulduğu tarihten itibaren devam eden genişleme politikasına karşı bir oluşabilecek bir koalisyon hareketinin önüne geçmektir. İlk amaca yönelik gösterilebilecek en önemli örnekler Napolyon döneminde devrim karşıtı diğer imparatorluklarla işbirliği politikaları ve “Üç İmparator Birliği” dir. Her ne kadar anılan dönemde (günümüzde de) bu amaca tam olarak ulaşıldığını söylemek güç olsa da; iki örnekte Rusya İmparatorluğu hem söylem hem de diplomatik olarak kendini Avrupa devlet sistemi ve güç dengesinde bir yer etmeyi başarmıştır. Yayılmacı politikaların olumsuz etkilerinin azaltılması hususunda Rus kamu diplomasisi kendisine daha geniş bir hareket alanı bulmuştur. Bu açıdan Orta Asya ve Kafkaslarda kullanılan uygarlaştırma ve modernleştirme söylemi o dönemde emperyalist politikalar yürüten diğer Avrupa devletleriyle paralellik göstermekte ve belli açılardan başarılı olmuş gözükmektedir. Öte yandan Osmanlı Devleti, Avusturya İmparatorluğu ve Doğu Avrupa’da izlenen yayılmacı politikaların meşrulaştırılmasında dini ve ırksal söylemler bu dönemde sıkça başvurulan yöntemler olmuştur. Doğu Hristiyanlarının hamiliği ve Üçüncü Roma Doktrini dini kökenli meşrulaştırma politikalarının temelini oluştururken, Panslavizm bu politikaların ırk kökenli tarafını oluşturmaktadır. Panslavizm’in imparatorluğun iç ve dış politikasına ne derece etki ettiği literatürde halen daha tartışmalı bir konu

olarak görülmesine rağmen, araştırmalar Balkan politikalarının meşrulaştırılmasında söylev olarak kendine önemli bir yer bulduğunu göstermektedir.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Rus İç Savaşı ve sonucunda kurulan Sovyetler Birliği yapısal anlamda Rusya İmparatorluğuyla çok farklı olmasına rağmen yürütülen kamu diplomasisi politikalarında ve hedeflerinde önemli devamlılıklar gözlenmiştir. İmparatorluk dönemindeki Avrupa devleti olarak görülme hedefi Sovyetlerin ilk yıllarında yerini meşru bir devlet olarak tanınma amacına bırakmıştır. Bu amaçla Rus kamu diplomasisinin başarılarından biri devrimin şevkiyle gerçekleştirilen atılımların dışarıda tanıtılması ve uluslararası arenadaki diğer ülkelerle diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmaya çabalanmasıdır. Bu anlamda önemli gelişmelerden biri 1933 yılında Amerikan Başkanı Roosevelt'in kişisel çabalarıyla Sovyetler Birliğinin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından tanınmasıdır. İlk yıllardaki bu güçlüğün sonrasında Sovyet kamu diplomasisinin iki önemli hedefi olmuştur. Bunlar dünya çapında komünist devrimlerin desteklenmesi ve Sovyetler Birliği tarafından izlenen saldırgan ve yayılcı politikaların olumsuz etkilerinin azaltılmasıdır. Her iki hedef te imparatorluk döneminde izlenen benzer politikanın bir devamı olarak görülebilmekle birlikte değişen konjonktürde daha ideolojik bir yüzle karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Lenin döneminde izlenen kamu diplomasisi politikası bu ideolojik yüzü belirgin bir biçimde yansıtmaları açısından önemlidir. Bu dönemde Marksist yazınlarda yer alan “Dünya Devrimi” ve devrim güçleri ile karşıt güçler arasındaki kaçınılmaz mücadele kavramları, ve Lenin tarafından geliştirilen “Barış içinde birlikte yaşama” (peaceful coexistence) kavramı Sovyet dış politikasının kökenini oluşturmuştur. Bu ikircikli politika Sovyetler Birliği'nin var olduğu dönem boyunca konjonktüre bağlı olarak dönüşümlü olarak kullanacağı dış politika doktrinlerini ortaya çıkarmıştır. İki doktrinde de kamu diplomasisinin ayrılmaz bir yeri vardır. “Dünya devrimi” doktrini için kamu diplomasisi üçüncü dünyada komünizmin yayılması ve halihazırda var olan hareketlerin desteklenmesi anlamına gelirken, “barış içinde birlikte yaşama” doktrini için gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerin halklarıyla iletişime geçme ve onlara komünizmin “gerçek” yüzünü gösterme anlamına gelmektedir. Devam eden dönemde Rus kamu diplomasisi bu dinamikler üzerinden bir rayda hareket ettiğine ve Rus kamu diplomasisinin özellikle de İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki dönemde izlenen genişleme politikasının (hem sınır hem

etki alanı olarak) etkilerini azaltma faaliyetleri üzerine yoğunlaştığına dair gözlemler sunulmuştur. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılma dönemine doğru ilerleyen süreç ve dağılmanın hemen sonrasındaki dönem hem kamu diplomasisi pratiğinin önemi hem de Rusya Federasyonu'nun yeni kimlik arayışı açısından önemlidir. 80'ler ve sonrası dönem kamu diplomasisi ve kültürel ilişkiler giderek devletten daha bağımsız bir hale gelmiş ve bu değişen dinamiğe Amerikan kamu diplomasisi daha iyi uyum sağlamıştır. Rusya Federasyonu'nun Soğuk Savaş döneminde yaşadığı kimlik karmaşası Yugoslavya İç Savaşında izlenen dış politikada belirgin olarak gözlemlenmek mümkündür. Rusya Federasyonu bu süreçte hem NATO ile işbirliği politikası sürdürmeye hem de yakın ilişkilere sahip olduğu ve saldırgan konumunda bulunan Sırbistan'ı korumaya çalışmış ve iki tarafa da yaranamayacak şekilde NATO karşılığının boyutunu sınırlandırmaya yönelik bir politika izlemiştir.

Rusya Federasyonunun dış politikadaki kimlik arayışı büyük ölçüde içerideki yeniden yapılanma süreciyle birlikte tamamlanmıştır. 2000'lerin ortalarına doğru Rusya Federasyonu uluslararası arenada giderek etkisini arttıran bir aktör haline gelirken Rus kamu diplomasisi de kendisine yeniden bir hedef oluşturmuştur. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde yakın dönem Rus kamu diplomasisini inceleme maksadıyla Ukrayna krizi ve Suriye iç savaşı bağlamında Rusya Federasyonu başkanlarının söylemleri incelenmiştir. İki örnek de uluslararası arenada Rusya'nın artan saldırganlığı ve giderek daha etkin bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla ilişkilendirildiği gibi kamu diplomasisinin de etkin biçimde kullanıldığı vakalar olması sebebiyle incelemeye alınmıştır.

Ukrayna, Rusya Federasyonu için tarihi ve kültürel yakınlığa ek olarak stratejik olarak da büyük öneme sahip bir ülkedir. Bu sebeplerden ötürü Ukrayna'nın AB Doğu Ortaklık Programı ve Avrasya Gümrük Birliği arasında yaşadığı ikilemle başlayan süreç Rusya Federasyonu için önemli bir dış politika ve kamu diplomasisi sınavı olmuştur. Bu süreçte Rus kamu diplomasisi öncelikle daha pozitif bir yaklaşımla Avrasya Gümrük Birliğinin alternatifine kıyasla avantajlı yönlerini Ukrayna kamuoyuna anlatma yoluna gitmiştir. Bu yaklaşım başarısız olduğunda Rus kamu diplomasisi mevcut ekonomik anlaşmalarda revizyona gidilmesine yönelik tehditkar bir tutum benimseyerek kısa vadede istediğini elde etmiş gibi görünse de devam eden süreçte sivil protestolar ve başkan Yanukoviç'in ülkeyi terk etmesine yol

açmıştır. Bu gelişmeler üzerine Rus dış politikası daha da sertleşerek Kırım'ın ilhakı ve Ukrayna'nın doğusundaki Rusça konuşan azınlığın silahlı isyanını destek başta olmak üzere saldırgan bir tutuma evrilmiştir. Bu süreçte Rus kamu diplomasisi önceki dönemlerde olduğu gibi bu politikaları uluslararası kamuoyunda meşrulaştırma görevini üstlenmiştir. Bu dönemde Rusya Federasyonu Başkanlarının söylemleri incelendiğinde üç tema öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi batı güçlerinin Ukrayna'ya müdahalesinin ve sonrasında yaşanan politik gelişmelerin meşru olmadığı ve Ukrayna'nın ulusal egemenliğine aykırı olduğudur. İkinci tema özellikle Kırım'da gerçekleştirilen referandum ve Rusya Federasyonu tarafından gerçekleştirilen ilhak bağlamında sıkça dile getirilen self determinasyon prensibidir. Üçüncü ve son tema ise Yanukoviç'in iktidardan uzaklaştırılması ve sonrasında Ukrayna'da yaşanan politika değişikliği bağlamında sürecin demokratik olmadığı ve Ukrayna anayasasına göre eşit konumda bulunan Rusça konuşan azınlığın hakkının yendiğidir. Üç temanın da temel olarak amacı incelendiğinde Rusya'nın Ukrayna müdahalesini meşrulaştırmak olduğu gözlenmektedir.

Dördüncü bölümün devamında Rusya Kamu diplomasisinin Suriye İç Savaşı kapsamındaki söylemi incelenmiştir. Sovyet dönemindeki ilişkiler ve mevcut askeri üsler göz önüne alındığında Suriye'nin Rusya Federasyonu'nun etki alanında bir ülke olduğu genel geçer bir görüş olagelmıştır. Suriye İç Savaşında Rus kamu diplomasi mesajları da Ukrayna örneğinde olduğu gibi Rusya Federasyonu Başkanlarının söylemleri üzerinden incelenmiştir. İnceleme sonucunda Suriye İç Savaşında Rus müdahalesi üzerine bazı söylemlerin öne çıktığı görülmüştür. Çatışmaların ilk aşamasında Rus kamu diplomasisi uzlaşmacı bir tavır takınmış ve büyük çaplı bir dış müdahaleyi engelleme maksadıyla Esad rejiminin yatıştırma politikalarını öne çıkarmaya çalışmıştır. Bu tema 2011 ve 2012 yıllarında görece değişmeden sürmüştür de sonraki dönemde batılı güçlerin Rusya'nın rejim yanlısı tutumunu, Rusya Federasyonu'nun çıkar gözetken dış politika uyguladığı savı üzerinden eleştirmesi; Rus kamu diplomasisini bu suçlamaları savuşturma ve Suriye'de kalıcı bir çözümü destekleme söylemi kullanmaya itmiştir. 2013-2014 döneminde rejimin muhalifler üzerinde kimyasal silah kullandığına yönelik haberler, muhaliflere destek olacak bir uluslararası koalisyon oluşma ihtimalini gündeme getirmiştir. Rus dış politikası ve kamu diplomasisi bu dönemde önemli bir başarıya imza atarak ithamların tam

teşekküllü bir müdahaleye evrilmesini önlemiş ve Suriye iç savaşının çözümünde yalnızca askeri olarak değil politik olarak da rol oynayabileceği mesajını uluslararası kamuoyuna iletmeyi başarmıştır. Bu önemli başarının ardından 2015 ve sonrası dönemde Rus kamu diplomasisi özellikle DEAŞ’la mücadele üzerinden önemli bir sempati kazanmıştır. Suriye’deki Rus mevcudiyeti kullanılan uluslararası terörle mücadele diskuru üzerinden meşrulaştırılırken batılı devletlerin bu durumun tersini amaçlayan politikaları etkisiz hale getirilmiştir. Bu durumun ortaya çıkmasında Rus kamu diplomasisi ve izlenen meşrulaştırma politikasının başarılı bir şekilde uygulanmasının etkisi günümüzde hale hissedilmektedir. Bu etki sayesinde mevcut durumda Rusya Federasyonu iç savaşın çözümü hususunda Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine nazaran daha etkin bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu başarının altında yatan önemli nedenlerin başında ise Rus kamu diplomasisinin uluslararası kamuoyuna verdiği mesajların Suriye’de izlenen dış politikayla tutarlı olmasıdır. Rusya Federasyonu başkanlarının (özellikle de Vladimir Putin’in) açıklamaları incelendiğinde “egemenlik sahibi bir ülkedeki meşru yönetime karşı müdahalenin yanlış olması”, “bu tarz bir müdahalenin gelecekte küresel güvenlik sorunlarına yol açabileceği”, “Suriye Arap Cumhuriyetinin korunması gerektiği”, “Suriyeli muhaliflerin taleplerinin diyalog içerisinde tartışılması gerektiği” ve “rejim değişikliğinin barışçıl yöntemlerle gerçekleştirilmesi gerektiği” mesajları öne çıkmaktadır. Son olarak mesajlardaki tutarlılığın yanı sıra batılı güçler tarafından Rusya Federasyonu’nun yalnızca ulusal çıkarlar için insan haklarına aykırı hareket eden bir rejimi savunduğu söylemine devamlı olarak karşı çıkılması da anılan mesajların yanı sıra Rus kamu diplomasisinin başarısını etkileyen bir etmen olmuştur.

Ukrayna ve Suriye’de uygulanan Rus kamu diplomasisi karşılaştırmalı olarak incelendiğinde iki müdahalede de meşrulaştırma politikası izlendiği görülmüştür. Ancak iki müdahalenin de kendine özel dinamikleri izlenen politikanın başarısını temelde etkileyen faktör olmuştur. Ukrayna örneğinde izlenen dış politika ayrılıkçı bir hareketin desteklenmesi ve uluslararası hukuka uygun olmayan bir şekilde ülkenin bir kısmını ilhak etmeyi kapsarken; Suriye örneği mevcut rejime destek ve bir ülkenin toprak bütünlüğünü korumayı içermektedir. Bu iki politika da kamu diplomasisi açısından farklı yaklaşımlar gerektirmesine rağmen Rusya

Federasyonu'nun iki örnekte de kullandığı söylemlerin birbirine çok yakın olduğu gözlenmiştir. İki örnekte de Rus kamu diplomasisi batı müdahalesini ulusal egemenlik kavramı üzerinden eleştirirken kendi müdahalesini Ukrayna örneğinde uluslararası hukuk ve self-determinasyon prensibi üzerinden, Suriye örneğinde ise küresel güvenlik ve barışçıl geçiş süreci üzerinden meşrulaştırmıştır. Ukrayna örneğinde batılı devletlerin müdahalesinin ulusal egemenlik kavramı üzerinden eleştirilmesi buna karşın Suriye örneğinde Rus müdahalesinin aynı kavram üzerinden meşrulaştırılması çelişkili bir durum ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu durumun çelişkisi özellikle Ukrayna krizi bağlamında Rus kamu diplomasisini olumsuz etkilemiştir.

Kamu diplomasisindeki “güvenilirlik” kavramı üzerine gerçekleştirilen teorik tartışmalara geri dönülecek olursa Rusya ve Suriye örneğinde izlenen dış politika ve kamu diplomasisi söylemlerindeki çelişkiler uzun vadede Rusya Federasyonu'nun imajını ve güvenilirliğini olumsuz açıdan etkileyecektir. Buna ek olarak iki örnek de temelde Rus nüfuz alanının genişletilmesi ve bu politikanın meşrulaştırılması olarak değerlendirilebilmekte ve “çekicilik” kavramı altında ikinci bölümdeki tartışmalarda sunulan modelleme içerisinde nötr kamu diplomasisi uygulaması olarak sınıflandırılabilir.

Sonuç olarak, tezin çıkış noktası olan “Rusya Federasyonu'nun uyguladığı kamu diplomasisinin temel amacı nedir?” araştırma sorusuna cevap verebilme maksadıyla kamu diplomasisi konsepti, kamu diplomasisi bağlamında Rus devletinin tarihi ve Ukrayna ve Suriye bağlamında güncel Rus kamu diplomasisi muhtelif bölümlerde incelenmiştir. Bu incelemeler sonucunda kamu diplomasisi konseptinin teorik olarak bazı eksikliklerinin olduğu öne sürülmüş ve bu eksikliklerin bir kısmı sunulan modellemelerle giderilmeye çalışılmıştır. İncelenen Ukrayna ve Suriye örnekleri göstermiştir ki güncel Rus kamu diplomasisinin temel amacı Rusya Federasyonu tarafından izlenen yayılmacı dış politikaya karşı gelişebilecek tepkileri sınırlandırmaktır. Yine incelenen örnekler göstermiştir ki bu hedefe, genellikle yapılan müdahalelerin meşrulaştırılması yöntemiyle ulaşılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu meşrulaştırma çabasını Rusya Federasyonu liderlerinin uluslararası kamuoyunda kabul gören konseptler ve savlar üzerinden yürüttüğü gözlemlenmiştir. Ancak tezin üçüncü bölümünde yapılan tarihsel analiz göz önüne alındığında izlenen bu politikanın yeni bir olgu olmadığı aksine uzun bir tarihsel süreklilik arz ettiği savı

ortaya atılmaktadır. Bu açıdan tezin ikinci bölümünde de savunulduğu üzere kamu diplomasisi ve bu konuyla ilişkili kavramların tarihi bir bakış açısıyla incelenmesi konu üzerine yapılacak gelecek çalışmalara önemli katkılar sağlayacaktır. Ancak, her araştırmada olduğu gibi bu önermelerin de farklı araştırmalarla desteklenmesi gerekmektedir.



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