

**REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
İSTANBUL KENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**



**CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE UKRAINIAN
NATION IN WAR-TIME (2022-2024): AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL
COMMUNICATIONS BY THE MEJLIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR
PEOPLE**

MASTER'S THESIS

ALEXANDER ULYANOV

İSTANBUL – 2025

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Thesis Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. ZAFER ÇELER

İSTANBUL – 2025

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The defense date of the thesis titled “CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE UKRAINIAN NATION IN WAR-TIME (2022-2024): AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS BY THE MEJLIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE” prepared by Alexander Ulyanov was made on 19 June 2025 and it was accepted as the Master’s Thesis of the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Graduate Education Institute of Istanbul Kent University by unanimous vote by the jury given below.

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DECLARATION

I declare that scientific ethics rules have been followed in writing this thesis, that in case of utilization of the works of others, references have been made in accordance with scientific norms, that no falsification has been made in the data used, and that no part of the thesis has been presented as another thesis study at this university or another university.



ALEXANDER ULYANOV

19.06.2025

PREFACE

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and respect to my advisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Zafer ÇELER, who has followed my work meticulously by embracing it during the writing phase of this thesis, for his valuable contributions and efforts. During the defense exam, the jury members made valuable contributions to the finalization of my work. On this occasion, I would like to thank all my professors and my relatives who have helped me during the final reading of my thesis. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my wife İrem Nur SOYCAN ULYANOV for her patience and support.

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ABSTRACT
Istanbul Kent University
Postgraduate Education Institute
Crimean Tatar National Movement and the Ukrainian Nation in War-Time
(2022 – 2024): an Analysis of External Communications by the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People

Alexander ULYANOV

Master's Thesis

Political Science and International Relations

Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Zafer Çeler

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After decades of independent development and limited contact, the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar national movements found themselves coexisting within a single political entity of the independent Ukrainian state. Following two decades of cautious cooperation underlied by tensions, the Crimean Tatar National Movement received a much more enthusiastic acceptance by the Ukrainian state after a Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea effectively forced it into exile from the peninsula. Examining the development and interaction of the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar nationalism, this thesis traces a shift in the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations from being largely compatible with the modernist theoretical model of central – peripheral nationalism interaction to bearing a closer resemblance to the ethno-symbolist model of a communitarian-oriented cultural nationalism as accepting its stateless coexistence with a state-bearing nation without either assimilating into or fully converging with it. Assuming the Russian occupation of Crimea as a trigger event for this transformation, external communications of the Mejlis, the highest representative and executive organ of the Crimean Tatars, are analyzed to trace further development of a cultural nationalism tendency in its relation to the Ukrainian state after a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022.

Key Words: Ukraine, Crimean Turks, Nationalism

ÖZET
İstanbul Kent Üniversitesi

Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü

Savaş Zamanında Kırım Tatar Milli Hareketi ve Ukrayna Ulusu (2022 – 2024): Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi’nin Dış İletişiminin Analizi

Alexander ULYANOV

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

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Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Zafer ÇELER

Haziran, 2025 – 83

Ukrayna ve Kırım Tatar milli hareketleri, onlarca yıllık bağımsız gelişim ve sınırlı temastan sonra, kendilerini bağımsız Ukrayna devletinin tek bir siyasi varlığı içinde bir arada buldular. Yirmi yıl süren ve gerilimlerle örülü temkinli işbirliğinin ardından Kırım Tatar Milli Hareketi, Rusya’nın Kırım’ı işgal ve ilhak ederek kendisini yarımadaadan sürgüne zorlamasının ardından Ukrayna devleti tarafından çok daha coşkulu bir şekilde kabul gördü. Ukrayna ve Kırım Tatar milliyetçiliğinin gelişimini ve etkileşimini inceleyen bu tez, Kırım Tatar – Ukrayna ilişkilerinde, merkez – çevre milliyetçilik etkileşiminin modernist teorik modeliyle büyük ölçüde uyumlu olmaktan, devlet sahibi bir ulusla asimile olmadan ya da ona tamamen yakınlaşmadan devletsiz bir şekilde bir arada var olmayı kabul eden cemaatçi yönelimli kültürel milliyetçiliğin etno-sembolist modeline daha yakın bir benzerlik taşıyan bir değişimin izini sürmektedir. Kırım’ın Rusya tarafından işgalinin bu dönüşümü tetikleyen bir olay olduğu varsayımıyla, Kırım Tatarlarının en yüksek temsil ve yürütme organı olan Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi’nin dış yazışmaları, 2022’de Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı tamamen işgal etmesinin ardından Ukrayna devletiyle ilişkisinde kültürel milliyetçilik eğiliminin daha da gelişmesinin izini sürmek için analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ukrayna, Kırım Türkleri, Milliyetçilik

INTRODUCTION

Native to the Crimean peninsula but having lost their political independence at the end of the 18th century and been mass-deported from it in 1944, the Crimean Tatars started their mass repatriation to Crimea, now under the jurisdiction of an independent Ukrainian state, in 1991. Having their own distinct culture and history, Ukraine has become for them a country of political rather than ethnic origin (Aydın, 2021: 12). Although a degree of tension existed initially, the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations improved significantly after the occupation and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the start of a hybrid Russo-Ukrainian war in the eastern provinces of Ukraine.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the development of the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations after a whole-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 as reflected in the external communications of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, the highest representative and executive organ of the Crimean Tatars, and frame it within one of the commonly accepted theories of nation and nationalism. Of particular interest is determining whether the interaction of the central Ukrainian nationalism and the peripheral Crimean Tatar nationalism fits the modernist or the ethno-symbolist model of core-peripheral nationalism relations. The subordinate purposes are to examine the development of Ukrainian national idea and the Crimean Tatar National Movement, and to trace their interaction from the earliest contacts in 1917, when both the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars pursued their respective (eventually short-lived) sovereign state-building projects, to the most recent developments anteceding the whole-scale war in Ukraine.

The Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations have been researched by Oxana Shevel and Gwendolyn Sasse (with a focus on the initial tensions in the first decades of independence/repatriation respectively); Filiz Tutku Aydın (in the aspect of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism and its connections with Ukraine); Fethi Şahin (with a focus on the role of the Crimean Tatars in Ukrainian consolidation and resistance in the face of Russian hybrid invasion in 2014); Natalya Belitser (with a focus on the status of the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people in Ukraine); Victoria Tolstenyova (with a focus on the role of Ukrainian activists in the development of the Crimean Tatar National Movement); and Ülkü Nur Zengin (in the aspect of the Crimean Tatar identity formation). Of particular importance to my thesis are Zengin's observations on the

peculiarities of the development of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in exile, which limit the application of modernist theories and constructs to it (Zengin, 2020).

None of the researches mentioned above, however, focused on the period after the whole-scale invasion or tried to analyze the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations within a clearly-defined framework of nationalism and nation theory. It is also worth noting that Crimean Tatar studies in general are a very small field: compared to the 91 dedicated centers of Ukrainian studies and 73 centers engaged in Ukrainian studies within regional framework in 2022, there were only 5 centers of Crimean Tatar studies in the world (Koval et al., 2022: 10) .

The Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations are those of a larger, endowed with sovereignty and a state apparatus nation, and a much smaller, stateless one. The two nations are very different in terms of their organization, their culture, their traditions, and their history after WWII – yet they followed similar trajectories of national building and the first attempt at gaining sovereignty. At the focal point of those relations is the Crimean peninsula which both nations claim: the Ukrainian one, as a territory under the jurisdiction of its state; the Crimean Tatar one, as its ancestral homeland. For years, their respective ideas of Crimea, its future, and the place of the Crimean Tatar people within it did not quite align. The Ukrainian state wanted Crimea to be a territory just like any other; the Crimean Tatar National Movement wanted to enjoy special rights and special forms of representation in that territory. For the former, the underlying concern was the preservation of their state's territorial integrity and sovereignty. For the latter, it was a concern about preserving their identity and traditional way of life as a community, which they kept throughout decades of exile.

It was when a Russian occupation of Crimea presented a threat both to Ukrainian sovereignty and the Crimean Tatar community that the Crimean Tatars unconditionally sided with Ukraine, and the Ukrainian state, in its own turn, became more welcoming to the Crimean Tatar group rights and aspirations. In this thesis, I make the argument that the newly-found symbiosis of the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatar community goes beyond mere alliance against a common enemy as it addresses the tensions which existed between Ukraine and the Crimean Tatars long before the war. Drawing on the ethno-symbolist theories of collective memory in the formation of national identity, with a view to characteristic features of the Crimean Tatar nationalism developed in exile but preserved beyond it, one can argue that the Russian invasion could become one shared

event in the collective memory of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars to change their respective nationalisms and the relations between them.



CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON NATION AND NATIONALISM

1.1. Historical Evolution of the Concepts

The Oxford English Dictionary etymologically connects the word “nation” to the Latin “natio,” which meant the place of one’s birth and, by extension, people of common territorial origin. Outside the Latin language, Eric Hobsbawm traces the use of words derived from “nation” back to the 14th century use of “pays de ma nation” by the French chronicler Jean Froissart in a similar sense of a place of origin (Hobsbawm, 1992: 15). Among other usages, the word “nation” or related words used to be a synonym for a foreigner (in Spanish), refer to groups of foreign merchants living within a city, and groups of students within a university who come from the same place. (Ibid.: 16) The 18th century German encyclopedist Johann Heinrich Zedler defined “nation” as a group of people who share a body of customs, mores and laws, regardless of where they live (as opposed to “Volk,” “people,” which he defined as a totality of “nations” living in the same territory (Zedler, 1961 [1740]: 901-3).

However, throughout the 19th century, a change in the use of the word “nation” gradually occurred, increasingly linking this notion to state sovereignty and fixed territory on the one hand, and linguistic and ethnic characteristics on the other (Hobsbawm, 1992: 19). At around the time of the American War of Independence and the French Revolution of 1789, the concept of nation came to represent “the common interest against particular interest, the common good against privilege.” (Vilar, 1978: 11) By the middle of the 19th century, however, it has become associated with the principle of nationality limiting the participation in a nation to the members of a single cultural and linguistic community (Hobsbawm, 1993: 101).

The term “nationalism” has also changed its meaning in the 19th century. Anthony Smith traces its earliest recorded use to the early 15th century, at Leipzig University, where it meant a union among professors of the same territorial origin to defend their common interests (Smith, 2008: 167). However, in the second half of the 19th century it was coined for xenophobic movements within multi-ethnic states (Hobsbawm, 1993: 105), thus referring only to a particular segment of all the movements and ideas which the word “nationalism” refers to in its modern sense.

Although the first academic works on nations and nationalism appeared yet in the 19th century, the subject has “been a peripheral concern of social and political theory for much of the

twentieth century” (Özkırımlı, 2010: 3). Most studies of nationalism trace the origins of the nationalist doctrine back to German Romanticism (the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries); but, as Özkırımlı points out, the thinkers of that period were heavily influenced by the philosophical work of earlier periods, most notably by the writings of Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacques Rousseau (Ibid.: 11).

The first to pay close attention to the importance of language for a nation was Johann Gottfried Herder. The idea of a nation-creating function of a common language was further developed and emphasized by Johann Gottfried Fichte, who claimed that “where a separate language is found, there a separate nation exists.” (Ibid.: 12) The influential ideas of national spirit, the innermost character of a people sharing a culture that manifests in its political life, (Hegel, 2001: 50) and of historical (linked to a continuously existing state or institutions, like France or Poland) as opposed to non-historical (newly-emerging, like the USA or Canada) nations were introduced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

One of the earliest academic definitions of nationality was given by J.S. Mill in “Of Nationality as Connected with Representative Government” (1862): “A portion of mankind . . . united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist among them and any others – which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively” (Mill, 2011: 294). Although racial, linguistic and religious factors can play a role in the formation of a nationality, the key element is a shared sentiment based on shared communal history.

The same year, 1862, Lord Acton stressed the historical novelty of the self-determination rights of nation tracing its emergence back to the partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century which “awakened the theory of nationality, converting a dormant right into an aspiration, and a sentiment into a political claim” (Dalberg-Acton, 1862). This theme of partitions and invasions will be particularly important for the subject of my thesis. Another event which, to Lord Acton, became a key milestone in the formation of nationalist doctrine, was the French revolution of 1789 (Ibid.).

20 years later, in his famous lecture “What is a Nation?”, the French historian Ernest Renan defined nation as “a soul, a spiritual principle” made up of “a rich legacy of memories” and “the

desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage” (Renan, 2018: 250). He explicitly designated nation as a relatively new historical development and emphatically distinguished it from racial or linguistic groups. Renan traced the historical origin of nations back to the polities established as a result of the conquest of former Western Roman territories by Germanic tribes characterized by the blending of the conquerors with the conquered through religious and cultural assimilation, thus creating a relatively homogenous society. (Ibid.) He pointed out the role of “the act of forgetting” as a factor in the creation of a nation: “unity is always achieved brutally,” and the associated violence needs to be collectively forgotten for a nation to inspire loyalty in its citizens (Ibid.: 251). Thus not merely a shared historical memory was introduced as an element of nation-building, but a certain element of deliberate constructing was admitted to be inherent in it.

The approach of Marxist authors to nation and nationalism can be described as ambivalent (Özkırımlı, 2010: 17). On the one hand, Marx and Engels in their early period expressed strongly internationalist views and considered nation only as a tool of conflict between social classes. On the other hand, in their later period, they came to recognize nation as a necessary stage of historical development (capitalism). (Ibid.: 19) Vladimir Lenin who, borrowing the term “imperialism” from J.A. Hobson’s work *Imperialism. A Study* published in 1902, designated a new dimension of the “national question” in the essentially nationalist struggles of colonized peoples against their metropolies (Özkırımlı, 2010: 29). Of particular importance to the subject of this thesis is Joseph Stalin’s approach outlined in his essay “Marxism and the National Question” (1913), as its author would design and lead the eventual Soviet policy of ethnic cleansings and mass deportations that drastically shaped both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar history of the 20th century. In it, he advocated for regional autonomy for “such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, the Caucasus etc.” while denying them the right to cultural-national autonomy, i.e. one granted to actual cultural or ethnic communities within given territories (Stalin, 1954).

The French sociologist Emile Durkheim, along with providing his own definition of a nation based on a “desire to live under the same laws, and to form a single state,” stressed the importance of public rituals, ceremonies and symbols in promoting national cohesion (Durkheim, 1974: 61-62). The German sociologist Max Weber, in agreement with Mill and Durkheim, defined nation as “a community of sentiment,” but such that “would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own,”

(Weber, 1981: 176) thus effectively linking nationhood to statehood or at least an active pursuit thereof. But perhaps more lasting contribution of Weber's to the theory of nation and nationalism is his definition of a state as a bearer of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.

Nationalism became a subject of specialized academic inquiry only after WWI, in the works of Hans Kohn, Carleton J. Hayes, E.H. Carr and others. For the period between the end of WWI and the end of WWII it was characteristic that the focus of academic research was the phenomenon of nationalism as a movement and an ideology, not that of nation as such, with a tendency to distinguishing morally defensible forms of nationalism from morally indefensible ones (Özkırımlı, 2010: 31-32). An example of this tendency is the typology of nationalisms created by Hayes.

Hayes distinguished five types of nationalism (Hayes, 1955: chapters 2-6):

1. Humanitarian nationalism advocated by the already mentioned Rousseau and Herder: the earliest form of nationalism shaped by the ideas of the Enlightenment, based on the ideas of natural law and presenting the creation of nations as a desirable and inevitable step in human progress. It branched out into Jacobin, traditional and liberal nationalism at around the end of the 18th century;
2. Jacobin nationalism: based in theory on the ideas of Rousseau and developed with the aim of defending the principles of the French Revolution in a period of war and domestic rebellion. Its characteristic features were intolerance of internal dissent, reliance on force in achieving its goals, and promotion of quasi-religious fanaticism. Its most influential legacy was the ideas of "the nation in arms" and "the nation in public schools." A milder form of Jacobin nationalism was eventually subsumed into liberal nationalism;
3. Traditional nationalism: developed by intellectuals opposed to the French Revolution, its frame of reference was not the Enlightenment ideas but rather history and tradition. Antagonistically opposed to the Jacobin form of nationalism, traditional nationalism was aristocratic and evolutionary (as opposed to revolutionary) in principle. It was eventually subsumed into the integral form of nationalism;
4. Liberal nationalism: was developed as a middle ground between Jacobin and traditional nationalism, originated in England. At the core of it is the idea that each

nationality should have its own constitutional government the purpose of which would be to ensure as much personal liberty as possible for each citizen;

5. Integral nationalism: reached its heyday in the first half of the 20th century, this form of nationalism is based on viewing the nation as an end in itself and putting national interests above those of the individual, as well as assuming the pursuit of the national interest as inherently hostile towards other nations.

The latter two, liberal and integral nationalism, are often referred to as civic and ethnic nationalism respectively.

However, this typology is largely built within the framework of certain historical experiences of certain European (mostly Western-European) countries and can hardly be fully applicable to the nationalisms of other periods and regions. It can also be noted that Hayes “tends to ‘assume’ rather than ‘explain’ the main object of analysis, the nation” (Özkırmı, 2010: 35).

Hayes’ contemporary Hans Kohn, the author of *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background*, is sometimes credited as the “founding father of the contemporary study of nationalism” (Plokhy, 1995: 710). To him belongs the formula “nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality” (Kohn, 1946: 15) and the description of nationalism as a “a state of mind, and act of consciousness” (Ibid.: 18) which becomes possible only as a result of a historical process which starts with the emergence of the modern – that is administratively centralized and politically sovereign – state between the 16th and the 18th centuries (Ibid.: 19). Unlike Hayes, Kohn distinguishes between the Western type of nationalism, rooted in the cultural legacy of the Enlightenment with its “liberal and rational outlook”, and the historically succeeding to and always influenced by it nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (Ibid.: 330).

While the Western-type nationalism is built on universally applicable (or claiming universal applicability) principles “without too much sentimental regard for the past,” the non-Western type nationalists “created often, out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political reality” (Ibid.). Non-Western nationalism did not “find its justification in a rational societal conception, it found it in the “natural” fact of a community, held together, not by the will of its members nor by any obligations of contract, but by traditional

ties of kinship and status” (Ibid.: 331). As such, argues Kohn, non-Western nationalism tends to be antagonistic towards the Western one, which finds a characteristic expression in its often messianic sentiments.

Although considered the longest-living and perhaps the most influential typology in the field of nationalism studies (Özkırımlı, 2010: 37), it does not necessarily apply to some of the later-period and geographically non-Western nationalisms. For instance, the nationalism of the Rukh movement in the last decade of the Soviet and the early years of the independent period of Ukraine is characterized as distinctly civic (“rational”) and territorial- rather than ethnically-based (Snyder, 2003: 243).

Approaches to the analysis of nationalism can be classified as follows (Breuilly, 1985: 18-35):

1. The nationalism approach, which assumes either that nationalism is an expression of an objectively existing nation that deserves independence and sovereignty, or at least that nationalism is an expression of a wide-spread sense of common identity which is more important than other identities individuals may have, including religious or state (citizenship) identities (as was the case, for instance, with Ukrainian nationalists within the Polish state);
2. The communications approach which views nation as a system of internal communications engagement with which creates a sense of shared identity among individuals;
3. The Marxist approaches which tend to view nationalism as an expression of class relations at a particular stage of a society’s historical development (capitalism), where nationalism can express the interests of a particular class or be a set of class alliances in which each class has its own interest;
4. The psychological approach that views nationalism as the answer to an inherent human need to identify with a larger cause, in conditions when earlier identities have failed or eroded. For instance, when industrialization forces individuals to move from rural areas to towns, away from their previous connections and occupations, where it becomes easier for them to identify with other attributes they have and may share with others (such as language, religion or skin color);

5. The functional approach that views nationalism as a force that helps to direct a community in its transition from pre-industrial to industrial society.



1.2. Major Schools of Thought on Nation and Nationalism

The development of nation and nationalism studies after WWII was characterized by the formation of three main schools of thought as far as the genesis and nature of nation is concerned: primordialism-perennialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism.

Primordialism refers to “the belief that nationality is a ‘natural’ part of human beings . . . and that nations have existed from time immemorial. This is the view of nationalists themselves . . . [and] the laymen’s view of nations and nationalism” (Özkırımlı, 2010: 49). While several subschools of primordialism can be distinguished, their common feature is the belief in the antiquity or naturalness of nation, which in itself can serve as the basis for a broader distinction of primordialists proper (those who consider nation a natural phenomenon, like human speech or sight) and perennialists (who believe in the antiquity of nations without considering them natural) (Ibid).

An important case of primordialism is what Özkırımlı refers to as the nationalist thesis: the belief that humanity is divided into distinct, objectively identifiable nations, nationality being an inherent attribute of the human condition (Ibid, 51). Being rather a common frame of reference for a number of nationalists or nationalist-influenced authors than a strictly-defined system, the nationalist thesis produced several narratives with a number of recurrent themes. Among them is the antiquity of nation, the golden age (a belief in an idyllic period in the distant past serving as an inspiration for the present), superiority of a given national culture, periods of national recess and national awakening, and the national hero who brings about the awakening (Ibid.: 51-52).

The works of Pierre van den Berghe exemplify the sociobiological approach to primordialism. National groups, he claims, “are fundamentally defined by common descent and maintained by endogamy. Ethnicity, thus, is simply kinship writ large” (van den Berghe, 2001: 274 as in Özkırımlı, 2010). This kinship, van den Berghe admits, can be putative in some cases but still can become the basis of strong sentiments such as nationalism, tribalism or racism. At the basis of the groups bonded through these sentiments are “the biology of human mating and reproduction,” which means that “ethnies have existed since the dawn of history” (van den Berghe, 2005: 115 as in Ozkirimli, 2010). When a sense of kinship and belonging is transformed into a political demand, a nation comes into existence as a “politically conscious ethnies” (van den Berghe, 2001: 273 as in Özkırımlı, 2010).

Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz stand at the forefront of what Anthony D. Smith referred to as cultural primordialism. This school of thought assumes the existence of an affinity between the members of the same ethnic group or nationality which results “not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the tie itself” (Geertz, 1993: 259-260 as in Özkırımlı 2010). This affinity is not biological but rather emotional and psychological in its nature.

Another term introduced by Smith with regard to primordialist teachings is perennialism, which he applied to the ideas of Adrian Hastings. The essence of this approach is seeing nation not as a natural phenomenon but still a constant and important presence in human life throughout history. Specifically, Hastings links the rise of nations to regular use of written vernacular language to produce literature and argues that only Christian groups could become nations as Christianity provides the very model according to which a nation is built. This allows him to speak of an English nation-state that survived the Norman Conquest of 1066 (Hastings, 1997: 4-5 as in Özkırımlı, 2010).

With their assumption of fixed identities and affinities, these theories did not play any significant role in my research as focused rather on the dynamics of a relationship between two nationalisms in the time of drastic social and political changes.

The modernist approach to nation and nationalism which evolved in the decades immediately following WWII is by far the most commonly accepted. At its core is viewing both nations and nationalism as relatively new phenomena which can come into existence only as a result of modernization, a historical process that started in Western Europe between the 16th and the 18th centuries (Smith, 2008: 2). Modernization can be defined narrowly through the formation of the modern state as administrative (i.e. having a centrally-managed administrative apparatus), citizen-mobilizing (i.e. requiring an active participation of its citizen in its affairs) and citizen-influencing (i.e. trying to inculcate certain attitudes and beliefs in its citizens) (Hobsbawm, 1993: 110); or broadly through the formation of a modern society as one based on a high-powered technology and the expectancy of sustained growth, which requires a mobile division of labor and sustained, frequent, precise communication between strangers (Gellner, 1983: 33-34).

In *When Is A Nation?*, Walker Connor defines a nation as a self-aware ethnic group the members of which hold a shared belief in common ancestry (whether there is actual common ancestry or not). To him, a number of conditions are to be met before an ethnic group can form a nation, all of which historically occurred only in the modern period. Among them are close and regular contact between ethnic groups, mass participation in public life, mass information and wide-spread literacy to enable the access to it (Connor, 1990). The title of this work is a reference to Renan's *What is a Nation?* emphasizing a shift of focus from the features of a nation as a phenomenon to the conditions of its historical emergence.

In *Nations and Nationalism*, Ernest Gellner argues that it was the transition from agro-literate to an industrial (or modern) society that necessitated the emergence of nationalism and the rise of nations and nation-states. Agro-literate is such society where some are literate but most are not. The lower stratum of such society is made up of small agricultural communities depending on face-to-face contact between their members and segregated vertically (Gellner, 1983: 9), that is having little or no regular contact among each other. The upper stratum of an agro-literate society is referred to as clerical, the bearers of high culture (standardized system of communication based on literacy and education) (Ibid.: 54) with a strict horizontal segregation from the lower stratum (Ibid.: 12). As most of production in an agro-literate society is agricultural, the division of labor is relatively simplistic and rigidly fixed; it occurs at a local level, and accordingly so does training and education.

As a result, cultures and cultural identities are highly localized and do not converge with political units (Ibid.: 49): the rulers and the ruled can speak different languages, various cultures can coexist within a single political unit, and the identity of an individual within a given community can be fluid or ambiguous, depending on the language, the religion, belonging to a family or a clan, each of these identities being given precedence now and again depending on the context (Ibid.: p.12).

However, as the advance of technology necessitates an increasingly complex division of labor among increasingly more individuals and more frequent change of occupation for most of them, which in its turn makes it necessary for individuals to get more specialized education and employment outside of their local communities. This spread of exo-education necessitates a shared system of communication for individuals from different localities within a political unit, which can best be provided through universal literacy and a centralized system of general education. (Ibid.:

34) Thus the standardized high culture spreads beyond the upper stratum and the once isolated clericy becomes co-extensive with the whole of society – which condition now needs to be sustained by the polity to sustain the division of labor, economic growth and advance of technology (Ibid.: 17).

A society comes to reproduce itself with universal, standardized, generic education (Ibid.: 29) on the basis of once limited high culture; and now state and culture, once coexistent but not convergent, become linked (Ibid.: 36) “A homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.” (Ibid.: 39) And nationalism, in its term, creates new social units using “the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world” (Ibid.: 49). Centralized, state-controlled education plays a crucial role in this process.

Although convincing, widely accepted, and fully accounting for the relations of power and culture in the dynamics of nationalism and nation-building, Gellner’s model of nationalist inception at the transition from a agro-literate to an industrial or modern society seems to be designed primarily to account for the origin of the historically earlier, or as Kohn calls them Western-type nationalisms. It is not as applicable to nationalisms rising or resurging in already industrialized societies or under the influence of foreign nationalism. It also is rather strict in completely subordinating both the cultural and the political elements of nationalism to the needs and economic developments in an industrialized society, effectively reducing the function of nationalist worldviews and movements to being a facilitator of the division of labor.

Drawing on Gellner’s understanding of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in *Invented Tradition* examine how, in establishing a homogenized, uniformly-educated society, nationalist policy-makers can present certain actually recent or newly-invented practices as traditional and arising from the past to create a sense of legitimacy and historical continuation. According to these authors, nationalism is a statist movement utilizing cultural forms and practices to homogenize society and shape it according to their own designs.

In his work on the historical development of nationalism, Hobsbawm outlined the elements of what he calls the principle of nationality, among which are: an assumption of a cultural and linguistic community within a given population; emphasis on state-formation based on that

community; historicism and a sense of mission, viewing the formation of a state as the realization of a given community's highest potential; claiming the legacy of the 1789 French Revolution in this or that form. (Hobsbawm, 1993: 101) At the same time, Hobsbawm draws a clear distinction between cultural or linguistic movements and what he considers nationalism proper, stating that language as such does not have any political potential, being only one of many identifying factors in a pre-national society (Ibid.: 62), and assumes a central role only where a modern definition of nationality is already in existence (Ibid.: 58), thus suggesting the formula "languages multiply with states, not the other way around" (Ibid.: 63).

Miroslav Hroch in *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* proposed the three-phase model of national movement formation: from the mostly cultural activities of a small group of intellectuals in Phase A, to an activist movement seeking political participation in Phase B, to a mass movement seeking independent statehood in Phase C. Thus, nationalism as a movement brings about a nation, and the ultimate goal of nationalism is to attain political sovereignty for the nation it creates. Accordingly, a movement without this goal can qualify, at best, as an incomplete, phase-A nationalism (Hroch, 1985).

In *Nationalism and the State*, John Breuilly argues to the contrary, that nationalist intellectuals and masses sharing a sense of national identity are not essential to the development of a nationalist movement. To him, nationalism is a form of politics that comes to exist in modern states, i.e. states where sovereignty is consolidated in particular central institutions (as opposed to pre-modern states where power is unevenly distributed at different levels between different groups and local elites). To assert its claim to central power, modern state needs a mechanism to legitimize itself and mobilize the mass of its population; while local elites or privileged groups, to protect their position against the modern state, need a means to consolidate their local population in defense of their cause. The former purposes are achieved by state-endorsed nationalism; the latter, by regional, most importantly separatist nationalisms (Breuilly, 1985: 355-356).

Both types of nationalism can legitimize themselves by recourse to different grounds, from universal principles (like those of the American War of Independence or the French Revolution of 1789) to a historical tradition of statehood (like Poland or Hungary in the 19th century). Breuilly notes that the more power and political participation a group enjoys the less likely would its nationalism be rooted in shared culture. However, all types of nationalism aim for political power

in a centralized, territorially-defined modern state, and thus are natural rivals to each other. Admitting the distinction of nationality as citizenship and nationality as cultural identity, Breuilly assumes that this distinction is challenged by nationalism which, when central, strives to subsume the peripheral cultural identities, or when peripheral, struggles for a sovereignty and citizenship of its own (Breuilly, 1985: 14).

This model of central-peripheral nationalism interaction is applicable to any historical period or geographic region as long as two distinct and unequal in terms of their access to political power nationalisms coexist within the same state. The relation of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar nationalism being exactly those of a central and peripheral nationalism within a single state, Breuilly's model was of particular relevance to my research for this thesis, along with John Hutchinson's model of cultural nationalism to be discussed below.

The modernist approach seems to be restrictive in the sense of emphasizing the homogeneity aspect of nation, limiting its historical occurrence to the modern era only, and equating nation and nationalism with a claim to sovereign power, thus excluding all other types of political activity from the scope of nationalism. While "nationalism views culture and power as each other's partners," (Gellner, 1983: 11) it appears implicit that power is perceived as the leading partner in this tandem.

A different approach was taken by the ethnosymbolist school which emerged in the 1980s as a critique of the modernists (Özkırımlı, 2010: 46). In his book *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*, Anthony D. Smith argues that "different kinds of nation or national community emerged in different periods" rather than all appeared at the onset of modernity. (Smith, 2008: 184) Rather than being created by the circumstances in times of pre-industrial to industrial transition, "both the concept of the nation and some well-known examples of national communities and national sentiments long predated the advent of modernity" (Ibid.: 185). From an ethnosymbolist viewpoint, a nation is defined as a "named and self-defining human community, whose members cultivate and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared public customs and common laws," while nationalism is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a human population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation" (Ibid.: 184). Thus the focus, as compared to modernist approaches, is shifted from securing control of a modern administrative state and creating a cultural homogeneity necessary to run it

efficiently, to preserving and developing, within a modern framework, an existing or nascent cultural identity. The markers of that cultural identity can be language, religion, assumed common origin, belonging to a certain territorial community, and possession of shared myths and traditions rather shaped by historical experience and preserved in collective memory than invented by nationalist intellectuals seeking to design a new identity.

In “Re-Interpreting Cultural Nationalism,” John Hutchinson directly challenges Breuilly, Gellner and Hroch on the subject of the political and the cultural elements in nationalism. He argues for the existence of what he calls cultural nationalism as a type, which defends a distinctive and historically-rooted way of life (Hutchinson, 1999: 393), is communitarian-oriented and small in size rather than seeking the control of a state, can align but never fully converge with purely political nationalist movements (Ibid.: 400), and is a recurrent movement in its own right, not just a transient stage in the development of an ultimately political and sovereignty-seeking nationalist movement (Ibid.: 405). Hutchinson emphasizes that the “cultural” in cultural nationalism does not mean a narrow focus on language or a pursuit of cultural homogeneity as would be assumed for a statist movement (Ibid.: 392-393). In other words, cultural nationalism can exist without a state of its own and cooperate with the nationalism of the state where it exists; its essence and the logic of its development are not subordinate to a pursuit of statehood and are focused rather on the preservation of a cultural identity which is not necessarily based on speaking a common language.

The approaches and schools of nation and nationalism studies, as divergent as the models they provide may be, still overlap to a significant enough extent to allow us to distinguish some elements common to all nationalisms, no matter which model this or that of them fits:

1. A nation combines both a political and a cultural element which are closely intertwined and inseparable, whether one or the other, or none of the two, can be viewed as clearly dominant;
2. Whether their actual existence or precursors in pre-industrial society can be admitted or not, nations become most prominent with transition to modernity. Yet they do not lose their relevance to public life after the transition is complete;
3. Nationalism is a social and political phenomenon accompanying modern nation-building and the preservation of a nation once it is formed, whether its task is to

create a nation from scratch or condense it from older, looser and more local lifestyles and identities;

4. Nationalism always starts with few intellectuals or activists and tends to expand over a broader community, whether it ends up claiming political sovereignty for that community or not;
5. Nationalism can be espoused both by a state seeking to secure its power and a stateless group within the jurisdiction of a state or across the borders of several, whether the relation of the two is one of rivalry or complementary coexistence;
6. Nations are built with older historical and cultural assets, which involves both enshrining some and intentionally overlooking other events and experiences, and often inventing myths and traditions which have no actual historical basis;
7. To be successful in its political and cultural project, nationalism needs a shared frame of reference and an efficient system of communication for its target community, which is best achieved through control of the education system.

Of particular importance to my research are the two models of interaction between central (in control of state apparatus) and peripheral nationalisms: the modernist model of Breuilly and the ethnosymbolist cultural nationalism model of Hutchinson. The former assumes the dominance of the political over the cultural element in nationalism, viewing the attainment and retention of sovereignty and state power as the primary goal of any nationalist movement. Within its framework, the central and the peripheral nationalism are treated as inherent rivals due to the inevitably separatist tendencies of any peripheral nationalism. The latter allows for certain types of nationalism which prioritize the preservation of a traditional lifestyle over attaining sovereignty, and thus can coexist non-competitively with a central, sovereignty-bearing nationalism. The central nationalism remains unchallenged in its sovereignty at the state level, while the peripheral nationalism enjoys recognition and a degree of autonomy at the communal level.

Assuming that either model is theoretical and does not occur in its pure form in actual life, I will seek to demonstrate that the interaction between the central Ukrainian and the peripheral Crimean Tatar nationalism within the independent Ukrainian state had shifted from mostly compatible with the modernist model in the period from the inception of Ukraine as an independent state in 1991 to the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, to more closely resembling the cultural

nationalism model in the period from 2014 to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the degree of resemblance further increasing from 2022 on.

In the following Chapters 2 and 3, the historical development of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar nationalism respectively will be examined with the purpose of identifying theoretically describable patterns.



CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDEA

2.1. Ukraine in the Pre-Modern Period

As pointed out by John Armstrong in *Ukrainian Nationalism*, the relatively late emergence of a modern nationalist doctrine in Ukraine was anteceded by a tradition of separate political development (Armstrong, 1980: 3). Kyiv, the modern capital of Ukraine, had been the center of a medieval conglomerate of principalities called Kyivan Rus' ruled by Scandinavian-origin nobility until a Mongolian invasion in the mid-13th century led to its eventual demise. (Magocsi, 2010: 55) Much later, in the 14th century, the descendants of Kyivan rulers and their semi-legendary progenitor Riuryk (Hroerkr) came to be referred to as the Rurikid dynasty' which term would be applied retrospectively (Ibid.: 90) .

As the Kyivan Rus' collapsed following a Mongol invasion, two separate branches of the Rurikid dynasty established their respective principalities in Galicia and Volhynia (the western part of what is now Ukraine), (Ibid.: 124) and the eastern cities of Suzdal and Moscow (in the western part of what is now Russia). For a couple of centuries to follow, the two offshoots of the now defunct Kyivan Rus', Galicia and Muscovy, would compete for the possession of its cultural and political legacy, the major part of which was the ecclesiastical institution of the Kyivan Metropolitanate within the Greek Orthodox Church. (Ibid.: 127-128) As Muscovy won the rivalry over the Metropolitanate and subsumed its clergy under its own dominion, (Ibid.: 160) it got the upper hand in shaping the narratives and the language of the Kyivan Rus' legacy and succession to it.

In the chancellery terminology of the Byzantine patriarchate, the older Kyivan Metropolitanate (now resident in Moscow) got the name of the Great Rus' ("Roussia" in Greek transcription), while the younger Galician Metropolitanate would be referred to as the Little Rus' (Roussia). (Nakonechnyi, 2001: XII) Eventually, "Muscovy fused the concept of the Rus' land with the idea of their own [branch of] Rurikid dynasty," (Magocsi 2010: 72) the word "Roussia" (Russia) ending up adopted officially (but already under a different dynasty) as its new name in 1721. (Nakonechnyi 2001: XIV) The names "Little Russia" and "Little Russian" ("Малороссия", "малорос") persisted with reference to Ukraine and Ukrainians as a people (an ethnic designation) in the Russian Empire until its collapse in 1917, (Ibid.: XII) far outside the ecclesiastical context of its origin (parishioners of a particular metropolitanate).

By the end of the 15th century, the Kyivan Rus' offshoot principalities on the territory of what is now Ukraine had fallen under control of Poland within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and were abolished: instead of Rus' nobility, they would be ruled by officials appointed by the Grand Duke of the Commonwealth. (Magocsi, 2010: 140) The Union of Lublin in 1569 placed all these territories under the Polish jurisdiction although they were able to preserve their Orthodox culture and religious structure. (Ibid.: 143-144) These former territories of the Kyivan Rus' and its Orthodox Christian population within the palatinates of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (and eventually Austria-Hungary), the words "Ruthenia"/"Ruthenian" (Latin derivatives from "Rus") would be used. Galician and Transcarpathian Ukrainians would continue to commonly use "Rus'", "Ruthenia", "Ruthenian" ("русин", Rusyn) in self-identification, without any affiliation to Russia (former Muscovy) implied. (Magocsi, 2010: 72) In contemporary use, the word "Ruthenian" or "Rusyn" refers to a particular East Slavic group living predominantly in the Carpathian Mountains region and speaking Rusyn, a distinct but closely related to Ukrainian language.

Although the oldest recorded mention of the word "Ukraine" ("україна") dates back to the early 13th century Kyivan Chronicle, (Magocsi, 2010: 171-172) it got a political meaning with the coming into force of Brest Union, 1596, which created the Ukrainian Catholic Church of Greek Rite (the Uniate Church). Intended to assimilate the Orthodox traditions within a single Commonwealth Church, it led to protest by Orthodox nobles in the former Kyivan Rus' territories. From then on, Ukraine would mean the land of the Orthodox Christians within the Catholic Poland. (Snyder, 2003: 110) "In effect, notes Magocsi, "the future of the Ukrainian people depended on the fate of its Orthodox Rus' church within a basically Roman Catholic environment" (Magocsi, 2010: 158). Thus religion and association with the legacy of the Kyivan Rus' were the identifying factors of the early modern Ukraine, while language was relatively unimportant as Polish became the chancellery language coexisting with the vernacular Ruthenian (early Ukrainian). (Snyder, 2003: 110) At the same time, Ukraine remained a territory administered by Poland, not a member of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on par with Poland and Lithuania.

The first time the tendency towards political independence manifested itself in the post-Kyivan Rus' Ukraine, was with the rise of the Cossack polity in the 16th century. A militarized class of settlers in the Ukrainian steppe regions, on the border with the Crimean Khanate, Cossacks

had been formally in the service of the Polish kings since the Treaty of Lublin and were ruled by administrators (hetmans) at first appointed by the king. However, with the growth of their military power, Cossacks came to elect their hetmans and pursue their own policies within the Polish-Lithuanian society, as well as in relations with foreign powers. (Magocsi, 2010: 196) Despite multiple Cossack uprisings against the Polish kings, they did not challenge the premise of being subjects of the latter and sought only autonomy and recognition as a distinct, privileged estate within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. (Ibid.) In the ascertainment of John S. Reshetar, “the Cossack community was more in the nature of an uncertain autonomous political entity rather than a truly sovereign independent state” (Reshetar, 1952: 14).

Nevertheless, the history and tradition of the Cossacks would have enormous influence on the Ukrainian nationalists of the modern period and came to be regarded as a central phenomenon in the historical development of Ukraine by most Ukrainian historians. For most Ukrainian scholars and literary figures on the 19th century, the Cossacks came to exemplify the core values of Ukrainians as a people: freedom, independence and a democratic way of life (Magocsi, 2010: 188). It was also with Cossacks that the name Ukraine came to be associated with at least a partially independent polity. Although they controlled only a part of Ukraine and referred to their territory with a different name, they identified with Ukraine as their homeland and on some Western European maps the land of Cossacks would appear as Ukraine (Ibid.: 189)

After a large-scale uprising in 1648, with the Crimean Khanate as their allies, the Cossacks took control of Kyiv and seemed to be on the course to establishing a properly independent state – but, eventually, had to sign the Pereiaslav Agreement with Muscovy in 1654, submitting to the authority of the latter in exchange for autonomy which they could not achieve in Poland. (Ibid.: 229) In the 19th and the 20th centuries, the “Pereiaslav myth” would become a crucial part of Russian propaganda representing Ukraine as a part of Russia which had been temporarily separated from and sought reunification with the latter. (Ibid.: 230) The attempted Union of Hadiach, which was intended to make Ukraine the third equal principality in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, (Snyder, 2003: 114) demonstrates that the main aspiration of the Cossacks was not joining Muscovy but rather finding a protector strong enough yet ready to grant them enough autonomy to accommodate for their traditional lifestyle and specific form of local democracy. (Magocsi, 2010: 229) It is also important to note that all the autonomies

and privileges in question concerned the nobility only, not the mass of citizens. The Cossack uprisings, alliances and unions were not yet a nation-building project in the sense of modernist theories of nationalism. But they did create collective memories, shared myths and traditions in which a national identity could become rooted with the advent of modernity.

The Muscovian/Russian-controlled part of Ukraine will be organized in three autonomies: the Hetmanate with Kyiv as its main city, Zaporizhzhia (the original Cossack land), and the Sloboda Ukraine with Kharkiv as the major city (a region that had remained largely uninhabited for a lengthy period and got organized already under Russia's sovereignty). All of them have lost their autonomy by the second half of the 18th century and became administratively parts of the Russian Empire. (Ibid.: 290) The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, initially predominant in Dnipro Ukraine, was absorbed by the Moscow Patriarchate yet back in 1686. (Nakonechny, 2001: XII) However, it is from these parts of Ukraine that the earliest articulations of Ukrainian patriotism would come in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries. (Snyder, 2003: 121)

2.2. Ukrainian Nationalism from Inception to the Ukrainian People's Republic: Dnipro Ukraine and Galicia

One of the earliest Ukrainian groups was the Novhorod-Sivers'k circle active in the 1770s to 1790s. It mostly looked up to the history and traditions of the Cossack Hetmanate and was concerned with the rights and privileges of the Ukrainian nobility, although to some extent was influenced by the ideas of the American and the French Revolutions. The views of the Novhorod-Sivers'k circle could be characterized as patriotic and autonomist: they did not necessarily seek independence from Russia but wanted more autonomy for Ukraine in cultural and religious affairs, and believed that Russia did not properly follow the Pereiaslav Agreement which guaranteed such autonomy to the Hetmanate. However, their activities were mostly cultural and educational, and the few administrative reforms they agitated for were meant for Ukraine as an administrative part of Russia, not an independent state. (Yas', 2010: 446-447)

Another instance was the Kharkiv Renaissance of the 1820s and 1830s, an intellectual movement that developed around the Kharkiv University. Although the scholars belonging to the Kharkiv Renaissance focused on studies of Ukrainian culture and language, their orientation was rather Slavophile than properly Ukrainian. Recognizing and admiring the unique character of the Ukrainian ethnicity, they tended to view it rather as accessory to a broader "Rus'" ethnicity, and could perceive it even as naturally subordinate to the Russian one. (Naumov, 2018: 191-192)

The first political movement that could be called properly Ukrainian was the secret Society of Cyril and Methodius formed in Kyiv in 1846. Liberal in its political orientation, the Society advocated for the establishment of a federation of legally equal Slavic republics of egalitarian interior constitution (which it claims to be natural for all Slavic peoples as such), Ukraine among them, as well as the abolition of serfdom, illiteracy and corporal punishment, the guarantee of freedom of speech, press and conscience. (Reshetar, 1952: 6-7) Among its members were Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet, and scholars like Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish, the author of the first Ukrainian translation of the Bible and the first phonetic alphabet of the Ukrainian language. The Society's program document, the Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People, presented a narrative of Ukrainian history as a part of Christian and Slavic history, prophesying a future role for Ukraine as the driving force for a new political order of free Slavic peoples: "For the voice of Ukraine has not died out. Ukraine will rise from its grave, and

will call again to its Slavic brothers, who will hearken to its call, and the Slavdom will rise.” (Knyhy Byttya, 1921: 103)

The Books of Genesis firmly ties the Slav identity to Christianity and tended to view Ukrainian aspirations for freedom and independence as identical to those of other Slav peoples rather than unique. In particular, it identified with the program of the Decembrist uprising in the Russian Empire: “And the voice of Ukraine resounded in Muscovy, when after the death of the tsar Alexander the Russians wanted to expel the tsar and the nobles, establish a Commonwealth and unite all Slavs in the divine image, indivisible and unmixed; but Ukraine wanted the same yet two hundred years before.” (Ibid.: 105) The Books does not place any particular emphasis on the importance of the Ukrainian language or any other markers of Ukrainian identity aside from being Slavic and Christian, but demonstrates a strong sense of resentment against “kings and nobles” who oppress and divide Slavic peoples and clear antagonism towards non-Slavic, allegedly not properly Christian Europeans (whom it broadly divides into the French, the Germans, and the British). For instance, mentioning Catherine II’s repressions against Ukrainian Cossacks at the end of the 18th century, the Books identifies and antagonizes her primarily as an ethnic German, not the head of the Russian Empire. (Ibid.: 96)

However, after the Russian authorities’ crackdown on the Society in 1847, no successor organization would appear for several decades, in large part due to restrictions imposed by the Russian government on the use of Ukrainian language in publishing, education and cultural activities in 1863 and 1876. (Reshetar, 1952: 7) Kulish, Kostomarov and Shevchenko resumed their cultural activities in Saint Petersburg in the 1850s within a Ukrainian circle known as Hromada (community). (Magocsi, 2010: 391) Among the important works produced in that period was Kostomarov’s essay Two Rus’ Nationalities in which he argued for a clear distinction between the Ukrainian and the Russian peoples. In particular, he observed that “[Ukrainian] community is a voluntary assembly of individuals [while] . . . the essence of the Great Russian communal organization is compulsion.” (Kostomarov, 1861) Still, this work fits rather the earlier autonomist tendency in viewing Ukraine as accessory to the Russian state. Remarkably, Kostomarov himself at that point refused to identify as Ukrainian. (Naumov, 2018: 191)

Mykhailo Drahomaniv, a Ukrainian intellectual and professor whose work was characterized by focus on the practical aspects of political activity beyond merely cultural matters,

advised his students to regard themselves not as political activists but only as those who were laying the groundwork for future political activity. (Reshetar, 1952: 9) In the authoritarian Russian Empire, the young Ukrainian nationalism that barely entered Phase B of Hroch's model struggled to progress any further towards a fully political movement.

It was able to enter a political stage only at the very end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century. The first Ukrainian political party (illegal) in the Russian Empire, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, was formed in Kyiv in 1900. (Magocsi, 2010: 402) This group comprised both Marxist socialists and nationalist revolutionaries, and outsourced the creation of its program to a Ukrainian nationalist lawyer Mykola Mikhnovs'ky. (Reshetar, 1952: 13) Published in Lviv as a brochure under the title *Independent Ukraine*, this program spoke of “an armed uprising of oppressed nations against oppressor nations,” assuming that each nation, depending on its international circumstances, aspires to sovereignty and independence, and only an ethnically homogenous state can provide its citizens with conditions necessary for unrestricted development and economic welfare. (Mikhnovs'ky, 2002 [1903]: 28)

The program refers to the Pereiaslav Agreement, arguing that it was meant to establish a community of equal states, a confederacy similar to that of Switzerland, but its terms were violated by Muscovy/Russia which renders the Agreement null and void from the standpoint of international law. (Ibid.: 30-31) As its motto, it proclaims, “One, united, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine spanning from the Carpathian to the very Caucasian mountains,” a goal to be achieved by any means including physical violence if needed. (Ibid.: 41)

In 1903, Mikhnovs'ky left the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party to establish his own Ukrainian People's Party on a pronouncedly ethnic nationalist platform. Its program, *Ten Commandments of the UPP*, promoted a monoethnic Ukrainian state where the Ukrainian language exclusively would be spoken, and prohibited the members of the party from marrying people of any other nationalities. It also gave a list of specific ethnic groups whose members were to be considered as enemies as long as they “rule over Ukrainians and oppress them”: Muscovites, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and Jews. (Mikhnovs'ky, 2002 [1903]) This was one of the earliest instances of Ukrainian nationalism, previously liberal or socialist-leaning, taking a turn towards integralism. At that point, however, neither Mikhnovs'ky's version of ethnic nationalism nor any of his political parties came to play an important role in the Ukrainian national movement. In fact,

in the Ukrainian nationalism of that period nationality to a significant extent overlapped with social class (the majority of Ukrainians were peasants), hence an emphasis on agrarian reform and social liberation was typical for Ukrainian nationalists, to the extent that “Ukrainian nationalism became a rival of Communism” in the competition for the allegiance of disenfranchised classes. (Armstrong, 1980: 10)

The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party eventually split into the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union (also known as Spilka, “society”), a non-nationalist party subordinate to the Russian Marxist Social-Democratic Labor Party, and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party which emphasized commitment to both socialist principles and Ukrainian national distinctiveness (Magosci 2010: 404) Another Ukrainian party was founded in 1905 as the Ukrainian Democratic Party, later to be renamed as the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party, which advocated for Ukrainian regional autonomy within a federated Russian Empire and closely cooperated with the Russian Constitutional Democratic party (Ibid.: 404) Thus four distinct strains in the political life of Dnipro Ukraine could be identified: national-socialist (Social-Democratic Labor Party, some members of which would eventually play important roles in the first governments of independent Ukraine), non-national socialist (Social-Democratic Union), the marginal integral nationalist (People’s Party), and the autonomist (Democratic Radical Party).

After a brief thaw in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, when Ukrainian political parties became able to operate legally and restrictions on the use of the Ukrainian language were partially lifted, the pressure of Russian chauvinism on the Ukrainian national movement was renewed, pushing it back into the area of purely cultural activities. (Ibid.: 406) Thus, by the beginning of WWI, Ukrainian national movement in Dnipro Ukraine had barely become a movement of intellectual activists but had no mass support. It could not provide a common sense of identity to the broader Ukrainian public, (Ibid.: 407) and even among the intellectuals themselves the outlook on the nature and role of Ukraine as an entity varied significantly. Although some groups clearly oriented towards full independence were present, the more common orientation was towards autonomy within the Russian state, and the main area of activity was cultural, in large part due to the persecution faced by the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire.

Yet this movement cannot, by and large, cannot be characterized as cultural nationalism within the framework of Hutchinson’s model due to its repeated, rather consistent attempts to

extend its activities into the area of politics at the level of the whole state (the Russian Empire) rather than a local community. Even those of them who did not seek independence for Ukraine still pursued a transformation (federalization) of the Russian Empire as a whole to accommodate for their version of Ukrainian autonomy. Thus the Ukrainian national movement of Dnipro Ukraine much better fits Hroch's model, namely as a nationalist movement unable to progress beyond Phase B. Were it able to secure a mass following, it would most probably fit or at least significantly approximate Breuilly's model of peripheric as opposed to central nationalism as well.

It was in Galicia, controlled by Austria after the successive partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century, that the Ukrainian idea became modern national politics (Snyder, 2003: 122) Here, the linguistic (Polish vs. Ukrainian) and the religious (Catholic vs. Uniate and some Orthodox) differences were superimposed on class ones: predominantly Polish gentry vs. predominantly Ukrainian peasants, while the political power in the region belonged to the Austrian government administering it from Vienna. (Ibid.: 124) Although Polish domination of the economic life created certain hindrances, Ukrainians in Austria still could use their language freely, have their own schools, public associations and clubs, and political parties. (Himka, 1988: 143)

A particularly important institution was the Uniate Church (Catholic Church of the Greek rite, or Greek Catholic Church). Established back in 1596 as an attempt to assimilate the Orthodox population of the Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it abandoned the use of the Polish language and its role as a keeper of the Polish high culture over the course of the 19th century, and now would focus more on appealing to Ukrainian peasants as the actual members of their parishes. It was with the Uniate Church that the heritage-gathering stage of the Ukrainian national movement (or Phase A in Hroch's terminology) in Galicia started in the city of Peremyshl'. A group of Uniate clerics began with trying to organize a system of schools teaching in Ukrainian (unsuccessfully) and created an institute for publication of elementary textbooks, some of them in Ukrainian. (Magocsi, 2010: 426) The Galician activists were preoccupied with language more than with history or ethnography, and established contacts with other Slavic activists both in the Austrian and the Russian Empires, including scholars from Dnipro Ukraine. Collections of folk songs in Ukrainian were published, and a standard alphabet was developed for the vernacular Galician dialect of the Ukrainian language. (Ibid.)

A transition from purely cultural to political activities became possible after the revolutions of 1848 which resulted, first, in the abolition of serfdom (which significantly improved the status of peasants, to which class the majority of Ukrainians belonged, and enabled their participation in political life), and second, in a shift in the attitude of the Austrian authorities towards the Ukrainian national movement. Initially viewed with suspicion and subjected to censorship (in a way not that dissimilar to what Ukrainian activists experienced in the Russian Empire), Ukrainians now came to be considered as potential allies against and a check on Polish nationalism.

Encouraged by the Austrian governor of Galicia, Ukrainians submitted a petition to the Austrian Emperor to recognize them as a separate nationality, and shortly after, in 1848, established the first Ukrainian political organization called the Supreme Ruthenian Council (with a full legal status and 52 years earlier than the first Ukrainian party in Dnipro Ukraine). (Magosci, 2010: 435) One of the first documents issued by the Council was a manifesto proclaiming the Galician Ukrainians (“rusyns” in the text) a part of a larger Rusyn people of 15 million, 2.5 million of whom lived in Galicia. (Manifesto of the Supreme Ruthenian Council 1848) It was also by the Supreme Ruthenian Council that the blue and yellow flag, eventually to become the national flag of independent Ukraine, was officially used for the first time in modern history. (Hrechylo, 2004: 547) The establishment of two Ukrainian/Ruthenian units within the Austrian army followed shortly. (Magosci 2010: 440)

These moves were met with fierce Polish opposition, including the establishment of an alternative Ruthenian Council by polonized nobles of Ukrainian origin who claimed that Ukrainians/Ruthenians of Galicia were rather Greek Catholic Poles than a distinct nationality, and that it was the Austrian governor who “invented the Ruthenians”. (Ibid.: 435-437)

The development of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia in the second half of the 19th century and in the decade preceding WWI was characterized by a search for identity and a closely tied to it language question. (Ibid.: 470) Three major tendencies developed among Galician intellectuals of that period: Ruthenian, Russophile and Ukrainophile. Both Ruthenians and Russophiles viewed East Slavic peoples (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians) as branches of a larger nationality ultimately deriving from the Kyivan Rus’. To Ruthenians, it was an overarching Rusyn/Ruthenian nationality which encompassed the three East Slavic peoples equally; they viewed themselves as the Ruthenians of Galicia within the Austrian Empire and did not identify

with any other group. To Russophiles, the Russian nationality was overarching, of which Belarusians (White Russians) and Ukrainians (Little Russians) were viewed as subordinate branches; they viewed themselves as the Russians of Galicia and identified with the Russian Empire which they perceived as a continuation of the Kyivan Rus'. Both Ruthenians and Russophiles favored the use of the Russian language: the latter for obvious reasons, the former because they perceived it as created by Ukrainian/Ruthenian scholars and thus suitable for use by all East Slavs unlike the unstandardized Old Ruthenian. (Snyder, 2003: 124)

To Ukrainophiles, Ukrainians were a separate nationality living in a territory spreading from the Carpathian to the Caucasus mountains, of which the Dnipro Ukraine was also a part. These identities were blurred and fluid, with some Ruthenians eventually going over to the Ukrainophile camp in the 1860s, some to the Russophile camp in the 1890s. (Magocsi, 2010: 471-472) This group advocated for the official and educational use of the vernacular Ukrainian language in the form of its Galician dialect. The main organizations of the Ukrainophile faction were Prosvita ("enlightenment"), which started out in 1868 with educational and culture-promoting activities but gradually grew in size and engaged in economic activities as well, and the Shevchenko Society established in the city of Lviv in 1873, which eventually became a center of intellectual and scholarly activity. The success of these organizations, especially in the sphere of public education, greatly contributed to the eventual success of the Ukrainophile faction. (Ibid.: 474)

Additional impetus to the Ukrainophiles was given by the migration of prominent nationalist intellectuals from Dnipro Ukraine to Galicia. (Reshetar, 1952: 9) Among the first to move and the most important of them was the historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, recently dismissed from his position at the Kyiv University, who would become the head of the Shevchenko Society and eventually author the first multi-volume work on the history of Ukraine: *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. In it, he provided a consistent narrative tracing the national development of Ukraine back to the Kyivan Rus' and arguing that the Kingdom of Galicia – Volhynia, not Muscovy, was the actual heir to it. Many other intellectuals from Dnipro Ukraine followed his suit and moved to Galicia where their activities would not be persecuted.

The political culmination of the activities of these migrants materialized itself in the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine established primarily by emigrants from Dnipro Ukraine in 4 August 1914, in Lviv. The goal of this organization was, with the help of the Central Powers and Galician

Ukrainians, to expel Russian forces from Dnipro Ukraine and establish an independent Ukrainian state in its territory: a constitutional monarchy with guaranteed civil, religious and linguistic rights for all ethnic groups. Identifying Russia as an enemy, the Union's program Our Platform argued, in remarkable contrast to the earlier *Books of Genesis* that only an independent Ukraine could be both a reliable bulwark between Europe and Russian expansionism and a protector of Slavic nations against "pan-Muscovism". (Suproniuk, 2015: 60) Among local Galicians, the idea of Ukrainian independence was pioneered 19 years prior by the Ukrainian Radical party and expressed in Iuliian Bachyns'ky's publication *Ukraina Irredenta*.

An actual attempt to create an independent Ukrainian state materialized at the end of WWI, after the collapse of the Russian (Ukrainian People's Republic in Dnipro Ukraine) and later the Austro-Hungarian (West Ukrainian People's Republic in Easter Galicia) Empires. Ultimately unsuccessful, it went through the following basic stages (Magocsi, 2010: 500-535):

1. Central Rada government in Dnipro Ukraine (Ukrainian People's Republic), established on 17 March 1917. Democratic and dominated by left-leaning groups, it had Mykhailo Hrushevs'ky as its President and coexisted with two other, parallel Ukrainian authorities: a Provisional Government subordinate to the Provisional Government in Russia, and the Communist Kyiv Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Mostly socialist parties of Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and Jewish orientation were represented in this government. The Central Rada did not seek full sovereignty but rather national autonomy within a federalized Russian state as long as it was ruled by the democratic or at least democracy-leaning Provisional Government. After the Bolshevik party came to power in Russia, the Central Rada ended up in an open conflict with both the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Soviet, and the UPR was invaded by the Red Army. Although the UNR proclaimed independence on 22 January 1918 and was recognized by the Central Powers at the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty and relieved by them from Russian occupation, the Central Rada found itself in conflict with the German military authorities and was eventually deposed by the German army.
2. Hetmanate, a republican on paper, quasi-monarchic right-wing government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'ky directly backed by the German military and supported

by the traditional elites of Dnipro Ukraine. Shunned by all parties associated with the Central Rada, the Hetmanate government was composed mostly of Russophile, “Little Russian” members. Although Hetmanate furthered some of the reforms started by the Central Rada, especially in the sphere of education and language, it took a weak position on the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church preferring for it autonomy within the Moscow Patriarchate rather than full independence (autocephaly). As the military power of Germany speedily deteriorated, Skoropads’ky had to look for new backers against internal opposition, and was going to abandon Ukrainian independence in exchange for an alliance with the anti-Bolshevik White Russians. However, his government was overthrown faster.

3. The Directory, a five-member government with a mostly left-wing program yet opposed to the authoritarian methods of the Bolsheviks. It had very little factual control over the territories it claimed, and its proclamation of unity with a 2 months old West Ukrainian People’s Republic had little more than symbolic significance. Engaged in a war with Poland, the West Ukrainian People’s Republic favored an alliance with the Entente Allies and the White Russian General Denikin, who would not recognize the independence of the UPR. The Directory UPR, in its own turn, sought an alliance with Poland. As Eastern Galicia was overrun by Poland, the WURP army made its alliance first with Denikin and then with the Bolsheviks, while the Directory, led by Simon Petliura, signed Galicia off to Poland in exchange of its support. Eventually the Directory government could not withstand multiple invasions and went into exile in Poland, thus ending the first modern attempt at Ukrainian independence in 1920.

John S. Reshetar, a scholar of this brief Ukrainian independence in the early 20th century, which he called the Ukrainian Revolution, listed the following among the reasons of its failure (Reshetar, 1952: 319-339):

- The leadership of the UPR was made up mostly of intellectuals and writers, not the type of people to be prepared for the practical realities of politics;
- Their grasp on and contact with the broader masses was rather limited as the Ukrainian population consisted predominantly of peasants, a stratum of society

usually engaged with local interests only and seldom interested in any wider national cause, and lacked a solid middle class;

- Unlucky choice of allies: Austria and Germany who backed the Ukrainian state eventually lost WWI; Poland, whose support was sought by the Directory, was ready to go only so far for Dnipro Ukrainians and antagonistic towards Galician Ukrainians;
- Lack of a common, clear identity. Even among the leading intellectuals there was no consensus on who Ukrainians are and what their place should be. There was no broad agreement even as to the name, such terms as “Little Russians”, “Ruthenians”, “Rusyns”, with an array of more specific local and regional names, were used to refer to the same Ukrainian people. Many still had multiple, overlapping identities;
- Party interests and broader political affiliations were sometimes placed above national interests: “Many Ukrainians did not possess that egocentric singleness of purpose which we associate with modern nationalism.”

Thus it can be argued that Ukrainian national movement at the time when the UPR was proclaimed, although seeking state sovereignty and tending at least to a certain extent towards cultural homogeneity quite in line with the modernist model, had not yet reached Phase C of Hroch’s model. It did not have a real mass following and was led rather by activists and intellectuals than by proper statespersons, and was better suited for agitation and advocacy than actual overtake of political power. In the aftermath of WWI and the revolutions in the Austrian and the Russian Empire, most of Ukraine ended up under Russian/Soviet control, while the two eastern regions of Volhynia and Galicia became part of a newly-independent Poland.

2.3. Ukrainian Nationalism from the UPR to Independence: Interbellum Partition, WWII Guerilla Warfare, Unification under the Soviet Control and a Renewed Movement for Independence

Although the Soviet regime theoretically recognized some rights of nationalities, it had little genuine commitment to them and intended the culture of each nation to be “national in form, socialist in content.” (Armstrong, 1980: 15) Still, as this approach seemed to provide some outlet for national, especially cultural within the policy of the so-called “Ukrainization”, activities, certain Ukrainian nationalists decided to move to the Soviet Union and try to subvert the Communist formula by building a Ukrainian culture that would be “socialist in form, national in content”. Among them was Hrushevs’ky, who had always subscribed to certain socialist principles. However, by the early 1930s the policy was reversed and “articulate nationalism was being crushed in Soviet Ukraine”: Hrushevs’ky was dismissed from his academic position (just like it once happened to him in the Russian Empire), and some others fell victims to the show trials of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (a nonexistent anti-Soviet conspiracy) case. (Ibid.: 16-18)

In Western Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia) controlled by Poland, now building a nation-state of its own, the status of Ukrainians was determined by two opposite approaches of the Polish authorities. In Galicia, known for its Ukrainian nationalism, the harsher approach of the Republican faction prevailed: the Polish authority expected full assimilation of everyone into one, homogenous Polish nation. In Volhynia, populated by mostly apolitical peasants, the Ukrainian policy of the Polish government was defined by the Federalist approach: the government would grant Ukrainians their educational and linguistic rights expecting loyalty to the Polish state in return. (Snyder, 2010: 148)

It was in the Polish-controlled Galicia that the next important development in the history of the Ukrainian national movement took place, which can be viewed as a reaction both to the structural weaknesses of the Ukrainian Revolution movement and to the factual circumstances in which it resulted: the rise of Ukrainian integral nationalism. In his work *Nationalism*, Dmytro Dontsov (originally from Dnipro Ukraine, and once the chairman of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), the chief ideologue of Ukrainian integralism, bitterly castigated the leaders of the UPR. “When a people cares only about “the language”, only about “peaceful and prosperous countryside”, when it, through the stupidity of its leaders, waives the performance of its higher

functions, it is by foreigners, by purloiners that these functions will be assumed.” (Dontsov, 1926: 169) “What could we love if we viewed the world as if through a lens over someone else’s eye, in which everything would be mixed up and one wouldn’t be able to tell a nation from a tribe, independence from federation, the native land from a ‘Slavdom’ or an ‘East of Europe’, a people from a population or a class, nationalism from internationalism, etatism from provincialism, one’s own idea from someone else’s, agreement from conflict?” (Ibid.)

“Only unconditional belief in an ideal can guard it from decay; it leaves no room for discussion when it comes to what the ideal orders, no room for reflection over its commandments . . . We lacked national dogmatism,” argued Dontsov. “What was good about the Ukrainian language when it was a medium for expressing anti-Ukrainian ideas purveyed by foreigners? A comprehensive ideal, a structure of power is the end goal of each body national: external consolidation against internationalism and internal consolidation against atomization, resisting both the outside world and the passive inner environment.” (Ibid.)

These ideas were a part of the larger trend that came to be in the countries of Central and Southern Europe after WWI, especially the countries that ended up on the losing side (like Germany). Integral nationalist movement did in fact appear in France back in the 19th century, but did not have much appeal until the 1920s. It can be characterized by the following key features: attaching an absolute value to the nation; appeal to an assumed unity of all members of the nation; anti-rationalism and affirmation of emotional attachment to national ideas; preference for a charismatic leader and a single-party elite; glorification of action, war and violence. (Armstrong, 1980: 22)

Exhibiting all of these features, Dontsov’s version of integralism had some individual traits of its own. It was very conscious of Ukraine lacking its own national state and for this reason glorified armed opposition to the Polish (or any other foreign or occupying) state and illegal activities; and absolutized the national language and culture as the only markers of national identity left in the absence of a nation-state. Characteristically, Dontsov’s integralist teaching emphasized the role of the youth as a social force less moderate than the older generations. (Ibid.) Despite this rather totalitarian orientation, “formal learning, respect for established authority, individual decision and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the most radical [Ukrainian] groups.” (Ibid.: 23)

Dontsov's ideas strongly influenced the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth, which in 1929 merged with the Ukrainian Military Organization, a paramilitary group of the UNR army veterans, to create the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was to become the major actor of the Ukrainian national movement till the mid-1950s. Appealing to both Galician youth living under Polish rule and to emigrants from Dnipro Ukraine, it used both political means and force in its struggle for an independent, ethnically homogenous, exclusively Ukrainian in its identity Ukrainian state. (Ibid.) Although both the UPR (in Poland) and the Hetmanate (in Germany) governments-in-exile continued to exist and operate, they would not play as important a role in the decades to come. (Ibid.: 31)

In March 1939 the OUN supported a Carpatho-Ukrainian government that used the German overtake of Czechoslovakia as an opportunity to proclaim independence; but the short-lived state was very soon occupied by Hungary. (Ibid.: 24) The OUN's own attempt at independent statehood came on 30 June 1941 in Lviv, as Germany had just recently started its invasion of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian nationalists came as paramilitaries along with the German army. (Ibid.: 79) The plan was to eventually extend the territory of the new state to include Dnipro Ukraine, and make Kyiv the capital state. (Ibid.: 84) However, the German authorities soon come to perceive this act as a threat and arrested Stepan Bandera, the leader of the radical, pro-independence wing of the OUN, as well as a number of his followers. Many of them would eventually be executed or otherwise die in concentration camps.

In continuing pursuit of statehood, a guerilla group called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (usually referred to as UPA, transliterating its Ukrainian acronym) was established in 1942 to fight against Soviets, Germans, and Polish guerillas. Trying to assert Ukrainian control over the region of Volhynia, it engaged in ethnic cleansing of Polish peasants in 1943-1945, while Polish guerillas responded with massacres of Ukrainian villages. This mutual ethnic cleansing culminated after WWII, with the establishment of a new border between the Communist Poland and the Soviet Union, which left the whole of Ukraine under the control of the latter. In pursuit of a policy yet more radical than that of the interwar Republicans, Ukrainians will be mass-deported to the Soviet side of the border in the course of Operation Vistula. These tragic events created the ethnic and territorial borders of modern Ukraine. (Snyder, 2003: 179-201)

The UPA was able to continue an insurgency against the Soviets till 1956, after which Ukrainian nationalism on the territory of Ukraine was virtually suppressed. In the ascertainment of John Armstrong, the wartime Ukrainian integral nationalism possessed a body of devoted organizers and was capable of arousing enthusiasm and be easily identified with, but still could not reach a truly mass following: “The galvanizing force was present; the cadres which might have transmitted it were half-formed; but the essential mass remained uncommitted.” (Armstrong, 1980: 289) Some of the OUN and UPA-affiliated activists continued their activities abroad, in Ukrainian diaspora, but eventually the integralists would not play a significant role in the resurgence of Ukrainian national idea in the 1980s and the establishment of independent Ukraine in 1991.

The key role in the Granite Revolution for Ukrainian independence was played by the People’s Movement of Ukraine for “perebudova” (the Ukrainian word for what is more often called “perestroika”, a transformationist policy of the latter-years Soviet Union). The Movement (often referred to by its Ukrainian name, Rukh) led by the charismatic figure of the anti-Soviet dissident and human rights activist Viacheslav Chornovil, was a broadly-oriented opposition party to the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It included representatives of different factions and orientations, from reformist communists to integral nationalists, all united by opposition to the totalitarian Soviet regime. The Rukh maintained a civic approach to national issues which allowed it to secure a massive vote in favor of independence in December 1991 (which can be interpreted as Ukrainian national movement finally reaching Phase C of Hroch’s model). Importantly, Rukh came to identify Russia, rather than Poland, as the main threat to Ukrainian security. (Snyder, 2003: 244)

In conclusion of this chapter, the following observation can be made on Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian national idea:

1. Ukraine is not a historic nation. By the time it developed a modern nationalist movement, the Kyivan Rus’ was too far away in the past, and the Cossack polity was not exactly a sovereign state. However, there certainly was enough collective memory and historical legacy to ensure a firm basis for the development of a national identity.
2. From the second half of the 17th century till 1945, Ukraine would be at all times divided between two larger powers: first the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and

Muscovy, then the Russian and the Austrian Empires. The difference in conditions within the respective dividing states affected the speed of nationalist developments in each respective part of Ukraine, Dnipro Ukraine being slower in its movement towards political organization.

3. However, there has always been a significant degree of interaction, identification and shared goals between Dnipro Ukraine/East Ukraine and Galicial/West Ukraine. Those were not two completely separate movements but rather two branches of the same movement.
4. The development of Ukrainian national movement fits the modernist model of Hroch's phases, from cultural to political activism to mass movement. Although it took significant time for Ukrainian nationalism to reach Phase C, it has demonstrated a consistent tendency towards seeking sovereignty and political independence, with multiple attempts at establishing an independent Ukrainian state over the 20th century. At the same time, it is worth noting that this orientation towards independence had developed relatively late, after a lengthy period of predominantly autonomist tendencies.
5. The nation-building projects of Ukrainian national movement were to a significant extent shaped by its search for allies. Always pitched against a stronger opponent, be it the Russian Empire or the wealthier and better-organized Polish nationalists within the Austrian Empire, Ukrainian nationalists had to look for sovereign protectors and change their own policies in order to secure the benevolence of the latter (as, most notably, the Directory did in abandoning Galicia to gain the support of the Polish state).
6. Throughout the history, Ukrainian nationalist groups and parties has demonstrated mostly civic, socialist or liberal leanings in their interpretations of nationalism. Integralist, ethnic/integral nationalism was predominant only under the specific circumstances of the interwar years and WWII. Alexander Motyl attributes the rise of Ukrainian integral nationalism to the harsh postwar conditions, embitterment after the failure of the 1917 Ukrainian Revolution, and disillusionment in its ideas. (Motyl, 1980: 2) For the most part, Ukrainian nationalism was characterized by an intertwining of national and social issues on its agenda.

7. Given the abundance of local and superimposed due to the legacy of the Kyivan Rus'/Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth identities, it took significant time and error to establish a shared Ukrainian identity that would be able to take root outside of intellectual circles. This identity was generated gradually, through rivalry of several factions, and even to this day is surrounded by a good amount of misunderstanding due to confusing terminology (Rus', Rusyns, Ruthenians, Galicians, "Little Russians" etc.)

In the following chapter, the development of the Crimean Tatar national movement will be considered, from its inception to the return of Crimean Tatars to Crimea which roughly coincided with and was in fact conditioned by Ukrainian independence.

CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL MOVEMENT

3.1. Crimean Tatar National Movement from Inception to the 1944 Mass Deportation

Unlike the Ukrainian one, the Crimean Tatar nation can be qualified as historical: a Crimean Tatar state existed from the 1440s till its annexation by the Russian Empire in 1783, already in the modern period. Known as the Crimean Khanate, it was an monarchy where a periodical assembly of the heads of noble clans (Kurultay) played an important role in checking the monarch's power, and early on became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, although maintained a high degree of autonomy. (Rayfield, 2024: 13) Crimean khans were elected by the Kurultay from among the members of the Chenghizid (descended from Chenghiz Khan, the first ruler of the Mongol Empire) Giray dynasty, and approved by the Ottoman sultan. As ruled by Chenghizids, the Crimean Khanate enjoyed privileged treatment by the Ottoman Empire, and received an annual tribute payment from Muscovy till 1700. (Magocsi, 2010: 290)

The state controlled roughly 25% of what is the modern Ukraine's territory, and was home to a highly diverse, ethnically heterogeneous population which could be broadly separated into two major groups, the sedentary (occupied mountain valleys and coastal towns) and the nomadic (lived in the steppes covering the northern regions of the Crimean peninsula and what is now southern Ukraine). The ruling elite were ethnically Kipchak (a Turkic group originally from the heartland of the Golden Horde, the north-western part of the Chenghizid Empire) (Ibid.: 181) and spoke a Turkic language combining the elements of Kipchak (native to the Inner Asian steppe) and Oghuz (Anatolian) Turkic, which would become the medium of the Crimean high culture and the basis for the modern Crimean Tatar language. This language, as well as the Islamic faith, would be adopted by other sedentary groups populating the Crimean peninsula (among them Goths, Genoese, Greeks, Armenians) who would now become known as Tats: non-Turkic by descent but linguistically and culturally turkicized. The Tats formed the core of the Crimean Khanate's polity and the basis of a Crimean Tatar ethnos. (Ibid.: 182)

The nomadic part of the population was made up of Kipchak-speaking Nogay Tatars who migrated from the ex-Golden Horde territories after Muscovy conquered the Astrakhan Khanate, a rump state of the Golden Horde. Formally recognizing the authority of the Crimean khan but enjoying a significant degree of de facto autonomy from and often rebelling against him, the

Nogays were raiding the Slav-populating territories to the north to procure captives for Crimean slave trade, which soon became the basis of the Khanate's economy. (Ibid.: 184) It was primarily for protection against Nogay raids that Cossack forces were initially established in the Ukrainian part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (although the first Cossack troops were themselves Turkic nomads hired by Polish nobles, which accounts for the Turkic origin of the word). (Ibid.: 191)

By the second half of the 18th century, the Crimean Khanate found itself excessively dependent on and to a much larger extent controlled by the Ottoman Empire, as well as not in control of its Nogay population, who made an alliance with the Russian Empire, anymore. (Ibid.: 290) Trying to preserve at least some autonomy, the Giray dynasty decided to shift its allegiance and, under the Treaty of Karasubazar of 1772, came under the protection of the Russian Empire. An ensuing internal conflict between the nobles who supported this new alignment and those in favor of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a military invasion by Russia and installation of a pro-Russian khan who would try to curtail the privileges and the political power of Tatar nobles. The failure of his policies lead to another invasion by Russia and annexation of the Crimean Khanate into the Russian Empire as the province of Taurida in 1783. (Ibid.: 291)

The subsequent period of Russian control in Crimea would be characterized by large-scale migrations and deportations of Crimean Tatars (Kahraman, 2014: 12) due to “a determined effort on the part of the tsarist state to colonize the peninsula with Russian/Slavic (or at least Christian settlers) . . . Crimean Tatars . . . essentially became second class subjects in virtually all aspects of social and economic life in the peninsula.” (Kırımlı, 2008: 752) Escaping from Russian oppression, Crimean Tatars would mass-migrate to the Ottoman Empire in several waves throughout the 19th century, a development which Russian authorities viewed as positive. As each new Russian-Ottoman war would single Crimean Tatars out as a suspicious group and potential collaborators with the Ottoman army, both persecution and migration would intensify in those periods. During the Russian-Ottoman war of 1806-1812, a part of Crimean Tatar population was actually deported from the peninsula by the Russian authorities, even though no Crimean Tatar revolts in support of the Ottomans have ever been recorded. (Ibid.: 753)

The first proposal to expel the entirety of Crimean Tatar population in its entirety came from Russian generals during the Crimean War but could not be followed through due to the

logistical limitations of the age and the region as well as the state of war. (Williams, 2016: 64) Immediately after the Crimean War, the Russian authorities began to actually encourage Crimean Tatars to emigrate (Williams, 2016: 75) However, the mass exodus of Crimean Tatars dealt so much damage to the economy and tax revenue of the region that by 1861 the authorities reversed their approach and canceled the issuing of passports to all Muslims in the peninsula to prevent them from leaving. The migration was further incentivized through agitation by Muslim clergy from the Ottoman Empire, who appealed to the religious sentiments of Crimean Tatars and their sense of community with Ottoman Muslims. (Ibid.: 78)

However, there was an element of identity politics underpinning the dynamics and patterns of these early migrations as well, and here we come to another major difference between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainians: unlike the latter, the former are a Muslim people, the mainstream group currently practicing Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school. (Zasztowt, 2019: 27) As Williams points out, throughout most of the 19th century the Muslim community of Crimea would define itself in traditional Islamic terms, identified with and looked up to the Ottoman Empire (“aq topraq” as it came to be known among Crimean Tatars) for protection, and tend to consider Crimea as “Dar el Harb”, a land under non-Muslim control which had to be abandoned. (Williams, 2016: 90) Although some Crimean Tatar men would join Ottoman military units fighting in Russian-Ottoman wars, and some would leave Crimea with the express purpose of evading service in the Russian army, (Ibid.: 99) there was no Crimean Tatar movement as such. The identity was defined in religious, not ethnic or cultural terms. (Ibid.: 91)

A re-definition of Crimea as a homeland (vatan) and the Crimean Tatars as a nation began with the works of Ismail Gaspiralı, a leading Crimean Tatar intellectual of the latter half of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century. Not a Crimean Tatar nationalist in a narrow sense, Gaspiralı advocated rather for a social reform for all Turkic Muslim peoples within the Russian Empire. The key aspect of the reform he proposed was a reform of education known as the New Method (“usul-i jadid”), which implied borrowing from and accommodation with Western ideas as opposed to the inwardly-oriented and traditionalist education that Turkic Muslims would receive back in the day. Gaspiralı established a number of New Method (or jadidist) schools in the Crimean Peninsula, which eventually spread to some other Muslim regions of the Russian Empire. It was also Gaspiralı who started *Tercüman*, the first newspaper in Crimean Tatar history. In his

publications in *Tercüman* (in Turki, a language artificially synthesized by Gaspıralı to be intelligible to as diverse Turkic audience as possible), he advocated for women's rights (his daughter Şefiqa was a prominent Crimean Tatar feminist and the editor of *Alem-i Nisvan*, a women's magazine in Crimean Tatar language) and broader cultural exchange between the Muslims and the non-Muslims of the Russian Empire. (Ibid.: 93-94)

In his social and political works, Gaspıralı spoke rather of “the Muslims of Russia” than Crimean Tatars specifically, and viewed them rather as a part of the Russian Empire than a group meant to seek independence. (Gasprinskiy, 2017: 89) Unlike the Ukrainian autonomists, whose emphasis was on a special and culturally-independent status of Ukraine within the Russian empire, Gaspıralı advocated for “this external, formal link [between Russians and Russian Muslims] getting more and more of a moral character,” arguing that a close association with the Russian Empire would open for its Muslim communities “convenient roads to civilization, education and progress.” (Ibid.: 90) In his article “A Critical View of the European Civilization”, Gaspıralı argued against close alignment with Western Europe with a reference to pan-Slavism as an example for Muslims: “Would not a civilization so comprehensively contrary to all intents and goals of the Slavs be yet more dangerous to Muslims?” (Ibid.: 66)

He even went as far as to exclude Russia from the category of colonialist countries oppressing Muslim peoples, limiting it to the Great Britain, France and Germany. (Lazzerini 1998: 59) For someone in whose lifetime occurred the atrocities of the Russian army against Crimean Tatar civilians during the Crimean War, the genocide of Circassians and a mass deportation of Chechens, Gaspıralı's praise for Russian policies towards Muslim peoples – “Russians, steering clear of any atrocity, pacify the subdued nations and satisfy their needs” (Gasprinskiy, 2017: 203) – might seem too odd to be sincere.

Although some contemporary Islamic traditionalists and later Crimean Tatar nationalists would label Gaspıralı as a Russophile and even a russificator of Crimean Tatars, he was viewed with suspicion as well by Russian authorities who perceived his activity rather as an attempt to use Russian resources to the benefit of the Muslim peoples. (Williams, 2016: 102) Remarkably, Gaspıralı's own personal allegiances remain ambiguous as he is known, at a certain point in his life, to have tried entering Ottoman military service.

Brian Williams classifies Gaspıralı as a Pan-Turkist who perceived all Muslim Turks as a single nation and was rather opposed to the narrower definition of a Crimean Tatar nation which came to be predominant eventually. His importance to the Crimean Tatar National Movement, in Williams' ascertainment lies precisely in establishing a national identity on an primarily ethnic and linguistic rather than purely religious basis, as well as providing a means of mass communication (*Tercüiman*) which made it easier for members of the Crimean Tatar community to identify with each other and see themselves in relation to other groups on the basis of ethnicity. Nevertheless, Gaspıralı would put primarily a cultural meaning into this national identification and opted for cooperation with the Russian Tsarist regime rather than challenging it in any way or form, be it out of genuine loyalty to the Russians or purely pragmatic, realpolitik considerations. He also openly opposed Crimean Tatar migration to the Ottoman Empire, although rather invoking the risks and practical difficulties of it than appealing to national sentiments. (Ibid.: 105-110)

The first properly nationalist critique of Crimean Tatar emigration appears in a 1902 poem by Seyit Abdullah Özenbaşı, a follower of Gaspıralı, titled "My Dear." In it, Özenbaşı accuses emigrants from Crimea of cowardice, of leaving their own people and their own land behind, and calls on them not to participate in the exodus. (Ibid: 119) Thus the religious significance and attraction of the Ottoman Empire as "aq topraq" gives way to an ethnic and cultural significance of Crimea as "vatan" or "ata topraq".

The Young Tatar movement became the next step in the development of Crimean Tatar nationalism. Chronologically, it roughly coincides with the emergence of the first Ukrainian political parties in the Russian-controlled territories, and was enabled by the same historical context of the 1905 Revolution. The Young Tatars were a group of Crimean Tatar progressive intellectuals who, unlike the bulk of the Crimean Tatar community, took an active part in the revolution. Without a clear political program or cohesive mass movement of their own, they coalesced with the Social Revolutionary and Social Democratic (Menshevik) Russian parties, identifying rather with their opposition to the autocratic Tsarist regime than with their socialist programs. (Kırımlı, 1993: 532-532) Hakan Kırımlı assesses the Young Tatars as "the transformation of the apolitical 'enlighteners' [Gaspıralı and his generation of Crimean Tatar intellectuals] into a politically conscious and idealistic national intelligentsia, playing both roles simultaneously," adding that they

viewed the Russian revolutionary parties “from a 1789 French perspective rather than a 1905 Russian one.” (Ibid.: 533)

The leading figure of the Young Tatar movement was Abdureshid Mehdi, the mayor of the town of Karasubazar and the publisher of a newspaper called *Vatan Hadimi*. Mehdi advocated for a land reform to benefit Crimean Tatar peasants, broadening of the education system and women’s rights, as well as more active participation of Crimean Tatars in the political life of the Russian Empire. In remarkable contrast to Gaspıralı, he did not try to solicit benevolence of the Russian monarch, but demanded change appealing to the rights of Crimean Tatars as a nation. (Ibid.: 538-539) Of particular importance was his contribution to the discourse of Crimean Tatar identity: asserting their primary identity as Crimeans, he imbued into this identity a Turkic and an Islamic components thus defining the basis of what Kırımlı calls “three-dimensional Crimean Tatar nationalism” characteristic of the Crimean Tatar National Movement to this day. (Ibid.: 540) Eventually the Young Tatars could gather a significant mass following, but presented an important transitional step towards the development of political Crimean Tatar nationalism and paved the way for the *Vatan Cemiyeti* (Fatherland Society) of the 1910s.

Inspired by the advancement of Turkish nationalism and the success of the Young Turks movement, two Crimean Tatar students, Cafer Seydahment Kırimer and Numan Çelebicihan, established it as a secret organization with the express aim of creating an independent Crimean Tatar state in the Crimean peninsula. Between 1912 and 1917 the organization created a number of clandestine cells first in Istanbul and then in villages and towns all over Crimea. The programs and agitation materials of the organization were printed in Turkey and distributed through New Method (established by Gaspıralı) schools. (Williams, 2016: 133) In further contrast to the earlier Crimean Tatar movements, *Vatan Cemiyeti* expressly advocated for physical violence should it be needed to achieve its goals. (Kırımlı, 1997: 173) However, a significant obstacle to the organization’s nation-building activity was posed by the persistence of sub-national identities among Crimean Tatar: the traditional religious identity, regional and ethnic (especially Tat and Nogai) identities. (Williams, 2016: 135)

After the Revolution of 1917 and the end of strict police-state Russian rule in Crimea, Crimean Tatar nationalists began to agitate for their cause openly. A congress of elected delegates from villages all over Crimea, most of whom were nationalists affiliated with the *Vatan Cemiyeti*,

convened in Simferopol for the first Kurultay since the fall of the Crimean Khanate and elected Numan Çelebicihan as the Chief Mufti of Crimea. (Ibid.: 154) By championing a land reform as a part of his nationalist program, he was able to gain the support of Crimean Tatar peasants against the opposition of traditional Crimean Tatar authorities (mullahs and mirzas who benefited from vakıf lands excluded from private ownership to be used for religious and charitable purposes only; the essence of the reform was to enable peasants to benefit from those lands), who in their turn would seek cooperation with and the support of the Provisional Government in Russia. (Ibid.: 156) A Crimean Tatar nationalist party, Milli Firka, was created as a legal organization of the movement.

However, the Kurultay was not the only authority in Crimea: organs of the Russian government still continued their operation, alongside with soviets of peasant, worker and soldier deputies established by the Bolsheviks. On 20-22 November 1917 representatives of these various authorities, as well as several political parties including Ukrainian ones, had a conference in Simferopol where it was decided to not recognize Russian sovereignty in Crimea and instead to cooperate with the Ukrainian Central Rada. Accordingly, the Council of People's Representatives was formed as a temporary government of Crimea, which excluded Bolsheviks. On 26 November, a Kurultay was assembled and continued its operation on a permanent basis as a parliament of the Crimean Tatars. Within the Kurultay, two visions of further political course of action were developed: one, advocated by Seydahmet Kırımer, implied cooperation with the Council of People's Representatives, while the other, suggested by Çelebicihan, provided a joint government of the Council, the Kurultay and the Bolsheviks. (Hutiv, 2024: 23)

On 13 December 1917 Crimean Democratic Republic was proclaimed and its Constitution was unanimously adopted by the Kurultay members. Based on the principle of self-determination of peoples, this Constitution established a Crimean Tatar state as an independent, sovereign national entity with guaranteed civil rights, equality of women and men. O. Kopylenko believes that the state model provided for in the Crimean Constitution was to a significant extent inspired by the Ukrainian Central Rada government. (cited in Hutiv, 2024: 24) However, already in January 1918 Crimea was invaded by the Red Army and occupied. Among the numerous victims of the ensuing repressions was Numan Çelebicihan. Despite the brief span of its existence, Hutiv points out, the Crimean Democratic Republic was an important precedent of Crimean independence, self-government and cooperation with Ukraine. (Ibid.) It is worth noting, however, that the Kurultay

established friendly diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Young Turks movement as well. (Williams, 2015: 161)

Seydahmet Kırimer continued resistance to Bolsheviks after the fall of the Crimean Republic, and was able to defeat them after an alliance with Germany. (Ibid.: 168) Like in the Hetmanate Ukraine, a Crimean Tatar but effectively German-controlled government was established, led by Suleyman Sulkiewicz, a Lithuanian Tatar ex-officer of the Russian army with no prior connections to the *Vatan Cemiyeti* or other Crimean Tatar nationalist organizations. However, German control of Crimea did not last and the peninsula was eventually occupied by White Russians who launched their own wave of repressions against Crimean Tatars.

Some members of Milli Firqa went into exile in Türkiye while others started a guerilla against the White Russians: first on their own, but then in alliance with the Bolshevik. The most prominent figure among the latter was Veli Ibrahimov. (Ibid.: 170-172) Their expectation was that the Bolsheviks would recognize at least a degree of autonomy for Crimea, but instead Milli Firqa was banned, the land reform of the Kurultay was abolished, and another wave of repressions took place. (Ibid.: 175) As Crimean Tatars responded with guerilla, the Bolsheviks established a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federated Republic in order to appease Crimean Tatars and gain their loyalty. As Williams ascertains, this event played a crucial role in forming a single Crimean Tatar national identity, finishing the job started by the Young Tatars (Ibid.)

Despite being a minority among the Crimean population, Crimean Tatars would play a dominant role in the administration of the newly-established autonomy. (Ibid.: 176) This was a part of the ‘korenization’ (nativization) policy of Vladimir Lenin, which was a policy of national identity construction through preferential treatment of native peoples within the territories assigned to them. An important element of this policy was introduction of universal education, which Crimean Tatars could receive in their own language. The ultimate aim was to gain the trust of non-Russian peoples and inculcate them to the idea of the revolution in their own language, (Ibid.: 181-187) quite similar to the key principle of the Ukrainization policies in Ukraine: “socialist in content, national in form.” In the words of Williams, what “korenizatsiya” actually promoted was “a tame, Soviet version of nationality.” (Ibid.: 192) All unauthorized expressions of nationalism, including the religious elements of national identity, were brutally suppressed. The outcomes of this policy

largely overlapped with what the Young Tatars were seeking to achieve: a weakened sense of religious, a stronger sense of national identity and a closer identification with Crimea as their homeland among Crimean Tatars. The fact that many ex-Milli Firqa members, such as Veli Ibrahimov, would occupy important public positions, only contributed to this trend. (Ibid.: 195) The policies they pursued can be compared to those of Hrushevs'ky in Soviet-controlled Ukraine.

However, the brief period of “korenizatsiya” ended, again, in brutal repressions after Joseph Stalin, “having established firm control over the various nationalities via these very naïve intermediaries [such as Ibrahimov] . . . cynically disposed of this element by tens of thousands.” (Ibid.: 205) A mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, as a part of a Soviet collectivization campaign, followed in the 1930s, foreshadowing the great deportation of 1944 that would define the history of Crimean Tatars in the 20th century.

Like most previous persecutions of Crimean Tatars by the Russian government, the total deportation of 1944 was being justified with a reference to their alleged disloyalty. As the Crimean peninsula was occupied by Germany in 1941 many Crimean Tatar nationalists, just like the members of the OUN in Ukraine, “considered the German occupation as a chance to establish their independent states.” (Kahraman, 2014: 23) They believed that Germans, being in need of their support in a war against the Soviets, would be ready to let them form independent states in exchange for alliance as they did in Slovakia and Croatia just a couple of years prior. Moreover, just like Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars had already had a positive experience of alliance with Germany in WWI.

Seydahmet Kırımer specifically, who was the head of the Crimean Tatar National Movement in Europe and in Türkiye at that point, evaluated the German-Soviet war as a historic opportunity not to be missed. (Ülküsal, 1999: 306 as cited in Kahraman, 2014) In December 1942, two Crimean Tatar intellectuals and nationalist activists, Edige Kırımal and Müstecip Ülküsal, both being Turkish citizens at the time, travelled to Berlin for negotiations with the German authorities regarding the status of Crimea and Crimean Tatars. They were met with suspicion, especially on account of their Turkish citizenship, alleged connection to the Turkish government and assumed pan-Turkic views. Eventually, only Kırımal was officially recognized by the German side (assumedly because he was born in Crimea) and Ülküsal had to leave Germany. (Kahraman, 2014: 25-26) What Kırımal managed to negotiate was the release of Crimean Tatar prisoners of war

(although on the condition that they join the auxiliary forces of the German army), and the establishment of the Muslim Committees as a Tatar authority in Crimea, led by the nationalist Ahmet Özenbaşlı. In Crimean Tatar villages, police and paramilitary units were formed to support German operations against Soviet-aligned guerillas, but these in fact tended to protect their own villages both against the Germans and the Soviets. (Williams, 2015: 227-229)

As the war progressed, however, Crimean Tatars would be increasingly subjected to German reprisals and conscription for forced labor in Germany, and stopped supporting Germany altogether, some of them joining anti-German guerilla units. (Ibid.: 232) Although all the remaining Crimean Tatar collaborators were evacuated from Crimea by a retreating German army in April 1944, (Ibid.: 234) and around 20,000 Crimean Tatars were serving in the Soviet army at the time, (Ibid.: 239) the Soviet leadership ordered deportation of the whole Crimean Tatar population (around 200,000 people) from Crimea to the Central Asia, predominantly Uzbekistan. The operation commenced on 18 May 1944, while WWII was still going on and Crimean Tatar soldier of the Soviet army were still deployed at the frontline. Williams (Ibid.) concurs with Kirimal that the actual motive behind the deportation of Crimean Tatars was not to punish them for actual or alleged disloyalty, but rather to remove a Muslim and traditionally friendly to Turkey ethnic group from the region in preparation for an invasion of Turkey, which the Soviet Union was planning at that point. In fact, a few other nationalities were subjected to mass deportation at the same time, such as Chechens, Ingushes, Kalmyks, Karachais and Meshketian Turks, which Edward Allworth qualifies as a consistent policy of the Soviet Union referred to at the time as the “national question”. (Allworth, 1998: 180)

Crimea would first have its status changed from an autonomous republic to a regular district within the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1945, then subjected to an extensive policy of “de-Tatarization”: village mosques and Muslim cemeteries were destroyed, toponyms were changed from Tatar to Russian, and mass settlement of Russians and Ukrainians to the peninsula was sponsored by the state. (Williams, 2016: 271-272) In 1954, Crimea was transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian SSR. Officially justified with a reference to the close economic, cultural and historical ties between Ukraine and Crimea, the deeper motives of this decision remain obscure. (Sasse, 2007: 119) It would play a crucial role after Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991

as its international borders would be established along the borders it had as a part of the USSR, thus leaving Crimea as a part of Ukraine.

Appallingly gratuitous in its brutality, this total deportation of Crimean Tatars had an enormous human toll and became a major trauma for the small Crimean Tatar people. According to Kahraman, “the 1944 deportation was kept alive and transferred to new generations through narratives by parents.” (Kahraman, 2014: 54) After it and until the fall of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the Crimean Tatar National Movement would exist only in diaspora: either within the Soviet Union, in exile; or outside it, mostly in Turkey, Germany, and Romania. In the exiled diaspora within the Soviet Union, the experience or memory of the 1944 deportation “served as a primary marker of Crimean Tatar identity . . . and kept the dream of returning to the lost homeland alive.” (Williams, 2002: 345)

3.2. Crimean Tatar National Movement in Exile: a Transformation

Kahraman bases his analysis of the Crimean Tatar Movement in the outer diaspora (beyond the borders of the Soviet Union) on the activities of three key figures: Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer in Turkey, Müstecip Ülküsal in Romania and Edige Kırimal in Germany. (Kahraman, 2014: 65) Although led by highly prestigious activists who played key roles in Crimean Tatar attempts to establish an independent state of their own, Kahraman characterizes the national movement of the outer diaspora as elite-oriented, limited to a few intellectuals without a mass following. Before WWII, prominent members of the Crimean Tatar National Movement played an active role in Prometheism, a Polish-initiated movement for non-Russian nationalists originating from the territories under Soviet control. (Aydın, 2000: 66) The activities of the outer diaspora nationalist movement after WWII were limited mostly to publications in the journals *Emel* (established in Romania, continued in Turkey) and *Dergi* (Germany). (Kahraman, 2014: 68-70) The basic message of their publications addressed to their respective host countries or the international community at large was advocacy for a united front against the USSR and communism and harsh criticism of any détente or “peaceful coexistence” projects by the Western Bloc countries towards the Eastern Bloc within the context of the Cold War. (Ibid.: 71-72) Notably, they argued that the Soviet policies towards their “captive nations” were equivalent to the policies of colonialism. (Ibid.: 73-76)

In Türkiye specifically, the Crimean Tatar National Movement underwent a distinct transition from an émigré movement started by Seydahmet Kırımer into a diaspora movement integrated into the larger Turkish society as defined by Filiz Aydın. She observes that a degree of association developed between the Crimean Tatar National Movement and the Turkish nationalist *ulkucu* movement, although the leadership of the movement has been cautious in distinguishing the Crimean Tatar agenda from Turkish nationalism at large. (Aydın, 2000: 75-76) Among the most important organizations of the Crimean Tatar National Movement in Türkiye today is Emel Türk Kültürünü Araştırma ve Tanıtma Vakfı established in 1986 in Ankara.

The nationalist movement of the Crimean Tatar inner diaspora existed under completely different conditions and followed a completely different trajectory. It underwent the following stages of development as per Kahraman (Kahraman, 2014: 84-110):

1. The emergence of the Crimean Tatar National Movement with its present-organizational structure and goals. It began with a partial reversal of Stalin’s policies

towards Crimean Tatars. The “special settlement” regime restricting them to tightly-policed reservations was lifted, and they were granted certain cultural rights which enabled the very existence of a social movement. However, unlike most other mass-deported in Stalin’s period peoples, Crimean Tatars were neither rehabilitated nor repatriated. Thus rehabilitation and repatriation became the goals of the movement, and its method was sending petitions to various Soviet authorities. Some of those petitions would bear as much as 130,000 signatures evidencing a mass character of the movement. Still, it did not put forward any properly political demands and would fall within the larger Soviet trend of “cultural opposition” which did not challenge the regime itself but only some elements of its culture. The petitions were Communist in spirit and aiming to prove the Crimean Tatars’ loyalty to the regime so that it could let them return to their homeland;

2. The next period was defined by a shift from petitions to demands which was facilitated by the Crimean Tatars getting in touch with the “dissident”, or political opposition, movement. The crucial events of this period was a speech by the (ethnically Ukrainian but not affiliated with Ukrainian nationalism) dissident and rights advocate Petro Hryhorenko addressed to Crimean Tatars, in which he urged them to “stop begging and start demanding”, take control of their own media, and reach out to other groups both within the Soviet Union and internationally (Tolstenyova, 2013: 247); the partial rehabilitation of 1967 which broadened Crimean Tatar language rights and allowed individual repatriations; and the first street protests in Chirchik, Uzbekistan and in Moscow. It was also in that period that the Crimean Tatar National Movement started to maintain permanent representatives in Moscow;
3. Finally, the period from 1967 till the collapse of the Soviet Union is characterized by Kahraman as “the decades-long struggle to settle down in Crimea . . . between the people and the authorities.” (Kahraman, 2014: 101) Individuals and families would return to Crimea but face persecution and forceful expelling, with only few exceptions. At the same time, some of the key activists of the Crimean Tatar National Movement were prosecuted and sentenced by criminal courts, such as Mustafa Dzhemilev and Ayshe Seytmuratova. However, with the start of the

“perestroika”/”perebudova” (“restructuring”) reforms in the Soviet Union, the activities of the Movement were resumed and significantly stepped up, culminating in the creation of a formally established Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement in 1989. The Organization led a plan of spontaneous resettlement to squat abandoned villages and build tent cities, which was met with violent attacks by the local population. Eventually, two state committees on “the Crimean Tatar question” were established consequently, eventually deciding to recognize the 1944 deportation as unlawful and legalize repatriation to Crimea. However, administrative hindrances remained in place and effectively prevented mass repatriation till the last days of the Soviet Union.

Of particular importance was the activity of Mustafa Abdulcemil oğlu Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar activist who assumed a leading position in the National Movement in the 1960s and remains one of its key leaders to this day. Dzhemilev developed a new historiography of the Crimean Tatar people contradicting the official Soviet narrative (Alexeyeva, 1998: 212) and initiated the rapprochement of the Crimean Tatar National Movement with the broader movement of civil rights activists in the Soviet Union, which step promoted an increased awareness of the Crimean Tatar issues both within and outside the Soviet Union. (Ibid.: 215)

Over the period of exile, the Crimean Tatar National Movement took on two salient features neither of which was typical for the movement in the previous periods of its development. First, due to all public spaces being effectively off limits, the (inner diaspora) Crimean Tatar National Movement in exile would be organized around neighborhood and kin-based networks. (Uehling, 2004: 148-149) Zengin notes that it was this mobilization of family and kinship structures for a nationalist cause that allowed the Crimean Tatar National Movement to secure mass support in the inner diaspora. (Zengin, 2020: 172) It is important to remark that this particular form of organization along kinship lines would most probably not be possible in a community with a different family culture: for instance, it did not come to be among the Dnipro Ukrainians in the 19th century, despite a comparable level of pressure on their nationalist movement by the Russian authorities. As Zengin remarks further, it was the sense of homeland that cemented the Crimean Tatar National Movement, and, the homeland being distant and lost, secured its focus on

repatriation and tied all the aspirations and hopes of the Crimean Tatar for a national and cultural revival with returning to Crimea, (Ibid.: 176) rather than setting up a political entity of any kind.

Second, in absence of any opportunities of formal education in Crimean Tatar culture and history, stories shared within family played a crucial role in forming a sense of national identity among the younger generation of Crimean Tatars, those born in exile or deported as young children. (Altan, 1998: 101) This latter development stands in remarkable contrast to both the modernist model of nationalism, with its assumption of centralized, state-controlled exo-education as the vehicle of nationalist sentiments, and the previous history of the Crimean Tatar National Movement itself, which started with Gaspirali's reformed public schools. These two features, neighborhood-/kinship-based structure and family playing the crucial role in the formation of national identity in the absence of a "nationalizing" formal education system, allow us to characterize the Crimean Tatar National Movement as it developed in the inner diaspora as communitarian in nature.

Throughout the exile period, the demands of the (inner diaspora) Crimean Tatar National Movement remained unchanged: an organized mass repatriation to Crimea, restoration of Crimean Tatar autonomy, and rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people from treason accusations. (Kahraman, 2014: 108) As Williams points out, "the Crimean Tatars' drive for repatriation . . . was not, however, simply based on typical nationalistic emotions." (Williams, 2015: 327) The ideal they had in mind was not as much the independent Crimean Khanate of the distant past, but rather what Williams characterizes as the more pragmatic model of a pre-WWII Crimean Autonomous Republic with the Crimean Tatars as a state-sponsored titular nation. (Ibid.: 328)

This is why in 1991, when the results of a Crimea-wide referendum favored a territorial autonomy within (back then still Soviet) Ukraine, the Organization of the Crimean Tatar Movement did not agree with them: it sought rather a national autonomy for Crimean Tatars, an ethnic minority in the peninsula. (Kahraman, 2014: 108) This dissent resulted in the assembly of Kurultay and Mejlis as the organs of a Crimean Tatar national autonomy. This goal of the Movement would define its activity within an independent Ukraine to be covered in the following chapter.

So far, we shall outline the following salient features of the Crimean Tatar National Movement as it developed before finding itself within the territory of a sovereign Ukraine:

1. It started as a national movement of a historical yet conquered and occupied nation.

2. From the very beginning, Crimean Tatar nationalism (unlike the Ukrainian one and many others) was that of an ethnic minority in the Crimean Tatar homeland: due to mass migration and resettlement policies of the Russian Empire, Crimean Tatars had become a minority in Crimea already by the early 1860s. (Williams, 2016: 88)
3. Crimean Tatar national identity emerged at the breakdown of a traditional, religiously-defined identity largely due to the efforts of Gaspıralı Jadidist reform movement, and developed as tri-dimensional: Crimean Tatar in the first place, but also with a strong sense of broader Turkic and Islamic identity.
4. The development of Crimean Tatar nationalism from the inception in the second half of the 19th century and till the 1940s clearly followed the phases model of Hroch: from the cultural activities of Gaspıralı and his followers, to the political activism of the Young Tatars, to the dedicated nation-building effort of the *Vatan Cemiyeti* and the first Crimean Tatar national government it created, with a brief resurgence during WWII. This pattern is similar to that Ukrainian nationalism followed before the 1940s, but the development of Crimean Tatar nationalism occurred at a much higher speed. The three generations of intellectuals and activists representative of each phase came very close after one another, the three theoretically-designated phases overlapping in practice. For instance, in the early 1910s all the most important figures of all the three phases were active simultaneously.
5. The mass deportation of 1944 became the crucial turning point in the development of Crimean Tatar nationalism. First, after the deportation and until mass repatriation in 1991, the Crimean Tatar National Movement existed only in diaspora, whether inside or outside of the Soviet Union. Second, it abandoned the aspiration for an independent state and focused on repatriation to Crimea and national autonomy (without sovereignty) within its territory as its main goals.
6. From 1944 and to 1991, the Crimean Tatar nationalism existed as Aydın Aydın calls diaspora nationalism, characterized by rather symbolic than social ties with the distant homeland (Aydın, 2000: 94) and partial assimilation with the host community. (Ibid.: 96) In the outer diaspora (outside the Soviet Union), it was an elite-oriented movement without mass support, while the inner diaspora movement

(inside the Soviet Union but outside of Crimea) eventually developed a mass following and organization.

7. The Crimean Tatar National Movement of the inner diaspora was organized around neighborhood- and kinship-based networks, with tradition-sharing within family playing a crucial role in the formation of national identity of its members. These features are not typical for the development of nationalist movements according to the modernist model.
8. The organizational structure of the Crimean Tatar National Movement as it exists today was developed within the inner diaspora national movement in the second half of the 20th century, and has consistently pursued the goal of mass repatriation to Crimea and establishment of a national autonomy, i.e. a special legal status for the Crimean Tatar national community in Crimea. Its governing organs, the Kurultay and the Mejlis, were created to manage community affairs, not to exercise the functions of a state.

It is worth noting that, although the Crimean Democratic Republic did cooperate with Ukrainian People's Republic in its brief period of independence, there had been no deep ties or consistent interaction between the Crimean Tatar and the Ukrainian national movements. Close contact and interaction began only in 1991, when Crimea came under the jurisdiction of an independent Ukraine and became open for Crimean Tatar repatriation. In the following chapter, we will examine the interaction between the Crimean Tatar National Movement and the Ukrainian state from the declaration of independence by the latter in 1991 till the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022.

CHAPTER 4: CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE (1991 – 2014)

4.1. Pragmatic and Limited Cooperation: 1991 – 2014

Although encouraged and sponsored by the Ukrainian state, the return of Crimean Tatars to the peninsula was associated with a number of legal and political complexities. As outlined by Oxana Shevel, among the most immediate of them were Crimean Tatar representation in organs of power, official recognition of the Kurultay and the Mejlis, recognition of Crimean Tatar status as an indigenous people rather than an ethnic minority and the official status of the Crimean Tatar language. (Shevel, 2001: 111) Intricately interconnected, these issues overlapped with the question of Crimean autonomy (whether it should be territorial, providing for the same legal status for the whole population of Crimea, or defined by special rights for Crimean Tatars) and created a nexus of complexity that would to a significant extent shape the relations of the Crimean Tatar National Movement with the Ukrainian state authorities, Ukrainian nationalist parties, and the Crimean regional elites and authorities.

A crucial factor of this complexity was the presence of what Gwendolyn Sasse calls “the Crimea question”: the existence of Crimean regional separatism and its conflict with both the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatar National Movement. The roots of Crimean separatism go back to the Soviet times and the Soviet policies of “de-Tatarization” and resettlement (almost 75% of the Crimean population came to the peninsula after 1945) (Sahin, 2019: 95) which left the peninsula, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, as a “territory ethnically dominated by Russians and attached to the Soviet values.” (Sasse 2007: 129) Crimea being one among the Ukrainian regions affected the worst by social and economic problems as the command economy system was being dismantled, (Ibid.: 193) the alienation of this population from the democratic present was matched by a nostalgia for the Soviet past. (Ibid.: 177)

Rather strictly regional than ethnic at its inception, the return of the Crimean Tatars aggravated the ethnic divisions in the peninsula, (Ibid.: 171) resulting in what Sasse calls “polarization along ethnically-defined cleavages.” (Ibid.: 155) The ensuing separatist movement was a “highly amorphous conglomerate . . . only united by the general ideas of Crimean separatism, Russian nationalism and reintegration with Russia.” (Ibid.: 156) This pro-Russian movement peaked in 1994, with the short-lived incumbency of the Russian nationalist Yuri Meshkov as the

President of the Crimean autonomy, but separatist tendencies remained and persisted well after. (Ibid.: 171) An attempt by Russia to seize the Ukrainian Tuzla island in 2003, which can be viewed as a means to strengthen Russia's influence on Crimea, accentuated the international dimension of the Crimean problem, (Hai-Nyzhnyk, 2017: 88) but did not see any involvement of the Crimean Tatars.

Remarkably, there was an ethnically Ukrainian element to the pro-Russian Crimean separatism: Russian-speaking Ukrainians nostalgic for or identifying with the Soviet Union. Shevel characterizes them as "Russified Ukrainian" (Shevel, 2001: 117) and supporting "the idea of a Slavic union of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, or some other form of the unified state with Russia." (Ibid.: 118) This peculiar alignment can be viewed as representing a more extreme version of what John-Paul Himka calls the "post-Soviet" Ukrainian identity as opposed to the "Central European" one.

Both being rather loose theoretical approximations developed to explain the varieties of identity formation in the newly-independent Ukraine, the Central European identity is geographically centered around Galicia (Halychyna), is Ukrainian-speaking and exclusively Ukrainian (incompatible with other identities), historically shaped by the development of the Galician Ukrainian nationalism within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland before 1939. The post-Soviet Ukrainian identity, geographically located in the parts of Ukraine controlled by the Soviet Union since before 1939, is Russian-speaking and allows for a hierarchy of multiple loyalties (Russian/Soviet, all-Ukrainian, regional within Ukraine), in this respect being similar to the earlier Russophile identity of the late 19th century. (Himka, 2006: 483-484) The rise of such extreme, to the extent of converging with Russian nationalists, version of a post-Soviet Ukrainian identity in the impoverished Crimea appears quite in line with Himka's observation that the success of civic nationalism promoted by the Ukrainian authorities in the early 1990s depended on a positive attitude towards the state and the new society being formed, and its cause was badly damaged by the failure of the Ukrainian state to foster economic prosperity in those transitional years. (Ibid.: 494)

Eventually coalescing around Communist and left-wing, pro-Soviet political parties dominating the Crimean regional parliament, (Shevel, 2001: 118) the adherents of Crimean separatism assumed antagonistic attitudes towards the Crimean Tatar National Movement, which

at some point prompted Mustafa Dzhemilev to characterize the Crimean administration as the most serious threat to the Crimean Tatars. (Ibid.: 117) As the key points of difference were the nature of the Crimean autonomy and the legal status of the Crimean Tatar people, to understand this conflict it would be necessary to first examine the notions of national autonomy and indigenous people.

As Natalya Belitser points out, there is a theoretical distinction between national-territorial autonomy, which implied granting autonomy rights to the population residing within a designated territory, and national-cultural autonomy. (Belitser, 2016: 34) The latter concept was coined by the Austrian politician and political thinker Adolf Fischhof in the late 19th century and later developed by the Austrian politician and scholar Karl Renner (who used, however, the term “national autonomy” as opposed to “territorial autonomy”). Renner’s approach to autonomy is based on the principle of personality, effectively freeing the nation as a group of people from territorial limitations. (Arzoz, 2020: 311) No matter where individual members of a nation live, and in fact regardless of whether they have any particular territory associated with them at all, they have the right to group representation through constitutionally-recognized autonomous associations with exclusive rights to educational and cultural activities, or even through their own legislatures, administrative and executive organs. (Belitser, 2016: 35)

The idea most relevant here to the Crimean Tatar discourse is that of national representative organs with a special legal status different from that of a simple civil society association: empowered to represent the national group and defend its group rights in state authorities. With the Crimean Tatar community, such organs were the Kurultay and the Mejlis – but throughout the period from 1991 to 2013, there were no provision in the Ukrainian legislation for such organs. (Ibid.: 53)

As Renner himself put his rationale for preferring the national-cultural model, “The territorial principle . . . is the cruelest and most inappropriate solution. The position of the foreign nationalities included in a territory is contingent upon whether they are favored or not, and they are forced to adopt a belligerent stance. It is the system of incessant squabbling, of never-ending disputes over assets.” (Renner 2005 in Arzoz, 2020) The Crimean autonomy being established as a territorial one in 1991, Crimean Tatars made up only 12% of its majority-Russian population by the end of the 1990s, (Shevel, 2001: 111) scattered all over the peninsula without forming a majority in any electoral district, which, given the majoritarian system of regional elections, led to

their severe underrepresentation in the Crimean government organs. As a response, a demand arose among Crimean Tatars for Crimean Tatar quotas in government organs or other means of proportional representation for them. To Crimean Tatar activists, the territorial autonomy of Crimea was a de facto Russian national autonomy effectively depriving the Crimean Tatars of actual group rights. (Ibid.: 112)

Another way in which the Crimean Tatars sought to protect their group rights was obtaining the status of an indigenous people as provided for in Article 11 of the Constitution of Ukraine. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples characterizes indigenous peoples as those who “have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.” (UN OHCHR, 2007: Preamble) Indigenous peoples’ rights are different from minority rights in their goal being to allow for a higher degree of autonomous development and to allocate authority to indigenous people so as to enable them to make their own decisions. (Eide and Daes, 2000: 3)

These demands of the Crimean Tatars were persistently rebuffed by the pro-Russian, pro-Communist authorities of the Crimean autonomy with the rhetoric of territorial autonomy, multiethnic make-up of Crimea and equal rights for all. (Shevel, 2001: 117) Assuming what Shevel calls an antagonistic attitude towards the Crimean Tatars, the Crimean authorities accused them of extremism and radical nationalism, and sought to sow division in the Crimean Tatar National Movement by encouraging Crimean Tatar organizations not aligned with the Mejlis. One of them, the Council of Aksakals (Elders), officially embraced all the goals mentioned above, including broader Crimean Tatar representation and the status of an indigenous people, but was accepted by the Crimean authorities, it seems, only because it did not align itself with the Mejlis. (Ibid.: 119)

Finding itself as a minority within a minority region and finding no way to achieve its goals in cooperation with the Crimean regional authorities, the Crimean Tatars had to look for alliance with the central Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian nationalist parties. The Crimean Tatars became the main opposition to the Crimean separatism and territorial autonomy (Sasse 2007: 187) from the standpoint of a strongly pro-Ukraine position. This alignment was not purely an alliance of convenience as the Crimean Tatar National Movement did in fact have some history of previous cooperation with pro-Ukraine forces, as well as an emotional connection to them. Both Crimean

Tatars and Ukrainians shared a collective memory of persecution by the Soviet Union, the leaders of the respective national movements – Mustafa Cemilev and Viacheslav Chornovil – had been personal friends for decades, and the ethnically Ukrainian Petro Hryhorenko was genuinely honored by the Crimean Tatars for the role he played in their struggle for repatriation. (Shevel, 2001: 120)

However, Shevel characterizes the unconditional support of the Crimean Tatars for Ukraine as “objectively determined” by the circumstances they found themselves in, and notes that, while both right-wing Ukrainian parties and the Ukrainian authorities relied on the Crimean Tatar support against pro-Russian separatism in Crimea, they did not show much commitment in return and in fact sometimes sacrificed the Crimean Tatar interests when it was expedient. The national Ukrainian authorities, having no consistent policy towards the Crimean Tatars and being cautious against antagonizing the pro-Russian part of the Crimean population, would try to “de-ethnicize” the Crimean Tatar concerns in their official narrative, trying to spin them rather as socio-economic in nature. (Ibid.: 124)

Another aspect of the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations of the period was the element of suspicion the latter harbored towards the Crimean Tatar movement and its goals. Strongly favoring a unitary form of state and opposing any federalization projects for Ukraine, some Ukrainian nationalists viewed the Crimean Tatar aspiration for autonomy as potentially as problematic as the pro-Russian one. (Ibid.: 122) This suspicion was aggravated by the provisions of the Declaration on the National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People adopted by the Second Kurultay in 1991. Article 1 of the Declaration stated that “Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people where it alone has the right to self-determination as outlined by the rules of international law recognized by the international community. Political, economic, spiritual and cultural restoration of the Crimean Tatar people is achievable only in a sovereign nation state of its own. The Crimean Tatar people will pursue this goal by all means compliant with international law.” (Guboglo and Chervonnaia, 1992: 109-112)

Despite official statements by the Mejlis that Crimean Tatar statehood can be realized within the Ukrainian state and that the right to self-determination, in accordance with international law, does not equate to or imply the right to secession, the Declaration was largely viewed as being in conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine. This further complicated the relation between the

Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian government, already plagued by ambiguity of legal regulations and unwillingness of the government to actively engage with Crimean Tatar issues, which shaped the relation in what Shevel calls “Tatar mass protest action – authorities’ concessions to the Tatars” pattern. (Shevel, 2001: 124) Mejlis and Kurultay remained officially unrecognized for decades, likewise there would be no progress on the indigenous people status for the Crimean Tatars.

This situation can be at least to an extent compared to the one the Ukrainians of Galicia found themselves in when the Austrian authorities provided them limited support as an opposition to the dominant Polish separatism in the region. It is important to note that the Ukrainian state, in its relations with ethnic minorities and the populations of various regions of Ukraine and diverging Ukrainian identities (as mentioned above with reference to Himka’s work), was engaged in a nation-building effort along civic lines. This allowed Taras Kuzio, in the late 1990s, to characterize the contemporary independent Ukraine rather as a “state-nation” than a nation state. (Kuzio, 1998: 9)

Although not recognized officially by the Ukrainian state, the Mejlis remained a strong and widely recognized authority among the Crimean Tatars (Tahiiiev 2024: 57), even though there was no legal penalty for incomppliance with its decisions. By the mid-2000s, many members of the Mejlis participated in elections and held official positions in regional and national authorities, as well as actively campaigned for Ukrainian nationalist parties and candidates, primarily the Rukh. (Ibid.: 58) In the assessment of Belitser, this “Crimean Tatar support for Rukh and other democratic nationalists was an important contribution to the formation of an inclusive, civic Ukrainian nation.” (Belitser. 2016: 57)

The Orange Revolution of 2005, in which mass protests over electoral fraud led to the annulment of election results and reversal of a victory by the pro-Russian and actively supported by Russia candidate Viktor Yanukovych, although it marked a major overcoming of regionalist tendencies in Ukrainian political life and a shift of nationalist activism from the West of Ukraine to Kyiv, did not involve the Crimean Tatars to any remarkable extent. (Wilson, 2005: 201-202) However, at a regional level, it “effectively pitted the Crimean Tatars against the Russian-speaking regional majority,” (Sasse, 2007: 264) with some pro-Russian political groups going as far as to demand the Mejlis and the Kurultay to be banned as “organized crime groups” later in 2010. (Radio Free Europe, 2010) Although a Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People was

established by the President of Ukraine back in 1999, the President Viktor Yushchenko who became incumbent as a result of the Orange Revolution “did not pay attention to maintaining the dialogue with the Crimean Tatars despite the mass support they gave him during the elections.” (Useinow, 2020)

All in all, no significant steps were taken by the central Ukrainian authorities to address the Crimean Tatar concerns and aspirations which had remained basically the same since the early 1990s. In 2013, a “lack of a legal framework for the restoration of the rights of the formerly deported people” was identified as “most pressing” in the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities report *The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine*. (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2013)

4.2. A Shared Crisis and a Shift in Patterns: 2014 – 2022

The turning point in the relations between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state came with another mass protest event involving Yanukovych and his pro-Russian activities: the Revolution of Dignity, or Euromaidan, in 2013-2014, which was followed by a Russian invasion and full occupation of the Crimean peninsula. With the Russian invasion already under way and the plans to declare Crimea's independence and subsequent transition under the Russian jurisdiction, more than 10,000 Crimean Tatars gathered in front of the Crimean regional parliament to protest it in the name of Ukrainian territorial integrity. The building of the parliament was occupied by Russian soldiers without insignia the next day, immediately followed by a special session of the Crimean parliament that decided to announce the autonomy's independence from Ukraine. (Sahin, 2016: 106) The peninsula would be annexed by Russia further to a staged referendum; neither the referendum nor the annexation being recognized as legal by most countries. The first act of reprisal against Crimean Tatar activists followed on 3 March 2014, when Reşat Amet was kidnapped by pro-Russian paramilitaries while on a solitary peaceful protest. His body was eventually found bearing signs of torture and violent death, marking only the beginning of Crimean Tatar persecution under Russian occupation authorities. (Ibid.: 107)

Yet as reprisals against individual activists were beginning, the Russian authorities still made an attempt to solicit the collaboration of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, promising high-ranking position in the new regional government and broad Crimean Tatar representation. However, after it became clear that the new regime required total submission instead of actual engagement, the negotiations failed and a number of prominent Crimean Tatar activists, including Mustafa Dzhemilev and the incumbent chairman of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov, were banned from entering Crimea. In 2016, the Mejlis was recognized as an extremist organization by the Russian authorities and banned from any activity on Russian-controlled territories, eventually continuing its operation in Kyiv. (Muratova, 2019: 52-53) A number of loyal, pro-Russian Crimean Tatar organizations were created to replace the Mejlis, but none of them got mass support from Crimean Tatars. (Wilson, 2017: 39) The only Crimean Tatar association pre-exiting the 2014 occupation to engage in cooperation with the Russian authorities was the Muftiyat, and organization of Crimean Tatar clerics previously allied with the Mejlis but increasingly critical of it after its change of allegiance. (Muratova, 2019: 54-55)

The change of balance of power within the Crimean Tatar community after the Muftiyat went over to the Russian side opened the way to cooperation between the Mejlis and various Islamic groups of the Crimean Tatars, the most important of them being Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an organization advocating for the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and rejecting the Western political ideas of nationalism and democracy, at the same time being committed to non-violent methods of struggle. The platform for cooperation between the Mejlis and Hizb-ut-Tahrir is the Crimean Solidarity, a political prisoner rights advocacy group. (Ibid.: 57)

In 2015, the Crimean Tatars would initiate a “civic blockade” of Crimea by setting up control posts on the roads to and from the peninsula to check cars and remove the goods intended for sale, thus to hinder trade with the occupied territory. To enforce the blockade, a Crimean Tatar paramilitary was formed, and the Crimean Tatars were assisted by Ukrainian nationalist activists and military veterans (Gressel, 2015).

All in all, the Crimean Tatar resistance to the invasion and annexation of the peninsula made a very positive impression in Ukraine. (Sahin, 2016: 109) In recognition, a number of Crimean Tatar activists were appointed to official positions: Mustafa Dzhemilev became the special representative of the President of Ukraine on Crimean Tatar Affairs, Refat Chubarov would take part in Ukrainian delegations to international organizations, Emine Capparova became the First Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Information Policy, Yusuf Kürkçü became the First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Displaced Persons’ Issues. (Ibid.: 117-118) Although the new appointments were not to crucial positions, they signified an increased trust of the Ukrainian government towards the Crimean Tatars and the start of broader Crimean Tatar representation in the organs of state power.

Of particular importance was the establishment of the Crimean Platform in 2021: a consultative forum aimed to generate international support for ending the occupation of Crimea by Russia. The Platform operates at the levels of heads of states, ministers of foreign affairs, parliaments and civil society organizations, assisted by an inter-factional association in the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine).

However, the most important developments were the official recognition of the Mejlis and the Kurultay, as well as of the status of the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people in 2014: both

being long-sought and struggled for goals. The public perception of and official narratives on the Crimean Tatars had changed accordingly, now acknowledging them as equal participants in the Ukrainian state and its defense. At the same time, a shift in Ukrainian culture policies resulted in an effort to promote the minority cultures of Ukraine including the Crimean Tatar one, (Pesenti, 2020: 26) most notably by sending the Crimean Tatar singer Jamala to represent Ukraine at the Eurovision contest in 2016, with a song in English and Crimean Tatar about the deportation of the Crimean Tatars titled ‘1944’.

Sahin went as far as to characterize the post-2014 Ukraine as a bi-national, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar state, in contrast to some characterizations of Ukraine as a bi-national Ukrainian-Russian state (such as Kuzio, 1998). In the assessment of Şahin, the events of the Euromaidan, the invasion of Crimea and the Crimean Tatar resistance to it “all contributed to the efforts to evolve the Ukrainian nation from a state-nation into a nation state.” (Şahin, 2016: 138) However, despite this improvement in relations, a degree of tension and mutual distrust still remained, (Ibid.: 130) and the representation of the Crimean Tatars in the national organs of authority remained still rather limited. Perhaps it would be more justified to attribute the dynamics of the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations in 2014-2022 not to a significant transformation of Ukrainian nationalism or its attitudes to the Crimean Tatars, but to a shift in the goals of the Crimean Tatar National Movement as pointed out by Nedim Useinow: from a movement of national revival, focused on asserting its autonomy within the Ukrainian state, it transformed into a movement of national liberation concerned primarily with securing the Crimean peninsula for Crimean Tatars and safeguarding against their total assimilation (Useinow, 2020). The latter is a much less ambitious, and much easier-alignable with the policies of the central state, goal.

In conclusion, the following general observation on the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations in the independence period before the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 can be made:

1. There was no persecution of the Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian state or Ukrainian nationalists, and in fact Ukraine sponsored and facilitated the Crimean Tatar repatriation to Crimea. However, many of Crimean Tatar demands and aspirations were ignored or perceived with suspicion, the situation being further aggravated by the ambiguity or absence of group rights legislation.

2. Faced with an antagonistic attitude of the regional Crimean authorities and the pro-Russian majority population, the Crimean Tatar Mejlis would position itself as a strongly pro-Ukraine force to secure the support of the central Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian nationalist parties. However, in contrast to the full and unconditional support for Ukraine on the part of the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainian commitment was rather limited.
3. In Crimea, the Crimean Tatars were the main opponents of the pro-Russian Crimean separatism. The key points of contention were the nature of the autonomy (national territorial or national-cultural in the terminology accepted in theory; territorial or national-territorial in the terminology commonly used by Crimean Tatar activists themselves).
4. The main goals of the Mejlis were: national autonomy for the Crimean Tatars instead of a territorial autonomy for Crimea; official recognition of the Mejlis and the Kurultay as the representative organs of the Crimean Tatars, not just civil society associations; recognition of the Crimean Tatars as a people indigenous to Crimea and thus entitled to special protection and special rights; broader representation of the Crimean Tatars in the organs of national, regional and local government.
5. The Crimean Tatar resistance to Russian occupation in 2014 led to a significant improvement in Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations and the Ukrainian government meeting some of the most pertinent Crimean Tatar demands (recognizing the Mejlis and the Kurultay, status of an indigenous people).
6. Up to 2014, the pattern of interaction between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian authorities was “Crimean Tatar mass action – the authorities’ concession,” with the Crimean Tatars constantly having to push for their rights.
7. The overall pattern of the relation between the Crimean Tatar and the Ukrainian nationalism still fits Breuilly’s central-peripheral nationalism model although being a benign case of it. Instead of being rivals to each other, the central (Ukrainian) and the peripheral (Crimean Tatar) nationalisms acted as allies against another peripheral (Russian/post-Soviet) nationalism. In 2014, the place of pro-Russian separatists was taken over by Russian invasion forces: a more serious threat to both the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatars, the annexation of Crimea becoming a

reliving of the exile for many Crimean Tatars, and of earlier Russian invasions for the Ukrainians. It may be argued that this shared experience of current crisis and of re-living historical memories could have brought the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainians closer together; the patterns of their relation starting to shift.

In the concluding chapter of my thesis, I will examine a number of external communications by the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, its individual members and Crimean Tatar activists to find out how the relation between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state developed, from the perspective of the Crimean Tatar national movement, in the conditions of an existential war now equally threatening both the Crimean Tatars and the rest of Ukraine.

CHAPTER 5: CRIMEAN TATARS AND THE UKRAINIAN NATION AFTER A WHOLE-SCALE INVASION BY RUSSIA (2022 – 2024)

5.1. Analysis of Relevant External Communications of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar

People: Method

The period after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 saw further developments in the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations. The cooperation between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean Tatar community broadened, accompanied by a number of new official appointments, the most notable of them being Rustem Umerov's incumbency as the Minister of Defense commencing in 2023 and Nariman Dzhelyal becoming the ambassador of Ukraine in Türkiye in 2024. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasized the importance of Crimea for Ukrainian war effort in a number of speeches and public addresses, most notably at the opening of the Second Crimea Platform Summit in August 2022: "It started with terror against the Crimean Tatar people, the indigenous people of Crimea" (Zelenskyy, 2022).

At the same time, a number of problematic issues still remained. Among them is the legal status of the Mejlis: as Liudmila Korotkykh, a lawyer for the Crimean Tatar Resource center pointed out in 2024, although officially recognized by the Ukrainian government, the Mejlis still did not have the status of a legal person as a representative body of an indigenous people, and thus could not take part in the operations of the United Nations or its organizations. (Crimean Tatar Resource Center, 2024) Eskender Bariev, a member of the Mejlis, taking part in a panel of ethnic minorities of Ukraine, stressed the persisting deficiency of legislation: although an Indigenous Peoples Act was adopted in 2021 and an Ethnic Minorities Act in 2023, only 2 Regulations had been adopted since out of the 17 regulations and amendments to 10 laws that would be needed to make sure the Indigenous Peoples Act and the Ethnic Minorities Act can be properly applied and enforced (Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, 24 January 2025).

In this chapter, I will examine external communications of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, its individual members and Crimean Tatar activists published between 24 February 2022 and 30 January 2025 and available in public access on the official website of the Mejlis (the posts on the official Facebook and X accounts of the Mejlis being references to its website) to see how the Crimean Tatar National Movement presents its relation to the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian nation.

In collecting and processing the data for my research, I used the methods of content analysis in the research field of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy efforts are characterized by seeking to contribute to positive attitudes and beliefs towards a nation, its people and its political goals and affairs (Marschlich : 329) While one research strand describes public diplomacy as the exclusive instrument of nation-states or governments, another strand also includes non-state actors, to which belongs the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. Research in this field mainly focuses on analyzing how actors represent themselves over long periods or during particular important events, such as in times of conflict or crisis in order to come to conclusions about agenda-building effects and implications for the perceived image of the actor (Ibid.: 330).

Public diplomacy research uses different research designs including qualitative and quantitative research, or a combination of the two (Ibid.: 331) Among the commonly used constructs in this field are: general occurrence and salience of themes, evaluation of topics, visibility and prominence of actors, evaluation of actors, network of public diplomacy actors and their publics, framing of country-related themes, public diplomacy modes and country image. (Ibid.: 332-334) I used the constructs of evaluation of topics and framing of country-related themes to see how the Crimean Tatar – Ukraine relation was presented in the communications analyzed. Communications were selected by the criteria of containing the key word “Україна” (Ukraine) or its morphological derivatives and coming from the Mejlis, its members or Crimean Tatar activists. Then the selected communications were shortlisted by the criterion of containing the relevant theme.

Searching by the keywords specified above, I found 1654 matching publications on the official website of the Mejlis, 142 of them being dated between 24 February 2022 and 30 January 2025. Of these 142 publications, only 8 matched the other criteria of my search: referencing statements by the Mejlis itself, its individual members or Crimean Tatar activists, and addressing the theme of the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relations. This relatively infrequent occurrence of the theme should not be surprising given the presence of more urgent and immediate concerns of wartime, such as persecution of Crimean Tatars in occupation, the plight of Crimean Tatar political prisoners and the efforts to bring about their release, international diplomatic activities, and ongoing combat.

5.2. Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People on the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian Relations

My translations (Ukrainian to English) of the relevant passages from the shortlisted communications are listed below.

1. From the speech of Rustam Umerov, the Minister of Defense, at Crimea Platform Summit: “Crimea is my home, and the Russian occupation of my homeland is for me, like for millions of Ukrainians, is a source of daily pain” (Mejlis, 12 September 2024a). A member of the Mejlis, Umerov expressly identifies as Ukrainian.
2. From the Statement of the Mejlis on inadmissibility of territorial concessions by Ukraine: “Crimea is the homeland of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people and an integral part of the Ukrainian state. Accordingly, any decision on the territorial belonging of the Crimean peninsula, its legal status, the organization of its political, economic, social and cultural life must not and cannot be made disregarding the will of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people and the consent of the Ukrainian state” (Mejlis, 14 November 2024).
3. From the speech of Nariman Dzhelyal, the first deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, at Crimea Platform summit: “From the first days of the Russian occupation, the strongest consolidation in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine was demonstrated by the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, and for this very reason they faced the most brutal repression by Russian occupation forces . . . The liberation and reintegration of Crimea must go hand in hand with the restoration of Crimean Tatar indigenous rights, including political rights” (Mejlis, 12 September 2024b).
4. From the speech of Eskender Bariev, a Mejlis member, at the National Communities of Ukraine – Historical Events and the Present in a Country-wide Context panel: “The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People made an official address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and all Ukrainian people, becoming the first in the world to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Thus the Crimean Tatars, as an indigenous people, exercised their right to self-determination as to what country they want to live in . . . Securing the rights of indigenous peoples and national minorities will ensure the resilience of the Ukrainian civic nation . . . The representatives of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities were the first to openly condemn Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 at a

press conference at Ukrinform. Thus they demonstrated their belonging in the Ukrainian civic nation and their readiness to defend their country together with ethnic Ukrainians” (Mejlis, 24 January 2025). Here, a distinction is made and a symbiosis is assumed between the Ukrainian civic nation, the Ukrainian ethnic nation, and the ethnic nations of minority groups, the former overlapping and providing an umbrella identity for both the latter. Thus the Crimean Tatar ethnic national identity is positioned not in opposition to the Ukrainian ethnic national identity, but alongside it on an equal footing within the Ukrainian civic national identity.

5. From a report on the official proposal by the Mejlis to institute a Day of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature in Ukraine: “Instituting a Day of Crimean Tatar Language and Literature in Ukraine will confirm the status of the Crimean Tatar language as an integral element of the identity and ethnocultural integrity of the Ukrainian people. It will promote language diversity, preservation of cultural and linguistic identity of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people . . .” (Mejlis, 3 October 2022). The Crimean Tatar cultural identity is presented not as separate from or exclusive of the Ukrainian one, but as being a part of it. Apparently, the Ukrainian identity referred to is not the ethnic but the civic national identity.
6. From a report on the speech of Arsen Zhumadilov, a co-founder of the 26 June Initiative, a Crimean Tatar activist group, at a panel of the Lviv Media Forum in May 2023: “The goal of the Crimean Tatars is to integrate into Europe as a part of Ukraine.” Zhumadilov’s own words: “We can see that Ukraine is about to join the EU and the NATO, join the whole civilized world” (Mejlis, 29 May 2023).
7. From the greetings of the Head of the Mejlis for the Ukrainian Constitution Day in 2024: “Of extreme and decisive importance for the future of the independent Ukrainian state is the transformation of the current legal status of Crimea into a national-territorial autonomy within Ukraine as an act of self-determination by the Crimean Tatar people” (Mejlis, 28 June 2024).
8. From the comment of Nariman Dzhelyal on the release of Leniye Umerova, a political prisoner: “. . . In spite of threats, she at once, just as she was being arrested, stated her civil position with a single short phrase, right in the face of those

henchmen: ‘Glory to Ukraine!’ This makes me proud of the young women of my people, an indigenous people of Ukraine” (Mejlis, 16 September 2024).

From these communications, the following conclusions can be made as to how the Mejlis presents the Crimean Tatar national identity in relation to the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation:

1. A distinction is made between civic and ethnic national identities.
2. While ethnic identities are assumed to be separate from and exclusive of each other, they fall under the umbrella Ukrainian civic national identity. Thus ethnic Crimean Tatars, while distinct from ethnic Ukrainians, are presented as sharing a civic Ukrainian identity equally with the latter. An individual can identify as a Crimean Tatar and a Ukrainian at the same time, as this two-tier identity is promoted and encouraged.
3. Crimean Tatar nationalism is presented as not exclusive of Ukrainian civic nationalism.
4. The group rights of the Crimean Tatar people are defined as indigenous people rights within the Ukrainian state.
5. The group rights of the Crimean Tatar people include political rights, but the Ukrainian state is viewed as the guarantor of them.
6. The decision to support Ukraine in its defense of its territorial integrity and sovereignty was the decision of the Crimean Tatar people who aspire to live in Crimea as a part of the Ukrainian state. Staying in and with Ukraine is in the best interest of the Crimean Tatar people.
7. The overall relation between the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine is presented primarily as contributory within a single civic national space, not as a segregatory between two ethnic national spaces.
8. The affirmation of the Crimean Tatar language and culture is presented primarily as occurring within a single space of ethnocultural integrity of Ukraine as a civic nation, not as a setting of boundaries for a Crimean Tatar ethnocultural integrity against a Ukrainian one.

9. The Crimean Tatars are presented as active and equal with ethnic Ukrainians participants in Ukrainian political, social, economic and cultural life, as well as in the defense of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity as a state.
10. The activities of the Mejlis are presented as limited to the affairs of the Crimean Tatar community and representing its group rights in the Ukrainian state organs. The engagement of the Mejlis in international relations is presented as aimed at promoting Crimean affairs and causes (such as ending the occupation of Crimea by Russia) and exercising the rights of the Crimean Tatars as an indigenous people within the UN system, not at establishing international relations like those of a state.
11. The Crimean Tatars support the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and the NATO, and aspire for Crimea to become a part of Europe within Ukraine.
12. No room is left for interpreting the Crimean Tatar national autonomy within Ukraine as associated with separatism.

All of these features demonstrate a significant similarity to Hutchinson's model of cultural nationalism characterized by communitarian orientation, limited size and territorial scope (the Crimean peninsula), not pursuing statehood, cooperation yet not full convergence with the state-bearing nation, and a consensual separation of powers rather than competition for full dominance between the central (Ukrainian civic) and the peripheral (Crimean Tatar) nationalism.

It is worth noting that many of those features were already present from the very start of the Crimean Tatar repatriation yet were not reciprocated by the Ukrainian state which seemed to view the Crimean Tatar nationalism rather from a modernist, Breuillian perspective which presupposes inherent rivalry, tension and mutual suspicion between the central and the peripheral nationalism. Thus we cannot speak of a drastic shift from a clear-cut modernist/Breuillian to a clear-cut cultural nationalism/Hutchinsonian model in the Crimean-Tatar – Ukrainian relation. Rather, we can observe the relations transitioning from a state more in line with the modernist model (and in fact bearing some parallels to the Phases A and B which the Galician Ukrainian nationalism itself has passed within the Austro-Hungarian Empire) to what resembles rather the cultural nationalism model.

It seems clear that the transition was triggered by the crisis of the Russian invasion of Crimea, and accelerated with the escalation of the crisis to a whole-scale invasion of Ukraine in

2022. Smith's ethnosymbolist theory of collective memories and historical experiences shaping the sense of national identity can be invoked to explain this transition. In the period of newly-obtained independence (for the Ukrainians) and repatriation made possible (for the Crimean Tatars), the two ethnic nations that had not had much contact before found themselves in a situation that was new to them both. Thus even with a common opponent in the Crimean pro-Russian separatism, they simply did not have enough shared historical experience or collective memory to interact at a level deeper than opportunistic alliance underlied with a degree of mistrust and suspicion.

The existential threat of a Russian invasion, it may be argued, triggered the old, perhaps faded to an extent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and a "reset" of relations, memories of exile (for the Crimean Tatars, many of whom were forced into exile again) and loss of long strived-for sovereignty (for the Ukrainians). Re-lived in the context of a new and this time shared historical experience, those memories created a symbolic bridge between the two nations, which transformed their relation in a qualitative way. It remains to be seen how it will develop after the war.

CONCLUSION

An overview of literature on nation and nationalism was given, with a particular focus on the modernist school of thought as the most commonly-accepted one with its basic assumptions of the exclusively modern origin of nation and nationalism as social and political phenomena, of inherent aspiration of all national communities to sovereign statehood, and the dynamics of nationalist movements as driven by the need to create a culturally homogenous society to accommodate for industrial economy and centralized administrative state. An overview of the ethnosymbolist school as a smaller rival of the modernist school was also given, which assumes the origin of at least some nations in pre-industrial cultural communities shaped by shared traditions, historical experiences and collective memories. Either school does not claim to give an ultimate and exhaustive account of nation and nationalism but rather provides a theoretical model that may approximate each individual case to a different extent.

Particular attention was paid to the two theories of central and peripheral nationalism interaction, a modernist one by John Breuilly and the ethnosymbolist theory of cultural nationalism by John Hutchinson. The former assumes a rivalry between the central and the peripheral nationalism, the former seeking to subsume the latter within and assimilate it into its own version of a homogenous society, while the former is seeking to establish and protect the borders of a homogenous society of its own, ideally achieving political independence and sovereign statehood for it. Hutchinson's model of cultural nationalism describes a small-sized, communitarian-oriented national movement which does not seek statehood for itself but instead prefers to cooperate with the central nationalism of the country where its members reside, yet without fully converging with it. An emphasis was placed on the word "cultural" referring not to the purely cultural and non-political activities associated by the modernist schools with the early phase of a nationalist movement development, but to the focus of the movement being rather on preserving its community's way of life than seeking sovereign statehood.

A brief account of the development of Ukrainian (central in the modern-day Ukraine) and Crimean Tatar (peripheric) nationalism was given. It was observed that both national movements followed a similar (although with a number of historically-determined differences) trajectory largely consistent with Miroslav Hroch's theory of the three phases of national movement development (from the non-political activities of intellectuals promoting folk culture, to a small-

scale movement of political activists, to a mass movement seeking to establish or take control of a sovereign state) until the mid-1940s when both Crimea and the whole territory of what is now Ukraine found themselves fully under the Soviet control. From that point on, Ukraine maintained a degree of autonomy within the Soviet Union and eventually obtained independence after its collapse in 1991, the independence initiative being led by a civic nationalist democratic movement. The Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, were mass-deported from Crimea in 1944, and since then their national movement was a diaspora one focused on repatriation to Crimea as its main goal, which became possible only in 1991, when Crimea gained the status of an autonomy within an independent Ukrainian state.

The relation between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state after the 1991 independence and repatriation were examined, observing that up till 2014 its pattern was largely consistent with Breuilly's model, with the Ukrainian authorities and nationalist parties being cautious of the Crimean Tatar autonomy aspirations, and the Crimean Tatars having to assert their group rights as an indigenous people and a national community with its own representative organs. The relation can be viewed as a more benign form of Breuilly's model as the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian central authorities/nationalist parties acted as allies against a pro-Russian separatist movement in Crimea; but in general the Crimean Tatars would get less benefit from that alliance than they could expect in return for their unconditional support of Ukrainian territorial integrity and central (civic) nationalism.

After the Crimean Tatar Mejlis strongly supported Ukraine in the face of a Russian military invasion and annexation of the peninsula in 2014, the Crimean Tatar – Ukrainian relation improved, and two of the most important Crimean Tatar demands were met: official recognition for the Mejlis and the Kurultay, and an indigenous people status. Moreover, several official appointments were made to ensure a broader participation of the Crimean Tatars in the organs of the state. Further improvements followed after a Russian full-scale invasion in 2022, with Crimean Tatars being appointed to crucial state positions (such as the Minister of Defense) and further steps taken to ensure the Crimean Tatar group rights and participation in the Ukrainian political and social life; although certain regulatory obstacles still remained in the way. The contribution of the Crimean Tatars to the defense of Ukraine against Russian invasion was fully acknowledged by Ukrainian

authorities and the society at large, while the Crimean Tatar culture became promoted and more commonly associated with Ukraine.

A number of official external communications by the Mejlis and its individual members published between 24 February 2022 and 31 January 2024 were analyzed to see how the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People presented its outlook on the relation between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state and nation, and how it positioned the Crimean Tatars within Ukraine at large. A number of observations were made underlying the general conclusion that the relation between the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian state has shifted from being largely compatible with the Breuillian model in the period from 1991 to 2014, to more closely resembling the Hutchinsonian model of cultural nationalism after 2022, the period between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine representing a transition between the two models.

In *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*, Eric Hobsbawm vividly describes the dilemma of small national groups in the classical era of nationalism in the 19th century: either to be absorbed and assimilated into a larger nation, losing their own language and culture, or to abandon all political aspirations and become a purely cultural community. (Hobsbawm, 1993: 42) Both options, in fact, imply loss of agency. Speaking later of the contemporary state of nations and nationalism, he offers an alternative to the assumed in the modernist thought inherent aspiration of nations for statehood – which eventually would produce only a plethora of small states that “will have as little real role in [the international system] as Oldenburg or Mecklenburg-Schwerin had over the politics of the German Federation in the nineteenth century” (Ibid.: 184) – in a largely supranational and infranational organization of the international system. But even this arrangement he describes with an analogy implying a diminished agency and a degree of irrelevance: “say, Catalan culture today flourishes, but on a tacit assumption that it is Catalans who communicate with the rest of the world through Spanish and English.” (Ibid.: 191)

The case of the small but resilient and well-organized Crimean Tatar nation, which lost neither its identity nor its agency, and in fact gained more agency through its active support of the Ukrainian cause, seems to test the limits of the modernist approach and can be better described and understood using the ethnosymbolist theoretical model of cultural nationalism.

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