


INTRA-UNION DEMOCRACY:
UNIONIZATION AND THE CASE OF DISK TEXTILE

A Master's Thesis

by
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TEXTILE



To Sedat Aslan and the workers who passed in the workplace homicide

INTRA-UNION DEMOCRACY:
UNIONIZATION AND THE CASE OF DISK TEXTILE

The Graduate School of Economics and Social
Sciences of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent
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ABSTRACT

INTRA-UNION DEMOCRACY: UNIONIZATION AND THE CASE OF DISK TEXTILE

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The implementation of union procedures in Turkey falls short of democratic norms, especially intra-union democracy. This deficit in union democracy is primarily due to the restricted possibilities for rank-and-file members to interact with union executives, which causes workers to feel alienated from their unions. Due to issues with union democracy, "over-centralized," "oligarchic," and "bureaucratic," unionism has come to dominate in Turkey. This study explores the causes for varying connections between union officials and members and the influence of diverse ideas of union aspires among workers and administrators to better understand the elements that determine the operation of union democracy. Unlike prior research, which focused on the factors that preclude embedding democracy in a trade union, this study focuses on the reciprocal relationship between labor mobilization and intra-union democracy and the sustainability of anti-bureaucratic responses. The objective of this thesis is to analyze the democratic participation mechanisms in unions by examining the position of rank-

and-file members inside decision-making bodies as well as the interaction between union officials and members as their connection changes during a unionization process in the textile industry. Based on in-depth interviews with fifteen workers in textile industry in Şanlıurfa and three union officials, this study considers the consequences of changing relations between union officials and members considering its impact on mobilization. Therefore, while viewing the union democracy this research focuses on the labor movement and union recruitment strategies.

Keywords: bureaucratic unionism, labor movement, union democracy, union leadership

ÖZET

SENDİKA İÇİ DEMOKRASİ: SENDİKALAŞMA VE DİSK TEKSTİL ÖRNEĞİ

Göçmen, Hazal

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Meral Uğur Çınar

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Türkiye'de sendikal prosedürlerin uygulanmasında demokratik normların, özellikle de sendika içi demokrasinin gereklerinin yerine getirilmesinde sorunlar yaşanmaktadır. Sendikal demokrasideki bu eksikliğin başlıca nedeni, tabandan gelen üyelerin sendika yöneticileriyle etkileşime girme olanaklarının kısıtlı olması ve bunun da işçilerin sendikalarına yabancılaşmasına neden olmasıdır. Sendikal demokrasiyle ilgili sorunlar nedeniyle, "aşırı merkezîyetçi", "oligarşik" ve "bürokratik" sendikacılık Türkiye'de hâkim hale gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, sendikal demokrasinin işleyişini belirleyen unsurları daha iyi anlamak için sendika yetkilileri ile üyeler arasındaki farklı ilişkilerin nedenlerini ve işçiler ile yöneticiler arasındaki farklı sendikal hedef fikirlerinin etkisini araştırmaktadır. Bir sendikada demokrasinin yerleşmesini engelleyen faktörlere odaklanan önceki araştırmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışma, emek hareketi ile sendika içi

demokrasi arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkiye ve anti-bürokratik tepkilerin sürdürülebilirliğine odaklanmaktadır. Bu tezin amacı, tekstil sektöründeki bir sendikalaşma sürecinde tabandan gelen üyelerin karar alma organlarındaki konumlarını ve sendika yetkilileri ile üyeler arasındaki etkileşimi inceleyerek sendikalarda demokratik katılım mekanizmalarını analiz etmektir. Şanlıurfa'da tekstil sektöründe çalışan on beş işçi ve üç sendika yetkilisi ile yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlara dayanan bu çalışma, sendika yetkilileri ile üyeler arasındaki değişen ilişkilerin sonuçlarını, örgütlenme üzerindeki etkisini göz önünde bulundurarak değerlendirmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu araştırma sendikal demokrasiye bakarken, emek hareketine ve sendikal örgütlenme stratejilerine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: bürokratik sendikacılık, emek hareketi, sendikal demokrasi, sendika liderliği

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Unions are structures that make it easier for workers to solve the problems they face in the workplace within a collective rather than individually with the employer. The internal functioning mechanism of trade unions is such that it gives its character to the encounter between workers and employers. Within the scope of this thesis, the union's position among the workers was tried to be understood through the workers' opinions, depending on the changing dynamics in the internal functioning of the union. In this context, the views of workers with organizational experience in the DISK Textile Union are included. For example, Savaş's statement that "of course, the union should do what the worker says, if it does not, why should the worker join? If his boss was one before, it will be two after he joins" and Gülcan's assertion that "the union is like a spy inside the workers, it learns workers' weaknesses and then uses these weak points against them" contain essential discussion topics about union aims. What Asiye said about the dismissal of the union official during the unionization process: "unionist's job is to defend the worker; a unionist was defending the worker. Why was he dismissed? We asked this question a lot, but there was no answer, " raised a new question to answer. Are unions a tool of struggle for workers to make their voices heard, or a space in which workers struggle to make their voices heard? Therefore, understanding how workers

comprehend the union, how they find a place for themselves, and on what basis they direct their criticism will also help to comprehend the internal discipline of the unions. Hence, the purpose of the study is to solve this puzzle.

1.1 The Objective of the Study

This research aims to examine the strained relationship between union officials and rank-and-file members in a textile factory located in the southeast region of Turkey, focusing on "union democracy" during the unionization process. In Turkey, the implementation of union practices falls short of democratic principles, particularly intra-union democracy. This deficiency in union democracy is primarily attributed to the limited opportunities provided to rank-and-file members to engage with union officials, leading to workers feeling alienated from their unions.

To better understand the factors that affect the operation of union democracy, this study investigates the reasons for changing relations between union officials and members, and the impact of differing conceptions of union purposes among workers and officials. The study involved interviews with workers who had experienced unionization in a textile factory in the southeast, as well as with union administrators from different regions, to gain insight into their perspectives on members' engagement with the union and their roles within the organization. This research will focus on the possibilities for democratic participation by rank-and-file members in decision-making processes and the consequences of their active engagement.

Union democracy aims to understand how rank-and-file members participate in decision-making processes within a union (Williams & Halcoussis, 2014; Stepan-Norris, 1997). Thus, the discussion focuses on members' active participation in issues related to their workplace. The significance of union democracy lies in its connectivity with labor movements (Goldberg, 2008), as vibrant and free participation of members in the decision-making process can be a prerequisite for labor mobilization that ends with

achievements.

The union democracy debate has several approaches. For example, theories that aim to evaluate the effectiveness of union democracy through elections keep the possibility of disregarding the compulsory environment within the organization (Kumar & Schenk, 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to observe the active participation mechanisms, self-organized methods used by workers to ensure participation, the personal relationship between union administration and members, and the impact of union culture that emphasizes the rights of rank-and-file involvement (Baccora, 2001; Strauss, 1991). Contrary to the union bureaucracy approach, which emphasizes the role of paid officials as experts in technical and administrative issues despite rank-and-file members in a trade union (Herberg, 1943; Taft, 1946; Streeck, 1988), literature advocating democratic unionism insists that democratic participation mechanisms make unions efficient because workers' expectations are well known by factory management (Baccaro et al., 2019; Stepan-Norris, 1997; Strauss, 1991; Regalia, 1988). This research suggests that a strong labor movement is possible through high rates of workers' participation in every step of the decision-making process, because if workers become active agents and take responsibility for their actions, cohesiveness creates an indestructible movement.

The concept of "union democracy" is a subject of debate in Turkish unionism, as mentioned in the literature regarding the "union crisis" in Turkey (Lordoğlu, 2004). This crisis is mainly linked to diversity in the conception of union goals, which may differ between union officials and rank-and-file members in various cases. Recent developments in Turkey and worldwide indicate that unions are not expanding but are primarily focused on protecting their realms from a conservative point of view (Lordoğlu, 2004). In Turkish history, DİSK emerged as a response to the union concept of Türk-İş, which mostly played a mediating role between the proletariat and capital. However, Lordoğlu believed that DİSK could not create a new conception of Turkish unionism.

Lordoğlu (2004) believes that union democracy primarily revolves around union

administration and the issue of leadership. Elections cannot be accepted as the only indicators of majoritarian democracy (Lordoğlu, 2004). Despite the election mechanism, union democracy remains controversial because even though the chairperson and officials are elected, union administration tends to continue with their duties. Therefore, it is difficult to accept elections as the only way to implement a democracy. The estimated period of duty does not change because of the number of unions, and the duty period is an independent variable of the number of members (Lordoğlu, 2004). Problems in union democracy have led to the dominance of over-centralized, oligarchic, and bureaucratic unionism in Turkey (Özveri, 2006).

To understand union democracy, rank-and-file members and delegate officials must be considered. In addition to union culture, the quality of confederations, and their operations, these two elements are necessary for grasping union democracy. Unions require specialized personnel to take part in administrative duties and dedicate all their work time to union services. Although union bureaucracy consists of an understanding, not individuals (Hyman, 1989), those who fulfill this duty can be considered representatives of union bureaucracy. However, the main issue is the bureaucratic mentality in labor organizations that do not originate and end with contemporary officials. This mindset can also be reflected in an organization because an election that threatens administrative officials' duties can also threaten the duties of people close to them, as people are keener to work with people who feel intimate. Hence, a change in union administration may also mean a change in the number of employees in the union.

In the Turkish case, it was difficult to control the union center. In unions, the audit committee that has the authority to check the center is also determined by the general assembly. Hence, the audit committee was identified with a predetermined list of teams that won the election. To avoid this, members should not only be technically educated, yet union consciousness and reflexes need to be improved to perform intra-union democracy (Lordoğlu, 2004).

Alpkan Birelma (2021) stated that it is not only the legal legislation that poses a threat to

union democracy but also the preferences and actions of union officials that make intra-union democracy unconvincing. Leader-centric, formal, and patriarchal democracies have become the norm. Additionally, the principle of fiscal transparency is strongly related to union democracy. Most union officials do not want to change articles that reinforce oligarchical tendencies (Gülmez, as cited in Birelma, 2021). This situation harms and weakens societal support for unions. Özveri believed that the power that unions require for organizations originates from active participation. "It can be embodied by the "recovery of the participation of the workers, without wasting a single bit of it at every stage" (Özveri, 2006, p.116)

1.2 The motivation for the study

Collective bargaining agreements, headhunting, and unionization in Turkey are the three major topics of the labor movement (EÇT, 2021). The achievements of labor movements can be analyzed in their relationship with the active involvement of workers. Analyzing the dynamic involvement of workers in decision-making bodies will unravel union officials' perceptions of workers, whether they conceive of the workers as their "trump" against the employer or active subjects. The role of workers will bring to light the bargaining process between the capital owner and the union management. The affiliation between union management and capital owners influences the line between workers and unions. Worker associations must have an attitude toward capital. Therefore, the question "Do the unions constitute an indispensable room for workers in the struggle, or do they become an additional area for the struggle for workers in their struggle against capital? is worth studying. Therefore, the impact of bureaucratic mechanisms on labor movements is understood. This thesis will focus on the relationship between the concept of "union democracy" and its impact on rank-and-file interactions with the union and labor mobility.

The literature mainly constitutes a duality between union democracy and bureaucracy to grasp the efficiency of an organization. This thesis will also benefit from this theoretical background to understand the difficulties in establishing democracy, the dilemma in

preserving democracy, and the reasons for its implication in Turkish trade unions by focusing on the ways to develop anti-bureaucratic reactions and their impact on labor mobilization will be tried to be understood.

Consistent with these statements, the literature on the concept of "union democracy" mostly grasps the concept as an internal one that primarily focuses on the operation of an organization. Studies that discuss internal union democracy in Turkey focus on topics that prevent embedding democracy in a trade union (Birelma, 2021; Demirdizen, 2013), which differs from previous studies that focus on the reciprocal relationship between labor mobilization and intra-union democracy concerning workers' initial motivation points in getting organized.

This thesis aims to analyze the democratic participation mechanisms in unions by analyzing the position of rank-and-file members within decision-making bodies and the relationship between union officials and members through a change in their connection in a unionization process in a textile factory. At the beginning of 2020, textile workers began to become unionized under the guidance of a union, especially with the aid of an officer. In addition, the factory established a committee among workers to evaluate and mobilize their actions. The committee played a role at every critical point in the decision-making process in unionization in collaboration with the officer. When factory management heard about unionization, they chose to close the factory as a disincentive for unionization. However, the effort made by the workers and union representatives reopened the factory. Subsequently, the central union administration dismissed union representatives and factory management-fired workers who were leaders in the process. Between the union representative's dismissal process and the workers' expulsion, the connection between workers and the union was cut off. Hence, the changing factors between and within these stages must be examined to understand the role of union democracy in ongoing labor mobilization.

Unionization is becoming a crucial debate in Turkey as an issue of class struggle. Most factories dismiss their workers because of the unionization process, since better working

and employment conditions that the union promises for workers are not desirable for factory owners. Hence, the hostility of the business creates an essential drawback for workers as a reason not to become unionized (Adaman, Buğra, İnsel 2009). Democratic union participation is essential because it changes workers' conceptions of the organization. However, there is considerable distrust of union administration by workers, which also reduces the rate of membership. Adaman, Buğra, and İnsel, in their article "Societal Context of Labor Union Strategy," stated that the weakness of unions (closed answers; on a 0–10 scale, 0 being not important at all and ten very important) the answer disconnection between the lives of unionists and workers has 6.8 points which constituted the third most important answer among the six.

Therefore, maintaining a healthy union relationship between officials and workers is essential to reinforce the union's power against capital. The question is how workers' participation during the unionization period can be shaped after unionization. How should relations between union officials and union members be formed?

Therefore, I analyze an example of unionization, which includes changing attitudes in union approaches for the democratic participation of workers in a factory, to examine how the union administration approach affects the collective participation of workers in decision-making bodies with its affiliation with labor mobilization. Three significant considerations inspired this study.

1. This thesis endeavors to reveal the connection between intra-union democracy and its impingement on labor movements, focusing on decision-making bodies or active participation mechanisms in an organization.
2. Hence, this research focused on the unionization process; the impacts of union motivation points on establishing union democracy and labor mobilization will be revealed. When the rank-and-file system fails to establish democratic mechanisms in the union, the possibility of anti-bureaucratic responses and their continuity within a union will be discussed.

3. This research aims to understand the relationship between union power, labor mobilization, and democratic mechanisms to determine whether democracy causes deterioration in unions.

My main aim is to understand union administration and member relations, and their impact on union democracy. Since this relationship characterizes union democracy, it has the potential to affect labor mobilization. The character of rank-and-file and management relations also raises the possibility of anti-bureaucratic responses within a bureaucratic organization and the ways in which they are sustainable. In Turkey, intra-union democracy is weakened by internal and external factors (Birelma, 2021). This thesis focuses on the deterioration of self-governing perceptions in a labor organization, starting from the unionization process. This thesis aims to analyze the internal factors in trade unions and their influence on rank-and-file members' conception of unions. Besides, the conception of union officials about union democracy, who also claimed to preserve democracy in the organization, needed to be thought in line with internal factors. In this research, the impact of workers' motivation for unionization on internal democracy is revealed. Workers may generate anti-bureaucratic responses within a union to participate in collective decision-making bodies or to subject themselves to an organization. These efforts need to be taught in line with the reaction of labor organizations and their potential for being long-hale. There is a dynamic relationship between the union and its members, which is also affected by environmental factors such as cultural, patriarchal, personal, and organizational "factors." Therefore, the reciprocal relationship between intra-union democracy and labor mobilization should be considered in line with this.

1.3 Research Question

The research question in this study to elaborate on the background information mentioned above is as follows.

"How does the union administrative approach (rules, regulations, conceptions of union

officials) in a textile union affect the rank & file workers' participation in decision-making bodies during their unionization period in 2021 in a textile factory with its impact on labor mobilization?"

In this framework, the research aims to grasp the democratic mechanisms in trade unions. Therefore, it primarily focuses on understanding the current dynamics, forms, and tensions at the organizational level that enable new forms of impediments to ordinary workers' participation in decision-making procedures. In addition, the relationship between workers' participation in collective bodies and the labor movement needs to be conceived for the study.

The approaches to union democracy will be discussed later, but bureaucratic mechanisms in a labor union organization will be briefly mentioned in the background information. This study also problematizes the connection between union bureaucracy and its impact at the organizational level. The roles of union officials and members need to be analyzed to understand the implementation of decision-making bodies. Democratic operations in a union can also be perceived from the activities of its members. Hence, the time and location for catalyzing the degree of participation should be discussed. In Turkey, cultural, religious, and traditional values are also considered in the analysis. Moreover, it works to maintain members' participation channels. Therefore, it is also essential to understand how democracy can be embedded in union culture.

There are various ways to comprehend the "union democracy"; In the literature, studies have primarily focused on the period when officials are on duty. The relationship between union members and the interactions between members and officials may be fruitful. In this regard, the concept of union democracy in trade unions for workers who have experienced unionization can open novel channels for discussion.

1.4 Research Method

In 1967, DISK separated from Türk-İş with the claim of "genuine" and "revolutionary"

trade unionism, criticizing Türk-İş. The founding of the DİSK declaration emphasizes that ‘...we see rapid development with social justice as possible only if the working class has a voice and decision in all sectors of state administration and thus democracy is truly implemented’ (Çelik, 2018, pp. 631-633). Therefore, the organization of DİSK as a confederation emphasizing revolutionary trade unionism does not seem to fit with the general understanding of the bureaucratic management encountered in the DİSK Textile Union within the scope of this background. Hence, this study is an example of the "least likely case, " since the theory of democratic implementation and revolutionary unionism of DİSK does not apply to its affiliated member, the DİSK Textile. Levy (2008) notes that, for the least likely case studies, a single case shows that it is important to test certain theoretical propositions. As a "least likely case," this research reveals the problem of intra-union democracy in a union that is expected to provide democratic mechanisms.

In this thesis, thematic analysis was adapted as a research method for analyzing interviews with union officials and workers. Thematic analysis enables the researcher to identify, analyze, and report themes within the data (Braun&Clarke, 2006). In addition, it is essential to familiarize ourselves with the data through repeated readings to search for meanings and patterns and to produce new theoretical insights from the data (Braun&Clarke,2006; Riessman, 2007). Owing to the thematic analysis of iterative moves and backs between the data and literature, lists of ideas that later turn into codes and themes are generated. Therefore, the thematic analysis unravels the reality in the primary data to make the "unspoken" realize. To illustrate this, the interview material was cited substantively (Riessman 2007, p.55). Through thematic analysis, the first themes were created under the guidance of a previous theoretical background (Riesmann, 2007). The themes were determined as follows: motivations for being a union member and meeting their expectations within the organization. The first theme included dignity and self-respect, gender inequality, and economic incentives as codes for the analysis. The second theme, meeting expectations, includes voice mechanisms and accountability, patriarchy, and economic expectations as codes. Braun and Clarke (2019) stated that qualitative research is a creative, reflective, and subjective

undertaking that focuses on understanding meaning and meaning formation in specific circumstances. For them, the ultimate analysis results from an immersive and reflective interaction with facts, necessitating careful and extended immersion. Braun and Clarke's approach recognizes that themes are actively generated via this process rather than being inert entities that emerge from the data. As a result, reflexivity fostered communication with the respondents since they also evaluated the researcher's interest in this topic. Furthermore, embracing the reflexivity method fostered flexibility and recursiveness, rather than rigid structures, in producing codes and themes.

In this research, workers from a factory who have recently experienced unionism will be interviewed to understand their conception of the operation of labor unions. The factory was selected from the southeastern part of the country to observe the cultural and patriarchal dynamics in implementing democratic mechanisms. Half of the workers who were interviewed participated actively in the demonstration of the unionization attempt, while the other half remained more observant during the process. Therefore, the answer to democratic mechanisms in a union differs significantly. The case is selected for the unionization period to observe the expectations of workers from a labor organization and how they first react to be part of the decision-making mechanisms. Besides, the kind of critics generated due to this novel familiarity is preferable for this study rather than engrained and inured relations between officials and members. As mentioned before, due to these reasons, a textile factory that experienced unionization in 2021 has been chosen as a case study.

One-half of the participants were dismissed because of their unionization activities. This also affects the establishment of relationships with the union. The other half of the participants, who had been more observant during the unionization period, continued to work in the factory. The interviewers who still worked in the factory were contacted with the aid of a factory representative of the union. The interviews with working participants were held on the phone because of the long working hours and the discomfort of meeting a man and woman late in the southeastern part of the country. Interviews with workers who have been fired are conducted face-to-face.

Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to generate data for this study. A non-random sampling strategy was used in this study. In the first part, snowball sampling was adopted in the process of interviews, as interviewees were found based on advice from earlier interviewees. In the second part, a purposive sampling strategy was used to get in touch with union officials who had specific features as their duty in the administration of a textile union (Lynch, 2013).

The interviewers, as mentioned above, were determined using the snowball sampling method to interview the workers. Therefore, the connection process for dismissed and active workers proceeds through two different channels. In addition to the worker interviews, three people who could be regarded as union officials were interviewed online. Remote interviews were conducted because the union officials were in different provinces. Some challenges also occurred in reaching workers. Some of the workers who had been dismissed from the factory did not want to make interviews not to remember those days again, or a female worker could not come to the interview because her husband did not allow her to go out. Furthermore, reaching workers who continued in the factory was a challenge. It was possible to conduct an interview with a union representative of the factory, who helped me get in touch with current employees in the factory.

The sample for this research included 15 workers and three union officials from the same union. Five participants were female, including one union representative of the factory. Moreover, three workers had worked in a different factory than the other twelve; they also had experience of unionization, yet it ended with success for other confederations for their factory. The questions for workers can be separated into three categories. This is the first instance of personal information. The second is their role in unions and the role of officials in the unions. Personal information can be a standard part of understanding their backgrounds in the textile sector and their familiarity with unions. The second part is mainly related to their roles in the union, how they see their responsibilities, how they conceive of their role in the union, and how they interpret

their relationship with union officials. Finally, the third part is affiliated with union administration. How do union officials grasp the duties of union officials, what are the union's goals, and do union officials discharge their duties following the targets? In addition, pseudonyms were used in this thesis to protect the confidentiality of the interviewed workers' information.

1.5 Outline of the Study

This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter includes a theoretical framework of the study by reviewing the relevant literature around the "union democracy" concept. Debates about bureaucratic and democratic approaches in trade-union organizations, democratic operations in an organization, and the discussion on Turkish unionism constitute the thesis's conceptual and theoretical background.

In line with the theoretical framework, Chapter 2 discusses the unionization case of a textile factory in southeastern Turkey. The chapter includes discussions on the fundamental motivation for textile workers to become unionized to establish a connection between their later actions within the union. Chapter 3 is the following part of Chapter 4, which analyzes the main expectations of workers from unions. In this section, the expectations of workers from a union will be discussed as to whether a democratic or bureaucratic organization is preferable for workers. This chapter examines which factors have an impact on members' conceptions, both positively and negatively. Hence, the primary purpose is to unravel the relationship between union members and the management. In the last chapter, the union democracy concept is studied in terms of its impact on labor mobilization. The final conception of workers against labor organizations and how a democratic operation in a union affects labor movements is discussed.

CHAPTER 2: ON THE DEPTHS OF UNION DEMOCRACY

In this thesis, the first conceptual debate in this chapter will be on union democracy because the experiences of textile workers who went through the unionization process at DİSK Textile are those who have experienced the consequences of both democratic and bureaucratic approaches in a union. Hence, this research will explore how union democracy first became a "problem" historically, what kinds of contentious discussions the idea has endured, and how it relates to union efficiency and structure. Insofar as the study's primary focus is on internal union dynamics in connection with the notion of union democracy, while focusing on trade union democracy in general, the specific focus will be on evaluating the literature on trade union democracy as it relates to the communication within the trade union between union members, representatives, officers, officials, and leaders. Finally, a third axis in this study that runs horizontally through all the issues is the relationship between the long-term success of workers and the form of union democracy. This discussion will be combined with the other two axes and placed within the context of Turkey by discussing the current and past of the DİSK union in general and the DİSK Textile in particular.

The union democracy concept is analyzed to grasp the process and consequences of workers' participation in decision-making bodies. The two main controversial approaches to union democracy structures in labor organizations dominate the literature. While the first group of scholars favors the democratic participation of workers in the

union, the second group defends the management of paid officials in the organization. The controversy between bureaucratic and democratic administrations in trade union organizations constitutes one of the oldest debates in union democracy literature. Famously Michel (1999) indicated that socialist parties and trade unions are subjected to the "iron law of oligarchy," the argument claim that democracy is hard to preserve in the long run for the organizations. Hence, unions become bureaucratic because of the oligarchical tendencies of privileged minorities in the union. Nevertheless, the literature argues that well-enhanced democratic mechanisms enable the maintenance of democracy through efficient governance. Critically approaching the literature on trade union democracy, this research discusses how democratic functioning has been addressed in trade unions, why unions have chosen or shied away from democratic participation as an effective form of governance, and how trade union democracy relates to workers' achievements in the long run.

2.1 Bureaucratic Approach in Unions

While the bureaucratic management model understanding claims that it is intrinsically advantageous to leave the decision-making processes within the union to those in authority by relying on their experience, it also includes the argument that all organizations will eventually become bureaucratic. Herberg claims that bureaucratic organization becomes inevitable in the organization's development process. The main argument resembles the "Iron law of the oligarchy" argument generated by Michels that unions are undemocratic or inevitably become bureaucratic after a while by nature. According to Herberg (1943), another side of the development of unions by size causes a systematic narrowing of democracy (Herberg 1943, p.410-411). To be more precise, the larger the union, the more challenging it is for workers to participate in debates. Hence, Herberg (1943) claims that preserving democracy in a trade union is impossible, and the organization has its roots deep in its very nature (p.413).

Taft (1946) also argued that the larger the union, the more bureaucratic it is. In addition, his conception of bureaucracy in unions was not harmful; instead, it was necessary

(Taft, 1946, p.360-361). Taft (1946) states that there is an "inherent need for delegation of power and authority by the membership; the rise of power centers subject neither to control by members nor by the government is almost inevitable (p.363)." This faction regarding the debate about union democracy regards small fractions or groups as a danger to the integrity of unions. Scholars who support the efficiency of bureaucratic mechanisms in the union assume that the central office is more experienced and expert than rank-and-file workers in the union. Furthermore, this body stated that the opposition is hard to establish in the unions because of the length of tenure; hence, the incumbent gains the benefit in this case (Taft, 1946, p.362).

Seidman's (1953) discussion also corroborates Taft's (1946) and Herberg's (1943) beliefs about the dilemma of preserving democracy in trade union organizations. Seidman intends to understand the predicaments of preserving democracy in trade unions. Joel Seidman (1953) grasps the components that influence the union democracy as a reflection of society. In addition, the argument generated by Herberg (1943) is also repeated by Seidman (1953), who believes that as the union grows, members' participation tends to fall sharply. The supplementary argument by Seidman (1953) indicates low levels of participation by rank-and-file members. It was argued that most members tended to leave critical topics to their chosen officials. This argument continues with the assumption that rank-and-file members are unable to express themselves. Seidman (1953) further claimed that the dilemma of preserving union democracy is bilateral. As low attendance allowed a comparatively small group of leaders and active members to dominate the union, Seidman believed that the increase in union membership caused a decrease in attendance at the meeting. According to Seidman (1953), members may conceive of the debates as insignificant, so essential issues are left to the chosen officials. Furthermore, workers hardly grasp the necessity of parliamentary procedures, and few of them can express themselves in front of a respectable audience. Moreover, when membership rates increase, the number of paid officials increases. Paradoxically, expanding the picture of the union would harm democracy (Seidman, 1953, p.221-223).

The discussion above needs to be considered when considering different conceptions of

union administration. Heery and Kelly (1994) perceived that unions become more managerial in their operations by researching and monitoring employee needs, designing and promoting union services to match and plan the organization, and training and deploying their own human resources to support services. According to this understanding, union members are perceived as individualistic customers. In addition, the relationship between leaders and rank-and-file members in trade union organizations is essential to grasp internal dynamics, as unions require strategic leadership and membership involvement simultaneously. The growth of managerial unionism has been linked to criticism of activism and professionalism to advance members' interests (1994, p.7-8). In this study, the most important aspect of managerial unionism is that its adoption of managerial unionism implies one last change in power relations, strengthening the role of union advisors and professionals in making decisions (1994, p.10). Heery and Kelly (1994) stated that managerialism has replaced a professional view of the officer's function, and a view of members as basically passive has been replaced with a vision of members as "reactive consumers." As a result, rather than an essentially static description in which the interaction structure between officers and members remains fixed, a genuine historical explanation of the union government is provided (1994, p.16). However, Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick criticized managerial unionism, indicating that even unions that provide a comprehensive package of individual services emphasize their members' roles as representatives of collective interests (2019, p.103).

In the context of the above debate, it is possible to argue that managerial unionism feeds the bureaucratic style of unionism. In addition, the main body of Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick's (2019) criticism is based on the claim that even individual service-based unions represent the collective interests of their members. Nevertheless, managerial unionism collects decision-making authority in the hands of union officials' lay representatives, constructing the basis of bureaucratic unionism. Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) refer to scholars who supported the iron law of oligarchy. Those who believe that paid officials have the skills and particular interest to prevail in decision making. Hence, the domination of decision making and the electoral process

generates a degraded circle. Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) argued that the focus of subsequent studies (and discussions among trade unionists) has frequently been on power and interest imbalances inside unions, but with two different kinds of emphasis. One is hierarchical, focusing primarily on the roles and influence of leaders and other paid officials as opposed to, more generally speaking, rank-and-file activists and members. This strategy has frequently resulted in polarizing debates on the distortionary effects of the "trade union bureaucracy." The second strategy emphasizes horizontal disparities (occupation, sector, gender, age, and ethnicity), mainly associated with feminist analysis. According to this viewpoint, trade unions redistribute power and resources within the working class, and between workers and capitalists. The interests of paid officials and lay representatives may undermine the union's overall policy because they often come from the relatively skilled, masculine, and native-born parts of the workforce. Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman's (2013) study reveals that, in recent years, unions in several nations have attempted 'proportionality' to solve this issue (as cited in Hyman and McCormick 2019, p.102).

When discussing bureaucracy, it is vital to avoid a rigid understanding that implies a personal dichotomy between the union officials and members. Bureaucracy within a union is the result of transpersonal understanding. In Hyman's (1989) words, "the problem of bureaucracy" was not anchored in the interests of a layer of full-time union officials (FTOs) but as a complex of social interactions that 'permeates the entire practice of trade unionism' at every level of the representational organization." Considering union officers as representatives of union bureaucracy perspective portrayed union executives as scapegoats for violations that were, in fact, inherent in trade unionism itself (Hyman, 1989, p.54-55) Darlington and Upchurch (2012) indicated that the strongest side of Hyman's early analyses of trade union officialdom over many 'pluralist' political and industrial relations commentators of the 1950s and 1960s was the effort to specify the issue of 'bureaucratic conservatism' not just to pressures internal to unions, but most importantly to the impact of external agencies with which the growth of neoliberalism and globalization in more recent years has highlighted the effectiveness of this theory even more (Darlington & Upchurch, 2012, p.80).

According to Hyman (1989, p.61), bureaucracy in trade unionism is formed through three sets of social relations. The first is the separation of representations from mobilization. The second is a hierarchy of control and action, and the third is a dissociation of formal policy and decision-making procedures from member experience. The accommodation between central authorities and lay decision-makers results in crude coercion and manipulation. Camfield (2013, p. 138) also stated that bureaucracy is best defined as a style of social relationship in which people's behavior is ordered by formal rules that limit their capacity to choose their nature and purpose. In this definition, bureaucracy refers to a type of social relationship rather than a collection of individuals. As a danger, serving as a full-time official becomes an occupation, rather than a temporary commitment.

In short, the bureaucratic approach in trade unions is embodied in the increasing limits of authority of officials in labor organizations as the organization grows and participation in decision-making naturally decreases, and in the belief that this method can be more effective in the efficiency of a labor organization. In this sense, it is vital to see that the current understanding of managerial unionism is derived from this perspective. It is essential to note that bureaucratic management, as emphasized by Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019), affects the entire internal management of the organization, not just interpersonal management, and that this transformation has also changed based on its relationship with institutions outside the organization.

2.2 Democratic Approach in Unions

According to the literature, research beginning with Lipset et al.'s Union Democracy (1957) study how internal democracy in organizations might be maintained over time. Scholars believe that it is unmanageable to sustain internal democracy in a world dominated by the "iron law of oligarchy" (Michels, 1999). Hence, this literature on democratic administration could only last in "untypical" unions like the International Typographical Union (ITU). Because the ITU instance highlights the existence of a

homogeneous and segregated "occupational community," it produced an extremely high level of rank-and-file commitment and involvement in union activities, a circumstance that, as the authors claimed, was uncommon.

In addition to the idea of the difficulty in preserving democracy, Jack Barbash (as cited in Baccaro, 2006) believed that rank-and-file members both act more extremely than union officials and lack experience in comparison to them. Because "the closer the union leadership is to the job, the more the leadership reflects rank-and-file concerns with the minute details of job shifts and job conditions, and the less it appreciates the economics of the enterprise which make changes necessary" (Barbash, 1967 as cited in Baccaro, 2006, p.7). Baccaro (2006) symbolizes Gramsci and Italian unionism in terms of democracy as a decision-making tool. The history of Italian unions' militancy and radicalism has frequently been related to their internally democratic organization.

In contrast to the bureaucratic management approach first mentioned, there are also arguments that a democratic approach is necessary for trade unions, in which internal functioning is organized based on conditions that create the participation of members. Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) thought it was troubling for trade unions to press credibly for industrial and economic democracy unless they were democratic (p.92). Goldberg (2008, p.762) believed that a stronger union movement can be understood as an outcome of internal democracy in unions. Goldberg's promotion of union democracy also results in democratic unions being less prone to complications, such as corruption, racketeering, and infiltration by organized crime. Williams and Halcoussis (2014) cite Lipset (1957) as he underlines that organizational corruption and oligarchy are intimately related. Williams and Halcoussis (2014) indicated that democratic unions are more effective at their core collective bargaining functions, contrary to the idea that only union officials are capable of collective bargaining and union strategies. By contrast, they argue that democratic unions are more advantageous in collective bargaining with employers. Scholars understand that direct democratic procedures in the union prevent the worsening of working and living conditions (Williams & Halcoussis, 2014, p.226).

The assertions that underline the more effective functioning of trade union democracy in labor organizations draw attention to the transparency of its functioning and claim that crises such as corruption, grafting, and nepotism that can exist in bureaucratic administrations will be less. At the same time, how a democratic administration can function with these claims is also critical. Christopher Schenk (2014) aimed to discuss the possibilities of enhancing democracy in his article titled "Unions and Democracy." Meaningful democracies need to be more than regular elections because decision-making about issues related to daily life expands workers' political education, develops their potential, and increases their self-confidence (Schenk, 2014, p.9). Schenk cited Hirschman to underline the voice mechanism of rank-and-file participation in the democratic process through discussions, voting, union elections, and negotiations. According to Hirschman (as cited in Schenk, 2014), workers must represent themselves without fear or revenge through the mechanism of collective voice. In addition, collective representation reinforces the status of all members and their questions in the organization (Schenk, 2014, p.9-10). Even though it is hard to preserve democracy in unions, Regalia (1988) believed that it is a necessary condition for organizations since they are constrained to be democratic by nature (p.361). Ida Regalia (1988) proposes that unions provide rank-and-file demands for action and direct engagement of a voice. According to Regalia (1988), "the establishment of delegate councils, workplace union institutions, and worker self-government are proof of union democracy" (p.345-346). The idea is that direct democracy is only possible in small units where workers express their opinions directly. Lipset supports this idea with the following conclusions "Democracy is possible in small units where direct participation is possible, and it requires autonomous centers of power" (1957, p. 80)."

On the other hand, there is disagreement about the methods of democratic practice in labor unions. For example, Strauss (1991) argued that not because democracy is beneficial in and of itself (which it is) but because democracy, overall, makes unions more effective at representing members' interests and organizing those members to support collective bargaining goals. Strauss (1991) believed that democracy at the local

level requires an active core of dedicated volunteers who can serve three functions: 1) check the leaders' power, 2) provide the nucleus of electoral opposition if the leaders become unresponsive, 3) act as a communications connection between the leadership and the rank and file. Democratic union leaders have a better grasp of their members' priorities, recruit, and train unpaid leaders, build a sense of devotion to the union, which is required for successful strikes, and make the union more appealing during recruitment efforts. However, town-hall democracy with high levels of direct participation may be rare, if not universally desirable. However, representative democracy can contribute significantly to union survival and success. Democracy adds to a union's existence and prosperity by increasing efficiency. Therefore, for Strauss (1991), even though democracy is frequently disorderly and disruptive, the long-term danger is not that unions will be overly democratic, but that democracy will be weakened, and the unions will transform into inefficient and corrupt organizations. (1991, p.3-4).

Strauss's (1991) claim that democracy can bring chaos does not prevent the adoption of democracy as a governance model due to its advantages within the organization. Contrary to Strauss as a proponent of representative democracy, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's arguments about union democracy endure through direct democratic participation practices. Lipset et al. (1957) based their theory of democracy on three fundamental propositions in response to Michels. The first, based on Aristotle, contends that democracy can exist only in a predominantly middle-class society. This implies that union democracy will thrive where members' incomes and security are high, and the status gap between leaders and members is small. Second, democracy works best in small groups that have direct participation. The third and most important proposition is that democracy thrives when members are organized into structured subgroups with autonomous power centers. Autonomous centers of power create conditions for opposition by providing forums for the generation of new ideas, communication networks, training opportunities for potential leaders, opportunities for individuals to become involved, and independent groups capable of forming an opposition outside of the administration's control. For democracy to function, that opposition must be granted legitimacy (or, at the very least, tolerance). (Stepan-Norris 1997, p. 478-479). In

addition, Stepan-Norris believed that factionalism was intimately related to democracy.

According to Stepan-Norris (1997), factions are built on ideological divisions, and the content of the ideas they represent is critical for preserving workers' interests and engagement. Additionally, factions are more beneficial to democracy when they provide workers with genuine options that align with their interests. She also cited the paragraph to affirmatively emphasize how factions affect union democracies: "faction is the lifeblood of [union] democracy" in that it "provides an active guardianship of membership interests" (as cited in Stepan-Norris, 1997, p.481).

Therefore, among the methods used to ensure democratic participation, some examples emphasize representative democracy and discussions, such as the workers' assemblies mentioned in the introduction, the creation of direct participation spaces, and the establishment of committees. There are judgments that democratic governance will increase consciousness of acting together within the class movement, leaving behind the different results of implementing these two methods of democratic administration. Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) believed that democratic unions could also mobilize collective action. Therefore, unions must first initiate a "willingness to act" among their members. Second, effective action requires some degree of overall coordination and definition of strategic priorities to gather union members. Consequently, members' energies will be preserved despite diverse, disparate, and perhaps reciprocally contradictory initiatives. Thus, unions require both membership and strategic leadership. The tension between these two requirements creates a dilemma for trade union democracies. (Hyman & McCormick, 2019, p.101).

Ida Regalia (1988, p.351) points out that union effectiveness involves the capacity to interpret, decode, sustain, and redefine the demands of the represented to invoke the broadest possible consensus and approval from the rank-and-file. According to Regalia (1988), since unions are based on consent, they must maintain that consent or, at the very least, try to contain apparent dissensions (p.361). With Regalia's reminder, it becomes clear that the relationship between the leader, who is responsible for collecting

the opinions and suggestions of members, and the rank-and-file within the union will be two-way. In other words, in a democratic management approach, this person doing his/her job well can be measured by his/her efforts to increase participation in these mechanisms, to create areas to act together, and to make the existing union structure suitable for this. At the same time, members must also take responsibility to guarantee this function. In a democratic trade union approach, strong leadership is strengthened not by monopolizing decision-making mechanisms but by spreading them to the grassroots.

However, the relationship between leadership and members must align with the contentious debate between bureaucracy and democracy. One group of researchers, including Hyman, has questioned the contradiction between union democracy and bureaucracy. Hyman (1989) believed that for the sake of the union, a happy medium should be found between a "trade union bureaucracy" and the "rank-and-file." He saw the phrase 'trade union bureaucracy' as an unsatisfying description frequently used by individuals who believed had an 'idealized and romanticized notion' of the industrial fight and shop steward militancy (Hyman, 1989, p.54). The viewpoint that Hyman critically approaches is generated by the increasing centralization of power at the top of large-scale bureaucracies and the resulting member apathy. Leaders expect privileged lifestyles and become increasingly hesitant to relinquish their positions of power. Their monopoly on communication channels and leadership development allowed them to maintain their control.

It is helpful to remember that the bureaucratic model of unionism relates to how it uses the decision-making mechanism in the leader-member duality. Since members' views were heard by union leadership, Child and colleagues emphasized the value of ordinary members' power to pressurize union officials. According to Child, Loveridge, and Warner (1973), the effectiveness of a union's formal representation structure is a crucial determinant of the degree to which members' concerns are typically acknowledged by union leadership, even though such pressures may occasionally manifest themselves through more direct forms of protests. Characteristics such as union size and

membership heterogeneity are likely to impact the effectiveness of a representative system (Child et al. 1973, p.82-83). Hyman and McCormick concluded that active participation and deliberation could be a source of strength. The analysis by Levi et al. (2009, p.223) reached that 'democracy may sustain and facilitate hard bargaining [and] it may even facilitate organizing'. Parker, referring to a successful strike against UPS (1998, p. 57), insisted that, "in a critical struggle against a corporation, democracy was not just the icing on the cake, but the very foundation of union power" (as cited in Hyman & McCormick, 2019, p.103).

Although the democratic form of governance is usually associated with a representative and direct democratic model, what is desired is a transparent, corruption-free, and nepotism-free governance approach, in which union officials act according to the principle of accountability, express the demands and expectations of members, and act together for these demands in line with the principle of democratic participation. In this model, the role of leaders is also significant and does not imply ineffective leadership. A leadership that learns to listen to the rank and file by extending all decision-making to the grassroots level can create a robust model of democratic union governance. Finally, intra-organizational democracy is vital in creating spaces where organizers can act together and expand the struggle for demands.

2.3 Union Democracy Structure

Providing a democratic structure in organizations brings about internal debates and advantages. Along with the dilemma of representative or direct democracy, the dilemma of centralization or decentralization has also gained importance. Structural problems come to the fore in the context of labor organizations. For this reason, the creation of a democratic structure within an organization leads to debates in terms of the structure and functioning of the organization.

A related debate concerns the centralization of decentralization in the union policy-making strategy. It has been argued that decentralized structures are more democratic

because they provide greater scope for membership involvement in decision-making. This argument is consistent with participative theories of democracy. However, a counterargument believes that decentralization prevents strategic direction about a particular problem when essential employer plans are progressively centralized (Streeck, 1988, 312-313). Streeck (1982, as cited in Baccaro, p.8) inherited mistrust for union members with equivalent gratitude for union officials' reliability and extrasensory perception. Other attitudes examine how to reconcile the strategic coherence of centralization and the democratic vitality of decentralization. For instance, Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) exemplify other approaches to reconcile the democratic vitality of decentralization with the strategic coherence of centralism. Kjellberg argued that Swedish unions combine both authoritative national decision-making and workplace-level autonomy over important issues, with close articulation between the two levels providing a source of strength and democracy (as cited in Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2019, p.102)

Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, citing Kjellberg concerning the Swedish trade union movement, argue that there is no completely exclusive distinction between centralization and decentralization. They emphasize that the tactical preference for centralization in policymaking in trade unions should be separated from bureaucratic understanding that closes all decision-making mechanisms to workers. In summary, anti-bureaucratic decision-making mechanisms can also be made functional in unions with examples of centralized decision-making processes. While the results of this form of decision-making are open to criticism, tactically, they differ from structures in which decision-making mechanisms are closed to workers. Hyman and McCormick (2019) state that every large and complex union requires professional supervision. However, they argue that managerial unionism contradicts the idea that unions are weak protectors.

In the debate on the institutionalization of trade union democracy, the claim to fulfill the requirements of representative democracy is also present in the literature. To illustrate, by discussing union democracy, a body of scholars believes that voting is an essential

part of democracy; hence, participation in the discussion becomes a distant result. Jonathan Eaton (2006, p.204) cites from Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin to emphasize the three components of a democratic union. First, a democratic constitution guarantees fundamental civil liberties and political rights; second, an institutional opposition that allows members to criticize and debate union officials, as well as organize, oppose, and replace officials through freely contested elections among contending political associations or factions; and third, an active membership with a high participation rate by its members for the practice of their power in the union and in generating the decisions that affect the decisions. In this context, intra-union democracy is expressed as the power of union members to vote, have a say in the election and decision processes, and change management when necessary (Dereli, 1998, p.23).

Participatory democracy proponents underline that active members understand the procedures and may utilize them to their advantage. A well-defined constitution that provides voting rights, periodic open elections, and different methods of rank-and-file control to assure leadership responsibility and empowered participation is critical for a democratic union. Nonetheless, they see a discrepancy between reality and what is written in the paper. Levi et al. (2009, p.206) state:

Such provisions include one-person, one-vote for contracts and officers, low thresholds for recall referenda, and clear communication channels between members and leaders. For these procedures to work, they must be supported by a union culture that emphasizes rank-and-file voices and rights. Procedures are insufficient; union members must know how to use them to make their officers accountable and responsive. Without an active membership with a tradition of enforcing compliance of other members and leadership with the institutional and constitutional arrangements of the union, oligarchy is likely to emerge.

Although democracy was more efficient for rank-and-file members to vote, the following issues may be raised: "Is participatory democracy desirable in trade unions?" "How dedicated are they to internal democracy?" "How can trade unions be more devoted to internal democracy?" Approaches to participatory democracy in trade union organizations also varied. According to a study, the union continues to have widespread support when internal democracy remains strong (Buhlungu, Brookes, and Wood 2008,

p.458). Morris and Fosh (2000) analyzed four possible perspectives on participatory democracy in unions.

As Morris and Fosh (2000, p. 96) note, there are four alternative perspectives on participatory democracy in unions. First, liberal pluralist approaches have existed. This suggests that the extent of participatory democracy reflects whether a union has a democratic constitution, voting mechanisms (Stepan-Norris, 1997, pp. 476–77), degree of membership participation in elections (Morris & Fosh, 2000, p. 96), and meetings in general (Seidman, 1953). Parks et al. (1995, p. 536) argued that a temporal dimension is necessary (e.g., when a member last participated in an election or attended a meeting). The second viewpoint, the consumer trade union, considers members to be consumers of union services (Morris & Fosh, 2000, p.97). Third, grassroots activism approaches look at how active members are in decision-making, actively seeking to control their officials and delegates, and participating in union affairs (Fairbrother, 1983, as cited in Morris and Fosh, 2000, p.97). Finally, as Morris and Fosh (2000, p. 98) note, conservative individual accountability views hold that rank and file are inevitably more moderate than leaders (ibid, p.98); a lack of interest in union affairs may mask a climate of intimidation (Taft, 1944 as cited in Buhlungu, Brookes, & Wood, 2008, p.451); hence, the degree of democracy is dependent on mechanisms such as secret ballots (Morris & Fosh, 2000, p. 98)

Moreover, in representative democracies, it is not enough to have laws, and they need an institutional structure to make them work. A democratic culture involving workers at every stage works effectively through direct democratic participation bodies operating through representation and committees in factories and workplaces. To foster participatory democracy, a workplace culture of militancy and solidarity is required, but is not sufficient, according to Levi et al. (2009, p.208). Even the most militant occupational culture is unlikely to prevent oligarchy without the institutionalization of democracy. These scholars stated that "we find that there are two "iron rules" in a union without democracy." Voss and Sherman (2000) explained the two iron laws as follows. First, despite formal democratic processes, organizations tend to evolve oligarchical

leadership over time. A rising gap between staff and members makes it possible for leaders to shape the organization against members' will. Hence, an increasing number of professionally trained employees are necessary. Second, as leaders become preoccupied with organizational survival, goals and tactics change in a conservative direction (2000, p.305).

In addition to the hierarchy in governance that leads to anti-democratic practices, as Voss and Sherman (2000) cited in "Union democracy reexamined, the inclination toward oligarchy also includes bureaucratic sclerosis; hence, they argue the renewal of militant members from outside the ranks of the union. Levi et al. (2009) suspect the strength of this strategy and its reinforcement of organizational culture. Scholars believe that Voss and Sherman's plan may be successful by defeating bureaucratic conservatism and enabling employees to fight for their economic rights. However, it needs to be more evident whether this tactic strengthens workers' unions or equips them with the means to have a political voice in a larger community. Democracy is secondary to their goals, which include reviving the importance of organizing and intensifying combat with employers. In contrast, democracy may encourage and support tough negotiations, as it most surely does with the ILWU, which they analyze its practices in their article. (Levi et al., 2009, p.223).

As Levi et al. (2009) suggest, it is also possible to discuss intra-union options and options to build a culture of trade union democracy in the long term. The renewal of militant members can be guaranteed by worker-centered structures, which have emerged as an alternative to the bureaucratic structure. For example, a general meeting of strikers, an elected strike committee, the commune, the Soviet Union, and the factory council (Castoriadis as cited in Camfield, 2013) or, more precisely, anti-bureaucratic responses developed by self-organized workers in response to the problem of long-term centralization. Castoriadis (1988) argues that there are alternatives to bureaucratic organizations, implying that theories that assume union bureaucracy is a natural byproduct of organizational growth are erroneous (as cited in Camfield, 2013, p.143). In addition, as workers can actively participate in these mechanisms, bureaucratic sclerosis

can be defeated by providing space for the renewal of militant members within the union, not from outside ranks. Therefore, it is possible to observe different views on what kind of content intra-union democracy will take on and that there are alternatives to representative or direct democracy and different forms of struggle against the existing tendency towards bureaucratization and union efficacy.

2.4 Union Democracy and Union Membership

The structural functioning of trade unions, their preference for a democratic or bureaucratic management approach, and the different contents of the democratic structure as representative or direct democratic participation in the functioning affect the interaction of members with each other and union officials. Freeman and Medoff, cited in Tilly (2013, p.2), consider that unions have two faces: the first is a monopoly face that reduces efficiency and the second is called the voice aspect that can increase it. While the monopoly face resembles paid officials with a profound role in decision making, the voice mechanism represents ordinary members. They can moderate the role of union leaders in deciding union matters. Hence, their standpoint is that democracy goes together with efficiency (Tilly 2013). In addition, most US unions are somewhat fragmented, and research shows that effective union activities depend on member engagement and mobilization. (Levi et al. 2009, p.11). Schmitter (1993) indicated that labor mobilization is the result of union democracy rather than a prerequisite. Baccaro et al. (2019) suggests that union membership privileges solidarity. Discursive contacts inside trade unions lead to a better feeling of commonality among employees (Ahlquist and Levi, 2013, as cited in Baccaro et al., 2019, p.7), one source of curiosity would be the question: is it the union that transformed the workers in this direction of struggle, or yet already combatant workers joined the organization?

Michels (1999) argues that as unions become institutionally linked with the capitalist economic and political system, they are vulnerable to the "iron law of oligarchy," which develops an autocratic leadership increasingly detached from the rank and file despite the existence of formal democratic procedures and pursues the primary goal of

organizational survival rather than working-class interests (Piven and Cloward, 1979, as cited in Baccaro et al., 2019, p.8). Autocratic leadership is related to well-paid privileged communities, which is the reason for criticism by unions. (Reynolds 1984, as cited in Tilly, 2013 p.2). Strauss (1991), echoing Michel's (1999) iron law of oligarchy argument, contends that oligarchy is not inevitable and that most unions include an activist core of volunteers who can restrict local leadership. There are also concentrations of opposing strengths that can threaten senior leadership (1991, p.6). As Voss (2010) points out, unions' efforts to "aggregate the interests of diverse workers and represent new constituencies" (p.369) are examples of other dimensions of democracy. Moreover, Levi et al. (2009) believed that active participation and deliberation could be a source of strength in unions to sustain and facilitate hard bargaining and organizing through a union culture (as cited in Connolly, 2020, p.212). Moreover, Connolly's (2020) research on U.K. trade unions indicated that leaders with left-wing and collectivist values, both full-time officers (FTOs) and activists, can be strong supporters of encouraging democracy and renewing a cohesive collective identity (2020, p.211). Hyman also maintained Levi et al.'s argument by stating that powerful and independent union organizations can provide an essential disposition against bureaucratization and accommodation of official union leadership (as cited in Darlington and Upchurch, 2012, p.78).

In a trade union, "collective identity" is required for effective input. Preserving "demos" in the union constituency, in addition to the sufficient "social capital" of the members, assists in efficient participation. Dufour and Hege (2013) demonstrate that representative capacity within union organizations is heavily reliant on the quality of the interrelationships between representatives and their constituents, representatives' responsiveness to the often-individualized everyday concerns of workers, and their willingness to act as a kind of social worker in dealing with issues that arise outside of work. Because social networks precede formal collective organization, they can serve as a springboard for unionization and a resource for effective intra-union dialogue (Dufour & Hege, 2013, p.361-363).

However, American literature views union democracy as damaging union effectiveness due to its tendency to diminish leaders' autonomy. Because according to this side of the literature, union democracy would lead union officials to "bow the myopic demands of their members which have the potential of neglecting long term interest of the organization." In addition, union democracy causes tension in bargaining demands because rank-and-file members are inclined to be more myopic and emotional than leaders. Therefore, union leaders need to distance themselves from the rank and file to be effective in bargaining (Lipset et al., 1957; Walton and McKersie, 1991, as cited in Baccaro et al., 2019, p.7-8).

Additionally, Offe (Marino et al., 2018) believes that active participation by members is disadvantageous for union efficacy (Offe, 1981; as cited in Marino et al., 2018, p.113). The question, then, is whether unions for whom, as in the article by Marino et al. (2018). Does the union aim to maintain sustainable relations with employees or meet the demands of its members? This article considers inclusive union strategies for underrepresented groups to inspire the appearance of novel ways of solidarity. Besides, the scholars clarify "inclusion" as the result of union's attempts to encourage ungarded workers for their economic interests (collective bargaining) and political participation (making their voices and concerns heard in the public sphere) (Marino, 2013, as cited in Marino et al., 2018, p.112).

On the other hand, Baccaro stated that distance was necessary to safeguard the union from unmanageable demands of rank and file, which resulted in concentrating power in the leadership, limiting members' ability to influence union policy, and tempering their claims in exchange for long-term benefits (Baccaro, 2006, p.5-9). In contrast, Offe (as cited in Marino et al., 2018) and Darlington and Upchurch (2012, p.90) saw aggressive rank-and-file engagement as the only way to prevent bureaucracy. Hyman (1989, p.321-325) argues that the conflict between the trade union bureaucracy and rank-and-file is fruitless and promotes the cohabitation of intense central and lower union levels, as well as robust internal articulation mechanisms.

It is clear from the above discussion that the concept of trade union democracy is directly related to the relationship between members and union officials. The union democracy debate is strongly related to different conceptions of union purposes and their impact on affiliates. Again, asking the question "unions for whom" is answered by Strauss with a passage below that starkly explicates the relationship between union democracy and its affiliates in a labor association as follows: (1) Unions exist to offer employees a voice and improve their economic circumstances. Democratic activism provides them with a voice. As union executives frequently get things wrong, more is needed to presume that they understand what membership wants (Gallagher & Strauss, 1991). Democracy implies that people, not just them, are in charge. (2) Over time, democracy strengthens unions by eliminating incompetent and corrupt members. This encourages police to perform better. (3) The members are more inclined to make decisions, such as the decision to strike. Democratic processes encourage member support. (4) Giving members a choice significantly boosts their identification with their union and has a significant symbolic value. Finally, (5) democracy finds and develops leaders, particularly underpaid shop-level leaders, who, in my opinion, are crucial to the health of unions. Salaried personnel can only handle some things (Strauss, 2000, p.211-212).

On the other hand, Taft (1956) stated that unions require discipline, unity, and administrative efficiency, but democracy implies factionalism, which may divide or paralyze the union. Taft (1956) confirmed that reciprocally war-ridden factions are expendable, which most unions cannot afford. Taft (1946, p.360) mainly argues that for their own safety, unions need to impose the general will over their subordinate branches. That can be supported by Allen's argument by saying, "end of trade union activity is to protect and improve the general living standards of its members and not to provide workers with an exercise in self-government" (Allen, 1954, p. 15). To illustrate, the objection of some local groups may oppose the rule of the union that certain procedures may be exhausted." (Taft, 1948, p.360). Formalized resistance is perceived as "threatening the sense of unity and brotherhood, which is the bedrock of trade union organization" (Roberts, 1956, as cited in Strauss, 2000, p.212).

Strauss (2000, p.212) believes that a trade-off between democracy and efficiency is needed to guarantee short term-efficiency. Populist democracy is unlikely to make difficult choices on which union survival may depend. In short, union "members have doubtless suffered far more from inefficient and unimaginative administration than they have ever lost through corruption and undemocratic practices" (Bok and Dunlop, 1970, cited in Strauss, 2000, p.212). The discussion leads to a novel question: "What is the position of union administration for democracy or efficiency should be or is there a duality?" Besides, quotation below is also essential:

The communicative processes associated with union democracy give union leaders ample opportunities to influence the members' process of preference formation. The examples above suggest that the dichotomy between strong and weak workers (and vice versa) is overly simplified. Union democracy may strengthen some leaders at the expense of other leaders depending on the type of union, its encompassing, and the diversity of internal constituency." (Baccaro, 2019, p.18)

The relationship between strong leaders and weak workers is also discussed by Turner (ascited in Hyman, 1975), arguing that active rank-and-file involvement tends to be the greatest in unions with relatively skilled and homogeneous membership. In more heterogeneous unions, there are often serious problems of interest aggregation, and stronger centralized leadership is necessary to sustain internal cohesion. Turner characterized such unions as 'popular bossdom' with strong and, at times, authoritarian leaders retaining control through the largely passive consent of their members (as cited in Hyman, 1975, p.72).

Leaders frequently make a difference not only by convincing others that an approach is essential but also by putting it into action (as cited in Alexander, 2010). The 'magical frontier' (Fairbrother, 2005, p. 259) between union members and leaders is highly permeable in the democratic model. Furthermore, Fairbrother criticized Kelly's ideas through the concept of leadership, arguing that "if Kelly is right, leaders will rule, and we will be ruled." Even if Kelly does not explicitly address the problem of intra-union

democracy, the distinctive aspect is not that everything can be solved with the leadership mechanism but that no results can be achieved without changes in the leadership mechanism (Kılıç, 2019, p.87). Hence, in the democratic model of union organization, there are numerous opportunities for members to become leaders (and vice versa), regular dialogue is provided between members and leaders, and frequent channels exist for members to hold leaders accountable. Besides, expecting these leaders to be influential and have a track record of changing direction would not contradict the understanding of democratic trade unions. In contrast, in bureaucratic union understanding, the effectiveness of critical leaders can be listed in two aspects. First, they do not create conditions that open the debate to union members, where the grassroots dominate the debate, and they narrow the possibilities of transience in this task by deciding to extend their term of office. Therefore, communication in the bureaucratic paradigm is often one-way from top to bottom.

Darlington (2009) also cited the idea of a strike agitator. He emphasized that the magnitude of workers' militancy has also been determined by a fundamental subjective factor: the presence of a layer of workplace union organizers and militants capable of standing up and disputing with their coworkers. Continuing with most of them, they confirm that activist leadership is critical in expressing workers' grievances, directing them against bosses, and organizing rank-and-file actions. These studies revealed that the negotiation floor has an essential impact on bargaining strategies. Fairbrother (1983) highlights the importance of rank-and-file democratic engagement. Furthermore, industrial conflict occurs only when genuine grievances exist; however, for it to take an organized form, it frequently necessitates the articulation of shop stewards and other union activists whose commitment to collectivist principles of trade unionism is potentially more deeply rooted (they may mobilize workers to take militant action).

Kelly claims that (1998), "the entire process of collectivization is primarily dependent on the activities of a small number of leaders or activists." Kelly's approach is criticized by Fairbrother (2005) as a "vanguardist approach that offers a "one-dimensional, exaltation of a leader-led duality' (p. 261-262), which excludes more participatory

modes of organization. Using Gramsci's concept of 'organic intellectuals,' Eyerman and Jamison argue that 'movement intellectuals' perform various tasks, not just articulating the movement's ideas, as traditional intellectuals might, but also acting as protest technicians or artists, proposing appropriate practical activities for specific circumstances. This view of leadership adds a new dimension to Kelly's approach, which emphasizes the function of leaders in persuasion and idea framing (as cited in Alexander, 2010, p.243).

Consequently, considering that union members' relationships with leaders directly affect democratic functioning, it is essential to remember the four stages of democracy described by Strauss (1991). First, members lack both the competence to deal with technical difficulties directly and the ability to judge how successfully their officials govern them. Second, elected leaders and their appointed subordinates may campaign for reelection nearly full-time, yet their possible opponents lack these opportunities. Third, because of alienation, leaders may be deprived of connections with rank and file. Finally, members realize the leadership's monopoly of power through indifference. Strauss emphasizes that stewards play an essential role in union democracy since their reaction to members' desires helps the union to be more responsive. Individual member participation requires shop-level democracy and self-help techniques, which may not necessarily accord with the union (p.3-5)

2.5 How to Understand “Democracy” in Unions?

Until now, the literature review has discussed the controversy between the democratic conception of unions and the effectiveness of bureaucratic mechanisms. Correlatively, to mention a democratic conception, we first need to consider ways to measure democracy. Researchers have primarily used two methods in their efforts to quantify union democracies. The "legalistic" approach places a strong emphasis on legal measures, such as constitutional frameworks (Cook, 1963, p.225-226) executive branch authority (Taft, 1948, pp.459-460), and civil and political rights protections in union constitutions (Cook, 1963, p.14). In contrast, the behavioral approach is concerned with whether there

is institutional opposition (Lipset et al., 1957, p. 240) and how effective it is at holding leaders accountable to their constituents (Strauss, 1991, p.11-13). The behavioral approach typically examines how contentious union elections are when evaluating responsibility.

Strauss (1991) also categorizes the assessment criteria of democracy into five stages. First, a legalistic approach emphasizes regular elections. However, this theory ignores the fact that elections may occur in a coercive atmosphere. A second test is required to ask, "Can members run for office and speak in opposition to the leadership without fear of reprisal?" Strauss (1991). The third test is a behavioral test that looks for institutional opposition. By lowering the risks to their permanent term of office, adjustments to bureaucratic industries that preserve union organizational stability also promote the interests of trade union leaders. In trade unions, officials decrease the sources of organized opposition by giving the administration more control over the local units. Control over the official means of communication within the organization is one of the primary conditions for monopolizing communication channels and shaping attitudes and behavior through propaganda. Under these conditions, the only view on union matters that those members can generally rely on are those of leadership. Dissenting views are discredited, and the only information about union affairs that reaches general membership is what the authorities want them to hear. Second, this control prevents dissent from organizing. Even if members are not convinced of the correctness of management policies, and there is widespread discontent, organizing active opposition requires "coming together" to communicate. Collective ignorance cannot be reduced without widespread contact and information. Moreover, the average worker needs more opportunities or needs to learn political skills. They are rarely asked to speak in front of a crowd, express their thoughts fluently, or organize group activities. The political skills of union officials are one of the most important factors preventing the effective organization of dissenting sentiment in labor organizations and enabling incompetent management to use their superior communication skills to suppress or channel discontent. Management groups can exercise complete control over the flow of communication within their organizations. Any attempt to analyze the factors that

distinguish democratic organizations from non-democratic ones must consider the determinants of such differences. A few are suggested here: newspapers and similar sources of communication that reach members from outside the organization can weaken administrative control (Lipset et al., 1957, p.218-219).

In addition to the opposition test close elections, officer turnover (Edelstein & Warner, 1975, p.66), high levels of membership participation in various forms of union activities, and the percentage of minority and female officers. This criterion assumes that the right to participate is insufficient; therefore, it must be applied. Moreover, close elections are the result of competition among contenders of equal status, power, and reputation, which are resolved by an electorate formally subdivided into potential supporters of equal electoral strength under voting systems that ameliorate rather than exaggerate any structurally produced inequalities (Edelstein and Warner 1975, p.66). Additionally, membership engagement is usually considered pertinent to, if not connected to, democracy (Edelstein & Warner, 1975, p.221). However, Stepan-Norris (1997) reminds Lipset, Trow, and Coleman of high participation rates that do not inevitably translate into high levels of democracy because dictatorships also find participation useful (1957, p.11). According to this analysis, all three factors—constitutional protection, sustained opposition, and participation—contribute significantly to a democratic union system. (Stepan-Norris 1997, p.476-477). The fourth and final criteria are receptivity and influence, respectively. The following question was asked to measure this: " Do officers represent their members' beliefs and priorities? Do members believe they have a "voice" in how decisions are made? Tannenbaum and Kahn indicated that participation is linked to the steward's perceived leadership abilities in (1) communicating with the men, (2) involving them in decision-making, (3) offering "help" to the men, and (4) showing a sincere interest in how the men get along at work (1957, p.277).

It is challenging to quantify responsiveness. Organizational decision-making and the influence process by observing member-officer interactions in work can be examined. To illustrate, observing member-officer interactions and interviews with both might help to understand how officers respond to member demands (Batstone, Boraston, and

Frenkel, 1977, as cited in Strauss). Members can also be questioned about how much "voice" they have at the different levels of the organization to make crucial decisions. Scholars have suggested that communication is a shared process. Members who are stewards informed about union affairs may reply by voicing their opinions or suggestions (Tannenbaum and Kahn 1957, p.282). The two categories of union organizations play a unique role in providing democracy. The first occupational community needs to catalyze the level of participation, while the activist core needs to be understood as the third factor in union democracy, as Strauss (1991) indicated. Active participants assist in facilitating participation because their role as an activist core act as an intermediary between paid union officials and passive rank-and-file members. As a result, the countervailing power of the active participant might prevent the union leaders from becoming autocratic (1991, p.6)

Democratic participation cannot be guaranteed in the center unless it penetrates the local areas. Strauss (1991) also mentioned the channels for engagement at the municipal level. The first was local gatherings. Local meetings, which can be exemplified as forums, should be considered because attendance, consequences of meetings, and continuity are essential. Even the sparse attendance of meetings is beneficial for workers. This channel enables workers to express their unhappiness and acts in the case of insufficient growth. A direct quotation from Strauss makes it more comprehensible:

Generalizing from the English language literature, "normal" attendance, as a percentage of membership, appears to be higher (a) in smaller locals; (b) when the local represents a single workplace; (c) when collective bargaining is relatively decentralized; and (d) when members enjoy a sense of occupational community. Attendance becomes momentarily higher on rare occasions when the meeting makes decisions that are directly important to a large portion of membership. These include strike votes, contract ratification, and closely contested elections. Smaller attendance spurts occur when matters of particular interest to specific groups are considered, e.g., seniority disputes. (p.10)

Votes can be cast at union meetings (by show of hands or secret ballot), workplaces (by secret ballot), or postal ballots. Limited research from the United Kingdom demonstrates that postal ballots significantly improve voter turnout compared with voting at

geographically based branch (local) meetings. Elections only support democracy when voters have genuine options (Strauss, 1991, p.11). The fact that participants had unique preferences does not mean that they should be isolated from their social and cultural environments. Baccaro (2006) stated that democratic decision-making methods did not merely collect preferences; they also played a significant "preference-shaping" function. In 1993 and 1995, union officials did not just ask employees to vote; they spent significant time and money prior to the vote setting up assemblies and attempted to persuade workers that approving the proposed deal was ultimately in their best interests. Some opposition organizations claimed that they were not given enough space in the gatherings to express themselves.

Union representatives capable of preference-shaping (Baccaro, 2006) are first-hand participants in discussions between members and unions. Stewards, as a third channel, have a critical relationship with members, so their role is essential in many unions. For members who do not attend meetings regularly, the steward may be their sole point of contact with the union. Stewards service their concerns, provide information about the union, and may organize other sorts of self-help when fractional bargaining occurs. In many unions, stewards are the primary source of information on members' views on higher union levels. Stewards, for example, affect how members vote and whether they attend meetings. Thus, Strauss (1991) believes that if stewards respond to members' wishes, the union will respond better. Furthermore, members choose their stewards and are in a better position to judge their responses than higher-level executives (Strauss, 1991). Again, we see a conflict between democracy and efficiency. The position of stewards between ordinary workers and union executives constitutes a part of the debate. As part of the active core, the union-oriented steward may more successfully advocate the work group's concerns at higher levels. Left-wing authors in the United Kingdom have explained that plant-level bargaining is more organized and americanized. Thus, stewards would become "integrated" into the union-management hierarchy and therefore become less representative (Hyman, 1989, p.58).

Being a worker enables the establishment of democratic mechanisms in the field through

daily production activities. Informal forms of engagement are common in the workplace. As a result, members who do not participate in local-wide events may be active at work. Indeed, Kovner and Lahne (1953, p.3-4) contend that developing a "shop society" is required as a foundation for union democracy. Most shop societies are interested in and aware of union affairs, although only a few members participate in formal union activities. Consequently, participation in these formal activities is a partial indication of membership awareness and interest. The so-called "active members" who attend union fairs maintain close communication with the rest of their coworkers. Although there is no formal selection process for active participants, they become "informal representatives" because they serve as spokespersons for the entire group. The informal representation of the members in the shop by active participants in official union affairs serves as a link between the shop society and the union organization. Indeed, many union businesses are addressed at specific workplaces, which may affect individual decisions about how to vote or attend meetings (Strauss, 1991, p.12).

Internal union democracy can be understood as a complex relationship between members and union representatives, union officials, and sometimes natural leaders. Legal procedures written in trade union statutes, such as elections, appointments, and terms of office, can sometimes lose validity in these complex relationships. In these cases, examining the level of participation in decision-making mechanisms, the transparent relationship between union management and members, and the level of worker control within the union can help to understand the level of democracy within the union.

2.6 Organizing Strategies in Trade Unions

The organizational tactics of trade unions may vary according to the set of priorities. One of the reasons that unions need to revise their organizing tactics is the divergence of interests between members and officials. European discussions on union democracy have generally concentrated on deliberative and participatory democracies (Thomas, 2017, p. 2). Heery and Kelly (1994) stated that union officers organize trade settlements

on employment terms and conditions with employers and the state to guarantee their organization's presence. The union and its members' interests separate, giving birth to rank-and-file uprisings shown in unofficial organizations and local wildcat blockages. If these uprisings are maintained and widespread, they ultimately alter union policy, forcing the union to pursue gains through membership mobilization rather than relying on the operation of procedures and agreements signed with employers and the legal rights guaranteed by the state (1994, p.26).

In addition to highlighting the disagreement between members and union officials, this research also indicated a decline in union membership, which led unions to generate novel recruitment strategies. The first form is 'territorial canvassing,' in which officers visit places within their assigned area to attract new members. The second form is 'intense recruitment,' which consists of concise, coordinated campaigns for specific employees in organized or disorganized industries. Typically, these initiatives are organized by industry or regional officials who identify targets, briefly educate local police, and assess performance. The goal is often to manage pressure and end a campaign with a recognition agreement. The third form is 'passive recruitment,' in which officers are approached with recruitment opportunities, either through individuals or groups requesting to join the union or through routine recruitment of new employees in organized workplaces (1994, p.106).

When discussing unions, it is essential to remember that not all types of unions are the same. To illustrate, Ibsen and Tapia (2017) examine the function of trade unions in labor markets and society, stressing tensions between researchers who regard unions as mobilizing actors and those who see them as employers' and governments' counterparts in their research (2017, p.171). Unions are adapting revitalization tactics to their unionism and institutional environments as revitalization strategies expand across nations. Turner suggested that unions are in trouble and require renewal in countries such as the U.S., Britain, and Germany. The institutions of industrial relations and their legal foundations are required, and labor requires significant transformation. Furthermore, essential voices within the labor movement in all three nations—most

notably in the U.S.—call for rank-and-file mobilization and a new kind of social movement unionism to attain these objectives. Hence, mobilization and organization are still used to revitalize the institutionalized channels of worker representation. (Turner, 2003, p.25).

On the other hand, Ackers (2015) challenged the common conception of trade unions as militant organizations by arguing that British trade unionism was practical and apolitical, a movement of experienced and skilled workers (p.110). Ackers believe that trade unions must embrace a cooperative approach to reclaim legitimacy and strength. This strategy entails trading security for flexibility and moving away from contentious negotiation toward more proactive and collaborative ties between the employer and trade union (p.113). Although trade unions may enter partnerships with businesses, their legitimacy still depends on membership (Ackers, 2015, p.121). Ibsen reminded us that collaboration could only work if unions first gained legitimacy and influence (Ibsen and Tapia, 2017, p.184).

According to Ibsen and Tapia, market-focused business unionism, society-focused unionism, and class-focused unionism are three ideal forms of trade unionism. Benassi and Vlandas (2016) cited Hyman to explain the positions of the unions. Hyman (2001) states that union identities also experience tension between market, class, and society. For Hyman, unions should be considered distinct for more than one type of union. Thus, for Hyman, depending on the economic and political context, unions tend to act closer to one of the three types of union (p.10).

Business unionism, as the first type of trade unionism, has trade consciousness rather than class consciousness (Hoxie, 1923, p.45-46, as cited in Hyman, 2001, p.8). According to the literature, this type of trade union understanding aims mainly at higher wages, shorter working hours, and improved working conditions for organized workers in the industry. According to Hyman, it often ignores workers outside the organic group and political and social considerations unless they directly affect their economic aims. It accepts the existing capitalist system of organization and wages, as well as existing

property rights and contractual bindingness, as inevitable, if not just. It views trade unionism as a bargaining institution and seeks to achieve its objectives through collective bargaining. The standard view of trade unions is that these organizations seek to improve the material welfare of their members, primarily by raising wages above the competitive wage level" (Booth, 1995, as cited in Hyman, 2001, p.8-9).

Class unionism, as the second type of unionism, includes three components: wage struggles and working conditions that become more acrimonious and violent. Second, workers would increasingly band together under the banner of collective action. Third, there would inevitably be a shift from economic defense to revolutionary politics. Marx argued in *Value, Price, and Profit* that for the working class to emancipate itself fully; workers must consciously act as its organizing centers to achieve their goals. (Marx, 1969). The industrial union, which brought together employees from every area of the economy and allowed a united front against capitalists, was the favored alternative to class unionism. (Hyman, 2001, p.17-18)

In addition, creating a powerful central confederation was viewed as a means of unifying the working class. The Turin Industrial Council served as the foundation for the unique analysis created by Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci, a comprehensive theory of trade unionism cannot exist because the nature of unionism varies depending on local and historical circumstances: "The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon" (Gramsci, 1968, p.39). Conversely, a robust council system could counteract the bureaucratic and conservative tendencies inherent in trade unionism and inspire more radical goals and tactics. The formal, overarching structures of the union served an essential purpose in establishing and defending "industrial legality, " which guaranteed workers some rights within capitalism. The foundation of a socialist society burgeons collective self-organization in the workplace. (Hyman, 2001, p.24). On the other hand, Hyman believed that class-based trade unionism was challenging to achieve. The idea of a "one big union," uniting workers of all stripes inside its ranks, was never more than a pipe dream; in reality, unions now split as they join. The working relationship is regulated and normalized by unions, which may also participate in

conflict (Hyman, 2001, p.36).

Society-focused unionism, a third type of trade unionism, indicates that unions can only acquire social power by actively participating in social concerns. According to the prevalent trade union view, it can only successfully utilize industrial power if it is socially powerful (Hardman, 1928; as cited in Hyman, 2001). There is a conflict between trade unions' pursuit of "social partners' status through engagement with organizations with economic and political clouts and their efforts to influence societal views and values. The demand for trade unions in Europe to become more active in advocacy is growing. Campaigning involves engaging in 'adversarial politics' to gain the ears and backing of the powerful. Finally, to the degree that unions opted to advocate for public support, they resisted working with civil society groups and instead attempted to position themselves as the only ones qualified to represent civil society. Rarely have such initiatives been successful. Unions have only thought about more significant partnerships of this nature when they face the collapse of their independent authority (Hyman, 2001, p.61-62).

In addition, Kochan et al. (2009) and Ackers (2015) argue that partnership strategies are superior for unions because mobilization against employers and governments is not sustainable in the long run. In addition, this strategy will not assist unions in achieving an institutionalized role in governing employment relations. Ackers believed that unions must thus 'convert the basic metal of occupation into the gold of an appealing, professional identity' (Ackers, 2015, p. 116) and demonstrate that they benefit both workers and businesses. Ackers' arguments resemble the mutual benefit argument (Kochan et al., 2009). Governments should be more ready to alter industrial relations institutions in favor of unions if they are convinced of their reciprocal advantages. This discussion might be understood as a return to business unionism. The author acknowledges that unions must widen their missions and appeal to new worker constituencies by recruiting tactics (Ackers, 2002).

Despite partnership strategies, Hyman (2016, as cited in Ibsen and Tapia, 2017) claims

that neoliberal policies and shareholder capitalism irreversibly weaken institutional security. As a result, unions can be revitalized by restoring power resources through organizing; organizational restructuring; coalition building with other social movements; partnerships with employers at the national, industrial, or workplace level; political action to provide access to power resources; and international links to have information about multinational corporations, improve unions' bargaining power, and hence, members can mobilize easily. (Frege and Kelly, 2003, p.9)

Kelly, in his research *Rethinking Industrial Relations*, revealed that statistics on union membership and strike action, the most significant union expansion, has typically corresponded with times of intense mobilization and militancy (Kelly, 1998, p.63). Kelly (1998) believed that Cohn's (1993) examination of French coal workers' strike results could explain this discussion. Empirical research has revealed that the best course of action is to strike often if the labor movement remains harmonious. Militancy improves wages by convincing managers that employees want to strike for their requirements. By doing this, the latter persuaded employers to pay them extra money as a form of the peace offering (Cohn, 1993, p.213, as cited in Kelly, 1998, p.63)

Through strikes, unions have proven that they can pursue and win claims and grievances. Non-unionized workers have been urged to join in exceptionally high numbers. Even when unions seek to pursue topics that are ostensible of equal interest to employers, including training, equal opportunities, and health and safety, such effectiveness is difficult to establish through moderation because current assessments of union advancement reveal persistent resistance on the part of employers to hold substantive conversations, which only serves to highlight the level of capital opposition that presently exists towards regulation (Kelly, 1998, p.64). Thus, Kelly's impression is that small or large waves of strikes are linked to a quantitative increase in membership, although not always with the same results. In short, contrary to the above paragraph, mobilized class unionism is also beneficial for expanding the organization itself (1998, p.89). Similarly, Darlington stated that moderation could seriously undermine trade unions and leave them defenseless to employers' attacks because it deteriorates the

willingness and potential of members to resist and challenge employer demand (2009, p.120).

Furthermore, as mentioned, moderation may gravely undermine trade unions and leave them open to business attacks, because it erodes members' motivation and capacity to oppose and fight company demands. (Like anything else, this is not a standardized procedure.) Thomas (2013), in a complementary manner, indicated that:

In both cases, a reformist discourse was developed, centered on a redefinition of action repertoires and an orientation to generic organizational models related to union management. The discourse was developed by reformist coalitions composed of union officials and leaders, together with private consultants and academics who had played an important role in introducing and legitimizing managerial practices within trade unions (p.25).

According to Thomas (2013, p.26), trade unions are two distinct entities: one is a voluntary association guided by democratic principles, and the other is an organizational structure subject to efficiency standards. Thomas mentions increasing the differentiation between officials, ranks, and file members. The problem is that union leadership positions are similar to those in other institutions and organizations. While access to an official union position was once seen as a culminating step in an activist's career, managerial redefinition of function implies a more vigorous assessment of formal education and increased differentiation between union officials and ordinary members (Thomas, 2013, p.27).

The renewal and strengthening of trade unions are critical in collective bargaining and workplace authorization. Therefore, each union has tried various strategies to maintain its strength in its field. As Hyman (2001) suggests, the three main types of unionism have different renewal strategies. For example, while class unionism aims for the political unity of the class based on a union of economic interests, business unionism argues that the relationship between employers and workers is based on a free contract outside the capitalist relations of exploitation. Business unionism refers to opening a compromised channel with employer and state policies. At the same time, the difference

in the operation of decision-making mechanisms is also notable between these two types of unionism. Whereas in class unionism, the emphasis is on workers experiencing management in their factories through the establishment of workplace committees, in business-type unionism, union officials dominate decision-making mechanisms. Discussions in the literature claim that this method weakens the union and even shows data that it increases the number of members compared to periods of mobilization. Therefore, internal dynamics determine the reorganization strategies of the unions.

2.7 Union Democracy Studies in Turkey and the History of DİSK Textile

Union democracy studies in Turkey indicate that it is not possible to mention a well-operated democracy in labor organizations in Turkey related to the weakening of the organization. Scholars have mentioned the internal and external reasons that caused the weakening of the union. Nevertheless, Birelma's (2021) emphasis is essential at this point because he states that the internal and external factors that cause unions' loss of power are more like analytical divisions. Many internal factors can result from external factors. Hence, it is more appropriate to discuss reciprocal relationships. To illustrate, union democracy is an internal debate, yet legal legislation encourages it (Birelma 2021). In addition, despite negative external factors, unions have an open place to show their personal will in making strategic decisions (Çelik, 2006). Despite the current restrictions in Turkey, unions that were able to increase their members can be counted as examples (Birelma, 2018).

Banu Uçkan Hekimler (2015) conceives of unions as schools that teach workers democratic principles. Hekimler (2015) states that, in countries where democracy is not developed through their institution's union, democracy creates a significant issue in working life. According to Hekimler (2015), union democracy was formally established only in Turkey. On the surface, union organs are determined for specific periods with elections, and the decisions are made through voting in these organs, constituting counselor organs to ensure an increase in the number of members and union-management accounts for their period in the general assemblies. However, being a

democratic institution is not a problem in organizational form.

Lordoğlu (2004) emphasized the existence of leader-centric unionism in Turkey. Even though presidents came to their duties by election, it is not always possible to assume that elections brought democracy by nature; long-term tenures are the first thing that comes to mind, which can prevent the operation of democracy. In addition, Lordoğlu (2004) states that before an election, members are known to be presidents. Therefore, it is difficult to claim that union leaders are essential for democracies rather than union organs or organizations. Lordoğlu (2004) believes that in Turkey, general assemblies, the most critical structure in the decision-making body of the unions, are required to meet every four years in ordinary situations.

Hence, it is understood that each president and management of the union prefers to stay in the administration for at least two more terms on average. Another point that was attempted to be understood with this research was the relationship between the leaders' length of time in office and the number of union members. The result was that there was no visible relationship between the term in office and the increase in the number of members of the union (Lordoğlu, 2004). He stated that a long tenure for union leaders generally results from both union leaders with more personal and behavioral patterns and qualities. In line with this, the expenses of union professionals are high. He states that union presidents incur an annual cost of 100 thousand dollars for a union. The operating segments may perceive this situation as associated with the concept of "lordship." Second, the length of tenure depends on the union base and delegates. However, tenure length can change in various confederations with different internal operations.

As a result of this discussion, Lordoğlu (2004) offers ten proposals to implement union democracy. Three of these factors are worth mentioning in this study. The first is turning some management parts into amateur groups and changing audits and execution to expert professional cadres outside the union. This reduced the appeal of unionism as a profession. There needs to be fiscal transparency to demonstrate the income and

expenditure of union officials that increases the trust level in unions. Second, the importance of union democracy is strongly related to the increase in the number of members who have embraced union culture and consciousness. According to Özveri (2006), there is no quality of internal opposition in organizations. However, unions are institutions that aim to generate solutions; hence, they require dynamism and different approaches enable the generation of novel approaches in the union (Özveri,2006). Finally, the educational process does not need to be restricted to technical space; it must develop union reflexes and consciousness.

Workers' attitudes toward the channels in decision-making bodies can be understood as determinants in a bureaucratic environment. Moreover, research conducted by the Bosphorus University Social Political Forum is critical. Since the results of the survey also for the question "Should workers participate in workplace management," 76 percent of workers answered, "Must participate." Most importantly, those who believed that workers should participate in management were asked about the form of participation. By 68 percent, while the rate of those who said that "workers should participate in management directly, not through unions," and those who defended participation through unions remained at 31 percent. Therefore, although they have traditional social values reflecting the structure of employment, it can be said that workers do not look at an organized society in which unions will play an important role. They are not against the concept of unions; on the contrary, they consider unions as essential institutions representing workers (Adaman et al., 2009).

Union conventions are more like a constitution for unions; hence, they are the most important sources for the development of democracy within the union (Petrol-İş, 1993, p. 66). Demirdüzen and Lordoğlu (2013) believed that abstract information about the necessary conditions for exportation in the convention complicates the provision of union democracy. Because union management can expel members or representatives who are opposed to it or maybe rivals of the union, based on its statute, it is a practice that weakens union pluralism and participation, which are among the basic principles of union democracy (Hekimler,2015).

The primary threat is turning unionism into a professional occupation that pulls off rank-and-file members from the top of the union from economic and social status perspectives. According to Hekimler (2015), union management strengthens its power in a short period; hence, without institutionalized opposition, long tenures resemble a rule among union managers (Dereli, 1998). According to Hekimler (2015), these evaluations of Turkish unionism validated the iron law of oligarchy in various cases. Therefore, the main channel is closed, ensuring communication between the top and bottom of the union; hence, a small executive group is formed.

Demirdizen and Lordoğlu (2013) pointed to three principles in their search for union democracy in Turkey: pluralism, participation, and openness. In openness, the union structure, activities, and functioning are open to all members, and members have the power to supervise when necessary. The decisions, activities, by-laws, and reports prepared by unions should be open to union members so that members can control their unions or develop attitudes towards certain decisions. To fulfill this principle, the budget and other activity reports must be announced so that all members can access them. In pluralism, the principle of ensuring people with different views and opinions participate in union processes without discrimination, reflecting their views, and protecting their rights (Petrol-İş, 1993, pp. 21-22). Özveri (2006) believed that diversity makes a union alive and healthy. The participation principle points out that all union members, without discrimination, can participate in the union processes. Thanks to this principle, union members can participate in decision-making, representation level, and implementation processes during the entire operation of a union (Petrol-İş, 1993, pp. 21-22). The principle of participation protects members from the management of unions by certain groups. Otherwise, like all democratic organizations, unions may turn into an oligarchic structure after a while, as Michels points out.

Democratic structures are institutions that develop workers' class struggles and contribute to their struggle for rights. Therefore, one of the most important qualifications in union structures is democracy. Consequently, the self-interest calculations of union

managers can harm democracy within the union. Intraunion democracy operates when the organizational structure, which is not dependent on leaders but on democratic principles, dominates the unions (Petrol-İş, 1993). Additionally, long-term leadership in unions is incompatible with democracy based on pluralism, participation, and openness. It is recommended that professional unionism be reduced as one way to achieve this goal. To change the current understanding of unions, in addition to legal regulations, union managers and employees who are aware of union democracy are needed. As a result, intra-union democracy is closely related to democratic rights and interests and therefore has vital importance for the survival of trade unions.

Özveri (2006) believes that after the 1980s, intra-union competition increased in Turkey. When unions could not press the government to solve their problems, the intra-union battle was restricted by the personal characteristics of executives. Intraunion conflicts threaten individual freedom in unions. To defend union rights, it is vital to guarantee free speech for workers in the union, and individual union rights are vital (Özveri 2006). Union democracy problems deteriorate the relationship between members and officials and alienate workers from their own organizations. Oligarchic tendencies increase when an audit is not done effectively through union democracy. The weak democratic culture in Turkey creates a "president cult" beginning even in the lower ranks. Even in some empirical work, it was seen that workers were afraid of the unions rather than the employees. Hence, union democracy must be implemented juridically, starting with delegated elections. In addition, there should be models to increase participation to make unions more democratic and confidential (Çelik, 2006).

Gender dynamics have mainly discussed the role of women due to their roles in the union administration. In addition, female workers and their problems sometimes create a topic for union administration. Urhan (2022) believes that men in the union exclude women by adopting strong hierarchical relations and solid bureaucracy; according to Urhan, the institutionalization of unions means the institutionalization of patriarchy.

The Textile Workers Union was founded on October 21, 1965, in Istanbul as the Istanbul Textile, Knitting, and Clothing Industry Workers' Union to operate in the weaving sector, first as an independent union. It was a member of the DİSK and IGLWF unions in 1975. The Textile Union, which remained independent, supported unions opposing Türk-İş during the 1966 Paşabahçe strike. On January 15, 1967, it participated in a meeting to establish a new confederation but was not among the founders of DİSK. On December 21, 1967, the ordinary assembly delegated Muzaffer Akbal to explain his decision to leave the Teksif union affiliated with Türk-İş and became a member of the Textile Union in the following words: Until six months ago, I was a Teksif executive, but when I saw that Teksif executives were working in partnership with the employer, I immediately left and joined this union.

In the general assembly convened on March 31, 1968, the union's name was changed to Textile (textile workers' union) to make some changes to the primary statute. In the general assembly in Istanbul on January 30-31, 1975, the union became a member of the DİSK and ICEF, headquartered in Geneva. In this assembly, the general president and secretary remained unchanged.

After 1978, the differences in opinions and disagreements that intensified within the DİSK were reflected in the textile workers' union. Administrations with different political views from the center controlled some branches. The ordinary general assembly could not be held on time because the general branch assemblies could not be completed. In response, the DİSK intervened and started work on the general assembly. The application for handing over to the trustee made to the Istanbul 5th Business Court was accepted by the court's decision dated July 17, 1978, and handed over to the trustee. Two general branch assemblies were convened by the trustee after interventions by the DİSK headquarters, preventing the union's general assembly from being held. As a result of these elections, Rıdvan Budak was elected as the union's general chairman and Hüseyin Akduman as the general secretary. At the general assembly convened in March 1980, the DİSK adopted a uniform statute for all affiliated unions. In 1980, the textile union went on strike in 55 different workplaces. After September 12, 1980, like DİSK

and other affiliated unions, Textile's activities were suspended, and all executives were imprisoned. The union resumed its activities in 1992.

The union's board of directors, Deputy General President Süleyman Çelebi, Hüseyin Kayabaşı, Selim Omay, Muharrem Kılıç, and Günay Onayman demanded the convening of an extraordinary general assembly with a joint text. The general assembly convened on September 26, 1993, and the bylaws were amended. The textile union was a democratic, independent class, and mass union. It considers the protection of the expected economic and social rights of the working class, the elimination of all forms of exploitation and oppression against the working class and working people, the protection of universal fundamental rights and freedoms (...) as an honorary duty of the class, and the struggle against undemocratic forms of governance and inhumane practices as its primary objective.

In the statute above, to implement democracy within the organization and to ensure a democratic structure from the bottom up, it was included in the statute, as mentioned, that "workplace working units" should be formed in each workplace, depending on the characteristics of the workplace, on a problem, a subject, or a section of the workplace, and not less than five people. (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi Cilt 3, 1996, p.192-196).

2.8 Concluding Remarks

The literature on the subject has opposing arguments regarding the governance of trade unions. The need for intra-union democracy in management and implementation is related to different positions in union approaches. In the literature, there is a bureaucratic understanding that limits the participation of workers in decision-making and the control of union management, as opposed to a debate that considers internal democracy as the essential characteristic that a union should have to fulfill its fundamental objectives and functions.

At the same time, unions' organizing and self-renewal strategies as labor organizations have a reciprocal relationship with their internal functioning mechanisms. Differences in organizing strategies exist in the democratic trade union approach, in which participation and control mechanisms are open to all members. A strategy of reorganization and renewal is adopted through organized mobilization of the class by reducing grassroots participation. A contrasting example is business unionism, where unions only see their members as customers and do not open participation agencies or approach problems through social dialogue. Thus, organizing strategies as external factors are also linked to democratic mechanisms as internal factors.

The institutionalization of democracy within a union is also a problem. Considering intra-organizational democracy as a dynamic set of relations with members, leaders, and union officials beyond legal regulations and evaluating it in terms of practical functioning by considering the interactions brings about different debates. Additionally, the literature emphasizes that the way intra-union democracy is implemented is critical. This is because, as studies in Turkey point out, democratic operations can be visible only on the surface. There is a need for further research to evaluate members' engagement with their organizations. Analyzing the approaches in intra-union democracy, the uniqueness in the Turkish case will be discussed along with the general problems in constituting a democratic approach in a labor organization. The discussion includes the possibilities and difficulties in implementing it. The literature will benefit from suggestions to understand the operation of intra-union democracy with the uniqueness of the Turkish case by establishing a connection with its impact on labor mobilization.

CHAPTER 3: WORKERS' EXPECTATIONS FROM A UNION: WHY BECOME A MEMBER?

This chapter examines the key motivating factors that lead workers to become members of unions. This part of the thesis is essential to understand whether the union is successful in meeting workers' expectations and how their relationship with union officials is primarily shaped by their perceived value of the union. Before discussing workers' main expectations, it is important to provide background information on unionization.

3.1 An Overview of the Unionization Process

Unionization started in the Uğur Textile during the pandemic era. During this time, Uğur Textile workers said, "we were going to the villages of workers to persuade them to unionize; we were that kind of committed to what we were doing." The process was mostly confusing when the factory administration learned about the unionization process, as they fired all their workers by reasoning Kod-18 on October 3, 2021 (GazeteDuvar, 2021). The main motivation was to prevent the union from entering by closing the factory after dismissing all workers under the pretext of Kod-18.

Following the dismissals, the workers initiated a series of ongoing demonstrations that they announced would take place in front of the factory and public squares in the town. To amplify their demands, the workers also gathered petitions to repeal the Kod-18

decisions. They alternated shifts in front of the factory to collect signatures for petitions (Evrensel, 2021).

During this process, the union and workers issued periodic press statements. Dialogues were initiated with the assistance of IndustriALL and ZARA, companies produced by the local factory. As a result of these efforts, factory management agreed to meet the union management (Evrensel, 2021)

After their days-long struggles, textile workers received compensation. However, they continued to fight for the demands of reopening the factory and being rehired as union members. Eventually, their efforts were paid off, and the employer agreed to reopen the factory, rehire workers, and recognize the union's authority. The workers who returned to the factory on November 1, 2021, had their insurance entries reinstated (GazeteDuvar, 2021)

However, this period was short-lived. On November 11th, the union representative Mehmet Türkmen was fired. Both Türkmen and the workers learned about it from the factory owner. When a new representative arrived at the factory, there was a quarrel between the union official and members. In response, the factory owner called on the police force to dismiss 97 workers. The workers were fired simply because they had joined a union earlier and did not comply with the demands of the union headquarters manager (GazeteDuvar, 2021)

The workers have been holding protests in front of the factory and in the center of Urfa for a month, calling on the union headquarters to protect their struggles. However, they claim that union management left their calls unanswered and did not even answer their phones. Despite this, the workers continued their protests and filed a trade union compensation lawsuit against their bosses. Additionally, the workers complained to the ZARA company, which Uğur Textile produced, and to the international union that DİSK/Textile affiliates. According to the workers, ZARA suspended its relationship with Uğur Textile until the workers were re-employed (Evrensel, 2021)

On November 23, dismissed workers began their demonstrations in town squares, with the Textile Union joining their protests. The workers demanded that the union's central office protect its members, as they believed that both the workers and former regional representatives had abandoned the union center. They claimed to have contacted the union center but were met with a negative response from the general president (Evrensel, 2021)

The workers continued to hold press conferences, in which they stated that their appeal to the union center had been rejected. They also drafted new petitions for ZARA management and international trade unions. The general president of the union informed ZARA that the workers were not participating in union activities voluntarily and that there was no disagreement with the factory management.

After a break from their demonstrations in anticipation of the ZARA audit, the workers resumed their actions when the process took longer than expected. On January 17, they held another press conference on a public square. The workers had already filed a lawsuit against the factory and had observed that the new union representative had testified in favor of the boss about the number of union members before they were fired under KOD-18 (Güneyin Gazetesi, 2022).

On January 21, workers announced via their Twitter accounts that they had won. It was stated that wages for idle time would be paid and rehired within the following 15 days. However, this result was later contradicted. The workers claimed that the employer was pressuring them to withdraw their cases without signing a protocol or covering court and attorney costs along with the union administration (Evrensel, 2021)

Later, they decided to organize press statements in Mersin, Adana, where ZARA stores are located. However, on April 8 they announced on their Twitter account that they were ending their actions and resistance, stating that they had not won:

We regret to announce it to the whole public. We are now ending our actions and resistance. We could not win. But we were not defeated either. From now on, we will continue our legal struggle. We had a just and honorable fight until the end.¹

The workers were not reinstated, and according to them, the union representative had called some workers and offered them their jobs on the condition that they withdrew their cases. Some workers have accepted this offer. Despite the press attention their case received, the workers were not hired because their names had been given to workplaces in an organized industrial zone.

3.2 The Fundamental Motivations of Union Membership

The unionization rate in the textile sector was low. Only 8,89% (Resmi Gazete, 2023) of textile workers are unionized in various organizations. In the interviews, executives working in the DİSK Textile Union explained the situation for two reasons: first, they state that they face predicaments due to female domination, and second, the manager's reaction to the DİSK Textile. The vice-chairperson of the branch stated that female employment is seen as a contribution to the family economy due to the patriarchal society. Therefore, women's demands are limited to insured jobs that they do not want to risk. Second, an executive in union management expressed that union activity commenced with a negative sign because of the name DISK, and that the employer did not want to let DISK enter the factory. For this reason, he said, mostly Öz İplik-İş, affiliated with the HAK-İŞ union, was brought in through the manager when the union initiated.

This chapter discusses the main expectations of textile workers from their unions. Owing to the risks associated with unionization, such as the possibility of losing jobs (Adaman et al., 2009), workers need a strong motivation to become members. Considering that being a union member carries the risk of dismissal, workers' primary

¹ Bütün kamuoyuna üzülererek duyuruyoruz. Artık eylemlerimize son veriyoruz ve direnişimizi bitiriyoruz. Kazanamadık. Ama yenilmedik de. Bundan sonra sadece hukuki mücadelemizi sürdüreceğiz. Sonuna kadar haklı ve onurlu bir mücadele verdik.

motivations for unionization will be decisive in the unionization process and their positions they will take after unionization. Therefore, the problems encountered at the workplace and aimed to be solved through union organization will also be decisive for workers when encountered within the union. Thus, the motivations that urge workers to organize will also be anticipated from the union as a labor organization. At the beginning of their research, it was crucial for workers to identify an appropriate union to represent their interests. Emphasis on protecting workers' agencies, ensuring their participation in decision-making bodies, and transparency in a meeting with factory management were essential criteria for employees. One of committee members belief is stated below:

We looked for the most effective and suitable union for our needs. We made the decision ourselves because some unions negotiate and agree with bosses, leaving workers unaware. We wanted a union that would prioritize workers' participation and transparency in the negotiation process, ensuring that workers were informed and included in the decision-making process. Ultimately, our search led us to choose a union that aligned with these values.² (Erdem, committee member)

In accordance with mobilization theory, a perception of unfairness, violation of contractual or legal rights, or violation of widely accepted social norms are the most likely causes of unionization (Kelly, 1998, p.29). Additionally, several non-union employees must share such complaints to foster a feeling of collective identity. Additionally, employees must either believe that an agency, often the employer or government, is to blame for their issues or ascribe responsibility to that agency (Kelly and Badigannavar, 2005). The primary reasons for joining can be analyzed in three parts in accordance with Kelly's expectations.

1. Active workers seek dignity and respect, while opposing nepotism.

² Biz hangisi daha etkilidir, diğerlerine göre daha iyidir diye kendimiz araştırdık. Bu kararı biz aldık. Çünkü kimi sendikalar var, işçilerin arkasından patronlarla görüşüyorlar, anlaşıyorlar. İşçileri habersiz bırakıyorlar. Sözleşme olsun, alınan haklar olsun, işçilerden habersiz yapıyor. Nihayetinde, arayışımız bizi bu değerlerle uyumlu bir sendika seçmeye yöneltti.

2. Female workers complained about physical and verbal harassment in their factories.
3. Inactive workers seek wages and relief supply kits, which are more like the economic incentives of the union.

Some workers have declared the union redundant due to its ineffectiveness and increased pressure from factory owners, leading them to believe that the union is no longer necessary.

3.2.1. Dignity as a Motivation to Unionize

Unions are perceived as collective mechanisms to protect workers from insults. Workers noted that their workplace was where they spent most of their time. They often had to arrive early in the morning, work overtime, and return home late at night. Consequently, they had little time to spend with their families, making it even more critical that the workplace was peaceful. One female worker explained, 'We spend most of our time at work and are there with our friends, so everything must go well' (Asiye). These sentiments are consistent with Hodson's view that the workplaces where people spend most of their lives are central to human agency and dignity (Hodson, 2001, p.16).

Hodson (2001) believes that reactions against workplace humiliation diverges into two realms which are safeguarding dignity and denials of dignity. In the first part, resistance, citizenship, the search for purpose, and social interactions at work are at least four critical contexts in which behaviors related to maintaining dignity appear. This topic includes both reactive and proactive actions for dignity. First, employees put up both active and passive opposition to mistreatment, excessive work, and exploitation to protect their self-respect. Nevertheless, Hodson (2001) believes that it must be thoroughly included in mainstream social research to understand how employees protect their dignity. An illustration of resistance in the defense of dignity is the event of machine wrecking in reaction to management abuse described in the ethnography of the wire harness factory. However, most of the opposition is far quieter and more discrete.

Resistance at work is often manifested in small-scale acts, such as subtly holding collaboration or hoarding excitement. On the other hand, denials of dignity can be realized through mismanagement and abuse, overwork, incursions on autonomy, and contradictions of employee involvement – occurring both separately and in every possible combination in organizations (Hodson, 2001, pp. 134-136).

In the case of Uğur Textile, which is examined in this thesis, one of the motivations for workers to unionize is the excessive workload and humiliating behaviors caused by the pressure to keep up with the work, as explained in the following section with the workers' statements. Workers in non-unionized workplaces are said to have joined unions to address these chronic problems. Unions become a channel for workers to voice the injustices they experience at work as tools that employees use in their fight to establish a work environment that values their dignity (Wellman, 1995, p.306). Wellman (1995) believes that trade unionism is a reasonably radical concept that adheres to its core objectives, including solidarity, equality, and democracy. Trade union collectivism challenges individualism, which is central to capitalist activity (1995, p.305-306). Wellman (1995) criticized scholars who dismissed "mere" trade union consciousness; in reality, it is the cause of the struggle. Additionally, Wellman (1995) referred to Rick Fantasia's "a simple, narrow, or 'mere' anything" phrase to emphasize the importance of ordinary struggles. Concepts that refer to unity in trade unions represent the antithesis of capitalist ideals as the foundation of social activity (Fantasia, 1988, pp. 237-238).

According to workers in the Uğur Textile factory, owing to the pressure of overproduction, the problems that workers experience can be understood as personal and private, even if they are not personal. However, to overcome this feeling of idleness and attack on their dignity, the union they organized enabled workers to move away from this individualism and become part of society.

Workers spent half a day in the factory. The subjects they frequently encounter here are the friends they work with on the same line and the department foreman. Therefore, their interactions with these subjects considerably affected their emotional states. The

fact that other coworkers also witness an argumentation with the foreman sometimes increases the impact of verbal spats on workers. As discussed in the previous section, the intention to protect subjectivity creates conditions for organizing (Wellman, 1995). Since Gülcan reminds that ‘Let me ask if the workers already worked in a place where their thoughts were respected. Do you think they would have attempted such a thing?’ This quote shows that a lack of respect reinforces the need to organize.

Workers who emphasized the significance of dignity placed economic incentives in second place. During the interviews, the workers who led the unionization process purposefully stated that economic demands did not come first for them at the beginning of their words, even without asking them if it was essential. Another declaration from a worker emphasized the importance of being agents in the workplace. Since Savaş said:

I will skip over the monetary aspect, such as that they might offer you 200₺, 300₺, or even 1000 Turkish liras per month. Instead, let me tell you about something else. In Urfa, where unemployment is high, one might sit next to Erdem, and five minutes later, one might learn that Erdem is fired. Therefore, one of the promises of the union is job security. We will not be easily laid off, and our fate will not be solely in the hands of the boss. We will have a voice in everything that affects us.³

In this quote, Savaş wanted to exist as a subject in the workplace. In addition, he does not want to make this need, depending on the boss. Savaş states that the boss delivering bread to the worker is a ridiculous sentence he has ever heard, and Erdem believes that such a thing does not happen; the worker earns himself, stressing that there is no free exchange between the boss and worker. The idea that the workers earn it by sweating their brow shows that they do not enter a relationship of gratitude with the manager and, therefore, can seek their rights. It is also possible to see an emphasis on being a subject in their interaction with the boss. Emphasis on ownership of rights also shows the

³ "Size aylık 200₺, 300₺, hatta 1000 Türk lirası teklif edebilecekleri maddi yönü geçeyim. Onun yerine size başka bir şeyden bahsedeyim. İşsizliğin yüksek olduğu Urfa'da Erdem gibi birinin yanına oturup beş dakika sonra işten çıkarıldığını görebilirsiniz. Dolayısıyla sendikanın vaatlerinden biri de iş güvencesiydi. Kolay kolay işten çıkarılmayacağız ve kaderimiz sadece patronun elinde olmayacak. Bizi etkileyen her şeyde söz sahibi olacağız.

consciousness that the worker is the class that creates the value and wealth of the boss. For this reason, when they say, "we entered this path for our work, for our rights' (Savaş), both the boss and the union representatives who obstruct their progress on this path are met with reactions from workers. For them, they were about winning their self-respect from their employers and becoming active workplace participants. The following quotation by Asiye exemplifies this sentiment:

They gave us a parcel box, but we wanted more than that. It was not about money; we wanted to feel motivated to work. When we woke up, we wanted to go to work, we went work even although we enjoyed the job a little bit. It was tiring; we are on our feet all day and surrounded by constant sound and noise. You get insulted there, too; you constantly hear insults; we heave a sigh of relief when we get out of there.⁴

According to Hodson (2001, pp. 134-36) and Birelma (2014, p.54), individuals who experience workplace humiliation may suffer from a loss of agency and diminished sense of self. Tensions with the foreman and sometimes humiliation, on the one hand, reduce self-confidence. However, on the other hand, it enables workers in similar situations to come together against this feeling. Workers can reclaim agency and protect their self-worth by speaking out against mistreatment and asserting their rights. In this context, Yasin's expressions exemplify Hodson (2001) and Birelma's (2014) arguments.

In many jobs, workers are insulted, you know, for work. The masters were shouting and screaming. The man gives me a job and says, "Are you an idiot?" Even if it is an insult, it is not a simple task. They humiliate the personality of the person.⁵

Yasin's statement about humiliation in the workplace can be viewed as a source of empowerment in preserving one's dignity, self-respect, and self-worth (Hodson, 2001). This can be particularly significant in a union that provides collective support and a

⁴ "Bize bir koli verdiler ama biz bundan daha fazlasını istedik. Mesele para değildi; çalışmak için motive olmak istiyorduk. Uyandığımızda işe gitmek istiyorduk. Yine de her ne kadar işten sadece biraz keyif alsak da işe gidelim diyorduk. Yorucu bir iş; bütün gün ayaktayız ve etrafımızda sürekli ses ve gürültü var. Orada da hakarete uğruyorsunuz; sürekli hakaret duyuyorsunuz, ancak fabrikadan çıktığımızda rahat bir nefes alıyoruz.

⁵ Birçok iş yerinde işçiye hakaret ediliyor resmen hani iş için. Bağırıyor, çağırıyor. Adam iş veriyor, "salak mısın sen?" diyor. Bu bile bir hakarettir yani öyle basit şeyler değil. İnsanın kişiliğine hakaret ediyorlar resmen.

platform for workers to voice their concerns and advocate for their rights. By doing so, workers can resist the dehumanizing effects of workplace mistreatment and assert their value as individuals.

Humiliation and disagreement with foremen mostly result from extra work. When workers come together, they talk about how labor intensity is one of their primary agendas and how to minimize it (Eren) while complaining about the boss who demands 700-1000 pieces daily. The moments when relations with the foreman become strained and harsh words are usually heard when workers ask for time off (Gülcan), fail to deliver the work they are obliged to deliver (Veli), or even if an excellent worker is in jeopardy if s/he does not get along with supervisors (Savaş). In the dispute over work delivery, workers show that they do not want to get 500-1000TL more financially, but do not want this burden to continue; they want to live and work humanely. In the case of the Uğur Textile, workers' initial struggle to protect their dignity takes the form of a collective movement with the union.

3.2.2.1 Nepotism

As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, human relations established at the workplace profoundly affect the worker's ideas about the work order. In this sense, the content of the relationship that a worker establishes with his/her coworker and master in the same shift and line also constitutes the basis of problems in the workplace. Workers also mentioned that the problems of favoritism and nepotism they encounter in bilateral relations are fundamental reasons for unionization. To explain the gravity of the situation, they express a lack of merit in the workplace through examples such as 'take people from Urfa to a seller of liver, then take our lives' (Savaş) and 'At first, you see, one person is from Suruç in a factory, and then it turns into 70' (Savaş). These examples lead to less-qualified people serving as foremen or workers who have a good relationship with the foreman being able to solve personal problems faster. If a good relationship with the foreman is not established, even the most minor step taken in the factory creates trouble. Because daily dialogues with Foremen vary from person to

person, verbal disputes during worktime are issues that workers need to solve for a peaceful work environment.

Crises such as nepotism and torpedoing at the workplace should be considered a strategy for bosses to create worker aristocracy, giving more privileged positions to some workers and disrupting class unity among workers (SSCB Bilimler Akademisi Uluslararası İşçi Sınıfı Hareketi Enstitüsü, 2021). In this sense, it is understandable for workers to organize in a labor organization to protect class unity against this situation.

Savaş expressed his concerns about the impact of nepotism in the workplace. He explained that this often leads to hiring unqualified individuals, including those from the workman's hometown or region, which can be unfair to more experienced workers who may be overlooked. The problem is compounded by the fact that new workers with inadequate skills are often paid the same as those with more experience, which puts pressure on veteran workers to increase productivity and output. Savaş later examined the relationship between workmen and workers, highlighting the adverse effects of nepotism on this dynamic:

You do not know the boss anyway. You know it is either a foreman or a manager. You must keep them happy to ensure job security, even if you are a hard worker. Unfortunately, some bosses provide preferential treatment to their relatives, which can create tension and unfairness in the workplace. It is like a torpedo turning things around. A torpedo also existed in the Uğur Textile. For example, a manager from Suruç hired 70 people from his village, regardless of their qualifications or experience.⁶

A female worker shared her impressions of other workers during the unionization process. She noted that everyone was initially skeptical about the possibility of injustice when entering the union. However, once it became clear that there would be no more unfair treatment, many workers raised the white flag and became more willing to join.

⁶ Patronu zaten tanımıyorsun. Senin tanıdığın ya ustadır, ustabaşıdır ya da müdürdür. Onları memnun etmen gerekiyor. 4/4'lük bir işçi olabilirsin ama yıldızın onlarla barışmıyorsa yine işin tehlikeye giriyor. Akrabalarını mesela yabancılardan daha çok işe alıyorlar. Torpil dönüyor. Uğur Tekstil'de de vardı. Mesela bir yönetici vardı, Suruçluydu, işten anlayan anlamayan 70 tane köylüsü çalışıyordu.

Inequality within the workplace also made nepotism a vital issue, as workers felt compelled to seek their rights and ensure fair treatment.

There was preferential treatment to certain workers based on their relationships. It was like a torpedo; while giving privileges to those they were close to, they mistreated others. For example, they might be unkind to someone they do not get along with. Furthermore, when granting permission, they might allow someone they were on good terms with, but not others.⁷

Labor aristocracy is a hierarchy among workers developed by bosses in workplaces to undermine the unity of interests among employees, provide information flow from the issues that workers sometimes talk about, and prevent workers from forming unity against their bosses. In this sense, it will be relatively more difficult for workers from Suruç, who are hired in connection with the Foreman, to convince the workers in the factory of a problem they face and to call them to act against the boss. The risk of these conversations reaching the ears of the boss and anxiety of being fired from the job will be more prevalent. In this sense, a sense of justice is dominant for workers outside of these favoritism relations, so they want to assert their power through a corporate agency. Therefore, as Gülcan said, most workers accept joining the union despite the risks when they are told that there will be no more injustice.

Work discipline in a factory, which takes up a notable amount of time, minimizes the ability of workers to express their opinions separately and limits their impact. Therefore, workers need a collective organization to voice their views and thoughts. Unionization offers workers instruments to express their ideas collectively and effectively. (Hodson, 2001, p.134-136). Hodson stated that unions are crucial in safeguarding workers from the worst excesses of overwork and exploitation. Without unions, many workers would hesitate to speak independently against their working conditions (Hodson, 2001, p.134). In Hodson's modern workplace, unions still offer workers a means to communicate their

⁷ Hani bazı ustaların bazı işçilere daha öncelik tanınması gibi durumlar vardı. Torpil yani. Daha samimi olduğu bir kişiye ayrıcalık tanırken mesela samimi olmadığı hiç anlaşılmadığı birine daha kötü davranıyordu. İzin isteme söz konusu olduğu zaman arasının iyi olduğu kişiye izin verebiliyordu ama diğerine vermiyordu.

opinions (Hodson, 2001, p. 136). "Voice" refers to talking with an employer about the conditions that need to be altered instead of abandoning a job (Hirschman, 1970 as cited in Hodson, 2001, p.134). As pressure organizations promote better working conditions and more dignity for all employees, unions are more likely to have a significant impact on members (Cornfield, 1991, p.38-40).

According to Freeman and Medoff (1984), a trade union is a way in which workers as a group may communicate with management in modern industrial economies. In two ways. Unions provide employees with a collective voice: 1) they compile opinions on matters of shared concern and bring them to management and 2) they offer grievance procedures so that individual concerns can explain themselves. According to Freeman and Medoff (1984, p.10), collective voice improves workplace productivity by "taking account of all workers and by appropriately considering the sum of preferences for work conditions common to all workers."

Asiye, who was previously the organizing officer of the Öz-İplik İş union in another factory, was one of the names her fellow workers chose to defend their rights as representatives. Asiye explains that when her friends asked her to become a representative, the first thing she did was search for the union on the phone and observe it. Her opinion changed when she realized that other union representatives did not tell workers complaints in front of the boss. By telling this anecdote, she states, "even if a worker says that they do not even like the tea in the factory, the representative is obliged to explain even that." She describes Öz-İplik İş as a pro-boss union, which she explains, "we call such unions as yellow unions," and when the workers realized that it was a 'yellow union,' they walked away from it. Hence, she expresses her expectations from the unions using the following words:

The union should be an organization that does not simply accept whatever the boss says. It should defend us and stand behind us when fired or insulted. Workers are always trying to do something on their own, but in our workplace, there were many insults and verbal abuse when asked for permission. We wanted the union to come and help us address these issues. Even if we can only take one

step forward, let us aim to take three or five with a union.⁸

Workers who actively joined the union underlined the "voice mechanism" (Hirschman, 1971, as cited in Schenk, 2014, p.9) as a key motivation, as Asiye continues her words by saying that "the union is very beneficial. At least now we will have a voice." Kelly (1998, pp.48-49) indicated that workers were more likely to state that their workplace would be better off with the union's intervention if they felt that "the union had effectively voiced key concerns of employees at the workplace. The number of times employees expressed their common workplace issues with coworkers in their own or other departments (social cohesiveness) and their opinions of the union's effectiveness were also positively correlated, although this association was not statistically significant. Yasin also highlighted the significance of the voice mechanisms. He perceived it as vital liberation. He continued:

We saw it in Özak Textile factory; they wanted to fire me. When 650 workers acted together, the workers realized that they could do anything. No one in Urfa knew of this. No one has ever encountered such a thing. Nothing like this has ever occurred since the 90s. After that, the GAP, the Tekel resistance, and nothing like this had ever happened. I mean that our peers had never experienced such resistance. Here, the workers observed that they could change many things. They had realized their right to speak. Likewise, Uğur Textile factory was closed but the owner had to open it after a struggle.⁹

These statements profoundly resemble the union's feature of being the voice of its belonging. Therefore, workers who have joined the union to have a voice also aim to be

⁸ Patron ne derse tamam deyip geçen bizi savunmayan biri işten çıktığında onun arkasında durmayan, ne bileyim ya da bir hakarete maruz kaldığımızda bunu yapamazsın diyecek bir örgüt olmalı sendika. Hep işçi kendi başına bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyor. Hakaret çok fazlaydı, mesela izin istediğinde sıkıntı yaşırdın. Çok fazla sözlü bağırış çağırışlar olurdu. Biz onlara çok maruz kaldığımız için zaten sendika gelsin istiyorduk. En azından biz bir adım atabiliyorsak sendika ile 3-5 adım atalım.

⁹ Özak'ta gördük, beni çıkarmak istediler. 650 kişi birlikte hareket edince her şeyi yapabileceklerini gördüler. Bunu Urfa'da kimse bilmiyordu. Kimse böyle bir şeye rastlamamış. Böyle bir şey 90'lardan günümüze yaşanmamıştı. GAP, Tekel direnişi, ondan sonra böyle bir eylem olmamıştı. Yani bizim yaşitlarımız yaşamamıştı böyle bir direniş. Burada işçiler birçok şeyi değiştirebileceğini, söz hakkına sahip olabileceğini gördü. Keza Uğur Tekstil fabrikasını da kapattılar ama mücadele sonucunda patron fabrikayı açmak zorunda kaldı.

part of the collective. Asya's testimony that workers' demands had never been expressed in front of the bosses in a yellow union exemplifies her primary motivation for the "voice mechanism" within the DİSK Textile.

Therefore, the need for instruments where workers can robustly express their opinions, the demand to protect their job security as a value-producing subject against the boss, and their motivation for unity against the humiliation they encounter in the workplace due to the heavy workload have accelerated the process of unionization. Workers who join a union expect the same level of respect and dignity from the union and seek workplace protection. They expect the union to take their concerns seriously and advocate for their rights in the face of mistreatment or abuse from employers. They also want mechanisms through which they can pursue active agents in decision-making bodies. Relatedly, the dominant tendency in the face of an attack on their personalities is to take an organized stance. Therefore, they stand side by side against their labor rights, the demand for justice and equality at work, nepotism, and attacks on their dignity. In line with these demands, workers who join the union will aim to participate in the union as an active subject, that their voices will be considered, and that they will expect elections for positions such as presidency and delegation according to democratic procedures.

In this sense, forming a union can be seen as an extension of workers' desire to protect their dignity and self-worth. Thus, protecting these workers is a struggle for workers in the union. The union's success is crucial in determining its effectiveness in representing its members and generating bodies where workers act as agents.

3.2.2 Harassment as a Motivation to Unionize

In the previous section, when discussing workers' needs for a union in the Urfa Uğur Textile factory, it was argued that the primary motivations for organizing were their desire to be respected, to protect their rights, and to make their voices heard strongly. The previous section also included the demands and wishes of the female workers.

However, for women, the problems they face in the factory deserve more special attention than for male workers. Therefore, the second key motivation for unionization was the prevalence of harassment cases within factories. Female workers were subjected to verbal and physical harassment, prompting them to seek rights.

Saygılıgil's (2018, p.187) case analyzing the strike of female workers in the Novamed factory has parallels in this respect. Examples of emotional and psychological pressures or violence at work, especially against female workers, bear traces of patriarchy. Saygılıgil (2018) interpreted this situation as women being controlled outside the home and power relations within the family continuing at the workplace. For women working in the Uğur Textile Factory in Urfa, verbal/physical harassment, which reflects gender inequality in the workplace, has become one of the pillars of union organizations.

Gülcan, a young worker whose first work experience was in the Uğur Textile Factory, was still reacting to her experiences. While expressing that she felt lonelier after her unionization experience, one of the issues that she was most concerned about was that her friend, who helped her unionize, continued to work, leaving her behind. When I asked her why she wanted to organize in the union, she shared her experience of harassment in a way that made it evident that she was trying hard not to swear. Like many others, Gülcan recognized the need for collective action to address the issue and protect the rights of all workers. She shared an example of harassment that occurred in the factory. Gülcan recounted a situation in which a friend of Gülcan was subjected to harassment, yet the perpetrator faced no consequences. In fact, her friend is fired from the job. She explained that the arrival of the union gave them hope that such incidents would no longer be tolerated, and that workers would be protected from harassment and other forms of abuse.

Although there is no direct physical or verbal harassment, there are other examples of bosses and foremen imposing gender inequality to oppress female workers. For example, the interactions between male and female employees pose a threat to women in the public. For example, in another textile factory, a team of workers who struggled to

become members of the DİSK Textile was assigned to the night shift. According to a male worker, by forcing a female worker to work at night in a factory with only men, the employer wants her family to react and either fire her or put pressure on her. Yasin says that they spoke very strongly to the foreman/bosses and told them, "You have mothers and sisters too, do not do this. Do you have any conscience? According to Yasin, bosses aim to force women to quit and distance them from the union struggle by selecting struggling women for night shifts in a society where the idea of "why a woman is not at home at midnight" is widespread. One of the female workers who had to go to work on the night shift said, ' Fortunately, my father always taught me to defend my rights, so he stood behind me here too. I was comfortable," she said, describing this period. In other words, any exchange between male and female workers outside the employment relationship is planned to be turned in favor of the employer by using cultural codes.

At the same time, the last part included the interviewed workers, emphasizing humiliation and dignity as attacks on personal rights. However, it can also be inferred from the workers' discourse that the verbal attacks experienced by women escalated to harassment. According to the workers, there was a difference in how men and women were insulted in the factory. Even the smallest issues, such as changing one's workplace, can lead to verbal shouting. This creates discomfort for women, as the implications of chefs can lead to the spread of gossip. These rumors pose the risk of resignation or families not allowing their daughters to work. Asiye shared her experiences.

When they had asked, "Are you blind? What are you looking at? Where is your mind? Take care of your work!" These words were unpleasant in these environments. If someone tells you to take care of your business, it is conceived very differently, and it seems that you are interested in other things. It was not pleasant.¹⁰

In addition, during Gülcan's unionization process, Mehmet Türkmen organized a meeting that was only open to women in the factory, where women were able to discuss

¹⁰ Ama kalkıp da "sen kör müsün?", "Sen neye bakıyorsun?", "Aklın nerede?", "İşine bak!" dendiğinde bu sözler o ortamlarda hiç hoş olmuyor. Biri sana etrafına bakma işine bak diyorsa orada çok farklı anlaşıyor, başka şeylerle ilgileniyorsun falan gibi duruyor. Hoş olmuyordu.

their demands. In addition, the fact that female workers established separate communication channels during the union organizing period and WhatsApp groups with only female workers reveals that they are concerned about the consequences of the relationship between female and male workers. The expected demand for women was discussed as discrimination at the workplace. In brief, women face examples of oppression and violence in the workplace that bear traces of patriarchal relations, employers' efforts to resort to family relations to intimidate female employees, and the fact that the relationship between male and female workers quickly becomes material for gossip against women in the factory. This shows that women need to unionize and come alongside working women who have similar problems.

3.2.3 Search for Economic Incentives

In the sections above, the primary motivation for workers to choose organized struggle as a partnership was the problems they faced in the workplace. It is essential to remember that there are no hard or fast distinctions between these three main topics. This heading is noteworthy, as it is the commonality of workers whose primary motivation is economic incentives and whose commonality is that they did not prefer to participate in workers' committees and decision-making mechanisms during the unionization period. Workers who were not actively involved in the unionization process believed that the workers' necessity mainly focused on the economic recoveries that the union offered for their members, mostly packages.

Additionally, the general demands mentioned are intertwined with demands for economic improvement. For example, Savaş's demand for job security, which Savaş calls for by saying that fate will not be between the two lips of the boss, is an economic demand in the sense that it should be included in workers' contracts. Therefore, in this case, economic demand is enlaced by the search for self-worth because workers should be able to maintain their existence against their employer. A worker in the union organizing committee of another factory addressed the need for a union organization concerning economic and personal rights. Yasin recognized the importance of building

connections with other workers in their shared struggle for unionization. From his perspective, unions were necessary to advocate for workers as a collective entity and defend their rights. He strongly believed the following:

After forming a membership, they quickly gained significant support. Workers began to see the value of unionization as they faced daily challenges that made them vulnerable and defenseless. Even the slightest pushback could result in termination without compensation, creating a sense of fear among the employees. To address these issues, workers had to turn to mediators or resort to costly legal battles, which often resulted in meagre settlements. They could only get 2-3 cents in their pockets. These experiences drove workers to seek out the support and protection which a union could provide.¹¹

Regardless of the two anecdotes above, the most important motivations for organizing the union are the packages given during holidays, the improvements made in salaries, and the gold given on special days. One male worker believed that a union was vital to guard workers against injustice. He assumed that workers in any factory were exposed to unfair behavior. Therefore, it was pleasant for him to know that someone was guarding their economic rights. Another worker who also believed the union was necessary to help the workers with their jobs since the economic conditions in Turkey were not good and workers had subsistence problems. Therefore, the union assisted them in obtaining additional money. Finally, Mehmet, whose first union in Uğur Textile, believed that the union was satisfactory for them:

The union defends the rights of workers. Our first union was in the Uğur Textile industry. We do not know much because we did not work with a union before, but it's nice here. I do not know much about the union now, but we are happy. In other words, we charge an additional price. They give a quarter of the gold to those who have a child and a shopping cart during Ramadan. So, we're satisfied now.¹²

¹¹ Üyelik yaparak kısa bir sürede sayıyı yakaladılar. Bir de oradaki insanlar sendikaya açtı, çünkü her gün hakları yeniliyor. Kendilerini savunacakları hiçbir şey yok. En ufak başını kaldırdığında tazminatsız gönderiyor patron seni. Bu da içeridekileri korkutuyor. Ya arabulucuya gidiyorsun. Ya da mahkeme anlaşıyorsun, cebine 2-3 kuruş para veriyorlar mesele kapanıyor. Bu deneyimler, işçileri bir sendikanın sağlayabileceği destek ve korumayı aramaya itti.

¹² Sendika işçilerin haklarını savunuyor. Bizim daha ilk sendikamız Uğur Tekstil'de. Daha önce sendikalı çalışmadığımız için pek bilgimiz yok ama burada güzel yani. Sendika hakkında şu an fazla bir bilgim yok ama memnunuz. Valla biz ek fiyat alıyoruz. Çocuğu olana çeyrek altın, Ramazan'da alışveriş kartı

Reasons for the lack of previous experience with the union, lack of previous work experience, and lack of unionized workers around her may explain why she thinks the regulations mentioned by the female worker above are sufficient in the working conditions she encounters. In addition, the fact that their expectations from the union are limited to the aspects mentioned earlier does not lead workers to become involved in decision-making mechanisms that regulate and develop these demands after becoming union members. Instead, there is a feeling that the union is an entity outside workers. In addition, its duty is to guard workers from their bosses. The state of seeing oneself outside the union also leads to the surrender of all rights and responsibilities to that guardian, without one's involvement. After this stage, it is up to the union to bring workers into the organization, look for ways to act together, and turn a single guard into an army. Alternatively, it is another choice to organize functioning with union officials and maintain the distance between them and workers.

Along with workers with different motivations for joining the union, some workers argued from the outset that unions were not in the interests of workers. However, this was a very rare proportion in the interviews. Akın, who started working at Uğur Tekstil as a recent high school graduate, stated that the union was not helpful in any situation, so its existence did not matter to him. He felt that his role in the union was ineffective. Another argument focused on work conditions:

Overtime was not compulsory in the past, but after the union, it became mandatory. We tell our bosses that we have other commitments, but 99% of them do not accept it. They say we must stay overtime.¹³

Factors such as the factory's closure during the unionization period, the dismissal of workers who went forward, and the late establishment of work peace after the

veriyorlar. Şu an memnunuz.

¹³ Eskiden mesai zorunlu değildi. Sendikadan sonra mesai zorunlu hale getirildi. Şu an ustalara diyoruz ki bizim böyle böyle bir işimiz var %99'u kabul etmiyor, mesai zorunlu kalmak zorundasın diyor.

unionization process provide a basis for the idea that the union has a relatively negative impact on work discipline within the factory.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

As a labor-intensive sector, the textile industry also increases pressure on workers during worktime. The increased pressure can lead to tensions in bilateral relations with the master, and sometimes the master takes revenge on the workers. The extent of pressure exerted by masters/employers on female workers is an indicator of gender inequality. In addition, impunity in cases of harassment in a factory where other male workers are perpetrators can also be given as an example. For a line of work with such intensity, the inability to work and still not make a living is one of the workers' demands for union membership to acquire economic incentives.

Unionization can provide a sense of stability and support in the workplace, allowing workers to focus on their tasks and perform better without fear of retaliation. Furthermore, the worker mentioned that Zara's attitude towards unionization is positive and normal, while for them, it is abnormal. This suggests that there may be cultural or societal bias against unionization in the workplace or industry. By advocating unionization, workers face this bias and seek to improve their working conditions and job quality.

Keeping in mind the deterrents to union membership explained in the introduction, in this section, I argue that the three primary sources of motivation that workers have for organizing in a union will shed light on their expectations from the union and form the basis of their attitudes they will develop. Therefore, it was evident that the worker who wants to express himself/herself at work with his/her boss/master, who wants to claim their rights, who expects to be respected and valued, will have similar demands from the union, which is his/her organization. In interviews with workers, the primary references to the first heading were that they were against nepotism, expected respect, and wanted to stand up against attacks on dignity. In the interviews, the common point underlined by female workers was the rumor environment that spread rapidly in the factory and

damaged the reputation of women and the patriarchal control mechanism that continued in the workplace. Their circumstances pushed them to show collective will. Workers who did not prefer to actively participate in the struggle for unionization, in isolation from other demands, emphasized the assistance that unions could provide in the interviews. In their speech, they chose to describe themselves outside the union structure.

Most of the workers interviewed supported unionism at various points of motivation. However, some workers find unions unnecessary in their factories. Half of the workers we met were fired by the boss to play an active role during the unionization period, to react to the dismissal of Mehmet Türkmen, the union official, in favor of a new representative in the factory, and the gendarmes who arrived violently removed workers from the factory building. In addition, in the process that led to the change of balance in the union and their subsequent unemployment, it was not the unions as an organization that the workers criticized, but the union understanding they encountered. Some dismissed workers said that they were still in contact with Mehmet Türkmen and that he had referred them to his newly founded BİRTEK-SEN, while others were in the observation phase, not holding back from joining other unions.

CHAPTER 4: INTERACTIONS WITH THE UNION

This chapter examines the reasons that led Urfa Uğur Textile workers to solve problems stemming from their personal experiences within a collective structure. Examining these reasons stems from the observation during the interviews that their motivation to organize in the union influenced their attitudes toward decision-making mechanisms. To recall the three headings, workers who wanted to preserve their dignity and prestige at the workplace increased their emphasis on being a subject in the union and insisted that decision-making mechanisms should be accessible to workers. Second, female workers subjected to harassment and pressure from both foremen and co-workers at the workplace explained examples where this inequality continued during the union organizing process. They stated that they tried to put under pressure with unfair attitudes within the union because they were women. Finally, a group of workers who organized in the union, limited to economic motivations, defined themselves as a passive component, and according to the comments, the discussions were restricted to whether the content of the aid packages was sufficient. Therefore, in connection with the previous section, this section will discuss the interaction of workers with the union organization and the reflections of the internal functioning of the union on this interaction.

4.1 The Process of Union Organizing

A group of assertive workers, in daily communication with their peers, emerged as a combative committee to drive unionization. The workers maintained a day-to-day relationship with one another in their quest to achieve unionization during the initial

period. A more detailed examination of the contextual factors driving workers to unionize, as well as the specific challenges they face, is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Hence, in the first period of unionization in which combative workers have called the union, there is an example of a worker-led period. Communication with the union proceeded with Mehmet Turkmen, who were regional representatives of the DİSK union. Darlington's (2009) argument can be competent with the initial period of the organization; the scholar emphasized the importance of membership control over decision-making at all levels within the unions. To achieve this, there is a pressing need for union structures that are more democratic and participatory than present ones, which would facilitate a truly responsive member-led movement (Darlington, 2009). During the initial stages of unionization, committee members and their peers engaged in thorough discussions at each step. Frequent meetings were held by committee members, and fundamental issues within the factory were deliberated upon. The emphasis on participatory decision making at the grassroots level is consistent with the democratic ideals that underlie successful union growth and power.

The committee member Eren explained the following:

In this struggle, we have seen that sometimes we have a 'voice' and sometimes we do not. There are two stages: one before Mehmet Türkmen and one after. We learned how to perform real union work when Mehmet Türkmen was around. Mehmet Türkmen was always there for us from the start of our organizing efforts until the end. Whenever a decision needed to be made, he asked us what our demands would be if we were to sign a work contract. He gathered all the information and asked each worker for their opinions freely. Everyone expresses their thoughts. We would say what we wanted, what we did not want, and what we were willing to compromise on. Mehmet Türkmen would take notes and say, 'You will all take these rights, not me. We will get them together in an organized manner.' Then we also learned how not to get our rights.¹⁴

¹⁴ Bu mücadele içerisinde söz hakkımızın olduğunu da gördük olmadığını da gördük. Bu iki evre aslında Mehmet Türkmen öncesi ve sonrası. Mehmet Türkmen varken gerçek sendikacılık nasıl yapılır onu gördük. Biz örgütlenmeye ilk başladığımız günden bu iş bitene kadar Mehmet Türkmen hep yanımızdaydı. Bir tane karar alınacak, atıyorum hani arkadaşlar iş sözleşmesi olur da imzalanırsa taleplerimiz ne olacak diye bize sorardı. Bütün işçileri toplardı, sorardı. Her işçi fikrini özgür bir şekilde söylerdi. Talebimiz şu olsun şu olsun bu olsun, bu olmasın bundan bu kadar olsun. Herkes fikrini söylerdi. Mehmet Türkmen not ederdi.

In the initial stage, the factory committee oversaw unionization. Mehmet Türkmen, as a representative of the DİSK Textile union, constantly emphasized the critical role of the workers in deciding and pursuing their rights. Factory committee member Savaş described daily interactions with workers during the unionization period. Unionizing was a risky undertaking because of the possibility of factory management terminating the employment contracts of all workers upon discovery. DİSK, known for its advocacy of workers' rights, was added to the challenges encountered during the unionization process.

So, there were friends who were ready to get the authorization and others who were saying ‘do not involve me.’ They were afraid that they would be fired if they were to become members. Therefore, we carried this out secretly. We would catch them alone during breaks and persuade them to do so. We would go to their homes. For example, the guy says, ‘I am in the village on the weekend.’ We would ask which village and get the location, then drive there. Subsequently, a public holiday occurred. We went around with to 5-6 vehicles and recruited to 50-60 members. Then we applied for the authorization.¹⁵

The daily interactions that occur during the process of unionization, which may include activities such as village travel and weekend meetings, can be viewed as the foundational building blocks of workers' ability to form collective action. These interactions can be seen as contributing to the development of “cultures of solidarity” (Fantasia, 1988) among workers, representing a step towards greater worker empowerment and the establishment of more equitable labor relations. Concurrently, the committee’s efforts, which are composed of struggling workers, to meet with a significant part of the workers during the organizing period, to explain the positive aspects of the union, listen to criticisms and concerns, place the committee on a

Tamam derdi, bütün bu hakları ben değil siz alacaksınız hep beraber örgütlü bir şekilde alacağız derdi. Ondan sonra hak nasıl alınmaz onu da gördük.

¹⁵ Bu sırada yetki alana kadar dünden razı olan arkadaşlar da vardı ya beni bulaştırmayın diyenler de vardı. Üye olursam beni işten çıkarırlar diye korkuyorlardı. Biz de gizli gizli yürütüyorduk. Molalarda tek yakalıyorduk öyle ikna ediyorduk. Evlerine gidiyorduk. Mesela hafta sonu adam ben köydeyim diyor, hangi köydesin konum at diyorduk, yeri öğrenince arabayla gidiyorduk. Araya resmi bir tatil girdi. Biz 5-6 tane araçla gezerek 50-60 tane üye yaptık. Sonra yetki başvurusunda bulunduk.

legitimate ground among workers, and aim to transform workers into decision-makers subject in the processes.

The members of the factory committee reported that they convened during cigarette breaks or lunchtimes to maintain ongoing communication (Eren). Initially, the identities of the committee members were kept confidential. This was attributed to the fact that Urfa is a small town where news can spread quickly, and confidentiality was seen as essential for ensuring the success of unionization efforts. As expressed by one of the committee members (Savaş), "you hear from Erdem what you've said Mehmet five minutes before."

In short, to coordinate the unionization process and discuss how they could involve more friends in the process, the workers started the process by electing a team that could take command of this unionization. This committee for unionization also formed an organic link between the workers and Mehmet Türkmen, who negotiated directly on behalf of the union. It was delegated to the DİSK Textile Union, represented by Mehmet Türkmen, to convey the decisions of union management to the committee and to determine the committee's operational strategy. As workers recount in the anecdotes above, Mehmet Türkmen's reminders that "he used to ask us about everything" and "he used to say that you will decide" during his tenure emphasize that the committee tried to make every worker who participated in the unionization process participate actively decision-making process. The tension that arose after the boss of the Uğur Textile became aware of the unionization process and pitted other representatives of the DİSK against the workers. Therefore, the relationship between prominent union officials and members will be discussed not as monolithic but as a fragmented process during the unionization period.

4.2 Accountability of Union Administration

In the section where the Urfa Hayri Uğur Textile workers were motivated to join the union, it was concluded that workers emphasized the importance of having their voice, being taken seriously by the employer, being respected, and taking an active part in

decision-making mechanisms as a subject. In this section, the change in workers' expectations through interaction with the DİSK Textile Union and the consequences of the interaction are discussed. The section describing the process by which workers began to organize the union in the factory concluded that the interaction with the union could not be considered monolithic. Many workers said that their words were valued when Mehmet Türkmen did not get fired, but that the union did not take them seriously after he was fired. Therefore, in this section, where we will evaluate interactions with the union, I will first discuss in different sections the period when the workers described Mehmet Türkmen's dismissal as the period when he was still in office.

The democratic and bureaucratic union administration dichotomy also applies to the various leadership models employed within the unions. However, it is important to note that leadership styles are contingent upon the daily interactions between rank-and-file workers and the union administration. As noted by Barker, Johnson and Lavalette (2001), the reciprocity and interaction between leaders and followers ultimately determines where a union falls on the spectrum between bureaucratic and democratic models. While recalling Kelly's (1998, p.44) argument linking the whole collectivization process to the activities of a small group of leaders, it is worth considering Alexandar's (2010, p.243) argument that leaders can shape and persuade an idea. Therefore, within the scope of this research, when we examine the interaction between the prominent names in the union management and the workers participating in the resistance in the factory, we see that there is a structure that operates democratic decision-making mechanisms and organizes the idea of the committee among workers.

Bureaucratic models have highly hierarchical and centralized leadership structures. The democratic leadership model, as Fairbrother reminds us (2005, p.259), entails a highly permeable "magical frontier" between union members and their leaders, whereby members can become leaders, and vice versa. This phenomenon is exemplified by textile workers who formed a committee to lead the unionization process after initially seeking it. In addition to the magical frontier between members and leaders, the concept of the "organic leader" (McAlevy, 2016) is evident in this example. According to

McAlevey (2016), organic leaders are crucial for success because they possess innate power among their peers and may be cultivated to broaden the pool of potential supporters of mobilizers' single-issue campaigns (McAlevey, 2016, pp. 12-14). These workers developed deep relationships with other workers and selected combatant workers to assume leadership roles among those who listened to them.

For example, from a trade union organization in Egypt, the members of the ETUF union were organized into factory committees in the densely populated areas of Shubra al-Khayma. Each workshop or row of machines chose a representative from the factory committee. Factory committees, in turn, elected delegates who oversaw collecting dues from members and communicating with union officials (Alexander, 2010, pp.244-245). The notion that 'leadership's extension beyond senior officials plays a vital role in the union's success in mobilizing its members. The extension of leadership to ordinary workers was visible in the first part of the organizational activity in this study. The workers' expressions clarify the necessity of workers' committees:

When the number rises to 15-20, a committee team is formed to command this work. In other words, several people command this work, depending on the factory size and number of workers. A WhatsApp group was established using these workers. They were in constant contact with each other. Subsequently, they constantly come together in factories during tea breaks, lunch breaks, and second tea breaks. They discuss how to do it faster, calmly, and quietly, and which men should be members. For example, there was a group; you could not convince them, but there was someone that the group liked very much. If he convinces him, the rest come. There is a sense of fellow countrymen here. There were many people in Suruç. He was the leader of the group. He was someone everyone liked and respected. Once you had made him a member, the rest would follow. We did not deal with 20 people anyway. In factories, during tea breaks, we would even go to the restroom to talk. In other words, when we had the opportunity, we would talk about the issues workers generally complained about the most.¹⁶

¹⁶Şimdi sayı 15-20'ye yükselince bu işe komuta edecek bir komite ekibi oluşur. Yani bu işe komuta edecek çalışılan fabrikanın büyüklüğüne işçilerin sayısına göre birkaç kişi belirlenir. Bu işçilerle WhatsApp grubu kurulur. Sürekli irtibatta olunur. Ondan sonra fabrikalarda çay molasında yemek molasında ikinci bir çay molasında sürekli bir araya gelinir. Daha hızlı, daha sakin sessiz nasıl yapılabilir bu konuşulur. Hangi adamları üye yapmalıyız diye konuşulur. Çünkü bir grup vardır grubu ikna edemezsin ama o grubun çok sevdiği biri vardır. Onu ikna edersen gerisi gelir. Çünkü burada hemşericilik var. Suruç'tan gelen çok kişi vardı. Bu grubun lideri olurdu. Herkesin sevdiği saydığı biri olurdu. Onu üye yaptın mı gerisi geliyordu zaten uğraşmıyorduk 20 kişi ile. Yani fabrikalarda çay molasında hatta tuvalette bile konuşma imkânımız

This passage highlights the importance of understanding the nature of worker involvement in decision-making processes. This emphasizes that workers do not act alone but instead participate in decision-making mechanisms, where they can represent the collective. By doing so, workers can communicate their interests and influence their decision-making process. Workers' leadership, as active participation in decision-making processes, has important implications for the organization of work and the empowerment of workers. Current situation can be explained through the arguments Uetrich-Eidlin's (2019) article in which the "militant minority," a thin layer of activists respected as leaders by their coworkers, made up the structure's core (Post, 2016). In addition, committee members were the most tenacious fighters, committed organizers, and active builders of solidarity cultures inside unions. This group plays a crucial role in initiating and consolidating upsurges (Uetrich-Eidlin, 2019, p.37). Committee members and mass representatives held leaders accountable, creating a perspective on organizational culture among leading workers.

The potential to generate new leaders within an organization also entails holding existing leaders accountable. In bureaucratic models, communication between leaders and members typically occurs in one way, with information flowing from the top down (Alexander, 2010). Workers in this organization divided their involvement into two periods: the period when Mehmet Türkmen was still present and the period after his discharge. During the first term, the workers reported being involved in the decision-making process. Türkmen emphasized that workers should decide on their demands within the trade union organization, which led to the emergence of new leaders. Leadership and organization were necessary to ensure that the steam would not dissipate, but ultimately “what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam” (Uetrich&Eidlin, 2019, p.43). Therefore, the reciprocal relationship between leadership and workers is inseparable from each other. The steam, in this case, is the workers, yet the duty of union management is to provide active engagement of rank-and-file members.

olurdu. Yani imkânımız olduğu dönemlerde işçilerin genelde en çok şikâyet ettiği konular üzerine konuşurduk.

When Mehmet Türkmen was a regional representative of the DİSK Textile Union, factory committees, a pillar of democratic participation, could control the period when the risk for a worker was at its highest. The factory's closure after learning about the union organization enabled workers to reverse this result by staying side by side without dispersing through these mechanisms. The weakness, in this case, can be described as the dismissal of Mehmet Türkmen and the interruption of the struggle with the dismissal of prominent workers because the movement lost the workers' committees that maintained the institution of democratic leadership. Therefore, the consequences of the authoritarian-bureaucratic management approach, which was already dominant in the DİSK Textile Union, made it difficult to generate new committees.

4.2.1 Accountability of Union Administration for Workers with Strategic Leadership

During Mehmet Türkmen's tenure, workers established committees that were in contact with workers during cigarette and lunch breaks, sometimes in restrooms, and sometimes by traveling from house to house or village to village. Savaş, also a committee member, said that Mehmet Abi would not decide without our knowledge that he would come and tell us everything, and the following statements confirm that workers established decision-making mechanisms in the process. One of the examples that workers gave about Mehmet Türkmen was that they always met when he was in office. When an interview question was asked about union function, Savaş, a committee member, said, 'If the union is going to ask the boss, not the worker, why should the worker join the union? First, his boss will be one and then two. The union give workers more headaches if the union does not ask him.' When I asked him to share his experiences, Mehmet Türkmen never decided on his own. He always left the final decisions of the workers. But whatever he promised, he stood behind it as much as he could." One of the crucial questions in this context was the level of participation of workers and how much it affected the content of the discussions. An interview question was asked to determine whether union members or workers who wanted to become members participated in the

meetings. In the last meetings, we held that all workers gathered at the point when we lost the thread. Currently, all workers must make decisions. Nevertheless, not everyone participated in the secrecy beforehand. They knew that we were committee members."

In addition to Savaş's evaluations, Erdem's comments on unions also emphasize democratic participation.

The union must consult the workers. Workers must be organized. Unless unity exists, these things cannot occur. Workers must be united. Workers must make all these decisions. A union refers to workers, and there are no unions without workers. How did the union's understanding change during the organization period in the Uğur Textile? Whenever a decision was made, Mehmet Abi gathered us all together. He would tell us that decision, and we would negotiate among ourselves when we accepted it. He asked us about everything; he favored asking workers about everything. This is how it should be done. We were always progressing like this.¹⁷

The involvement of workers in decision-making mechanisms can lead them to emerge as activists. However, it would be incorrect to view this activism as being driven solely by the will of an individual worker. Instead, the reality is that workers act collectively through discussion; thus, each worker can behave as an active subject. These subjects represent the collective and derive power from the regular and qualified communication they establish with them. Thus, worker leadership should not be treated as an abstract example of activism. Instead, the importance of the mechanisms that allow workers to participate in their representation should be considered. This is not to say that mass meetings and demonstrations are inherently democratic, but rather that sustained levels of worker mobilization can increase opportunities for workers to hold leaders accountable to 'from below' pressure (Alexander, 2010).

Almost none of the interviewed workers had worked in a unionized workplace before or

¹⁷ İşçilere danışması lazım. İşçilerin örgütlülüğü olmalı. Birlik olunmadıkça bu bahsedilenler gerçekleşmez. İşçilerin birlik olması lazım. Bu kararların tamamını işçilerin alması lazım. Sendika demek işçi demek, işçi olmazsa sendika da olmaz değil mi? Uğur Tekstil'de örgütlenme döneminde sendikal anlayış nasıl değişti? Mehmet abi en ufak bir karar alınacağı zaman hepimizi bir araya topluyordu. O kararı bize söylüyordu biz kabul ettiğimiz zaman, müzakere ediyorduk kendi aramızda. Her şeyi bize soruyordu her şeyin işçilere sorulmasından yanaydı ki böyle olması da gerekiyor. Sürekli böyle ilerliyorduk.

during the interviews, and they had no idea about the internal work of unions, the activities of other unions in Turkey, or the practices of DİSK unions in other branches of labor. Therefore, what was told and experienced during the unionization period should be seen as the workers' first experiences of unions. In this sense, their responses to the questions of what kind of structure they think a union should be and what level of participation workers should have contained the main emphases that led them to decide to unionize. For example, Gülcan's response to the union is relatively straightforward for a young worker who has never been involved in union activities or has worked in a unionized workplace. Gülcan stated that:

I know the union is already there for the workers; that is how we agreed. If it takes even one step, not just one step, but even a half step, it must take our opinion. Our work requires some patience in the first place.¹⁸

The arguments stating that the functioning of the union should aim to achieve the most efficient result possible with the knowledge of union representatives, officials, and presidents, as opposed to democratic functioning, are criticized in this example by workers who were at the center of the organizational process. In this example, the fact that workers are in direct control and supervision, have instant access to information from union headquarters, and can make decisions based on this information leads them to draw different conclusions regarding which form of management would be effective. Therefore, different approaches become possible regarding the functioning of decision-making mechanisms in the labor organization and the attitudes of the officials who take positions according to this function. For example, Eren argues against the bureaucratic understanding of union management as a profession and puts forward the following propositions:

An ideal union type is the example of Birttek-Sen, which Mehmet Türkmen is doing in Antep. Yes, current officials see it as a profession, but it is not a profession but a noble struggle. The unionists did not belong to this union.

¹⁸ Sendika zaten oraya gelirken de işçiler için geliyor diye biliyorum. O şekilde kabul etmiştik. Eğer bir adım dahi atacaksa, değil ki bir adım yarım adım dahi atacaksa bizlerin görüşünü almak zorunda diye düşünüyorum. Yaptığımız iş en başta biraz sabır gerektiriyor.

Unionism requires gristles. They look at unionism as making money.¹⁹

In essence, union culture also needs to support Savaş's emphasis on union leadership acting together with workers. As Levi et al. (2009) state, procedures that guarantee workers' participation in decision-making mechanisms need to be backed by a union culture that prioritizes rank-and-file views and rights to be successful. As procedures alone are insufficient to hold officials responsible and responsive, union members must know how to apply them. Oligarchy will likely develop without engaged membership, with a history of requiring leadership and other members to abide by the union's institutional and constitutional procedures.

It is also essential to have a reciprocal relationship between union leaders and members, as union leaders need not be disconnected from rank and file because, as Strauss believed, democratic union leaders are better able to understand the objectives of their members, recruit and educate unpaid leaders, foster a sense of loyalty to the union that is necessary for successful strikes, and increase the union's attractiveness when it comes to recruiting. The lack of democracy in union organizations will be ineffective and corrupt unless members control it. There is a linear relationship between democracy and efficiency: when democracy is undermined, unions are more likely to become ineffective and corrupt (Strauss, 1991, pp. 3-4).

Additionally, Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) did not sharply diverge between rank-and-file participation and leadership. In this unionization example, the role of union representatives became critical. In a city where unionization struggles are weak, it is essential to perceive workers' emphasis on participation rates in interviews with more than one worker. Simultaneously, workers' ownership and protection of these demands for long weeks was also due to the emphasis on active engagement. What Mehmet Türkmen did in the first weeks of the unionization process was what Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) offered, as they said unions must first encourage

¹⁹ Olması gereken şu anda Mehmet Türkmen'in Antep'te gerçekleştirdiği Birtek-Sen sendikacılığı. Evet şu anki sendikalar bunu bir meslek olarak görüyor halbuki meslek değil onurlu bir mücadele. Sendikacıların o sendikaya aidyeti yok. Sendikacılık biraz omurga ister. Sendikacılığa para kazanmak olarak bakıyor.

"willingness to act' among their members. In addition, as Gülcan reminded, this was a process that required patience. Hence, it is equally important to preserve members' "willingness to act." In maintaining their energy, in the first part of the Unionization Act, interactions with international actors and the "voice mechanism" were beneficial.

First, Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2019) state the importance of international interaction in organizing members and conducting successful campaigns. In this sense, the involvement of Zara, the company that the factory produces for, and the involvement of Kuvvet Lordoğlu and the IndustriAll Union increased the pressure on the factory and led to the resumption of production. Second, as a result, members' energy is maintained despite various, dissimilar, and sometimes mutually contradictory endeavors. In this example, Eren, a committee member, stated that one of the crucial factors in maintaining the energy of the workers' struggle was when they realized that they were united by speaking their own words. Eren's comments on the advantages of workers being active participants when they stood side by side during the closure of the factory and stood together until they achieved gains are located below:

Unions should be structures in which workers have a voice and make decisions. The union should fully respect this decision and support it. The working class is on the one hand, and the capitalist class is on the other. Uğur Textile workers have seen what the working class can do with unity.²⁰

They also attributed the success of this process to the transparency with which they explained the approach to the workers. Eren says, "We explained what a union means, what rights workers have, and what workers can do if they work together. Eren stated that:

We were saying that the worker has rights, yet we can only claim them if we organize. Yes, we were showing the legal clauses, just as the employer is a union member. The first thing we heard was 'what if he fires me?' Maybe it is funny,

²⁰ Sendikalar işçinin söz hakkının olduğu, işçinin sözünün geçtiği, işçinin karar aldığı yapılar olmalı. Sendika da bu karara tamamen saygı duymalı. İşçilerin verdiği kararın arkasında durmalı. Bir tarafta işçi sınıfı var bir tarafta sermaye sınıfı var. Uğur Tekstil işçileri, işçi sınıfının birlik olması ile neler yapabileceğini gördü.

but some people said, 'what if they take my house away.' Thus, when explained well, it is possible to stand up to the boss, union president. The worker must learn what a union means. They think that they can get their rights without fighting for them when they become a union member.²¹

Regarding Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick in the paragraph cited above, how members' energy can be maintained in this example is the result of a transparent and open language. Strategic leadership is also why workers accept the first period as being successful. In the first period of this example, strategic leadership is balanced with worker involvement. (Hyman & Gumbrell-McCormick, 2019, p. 101.)

Workers who worked closely with Mehmet Türkmen during the union organizing process emphasized that Türkmen left the decision to the workers. At the same time, the subtext states that the workers brought up all the possibilities and made the final decision. In this practice, it is possible to find an effective combination of experiences and democracy. Experiences within union leadership and class struggles enable workers to learn about the possible negativities in the process, make their own decisions, and gain experience. For example, if we analyze Asiye's statements, we can conclude that Mehmet Türkmen's management style is strategic leadership:

We were in contact with Mehmet Abi, but we were the ones who made the decisions. We were the team that made these decisions. For example, they would tell me to talk to the girls. For instance, we met Mehmet Abi on March 8, Women's Day. At that time, we said that we should become self-aware. Let's all unite, and our unity was perfect that day.²²

One of the issues emphasized by workers in the textile industry, where women are predominantly employed, is that female workers are often unable to attend meetings and

²¹ İşçinin şöyle hakları var, bunları ancak örgütlenirsek arayabiliriz diyorduk. Evet, yasal maddeleri gösteriyorduk, tıpkı işverenin sendika üyesi olması gibi. İlk duyduğumuz şey ya beni işten atarsa oldu. Belki komik ama ya evimi elimden alırlarsa diyenler oldu. Yani iyi anlatıldığında patrona, sendika başkanına karşı durmak mümkün. İşçinin sendikanın ne demek olduğunu öğrenmesi lazım. Sendikaya üye olduklarında haklarını mücadele etmeden alabileceklerini düşünüyorlar.

²² Mehmet abi ile iletişimdedik ama kararları biz alırdık. Biz kendi aramızda karar alan bir ekiptik. Mesela bana sen git kızlarla konuş derlerdi. Biz 8 Mart kadınlar gününde bir toplantı yapmıştık Mehmet abilerle. O zaman hem bilinçlendirelim hem de biz kendimiz bilinçlenelim demiştik. Hepimiz birlik olalım, ki bu birliğimiz o gün çok güzeldi.

gatherings due to family, home, and neighborhood pressures, but they also experience problems due to gender inequality. The proposal to organize a March 8 meeting paves the way for female workers who did not participate before being included in the process of cohesiveness. Besides, another quotation made by Gülcan underlined that “he even had a special meeting just for the ladies. It was just us in the room; Mr. Türkmen was with us, and his lawyer was with us. He would ask, what do you want as a woman? What problems do you have?” Therefore, as in the analysis by Marino et al. (2018), to encourage the emergence of new forms of solidarity, this study examines inclusive union practices for marginalized groups. Additionally, the scholars define "inclusion" as the outcome of union efforts to support vulnerable workers for their political participation (making their voices and concerns heard in the public sphere) and economic interests (collective bargaining) (Marino, 2013, as cited in Marino et al., 2018, p. 112).

The effort to involve workers in decision-making mechanisms can be related to Regalia's point, which underlines the union's ability to read, decode, support, and reframe the demands of those represented to gain the broadest possible consensus and approval from the rank and file to be effective (1988, p. 351). The aim of dispersing decision-making mechanisms can be understood to be to provide consent or, at the very least, to suppress any apparent disagreements (p. 361). For example, in an interview with a union official, workers engaged in collective bargaining. The difference in opinion between workers and union officials regarding collective bargaining can be discussed based on the following quote:

In other words, in collective agreements, we do not have any problems, such as whether the workers hear. Whether they are satisfied. As the workers know what the draft is from a to z until the final version, they are informed. I mean, when it comes to the signing stage, whether they are satisfied is known. Of course, there are parts some of them are not satisfied, but as managers, we can make our own decision whether to sign it or not.²³

²³ Yani toplu sözleşmelerde işçilerin duyması, duymaması gibi memnun olup olmaması gibi bir sıkıntımız olmuyor. Çünkü işçi a'dan z'ye kadar, son haline kadar taslağın ne olduğunu biliyor, bilgilendiriliyor yani. İmza aşamasına geldiğinde memnunlar mı değiller mi biliniyor. Tabii ki bir kısım memnun olmayan da var ama biz yöneticiler olarak bunu imzalayıp imzalamamak konusunda kendi kararımızı verebiliyoruz.

The quote above states that even if there are dissatisfied workers at the collective bargaining stage, the union executive has signing authority. In other words, managers 'signing power can reduce two-way communication from top to bottom to one side. With Regalia's (1988) reminder, it is stated that there will be two-way communication between the union's leader and the rank-and-file, who are both tasked with gathering members' thoughts and comments. In this example, the fact that it consists of a team with no previous experience in unionization clarifies the role of union management in the process. Hyman and McCormick's (2019) strategy for strong leadership can be viewed in Regalia, noting that strong leadership is reinforced in a democratic trade union strategy by dispersing decision-making powers rather than monopolizing them.

As discussed in the literature review section, the democratic form of government aspires to a transparent, nepotism-free, and corrupt-free governance style, in which union officials act following the accountability principle, express the needs and expectations of members, and work together to meet the needs of the democratic participation principle. This paradigm also emphasizes the importance of leaders and does not indicate weak leadership. A strong form of democratic union governance may be developed by a leadership that learns to listen to rank and file and decentralize all decision-making. The above quotations need to be considered in line with these evaluations. Finally, intra-organizational democracy is essential for fostering environments in which activists collaborate and intensify the fight for demands. Asiye explains this necessity in the following way:

A unionist should consult with the workers. For example, you may come from the outside as a union official. You know, there are rules; we are going to elect a representative, and the simplest thing is to talk about it and act with the workers. For example, I would like to be helpful to you. Instead of coming directly without knowing you and saying we should do this here; the representative must ask that 'what do you want?' Please consult the workers because their consequences will benefit and harm them. If you sit at the table with the boss as a representative of a labor union and say we have done these things, and this is how it will be, the worker should have the right to say we want something extra, or we do not accept the result. What is the reason for this finding? The worker must be at the table. For example, when Mehmet Abi was present in DISK, he

defended workers' rights as if he was defending his own rights. Everyone should behave similarly. At least as if it was their own work, their own rights. It also depends on unionists. For example, we cannot always be with him or observe him. Alternatively, we cannot see behind the curtain what he is doing. It is a little bit related to the unionist and to the person. But thank God we never encountered anything like that in that process; he was always behind us.²⁴

Asiye's assessments above emphasize the importance and determining role of both grassroots participation and the attitude of union leaders prioritizing it. Dufour and Hege (2013) show that representative capacity within union organizations heavily depends on the caliber of the interactions between representatives and their constituents, the responsiveness of representatives to the frequently individualized daily concerns of workers, and the willingness of representatives to act as a kind of social worker in dealing with issues that arise outside of the workplace. Social networks can serve as a springboard for unionization and a resource for successful intra-union discourse since they exist before official collective organizations do so (Dufour & Hege, 2013, pp. 361–363). Workers' democratic participation in the process positively affects the outcomes and prevents shortcomings encountered during the process. Asiye mentioned the problems of corruption and nepotism that are reduced or eliminated when the principle of accountability is applied in democratically functioning structures with workers who ask, control, and demand information, even though the position of the union representative depends on the person in charge. When the union official was asked how, from his perspective, he evaluated workers' criticism/auditing of the union, the female official gave the following answer:

²⁴ Bir sendikacı işçilere danışmalıdır. Mesela siz dışarıdan geliyorsunuz sendika yetkilisi olarak, hani kurallar var, temsilci seçeceğiz, en basiti bunu konuşmak ve işçilerle birlikte hareket etmek gerek. Mesela ben size faydalı olmak istiyorum. Sizi tanımadan direkt gelip burada şunu yapalım demek yerine; siz burada bunu nasıl istiyorsunuz? Lütfen işçilerle istişare edin çünkü bu işçilerin yararına ve zararına olacaktır. Patron ve sendika ile masaya oturup biz bunları yaptık, böyle olacak dersiniz, işçi de biz bunu fazladan istiyoruz ya da biz bunu istemiyoruz, bu niye böyle demeli. İşçinin masada olması lazım. Mesela DİSK'te Mehmet Abi vardı. Kendi haklarını savunur gibi işçilerin haklarını savunurdu. Herkesin böyle olması lazım. En azından kendi işiymiş, kendi hakkıymış gibi yapmalı. Bu sendikacıya da bağlı. Mesela her zaman yanında olamıyoruz, göremiyoruz. Ya da perdenin arkasını göremiyoruz ne yapıyor ne ediyor, o biraz sendikacıyla alakalı, kişiyle alakalı. Ama Allah'a şükür o süreçte hiç öyle bir şeyle karşılaşmadık, hep arkamızdaydı.

Of course, there is no such thing as everyone will be satisfied with us; of course, there will be those who criticize us, but we talk to these colleagues to convince them about what they charge us for that they are not satisfied with. There is no thing that they will not condemn us. It is not that branch management knows the best of everything; we will be criticized. We take these friends to our side and talk to them until they prove that our actions are correct. No law says they cannot attack us.²⁵

There is maturity in this quote in anticipation of criticism. However, instead of suggesting that the workers' criticism may be justified and that the union may consider it, the quote says that they will prove themselves right, a narrative style that reinforces a one-way relationship. Therefore, this approach shows that there is no tendency to learn from workers.

4.2.2 Accountability of Union Administration for Workers without Strategic Leadership

During the unionization period, workers distinguished between when Mehmet Türkmen was in office and when he was dismissed regarding the change in the union's attitude toward the workers. In the first period, workers who won their protests after the union reopened the factory that had been closed after it was authorized, learned from their bosses, according to their statements, that Türkmen was dismissed by the union headquarters shortly after the factory reopened. With the dismissal of Mehmet Türkmen, the changing dialog between the union leadership and the workers creates new conflicts in workers' ideas about the functioning of unions. While one of the motivations of workers to unionize is to be respected, not to be humiliated, to protect their dignity, and to be able to express their opinion and be heard in the union, it is seen that with the dismissal of Türkmen, the motivation to unionize, which is to be respected, is broken at the beginning of the process of trivialization within the union. One of the workers expressed what he saw as an important point about this change in attitude in the union in

²⁵ Tabii herkes bizden memnun olacak diye bir şey yok tabii ki eleştirenlerimiz de olacak ama biz bu kısım arkadaşları memnun olmadıkları hangi konuda bizi eleştirdiklerini onları ikna etmek için karşımıza alıp konuşuyoruz. Bizi eleştirmeyecekler diye bir şey yok, şube yönetimi her şeyin en güzelini biliyor diye bir şey yok tabii ki eleştirilecek. O arkadaşları kendi yanımıza çekip yaptığımızın doğru olduğunu ispatlayana kadar da anlatırız. Ha anlayan anlar, anlamayan anlamaz o ayrı bir şey. Hani bizi eleştiremezler diye bir kanun yok.

the following words:

It was not about us or about them. What mattered was that the decisions taken there were solution oriented. Only the respect for our opinions and the importance given to us mattered.²⁶

Arguments to the authorities about the tendency of workers to leave essential issues within the union suggested that ordinary workers were unable to express themselves. For instance, Seidman's (1953, pp.211-212) argument that bureaucratic management dominates unions because workers are less likely to attend meetings due to a lack of understanding of the compulsory processes and a reluctance to debate in front of an audience. However, we observe that workers who are new to the union attribute the opposite meaning to it as a mechanism in which they can have their voice and be effective, despite the risk of putting their jobs in danger.

Transpersonal awareness causes bureaucracy in a union. According to Hyman, "the problem of bureaucracy" is a complex of social relations that "permeates the entire practice of trade unionism" at every level of the representative organization, not only the interests of a layer of full-time union officials (FTOs) (Hyman, 1989, pp. 54–55). Hyman's argument should be considered as an emphasis on the fact that although workers experience their first encounters with union bureaucracy through individuals, the roots of bureaucracy lay in the functioning mechanisms of the labor organization.

In addition to Hyman (1989, p. 61), trade unionism's bureaucracy includes three types of social interactions. The first is the separation of representations from mobilization. The second is a hierarchy of control and action, and the third is a dissociation of formal policy and decision-making procedures from member experience.

In the Uğur Textile example, bureaucratic management emerged through these three steps, as indicated by Hyman. The first occurred through the dissociation of

²⁶ Önemli olan biz veya onlar değildi. Önemli olan orada alınan kararların çözüm odaklı olmasıydı. Önemli olan sadece düşüncelerimize saygı, bize verilen önemdi.

representation from mobilization. The tendency to keep workers away from mobilization, which took shape as the primary attitude of the union after Mehmet Türkmen was dismissed from office, was an attitude embraced by the union headquarters, even though Türkmen was in office. The examples that Eren provides while describing this process reveal that workers are encouraged in a negative sense:

Suppose a decision is to be taken to stop this process entirely. In that case, to stop or slow down work, the employee must make this decision, and the union must stand behind it. For example, in our meeting, legislation and law favored workers. However, when we told union officials that we would make a press release or organize an action, come, and stand with us and say something, no one except Mehmet Türkmen stood with us. They even told us not to go.²⁷

Keeping workers away from mobilization continued to be the primary attitude of the union even after Mehmet Türkmen's dismissal. Gülcan stated that after the workers learned about the dismissal, the union did not stand with us in any way after we were dismissed. Workers express that the union does not prefer to mobilize the representation mechanism among workers and sometimes acts as an obstacle to unity among workers. At the same time, Eren says that workers with strong ties to union headquarters denounce workers who continue their protests on union leadership. For example, Erdem, who evaluates the union as a mechanism for workers' representation and actions against the boss, says the following about the process:

Workers need to unite to obtain their rights. The worker unites under the umbrella of the union, right? However, what does the union do? It negotiates with the boss without the workers' awareness; it negotiates everything with the boss without our knowledge. When this happens, we cannot get our rights.²⁸

²⁷ Diyelim ki bu süreci tamamen durdurmak için bir karar alınacak. Bu durumda, yani işi durdurmak ya da yavaşlatmak için işçinin bu kararı alması ve sendikanın da bunun arkasında durması gerekir. Örneğin bizim yaptığımız toplantıda mevzuat ve yasa işçinin lehineydi. Ama biz sendika yetkililerine basın açıklaması yapacağız ya da eylem yapacağız gelin yanımızda durun bir şeyler söyleyin dedüğümüzde Mehmet Türkmen dışında kimse yanımızda durmadı. Hatta bize gitmeyin bile dediler.

²⁸ İşçinin birlik olması lazım ki hakkımızı alabilelim. İşçi de sendika çatısı altında birleşiyor değil mi? Ama sendika ne yapıyor? Bizim arkamızdan patronla görüşüyor, bizim haberimiz olmadan her şeyi patronla görüşüyor. Bu olunca da hakkımızı elde edemiyoruz.

Hyman (as cited in Darlington and Upchurch, 2012, p.80) explains the emergence of bureaucratic management under three headings, the first of which is the separation of representation from mobilization. In this example, we see that workers confronted the bureaucratic understanding inherent in the union's headquarters with the dismissal of Türkmen. The encounter with union bureaucracy leads to tendencies such as feeling powerless against the union, distrusting the union, and blaming oneself for being a member. For example, when we asked how information flowed from the union to the workers after Türkmen's dismissal, the feeling of powerlessness against the union was expressed as follows: "After Mehmet Türkmen's dismissal, we started not receiving information. We are poor fellows, and what can we do? Since the headquarters is in Istanbul, whom do we know so we can get information?" (Savaş). While blaming oneself for being a member, "If I were to defend my rights again, I would defend them. Nevertheless, I would never do so within the union. You know how they say that if you do it the first time, it is a mistake, but if you do it the second time, it is stupidity" (Gülcan).

Hyman's (1980) second moment when bureaucracy makes itself visible is when the hierarchy and control relations between members start to become decisive. In the case of Uğur Textile workers, this can be interpreted as the moment when they begin to feel the power of the union headquarters over them. While examples of workers being able to express their opinions openly and criticize each other during the unionization period are highlighted, the control of the union headquarters carries examples of domination over workers. For example, when Erdem describes his encounter with Mehmet Ali Başak, who took office after Mehmet Türkmen, he says that they started to argue in the factory and that "it was a negotiation. You may disagree with the union. When the boss saw this, he dismissed us with gendarmes, saying that those who have no respect for their union president have no respect for me". The absence of a reaction from the union representative and the use of force by the union, which is the organization of the workers, on the workers in a dispute creates a separation between the workers and the union. Establishing this pressure and control mechanism introduces the process of

separating workers from decision-making processes as a third method, as described by Hyman.

The lack of transparency and communication between the union leadership and workers became more evident when a new union official arrived at the factory. According to worker accounts, a dispute broke out, resulting in being expelled by force. These events further highlight the need for democratic union practices that prioritize worker participation, transparency, and accountability in the decision-making processes. The committee members before the process of official authorization of the union can be regarded as “shadow stewards” who in the absent of official stewards acts as representative of their workgroup as Findley and McKinley discussed (as cited in Fairbrother, 2005). Fairbrother emphasizes that activism has its roots in the workplace and is a component of a larger workgroup. Fairbrother (2005) believed that the explanation of how workers attempt to organize themselves is what makes it most intriguing; it is from this experience that leadership-type activities may arise. However, the active and willing support of followers is a precondition for effective leadership, particularly in voluntary organizations such as labor unions. Moreover, bureaucratic leadership has expectations of membership passivity, which can be viewed in older presidents in the union. Hence, the textile union also expected the passivity of its members when they had discharged Mehmet Türkmen. Erdem talked about this time:

Everyone could not say what they think. After Mehmet Abi left, they said that we could not ask workers about everything, for example, decisions about the wages and rights of workers concerning collective bargaining agreements. They would not give us proper information; they would say things like ‘we cannot tell you; we do not know.’ However, they were aware of this. When we said, ‘You must tell us the situation,’ we found ourselves in front of the door. The people working there right now do not speak loudly for their opinions; if they do, they would not be working. I think they are also happy about not to say anything.²⁹

Leaders who have limited worker participation aim to enlarge their positions in the

²⁹ Herkes kendi sözünü söyleyemiyordu. Mehmet abi gittikten sonra her şeyi de işçilere soramayız diyorlardı. Alınan kararları, mesela toplu iş sözleşmesinde işçinin alacağı ücreti, hakları. Bunu bana söylemen lazım dediğimizde kendimizi kapının önünde buluyorduk. Doğru düzgün bilgi vermiyorlardı, söyleyemeyiz, haberimiz yok gibi şeyler söylüyorlardı. İllaki haberleri vardır ama. Orada çalışanlar da fikirlerini söylemiyorlar, söyleseler onlar da şimdi çalışmıyor olurlardı. Onlar da konuşmamaktan memnunlar.

union, which prevents the production of beneficial consequences for workers. Democratic leadership is more likely to produce democratic outcomes because it encourages democratic practice in broad layers of movement participants and provides them with the skills to participate actively in debates, leadership selection, and decision-making. On the other hand, bureaucratic leaders thrive in situations where these skills are limited to a narrow layer, and most movement participants are passive (Alexander, 2010).

It is also essential to remember that activism does not result solely from the willpower of the individual workers. The organized committee with the leadership perspective, which emphasizes the self-ruling of workers, enables individuals to act as subjects of the organizations that lead them to act as leaders/activists for the general will. Their power also comes from their relationships with general workers.

Explaining the breakdown of workers' communication with the union, Eren said that the process negatively affected their unionization experience and that the union headquarters became an obstacle in their way: "We learned from the boss that Mehmet Türkmen, the regional representative, was dismissed, and when he was dismissed, we were dispersed, they scattered us all like chickens. When Mehmet Türkmen was in office, he sent us a list almost every day. He would send us the list he received from the union headquarters, and we would look at it. I could see which workers were union members and which had resigned. We would go to the workplace and ask them why they had resigned, convince them, and make them members again. After Mehmet was fired, we did not know who new member was."

Depending on the limited experience of workers' encounters with bureaucratic management in unions, workers' reactions to bureaucratic management include distrust of labor organizations, a cautious approach, or the continuation of their struggle in anti-bureaucratic mechanisms. While distrust and caution towards trade unions is the first reaction that comes to mind, workers who were dismissed from the factories they worked in, when asked if they would consider being unionized in their new workplaces, responded, "I would still defend my rights in trade unions" (Erdem) and "I joined the

union in my new workplace, but here I try to understand the internal relations from a distance" (Asiye). On the other hand, Gülcan states that the union is an unreliable institution as a structure and that she will never be a part of it again, and her comparison of the union to a spy among workers becomes striking:

The DİSK Textile Union was the first to achieve it. That is why I liken the union to spy inside workers. The union knows the weakest points and problems of the workers and uses them against the workers. A union is never something to be run by a chairman or someone else. One of the workers who sold us could have managed it better. Textile only achieved a first there; it was the first time such a thing happened in Urfa; it was experiencing the pleasure of being in a place where officials did not attain or spend labor.³⁰

Therefore, for workers who have experienced organizing in the Uğur Textile, the union bureaucracy operates a method that comes to power by basing their power on the workers and thanks to them. However, instead of cutting the connection with the workers and maintaining this rule through the demands and control of the workers, it operates a method that controls the workers using control and pressure mechanisms. Workers' attempts to establish anti-bureaucratic mechanisms, based on the examples of mobilization and democratic participation experiences in this example, show that the workers also continue to attempt to maintain anti-bureaucratic mechanisms. "When Mehmet Abi was on duty, we made decisions like when Mehmet Abi was not. Mehmet Abi was not on duty, but he was still among us. When Mehmet Abi was on duty, he did not speak to us as an official. He talked to us as if he were one of us. In other words, he would say that whatever you say will happen. He would tell us the possibilities; we would give our opinions, and then we would unanimously decide on the most correct one. The situation was the same when Mehmet Abi was in charge, and it was the same when he was not." With these words, he expresses that they do this as an election tactic when they are directly confronted with the attitude of union management. According to

³⁰ Orada bir ilki başardı. Bu yüzden sendikayı işçilerin içindeki bir casusa benzetiyorum. İşçilerin en zayıf noktalarını, sorunlarını biliyor ve bunu işçilere karşı kullanıyor. Sendika hiçbir zaman bir başkan ya da bir başkası tarafından yönetilecek bir şey değildir. Bizi satan işçilerden biri bile bunu daha iyi yönetebilirdi. Sadece orada bir ilki başardı; Urfa'da ilk defa böyle bir şey oldu; şimdi yetkililer emek harcamadıkları, kazanmadıkları bir yerde olmanın hazzını yaşıyor.

Castoriadis (as cited in Camfield, 2013), these dynamics of opposition, such as the general assembly of strikers, an elected strike committee, the commune, the Soviet Union, and the factory council, are anti-bureaucratic responses created by self-organized workers in response to the issue of long-term centralization. Castoriadis (as cited in Camfield, 2013) contends that bureaucratic organizations have alternatives, meaning that views of union bureaucracy as an expected outcome of organizational growth are false (as cited in Camfield, 2013).

Workers can directly confront the union headquarters' attitude after Türkmen's dismissal, so the fact that the first form they encounter in the union organization process is based on democratic participation generates some formal criticisms of the union's functioning. For example, Eren said, "When we talk to Kazım Doğan, he says, 'I've been here for 40 years. How can you stay there?' He has been there for 26 years. Has there ever been a candidate against him? Hasn't anyone ever asked him why this man is here?" Savaş said, "I am always against one man. This means that some important decisions should not be made by one person. When only one person makes them, the devil is there to mess with others. This has tempted people's minds. What you call ego is awful. It can lead you in the wrong direction at any time." When seeing union leaders as representatives of the union bureaucracy, union executives were portrayed as scapegoats for their errors inherent in trade unionism itself (Hyman, 1989, pp. 54–55). Combined with the criticism of the bureaucratic union approach, the essence of bureaucratic union understanding is criticized for maintaining management in a monopoly and preventing it from spreading to the grassroots.

4.2.3 Accountability of the union after the authorization

The process continued with the authorization of the DİSK Textile Union in the Hayri Uğur Textile Factory. Besides the resumption of work, after some workers in the committee withdrew their lawsuit against the employer in agreement with the new union management, the relationship between the union and factory workers was reproduced. Although it was not possible to make in-depth observations on the union's effectiveness

in the factory, it was possible to draw inferences from the interviews about the relations the union established after it was authorized. When we interviewed a worker, a union representative, she stated that the union's internal function was in consultation with the workers, consulting with the presidents, and being solution-oriented. In terms of linguistics, it would not be wrong to say that she adopted a language close to the employer's language. While stating that the dialog with the workers progresses through her, she, as a factory representative, makes the following evaluations about the progress of internal relations:

I also have an assistant; we have two disciplinary board members. We referred to our friends when there was a problem. We have our own room, and I have my own room. We call them, talk to them, and convey the results to them. When there is an exceptional situation or a piece of information about the union, such as food aid and education aid, we go to the staff individually and ask how they are doing. I inform them that is how we take it in the union.³¹

As can be inferred from the statements, there is an emphasis on the fact that there is a subordinate-superior relationship between the names he worked within the union representation. There is also stress that he is the one who directs this relationship and calls the workers and talks to them. In addition, the "staff member" she uses when he goes to the workers in a unique situation reveals that the relationship between the union representative and the union member converges with the relationship between the employee and the employer. In addition, the discourse used to describe the termination of the job of the assistant's name in labor relations reinforces the above inference as follows:

I had an assistant who was misbehaving. He disturbed my work environment. When this happens, employees complain about it. I will take him in front of me and talk to him. Look, you are disturbing the peace of the work environment; you should not behave like this. After all, we have established labor peace here and have gone through challenging times. We had two friends whom I said you

³¹ Bir de yardımcım var, iki tane disiplin kurulu üyemiz var. Bir sorun sorun, sıkıntı olduğu zaman arkadaşlarımızı çağırıyoruz. Bizim kendi odamız var, benim kendi odam var. Çağırıyoruz orada konuşuyoruz, sonucu kendilerine iletiyoruz. Çok özel bir durum olduğu zaman ayrı veya sendikayla alakalı bir bilgilendirme işte erzak yardımı, eğitim yardımını vesaire oldu mu elemanların yanına tek tek gidip hem hâl hatır soruyoruz hem de bilgilendirmelerini yapıyorum, o şekilde götürüyoruz sendikada.

were acting against me, so I do not want you. We parted ways with them, we said goodbye, and they left.³²

The statement that we parted because he disturbed my work peace can be seen as another example of the employee-employer relationship. In addition, although workers have complained about the same name, it is stated that instead of running committees involving workers to solve the problem, the union administration terminated the duty of the union officer. Although the disagreements in the process are not clearly stated, the name to be elected should be kept in with the existing representative.

It is possible to find explanations that support the argument that union members do not prefer to participate in decision-making. Therefore, these bodies should be left to union management. However, the missing part of these explanations is that they need to sufficiently explain the socio-environmental conditions that led workers to make decisions. For example, we can see how Cem, who continues to work in the factory, positions herself at a distance from the union that she is a member of in the following statements:

The union is meaningless. The presence or absence of union does not matter. There is only one thing I know, and in some cases, the union should defend the workers. First, they should consult with the worker; without the worker, they are nothing. However, we were not consulted. Everything ends with management. We are not informed, and we do not know. It is always managed in a veiled manner, but what is being administered needs to be clarified. We do not come together, so that our ideas cannot be on the agenda in the union. I do nothing because nothing will change, even if I do. After all, workers cannot change anything unless they are united.³³

³² Benim yardımcım vardı, aykırı davranıyordu. Benim iş ortamı huzurumu bozuyordu. Bu şekilde olduğu zaman elemanlar da şikayetçi oluyor. Ben de karşıma alıp konuşuyorum. Diyorum ki bak sen şu an ortamın huzurunu bozuyorsun, senin bunları yapmaman lazım. Sonuçta burada iş barışı sağlamışız çok zor süreçlerden geçtik. Sen bana aykırı davranıyorsun, biz seni istemiyoruz dediğimiz iki arkadaşımız oldu. Onlarla yollarımızı ayırdık, helalleştik gittiler.

³³ Sendika boş bir şey. Olsa da olur olmasa da olur. Yani benim bildiğim tek bir şey var yani bazı konularda işçi savunmalı. İlk başta işçiye danışmalı, işçi olmazsa onlar bir hiç zaten. Ama danışmıyorlar. Bütün her şey içerideki yönetimle bitiyor. Hiçbir şekilde bilgi aktarılmıyor ve bilmiyoruz. Hep üstü kapalı şekilde yönetiliyor ama ne yönetiliyor belli değil. Biz de fikrimiz sendikada gündem olsun diye yan yana gelmiyoruz. Ben bir şey yapmıyorum çünkü yapsam da bir şey değişmeyecek zaten. Sonuçta işçiler birlik olmadığı sürece hiçbir şey değiştiremez.

The tendency discussed as positioning oneself outside the union brings two extreme concepts: seeing union-management as the source of problems and solutions. Therefore, instead of seeing union leadership as people expected to represent workers during their office period, they are seen as either the crown of the worker's heads or the source of all unpleasant events. Rank-and-file members must consider the union as the interlocutor of any puzzle. By contrast, union administrations are either reluctant or do not prefer to establish union structures in which workers are active. The part of the problem that originates from union leadership stems from their desire to extend their tenure in office and preserve the relatively privileged position they have achieved within union leadership. Hence, officials perpetuate their leadership through the dismissal of representatives with whom the union headquarters disagreed. In the example below, the worker's relationship with the union after the union received power in the factory is clearly explained by Akın:

Since we do not see the union leader, we cannot tell him the problem. Even if we do so, he does not help. How many times did we ask for food? Even the food remains the same. We are at the very back of the line, go out with the machinists, and our time is limited to 45 min; until we eat our food there and smoke a cigarette, we run out of time until we go to prayer. Even getting off the belt is problematic. Sometimes, we leave, and no food is left. This happened twice. This time, we wait for food. Irrespective of the crowd, we are in the palms of their hands. No matter how much we say, this does not help. The union official comes, takes money, and stops talking. He eats the food there. He knows how bad the food is and yet counts his money. Most of the time, I call the representative for the food anyway. The following day, the same problem was repeated. Our representative directly tells anything. Sometimes, she fights for us. Sometimes she argues. She was even going to resign at one point, but we barely convinced her. I mean that because she is straightforward, she says it directly and does not hesitate. If we leave it to others, they may be unable to do so. They cannot know it because they would be fired.³⁴

³⁴ Sendika başkanını görmediğimiz için sorunu söyleyemiyoruz. Söylesek de fayda etmiyor. Kaç sefer yemek için söyledik, yemek bile hala aynı. Biz bandın en arkasındayız makinecilerle çıkıyoruz. Bizim süremiz 45 dakika, biz orada yemeğimizi yiyip sigara içene, namaza gidene kadar zamanımız bitiyor. Banttın çıkmamız bile sorun. Bazen gidiyoruz, yemek kalmamış. İki sefer başımıza geldi. Yemeği bekliyoruz bu sefer. İstedığımız kadar kalabalık olalım, adamların avucunun içindeyiz. Ne kadar söylesek fayda etmiyor. Görevli geliyor paramızı alıyor susuyor. Oradaki yemeği de yiyor. Yemeğin ne kadar kötü olduğunu da biliyor sonra gidiyor parasını sayıyor. Çoğu zaman zaten yemekler için temsilciyi arıyorum. Hallediyoruz diyor. Ertesi gün yine aynı sorun. Onu da geçiştiriyorlar. Yine aynı oluyor. Temsilcimiz direkt neyin ne olduğunu söylüyor. Yeri geliyor bizim için kavga ediyor. Yeri geliyor tartışıyor. Hatta bir ara istifa

Assigning the problems encountered at the workplace to union management by refusing to be a subject of the solution process leads to seeing the union as a redeemer that protects the worker. Therefore, the savior's role, without making workers active in the union, limits them in the struggle as much as the initiative of the savior. For example, in the quotation above, the representative is praised for defending workers' rights and not hesitating to fight for them. The almost-resigned representative continues to serve worker requests. However, the organization of the struggle, which is compressed into the personal will of the representative without the workers' intervention, is limited.

The fact that workers expect an organization to protect them and prefer to take a step back is not a personal hesitation but a social problem. Under conditions of long working hours, low wages, and precarious work, in addition to the pressure of production in the factory, reinforced by verbal harassment, it is quite natural to expect workers to be in a defense network. The problem is that unions recruit workers and fail to make them part of the shield. Therefore, the fact that a member found it unnecessary for the union to tell workers about issues that could not change, as in the quote below, should be seen because of the union's adoption of this tactic by the workers. Ahmet clearly explained his experiences:

I did not know about unions. I had seen them on TV before but had never heard of such a thing in Urfa. Well, I had to search it thoroughly to think it was good, and after examining it, I concluded that it was necessary. A union is necessary for workers, and there should be someone who defends them. They should protect workers and defend their rights. If we talk about rights today, no matter which worker you ask or which factory you ask, you can see that workers are constantly treated unfairly. I want the union to prevent this. It is good for workers to know that someone is defending themselves. If they need it, the representative tells them downstairs. You know, he decides that the issue is necessary; maybe he has nothing, whether we communicate it or not; this is the result, for example. It does not matter whether you tell workers about a decision that will remain the same. Thus, it is futile for workers to react. Our people want everything because of financial difficulties. They would like even if there were 5

bile edecekti zor bela çevirdik. Yani açık sözlü olduğu için direkt söylüyor hiç çekinmiyor. Diğerlerine bıraksak yapamayabilirler. Kovulacakları için söyleyemezler.

cents, but it is not possible.³⁵

When the communication between the union and workers is analyzed, the inclusion of workers into decision-making mechanisms, the execution of processes together with factory workers, and the participation of women, who have difficulty in being an active part of the process due to gender inequality, in decision-making mechanisms and unions can be explained by two different perspectives. When discussing a democratic unionism model, we see that leadership is not an abstract subject, detached from workers, and capable of dragging them along. However, a structure that spreads decision-making to grassroots informs workers about the process, discusses possible outcomes, and collectivizes the final decision. Workers embrace this structure and reinforce their sense of belonging. On the other hand, a management approach that positions itself outside the workers and carries out the process at the union headquarters isolates the workers from collective feeling and paves the way for them to reinforce their attitudes. When workers are removed from a management approach based on democratic participation, they tend to draw personal conclusions within an organized structure.

4.3 The Patriarchal Relations in a Labor Organization

It can be said that gender inequality between male and female workers makes a difference in their motivation to join a union, and that women consider the union an organized mechanism against harassment, mobbing, and psychological violence they face at work. As a result, the movement generated female leaders to establish connections with other female workers. However, it should be noted that female leaders were not visible in public, given the pressure that prevented them from assuming public

³⁵ Sendikalara dair bilgim yoktu. Daha önce televizyonlarda görüyordum ama Urfa'da daha önce böyle bir şey duymamıştım yani. Valla iyi bir şey olduğunu düşünmem için iyice araştırmam gerekiyordu araştırdıktan sonra gerekli olduğu kanaatine vardım. Sendika işçiler için gerekli, onları savunan biri olmalı. İşçileri korumalı, haklarını savunmalı. Eğer hak olayına girersek bugün hangi işçiye sorarsanız sorun, hangi fabrikaya sorarsanız sorun işçinin sürekli bir hak yenme durumu olduğunu gözlemleyebilirsiniz. Sendikanın bunun önüne geçmesini isterim. Yani işçilerin birilerinin onu savunduğunu bilmesi güzel. Eğer gerek duyarlarsa temsilci aşağı söyler. Hani konunun gerekli olduğuna şöyle karar verir belki bir şeyi olmadığında, iletsek de iletmesek de sonuç değişmez mesela. Değişmeyecek bir kararı işçilere anlatsan ne yazar anlatmasan ne yazar. İşçilerin tepki göstermesi boşuna, insanlarımız geçim sıkıntısı yüzünden her şeyi isterler. 5 kuruş olsa onu da isterler, ama mümkün değil.

leadership roles. The female participants explicitly stated that they intentionally distanced themselves from public statements or the media, given the factory management's tendency to summon their families and humiliate them or imply that their daughters had taken the wrong path. The unionization process involved collective resistance by male and female workers and was characterized by management as immoral. The generation of female leaders can be extracted from an interview with İsmet:

That is why we gave a little more importance to female friends. We attempted to include women in this period. We generally cannot communicate with female friends because of our lifestyles in Urfa. We divided the participants into different WhatsApp groups so that our female friends could take care of female workers. We have difficulty communicating with them. So, we thought that they would be comfortable, maybe they could not talk to us.³⁶

Therefore, during the union's organizing period, the participation of female workers in the process required a different labor time process compared to male workers. For this reason, finding opinion leaders among women, preferring "older sisters," pointed to the need for male workers to communicate relatively more efficiently and to be listened to among female workers. Simultaneously, as one worker noted above, establishing more private communication groups among women can be seen as a reflection of these needs. As a young female worker put it, in the WhatsApp group called "Roses of Revolution," women were free to speak their hearts out. The problem of gender inequality that characterizes organizing tactics in the union is also manifested in the sexist character of the union bureaucracy that women face.

Ramsay and Parker (1991) posit that gender is a crucial component of organizational culture and significantly impacts how organizations operate and are structured. They suggested that traditional bureaucratic structures tend to favor masculine traits and behaviors, thereby reinforcing gender disparities. The authors further argue that gender is not merely an individual characteristic, but also a social construct that is perpetuated

³⁶ Bayan arkadaşlara biraz daha önem veriyorduk. Aramızda bayan bulundurmaya çalışıyorduk. Şöyle biz genelde bayanlarla iletişime geçemiyoruz Urfa şartlarında, yani yaşam biçimi olarak. Hatta kadın arkadaşlarımızın kadın çalışanlarla ilgilenebilmesi için farklı WhatsApp gruplarına bölündük. Onlarla iletişim kurmakta zorlanıyorduk. Yani rahat olurlar, belki bizimle konuşamazlar diye düşündük.

through organizational practices and policies. To address gender inequalities in organizations, the authors recommend breaking down conventional bureaucratic structures and creating more adaptive, comprehensive, and diverse organizational cultures. In conclusion, this argument highlights the need for organizations to acknowledge the role of gender in their culture and adopt inclusive and diverse practices to address gender disparities.

Both textile unions, which bear the traces of the union bureaucracy, maintain the understanding that they position women within family relations and do not accept their involvement in production relations as independent individuals. Therefore, Urfa, a city where gender inequality is sharply exemplified, also becomes a site of attack on gender inequality in two unions that are supposed to be organizations of labor struggles. Women who are union members or are criticized for not being union members are associated with their families through the concept of honor as a continuation of patriarchal relations. Therefore, unlike men, women who do not comply with union management policies face a threat within power relations.

Asiye as a DİSK Textile organizer working in a factory where the Öz-İplik İş Union is authorized describes what happened to a female colleague as follows:

As a union, they were also going to the houses of female workers. For example, a friend of mine called me and said ‘Asiye, they came to our house and talked to my father. My father asks me, are you going to work, or anything else?’ Öz-İplik came later in DİSK. So, there were such problems for female workers.³⁷

The fact that women are active in the DİSK union contributes to the failure of the Öz-İplik-İş union to obtain authorization. To prevent workers from carrying out activities in a relatively more struggling union, the patriarchal pressure mechanism is adapted to distract women from organized unions by visiting the homes of female workers and informing their families that their daughters are engaged in harmful activities instead of going to work. A similar example can be found in the DİSK Textile union expressed by

³⁷ Sendika olarak da kapılarına gidiyorlardı kadınların. Mesela bir arkadaşım beni arayıp şey demişti ‘Asiye, bizim eve gelip babamla konuştular. Babam da bana diyor ki, sen işe mi gidiyorsun ne yapmaya gidiyorsun?’ Biz DİSK'teydik, Öz-İplik gelmiş o zaman. Kızlar için öyle durumlar vardı yani.

Veli:

Mehmet Ali Başak (the regional representative appointed after Mehmet Türkmen) especially calls female workers; he and the management try to reach their families to threaten them. To say that ‘you will lose your job, you will not be hired, you will not be able to work in Urfa again.’ These individuals were members of the DISK. The management together with the boss were calling their own members.³⁸

Patriarchal relations, which prevent democratic participation and limit women's decision-making rights, appear to be a strategy used by the union bureaucracy to continue disagreements between workers and union management regardless of the union. Alexander (2010) indicated that the prominent role of female workers in strikes and protests demonstrates how the spaces created by workers' collective action can be viewed as 'liberated zones' in multiple ways. Alexander (2010) cited Morsi (2008) to reveal that male and female strikers slept over in their workplaces, and workers' collective action challenged deeply held social conventions against women and men who are not members of the same family sharing living spaces. Periods of resistance can be moments of departure from social conventions, but they can also quickly become repression tools to suppress disagreements with the administration. Although the union bureaucracy intends to establish a relationship of domination over female workers with the central axis of social pressure, the patriarchy in which the union bureaucracy resorts to consolidate its dominance is also seen as a determining factor in internal relations. Eren's example below can be discussed as an example of the patriarchal relations since the executive expects respect from him for his age:

Let me tell you about my phone conversation with head of the union. Mehmet Türkmen was always with us when we called him. When he said he was coming from Antep, Kazım Doğan would say that ‘I was paying his money, and of course, he would come.’ Doğan was someone who expected respect from us due to his age. A union chairman in his seventies, but you are not doing your job;

³⁸ Mehmet Ali Başak (Mehmet Türkmen'den sonra atanan bölge temsilcisi) özellikle bayanları arıyor, yönetimle birlikte bayanların ailelerine ulaşmaya çalışıyor, tehdit gibisinden. İşte bak işinizden olursunuz, işe alınmazsınız bir daha Urfa'da çalışamazsınız. Bu insanlarda DISK'e üye olanlar. Kendi üyelerini arıyor patronun yanındaki yönetim birlikte.

you did not defend our rights. On the other hand, Mehmet Türkmen was 8 or 10 years older than me; I respected and loved him like a brother.³⁹

In particular, the problems faced by female workers due to gender inequality in the workplace and the reasons that led them to become part of a labor organization continue to reproduce the problems female workers face within the bureaucratic organizational mechanism. The reactions produced by women who face the pressures of the bureaucratic organizational mechanism push female workers to protect themselves, act more cautiously, and take a stance on the consequences of problems instead of their sources.

4.4 Economic Interactions

The interviews emphasized workers' desire for better living conditions, wages, and secure working conditions. Nevertheless, economic benefits were not the dominant motivation for organizing the union for workers on the committee or behind a circle during the union organization period. Workers who expressed their economic demands predominantly shared their positive or negative views on unionization based on the adequacy of the benefits they would receive in collective bargaining agreements concluded by unions. In addition, it is vital to remember that very few of the workers interviewed had experience working in unionized workplaces, that the number of unionized workplaces in the city where they live was small, and that the unionization process was the first in terms of urban memory. Therefore, contrary to the understanding that the union is the workers' self-organization and struggle apparatus, there is a tendency to see it as limited to economic regulations, which is considered sufficient by the workers given the long working hours and precarious working conditions in the city where frequent dismissals occur. Mehmet, whose first union experience is in Uğur Textile, should be evaluated with this background information:

³⁹ Kazım Doğan'la telefonla görüşmemi anlatayım. Mehmet Türkmen sürekli yanımda, aradığımızda günde iki kere bile geliyor dediğimde onun parasını ben veriyorum tabii ki gelecek diyordu. Kazım Doğan onun yaşına saygı göstermemizi bekleyen biriydi. 70'li yaşlarında sendika genel başkanı, ama sen işini yapmıyorsun, hakkımızı savunmadın. Mehmet Türkmen benden 8-10 yaş büyük, saygıda kusur etmiyordum abimiz gibi seviyordum.

I know little about their decision-making, but they do not consult the workers. I do not know if they asked the mayors, but they helped me. We received help two or three times. Now that the president has been elected, we tell them about our problems. Friends, or more precisely, those who have problems, tell them, and they report it to them.⁴⁰

When economic gains are squeezed between the oppression and challenging conditions of union organization, and in some cases when the union bureaucracy becomes evident in workers' eyes, unions are evaluated by workers based on the cross sections in their eyes. For example, the evaluations of Akin who left the union after the union was authorized in the factory and continued to work at the workplace will shed light on this sense:

I was a student, finished high school, and then started working. I needed to learn about the union. Some people said to join, and some said don't. I joined for a while. I realized what was going on and left. There were no prior problems in the factory. Our salaries were paid in exact amount and our food was good. Usually, in other factories, no one quickly provides public holidays. They even gave us public holidays. Thus, the union was unnecessary. Even unionized people now miss old times. There are even those who are regretful about making the factory unionized. There is a lot of pressure on us now.⁴¹

While evaluating that before the union, the workplace gave workers time off on public holidays, unlike other factories, and that after the union came in, the workplace increased the pressure on workers to work overtime, believing that the act of joining the union led to these results, not that union organization, which is a constitutional right, was not accepted by the bosses and increased the mechanisms of coercion on workers. It is important to note that distrust of the union's functioning was decisive in these assessments. In addition to the fact that the union president initially visited the factory once or twice a month and left after lunch, and those workers were not consulted on

⁴⁰ Karar almaları hakkında fazla bir bilgim yok ama işçilere danışmıyorlar. Eğer başkanlara sormuşlarsa onu bilmiyorum. Ama yardımları oldu. İki sefer mi, üç sefer mi ne yardım aldık. Başkan falan seçildi ya sıkıntıları onlara söylüyoruz.

⁴¹ Ben normalde öğrenciydim liseyi bitirdim ondan sonra başladım. Sendika ile ilgili hiç bilgim yoktu. Bazıları katıl diyordu bazıları katılma. Bir ara katıldım. Neyin ne olduğunu anladım geri çıktım. Daha önce fabrikamızda sorun yoktu. Maaşımız tam yatıyordu, yemeğimiz güzeldi, iznimiz iyiydi. Normalde diğer fabrikalarda kimse kolay kolay resmî tatili vermiyordu. Bize resmî tatili bile veriyorlardı. Sendika gereksizdi. Şu an içerideki sendikalılar bile eski zamanını özlüyorlar. Sendikayı getirdiklerine pişman olanlar bile var. Şu an üzerimizde çok baskı var.

issues such as food aid, there were also concerns that workers who participated in decision-making structures might provide different information to workers due to bribery.

The central dynamic of this tendency is its evaluation in limited phenomena such as aid and Ramadan aid. The significant dynamic of this tendency is that workers do not see themselves as union stakeholders, but as influencers. While Atakan is satisfied with the increased benefits of the union's presence in their factory, Ahmet believes that workers' demands, such as refusing overtime, could be more affordable.

It is quite understandable that all workers who become union members at risk of dismissal expect economic improvement in their living conditions. However, the approach evaluated under this heading is to discuss the positive and negative aspects of the union based on phenomena disconnected from their connections, according to the results in this respect. Therefore, the statement that the union has met its expectations regarding economic gains should be grasped, considering that they have experience working in a city with limited positive examples of union gains. In addition, the far from the inclusive attitude of the union leadership towards the workers is seen to increase the domination of the boss over the workers rather than the union organization itself being a structure that will create these economic developments.

4.5. The Relation Between Internal Union Democracy and the Labor Mobilization

It is possible to examine internal union democracy and its impact on the labor struggle in the resistance of Uğur Textile workers in three sections. First, this section discusses the period in which Mehmet Türkmen was in office. Second, the period when Türkmen was dismissed, but the workers continued their de facto actions, and third, the period of workers' mobilization after the DİSK Textile Union was authorized.

In the first period, although the boss, until he learned of the union's existence, dismissed the workers, the reopening of the factory as a result of the actions initiated and sustained by all the workers is a prerequisite for the physical involvement of workers in actions

and demonstrations, as well as the establishment of structures and unions in which they can participate in decision-making mechanisms and in which union officials regularly seek rank-and-file workers' views. Hyman and McCormick (2019) state that it was troubling for unions to press credibly unless they were internally democratic. Therefore, with the functioning of a democratic structure, a structure that protects its internal democracy against the dismissal of all workers with an SMS notification with Kod18 takes its place on stage for their struggle to claim their democratic demands for the right to work. An example is the question of which of the two opposing classes on the ground in the class struggle is more organized. There is closer cohesion in institutions where trade unions are more organized among workers, and where there is the possibility of discussing and solving problems together at every stage. Kelly also stated that social connection is vital for mobilization because it enables people to gauge how much support there is for collective action and dispels pluralistic misunderstandings (1998, pp.34-36). Parker (1998) reminded a successful strike against UPS and stated that "in a critical struggle against a corporation, democracy was not just the icing on the cake, but the very foundation of union power" (as cited in Hyman & Cormick, 2019, p.103). Hence, the union power resulting from internal democracy can be seen in the reopening of the closed factory. After being closed for approximately a month, the factory reopened following the workers' resistance. This process has also been very active among workers. Gülcan, a young female worker, describes the period when the workers came together in the following words:

There are yellow unions, and then there are unions that do not really stand with the workers. When we joined this union, we did it on purpose, because we thought it was on the side of the workers. That is how we held meetings; we came together at Gümrük Han. We made a lot of noise.⁴²

One of the positive outcomes of intra-union democracy is that it increases the bargaining margin between the union and boss. In contrast to the notion that only union officials are capable of collective bargaining and union tactics, Williams and Halcoussis (2014)

⁴² Zaten başta bu şekilde DİSK'e girdik. Sarı sendikalar var bir de gerçekten çalışanın yanında durmayan sendikalar var. Biz bu sendikaya girdiğimiz zaman çalışanın yanında diye bilerek girdik. O şekilde buluşmalar yaptık, Gümrük Han'da falan bir araya geldik. Baya bir ses getirdik.

found that democratic unions are more effective in their essential collective bargaining duties. They contend that democratic unions, in contrast, are more favorable when engaging in collective bargaining with employers. According to scholars, a union's direct democratic processes prevent the deterioration of living and working circumstances (Williams & Halcoussis, 2014, p. 226). Therefore, the fact that both the DİSK Textile Union and the workers came to common ground because of meetings and made statements together after the workers were dismissed with Kod-18, that is, the clause applied in case of termination of work in seasonal and fixed-term contracts that were not valid for Uğur Textile workers, can be given as an example to Williams and Halcoussis' (2014) evaluation in terms of the process being concluded in favor of the workers. Initially, Uğur Textile employer and managers' threats were failed after the union was authorized. In addition, the initial part of the unionization process proves Kelly's (1998) argument regarding the positive correlation between internal union democracy and achievements in union mobilization.

It is debatable whether it is correct to equate the process of gaining union authorization during the union organizing period with the argument that involving workers in the collective bargaining period, as exemplified by Williams and Halcoussis (2014), leads to gains. However, in an experience where union organization, union security, and the culture of union struggle are still limited, the strategy that puts workers at the center of decision-making in this period mobilizes workers until the process is complete. Despite these shortcomings, the collective involvement of workers is a positive outcome. On the other hand, in an interview with Mehmet Türkmen (Gazete Duvar, 2021), he explains the process that ends with his dismissal as follows:

We learned that the draft of the collective agreement is being discussed without consulting the workers. We also learned that Hayri Uğur, the factory boss, said that he was uncomfortable with me, and that Kazım Doğan, the union president, promised that I would not be here if the union agreed. He tried to liquidate me. Our expert friend, Deniz Kar, who worked in the region, was dismissed. While there was no change in my duties, the deputy general chairman started meeting

with workers in Urfa without my knowledge.⁴³

In addition, Mehmet Türkmen states that collective bargaining agreements must meet workers' demands. The conditions that led workers to unionize must be corrected. Such drafts should be prepared, which is the task ahead. We will meet the workers, prepare a draft per their demands, and start negotiations. We will do the same in the future as we have overcome the problems with the workers' unity." His words show that this attitude exemplifies the chain of continuity. Although not directly related to this case, in an interview with managers working in the DİSK Textile Union, they stated that in another field, a protocol had to be signed with the employer due to a decrease in textile orders and that they convinced workers who reacted to this by visiting the departments. The method of persuading workers is to tell them that if this protocol is not signed, the employer will resort to a way out. Therefore, the consequence of not involving workers in decision-making mechanisms is that, at critical moments, worker mobilization cannot even be brought to the table as an option. At the same time, the union had no expectations of mobilization.

In contrast, in the second phase of unionization, when Mehmet Türkmen was dismissed, the relationship between the unionization committee and union administration reversed negatively. The bond between workers and union leadership is much weaker when it is disconnected from its members and the needs, demands, and expectations of its members. This weak bond between the workers and the union leadership turns into an area where the leadership distances itself from the workers, sometimes turning their duties into a profession, and where cases of corruption, racketeering, and infiltration by organized crime can increase. In the opposite case, where the bond between workers and management is much closer and workers continue to learn from their own management experiences, a stronger union movement is possible only through a robust internal

⁴³ İşçilere sorulmadan toplu sözleşme taslağının tartışılmaya başlandığını öğrendik. Ayrıca fabrika patronu Hayri Uğur'un benden rahatsız olduğunu söylediği ve sendika başkanı Kazım Doğan'ın, sendika kabul ederse benim burada olmayacağıma dair söz verdiğini öğrendik. Fiilen beni tasfiye etmeye çalıştı. Bölgede çalışma yürüten uzman arkadaşımız Deniz Kar görevden alındı. Benim görevimle ilgili yapılmış hiçbir değişiklik yokken genel başkan vekili, Urfa'da benden habersiz işçilerle görüşmeye başladı.

democracy (Goldberg, 2008, p.762). Committee member Erdem describes the process they had undergone with the following sentences:

After Mehmet Türkmen left, we had no voice in the matter. Now, we specifically call Mehmet Türkmen, but a worker like Mehmet Türkmen has the right to speak and the authority to make decisions. After the dismissal, not only did the union stand behind us, but we completely disintegrated after they united with the boss. Workers could have continued the struggle unless the union administration collaborated with the factory management.⁴⁴

The dismissal of Mehmet Türkmen and the statement by DİSK Textile Union officials that they would resume work on the condition that the workers withdrew their lawsuits for reinstatement revealed that the second period was shaped as a period of compromise between the boss and the union. The close relationship between the union and the boss builds a wall between workers and the union. Workers who are committee members are not hired again, and even if hired, the union management asks them to compromise with the boss. Therefore, this process diminishes workers' faith in their collective action and undermines their trust in the union. It is difficult to evaluate the reinstatement of workers as an achievement of the conciliatory unionism model because not all workers were reinstated, and workers who met with their colleagues at the workplace emphasized that some of them were fired after a short period. In contrast, others have emphasized that working conditions have worsened. Therefore, it can be concluded that the second phase, in which the union adopted an authoritarian management approach that cut off the connection with workers in decision-making processes and forced them to implement their own decisions, did not result in any gains for Uğur Textile workers.

The third period is when the union became more established in the factory than in the first two periods. Workers mostly said that they would tell union representatives about problems during this period. Although the emphasis on talking to the representative

⁴⁴ Mehmet Türkmen gittikten sonra bizim hiçbir söz hakkımız kalmadı. Şimdi özel olarak Mehmet Türkmen diyoruz ama Mehmet Türkmen gibi işçinin söz hakkı da vardır, karar alma yetkisi de vardır. Görevden almanın ardından sendikanın bizim arkamızda durmaması bir yana, patronla bir olduktan sonra biz tamamen dağıldık. Patronla bir olmamış olsaydı işçi yine mücadeleye devam edebilirdi.

emphasized in the interviews at first glance suggests an active leadership mechanism within the union, it is possible to conclude that workers do not see themselves as stakeholders of the union and act with the motive of delegating their responsibilities. Therefore, a leadership mechanism that can mobilize workers based on their problems by involving them in the process needs to be added. Kelly (1998) also attributed the lack of collective identification and action to the absence of motivating leadership. As Kelly (1998) continued, leaders are essential in fostering group cohesiveness and identity, encouraging employees to take collective action, and upholding that action in the face of dissuading arguments. The lack of a democratic governance model with a mechanism also leads to negative attitudes towards unions, such as unions not functioning correctly (Cem) and not caring about workers after taking their dues (Akın). Therefore, if we interpret the distrust of the union with the assumption that workers calculate the possible harms and benefits in carrying out actions (Kelly, 1998), it can be said that mobilization will decrease because workers who do not think that the union will work effectively and who doubt that workers will report their concerns to the employer will not prefer union intervention (McAlevey, 2016, pp. 16-20).

The second aspect of the third stage is the evolution of the worker's relationship with the union into a form in which they are not active subjects. The deduction can be inferred from a worker who continues to work in the factory that "it is fine to leave all the responsibility to the representative, so there is no problem" (Mehmet). In a sense, referring the problems and troubles experienced by the workers to an authorized person within the union and expecting him to solve them can be interpreted as not believing in the power of their collective action. The workers' statement exemplifies this, "Workers are sometimes hesitant among themselves, nothing will come out of this, let us not get backlash for nothing" (Ahmet). In addition, the distrust created by the union leads workers' demands to be seen as insignificant or excessive, as in the following phrase: "Workers sometimes ask for too much (Ahmet). When the desire to avoid a backlash is combined with the assessment of demands as excessive, it is understandable to expect a decline in the tendency to mobilize. This assessment should be perceived because of the interaction of the unionist model with the workers rather than their attitudes.

In the case of Uğur Textile, when labor mobility is analyzed by dividing labor mobility into three periods as above by looking at the relationship between workers and the union in the period starting with the unionization process, it confirms the argument that internal union democracy should also be evaluated in direct proportion to a large-scale state of mobilization. When a transparent, auditable, and accountable structure within the union is combined with a leadership method that includes workers in decision-making, the internal dynamics of the communication established by the workers among themselves are strengthened, and mobilization with a high probability of success is revealed.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

The relationship between DİSK Textile union and Hayri Uğur Textile workers, which has been observed over a while, shows that the relationship between the union management and the workers changes depending on the internal functioning of the union management, how the principle of democratic accountability is maintained, and the extent to which worker participation and control is ensured. Although the concept of union democracy, as revealed by the changing relations within the process, highlights examples where the attitudes taken by members and those in management to operate democratic mechanisms are decisive, it is understood that it is decisive for the organization to have a culture of democracy that will guarantee the continuation of this functioning. The principle of strategic leadership, which was implemented at the beginning of the union's organizing period, opens decision-making mechanisms to workers as a union attitude and creates a management model that can dominate and direct the process rather than expressing an opinion at the last stage of decision-making with the committees established by the workers.

Strategic leadership, which prioritizes workers' participation in the union, changes with the dismissal of the union leadership and the dominance of an authoritarian management model that eliminates decision-making mechanisms. Although the de facto committees

established by workers who face the union's authoritarian attitude are centers of resistance established to ensure workers' participation, resisting the pressure from the union headquarters cannot be long-lasting for very newly established committees. In the workers' struggle for their demands, the union takes on the role of a second boss, as workers call it, and takes the stage as an obstacle to overcome. In the unions that women join due to gender inequality, the union management's conflicts of interest again deter women from targeting them by threatening them by taking their families as interlocutors. In other words, especially for women, the struggle to build a democratic structure within the union is shared with the struggle to participate in the labor struggle based on equal citizenship. After a while since the union administration received the authorization, there is a feeling among the workers who continue to work in the factory that they do not feel they are part of the union. Therefore, in a relatively favorable situation that develops thanks to the union, the union is held in high esteem, while adverse conditions that develop because of the union's existence led to the union organization being perceived as the enemy. At the root of this tendency, which reflects these two extremes but arises from the same conditions, lies the bureaucratic understanding separating workers from the union's management.

CHAPTER 5: RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES IN BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS

It is necessary to examine the authoritarian organizing strategy implemented by the DISK Textile Union; it may be possible to evaluate based on two examples. The first reason for describing the union's organizing strategy as authoritarian is the dismissal of an official union representative without consulting the workers after a dispute with the union. The second is the union management's one-way relationship with the workers. On the other hand, the fact that the union was authorized in the factory where the case was examined also raises the possibility that this was a strategy carried out by the union. The literature on trade union organizing strategies examines the problem of decreasing members in trade unions due to the union administration dominated by authoritarian rule. According to the literature, periodically introducing democratic functioning through prominent figures and then withdrawing these figures from the scene.

Uetrich and Eidlin (2019) discussed the U.S. union revitalization strategies due to the problem of membership decrease concerning the militant minority. According to Uetrich and Eidlin (2019), American labor unions have been declining for decades. Hence, they categorized the proposed solutions into three categories which are policy fixes, technical fixes, including sophisticated organizing techniques and comprehensive campaign strategies, and political fixes, including electing sympathetic politicians and winning regulatory reforms (Uetrich & Eidlin, 2019, p. 36) The authors have criticized these solutions as they have their roots in an elite-led paradigm of upward social

transformation which disregards the conventional sources of power for unions.

Depending on Uetrich and Eidlin's (2019) ideas, unions benefited from the support of large-scale social movements during each of these times of rapid expansion. Such a system was based on a "militant minority," or a thin layer of workplace activists. The scholars indicated that the militant minority is currently absent from the labor movement. Building a class-conscious, combative layer of workers is necessary to seize possibilities for labor's rebirth. A section of the working class known as the militant minority "endeavor[ed] to fuse their coworkers and neighbors into a self-aware and conscious working class." At the beginning of the unionization process in Uğur Textile example, the militant minority actively participated in the daily unionist activity.

The militant minority mentioned here, which changed the direction of union organizing and influenced the course of the movement, should be thought of concerning the team that made the call for union organizing in the factory and subsequently contacted the DİSK Textile union themselves in the initial period of the unionization. At the same time, the statements of this group, which, as mentioned, is connected to the daily lives of the workers, that they used to come together during tea, lunch, and even second tea breaks, that they used to cheer each other up when they came, that they would meet to say that everything was fine and going well, reveal how much importance they attach to maintaining the unity of feeling. Their attempts to strengthen the bonds between them by going to their villages during times outside of work (holidays, after work) can be considered examples of creating a culture of solidarity (Fantasia, 1988) outside of work. The fact that women are preferred in communication both because they are organized in a conservative city and because the women examined in the first part have experienced the same demands to join the union by other women in the same city reinforces the infrastructure of this relationship.

In the U.S. context, unionism was modified by a tiny group of radical workers, primarily communists. The militant minority had the opportunity to transform employee unhappiness into tangible organizational advantages. Its ideological fervor, practical

expertise, and meticulous workplace organization were vital. Radicals already present at work took the helm of campaigns to organize unions. Radicals concentrated on forming unions because they considered them a means to organize the working class rather than a means in and of themselves. To represent employees in disagreements with managers, shop stewards were developed with a significant contribution from radicals (alongside militant white ethnics and African Americans). By surviving the CIO's purge of radicals, shop steward networks managed to keep their unions more democratic. (Uetrich and Eidlin, 2019, p.47)

In the article, Uetrich and Eidlin discuss the strategy of SWOC (Steel Workers Organizing Committee). Radicals, particularly communists, had significant roles in the SWOC, spearheaded by John L. Lewis under the CIO. Lewis could keep radicals under control by exploiting their organizational skills and determination to start the project before letting them go. Lewis illustrated this with the joke, "who gets the bird? The hunter or the dog?" joke in defense of why he kicked the communists out of the union; as Uetrich and Eidlin discuss in the article, Lewis explains that it was the radicals, the dogs, who won the bird, the new union members, not the union officials. In this sense, Lewis, who has always maintained his position in the management, quickly expels the dogs, the radicals, from the union as he gains new union members, the birds (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin as cited in Uetrich and Eidlin, 2019, p.41).

It is possible to find traces of the strategy employed by conservative American unions in the tactics used by the DİSK Textile Union in Hayri Uğur Textile company. The textile sector is an area where union organization is low. Only 8,89 percent of textile workers are organized in unions, and DİSK Textile ranks third here with 1,02 percent. When Uğur Textile Workers in Urfa were dismissed with a message without union authorization, there were 1,167,918 workers in the textile industry. Of these, only 11,871 were DİSK Textile members (Resmi Gazete, 2020). The data affirm the scholars since they emphasized that the same dynamic was not true for liberal or anti-communist unionists who, while couching their antiradicalism in a commitment to democracy, often were highly undemocratic unionists themselves. This also reminds the strong

relationship between democratic unions and the power of the unions. Hence, the power comes from also the number of its members. Their weakness resulted from the fact that they were not committed to building the kind of militant shop-floor power that radical unionists were (Uetrich & Eidlin, 2019).

5.1 Democracy as a Strategy to Organize in DİSK Textile

Kazım Doğan, the general president of the DİSK Textile Union, has worked as a manager at different levels in the same union since 1974. Since 2015, he has been the chairman of the union. In 2015, the union had 11,974 members and represented 1.16 percent of textile workers (Resmi Gazete, 2015); in 2023, it had 13,823 members and 1.04 percent (Resmi Gazete, 2023). There has been no noticeable increase during the administration of its president Kazım Doğan. In Turkey, the proposal to have a membership of at least one percent of all workers in the existing line of work brings the obligation to renew the union membership. Therefore, it is necessary to say that the textile sector faces a Turkey-wide threshold. The essential condition to realize this is to have members. Therefore, the union understanding in Mehmet Türkmen was not one that DİSK Textile adopted during the organizing phase. As a short-term organizing strategy, it was a method that took advantage of the advantages of democratic and worker-participatory unionism in gaining members.

The argument that union bureaucracy weakens unions can also be found in the literature. Even Stepan-Norris gives an example. He states that union democracy will increase the union's strength, which proves the current situation. Ida Regalia (1988) reminded us that union effectiveness entails the ability to interpret, decode, sustain, and redefine the demands of the represented to elicit the broadest possible consensus and approval from the rank-and-file. It would not be possible to see such an understanding in an organization dominated by a bureaucratic management approach. Stepan-Norris' (1997) statement about the contribution of union democracy to its existence and prosperity through increasing efficiency is also visible in this context. For her, democratic union leaders better understand their members' priorities, which helps them recruit and train

unpaid leaders, build a sense of loyalty to the union, which is required for successful strikes, and make the union more appealing during recruitment efforts. Hence, union strength is sourced from active participation and deliberation. (Hyman & McCormick,2019).

Mehmet Türkmen, who served as the DİSK Textile regional representative between 2019-2021, describes the situation in his own words as follows in an interview (GazeteDuvar, 2021) he gave following the end of his tenure at the union:

From the beginning, we always had a mismatch. There was always a difference between the union center and my union understanding. The gap between the practice we had been carrying out for two years and the practice of the union headquarters was noticed by everyone. You may ask why I took office in the union despite this difference in understanding. When I took office, I knew what kind of understanding prevailed at the union headquarters. We talked about it openly. They wanted to give me a position. I had worked in this union before; I was a member of this union when I was a worker. The reason why they wanted to give me a position despite this difference in understanding is that the organization was lost in this region because of the union understanding that prevailed before. There was also a threshold problem. I said from the beginning that I would act with the workers' will, that I would not accept any interference from above, and that we should discuss this from the start. The union president said that I had all the authority and that there would be no interference. That is how I accepted the task.⁴⁵

Therefore, the appointment of Mehmet Türkmen and the development of a democratic internal structure with a leadership mechanism aims to increase the number of members of the DİSK Textile Union long-term by ensuring organization through a large-scale mobilization and militancy. Scholars of all ideological stripes have recognized leftists'

⁴⁵ Baştan beri bir uyumsuzluğumuz hep vardı. Merkezin sahip olduğu sendikal anlayışla, benim sendikal anlayışım arasında farklılık hep vardı. İki yıldır sürdürdüğümüz pratik ile sendika merkezinin pratiği arasındaki uçurum herkes tarafından fark ediliyordu. Bu anlayış farkına rağmen niye sendikada görev aldığımı sorabilirsiniz. Ben göreve başlarken sendika merkezinde nasıl bir anlayışın hâkim olduğunu biliyordum. Bunu açık konuştuk. Onlar bana görev vermek istediler. Ben daha önce de bu sendikada görev aldım, işçiyken de bu sendikaya üyeydim. Bu anlayış farkına rağmen bana görev vermek istemelerinin sebebi, bu bölgede daha önce hâkim olan sendikal anlayış yüzünden örgütlülüğün kaybedilmiş olması. Ayrıca bir baraj sorunu yaşıyordu. Ben işçilerin iradesiyle hareket edeceğimi en başından söyledim. Buna yukardan bir müdahale olursa kabul etmeyeceğimi belirttim ve bunu baştan konuşalım dedim. Sendika başkanı bütün yetkinin bende olduğunu ve müdahale olmayacağını söyledi. Ben de görevi böyle kabul ettim.

importance in forming American industrial unionism (Zieger, 1995, as cited in Uetrich and Eidlin, 2019). This was not by chance. Uetrich and Eidlin exemplify from a shoop-floor newspaper to establish "party units" in a dozen factories to "pave the way" for industrial unionism by a "small nucleus." Leftists were among the core of workers willing to endure firings and even violence to organize at a time when the legal and political climate for labor was mainly. This implied two things. First, even when the movement was retreating, the militant minority maintained vital organizational infrastructure, building trust and confidence among workers. They developed ideas and strategies that could be implemented when conditions improved—even when they lost (Uetrich & Eidlin, 2019).

It is possible to say that this study on the organization of Urfa Uğur Textile workers in the DİSK Textile union is like the way conservative unions in the US guarantee the membership threshold by having communist labor leaders as organizers in their unions. Nevertheless, a pragmatic point of view can make some concessions to achieve a high organizing rate. However, at the point where union ideals clash, they expel dissidents from the union in order not to awaken a new alternative idea among the workers. In this sense, the bureaucratic trade union understanding smoothly transitions to authoritarian rule. In the long run, this can be expressed as a gain for the bureaucratic and authoritarian union understanding as they increase the number of members. The following words of a young woman worker from Uğur Textile illustrate merely the interpretation of such a functioning trade union understanding from the workers' point of view. Gülcan, Urfa Uğur Textile Worker:

The bad thing about the union is that it ignores the workers there. So, think of it like there is a castle, and your goal is just to get into that castle; we do not care who is sacrificed there, just let me get in, but I do not care who is crushed underneath. Think about it, Uğur Textile has achieved the first. Do not you think that would be reason enough to enter this castle? You know, right now, for example, even a photo was shared when it was done to provoke. An image of the worker being handed with a check. Do you think this is a provocation or what? Okay, he got in thanks to us, but ignored us.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Sendikanın kötü yönü işçileri orada göz ardı etmek. Yani sırf şöyle düşünün bir kale var amacınız sadece o kaleye girmek, orada kimin feda edildiği umurumuzda değil sadece ben gireyim ama kimler altında

Gülcan is a young worker who started her job at the Uğur Textile factory, so this is her first encounter with a union organization. She is more emotionally affected by her experiences than her fellow workers. There is a resentment that she has been unable to get over about the fact that the dismissed committee members who had called on her to join the union were reinstated with the call of the changed regional representative of DİSK. Workers who are part of the organized process by making sacrifices due to the risks of union organizing create a solid emotional bond between them to maintain it. Therefore, when committee members leave themselves alone and return to work, it is a personal resentment and undermines trust and credibility in the institutions. This emotional fracture results in the entire union being conceived as spies, as institutions that learn workers' weakest points and use this information to attack them.

5.2 Understanding DİSK Textile's Organizing Strategies through Comparison

In Egypt, the workers' actions spread around the textile workers' struggle that emerged in 2006 and is said to have created collective resistance, spaces where workers learned to lead by making decisions in forums. These new alternative leadership and decision-making processes conflict with the ETUF's bureaucratic trade union approach. In the Egyptian case, the ETUF tended to include and give official positions to the labor leaders it had difficulty "dealing with," depending on the facts and circumstances. In this conflict, the ETUF, as an established organization, uses strategies that directly target these new understandings of leadership. Anne Alexander (2010) outlines this strategy under three headings. According to Alexander (2010), the ETUF has yet to respond passively to the challenge posed by alternative leadership's emergence (even in embryos). Its first strategy is to propose new forms of workplace organization that sometimes ignore its existing structures. Secondly, they have tried to incorporate strike leaders into existing unions and, at times, have directly supported workers' collective action. The third and final strategy is a coercive one. ETUF officials used coercive methods to weaken emerging challengers, including bringing legal cases against them

ezilirse ezilsin umurumda değil. Düşünsenize şu anda Uğur Tekstil bir ilki başardı. Sizce bu ilke girmek yeterli bir sebep olmaz mı? Bu kaleye girmek için. Mesela hatta kışkırtmak amacıyla yapıldığı zaman fotoğraf paylaşılmış. İşçiye çek uzatılırken bir fotoğraf. Sizce bu kışkırtmak da değil de ne yani? Tamam bizler sayesinde girdi ama bizleri göz ardı etti.

and physically attacking some alternative leaders. Alternatively, removing them by force, such as by filing lawsuits or physical assaults, is also an option for the union. It is also essential to remember that in the first case, when labor leaders had official positions within the unions, they did not have a direction-changing effect on the union's management approach. As a pragmatic strategy, struggling trade unionists in bureaucratic institutions do not represent a moment of intersection and continuity. Therefore, harboring these trade unionists in institutions where the bureaucratic structure is entrenched can be understood as an attempt to adapt them to this culture rather than to change it.

The Egyptian case differs from the case of the DİSK Textile Union organization examined in this thesis. Because in the case of DİSK Textile, the union leadership was expected to mobilize and organize the union by incorporating democratic and combative elements. In the case of ETUF, the vanguard workers and leaders of an emerging class struggle are confronted with bureaucracy and authoritarian leadership within the union as they combine their actions with the union struggle. However, it can be argued that they have in common the practices developed by the bureaucratic union's understanding of democratic organizing practices. This argument can also be made in terms of similarities with the strategies used by conservative unions in the US. First, the Egyptian unions' strategy of including leaders who emerged during the protests is like the DİSK Textile union's choice to appoint Mehmet Türkmen to the union. In this sense, the bureaucratic elements of the DİSK Textile Union are not unique to this movement. A strategy adopted by authoritarian union administrations is either to strengthen themselves by incorporating struggling elements and feeding on the mobilization that emerges and transforming these elements with a bureaucratic management model or to incorporate the names of those who adopt a democratic union understanding for the same purpose to hunt the bird, and then to expel them when there is no compromise.

The fact that this authoritarian trade union approach has a historical background for the DİSK Textile Union becomes comprehensible in the interview with a member working in the DİSK Textile Union. In the interviews, it was stated that these examples were also encountered in the past. For example, an interviewee mentioned as follows:

I have been an executive in the union for a long time. I had many problems during the Rıdvan Budak period, and they did not want me anywhere because I opposed them. If the workers had not been behind me, I would not have been in the union until now. For example, you should know the last conversation I had with him. The last thing he said was, I may not be the union's general president, but I will not let you breathe here.⁴⁷

He used his statements to describe the internal conflicts within the union and the periods when it was relatively more anti-democratic. At this point, the DİSK union's values and the change in its understanding of trade unions when it resumed its activities after the September 12 coup d'état are also crucial for understanding the debate. To understand the internal structure of the union, it seems necessary to include the evaluation of Rıdvan Budak, who is mentioned in the quote above and who served as the general chairman of the DİSK Textile several times, in Demet Parlak Poyraz's book. Poyraz (2020), in her book "Class-State-Politics in the Neoliberal Period: The Case of DİSK" in her book, DİSK, which regained its social legitimacy within the limits of the centralized labor relations and authoritarian labor regime institutionalized after September 12 and proved its existence in the trade union and political spheres, provides essential leverage for Rıdvan Budak, who served as the general chairman for about five years. After taking the initiative during the February 28 process, the presidency of DİSK led Budak to become a member of parliament in the 1999 elections. With Budak's inclusion in the cadre of trade unionist MPs, one of the mechanisms that articulated the unions to the system, DİSK realized one of the critical pillars of re-institutionalization. In this context, under the leadership of Rıdvan Budak, DİSK, which found a place for itself within the existing trade union structure, should be seen as the product of a pragmatist approach that emerged because of a search for reality and balance.

To comprehend the strategy of DİSK in this case, the above quotations allow us to show how the other strategy of the DİSK textile union, in this case, is linked to the ETUF strategy. In short, DİSK, which has adapted to the changing trade union understanding and system with the prefix "Contemporary Trade Unionism," prefers to organize in

⁴⁷ Uzun zamandır sendikada yöneticilik yapıyorum. Rıdvan Budak döneminde çok sorunlar yaşadım, onlara karşı çıktığım için beni hiçbir yerde istemediler. Eğer işçiler arkamda olmasaydı şimdiye kadar sendikada olamazdım. Mesela en son onunla yaptığım konuşmayı bilmeniz lazım. En son söylediği şey, ben sendikanın genel başkanı olmayabilirim ama sana burada nefes aldırmayacağımdı.

some places by including struggling trade unionists and leaders. In contrast, in other places, it prefers to weaken these newly emerging opportunities, to distance them from the union, and sometimes to make them the target of attacks originating from the union. The strategy of including and subsequently alienating seemingly opposed alternative leaders is, in fact, deeply connected. Because democratic unionism should not be seen as the general attitude of the DİSK Textile Union but rather as a strategy adopted periodically to take advantage of the organizing and mobilization created by democratic unionism, therefore, inclusion and subsequent self-exclusion can be seen as two opposing strategies adopted to protect the interests of the long-term authoritarian union leadership.

CONCLUSION

This study investigated the unionization experience of Urfa Uğur Textile workers in the context of intra-union democracy and labor mobility, their motivations for unionization, their interaction with unions, and the effects of the internal functioning of unions on workers. In this context, the literature on intra-union democracy is discussed, and the link between the internal management mechanisms of trade unions and the relationship between workers and the union is tried to be discussed. For this reason, the literature on intra-union democracy has been brought to the agenda by emphasizing the link between the internal organizational scheme and the workers. As discussed above, the democratic trade union approach emphasizes the ability of workers to understand, comprehend and find solutions to their demands and problems. In contrast, the bureaucratic trade union approach discusses the relationship between workers and union officials as a top-down relationship that is not transitive. These two different approaches diverge on the inclusion of workers in the decision-making mechanisms of the union on issues that concern the rank-and-file members in which they are the subjects, such as collective bargaining agreements and union management. Two approaches diverge whether deciding the topics together in all processes or dictating the decisions of union administration.

The example of Uğur Textile, as a least likely case (Levy, 2008), since this case underlines the question of intra-union democracy inside a union that is supposed to provide democratic tools. However, as a DİSK affiliate, the Textile Union violates this revolutionary unionism by demonstrating bureaucratic administration. Therefore, DİSK

Textile was chosen because a union affiliated with an organization that claims revolutionary trade unionism among the three main labor confederations in Turkey generated a bureaucratic approach to unionism. Hence, examining workers' changing attitudes regarding their expectations from the confederation, where democratic unionism is treated solely as an organizing strategy and the bureaucratic/authoritarian structure has become a chronic problem, was valuable. Besides, in the Uğur Textile factory, the relationship between the union and the workers was newly established. Observing the interactions during the union organizing process was beneficial to evaluate workers' perspectives and the consequences of periods of differentiation in union decision-making processes. In addition, it should be noted that the bureaucratic dominant union understanding encountered in the DİSK Textile union is not a very common case as it is a labor organization that is not a "yellow union" in the workers' views among the three significant confederations operating in the textile industry in Turkey. Since the workers started the process by taking possible risks before unionizing, their trust in the union and the reasons that pushed them to unionize in the factory where they worked formed the basis and sustainability of this decision. Moreover, the fact that the struggle for unionization took place in Şanlıurfa as a city contextually made the problem of gender inequality more visible for female workers. In Chapter 2, workers' motivations for unionization were discussed under three main headings:

1. The search for dignity, the need to protect their personalities, and being against nepotism.
2. For women, the end of problems arising from gender inequality in the factory.
3. The economic incentives that motivate workers to unionize

Workers' interactions with the union were analyzed under the main heading of accountability. The first period took place when a democratic understanding prevailed, the second period when the regional representative, who acted with the workers, was dismissed, and the last period when the union gained authorization with new officials. Based on the interviews, it was highlighted that the inclusion of workers in decision-making mechanisms transformed them into active subjects and increased their loyalty by

taking ownership of the structure. Studies in the literature claim that under conditions where internal union democracy is ensured, the union can be adequate, better equipped, and more effective in achieving its demands (Goldberg, 2008). When the findings of the field research are analyzed by dividing workers' interactions with the union into periods, it will be proved that the conditions in which workers' democratic participation processes are ensured through workers' committees and strategic leadership mechanisms facilitate and, in some cases ensure the achievement of their demands.

What distinguishes this thesis from other studies is that when it is analyzed starting from the unionization process, workers' motivations for unionization determine the position they take when building or operating democratic mechanisms within the union. Hence, the feeling of injustice, in general, brought the workers together to get unionized from the viewpoint of Kelly (1998). The tendency of workers to come together and stand side by side against the injustices experienced and the risks of unionization, which can lead to dismissal, was dominant. Therefore, while demanding unionization, it was seen that workers who want to protect their dignity, who sought to be an active subject in their workplaces, and who objected to the reflections of gender inequality for female workers are involved in decision-making mechanisms in democratic mechanisms within the union and continued their struggle and demands to be active subjects within the organization. Moreover, the role of workers who put economic incentives ahead of the first two demands is more fluid during the unionization period. In the initial period of unionization, the guidance of organic leaders (McAlevy, 2016) spread the democratic approach at the grassroots; hence, most of them voluntarily participated in the democratic mechanisms and the labor movement. Moreover, grassroots leadership approach in decision-making process revealed the role preference shaping role of leadership (Baccaro, 2006) since the undecisive workers also became part in the struggle. In the second part of Turkmen's dismissal demonstrated that leadership is not just an abstract concept but also a mobilizing one (Kelly, 1998). When evaluated within the literature on internal union democracy, this study confirms that a union with functioning democratic participation will be more effective since the union

administration works better when it knows the demands and wills of its members (Regalia, 1988; Stepan-Norris, 1997; Strauss, 1991).

The fact that the union managed the process together with the workers in the first process, that the decision-making processes were carried out with the supervision and participation of the workers, and that they had the necessary information during this period because the workers were able to take responsibility for making decisions at critical moments which reinforced their initial assumptions. The democratic union understanding adopted by Mehmet Türkmén, who was Gaziantep regional representative of the DİSK Textile union, and the strategic leadership management that spread the process to the grassroots, which workers referred to in the beginning, enabled the factory to reopen with the establishment of an integrated union by the workers after the boss, who heard about the unionization process, closed the factory. In other words, an organized mobilization and robust internal democracy made DİSK Textile Union powerful to achieve its goals, as argued (Goldberg, 2008; Kelly, 1998).

Based on a single case, it shows how participation in the decision-making processes in the union affects workers' sense of belonging, unity, and subjectivity based on interviews. It discusses the relationship between the feature of democracy to have a voice in the process, not in the result, and the class mobilization, unlike the primary trend in the literature. After the reopening of the factory, the bureaucratic management of the DİSK Textile union, which was dominant at its headquarters, wanted to compromise with the boss, so the regional representative, who led the unionization process with a democratic union understanding, was dismissed. This study falsifies the argument that rank-and-file members in the union are reluctant to speak in public and express their opinions in decision-making processes (Seidman, 1953) and therefore leave the decisions to union officials of their own accord. It also shows that the tendency of workers who tend to prefer to stay in the background will be transformed into involvement in the process with a leadership approach that pushes the discussion to the grassroots.

In the second part, in contrast to a mobilizing leadership approach, negotiations with the boss took place at the management level, and workers were forced to withdraw their lawsuits; hence an authoritarian style supported the bureaucratic management approach. During this period, as the workers mentioned, the union did not support the functioning of the de facto committees established by workers who were called and persuaded to return to work should be seen as a product of the union's intention to disrupt the existing activism process. The conclusion is that unless a permanent democratic management culture is established among the workers, the union headquarters will likely suppress the de facto committees, which has power in the management. Therefore, the sustainability of anti-bureaucratic mechanisms will be ensured by the continuity in the operation of democratic mechanisms at the grassroots level by organic leaders among workers. At the same time, the bureaucratic/authoritarian understanding was adopted to draw its members to the union line through the method of calling the families of female workers to threaten them, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. When predominantly female workers continued their actions without the approval of the union management, the fundamental motivations for them to participate in the union became the fundamental method of being oppressed in a labor union. Therefore, the union administration turns the problem of gender inequality into a method of oppression over its members in various ways. Besides, after the union was authorized, workers at the factory felt disconnected from the union, not perceiving themselves as members with responsibilities. Therefore, the union is praised during favorable situations but seen as an adversary when unfavorable conditions arise. This trend stems from a bureaucratic perspective that separates workers from union management, despite arising from the same conditions. Therefore, as discussed in the passages in Chapter 3, the tendency to position oneself outside the union, which is one's own organization, is quite dominant in the axis of workers who continue to work in the Uğur Textile factory after the union's authorization.

The research indicates that the general union understanding of the DİSK Textile union has the bureaucratic union approach found in the literature review. In addition, although the possibility of democracies turning into oligarchic governments (Michels, 1999) is mentioned, which the study does not refute, it does not focus on authoritarian

management methods to maintain bureaucratic mechanisms to defend their "effectiveness" in decision-making processes and management. The second stage in the unionization process, which is discussed in terms of keeping workers back through coercion by removing them from the decision-making process with the union, proves. In contrast, the democratic union understanding that emerged in the case of Uğur Textile workers is a deviation. As discussed in Chapter 4 and as certain aspects of the research reveal, the bureaucratic union understanding adopted by DİSK Textile does not result in workers embracing the union organization and becoming involved. Therefore, the periodic appointment of a person with a democratic trade union approach strengthens the long-term interests of DİSK Textile by increasing the number of members. As Gülcan said, "DİSK Textile has organized in a factory, something that did not happen in Urfa before; you are entering a castle. What does it matter to sacrifice those who went before you?" Therefore, the democratization deviation that periodically emerges from the authoritarian trade union understanding adopted by the DİSK Textile Union should be understood as an organizing strategy. The sacrifice of those who entered the castle first was the most expected step of this process for the union.

One of the first questions that will come to mind because of the research will be how to overcome the iron law of oligarchy that manifests itself in trade unions in Turkey due to the existing institutional and structural conditions through the thesis results. Is union bureaucracy inevitable for the internal functioning of the organization? In the study, workers' motivations for joining the union were categorized, and their interaction with the union was discussed on these three grounds. Based on the results obtained from this comparison, it was found that workers who reduce the union's objectives to periodic economic benefits are highly transitional in their attitude toward defending the union. Although this transitive attitude tends to participate in decision-making mechanisms within the union and to be an active subject with strategic leadership guidance, when this situation differs, workers are ready to see the union as an organization in which they are not involved. Therefore, a solution suggestion from the study is that the structuralized bureaucratic understanding can be overcome by understanding the aims

and activities of the unions among the workers and stabilizing this transitory attitude during periods of movement.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from the study concerns the general results of participatory democracy. Workers' perceptions of unions differ significantly between the period when the union prioritized the participation of workers and brought them together by giving them active responsibility for the problems they faced in their workplaces and the period after the unionization process ended and a significant number of workers were dismissed, and the attitude of the headquarters in response. Workers tend to see the union as a spy, to shy away from involvement in their next workplace, and to regard those periods as traumatic memories. Therefore, in this example, the DiSK Textile union has produced the idea that acting in a collective makes worker reluctant to take responsibility and cannot bring a solution. Simultaneously, it can turn workers into members who come together to solve their problems with active responsibility in the workplace where they exist daily. It has dramatically reduced the possibilities for workers to raise the demand for democracy on a broader scale based on active citizenship by ensuring democratic participation daily. In terms of its consequences, the negative impact of bureaucratic unionism seems to have alienated workers from a broad demand for democracy.

Considering these results, the suggestions for further research became clear. The difference between authoritarian and bureaucratic management and their intertwined moments must be clarified for further research. While the literature on intra-union democracy is primarily based on the bureaucracy debate and establishes a top-down hierarchy regarding the narrowing of decision-making mechanisms and management decision-making, authoritarian unions use pressure and control over workers to enforce these decisions. Therefore, there is a need for a more detailed study both conceptually and in practice, as narrowing the decision-making process and guaranteeing the applicability of this decision by the rank and file are intertwined features of bureaucratic and authoritarian union management. On the other hand, it is striking that the problems experienced by female workers due to gender inequality in intra-union democracy are

discussed with duties such as the presidency and taking part in the management within the union. However, on the other hand, the functioning of democracy within the union, a culture of democracy that adopts the principle of gender equality and does not expect characteristics such as age, gender, or sexual orientation to be an authority, directly impacts the work process. For this reason, one direction of possible studies could be to open a discussion on the problem of gender inequality within union organizations and among union member workers in the context of union democracy.



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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview Questions

Part 1: For Workers

1. Can you tell us how your working life has continued until today? Did you work in a workplace before Uğur Tekstil? Was there a union at your workplace, or did you fight for a union? / Çalışma yaşantınızın nasıl başladığını ve bugüne dek nasıl devam ettiğini anlatabilir misiniz? Uğur Tekstil'den önce bir iş yerinde çalıştınız mı? Çalıştığınız iş yerinde sendika var mıydı ya da sendika için bir mücadelede bulundunuz mu?
2. What are your thoughts on the union struggle in Turkey? Do you think a union is necessary? What do you think the aims of a union should be, and what steps do you take to help unions realize these aims? / Türkiye'de sendikal mücadele alanına dair düşünceleriniz neler? Sizce sendika gerekli mi, sendikanın amaçlarının neler olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Siz sendikaların bu amaçları gerçekleştirmesi adına nasıl adımlar atıyorsunuz?
3. How do you evaluate the activities of the union branches or confederations affiliated with DISK in Turkey? What aspects do you criticize? / Türkiye'de faaliyet yürüten DİSK'e bağlı sendika şubelerini ya da konfederasyonların faaliyetlerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Eleştirdiğiniz yönleri neler?
4. How do you think the union leadership should act when making decisions on warning actions, work stoppages, strikes, collective bargaining negotiations, etc. What procedures make it easier or harder for workers to get involved? What would be the consequences of workers directly making these decisions? Sendika yönetiminin uyarı eylemleri, iş bırakmalar, grevler, toplu iş sözleşmesi görüşmeleri gibi konularda karar alırken nasıl hareket etmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz? İşçilerin dahil olmasını kolaylaştıran ya da zorlaştıran prosedürler sizce neler? İşçilerin doğrudan bu kararları almasının nasıl sonuçlar doğuracağını düşünüyorsunuz?
5. How does the process of informing workers about issues on the agenda within the union work? Are there different methods workers have developed to be

informed about these issues? /Sendika içerisinde gündem olan konuların işçilerin bilgisine ulaşma süreci nasıl işliyor? İşçilerin bu konulardan haberdar olmak için geliştirdikleri ayrı yöntemler var mı?

6. Do you think there is a democratic understanding within the union? For example, do you believe workers can change union leaders through elections? Can you run for union leadership without any fear or reservation? Or can you freely express your opinion against the union leadership? /Sendika içerisinde demokratik bir anlayış olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Örneğin işçilerin seçimler sonucunda sendika yöneticilerini değiştirebileceğini düşünüyor musunuz? Sendika yöneticilik seçimlerinde herhangi bir korku ya da çekince duymadan aday olabilir misiniz? Ya da sendika yönetiminin karşısında fikrinizi özgürce beyan edebilir misiniz?

7. Can union officials represent workers' ideas and priorities? Do you have a voice in decision-making processes within the union? Do you believe that the voices of ordinary workers can have an impact on the union? How? / Sizce sendika görevlileri işçilerin fikirleri ve önceliklerini temsil edebiliyorlar mı? Sendika içerisinde karar alma süreçlerinde bir söz hakkına sahip olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Sizce sıradan işçilerin sesini duyurması sendika içerisinde bir etki yaratabilir mi? Nasıl?

8. In your workplace, how often do you meet with workers in the departments where you work? Do you discuss issues on the agenda in your workplace with local groups? Do you organize these meetings at the workplace level? How often? / İş yerinizde, çalıştığınız bölümlerdeki işçilerle ne kadar sıklıkla yan yana geliyorsunuz? İş yerinizde gündem olan konuları yerel gruplar ile tartışıyor musunuz? Bu buluşmaları iş yeri düzeyinde gerçekleştiriyor musunuz? Ne sıklıkla?

9. How do you think decision-making processes within the union should work? Is it advantageous for workers to leave this task to elected officials? / Sizce sendika içerisinde karar alma süreçleri nasıl işlemeli? Bu görevin seçilmiş yetkililere bırakılmasının işçiler için avantajlı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

10. Why do you think it is essential that workers' voices are heard and their ideas are taken seriously? Considering the customs and traditions of society, how do you think the decision should be left to an authorized person? What are your personal experiences on this issue? / Sizce işçilerin sesinin duyulması, fikirlerinin ciddiye alınması neden önemli? Toplumun gelenek ve göreneklerini de göz önünde bulundurarak kararı yetkili bir kişiye bırakmanın nasıl sonuçlanacağını düşünüyorsunuz? Konudaki kişisel tecrübeleriniz neler?

11. Workers went on a de facto strike against the will of the union leadership. How would you evaluate workers' participation in the decision-making process during this de facto strike? How do you evaluate its results? / Sendika

yönetiminin iradesi dışında işçiler fiili bir grev gerçekleştirdi. Bu fiili grev sürecinde işçilerin karar alma sürecine katılımını nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? Sonuçlarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Part 2: For Officials

1. How did you start to take part in the union-management? Can you tell us about the process you have continued in union management until today? / Sendika yönetimi içerisinde görev almaya nasıl başladınız? Bugüne kadar sendika yönetiminde devam ettiğiniz süreci anlatabilir misiniz?
2. How do you think trade unions contribute to the labor struggle in Turkey? What should be among the aims of a trade union? How do you take positions to develop the working-class struggle? / Sendikaların Türkiye’de emek mücadelesine nasıl katkısı olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce sendikanın amaçları arasında neler yer almalı? Siz işçi sınıfı mücadelesini geliştirmek adına nasıl pozisyon alıyorsunuz?
3. How do you evaluate the activities of other union branches or confederations affiliated with DISK in Turkey? What aspects do you criticize? / Türkiye’de faaliyet yürüten DİSK’e bağlı diğer sendika şubelerini ya da konfederasyonların faaliyetlerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Eleştirdiğiniz yönleri neler?
4. Do you have a connection with the daily life of your union members? How do you believe the relationship between union leaders and members should be? / Sendika üyelerinizin günlük yaşamı ile bağlantınız var mı? Sendika yöneticisi ve üyesi arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl sürmesi gerektiğine inanıyorsunuz?
5. What do you think should be done in cases where union members criticize the decisions taken by the union leadership and act outside these decisions? / Sendika üyelerinin sendika yönetiminin aldığı kararları eleştirdiği ve bu kararlar dışında hareket ettiği durumlarda ne yapmak gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz?
6. The textile sector is an area where union organization is low. How do you go about increasing organizing efforts? / Tekstil iş kolu sendikal örgütlülüğün düşük olduğu bir alan. Örgütlenme çalışmalarını arttırmak adına nasıl bir yol izliyorsunuz?
7. In many cases in Turkey, union organizing leads to possible dismissal. At this point, what kind of strategy do you follow with workers and union-management? / Sendikal örgütlenme Türkiye’de birçok örnekte işten atılma ihtimalini doğuruyor. Bu noktada işçiler ve sendika yönetimi ile nasıl bir strateji izliyorsunuz?

8. How do you handle issues on the union management's agenda (Collective Bargaining Agreement, negotiations with the employer)? How would you evaluate the role of worker representatives for these agendas? How do you think the relationship between worker representatives and workers should be? Should union officials make decisions on issues that need to be decided quickly? / Sendika yönetiminin gündemi olan konuları (Toplu İş Sözleşmesi, iş verenle görüşmeler) nasıl yürütüyorsunuz? Bu gündemler için işçi temsilcilerinin rolünü nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? İşçi temsilcileri ve işçiler arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Sizce hızlı karar alınması gereken konularda sendika görevlileri karar almalı mı?
9. Is it advantageous to be familiar with the legislation in negotiations with the employer? As union officials, what steps do you take to become familiar with labor law? Are ordinary union members sufficiently familiar with this legislation? How do you think ordinary workers should be involved in these negotiations? / İş verenle görüşmelerde mevzuata hâkim olmanın bir avantajı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Sendika görevlileri olarak iş hukukuna hâkim olmak için nasıl adımlar atıyorsunuz? Sizce sıradan sendika üyeleri bu mevzuata yeteri kadar hâkim mi? Sıradan işçilerin bu görüşmelere katılımının nasıl olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz?
10. How do situations where there is "a voice from every head," so to speak, within the union affect union functioning? If it has positive consequences, how? What measures are you taking to change it if it has negative consequences? / Sendika içerisinde tabiri caizse “her kafadan bir ses çıktığı” durumlar sendikal işleyişi nasıl etkiliyor? Olumlu sonuçlar yaratıyorsa nasıl? Eğer olumsuz sonuçları varsa değiştirmek adına nasıl önlemler alıyorsunuz?

Appendix B: Sample Interview

GÜLCAN

1. Çalışma yaşantınızın nasıl başladığını ve bugüne dek nasıl devam ettiğini anlatabilir misiniz? Uğur Tekstil’den önce bir iş yerinde çalıştınız mı? Çalıştığınız iş yerinde sendika var mıydı ya da sendika için bir mücadelede bulundunuz mu?

Benim ilk iş tecrübem Uğur tekstil olmuştu. Onun dışında daha önce çalışmadım, tecrübesiz olarak girdim. Aslında girerken bir problem de yoktu. Aksine bütün işverenlere rağmen gayet güzel bir yerdi. Hijyenik bir yerdi. Diğer fabrikalara göre daha bakımlıydı. Pandemi girdikten sonra iş düzeni tamamen bozuldu. Şöyle söyleyeyim aslında ne olduysa pandemiden sonra oldu. Hani iş düzeni değişti, mesafeler araya girdi, ona göre bir iş düzenlemesi yapıldı. Bu sefer de aslında hiçbirimizin tasvip etmediği şeyler olmaya başladı. Bazı ustaların bazı işçilere daha öncelik tanınması gibi. Torpil yani. Daha samimi olduğu bir kişiye ayrıcalık tanırken mesela samimi olmadığı hiç anlaşılmadığı birine daha kötü davranıyordu. İzin isteme söz konusu olduğu zaman arasının iyi olduğu kişiye izin verebiliyordu ama diğerine vermiyordu.

2. Türkiye’de sendikal mücadele alanına dair düşünceleriniz neler? Sizce sendika gerekli mi, sendikanın amaçlarının neler olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Siz sendikaların bu amaçları gerçekleştirmesi adına nasıl adımlar atıyorsunuz?

Şöyle söyleyeyim ben bilmiyordum. Biri söyledi bana açıkçası. İlk başlarda çıtlatıldı ben takmadım yani fazla bir bilgim falan yok sendikayla ilgili. Daha önce sendika lafını çok nadir duymuştum ama daha sonra biri daha söyledi böyle bir durum var hatta bunu bize teşvik edenlerden biriydi. İsmi vermek istemiyorum. Hala Uğur tekstilde çalışıyor. Hatta başımızda duranlar diyelim. Yani bizi bu işe teşvik edenlerin çoğu şu anda çok gerçekten çok sinirli bir şekilde söylüyorum. Bizleri yarı yolda bırakıp işlerine geri döndü. Eren abi söylemiştir şu anda çok az kaldık hatta bayan olarak sanırım benle Fadime bir de Azra abla kaldık. Diğer bütün bayanlar, başında davamızdan vazgeçmeyeceğiz diyen birçok kişi maalesef bizi yarı yolda bırakıp işlerine devam ettiler. Dedğim gibi aslında sendikanın avantajlarından bahsettiler bize. Yani gıda yardımı, kimsenin kolay bir şekilde sizi ezemeyeceği, haksızlık yapamayacağı. Bir çoğumuzun aslında kabul etmesinin sebebi haksızlıktı. Zaten haksızlık yapılmayacak dendiği zaman oradaki birçok kişi yelkenleri suya indirdi. Zaten buna maruz kalıyorduk. Bu şekilde söylendi. Tamam dedik başvurmuzu yaptık. Sendikaya katılma nedenlerimizden biri de bayanlar olarak yaşadıklarımızdı. Örnek vermek gerekirse bir tanesi benim arkadaşımı taciz etmişti, biz şikâyet etmemize rağmen o değil arkadaşım işten çıkarıldı. Biz bunların da son bulmasını istedik. Sendikalı olmanın belli bir sınır varmış galiba bunu aştık. Fabrikanın bunu kabul etmesi gerekiyormuş fakat bunu kabul etmedi. Bütün fabrika gece bir mesajla uyandık ve hepimizin çıkışı verilmişti üç yüz tane işçinin çıkışı verilmişti. Yani bu sendikalı olmakla alakalı değildi yani sendikalı olmayanların da çıkışı verilmiş. Birçok kişi ekmeğinden olmuştu. Bunun için bir eylem falan yapıldı gittik. Yürüyüşler falan yaptık, hani görmüşsünüzdür mutlaka sosyal medyada falan ama birçoğu işe yaramadı aslında ilk başlarda. Birlik olmuştuk, hani

birliğin ne demek olduğunu biz o zaman eylem zamanında ya da yürüyüş yaptığımız zamanlarda gerçekten anlamıştık birlik olduğumuzu. Bu yüzden bu sayede açıldı Uğur tekstil tekrar. Ama ne oldu? Tekrardan açıldı tekrardan bir tartışma açıldı bizimle gelen biri vardı. Mehmet Türkmen, bayağı bizimle bir çaba sarf etmişti kendisi bir toplantı olacağı söylenmişti bizlere ama sendikanın başkanının geleceğini söylemişlerdi.

3. Türkiye’de faaliyet yürüten DİSK’e bağlı sendika şubelerini ya da konfederasyonların faaliyetlerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Eleştirdiğiniz yönleri neler?

Biz sendika başkanı Mehmet Türkmen diye biliyorduk fakat başkası geldi. Ben kendim kabul etmezdim çünkü bir adam bizimle mücadele etmiş. Bizim yürüyüşlere bile katılmış bir insandı. Orada hiç yüzünü görmediğimiz birini görünce biz şoka uğradık. Tabii yani istemezdik onun orada olmasını biz Mehmet Bey’in orada olmasını beklerdik. Hani tamam bir köprüdesin kendini feda etmiş biri gidiyor ama köprü sonunda bir bakıyorsun yüzünü görmediğiniz biri karşınıza çıkıyor. Diyor ki ben yapmışım. Bunu hiçbirimiz kabul etmedik. Tabii Mehmet Türkmen’in işine son verilmişti. Yani neden işine son verildiği konusunda başta hiçbir fikrim yoktu işte.

Sonra tekrar mesajlar falan geldi. İşine son verildiği falan söylendi. Tabi biz kabul etmedik yani hepimiz soru sormaya başladık. Hani koşulları falan konuşurken vesaire vesaire bir anda İşte Mehmet beyin konusu açıldı tabii. Yeni ortak konuşmalara girdi. Mehmet Türkmen’in olmadığını Mehmet Ali Başakla artık devam edeceğini söylemişlerdi. Sonradan tabii Mehmet Türkmen’le herhalde bir anlaşma mı yapmak istemişler ne yani işçilere karşı Mehmet Türkmen de bunu kabul etmemiş kendisine karşı aykırı bulmuş.

Fakat sendikada olan Mehmet Ali Başak herhalde bir toplantı yapmışlar, yemek mi yemişler hâkim değilim konuya açıkçası, ondan sonra bir baktığımda direkt işverenin tarafına geçti. Orada yaptığımız yürüyüşler, konuşmalar hatta jandarma tarafından kovulduğumuz işten çıkarıldığımız yer fabrikanın içinden açıldığımız videolar vardı bende. Mehmet Türkmen’in bize göndermiş olduğu ses kayıtları hepsi bende vardı hepsini arşivlemiştim açıkçası ben ama şu anki telefonum resetlendi içindeki bütün bilgiler gitti. Yoksa verebileceğim çok fotoğraf vardı gerçekten sana ama dediğim gibi Mehmet Bey işveren tarafını tuttu.

Bu şekilde sendikaya olan güven gitti. Artık iş birliği tamamen gitmişti çünkü Mehmet Ali Başak Bazı kişileri arayıp gelin katılın yani gelin işinize dönün. Sekiz bin boşta geçen zamanınızın ücreti olarak verilecek diyordu. Yani onları kınamıyorum çünkü gerçekten işsizlerdi ve çok zor durumlardı. Çocuk bakmak zorundaydı. Hani çoğu kabul etti ama tabii zorumuza gitti mi gitti. Belki beraberlik içinde devam etseydik şu anda hepimiz aynı yerde çalışıyor olabilirdik.

- 3 Sendika yönetiminin uyarı eylemleri, iş bırakmalar, grevler, toplu iş sözleşmesi görüşmeleri gibi konularda karar alırken nasıl hareket etmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorsunuz? İşçilerin dahil olmasını kolaylaştıran ya da zorlaştıran prosedürler sizce neler? İşçilerin doğrudan bu kararları almasının nasıl sonuçlar doğuracağını düşünüyorsunuz?

Sendika zaten işçileri temsil eden bir şey bunun için kurulduğunu biliyorum. Sendika zaten oraya gelirken de işçiler için geliyor diye biliyorum. O şekilde kabul etmiştik. Eğer bir adım dahi atacaksa, değil ki bir adım yarım adım daha atacaksa bizlerin görüşünü almak zorunda diye düşünüyorum. Yaptığım şöyle biraz sabır gerektiriyor. En başta gerçekten sabır gerektiren bir şey çünkü. Hani bazen davalar açılıyor gerçekten ne kadar bir süre oldu? Hani bir yıldan fazla oldu diye ben düşünüyorum, bayağı bir zaman oldu. Hani gerçekten yaşanabilecek bütün olumsuzluklara rağmen sabır gerektiren bir dayanma gücü gerektiriyor. Ayrıca burada şeriat ağır basar. Hani bayanlara çok önem vermezler ona rağmen biz bayanlar olarak katılmaya çalışıyorduk. Ama dediğim gibi dayanıklılık ve sabır gerektiren bir şey. Şöyle söyleyeyim hani başka bir şey olsaydı belki çok normal karşılanabilirdi. Mesela ben haberlerde de denk geldim kimi yerlerde bayanlar gerçekten avazının çıktığı kadar bağırabiliyordu ama burada biz mesela sosyal medyaya atmak için video işine bile hani kolay kolay maalesef giremiyorduk. Daha çok fark etmişseniz erkekler daha ön plandaydı. Çünkü onlar gerçekten hem aile baskısı yok hem kötü bir duruma düşme korkusu, onlar kendi ekmekleri için savaşıyordu. Bizler de onun için savaşıyorduk ama dediğim gibi olduğumuz bölgenin biraz da baskısı vardı. O yüzden bayanlar fazla sesimizi çıkarabildiğimizi düşünmüyorum.

5. Sendika içerisinde gündem olan konuların işçilerin bilgisine ulaşma süreci nasıl işliyor? İşçilerin bu konulardan haberdar olmak için geliştirdikleri ayrı yöntemler var mı?

Şöyle söyleyeyim mesela ilk toplantımı hatırladım Mehmet Bey ile. Mehmet Bey sürekli çözüm odaklıydı. Sürekli bizim sorunlarımızı çözme eğilimindeydi. Özellikle mesela sadece bayanlar için bile özel bir toplantı yaptığını hatırlarım. Sadece biz odadayız, Mehmet Bey yanımda, avukatı yanımdaydı. Hani sorardı siz bayanlar olarak ne istiyorsunuz ne gibi bir problem yaşıyorsunuz diye. Herkesin söylediği ayrımcılıktı. Ama biz bayarlardan bile orada temsilci olmasına rağmen bayanlar bile birçoğu bıraktı. Sonunda ne oldu girenlerin çoğu geri çıkarıldı zaten. Nasıl bazen birçok baskı yaptılar kendileri çıkarmak zorunda kaldılar. Hakan abi ile karşılaştım durumlar nasıl diye sordum çok kötü bir tabir kullanmıştı ...'dan ibaret durumdayız. Dedim orası düzelmez mi, dedi orası iflah olmaz artık. Bu duruma gelmişti, belki hiçbir şekilde yeltenmeseydik böyle devam edecektik.

6. Sendika içerisinde demokratik bir anlayış olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Örneğin işçilerin seçimler sonucunda sendika yöneticilerini değiştirebileceğini düşünüyor musunuz? Sendika yöneticilik seçimlerinde herhangi bir korku ya da çekince duymadan aday olabilir misiniz? Ya da sendika yönetiminin karşısında fikrinizi özgürce

beyan edebilir misiniz?

Şöyle söyleyeyim hani böyle bir süreç işleseydi Mehmet Türkmen çıkarılmazdı. Çünkü bizim güvenebileceğimiz biriyse zaten gidip anlaşma yapmazdı. Tam ona net bir şey söyleyemiyorum, getirir miydi getirmez miydi? Ama tek bildiğim bir şey var. Eğer gerçekten bizlerin tarafını tutulmuş olsaydı hani bizden veya onlardan biri olmasının bir önemi kalmazdı. Önemli olan biz veya onlar değildi. Önemli olan orada alınan kararların çözüm odaklı olmasıydı. Bu zaten en başından beri olmayan bir şey. Yani biz veya onlar önemli olan sadece düşüncelerimize saygı, bize verilen önemdi.

7. Sizce sendika görevlileri işçilerin fikirleri ve önceliklerini temsil edebiliyorlar mı? Sendika içerisinde karar alma süreçlerinde bir söz hakkına sahip olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Sizce sıradan işçilerin sesini duyurması sendika içerisinde bir etki yaratabilir mi? Nasıl?

Yani onaylayabileceğim yönleri de var sendikanın onaylamayacağım yönleri de var. Bu tamamen başında kimin durduğu ile alakalı. Bir daha sendika gibi bir duruma karışır mısın asla karışmam. Çünkü sendikaya güven olmadığını bizzat yaşamış oldum. Benim tek bildiğim şey şuydu Mehmet Ali Başağın geldiğini, kapıdan ilk başta hiç hiçbir şekilde alınmadığını, sonra bir yemek düzenlendiğini ve ondan sonra Mehmet Ali başağın içeri alındığı söylendi. Hatta birçoğumuz çok iyi hatırlıyorum. Bir kişi kim olduğunu tam olarak hatırlamıyorum. Seni ilk başta kapıdan almadılar. Yemekten sonra nasıl seni içeri alıyorlar seni kapıda beklettiler ilk başta diye sorduklarını anlatıyorum. Sendikanın kötü yönü işçileri orada göz ardı etmek. Yani sırf şöyle düşünün bir kale var amacınız sadece o kaleye girmek, orada kimin feda edildiği umurumuzda değil sadece ben gireyim ama kimler altında ezilirse ezilsin umurumda değil. Düşünsenize şu anda uğur tekstil bir ilki başardı. Sizce bu ilke girmek yeterli bir sebep olmaz mı? Bu kaleye girmek için. Hani şu anda mesela hatta kışkırtmak amacıyla yapıldığı zaman fotoğraf paylaşılmış. İşçiye çek uzatılırken fotoğraf. Sizce bu kışkırtmak da değil de ne yani? Tamam bizler sayesinde girdi ama bizleri göz ardı etti. Orada bir ilki başarmış oldu. O yüzden işçilerin içindeki casusa benzetiyorum. İşçilerin en zayıf noktalarını, sorunlarını biliyor ve sendika bunu işçiye karşı kullanıyor.

8. İş yerinizde, çalıştığınız bölümlerdeki işçilerle ne kadar sıklıkla yan yana geliyorsunuz? İş yerinizde gündem olan konuları yerel gruplar ile tartışıyor musunuz? Bu buluşmaları iş yeri düzeyinde gerçekleştiriyor musunuz? Ne sıklıkla?

İlk başladığımız zaman bir grubumuz vardı, kızların grubuydu. Adını devrimin gülleri diye kaydetmiştik. Maalesef o güllerden geriye kalan artık gidenler mi diken oldu kalanlar mı ben anlayamadım. Mehmet Bey'in bize attığı ses kayıtları oluyordu kötü de olsa bazen yani birlik zamanında onlara hakkında konuştuğumuz kelimeler kötü dahi olsa içimizi boşaltıyorduk açıkçası. Yani özetle boşa gitti. Geri dönmek istesem katılır mıyım? Asla öyle bir hata yapmam. Ben bir tane arkadaşımın giriş yapmasını istedim

yani sendikaya kayıt yap dedim kendisi yok dedi. Çünkü ablası sendikaya üye olduğunda problem yaşamış bundan dolayı korkuyordu sendikadan. Başka bir şekilde benim kimseyi ikna etme çabam olmadı. Ben kendimi içinde buldum açıkçası. Yani sadece haksızlığa karşı duralım dediğimizde ben kendim içinde bulmuştum. Bayanlar olarak çok değildik çoğu erkekti. Gerçekten başımızda durup, hakkımızı savunan çok insan oldu ama bizi yarı yolda bırakan da çok insan oldu.

9. Sizce sendika içerisinde karar alma süreçleri nasıl işlemeli? Bu görevin seçilmiş yetkililere bırakılmasının işçiler için avantajlı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

Evet zaten onlar bizi bırakıp gittiler ya. Aralarında bir tek Eren abi ile Erdem kaldı. Bu işe sürükleyenler bizi bırakıp gittiler. İşçi temsilcileri direkt haberdar olabiliyorlardı. Sonra bizi bırakıp gitmeleri gerçekten bir hayal bırakılır gerçekten. Hani o durum gibi bir şey gerçekten şöyle söyleyeyim: eğer bildiğimiz gerçekten bulmasaydı inanın çok farklı şeyler olabilirdi. Onlar Mehmet abi ile direkt iletişim kuruyorlardı. Hem durumu anlatıyorlardı. Sendikaya girelim diye onlar anlatıyorlardı, sonra gitmeleri gerçekten hayal kırıklığı “faso fiso” derler ya gerçekten öyle. O yüzden de bırakmamak gerekir.

Yani o zaman ben buradan bunu çıkartıyorum. Sendika asla bir başkan tarafından veya biri tarafından yönetilecek bir şey değil. Bizi satmış olan işçilerden bir tanesi bile gitse belki daha iyi yönetirdi. Orada sadece ilki başardı ya. Orada ilk defa Urfa’da böyle bir şey gerçekleşti ya kazanmadığı emek harcamadığı bir yerde bulunmanın zevkini yaşıyordu. Ben artık kendi işindeyim kendi gücümdeyim. Ama zor durumda yaşayan var mı arkadaşlar gerçekten? Mesela hala konuşurken ağlama durumunda bir arkadaşım. 35 yaşındaki bir kadın ağlayarak evim kira kocamın çalıştığı yetmiyor demesi bile bu durumu özetliyor bence.

10. Sizce işçilerin sesinin duyulması, fikirlerinin ciddiye alınması neden önemli? Toplumun gelenek ve göreneklerini de göz önünde bulundurarak kararı yetkili bir kişiye bırakmanın nasıl sonuçlanacağını düşünüyorsunuz? Konudaki kişisel tecrübeleriniz neler?

Ama şöyle söyleyeyim zaten işçiler kendi düşüncelerine kendilerine saygı gösterilen bir yerde çalışmış olsalardı sence böyle bir şey yeltenirler miydi? Bu yüzden yeltenmiştik ama sonunda ne oldu? Bir enkaz oluşturduk. Yapılan binayı da yıktık. Öyle bir örnek vereyim sana yıkılan binayı yapmak gerçekten uzun sürüyor.

11. Sendika yönetiminin iradesi dışında işçiler fiili bir grev gerçekleştirdi. Bu fiili grev sürecinde işçilerin karar alma sürecine katılımını nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? Sonuçlarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Mehmet Bey’in işten atıldığını öğrendiğimiz biz zaman oradan çıkarıldığımız zaman

zaten hiçbir şekilde sendika yanımızda olmadı. Eren abi gerçekten çok çaba gösterdi sanırım. Küresel sendikaya dilekçeler yazıyordu, Zara yönetimine dilekçeler yazıyordu. Artık mal vermiyor diye biliyorum. Bu aslında başımızda duran biriyle alakalıydı o dursaydı zaten zara veya başka bir marka vesaire fark etmezdi onların olması.

Gerçekten ben kendi adıma da söylüyorum. Lanet olsun sendikaya başvurduğum güne diyorum. Çünkü gerçekten problem yaşadım. Evimde çalışan tek ben vardım. Ben nişanlı durumdaydım. Evlendikten sonra annem daha çok zor bir durumda yaşadı. Hiçbir gelirleri yoktu. Bir de benim evliliğim falan olunca tamamen hiçbir geliri kalmadı. Elimizdeki avunucumuzdakinin hepsini kaybettim neredeyse. Yani şuna rağmen birçoğumuz dosya masrafı olarak 500 TL istendi onu verebilecek durumda bile değildik. Ben kendi adıma söylüyorum bankadan borç alarak ödedim. Onun cefasını zaten çekiyorum. Maalesef şu anda tahmin edemezsiniz. Öyle bir borcum var ki sürekli arıyorum. Bunun sebebi de belki biraz daha dayanabilir miydim? Dayanamazdım. Çünkü gerçekten parasızlık buraya kadar gelmişti., Dışarı çıkacaktı. Hani yol parası nedir? o bile yoktu. Borç edinerek çıkıyorduk. Birçok arkadaşım gerçekten bu durumdaydı hani toplantı olacağı zaman gelemiyordu bile. Mesela Azra abla gelemiyordu niye çünkü gerçekten yorulmuş durumda.

Zaten başta bu şekilde DİSK'e girdik. Sarı sendikalar var bir de gerçekten çalışanın yanında durmayan sendikalar. Biz bu sendikaya girdiğimiz zaman çalışanın yanında diye biz bildik bu şekilde girdik. O şekilde buluşmalar yaptık, Gümrük Han'da falan. Baya bir ses getirdik ama hepsi boşa gidince insan hüsrana uğramıyor değil. Toplu bir şekilde yaparsın yapamazsın ayrı mesele, yani böyle bölünmek ayrı mesele. Helal olsun ya onlar bizi bırakmayacak dediğimiz insanlar. Ama maalesef geriye kalanlar onlar olmadı. Bir daha hakkımı savunacak olsam yeniden savunurum. Ama sendika altında bunu yapar mıyım asla yapmam. 1.si de yaparsan hatadır, ama ikinci de yaparsan aptallıktır derler ya o hesap.

İşte çok iyi hatırlıyorum. Ben Mehmet Ali Başağı aradım davadan geri çekilenler için iş veriliyor ya zor durumda kaldığım için. Dediğim gibi ailem bayağı bir zor durum geçirdi. Ben kendisini aradım hatta teklifiniz geçerliyse ben davayı geri çekip gelmek istiyorum dedim. Mehmet Ali beyin bana kullanmış olduğu kelime ne biliyor musun? Sen beni dinlemedin sen büyük sözü dinleseydin bu hale gelmezdin. Bu kelimeyi bana kullandı. Ne oldu ben yerin dibine girdim, mecbur kaldım. Mecburen haklısın abi dedim. Çünkü gerçekten zor durumdaydım. Siz düşünün eğer bir sendika işçi tarafından olsaydı ben onu aramış olmama rağmen benim ona boyun eğmiş olmama teklifimi reddeder miydi, sen benim sözümü dinleseydin bu halde olmazdın der miydi?

Appendix C: List of Interviewees

Pseudonyms	Gender	Currently Employed in Textile Industry
Gülcan	Female	No
Asiye	Female	Yes
Derya	Female	Yes, continuing in the same factory
Erdem	Male	No
Eren	Male	No
Savaş	Male	No
Veli	Male	Yes
İsmet	Male	No
Yasin	Male	Yes
Ayşe	Female	No
Ahmet	Male	Yes, continuing in the same factory
Mehmet	Male	Yes, continuing in the same factory
Atakan	Male	Yes, continuing in the same factory
Akın	Male	Yes, continuing in the same factory
Cem	Male	Yes

Table 1. List of Interviewees