



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

SCALING THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

Ph.D. Dissertation

Necdet Özçelik

Ph.D. Program in Middle East Studies

June 2023



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ÖZET

Şiddet kullanan devlet dışı silahlı (DDSA) aktörler kavramı, son yirmi yılda güvenlik araştırmalarında en çok tartışılan konulardan biri haline geldi. Şiddet uygulayan devlet dışı aktörlere atfedilen önem silahlı çatışmaların değişen doğasındaki ve düzensiz savaşın dinamizminin içinde aldıkları rolden kaynaklanmaktadır. Devlet dışı silahlı aktörler hakkındaki çalışmalar, çoğunlukla bu aktörlerin kavramsal tanımını ve tipolojisini tartışmaya odaklanmıştır; bu aktörlerin şiddet içerikli faaliyetleri, silahlı eylemleri veya askeri programlarının etkililiği akademisyenler ve alan uzmanları tarafından herhangi bir ölçeğe dayanmaksızın betimsel yorumlarla mahdut bir şekilde tartışılmaktadır. DDSA'ların askeri etkililiğinin ölçülmesi, devletler ve diğer DDSA'lar için ilgili DDSA ile mücadele etmek veya bu DDSA ile iş birliği ve ortaklık geliştirmek için strateji belirleme sürecinde önemli bir faktör olarak görülmektedir. DDSA'ların askeri etkililiğinin ölçülmesi DDSA'nın öz değerlendirmesi için de hayati bir faktördür. DDSA'ların askeri etkililiğini belirlemek bu aktörlerin gizlilik içeren karakterlerinden dolayı zor olsa da bu çalışma askeri etkililiğinin belirli parametrelerden oluşan bir ölçekle yardımıyla ölçülebileceğini savunmaktadır. Çalışmadaki ölçek parametreleri, DDSA'ların sosyal, coğrafi ekosistemler ve potansiyel kaynak havuzlarıyla olan ilişkisi ve DDSA'ların eriştiği kaynakları savaş gücüne dönüştürme becerisi ve DDSA'ların silahlı eylem becerileri içinden belirlenmiştir. Bu çalışma, DDSA'ların askeri etkililiğini ele almakta ve DDSA'ların güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini belirleyen etkililik parametreleri çerçevesinde DDSA'ların askeri etkililiğini gösteren bir ölçek önermektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Askeri Etkililik, Ölçek, Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörler (DDSA)

ABSTRACT

The concept of violent non-state actors has become one of the most discussed topics in security studies over the last two decades. The emphasis of the violent non-state actors is regarded as their roles in the changing nature of armed conflicts and the dynamism of irregular warfare. Studies about the violent non-state actors have mostly focused on conceptual discussion and typology of the violent non-state actors; effectiveness of their violent, armed, or military activities is discussed through a limited descriptive interpretation by academicians and field experts without a measurement. Measuring the military effectiveness of VNSAs is a key factor for the state actors and the other VNSAs in order to develop either a countering or convergence strategy. Measuring the military effectiveness of VNSAs is also a vital factor in their self-evaluation. Although it is hard to determine the military effectiveness of VNSAs due to their secretive character, this study suggests that their military effectiveness is measurable by a scale composed of certain parameters. Parameters of the scale in this study were determined out of VNSAs' relationship with the social and geographic ecosystems, the pool of potential resources, the organization's ability to process the resources accessed into fighting power, and the practical achievement of their fighting power. This study addresses the military effectiveness of VNSAs and suggests a scale to measure the military effectiveness of a VNSA by suggesting certain effectiveness parameters comprising indicators associated with the strength and weakness of the military effectiveness.

Key Words: Military Effectiveness, Scale, Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	: Army Doctrine Publication
APA	: The American Psychological Association
ATGM	: Anti-Tank Guided Missile
ATP	: Army Technical Publication
CBRN	: Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear,
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
DBIED	: Drone Borne Improvised Explosive Device
EFA	: Exploratory Factor Analysis
ETA	: Basque Homeland and Liberty (<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i>)
EUAA	: European Union Agency for Asylum
FARC	: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army (<i>Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>)
FM	: Field Manual
FMI	: Field Manual Interim
GTD	: Global Terrorism Database
HPG	: People's Defense Forces (<i>Hêzên Parastina Gel</i>)
IED	: Improvised Explosive Device
ISIL	: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
IW	: Irregular Warfare
JP	: Joint Publication
KCK	: Kurdistan Communities Union
KMO	: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value
LIC	: Low Intensity Conflict
MANPADS	: Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
OFAC	: Office of Foreign Assets Control
PCA	: Principal Component Analysis
PJAK	: Kurdistan Free Life Party (<i>Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistan</i>)
PKK	: Kurdistan Workers Party (<i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan</i>)
PYD	: Democratic Union Party (<i>Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat</i>)

SPSS	: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
START	: Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
SVBIED	: Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
UNICEF	: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC	: United Nations Office of Drug and Crime
VBIED	: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VNSA	: Violent Non-State Actor
YPG	: People's Protection Units (<i>Yekineyen Parastina Gel</i>)
YPJ	: Women's Protection Units (<i>Yekineyen Parastina Jin</i>)



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Military effectiveness is known as an old military concept associated with the regular military of the states, while the concept of violent non-state actors (VNSA) is new in security studies. A firepower comparison of the state armies has always been an important argument when predicting the military effectiveness of an army. Military effectiveness, measured by the statistics of military possessions, is normally based on weighing the deterrence capacity of a state army. Even though combat effectiveness is supported by armies' high budgets and large human resources, misguided military doctrine, inadequate training, untrained leaders, and improper organization have a negative impact on military capabilities. While measuring the military capability of an army, many analysts act with numerical data on existing soldiers, weapons, vehicles, and equipment and work with a quantitative dominance. Numerical comparisons are made between the number of soldiers, air, sea, and land platforms, and systems of the countries in times of crisis (Global Firepower, 2023). However, it could be suggested that no real effectiveness is measured unless a war is fought.

It can be suggested that there is an interaction between the changing nature of the warfare and the revolution in military affairs. Nevertheless, the states cannot be claimed as the sole actors in changing the nature of warfare and military affairs. The VNSAs should be considered as effective as in changing warfare and the military affairs. Clausewitz points at the people, army, and the government as the wondrous trinity of the war (Clausewitz, 1991). The nature of the warfare could also be claimed to change on these triple bases, not only because of the state's dominance but also because of the VNSAs' influence on these triple aspects. Andreas Herberg-Rothe argues that Hamas and Hezbollah are the decisive VNSAs in the war, even if they are not the sole actors (Herberg-Rothe, 2007). Haldun Yalçınkaya argues that the Clausewitz core trinity can also explain terrorist structures like ISIL and the violence that they created (Yalçınkaya, 2019). Modern warfare is considered the product of administrative, technological, and ideological change in accordance with Charles Townshend's suggestion (Townshend, 2005). The revolution in military affairs is attributed to doctrine and technology. A doctrine-based revolution in military effectiveness could be claimed as the product of the assessment of the adversary capabilities that drive the

restructuring of the force available and the adoption of new technological systems, platforms, and ammunition. In this sense, the VNSAs are suggested to play an important role in driving a revolution in military affairs rather than a revolution in their armed program. Anthony H. Cordesman points out the role of insurgency, terrorism and the civil war in revolution in military affairs in his studies (Cordesman, 2015a; Cordesman, 2015b). Götz Neubeck and Christian Alwardt discuss how the irregular warfare environment influenced the U.S. military to adopt the technology-based Net-Centric warfare system in Afghanistan and Iraq (Neuneck and Alwardt, 2008).

The changing nature of warfare and the irregular character of modern armed conflicts suggest that it is not the state armies alone that shape conflict environments; non-state actors that follow armed programs also heavily engage in existing or emerging conflict. Therefore, the VNSAs are attributed a number of roles in modern conflict environments. The roles that VNSAs assume in the modern conflict environment have made them as effective state actors. VNSAs are structured in the conflict environment by realist, institutional, and constructivist approaches (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011: 607-608). The military effectiveness of the VNSAs is associated with the realist approach, which ultimately focuses on the elimination of, suppression of, and control over non-state armed actors in order to force them to adapt to a new situation, as Hofmann and Schneckener pointed out in their work.

The states hesitate to risk their military deterrence with big wars because of the high cost of conventional wars. States, on the other hand, also prefer to engage any threat with low-intensity conflict apparatus rather than large-scale conventional combat instruments; surgical operations, special operations, proxy wars, and clandestine activities have alternated with conventional engagements. VNSAs are not the product of the support of interventionist states alone. They emerge in parallel as the states go weak, fail, or completely collapse. The environment of weak, failed, or collapsed states is one in which security and political goods cannot be delivered by the state authority; as the states go weak, fail, or collapse, violent non-state organizations, interest groups, and interventionist states pursue filling the power vacuum. The multiplicity of the actors leads to either convergence or divergence among them, where sharp polarization is observed, as it happened in Syria after 2011 (Oktav, 2018: 1-33). In this sense, the local

partnership with the VNSAs is vital for the interventionist states when they prefer small wars to large-scale conventional battles.

The military effectiveness of the VNSAs has become an area of interest for all the relevant actors in a conflict environment due to the non-state characteristics of irregularity, locality, sustainability, adoptability, and immorality, as well as the changing nature of the conflict (Shapiro, 2012). The military effectiveness of VNSAs deserves a study as the nature of warfare becomes more irregular. The relationship between the conflict structure and the VNSAs is explained in this study through the methodological approach of structure-agent relations. The characteristics of the VNSA are narrowed down to terrorist and insurgent groups as agents due to their high influence over irregularities in modern conflict environments. The PKK is taken as the VNSA case to test the developed military effectiveness scale due to its uniqueness in transnationalism, prolonged armed strategy, and long-standing terror tactics.

1.1. STATUS OF THE PROBLEM

The concept of violent non-state actors has become one of the most discussed issues in security studies over the last two decades. The emphasis of the violent non-state actors is regarded as their roles in the changing nature of armed conflicts and the dynamism of irregular warfare. Studies about the violent non-state actors have mostly focused on discussing the conceptual description and typology of the violent non-state actors; no study has analyzed the effectiveness of the violent, armed, or military activities of the designated groups. This study aims to address the military effectiveness of violent non-state actors and suggest a scale for measuring the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor by suggesting certain effectiveness parameters comprising indicators associated with the strength and weakness of the military effectiveness. A combination of descriptive and empirical case studies is suggested to develop a scale for measuring the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor.

Once the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor is discussed, the focal point is commonly considered in grounding the possibility of the group's success or failure. Peter Krause discusses whether the group's employment of violence could achieve the objectives of ending military occupations, establishing new states, and shifting the balance of power among key political actors. He argues the failure of

violence with being weakened and destroyed and the grief of the affiliated social movements (Krause, 2013). It could be assumed that no matter what ideology and political/social cause violent non-state actors have, it is the success or failure of the violence employed that determines the success or failure of the organization. Organizational ideology and the political/social cause could be claimed as the subjective factors for reasoning the use of violence.

Setting aside the convergence in ideology, interests, and objectives, the choice of all the actors, such as states, non-states, and civil-social organizations, is also related to the success of violence by a certain non-state actor in a conflict environment when a partnership is considered. On the other hand, the success or failure of the violence may lead to a divorce between a certain non-state actor and all other actors. The level of violence effectiveness (military effectiveness in this study) is a matter of choice for either developing or ending relations with non-state actors from the perspective of all other relevant actors. The challenge is to make a perfect calculus for the relevant actors to form a relationship with a violent non-state actor. For a better calculus, scaling and measuring the military effectiveness of a non-state actor is the key to policy making not only for the relevant actors in a conflict environment but also for the non-state actor itself.

1.2. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this study is to develop a military effectiveness index for violent non-state actors in a defined geopolitical context. In order to develop the index, this study aims to devise a framework for laying out specific indicators of military effectiveness that can be measured. However, the study does not seek to suggest relativity regarding the military effectiveness of the selected case. The analysis of the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor is important to policy makers of state and non-state organizations for doctrine/program development and resource management.

Existing literature on military effectiveness is mostly interested in the combat effectiveness of the state's regular armies. The literature about the military effectiveness of violent non-state actors is too limited and does not suggest a military effectiveness scale. Therefore, the model for studying military effectiveness has been extracted from

the current studies on states' military. Evaluating the military effectiveness of violent non-state actors is a formidable analytic task given the secretive nature of organizations such as terrorist and insurgent groups. It is challenging enough to evaluate military performance with the benefit of hindsight and historical data. The absence of an outcome upon which to measure relative effectiveness and the absence of a symmetrical adversary to compare make this study more complex. This is related to the contextual aspect of violent non-state actors.

1.3. RESEARCH METHOD

In pursuit of the best methodological match, it is aimed to find answers to the following questions in this study: (1) Why is there a need for an effectiveness index for VNSA? (2) What is the aim of the research? (3) Which research method is most appropriate for the suggested military effectiveness scale? (4) What is the contribution of this research to security studies? Research is the process of collecting, analyzing, assigning, and reporting the data in a systematic and planned way in order to find reliable solutions for the problems.

This study focuses both on qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative research method was followed when suggesting the parameters of the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor. The military effectiveness parameters were determined through the existing literature by applying for expert views. The suggested scale is developed on three bases of military effectiveness: (1) organizational resources, (2) organizational ability to convert the resources into fighting power, and (3) achievement of the fighting power (Hurt, 2012: 63-71). Each basis for military effectiveness is categorized by a number of parameters. The quantitative aspect of the research was applied when measuring the strength of the indicators of the determined parameters (Creswell, 2009). Each parameter is assigned one of the designated indicators. The strength of the parameters was valued in a score range of 0 to 3. The developed scale was transformed into a questionnaire form, and the questionnaire form was applied to academicians, former bureaucrats, and field operatives to collect the data to process through the VNSA military effectiveness scale.

The research approach follows the method of inductive reasoning (Lodico, 2010). Though, it is aimed to produce generalized conclusions in categorizing the

military effectiveness parameters in this study. A number of parameters and indicators were listed and grouped in accordance with the military effectiveness subdimension, which also frames the relevant subscale. There were eleven groups of subdimensions, and subscales achieved through the descriptive stage of the study. The subscales were introduced to the experts' views through a questionnaire in order to gain their views on how to score the impact of the designated parameters on the military effectiveness of the selected sample case. This was the empirical aspect of the study. The data obtained from the experts were analyzed by a variety of statistical tests within the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Each sub-dimension was applied with statistical tests individually, and they were all scored between "0" and "3" points for their military effectiveness indicator. Coherence and discrepancies between eleven subscales were also observed by correlation. Finally, the sum of the military effectiveness scores of the eleven subscales was divided by the number of subscales, and the average score was designated as the military effectiveness score of the sample case.

1.4. LIMITATIONS

The idea of developing the military effectiveness scale of violent non-state actors in this study is based on the assumption of that military effectiveness parameters could be interfered with by the states' military effectiveness parameters. In this sense, the adoption of the parameters of a conventional military by the unconventional nature of a violent non-state organization may cause some anomalies. On the other hand, the study is descriptive analytical research based on the findings from political, academic, and security sources; no data was able to be obtained from the primary sources of violent non-state actors or the intelligence agencies of state actors due to the secretive nature of the VNSAs and legal considerations.

The data required for the developed military effectiveness scale was obtained through a questionnaire from academicians and journalists who either studied security or had field experience with the irregular conflict environment affected by the sample. The data was also obtained from the retired Turkish security bureaucrats who were actively involved in countering the sample case in and out of Turkey. The questionnaire form was not intended to apply to active-duty security personnel due to the difficulty of

obtaining institutional permission from the state authorities such as the National Defense Ministry and Ministry of Interior in Turkey; all the participants from the security bureaucracy were retired personnel who had their individual will to participate in the questionnaire. The retired military and police personnel had experience ranging from 10 to 32 years in the service. Their timeline in the service ranged from 1976 to 2022, which overlaps with the lifespan of the sample case. The highest military rank of the participants was that of lieutenant general, who served in a strategic leadership position in the armed forces, while the lowest rank was specialist, whose position was limited to tactical duties in counter-terror operations. The highest police rank position was the provincial police chief, which is quite strategic; the lowest police rank was the police officer, who had tactical responsibilities. The majority of the participants from the security bureaucracy were operatives at the operational and tactical levels. In the military services, the participants were from the elite special operations forces, commando units, border security units, and air force units, which were heavily involved in counter-terror operations. The participants from the interior ministry were from the special police/gendarmerie operations, law enforcement units, anti-smuggling, and organized crime units. The questionnaire was written in Turkish, and all the participants were Turkish citizens. The participants did not prefer to share their demographic information other than their profession during the preliminary talks. Therefore, their age, sex, rank, name, and branch of their security services were not listed in the questionnaire form. It was aimed to get at least 300 responses, but 268 were taken; 19 respondents were academicians and journalist, and 249 respondents were from the security bureaucracy.

1.5. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

I have framed my dissertation into four chapters after the introduction. In Chapter 2, I conducted a literature discussion on VNSAs, explaining why terrorist groups and insurgency groups have been identified as non-state armed actors in this study. In this context, I first explained how the literature review was conducted. Later, I discussed non-state armed actors within the framework of the structure-actor-action relationship. In the context of the structure, I explained the irregular warfare, low-intensity conflict, and irregular warfare environments that cause the presence of non-

state armed actors. I examined typology-based studies on VNSAs and focused on terrorist organizations and insurgency movements, whose military effectiveness in the structural environment produced geopolitical impacts. Finally, I examined the relationships of VNSAs in the structural environment through the dynamics of intra-VNSA, inter-VNSA, and state-VNSAs. At the end of this chapter, I argued for the importance of the military effectiveness of terrorist and insurgent groups, suggesting that this effectiveness should be measured so that it can be managed by different actors.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss the concept of military effectiveness through a literature review and explain how the military effectiveness of VNSAs can be measured. I will discuss how the concept of military effectiveness in the literature is attributed to conventional militaries rather than unconventional armed actors. I will make a rational connection between the concept of military effectiveness and unconventional armed actors. The military effectiveness is suggested as a course of action in between the organizational resources, the ability to convert, and the fighting power. In this chapter, I will also suggest a scale to measure the military effectiveness of the VNSAs.

In Chapter 4, I will present the empirical test of my VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale on my case study. I will explain how I conducted a questionnaire to obtain the necessary data for the scale. I will also explain how the data was processed systematically through a set of statistical tests to prove the validity, reliability, and replicability of the test. I will also discuss the findings about the sample case in this chapter.

In the Conclusion Chapter, I will summarize why there is a need for measuring the military effectiveness of the VNSAs. I will also suggest that the developed VNSA's Military Effectiveness Scale is able to measure the military effectiveness of any other VNSAs. I will restate the methodological aspects of data collection and analysis necessary to operate the VNSA's Military Effectiveness Scale, and I will also summarize how the VNSA's Military Effectiveness Scale could be applied to other VNSAs.

CHAPTER 2: VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS: A LITERATURE REVIEW THROUGH STRUCTURE, ACTOR AND ACTION

The literature review regarding the scope of this study has focused on; (1) reviewing the relevant studies and views on the related concepts; (2) relevant research and views on the selected context; and (3) relevant methodological studies and views for the data collection and data analysis. The literature review was conducted in three different contexts: (1) a critical review for understanding the concepts; (2) a systematic review for describing the context and analyzing the selected case; and (3) a meta-review for collecting and analyzing the data, developing procedures for suggestions and improving the estimates.

This chapter suggests a relationship between the VNSAs and the irregular structure of the unconventional conflict. This agent-structure relation does not correspond with what the neoliberal and world system theories offer. The VNSAs are ontological and epistemologically opposed to these theoretical suggestions, as Alexander Wendt defended (Wendt, 1987: 338). The VNSAs are the primary actors in irregular conflict environments because they pose a challenge to regular state authority or international systems. In this sense, the uniqueness of the VNSAs is related to the irregularity of the conflict environment, which serves the non-state actors better.

This study mainly focuses on the concepts of (1) violent non-state actors and (2) military effectiveness. In addition, (3) irregular warfare, and (4) terrorism and insurgency are studied as secondary concepts. The PKK is selected as a case study of violent non-state actors in this study in order to scale its military effectiveness. In addition to literature on the PKK's evolution, literature on the geopolitical environment in which the PKK has been active was also referred to contextualize the PKK's military effectiveness. The aim of this study is to develop a military effectiveness index for violent non-state actors. So, the literature on developing scales was referred to measure the indicators of military effectiveness.

The literature in this study is a combination of descriptive and empirical sources. The intellectual fields of military history, social science, and operational research are aimed at framing the descriptive sources, while the empirical sources are designated

with interviews with intellectuals, academicians, bureaucrats, and operatives in the field.

The concept of the violent non-state actor is new in security studies but has an old history in the practical realm of war. Thus, naming this phenomenon may vary in different conflict contexts, ranging from conventional warfare to irregular warfare environments. So, it is not the conceptual framework alone that should be stressed when studying the VNSA; the contextual framework should also be taken into consideration. Ulrich Schneckener points out three characteristics when defining armed non-state actors: (1) capability of using violence; (2) non-integration of military formations of state-armed institutions; and (3) possession of autonomy at a certain level. He also suggests that non-state actors might be supported by state actors or that the involvement of state officials in the activities of non-state actors might be possible because of ideological reasons (Schneckener, 2010).

In accordance with Klejda Mulaj's definition, VNSAs are non-state groups that resort to organized violence as a tool to achieve their goals. Mulaj points out five typology definitions of violent non-state movements, including (1) national liberation movements, (2) insurgent guerilla bands, (3) terrorist groups, (4) irregular militants, and (5) mercenary militias (Mulaj, 2010: 3-6). In Mulaj categorization, paradigms are associated with domains such as objective, strategy, and motivation of violent organizations.

The relationship between the state and non-state actors is based on sharing sovereignty; non-state actors pursue more shares of sovereignty while the state acts to keep the status quo. Murat Yeşiltaş and Tuncay Kardaş prefer to name the actors employing violence with arms without having state characters as non-state armed actors (NSAA) in their study (Yeşiltaş and Kardaş, 2017: 3). Yeşiltaş and Kardaş also emphasize four different casual determinants for the emergence of NSAAs in the Middle East, referring to; (1) the decline of state structure, (2) territorial claims, (3) regional context, and (4) external military intervention (Yeşiltaş and Kardaş, 2017: 10-14). Yeşiltaş and Kardaş basically focus on the existing social, informational, and physical environments in which the VNSAs emerge.

Another study framed the conceptualization of insurgency and terrorism by stressing on a parametric approach in defining the VNSAs (Özçelik, 2017). The study

focuses only on the comparison of insurgency and terrorism concepts, yet it suggests a wide range of determinant parameters in defining terrorism and insurgency.

Once the military effectiveness of a violent non-state actor is discussed, a focal point is developed for grounding the possibility of the group's success or failure. Peter Krause discusses whether the group's use of violence could achieve the objectives of (1) ending military occupations, (2) establishing new states, and (3) shifting the balance of power among key political actors. He argues the failure of violence with being weakened and destroyed and the grief of the affiliated social movements (Krause, 2013). It could be assumed that no matter what ideology, political, or social cause violent non-state actors have, it is the success or failure of the violence employed that determines the success or failure of the organization. Organizational ideology and the political or social cause could be claimed as the subjective factors for reasoning the use of violence.

Reviewing the literature through the scope of military effectiveness, VNSAs are suggested to be characterized with the following elements in this study: their affiliations in irregular conflict environments, conceptual impediments of the VNSAs with insurgency and terrorism, state and VNSA relations, inter-VNSA relations, and organizational dynamics.

Michael Vasseur and his friends at RAND Cooperation define the VNSA as an organization that engages in unsanctioned violence and neither directly nor officially represents a recognized state or country (Vasseur et al., 2022). This definition also points to a non-state challenge against the state authority in an irregular conflict. Vasseur argues that the VNSAs are adapting themselves to the changing nature of the conflict.

2.1 Structural Environment of VNSAs

Armed conflicts evolve in environments that can involve elements of people, geography, weather, and the combatant actors. However, conflicts go far beyond the environmental elements and the levels of conflict intensity, which break the conflict into three dimensions: the conflict during routine peaceful competition, the conflict at low intensity, and the war. Routine peaceful competitions do not employ direct violence; instead, a series of espionage and clandestine activities are involved. Peaceful

competitions have the potential to evolve the conflict into one of higher intensity or into war. When war is fought, it is expected to resolve all aspects of the conflict. Nevertheless, war is not able to bring the utmost resolution to the conflict; in addition to the security setbacks, political, economic, and social disputes can still arise. Thus, the war also has the potential to evolve into a lower-level, lower-intensity conflict.

Low intensity conflict (LIC) is somewhere between routine peaceful competition and war. Peaceful competition, low-intensity conflicts, and war are observed mainly between state-level actors. Routine peaceful competition can upgrade, and war can downgrade to low-intensity conflict. LIC is an area of opportunity for the VNSAs to pursue their goals while the states avoid engaging each other. Therefore, the LIC environment provides better conditions for VNSAs as the groups seek political-military confrontation (Gallagher, 1992: 3). The low-intensity conflict provides a fertile environment for VNSAs to exist. In the LIC environment, it is observed that VNSAs assume a variety of roles between the belligerent parties. The multiple roles of VNSAs for a state actor could include that of a proxy, partner, or adversary.

Violence, as the instrument of dispute between the belligerents in irregular warfare, is of a smaller magnitude compared to conventional military applications. However, as the peaceful spaces of society are consumed, the variations of violence increase in irregular environments, such as in civil war conditions. Even if there is linearity between war and violence, violence in irregularities is more viable. While Stathis N. Kalyvas argues that violence should be decoupled from war, he also stresses the principles of the legitimacy of violence in war (Kalyvas, 2006). Nevertheless, there is no clear explanation of the subtle violence in the irregular war. The scale of conventional warfare may magnify the essence of the violence in war, but the blurry atmosphere of the irregular environment makes the violence in armed conflict more viable. Kalyvas also suggests that the hostile fractions in a society, the lack of popular allegiance, and the disjunction between the macro level of war and the micro level of power of violence are the problems of the violence of irregularities (Kalyvas, 2006).

There are some elements in defining armed conflict, according to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. The use of armed force is the primary element, and the minimum number of yearly conflict-related deaths, which is 25, is the secondary element (UCDP Definitions, 2023). The element of party

defines the belligerent actors in the conflict, and it is categorized as the government and the opposition organization. The state is considered as the fourth element of the conflict due to its sovereignty and control over a certain territory. The incompatibility element frames the insufficiency of authority in positions, government and territory.

LIC is a political-military conflict either between the states or between the states and the armed groups below conventional warfare and above routine, peaceful competition among the states (US Army FM 100-20). The devastating consequences of the wars force the state armies to go after LICs instead of fighting a conventional war when upgrading the intensity of the conflict from peaceful competition, or the armies prefer to fight in an unconventional way when confronted with a conventionally stronger enemy. The LIC environment is also the cessation period of peace and war, where the conflict continues in a variety of ways. Methodological varieties are the effects of the ambiguity of the continuum in conflict, which contributes to the irregularities of warfare. More importantly, plurality and the status of the violent actors form the basis of the irregularities.

Eric T. Olson argues that a balanced approach to war should be employed when confronting an insurgency (Olson, 2011: 3-7). Olson suggests blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil actions to achieve success. Even if Olson's perception concentrates on countering only one irregular armed phenomenon, which is insurgency, his study refers to the irregular countering methods for all other VNSAs.

As the most effective conventional military actor and having a variety of affiliates and confrontations with VNSAs in the world, the U.S. Department of Defense defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as: "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will" (US DoD, 2007). It is clearly understood in the definition that the violent (armed) struggle of both the state (authority) and the non-state actor runs for seeking legitimacy over the target population. It raises the question of whether the IW is only people-centric. The suggestion of the U.S. DoD would sound correct, if the concept of the IW was limited only to insurgency.

However, IW does not refer only to insurgency; terrorism and organized crime are also considered in the same context. Terrorism might be enemy-centric with direct means of struggle, but it is also a social phenomenon, similar to organized crime (Gibbs, 1989: 335). In the case of terrorism, it also seeks legitimacy, but organized crimes have no such objective. Putting organized crimes aside, IW mostly focuses on the insurgency and terrorism, and the context of IW encompasses the insurgency, terrorism, and countering measures against both. The scope of the IW could be varied and limited with insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. The IW is considered a conflict between the weak opposition and the strong authority, and an asymmetric methodology of violence is expected between the violent non-state actors and the security organizations of the authority (mostly the states).

IW is also suggested to employ direct and indirect applications with asymmetric military capabilities (Black and Ellis, 2023). From the perspective of violent non-state actors (weak party), direct violent applications aim to weaken and exhaust the operational and administrative supremacy of the authority. The asymmetric methods of the weak are employed with the protracted strategy of violence. On the other hand, the authority forces (strong party) differ in adopting the direct applications. State or authority forces engage their adversary to isolate or defeat them with their dynamic operational capacity. Direct applications from both sides are exhausting and problematic to sustain at the same operational tempo. Moreover, long-lasting concentrated operations have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of violent activities, forcing the parties to employ new strategies of using violence. Irregularities in violent methods also diversify as new strategies are adopted in the conflict. Direct and indirect applications contribute enormously to the irregularity of conflict (Ucko and Marks, 2022). Direct applications are direct violent actions to disrupt the adversary structure, and harm its modus operandi, or isolate the enemy from society. Direct applications are mostly tactical, operational, and short-term, but they are not sufficient to achieve the utmost victory. Therefore, these applications should be supported with strategic approaches, which are indirect applications that have stability characters in it.

Belligerent parties concentrate on the indirect methods when facing criticism of legitimacy in direct violent application. It is the indirect applications where the weak and strong parties meet in operational objectives, and it is the objective of shaping and

influencing the conflict environment. Both parties know that victory cannot be reached only through direct violent engagement, and they need to invest in social dynamics. The nature of society runs on dynamics such as ethnic and tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. Touching social grievances will have a bigger effect than killing huge numbers of adversaries. Building the local partnership by taking social sensibility and divergence into consideration is key to winning the conflict. Therefore, dominating the public space with information supremacy is vital to conflict resolution. A well-organized information operation, either by the authority or by the non-state actor, can drain the swamp rather than wasting efforts to kill all mosquitoes.

IW is a race for legitimacy, and it is driven by the well-organized balance and intensity of the armed program for the VNSAs in order to adopt a decisive struggle (US DoD JOP, 2007). A two-dimension diagram is provided below to envision the context of the situation and project the recommended policies of the security environments sketched in four quadrants. The numbering of the quadrants of the graph is based on the transformation stream of the security environment driven by the direct and indirect applications. Area I is the starting point of the irregularities due to the lack of authority (Black and Ellis, 2023). This is the area of study for the nature of society, threats, geography, and all relevant factors.

Area II is the phase of settlement of the authority with sensitive applications, both direct and indirect (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011). In this area, urgent and swift hard power (military-centric) actions are needed to fill the vacuum of authority by force. In Area II, the basic needs of the people should be met appropriately. However, power centric applications should dominate the environment until the adversary is considerably isolated from the people. Area III is the environment for reasoning about the direct and indirect options (Hurley et al., 2009: 18-32). The indirect methods rise considerably to balance the applications of the direct; in this area, public space is manipulated by dealing with the real causes of the people's grievances. This is the most sensitive area to evolve the security environment into the desired law and order environment. Area IV is where stability is envisioned, and information supremacy is needed the most (Hurley et al., 2009: 36-51). This area is sensitive to the maintenance of stability. Adversaries are always manipulative to undermine the legitimacy of the authority. Precise direct actions should be carried based on intelligence supremacy.




Figure 2.1. Plane of the Security Environment in Irregular Warfare

Asymmetry in conflict is reflected in numbers, weapons, tactics, technology, and logistics, as well as the principles of war in an armed conflict. Inequality among those these instruments force the weak party to adopt the new and sophisticated methods with limited sources. The nature of the conflict is shaped by the weak party's activities of recruiting fighters, improvising weapons, and ammunition, and adopting unconventional tactics of attack (Adaili, 2022). Hence, the nature of the conflict is completed with the countermeasures of the strong party. The influence of asymmetric tactics is seen in guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is the most practical instrument in IW when confronting a strong conventional adversary. The irregular formations of the guerilla units make the IW more irregular. Tactics, when countering guerillas, also require

special formations and sophisticated methods of conventional force. In this aspect, the IW even has the influence of transforming the regular military units into irregular formations. Guerilla warfare is fought on five key elements: the fighting element (guerilla), the underground element, the auxiliary element, the people, and the foreign assistance (Talbot, 1978). The first three elements of the guerilla warfare are the main body of the guerilla structure, and those are also bound to people, which is the fourth element. The survivability of the guerilla depends on the people's support, or at least the people could be used as a mass for the guerilla to embed in. A mutual relationship between the guerilla and the people is developed with a series of restraints. During this period, the auxiliary and underground structures of the guerilla play a crucial role in linking the people with the cause. Foreign assistance to the guerilla completes the missing dynamic of survivability, and it is provided undercover (indirectly) during the development period, then the support is provided openly as the legitimacy of the cause is emplaced enough. The support could be seen politically, economically, militarily, or in a combination of all three.

Irregular warfare occurs in an unstable security environment where the population is centered on the scope of the adversaries. (US DoD JOP, 2011). Although the IW is concerned with politics, the violent character of the struggle differentiates it from politics. The adversaries in IW confront each other with both violent and nonviolent activities. Therefore, it goes far beyond a military aspect in terms of influencing the population and foreign governments. However, the complexity of the IW is not limited to influencing the non-belligerents; sustaining the conflict in balance while coping with the adversary's violence and meeting the social grievances in the people's favor is the main challenge.

2.2 Profiling the Actors

The VNSAs have a variety of profiles, as explained above. However, the concept of the VNSA is narrowed down to insurgent and terrorist groups in this study. I have excluded the concepts of individual militias, gangs, warlord-led organizations, and other marginal criminal groups that typically act with no or less ideological orientation. This is why I have concentrated on the terrorists and insurgents whose adoptability,

survivability, modus operandi, doctrine, and training follow a pattern. Below are the two conceptual discussions of terrorist and insurgent groups.

2.2.1 Terrorist Groups

Terrorism is considered to have an objective and subjective element in its definition in accordance with the United Nations (UN A/HRC/AC/24/CRP.1, 2020). The objective element is called a criminal offense up to a certain extent, as is the use of physical violence against the person. The subjective elements reflect a certain motivation or intention on the part of the perpetrators. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also points out the three categories of motivation: the will to create a state of terror; the will to intimidate a population; and the will to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (UNSC, S/RES/1566, 2004). The subjective element requires terror and fear in the population and a threat against the existing state authority (Walter, 2017). It is clear that all violent actions cause terror and fear in almost every population and also pose a security challenge to the states. However, the problem in defining terrorism lies in the objective elements of the definition. The criminal offense and the physical violence that the groups commit stipulate a methodological categorization and measurement of the use of violence by the motivated non-state violent groups. On the other hand, ideological and operational priorities have an enormous effect on defining terrorism in a dynamic social environment where terrorism is rooted.

The definition of terrorism varies in national interpretation due to political engagements. Therefore, the concept of terrorism currently limits itself to the legal definition, which is differentiated among state actors. For instance, terrorism is defined by US law (US Code, Title 22) as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Terrorism is defined by Turkish law (3713 numbered Anti-Terror Law, 1991) based on the act of methodology, the target (state and public order), and the code of criminal action. In the reactionary realm, the concept of terrorism is defined with a more technical focus, stressing the details of the motivation, the objective of the group, and the methodological practices of the group's action. The US military defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious,

political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political” in accordance with the US Chief of Staff (JP-1, 241).

The definition of terrorism focuses on the typology when considering the objective, and subjective goals of an organization and the priorities of a state actor. According to Schneckener’s typology, terrorists aim to spread panic and fear in societies in order to achieve political goals based on social-revolutionary, nationalistic or religious ideologies (Schneckener, 2017). In typology, it is the ideology of the organization that has the most important gravity in an organization’s definition. The strategic objective of an organization is another sign of its definition. Objectives and ideology support each other, especially when directed by determined leadership. However, the actual outcomes are normally hidden in the program of the organization — the concept, strategy, and methods — which is called the *modus operandi*. Terrorism, in current literature, basically focuses on the following parameters: political purpose, creation of fear, threat of violence, existing in social, informational and physical environment. Terrorists are typically clandestine, violent non-state actors, banding in small groups or acting alone and hiding in plain sight (US National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2018: 17).

It is suggested to make the comparison between insurgency and terrorism on the basis of the character of the organizational program. The program characters are broken down into seven categories objective: strategy, motivation, environment, orientation, subjective mean (subjectivity) and impact (Özçelik, 2017). The suggested program objective is to support the ideology and philosophy of the organization to achieve the utmost desire, while strategy concentrates on the methodological application of the program to confront authority and society. Insurgency and terrorism have similar objectives in general; however, insurgency looks for a partially or completely revolutionary change in the state system.

On the other hand, terrorism forces the authority to make limited changes in certain areas of state policy or support the state's suppression of society to maintain the status quo. The strategy of an organizational program also differs in insurgency and terrorism; insurgency pursues the total collapse of the authority militarily, economically, physiologically, and politically. Hence, terrorism follows a strategy of

terrorizing authorities and people. Motivational character is political and the same both in insurgency and terrorism because of their social nature, but insurgency and terrorism differ in their environments, nonetheless. Insurgency has a territorial boundary, while terrorism has no aspiration of limiting itself to a certain territory. In orientation, insurgency focuses on the people to mobilize a mass population, but terrorism mainly focuses on the enemy. Insurgency concentrates on physical subjectivity (obviousness), while terrorism acts psychologically (covertly) (US Army FMI, 2009; Friedland, Merari, 1985). The impact of the insurgency and terrorism also has a close relationship with all other characters. The impact of insurgency is mostly contained in domestic and regional territory, but terrorism can cause domestic, regional, and global (international) impacts without borders.

2.2.2 Insurgent Groups

Insurgency is described as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02, 2010). The difference between the insurgency and all other non-state armed movements is that the insurgency uses violence to achieve political goals (FMI 3-24.2, 2009). However, I argue that the political goals are not limited only to the insurgent groups as the VNSAs in an irregular warfare environment, but the terror groups also pursue political goals. Although insurgency is described as an internal struggle within a state and not between states (FMI 3-24.2, 2009), the transnationalism of the insurgency makes the insurgent group a broader threat beyond a core state, challenging multiple state-level actors. In this sense, the regional threat level of the insurgency could make the insurgency get close to terrorism due to a common challenge to weaken the power, control, and legitimacy of the multiple governments.

The US Central Intelligence Agency suggests five types of insurgencies: (1) revolutionary insurgencies; (2) reformist insurgencies; (3) separatist insurgencies; (4) resistance insurgencies; and (5) commercialist insurgencies (CIA, 2012). In accordance with the CIA's categorization, revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of economic and social structures. Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies

or undertake political, economic, or social reforms. Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries. Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory. Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth (CIA, 2012). No matter how the insurgency is categorized, most insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic in pursuit of their organizational goals. Even though the insurgency is described as a method of protracted political-military struggle against one or more governments separately or simultaneously, or against an occupying power, the methodology of the implementation of armed violence has similarities with long-standing terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, ISIL, ETA, FARC, and the PKK.

What makes the terrorist groups different from the terrorist organizations is the perception and identification of these groups by the different state actors. The CIA also claims that the common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources, and that this objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations (CIA, 2012). However, when ISIL established territorial control in Iraq and Syria between 2013 and 2016, it was still a terrorist organization despite the territorial and population claims (Hassan and Weiss, 2015; EUAA, 2023). Therefore, territorial and population control by the VNSA have little effect on identifying a VNSA as an insurgent. The CIA also argues that identifying a movement as an insurgency does not convey a normative judgment on its legitimacy because the term insurgency is simply a description of the nature of the conflict and the insurgent group is a violent non-state actor (CIA, 2012). The subjective domain of the state's identification of a VNSA as an insurgent group could be claimed to be the attribution of legitimacy to the VNSAs. Either terrorist or insurgent groups' ability to access potential ideological, human, financial, and environmental resources and their ability to process these resources could be claimed to have methodological similarities in an irregular warfare environment.

The relationship between the state and non-state actors is based on sharing sovereignty; non-state actors pursue more shares of sovereignty while the state acts to keep the status quo. Schneekener categorizes the armed non-state actors into eight

different classifications; out of these eight categories, rebels or guerilla fighters are suggested to be the groups that seek the liberation of a social group or a nation. Rebels or guerilla fighters are also considered the future army of the liberated population. The armed campaign is made as an instrument of social revolution or ethno-nationalistic movement to achieve the political objective. In this aspect Schneekener's suggestion of the rebels or guerilla fighters' definition complies with David Killcullen's definition of insurgency. Killcullen defines insurgency as "a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a state and group of states confronting one or more (internal or external) non-state challengers (Killcullen, 2006). He also adds that "insurgencies are popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-existing social networks (village, tribe, family, and neighborhood, political or religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and physical environment."

Charles V. Gvynn defines the insurgency as "based on the coordination of the civil (popular) and military (guerilla forces), the insurgency is the primacy of the civil power, albeit it is an irregular armed phenomenon. The irregular armed campaign of insurgency should employ the minimum use of force with firm and timely action (Gvynn, 1939).

Klejda Mulaj points out five typological definitions of violent non-state movements, including separatist movements, insurgency guerilla bands, and terrorist groups. (Mulaj, 2010). Although Mulaj suggests that separatist movements differ from insurgency bands, both categories have shared characteristics in terms of political objective and armed program. Both categories seek autonomy or independence from the ruling authority, and the methods of their armed program seek to destroy the authority's power in a protracted way based on asymmetric armed engagement against the state forces. Thus, Mulaj's categories of separatists and the insurgency's guerilla bands are considered as the insurgency in this study. Insurgency basically focuses on the following parameters: popular character of the uprising, non-state challenge, and existence in social, informational, and physical environments.

2.3 Characterizing Actions of the Terror Groups and Insurgent Groups as VNSAs

The irregularity of warfare is not new, the complexity of irregular warfare is due to the combination of its kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities (Hurley et al., 2023). The nature of irregular warfare is getting more complex due to the reluctance of interventionist state actors to engage directly in certain security environments. The plurality of non-state actors in irregular warfare empowers the idea of using proxy elements instead of taking a direct role in the area of conflict. The problem with irregular warfare is mainly hidden by the legitimate use of violence by non-state actors, which are either proxy or self-oriented movements. Two important concepts in irregular warfare are insurgency and terrorism. Irregularity, indeed, is also embedded in these concepts.

Although the insurgency exists in social, informational, and physical environments based on the popular uprising driven by non-state actors, the state of complexity brings new actors into the conflict environment, which is called the “conflict ecosystem” (Kilcullen, 2006). Insurgency itself evolves based on population, adversaries and the environment. However, it is not only population, adversaries and environment that help the insurgency survive or collapse; other factors are also involved with its evolution. The ideological and methodological compatibility of insurgency with the current world order frames the descriptive morality of insurgency. Additionally, the empiric variability of the insurgency with the methods of using violence or employing foreign fighters and agencies of state actors helps the insurgency keep its noble bearings. Supporting or countering the efforts of the state actors in an insurgency attempt could determine whether the insurgency achieves its goal or fails totally. While supporting the efforts of state actors for a certain insurgent group might result in more legitimacy and dominance over others, countering efforts might turn the insurgency group into a terror organization. On the other hand, imbalanced state support for different insurgent groups or imbalanced countering efforts against others are mostly likely to cause the conflict ecosystem to be more destructive. Moreover, imbalances between supporting and countering efforts even cause the conflict ecosystem to be more complex and last longer.

Terrorism, on the other hand, is the illegal use of violence to pursue certain goals. Even if the terrorists are believed to be too weak to attain their goals with armed violence, the psychological impact of terrorism has the potential to evolve into an insurgency. Andrew H. Kyvd and Barbara F. Walter argue that the terrorists have five principal strategic logics in their armed campaign: (1) attrition, (2) intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding (Kyvd and Walter, 2006). In all of those strategies, there is a tendency to lean on violence. The potential for terrorism to evolve into an insurgency is hidden in the perception of violence by the people. Understanding the nature of these strategies will be helpful to understand the nature of the conflict and even provide policies for countering efforts.



Table 2.1: Conceptual Comparison of Terrorism and Insurgency

Conceptualizing the Organization Characters							
	Objective	Strategy	Motivation	Environment	Orientation	Subjective Mean	Impact
	Revolution or Change	Subversion or Terror	Political or Economic	Territorial or Non- territorial	Mass population or Enemy-centric	Physical or Psychological	Domestic, Regional or International
Terrorism	Change	Terror	Political	Non-territorial	Enemy-centric	Psychological and Physical	Domestic, Regional and International
Insurgency	Revolutionary	Subversion	Political	Territorial	Mass population	Physical	Domestic and Regional

The literature on terrorism and insurgency suggests that these two non-state methods of political movement are framed on the basis of the character of the organizational program. Organizational programs are suggested to be characterized by seven domains: objective, strategy, motivation, environment, orientation, subjective mean (subjectivity), and impact (Özçelik, 2017). Insurgency and terrorism have similar objectives in general; however, insurgency looks for a partially or completely revolutionary change in the state system. On the other hand, terrorism forces the authority to make limited changes in certain areas of state policy or support the state's suppression of society to maintain the status quo. The strategy of an organizational program also differs in insurgency and terrorism; insurgency pursues the total collapse of the authority militarily, economically, physiologically, and politically. Hence, terrorism follows a strategy of terrorizing authorities and people. Motivational character is political and the same both in insurgency and terrorism because of their social nature, but insurgency and terrorism differ in their environments, nonetheless. Insurgency has a territorial boundary, while terrorism has no aspiration of limiting itself to a certain territory. In orientation, insurgency focuses on the people to mobilize a mass population, but terrorism mainly focuses on the enemy. Insurgency concentrates on physical subjectivity (obviousness), while terrorism acts psychologically (covertly). The impact of the insurgency and terrorism also has a close relationship with all other characters. The impact of insurgency is mostly contained in domestic and regional territory, but terrorism can cause domestic, regional, and global (international) impacts without borders. David Kilcullen calls the identification of a VNSA as a terrorist or insurgent group due to their use of terrorism to generate a political effect for highlighting the organizational issues in the target society during an interview (International Review of the Red Cross, 2011: 590). He also continues with his arguments that most terrorists don't like to be described as terrorists, but most insurgents use terrorism while trying to avoid the opprobrium of being labelled as terrorists (International Review of the Red Cross, 2011: 591). This dilemma also explains why terrorist and insurgent groups were taken as VNSAs in the irregular warfare context.

Insurgency, in this sense, could be described as the popular-centric, politically motivated, revolutionary, subversive, and physical use of organized violence in certain territories that has a domestic impact. Terrorism could be described as a politically

motivated unlawful use of physical and psychological organized violence with no territorial boundaries that has a domestic, regional, and global impact to instill fear and coerce governments and societies into forcing change. However, these suggestions do not make a clear distinction between insurgency and terrorism.

2.4 State-VNSA Relations

The states' relations with VNSAs may be divided into two categories: convergence and divergence. The convergence points at the cooperation and the divergence are suggested with the confrontation between the state actors and VNSAs. Ulrich Schneckener points out the grey areas in between the three characteristics of armed non-state actors, and he also suggests the possibility of the involvement of state officials in the non-state actors' activities (Schneckener, 2017). These grey zones, or gaps between the characteristics, originate the disputes about how the states approach VNSAs.

The states' relationship with the convergence realm is observed in the way they hire VNSAs as proxies and associate with VNSAs as local or regional partners in a geopolitical security environment. States hire VNSAs as proxies or associate with them as partners in order to confront belligerent, rival, or adversary state actors or to fight against the other designated VNSAs so that they can evade the military and political costs of the war. The states' converging relations with VNSAs are based on the existing, potential or hoped-for military effectiveness of VNSAs that states could utilize in a conflict environment. The converging engagement requires state actors to invest militarily and politically in VNSAs. The military investment is seen as being through a military assistance program. This assistance program could be made overtly or covertly in accordance with VNSAs' character with regard to their legitimacy. States are observed to follow a pattern of train-equip-let it fight alone when they hire VNSAs as proxies. When states associate with the VNSAs partners, their assistance program follows the train-equip-fight together pattern. The methodological difference in handling the military assistance program for the proxy VNSAs and the partner VNSAs is suggested for two reasons. The first reason is the military capacity of VNSAs. The higher the military capacity of VNSAs, the more involvement of state actors' operatives in the conflict dynamics is limited. States actors prefer self-motivated, self-organized,

self-operated VNSAs to hire as proxies. Yet, state actors aim to develop the military capacity of the proxy VNSAs. In this sense, the proxy actors already have military effectiveness at a certain level. When it comes to the partner VNSAs, the states are keener on operating together with the VNSAs because of the inability of their self-motivation, self-organization, and self-operation in military aspects. The partner VNSAs are observed to be more vulnerable to survival without the actual military association of the state actors in the conflict environment. Therefore, states prefer to operate together with their partner VNSAs through a train-equip-fight together strategy (Özçelik, 2018). The second reason is the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the VNSAs. States prefer to work with the partner VNSAs more visually. This is because of the legitimate claims of the VNSAs (Taylor and Stein, 2016). In contrast to terrorist groups, insurgent groups are recognized as operating for a legitimate cause. When a state operative is seen together with the VNSAs with a recognized legitimate cause, it also helps the state actors justify the military presence in foreign territory. The reluctance of the state actors to operate together with the proxy VNSAs is suggested by the illegitimate character of the VNSA. In this sense, it is suggested that the states have more covert and clandestine relations with the proxy VNSAs. Muhittin Ataman suggests that the instruments of national groups play an important role in Middle Eastern politics (Ataman, 2003). Ataman also claims that the United States, Israel, Western European, and Middle Eastern countries have been using ethnic Kurdish organizations against the central governments in which the Kurds live and constitute a certain percentage of the population.

The divergence between state actors and VNSAs is because of the challenging stance of VNSAs. The VNSAs in divergence relations are characterized as challengers to state function and structure. VNSAs are also considered threats to domestic, regional and international security. In this sense, the divergence relation is shaped through the confrontation between domestic, regional and international state actors and the challenging VNSAs. The confronting or countering engagement of the states may vary with regard to their proximity to the VNSAs' area of activity (Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011). In this sense, VNSAs initiate their challenging activities first against the local/domestic state authority within the political and territorial domain of the target country. The challenge may have revolutionary objectives of governmental

change or systemic change, or irridentist objectives of autonomous control or total secessionism. The primary challenge of the VNSAs is directed against the domestic government's sovereignty in the form of either terrorism or insurgency. In this sense, it is the domestic state's role to shape the environmental conditions for VNSAs.

Robert I. Rotberg (2003) postulates that, in terms of their functions, states can be classified as weak, failed, or collapsed. This classification helps us understand the motivation of VNSAs. According to Rotberg, "weak states" are states that are inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints. Weak states also harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic and other intercommunal tensions that become partially or thoroughly overtly violent. *Failed states* are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly divided by warring factions. The state faces two or more insurgencies and varieties of civil unrest and communal discontent. *Collapsed states* are considered the rare and extreme version of failed states where security is equated with the rule of the strong in the absence of state authority. These three categories are also attributed as the pulling factors for VNSAs to emerge in the domestic country. However, the risk with VNSAs may not be limited to the country of origin; it may have spillover effects on regional and even international geopolitics if VNSAs have a transnational aspiration (Martinez, 2016). In this sense, the confrontational is shaped by the challenging initiatives of VNSAs and the countering measures of domestic, regional, and international state actors. The domestic states' countering measures could be characterized as reactive until the initiative is gained from the challenging VNSA, or the counter measures may not prevail against the challenging VNSA, the situation is protracted in the way of the status quo of the irregular warfare, or it may end up with a state defeat. The countermeasures of regional or international state actors are observed in the form of intervening or preventive engagements. These state-level actors consider VNSAs a collective threat and aim to encompass VNSA threats in their country of origin. Then, if the domestic country is in harmony with the regional and international geopolitical order, these intervening actors may aim to develop the security capacity of the host state through foreign security assistance programs (Clark and Hindin, 2019). If there is an ongoing competition or discrepancy between the country of origin of VNSAs and the regional and international state actors,

then these actors may not attempt to defeat the challenging VNSA completely in order to utilize them as leverage in state-to-state competition and rivalry.

2.5 VNSAs and Self-Dynamics

VNSAs operate on the elements of objective, strategy, environment, and orientation. The objective is the main domain of the ideology, and the identity of the organization is shaped by the ultimate objective. The objective might be a popular revolution or a systemic or administrative change with existing domestic authority. The strategy concentrates on the methodological application of the program to confront their adversary and influence all relevant actors. VNSAs follow a *modus operandi* concentrating on physical and psychological effects. Environment is the parameter where VNSA typologies are authenticated. The environment is related to physical and social spaces within VNSAs territorial boundary (Ackerman, 2016). The impact of insurgency is mostly contained in domestic and regional territory, yet terrorism may have territorial boundaries and might also be observed on a global scale. When considering a VNSA's orientation on objective, strategy, and environment, a VNSA may have the idea of framing its own typology to manage its relationship with the target audience and projected environments. Özgür Özdamar argues that the determinants of political actions or violent policies by terrorist organizations are organizational rather than political or ideological due to the need to be self-sustaining and survive (Özdamar, 2008). VNSAs also need to optimize their strategy with their organizational identity and organizational structure. Therefore, they need a strong mechanism for more self-evaluation.

Ideologies drive the nature of conflicts. Therefore, it is hard to theorize warfare. Apart from conventional warfare, in which nation-states or alliances confront each other, the problem lies in the scope of irregular warfare. Terrorism and the insurgency play frontier roles in irregular warfare. There is, however, a disputed thin line in separating one from the other. Since ideologies are quite dominant in irregular warfare, terrorism and insurgency are both political. The treatment of both terrorism and insurgency by external actors is also political, and terrorism and insurgency turn into proxies that are used by the major ideologies or interests. VNSAs have serious problem grounding an organizational identity in this sense. The legitimacy of the use of violence

is another factor that distinguishes insurgency from terrorism. Violence is used by terrorists and insurgents to coerce the current authority to force change or to gain partial or full control of the government or country (Waldron, 2004; Clark, 2015). The justification of the violence is proved by the legitimacy of the cause. Although there is a correlation between the cause (ideological) and the use of violence (methodological), it is hard to suggest that all ideologies have the right to pursue goals with the use of violence. Legitimate use of violence has different parameters other than ideology; strategies and tactics of the violence are key elements to evaluate the implementation of the violence.

Ideology and the legitimate use of violence are two pillars of identifying armed groups as terrorists or insurgents. Local people's support for a non-state actor was also taken into consideration as a parameter to categorize the group based on legitimacy (Ünver, 2017). State actors are quite insistent on recognizing whether an organization is a terrorist organization or not. That is based on the fact that the group has solid connections with a terrorist group that was already identified. However, the major problem with this fact is how convincing the concrete proofs are. Another parameter is the method of use of violence, and this primarily focuses on the use of chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) activities and other means of mass destruction in the armed program of the group. Mass cleansing methods against the opposite groups, like forcible relocations, mass killings, and coercion, were also taken as another parameter for identifying the organization. The group's threat to regional and global security is the final parameter that is suggested. The governance policy of the political authority within the VNSA's organizational body towards the created shadow economy is believed to help legitimize the use of violence due to its impact on the target social sphere as a result of the social inclusion activities that meet the fundamental needs of the local population (Idler and Forest, 2015).

VNSAs aim to link a rational relation between the potential resources of ideological, human, financial, and environmental resources on the axis of pursuit of legitimacy and claimed identity. The functional element of the VNSA is structured and organized in accordance with its ability to affiliate with potential resources. The measurement of the military effectiveness of the VNSA is also a self-evaluation of accessing and processing potential resources in favor of organizational objectives. The

roles and functions of the leadership, armed cadres, underground structure, auxiliary members, and passive supporters are needed to be tested through a valid and reliable measurement scale.

2.6 VNSA-VNSA Relations

VNSAs are also observed to interact with each other in irregular conflict environments in the form of competition or solidarity. The factors that construct their competition or solidarity are based on multiple factors, such as their stance towards the local state authority, their similarity or difference in ideological orientation, and their shared or conflicting objectives during the emerging conjectural developments.

VNSAs can be categorized into two groups: para-state VNSAs and anti-state VNSAs. The neutrality of VNSAs is observed in a third VNSA's approach towards a conflict between two VNSAs, but the neutrality of VNSAs towards the state authority is barely observed (Idler, Forest, 2015). The ideological similarity or difference is another factor that might group multiple VNSAs on two or more fronts. As the number of VNSAs on the fronts increases, the polarization will lead to an intensification of the irregular conflict, as happened in Libya and Syria after 2011. The state is likely to face a risk of collapse even if the para-state VNSAs are attributed with a role of support for the state's survival. The *Hashd al-Shabi* Groups (People's Mobilization Forces) in Iraq after 2014 are a perfect example of how the para-state VNSAs consider themselves a substitute for the state authority (Mansour, 2018). When inter-VNSA conflict or competition increases, it is observed that the conflict environment is out of the state's control; state authority is either unable or reluctant to intervene. The inter-VNSA conflicts are observed to maximize their social, economic, and territorial gains.

The solidarity among VNSAs could be identified as a nexus between the groups. The nature of the nexus between VNSAs is observed in the form of alliance, motivation, and convergence. Small groups aim to sustain their survivability by utilizing the capabilities of the bigger groups during times of change due to geopolitical dynamics, and societal and economic transitions (Idler and Forest, 2015). One of the most important pulling factors for small groups to merge around bigger groups is the military effectiveness of the bigger group. The solidarity among the groups in Idlib province, Syria, during the Syrian Civil War after 2013 is an example of how the

different armed groups cooperated against a common threat (Galia and Schweitzer, 2020).

The early stage of the nexus is characterized by convergence factor of the nexus based on the cooperation of the separate activities. The ideological or operational motivation is also a factor in the nexus between the groups. It is not necessarily to lead to the utmost unification of the groups, but the shared motivation may lead to joint activities. Within the scope of the alliance relations in nexus, VNSAs pursue corporate activities such as joint military operations, joint procurement activities, information sharing, and illicit economic activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and smuggling. The nexus between the groups is based on the pragmatic approach of the groups; organizational identity is always tried to preserve by the VNSAs (Idler and Forest, 2015).

The military effectiveness of a VNSA matters for multiple actors in a dynamic, complex political-military environment, which is the combination of the international world order and the inter-VNSAs irregular order. Despite the international order being defined as a patterned or structured relationship between actors at the international level (Lascurettes and Poznansky, 2021), states and VNSAs tend to develop unilateral or mutual political and military relations. The unilaterality in the relations could be suggested as the aggression in the challenging character of the VNSA action and the responsive character of the state action. Both define themselves as adversaries. The mutuality in the relations is suggested as the convergence of a volunteer affiliation between the state and the VNSA for shared objectives. The aggressive relationship between the state and the VNSA may have the potential to strengthen the international order if the challenge of the VNSA is perceived as a common threat, which can drive the collective reaction of the state actors (U.S. Department of State, 2023). However, the converging nature of the mutual relations between the states in the VNSAs has the potential to problematize the structure of the international order and the pattern and level of the relations between the state actors. Based on the converging mutual relations, it could be claimed that the VNSAs are hidden and semi-functional in the international world order in the realm of political-military relations. In the case that the VNSA is considered an adversary, the military effectiveness of the VNSA is needed to be determined on a valid and reliable scale in order to develop a counterstrategy (Oz,

2010).The state actors also need to determine the level of military effectiveness of the VNSA through a valid and reliable scale in order to balance their support with the potential or existing military effectiveness of the VNSA when they pursue the VNSA as a potential proxy, partner, or ally in a conflict environment.

States and VNSAs need to measure the military effectiveness of a VNSA for different reasons. The measurement of the military effectiveness of a VNSA plays a significant role in helping the states counter VNSAs, challenge them, or develop them, or end them. For VNSAs, the measurement of the military effectiveness of a VNSA is sine qua non for the self-evaluation, or to ground the level of the VNSA-VNSA nexus in the irregular order of VNSAs. Managing the relationship with VNSA based on the military effectiveness of a state or other VNSA, or self-management of the military effectiveness of the VNSA, could be made a valid and reliable measurement. The measurement of the military effectiveness of the VNSAs is a perfect example of the anonymous saying, “What gets measured gets managed”, even if this saying is attributed to Peter Drucker.

CHAPTER 3: MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS: A CONTEXTUAL DISCUSSION

The classical concept of military effectiveness, which is attributed to the state's military, has the potential to retrieve to adapt to the VNSAs, which are the primary actors in the irregular warfare context (Wright, 2007). Alan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Risa A. Brooks discuss the concept of military effectiveness in a conventional context that is designed by state actors (Millett and Murray, 1988). Both Millett and Murray's, and Brook's suggestions of military effectiveness address the military effectiveness of the state's military, which already exists. So, their suggestions are based on the functional ability of the already existing state institutions in relation to the existing resources, the constructed functions, and the desired quality of the existing military power. Their suggestions could be summarized as capacity developments of the state institutions for achieving a better military that is conceptually integrated for joint operations, contextually responsive through combat readiness, and equipped with skills in personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics management. However, they have no suggestion of creating a top-down military structure which would benefit many non-state actors who are in pursuit of a political objective through the use of armed activities.

I suggest that developing the military effectiveness of VNSAs is a top-down process that follows the creation of organizational bodies parallel to the conversion of potential organizational resources into fighting power, as in Millett and Murray's military effectiveness process for the state military (Millett and Murray, 1988). In this sense, I have a pattern of discussing the military effectiveness of the VNSAs on three grounds. First, I argue that the VNSAs have a relationship with the potential resources of ideological, social, financial, and geographical environments. Second, I assert that VNSAs have the ability to access these resources and exploit them for their intended organizational activities. I argue that VNSAs have the ability to exploit these resources by (1) converting the ideological resources into the construction of the organizational identity; (2) converting the human resources into the organization's manpower; (3) converting the financial resources into the funding of the organizational activities; and (4) converting the physical environment into the organization's area of activities. Third,

I argue that the fighting power achieved by the VNSAs can be analyzed through its success at practical patterns at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Neither Millet and Murray, nor Brooks discuss the fact that military effectiveness is measurable. They have pointed out that military effectiveness is not an inventory work to bring up the number of troops and equipment (Millet and Murray, 1988; Brooks, 2007). Despite my agreement with them that military effectiveness is not an inventory work, the function of the VNSAs could be sensed through the views and feedback of the experts who are practically working with or against the VNSAs and academically and socially studying the nature of the VNSAs and their conflict environment. I argue that a collection of expert views can lead a measurement of the military effectiveness of VNSAs, and that the wider the range of the experts to whom their views apply, the more precise the measurement of the military effectiveness could be claimed. The military effectiveness of a VNSA could be measured if its armed program follows a sensible pattern pursuing a political objective driven by ideological motivation, as explained in Chapter 2. The nature of the irregular warfare and the profile of the terrorist and insurgent groups as the VNSAs frame the contextual outlook for developing a scale model to measure the military effectiveness of the VNSAs. The social, political, economic, and geographic spaces in which the VNSAs operate specify the contextual design for a better measurement of the military effectiveness of the VNSA. This chapter suggests a scale for measuring the military effectiveness of a terrorist or insurgent group through the conceptual domains of military effectiveness and the contextual characteristics of the irregular warfare environment.

3.1 Conceptual and Contextual Discussion of the Military Effectiveness for Conventional Military

Military effectiveness is defined as a process in which a military converts its available national resources into fighting power (Millet, 1988). This definition limits itself to the effectiveness of the conventional (regular) military of a state and has no interest in other armed actors' military effectiveness. Risa A. Brooks and her friends define military effectiveness as the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital (Brooks, 2007: 9-10). As she defines military effectiveness, she stresses a state's army rather than a non-

state armed actor. Brooks and her friends argue that the level of effectiveness of a state's military varies with the degree to which it is organized to make good use of its material and human resources. Their arguments suggest a chain of military effectiveness that consists of (1) independent variables, (2) military activities and (3) military effectiveness (Brooks, 2007: 9). Brook's chain of military effectiveness has the same pattern of the military process with different names that I have retrieved from Millet and Murray's arguments (Millet and Murray, 1988). Brook explains the relation between the independent variables, military activities, and military effectiveness (Brooks, 2007: 9). She groups the contextual factors for designing the national resources as culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-military relations, interstate competition, global norms, and international organizations under the name of independent variables while grouping the strategic assessment processes, procurement, strategic command and control, intelligence and internal monitoring, officer selection, promotion, and rotation, tactical command and control, and training and education under the name of military activities, which overwhelmingly refer to Millet's and Murray's category of conversion process. Brook's last category is military effectiveness, which comprises integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality which she points to as the combat readiness. The military effectiveness of the VNSAs is a matter of context in irregular warfare. The nature of irregular warfare dictates that the VNSAs process their available organizational resources to convert them into fighting power. Even if VNSAs may not represent a national aspect, they have their own available resources within the organizational sphere of influence. So, the subject matter of the military effectiveness of a non-state armed actor is not necessarily the national resources when considering VNSAs; it is the organizational resources that need to be converted into fighting power.

In this sense, the scope of the definition could be expanded to cover the military effectiveness of VNSAs taking their organizational resources into consideration. Therefore, the military effectiveness of a non-state armed actor could also be defined as a process in which the organization (a violent non-state actor that follows an armed program) converts its available organizational resources into fighting power. The focal point for defining military effectiveness is a process rather than a product (Wright, 2007). The process could be described as the interaction between the multitude of variables in military effectiveness. In this sense, defining the variables and

understanding the interaction between them may lead to assessing the military's effectiveness. Yet, the assessment requires a multiple domain scale. This study aims to develop a scale to measure the military effectiveness of non-state actors by defining the variables, explaining the interactions, determining the indicators, and grading the indicators.

James W. Wright argues that the process of converting the resources into fighting power is a dynamic relationship between the strategic resources, conversion capability, and fighting power (Wright, 2007). The correlation between strategic space, fighting power, and the capability of a VNSA presents a military effectiveness that goes far beyond the inventory assessment. The military effectiveness of a non-state actor is interpreted as a cause-and-effect relationship that is developing around the organization's ability to materialize its resources into combat power in compliance with the armed program. In this sense, the military effectiveness is not just combat effectiveness alone, the ability to utilize the limited resources within the complicated strategic security environments is vital for the non-state actor to achieve its designated objectives of the armed program.



Figure 3.1 Military Effectiveness Process

In this study, the military effectiveness of a non-state actor is analyzed in three sets of assessments: (1) organizational resources; (2) the ability to convert the resources; and (3) fighting power, which reflects the capability and performance of a VNSA's warfighting.

3.2 Analyzing the Organizational Capabilities and Developing a Scale Model to Measure the Military Effectiveness of VNSA

The analysis of the VNSAs' organizational capability and the development of the scale will be made on three bases: the analysis of the resources, the analysis of the

ability of conversion, and the analysis of the fighting power as an indicator of the VNSAs' military effectiveness.

3.2.1 Resources

Paul Staniland suggests that the insurgent groups (taken as the VNSA in this study, which also have similarities in characters with terrorist groups) embed in the social bases with preexisting relations and ties with the local communities (Staniland, 2012: 152). The horizontal social ties without a hierarchy between the VNSA and the local communities can lead the VNSA to analyze the potential pool of ideological, human, financial, and environmental resources (Staniland, 2012: 153-155). This suggestion frames gives a framework for the resources that the VNSAs can access and exploit for the purpose of their organizational activities.

Resources are grouped into four categories in this study: (1) ideological resources; (2) human resources; (3) financial resources; and (4) environmental resources. Each and every category is aimed at evaluating the accessibility level of VNSAs based on determined parameters. The evaluation will be based on the reactions of the respondents to the survey chart. In the evaluation of the resources, the accessibility level of VNSAs to the potential resources is attempted to be determined in accordance with the Likert Agreement Scale. Because the data required for the scale is based on expert views, the Likert Agreement Scale is suggested to match the evaluation of the view because it is commonly used to measure attitudes, knowledge, perceptions, values, and behavioral changes (Vagias, 2006). The ability level of a VNSA to access potential human resources is aimed at being determined at the indicator levels of "Not Able", "Weak", "Medium" and "High".¹

The level of "Not Able" is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is not able to access the potential resources at all. A complete incompatibility between the potential resources and the VNSAs character is suggested to play a role in the denial of access to the potential resources by VNSAs.

The level of "Weak" is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is poorly able to access the potential resources at all. Even if the incompatibility between the potential

¹ For further examples of the Likert Agreement Scale, visit https://mwcc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Likert-Scale-Response-Options_MWCC.pdf

resources and the VNSAs' character dominates the relationship between them, poor connections between the potential resources and the VNSAs' character are suggested to play a role in allowing the VNSAs to access to the potential resources. In this indicator, facilitating factors for developing a mutual connection are suggested to be too limited.

The level of "Medium" is presumed to indicate that VNSAs are mildly able to access the potential resources at all. A rational balance between convergence and incompatibility between the potential resources and VNSAs' character is suggested to be achieved. A rational interconnectivity with a variety of facilitating factors is presumed to have been established between the potential resources and the VNSAs' character. Therefore, interconnectivity and mutuality between the potential resources and the VNSAs' character is suggested to be optimized in order to get close to developing a functioning mechanism.

The level of "High" is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is highly able to access the potential resources. In this level of indicator, it is presumed that a compatibility between the potential resources and the VNSAs' character is already beyond the fair relation, and a functioning mechanism in between is presumed to be achieved.

3.3.1.1 Ideological Resources

Ideology could be suggested as the pathway to justify the organized violence of VNSAs. In terms of defining their military effectiveness, ideology is an insourcing tool to achieve an effective armed program. This argument applies only to terrorist organizations and insurgent movements that seek political, ethnic, or religious objectives. Robert Gurr points to individuals' connection with the grievances as the individual motivation to join the terror groups (Gurr, 1970). Gurr's suggestion falls into three categories of interpretation of the grievances: (1) sociopolitical grievances; (2) discontent over the relevant grievances; and (3) implementation of violence to eliminate the relevant grievances.

It is suggested that a broader approach to the interpretation of the individual's participation in the VNSAs' bodies should phase in the evolution of their personal sense of discontent with the use of violence. In this sense, interpreted from Borum's suggestion of resource mobilization through the New Social Movement Theory (Borum,

2011), it suggests that four stages of personal discontent for the use of violence may include (1) the existence of social, political, and economic problems; (2) the social inability to overcome the relevant problems; (3) connection with the ideology; and (4) the implementation of the violence. This suggestion points out how ideological resources play an important role in shaping the violent program of a VNSA. Vasilenko categorizes terrorist organizations into five group types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, (4) religious, and (5) criminal (Vasilenko, 2005). Ideology plays an important role in his identification of the typology of terrorist groups. Ideological motivations are grouped in the ethnic, religious, and socio-economic realms in his study.

Ranya Ahmed suggests that the legacy of similar ideological movements might mitigate the ideological motivation of the terrorist group (Ahmad, 2020). VNSAs prefer to play an instrumental role in transforming individual grievances into a collective cause by introducing the organizational approach toward similar grievances to the individual's cognitive domain in order to achieve an analogy between the individual and the organization. After shaping the individual's cognitive behavior in accordance with the organizational VNSAs program, the individual can become an element of any functional mechanism of the organization. In this respect, ideological causation is hidden among grievances in ethnic, religious, socio-economic and political realms which also define the ideological resources of VNSAs. Ideological resources are tried to be determined with five factors. The first four factors describe the grievance frame, and the fifth category stresses the role of similar ideological practices in the past as an inheritable source.

Table 3.1 Evaluation Chart for Ideological Resources

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Ideological Resources	Level of Accessibility			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's accessibility level to ethnic grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to religious grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to socio-economic grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to political grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				

VNSA's accessibility level to the ideological legacy of the armed movements in history as an ideological resource,				
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I argue that the ideological resources of a VNSA are shaped by ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievance, and the VNSAs have a different level of ability to access these realms of grievances. I suggest that the ability level of the VNSAs for accessing these realms of grievances may range from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to access ideological resources affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.1.2 Human Resources

The human resources of VNSAs are mainly shaped by the ideological orientation of the individuals. The personal motivation for joining terrorist organizations is suggested in three categories by Randy Borum (2004). Borum suggests that the motivation to join the organization is related to (1) injustice, (2) identity, and (3) belonging. Injustice is considered a pushing factor; identity and belonging could be considered pulling factors to join the organization for individuals who have a sense of discrimination. Martha Crenshaw discusses similar arguments with broader aspects of the motivation for individuals to join the organizational body (Crenshaw, 1985). Crenshaw's arguments include (1) opportunity for action under a collective pattern; (2) sense of belonging to an organization; (3) pursuit of social status; and (4) expectation of financial earning.

Ethnic, religious, and socio-economic identities define the potential groups that can provide the future operators for the VNSAs. On the other hand, the social influence of the VNSA over the diaspora and common hatred against the designated adversary may develop sympathy among ideologically irrelevant and foreign individuals for VNSAs. Moreover, pragmatists who look for organizational protection may also develop a nexus with VNSAs. Within the framework of identity seekers, foreign sympathizers, and pragmatists, VNSAs put enormous effort into exploiting the groups of youth and students, the oppressed, the unemployed, the haters, the diaspora, foreign sympathizers and pragmatists as human resources for their recruitment process. Karaaslan suggests that all the terror groups around the world aim to benefit from the

dynamic power of the youth (Karaaslan, 1998: 46). This suggestion is indeed not limited to the terror groups alone; it also applies to all VNSAs who follow an armed program.

Table 3.2 Evaluation Chart for Human Resources

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Human Resources	Level of Accessibility			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's accessibility level to youth and students as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the unemployed as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the ethnic diaspora as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the religious diaspora as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to foreign sympathizers as a human resource,				

I argue that the human resources of a VNSA are shaped by the youth and students, the unemployed, ethnic diaspora, religious diaspora foreigners and political grievances, and that the VNSAs have a different level of ability to access these realms of human resources. I suggest that the ability level of the VNSAs for accessing these realms of human resources may range from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to access human resources affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.1.3 Financial Resources

VNSAs try to stand at a vague point in between legality and illegality in terms of their activities. In this sense, their financial behaviors also follow the same pattern of abusing a variety of sources. It could be suggested that the financial resources of VNSAs can be grouped into two categories: legal and illegal sources. VNSAs are pragmatic actors, and they pursue any available financial resource for the organization's survival and the fund for its activities. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) points out that any crime that results in a profit can be used to finance terrorism (Interpol, 2022). The sources of terrorist funding include low-level fraud, kidnapping for ransom, the misuse of non-profit organizations, the illicit trade in commodities (such as oil, charcoal, diamonds, gold, and the narcotic “captagon”), and digital currencies.

In regard to the legal resources, VNSAs have few physical opportunities to collect the funds. Legal organizations such as associations, commercial businesses, and political and cultural entities that have sympathy for the cause of VNSA make donations. They can also recruit the individuals designated by VNSAs so that the individuals can donate a significant portion of their salary to the VNSA. VNSAs mostly rely on illegitimate sources such as forceful taxation and criminal activities like drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, fraud, and robbery. Therefore, the funds for the operational needs of the VNSAs may be characterized by impartial technical oversight through politicized or corrupt processes, unlike what Risa Brooks claims (Brooks, 2007: 20).

Table 3.3 Evaluation Chart for Financial Resources

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Financial Resources	Level of Accessibility			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's accessibility level to individual donations as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the forceful taxation of individuals and private corporations as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to criminal activities as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to non-profit organizations as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to foreign aid as a financial resource,				

I argue that the financial resources of a VNSA are shaped by individual donations, forceful taxation, criminal activities, income from the NGOs, and foreign aid, and that the VNSAs have a different level of ability to access these realms of income. I suggest that the ability level of the VNSAs for accessing these realms of income may range from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to access financial resources affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.1.4 Environmental Sources

Environmental resources point to the characteristics of the physical environment in which the armed program of VNSAs will be carried out. In this sense, the

architectural structure of the urban centers and the topographic characteristics of the terrain determine the basics of the armed program of VNSA. The distinction between urban and rural environments is a matter of interest to develop an optimum armed program for the decision-makers of VNSAs in order to improve the operability and survivability of their practitioners (O’Conner, 2014). Fidel Castro advocates a rural strategy to optimize the armed program with the physical environment. Castro states that “city is the grave of the guerrilla” (de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012: 581).

The methodological implementation of armed violence is determined by the effects of the environment. Tactical and operational elements are also organized accordingly. Weapons to be used in the armed program are also designated by the environmental conditions. An urban strategy runs on armed abilities in the conflict dimensions at the rooftops, streets, and underground, while the rural strategy relies on the high mountains, deep valleys, and green cover of terrain.

The preference for the armed strategy by VNSAs includes not only target selection but also other considerations like survival. Stephen Nemeth and his friends point out that proximity to officials and institutions, capital, a large population, high population density, and poor economic conditions have been linked to increasing the likelihood of domestic terrorism at the grid cell level when terrorists seek targets and survival (Nemeth et al., 2014). Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman argue in a report that they prepared for the U.S. Army that it is the restraining and mitigating characteristics of urban and rural areas with logistics and security to dictate the preference of the armed program (Taw and Hoffman, 1995).

Density, the characteristics of the buildings and communities in the urban centers, and the harsh traverse in the mountains are the desired characteristics to deny access to the adversary forces. On the other hand, the areas of armed activities are required to allow the transition with other areas of activities so that a collective VNSA effect could be achieved. Demographic density and the human perception of VNSAs’ activities in the designated urban and rural areas are also important factors (Talbot, 1978). Non-state actors start their armed program either in urban or rural areas at the initial phase. Then a combination of both could be adopted as the organizational growth reaches the optimum level to defeat the adversary. Non-state actors conduct area studies

to make a rational choice of urban or rural strategy before starting their armed program. Therefore, environmental sources are vital for strategy development.

Table 3.4 Evaluation Chart for Environmental Resources

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Environmental Resources	Level of Accessibility			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's accessibility level to the rural environment as an environmental resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the urban environment as an environmental resource,				

I argue that the environmental resources of a VNSA are shaped by rural and urban resources and that the VNSAs have a different level of ability to access these realms of environmental resources. I suggest that the ability level of the VNSAs for accessing these environmental resources range from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to access environmental resources affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.2 Conversion

Conversion is based on the organization's ability to process the resources available. Conversion ability is also grouped into four categories: (1) development of organizational discourse in the ideological realm; (2) methodological ability of recruitment; (3) management of financial resources; and (4) interpretation of environmental resources (Borum, 2011; Guadagno et al., 2010; Interpol, 2023; Talbott, 1978). Each and every category is aimed at evaluating the ability to access and process organizational resources. Evaluation is intended to be made based on the parameters determined on the evaluation chart. In the evaluation of conversion ability, the quality of the ability to process the resources will be determined in accordance with the Likert scale.

The ability level of a VNSA to convert potential resources is aimed at determining the indicator levels of “Not Able”, “Weak”, “Medium” and “High”. The level of “Not Able” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is not able to convert the potential resources into fighting power. A complete incompatibility in processing the relevant potential resources is suggested at this level. The level of “Weak” is presumed

to indicate that the VNSA is poorly able to process the relevant potential resources. The level of “Medium” is presumed to indicate that the VNSAs are mildly able to process the relevant potential resources at all. The level of “High” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is highly able to process the potential resources.

3.3.2.1 Converting the Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

An epistemological description of ideology is suggested by Josué Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, José Luis Usó Doménech, and Hugh Gash as (1) a system of ideas that an individual or a social group holds over time to which they are committed, (2) an organizing world view that obscures aspects of experience, and (3) a phenomenon that diminishes the importance of individuals (Selva, Doménech and Gash, 2017). Ideology for the terror and insurgent groups as the VNSAs mirrors their identity. The motivation behind the ideology can be framed through political, religious, or other objectives (McCoy, Jones and Hastings, 2019). However, among a variety of the typologies of ideology, it is suggested that VNSA’s ideological preference has a better coherence with protostatic ideology, which is one of the ideology categories developed by George Walford (1979). Walford describes the function of protostatic ideology as to provide a stable social group offering protection against other groups, and he also stresses that identifying with the group and the individuals is important for survival, so thinking is necessarily very conservative and dominated by social cohesion (Walford, 1979). Walford also argues that the group’s thinking is focused on the in-group and hostile or potentially hostile to the out-group. This is exactly how the terrorist and insurgent groups attribute to the ideology a meaning: they claim the similar functions of protecting individuals and social groups from the designated threats while limiting the individual thinking in favor of conserving the group’s identity. The conversion of ideological resources into organizational discourse lies within the arguments of cognition, cause, and exposure.

Building Ideological Awareness Through Cognitive Development

Awareness is suggested in this study as the primary step for VNSAs to construct their organizational identity. Ideological awareness can be built through the following

cognitive learning processes: attention, rehearsal in working memory, retrieval from long-term memory, and metacognitive monitoring (Clark and Herrelson, 2022). The American Psychological Association (APA) describes cognition as the processes of knowing, including attending, remembering, and reasoning (APA Dictionary of Psychology, 2023). It is suggested in this study that cognition is the main domain for VNSAs to convert the available ideological resources into organizational concepts and memories through an awareness process.

In this respect, Bloom's Taxonomy is interpreted as the methodological process of cognition, describing how VNSAs set the interrelations between different objectives and skills for their target audience to raise ideological awareness (Krathwohl, 2002). In this sense, VNSAs are suggested to follow the same hierarchical pattern for cognition as Bloom argued. The cognition hierarchy is presented from bottom to top as follows (Armstrong, 2010). Cognition can be summarized as a methodological approach to raising awareness of the organization's cause among the target audience to drive ideological motivation and active involvement in organizational program. Cognition generally aims to raise the awareness of those who have no connection with the organization's ideology and activities.

Lewis Rambo proposes an integrative model for the religious model, and Randy Borum interprets this model for the recruitment of radical and violent extremist groups (Rambo, 1993; Borum, 2011). Borum discusses that the seven components of religious conversion follow an integrative pattern for an identity seeker. In accordance with Borum's interpretation of Rambo's conversion model, it follows a seven-phase process. The first step starts with the contextual design of the grievances within the cultural, historical, political, and social environments. The second step is the sense of personal and social disruption, which is related to with individual and collective disequilibrium. The third step is self-effort for restoration of equilibrium, which ends up failing frequently. The fourth step is explained as an encounter with a seeker who engages in the quest of the proponent (individual) who bears. The fifth step is described as the exchange of ideas between the seeker and the proponent. The sixth step is suggested as the commitment, when a decision and an investment are made in the ideology and the pledge of loyalty is made publicly. The seventh and last step is the digestion of the effects of the decisions, actions, and commitments that label the individual with

ideology. Borum suggests that Rambo's conversion theory is quite consistent with observations of the post-2001 militant Islamist radicalizations (Borum, 2011).

Causation for Loyalty

The causation argument is different from cognition in terms of the target audience. John Angus D. Hildreth, Francesca Gino, and Max Bazerman argue that if the object of loyalty is a person or group, then loyalty is likely to be highly correlated with collectivist constructs related to group membership, such as identification, liking, and commitment toward that person or group (Hildreth, Gino and Bazerman, 2015). Therefore, the consequences of loyalty could be the uncertainty of the existence of values regarding the causal direction. Loyalty is considered the collectivist prosocial motivation with principles, and it is imperative to act in the group's interest even if it is not right legally, socially, or ethically to do so (Hildreth, Gino and Bazerman, 2015).

Causation is the conversion method to raise the level of ideological awareness for those whose motivation and involvement are not at the desired level. In regard to the causation approach, the organization pursues sustainable loyalty among its members. Causation changes the mindset of individuals who do not understand the ideology that's supposed to inspire them. Causation aims to monopolize the use of violence in order to make the violence serve an organizational objective other than the initiative of individual radicalism. Causation also pledges a protective identity for the organization's members to meet individual needs for survival and socialization.

Exposure and Practice

Ideological practice is based on the reactions of individuals to the organization's activities. In ideological practice, an individual is expected to expose himself or herself to the organization's discourse. Rather than expecting the individual to participate in the organizational VNSAs' activities, the individual is expected to (1) show support for the organization's armed activity on social platforms, (2) participate in ideologically motivated political meetings, (3) commemorate the anniversary of key events, and (4) disseminate the organizational propaganda. The exposure argument characterizes simply the passive supporter segment of the organization in which the individuals meet with the organizational ideology. Randy Borum discusses that engagement in terrorism

emanates from contextual factors such as the support or rejection of friends and family and the extremist ideology or justifications for violence (Borum, 2004).

The first transformation ability of VNSAs to utilize for organizational objectives is suggested to serve for either constructing the organizational identity or expanding the scope of the organizational identity that is already constructed. The factors that determine VNSAs' ability to convert ideological resources into the construction of organizational identity are clustered into three groups that seek the (1) ability to raise the ideological awareness, (2) ability to raise ideological belonging, and (3) ability to raise ideological participation (Lee and Knot, 2018). Three successive charts below aim to determine the ability levels of VNSAs in terms of ideological awareness, ideological belonging, and ideological participation.

Table 3.5.1 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Raising the Ideological Awareness			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability to process ethnic grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability to process religious grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability to process socio-economic grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability to process political grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability to process ideological heritage to raise ideological awareness,				

Table 3.5.2 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Developing the Ideological Belonging			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability to process ethnic grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability to process religious grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability to process socio-economic grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability to process political grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability to process ideological heritage to develop ideological belonging,				

Table 3.5.3 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Developing the Ideological Participation			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability to process ethnic grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability to process religious grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability to process socio-economic grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability to process political grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability to process ideological heritage to develop ideological participation,				

I argue that the ideological resources of a VNSA can be processed by the VNSAs through the methods of raising ideological awareness, developing ideological belonging, and enhancing ideological participation. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability to process ideological resources, ranging from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.2.2 Converting the Human Resources into Organization's Manpower

The recruitment methodologies of VNSAs include individual volunteer recruitment (ideological reasoning), smooth recruitment (radicalization), and forceful recruitment (kidnapping and pushing for crime). Ideological reasoning is generally nationalistic, political, or religious in nature. The U.S. Department of State points to nationalism, tribalism, regionalism, religious orientation, and sectarianism as factors in volunteer recruitment for terrorist groups (U.S. Department of State, 2019). In terms of smooth recruitment, radicalization is the best way to convert a regular person into an extremist. Radicalization puts an individual at the center of a socialization process that revolves around a sociopolitical environment. Radicalization is a cognitive process that entails the gradual adoption of extremist ideas and would, if completed, result in the practice of violent extremism. Recruitment by force is based on the intimidation and blackmailing of the individuals who are kidnapped or pushed into illegal activities.

Once the individuals got involved in the criminal activities, they were convinced by VNSAs that there was no way out but violence for survival.

Individuals might prefer to volunteer to participate in the body of VNSAs for several reasons. McCoy argues that individuals have a tendency to self-participate in violent groups as the behaviors of the group are legitimized and normalized. (McCoy, Jones and Hastings, 2019). A report prepared for the United States Institute of Peace by John M. Venhaus in 2010 suggests that volunteer recruitment evolves around four typologies: (1) revenge seekers, (2) status seekers, (3) identity seekers, and (4) thrill seekers (Venhaus, 2010). These four typologies are suggested as the rational causation for volunteer recruitment. The revenge seekers are suggested as individuals who are looking for an outlet for frustration, while the status seekers are identified as individuals looking for a recognition that may even be a pragmatic objective. On the other hand, the identity seekers could be suggested to suffer from a lack of security and be looking for a place to belong, while the thrill seekers are introduced as individuals looking for adventure.

Radicalization is a process through which individuals adopt a worldview or ideology that is opposed to the social and political standards, or “status quo” of society (McCoy, Jones and Hastings, 2019). Individuals are introduced by the VNSAs to the idea of change in the political, economic, and cultural systems of a society through smooth cognitive methods so that the individuals can internalize a belief system that requires them to be involved in radical or extremist activities. Once a discrepancy in the ideological relationship between the organization sympathized with and the other political or social actors is seen, the answer might be observed in violence, which is considered the product of radicalization.

The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) published a report in 2017 about the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The report suggests that terrorist and violent extremist groups primarily engage in forced and often brutal recruitment of large numbers of children (UNODC, 2017). The forceful recruitment of the children was categorized as kidnapping, abduction, coercion through threats, and purchase from human traffickers (UNDOCs, 2017). Boko Haram and the PKK, as the VNSAs, are known to be quite famous for abducting children through forceful methods. The United Nations

International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) reported in 2018 that more than 1,000 children in northeastern Nigeria have been abducted by Boko Haram since 2013 (UNICEF, 2018). A report presented at the UN General Assembly in 2018 points out that the PKK and its affiliated groups recruited 35 children in Iraq alone in 2018 through forceful recruitment methods (UN A/72/865–S/2018/465, 2018). These reports also underline how the VNSAs depend on forceful recruitment for their various bodies of the organizational structure.

Table 3.6.1 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs for Converting Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Volunteer Recruitment			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA’s ability to process youth and students for volunteer recruitment in the organizational body,				
VNSA’s ability to process the unemployed for volunteer recruitment in organizational bodies,				
VNSA’s ability to process the ethnic diaspora for volunteer recruitment in the organizational body,				
VNSA’s ability to process the religious diaspora for volunteer recruitment in the organizational body,				
VNSA’s ability to process foreign sympathizers for volunteer recruitment in the organizational body,				

Table 3.6.2 Evaluation Chart for the Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs for Converting Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Recruitment through Radicalization			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA’s ability to process youth and students for recruitment in organizational bodies through radicalization,				
VNSA’s ability to process the unemployed for recruitment in organizational bodies through radicalization,				
VNSA’s ability to process the ethnic diaspora for recruitment in the organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA’s ability to process the religious diaspora for recruitment in the organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA’s ability to process foreign sympathizers for recruitment in organizational bodies through radicalization,				

Table 3.6.3 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs for Converting Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Forceful Recruitment			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability to convert the youth and students into the organization's manpower through forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability to convert the unemployed into the organization's manpower through forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability to convert the ethnic diaspora into the organization's manpower through forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability to convert the religious diaspora into the organization's manpower through forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability to convert foreign sympathizers into the organization's manpower through forceful recruitment,				

I argue that the human resources of a VNSA can be processed by the VNSAs through the methods of volunteer recruitment, radicalization, and forceful recruitment. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability to process human resources, ranging from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.2.3 Converting Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

VNSAs use their financial resources to purchase weapons, ammunition, equipment, and platforms for operational purposes. In addition, they also use their funds for propaganda, recruiting, and networking. In some cases, the financial resources could also be spent on the purchase of training for sophisticated weapons and systems. This is considered item that has the biggest share of the fund allocation.

Propaganda, recruitment, and networking activities are needed for VNSA to have a sustainable armed program. Non-state actors also spend their money on international media, social media platforms, and web providers for the dissemination of armed activities. Funds are also spent to establish and operate their own media platforms, such as TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers. Social and cultural events such as concerts and courses like music and photography could be organized and funded by the VNSAs. Non-state actors tend to pay for the basic needs of the families of those

VNSA members who died during the armed activity. This even attracts sympathy for developing a working social network.

Non-state actors also spend their money for the purpose of training. Effective training and military education systems can also improve skill by developing the fighter's capacity to assimilate technology, use weapons effectively, and execute sophisticated doctrine and battle drills (Brooks, 2007: 22). However, training, especially for the sophisticated drills, requires advanced expertise, mostly from instructors outside the organization. Training is acquired to develop the technical capacity of the tactical elements. In this sense, VNSAs may pay private military companies or individual experts for training in sophisticated weaponry systems like ATGMs and MANPADS. On the other hand, training for the drone operations, and paramotor and paragliding training could be acquired at private courses at individual level.

Table 3.7.1 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Procurement of Weapons, Ammunitions and Life Supplies			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				

Table 3.7.2 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Procurement of Training and Consultancy			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to procure training and consultancy				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to procure training and consultancy,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to procure training and consultancy,				

VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to procure training and consultancy,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to procure training and consultancy,				

Table 3.7.3 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Propaganda and Network Developing			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to fund the propaganda and network development,				

Table 3.7.4 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Recruitment and Social Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to fund the recruitment and social activities,				

I argue that the financial resources of a VNSA can be processed and transformed by the VNSAs for the organizational needs of procurement of weapons, ammunition, and life supplies; procurement for training and consultancy; development of propaganda

and networks; and recruitment and social activities. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability to transform the financial resources an organization needs, ranging from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into funds for organizational activities affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.2.4 Converting the Physical Environment into Organization’s Area of Activities

Geography and place define the spatial nature of a VNSA, which shapes the armed program through organizational resources, logistical domains, and the possibilities of transnationalism (Starr, 2005). A designated armed program of a VNSA is the product of its ability to comply with geographical advantages and restraints at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Determining the armed program, either on through rural or urban-centric efforts, is one of the most challenging tasks of a VNSA. Therefore, the ability to interpret of interpretation of the geography and the places is the first parameter to assess the military effectiveness of the organization and to understand the rationality of the choice of armed program to practice (urban, rural, or a combination of both). Physical terrain is analyzed systematically through an area study in which a set of technical data is available (U.S. Army Manual of ATP 2-01.3, 2019). —

Sun Tzu implies that the terrain is part of the geography and places at the operational and tactical levels. In accordance with Sun Tzu, terrain is distinguished by six different characteristics: (1) accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; and (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy (Tzu, 2010). In his case, Sun Tzu simply underlines the biases and merits of the terrain, both for the organization (the weak VNSA) and the enemy (the strong state). Tzu rightfully points out the modern approach to the analysis of the terrain based on the following factors: (1) Observation and Fields of Fire; (2) Cover and Concealment; (3) Obstacles (man-made and natural); (4) Key or Decisive Terrain; (5) Avenues of Approach, as indicated in the U.S. Army Manual of ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield.

Table 3.8.1 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Physical Environment into Organization's Area of Activities	Level of Ability of Interpretation of the Environment for Organization's Survival			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of converting the rural physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive,				
VNSA's ability of converting the urban physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive,				

Table 3.8.2 Evaluation Chart for Ability to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs of Converting the Physical Environment into Organization's Area of Activities	Level of Ability of Interpretation of the Environment for Organization's Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's ability of converting the rural physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities,				
VNSA's ability of converting the urban physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities,				

I argue that the environmental resources of a VNSA can be interpreted and utilized for the organization's survival and activities. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability to interpret and utilize the environment for the organizational survival and organizational activities, ranging from "not able", "weak", "medium" to "high". I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as the area of an organization's armed program affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.3 Fighting Power

In this study, the fighting power of VNSAs is suggested to be analyzed through the level of achievement of practical operational patterns that are based on the organization's converted resources (Sandler, 2014). Practical operational patterns are categorically divided into strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions, which are broken down into practical parameters. This section of the study aims to understand the compatibility of the organization's practices with its designated objective. The practical

parameters in the strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions are aimed to scale through the level of achievement of the implementation of adoptability and sustainability as well as the objectives of intimidation, coercion, and deterrence.

In the evaluation of the achievement level of VNSAs at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the quality of the achievement will be determined in accordance with the Likert Scale. The ability level of a VNSA to practice the armed program is aimed at being determined at the indicator levels of “Not Able”, “Weak”, “Medium” and “High”.

The level of “Not Able” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is not able to adopt and sustain the selected armed strategy (war of attrition or decisive war) at the strategic level. The level of “Weak” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is poorly able to adopt and sustain the selected armed strategy (war of attrition or decisive war) at the strategic level. The level of “Medium” is presumed to indicate that VNSAs are mildly able to adopt and sustain the selected armed strategy (war of attrition or decisive war) at the strategic level. The level of “High” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is highly able to adopt and sustain the selected armed strategy (war of attrition or decisive war) at a strategic level.

The level of “Not Able” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is not able to intimidate, coerce, and deter the target audience by its rural and urban armed activities at the operational level. The level of “Weak” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is poorly able to intimidate, coerce, and deter the target audience through its rural and urban armed activities at the operational level. The level of “Medium” is presumed to indicate that the VNSAs are mildly able to intimidate, coerce, and deter the target audience by their rural and urban armed activities at the operational level. The level of “High” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is highly able to intimidate, coerce, and deter the target audience through its rural and urban armed activities at the operational level.

The level of “Not Able” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is not able to command, control, and coordinate the armed activities and utilize the armed activities to cause fatalities in the target audience at a tactical level. The level of “Weak” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is poorly able to command, control, and coordinate the armed activities and utilize the armed activities to cause fatalities on the target audience at a tactical level. The level of “Medium” is presumed to indicate that the

VNSAs are mildly able to command, control and coordinate the armed activities, and utilize the armed activities to cause fatalities on the target audience at a tactical level. The level of “High” is presumed to indicate that the VNSA is highly able to command, control and coordinate the armed activities, and utilize the armed activities to cause fatalities in the target audience at a tactical level.

3.3.3.1 Achievement of the Selected Armed Strategy at Strategic Level

The ability to undertake armed activities remains the ultimate “output” of an VNSA’s organizational power because it represents how a VNSA can secure its political objectives in the areas of activity and interests. However, the *sine qua non* for a VNSA could be claimed as survival. Ayşegül Aydın and Cem Emrence suggest that survival is a function of long-term interactions with territory and people in the environment of irregular warfare like civil war, insurgency, or terrorism (Aydın and Emrence, 2015: 60). Aydın and Emrence argue that the PKK’s armed strategy was based on having a monopoly on the local population and the rural operational tactics so that the PKK would dominate the urban and rural environment with a long-standing armed strategy (Aydın and Emrence, 2015: 60). The PKK’s armed strategy was observed to evolve around the borderline with Iraq so that the PKK would wage its armed attacks in Turkish territory to coerce and subvert the local population while finding a safe base in northern Iraq for survival. The strategic level of fighting power is based on the choices of the armed program that VNSAs follow. Calculating the weaknesses and strengths of their own and the adversary, non-state actors may choose either protracted or decisive war strategies.

Protracted War Strategy

The protracted war strategy is based on Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted popular war. This strategy is broken down into three distinct phases: latent or incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement (Mao, 1967). The first stage aims to establish a local stronghold in a difficult and isolated terrain in which the survival of the organization is pursued. This stage can be observed to initiate either in a rural or urban environment. In the second stage of the protracted war strategy, VNSAs try to dominate the ‘pocket areas’ in the surrounding areas to create zones to expand their area of

influence (Aydın and Emrence, 2015). The VNSAs aim to capture small cities in reasonable proximity to each other so that the strategy can pave the way for a decisive war or a surge on the expanded battlefield.

Andrew Mitzcavitch suggests that al-Qaeda in Afghanistan also followed the same pattern as Mao's protracted war strategy in his study (Mitzcavitch, 2014). He suggests that al-Qaeda operated in the remote areas of Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001. It is also claimed by Mitzcavitch that it was with the four coordinated attacks in the U.S. in 2001 that al-Qaeda dared to initiate the second stage of Mao's protracted warfare strategy. I agree with Mitzcavitch that staging al-Qaeda's armed program is similar to Mao's protracted strategy. However, I disagree with the contextual analogy of al-Qaeda's armed program with Mao's protracted war strategy. Mao's program was based on popular warfare based on resistance against an occupying force. But al-Qaeda's organization's objective was to root in a distant geography and export its religiously motivated ideology to different parts of the world. Al-Qaeda's organizational character has not fit into any insurgency type either.² Al-Qaeda also was not able continue to go further with third stage of the Mao's protracted war strategy.

Each phase builds upon the previous phase and continues activities from the previous phases. The protracted popular war strategy has both a political and a military wing. This strategy requires a high level of organization and indoctrination, actions along multiple lines of effort, and leadership to direct the shifting of phases according to circumstances. Characteristics of a Protracted War Strategy include: (1) continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization; (2) highly indoctrinated leadership, political cadre, and guerrilla fighters; (3) an extensive, well-organized, unarmed auxiliary; (4) leadership that can exert control over the insurgency; (5) the ability to shift phases at the direction of its leadership, including returning to the previous phase if necessary; (6) attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government and counterinsurgents; (7) continuous operations along multiple lines of effort, although some phases will emphasize different lines of effort (Lyons, 2016; Joiner, 1967).

² See the typology of insurgent groups in Chapter 2.

The Decisive War Strategy (Surge)

VNSAs may attempt to confront their strong adversary as a result of overconfidence. Characteristics of the decisive war strategy may include (1) a large number of the operators or fighters are needed, and (2) the strategy is vulnerable due to a lack of command, control, and communication (Burton, 1996). It is also vulnerable if the adversary is well prepared for the conventional engagement (Bretnor and Reginald, 2001). This strategy could be observed either at the beginning phase of a revolutionary civil war when the foreign support for the insurgency pushes for an imminent takeover of the existing authority or as the continuation of a protracted war strategy when the non-state actor feels mature enough to shift from the war of attrition to a total surge. In both cases, decisive war strategy is too risky due to the vulnerability of the early stages of an armed movement and the sensitive transition from the irregular character of the protracted war to large-scale regular military implementation. Heather Marie Vitale and James M. Keagle suggested that the ISIL has advanced common jihadist ideas in a short period to achieve what no other insurgency has been able to do: establish an Islamic caliphate. Combining innovative technological strategies with strong force, intimidation, and financial resources (Vitale and Keagle, 2014).

Table 3.9.1 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Strategic Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Strategic Level	Level of Ability of Adopting the Armed Strategy			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of adopting the attrition war strategy,				
VNSA's achievement of adopting the decisive war strategy,				

Table 3.9.2 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Strategic Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Strategic Level	Level of Ability of Sustaining the Armed Strategy			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of sustaining the attrition war strategy,				
VNSA's achievement of sustaining the decisive war strategy,				

I argue that the achievement of the armed activities of a VNSA at the strategic level can be determined through the indicators of adopting and sustaining the attrition war strategy and the decisive war strategy. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability to adopt and sustain the attrition war strategy, and decisive war strategy ranging from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.3.2 Achievement of the Selected Armed Strategy at Operational Level

Fighting Power at the operational level points to the *modus operandi* of a non-state actor. The *modus operandi* in accordance with the organization’s armed program is developed either in a rural or urban environment. However, the combination of both can also be adopted by VNSAs.

Rural Strategy

The military-focused strategy believes that military action can create the conditions needed for success (Meiser et al., 2021). Military-focused insurgents often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in an area where grievances exist can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. The success of this small group depends on successful military action and a popular uprising. Rural strategy actions include (1) attacks on government targets to gain popular support; (2) propaganda that incites people to join the organization’s cause and revolt against the government and that focuses on demonstrating the government’s weakness and illegitimacy; (3) little evidence of long-term efforts at building a political base; and (4) little effort to building the political wing or infiltrating legitimate organizations (US Army FMI 3-24.2, 2009: 2-17).

Urban Strategy

In the urban strategy, armed attacks are carried out against government targets with the intention of causing government forces to overreact against the population (provocation). The insurgents want the government’s repressive measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency, and overthrow the government. This

strategy can be initiated without popular support. Its success relies almost exclusively on a spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression. As retrieved from Carlos Marighella's Mini Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, urban strategy actions are often predictable and possess the following characteristics (Marighella, 1969): (1) VNSAs often carry out terrorist attacks, which they hope are highly visible and produce high casualties. Their true intention may not necessarily be to cause fear or terror but to provoke the government into overreacting. (2) VNSAs' propaganda tends to focus on government brutality, calling attention to specific harsh government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations.

Table 3.10.1 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Operational Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Intimidation of the Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in urban environment,				

Table 3.10.2 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Operational Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Coercion of the Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of coercing the local society in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of coercing the adversary in urban environment,				

Table 3.10.3 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Operational Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Deterrence of the Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of deterring the adversary in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of deterring the adversary in urban environment,				

I argue that the achievement of the armed activities of a VNSA at the operational level can be determined through the indicators of coercion, intimidation, and deterrence in urban and rural environments. I also argue that VNSAs have different levels of ability in coercion, intimidation, and deterrence strategies ranging from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” and to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the operational level affects their military effectiveness.

3.3.3.3 Achievement of the Selected Armed Strategy at Tactical Level

The operational success of the selected armed strategy depends on the tactical capabilities demonstrated through a variety of combat operations against an adversary. In a broader sense, the successful conduct of tactical armed activities is the pillar of the achievement of the selected armed strategy at the operational and strategic levels. Therefore, combat proficiency is the key to determining the achievement of the armed strategy of a VNSA. Tactical proficiency requires a rubric to assess the success of the implementation of each of the selected armed tactics. The success of the tactical implementation of the armed strategy is suggested by the integrative capabilities and the intended physical outcomes. (Tellis et al., 2000: 160). Therefore, the simple idea of measuring the tactical achievement of the armed activities is suggested to numerically indicate the ability of command, control, and coordination and the fatality of the tactical armed activities.

The methods of the terror attacks are categorized into nine broad tactical classes by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland (GTD, 2021). The Global Terrorism Database’s tactical classification includes (1) assassination, (2) hijacking, (3) kidnapping, (4) barricade incident, (5) bombing/explosion, (6) armed assault, (7) unarmed assault, (8) facility/infrastructure attack, and (9) unknown (GTD, 2021: 24). The US Army categorizes terror tactics in a wider range in its military manual, FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Terror tactics in FM 100-20 include twelve categories: (1) assassination, (2) arson, (3) bombing, (4) hijacking, (5) hostage-taking, (6) kidnapping, (7) maiming, (8) raids, (9) sabotage, (10) hoaxes, and (11) use of

chemical, biological, radiologic, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (FM 100-20, 199, 3-3, 3-43).

I have grouped the terror tactics into five categories in this study. My categorization includes (1) armed attacks, (2) bomb attacks, (3) indirect fire attacks, (4) sophisticated attacks, and (5) others. I have taken three factors into consideration when suggesting my own categorization; (1) the hierarchy and the commonality of the use of the tactics; (2) the technical aspect of the attack types; and (3) the latest trend in modern irregular conflicts. Because the insurgents and the terror groups, as the VNSAs pursue a surge to shape the conflict environment with more organized methods, I have categorized the violent tactics that require command, control, and coordination and that are also adaptable in the material technology, changing the nature of the geography, and forming alliance as Michael Vasseur and others have pointed out (Vasseur et al., 2022). The tactics of the modern insurgencies combine the tactical actions of terrorism and the modus operandi of the two different VNSAs that associate with each other (Connable and Martin, 2010: 99). At the tactical level, a counterinsurgent or counterterrorist will usually only deal with urban, military-focused, and protracted popular war strategies. The insurgent and terror strategies provide a common frame of reference for the countermeasures as well.

Command and control is the process by which the leadership and upper echelons of the military hierarchy communicate, coordinate, and transmit decisions down the chain of command for the success of the intended strategic, operational, and tactical activities (Brooks, 2007: 20). Therefore, command, control, and the coordination are indicators of the success of an organized armed activity. The command, control, and coordination procedures can improve responsiveness by ensuring that developments on the battlefield are communicated in a timely fashion up the chain of command to the political leader and that decisions are transmitted quickly and clearly via the military hierarchy to tactical commanders so that an achievement of the tactical, operational, and strategic activities can serve in echelon to optimize the armed program (Brooks, 2007: 20).

The weapons, ammunition and the explosives detected or captured in irregular environments, such as in the post-invasion period in Afghanistan after 2001, Iraq after 2003, and the Syrian Civil War after 2011, indicate that the VNSAs have a tendency to

follow compact tactical attacks, which can be categorized into (1) armed attacks, (2) bomb attacks, (3) indirect fire attacks, and (4) sophisticated attacks. Research made by Conflict Armament Research over the ISIL's procurement of weapons, ammunitions, and explosives confirms my categorization of the tactical attacks of the VNSAs (Conflict Armament Research, 2017).

Armed Attacks

Armed attacks are the type of operations that destroy or defeat enemies, seize terrain, and secure it (US Army ADP 3-90, 2019). Armed attacks are suggested to be the foremost small-unit tactics employed by terrorist and insurgent groups against their adversaries. Terrorist organizations and insurgent groups mostly depend on the small unit offensive in tactical engagements due to their weaker fighting power than the state adversary that they challenge. The power asymmetry between their tactical elements and the state's army led the VNSAs to conduct small-scale ambushes, raids, and harassing fire as tactical offensive practices. As the location, time, and power are optimized, the VNSAs actors can also be seen conducting ambushes and raids with bigger tactical groups outnumbering the adversary units. However, offensive modus operandi could be suggested to be carried out mostly in small groups due to survival and force protection considerations as well as the need for command, control, and coordination of the intended attacks. Ambush is described as an attack by fire from concealed positions in a variety of formations on a mobile or temporarily halted adversary element (US Arm FM 3-90-1, 2013). A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy a capability culminating in a planned withdrawal (JP 3-0, 2018). A harassing fire is a small arms fire of assault rifle, sniper rifle, mid-caliber anti-material sniper rifle, and long-range mid-caliber anti-aircraft gun fire that is employed to disturb the routine of the adversary forces, curtail their movement, threaten them with random losses, and lower morale (JP 1-02, 2001). The use of grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenades and light mortars is also seen in this harassing fire.

Bomb Attacks

Contemporary bomb attacks by the VNSAs are suggested to be based on the model of improvised explosive devices. The US Chief of Staff Joint Publication 3-15.1 describes the improvised explosive device as a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract (JP 3-15.1, 2012). The US Chief of Staff Joint Publication JP-1 also describes the IED as a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract (JP 1-02, 2010). The IEDs are commonly seen as the tactic of the bomb attacks by the VNSAs to achieve the intended objective of the attacks in irregular warfare environments due to the availability of the IED components in the market and the optimization of the attack through a variety of means, and the sensational impacts. The tactical employment of IEDs by VNSAs could be seen both in rural and urban security environments. VNSAs utilize IED attacks along with other types of attacks to create a joint effect. IEDs have a variety of implementation areas, ranging from suicide vest attacks to roadside engagements and urban defense tactics (JP 3-15.1, 2012; Conflict Armament Research, 2017). Vehicle Borne IEDs could be described as the mobilized form of the IEDs in order to reach the intended targets. VBIED attack aims at both mobile targets, such as crowds and convoys, and fixed targets, such as buildings and checkpoints. Consequently, A VBIED attacks result in a higher volume of casualties. The suicide version of the VBIED attacks (SVBIED) that the non-state actors employ.

Indirect Fire Attacks

Indirect fires can strike targets when the low-angle fires from them are not able to hit targets on reverse slopes, in narrow ravines or trenches, in dense forests, or in urban areas (US Army Handbook, 2009). Artillery, mortars and dull rockets could be included in the weapon types for indirect engagements. Mortars, on the other hand, are the best indirect fire weapons for small units due to the weight advantages of the weapon itself and the ammunition. Mortars can destroy sensitive area or point targets that are vulnerable to engagement from overhead. Mortars can also provide illumination of the intended target area during nighttime offensives. The small tactical elements can

use the mortars for suppressive purposes to support the infiltration of the assault or maneuver element into the intended target during a raid. A mortar attack is an indirect means of firing projectiles with varying diameters. It normally has no direct sight of the weapon towards the target; an eye (a forward observer) is needed to direct the fire on target.

Sophisticated Attacks

The VNSAs are known to have an ambition to shape the battlefield and to instill their influence in the rest of the irregular warfare environment with the use of sophisticated weaponry systems. The VNSAs are quite eager to cause sensational damage and casualties on their adversary's combined-arms regular military army with less expensive antitank weapons, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), and drones. The use of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), MANPADs, and drones has become very common in the Syrian Civil War and onwards. Can Kasapoğlu and Sinan Ülgen argue in their analysis of the PKK and YPG's armament trends that the PKK's lethal weapons inventory has reached hybrid warfare capacity with the help of ATGSMs, MANPADs, and drones (Kasapoğlu and Ülgen, 2017). Kasapoğlu and Ülgen's claim reflects how the VNSAs have the intention of having an influence in the conflict environment through this sophisticated weapons capacity.

The Anti-tank Guided missile (ATGM) is a sophisticated attack weapon against armored vehicles due to its laser guiding, television camera, and wire guiding systems. Jakub Janovský has pointed out how the rebel groups utilized the Syrian Army's arsenal to obtain ATGMs for developing their military effectiveness (Janovský, 2018). Janovsky also argues that any ATGM type has a very good chance of hitting its target even if handled by non-nation-state actors, indicating that these non-state actors received a notable amount of training from state-level expertise.

Chris Smith argued during the Disarmament Forum in 2008, organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), that the MANPADS would appear to fit the criteria for weapons favored by the VNSAs due to their advantages of freestanding, easy use, portability, and affordability (UNIDIR, 2008). He was proved correct with his assessment after a number of incidents were reported with the use of the VNSAs. VNSAs also have access to sophisticated man-portable air

defense systems (MANPADS). The sophisticated infrared homing system of a surface-to-air missile is the MANPADS that the VNSAs use against the rotary-wing aircraft in the conflict areas.

As the drones became available for commercial use, VNSAs tended to improvise with the drones for their tactical purposes. Drones have come into use of VNSAs as Drone-borne IEDs (DBIEDs) and the platforms to release the small projectiles remotely. Serkan Balkan suggests in his study of the ISIL's drone strategy that ISIL had used the drone technology for two purposes: (1) to cause maximum casualties, and (2) to publish/broadcast their capabilities for propaganda purposes (Balkan, 2017). Balkan also suggests that ISIL utilized the drones for gathering intelligence, coordination of the ground attacks, and direct attack by delivering the explosives to the intended target.

Other Tactics

Attacks other than armed, bombed, indirect fire, and sophisticated attacks such as assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, barricade incidents, unarmed assault, arson, hostage-taking, hoaxes, and CBRN attacks require fewer or no military formations and less organization to instill the military's effectiveness to shape the conflict environment. (US Army FM 1002-20: 3-3). Therefore, these attacks were not taken into consideration when developing the VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale at the tactical level.

As seen, all types of methods of tactical attacks—command, control, coordination, and the impact of the attacks causing casualties—are considered factors for determining the success of the tactical activities. On the scale, command, control, coordination, and the fatalities of the designated attacks are aimed at being measured.

Table 3.11.1 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Tactical Level	Level of Command, Control and Coordination of The Tactical Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its armed attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its bombing attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its indirect fire attacks,				

VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its sophisticated attacks,				
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Table 3.11.2 Evaluation Chart for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Tactical Level	Level of Fatalities of The Tactical Armed Activities			
	Not Able	Weak	Medium	High
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its armed attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its bombing attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its indirect fire attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its sophisticated attacks,				

I argue that the achievement of the armed activities of a VNSA at tactical level can be determined through the indicators of command, control, and coordination and the fatalities of the armed forces, bombing, indirect fire, and sophisticated attacks. I also argue that VNSAs have a different level of ability in command, control, and coordination, and fatalities during the implementation of their tactical attacks range from “not able”, “weak”, “medium” to “high”. I suggest a hypothesis that the ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level affects their military effectiveness.

3.4 Hypotheses

I have aimed in this chapter to frame the military effectiveness of a non-state actor by evaluating (1) the availability of organizational resources, (2) ability of access and process the resources and (3) ability of implement the fighting power. The background research also allowed me to answer the question of “whether the military effectiveness of the VNSAs is measurable or not”. The descriptive background research with the literature over the concept of VNSAs and military effectiveness and with the literature over the concept and context of irregular warfare allowed me to develop a scale model for measuring the military effectiveness of the VNSAs based on the eleven dimensions. I have created eleven hypotheses based on the eleven dimensions retrieved from the background research. Now, the hypotheses created are needed to be tested

through an experiment with data collection and analysis, which is studied in the next chapter.

Hypothesis 1: The ability of VNSAs to access ideological resources affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 2: The ability of VNSAs to access human resources affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 3: The ability of VNSAs to access financial resources affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 4: The ability of VNSAs to access physical environmental resources affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 5: The ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 6: The ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 7: The ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into funds for organizational activities affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 8: The ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as the area of an organization's armed program affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 9: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 10: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the operational level affects their military effectiveness.

Hypothesis 11: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level affects their military effectiveness.

CHAPTER 4: TESTING THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS SCALE: THE PKK CASE

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a long-standing violent non-state actor that has waged a terrorist campaign against the Republic of Türkiye in order to pursue a separatist objective based on the ambition for recognition of self-determination. The PKK emerged in left-leaning socio-political movements throughout the world in the 1960s (Özcan, 1999: 25-54). The PKK was formally founded in 1978 to instill a Kurdish nationalism based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Leaning on the transnational opportunities for logistics and training in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the PKK started its armed program in 1984, utilizing the social and political atmosphere in Turkey in the post-coup d'état of 1980 (Orton, 2017). PKK's violent campaign could be divided into four major periods: (1) 1980-1990, the early stages of the armed program and the organizational growth (Orton, 2017); (2) 1990-1999, pushing the public involvement in the organizational activities and intensifying the violent attacks (Törel, 2002: 110-163); (3) 1999-2013 reconstructing the political and armed wing of the organizational body, seeking the political means for the organizational objectives (Köse, 2017: 13-40); and (4) 2013-now, exploiting the regional developments and resuming the armed campaign in wider regional geopolitics (Acun and Keskin, 2017).

The PKK has never given up its armed program, which is considered vital for the organization's survival, and the ultimate authority is attributed to the PKK's armed wing, which is the HPG. Historically, the PKK adopted Marxist/Leninist principles as its worldview while depending on violence for its survival. (Özcan, 1999: 72). Abdullah Öcalan has stressed that militarization is a product of the PKK's organizational policy:

Militarization is the most concentrated expression of politics. Politics is also the thinnest part of the infrastructure and superstructure. The army is the thinner side of it is happening. Our people, on the other hand, do not understand the basics of politics properly. They are particularly far from putting it into practice. How do they understand the military? The understanding of "I don't understand politics, I understand military service" is the approach that will hurt the military the most. Those who do not understand

politics cannot even come close to military service, especially to the army (Öcalan, 1992).

The violence could be suggested as an indispensable factor for the PKK's survival. In this sense, it is also suggested that whoever controls the HPG (PKK's armed wing) can control the PKK and all other affiliated non-state actors or social, political, and economic spaces that have sympathy for the PKK in broader geopolitics. The main reason why the PKK is selected as a case to test in this study is on account of its influence over a wide range of actors in the irregular structure of the conflict in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran (Sezer, 2012), (Çelik, 2019).

The PKK, with its current structure of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), carries out its political activities covertly in Turkey and overtly under the names of PÇDK in Iraq, PYD in Syria, PJAK in Iran, and affiliated civil society organizations in Europe (Çelik, 2019). The armed wings of the HPG of the PKK and the YGP/YPJ of the PYD have been carrying out transnational terror activities in coordination with each other and with the support of local, regional, and international actors (Kavalek, 2018).

4.1 The PKK as a VNSA

The leverage for the VNSA is the armed activities that lead to constructing an organizational identity. The failure and success of the armed program are suggested to be the determinants of the VNSA's claim to organizational tutelage over the intended political, social, and economic spaces. In the long term, VNSA members who follow an armed program may attempt to transform into a political party, enter government, or become state builders, as Schlichte (2009: 178-202) suggested. The PKK's organizational objective also follows the same patterns as the other VNSAs who seeks recognition from specific other political/social actors, the governments, other armed groups, international organizations, or local populations (Pfeifer, Geis and Clement, 2022: 4). However, the PKK is not a VNSA that was able to attain its political goals; it has never refrained from using violence. This is related to the relativity of its military effectiveness. The US recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization on October 8, 1997 (U.S. Department of State 1997). Canada listed the PKK as a terrorist organization on December 10, 2002, and revised the PKK's status as a terrorist organization on

November 21, 2021 (Canada Ministry of Safety, 2021). The European Union designated the PKK as a terrorist entity in 2004 and reviewed its status as a terrorist organization on April 15, 2009 (EU Official Journal, 2009).

Although the PKK is designated a terrorist organization by international organizations and foreign governments, in addition to the Republic of Türkiye, there is a tendency for the PKK to be recognized as an insurgent group in academia. Francis O’Conner identifies the PKK as an insurgent group that operates through a combination of urban and rural strategies based on popular support (O’Connor, 2021: 108-182). The International Crisis Group also identified the PKK as an insurgent group seeking Kurdish nationalist rights through insurgent and terror attacks in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2011). Mustafa Coşar Ünal suggests that the PKK is a violent uprising of dissident Kurds in Turkey with a deep-rooted historical background (Ünal, 2016). He also suggests that the PKK employs a wide range of violence, characterized both by terrorism and insurgency methods.

PKK’s success in achieving a wide spectrum of relations is attributed to its tutelage over the radical leftist groups in Turkey and its prominence in shaping Kurdish politics not only in Turkey but also among the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, as well as within the Kurdish diaspora mainly in Europe (Kaválek and Mareš, 2018).

4.1.1 Why is PKK selected as a Test Case?

The PKK is taken as a violent non-state actor case for testing the military effectiveness scale of the VNSA because of its long-standing terror campaign, which consists of a combination of the terror and insurgent tactics. The uniqueness of PKK’s character in the implementation of a long-run armed program in a broad transnational geopolitical context with its influence over the social-political and socio-economic spaces also played a role in the selection of the PKK as the case for this study. The paradigm shifts of PKK in terms of ideology, objective, and armed structure in changing environmental situations and conjectural developments through its timeline also facilitated the PKK's choice of a case for this study.

Data needed to measure the military effectiveness of the PKK was obtained through a questioner deprived of the developed VNSA Military Effectiveness Scale. The questionnaire was applied to retired police and military personnel, journalists, and

academicians who had expertise in the PKK case. The data collected through the “Experts Opinion Questionnaire” was analyzed in accordance with the statistical framework of the VNSA Military Effectiveness Scale. This chapter suggests that the VNSA Military Effectiveness Scale measures the military effectiveness of the PKK, and the VNSA Military Effectiveness Scale could be applied to measure the military effectiveness of other VNSAs.

4.1.2 PKK and Ideological Resources

It is claimed by Nihat Ali Özcan that the first document explaining the PKK’s organizational program is “The Way of the Kurdistan Revolution (Manifest)”, which was published in 1978 when the PKK officially declared its establishment (Özcan, 1999: 55). However, it is known that Abdullah Öcalan wrote the Manifest in 1976 (Sezer, 2021), two years before its establishment. The two years of drafting The Manifest are suggested as an effort by Abdullah Öcalan to construct the organizational identity. This document, indeed, frames a mental setting for thinking about the “Kurdish Cause” as an ideological leverage in order to justify the organization’s identity in the eyes of the targeted public space. Özcan also suggests that Öcalan defines the PKK’s ideological orientation as Marxist-Leninist as a methodological choice in order to benefit from its accepted basics during the conjecture of ideological confrontations in the 1970s (Özcan, 1999: 55).

Öcalan tries to shape the minds of the target audience by attempting to create a pool of ethnic and socio-economic grievances. Öcalan’s one of the most important priorities was to create the idea of the existence of the socio-economic classes within the social and economic spaces where the states sovereignty and moral and religious rules were quite effective. Öcalan’s discourse of the feudal system is suggested to be a key factor in the denial of state sovereignty, social moral values, and religious rules in order to pave the way to access ideological and human resources through socialism as an instrument. The main ideological convergence between Abdullah Öcalan’s intended organizational identity and similar violent movements in the past during the Ottoman State and the early times of the Republic of Turkey is seen in the realm of ethnic reasoning. However, what makes the PKK’s ideological orientation different from

similar violent movements such as the Shaykh Said Uprising is the secular motivation that Abdullah Öcalan's dictated in the Manifest (Palabıyık, 2015).

This is considered a self-restriction by Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK to access the broader human resource space. Öcalan's Manifest is not considered an organizational program alone, but it is also suggested as the start of the PKK's institutional memory with the ideas and strategies proving Ayşegül Aydın and Cem Emrence's claim that the PKK's institutional memory stretches back to the 1970s (Aydın and Emrence, 2015: 10). Abdullah Öcalan's The Manifest is also considered to be the basic ground on which the PKK's military effectiveness sits. The Manifest points out the potential resources and the intention of converting these resources into fighting power. PKK is considered the Öcalan's ideological product of the transformation of the revolutionary left into an organizational body in the 1970s (Aydın and Emrence, 2015: 18). Abdullah Öcalan claims that the Kurdish nationalism was an ideological response to Turkish nationalism during Ottoman rule in late 1800s and early 1900s. He claims that:

This is the Kurdish question in the modern sense coincides with the period. Initiation of the Committee of Union and Progress to the committee and the question of his explicit orientation towards Turkism rather than Islamic nationalism also increased. There were two factions: the noble Turkish nationalism and the Islamic nationalism. The Kurds tried to maintain their traditional ties with the Islamic nationalists. Naskhi Sheikhs, Mevlana Halit and Said-i Nursi, as the mainstream, represented this trend (Öcalan, 2009).

Öcalan's causation between the ethnic grievance and the Kurdish civil rights has ended up with a non-Islamic ideology of Marxist/Leninist ideology, despite Öcalan defense that the Kurds would have sympathized with Islamic nationalism during the late Ottoman period. This was simply a dilemma that led to understand how Öcalan could manipulate ideological causation. Öcalan's effort of combining the self-interpreted history of Kurds and the adopted basics of Marxist/Leninist ideology indicates how Öcalan attempted to optimize the given ethnic causes with a popular world view of the time for achieving an identity cognition and awareness shaping around the PKK as an organization.

4.1.3 PKK and Human Resources

Studies about the PKK suggest that the PKK's human resources are shaped by the socio-politically motivated youth, the employed and the ethnic diaspora. Özeren and his friend suggest that 73% of the initial participation in the organization is between the ages of 15 and 21, while 78% of PKK members are suggested to be unemployed (Özeren and at all, 2014). The methodological engagement of the PKK with human resources has a variety of implementation methods. Süleyman Özeren and his friends suggest that the PKK's engagement methods in human resources include (1) driving young individuals to crime that leads to conviction; (2) kidnapping, forcing, intimidating, and deceiving; (3) using structures related to the organization within the recruitment process; (4) the influence of organizational media; (5) prison activities; and (6) activities in Europe (Özeren et al, 2014). Özeren and his friends' categorization of the PKK's engagement with human resources also corresponds with the suggested VNSA Military Effectiveness Scale, which was explained in Chapter 3 of this study; basically, the PKK's engagement methods could also be framed with volunteer recruitment (ideological reasoning), smooth recruitment (radicalization), and forceful recruitment (kidnapping and pushing for crime) by social and psychological engagements. Aytekin Yılmaz discusses in his book (*They Were Just Children, Onlar Daha Çocuktı*) how the PKK was influential in recruiting the children through different recruitment methods (Yılmaz, 2019). Adem Palabıyık, on the other hand, stresses on the forceful recruitment of PKK members and their family members' struggle to get them out of the PKK body in his study (Palabıyık, 2020).

4.1.4 PKK and Financial Resources

PKK is known to affiliate with a variety of activities, such as organized crime, illegal human smuggling, and drug trafficking, for its financial needs. Haydar Karaman points to state sponsorship and illegal drug trafficking as sources of the PKK's financial resources in his study (Karaman, 2021). Karaman's suggestion complies with the VNSA military effectiveness scale, which was presented in Chapter 3. The U.S. Department of Treasury also acknowledged the PKK's engagement with drug trafficking and its high-ranking leaders, Murat Karayılan, Ali Rıza Altun and Zübeyir Aydar as drug traffickers (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2009). Cemil Bayık and Duran

Kalkan, two other high-ranking PKK leaders, were also added to the narcotics list of the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2011 (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2011). Habib Özdemir and İlker Peközlü frame the PKK's financial activities with (1) international smuggling, (2) extortion (forceful taxation), (3) illegal trade revenues, (4) mass media, (5) business and cultural organizations, and (6) from the United Nations' Makmur Refugee Camp (Özdemir and Peközlü, 2012). The above-mentioned references about the PKK's financial resources also support the idea of measuring the gravity of the financial resources of the PKK within its military effectiveness through the parameters of (1) individual donations, (2) forceful taxation of individuals and private corporations, (3) income from criminal activities, (4) income from non-profit organizations, and (5) foreign aid.

4.1.5 PKK and Environmental Resources

The PKK has adopted the “Protracted People's War Strategy” to achieve its strategic goals through several stages (Özcan, 1999). If the PKK's armed program were to be divided into phases along its history, the first stage is seen between 1984 and 1990 and is influenced by the Iraq-Iran War, the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and the Turkish political and institutional transformation following the coup d'état in 1980. This was the perfect course for the PKK to start its armed campaign to be recognized domestically, regionally, and internationally. Contrary to the Maoist strategic defense aspect, the PKK acted proactively to develop its armed capacity for a large-scale armed campaign. The Gulf War in 1991 and its aftermath provided the PKK with many opportunities to develop its organizational growth. Even though the PKK aimed to initiate its strategic balance and then move to the strategic offense stage, Turkish counter-terrorism activities suppressed the PKK's back-and-forth armed surge during this period. Regional developments such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 paved the way for the PKK to adopt a new character through the formation of the PYD in 2003 and the establishment of the KCK in 2005 (SDE, 2011). The PKK's “democratic confederalism” rhetoric under the KCK organization is the driving force behind the resumption of violence in Turkey in 2015 (Serxwebun, 2017).

The Turkish strategy of fighting the PKK's rural elements in eastern Turkey has changed considerably since the 1990s. The military manual of internal security by the

Turkish General Staff stresses on area control in eastern Turkey (İç Güvenlik Harekatı, 1995). The military surge in eastern Turkey also helped cut off the continued contact between the local civilians and the tactical PKK elements, especially in the distant villages in the mountainous areas. However, the bias of the military surge in eastern Turkey resulted in a mass domestic immigrant influx from the rural areas to the urban areas in the bigger cities in eastern and western Turkey (Tuncel and Gündoğmuş, 2013). This was the natural cause of the PKK's armed strategy to urbanize, even if these armed strategies were based on less poorly organized underground actions such as individual sabotages, bombings, and assassinations in the early times of the domestic immigrant influx from rural areas to urban centers. The organized attempt of a collective urban uprising was observed in 2015 (Özçelik, 2007).

4.2 Testing the Scale

The VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale was tested within the framework of the eleven hypotheses. First, the data was collected from the target audience through the questionnaire forms, then the data was retrieved from them and transferred into relevant statistical programs for analysis. The scale consisted of eleven sub-dimensions (sub-subscales) aiming to test the eleven hypotheses. Hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to access the ideological resources affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the first sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to access the human resources affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the second sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to access the financial resources affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the third sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to access the physical environmental resources affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the fourth sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the fifth sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the sixth sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into fund of organizational activities affects their military effectiveness" was tested with the seventh sub-scale, hypothesis of "The ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as the area of organization's armed

program affects their military effectiveness” was tested with the eighth sub-scale, hypothesis of “The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level affects their military effectiveness” was tested with the ninth sub-scale, hypothesis of “The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the operational level affects their military effectiveness” was tested with the tenth sub-scale, and the hypothesis of “The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level affects their military effectiveness.”

4.2.1 Data Collection

The data required to test the scale developed in Chapter 3 was collected in a questionnaire form. The questionnaire, titled “Experts Opinion Questionnaire on the Military Effectiveness of Non-State Armed Actors”, was applied to retired police and military personnel who had experience in irregular warfare, journalists who worked in an irregular warfare environment, and academics who have theoretical and empirical studies on irregular warfare (see Appendix A). The universe of the participants was cautiously aimed to be determined with the respondents who are also familiar with PKK, which is designated as the sample VNSA case in this study. The questionnaire was applied after approval by the Social Sciences University of Ankara Institutional Ethics Committee of Social Sciences and Humanities Research and Publication with its Certificate of Ethics Approval (see in Appendix B). The questionnaire was administered online (Google Form) and face-to-face to the participants. 268 responses were received. 249 responses were reported from retired police and military personnel, while 19 responses were received from journalists and academicians. The dates in accordance with their answers were combined in a Microsoft Excel form to be analyzed by relevant statistical tests in accordance with the scale structure.

The data required for the developed military effectiveness scale was obtained through a questionnaire from academicians and journalists who either studied security or had field experience with the irregular conflict environment affected by the sample. The data was also obtained from the retired Turkish security bureaucrats who were actively involved in countering the sample case in and out of Turkey.

The questionnaire form was not intended to apply to active-duty security personnel due to the difficulty of obtaining institutional permission from the state

authorities such as the National Defense Ministry and Ministry of Interior in Turkey; all the participants from the security bureaucracy were retired personnel who had their individual will to participate in the questionnaire. The retired military and police personnel had experience ranging from 10 to 32 years in the service. Their timeline in the service ranged from 1976 to 2022, which overlaps with the lifespan of the sample case. The highest military rank of the participants was that of lieutenant general, who served in a strategic leadership position in the armed forces, while the lowest rank was specialist, whose position was limited to tactical duties in counter-terror operations. The highest police rank position was the provincial police chief, which is quite strategic, the lowest police rank was the police officer, who had tactical responsibilities. The majority of the participants from the security bureaucracy were operatives at the operational and tactical levels. In the military services, the participants were from the elite special operations forces, commando units, border security units, and air force units, which were heavily involved in counter-terror operations. The participants from the interior ministry were from the special police and gendarmerie operations, law enforcement units, anti-smuggling, and organized crime units.

The questionnaire was written in Turkish, and all the participants were Turkish citizens. The participants did not prefer to share their demographic information other than their profession during the preliminary talks. Therefore, their age, sex, rank, name, and branch of their security services were not listed in the questionnaire form. It was aimed to get at least 300 responses, but 268 were taken: 19 respondents were academicians, and 249 respondents were from the security bureaucracy. Persons known for their membership and affiliation with the PKK were not preferred to reach out due to legal reasons, and no data was obtained from these individuals.

4.2.2 Data Analysis

It was the SPSS 26 program used in data analysis. Its construct validity was tested by exploratory factor analysis for each of its sub-dimensions (scales). The assumptions required for the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and the criteria to study for interpretation were identified before the findings. The reliability coefficients of the scales were reviewed by Cronbach's alpha coefficients, and they are accepted as reliable if the results are over 0.70. In the case where the number of items is small (less

than 5), a lower Cronbach alpha value is obtained (Pallant, 2007). Scale scores were obtained from the average value of items in sub-dimensions, and all sub-dimensions were distributed in the same score range. The normality of the score distribution was examined by looking at the skewness and kurtosis values. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) suggest using these values in large samples ($N > 50$), and they specify the distribution of the scores as normal if the values are within the ± 1.5 range. Parametric methods were used in the analysis because scores for all sub-dimensions were normally distributed. The t-test method was used to compare the scores of the independent groups (occupation), and the relationship between the dimensions was analyzed with the Pearson correlation method. For statistical analyses, $p < .05$ level of significance was examined.

4.2.3 Testing the Hypothesis

Explanatory factor analysis (EFA) is a multivariate statistical method that aims to generate fewer (k) latent structures from a large number of interrelated observed variables (Henson and Roberts, 2006). 11 subscales were developed in a single dimension in this study, and EFA was performed for each of them separately. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used as a factor extraction method in each scale. There are different opinions in the literature regarding factor extraction. According to Karaman, Atar, and Aktan (2017), there are no significant differences between factor extraction methods in deciding the number of factors in strong structures with high factor loading, but they state that there may be differences in structures with low factor loading. Therefore, principal component analysis was chosen as it contributes more to the variance.

There are important criteria for EFA. First of all, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value, which shows the adequacy of the sample size, is examined, and if this value is greater than 0.60, the sample size is sufficient. Another important criterion is that the correlation matrix obtained from the variables must be different from the unit matrix; this is defined as the Bartlett sphericity test. Significance at the $p < 0.001$ level in the Bartlett sphericity test indicates that the correlation matrix is suitable for EFA (Thompson, 2004; Kaiser, 1960).

The main purpose of EFA is to decide on the number of factors, and there are different suggestions in the literature for deciding the number of factors. The eigenvalue's being greater than 1, which is suggested by Kaiser (1960) and also known as the K1 rule, is the main method in use (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum and Strahan, 1999; Kline, 1994; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang and Hong, 1999; Thompson, 2004; Velicer and Jackson, 1990). Factor loadings are checked for the relationship between the items and the factors. For an item to be associated with a factor, the factor loading must be at least 0.30. When an item is assigned more than one factor loading, the difference between factor loadings must be at least 0.10 (Stevens, 2002). In addition, a factor with at least three items has a stable structure (MacCallum et al., 1999). However, if there is a high factor loading (>0.80), two-item factors can also be defined.

4.2.3.1 Testing Hypothesis 1: The ability of VNSAs to access ideological resources affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.1 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Access Ideological Resources

Items	Factor Loading
b1_4	0,809
b1_3	0,807
b1_5	0,78
b1_1	0,771
b1_2	0,569
KMO Value	0,822
Bartlett Sphericity Test	413,067
Eigenvalue	2,831
Explained Variance	56,623
Reliability	0,798

The KMO value for the Ability of Accessing the Ideological Resources Scale is found to be 0.822, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 413.067$, $sd=10$ $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.569-0.809. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 56.6 percent of the variance in the Ability of Accessing the Ideological Resources Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.798 for this scale. As a result, the Ability to Access Ideological Resources scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loadings of the ability to access political reasons, socio-economic reasons, and the ideological legacy of the armed movements in history dominate the military effectiveness of the sample case within the realm of ideological resources. The factors of ability to access religious and ethnic reasons do not have a significant effect on the sample case's military effectiveness.

4.2.3.2 Testing Hypothesis 2: The ability of VNSAs to access human resources affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.2 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Access Human Resources

Items	Factor Loading
b2_2	0,799
b2_1	0,789
b2_3	0,712
b2_5	0,574
b2_4	0,51
KMO Value	0,725
Bartlett Sphericity Test	270,026
Eigenvalue	2,356
Explained Variance	47,12
Reliability	0,705

The KMO value for the Ability to Access the Human Resources Scale is found to be 0.822, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 270.026$, $sd=10$ $p<.001$)) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.51-0.799. There is a factor with a higher eigenvalue than 1, and this factor explains 47.1% of the variance in the Ability to Access the Human Resources Scale. Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.705 for this scale. As a result, the Ability to Access the Human Resources Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to access the unemployed, youth, and student spaces dominates the military effectiveness of the sample case within the realm of human resources. The factors of ability to access the religious diaspora and international sympathizers are observed to have the least effect on the sample case's military effectiveness within the realm of potential human resources. This indicates that the sample case must limit itself to some potential human resources.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to access the unemployed, youth, and student spaces dominates the military effectiveness of the sample case within the realm of human resources. The factors of ability to access the religious diaspora and international sympathizers are observed to have the least effect on the sample case's military effectiveness within the realm of potential human resources.

4.2.3.3 Testing Hypothesis 3: The ability of VNSAs to access financial resources affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.3 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Access Financial Resources

Items	Factor Loading
b3_4	0,865
b3_3	0,775
b3_2	0,747
b3_1	0,736
b3_5	0,735
KMO Value	0,815
Bartlett Sphericity Test	484,307
Eigenvalue	2,989
Explained Variance	59,776
Reliability	0,828

The KMO value for the Ability of Accessing Financial Resources Scale is found to be 0.815, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 484.307$, $sd=10$ $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.735-0.865. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 59.8% of the variance in the Ability of Accessing Financial Resources Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.828 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Ability to Access Financial Resources Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to access the income from associations, foundations, pro-organization local administrations, and NGOs dominates the military effectiveness of the sample case within the realm of Financial Resources. The factor loadings of ability to access the realm of forceful taxation, ability to access the realm of income from criminal acts, ability to access the realm of direct

and indirect international support, and ability to access individual or corporate donations point to a similar effect as with ability to access the realm of income from associations, foundations, pro-organization local administrations, and NGOs in the military effectiveness of sample case within Financial Resources. This indicates that the sample case has a range of potential financial resources.

4.2.3.4 Testing Hypothesis 4: The ability of VNSAs to access physical environmental resources affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.4 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Access Environmental Resources

Items	Factor Loading
b4_2	0,842
b4_1	0,841
KMO Value	0,65
Bartlett Sphericity Test	49,724
Eigenvalue	1,413
Explained Variance	70,663
Reliability	0,684

The KMO value for the Ability of Accessing the Environmental Resources Scale is found to be 0.65, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 49.724$, $sd=1$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings are higher than 0.80. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 70.7% of the variance in the Ability of Accessing the Environmental Resources Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.684 for this scale, and it is suggested that the scale is reliable. The low reliability is due to the small number of items. As a result, the Ability to Access Environmental Resources Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to access environmental resources has a similar effect as the ability to access financial resources in determining the sample case's military effectiveness. The factors of ability to access urban and rural environmental resources have equally high factor loadings and have the same effect on the sample case's military effectiveness within the realm of environmental resources. This indicates that the sample case has a potential physical environment to survive and operate both in urban and rural areas.

4.2.3.5 Testing Hypothesis 5: The ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction affects their military effectiveness

Table 4.5 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

Items	Factor Loading
b5_14	0,820
b5_10	0,819
b5_4	0,817
b5_8	0,799
b5_9	0,796
b5_13	0,779
b5_15	0,779
b5_3	0,766
b5_5	0,758
b5_11	0,743
b5_6	0,741
b5_1	0,707
b5_7	0,622
b5_12	0,574
b5_2	0,508
KMO Value	0,893
Bartlett Sphericity Test	3620,534
Eigenvalue	8,232
Explained Variance	54,878
Reliability	0,939

The KMO value for the Ability of Converting the Ideological Resources into the Construction of Organizational Identity Scale is found to be 0.815, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 3620.534$, $sd=105$ $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.508-0.820. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 54.9% of the variance in the Ability of Converting the Ideological Resources into the Construction of Organizational Identity Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.939 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into the Construction of Organizational Identity Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to process the political grievances to develop ideological participation, the ability to process the ideological heritage to develop ideological belonging, and the ability to process the political grievances to raise ideological awareness have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of ability to process the religious grievances to raise ideological awareness, ability to process the religious grievances to develop ideological participation, and ability to process the religious grievances to develop ideological belonging have a relatively smaller effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. This explains that the sample case can interpret the political grievances and the ideological heritage of similar armed activities in the past more effectively for constructing the ideological identity. The result also indicates that religious grievances have no significant effect on constructing ideological identity.

4.2.3.6 Testing Hypothesis 6: The ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.6 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment

Items	Factor Loading
b6_7	0,800
b6_6	0,761
b6_2	0,738
b6_12	0,724
b6_13	0,723
b6_3	0,717
b6_8	0,711
b6_1	0,679
b6_5	0,677
b6_10	0,67
b6_11	0,658
b6_4	0,610
b6_15	0,600
b6_9	0,598
b6_14	0,590
KMO Value	0,848
Bartlett Sphericity Test	2910,13
Eigenvalue	7,067
Explained Variance	47,114
Reliability	0,918

The KMO value for the Ability of Converting Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment Scale is found to be 0.848, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 2910.13$, $sd=105$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.59-0.800. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 47.1% of the variance in the Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.918 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to process the unemployed for recruitment in organizational bodies through radicalization, the ability to process the youth and students for recruitment in organizational bodies through radicalization, and the ability to process of processing the unemployed for volunteer recruitment in organizational bodies have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of ability to convert the religious diaspora into organization's manpower by forceful recruitment, ability to convert the religious diaspora for recruitment in the organizational body through radicalization, and ability to convert foreign sympathizers into organization's manpower by forceful recruitment have a relatively smaller effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. This explains that the sample case is more dependent on recruitment through the methods of radicalization and volunteer participation. The scale also explains that the recruitment pool for the sample case is comprised of unemployed people, youth, and students. The religious diaspora and foreign sympathizers have too little volume in the sample case recruitment objective.

4.2.3.7 Testing Hypothesis 7: The ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into funds for organizational activities affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.7 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities

Items	Factor Loading
b7_12	0,850

b7_9	0,832
b7_14	0,832
b7_7	0,824
b7_13	0,823
b7_11	0,82
b7_19	0,814
b7_17	0,805
b7_16	0,798
b7_6	0,795
b7_4	0,771
b7_2	0,769
b7_8	0,768
b7_1	0,748
b7_15	0,733
b7_18	0,733
b7_3	0,692
b7_20	0,68
b7_10	0,672
b7_5	0,611
KMO Value	0,906
Bartlett Sphericity Test	5472,013
Eigenvalue	11,887
Explained Variance	59,433
Reliability	0,964

The KMO value for the Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Funds of the Organizational Activities Scale is found to be 0.906, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 5472.013$, $sd=190$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.611-0.850. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 59.4% of the variance in the Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Funds of the Organizational Activities Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.964 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Funds of the Organizational Activities Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to process the forceful taxation to fund the propaganda and network development, the ability to process the income from the non-profitable organizations to procure training and consultancy, the ability to process the income from the non-profitable organizations to fund the propaganda and network development, ability of processing the forceful taxation to procure training and consultancy, and the ability to process the income from the

criminal activities to fund the propaganda and network development have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of ability to process foreign aid to procure weapons, ammunition, and life supplies, ability to process foreign aid to procure training and consultancy, and ability to fund recruitment and social activities have a relatively smaller effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case.

This explains that the sample case can generate more funds from forceful taxation, NGOs, and criminal activities than from donations and foreign financial aid. The fund allocation is observed to be more focused on funding the propaganda and network development and the procurement of consultancy and training.

4.2.3.8 Testing Hypothesis 8: The ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as the area of an organization's armed program affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.8 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Ability to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities

Items	Factor Loading
b8_3	0,871
b8_1	0,869
b8_4	0,865
b8_2	0,813
KMO Value	0,675
Bartlett Sphericity Test	678,855
Eigenvalue	2,923
Explained Variance	73,082
Reliability	0,876

The KMO value for the Ability to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities Scale is found to be 0.675, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 678.855$, $sd=6$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.813-0.871. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 73.1% of the variance in the Ability of Converting the Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.876 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Ability to

Convert Physical Environment into an Organization's Area of Activities Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the ability to convert the rural physical environment into an organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities, and the ability to convert the rural physical environment into an organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of ability to convert the urban physical environment into an organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities and ability to convert the urban physical environment into an organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive have a relatively positive effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. This explains that the sample case is mainly dependent on converting the rural physical environment into the organization's area of activity to utilize for armed activities and for the cadres to survive, rather than the urban environment.

4.2.3.9 Testing the Hypothesis 9: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level affects their military effectiveness

Table 4.9 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Achievement of the Armed Activities at Strategic Level

Items	Factor Loading
b9_2	0,887
b9_3	0,871
b9_4	0,868
b9_1	0,862
KMO Value	0,752
Bartlett Sphericity Test	669,871
Eigenvalue	3,042
Explained Variance	76,05
Reliability	0,894

The KMO value for the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Strategic Level Scale is found to be 0.752, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 669.871$, $sd=6$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.862-0.887. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 76.5% of the variance in the Achievement of the Armed Activities at the Strategic Level Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.894 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Achievement of Armed Activities at Strategic Level Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that all of the factor loadings of the achievement of adopting the decisive war strategy, sustaining the attrition war strategy, and adopting the attrition war strategy have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. However, the sample case is seen as more capable of adopting the decisive war strategy, while it is observed to be more capable of sustainment of the attrition war strategy. This indicates that the sample case runs on the attrition war strategy, but it is able to adopt the decisive war when favorable conditions emerge.

4.2.3.10 Testing Hypothesis 10: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the operational level affects their military effectiveness

Table 4.10 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Achievement of the Armed Activities at Operational Level

Items	Factor Loading
b10_1	0,861
b10_3	0,841
b10_4	0,829
b10_2	0,825
b10_5	0,649
b10_6	0,631
KMO Value	0,674
Bartlett Sphericity Test	1375,394
Eigenvalue	3,635
Explained Variance	60,579
Reliability	0,865

The KMO value for the Achievement of Armed Activities at Operational Level Scale is found to be 0.670, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 1375.394$, $sd=15$,

$p < .001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.631-0.861. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 60.6% of the variance in the Achievement of Armed Activities at Operational Level Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.865 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Achievement of Armed Activities at Operational Level Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in rural environment, the achievement of coercing the local society in rural environment, the achievement of coercing the adversary in urban environment, and the achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in urban environments have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of success in deterring the adversary in rural environments and success in deterring the adversary in urban environments have a relatively smaller effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case at the operational level. This explains that the sample case is capable of coercion and intimidation, but it is not effective in deterrence.

4.2.3.11 Testing the Hypothesis 11: The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level affects their military effectiveness.

Table 4.11 EFA Table Regarding the Scale of Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level

Items	Factor Loading
b11_4	0,846
b11_7	0,828
b11_3	0,811
b11_5	0,800
b11_1	0,783
b11_8	0,781
b11_2	0,773
b11_6	0,759
KMO Value	0,873
Bartlett Sphericity Test	1482,199
Eigenvalue	5,094
Explained Variance	63,677
Reliability	0,917

The KMO value for the Achievement of Armed Activities at Tactical Level Scale is found to be 0.873, and the Bartlett test of sphericity ($X^2 = 1482.199$, $sd=28$, $p<.001$) is found to be significant. Therefore, the sample is sufficient, and the data structure is suitable for EFA. Factor loadings were found in the range of 0.759-0.846. There is a factor with a higher than eigenvalue of 1, and this factor explains 63.7% of the variance in the Achievement of Armed Activities at Tactical Level Scale. The Cronbach Alpha constant is 0.873 for this scale, and the reliability of the scale is high. As a result, the Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level Scale is a valid and reliable scale.

The scale indicates that the factor loading of the achievement of command, control, and coordination with its sophisticated attacks, the achievement of lethality with its indirect fire attacks, and the achievement of command, control, and coordination with its indirect fire attacks have a significant effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case. The factors of achievement of lethality with its bombing attacks, the achievement of command, control, and coordination with its bombing attacks, and the achievement of lethality with its sophisticated attacks have a relatively smaller effect on the military effectiveness of the sample case at the tactical level. This explains that the sample case is more capable of command, control, and coordination in sophisticated weaponry attacks like ATGMs and indirect fires like mortar shelling. The sample case is observed to be more effective with the indirect fire attacks regarding lethality. The sample case is observed to be relatively incapable of achieving command, control, and coordination of the bombing attacks, as well as lethality with bombing attacks and sophisticated attacks.

4.2.4 Discussion of the Findings

As a result, the single-factor structure is verified for all sub-dimensions, and the scores for the relevant sub-dimensions were obtained with the average of the items, and the scores range from 0 to 3. A high score indicates that the measured characteristic of the relevant dimension is also high.

Findings for descriptive statistics in regard to the scales

Table 4.12 Descriptive Statistics Table for Sub-Dimensions

Scale Scores	Lowest	Highest	Avg.	sd	Skewness	Kurtosis
Ability to Access Ideological Resources	0	3	1,91	0,61	-0,786	0,952
Ability to Access Human Resources	0	3	2,10	0,52	-0,746	0,847
Ability to Access Financial Resources	0	3	2,23	0,61	-0,846	0,341
Ability to Access Environmental Resources	0	3	2,21	0,61	-0,96	1,326
Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity	0	3	1,81	0,58	-0,225	-0,003
Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment	0	3	1,67	0,58	0,379	0,019
Ability of Convert Financial Resources into Fund for the Organizational Activities	0	3	2,17	0,62	-0,492	-0,096
Ability of Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities	0	3	2,18	0,69	-0,977	0,773
Achievement of the Armed Activities at Strategic Level	0	3	1,56	0,76	-0,02	-0,346
Achievement of the Armed Activities at Operational Level	0	3	1,64	0,67	-0,28	-0,354
Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level	0	3	1,37	0,61	0,03	0,324
Total Score	0	3	1,90	0,48	-0,721	1,445

The descriptive statistics table regarding the scores obtained from each sub-dimension is shown in Table 12. Scores for each part range from 0 to 3. Ability to Access Financial Resources is observed as the sub-dimension with the highest average ($X=2.23$, $sd=0.61$) while Achievement of Armed Activities at Tactical Level is observed as the sub-dimension with the lowest average ($X=1.37$, $sd=0.61$). When the skewness and kurtosis values are examined, the score distribution is normal since these values are between ± 1.5 .

Comparison of the Findings

Is there a difference between the scores obtained from each sub-dimension according to the professions of the participants? The difference between the scores according to the professions of the participants obtained from each sub-dimension was examined by the t-test method for the independent groups from parametric methods, and it is shown in Table 13.

Table 4.13 Independent groups' t-test table for the difference between the scores according to the professions of the participants obtained from each sub-dimension.

Scale Scores	Profession	N	Average	ss	t	Sd	p
Part 1	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,88	0,62	-0,223	266	0,824

	Academician/Journalists	19	1,92	0,61			
Part 2	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	2,00	0,63	-0,824	266	0,411
	Academician/Journalists	19	2,10	0,52			
Part 3	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	2,13	0,68	-0,767	266	0,444
	Academician/Journalists	19	2,24	0,60			
Part 4	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,97	0,84	-1,715	266	0,087
	Academician/Journalists	19	2,22	0,59			
Part 5	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,77	0,65	-0,284	266	0,777
	Academician/Journalists	19	1,81	0,58			
Part 6	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,66	0,63	-0,064	266	0,949
	Academician/Journalists	19	1,67	0,57			
Part 7	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	2,17	0,76	-0,016	266	0,987
	Academician/Journalists	19	2,17	0,61			
Part 8	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	2,03	0,76	-1,018	266	0,309
	Academician/Journalists	19	2,19	0,69			
Part 9	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,72	0,73	0,952	266	0,342
	Academician/Journalists	19	1,55	0,76			
Part 10	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,43	0,61	-1,383	266	0,168
	Academician/Journalists	19	1,65	0,68			
Part 11	Retired Police/Military Personnel	249	1,16	0,48	-1,584	266	0,114
	Academician/Journalists	19	1,39	0,62			

* $p < .05$

There was no statistically significant difference between the scores obtained from all sub-dimensions according to the professions of the participants ($p > .05$). The average score of retired police and military personnel, academics and journalists from these sub-dimensions is similar.

Findings Regarding the Relations between the Sub-dimensions

Is there a relationship between the scores obtained from the sub-dimensions? The relations between the scores obtained from the sub-dimensions were examined by the Pearson Correlation Method. For this method, the scores must be continuously and normally distributed. The correlation coefficient is denoted as “ r ”. Baykul (2010) defines the relationships regarding the correlation coefficient as follows:

- $r < 0.40$ indicates weak relation,
- $0.40 \leq r < 0.70$ indicates fair relation,
- $r \geq 0.70$ indicates high relation.

The correlation coefficient could be positive (+) or negative (-). If it is positive, it means that the two variables move in the same direction, and if it is negative, one of

the two variables increases while the other decreases. Sub-dimensions in Table 14 are shown as the Part numbers.

Part 1: Ability to Access Ideological Resources

Part 2: Ability to Access Human Resources

Part 3: Ability to Access Financial Resources

Part 4: Ability to Access Environmental Resources

Part 5: Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into Construction of Organizational Identity

Part 6: Ability to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Recruitment

Part 7: Ability to Convert Financial Resources into Fund of the Organizational Activities

Part 8: Ability of Converting the Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities

Part 9: Achievement of Armed Activities at the Strategic Level

Part 10: Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level

Part 11: Achievement of Armed Activities at the Tactical Level

Table 4.14 Table for Pearson Correlation between the Sub-Dimensions

	Part 1	Part 2	Part 3	Part 4	Part 5	Part 6	Part 7	Part 8	Part 9	Part 10	Part 11
Part 1	1										
Part 2	,760**	1									
Part 3	,615**	,621**	1								
Part 4	,614**	,626**	,574**	1							
Part 5	,814**	,703**	,568**	,603**	1						
Part 6	,666**	,717**	,631**	,566**	,760**	1					
Part 7	,650**	,649**	,741**	,543**	,677**	,769**	1				
Part 8	,558**	,490**	,487**	,618**	,565**	,539**	,618**	1			
Part 9	,493**	,447**	,361**	,397**	,498**	,523**	,537**	,587**	1		
Part 10	,469**	,440**	,381**	,396**	,533**	,485**	,475**	,504**	,545**	1	
Part 11	,409**	,423**	,401**	,340**	,502**	,556**	,482**	,487**	,572**	,530**	1

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

A positive correlation was obtained between all sub-dimensions ($p < .01$). The highest level of correlation ($r = 0.814$) was obtained between the scores obtained from Part 1 (Ability to Access Ideological Resources) and Part 5 (Ability to Convert Ideological Resources into the Construction of Organizational Identity), and the lowest level of relationship ($r = 0.340$) was obtained between the scores obtained from Part 4

(Ability to Access Environmental Resources) and Part 11 (Achievement of the Armed Activities at Tactical Level).

4.3 Discussion of the Findings

The scale indicates that the military effectiveness score of the sample case is 1.9 out of 3. The total military effectiveness score is obtained from the scores from the eleven sub-dimensions. Eleven sub-dimensions were first analyzed as individual scales to test their structural suitability, reliability, and validity. Each and all sub-dimensions were seen as suitability for EFA, and they were determined to be reliable and valid. Each sub-dimension had a different number of factors, and a factor ranking in accordance with the relation between the observed and latent variables was obtained in each sub-dimension. The higher factor in a sub-dimension indicates the highest relevance level of the factor with the suggested military effectiveness character of the sample case in the same sub-dimensions. The score distribution (0-3) of the factors and the sub-dimensions was also found to be normal by the relevant test. Each factor has its own military effectiveness score for the sample case in accordance with the specified independent latent variables, indicating the ability or success level (0-3) in a sub-dimension. The score of a sub-dimension was obtained as the average of the factor scores in the same dimensions. The ranking of average scores in all sub-dimensions indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the sample case and its military effectiveness.

The scores determined in each dimension of the scale were relative, and it was seen that the scores were obtained in relation to the characteristics of the sample case. The military effectiveness scale suggests that the sample case is able to access the Financial Resources with an average of 2.23 factor loading, the Environmental Resources with an average of 2.21, the Human Resources with an average of 2.1, and the Ideological Resources with an average of 1.91.

The sample case is able to convert the physical environment into the organization's area of activity with an average factor loading of 2.18; convert the financial resources into the fund of the organizational activities with an average of 2.17; convert the ideological resources into the construction of organizational identity with an average of 1.81; and convert the human resources into organizational recruitment with an average of 1.67.

The test of the scale indicates the following results:

- 1) The ability of VNSAs to access ideological resources affects their military effectiveness.
- 2) The ability of VNSAs to access human resources affects their military effectiveness.
- 3) The ability of VNSAs to access financial resources affects their military effectiveness.
- 4) The ability of VNSAs to access physical environmental resources affects their military effectiveness.
- 5) The ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction affects their military effectiveness.
- 6) The ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment affects their military effectiveness.
- 7) The ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into funds for organizational activities affects their military effectiveness.
- 8) The ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as the area of an organization's armed program affects their military effectiveness.
- 9) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level affects their military effectiveness.
- 10) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed programs at the operational level affects their military effectiveness.
- 11) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level affects their military effectiveness.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The military effectiveness is not an inventory of the manpower, arms, and equipment that VNSAs have. Military effectiveness is an ability to process the three elements of resources, conversion, and the fighting power. The concept of military effectiveness is traditionally attributed to the effectiveness of the regular military of state actors, and there was no study to measure the military effectiveness of VNSAs found in the literature review. The military effectiveness of VNSAs is a key factor for the state actors and the other VNSAs in order to develop either a countering or convergence strategy. The measurement of the military effectiveness of the VNSAs is also a vital factor in their self-evaluation. Although it is hard to determine the military effectiveness of VNSAs due to their secretive character, this study suggests that the military effectiveness of VNSAs is measurable by a scale composed of certain parameters. The parameters of the scale in this study were developed out of VNSAs' relationship with the ecosystems, the pool of potential resources, the organization's ability to process the resources accessed into fighting power, and the practical achievement of the fighting power.

The Military Effectiveness Scale for VNSAs was developed on three bases of military effectiveness. There were three elements of military effectiveness designated: the potential resources of VNSAs, the VNSAs' ability to convert the potential resources into fighting power, and the practical achievement of the fighting power. The parameters of the scale in this study were designated based on VNSAs' relations with the ecosystems of the pool of potential resources and the organization's ability to convert and achieve fighting power.

The Military Effectiveness Scale for VNSAs is comprised of eleven sub-scales, which are organized into three groups. The first group consists of the first four subscales, which are developed to measure VNSAs' ability to access potential ideological resources, human resources, economic resources, and environmental resources. The second group consists of the next four sub-scales, which are developed to measure the VNSAs' ability to convert ideological resources, human resources, economic resources, and environmental resources into fighting power. The third group consists of the last three sub-scales, which were developed to measure the practical

achievement of the fighting power of VNSAs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The first sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to access ideological spaces through an approach of ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievances, as well as similar ideological practices in the past, so that the VNSA can make an analogy with its own organizational identity. Ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievances and the analogy with similar ideological practices in the past were designated as potential ideological resources for VNSAs. The level of ability to access designated resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's accessibility level to ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievances and to the ideological legacy of similar armed movements in the past, as well as the ideological resources, has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to access ideological resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The second sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to access the human spaces of youth and students, the unemployed, the ethnic diaspora, the religious diaspora, and foreign sympathizers. The human spaces of youth and students, the unemployed, the ethnic diaspora, the religious diaspora, and foreign sympathizers were designated as potential ideological resources for VNSAs. The level of ability to access designated resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's accessibility level to the youth and students, the unemployed, ethnic diaspora, religious diaspora, and foreign sympathizers as human resources has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the

VNSA's ability to access human resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The third sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to access the economic spaces of individual donations, the forceful taxation of individuals and private corporations, criminal activities, non-profit organizations, and foreign aid. The economic spaces of individual donations, the forceful taxation of individuals and private corporations, criminal activities, non-profit organizations, and foreign aid were designated as potential economic resources for VNSAs. The level of ability to access designated resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's accessibility level to the realm of individual donations, forceful taxation of individuals and private corporations, criminal activities, non-profit organizations, and foreign aid as a financial resource has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to access financial resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The fourth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to access the physical spaces of rural and urban environments. The physical spaces of rural and urban environments were determined as environmental resources. The level of ability to access designated resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's accessibility level to the rural and urban environment as the environmental resource for the organizational activities has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to access environmental resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The fifth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to convert ideological resources into fighting power through three methods: raising ideological awareness, developing ideological belonging, and developing ideological participation. VNSAs' ability to convert each and every ideological resource of ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievances and similar ideological practices in the past was determined with the indicators of "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high" at the three methodological dimensions of raising the ideological awareness, developing the ideological belonging, and developing the ideological participation. The level of ability to convert the ideological resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VN SA's ability to convert ideological resources into organizational identity through the methods of raising ideological awareness, developing ideological belonging, and developing ideological participation has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VN SA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VN SA's ability to convert ideological resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VN SA relations, VN SA-VN SA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VN SA.

The sixth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to convert human resources into fighting power through three methods: raising ideological awareness, developing ideological belonging, and developing ideological participation. VNSAs' ability to convert each and every human resource of ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and political grievances and similar ideological practices in the past was determined with the indicators of "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high" at the three methodological dimensions of raising the ideological awareness, developing the ideological belonging, and developing the ideological participation. The level of ability to convert the human resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VN SA's ability to convert human

resources into manpower through the methods of volunteer recruitment, radicalization, and forceful recruitment has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to convert human resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The seventh sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to convert economic resources into fighting power through four methods: funding the procurement of weapons, ammunition, and life supplies; funding the procurement of training and consultancy; funding propaganda and networking; and funding recruitment and social activities. VNSAs' ability to convert each and every economic resource of the donations, the forceful taxation, the income from criminal activities, the income from non-profit organizations, and the income from foreign aid were determined with the indicators of "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high" at the four methodological dimensions of funding the procurement of weapons, ammunition, and life supplies, funding the procurement of training and consultancy, funding the propaganda and networking, and funding the recruitment and social activities. The level of ability to convert the economic resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's ability to convert financial resources into funds for the organization's activities through the methods of funding the procurement of weapons, ammunition, and life supplies, funding the procurement of training and consultancy, propaganda and network development, and the level of funding recruitment and social activities has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to convert financial resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The eighth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' ability to convert environmental resources into an organization's area of activities through two methods: interpretation of the environment for the organization's survival and interpretation of the environment for the organization's armed activities. VNSAs' ability to convert each

and every physical resource of rural and urban environments was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high" at the four methodological dimensions of interpretation of environment for organization's survival and interpretation of environment for organization's armed activities. The level of ability to convert the environmental resources was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's ability to convert environmental resources into an organization's area of activities through the methods of interpretation of the environment for the organization's survival and for the organization's armed activities has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's ability to convert environmental resources is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The ninth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' achievement level of the attrition war strategy and the decisive war strategy at the strategic level. The achievement factors were determined in terms of the dimensions of adoption and sustainment of the selected armed strategy. VNSAs' level of achievement of the strategy is determined by the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high" at the dimensions of adoption and sustainment of the attrition war strategy and the decisive war strategy. These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's success or failure with the adoption and sustainment of the attrition war strategy and the decisive war strategy has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's achievement with the selected armed program at the strategic level is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The tenth sub-scale was developed to measure VNSAs' achievement level in armed activities at the operational level. The dimensions of intimidation, coercion, and deterrence determined the achievement factors. VNSAs' level of achievement in intimidation, coercion, and deterrence was determined with the indicators "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high." It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's success or failure with implementing armed activities to pursue the objectives of intimidation, coercion, and deterrence has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's achievement with the armed activities at the operational level is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The eleventh sub-scale was developed to measure the VNSAs' achievement level in armed activities at the tactical level. The achievement factors were determined at two dimensions of achievement: command, control, and coordination, and the fatalities of the tactical armed forces, bombing, indirect fire, and sophisticated attacks. VNSAs' level of achievement of command, control, and coordination and the fatalities were determined with the indicators of "not able," "weak," "medium," and "high." These indicators were also coded with the numeric values on the scale: "0" represented "not able," "1" represented "weak," "2" represented "medium," and "3" represented "high."

It was observed in the literature review and the test with the selected case in this study that a VNSA's success or failure with implementing the tactics, techniques, and the procedures of the armed activities at the tactical level to optimize the command, control, and coordination of the activities and the fatality on the intended targets has marginal effects in determining the military effectiveness index of a VNSA. Determining parametric efficiency in regard to the VNSA's achievement with the armed activities at the tactical level is suggested to help with a better analysis of state-VNSA relations, VNSA-VNSA relations, and the self-dynamics of the VNSA.

The data required for VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale to measure the military effectiveness of the selected VNSA is suggested to be collected from experts such as retired or active-duty police or military personnel who have experience in

irregular warfare, journalists who worked in an irregular warfare environment and academicians who have theoretical and empirical studies on irregular warfare. If there is no judiciary obligation and if an opportunity is achieved to access the VNSA circles of leadership, armed cadres, and active and passive supporters, the data from these VNSA circles should also be included in the scale. The data is suggested to be obtained through a questionnaire application on the form of the VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale.

The scale and the data about the sample case used in the scale were analyzed by the SPSS 26 program. The construct validity of the scale was tested by exploratory factor analysis for each of the eleven sub-scales. The assumptions required for the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and the criteria to study for interpretation were identified before the findings. The reliability coefficients of the scales were reviewed using Cronbach's alpha coefficients. Scale scores were obtained from the average value of items in sub-dimensions, and all sub-dimensions were distributed in the same score range. The normality of the score distribution was examined by looking at the skewness and kurtosis values. Parametric methods were used in the analysis because scores for all sub-dimensions were normally distributed. The comparison of the scores of the independent groups (occupation) was tested by the t-test method, and the relationship between the sub-scales was analyzed with the Pearson correlation method.

The scale was found to be valid and reliable through the test. The score on the scale was also found to be significant. The scores of the independent groups were also found relevant. The relationship between the sub-scales (dimensions) was found to allow a multidimensional analytic interpretation of VNSAs' military effectiveness. It is suggested that the military effectiveness score of a VNSA is scored between 0 and 3. The higher the number, the more effective VNSAs are militarily. The individual scores of the eleven sub-scales point to the center of the effectiveness (strength) or ineffectiveness (weakness) of VNSAs.

The VNSAs' Military Effectiveness Scale can measure the military effectiveness of any VNSA and suggest a numeric score between 0 and 3. The scale can also measure the following abilities of the VNSAs individually and suggest individual scores between 0 and 3:

- 1) The ability of VNSAs to access ideological resources that affects their military effectiveness.

- 2) The ability of VNSAs to access human resources that affects their military effectiveness.
- 3) The ability of VNSAs to access financial resources that affects their military effectiveness.
- 4) The ability of VNSAs to access physical environmental resources that affects their military effectiveness.
- 5) The ability of VNSAs to transform ideological resources into organizational identity construction which affects their military effectiveness.
- 6) The ability of VNSAs to transform human resources into recruitment that affects their military effectiveness.
- 7) The ability of VNSAs to transform their financial resources into funds for organizational activities that affects their military effectiveness.
- 8) The ability of VNSAs to utilize the physical environment as an area of an organization's armed program that affects their military effectiveness.
- 9) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the strategic level that affects their military effectiveness.
- 10) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the operational level that affects their military effectiveness.
- 11) The ability of VNSAs to implement their armed program at the tactical level that affects their military effectiveness.

The scale allows the user to analyze (1) the strength and weakness of the military effectiveness of VNSAs, (2) the center of gravity of the military effectiveness of the VNSAs, (3) make comparisons with the military effectiveness of other VNSAs, (4) the gap between the military capability of the existing authority and the VNSA, and (5) predict the sustainability and adaptability of the VNSAs in changing conflict environments. The scale can be applied to measure the military effectiveness of terrorist organizations and insurgent movements, such as the VNSAs. Once the data is obtained from the participants, the scores for the sub-scales can be obtained from the average values of the factors, and the total score of the VNSAs Military Effectiveness Scale can be obtained from the average values of the eleven sub-scales. The comparison of the scores must be made by t-test, and the relations between the scores obtained from the

sub-dimensions must be examined by the Pearson Correlation Method. The descriptive interpretation of the scores must be made after the completion of the t-test and the correlation between the sub-scales. For future studies, it is recommended to expand the universe of participants in order to obtain data from a wide range of participants if legal considerations allow.



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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Questionnaire for the Experts View of The Military Effectiveness of Non-State Actors

Appendix B: Certificate of Ethics Approval for Social Sciences University of Ankara Institutional Ethics Committee of Social Sciences and Humanities Research and Publication

Appendix C: Scale Model for Measuring the Military Effectiveness of the VNSAs

Appendix A: Questionnaire for the Experts View over the Military Effectiveness of Non-State Actors

ARAŞTIRMA GÖNÜLLÜ KATILIM FORMU

Bu çalışma, *Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörlerin Askeri Etkililiklerinin Ölçülmesi (Scaling the Military Effectiveness of Violent Non-State Actors)* başlıklı bir araştırma çalışması olup *Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörlerin Askeri Etkililiklerinin Ölçülmesi* amacını taşımaktadır. Çalışma, *Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi Orta Doğu Çalışmalarında doktora tezi kapsamında Necdet Özçelik* tarafından yürütülmekte ve sonuçları ile *Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörlerin Askeri Etkililiklerini nicel olarak* ortaya konacaktır/*literatür* gelişimine ışık tutulacaktır.

- Bu çalışmaya katılımınız gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır.
- Çalışmanın amacı doğrultusunda, **anket** yapılarak sizden veriler toplanacaktır.
- İsminizi yazmak ya da kimliğinizi açığa çıkaracak bir bilgi vermek zorunda değilsiniz/araştırmada katılımcıların isimleri gizli tutulacaktır.
- Araştırma kapsamında toplanan veriler, sadece bilimsel amaçlar doğrultusunda kullanılacak, araştırmanın amacı dışında ya da bir başka araştırmada kullanılmayacak ve gerekmesi halinde, sizin (yazılı) izniniz olmadan başkalarıyla paylaşılmayacaktır.
- İstemeniz halinde sizden toplanan verileri inceleme hakkınız bulunmaktadır.
- Sizden toplanan veriler *elektronik ortamda kilitli dosyalama* yöntemi ile korunacak ve araştırma bitiminde arşivlenecek veya imha edilecektir.
- Veri toplama sürecinde/süreçlerinde size rahatsızlık verebilecek herhangi bir soru/talep olmayacaktır. Yine de katılımınız sırasında herhangi bir sebepten rahatsızlık hissederseniz çalışmadan istediğiniz zamanda ayrılabilirsiniz. Çalışmadan ayrılmanız durumunda sizden toplanan veriler çalışmadan çıkarılacak ve imha edilecektir.
- Bu araştırmada Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörlerin askeri etkililiklerinin belirlenmesi için araştırmacı tarafından bir anket geliştirilmiş, **PKK terör örgütü örnek vaka olarak alınmıştır**.
- Anket toplam 89 soru içermekte, anket formunun doldurulması 10-15 dakika sürmektedir.

Zaman ayırarak ankete katıldığınız için teşekkür ederim. Çalışma hakkındaki sorularınızı *Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Orta Doğu Çalışmaları bölümünden Necdet Özçelik'e* (mail/tel) yöneltebilirsiniz.

Araştırmacının

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Bu çalışmaya tamamen kendi rızamla, istediğim takdirde çalışmadan ayrılabilceğimi bilerek verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

(Lütfen bu formu doldurup imzaladıktan sonra veri toplayan kişiye veriniz.)

Katılımcı Ad ve Soyadı:

İmza:

Tarih:

**DEVLET DIŐI SİLAHLI AKTÖRLERİN ASKERİ ETKİLİLİĞİNE İLİŐKİN
UZMAN GÖRÜŐLERİ ANKET FORMU**

Bölüm 1: Demografik Bilgiler

Lütfen mensubu olduėunuz meslek grubunu “X” ile işaretleyniz	Emekli Asker/ Emniyet Personeli	Akademisyen	Gazeteci

**Bölüm 2: Devlet Dıőı Silahlı Aktörlerin Askeri Etkililiėine İliőkin Uzman Görüşleri
Anket Soruları**

Kısım 1: İdeolojik Kaynaklara Nüfuz Edebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneėi “X” ile işaretleyniz.

	Nüfuz Edebilme Düzeyi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın ideolojik kaynak olarak etnik gerekçelere nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın ideolojik kaynak olarak dini gerekçelere nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın ideolojik kaynak olarak sosyo-ekonomik gerekçelere nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın ideolojik kaynak olarak siyasi gerekçelere nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın ideolojik kaynak olarak tarihteki silahlı hareketlerin ideolojik mirasına nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 2: İnsan Kaynaklarına Nüfuz Edebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneėi “X” ile işaretleyniz.

	Nüfuz Edebilme Düzeyi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın insan kaynaėı olarak genç ve öğrenci kitlesine nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın insan kaynaėı olarak işsiz kitlesine nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				

PKK'nın insan kaynağı olarak etnik diasporaya nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın insan kaynağı olarak dini diasporaya nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın insan kaynağı olarak uluslararası sempaticizantlara nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 3: Finans Kaynaklarına Nüfuz Edebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Nüfuz Edebilme Düzeyi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın finans kaynağı olarak bireysel veya kurumsal bağış alanına nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın finans kaynağı olarak zoraki vergilendirme alanına nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın finans kaynağı olarak suç eylemleri alanına nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın finans kaynağı olarak dernek, vakıf, yerel yönetimler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarına nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın finans kaynağı olarak uluslararası yardımlara nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 4: Fiziki Çevre Kaynaklarına Nüfuz Edebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Nüfuz Edebilme Düzeyi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın çevresel kaynak olarak kırsal olanaklara nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın çevresel kaynak olarak kentsel olanaklara nüfuz etme düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 5: İdeolojik Kaynakları Örgütsel Kimlik İnşasına Dönüştürebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	İdeolojik Aidiyet Geliştirme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın etnik gerekçeleri kullanarak aidiyet geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dini gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik aidiyet geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın sosyo-ekonomik gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik aidiyet geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın siyasi gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik aidiyet geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın tarihteki silahlı hareketlerin ideolojik mirasını gerekçelendirerek ideolojik aidiyet geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
	İdeolojik Farkındalık Geliştirme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın etnik gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik farkındalık geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dini gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik farkındalık geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın sosyo-ekonomik gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik farkındalık geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın siyasi gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik farkındalık geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın tarihteki silahlı hareketlerin ideolojik mirasını gerekçelendirerek ideolojik farkındalık geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

	İdeolojik Katılım Geliştirme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın etnik gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik katılım geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dini gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik katılım geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın sosyo-ekonomik gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik katılım geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın siyasi gerekçeleri kullanarak ideolojik katılım geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın tarihteki silahlı hareketlerin ideolojik mirasını gerekçelendirerek ideolojik katılım geliştirme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 6: İnsan Kaynaklarını Eleman İstihdamına Dönüştürebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Gönüllü Katılım Sağlama Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak genç ve öğrenci kitlesini gönüllü katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak işsizleri gönüllü katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak etnik diasporayı gönüllü katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak dini diasporayı gönüllü katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak uluslararası sempaticianları gönüllü katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

	Radikalleştirme Yoluyla Katılım Sağlama Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak genç ve öğrenci kitlesini radikalleştirme yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak işsizleri radikalleştirme yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak etnik diasporayı radikalleştirme yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak dini diasporayı radikalleştirme yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak uluslararası sempaticianları radikalleştirme yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

	Zoraki Katılım Gerçekleştirme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak genç ve öğrenci kitlesini zoraki katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak işsizleri zoraki katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak etnik diasporayı zoraki katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak dini diasporayı zoraki katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın potansiyel insan kaynağı olarak uluslararası sempatanları zoraki katılım yoluyla eleman istihdamına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 7: Gelir Kaynaklarının Örgüt Faaliyetlerinin Finansmanına Dönüştürme Becerisi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Silah-Mühimmat ve Yaşam Malzemesi Tedarik Finansmanı Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın bireysel ve kurumsal bağışlardan elde ettiği gelirlerle silah-mühimmat tedariki ve yaşam malzemesi temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın vergilendirme adı altında elde ettiği gelirler ile silah-mühimmat tedariki ve yaşam malzemesi temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın suç eylemlerinden elde edilen gelirler ile silah-mühimmat tedariki ve yaşam malzemesi temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dernek, vakıf, yerel yönetimler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarından elde ettiği gelirler ile silah-mühimmat tedariki ve yaşam malzemesi temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın uluslararası yardımlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile silah-mühimmat tedariki ve yaşam malzemesi temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				

	Eğitim ve Danışmanlık Teminin Finansman Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın bireysel ve kurumsal bağışlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile eğitim ve danışmanlık temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın vergilendirme adı altında elde ettiği gelirler ile eğitim ve danışmanlık temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın suç eylemlerinden elde edilen gelirler ile eğitim ve danışmanlık temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dernek, vakıf, yerel yönetimler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarından elde ettiği gelirler ile eğitim ve danışmanlık temin faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın uluslararası yardımlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile eğitim ve danışmanlık temini faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				

	Propaganda ve Network Geliştirme Finansmanı Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın bireysel ve kurumsal bağışlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile propaganda ve network geliştirme faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın vergilendirme adı altında elde ettiği gelirler ile propaganda ve network geliştirme faaliyetlerini fonlama finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın suç eylemlerinden elde ettiği gelirler ile propaganda ve network geliştirme faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dernek, vakıf, yerel yönetimler ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarından elde ettiği gelirler ile propaganda ve network geliştirme faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın uluslararası yardımlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile propaganda ve network geliştirme faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				

	Eleman Temini ve Örgütün Sosyal Çevresindeki Dayanışma Faaliyetlerini Finansman Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın bireysel ve kurumsal bağışlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile eleman temini ve örgütün sosyal çevresindeki dayanışma faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın vergilendirme adı altında elde ettiği gelirler ile eleman temini ve örgütün sosyal çevresindeki dayanışma faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın suç eylemlerinden elde ettiği gelirler ile eleman temini ve örgütün sosyal çevresindeki dayanışma faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın dernek, vakıf, yerel yönetim ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarından ettiği gelirler ile eleman temini ve örgütün sosyal çevresindeki dayanışma faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın uluslararası yardımlardan elde ettiği gelirler ile eleman temini ve örgütün sosyal çevresindeki dayanışma faaliyetlerini finans etme becerisinin düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 8: Fiziki Çevreyi Örgütün Silahlı Programının Etki Alanına Dönüştürebilme Beceri Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Hayatı İdame için Yorumlama Becerisi
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	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın kırsal çevre olanaklarını örgüt kadrolarının hayatı idamesini sağlamak için etki alanına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kentsel çevre olanaklarını örgüt kadrolarının hayatı idamesini sağlamak için etki alanına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

	Silahlı Eylem için Yorumlama Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın kırsal çevre olanaklarını örgütün operatif eylemlerini gerçekleştirmek için etki alanına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kentsel fiziki çevre olanaklarını örgütün operatif eylemlerini gerçekleştirmek için etki alanına dönüştürebilme beceri düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 9: Program Tercihlerinin Stratejik Seviyedeki Başarı Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Silahlı Stratejiyi İçselleştirme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın yıpratmaya dayalı silahlı stratejiyi içselleştirme başarısının düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kısa sürede sonuç almaya dayalı silahlı stratejiyi içselleştirme başarısının düzeyi nedir?				

	Silahlı Stratejiyi Sürdürme Becerisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın yıpratmaya dayalı silahlı stratejiyi sürdürebilme başarısının düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kısa sürede sonuç almaya dayalı silahlı stratejiyi sürdürebilme başarısının düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 10: Silahlı Program Tercihlerinin Operatif Seviyedeki Başarı Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Silahlı Stratejinin Korku/Gözdağı Etkisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın kırsal alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının hedef kitle üzerinde yarattığı korku/gözdağı etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kentsel alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının hedef kitle üzerinde yarattığı korku/gözdağı etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				

	Silahlı Stratejinin Baskı/Sindirme Etkisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın kırsal alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının hedef kitle üzerinde yarattığı baskı/sindirme etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kentsel alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının hedef kitle üzerinde yarattığı baskı/sindirme etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				

	Silahlı Stratejinin Engelleme/Caydırma Etkisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın kırsal alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının devlet kurumlarını engelleme/caydırma etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın kentsel alandaki silahlı program uygulamalarının devlet kurumlarını engelleme/caydırma etkisinin başarı düzeyi nedir?				

Kısım 11: Silahlı Programın Tercihlerinin Taktik Seviyedeki Başarı Düzeyi

Lütfen sorulara ait en uygun seçeneği “X” ile işaretleyiniz.

	Komuta-Kontrol-Koordinasyon Başarısı			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın taktik silahlı saldırılarının komuta-kontrol-koordinasyon başarısının düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın taktik bombalı saldırılarının komuta-kontrol-koordinasyon başarısının düzeyi nedir?				

PKK'nın görmeyerek ateş vasıtalarıyla düzenlendiği saldırıların komuta-kontrol-koordinasyon başarısının düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın gelişmiş silah sistemleriyle düzenlendiği saldırıların komuta-kontrol-koordinasyon başarısının düzeyi nedir?				

	Zayıat Verdirme Etkisi			
	0	1	2	3
PKK'nın taktik silahlı saldırılarının zayıat verdirme etkisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın taktik bombalı saldırılarının zayıat verdirme düzeyi etkisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın görmeyerek ateş vasıtalarıyla düzenlediği taktik saldırıların zayıat verdirme etkisinin düzeyi nedir?				
PKK'nın gelişmiş silah sistemleriyle düzenlendiği saldırıların zayıat verdirme etkisinin düzeyi nedir?				

ANKET BİTMİŞTİR. TEŞEKKÜR EDERİM.

Appendix B: Certificate of Ethics Approval of Social Sciences University of Ankara Institutional Ethics Committee of Social Sciences and Humanities Research and Publication

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VE
BİLİMSEL YAYIN ETİK KURULU
(SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION)

ETİK ONAY BELGESİ
(CERTIFICATE OF ETHICS APPROVAL)

Araştırma Yöntemi (Research Method)	Anket Çalışması
Araştırmanın Adı (Study Title)	Devlet Dışı Silahlı Aktörlerin Askeri Etkililiklerinin Ölçülmesi (Scaling The Military Effectiveness of Armed Non-State Actors)
Sorumlu Araştırmacının Adı Soyadı (Principal Researcher Name Surname)	Necdet ÖZÇELİK
Karar (Committee Decision)	UYGUNDUR-APPROVED

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr. M. Hakan TÜRKÇAPAR
Başkan (Chair)

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr. Aslı AKAY
Üye(Member)

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Bu belge 5070 sayılı Elektronik İmza Kanununun 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Appendix C: Scale Model for Measuring the Military Effectiveness of the VNSAs

Sub-Scale 1

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Ideological Resources	Level of Accessibility (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's accessibility level to the ethnic grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the religious grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the socio-economic grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the political grievances to utilize as an ideological resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the ideological legacy of the armed movements in history as an ideological resource,				

Sub-Scale 2

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Human Resources	Level of Accessibility (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's accessibility level to the youth and students as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the unemployed as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the ethnic diaspora in as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the religious diaspora as a human resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the foreign sympathizers as a human resource,				

Sub-Scale 3

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Financial Resources	Level of Accessibility (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High
VNSA's accessibility level to the individual donations as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the forceful taxation of individuals and private corporation as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the criminal activities as a financial resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the Non-Profitable Organizations as a financial resource,				

VNSA's accessibility level to the foreign aids as a financial resource,				
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Sub-Scale 4

Factors to Determine the Accessibility Level of VNSAs to Environmental Resources	Level of Accessibility (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's accessibility level to the rural environment as an environmental resource,				
VNSA's accessibility level to the urban environment as an environmental resource,				

Sub-Scale 5

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Raising the Ideological Awareness (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the ethnic grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability of processing the religious grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability of processing the socio-economic grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability of processing the political grievances to raise ideological awareness,				
VNSA's ability of processing the ideological heritage to raise ideological awareness,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Developing the Ideological Belonging (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the ethnic grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability of processing the religious grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability of processing the socio-economic grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability of processing the political grievances to develop ideological belonging,				
VNSA's ability of processing the ideological heritage to develop ideological belonging,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Ideological Resources into Organizational Identity	Ability Level of Developing the Ideological Participation (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the ethnic grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability of processing the religious grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability of processing the socio-economic grievances to develop ideological participation,				

VNSA's ability of processing the political grievances to develop ideological participation,				
VNSA's ability of processing the ideological heritage to develop ideological participation,				

Sub-Scale 6

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Volunteer Recruitment (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the youth and students for volunteer recruitment in organizational body,				
VNSA's ability of processing the unemployed for volunteer recruitment in organizational body,				
VNSA's ability of processing the ethnic diaspora for volunteer recruitment in organizational body,				
VNSA's ability of processing the religious diaspora for volunteer recruitment in organizational body,				
VNSA's ability of processing the foreign sympathizers for volunteer recruitment in organizational body,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Recruitment through Radicalization (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the youth and students for recruitment in organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA's ability of processing the unemployed for recruitment in organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA's ability of processing the ethnic diaspora for recruitment in organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA's ability of processing the religious diaspora for recruitment in organizational body through radicalization,				
VNSA's ability of processing the foreign sympathizers for recruitment in organizational body through radicalization,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Human Resources into Organizational Manpower	Ability Level of Forceful Recruitment (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of converting the youth and students into organization' manpower by forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability of converting the unemployed into organization' manpower by forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability of converting the ethnic diaspora into organization' manpower by forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability of converting the religious diaspora into organization' manpower by forceful recruitment,				
VNSA's ability of converting the foreign sympathizers into organization' manpower by forceful recruitment,				

Sub-Scale 7

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Procurement of Weapons, Ammunitions and Life Supplies (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to procure the weapons, ammunitions and life supplies,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Procurement of Training and Consultancy (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to procure training and consultancy				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to procure training and consultancy,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to procure training and consultancy,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to procure training and consultancy,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to procure training and consultancy,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Propaganda and Network Developing (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to fund the propaganda and network development,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to fund the propaganda and network development,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Financial Resources into Fund for Organizational Activities	Ability Level of Funding the Recruitment and Social Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)

VNSA's ability of processing the individual donations to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the forceful taxation to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the criminal activities to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing the income from the Non-Profitable Organizations to fund the recruitment and social activities,				
VNSA's ability of processing foreign aid to fund the recruitment and social activities,				

Sub-Scale 8

Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities	Level of Ability of Interpretation of the Environment for Organization's Survival (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of converting the rural physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive,				
VNSA's ability of converting the urban physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's cadre to survive,				
Factors to Determine the Ability Level of VNSAs to Convert Physical Environment into Organization Area of Activities	Level of Ability of Interpretation of the Environment for Organization's Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's ability of converting the rural physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities,				
VNSA's ability of converting the urban physical environment into organization's area of activity to utilize for the organization's armed activities,				

Sub-Scale 9

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Strategic Level	Level of Ability of Adopting the Armed Strategy (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of adopting the attrition war strategy,				
VNSA's achievement of adopting the decisive war strategy,				
Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Strategic Level	Level of Ability of Sustaining the Armed Strategy (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of sustaining the attrition war strategy,				
VNSA's achievement of sustaining the decisive war strategy,				

Sub-Scale 10

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Intimidation of the Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of intimidating the adversary operatives in urban environment,				
Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Coercion of the Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of coercing the local society in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of coercing the adversary in urban environment,				
Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Operational Level	Level of Deterrence of the Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of deterring the adversary in rural environment,				
VNSA's achievement of deterring the adversary in urban environment,				

Sub-Scale 11

Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Tactical Level	Level of Command, Control and Coordination of The Tactical Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its armed attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its bombing attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its indirect fire attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of command, control and coordination with its sophisticated attacks,				
Factors to Determine the Achievement of Armed Activities at the Tactical Level	Level of Fatalities of The Tactical Armed Activities (Value)			
	Not Able (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	High (3)
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its armed attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its bombing attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its indirect fire attacks,				
VNSA's achievement of lethality with its sophisticated attacks,				