

T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

**SECURITIZATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD BY
EGYPTIAN REGIMES: A COMPARISON OF THE NASSER AND SISI
ERA**

PhD THESIS

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THESIS APPROVAL

This work, headed “Securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood by Egyptian Regimes: A Comparison of the Nasser and Sisi Eras”, prepared by Ahmet Fathy İbrahimoglu, has been unanimously approved as a Ph.D. thesis by our jury.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Ahmet Fathy İbrahimoglu.

December 5, 2024



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ABSTRACT

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Abstract of Ph.D. Thesis

Title of the Thesis: Securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood By Egyptian Regimes: A Comparison Of The Nasser And Sisi Era.	
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This thesis explores the security relationship between the Egyptian regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, culminating in the Nasser era and post-2011 revolution to a securitization process aimed at eradicating the Brotherhood's activities. The study concludes by finding the similarities and differences between the securitization patterns held by the Egyptian regimes towards the movement in the eras of presidents Nasser and Sisi. While multiple frameworks exist to dissect regime preservation tactics, this thesis uniquely harnesses securitization theory to illuminate these patterns. Research arguments are based on the theoretical framework of Terry Balzaque' s securitization theory and Juha Vuori's foundational work on securitization in non-democratic environments. The research emphasizes that the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood has taken on a security-oriented form since the group's inception up to the present day. The regime allowed limited freedom for the Brotherhood in religious and charitable activities while seeking to stifle the group's political activities. This is evidenced by the regime's efforts to completely halt the Brotherhood's activities through a successful securitization process during the Nasser era and after the 2011 revolution, which enabled the Egyptian regime to implement violent extraordinary measures against the Brotherhood following the expansion of the group's political capabilities, which posed a large threat to the rule of the military regime in Egypt. In other words, The Egyptian army regime systematically cracked down on the brotherhood whenever the group's influence grew in the political sphere. Additionally, the research highlights the utilization by the Sisi regime of Nasserist security strategies in dealing with the Brotherhood.	
Keywords: Securitization, 2013 Coup, Egyptian Revolution, SCAF, Muslim Brotherhood.	

ÖZET

Sakarya Üniversitesi, Ortadoğu Enstitüsü

Doktora Tez Özeti

Tezin Başlığı: Mısır Rejimleri Tarafından Müslüman Kardeşlerin Güvenlikleştirilmesi: Nasır ve Sisi Dönemlerinin Karşılaştırılması

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Anabilim Dalı: Ortadoğu Çalışmaları

Bu tez, Mısır rejimleri ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki güvenlik ilişkisini, Nasır döneminde doruğa ulaşan ve 2011 devriminden sonrasında tamamen Müslüman Kardeşler'in faaliyetlerini yok etmeyi amaçlayan bir güvenlikleştirilme sürecine kadar araştırmaktadır. Çalışma, Nasır ve Sisi dönemlerinde Mısır rejimlerinin Müslüman Kardeşler hareketine karşı güvenlikleştirilme kalıpları arasında benzerlikler ve farklılıkları olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Rejim koruma taktiklerini açıklamak için birden fazla çerçeve bulunmasına rağmen, bu tez bu kalıpları aydınlatmak için güvenlikleştirilme teorisini kullanmıştır. Terry Balzaque'nin güvenlikleştirilme teorisi ile Juha Vuori'nin demokratik olmayan ülkeler bağlamı ile güvenlikleştirilme üzerine temel eserlerine dayanarak araştırma argümanlarını teorik çerçevesine oturtmuştur. Araştırma, Mısır rejimi ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki ilişkinin, grubun kuruluşundan günümüze kadar güvenlik odaklı bir form aldığını vurgulamıştır. Rejim, Müslüman Kardeşler'e dini ve hayırsever faaliyetlerde sınırlı özgürlük tanıırken, grubun siyasi faaliyetlerini bastırmaya çalışmıştır. Bun durum, Mısır rejiminin Nasır dönemi ve 2011 devriminden sonra güvenlikleştirilme süreciyle Müslüman Kardeşler'in faaliyetlerini tamamen durdurma çabalarıyla kanıtlanmıştır. Bu çaba, Müslüman Kardeşler'in siyasi yeteneklerinin genişlemesiyle Mısır'daki askeri rejimin egemenliğine büyük bir tehdit oluşturması sonucunda, Mısır rejiminin Müslüman Kardeşler'e karşı şiddet içeren, olağandışı önlemler uygulamasına olanak sağlamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, Mısır'daki askeri rejimi, Müslüman Kardeşler'in siyasi alanda etkinliği arttığında harekete karşı sistematik olarak baskı uygulamıştır. Ayrıca, çalışmada Sisi rejiminin Nasırcı güvenlik stratejilerini Müslüman Kardeşlerle ilişki kurarken nasıl kullandığını vurgulamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlikleştirilme, 2013 Darbesi, Mısır Devrimi, Mısır Silahlı Kuvvetleri Yüksek Konseyi (MSKYYK), Müslüman Kardeşler.

PREFACE

To the comrades of the 2011 revolution... to the martyrs of that struggle... to those confined behind bars... to the exiled, cast from their homes and stripped of their possessions... and to the generations yet to come. I offer these words in hope that you may find within them “milestones along the path” toward the next waves of liberation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CS : Copenhagen School

FOM: Free Officers Movement

FJP : Freedom and Justice Party

MB : Muslim Brotherhood

MI : Military Intelligence

NSF : National Salvation Front

PS : Private System

RCC : Revolutionary Command Council

SCAF: Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SD : Salafi Dawa

SM : Egyptian student movement

WT : Washington Times

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 1919 revolution in Cairo, a seminal juncture in Egypt's resistance against English occupation, the subsequent promulgation of the Constitution of 1923 heralded the advent of a transformative liberal epoch. This epoch was characterized by burgeoning party politics primarily dedicated to the pursuit of political liberation for the nation. However, within the zeal for political change, the salient dimensions of civil rights and social justice found themselves relegated, thereby paving the way for the ascendancy of influential social movements, most notably the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 1928. Founded upon religious advocacy, the MB initially embarked on a mission of broad social engagement. Yet, as the political milieu evolved, so did the MB's role, capturing the attention and allegiance of the Egyptian populace. This metamorphosis did not escape the notice of British colonial authorities and subsequent Egyptian administrations, engendering concerns regarding the burgeoning influence of the MB.

Concurrently, the sociopolitical canvas of this era was further imbued by the rise of a middle-class comprising professors, university students, and intellectuals, who emerged as pivotal actors in the dynamics of nascent movements. The MB's expanding political footprint prompted strategic responses from the Egyptian state, ranging from interventions by the political police to the imposition of publication prohibitions and the creation of alternative groups designed to divert public support. Media campaigns were launched with the explicit aim of distorting the image of the MB and shaping public perception.

Tensions reached a zenith during the royal era, particularly with the MB's active involvement in the 1948 war against Jewish forces in Palestine, posing a direct threat to British interests. The consequential decision to dissolve the MB in December 1948 and the subsequent assassination of its founder, Imam Hassan Al-Banna, marked a watershed moment. Nevertheless, the MB expeditiously re-emerged in 1949, resuming its social activities and engaging in political endeavors by collaborating with the Free Officers Movement (FOM), actively participating in the events of the 1952 military coup.

Post-1952, all extant political parties were dissolved, with the MB initially serving as the civilian counterpart to the FOM. The alliance, however, proved ephemeral as President Nasser perceived the Brotherhood as a threat, initiating measures to eliminate it. Government-controlled media played a pivotal role in tarnishing the group's image. The apex of these measures was the Manshiya incident, leading to severe sanctions on Brotherhood members. These measures endured until the termination of Nasser's rule in 1971, ostensibly justified under the guise of widespread popular support for Nasser.

During the Nasserite era, the Egyptian Islamic movement witnessed the formation of new perceptions and ideas, notably articulated by the Islamic intellectual and Quran interpreter Sayyid Qutb. This period witnessed the concomitant rise of new Islamic ideologies alongside the MB. The assumption of power by President Sadat in 1971 marked a shift towards the Western camp, leveraging the growing Islamic awakening. The relationship between Sadat and the Brotherhood remained tenuous, with the latter denied legal legitimacy to ensure its detachment from political action. Despite the release of prisoners associated with the Islamic movement and the allowance of unrestricted Islamic dawah and societal work, tensions endured.

The beginning of the Mubarak era in the 1980s witnessed a degree of flexibility in the Brotherhood's dealings with the regime, reciprocated by a considerable degree of tolerance. However, the state did not accord the group formal political legitimacy, portraying it in state media as a dawah group, ostensibly precluding its interference in politics. The group strategically navigated this environment, expanding its influence in professional syndicates, student unions, and parliament. However, as it endeavored to intervene in the political sphere, tensions escalated in the 1990s. The state responded through the distortion of the group's image, widespread arrests, and violence, particularly during parliamentary elections. At the dawn of the new millennium, a measure of flexibility towards the Brotherhood emerged due to American pressures for democratic transition post-September 11, 2001. The Egyptian state opportunistically wielded the MB card during this period. However, the regime swiftly reverted to its previous stance, culminating in heightened tensions by the decade's end.

The 2011 Egyptian Revolution marked a transformative phase characterized by the convergence of diverse social and political movements. The Supreme Council of the

Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed a pivotal role in post-revolutionary governance alongside the Muslim Brotherhood. Both state and non-state media played instrumental roles in shaping negative perceptions against President Morsi and the MB, with some U.S. press narratives depicting Morsi as politically anti-democratic and anti-Western.

Since the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping international security and counterterrorism, the thesis examined the U.S. role in the securitization of the MB situating it within the global security context, deducing how far the U.S. policies and security rhetoric can influence the Egyptian state in constructing the security threats. This illuminates that securitization is not only about addressing perceived threats but also about maintaining alliances and securing foreign support, and showing how security in the middle-eastern non-democratic contexts are shaped or reinforced by Western superpowers, which verifies the transnational nature of the security issues.

During President Morsi's tenure, collaboration between SCAF and non-state actors transpired, encompassing youth activists, women's rights advocates, opposition political parties, and religious figures. These collaborative efforts played a substantial role in designating the MB as a perceived threat. Secular non-state actors, exemplified by the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the Tamarod movement, vehemently opposed President Morsi's presidency. The satirical show hosted by Bassem Youssef emerged as a catalyzing force amplifying criticism and contributing to the negative portrayal of Morsi and the MB, ultimately culminating in the 2013 military coup. Post the 2013 coup, mass atrocities unfolded, notably in Rabaa and Nahda squares. Extrajudicial executions and arrests, outside the normative legal framework, targeted the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of President Morsi. Significantly, this occurred amidst a conspicuous lack of substantial popular opposition, fostering a state of considerable public endorsement for the coup.

The narrative propagated by the military coup presented it as a popular revolution, reminiscent of the military regime's promotion of the July 1952 coup, subsequently referred to as the 1952 Revolution, imbued with a populist character. Throughout this period, the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of President Morsi organized extensive protests against the military coup, advocating for the restitution of the elected president. The SCAF, persistently engaging with the Brotherhood outside legal bounds,

implemented aggressive security measures. This precipitated the emergence of youth groups initially involved in minor acts of vandalism against military and police forces, gradually evolving into quasi-military factions in response to the regime's severe treatment of the opposition. The coup leader strategically utilized media and state institutions as securitization actors, mobilizing popular support for the coup. Concurrently, efforts were directed towards forging robust relationships with the international community to secure external backing.

The thesis is anchored in the Eurocentric securitization theory, as modified by Vuori, Greenwood, and Wæver who sought to enhance its applicability in non-democratic contexts. Specifically, it posits that following the 2011 revolution in Egypt, especially in the aftermath of President Mubarak relinquishing governance to the Military Council, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) interpreted the revolution as an insurgency against the Egyptian military regime. In response, SCAF, with the assistance of Egyptian security institutions, initiated a securitization process. Employing a security logic and rhetoric, SCAF successfully framed the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat to Egypt.

This framing, in turn, provided justification for deviating from established norms in Mubarak's political dealings with the MB and facilitated the unprecedented use of state violence against the group following the 2013 coup. The thesis further contends that the legacy of Nasserism in Egypt, coupled with its enduring impact on the post-Nasser Egyptian ruling elite—predominantly composed of Nasserist adherents—exerted a discernible influence on SCAF's counter-revolutionary actions and its approach to the MB. Notably, SCAF's modus operandi bore striking resemblance to Nasser's governing style, underscoring the enduring influence of Nasserist principles on Egypt's political landscape.

Research Questions

The thesis is trying to focus on the Securitization process against the Muslim Brotherhood by Egyptian Regimes, between Nasser and Sisi Eras with a Main Research Question: **What are the similarities and differences between the patterns of securitization held**

by the Egyptian regime towards the MB in the era of Nasser and Sisi? With the following sub questions related to the study:

1. What was the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the MB in king Farouk's era?
2. What are the patterns of securitization held by the Egyptian regime towards the MB in Nasser's era?
3. What was the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the MB in Sadat's era and Mubarak's era?
4. What are the patterns of securitization held by the Egyptian regime towards the MB in the Morsi's era and Sisi's era?
5. What are the similarities and differences between these patterns in Nasser's time and Sisi's time?

Practical Importance

The Muslim Brotherhood is considered as one of the largest and most widespread organization in contemporary history. Throughout its history, the Brotherhood has been subjected to repeated security operations by successive Egyptian political regimes over the course of a century. Some of these operations aimed to limit the group's influence, while others sought to completely eradicate its effectiveness within Egyptian territory. Using the framework of securitization theory, this research aimed to explore this crucial aspect, which aids in understanding the itinerary of the events of the Arab Spring in Egypt, including the 2011 revolution, the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, the rule of the SCAF, and the 2013 coup.

Also, the impact of the Nasserist legacy on current events. In other words, the research seeks to understand the strategies of counter-revolution that targeted the components of the 2011 revolution, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, which succeeded in reinstating military rule in Egypt. The research subject could be considered one of the important tributaries in attempting to answer the question of "why the Arab Spring events failed in Egypt?". In other words, the research explores the integrated security system that led to the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood's governance experience after its free democratic election by the Egyptian people.

The thesis as a case study offers significant contributions to the existing literature of securitization theory by extending the theory beyond its traditional focus on liberal democracies by applying it to authoritarian regimes in Egypt across different political periods (Farouk, Nasser, Mubarak, SCAF, and Sisi). It shows how these regimes have framed the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat to justify political suppression and maintain power. The historical analysis illustrates how securitization practices adapt to changing political contexts while targeting the same group.

The study also bridges securitization theory and political Islam by analyzing how Islamist movements are framed as security threats. This contributes to understanding the securitization of political Islam, highlighting how perceptions of political Islam are manipulated for state control. Additionally, the thesis reveals how security rhetoric is used to suppress dissent, with significant consequences for human rights, such as mass arrests and restrictions on civil liberties.

Research Hypothesis

The thesis argues that after the 2011 revolution in Egypt, definitely after former president Mubarak delegated governance to the Military Council, SCAF recognized the revolution as an insurgency move against the Egyptian military regime state, SCAF with the aid of Egyptian security institutions has begun a securitization process, using a *security logic and rhetoric* succeeded in constructing the MB as an existential threat to Egypt. This facilitated a departure from the previous protocols governing the Mubarak regime's approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, enabling the application of unprecedented levels of state violence against the group following the 2013 coup. The thesis further contends that the ideological legacy of Nasserism in Egypt, and its influence on the post-Nasser ruling elite — who are predominantly Nasserists — played a significant role in shaping the counter-revolutionary strategy employed in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Research Methodology

As mentioned the research used Thierry Balzacq's version of the securitization theory, focusing on the "Acts" level. Balzacq's framework divides the securitization process into three critical levels: agents, acts, and context, which are then broken down into their respective constituent analytics (Balzacq, 2011: 36-37). These levels form a dynamic and

interconnected structure that allows for the analysis of how security threats are constructed and perceived within specific political environments. By focusing on the "Acts" level, this research hones in on the performative dimension of securitization, the moments when security issues are framed, communicated, and enacted by the securitizing agents, typically the political elite. To further refine the analysis, this research integrates the works of Juha Vuori (2008; 2011) and Greenwood and Wæver (2013), who have expanded the Eurocentric securitization theory and applied it to non-European contexts. Vuori's work is particularly relevant, as it highlights how securitization plays out in non-democratic settings, making it suitable for examining the Egyptian case.

In line with Gramscian theories of Hegemony, this study scrutinizes how the Egyptian regime used its hegemonic position to securitize the Muslim Brotherhood. The concept of hegemony, as articulated by Gramsci, informs our understanding of how power relations between the state and opposition groups are maintained and reinforced through both coercion and consent.

This study employed a mixed-methods approach, combining both qualitative and quantitative research methods to achieve a robust and comprehensive analysis. The qualitative component involved discourse analysis, which was used to assess both primary and secondary sources in Arabic and English. Primary sources included government statements, speeches by key political figures, official documents, and media reports, while secondary sources comprised academic literature, analyses, and articles by local and international organizations and newspapers.

The discourse analysis focused on identifying securitization patterns and how the Egyptian regime framed the MB as a threat to national security. The quantitative component involved content analysis conducted by gathering data on political figures' perceptions, Election results, and government actions during key moments of political tension between the Egyptian regime and the MB, providing empirical support to the qualitative findings. The combination of qualitative discourse analysis and quantitative data enabled the research to triangulate findings and offer a more comprehensive understanding of the securitization process.

Time and place Scope of the Research

The thesis studies the security relations between the Egyptian state and the MB all-over the movement's lifetime, since the foundation of the movement in 1928, going through the eras of King Farouk and presidents Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, Mursi and Sisi. While the study focuses on the actions taken against the group residing within Egyptian territory while avoiding an examination of the security operations carried out by the Egyptian regime against the Brotherhood's branches outside Egypt or against its diaspora communities during the Nasser or Sisi eras.

Previous Studies and Literature Review

The ascendancy of the SCAF and MI in managing the political situation during and after the 2011 revolution until the 2013 military coup led by the Minister of Defence and former Director of MI against the elected president, followed by the continuity of the former Director of MI as the president of the republic following the 2013 coup, indicates the Egyptian regime's strategic security plan in dealing with the 2011 revolution, aimed at safeguarding the Egyptian military regime from collapse or change. Similarly, we can observe a parallel situation in the accession of President Abdel Nasser, the leader of the military coup in 1952, to the presidency of the republic, his dissolution of political parties, and his rejection of the army's return to its barracks.

For this study to achieve its aim, exploring the relationship and the securitization process between the Egyptian regime and the MB during the reign of King Farouk and the presidencies of Nasser, Mubarak, Mursi, and Sisi; the study drew upon a variety of historical and contemporary sources and studies scattered across the timeline of the research period. Firstly, during the periods of King Farouk and President Nasser, several sources have documented this era and highlighted aspects of the relationship between the regime and the MB from various perspectives.

From the perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood, we can find the book of Mahmoud Abd El-Halim (1994/1), the MB's most influent historian, titled "The Muslim Brotherhood: events that made the history". The book authored by one of the MB founding members chronicles the establishment of the Brotherhood, elucidating its ideology and recounting the historical events it traversed from its inception in 1928 until the end of President

Nasser's era in 1971. It delves into the relationship between the palace and the Brotherhood, detailing the dissolution of the Brotherhood after 1948 and the assassination of its founder, followed by its resurgence in 1949 during King Farouk's reign. Additionally, it explores the Brotherhood's interaction with the Free Officers Movement and the 1952 coup, as well as the Nasserist period until the Brotherhood's dissolution once again.

Also, the seminal work of Richard P. Mitchell (1993) titled "The Society of the Muslim Brothers" the book chronicles the history of the MB since its foundation going through its zenith and first dissolution in Farouk's era, and its second dissolution in Nasser's era. Also, it shows the MB's structure, administration and ideology. Other works concentrate on the relation between the FOM and the MB, for example, the book of Saud Al-Mola (2017), titled "The Brotherhood and the Army". The study presented an overview of the history of the MB since its inception and the ideas of its founder, Hassan Al-Banna. The study is distinguished by its detailed presentation of the issue of the private system associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and its potential relationship with Al-Banna. Additionally, it presents the cooperative and conflictual interactions between the private system and the organization of the Free Officers, from the perspective of both parties.

For President Mubarak and President Sadat Era, there are a number of works that can show the relation between the Egyptian regime and the MB. The Book of Hesham Al-Awadi (2009) titled "In Pursuit for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak (1982-2007)" The Al-Awadi examined the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Nasser era and the relationship of the group with the Egyptian regime during the presidency of Sadat.

Furthermore, the researcher detailed the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Mubarak regime, dividing the relationship into six distinct stages throughout the Mubarak era. This analysis delved into the political and social role of the group in professional unions, student unions, and parliaments, as well as the role of security apparatuses in curbing the group during this period. This included measures such as the prohibition from parliamentary and student elections, arrests, the referral of civilians to military courts, as well as the freezing of assets and seizure of companies. Also, the work of Annete Ranko (2012), titled "The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt". With the

outlined methodology, the study presents a historical narrative illustrating the presence of a war of position within Egypt during Mubarak time, spanning from 1981 to 2011, and provides a detailed account of this war of position, exploring the ideational aspects of state-Islamist relations. The study also, concerns about the incorporation of the ideational dimension into the analysis.

Also, the work of Carrie Wickham (2002) titled “The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement” which investigates the mechanisms and motivations behind the successful engagement of Islamic factions in rallying educated youth towards political participation within Egypt's authoritarian regime, presenting insightful and unexpected solutions to a range of critical inquiries. It delves into the circumstances under which opposition groups can mobilize effectively within authoritarian contexts. Also, it scrutinizes why Islamist organizations demonstrated greater efficacy in drawing supporters and navigating governmental barriers compared to their secular counterparts, Showing the conflictual interactions between the Egyptian security apparatuses and the MB concerning the activities of the group in the political and social spheres during this period.

For the period after the 2011 revolution which includes the SCAF era and President Mursi era, we can find the work Azmi Beshara (2016/2), titled “Egypt's Revolution: From Revolution to Coup d'Etat” which presents, through two large volumes, the history of protest movements in Egypt, beginning with a focus on the era of President Mubarak and meticulously chronicling the protests that paved the way for the 2011 revolution. Detailed accounts of the events of the January 25th Revolution are provided, highlighting the early interventions of the military in the revolution, its agreements, and its relationships with various revolutionary forces. Additionally, the author examines the behaviour of the MB during the revolution and its interactions with the military at that time. The book also extensively covers the period of rule under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, followed by the presidency of President Morsi, elucidating the military's relationship with the political landscape during this period and its interactions with the Brotherhood, the president, and other revolutionary forces.

The study of Pratt and Rezk (2019) titled “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring”, The article expands upon

previous criticisms regarding the Eurocentric nature of securitization theory, incorporating insights from Antonio Gramsci's works to enhance its applicability in non-democratic environments. In addition to exposing the exceptional nature of state violence directed at the MB and underscoring the significant involvement of ostensibly non-state actors in framing the MB as a threat to Egypt, the article also underscores the role of securitization in reinstating authoritarian governance following the 2011 uprising.

Also, the study of Maja Greenwood and Ole Wæver (2013) titled “Copenhagen–Cairo on a roundtrip: A security theory meets the revolution”. This study centers on interpreting the Egyptian revolution within the framework of securitization theory and examines the implications of this analysis for advancing theoretical understanding. It highlights the dual challenges facing securitization theory: its application to analyze and influence political dynamics in the Middle East, and its adaptation during and after the Arab Spring.

Also, Ahmed Tohamy (2016) study titled “Youth activism in Egypt: Islamism, political protest and revolution” which shed light on the rise and decline of the youth activism that was so prominent in the 2011 revolution. Using the analytical framework of the social movement theory explores the conditions that shaped the mobilization of youth activism that took place in Egypt during that critical time, and the similarities, and differences between the conventional social movements and the 2011 revolutionary youth movements. Showing mutual relationships between the youth, SCAF and the MB. Also, it explores the MB’s strategy after the 2011 revolution which tended to focus on participatory and election-based politics.

In the era after the 2013 military, and President Sisi Era there are still rare studies in this area of study, so the researcher depended almost on primary sources. Although we can find the work of Amr Hamzawy (2017) titled “Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt’s New Era of Repression”. Hamzawy explored what he described as the authoritarian Egyptian regime strategies after 2013, like restricting public discourse, clamping down on independent civil society groups and opposition parties, stifling pluralistic political activity, and impeding citizens' peaceful participation in public affairs. The government's primary tactic involved implementing widespread repression through legislative measures, bolstered by the propagation of conspiratorial and populist narratives to justify its actions. Demonstrating unparalleled determination, it has enacted new laws

concerning protests and terrorism, introduced legal amendments targeting NGOs, and expanded the jurisdiction of military courts. Due to Hamzawy the regime is manipulating legislation to serve its own agenda. To effectively counter this trend, those opposing the regime must gain a comprehensive understanding of how it operates.

Divisions of The Research

This research is structured into an introductory section followed by five distinct chapters and a concluding segment. The first chapter introduces the conceptual and theoretical framework. The second chapter concentrates on analysing the intricate dynamics of interactions between the MB and the monarchy, shedding light on the evolving relationships and strategies employed by the regime against the MB. It also, delves into the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood during the reign President Nasser in Egypt, examining the historical context and the processes involved. Chapter three concentrates on analysing the intricate dynamics of interactions between the MB and the administrations of Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, shedding light on the evolving relationships and strategies employed by the regime against the MB. In chapter four, attention is directed towards exploring the securitization of the MB throughout the transitional period under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the tenure of President Morsi, scrutinizing the shifts in security policies and their impact on the Brotherhood. Lastly, chapter five scrutinizes the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood during the presidency of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, examining the strategies, narratives of securitization measures implemented during his tenure.

CHAPTER ONE

SECURITIZATION THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS

1.1.Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical foundation necessary for analyzing the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood by military regimes in post-revolutionary Egypt. By adopting the securitization theory initially developed by the Copenhagen School (CS) and refined by second-generation scholars such as Thierry Balzacq and Juha Vuori, to elucidate how the military framed the MB as an existential threat to justify extraordinary measures outside the realm of normal politics. This chapter explores key theoretical constructs, including the roles of referent objects, securitizing actors, functional actors, and the processes through which securitization is enacted and legitimized.

The Copenhagen School's securitization theory posits that an issue becomes securitized when it is articulated as a threat requiring urgent, exceptional responses, thus circumventing routine political discourse. In non-democratic contexts such as Egypt, where political authority is concentrated and opposition is suppressed, the applicability of securitization theory requires careful examination. This chapter addresses this by incorporating Vuori's perspective, which argues that securitization is relevant even in authoritarian settings where all societies have "rules", which are products of their own historical and social contexts. When "security logic and rhetoric" is utilized to legitimate the breaking of these rules, we have a case of securitization.

While traditional securitization theory emphasizes speech acts, this chapter incorporates Balzacq's broader framework, which includes practices, tools, and the socio-historical context influencing the securitization process. The research underscores how the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces strategically employed securitization to delegitimize the MB and maintain the military's dominance in governance.

By integrating securitization theory with counter-revolutionary, knowing the adversary approaches this chapter offers a comprehensive framework for understanding how securitization functioned as a tool of political control in Egypt. Also, integrating preventive war approach and the theoretical insights discussed here establish the

groundwork for analyzing the securitization practices observed during and after the 2011 revolution, highlighting the interplay between domestic power dynamics and international influences.

1.2.The Securitization Theory

Securitization theory has become an influential framework within International Relations for analyzing how issues are constructed as security threats. Developed in the 1990s by the Copenhagen School, which sought to expand the narrow focus of traditional security studies in the context of the post-cold war era where the traditional understanding of security focused on military power and strategic relations (Booth, 2007: 96). Renown scholars on security studies, for example, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde examined in their seminal work on security theory in the late 1990s-forming the theoretical framework for the security research that security has diverse dimensions, encompassing environmental, economic, societal, and political aspects, alongside the military dimension (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998).

The securitization theory challenged the traditional state-centric and military-focused view of security by introducing the idea that threats are not objectively given but are socially constructed through discourse (Balzacq, 2011: 58). Securitization theory emphasizes the performative nature of security, where an issue becomes a threat through the declaration of a securitizing actor and the acceptance by a relevant audience (Balzacq, 2011: 6).

This thesis illuminates the role of the Egyptian Military regimes in the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood. To fulfill the objectives of the thesis, it relies on Terry Balzacq's version of the securitization theory, while considering the work of "Juha Vuori" applying the Euro-centric theory to a middle eastern non-democratic state.

1.2.1. What is Securitization?

A public issue can be located on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it) through politicized (meaning it is a part of public policy) to securitized (meaning it is presented as an existential threat justifying actions outside normal politics) (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 23). According to the Copenhagen

School (CS), securitization involves framing an issue as both urgent and existential, deeming it so crucial that it should not be subjected to regular political negotiations. Instead, it is to be addressed decisively by top leaders ahead of other matters (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 29). This process extends politics beyond the established rules of the game, portraying the issue either as a unique form of politics or as transcending politics altogether (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 23).

1.2.2. Core Concepts and Methodology

In terms of units, the CS theory offers three units of analysis: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. The “Referent objects” are entities that are asserted to be existentially threatened and possess a valid reason to safeguard their existence. Traditionally, these have been perceived as state sovereignty or the nation’s identity, albeit in a somewhat concealed manner.

The “Securitizing actors”, on the other hand, are the individuals or groups that identify something as a referent object and undertake the securitization process. Typically, these actors are political leaders, governments, and bureaucratic entities who carry out the speech act (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 40-42).

The “functional actors” are actors who significantly influence decisions in the field of security, but they are not the referent object or the ones calling for security on behalf of it (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 36). When securitizing actors are not able to securitize an issue directly, they can draw on the social capital of functional actors, by asking the functional actor to contribute to the speech act of security (Balci & Kardas, 2012).

One of the key elements of the securitization process is the “audience” which is defined as “those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 41). However, no clear criteria are provided to precisely identify the audience in practice. In contrast, practical examples of securitizing actors — such as political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups — are given (Balzacq, 2011: 59).

When a “securitizing actor” speaks security addressing some kind of “audience” using a rhetoric of existential threat to a “referent object” achieving sufficient effect to make the audience tolerate violations of rules, and thereby takes an issue out of the normal politics or normal rules of dealing with it, we have a case of securitization. While that form of discourse does not by itself create securitization, it is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only when the audience accepts it as such. Therefore, studying securitization due to the first generation of CS means studying discourse and political constellations, the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act, which is not referring to something more real, as the utterance itself is the act (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 24-26) . While the second generation of the securitization theorists includes “Acts” in their analysis which adds the constellation of *practices*, *tools* and *the policies* generated by securitization, along with the speech act (Balzacq, 2011: 36).

Speech Acts in Securitization Theory

Searle and Vanderveken proposed that speech acts can be divided into five elementary types, depending on their illocutionary point: assertive, directives, commissives, expressive and declarations (Searle & Vanderveken, 1985: 37–38). The research uses discourse analysis to examine the securitization discourse, working on two axes, the internal coherence of the text (intratextuality), and exploring what kind of action a text aims for (assertive, commissive, expressive, directive, or declarative).

What representations are created by this or that particular action? What are the communicative purposes and domains of the relevance of the text? What kinds of interactions are generated? and secondly the relationship among texts (intertextuality) where patterns of representations are understood according to their relationship with others (Balzacq, 2011: 43), which includes due to CS the written and spoken utterances (Balzacq, 2011: 39).

Due to Fairclough, the textual samples can be viewed from a variety of angles: How are the samples connected to other texts, and how does this facilitate or impede the possible aspect of securitization evident in them? How do the samples draw on culturally resonant ideas? As mobilization should draw on existing ideas which are applied creatively to the

situation, the central task is to advocate a view that both legitimizes and motivates protest activity, which is called 'framing' (Balzacq, 2011: 188).

Gary Max classifies the repressive actions due to the actor's specific aims as the creation of an unfavourable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement's resources and limiting its facilities, derecruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fueling internal conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and sabotaging particular actions (Porta, 1996: 65). Vuori argues that securitization can have political functions beyond legitimacy, such as deterrence and control (Vuori, 2011: 187).

Various Limitations of Securitization Theory

Focusing on speech acts: The most criticized aspect of the theory is its focus on speech acts. According to McDonald, the theory overemphasizes speech acts while neglecting other forms of communication, such as images and visual representations like videos, which also play a significant role in the securitization process (Baysal, 2020).

Inherent elitism and top-down framework: Another shortcoming of Securitization Theory is its inherent elitism and top-down framework. Rooted in Schmittian thought, the theory implicitly elevates political leaders and decision-makers, while portraying others as passive listeners or audiences who can only accept or reject securitization. This perspective frames securitization as a linear, top-down process, overlooking its bottom-up dynamics (Baysal, 2020).

Eurocentrism: One of the primary critiques of securitization theory is its **Eurocentric bias**. The theory was developed within the context of liberal democratic states, making it less applicable to non-Western or authoritarian settings. Securitization is fundamentally about constructing exceptions to justify the use of extraordinary measures. This raises the critical question: What defines "normal"? Since the notion of normalcy varies across temporal and spatial contexts, what is considered an exception in one context may be viewed as normal in another. As a result, the mechanisms, measures, challenges, and consequences of securitization processes can differ significantly depending on the time and place (Baysal, 2020).

Democratic Concerns: Securitization poses potential threats to democratic principles and civil liberties. By framing issues as existential threats, governments can bypass normal democratic processes and justify extraordinary measures that curtail freedoms (Huysmans, 2006: 102), which can lead to the erosion of democratic accountability.

1.2.3. Second Generation of the Securitization Scholars and Speech Acts

In application, securitization theory faced several limitations. The focus on speech acts was the most criticized. The CS theory neglected other means like images, videos, music etc. also neglected other practices and tools, the role of the audience and the context, especially when it is applied to a non-western and non-democratic context like Egypt (Baysal, 2020).

Due to that limitations and from a critical perspective the second generation of the securitization scholars like Thierry Balzacq analyzed the process by three levels, and their constituent analytics, as the first level analyzes the (*agents*) which concentrates on the actors and the relations that structure the situation under scrutiny, including those who contribute or resist, the power positions, what is threatened and what threatens.

While the second level refers to the (*acts*) which are interested in practices, referring to the language used in performing a given act, including analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, or stereotypes. The constellation of *practices* and *tools* and the *policies* generated by securitization. Finally, the third level concerns to (*context*) situating the discourse both socially and historically (Balzacq, 2011: 36-37).

1.2.4. Major Contributions and Applications of Securitization Theory

Counter-Terrorism Policies Post 11 September 2001

One of the most significant applications of securitization theory is the analysis of counter-terrorism policies following the 11 September 2001, attacks. The U.S. government framed terrorism as an existential threat to national security (Huysmans, 2006: 5).

Migration and Border Security

Securitization theory has been applied to the study of migration and border security, particularly in Europe. Political leaders and media outlets have framed refugees and

migrants as threats to national identity, social cohesion, and economic stability (Huysmans, 2006: 106). This securitization of migration has led to restrictive immigration policies, increased border controls, and the criminalization of migrants (Huysmans, 2006: 114).

Climate Change as a Security Threat

Climate change has increasingly been framed as a security issue, reflecting the growing recognition of its impact on human survival, national security, and global stability. Climate change is a 'massive threat to human development which in some places is already undermining the international community's efforts to reduce extreme poverty (Floyd, 2010: 180). In 1994, with the emergence of the so-called *environmental scarcity thesis* in policy-making circles, the Clinton administration's environmental security discourse acquired an additional dimension. Broadly, the environmental scarcity thesis highlights threats to state security arising from the link between environmental scarcity and violent conflict (Floyd, 2010: 73-74).

Cybersecurity

In the digital age, one of the key reasons cyber threats have gained significant attention in recent years is that, during the politics of threat construction, U.S. officials have convincingly argued these threats endanger the very fabric of modern society. The argument posits that nearly all essential functions — such as energy delivery, healthcare effectiveness, and commerce — rely on the reliability of information systems and networks. These critical information infrastructures are viewed as the backbone of other vital infrastructures, given that uninterrupted data exchange is crucial for government operations, emergency services, and economic activity. This growing dependence on information, coupled with increasing vulnerabilities due to technical security gaps, highlights substantial risks to national security and the economy (Cavelty, 2008: 138).

1.2.5. Studying Securitization in Egypt as a Non-Democratic context

There has been a considerable debate around the ability to apply the securitization theory to the non-democratic context, while the main theorists of securitization have understood all types of political systems as applicable for analysis within the framework, without

clarifying it (Vuori, 2008), but if securitization is known as moving issues beyond the democratic process, then how it could be applied to non-democratic states? (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

Breaking the Inherited Rules

Considering non-democratic systems, Vuori argued that all societies have *rules*, which are products of their own historical and social contexts. When *security logic and rhetoric* is utilized to legitimate the breaking of these rules, we have a case of securitization (Vuori, 2008).

The aim of this research is to examine the two major crises faced by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout its nearly century-long history, specifically those that occurred during the presidencies of Nasser and El-Sisi. Based on this, the researcher began by examining the period of King Farouk to identify the principles governing the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood during this time. This examination aims to determine the extent to which the Nasser regime deviated from the established norms of the monarchy in dealing with the Brotherhood and how Nasser's securitization discourse led to public acceptance of the harsh measures taken against the MB starting in 1954. The researcher then conducted a brief study of the Brotherhood's relationship with President Sadat's regime, the period following Nasser's presidency, during which the securitization measures imposed by Nasser were dismantled or in other words the de-securitization took place.

The research revealed that the process of securitization, which peaked during President El-Sisi's era, began immediately following the conclusion of the January 2011 Revolution, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed power. During this period, military intelligence, under the leadership of General Sisi, took charge of handling this matter.

Therefore, the study considered the securitization process during President Sisi's era to have commenced with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' assumption of power following the 2011 Revolution. This period encompasses the military council's rule, President Morsi's presidency, the post-2013 military coup period — which marked the

peak of securitization — and President Sisi's presidency, characterized by the continuation of securitization until the completion of this dissertation in 2024.

Consequently, the researcher examined the period of President Mubarak as the phase preceding the securitization process under investigation, which began in the aftermath of the January 2011 Revolution, to identify the principles governing the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood during this time. This examination aims to determine the extent to which the Egyptian regime after 2011 revolution deviated from the established norms of the Mubarak regime in dealing with the Brotherhood and how Sisi's securitization discourse led to public acceptance of the harsh measures taken against the MB after the 2013 military coup.

Accordingly, the dissertation began by examining the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime during King Farouk's era, followed by the securitization process during Nasser's regime, and then the return to normalcy under President Sadat. The study subsequently explored the nature of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime during President Mubarak's era, followed by the securitization process that began under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, continued through President Morsi's tenure, escalated after the 2013 military coup, and persisted during President Sisi's rule.

Military Rule in Authoritarian Settings

Greenwood and Wæver proposed that in authoritarian settings, the military assumes the dual responsibility of safeguarding the nation's borders and overseeing societal control in alignment with the regime's principles. This involves defining acceptable societal groups and activities, as well as identifying those with perceived 'threat profiles' (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

The researcher assumes that SCAF after Mubarak's step aside simply did that forementioned job, defining the MB and other revolutionary groups as a threat, after considering the 2011 revolution as an insurgency against the military state, considering breaking the normal rules inherited since Sadat and Mubarak eras in dealing with the MB post 2013 military coup by SCAF was done after a successful securitization process. Furthermore, in 1952 the officers in the Revolutionary Command Council, led by Nasser,

refused to return to their barracks and transfer power to civilian leadership. They dissolved all political parties, except for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was aligned with them at the time then dissolved the MB in 1954 breaking the normal rules inherited since King Farouk era in dealing with the MB and other political powers. Officers then exercised power from 1952 and have continued to do so to the present days, as outlined in the relevant section of the thesis.

Securing Regime's Core Values

Also, every political order, regardless of its type, engages in the securitization of its core values. This understanding of core values as critical references for security has been prevalent since Arnold Wolfers' definition of national security, which underscored the role of core values by stating, "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values". Securitization serves as a method for recognizing and delineating threats to these core values and safeguarding them can be seen as a special type of politics, even within non-democratic systems (Vuori, 2008).

Buzan et al. called safeguarding that core values 'identity security' (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 120). While Wilkinson argued that the invocation of a collective 'we' identity emphasizes the need for safeguarding to ensure its continuity (Wilkinson, 2007). Also, Vuori argues that *securitization* is a way of identifying and defining threats to these core values and their protection can be considered a special type of politics, even in non-democratic systems (Vuori, 2008). This strengthens the hypothesis that the military regime had to protect its own *military secular* model in governance against revolutionary changes by the revolutionary groups, especially the MB which adopts an Islamic model of governance.

This is reflected in the media, notably in the famous song by Ali El-Haggag, which suggests that Egyptians adhere to a different faith and God than that worshipped by the Muslim Brotherhood saying "We are a nation, and you are another nation. Although God is one, we have a God, and you have another God". It is also evident in statements issued by Dar Al-Ifta, which criticized the political and religious ideology of the Brotherhood, deeming it contrary to the correct interpretation of Islam. Furthermore, this sentiment is mirrored in the rejection by Egyptian secularists of the Muslim Brotherhood's model of

governance and politics. Similarly, during the Nasser era, this dynamic is evident in the conflict between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood due to the Brotherhood's insistence on implementing an Islamic model of governance. This followed the liberal period that Egypt experienced in 1932 during the monarchy. In contrast, Nasser adopted a socialist model of governance, which later came to be known as the Nasserist model, as outlined in the relevant section of the thesis.

Stating that a society distinguishes itself from social groups through a notable level of social inertia, which often spans across generations, and is characterized by a robust framework of norms, values, and broader institutions (Wæver & Barry Buzan, 1993: 21), SCAF utilized this hypothesis, as the People have been used to the rule of the military regime for a very long term, which makes SCAF's job easier.

As per Wæver, differentiating between perceived threats to society or nation and state is crucial. The fundamental benchmark for societal security is identity, while state security hinges on sovereignty. In both contexts, the underlying concern is survival. A state without sovereignty ceases to exist as a state, and a society losing its identity apprehends an inability to persist in its true form (Guzzini & Jung, 2004: 220). As shown above SCAF portrayed the threat to the Mubarak regime, against which the revolution took place, as a threat to society or the nation. In other words, it portrayed the threat against its sovereignty as a threat to the nation's identity.

Securitization Before Excessive Force

In the context of an authoritarian regime, the question arises: why engage in a securitization process instead of directly employing excessive force? According to Holm, even authoritarian regimes find it necessary to justify their implementation of 'extraordinary' measures. A deficiency in this legitimization can become evident through manifestations such as demonstrations, riots, intra-elite revolts, palace coups, or instances of active non-participation (Holm, 2004: 219-20). SCAF succeeded through the security process to conceal its legitimacy again, avoiding any type of popular opposition against it. On the contrary, it succeeded in ruining the MB's legitimacy and popularity, to the extent that the majority of Egyptians accepted massacres like *Rabaa and Ennahda* against the MB, even some Egyptians celebrated the bloodshed. As Vuori argues "a security

argument can be accepted wholeheartedly and embraced proactively to the extent of joining the military” (Vuori, 2008).

The Audience for Securitization

Bourdieu emphasizes that a notable feature of the political field is that for professionals to thrive within it, they must garner support from groups or forces situated outside the confines of the field (Bourdieu, 1991: 28). According to Vuori's argument, in non-democratic states, the audience for securitization efforts might consist of the power elite or a group of fundamentalists. Within this model, it is essential that the audience possesses the capacity to enable the securitizing actor to achieve their objectives through the process of securitization (Vuori, 2008).

The research shows that SCAF first directed its speech to some state institutions as power elites, and some non-state actors, then SCAF used the mentioned power elites and non-state actors in the security process. For the audience, Nasser directed the securitization process toward both the masses of the Egyptian people and the elite members of the Muslim Brotherhood as the securitization audience. Nasser addressed the Brotherhood's leadership and influential figures to sway them to his side against the group's Supreme Guide, Al-Hudaybi. For example, he appealed to them in an effort to either form a nominal cabinet or dissolve the Brotherhood into a governmental institution. Nasser also targeted the elite within the Brotherhood who were part of the private system, attempting to create divisions within the group's ranks and other similar strategies, as outlined in the relevant section of the thesis.

Likewise, in the post-2011 revolution period, the SCAF addressed political elites, including secular and Islamist parties and political movements, successfully creating divisions between them. The council also directed its discourse toward the youth elites, particularly revolutionary youth movements, leveraging these groups to form the Tamarod Movement, which worked against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, SCAF addressed Islamic and Christian religious elites, utilizing state-affiliated religious institutions to influence both the elites and the religious masses. The council further directed its communication to the general public through

media, programs, speeches, and official statements, as outlined in the relevant section of the thesis.

1.2.6. The Thesis Contribution to the Securitization Theory Literature

The thesis as a case study offers significant contributions to the existing literature of securitization theory by applying it to an authoritarian context. While traditional securitization theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, primarily focuses on liberal democracies, this thesis extends the theory's application to Egypt, showing how regimes under Farouk, Nasser, Mubarak, SCAF and Sisi have framed the MB as a security threat to justify political suppression and maintain power. By providing a longitudinal analysis across different political periods, it illustrates how the practice of securitization evolves while targeting the same political entity. This historical perspective enriches the understanding of how security discourses are adapted to suit shifting political needs within non-democratic systems.

Moreover, by focusing on the MB, the thesis bridges the fields of securitization theory and political Islam. It demonstrates how Islamist movements are framed as security threats, contributing to broader discussions on the securitization of political Islam. This analysis provides insight into how perceptions of political Islam are manipulated to serve state interests and consolidate authority, offering a nuanced understanding of the relationship between security policies and ideological suppression.

Also, the thesis reveals how regimes use security rhetoric not only to address perceived threats but also to suppress dissent and shape political order. This dynamic has significant consequences for human rights, as securitization often leads to mass arrests, restrictions on civil liberties, and other repressive measures.

In sum, the thesis as a case study enhances securitization theory by demonstrating its applicability beyond democratic contexts, providing empirical evidence on the securitization of political opposition, and offering deeper insights into the intersection of security, governance, and political Islam in Egypt.

1.3. Counter-Revolution Approach

While the overall securitization process has been settled to reverse the results of the 25 January 2011 revolution, due to that the researcher assumes the securitization process done by SCAF as a counter-revolutionary strategic plan carried out by military intelligence (MI), in other words, the researcher will consider the overall process done by the MI lead by El-Sisi as the head of MI and later the Egyptian president as a counter-revolutionary strategic plan. Especially when Sisi hinted in 2014 that he had duped President Mursi from the start, saying that Mursi underestimated him. Mubarak also reassessed Sisi, saying, "He turned out to be devious" (Kirkpatrick D. , 2018: 304). To define the parameters of this strategy the researcher used the counter-Revolution approach.

Strategies are simply the choices available to the players, therefore each player must make a complete plan of action (Dixit & Skeath, 2004: 27). A strategy delineates a method, or a set of methods aimed at achieving a specific objective. Both traditional and modern strategic thinking, as exemplified by the U.S. Army War College model, portray military strategy as a predetermined, static plan with clearly defined outcomes set before the onset of conflict. U.S. military doctrine outlines two approaches to achieve this objective: annihilation, aiming to completely disable the enemy, and erosion, which seeks to impose substantial costs on the opponent (Albino, Friedman, & Bar-Yam, 2016).

While Killine Clarke defines Revolution as "a mode of regime change that explicitly involves the mobilization of social forces seeking to overthrow an incumbent regime using popular protest" (Clarke, 2017), the term "counter-revolution" is defined by Fred Halliday as "a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, or policies designed to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power" (Halliday, 1999: 207).

Jamie Allinson argues that a counter-revolution case is built partly by portraying revolution as an external threat that could be countered only by the organic unity of an imagined past (Allinson, 2019). As revolutions display a common precondition, what John Chalcraft calls "hegemonic contraction" in which support for the existing rulers has fatally narrowed, or what Gramsci's analysis calls "crisis of authority" or "crisis of

hegemony" or "general crisis of the state" (Chalcraft, 2016: 36). The task of counter-revolutionaries, if they are to succeed, is to reverse this process. This reversal requires the rebuilding of a political coalition capable of carrying out and supporting coercive repression (Allinson, 2019). In the Egyptian case, counter-revolutionary intervention was both continuous and consequential from the time of Tahrir Square and onwards. Allinson argues that counter-revolutions can also operate across borders during situations of revolutionary upheaval but before revolutionary movements have established a sovereign power of their own (Allinson, 2019).

Moreover, this intervention was not simply a response to conditions of international anarchy but reflected cross-border social relations: in particular the deep interlocking of economic and security interests between Egyptian, Gulf, and US elites (Allinson, 2019), from his view Nick Bisley divided the tactical methods of international intervention into military, financial, diplomatic, and logistical means (Bisley, 2004). While Allinson demonstrates that on 11 February 2011, following the popular revolt, the SCAF sensing that only Mubarak's removal would stem the tide of revolt, and assured of the support of its major foreign backer, the United States, announced the resignation of the president and a plan for constitutional reform and parliamentary and presidential elections under military tutelage (Allinson, 2019).

Allinson argues that the experience of attempts at international 'catch-up' under conditions of uneven and combined development provides resources for counter-revolutionaries to prevent such success, as the changing forms of such 'catchup' projects generate alliances with other states, that states may provide the military, diplomatic, or financial support to prevent a successful revolutionary outcome (Allinson, 2019). In the case of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the stronghold of Nasserism represented the former and the policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council States and the US, the latter, thus the counter-revolution relied upon two factors deriving from this strategy: the ideological inheritance of Nasserism as a response to international hierarchy, and the integration of the post-Nasser Egyptian ruling elite, which was not united in its response to the revolution, with Gulf financial, and US security networks (Allinson, 2019).

Egypt has obtained \$23 billion (15 billion pounds) in aid from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait in 18 months after ousting President Mursi (Reuters, 2015),

receiving a total of \$8 billion in one week after the coup (Peel, Hall, & Saleh, 2013). Also, the Saudi role in financial and logistical support for the Salafi movement after the 2011 revolution has become clear (Al-Arabi, 2018).

While Clarke demonstrated that the conflicts which have shaped these trajectories have been waged between groups defined along non-class lines: between Islamists and secularists; Christians, Sunnis, etc. (Clarke, 2017). At a broad level, the United States views the stability of Egypt as key to the stability of the Middle East and therefore maintains a decades-long security partnership to strengthen Egypt's armed forces and its ability to combat terrorism (Sharp, 2020).

Mayer demonstrated that counter-revolutionaries revolutionize the content of reaction by adopting the methods of revolution: insurrectionary and plebeian, they actively seek a mass base among the declining economic strata (Allinson, 2019). Clark -using a social force lens-detailed the need for counter-revolutionaries to reach a mass base of support, and therefore to mobilize social groups (Clarke, 2017; Clarke, 2014). What appeared clearly in the Egyptian case in use of thugs and the Tamarod movement.

1.4. Knowing the Adversary Approach

Each player in "the game of strategy" calculates the consequences of his choices by using his own values or rating system, each player must not impute his own value systems or standards of rationality to others and assume that they would act as you would in that situation. So, in such games, trying to find out the values of others and trying to conceal or convey one's own become important components of strategy, So each player chooses his best response to the other's choice (Dixit & Skeath, 2004: 30).

Fearon illustrates that if the states knew each other's levels of resolve, they could in principle look ahead and anticipate what would happen if they were to escalate and create a crisis (Fearon J. D., 1994).

In the research case study, the SCAF had detailed knowledge of its adversary while it seems that the MB and the Egyptian revolutionary movements had weak information about the SCAF. Which enabled the SCAF to deal intelligently with the revolutionary movements and the MB, while it made these groups lose the ability to deal properly with

the SCAF and the counter-revolutionary forces. Undoubtedly, inadequate knowledge on adversary's culture can result in dire consequences at strategic, tactical and operational levels (Mishra, 2020). What facilitated the success of the securitization process against the revolutionary forces and the Muslim Brotherhood.

This factor significantly influenced the strategic plan of the counter-revolution against the January 2011 revolution and also, the manner in which the Muslim Brotherhood engaged with the counter-revolutionary forces. In other words, the "knowing the adversary approach" played a crucial role in the success of the securitization process against the Muslim Brotherhood, whether due to the Brotherhood's underestimation and lack of awareness of counter-revolutionary forces, or the counter-revolutionary forces' comprehensive understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood and its behavior.

1.5.The Preventive War Approach

Preventive war is a persistent theme in the history of international politics and theoretical explanations of war. As Paul Schroeder contends, preventive war has been a "normal, even common tool of statecraft". Preventive war is fought to exert the erosion of relative power to a rising adversary and the future dangers this power shift might present (Silverstone, 2007: 1). According to Jack Levy, if political leaders in a given state "fear what their rising adversary *might* do once he gains superiority, the preventive war temptation may be potent enough to drive that state to attack and blunt its rival's growth (Levy, 1987).

Fearon notices that it is frequently argued that if a declining power expects that it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the present may be rational (Fearon J. , 1995). Powell confirms that a preventive war could be triggered by an anticipated shift in the distribution of power (Powell, 2006).

In the Oxford Handbook of International Security, Andrew Kydd illustrates the fact that one state is growing means that deals which are satisfactory in the present may not be in the future. In response, states may engage in redistributive bargaining in the future, and possibly in the present as well. However, if the shift in power is too great and the conflicts of interest between the states too important, the declining power may attack preventively

in the present because it fears that in the future it will be exploited or attacked (Kydd, 2018: Kindle Locations 4914-4916).

Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself. In essence, the liberal states like the US seeks to spread its own values far and wide, pursuing this strategy at the expense of balance of power politics (Mearsheimer, 2018: 12). Many in the west, especially among foreign policy elites, consider liberal hegemony a wise policy that states should axiomatically adopt. Under Presidents Bush and Barack Obama, Washington has played a key role in sowing death and destruction across the greater Middle East, and there is little evidence the mayhem will end anytime soon (Mearsheimer, 2018: 16).

It is widely believed in the US that the MB promotes moving away from secularism and returning to an Islamic law governing system. Although the MB had been accused of operating under violent tactics to secure its objectives at the time of Donald Trump (ISPU, 2019). President Trump was only days into office in January 2017 when he first began considering a move with the potential to ignite designating the MB a terrorist organization (Schmitt, Cooper, Wong, & Savage, 2019).

In 2015 Senator Ted Cruz submitted a report to Congress on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization (Sen. Cruz, 2015). We can recognize how the US thinks about that situation from the words of Donald Rumsfeld about what he considers 'militant ideology': "They will either succeed in changing our way of life, or we will succeed in changing theirs" (White & Tyson, 2006). He thinks of it as a two-sided equation, change or you will be changed. That means, from his point of view, if the US doesn't spread liberal democracy, it will definitely vanish. Buzan considers that the explicit 'long war' framing of the Global War on Terror GWOT, where the US strategy involved the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere, is a securitizing move of potentially great significance. If it succeeds as a widely accepted, world-organizing macro-securitization, it could structure global security for some decades, in the process helping to legitimize US primacy (Buzan, 2006), which means that in the thoughts of one of the prominent Western political scientists added to the political elites, the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere, will add more legitimacy to American superiority. In the opposite sense, the restriction of liberal

democracy will lead to the restriction of American superiority in their perception. For that the research argues that the US may have participated in a "preventive war" against the MB authority in Egypt, playing an important role in the Egyptian counter-revolution to prevent the MB from implementing an Islamic model of governance not harmonious with the Western liberal model.

Since the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping international counterterrorism, examining the U.S. role in the MB's securitization process situates it within the global security context, and shows how far the U.S. policies and rhetoric can influence how the Egyptian state constructs security threats. Also, this strategic alignment with U.S. security interests can illuminate how securitization is not only about addressing perceived threats but also about maintaining alliances and securing foreign aid.

By examining the role of the U.S. in the securitization process the thesis moves beyond a domestic focus and highlights the interaction between a superpower as an international actor and the Egyptian local securitization process, which provides a more comprehensive understanding of how external states contribute to shaping internal security policies in Egypt as a non-Western context. This analysis can participate in the literature of the "post-colonial security studies", showing how security in the eastern contexts are shaped or reinforced by Western superpowers.

Moreover, including the role of the U.S. in the securitization process demonstrates that securitization is not an isolated, domestic process but a process which is influenced by global political trends, international alliances, and global security discourses, which verifies the transnational nature of security issues. This helps to provide a wider understanding of how the MB has been framed as a security threat, both within Egypt and on the global stage.

In conclusion, the thesis argues that the U.S. played a vital role in drafting Egypt's securitization of the MB, highlighting how global powers influence local security policies. This transnational process reflects broader political attitudes, alliances, and the interactions between domestic and international security actors, stressing the interconnected nature of global and local securitization efforts.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SECURITIZATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD DURING THE ERAS OF KING FAROUK AND PRESIDENT NASSER IN EGYPT

2.1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the 1919 revolution in Cairo, a defining moment in Egypt's resistance against English occupation, the subsequent promulgation of the Constitution of 1923 heralded the dawn of a new liberal era. This transformative period witnessed the emergence of vibrant party politics, principally dedicated to the pursuit of political liberation for the homeland. However, amidst the fervour for political change, the crucial dimensions of civil rights and social justice found themselves somewhat relegated—an oversight that paved the way for the ascent of influential social movements, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. Rooted in religious advocacy and established in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood initially undertook a mission of extensive social engagement.

As the political landscape evolved, so did the Brotherhood's role, capturing the attention and allegiance of the Egyptian populace. This transformation did not go unnoticed, triggering concerns among both British colonial authorities and successive Egyptian governments about the group's burgeoning influence. The socio-political canvas of this era was further painted by the rise of a middle-class comprising professors, university students, and intellectuals, who became integral actors in the dynamics of these burgeoning movements. The MB's expanding political footprint prompted strategic responses from the Egyptian state. From interventions by the political police to the imposition of publication prohibitions and the creation of alternative groups designed to divert public support away from the MB, a multifaceted effort was underway to curtail the influence of the MB. Media campaigns were launched, with the aim of distorting the image of the group and shaping public perception.

The tensions reached its zenith during the royal era with the MB's active involvement in the 1948 war against Jewish forces in Palestine alongside Arab armies. This participation posed a direct threat to British interests in the region, leading to the consequential decision to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1948.

This chapter systematically examines the intricacies of the historical juncture under consideration, delving into the multifaceted aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood's evolution within the intricate framework of prevailing political dynamics. The objective is to comprehensively analyze the normal *modus operandi* or the normal rules that the Egyptian regime interacted with the group during the pre-Nasserite era, contrary to the violent security measures implemented by the Nasserite regime subsequent to a successful securitization operation against the MB. Furthermore, the chapter undertakes an in-depth exploration of the controversies surrounding the relationship between the MB and the Free Officers, investigating allegations of the group's involvement in the 1952 military coup, elucidating the securitization process employed by the Nasserist regime to effectively mobilize popular support against the group and its adherents. This scholarly inquiry seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the intricate historical dynamics which created the Nasserite era.

2.2. The Egyptian Political System in the Stage of Parliamentary Democracy (1923-1952) and the Rise of Social Movements

Politically the 1919 revolution led to the abolition of the British protectorate over Egypt in February 1922, gaining the British recognition that Egypt is an independent and sovereign state. In April 1923 a constitution was announced, which had formed a general framework for Egyptian politics, approving a parliamentary life. The revolution also created a general renaissance that included various aspects of social life, as many trade unions were formed, artistic life rose, and civil scout and cooperative supply associations were formed (Hilal, 2006: 74). Ayubi argued that the importance of the 1919 Revolution was due to two main points: First, it gave a mass content to the idea of Egyptian citizenship, and the Union of the Egyptian nation's Muslims and Copts against colonialism. Second, the revolution marked the beginning of the attempts of the new Egyptian classes to wrestle with foreign colonial rule, with the aim of taking over the reins of the Egyptian state. This movement was expressed politically by the Wafd Party (Ayubi, 1989: 83-85).

At that time many parties, mass movements and forces were formed in Egypt. Among the parties, the Wafd Party emerged, which appeared in response to a popular and national desire, as it worked as a National Front that included various political and social forces

that participated in the 1919 Revolution, which reflected the formation of the entire Egyptian nation, it included among its ranks Muslims, Copts, large landowners along with workers, peasants and others (Taha, 2014). Despite this popular momentum of the Wafd, a state of conflict appeared between it and the King, which eventually led, as Rauf Abbas argued, to the fact that the liberal democracy that Egypt had known before the revolution of July 23, 1952, was an imaginary democracy, as the real control on the government was in the hands of the palace, exercised by a limited elite of the upper strata of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, linked to the palace by ties of Alliance and common interests (Abbas, 2017). For that reason, with internal personal conflicts the Wafd party became weak and disintegrated.

In 1937, Ahmed Maher (1888-1945), the former Egyptian prime minister (1944-1945), defected and formed the Saadi Party, were in 1942 Makram Ebeid (1889-1961), former Minister of Transportation and Finance, withdrew, and established the Wafd bloc Party (Hemeed, 1986: 71). However, the majority of historians and political scientists accept that the institutions of liberal democracy did not flourish in Egypt (Hilal, 2006: 111). Communist and Islamic movements have also spread since the weakness and fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, including the Eastern League in 1922, the Muslim Youth Association in 1927, and the Muslim Brotherhood arose in 1928. The spread of Islamic ideas at that time helped to pay attention to the issue of social justice, and the atrocities of colonialism, and the growth of the general Islamic feeling (Hemeed, 1986: 76-77).

According to Hilal, this period was characterized by political competition through the multiplicity of parties, with the absence of social programs and policies; because of its primary interest in the issue of the national struggle against the British, while the executive authority had the supremacy in its relationship with the parliaments, which led to political instability, and the political leadership of the various parties reflected the interests of the landlord class, which remained the loudest voice in Egyptian politics until 1952. What means that the state power in fact concentrated in the hand of the palace and the big bourgeoisie from the minority parties that have falsified parliamentary life (Hilal, 2006: 107). This, in his opinion, led to the emergence of several organizations, whose main concern was social and economic rejection; Such as the Misir Al-Fatah, the MB and

the socialist movements, which raised the economic and social problems of middle and poor-class citizens (Hilal, 2006: 91-93).

Hemead agrees with Hilal's last opinion and explains the reason for the popularity of the MB and other social movements. He argues that in 1936, a treaty was signed between Egypt and Britain, according to which the English withdrew to the Canal Zone and the cities of Cairo and Alexandria, and foreign privileges were liquidated under the 1937 Montreux Agreement. The issue of social justice became as important as national liberation, which led to groups with social goals such as the MB and Misir Al-Fatah (Hemead, 1986: 71). In this period, especially after the defeat of the Arab armies in Palestine in 1948, the traditional balance of the Egyptian society based on the sovereignty of large landlords began to shake, and a new middle class emerged, including university graduates, intellectuals, and professionals joined the new parties and movements, and provided intellectual leadership for the desired social and political change (Hilal, 2006: 126).

2.3. The Muslim Brotherhood

2.3.1. Historical Review

The Muslim brotherhood originated in 1928 in Ismailiyah City in Egypt, centered on the intellectual & motivational leadership of the founder Hasan Al-Banna. Al-Banna began teaching, preaching and discussing Islam, not forgetting in his da'wa the sources of power in the community, like the social and religious societies, shaykhs of Sufi orders, the Islamic scholars and the leading families and groups (Mitchell, 1993: 7). In 1932 Al-Banna had been transferred to Cairo, beginning a new phase of the MB. In Cairo, he began organized work among the university students, published a magazine called "Al-Nazeer", took a special badge for the brothers, and held mass conferences to demonstrate the MB's da'wa. The MB has begun to Spread the da'wa in the various regions of Egypt, contacting different parties and bodies and Muslim leaders in Egypt and abroad (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 111-142).

Regarding his political ideology, Al-Banna delineated the principal objective of the MB as "comprehensive and complete reform", a collaborative endeavor engaging all the forces within the Muslim Umma. This reformative vision involves navigating through

various existing circumstances by means of change and alteration. Central to this vision is the aspiration to revive an ideal Islamic nation deeply rooted in authentic Islamic principles. The envisioned Islamic nation is characterized by a steadfast commitment to true Islam, wherein it possesses a guiding authority and an imam, thereby establishing itself as the quintessential embodiment of the state governed by the principles of the Qur'an (Al-Banna, 2010/2: 340).

After Al-Banna explained his main goal, which is to resurrect the ideal Muslim nation and comprehensive reform in which all the forces of this nation cooperate; Al-Banna explained his view towards the secular governments, and his ideas on how to change to the MB's desired Islamic government, where he emphasized the gradual advocacy peacefully, and also emphasized the use of armed force only for the necessity of defence. This can be clearly seen in his reports at the fifth Congress of the MB in 1939 (Al-Banna, 2003).

In February 1939 the MB held their fifth conference, in which Al-Banna mentioned several important issues, such as the MB's position on governance, their intention to carry out a revolution against the Egyptian regime at the time, their intention to use force to achieve their goals, their relationship with political parties, the Islamic unity, and their attitude towards the colonial countries (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 121-122). Al-Banna confirmed that the MB believes that the rulings and teachings of Islam are comprehensive, regulating people's affairs in this world as well as in the Hereafter, including both the spiritual and the worldly aspects. Islam must dominate all the affairs of life, all of them must be tinged with it and should come down to his rule. For MB, Islam is a belief, worship, homeland, nationality, religion, state, Quran and sword (Al-Banna, 2010/2: 260-261).

Al-Banna divided the power required by the MB into three categories, first is the power of belief and faith, the power of unity, and then finally the power of the arm and the weapon. He claimed that if the MB uses the strength of the forearm and weapons while the MB is disjointed, disordered, or weak in belief and stagnant in faith, its fate will be annihilation and destruction, confirming that the MB will not use practical force until it is a must, and where they are confident that they have completed the process of faith and

unity. Also, he confirmed his vision of the revolution saying that the MB does not think about it, rely on it, or believe in its benefits and results (Al-Banna, 2010/2: 274-275).

Al-Banna also explained his view of governance and its relation with Islam, He said that Islam, from his point of view, is ruling and implementation, legislation and education, law and judiciary, which are inseparable from each other. The Islamic reformer due to the Al-Banna is obligated not to leave the state executives to legislate for the nation what Allah didn't permit and force it by the power of governance to violate Allah's commands. Al-Banna concluded that if the actual legislation is not following the Islamic legislation, then the failure of the Islamic reformers to demand governance is an Islamic crime that is only expiated by extracting the power of execution from the hands of those who do not apply the provisions of Islam. This means that the Muslim Brotherhood will work to extract power from the hands of every government that does not carry out the orders of Allah due to Islamic legislation (Al-Banna, 2010/2: 276).

2.3.2. The Muslim Brotherhood Structure

The Movement's Main Structure in that Era

At that time, the MB At the organizational level consisted of three bodies: the administrative offices, the branches, and the general center, as follows:

- The administrative offices: Each Egyptian governorate has an administrative office, which has been considered the general center of the MB in that governorate. Its function is to supervise the MB branches in the governorate, issue instructions, and follow up on its implementation.
- The branches: Each one has been consisted of a number of the MB cells called MB families: The da'wa affairs in each branch have been managed by a board of directors consisting of a number of its elected members, headed by a member called the branch deputy.
- The General Center: It had been located in Cairo, which was a headquarters that brings together the committees and departments that represent the aspects of the activities carried out by the Brotherhood, namely the Student Committee, the Cultural Committee, the Workers' Department, the rovers Department, the da'wa Propagation Department, the Department of the Brigades and Families, the Department of Social Services, the

Department of Communication with the Islamic World, and the Muslim sister's department. (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 221-222).

While at the level of leadership the MB consisted of three bodies: The Constituent Body, General Guidance Office, Membership Committee as follows:

- The Constituent Body: which had been the General Assembly of the Brotherhood. It was formed in 1941 to draw the main lines of the Da'wa policy and consisted of 100 Brotherhood members. Its ordinary meeting takes place every year, but the General Guide may call it to meet at any time he deems it necessary. It has the authority of the Commission to elect from among its members, the members of the Guidance Office and the Membership Committee.
- General Guidance Office: It has been composed of 12 members, and has been considered the administrative council of the da'wa, representing it before public opinion and official bodies. Its main task is to implement the policies approved by the founding body and to issue decisions that the administrative offices and its branches are committed to implementing.
- Membership Committee: It was composed of 12 members. Its main task is choosing the new members of the constituent body, realizing what is raised about the members of this body and issuing decisions regarding them (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 222-223).

The Private System (PS)

There were different opinions about the emergence of the PS and its goals within the MB historians as well as outside it. Ahmed Adel Kamal - one of the most prominent members of the MB and its PS - said that the PS was established in 1938, at the time when the resistance movement in Palestine had begun under the leadership of the Mufti of Palestine Haj Amin Al-Husseini in 1936, named "the Arab revolution in Palestine", resisting the Zionist movement's expropriation of their land under the protection of Britain. This was after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the vanishing of the Islamic caliphate which had united the Muslim countries for centuries, and the spread of the national tone, in an attempt to divide the incorporeal or moral bonding of the Islamic world after dividing its geographical units, which made the Egyptians have nothing to do with what happens to the Palestinians, Syrians or Iraqis (Kamal A. A., 1989: 149-150).

Abd El-Haleem, the MB's well-known historian and one of the founders of the PS, said the establishment was in 1940, to face the Zionists in Palestine (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 258). While Kamal claimed that the MB had begun collecting donations to finance the Palestinian resistance, the Mufti of Palestine told Al-Banna that they needed weapons, not money, so the brothers began collecting weapons for the people of Palestine, and as a result of their inexperience, they gathered invalid weapons. Here, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi thought of establishing the PS to do this in 1938 (Kamal A. A., 1989: 150).

Another narration was of Salah Shadi. He said that Al-Banna offered the establishment of the PS in 1945 to five members of the Brotherhood. Its main goal was to face its responsibilities towards the British occupation of Egypt and the Zionists in Palestine, and he assigned these five the leadership of the PS and he asked them to train its members on the foundations of the Islamic military (Abu Shadi, 1987: 64). Anyway, all the historians of the Brotherhood agreed that the private system originated directed to Zionist groups in Palestine, and perhaps also against the British occupation in Egypt, and was not directed towards the Egyptians.

Kamal presents in his book a number of activities related to the private System in which he participated or witnessed. He said the PS carried out an inventory of the Jews in Egypt, where their loyalty to the Zionist movement was clear. It included companies under the names of "the Nile", "Cairo" and "the Egyptian", which are owned by Jewish personalities. Also, several Jewish families surrounding King Farouk like *the Mosery* and *Katawy* families helped the Jewish penetration into Egypt, whether on the political, economic or social levels and provided opportunities for Zionism to operate on the Egyptian lands, as an example in the aftermath of World War II they were collecting weapons from the remnants of the battles of the Egyptian Western Desert, to arm the Zionist gangs in Palestine (Kamal A. A., 1989: 152-160).

The PS also created a special section that acted as an intelligence service. It had a chief who directed the work of the department based on the commands of the leadership and a deputy who carried out the implementation of his directives. Also, Units, each unit consists of groups whose members are dispersed among the organizations and movements, to obtain news and provide the head of the unit with it, and to recommend

individuals and group leaders. A number of individuals were allocated to follow communism, some political parties, organizations, trade unions, and the political police (Kamal A. A., 1989: 161-162).

The PS lead the MB volunteers in Palestine. In May 1948, Al-Banna sent a telegram to the leaders of the Arab countries meeting in Lebanon promising them to bring ten thousand Mujahideen as a first batch to Palestine. Then the brothers rushed to volunteer and prepare to organize a military movement to save Palestine. The first force of the Brotherhood had entered Palestine and the first battles in the south began in April 1948. Due to the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian government, the Brotherhood was forced to submit its youth to work under the leadership of the Arab League (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 412-416). While Kamal believed that the number of the brothers who entered Palestine was about two thousand fighters and that they fought their first battles in February 1948 (Kamal A. A., 1989: 231).

2.4. Security Process Against the MB in King Farouk's Era

After the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood's da'wa, the expansion of its membership and its effects on Egyptian society, and its ability to collect weapons and volunteers to participate in the fight against Zionism in Palestine. The colonial countries, especially Britain, began to be aware of the danger that the group might pose to the Zionist project, but rather to the colonial project as a whole. The process of confronting the MB or securitizing its spread has begun. A state-loyal Egyptian newspaper published a translation of an article from a major American newspaper which mentioned Hassan Al-Banna, it said: "This man is the most powerful man in the Islamic world today, and he cannot be defeated unless events become greater than him" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 436).

It seems that the American newspaper was pushing those concerned in the direction of eliminating Al-Banna and his movement to create those events, in the forefront of them was King Farouk, who pushed the Egyptian newspapers to publish the article. The Egyptian state in that Era tried to suppress the MB in many events and different ways, using a number of tools to suppress the MB as follows:

2.4.1. The MB and The Political Police

One of the means of successive Egyptian governments was the use of “the political police” or intelligence, which at that time had been working for the Egyptian government as well as the British Embassy, to convey the secrets of Brotherhood societies and spy on them. Their work focused on preventing some meetings, confiscating some issues of the Brotherhood magazine, and summoning some members for interrogation (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 437-438).

This apparatus was updated and reconstituted after 1952; In the immediate aftermath of the 23 July 1952 coup, the Free Officer regime placed internal security and intelligence reform high on its agenda, designating the adherents of the former regime, dissident military personnel, adherents of communist ideologies, and members of the MB were identified by Nasser's regime as its foremost threats. One of the initial policy measures implemented by the Nasser administration was the establishment of a novel General Investigations Directorate (GID) endowed with augmented security authorities and capabilities, exercising direct oversight over the intelligence-gathering procedures. A pivotal architect of the 1952 coup and a longstanding associate of Nasser, Zakaria Muhi Al-Din, often regarded as the progenitor of the contemporary Egyptian Intelligence apparatus, expeditiously assumed the role of Director of Military Intelligence (MI), notwithstanding his absence of formal credentials in the field of intelligence.

While the MI was the most powerful security agency in Egypt, new political police emerged after the coup called the General Investigations Directorate GID, later called the State Security Investigations Service, was led by Zakaria Muhi Al-Din and supervised by a cadre of MI officers helped by the CIA, as the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was a key GID liaison partner from the outset. GID began with four departments that reflected its mission areas: Foreigners, Zionism, Communism and Internal Affairs. This last department covered the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd, and others (Sirrs, 2010: 29-32).

In the early months of 1954, both the Military Intelligence (MI) and the General Investigations Directorate (GID) deployed officers to mosques with the objective of intimidating sympathizers of the MB and disseminating pro-regime propaganda. This propaganda aimed to depict the MB as an ally of communism, alleging financial support from Moscow through the Syrian communist movement. Concurrently, these security

entities undertook a systematic purge of Brotherhood sympathizers from the ranks of both the police and the military. By April 1955, a U.S. assessment acknowledged the efficacy of the Egyptian military's counter-intelligence service, characterizing it as proficient in infiltrating potential army conspiracies and deterring anti-regime activities within military ranks. The same report highlighted the enhanced efficiency and capability of the restructured police force in intelligence matters. It emphasized the close collaboration between the police and the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in neutralizing threats posed by the MB and communist elements (Sirrs, 2010: 37-38).

2.4.2. Freedom Brothers

The Egyptian regime tried to form associations similar in name to the *Muslim Brothers* or in Arabic “*Ekhwan Moslmun*” and opposing it in ideological terms, such as the Freedom Brothers Association or in Arabic “*Ekhwan Alhorriya*”, to divert the MB members to it. At a time when the Brotherhood is trying to spread Islamic culture and adhere to the provisions of Islamic Sharia, this association has tried to spread liberation ideas that are contrary to brotherhood Islamic ideas, such as freedom of immorality and drinking alcohol and the like, in an attempt to attract young people to stop being convinced of the MB’s ideas and then withdraw from its membership (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 438-445).

2.4.3. The Hindrance of the MB's Daily Newspaper

In publishing their daily newspaper, the MB faced many problems, especially in writing, advertising, and distribution. Abdel Halim claims that the popularity of the Brotherhood at that time was enough to make the most famous writers race to write in the MB daily newspaper, but on the contrary, most of the writers refused to participate in the Brotherhood newspaper. This made the Brotherhood suspect that there were those who communicate with the writers or threaten them if they participate.

This expectation was heightened by the MB's discovery that “the newspaper distribution company had threatened verbally the local distributors in various governorates if they distributed the magazine”, also compensating them with sums of money when they didn’t distribute it. The Brotherhood also faced an unjustified refusal from companies to advertise in their newspaper, while the advertising market was controlled by a British

company called “The Eastern Advertising Company,” according to Abdel Halim, most of its employees were British intelligence men and Jewish activists (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 446-456). Abdel Halim also claims that the Egyptian government used its media apparatus represented in the radio and newspapers, so it overturned the facts and described the Brotherhood as “brutal and assaulting the peaceful, and were preparing to overthrow the regime” (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/1: 488).

2.4.4. The Jewish Incitement Against the MB

According to Kamel Al-Shareef, the Jews also worked to provoke their allies against the MB, especially after it participated in the 1948 war. For example, a Zionist writer called ‘Ruth Karev’ wrote in 1948, provoking the United States as a great power against the MB, saying: “The Muslim Brotherhood has issued a call for a decisive confrontation against perceived United States interference in the Middle East, urging Muslims to abstain from collaboration with the United Nations. The Brotherhood's adversarial stance is particularly directed towards the Jewish community, which they identify as their most vehement adversaries. Consequently, followers of the Brotherhood have engaged in acts of aggression, including the destruction of Jewish properties and the looting of their assets in numerous Middle Eastern cities. Presently, there are indications of imminent violent assaults on Jewish communities in Aden and Bahrain. This follows previous attacks on American legations and consulates, accompanied by explicit demands for the withdrawal of Arab nations from the United Nations” (Al-Shareef, 1984: 32).

Karev endeavoured to depict the MB as an adversary of both the United States and the United Nations, claiming to emphasize their antagonistic actions such as attacks on U.S. missions and consulates. Furthermore, Karev portrayed the MB as challenging the post-World War II international order, suggesting a reluctance among Arab states to adhere to the new global legal framework, thereby complicating the interests of major nations. The narrative claims the MB's hostility by illustrating their claimed assaults on Jewish civilians which involved posing the destruction and looting of private properties. The culmination of this portrayal is Karev's call for the United Nations Security Council to deploy an international force to Palestine to counter the influence of the MB in the region. This narrative seeks to align the actions of the MB as a threat to international stability and emphasizes the need for a concerted international response.

2.4.5. The Egyptian Government and the MB in the 1948 War

The historical developments in 1948, pertaining to the MB's interactions with the Egyptian government, exhibit a discernible correlation with geopolitical dynamics and power structures of the time. In the context of the prevailing influence of the United Kingdom as a major power in Egypt during this period, the Egyptian government, ostensibly acting as a proxy influenced by external forces, engaged in actions aimed at diminishing the MB's prominence. Following the provocation of major powers against the Brotherhood in 1948, the Egyptian government, under considerable influence from the UK, embarked on a strategic initiative to curtail the Brotherhood's influence during the 1948 war. This maneuvering subsequently led to the dissolution of the MB.

Notably, the Egyptian government employed several measures to achieve this end. Initially, the Egyptian government obstructed the entry of MB volunteers into the Naqab desert in Palestine. Subsequently, it formally requested the MB's General Center to withdraw its remaining forces from the Naqab desert. In response to the Brotherhood's refusal to comply with this directive, the government took more stringent actions. Specifically, it severed the supply lines supporting the MB's forces and implemented tightened control over Egypt's state borders, thereby preventing the inflow of resources and reinforcements to the Brotherhood's deployed units until their eventual return to Egypt. Upon the return of the MB volunteers from their participation in the conflict alongside Arab armies in Palestine, the Egyptian government pursued legal actions against them, resulting in imprisonment. These events underscore the intricate interplay of political, strategic, and international factors shaping the dynamics between the Egyptian government and the MB during this pivotal historical juncture. (Al-Shareef, 1984: 40-41).

2.4.6. The Egyptian Government and the MB Dissolution in December 1948

No sooner had the year 1948, in which the Brotherhood volunteered to resist the Israeli occupation in Palestine, than The Saadi party, Prime Minister of the Egyptian government, Nuqrashi Pasha, issued a military decision to dissolve the MB on December 8, 1948, in a context where a violent struggle for primacy, mutual antipathies, and challenging to each other, especially between the Egyptian Wafd party and its dissident Saadi party and the MB was evident (Mitchell, 1993: 59).

The explanatory memorandum of the decision submitted by the Minister of Interior Abdel Rahman Ammar was filled with accusations of the MB of terrorism, murder, sabotage and disturbing the general peace of society, etc. (Abu Shadi, 1987: 239). While the MB's volunteers were fighting side by side with the Egyptian army in Palestine, in the same year the decision was issued. If the group was as the report claimed terrorists, murders, looters, etc... How did the Egyptian government and the Egyptian army allow it to participate in the war alongside the Egyptian state in Palestine? Rather, some senior officers of the Egyptian military witnessed the patriotism of the Brotherhood members and their fight alongside the army as volunteers, such as the testimony of Major General Ahmed Ali Al-Mawawi - after he swore an oath before the court, saying: "He was using volunteers from the MB as vanguards of the army and as a real force operating from his right side in the eastern side" (Al-Qaradawi, 2021).

In his memo, which he published as a response to the memorandum of the Minister of Interior, Al-Banna discussed his conviction that the decision to dissolve the Brotherhood was at the request of the major powers, not stemming from the fact that the group had become a harm to the Egyptian society. As Al-Banna claimed after the MB war participation in Palestine, it had in fact become a harm to the interests of the British occupation. Referring to the statements of the Minister of Interior himself, Al-Banna said: "This was stated by His Excellency Ammar Bey himself and he acknowledged that the ambassadors of Britain, America and France had gathered in the city of Fayed and wrote to His Excellency Al-Naqrashi Pasha explicitly that the MB must be dissolved. He responded to this foreign desire and issued the decision of dissolution, so he gloated the enemies and grieved the pious believers" (Abu Ghader, 2019).

Al-Banna also explained that the Minister of Interior told him that the Brotherhood had become a danger to the security and the state and that the British threatened to return to occupy Cairo if the group was not dissolved (Kamal A. A., 1989: 264). Al-Shareef, an MB member and historian who participated in the 1948 Palestine war, claims that the British are the reason which inspired the Egyptian Prime Minister, Al-Nuqrashi Pasha, to dissolve the MB and restrict its activities in the hope that they would begin an armed resistance in Egypt after they had gained the necessary experience in Palestine war, and

this would be a sufficient reason for the British to intervene in Egypt more (Al-Shareef, 1984: 140).

This perception is claimed also by Mahmoud Abdel Halim, the group's most famous historian. He reported that the Lawyer Shams El-Din El-Shinnawi presented to the Egyptian court in one of the famous Brotherhood cases in 1951 a document that he claimed was signed by Mr. MacDermott, the commander of British forces in the Middle East at that time, in which he responds to the British embassy in Egypt, confirming Britain's intervention to dissolve the MB -in case the document is true- in which he said: "I have officially notified the leadership that diplomatic steps will be taken to persuade the Egyptian authorities to dissolve the MB as soon as possible" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 35).

Another evidence of external interference in dissolving the Brotherhood is that Moshe Dayan, the former Israeli defence minister, held a press conference in America in 1948, as one of the journalists asked him: Can he guarantee Israel's survival among large countries that are hostile to it and harbor evil? Moshe Dayan replied: "Israel is not afraid of meeting these countries together or separately, as it would defeat them, but it hates to meet only one faction, the MB, and their government will take care of getting rid of them" (Al-Qaradawi, 2021).

Days before the group's dissolution, the attacks of the pro-government newspapers intensified, such as the *Al-Asas* newspaper, which is affiliated with the ruling Saadi party, paving the way for the group's dissolution by publishing its attack on the Brotherhood, after stopping the MB newspaper, the group's mouthpiece (Kamal A. A., 1989: 263).

The pro-government "Akher Sa'a" newspaper published after the dissolution decision, trying to show the MB as the biggest danger facing the Egyptian state, or a possible alternative to it, which suggests that the group was preparing for a coup against the Egyptian state, saying "The government has disposed of a group that can be considered its strongest opponent. This group was not just a party, it was like an entire state with its weapons, hospitals, schools, factories and companies" (Kamal A. A., 1989: 265).

The Egyptian military ruler issued "Resolution No. 63 of 1948" on December 8, which in the first article stated: "The association known as the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its branches throughout the Kingdom of Egypt, is to be immediately dissolved. The premises allocated for its activities are to be closed, and all papers, documents, records, publications, sums of money, and funds, as well as any other assets belonging to the association, are to be confiscated. Furthermore, the members of the association's board of directors, its branches, its managers, its members, and anyone affiliated with it in any capacity are prohibited from continuing the association's activities" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 22).

The memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister and the military ruler by the Minister of the Interior requesting the dissolution of the Brotherhood, which was broadcasted on the radio after broadcasting the dissolution decision. In its nine other articles the memo accused the MB of transcending its religious and social goals to political goals, and the issuance of a daily political newspaper that became immersed in the current of political struggle forgetting its original goals, working to reach power and overthrow the Egyptian regime and the established systems in the Egyptian state. It also, accused the MB of terrorism and the use of violence to reach its goals, issuing Military training for its members, collecting weapons, bombs and explosives, and storing them for use when needed inside Egypt behind the guise of the Palestinian cause. It also, accused the group of attracting students to the MB, the thing that spoiled their educational life, causing disturbance and disruption of order in educational institutes through them (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 23-24).

However, the Egyptian student movement (SM) was not limited to the Muslim Brotherhood's youth. As in the liberal Era before 1952, the student movement was an active movement within the framework of political pluralism established in the political system. In other words, the SM was an official democratic movement that contributed to the activities of the political system as most parties and groups had student activities, especially the Misir Al-Fatah movement, the MB and the Communist Movement. It is worth mentioning here that before 1952 the patriotic role of the student movement centered around the confrontation with external entities, especially if it was an aggressor

or an occupier, and then the main clashes were with the British occupation forces demanding the liberation of the country, and freedom in the political system.

We can note that the major historical uprisings in Egypt before 1952 were about the evacuation of British forces from Egypt and complete independence, such as the student uprising in 1935-1936, after which the independence treaty came in 1936, then the uprising in 1946 after the Second World War. which indicates the British occupier's concern about the growing student role of the MB (Abd Allah & Bahaa El-Deen, 1993: 1-8).

Returning to the memo and its defaming of the MB, it mentioned many criminal activities and claimed that the MB committed them. The Explanatory note of the memo claimed that "the MB aimed to turn the basic systems of the social body through terrorist acts by a team that was trained in military training called the "rover team", using and manufacturing bombs and weapons, murdering its opponents, members clash on the police men and shooting fire towards them, training in the use of firearms, bombs and explosives, storing massive amounts of weapons and explosives, inciting workers to stop working, sending threatening letters to some companies to extort money from them, The MB's students was accused of killing "the capital's police chief" in an incident that occurred at the "Fouad I" university on December 4, 1948; an officer and seven soldiers were wounded outside the walls of a secondary school by throwing grenades on them on December 6 (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 25-30). Although "the role of the Brotherhood's students was no more than that of other movements in the events, and most of the arrested were non-Brothers" as Al-Banna mentioned in his response to the memo" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 51).

Also, the memo "accused the MB of the "Eastern Advertising Company" blew up on November 12, 1948, which resulted in demolition, vandalism and killing, and the seizure of a car containing materials Explosives, ammunition, weapons and dangerous documents on November 15, 1948, which led to the seizure of huge quantities of bombs and explosives" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 30). While Hasan Al-Banna denied all these charges attributed to the MB and its members in a memorandum entitled "Hassan Al-Banna's response to Ammar Bey's memorandum dissolving the Brotherhood", but was

not allowed to be published until December 12, 1949, a year after the decision to dissolve (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 46-59).

The Egyptian court also has recognized, in a case called the “jeep car” in March 1951, the innocence of the MB and its members of the terrorism charges attributed to it, and affirmed the highness of their intentions (Ikhwan Wikipedia, 2019). What indicates the government’s attempt to conceal the MB’s defense of itself, to appear before public opinion in a distorted appearance which the government wanted it to look, or to appear in the appearance of a terrorist group that commits crimes against the homeland and the Egyptian people, and betrays them; to make them accept the government following actions.

2.4.7. The Actions of the Military Ruler after the Dissolution of the MB in 1948

In response to the dissolution of the MB and the ensuing actions taken by the state, Hassan Al-Banna articulated a series of grievances in his memorandum addressed to the Minister of Interior. The document detailed a catalogue of infractions perpetrated under martial law against MB members after the dissolution decree in 1948. These transgressions were primarily focused on impeding the group's sustainability through strategies such as derecruitment, resource constraints, facility limitations, the severance of ties between leaders and members, and the implementation of deterrence and control measures, as following:

- The media’s exaggeration in portraying the MB as criminals in front of the public, until one of the government newspapers said that “if the Jewish gangs occupied Cairo, they would not have done one percent of what the Brotherhood did to destroy it” (Al-Sabbagh, 1998: 61-63).
- The confiscation of a number of companies bearing the MB’s name or owned by individuals belonging to it, such as the Arab Mines Company, the Arab Advertising Company, The Brotherhood Weaving Company, The Brotherhood Press Company, The Brotherhood Printing Company, and the Brotherhood Schools Company in Alexandria.
- All members of the Guidance Bureau were arrested, except for the General Guide, Hassan Al-Banna, who was later killed, and all members of the Constituent Assembly and members known to the government from the MB were arrested (Al-Sabbagh, 1998: 59).

- Accusing everybody related to the MB or bearing its name with crime and aggression, confiscating his freedom, money, and work, and attacking him.
- Arresting dozens of the MB's youth for no reason other than their previous affiliation with the group. Mitchell estimates the number of imprisoned MB members in July 1949 in camp prisons of Turh, Huckstep, and Uyun Musa by 4000 (Mitchell, 1993: 72).
- Issuing an order for the leaders of the Egyptian army in Palestine to arrest all volunteers from the MB, by setting up detention camps at the front that include these people (Al-Sabbagh, 1998: 60).
- Severe censorship was imposed around the residence of the General Guide, Hassan Al-Banna, surrounding him with a fence of royal policemen, and arresting anyone who tried to contact him (Abu Ghader, 2019). Abd El-Haleem said this siege was followed by the arrest of all Al-Banna's brothers, especially Abdel Basset, the police officer, stripping him of his personal pistol, seizing his private car, and not allowing him to leave Cairo (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 67).
- The Assassination of Hasan Al-Banna on 12 February 1949, Evidence presented indicated that it was planned, by prime minister Ibrahim Abd Al-Hadi, and executed by the political police, and the process was probably supported by the palace (Mitchell, 1993: 71).

2.4.8. The MB Reformation

In July 1949, the King announced the dismissal of the government of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, who belonged to the Sa'dist Party, and declared that this dismissal was the King's gift to the people (Al-Sabbagh, 1998: 63). The release of the MB prisoners had begun in the same month after the new prime minister Husayn Sirri acceded to power. MB detainees in Palestine were returned in small groups, and released after investigations or minor detentions. The MB, while it remained technically illegal, began regrouping under the leadership of the former deputy 'Salih Ashmawy' (Mitchell, 1993: 80).

In October 1951, Chancellor Hassan Al-Hudaybi was elected as the new general guide of the MB. The major Egyptian newspapers also published on November 21, 1951, the news of the meeting of Counselor Al-Hudaybi in his capacity as general guide of the MB, King Farouk, in a meeting that lasted for 45 minutes, which indicates the king's official recognition of the group and its new guide (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 491). Two days

after his nomination, Al-Hudaybi demanded, through the Al-Masry newspaper, that the government issue an amnesty for all political prisoners due to hostility to the British occupation in the country, stressing that the group does not have battalions to resist the British and didn't study this matter at that time (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/2: 477-480).

Other Brotherhood sources indicate that after the release of the defendants in the famous "Jeep case" in March 1951, there was a Second formation of the private system (1951-1953), as members of the PS began to rebuild it again (Kamal A. A., 1989: 260, 325). The new formation only took a few months until the government announced the cancellation of the 1936 treaty in October 1951, and the new PS began armed activity against the British occupation in the Canal area (Kamal A. A., 1989: 335).

2.5. The Pattern of the Egyptian Regime's Interactions with the MB During Farouk Era

The pattern of interactions between the monarchy and the MB underwent phases marked by tranquillity, facilitating the establishment of the group as an Islamic preaching entity. This enabled widespread propagation throughout Egypt, encompassing the dissemination of newspapers and magazines. Furthermore, financial sustenance was acquired through the establishment of companies, all within the framework of security measures taken against the MB marked by a multifaceted approach aimed at curbing its influence and activities. The political police, intelligence agencies, and the collaboration with foreign entities played significant roles in these measures.

Political Police and Intelligence Surveillance: The Egyptian government, particularly during King Farouk's reign, utilized political police and intelligence agencies to monitor and control the MB. These agencies, often worked in collaboration with the British Embassy, gathered information about Brotherhood activities, infiltrated their meetings, and interrogated members. The focus was on preventing gatherings, confiscating materials, and summoning members for questioning.

Formation of Rival Associations: To counteract the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological influence, the Egyptian regime attempted to establish associations with names similar to the Brotherhood but espousing opposing values. The "Freedom Brothers Association"

was one such attempt, promoting ideas contrary to the Brotherhood's Islamic principles, such as advocating freedom of immorality and alcohol consumption.

Hindrance of Media Outlets: The Egyptian government imposed obstacles on the MB's media outlets, including their daily newspaper. The government-controlled distribution companies threatened local distributors, and major writers hesitated to contribute to the Brotherhood's newspaper. The media narrative orchestrated by the government portrayed the Brotherhood as a threat, contributing to the suppression efforts.

The escalation of the group's political involvement, including its active participation as an armed force in the 1948 Palestine War, marked a turning point that initiated a period of heightened tension between the regime and the group. This tension was exacerbated by the group's actions, which were perceived as encroaching upon the interests of Britain, a major power at the time. The Egyptian government, influenced by external powers, took actions during the 1948 war to diminish the MB's influence. This included obstructing Brotherhood volunteers from entering the Naqab desert, severing supply lines, and implementing control measures.

Legal actions were taken against Brotherhood members upon their return from participating in the conflict. In December 1948, Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha issued a military decision to dissolve the MB. The decision was based on accusations of terrorism, murder, sabotage, and disturbing the peace. The government's actions included arresting key members, confiscating assets, and accusing the Brotherhood of subverting societal norms. Following the dissolution, the government took various actions against the MB, including arrests, media portrayal as criminals, and confiscation of assets.

The assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in February 1949 further intensified tensions. However, the Brotherhood began regrouping in 1949, and by 1951, a new General Guide, Hassan Al-Hudaybi, was elected, marking a reformation of the MB. In conclusion, the security processes employed during King Farouk's era against the MB encompassed a comprehensive strategy involving surveillance, media control, external influence, legal actions, and the ultimate dissolution of the organization. The subsequent reformation demonstrated the resilience of the MB in adapting to and overcoming these challenges.

Despite the intensity of these measures, a return to normalcy occurred within a relatively short span of one year.

2.6. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers Movement (FOM)

The historical narrative differed about the relationship between the FOM and the MB. Most of the brotherhood historians' narration said that Gamal Abd El-Nasser was a member of the MB's private system. The same narration to what happened in 2012, when Al-Sisi assumed the position of Minister of Defense, there were numerous speculations regarding his affiliation with the MB, suggesting that he was a 'Brotherhood man' within the armed forces (Fouad, 2013).

Ahmed Adel Kamal noted that the MB member and the founder of the MB movement in the army, Major Mahmoud Labib, attracted a number of army officers to the ranks of the Brotherhood, Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the highest military ranks that joined the MB, as a result of the fact that army laws prohibit officers from engaging in politics or affiliation with political organizations, they were assigned to the PS to work with the MB in secrecy, and they contacted Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi. In any case, Abdel Nasser joined the Brotherhood's formations and swore to the Qur'an to respect its principles and adhere to it, years before he started his own group formation (Kamal A. A., 1989: 369-371).

In a report issued by British Security Intelligence in the Middle East in 1952 entitled "The Current Situation in Egypt After the Last Coup", prepared by the "Egyptian Affairs Coordination Team" at the intelligence headquarters in Cairo, which was considered the main source of information for British policymakers towards the Middle East. The report confirmed the membership of six of the ten founding members of the FOM in the MB (Sultan, 2022).

Lieutenant Hussein Hammouda, one of the founders of the FOM, counted seven officers who repeatedly met with Major Mahmoud Labib, deputy representative of the MB, from 1944 until May 1948. These were, in order of military rank, Abdel Moneim Abdel Raouf, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kamal El-Din Hussein, Saad Tawfiq, Khaled Mohi El-Din -the RCC member-, Hussein Hammouda, and Salah Khalifa. According to Hammouda, they were the main cell of the MB within the armed forces. This organization has been secretly

active within the army for four years and four months to include the largest possible number of officers in its ranks. The officers also agreed with Abdul Rahman Al-Sindi that they would train the Brotherhood's youth from the PS on the use of weapons. (Himmouda, 1985: 31-36).

While Salah Shady declared the cause or the secret behind the Free Officers' separation from the MB, or Abdel Nasser's, capability to form and control the Free Officers away from the Brotherhood. he said that Since 1946, Nasser began to transfer the loyalty of the officers to him from behind of Mahmoud Labib's back (Abu Shadi, 1987: 94).

After the issue had been discovered and discussed by the MB, the decision of the General Guide, Counselor Al-Hudaybi, was that it would have been better not to put all the eggs in one basket, so the Brotherhood would continue on their way, and Nasser continues on his with total separation from the MB, or he decided to separate Nasser and his group from the MB but still a friend to them. While Nasser replied that he would continue to be a friend of the MB (Kamal A. A., 1989: 371).

The former Egyptian president and member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Anwar Al-Sadat, had another opinion. He claimed that the Brotherhood had no relation with the FOM or the 1952 coup, but rather stated that the MB's position was negative, despite what the MB claimed after the coup that they created it. Sadat said about the first days of the revolution: "Even that man, Hasan Al-Hudaybi, and his followers, the heirs of the Book of God at this time, did not support the leadership of the army in the first days of the revolution. We did not see the face of Al-Hudaybi, the preacher who demanded freedom and democracy. Where was he and his followers who later claimed that they were the makers of the revolution? Then suddenly, when they knew that the revolution had succeeded and that the throne had fallen from the hands of their master, they came to us and congratulated us" (Al-Sadat, 1965).

The last text was published in July 1965, during periods of conflict between the RCC and the MB, which questions the credibility of the narration. Sadat portrayed the Brotherhood as a utilitarian group, trying to attribute the events to itself without participation, as if they were not the first kernel of the Free Officers before Nasser separated, or as if Nasser himself was not a member of the MB and its PS, or as if there was no old ongoing conflict

between them on one hand and the king and the government on the other, calling the king as their master, they only came to congratulate the winner in the conflict when the throne had fallen. While another narration was verified by Ahmed Hamroush, an RCC member, who is considered the historian of the Free Officers, who said: “Gamal Abdel Nasser and Kamal El-Din Hussein went to inform “Hassan Ashmawi and Saleh Abu Rafeq”, who were members of the Guidance Office at that time, of the date of the movement, and on the morning of July 23, a number of the MB were guarding the facilities and places of worship. The Free Officers' relationship with the Brotherhood was close, and a large number of them belonged to the group at one stage of their life” (Hamroush, 1992: 303).

Likewise, Hussein Hammouda, one of the Free Officers, witnessed the participation of the MB in the July 1952 Revolution through the officers affiliated with the group, who constituted a majority of the Free Officers' Organization. Hammouda said: “The revolution was carried out by 99 army officers, most of whom were from the MB, and the Brotherhood's civilian secret apparatus also participated in the revolution”. Hammouda confirmed that Abdel Nasser told him “I agreed with Hassan Al-Hudaybi on everything, and the brothers, since the morning of 23/07/1952, have been volunteers to protect foreign embassies and vital civilian installations. And they have forces on the Suez and Ismailia roads and the Canal area to inform the revolution leadership of the movements of British forces” (Hammouda, 1985: 152).

2.6.1. July 1952 Coup

On July 23, 1952, the FOM carried out a military coup against the monarchy in Egypt, and succeeded in expelling the king, declaring the republic. Later get rid of the old parties, as well as the class of landowners. The Free Officers at this time were not committed to a specific political ideology. Rather, the new ideology of the revolution gradually developed. Nasser referred several times to the empirical character of his policies, as the officers' ideas developed as a result of their experience and practical experience, or what Hilal called “the try-and-error approach” (Hilal, 2006: 138), until Nasser sought to functionalize Arab nationalism as an instrument in his desire to legitimize his oppression within the country, to be effective in the regional politics, and to become a powerful actor on the global scale (Telci, 2022: 202).

Nasser said in his book titled 'The Philosophy of the Revolution' "I admit that the whole picture did not become clear in my imagination until after a long period of experience after July 23rd" (Abd El-Nasser, 1996: 26). That means Nasser at that time had completely rid of the Islamic ideology, which he had pledged the Brotherhood to adhere to since 1946, as the researcher mentioned previously. This indicates that his cooperation with the MB after the coup was not ideological but was purely utilitarian. The first phase, following the coup, was characterized by an attempt to consolidate the pillars of the new regime, gain public support, and liquidate the opposition. The RCC carried out extensive purges in the army, police, government agencies, and the press. All political parties were dissolved by the law of dissolution of political parties on January 16, 1953, except for the MB, which was dissolved in 1955 (Hilal, 2006: 139).

Based on the philosophy of 'trial and error', the famous Six Principles of the Revolution were not announced until 1956 after the actual implementation of them, from Nasser's point of view. The RCC seized the Egyptian political life with an iron hand, stabilized its management of the army, and eliminated the opponents of the RCC as the king's aides, parties, groups, movements, and the Egyptian landowning class or capitalism. The RCC also made social dramatic changes as expanding the middle class and providing free education for everyone. These six principles are as follows: Abolishing feudalism, ending colonialism, ending the domination of capital over government, establishing a strong national army, establishing social justice, and establishing a healthy democratic life ("Egyptian State Information System," 2023).

2.6.2. The RCC and the MB after the 1952 Coup

While Greenwood and Wæver proposed that in authoritarian settings, the military assumes the dual responsibility of safeguarding the nation's borders and overseeing societal control in alignment with the regime's principles. This involves defining acceptable societal groups and activities, as well as identifying those with perceived 'threat profiles' (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013). Directly after the 1952 coup close cooperation took place between the MB and the RCC, the MB was the only party or entity that had not been eliminated after the revolution until 1955. This led the MB to take the lead in Egyptian political life, as the "civil protector" of the regime and as a popular voice on the ideological level (Mitchell, 1993: 110).

When Law No. 179 of 1952 regarding the organization of the Egyptian political parties was issued on September 9 ("Egyptian Official Gazette," 1952), Nasser contacted Interior Minister Suleiman Hafez, requesting that the MB not be dissolved, citing the fact that the group was one of the largest supporters of the FOM and it still provides its continuous support to the officers at that time. That was against the will of Major General Mohamed Naguib, the former Egyptian president and prime minister at the time (Nagib, 1984: 169; Hamroush, 1992: 306).

The good relationship between the MB and the RCC continued during the clash with the parties, even the group was not dissolved after the issuance of Law No. 37 of 1953, according to which the political parties were dissolved ("Egyptian official gazette," 1953), the Brotherhood was always against parties and partisanship. Hamroush believed that the reason for this was the Brotherhood's belief that dissolving the parties would free the arena for them (Hamroush, 1992: 307). Also, MB supported the RCC in the abolition of student unions (Mitchell, 1993: 106).

Former President Muhammad Nagib confirmed a near idea, giving evidence in his memoirs by what one of the MB leaders told the newspapers: "We will not ask for parties to be formed for the simple reason that we call on all Egyptians to support us and follow us in the case of Islam". This may be normal for an ideological group that wants to implement its ideology. Adding to that it laid the first seed for the FOM, participated in its organization and supported it to carry out a coup that overthrew the king and his border (Nagib, 1984: 253).

It is not strange that the MB seeks to implement its ideology, Nagib supports this proposition by saying: "the Brotherhood supported the establishment of the revolution because they imagined that they would achieve the desired Islamic change through it" (Nagib, 1984: 167). At the same time, Nagib confirmed that Nasser and his companions were openly seeking to monopolize power, as they got rid of the Free Officers who did not follow them, sought to get rid of the officers affiliated with Nagib, silenced civilians, and sought to displace the military (Nagib, 1984: 215).

Also, Miles Copeland claimed that the US intelligence reported that Nasser was shuffling the command structure in a way that seemed aimed at establishing a military fascist dictatorship (Copeland, 1969: 85).

While Nasser and his companions gave up their allegiance to the Brotherhood and their Islamic ideology, it was ordinary that a clash would occur between these officers and the Brotherhood, who have sought to implement their version of Islamic ideology in power or have specific modules for a desired Islamic change.

Hamroush recounts the direct reasons that provoked the RCC against the Brotherhood, from the officer's point of view, such as Hedaybi's statement to the Associated Press newspaper in July 1953, which the officers considered an attempt to make a rapprochement between the MB and the Western countries at a time when negotiations between the Egyptian state and the British side were cut off. Where Anthony Eden, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, wrote that "Hedaybi was keen on good relations with the United Kingdom". Also, the fact that the Brotherhood remained a solid and active bloc among the masses triggered the RCC's fear that their loyalty had not completely shifted to them (Hamroush, 1992: 307).

Improving the relationship between the Brotherhood and the West at a time when the relationship between the officers and the West is in a state of tension may raise among the officers aspiring to power the idea of the Brotherhood's competition with them, even if this is not the case if the officers intend to return to their barracks and let the civilian political life continue again. Based on this assumption, the Brotherhood's active solid mass and attachment to the people will undoubtedly be the biggest factor that will raise the aspiring officers' concern, therefore Nasser was keen to fragment it and blow it up from within ideologically and physically.

Therefore, after a short time differences began to erupt between Nasser and the Brotherhood. The RCC began a wide securitization process against the MB, to exclude the group from the political and public life. The process ended with the decision to dissolve the group in 1954 and to prosecute and arrest its members.

2.7.The Securitization Process against the MB by Nasser and the RCC

Table (2.1): Simplifies Thierry Balzacq's Levels of Analysis for Nasser Era

Context	Agents				Acts Examples
	Referent Object	Securitizing actor	Securitized actor	Audience	
Post-1952 coup- Nasser Era	Egyptian Military Regime	RCC and Nasser	Muslem Brotherhood	As detailed in table (2.3)	• garner public support for crackdowns on the MB • incite fear and distrust toward the MB • undermine loyalty toward MB leadership • sow distrust and division within the MB • present the RCC as the legitimate

It seems that Nasser decided to take steps that would discredit the Brotherhood, and replace them with other organizations in political life, in order to be able to gradually eliminate the group, or in other words, he designated the MB as a threat to the Egyptian state and decided to follow security steps to defame and dismantle the MB to reach harsh security dealings outside the framework of ordinary law with the group, or to securitize the MB according to the CS.

In the securitization process Nasser mostly committed all the repressive actions argued by Gary Max who classified the repressive actions due to the actor's specific aims as the creation of an unfavourable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement's resources and limiting its facilities, derecruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fueling internal conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and sabotaging particular actions (Porta, 1996: 65).

The securitization Audience is mostly the public. According to Vuori's argument, in non-democratic states, the audience for securitization efforts might consist of the power elite or a group of fundamentalists. Within this model, it is essential that the audience possesses the capacity to enable the securitizing actor to achieve their objectives through the process of securitization (Vuori, 2008), which included the following:

2.7.1. The Liberation Rally Issue

In January 1953, Nasser established the Liberation Rally, formed its principles close to religious groups, and tried to draw the Brotherhood into affiliation with it. The Assistant Secretary-General of the organization, Major Ibrahim El-Tahawy, held a press conference to explain the organization's activities, stating "The people have unanimously agreed on Naguib's leadership and his assumption of the presidency of the Liberation Organization, and that the system of the Liberation Organization is the most just democratic system in the world", affirming that the organization's system is the best and most equitable of all systems (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 176).

Nasser shifted his audience in this case to the MB leaders, or power elites in that time. Nasser presented rally's general secretariat to Salah Shadi, a leader person in the MB, and focused on attracting Sayyid Qutb and Al-Bahi Al-Khouli, the guidance office members, to its membership, but they all refused its membership. Abdel Halim argued that that body, whose philosophy appeared to mix the Islamic idea with other ideologies such as Marxism, was nothing but an attempt to contain and control the MB within it, dissolving its pure Islamic idea (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 173-174).

Even may continue to eliminate the Islamic idea in favour of Nasser's Arab nationalist idea, trying to dissolve the MB ideology as will be mentioned next. The Murshid got the idea and dealt with the rally establishment by a method that defended the MB from Nasser's plane. Abbas Al-Sisi, one of the most important members of the first generation of the Brotherhood, said that "the officers asked the MB to join the editorial board at the beginning of its establishment on the basis of preparing the nation for jihad against the occupier" (Al-Sisi, 2020).

After the refusal of the Murshid to join the “Liberation Rally”, On January 15, 1954, Egyptian newspapers published a statement in an attempt to tarnish the image of the Muslim Brotherhood’s General Guide. They claimed “When the General Guide learned about the formation of the Liberation Organization, he met with Major Gamal Abdel Nasser at the leadership headquarters in Kobri El-Qubba and told him that there was no need to establish the Liberation Organization as long as the Brotherhood existed. Major Gamal replied that there were people in the country who did not wish to join the Brotherhood, and that there was ample room for reform through both organizations. The General Guide then stated that he would not support this organization. From that day forward, he began opposing the Liberation Organization, issuing orders to incite disturbances and fabricating incidents to create an atmosphere of hostility among the people of the same nation” (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 262-263).

Contrary to that the MB’s opinion was that it is a stand-alone group that does not accept duality, except that it is okay for the Brotherhood to participate in jihad under the name of the group and the banner of Islam. In October 1953, the editorial board began calling for training camps under the name “National Guards” and they invited the Brotherhood to participate, and the Brotherhood did not object to that. Abbas Al-Sisi said that Al-Hudaybi in one of his speeches made it clear that “the Brotherhood is not harmed by the establishment of another body or bodies, but the MB is based on a doctrine and a da’wa and doesn’t accept the flow or dilution of any other group, but this does not prevent the Brotherhood’s cooperation with any other group for the benefit of the country and the people (Al-Sisi, 2020)”.

That was the problem of Nasser, which was the survival of the MB as a united entity that works under the banner of Islamic ideology. That is evidenced by what is mentioned by Tawfiq Al-Shawi, one of the first generation of the Brotherhood and a companion of Al-Banna, about Nasser’s behavior with Ben Bella in Algeria, as the Nasserist authorities had chosen the path of transformation towards pure socialism totally eliminating Islamic ideology, and worked to impose it on the Algerian revolution as an example of what Nasser targeted to do with the MB if he had the chance.

Nasser held the second national conference of the Algerian revolution in Cairo, its decisions received the explicit support of Nasser, as it emphasized applying Arab

nationalism to the Algerian people, while that was the first time that Arabism was mentioned without linking it to Islam. Taking into account that the leaders of the national jihad in Algeria previously rejected the documents of the “Al-semam conference” which ignored linking Arabism with Islamism, as they held another conference confirming that Algeria would be an Arab and Islamic country. The representative of the Nasserite government indicated that when he presented these new decisions that adhere to Arabism and ignore Islam for the first time to Nasser, he saw it as a good step to unify the efforts of the Algerian Liberation Army (Al-Shawi, 1998: 275-278).

This indicates that Nasser tried to attract the Brotherhood into a new organization to melt it into an entity with a nationalist ideology, which is contrary to its Islamic ideology. Rather, as happened with the Algerian revolution, Nasser would seek to even separate Islam and Arabism, to have as a result a pure nationalism movement totally different than the MB’s Islamic ideology.

2.7.2. The Issue of the MB Forming the Cabinet

After Nasser’s efforts to incorporate the Brotherhood into the Liberation Organization failed, he then offered Abdel Hakim Abdeen, the Brotherhood's general secretary, the formation of a full brotherhood government in the presence of the RCC. Also, Nasser shifted his audience in this case to the MB leaders, or power elites in that time. Abdeen rejected this offer, arguing that “the rights of sovereignty would be for the RCC, not for the Council of Ministers. Then the Council of Ministers will be a tool to confront the people with the decisions taken by the RCC that affect their interests, and then the criticism of the people will fall on the Brotherhood, not the RCC”.

Therefore, Abdeen stipulated to accept the proposal that the RCC be dissolved first, and that didn’t happen. Abdel Halim argued that Nasser recognized that the Brotherhood's solution did not eliminate its da’wa, but rather increased the people's love, so he wanted to dissolve it in another way that would eradicate them from its roots, by bringing hatred for it into the hearts of the people (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 177-178).

2.7.3. The New Private System Issue

Abdel Halim argued that Nasser created a series of conspiracies to dismantle the group internally and distort its image in front of public opinion (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 267). Nasser, as a securitization actor again chose his audience this round from the MB elites, as he chose a group of PS members, to try to dismantle the group internally, and then guided the newspapers to publish the events in order to distort the group in front of public opinion.

Hamroush argued that a hidden war had arisen between the Brotherhood and the RCC, while the officers' only opportunity was to play the well-known game of infiltrating the Brotherhood's ranks, trying to deepen the existing contradictions between them and blow them up from within. At that time the officers noticed that there was a beginning of a split in the Brotherhood over cooperation with the army movement and the issue of the survival of the private system. Nasser succeeded in attracting Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi, who had controversies with Al-Hudaybi (Hamroush, 1992: 307).

The researcher noticed that there have been a lot of contradictory narrations regarding the reality of the following incident, and in general, with regard to the PS. We can recognize many opposite narrations even from the members of the organization themselves, as a result of the secret nature of the organization. However, what concerns the researcher here is the fact that Al-Sindi worked to divide the MB, whether Nasser succeeded in using him in an attempt to divide the group, or Al-Sindi fulfilled Nasser's demand because their interests intersected here. On November 22, 1953, Counsellor Al-Hudaybi dismissed four members of the MB, who belonged to the PS, namely, the head of the it, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi, Ahmed Adel Kamal, Mahmoud Al-Sabbagh, and Ahmed Zaki. After he knew that they had been preparing an internal coup against the MB general guide, in an attempt to remove him by force and appoint another in his place (Kamal A. A., 1989: 354-355).

As a result, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi planned to carry out an operation that would result in the occupation of the general center of the Brotherhood, and the announcement of the resignation of the General Guide through two teams, the first breaking into the Murshid's house to force him to write his resignation, while the second team breaks in and occupies the general center, as this team was led by Saleh Ashmawi, Muhammad Al-Ghazali, and

Ahmed Abdel Aziz Jalal, the members of the founding body. The incident took place on November 27, 1953, although the first party was unable to obtain Murshid's resignation, the three former leaders announced his resignation to the newspapers, as the agreement between them was to announce the resignation and then announce their new guide. The Murshid had noticed before that incident, the frequent meetings of Nasser with members of the PS, especially its head, Abd El-Rahman Al-Sindi.

One of these incidents was the meeting of some private system members ordered by Al-Sindi with Nasser, and his companions Abd Al-Hakim Amer and Salah Salem. Nasser and his companions used to insult Al-Hudaybi and depict to the audience that the dispute between the General Guide and the revolution was a personal one, not a dispute over principles or politics. (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 203-204).

Ahmed Hamroush claimed that Nasser was able to attract Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sindi to his side, because of his disagreement with Al-Hudaybi and Sayed Sabiq, he also claimed that because of this a split occurred in the PS and a new leadership formed (Hamroush, 1992: 307). Mahmoud Assaf, a former member of the PS, also confirmed this close link between Al-Sindi and Nasser and the possibility that Nasser was behind the strife that afflicted the brothers (Assaf, 1993: 156).

In another incident an unknown person went to the house of Syed Fayez, a leader person in the PS, and gave his family a box of sweets, when Fayez came back and opened it, it exploded in his face, and he was killed instantly. Abbas Al-Sisi informed that all the comments in between the Brotherhood members indicated that the killing of Fayez, was done by Nasser. The brothers claimed that it is impossible for a member of the Brotherhood to kill his Muslim brother, no matter how far the dispute between them is (Al-Sisi, 2020).

However, Assaf confirmed that Sheikh Sayyid Sabiq told him it was the head of the PS who planned the incident and one of his assistants carried it out, but at the end, there is no difference if Nasser carried it out himself or another one close to him did it because the goal is the same (Assaf, 1993: 158). The killing of Fayez would be blamed on his enemies in the PS, which may lead to a wave of violence and counter-violence within the armed PS that may lead to blowing up the MB's internal structure. Moreover, during that

period between 1952 and 1954, some of the FOM was carrying a paper signed by some members of the Brotherhood's Constituent Assembly calling for the dismissal of Al-Hudaybi, the dissolution of the Guidance Office and the formation of a new office (Al-Mola, 2017: 183).

After the success of the conspiracy against Al-Hudaybi, Nasser was keen to show the disagreement within the MB to the public opinion, to show it in the image of the disjointed group, with weak leadership in front of the securitization audience. Ahmed Abu Al-Fath, owner of the most widely circulated newspaper in Egypt at that time, tells in his book "Gamal Abdel Nasser" that Nasser himself summoned him on the 27th of November 1953 night to inform him of the news of the incident. while Al-Hudaybi messaged Salah Salem, Minister of Guidance, begging him not to publish, and Salah agreed, but Nasser objected and told him that "The newspapers are free to write, and we must not interfere". Nasser told him and allowed him to publish that: "The group opposed to Al-Hudaybi has occupied the general center of the Brotherhood, expelled the supporters of Al-Hudaybi from it and announced that they are the only authorized group in the Brotherhood, and they already forced Al-Hudaybi to resign from his position as General Guide" (Abu Al-Fath, 1991: 197).

Salah Abu Shadi also confirmed that the incident was planned by multi-sides, he narrates what Sayyid Qutb, famous writer and the head of the Brotherhood's Da'wah Department at that time, said that Ali Amin, the owner of "Akhbar Al-Youm" Egyptian newspaper, told him about the events before they occurred, which made Qutb conclude that the events were planned by multi-sides (Abu Shadi, 1987: 82).

The newspapers continued to publish the incident starting from the next day, in a way that depicted to the public a great internal division in the MB, the leadership and the group's weakness, and the members' dissatisfaction and distrust toward the leadership. The newspaper used words like "force, forcing him, and occupy" to portray the use of violence between the members of the MB to the audience or the Egyptian public. Al-Masry newspaper published the incident on November 28, 1953, with the title "dangerous split in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood - some members occupy the public center and close it", it said that "the dismissed four called their supporters, and at five o'clock in the evening came with them fifty members of their supporters to the house of Al-Hudaybi,

forcing him to sign his resignation, but he refused. Then they went to the General Center. They opened it by force and occupied it, and they called Sabeq a new Murshid and Ashmawi as his deputy, as they were with them in the demonstration and announced their pledge of allegiance” (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 215).

The newspaper also published on the same day a statement from Saleh Ashmawi and his companions, portraying that this group which claims that it is based on religion and calls for ruling with the justice of Islam is in fact full of Injustice within its leadership level, punishes its members for no fault of their own; what calls into question the reality of the group and its credibility in representing the Islamic religion, using words like “surprised, confusion and disorder” to portray the members exclamation and hesitation, what drives the members to distrust the leadership, and then not to obey its orders, or may push it to split into two groups, saying “The Brotherhood and public opinion were surprised by a decision issued by the Guidance Office to dismiss four members of the group without any investigation being conducted with them, or any charges being brought against them, and without giving the reasons that led to taking this dangerous decision, and this resulted in confusion in the souls of the Brotherhood , and disorder in their ranks, Some of them asked the General Guide about the reasons for the expulsion, but he refused to disclose them, affirming that the office issues its decisions and no one has the right to question its actions”, This was an attempt to portray the General Guide as authoritarian (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 215).

After the Incident

Hamroush claimed that the Brotherhood tried to play on the same chord by exploiting the contradictions that began to appear between Nagib and the members of the RCC (Hamroush, 1992: 308). According to the narration of the former Egyptian President Mohamed Naguib, in December 1953 the MB tried to contact him, their demands were summed up in the continuation of the military rule, the non-return of parties, the non-return of parliamentary life, the non-abolition of martial law, on the condition that Naguib rule alone and that Nasser and the rest of the members of the RCC be excluded.

Also, the MB demanded that a civilian ministry must be formed with the approval of the Brotherhood and that a secret committee be formed in which some military officers loyal

to Naguib and an equal number of the Brotherhood members would participate in. Naguib rejected the proposal completely and claimed that the Brotherhood wanted to take control of the government (Nagib, 1984: 254; Hamroush, 1992: 308).

This narration may be supported by the proposal that the Brotherhood may have wanted to play on the same chord, trying to offer Nagib quick and strong power to get rid of their first enemy at that time, which was Nasser and his aides before he succeeds to get rid of them, especially after the events of November 1953. This is if we look at the narration in its historical context, in other words, the MB's offer to Nagib came as a tactic to solve the Brotherhood's aggravating crises with the RCC at that time. Contrary to the demands offered to Nagib, a-Hudaybi send a letter to Nasser on May 4, 1954 demanding the restoration of parliamentary life, the abolition of martial law and the release of freedoms, especially the press (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 309), which may be another tactic, after despairing of Nagib's position, that Al-Hudaybi used to get rid of the grip of Nasser and the RCC, with the changing political context. At this time, a clash between the RCC and the Brotherhood became inevitable (Hamroush, 1992: 309).

2.7.4 The Rule of the Religion Institutions

Al-Azhar and Sufi Orders

Since the Mamluk and Ottoman eras in Egypt, the role of Sufi orders has been magnified with the rapprochement between the orders and Al-Azhar schoolers, which is Islam's oldest existing scholarly institution, relied on three forms of independence: financial independence via endowments, intellectual independence via rapprochement with Al-Azhar, and autonomy of their administrative hierarchy through independence from the state.

After the 1952 coup which had begun the role of a military state in Egypt, Nasser worked to weaken Al-Azhar, trying to make it fully dependent on the state. Nasser cancelled religious courts, put all endowments under state control and transformed the historic Al-Azhar University into a state university by law 103 of 1961, transferring Al-Azhar to a fully controlled state institute (Korany & El-Mahdy, 2012: 127-28).

This motion allowed Nasser to appoint both the minister of religious endowments, the sheikh of Al-Azhar, and Al-Azhar's undersecretary, thereby extending state control over the most important religious institution in the country as well as corollary institutions such as Mujamaa Al-Azhar, which undermined the traditional influence of the Ulama (Gerges, 2018: 196). The nationalization of this key religious institution enabled Nasser to promote the state's vision of Islam, aiming to counter both the Muslim Brotherhood and regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia (Gerges, 2018: 303).

Also, At Sadat time, law no.118 of 1976, Regulating Sufi Orders was issued, which transformed the Sufi Orders Council into a fully controlled state establishment or an official state institution. Article no.7 of the law stipulates that "The grand sheikh of the sheikhs of the Sufi orders is appointed by the state president among the elected sheikhs of the Sufi orders supreme council, after taking the opinion of the aforementioned council" ("Republic of Egypt Official Gazette," 1976). In article no.5 we can realize that the Council of Sufi Orders is composed of 16 members, five of them are appointed from government members or official establishments as follows: a representative of the Grand Sheikh of the Al-Azhar Mosque, a representative of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, a representative of the Ministry of Culture, respectively and a representative of the Ministry of Local Governance. Added to the grand sheikh of the sheikhs of the Sufi orders appointed by the state president ("Republic of Egypt Official Gazette," 1976).

Although the military regime worked to weaken Al-Azhar and the Sufi orders, at the same time Nasser used the pulpit of Al-Azhar in order to consolidate his own legitimacy and hegemony, and utilized the authority of Al-Azhar as a counterbalance against both internal and external adversaries, including the MB, who framed their opposition to Nasser in religious terms (Gerges, 2018: 195-196).

Nasser also, used Sufi orders as a religious front, especially in its conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood, trying to establish state legitimacy, justify its policies, creating social and political legitimacy, justification of the socialist project, the war in Yemen, the 1967 defeat and raising the morale of the armed forces. Abdulhakim Amer, the minister of defence at Nasser's time, appointed his friend Mohamed Elwan as the Grand sheikh of the sheikhs of the Sufi orders in 1957 (Hassan A. A., 1997: 98).

Heikal argued that in the mid-1950s, during Nasser's conflict with religious political activists and rivals such as the Muslim Brotherhood, he strategically utilized the sacred imagination to portray himself as equally, if not more, religious than his Islamist adversaries. As he understood the profound importance of the sacred in Egyptian life. This approach aimed to solidify his legitimacy and reinforce his hegemony (Gerges, 2018: 194-195).

At the same time, while political Islam, represented by the MB, maintained a constant adversarial relationship with the Nasser regime, Sufism served as a pliable tool in Nasser's hands. It was used both to counter the Muslim Brotherhood and to enhance the regime's religious image. This dynamic is evident in several official publications issued by the General Sheikhdome of Sufi Orders, which openly supported the 1952 coup and praised Nasser. For instance, they described the 1952 coup in the following terms: "The blessed revolution has arrived, bringing with it the spirit of *faith* and vigor. The noble valley shone with the light of hope, and the ancient people arose for struggle and labor. The hand of reform began to build, construct, and unleash latent energies. Islamic Sufism could not lag behind the procession of life and the dawn of the renaissance" (Hassan A. A., 1997: 98-99).

In another discourse they praised Nasser stating that: "The words of Abdel Nasser, 'Our ideal in struggle is *faith* and perseverance,' are immortal words that we must reflect upon deeply, contemplate, and savor... It was Nasser's faith that endowed him with an indomitable resolve, an unyielding will, and an invincible strength. This *faith* was the decisive weapon that equipped him with courage, patience, and triumphant determination, enabling him to achieve his nation's aspirations for dignity and pride" (Hassan A. A., 1997: 99).

Also, For Al-Azhar which aimed to undermine and discredit Islamist groups while bolstering Nasser's domestic legitimacy. Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, appointed as the Sheikh of Al-Azhar in 1958, notably praised Nasser and referred to him as "the young believer" (Gerges, 2018: 196).

Sufis joined Nasser's side in the 1965 great clash between the MB and Nasser. Grand Sheikh Alwan issued a statement declaring that "the message of Sufism is the call for

security and peace and the fight against methods of violence and terrorism”, condemning the MB as a terrorist movement. He also stated that “Islam prohibits covert plotting and sudden acts of sin and aggression”, explicitly referring to the Muslim Brotherhood (Hassan A. A., 1997: 100). Gerges argued that long before the 1967 Six-Day War, the Nasserist state incorporated religious institutions and symbols partly in order to deny the MB an outlet for social mobilization (Gerges, 2018: 195).

Ansar Al-Sunna Association

On the other hand, the Salafist movements also played a role in supporting Nasser’s regime, presented in the Ansar Al-Sunna Association established by Mohamed Hamed Al-Fiqi in 1926 (“Ansar AlSunna Almohamadiya,” 2023), which is considered the incubator of Wahhabi Salafi thought in Egypt, where most of the founders of Salafi groups learned. As an example, we can recognize in the association's official magazine “The Prophet's guidance” under the title of “Ansar Al-Sunna Muhammadiyah congratulate the Commander-in-Chief” a letter addressed to the leader of the military coup in 1952 that: “The association has the honour to remember the heroes whom God has ordained to save this country from the oppressors. He has sent them to purify it from corruption and corrupters, and has honoured them by registering their names on the registry of the Mujahideen and Heroes of Islam” (Alsayed, 2009: 119).

The association directly after the coup declared its full loyalty to the leaders of the coup, using words which have religious connotations, calling the regime of King Farouk as *oppressors, corrupters, and needed to be purified*, while the coup leaders were called as *the saviours, the Mujahideen, and Heroes of Islam*; which helped to legitimize the new regime among the majority religious section of Egyptian society with Al-Azhar and the Sufi orders. Ironically, the same magazine published in its 7th episode on the King Farouk I era under the title of “His Majesty the good King Farouk I” that: “Egypt witnessed the just king, who grew up in the worship of God, whose heart was attached to mosques, from the signs of his keenness for Islam and his adherence to its laws, and his preservation of its rulings, unless it witnessed a long time ago” (Alsayed, 2009: 87). The researcher did not observe any change in the association's stance toward the Nasser regime until the end of the Nasser era.

2.7.5 The RCC Decision to Dissolve the Brotherhood in 1954

On January 15, 1954, the RCC issued a statement that appeared in newspapers under various headlines that focused on distorting the image of the Brotherhood in front of the public and depicting them in the form of traitors to their country, trying to sell it to the colonizers, and hiding their evil deeds behind religion. The newspapers accused the MB of working for British colonialism, overthrowing the regime, forming secret cells to infiltrate the army and police, and exploiting religion for personal ambitions. As it was mentioned in the headlines of the widely spread Egyptian newspapers. “Al-Akhbar” newspaper headlines in 15 January 1954 mentioned: “Muslim Brotherhood solution”, “450 brothers arrested”, “The RCC explains the Brotherhood's contact with the English and their provocation of the Cairo massacre two days ago”, “Intelligence reveals secret Brotherhood cells working to stir up the ranks of the army and police” (Hasan, 2020).

While “Al-Jomhoriah” state newspaper headlines in 15 January 1954 focused at that time on distorting Al-Hudaybi’s image, trying to show him as non-patriotic, and a Traitor to his homeland, mentioning him as follows: “The Murshid is working to overthrow the regime”, “The Murshid forms secret organizations in the army, police, universities and among workers”, “Al-Hudaybi's confession of contacting the English”, “The Murshid takes advantage of the da’wa for his personal ambitions and plots a coup in the name of religion”, “The Murshid and his entourage are negotiating with the British behind the back of the revolution” (Al-Jomhoriah, 1954).

Also, “Al-Jomhoriah” state newspaper headlines in 15 January 1954 focused at that time on distorting Al-Hudaybi’s image, mentioning him as follows: “Al-Hudaybi Approved the Execution of the Plot”, “Al-Hudaybi Reviewed and Approved the Secret Organization’s Plan to Overthrow the Regime”, “Formation of a Secret Apparatus to Carry Out Assassinations”, “Printing Pamphlets to Incite the Overthrow of the Regime”, “Issuing Orders to the Secret Apparatus to Assassinate the President” (Al-Jomhoriah, 1954).

The statement itself consists of a number of main points, deliberately distorting the image of the Brotherhood and accusing them of treason, aiding the occupation and manipulating religion, as previously explained above, which makes the public accept the idea of

arresting the Brotherhood and expelling them from political life, as the statement's most important claims or more clearly accusations were:

- The Brotherhood did not support the revolution from its very beginning and insisted on not issuing a statement of support before the king's departure. This means the MB was not loyal to the so-called "revolution".
- The Murshid asked the RCC to inform him about any action taken by the RCC before it was approved.
- The Brotherhood's attempt to impose its guardianship over the revolution, by requesting participation in the ministries, or the formation of a committee of the Brotherhood's members that would be informed about laws before they are issued for approval.
- The Murshid dismissed Sheikh Al-Baqouri from the MB for accepting the position of Minister of Endowments in the government of the revolution.
- The Murshid's attack on the revolution and its government in the internal and external press and instructing the members to appear as a challenger to the revolution.
- The Murshid issued his orders to fight the "liberation body", incite the people against it, and create occasions to create an atmosphere of rivalry.
- The statement claimed that the Brotherhood communicated with the English and talked with them on national issues, which shows the country as divided.
- In June 1953, it was proven to the Egyptian intelligence that the Brotherhood had begun to develop a plan to infiltrate the army and police and to make a coup against the regime.
- The report claimed that Al-Hudaybi is forming a new PS that owes allegiance to him instead of the old one, which has been led by Al-Sindi from the time of Al-Banna until that time. The statement shows Nasser as a man of peace who tried to solve the problem between the two parties. The researcher previously presented the idea that Nasser was the one who created the problem.
- The statement tried to portray the Brotherhood's students at the university as aggressors against the students of the Liberation Rally, loyal to the RCC, just because they chanted a slogan other than that of the Brotherhood.
- The Brotherhood's Murshid and those around him directed the MB's activity in a direction that harmed the integrity of the homeland and violated the sanctity of religion.
- The MB manipulated for their own purposes and desires and exploited religion to serve their own purposes (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 260-267).

Most of the accusations in the statement indicated that the solid entity of the Brotherhood had not dissolved in the RCC entities, while the RCC was working to achieve that. It seems the Brotherhood dealt with the officers as an independent political entity, not an entity affiliated with them. Some of these accusations don't appear as accusations unless we consider that the independence of the Brotherhood from the officers is a charge in itself. The MB had its independence to nominate its members or not to the cabinet, to negotiate, to speak to the free press, to participate in the government institutions or not, and to participate in the legislative process, taking into account that the foregoing monarchy had a liberal model of governance.

Assuming its validity, we can illustrate the statement claim that the Brotherhood wanted to impose their guardianship on the revolution or the Brotherhood's negotiations with the British. As the research mentioned earlier, the Free Officers arose as a branch of the MB, the members of the Free Officers were members in the MB, and the Brotherhood helped the officers along its path. While at that time there was complete cooperation between the RCC and the MB, which may push the Brotherhood to consider itself as the RCC's partner in ruling, or that the ruling is a shura among them, as in the Islamic module of governance. Therefore, it is normal for Al-Hudaybi or the MB to demand to participate in the legislative process or be informed about laws before they are issued for approval, especially with Parliament suspended.

However, since the officers' movement wanted complete independence in governance, as Hamroush indicated previously, such a request was considered by the officers as an imposition of guardianship. Furthermore, what is expected at that time is for the officers to return to their barracks as soon as possible, and for civil political life to return to its normal state, at a time when the MB was almost the only civilian force remaining on the political scene, meaning that its participation in governance is a normal matter. This claim also applies to what the statement claimed of the Brotherhood's negotiations with the British.

It is also normal for the MB as an organization with a special religious ideology to seek to implement it, which may explain the Murshid's request from the Revolutionary Council to present the laws to the Brotherhood before approval. That is monitored by what was mentioned in the same statement, that the Murshid met Nasser at the beginning

of the revolution, calling him “to implement the provisions of the Qur’an immediately” (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 260; Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 597).

Perhaps the Brotherhood's disagreement on the return of the political parties and the liberal parliamentary life, as mentioned by Naguib, was due to their quest to bypass the liberal secular era in Egypt to inaugurate an Islamic model era. This is evidenced by the aforementioned statement by one of the Brotherhood leaders after his statement rejecting the return of the parties “We call on all Egyptians to follow us in the cause of Islam” (Nagib, 1984: 253).

The statement also accused Al-Hudaybi of forming a new PS that owes allegiance to him instead of the old one. If we take into account the dispute between Al-Hudaybi and Al-Sindi, until Al-Sindi tried to dismiss the Murshid and occupy the general center of the MB, we would find that what Al-Hudaybi did was normal to preserve the MB unity when he changed the structure of the private system. However, what provoked Nasser was that Al-Hudaybi revealed his plan and worked against it.

After Nasser had been able to attract Al-Sindi, and supported him against Al-Hudaybi , which led to a split in the PS and the MB. Al-Hudaybi dismissed Al-Sindi and a new leadership was formed for the PS, headed by those who opposed cooperation with Nasser like Ibrahim Al-Tayeb, Youssef Talaat, Muhammad Al-Farghali, and Al-Sayed Fayez who the statement mentioned his murder. These new leaders tried to do the same and split Nasser’s front, and they succeeded in attracting a number of army and police officers who were affiliated before with the Brotherhood (Hamroush, 1992: 308). While the report blames Al-Hudaybi for the killing of the PS member Eng. Sayed Fayez, the researcher found that Fayez was one of the leaders of the new formation that supports the Murshid against Al-Sindi, which means that the accusation finger in fact points to Nasser.

While this statement addressed the Egyptian masses, including members of the Brotherhood, in an attempt to distort the image of the MB, the officers continued their attempts to attract and dismember the MB members, by addressing the members to separate them from their leaders, claiming that the Murshid didn’t adhere to the true ideology of the MB and contradicted the ideas of the founder, even the officers came to call for returning to Al-Banna's ideas just to violate Al-Hudaybi. Following the

dissolution of the MB and the arrest of its members, Waheed Ramadan, one of the Free Officers, addressed the Liberation Rally, saying that Al-Hudaybi and his men were not from the Brotherhood one day, but were living their Masonic lives under the English colonization. we demand a return to the teachings of Hassan Al-Banna (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 275).

Nasser was trying to shook the MB's confidence in its Murshid, accusing him of notorious Freemasonry, living under colonial rule, and moving away from the true Brotherhood's approach and demanding a return to it, as if the officers were reformists wanting to return to the teachings of the MB founder, Hassan Al-Banna, against those who called him the "Freemason" Hassan Al-Hudaybi. In addition to supporting this claim, Nasser and his comrade Salah Salem visited on February 12, 1954, less than one month after the decision to dissolve the group, visited the tomb of Al-Banna, accompanied by Sheikh Al-Baqouri, the former MB member and minister of endowments, and the brother of Hassan Al-Banna, Abd Al-Rahman Al-Banna, and Saleh Al-Ashmawi, the former debut of the MB. The newspapers published this under the title "The men of the revolution participate in the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the shahid Hassan Al-Banna" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 275).

Nasser was keen to show himself as loyal to Al-Banna and his thoughts, he said "I testify to God that I have been working and working to implement these principles and have perished in them and strive for them" (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 265). Hamroush commented on this, saying that the attempt to attract the masses of the Brotherhood continued through the wing cooperating with the revolution (Hamroush, 1992: 311), while Abdel Halim said that there is no need to comment on this clear maneuver (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 275). Nasser wanted to appear in the image of the defender of Al-Banna and his Islamic ideas in contrast to Al-Hudaybi and his claimed Masonic ideas.

In any case, Mohamed Naguib, the president of Egypt at that time, approved in his memoirs that he did not agree to the Brotherhood's dissolution, did not agree with the statement and had no choice at the time to submit his resignation (Nagib, 1984: 220). On the first of March 1954, a huge demonstration took place in Cairo demanding the return of Naguib to his positions after he was dismissed by Nasser on February 15, as a result,

Naguib returned to all his positions, and the MB members were all released (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 277,279).

On February 15, the newspapers announced the release of Al-Hudaybi and the detained Brotherhood members and was agreed with the Murshid that the group would return to its previous activity and entity without limiting its freedoms, return its confiscated money, branches, and general center, immediately release all detainees, and issue a statement clarifying the truth of the reasons that the RCC considered for the dissolution of the Brotherhood. Moreover, Nasser went to Al-Hudaybi's house and met him as a kind of apology (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 290).

Despite this, Nasser did not abandon his means to deform the Brotherhood's reputation but doubled it. As an example, an Egyptian newspaper rumoured that "Al-Hudaybi begged King Farouk when he met him and conspired against the Egyptians" (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 319). Copeland argued that in Nasser's time, Government-generated propaganda was used effectively to securitize the regime's enemies, or in his words exposing them to bad light, justifying harsh actions against them. For that purpose, the American Ambassador brought to Nasser, Paul Linebarger who had come to Egypt in March 1954 (Al-Sisi, 1987: 75), the leading practitioner of (black) and (grey) propaganda in the west, who showed to the Egyptians how to damage hallowed figures (Copeland, 1969: 100).

Nasser repeatedly arrested Brotherhood youth, especially from the PS, tortured them, and spread lies and slanders against them in the newspapers, while depriving the Brotherhood of responding. Until the General Center was almost empty of young people (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 333). Copeland confirmed that the Nasser regime made a list of trusted and non-trusted foreign and local correspondents giving the former complete freedom and depriving the latter. Censorship became a routine matter, which actually deprived the MB and other regime opponents from responding (Copeland, 1969: 99).

2.7.6 The Agreement of the British Forces' Evacuation from Egypt and the Manshiya Incident

On July 27, 1954, the governments of Egypt and Britain announced their agreement on some topics of a new treaty between the Egyptians and the English, mentioning the English forces evacuation. They agreed that the approval of the treaty would be on October 19, 1954, and a popular celebration would follow. That celebration was the scene of the Manshiya accident (Al-Sisi, 1987: 74). On July 31, a Beirut newspaper published the Murshid's criticism of the agreement. On August 12, 1954, the MB sent to the cabinet Presidency a detailed memorandum criticizing the agreement (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 318-322). In the period after August 1954, the police began besieging Brotherhood's mosques and arresting their sheikhs, and also, arrested a group of military officers in various army units and placed them in the military prison, while the arrest of young people increased (Al-Sisi, 1987: 97). Nasser increased the process of abuse and defamation of the Brotherhood and began to transfer employees from Cairo to other regions to disperse the power of the MB (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 333).

2.7.7 Securitization of the MB in Nasser's Discourse 1954

At the headquarters of the Liberation Rally in Cairo, which is considered an official organization parallel to the MB, on August 21, 1954, during the evacuation negotiations, and within 9 days after the Murshid had sent his memorandum criticizing the agreement, Nasser described the MB as "political merchants", who "wanted to impose their will and guardianship on the revolution" (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 596).

Nasser claimed that "Al-Hudaybi had started negotiations with Evans, the eastern advisor to the British Embassy, in April 1952", meaning that he wanted to complete these negotiations instead of Nasser. Therefore, Nasser concluded that "the Brotherhood's opposition to the agreement resulted from hatred, rancour and deception", not from a real criticism of the treaty (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 596-598). Nasser said: "This is the opposition of hatred, the opposition of demolition, and the opposition of personal interest under the name of religion, under the name of Islam and the name of Muslims, anything this regime will do, they will oppose it because they want to rule" (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 598). Nasser repeated to the Spanish newspaper "La Vanguardia" on September 2, 1954,

his idea that the Brotherhood is working for their personal interest, saying that “the government will not tolerate a disturbance raised to achieve personal interests”, when the newspaper asked him about his position on the MB (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 633).

On September 5, 1954, Nasser delivered a speech at the headquarters of the Liberation Rally in Cairo, the speech focused on distorting Al-Hudaybi's personality and accusing him of making “a secret armed organization to work against the Egyptians”, “working for personal interests”, “partisan fanaticism”, “rapprochement with the king, and remaining silent about corruption” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 644-646).

If we take some excerpts from Nasser's words in this speech. Nasser said “we turned to the Brotherhood on the basis that they were a force raised on righteousness, and we had high hopes for much good to come from this. However, personal ambitions began to take hold, and resentment started to creep into hearts: Why should Gamal Abdel Nasser rule and not Al-Hudaybi?” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 644), Portraying Al-Hudaybi as someone ambitious for power.

Also, Nasser said “I am utterly astonished. Egypt was ruled by Farouk and his entourage, and at that time, Al-Hudaybi was the General Guide of the Brotherhood. He used to go to Abdeen Palace, kiss the king's hand, and, upon leaving, would say: ‘It was a gracious visit to a generous king!’ His congratulations were recorded in the protocol books on all occasions. Yet, we never saw the Brotherhood, under Al-Hudaybi's leadership, fight against Farouk or corruption” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 645), Portraying Al-Hudaybi as someone who was submissive to the king despite his injustice, offering him congratulations and blessings on occasions, and never opposing or standing up to him.

Moreover Nasser said “The Brotherhood has descended into the abyss of vile partisanship and into fighting against the nation and its dignity. They do not attempt to overthrow Farouk, the British, or colonialism; rather, they seek to undermine the Revolution, the very Revolution that freed them from prisons and achieved national pride. All of this is driven by hatred and resentment” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 645), Portraying the Muslim Brotherhood under Al-Hudaybi's leadership as being filled with hatred and animosity toward the homeland, consumed by hateful partisanship. Also, he said “We

will not allow any opportunistic group to dominate us, neither in the name of religion nor in the name of freedom” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 645).

These attacks seem to be usual from Nasser against Al-Hudaybi, as Abbas Al-Sisi, the grand MB member, noted that Nasser worked with all means to remove Al-Hudaybi from his path, and made intense efforts and extensive contacts with Al-Hudaybi’s opponents to get rid of him (Al-Sisi, 1987: 96).

Nasser emphasized the idea that the Brotherhood were working to achieve personal ambitions in governance, and latent hatred in their souls, claiming that they say: “Why does Gamal Abdel Nasser rule and not Al-Hudaybi?”. Nasser begins directing his criticism to the person of Al-Hudaybi, trying to distort MB’s leadership and make him appear greedy for power. Nasser put Al-Hudaybi in the image of the person who was grovelling to King Farouk, kissing his hand, getting close to him, and silent about the corruption of the palace dwellers, who hate the rule of the Egyptians. Nasser tried to provoke Egyptian national sentiment against the MB and repeated the idea of exploiting religion for personal benefits, saying “Should those who govern today be eliminated because they are Egyptians? Why are they spreading this campaign in the name of religion and Qur’an?” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 645).

Nasser emphasized the idea that the MB, led by Al-Hudaybi, is motivated by hatred, and partisan fanaticism, which, according to him, led them to fight the “homeland” and the “revolution” and work against Egyptian nationalism, all under the guise of religion.

Nasser Also accused Al-Hudaybi of creating an armed secret organization directed not towards colonialism or corruption but against the Egyptian people, while he was showing reverence for King Farouk, in violation of Hassan Al-Banna, who created a secret organization to eliminate colonialism and corrupt monarchy, which shakes the Brotherhood’s confidence in the fact that Al-Hudaybi follows Al-Banna’s ideas, or his leadership of the group on the same path as Al-Banna, meaning that Nasser continues his attempts to break up the group from within (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 645).

Nasser accused Al-Hudaybi of “having gone to Syria and Lebanon to fight the Egyptian revolution there” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 646), and accused him of misleading and

deception and called on the people to eliminate him. Nasser said “I will leave to you the deceiver; you are the ones who will destroy him” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 647). Nasser also accused the Brotherhood of being opportunists who exploited the simplicity of the poor, motivated by a lust for rule and control. He also, accused them of “being the enemies of freedom and democracy, covered by the veil of religion” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 643).

In Nasser’s speech on September 20, 1954, his main accusations to the Brotherhood were that they were “enemies of the July 23 revolution”, “followed the methods of old Testament politicians”, “monopolised religion”, “supported tyranny”, “served Zionism and colonialism”, “harmed the country”, “undermined the world’s confidence in the Egyptian revolution and tried to control the armed forces” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 660-662).

Nasser also accused the MB of “trying to form a secret armed apparatus to carry out terrorism”, “aspiring to reach power”, “forming terrorist organizations whose purpose is to overthrow the regime”, and “shedding the blood of the innocents” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 660-662). Again, and again Nasser emphasized that the MB is deceiving people, while full of hatred for the people and their revolution, Nasser said: “After you learned what Al-Hudaybi and the Brotherhood are doing, believing that the revolution is over. I assure you that the revolution is still, no deceiver will stand in front of it, and it will move forward, to end the hidden hatred that fills the hearts of these deceivers” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 660-661).

Nasser claimed that the MB is trying to resurrect the policy of the old parties that destroyed the country and the revolution started to end it, he said: “This group believes that the time is right for them to follow the old methods of politics, and the methods of the parties that demolished us and empowered the colonialists, tyrants and deceivers in us. I tell them in the name of the people that this covenant will never return” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661). Nasser also claimed that the Brotherhood wanted to monopolize religion and speak in its name alone. What creates a kind of tyranny called religious tyranny, saying “As for the monopoly they lead, it is nothing but a form of disbelief and exploitation, and a type of tyranny” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661).

Nasser also accused the Brotherhood of “serving Zionism and colonialism and harming the interests of the nation, whether they knew it or not” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661). Nasser tried to prove this by saying that “Israel Radio and Radio France are only concerned with broadcasting Al-Hudaybi's statements, which undermines the world's confidence in Egypt and its revolution” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661). This part is exactly what Copeland referred to when he mentioned Nasser's black propaganda, as he said that the American propagandist Linebarger showed the Egyptian propagandists how to damage hallowed figures while seeming to praise them (Copeland, 1969: 100). In this case it seems that Israel radio was helping to damage Al-Hudaybi's figure by repeating his words as if he works for their interest.

Nasser also, argued that “the Brotherhood is working to serve their personal interest, which is access to power” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661). For this reason, they appear with two different appearances, or have two faces, one with which they deceive the simple persons in the name of religion and another with which they try to reach governance, which generally frightens the Egyptian masses from joining or supporting them, he said: “The Brotherhood in Egypt follows two policies: an apparent policy in the name of religion, in which the simple and naive are exploited, and a hidden policy to control the armed forces. they created a secret apparatus to carry out terrorist operations. The truth is that they do not seek the religion and the interests of Muslims, but rather their personal interest, which is access to power” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 661).

Nasser here also set some cliches, which the military regime still repeats today, saying that: “The Brotherhood follows the policy of exploiting the simple and the policy of terrorism”, “The Brotherhood are terrorist organizations whose purpose is to overthrow the democratic regime”, “The brothers shed the blood of the Egyptians” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 662).

2.7.8 The Manshiya Incident in Alexandria 26 October 1954

On October 19, 1954, the final evacuation agreement was signed between Egypt and Britain. During Abdel Nasser's speech in Manshiya Square on October 26, 1954, to celebrate the signing, nine bullets were fired at him, and a member of the MB's private system was accused (Hamroush, 1992: 362). Nasser continued his speech saying that

“They assaulted me today; I am accustomed to treachery, the treachery that seeks to shackle you, dominate you, and seize control of your destinies. Let the traitors and the misled know that Gamal Abdel Nasser is not just an individual in this nation. You are all Gamal Abdel Nasser after you have felt pride, after you have felt freedom, and after you have felt dignity” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 745-746). The Egyptian radio and the international radios reported that Nasser had survived an assassination attempt while he was preaching in Alexandria and that the perpetrator had been arrested (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 396).

Considering non-democratic systems, Vuori argued that all societies have *rules*, which are products of their own historical and social contexts. When *security logic and rhetoric* is utilized to legitimate the breaking of these rules, we have a case of securitization (Vuori, 2008). Hamroush believed that the incident was an important turning point in the people's sympathy towards Nasser against the Muslim Brotherhood or the culmination of the security process carried out by Nasser against the Brotherhood. That night, Abdel Nasser toured the streets, while people met him with great enthusiasm. Nasser's companion Salah Salem delivered a speech at the “Alexandria Lawyers Syndicate”, and some of them were moved to tears. Which indicated the public audience's wide acceptance of the securitization process or the success of the process.

This paved the way for Nasser to implement unprecedented and extraordinary measures against the MB. Where Nasser began a campaign of severe pressure against the Muslim Brotherhood movement (Telci, 2022: 202). On that same night, orders were issued to arrest the Muslim Brotherhood members in the largest arrest campaign that Egypt had witnessed until then. In November 1954, the RCC formed a special court under the name of (People's Court), and 6 people accused of planning and carrying out the incident were executed. Al-Hudaybi was sentenced to death, but he was later commuted to a prison sentence. (Hamroush, 1992: 363-4).

While the sources of the MB rejected the fact that the group committed the incident, and considered it a premeditated incident to trap the group into carrying out the campaign of arrests and executions carried out by Nasser to get rid of the group (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 397; Al-Sisi, 1987: 153-207; Abu Shadi, 1987: 195).

While Nasser launched the campaign of arrests, he continued to attack the MB. On October 29, 1954, in the Liberation Rally of Cairo, Nasser launched his attack on the MB, represented in the person of Al-Hudaybi. Nasser repeated the same ideas that he always repeated about Al-Hudaybi and the MB, accusing “armed action against Egyptians”, “hatred”, “terrorism”, “exploiting the simple people”, “exploiting people’s poverty”, “previous grovelling to the former king”, “trading in the name of religion”, “trying to control the government”, and Nasser added that he fights poverty and calls for freedom and pride. And dignity for the Egyptians. He stressed that “the homeland cannot be established in which such a group exists”. This indicated Nasser’s intention to uproot this group and crush it completely (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 769-770).

Nasser claimed that he knew that Al-Hudaybi and his followers were conspiring against him, saying “I knew what Al-Hudaybi's supporters are planning. If you go back a little to the past, to the days before the agreement, you will see that I wasn’t attending public meetings for a simple reason: I knew that Al-Hudaybi was plotting something against Gamal Abdel Nasser and against the brothers of Gamal Abdel Nasser” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 769)

Nasser claimed that Al-Hudaybi had disappeared and declared armed jihad against the revolution and its men, addressing the sentiments of the masses, saying “Al-Hudaybi, in his hiding place, declared jihad. Against the Jews or the English? Rather, against those people who rose on July 23, demanding your goals. There are people waiting on orders from Al-Hudaybi and his associates to carry out assassinations” (Abd El-Nasser, 2014: 769-770).

2.8. The Pattern of the Egyptian Regime’s Securitization Process against the MB During the Nasser Era

In the preceding section, it is observed that during the era of King Farouk, the Muslim Brotherhood was permitted to operate and expand extensively within the Egyptian territory, with some minor security reservations. This was until the organization formed armed militias of volunteers that participated alongside Arab armies in the 1948 war against Zionist gangs in Palestine, causing harm to the interests of Great Britain at that time. Subsequently, the Egyptian government decided to dissolve the Brotherhood, imposing severe sanctions against it, and tarnishing its image in the short term before and

after the dissolution decision. However, within a year, the release of detainees commenced, and the Brotherhood resumed its formation and activities. By the year 1951, the King officially received the new MB leader in a formal reception at the palace. It appears to the researcher that the Brotherhood returned to its previous practices without imposing stringent restrictions, enabling its participation in the formation of the Free Officers and direct involvement in the 1952 coup.

In the period preceding and immediately after the 1952 coup, the MB actively participated alongside the Free Officers in their overthrow of the monarchy. Following the coup, the Brotherhood aligned itself with the Free Officers in a manner that led Nasser to exempt it from the decision to dissolve political parties, allowing the Brotherhood to monopolize the political arena. However, as differences emerged between the Brotherhood and the Revolutionary Command Council over the demand for the implementation of Islamic Sharia, the honeymoon phase between the two entities ended. The last section reveals a systematic securitization process wherein the Nasser regime skilfully framed the MB as a security threat, justifying extraordinary measures and utilizing propaganda to control public perception and support for its actions. This process involved several key elements:

- Identification of the mb as a security threat: Nasser's government strategically framed the MB as a security threat, categorizing the group as an enemy to the state and implying that its activities posed a danger to national security. Nasser employed various strategies, including attempting to incorporate the Brotherhood into a new structure, compelling them to form a diminished-power government, and exacerbating internal rifts within the organization.

Moreover, in Nasser's securitization discourse, he characterized the MB as "political merchants" seeking to impose their will on the revolution illustrating the framing of the MB as a threat to the established order. Accusations of secret armed organizations, negotiations with foreign entities, and accusations of working against the Egyptian people contribute to the securitization narrative. The use of language is notable, with Nasser employing terms like "hatred," "deception," and "personal interest" to depict the Brotherhood's opposition to the evacuation agreement as rooted in ulterior motives. By emphasizing alleged connections with foreign powers and accusing the MB of

undermining the revolution, Nasser constructs a narrative aimed at justifying the subsequent crackdown.

Nasser's attempt to discredit the MB's leadership, particularly Al-Hudaybi, involves accusations of grovelling to the former king, collusion with corruption, and a departure from the ideals of the Brotherhood's founder, Hassan Al-Banna. The narrative aims to erode public support for the MB by framing its leadership as self-serving and inconsistent with the values of the revolution.

The Manshiya incident is presented as a turning point, with Nasser attributing an assassination attempt to a member of the MB. The subsequent arrests and execution of individuals linked to the incident further highlight the escalation of the securitization process. Nasser's speeches, delivered in the aftermath of the incident, reveal a concerted effort to consolidate public opinion against the MB by emphasizing the alleged threats they posed to the revolution, nationalism, and stability.

- **Propaganda and information control:** Propaganda played a pivotal role in the securitization efforts. The regime-controlled information flow through censorship and manipulation of media narratives, shaping public perception to view the Muslim Brotherhood as subversive and undermining the revolutionary ideals of the state.

- **Creation of an “Other”:** The securitization process involved portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as the 'other'—an entity fundamentally opposed to the ideals of the Egyptian state. This facilitated the de-legitimization of the Brotherhood and garnered support for the extraordinary measures taken against them.

- **Exploitation of international allegations:** Nasser's regime leveraged allegations of external collusion involving the MB to further securitize the group. By associating the Brotherhood with foreign interests, the regime sought to reinforce the notion that it was combating not just an internal threat but one with potential foreign backing.

- **Use of extraordinary measures:** Subsequently, a significant number of Egyptians rallied in support of Nasser against the Brotherhood after the Al-Manshiya incident. What showed a successful securitization process justified the implementation of extraordinary security measures against the MB. This included mass arrests, long-term imprisonments

which ended after Nasser's death, and the curtailment of civil liberties under the pretext of safeguarding the nation from an alleged internal threat.

2.9.Conclusion

The relationship between the Egyptian state during the royal era and the Muslim Brotherhood took the pattern of a calm relationship, as the state allowed the MB to spread in the religious and social sphere, while the state and British colonialism, were keen to keep it away and limit its activity in the political sphere. These attempts consisted of suppressing the media voice of the group, banning its official newspaper, distorting its image in the official state media, dealing with its affairs as a security issue through the political police, forming groups similar to it in name but with counter-ideas to attract the masses far away the MB, and even dissolving the group after its participation in the 1948 war against Jewish gangs in Palestine, arresting its members, confiscating its funds, property and headquarters. This was after attacking it through government and party newspapers loyal to it, portraying the group as a terrorist group working in the interests of the occupier or as the greatest danger facing the Egyptian state at that time. The Brotherhood participated in the establishment of the FOM, then participated with it in the military coup in June 1952 against the Egyptian monarchy.

After the coup, the MB acted as a civilian supporter for the RCC, until the dispute occurred between Nasser and the Brotherhood leadership, especially with Al-Hudaybi, the general guide, over the immediate application of Islamic law in Egypt and other issues related to applying the religious ideology of the group in politics. In other words, we can say that the relationship between Nasser and the MB was cooperative until the MB tried to impose its political model in governance, then Nasser began a securitization process against the MB, beginning with attempts to contain the group by dissolving it within the state loyal "liberation rally" and asking the MB to form a puppet government under the full control of the RCC.

Nasser also tried to divide the MB by creating a wedge between the younger generation especially members of the private system PS and the group's leadership in the Guidance Office, with the distortion of the group's image in the official media and pro-state newspapers. Until Nasser reached the ability to dissolve the group, arrest its members,

and confiscate its property under the cover of mass support after the Manshiya incident, in which Nasser claimed that the group tried to assassinate him.

The successful securitization process manifested in the justification for the imposition of extraordinary security measures against the Muslim Brotherhood. This encompassed widespread arrests, protracted incarcerations, a practice that persisted until the demise of Nasser, and the constriction of civil liberties, all ostensibly undertaken in the guise of safeguarding the nation from an asserted internal peril.

The researcher can summarize the Securitization Discourse Key Themes in Nasser's time which succeeded in distorting the MB's image, showing examples of the speech acts in the following table (2.2):

Table (2.2): Nasser Time Securitization Discourse Examples Against the MB

Securitizing actor/ Securitized actor	Context	Key Themes distorting the MB's image	Example of Speech acts
Nasser/MB	August 21, 1954 Liberation Rally Speech	-Political Exploitation - Personal Ambition	"They wanted to impose their will and guardianship on the revolution"
	August 21, 1954 Liberation Rally Speech	- Collusion with Colonial Powers	"Al-Hudaybi had started negotiations with Evans, the British advisor, in April 1952"
	September 5, 1954 Liberation Rally Speech	- Power Ambitions - Submission to Monarchy	"Why should Gamal Abdel Nasser rule and not Al-Hudaybi?" "Al-Hudaybi kissed the king's hand."
	September 20, 1954 Liberation Rally Speech	- Anti-Nationalism - Collusion with Zionism	"They supported tyranny", "served Zionism and colonialism", "Israel Radio broadcasts Al- Hudaybi's statements"

	Manshiya Incident October 26, 1954	- Treason and Assassination	“They assaulted me today... treachery that seeks to dominate you and seize control of your destinies.”
	October 29, 1954 Liberation Rally Speech	- Terrorism - Hatred and Deception	“Al-Hudaybi declared jihad... not against Jews or the English, but against those who demand your goals”
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)/MB	January 15, 1954 Dissolution Statement	- Treason - Collusion with British	“The Brotherhood communicated with the British and provoked the Cairo massacre”
	January 15, 1954 Dissolution Statement	- Manipulation of Religion	“The Murshid takes advantage of the da’wa for his personal ambitions and plots a coup in the name of religion.”
State-Controlled Media/MB	January 15, 1954 Press Coverage of Dissolution	- Character Assassination - Treason	“Al-Hudaybi’s confession of contacting the British.” “The Murshid works to overthrow the regime.”
	After Manshiya Incident	- Public Fear of MB	“The Brotherhood are terrorist organizations whose purpose is to overthrow the democratic regime.”

Also, The researcher can show Nasser's time securitization process audience, the securitizing actors, examples from the objectives of Securitization Discourse and examples of the speech acts in the following table (2.3):

Table (2.3): Nasser Time Securitization Audience Against the MB

Audience	Context	Objective of Securitization Discourse	Examples from the speech acts/securitizing actor
Egyptian General Public (public audience)	Post-1952 Coup and Manshiya Incident	To garner public support for crackdowns on the MB by framing them as traitors, terrorists, and conspirators.	"They assaulted me today... treachery that seeks to dominate you and seize control of your destinies"(Nasser)
	Post-1952 Coup and Manshiya Incident	To incite fear and distrust toward the MB by portraying them as enemies of the revolution and national security.	"The Brotherhood has descended into the abyss of vile partisanship" (Nasser)
Muslim Brotherhood Members (Elite audience)	Internal conflicts within MB and PS disputes	To undermine loyalty toward MB leadership by portraying Al-Hudaybi as corrupt, power-hungry, and submissive.	"Why should Gamal Abdel Nasser rule and not Al-Hudaybi?" (Nasser)
	Internal conflicts within MB and PS disputes	To sow distrust and division within the MB ranks by depicting their leaders as compromised or traitorous.	"Al-Hudaybi kissed the king's hand" (Nasser)
Military and Security Forces (Elite audience)	During the RCC's consolidation of power	To justify purges and reorganization within the military by presenting the MB as a threat to the army's integrity.	"The Brotherhood tried to infiltrate the army and police" (RCC Dissolution Statement,1954)

	During the RCC's consolidation of power	To reinforce the RCC's authority by depicting any MB influence as a dangerous breach of military loyalty.	“Intelligence reveals secret Brotherhood cells working to stir up the ranks of the army and police” (RCC)
Western Powers (international elite audience)	During British Evacuation Negotiations	To discredit the MB by framing them as collaborators with colonial powers seeking to undermine Egypt's independence.	“Al-Hudaybi had started negotiations with Evans, the British advisor” (Nasser)
	During British Evacuation Negotiations	To present the RCC as the legitimate and stable authority defending Egypt from internal threats.	“The Brotherhood communicated with the British and provoked the Cairo massacre” (RCC)
Students and Youth (public audience)	MB vs. Liberation Rally Conflicts	To attract youth to the RCC's cause by portraying the MB as reactionary, manipulative, and anti-revolutionary.	“The Brotherhood’s students at the university attacked the Liberation Rally students” (RCC)
Religious Egyptians (public audience)	General Securitization Discourse	To undermine the MB's religious credibility by accusing them of exploiting Islam for personal gain.	“The Brotherhood uses religion as a cover for their ambitions” (Nasser)
	General Securitization Discourse	To position the RCC as the true defenders of national and Islamic values.	The men of the revolution participate in the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the shahid Hassan Al-Banna (State-Controlled Media)

CHAPTER THREE

DYNAMICS OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE SADAT AND MUBARAK REGIMES

3.1.Introduction

During the Nasserite era, new perceptions and ideas were formed in the Egyptian Islamic movement, the most prominent of which was written by the Islamic intellectual and Quran interpreter Sayyid Qutb, which led to the emergence of new Islamic ideologies alongside with the MB. President Sadat came to power after the death of President Nasser in 1971. Sadat directed Egypt towards the Western camp away from the Nasserist ideology, taking advantage of the growing Islamic awakening in Egyptian society, especially among university students. Where Sadat released the prisoners of the Islamic movement, trailed and imprisoned from the Nasser era, and unleashed Islamic dawah and societal work without restrictions. Nevertheless, the relationship between Sadat and the Brotherhood remained wary, as Sadat refused to give them legal legitimacy by forming an official political party so that the group would remain as far as possible from political action, and the Brotherhood also refused public support for the Egyptian regime.

The MB focused its attention on rebuilding the organization again. However, soon some groups with new ideas that grew in Nasser's prisons began to demand the complete shift of the Egyptian state towards the Islamic ideology of governance, and then soon they managed to assassinate Sadat in 1981 after the latter carried out a wide campaign of arrests that affected many Egyptian figures at the time.

Mubarak assumed power in 1981 following the assassination of Sadat, by armed Islamic groups. It seems that the Brotherhood was keen during that period to distance themselves from the accusation as well as from the revenge of the Egyptian state. At the beginning of the Mubarak era in the eighties, the group showed a degree of flexibility in dealing with the regime, and the regime exchanged a great deal of tolerance for it, but the state also did not allow the group to formally exist in the political arena, and showed it in the state media as a dawah group which is not able to interfere in politics. The group took advantage of the space available to it and was able to expand in professional syndicates, student unions, and parliament, then it rushed to intervene in the political space, which

increased tension between the group and the regime in the 1990s, and the state rushed to suppress the group by distorting its image, widespread arrests among its members, and the use of violence against it, especially in parliamentary elections.

The military trials for civilians belonging to the MB amounted to nine trials which included a number of the MB leaders and cadres. At the beginning of the millennium, the state showed a degree of flexibility with the group as a result of American pressures for democratic transition after the events of September 11, 2001, and the Egyptian state took advantage of the MB card at that time. However, the regime soon returned to its former path, and the tension between it and the MB reached its maximum limits at the end of the decade.

3.2. President Sadat Era (1971-1981)

For most political Islamic movements, the Nasserite model represented an anti-Islamic model. Refaat Sayed Ahmed said that according to the Brotherhood in all their documents, Abdel Nasser was a ruler who was hostile to Islam. Due to the MB Nasser does not possess a correct Islamic vision, but rather a corrupt or even infidel vision sometimes (Ahmed R. S., 2023). In September 1970 Anwar El-Sadat was nominated as the president of Egypt after Nasser's death.

Sadat initiated the formation of a new political and social reality, as Greenwood and Wæver proposed that in authoritarian settings, the military assumes the dual responsibility of safeguarding the nation's borders and overseeing societal control in alignment with the regime's principles. This involves defining acceptable societal groups and activities, as well as identifying those with perceived 'threat profiles' (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

Sadat rejected Nasser's Arab Nationalism and excluded Nasser's government and Soviet military advisers in 1972 (Curtis, 2010: 107), as Sadat strengthened his fist on the Egyptian state by arresting Nasser's pro-Soviet Supporters in his "corrective revolution" in May 1971 (Kepel, 2002: 65).

Instead, Sadat attempted to forge a new alliance with the United States. Washington also was eager to work with Sadat to bring Egypt to the US side in the Cold War and the US policymakers encouraged restoring the Islamic movements in Egypt to help in hindering

the pro-Communists. Helping the growth of the Islamic right in Egypt at the expense of the communist movements pushed the begin of a dramatic expansion of America's power in the Middle East (Dreyfuss, 2005: 147).

According to Abd El-Moneim Abu Al-Fotouh, the head of the "Islamic Group" in the Egyptian universities in the seventies, Sadat decided to hit the communist groups simply, by letting the Islamic groups work without hindrance, also, it is worth saying that he did not put any obstacles in front of others (Tammam H. , 2012: 56).

For that from the very beginning in 1970 Sadat ended the harsh repression of the MB (Ranko, 2012: 68), until In 1974, he released them gradually from prisons and let them return from Nasser-imposed exile in Saudi (Kepel, 2002: 83).

Directly after their release Sadat allowed the MB to engage in public activity without any state interference. Sadat's era was marked by freedom of speech and action, as he did not arrest or summon any of the MB for security investigation, or prevent the distribution of their books or publications (Tammam H. , 2012: 57,73).

Umar Al-Tilmisani, the former general guide of the MB (1973-1986), who was released by Sadat in 1971 began publishing the MB's monthly magazine *Al-Dawa* in 1976 and was permitted some editorial freedom at a time when the rest of the Egyptian press was tightly muzzled (Kepel, 2002: 83). But the relationship between Sadat and the MB seemed to be cautious, as the Brotherhood refused to openly back the regime, not least since Sadat refused to allow it to operate as a political party (Curtis, 2010: 110).

It is worth saying that the MB in the 1970s officially stayed rather apart from the political scene, and officially stuck to the former Murshid Al-Hudaybi's isolationist and apolitical Dawa outlook. The MB focused on two objects. The first was to secure the legal status which had been lost in Nasser's time in 1954, that illegality which was strengthened by Sadat's political party law of 1976, and to rebuild the organization (Zahid, 2010: 89-90).

Al-Tilmisani believed that the MB needed a shift from its traditional focus on spiritual piety to political activism, which indicated a change in the shape and character of the MB allowing it to return as a key political actor. That was done by the rise of a new generation

in the late 1970s and early 1980s who showed a new culture of politics in the MB (Zahid, 2010: 90,92).

Despite that Qutb's ideas began to spread inside the MB beneath its official thoughts. At the same time, various Islamist groups, especially the Jehadi groups, were very much inspired by Qutb, especially his famous book "The Milestones", which inspired them to work for a radical and proximate change in the Egyptian regime. But the paradox is that while Qutb's thoughts towards the use of violence remain ambivalent and controversial, the radical groups began to fully embrace violence until it assassinated Sadat at 1981 (Ranko, 2012: 69-70).

After the 1973 war, Egypt re-established ties with the United States, and then Sadat flew to Jerusalem, splitting the Arab world and opening negotiations with Israel in 1977 (Dreyfuss, 2005: 148), and until that point, the Egyptian government and the Islamic movements were allies (Kepel, 2002: 83). The quiet relationship between Sadat and the MB continued until the start of Sadat's peace project with Israel, as it reached a clash after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 when the Islamic movement launched a huge campaign against it. Al-Tilmisani stated that on the 28th of Ramadan in 1979 at the intellectual meeting of Sadat in Ismailia, Sadat made a torrent of accusations against him, accusing Al-Tilmisani and the Brotherhood of sabotage, collusion, provoking power and sectarian strife (Al-Tilmisani, 2013).

Also, it seems that Western newspapers have spared no effort to launch a campaign against the MB. In an article entitled "This frenzied campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, isn't it time to end?", Al-Tilmisani mentioned in amazement that newspapers such as the New York Times, Science Monitor, and some English, French and communist newspapers aroused the hostility of the Egyptian governments against the MB as if the MB were interfering in the affairs of those countries, in a way that frightened and worried them (Al-Tilmisani, 2012).

On the 2nd of September 1981, With the growing criticism of the regime, Sadat undertook a massive crackdown. About 1500 people from the opposition's different wings were arrested, including political parties, the MB, extremist groups and some individuals. All opposition publications were banned and mosques were placed under the direct

supervision of the government. Islamist's Private mosques were shut down (Cook, 2012: 153). What can give a reason for the wide inspiration by the Qutbi intellectual legacy and the doubt towards liberal democratic concepts inside the MB in the 1980s compared to the increased reliance on Al-Banna thoughts in the 1990s after the regime allowed the MB to participate in politics during the 1980s (Ranko, 2012: 195-196).

The foregoing indicates that Sadat did not target the Islamist groups especially the MB, with a special securitization process, but his era was distinguished by freedom of speech and action for them. Until the clash between all opposition sects and Sadat in 1977, when he imposed security restrictions on all opposition sects, not just the MB.

3.2.1. The Pattern of the Egyptian Regime's Interactions with the MB During the Sadat Era

The transition from the Nasser era to Sadat's presidency marked a notable shift in the political landscape. Sadat distanced himself from Nasser's Arab Nationalism and orchestrated a repositioning of Egypt's alliances, moving away from Soviet influence and towards a closer relationship with the United States. In his efforts to counter communism, Sadat adopted a strategic approach, allowing Islamic movements, including the MB, greater operational freedom. This tactical move aimed to weaken communist influence in Egypt and align with U.S. interests during the Cold War.

During Sadat's era, the MB, which had faced severe repression under Nasser, experienced a change in status. Sadat released Brotherhood members from prison, permitted their return from exile, and allowed them to engage in public activities without interference. This marked a period of relative freedom for the MB, with the organization focusing on rebuilding and securing legal status. Despite the increased liberties, the relationship between the government and the Brotherhood remained cautious. While Sadat granted certain freedoms, the Brotherhood did not openly endorse his regime, especially since Sadat refrained from granting them political party status. During this period, the Brotherhood officially adhered to an isolationist and apolitical stance.

The dynamic between Sadat and the Islamists took a turn after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979. Islamic movements, including the MB, launched a campaign

against the peace treaty, resulting in heightened tension between Sadat and the Brotherhood. The escalating criticism of Sadat's regime triggered a massive crackdown in September 1981. Around 1500 individuals from various opposition groups, including the MB, were arrested. Opposition publications were banned, and mosques, including private ones, were placed under government supervision. The repression during Sadat's later years, coupled with the crackdown in 1981, contributed to a shift in the ideological orientation of Islamic movements.

To summarize the relation the researcher can say that, in a strategic move against communism during the Cold War, Sadat granted increased freedom to the MB, previously suppressed by Nasser. However, their relationship remained cautious. After the 1979 "Egyptian-Israeli" peace treaty, tensions rose between Sadat and the Brotherhood, leading to a crackdown in 1981, altering the ideological stance of Islamic movements in response to increased repression.

3.3. President Hosni Mubarak Era (1981-2011)

The Muslim Brotherhood Wikipedia summarized the relationship between the Mubarak regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, in their view, as the famous game of "cat and mouse", where each side is trying to exhaust the other in a maximum way so that it achieves some gains at the expense of the other ("Ikhwan Wikipedia," 2014/2).

From another point of view, Awadi claimed that since the founding of the MB, the relationship between it and the Egyptian regimes has followed a pattern that usually begins with coexistence ends with confrontation and clash (Al-Awadi, 2009: 67). While Pratt & Rezk claimed that in Mubarak's era, the MB was tolerated, but not legalized. It was allowed to work within the political system, running in the parliamentary and the professional syndicate board elections. As a response to the MB's success and popularity, the state moved to take control over it, deactivate a number of its activities, periodically arrest its members and trial a number of them before military courts (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

Mubarak initiated the formation of a new political and social reality, as Greenwood and Wæver proposed that in authoritarian settings, the military assumes the dual responsibility of safeguarding the nation's borders and overseeing societal control in alignment with the regime's principles. This involves defining acceptable societal groups and activities, as

well as identifying those with perceived 'threat profiles' (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013). Throughout the Mubarak administration, the army was constantly portrayed as the most important institution of Egypt and depicted as the defender of the country and determiner of its destiny (Telci, 2022: 206).

Anani claimed that the Mubarak regime allowed the group a limited degree of political and organizational presence, depending on the circumstances of the regime and its goals at each stage, while the brotherhood has succeeded in exploiting this space in order to strengthen its political and social presence. In the decade of 1980s, the emerging Mubarak regime needed to support its political legitimacy and prove its openness to political currents, allowing the MB to have a limited presence in parliament, while during the 1990s the regime needed to confront the armed Islamic groups, allowing the MB to have a community presence while restricting the group's political work. At the beginning of the millennium, the regime tried to hire the Brotherhood in order to stop the American pressure on it regarding political reform (Al-Anani, 2011).

Ranko divided the stages of the relationship between Mubarak and the Brotherhood into four time periods. In the first period (1981-1987), the MB didn't work as political opposition but presented itself as a wannabe religious affairs and cultural councillor of the state, represented in tiny numbers in the parliament and syndicates. In the second period (1987-1995), the MB expanded its presence in parliament and syndicates and began to act as political opposition.

In response, the state applied legal measures to reduce the MB's growing force and began to soil the MB's image in the media to discredit it in the eyes of the public, including showing a moderately negative image of the MB in the media and portraying it as the enemy of the Egyptian nation, anti-democratic, terroristic and against the Egyptian legal political framework. Despite this, the state didn't succeed in effecting the growing popularity of the MB. In the third period (1995-2000), the state began political exclusion and repression. In the fourth period (2000-2011), the negative image of the MB continued but repression and political exclusion ended, even the MB began to mirror the media image portraying Mubarak's state as the enemy of the nation, anti-democratic and terroristic due to its excessive use of torture and state violence. The MB began to represent

itself as the Savior of the state and the democratic political reformer (Ranko, 2012: 193-197).

3.3.1. The First Period (1981-1987)

Mubarak's first years were characterized by a general atmosphere based on tolerance and reconciliation (Al-Awadi, 2009: 91) and the state showed limited mutual tolerance towards the MB. While Mubarak has adopted a more tolerant style of rule, the basic mechanisms of rule remained the same as under Nasser and Sadat. Also, the central pillars of the rule "the military, the bureaucracy, and the infitah bourgeoisie" remained the same (Ranko, 2012: 78).

The Brotherhood took advantage of that limited tolerance in building and expanding the organization's structure and attempted to obtain state recognition of the group (Al-Awadi, 2009: 91), for doing that the MB promised to work within the political order, not against it. Due to Abu El-ella Madi, a former leading member of the MB and current Head of El-Wasat part, "The MB decided to participate in all democratic institutions, which included professional syndicates, in the 1980s, so that the MB's ideology could reach a far larger and more important faction of society – middle-class professionals – and also to demonstrate the efficiency of the MB in civil activities" (Zahid, 2010: 109). In return, the state allowed the MB to enter the parliament and the civil society institutions and spread a positive image of it in the media, despite that the MB was not granted legality by the state (Ranko, 2012: 75).

The MB were able in these circumstances to gradually expand their activities and organizational structure (Al-Awadi, 2009: 91). At the beginning of his reign, Mubarak assured the rule of law, approved the return of prominent Brotherhood figures such as Mustafa Mashhour to Egypt, and complied with the court's decision to return publications such as "Al-Itisam magazine", "Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami magazine" (Al-Awadi, 2009: 99).

In 1982 Mubarak readmitted most of the opposition press (Ranko, 2012: 76). Mubarak emphasized, through the electoral law in 1983, the partisan culture in political engagement, which prompted the Brotherhood to try to obtain the status of a party to have the ability to participate in the political process under a legal umbrella, unless it was in

the movement's priorities before, especially with Al-Banna's rejection of the party system at the beginning of the movement, and then The interest of the movement in the seventies in organizational reconstruction and widespread, as well as the laws of partisan pluralism that have prohibited the formation of political parties on religious grounds since 1976. The Mubarak regime's refusal to give the MB a right to form a legal political party attempt prompted the Brotherhood to form an alliance with a political party that has an orientation contrary to the group, the Wafd Party, to run in the parliamentary elections (Al-Awadi, 2009: 99-100), which was a brave move, if we consider the severe ideological differences and historical confrontation between the MB and al Wafd party (Zahid, 2010: 98).

The MB and the Parliament Elections

In 1984 parliamentary elections were held, Mubarak's official discourse at that time centered on the importance of partisan pluralism and respect for the law, but the law was restrictive. The election law restricted the opportunity for political participation to recognized political parties, and prevented independent candidates from participating, adding to that the difficult conditions for forming political parties.

The law also stipulated that the parties that want to have representation in Parliament must obtain at least 8% of the votes. While the votes of the parties that did not achieve the percentage went to the party that won the majority, what means they go to the ruling National Democratic Party. The elections led to the victory of the National Democratic Party NDP, led by Mubarak, by obtaining 390 out of 448 total seats, leaving the remaining seats for the opposition. It was believed that the government had manipulated the ballot box to ensure results that favoured the NDP (Al-Awadi, 2009: 127), and ensured a comfortable two-thirds majority for it. The new Wafd party with the MB in an electoral alliance gained 58 out of 448 total seats, 8 of them were assigned to the MB (Zahid, 2010: 97-98).

Another parliament elections were held in 1987. In these elections the MB formed a political alliance with the Al-Amal party and Al-Ahrar party, passing the inferior status that it held in electoral alliance with the Wafd party. The new alliance carried the name “the Islamic Alliance” under the slogan of “Islam is the only solution”. While the alliance gained 56 seats, 36 of them went to the MB, the Wafd party only won 35 seats. That showed the MB’s changing character, willing to cross more ideological barriers, in adding to its growing political weight in Egyptian politics (Zahid, 2010: 100).




Figure (3.1): Number of MB Deputies in the Parliament (1983-1987).

Source: Mohammed Zahid, (2010), *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis*, London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, p.100.

We can say that Mubarak was trying to show a democratic face, but he didn’t run a real democratic state and never believed in it as a good tool of governance in Egypt. In his opinion, Mubarak thought that Egypt still loses mandatory conditions for democracy, which made democracy application in Egypt in his mind a catastrophe. As Mubarak said “Democracy has basic conditions that must not be compromised so as not to become a gateway to the chaos that undermines the order of society, and no minority, no matter how loud its voice and noise, will be able to intimidate the majority or force it to bow to its will” (Wael Khodeiry, 2014)

We can say that the opposition parties in the Mubarak era could contest for power but never gain it, the parliament could be used to ask questions without the right to follow up. Mubarak developed a “divide et impera” strategy for dealing with the Islamists, as he

divided them into “moderate” and “radical”. The MB placed itself on the moderate side as Al-Tilmisani and the MB stated it will work within formal political institutions, not against it (Ranko, 2012: 78-80). The MB was allowed to resume its activities and open its headquarters, and its imprisoned members were released beginning from 1983 till 1987. Despite that the MB’s legal recognition was denied, it wasn’t able to publish its journal or participate in elections in its own right, or under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ranko, 2012: 82).

The MB and the Professional Syndicates

As soon as the MB resumed their activities in 1982 it started to work on professional syndicates as doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and lawyers. The new activists of the Brotherhood, such as Essam El-Erian and Abd El-Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who aspired to run in the elections, promised to provide services to the members of the union and promised to fight financial and administrative corruption (Al-Awadi, 2009: 150).

El-Choubky, the well-known MB commentator, thought that The MB new generation’s previous experience on Campus, by their involvement in student unions during the 1970s, has given them the required experience for that (Zahid, 2010: 113).

In 1984 the MB won 7 of 25 seats in the “Doctors Syndicate’s council”, in 1987 it won 54 out of 61 seats in the “Engineers Syndicate Council” and won seats also in the “Pharmacist syndicate” in 1988. The MB gained a very well reputation in syndicates from addressing corruption and financial mismanagement within them and improving the social services and facilities provided by the syndicates (Ranko, 2012: 84).

In the year 1992, it could be seen clearly that the majority of the Brotherhood in the councils of the professional syndicates of physicians, engineers, lawyers, and pharmacists as in Table 3.1 (Zahid, 2010: 118).

Table (3.1): The Number of Syndicate Council Members.

Syndicate	Number of council members	Number of MB members	Others
Physicians	25	20	5
Engineers	61	45	16
Lawyers	25	18	7
Pharmacists	25	17	8

Source: Mohammed Zahid, (2010), *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, p.118.

Indeed, the Brotherhood succeeded in stopping the misuse of resources, and they were able to achieve large surpluses in the budgets of the professional syndicates that they controlled (Al-Awadi, 2009: 150).

To win over the masses, the Brotherhood worked to offer services such as organizing durable goods exhibitions such as washing machines, refrigerators, and home furnishings. In addition, the Brotherhood put forward their famous health insurance project in the "Medical Syndicate" for the doctors and their families in 1986 and established social clubs.

In the "Engineers Syndicate" the MB also, initiated medical insurance for the engineers and their families, which the number of beneficiaries of the project reached 36% of its 200,000 members, and established social clubs. At the same time, the MB members could organize cooperation between different professional syndicates under their control.

Due to Hamzawy, they could renew the legacy of social Islam. All that was a very successful way to mobilize people to support the policies of the Islamic movement at that time, and it also gave the Brotherhood enormous popularity. This led to the growth of the social contract between the Brotherhood on one side, and the students and professionals

on the other side at a time when this contract between the state and society was eroded (Al-Awadi, 2009: 151-152; Zahid, 2010: 113-114).

Fig. 3.2 shows the MB's growing popularity in the large increase of registered voters, fee-paying members, and the actual number of voters in a time scale of 10 years from (1982-1992) in the “Egyptian Medical Syndicate” (Zahid, 2010: 114).




Fig. (3.2): Voters in the Egyptian Medical Syndicate (1982-1992)

Source: Mohammed Zahid, (2010), *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, p.114.

The MB started to criticize the state on several occasions like upholding the emergency law or spread of corruption, and the state didn't intervene at that time (Ranko, 2012: 85). Until The Brotherhood was able to use the syndicates in the 1990s as spaces for mobilization and activation (Al-Awadi, 2009: 103).

The MB and the Egyptian Universities' Student Unions

The student movements in the seventies represented the main ground for the Islamic groups, which were responsible for the assassination of Sadat, and therefore the university remained subject to strict monitoring procedures. Mubarak maintained Sadat's amendments to the student regulations in 1979, which included the dissolution of the

elected General Union of Egyptian Students, placing students' activities under full monitoring by the faculty members, and legitimizing the presence of security guards inside the university. Because of this, the Brotherhood was not able to resume its activities in universities until Mubarak introduced some reforms (Al-Awadi, 2009: 105-106). With Mubarak's reform of the Student's Union regulations in 1984, and the return of student activity, which Sadat dissolved in 1979.

The activities of the Islamic student movement focused on interaction and friction with students, and the Muslim Brotherhood quickly became the most effective force in universities during the year 1984, and they remained in control of the Student Union in Egyptian universities from the mid-eighties until the late nineties, whether at the level of Cairo and Alexandria universities or universities in the other Egyptian regions (Al-Awadi, 2009: 145).

The MB and the Economic Field

The decline in the role of the state in planning and administration with the gradual liberalization of the economy, and the relative tolerance that characterized Mubarak's time in that period towards the Brotherhood, led to the growth of their role in the economic field (Al-Awadi, 2009: 156).

The MB was also able to develop its own financial projects, while the Egyptian regime did not consider these projects at that time as a threat as the regime may have believed that it could benefit from these projects. Al-Awadi monitors the Brotherhood's participation in the establishment of several investment companies such as the Al-Sharif Company and the Hijaz Investment Company, they also occupied influential positions in a number of Islamic banks such as the International Islamic Bank and Faisal Islamic Bank, whose executive director was occupied at one of its stages by Ahmed Adel Kamal. The Board of Directors of the International Bank for Investment and Development also included Abdul Hamid Al-Ghazali and Khairat Al-Shater, the two influential members of the Guidance Office (Al-Awadi, 2009: 113-116).

The MB also engaged in religious institutions, youth centres, schools and the local community working in social education and welfare work. The MB managed at that time to establish a net of social institutions like private mosques, voluntary organizations like

health clinics and cultural organizations, investment and manufacturing companies, creating an atmosphere of competition with the cultural, religious and service arms of the state (Ranko, 2012: 85).

The state followed *a twofold strategy* towards the MB, it affirmed the nobility of the MB's religious and moral commitment but presented it as unable to deliver in politics. The state strategy was to support the group in the cultural and religious domain as a counterweight to the radicals but to ban its possible rule in politics (Ranko, 2012: 90-91).

The State Narration of the MB's Incapability in Politics

In the first years of Mubarak, the state didn't see the MB as a political threat, so it didn't take serious action in the form of large-scale anti-brotherhood propaganda in the media. The state claimed that the only way to bring development and modernization to Egypt was the secular modern state, while the MB were men of da'wa and they would fail in the domain of politics. This idea could be seen in some articles about the MB around the 1984 parliamentary elections, discussing the electoral alliance between the Brotherhood and the Wafd party on legal technical grounds showing that the alliance is technically defunct (Ranko, 2012: 93-94).

3.3.2. The Second Period (1987-1995)

In the late 1980s, the Egyptian regime gave the security services a prominent role in confronting the Islamists. In 1986, Police General (Zaki Badr), who is famous for his brutality against Islamists, was appointed as interior minister, which was a turning point in the relationship between Islamists and the Egyptian regime. The repressive treatment of Islamists began as a national policy everywhere in all governorates of Egypt (Al-Awadi, 2009: 175).

After the 1978 parliament elections, the NDP deputies began to publicly investigate the MB deputies about some contentious economic issues like Islamic investment companies, the public versus the private sector, and landlord-tenant relations, in order to claim that the MB doesn't have a systematic program, and the famous slogan "Islam is the only solution" is nothing but an illusion (Springborg, 2018: 243). On university campuses. The University's student union elections have witnessed repeated interference, and candidates

have been repeatedly threatened and even physically harmed to prevent them from running in student elections. In 1988, security forces arrested 27 Islamic students during an election campaign at Assiut University, beat them and threatened them with sexual assault (Al-Awadi, 2009: 176).

The statistics of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights indicate a clear decrease in public freedoms in this period. The numbers show the increase in the number of civilians transferred to military courts, especially in 1993, as Figure (3.3) illustrates (Kienle, 1998).




Figure (3.3): The number of civilians tried in military courts.

Source: Eberhard Kienle (1998), More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, *Middle East Journal*, 52(2), pp.219-235.

In 1993 there were at least 10,000 political detainees held under emergency law, and according to some sources amounted to more than 16,000 in 1996 (Kienle, 1998).




Figure (3.4): The Number of Political Detainees

Source: Eberhard Kienle (1998), More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, *Middle East Journal*, 52(2), pp.219-235.

The number of death sentences passed on civilians by military courts, between 1992 and the end of 1996 reached a total of 74 civilians. Shown in Figure 2.5. (Kienle, 1998).




Figure (3.5): The Number of Death Sentences Passed on Civilians by Military Courts (1992-1996).

Source: Eberhard Kienle (1998), More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, *Middle East Journal*, 52(2), pp.219-235.

Also, the state passed in May 1995 new restrictions on the press and publication called the "Press Law", imposing up to 5 years in prison sentences and large payments as a penalty on "publication crimes" such as publishing "false rumours" or "defamations" especially those directed against the state. In one year, 99 editors and journalists had been interrogated or charged (Kienle, 1998).

As a result of the state's brutal security policy, the end of the 1980s witnessed an increase in violence by some Islamic groups against the regime, especially the Jema'ah Islamiya and the Jihad groups. In 1987, armed groups launched operations against public figures such as interior ministers Hassan Abu Pasha and Al-Nabawi Ismail. In 1988, security forces entered the Ain Shams University campus in Cairo and arrested and injured hundreds of students who had gathered to commemorate a religious anniversary, while in 1989, there was an escalation of incidents between the Islamic group and the police, in which knives and grenades were used, resulting in the death and injury of members of both parties. As a result, 8,000 people were arrested and five weapons caches were discovered (Al-Awadi, 2009: 174-175).

As a result of previous state policies against Islamists in general, many groups and public figures have criticized the Egyptian state, including the sheikh of Al-Azhar, "Jad Al-Haq Ali Jad Al-Haq", who issued a long fatwa against the Islamic armed group's manifesto called "the neglected duty" in 1981 calling the Jihad group as Khawarij (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997: 228), supported the state at the beginning, saying that: "Those who commit violence are not Islamists and do not represent Islam. They are criminals who must be punished" But later from 1992 to 1996 Al-Azhar increasingly opposed a wide variety of state policies, and claimed that the state bears the reasons that resulted in the spread of extremism, which forced rely on another institution "Dar Al-Ifta" with its head Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, who was appointed in 1996 as Shaykh of Al-Azhar after dismissing Shaykh Jad Al-Haq (Moustafa, 2000).

The Brotherhood also, objected to the state's policies and has been reluctant to support the state's campaign against armed Islamist groups, and used such incidents in Parliament to demonstrate the violent policies pursued by the regime. From 1987 the confrontation level between the state and the MB raised at the expense of the conciliatory interactions, while the MB was growing to become the biggest political opposition in Egypt, shifting

from portraying itself as a *state counsellor* to being a *political opposition*. especially after its electoral success in 1987 in the parliament and professional syndicates. In this period while the state was applying legal measures, and some more repression. Also, trying to spoil the image of the MB in the media calling them “the enemy of the nation” (Ranko, 2012: 109).

Despite this, the state couldn’t stop the progress that the Brotherhood is making, whether in institutions such as parliament, professional syndicates, or in society. The group continued to win student elections, winning in 1987 the majority of seats in student unions at the Universities of Cairo, Alexandria and Zagazig. In 1988 and 1989, they took control of Mansoura and Al-Azhar universities. The MB continued to provide its services to the masses better than the services provided by the regime what strengthened its social legitimacy (Al-Awadi, 2009: 180). The MB’s provision of Community Services was the direct factor that caused the spread of their call, both at the institutional and community levels. Badr Ghazi, one of the leaders of the MB in the early nineties, says “We did not talk about politics in our campaigns, but focused on the real concerns of people, and salaries, housing and health treatment were the concerns that people were concerned about” (Al-Awadi, 2009: 180).

In 1990 the MB boycotted the parliament elections with other main oppositional forces like Al-Wafd, Al-Amal, and Al-Ahrar calling for a fair parliament election, claiming that they were not consulted on the demanded political reforms and the continual emergency law and that the elections were being held under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior and not the Ministry of Justice (Al-Awadi, 2009: 204). On the other side MB activities reached the peak in the 1990s in the professional syndicates and the student unions, as five of the traditionally important syndicates were under MB control: medicine, engineering, science, pharmacy, and law. But in order not to anger the state, the Brotherhood never tried to win the seat of syndicate chairman.




Figure (3.6): The Number of MB deputies in the parliament (1987-1995).

Source: Annette Ranko (2012), *The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt*, Hamburg: Springer VS, pp.116-117.

The MB began to enlarge its activities and gain more success in parliament and civil society in the 1990s were Egyptian people suffered from three issues that increased the alienation between the people and the state. First of them was a civil war-like circumstance due to mutual violence between the state and some jihadi Islamist groups especially the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya and the Jihad group. Second the decay of freedoms that Mubarak granted in his first years, third the rise of corruption and poverty. Those circumstances gave the MB the chance to succeed in cultivating its political weight (Ranko, 2012: 110).

In the 1980s and the 1990s the MB relied on its grassroots built through syndicates, student unions, schools, and hospitals to raise its political weight, hence sharpening its political opposition against specific policies of the state like the support of the Western intervention in Iraq 1991, and the involvement of the Madrid peace negotiations in 1991. In the 1992 earthquake, the MB seemed more powerful than the state, providing professional help through the Humanitarian Relief Committee of the “Doctors Syndicate” and spreading banners with the slogan (Islam is the only solution), in a time the state couldn’t provide an organized help (Ranko, 2012: 117-118).

In October 1994 the “Medical Syndicate” held a two-day conference on “freedoms and Civil society” by Essam El-Aryan and Abu El-Ella Madi gathering hundreds of activists and intellectuals, even government figures trying to make a consensus on basic rights (Zahid, 2010: 123). The relationship between the MB and the state was further exacerbated when the professional syndicates held a joint meeting at the “Doctor’s Syndicate”, in which the syndicates representatives demanded political demands, most notably the demand that Mubarak give up the presidency of the NDP and cancel the emergency law (Bakri & Ahmed, 2020).

The state decided to suppress the MB’s growing power in syndicates and student unions and to exhaust its economic resources. The state passed “Law 100 of 1993” titled “The law to guarantee democracy in professional syndicates” trying to suppress the MB in the professional syndicate’s elections, due to that law the elections were put under the control of the judges, not under the control of the syndicate board as before it. Also, the election will not be valid until half of the members are present in the first round of elections, and in the second round, one-third of the members must attend. even that didn’t suppress the strength of the MB in the syndicates (The Egyptian Law Publications, 1993).

In accordance with the previous law and various circumstances, the state imposed judicial custody on the “Engineers Syndicate” in 1994, then the “Lawyers Syndicate” in 1995, the “Doctors Syndicate” in Alexandria in 1995, and the “Social Workers Syndicate” in 2008 (Bakri & Ahmed, 2020). In the “Egyptian Universities”; the state tried also to suppress the MB by rejecting candidates from joining student unions in 1992 and 1993 the state rejected about 8000 candidates, until in 1995 the state authorities rejected 55% of the “Cairo University Student Union” candidates (Ranko, 2012: 119).

The state also began to apply preventive measures against the MB like security strikes every six months and arresting MB effective members who may be tortured. The state suppressed the group's economic resources by some measures like closing the computer firm named “Salsabil” owned by Khairat Al-Shater, the well-known MB member, in 1992 (“Ikhwan Wikipedia,” 2014/1).

In 1987 the head of the parliament declared the MB as an illegal organization. While the MB was affirming it was only a peaceful da’wa with non-violent behaviour, The state

argued that the MB was cooperating with violent groups, like the Al-Jihad group, to disseminate civil war in Egypt. In the period of (1987-1995), the state portrayed the MB in its media as “enemies of the nation”, “threat of national security”, “threat of national unity”, and “threat of moderate Islam”, arguing that the group is a new enemy of the Egyptian nation. Mubarak in his speech in May 1990 showed the MB as a minority group trying to change the Egyptian national identity by imposing their view on the majority. He accused the MB of da’wa activities, claiming that the MB recruited Egyptians to join the MB, after a while they joined the violent groups, calling the da’wa activities of the MB “the violence da’wa”. The Press close to the state, such as Rose Al-Youssef magazine said that the MB is the mother of all the radical groups and that they have all drunk from its ideology. Also, the magazine claimed that the MB is turning religion into politics, and politics into violence. Showing the MB as a criminal group, not a political one (Ranko, 2012: 122-125).

3.3.3. The Third Period (1995-2000)

In this period the state continued to suppress the freedoms and rights of the Egyptians, especially the Islamists. Also, the state censorship on media and publications was elevated, the private mosques were subordinated to the Ministry of Awqaf, and the state passed law number 153, elevating control over NGOs (Ranko, 2012: 142). It can be said that 1995 was the peak of the clash when the regime decided to arrest hundreds of the MB of different ages, regions and provinces and transfer some of them to military courts (Al-Awadi, 2009: 237).

The state moved from threat and intimidation to repression. Beginning from January till October 1995, 81 influential MB members were arrested and tried by military courts. In November 1995, 54 of them were judged to prison sentences between 3 and 5 years. By that, the state prevented that high-rank MB members from political activity, not only during their prison time, but also for several years after it due to the Egyptian law (Ranko, 2012: 143-144).

In October 1999 security forces attacked the “Engineers Syndicate” office in the Maadi district in Cairo, where 16 of the professional syndicates activists who were leader members in the MB held a meeting. They were arrested and trailed among military courts

and charged with planning to overthrow the state, belonging to a secret illegal group, and using professional syndicates to undermine state security. In November 2000 a number of them were sentenced to five and three years in prison. According to Rashwan, the former chairman of the “Journalists Syndicate”, and the head of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, that attack was “to prevent the MB from taking an effective part in the next syndicate elections by hindering its activists who enjoy trustiness within syndicate circles”, a huge numbers of MB members were arrested in April 2001 before Shura Council elections (Wickham, 2002: 216).

In 1995 Official estimates indicated that more than 4,000 candidates contested the Assembly’s 444 seats; 439 were from the NDP, 181 from the al Wafd party, 107 from the al Amal party, and 170 from the MB. Polling witnessed an unprecedented level of violence from the security forces, including coercive interference to prevent the political opposition, and the MB in particular, from succeeding at the polls, hundreds of voters were bothered by the security forces, some 60 people were killed and 878 injured in violence outside polling stations (Zahid, 2010: 100-101). It also witnessed a high degree of interference and fraud. In only one Cairo district, called Nasr City, the NDP candidate got more than 10,000 non-existed voters (Kienle, 1998). The result was out of 170 MB candidates they only won 1 seat, even that single Parliament deputy, Essam El-Aryan, was accused of belonging to an illegal group, and his parliament membership was revoked (Zahid, 2010: 102). As shown in Figure (3.7).




Figure (3.7): The Numbers of MB Deputies in the Parliament (1995-2000).

Source: Mohammed Zahid (2010), *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis*, London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, p.102.

Also, in professional syndicates and student unions, the state worked against the MB. The law 100 of 1993 was amended, giving the judges greater powers to intervene in the syndicate board elections, and giving the interior ministry the power to disqualify candidates, especially since the parliament elected in 1995 was intended to nominate Mubarak for a fourth presidential term in 1999, the regime feared that the Brotherhood could hinder Mubarak's candidacy if they with other opposition groups controlled more than a third of the seats. Since that time syndicate elections were often blocked and activities in the syndicates halted. The elections of the most dynamic syndicates, the engineers, the medicals, and the lawyers, were stopped, and the syndicates were placed under governmental supervision (Ranko, 2012: 144-145).

In the university, hundreds of Islamist students were arrested, and blocked from participating in student union elections. For example, in 1998, opposition newspapers reported that security forces had arrested hundreds of Islamists from at least five universities in the run-up to the student elections scheduled for that November (Wickham, 2002: 216).

From 1995 the state put its depiction of the MB as the "enemy of the nation" from period 2 into practice in period 3, the state made huge detentions and military trials and covered it by the media, and showed images of leading Brotherhood members standing in court as criminals and reiterated the charges levelled against them, claiming that the MB turned to a terrorist group, and its leader are just criminals (Ranko, 2012: 146).

That year, the regime arrested 95 high-ranked members of the group, from the directors of administrative offices and departments within the group, and transferred them to trial before military courts, including Essam El-Erian, the former member of the guidance office, Mohammed Habib, a former member of the guidance office and was responsible for the Department of universities staff at the MB, Khairat Al-Shater, a member of the guidance office and manager of the planning department in the group at that time, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, and Mahmoud Ezzat, the current deputy general guide of the Brotherhood and a member of the guidance office (Al-Awadi, 2009: 243). The state also tried to forbid the Islamists' outreach to society, in January 1996 a law passed that all private mosques are placed under the control of the Ministry of Awqaf, and in April 1996 a law prohibited any association from receiving foreign funds (Wickham, 2002: 216).

3.3.4. The Fourth Period (2000-2011)

Anani believes that the relationship between the regime and the Brotherhood in this period can be divided into two phases, the first before the 2005 elections and the second after it. In the first phase, the policy of security prosecution of the MB's leaders continued, as the year 2001 witnessed a military trial known as the "University Professors' Case", in which 16 members were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years. The second stage was marked by many changes, especially after the Brotherhood won about 20% of the seats in the Egyptian parliament, which gave credibility to the Egyptian parliamentary elections and whitened the face of Mubarak's regime regarding the integrity of political competition and freedom of participation (Al-Anani, 2011) , but the struggle for position intensified between the state and the MB.

In this period the state was still portraying the MB as the "enemy of the state". The MB tried to reverse that image claiming that the state is the "actual enemy of the state" with an actual "threat to the Egyptian national security". The MB went beyond that calling the people to defend the nation by peaceful political reform, adjusting itself as responsible for bringing that reform. Once the state finished the violent Islamist groups in the late 1990s, it decided to introduce political liberalization due to the US pressure on it, nevertheless, it couldn't shift much away from repression (Ranko, 2012: 155-156).

While after the 9/11 events, the US managed to boost democratization in the Middle East as a tool to contain terrorism in the region. As a result, Mubarak received pressure to take several steps towards democratic reform. At the same time, a revolution in the world of technology and communication revealed, with increasing accessibility to the internet, the emergence of private TVs. As a result, the state lost its ability to control the media, and the opposition gained more momentum in political life, which gave rise to a wave of vocal critique of the state, all of which benefited the opposition, especially the MB (Ranko, 2012: 157).

Even though the state's portrayal of the MB was offensive in this period, the state continued to describe the group as a threat to national security and predicted the failure of the MB as a political player due to mixing religion with politics. Further than that the state claimed that the MB, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah also possessed a common plan

to destabilize Egypt internally (Ranko, 2012: 173, 177). In the other side the MB used its parliamentary presence to confront the state and present itself as the major force for political reform (“International Crisis Group,” 2008: i).

In 2000 the state gradually released many MB leaders sentenced to jail in the mid-1990s. Also, the regime allowed the Brotherhood to run in parliamentary elections as independent deputies, and the MB had the chance to win 17 seats in the parliamentary elections held in the same year. The elections ran under full judicial supervision, which was thought of as a unique political precedent in Egypt, in analogy to 1 seat in the 1995 parliamentary elections. This enabled the group to win third place in the parliamentary election race after the independent deputies and the National Party, and first place as the biggest opposition group in the parliament (Al-Awadi, 2009: 267-268), also the state allowed the group to re-enter the professional syndicates (Ranko, 2012: 158).

In 2005 parliamentary elections the MB won 88 seats, or 20% of the total seats, despite the interference of the security forces and vote forgery, which provided the MB with a political platform until the last days of Mubarak in 2010. Since that success the state changed its strategy towards the MB, trying to stop it from gaining more area in the Egyptian political life (“International Crisis Group,” 2008: 1). The state ran an excessive number of arrests against the MB members and supporters, sentenced them to long jail periods, imposed travel embargos on its leaders, reduced the group’s public activities, imprisoned the key members under the Emergency law without charges, proceeding leaders and financiers in military courts, blocked the group from participation in next polls, restricted its ability to function in the parliament (“International Crisis Group,” 2008: 8-9,11).

The researcher observes that during this period, the Egyptian regime allowed the establishment of several Salafi satellite channels to counterbalance the expanding activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. One notable example is “Al-Nass TV Channel”, which began its operations in January 2006 (Al-Marefa, 2009). Al-Anani stressed that the Mubarak regime was fighting the MB's activity by allowing Salafist da’wa to spread in society (Al-Anani, 2009). Abu Rumman argued that Salafi movements are often willing to collaborate with Arab governments against their political adversaries, particularly against political Islamic movements. This highlights the dilemma faced by Arab regimes

and governments in utilizing the fatwas and positions of this trend as part of the political game. By granting Salafi movements space to operate in social and religious domains to influence the public, these governments intentionally weaken the capacities and opportunities for political Islamic activism. At the same time, they inadvertently contribute to the entrenchment and strengthening of Salafi movements (Abu Romman, 2010: 247).

By 2006, the United States began to abandon its agenda of political reform in the Arab world, and adopted an agenda of alliance with authoritarian regimes to counter-terrorism, especially after the repeated successes of Islamists in legislative elections (Al-Awadi, 2009: 272). As a result, since 2007 the state has started to legalize the process of political, economic and social exclusion of the group (Al-Awadi, 2009: 266).

To hinder the MB a constitutional amendment in 2007 was done: In article 5 it barred any political activity with religious reference or character. Article 88 severely constrained the judges' supervision of elections. Article 136 gave the president the right to dissolve parliament without a public referendum. This clearly threatened the MB, as their parliamentary bloc could now be dissolved at any time. It reached its peak in the parliamentary elections of November 2010, which it was the most violent elections seen in Mubarak's time, members of all opposition were attacked by security forces or thugs, blocked from entering the polling stations. NDP won 209 seats out of 222 total seats, the MB won only 1 seat (Ranko, 2012: 165-166). As shown in figure 3.8.




Figure (3.8): The Number of MB deputies in the parliament (2000-2010)

Source: Annette Ranko (2012), *The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt*, Hamburg: Springer VS, pp.165-166.

As for the Professional syndicates, the state's cancellation of elections in 1990 resulted in freezing the effectiveness of the Brotherhood in its work, which led to a decline in the role of the syndicates in the Egyptian political movement, as an example we can see that in its ineffectiveness in the parliamentary elections in 2005 or the constitutional amendment in 2007 (Al-Awadi, 2009: 280).

While since 2000, the Brotherhood's influence has increased inside universities, while the cancellation of syndicates elections led to the cooling of the MB's effectiveness, the exclusion of the Brotherhood from participating in student union elections had the opposite result. Where it increased the vitality of the students of the group within the University. In 2005 and 2006, the MB students switched to working directly under the name (Muslim Brotherhood) instead of the name (Islamic Current), as well as their call for the election of a free Students 'Union as an alternative to the University Students' Union, which became controlled by security men and the university administration. The formation of the "Free Students' Union" and "The Free General Union Of Universities Of Egypt" resulted in the increased dismissal of students who participated in the elections regardless of their affiliation. The Brotherhood's students were able to successfully exploit the student movement to support the group in its parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 (Al-Awadi, 2009: 286-288).

The States' Repression Towards the MB (2000-2011)

Many researchers and activists mentioned the tools used by the Mubarak regime to curb the group and weaken it, whether in the social or political arena. Abdel Maksoud, the MB's well-known lawyer, summarized the repressive policies practised by the Mubarak regime towards the Brotherhood, adding some statistics as follows:

- Abuse of the group: members of the group were subjected to arrest and detention outside the framework of the law, which amounted to 32,000 detainees, despite the issuance of more than 62,000 judicial decrees in favour of the group on the acquittal of the accused from the group or their release, and were not implemented.
- Exclusion of Brotherhood candidates: the regime resorted to excluding Brotherhood candidates from all elections in Egypt from the parliament, Shura council, Municipal councils, professional syndicates and student unions.

- Exclusion of MB university students: whether judicial rulings have been issued for Brotherhood students in universities by not dismissing them or including them in the lists of candidates, or their right to housing in university cities, the state continued to arrest the students and exclude the MB students from student unions elections and dismissed from student housing where during the Mubarak era, more than 44 thousand students were subjected to violations in university housing (Afifi, 2012).
- The biggest issue was the so-called "Al-Azhar militia case", in which about 40 leaders of the group were arrested with a number of university students, such as the well-known leader member Khairat Al-Shater, Mohammed Ali Bishr, a university professor and a member of the guidance office, and Hassan Malik, a well-known Brotherhood businessman. About 25 detainees were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 10 years. This led to the depletion of the economic structure of the group through the arrest of a large number of businessmen affiliated with the group, such as Abdul Rahman Saud and Medhat Al-Haddad (Al-Anani, 2011).
- Preventing the leaders of the group from travelling outside the country.
- The seizure of property belonging to Brotherhood members amounting to 800 cars and their destruction, and the closure of more than 1,400 companies belonging to Brotherhood members.
- Exclusion from Jobs: 11,000 were excluded from working in various jobs.
- Depriving the Muslim Brotherhood of compulsory military service. (Afifi, 2012)

Table (3.2): The State's Repression Towards the MB (2000-2011)

issues	amounts
MB members detainees	32,000 persons
Not implemented Judicial rulings in favour of the MB members	62,000 decrees
MB members Companies' closure	1,400 company
Expulsion of MB members from work	11,000 people

MB member's cars seizure and destruction	8,000 cars

Sources: (Al-Anani, 2011; Afifi, 2012)

While the periodic waves of arrests continued, even amongst the influential Brotherhood's leadership The security measures against the group peaked in February and March 2010, when several members of the MB's Guidance Office were jailed. Repressive measures were also taken against the MB's parliamentary staff as they were repeatedly arrested, and tortured (Ranko, 2012: 165).

Al-Anani claims that the relationship between the state and the MB from 1981 to 2006 was summed up in allowing the movement to fulfill its religious and social role in exchange for not threatening the regime politically, but at the end of this period, after the success of the MB in the 2005 parliament the relationship between the Brotherhood and the regime reached a high degree of tension. as it has moved from a political confrontation to something like a zero battle, and the regime followed a comprehensive strategy aimed at isolating the Brotherhood socially and hitting it economically, in preparation for eradicating their political affairs (Al-Anani, 2009). Munib stresses that the Egyptian regime has worked to keep the capabilities of Islamist movements under government control so as not to allow them to overcome the symbols of governance in any political conflict, whether at the level of parliamentary or local administrations elections or in trade unions or universities, and the security strikes played its role in maintaining the size of each of the Islamist opposition within a specific framework that does not exceed it (Moneeb, 2016).

According to Al-Anani, the regime has succeeded in neutralizing the Egyptian people towards the Brotherhood, isolating the group politically and socially, drying up its financial sources, and draining it organizationally at this time. By following a seven-pronged strategy in its battle against the Brotherhood:

- Criminalizing the Brotherhood constitutionally, by amending Article V of the Constitution, which criminalizes political action on a religious basis, to prevent the group from contesting any elections in the future.

- The attempt to freeze the political activity of the movement, and to strike its alliances with other political forces.
- He hit the economic structure of the movement, arresting dozens of businessmen affiliated with the group, whose investments exceed millions of dollars.
- stop the social activity of the group by arresting the heads of administrative offices and its members, stopping the charitable and social activities of the group, and giving space to charities belonging to other religious groups.
- Fighting the MB's da'wa activity by allowing Salafist da'wa to spread in society.
- Besieging the media activity of the group.
- The continuous security pursuit of the group through the arrest of its members and cadres of all levels. (Al-Anani, 2009).

From the MB's point of view, one of the Brotherhood's internal reports, published on the MB's official website "Ikhwanwiki" stated that the regime's strategy towards the movement can be summarized as "Siege and containment as a prelude to encirclement and eradication.", due to the source the state followed a four-pronged strategy against the MB:

- **Legislative and legal instruments:** It is an easy tool in the hands of an undemocratic regime that always has a parliamentary majority. The state began from denying the legitimacy of the movement and criminalizing its activities to the continuous imposition of the emergency law, and the continuous enactment of legislations and laws to confront the movement.
- **The security tool:** The regime has used security policies, as already stated, extensively to hit the Brotherhood movement, and there is no need to repeat here.
- **Communication and advertising tool:** The regime has used all means of communication, including the Press, television, cinema and theatre, as well as the educational system under its control to confront the MB, through a policy of distorting the positive image of the group and leaking an image contrary to it in the collective consciousness of the Egyptian people. The regime also used the policy of "drying up the sources," which means reworking educational and cultural curricula to besiege the symbols of Islamic presence.

- **Dismantling of the MB:** The Mubarak regime bet on the dismantling of the movement and its preoccupation with securing its existence through successive Security strikes. In addition to creating splits and distortions within the body of the movement ("Tkhwan Wikipedia," 2014/2).

There is no doubt that the idea of dissolving and dismantling the MB is still a basic demand of the regime after the 2013 coup, as mentioned by the report of Middle East Eye, which indicated that the death, or rather the killing, of Dr. Morsi, came after threatening him with dire consequences unless he dismantled Muslim Brotherhood (Hearst, 2019).

3.3.5. The Pattern of the Egyptian Regime's Interactions with the MB During the Mubarak Era

From the preceding chapter, the researcher recognised in the analysis that the relationship between Mubarak and the MB evolved from a phase of tolerance and limited cooperation to escalating repression and exclusion. The state's strategies involved a mix of political manoeuvring, suppression, economic measures, and propaganda, while the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated adaptability and resilience in the face of changing political dynamics and international pressures. However, despite the Mubarak regime's implementation of security measures against the Muslim Brotherhood, including the referral of its members to military trials and the exposure of its affiliates to arbitrary arrests, the relationship did not evolve into any form of mass massacres, executions, or extremely prolonged detentions.

The relationship between the Mubarak regime and the Muslim Brotherhood can be divided into four distinct periods. The First Phase (1981-1987) saw Mubarak attempting to present a democratic image while maintaining power. In reality, he adopted a cautious approach without fully embracing democracy. Mubarak categorized Islamists as "moderate" and "radical," positioning the MB as moderate and pledging to work within formal political institutions. The relationship during this phase was characterized by limited mutual tolerance between the state and the MB, coexisting with unchanged fundamental mechanisms of rule. During this period, the MB sought state recognition, expanded its organizational structure, and, despite lacking legal recognition, entered parliament.

The MB formed alliances, gained seats in parliamentary elections, and strategically engaged in professional syndicates and student unions. The group addressed corruption and worked on improving services, resulting in a growing influence. Economic liberalization allowed the MB to expand its economic ventures, participating in investment companies and securing influential positions in Islamic banks. Despite the portrayal of the MB as incapable of political delivery, the state used it to support cultural and religious domains as a counterweight to radicals while limiting its political influence.

During the Mubarak era's second phase (1987-1995), security services played a significant role, leading to increased repression and a national policy against Islamists, notably the MB. Public freedoms decreased, with military courts and press restrictions. Repressive policies sparked violence by Islamic groups, resulting in armed clashes. Political detainees rose, military courts were extensively used, and civilians faced death sentences under emergency law. Opposition figures, including Al-Azhar, criticized state policies, and the MB, despite facing suppression, grew as the largest political opposition, boycotting elections in 1990. The MB's community services strengthened its political weight, focusing on essential concerns. The state responded with measures to suppress the MB economically. The media portrayed the MB as enemies, threats, and sources of radical ideologies. Mubarak framed them as a minority violently changing national identity. This period involved a complex interplay of repression, social outreach, economic suppression, and media manipulation.

In the third phase of the Mubarak era (1995-2000), repression intensified through increased state censorship, media control, and tighter laws. The focus of suppression shifted towards Islamists, particularly the MB, with arrests and military trials peaking, leading to the imprisonment of influential members and hindering political activities. The state undertook measures to suppress the MB in professional syndicates, frequently intervening in elections and blocking syndicate polls.

The 1995 parliamentary elections saw unprecedented violence, coercion, and interference, resulting in reports of fraud, and the MB winning only one seat out of 170. In universities, arrests and the prevention of Islamist students from participating in elections were observed, alongside efforts to curb Islamist influence in academic institutions. Media portrayal persisted, depicting the MB as the "enemy of the nation"

with an emphasis on a narrative of criminality and terrorism. Laws were enacted to place mosques under state control, restrict foreign funds, and limit Islamist outreach in society. This phase was characterized by a systematic and multifaceted approach to suppress the MB, encompassing legal, political, and media dimensions.

In the fourth phase of the Mubarak era (2000-2011), a dynamic interplay characterized distinct phases with shifting dynamics. The state's approach evolved from security prosecution to more repressive strategies, employing constitutional amendments, legal restrictions, and violent elections to exclude the MB.

A systematic effort aimed to erode the MB's influence across social, economic, and political spheres. Internationally, there was a shift in the U.S. stance, initially pressuring for democratization and later aligning with authoritarian regimes, influencing the state's response to the MB. The emergence of technology and increased internet accessibility provided a platform for opposition voices, including the MB, to gain momentum. Despite repression and exclusion, the MB persisted as a resilient force, facing challenges in navigating a changing political landscape. This phase was marked by a complex interplay of domestic and international factors, repressive measures, technological advancements, and the enduring resilience of the MB.

In summary, the relationship between the Mubarak regime and the Muslim Brotherhood spanned four phases. Initially cautious (1981-1987), Mubarak allowed limited tolerance. The second phase (1987-1995) saw increased repression, portraying the Brotherhood as enemies. In the third phase (1995-2000), repression intensified with censorship and legal measures. The fourth phase (2000-2011) featured evolving strategies to exclude the Brotherhood, influenced by international dynamics and technology. Despite enduring repression, the Brotherhood displayed resilience in navigating challenges.

3.4. Conclusion

The analysis of the historical interactions between the Egyptian regime, led by Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a nuanced narrative that underscores the intricate dynamics shaping their relationship. From a scientific standpoint, these observations highlight the intricate interplay of political, socio-

economic, and international factors that have influenced the complex trajectory of state-Islamist interactions.

During the Sadat era, a strategic recalibration of Egypt's alliances away from Soviet influence and towards the United States was evident. The calculated move to grant the Muslim Brotherhood greater operational freedom was positioned as a countermeasure against communism during the Cold War. This geopolitical alignment sheds light on the instrumental role of global considerations in shaping domestic political decisions and the strategic manoeuvres of the state. The shift in the relationship between Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 marks a pivotal moment. The subsequent crackdown on the Brotherhood reflects the delicate balance between national interests, regional dynamics, and the ideological stance of Islamist movements. Scientifically, this dynamic illustrates how external geopolitical events can significantly impact the state's approach to domestic political actors.

The examination of the relationship between Mubarak's regime and the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a predominant reliance on security-oriented measures as the primary modality of engagement. The researcher posits, through analytical scrutiny, that the Mubarak regime acknowledged the impracticality of complete eradication of the group. Rather, it perceived the MB as a necessary moderate Islamic entity in countering the proliferation of extremist movements, particularly jihadist factions, and also to beautify its democratic mask in front of the West within the democratic façade it sought to uphold.

Simultaneously, the MB assumed a multifaceted role, alleviating the Egyptian state of various societal and service responsibilities encompassing health, education, durable goods, necessities, and merchandise. However, despite this cooperative facet, the group concurrently maintained an ideological and Islamic political agenda, actively positioning itself as a political actor whenever opportunities arose. Consequently, the regime aimed to extract maximum social and religious benefits from the group while confining its political manoeuvrability within delimited parameters. The political field witnessed concerted efforts to curtail the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in reciprocal attempts to undermine each other's influence. While the regime pursued a security-centric policy involving

arrests, military trials, violence, electoral manipulations, and legislative measures aimed at stifling the group politically and framing it as a terrorist entity, the Muslim Brotherhood strategically expanded its presence in various spheres such as professional unions, student unions, service activities, municipal councils, sports clubs, and the medical and service sectors. By 2005, the group had secured 20% of the parliamentary seats, underscoring its pervasive influence. Thus, the security process during the Mubarak era vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood primarily sought to politically constrain the group rather than outright eliminate it.



CHAPTER FOUR

THE SECURITIZATION OF THE MB DURING SCAF AND PRESIDENT MORSI'S TIME.

4.1. Introduction

The events surrounding the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath present a compelling case study for examining the intricate dynamics of political transitions, securitization processes, and media influence in the context of a rapidly evolving socio-political landscape. This scientific exploration focuses on key periods, actors, and narratives that shaped the post-revolutionary era, with particular attention to the role played by the SCAF with state and non-state actors, and the media. The 2011 Egyptian Revolution marked a transformative phase characterized by the convergence of diverse social and political movements.

The analysis unfolds chronologically, investigating the evolution of youth movements, the influence of the MB, and the complex relationships with the military. This contextual backdrop sets the stage for understanding the subsequent dynamics, particularly during the tenure of President Mohamed Morsi and the events leading up to the 2013 military coup. The SCAF emerged as a critical player in post-revolutionary governance, navigating complexities alongside the transformative role of the MB. A focus on the SCAF's security measures against the MB between 2011 and 2012 sheds light on the securitization processes during this period. The examination of securitization involves the designation of threats and the legitimization of emergency measures.

Further exploration delves into the media's role in shaping perceptions against President Morsi and the MB. Employing a chronological approach, the study traces the evolution of US media narratives, highlighting the progression from portraying Morsi as politically weak to framing him as anti-democratic and anti-Western. This analysis underscores the influence of media framing on public opinion and historical interpretation, emphasizing the media's role in legitimizing the 2013 coup.

The examination narrows its focus to President Morsi's tenure, detailing the collaboration between state and non-state actors in the securitization process. Wilkinson's concept of

an alternative referent object is invoked, suggesting the emergence of non-state actors as alternative sources of legitimacy. Non-state actors, including youth activists, women's rights advocates, and opposition political parties, played a significant role in designating the MB as a threat.

The chapter expands its scope to include secular securitization actors, such as the National Salvation Front NSF and the Tamarod movement, which opposed President Morsi's presidency. Bassem Youssef's satirical show is identified as a catalyst for amplifying criticism, contributing to the negative portrayal of Morsi and the MB. The interplay between secular forces and the military is examined as tensions escalated, laying the groundwork for the military's eventual intervention. The analysis culminates in an exploration of the 2013 military coup, a critical juncture marked by complex sociopolitical dynamics and strategic securitization processes. The roots of the coup are traced to a calculated securitization process that exploited opportunities strategically, leading to the overthrow of President Morsi.

This scientific examination offers a comprehensive overview of the complex interplay between political actors, securitization processes, and media influence in post-revolutionary Egypt, contributing to a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of political transitions in the region.

4.2.Political Context

The 2011 Egyptian Revolution marked a transformative period in the nation's political landscape, characterized by a convergence of diverse social and political movements. This section delves into the intricate dynamics of this revolutionary epoch, with a particular focus on the role played by the MB and emergent youth movements. Through an exploration of historical events, ideological shifts, and the interplay between key actors, this analysis aims to elucidate the complex interactions that shaped the revolution. Drawing on primary sources and scholarly perspectives, the narrative unfolds in chronological order, elucidating the evolution of youth movements, the influence of the MB, and the intricate relationship between these forces and the military. Additionally, it examines the post-revolutionary fragmentation of youth movements and the nuanced

interactions between political elites, contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

4.2.1 The Youth Movements in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution

As shown in Chapter Two, the MB represented the largest and most organized opposition force during the Mubarak era. The group has continued to lead demonstrations and protests against the Mubarak regime in Egypt, taking advantage of its large spread in Egyptian society and elected state institutions such as parliament, professional syndicates, and student unions. With the beginning of the new millennium, new social movements that transcended ideology emerged, focusing their activities on protest, we can find that the MB participated in their establishment and continuity.

The Egyptian regime at that time faced major challenges from the growing protest networks and youth activism, and couldn't manage the pressure resulting from it especially after it began to work across ideological divisions (Tohamy, 2016: 79). In September 2004 an across-ideologies protest social movement, formed from a mixture of leftists, liberals, Nasserites, and Islamists from the 1970s generation, called "the National Movement for Change" or "*Kefaya*" which means "Enough", was established by the meeting of six public figures from different political spectrums in November 2003. Those figures were the Islamist Abu El-Ela Madi, the Arab nationalist Muhammad Al-Saeed Idris, the MB member Sayed Abdel Sattar, the leftist Ahmed Baha El-Din Shaaban, the Nasserist Amin Iskandar, and the Coptic liberal George Ishaq (Beshara, 2016/1: 243; Telci, 2011).

One of the novelties of this social movement was the methods used in its organizational and operational structures. There was almost no hierarchy within the group that is structured around a leadership. All members applies to the philosophy of the group. Its supporters come from diverging backgrounds from socialist to liberals and from seculars to the Islamists. Members of the group are generally volunteers who dedicate themselves to democracy, human rights and freedom of expression (Telci, 2011).

The movement's demands expanded to include a number of social and political demands. Branches were formed within professional groups such as (Journalists for Change),

(Writers and Artists for Change), (Doctors for Change) and (Students for Change) and raised slogans such as "Enough unemployment", "Enough bribery", and "No inheritance" against the Gamal Mubarak's succession to his father Hosni Mubarak, and "no extension" for Mubarak himself in power. The movement held its activities inside Cairo and was able to expand the geographical area of the protests outside the capital, especially in the city of Suez (Beshara, 2016/1: 245-246).

Also, The Egyptian labor movement actively organized protests intensively since Ahmed Nazif's government implemented its new liberal policies in 2004. Among the most notable was the workers' strike in Mahalla Al-Kubra on April 6, 2008. As soon as the protests began in Tahrir Square, thousands of demonstrators from the labor movement flocked to the square, with labor leaders affirming their decision to support the revolution's protests (Telci, 2014).

Also, another number of protest movements with political, economic and social demands arose, such as (Engineers Against the Guard), (Independence of Universities-March 9th) in 2003, (He Must not Rule *Ma Yhkomshi*), and (The Egyptian Coalition for Change) in 2009. These movements were characterized by the fact that they arose as a result of supra-ideological alliances outside partisan frameworks that relied on direct protest action, and were able to attract a new generation of young activists (Beshara, 2016/1: 247-248). Also, it attracted a large part of the intelligentsia and middle-class professionals who have been classically tied to the state. Figures like ex-Prime Minister Aziz Sedki, ex-Minister Yehia El-Gamal, and a number of columnists in state-owned newspapers became associated with these movements (El-Mahdi, 2009).

Around 2000 during the Palestinian second intifada and the American invasion of Iraq, youth became more struggler, launching political movements to undermine the Mubarak state and dampen its security system (Tohamy, 2016: 79). A few months after Kefaya's first demonstrations, it attracted hundreds of youth whom the movement was their first political action, in two years several branches like "Youth for Change", "Journalists for Change", and "Workers for Change" appeared (El-Mahdi, 2009).

In 2010, several successive events occurred, including the return of Mohamed El-Baradei, the killing of a young called "Khaled Said" by a police officer, then the opening of the

famous Facebook page "We are all Khaled Said" which emerged as a new type of coordination and leadership through the Facebook, gaining the support of 100.000 people in a short period (Telci, 2013), and the rigged parliament elections, which pushed youth protest activity to its peak (Tohamy, 2016: 135). Until the youth movements had the capability to trigger the Egyptian 2011 revolution and became an important part of the political scene (Abd Allah N. , 2016). After the 2011 revolution, the youth movements fragmented into a large number of coalitions rather than uniting (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013), I will also explain it in its historical sequence.

Ezbawy argued that the youth movements contained four circles, the core was a politically conscious youth "Facebook youth", who expanded to include a wider circle of apolitical youth pushed by their social problems, the third and fourth circles were a middle-class who were depressed politically and economically, and marginalized (Ezbawy, 2012).

4.2.2. 25th January 2011 Revolution Incidents

Jamie Allinson argues that revolutions display a common precondition, what John Chalcraft calls "hegemonic contraction" in which support for the existing rulers has fatally narrowed, or what Gramsci's analysis calls "crisis of authority" or "crisis of hegemony" or "general crisis of the state" (Chalcraft, 2016: 36). While from a social perspective, Telci argued that the Egyptian revolution was a societal explosion resulting from the increasing repression of the Mubarak's regime, where the growing oppression and violence against dissenters in recent years signaled an impending societal eruption (Telci, 2013: 262).

It seems that the Mubarak regime at that time began to sense the potential for such a revolution. Consequently, Sisi, who was the director of military intelligence at the time, developed a plan to counter the revolution in case it occur. The Telegraph newspaper said that an Egyptian senior advisor informed that, in 2010 El-Sisi drew a blueprint for the army to seize power in case of the revolution against Mubarak. According to Hassan Nafaa, the army had pre-drawn plans to deal with the 2011 revolution. Nafaa confirmed that the army may have used the revolution to stop the succession of Gamal Mubarak after his Father Hosni Mubarak, or they sacrificed Mubarak instead of sacrificing the whole regime (Spencer, 2014). This is confirmed by the testimony of El-Beltagy, a

prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, that Al-Sisi personally participated in the attempt to expel the demonstrators from Tahrir Square since February 2, 2011, known in the media as the Battle of the Camel Day (Egyptians, 2012).

According to Bishara, the Egyptian regime's efforts to contain the revolution have continued since Mubarak's first speech on February 1, 2011, especially the head of the General Intelligence (GI), Omar Suleiman, and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik (Beshara, 2016/1: 478). This is evidenced by the fact that the army, which allowed the passage of horses, camels and white weapons on February 2 with Mubarak supporters, did not allow aid to enter Tahrir Square, including food and drinks to the revolutioneers (Beshara, 2016/1: 482).

Head of the GI Threatening the Inside and Outside about the Departure of Mubarak

Omar Suleiman who died in July 2012, is considered a pivotal figure in the events, it appears through the extrapolation of the events that he participated in drawing its stream from the first days of the revolution until the end of President Morsi's era, or at least he was fully acquainted with them, as his statements were accurately implemented by the counter-revolution lead by SCAF. Suleiman tried from the first days of the revolution to wrap around it, he said to CNN on February 8, that the Egyptian people do not possess the culture of democracy and threatened the international community that any attempts to implement democracy in Egypt would hand Egypt over to the Islamists (Beshara, 2016/1: 489), at the time that most European leaders feared that the Egyptian revolution, if successful, could lead to a situation like Algeria in 1990, or to an Islamic rule like the Iranian regime. This means there was concern about the possibility of establishing an Islamic regime on the ruins of the Mubarak regime, which might affect the entire Middle East region, with the accompanying repercussions for Europe and Israel (Beshara, 2016/1: 496).

It seems that work has been done to show that threat on the ground. What was actually achieved after that was the formal handing over of authority in Egypt to the Islamists, while the real power remained in the hands of SCAF. The Gulf monarchies have feared the spread of the Arab Spring towards them and rushed to provide financial support for the army coup in 2013 (Shemt, 2013).

Israel was threatened by a number of factors, including the spread of jihadist groups in Sinai, after the security chaos in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, due to the inaction of the police force, during the era of President Morsi (Umara, 2012). Another threat was the strengthening of relations between the Morsi regime and Hamas (Aziz, 2013), and from the famous appeal of President Morsi “We will not leave Gaza alone”, or his appeal “We all yearn for Jerusalem”, following the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2012 (“Learn With Us”, 2014), which may have been considered by Israel as a direct threat, taking into account that the US President Trump declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 (El-Ragoub, 2020).

Likewise, perhaps the fear of some regional powers such as Iran or the great powers over their interests in the region after the famous appeal of President Morsi in July 2013 “*Labbayki ya suriya*” which means “to you, Syria” (Al-Mayyani & Amer, 2013), which was picked up by some pro-SCAF newspapers, and tried to show that Egypt is allowing Islamic militants to cross borders and participate in the Syrian revolution. In October 2012, the pro-army newspaper *Al-Youm Al-Sabea* published an interview with an Egyptian jihadist returning from Syria, describing how volunteers move to fight from Egypt to Syrian territories, and another in November 2011 bearing the same meaning, which indicates the continuous media attempts to deliver threatening messages to the outside world (Abd Al-Gaffar & Gamal, 2012; Nawwar, 2012).

In the time that the revolution was essentially a “leaderless” process (Telci, 2013), Suleiman tried to turn around and gathered 21 small cartoon parties, after real political parties and forces refused dialogue without a clear platform (Beshara, 2016/1: 491), in an attempt to show that there are those who are negotiating to attract real political forces to talk with him. Until February 6, when he was able to meet with a number of political forces, including the Wafd party, the National Assembly, the ruling National Party, the MB, and a number of independent personalities and former ministers. Suleiman was also able that day to hold a parallel meeting of a number of young people affiliated with the revolution (Beshara, 2016/1: 504-505).

Suleiman also repeatedly warned of a military coup if Mubarak's proposals for reform and negotiation were not accepted during the revolution by saying “Dialogue or Coup”. If the military coup meant that the army took control of the government after deposing

the head of the state by force, then what happened was the army's assumption of power after the head of the state relinquished power to the SCAF, which could be called a soft military coup. After the revolution, Suleiman warned against a coup if the MB came to power, which is what actually happened in 2013 (Beshara, 2016/1: 509).

SCAF Interference as a Political Player in the Events of the 2011 Revolution

The police forces withdrew from civilian life since Friday, January 28, 2011, known as the "Friday of Anger", in what appears to be a punitive policy aimed at creating chaos, linking the revolutionary act to it, and pressuring the army to intervene (Beshara, 2016/1: 426).

However, the Minister of the Interior, "Habib Al-Adli", tried in his testimony before the court to attribute the reason for the withdrawal of the police to the negative psychological impact on the policemen after the armed forces came down to the square to participate in the security operation (Beshara, 2016/1: 433). Since that time, the army began to interfere with the events, according to orders issued to it by Mubarak to participate. According to Yahya Al-Jamal, the former deputy prime minister, Mubarak instructed the police and the army to beat the demonstrators, but Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the former Minister of Defense, refused because he was against the succession project (Badawi, 2013).

As an eyewitness to the 2011 revolution in Tahrir Square, based on my observations, I can say that the demonstrators differed about the purpose of the army's intervention, and the position was not clear. There was fear in the Square that the army would strike the peaceful demonstrators, similar to what happened in the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in 1989.

Everyone remained alert, and groups of young began to sit and sleep under the tracks of the tanks to try to Immobilize them if orders came to hit. Amid this atmosphere, unknown people launched the slogan "*The army and the people are one hand*", it was not known whether a certain party launched it, or it was randomly released. What is certain is that the slogan was very popular among the demonstrators, whether they liked or trusted the army or were apprehensive about it, because the slogan represented a kind of protection against their fears of the army's attacks against them and a hope that the army defends them from the police forces and thugs, In other words, the way and circumstances this

sentence was uttered in the square, always when the demonstrators heard army gunshots or tank motors sound with or without movement, affirms that it was a directive illocutionary speech act, not a declarative, aiming to tell the army men that “you and we are one hand, brothers in the homeland, and we are not your enemies, do not think of attacking us”.

It is likely that the army was the one who launched this sentence to create trust and a channel of communication between it and the revolutionaries by portraying itself as a shield of protection, whom the revolutionaries ask for protection against attacks by the police forces or the thugs of the National Party to polish its image in the popular imagination at that time, away from the person of Mubarak, in preparation for replacing him in power¹.

Knowing that the Egyptian army has become a nationalist symbol since the Nasser’s time (Telci, 2022: 206). It seems that Mubarak, who was keen throughout his era to show that he was "the commander of the first air strike in the October 1973 war" wanted to benefit from his affiliation to that national symbol and the popularity that the army showed among the angry crowds, so he visited the Armed Forces Operations Center on January 31, accompanied by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff (Safa Agency, 2011), confirming that in his video speech on February 1 that he is a member of the Armed Forces (Al-Shorouk News, 2011). In conjunction with the Armed Forces statement implementing a soft policy aimed at reassuring the revolutionaries and then dismissing them from Tahrir Square.

On February 1, the armed forces issued a statement confirming that they will not use violence and that they understand the Egyptians' legitimate demands (SCAF, 2011), but on the next day February 2, it allowed thugs carrying white weapons and riding camels and horses to enter the Tahrir square and beat the demonstrators, as it was confirmed by former military persons that orders were issued from the leadership of the Military Council to the army field commanders to allow the thugs to attack the demonstrators in Tahrir Square (“The New Arabi,” 2019), and later investigations revealed that the police secured their arrival to the Square (Negm El-Dean, 2021).

¹ Based on my observations as an eyewitness in the incidents of the 2011 revolution in Tahrir Square.

While the police forces continued to attack the demonstrators as well as the thugs under the eye of the army, according to the report issued by the “25 January Fact-Finding Committee”, which stated that the police used extrajudicial excessive force in confronting the demonstrators, until the death toll reached 840, and the injuries reached thousands. The committee reported that the police fired shots at the demonstrators or sniped from the rooftops of buildings overlooking Tahrir Square, and police armoured cars were seen deliberately hitting the demonstrators, killing and injuring a number of them (Ali, 2011).

In contrary to the police violence, the army showed itself as if it was biased towards the demonstrators, or as a safe haven for the demonstrators against the actions of the police and thugs, to gain the trust of the Egyptian people. Until February 10, when the army announced its so-called statement no.1, Emphasizing its “protection of the people, taking care of their interests and security, out of concern for the safety of the homeland, citizens, and the gains and property of the great people of Egypt, and confirming and supporting the legitimate demands of the people” (Osman, 2015), which was followed in the next day February 11, by the announcement of Suleiman to step down Mubarak, and transferred power from Mubarak to the SCAF (Hassan M. , 2011). Rather, the army was able, in addition to improve its image, to impose itself as a political player, the resultant was that during the 18 days of the revolution, all political forces participated in meetings with the Military Council (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1).

The MB's Interference with the Army in the 2011 Revolution

As the research mentioned in the second chapter, the MB represented the first opposition group to Mubarak’s regime. The MB carried out many and varied activities to show objection to the policies of Mubarak’s regime. It also participated with a number of its influential members in establishing new protest movements like the Kefaya movement. The MB youth also participated with others in the establishment of the youth protest movements.

Since the beginning of the 2011 revolution, members of the MB participated individually in the protests, in addition to the presence of a number of young Brotherhood members as the main engine in the protest movements with other secular movements, the movements send its youth cadres to Tahrir Square to support the demonstrations but keep

their political affiliation unknown (Telci, 2011). It seems that the MB did not want to officially announce its participation since the first day of the events so as not to bear the Egyptian regime's retaliation in case of failure, or so that the regime would not use the scarecrow of terrorism in confronting the protests, especially since the events did not begin as a revolution aimed at changing the regime from its beginning, but rather began as factional demonstrations which had developed as a revolution that wanted to overthrow the system as a whole. The MB's official participation began after January 28, the so-called "Friday of Anger" (Tammam H. , 2011), Which was considered a differentiating day in the modern history of Egypt, in terms of the gathering of huge numbers of demonstrators, the use of extreme violence by the police, then their withdrawal from the streets, the armed forces taking to the streets, and the imposition of a curfew (Ali, 2011).

The MB issued a statement on January 28, blessing what it called "the blessed uprising of the Egyptian people", affirming that what happened is a spontaneous, peaceful, national revolution that rejects injustice and demands freedom and comprehensive reform, and they call for its continuation. In its statement, the group announced joining the masses of the Egyptian people and demanded the abolition of the state of emergency, the dissolution of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, the immediate release of all political detainees, the formation of a transitional government to undertake the peaceful transfer of power, and the formation of a national fact-finding committee into the killings and violence against demonstrators (MB, 2011/4).

We can also notice in the statement that the general guide of the MB, dr. Mohammed Badea, addressed the Egyptian army, saying that the Brotherhood: "Together with the masses of the Egyptian people, salute the Egyptian army, which has an honourable national history, and which certainly has a strategic vision to preserve Egypt's security, protect the people's gains, and achieve their just demands" (MB, 2011/4).

On January 30, the Brotherhood issued a statement reaffirming its support for the revolution and its solidarity with the revolutionaries, condemning the acts of sabotage and spreading chaos in the country, and followed that up by requesting protection from the army for the demonstrators, state institutions, and public and private property. The statement also called on the army to stop the ongoing killings of civilians, braising the men of the armed forces, calling them "the shield and protector of the nation" (MB,

2011/6). Again, the MB issued a statement on January 31, confirming that it is still in the midst of the revolutionary movement that the Egyptian people are carrying out for the purpose of peaceful regime change, which was its first call for all regime change.

It is also noteworthy that the statement again praises the army and considers it "biased towards the Egyptian people" against the regime, and indicates the MB's full confidence in the army men. The statement addresses the army at that time as if it were an independent entity from the regime, saying that the army "will not respond to the regime's attempts to use it against its family, brothers, and people" (MB, 2011/5).

The frequent praise observed in the Brotherhood's statements to the army could have two scenarios, first: the army's presence in the streets replacing the police forces prompted civilian groups such as the MB and others to praise the army and demand protection from the armed police troops, which committed violence and murder against demonstrators, hoping that they would find a safe haven in it. Then the army picked up this thread and was keen to appear in this form. Second: We can note, through the testimonies of many leaders of social movements or political forces in Egypt, that leaders of the army communicated with them during the events, which included requests or urging these groups to take specific positions that the army deemed appropriate for the public interest. Where Major General "Mohammed Al-Assar" was responsible in the Military Council for the file of foreign relations, communication with the media and political forces during the January revolution ("Arabi21," 2020), and this role continued during the transitional period, as he played the role of mediator between the political forces and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Al-Desuqi, 2012).

Through this, the Brotherhood, which represents the largest social movement in Egypt, as well as the most organized political force at that time, had the largest share of the army's contacts with the political forces, which could indicate that the repeated praise of the army in the Brotherhood's statements may have come as a result of a request from the army itself, or its attempt to appear before the MB in this guise to create a good reputation in the minds of the public away from the crumbling Mubarak image. Anyway, that tune helped to improve the army's image and paved the way for the revolutionaries' acceptance of the idea of transferring power from Mubarak to the SCAF. And that was what the SCAF was trying to do. As the former Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Sami

Anan, mentioned in his memoirs that he suggested on January 29 to the minister of defence, a "soft coup" against Mubarak's regime as the only solution for the issue on the ground, his idea was summarized in the formation of a presidential council headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, Minister of Defense, in addition to the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense, then announcing a time table determined to end the crisis and lead the country to safety, of course, after the overthrow of Mubarak (Husaain, 2013).

This required polishing the army's image among the Egyptian people to accept it, specially showing the army as if it is an independent entity from the regime with its own independent decisions which was mentioned above; Which strengthens the idea that leaders from the army worked to contact the MB to negotiate and polish the army's image in front of it, and also, use it to influence the demonstrators. It seems that Mubarak himself was concerned about this step, so he visited the Armed Forces Operations Center on January 31, accompanied by the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of General Intelligence. The visit was broadcast on television, the video showed one of the officers explaining to Mubarak the army's plan to deal with the situation, while Mubarak was giving his orders to the armed forces, which indicates his complete control over the army at the time (Safa Agency, 2011).

From that time also we can see the beginning of the good relations between the MB and the army, or what we can call the honeymoon between the two parties, which continued until the coup against President Morsi.

While the dispute began to emerge early among the Egyptian political elites, in a meeting of what was called at that time the "People's Parliament", which included representatives of a number of opposition political parties and forces on January 30, sharp differences arose that led to the withdrawal of Dr. Muhammad Badea, the MB's general Murshid, and the political activist, Eng. Mamdouh Hamza, and two others. It also refused to include Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a well-known political opponent. It is also noteworthy here that the members agreed to support the demand for Mubarak's departure, but they demanded the formation of a presidential council that included two judges and one of the militaries (Rabea & Soud, 2011). That is, at a time when the chanting in the square was "Down, down military rule" the political elite called to form a presidential council of judges and soldiers, which

indicates the separation of this elite from the street, and also the potential effect of opening the aforementioned channels of communication between the army and the political forces, in demanding the reinstatement of Rotating the military rule of Egypt.

On February 1, the Brotherhood issued a statement in which it clearly repeated its vision of the separation between the army and the regime, as it addressed the army, saying, "our respect to the men of the armed forces who stand with love and sincerity with the Egyptian people, respect their will, and guard their security, property, facilities, and state institutions". while the statement said "We reject all forms of negotiation with the regime, which has lost its legitimacy with its president, parliament, party and government, and it no longer exists in relation to the management of the affairs of the homeland" (MB, 2011/7).

However, the MB returned and participated as part of a delegation of political forces and parties in the dialogue called for by Omar Suleiman, Vice President of the Republic, at the headquarters of the Council of Ministers on February 6, represented by two MB figures, Dr. Muhammed Morsi and Dr. Saad Al-Katatni, in which the MB presented several demands, most notably the resignation of President Mubarak, the abolition of the state of emergency, the dissolution of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, and the formation of a government transitional national (Al-Khatib & Adeeb, The Brotherhood participates in the dialogue and puts forward 8 demands, including stepping down, canceling the emergency, and dissolving Parliament., 2011).

El-Baradei commented on the dialogue, saying, "The dialogue is run by Vice President Suleiman. Everything is run by the army, and this is part of the problem" ("Reuters Staff," 2011), Perhaps the MB's participation came after announcing the standstill of all forms of negotiation with the regime as a result of an invitation from the army because of its excessive confidence in it at the time. After the meeting, the Al-Mehwar satellite channel hosted Al-Katatni to present the results of the dialogue with Suleiman, he seemed fully convinced of the results of the meeting and the gains they achieved, and he stated that they will convey these results to the youth in the Tahrir Square and will work to inform them about its importance, also, he accused some political forces that opposed the negotiation results of working for their own interests, away from the national interest which Suleiman's project fulfil (Seif Eldin, 2012).

Morsi stated that Suleiman's proposals regarding political reforms were insufficient and that the goals of the uprising were Mubarak's departure from his party, government, and security, and perhaps the protests will have to achieve their goals on their own, away from dialogue ("BBC Arabic," 2011). However, the MB announced on the next day, February 7, the reason for its participation in the dialogue, which was to carry the legitimate popular demands to the officials, while continuing the revolution and recognizing the people's right to peaceful demonstration without being attacked until these demands are met (MB, 2011/1).

The MB also, confirmed in a statement on February 9, that "MB When they participated in the round of dialogue, this did not mean at all abandoning the revolution or departing from it, but rather it was for the purpose of expediting the realization of its demands through a peaceful and rapid transfer of power, and it was not for the purpose of legitimizing the regime that the people overthrew" (MB, 2011/2). It seems to the researcher that a disagreement occurred between the leaders of the MB over the results of the dialogue with Suleiman, which led to conflicting statements between Morsi and Katatni, who both attended the negotiations with Suleiman, but the MB decided its position after the complete rejection of the results by the Revolutionaries in Tahrir Square, as well as the general revolutionary mood. As Mearsheimer said " International politics is all about choosing among bad alternatives" (Gita Wirjawan, 2023), Perhaps the Brotherhood leaders decided to open the door for negotiation to obtain the revolutionary demands at a lower cost, especially with the continuing injuries and killings among the demonstrators at that time. In other words, they may have chosen between two bad alternatives trying to choose the least bad one: The first was negotiation with the regime, to try to save the lives of the revolutionaries, and the second was continuing the revolution with paying the cost.

The MB leaders tried the first alternative and then chose the second one when the first failed, as the MB confirmed in their announcement that they attended the negotiation "for the purpose of expediting the realization of its demands through a peaceful and rapid transfer of power". On February 11, Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation from the position of the President of the Republic, with his mandate to the SCAF to run the country's affairs ("Maspero Memo," 2015).

The Brotherhood's relationship with the army during the revolution was characterized by the Brotherhood's trust towards the army. This was indicated by the continuous praise of the army in the MB's statements during the revolution, the depiction of the army as a safety valve for the demonstrators against the police forces and thugs, the Brotherhood's separation between the Mubarak regime and the army in statements, then the MB acceptance of the mandate of the SCAF to run the country's affairs after Mubarak stepped down. This confidence had an impact on polishing the army's image during the revolution, and the revolutionaries' acceptance of the idea of the military council assuming power after Mubarak. The military also took advantage of this confidence to differentiate between the Brotherhood and other political forces in the transitional phase and the period of President Morsi's rule, as will come later.

4.3. SCAF's Era (2011-2012)

Table (4.1): Simplifies Thierry Balzacq's Levels of Analysis for SCAF Era(2011-2012)

Context	Agents				Acts
	Referent Object	Securitizing actor	Securitized actor	Audience	
SCAF era (2011-2012)	Egyptian military regime	SCAF	• MB • Youth Movements • Liberal and secular Parties/Movements	As detailed in table (4.3)	• Rumors • Security Rhetoric • Setting up Nour Party • Butting MB in position against Youth Movements

SCAF initiated the formation of a new political reality, as Greenwood and Wæver proposed that in authoritarian settings, the military assumes the dual responsibility of safeguarding the nation's borders and overseeing societal control in alignment with the regime's principles. This involves defining acceptable societal groups and activities, as well as identifying those with perceived 'threat profiles' (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

In the wake of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the dynamics of political transition were intricately shaped by the interplay between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces SCAF, and the MB. Positioned as a critical juncture in Egypt's history, this period

witnessed the SCAF navigating the complexities of post-revolutionary governance while the MB transformed from a historical opposition force to a key player in the unfolding political landscape. This section aims to unravel the multifaceted security processes enacted by SCAF in response to the MB between 2011 and 2012. Understanding the intricacies of these security measures is pivotal for grasping the securitization process in the evolving socio-political context of post-revolutionary Egypt.

The forces of the revolution did not understand that the battle with the Mubarak regime did not end on the day of his resignation on February 11 but had just begun. At the same time, the SCAF realized the lack of seriousness of the parties, and the disintegration of the youth situation, so self-confidence gradually returned to it, and in less than a year it was able to gather the old regime remnants (Beshara, 2016/2: 62).

Holm argues that Whenever society protests against the policies of the state/regime, the latter is prone to perceive the protest or criticism as a threat to the survival, not only of the regime but also the state. Any political change at the governmental level is therefore to be perceived as entailing the risk of the complete breakdown of the state (Holm, 2004). It seems that the strategy adopted by the Egyptian regime is to weaken the three pillars of the old regime of the ruling party, the security forces and the ruling family, to strengthen the pillar of the army so that it becomes the pillar that holds the state (Beshara, 2016/2: 35). While the head of the regime was absent, the institutional structures and authoritarian structures rooted in the pillars of the Egyptian state did not change (Beshara, 2016/2: 39).

It seems that the intelligence apparatus has begun its work early, the Telegraph newspaper said that an Egyptian senior advisor informed that, in 2010 El-Sisi drew a blueprint for the army to seize power in case of a revolution against Mubarak, and according to Hassan Nafaa that the army had a pre-drawn plans to deal with the 2011 revolution. Nafaa confirmed that the army may have used the revolution to stop the succession of Gamal Mubarak after his Father Hosni Mubarak, or they sacrificed Mubarak instead of sacrificing the whole regime (Spencer, 2014). This is confirmed by the testimony of Mohammed El-Beltagy, a prominent leader of the MB, that Al-Sisi personally participated in the attempt to expel the demonstrators from Tahrir Square since February 2, 2011, known in the media as the Battle of the Camel Day (Egyptians, 2012).

According to Beshara, the Egyptian regime's efforts to contain the revolution have continued since Mubarak's first speech on February 1, 2011, especially the head of General Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik (Beshara, 2016/1: 478).

After the 2011 revolution, the Revolutionary groups divided broadly along four lines: First was the youth who initiated the protests that grew into the revolution, who were fragmented into a large number of coalitions rather than uniting. Second was the traditional right and left political opposition, which were pushed to join anti-regime forces and to accept the leadership of the MB, but wary of its attitude towards secularism and democracy. Third was the Islamic groups, the MB in addition to Salafi groups, mainly the *Alexandria Salafi group* which founded the 'Nour Party', *Gamaa Islamia* which founded the 'Building and Development Party', and other Salafi groups mainly coalited with one of the former parties, Also, the Salafi jihadi group which continued to condemn the democratic process, and founded a number of Armed groups mainly at the Sinai Peninsula. Fourth civil society organizations, NGOs and human rights groups which had grown massively in the previous two decades; although these were initially focused on development issues, they gradually moved onto the central political stage during the revolution (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

4.3.1. SCAF Strategies after the 2011 Revolution

When we are talking about SCAF, we are talking about the army leaders who are educated and trained to think in a warlike way. warfare strategy is intricately linked with the knowledge of an adversary's culture. Understanding one's enemy as a tool to formulate effective warfare strategy became a regular affair by war councils since the Greco-Persian wars, believing that inadequate knowledge of the adversary's culture can result in dire consequences at strategic, tactical and operational levels (Mishra, 2020). Also, Holm argued that when the regime tends to cling to the armed status quo, that results in further erosion of legitimacy, bringing further protests (Holm, 2004).

Therefore, in the Egyptian case, we find that the Military Intelligence (MI) was authorized to deal with revolutionary movements, with the great experience of the Egyptian intelligence services in dealing with Egyptian political movements, whether Islamic or

secular, instead of the direct armed forces, planning a strategy to undermine the revolutionary act to preserve the regime from falling, not because the army is convinced of the revolutionary action, this is evidenced by the fact that the army did not hesitate to use violence against demonstrators during the transitional period when it was in its interest (Beshara, 2016/2: 53).

Fearon illustrates that if players knew each other's levels of resolve, they could, in principle, anticipate the outcomes of escalation and crisis creation (Fearon J. D., 1994). In other words, if the players know each other they can predict their opponent's moves, and the degree of that prediction will be relevant to the degree of the knowledge. On the contrary, while the revolutionary movements were an open book for the Egyptian intelligence services, the youth were not aware of the state apparatus and its components. Likewise, the traditional party forces, which made themselves part of the revolutionary movement in this period, were attracted to the state apparatus, especially the army (Beshara, 2016/2: 46).

Strengthening the Army's Position in the Egyptian Political Arena

After Mubarak stepped down SCAF followed the Greenwood & Wæver argument and worked to restore its political legitimacy, continuing its ordinary function of defining which societal groups and activities are acceptable and which are *a threat* due to the Military State's view (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013). The SCAF claimed that it was holding onto power to maintain stability and secure the revolution, while the youth revolutionaries accused the military of halting the political process (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

SCAF also was able to convince Egypt's allies in the United States that the presence of the armed forces would keep Egypt stable on its international policies and alliances, and it would be possible to avoid any unknown shifts in relations (Beshara, 2016/2: 59). To secure itself SCAF issued a constitutional declaration on February 13, 2011, announcing that the SCAF would manage the affairs of the country, suspending the work of the Egyptian constitution, dissolving the Parliament, and giving itself the right to issue legal decrees, what means that the Council has the executive and legislative power at the same time (SCAF, 2011). Also, SCAF formalized the 'right to intervene' within the

constitution, overruling parliamentary oversight and civilian control over the military (Hashim, 2011). SCAF also was able to avoid any chanting against it by the political forces. Rather, the chant was “The army and the people are one hand” (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1).

SCAF also worked to seize power centres in the Mubarak regime, such as the Military Intelligence’s acquisition of the General Intelligence and State Security Investigations relations with the media, and allowing young people to storm the State Security Apparatus to subjugate the apparatus to it (Beshara, 2016/2: 92,102). Mohamed Mahsoub, an Egyptian politician and former minister of state for parliamentary affairs, argued that breaking into state security was very easy, even though twenty times that number could not break into the military zone in “Abbasiya”, and this came as a result of the clashing of state agencies during the Mubarak era. The military council wanted to break the prestige of the police and show its complete control over the situation so that the police would work under its command after that (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2).

SCAF also tightened the security grip on the people, as did not cancel the precautionary measures inherited from the Mubarak regime, such as the emergency law imposed since 1981, rather, it was expanded to include crimes of disrupting transportation, blocking roads and spreading rumours, which gives the military council the possibility of applying it to demonstrations after it was restricted in 2010 to terrorism and drug crimes (Amnesty International, 2011).

Mahsoub argued that the military council managed everything by using the men of the old regime away from the forces of the revolution. As an example, the head of the National Dialogue Committee was Abdel Aziz Hegazy, the former Prime Minister (1974-1975) during the Sadat era, From the deep state, and everyone agreed to sit with him for dialogue. Also, the National Reconciliation Committee in May 2011, run by Yahya El-Gamal, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and Administrative Development, then “the Committee of the Fifty” after the coup which SCAF called for and selected its participants, where the decision came regarding its formation, and selected figures from the armed forces. The sessions were managed by the men of the deep state, and the results were always a confirmation of the point of view of SCAF, not the goals of the revolution. It didn’t affect the institutions or structures of the old regime but rather preserved it.

According to Mahsoub, the goal of this appears clearly in the provisions of the “Selmi Document” drawn up by the National Reconciliation Committee, including fortifying the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, fortifying the Armed Forces budget from popular oversight, forming the National Council so that it is dominated by military forces, and opening military trials so that any dispute with the military goes to the military courts, and thus in times of dispute, the armed forces are granted judicial control (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/3). The Supreme Constitutional Court also ruled that the “Political Isolation Law” was unconstitutional, allowing men of the old regime to freely compete politically (DW, 2012).

Sharpening the Division Between the Forces of the 2011 Revolution

Clarke argued that the conflicts which have shaped this stage have been waged between groups defined along non-class lines: between Islamists and secularists; Christians, Sunnis, etc. (Clarke, 2017). Mahsoub summarized the SCAF's strategy by distinguishing between the components of the revolution (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1). The army considered itself above the parties, even though it was negotiating as part of the system. This was helped by the rift between the forces that participated in the revolution, which were unable to agree on the principles of democracy and establish a united front against the old regime (Beshara, 2016/2: 18-19). The secular political forces were more willing to ally with the old regime than they were to ally with the Brotherhood (Beshara, 2016/2: 30). The Brotherhood however, in many instances, was on the side of the SCAF arguing that without military-led transition there would be chaos (Telci, 2011).

Indeed, some Islamist forces, hostile to the Brotherhood, allied themselves with the old regime such as the Salafist Nour Party which welcomed the admission of members of the dissolved National Party to its lists for the parliamentary elections (“Al-Jazeera,” 2015/2). SCAF was also able to bring back the men of the former regime by allowing the formation of parties in large numbers (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1). In the end, the majority of the revolutionaries accepted that cooperation with the military establishment was their only option, and that no one should undermine the mutual trust between the Egyptian people and the army, and that antagonizing the military establishment would not be in the interest of the revolution (Beshara, 2016/2: 55).

In contrast to the Nasserist era, as argued by the researcher in the first chapter, the MB was in alignment with the FOM during the events of the 1952 military coup. Furthermore, it actively participated in this coup and subsequently functioned as a civilian protectorate for the nascent regime. Consequently, Nasser exempted the Brotherhood from the decision to dissolve political parties in 1952. During that time, the Brotherhood remained singular in the political arena until disagreements arose with the Revolutionary Command Council led by Nasser. This stands in stark contrast to the events of the 2011 revolution in which the Brotherhood participated against the Mubarak regime.

The military council's response was to open the door widely for the formation of political parties, including the Justice and Development Party affiliated with the MB. However, this time, the Brotherhood was not allowed to monopolize the political stage. On the contrary, other religious parties were permitted to form, serving as stumbling blocks against the Brotherhood, such as the Salafi Nour Party, as detailed in the current chapter. This led to the emergence of ideological conflicts, including the Islamist-secular divide, positioning Islamic parties against secularism. Additionally, there was a reformist-revolutionist divide, pitting reformist currents like the MB against revolutionary youth movements, as elucidated in the following:

Driving a Wedge Between the Revolutionaries and the People

Mayer argued that counter-revolutionaries revolutionize the content of reaction by adopting the methods of revolution: insurrectionary and plebeian, they actively seek a mass base among the declining economic strata (Allinson, 2019). Which can be seen during the transitional period, SCAF began to address the general public and relied on people's concerns about stability, the economic situation, and the security situation (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2).

In March 2011, Field Marshal Tantawi stated that Egypt's economy was on the verge of collapse, that wheat stocks were not enough for a few weeks, that Egypt was losing \$320 million every day, and that there was not enough to pay employees' salaries. At the same time, an unprecedented state of societal chaos and chaos began in Egypt, and acts of bullying, intimidation, and coercive theft appeared, kidnapping girls and young men, car theft, forcing the driver to sign a car sales contract by force, storming homes and shops,

and seizing money and movables (Beshara, 2016/2: 85-86), fearing the people of the continuation of the revolutionary situation and its impact on the scarcity of food. In an attempt to mobilize the people against the apparent momentum demanding change (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2).

Increasing Sectarian Strife Between Muslims and Copts

Also, as Mayer argued that counter-revolutionaries revolutionize the content of reaction by adopting the methods of revolution like insurrectionary. The research can recognize On March 4, 2011, acts of arson and attacks occurred on the Church of the two martyrs in the village of Sol currently in Giza Governorate, and some individuals attacked Copt's homes in the village (Khalil, 2011). As a result, 100,000 Copts, joined by thousands of Muslims, staged a sit-in in front of the radio and television building. "The protesters demanded the rebuilding of the church and its annexes, the formation of a fact-finding committee to investigate the events and hold those involved accountable, the establishment of guarantees to provide protection for Copts and ensure their return to their homes. Paying compensation for the losses suffered by the village's Copts, holding accountable the negligent army commanders who failed to protect the church, and activating citizenship and equality among Egyptians to ensure equality in the practice of religious rites" (Al-Ahram Gate, 2011).

Where the demands show the Copts' complaint that they do not enjoy adequate protection from the state or full citizenship rights. The fingers of blame were pointed at State Security officers and the remnants of the Mubarak regime, as the "January 25 Revolution Youth Coalition" issued a statement on March 9, 2011, in which it accused the State Security officers and the remnants of the regime, and the Brotherhood also accused them of trying to ignite sectarian strife between Muslims and Copts.

Also, a website called "United Copts" said that a former state security detective incited the attack on the church and that two former parliamentarians in the National Party were among the most prominent seditionists (Beshara, 2016/2: 165-166). There were many incidents of mutual violence between Muslims and Copts. On May 7, 2011, at least 11 people were killed and 140 others were wounded in the *Imbaba* neighbourhood in Cairo in an exchange of fire between Muslims and Copts after the news was transmitted about

the detention of a Coptic woman who converted to the Islamic religion and married a Muslim, where clashes broke out. After Salafists gathered in front of Mary Mina Coptic Church (“Al-Jazeera,” 2011).

On October 9, 2011, the police and military police assaulted a large number of Coptic demonstrators, who staged a sit-in in front of the radio and television building in Maspero, against the background of the demolition of an unlicensed church in the village of Marinab, Aswan Governorate, southern Egypt, which resulted in a massacre that claimed the lives of 27 people. Hundreds of Muslim and Christian youth then headed to Tahrir Square, chanting, “Down to the military rule”. While a group of Salafis headed to the square chanting “Islamic, Islamic” and another group of Christian youth set off in a march raising the slogan “I sacrifice for you, O Cross” and Egyptian security forces clashed with both of them. This indicates attempts to ignite sectarian strife between Muslims and Christians by the Egyptian state apparatus, especially with the violent security response to the phenomenon, which led to the killing of 27 Coptic citizens.

The next day, the Egyptian Prime Minister at the time, Essam Sharaf, met with a group of ministers, explaining that there were those who were working to ignite strife between Muslims and Christians to spoil the revolution, he said, “The only beneficiaries are the enemies of the revolution and the enemies of the Egyptian people, both Muslims and Christians. What is happening are not confrontations between Muslims and Christians, but rather attempts to cause chaos and ignite strife in a way that does not befit the people of the country who have been and will continue to be one hand against the forces of sabotage, extremism and extremism” (“The New Arab,” 2017; Telci, 2017).

Kamal Habib also argued that the Salafists' provocation of sectarian strife continued, as he says, "One of their intellectual leaders who owns a bakery in Sharkia comes out to us every day in the press with delusive fatwas about Copts, violence, and others" (Habib, 2012).

Stirring up Differences Between Islamists and Secularists

SCAF's plan required that the MB are given an electoral path because it was ready to mobilize, at the same time it gave the liberal current media channels to speak in because

it was elitist and unable to mobilize. Due to that, the liberal voice became loud on satellite channels and the Islamic voice became loud in the street, and they turned against each other (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1).

The dispute began to intensify between Islamists and secularists with the referendum on constitutional amendments, which ended with the constitutional declaration on March 30, 2011. The Islamists who have great influence in the street wanted elections and then the drafting of the constitution, as they will prevail in the elections and they will be able to draw up a suitable constitution for them. The liberals understand this and want a constitution first, then elections, so they can participate and obtain a constitution that is suitable for their ideology. In the end, the Military Council left this and that behind and created a 62-article constitution away from them (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2). Some political currents began to express their fears of the Brotherhood's control over the legislative body, while the Brotherhood tried to assert that their principle is "participation, not domination". The discussion between the two parties turned into accusations of collusion and receiving American money from one side, and accusations of Wahhabism and attempting to Islamize the revolution on the other side, until the media reached the point of promoting that the Brotherhood and the remnants of the National Party had formed a single front (Beshara, 2016/2: 131,134).

The Egyptians voted 4 times during the military council's rule, and each time the result was in favour of the Islamists, whether the Brotherhood or the Salafists. Until some activists thought that the army and interior ministry were handing the country to the MB ("BBC News," 2012). Bishara argued that co-opting the Brotherhood was a strategy of the SCAF that was hostile to partisanship in general and to the Brotherhood in particular (Beshara, 2016/2: 138). This will also lead to raising the West's fears about the establishment of an Islamic rule on the ruins of Mubarak's rule in the event of the complete removal of the old regime, as well as raising the fears of the Gulf monarchies of the expansion of the Arab Spring revolutions towards them, as well as Israel's fears of the spread of armed jihadist movements in the Sinai Peninsula on the border between it and Egypt, as I mentioned previously.

We can recognize that in incidents like "Mohamed Mahmoud" on 19 November 2011 ("Al-Jazeera," 2013/4), and "The Council of Ministers" the MB Denounced the youth

moves and its revolutionary demands. As SCAF succeeded in putting the MB against the youth. For example, some instances have turned to be famous *visual symbols*, like Videos which showed officers grabbed and stripped female demonstrators, tearing off their Muslim head scarves. In the most infamous case caught on video, a half-dozen soldiers beat a supine woman with batons and ripped off her abaya to reveal a blue bra. Then one of them kicked her in the chest (Kirkpatrick D. , 2011). This pushed Ahmed Maher the leader of the 6 April youth movement, which has been a leading movement in organizing demonstrations and protests since Mubarak's time (Telci, 2011), to say that the MB, in its official and unofficial rhetoric, defended the positions of the army and police against the revolutionaries (Maher, 2017).

This incident once again raised the issue of “virginity tests”, as the army subjected the arrested female activists to a medical tests to confirm their virginity. The Administrative Court had issued its decision that SCAF should stop these practices. A group of revolutionary youth movements also launched the “Military Liars” campaign in an attempt to expose the Military Council's allegations and accuse it of systematic lying by showing video clips in squares and streets. Tensions intensified between the Brotherhood and the youth movements until some skirmishes occurred between them in commemoration of the first anniversary of the 2011 revolution in Tahrir Square in Cairo and Commander Ibrahim Square in Alexandria (Beshara, 2016/2: 212-214).

The dispute also worsened among a number of the MB's youth when representatives of the MB's youth in the Revolutionary Youth Coalition decided to go to Tahrir Square on Friday, May 27, 2011, called “the Second Friday of Rage”, and participate with other political parties and movements, which is the first violation of the MB's official decision not to participate (Saad El-Dein, 2011). After the MB issued a statement on May 25, 2011, in which it praised the role of the armed forces, saying: “The armed forces, led by the Supreme Council, played a prominent role in responding to the legitimate demands of the people and protecting the revolution, as well as submitting to the will of the people and declaring a commitment to a specific date for handing over powers to the people through free and fair elections” (MB, 2011/3). The statement stated that this activity means one of two things: “the first, it is a revolution against the people or their clear majority, and

the second, it is driving a wedge between the people, their armed forces, and their leadership represented in the Supreme Council” (MB, 2011/3).

On May 28, 2011, Mahmoud Hussein, Secretary-General of the Muslim Brotherhood, announced that there were no representatives of the MB in the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, while tension increased between the youth groups and the MB. The coalition considered Hussein’s statements unjustified and incomprehensible, stressing its adherence to the membership of the Brotherhood youth within the executive office of the coalition, and sectors of the group’s youth within its organizational structure and in its various committees based on their desire (Sameka & Al-Wazeri, 2011). The dispute between the youth and the group increased when a number of the MB youth founded “the Egyptian Current Party” in cooperation with a number of youth from other movements. The MB responded by expelling them (Hedia & Fakhri, 2011).

At the same time, Unknown parties used to launch sentences which increased hatred and fear between youth and secular groups on one side and the MB on the other, like "Brotherhood sold us in Muhammad Mahmoud" (“Al-Jazeera,” 2018). Even the US Secretary of State John Kerry repeated sentences like “The Brotherhood stole the revolution” (The San Diego union-tribune, 2013), Other rumours which increased the fears of the secular groups like calling a Friday incident "Friday of Kandahar" which was full of Salafists, where some Jihadi groups raised the Al-Qaida flag (Al-Haddad, 2021), or trying to rumour that the Brotherhood will cancel some kinds of arts in Egypt and so on (Adly, 2013).

At the same time, in 2011 the SCAF's direct rhetoric had been growing harder against Islamists, for example, a senior spokesman stated that the SCAF would not allow a ‘Khomeini to take power’ in Egypt, delegitimizing Islamists in much the same way that the Mubarak regime had done (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013). As Holm argued in the case of Algeria in the 1990s, the more the Islamists gained influence, the more the representatives of the state/regime and the secularized francophone elite responded to their challenge by securitizing the state/regime (Holm, 2004).

That security rhetoric and other acts induced some youth movements later to join the "Tamarod Coalition" like "The 6 April Movement" and "Revolutionary Socialists"

against President Morsi. While liberals would occasionally side with the MB when the issue was the military versus the civilian population (Kirkpatrick D. , 2012).

Stirring up Differences Between Islamists and Each Other

The Salafists also stormed the political scene early on February 15, 2011, when a meeting took place for a number of Salafist leaders warning against violating Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, which stipulates “Islam is the religion of the state, the Arabic language is its official language, and the principles of Islamic law are the main source of legislation” what caused major discussions and disagreements, even though no one spoke about it before, which caused an early dispute between the revolutionary forces (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2). While they stormed the political scene during the constitutional amendments, and pushed for passing it, using religious slogans until Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub, one of the well-known Salafist scholars in Egypt, considered the referendum as if it were a military battle and described it as a “battle of the boxes”, and the approval of the constitutional amendments is considered a “victory for religion” (Al-Khamesy, 2021).

One of the *securitizing acts* was setting up the 'Nour Party' by Alexandria Salafi Dawah, as a non-state securitizing actor, even against its own literature, where it used to disavow political work and its importance, and considered it a departure from the rules of Sharia (Abu Romman, 2010: 246). Indeed, the most prominent sheikh of the Salafi Dawa, Yasser Burhami, explained his point of view on the political parties, saying: “The parties that are based on the principles of secularism, democracy, socialism, communism, and other man-made principles, all of this is ignorant fanaticism and allegiance to the unbelievers and hypocrites, which requires every Muslim to reject it, fight it, and disavow it” (Burhami, 1992).

With the aid of former members of Mubarak`s national party (Al-Jazeera, 2015/2), the Nour Party, the opposing Islamic ideologist to the MB, played as a power balance against the MB in the presumed democratic process (Beshara, 2016/2: 30), which was more clarified in Morsi's Era as the party worked against the Presidency and the MB, finally participated in the 2013 coup as will be shown later.

What most indicates the SCAF's desire to involve Salafists and other Islamists who disagree with the Brotherhood ideology in political life, or even don't believe in political life, is to allow the legal status of members of the Jihad Group and the Islamic Group to be settled, and to remove their names from waiting lists at airports. At the end of March 2011, Lawyer Ibrahim Ali, the lawyer for the Islamic groups, reported that 3,000 Leaders and cadres of the Jihad and Islamic group would enter the country within days after their names had been removed from the arrival lists (Adeeb, 2011).

They were also allowed to establish political parties, such as the "Construction and Development Party" which represents the political arm of the Egyptian Islamic Group, and the "Safety and Development Party," which was founded by a number of former members of the Jihad Group (Habib, 2012). This indicates the Military Council's will to put the differences between Islamic groups on the political table at that time, especially the differences that may arise between Reformist Islamists like the Brotherhood and the jihadist movements, in which the latter may use violence whenever they need it. Mahsoub argues that allowing the establishment of parties in large numbers gave a great deal of freedom, causing a great deal of confusion, as the political forces based on the revolution had major differences between them, thus erupting old disputes. This is what happened in the referendum on the constitution on the 19th of March. It was the beginning of the division, as the people were divided into Islamists and liberals. Funny statements appeared, such as the statement of Hussein Yaqoub, the famous Salafist leader "The Battle of the Boxes". On March 30, the Council stomped on everyone and issued a constitutional declaration without a referendum (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/2).

As a Conclusion, we can note that this era was characterized by the inflaming of sectarian differences between the parties of the 25 January Revolution in favour of SCAF. These disputes were between Muslims and Copts, between Islamists and secularists, and between Islamists and each other. Also, SCAF worked to intimidate the people from the scarcity of food, and allowed security chaos to occur, in an attempt to drive a wedge between the revolutionary forces and the general population. As a result of the struggle between the political forces, the military council began to rule among them, and these forces began to appeal to the military council, instead of wrestling with it (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/3).

The researcher can summarize some key themes of SCAF’S Securitization acts (2011-2012) and its objectives within its context showing examples of securitization speech acts in table (4.2), as follows:

Table (4.2): SCAF Time Securitization Discourse Examples.

securitizing actor	Context	Key Themes	Securitization Objective	Examples from the speech acts
SCAF	Post-2011 Revolution	Stability vs. Chaos	SCAF framed the revolution as leading to social instability and economic collapse, positioning itself as the only force able to restore order.	“Egypt’s economy was on the verge of collapse... wheat stocks were not enough for a few weeks... losing \$320 million every day” (Field Marshal Tantawi)
SCAF	Post-2011 Revolution	Government Legitimacy	Claimed that SCAF was maintaining legitimacy by securing the revolution and ensuring Egypt’s international stability.	“SCAF is in charge to maintain stability and secure the revolution. We will hand over power when Egypt is secure” (SCAF)
SCAF	Post-Revolutionary Political Landscape	Threat of Islamist Rule	SCAF feared the rise of Islamist power, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, framing them as a threat to national security.	“We will not allow a Khomeini to take power’ in Egypt” (SCAF Spokesperson)
SCAF	Post-Revolutionary Political Landscape	Control over Military	SCAF took control over legislative and executive powers through the constitutional declaration, reinforcing military dominance in political life.	“SCAF will manage the affairs of the country and issue legal decrees... We have full legislative and executive control” (Constitutional Declaration, 2011)

SCAF	Sectarian Strife (Muslims vs. Copts)	Dividing Revolutionaries	SCAF allowed sectarian violence between Muslims and Copts to unfold, framing it as a national security issue requiring military intervention.	“What is happening are not confrontations between Muslims and Christians, but rather attempts to cause chaos and ignite strife” (Essam Sharaf)
SCAF	Economic Insecurity	Fear of Scarcity	SCAF emphasized economic chaos, including food and fuel shortages, to justify their continued control over Egypt’s government.	““Egypt's economy was on the verge of collapse” (Field Marshal Tantawi)

The researcher can summarize the **securitization actors** and their targeted **audiences** during SCAF’S time (2011-2012) showing securitization discourse objectives in table (4.3), as follows:

Table (4.3): SCAF Time Securitization Actors and its Targeted Audience.

Securitization Actor	Audience	Securitization Discourse
SCAF	Egyptian General Public (Public audience)	SCAF framed itself as the guardian of stability, presenting itself as the force capable of protecting the revolution.
SCAF	Political Opposition Groups (Elite audience)	SCAF attempted to fragment opposition groups, especially between Islamists (mostly the MB) and secularists.
SCAF	Islamists (Elite audience)	SCAF positioned itself as a moderating force between rival Islamist factions, such as the MB and Salafi movements.
SCAF	Secularists and Liberals (Elite audience)	SCAF played on fears of an Islamist takeover, framing itself as neutral, above the ideological divisions.

Islamist Groups	Secularists (Elite audience)	Islamists like the MB framed secularists as agents of Western influence and anti-revolutionary forces.
Islamist Groups	Civilians and Revolutionary Youth (Public and Elite audience)	Islamists aimed to present their vision of democracy to the broader population, though it conflicted with the youth's goals.
Revolutionary Youth Movements	SCAF	Youth movements depicted the SCAF as the enemy of the revolution, accusing them of seeking to preserve old regime structures.
Revolutionary Youth Movements	Public Audience	Youth groups targeted their rhetoric to mobilize the public, emphasizing the need for revolutionary change.
Western Powers (United States)	Egyptian Government and MB (Elite audience)	The West expressed concerns about the rise of Islamic rule, pressuring SCAF to ensure democratic transition.
Salafi Nour Party	Other Islamist Groups (Elite audience)	The Nour Party acted as a counterbalance to the MB, promoting an alternative vision of Islamic governance.
Coptic Groups	Islamic Groups (Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists) (Elite audience)	Copts were concerned about sectarian violence and advocated for citizenship rights and equal treatment.
Egyptian Security Forces	General Public Audience	The Egyptian security forces were involved in repression against protestors, justifying their actions as a means of national security.

4.4. President Morsi's Era (2012-2013)

Table (4.4): Simplifies Thierry Balzacq’s Levels of Analysis for President Morsi’s Era (2011-2012)

Context	Agents				Acts Examples
	Referent Object	Securitizing actor	Securitized actor	Audience	
President Morsi’s Era (2012-2013)	Egyptian military regime	• SCAF • Non-state actors (.... • Tamarod Movement • Nour Party • National Salvation Front • Secular Opposition • Mubarak-era business elites • Foreign support	MB	As detailed in table (4.6)	• Rumors • Security Rhetoric (army belongs to people alone-army is the guarantor of the country-integral part of people) • Army and state power institutions works against Presidency • Police forces not working in full • Media discourse (Bassem Yousef-TawfiqOkasha...)

It is thought that President Morsi didn’t recognize the wisdom of Carl Schmitt’s hypothesis that politics, in general, is characterized by enmity and exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening others central to political life, and this is the normal rules of politics (McDonald, 2008). Reaching the beginning of this time interval, SCAF succeeded in developing hostility and disharmony between the *reformative* MB and the *revolutionary* youth movements as mentioned in the previous section, even though several revolutionary youth groups, including the 6 April Youth Movement endorsed the Brotherhood leader in the 2012 presidential elections, driven by the aim of preventing the ‘return of the old regime’ (Abd Allah N. , 2016).

Nour Party has begun to work against the MB in the presidential elections, as in the presidential elections in 2012, the party supported the Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim Abu Al-Futouh, which dealt a blow to the chances of the Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi (“BBC News,” 2012). The police forces were refusing to restore in full or to work with the MB’s president. Some senior officers have been waiting, from the

beginning of Morsi's time, for the right time to move against him, some others decided not to be a "tool" for the MB, which was regarded as a terrorist group in Mubarak's times, even intelligence officials advised the activists to take to the streets and challenge Morsi (Al-Sharif & Saleh, 2013).

Aligned with the revolutionary milieu, the predominant media outlets directed their focus towards entities supportive of President Mubarak within both the news media and the judiciary. Concurrently, they shielded intelligence agencies and other security apparatuses from criticism. The discourse surrounding the 'deep state' narrative specifically targeted ostensibly ineffectual individuals or agencies of the former regime, diverting attention away from other influential entities.

In essence, this approach strategically omitted effective components from public scrutiny, facilitating the successful completion of the securitization process that reinstated the old regime. Greenwood and Wæver contend that securitization was overtly evident in the discourse emphasizing "secret information", alluding to a "conspiracy", and highlighting "real and imminent threats". These rhetorical devices played a crucial role in framing the narrative around security concerns, ultimately contributing to the restoration of the old regime.

Simultaneously, the secular opposition actively participated in the securitization process. They posited that President Morsi posed a threat to democracy, citing concerns regarding both his procedural actions and the substantive content of the constitution that he promulgated through these measures. This active engagement by the secular opposition further fuelled the securitization narrative, intertwining concerns about democratic stability with the broader discourse on security (Greenwood & Wæver, 2013).

In the aftermath of the 1952 coup, the observations of the MB members were notable. At that time, Nasser presented the complete formation of the Cabinet while maintaining the RCC to Abd El-Hakim Abdeen, the Secretary-General of the Brotherhood. Abdeen rejected the offer, justifying that sovereignty rights would belong to the RCC rather than the cabinet formed by the Brotherhood. He added that the cabinet, in this manner, would become a tool to confront people with decisions of the RCC, potentially conflicting with the interests of citizens. This would lead to public resentment against the Brotherhood.

Therefore, Abdeen advocated first for the dissolution of the Revolutionary Leadership Council. Abdul-Haleem argued that this step was taken due to Nasser's observation that dissolving the MB during the royal era didn't stop it, whereas it gained the people's love and sympathy. But this time, Nasser wanted to dissolve it after planting hatred towards it in the hearts of the people (Abd El-Haleem M. , 1994/3: 177-178).

This pattern repeated itself in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution when President Morsi assumed the presidency while the authority remained in the hands of the SCAF. Through a successful securitization operation, SCAF managed to tarnish the image of the Brotherhood and generate a suitable level of societal animosity towards it in Egyptian society. This led to the Egyptian people's acceptance of harsh security measures against the Brotherhood in the aftermath of the 2013 coup, as will be detailed in this section.

4.4.1. The Role of Non-State Securitization Actors in the Process

El-Sisi reported that he was acting in cooperation with certain political and social figures, referring to the coalition of opposition political parties, youth movements and other groups as well as the Coptic Church and Al-Azhar, who sided with the army in removing Morsi (Pratt & Rezk, 2019), Clarifying that state and non-state actors were cooperating with the army in the securitization process.

The Copenhagen School focused on the role of official elites in designating “the threat”. According to Vuori's argument, in non-democratic states, the audience for securitization efforts might consist of the power elite or a group of fundamentalists. Within this model, it is essential that the audience possesses the capacity to enable the securitizing actor to achieve their objectives through the process of securitization (Vuori, 2008).

Wilkinson argued that the creation of an alternative referent object is particularly welcome in the case of situations where states lack legitimacy and non-state actors consequently have greater potential to act as alternative loci of legitimacy (Wilkinson, 2007). Pratt & Rezk argued that the major actors in designating MB as a threat were non-state actors in civil society who finally coalesced around the ‘Tamarod’ campaign. The non-state actors were youth activists, women’s rights and human rights advocates,

opposition political parties, artists, journalists, writers and media personalities (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

While Gary Max classifies the repressive actions due to the actor's specific aims as the creation of an unfavourable public image, disinformation, restricting a movement's resources and limiting its facilities, derecruitment of activists, destroying leaders, fueling internal conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and sabotaging particular actions (Porta, 1996: 65). Which will be shown as committed by the securitizing and functional actors in the following sections.

In contradistinction to the Farouk-era security process against the MB, just in the few days leading up to the 1948 dissolution of the MB, a strategic approach marked by the escalated orchestration of systematic attacks through pro-government newspapers was employed. The primary aim was to depict the MB as the paramount threat to the Egyptian state. Notably, a crucial juncture transpired immediately preceding the group's dissolution, characterized by the discontinuation of the MB's official newspaper—an integral communication conduit for the organization. This measure played a pivotal role in paving the way for the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 (Kamal A. A., 1989: 263,265).

In the following, the researcher will show the role of some non-state actors in the securitization process:

Islamists as a Non-State Securitizing Actor in Morsi's Era

The Islamist organizations before the Egyptian 2011 revolution were composed of five main groups. First, the official religious establishment, which includes four mega institutions: Al-Azhar Mosque, Al-Azhar University, Dar Al-Ifta and the Ministry of Endowments (Gomaa, 2014). Second, the MB, the main Egyptian opposition group. Third, the Salafis, which composed a largely non-organized social movement. Fourth, the Sufi orders, which have been increasingly under the control of the state and have lost social legitimacy. Fifth, Neoliberal Islam trending in Egypt in the 1990s, especially among the urban upper middle classes (Korany & El-Mahdy, 2012: 126-127).

Clark detailed the need for counter-revolutionaries to reach a mass base of support by mobilizing social groups (Clarke, 2017; Clarke, 2014). SCAF continued the Mubarak regime's mutual interdependence relationship with Sufi orders and Al-Azhar schoolers, while the latter continued to offer its loyalty to SCAF and the Sisi regime, which qualified it to play an important role in the securitization process before and after the 2013 coup, especially the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta and the Grand Mufti which had the lion's share in the process.

The round of controversy began in July 2012 when Mohamed Ibrahim, a well-known Salafist, tweeted that he accepted to be the new minister of religious endowments after having been approached by Prime Minister Hisham Qandil, which sparked fears of the official propagation of Salafism under the ministry's control. The next logical and final step would be to install a Salafi in the role of Sheikh Al-Azhar (Hellyer, 2012). After Ali Gomaa, the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, was dismissed from his position in March 2013.

Former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa:

Ali Gomaa used to be a Professor of Fundamentals of Jurisprudence at Al-Azhar University, a Member of the Council of Senior Scholars, a Member of the Islamic Research Academy of Al-Azhar Al-Sharif since 2004 until now, the general Supervisor of Al-Azhar Mosque from 1999 to 2013, The Grand Mufti of Egypt from 2003 to 2013 (Gomaa, 2014), and he has been also the Sheikh of the *Seddikiya Shazliya* Sufi Order since 2018 (Gomaa, 2018).

In April 2012, a number of representatives of the Egyptian People's Parliament demanded the dismissal of the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa, because of his visit to occupied Jerusalem (Skynews, 2012), also, hundreds of parties, political and youth representatives demonstrated in front of Dar Al-Ifta, to demand the dismissal of the grand Mufti of the Republic, Ali Gomaa for the same purpose (Al-Ahram Gate, 2012).

Gomaa spoke about the impeachment of the Presidents of the modern Republics in his Islamic jurisprudential opinion, Gomaa said: "It is forbidden to revolt against the Imam - head of state- unless he commands disobedience of Allah, the Imam position is permanent along his lifetime, it is not permissible to dispute the imam and he is not dismissed unless he violates the conditions of the imam, and it is not permissible if there is a Fitnah that

occurs from the dismissal” (Gomaa, 2011: 7). Moreover, Gomaa confirmed that the presidents of modern states are legitimate rulers from the Islamic point of view or an Imam (Gomaa, 2011: 32).

Gomaa also decided that it is not permissible to revolt against him even if he is unjust, as it is not permissible in Islam to revolt against the ruler unless he manifests blasphemy with evidence (Gomaa, 2011: 52). Although the latter is his jurisprudential opinion, he said after the 2013 coup: “It is permissible in Islamic jurisprudence to dismiss the president if he becomes insane, if the enemy captures him, if the country and the people are in conflict, or if he commits high treason and that is in the interest of the people” (On the Arab Revolutions, 2014/2).

Before that, Gomaa selected the condition of “the captured Imam” while mentioning that Morsi lost his legitimacy because he is considered an interdicted Imam (“Al-Jazeera,” 2013/2). This confirms that Gomaa considered the relationship between the SCAF and their own president as enemies, which gives a logical reason for the securitization process in which Gomaa himself participated as will be detailed, confirming that the SCAF dealt with President Morsi as an enemy, in the view of one of the important actors in the securitization process.

On the other hand, Gomaa, along with others like Ali Al-Jafry and Osama Al-Azhary, as will be detailed in Sisi Era in chapter 4, tried to strip the MB's religious legitimacy from its foundations. Gomaa said: “The premises of the Brotherhood idea is absolutely not correct; it is a distorted picture of the Islamic sacred texts. Also, they are not qualified to understand those texts at all” (CBC Egypt, 2013/2) .

Despite that during President Morsi’s era, in March 2013, Gomaa was removed from the position of the grand Mufti and Shawky Allam was appointed to the position (Mugahed, 2013). After his dismissal in Jun 2013, Gomaa started to talk about the Kharijites and the necessity of killing them, and the so-called “merchants of religion”, without addressing any entities, those terms that were used by the 2013 coup to describe the Brotherhood and their supporters later (Masr El-Mahrousa, 2013). Using the term *Kharijites*, which has a “culture resonance” in Muslim society, as Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde argue that “the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be

made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 25).

The coup had the ability to bring in religious scholars who did assure the army and police officers and soldiers that killing demonstrators is permissible because they are apostates, Kharijites, and stinky people who do not deserve citizenship, as Gomaa did in his famous speech (Abou Al-Ghayt, 2013).

Directly after the 2013 coup, Gomaa played a significant role in supporting and legitimizing it, presenting a detailed religious justification for the Egyptian security forces for a deadly crackdown on the supporters of President Morsi. Gomaa recorded a video between almost the 10th of July and the 7th of August 2013 in the month of Ramadan 2013, he clarified that life in President Morsi’s time was confusing, plagued by high prices and insecurity. Although from his literature we can find that Gomaa’s opinion is that demonstrations and sit-ins are permissible in Islamic jurisprudence (Gomaa, 2011: 40), he addressed the MB demonstrators, and their supporters as Kharijites, which The Prophet Mohammed -peace be upon him- said about them that (they are dogs of hellfire. Blessed are those who killed them and whoever killed them are more deserving of God than them). Gomaa said: “They are in the anger of God, the Messenger of God is their opponent, they are corrupters on earth, and whoever uproots them will receive a great reward from God (Accursed, wherever found, they shall be seized and killed with a terrible slaughter) -Surat Al-Ahzab 61-” (On the Arab Revolutions, 2014/2).

Gomaa confirmed, at that time, that the events were not a coup, because if it was, the army would have taken power for itself, which didn’t happen yet until that date. Rather, the events happened because 30 million of the Egyptian people made a new revolution, that argument which the events later refuted. He addressed the Egyptian Army as the “western soldiers” who were mentioned by the prophet Mohamed -peace be upon him- as he said, telling a prophecy: (A catastrophe -fitnah- will happen. The safer people will be the western soldiers). Gomaa continued that the army is safe from temptation, repels tyranny, lifts aggression, disciplines the outlaws, the Victorious squad, and is supported by God. Gomaa here also uses Islamic jurisprudence terms circulating in the collective mind of Muslims, such as “the Victorious Squad”, and even invokes uncirculated and unsound heritage texts such as “the Western soldiers” to praise the Egyptian army, and

terms such as “Kharijites” and “hellfire dogs” to justify cursing and killing supporters of President Morsi coldblooded (On the Arab Revolutions, 2014/1).

Also, Gomaa used the well-known term “push the aggressor” against Morsi supporters, which justifies, due to Gomaa, the army and police using gunfire against them if they are strong and trained!! claiming that they are not Peaceful protesters any more, he claimed that they block roads, violate citizens' lives, cut bridges under the pretext of prayer, provoke the Egyptian people and the social security and make fitna which is exactly like using weapons in Gomaa's opinion. Gomaa said: “We disperse them with water first, and their penalty *tazeer* reaches death when they use weapons or Molotov”. While Gomaa said the Army soldier who doesn't want to participate in the events has the judgment of the one “who left on the day of march” in Islamic jurisprudence, which is a massive sin (On the Arab Revolutions, 2014/2), in an attempt to discredit President Morsi and his supporters, and to push army soldiers against them after he used the Islamic heritage war terminology.

Al-Nour Salafi Party

The Nour Party, which has been the political arm of the Salafist da'wa Group in Alexandria since 2011 -which has showed another example of Clark's argument confirming the need for counter-revolutionaries to reach a mass base of support by mobilizing social groups (Clarke, 2017; Clarke, 2014)- is considered the main entity that led the process of securitization against the MB from the Salafi community. It is according to the definition of Abdel Moneim El-Shahat, one of its well-known leaders, “a reformist advocacy group that adopts Salafism as a method and organized collective action as a method” (Al-Shahat, 2013), The emergence of the Alexandrian Salafist da'wa went through three stages, beginning with the stage of the Islamic group that arose in the seventies of the twentieth century in Egyptian universities, passing through the stage of the Muslim Brotherhood's release from prisons, and their attempt to rebuild the organization by attracting the cadres of the Islamic group at the time. Then the stage of rejecting this polarization and then declaring independence with an independent group called the Salafi School in Alexandria, which later became the Salafi da'wa (Salem, 2013). This indicates that the group originally arose as an entity that rejected the MB.

The Salafist da'wa refused political participation before the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt (Al-Shahat, 2013; Telci, 2011), which was clear in the thoughts of Yasser Burhami, the head of the group and its most prominent theorist, who believed in the fall of the ruler's legitimacy as long as his state was not established on the basis of Islamic law, and accordingly, he did not recognize the Egyptian regime and its institutions, and presented the Islamic movement as an alternative to it to carry out the work of the judiciary, the implementation of judgments, war, police, economic work and others (Burhami, Teamwork between excess and negligence, 1991).

Burhami explains his rejection of secular parliaments, or parties and groups that believe in secular political actions, as he clarifies that there is a big difference between Islamic rule and secular democratic rule. In his view, it is not permissible, according to Islamic law, to present Islamic law to individuals so that they may be able to implement it or not. This is what happens in parliaments that enact laws contrary to Islamic law that obligate people in them to the opinion of the majority, which he described as infidel councils. Burhami considered that the parties that are based on the principles of secularism, democracy, socialism, communism and other man-made principles are all from ignorant fanaticism and loyalty to the unbelievers and hypocrites, which necessitates every Muslim to reject him, desert him, fight him and renounce him (Burhami, Salafism and approaches to political change, 1992).

Al-Shahat said, from his point of view, in a quieter language that thoughts were due to the political climate in Mubarak's time in which no one was allowed - at least in the media - to enter the political arena except by waiving many legitimate matters, foremost of which is the absolute acceptance of Western democracy without restrictions or conditions (Al-Shahat, 2013).

If the Salafis had stood on this point, it would have been possible to explain their position by abstaining from participating in secular political actions, but at the same time they did not hesitate to cooperate with the Arab states, against their Islamist political opponents, especially jihadist and other reformist movements. Here, the dilemma of the Arab regimes and governments, in employing the fatwas and positions of these movements in the political game, and opening the horizons of work for it in the social and religious fields in order to influence the people, is clearly visible, as these governments are working to

weaken the capabilities and areas of Islamic political action by contributing to the rooting of these currents (Abu Romman, 2010: 246-247).

Despite the previous position of the Salafist da'wa, after the 2011 revolution, it formed the Nour Party and participated in the parliamentary elections, as the Nour Party became the second largest party in the number of seats in Parliament after the Freedom and Justice Party of the MB. The Salafist da'wa announced that "After consultation and dialogue in light of the new changes, it had decided to participate positively in the political process, and that it was in the process of determining the appropriate option for the image of this participation" ("Salafist Da'wa Board of Directors," 2011).

Then The Salafist da'wa participated in the 2011 People's Assembly elections and won 121 seats, equivalent to 24,29% of the seats, while the MB won 235 seats, equivalent to 47.18% (Abu Shaqra, 2012) as shown in Figure 3.1. then participated in the writing of the 2012 constitution, also we can recognize its Participation in the 50-member committee to write the 2013 constitution ("Al-Jazeera," 2013/3).




Figure (3.9): 2011 People's Assembly Seats

Source: Abu Shaqra, R. (2012, January 21). The Muslim Brotherhood obtains 235 seats in the People's Assembly. Retrieved September 17, 2023, from FRANCE 24: <https://www.france24.com/ar/20120121-egypt-muslim-brotherhood-winner-parliamentarian-elections>.

The Salafist da'wa also participated in the Presidency Institution in Positions such as the appointment of Imad Abdel Ghafoor, former head of the Nour Party, as Assistant to the

President of the Republic (Zaki A. , 2012), and the appointment of Dr. Khaled Alam El-Din, one of the party leaders, in the position of advisor to the president (Abd El-Moneam, 2013).

The Security Role Played by the Salafist Da'wa Could be Recognized in the Following:

Rejecting the January 2011 Revolution & Provoking a Division Between Revolutioneers

During the January 25, 2011 revolution, the Salafist da'wa held a conference emphasizing Egypt's Islamic identity. That issue, which was not considered by anyone regarding the people's revolution against the system of injustice and corruption, under the demands of "bread - freedom - social justice", Then it described the demonstrators as a group of climbers on the shoulders and blood of the masses, assuming a hypothetical enemy that threatens peace and social tolerance by threatening the Islamic identity of Egypt (Ana El-Salafy, 2011), which indicates that there are those who pushed it in the direction of provoking a division between Islamic and secular movements, or between Muslims and Christians in This critical revolutionary moment. Khaled Harbi, one of the well-known Salafi activists, wrote, addressing his letter to Burhami, saying: "Do you remember that you prevented the youth from going out in the revolution, and announced on January 25 the longest lesson in the history from noon until dinner, in order to ensure that the youth did not go out in the revolution?". (Ismail & kamel, 2012).

Harbi also accused Burhami of being the first to split the ranks of the revolutionaries. When he came out immediately after Mubarak's resignation, cursing the secularists who would change the second article of the constitution related to Islamic law, which was not originally proposed for amendments, to the extent that Sheikh Muhammad Abd El-Maqsoud, the well-known Salafi scholar, addressed Burhami saying "Do not create fake battles in which you cover your bad attitude towards revolution" (Ismail & kamel, 2012).

Political Isolation of NDP Members

The Salafi da'wa SD rejected the issue of political isolation of members of the ruling National Party after the 25 January revolution under the pretext of letting the people choose whom they want. Nader Bakkar, the official spokesman of the Al-Nour Party,

said: "Al-Nour Party also strongly rejected the idea of political isolation against members of the National Democratic Party after the January revolution, and it was clear in the principle of bringing those found guilty of a crime to justice and then letting the people decide through the ballot boxes who they want and who they reject" (Bakkar, 2013). Which means the ability of the same people against whom the revolution was launched to continue to participate in political life, as if the 2011 revolution had not taken place, at a time when the youth and revolutionary movements were demanding the establishment of revolutionary courts for them, filling the Egyptian squares with large banners calling for the military council to speedily put the ousted President Hosni Mubarak, his family, and the former regime's aides on top, led by Safwat Al-Sharif and Fathi Sorour, as well as the trial of all those who spoiled political life in Egypt (Saad, 2011), Which Clarifies the bias of the Salafist da'wa to the ranks of the counter-revolutionary forces in practice.

Offer Blood Money to the Families of the 25 January Martyrs

In a move that would reduce the penalties imposed on police officers and individuals accused of killing the January revolutionaries, Burhami exploited the religious influence of the Salafist da'wa and played a mediating role between those and the families of the 25 January martyrs. He offered blood money to pardon some of the officers accused of killing the revolutionaries.

Harbi addressed a letter of reprimand to Burhami emphasizing this issue, saying: "Do you remember when you offered the families of the revolution's martyrs to accept blood money so that the killers of the revolutionaries would not be tried, and when we asked you, maybe some of the murderous officers do not have money, you said the state will pay the blood money" (Ismail & kamel, 2012), which means that the Salafist da'wa was actually ordered by the state or SCAF, which was the ruler of the country at that time, to play that role trying to protect those convicted of murder from state agencies at that time.

The brother of one of the martyrs claimed that Burhami offered him blood money in the amount of 500,000 Egyptian pounds in exchange for pardoning his brother's killer. He told him that blood money had been imposed on him whether he liked it or not (Al-Jareeda, 2011). Abdel Moneim Al-Shahat, the official spokesman for the Salafist da'wa, confirmed there mediating role and claimed that the Salafist da'wa has tried to dissolve

the problems of revenge to reform between people since the time of the previous regime (Maghazy, 2011).

In order to understand the role of the Salafist da'wa in this issue, we can find a number of lawyers and jurists confirmed that several families in different governorates were subjected to intimidation and extortion into giving up the rights of their martyred sons, after police officers failed to use the financial bargaining (Maghazy, 2011). Which means that the da'wa was working in parallel with the police forces on this issue. The offer was either to accept the money and then concede or face threatening and intimidating in the case of non-acceptance.

The Coordination with the Military Candidate Against the Brotherhood Candidate

The Salafist da'wa supported the presidential candidate, Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, against the MB's candidate Muhammed Morsi ("DW," 2012), which led to the dispersal of votes supporting political Islam in the first phase of the presidential elections after the revolution. In the second phase between the military candidate and the brotherhood candidate, Burhami met with Lieutenant General Shafiq at his house on the evening of the presidential elections, to coordinate with him. The famous program presenter, Wael Al-Ibrashi, revealed this incident by asking the question to Burhami, who tried to get rid of him by saying "There was a phone call" (Yahya Refai, 2013).

The Attack Against the Muslim Brotherhood During the Reign of President Morsi

Al-Nour party may have tried to present itself as the Islamist alternative to the FJP of the brotherhood for those who want to vote Islamist while disappointed by the MB (Daragahi, 2013). That may have made it a fertile ground for the securitizing actors working against the MB bushing the Da'wa and its party to frequently attack the MB and the institution of the presidency during the time of Morsi. This claim appears in a number of topics, including:

- What the "Al-Watan Newspaper" website mentioned that the Salafi mosques in Alexandria have turned into platforms for attacking President Morsi and the MB, as thousands of copies of statements are distributed by the Nour Party, accusing the MB of "brotherhoodizing the state", A claim which meant that the brotherhood is appointing a

number of the MB members to leadership positions to control the state's media, civil, judicial, security and other institutions (Bahaa El-Deen, 2012). In an attempt to reduce the influence of Morsi and the FJP and their efforts to control the joints of the state, or at least prevent its growth. Also, in an effort from the SD to gain more political landscape from the MB, the SD accused the MB of suppressing the members of the Da'wa, preventing them from public speaking in mosques affiliated with the Ministry of Endowments, and working to degrade them in the Egyptian street (Al-Wakeel, 2013).

- Younes Makhyoun, the head of the Nour Party, submitted a file to the Egyptian presidency that included several names, in opposition to the so-called “brotherhoodizing the state”, which clarified his objection to the appointment of a number of the MB members to leadership positions in the Egyptian governorates (Hashem, 2013). Makhyoun stressed that the party will stand firmly against brotherhoodizing the state, calling on members of the MB to stop hiding the facts that the Egyptian people touch and watch (Goda & Abu-Elfadl, 2013). Khaled Alam El Din, a Salafi leader and former advisor to President Morsi, added that the Brotherhood offered the Nour Party a share of positions, but they refused (Al-Hakeem, 2013), which reflects Makhyoun's desire for the men of the former regime to remain in their positions. He is not satisfied that members of the new ruling party replace the men of the previous regime or that his party replaces them.

- It is worth saying that speaking of “brotherhoodizing the state” was widely spread in the media, during the period of Morsi, until it became the topic of the hour and the media's preoccupation (Bahaa El-Deen, 2012). We can understand the issue if we know that SCAF or the Army formed since Nasser's era the institutional spine of the state while enjoying complete autonomy, it has been involved in manufacturing, construction and service activities shouldering most of the infrastructure projects. Military officers, both retired and in service, occupy a wide range of positions in the state bureaucracy, municipal positions, and middle management positions (Abdelrahman, 2015: 24-25), and they are not expected to leave their positions easily. This means that any attempts by the elected president, his party, or any other forces against the army's complete control over the joints of the Egyptian state will be rejected and distorted by SCAF, the beneficiary of this situation, which represents an existential threat to the deep military state after the January 2011 revolution. Therefore, deep state tools were shed against attempts to change

this situation, and the Salafist da'wa, with its political wing, the Nour Party, was one of these tools attempting to obstruct the process of revolutionary change.

- The Salafist da'wa's attack on the presidency due to Morsi's visit to Iran, accusing him of working to strengthen the Shiite tide in Egypt. As a result of this claim, the leaders of the Salafist da'wa launched a sharp attack on the Brotherhood, and held a conference entitled "The Shiites are the danger, so beware of them". The spokesman for the da'wa claimed that they were Surprised, as Morsi opened the door wide for the Shiites to have direct contact with the Egyptian people (Abd Allah R. , 2013). Which was a fake situation the SD tried to use to distort the MB image in front of the Egyptian Sunni population.

- The Salafist da'wa incitement to revolution against the emerging political Islam regime in Egypt, as Nader Bakar, the spokesman for the Al-Nour party, hopes the success of the 30 June 2013 events, saying "The failure of "June 30" will turn the MB into a great monster that can't be stopped" (Asar, 2013).

- The participation of the Salafist da'wa and the Nour Party in the statement of the military coup against President Morsi, who is considered the first elected Egyptian president representing the Islamic movement, attended by the party's representative, Galal Murra, Secretary General of the Nour Party. Trying to use the religious influence of the SD on the masses to correct the coup act, and discredit MB, saying "I swear to god that we are only motivated by our Islamic religion and Jurisprudence" (Al-Nahar TV, 2013).

- After the 2013 coup, Burhami called for peaceful coexistence with it and acceptance of it as a fait accompli. Also, he justified the police's use of weapons to kill protesters, claiming that the Rabaa sit-in had weapons and that someone was shooting from among the protesters. Defending the army and police forces, accusing the Brotherhood of deliberately committing murders and shedding blood in order to exploit it politically. He also confirmed his mediation attempt to commit a political solution to break up the sit-in (Arabi21, 2016). Burhami argued that Sisi was not responsible for the blood of the Rabaa and Al-Nahda martyrs and that he did not call for the killing of the unarmed, then he tried to assign responsibility to the Brotherhood leaders, who called for a sit-in and a clash with the state, knowing that there was blood to be shed (Kamal A. , 2015).

Seculars as a Non-State Securitizing Actor in Morsi's Era

Secular forces, spearheaded by the NSF and Tamarod movement, opposed Mohamed Morsi's presidency in Egypt. Bassem Youssef's satirical show amplified criticism, contributing to the negative portrayal of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Tensions escalated between Islamists and liberals, strategically facilitated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. As anti-Morsi sentiments grew, the military, emphasizing its role as the guardian of security, prepared to intervene independently of the presidency. This laid the groundwork for the military's eventual intervention amidst political turmoil, as will be shown in this section. During this period, many non-state secular forces worked to discredit the MB and its elected president, whether through legal persons or opposition media channels, parties such as the Constitution Party, blocs such as the Salvation Front, or protest movements such as the Tamarod Movement.

Mahsoub argued, as I mentioned previously, that the SCAF strategy was to differentiate between the components of the Egyptian revolution, therefore it gave the MB an electoral path; Because it was able to mobilize. While SCAF also gave the liberals television channels on which to speak, due to the elitist nature of the movement that is unable to mobilize. As a result, the liberal voice became loud on satellite channels, and the Islamic voice became loud in the street. Simply they turned against each other when SCAF opened the election gate, which led to putting the Islamists' interest against the seculars' interest, and then the secularists used their bullhorns to attack the Islamists (Ahmed Mansour, 2020/1). As the dispute intensified between the Islamic and liberal movements, secular channels worked to attack the MB and discredit the movement and its elected president. Two famous models achieved wide fame at this time and were able to reach a wide segment of Egyptian society, namely the satirical program "The Program" presented by Bassem Youssef, and the satirical presenter, Tawfiq Okasha, on Al-Faraeen channel (Armbrust, 2013).

One of the most influential critics whose work helped to demonize Morsi and the MB, from the pro-army liberal private media, was the satirist Bassem Youssef, who was called "The Jon Stewart of the Arabic World", his Program turned out to be the most popular television show in Egypt's history (Paget, 2018). Bassem used to make fun of President Morsi and distort his image. In one of the episodes of the program, on the occasion of

granting Morsi an honorary doctorate from one of the universities in Pakistan, Bassem put a very large hat on his head, mocking Morsi and his clothes during the awarding ceremony (Al-Bernameg, 2013). In another episode, the singer said after he showed a short speech of Morsi “It seems that we got the short end of the stick” (MEKOO Z, 2013), In a way that completely lacks politeness in speaking, to mock Morsi and destroy his prestige. He tried to say in a satirical manner that “Morsi is going to sell the Suez Canal to Qatar” or portray the Islamists as “merchants of religion” (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

In another situation, Youssef also tried to mock Morsi by saying, “We chose him, and now we're stuck with him”. Youssef also tried to show falsely that Morsi was going to sell the Egyptian economy to the state of Qatar, for an example in Youssef's program a singer said “My Qatar, beloved little brother -- Day by day its wealth multiplies. Investments are its lifeblood -- My Qatar keeps throwing its money around. Qatar, my Qatar” (Gordon & Arafa, 2014).

The National Salvation Front and Tamarod Movement

Clark -using a social force lens-detailed the need for counter-revolutionaries to reach a mass base of support, and therefore to mobilize social groups (Clarke, 2017; Clarke, 2014). On 24 November 2012, several leading secular politicians and parties united and formed the NSF to coordinate opposition to a constitutional declaration by Morsi on 22 November. Its most prominent members were Mohamed El-Baradei, co-founder of the liberal Constitution Party, and the NSF's first general coordinator, Amr Moussa, co-founder of the secular Conference Party, and Hamdeen Sabahi, co-founder of the Egyptian Popular Current, another secular alliance. A number of other opposition organizations joined the front. like the Wafd Party, the Dignity Party, the Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Kifaya Movement, and the Maspero Youth Union (Carnegie, 2013).

While the NSF failed to organize and campaign effectively in the streets, a group of activists from the Kefaya Movement on 28 April 2013 decided to mobilize the opposition against Morsi by founding the Tamarod movement, which tried to signal a vote of no confidence in the president and called for early presidential elections, and the campaign succeeded, by the end of June it collected 22 million signatures (Carnegie, 2013). The

movement was soon endorsed by the NSF with the approval, support and funds of the military and security agencies as well as supporters of the former Mubarak regime, like the Mubarak-era business elite, billionaire Naguib Sawiris. Also, many revolutionary and anti-military activists, such as the Revolutionary Socialists and the 6 April Movement, supported Tamarod, viewing it as a means of reviving the revolutionary process (Ketchley, 2017: 113).

The youth movements began cooperating with Tamarod which was endorsed by the regime at a time when the societal climate became hostile to the revolutionary youth after the failure of the MB's tenure in power. A lot of people showed enmity to youth activists who participated in Morsi's victory in the 2012 presidential elections. Political figures who had been opposed to the Mubarak regime as well as several revolutionary youth groups, including the 6 April Youth Movement endorsed the MB leader aiming to prevent the 'return of the old regime' (Abd Allah N. , 2016).

From that point on, the military made a number of statements seeking to re-establish the army as the "true guarantor of the country's security", "an integral part of this great people", El-Sisi told the air force pilots in a speech that "the armed forces belong to the people alone". Moreover, General Sedki Sobhi, announced that the army was keeping an eye on what is going on in the country, saying that "if the Egyptian people ever need the armed forces, then they will be on the streets in less than a second". Both statements demonstrated that the army is ready to work separated from the Presidency (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

4.5. The US Intervention in the Egyptian 2011 Revolution, SCAF, and Morsi's Era

Allinson argued that the U.S. intervention in Egypt's revolution was not simply a response to conditions of international anarchy but reflected cross-border social relations. In particular the deep interlocking of economic and security interests between Egyptian, Gulf, and US elites (Allinson, 2019), from his view Nick Bisley divided the tactical methods of international intervention into military, financial, diplomatic, and logistical means (Bisley, 2004). While Allinson demonstrates that from the very beginning, on 11 February 2011, following the popular revolt, the SCAF sensing that only Mubarak's removal would stem the tide of revolt, and assured of the support of its major foreign

backer, the United States, announced the resignation of the president and a plan for constitutional reform and parliamentary and presidential elections under military tutelage (Allinson, 2019).

The aspect of this section revolves around the media's role in shaping perceptions of President Morsi and the MB. Employing a chronological approach, the study traces the evolution of US media narratives. It unveils a progression from portraying Morsi as a politically weak figure to characterizing him as an anti-democratic and anti-Western leader.

This meticulous examination lays the groundwork for understanding how media framing can wield influence over public opinion and historical interpretation. The analysis posits that the media's construction of distorted images played a significant role in legitimizing the 2013 coup. By highlighting contradictory depictions and utilizing orientalism techniques, the media contributed to the solidification of narratives that, irrespective of their accuracy, shaped Western perceptions. Consequently, these perceptions influenced the geopolitical trajectory of post-Arab Spring Egypt, underscoring the potency of media representation in shaping historical outcomes.

4.5.1. The Preventive War Approach and Liberal Hegemony

Preventive war is a persistent theme in the history of international politics and in theoretical explanations of war. In fact, as Paul Schroeder contends, preventive war has been a "normal, even common tool of statecraft". Preventive war is fought to exert the erosion of relative power to a rising adversary and the future dangers this power shift might present (Silverstone, 2007: 1). According to Jack Levy, if political leaders in a given state "fear what their rising adversary might do once he gains superiority, the preventive war temptation may be potent enough to drive that state to attack and blunt its rival's growth (Levy, 1987). Fearon notices that it is frequently argued that if a declining power expects it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the present may be rational (Fearon J. , 1995), while Powell confirmed that a preventive war could be triggered by an anticipated shift in the distribution of power (Powell, 2006).

In the Oxford Handbook of International Security, Andrew Kydd illustrates the fact that one state is growing means that deals which are satisfactory in the present may not be in the future. In response, states may engage in redistributive bargaining in the future, and possibly in the present as well. However, if the shift in power is too great and the conflicts of interest between the states too important, the declining power may attack preventively in the present because it fears that in the future it will be exploited or attacked (Kydd, 2018: Kindle Locations 4914-4916).

Mearsheimer argues that Liberal states like the US work to spread their ideology all around the world calling that action, which many of the Western foreign policy elites believe in, as Liberal hegemony which he defined as “a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself” (Mearsheimer, 2018: 12). Mearsheimer confirms that the US under presidents George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barak Obama (2009-2017), played an essential role in distributing destruction and death across the Middle East (Mearsheimer, 2018: 16).

It is widely believed in the US that the MB promotes moving away from secularism and returning to an Islamic law governing system. Although the group had been accused of operating under violent tactics to secure its objectives at the time of Donald Trump (ISPU, 2019). President Trump was only days into office in January 2017 when he first began considering a move with the potential to ignite designating the MB a terrorist organization (Schmitt, Cooper, Wong, & Savage, 2019).

In 2015 Senator Ted Cruz submitted a report to Congress on the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization (Sen. Cruz, 2015). We can recognize how the US thinks about that situation from the words of Donald Rumsfeld about what he considers ‘militant ideology’: “They will either succeed in changing our way of life, or we will succeed in changing theirs” (White & Tyson, 2006). He thinks of it as a two-sided equation, change or you will be changed. That means, from his point of view, if the US doesn’t spread liberal democracy, it will definitely vanish. Buzan considers that the explicit ‘long war’ framing of the Global War on Terror GWOT, where the US strategy involved the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere, is a securitizing move of potentially great significance. If it succeeds as a widely accepted, world-organizing macro-securitization, it could structure global security for some

decades, in the process helping to legitimize US primacy (Buzan, 2006), which means that in the thoughts of one of the prominent Western political scientists added to the political elites, the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere, will add more legitimacy to American superiority. In the opposite sense, the restriction of liberal democracy will lead to the restriction of American superiority in their perception.

Referring to a historical context during King Farouk's reign, Al-Banna postulated that the 1948 dissolution of the MB during that period was prompted by external pressures, particularly the insistence of major powers. Al-Banna argued that the MB's active involvement in the 1948 Palestine war had begun to pose a threat to the strategic interests of the British occupation (Abu Ghader, 2019).

According to Al-Shareef's account, the Minister of Interior conveyed to Al-Banna that the British authorities had issued a direct ultimatum. Specifically, the British threatened to reinstate their occupation of Cairo unless the MB was disbanded, emphasizing the perceived incompatibility of the group's activities with the broader geopolitical objectives of the British authorities (Al-Shareef, 1984: 140).

Additional evidence pointing towards external interference in the 1948 dissolution of the MB is presented through a notable statement by Moshe Dayan, the former Israeli defence minister. In 1948, during a press conference in America, Dayan responded to a journalist's inquiry regarding Israel's ability to survive amid hostility from larger nations. In his reply, as documented by Al-Qaradawi in 2021, Moshe Dayan expressed that "Israel did not fear facing these nations collectively or individually, as it believed it could overcome them". However, he conveyed a distinct concern about encountering the MB. Dayan emphasized that Israel harboured an aversion to confronting only the MB, suggesting a preference for the Brotherhood's elimination, with the insinuation that external forces, potentially including governmental influences, would address this matter (Al-Qaradawi, 2021), which indicates the old Western tendency to eliminate the group from political life. Keep the above in mind, while the MB is assumed to change the "military secular model" in governance to some Islamic model not harmonious with the Western liberal model.

Therefore, the researcher argues that the US has participated in a "preventive war" within the scope of that macro-securitization war, against the Egyptian state at Mursi time which

ended by ousting the elected president, playing an important role in the Egyptian counter-revolution to prevent such a change. As an example, In the following section, the researcher will explore the role played by the US press in attacking the MB.

4.5.2. The US Press Representation of President Morsi (2012-2013)

From the beginning of his time, the American press worked to distort the image of President Morsi and the MB, and continued throughout his era to interpret the events in a way that confirmed that distorted image. While after the 2013 coup, it worked to improve the image of its leader. In July 2012, during the first month President Morsi was Sworn in as president, the Washington Times WT began to attack him, arguing that the military leader “Tantawi” was the real leader of Egypt, describing Morsi as a weak person who didn’t have the ability to even rule his party, As well as ruling Egypt. In the newspaper's vision, Morsi couldn’t be trusted, and took charge of Egypt through chicanery and falsehoods. Morsi was also described by the US media as worse than dictators, a weak politician, anti-democracy, and Anti-western (Washington Post, 2012).

While this was the image of the democratically elected president, after the 2013 coup the newspaper depicted its leader as a strong partner and a great ally of the US, who did a “fantastic job in a very difficult situation” (Miller, 2017). Which means that the Coup leader and protester killer has done a fantastic job, while the democratically elected president is weak and non-trusted. To imagine the reality of the incidents, we can explore some of the accuses brought against the coup leader by Human Rights Watch HRW, including a lack of accountability for many killings of protesters by security forces, mass detentions, military trials of civilians, hundreds of death sentences, and the forced eviction of thousands of families in the Sinai Peninsula (HRW, 2014).

These facts prompt us to research the participation of the American press in the securitization operation against President Morsi, trying to answer a research question: did the American media legitimize the coup in 2013 by drawing a frustrating image of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood? To answer this question, the researcher will follow the images have been drawn by a sample of the American newspapers and research centres of President Morsi, the MB and the Egyptian government in the American media during the reign of President Morsi from 1st July 2012 to 1st July 2013, according the

newspaper reports month by month, to assemble the image and analyze it to reach an answer to the research question, as follows:

➤ **In July 2012**, from President Morsi's first days in power, we can find a number of reports accusing the president and the MB, playing on several issues, as follows:

- **Playing on the president's character:** From the very beginning of President Morsi's time, the Washington Times considered that there was an American consensus that Egypt had been lost since Morsi has been the president of Egypt, describing him as "President Morsi of the MB" not of all Egyptians, trying to show him as a weak and powerless person who doesn't in fact rule Egypt, while field marshal Tantawi, SCAF leader, was the real ruler of Egypt. The newspaper tried to show the weakness of Morsi arguing that he did not even run the MB, as the newspaper claimed that it was run by the group's powerful man, Khairat Al-Shater (Pipes & Farahat, 2012).

In its report the WT argued that Morsi and MB are not trusted, has no regard for promises or the truth, his domestic and foreign policy has been replete with falsehoods, and attempting to establish his theocratic regime hostile to America, Israel, Western civilization (Marans, 2012).

- **Playing on religious sectarianism:** Concerning the Coptic issue in Egypt, the WP on July 1, 2012, even before Morsi entered the presidential palace, had tried to portray that there will be a mass exodus of Copts from Egypt because of Morsi assuming power. The WP said "Everyone at the church seemed to have friends and relatives who were trying to leave Egypt the disaster is coming very soon". The WP justified this by saying that Morsi and MB had been "an aggressive anti-Christian force in Egypt for just as long" (Constable, 2012). Also, the WT said on 27th July the new Egypt has Escalating violence against Coptic women and girls, "coerced conversion and forced marriage of Coptic Christian women and girls, those women are being terrorized and consequently marginalized" (Smith, 2012).

We can start here by collecting the puzzle, or in other words assembling the early picture of Morsi due to American media as Weak, powerless, not trusted, and anti-Coptic.

➤ **In August 2012:**

- **Playing on the string of dictatorship:** Ignatius from the Washington Post reported that the MB “has now tightened its grip on Egypt, controlling the military as well as the presidency and the parliament”, that is not bad, but the bad news will come if Morsi moved to make changes in Egypt’s judiciary, trying to control it for his own benefit (Ignatius D. , 2012). The newspaper showed Morsi as contrary to the previous picture. sometimes he is a dictator griping power, controlling the military, presidency, and parliament and in his way to grip the judiciary system, another time he is a weak person who can't even control his own party. Where there is no common logic for this but distorting his image.

➤ **In September 2012:**

- **Playing on the antagonism of the West and its allies:** Gaffney at the Washington Times also, showed Morsi as a big danger confronting the Jewish state and American interests, describing him as a festering Islamist sore, prone to jihad, most immediately against Israel and, inevitably, against the United States (Gaffney, GAFFNEY: Israel betrayed?, 2012). Also, in Townhall news, Gaffney showed him as a defender of some dangerous jihadists, who were convicted of leading the first lethal attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 (Gaffney, The World's Not Better Off, 2012).

➤ **In October 2012**

- **Playing on religious sectarianism and antagonism of the West:** In this month the Washington Times continued to distort Morsi's image, by presenting him as an enemy of Western culture and civilization, as well as an enemy of Christianity, the most widespread religion in the West. The newspaper said that "Morsi certainly in his instincts is very anti-American" (Najjar, 2012). It claimed that the "Persecution of Coptic Christians has intensified since the Egyptian uprising even children are persecuted ", speaking about the mass murder of more than 100 Copts in 2011 and hundreds of injuries, added to “Hundreds of Coptic families were evicted from their homes by Islamic extremists, and many Coptic churches, homes and businesses were destroyed” and “tens of thousands of Copts have left Egypt since the revolution” (Yacoub, 2012), trying to portray that there is a Mass exodus and Forced deportation of Copts in Egypt, but if that is real where did that ten thousand Copts go? In other words: If tens of thousands of

Copts left Egypt where did that nation go? There is no country Announced about receiving them! There are no pictures or videos of that destruction, there is no evidence.

- **Claiming that the MB was following the Mubarak-era legal framework:** in October 2011 RAND claimed that the MB was following the unjust legal framework of the Mubarak era, which criminalized the insulting of the president, shutting down protests, suppressing secular protests against what the newspaper mentioned as “the Brotherhood's consolidation of power” (Martini, 2012). From the previous sections, we can collect another piece of the image or the distorted image the American Media portrayed Morsi, as a dictator, an enemy of America and Israel, a terrorist defender, anti-Coptic, forcing Copts to mass exodus, destroying Coptic churches and homes, suppressing and killing the secular protestors.

➤ **In November 2012**

- **Playing on the president's character:** while the Washington Times considered Morsi as a lightweight politician, who could be manipulated or replaced by SCAF leader (Pipes & Farahat, Morsi could discredit Muslim Brotherhood rule, 2012). In the same month, the Washington Post reported that the Supreme Constitutional Court accused the president, of participating in an attack on the justice system, due to passing an edict authorizing Morsi to legislate without judicial oversight (Hauslohner, 2012). At the same time, one newspaper described Morsi as a lightweight politician, and the other described him as a strong dictator how is attacking the justice system, to grab legislative power, all that Contrasting images united on one meaning to distort the president's image to legitimise the coup against him.

➤ **In December 2012**

- **Claiming that Morsi is anti-Democracy:** Hall’s argument about van der Straet's figure, called “Europe encounters America”, which is bringing the thing and the exact opposite, but systematically related, which is a part of what Foucault calls a "system of dispersion" (Hall, 1992: 306). The Washington Institute added an essay titled "The First Flower of the Arab Spring", the writer tried in the beginning to say there is a fundamental change that has taken place in Egypt since the fall of the Mubarak regime. "Today stands an Egypt in which journalism is free and where criticism and demonstrations against the government are simply part of daily life", but unfortunately, contrary to that there is bad

news due to the writer, it seems that the Egyptian government is gradually eliminated the steps that led to a real democratic country (Cohen, 2012). Showing the reader, the thing and its opposite, saying to him yes you are seeing good things like a free press but take care they are tricking you and eliminating real democracy.

➤ **In January 2013**

The Washington Post claimed that Morsi's Egypt had a potential religious holocaust (Weinhold, 2013), trying to confirm that the Egyptian youth are ready for another revolution (Kumar Sen A. , 2013/2).

➤ **In March 2013**

- **Playing on the antagonism of Israel as a US ally:** the WT incited Israel against Morsi, in an attempt to show Morsi as an enemy of Israel, claiming that he addressed Jews as descendants of apes and pigs, for that Palestinian extremist, as an enemy for Israel, have become emboldened, Which represents a potential danger against Israel (Manison, 2013).

- **Playing on scaring people about a religious holocaust:** Fahim from The New York Times said: "Dozens of people were injured Friday when thousands of supporters and opponents of the ruling MB clashed outside the group's Cairo headquarters, many of them armed with weapons like meat cleavers, cattle prods and pistols" (Fahim, 2013). Giving the reader an impression that the MB deals as an armed gang against the people of their homeland and not as a movement in which its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party FJP, is ruling the state, in other words, he is drawing a picture of a wicked gang, facing Egyptians with knives and cleavers, not a ruling party.

➤ **In April 2013**

- **Playing on the antagonism of the US:** Sacribey in HuffPost claimed that "the MB has soured American attitudes towards Egypt since Morsi won the presidential elections" (Sacribey, 2013).

- CARNEGI center published a meeting with Hamzawy, the founder of Freedom Egypt Party, who claimed that the relationship between the opposition and the government is marked by a mutual lack of trust, the inability of President Morsi to govern, and also, spoke about a growing financial problem in Egypt at that time (Hamzawy & Sadjadpour, 2013).

➤ In June 2013

In the last month before the coup against Morsi, WT escalated its tone against the president and the MB, saying that Morsi is a member of the terrorist organization known internationally as the MB, which spews hateful, anti-Western rhetoric (Paul Gosar, 2013). In the same month the Washington Post Published an article entitled "Mohamed Morsi's betrayal of democracy", it claimed that Morsi and the MB lied, broke promises, and killed protesters, especially members of the April 6 Movement (Washington Post, 2013/2). Another report claimed that "Morsi is failing to govern in an effective, pluralistic way" (Ignatius D. , 2013), what results in the continued crackdown of Egypt's civil society (Washington post, 2013/1).

Finally, inside the coup incidents on the 1st of July 2013, the WT said the protestors chanted to Morsi to leave, showing that Morsi lied to them in the name of religion (Kumar Sen A. , 2013/1).

From the previous section we can collect more pieces of the distorted image they portrayed of Morsi, they claimed that he was anti-Western, anti-Coptic, dealing like a gang member, a member of a terrorist organization, and lied to Egyptian people in the name of religion. That distorted image they promoted in the West undoubtedly helped to legitimize the 2013 coup in front of the Western state elites and people. Regardless of their authenticity, repeating it convinced Westerners and made it as if it is the truth in their minds, as Edward said quoted from Nietzsche: "Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are" (Said, 2003: 203).

American media, using orientalism techniques, tried from the first days of President Morsi to draw an elusive picture of him as worse than dictators, a weak politician, anti-democracy, Anti-western civilization, anti-Copts, anti-feminine killing Christians, against America and Israel, member of a terrorist group, full of hatred to the west, liar, arrested for treason and espionage and theocratic. This deceptive image had been thought true in the minds of Westerners, as it didn't reflect the real Morsi but who they wanted Morsi to be, confirming Bhabha's argument: "Others is something created by me", in other words, they created their "predetermined president Morsi", and legitimized the coup over that "imaginary president Morsi" which is not necessarily the real Morsi, as Edward Said argued: "Orient does not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field

surrounding the word" (Said, 2003: 203). Using orientalism techniques to legitimize a military coup over the democratically elected president means prohibiting the democratic transition in Egypt, which means that imperialism succeeded in restructuring Egypt after the Arab Spring to a more repressive military regime state, instead of a free democratic one, which led to the continuation of imperial domination and authority over Egypt—said Defined Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Said, 2003: 3).

The researcher can summarize the securitization actors and their roles in the securitization process in President Mursi time (2012-2013) with its relevant speech acts in table (4.5), as follows:

Table (4.5): President Mursi Time Securitization Discourse Examples.

Actors	Roles in the Securitization Process	Relevant Speech Acts
State Actors		
SCAF	- Used military influence to build societal animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood - created a hostile media narrative against MB and President Morsi.	Statements accusing the MB of threatening national security, justifying harsh security measures post-coup; discourse framing the MB as conspirators.
Non-State Actors		
Secular Forces	- Propagated the MB's alleged threats to democracy. - legitimized the military's intervention.	- Criticism of President Morsi's constitution as anti-democratic. - Tamarod campaign speeches promoting a no-confidence vote against Morsi. - satire by media personalities like Bassem Youssef framing Morsi as incompetent and oppressive.

Salafist Da'wa and Nour Party	- Discredited the MB during Morsi's presidency - cooperated with the military to frame Morsi as a threat.	- Accusations against MB of "brotherhoodizing the state". - speeches claiming Morsi was introducing Shiite influences in Egypt. - statements urging acceptance of the 2013 coup as legitimate and necessary for national stability.
Former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa	- Religious justification for the securitization of MB supporters and Morsi.	- Fatwas labeling MB members as "Kharijites" (rebels), justifying their killing. - statements comparing army soldiers to the "victorious squad" in Islamic prophecy to legitimize the military's role in the coup and repression.
Media (Secular and Pro-State)	- Amplified anti-Morsi narratives - framed the MB as a threat to secularism and national stability.	- Satirical programs like "The Program" portraying Morsi as anti-Western, anti-Christian, and incompetent. - media narratives accusing Morsi of selling Egyptian resources to foreign powers (Qatar).
Tamarod Movement	- Mobilized public sentiment against Morsi by presenting him as a failure and an authoritarian.	- Campaign speeches emphasizing Morsi's alleged betrayal of revolutionary goals. - petitions demanding early elections based on claims of widespread dissatisfaction.
Official Religious Establishments	- Supported the securitization by aligning with the military and discrediting the MB's Islamic legitimacy.	- Statements by Al-Azhar scholars emphasizing the MB's misinterpretation of Islamic texts. - Dar Al-Ifta fatwas supporting the military crackdown on MB protests.

Also, The researcher can conclude the securitization actors and its targeted audience in President Mursi time (2012-2013) in table (4.6), as follows:

Table (4.6): President Mursi Time Securitization Actors and its Targeted Audience.

Actors	Targeted Audience	Role in the Securitization Process
SCAF	General Egyptian public, international community, and Western allies concerned with regional stability.	Used military and media influence to frame the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to national stability and security.
Secular Forces	Liberal Egyptians, international observers, youth movements, and middle-class urban populations.	Discredited the MB and President Morsi, framing them as anti-democratic and harmful to Egypt's future.
Salafist Da'wa and Nour Party	Conservative and religious Egyptians, particularly Salafist followers, and rural populations aligned with Islamic values.	Framed the MB as usurping power and damaging Egypt's Sunni identity.
Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa	Religious and devout segments of Egyptian society, including soldiers and police officers seeking moral justification.	Provided religious legitimacy for the securitization of MB supporters, justifying violent repression.
Media (Secular and Pro-State)	Urban middle-class Egyptians, international media consumers, and political elites abroad.	Amplified anti-Morsi and anti-MB narratives, portraying them as enemies of democracy and national unity.

Tamarod Movement	Egyptian youth, grassroots activists, and disillusioned revolutionaries from the 2011 uprising.	Mobilized public discontent by accusing Morsi of betrayal and incompetence.
Religious Establishments (Al-Azhar, Dar Al-Ifta)	Religious leaders, devout Muslims, and conservative social groups across Egypt.	Delegitimized the MB's Islamic authority and supported the military's narrative of national salvation.

4.6. The 2013 Military Coup

Table (4.7) Simplifies Thierry Balzacq's Levels of Analysis Post-2013 Coup

Context	Agents				Acts Examples
	Referent Object	Securitizing actor	Securitized actor	Audience	
Post-2013 coup- Sisi Era (2013-2017)	Egyptian military regime	SCAF	• MB • Armed Groups (pro-MB, Jihadi Groups) • Pro-MB Youth Groups	As detailed in table (4.9)	• Security Rhetoric • Media discourse • Imprisonment out of law • Killing out of law • Unjust death sentences • Excessive force use

Considering non-democratic systems, Vuori argued that all societies have *rules*, which are products of their own historical and social contexts. When *security logic and rhetoric* is utilized to legitimate the breaking of these rules, we have a case of securitization (Vuori, 2008). The 2013 military coup in Egypt marked a pivotal moment, driven by a strategic securitization process. The SCAF, empowered by prior successes, overthrew the elected president, leading to brutal reprisals against supporters. Public discontent, economic challenges, and a media-driven "sheep paradigm" contributed to widespread acceptance of extreme measures, culminating in the infamous Rabaa and Nahda massacres. El-Sisi justified the coup, emphasizing stability and national reconciliation. This brief period encapsulates a complex interplay of political strategy, media influence, and the erosion of democratic norms in post-2011 Egypt.

In this interval as a result of a successful securitization process done in the former time intervals, SCAF had the ability to break *the rules* or commit *special procedures*, overthrowing the elected president, and committing brutal massacres against his supporters, imprisoning and killing outside the law, without almost any condemnation mentioned by the Egyptian people, even a large sector of Egyptian celebrated the blood Shedding and brutality by the army.

From the 2013 coup till today Sisi continued to designate the MB and its allies as the biggest threat to Egyptian national security, continuing to use *special measures* against them, whether by the media discourse or by using excessive force. SCAF could have ousted Morsi at any time since the beginning of his era, However, the military exercised tactical patience, calculating that it needed an outpouring of public support before it could justify such a move.

The military did not have to wait long. From July 2012 to July 2013, public criticism of Morsy's rule ascended in a gradual escalation. Secular and some Islamic Opposition parties, Many of Egypt's courts and judges condemned the MB, Millions of Egyptians grew angry due to the sustained high costs of fuel and food. By June 2013, the Egyptian military could sense that public opinion was turning decisively against President Morsy, which means that the securitization process was successful.

Many Egyptians began calling for the Egyptian military to resolve the problem, and here the Egyptian military possessed a window of opportunity to reclaim its institutional prerogatives (Taylor, 2014: 140-141). Whether this state of anger is real, as some analysts believe, or it is an unreal state created by the media, it has affected large numbers of the Egyptian people. What made them accept the idea of random massacres such as Rabaa and Nahda squares, and widespread arrests and torture against the Brotherhood and their supporters.

On July 1, 2013, El-Sisi, issued an ultimatum to President Morsi and the political forces in which he gave them 48 hours to solve the political crisis or the army would impose their own roadmap (Pratt & Rezk, 2019). On July 2, 2013: Morsi stressed in a long speech that maintaining legitimacy is the primary guarantee against bloodshed (Al-Jazeera, 2016). On July 3, 2013, a military coup ousted the democratically elected government of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (Hamid, 2023).

On the same day, the coup leader, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, delivered his first statement after the military coup, in which he tried to justify the reasons for the coup against the elected president, saying that “the armed forces tried to contain the political situation and carry out national reconciliation between all political forces, including the presidential institution”. He also issued a number of decisions, including temporarily suspending the Constitution, allowing the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court to take charge of the country’s affairs until a new president is elected, holding early presidential elections, and forming a government of national competencies (CBC Egypt, 2013/1).

Allinson argues that the experience of attempts at international ‘catch-up’ under conditions of uneven and combined development provides resources for counter-revolutionaries to prevent such success, as the changing forms of such ‘catchup’ projects generate alliances with other states, that states may provide the military, diplomatic, or financial support to prevent a successful revolutionary outcome (Allinson, 2019).

In the case of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the stronghold of Nasserism represented the former and the policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council States and the US, the latter, thus the counter-revolution relied upon two factors deriving from this strategy: the ideological

inheritance of Nasserism as a response to international hierarchy, and the integration of the post-Nasser Egyptian ruling elite, which was not united in its response to the revolution, with Gulf financial, and US security networks (Allinson, 2019).

Egypt has obtained \$23 billion (15 billion pounds) in aid from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait in 18 months after ousting President Mursi (Reuters, 2015), receiving a total of \$8 billion in one week after the coup (Peel, Hall, & Saleh, 2013). Also, the Saudi role in financial and logistical support for the Salafi movement after the 2011 revolution has become clear (Al-Arabi, 2018).

As a result, supporters of President Morsi set up protests all around the country, and sit-ins in Rabaa and Nahda squares in Cairo. Here we can recognize the beginning of using excessive force against the MB and its allies. As a response on 23 July, El-Sisi asked Egyptians to give him a mandate and order to confront potential violence and terrorism ("Anadolu Agency," 2013).

On 14 August 2013, Egyptian police forces dispersed a sit-in in Rabaa Al-Adawiya and Nahda Squares in Cairo by supporters of President Morsi, which Human Rights Watch HRW described as "one of the largest incidents of mass killing of peaceful demonstrators in one day in the history of the modern world". Some Brotherhood leaders, such as Mohamed El-Beltagy, stated that the death toll exceeded 3,000, in addition to thousands of dead and injured. While the Egyptian Ministry of Health announced the number of victims at 670 dead and about 4,400 injured. While HRW announced that 817 people were killed (Al-Jazeera, 2023). That was followed by a series of repressive measures against the members of the organization, A number were imprisoned, and others were sentenced to death (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

Wilkinson argued that the invocation of a collective 'we' identity emphasizes the need for safeguarding to ensure its continuity (Wilkinson, 2007). The coup media discourse used Barend Haar's "demonological paradigm" to form a dyad of us and them, Haar's paradigm has been derived from a Chinese counter-revolution case that applied demonic terms to revolutioners to give the counter-revolution forces the capability to combat them with anti-demonic means, targeting them with a sever violent acts (Vuori, 2011: 202).

In the Egyptian case, we can update the term to “sheep paradigm”, in which they described President Morsi's supporters as “sheeps” (“The New Yorker,” 2017), then have been slaughtered like sheep in incidents like Rabaa and Nahda squares. During that period the media machine continued to send hostile messages against the Brotherhood to the people, to cover up these events, For example, Egyptian singer Ali Al-Haggar after the Rabaa massacre addressed the MB said “We are a nation and you are another nation. Although God is one, we have God and you have another God” (“Al-Jazeera,” 2013/1).

To convey a message to the Egyptian people that President Morsi and his supporters are another people, not Egyptians, and they worship a God other than our God, whom we worship, in a tone that suggests an attempt to strip President Morsi and his supporters from their Egyptianness and even from the religion of Islam, which is the religion of the majority of the Egyptian people, and which the MB calls for its application in all aspects of public and private life; to erase any kind of sympathy that the masses of the Egyptian people may feel towards President Morsi and his supporters. More than this Sisi supporters celebrated after the massacres, rushing into streets dancing and singing Joyfully, saying "Goodness for those hands, goodness for our country's army" (VideoYoum7, 2014). As they are praying for the hands which shed the blood of Morsi's supporters, which points to the success of the securitization process.

The researcher can summarize the SCAF's securitization discourse including context, key themes, securitization acts post 2013 coup in table (4.8), as follows:

Table (4.8): Post 2013 Coup Securitization Discourse Examples

Context	Key Themes	Securitization Acts
2013 Military Coup	Stability vs. Chaos	Justified the overthrow of President Morsi as necessary for maintaining national stability and preventing chaos.
Post-Coup Crackdowns	Threat of Terrorism	Framed MB supporters as terrorists to justify violent crackdowns and massacres.
Rabaa and Nahda Massacres	Dehumanization of the MB	Deployed the “sheep paradigm” to dehumanize MB supporters, making brutal force more acceptable.

Media Discourse Post-Coup	Us vs. Them Narrative	Media used a demonological framework to create a stark divide between “patriots” and “traitors.”
Public Celebrations of Violence	Legitimizing State Violence	Encouraged public acceptance of state violence by portraying it as a patriotic duty.
Economic Hardships and Discontent	Blaming the MB	Exploited economic difficulties to turn public opinion against Morsi and the MB.
Ultimatum to Morsi (July 1, 2013)	Military Intervention as Necessity	SCAF issued a 48-hour ultimatum for political forces to resolve the crisis or face military intervention.
Demonization of the MB	Erasing Egyptianness and Islam	Stripped MB supporters of their national and religious identity to justify brutal measures.
Tactical Patience (July 2012 - July 2013)	Calculating Public Support	SCAF waited for public discontent to peak before acting against Morsi, ensuring popular backing for the coup.
Judicial and Political Support	Institutional Legitimacy	Secured backing from courts and opposition parties to legitimize the coup and subsequent crackdowns.

Also, The researcher can conclude the securitization actors and its targeted audience post the 2013 military coup in table (4.9) including the discourse themes as follows:

Table (4.9): Post 2013 Coup Securitization actors and its Targeted Audience.

Securitization Actor	Target Audience	Key Themes of Securitization Discourse
SCAF	General Public Audience	- Stability vs. Chaos - National Security
SCAF	Secular and Liberal Opposition (Elite audience)	- Threat of Islamist Rule - Preserving Secularism
SCAF	MB Supporters and Islamists (Elite audience)	- Demonization - Erasure of National Identity

SCAF	Judicial Institutions (Elite audience)	- Legitimizing the Coup - Restoring Institutional Order
State-Controlled Media	General Public Audience	- Demonization of MB - Dehumanization of MB
State-Controlled Media	Supporters of the Military (Public audience)	- Patriotic Duty - Celebrating Violence
El-Sisi and Military Leaders	General Public Audience	- Restoring Stability - Combating Terrorism
El-Sisi and Military Leaders	Protestors and MB Supporters (Public Audience)	- Suppression of Dissent - Legitimizing Use of Force
Muslim Brotherhood	General Public Audience	- Legitimacy and Democracy
	Islamist Supporters (Public audience)	- Victimhood and Oppression
Judicial state Institutions	General Public Audience	- Rule of Law - Opposition to MB Governance
Secular and Liberal Opposition Parties	General Public Audience	- Anti-Islamist Sentiment - Preserving Civil Society

4.7. The Pattern of the Egyptian Regime Securitization Process against the MB During SCAF and President Morsi Eras

The researcher argues that the post-2011 Egyptian political milieu could be explicated through the lens of a securitization pattern, with distinct actors, strategies, and influences shaping the trajectory of events. The nuanced interplay among state and non-state actors, media dynamics, and international dimensions is deciphered within the framework of securitization, providing a scholarly understanding of the multifaceted forces at play in Egypt's post-revolutionary evolution.

In the pattern, the SCAF emerges as a central securitization actor, initially adopting an ambiguous stance and evolving into a pivotal force. Its strategic manoeuvres, applauded

and questioned, shape the securitization pattern. The SCAF's adapted navigation of the political landscape through strategic securitization measures, coupled with the exploitation of internal divisions, exemplifies a securitization strategy that influences the trajectory of post-revolutionary Egypt. The Egyptian media, particularly through influential shows, assumes a role as a securitization influencer, amplifying discontent and contributing to the polarization of Islamist and liberal factions. Also, a number of US media played a significant role in negatively framing President Mursi in the international landscape, constructing narratives that contributed to the perception of Morsi as a threat to democratic and Western values.

The 2013 coup is analysed as a culmination of a strategic securitization process, where the military strategically waited for public support before justifying the overthrow of President Morsi, which led to the public acceptance of extreme measures, such as the Rabaa and Nahda Squares massacres, which confirms the manifestation of successful securitization processes, wherein public discontent, economic challenges, and media narratives contribute to the legitimization of repressive measures.

4.8. Conclusion

The detailed analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath paints a complex picture of political dynamics, ideological shifts, and the interplay among various actors. The Muslim Brotherhood's strategic and cautious approach, the military's pivotal role, the influence of secular opposition and media narratives, and the international dimensions all contribute to the intricate web of forces shaping Egypt's political landscape.

The securitization processes, highlighted during SCAF and President Morsi's era and the 2013 coup, underscore the erosion of democratic norms and the successful manipulation of narratives to justify repressive measures. This led to the acceptance of extreme actions, such as the Rabaa massacre, pointing to the challenges of maintaining democratic principles amid political turmoil.

The intricate relationship between the military and the revolution is highlighted, with indications of pre-drawn plans ready for suppressing any demonstrations or act of political change. The military's role, initially ambiguous, evolved into a pivotal position, earning both praise and scepticism from different political actors. The examination of the

Mubarak era General Intelligence Head Omar Suleiman's role underscores the military regime's attempts to contain the revolution, with implications for the military's subsequent political manoeuvring. The chapter also sheds light on the MB's interaction with the army during the revolution, which shows a degree of trust and collaboration. The Brotherhood's nuanced approach, initially refraining from official participation in protests, gradually giving way to engagement in political dialogue, reflects a cautious strategy influenced by its experience throughout its history.

Moreover, the chapter illuminates the multifaceted dynamics that defined the SCAF era in post-revolutionary Egypt and the securitization processes during President Morsi's tenure. The strategic manoeuvrings employed by the SCAF, the careful exploitation of internal divisions within revolutionary forces, and the consolidation of military power emerged as central themes. The repercussions of this era cast a lasting imprint on Egypt's political landscape, laying the groundwork for subsequent developments. The SCAF's adept navigation of the political terrain, its implementation of securitization measures, and the fragmentation of revolutionary forces underscore the complexity of power dynamics during this period. Political legitimization strategies, social division tactics, and the nuanced role of Islamist groups, particularly the MB and Salafists, further highlight the intricate interplay between state and non-state actors.

The examination of the securitization process during President Morsi's era adds depth to our understanding. The cooperation between state and non-state actors, the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat by diverse non-state entities. The role of specific non-state actors, such as former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa and the Al-Nour Salafi Party, in the securitization process provides insights into the varied influences shaping political narratives. Notably, the post-coup justifications and calls for coexistence by Salafists serve as a lens through which to understand the evolving dynamics after significant political shifts. The chapter underscores the dynamic nature of alliances and strategies in response to changing political landscapes, emphasizing the adaptability of actors in influencing public opinion. In essence, this study offers a comprehensive exploration of the complex interplay between state and non-state actors, providing a nuanced understanding of Egypt's post-revolutionary political evolution. By delving into the roles of religious figures, political parties, and media in shaping public opinion, it sheds light

on the intricate tapestry of influences that define the country's contemporary political landscape.

The opposition to Mohamed Morsi's presidency by secular forces in Egypt was a complex interplay of political, media, and military dynamics. The NSF, Tamarod movement, and influential political parties coalesced against Morsi's policies, emphasizing concerns over his constitutional declaration. Simultaneously, the media, particularly through shows like Bassem Youssef's and Tawfiq Okasha's, played a crucial role in amplifying discontent and contributing to the polarization between Islamist and liberal factions. The military, positioning itself as the guardian of security, strategically differentiated between revolutionary components, paving the way for intervention.

Statements from military figures, notably General Sisi and General Sidiqi Subhi, underlined their readiness to act independently of the presidency, creating an atmosphere conducive to military involvement. The culmination of these factors led to heightened polarization, with secular forces using the media to discredit Morsi and the MB. The SCAF strategically facilitated tensions, contributing to the political turmoil that ultimately prompted Popular acceptance of military intervention. In essence, the opposition's multifaceted approach, coupled with media influence and the military's strategic positioning, created a volatile environment that culminated in the military's intervention, reshaping Egypt's political landscape.

Also, this chapter illuminates the multifaceted role of the US media in shaping perceptions in the aftermath of the Egyptian 2011 revolution. Through a chronological exploration, it becomes evident that media narratives showed President Morsi as a politically weak figure and portrayed him as anti-democratic and anti-Western. Crucially, the study reveals a consistent pattern of negative framing, employing orientalism techniques to construct a distorted image of Morsi. This portrayal played a pivotal role in legitimizing the 2013 coup in the eyes of Western audiences.

The integration of theoretical frameworks, specifically the preventive war approach and liberal hegemony, broaden our understanding by contextualizing media narratives within broader political and ideological motivations. The notion that liberal states, like the US, seek to spread their ideology globally provides a lens through which the perceived threat

posed by the MB to Western values is examined. Scientifically, the analysis underscores the influential role of media representation in shaping public opinion and historical interpretation. The manipulation of narratives, exemplified in the portrayal of Morsi, not only reflects a specific ideological stance but also serves political interests. Importantly, this study raises awareness about the far-reaching implications of distorted media portrayals on democratic processes. The case of Egypt serves as a stark reminder that the media's construction of an "imaginary President Morsi" contributed to undermining the democratic transition, paving the way for repressive military rule. In essence, the scientific conclusion emphasizes the intricate interplay between media, politics, and international relations. It urges scholars and policymakers to critically assess the influence of media narratives on public perception, democratic processes, and historical outcomes. The lessons drawn from the Egyptian case underscore the imperative for a vigilant and critical examination of media framing in the study of international relations.

The significant role of a strategic securitization process in the 2013 military coup in Egypt. Empowered by prior successes, the SCAF orchestrated the overthrow of the elected President Morsi, leading to brutal reprisals against his supporters. The acceptance of extreme measures, such as the Rabaa massacre, was influenced by public discontent, economic challenges, and a media-driven "sheep paradigm".

The success of the securitization process allowed the SCAF to act outside the rule of normal law with minimal condemnation. Media discourse, employing demonological and "sheep paradigm" narratives, played a pivotal role in dehumanizing Morsi and his supporters, contributing to widespread acceptance of repressive measures. The timeline leading to the coup reflects a calculated strategy by the military, waiting for public support before justifying the overthrow of President Morsi. The subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, characterized by mass killings, imprisonment, and torture, further emphasized the success of the securitization process.

In summary, the 2013 coup and its aftermath reveal a complex interplay of political strategy, media influence, and the deterioration of democratic norms. The successful securitization process facilitated the military's actions and led to sustained repression, consolidating the military's power.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECURITIZATION OF THE MB DURING PRESIDENT SISI'S TIME

5.1.Introduction

Following the culmination of the securitization process, as discussed in the third chapter, the military coup was enabled to commit mass atrocities, as witnessed in the Rabaa and Nahda squares. It embarked on widespread extrajudicial executions and arrests outside the purview of ordinary law, targeting the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of President Morsi. Remarkably, this occurred without significant popular opposition; instead, a state of considerable public endorsement for the coup emerged. The military coup successfully propagated this narrative, presenting it as a popular revolution, akin to the military regime's promotion of the July 1952 coup, subsequently referred to as the 1952 Revolution, imbued with a populist character.

During this period, the MB and supporters of President Morsi organized extensive protests against the military coup, advocating for the return of the elected president. As the SCAF persistently dealt with the Brotherhood and its supporters outside the bounds of the law, implementing aggressive security measures, a new phenomenon emerged. Youth groups, initially engaged in minor acts of vandalism against the military and police forces, gradually evolved into quasi-military factions as the coup regime continued its harsh treatment of the opposition. The coup leader consistently employed his tools, such as the media and certain state institutions, as securitization actors, mobilizing popular support for the coup. Additionally, efforts were made to forge strong relationships with the international community to secure external backing.

This chapter will shed light on the role of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta and the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders as official religious institutions, illustrating their involvement as security actors. It will also explore external support for Sisi, exemplified by the backing from President Trump's administration during his first tenure.

5.2.Political Context

After all, the final actor in removing Mubarak, and Morsi, was SCAF. While a coercive institution of the state, the army, enters the space of civil society, claiming that it is acting on behalf of the Egyptian people or even calling them to protest in its support, as it did in July 2013 calling for a mandate to confront terrorism, as part of the ruling class, the army engaged in civil society in order to re-establish its hegemony (Härdig, 2015). To complete achieving this hegemony, since July 2013, the Sisi regime has widened the circle of repression beyond the Islamists or the MB and its supporters, including human rights activists, lawyers, and businessmen who refused to give financial support to the government's mega-construction projects, journalists, university students, labour activists etc. (Hamzawy A. , 2017).

The state media spread a discourse that redefined the 2011 revolution as a conspiracy implemented by the Brotherhood, other Islamists and foreign governments to destroy the Egyptian state (Pratt & Rezk, 2019). We can recognize Sisi saying that "the January 2011 Revolution aimed to destroy the state, not change the ruling regime" (MEMO, 2020/2), which confirms the argument that SCAF considered the 2011 revolution as an insurgency from the very beginning and started a securitization process immediately against it.

In this era, the confrontation became clear between SCAF and the MB, where Sisi faced opposition from MB and its allies, mainly in the peaceful demonstrations organized all around the country ("Al-Jazeera," 2013/5), and as a result of high suppression from the military side, some pro-MB youth movements did some acts of sabotage for example "Goblins against the coup" ("Al-Jazeera," 2013/6).

Also, a number of armed groups that were attributed to the MB like "Hasm" and "Lewa El-Thawra" movements (Abd El-Rahman W. , 2018), in addition to the Saini peninsula Jihadi groups, far from the MB, which decided to point their weapons towards The Army after the 2013 coup (Abu Zamel, 2017). The state succeeded in suppressing the demonstrations, sabotage acts, Sisi launched the toughest crackdown on Islamists in Egypt's modern history, widening the sphere of repression, killing and imprisoning outside the law (MacLellan, 2015), continuing to designate MB and its supporters as the biggest threat to the Egyptian national security (Pratt & Rezk, 2019).

Sisi still emphasises in his speeches that the MB and its allies are terrorists, working to demolish the Egyptian state, or attempting to destroy Egypt (MEMO, 2020/1), introducing himself and the Army as the saviours of it (Härdig, 2015). Early in October 2020 during a meeting with the Egyptian army, Sisi stated that he refuses any reconciliation with the MB, reasoning that “Egypt rejects any reconciliation sought by the forces which carry out bloody attacks against the people of Egypt and seek to destroy the state” (MEMO, 2020/1).

The Egyptian large media apparatus is also still working against MB, with famous program introducers like Ahmed Mousa and Amr Odeab, continuously attacking the MB introducing a securitizing discourse (“Al-Jazeera,” 2021). On 4 October 2016, Mohamed Kamal, a senior top leader within the MB was killed by police forces, Kamal was thought to be responsible for the Brotherhood's *armed wing* (Ismail A. , 2016).

Kamal's killing affected the MB making a wide fraction within its top leadership and affiliates. As a result, differences and divisions occurred within the ranks of the group (Kamel, 2020), It still hasn't been mentioned that it has been resolved as of now in 2023. A situation similar to the disagreement between the "armed" private system led by Abdul Rahman Al-Sindi and the General Guide Al-Hudaybi occurred, leading to internal rifts within the group. The matter culminated in an attempt by some youth from the private system to occupy the central leadership, compelling the Murshid to resign. However, Al-Hudaybi managed to maintain cohesion and remain in his position, leading to the suspension of the membership of the defectors at that time. Most historical sources have indicated Nasser's involvement in orchestrating this event, as detailed in the first chapter.

On 17 June 2019, President Morsi died suddenly while he was in court, it has been widely suspected that he was killed by poisoning his food, some observers considered his death 'the last nail in the coffin of Egypt's revolution' (Al-Malky, 2019), due to the successful securitization process, most of the Egyptian people didn't cry their former elected president, and even a large sector showed happiness and mentioned Morsi as a terrorist. He was buried at night in secrecy without a formal funeral (DW, 2019), as Sisi succeeded in distorting his image and portraying him as a terrorist, not an elected president.

5.2.1. Stages of the Emergence of Armed Organizations Linked to the Islamic Movement in Egypt

The idea of armed struggle appeared within the Egyptian Islamic movement, beginning with the “private system” of the MB, and ending with the emergence of Salafist jihadism and its applications such as “the Sinai Province organization”, passing through historical milestones, that witnessed major changes in goals, and the targeted enemy, in which the jihadist situation was linked to Salafism beginning with the 1960s of the last century until today.

The phenomenon of the emergence of armed groups attributed to the Brotherhood, for a short period of time following the 2013 coup until 2017 represented an intellectual and kinetic problem for the MB, which was fully committed to a peaceful approach, both intellectually and kinetically, without the emergence of significant violations within its ranks, since the era of President Sadat. Its institutions and structures were built based on this approach, in addition to the repetition and regurgitation of the experience of jihadi movement groups, which the Egyptian security services had practised for many years, which made the idea of building such an armed groups on the MB structures merely impossible.

Before the Arab Spring Revolutions (Historical context)

Armed actions appeared among the Egyptian Islamic movement early, with the establishment of the private system of the Brotherhood in 1940, and far from the dialectics of origin, we can see the idea of protecting the da’wa permeated among the group’s literature and in the founder’s sayings such as “Islam is a religion and a state, sword and Qur’an” (Al-Banna, 2010/1: 330). Even in the MB’s most famous slogan “Jihad is our path, and death for the sake of God is our highest aspiration” (Al-Banna, 2010/1: 430). The conditions of persecution during the Nasserist era, along with the emergence of the writings of "Sayyid Qutb", those writings that armed movements interpreted in their own way led to the emergence of a number of Islamic movements aiming to revive Islamic life through armed change. Among them were the Jihad Group and the Jamaa Islamiyah Group, until the idea of global jihad, or jihadist Salafism, emerged, along with the new form it gave to armed action.

From the Jihadists' Perspective Sayed Qutb had a significant impact on the overall transformative approaches adopted by the Islamic movement in the 1960s and the 1970s, and beyond. He reshaped the kinetic idea by integrating the prevailing literature, such as the literature of the MB and the literature of Abul Ala Mawdudi. Qutb gave it a new identity within a new intellectual framework, with its principles and foundations of thought. Moreover, with its political jurisprudence, means for its implementation, and its theory of change (Al-Taledi B. , 2013/1: 251-252).

According to Abu Musab Al-Suri, a prominent ideologue within the jihadist movement, the writings of Sayyid Qutb constitute a pivotal intellectual and methodological cornerstone for the contemporary jihadist trajectory across the Arab world and beyond. Al-Suri emphasizes Qutb's opus, "In the Shade of the Quran" which his supporters regard as a dynamic exegesis of the verses of the Quran, as the crystallization of Qutb's conceptual framework. This work subsequently evolved into the fundamental theoretical underpinning of contemporary jihadist ideological constructs. Notably, Al-Suri underscores the significance of Qutb's 'Milestones', despite its concise nature, as it encapsulates the crux of Qutb's jihadist-revolutionary propositions (Al-Suri, 2004: 692).

From the perspective of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the ostensibly tranquil surface of the era belied an underlying and dynamic resonance with Qutb's intellectual oeuvre, marking the incipient stages of the formation of the contemporary jihadist movement in Egypt (Al-Zawahiri, 2001: 12). "Al-Suri" refers to identifying the intellectual sources of the global jihadist, which consist of fundamental principles derived from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and the kinetic approach of Sayyid Qutb. Additionally, it encompasses the political jurisprudence of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah and the jurisprudential and doctrinal heritage of the Wahhabi dawah or the Salafi school (Al-Suri, 2004: 698).

In examining the role of Sayyid Qutb's thought in the genesis of jihadist currents in Egypt, Al-Zawahiri perceives Qutb's primary contribution as the emphasis on the assertion that the struggle between Islamists and their adversaries is fundamentally a theological battle or an existential conflict between Islamic methodology and secular materialistic ideologies. Meanwhile, he argues that Qutb's cohesive group, at the time, decided to direct its strikes against the Egyptian regime, considering it as a secular system antagonistic to Islamic methodology. This stands in contrast to earlier literature, which

asserted that the enemy of Islam was exclusively external, thus igniting the spark of initiation (Al-Zawahiri, 2001: 10-11).

Akram Hegazy confirms the last components of Al-Suri and points out that the heritage of the Wahhabi Dawa is considered the most important for Salafi jihadist groups. This is in addition to the experiences of the special apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The matter evolved due to the extensive intellectual work presented by Qutb, and the heritage of jihadist Islamic groups in Egypt and the Levant, especially Saalih Serryya's "Message of Faith", and the book "The Missing Duty" by Muhammad Abd El-Salam Faraj, played a role in this evolution. The latter distinguished itself by invoking jihadist jurisprudence from within the legacy of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim (Hegazy, 2013: 45). Osama Hameed emphasizes that the direct reason for the transformation of some early jihadist leaders into Salafism is the upbringing of the first jihadist groups in the well-known Egyptian Salafist association "Ansar Al-Sunna". Consequently, they adopted the Salafi methodology in both belief and jurisprudential studies (Hameed, 1986: 296).

In the aftermath of that, in the 1970s, several small groups emerged in Egypt that adopted an armed approach. Among them was an organization known as the "Military Technical College Organization" led by the Palestinian "Saleh Serryya" the author of "The Message of Faith" in which he reaffirmed the sovereignty of Sharia. He denounced the Egyptian state at the time and called it a blasphemy state, rejecting secular laws (Ahmed R. S., 1989: 55-65).

Another member of the Military Technical College Organization was "Mohamed Abdel Salam Farag" the author of "The Missing Duty" which was published in 1981. In this book, he reiterated the ideas of "Serryya" but with a Salafi flavour, relying on the legacy of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah. The book revolved around three axes: the inevitability of the victory of Islamism, Islamic legal judgments related to the regime and the Egyptian state, and then it concluded with the inevitability of jihad, stating that "There is no doubt that the tyrants of this land will not be removed except by the force of the sword" (Farag, 1981: 6). "Farag" also added some ideas that had a significant impact on the modus operandi of Egyptian jihadist groups, such as "the oath of allegiance unto death" (Farag, 1981: 37), "war is deception" speaking about the permissibility of lying to enemies,

assassinations, deceit, and the absence of warning before combat. He also justified the killing of women and children unintentionally based on their association with their fathers, as well as the permissibility of sabotage operations (Farag, 1981: 41-45). We can observe the clear influence of "Farag" in the book "Al-Umda" by its author "Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif," which was considered the main reference for jihadist groups until the beginning of the millennium.

According to Al-Zawahiri's narrative, the jihadist movement with the Salafi orientation was dominant in student unions at universities in southern Egypt during that time. They expanded beyond the university walls through protests and massive conferences, opposing President Sadat's policies of reconciliation with Israel. This marked the beginning of their acquaintance with Sheikh Omar Abd El-Rahman. Al-Zawahiri argued that when "Farag" and his group met with this movement in Upper Egypt, the "Islamic Group" was formed (Al-Zawahiri, 2001: 14).

Al-Awa argued that this meeting occurred between 1979 and 1980. Until 1981, the group did not have an organized administrative entity or specific jurisprudential references (Al-Awa, 2006: 87). The shape of the group began to take form with the issuance of the "Charter of Islamic Action" in 1984, composed in the Liman Tora prison.

This document served as the covenant for the group's activities following severe setbacks after the assassination of President Sadat. The document affirmed the group's goal as "dedicating people to their Lord and establishing a caliphate according to the prophetic method" through "calling, enjoining good, forbidding evil, and jihad in the path of Allah" (The Islamic Group in Egypt, 1984: 1). The document rejected all methods or approaches other than these, stating, "We reject all means proposed by ignorance as methods of work and tools for change through its institutions, systems, and principles" ("The Islamic Group in Egypt," 1984: 64). It was followed by the "Inevitability of Confrontation Document" in 1987, which emphasized the inevitability of armed confrontation with the Egyptian regime, asserting that there is no path for political change except through "a book that guides and a sword that conquers" ("The Islamic Group in Egypt," 1987: 9). The group eventually announced its retreat from armed action in 1997.

Another group was “the Egyptian Jihad Group”, According to Montaser Al-Zayat, it is an elite quasi-military group that operates clandestinely, attracting military or civilian individuals willing to engage in military activities. Since its inception in the 1960s, figures such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Sayyid Imam, and Essam Al-Qumari have played significant roles in shaping the group (Al-Zayat, 2008: 87).

Kamal Habib suggests that the group's objectives, from its establishment, revolve around calling for the Islamic religion, working to overthrow rulers who do not implement Islamic law, referred to by the group as "tyrants," and establishing Islamic rule, reinstating the Islamic Caliphate. To achieve these goals, the group chose armed jihad as its means (Habib, 2012: 12-13). In a document titled "Jihad against Tyrants is a Divine Yearning that Does Not Change", the group stated that armed confrontation against rulers is an essential part of their faith. The document emphasizes that the assertion "There is no god but Allah" entails four fundamental truths: dissociation from all tyrants, declaration of war against all forms of disbelief, clarity of the confrontation and its unity, and the realization that the methodology of "There is no god but Allah" can only be fulfilled by performing the duty of jihad for the sake of Allah and sacrificing for its dissemination (Al-Zawahiri, 2019: 7-8).

The group described the Egyptian reality at the time as a "disbelieving government, supported by an apostate faction, a misguided population, and confused Muslim youth" (Al-Zawahiri, 2019: 10). Kamal Habib affirms that this group laid the foundations for contemporary Salafi jihadism, drawing inspiration from the Ansar Al-Sunna Association (Habib, 2012: 12-13).

In 2007, Sayyid Imam published a document titled "Document of Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World," in which he announced the impermissibility of confrontation with governing authorities in Muslim countries in the name of applying Islamic law. He also affirmed that armed combat is not the sole option for confronting an unlawful reality and discussed the concept of power parity between resistance groups and ruling authorities (Emam, 2007).

Since the events of September 11, and the emergence of Osama bin Laden, the Salafi Jihadist trend has come to the forefront. According to Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, a

prominent theorist in Salafi Jihadism, “Salafi Jihadism is a trend that seeks to achieve monotheism through the jihad against tyrants” (Hijazi, 2013: 36). Since then, the term Salafi Jihadism has come to represent jihadist currents that believe in the idea of global militant Islam. The essence of this approach lies in its effort to extract the concept of jihad from the ideological content characterized by organizational, national, and limited political dimensions that have dominated it for decades (Hijazi, 2013: 33).

Hijazi believes that Salafi Jihadism can be observed by looking at hot fronts as spaces of varying levels of polarization in fieldwork. He categorizes Egypt, along with Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, in the fourth level (Hijazi, 2013: 50-51). Also, following the events of September 11, 2001, there was a noticeable interest among jihadists in Wahhabism or Salafism. Scholars like Ali Al-Khudair and Ahmad Al-Khalidi entered the jihadist scene (Hijazi, 2013: 35).

However, the most significant impact of the prominent Salafi Jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi lies in adopting the Wahhabi line. Al-Maqdisi focused on reviving and activating the concept of "monotheism" as the most important religious term and concentrated primarily on the opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, and the Najdi scholars. He revived the political legacy of the Wahhabi Dawa, emphasizing issues like "Sharia governance", "loyalty and disavowal" and "disbelief and faith", authoring works such as "The Creed of Ibrahim" "The Thirty Rules in Warning Against Exaggeration in Takfir," and "This is Our Creed".

After the Arab Spring Revolutions

The Arab Spring brought about fundamental changes in the jihadist movement, both at the Egyptian and Arab levels. Egypt witnessed the return of many jihadists who were pursued or had fled during the Mubarak era (Al-Khatib, *The Returning Jihadists: From Participation in September Events to Egypt After the January Revolution*, 2011). Additionally, a significant number emerged from Egyptian prisons, with some having been detained for periods ranging from 20 to 30 years (Zaki M. , 2018). This occurred in the aftermath of the decline in the role and cohesion of the “Islamic Group” following ideological revisions. The integration of the Jihad Group into the "Jihad Base organization” outside Egypt since 1998, and the intellectual reviews undertaken by its

former leader, Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif, within Egyptian prisons, contributed to the shaping of the concept of global jihad transcending national borders, commonly referred to as jihadist Salafism (“BBC,” 2021).

After July 2013 Coup:

The period after the July 2013 coup witnessed a significant number of jihadists leaving Egypt to join the factions of the Syrian revolution, commonly referred to as the 'Syrian Jihad' (Kamel, 2012). This substantially emptied the Egyptian arena of potential violent activities against the coup regime. Additionally, the coup led to the armed factions in Sinai redirecting their weapons towards the Egyptian regime, shifting their focus from primarily targeting the Zionist enemy (“Al-Jazeera,” 2015/1). The situation evolved as some factions in Sinai pledged allegiance to the group 'Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis', later becoming affiliated with the Islamic State 'ISIS', establishing a foothold for the organization in Egyptian Sinai (Ashour, 2015). Other smaller jihadist Salafist groups emerged, such as 'Ajnad Masr', 'Ansar Al-Islam', “Jund Al-Islam, etc. These groups quickly became apparent targets for successive Egyptian security strikes, as Egyptian security forces became adept at dismantling such groups (Badran, 2017).

Armed Groups “Qualitative Groups” Potentially Affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood:

Analysts classify these armed groups into three successive waves. The first wave, spanning from late 2013 to mid-2014, is characterized by limited training, organization, and a lack of leadership. It employs primitive methods such as Molotov cocktails and occasionally firearms. They are represented by movements such as “Fire”, “Molotov”, "Execution" and "The Unknown".

The second wave, from late 2014 to early 2016, features the use of light weapons and primitive explosive devices. These groups maintain electronic platforms but lack specialized training. They are represented by movements like "Revolutionary Punishment" and "Popular Resistance" The third wave, from mid-2016 to 2018, utilizes assault rifles, explosive devices, and car bombs. It possesses effective leadership and control systems, specialized training, and focuses on ideological, political, and military

discourses, represented by movements such as "Hasm" and "Revolution Brigade" (Awad, 2017).

These movements distinguish themselves from jihadist groups by framing violence within the legitimacy derived from revolutionary legitimacy, blending the idea of "Jihad in Islam". Their rhetoric rarely includes terms used by jihadists, such as "apostates", "tyrants", or "infidels". But often employs phrases like "treason", "betrayal", and "collaboration". This maintains the approach followed within the Muslim Brotherhood of operating within the accepted framework of modern nationalist states, avoiding as possible direct confrontation or employing rhetoric that directly seeks to dismantle them at present. Their discourse also lacks any specific space for conflicts with other Islamic groups, possibly because their field of action has not intersected with any of these movements yet, or their interests have not conflicted. They adhere to the inclusive discourse characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood, diverging from the narrow sectarianism prevalent in Salafi-jihadi thought. For example, citations include statements from Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab Al-Suri, Ali Azzat Bijovich, some leaders of Hamas, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Ghazali, previous MB Murshid Mahdi Akef, and the well-known MB intellectual Mohammed Ahmed Al-Rashid (Tawfeq, 2017).

The United States designated the "Hasm" and "Revolution Brigade" movements as terrorist entities in January 2018, following the lead of the United Kingdom, which listed them in its terrorism list in December 2017. Britain justified its decision by citing their proven involvement in attacks against Egyptian security personnel and public figures (Abd El-Rahman W. , 2018). Trager argued that the heightened capabilities and broadened target scopes of at that time of that militant factions suggest a diminishing gap between them and Salafi-jihadist entities. He noticed several indications showing Al-Qaeda aim to co-opt these Egyptian groups, as Al-Qaeda-associated media channels have been endorsing statements from groups like Hasm since late 2016 and issued a statement expressing condolences for Mr. Akef, attempting to attract MB members (Trager, 2017).

5.3.The Role of Religion Institutions and Personalities in the Securitization Process after the 2013 Coup

5.3.1. Introduction

While Killine Clarke defines Revolution as "a mode of regime change that explicitly involves the mobilization of social forces seeking to overthrow an incumbent regime using popular protest" (Clarke, 2017), the term "counter-revolution" is defined by Fred Halliday as "a policy of trying to reverse a revolution", and, by extension, to policies designed to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power (Halliday, 1999: 207), or a reverse action by the previous regime to overthrow that social forces. While Allinson argued that to securitize a revolution, a counter-revolution case is built partly by portraying revolution as an external threat that can be countered only by the organic unity of an imagined past (Allinson, 2019). Revolutions display a common precondition: what John Chalcraft calls "hegemonic contraction" in which support for the existing rulers has fatally narrowed, or what Gramsci's analysis calls "crisis of authority" or "crisis of hegemony" or "general crisis of the state" (Chalcraft, 2016: 36). The task of counterrevolutionaries, if they are to succeed, is to reverse this process. This reversal requires the rebuilding of a political coalition capable of carrying out and supporting coercive repression (Allinson, 2019).

This was done in this case study in some of its parts by strengthening some official religious institutions with wide social and religious activity in Egypt, such as the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders, after neglecting their societal role, which led to their weakness during the Mubarak era, and the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, which recently added a security dimension to its activity showing full cooperation with the 2013 coup. Also, some other non-official groups such as the Salafist da'wa Group in Alexandria have participated in the process as shown in chapter three.

5.3.2. The Rule of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta and Grand Mufi in the Securitization Process

Bourdieu emphasizes that a notable feature of the political field is that for professionals to thrive within it, they must garner support from groups or forces situated outside the confines of the field (Bourdieu, 1991: 28). The 2013 military coup relied on Dar Al-Ifta

in the process of securitization in an attempt to use its religious soft powers to help in distorting the MB, trying to portray it as a group of terrorists or extremists unqualified to understand the true Islamic religion, in an attempt to fill the Islamic ideological space instead of the MB and the other Political Islam groups. What has added to Dar Al-Ifta's historical role, in issuing the Islamic fatwa, a security dimension serving the world of politics, which will subsequently harm the religious credibility of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta and perhaps for Al-Azhar as a whole.

After the role done by former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, shown in chapter three, the former Mufti Shawky Allam, who started as the Egyptian Grand Mufti in March 2013 until August 2024 succeeding Gomaa, continued to play the security role with the aid of the institution of Dar Al-Ifta. Prof. Dr. Shawky Allam is the professor and former head of the Department of Jurisprudence at the Faculty of Sharia and Law at Al-Azhar University, Tanta City branch. Although Allam is not known as a Sufi scholar but seems to be inclined to Sufism (Reda, 2020).

Showing the vital role of Allam for the regime, in August 2021 The President of the Republic issued a decision no.338 to consider the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta as an entity of a special nature, which the provisions of Articles 17 and 20 of the Civil Service Law do not apply to its leadership positions and supervisory management. (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021j; Egyptian Official Gazette, 2021), which means that the appointment of the Grand Mufti will be directly affirmed by the President of the Republic, without selection or nomination by any party such as the Council of Senior Scholars (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/1). This included the reappointment of Allam to the position of Mufti after he exceeded the retirement age of 60 years, and also has led to weak control of the Al-Azhar Council of Senior Scholars over Dar Al-Ifta and the creation of a parallel entity to Al-Azhar specialized in Islamic affairs, in violation of article 7 of the Egyptian constitution 2014, which states that Al-Azhar is the main reference in religious sciences and Islamic affairs (The Arab Republic of Egypt Official Gazette, 2014).

Dar Al-Ifta supported the military coup from its first day. As the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta confirmed, through its official page - branded blue - via the Facebook application, on 3rd July 2013, its confidence in the armed forces (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian

Dar Al-Ifta, 2013/1). The next day, the advisor to the Grand Mufti of the Republic spoke to outside Egypt through the Washington Post, confirming their support for the role of the army, saying: "We are aware of the important and decisive role of the Egyptian armed forces at this stage in maintaining peace and security throughout Egypt" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2013/2).

On the 5th of July, the Mufti of the Republic congratulated Counsellor Adli Mansour for assuming the duties of the interim President of the Republic (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2013c). Also, Allam appeared as a supporter of electoral benefits such as the referendum on the constitution (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/2) and the presidential elections in 2014 (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/3), trying to activate some sources of the economy of the coup state, such as his support for tourism, stressing that supporting and developing it is a national duty (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/4), and trying to reassure the outside that Egypt is moving towards stability (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/5) away from the elected president.

In 2015 Allam accused the Islamic movements of terrorism, and at the same time supported the armed forces to wage an open war against them, using some religious terms such as jihad for the sake of God, and his absolute support for the leader of the military coup continued. Saying to him "Your honourable war on terrorism is self-defense, defense of honour, defense of religion, and defense of Egypt and its surrounding countries" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2015).

Although the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta is a religious body specialized in fatwas, we can find that the institution has skipped this role and began, after the 2013 coup, through its religious authority to play a politically supportive role for the military state against MB and President Morsi supporters. Dr. Osama Al-Abed, the former President of Al-Azhar University, confirms that by considering the "Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta as the most important intellectual battalion that supported the president's decisions" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020c), which shows it Mixing its religious role with a political one to influence politics through its religious authority.

Although Dar Al-Ifta has been playing that role, the Grand Mufti had accused the MB of “Encapsulating political opinions in religious matters”, confirming that it “is the way for the terrorist group to infiltrate people's minds” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020n).

From a numerical perspective, the researcher studied the officially blue-marked Facebook pages of the Egyptian Dar Al Ifta² and Dar Al Ifta - Media Centre³ posts in a time interval of about six years, from December 2015 to January 2022, extracting numerical indicators, showing the support of Dar Al-Ifta to the Egyptian regime in the period after the 2013 coup. It has been recognized that Dar Al-Ifta mentioned the word (brotherhood) 131 times in the time interval.

Dar Al-Ifta launched a total of 102 direct attacks against the MB during a specific period. These attacks can be categorized into three main types: instances where joining the MB was prohibited, actions or movements associated with political Islam were targeted, and criticisms directed towards the ideas, fatwas, or influence of Sayyid Qutb, a prominent scholar within the MB. Specifically, there were three instances where joining the MB was prohibited, 59 instances where MB actions or political Islam movements were attacked, and 40 instances where the ideas or fatwas of the MB and Sayyid Qutb were criticized. According to Dar Al-Ifta, the MB has been characterized as a group associated with terrorism and extremism. This characterization is reflected in the frequency of the terms used, with the word “terrorism” being cited 307 times, “extremist” 57 times, and “extremism” 92 times. Dar Al-Ifta attacked the MB and its supporters 224 times, while supported and praised the coup and the coup leader for 246 times as illustrated in Figure (4.1), what will be shown in details in the following:

² The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, “Facebook post”, <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptDarAlIfta>.

³ The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, “Facebook post”, <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptDarAlIftaMedia>.




Figure (5.1): Attacking the MB and Supporters Versus Praising the Coup and its Leader

Source: (Numerical statistics extracted from the official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, and Dar Al-Ifta Media Center).

5.3.2.1. *Attacking the Brotherhood and Supporters*

The Direct Attack on the MB

The MB was directly attacked by Dar Al-Ifta in the time period 102 times, mentioning the word (brotherhood) 131 times, between the Prohibition of joining the Brotherhood 3 times, Attacking MB actions 59 times, and attacking MB and Sayyid Qutb ideas or fatwas for 40 times.

After Allam accepted the appointment to the position of the grand Mufti of the Republic by a decision of President Mohamed Morsi, who belonged to the Brotherhood and during his reign, Allam later turned against the MB, and summed up his work towards the Brotherhood, saying, "We must defend fiercely against the ideology of these terrorist groups and their existence" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020k). declaring his role in the securitization process against the MB, as refuting the ideology and squelching the existence. Allam used traditional Islamic terms that indicate the error of thoughts and at the same time encourage the killing of the Brotherhood, like the term of Kharijites, saying that "The Brotherhood represents the term Kharijites, from a scientific and a factual point of view" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020k).

Dar Al-Ifta characterized the MB as a terrorist group which seeks to demolish religious references and institutions and establish parallel entities to the state in various fields (The

official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021L), claiming that the MB considers itself an alternative to society (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020a), considering the MB as the Kharijites of the modern time, the enemies of Egypt who spread destruction everywhere in the name of establishing religion affairs (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020b).

While on the anniversary of "June 30 Revolution", the grand Mufti praised it saying: "it was the Anniversary of reclaiming the homeland from the hands of the terrorist groups", meaning the MB (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020L), trying to convince people that president Morsi and MB were just a group of terrorists that kidnapped Egypt. That makes sense about the death sentences that the grand Mufti has been agreeing about against the MB members and supporters (Sebaey, 2015). As we can recognize him saying during his lecture at the symposium titled "Correct your thoughts" at an Egyptian University about the Kharijites that "there is no cure for them except the sword", inciting the killing of Mursi supporters who he called Kharijites (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021j).

While the military coup in July 2013 led to the emergence of a negative environment for all ideologies in Egypt, especially for Islamic groups (Telci, 2022: 208), Dar Al-Ifta played its designated role in distorting the ideas and ideology of the MB, which would undermine the group's very existence and disengage its members. Dar Al-Ifta attacked MB's, well-known and most influential scholar, Sayyid Qutb. Allam said Qutb was not even a jurist, claiming that the famous Azhar scholar Sheikh Al-Subki did not consider Sayyid Qutb to be one of the scholars, jurists, or mujtahids, but rather called him "The Author" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020m). Allam assigned some thoughts to Qutb and accused him of it. He claimed that Qutb believed that Islam had disappeared, was feeling arrogant with religion (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021k), and his idea of governance confirms the kufr of the ruler who did not rule according to Islamic law, which, due to the Grand Mufti influenced the terrorist groups and their leaders all over the world (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/1). Allam added that "Al-Baghdadi", a former ISIS leader, and Al-Zawahiri, the Al-Qaeda leader, revealed that they embraced the ideology of Qutb and their affiliation with the

Brotherhood. Allam argued that Al-Banna and Qutb would bear the responsibility of destabilizing countries and killing people before God (Ibid).

Al-Ifta Observatory Center argued that Hassan Al-Banna legitimized violence, and Sayyid Qutb declared societies and regimes to be infidels (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2018), what gives the masses of people a preconceived notion that the MB declares them to be infidels, and may resort to using violence against them, which would persuade people to turn away from their ideas and accept violence against them.

More than this, Allam added that Sayyid Qutb's ideas confirm the inevitability of conflict with society with all its components, and thus killing, destruction and robbing money become a way to bring people back from their *Jahiliya* (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021g). Allam addresses the masses with the idea of the necessity of a confrontation between them and the Muslim Brotherhood, promoting the idea of a preemptive attack against them, or the inevitability of their surprise before their inevitable attack, which legitimizes and facilitates the security process, and shows the Egyptian army and police forces as the people's true defender against their enemy, what justifies using of state violence, or legitimates the use of special procedures for the necessities of society survival.

The Grand Mufti continued his attack on the MB's ideology, accusing it of exclusion and spreading the idea of heresy and atonement against the Egyptian people and the exploitation of religion for its interests (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021h). The MB was charged with exploiting the religious sentiment of the Egyptians to instil contradictory misconceptions and achieve private gains, as the religious discourse of the MB is a Machiavellian one that considers "the end justifies the means" from the point of view of Allam (Ibid). After Allam tried to strip the religious character from the MB's ideology, he described it as a notorious and anti-religious ideology from the point of view of the Egyptian people, continuing the attempt to distort the MB's reputation.

Outside Egypt, During Allam's visit to the British House of Lords, he stated that the Brotherhood is neither a preaching nor a scholarly group, but rather a terrorist group. Declaring that Dar Al-Ifta has been studying the literature of the Brotherhood and has demonstrated that the Brotherhood idea is based on violence and terrorism (The official

Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021I), Although claiming the MB is not peaceful nor oppressed (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021m). In an attempt to bring international support to the Egyptian regime and a continuation of the attempts to deliberately distort the Muslim Brotherhood, which supports the Egyptian regime in continuing to use the security solution against the Brotherhood.

Moreover, Allam made efforts to provoke Western hostility towards the MB by stating that the organization demonstrates treachery, claiming that there is a real duplicity in the Brotherhood's methodology when disclosing their ideas, as they declare more liberal ideas and deviate from the Islamic constants in front of the West, in contrast to what they declare in Muslim countries (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021n).

During the year 2021, Dar Al-Ifta published a new issuance of its English electronic magazine "Insight" which is normally directed to non-Arabic speakers, almost the West titled "The History of the Mother of evils", in reference to the MB, as the issuance criticized its history and thoughts (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021o).

Allam continued his accusations of the Brotherhood's ideology and claimed that "the approach and thought of the Brotherhood leads to division and creates crises in society, as it revived the concepts and ideas of the early Kharijites, but in a more complex and more dangerous way" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020d), He asserts his opinion that they are the contemporary Kharijites and are even more dangerous, which justifies the continuity of the security process, which means the continuation of political arrests and executions with the MB.

The grand Mufti added that the wrong religious concepts spread by the Brotherhood are among the most dangerous weapons used by the terrorist group, carrying with it the atonement of rulers, society, the army, the police and judges. He argued that Egyptian society, in the Brotherhood's view, is an infidel society, which does not apply God's law even if the individuals pray, fast and recite the Qur'an (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020e). without noting that the MB has always declared that this idea is a pure slander against it (Al-Boslama, 2024; Ramadan, 2006).

Moreover, Allam said that the Brotherhood is a terrorist group that seeks to demolish religious references and approved state institutions and establish parallel entities to the state in various fields (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021t). Additionally, the Grand Mufti said that the Brotherhood is trying to dwarf the role of Al-Azhar because it does not correspond to their purposes, but rather it is a detector of their falsehood (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021b), Allam added a Fatwa that there is an Islamic jurisprudential forbidden or “haram” to join the MB (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021c), in an attempt to present himself and the institution of Dar Al-Ifta as a well-educated Islamic alternative to the audience affected by the MB.

In this sense Allam, who exaggeratedly praises the coup leader and his fellows, as will be explained, claimed that the group that presented a legitimate, freely democratic elected president divided the Egyptian people, or the people of one nation and incited against state institutions, and those who staged a military coup against the elected democratic president gather the citizens and preserved the state institutions. Allam said “The Brotherhood is the one who created division among the citizens of the same nation and invented slogans that incite against state institutions” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021a). This indicates the Grand Mufti’s continuous attempts to accuse the MB, even if illogically, echoing what the MB’s enemies are promoting, using his religious authority, confirming what they promote in addressing the masses.

While other texts of Allam refute that. He argued that “If the Brotherhood remained in power for years, it would have caused divisions and civil war”, which means that divisions didn’t actually happen (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021d). Also, he said “During their rule period, The Brotherhood tried to control all state institutions, but they failed, thanks to God” (Ibid.), At the time the MB opponents were speaking about brotherhoodizing the state, which meant that the MB was trying to appoint their members to the leadership positions in the state institutions at Mursi era (Bahaa El-Deen, 2012). What makes it unlogic to attempt to lead and control the state institutions and at the same time incite against them.

Attacking the Policies of Other Countries Supporting the MB'S Issues

The Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, which is specialized in Islamic fatwas with a clear religious nature, have moved to play a role as if it is a part of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attacking the policies of other countries and their leaders, using the religious authority in attacking regimes that were not compatible with the Egyptian regime at that time.

In January 2014, the Mufti of the Republic met with the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and they signed a protocol of cooperation between them, in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Dar Al-Ifta represents soft power for Egypt in the countries of the world (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, 2014/1). What explains the behaviour of Dar Al-Ifta after this date, as if it is an institution affiliated with the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, in its repeated attacks on some countries such as Turkey and Ethiopia, and its publication of reports on national security issues such as its monitoring of armed terrorist operations around the world, and its repeated congratulations to the leaders of countries, and even warning countries against the spread of some groups on its lands like right-wing groups in Europe. As well as the frequent reception of ambassadors and foreign statesmen, and foreign countries visits⁴, the most recent of which was Allam's visit to the British Parliament, in which the Mufti claimed that the Brotherhood is a bloody group, which shows that the Egyptian state decided to exploit the soft power or religious influence of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta to achieve its political goals.

The Turkish Republic had the lion's share of the Dar Al-Ifta attack outside Egypt, with 17 offensive posts, where the words "Turkey", "Turkish regime" and "Turkish" were repeated 32 times, while it attacked Ethiopia in one post. Trying to use Dar Al-Ifta's soft power to negatively affect Turkey's image as a state and leadership in front of the Islamic world and Muslims, in an attempt to convince them of the unjustness of those issues that Turkey supports, which may negatively affect its support for the issue of President Morsi and MB.

⁴ See in the time period from December 2015 to January 2022: The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, "Facebook post", <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptDarAlIfta>; and The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, "Facebook post", <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptDarAlIftaMedia>.

The main ideas for attacking Turkey were at the level of the Arab world and Africa, as the Dar Al-Ifta observatory center accused Turkey of its colonial ambition, claiming that Turkey has aspired to control the depths of Africa, and the Arab region creating a fertile environment for terrorist groups (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/1), while Dar-Alifta claimed that the Berlin conference, which the Egyptian president Sisi attended, tried to put an end to Turkish ambitions in Libya so it supported stability in the Libyan territories (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/2).

Moreover, Dar Al-Ifta left its religious role to guide the parliaments of other countries in their decisions, as the Observatory of Takfiri Fatwas and Extremist Opinions of the Dar Al-Ifta condemned the Turkish Parliament's approval of the authorization to send military forces to Libya (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/3), and accused Turkey of transferring terrorists to Libya to support the UN recognized Tripoli government, calling it (the Tripoli militias) (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2019/1).

Dar Al-Ifta also claimed the emergence of terrorism in the areas controlled by Turkey in Syria and argued that the Turkish regime sent hundreds of terrorists to support and strengthen the ranks of ISIS in the Sahel and Sahara region (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/4).

While at the level of the Western world, Dar Al-Ifta claimed that Turkey's behaviour in the West is fueling Islamophobia, and bringing Muslims there into the circle of political conflict, it also warned about Turkey's use of the Muslim presence in the West to achieve its political goals (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/5). Also, it is claimed that Turkey threatens the West by flooding Europe with extremists and burning it with terrorist fire (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/6).

The Turkish President Erdogan was also directly attacked, in an attempt to distort his image in front of Muslims. Dar Al-Ifta claimed that Turkey is interfering with the issue of refugees in order to obtain European support for Erdogan's policies (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/7), the Turkish fatwa discourse at home and abroad was used to serve Erdogan's expansionist works (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/8), and the

Muslim Brotherhood issued fatwas of a Takfiri nature to serve Erdogan's purposes and ambitions in Libya, Syria and Yemen (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/9).

Dar Al-Ifta also tried to indirectly distort the image of Turkish religious scholars, saying that fatwas and religious discourse are Erdogan's cheap weapons for staying in power and achieving the dream of the caliphate (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/8), accusing the Turkish scholars of issuing false fatwas to achieve political interests, what may weaken the image of their fatwas in front of the Muslim public who trusts the scholars of Al-Azhar.

Attack on Political Islam

The political Islam groups were attacked by Dar Al-Ifta in the time interval 10 times, mentioning the words “political Islam” or what they called “political Islamization”. While Dar Al-Ifta has spoke politics, supporting the coup and coup leader, it criticized political Islam movements for reducing Islam to a political issue (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/10), describing Political Islam as a failed project that originated at the hands of Hassan Al-Banna and has become a nightmare that disturbs the whole world while it has retreated religiously and morally since its inception because it was based on flimsy foundations and misconceptions (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2019/2).

The grand Mufti defined Political Islamism as the political and bad exploitation of Islam to achieve certain goals in the past and present (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020j). He said political Islamization groups have deviated from the lofty concepts inspired by the Book of God and the Sunnah of the Messenger of God and have departed from the path of moderation (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021e).

Allam claimed that Political Islamism is a danger to nations and they have made a lot of efforts to confront it, but they still need the unity of religious institutions and other state institutions to confront it (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021f). This time, instead of the ordinary masses, Allam addresses another audience, elites who have real power, who are officials in various religious and other

institutions, asking for help against the MB and other political Islam groups. If he can convince this kind of audience, that will provide actual power to continue securitizing it.

Attack on the So-Called Extremist and Terrorist Groups

The securitizing actor tries to convince his audience by labelling his opponent or framing him. The central task in 'framing' is to advocate a view that both legitimizes and motivates protest activity, and its success is partly determined by the 'cultural resonance' of the frames the activists draw on (Vuori, 2011), Dar Al-Ifta continues to use resonant terms. this time it tried to infame the MB by using the terms *terrorism*, *terrorist*, *extremism* and *extremist*. Dar Al-Ifta considered all the political Islamic movements to be terrorist or extremist movements without distinguishing between them. It accused the MB of terrorism as well as ISIS, and it blamed Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb for extremism and terrorism, as well as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and Ayman Al-Zawahiri as explained before.

The so-called Extremist and terrorist groups were attacked by Dar Al-Ifta in the time interval 95 times, mentioning the words "Extremist/s" and "Extremism" 153 times, while mentioning the words "Terrorism" and "Terrorist/s" 374 times. After labelling the political Islamic groups by the later terms, the grand Mufti focused on emphasizing it by adding appropriate descriptions, repeating that they misunderstood Islam. We can notice that in Allam's texts saying: "We have been plagued by extremist groups that distorted the image of Islam and showed it in an aggressive manner, and they misunderstood the religion" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/22), "We found many deviations among extremist groups and many delusions with which they dressed falsehood in the robe of truth" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/30). "Terrorist groups have offended Islam with their ill understanding and despicable actions, even though their number does not exceed 1% of Muslims" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/31). "Terrorist groups resort to deviant and extremist interpretations of religious texts that take them out of their context and justify their criminal actions" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/33).

While in the same time, the Grand Mufti assured that the 2013 coup leader is a “religious reformer” who has carried on his shoulders the issue of renewing religious discourse to suit the changes of the times and has cared about showing Islam in a civilized dress (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/2). Allam clarified his conception of the extremist organizations, that they all emerged from the womb of the MB which is rooted in violence from the beginning of their era (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/34). He didn’t also forget to accuse Sayed Qutb of extremism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/35), and called on young people to completely stay away from what he called extremist currents and poisonous ideas (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/36).

To focus more on the ideas of the MB and the Islamic movement and continuous following, Dar Al-Ifta established “The Observatory of Takfiri Fatwas and Extremist Opinions” in 2014, which monitors and analyses all published extremist fatwas and issuances and works, from Dar Al-Ifta’s point of view, to dismantle them. Until January 2022, the observatory has issued more than 600 reports (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2022/1). Dar Al-Ifta also worked on training students and imams working in the Ifta field and qualifying them to confront the so-called terrorism and extremist views (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/37).

The General Secretariat of Fatwa Institutions in the world, headed by Allam, issued in 2021 a publication entitled "The Reference Guide to Confronting Extremism" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/38). Dar Al-Ifta also launched a research and academic platform under the name of (Salam Center for Studies of Extremism) in 2021, which is concerned with studying, analysing and treating the phenomenon of extremism in the name of religion. The centre’s objectives are based on achieving comprehensiveness in confronting extremism and terrorism by addressing the religious, human, social and intellectual dimensions of the combating process, and providing recommendations and action programs for how to confront, combat and eliminate this phenomenon (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/39).

Under the cover of framing the MB as terrorists and extremists, the grand Mufti tried to connect and pass some other thoughts to those terms, to affect the people and even the members of the MB, Allam in one of his seminars described the Brotherhood and its supporters as the forces of evil and terrorism that tried to stop and disrupt the process of construction and reconstruction to demolish the Egyptian state. At the same time, he tried to convey the message that El-Sisi -the leader of the coup- led with all his strength and determination the locomotive of change, reform and modernization in all fields. Sending to the people messages, describing the Brotherhood with negative qualities, and describing El-Sisi with the opposite positive qualities (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/11).

Allam said that “The wrong religious concepts that the Brotherhood has spread are among the most dangerous weapons used by the terrorist group, which carries with it the infidelity of rulers, society, the army, the police and judges” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/11), trying to pass that the MB has been spreading wrong religious concepts under the cover of calling them a terrorist group. Allam also, tried to dismember the MB, by claiming that the MB’s generations are dangerous terrorists, he said “People should be aware of the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorist groups it generates” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/12), he assures that Dar Al-Ifta is fighting them everywhere added the cyberspace “Terrorist groups exploit cyberspace to recruit young people, and we face this by storming social media” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/40).

Allam Also, showed the MB as terrorists, trying to destroy religious references and state institutions, saying that “The Brotherhood is a terrorist group that seeks to demolish religious references and approved institutions and establish parallel entities to the state in various fields” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021t). Moreover, he tried to gain international cooperation against the MB, mentioning them as extremists. Saying “We are facing a great responsibility that needs international cooperation to confront extremism, and Egypt is fighting terrorism on behalf of the whole world” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/41).

In 2015, Allam met the ambassadors of all European Union countries in Egypt and consulted with them on ways to enhance cooperation to confront extremism and terrorism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2015/1). In 2020, he received a high-level US delegation to discuss aspects of religious cooperation in confronting extremism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/13). Later, Allam said “Dialogue between followers of different religions is a real victory over extremism and terrorism, and it must be transformed into real programs that help coexistence” (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/42). Even his request for participation from people of other religions like Christians and Jews in his intellectual war against the Brotherhood or political Islam raises questions about the ability of other religions to correct what Allam considered to be wrong Islamic thoughts.

We can compare it to the media at Farouk's time which had engaged in hyperbolic depicting the MB as criminal elements before the public eye. This reached an extent where a government-affiliated newspaper asserted that even if Jewish gangs were to occupy Cairo, their detrimental impact would not amount to even one percent of the destructive actions attributed to the Brotherhood (Al-Sabbagh, 1998: 63). Despite the media sentiment during Farouk's era, wherein there was a belief that the occupation of Cairo by Jews would pose a lesser threat compared to the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Allam, in a strategic move, opted for collaboration with the media. He sought their cooperation to assist in his campaign against the Brotherhood. In other direction, the grand Mufti tried to undermine the credibility of the MB's supporting media as if it was trying to take away from the people's unity, saying “Egypt is facing a fierce battle in which the dirtiest schemes are used to dismantle the unity of the homeland and weaken its power, and the obscurantist groups seek to destroy the state through the client media funded and directed to distort the facts, and the Fatwa House's confrontation with the Brotherhood's plans made it a target for distortion and fighting by the group's channels (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/11).

Also, The Ifta Observatory, in the same manner, said that “the virus of “rumours and lies” of the Brotherhood and terrorist groups seeks to distort national institutions and sow

discord among the people of the country. The Brotherhood's falsehoods are one of the strategies of the fifth-generation wars that are increasing on social media platforms. But their attempts have failed, which reflects the people's support for the political leadership" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/14). Continuing to distort the MB's image in front of the Egyptian audience.




Figure (5.2): Attacking the Brotherhood and Supporters.

Source: (Numerical statistics extracted from the official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, and Dar Al-Ifta Media Center).

5.3.2.2. *Supporting and Praising the Coup and Coup Leader*

Praise for President El-Sisi

Dar Al-Ifta praised El-Sisi 45 times in the interval. Contrary to her rhetoric against the Brotherhood, the Grand Mufti and Dar Al-Ifta praised Sisi's ideas and actions almost on every occasion. We can recognize that in Allam's speeches like: "We are still on the road, God willing; In order to continue the blessed march in the service of the homeland, religion and humanity under your blessed leadership, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi - may God protect you" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/43).

While Dar Al-Ifta accused the Brotherhood and its followers of being the first to incite against the Copts of Egypt (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media

Center, 2017/1), tearing up society and fueling conflict between its components until it claimed that Egypt would fall into a civil war if the MB continued to rule (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/44). Contrary to that when the Mufti mentions the coup leader, Egypt is a state with a unique experience of coexistence, followed by praising Sisi and that he was keen to build the mosque next to the church in his new administrative capital (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/25).

Allam continued to praise El-Sisi, saying, "The loyalty and gratitude to President Sisi, who has great visions and initiatives, and confident steps, to implement a comprehensive development strategy, who was able to make a strategic, military and developmental difference in a short time" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/45). Here it is worth asking whether one of the major official religious institutions in Egypt is monitoring the strategic and military developments? As a result, its head announces the result of its work.

While laying the foundation stone for a new hospital, it was natural for the attendees to say a word of thanks to the President of the Republic. The Mufti of the Republic, who used to exaggerate, said that Egypt is witnessing a boom in all areas of life, the most important of which is medicine! (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/46).

While Allam tried to turn some facts into the imagination of the Egyptians, to cover up some of the problems facing the Egyptian state, such as the problem of high prices, and the marginalization of the poor classes Allam said "The political leadership pays great attention to the poor and the marginalized and seeks to provide a decent life for citizens" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/47).

In 2021, While Egypt has been suffering from fear of water shortage and after the failure of negotiations with Ethiopia to preserve its water share, Allam thanks President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the Egyptian state with his leadership for the measures it is taking to protect water (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/48).

Also, Allam tried to give a religious character to the military state in Egypt. He added that the military secular state under the leadership of El-Sisi is keen to work with Islamic Sharia and adopt it as a basis for legal and constitutional legislation (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/23). This prompts supporters of the Islamic movement to support the Egyptian state in the face of the Brotherhood, which Allam has repeatedly stressed that they do not understand the true Islam and do not apply it. While Allam described the Muslim Brotherhood as an extremist and terrorist group that divides the people of the country, Dar Al-Ifta described the words of President El-Sisi as expressing the masses of Egyptians and Muslims, and as an embodiment of Egyptian moderation that restores respect for religious values (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/15)

Congratulations to El-Sisi on Various Occasions

Dar Al-Ifta Congratulated El-Sisi or his men on various occasions 42 times in the interval. Allam congratulated El-Sisi 31 times, between the Egyptian national holidays such as Air Force Day (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021), the victory of the October War (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/17), the anniversary of the 1952 revolution (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/21), and the anniversary of the liberation of Sinai (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/20). Or the opening of a naval base (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/24), assuming the presidency of the Republic and receiving an award from the Arab Parliament (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/49). Or religious holidays such as the new Hijri year (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/26), the memorial of Isra and Mi'raj (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/50), the Prophet's birthday (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/18), and Eid Al-Adha (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/23).

Allam also congratulated President Sisi and the Egyptian people on the seventh anniversary of the "June 30 Revolution" claiming that it is the anniversary of reclaiming the homeland from the hands of terrorist groups and a response to the nation's will in the

face of extremism and terrorism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2017/2).

Allam also congratulated El-Sisi in March 2021 on the success of the efforts to float the stranded ship in the Suez Canal (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/21). It is conceivable that Allam should extend congratulations to the Suez Canal Authority for the completion of its work, should he wish to commend someone. However, without apparent justification, he chose to congratulate the President of the Republic for the successful floating of a ship by the Canal Company. This suggests that the individual is attempting to capitalize on any opportunity to attribute achievements to El-Sisi in order to polish and enhance his image. At the same time, he exploits any event to tarnish the image of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters.

Praise the June 30 Revolution

Dar Al-Ifta commended the June 30 Revolution on ten occasions within the specified timeframe. Allam asserted that the events of June 30th constituted a significant revolution that rectified the trajectory and reclaimed the religious discourse seized by terrorist groups (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/13). He viewed these events as a natural response to the will of the Egyptian populace, rejecting capitulation to the threats of extremism and terrorism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/20). Allam argued that the occurrences on July 3rd were a conspicuous demonstration of exceptional merit for the Egyptian people, marking a defining day in the contemporary history of Egypt, where divine providence played a significant role (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/22).

Military and Police Forces Support

Dar Al-Ifta has manifested its endorsement of military and police efforts on 52 distinct occasions within the specified timeframe. Furthermore, it has consistently expressed commendations in conjunction with these occasions. Concurrently, Dar Al-Ifta has attributed acts of terrorism, societal disintegration, extremism, and conspiratorial activities against the homeland to the Muslim Brotherhood. As reiterated earlier, Dar Al-Ifta has unmistakably demonstrated unwavering support for the authoritative institutions

within the Egyptian state. Allam said "We have to stand in honour and send a message of salutation and glorification to all members of the army and police to protect them and preserve this country" (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/51).

He regarded himself and his associates, who belong to the clergy actively engaging with the military and police, as akin to participants in the inherent duties of these institutions. Emphasizing that the army and police are actively contending in physical battlefields, he underscored that those designated as scholars adhering to the moderate doctrinal approach are engaged in an intense ideological struggle (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/52). In light of the preceding declaration by the Grand Mufti, it becomes evident that Dar Al-Ifta, having diverged from its fundamental religious responsibilities, has incorporated several security-oriented entities. This transformation involves the issuance of strategic reports, global surveillance of terrorist activities monitoring and opposition to political ideologies. Consequently, Dar Al-Ifta seems to have assimilated into the operational framework of Egyptian security services. This confluence signifies the deliberate intention of the present Egyptian state to amalgamate religious and political elements, leveraging the religious authority inherent in Dar Al-Ifta to exert influence over the political trajectory.

Meeting Foreign Ambassadors and Statesmen or Foreign Bodies

Dar Al-Ifta, under the leadership of the Grand Mufti, has prominently featured 52 instances of diplomatic engagements with foreign ambassadors, statesmen, or international entities within the specified period. Allam has actively harnessed the soft power emanating from the religious authority of Dar Al-Ifta to enhance the international perception of the El-Sisi regime. The official website of the institution indicated that it has formulated a precise strategy for religious outreach with foreign entities. This strategy aims to implement goals, policies, and programs to leverage the Egyptian soft power in the religious domain on the international stage (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/53).

Despite Allam's explicit condemnation of the Muslim Brotherhood, asserting that "the exploitation of religion to gain power is reprehensible and unacceptable" (The official

Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/11), it is noteworthy that he consistently and recurrently utilized religious influence to perpetuate and fortify the regime's authority.

The Grand Mufti received in his office in the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta during only the year 2021 a number of senior officials, muftis and ambassadors from different countries of the world in more than sixty meetings during this period, the most prominent of them were: Archbishop of Canterbury, Secretary of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Mufti of Kosovo, Ambassador of the UAE, Ambassador of Azerbaijan, Ambassador of Kazakhstan, Ambassador of Pakistan, Ambassador of Jordan, Ambassador of Oman, Ambassador of Canada, Ambassador of India, the Mufti of the Comoros and its ambassador He also received the Minister of Islamic Affairs and Djiboutian Endowments, the Religious Adviser of the French Foreign Ministry, the Secretary General of the Association of Islamic Universities, and a number of ambassadors of Arab, Islamic and foreign countries. He also received in the time interval the ambassadors of Thailand, Venezuela, Spain, Indonesia, Filipins and Holland (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/19).

Conversely, in 2015, the Grand Mufti convened with ambassadors from all European Union nations in Egypt. During these meetings, consultations were conducted to explore avenues for strengthening collaboration in the face of extremism and terrorism. The primary objective was to furnish requisite religious support for Muslims residing in the countries comprising the European Union (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2015/1).

In May 2022, Allam undertook a visit to the British Parliament during which he disseminated a report among members of the House of Commons and Lords titled "The Neo-Kharijites: The Violent Nature of the Muslim Brotherhood" This endeavour was evidently aimed at asserting the purportedly violent disposition of the Muslim Brotherhood (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2022). In 2017 the adviser to the Grand Mufti received the ambassador to combat hate and terrorism at the Swedish Foreign Ministry to discuss cooperation in the field of combating terrorism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2017/3).

In 2022, the advisor to the Grand Mufti of the Republic, in his speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, called on the Council for the necessity of strong intellectual action to block the path of terrorist organizations (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2022/2). In June 2022 the works of the international conference of the Salam Center for Combating Extremism was launched, and the advisor to the Grand Mufti explained that representatives from the Security Council, the United Nations and the League of Arab States will be among the attendees. Among the issues that will be discussed are the issues of returnees, the financing of terrorism and the renewal of religious discourse (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2022/3).

Miscellaneous Topics

Various other topics in which Dar Al-Ifta supported the military 45 times in the interval. Allam called of the young to the need to support the state at this stage and maintain the stability of the country (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/17), praising the state's wise strategy in managing its files, especially the fight against terrorism (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/15), and its implementation of new development projects, describing Egypt as witnessing a boom in all areas of life (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/14). He confirmed Sisi's care for Egyptian religious institutions (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/16), and confirmed that the political leadership gives special care to young people (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/18). Allam claimed that any call that calls for the demolition or failure of state institutions is contrary to all religions and divine books (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/12).

The Mufti of the Republic supported and praised the Egyptian judiciary (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/10) at a time when political judgments abounded, especially death sentences. In order to confirm support for the judiciary and its political judgments, Allam tried to use his religious authority, claiming that the Egyptian state under the leadership of President Sisi was keen to work with Islamic law and adopt it as a basis for legal and constitutional legislation (The official

Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/9), Allam Called for active participation in the Senate Council elections (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2020/19), and even added that Sisi, since assuming the duties of his position, has taken upon himself the issue of a disciplined renewal of religious discourse, and is concerned with the necessity of showing this religion in its civilized dress (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/2).

Allam did not stop at that point in portraying the current Egyptian state as operating according to the provisions of Islamic law until he declared that the Egyptian state is currently an *ideal model* for building a modern state that achieves the purposes of Islamic law (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/8).

Allam also tried to use his soft religious authority to push citizens to pay taxes to the state, for example, claiming that paying taxes is a form of devotion to God (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/7), and made those who call for investing money outside the scope of state-approved economic institutions are weak-minded and exploiting the poor (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/6). He also made opposition to the Egyptian political system from outside Egypt a major sin, likening it to disobeying parents (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/5)! portraying Sisi as a father for Egyptian citizens. Allam portrayed President Sisi as a figure actively engaged in intricate Arab affairs, particularly concerning the Palestinian issue. He asserted, "Egypt, under the leadership of President Sisi, endeavoured to consolidate endeavours, mitigate discord, and reconcile differences among all Palestinian factions. This was undertaken to foster unity and pursue a fair and comprehensive resolution to the Palestinian predicament." (The official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta Media Center, 2021/4).




Figure (5.3): Supporting and Praising the Coup and Coup Leader

Source: (Numerical statistics extracted from the official Facebook page of the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, and Dar Al-Ifta Media Center).

5.3.3. The Rule of Sufi Orders and Scholars in the Securitization Process

Also, Bourdieu argument that professionals in politics must garner support from groups or forces situated outside the confines of the field (Bourdieu, 1991: 28), coincides with Sufi orders case. The Sufi movement played the spearhead in the 30 June 2013 coup alongside the political forces to overthrow the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. We can see the approach of Sufism to political power in Egypt after the June 30 revolution, which made the Sheikh of Sufi sheikhs, Dr. Abdul Hadi Al-Qasabi, one of the well-known political figures, became involved in many political issues after reaching the position of Chairman of the “Social Solidarity Committee” in the Egyptian House of Representatives in 2016 (“Al-Ahram Center for political and strategic studies,” 2017).

Abdel Hadi Al-Qasabi, won the presidency of the "Support Egypt" coalition in the House of Representatives, which is the majority coalition close to President Sisi. Which includes 317 deputies, nearly two-thirds of the 596 members of the Assembly, which can pass laws according to the constitution. The sheikhs of the Sufi orders considered this victory to be a rehabilitation of Sufism, and that they are qualified to represent the Islamic trend in Parliament and the entire political scene (Hassan A. , 2018).

Some Sufi personalities from within the official institution also emerged in support of the coup, such as the former Mufti Dr. Ali Gomaa, or the head of the Supreme Council of Sufi Orders, Dr. Abd Al-Hadi Al-Qasabi, or Dr. Osama Al-Azhari, who holds the position of advisor to the President of the Republic for religious affairs, or those with a Sufi inclination such as the former Mufti, Dr. Shawky Allam, some Sufi figures emerged from outside the official establishment, such as the Yemeni Sheikh Ali Al-Jafri, the well-known Sufi preacher who holds the position of General Manager of the “Tabah Foundation” in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Although Al-Jafri confirms that he is a neutral party, neither with the military coup nor with the Brotherhood (Tanweer Clips, 2015/1), After the coup, Al-Jafri tried to challenge the mechanisms of democracy that brought the elected president and tried to prove that democracy could not be compatible with the Islamic system, to challenge the legitimacy of the democratically elected president who belongs to the Islamic movement. At the same time, Al-Jafri always praised the military coup leader and the Egyptian army. Directly after the coup Al-Jafri with Dr. Osama Al-Azhari on the 3rd of July 2013 twitted confirming that "the conflict is totally political, not religious" (Usama El-Sayed Al-Azhary official Facebook page, 2013).

On 11th July 2013 Al-Jafri, at the CBC TV channel, came out in support of the military coup against the democratically elected president, trying to challenge the very principles of democracy, claiming that democracy could not block the outlets of those who want control and dictatorship through them (Habib Ali Al-Jifri, 2013), trying to convince people that the democratically elected president was able to implement Democracy to impose a dictatorship. In other words, he was trying to convince people that Morsi was a dictator who deceived the people through democracy.

Al-Jafri said, "They use democracy, and then if the violator uses what is permissible in democratic custom, they invoke Sharia saying that is "a break *khroj* against the ruler" (Habib Ali Al-Jifri, 2013), trying to give the character of the revolution to the coup, meaning that a large percentage of the people have revolted against President Morsi, and this means in democratic custom that he must step down from Authority from Al-Jafri's point of view as he clarified later (Tanweer Clips, 2015/1), while President Morsi's supporters reject this logic and cling to his electoral legitimacy.

After Al-Jafri had tried to challenge democracy by showing it incapable of preventing dictatorship, he began to show that it could not be compatible with the principle of shura in Islamic law, pointing out that a democratically elected president could not be an Islamic one in any case, trying to remove the religious influence of the MB blocking the way for those who call for some Islamic principles, such as “the prohibition of rebellion against the ruler” or “the obligation to obey the ruler”, to be applied to the case of President Morsi.

Dr. Mukhtar Gomaa, former Minister of Endowments, after the coup, has banned 55,000 imams from preaching in mosques, stopped and transferred thousands of imams who rejected the coup, and closed mosques immediately after prayers (The New Arab, 2014), to muzzle and silence any voice bearing an official religious character from the supporters of President Morsi supporting in removing any religious influence from the brotherhood.

On 13th July 2013 Al-Jafri, on the CBC TV channel, claimed that today, there is no such thing as called “political Islamic project”, but rather an idea that has been falsely marketed to people in the name of the Islamic project, it is invalid to include the jurisprudence of previous jurists about shura and “the people of solution and contract *Ahlo Elhal wa Alakd*” in looking at democracy and modern parliaments due to different premises. We have not yet devised a contemporary legal model that we place in exchange for democracy or for the post-democratic stage, or even studied the aspect of compatibility between them (Al-Jafri, 2013).

Al-Jafri's ideas may be Contrary to the Mufti of the Republic, who tried to show that the Egyptian state, under the leadership of President El-Sisi, is keen to work with Islamic law as an ideal model for building a modern state that achieves the purposes of Islamic law, showing El-Sisi as a religious reformer. This means that the grand Mufti has devised a contemporary legal Islamic state model that he could place in exchange for democracy, and it is working also ideally.

Al-Azhari emphasized the previous idea of Al-Jafri, also trying to remove the religious influence of the MB. Al-Azhari argued that the issue is about the reality of the Brotherhood's relationship with religion, not about the Brotherhood's political struggle with any party. Al-Azhari tried to show the Brotherhood in the form of a deceiver of

religion. He called on them to leave religion unscathed and not to disrespect it in political practice and claimed that the Brotherhood twists Sharia to utter what they want. Al-Azhari attributed to Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb a collision philosophy and claimed that ISIS was the result of this philosophy (Habib Ali Al-Jifri, 2016).

At the same time, neither Al-Azhari nor Al-Jafri mentioned the bloody clash of El-Sisi with the supporters of the elected president or mentioned anything about the Rabaa or Elnahda massacres done by him which the leader of the coup carried out in cold blood. On the contrary, Al-Jafri praised the Egyptian army and its commander, saying “Whoever considers targeting the Egyptian army as resistance, I am one of the Egyptian army” (Tanweer Clips, 2015/1). In the works of the cultural session No. 24 of the Armed Forces, in the presence of El-Sisi, Al-Jafri described the Egyptian army as if it is mentioned in the hadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him, as "the soldiers of the West", who is a victorious, believing army, he prayed God to support President El-Sisi (Carlot Renga, 2017).

With Al-Jafri's support for El-Sisi and the army, Al-Jafri sends messages to the Brotherhood and the families of the victims of the Rabaa massacre that would help establish the authority of the coup, asking them not to participate in any resistance acts against the coup, and to be satisfied with patience, prayer, supplication and conquer anger, calling on them to refrain from any revenge actions, and preserve the army, saying, “If you are burning the country, what is the difference between you and this brute authority that you speak of, if the Egyptian army had fallen, the whole country would have fallen” (Tanweer Clips, 2015/2).

5.4. The U.S. Rule in Egypt after the 2013 Coup

Regarding the case under study, the American administration worked in the era of President Trump in two directions: a direction that pushed against the Brotherhood, and in the other direction that supported the regime of President Sisi in Egypt. From the first days of Trump, the idea of classifying the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization began to be raised, while the American administration at the same time pushed towards establishing the Sisi regime in Egypt by praising it and presenting it as a strong ally of the United States.

Allinson argued that the U.S. intervention in Egypt's revolution was not simply a response to conditions of international anarchy but reflected cross-border social relations. In particular the deep interlocking of economic and security interests between Egyptian, Gulf, and US elites (Allinson, 2019), from his view Nick Bisley divided the tactical methods of international intervention into military, financial, diplomatic, and logistical means (Bisley, 2004).

5.4.1. President Trump's Attempts to Classify the MB as a Terrorist Group in 2017

Schmitt and others argue that after President Trump assumed office in January 2017, he began contemplating the classification of the MB as a terrorist movement. However, this proposal was shelved by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Lieutenant General McMaster, the National Security Advisor (Schmitt et al., 2019).

Mark Lynch anticipates that such a classification, if implemented, would serve as a significant reward for key Arab autocratic allies, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. It could also be a major victory in their ongoing campaign against Qatar. Additionally, this move might align with Trump's domestic political agendas as he entered the 2020 elections (Lynch, 2019). At that time, "Government Lawyers" cautioned that the MB did not meet the legal criteria for classification as a terrorist organization. In the volatile Middle East, where U.S. forces were already confronting Islamic extremists, confronting the MB could create more fronts than necessary. Additionally, the movement had been recognized as a legitimate political entity in many majority-Muslim governments. Moreover, they highlighted concerns from U.S. counterterrorism, intelligence, and defence officials about shifting focus from genuine terrorist organizations and their threats.

Andrew Miller, a former official at the U.S. State Department, expressed apprehension about politicizing the classification process, which could undermine the credibility of U.S. classifications against actual terrorist movements. A former U.S. official affirmed that the State Department found no evidence over the past two years to warrant classifying the MB as a terrorist organization. Diplomats and foreign policy officials at the State Department did not recommend passing such a classification (Schmitt et al., 2019).

On the contrary, Andelman argued that the U.S. government should have supported the MB. He argued that if America desires the region to move towards democracy, freedom of expression, and civil liberties, then supporting the MB is essential because it has been deeply rooted in societies where genuine terrorist groups like ISIS have sought control, making the presence of the MB crucial for maintaining stability wherever it is present (Andelman, 2019).

Iftikhar argued that intelligence officials and foreign affairs experts unanimously agree that the MB is not a terrorist organization. He contended that imposing American sanctions against a diverse political group with millions of members would be burdensome. Iftikhar added that even the CIA considers this idea highly unfavourable, cautioning two years ago that it would play into the hands of extremism, and damage relationships with America's allies. The agency, in an internal memo dated January 31, 2017, stated that the Muslim Brotherhood, followed by millions in the Arab world, officially rejects violence as a policy, and formally opposes Al-Qaeda and ISIS (Iftikhar, 2019).

Lynch also argued that there is a global consensus among analytical, academic, and intelligence communities that the MB is not a terrorist organization. Despite wide and fierce disagreements on other issues among these groups, such as whether the MB is committed to democracy or the extent to which it can act as a barrier against extremism and violence (Lynch, 2019).

Kirkpatrick also points out the illogical nature of this classification. While most parties associated with the MB strongly criticize U.S. policies, some of them have supported U.S. goals. He also highlighted the existence of multiple alliance relationships between certain branches of the MB and the United States. For example, in Kuwait, the MB is allying to America. In Iraq, the political party associated with the MB consistently supports the U.S.-backed political process and remains part of the governing coalition. In Yemen, the Brotherhood-affiliated party collaborates with some of America's Arab allies in the war against a group supported by Iran (Kirkpatrick D. , 2019).

It is also challenging to determine who Trump is targeting with this classification. The broader movement has inspired thousands of independent social or political groups

worldwide, including major currents and affiliated associations in Europe and North America, as well as recognized and U.S.-allied political parties from Morocco to Indonesia. Additionally, although the classification serves the interests of a group representing America's allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, the move itself risks isolating another group of partners, including Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan. Many governments aligned with the United States, such as Bahrain, Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kenya, all recognize political parties that carry the ideology of the MB. This situation could be seen as a "new Cold War in the region" (Dunne & Miller, 2019).

And about the harm of this classification against the issue of supporting Arab democracy, Shadi Hamid argues that this classification would undermine any claim that the United States has a genuine interest in supporting Arab democracy, given that the MB or affiliated groups are often the largest entities opposing authoritarian regimes and advocating for democratic elections. Allison Barrie further asserts that such a classification, if implemented, would pave the way for more oppression in a region already immersed in suppression (Young, 2019).

5.4.2. President Trump's Praise for El-Sisi and the Consolidation of His Regime

President Donald Trump has on numerous occasions refrained from raising concerns about human rights in Egypt, opting instead to commend President El-Sisi for his efforts in combating terrorism. This was evident in statements where Trump praised El-Sisi, expressing approval for what he considered an "outstanding job" in the fight against terrorism (HRW, 2019/2).

Human Rights File in Egypt During the Sisi Era

Human Rights Watch described the human rights situation in Egypt as the "worst disaster for human rights in Egypt in decades". Hussain Bayoumi, a researcher at Amnesty International, argued that "Egypt is currently experiencing one of the worst historical periods in security campaigns and arbitrary arrests, where individuals can be detained without any reason whatsoever". Since El-Sisi came to power following the military coup in 2013, Egypt has taken a dark path, crafting its worst human rights record in its long history (Kilani, 2019).

According to Human Rights Watch, since the 2013 coup, Egyptian authorities have arrested over 60,000 individuals, forcibly disappeared hundreds for many months, issued death sentences for hundreds more, and subjected thousands of civilians to military trials. To facilitate these actions, at least 19 new prisons were established. This underscores the critical importance of discussing the issue of freedom of expression during Sisi's visit to Washington (HRW, 2017). As for cases of extrajudicial executions within and outside the legal framework, for instance, in February 2019, nine individuals were executed following their conviction in the case of the killing of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat. Additionally, others were liquidated, resulting in a total of 50 execution cases within one month (Kilani, 2019).

According to the HRW, from 2016 to 2018 Egypt has consistently ranked within the top decile globally in terms of both the incidence of implementing capital punishment and the pronouncement of death sentences. Notably, in September 2018, the Cairo Criminal Court issued 75 death sentences in connection with a mass trial pertaining to the dispersal of the Rabaa Square sit-in events in 2013. According to data from the Egyptian Front for Human Rights, a minimum of 51 Egyptians faced an imminent risk of execution subsequent to the exhaustion of all available avenues of appeal in 2018. Authorities have already executed a minimum of 46 individuals in various cases, primarily civilians who were convicted by military courts. Additionally, the Egyptian military has undertaken the demolition of over 3,000 residential and commercial structures in Sinai since February 2018. Moreover, the continued detention of over 20 journalists persists, underscoring the gravity of the human rights situation in Egypt (HRW, 2019/1).

In 2015, the Egyptian government reported that prisons were operating at 160% of their capacity. By 2016, "Prison Brief" statistics indicated the presence of 90,000 political and non-political prisoners in Egyptian prisons, with an additional 16,000 in other detention facilities. This raised concerns among human rights organizations about the potential radicalization of inmates in prisons and detention centres. According to Foreign Policy magazine, Egyptian prisons have become recruitment platforms for the Islamic State (ISIS). This occurs simultaneously with the Trump administration commending President Sisi's efforts in counterterrorism. However, members of the U.S. Congress, both

Republicans and Democrats, have raised awareness about the threat posed by Sisi's policies to local and global security (Woodyatt, 2019).

President El-Sisi's Visits to Washington and President Trump's Warm Reception

On March 9, 2019, President Trump invited President El-Sisi to visit Washington, where Trump warmly welcomed him, addressing him as "my friend." Trump stated that the relations between Egypt and the United States had never been stronger. El-Sisi expressed gratitude to Trump, saying, "All the credit goes to you, Mr. President. Thank you very much for your support on all fronts". Before the meeting, President Trump articulated that the agenda would encompass discussions on bilateral trade issues and collaborative counterterrorism efforts. Notably absent from the pre-meeting discourse were references to human rights in Egypt or the release of detained Americans. However, the latter topic was considered during discussions with Secretary of State Pompeo (Lander, 2019).

Reuters quoted a senior official from the U.S. administration, indicating that the U.S. encourages the development of democratic institutions in Egypt. However, this encouragement is tempered by the consideration of U.S. security interests. Trump, according to the official, prioritizes relations with Egypt to achieve American interests (Mason & Alexander, 2019). This suggests that the Trump administration perceives the El-Sisi administration as serving U.S. security interests in the region, regardless of the compromised state of democracy and human rights in Egypt.

Michael Page, the deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch, contends that El-Sisi's visit to Washington aimed to secure approval for proposed constitutional amendments that would empower the military excessively and perpetuate authoritarianism. This aligns with El-Sisi's pursuit, through anticipated constitutional amendments, to extend his term in office until 2034. Undoubtedly, Trump has provided the support sought by El-Sisi to fortify his rule and confront adversaries (HRW, 2019/2).

Charles Dun, the diplomat and former Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programs at Freedom House highlighted that this would be perceived by Egyptians as American approval of suppressing freedoms and the tens of thousands of arrests. Dun added that this is not surprising, as Trump has always shown warmth towards dictators,

but at the same time, it harms U.S. interests and brings shame to any American who believes in human rights and democracy (Kilani, 2019).

Also, Hawthorn, the Deputy Director of Research at the Middle East Democratic Project, affirmed that the sole reason for El-Sisi's visit to the White House was to garner support from President Trump to remain in power. El-Sisi anticipates that he can intimidate his potential opponents through a staged display of American endorsement (Lander, 2019).

Despite Trump's welcoming of Sisi and considering him a strong ally for the United States, a number of members of Congress raised the issue of human rights in Egypt. Four senior American lawmakers, two Democrats and two Republicans, preempted Sisi's visit on March 9, 2019. They sent him a direct message before his visit, highlighting their concerns about human rights in Egypt and the Egyptian failure to meet the requirements of U.S. security assistance. They criticized Sisi's campaign against political opposition, even with Trump's support as an ally in counterterrorism and confronting Iran (Gramer, 2019).

Also, on the same day Seventeen senators from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including the leading Republican senator and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jim Risch, and the senior Democratic member, Senator Bob Menendez, sent a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo urging him to address “urgent issues” in the Egyptian case. Among these issues are the proposed Egyptian constitutional amendments, which, in their view, would erode the independence of the judiciary in Egypt. The amendments would allow Sisi to appoint heads of judicial bodies and extend his rule until 2034.

The American lawmakers expressed their rejection of these amendments and called on Sisi to establish democratic governance that ensures the independence of the legislative branch. They also raised concerns about human rights, civil society, and the release of American detainees in Egypt, as Egypt currently holds over 12 Americans, highlighting the legitimacy of these issues and the administration's apparent disregard for them at that time (MEMO, 2019).

5.5.Comparative Analysis of Securitization Patterns in the Nasser and Sisi Eras

As detailed in the thesis chapters during the pre-Nasser royal era, the monarchy allowed the Muslim Brotherhood freedom to engage in religious and social activities while adamantly refusing its involvement in the political sphere. This dichotomy was evident in the suppression of newspapers and magazines associated with the Brotherhood and the vilification of its image in government-controlled media. The government primarily dealt with the Brotherhood through the political police, employing various security strategies such as the arrest of members, freezing of financial resources, confiscation of properties and assets belonging to the group, and targeting government and partisan newspapers affiliated with the Brotherhood. Additionally, the Brotherhood was portrayed as a terrorist organization collaborating with occupiers posing the greatest threat to the Egyptian state at that time. Furthermore, other groups with similar names but differing ideologies were formed to attract followers away from the Brotherhood. Additionally, the Brotherhood was dissolved in 1948, its founder assassinated, and attempts were made to dismantle its infrastructure. However, this dissolution was short-lived as the Brotherhood resumed its activities officially in 1949, with its new leader being officially received at the royal palace.

The MB participated in the formation of the Free Officers Movement and played an active role in the success of the military coup in July 1952. Mitchell described the Brotherhood during this time as the "civil defender" of the Revolutionary Command Council until disagreement arose between Nasser and the MB. Following this disagreement, Nasser sought to tarnish the image of the Brotherhood through sympathetic media outlets and newspapers affiliated with the regime. He adopted new strategies aimed at marginalizing the Brotherhood in the public sphere. Nasser was initially attempting to integrate the Brotherhood into a government entity under his full control known as the "Liberation Rally".

Additionally, Nasser endeavoured to coerce the Brotherhood into accepting a puppet government, which the Revolutionary Command Council could manipulate to incite public anger against the Brotherhood. Nasser also worked to create internal divisions within the Brotherhood, particularly targeting divisions between the youth and their leaders, especially those aligned with the private system.

Ultimately, Nasser succeeded in dismantling the Brotherhood in 1954 through his security operation, which gave him the ability to involve widespread arrests, seizure of assets and funds, expansion of executions, torture of Brotherhood members and imprisonment and detention for long periods, some of which reached the end of the Nasserist rule. These measures were carried out under the guise of an alleged assassination attempt against Nasser in the "Al-Manshiya Incident" in October 1954, for which the Brotherhood was accused. These actions were executed with almost no opposition from the Egyptian populace.

As detailed in chapter two the dynamics of state-Brotherhood interaction underwent a significant shift during the Sadat era. Sadat released the Brotherhood from long-term detention and provided Islamists with a substantial degree of political participation, aiming to counter the communist influence in Egypt. Additionally, this move was intended to confront what was termed as "centers of power" within the Nasserist movement, which posed a threat to his regime at the time. This situation persisted throughout Sadat's rule and extended until the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and the Zionist entity. The treaty was met with rejection from the majority of Egyptian political currents, including the MB, and led to arrests targeting various political factions, not solely the MB.

As mentioned in chapter two, during President Mubarak's time, while the regime allowed the MB to participate in service and religious activities, it significantly curtailed the group's political engagement. While the regime did not prohibit the MB from various charitable activities such as establishing charitable associations, hospitals, Islamic schools, mosques, sponsoring orphans and the poor, distributing alms, and organizing Eid prayers, it worked to limit the Brotherhood's political participation.

Under Mubarak, a security apparatus was implemented, encompassing arrests, military trials, police violence, and electoral manipulation, in addition to legislative measures aimed at politically suffocating the Brotherhood. Furthermore, Mubarak's regime sought to tarnish the image of the Brotherhood in the media, portraying it as a terrorist organization. Despite these efforts, the Brotherhood managed to expand its influence in various spheres such as parliaments, professional syndicates, student unions, local administrations, as well as the medical and service sectors. Despite Mubarak's attempts

to politically stifle the Brotherhood, he did not strive for its complete eradication, allowing for its partial presence in the political arena.

In the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the political landscape can be understood through a securitization framework, which delineates various actors, strategies, and influences shaping the course of events. This approach dissects the intricate interactions among state and non-state entities, media dynamics, and international factors, offering an academic lens to comprehend the multifaceted dynamics in Egypt's post-revolutionary trajectory.

Within this framework, the SCAF emerges as a central actor in the securitization process. Initially adopting a stance of ambiguity, the SCAF evolves into a pivotal force, employing strategic maneuvers that both garner praise and provoke scrutiny, thus molding the securitization pattern. The SCAF's adept navigation of the political terrain, utilizing securitization tactics strategically and exploiting internal divisions, exemplifies a strategy that shapes post-revolutionary Egypt's trajectory.

Simultaneously, the Egyptian media, particularly influential programs, assumes a role as an influencer in the securitization process, amplifying discontent and exacerbating the polarization between Islamist and liberal factions. Furthermore, certain US media outlets played a significant role in negatively framing the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi on the international stage, constructing narratives that portray Morsi as a threat to democratic and Western values.

The 2013 coup is examined as the culmination of a strategic securitization process, wherein the military tactically waited for public support before justifying Morsi's overthrow. This led to public acceptance of extreme measures, such as the Rabaa and Nahda Squares massacres, underscoring the effectiveness of securitization processes. Here, public discontent, economic challenges, and media narratives converged to legitimize repressive actions.

As mentioned in chapter four, in President Sisi's era security operations reached their zenith during the 2013 military coup. This phase facilitated the perpetration of large-scale

atrocities, characterized by the absence of initiating a de-securitization process and the ongoing implementation of stringent security measures against dissenting factions.

Consequently, nationwide protests escalated, giving rise to youth groups initially involved in minor acts of vandalism against the military and police. Over time, these groups evolved into armed factions wielding light weapons, and certain jihadist groups in Sinai, unrelated to the MB, also directed their guns against the Egyptian regime. The military coup strategically deployed its instruments to initiate an extensive campaign both domestically and internationally, aiming to preempt the erosion of popular support or international endorsement. For this reason, several state institutions such as the official religious institutions played a pivotal role as securitization actors. Particularly, the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta expanded its engagement by establishing specialized centers with a security dimension, undertaking ideological and operational offensives against Islamist groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. Its objectives encompassed tarnishing the group's image, proscribing affiliation or support, and portraying it as a religiously extremist and terrorist entity incapable of comprehending Islam accurately.

Furthermore, Dar Al-Ifta targeted the group's supporters domestically and internationally, even admonishing countries sympathetic to the legitimate president. Simultaneously, Dar Al-Ifta extolled the military coup and its leader, endorsing its policies both domestically and abroad. Also, the role played by the Sufi orders leadership and specific Sufi scholars, who tried to challenge the mechanisms of democracy that brought the elected president, to prove that democracy could not be compatible with the Islamic system; to separate people from the elected president; in supporting the military coup and distorting the image of the Brotherhood within the Egyptian collective consciousness.

During this period, the Egyptian regime issued arbitrary death sentences and imprisonment verdicts. Moreover, it expanded arrests and extrajudicial killings targeting members of the Brotherhood and their sympathizers. The regime also worked on tarnishing the image of the Brotherhood internally and externally, even seeking to incite other countries against the group. This was evidenced by the Grand Mufti of the Republic's speech before members of the British Parliament, where he incited against the Brotherhood, as well as Sisi's request to the United States to classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. It is apparent that the model of the relationship between the

Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood during this period was geared towards the complete eradication of the group's activities across all political, social, and religious spheres.

In the comparison between the eras of Presidents Nasser and Sisi, the following can be noted:

- While historical narratives vary regarding the origins of the Free Officers Movement and its actual affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, whether as one of the Brotherhood's arms or through subsequent membership of Brotherhood members, there is little dispute about the Brotherhood's simultaneous participation alongside the Free Officers in the events of the 1952 coup. Furthermore, we can also observe the participation of the Brotherhood members, especially the youth, in the opposition social movements emerged before the 2011 revolution since their inception, including their early involvement in the protests of January 25, 2011. Subsequently, the Brotherhood officially announced its participation in the 2011 revolution after the escalation of the protests and its transformation into a comprehensive uprising (Tohamy, 2016: 167) .

- After the 1952 coup, there seemed to be a honeymoon period between the Revolutionary Command Council and the Muslim Brotherhood, to the extent that "Mitchell" described the Brotherhood as playing the role of the "civil defenders" of the Revolutionary Command Council. Additionally, all political parties and forces were dissolved and suspended except for the MB, during which time the RCC managed to overthrow the monarchy and its affiliates. Contrary to that, in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the MB did not monopolize either the civil political arena or the Islamic preaching arena alone. Instead of abolishing the old parties, a large number of political parties were licensed during the era of the military council. By September 2011, just nine months after the revolution, the number of parties reached 47, including 24 newly established parties after January 25, 2011 (Esam El-Din, 2011).

Furthermore, contrary to the 1952 coup where Nasser and the RCC managed the political sphere, there was no clear leadership for the 2011 revolution, which emerged as a result of cooperation among politically disparate forces with differing ideologies, but who agreed on the necessity of protesting against the Mubarak regime. This enabled the SCAF in 2011 to gradually assume the leader role or to assume the role played by the RCC in

the aftermath of the 1952 coup in managing the country and the political scene. Beginning with the scene of President Mubarak delegating his presidential powers to SCAF to govern the country, then the military council portraying itself as a neutral governing force above political factions, until culminating in a coup against the democratically elected president in 2013, restoring full military rule over the country.

In both cases, 1952 and 2011, despite differing circumstances and contexts, the military council was the governing authority above political forces, and in both instances, the military successfully staged a coup. In the first case, the military staged a successful coup against the monarchy, while in the second case, they carried out a successful coup against the elected president following the 2011 revolution.

The consensus between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood did not last long, as the Brotherhood demanded the implementation of its own vision for applying Sharia law and the return of the military to their barracks, leading to discord between the two parties. Nasser began attempting to contain the Brotherhood, employing various strategies, including an attempt to integrate the Brotherhood into a governmental structure under the name of the 'Liberation Rally'.

However, this was met with rejection from the Brotherhood. Nasser also attempted to push the Brotherhood towards forming a powerless cabinet controlled by the RCC, which was also rejected by the MB. Additionally, Nasser sought to foment dissent within the MB by inciting members of its 'private system' against the MB's Murshid. Some youth members of the 'private system' even attempted to occupy the MB's general center and force the murshid 'Counselor Al-Hodeiby' to resign, but their efforts ended in failure. Nasser also utilized pro-government media outlets to tarnish the reputation of the Brotherhood. Additionally, he regularly accused the Brotherhood in his speeches of exploiting religion and working against the interests of the Egyptian people etc.

Furthermore, the researcher observed that SCAF employed various strategies to contain the Brotherhood in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The researcher notes the SCAF's implementation of measures aimed at sowing division among the revolution's partners. This began with fostering discord between secular and Islamist forces, as well as between revolutionary and reformist factions. Additionally, managing disputes among Islamic

movements to the military's advantage, particularly between the MB and the Salafis represented by the Salafi Al-Nour Party, was evident. These disagreements manifested in various forms, such as the debate over expediting the creation of a new constitution versus hastening parliamentary elections, with each party pushing for what served its interests. It is also notable that these divisions grew within the ranks of the Brotherhood starting from 2016, between the peaceful wings and the more revolutionary ones (Ranko & Yaghi, 2019).

Moreover, it is notable that the military council retained control over the state apparatus during President Morsi's tenure, resembling the model of a stripped-of-powers cabinet that the Brotherhood rejected during the Nasser era.

Moreover, the utilization of pro-Nasser media to tarnish the image of the Brotherhood was paralleled in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, particularly during President Morsi's presidency. Media outlets, whether affiliated with the military like Tawfik Okasha's program on the Al-Faraeen channel, or those aligned with secular factions like Bassem Youssef's program 'Al-Bernameg', played a significant role in smearing the Brotherhood's reputation. This trend continued with media outlets associated with religious institutions, notably the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta, following the 2013 coup.

The phenomenon of "Othering" can also be observed, which entails attempts to separate the Brotherhood from the Egyptian people or its popular incubator. Nasser attempted to alienate the Brotherhood from the populace by portraying them as enemies of the Egyptians, depicting them as a clandestine military organization working against the Egyptian people, thus implying they were not true Egyptians. They were also depicted as fighting against "the nation" and working against Egyptian nationalism under the guise of religion, or as being directed by external forces to act against the Egyptian people.

Similarly, in 2013, the military employed the same tactic by portraying the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization hostile to Egypt and the Egyptian people. Additionally, they attempted to portray the Brotherhood as belonging to another nation, not the Egyptian one, by using popular songs to suggest that Egyptians worship one god while the Brotherhood worships another. For example the pro-military Egyptian singer Ali Al-

Haggar after the Rabaa massacre addressing the MB said “We are a nation and you are another nation ... Although the God is one, we have God and you have another God”.

Also, if the interaction during the Nasser era was direct between the state and the MB as a “non-state actor”, the conflict in the Mursi era occurred between two sides of the Egyptian state, represented by the military council on one hand, and the presidency institution represented by the elected president affiliated with the MB on the other. Therefore, the military institution utilized “non-state actors” as proxy actors in confronting the situation, opting not to directly confront the presidential institution during President Morsi's tenure. The situation only returned to the aforementioned confrontation between the military and the Brotherhood after the 2013 coup.

While both Nasser era and Sisi era patterns share core elements of threat identification, media manipulation, military involvement, and the implementation of extraordinary measures, their temporal contexts, nuanced dynamics, and international dimensions distinguish the Nasser era from the Sisi era. In the following, the researcher can summarize some key elements in the comparison:

- **Threat Identification:** In both eras, the regimes strategically identified the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat. This involved categorizing the group as an existential adversary to the state, framing their activities as detrimental to national security.
- **Media Influence and Propaganda:** A commonality across both securitization patterns is the instrumental use of propaganda and media control. Both regimes employed censorship, narrative manipulation, and strategic information dissemination to mould public perception, portraying the MB as a subversive force
- **Creation of an 'Other':** Both patterns incorporated the concept of “othering” portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as fundamentally antithetical to the ideals of the Egyptian state. This deliberate de-legitimization aimed to garner public support for the state’s repressive measures.
- **Military Involvement:** The role of the military emerges as a crucial factor in both patterns. In the Nasser era, the military's alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1952 coup initially provided the group with a degree of protection. Conversely, in the

Sisi era, the military assumed a more direct and interventionist role, culminating in the 2013 coup.

- **Implementation of Extraordinary Measures:** Both securitization processes justified the imposition of extraordinary security measures, including mass arrests, prolonged imprisonments, and the curtailment of civil liberties. These measures were ostensibly implemented to safeguard the nation from an alleged internal threat.

- **Temporal and Contextual Nuances:** The Nasser era's securitization pattern (1952-1954) is rooted in historical context and the early relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers. In contrast, the Sisi era pattern encompasses the post-2011 period, marked by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, President Morsi's tenure, and the 2013 coup, reflecting contemporary political dynamics.

- **Alliance Dynamics and Adaptability in the Sisi Era:** The Sisi era's securitization pattern introduces nuanced dynamics, such as cooperation between state and non-state actors, diverse non-state entities designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, and adaptive alliances and strategies in response to changing political landscapes. While we do not find such alliances in the Nasser era, which is distinguished by the fact that the Revolutionary Command Council led by Nasser was the only actor allowed to engage in political action.

5.6.Results

The chapter concludes by emphasizing the persistent security operations under the administration of President Sisi, reaching their zenith during the 2013 military coup. This phase facilitated the perpetration of large-scale atrocities, characterized by the absence of initiating a de-securitization process and the ongoing implementation of stringent security measures against dissenting factions. Consequently, nationwide protests escalated, giving rise to youth groups initially involved in minor acts of vandalism against the military and police.

Over time, these groups evolved into armed factions wielding light weapons, and certain jihadist groups in Sinai, unrelated to the MB, also directed their guns against the Egyptian regime. The military coup strategically deployed its instruments to initiate an extensive campaign both domestically and internationally, aiming to preempt the erosion of popular

support or international endorsement. The chapter culminates by underscoring the pivotal role played by official religious institutions as securitization actors.

Particularly, the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta expanded its engagement by establishing specialized centers with a security dimension, undertaking ideological and operational offensives against Islamist groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. Its objectives encompassed tarnishing the group's image, proscribing affiliation or support, and portraying it as a religiously extremist and terrorist entity incapable of comprehending Islam accurately. Furthermore, Dar Al-Ifta targeted the group's supporters domestically and internationally, even admonishing countries sympathetic to the legitimate president. Simultaneously, Dar Al-Ifta extolled the military coup and its leader, endorsing its policies both domestically and abroad. Harnessing the soft power of the Egyptian religious institution, it endeavoured to undermine popular and international support for the MB and its cause. The chapter also highlighted the analogous role played by the Sufi orders leadership and specific Sufi scholars, such as Osama Al-Azhari, and Ali Al-Jafri, who tried to challenge the mechanisms of democracy that brought the elected president, to prove that democracy could not be compatible with the Islamic system; to separate people from the elected president; in supporting the military coup and distorting the image of the Brotherhood within the Egyptian collective consciousness.

Moreover, the chapter elucidated American support for Sisi during the Trump administration, leading to attempts to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist group. However, this initiative faltered due to the group failing to meet the criteria for such classification. Nonetheless, Sisi garnered substantial support during that period, contributing to the widespread acceptance, both domestically and internationally, of the perpetuation of robust security measures against the Brotherhood outside the parameters of natural legal procedures.

The researcher can summarize the President Sisi's securitization discourse including context, securitizing actors, targeted audience, and discourse themes in table (5.1), as follows:

Table (5.1): President Sisi Era Securitization Audience and Discourse Examples.

Context	Securitizing Actor	Securitized Actor	Target Audience	Discourse Theme / Justification
2013 Coup and Aftermath	SCAF / Sisi	MB	General Public Audience	Stability vs. Chaos: Framing MB as a threat to national security and stability.
Suppression of Protests	SCAF / State Media	MB Supporters and Protestors	General Public Audience	Dehumanization: Justifying repression by depicting MB supporters as extremists or terrorists.
Judicial and Institutional Legitimacy	State Judiciary	MB and Allies	General Public Audience	Rule of Law: Framing state violence as legally justified to combat extremism.
Media Framing of the 2011 Revolution	State Media	Revolutionary Youth / MB	General Public Audience	Conspiracy Narrative: Reframing the 2011 revolution as an MB-led conspiracy to destroy the state.
Dar Al-Ifta's Religious Framing	Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta	MB and Islamist Groups	General Public Audience/ Religious Communities (Elite audience)	Religious Extremism: Framing MB ideology as extremist and anti-Islamic to justify crackdowns.

International Support	SCAF / Sisi	MB and Islamist Movements	U.S. Administration	Global Counterterrorism: Framing MB as a global terrorist threat to secure international backing.
Economic Hardships	SCAF / State Media	MB and Allies	General Public Audience	Economic Collapse Narrative: Blaming the MB for economic mismanagement to justify intervention.
Public Mobilization Against MB	SCAF/ Sisi	MB	General Public Audience	National Unity: Calling for public mandates to support military actions against MB.
Security Operations and Massacres	SCAF	MB and Protestors	General Public Audience	Violence Justified as Security: Repression framed as necessary to maintain national security.
Erasure of MB's Legitimacy	State Media / Judiciary	MB Leaders (President Morsi)	General Public Audience	Delegitimization: Stripping MB leaders of legitimacy, portraying them as enemies of the state.

CONCLUSION

This thesis as a case study in securitization theory significantly contributes to its existing literature by extending its application to an authoritarian context. While traditional securitization theory, as developed by the Copenhagen School, primarily focuses on liberal democracies, this study applies the framework to Egypt, examining how successive regimes, including those of Farouk, Nasser, Mubarak, SCAF, and Sisi, have framed the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat. This framing serves to justify political suppression and consolidate power. Through a longitudinal analysis spanning different political periods, the thesis demonstrates how the practice of securitization evolves while consistently targeting the same political entity. This historical perspective enriches our understanding of how security discourses adapt to meet shifting political needs within non-democratic systems.

Furthermore, by focusing on the MB, the thesis bridges securitization theory and the study of political Islam. It shows how Islamist movements are constructed as security threats, contributing to broader discussions on the securitization of political Islam. This analysis provides valuable insights into how perceptions of political Islam are manipulated to serve state interests and reinforce authoritarian control, thereby offering a nuanced understanding of the relationship between security policies and ideological suppression. Additionally, the thesis highlights how regimes employ security rhetoric not only to confront perceived threats but also to suppress dissent and shape political order. This dynamic has profound implications for human rights, often resulting in mass arrests, the restriction of civil liberties, and other forms of repression.

The relationship between the Egyptian state during the royal era and the Muslim Brotherhood generally took the pattern of a calm relationship, as the state allowed the MB to spread in the religious and social spheres. While the state and British colonialism were keen to keep it away and limit its activity in the political sphere. These attempts consisted of suppressing the media voice of the group, banning its official newspaper, distorting its image in the official state media, dealing with its affairs as a security issue through the political police, forming groups similar to it in name but with counter-ideas to attract the masses far away the MB, and even dissolving the group after its participation in the 1948 war against Jewish gangs in Palestine, arresting its members, confiscating its

funds, property and headquarters. This was after attacking it through government and party newspapers loyal to it, portraying the group as a terrorist group working in the interests of the occupier or as the greatest danger facing the Egyptian state at that time.

The Brotherhood participated in the establishment of the FOM, then participated with it in the military coup in June 1952 against the Egyptian monarchy. After the 1952 coup, the MB acted as a civilian supporter for the RCC, until the dispute occurred between Nasser and the Brotherhood leadership, especially with Al-Hudaybi, the general guide, over the immediate application of Islamic law in Egypt and other issues related to applying the religious ideology of the group in politics. In other words, we can say that the relationship between Nasser and the MB was cooperative until the MB tried to impose its own political model of governance, then Nasser began a securitization process against the MB, beginning with attempts to contain the group by containing it within the state loyal "liberation rally" and asking the MB to form a puppet government under the full control of the RCC.

Nasser also tried to divide the MB by creating a wedge between the younger generation especially members of the private system PS and the group's leadership in the Guidance Office, with the distortion of the group's image in the official media and pro-state newspapers. Until Nasser reached the ability to dissolve the group, arrest its members, and confiscate its property under the cover of mass support after the Manshiya incident, in which Nasser claimed that the group tried to assassinate him. The successful securitization process manifested in the justification for the imposition of extraordinary security measures against the Muslim Brotherhood. This encompassed widespread arrests, protracted incarcerations, a practice that persisted until the demise of Nasser, and the constriction of civil liberties, all ostensibly undertaken in the guise of safeguarding the nation from an asserted internal peril.

The analysis of the historical interactions between the Egyptian regime, led by Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, and the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a nuanced narrative that underscores the intricate dynamics shaping their relationship. From a scientific standpoint, these observations highlight the intricate interplay of political, socio-economic, and international factors that have influenced the complex trajectory of state-Islamist interactions.

During the Sadat era, a strategic recalibration of Egypt's alliances away from Soviet influence and towards the United States was evident. The calculated move to grant the Muslim Brotherhood greater operational freedom was positioned as a countermeasure against communism during the Cold War. This geopolitical alignment sheds light on the instrumental role of global considerations in shaping domestic political decisions and the strategic manoeuvres of the state. The shift in the relationship between Sadat and the MB after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 marks a pivotal moment. The subsequent crackdown on the Brotherhood reflects the delicate balance between national interests, regional dynamics, and the ideological stance of Islamist movements. Scientifically, this dynamic illustrates how external geopolitical events can significantly impact the state's approach to domestic political actors.

The examination of the relationship between Mubarak's regime and the Muslim Brotherhood reveals a predominant reliance on security-oriented measures as the primary modality of engagement. The researcher posits, through analytical scrutiny, that the Mubarak regime acknowledged the impracticality of complete eradication of the group. Rather, it perceived the MB as a necessary moderate Islamic entity in countering the proliferation of extremist movements, particularly jihadist factions, and also to beautify its democratic mask in front of the West within the democratic façade it sought to uphold. Simultaneously, the Muslim Brotherhood assumed a multifaceted role, alleviating the Egyptian state of various societal and service responsibilities encompassing health, education, durable goods, necessities, and merchandise.

However, despite this cooperative facet, the group concurrently maintained an ideological and Islamic political agenda, actively positioning itself as a political actor whenever opportunities arose. Consequently, the regime aimed to extract maximum social and religious benefits from the group while confining its political manoeuvrability within delimited parameters, while the political field witnessed concerted efforts to curtail the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Both the state and the MB engaged in reciprocal attempts to undermine each other's influence. While the regime pursued a security-centric policy involving arrests, military trials, violence, electoral manipulations, and legislative measures aimed at stifling the group politically and framing it as a terrorist entity, the Muslim Brotherhood strategically

expanded its presence in various spheres such as professional unions, student unions, service activities, municipal councils, sports clubs, and the medical and service sectors. By 2005, the group had secured 20% of the parliamentary seats, underscoring its pervasive influence. Thus, the security process during the Mubarak era vis-à-vis the MB primarily sought to politically constrain the group rather than outright elimination it.

The detailed analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath paints a complex picture of political dynamics, ideological shifts, and the interplay among various actors. The MB's strategic and cautious approach, the SCAF's pivotal role, the influence of secular opposition and media narratives, and the international dimensions all contribute to the intricate web of forces shaping Egypt's political landscape.

The securitization processes, highlighted during SCAF and President Morsi's era and the 2013 coup, underscore the erosion of democratic norms and the successful manipulation of narratives to justify repressive measures. This led to the acceptance of extreme actions, such as the Rabaa massacre, pointing to the challenges of maintaining democratic principles amid political turmoil.

The intricate relationship between the military and the revolution is highlighted, with indications of pre-drawn plans ready for suppressing any demonstrations or acts of political change. The military's role, initially ambiguous, evolved into a pivotal position, earning both praise and scepticism from different political actors.

The examination of Mubarak's era General Intelligence Head Omar Suleiman's role underscores the regime's attempts to contain the revolution, with implications for the military's subsequent political manoeuvring. The study also sheds light on the MB's interaction with the army during the revolution, which shows a degree of trust and collaboration. The Brotherhood's nuanced approach, initially refraining from official participation in protests, gradually giving way to engagement in political dialogue, reflects a cautious strategy influenced by its experience throughout its history.

Moreover, the thesis illuminated the multifaceted dynamics that defined the SCAF era in post-revolutionary Egypt and the securitization processes during President Morsi's tenure. The strategic maneuverings employed by the SCAF, the careful exploitation of internal

divisions within revolutionary forces, and the consolidation of military power emerged as central themes. The repercussions of this era cast a lasting imprint on Egypt's political landscape, laying the groundwork for subsequent developments.

The SCAF's adept navigation of the political terrain, its implementation of securitization measures, and the fragmentation of revolutionary forces underscore the complexity of power dynamics during this period. Political legitimization strategies, social division tactics, and the nuanced role of Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, further highlight the intricate interplay between state and non-state actors.

The examination of the securitization process during President Morsi's era adds depth to our understanding. The cooperation between state and non-state actors, the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat by diverse non-state entities. The role of specific non-state actors, such as former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa and the Al-Nour Salafi Party, in the securitization process provides insights into the varied influences shaping political narratives.

Notably, the post-coup justifications and calls for coexistence by Salafists serve as a lens through which to understand the evolving dynamics after significant political shifts. The thesis underscored the dynamic nature of alliances and strategies in response to changing political landscapes, emphasizing the adaptability of actors in influencing public opinion. In essence, this study offered a comprehensive exploration of the complex interplay between state and non-state actors, providing a nuanced understanding of Egypt's post-revolutionary political evolution. By delving into the roles of religious figures, political parties, and media in shaping public opinion, it sheds light on the intricate tapestry of influences that define the country's contemporary political landscape.

The opposition to Mohamed Morsi's presidency by secular forces in Egypt was a complex interplay of political, media, and military dynamics. The NSF, Tamarod movement, and influential political parties coalesced against Morsi's policies, emphasizing concerns over his constitutional declaration. Simultaneously, the media, particularly through shows like Bassem Youssef's and Tawfiq Okasha's, played a crucial role in amplifying discontent and contributing to the polarization between Islamist and liberal factions.

The military, positioning itself as the guardian of security, strategically differentiated between revolutionary components, paving the way for intervention. Statements from military figures, notably General Sisi and General Sidiqi Subhi, underlined their readiness to act independently of the presidency, creating an atmosphere conducive to military involvement. The culmination of these factors led to heightened polarization, with secular forces using the media to discredit Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. The SCAF strategically facilitated tensions, contributing to the political turmoil that ultimately prompted Popular acceptance of military intervention. In essence, the opposition's multifaceted approach, coupled with media influence and the military's strategic positioning, created a volatile environment that culminated in the military's intervention, reshaping Egypt's political landscape.

Also, this study illuminated the multifaceted role of the US media in shaping perceptions in the aftermath of the Egyptian 2011 revolution. Through a chronological exploration, it becomes evident that media narratives showed President Morsi as a politically weak figure and portrayed him as anti-democratic and anti-Western.

Crucially, the study reveals a consistent pattern of negative framing, employing orientalism techniques to construct a distorted image of Morsi. This portrayal played a pivotal role in legitimizing the 2013 coup in the eyes of Western audiences. The integration of theoretical frameworks, specifically the preventive war approach and liberal hegemony, broaden our understanding by contextualizing media narratives within broader political and ideological motivations. The notion that liberal states, like the US, seek to spread their ideology globally provides a lens through which the perceived threat posed by the MB to Western values is examined.

Scientifically, the analysis underscores the influential role of media representation in shaping public opinion and historical interpretation. The manipulation of narratives, exemplified in the portrayal of Morsi, not only reflects a specific ideological stance but also serves political interests.

Importantly, this study raises awareness about the far-reaching implications of distorted media portrayals of democratic processes. The case of Egypt serves as a stark reminder that the media's construction of an "imaginary President Morsi" contributed to

undermining the democratic transition, paving the way for repressive military rule. In essence, the scientific conclusion emphasizes the intricate interplay between media, politics, and international relations. It urges scholars and policymakers to critically assess the influence of media narratives on public perception, democratic processes, and historical outcomes. The lessons drawn from the Egyptian case underscore the imperative for a vigilant and critical examination of media framing in the study of international relations.

The significant role of a strategic securitization process in the 2013 military coup in Egypt. Empowered by prior successes, the SCAF orchestrated the overthrow of the elected President Morsi, leading to brutal reprisals against his supporters. The acceptance of extreme measures, such as the Rabaa massacre, was influenced by public discontent, economic challenges, and a media-driven "sheep paradigm".

The success of the securitization process allowed the SCAF to act outside the rule of normal law with minimal condemnation. Media discourse, employing demonological and "sheep paradigm" narratives, played a pivotal role in dehumanizing Morsi and his supporters, contributing to widespread acceptance of repressive measures. The timeline leading to the coup reflects a calculated strategy by the military, waiting for public support before justifying the overthrow of President Morsi. The subsequent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, characterized by mass killings, imprisonment, and torture, further emphasized the success of the securitization process.

In summary, the 2013 coup and its aftermath reveal a complex interplay of political strategy, media influence, and the deterioration of democratic norms. The successful securitization process facilitated the military's actions and led to sustained repression, consolidating the military's power.

In the aftermath of the 2013 military coup, the study concludes by emphasizing the persistent security operations under the administration of President Sisi, after it reached its zenith during the 2013 military coup. This phase facilitated the perpetration of large-scale atrocities, characterized by the absence of initiating a de-securitization process and the ongoing implementation of stringent security measures against opposition factions.

Consequently, nationwide protests escalated, giving rise to youth groups initially involved in minor acts of vandalism against the military and police.

Over time, a number of these groups evolved into armed factions wielding light weapons, and certain jihadist groups in Sinai, unrelated to the MB, also directed their guns against the Egyptian regime. The military coup strategically deployed its instruments to initiate an extensive campaign both domestically and internationally, aiming to preempt the erosion of popular support or international endorsement.

The study culminates by underscoring the pivotal role played by official religious institutions as securitization actors. Particularly, the Egyptian Dar Al-Ifta expanded its engagement by establishing specialized centers with a security dimension, undertaking ideological and operational offensives against Islamist groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood. Its objectives encompassed tarnishing the group's image, proscribing affiliation or support, and portraying it as a religiously extremist and terrorist entity incapable of comprehending Islam accurately.

Furthermore, Dar Al-Ifta targeted the group's supporters domestically and internationally, even admonishing countries sympathetic to President Mursi. Simultaneously, Dar Al-Ifta extolled the military coup and its leader, endorsing its policies both domestically and abroad. Harnessing the soft power of the Egyptian religious institution, it endeavoured to undermine popular and international support for the MB and its cause.

The chapter also highlighted the analogous role played by the Sufi orders leadership and specific Sufi scholars, such as Osama Al-Azhari, and Ali Al-Jafri, who tried to challenge the mechanisms of democracy that brought the elected president, to prove that democracy could not be compatible with the Islamic system; to separate people from endorsing the elected president; in supporting the military coup and distorting the image of the Brotherhood within the Egyptian collective consciousness.

Moreover, the thesis elucidated American support for Sisi during the Trump administration, leading to attempts to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist group. However, this initiative faltered due to the group failing to meet the criteria for such classification. Nonetheless, Sisi garnered substantial support during that period,

contributing to the widespread acceptance, both domestically and internationally, of the perpetuation of robust security measures against the Brotherhood outside the parameters of natural legal procedures.

The study affirms that both Nasser era and Sisi era patterns share core elements of threat identification, media manipulation, military involvement, and the implementation of extraordinary measures, their temporal contexts, nuanced dynamics, and international dimensions distinguish the Nasser era from the Sisi era. In the following, the researcher can provide key elements in the comparison:

- **Threat Identification:** In both eras, the regimes strategically identified the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat. This involved categorizing the group as an existential adversary to the state, framing their activities as detrimental to national security.
- **Media Influence and Propaganda:** A commonality across both securitization patterns is the instrumental use of propaganda and media control. Both regimes employed censorship, narrative manipulation, and strategic information dissemination to mould public perception, portraying the MB as a subversive force.
- **Creation of an 'Other':** Both patterns incorporated the concept of “othering” portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as fundamentally antithetical to the ideals of the Egyptian state. This deliberate de-legitimization aimed to garner public support for the state’s repressive measures.
- **Military Involvement:** The role of the military emerges as a crucial factor in both patterns. In the Nasser era, the military's alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1952 coup initially provided the group with a degree of protection. Conversely, in the Sisi era, the military assumed a more direct and interventionist role, culminating in the 2013 coup.
- **Implementation of Extraordinary Measures:** Both securitization processes justified the imposition of extraordinary security measures, including mass arrests, prolonged imprisonments, and the curtailment of civil liberties. These measures were ostensibly implemented to safeguard the nation from an alleged internal threat.
- **Temporal and Contextual Nuances:** The Nasser era's securitization pattern (1952-1954) is rooted in historical context and the early relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers. In contrast, the Sisi era pattern encompasses the post-

2011 period, marked by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, President Morsi's tenure, and the 2013 coup, reflecting contemporary political dynamics.

- **Alliance Dynamics and Adaptability in the Sisi Era:** The Sisi era's securitization pattern introduces nuanced dynamics, such as cooperation between state and non-state actors, diverse non-state entities designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, and adaptive alliances and strategies in response to changing political landscapes. While we do not find such alliances in the Nasser era, which is distinguished by the fact that the Revolutionary Command Council led by Nasser was the only actor allowed to engage in political action.

Finally the researcher can simplify the **securitization processes** from **Nasser to Sisi**, including key **actors, audiences, contexts, and key themes** in table (5.2) as following:

Table (5.2): Securitization Processes Against the MB from Nasser to Sisi

Securitizing Actor	Securitized Actor	Context	Target Audience	Key Themes
Nasser	MB	Post-1952 Coups & Manshiya Incident	General Public Audience	- Treason. - Terrorism. - Collusion with Colonial Powers
RCC	MB	1954 Crackdown on MB	Military and Security Forces	- Infiltration to military - Threat to Military Integrity

State- Controlled Media	MB	Post- Manshiya Incident	General Public Audience	- Public Fear. - Character Assassination
SCAF	MB	Post- 2011 Revolution Transitional Period	General Public Audience	- Stability vs. Chaos. - Economic Collapse
SCAF	MB	Post-2011 Revolution Political Landscape	Secular and Liberal Opposition (Elite audience)	- Threat of Islamist Rule.
SCAF	MB	2013 Military Coups	General Public Audience	- Combating Terrorism. - National Security.
State Judiciary	MB	Post-2013 Coups	General Public Audience	- Legitimizing Repression. - Rule of Law.
State Media	MB	Post-2013 Coups Crackdown	General Public Audience	- Dehumanization. - Demonization

- Dar Al-Ifta	MB	Post-2013 Coups	Religious Communities (Elite and Public audience)	- Religious Extremism. - Delegitimizing MB
El-Sisi and SCAF	MB and Protestors	Post-2013 Coups Crackdown	General Public	- Restoring Stability. - Suppression of Dissent
Secular Forces (non-state actor affiliated to SCAF)	MB	Morsi's Presidency	Elite and Public audience	- MB's alleged threats to democracy. - legitimized the military's intervention.
Salafi Nour Party	MB	Morsi's Presidency	Conservative Religious Egyptians (Elite audience)	- Fracturing Islamist Unity. - Preserving Sunni Identity
Revolutionary Youth Movements	SCAF	Post-2011 Revolution	General Public / Youth	- Opposition to Military Rule. - Democratic Reform

Western Powers (U.S.)	MB	Post-2011 Revolution	SCAF / Egyptian Government	- Stability. - Counterterrorism



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Curriculum Vitae

Ahmet F. Ibrahimoglu obtained his first bachelor's degree in electronic engineering in 2002 from Menoufia University, Egypt. In 2010, he received a Bachelor of Arts in Arabic language and literature from Menoufia University, Egypt. In 2011 He obtained a two-year graduate Diploma in political studies from the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo. In 2015 he further pursued his academic career by obtaining an MA in political studies from the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo, specializing in Islamic Political Thought and contemporary Islamic Movements, his thesis was titled "*Reform and revolution in the political thought of Ibn Taymiyyah and its effects on Salafi groups in Egypt*". Moreover, in 2016 he earned another MA degree from Menoufia University, Egypt, in Islamic studies, specialising in Islamic jurisprudence, his thesis was titled "*Diligence with Sharia intents between Imams Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d.505 AH) & Taqi Al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728AH): A Comparative Study*". In 2024 he completed his PhD in Middle East studies, from the Middle East Institute, Sakarya University, Turkey, specializing in security studies and Islamic movements, his thesis was titled "*Securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood by Egyptian regimes: a comparison of the Nasser and Sisi era*".

Ibrahimoglu attended several training courses in politics like "Rules and skills of political analysis" in 2012 at the Forum of International Law, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo, and "Intellectual Studies" in 2013 at Elhadara Center for Political Studies, Cairo.

His peer-reviewed articles have been published in Web of Science-indexed journals such as *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, with the article "When Religion Takes the Stage: How the Coup Regime Instrumentalizes Religion in Securitizing Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt". He has also contributed to TR Dizin-indexed journals such as *Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, with the article "Abu Al-'Abbās b. Taymiyyah's societal security paradigm: a philosophical exploration in Islamic political heritage". Additionally, he has published in Egyptian universities-indexed journals such as *Menoufia University Faculty of Arts Journal*, with the article "The principles and guidelines of maqasid-based ijthad according to Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali" (in Arabic).

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