



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN TURKEY SINCE 1980s:
CASES OF KURDS OF IRAQ AND TURKS OF BULGARIA**

Master's Thesis

YASEMİN KAYMAZ

Peace and Conflict Studies

June 2021



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute of Social Sciences.

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ÖZET

“1980 SONRASI TÜRKİYE’DE GÖÇÜN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ: IRAK KÜRTLERİ VE BULGARİSTAN TÜRKLERİ ÖRNEKLERİ”

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Türkiye öteden beri göç alan, göç veren veya geçiş ülkesi olarak kendi bölgesinde göç hareketlerinin bir parçası olagelmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin göç tarihi bakımından bir dönüm noktası teşkil eden özellikle 1980 sonrası dönemdeki göç hareketliliklerin göç alma yönüne odaklanmıştır. 1980 sonrası yaşanan ilk iki kitlesel göç hareketi bu tezin merkezine oturtulmuş ve ilk aşamada ayrı ayrı sonrasında ise bu hareketler karşılaştırılmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Öncelikle 1988 yılında o dönemin otoriter baskıcı rejiminin sebep olduğu Iraklı Kürtlerin akını, daha sonrasında- ilk vakaya benzer şekilde- 1989 yılında ülkedeki asimilasyoncu komünist rejimden kaçan Bulgaristanlı Türkler incelenmiştir. Bu olaylar her ne kadar art arda yaşanmış olsa da göçmenlerin Türkiye’ye kabulleri ve bunlara yönelik politikalar kayda değer bazı farklılıklar göstermiş, bu farklılıklar her iki vakanın güvenlikleştirme seviyesi ve kapsamını yansıtmıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı iki göçmen grubundaki güvenlikleştirmeyi, aktörleri, sektörleri ve seviyeleriyle ortaya koymak olduğundan, Kopenhag Okulu’nun Güvenlikleştirme Teorisine başvurulmuştur. Ayrıca bu teori çerçevesinde, devlet yöneticilerinin resmi açıklamalarından, çok okunan gazetelerin haberlerinden veriler toplanmış ve söylem analizi metoduyla analiz edilmiştir, böylece bir çeşit söz eylem olan güvenlikleştirme eylemi de kapsamlı olarak ele alınmıştır. Son olarak da iki olayın güvenlikleştirilmesindeki değişiklikler karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiş ve bulgular ayrıntılarıyla irdelenmiştir. Türkiye’nin ilk göç alma hareketlerinden olan bu iki örneği konu edinen ve aynı zamanda arşiv kaynaklarından faydalanan bu çalışmanın, Türkiye’ye yönelen hem önceki kitlesel göç hareketlerinin hem de son yıllarda yaşanan Suriyelilerin akını gibi günümüz örneklerinin Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi temelinde daha iyi anlama ve bu bağlamda daha çok çalışma yapılmasına katkı sağlayacağına inanıyor ve umuyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi, Irak Kürtleri, Bulgaristan Türkleri, güvenlikleştirme, göç, göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi

ABSTRACT

“SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN TURKEY SINCE 1980s: CASES OF KURDS OF IRAQ AND TURKS OF BULGARIA”

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Turkey has always been an important part of the migratory movements in its region either as sending, or receiving and transit country. This study deals with the immigration aspect of those movements especially after 1980s, defined as a landmark Turkey's migration history. Two initial mass migration events after this period were placed in the heart of this thesis, and separately at the first stage and then comparatively analyzed. Firstly, the Kurds of Iraq flow from then authoritarian repressive regime occurred in 1988, was examined, and secondly – akin to the first case- the Turks of Bulgaria who escaped from the assimilationist communist regime in the country in 1989. Though those events were consecutively experienced, the reception of the migrants in Turkey and the policies regarding them show some noteworthy differences and such differences mirror the level and extent of the securitization in the both cases. Since the main goal of this study is to put forth securitization of two migration group with its actors, sectors and levels, the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School is employed in this study. In the light of this theory, the official statements and news pieces from top newspapers are collected and analyzed through the discourse analysis method, thus the securitization which is a form of speech-act is comprehensively elaborated. In the end, the variations in securitizations of two events are comparatively analyzed and finding are evaluated in depth. I believe and hope that this study handling the early immigration movements and benefitting from archive resource, will contribute to better understand and further study the contemporary mass migratory movements towards Turkey such as Syrians in recent years on the grounds of Securitization Theory.

Key Words: Securitization Theory, Iraqi Kurds, Bulgarian Turks, securitization, migration, securitization of migration

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)
DYP	True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)
EU	European Union
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPI	International Press Institute
IR	International Relations
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
MÇP	Nationalist Workers Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi)
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)
PM	Prime Minister
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RP	Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
SHP	Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partî)

ST	Securitization Theory
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TRT	Turkey Radio Television (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US/ USA	United States/ United States of America
WHO	World Health Organization



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“One's security may be another's insecurity.”

Nazlı Choucri

The main objective of this study is to analyze the mass migratory movements towards Turkey in the 1980s on the basis of the Securitization Theory, by examining the biggest two mass migration cases: Iraqis in 1988 and Bulgarians in 1989. Thus, this period—witnessing two cases almost coinciding in time but greeted differently—is eligible to be analyzed for seeing the degree of securitization and sectoral variations for the given cases in Turkey at the time.

The topics such as migration studies, migration management, refugee relief, etc. have increased enthusiasm, interest and concern both in academia and administrative spheres, especially after Syrians' mass migration to Turkey in 2011 following the Arab Spring and regional conflicts. Even though it has been a decade since the beginning of the Syrians' mass migration to Turkey and they have been the focal point of the studies in this field, it is not the first influx that Turkey has encountered. Much as it requires and has already drawn a special attention of many circles as it is a contemporary issue, in which many of them entered Turkey in great numbers and still continue to do so, it is not an eligible case to be handled in the securitization context within the framework of this thesis. Thus, this study presents a perspective from this point with a historical background by analyzing two early cases from different geographies; one from the west, one from the east in 1980s.

Indeed, Turkey was known as a country of emigration rather than a country of immigration especially after the labor migration heading towards the European countries as of 1960s and onwards (Kirişçi, 2007). Yet, from a historical perspective, when we look at the migratory movements towards Anatolia and numerous wars waged to conquer this

region dating back to the Republican period, Ottoman Empire, Seljuq Dynasty, and even in the earlier ages including Byzantine Empire, we see that Anatolia has been a highly-preferred region as a destination because of its geopolitical and geostrategic location. After its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey experienced various migratory movements in intensive volumes during the first years. A great portion of these movements were carried out for the purposes of creating a “Turkish nation” composed of primary Turks, Muslims (Sunnis being more preferable than Shiites) and those who can be easily melted in this national identity (Kirişçi, 2000). So, the mass groups coming to Turkey in line with these practices were not considered as migrant or refugee, they were an organic part of the Turkish nation from the view of the Turkish state (İçduygu, Soner, & Toktaş, 2008, p. 361).

The developments in the region such as instability, economic problems, unemployment, dictatorships, oppressions, persecutions, inter-state and intra-state conflicts, etc. caused displacement of people in great numbers for a long time. Due to the geographical proximity, Turkey is one of the most affected countries. Actually, today Turkey ranks in the first place hosting the largest number of refugees all over the world with approximately 4 million registered refugees (UNHCR, 2020). Thus, it is possible to say that Turkey is located in a refugee-generating geography.

The course of Turkish migration history has changed dramatically due to the developments in the region. The period of 1980s, starting with the Iranian refugee influx following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, is a watershed in Turkish immigration history because it is the first time when the Turkish state encountered such a huge group of immigrants composed of “non-Turks.” Since then, Turkey has been serving as a hub for many migrants in different categories (asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, stateless people, persons of concern, and etc.). Taking into consideration the facts that the period of forty years beginning with 1980 is too long to be handled from all aspects only in one research paper, and that each of the significant mass migration cases (Iranians, Iraqis, Bulgarians, Afghans, Kosovars, Bosnians, and Syrians) from that time requires a special attention, it is a prerequisite to draw the framework of this master’s thesis by limiting the time span and making a case selection.

The period after 1980 is chosen due to its feature of being a turning point in terms of immigration towards Turkey. As the initial migratory movement, we witness the

Iranian refugee influx that started after the revolution of 1979. However, their motivation was not to stay in Turkey for a long time, they aimed at saving themselves from the regime's oppression and seeking asylum in the West. We can say that Turkey merely served as a bridge for Iranians to transit to the Europe, the US or Canada. Hence, many of them resettled in third countries, and only a small number of Iranian refugees continued staying in Turkey (Kirişçi, 2000). Therefore, it can be possibly inferred that Turkey shouldered the role of the facilitator of migration for Iranians into a third country by providing easy visa and entrance policies and temporary stay.

Towards the end of 1988, Turkey encountered tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds who escaped from the oppression and massacre attempts of the Saddam Huessin's regime at its eastern border. Having the dilemma between being humanitarian and having security concerns, such as the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* - Kurdistan Worker's Party) threat, Kurdish issue, Sevres Syndrome etc., Turkey hesitantly opened its border to "Kurdish Peshmergas" and temporarily provided shelter in the camps located close to the border. The number of those temporary refugees as of September 1988 was 63.000 (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001, p. 139).

While Turkey was dealing with those coming from Iraq, there was another exacerbating issue on the western front. The Bulgarian communist regime under Zhivkov mounted its assimilations and violent policies in the name of "Revival Process" towards the Turkish minority in the country especially as of 1984. Along with prohibiting the Islamic and national rituals, such as funeral ceremony, fasting, circumcision, speaking Turkish, books in Turkish and so on, the regime forced them to change their Turkish names with Slavic names. All these and more oppressions increasingly continued and finally Turks were forced to migrate by the regime, leaving almost everything behind in June 1989 (Uzgel, 2001). Moreover, as the Turkish government declared to accept all "kindreds" in Bulgaria and facilitated the admission procedures, the number of Bulgarian Turks arriving Turkey reached approximately 300,000 within only few months (Çetin, 2008, p. 251).

On the theoretical ground of this study lies the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School. More detailed information pertaining to the securitization process is given in the section on Securitization Theory. As one of the trend topics of the recent decades, migration and refugee crises have also included widened spectrum of

securitization. Shortly, in the securitization of migration, we see that the immigrants or refugees¹ are labelled as a threat by a securitizing actor against a referent object and if this attempt becomes successful then certain measures against this threat are taken. Via the selected two cases, in which the Securitization Theory is employed, we see how the securitizing actors' responses may vary in two different refugee influxes and the two different securitization processes because in these cases the actors (the authority) are the same, the audience is the same, and the time period is almost the same (migration of Bulgarians starts approximately ten months later than the first Iraqi influx). Through this analysis, we might have the opportunity to see the pros and cons of this theory and its functioning in different contexts.

Buzan et al. (1998), the founding academics of the theory in question, depict the process of securitization as a speech act in the language theory, which means that utterance itself is an act. Since this is a process carried out through speech act, the method of discourse analysis, in particular the Critical Discourse Analysis, would be the most appropriate method to be applied in this study. Hence, I have analyzed the data composed of the official statements and speeches of the political elites covered in the media and the parliamentary minutes. In addition to the official minutes, I have selected three of the top newspapers by circulation in Turkey. *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Tercüman* representing different opinions in the society are selected intentionally to avoid bias.

The data are the selected news articles starting from the first entry of the refugees, especially the periods when the refugee issue was high on the agenda of the politics and press are chosen. When the issue starts to lose its significance and covered less in the media outlets, the selected time period is also narrowed. It appears that both of the cases draw a similar pattern in terms of period ending, as they were dropped off the agenda due to the coming election. The press became more engaged with the elections and domestic politics during those times.

To sum up, by analyzing the above given materials with the method of the Critical Discourse Analysis, this study aims at finding adequate and acceptable responses to the following research questions in line with the Securitization Theory:

¹ Throughout this thesis, it is avoided from rigid categorization of migrants because of the different usages in the Turkish legislation; hence, the terms immigrant, migrant, refugees are used interchangeably.

- Whether and to what extent the mass migrations of Kurds from Iraq and Turks from Bulgaria were securitized?
- What are the levels of securitization in these cases (strongly or weakly securitized)?
- For what purposes, through which means, and by which actors was securitization carried out?
- How and in which sectors (military, political, societal, economic, and environmental) were these influxes securitized?

Concerning the structure of this master thesis, it is composed of eight chapters. The Chapter II sets forth the analytical and theoretical background of the study. The main concepts such as security, migration, migrant refugee and so on are elaborated in detail in line with the context in which they are employed. As the backbone of the study, the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School and their new approach to the Security Studies including sectoral and regional security understanding are covered in this chapter.

Chapter III provides information about migration background of Turkey from a historical perspective and sheds light on the legal aspect of the issue as well in view of the laws and regulations applied in Turkey on migration. Within the historical framework, the backgrounds of the two selected cases—mass migratory moves from Iraq and Bulgaria—are given thoroughly. The methodological structure and research design applied in this study are described in the Chapter IV. The selection of Bulgarian and Iraqi migration cases and time periods, Critical Discourse Analysis as the research method, and the materials used as the data are also topics under this section.

The following three chapters are the main works including the separate discourse analysis of the data pertaining to mass migration of Iraqi Kurds in the Chapter V and Bulgarian Turks in the Chapter VI within the context of securitization. Finally, we see a comparative analysis of those cases in Chapter VII. In the end, the Chapter VIII comes with the conclusion and recommendation sections to put the finishing touches to this study.

I believe that this study will contribute to fill the gap in the literature on securitization of migration in Turkey (even a little) especially from a historical perspective, and shed light upon the future studies.

CHAPTER II

2.1. ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1.1. Main Concepts and Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the main concepts such as ‘security’, ‘securitization’, ‘migration’ and ‘securitization of migration’ will be defined per the intended usage throughout this study. Despite the availability of numerous definitions, we will concentrate on the concept of security in line with the Copenhagen School, especially taking Buzan, Wæver et al. as reference. At this point, Buzan criticizes the general phenomenon of traditionalists namely classical security that emphasizes state-centered security and military power. We will present these differences and provide detailed information about the Securitization Theory which will be benefited as the theoretical basis of this thesis. When it comes to the conceptualization of migration, we will use the most comprehensive definition available to provide a holistic approach by considering all kinds of movements of people and by staying away from rigid and legal categorizations.

2.1.2. Conceptualization of Security and Securitization

2.1.2.1. Security as a Concept

Throughout history, security has been a key issue in International Relations and world politics and has never fallen off the agenda of these fields. Defining the concept of security has been controversial due to its usage in different meanings both in political and academic realms. Its conceptual confusion led Baldwin (1997) to call it “essentially contested concept”. According to Gallie, essentially contested concepts “inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users” (1955, p. 169). Inconsistent usage in several pieces of research or using the same concept in different meanings in different parts of the same work is the reason for labeling a term as an essentially contested concept. Additionally, since almost every approach and school has

set out its own definition of security in various ways, explicitly the term of security becomes an essentially contested concept. Besides being an essentially contested concept, similarly, security is rendered as “a relative concept” by Buzan (1983), and it seems safe to state that the definition and conceptualization of this term vary from state to state and even from person to person; in other words, every person’s perception of security is different from that of one another. Sometimes security appears in the dress of interest, power, military or nuclear capability, soft power, national security, individual security, or sometimes of threat, integrity or solidarity, etc. And as attested by both Wolfers and Wæver (1989), the uniqueness of each state’s core values and past experiences along with the difference in their levels of threat and fear lead to put forward a redefined security definition.

As stated above, security has been on the agenda of both politicians and academicians, and from an academic point of view and scope of its definition, it is categorized under two groups by traditionalists and wideners in other words deepeners. Among the proponents of the traditionalist security perception, initially, the Realists place security at the very heart of their studies and field of research. The Realist approach argues that in the anarchy of the international system, states as the core element of the system have to provide their own security and to seek for their own national interests through the “self-help” mechanism (Tripp, 2013). As one of the most prominent representatives of the Realist School, Arnold Wolfers’ definition of the term is as follows: “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” (1952, p. 485). Thus, he emphasizes the close link between security and protection and maintenance of the values. Defining security as the absence of threat and fear towards the values is also similar to Galtung’s categorization and definition of “negative peace”, which means the absence of war, violence, and conflict (Galtung, 1969). During the Cold War era, by departing from the definition of Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988), security studies is delineated as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force”. Walt sets forth the traditional approach as follows: “the main focus of security studies is easy to identify [...] it is the phenomenon of war” (1991, p. 212). Similarly, the pioneer of Neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz says,

The state among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war (1979, p. 102).

Thus, security in this sense is to be ready for any possible war in any case and under any circumstances with a strong army, namely military power, to survive. In light of all these definitions of some scholars from the realist wing (including classical realists, neo-realists, and structural realists) or mainly the traditionalists, security is basically the state of being free from threats towards national core values and national experiences through military power; and in this approach, state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, military capacity have a crucial place in the cause of a nation's security. This constitutes the traditional and narrow aspect of the security concept.

With the end of the Cold War, while security kept its seat in terms of significance, securitization studies went through almost a paradigm shift concerning its scope when the scholars of the time, such as Structuralists, Criticists, Constructivists, etc. introduced much deeper and wider definitions both horizontally and vertically to address more complex and multi-faceted threats, because of radical changes and developments in the international system, particularly at the political level. In Kaldor's terms, the hegemonic understanding of "old wars" composed of traditional interstate and symmetric wars have been replaced by "new wars" including intrastate conflicts, civil wars, asymmetric wars, guerilla wars, terrorism, and other new types of conflicts (Kaldor, 2013). The shift in the logic of war and the nature of threat naturally reshaped the perception of security, and these newly-launched definitions emerged to meet the challenges of the international system and security requirements. New approaches made security gain a multidimensional and broader perspective other than conventional state-centric and military-oriented views. In the traditional approach, while security is equated with national security (for the state to be free from any threat), military power, and strengthening the military aspect, which means getting a more secure state, after the Cold War it was understood that the fact is not in that way. It is clear enough in Wolfers' explanation (1952),

Security and power would be synonymous terms if security could be attained only through the accumulation of power, which will be shown not to be the case. The fear of attack—security in the subjective sense—is also not proportionate to the relative power position of a nation. Why, otherwise, would some weak and

exposed nations consider themselves more secure today than does the United States? (p. 485)

In the modern world with changing balances of the post-Cold War era, it is not possible to claim that there is a direct proportion with security and military power, other parameters like economic, social, environmental factors, and so on are to be taken into account. In Wolfers' own terms (1952), it is understood that it is more than just 'national security'. Whereas being exposed to several and various threats in different numbers and forms is it possible to respond to all these complex threats through a single conventional security perception? Therefore, the non-military aspect of threat and security was on the rise. The widening formed upon the Constructivism (Classical and Critical), Human Security, Post-colonialism, Critical Security Studies, and the Copenhagen School along with Poststructuralism and Feminism added both restructured sectoral dimensions and a shift on the referent object of the security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Together with these schools of thought, national security—the referent object of which is the state—is evolved into "human", "gendered" or "individual" security. Throughout the 1980s, while economic and environmental issues were prominent on the security context, immigration also manifested itself as a threat to national identity, cultural and societal values especially in the Europe case; more importantly, in this societal security, the referent object is society unlike the state (Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, & Wæver, 1993). Among the new forms of threats, natural disasters, pollution, famine, poverty, organized crimes, HIV/AIDS, and others can be listed (Buzan, 1983). However, Walt (1991, p. 213) claims that attributing security to this kind of concept may pose a threat to the security itself due to the leading intellectual incoherence. It even poses an epistemological problem to the notion of security; it is therefore important for us to grasp its widening process.

Since the Realists were not able to predict that the Cold War era was coming to an end, and its consequences, and fell short of developing adequate theories and studies on it, the challengers introduced a firm criticism against their state-centric, military mindset. On the one hand, Constructivists argue that security is a socially constructed term by object and object of the matter (Šulovic, 2010). On the other hand, in particular, Buzan and et.al. and, in general, other Critics turned the notion of referent object that is state or nation in traditional narrow perception into humanity, environment, individual, society, economy, culture, identity, and other similar concepts. The referent object is the

answer to the question of “Security for whom?”; namely, the object aimed to be protected is the referent object in securitization. Another simple way to comprehend securitization is Baldwin’s questions: “Security for whom? And security for which values?” (1997, p. 13).

Table 2-1: Comparing Security Paradigms

SCHOOL OF THOUGHT	KEY ACTOR(S)	KEY VARIABLES	EXPECTED BEHAVIOR OF ACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	PREFERRED METHOD(S)	NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
<i>I. Substantive Theories</i>						
realism	state	violence/military force	conflict/cooperation with rival(s) possible	state-to-state	historical/analytical	armed conflict endemic, but managed by balances of power and mutual restraints on force
neorealism	system of states	violence/military force	conflict/cooperation possible, but not likely	system	historical/analytic	armed conflict endemic, but managed by balances of power
liberal institutional	state bounded by other actors	violence/military force and economic ideas/values	cooperation	state-to-state/transnational domestic	historical/scientific/analytic/behavioral	cooperation is likely but armed conflict possible
classical liberal	individual (personal/corporate)	technological/economic	cooperation	individual	methodological individualism/scientific	armed conflict is potentially resolvable
neo-Marxist	corporations	technological/economic	conflict	system/markets	historical/analytic	armed conflict eliminated with end of capitalism
<i>II. Methodological and Social Critiques of Security Theories</i>						
constructivist	actor as a social construct	ideas/values	cooperation/ (conflict?)	exchanges socially constructed	social and social psychological	armed conflict can be eliminated by will directing reason
behavioral	research dependent	research dependent	conflict/cooperation	all levels/research dependent	scientific bias for modeling & measurement	purportedly value free


2.1.2.2. Securitization Theory

At this point, it is important to delve into the Security Studies of Copenhagen School, in particular into Securitization Theory (ST), that is applied throughout this thesis. While Copenhagen School is coined with Bill McSweeney, the term of securitization was firstly introduced by Wæver in the book titled “Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe” written together with Buzan in 1993 (Balzacq, 2016). The Copenhagen School—especially Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)—does not totally reject the abovementioned traditional definitions, yet criticizes them because of poorness and inadequacy in meeting the requirements of different sectors and upcoming challenges. With its multisectoral and multidimensional structure, the Securitization Theory of this school of thought added new sectors but by overthrowing the monopoly of military-oriented approach such as political, economic, environmental, social in addition to the military. Among the pioneers of this school, can be listed. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, and Elzbieta Tromer. Three significant contributions of this school to the field are: securitization/desecuritization, regional security complex theory, multisectoral security approach (Baysal & Lüleci, 2011). Since this study is shaped around the securitization of migration, we will explain Securitization Theory (ST) in depth in this part.

Through the lenses of the Copenhagen school, we can explain the securitization process as follows: first of all, a matter needs to be chosen for it to be perceived as a threat to the survival of the referent object, and secondly, the securitizing actor should label that matter as a security problem or threat via speech act, namely by pronouncing these concerns. And finally, the audience (it can be people, nation, or any kind of group) should accept the assertion of the securitizing agent. In such a way, the securitizing agent legitimizes its implementation of extraordinary measures to eliminate the labelled threat (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). It is not necessary for the existence of a real threat but there must be a perceived threat, for that reason securitization is generally a political choice made by the securitizing agent for the legitimization purposes. However, securitization is rendered evil or an undesired move as it assigns scapegoats of the so-called threat, so the preferred action is to desecuritize the matter and take it out of the world of perceived threat. In this way, the imposition of extraordinary measures would be hindered.

The concepts of politicization and securitization are easily confused and sometimes are used interchangeably. It is possible to differentiate them from each other as such; politicization is, too, a speech act for taking an issue onto political agenda, yet securitization is the more extreme version of politicization to put extraordinary measures into force against the perceived threat (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). Securitization thus takes the issue a step further beyond ordinary politics. According to Buzan et. al. while politicization means government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance, securitization means that the given issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (1998, pp. 23-24). The following table puts forth a clearer distinction (Does, 2013):

Table 2-2: Politicization vs. Securitization



Non-politicized	Politicized	Securitized
- The state does not cope with the issue - The issue is not included in the public debate	- The issue is managed within the standard political system - It is 'part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some form of communal governance' (Buzan et al. 1998: 23)	- The issue is framed as a security question through an act of securitization - A securitizing actor articulates an already politicized issue as an existential threat to a referent object

Due to the fact that the source of a threat is the labeling of an issue as an existential threat by a securitizing actor, this kind of speech act is seen as a self-referential act. As securitization is evolved around a perceived threat to the shared values by a securitizer, it is not possible to attribute objectiveness to this process. On the other hand, it is not possible to call it a subjective process, securitization can only be successful as long as it is accepted by the audience. This process conducted between these two actors (securitizing agent and audience) is an intersubjectively-established practice. Unless accepted by the audience, it can only be a decision of the securitizer and a securitizing

move but nothing more. The securitizing actor is generally designed as political leaders, state representatives, elites, and so on; however, it is not a requirement; a politician or an expert, a specialist may not have any power, authority, or any impact on people. So, a securitizing agent can be an ordinary person or any kind of unit having a capacity to influence the society, viz., the audience to mobilize the emergency acts. In the book of Buzan et. al. titled “Security a New Framework for Analysis” putting forward the securitization practice in detail, the units of securitization are classified as referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. The referent object in this process is anything regarded as exposed to a threat to its survival, so it must be protected. Secondly, the securitizing actor is the agent claiming the existence of a threat to the referent object and labeling and declaring it to the audience; in other words, it is the implementer of the securitizing move. The third one is the functional actor, bearing capacity to affect the dynamics of a sector other than a securitizing actor and referent object. It is not always simple to distinguish these actors from each other because one agent can be both a referent object that is threatened and a securitizing actor who utters this threat at the same. The referent object does not have to be a single one, more than one is possible as well, so we can encounter numerous threatened shared values in one single process. For instance, in case of an outbreak of civil disorder in a country, the government can name the lives of civilians as referent objects in addition to the historical sites that can be destructed during this conflict. Thus, we have two referent objects in this case: the people and the cultural heritage. The referent objects can be increased in number and varied. In order to analyze securitization easily, the abovementioned pioneers of this theory group the referent objects at three levels as micro-level (the smallest unit like individuals or small groups of people), middle scale (nations, states, and civilizations), macro-level (system scale like international system, world peace, global warming, etc.). Even though it is criticized that the middle scale places the state or affiliated concepts such as nation, sovereignty, territorial integrity as similar to the traditional security understanding; the most successful securitization practices are observed at this level. However, it is not extremely rare to see securitization at macro or micro levels.

In Copenhagen School, sectors are utilized to reduce the complexity of analysis. One of the greatest contributions of the theory to the field is its multisectoral approach composed of economic, societal, military, political, and environmental sectors. The

military sector is very similar to the traditional approach regarding security as the survival of the state, and the military capacities should be put into practice to protect the state and to ensure its survival, territorial controlling and integrity, and sovereignty. Among the main duties of government, the maintenance of civil order and peace, along with administration and law, bear great importance. Apart from the state, the religion, too, can be embodied as a referent object for military securitization; however, it could not overshadow the role of state and government. The level of military securitization with respect to the religion can increase when the state is identified with the religion (for instance, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the states having an official religion). International order and stability, public order, human rights, civilizations, and collective security can also be invoked as referent objects. It is a well-known fact that the securitizing agent of this sector is the state itself due to the resemblance to the traditional understanding. It is not an obligation for the state to be the securitizing agent but its limits and authority are defined sharply and clearly. Thus, it cannot be easily applied to other actors like non-governmental organizations, nations, tribes, and other similar groups that do not have a strict structure to advocate securitization tools (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998).

The environmental aspect of the threat is the concern of both political and scientific realms. While the actors of the former are governments, intergovernmental bodies, the others are scientists, non-governmental organizations, and research institutions. The scientific side of it differs from the political one in terms of the socially constructed structure of the political threat. But the scientific threat perception is solely not enough unless it is accompanied by the politics and general public opinion. The environmental sector is composed of several study areas; as stated in the book these areas are distribution of ecosystems, energy problems, population problems, food problems, economic problems, and civil strife (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 74-75). It is not argued that an environmental threat must be placed under one of these categories as if it can be absolutely identified, yet all of these categories can overlap with each other. In this study, it is not a prerequisite to categorize the securitizing moves according to sub-categories of the five main sectors.

The referent objects of this sector are the environment itself or the achieved level of civilization. Having a domino effect due to its nature, environmental security is a global

problem, but localizing it is a must to perform a successful securitization. This kind of a large scale of securitization does not have a big chance for success. When it comes to the actors, in a general sense the author of harm and the sufferer—the most affected ones from that harm—are different from each other. Thus, it is not easy to draw sharp lines.

Another sector in the security agenda is the economic sector. Again, state is the key securitizing actor in this field just like in the previous sectors. The reason for economic securitization is its triggering and endangering effect over other sectors, especially military capacities and state stability. If the market of a state collapses, it means state failure that can drag the survival of the state into danger. So, it is rendered as economic security agenda. And economic interdependencies in the global market increases the risk of survival of the state. Yet the spectrum of referent objects in this sector is wide enough to encompass all elements engaged with the economy at micro, macro, middle, and macro-level such as people or individuals, various groups with complicated structures, states, and global actors. Just like the other sectors, the economic sector also overlaps with the others as it has a significant effect on them.

Since the core of securitization in the societal sector is the identity, the societal sector is also named as “identity security” (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 120). The threatened object is the collective identity, namely the “we” identity of a community, and these communities do not only include nation-based citizen groups but also religious, ethnic, racial, or other types of shared value-oriented groups. The society in this sector thus means a group established on a common ground by the individuals sharing certain values and features. As the very nature of the “we/us” groups is based on the socially-constructed identities, new and various societal groups (to be threatened) can be frequently produced and reproduced. After the rise of nation-states, and as we know in the traditional view, the state is the center of gravity, and automatically the nation shares the same position with the state in that sense. Buzan and others draw the outline of threatening matters in this sector under three titles: migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition. All these construct threats to homogeneous population and culture, the sociological structure of the community, territorial integrity and state unity and solidarity due to secessionist demands of some groups and so on. As aforementioned, migration is one of the three major threats to societal security. Hence, for the mainstream culture (the homogeneous one) the state being at stake because of minority cultures

requires to eliminate these endangering elements, as part of the societal securitization process. On the one hand, the referent objects are closely identity, religion, ethnicity, civilization. The securitizer, on the other hand, generally emerges as the advocates of the threatened objects, so the securitizing actor and referent object can be the different sides of the same coin. It is obvious globalization has an impact on the society as well as on the societal sector. And in their book Buzan et al. point out how the societal sector is securitized as a consequence of globalization as follows: “(1) the cycle of poverty in the South, migration, poverty-related diseases transmitted through migration, and migration-related organized or unorganized crime; and (2) the clash of civilizations especially the dialectics of Westernization—a trend toward cultural homogenization and reactions against it” (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 138). And that movement of people causes changes in the community structure and concern among state elites and community leaders.

The final sector is the political sector, the ultimate goal of which is to maintain social order and to ensure state sovereignty, but out of military elements because they are elaborated in the military sector. This sector deals only with the political aspect of the threats against sovereignty. But as all sectors are interconnected and almost all security issues are on the political matters in old times and especially in modern times, and as there is not a very specific distinctive feature in this sector, we will characterize a matter as political securitization unless there is an obvious and direct threat to the environment, military, economy, and society. “Because all security is political.” According to Buzan and et al. (1998) political security is: “

Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state (p. 142).

The political entity can face two types of threats which are external and internal threats against the political and ideological identity, legitimacy, and sovereignty of the nation-state. For a sovereign and territorial state, the main concern is the political recognition both domestically within its borders and externally at the international system.

The referent object here is predominantly the state itself; however, similar state-like units and as supra-state organizations and transnational structures holding the power to mobilize the masses or any kind of self-institutionalized units are among the referent objects. To differentiate from other sectors, we will handle the units in the sense of whether they have an established organizational and institutional structure. The authorities and leaders of all these units (states or non-state units) hold the post of the securitizing actor. The government acting on behalf of the state put the security measures into effect as the legitimate power holder. Whereas in the weak states, the internal threats challenging the legitimacy of the government are more prevailed, the government of the strong states rather encounter external threats.

To conclude, in their new framework of security analysis, Copenhagen School advocates—especially Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde—set forth the components of the security analysis as securitizing actors, referent objects, and facilitating conditions. Their contributions include securitization/desecuritization theory, regional security complex theory, and multisectoral security approach. This newly-introduced framework argues that the security is not only limited to the state, yet it also has micro and macro levels covering nearly all forms of national, international, and small-scale units. According to this approach, securitization is something evil to abstain from and the ultimate goal is to desecuritize an issue considered as a threat by taking it out of the security and political agenda. It is also underlined that securitization is a stricter form of politicization, so we can say that it is an upgraded version with unusual and sound measures to be carried out. For a successful securitization, there are three basic steps: firstly, labeling a matter as a threat to some certain values by the securitizer; secondly, presenting this perceived threat to the audience and gaining approval from them, and, in the end, implementation of extraordinary measures as legitimized with the support of the audience. They developed a multisectoral approach by bringing the environment, society, military, economy apart from politics into the agenda. These sectors are outlined to make a much easier and detailed security analysis and to widen the analysis perspective beyond state-centric traditional views. While the state, in the classical thought, is taken as the only and the most important referent object, the wideners put other objects such as the environment, society, military, economy along with politics in the place of referent object. In this section, these five main sectors are explained and the actors of each sector are given

explicitly. As a golden rule, we should always keep in mind that even if there are differences among the sectors, they all are connected to a great extent and even it is sometimes so challenging to determine just one sector. Given that all securitizing move is a political act, Buzan generally uses a combined version of these sectors like, “military-political security”, “societal-political security”, “economic-political security” and so on. As our principal aim is to make a clear analysis, not come up with a strict distinction, this model will facilitate our analysis throughout this study.

2.1.3. Conceptualization of Migration

2.1.3.1. Migration as a Concept

Migration is not something new to humanity. Since the very early days of history people have always been in constant travel and movement for various motives in line with the changing needs. After the states (in a way, the nation-states) with strict borders are established and these borders are protected from “others” through some papers like visa procedures, travel, and movement limitations, border controls conducted through government officers, border guards, or different technological devices, movement of people began to be seen as a concern. In order to assign a more solid ground in the international law, in 1951 Refugee Convention—founded upon the universal human rights— was signed by 145 state parties in Geneva under the chairmanship of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It outlines the definitions, status, conditions, and treatment of refugees and other displaced people. As this text emerged in the post-war period, at the very beginning its main aim was to ensure the safety of the victims of war and oppressed people due to this political disturbance, yet with its geographic and temporal limits. Through the amendment of the 1967 Protocol, the scope of the convention has been widened to address all people seeking protection, by abolishing geographic and temporal limits. Since it is updated and valid—even today— version is given in this protocol, we will resort to these generally-accepted definitions throughout this thesis. In a more general sense, our guideline with respect to main concepts in migration literature will be the ones set out by the international authorities of the field (e.g., IOM and UNHCR).

According to Article I of this convention, the definition of a refugee is:

“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (UNHCR, The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol).

Thus, here in the definition of refugee, we see a forced displacement stemming from some vital motives. But it does not mean that all migratory movement results from such a life-threatening situation. Especially in today’s world when the globalization facilitates the mobility of things, capitals, materials, and the human as well, migration is a very common practice both in a voluntary and involuntary way. The physical borders separating towns, cities, or states from each other have become blurred, and we, as the humanity, have been living in an “age of migration” with the words of Millers and his friends in this global village (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014).

With the aim of analyzing this intensified movement of people, researchers from various fields and politicians turned their eyes to this particular migration realm. With its interdisciplinary nature, migration studies have taken its place in the areas of history, sociology, politics, international relations, economics, and finally security studies.

Even if it is challenging to put forward totally-agreed definitions of the key terms in the migration studies, including different categories, patterns, and typologies, it is necessary to know them at least to understand what we refer to when we say migration, refugee, home country, etc.

Thus, here are the definitions of these key migration terms set out by the IOM (2020) for the purpose of grasping the big picture in basic terms:

Asylum seeker: An individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker.

Immigrant: From the perspective of the country of arrival, a person who moves into a country other than that of his or her nationality or usual residence so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.

Emigrant: From the perspective of the country of departure, a person who moves from his or her country of nationality or usual residence to another country so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

Migrant: An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons (IOM, 2020).

According to the main distinction, while migrants are seen as voluntarily moved people- economic migrants-, refugees are seen as the forcibly moved people due to fear of security, life, freedom, and oppression. By embracing the inclusivist migrant approach of the IOM, which encompasses all forms of migrated people such as stateless people, displaced people, temporary or permanent migrants (short-term and long-term migrants), international students, smuggled migrants, and so on, we will broaden our perspective in this study. Thus, when it is said “migrant” or “refugee” in this thesis, it will refer to this inclusive meaning rather than its legal definition.

In the above-given definitions, we see that the conceptualization of migrants, emigrants, immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers are set out in the literature of Migration Studies, but we will not limit our study by addressing only one group, we will adopt a more comprehensive and inclusive perspective because the main objective of this study is to analyze the movement of people in Turkey in a more general sense.

From the window of international migration, it is possible to speak of three types of country in terms of their position during the cross-border migration process. Even if

those can be named differently, the point is their positions. The first one is the country from which people migrate, and it is called the *country of origin*, *home country*, or *sending country*. The second is the country of destination that is the final station where a person or a group of people reach at the end of their migratory movement. The other labels interchangeably used for this term are *host country* and *receiving country*. Between these two ends, the third one is the transit country. It is a station where migrating people pass by for a while during their journey to the country of destination (IOM, 2020).

At this point, in line with the definitions above, the position of Turkey in chosen cases is important for this thesis. For both Iraqis and Bulgarians, Turkey served as a destination and transit country. And because of Turkey's specific practices for each influx cases, the terms "migrant, immigrant, refugee, taking shelter" are used out of all legal categorization set out in the all officially-recognized law and regulations.

2.1.4. Securitization of Migration

We are living in an age of migration and security, and the globalization is one of the great contributors (Choucri, 2002). Although the concepts of security and migration seem like the focal points of two independent and separate fields, it is inevitable for migration to stay out of the security realm so in the contemporary context they frequently accompany each other. It is hard to set an exact date for the marrying of these two fields; however, some developments have paved the way and facilitated the process in this line. For instance, the birth of Security Studies as a separate field, straying away from the traditional military security had a wide research area to cover newly-introduced security concerns—especially stemming from globalization, leap in the technological developments—mass migrations, the influx of undocumented and irregular migrants, rising terrorist attacks (generally associated with the foreigners), organized crimes, and so on.

From a holistic and historical perspective, the emergence of the nation-states constitutes the building block of today's security concerns. The notions like borders, orders, sovereignty, identity, non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state, embassies, abroad representation, visa practices, and so on are the direct or indirect products of the Treaty of Westphalia (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). And these given

notions belong to the state, military, and classical security understanding of the nation-states.

Drawing away from the IR discipline and emerging as an independent field, Security Studies has enlarged its spectrum to such an extent that encompasses natural disasters, pollution, famine, poverty, organized crimes, pandemics/epidemics, mass or irregular migration, etc. This enlargement in the scope of the security issue draws a parallel with globalization leading to social and political shifts especially after the Cold War (Huysmans & Squire, 2009). The Securitization Theory under the roof of the Copenhagen School's Security Studies sets forth a multidimensional structure composed of five sectors: economic, societal, military, political, and environmental sectors; and immigration, especially in great numbers, occupies a highly important place regarding the state security, human security, economic security, societal security, environmental security and so on. Among these diversified security concerns, opening a room for rapidly-increasing international migration becomes inevitable.

And, we see that, within the context of the theory, to make an issue securitized, the authorities put it onto the security agenda and label it as an existential threat. So, if a migratory movement or migrants are aimed to be securitized, the political or security elites create a perception of existential threat emanating from the immigrants. Given in the Securitization Theory section, this process is a speech act performed by the authorized and effective persons. To make migration a security issue, migrants are put as the target, the elites announce them as threats and commence the justification process to employ harsher migration policies and extraordinary measures on immigrants.

The security rhetoric and act can be applied on different aspects of the migration. Particularly in the recent decades, securitized migration has been studied by many in the academic and political realms, and some weigh on the effects of restrictive immigration policies and some on multiculturalism, integration, citizenship, identity, labor market, human rights, democracy, and freedom (Bourbeau, 2011).

For example, local people consider that "immigrants take our jobs and we become unemployed". But the reality is that immigrants are generally employed in the jobs known as 3D jobs, so it means blue-collar jobs are dirty, difficult and dangerous, no matter in which country they are (Aksel & İçduygu, 2013, p. 17). Since this kind of works are not preferred by the national workers, the immigrants who are obliged to work under these

more challenging conditions at a lower wage have no other choice accepting it. Despite all these facts, they are seen as “job-stealing” people. And this concern of the public serves in the hands of the politicians and elites to take it into security agenda and create a threat discourse. Even if there is not a real concern in the public sphere, politicians can create fabricated threat rhetoric regarding employment and the economy. The contribution of the immigrants, on the other hand, cannot be ignored. Thanks to their cheap labor force, the employers, factories, and other relevant sectors can multiply their production and lower their costs.

Another aspect is the criminality ratio of the immigrants. The claim under the “criminal immigrant thesis” is that they are more involved in criminal activities than the nationals, and the number of the criminal immigrant is much higher (Lee & Martinez , 2000). But the later studies found out that immigrants were overrepresented in the statistical data. Ceyhan justifies why immigrants are more frequently associated with crime on the ground that firstly, they are generally young, male, unmarried, and poor so all these parameters make them more inclined to participate in a criminal act; secondly, unequal treatment before the justice system makes their numbers higher in statistics (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002, p. 25). The presumption that the immigrants are more prone to commit a criminal act is but just a brick to build the wall of threat discourse (Borowski & Thomas, 1994). But this linkage between crime and migration is just a stereotype shaping public opinion (Espanshade & Belanger, 1998).

The immigrants are generally associated with the “coming anarchy” (Kaplan, 2000). And there is a common belief that they will create chaos, disorder, and in the end a conflict as asserted by Huntington in his thesis named “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1996). Since this chaotic environment makes border controls and surveillance challenges, international migration poses a threat to the sovereignty of nation-states (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014). Even though migration has always been on the agenda of the states to some extent, the 9/11 attacks constitute a turning point with regard to the attitude towards immigrants. In addition to being criminal, since then the label of “terrorist” has been attached to immigrants. This event strengthened the hands of those waiting for such an opportunity to make some certain persons or groups scapegoats and facilitated the process of alienation. The migrants were at the very top of this list to be targeted. The rise of threat perception led governments to adopt stricter migration

policies and border control practices. This is the pure form of securitized migration. Due to the production of a harsh discourse of fear and proliferation of danger originating from immigrants, Ibrahim takes the securitized migration a step further and calls it racism (Ibrahim, 2005). According to her, securitization is a “discourse through which relations of power are exercised”, and the seeds of that are cultural and ideational differences (p. 164). Instead, it is “new racism”, which is a redefined form of classical racism—based on biological differences and racial superiority—, referring to cultural superiority of a certain society over others, and viewing others as a threat to their own cultural identity (Baker, 1981). The superiority factor here is the cultural differences instead of biological and ethnic differences. But it does not totally deny race-based discourse, it only adds the cultural one to the traditional racist mindset (Togral, 2011).

The end product of nation-building processes is the formation of a shared national identity mentality founded on common customs, traditions, history, language, ethnicity, belief, way of life, etc. But immigrant “others” pose a threat to this homogenous facet of the national identity (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014). Perceived deformation of social structure, undermining of the unity and solidarity of the society, and damaging the national and cultural values yield to racist and xenophobic stance among citizens. And political elites and media reflect it as social problems with the aim of convincing public opinion towards security discourse (Edelman, 2001). And we may name it as “clash of cultures or identities”.

All in all, even though the whole myths stated above about immigrants are only socially and politically constructed discourses, it gains public acceptance, and politicians legitimize their practices leaning upon this acceptance. In the end, a successful securitization would be carried out. The process that starts with symbolic politics ends with a concrete form.

CHAPTER III

3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE TURKISH CONTEXT

Turkey's evolution process from a sending and transit country to a migration receiving country will be elaborated in this part. This chapter will help us to understand the Turkish migration policies through migration history including influxes and relevant official papers such as the laws and regulations on citizenship, migration and settlement. The general information and background of the cases of Iraqi Kurds and Bulgarian Turks which are main topics at heart of the analysis are given in the below sections.

3.1.1. Migration in Turkey

3.1.1.1. Historical Background

In various parts of the world, migration policies have played an important role in nation-building processes. Because it serves to remove the “cultural and national other” and to pull and attract those who belong to the created national identity. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire with a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious social structure, a very similar pattern was experienced in the modern Turkish state. In the early years of the republic, while formulating the Turkish citizenship notion, some population exchanges carried out between Muslims and non-Muslims, i.e., Turkish nationals and other nationals.

With the bilateral labor agreements signed between Turkey and some European countries, especially Germany, as of the 1960s, the emigration story of Turks starts (Kirişçi, 2003). Expansion of migration networks, family reunion, and increasing demand for labor force deriving from the economic upswing recorded in industrial countries of the West fueled the emigration from Turkey. In 1961, with 22 percent of “*Gastarbeiter*” (guest worker) in Germany, where this term is originated, Turks would take the lead among guest workers from several countries (Thomas, 1974). This situation is very akin

in countries such as the UK, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, France, Norway, Netherlands, Finland, Canada, and the USA. This spectrum of destination countries reaches a point that covers the countries from various regions like Middle Eastern states, Russia, Turkic states of Central Asia, and other parts of the world. The official records from Turkish authorities illustrating the numbers of the Turkish emigrants in some countries are as follows: in total, approximately 800,000 workers went to Europe through the Turkish Employment Service between 1961 and 1974: out of these workers, 649,000 (81%) went to Germany, 56,000 (7%) to France, 37,000 (5%) to Austria and 25,000 (3%) to the Netherlands (Akgündüz, 2006).

3.1.1.2. Mass Migration Flows in Turkey

As given above, while Turkey was classically known as a country of origin and transit country that provides a temporary stop for those who want to take shelter in a third country especially in the EU countries, because of its geopolitical location, Turkey has been the first safe harbor in particular for those fleeing from the neighboring countries and MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region. The common feature of these countries is the prevail of civil strife, political unrest, dictatorship holding the power for years, economic crises, terrorist organizations and attacks, insecure environment, high rate of unemployment, and many similar structural problems.

Since Turkey is surrounded by many states both by land and sea, almost every development in the region affects and concerns the country and shapes its policies at home and abroad. According to data from the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior Affairs, some influxes of migrants to Turkey, caused by historical events since its foundation in 1923, are presented below (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2020);

- 1922-1938: 384 thousand people from Greece
- 1923-1945: 800 thousand people from Balkans
- 1933-1945: 800 people from Germany,
- 1988: 51.542 people from Iraq,
- 1989: 345 thousand people from Bulgaria,
- 1991: 467.489 people from Iraq following the Gulf War I,
- 1992-1998: 20 thousand people from Bosnia,

- 1999: 17.746 people from Kosovo in the aftermath of the incidents,
- 2001: 10.500 people from Macedonia,
- Between April 2011 and January 2020, due to internal disturbances in Syria approximately 3.6 million people have come to Turkey.

The immigration history of the nation-state Turkey has been studied under two categories as “new” and “old” immigration (Tolay, 2012). This division emanates from the differences between the received groups, and the reason for accepting these immigrants. The old immigration groups, from the foundation of the republic in 1923 to the 1980s, are composed of the Muslims and those with Turkish origin or culture who can easily adopt the newly-created homogenous Turkish identity (Kirişçi, 2006). Besides the Turkish ethnic origin, those, from the geographies previously dominated by Ottoman, who are considered as belonging to the Turkish culture such as Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Circassian, Pomak, Roman, Tatar, and so on constitute the majority of immigrants of that time (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 6). Thus, this first stage is deemed as “Turkification, Islamisation and new nation-building” process instead of immigration by many because the immigrating people were not “foreigners”, but a natural part of the nation (Aksel & İçduygu, 2013). The Sunni Muslims are, too, among the highly preferred immigration groups for the new nation.

According to Kirişçi, this shift from “old migration” to “new migration” emerges with the mass immigration of the “non-Turks” and “non-Muslims” in the 1980s, and only then does the government require to introduce new measures to manage this diversified groups and patterns of immigration (Aksel & İçduygu, 2013, pp. 174-175). The influx of the “foreigners” starts with the Iranians who fled from the regime’s repression following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and again the Iranians and Iraqis seeking protection moved to Turkey because of Iran – Iraq War between 1980-1988; invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990; the 1990-91 Gulf War; the Saddam regime and repression after the invasion of Iraq in 2003; the war in Afghanistan since 2001; upheavals in the Arab world and Arab Spring since 2011; and other forced migration from Asian and African countries (İçduygu, Sert, & Biriz Karaçay, 2009). And thus, the 1980s is a turning point with respect to the immigration understanding and migration policy of Turkey, because the number of non-Turkish immigrants started to surpass the number of “Turkish” immigrants (Tolay, 2012, p. 5). And the common feature of all these refugee groups is that almost all of them want

to use Turkey as a transit country to reach generally the West and Global North. Also, they could not acquire legal refugee status in Turkey because of the geographical limitation that Turkey applies on the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention of the UNHCR.

a. First Influx Experience: Iranians in Turkey

Iranians are the first migration group of the “foreigners” that Turkey has encountered since its foundation as a modern state in 1923. Turkey shares a land border of 534 km with Iran in the south (Turkish Ministry of Commerce). This direct linkage on the land and the border gates facilitate the border crossings between these two countries. In general, because of the political unrest, repression, and economic problems, and in particular the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranians in huge numbers escaped from the country. When Ayatollah Khomeini got the power and founded the Islamic Republic of Iran after toppling down the monarchy regime under Reza Shah, various sections of the society were marginalized, alienated, and oppressed. He adopted a policy forcing the public to either support his government and the Shi’ite Islamic religion wholeheartedly or leave Iran (Bakhash, 1984). The fleeing groups were substantially made up of the academicians, supporters of the previous regime under Reza Shah, and the opponents of the new regime; so, they were free to leave the country (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 13).

Under the oppressions of the new regime and the Iran-Iraq war, a great deal of Iranians took the road to Europe and the North America. Even though Turkey was just a stop on their road to the West until the resettlement in a third country, some continued to stay in Turkey because of various reasons. During that period, Turkey had a flexible policy allowing those Iranians to enter the country without a visa and stay temporarily (Latif, 2002). With these facilitated legal and *de facto* policies—even in the lack of official data about the numbers—between 1980 and 1991 approximately 1.5 million Iranians sought temporary refugee status in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 15.02.1993).

According to the data received from the DGMM (Directorate General of Migration Management) of Turkey, the number of Iranians holding a residence permit in Turkey at the end of 2019 is estimated as 67.000 (IOM & DGMM, 2020).

b. The background of Iraqi Mass Migration to Turkey

After the war that lasted eight years, Iran and Iraq signed a ceasefire agreement under the UN Resolution 598 adopted on July 20, 1987, and the ceasefire started to be implemented as of July 1988. When the possibility for a ceasefire appeared, Iran withdrew its support from the opposition groups in Iraq, especially from the Peshmergas, fighting for Kurdish independence against the Iraqi government. The Peshmerga was a highly effective tool serving in the hands of Iran during the war. On the Iraq side, the accumulated revenge against the Kurds manifested itself as persecution, oppression, using the chemical weapon not only on the Peshmerga fighters but also on the hundreds of thousands of civilians. The already existing oppressions intensified during the period following the cessation of Iranian support. On March 16, 1988, Iraq carried out a chemical attack on Halabja and caused the death of estimated 5,000-7,000 Kurdish civilians including newborn babies, children, women, and the elderly (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Upon these attacks and ongoing persecution activities, many survived Kurds attempted to cross the border of Iran and Turkey to seek protection. For the fear of further oppression following the ceasefire, after August 28, many mobilized towards the Turkish border (Kaynak & Yinanç, 1992, p. 25).

The Kurdish identity especially after the 1980 military coup in Turkey was used to be systematically denied, where some Kurds were seen as the “Mountain Turks” who had lost their Turkish roots rather than as a separate and exclusive identity (Karaca & Kirişçi, 2015, p. 304). Yet it was not the issue only after 1980s, it had a history dating back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and foundation of modern Turkish nation state. In the partition of the Empire, the area called Kurdistan including the southeast of Turkey, and some parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia was allocated to set up a Kurdish state in accordance with the Treaty of Sevres (Elphinston, 1946). Denying this treaty, the people of the Ottoman waged the War of Independence against the Allied Powers and founded the today’s Turkey in 1923. Since then, the Kurds have become the largest minority group in the country struggling to create and uphold a homogenous national identity. During the unstable democratization history of the state interrupted by a few coup d’états and military interventions, the Kurds have been subjected to some political, economic, social restrictions and discriminations especially when a dramatic change is experienced in the politics (Çoşkun & Erdoğan, 2008). Under this pressure, the Kurds

raised their voices from time to time. When it comes to 1978, the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan in search of an independent Kurdish state within and across the borders of the Turkish state and they launched the paramilitary operations by attacking Turkish soldiers in 1984 (Akyeşilmen, 2013). In Turkey, the state of emergency was declared under the rule of the military government after the army's coup in 1980. Moreover, the southern part with predominantly Kurdish population was governed by a stricter authority (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 2001).

These developments reinforced the already established skepticism towards the national minorities, which is called "Sevres Syndrome". This syndrome refers to the Treaty of Sevres promising independence or autonomy to the minorities such as the Kurds and Armenians within the Empire borders. Thus, it is the perception that Turkish state was encircled by the enemies desiring to destroy and partite Turkey (Jung, 2003).

As stated above, since 1984, Turkey has been waging an active fight against the PKK. Because the bloody conflicts between the state and the PKK became more severe at the end of 1980s, the state's stance and policies became harsher and took the Sevres Syndrome and Kurdish question to a further point. Regarding the Iraqi Peshmerga refugees, the possible linkage of fleeing Kurds with the PKK guerrillas was another source of great concern for the government. Thus, all these conditions were eligible and sufficient to frame this influx within security concerns. Yet in the end, Turkey could not stay indifferent because of the international pressure and requests of the local Kurdish population who have kinship relations with the Kurds waiting on the borderlines and striving to save their lives and allowed them to enter in the country on the "humanitarian grounds" as "guests" and not as refugees for a temporary period (Human Rights Watch, 1991). And when the government let them in, they were settled in the camps allocated and ruled by the government officials in cities near the Iraq, Syria, and Iran borders in the southeastern part of the country. The most populated camps were Mardin, Diyarbakir, and Mus. The Kurdish populated southeastern region including 8 to 13 cities was already under state of emergency rule. This authority was established to ensure the order and stability and conduct effective combat against terrorist activities in the region and donated with extraordinary powers, and it had been exercised until November 30, 2002, when the state of emergency was lifted. The Iraqi refugees were settled in the camps set up in some provinces under the state of emergency rule. The state of emergency governor of the time

was Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, who previously served as the governor of Istanbul (Öztan & Bezci, 2016, p. 13). In addition to the state authorities such as the president, prime minister and other relevant ministers, his statements are also important in this study to analyze the securitization process regarding the Iraqi refugees.

When it comes to the relations between Iraq and Turkey, the agreements on the joint security activities are important. One of them was the Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement signed between Turkish and Iraqi governments in 1983, enabling both states to conduct cross border hot pursuit operations. After the refugee crisis in 1988, this agreement could not be renewed (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 1). Turkey said it would not allow any harm to the Kurdish refugees taking shelter within its borders. Losing its right to hot pursuit operations, Turkey would no longer carry out any operation against the PKK on the other side of the border (Keskin Ata, 2008, p. 61). This outcome undermined bilateral relations and further fueled Turkey's security concerns.

c. Iraqis in Turkey

Iraq is one of the neighboring countries of Turkey with a total land border between the countries of 378 km in the south of Turkey and in the north of Iraq (Turkish Ministry of Commerce).

The majority of the Iraqis fleeing from their country and seeking refuge in Turkey were those with Kurdish origin but a significant number of Turkmens, Assyrians, Jews, and Armenians were also included (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 13). Similar to Iranians, they, too, aimed at arriving at the western countries or the US. Even if Turkey did not pursue a very welcoming policy towards Kurdish refugees because of the Kurdish issue and the PKK terrorist organization in the country, it could not turn a blind eye to the situation and considered them as “temporary guests” by allowing their entry, and additionally granted temporary asylum to them (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999).

At the end of the Iran- Iraq War, the first wave of the Iraqi flow appeared with the entry of approximately 50,000 Kurdish Iraqi citizens to Turkey in 1988 when the Iraqi army repressed and attacked, with the chemical weapons, the Kurdish *peshmergas* and civilian people in Halabja and Badinan in northern Iraq, under the Al-Anfal Campaign of Saddam Hussein (Human Rights Watch , July 1993). The total number of Iraqis seeking protection in Turkey reached 600,000 between 1988 and 1991 (Mannaert, 2003).

The second wave of the mass influx from Iraq was a consequence of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the ensuing Gulf War in 1991. Along with the Kurds, a large number of third country people who were employed in these countries and Iraqi soldiers and civilians also fled from Iran and Kuwait and sought shelter in Turkey (Latif, 2002). In that year, 460,000 people, majority of whom were Kurds, sought protection in Turkey (Kirişçi, 2000, p. 12). The total number during that period is estimated as 60,000 asylum seekers coming from the given region (Altıok & Tosun, 2019, p. 8).

As a result of the intervention operations of Desert Shield, and Desert Storm conducted by the international military coalition under the lead of the United Nations Security Council, most of the "temporary guests" in Turkey returned to Iraq, only 14 thousand of them continued to stay in Turkey, but this number also decreased to five thousand at the end of the year (Altıok & Tosun, 2019, p. 6).

Though the rapid and mass influx of the Iraqis was slowed down between 1991 and 2003 with the restrictive policies on existing of the Iraqi government, people continued to cross the border in small groups (Danış, 2011). When it comes to 2003, Iraq was invaded by the allied military force of the US and the UK together with some other nations, the Iraq War broke out, and then Saddam's regime fell. This would mean hope to those persecuted under the dictatorship and the Western states expected that there was no need for Iraqis anymore to seek asylum in other countries as the threat in their country was eliminated. Thus, in the first years of the post-Saddam period, the emigration was highly reduced only till 2005 when the threat, violence, instability prevailed in the country (Danış, *Changing Fortunes: Iraqi Refugees in Turkey*, 2011). Because of the chronic problems, such as terrorist activities, instability, economic crisis, ethnic, religious and sectarian conflicts, disorder, violations of human rights, etc. in the country, the refugee influx has continued towards Turkey in varying sizes (Kaya, 2009).

At the end of 2019, the number of Iraqis with residence permits in Turkey according to the official migration management authorities of Turkey was 141,818. And they are the second largest group with a ratio of 28% among those waiting for international protection applications within the borders of Turkey (IOM & DGMM, 2020). Even today Iraqis are the second largest group seeking protection in Turkey after Syrians.

d. Background of migration from Bulgaria to Turkey

Bulgaria, which had become an autonomous principality under the Ottoman rule in 1878, declared its independence from the Empire in 1908. Since then, the Turks in the country have been the largest minority group and become the determining factor in bilateral relations between modern Turkey and Bulgaria, especially during the socialist rule between 1944 and 1989 (Uzgel, 2001). We might see the bilateral treaties signed between these two states to solve the ethnic minority problem in 1925, 1950 and 1968. They were to reunite the divided families through population exchange (Vasileva, 1992). However, these treaties might not have been efficient to stop the pressure over Turks and they were expelled over and over again, finally in 1989.

Even if the migration of the Bulgarian Turks continued for a long time, in 1984 it evolved to a new form as the “Revival Process” launched by the Todor Zhivkov’s communist regime (Çetin, 2008). With this process, an intensified assimilation policy was put into force against the marginal groups, particularly the Turkish minority. Under these policies, Turkish schools were closed, religious education and Islamic practices such as praying, fasting, circumcision, and funeral ceremony were prohibited, and mosques were closed. Wearing traditional Turkish clothes and performing cultural activities were restricted (Eminov, 2003). Even if the name Turk was written on the previous documents and migration agreements, Communist leader Zhivkov denied the existence of the Turkish identity and minority in Bulgaria with his words “There is no Turks in Bulgaria, there are Muslim Bulgars”. He claimed that those were the Bulgarians forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman invasion (Kamusella, 2018).

At a time when the pressures and tortures reached an unbearable level, such as changing Turkish names to Slavic names, some uprisings and resistance to the regime broke out in Turkish populated towns and cities. To suppress those protests, the troops were deployed and caused some casualties (Poulton, 1989). The island of Belene was utilized as a prison and forced labor camp for those who acted and thought against the regime including Muslims and Turks. That is why it is remembered as a symbol of the communist repressions and violent policies in Bulgaria (Koleva, 2012, p. 4).

Forced migration was also a part of this process to decrease the Turkish population and the “Big Exodus” unfolded in the mid of 1989. The Turkish government declared to open the borders to all oppressed Turks in Bulgaria on May 30, 1989. Within a very short

period as May 30 – August 22, approximately 300,000 “un-Bulgarianize-able” people from Bulgaria crossed the border (Kamusella, 2018, p. 1).

e. Bulgarians in Turkey

While Turkey was trying to handle the refugee flows from the southern neighboring countries in the Middle East, this time it was subjected to another flow from the west, from Bulgaria sharing 269 km of the land border (Turkish Ministry of Commerce). At the end of the nineteenth century, the communist regime launched the Bulgarisation campaign through assimilation policy practices against the minority groups in the country (Vasileva, 1992). And ethnic Turks were the primary target of the government because they were different from the original Bulgarians, and the forced migration of Turks was initiated by the hands of Todor Zhivkov’s government (Çetin, 2008, p. 250).

When the campaign was intensified, 300,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to the Turkey frontier and sought protection. And Turkish government eased the visa, entrance and exit procedures for their Bulgarian-Turk cognates, and granted citizenship most of them much easily when compared to the other asylum seekers. However, those who could not meet their expectations in Turkey started to turn back to their country. In the end, 154,937 of them returned and 212,688 of them remained in Turkey (Ihlamur Öner, 2013, p. 196).

3.1.2. Legal Background

To have a comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s asylum and refugee policies, in this part laws and regulations on citizenship, settlement, asylum, immigration, refugee status, human trafficking, etc. are presented in chronological order. In line with the scope of this study, only parts of the laws and regulations on immigration are given and articles and official documents on emigration are excluded.

3.1.2.1. Law on Citizenship

The boundaries of Turkish citizenship are drawn by Article 66 of the Turkish Constitution as follows:

ARTICLE 66- Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.

(Sentence repealed on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) Citizenship can be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be forfeited only in cases determined by law.

No Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he/she commits an act incompatible with loyalty to the motherland. Recourse to the courts in appeal against the decisions and proceedings related to the deprivation of citizenship shall not be denied (Turkish Constitution).

This article on citizenship is the founding block of migration policies, as those not covered in this citizenship article falls under the laws and regulations pertaining to migration, refugee, asylum seeker, and so on.

3.1.2.2. Law on Settlement (1934)

The first Settlement Law No. 2510 of 1934 has a special emphasis on “Turkish culture and descent”, thus the people that could easily be integrated to and assimilate into Turkish identity can receive asylum seeker or refugee status or even citizenship (Şirin Öner & Genç , 2015). This practice preserves its validity in the amended new Settlement Law No. 5543 of 2006.

In the law, the foreigners are defined as “immigrant (*göçmen / muhajir*)”, and pursuant to Sub-article d of Article 3, its definition is as follows: individuals or groups of Turkish descent and culture who came to settle in Turkey (2150 Numaralı İskan Kanunu, 1934). Basically, this law defines who has the right to enter and settle and who can apply for asylum (Suter, 2013, p. 12).

Until 1994, Turkey did not develop a specific regulation on refugees and asylum seeker, and hence Aksel & İçduygu call this period of legally disregarding the foreigners in the country as “time of ignorance” (Aksel & İçduygu, 2012, p. 40).

3.1.2.3. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and 1967 UN Protocol

Turkey has become a party to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (also known as 1951 Geneva Convention) on August 24, 1951, and to its 1967 New York Protocol on March 30, 1962 (UN, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 2020).

The Turkish government tightly holds on to the “geographical reservation” that refers to the "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in the Convention (UN, 1951). It means that Turkey gives the right to seek asylum and to apply for refugee status only to those coming from the European countries. Non-European refugees—comprising a great majority of refugees in Turkey—are not accepted and considered within the framework of this convention. The authority charged with these non-European refugees is the UNHCR’s Turkey office, not the Turkish government.

The government provides temporary protection to these non-conventional refugees until they are resettled in a third country by the UNHCR or repatriated. Hence, they cannot fully enjoy the refugee rights set out in the Convention.

Even though there have been some initiatives to lift the geographical limitation from time to time during the EU accession process in order to harmonize the Turkish refugee policies with the EU *acquis*, the Turkish state has never stepped back from its stance by asserting the vulnerable and unstable nature of its geography, and the potential influxes besides the already-experienced.

3.1.2.4. Regulation on Asylum (1994)

Turkey was caught unaware by the mass influx of non-national immigrants made up of Iranians, Iraqis, and partly Bulgarians after the events unfolded in the region. The previously pursued policies were not adequate and could not address the requirements of the changing migration trends. On the other hand, some disputes were arising out of the Turkish refugee practices, and geographical limitation between the state officials and the UNHCR. So, in order to eliminate these disagreements between Turkish authorities and the UNHCR with relation to the issues such as granting asylum and/or refugee status, protection, settlement, etc., the Turkish government itself issued a national regulation on these matters for the first time. This step can be interpreted as the end of the “time of ignorance” and the starting point of a new era. With this regulation, both European and non-European asylum seekers were required to make an application to the Turkish state official besides the UNHCR (Suter, 2013, p. 13).

CHAPTER IV

4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Since this study aims to analyze the threat perception towards the migrants in two influx cases, it naturally falls in the study area of securitization of migration and the Securitization Theory due to its widened security agenda. We will see the functioning process by demonstrating how each migration influx became a securitized matter in different ways.

In these cases, it is required to take into account the contextual circumstances, internal and external factors, political, social, and economic environment, and the international system within the designated period. Because we witness two different receptions by the same securitizing actors towards similar migratory flows.

4.1.1. Case selection

When it comes to the cases selected for this study, the first one is the mass migration of Iraqis experienced in two waves. In 1988, upon the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the oppression of Saddam regime and *Al-Anfal* (The Spoils) Campaign targeting primarily Kurdish people, *peshmergas*², Shiites, and other marginalized groups, the first wave of the flow of Iraqi people started. The second wave appeared when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and the international coalition resorted to military intervention in the conflict. This coming group was majorly composed of foreign workers residing in these two countries (Danış, 2006). Turkey hesitated to accept the refugees in both waves because of the domestic problems like the Kurdish issue, the PKK threat, and the possible affiliation of the coming refugees with this terrorist organization. Despite the first rejections, in the end Turkey allowed them to enter as “temporary guests for humanitarian reasons” under the strict controls (Danış, 2006, p. 35).

² *Peshmerga* literally means “those who face with death” and it refers to the Kurdish nationalist fighters. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975>)

The second case is the large influx of Bulgarian Turks because of the oppressive and assimilationist policies of the communist leader Todor Zhivkov. Increasing repression of the regime led 340,000 Turks of Bulgaria to cross the border between June and September in 1989 until Zhivkov was toppled down (France-Presse, 2012). Turkey, as a state, took up a stance supporting Turks in Bulgaria, condemning the government and welcoming those who were forced to migrate and seek refuge in Turkey.

The state response of Turkey to these two massive fluxes occurring almost in the same period (from 1988 to 1991) differs from one another. I think that these cases are crucial to comprehend Turkey's two-tiered migration policy towards two different refugee groups from the West and the East under the same government. On the one side, there is a group entailing the "European" and "Turk"; on the other side, there is a group entailing the "non-European" or "Middle-Eastern" and "non-Turk". To better understand the differentiated reaction of Turkey in these cases, the statements and data collected regarding influxes are analyzed in a qualitative manner by employing the method of discourse analysis.

4.1.2. Time period

The period that I analyzed the news is composed of the dates on which selected newspapers gave a place to the Iraqi and Bulgarian refugee influxes on their first pages. So, it varies in the two cases. For example, in the Iraqi case, the first official admission of the refugees was on September 1, 1988. For sure, there were unofficial entrances in small groups before that day, but this study concentrates on the mass flows. As of the admission, the Iraqi refugees intensely occupied the agenda in the media, and took place in all newspapers and even on their first pages and headlines until the referendum rally to be held on September 25. After September 20, the agenda of the state and media was busy enough with the referendum rally campaigns and domestic political affairs to let the refugee flow slip off the agenda. Hence, in the Iraqi case, I have analyzed the statements and news in a period of approximately one month starting with September 1, when the Iraqi refugee issue was the hot debate in both media and politics.

In the Bulgarian case, even if there were media coverages about the Bulgarian regime's oppression towards Turks in previous months, the analysis of this study starts as of May 30, 1989. On this day, Prime Minister Özal made a statement that Turkey would

admit all its Turkish kindreds in Bulgaria and the masses of people appeared at the border gates. This case reflected intensely in the media as we could see the news articles and stories about the Bulgarian policies and those who had to flee to Turkey every day on the first pages. It lasted about three months and when the government took the decision to reintroduce the visa requirement on August 22, the volume of the migration and the interest of the media as well decreased. Despite this decrease, I have continued my analysis until the issue almost totally lost its place on the agenda, namely until the election. The presidential election—for the first time under the military rule—would be held on October 31, and as the day approached to vote, the main focus of the press and politicians became the election and domestic politics rather than Bulgarian Turk refugees. Thus, it is possible to say that the news articles published in five months are analyzed for the Bulgarian refugee case. In total, nearly six hundred news articles and editorials are examined throughout this study.

4.1.3. Discourse analysis: Operationalization

In this study, discourse analysis is utilized as a qualitative research method, since it is one of the most expedient methods for the Securitization Theory and the detailed analysis of speeches and texts.

First of all, the question of “What does discourse mean?” comes to mind. One of the leading theorists in the field, Foucault describes it as follows, “discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence” (Foucault, 1972, p. 107). And he draws attention to the power relations between language and society in order to understand the intersubjective feature of the discourse. This intersubjectivity can also be seen in the speech act of the securitization. Indeed, the act of securitization is a socially constructed security discourse.

Away from all philosophical and linguistic debates, very basically, discourse is “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world) (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). And security, especially from the perspectives of the state authorities as the actor, is a nonignorable part of that realm.

Buzan et.al. say that the discourse analysis is the obvious method to be applied in these cases, as it shows when and how something (in our study migration and migrants)

is established by whom as a security threat (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 176). Copenhagen School especially puts an emphasis on the Speech Act Theory of John L. Austin in his book titled "*How to Do Thing with Words*" (Austin, 1962) and frames securitization as a speech act (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998). It means that saying equals acting, so when you enunciate something as a threat, it becomes a threat in accordance with the Securitization Theory that rises on the speech act.

Namely, the main point in securitization for a securitizing agent is to create a security discourse through speech act. This process itself is a discourse, so the most appropriate method naturally might be discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is conducted by making an insightful and comprehensive interpretation of a given data by going beyond the uttered words and sentences.

In the study, I particularly apply the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough. He says language as a discourse is both changed and formed by the people and also shapes the society (Fairclough, 1995). So, the CDA adopts a broader analysis style among the other types of discourse analysis. In accordance with this approach, analysis of the text is not sufficient on its own, so it should be supported with more comprehensive historical, social, and sociopolitical research (Stritzel, 2012, p. 552).

The discursively analyzed materials are mainly made of the speeches and written texts, but it is not only limited to those, visual materials are also an indispensable part of the discourse (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61). Fairclough also argues that critical discourse analysis brings together the following steps: (a) analysis of the text, (b) analysis of processes of text production, consumption, and distribution, and (c) sociocultural analysis of the discursive event (be it an interview, a scientific paper, or a conversation) (Fairclough, 1995, p. 23). For this reason, along with the texts, I have enforced my analysis through this kind of semiotic elements such as the pictures from the newspapers relevant to my thesis topic, as well.

In line with this method, I have selected the intended statements, the scope of which is outlined in the following section, and I have directly translated them from Turkish to English as possible in order to better demonstrate the authentic statements and make a proper discourse analysis. Along with these translations, I have interpreted them according to the CDA. At the same time, the contextual information is also provided within the framework of the CDA, and the analysis is supported by visual materials.

4.1.4. Data-Access Issues

The secondary data extracted from minutes of the mainstream newspapers of that time and Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi-TBMM*) form the main source of this study. The minutes of the TBMM since 1908 are open to access on its official website, so I selected from among them the relevant ones by making research with the keywords (such as Iraq, Iraqi refugees, Kurds, Peshmerga, Bulgars, Bulgarian Turks, migration, muhajir, migration, immigration, security, border, etc. and the derivations). However, when I look up any minutes relating to Kurdish refugees, I find no reference to this issue. Concerning Bulgarian Turks, the statements were mostly identical to or similar to what was written in the newspapers. As a result, even though I reviewed all of the minutes at the time, I was unable to obtain the necessary material, and instead relied heavily on newspaper articles and editorials.

Hence, the research materials collected and discursively analyzed are the speeches, and written and/or oral statements on the relevant issues (Bulgarian and Iraqi migrants), delivered by the president, prime ministers, the state elites, ministers, members of the parliament, relevant provincial and district governors, municipals and other authorities in the region (if they made any statement about the issue and if their statements were covered in the media outlets stated below), news, editorials, parliamentary speeches, written records, and minutes of that time. These mayors and governors are those of the provinces and the districts hosting most of the refugees.

In addition to the parliamentary minutes having a significant place in this paper, as they represent the state's official rhetoric from the first hands, some certain mainstream newspapers with the mass-circulation at the time are examined. To avoid prejudice and partiality, three newspapers representing different sections of the society are selected. For example, *Milliyet* positioned itself in the center-right, *Tercüman* (*Halk'a ve Olaylara Tercüman*) as nationalist and conservative, and *Cumhuriyet* in the social-democrat, Kemalist and center-left wing (Open Source Center, 2008). I have selected the relevant news if it is covered on the first page. Whether this news is covered in the first pages of the newspapers and given a place in the headlines are important clues. They can also be covered in the last pages and not given a noteworthy place. With these hints in mind, it can facilitate grasping the level of securitization, if strong or weak.

Thus, it bears the feature of being archival research. So, only the materials reflected in the media, namely the chosen newspapers, and parliamentary minutes in the selected period are analyzed in this study.



CHAPTER V

5.1. SECURITIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MASS IMMIGRATION OF IRAQI KURDS

This chapter is composed of the analysis of the selected documents and news regarding the influx of Iraqi Kurds. For the theoretical basis, the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School is used to understand the securitization process, extent, and elements of the given case.

Briefly recalling the background of this case explained in Chapter III, Turkey at the beginning was reluctant and concerned about accepting the Kurds who fled to the border, as they would revive the denied “Kurdish question”. What makes this issue more complicated is that the refugees were mostly armed Kurdish fighters and their families, enhancing the fear of possible affiliation with the PKK. In addition, it was thought that this influx would bring a great burden on the state’s already weak economy. Even though the border opening for the refugees was not allowed and the previously admitted refugees were returned to their country on the first days, Turkey could not maintain this policy and opened the gates (Firat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001, p. 138). *Cumhuriyet* interpreted these steps of the government as follows, “the border was closed on the grounds of ‘political reasons’ and then reopened on the grounds of ‘humanitarian reasons’” (Cumhuriyet, 04.09.1988).

As of September 1, the Iraqis were officially allowed to enter Turkey with the decision of the National Security Council³ convened on the previous day. Starting from this date, the news, editorials, and statements taken place in the selected newspapers are analyzed as follows.

³ The meeting was held as closed to the press. And the decision taken there was not totally declared in detail to the public and press. Even if I have contacted with the Undersecretariat of the National Security Council for the archival access, I could not access this decision for confidentiality reasons. Thus, in hand there is only the statement given by the Prime Minister Özal on the following day.

In the Turkish press, Iraqi refugees were mostly called “Peshmerga” which carries a negative reputation and connotation, as it refers to the Kurdish guerilla fighters. Peshmerga might be seemed less dangerous than Kurd. Because uttering even the name of “Kurd” became problematic especially after the military coup in 1980 and Kenan Evren was holding the post of president as the chief commander (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001). The newspaper *Cumhuriyet* calls the refugees as “Kurds” and seems to bring the “Kurdish problem” to the forefront with its editorials and media coverages. While *Milliyet* used the concept of “Peshmerga”, *Tercüman* preferred to use both terms interchangeably in most of the news.



Figure 5- 1: Milliyet, 01.09.1988

Motherhood and freedom: The mothers and children are the mostly suffered ones among the Kurds taking refuge in Çukurca escaping from Iraq. This young woman getting hopeful due to Turkey's humanitarian approach is breastfeeding her little baby and enjoying the freedom for now in a little while.

5.1.1. “Humanitarian Approach” and Status of the Refugees

On September 1, 1988, when the Turkish state agreed to open the border gates for the Iraqi refugees, *Milliyet* announced this news with the headline “Kurdish tragedy coming from Iraq is getting intensified” and the photo of a nursing woman with her baby was given under this headline.

Similar to the news above, in *Tercüman*, the below figure with a story about a woman who escaped from the persecution with her 4 children were given on the first page. While crossing the river, she lost her all children in the water. This story was also covered in the headlines of *Cumhuriyet*. There are many similar tragic stories and reflecting such stories in the press would evoke the empathy feelings of the local people and pave the way to public consent and acceptance. Yet at the same time it is possible to see the emphasis on the Peshmerga fact and name these groups of women, children, and the elderly as “families of Peshmerga”. The news stories say that when the women were asked about their husbands, boys, and other relatives, they proudly talked about their men fighting in Iraq (Cumhuriyet & Tercüman, 02.09.1988).



Figure 5- 2: Tercüman, 02.09.1988

Tragedy at the Border: The families of the Peshmerhas entered Turkey from the Northern Iraq are temporarily settled in Çukurca and neighboring towns. Thousands of people who could not find a place to stay in are waiting in a state of fear and excitement. Women are wailing both for their loss relatives and their fate. This scene has been experienced for weeks in Turkey’s border region with the Northern Iraq.

According to the news stories in *Tercüman*, the refugees were provided with food, water, and basic materials by the government and people in the region (most of them are relatives of the Iraqi Kurds). Since there were many women and children, a team of prenatal care services, baby food, medicines, and disinfectant material are sent to the region on the third day of the influx (03.09.1988, *Tercüman*). Governorate of Diyarbakir established a committee to ensure the temporary settlement and protection of the Kurdish families brought to Turkey. The Provincial Governor said all needs of the refugees would be met by the committee day and night.” The news articles wrote the aid and donation from the mayors, politicians, and local people under the headline of “Wealth of the Hearts” (*Tercüman*, 04.09.1988). According to this newspaper article, the “humanitarian aspect” of the issue gained ground in media and the public sphere. However, the public support and sympathy seemed to be limited to the Kurds in the region, since there was not any news (neither approving nor opposing) about the rest of the public in other parts of Turkey. There were only stories about the Kurdish people who gave their helping hands to the Iraqi Kurds arrived in Turkey. We could not have any information reflected in the media about the help and support of the Turks. Likewise, in the helps from the politicians covered in the media, we may see the contributions of the MPs from the eastern provinces like Nurettin Yılmaz and some other members of parliaments from ANAP with Kurdish origins (*Milliyet*, 07.09.1989).

Putting the humanitarian approach aside, Turkey’s image in the West and the relations with the EC (European Community—today’s European Union) might appear as among the primary targets of the state during those years. It is also significant that after having severed relations with the EC for several years following the 1980 coup, Turkey attempted to resume and improve bilateral relations from 1983 Europe under the premiership of Özal (Oniş, 2000, p. 268). In fact, Turkey applied for the full membership of the community in 1987 and was rejected in 1989 (Eralp, 2000). While officially there were a number of reasons to justify this decision, for many people in Turkey the real reason was that Turkey was not seen as sufficiently democratic and ‘European’ (McClaren & Müftüler-Bac, 2003, p. 18). Therefore, it can be suggested that Turkey was very careful about the image it was projecting to outside, especially to Europe, even more than usual.

The handling of this refugee crisis might be read as an opportunity in the construction of better and more democratic image.



Figure 5- 3: Milliyet, 08.09.1988

Exhausted: The woman whose name is Sindo, gets exhausted reaching the protection center after fourteen hours of journey. She lies in the sun with her child.

The news articles of that time also give a special place to this issue. Putting the humanitarian approach aside, under the headline of “Key week in the EC: The Peshmerga is our trump card”, the meeting in the EC is elaborated. The observers from the European Community expressed that “the recent events about the Iraqi Kurds made Turkey score points (Tercüman, 08.09.1988). In this sense, it seems like Turkey came closer to its goal on the way to the accession process, because one of the motives for Turkey to admit Iraqi Kurds was to reshape its image in a better way in the West. As the time passed, even if some of the refugees had to return to Iraq, Turkey could be able to get the attention and support of the international actors in the long term, especially during the second wave of the Iraqi refugees in 1991 when the number reached half a million. The military interventions such as Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Operation Provide Comfort were carried out by the international alliance under the lead of the UNSC and the NATO. At the end of these operations a no-fly and safe zone was established for the refugees in Iraq throughout the Turkish border, and finally the majority of the refugees in Turkey returned to Iraq, from half a million only 14 thousand continued to stay in Turkey, but this number

decreased to five thousand at the end of the year when the transit processes to a third country were completed (Karaca & Kirişçi, 2015). It seems that Turkey trying to handle this issue outside of its border managed to send back the refugees who came in 1988 with the first wave by the resolution concluded after the second wave in 1991.

On the following days, the humanitarian aspect continued to be highlighted in the newspapers. In the below figure, *Cumhuriyet* covers a news story about a sad Peshmerga who lost his baby. It tried to keep alive the empathy as on the first days.



Figure 5- 4: Cumhuriyet, 16.09.1988

Hope and Sorrow: This elderly Peshmerga is among those escaping from Iraq's operations and taking refuge in Turkey. He just started to taste the joy of saving his life and the hope for building a new life for his little children, he felt the sorrow of losing his baby.

When it comes to their admission, according to the news stories in three newspapers, the National Security Council convened to discuss the situation of the Iraqis waiting at the border, under the leadership of President Kenan Evren with the participation of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mesut Yılmaz, Minister of Interior Mustafa Kalemli, Minister of Defense Ercan Vuralhan, Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay, and the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Especially after the military coup in 1980, the National Security Council occupied a more crucial position in the decision-making process, and its mission was projected as it was a

governmental body charged with national security, order, adopting policies for the sovereignty, unity, and existence of the state. (MGK, 1982). Discussing the refugee issue in the NSC meeting means that this flow is considered clearly as a national security problem. Handling of the issue at the NSC is clearly an indication that the matter at hand is treated as a security issue. Furthermore, it can be argued, it is itself part of the very act of securitization. After all, the meeting obviously gives a clear message: the Turkish state is taking the issue very seriously and as a potential national security problem. In other words, instead of creating a, say, parliamentary sub-committee to discuss the issue, the very top national security mechanism handles it with the involvement of the heads of state and government as well as the army.

Prime Minister Özal's statement after the meeting was as follows: "Of course, there were some items on the agenda of the National Security Council. In general, interior and internal affairs, security issues. At each meeting, these issues are discussed. At this meeting, the recent problems in our southern border are also among our agenda items. You must see it in the newspapers as well. It is known that a significant number of people of children and women have crossed the Turkish border because of Iraq's operations there. This issue is handled. We guess some more border crossings may take place because they came as terrorized, they are scared of the operations there. Turkey adopts a humanitarian stance on this matter. We will provide all kinds of humanitarian aid, especially to women and children. We will continue talks with Iraq regarding this issue. We do not know the exact number of them. But we guess there are 20 thousand." (Cumhuriyet, 01.09.1988).

He highlights especially "women and children", because the others were the weapon-carrying boys and men and they were mostly the Kurdish guerrillas combating against the regime in Iraq. Their situation and threat perception towards the Peshmergas might be different from those of vulnerable groups. The repeated emphasis on the "humanitarian approach" is important, and almost in all statements, this phrase is uttered. The newspapers also emphasize the humanitarian aspect and tell the world a story about a strong, democratic and humanitarian Turkey. As stated above the motivation herein is to enhance Turkey's image and elevate its position in the international arena and the West and particularly on the path to accession to the EC following the full membership application in 1987 (Karasapan, 1989). On September 15, there would be the sitting of

the European Parliament to evaluate Turkey's accession process. So, until that time, Turkey must chalk up points through its response to the refugee crisis. Although they tried to uphold this positive and welcoming approach, neither Turkish politicians nor the Turkish press could desist from speaking of domestic and national concerns.

On the following day, on September 2, a cabinet meeting was held and the PM answered the question regarding this issue. He repeatedly stressed that they adopted a highly humanitarian approach and it was a human duty. He said, "Although this is not the first time when Turkey encounters such an incident, from another perspective, it is new to us, as they are not our citizens. According to them, they escaped from death, so we have quite a humanitarian approach". He underlined "according to them" and indicated the relativity and subjectivity of the situation and the suspect about the refugees' expressions. This speech might reveal Turkey's worries to avoid directly blaming the Iraqi government in order not to deteriorate the relations and also call the Turkish public to empathy for the refugees. The PM said, "Turkey's humanitarian attitude, admitting some of them, and providing ease to them might be the best response to those who support a terrorist organization such as the PKK at home and abroad and to those blaming Turkey on this matter." After that, "In yesterday's meeting of the NSC, it was already decided that Turkey would adopt a humanitarian attitude. The places for settlement will be prepared within our capabilities, we will be in a humanitarian manner in line with the reasonable conditions. As I said, Turkey is a democratic and constitutional state respecting human rights. Helping persons seeking refuge in our country is a natural human duty. They are the cognates of our citizens, on this side of the border" (Milliyet, 02.09.1988). We can see here again the image-promoting statements stressing out the democratic and humanitarian attitude.

Özal's response to the question, "Will the refugees be provided with the permanent settlement?" was that "I cannot say anything about the permanent settlement, but now we are working on the temporary settlement." Another question from the correspondents was, "Will the request for asylum of the refugees be accepted?" and the PM replied as follows; "Still, there is no such thing... The ones coming are the wives and children... It is too early to say anything about it."

These responses show that the state could not accept the refugee reality, and for that reason, it regarded the refugees as only temporary guests instead of developing a

consistent and established policy. Indeed, it appears that neither anyone nor any institution knew even how to call them. Another subheading is “Turkey does not have to accept refugees”, and it implies that even if Turkey temporarily accepted the Kurds, it would not grant the legal refugee status to them because of the geographical limitation on the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol providing for legally accepting only the European refugees.

It is possible to draw the conclusion that, in time, especially after Turkey could not achieve the desired results out of the EP (European Parliament) sitting on September 15, Turkey’s response to the refugees changed. During this process, Saddam Hussein was also convinced to proclaim an amnesty and retake the people who escaped from the country. But, the refugees in Turkey rejected to return as they did not trust Saddam. On the other hand, even if Iran also said it would accept the Kurdish refugees in Turkey, there were only a few numbers of them who wanted to go there. So, these situations caused disappointment for Turkey that saw them as “temporary guests”. In the end, the refugees who were deemed as “humanitarian duty” at the beginning turned into a “burden”. In the following news, we will see the “burden perception”. Another very important reason for the change in Turkey’s discourse and policy was the increasing number of Iraqi Kurds at the border. It was one thing to deal with 15-20 thousand refugees, most of whom being women and children, already contained in the camps. It was totally another thing to manage the fear deriving from tens and hundreds of thousands of potential new refugees, many of whom were Peshmergas who were involved in armed conflicts in Iraq. When it comes to the numbers, it is very complicated. *Milliyet* writes “There is nobody who knows the number of the refugees”. It states that while Foreign Minister Yilmaz said the number was 63 thousand on the previous day, the following day he said it was 56 thousand 377, and Interior Minister Kalemli said it was 120 thousand. In addition to this uncertainty at home, the Iranian national radio declared the number of refugees who entered Turkey as 150 thousand (*Milliyet*, 07.09.1988).

Milliyet writes, “Visiting Peshmergas, Özal reiterated his proposal: ‘let us reduce the burden’”. About the refugees who did not return after Saddam proclaimed amnesty the PM said, “We do not send anyone back by force”. Özal asked the Peshmergas to obey the Turkish laws. In his speech, he said, “The biggest problem in the future is what will happen if they will not return to their country. We do not send anyone back by force.

Now, I am addressing the democratic states of the West. Will they admit half of these people to their countries by some certain quotas? If they take the half, we will settle the other half in the best way". He also asserted that he did not make it an issue of domestic politics. The PM said, there was a need for 100 million dollars for the settlement of the Peshmergas, and until that time the costs of them over Turkey would exceed 6-7 billion liras. (Milliyet, 17.10.1988).



Figure 5- 5: Tercüman, 13.09.1988

The Peshmergas discussing about whether return ask loudly: What will happen to us?

During this period, the newspapers write the aid proposals from various states and international organizations but these were rejected by the Turkish state. The Foreign Minister and the governors also made a similar statement about not accepting international aid (Milliyet, 07.09.1988). As in the above statements, here we may see a contradiction: on the one hand, the authorities complained about the burden of the refugees on the Turkish economy; on the other hand, they rejected the outreach from foreign countries and international organizations. This contradiction seems to be caused by Turkey's potential concern that the prolonged presence of refugees and inflow of foreign aid might open up a channel for foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the country. This can also be read as avoiding commitments by benefitting from the uncertainty of the issue.

A similar avoidance can be seen in addressing the refugees, i.e., the state never called them refugee, because it is a legal term and requires some commitments. A journalist making an interview in the camps from *Milliyet* was warned by the authorities when he said “camp” as: “Do not to call these places as camps, these are not refugees.” (Milliyet, 20.09.1988). Now, we see a total rejection of the idea of granting refugee status. Initially, the rhetoric was mostly full of uncertainty and ambiguity. The authorities did not make any statement about giving any status, but later they denied obviously a permanent status and took initiatives to send them back. At the first stage, it can be assessed as a response to a humanitarian crisis; as the time passed and the number continued increasing, Turkish state might become more worrisome about the future of the arrived refugees and the potential arrivals. Finally, it became sure not to grant any status and repatriate them. The hesitations from the local and international public reactions due to a possible return attempt might be partly eroded when the decision of the European Parliament disappointed Turkey on September 15.

5.1.2. Kurdish Issue

The Turkish state, which tended to ignore or deny the very existence of the Kurdish issue under the military rule, had to face this complex problem with the arrival of a mass Kurdish population.

Cumhuriyet draws attention to the dispute about the identity of the refugees among the politicians of the ruling party, ANAP. It publishes an interview conducted with Mustafa Taşar, a nationalist-conservative member of parliament from ANAP. The headline is “According to Taşar, the refugees are not Kurds”. Taşar is quoted as saying “I do not know a nation as Kurds. Even if they call themselves that, I reject it. I do not agree with the PM”. The interview is given below:

Question: Why do you want them to be sent to Iran?

Taşar: Let Iran feed them. We already have enough people to feed in our country.

Question: Are you concerned that they will be a problem in the future?

Taşar: In the future, they can be a problem for Turkey... It has a meaning that Nurettin Yılmaz (a Kurdish MP from ANAP) delivered a speech on the day when those came to Turkey. Anyone else can make it. But Nurettin Yılmaz is a friend of ours who made a speech as “Kurdish society” by emphasizing the

existence of Kurds in Turkey. There is no Kurd in Turkey. They all are a member of the Turkish nation and we believe that they are one of the Turkic tribes.

Question: To you, are they a Turkic tribe?

Taşar: I guess, they are Peshmerga.

Question: Yes, but what is their nationality? Are not they Kurds?

Taşar: I do not know a nation as the Kurdish nation.

Question: So, those coming from Iraq are not Kurds, are they?

Taşar: No, they may call themselves as such. In Russia, there are Russian Kurds; in Iran, there are Iranian Kurds.

Question: But Prime Minister Özal said “those coming have cognates in our society.” What does it mean?

Taşar: I am not in the opinion that they have cognates here.

Question: Then, you do not agree with the PM, do you?

Taşar: I do not agree. There is no cognate of them here. We can treat them as brotherly. We can say they are our brothers and sisters. And we can welcome them with our arms wide open.

About the above statement of MP Taşar, Nurettin Yılmaz said “We are in the same party, but our opinions about human rights are different” (Cumhuriyet, 07.09.1989). The nationalist MP might deem more appropriate to refer to the refugees as “those who came to Turkey” in order not to utter the word “Kurd”.

Even though there were many statements supporting the government's decision of admitting Iraqi refugees from all political parties, some disagreements appeared because of security concerns. After its foundation as a nation-state in 1923, Turkish identity policy was to unite the multi-ethnic structure of the former Ottoman Empire in a shared Turkish nationality. As many nations claimed their independence after the collapse of the Empire, the prospects of an independent Kurdish state in the southeast of Turkey has been a great concern. The presence of a Kurdish community, in particular, as the largest minority group, had long been denied for that reason. And it was claimed that they are the “mountain Turks”, not a separate nation or ethnic group as Taşar advocated in his interview (Karaca & Kirişçi, 2015). Thus, the Kurdish issue was covered by denial and ignorance. The foundation of the PKK and its deadly attacks targeting Turkish security forces and civilians starting in the 1980s took the issue to a more severe level. The military government under President Kenan Evren developed stricter policies and security practices in this region. So, the fear of a revival of denial of Kurdish identity and possible

linkage with the PKK unfolded again with the influx of Kurds from Iraq. Despite all emphasis on the humanitarian attitude, this issue must have always been kept in mind. The perceived threat against the state's unity and solidarity, the Turkish identity, and social structure were decisive factors shaping Turkey's approach and policies regarding refugee Kurds as well.

As the process further unfolded and Turkey's rhetoric appeared to change from its initial humanitarian stance, the way the Western countries and media outlets perceived the crisis started to change. Increasingly, criticisms towards Turkey and its failure to allow all refugees to enter through its borders came to dominate the pages within a few weeks as seen below.

This meant that the one obvious advantage that Turkey accrued from the crisis, namely portraying a democratic state that is respectful to human rights of even non-citizens, was quickly dissolving. All the security concerns, social unrest, and economic burdens, in contrast, were galvanizing every passing day. The combination of these, expectedly, caused further disturbance in Turkey.

One of the headlines on this matter of Sevres in *Milliyet* is "The West resurrected the Kurdish issue against Turkey: The efforts to revive the Sevres" (*Milliyet*, 14.09.1988). Some Western and American journalists, using the refugees of the Iraqi Kurds as an opportunity, stated to publish some articles to rehandle the Treaty of Sevres ripping Turkey apart 68 years earlier, and to demand autonomy for the Kurds. The news published in French *Le Figaro* and American *New York Times* bring into the agenda the "Kurdish state" according to the plan in the Sevres. Even a week later, this issue was still alive and *Tercüman* served the statement "With the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the hope of founding a Kurdish state was lost." of the US Congress with the headline "Revival of the Sevres" (*Tercüman*, 21.09.1988). Exerting efforts to portray itself as a democratic and humanitarian state, Turkey found itself at a totally opposite point where it had to deal with a Kurdish question boosted through the Iraqi Kurd refugees and by the Western states. These criticisms were naturally read as an existential threat to national and territorial integrity for a state which had been struggling in this cause for years.

Opting for even not to utter the word Kurd and the existence of this ethnic identity, the Turkish state had to host a mass of Kurdish refugees in addition to its own Kurdish citizens. With this influx, Kurds of Iraq and Turkey had an opportunity to meet and come

together. And the fear that this influx would fuel the rise of Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the unity of the Turkish state and nationality prevailed.

Even though the Turkish army was strict about the Kurdish issue, Prime Minister Özal was open to dialogue and had a more liberal attitude. In the following years, MP Nurettin Yılmaz reported that Özal said that his mother was also a Kurd and his aunt did not speak even a word of Turkish in her lifetime (Cumhuriyet, 10.02.1992). When he was elected as president, he promised to solve the Kurdish problem and ordered his politicians to write a report on the Kurdish issue (Haber7, 2009). Thus, the first steps on the way of solution were taken during this period, and the Kurdish refugee influx might contribute to openly speaking of this issue. And it is seen as a turning point in the history of the Kurdish issue and the Turkish state's response to it (Çandar, 2012, p. 138). Because it was a time when uttering even the word "Kurd" was troublesome under the military rule, to refer to Iraqi Kurds Özal said "the kindreds, living in Iraq, of our citizens in the Southeast". With this influx, the Turkish chief of the general staff for the first time uttered "Kurd" to refer to the Iraqi refugees, and this word was an important step to break down the social and political taboos on the Kurdish issue (Oran, 2001, p. 24).

5.1.3. Asylum Requests of Peshmerga Leaders

Those escaping from Saddam Hussein's repressions and seeking refuge in Turkey were not only the vulnerable civilians. Some allegations about the refugee demands of the two leading Peshmerga groups are reflected in the news during this period. Ma'sud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were among the major Kurdish national movements in Iraq (Gunter, 1996). It appears that these groups in Iraq and the PKK might meet on a common ground with respect to the liberation movements of Kurdish minorities in their respective countries, we might see their cooperation agreements. In 1983, a cooperation protocol was signed between the KDP and the PKK. Yet, at the same time, Turkey and Iraq also concluded "Hot Pursuit Agreement" to conduct anti-terror operations across the border in 1984. When Turkey's operations, on the basis of this agreement, targeting PKK camps in northern Iraq heavily battered the KDP and PUK camps as well, Barzani decided to cut its ties with the PKK in 1987 to heal the relations with the Turkish government and to be saved from the attacks. Then, the KDP declared the PKK as a terrorist organization. After

the broken ties, this time the PUK and the PKK agreed to cooperate in 1988 (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 2001). With the experiences and concerns of possible cooperation among these groups, Turkey might be hesitant about Barzani and Talabani, when they applied for asylum.

“Talabani is at the gate” is on the first page of *Milliyet* on September 1, 1988, when the official admission of the Iraqis started. There was a claim that Talabani, too, who was the leader of the Kurdish guerillas in Iraq, wanted to seek refuge in Turkey. Although most of the refugees were civilian women, children, and elderly people, it talks about Talabani. This visibly places the refugees in a military and political context and this event actually posed a bigger threat because the PKK and Talabani had agreed to cooperate just a few months ago. When we flashed back in 1983, Barzani also openly declared their support for the PKK and called Turkey a “fascist state and the enemy of the Kurdish people” (Ateş & Akutay, 2013, p. 128). And it is written that in the early days of that year Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, and Barzani agreed to cooperate.

In *Tercüman*, State Minister and Government Spokesperson Mehmet Yazar replies to the question, “Did Talabani demand the right to seek refuge in Turkey?”, of the press after the cabinet meeting. He said, “No, there is no such thing for now.” Pointing out the ongoing diplomatic initiatives, he also stated that “The issue has humanitarian and security aspects and we try to balance them”. On September 3, Foreign Minister, Mesut Yılmaz was asked about the Barzani’s asylum request. Approving the claim that Barzani had applied for political asylum, the Minister said, “Yet, there is no work done in this matter.” But, on the same day Minister of Interior Kalemli’s answer to the same question was “There is no such request.” (Tercüman, 03.09.1988). It is likely to see a discrepancy in the statements of the authorities about the protection demand of the Peshmerga leaders and it might be an attempt to hide this matter from the public not to cause more unrest and insecurity. Additionally, the state was still ruled by a soldier president, so if he intervened in militarily, the matter would become highly securitized and Özal’s civil government would lose its control over the management of the influx. With these concerns in hand, we would encounter such initiatives of the government to desecuritize the matter and hold it within the sphere of normal politics rather than extraordinary measures.

5.1.4. The PKK Threat

On September 3, Minister of Interior Mustafa Kalemli paid a visit to the refugee sites in Hakkari. During his talk with the refugees, he said, “If you allow anyone who offended against the Turkish state to be with you, our attitude towards you will change” (Milliyet, 03.09.1988). Barzani and the Peshmerga commanders declared that they would not allow any act against Turkey and thanked Turkey for saving their lives and providing shelter. Such warnings from the officials were frequently repeated. This, again, shows that accompanying the humanitarian perspective or actions of the state, the security dimension and concerns are ever present.



El sıkıştılar İçişleri Bakanı Mustafa Kalemli ile beraberindeki heyette yer alan Bayındırlık Bakanı Safa Giray (el sıkışan), Jandarma Genel Komutanı Orgeneral Burhanettin Bigalı, Çukurca İlçesine bağlı Yekmal bölgesine yerleştirilen Peşmergelerin lideri Salih Ahmet'le bir süre sohbet etti. Kalemli'nin "PKK ile işbirliği yapıyor muydunuz?" sorusuna, Salih Ahmet, "Biz, PKK'ya düşmanızdır" yanıtını verdi.

Figure 5- 6: Milliyet, 02.09.1988

They shake hands: Minister of Interior and a committee including Minister of Public Works and Chief Commander of Gendarmerie Forces shake hands with the Peshmerga leaders in Çukurca. The Peshmerga leader responded the Minister's question of "Did you cooperate with the PKK?" with the answer, "No, the PKK is our enemy".

According to an interview of *Cumhuriyet* with the officials from the Ministry of Interior, “The fight against the PKK in the region will continue. There is no linkage between the fight against the PKK and those coming from Iraq. These are separate issues. But the case of Iraqi refugees is a humanitarian issue.” (Cumhuriyet, 03.09.1988). The authorities again try to desecuritize the refugees in the public realm by means of emphasizing that they were not the same with the PKK.



Figure 5- 7: Tercüman, 03.09.1988

Reactions to the mass migration: We should be careful.

On the same day, *Tercüman*'s news article with the bold letters reads “Reactions to the mass migration”, and “We should be careful”. Indicating that the actions carried out by the Kurds in the past should not be forgotten, Director General of Turkey's Promotion Foundation, Kemal Baytaş said, “While showing our humanitarian attitude, we should not throw caution to the wind.” Actually, he might refer to the PKK operations and some support from the inhabitant Kurds in the region to those operations with the Kurds' actions in the past.

Another news article with the headline of “Turkey's measures” says “Against the infiltration of the PKK the security measures are being enhanced. The Peshmergas are questioned about the PKK. The reason for the reinforcement is that the Iraqi army

followed and attacked the refugees, and Turkey increased the measure to both ensure the refugee's safety of life and hinder the entrance of the terrorists into the country. (Tercüman, 03.09.1988). Similarly, the newspapers of September 6 and 7 write that 100 PKK fighters infiltrated into Turkey among the Peshmergas (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 6-7.09.1988).

Under the headline of "PKK- Peshmerga Cooperation" on the first page, "Minister of National Defense Vuralhan: There is a security concern, but measures are taken". Pointing out the problem of cooperation between the PKK and the Peshmergas was not eliminated yet, the Minister stated that some "wanted" terrorists were caught among the Peshmergas. "The situation is under the control of the state and we are very cautious." (Milliyet, 17.09.1988)

In one of his interviews, PM Özal said, "The army was rejecting and opposing to it so harshly that it was not easy to convince them that it was a humanitarian issue." (Çandar, Mezopotamya Ekspresi, 2012, p. 138). Already fighting with the PKK in the southeastern part of the country for years and with many lives from security forces and civilians lost, the army was highly reluctant and strict about the Kurdish refugees. The stance of the army shows that the possibility of PKK infiltration would provoke the military security threat perception and lead to the mobilization of more security forces to the region as extraordinary measures.

5.1.5. Refugees' Return and/or Transfer to Iran

Another important theme within the discourses surrounding the media gaze and political discourse on Iraqi refugees at the time was the issue of refugees' return to Iraq or their transfer to Iran. In fact, while the Iraqi Kurds continued to enter Turkey, the PM underlined the ongoing talks with the Iraqi government. According to the newspapers published around those days, Turkey desired to repatriate these refugees as soon as possible before causing bigger problems. Thus, it was to provide only temporary protection until Saddam's government would be persuaded to stop violence and cleansing. The talks with the Iraqi government had a great importance for the course of the refugee flow and sending back the already arrived groups. Turkey would also allow and provide ease for those who wish to go to Iran and put efforts to make agreements with the Iranian regime for that.

On September 3, Councilor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Nüzhet Kandemir made a visit to Iran and conveyed Özal's written remarks about the regional issues and bilateral relations to Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister. In his statement following the visit, he said, "Those taking refuge in our country and preferring Iran as the country of asylum will be sent to this country as soon as possible with the humane treatment" (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 03.09.1988).

Another point deepening Turkey's security concerns at the border might be the Iraqi army that tracked the escaping Peshmergas. On September 5, when the Iraqi army came up to the Turkish border and the Turkish soldiers fired a warning shot, Governor of Hakkari, Şahabettin Harput made the following statement: 'If the Iraqi troops made any military attack to retake the Peshmergas, we will resort to the tit-for-tat strategy'. The villagers also complained that the Iraqi soldiers checked for the identities of the local villagers as they looked like the Peshmergas (Milliyet, 05.09.1988). The Iraqi soldiers disturbed the people and refugees in the region and broke the order and peace. So, even if the refugees did not pose a threat to the social order, Iraqi forces did.

On September 6, Foreign Minister Yılmaz made the following explanation when the journalists recalled the remarks of Iraq's Ambassador that the Peshmergas should be returned to Iraq: "We do not have an extradition treaty with Iraq. Even if we had such a treaty, in order to implement it, it would be required that the documents about who is guilty what their crime is to be prepared by the legal authorities and to be delivered through the diplomatic channels. Until now, there is no such attempt." (Cumhuriyet, 06.09.1988).

In all newspapers of the 7th of September, it is written that Saddam proclaimed a general amnesty for Kurds who are still in Iraq or seeking refuge abroad for their return. It is also written that Turkey contributed to this amnesty to a great extent. Yet, only a few of them returned to Iraq, as they did not trust in Saddam and his promise (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 07.09.1988).

On every occasion, the concerns are uttered and the situation of the refugees is generally bound to certain conditions. The previous Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit also says, "On the conditions that they will cut their ties out of our country, and will not bring the problems in Iraq to Turkey, and will not participate in the separatist groups in Turkey, they can be admitted to the citizenship." (Tercüman, 12.09.1988). The permanent stay of

the refugees was not something negotiable at the beginning. Even if in time it became more open to discussion, their settlement was always combined with some conditions and insecurity.

With the headline “3,200 Peshmergas are leaving”, it is stated that the number of refugees leaving Turkey voluntarily to go to Iran reached 2,200. And 1,000 of them wanted to return to Iraq under the watch of the Red Cross. However, out of approximately 60 thousand refugees, this number might not be sufficient for a state who want to repatriate all of them (Tercüman, 22.09.1988).

In the above statements, we see that the Turkish state was determined to protect and not to send back forcibly the refugees, but its aim was to send them back voluntarily through political initiatives, and the role of a better-image concerns cannot be ignored in this attempt. Even if it was not willing to provide this protection for a long time, it could harm its appreciated portrayal in the West after admitting the Iraqi Kurds.

5.1.6. Armed Peshmergas and Life inside the Camps



Figure 5- 8: Milliyet, 01.09.1988

The Peshmergas taking refuge in Hakkari do their shopping with Iraqi *dinar* (the currency of Iraq). Food prices in the region are sky-high.

A great majority of the refugees were the Peshmergas and their families. Some were the fighters combatting against the Iraqi army and they were disarmed by the Turkish security forces while crossing the border. According to the news, the Iraqi Ambassador said, “We are saddened because of Turkey’s decision. These people are criminals, they are terrorists. Today they hand over their weapons, tomorrow they will find weapons again from somewhere” (Milliyet, 03.09.1988). Whereas, Turkey—due to the distrust of the Peshmergas—was trying to keep the armed fighters under control by taking their weapons away and employing strict measures, such a warning would add fuel to the fire. Besides, the significance of the relations with Iraq was repeated constantly, and this issue might be embodied as an obstacle in the path of good and strong ties.



Figure 5- 9: Milliyet, 05.09.1988

Fight in the camp: In Iraqi refugee camps, big fights break out time to time because of the animal and field disputes. Turkish gendarmeries break up the fight to prevent escalation.

With the above Figure covering a group of fighting Peshmergas, *Tercüman* writes a news story under the headline of “Tension at the border”. These stories draw an attention in the press great enough to be covered in other two newspapers and it is written that the reason of the fights is the discussions to stay in Turkey or return to Iraq. On the following days, similar fights broke out both among the Peshmerga and between the Peshmergas and the local villagers. Moreover, Turkish security forces were involved in these fights to break up the fighters (Tercüman, 05.09.1988).

On September 14, newspapers covered another big fight unfolded among Peshmergas on the previous day. At the end of the fight, one of them was dead and there were three seriously wounded. In the same news story, *Milliyet* writes that “27 guns were found with the Peshmergas” and that the Peshmergas who were grown up with the guns secretly bring the weapons to the camps where they took refuge even though their weapons were taken by the Turkish security forces at the border (Milliyet, 14.09.1988).

After these fights, the newspapers write that the tension in the camps (especially in Silopi) did not deescalate. For that reason, the authorities started to employ stricter security measures in the camps. Three of the refugees were arrested. The movement in and out of the camp was restricted, and the press was not allowed in (Tercüman, 18.09.1988).



Figure 5- 10: Milliyet, 18.09.1988

The officers including police forces intervened to the Peshmergas surrounding the governorate's tent.

In the media, there was much news on the fights of Peshmergas in the camps, and in time these fights became more severe. And on September 18, the Peshmergas took the district governor and mayor captive in the camp in Uzunsirt, Yüksekova, because some

of their friends were arrested. The friends in question were arrested for being members of the PKK. After a few hours of negotiation, the governor and mayor were released (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 18.09.1988).

According to *Tercüman*, the Peshmerga took a police chief and 25 policemen hostage along with the mayor. They threatened to kill the police chief who arrested one Peshmerga if the police would not release him. Yet, the Chief Commander said that they would not allow the release of that Peshmerga at any cost as he was a PKK terrorist. Upon this event, a great number of soldiers were deployed in and around the camp. All services provided in the camp were suspended except for the food distribution. Additionally, in this camp, in and out movement was also restricted. We see that the extraordinary measures were introduced on the grounds of security concerns following these fights (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 18.09.1988).




Figure 5- 11: Milliyet, 05.09.1988

A woman Peshmerga leader with her weapon.

The statement of the governor after this event was as follows: “We cannot call it ‘taking hostage’. They just wanted us to release their friends. We had a short discussion. Because of this discussion, we have stayed among the Peshmergas for hours and we could not leave.” Then the governor talked about the facilities in the camps: “We are taking care of a population of 25 thousand people; we are providing daily 74 thousand loaves of

bread. Until now, we have spent 55 million liras only on milk for the children. But we cannot tolerate any action that can break the peace and order. As it is stated that there are PKK militants, the security forces continue their inspection works. The Peshmerga should also respect these works” (Tercüman, 18.09.1988).

According to all the news pieces and photos published on this event, it seems safe to argue that this was indeed a big uprising, a case of taking hostage and threatening authorities to kill the policeman. It appears that the state officials, the Governor in this case, were trying to frame the incident in a much softer tone so as to prevent a public reaction and backlash. In these news stories, it is also stated that many soldiers and special security teams were mobilized towards the camps in order to ensure security and deescalate the tension. So, these undesired events that took place in the camps opened the doors for stricter precautions and heavier military interventions.

In the meantime, the government was working to increase the number of camps and improve the conditions there such as putting the electricity, water, and sanitation systems into service. In addition to these services, it was decided to provide Turkish language courses for the refugees. According to the news on September 9, Minister of Education, Youth and Sport, Hasan Celal Güzel declared that Turkish language courses would be open in the camps within twenty days. And he said, ‘It is uncertain how long the Iraqi refugees in Turkey will stay. If there will be the ones whose residence is prolonged, then we will apply the classical primary education. Our current works are concentrated on Turkish reading, writing, and speaking” (Milliyet, 09.09.1988). This statement indicates a limited integration vision, but as the refugees were still deemed as “temporary”, concrete initiatives for long-term integration are very limited and late. On the one side, it might be read as a small but a positive step in the way of integration and permanent settlement, but the discussions continued. Mahmut Alınak, an MP from SHP, made the following comment about the Turkish courses, “We love all languages, and Turkish as well. But we should ask PM Özal if this Turkish education has an assimilation purpose.” We see here that the Turkish courses in the camps caused a discussion about whether it being a policy of integration or assimilation among the parties. The opposition might deem it as an attack to assimilate the Kurdish identity through language courses.



Figure 5- 12: Cumhuriyet, 10.09.1988

The Fear of Winter: the refugees arriving the camp near to Dicle River after twelve hours of journey seem pelased with the situation for now, but they get desperate when they think about the winter.

In the news of the Figure 5.12, it is written the harsh conditions in the camps and that the winter would be too cold to continue to live in the tents. And another information in the news is that the camp sites were surrounded by the wire fence and walls (Cumhuriyet, 10.09.1988 & Milliyet, 19.09.1988). In and out movement in the camps was already restricted following the fights, and now these measures made more reinforcements with the walls and fences.

While *Cumhuriyet* constantly talks about how bad the situation of the refugees and the camps were, the other two newspapers, especially *Milliyet*—having a more nationalist tendency—starts to give place mostly to the “harms and burden” stemming from the Iraqi refugees. After the second week of the flow, the bother about the refugees unfolded in some media outlets. The humanitarian rhetoric is replaced by some problems as the time passed. *Milliyet* writes the complaints of the refuges about the conditions of the camps under the headline of “We have opened our arms but we could not make the Kurds satisfied” (Milliyet, 15.09.1988). The news article depicts the situation as such although Turkish state put so much effort to help those who escaped to save their lives, the Iraqi Kurds never became happy.

On the same day, *Tercüman* issues with the headline, “We borrow the trouble! The bill of burden brought by the Peshmergas is going up.” In this news, it is said that

while the refugees at the beginning were praying not to be sent back to Iraq, now they are complaining about everything: the food, water, sanitary, electricity, cold weather, and heating problems. Actually, the newspaper complains about the refugees, saying they set the wooden electricity pylons on fire to get warm. Turkish social aid fund for persons in need and *Kızılay's* (Turkish Red Crescent) resources were mobilized for the refugees instead of the citizens in need. And it emphasizes them as “our Kurdish ‘guests’ escaping from Iraq”. It is written that while the local people of Hakkari suffered from lack of even bread, there were piles of food waste around the refugee tents. It touches upon their costs for settlements and transfers to other camps. Hakkari Governorate’s liabilities to the public went up to meet the needs of the refugees. It also implies the doubt about why the Peshmergas came to Turkey while a great number continued to stay in Iraq, and says “who provoked them is unknown” (Tercüman, 15.09.1988).

Along with the media outlets, the unrest over the refugees starts to appear in the discourse of the authorities as well. For instance, complaining about the unsatisfied refugees, Governor of Hakkari Harput said “Turkey opened its arms. In the beginning, they (refugees) were under bad conditions. The conditions in the camps have improved with the precautions and supports of the state. While they must have been more satisfied with this situation, we have seen the opposite. They have never become satisfied with anything. We know that this happens because of the provocations of some foreign powers. Indeed, we have indulged them too much. The guest should know its place.” (Cumhuriyet 19.09.1988).

When Governor Kozakçıoğlu was asked about whether the refugees requested to continue staying in Turkey, he said, “It is not possible for us to allow them to become permanent refugees, a mere consumer.” About the foreign aid proposals, the Governor said, “Yes, I received the proposal for outreach. Without defining the status of these people, you cannot be established in international relations. The Turkish government can lose its sovereignty rights over these people in international relations.” (Milliyet, 18.09.1988).

On the same day, Governor Kozakçıoğlu continued his remarks, “I think there is not a problem in terms of security. The main problem is that the refugees were used for political aims. The aliens with evil intentions entered the shelters in the guise of observers or journalists. And they carry out political provocations. The entrance-exit procedures

shall be standardized and kept under control for the state's security. Political exploitation for the future is very dangerous and wrong. The Peshmerga is also striving for political propaganda. They shout slogans such as 'Long live Kurdistan' in shelters, in Turkish territories. This is a crime according to our laws." (Milliyet, 18.09.1988).

As we shall revisit at the end of this chapter, we see a shift in the discourse regarding the Kurdish refugees above. While at the beginning the sad stories about the Peshmergas and their vulnerability especially through the children and women are covered in the media outlets, within two weeks this image turns into ungrateful "Kurdish Peshmerga" always causing problems.

5.1.7. Stance of the Political Parties

To grasp the general perception of the refugees in the political world, the statements of the opposition parties are important as well as the ruling party. On the first days, their opinions were covered and reflected in the press under the headline of "support from all parties". *Tercüman* pens this article on its front page. In addition, all newspapers write that some members of the parliament from the opposition parties paid visits and examined the situation of the refugees in the region. Moreover, they criticize the government because of its hesitation to open the gates at the first stage because it might mean to allow those vulnerable people to die. Maybe this criticism is directed as a requirement of being an opposition party. Özal also expresses that "as a country that is a party to the all international conventions and that upholds human rights and that extends its helping hand to those seeking protection in the country from several countries, and Turkey should again show this attitude to the Iraqi civilians. Otherwise, it would also be responsible for the persecution of those innocent people before the eyes of the international public" (Tercüman, 02.09.1988).

A joint declaration approving the government's decision from all opposition parties issued: "We support this humanitarian approach of the government instead of criticizing it. We should provide shelter for those seeking refuge in Turkey as what suits the Turkish state" (Tercüman, 02.09.1988). This support from all political segments of the state shows that the Iraqi refugee influx was neither politicized nor securitized in the political sector in the beginning of the process.

Tercüman, writes about the political parties' preferences in addressing to the refugees. The headline, which is "Ruling and Opposition Parties are on the same 'humanitarian' page: The parties are of the same mind", highlights the full support to the government in the admission of the Iraqi refugees. Özal, who restrained from any offense to the public and the army, named the refugees as the "Iraqis entered Turkey". While the leader of SHP (Social Democrat Populist Party) Erdal İnönü called "Kurds", another opposition leader Süleyman Demirel, the leader of DYP (True Path Party), named them as "scared people". Demirel used also the words "our citizens and brothers" that would cause a discussion later. On the other hand, former prime minister Bülent Ecevit called them as "those who want to take shelter in Turkey". All of these callings that were used to describe refugees point out to a widespread avoidance of giving them a legal status. Unlike the media, the political leaders take up more moderate rhetoric by not calling them Peshmerga, yet they still abstain from calling them Kurds. This situation also indicates the absence of a unified rhetoric regarding refugees among political leaders (*Tercüman*, 02.09.1988).



Figure 5- 13: Milliyet, 03.09.1988

Long Live Turkey: The Iraqi Kurds who take refuge in Turkey express their gratitude by holding Turkish flag and Atatürk's portrait

Tercüman publishes a news piece with the title “left-wing of SHP strives to politicize the ‘humanitarian’ issue”. According to news, some MPs from SHP claimed that they desired to make the situation of Iraqis taking refuge in Turkey an international problem but the government did not allow them. Another MP from SHP said that he was saddened as the refugees were transferred with trucks to camps. “We know how the government treated Afghan refugees and those coming from Bulgaria. Kurds know that as well. Cannot we send them by trains?” (Tercüman, 10.09.1988). Again, it appears as the government’s attempt to handle the issue in an apolitical and non-securitized manner contrary to all criticisms, so it would continue to keep it its own control.

Some SHP MPs accused Özal’s government because they wanted to use the Iraqi refugees as a referendum tool to gain the votes of the Kurdish voters. One of them said, “Turkey does not have an intention to grant any legal status to the Iraqi refugees.” He continued; “After the referendum, they will wish these people to return to Iraq or be sent to Iran. And the amnesty proclaim of Saddam’s government will be shown as the justification” (Tercüman, 13.09.1988). This criticism might show that the refugees were deemed as an opportunity to increase the votes, so inevitably it became politicized in the polarized environment of the politics.



Figure 5- 14: Tercüman, 19.09.1998

Separatist Banners at SHP Rally: “We call all the world nations for solidarity against the massacre and exile targeting Kurdish nation” (On the banner)

PM Özal criticizes the opposition for their stance towards refugees. He said, “They should be very cautious about this matter.” About SHP, “Do not you know how CHP (your predecessor party) wrongly handled this issue?”. And about the Süleyman Demirel, the leader of DYP, the PM says “I reproached Mr. Demirel for he called those coming from Iraq as ‘our citizens’. These are wrong. This is humanitarian, the politicization of the matter harms both the refugees and Turkey as well” (Tercüman, 16.09.1988). The government rhetoric indicates that it wanted to tackle the refugee issue out of the political sphere. However, with the coming referendum, the humanitarian approach seems to be pushed aside by all parties and the refugee issue became a part of domestic politics in the name of gaining more votes.

5.1.8. Course of the Bilateral Relations

In accordance with the news pieces, Iraq was already disappointed about Turkey’s admission of thousands of Peshmergas who were viewed as “criminals” by the Iraqi administration (Milliyet, 03.09.1988). Moreover, Turkey’s rejection of the Iraq’s follow-up request for the Peshmergas who entered Turkey further boosted this disappointment.

Since the Iraqi soldiers traced the Peshmergas, they came to the Turkish borders and the risk to confront with the Turkish soldiers was incurred. On the front page, *Tercüman* pens “Reinforcement to the border”. The article says that two thousand soldiers from Siirt were sent to the region for security purposes. The Turkish soldiers fired warning shots, as the Iraqi army came to the Turkish border and attempted to shoot the refugees who were trying to escape to Turkey. Then the Iraqi soldiers withdrew (Tercüman, 03.09.1988). It is possible to argue that the armies of the both sides might wish not to cause harm to the states and the relations upon the instruction of the state authorities, thus the tension did not go beyond a warning as covered in the media.

Foreign Minister Yılmaz made a statement that they would not renew unilaterally the Hot Pursuit Agreement. After this statement, he replied to the questions about the Iraqi government’s alleged request to conduct a hot pursuit operation in line with the agreement. Yılmaz said, “We did not receive any official request from Iraq”. About the relations, he said “We attach great importance to bilateral relations in every field. The current issue (refugee protection) has no connection to the bilateral relations” (Milliyet,

06.09.1988). For Turkey, termination of this agreement meant that Turkey would not carry out any pursuit and operation against the PKK across the Iraqi-Turkish border.

On the other hand, the issue of use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime had an important place in the relationship between Turkey and Iraq. Iraq denied but in the international arena, some states declared that the evidence about it was found. Turkey was trying to stay impartial and neutral in this matter as it did in the Iran-Iraq war. If Turkey confirmed that the chemical weapon evidence was detected in the refugees entered Turkey, the strained relationship because of the refugee protection would be more worsened. Namely, Turkey neither directly denied nor confirmed the allegations against Iraq, instead Turkey refrained from the attitudes that may annoy the Iraqi state partially for the sake of the economic interests and to remedy the broken ties due to the annulled Hot Pursuit agreement. Iraq was a prominent economic partner in terms of export and import with PM Özal's initiatives to open up and boom the Turkish economy. In addition to the ongoing good relations, Turkey became more crucial for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, because it was the supply and transit point. As of 1985, Turkey's export volume to Iraq reached 961 million dollars and constituted 12% total export revenue (Yaycı, 2019, p. 333). Naturally, Turkey feared that the weakening political relations would undermine the economic relations as well. We may see some examples to uplift the economic ties in the news article published in *Tercüman* as follows: "Minister of Finance, who will pay a visit to Baghdad with a new mission, will try to repair the broken ties with Iraq" (Tercüman, 05.09.1988).

The examinations for the chemical evidence continued in the Turkish part. The Director of Health and Social Assistance Center in Diyarbakır said that 5 thousand Iraqi refugees underwent a medical examination and no sign of a chemical weapons was detected. Those symptoms were due to the illnesses emanating from poverty (Tercüman, 10.09.1988). In an interview on September 16, Özal made the following statements upon the press' questions: "They want to destroy the ties between Turkey and Iraq with the allegations of chemical weapons, poisonous gas. We could not find proofs verifying this in our examinations. They wanted a committee from the UN would come to examine. I rejected. Because the UN is a political body. If a committee will come, then let a committee from the Red Cross come. The Red Cross is not a political body." (Tercüman, 16.09.1988)

Similar to the above statement of the Prime Minister, the Iraqi regime's use of chemical weapons was denied many times. This denial was interpreted as a favor from Turkey to Iraq in order to enhance the damaged bilateral relations, as the broken relations would deteriorate Turkey's economy.

5.1.9. In Sum

To sum up, the decision of admitting Iraqi refugees taken albeit the resistance of the army seemed to be welcomed by the political elites and the press at the first stage. However, it is argued that the intense pressures from both the local Kurdish citizens and from the international actors played a great role in the admission. More national and conservative newspapers *Milliyet* and *Tercüman* cover almost only the Turkish states' help and facilities for refugees, and depict the issue as salvation after eight years of war and attacks even if under bad conditions, the safety of their lives is guaranteed; while the opposition *Cumhuriyet*, with more leftist tendency, talks about the failed policies and practices in the camps and decisions, maltreatment towards the refugees, etc. during this whole period.

In this case we can see two different stances; one is to securitize and the other one is to desecuritize the issue. On the securitization front, it is possible to see the army, the President (even if he did not declare it openly, he was a soldier), the NSC, nationalist and conservative groups of the society and press as the securitizing agent. They deemed the Kurdish issue as a matter of survival, an existential threat posed to the unity and solidarity and the territorial integrity, as they would associate the Kurds with the PKK because of the relations and kinship ties. The Kurds coming from Iraq might be a part of "this existential threat". The increasing number with this migration would lead a demographical change and a threat to the Turkish identity in the future as well. On the other side, the Özal's government, Kurdish citizens and more moderate public appear on the desecuritizing front. For the government this issue should be kept out of the security context so that the involvement of the military could be reduced to the minimal level. Desecuritizing initiatives were also crucial again for the Turkish state that had been striving to build a democratic, humanitarian and western state image. If the issue lost its humanitarian priority and stayed away from the control of the civil government, the dreams of making Turkey a "little America" and the EC membership would become

almost unimaginable (Abou-El-Fadl, 2018). Another motive triggering the moderate approach towards the refugees might be to gain the votes of the Kurdish relatives of them in the country, and it might be an indicator of the political security concern. However even in the softer rhetoric, the security aspect is uttered sometimes clearly, sometimes obliquely, but never forgotten. Thus, it could be wrong to claim that the government adopted a totally security-free discourse.

Under the role of the securitizing agents, the governors, mayors, members of parliament, ministers, prime ministers, security forces, and above given relevant authorities and media talk about the problems caused by the refugees, fights in the camps, and PKK infiltration. It is regarded as posing an existential threat to state sovereignty, unity, peace, and order in the region. These reasons are used as justification tools and measures against the refugees are empowered. Movement of the refugees and entrance of the outsiders into the camps are restricted. Camp sites are encircled by wire fences, more security forces are deployed there, and from time to time they resort to physical force such as the use of firearms, batons, etc. This is an example of a successful securitization process composed of all actors (as referent objects, the Turkish state, and security; as securitizer, authorities, and press; as a threat, Iraqi refugees) especially in the military and political sectors.

The Turkish state, already suffering from economic problems, has to cope with a more severe problem by accepting a great number of refugees. As it does not allow them to work and earn money in Turkey, all costs of them are covered by the domestic resources of the state and national relief organizations. There are complaints about the costs of and food wasted by the refugees. This also becomes an economic security concern.

The political polarization due to the coming constitutional referendum on September 25 might have deepened and played a significant role in this controversy and securitization of the migration, because the refugees seem to evolve into a political issue to discuss. During this period, Cumhuriyet, on the leftist side, and, closer to the main opposition party, SHP criticize the ruling party and cover government's unsuccessful response to the refugee issue, and appreciate SHP for their visits to the camps, call for international help, and so on. Similarly, the other two newspapers, which are closer to the right, nationalist and conservative opinion like the ruling party ANAP, appreciate the government. Moreover, Cumhuriyet occasionally associates the refugees with the

Kurdish issue, whereas the other two and the government handle these as two separate issues without any linkage and affiliation.

The opposing parties criticized other parties for making a “humanitarian issue” politicized. And the volume of the politicization and political polarization increases as the referendum date comes closer. On the way to the referendum, the politicians and the press are canalized to the referendum and the refugee issue drops off the agenda, a few days before it. Hence, the Iraqi refugees were rarely covered in the media outlets especially as of September 20 in the newspapers, so this period is examined throughout this study.

While tracing this process of Iraqi refugees’ case, it is encountered with two important functional agents which are the turning points in the securitization process. The first one is the above-mentioned referendum causing the issue to be placed in political securitization. The second one is the sitting of the EC, in which unfavorable decisions are taken regarding Turkey. This disappointment led to a change in the attitude and discourse of the Turkish state and media towards the refugees. So, this is a reason to question the sincerity of the humanitarian approach.

The securitized context of this case can shortly be viewed with the following points: the problem of naming the refugees (Peshmerga, Kurds, refugees, guests, brothers, citizens, and so on), the revival of the denied Kurdish issue, possible linkage with the PKK and infiltration of the terrorists, economic burden, image in the Western world and the relations with the EC, worsening of the relations with Iraq and unilateral annulment of the Hot Pursuit Agreement.

With these factors in mind, it is possible to claim that the securitization of this migration was inevitable because the refugees had potential of threat even before they came to Turkey. Even if each migration becomes securitized to some extent, the contextual factors such as particularly ethnic identity and past experiences with the PKK, probably have a big share in the securitization of the Iraqi Kurd refugees. When the Kurdish issue revives because of the refugees, this is traditionally deemed as a threat to the shared official Turkish identity of Turkey. For this reason, some elites systematically reject it.

As a consequence of all the reasons given above, the Turkish political establishment appears to have been caught in a dilemma: on the one hand, the forced

displacement of Kurds by chemical warfare and persecution was seen very obviously as a humanitarian issue, to which Turkey could not remain neutral or unresponsive. On the other, there is a very clear security emphasis that hinder the state blindly admitting those people.



CHAPTER VI

6.1. SECURITIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF MASS IMMIGRATION OF BULGARIAN TURKS

In this chapter, the securitization of migration flow of the expelled Bulgarian Turks whose number reached about 300,000 during the summer of 1989 is analyzed. The political and media discourse regarding these migrants is elaborated through the news pieces and statements retrieved from the selected newspapers of the time.

During the Cold War era, Turkey and Bulgaria were the members of the opposing parties. While Turkey was a member of the NATO and the Western Bloc, Bulgaria was a loyal advocate and backyard of the Eastern Bloc. Hence, the web of relations among those states, allies, and superpowers was curial in forming the bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria (Demirtaş Coşkun, 2001). Even if this Cold War enmity was felt strongly in the policies, the Bulgarian Communist Party—by adhering to the traditional concepts—strayed away from the revisionist approach of the USSR under Gorbachev. In the 1980s, Soviet leader Gorbachev launched *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) processes to open up to the world and smooth the strict communist policies, and started to approach the West. However, with his repressive attitudes, Zhivkov contradicted the reformist policies of Gorbachev (Kamusella, 2018). While Bulgaria was condemned by the Western Bloc especially because of its oppression over the minority Turks, it could not receive support from the Eastern Bloc allies as well (Mahon, 1999, p. 160).

It is discussed that these assimilationist policies, extreme nationalism, and forced migration by Bulgaria are the tools at the hands of the communist authorities to consolidate their position (Bojkov, 2004, p. 344). Moreover, such a crowded and “un-Bulgarianize-able” dominant minority group would appear as a destabilizing factor and a threat posed to the communist Bulgarian identity (Mahon, 1999). With the assimilationist policy and the expulsion of the Turks, this threat would be removed, but, in the end, it

failed. Moreover, some researchers argue that this “Big Excursion” played an important role in bringing an end to Zhivkov and the communism in Bulgaria. It was ironically called “excursion”, which was originally “big expulsion”, because the regime sent Turks as “tourists” with three-month visas. Bulgarian Turks were the only group who breached the Iron Curtain and escaped from a communist rule in such a magnitude (Kamusella, 2018). About this forced migration, Reuters says, “It is one of the biggest migratory movements in Europe after WW II” (Milliyet, 24.07.1989). The migration *en masse* of Bulgarian Turks started as of June 2, 1989, a date when the persecution of the Bulgarian government against the Turkish minority peaked, even if smaller groups had arrived beforehand.

According to the news coverage in the selected newspapers, in May 1989, the Turks in Bulgaria started to protest against the intensifying assimilationist policies of the Zhivkov government in some towns and cities of Bulgaria with mostly Turkish population. During that month, all three newspapers gave place to the oppression of the Bulgarian regime and the call of the Turkish state to stop those policies against “our kindreds” on international and regional organizations, and some states particularly including the US, USSR, and China. In this period, the forced migration of the Bulgarian Turks became one of the leading agenda items and made headlines in the media outlets especially from the early days of June 1989, when Prime Minister Özal declared to accept all kindreds from Bulgaria. This issue continued to be a hot topic until October of that year when the presidential elections were held. As the day of the election approached, the refugee issue appeared to lose its significance to some extent.

As presented by the newspaper articles published during this period, the persecution and forced migration were not limited only to the politics and the international arena, it also raised great concern and interest for the public to protect and defend their kindreds. Turkey’s Turks showed their reaction by taking to the streets in protests against Zhivkov in various cities through the meetings and numerous events. Moreover, some politicians adopted the issue so firmly that they criticized the government for not advocating and protecting the rights of the “kindreds”, and made a call to the PM to “Protect the honor of the Turk” (Tercüman, 25.05.1989). Receiving the support of the people and political establishment, the government declared to admit all Turks in Bulgaria and the flow of migration started as of June 1989.

6.1.1. Making of an International Crisis

6.1.1.1. Opening the Border for the Bulgarian Turks

The newspapers wrote that Zhivkov made a call to Turkey to admit all Muslims from Bulgaria at the end of May (Milliyet, 30.05.1989). He did not call them ‘Turk’ but said ‘Muslim’ deliberately because the regime had a vehement denial about the existence of Turkish identity in Bulgaria.




Figure 6- 1: Cumhuriyet, 31.05.1989

Two refugee children: some of the hundreds of Turks displaced through the passport requirement were sent first to Vienna and then İstanbul last night.

The response of Prime Minister Özal to this call was as follows, “They send our kindreds with a suitcase. What happened to their properties, their lands? To whom did you give them? We are ready to negotiate all of these matters. Our borders are open. We call Bulgaria to open its borders as well. There is no need to continue sending our kindreds to Australia, Yugoslavia. If they are sincere, I invite them to sit down at the table to negotiate a comprehensive migration agreement. It is a must to ensure the religious and cultural rights of those who will continue living there.” The Prime Minister reiterated his words “We do not refuse anyone” in his later speeches as well. One of his famous remarks

most probably is “We can admit even Zhivkov to Turkey” because we see this discourse several times in the later statements (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 01.06.1989).

On June 2, the Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the number of kindreds that entered Turkey was 400 per day (Tercüman, 02.06.1989). In the beginning, the number of refugees was limited to dozens. Maybe due to the contextual factors, such as the power struggle between the superpowers during the Cold War, its effect on Turkish-Bulgarian relations, Turkey’s political inclination towards the West, and opening up to the world as opposed to the Bulgaria’s strict adherence to the communist principles and close ties with the USSR, the refugees arriving in Turkey became of secondary importance in the media. The persecutions and oppressive policies of Zhivkov, criticisms targeting the communist regime, and calls to support the Turkish minority were more preferred. The initial small numbers might be another factor affecting the media coverage ratio of the refugees. During the first days of migration, it is possible to see the supportive rhetoric to open the gates for the Bulgarian Turks without any limitation.



Figure 6- 2: Tercüman, 01.06.1989

“We have opened our arms to our kindreds.”

Under the headline of “Temporary Settlement to Our Kindreds”, it is written that Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee was established to make decisions regarding the Turkish refugees from Bulgaria under the leadership of State Minister and Deputy PM Ali Bozer, with the participation of Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Interior Minister Abdülkadir Aksu, State Minister Cemil Çiçek, and Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs Minister Lütfullah Kayalar on June 6 (Tercüman, 06.06.1989). At the first meeting of this Committee, it was decided that the temporary settlement of the kindreds would be enabled in Edirne, Kocaeli, and İstanbul. And the guest houses of the governorates, schools, and other facility centers would be put into service for temporary settlement. However, the temporariness in the headline draws attention. Even if the Turkish state opened its arms fully to the kindreds, it appears that the process was to be pursued cautiously and gradually. Preventing the public reaction may also be another reason for this emphasis. Furthermore, Turkey might desire to demonstrate this problem as an international crisis endangering human rights and international law, rather than a problem that only concerns Turkey due to identity politics.



Viyana ve Belgrad'dan önceki gece yarısından sonra iki uçakla Yeşilköy'e inen 183 soydaşımız, havalimanında Türk bayraklarının arkasında, anavatandaki ilk heyecanlarını birlikte yaşadılar.

Figure 6- 3: Milliyet, 01.06.1989

Our 183 kindreds transferred from Vienna and Belgrad to İstanbul, enjoyed the blessing of being in the homeland with the Turkish flags. (On the banner: “We are asking to the whole world, what did you do in the face of persecution?”)

For the permanent settlement, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs was authorized (Tercüman, 09.06.1989). From the following speech of the PM after the party meeting, “I have charged a minister full-time with this matter... We talk with those coming and record the received information very well”, we may infer that the government attached great importance to the forced migration of Bulgarian Turks

(Tercüman, 14.06.1989). This might also be an attempt to handle the issue as free from the security context through designating a civilian minister for them instead of the security forces. Additionally, while the newspapers talked about the temporary settlement on the previous days, now it was seen that the procedural works were initiated for permanent settlement.

On June 14, President Evren issued a message for the first time about the Bulgarian state's persecution against Bulgarian Turks. "As the President of Turkey, I address the whole world. A tragedy, a humanitarian tragedy occurs in Bulgaria. This is not only a problem of Turkey but a problem of humanity...I call all states, media outlets and press members to work to stop this tragedy" (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 15.06.1989). This may be seen as a big step because the president in Turkey was not used to talking about daily politics, he generally was used to staying silent as seen in the news and media covers.

During his visit to Kapıkule and Dereköy border gates, one of the opposition party leaders, Demirel, said of the kindreds as follows, "What I see is heartrending. Our kindreds should be admitted without being subjected to that much paperwork. They are the guests of our entire nation." (Tercüman, 16.06.1989). Even if the kinship ties were at the forefront, the stress on the 'guest' might again refer to the temporariness in the beginning. As it was thought that those people were persecuted because of being Turk and Muslim, Turkey might deem protecting and advocating them as its responsibility. On these grounds, we can see the repeated discourse of "kindred" and "Muslim fellows" both on the government and opposition sides.

About the claim that the Bulgarians would send 300 thousand kindreds, Konukman interpreted it as a "Bulgarian bluff" and continued, "seeing how many of our kindreds to be sent, we are determined to open our arms to all of them, now the Bulgarian government makes propaganda to get the Turks not to go" (Tercüman, 24.06.1989). Even if Turkey said it would admit all forcibly migrated Bulgarian Turks, the government did not want to believe that many people would be sent and deemed it as a bluff. Although it was seen as an international problem, Turkey was at the very heart of it as the number of refugees might cause the Turkish state to worry. If the refugees entered in such big masses, Turkey might worry about not being able to manage well and disgracing itself because it was Turkey that opened the gates and declared to accept all kindreds in

Bulgaria. During the rivalry setting of the Cold War, Bulgaria as a communist state and Turkey as an anti-communist state were attacking each other, and those refugees became a crucial instrument of this dispute. In the case that Turkey failed in its policy, the Bulgarian communist state would well benefit from it.

6.1.1.2. Propaganda Wars through the TV Series

The tense and rivalry relations between Bulgaria and Turkey were reflected in many fields beyond politics. Both sides broadcasted TV series demonizing the other side. Bulgaria was claiming that Turks during the Ottoman Era converted the Slavic Bulgars to Islam violently in its movies and series. Turkey was depicting the Bulgarian repression against the Turkish minority.

The newspaper articles of the time wrote that “Belene will be broadcast on Saturday”, as stated by the Foreign Minister Yılmaz and he continued, “we learned that the Bulgarians will broadcast the TV series (about alleged forced Islamization of Bulgars) in question as of tomorrow. In response to that, our TRT is allowed to broadcast Belene.” Belene was a Turkish TV series telling the real stories of the oppressed Turks in Bulgaria. This series was produced in 1987 by TRT (Turkey’s state TV channel) and the broadcast of it was banned earlier to avoid harming the relations with the Bulgarian state. When Bulgaria declared that they would start to broadcast a series “Time of Violence (*Vremena nasilie*)”, the theme of which was “forced Islamization of the Bulgars during the Ottoman rule in Balkans” (Thornton, 2016), the Turkish government, too, decided to respond the same way and permitted to broadcast Belene. The official rhetoric of the Bulgarian regime was “We do not have Turks in Bulgaria; they are Muslims who were forcibly converted by Ottomans” as uttered by Zhivkov as well (Tercüman & Cumhuriyet, 08.06.1989). So, it seems like a political step to justify that claim through the movie. It is arguable here that the movies as a propaganda tool were also put into practice on both sides. The Turkish state might be able to demonstrate the situation of refugees in a more concrete way by this means, so it might be assumed to contribute to the acceptance and warm welcome of the refugees by the local citizens. Turkey tried to display that Muslim Turks had been living there for centuries, now they were held under repression with the assimilationist policies of the BCP (Bulgarian Communist Party)

since they came to the power. This oppressive mindset even denied the Turkish existence in the country.

The series *Belene* was broadcast on foreign channels like CNN. The Washington Post gave a place to the Bulgarian persecution. Pakistan condemned the persecution, and Iran reacted to it (Tercüman, 16.06.1989). In addition to Muslim countries, some non-Muslim and western countries reacted to Bulgaria. In the upcoming days, *Belene* started to be broadcast on British and Saudi TV channels (Milliyet, 01-10.07.1989). This series, which was aired on national and foreign channels, might be seen as an important tool to internationalize the issue and take common action in the face of persecution. Reporting of the broadcast of *Belene* on foreign channels as news in Turkish newspaper shows that Turkey appeared to take a successful step in the internationalization of the issue.

Demirel also held the Özal's government responsible for the forced migration, "The movie (*Belene*) is produced by the government. It is not possible to understand why the government has hidden the movie from the people. If the forced migration was experienced, they would never broadcast the movie. They took an extraordinary passive stance. So, our kindreds were sent forcibly to Turkey. The government has a great responsibility for it." (Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1989). He argued that the government was already aware of the persecution as seen in the TV series produced by the government, but it did not take any action and allowed the kindreds to suffer.

6.1.1.3. Migration Agreement

Turkey exerted efforts to protect and take under guarantee the rights, status, and existence of the Turks who became a minority in Bulgaria after those countries became two separate modern nation-states through the international and bilateral agreements. Foreign Minister Yılmaz delivered a speech regarding the expulsion of the Muslim Turks in an assembly meeting on June 7, 1989. According to the minutes of the meeting, Minister Yılmaz stated, "Up to date, Turkey and Bulgaria concluded several agreements, for instance, the Friendship Agreement in 1925 enabling population exchange and settlement of the Bulgarian Turks in Turkey. From this agreement to 1949, 220 thousand kindreds immigrated to Turkey. In 1950, the Bulgarian state deported approximately 155 thousand Turks, and finally, a migration agreement was signed in 1968. Within the scope of this agreement to be effective for ten years, 130 thousand kindreds arrived in Turkey

till 1978. Briefly, more than half a million of our kindreds came to Turkey and acquired Turkish citizenship within this period. Similar to these examples, we repeatedly stated that we were ready to admit all our kindreds.” Continuing the speech, he said about the migration agreement requested by the Turkish side, “Mr. PM has invited Bulgaria to negotiate a migration agreement in compliance with the international norms on May 30” (Tutanak Dergisi, 07.06.1989). Turkey on every occasion made a call for the agreement. In the same meeting, MP Bozkurt, on behalf of the ANAP, indicated that, in order to establish good relations between the two states as in the past, it was a must for Bulgaria to stop violence against the kindreds and sign a migration agreement enabling those who wanted to come to Turkey to emigrate.

The possible migration is a decisive factor to form the course of the flow and the future of the bilateral relationship as well. Turkey was insisting to bring Zhivkov to the negotiation table but he was not willing to talk about it. This is because signing a migration agreement meant that Bulgaria admitted its persecution against the Turkish minority and violation of human rights and also recognized the existence of the Turks in the country. However, they were denying all these facts with their claims, such as “They are not Turks but Muslim Bulgars”, “They go to Turkey as tourists and visit their relatives, there is not any kind of coercion” and so on.

The newspapers also wrote about it; in a statement, FM Yılmaz said, “We are waiting for an answer for the migration agreement from the Bulgars. We are ready to admit all our kindreds.” (Tercüman, 08.06.1989). Özal reiterated his call to the Bulgarian government to make an agreement on the migration (Tercüman, 19.06.1989). Since the early days of the expulsion, it is possible to encounter this call, but Turkey could not receive a response to its calls for the reasons stated above.

Whereas Turkey was trying to initiate talks to discuss the terms of a migration agreement with Bulgaria by applying international pressure instruments, the Özal’s government was also under the pressure of the opposition in the domestic politics to sign an agreement sooner. Opposition leader Erdal İnönü criticized the government as follows, “Why has not been a migration agreement signed yet? ... We open our arms to our kindreds but we have to find a solution to this. We find inadequate the attitude of the government on this issue. We want and expect them to do more. There cannot be a separation between the ruling and opposition in the face of such a problem for the

country... We want to help. But we expect from the government; the primary responsibility is to carry out its duty.” (Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1989). It was considered as a national and international crisis to be addressed by both all political groups and the Turkish public. This issue prevailed in almost every sphere of the public and the state; hence, it loaded more responsibly on the government to take immediate action.



Figure 6- 4: Cumhuriyet, 17.06.1989

The Bulgarian Turks who reached Turkey kiss the ground with the joy of arriving the homeland.

President Evren paid a visit to the tent cities set up in Edirne and Kırklareli to facilitate the admission procedures during the first days of the influx. He talked with the refugees, “Let all those left behind come.” Addressing the refugees, he continued, “The Turkish nation will provide you with employment, and surely, in cooperation with the Turkish government. We will settle you where you will live. We are not complainant about our coming kindreds. But there is a solution to it. It is what humanity requires. At one time, a migration agreement was concluded (referring to the agreement on family

reunification concluded in 1968) (Karaca & Kirişçi, 2015). It is necessary to make an international agreement... We are contended with our kindreds. Our population increases thanks to them” (Milliyet, 28.06.1989). The increase of the Turkish population in Turkey might be seen as a power marker and a stronger national identity and sense of belonging. We see again the need for an agreement from the top figures of the states. Also, the visit of the president might portray the image that the Turkish state as a whole stood by the kindreds.

Despite the repeated demand for migration agreement from the Turkish party since the beginning of migration flow and all mediative initiatives of third parties, Bulgaria seemed like avoiding an agreement as it did not give a response to this demand. Regarding the migration agreement, Foreign Minister Yılmaz declared that Bulgaria rejected the agreement request as he learned from the USSR Ambassador in Ankara working as the negotiator in the tension between Bulgaria and Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 03.08.1989). The long-awaited response from Bulgaria came through the channel of a third party; this also shows the deeply broken ties. Probably after this information of rejected agreement, the Turkish government might be triggered to take action to take the control of the flow into its own hands. Because after that, it was understood that the Zhivkov would not come to the table for an agreement as the Turkish policies went in the same way and continued accepting those coming from Bulgaria. Then, Turkey relaunched the visa requirement within a few weeks.

6.1.1.4. Call for International Support

From the beginning of violence against the Bulgarian Turks, the Turkish state made calls to end violence on several platforms. *Tercüman* pens that during such a rough period the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) extended its hand to Turkey and Bulgarian Turks. President Denktaş of the TRNC declared that Northern Cyprus could temporarily host a number of refugees. Turkey appreciated this proposal but did not deem it as necessary (Tercüman, 19.06.1989).

Foreign Minister Yılmaz accompanied a committee of foreign representatives from 60 countries in their visits to the camps to show the tragedy to the whole world and achieve their support against the Bulgarian oppression. Later, he wrote a letter to UN Secretary-General Cuellar about the forced migration of Turks from Bulgaria and

requested him to take the issue to the UN Security Council (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 20.06.1989).

In the Humanitarian Dimension Meeting of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation⁴), western countries except for Greece condemned the actions of Bulgaria. Amnesty International sent a message to Zhivkov about his policies and requested an urgent investigation.



Figure 6- 5: Cumhuriyet 22.06.1989

Visit to the Camps: Foreign representatives together with Foreign Minister Yılmaz pay a visit to refugee camps at the border and listen the complaints of the refugees.

Visiting the refugee camps in Edirne, Secretary-General of the OIC, Hamid Al-Gabid said, “These are very dramatic events. All they wanted is freedom... the Muslim world can and must help these people. There are different types of help. The first one is the political help to stop this violence... the other is to supply aid to Turkey”. On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* writes the disappointment about the silence of the Muslim world, as one-third of the OIC members were reluctant to show a reaction against Bulgaria (Cumhuriyet, 08.07.1989). *Milliyet* also writes about the visit, Gabid declared that the

⁴ The name of CSCE was changed with today’s Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on January 3, 1995. Retrieved from www.osce.org

Organization and Muslims would support Turkey and that they would prepare a report on the Bulgarian oppression and send it to Islamic leaders (Milliyet, 09.07.1989).



Figure 6- 6: Cumhuriyet, 08.07.1989

Secretary General Gabid of the OIC visited the refugees at the border with Minister Konukman and Governor Ünal. He listened to their complaints about the Bulgarian regime.

Under the headline of “Full support from Bush”, *Milliyet* writes that the US President Bush stood by the Bulgarian Turks on the occasion of Captive Nations Week (Milliyet, 23.07.1989). US Ambassador in Ankara also paid a visit to Kapıkule border gate and stated that “It is a very sorrowful event, we will provide the support within our capabilities... We condemn this inhuman treatment” (Milliyet, 05.08.1989). Then, according to *Cumhuriyet*, NATO condemned Bulgaria’s forced migration policy against the Turkish minority and stated that Bulgaria infringed constantly the agreements concluded within the framework of CSCE (Cumhuriyet, 01.07.1989).

It can be possible to see the support for Bulgarian Turks and Turkey’s actions from the international media. The IPI (International Press Institute) criticized Bulgaria for rejecting the visa applications of Turkish journalists as it regarded the situation as a violation of press freedom. Addressing the Bulgarian government, the IPI stated that, “...your government tries to hide human rights violations against the Turkish minority.” *Tercüman* interprets the use of the ‘Turkish minority’ term in this statement as a harsh

response to the Bulgarian regime that denied the existence of Turks in Bulgaria (Cumhuriyet & Tercüman, 27.06.1989).



Figure 6- 7: Cumhuriyet, 27.08.1989

Talks with the refugees: Together with a committee, Deputy Secretary General of the UN Jonah visits a tent city in Edirne and talks with them.

In this period, representatives of various states and international organizations, and press members visited the refugees in Turkey and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Even after the visa regime was put into force again as of August 22, these representatives continued their watch at the border and called the Bulgarian state once again for reaching an agreement upon witnessing such dramatic scenes. The visit of the US Congress CSCE Monitoring Committee to the border area is one of them, and Turkey's decision on the restriction is deemed appropriate (Cumhuriyet, 24.08.1989).

6.1.1.5. The Great Condemnation Meeting

Besides the visits of internationally prominent figures, Turkey organized various events as part of Turkey's efforts to increase the international visibility of the crisis and draw support from the international society. One of these activities is the organization of

a meeting entitled ‘the great condemnation meeting’ with the participation of several recognized persons, politicians, and people from all over Turkey. The news about the great condemnation meeting, covered in the selected media outlets is given below. In the news, it is written that Bulgarian oppression would be condemned on June 17 and 14, ANAP and DYP will hold public demonstrations” (Cumhuriyet, 14.06.1989). ANAP called the opposition parties for ‘national unity’ to protest the Bulgarian operations against Turks. SHP declared its support as “It is a national cause. Surely, we support this demonstration”, a move that can be read as an attempt to strengthen the unity and increase public support. Even if there was no reply from DYP, due probably to concerns about neither wanting to appear as an opposition party unsupportive of a national cause nor ready to jump on the ruling party’s bandwagon, they announced that they would hold another meeting in Sakarya on June 17. In a similar vein, DSP also declared to hold a separate meeting in Bursa on June 18, with the participation of the party leader Ecevit. With the invitations to all domestic political parties, the government might aim to flourish the national support and solidarity against Bulgaria’s inhumane treatment towards the Turkish minority. To draw attention to the problem and move it on the international agenda, ANAP invited some national and international celebrities such as Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens), UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, and representatives from Amnesty International, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and so on (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 13.06.1989). We may witness that Turkey at every turn endeavored to call international attention to the humanitarian crisis aspect of the issue.

Cumhuriyet writes that ANAP Deputy Leader Halil Özsoy said that July 24 would be declared as the national mourning day and invited all parties and all nations to the great condemnation meeting in Taksim (Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1989). PM Özal stated that as they considered the meeting far above a political event, he and President Evren would not attend the meeting to keep it away from the domestic politics (Milliyet, 16.06.1989). It might be intended to cultivate domestic awareness and hinder political dispute on a humanitarian and sensitive issue.

After the discussions about whether the meeting was a political party event, a joint committee was formed among the parties to organize the great condemnation meeting in order to take the refugee issue out of domestic politics. In other words, it is safe to argue that the opposition parties sought to prevent the matter from being handled solely by the

ruling party. Accordingly, PM Özal, when asked whether he would deliver a speech at the meeting, said, “There is the organization committee. We will abide by what they say. If the leaders wished to speak, we speak. We deem this as a national issue, not a party issue” (Tercüman, 19.06.1989). By packaging the issue as a national crisis, not a party issue, the government was able to gain support from domestic politics. After forming this committee all three parties in the cabinet composed of ANAP, SHP and DYP decided to take part in the demonstration (Cumhuriyet, 14.06.1989), and they frequently convened in the TBMM to discuss necessary precautions for the upcoming meeting (Cumhuriyet, 20.06.1989). This committee became a uniting agent among the parties to show a common political and national stance.



Figure 6- 8: Milliyet, 25.06.1989

One Voice, One Heart: thousands of people yesterday gathered in Taksim Square with Turkish flags to protest.

When the meeting day came, hundreds and thousands of people from various cities of the country rushed to Taksim Square in İstanbul with Turkish flags and banners condemning the Bulgarian regime. Along with the political parties, some Bulgarian Turks, NGOs, and many famous people also participated in the meeting. The news wrote in the headlines as “National Warning to Sofia; National Reaction to Sofia; One Voice, One Heart in Taksim” (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 25.06.1989).



Figure 6- 9: Cumhuriyet, 25.06.1989

Pictures from the Meeting: The representatives from the three parties including ANAP, SHP, and DYP. There are also representatives from foundations, NGOs, the Turkish youth, celebrities such as Fatma Girik and Bulgarian refugees in Taksim

Along with the celebrities such as Fatma Girik, a famous Turkish actress, some famous Bulgarian Turks who escaped from the persecution attended the demonstration as well. One of them was the world weightlifting champion Naim Süleymanoğlu, who escaped from Bulgaria and became a Turkish citizen in 1986, and he also made a speech as a first-hand victim of the years-long oppression (Cumhuriyet, 25.06.1989).

A banner with the words “For a tree, its branches are not a burden” took the attention, a rhetoric built upon the metaphor that clearly demonstrates how Turks in Bulgaria are and should be seen. According to the local Turkish people, they were not the

outsider imposing a load on them, the shared roots played again a significant role in how the Bulgarian Turk refugees were greeted.



Figure 6- 10: Tercüman, 25.06.1989

Tens of thousands of people from all over the country gather in Taksim with the Turkish flags by chanting “Murderer Zhivkov” and “Army to Sofia”.

Delivering a speech in the name of SHP, Secretary-General Baykal said, “The problem is beyond the migration and it is much deeper. Dating months and years back, the problem is that our kindreds in Bulgaria have been deprived of human rights... If 300 thousand people came, 1 million 200 thousand would be left behind. What will happen to them? The problem is not providing shelter or food to those coming. There is no other example that a state deports its own citizens, in the absence of war” (Cumhuriyet, 25.06.1989). We see here, as declared in many statements, the problem is not providing shelter to those who already crossed the border, but the rights of those staying in Bulgaria and the possibility that all of them will be forced to migrate. Furthermore, not only the government but the opposition was also of the opinion that they did not have trouble with the refugees, yet they were troubled with the Bulgarian administration and its brutal policies.

During the meeting, Bulgarian attitude towards Turks, Zhivkov, and his policies were condemned, and some states and organizations were criticized by the speakers because of staying silent as the Turkish government sought to get the support of

international actors, thereby internationalizing the matter. A written statement of President Evren condemning Bulgaria was distributed to the people who came to the meeting (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 25.06.1989). The slogans such as “Murderer Zhivkov, army to Sofia!” and “We want guns against Bulgaria!” were chanted during the meeting (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 25.06.1989).



Figure 6- 11: Milliyet, 25.06.1989

The Turk is the friend to the Turk: Other Turkic groups living in Turkey also attended the meeting in their traditional dresses to show their support to the Bulgarian Turks.

The determination to draw the attention of the international organizations and actors on the Bulgarian oppression was uttered at every occasion and that condemnation meeting was one of the most effective attempts to show it. Therefore, the meeting demonstrated how the state and nation gathered in solidarity on the common ground with the attendance of three main parties, several politicians, media outlets, many NGOs, the youth, the elders, men and women, the people with other Turkic origins, celebrities, etc. The presence of the three main parties, in particular, at the meeting, which served to consolidate national unity and public support, also indicated the success of the attempts

for the matter to be taken rather as a supra-political and national cause than as a mere agenda item in party or domestic politics.

6.1.1.6. Vaccination

In the path to internationalize the Bulgarian oppression, the allegation of Bulgaria's forced vaccine on the Turks was put forward on the media and international platforms. The refugees claimed that the youth and children were vaccinated by the Bulgarians before they were sent to Turkey. The blood samples were taken from those who were vaccinated and sent to laboratories to be checked (Tercüman, 17.06.1989).



Figure 6- 12: Milliyet, 18.07.1989

A committee from WHO is in Ankara to investigate the Bulgarian vaccine.

Health Minister Halil Şıvgın stated that they were concerned about the forced vaccination. They suspected that the kindreds were injected with a virus to cause infertility and death in the long term. To take measures, they made an application to the World Health Organization (WHO) for an investigation. Relevant health authorities of the Turkish government began to investigate acutely and immediately that claim (Tercüman, 20-24.06.1989). The WHO decided to send a committee to Turkey in order to make investigations on the unknown vaccine (Tercüman, 24.06.1989). A professor from Istanbul University's Medical Faculty declared that this injected material might be a radioactive substance. And the Health Minister expressed the investigations were ongoing (Milliyet, 02.07.1989).

The Committee of the WHO visited the refugee settlements to make an investigation about the vaccine. Then, they left for Bulgaria to continue their search there (Milliyet, 23.07.1989). Tercüman writes that “There is ammonia in the Bulgarian vaccine”. While waiting for the report from the WHO, a refugee brought an ampoule of vaccine and Turkish experts announced that there was 10% of ammonia in the vaccine after their investigation. They also expressed it was harmless but it might be sent intentionally by the Bulgarian government to misguide the search on the vaccine. (Tercüman,17.08.1989). Even if the Turkish state was not sure about the use and the ingredients of the vaccine, it might be projected as a part of the inhumane treatment of the Bulgarian regime.

6.1.2. Domestic Context

6.1.2.1. Naming the Bulgarian Turks

The name that a state uses to address an immigrant group is a good signifier to reflect the state approach to the issue. As presented by the news pieces, the authorities and media outlets preferred to call the Bulgarian Turk refugees *soydaş* (kindreds) from the very beginning to the end. Some newspapers and politicians did not even utter the name of ‘refugee’ to refer to them. The utterance of the “kindreds” is well above the status of refugee and migrant. Due to ethnic, religious, and cultural bonds, they were deemed as a natural part of the Turkish nation. Even if they were rarely referred to as “immigrants” in some newspaper stories, those might not mean to alienate them or attribute any other status than “kindred”. With the knowledge that the persons from Turkish origins or who can adopt this identity are accepted as Turkish citizens in the Turkish laws, it is safe to argue that a widely-held refugee perception towards Bulgarian Turks might ever be constructed neither politically nor socially.

6.1.2.2. Local Support

While the Bulgarian Turks continued to enter Turkey in huge crowds, the Turkish state and people were in a rush to help those already arrived. Because the Bulgarian government sent the Turks merely with their suitcases on the first days of the expulsion, the first-comers, in particular, were in a disadvantaged situation. Minister of State Cemil Çiçek declared, “We have enough money in the fund (Social Aid and Solidarity

Promotion Fund). All kinds of relief will be provided to our kindreds” (Tercüman, 06.06.1989). On the same day, the newspaper Tercüman launches a comprehensive aid campaign including financial aids, employment, housing, scholarship for the refugee students, and so on. This campaign had been covered and announced on the headline of the newspaper for months. Under the headline of “Full support from the parties”, it is also written that this campaign entitled “Let us lookout for our kindreds” gained the support of all parties, ANAP, SHP, RP, and MÇP. Many mayors and businesspersons from various cities of Turkey promised to provide the refugees with land, employment, scholarship, and some other types of relief (Tercüman, 08.06.1989). This campaign might be said to have lasted for a long time because even in August the same year we could see the news articles about the campaign.



Figure 6- 13: Milliyet, 19.06.1989

The refugees waiting at the border with their families and belongings.

In the following days, the Municipality of Küçükçekmece launched a relief campaign for “the Turks forced to migrate from Bulgaria”. The municipality would put into service prefabricated temporary houses for about 100 families, and it was also stated that cash aid would be provided for those families (Cumhuriyet, 11.06.1989).

According to the news, İzmir Governorate located more than one thousand refugees in the schools and stated that a committee was formed for the temporarily settled citizens and that it would meet all their needs. Also, the local citizens in İzmir lent a hand to the refugees. In his speech, the Deputy Governor of İzmir called them “citizens” but

not refugees. On the other hand, a Mayor from Erzurum declared that about 30 hectares of land were granted to the refugees (Tercüman, 19.06.1989). Here, it seems like the people from every corner of the country, from İzmir in the west to Erzurum in the east, tried to help the kindreds. All the help campaigns are not given here but there are numerous similar examples from many governorates and municipalities. These were to demonstrate how acceptive and welcoming the residents and local administrations in different parts of the country were towards the kindreds.

On the financial side, Ziraat Bank, one of the leading state banks of that time in Turkey, also launched a campaign for the refugees and donated 500 million Turkish liras at the first stage (Cumhuriyet, 28.06.1989). Visiting the camps in Edirne and Kırklareli, Minister of Finance, Customs and Monopolies Ekrem Pakdemirli talked to the refugees as, “You will not suffer any cash problem. I can send money as you want. Meeting your needs is our high priority” (Tercüman, 10.08.1989).

Throughout this period, in the news, we see numerous aid campaigns and donations in various kinds from work to scholarship, from house to cash aid, from land to psychological support. These were not only provided by the state but also by the private sectors, NGOs, municipalities, universities, schools, individuals, and so forth. Only some of them are given as an example in this study to represent the overall support. By largely proceeding these campaigns in their news and front pages, the media also might seek to underline the overall support and encourage people to maintain their welcoming attitude.

The only featuring shared trait is not the Turkishness of the refugees coming from Bulgaria in the discourse but also the religious belonging as a substantial parameter in the establishment of the close ties. Especially the more conservative media outlet, *Tercüman* gives a place to such news and calls people to help the refugees through Islamic messages as well. It writes that those helping the refugees will be awarded by Allah by referring to the *hadiths*⁵ and verses from the Qur’an as: “And the first forerunners [in the faith] among the *Muhajireen* and the *Ansar* and those who followed them with good conduct - Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him, and He has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide forever. (Qur’an, 9:100)”⁶ This is

⁵ Hadith is the record of the traditions or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Retrieved from www.britannica.com)

⁶ Retrieved from www.quran.com , Surah-al Tawbah.

shown as an example that can also be applied in the Bulgarian Turks case because the Turks were displaced from their homes as they wanted to exercise their belief just like the *Muhajireen* (Tercüman, 09.06.1989). This is a strong narrative for the believers because it is written in their most sacred book that they will be awarded if they help the refugees. This message was occasionally repeated in social gatherings and the media to promote the supports.

In addition to the media support in religious terms, the Directorate of Religious Affairs as the highest religious body in the Turkish state organization also demonstrated its support to the ‘Muslim brothers and sisters’. The Director condemned the Bulgarian administration and stated that the persecution suited neither any religion nor humanity: “Our kindreds are not only under the protection of the state but also the whole nation. They are the guests of all of us. I am sure that every person who has the opportunity will treat them with the same tenderness and affection of our state.” And he said to the refugees “Welcome” (Tercüman, 14.06.1989). On the previous days, the newspaper writes that the Directorate of Religious Affairs would give place to the themes of helping the refugees and Bulgarian violence in the Friday sermons to inform the public and call them to help (Milliyet, 14.06.1989). It is probably viewed, along with the official rhetoric, as the religious and national feelings and values were tried to be kept alive and the citizens were asked to help the refugees. The calls on people to help made through the Directorate of Religious Affairs, political elites, and media outlets are given in this section, and it might be read as the state used its power and communication channels to convince the Turkish public.

6.1.2.3. Stance of the Political Parties

Along with the relief campaigns, political parties showed their support to the Bulgarian Turks in their rhetoric as well. *Cumhuriyet* writes the backlashes of the political party leaders against Zhivkov’s government under the headline of “Reactions from Leaders to Sophia”. All parties condemned the Bulgarian government and called to stop violence against the Turks in Bulgaria (Cumhuriyet, 11.06.1989). Moreover, they said that they would carry the issue into the international platform. *Tercüman* writes, “Ecevit:

Muhajireen are those emigrated from Mecca to Madinah, and Ansars are those helping and hosting the Muhajireen.

Persecution cannot be prevented through words". In a rally held in İstanbul, Bülent Ecevit, the leader of DSP (Democratic Left Party), talked about the Bulgarian state's policies and refugees sent by force to Turkey. He said that those coming from the Balkans had the same rights as the citizens born and raised in the Turkish territories from a humanitarian and national perspective. He also proposed to pull the Turkish embassy out of Sofia and to establish a ministry on the refugees and Turks abroad (Tercüman, 11.06.1989). This rhetoric can also be interpreted as a sign of hope instilled in the Turks in Bulgaria that they were entitled to and would enjoy the rights of citizenship upon their arrival in Turkey as soon as practicably possible.

PM Özal stated that he would pay a visit to Thrace for the refugees at the weekend. He wanted all people to extend their helping hands to the refugees (Milliyet, 14.06.1989). Additionally, on the same day, SHP leader İnönü and a group of MPs from DYP visited the border and looked into the situation. They uttered the failures in the services such as providing shelter and food. And they called the government to be more assertive and deterrent about the Bulgarian regime (Tercüman, 14.06.1989). Throughout this period many politicians and state officials paid visits to the camps and gave an ear to the requests and problems. This might show that the Turkish politicians from left to right backed up the kindreds and never left them alone.

Whereas uttering their supports to the kindreds, they criticized Özal for not showing an adequate reaction to the Bulgarian government and for lacking the grit to protect the rights of Turks therein (Cumhuriyet, 11.06.1989). SHP leader İnönü: "Solving the problem without war is a must. We should use all international pressure means". DYP leader Demirel: "Bulgars did not find the stance of the government in Turkey deterring and discouraging for their practices" (Cumhuriyet, 12.06.1989). As can be seen here, the parties manifested their support for the Turks in Bulgaria and their reaction against the Bulgarian government through condemnations and invocations to the international authorities. Maybe as a duty of being in the opposition wing, they also cast criticisms on the Turkish government for not exercising enough pressure.

In line with the news articles, it can be argued that the main criticism of the opposition was that Turkey lost its deterrent power against the Bulgarian regime. They blamed the government for serving to Zhivkov's Bulgarization policies by facilitating the forced migration of Turks in Bulgaria. Since Turkey did not reject anyone from Bulgaria,

the Bulgarian state intensified its policy to expel the Turks from Bulgaria. The dissidents also asserted that the safety and security of Turks should have been ensured in Bulgaria instead of taking all them to the country. The opposition, however, might not be seen as turning their back on the kindreds who were stuck in brutal actions, so they repeatedly stated their support to the government in accepting all Bulgarian Turks. This conflicting attitude of the opposition, between two edges, may have continued throughout the migration process, just like in their opinions on visa requirement decision.

Once and for all, it is possible to conclude that regardless of their political views, all parties in the Turkish assembly showed their support in the direction of welcoming all of the kindreds despite some frictions. They also demonstrated their supports concretely by visiting the camps, organizing aid campaigns, and participating in the meetings held against the Bulgarian regime, and so forth.

6.1.3. Handling of Migration

6.1.3.1. Legal Status

As the number of Bulgarian Turks arriving in Turkey increased, a question emerged as to what their legal status should be. The most relevant piece of legislation at the time was the Law on Settlement dated 1935, which regulated immigration and permanent settlement for those with Turkish ethnicity and culture. Yet, since some changes in the law were required, the authorities immediately initiated the relevant procedures.

In this dramatic increase in the number, the fact that the Bulgarian state started to give a passport to everyone who applied after the second half of June may have played an important role. Small groups and families were replaced by huge crowds. Upon this development, State Minister Konukman stated that an amendment in the settlement law would be applied in order to swiftly settle the Bulgarian Turks whose number reached up to 16 thousand. The Ministry of Interior sent a circular to each governorate to detect the empty lands and houses convenient for settlement. Those would be purchased by the government and the refugees would be settled there (Tercüman, 14.06.1989) As of June 17, two new laws enabling Bulgarian Turks to have property rights and to become Turkish citizens in line with the Settlement Law No. 2510 were enacted by the parliament (Cumhuriyet, 17.06.1989).

Replying to the question about granting Turkish citizenship to the refugees, Minister Konukman said, “Law on Turkish Citizenship has been passed. We have initiated the procedures of our kindreds applied for citizenship, in line with this law.” He also stated that until the citizenship procedures were completed, the refugees would be given temporary ID cards (Cumhuriyet, 24.06.1989). It seems that the required legal structure was established at speed.

As of June 30, the law amendment to grant legal refugee status was passed and issued in the Official Gazette. With the additional article to the Law on Settlement, those with Turkish origins and those who adhere to the Turkish culture, come and wish to settle down in Turkey because of forced migration after January 1, 1984, were given the status of refugee (Cumhuriyet, 30.06.1989). On the following day, Minister Konukman said, “We declare that we want to grant Turkish citizenship honorably to the Turks who have come from Bulgaria (Cumhuriyet, 01.07.1989).

6.1.3.2. Camp Life

The Bulgarian Turks were greeted welcomingly by the Turkish authorities and people, and they were hosted at the houses of their relatives especially during the first days of the expulsion. However, when the flow intensified and the number of the kindreds who had no relatives in Turkey to live together increased, the Turkish state was involved by providing temporary settlement. When the State Minister Konukman became the responsible authority for the refugees, he started swiftly to work on their entry and settlement procedures. In a press meeting, he said two camps would be built up with the capacity of 2000 persons each and their capacities could be increased in line with the needs. “The peace and comfort of our kindreds in these camps will be ensured. Of course, they will not stay here for a long time. Employment and housing will be provided. If they desire, they will be able to contact their families and relatives” (Cumhuriyet & Tercüman, 13.06.1989). It seems to be a clear sign that there was not a requirement for refugees to stay in camps, and those who had relatives in Turkey could leave the camps to live with them. As understood from the statements and news, the primary aim of the camps was to provide shelter to those who had no place to go in Turkey. There was not a restriction on their movements and in which province they desired to live as well.



Figure 6- 14: Cumhuriyet, 17.06.1989

126 families are in the camp: 450 refugees are settled in the tent city in Edirne. Settlement procedures are ongoing in the camps.

In addition to some ministers and members of parliament, Minister of National Education Avni Akyol visited the camps at the border and, according to the news stories, stated that the ‘tent schools’ would be set up during the summer for the immigrated children. The courses would be arranged according to their levels, and Turkish language and technical courses would also be provided (Tercüman, 20.06.1989). These attempts might be read as the initial steps and preparations for the integration of the Bulgarian Turks and granting Turkish citizenship. The government seems to aim at contributing the refugee employment with the occupational courses. Making plans from the beginning of the migration process for the Bulgarian Turks’ integration through the efforts to provide settlement, education, and employment might indicate that the Turkish state managed this process with the opinion that the kindreds would stay permanently and became Turkish citizens in the end. Probably that is why Turkey took more concrete steps for the adaptation of the kindreds from beginning to the end.

Konukman also talked about the preparations for the winter by expressing that the refugees who could not rent a house would be placed in prefabricated houses and military facilities during the winter. The polar shelters would be built as well in the camps. With an amendment in the law, the Directorate General of Migration would be formed to deal with the problems of the refugees (Tercüman, 18.08.1989). Cumhuriyet also writes about

this Directorate as Minister Konukman declared to establish a directorate for those refugees within two weeks and the fund allocated for the kindreds would be managed by that directorate (Cumhuriyet, 20.08.1989). Even if the need for a unified body to deal with the migratory movements in Turkey was realized especially with the mass migration of Bulgarian Turks, such an umbrella institution was not realized up until 2013 when the Directorate General of Migration Management was established under the Ministry of Interior (DGMM, 2013). The mission of the Directorate of Migration established at that time was to look out for the kindred refugees expelled from Bulgaria, it was not a comprehensive authority to handle the other refugee groups in the country.



Figure 6- 15: Cumhuriyet, 01.07.1989

Increasing number of refugees: the daily number of refugees entered Turkey is about four thousand. They are waiting for their admission procedures.

A news article in *Tercüman* writes about daily life in the camps on the second month of the migration. According to this article, the kindreds go through a ‘harmonization process in the tent cities to overcome the first shock when they arrive. While they continue their daily lives, the parents and children attend Turkish language courses. Various facilities like barbers, masjids, and showers are available in the camps. They are provided with a meal three times a day. The kindreds can find suitable jobs through the contact office of the Turkish Employment Institution which was set up in the camps’. The news states that the kindreds called Edirne Governor Ünal Erkan ‘Father

Governor'. The Governor states that the biggest problem was unemployment. "As our kindreds are used to work in jobs provided by the government in public sector, they hesitate to work for the private sector and demand jobs in the government. We try to convince them to work in the private sector. Our kindreds, now, go through a harmonization process" (Tercüman, 04.07.1989). According to this article, the refugees feel not foreign, because they see Turkey as their homeland and they sustain their daily lives in peace. It might be seen on the news pieces that being unemployed was reflected as the only problem the refugees suffered.

Tercüman continues to write about the daily life of the kindred as follows, "They go to the market, make a bargain, and become friends with the local people. This is a 'typical national unity and solidarity' on the hardest days of the Turk. They look to the future with hope in 'their motherland'" (04.07.1989). In this news piece, the free movement and social interaction of the Bulgarian Turks with the local citizens are portrayed in a friendly and sincere atmosphere. Instead of isolating the refugees from the locals, Turkish authorities opted for more freedom and integration for them most probably in line with the vision of long-term settlement and citizenship. Maybe to reinforce the national and ethnic belonging shared by the refugees and Turkish citizens, the Turkish identity might be frequently and clearly highlighted. Moreover, the relations were drawn more beyond a pure host-guest relationship by indicating the notion of the motherland, and therefore the Bulgarian Turks were not ordinary guests, but already inhabitants in their 'homeland'.

As it is seen in the below figure, an activity was held in the 'tent city' with the participation of Minister Konukman to entertain the refugees on June 16. An MP from ANAP spent that night together with the refugees in the camp to give support to them (Tercüman, 17.06.1989). According to *Cumhuriyet*, a similar event was planned for the following month. It announces that a big concert would be organized for the refugees on July 30 (Cumhuriyet, 27.07.1989).




Figure 6- 16: Cumhuriyet, 07.08.1989

All income from the concert for our kindreds: In the concert Nurettin Sözen with his Mexican hat, Sibel Can and Yugoslav folk dancers are watched in amusement.

A *Cumhuriyet* news story writes about the “first *eid* (*religious festival*) of the refugees”. Accordingly, on the first day of the *eid*, Minister Konukman, the Governors of Edirne, and Kırklareli Erkan and Ünal together attended the *eid* prayer with the refugees in Selimiye Mosque (*Cumhuriyet*, 17.07.1989). The Turkish state authorities might show their support on every possible occasion to the kindreds and not make them feel lonely. As it is seen in these examples, the support of the Turkish authorities and people were not only limited to the financial and procedural ease, but they gave moral support as well.

6.1.3.3. Settlement

As seen in the news, it might be witnessed that the Turkish government started to take actions to facilitate the entry and settlement processes of the refugees since the day when Prime Minister Özal said, “Our doors are open to our all kindreds” (*Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman*, 31.05.1989).

Tercüman writes that the admission centers were established at the border crossing points in Edirne and Kırklareli. State Minister and Government Spokesperson Mehmet Yazar announced the decisions taken at the cabinet meeting in a press release. He stated that the Turkish government was following up closely the situation of the Turks in Bulgaria, and with the aim of carrying out this duty properly a coordination committee was set up under the chairmanship of State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bozer

and then State Minister Ercüment Konukman. The admission centers would facilitate ID controls and physical examinations (Tercüman, 06.06.1989). On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* pens the same news as “From now on, those who will come to Turkey will wait, for ‘security reasons’, at the camps to be set up at the border gates” (Cumhuriyet, 08.06.1989).

Following the cabinet meeting, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, İnal Batu, said, “Our kindreds can stay in Turkey as long as they wish. They can stay forever. If they wish, they can become citizens as well. However, as you know, their departure from there is not a voluntary movement...” He also recalled that a protocol was signed between the government and Turkish Airlines to bring the Turks who wished to come to Turkey. Referring to another achievement accomplished, he continued, “Our initiatives before the High Commissioner for Refugees are about to succeed. This organization will cover the arrival costs to Turkey of those coming from now onward” (Tercüman, 09.06.1989). Further development to lighten the burdens of the refugees was that they could exchange easily their Bulgarian currency with the Turkish lira, and the limitation on exchange up to 10 Levs was lifted (Cumhuriyet, 11.06.1989).



Figure 6- 17: Milliyet, 14.06.1989

Kapıkule border gate is clogged by the crowd, when Bulgaria started to give passport to everyone who wishes.

State Minister Ercüment Konukman was charged with solving such problems as settlement, food, and transportation that the refugees had. As the Chairman of the Coordination Committee, Konukman said at the press meeting, “We are determined to

receive all of our kindreds with wide-open arms.” He also stated that two camps would be set up at the border gates (Cumhuriyet & Tercüman, 13.06.1989).

Minister of Public Works and Settlement Cengiz Altınkaya stated that the works to build prefabricated houses for the deported ones from Bulgaria were initiated. Firstly, the survey would be conducted in the lands where those families wished to settle down (Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1989). This is another indication of the policy of allowing Bulgarian Turks to voluntarily settle in places of their own choices. Yet, on the same day, we see a news article in *Cumhuriyet* writing that Foreign Minister Yılmaz for the first time pronounced that the border might be closed (Cumhuriyet, 13.06.1989). However, we could not see any other explanation or statement about border closure until August 22. Even if the matter of border closure might have been talked about among the authorities in the second week of the influx, they did not make any clear and official speech on that, maybe due to the hesitations from the reactions of the public and political opposition and becoming inferior before an enemy communist state, namely Bulgaria, during the age of frozen ties of the Cold War.



Figure 6- 18: Milliyet, 29.08.1989

The refugees settled in school dormitories are in search of jobs.

About the economic impact of the refugees, Özal stated that the Bulgarians thought that the refugees would place a burden upon the Turkish economy. “On the

contrary, they will be settled in the most appropriate way and they will contribute to the economy. And one day, Bulgarian authorities will be brought to account for what they did” (Cumhuriyet, 14.06.1989). Later on, a foreign journalist asked Özal, “Did the tent camps cost too much? Will you demand any help?” He answered, “When over 60 thousand refugees from Iraq came, within a week, we set up camps with all infrastructure and healthcare services from postal services to banks and playgrounds. We cannot know how many will come. If the number increases, we may request help from the UN and friendly states” (Tercüman, 19.06.1989). In the light of these statements, the Turkish government might not utter even a word on the disadvantage of the kindreds even about the economic costs of such a crowded group of refugees. They might seek to keep fresh their hope that the refugees would easily integrate into the society and system so that they would be an advantage instead of a load on the Turkish economy. This might be a precaution to appease a possible offense and annoyance from the economically-stricken local Turkish people with the kindreds, and from the militarily-powerful Presidency keeping its firm hand on the government.



Figure 6- 19: Cumhuriyet, 27.07.1989

Waiting for a work: 3549 refugees are settled in the dormitories and schools in Ankara. An employment office is formed by the governorate in one of the dormitories. The salary offered to the refugees is the same, the minimum wage.

The refugees were settled in different parts of Turkey, including those who were settled in dormitories in Ankara as shown by the above figure. According to this news story, one floor of the dormitory was used as an 'employment office'. Employers throughout the country came and offered jobs to the refugees via this office (Cumhuriyet, 27.07.1989). Minister Konukman made a warning after learning some employers hired refugees at a low salary. "All of them will be employed within three months. Just a little patience. In this period, they will not be left needy. They should report those offering a low salary to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security" (Tercüman, 27.08.1989). We see the efforts to guard the rights of refugees in Turkey and to push back the opportunist employers.

It seems like the principal concern of the refugees was to find a job to sustain their lives. Even if the state exerted efforts to meet this demand, it could not be sufficient for such a crowded group. Turkey itself, as a developing country, was also suffering from high unemployment rate. So, the nationals might be disturbed by this situation with the thought that while they were waiting for a job, the state worked to provide employment to the refugees. Cumhuriyet covers such a news article with the headline "Reaction to the refugees". It is stated in the article that the refugees brought to Zonguldak and given jobs at the Directorate General of Turkish Hard Coal Institution met with reactions firstly from the Mine-Work Union representing 60 thousand mine workers (Cumhuriyet, 30.07.1989). Given then the economic setting of Turkey, this kind of reaction from the local public might become inevitable throughout the employment process of the kindreds.

According to *Tercüman*, Konukman said, "Our kindreds always hold a special place in our hearts. We are working to carry out what falls upon us as the Turkish state. This is our responsibility as the state, nation, and citizen. However, I want to emphasize one point. The special care shown to our kindreds will be neither less nor more than what is shown to our citizens. They are not only our kindreds but they will become our citizens. For that reason, they hold the advantages and disadvantages of a Turkish citizen equally... Neither negative nor positive discrimination will be shown" (Tercüman, 18.08.1989). In this statement, we may infer that the Minister fears a potential public reaction similar to one shown by the mineworkers in Zonguldak. Therefore, he tries to change the privileged treatment perception towards the refugees and emphasizes equality.

As stated earlier, the education for the immigrant children was initiated in the camps, and some new forward-looking actions were also taken in the education of the refugee children and youth. The Ministry of National Education declared that it would provide free boarding education to 15 thousand students. Furthermore, it was declared that the teachers who came from Bulgaria also would be integrated into the Turkish education system and could pursue their professions. Last but not least, the leading universities of the country, such as Hacettepe University and Ankara University, declared that they would open additional places for the refugee students (Cumhuriyet, 06.07.1989). These examples also show the extent of welcome displayed towards Bulgarian Turks and indicate the fact that from the beginning, both the Turkish society and various societal actors, openly declared their readiness for their long-term settlement in the country. Furthermore, with the integration of the kindred teachers, employment of the refugees might be ensured to some extent, and the demand for literate people might be enabled via those teachers.

Minister Konukman stated that rent relief for the refugees would be provided as of September 1. “We continue our works to provide rent relief or grant houses to our kindreds. We hope that we will complete as soon as possible” (Cumhuriyet, 30.06.1989). Within three months, Konukman shared detailed news that “the rent relief will be provided monthly for one year” (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 02.08.1989). After the rhetoric on the satisfaction of the main problem of accommodation, Konukman used further promising words for the refugees as to their becoming able to lead their lives on their own “We will empower our kindreds to find a job and set up houses on their own (Cumhuriyet, 22.07.1989). As written in all three newspapers, the promised rent relief for housing started to be distributed as of September 1 (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 01.09.1989). In the light of these statements, the handling of migrants was taken to a further step. The authorities discussed the integration of the migrants by providing permanent settlement and employment as of September, and the issues regarding the entries of new kindreds were not that hot topic as in the early days of the influx.

6.1.4. Security Debate

6.1.4.1. Bulgarian Turks as the Agenda Item of the NSC

During this period, the Turkish state swiftly formed a committee for the migration procedures and necessary works of the kindreds deported by the Bulgarian regime. Even though this committee composed of various ministers was authorized to deal with the Turkish refugees, it was witnessed that the National Security Council was also involved from time to time.

The news articles of that time write that the matter was discussed in the NSC meeting held by President Evren. With the headline of “Forced migration is discussed in the NSC”, *Cumhuriyet* writes the statement of the Secretary-General of the NSC, “National Security Council reviewed the domestic and foreign affairs, assessed the general state of security and order, and negotiated the measure(s) taken and to be taken regarding our kindreds who are forced to migrate from Bulgaria” (*Cumhuriyet*, 30.06.1989). It might show the signals that the forced migration initially emerged as a concern of the civil authority in time turned into an agenda item of the military authorities. However, this is an unfavorable situation for the government and we see their concern in the words of the Prime Minister. Özal made an unexpected visit to Chief of the General Staff General, Necip Torumtay, and a statement with the explanation “I am explaining so that the journalists do not misunderstand this visit”. He stated that the purpose of the visit was to receive information about border security. “This kind of event may cause some problems. The security and safety of Turkey are above everything” (*Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman*, 13.06.1989). According to this explanation, it is safe to argue that the government verbalized openly the fear from the intervention of the military administration and aimed to inform the public and refugees not to cause chaos.

Tercüman writes that the NSC would be convened on August 31 and closure of the border would be among the agenda items of the meeting in which the relations with the neighbors are to be discussed (*Tercüman*, 22.08.1989). This might indicate the severity of the situation, yet there was not any statement which could do a disservice to the Bulgarian Turk refugees. We see in the later speeches of President Evren that he made calls for solidarity to protect the Muslims Turks in Bulgaria and he also continued to hold on to the kinship emphasis (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.09.1989). The fact that the issue was talked in the NSC meeting might point out its evaluation as a national security issue; however,

it might not be the kindreds that were seen as the national security problem but the Bulgarian policies as concluded from the maintenance of the friendly treatment towards the kindreds.

6.1.4.2. Spy Infiltration

Turkey was employing an open-door policy for the kindreds and accepting everyone coming from Bulgaria without requiring a visa. When the number of arrivals further increased, there appeared to be a concern over Bulgarian spies infiltrating by posing as refugees. As a first measure, it seems that ID controls and security screenings were increased. According to news of that time, the Bulgarian state abused this loosened restriction and sent some spies and some unwanted people from other minority groups into the country such as gypsies among the Bulgarian Turks and the regime spies. When the Turkish authorities realized it, they initiated ID controls for the refugees at the border, *Cumhuriyet* covered it as “ID Controls of the Migrants”. Foreign Minister Yılmaz said, “According to the information received from the civilian authorities, among those sent to Turkey, there are some non-Turkish people, even though a few. For this reason, we have taken some measures and we will continue to take such measures.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10.06.1989). Akin to Foreign Minister Yılmaz’ comments, State Minister Konukman expressed that the Bulgarians sent some non-Muslims among the kindreds and they were returned to Bulgaria. The minister stated that the required works were conducted to distinguish those elements and the ones without a passport would be admitted to Turkey by no means (*Cumhuriyet & Tercüman*, 13.06.1989). The reason for Turkey to consider this issue as a security problem could be the possibility that the non-Turks might be the communist agents who were intentionally sent by the Bulgarian regime in the guise of Turkish refugees. Those times were the culmination of the espionage activities between the allies of two opposite superpowers of the Cold War, and spy infiltration among the kindreds into Turkey might be a great source of security concern. Moreover, the Turkish state continuously utter that they accept “their kindreds” and the Turkish public respond positively to their admission especially on the “kinship” and “religious fellowship” grounds, but the entry of the non-Turk and non-Muslim people might be adversely reacted. To continue receiving the support of the local people, the government might have to prevent all kinds of infiltrations.

When it was asked about deploying security forces to the border in the press meeting, the authorities rejected this claim. On this issue, National Defense Minister Safa Giray said, “No, we did not deploy extra soldiers on the border. However, our army is on alert. It is in line with the duty. It takes what measure is required and does what is necessary.” (Cumhuriyet, 14.06.1989). This possibility might be read as Turkey’s menace towards Bulgaria to protect the kindreds and bring the Bulgarian administration to the table for migration agreement. However, it was not an action to prevent the entry of Bulgarian Turks, contrarily it might be to provide their safe and secure border crossings.

As stated above, Turkish authorities were worried about the infiltration of the spies among the Turkish refugees, and it became an important security concern by the day. When Konukman was asked how many spies were caught among the refugees, he replied, “There are some independent cases followed up. There is nothing certain. But we are worried.” (Tercüman, 15.06.1989). Even if the media and authorities did not mention so much about the Bulgarian spies who infiltrated into the country, this problem seems like revived again after the border closure on August 22. Minister Konukman declared the number of spies caught among the refugees as about 500 during an interview (Milliyet, 29.08.1989). In the end, the fear of Bulgarian espionage in Turkey, which first appeared as a concern, ended up with a solid security problem.

At this point, the security concerns were openly uttered by the state authorities. The Minister claimed that with those infiltrations, the Bulgarians aimed to get Turkey to close the border in order to damage its image. After these problems, the tents and admission centers were established at the border to run checks on the refugees properly. These infiltrations were shown as the justification for stricter border security and admission policies. In the end, as a result of the heightened concerns regarding the Bulgarian state’s potential to instrumentalize the refugees as a cover to pursue its espionage activities in Turkey, the border was closed. With this border closure decision partly affected by the spy infiltration, it was not the Turkish refugees targeted but the Bulgarian regime and its spies.

6.1.4.3. Closure of the Border

At a time when approximately 4 thousand Bulgarian Turks crossed the border per day and the Turkish government continued to announce its determination to admit all

kindreds, a decision to close the border was abruptly issued. *Milliyet* writes in its headlines, “Limited stop to migration” and “Visa requirement for those coming from Bulgaria is discussed at the cabinet meeting”. When the number of the kindreds reached 300 thousand, it was decided to slow down the influx through visa requirement, in order to solve the settlement problem of the refugees. It was also stated that the government wanted to take control over migration and bring the Bulgarian state to the table for a migration agreement (*Milliyet*, 21.08.1989).



Figure 6- 20: *Milliyet*, 23.08.1989

Is there anywhere like the homeland: those are the last kindreds entered Turkey just before the visa restriction.

All three newspapers write about the temporary closure of the border and point out its dramatic aspect. *Milliyet* writes about the families, some members of whom had to stay on the other side of the border, as “Families are dispersed”. According to the news, this unexpected decision was met with reaction both from the opposition and from within ANAP in the political realm. Demirel, the leader of DYP, said, “We left out kindreds in the hell” and declared to propose a motion of no confidence against PM Özal because of destroying the state’s reputation with failed and inconsistent policies. If they were to close the border, why did they open it in the first place and caused such agony?” In his speech, Demirel held the Prime Minister responsible for all those failed policies. SHP leader İnönü also uttered similar words and declared to support DYP’s motion of no confidence

to be tabled in the Assembly. Özal and his government were harshly criticized with reference to his statement on the first days of migration such as “We will take all of our kindreds, even if they send 1 million or 2 million, it does not matter, we will admit all... We can admit even Zhivkov to Turkey” (Cumhuriyet & Milliyet & Tercüman, 22.08.1989).

Other parties, too, voiced their statements critical of the border closure decision. DSP leader Ecevit evaluated the decision as “a saddening example of irresolution and inconsistency” and proposed to postpone the decision for a week so that the kindreds who came to Turkey by leaving everything behind would not have to leave Turkey and families could unite. He continued, “This may be more sorrowful than the Bulgarian oppression for our kindreds.” He also stated that if the visa requirement had been imposed at the first stage, the Bulgarian state might have signed a migration agreement and the tragedy after border closure might have never been experienced. He criticized the government for being ignorant because it deemed Bulgaria’s saying to send 1 million Bulgarian Turks as a bluff (Cumhuriyet, 23.08.1989).

Meeting with such fierce criticisms leveled by the public and parties fully supportive at the first stage in the admission of the kindreds, PM Özal might find making clear the justifications of the decision necessary. According to *Tercüman*, he stated that “We opened the border with the expectation of concluding a migration agreement. However, 320 thousand kindreds entered Turkey within 2 months and 21 days. It is over 100 thousand per month. If it continues like this, 1.5 million kindreds will come in 8 months. Even the most powerful states could not do anything in the face of such a huge influx. Yet we do not know their numbers. So, it is a must to make a migration agreement, and the rights of our kindreds should be protected. If Bulgaria accepts to send our kindreds as migrants instead of tourists, we are ready to admit all of them within the framework of a program. I tell clearly that we do not close the border, but we apply this procedure to conclude a migration agreement” (Tercüman, 23.08.1989). With the thought that sending 1 million Turks from Bulgaria was seen as an unrealistic bluff of the communist regime, Turkish authorities were caught in the fear that it could be possible if the mass migration continued at such volume and speed. Even if Turkey pretended to be strong enough to provide shelter to all the kindreds against rival communist Bulgaria, it started to lose its control over the already arrived refugees and be filled with worry about how to cope with

the further flow. Moreover, the challenges experienced in helping the kindreds to come to Turkey as ‘migrants’ other than ‘tourists’ would be handled more easily in terms of being able to meet their varying needs if an agreement could be concluded with Bulgaria. It could be understood that a migration agreement would be the only way out for Turkey in handling the flow of Bulgarian Turks.

Özal’s statement continues as follows: “There are two main reasons for our visa requirement decision. The first one is to find an absolute resolution to the problem of their real estate and pensions. The second one is to detect the exact number of our kindreds therein ... We did neither break nor forget our promise. We want to admit them as migrants, not as tourists... We need to enable a regular pattern in this flow” (Cumhuriyet,23.08.1989). Besides, there was also the issue of border closure and imposition of entry restrictions through visa regime due in part to the need to buy time for the settlement of the comers as well as to pressure the Bulgarian government for agreeing to reach an agreement. The need for this agreement and the worrisome situation became evident in Özal’s remarks.



Figure 6- 21: Tercüman, 23.08.1989

She faints when she learns that the border is closed.

It was not only the political parties at odds with the government on the border closure decision but, naturally, the Bulgarian Turks arrived in Turkey as well. In this regard, *Tercüman* writes about the refugees' opinions at the border about the restriction. A young woman whose family could not cross the border said, "Why does not Özal keep his promise? He has promised to bring all of them... His decision to close the gates revived all our sufferings. Our families had to stay here." (*Tercüman*, 23.08.1989) A woman in a dormitory in Ankara said, "When we return to Bulgaria, they will make propaganda. They will say 'You are not Turks. If you were, Turkey would not reject you...' We were not Turk there. We came here and we are called *gawur* (infidel). When will we become Turk? Will it be when we die?" (*Cumhuriyet*, 23.08.1989). The frequent coverage of such news about the suffering of the refugees after the border closure might further boost the reactions against the government. The media outlets did not only reflect the public opinion but they had a profound impact upon shaping it. Within the context of securitization, it is safe to interpret the Turkish state's decision to restrict the migration as a securitizing move and extraordinary measure, and the media, as an important securitizing actor.

Minister Konukman, charged with the coordination of the refugees' affairs, accepted chairmen of some Bulgarian Turks' associations and listened their concerns. They told they were worried about the possible escalation in the Bulgarian violence as the Turkish minority felt more vulnerable when the border was closed. However, Konukman talked about 40 thousand kindreds who were provided with jobs. He also evaluated the fact that the refugees did not go to provinces and places allocated for them as a big problem. On the previous days, the entrance to Bursa was closed to the migrants as their population was getting more crowded day by day. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23.08.1989) *Tercüman* also writes that while 188 thousand refugees were settled in 43 provinces, the locations of 101 thousand 823 refugees were unknown as they did not go to the designated provinces. It was estimated that they went to their relatives living in Bursa, Adapazarı, İzmir, Tekirdağ, Edirne, and Kırklareli (*Tercüman*, 27.08.1989). As stated by Minister Konukman, this situation was regarded as a big problem, because the settlement and employment of the overcrowded refugees might become more challenging when they did not act in accordance with the government's plan. Moreover, we could infer that the control over the refugees was weakening as the number constantly rose and they became

disobedient. Even though it was not covered so much in the media, this may be among the reasons for visa restrictions.

With the visa decision, the crisis might be more visible in the international arena, and in this sense Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Murat Sungar, spoke in the press meeting and told the UN Secretary-General would send a delegation to investigate the Bulgarian persecution on site.



Figure 6- 22: Milliyet, 02.09.1989

Sad return: They are able to say only that they were sorry for return. "My mother and my father could not find a job, that is why we are turning back"

About the visa restriction, he stated, "Actually, visa duration will not be an important criterion. We will not say 'Turn back to Bulgaria' to whoever comes and wants to stay. He emphasized the visa applications in the consulates would never be rejected (Tercüman, 24.08.1989). Foreign Minister Yılmaz expressed that reintroducing the visa requirement did not mean closing the border. "With this decision, we have taken the course of this migration to our initiative from Bulgaria... The Bulgarian regime was in the search for loading all burden of this migration on Turkey. Turkey is ready to admit all

our kindreds under a migration treaty.” (Tercüman, 27.08.1989). The Ministry also said 1,462 kindreds who applied to Turkish consulates in Bulgaria were given visas (Milliyet, 03.09.1989). In accordance with these news stories, it is possible to witness that the Turkish authorities did not waive from their acceptive rhetoric towards the kindreds; however, they in practice applied restrictive measures to prevent the entries in contradiction to their statements. They might endeavor to desecuritize the issue by holding on to this rhetoric in order to minimize the reaction, but such a crucial solid action against the sayings could not be freed from being the target for the criticism arrows. At this point, it seems that the media had a hand in the public awareness and reaction through the way they presented the news. Namely, the political elites might try to cover their securitizing action against the Bulgarian Turks through their welcoming utterances, but the media outlets undermined this attempt by engaging busily with the refugees’ sorrows after the border closure.

The media outlets gave an important place to the reactions arising from the various segments of the public such as the civil society as well. According to a news article published in *Cumhuriyet*, President of Human Rights Association Nevzat Helvacı made an assessment about the decision, “Now, they try to correct the mistake of opening the border with another mistake” ... “It is another form of discrimination to accept the refugees from Bulgaria as they are ‘kindreds’ or ‘religious fellows’ instead of accepting them as human beings (Cumhuriyet, 24.08.1989). *Cumhuriyet*, more tended to the opposition, appeared to tone up its criticism by enforcing legal and humanitarian filling for the gap in the government’s rhetoric. Both the opposition parties and the dissidents among the public and civil society seem that they might never miss the chance to get on their soapbox about this decision of the government. With the works of the opposition and media especially during the rivalry atmosphere of the domestic politics due to the coming elections, the relaunch of the visa requirement for the kindreds might become more visible in a highly tragic form.

Akin to the above figure, several dramatic return stories told by the kindreds were published, even if the entries into the country continued with visas but with a limited number after the decision in question. *Milliyet* writes the number of refugees with visas as 419 as of September 2. The reason for the return was put forward as their families could not come to Turkey after the decision (Milliyet, 02.09.1989). Although PM Özal

reiterated that the visa requirement was employed to convince the Bulgarian administration to sign a migration agreement in favor of the kindreds, the kindreds might seem to be deeply suffered from this procedure.

6.1.5. In Sum

From a wider perspective, we may see that the official and public discourse reflected on the media regarding the refugees with Turkish ethnicity coming from Bulgaria evolved around the notions of firstly national and ethnic kinship and secondly religious affiliation. That is why the political elites and the press attached a special emphasis on calling them “our kindreds” instead of refugees or migrants.

For the admission of the Bulgarian Turks who were subjected to forced migration, a positive and appreciative stance was displayed almost in all spheres from politics to civil society at the beginning. The refugee flow is tried to be handled out of security context especially by forming a specific committee composed of the ministers related to the issue. This committee was the responsible body to coordinate all matters and solve the problems of the refugees. It is seen that from time to time the topic is made an agenda item at the NSC meetings for consultative discussions; therefore, it is not possible to say that the binding decisions came out of such meetings. Instead, the decisions on the refugees were taken in the cabinet meetings.

One night, the policy of ‘open-door to the end’ was interrupted suddenly with a decision from the cabinet envisaging to reintroduce the visa requirement which was lifted during the first days of the influx. However, even in the case of a sharp change in the policy, we do not probably see a clear switch in the government discourse regarding the refugees. The calls to stop Bulgarian violence and to admit all kindreds were maintained, and the decision to reapply visa procedures was explained as just a pause to provide a regular migration pattern and bring Zhivkov to the agreement table. While the government sustained its similar discourse, the opposition became more critical against the government and its decision. It may be said that, akin to the opposition parties, some people even in the government did not very welcome this decision causing both the refugees in Turkey and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, who were waiting for the day when they would be able to save themselves from the oppression, to suffer. It is safe to feel that the coming election at the time also might have an important share in this obvious

divergence in the political discourse. The refugee issue was added to the politicized agenda of the country. Yet, what was criticized was not the refugees but the migration policy of the government.

As the refugees were not perceived as a threat of any kind at the beginning, they were not subjected to any restriction in their movements and settlements. They were free to travel anywhere in Turkey. After a week, the authorities started to check the IDs of the refugees and to impose some security measures at the border because the Bulgarian state sent some non-Muslims, gypsies, regimes' spies under the guise of Bulgarian Turks. Thus, in the focal point of these measures, there were not Bulgarian Turks but other groups and spies. Those who were caught were sent back to Bulgaria. Despite all these, we may read this attempt as a partial securitizing move towards the refugees as it might reflect the security concerns which were not openly voiced. Even if the refugees were not the clear targets, the Turkish refugees fell into a disadvantageous position due to the spy infiltration which was seen as a serious hazard in the Cold War atmosphere. Securitizing actors, namely the political formation and security forces, aimed to eliminate the threat directed to the state through spies. The referent object in this context was the state itself but the government might not share enough information even about the number of infiltrations. The number, which was uttered as 'few' at the first stages, was declared as about 500 after the visa requirement decision was taken on August 22. We may interpret that as a move to prepare a ground for the justification of the visa application decision.

In terms of societal securitization, by looking at the news pieces of that time published in the selected newspapers, it seems rare to observe a significant amount of objection to the admission of the Bulgarian Turks reflected on the media. Even if there were reactions in the public, those were not covered that much, as they may have preferred to act in favor of the government at the beginning. Furthermore, according to the Securitization Theory, media is not just a medium purely reflecting the public opinion as it is but it also shapes the perception and opinion as a securitizing actor. As seen in this case, the media may have developed a positive discourse regarding the kindreds even in a way fully supporting the Turkish authorities from pro-government to the opposition. This effective tool that played an important role in public acceptance of the refugees at the beginning appeared to become a challenging instrument when the state changed the gear in its open-door migration policy. Even if the state might discursively sustain its

desecuritizing efforts from beginning to the end conflicting with its border closure decision, the media seemed to uphold more vigorously this discourse especially after the decision. Hence, this securitizing measure became more apparent via the media coverage probably as against the will of the authorities, and we might infer that the media as a desecuritizing actor might have a significant share in the public reaction. It is possible to argue that the political elites might have overlooked the powerful desecuritizing role of the media as well as the securitizing role.

In the wide public acceptance and desecuritization of the mass migration of the Bulgarian Turks, the share of the aid campaigns, sermons, and movies depicting how brutal Bulgaria's policies were against the Turkish minority should not be ignored along with the media and official discourse. The repeated emphasis on shared identities such as 'our kindreds' and 'fellow Muslims' might be a great contributor for the public sympathy. Because of the ethnic and cultural affiliation frequently highlighted in the media and public rhetoric, it might have become almost impossible to see them as foreigners or refugees. As reflected in the media, they would speak Turkish, they were Muslim, and they would have the same or similar customs and traditions as the Turks in Turkey. Therefore, it seems that those similarities might have reduced the risk of an identity threat to Turkey's established national identity. Yet, these may not be enough for full acceptance. As the number of refugees increased, some problems appeared in the economic domain. While Turkey, as a developing country, tried to solve the unemployment problem, now it needed to provide jobs for the refugees as well. According to the news within the period in question, one of the occasionally pronounced statements of the state elites was that "We will provide employment as soon as possible to our kindreds". It might indicate the mounting economic concerns and local people's disturbance. As a piece of evidence to the economic problems in this context, some reaction signals rose from the local people; for instance, the mineworkers in Zonguldak reacted when some refugees were given work there. Even if they showed full support and greatly helped the refugees, it is possible to see the public as a securitizing agent in the economic part. The unemployment and general economic problems in the country might have been embodied as the important functional agents in the economic securitization because the demand and need for scarce resources might weigh heavier than the wish to

welcome kindreds or fellow members of the same religion and see them becoming new competitors.

On the military side, even if we see the statement of the army declaring their preparedness in case of any problem, this is mostly read as a warning to the Bulgarian regime to put an end to the persecution. We also witness that in slogans such as “Army to Sofia!” in the great condemnation meeting. Thus, it was not a move targeting the refugees, but, instead, it is to guard their rights. It was openly stated by the authorities that the firmer security measures were in place only to hinder spy infiltration. Therefore, the threat was not the refugees or their movement to Turkey, but the Bulgarian regime and its policies.

Per contra the classical securitization process mostly carried out by the political elites in a top-down fashion, the Turkish government appears to be acting as a desecuritizing agent in this migratory movement at the first stage. The main concern in adopting a desecuritizing discourse might have been to manage and take the migration flow and the process under its own control, including the settlement and in-country procedures of the refugees, rather than giving them to the hands of the military-dominated Presidency. The decision of lifting and reintroducing the visa requirement might be one of the most apparent proofs of that. While in rhetoric Turkish political elites might have put in efforts to deal with the migrants out of the security context, it is safe to read the border closure decision as a clear sign of the securitization in practice. According to the news pieces elaborated above, it seems that the media might have lifted the lid off on the elites’ securitizing move conducted through restricting the migration despite all desecuritizing rhetoric of the state. When the statements of the Turkish state as that decision was taken to persuade Zhivkov for an agreement and to provide better services to those who came in Turkey by taking the control of the influx in its hands are taken into consideration, the target of the securitizing decision of the Turkish state might not be the Bulgarian Turk refugees. The problem might be their number and the drastic increase in this number; therefore, it caused fear as it turned into an unmanageable situation for the authorities.

From an overall view, Turkey seems to be caught again in a dilemma. While the Turkish state elites appear to opt to see the issue as a totally human rights violation and international crisis in their rhetoric against the enemy communist Bulgaria rather than just

an ethnic minority problem, in practice, they were of the opinion to accept all oppressed ones within the discourse of the ‘kindred’ and ‘Muslim fellows’. Despite all those acceptive utterances, the Turkish side was in the seek for a migration agreement, and even the border closure decision was said to be taken in this cause. As seen in almost every migratory movement, it is possible to observe a securitization process to some extent especially in the economic and societal sectors. Importantly, under the Cold War circumstances and the democratic and economic stagnation in domestic politics of Turkey, the effects of the functional factors appear to have been more than mere facilitation agents in the process.



CHAPTER VII

7.1. SELECTIVE SECURITIZATION OF MASS IMMIGRATION: IRAQI KURDS AND BULGARIAN TURKS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In this chapter, a comparative analysis of two cases that are independently scrutinized in the previous chapters is presented. The below figure, a cartoon published in a newspaper, runs parallel to the representative findings obtained throughout this study (Oran, 2001, p. 14).




Figure 7- 1: Cumhuriyet, 11.11. 1991

On the front page of the first newspaper: “Turks are in the Bulgarian Parliament”

On the front page of the second newspaper: “Kurdish MPs are in the Turkish Parliament”

It is quite clear that the two instances of mass immigration were seen, handled, and talked about in very different ways, even though they took place almost simultaneously with very similar contexts and the same single party government in power. To understand the reasons for the remarkable difference, a comparison of the two cases is necessary with a clear focus on the tenets and expectations of the Securitization Theory and the relevant literature.

A good starting point for such a comparison would be the respective volumes of the immigration in both cases. As the previous chapters have shown, the exact numbers of refugees in both cases are a controversial issue, because of the lack of concrete and reliable data. The commonly-accepted view is that the number of Kurdish refugees from Iraq who arrived in Turkey was between 50.000 and 60.000 in 1988, and that of the Turkish refugees from Bulgaria was approximately 300.000 in 1989 (İhlamur Öner, 2013, p. 196). Therefore, it should be remembered that the immigration of Bulgarian Turks occurred in much greater numbers. This is particularly interesting when it is noted, as it will be elaborated in greater detail below, that the arrival of a much smaller number of refugees was met with a much greater public reaction and securitization.

7.1.1. Arrival and Admission

A very obvious and extremely significant difference between the two cases concerns the arrival and admission of the refugees in Turkey. As it was suggested, when the Iraqis escaping from the repressions of Saddam Hussein's regime massed at the Turkish border, initially Turkey rejected to open the gates due to security concerns. Yet, it was decided to permit them to enter on the 'humanitarian grounds' with the decision of an NSC meeting and the admission started under the strict controls as of September 1, 1988, in alarms (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001). Turkish security forces were firmly carrying out ID controls and taking the weapons away before the *Peshmergas* crossed the border because a great majority of them were the armed guerillas fighting against Saddam's administration. They were admitted in Turkey as "temporary guests" as the security concerns would never be pushed aside.

In stark contrast, Bulgarian Turks were welcomed with wide open arms, and the Turkish state made many calls to the Bulgarian administration to allow those who wanted to leave Bulgaria and come to Turkey. The repeated statements of authorities from various

levels and positions to “admit all kindreds” and “let all of them enter, even Zhivkov” reveal Turkey’s stance to accept the kindreds willingly. To facilitate migration and citizenship processes, the visa requirement was lifted and new regulations were introduced for the Bulgarian Turks. Almost everyone who wished could enter during the early days. The situation gradually changed after some spy infiltrations, upon which the controls were reinforced through the ID controls and admission centers. Later, as the numbers were increasing too drastically, the Turkish government decided to restrict the entry by reintroducing the visa requirement.

Hence, we can witness two contrasting stances, such as while being reluctant in the admission of the victims from Iraq, the political elites were making aloud calls inviting all the kindreds in Bulgaria to the ‘homeland’. The first difference might have revealed itself at this point as even if both of the refugee groups were the people who were oppressed by the regimes in their respective countries, the Iraqi Kurds’ demand to seek refuge might have been considered troublesome by the Turkish authorities as their arrival could be accompanied by some security and identity problems engraved in the Turkish history. This concern appears to be shaped around the possible problems that the Iraqi refugees might lead to in the future as well as some experiences in the past, namely there might not even exist a direct and concrete threat but there was a great concern linked with Turkey’s well-known Kurdish Question and the PKK. Yet, in terms of Bulgarian Turks’ admission, Turkey pursued a fully open-door policy with a loosened visa requirement to such an extent that every individual from Bulgaria could enter Turkey. Turkey’s first reaction as admitting everyone, and threatening and condemning the Bulgarian regime can be considered as too nationalistic, or even chauvinistic, and far away from caution and reality, as, later on, it had to take a step backward by limiting the entry of the kindreds. In this reaction, surely the contextual factors arising out of the Cold War climate should be noted, such as communist Bulgaria was a member of the alliance on the other side of the Iron Curtain, unlike Turkey which positioned itself within the Western Bloc as a loyal member of the NATO. Moreover, Turkey was striving for stabilization of its democracy and economic growth for years as a ‘modern democratic Western’ state and aiming to join the EU (then the EEC) having officially applied for full membership in 1987. Thus, the admission and well-treatment towards the refugees from both countries might have been to the advantage of Turkey to elevate its position as a Western democracy opening

its humanitarian arms for innocent civilians repressed by authoritarian regimes. One of the leading motives lying behind the de-securitizing efforts of the Turkish authorities might therefore be the accession to the EU.

7.1.2. Political Acceptance

As presented by the media coverage, all political groups agreed to admit the Iraqi refugees “on the humanitarian grounds”. However, it was not a topic utterly freed from political discussions, as the parties sporadically attacked each other regarding their respective stances on the policies, attitudes, and actions taken towards the refugees from Iraq. The association of Kurdish refugees with the tabooed ‘Kurdish Problem’ especially under the former military administration of Evren was one of the important factors triggering the cleavage in internal politics. Whereas it was in particular the MPs from the Kurdish ethnicity who brought the Iraqi refugees into question and invited the public to help them, the politicians on the more nationalist, conservative, and Kemalist fronts opposed those people from probably an identity politics view.

During the first days of the Bulgarian Turks’ forced migration, even President Evren, in addition to all political parties, made a statement condemning the Bulgarian state, called for violence to stop, and, within a few days, declared that they could admit all Turks who were left behind in Bulgaria. He also visited the tent cities and talked with the refugees and promised to solve their problems. Yet, when it comes to Iraqi refugees, the President neither made any statement about them nor visited their camps. In the latter case, we can see him only in the NSC meetings as the chairman while taking the decisions regarding the Iraqi refugees.

The political establishment in Turkey appeared to unanimously agree to admit all Turks in Bulgaria and to put an end to the regime’s oppression. Probably, until the border closure decision of the government, the only disagreement among the political parties was that the kindreds were not provided with sufficient assistance. When the procedures to restrict the inflow through visa requirement were reintroduced, the opposition railed against the government. Accordingly, the families were divided one more time due to this failed policy. Obviously, this criticism was not against the refugees; in contrast, it was against the government to make refugees more comfortable and solve their problems.

Therefore, it is possible to see a significant difference in how the Turkish political establishment reacted to each event. While a minimum humanitarian stance seems to provide ground for a reluctant acceptance in the Kurdish case, all political parties and actors, whether on the right or the left of the ideological spectrum, embraced Bulgarian Turks. It can even be argued that all the political actors attempted to utilize the crisis in the latter case for political gain, whether it was gain in foreign policy by showing the significance of Turkey for the Western Bloc or in domestic politics by gaining public support of nationalist circles by helping kindreds or the support of leftist circles by liberating those oppressed by the assimilationist policies of an authoritarian government. In any case, this remarkable difference in the respective levels of political acceptance has certainly factored in how the issues were portrayed by the media and perceived by the public. Therefore, it was also crucial in the overall process of securitization, as the political elites appear as an important securitizing agent. Though the general approach of Özal's government might be to desecuritize both flows by avoiding harsh rhetoric fueling threat perception towards the refugee groups, as seen, it could not be successful enough especially for the Kurdish refugees because of the identity issues, military administration at that time, and other functional actors. Similarly, even though the de-securitization of the Bulgarian Turkish refugees was highly successful in rhetoric, they ended up with securitization in practice by the extraordinary measures as evident by the sudden closure of the border when the number reached a peak.

7.1.3. Migration Management and Settlement

The difference observed in the first stage, namely in the admission, continued in the forthcoming period relevant to the management of those two influxes. To manage the influx of Iraqis, the local authorities composed of the governors of provinces and districts, municipalities, and security forces were charged. As previously stated, Hayri Kozakçıoğlu as the regional governor of state of emergency appeared as an important figure dealing with the Kurdish refugees. The refugee camps set up for the Iraqis were located in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country which had been governed under stricter rules within the scope of counter-terrorism efforts since 1987 due to the conflict between Turkish armed forces and the PKK in the region. It was also the closest point to the border with Iraq and had been inhabited by mostly the Kurdish population. It

is safe to argue that this region inherently was a securitized area due to the terror threat, and the refugees might also have become an additional factor exacerbating this existing threat perception. Therefore, the major authority managing the Iraqi refugees were mainly the security forces with exceptional powers. For the Bulgarian Turks, in contrast with the active involvement of the security forces as in the flow of the Iraqis, a high-level public establishment with the title 'Coordination Committee' was immediately formed composed of the relevant ministers to solve the problems of refugees from admission to settlement, from aid to employment. Additionally, with an amendment in the law, the Directorate General of Migration would be formed to deal with these issues for the first time. Even if we could not see such a comprehensive authority until 2013, the need for an institutionalized migration management body might have been realized with these influxes, particularly with that of the Bulgarian Turks, regarding safety, security, and order. The significant divergence regarding the management was embedded in the authorities charged with two migrant groups, as, obviously, in the fact that the responsibility of the Kurdish refugees was given in the hands of the security forces might be considered as a clear indication of the threat perception and the securitization predominantly in the military sector.

Along with the security forces, the NSC, chaired by President Evren and his high military officers, came forth as the decision-making body for the Peshmerga refugees. Taking this issue within the scope of the security agenda of the country might point out to what extent the Iraqi refugees were securitized especially in the political rhetoric. Akin to the securitization of Iraqis in the military sector especially in practice, the policy-making mechanism was itself a securitizing agent. However, the Coordination Committee set up for the "kindreds" did not have such a direct linkage with the security concerns. They might have been viewed as a threat only when the numbers reached an uncontrollable level, mostly on economic grounds, but it was not a severe military concern, thus it can be seen that the NSC did not actively get involved as it did in the migration of the Iraqis. In the difference with respect to the migration management, the external factors for the Iraqis such as the possible linkage with the PKK and the Kurdish question might have played a crucial role in the securitization of this movement. Unlike the Iraqis, the Bulgarian Turks were tried to be desecuritized for the sake of having an upper hand in the face of the communist Bulgaria.

Another point to be noted is that the Kurdish refugees were kept in the camps close to the border without allowing them to travel and settle in the interior parts of the country. What lies behind this decision of keeping them close to the border might be the hope to send them back to their country as soon as possible and the desire to bar their further integration with their Kurdish relatives in the region. Herein, it is possible to see that the Turkish authorities did not envisage a permanent settlement for the Iraqi refugees while preparing a settlement plan for the Bulgarian Turks all over the country. The “guest” perception and treatment might have paved the way for alienation and securitization, and this perception repeatedly verbalized by the authorities with the emphasis of the ‘humanitarian grounds’ might have been perfectly realized through the restrictions and treatments.

Indeed, during the early days of their arrivals, both Bulgarian Turks and Iraqi Kurds were allowed to go wherever they wanted in Turkey and lived with their relatives for a short period. As the numbers increased, however, the difference started to appear in a more concrete form with additional measures employed. The Iraqi refugees including those living with their relatives were called to refugee camps built at certain points in order to ensure control, and, upon the uprisings in the camps, the Turkish authorities imposed some restrictions such as the entry and exit movements in the refugee camps. When it comes to Bulgarian Turks, firstly they, too, lived with their relatives, in addition to the schools, dormitories, and guest houses opened for their temporary settlement and for those who did not have any relatives in Turkey. Within a couple of weeks, admission centers and tents were set up for temporary settlement at the border in order to facilitate the procedures. To provide official settlement, some efforts were exerted to amend the Law on Settlement. The government made an investigation to find suitable houses and lands for the refugees. There were also opportunities created and offered for the employment of the refugees as well. The Bulgarian Turks had preference over the city where they wanted to live, and it could be anywhere in Turkey without a restriction. Thus, and for fear that the Iraqis, just like Turks from Bulgaria enjoying the privilege of free mobility in Turkey, could unite with their Kurdish relatives living in Turkey and reinforce the Kurdish identity, one of the chief concerns to jeopardize the cultural/racial homogeneity and social structure of Turkey, their movement might have constituted too much of a direct threat from already “unwanted guests”.

7.1.4. Status

In the news of the time, it might be seen that the Turkish state's desire was to quickly integrate the Bulgarian Turks into the Turkish society and send the Iraqi Kurds back by isolating them in the camps with minimum interaction with the local society. Within this context, the legal framework regarding those two groups of migrants constitutes evidence to the Turkish state policy in the long run. As set forth by Kirişçi (2007), Turkey pursued a two-tiered migration policy enabling refugee status only for those who came from Europe in line with the geographical limitation that Turkey retains in the implementation of the Geneva Convention. With respect to this convention, the Turks from Bulgaria could acquire the legal status of refugee as the Europeans, while those who came from Iraq could not apply and request any status in Turkey due to the reservation. Turkey could only be a transit country for non-European refugees where they could reside temporarily until they would be settled in a third country. There was no open door in Turkish legislation for the Iraqi refugees, and, maybe for that reason, they were called “guests, *Peshmerga*, those who came from Iraq” and deliberately forbore from calling refugees. As understood from the official statements, there was no attempt to provide the Iraqi refugees with any permanent status.

Besides the Refugee Convention, Bulgarian Turks would have two more options. According to Settlement Law No. 2510 of 1934, the individuals or groups of Turkish descent and culture who came to settle in Turkey are naturally immigrants (2150 Numaralı İskan Kanunu, 1934), and, under this law, they could be immigrants in Turkey. Moreover, within a month, after the flow of Bulgarian Turks started, Turkish authorities initiated the procedures, and a new law granting citizenship entered into force. In the second half of 1991, the Bulgarian Turks who arrived in Turkey in 1989 started to become Turkish citizens under this new regulation (Ceylan & Uslu, 2019, p. 208). In the end, the number of those who were given Turkish citizenship reached 212,688 (İhlamur Öner, 2013, p. 196), which would mean that approximately two-third of the Bulgarian Turks acquired citizenship in Turkey while there is not a record about the Iraqis who permanently stayed and were given any status in Turkey. Thus, the Bulgarian Turks were neither seen nor treated as foreigners or refugees and they easily became citizens, but the repatriation of the Kurdish refugees was looked forward.

7.1.5. A Perspective on the Public Opinion: Refugee Relief

An effective securitization process is better observed through the public reaction and in this archival study we can only see the public opinion through the news pieces to the extent its reflections were presented on the media. The most extensively covered issue about the local Turkish citizens' attitude towards the refugees was about the relief campaigns. The news pieces retrieved from the selected media outlets write that the Turkish Welfare Fund was put into service for both refugee groups. *Kızılay*, too, significantly contributed to the collection and distribution of aid supplies. When it comes to civil initiatives, it is possible to state that almost only the relatives and local people from southern Turkey with Kurdish origins helped the Iraqi refugees and only the Kurdish political figures launched aid campaigns for these refugees, as far as reflected on the media.

However, the Bulgarian Turks' forced migration drew the attention of almost every citizen in Turkey and huge aid campaigns and events were launched by several NGOs, municipalities, governorates, private sectors, foundations, ministries, religious authorities, parties, media outlets, and so on. These calls were well-responded to by the people from every corner of the country who did their best to help within their capabilities. Whereas the hospitality and empathy for the kindreds were explicitly displayed by the local people, the unwillingness towards the Kurdish refugees was not only in the political and military realm but public seems to have shared similar feelings and concerns as well. Again, regarding the Bulgarian Turks, the welcoming approach maybe raising on the "kindred" and "fellow Muslims" foundations changed its direction when the economic burden started to be severely felt and some local Turks were left unemployed due to the Bulgarian Turks. Though a few in number, such news articles were covered in the media, and it is safe to discuss that the kindreds might have become classical 'job-stealer' immigrants in time. So, the public reaction was about the numbers, unlike the reaction towards the Kurdish refugees that directly targeted their identities.

7.1.6. International and Bilateral Relations

We might conclude that most of the policies of Turkey were shaped around military security especially because of the PKK's mounting threat particularly in the second half of the 1980s and the transitional period after a military coup. As the PKK had

connections and affiliations in Syria and Iraq, bilateral relations with these countries had an important place in Turkey's fight against this group. Moreover, due to the economic and security motives, Turkey had developed good relations with Iraq. The Hot Pursuit agreements enabling cross-border operations were signed between Iraq and Turkey in 1983 and it contributed to weakening of the PKK. However, the refugee influx in 1988 interrupted this agreement and undermined the good bilateral relations. The refugees were seeking protection from Turkey on the front lines but according to this agreement, Iraq could track, bring back, or eliminate the threatening elements who crossed the border within the designated areas. This situation might appear to contradict the Iraqi refugees' protection so Turkey annulled the argument unilaterally. Actually, Turkey's protection of the Iraqi Kurds could be seen as proof of the Iraqi regime's repressure against this minority group, even if Turkey did not make any statement regarding Saddam Hussein's policies. Furthermore, Turkey abstained itself from the discussions on the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein over the Kurdish civilians, and it was interpreted as Turkey did a favor to Iraq for the sake of restoring the soured relations (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001, p. 138). To alleviate the international reactions towards Iraq might be another reason behind this favor. Thus, Turkey accepted the refugees escaping from Saddam and rejected to return them at the cost of deteriorating the positive relations. However, the benefits might have been calculated to be bigger than the costs, because it could bring Turkey closer to the long-awaited EEC membership by presenting itself as a modern democratic state respecting human rights. Therefore, it might be seen that Turkey was in the pursuit of better image with its policies towards the Kurdish refugees developed on the "humanitarian ground."

In a similar manner, Turkey made several calls and organized several events to draw the attention of the whole world to the Bulgarian persecution and forced migration. The Turkish state was constantly condemning Zhivkov. With the efforts of Turkey, more than 50 states and international organizations protested and condemned Bulgaria because of its assimilationist policies towards the minorities causing displacement and forced migration (Ceylan & Uslu, 2019, p. 208). Through the calls made to the world on every occasion, Turkey might be seeking to portray the issue as an international humanitarian crisis rather than a basic ethnic conflict concerning only Turkey and Turkish people. Thus, this might again provide an advantage to Turkey with drawing the picture of a state as

helping a community oppressed under a brutal communist regime. Additionally, the hostile environment of the Cold War and political rivalry became effective in building support for Turkey among particularly in the anti-communist world as desired by Turkey.

7.1.7. Role of the Identities of the Refugees in Securitization

Up to now, a series of different handling—either politically or practically—of two refugee groups by the Turkish authorities was elaborated above. In light of the observations from the news pieces, it can be drawn that the identity features of those refugees might have played a more important role than expected in the state policies and practices. Most of the Iraqi refugees were ethnically Kurds as well as being Muslim. The Turkish state seemed to be confused about how to address the Iraqi refugees even in its rhetoric. As the existence of Kurdish identity was denied especially under the previous military rule and less democratic administration of the time, they refrained from calling them Kurds and instead they preferred the Peshmerga which refers to Kurdish guerillas. In the name of maintaining their denial policy and keeping the refugee and Kurdish issue separate from each other, the authorities gave a more worrisome name by using the Peshmerga. Along with calling them Peshmerga, the officials always restated that those who came from Iraq were the elderly, children, and women to imply that they were not dangerous with the purpose of further emphasizing the humanitarian aspect of the problem and gain more public sympathy. Indeed, they also were a part of the Ottoman past and they were Muslims as well. Instead of those common values and shared memories, the Turkish state called attention to their vulnerable situation. It seems like the they did not want to establish any special ties with the Iraqi refugees other than ‘the helper’ and ‘the needy/victim’. The preferred picture might be on the one side, Turkey, as a democratic, modern, humanitarian, and western state that helps those in need despite all security concerns; and, on the other side, the vulnerable people escaped from a non-democratic state—unlike Turkey—and requested help and protection of a ‘democratic’ country.

The emphasis on the shared ethnic, national, cultural, and religious identity of the Bulgarian Turks attracts attention in the second event. In the political and media discourse, they were always named as ‘kindreds’—not even migrants or refugees, they were the ‘grandchildren of Ottomans’, they were the ‘Muslim fellows’. Even the Director

of Religious Affairs, the highest religious authority in Turkey, invited Turkish people to help and take care of the refugees as a religious duty. Constantly repeating that those people were persecuted because they were Turk and Muslim, admitting and helping them were projected as a natural responsibility of the Turkish state and nation in Turkey's general official and public rhetoric. In line with the analyzed data throughout this study, it can be argued that the Bulgarian Turks were not considered as the 'other'; instead, they were a part of 'us'. This might contribute to developing deep empathy for the refugees from Bulgaria in Turkish society, unlike the vulnerable Kurdish refugees who were also Muslim. In this comparative analysis, the identity feature and the already existing perception regarding those two groups of refugees can be considered as a significant factor—maybe unwittingly—effecting their acceptance in the same host country. Thus, I believe that this feature is more than just a functional actor facilitating the securitization or de-securitization processes; rather, it is a vital determinant.

7.1.8. Engagement of the Securitization Theory

The Turkish government appears to put extraordinary efforts to desecuritize the influxes in both cases and especially to handle the issue out of the military framework, but the environment of the time did not allow it. Moreover, both influxes coincidentally occurred on the eve of the elections in Turkey, and in this context, the refugees became an ineluctable political instrument to gain more votes and it might have led to a politicization process in addition to the securitization.

Taking the Kurdish refugees out of security rhetoric was highly challenging. The country was under state of emergency and the president of the time was a former military general who came to the power via a military intervention in 1980. Even if the government tried to deal with the issue as if there was no linkage between the Iraqi refugees and the PKK and the Kurds in the country, the PKK infiltrations and the Kurdish relatives living in Turkey were deemed as the obvious signs of the affiliation. The government might be in the opinion that if the refugee issue became securitized especially in military terms, the soldiers would become more involved and the issue would become unmanageable for the civil authority. As stated in the previous chapters, Turkey was in the pursuit of the European Economic Community membership and a better image in the West and international realm by proving that it was a democratic country respecting

human rights. Hence, the Iraqi refugees were perceived as a great opportunity to prove that on the one hand. The image mirrored to the outside world should have been that Turkey gave the helping hand in spite of all security concerns from military to societal challenges. That is why the ruling elites assigned great prominence to the humanitarian aspect of the issue especially in the case of the Kurdish refugees.

Within the contextual factors, as the position of the presidency was occupied by a former military officer and the critical decisions were taken in the National Security Council under the aforementioned president, almost all the domestic and foreign administrative affairs were handled from a military and security conception and threat perception. The existence of a former military administration itself was inevitably a source of securitization. The civil government established by Özal seemed to have been in search of desecuritizing both events; however, he was not immune to the presidential military influence coming from the previous years.

The socio-geographical features of the region are another determining factor in this securitization process. The Iraqi border lays in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey which were mostly populated by the Kurdish minority. The Kurdish question was already a sensitive matter for Turkey since its foundation as a nation-state. The refugees escaping from Iraq were predominantly Kurds and the relatives of the Kurds in Turkey. This may have led to enhance national belonging to the Kurdish identity and an increase in the Kurdish population, which was apparently not a development desired by the state.

With the above reasons in mind, the Iraqi refugees became securitized despite all desecuritizing efforts of the Özal's government. Because there might be a strong threat perception against them in the military and public spheres, coming from the past. Their number was not even as high as the Bulgarian Turks who would come one year later. The Bulgarian Turks were almost six times more crowded than the Iraqis. We cannot speak of a parallel linkage between the number of refugees and the securitization level of migration in these cases; *a fortiori*, it is possible to argue that the identities—rather than numbers—of the migrants played a more crucial role in the threat perception.

In this influx, the securitization move was not just operated classically in a top-down way in which the political elites guided and implemented the process. Despite the security-focused utterances of the authorities, it was also a bottom-up process under the

influence of the public as well. Turkish society's general perception of Kurds was commonly linked with the PKK and this organization was a national enemy. Thus, the problem was not that the Kurdish refugees came and caused trouble but they were a matter of trouble even before they came, because of how their ethnic and cultural identities were perceived. The general tendency among the public and military was that they would endanger the Turkish constructed national identity and state sovereignty. To eliminate this risk, extraordinary measures were employed such as strict border controls, accommodation in the refugee camps with restricted in and out movement, building fences around the camps, more security forces deployment, initiatives to repatriate all of them, and so on. All of those practices can be interpreted as the reification of the existing and created security concerns. The security discourse as a speech act was constructed by the political elites, media, and public and it gained acceptance by the people because they were also one of the securitizing agents during the process. We see a bi-directional securitization, i.e. top-down and bottom-up, due to the involvement of both public and political elites as the securitizing actors. Also, the refugees were securitized by almost all sectors due to being perceived as a threat to the state sovereignty, national identity, societal homogeneity, border security, law enforcement agency, public peace and order, economy, and so on. As seen in many securitization processes and various cases all over the world, the securitizing actor was the political elites and partially the society, and the agent charged with realizing these securitizing measures was the security forces.

Concerning the issue of the flow of Bulgarian Turks in 1989, neither the Turkish society nor the political elites were even slightly reactive, particularly during the first days. They were very welcoming towards their "kindreds" and "fellow Muslims". This was mostly because these people were viewed as a natural part of the Turkish nation and society rather than as "others" in line with the Turkish nationalist perspective and statehood tradition. Furthermore, this influx was not the first flow of the Turks from Bulgaria, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks arrived in Turkey in the 1950s, 1968, and 1970s (Karaca & Kirişçi, 2015). However, we could not speak of a securitizing move until when the arrivals started in mass and their numbers grew too large reaching about 300.000 in mid-August 1989. As the numbers drastically increased every passing day and how many more would come was unpredictable, this situation caused great concern at the administrative level. Even if the legal procedures were initiated for Turkish citizenship,

the problems about settlement and employment started to become unmanageable. The refugees were not going to their designated places especially in the eastern part of the country. Instead, they preferred some western cities where their relatives lived. For that reason, those cities became overcrowded, rental prices of houses in the region climbed, and the unemployment was felt more deeply. In the end, the local people also began to speak out their reactions and concerns against the kindreds.

A further question, in this case, was the employment of the refugees who were envisaged to become permanent settlers in Turkey. During those days, the Turkish labor market did not bear enough working opportunities neither for local Turks nor the migrated Bulgarian Turks. Moreover, the Bulgarian Turks were mostly more skilled than the local Turkish citizens (Çetin, 2008), and they were more inclined to work for cheaper wages because they had to earn their livelihoods in another country to which they were expelled. The beneficiaries from this situation were the employers who preferred to recruit the more skilled Bulgarian Turks at lower wages instead of Turkish citizens. In the end, the unrest was manifested over the 'stolen jobs' among the unemployed citizens because of the migrants. The Bulgarian Turks were also dissatisfied with the economic settings and wages. Regarding this case, it is possible to observe a securitization, particularly in the economic sector. Even if it followed a bottom-up pattern stemming from the public disturbance in the economic sector, this securitization did not end up with adoption of any measures against the refugees. It was limited to public discourse and media coverage, yet it was only the economic aspect of the issue.

Turkey, from the very beginning, depicted the Bulgarian case as an international crisis rather than a national and ethnic problem concerning only Turks and Turkey. That is why, the international organizations, NATO allies, Islamic organizations, and Muslim countries were invoked to stand against those oppressive actions of the Bulgarian state violating international law and human rights. Turkey as the protector and advocate of human rights and law sought for elevating its position as well against a communist state. Even when it closed the border, Turkey sustained its rhetoric expressing its willingness to protect the Bulgarian Turks and condemning the assimilationist policies. It might be concluded that the securitized agent was not the refugees but the regime and its policies over the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. However, in this case, securitization was carried

out without a securitizing discourse in classical terms, it was embodied directly as extraordinary measures instead of a speech act.

7.1.9. In Sum

This chapter attempted to comparatively analyze some major aspects of the two mass refugee inflows in Turkey within a narrow period in the 1980s. The findings regarding the handling of two different migrant groups, i.e. one from the east, and the other one from the west, were elaborated above in depth. Starting with the refugee admissions, the differences manifested themselves in many spheres, even in the policies and practices in the long run. It was observed that securitization became inevitable in both cases; in fact, it seems like each migratory movement brings securitization along either intentionally or unintentionally. And in both securitization processes, it is observed a bi-directional pattern as top-down, conducted by the elites, and bottom-up by the society. In the end, it is found out that the role of the functional actors is more than being a facilitator of securitization, rather a significant determinant as seen in different management of these two influxes. Among these functional actors are identities of the refugee groups (Turk, Kurd, Muslim, Peshmerga, vulnerable groups, etc.), domestic political dynamics (ongoing military effect of the coup d'état, unstable democracy), and surrounding conditions (the Cold War's rivalry, Turkey's position in this environment, efforts for the EEC accession). These parameters are noteworthy in terms of both securitization and desecuritization experienced throughout the migratory processes in the cases.

CHAPTER VIII

8.1. CONCLUSION

This thesis examined whether and, if so, how migration has evolved into a security concern in Turkey after the 1980s, using insights from the securitization theory as benchmarks. The main cases of this analysis were two refugee influxes, namely that of Kurds from Iraq in 1988 and Turks from Bulgaria in 1989. The qualitative analysis of the differences between the two cases, from the large-scale reception of refugees to long-term policies, and the causes, actors, and factors in this disparity are based on data retrieved from news articles and state records available during the time span in question.

‘Securitization of migration’ is defined in this study as the handling of migration movements or migrants within the limits of the New Security Framework of the Copenhagen School. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, who are the pioneers of this school, redefine the concept of security by overstepping the boundaries of the traditional security understanding. While the classical approach basically deems security as a purely state-centric notion concerned with protecting it through military power, Buzan et al. widened the spectrum of security to embrace contemporary issues such as natural disasters, pollution, famine, poverty, organized crimes, HIV/AIDS, terrorism and so forth, especially after the Cold War era. Migration was also included in the reformed security agenda in time, particularly as globalization has fueled various mass migratory movements caused by inequalities and insecurities worldwide. The main contributions of this group of researchers to the Security Studies include concepts of securitization/desecuritization, Theory of Regional Security Complex, and multisectoral security approach. Among these new approaches, Securitization Theory, in particular, has been very popular and employed as the theoretical basis of this study. The study has also benefitted from the multisectoral approach that is constituted of economic, societal, military, political, and environmental sectors at certain points to better reflect the variations in the state responses.

Securitization, in basic terms, is a process in which the securitizing actors transform an issue into a security problem that poses an existential threat to the referent objects. This move is performed through labeling an issue, person, or group as a threat and convincing the audience about the existence of such a threat. In other words, securitization is primarily a speech act that is carried out by rhetoric. Predominantly composed of the prominent persons or entities of the society, such as the political elites and notable figures, securitizing agents acquire the power to legitimately resort to the extraordinary measures against the constructed threat through securitizing it. It is not about the existence of real danger but the discursive ability of the securitizer, that is why it is seen as a political act. However, it differs from politicization in terms of justifying the implementation of extraordinary measures; thus, securitization is considered an extreme form of politicization. According to the originators of this theory, the securitization is actually an undesirable act, because it takes the issue out of normal politics and creates victims and puts them in jeopardy through discursively constructed threat perception. Thus, the Copenhagen School suggests opting for desecuritization instead of securitization in order to address the issues with ordinary means instead of resorting to the extraordinary measures.

As the Securitization Theory aims to answer the following questions, i.e., who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not the least, under what conditions; I have applied these questions to the cases of the migration influxes of Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and Bulgarian Turks in 1989 throughout this study to demonstrate the securitization of migration in Turkey after the 1980s from a historical perspective.

In search of answers to these questions, I have examined the archival resources composed of three most read newspapers and parliamentary records of the relevant period. To restrain from partiality, three newspapers representing different sections of the Turkish society are preferred; these are *Cumhuriyet* with a more leftist and social-democratic position, *Milliyet* in the center-right, and more nationalist and conservative *Tercüman*. From these materials, the statements and speeches of then top figures of the Turkish administration, including the president, prime minister, state elites, ministers, members of the parliament, opposition party leaders, relevant provincial and district governors, mayors, and other authorities in the region have been collected. The

newspaper articles constitute a significant proportion of the materials, and those are important to mirror the social and political environment of the time. In both cases, the periods when the refugee influxes intensively occupied the agenda of the politics and media are scrutinized, and the number of news pieces checked in the study is nearly six hundred.

The reason for the importance of the political elite's statements is that the first phase of securitization is labeling or speech act carried out via utterance of a threat by the actors, holding the ability to influence the public. As is the case, I examined whether and how those elites portrayed the refugees and refugee flows as a security problem in their rhetoric. The method of discourse analysis is accepted as the most applicable method in analyzing a securitization process by the Copenhagen School; therefore, I have examined the materials with this method. Along with the written or verbal statements, some photographs and their engagement with the rhetoric are also used to illustrate how the refugees in each case were covered in the media. As the method of Critical Discourse Analysis suggests a more comprehensive approach, I have employed this method.

The 1980s was a decade when Turkey was faced with immigration flows of non-Turkish populations for the first time; for this reason, this decade is known as a landmark in Turkey's immigration history. Until those days, mainly the people from Turkish ethnicity and culture who were previously the people of the Ottoman Empire immigrated to Turkey. Due to these bonds, they were not seen as the "other" in the Turkish statehood tradition. During this period, Turkey first admitted Iranians escaping after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, but they stayed temporarily until receiving legal status in a third country. For this study, I analyzed the migration of Iraqi Kurds in 1988 as the first case, and secondly, the Bulgarian Turks in 1989. There are some critical features in selecting these influxes; those two subsequent migratory movements took place with ten months in between in terms of their beginning. They were admitted under the same state administration (same president, same government, same regime), but the response to each refugee flow was significantly different. While the 'Peshmerga' refugees were strongly securitized, 'kindred' refugees from Bulgaria were weakly securitized in the same setting. With the analysis of the collected data, this differentiation in the greetings is exhaustively elaborated in three chapters. Firstly, each case is analyzed independently in two separate chapters, and then they were comparatively analyzed in Chapter VII for a better projection

of the variation. At the end of all works, the research questions posed in the first chapter are comprehensively answered, and the findings are precisely evaluated.

When we look at the findings and responses to the study's research questions, it is revealed that both cases were securitized to some extent. Indeed, it might be safe to argue that securitization seems inevitable for each migratory movement all over the world, whether deliberate or not. While a strong securitization was operated for the Iraqi refugees both in discourse and practice despite all of the desecuritizing efforts of PM Özal's government, the Bulgarian Turks were almost never securitized in discourse. However, in practice, some restrictive measures were employed for them as well. From the perspective of the multisectoral approach in securitization, all sectors overlap or are interconnected with each other in a way. Even if it was not possible to strictly categorize the securitizing moves, they were attributed with the most relevant sectors. In the case of Iraqi refugees, it can be argued that, as far as reflected on the news pieces, Turkish people were worried about their national security and identity, social unity, and territorial integrity, and these concerns were primarily concentrated in the social and military sectors. Thus, it is possible to claim that Iraqi refugees were strongly securitized in social, political, and military sectors while weakly securitized in other sectors. Whereas this is the case in terms of the public reaction, this study mainly deals with how the state elites and securitizing actors responded to each migration flow rather than how local people responded. Regarding the Bulgarian Turks, the frequently uttered disturbance was the economic problems caused by the efforts to meet the needs of the hundreds and thousands of the kindred refugees and rising unemployment in the already fragile economy. Even if the local people welcomed and helped the Bulgarian Turks, some reactions appeared in time due to the rapidly increasing number at the local and administrative levels. It might be possible to draw a conclusion that the securitization remained restricted only to the economic sector in this case, while such an apparent reaction in other sectors was not witnessed.

It is expected that the level of securitization is directly linked to the number of migrants, yet we cannot see this pattern in this study. On the one hand, even when the number of the Bulgarian Turks reached 300.000 within a few months, the political elites maintained their support and acceptance towards the kindreds in discourse. On the other hand, the Iraqi refugees became a security concern for the authorities and the public even

in the early days with their few numbers. Therefore, the present analysis appears to suggest that it is not about the quantity but about the quality; in other words, the features of the refugee groups are more determinant in threat perception of the host country than the mere numbers. As a matter of course, we cannot totally ignore the magnitude of the flow because the Bulgarian Turks were also securitized after the peak. However, the Iraqi refugees were perceived as an existential threat from the very beginning and the unwillingness to open the borders at the beginning was one of the first indications of this justification.

Another point to be noted in this study is the functional factors that are overlooked or underestimated during the securitization process, which were merely seen as facilitating elements, unlike the securitizing agents and referent objects. However, it is showed in this study that the functional factors, such as the circumstances of the relevant period and the inherent features of the refugee groups, went beyond being just functional dynamics in the securitization process. In the selected cases of this study, we see that the motivations of being a modern, western state that is eligible to access to the EEC, a better image in the international arena, getting closer to the Western Bloc under the geopolitical tensions stemming from the Cold War era led Turkish authorities to hold both refugee groups out of the securitizing discourses as much as possible. Still, these efforts seem to have failed when looked at the end product of the processes. In the first case, the security concerns and threat perceptions about the Peshmergas ended up with restrictions on the Iraqi refugees' movement and enclosed them within the fences of the refugee camps, Turkey was in search of an agreement to send them back to their home country or to a third country. They were never seen as either legal refugees or migrants, they were only the vulnerable 'guests' who were temporarily under the protection of the 'modern and democratic' Turkey on 'humanitarian grounds'. One of the dynamics triggering the unwillingness to accept the Iraqi refugees, who were mostly the armed guerillas and Kurds, was that Turkey was suffering from a severe Kurdish question and the terrorist organization PKK. Thus, when all these issues were assessed together, it created a significant threat perception at the public, administrative and military levels. The share of these functional actors in this successful securitization process cannot be ignorable.

When it comes to the Bulgarian Turks who were addressed and treated as "kindreds and fellow Muslims" from the very beginning, they did not encounter almost

any rejection and maltreatment during the early days of the influx. In this pleasant reception, a strong Western-state stance against the Eastern Bloc played a crucial role as well as refugees' identity as Turks and Muslims. Whereas these points motivated Turkish authorities to desecuritize the issue of kindred refugees, the drastically increasing economic burden of the refugees and the rising unemployment paved the way for securitization in the end. Therefore, the role of the functional actors as listed above should not be underestimated in either securitization or desecuritization.

Regarding the limitations of this study, it is possible to speak of some significant points restricting this research. Firstly, a successful securitization process is better understood by the public acceptance; thus, the primary data obtained through the interviews with the people of the host country in these events would be more appropriate to reflect the level of securitized migration. However, as it is an archival research, I do not have the opportunity to receive such information through interviews with the local people of the time. So, I made use of the news pieces from the commonly-read newspapers that reflected the different opinions in the Turkish society. By this means, I exerted all efforts to minimize this limitation to the lowest possible level. Another limitation is that some of the documents, such as the National Security Council decisions and jurisdictions on the refugees, are classified information, so I could not access the totality of the papers. I had to use only the parts covered in the media. Finally, as securitization is a process, naturally, it requires a long period —maybe months or years—to analyze and detect especially the long-term consequences. However, it is not possible to track and analyze such a long period adequately in a master's thesis. Thus, the most eligible time span reflecting securitization processes was identified and analyzed.

For further research, I hope that this study set an example for the further engagement of the Securitization Theory in migration studies in Turkey, which is an epicenter of the many refugee crises of late. This theory reveals how an act starting with discourse leads refugees who are already harmed in their home countries to suffer more. In addition to its contribution to filling the gap in the literature, this study may help authorities understand how a refugee group becomes a security issue and not demonize those vulnerable groups by showing the process and drastic consequences in the past. Finally, in the theoretical scheme, it is seen that the role of functional actors is

undervalued, and it is understood that it deserves more attention and research in the overall securitization process.



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RESUME

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- **M.A.:** Peace and Conflict Studies Master of Arts student in Social Sciences University of Ankara- 2021 (Thesis on Securitization of Migration in Turkey since 1980s)
- **B.A.:** Student at the Department of Sinology- Ankara University (2020-still)
- **B.A.:** Graduated with honors from the Department of Translation and Interpretation- Hacettepe University-2017
- **B.A.:** Graduated from the Department of International Relations- Anadolu University-2017
- **High School:** Graduated from Afyon Kocatepe Anatolian High School in the second rank with high honors

CERTIFICATES

- B1.1 Spanish Course Certificate- Latin America Studies Research and Application Center of Ankara University- 2019
- Certificate of Attendance for the ‘Young Translators Contest-2017’ held by the Ministry for EU Affairs as one of the representatives in the name of Hacettepe University
- Certificate for Teaching Turkish as a Foreign Language-Hacettepe University TOMER-2017
- Certificate of Participation from SETA (The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) Saturday Seminars-2017
- Certificate of Participation for Fall 2017 Peer to Peer: Facebook Global Digital Challenge with the Project of Battle against Sexual Harassment
- The Certificate of Attendance for ORSAM (Center for Middle Eastern Studies) Middle East Summer School Seminar Programme-2016

- The Certificate of Attendance for 1st International Students Social Sciences Congress in Hacettepe University-2015

WORKING EXPERIENCES AND INTERNSHIP

- Translator & Interpreter at Presidency's Directorate of Communications (February 2020- still)
- Translator & Interpreter at the Presidency of Religious Affairs (March 2019- February 2020)
- Certified Translator & Interpreter at Onur Translation Center (May 2018- March 2019)
- Notary Public Clerk- (September 2017- April 2018)
- Since 2015, Freelance Translator & Interpreter for several projects and freelance book translator for a publishing house
- Part-time English teacher during the years of university student
- Internship as translator and interpreter at the Ministry of Youth and Sports- Summer 2016

COMPUTER AND LANGUAGE SKILLS

- Advanced Level in English (Reading, Listening, Writing, Speaking)
- Intermediate Level in Chinese
- Intermediate Level in Spanish
- Good at Microsoft Office programs (Word, PowerPoint)
- Good at CAT (Computer-Assisted Translation) Tools (Nubuto, Smartcat, Memsource and etc.)