

**GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE HYBRIDIZATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
POWER PENDULUMS:
A COST BASED ANALYSIS (1945-2015)**

PHD THESIS

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ABBREVIATIONS

4GW	: Fourth Generation Warfare
AWACS	: Airborne Warning and Control System
CFE	: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
COIN	: Counter-Insurgency
COW (Project)	: Correlates of War (Project)
CSCE	: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	: Common Security and Defense Policy
CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty Organization
EC	: European Community
EEC	: European Economic Community
ETA	: Basque Homeland and Liberty Movement (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)
EU	: European Union
ESDP	: European Security and Defence Policy
CFE	: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
COIN	: Counter-Insurgency
CSTO	: Collective Security Treaty Organization
EPAA	: European Phased Adaptive Approach
FNLA	: The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)
FRELIMO	: Front of the Liberation Movement
FTFs	: Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
HTS	: Human Terrain System
HTT	: Human Terrain Teams
ICBMs	: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
IDF	: Israel Defense Forces
INF	: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IRA	: Irish Republican Army
IRBMs	: Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
ISIS	: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JSTARS	: Joint Surveillance and Target-Attack Systems
KFOR	: Kosovo Force
MAD	: Mutually Assured Destruction
MANPAD	: Man-Portable Air Defense System
MBFR	: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MPLA	: The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
MR	: Military Revolution
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNEP	: Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Weapons
NPA	: New People's Army
NPT	: Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSAs	: Non State Actors
NSC	: National Security Council (of the USA)
OSCE	: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	: Partnership for Peace
PGMs	: Precised Guided Munitions
PMCs	: Private Military Contractors
QDR	: Quadrannual Defense Review
RENAMO	: The Mozambique National Resistance Organization
RMA	: Revolution in Military Affairs
SALT	: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty
SCO	: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDI	: Strategic Defence Initiative
SF	: Special Forces
START	: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UAS	: Unmanned Aerial System
UAVs	: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UÇK	: Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves)
UN	: United Nations
UNEF	: United Nations Emergency Force
UNITA	: The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	: Western European Union
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

Armed conflicts and wars, the most organized form of armed conflicts, have influenced international structures, states, societies and individuals as one of the most fundamental determinants throughout history. As wars transformed, the meaning for each of these elements changed. The transformation in wars has been observed more carefully, as the central position of the war in the lives of people has increased and its indirect effects have been replaced by direct influences. As a result, the observation of armed conflicts has been one of the main issues not only in the war studies or military issues, but also in the field of international relations for a long time.

At this point, the current armed conflicts display interesting features that need to be examined. It has retained its 'basic characteristics', some of which have been considered to have survived since at least 1648. With some features, it seems to be an updated version of similar forms in history. In terms of some features, completely new, never-before-seen approaches, methods and objectives stand out. Even more interesting, 'hybrid' forms where these characteristics are intertwined are increasingly prominent. Understanding not only the current conflicts but also the transformation of conflicts through hybridization is the subject of this study.

War has increasingly entered our lives in parallel with the evolution it has been undergoing throughout history. Thus, the types of warfare that used to be relatively distant from the individual replaced with the types of struggle that almost extending to our 'living room'. Although it is often attributed to the non-conventional methods of armed conflicts, it is a fact that the fundamental transformation in war making goes until the transition based on industrialization. This transition, which is fundamentally based on inter-state wars, aimed at the non-military dimensions of the war, especially

in the industrial cities, has become more complicated with the use of unexpected methods by non-conventional actors.

Today, traditional military elements and non-traditional actors coexist. As well as targeting their equals, they don't hesitate from targeting asymmetrical elements. Furthermore, in many cases, these two elements, which appear to be completely opposite, have collaborated and even, intertwined. In this context, there is hybridization in the actors of the war. On one hand, the states are developing their military capabilities to defend even space while on the other hand, they are trying to prevent attacks on civilians by hand-made bombs. Non-state actors are distributing their power to small groups that cannot be found and eliminate by states on one hand, while they are trying to be organized to be stronger against other non-state actors on the other. While states are trying to protect the entire physical space that is essential in the field of economy, communications and security, other states, non-state actors and even individuals can target these physical space through cyberspace. For this reason, many elements related to war have been intertwined, in other words, armed conflicts have been hybridized.

As a result of all these, there are actors in practice who re-structure their forces 'in the shadow of opposing side' for solving the problem. This inevitably brings hybridization. In almost all of the contemporary struggles, the confronting parties had the characteristics that could not be explained through a single approach. There are no hand-made bombs or black market Kalashnikovs in the hands of non-state actors. At the same time, there are sophisticated weapons that only states can produce. States, on the other hand, do not only use conventional methods against their forces. At the same time, in the light of the approaches they developed such as 'counter-insurgency', 'counter-guerrilla' and 'counter-terrorism', they respond in a wide range of ways, which are implemented by organized units such as non-state actors. In addition to this, it has been demonstrated that the interests of at least one of the parties in the cases correspond to another actor who is out of conflict. The possibility of states to realize their interests by using a proxy has further blurred the question of which actor is more decisive by adding the state actor to these struggles. This blurriness has brought out the questions of the study: What is the main transformer of contemporary armed conflicts, and how does this transformation affect power relations?

The first part of the study was the search for answers to the above question. In this context, it has been seen that the studies seeking answers to this question differ from each other in terms of methodological and theoretical. In this direction, firstly methodological differences were determined and the method of the study was shaped. Then, in the light of this method, various approaches are discussed. Then, in the light of the determined approach, hypothesis has been developed and tried to be verified by necessary historical and theoretical data.

Both inductive and deductive methodologies have been found to have a significant accumulation of knowledge in the study of armed conflicts. Therefore, the methodology is based on the question of which method would be more appropriate for the study. In this context, it was concluded that the deductive methodology was more successful than the inductive methodology to explain the transformation. In accordance with the deductive method, falsification has been made between the approaches that try to understand the transformation and the hypothesis has been shaped as a result the falsification process.

When examining the approaches, it was evaluated that there are three basic clusters. The first of these clusters is those who argue that the transformation causes as a result of the transformation of Westfalian international relations. The studies in this cluster have progressed in parallel to the globalization debate and are consequently referred to as ‘new wars’ in the literature. In these studies, it is argued that the transformation of the sovereign states also transformed wars based on this basis. The second cluster argues that this transformation is the result of the methodological transformation of armed conflicts. This approach, which intersects with the previous cluster with its specific aspects, argues that wars, in the course of historical development through generations, adapt to the struggle practices of their own era. In this context, it is argued that contemporary conflicts, which they call ‘fourth generation warfare’, are in a structure carried out by non-state actors with a different warfare culture. As a result, it is emphasized that all actors, including states, should organize themselves according to this new paradigm. The last cluster is the traditional readings that continue to see war as only one of the instruments of international relations, and that the function of the wars, and therefore the transformation of the wars, can only be understood through this general understanding. These approaches advocate that the war should be carried out in the light of a political aim, but without the exclusion of

non-state actors, but by accepting the decisive role of the states. These studies also emphasize that the decisive factor in state behavior is not to win or lose war, but to increase or decrease its relative power at the end of war.

After analyzing these three approaches by falsification, it is concluded that the third cluster is the perspective that best describes the transformation of wars. In this context, the third approach was found to be more explanatory because it did not deny that there was a transformation and it included the missing aspects of the first two approaches. The other two approaches are considered as complementary elements, not the basis.

In this context, the hypothesis is based on the approach that the transformer is the power struggle in international relations and the relative power of the element that stands out the state or non-state actors. It has been one of the main elements of the hypothesis that the progress of the cases has changed since the actors won or lost as a result of the conflicts. The concept of cost as the main measure of gains or losses therefore constitutes the basis of the thesis. It has been concluded that all state or non-state actors create strategies from the cost base, thus the costs are key to not only the first initial question, but also the second initial question. Another component of key role has been military technologies. It was evaluated that the major powers that achieved a cost-cutting technologies, increased their commitments and the forces opposing these powers were trying to increase the cost of the commitment by applying methods in which these technologies became meaningless.

In this regard, to give a clearer answer to the first question, it was found that the element that transformed the conflicts was the reaction of the actors whose costs were increasing or decreasing. Accordingly, the powers with cost-cutting technology could enter into commitments where they could gain political profit at low cost. The forces against them changed the method and increased their costs. This has transformed the components and the form of armed conflicts. The response to this was the replacement of direct methods with indirect methods. Or in other words, using proxies rather than direct engagements. As technology and method change, it swings up and down like a pendulum. This swinging led to the creation of the concept that the hypothesis was based on and that interconnected the two questions: Power pendulums.

According to the power pendulums, at least since 1945 there have been two swings due to the decrease and the increase of costs -in terms of great powers. Ensuring the very low cost of commitments with atomic bomb technology has reduced the costs of political gains of two superpowers. On the other hand, the successful implementation of the guerrilla methods pulled the costs up again, for example, as in the case of Vietnam, the relative power of the United States was able to attract the bottom point. In the light of this, the period of proxy wars began, and the states resorted to indirect strategies to obtain their interests at minimum cost. This has led to an improvement in the relative strength as it reduces the losses rather than the gain. This initial swing was followed by a second swing that started after the active use of precision-guided munition. Again, as in the case of Vietnam, and again as the US has experienced, the new type of struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised costs. The response to this was the implementation of indirect strategies. The second phase of the second swing is considered to continue as of 2019.

The costs involved in the hypothesis, the importance of weapon technologies and the power pendulums shaped upon them were tested both in historical and theoretical studies in the first part and in cases in the second part. In this context, in the first part, the historical increase of the cost of war and its effect on power relations have been shown. In the first part, the logic of non-conventional methods is also explained by cost. In the second part, the contemporary practices of the transformation have been explained in four periods and different cases where the swinging increased and decreased.

As a result of all this, it was tried to answer the initial question about the logic of hybridization in armed conflicts between 1945 and 2015, and the initial question about the effects of this transformation on international relations.

ÖZET

Silahlı çatışmalar ve silahlı çatışmaların en organize şekli olan savaşlar, tarih boyunca en temel belirleyicilerden birisi olarak, uluslararası yapıları, devletleri, toplumları ve bireyleri etkilemişlerdir. Savaşlar dönüştükçe bu unsurların her birisi için anlamı değişmiştir. Savaşın insanların hayatındaki merkezi konumunun giderek artması ve dolaylı etkilerinin yerini doğrudan etkilere bırakması nedeniyle savaşlardaki dönüşümler daha yakından takip edilir olmuştur. Sonuçla, silahlı çatışmaların gözlemlenmesi, uzunca bir süredir yalnızca savaş çalışmalarının ya da askeri konuların değil, uluslararası ilişkiler alanının da temel konularından birisidir.

Bu noktada günümüz silahlı çatışmaları inceleme gerektiren ilginç özellikler göstermektedir. Bazı özellikleri ile en azından 1648'den beri süregeldiği kabul edilen 'temel niteliklerini' korumaktadır. Bazı özellikleri ile ise, tarihteki benzer formların güncellenmiş versiyonları gibi görünmektedir. Bazı özellikleri açısından ise tamamen yeni, hiç görülmemiş yaklaşım, yöntem ve hedefler göze çarpmaktadır. Daha da ilginç olarak, bu özelliklerin iç içe geçtiği 'melez' formlar giderek öne çıkmaktadır. Söz konusu melezleşme üzerinden yalnızca güncel çatışmaları değil, aynı zamanda çatışmaların geçirdiği dönüşümü anlayabilmek, bu çalışmanın konusunu oluşturmaktadır.

Savaşlar, tarih boyunca geçirmekte olduğu evrime paralel olarak giderek daha fazla hayatlarımıza girmiş, bireylerin görece uzağında kalan savaşım tipleri yerlerini, neredeyse 'oturma odamıza' kadar uzanan bir savaşım tipine bırakmıştır. Her ne kadar sıklıkla silahlı çatışmaların geleneksel olmayan yöntemlerle yürütülmesine atfedilse de, aslında kökleri endüstrileşmeye dayanan bu geçiş nedeniyle savaşların yürütülüş biçimi temel bir değişiklik yaşamaktadır. Temeli devletler arası savaşlara dayanan, endüstri kentleri başta olmak üzere, savaşın askeri olmayan boyutlarını hedefleyen bu

geçiş, geleneksel olmayan silahlı unsurların beklenmedik yöntemleri kullanmaya başlaması ile daha karmaşık bir hal almıştır.

Bugün geleneksel askeri unsurlar ile geleneksel olmayan aktörler bir arada yer almaktadır. Kendi simetriklerini hedefledikleri gibi, simetrik olmayan unsurlara yönelmekten de çekinmemektedir. Bunun da ötesinde, birçok vakada, birbirinden tamamen zıt görünen bu iki unsur iş birliği yapmış, hatta iç içe geçmiştir. Bu bağlamda savaşın aktörlerinde bir melezleşme söz konusudur. Devletler bir yandan uzayı dahi savunacak şekilde askeri kapasitelerini geliştirirken, diğer yanda el yapımı bombalarla sivillere gerçekleştirilecek saldırıları önlemeye çalışmaktadır. Devlet dışı aktörler bir yandan güç asimetrisi içinde bulundukları devletlere karşı güçlerini bulunamaz şekilde küçük gruplara dağıtırken, diğer yanda diğer devlet dışı aktörlere karşı daha güçlü olacak şekilde organize olmaya çalışmaktadır. Devletler ekonomi, iletişim ve güvenlik alanında temel olan tüm fiziksel alanı korumaya çalışırken, diğer devletler, devlet dışı aktörler ve hatta bireyler, bu fiziksel alanları siber alan aracılığıyla hedefleyebilmektedir. Bu nedenle savaşa dair birçok unsur iç içe geçmiş, diğer bir ifade ile silahlı çatışmalar melezleşmiştir.

Tüm bunların sonucunda pratikte yaşanan, sorunu çözmek için ‘karşısındakine göre’ yapılanan aktörler olmaktadır. Bu da kaçınılmaz olarak melezleştirmeyi getirmektedir. Yaşanan mücadelelerin neredeyse hepsinde taraflar, tek bir yaklaşım üzerinden açıklanamayacak özelliklere sahip olmuşlardır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin ellerinde yalnızca el yapımı bomba ya da karaborsadan alınmış kalaşnikoflar yoktur. Aynı zamanda, yalnızca devletlerin üretebileceği sofistike silahlar bulunmaktadır. Devletler ise karşılarındaki güçlere karşın yalnızca geleneksel yöntemlerini kullanmamaktadır. Aynı zamanda geliştirdikleri ‘ayaklanmaya karşı mücadele’, ‘gerillaya karşı mücadele’ ve ‘terörizme karşı mücadele’ gibi yaklaşımlar ışığında, tıpkı devlet dışı aktörler gibi örgütlenmiş birimlerin uyguladıkları çok çeşitli yöntemlerle yanıt vermektedirler. Bu hususlara ek olarak çatışmaların görüldüğü vakalarda, tarafların en az bir tanesinin çıkarının çatışma dışı başka bir aktör ile uyduğu da diğer bir gerçek olarak ortaya konulmuştur. Devletlerin birer vekil kullanarak çıkarlarını gerçekleştirme ihtimali, bu mücadelelere devlet aktörünü daha fazla katarak hangi aktörün daha belirleyici olduğu sorusunu daha da bulanıklaştırmıştır. İşte bu bulanıklık, çalışmanın çıkış sorularını da beraberinde

getirmiştir: Günümüzdeki silahlı çatışmaların ana dönüştürücüsü nedir ve bu dönüşüm güç ilişkilerini nasıl etkilemektedir?

Yukarıda yer alan soruya cevap aranması çalışmanın ilk bölümünü oluşturmuştur. Bu bağlamda yapılan okumalarda bu soruya cevap arayan çalışmaların yöntemsel ve yaklaşım açısından birbirlerinden farklılaştıkları görülmüştür. Bu doğrultuda ilk olarak yöntemsel farklılıklar değerlendirilerek çalışmanın yöntemi belirlenmiştir. Ardından bu yöntem ışığında yaklaşımlar ele alınmıştır. Ve ardından belirlenen yaklaşım ışığında hipotez geliştirilerek gerekli tarihsel ve kuramsal verilerle doğrulanmasına çalışılmıştır.

Silahlı çatışmaları inceleme konusunda hem tümevarımcı hem de tümdengelimci metodolojilerin önemli bir birikim yaptıkları görülmüş ve metodolojik seçim yapmak için, çalışmanın inceleme sorularına hangi yöntemin daha uygun olacağı sorusu temel alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, yapılan inceleme sonucunda, tümdengelimci metodolojinin, dönüşümü açıklamak konusunda tümevarımcı metodolojiden daha başarılı olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Tümdengelimci yöntem gereğince, dönüşümü anlamaya çalışan yaklaşımlar arasında yanlışlama yapılmış ve hipotez bunun sonucunda şekillendirilmiştir.

Yaklaşımlar arasında inceleme yapıldığında, üç temel kümenin olduğu değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kümelerin ilki, söz konusu dönüşümün Westfalyan uluslararası ilişkilerin dönüşümünden olduğunu savunanlardır. Küreselleşme tartışmasına paralel şekilde ilerleyen ve literatürde ‘yeni savaşlar’ çalışmaları ile anılan bu kümede, egemen devletlerin dönüşümünün bu temele dayalı savaşları da dönüştürdüğü savunulmaktadır. İkinci küme ise, söz konusu dönüşümün silahlı çatışmaların yöntemsel dönüşümü sonucunda olduğunu savunmaktadır. Belirli yönleri ile bir önceki küme ile kesişen bu yaklaşım, ‘nesiller’ üzerinden aktardığı tarihsel gelişim süreci içinde, savaşların kendi dönemlerinin savaşım pratiklerine uyum sağladığını savunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda dördüncü nesil olarak adlandırdıkları günümüz savaşlarının ise devlet dışı aktörlerin, farklı bir savaş kültürü ile yürüttükleri bir yapıda olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bunun sonucunda savunulan, devletler dâhil tüm aktörlerin kendilerini bu paradigmaya göre düzenlemesi gerektiğidir. Son küme ise, savaş uluslararası ilişkilerin araçlarından yalnızca birisi olarak görmeye devam eden ve savaşların işlevinin, dolayısıyla neye göre dönüşüp dönüşmediklerinin yalnızca bu

genel konsept üzerinden anlaşılabilceğini savunan, geleneksel okumalardır. Bu yaklaşımlar, savaşın politik bir amaç ışığında yapıldığının kabulü ile, devlet dışı aktörleri dışarıda bırakmadan ama devletlerin belirleyici rolünü kabul ederek analiz yapılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Devlet davranışlarında belirleyici olanın savaşı kazanmak ya da kaybetmek değil, savaşın sonunda görelî gücünü artırmak ya da azaltmak olduğunu belirtmektedir.

Bu üç yaklaşımın yanırlama yapılarak analiz edilmeleri sonrasında üçüncü yaklaşımın savaşların dönüşümünü en iyi açıklayan yaklaşım olduđu sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu bağlamda üçüncü yaklaşım hem dönüşüm olduğunu reddetmemesi hem de ilk iki yaklaşımın eksik kalan yönlerini de kapsaması nedeniyle daha açıklayıcı bulunmuştur. Diğer iki yaklaşım ise, temel değil, tamamlayıcı unsurlar olarak ele alınmışlardır.

Bu bağlamda hipotez, dönüştürücünün uluslararası ilişkilerdeki güç mücadelesi olduđu, devlet ya da devlet dışı aktörleri öne çıkaran unsurun görelî güç olduđu yaklaşımı üzerine kurulmuştur. Aktörlerin çatışmaların sonucunda kazandıkları ya da kaybettiklerine göre vakaların aldığı seyrin de değıştiğı hipotezin temel unsurlarından birisi olmuştur. Kazanç ya da kayıpların temel ölçüsü olarak ‘maliyet’ kavramı bu nedenle tezin temelini oluşturmuştur. Devlet ya da devlet dışı aktörlerin tamamının maliyet temelinden strateji oluşturdukları sonucuna ulaşılmış, böylece maliyetler, yalnızca ilk çıkış sorusu için değil, aynı zamanda ikinci çıkış sorusu için de anahtar rolü üstlenmiştir. Anahtar rolü üstlenen bir diğer bileşen ise silah teknolojileri olmuştur. Bir maliyet düşürücü olan teknolojiyi elde eden büyük güçlerin taahhütlerini artırdıkları, buna karşı çıkan güçlerin ise bu teknolojilerin anlamsız hale geldiğı yöntemler uygulayarak, taahhüdün maliyetini artırmaya çalıştıkları değerlendirilmiştir.

Bu yönüyle ilk soruya daha net bir yanıt vermek gerekirse, çatışmaları dönüştürenin maliyetleri düşen ya da çıkan aktörlerin, bu geçişlere verdikleri tepkiler olduđu bulgusuna ulaşılmıştır. Buna göre maliyet düşürücü teknolojiye sahip olan güçler bununla düşük maliyetle politik kazanç elde edebildikleri taahhütlere girebilmişlerdir. Karşılarındaki güçler ise yöntemi değıştirmiş ve maliyeti artırmışlardır. Bu da silahlı çatışmaların görünümünü değıştirmiştir. Buna verilen karşılık ise, devletlerin geri çekilerek vekil kullanmaları olmuştur. Bu durum teknoloji

ve yöntem deęiřtikçe ařaęı ve yukarı, tıpkı bir sarkaç gibi salınmaktadır. Bu salınım, hipotezin üzerine kurulu olduęu ve iki soruyu birbirine baęlayan kavramın geliştirilmesine neden olmuřtur: Güç sarkaçları.

Güç sarkaçlarına göre, en azından 1945'ten beri maliyetlerin –büyük güçler açısından- düşmesi ve yükselmesine göre iki salınım gerekleşmiştir. Atom bombası teknolojisi ile taahhütlerin ok düşük maliyete saęlanması, iki süper gücün politik kazanç maliyetlerini ařaęı ekmiştir. Buna karřılık gerilla yöntemlerinin başarıyla uygulanması maliyetleri yeniden yukarı ekmiş, örneęin Vietnam vakasında olduęu gibi ABD'nin görelî gücünü dip noktasına ekebilmiştir. Bunun ışığında vekil savařlar dönemi başlamış, devletler ıkarlarını minimum maliyetle elde edebilmek için dolaylı stratejilere başvurmuşlardır. Bu durum kazancı artırmaktan ok kayıpları düşürdüęü için görelî güçte bir düzelme yaratmıştır. Bu ilk salınımı, hassas güdümlü mühimmatın aktif kullanımı sonrası başlayan ikinci bir salınım takip etmiştir. Yine tıpkı Vietnam'da olduęu ve yine ABD'nin deneyimledięi üzere, Irak'ta ve Afganistan'da görülen yeni mücadele tipi, maliyetleri yukarı ekmiştir. Buna verilen tepki, yine dolaylı stratejilerin uygulanması olmuřtur. İkinci salınının ikinci ařamasının 2019 itibarı ile devam ettięi deęerlendirilmektedir.

Hipotezde yer verilen maliyetler, silah teknolojilerinin önemi ve bunların üzerine řekillenen güç sarkaçları, hem ilk bölümdeki tarihsel ve kuramsal incelemelerde, hem de ikinci bölümdeki vakalarda denenmiştir. Bu bağlamda ilk bölümde tarihsel olarak savařın maliyetinin yükseliři ve bunun güç iliřkilerine etkisi gösterilmiş; ayrıca geleneksel olmayan yöntemlerin mantıęı da maliyet üzerinden açıklanmıştır. İkinci bölümde ise salınının yükseliř ve düşüş gösterdięi toplam dört dönem ve farklı vakalar üzerinden dönüşümün güncel uygulamaları gösterilmiştir.

Böylece 1945-2015 arasında silahlı çatıřmalarda görülen melezleşmenin mantıęı ve bunun uluslararası iliřkilere yansımaları hakkındaki ıkıř sorularına yanıt vermeye alışılmıştır.

INTRODUCTION

“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”¹

Carl von Clausewitz

It was hoped that the end of World War II would be the beginning of a future in which humanity would take lessons from wars and build peace in the light of these lessons. However, it was soon realized that this would not happen as it was thought. A period of fear, called the Cold War, divided the world into two camps. With the concern of a nuclear war with the potential to destroy all mankind, armed conflicts broke out all over the world, creating an environment that eclipses efforts the great progress achieved to reach the peace.

Similarly, the end of the Cold War again revealed a great optimism. This perspective, which would argue that not only the conflicts, but even the dialectic alternatives have ended,² was not long-lived. Those who argued that the conflicts that emerged after 1991 were the pains of transitional periods, had to give up their arguments in the process following the 9/11 attacks.

And today, despite all the efforts, initiatives and great advances made in the light of more than a hundred years of experience in institutionalizing peace, it is difficult to argue that we are moving into a world without war. Moreover, this is perceived not only by decision-makers, but also by societies. As a result of a field study conducted in the UK in 1954 and 2004 with the same questions, the fear of a world war appeared to be higher in 2004.³

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, translated to English by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 65.

² Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, **The National Interest**, No 16, 1989, pp. 3-18.

³ Eric Hobsbawm, **Küreselleşme, Demokrasi ve Terörizm**, translated to Turkish by Osman Akınhay, İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2008, pp. 30-31.

In this context, what should be accomplished is to pursue the way of all the other researchers, who ask how we protect the world from wars: to investigate the causes of an element that affects war, to think about how to eliminate it. The first part of this effort, that is to investigate the causes and effects of an element that affects the war, is the subject of this study.

Throughout history, the transformations in war-related areas have been significant breaking points, and these changes have been perceived to be the precursors of future significant changes. Thus, questions about whether there was a significant transformation in the war and what the reasons were emerged as important areas of investigation. Because war, as one of the most open areas of interaction, is affected by many areas such as technology, economy, politics, society and culture and also has significant effects on these areas. Therefore, the transformation observed in one or more of these areas brings with discussions on war.

In post-Cold War period, researchers continue to work in such a ideational environment and try to answer the question of how the wars have transformed and what effects it might have. Since this period represents an extremely complex era, in which perhaps all of the elements of interaction mentioned above have been discussed, the environment has developed and has led to the emergence of different clusters of approaches. The main reason for the development of controversy and the formation of different clusters was the ambiguity of the base analysis because of the increasingly 'hybrid' character of armed conflicts.

In this context, it is observed that non-conventional actors have gained weight in armed conflicts, at least since 1945. However, this transformation has almost no effect on some stabilities. States that have consistently prepared their armies for a potential conventional war, have continued to strengthen their armies quantitatively and qualitatively. More importantly, after the millennium, number of conflicts in which these two intertwined, began to increase.

Another hybridization is observed in the transformation seen in the method of armed conflicts. The tremendous power gap between the sides of the conflicts has led to the change of methods by weak actors. It was understood that this method change was no exception, especially after the high rates of achieving the goals of the actors

who were weak.⁴ Thus, asymmetric methods have become a way not only by non-state actors (NSAs) but also by states trying to reach their targets with indirect strategies at minimum cost. This has brought about a great hybridization. An asymmetric structure, such as a state- NSA confrontation can be observed in conflicts, as well as a ‘different form of symmetry’ involving NSA-NSA encounters.⁵ And if states support these elements, asymmetry (or symmetry) can become multilayered. This dimension will also affect different clusters.

The shift in the subject of armed conflicts is another hybridization area. The shift towards civilians is another important area of observation, both in terms of conflicting elements and targets. Since the emergence of industrial and city-based wars, the increasing number of civilian elements has become a point to question whether the nature of the conflicts has changed. In addition to all these elements, another shift that increases its weight every day adds a new dimension to the discussions. The shift from the physical space to the cyber space, added a new dimension to the hybridization and developed the ideational environment.

This whole process of intertwining has brought with it the effort to understand the process. Moreover, the answers given in response to this effort of meaning, as mentioned above, have also created various clusters that intersect on some issues.

It is possible to collect these interpreting efforts in two main clusters. The first is that those who argue that the ‘nature’ of the armed conflicts have changed, and the second is that the ‘characteristic’ has changed.

Accordingly, the first cluster, which emphasized the post-Cold War transformation of armed conflicts, argues that the Clausewitz-based war analysis failed to explain the post-1991 conflicts and stated that a new paradigm was needed. This cluster is divided into two groups. The first of these groups stresses that the transformation of the nature of international relations is the reason for the paradigm shift. The main emphasis of this approach -parallel to the globalization debate- is that wars have transformed in parallel with the transformation of the Westphalian system.

⁴ Ivan Arreguin Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflicts”, **International Security**, Vol 26, No 1, 2001, pp. 93-128.

⁵ PRIO, **Conflict Type**, <https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/UCDP/2009/Graph%20-%20Conflicts%20by%20Type.pdf>, accessed on 17.12.2017.

The second group focuses directly on wars and war making. The analyzes in this group emphasize that the transformation in the method of armed conflict changes the nature of the wars, although they do not directly emphasize the role of states.

The second cluster, on the other hand, consists of analyzes that emphasize that the Clausewitzian paradigm, based on the instrumental position of war, does not change, although it accepts that wars are transforming. While accepting different methods in the implementation of war, these approaches, which treat them as an indirect strategic orientation, rather than a fundamental change, argue that this is the characteristic of the war. Another element that constitutes the basis for this cluster is that the transformation started after the industrial wars, and the breaking point is the use of atomic bomb, not the end of Cold War. Therefore, this group emphasizes that there is no paradigm shift, and argues that it is necessary to analyze within the scope of international relations studies that consider war as an instrument of international relations.

These different approaches constitute the first question of the study to be solved. According to this, it is not possible to make further analysis without answering the question of whether the main determinant of the transformation of wars is the transformation of the Westphalian system, the transformation of armed conflicts or the transformation of power relations. This question raises the following question related to the first one: What are the effects of this transformation on the actors who who are the subject of international relations? The search for answers to these two questions reveals the examination plan of the study. And in this direction, the study will be done in two basic parts. The first question will be answered in the first part, the second question will be answered in the second part.

In this context, the first part consists of three main areas of study, and therefore three chapters. The first chapter will include selecting method and cluster between two methods and three clusters trying to understand the transformation and then creating the hypothesis. At this point two issues should be mentioned. The first is that, due to the holistic nature of the transformation and the frequency of cases where hybridization is observed, the deductive method will be preferred. Accordingly, the first chapter will proceed with the falsification method and explain why the inductive method will not be used in the study. The second issue to be mentioned is the assumption that the third

of the clusters is based on the hypothesis after the prereadings. In this way, after the methodological selection, the clusters will be falsified and it will be explained why the third cluster has selected.

In this context, the hypothesis will be based on the cost-based analysis of war on the basis of the third cluster. The cost-based analysis also constitutes a bridge to the second question. Because, after 1945, it is argued that the factors that determine the armed conflicts are the power relations and the main factor determining the power relations is the effect of the costs on the relative power.

The fact that the concept of cost comes forward in the first chapter requires two separate examination to strengthen the theoretical basis. The first is to demonstrate the correlation of costs with modern warfare and the correlation between actor actions. In this context, there are three elements highlighted in the third cluster. The first of these is that since the monetization of war, costs are the main factor determining the use of war. Secondly, costs are in a constant uptrend, except for the impact of short periods of new cost-cutting technologies. The third one is that the current transformation has found its roots in the aftermath of the industrial revolution and is continuing. The second chapter of the first part is based on supporting these findings with historical data.

The second examination constitutes the third chapter of the first part. This includes demonstrating that non-conventional strategies, which have a large emphasis on other two clusters, also act cost-based logic, so that the behavior of actors in post-1991 conflicts can be read through the instrumental position of the war. In this context, the relationship of guerrilla, terrorism and hybrid warfare methods with cost and their common logic will be examined.

As it can be understood from the emphasizes above, costs play a crucial role for both observing the transformation process and also for understanding the actor behavior. In that point it has to be notice that, the focus point will be the correlation between increasing (or decreasing) economic burden and the shape of political (or military) engagements of the actors. Because of this reason, costs, as a examination tool, will be limited with a few spesific elements, like actors' share in world economy, percentage of military spendings and its relation with economic development. Another component to read the costs will be the effect of military technologies. In this respect,

cost, which was evaluated in theoretical framework in the first part, will be examined in practical framework in the second part.

Drawing the theoretical framework means giving the answer to the first one of the initial questions. However, in order to support both the given answer and empirical data, and to respond to the second initial question, the hypothesis must be tested in the cases after 1945. This effort will constitute the second part of the study.

The post-1945 period will be examined over four terms over the relationship between cost and relative power. What determines these four periods is the equilibrium between three elements: the rise of costs, the decline of the relative power and the change of the use of armed force as an instrument of international relations. According to this approach, which will be called as *power pendulums*, it will be argued that the relative power of states moves down and upward like a pendulum parallel to the way they use costs and / or methods. These four periods are discussed at the top and bottom points of this pendulum.

Accordingly, the term between 1945-1972 will be examined as the first period. In this section, which was examined in the US-USSR competition due to its bipolar structure, the strategic environment and relative power reflections were examined through these two actors. In this context, the period began when the development of the atomic bomb facilitated a political result at low cost. On the other hand, actors who could not achieve political results by conventional methods built non-conventional methods on cost increase and started to achieve political results with asymmetric struggles. What is important in that point is that almost none of the conflicts have been militarily defeated by the powerful side, but that the relative power of it has been reduced and withdrawn to reduce costs. In the case of Vietnam, the most obvious example of this, and the year 1972, when the US decided to withdraw and began to reduce costs (and thus began to increase its relative strength), was considered as the end of this period.

In the second period, the years between 1972 and 1989 was examined. In this term, where the strategic environment and the relative power reflections maintained, the basic examination continued through these two actors. This 17 years process has been shaped with the importance of asymmetric strategies and direct engagements. Thus, this term also called as 'proxy wars era' in which indirect methods are replaced by

strategies that increase the costs of opposing powers. In this context, it will be defend that the fact that at least one of the parties of the struggles has become non-state actors, supports data rather than preventing the issues that are defended on a theoretical basis. The bottom point of this process will be the USSR's case of Afghanistan and the date of 1989's withdrawal from the region. Since the withdrawal date of the USSR will also constitute the beginning of the disintegration process, this will push the US to the top of the pendulum in terms of relative power and initiate a second release of pendulum.

In the third period between 1989 and 2009, it will be examined how the relative power of US has increased due to being the only superpower of the world and how it decreased after the challenge of NSAs with unconventional methods. Therefore, the strategic environment is examined through US and NSAs. A new wave for declining costs also allows comparison. Accordingly, after the emergence of precision guided munitions as a cost cutter, it will be shown how the security commitment of the United States was eased just as it was after the atomic bomb. Similarly, in the wake of transformed non-conventional strategies, the inability of the United States to achieve political results despite significant military successes and the declining power constitute the basis for another comparison. 2009 will be accepted as the bottom line of the second pendulum, when US was decided to withdraw from Iraq in a way that the burden would share with the local elements, recognizing that the desired political goal wouldn't be fully achieved, just as it was in Vietnam.

The period between 2009 and 2015 is the last period. The first thing to be emphasized that 2015 is not the end of the process, however it points the end of the examination. It is accepted -as of the year 2019- that this period still continues. This term is examined as a period of hybrid wars in which actors such as the USA, Russia, Israel, Iran, Ukraine enter into struggle against both states and NSAs, in many cases where both actors and methods intertwine. In this context, a comparison will be made with the second period and how the states are trying to decrease their costs through indirect strategies are discussed.

It is clear that each of the areas and cases mentioned above have scopes which require separate examination. However, it is considered that the method and the focus of study make it possible to examine these broad issues as a whole. Robert Dahl used

the following words in a section when he wrote on state in his prominent work, *On Democracy*:

“Writings about the state by political and legal philosophers would probably require enough paper to use up a small forest. But what I have said will, I believe, serve our purpose.”⁶

I would like to begin to the study inspired by Dahl's words. Although studies on war and transformation of war constitute one of the most extensive literature of our time, my examination prepared in the light of focus areas, I believe, will be sufficient to find answers.



⁶ Robert A. Dahl, **Demokrasi Üzerine**, translated to Turkish by Betül Kadioğlu, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2010, p. 51.

I. UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR

The transformation of armed conflicts has been one of the most dynamic and most open areas of interaction throughout history, and has been influenced by the conditions in which they are present, as well as being one of the most striking factors in these conditions. Parallel to this, the transformation of armed conflicts was not only confined to its own domain, but also initiated transformations in all areas of interaction. For this reason, the transformation of armed conflicts has never been limited to the field of war studies and/or security; different researchers have addressed this crucial reality in various dimensions, according to the subjects of their studies.

Focus variations affected the assumptions on the fundamental determinants of transformation, which led to the constructing of different approaches on transformation. In summary, in order to talk about the transformation of armed conflicts, it is necessary to first define the areas in which it is interacting individually, to specify what is effective in these areas, and then to examine them.

In this context, technology is the first motive to transform wars. The development of tools that have great advantages in battles has brought about the re-organizing of the warfare and the armies accordingly, and when these needs are at a fast pace, it has been often observed that the adjustments in political and economic scopes are made. The use of scientific developments into wars as technological practices and likewise the support in scientific studies to provide advantages in war have been one of the greatest continuities in history. As Oswald Spengler points out, it is not a coincidence that the use of gunpowder in wars and the fact that the publication of books coincided with almost the same time,⁷ indicate this relationship. Within this scope, the historical

⁷ Oswald Spengler, **The Decline Of the West**, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 1926, Vol 2, p. 460. Cited by, H. A. De Weerd, "Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: Sivillerin Ortaya Çıkışı", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 397-417.

course is full of the examples of the effects of technology transformation on the armed conflicts and its beyond.

Accordingly, as an example from the period when bringing as many people as possible into the battlefield was the main practice, the long spears used by Alexander made it possible for the smaller troops to gain important victories and to defeat the larger armies with more soldiers in number than themselves. This advantage, a result of the use of technology, also influenced the politics and it enables other states with small armies to declare war. This age was followed by the periods when firearms were used in battlefields. The use of cannons in battlefields has not only brought about the significant innovation on the battlefield but has also been one of the fundamental motives in the centralization of sovereign authority which had been disintegrated as the feudal structures in Europe. In the following ages, the products of the industrial era became influential on the battlefields. It was not only related with war like machine guns but also the technologies such as railways and telegraphy changed totally the war patterns. Subsequently, the process of the formation of mechanized units, submarines and planes turns wars into a three-dimensional instance and this has been followed by the outbreak of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the deadliest weapon of humankind. The existence of these weapons has deeply influenced not only wars but also politics and society with its concept of 'mutual assured destruction' (MAD). This advancement process within the same logic continues today hand in hand with the technological developments such as precision-guided munitions (PGM) or cyberspace and it continues to transform wars.⁸

Another issue to discuss is the organization of war. At this point, Keegan describes six forms of military organizations. According to this, warrior, mercenary, slave, regular, conscript and militia have been the forms of military organization in different eras and societies.⁹ In this context, mercenaries were preferred for a period of time in the states which found regular military establishment costly and interested in trade instead of military service, whereas the compulsory military form emerged as a result of the French Revolution conditions and political imposition and then continued in the absence of imposition. As it can be seen in these examples, the issue of the organization

⁸ Martin Van Creveld, **Technology and War**, New York: Free Press, 1989, pp. 235-297.

⁹ John Keegan, **Savaş Sanatı Tarihi**, çeviri Füsun Doruker, İstanbul: Gençlik Yayınları, 1995, p. 176.

and transformation of the military domain is directly related to the political, economic and social domains and the examination should be made accordingly.

Another factor that transforms wars is the economy. Economics becomes one of the main determinants of wars after the transition to the monetary economy while it was a relatively minor matter in the early era due to self-sufficient feudality or knight-like militia military organization. In addition, technological developments have brought about not only the use of economic resources to achieve these developments, but also the problem of covering the additional costs due to technological developments. As an example, although it was expected that the development of cannons would require less animal use in wars and reduce costs, in 1550, it required 39 horses to carry only 1 large cannon and 156 horses to carry gunpowder and bullets for the supply of one week. Similarly, to carry 10 cannons and mortar shells, 1849 oxen pair and 753 cars were found to be required.¹⁰ This is undoubtedly not only economic but also logistic problem as described below. Economic sustainability will become the main goal after the era of attrition wars as a continuation of the emergence of total wars in the upcoming periods. Especially during the era of strategic bombardments in the maneuver wars, it will be the fundamental goal to target the industrial areas and economic infrastructure of the enemy. For this reason, in many wars, strategies are established on battlefields as well as economic sustainability and more powerful states in collecting economic resources have applied indirect strategies instead of direct ones. Undoubtedly, as this represents a significant transformation in the framework of the warfare, the determinant is not the technology or the organization of army, but the economy. Another thing that requires considering the economy and technology together is that the cost of ordnance has increased in parallel with their old technologies. In this context, throughout the history, the development of a new weapon system has led to the development of another weapon system against it, and ultimately the resource spent to maintain the weapon system exceeded and continues to exceed its benefit.¹¹ This loop of the development of a new technology and weapon system exemplifies the impact of the technology-economy relation on transforming wars.

¹⁰ Geoffrey Parkey, "Hanedan Savaşları", in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, ed. by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsün Tayanç ve Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 177.

¹¹ George Friedman, **Savaşın Geleceği**, translated to Turkish by Enver Günsel, İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2015, pp. 41-43.

Logistics has been one of the main determinants of war formation since the early ages. The expression of the famous French statesman Cardinal Richelieu that "*history books show many army perished not due to the enemy action but due to the lack of food and order*"¹² reveals the role of logistics in the transformation of wars. Beyond the economic and political dimensions, feeding the army, transporting their equipment with themselves, storing these necessities on the shortest route and fulfilling the sheltering needs have created a requirement for an important organization. In this respect, the issues such as the railway and the use of chemicals in food directly affected the logic of logistics and brought about the wars with bigger armed forces spreading to larger areas. Besides, logistic problems affect the economy in the first step and later politics. As an example, the money which had spent for the army's food even in the early era of mass armies was equivalent to the daily wage of 90,000 ordinary workers.¹³ In a similar way, to demonstrate the influence of railways in terms of transportation, it may be useful to give an example from a much earlier period than railways. Roman Vegetius notes that military exercises should include also 30 kg cargo handling training and he underlines its reason as the soldiers carrying their equipment and food before the war will be tired for war if they are unprepared.¹⁴ Logistics not only includes procurement convenience but also transportation convenience. For example, using rivers as a means of transport had a major role in combat strategies in lowering both transport and additional costs until the railways became the main transportation means. As an opposite example, in the case of Khiva expedition by the Russians in 1874, it was necessary to bring 8800 camels for the 5800 soldiers to pass the rugged terrain and to reach the destination.¹⁵ In a similar way, the strategy of obtaining resources from conquered territories in many wars to supply their logistical needs has revealed political implications; wars and lootings in different parts of the world are observed simultaneously.

The political area has been greatly influenced by the transformation of wars as well as playing a key role in the transformation of wars. The determination of politics

¹² Martin van Creveld, **Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 17.

¹³ Charles Tilly, **Zor, Sermaye ve Avrupa Devletlerinin Oluşumu**, translated to Turkish by Kudret Emiroğlu, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2001, pp. 144-145.

¹⁴ G.R. Watson, **The Roman Soldier**, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985, pp. 63-65. Cited by John Keegan, op.cit, p. 233.

¹⁵ John Keegan, Ibid, p. 234.

in the outbreak of wars has continued in all periods; it has given various forms to wars such as the 'dynasty war', 'the war of religion', 'inter-state war', 'international war' and has basically affected the activities of the societies that are the motivation and the element of war. As a simplest example, the transformation of the political structure into a nation-state form during the French revolution did not only lead to a regional war but also to the legislation of the compulsory military service by revolutionary forces seeking a solution to this war. This practice made an important contribution to the way to total wars by significantly influencing the conduct of wars. Moreover, wars have played a vital role in the formation of sovereign states and states have begun to use war as a mechanism. Tilly expresses this pattern as "*wars make the state and the states make war.*"¹⁶ Another example of the effect of politics on the transformation of war is that the groups, not being able to respond to their opponents by traditional methods of war, prefer new diverse ways of the warfare, ranging from guerrilla to terrorism, by creating new political organization forms.

Another crucial point that should be addressed in the examination of the transformation of the war is the fact that the historical perspective of the transformation is largely driven by the transformation in Europe and so it is European-centered. This is due to the fact that the transformation of the structures that affect our present is mainly formed in Europe and these structures are imported to some extent into the different parts of the world such as the Ottoman Empire, Japanese Empires or Tzardom of Russia which tried to join this transformation process from an external point of view. To illustrate with an example, it can be argued that certain periods of the Roman Empire, the Carolingian Empire's feudal structures and the Ottoman Empire's manorial system had similar infrastructure and organization characteristics. However, while the Ottomans maintained a manorial system supported by the Janissaries for a long time, a transformation took place in Europe and the Ottoman Empire tried to import the benefits of this transformation after the 18th century. For this reason, it is a fact that most of the economic, political and social data about the examples and infrastructure to be observed and discussed in order to examine the transformation of the war initially belong to Europe.

¹⁶ Charles Tilly, op.cit, pp. 123-168.

In brief, the transformation of war, -like the war itself- is a complex phenomenon that cannot be judged by its interaction with the developments only in one field.

For this reason, in order to examine the transformation, it is necessary to proceed with the approach and method that gives the most convenient tools for the problematic of the study and therefore to choose the suitable theoretical background among various studies with different classifications.



A. How to Read the Transformation: Three Approaches on Contemporary Armed Conflicts

As it emphasized above, there are a wide range of approaches and methods on the transformation of armed conflicts. Therefore, the first thing to do should be to determine the convenient approaches that overlap the research question among these approaches and methods, and then to put forward the hypothesis by comparing these approaches.

1. How to Read the Transformation: Comparing Approaches and Methods

In order to find the most convenient basis for study in various approaches and methods, it is considered that the right start should be re-mention the initial problem and to advance in the light of this problem. In this context, the initial problem is shaped by what is the decisive dynamics of the hybridization¹⁷ of armed conflicts and how it is reflected in the actors' behaviors.

The first question to be answered in the light of the initial problem is which perspective will be examined. In this context, stating two fundamental perspectives will be easier for answering the question. There are two main tendencies to examine armed conflicts: normative perspective and empirical perspective.¹⁸ The normative perspective examines areas such as initiating war, ethical determinants of fighting and ending, situations where war is justified (just war), and law of war. Empirical

¹⁷ The concept of armed conflicts gradually shifting from traditional methods to non-conventional methods, from symmetric warfare to asymmetric warfare, from physical space to cyber-space, from military elements to civilian elements, and in almost every case to intertwine.

¹⁸ Greg Cashman, **What Causes War: An Introduction to the Theories of International Conflict**, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2014, pp. 1-3. Cited by Öner Akgül, "Bilimsel Yöntemlerle Savaşın Nedenlerini Açıklama Yolu Olarak Savaş Çalışmaları Disiplini", **Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi**, Vol. 12, No. 23, 2016, p. 4.

perspective, however, stands out as the method of trying to establish a cause and effect relationship based on observable data.¹⁹

In this context, the first choice on the perspective should be the empirical method, considering the initial problem of study. In both the hybridization of armed conflicts and actor behaviors are the areas of investigation outside the normative area. What should be done after this elimination should be to cluster empirical research approaches and to put the hypothesis on the theoretical approach which is decided to be the most appropriate tool among these approaches.

Considering the transformation of armed conflicts, there are a number of classifications with different focus. Chronologically ranking the prominents of these classifications will be useful in terms of clustering.

	1 st Phase	2 nd Phase	3 rd Phase	4 th Phase	5 th Phase
Quincy Wright (1942/1964) ²⁰	Pre-Modernism Wars	Adaptation of Firearms	Professionalization of Armies	Capitalization of War	Totalitari- zation of War
William Lind et al. (1989) ²¹	Pre-Westphalian Wars	First Generation Warfare	Second Generation Warfare	Third Generation Warfare	Fourth Generation Warfare
J. Hanle (1989) ²²	Middle Ages Period	Classical Period	Early Modern Period	Late Modern Period	Nuclear Period
Charles Tilly (1990) ²³	Patrimonialism Stage	Brokerage Stage	Nationalization Stage	Specialization Stage	
Martin van Creveld (1991) ²⁴	The Age of Tools	The Age of Machines		The Age of Systems	The Age of Automation
Alvin Toffler (1993) ²⁵	Wars of Agricultural Societies	Wars of Industry Societies		Wars of Information Societies	

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

²⁰ Quincy Wright, **A Study of War**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 65-70.

²¹ William Lind et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into The Fourth Generation", **Marine Corps Gazette**, Vol 73, No 10, 1989, pp. 22-26.

²² Cited by Metin Gürçan, "Savaşın Evrimi ve Teorik Yaklaşımlar", in **Teoriler Işığında Güvenlik, Savaş, Barış ve Çatışma Çözümleri**, ed. Atilla Sandıklı, İstanbul: Bilgesam Yayınları, 2012, p. 76.

²³ Charles Tilly, op.cit, pp. 63-64.

²⁴ Martin Van Creveld, op. cit.

²⁵ Cited by Metin Gürçan, op. cit. p. 76.

Mary Kaldor (1999) ²⁶	Pre-Westphalian Wars	Absolutist States and Empires Wars	Nation States Wars	Cold War Period – Ideology Wars	New Wars
Q.Liang and W. Xiangsui (1999) ²⁷	Limited Middle Age Wars	Limited Empire Wars and Nation-State Wars			Unlimited Post-Modern Wars
J. Arquilla and D. Rondfelt (2000) ²⁸	Age of Swords	Mass and Industry Wars		Maneuver Wars Period	Conflicts Derive from Each Other
Knox and Murray (2001) ²⁹	Wars after modern military institutions (Westphalia Era)	Parallel Military Revolutions		Post-WWI Period	Nuclear Weapons Era
		French Revolution	Industrial Revolution	(The period which combines previous two phases)	
Geoffrey Parker (2005) ³⁰	Age of Massed Infantry	Age of Stone Fortifications	Age of Guns and Sails	Age of Mechanized Warfare	

Table 1.1: Classifications on the Transformation of Armed Conflicts³¹

Considering the above classifications, it is observed that two basic group focus on war, are out of the table. The first of these is the study group, which is also called traditional readings, in which the war reads in the light of general realist principles of international relations. In this context, warfare appear as a 'result' within the general framework drawn by the realist theorists and theoreticians who are close to realist theory, although they do not consider themselves representative of any theoretical approach.³² These approaches, which read through the phenomenon of power in international relations and read through the changes in power relations, analyze the

²⁶ Mary Kaldor, **New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era**, London: Polity Press, 1999, p.10.

²⁷ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, **Unrestricted Warfare**, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.

²⁸ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, **The Advent of the Netwar (RAND Report)**, California: RAND Cooperation, 1996.

²⁹ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, **The Dynamics of Military Revolutions (1300-2050)**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

³⁰ Geoffrey Parker, **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, translated to Turkish by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006.

³¹ Metin Gürcan's table was used as the first template to bring the different classifications together; various changes and additions to this table have been made. For initial table see also Metin Gürcan, op.cit, pp. 75-76.

³² John A. Vasquez, **The War Puzzle Revisited**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 98-99.

war based on International Relations and use a deductive methodology in this regard. Therefore, although they do not provide an explanation based only and directly on technological, political, economic, etc. elements that constitute the infrastructure of war, they examine the holistic structure of these elements. Thus, they developed complex theories based on approaches such as international anarchy, balance of power, power transitions, and hegemonic transition. For this reason, it is considered that realist theories should be included in the comparison.

The second group, also known as behaviorists, is the cluster that advocates that the war should be investigated with a quantitative and inductive methodology on the basis of cause-and-effect relationship. As an extension of one of the main debates of international relations, behaviorists argue that it is problematic to give the truths of examinations to be initiated in the light of any scientifically unobserved knowledge. For this reason behaviorists are clustered with the understanding that assumptions should be developed by examining data.³³ At this very point, the first question mark is about explaining the transformation of the armed conflicts of behavioral studies. The studies which advocate that each case is shaped in its own time-space conditions and that this data should be considered as a "pre-condition" in both systemic and dyadic/triadic/multilateral relations find their 'constants' rather than the 'transformation' factors of armed conflicts. The explanations on transformation include a very long period. For example, the progress of armed conflicts after 1815 from military elements to civilians was a very clear case with data sets. However, there is no holistic study of the reasons behind the acceleration of the process after the twentieth century, the explosion after 1945, and the civilianization of military elements after 1991. In this context, Vasquez's emphasis on behaviorist differences in the development of theoretical hypotheses about war will be useful to bring it up.

Vasquez made six basic assumptions to address the war.³⁴

1. War is learned.
2. War comes out of a long-term process.
3. War is a product of interaction and not simply systemic conditions.
4. War is a way of making decisions.
5. War is multicasual.
6. There are different types of war.

³³ Erhan Büyükakıncı, "J. David Singer", in **Savaş Kuramları**, ed. Erhan Büyükakıncı, İstanbul: Adres Yayınları, 2015, pp. 517-526.

³⁴ John A. Vasquez, op.cit, p. 42.

As can be judged from the above assumptions, inductive studies have been formulated on the basis of exposing the conditions within each armed conflict and exposing the continuities within the different conflicts. In this regard, behavioral studies have a significant capacity to explain many aspects of today's armed conflicts, but they cannot focus on the elements that transform the different conflicts throughout the world in a similar way. Vasquez's third assumption above, for example, is that war cannot be reduced only to systemic elements, and that interactions need to be considered at in terms of transformation, is crucial to understand the transformation. However, this assumption is already accepted by all approaches. Even Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, who claimed to have made systemic reductionism, accepted this fact and established his theory accordingly:

“The third image³⁵ describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images³⁶ there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”³⁷

The element to be emphasized at this point is that the deductive approaches do not deny that the actors within the system have distinctive circumstances and their relationships are crucial for analysis. However, it is based on using a general assumption and test it in the light of falsification principle in order to find the similar transformations occur in different cases. This is not seen in the inductive approaches. For example, there are different actors, different decision-making processes, different external elements and their interaction in the Sierra Leone Civil War in the 1990s or in the Yugoslavian civil war in the 1990s, or in the Syrian Civil War in the Conflict Ukraine in the 2000s. However, there are issues that offer similarities all over the world such as the cheapness of weapons, the use of foreign warriors, and the emergence of identities. These new elements, as shown below, are seen as the result of globalization in some studies, while some are seen as the result of transformation in military organizations and some as the result of the formation of power vacuums. Inductive

³⁵ The third image will be expressed as the "anarchic structure" in later works of Waltz.

³⁶ These two images refer to state and individual levels. Considering that these two levels were later further developed by behaviouralists, it is acceptable to include sub-state actors (such as society, bureaucracy, decision makers).

³⁷ Kenneth Waltz, **Man, State and The War**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p.238. Cited by, Menent Savaş Cazala, "Kenneth N. Waltz", in **Savaş Kuramları**, ed. Erhan Büyükcakıncı, İstanbul, Adres Yayınları, 2015, p. 380.

studies, however, abstain from these holistic explanations and despite the success of method's explanatory power, they are lacking in explaining the transformation.

Another question mark for the explanatory nature of inductive studies is how to measure the transformative effect of armed conflicts or decision-making processes based on various components. Accordingly, it has become a matter of questioning the explicability of a method that asserts that decision-makers will act in rationality and that they can define each component as a condition by finding each of the causes affecting the war.³⁸ Again, by way of example, it is a question of how the approaches based on the examination of decision-making mechanisms based on the rationality of the executives will be implemented towards any tribal leader of a civil war in Africa or towards a warlord in Afghanistan. A similar reality exists about the quantitative data. The claim that the will of the other party would be broken when the force was applied was supported by quantitative data during the Cold War period. However, the failure of the US to achieve a political outcome despite its quantitative superiority in Vietnam has shown the lack of this approach. This has shown similar results in all non-conventional conflicts and has brought forward the approach of Clausewitz, who described the war as a 'chameleon'.³⁹

This also applies to studies that address decision-making mechanisms over the benefit-cost accounts of decision-makers, not only over the psychological, cognitive or other backgrounds of decision-makers.⁴⁰ The multi-dimensionality of armed conflicts and the fact that each actor evaluates these dimensions differently, beyond that -often by threats to survival- is where the cost calculation is not done, it also questions the adequacy of these approaches. The biggest problem of these approaches is that actors tend to act on vital issues such as armed conflicts in ways that have not been tried (hence it is impossible to address quantitative data). Another factor that

³⁸ Graham Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis can be shown as an example for studies that examine the decision-making processes for entering or not entering the war with these methods. For the study see also, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, **The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis**, London: Pearson, 1999. For the prominent studies which examines foreign policy decision making processes (including war decisions) on the level of analysis method, see also Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck ve Burton Sapin, **Foreign Policy Decision Making**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Alex Mintz ve Karl DeRouen Jr., **Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

³⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, op.cit, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Bueno de Mesquita's work has been the most prominent of these approaches, which is the attempt to apply the 'expected utility' theory in economics to international relations. For the study, see also Bueno de Mesquita, **The War Trap**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

makes this statistically difficult is that the unexpected moves made by different actors simultaneously create an endless chain of possibilities that affect all the elements. The best example of this is the creation of a variety of asymmetrical methods against symmetrical methods, or an extended response to suicide actions against most advanced military control mechanisms. In summary, although it is impossible to make a full and general explanation for the impact of armed conflicts on actor behavior, using a deductive method to achieve a relatively broader explanation can be more beneficial.

The final question mark on inductive methods emerges at the point that classifying the different types of war, which constitute the last assumption of Vasquez, is sufficient for today's armed conflicts. In order to discuss this, it would be useful to start with the way the Correlates of War (COW Project) deals with the transformation of the war, which makes one of the most comprehensive classifications on the types of armed conflicts and updates it after developments in international relations.

Traditional Typology ⁴¹	Expanded Typology ⁴²
I. International Wars	
A. Inter-state Wars	I. Inter-state Wars(war type 1)
B. Extra-systemic Wars	II. Extra-state Wars
(1) Colonial	A. Colonial: Conflict with colony (war type 2)
(2) Imperial	B. Imperial: State vs. non-state (war type 3)
II. Civil Wars	III. Intra-state Wars
	A. Civil Wars
	(2) For central control (war type 4)
	(3) Over local issues (war type 5)
	B. Regional Interwar(war type 6)
	C. Intercommunal(war type 7)
	IV. Non-state Wars
	A. In nonstate territory (war type 9)
	B. Across state borders (war type 10)

Table 1.2: The COW Project's Two Typologies of War⁴³

As shown in Table 1.2, the types of wars are classified sharply from each other and evaluated within the data in these classifications, the expansion of types is based on the diversification of the parties and areas of the conflicts. Accordingly, the transition to non-state actors from inter-state wars has been categorized not only through the center-periphery (metropolitan-peripheral) distinction of the imperial states, but also to include the internationalized aspects of the armed struggles that the non-state actors have with themselves. In this context, the transformation of armed conflicts has been limited to expressing the transitions between these typologies. Accordingly, the COW Project classified the transformations as follows:⁴⁴

⁴¹ David Singer and Melvin Small, **The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook**, New York: John Wiley Press, 1972. Singer and Small then made an update to their classification by adding new data about the civil war. For the updated study see also, Melvin Small and David Singer, **Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars (1816-1980)**, California: Sage Publications, 1982.

⁴² Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, **Resort to War: 1816-2007**, Washington: CQ Press, 2010.

⁴³ Meredith Reed Sarkees, **The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorising Wars (Version 4 of the Data)**, 2010, http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf, accessed on 19.08.2017. For the datasets used for each typology by COW Project, see also, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war>, accessed on 19.08.2017.

⁴⁴ Meredith Reed Sarkees, Ibid.

1. from inter-state war into extra-state war
2. inter-state war into intra-state war
3. from extra-state war into inter-state war
4. from extra-state war into intra-state war
5. from extra-state war into non-state war
6. from intra-state war into inter-state war
7. from intra-state war into extra-state war
8. from intra-state regional war into intra-state civil war
9. from non-state war into inter-state war
10. from non-state war into extra-state war
11. from non-state war into inter-state war
12. from non-state war into intra-state war

Such as a transformation classification based on quantitative method can provide a basis for the establishment of many different statistical models. For example, through analyzing various internationalized wars occurs between state and non-state actors, a statistical model can be established for the direction in which the foreign forces involved in the war affect the war. Or, with another example, an assumption can be made about the elements that transform an inter-state war into international war. One last example can be given on the cases in which intra-state wars transforms into inter-state wars. It is possible to find a correlation between non-state actors and their external supporter states in means of geography, identity or ideology. These examples can be applied according to each transformation model and provide highly valuable information in terms of identifying the determinants that are decisive of armed conflicts.

Nevertheless, none of these aforementioned models can adequately explain yet how the war organization transformed, how its resources are met, its impact on the participation of other powers in the war, the methods used in the war, the strategic reasons for the prolongation of the war and the effect of technological innovations over the war. In addition, in accordance with the definition made, the logic of using violence fixed to the number of deaths,⁴⁵ diverges the war from the holistic approach that sees it as a continuation of the political struggle in Clausewitzian expression. It would be useful to open that with examples. For example, cyber-attacks, any action aimed at civilians, (organized rape, kidnapping, assassinations to state officials, etc.) or economic sabotage are the methods of fighting against the political will of the other

⁴⁵ For example, Bremer et al., describe the international warfare as follows: "An international war is a military conflict waged between (or among) national entities, at least one of which is a state, which results in at least 1000 battle deaths of military personnel". Stuart Bremer et al, **The Scientific Study of War**, New York, Learning Resources in International Studies, 1975, p. 12, cited by John A. Vasquez, op.cit., p. 26.

party. These methods involving the use of force in different forms cannot be considered sufficiently explanatory because the above classifications are defined by the actor rather than by the action.

A different example can be given through the process of globalization. In the process of globalization, some states have become failed or fragile states. The easiness of non-state actors in finding and funding personnel in these countries has changed the approach of many states towards war and security. The method above seems not adequately to explain the relationship between globalization and warfare. Because analysis should be based on globalization and also analysis should be directed from globalization to war. In other words, method has to be deductive. Given that this is the main factor in determining the actor's behavior, the problem becomes clearer.

The problem is even more obvious in actual cases such as hybrid warfare,⁴⁶ which are increasingly examples. In this context, it will be useful to give examples through hybrid warfare issues that will be explained in the following sections. The first example can be given over the Ukrainian case. In this case, there is a political struggle, with Ukrainian government on one side and non-state actors on the other side, faced by external actors blending traditional and non-traditional methods. It appears that Russia has not officially existed in the conflict, but it has also intervened in the political process through cyber attacks and military elements assumed to be outside of Ukraine. When this hybrid approach is considered, it is evaluated that the answer to the question of which one of the aforementioned classifications should be included in the case is unclear. Should this struggle be accepted as an internationalized intra-state war? Or should it be taken as a struggle between Russia and NATO-EU, which is transformed from intra-state war to inter-state war? Or has it evolved from intra-state war to extra-state war? More importantly, when we choose any of these, how can we prove the criteria that will defeat the others in such a hybridized struggle?

Another example is the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006. Is the political struggle an internationalized state-non state actor conflict? Who will be the parties? The fact that Hezbollah is settled in Lebanon, but that the missiles used in the war are of Iranian origin complicates the situation. More importantly, Iran did not officially engage in the conflict, and Israel did not attack Iran, which it said was the 'real responsible'

⁴⁶ Hybrid warfare will be explained in 1.C.3 section.

country of the war. Additionally, Iran did not officially engage in the conflict, and Israel did not attack Iran, which it accused of being the main responsibility of the war. So what criteria would it be best to deal with this conflict and its actors? In summary, due to the classification criteria and analysis methods of the inductive methods, it is considered that it has not yet been able to fully provide the tools needed to investigate the relationship form indicated in the initial problem.

In the light of all these factors, it is decided to use deductive methodology. Although important analysis of the inductive methodology will be frequently used, it is decided that it is not suitable for this study as fundamental methodology. In this context, although the data sets, quantitative data and the studies of behavioral researchers are included in the study, the methodology to be followed to find an answer to the initial problem is different. Because of the focus of the study on assessing armed conflicts in the context of international relations and the impact of armed conflicts on power relations, there will be a choice between deductive approaches.

After selecting the approaches and methods to compare among the classifications that are not included in Table 1.1, it is necessary to return to the table and evaluate the clusters of approaches. It is possible to divide three approaches clusters, all of which are deductive. In addition to that, there is one more cluster which consist from various studies that cannot put one of these clusters.

First, for those who cannot be included in any cluster, the classifications of Quincy Wright, Alvin Toffler, and Charles Tilly's works can be listed. Wright's work, considered one of the fundamental works on war, will be considered as a 'reference guide', rather than as part of one of the clusters, since the effects of the work are seen in different clusters and the analysis does not include the post-1964 period. The classification of Alvin Toffler cannot be included in any group. Because Toffler is a researcher who observes mega-trends, not wars, and what he points about war are general. In this context, it can be said that the new war studies and the fourth generation war studies, which will be mentioned below, are influenced by Toffler's classification of information society wars. Finally, the work of Charles Tilly, whose focus is beyond the transformation of wars, just like the Toffler, is too broad to put a cluster. However, it should be noted that Tilly's analyses were taken into account both in new wars and in the fourth generation of war studies.

The first of three clusters is the one formed by those who argue that transformation in the international system is transforming armed conflicts. Mary Kaldor is accepted as the leading theorist of new wars studies. Herfried Münkler⁴⁷ and partly Martin Van Creveld⁴⁸ are other important theorists of this approach, which stated in the Table 1.1 with classification of Mary Kaldor.⁴⁹ In this approach, it is argued that armed conflict and its role in political struggles has transformed due to the political, economic and social effects of globalization process. This approach, which provides important data and contributions to the forms of political struggle towards post-Cold War period, shows new interactions in armed conflicts, but it is considered that the consequences of the change in the nature of armed conflicts and the change in the role of politics in armed conflicts are wrong. Moving from the determination that the characteristics of the war has transformed, not the nature, the next section will focus on separation between the analyses which can be useful in the study and the analyses which will be falsified.

The second cluster consists of advocates that technological innovations and ideas are the turning point of the effects of organization and war making. This approach, found in the organizational changes seen by the influence of technological and cultural innovations, divides war into generations and argues that technological innovations brought by these generations have changed the organization of war. Fourth generation warfare approach has first developed by William S. Lind and his colleagues.⁵⁰ Lind's classification on transformation of war is also similar with Liang&Xiangsiu and Arquilla&Rondfelt, as can be seen in Table 1.1. The fourth generation warfare studies are highly affected from Creveld's studies, as it was embraced by Thomas Hammes

⁴⁷ For the fundamental work that Münkler has compiled on the subject, see also Herfried Münkler, **Yeni Savaşlar**, translated to Turkish by Zehra Aksu Yılmaz, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.

⁴⁸ Although Martin Van creveld is often associated with the literature of new wars, he has a visionary perspective that transcends this approach, which is also the basis for the fourth-generation war approach. In this context, as a thinker who affects both approaches, it will be referred to in both approaches as 'partly'. Creveld's most important contribution to the new war approach stems from the post-Clausewitzian war approach. For the fundamental work that Creveld has compiled on the subject, see also Martin van Creveld, **The Transformation of War**, New York: The Free Press, 1991.

⁴⁹ For the fundamental work that Kaldor has compiled on the subject, see also Mary Kaldor, op.cit.

⁵⁰ For the fundamental work that considers as the reference guide of fourth generation warfare literature, see also. William Lind et al, op.cit., pp. 22-26.

completely⁵¹ and by David Kilcullen partly.⁵² In this context, it is argued that many areas in which the states are monopolized by its power of resource mobilization are transformed after technological innovations, which affect actor behaviors.

Similar to the first cluster, this second cluster also provides useful data and approaches, but it is considered that there is no approach to be based on the hybridization of armed conflicts and its reflection on power relations. In this section on the approach, three assumptions will be tried to be falsified. The first of these are the criteria for the division of the generations of war. The second is the erroneous assumption on the distinction criteria between the Western-Eastern war cultures. The last one is that the argument that states organized in the light of Clausewitzian doctrines do not embrace the fourth-generation war. The falsification of the third assumption will bring also the fundamental logic of the third group, and also of the approach to be defended in the hypothesis of study.

The hypothesis of the study will be based on the work of the third cluster, which reads the transformation of armed conflicts through 'traditional readings'. In this context, it will be essential to establish a hypothesis based on the approaches that claim that the 'characteristic of the war is transformed rather than its nature'. Accordingly, it will be argued that Clausewitzian means that the relationship between the uses of policy-armed force, in other words, the instrumental role of war, has not changed, however policy makers and conduction of war have been diversified and transformed. In other words, although the existence of elements presented by the first two clusters as data is accepted, these elements will be treated as 'side elements' which cause new strategies to be produced within the general framework of international relations, not as elements of basic analysis.

Since armed conflicts are examine with in the general framework of international relations, they will not only be evaluate with the transformation of armed conflicts, but will be dealt with gradually over various elements. In this context, the systems established within the framework of the general structure of international relations will

⁵¹ Thomas X. Hammes, **The Sling and The Stone: On War In The 21th Century**, Minneapolis: MBI Publishing, 2006.

⁵² Although Kilcullen has elaborated on counter-insurgency in great detail, it appears that the fourth generation warfare approach in his work shares the emphasis on the intellectual domain. Kilcullen's approach will be discussed in the following sections.

be evaluated within the power relations. The use of armed forces will be shaped on this infrastructure. Since one of the two focal points of the study is power relations, the overall framework will be read through structural realism. In this context, military history studies can be evaluated as the third cluster for the transformation of wars. Military history studies, which do not imply a 'mission' to the transformation of the war, but which look at the breakpoints leading to similar results in military organizations all over the world, make a significant contribution to this. Murray and Knox's study,⁵³ G. Parkey's study⁵⁴ or J. Henle's study in Table 1.1, can be given as examples. Among these studies, Murray and Knox's work will be used to explain the military transformation. The reason is that there is an analysis that distinguishes between the concept of 'military revolution' (MR) and the concept of 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), as well as the response to the classification of the fourth generation of war approaches. The theoretical background that will give empirical data by linking the two pillars of the hypothesis (general framework and use of armed force) will be the studies that demonstrate how actors produce strategies in the context of the structure, starting with great powers. At this stage, the 'imperial overstretch' concept, developed by Paul Kennedy, will be used.⁵⁵ It will be useful to demonstrate the strategies of great powers according to their power expansion and decline; and its reflections on other actors. In conclusion, the hypotheses that will be formed by updating and synthesizing these theories according to contemporary conflicts will be included in the last section of this chapter.

Following the methodological and theoretical selection of how to read the transformation, three different approaches can be taken one by one and the hypothesis can be put forward.

2. Reading the Transformation Through Globalization: New Wars

The new wars studies basically argue that States and wars have begun to transform in parallel with the process of globalization. For this reason, these studies assert that

⁵³ MacGregor Knox ve Williamson Murray, op.cit.

⁵⁴ Geoffrey Parker, op.cit.

⁵⁵ Paul Kennedy, **The Rise and Fall of Great Powers**, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 14.

traditional perspectives, which emphasize the importance of nation states and use Clausewitzian approach, cannot fully understand the organized violence of the present day and that no solution can be produced to them.⁵⁶ In fact, the new types of conflicts in different regions of the world (especially so-called 'failed states'⁵⁷) were not just about the collapse of these countries, but the evaluations of what might be a new political turmoil to the whole world were also made right after the end of the Cold War.⁵⁸ However, the holistic studies that combine with the criticism of the Clausewitzian paradigm of war by taking the process over the effects of globalization, started with new wars. In this context, the new wars studies first defines the new structures brought with the globalization process, and then goes to a new-old wars distinction for analysis, arguing that the resulting form of struggle is 'new'. After these common assumptions, it is observed that different results can be achieved. Accordingly, Mary Kaldor argues that the situation that arises will create a global chaos that can be solved only by the global governance logic based on cosmopolitanism.⁵⁹ Herfried Münkler argues that 'centers' that can influence the globalization process and maintain resource control will create 'new form of empires' to control periphery through small fragments formed in scattered states.⁶⁰

The impact of globalization on organized violence is explained in three main areas in the new wars approach. First of these are the fact that many of the states are unable to benefit from the resources they control after the global economy and political transformations, so they begin to fall in the sense of sovereignty and legitimacy. Secondly, in parallel with the problems of legitimacy, cultural interaction in the process of globalization has increased dramatically, and a shift from national and/or

⁵⁶ Mary Kaldor, "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror", **International Politics**, Sayı 42, 2005, pp. 491-498.

⁵⁷ Yalcinkaya states that the term was first used by Gerald Herman and Steven Ratner. Accordingly, the term is defined as "*utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community*". For definition see, Gerald B. Herman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States", **Foreign Policy**, No 89, Winter 1992-93, p.3. Cited by Haldun Yalçinkaya, **Savaş: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Kullanımı**, Ankara: İmge yayınları, 2008, p.326. For a re-evaluation of the thesis, see also, Gerald B. Herman and Steven Ratner, op.cit.

⁵⁸ For an example on these early studies, see also Alain Minc, **Yeni Ortaçağ**, translated to Turkish by Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995, p. 24.

⁵⁹ Mary Kaldor, "**New and Old Wars...**", pp. 112-138.

⁶⁰ Herfried Münkler, **İmparatorluklar: Eski Roma'dan ABD'ye Dünya Egemenliğinin Mantığı**, translated to Turkish by Zehra Aksu Yılmaz, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012. Herfried Münkler, **Yeni Savaşlar**, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005, pp. 67-68. The person who united the new imperial approaches with the theory of new wars has become Münkler. However, a number of new empire studies have been carried out and the following will be mentioned below.

ideological identities to subnational and/or transnational identities has been experienced, thus struggles based on identity politics have emerged.⁶¹ The third is that, parallel to all these processes, it has become easier for states to reach the resources⁶² of the struggle, whether through the transit of loosed borders, or without direct support from the national structure or from another state. It is argued that the three above effects of globalization have shifted armed conflicts into a post-Clausewitzian logic.

In this context, it is assumed that the first impact of globalization is experienced in state sovereignty. Due to the sovereignty and management weaknesses of the states, a process extending from becoming the fragile state to the failed state⁶³ at the extreme point is the most important observation factor. In this context, it is observed that many states cannot control their territorial and national resources, and beyond that, they experience security weaknesses, which are their main tasks, and they cannot secure their citizens partly or fully. In this respect, conflicts arise in some countries where central authority is completely lost, and in others where the government becomes a party of the conflict, and so the new face of the conflict is shown. As a result, even though the 'state-state' wars constituted a part of the use of violence, the view that it is now 'obsolete'⁶⁴ and rarely seen as a phenomenon has been accepted in these approaches. More frequently, the assessment of the other three faces of violence was adopted and based on the studies of the encounters between 'state-nonstate actor', 'state-civil society' and 'civil society-nonstate actor'.⁶⁵

As a result of the process described above, another assumption is based on the emergence of identities. In this context, with the increasing interaction of individuals who meet in transnational identities, a struggle over any spatial field can become an

⁶¹ Mary Kaldor, "New and Old Wars ...".

⁶² These include human resources, weapons transfers and economic resources.

⁶³ For a useful source of discussion on the definition of the concept of failed states, and beyond that, the debate on international discipline see also, Edward Newman, "Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol 30 No 3, 2009, pp. 421-443. The Foreign Policy magazine, keeps an annual index on fragile and failed states. For fragile state ranking criteria bkz. Foreign Policy, **Fragile States Index 2016**, <http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-index-2016-brexite-syria-refugee-europe-anti-migrant-boko-haram/>, accessed on 10.04.2018.

⁶⁴ For a hypothesis that has been put forward in this regard and following discussion see also Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?", **Survival**, Vol 40 No 4, 1998, pp. 20-38. Donald Kagan, Eliot A. Cohen, Charles Doran & Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange", **Survival**, Vol 41 No 2, 1999, pp. 139-152.

⁶⁵ Barry Buzan, "Askeri Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi", **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, 2008, Vol 5 No 18, pp. 121-123.

identity struggle involving people from all over the world. The most recent example of this was the struggle of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist organization by taking advantage of all the opportunities of globalization. ISIS, which targets the whole world in finding people and uses 'social media' channels for it, has been successful in this issue and has enabled different nation-state citizens who have met in the same identity from different countries of the world to fight in Syria and Iraq.⁶⁶ Moreover, this identity-based approach inevitably transnationalizes the solution production mechanisms and the use of legitimate violence, according to the approach of new wars.⁶⁷ In this context, as well as being supra-national identities shaped at the sub-national level and applied at the very sub-national level to determine political goals, confronted groups felt threatened. This point constitutes the basis of the elements such as fear, internet based provocations, religious and ethnic motives, which are considered among the motivations of violence by Kaldor.

Kaldor points out that this also affects political practice and that it is an important element, which distinguishes the new wars from the old ones. Since new wars are shaped over the areas of sovereignty that globalization has deployed, wars are not intended to conquer an entire region and control the entire population, and also not to take their support and ultimately to rule the country. On the contrary, new wars are aimed at excluding others, by giving state tools to a particular identity group (ethnic, religious, tribal).⁶⁸ In other words, Kaldor argues that societal security⁶⁹ is a fundamental component of the new wars, and emphasizing that, practices such as ethnic cleansing, forced displacement, organized rape, massacre and genocide in some cases are inevitable result of these new wars.⁷⁰

The third impact of globalization on new wars is that it makes easier to conduct an armed conflict. This easing appears at the point of obtaining human resources,

⁶⁶ Charles Lister, "Assesing Syria's Jihad", *Survival*, Vol 56 No 6, 2014, pp. 87-112.

⁶⁷ Mary Kaldor, "Reconceptualizing Organized Violence", in **Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy**, edited by Danielle Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, California: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 103. Cited by, Ian Clark, "Güvenlik Devleti", in **Küresel Dönüşümler: Büyük Küreselleşme Tartışması**, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, 2008, p. 216.

⁶⁸ Mary Kaldor, "In Defence of New Wars", *Stability*, Vol 2 No 4, 2013, p. 2.

⁶⁹ For a detailed review of the components that are built on societal security, including the shaping of a security perception to include the protection of identity see also Ole Waewer, "Toplumsal Güvenliğin Değişen Gündemi, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol 15 No 8, 2008, pp. 151-178.

⁷⁰ Mary Kaldor, "New and Old Wars...", pp. 76-86.

giving them the necessary equipment and financing these activities. In this context, organizations are able to bring citizens of different countries to their own structures through a wide range of resources, especially the internet. The diversity of the countries where some of the participants of the ISIS combined with the fact that some of them have already participated and returned with the same motives in previous different wars, gives an idea about the source.




Figure 1.1: Number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters of ISIS and Returned Fighters (2016-2017)⁷¹

Another aspect of human resources is child soldiers. This is parallel to the technological innovation and widespread use of light weapons. The definition of Münkler for this is remarkable:

“The fact that hand-held firearms have a considerable increase in their shooting power, but their weight is getting smaller, is the main reason why child soldiers can be fully engaged in combat. Moreover, the weapons were not only lightened, they were also get smaller. Some seem to be designed for children rather than adults.”⁷²

In parallel with this process, the weapons have become very cheap, the other missing component has been completed, so the combination of human resources and ammunition required for conflicts. Especially, the fact that the weapons transferred to the conflict zones during the Cold War were left in the conflict zones after 1991, played an important role in this cheapness. Thus, millions of warriors, including more than

⁷¹ Niall McCarthy, **Scores of ISIS Foreign Fighters Have Returned Home**, 25.10.2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/10/25/scores-of-isis-foreign-fighters-have-returned-home-infographic/#4f47890a5e8e>, accessed on 17.03.2018.

⁷² Herfried Münkler, “Yeni Savaşlar...”, p. 39.

300,000 child soldiers,⁷³ have joined an armed conflict independently from their 'legitimate governments'. While Charles Tilly was emphasizing the monopoly of states on war instruments in the process of the formation of modern states, he has expressed that *"every nobleman had a sword in 13th century, but there was no one who has an anti-aircraft weapon in 20th century."*⁷⁴ The new war theorists will argue that many states have lost their monopoly on war due to cheap Kalashnikovs, hand grenades, portable missiles, even in some cases tanks and ships. They will also assert that mastering organized violence⁷⁵ has become very easy, just as in the pre-Westphalia era.⁷⁶

The question of how these wars are financed in a way that is without a national organization, although these elements have been cheapened, reveals another assertion of the new war approach. Accordingly, it is emphasized that the new wars were made by means of looting, pillaging, confiscating international aid, and agreements with private military companies⁷⁷ for future resources. It is also stated that the forces that have succeeded to overcome local resources, provide resources from diasporas (if they have), engage in relations with international criminal organizations, engage in human, drug and weapons trafficking, sexual trade, etc. and provide income from them.⁷⁸

In the light of all these elements, the table of comparative new wars offered by Mary Kaldor is as follows:

⁷³ For data see also, United Nations, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org>, accessed on 21.06.2018.

⁷⁴ Charles Tilly, op.cit., p. 150.

⁷⁵ It is important that Mary Kaldor uses the term 'organized violence' rather than war. And because of the same reason, the emphasis on pre-Westphalian wars are important in new war studies. Organized Violence is an act which refers not only the politics based and regulated types of violence like war, but also refers the ambiguous forms as well. In this context, many active and reactive groups can be the subject of such as an act, and the their their acts, which are not regulated, could be the topic of analysis.

⁷⁶ Herfried Münkler, *"Yeni Savaşlar..."*, pp. 127-128.

⁷⁷ It has been a frequent occurrence for private military companies to undertake resource control, not money, to enter into a conflict with a fighting group. For this reason, it is seen that these companies are called private military contractors' instead of private military companies. For a detailed Turkish study on private military contractors see also, Alper Ekmekçioğlu, *Savaşın Virüsleri: Özel Askeri Şirketler*, İstanbul: Nobel Yayınları, 2016. In this context, it is not a coincidence that the war contractors are mostly interested in mines, and they are in close contact with the owners of the mining companies, and even they are often part of the 'umbrella companies'. For this relationship see also, Alice E. Fuchs, "Searching for Resources, Offering Security: Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone", in *Private Military and Security Companies*, Wlesbaden: Verlag für Socialwissenschaften, pp. 105-121. Cited by Alper Ekmekçioğlu, Ibid, p. 79.

⁷⁸ Mary Kaldor, *"New and Old Wars..."*, pp. 90-112.

	National Conflicts	Ideological/ Cold War Conflicts	New Wars	Humanitarian Intervention (ideal)
Political Goals	Consolidation of state power, especially borders, geopolitical interests	Capture or maintain state power	Disintegration of states; new forms of power based on ethnic homogeneity	Consolidation of international institutions
Ideologies	National	Universal ideologies, e.g. democracy, fascism, socialism	Identity politics; nationalist, tribalist, communalist	Cosmopolitan humanist
Forms of Mobilization	Economic, physical, appeal to patriotism	Ideological/ authoritarian	Fear, corruption, religion, magic, key role electronic media	Transnational civil society
External Support	Allies, imperialism	Super-powers; ex-colonial Powers	Diaspora, foreign mercenaries, mafia, regional powers, etc.	Transnational governmental and non-governmental coalitions
Mode of Warfare	Regular, Professional forces, vertical hierarchical command system, importance of battle	Centralized, totalizing, extreme development of military technology	Diversed, fragmented; involvement of para-military groups and criminal groups; use of atrocities, famine, rape, sieges; use of light weapons	Peace enforcement; transnational policing
War Economy	Statist, regularization of taxation, borrowing and administration	Command economy; conscription, autarky, total mobilization	Emergency assistance plus informal parallel economy	Reconstruction, normalization, decentralization and integration

Table 1.3: Mary Kaldor's Comparison on the Transformation⁷⁹

After the explanations on indirect effects of globalization, new war studies focus on direct effects of globalization on wars. Its manifestation is the thesis that wars transformed to post-Clausewitzian logic. Accordingly, it is argued that the state, which is at the root of Clausewitz's approach, ends its decisive role of violence monopoly.⁸⁰ In this context, it is argued that the 'trinity', which can be assumed as Clausewitz's theoretical foundations, is no longer valid for many wars.⁸¹ In order to make these assumptions, Kaldor makes a distinction between old and new wars. Kaldor also classify different periods of 'Clausewitzian Old Wars':

⁷⁹ Mary Kaldor & Basker Vashee, **Reconstructing The Global Military Sector. Volume I: New Wars**, London: Pinter Publishing, 1997, p.10.

⁸⁰ Mary Kaldor, "Inconclusive Wars: Is Clausewitz Still Relevant in these Global Times?", **Global Policy**, Vol 1 No 3, 2010, pp. 271-281.

⁸¹ Martin van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited", **Small Wars and Insurgencies**, Vol 13 No 2, 2002, pp. 7-8.

	17th and 18th centuries	19th century	Early 20th century	Late 20th century
Type of polity	Absolutist state	Nation-state	Coalitions of states; multinational states; empires	Blocs
Goals of war	Reasons of state; dynastic conflict; consolidation of borders	National conflict	National and ideological conflict	Ideological conflict
Type of army	Mercenary / professional	Professional / conscription	Mass armies	Scientific-military elite / professional armies
Military technique	Use of firearms, defensive maneuvers, sieges	Railways and telegraph, rapid mobilization	Massive firepower; tanks and aircraft	Nuclear weapons
War economy	Regularization of taxation and borrowing	Expansion of administration and bureaucracy	Mobilization economy	Military-industrial complex

Table 1.4: Mary Kaldor's Classification for the Evolution of 'Old Wars'⁸²

Kaldor aims to display what have changed with the new wars by putting out the old wars. Furthermore, she also endeavor to defend the idea, that the understanding based on perceiving and solving the contemporary cases with Clausewitzian logic is wrong. Because of this reason, she identifies new wars studies as "*a research strategy and a guide for policy*"⁸³ Accordingly, as seen in the table above, she defines the old, through the fields such as actors, goals, methods, and financing.

In this respect, it is claimed by Kaldor that the old wars, in which actors were states, replaced by new wars also called 'network centric warfare'.⁸⁴ Although there are also regular armies in the network wars, it is stated that decisive actors are non-state actors, like private military companies, mercenaries and warlords. In terms of goals, she argues that wars based on the conquest of a geopolitical-territorial area are replaced by wars aimed at the dominance of a certain identity in the state power. Therefore, it is claimed that the activation of identities has become the aim of the war, not an instrument. In terms of the methods, she states that the battles that aim to achieve

⁸² Mary Kaldor, "**New and Old Wars...**", p.14.

⁸³ Mary Kaldor, "In Defence...", p. 1.

⁸⁴ Although the the emphasize on networks echoed through Kaldor's works, the term first used in 1996 by John Arquilla and David Ronsfelt's book. And the term 'network centric warfare' has first used by Thomas X. Hammes. For Arquilla&Rondfeldt's study, see, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, op.cit. p. 87. For Hammes' study, see Thomas X. Hammes, op.cit. p. 48.

a decisive result based on territorially conquest is replaced by a type of warfare that avoids entering decisive confrontations, controls the population and excludes what they can't control. It is also argued that this transformation has largely eliminated the militaries shaped in uniforms, fought within the rules determined by international law and conventions, and thus the wars in which civil-military distinction was made. Finally, as regards financing, she emphasizes that regular taxes and legitimate borrowings have been replaced by looting, confiscating international aid, creating privileged areas for private military companies, feeding from diasporas and organized crime.⁸⁵ In addition, the argumentation is also important that the new wars are post-Clausewitzian and also show a similarity to 'pre-Clausewitzian' wars. In this context a comparison made between new wars and 30 Years Wars, which is accepted as the most obvious examples of pre-Clausewitzian wars.⁸⁶

In the light of these evaluations, two main conclusions are made concerning Clausewitz. The first of these is the conclusion that the Clausewitz's trinity, which is determined among the people, the army and politics, regards war as one of politics' instruments of implementation,⁸⁷ is no longer valid today. Accordingly, it is argued that the decisive role of the state and therefore the politics between these three elements has been eliminated.⁸⁸ It is stated that the States lose the monopoly of violence in the process of globalization in terms of organization, financing and weapons. It is argued that, a certain number of people and groups of people could be a military unit and start a military struggle, just like the pre-Westphalian period, in which a certain number of people with swords and equipment could be a military unit. It is argued that it is no longer possible to define war as a compelling way to subjugate the will of the other party, due to the replacement of a rational struggle defined by a political goal in the states, with the reactionary, identity-based politics.⁸⁹

The reason for this is that a constant enemy who will define its will by fighting directly is replaced by a network that appears and disappears day by day. With another example, regular forces that will consume resources by attrition, replaced by the forces

⁸⁵ Mary Kaldor, "In Defence...", pp. 2-3.

⁸⁶ Herfried Münkler, "**Yeni Savaşlar...**", pp. 59-87.

⁸⁷ The general approach and the premises of Clausewitz's theory are explained in detail in chapter I.B.2, including the historical conditions that uncovered it. For the explanation of the historical background and for the Clausewitzian trinity see also, pp. 75-81.

⁸⁸ Martin van Creveld, "**The Transformation...**", pp. 33-51.

⁸⁹ Mary Kaldor, "Inconclusive Wars...", pp. 274-275.

that are fully funded by illegal methods are replaced. In this context, Kaldor sees Iraq case as a recent example to this. When the US army, who fought with the Iraqi army in Clausewitzian means, thought that the Iraqi side was subject to its will. However it was shortly understood that this was not so, and that the war of the network was being waged because the will of the opposing party was decentralized.⁹⁰

The second conclusion is the approach that Clausewitz's 'friction' in many cases disappeared. The people whom Clausewitz describes through 'passion/hate', are restrained by the politics he defines through 'reason'. Accordingly, people's hate, hatred and desire for win after the war begins led the war to the 'absolute war', which he has lifted from all kinds of rational reasons, has led to the end of the war by interfering politics according to the course of the war. It is argued that the understanding of political actors who try to resolve friction between political goals and the costs of war and to maximize political output doesn't exist in the new wars.

According to this, civilians, both the executive and the target of the war, carry out some kind of absolute war, which is based directly on their existence and identities, implement moves by motive of hate and passion, which can led to a complete destruction of other side, like genocide. Knowing (or without thinking) that it will bring significant political harm in the long run, such as massacres against the 'rival' society, organized rape activities, attempts to commit genocide, the displacement of an entire society, is explained over the elimination of friction in the new wars.⁹¹ In this context, the distinction is not in the form of Clausewitzian and post-Clausewitzian wars, but in the form of old and new wars is associated with the assumption that interstate wars are now seen as impossible wars.⁹² In a world where inter-state war will be an exception, analyzing with a post-Clausewitzian perspective takes a fundamental position, hence using the concept of "old wars" becomes instrumental to explain the main "new wars thesis". The main reason for this is the presence of nuclear weapons, and it is argued that the tendency of states not to escalate conflict is accompanied by a tendency not to directly intervene in small conflicts.⁹³ The expansion of private military companies (PMCs) are also associated with this tendency. It is also argued

⁹⁰ Mary Kaldor, "Old Wars, Cold Wars...", p. 492.

⁹¹ Mary Kaldor, "Inconclusive Wars..."pp. 276-279.

⁹² Martin van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited...", pp. 3-7.

⁹³ Herfried Münkler, "**Yeni Savaşlar...**", pp. 35-45.

that the expansion of PMC is important not only for the weak states, but also for the great powers, and that the great powers tend to resolve their goals frequently. At this point, the Swedish king Gustavos Adolpus, who lived in the 17th century and made up of 90% of his army with mercenaries,⁹⁴ can be compared to the US, which is made up of more than 50% of military with private military contractors in Iraq.

Kaldor takes this one step further and suggests that it is not the case of great powers confrontation in Cold War period because of the existence of nuclear weapons. In this context, she asserts that Cold War conflicts are ‘imaginary wars’, which based on legitimizing the hegemonic existence of US and USSR.⁹⁵ Based on Carl Schmitt's approach to protecting the identity of states with clear distinction of friends (citizens) and enemies,⁹⁶ she argued that the United States and the USSR needed this imaginary war in an international context where Clausewitzian logic began to disappear. In other words, she claims that the two countries created an imaginary war for their blocks they want to control, based on their understanding that their hegemony can only exist in a Clausewitzian world. So, Kaldor finds the sources of post-Clausewitzian transformation in Cold War period. With globalization process she integrates the post-Clausewitzian transformation with post-Westphalian international system in the new war thesis.

Similarly, she states that the ‘war against terrorism’ during the Bush era is also an imaginary war. Accordingly, Kaldor first defines Echevarria's definition of war on terrorism:

“Both antagonists seek the political destruction of the other and, at this point, neither appears open to negotiated settlement.”⁹⁷

In response to this recognition, Kaldor argues that a military response to each terrorist action must be responded, that it will bring a greater counter-reaction. That continuous military response in the absence of a decisive war will not work, and that the conflicting parties will feed each other:

⁹⁴ Peter Warren Singer, **Kiralık Ordular: Özel Askeri Şirketler**, translated to Turkish by Gözde Aral and İsmail Yaman, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009, p. 57. Cited by Alper Ekmekçioğlu, op.cit., p. 20.

⁹⁵ Mary Kaldor, “Old Wars, Cold Wars...”, p. 493.

⁹⁶ Carl Schmitt, **The Concept of the Political**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932, p.33. Cited by Mary Kaldor, “Old Wars, Cold Wars...”p. 491.

⁹⁷ Antulio Echevarria, **Clausewitz and Contemporary War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 211. Cited by Mary Kaldor, “Inconclusive Wars...”, p. 275.

“American people and the defender of democracy and those with a vested interest in a high military budget are rewarded, and in which extremist Islamists are able to substantiate the idea of global jihad and to mobilize young Muslims behind the cause, then action and counter-reaction merely contribute to ‘long war’, which benefits both sides.”⁹⁸

It can be said that two kinds of new wars examinations exist in the light of all the aforementioned elements. The first is the approach by Herfried Münkler, whose descriptive aspect is heavy, and which deals with cost-benefit analysis without seeing these conflicts independently of the great power politics. The other approach by Mary Kaldor prefers categorically separating new wars, which is based on globalization, which advocates that the existing infrastructure will form the next line of wars. According to this, armed conflicts have also changed due to the decline of states in the globalization process.

Both of these readings are in the best position to reveal the many dimensions of contemporary conflicts. However, although these studies have successfully revealed the characteristics of today's armed conflicts, it is considered that their conclusions regarding the nature of war is equivocal. For this reason, it is considered that the work of new wars gives a 'complementary' perspective, rather than a 'fundamental' one.

In particular, Münkler who reads contemporary conflicts in parallel with the work of new imperialism, provides a perspective that contributes to the cost-policy making approach to be alleged in the hypothesis.⁹⁹ However, it will be argued that Kaldor's approach, whose study is considered to be the founder and prominent source of the new war approach, has meant a short period of time and a certain region. Therefore, although there will be a theoretical distinction, the data obtained from these studies will be tried to be used. In this context, the equivocal data and analyses should be eliminated to determine the necessary information for hypothesis.

The cheapening and the facilitation of war making and the decentralization of the states' role constituted the infrastructure of the new wars approach. As a result, it is

⁹⁸ Mary Kaldor, *Ibid*, p. 276.

⁹⁹ For a study summarizing the approaches of Hardt and Negri, who are considered to be important contributors to the new imperialism studies see also, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “İmparatorluk Olarak Küreselleşme”, in **Küresel Dönüşümler: Büyük Küreselleşme Tartışması**, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, 2008, pp. 144-147. For complete study see also, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, **Empire**, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.

emphasized that the post-Clausewitzian type of struggle has begun to be transformed. At this point it should be noted that the post-Clausewitzian war concept is also based on the fourth generation warfare studies. For this reason, the assumptions to be falsified of new wars studies will not be covered by the post-Clausewitzian conception in this section, and will be addressed in the next section, with the aim of avoiding repetition.

The first reason for the evaluation of new wars' studies as a complementary element, not fundamental, is that data are available in regions where the claim of cheapening war resources is only of a certain period and certain conditions. That certain period is about 15 years, which is shaped by the conditions of the end of the Cold War. This period began after 1985-1990 when the Cold War conditions began to end, and it lasted until the 2000-2005 when the power gap was filled. The area is sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, where proxy wars continue during the Cold War and where serious resource transfers have been made. This military structure backed by the financial and material support until the end of 1990s, with its support after this date, left behind a huge ammunition, millions of unemployed soldiers and unfinished regions of political power struggle.

In this context, the example given by Kapuscinski makes sense:

“Mengistu established the largest army in the Sub-Saharan Africa, with the help of Moscow. This army of 400.000 soldiers had missiles and chemical weapons. (...) After the Cold War (...) when the leader of the army was heard to have fled (...) the army collapsed within a few hours. (...) While you pass through Ethiopia, (...) you will see strong, healthy young men sitting in a drunken (...) or driving in bars. These are the soldiers of Mengistu's great army, who dispersed in a single day in the summer of 1991.”¹⁰⁰

The actors (either state or non-state) supported by one of the two blocks during the Cold War were 'unhacked' in a sense after 1991¹⁰¹. As a result, while the existing

¹⁰⁰ Ryszard Kapuscinski, **Afrikanischer Fieber**, Frankfurt: Piper Taschenbuch, 1999, p. 220. Cited by Herfried Münkler, “**Yeni Savaşlar...**”, p. 23.

¹⁰¹ The most clear data on the abandonment of the two blocs after a short period of time until 1991 is in arms transfers. According to this, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa, which had a 7.4% share in World arms imports in 1983, will be 1.1% in 1993. Similarly, the 7.1% share of Latin America in 1983 would fall to 1.7% in 1993. For the source that compiled the data on all continents see also Genevieve Schmeder, “Global Trends in Military Efforts and Activities”, in **Reconstructing The Global Military Sector Volume II: The End of Military Fordism**, ed. Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht and Genevieve Schmeder, London: Pinter Press, 1998, p. 23.

conflicts took on a different form, the actors were able to engage in practices (even genocides) in conflicts that they could not have started because of the control of the great powers. The conflict continued as it was proposed in the new war approach until the excess of these forces was exhausted and the international society was more willing to intervene. After about 15 years of this process, weapons have begun to become more expensive, the role of states and international institutions has increased, and the quality of human resources has begun to change. As a matter of fact, the weight of inter-state transfers in light arms trade, which expresses the basis of the new war approach, questions the validity of this approach in the 2000s.



Figure 1.2: The Proportions of Legal and Illicit Small Arms Transfers¹⁰²

As seen in Figure 1.2, as of the 2000's, arms trade reached a similar picture as in the Cold War era. In this context, in most of the struggles, resources have again begun to come from backing states. The other remarkable point is about the black circle, or about acquiring weapons in illegal ways. Cases where smuggling activities occur frequently occur as a result of smuggling of some of the past legal supports. At this point, the fate of Stinger missiles, which have been transferred from the United States to Afghanistan in 1980s and have played a crucial role in the withdrawal of the USSR, is a good example.

“It is estimated that, of the approximately 1,000 Stingers transferred, from 200 to 600 were never returned to the United States. Between 16 and 30 were transferred illicitly to Iran.”¹⁰³

¹⁰² Small Arms Survey, *The Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2007*, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/full/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-03-EN.pdf>, accessed on 04.01.2018, p.74.

¹⁰³ Small Arms Survey, *The Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2001*, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2001/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2001-Chapter-03-EN.pdf>, accessed on 04.01.2018, p.99.

Other data on the re-increasing role of States in acquiring cheap weapons are provided both by their impact on arms trade and by the discovery that states have implicit roles in many cases. In this context, the fact that Iran-Contra scandal¹⁰⁴ emerged during the Cold War period are seen with similar cases like Angolagate scandal¹⁰⁵ in Post-Cold War period, shows parallels in this sense. Apart from this, the schemes for the role of state officials in the illegal arms trade also question how realistic it is nowadays to trade illegal weapons from the intelligence services of the states, and therefore from the interests of the states.




Figure 1.3: Network and Process of Illicit Weapon Trade¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ In the scandal that a local newspaper in Lebanon has revealed, it is understood that the United States secretly sold a wide range of weapons, including anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, to Iran after the Revolution, which was an enemy to US, in order to provide financial support to the US-backed counter-guerrillas in Nicaragua. For detailed information see also, Roland Matthews, "Iran-Contra Affair", Encyclopedia Britannica <https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Contra-Affair>, accessed on 17.04.2018. In addition, Colonel Oliver North, who is considered to be responsible for the activities in question, is currently the chairman of the National Rifle Association (NRA), which is considered to be the most effective weapon lobby of the United States.

¹⁰⁵ In documents, which was believed to be leaked by Jacques Chirac because of his close friend's support to another candidate in Presidency elections in France, it is understood that more than 300 statesman involved to an organized arms smuggling to Angola, ranging from high level bureaucrats to Mitterrand. As a result of this trade, it is considered that the weapons that infiltrate Angola have made the most important contribution to the human tragedy in this country. For detailed information on Angolagate Process, see also, Hasan Köni, *Dev Türkiye, Cüce Türkiye: Tamamı Çözömlü Jeopolitik Test Kitabı*, İstanbul: Hayy Kitap, 2010, pp. 172-174. Samuel Perlo Freeman, *Angolagate*, 05.05.2017, <https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/angolagate/>, accessed on 04.03.2017. Deutsche Welle, *How 'Angolagate' Shook French Political Foundations to the Core*, 31.12.2009, <http://www.dw.com/en/how-angolagate-shook-french-political-foundations-to-the-core/a-5035505>, accessed on 04.03.2017.

¹⁰⁶ Small Arms Survey, "The Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2001...", p.99.

The criticism of cheap weapon evaluations is that it is also valid for a certain period and region. In this context, it would be enough to compare the Kalashnikov rifle prices, which is the most frequently given example. In these arms, which were sold at the price of chicken in Angola¹⁰⁷ for a period, there was a rise in prices up to 40% after this period when stocks were declining.¹⁰⁸

Five-Year Period	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005
	402 USD	393 USD	538 USD	495 USD

Table 1.5: Global Average Kalashnikov Prices (1986-2005)¹⁰⁹

As with other data on human resources, data on the commercialization of violence and the use of PMCs are considered to be the supplementary, not fundamental. Because it is not that these companies dominate states in war making or take the place of states in conflicts, but rather that they are evolving into the use of states as a result of their quest to ‘outsourcing war’. According to this, the use of these companies is similar to the examples of the Westphalian period, not the pre-Westphalian period, as indicated in the new war literature. It would be useful to open this with examples.

First of all, there is a ‘Westphalian myth’¹¹⁰ in the words of Echevarria, both in the work of new wars and in the work of the fourth generation warfare, which appears to have started and finished in a short period. According to this, the use of private military structures by the states after Westphalia ended and rose from the grave after 1991. However, after 1648, the states continued to use mercenaries frequently. In this context, it is seen that among the 16th and 19th centuries, mercenaries called *privateers*¹¹¹ are benefited from. For example, in the 16th and 17th centuries, many

¹⁰⁷ Robert Neild, **Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social Evolution**, London: Anthem Press, 2002, p.131. Cited by Hasan Köni, op.cit., p.163.

¹⁰⁸ Even ships and tanks were sold during this period. According to the figures cited by Ekmekçioğlu from Singer, attack ships were sold for 200.000 dollars and tanks fortified with reactive armor were sold for 40.000 dollars. Today it is not even a question of whether to increase prices or not to buy them.

¹⁰⁹ Small Arms Survey, in **The Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2015**, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/full/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-08-EN.pdf>, accessed on 04.01.2018, p. 261.

¹¹⁰ Antulio J. Echevarria II, **Fourth Generation War and Other Myths**, Michigan: University of Michigan Library, 2005, pp. 8-9.

¹¹¹ The distinction between Piracy and privateers is important at this point. The activities carried out without the state authority (and similar today’s new wars assumptions) called ‘piracy’. The people carried out piracy-like violence activities under the state authority were called ‘privateers’. Janice E.

privateers who supported the British dynasty were given nobility. In the American War of Independence, privateers have made a vital contribution to the struggle by sinking 600 British ships. In the American Civil War, there was privateer use.¹¹²

In the 19th century, a very similar approach to the current understanding of "military contracting" emerged. The best examples are the British East India Company, which consist of 100,000 soldiers, and the Dutch East India Company, which consist of 25,000 soldiers. A similarity arises when it is considered that a vast part of these forces third-country citizen as it is today. The logic of their work is just like today's PMCs: To provide a specific commercial interest and to fight against elements that could damage the dominance of the political structure that gives that PMCs the privileges.¹¹³ The only exception to this process is the first half of the twentieth century when almost all acts of violence are seen in state monopolies. This is a period when states have wars of their own defenses, Shaped by two world wars.

In summary, throughout the Westphalian period, all states except failed states manage their defense with their own armies, but they have been found to benefit from special armed structures in their foreign policy activities. The last point that should be mentioned about the PMCs is the effect of outsourcing in world's general economic structure to the armed forces, especially the US armed forces.¹¹⁴ In this context, the areas where PMCs have used, falsifies the assumptions of new wars studies on the mission of PMCs.

Thompson, **Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p.21. Cited by, Alper Ekmekçioğlu, op.cit., p. 20.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 21.

¹¹³ Daniel Kramer, "Does History Repeat Itself? A Comparative Analysis of Private Military Entities", in **Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects**, edited by Thomas Jaeger and Gerhard Kümmel, Wlesbaden: Verlag für Socialwissenschaften, 2007, p. 25. Cited by, Alper Ekmekçioğlu, op.cit., p. 27.

¹¹⁴ This process has also led to a downsizing in the US Department of Defense(DoD), some of which is done through private companies. For more information see also, Ruth Stanley, "Employment Effects of Military Reconstructing", in **Reconstructing The Global Military Sector Volume II: The End of Military Fordism**, edited by Mary Kaldor, Ulrich Albrecht and Genevieve Schmeder, London: Pinter Press, pp. 39-41.

Mission	Ratio (%)	Total (%)
Conflict and Military Operations	2,7	19,3
Operation Support	16.6	
Military Consulting and Training	17.4	22.2
Police Consulting and Training	4.8	
Logistic Support	18.2	42
Intelligence	5.6	
Mine Clearance	8.9	
Humanitarian Support	0.2	
Weapon Annihilation	1.9	
Construction Military Facility	7.2	
Security/Protection	15.5	16.5
Crime Prevention/Border Patrol	1	
Total	100	100

Table 1.6: Responsibility Areas of PMCs¹¹⁵

As can be seen in the table above, the PMCs appears as a supporting actor under the control of states. Much of the activity areas are non-conflict areas of support, as well as accentuated third-country nationals working on these areas. For example, the majority of the third-country nationals working in the PMCs, which the US uses in Iraq, are people who work in jobs¹¹⁶ where US citizens do not get in because of the risks they face in paying salaries. In the first countries, the participation of those who have military experience has been limited in the same period. As a result of the downsizing of the armies in post-Cold War period,¹¹⁷ the unemployment of approximately 7 million soldiers in 15 years¹¹⁸ has increased the interest of these former soldiers, but in the following years, the old balance began to return.

The above-listed elements of the new wars show that their basic data is limited to a certain period and cannot be considered as a fundamental theoretical approach. Following this assessment, it is necessary to review the other approach, the Fourth Generation Warfare studies.

¹¹⁵ Zeljko Branovic, **The Privatization of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assesment**, Genova: DCAF, 2011, http://psm.du.edu/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=ZirgUmx0FcZQjUxMbUVIU8nggzol4zzo26MMws9B_g4, accessed on: 22.05.2018. Cited by, Alper Ekmekçioğlu, op.cit., p. 161.

¹¹⁶ Like truck driving, mine clearance, border patrol.

¹¹⁷ In this period, the US army was downsized by 30% and the German army was downsized by 50%, and the British army was downsized to its smallest army since 1815. P.W. Singer, "Outsourcing War", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.84 No.2, 2005, p. 128.

¹¹⁸ Alper Ekmekçioğlu, op.cit., p. 47.

3. Reading the Transformation Through Technology and Culture: Fourth Generation Warfare

In an article published just before the end of the Cold War,¹¹⁹ William S. Lind and a group of colleagues argued that modern wars are in the process of evolution, and that a new generation is being entered as a result of the living evolutionary process. It was published in 1989 as a result of the regular brainstorming sessions¹²⁰ of some soldiers, all of whom are medium-level military officers. Following the first wave created by this publication, the approach was updated by Thomas X. Hammes,¹²¹ after the 9/11 attacks, which constituted the second wave of the approach. In addition, writers such as Arquilla&Rondfeldt¹²² from the West, as well as authors such as Liang&Xiangsiu¹²³ from the East have adopted this theory and contributed. These theoretical approaches were also adopted by researchers from different focus areas. Martin Van Creveld, for example, extended his book of history of strategy to William S. Lind,¹²⁴ and contributed to Lind's books by writing broad forewords.¹²⁵ David Kilcullen, one of the theoreticians of the counter-insurgency (COIN), expanded his approach to include some of the issues raised by the fourth generation warfare approach.¹²⁶ In the light of all these elements, it would not be wrong to say that a fourth generation warfare (4GW) approach to the transformation of wars has emerged.

Accordingly, the 4GW approach is in fact based on a Western-Eastern distinction and comparison of war cultures. According to this, it is argued that western type war was carried out in the first three generations to be explained below. It was emphasized that the fourth generation war which started to take place in the direction of eastern war culture, caught unprepared and therefore frequently succeeded.¹²⁷ Following these evaluations, the writers advocated that the recommendations to the west -and indeed, the US military that they were members of- should be used to balance the advantages

¹¹⁹ William Lind et al, op.cit., pp. 22-26.

¹²⁰ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "**Fourth Generation...**", p. V.

¹²¹ Thomas X. Hammes, op.cit.

¹²² John Arquilla and David Rondfeldt, op.cit.

¹²³ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, op.cit.

¹²⁴ Martin van Creveld, **A History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind**, Castalia House, 2015.

¹²⁵ William S. Lind, **On War: The Collected Columns of William S. Lind (2003-2009)**, Castalia House, 2014.

¹²⁶ David Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux", **Survival**, Vol 48 No 4, 2006, pp. 111-130.

¹²⁷ William Lind et al, op.cit., p. 22.

of the ‘other side’ with technological innovations and reorganization of the armies on the basis of these innovations.¹²⁸ In this context, the first three generations must be explained to address the emphasis on the fourth generation.

The Four Generations of Warfare

The first generation was defined by the emergence of modern wars and firepower. It is stated that the masses that provide firepower that they are firing in rows together, identifies the first generation of modern warfare. In this respect, the aim is to destroy or withdrawal of the enemy who came to the ‘battlefield’ through intense firepower. The conquest of a field after the defeat of the enemy, whose will was broken on the battlefield, also sets out the political goal. The Napoleonic wars have been emphasized as the war that expresses the transition from the climax of the first generation to the second generation. In many ways it has been stated that the first generation shows many features of the second generation with many other aspects.¹²⁹

It is argued that this generation is replaced by a second generation with technological innovations and ideas based on these innovations. Many innovations listed as the catalyzers of the transformations. New artillery and bomb technologies listed for destruction, trenches for attrition and indirect innovations (in means of communication, transportation, chemistry technologies) for facilitators of the second generation warfare. It was emphasized that these innovations changed the way in which they were thinking about war. It has been expressed that this transformation has come about with armies that can be divided into attacking, capable of operations in larger areas. In the sense of defense, it was expressed that the idea of a war emerged that was based on the formation of large defensive areas over the trenches and attrition of the opposing force. The First World War have been emphasized as the war that expresses the transition from the climax of the second generation to the third generation. In many ways it has been stated that the second generation shows many features of the third generation with many other aspects, like maneuvers.¹³⁰

The third generation of wars was defined as a new generation that emerged in the light of technological and intellectual innovations, like other two generations. In this

¹²⁸ Ibid, pp. 24-26.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 23.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

generation, tanks and airplanes, which help to maneuver and overcome the wars of attrition that affect the thought structure of the previous generation, have been introduced as innovations that launch a new generation. According to this, the idea of moving forward both to the wings and to the rear guard through tanks and airplanes rather than to wear out on the front is essential of military thought of this generation. With this, it will be possible to target the command and communication centers of the opposing force. Germany's Blitzkrieg operations successfully implemented this approach, thus launching a new generation of emphasized. At this point, the emphasis on tanks and planes is important, because it gives a historical example for the assumption that *“technologically, it is possible that a few soldiers could have the same battlefield effect as a current brigade.”*¹³¹ This approach will serve as the basis for an approach that emphasizes armies organized in the context of technology based unconventional conflicts. A similar approach will also be seen in Liang and Xiangsiu:

“When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form¹³² (and the paradigms we know change from the root)”¹³³

In this context, the 1991 Gulf War was considered as the climax of the third generation. However, as it was emphasized for other generations, it is emphasized that the third generation shows many features of the fourth generation with many other aspects.¹³⁴

The first point emphasized in the fourth generation war is that the process of shifting the attacks on the front to the wings is now completely out of the front, that is, towards civilians. With the actors of these attacks being small groups, it is stated that a flexible understanding that can respond to the situation at the lowest level and a structure in which the initiative of the unit commander is important is required. The second point is, parallel with the new wars approach, that the state loses its monopoly on war and war logistics. The third is the changing characteristic of maneuver. It is stated that the maneuvers conducted by large units in large areas were replaced by new

¹³¹ Ibid, p. 24.

¹³² Qiao Liang ve Wang Xiangsui, op.cit., p.6. Cited by Metin Gürcan, “Bir Önceki Savaş İçin Hazırlanmak: Değişen Küresel Güvenlik Ortamının Geleneksel Savaş Olgusuna Etkisi”, **Bilge Strateji**, Vol 3 No 5, 2011, p. 127.

¹³³ Although the sentence in parentheses were included in Gürcan's Turkish translation, it was not found in the original text.

¹³⁴ William Lind et al, op.cit., p. 22.

methods conducted by small units in mountainous or residential areas. The fourth point is expressed as the settlement of the understanding that refers the collapse of opposing force, rather than physical one.¹³⁵

In light of all of this, it is asserted that the fourth generation is a generation where *“the distinction between (...) war and peace, (...) civil and military, (...) military targets and civilian targets (...) is blurred.”*¹³⁶ Lind refers the blurring structure seen in the fourth generation to the *idea-based* transformation. According to this, the war is transforming by the effect of eastern war culture, which was developed on the basis of human power. In this context, to return to the West-East comparison, it is seen that the fourth generation of war theorists have been transferring a widespread tradition in Western war reading. According to this, the western war culture is defined with its limited manpower and also defined as a culture that has always invested in technology to close the gap.¹³⁷ On the other hand, Eastern war culture is portrayed as a party that does not rely much on technology but ‘does not hesitate to sacrifice’¹³⁸ human power to cover this gap. In some studies, this duality is combined with the "capital intensive West versus labor intensive East" approach in line with economics.¹³⁹ In this direction,

¹³⁵ Ibid, p. 23.

¹³⁶ Ibid, pp. 23-24.

¹³⁷ Friedman's words, which deal with this approach from the perspective of the United States, provide an appropriate summary of the approach: *“Because the United States is far from Europe and Asia, the military interventions in Eurasia will always be far away, the US forces will remain smaller next to the domestic forces. Power amplifiers, that is, weapons that increase the power of a small number of soldiers, constitute the basis of the Great American strategy.”* George Friedman, op.cit., p. 17.

¹³⁸ Thierry Camous' words, with false information and orientalist prejudices constitute a dramatic example of this approach: *“The case of kamikaze is another very explanatory element in terms of concepts that confront the status of the individual in the Easts and Wests. Westerners cannot understand the meaning of the kamikaze method that terrifies them, because it derives from the notion of another individual status. Kamikaze attacks are rare in the West except for unusual situations. (...) Christian religion and Western morality condemn suicide. The western victim, in particular, does not pursue death, prefer death only from dishonesty and vengeance. On the other hand, in the Muslim East, giving his life for war is regarded as a choice rather than a horror. Moreover, suicide is, first and foremost, a weapon of hopelessness and weak person. The death volunteer is able to reach its purpose much more effectively and with far less opportunity. So voluntary death is a weapon of the mystical, hopeless, and poor East. For the West, the death volunteer is a living symbol of a culturally frightening weapon.”* Thierry Camous, **Doğular Batılar: Yirmi Beş Asırlık Savaş**, translated to Turkish by Hande Güreli, İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2011, p. 439.

¹³⁹ For a study that combines this approach with a thesis that states will be successful in the face of network wars in parallel with the success of the information technologies that companies have implemented, see also,

Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future”, **US Naval Institute Proceedings**, 1998, http://www.kinection.com/ncoic/ncw_origin_future.pdf, accessed on: 28.05.2018.

in the first studies an eastern definition consisting of Huntingtonian sense¹⁴⁰ of Islam-Confucian alliance is made, and after 9/11 attacks, the east is portrayed as a side of Islamic-Crusader opposition by an orientalism-like stereotyping:

“Fourth generation war is also marked by a return to a World of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam.”¹⁴¹

This approach is supported by various examples in the fourth generation warfare approach. According to this, the most important reason for the execution of non-conventional methods, especially terrorism, derives from this human power. In this respect, technology is proposed for the US, which does not have human power. In this context, it is essential for success to establish a military structure to be organized in accordance with the emerging technologies. According to the critics of 4GW theorists, there are two reasons why the United States often fails in the fourth-generation wars. The first one is that US doesn't embrace that a new generation of warfare has started. The second reason is because it acts in the logic of the third generation, so it conducts operations with large and bulky structures required by the third generation against the fourth generation of warriors.

The Second Wave of Fourth Generation Warfare Studies

This first wave created by Lind and his colleagues will be updated by Thomas Hammes after the 9/11 attacks. Considering the mastery of the terrorist groups in 9/11 attacks, Hammes will argue that the structures that form transnational networks have begun a new kind of network warfare under the influence of globalization.¹⁴² Although Hammes was based on the 4GW approach in his study, he also benefited from three more theoretical approaches. The first is the classification of the Toffler’s approach, which is considered as a general perspective. Toffler, who categorized the world's transformations through the basic economic-political revolutions, argued that the information revolution, which is observed after agricultural and industrial revolutions,

¹⁴⁰ For the alleged Islam-Confucius alliance against the West, which Huntington put forward in his famous "Conflict of Civilizations" thesis see also, Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol 72 No 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

¹⁴¹ William S. Lind, "Understanding the Fourth Generation War", **Military Review**, September-October 2004, p. 13.

¹⁴² Thomas X. Hammes, op.cit., pp. 2-11.

will transform everything about society, and accordingly war. From this point of view, Hammes claims that the 4GW conflicts are the wars of the information age.¹⁴³

The second theoretical approach is the COIN approach, which has been already largely examined. Hammes considers the fourth generation war as a reorganization of insurgencies in a transnational form.¹⁴⁴ Hammes' approach will also be expressed by David Kilcullen, one of the prominent theorist of COIN studies, with a similar emphasis on Islam:

“The war against terrorism is in fact a move against a global Islamist insurgency. For this reason, the best approach to the conflict is not the counter-terrorism but the counter-insurgency. However, the theory of classical counter insurgency is aimed at suppressing the insurgency in one single country. (...)Therefore, we need a new paradigm in the fight against globalized insurgency.”¹⁴⁵

The last approach Hammes assessed is the approach of new wars studies. Although there is no direct reference, there are evaluations of the impact of globalization on political structures and its impact on network wars in the book chapter titled “Changes in Society”.¹⁴⁶

Considering the 4GW studies built on the above mentioned elements, it should be stated that they share their thesis on many aspects and new wars. In this respect, the emphasis placed on small organizations that find human resources and war materials easy to carry out their struggle is the first of these common points. The failure of states against these organizations and consequently the use of PMCs by state and/or non-state actors, -in other words, the commercialization of violence- is another common point. The last common point of both approaches is that non-Trinitarian wars, in other words, post-Clausewitzian war has emerged. In this context, it is argued that states lose control over violence instruments, and thus lose the monopoly of violence. Again, according to the post-Clausewitzian approach, the instrumental position of war versus policy and the change in the determinism of politics are another common point.

¹⁴³ Ibid, pp. 10-12.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁴⁵ David Kilcullen, **Counterinsurgency**, London: Hurst and Co. Publishing, 2010, p. 166. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, **Tarihten Bugüne Gayri Nizami Savaş**, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, 2015, pp. 153.

¹⁴⁶ Thomas X. Hammes, op.cit., pp. 32-44.

The different aspects of the two approaches emerge in conclusions. The new war approach advocates that the international system cannot respond to the new type of conflict because of the globalization's effect on state structures and sovereignty. 4GW approach, on the other hand, advocates that the current conceptualization of warfare cannot respond the new type of conflict, thus it has to be transformed towards new generation's needs.

The first two of the common points were evaluated in the previous section. In this context, it is necessary to examine the post-Clausewitzian approach that must be done before analyzing the diverging aspects of 4GW.

In both approaches, it is argued that in parallel with Van Creveld, Clausewitz's trinity has become void. Both of them asserting that the reason of the 'endless wars' is the type of respond which is based using military force against non-conventional methods that targeting the psychological structures, not the physical. It is argued that this did not only undermine the tendency to regulate international wars with norms, but also undermine the attempt to distinguish the war and peace situations, since the Aristotle and Cicero.¹⁴⁷ In this respect, it is argued that it becomes impossible for politics to determine both its own purpose and the other party's political aim in the ambiguity of the existing conflicts. Finally, it is stated that it is impossible to determine the 'will' of the groups acting in networks down to cells of 3-5 people and to impose a will against them.

Although it is accepted that the above-listed elements are applicable in various cases, it is considered that the use of force in international relations hardly reflects any of the above. In this context, the first thing to be emphasized is that the decrease in inter-state war does not mean that the Clausewitzian interpretation of war has been eliminated. States have allocated most of their defense resources to possible threats from states. Examples can be given from US security strategy documents in post-Cold War period. Threat definitions, which focus on non-state actors for a short period after 1991, have transformed weight in the following years to inter-state or global affairs, with including non-traditional threats.¹⁴⁸ Non-conventional threats evaluated in an international environment which shapes both state and non-state actors.

¹⁴⁷ Alex J. Bellamy, "Perpetual Battle", *Survival*, Vol.54 No.3, 2012, pp. 169-178.

¹⁴⁸ The US national security strategies will be discussed in detail in the second part.

Another deficiency of post-Clausewitzian approaches is the conclusion that Clausewitz's trinity is not applicable to non-state actors, and therefore not a political will to be identified or targeted. The Clausewitzian approach, however, focuses on the determinism of the policy at its core and emphasizes that it can be applied over time to different actors (and thus to non-state actors) as well:

“These tendencies, Clausewitz said, generally correspond to three institutions: the first the populace, the second to the military and the last to the government. However, as Clausewitz also noted, each of these institutions has taken various forms over time. The government, for example, can be the head of a clan or a tribe, or the King of Prussia. The trinity consists of the actual forces themselves, which are universal, and not the institutions, which are just particular representations of them. Thus, those who, like van Creveld, refer to Clausewitz's trinity as people, military and government do not understand it.”¹⁴⁹

Final deficiency of post-Clausewitzian approaches is the tendency to see non-state organizations as groups whose political goals are ambiguous, who act reactionary, and in most cases, engage in conflicts due to the opportunities they have achieved through globalization and technology. The most important criticism they make in this direction is that responding in a Clausewitzian sense against such ambiguous groups of political will further complicate the problem and further reproduce it. In this context, it would be useful to return to Kaldor's criticism of Echevarria mentioned above.¹⁵⁰ Kaldor considered Echevarria's statement “targeting the political destruction of the opposing power” as a military destruction and assessed that it was not possible to destroy the terrorist groups in military ways. Although Kaldor's second conclusion is true, her misinterpretation of the ‘destruction’ causes her not to use the Clausewitzian paradigm. It would be useful to respond to this criticism through the evaluation of Ali Karaosmanoğlu. Because Karaosmanoğlu gives the example over El-Qaeda, organized as global networks of cells that can be considered to be the most successful post-Clausewitzian example. Through this example, he summarizes the erroneous points of the post-Clausewitzian approach:

¹⁴⁹ Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Deconstructing The Theory of Fourth-Generation War”, **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol 26 No 2, p. 235.

¹⁵⁰ For above mentioned criticism see, pp. 27-28.

“Many people consider Al-Qaeda a fundamentalist ‘nihilists’ organization with no political purpose. It is claimed that the destruction of the enemy has only one sacred purpose. They are considered to have committed terrorist acts in the name of ‘Allah’. This understanding indicates that Al-Qaeda militants were mobilized using an unusual (and false) interpretation of Islam. It even underlines that terrorists have a high spiritual power. However, this does not mean that Al-Qaeda does not have a political goal as a terrorist organization. (...) political program is described as three phases: First, to free all Muslim lands from the hands of non-Muslims (tahrir), second, (...) unite all Muslim states by abolishing nation states (tevhid) and re-establish the Caliphate (...) to encompass the Islamic geography, as an ultimate goal.”¹⁵¹

(...)

One of the criticisms of Clausewitz is that his approach only covers inter-state wars. However, the paradigm of Clausewitz includes not only states, but also non-state forms,¹⁵² it can also be applied to non-state organizations, such as Kaldor's ‘networks.’¹⁵³

In this context, Echevarria II emphasized that after their successes in return of their terrorist activities, Hamas, Hezbollah and even Al-Qaeda have tried to integrate themselves into social and political structures, rather than establishing more cells.¹⁵⁴ The most current example is undoubtedly the ISIS that emerged with the claim of having a state form, although it uses non-conventional methods.

In summary, analyzing through a post-Clausewitzian paradigm, it is assessed that it will prepare a false ground in examining the cases. It is not yet known whether it is temporary that states do not engage in direct conflict with each other. In addition, political targets and the instrumental role of violence can be observed in conflicts including non-state actors as well.

In this respect, what should be done next is to eliminate the conclusions of 4GW approach that are considered falsified, while separating the useful data and conclusions -as is has done for the new wars studies.

¹⁵¹ Walid Phares, **Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America**, Londra: Palgrave, 2005, p. 200.

¹⁵² Antulio J. Echevarria II, **Clausewitz and Contemporary War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 84.

¹⁵³ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Yirmibirinci Yüzyılda Savaşı Tartışmak: Clausewitz Yeniden”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol 8 No 29, 2011, p. 15. The use of citations in the quotation was also made by Karaosmanoğlu, taken from this work and added to the footnote.

¹⁵⁴ Antulio J. Echevarria II, “**Fourth Generation...**”, p. 3 and pp. 12-14.

Critic of 4GW Studies: Military Revolutions Concept as a Tool of Comparison

In this context, it is considered that both the technological column and the cultural-ideational column on which the 4GW approach are based are classified incorrectly. In this context, the first criticism will be towards the classification of war cultures. As explained above, both Western and Eastern war culture generalizations will be criticized. According to this, the assumption of Western war culture should be mentioned first.

Although the use of technology has been largely shaped by Western countries over the last 500 years, it is considered that it is linked to integrating scientific developments into war rather than to war culture. To crystallize in the historical process, it can be said that as a result of the shift of the scientific centers from east to west and the great influence of the industrial revolution, the Western states have also shifted to a technology-based warfare understanding. However, in order to be accept a continuing western war culture, it is necessary to conduct a technology-based war in the period when the West was not the scientific center of the world. In the past 500 years, however, eastern states can be accepted as the best executors of technology-based war. In addition, parallel to the interiorizing of the industrial revolution, many eastern countries also seem to have caught technology level of western countries. For example, the Ottoman Empire was in the best condition in cannonball technology, which was considered as the high level war technology of its time. For the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, a cannonball technology, which was not used since, was used. The Mohac War in 1526, which was won by the influence of the cannonballs, was recorded as one of the greatest casualty difference between the two sides for that period,¹⁵⁵ and at the same time, the one that resulted in the shortest time.¹⁵⁶

It is evaluated that the stereotyping done positively for the western war culture in the 4GW approach also exists for the eastern war culture with a negative aspect. This stereotyping based on assumptions that using asymmetric methods and sacrifice people when it's necessary, is the general warfare culture of the east. According to an observation on the struggle in Wales in the 12th century, at the time when an

¹⁵⁵ The Hungarian army of 35,000 lost 18,000, while the Ottoman army of 60,000 lost 2,000. Around 10,000 were taken prisoner. Tony Bunting, "Battle of Mohacs", **Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Mohacs>, accessed on: 19.10.2017.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

exceptionally asymmetric struggle was conducted in the east, would give an idea on this issue:

“The light-armed people, based on their mobility rather than their forces, do not fight to conquer the battlefield. (...) They harass the enemy with ambushes and night raids. (...) Hunger, cold, or difficulties of war do not ruin their morale. It is easy to defeat them in a single battle, but it is hard to suppress their resistance in an extended battle.”¹⁵⁷

The sentences seen in the above example do not differ from those that describe Mao Tse-Tzung's strategy. Therefore, it will not be wrong to seek asymmetric struggles in differences in the balance of power rather than to put them into stereotypes, like culture. In this sense, it would be useful to give a few more examples. In the Mohac War given above, there were Hungarian soldiers who had to 'self-sacrificing' themselves with making 'suicide attacks' against the Ottoman army, not the Eastern army that fought with the conventional methods.¹⁵⁸ More broadly, Max Boot's study of the most important guerrilla struggles throughout history¹⁵⁹ is full of asymmetric methods and self-sacrificing examples of western groups against both eastern and western states. In this context, for example, asymmetric warfare methods have been applied in the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek independence struggles against the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, asymmetric methods used in American War of Independence against British Empire were not different than the methods used in eastern British colonies. Current examples from the West are the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Homeland and Liberty Movement (ETA)*.

In summary, it is evaluated that the approach that compress war cultures into an east-west duality, not to societies and historical periods, is a deficiency of 4GW studies. The analysis of asymmetric strategies should be considered not in an ambiguous war culture perspective, but in a strategic background designed to close the gap in the balance of power.

¹⁵⁷ Lewis H. Gann, **Guerillas in History**, Standford: Hoover Institute Press, 1971, p.3. Cited by, Mehmet Tanju Akad, op.cit., pp.16-17. For the original source used by Gann see also, Giraldus Cambrensis, **The Itinary Through Wales and The Description of Wales**.

¹⁵⁸ Tony Bunting, op.cit.

¹⁵⁹ Max Boot, **Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present**, New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013.

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To continue with the technological column, it would be useful to compare it with a different classification. In this context, the studies which use the separation between “MR and RMA” will be appropriate. Because these studies do not consider each military innovation as a breaking point, but consider these innovations as the moves that give advantage to war operations within the current military revolution paradigm. For this reason, the classification of Knox and Murray, which included the above distinction of MR-RMA, creates a good basis for comparison among various studies examining the military revolutions in different aspects.¹⁶⁰

Generations Based Analysis¹⁶¹	Military Revolutions Based Analysis¹⁶²
First Generation Warfare: Classic, Firepower based wars • Mass armies • Targeting maximum firepower to annihilate opposing power	Military Revolution 1: the seventeenth-century creation of modern state and of modern military institutions Associated and resultant RMAs (Revolution in Military Affairs) • Dutch and Swedish tactical reforms, French tactical and organizational reforms, naval revolution, Britain’s financial revolution; • French military reforms following Seven Years’ War.
Second Generation Warfare: Industry based total wars • Using technological innovations to maximize the profit from each unit • Expand the war into various battlefields • Using massive firepower to capture territory	Military Revolutions 2 and 3: The French and Industrial Revolutions Associated and resultant RMAs • National Political and economic mobilization, Napoleonic warfare (battlefield annihilation of enemy’s armed forces); • Financial and economic power based on industrialization (Britain); • Technological revolution in land warfare and transport (telegraph, railroads, steamships, quick-firing smokeless powder small arms and artillery, automatic weapons); • The Fisher revolution in naval warfare: the all-big-gun battleship and battle fleet (1905-1914).

¹⁶⁰ For other prominent studies except Knox and Murray’s study, see also Brian M. Downing, **The Military Revolution and Political Change**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Geoffrey Parkey, **The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (1500-1800)**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Clifford J. Rogers, **the Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe**, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

¹⁶¹ William Lind et al, “The Changing Face...”, pp. 22-26.

¹⁶² MacGregor Knox vs Williamson Murray, op.cit.

Third Generation Warfare: Maneuver based wars • Targeting psychological and economic sustainability of opposing force by strategic maneuvers • Using technological innovations (tanks, planes etc.) for making strategic operations to lower costs	Military Revolution 4: the First World War irrevocably combines its three predecessors Associated and resultant RMAs • Combined-arms tactics and operations, Blitzkrieg operations, strategic bombing, carrier warfare, submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, radar, signals intelligence.
Fourth Generation Warfare: Technology and idea driven forms of armed conflicts • New Technologies which able to give the opportunity to organize an armed conflict for smaller groups • Decentralization of political will and chain of command	Military Revolution 5: nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems Associated and resultant RMAs • Precision reconnaissance and strike; stealth; computerization and computer networking of command and control; massively increased lethality of 'conventional' munitions.

Table 1.7: Comparison between 4GW Based and Military Revolutions Based Classifications

As shown in Table 1.7, the maneuvers, which are taken as the third generation of the war in the classification of Lind, considered as a RMA in the classification of Knox and Murray. In addition, nuclear weapons, which has evaluated as the final MR in study of Knox and Murray, were not included in the 4GW studies at all. In addition, it has been stated that the methods taken as the basis of the fourth-generation warfare are not very new and are also included in other generations. It is also emphasized that the great practitioners of unconventional warfare such as Mao Tse-Tsung and T.E. Lawrence also states that final result can be achieved only with conventional powers.¹⁶³ In this context, first of all, it is necessary to put forward the difference between military revolution and revolution in military affairs and then return to the problem of what transformed the war.

The term MR was first conceptualized by the historian Michael Roberts in 1955,¹⁶⁴ and was then developed by many researchers in different dimensions.

¹⁶³ Lawrence Freedman, *Strateji*, translated to Turkish by Belkıs Çorapçı Dışbudak and Taciser Belge, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2017, p. 411.

¹⁶⁴ Aaron Frank, *Military Revolutions, Evolution, and International Relations Theory*, 2014, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228277820_Military_Revolutions_Evolution_and_International_Relations_Theory, accessed on: 17.03.2018.

Accordingly, MR can be summarized as the fundamental changes related to war that require the political and social regulation, in order to be able to use that MR in aggressive or defensive purposes.¹⁶⁵ In this sense, all actors who are the subjects of the war have planned their policies, their economies and their military structures in the light of this ‘new paradigm’ of war and have gone to regulate them in such a way as not to contradict this paradigm. In other words, MR is the element that changes the ‘strategic level’ of war, that is, the way it is treated as a path of achieving the political goal of war.¹⁶⁶

Although the RMA first began to be discussed in the USSR, it found its theoretical evaluation in the US in the late 1980s. The term is first referred to as the ‘military technical revolution’, in the work carried out under the coordination of the Net Assessment Office (ONA),¹⁶⁷ which is affiliated with the US Department of Defense.¹⁶⁸ It was subsequently transformed into the term ‘revolution in military affairs’ by Krepinevic, who made the first definition, as “*transformations to provide a dramatic increase in military effectiveness*” to include “*not only the technical fields, but also the operations and organizations that must be organized according to these technical fields*”.¹⁶⁹ In other words, RMA is an element that changes the *operational level* of the war, that is, the way it is executed and the way it is concluded. In this context, while MR appears as the main frame, RMA can be considered as innovations brought by different actors in order to gain advantage under paradigm.¹⁷⁰

This distinction also shows that the elements that point to the breakdown of the transformation of war, find their expression in the concept of military revolution. In this context, when the classification of 4ns is reconsidered, it is understood that the classification they have made after the second generation is incomplete. Maneuver wars, shown as a transition to the third generation, are actually a RMA, as Knox and

¹⁶⁵ MacGregor Knox ve Williamson Murray, op.cit., pp. 6-11.

¹⁶⁶ For a comprehensive analysis based on Knox and Murray’s distinction, on the effect of revolution in military affairs to armed conflicts, see Colin S. Gray, **National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities**, Washington: Potomac Books, 2009, pp. 121-164.

¹⁶⁷ These researches were conducted by a group of researchers, led by Andrew Marshall, who is a respected employee of the Rand Corporation.

¹⁶⁸ Lawrence Freedman, op.cit., p. 390.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Krepinevic, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions”, **The National Interest**, No 37, 1994, p. 30.

¹⁷⁰ Colin S. Gray, op.cit., pp. 163-164.

Murray have shown. Because it is based on industry-based mass wars, which are essentially the basic paradigm, but it brings great innovations to provide advantages in this kind of war. As a historical example, the mass armies that emerged after the French Revolution are a military revolution. Because after the revolution, all actors went back to organizing their own national armies over time and the wars started to advance on this reality. Similarly, the prolongation of wars after the industrial revolution brought about the importance of industrial capacity and targeting this capacity. In this context, maneuver wars are based on this main paradigm. The Blitzkrieg doctrine has brought great innovation within this paradigm, enabling the German armies to quickly obtain results. However, the Second World War was again an industrial-based mass war, and the parties aimed at each other's industrial capacities and masses as well as the battlefields. What determines the outcome of the war is the sustainability of the war, not which side uses tanks and planes better. In other words, with maneuver wars, the operational level of the war has changed, whereas the strategic logic remains the same.

Similarly, it is considered that an erroneous evaluation was made in the transition to the fourth generation of war. All components of the fourth generation war will not be repeated here, as they are discussed and examined above one by one. The only point to be mentioned at this point is that this classification, which was undertaken in the post-1945 period when the determination of nuclear weapons embodies the struggle between the great powers, without addressing these weapons and comparing proxy wars with today's conflicts, contains significant deficiencies. Although this provides significant data on the operational level of armed conflicts, there is no adequate evaluation of the strategic level, which is the basis of the relationship between use of force and actor behaviors.

The last falsification that needs to be made is about the failure of the US in Iraq, which is expressed both by Lind and Hammes. Lind and Hammes pointed out that the US did not obtain the planned goals in Iraq because it practiced the third generation war. As a solution to this, they suggested that US should learn the logic of the fourth generation war and adapt itself. This assessment needs to be answered because all the above theoretical falsifications do not explain the failure of the US in Iraq.

The answer to this question is also the basis of the hypothesis of this work. For this reason, it will be useful to go on to explain the hypothesis, starting from this question.

4. Reading the Transformation Through Costs and Relative Power: An Update on Various Studies

One factor that led to accelerated the fourth generation warfare studies following the millennium was the 9/11 attacks, while the other was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite the technology and the military success against the Iraqi army, the failure by obtaining political goal and the initiation of significant casualties led to the critics of 4GW theorists. These criticisms are two-sided. According to the first, the United States was unable to adapt to this new war type, 4GW, because it was fighting in accordance with 3GW against non-state actors organized in accordance with the network war. Second, it is that the United States, acting on Clausewitzian logic, has not strategically directed against its enemies acting on the post-Clausewitzian logic, and is therefore politically paralyzed.

In these conclusions, two fundamental mistakes are considered. First, non-conventional war, in which technological superiority become meaningless, is not new for the United States. The United States has gained this experience in Vietnam, and more importantly, with this lesson from this date, it integrated this new conflict type into Clausewitzian practices very successfully. Thus, it succeeded in being the surviving side of the Cold War. Even so, the US emphasize of COIN operations in Iraq considering with new characteristic¹⁷¹ of armed conflicts, criticized that it is now

¹⁷¹ As it explained above, it is defended that the characteristics of war has changed, not the nature. Because of the term 'characteristic of war' will be use in this section frequently, it will be helpful to compare it through Colin Gray's questions. Accordingly, the answers to the question "what is war?" are related to the nature of the war, and the answers to the question "how is war fought?" are about the characteristic. In this context, as described above, the changes are related to the characteristic of the war. For the study in which Gray listed six questions related to war, including aforementioned two, see, Colin Gray, "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War", **Parameters**, Vol 38 No 4, 2009, p. 18. Gray's comparison of the nature and characteristic of the war is as follows:

"Some confused theorists would have us believe that war can change its nature. Let us stamp on such nonsense immediately. War is organized violence threatened or waged for political purposes. That is its nature. If the behaviour under scrutiny is other than that just defined, it is not war." Colin Gray, **Another Bloody Century**, London: Weidenfeld Press, 2005, p. 30. Cited by Colin M. Fleming, "New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future", **Journal of Strategic Studies**, Vol 32 No 2, 2009, p. 230.

beginning to become a 'dogma' in Iraq.¹⁷² Despite this approach, linking the US failure to the warfare character in 4GW studies, reveals the second mistake to be criticized. Because, in the 4GW studies, the strategic engagement of the United States in Iraq is expressed at the operational level.¹⁷³ For the United States, which is a global force, strategic interests are assessed not by operations in a country or region, nor by resistance, but by considering the relative power among other big powers, after operations. Here is the answer to the question why the US made a similar mistake in Iraq despite the lessons it received from Vietnam.

The United States has made this operation in response to an environment in which, in light of its experience with the first Gulf War and operation in Afghanistan, it considers that it will bring great returns at low cost, or in other words, it will increase its relative power. The United States, which could not afford to disable the military power of the opposing force in Vietnam, succeed to disable the military power of opposing forces in Gulf War and Afghanistan operation with its high level technology. Accordingly, US considered that this would be enough to achieve its political goal. However, in the new period, it neglected the cost of 'peace building' process, which creates the actual cost. Because, peace building process that is considered as a long termed post-conflict implementation, requires multi dimensional 'state building' activities. In addition, parallel its declining hegemony, US has not received adequate support from other powers benefiting from the system. For example, in the first Gulf War, an entire Iraqi army was defeated at very low cost with owing to new technologies, while nearly %80 of the cost was met by its allies, especially Germany

¹⁷² For studies emphasizing the "COIN dogma" see also, Bettina Renz, "Russian Military Capabilities after 20 Years of Reform", *Survival*, Vol.56 No.3, 2014, pp. 61-84. M.L.R. Smith, "Guerillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare", *Review of International Studies*, No.29, 2003, pp. 19-37.

¹⁷³ In this manner of expression, it can be effective for those who develop the approach to be a mid-level military administrator. Because they do not focus on what the state will obtain from a war, according to their duties, they focus on winning the war and manage the operations. For this reason, they became those who ask the question "How do we win the war with resources we have" instead of the question "Do we need to use armed resources to achieve the political goal and how should we use it?" In this context, a sentence of Lind is meaningful to reveal the point of view. Lind advises that the US military "has a lot to learn from the police" in an article in which he get 'angry' to James Mattis, US Marine Corps (USMC) general and then US Secretary of Defense, for his statement that the nature of the wars has not changed. This approach could lead the United States to success in Iraq invasion in operational sense, but surely the cost of this success will create an economic black hole that will destroy the relative power of the United States in the long run. It can be asserted that the biggest obstacle of 4GW theorists is the understanding which focuses operational level too much. For Lind's comments on nature of war and Mattis' words see, William S. Lind, "Understanding the Fourth Generation War", *Military Review*, Eylül-Ekim 2004, p. 13.

and Japan, which had previously been strengthened by the US's security guarantees.¹⁷⁴ In addition, after first Gulf War there was also no peace-building activity for Iraq. In other words, the war has ended when the battle finished. However, in the second Gulf War, the United States, which did not receive much support from its allies, undertook much of the peacebuilding activity itself, and the economic and political costs after the attacks were greatly increased. It will be useful to include a research by RAND Corporation,¹⁷⁵ to understand why post-conflict activities is essential for obtaining the political goals.

As can be seen in the figure below, a military presence of 20 people for each 1000 population is shown as the proportion of persons required to suppress possible insurgencies and support peace building, in the post-conflict process.¹⁷⁶ It is seen that this was achieved only in Bosnia and Kosovo operations after 1991, which also threatened the European allies of the US, so that the burden was shared. As it is known, in these operations, a political outcome could be obtained, unlike many other cases. However, in operations where the issue is largely dealt only with US sources, it remains very low. Every move that will change this rate means increased costs for the United States.




Figure 1.4: The Ratio of International Forces per Thousand Population in Selected Operations¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Herfried Münkler, "İmparatorluklar...", p. 249.

¹⁷⁵ Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 2010, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf, accessed on 14.06.2017.

¹⁷⁶ Military presence is necessary, but not sufficient. It can even be said that it corresponds to a third of the activities as Robert Thompson expressed. However, military presence are indispensable in these activities. Detailed examination of the subject can be found in the third chapter of the first part. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam*, London: Chatto&Windus Publishing, 1966.

¹⁷⁷ Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, op.cit. p. 130. Further data will be include in cases of Part II.

As this figure shows, the US, a country that is the dominant power of the post-Cold War system and which is engaged in security guarantees globally, is unable to provide adequate support for the crisis and is unable to share the cost sufficiently, except for cases that threaten NATO allies. This leads to the inability to create necessary internal and external sources for the interventions. Hence, the increasing visibility and success of the new types of conflict in the southern countries is primarily due to the cost-based hegemonic inadequacy of the US, which has fostered in the post-1991 international system and expanded security guarantees. Although the US has relied on its military technology innovations to overcome this, and has considered that it does not need to shift many troops as shown above, the Iraqi case has become a breaking point in terms of understanding that it will not be possible.

In this context, the breaking point of the USA in Iraq is similar to the breaking point of Vietnam experienced in the Cold War period.¹⁷⁸ The US has begun to implement a strategy similar to its post-Vietnam strategy, at the point where the cost has reduced its relative strength, as it was in Vietnam. Moreover, the USSR, the other hegemon power of the Cold War period, made the same mistake in Afghanistan, but since the state was dispersed during the withdrawal period, there was no chance to develop a similar strategy. Ironically, however, the behavior of the USSR in the Cold War era before Afghanistan's failure is well suited to the behavior of an actor that took this course. In short, there is no new war type, but there is a pattern of repeated behavior. These repetitions gives the basis of the hypothesis.

These repetitions, which can be observed in the case of the United States, are considered to form a continuity for post-1945 power relations and actor behaviors and constitute the main dynamic of today's armed conflicts. In accordance with an assumption that could be called "power pendulums", it will be argued that when actors find a tool that reduces cost through their position in the system, they will try to achieve their political goals through a more direct and state-based method. Accordingly, in cases where costs are rising, they will try to achieve more indirect and non-state actors based methods. This cost-cutter is primarily a military technology to provide security guarantees for big powers. For smaller powers, it is the security guarantees which increase their relative power by allocating less resources. In cases where the

¹⁷⁸ Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon", *Foreign Affairs*, 2006, Vol.85 No.2, pp. 2-14.

technological innovation and other cost reducers do not work adequately, there is a fluctuation and all actors are engaged in activities that will protect their position in the new situation.

In this context, in order to transform the aforementioned assumption to a hypothesis, a holistic analysis should be made which will correlate the related concepts with theories.

The hypothesis of the study is based on a five-step theoretical background in the light of the assumption. The structure, which started in the framework of neo-realist theory based on the logic of the general functioning and power relations of international relations, is supported by theories about the role of international system and power transitions. Parallel to the focus of the study, approaches on the role of weapons technologies complements on this basis. At the top, there are approaches to strategy development in the light of all these components. It will be argued that the power pendulums have emerged as a result of a transformation process in which all these elements are composed. Therefore, it is necessary to show this infrastructure as a whole and clarify its connections with the hypothesis.




Figure 1.5: Theoretical Infrastructure of the Power Pendulums Based Hypothesis

As Figure 1.5 shows, neo-realist theory constitute the core of theoretical infrastructure. The first thing to be emphasized at this point is that neo-realism is used as a systemic explanation. In other words, it will be benefited from the fact that neo-realism is a theory which does not allege to explain ‘everything’ of international relations but alleges to explain ‘fundamental functioning logic’.¹⁷⁹ Neo-realism, as frequently expressed by many realist thinkers, does not reduce everything to power relations, nor is it closed to other theories.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, the first of the benefits is the anarchic¹⁸¹ structure of the system and the search for security arising from anarchic

¹⁷⁹ Charles L. Glaser, “Structural Realism in a More Complex World”, **Review of International Studies**, Cilt 29 Sayı 3, 2003, pp. 403-414.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 403-414.

¹⁸¹ The anarchic structure is defined by Waltz as the absence of a superior principle that determines the behavior of the components of the system. In this context, Waltz redefines the differentiation of domestic politics and foreign policy, which is consistent with the realist tradition, through the “arches”. According to this, the functioning logic of the national structures with hierarchy and the international structures with anarchy are different.

structure.¹⁸² Another benefit is the assumption of the decisive role of the great powers, and in particular the demands of the hegemonic power(s) to maintain and improve their relative position. In this context, the end of the Cold War, is a good example. The end of the systemic competition environment and in addition to the unrivalled US presence, has led many researchers to think that security approaches and military expenditures would fall due to the elimination of security concerns. On the other hand, neo-realists, who argue that the security approach is not a by-product of competing actors but of the anarchic structure of the system, have argued that there is nothing changing in the structure. In this context, in the years following 1991, a process which created a great frustration for many people was realized.¹⁸³ Military expenditures have increased, and the United States has led these spending.

The US's post-Cold War behavior and other actors' reactions to this behavior have once again led to the so-called “the tragedy of the great power politics” by Mearsheimer.¹⁸⁴ In this context, the security measures taken by the United States, whether to expand the hegemonic area or to adapt to the new security environment, were perceived by other big powers as a threat to disrupt the anarchic structure of the system and they attempted to take measures. This led to an increase in mutual security spending by restarting a vicious cycle based on the security dilemma. In this context, it is important that not only Russia and China, but also the European allies of NATO, have increased their expenditure in the light of the needs of a possible inter-state war. It is meaningful that the European Union (EU) tries to establish a European Defense Agency immediately after the Cold War, in the safest conjuncture in means of inter-state relations. Friedman's statements, who takes the issue from the point of view of the USA, are meaningful in this respect:

¹⁸² For Waltz's general theory of international relations, including how security needs are triggered by international anarchy, see, Kenneth N. Waltz, **Uluslararası Politika Teorisi**, translated to Turkish by Osman S. Binatlı, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, 2015.

¹⁸³ Thomas W Pogge's justifications summarize this frustration: “*The disappearance of the Soviet Bloc gave the rich nations broad opportunities to integrate their moral values and knowledge to their foreign policies and to the rapidly evolving international institutional order. It also allowed them to cut their GDP from military spending (...) to make a peace profit of 477 billion dollars a year. So during this period (...) the rich countries had both powers and funds for an effort to destroy global poverty. But such an effort was not made. (...) Rich nations are more willing to refer to moral values and use these values to justify unthinkable initiatives during the Cold War, such as NATO bombing in Yugoslavia.*” Thomas W. Pogge, “Küresel Adaletin Öncelikleri”, in **Küresel Dönüşümler: Büyük Küreselleşme Tartışması**, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınları, 2008, p. 650.

¹⁸⁴ John Mearsheimer, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, New York: Norton&Company Press, 2001, p 18.

“In post-Cold War period (...) on a deeper and more serious level, Euroasia, from Central Europe to the Pasific, was in chaos. That chaos was what reassured the United States the most. No Euroasian power would be seeking hegemony for a generation or more. (...) US strategy was based on the assumption that there was no systemic opposition. In fact, there was such opposition on two levels: Cold War allies who thought the US was becoming too powerful, and Muslims who saw an opportunity for fomenting risings. These two forces were not setting a trap for the United States, nor was the US seeking a confrontation. All sides were playing out of the hands that had been dealt to them. But this is what accounted for the rise of El Qaeda as well as the behavior of erstwhile American allies following September 11.”¹⁸⁵

Based on these explanations, two important components of realism stand out: Decisive role of big powers and balance of power. It can be said that the greatest security guarantee of a great power is the absence of a power which is not strong enough to dominate the system. In this context, it can also be said that the greatest security threat is a state that is likely to dominate the system. For this reason, it is seen that states are evaluating themselves according to the positions of other states in the system and, furthermore, are considering their relative positions not only by themselves, but also by the position of the rival states. In other words, the approaches of the great powers to power are evaluated not only by expanding their own power, but also by reducing their rivals' powers. Relative gain is the fundamental element that determines the strategies of states, because states shape their strategies on the political ground through their medium and long-term positions.¹⁸⁶

This approach provides the fundamental element that distinguishes the hypothesis from the two previous approaches. States' approach to armed conflicts cannot be perceived only by the way how war is operated. Unlike other forces, the big powers¹⁸⁷ evaluate their armed struggles according to their strategic goals and choose to use other resources by not participating in the conflict accordingly. In this context, if the national resources of the state are insufficient or “meaningless”, states can withdraw and use their economic and technological resources, and when they find other actors to fight

¹⁸⁵ George Friedman, **Amerika'nın Gizli Savaşı: Amerika ve Düşmanları Arasındaki Küresel Çatışma**, translated to Turkish by Enver Günsel, İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2014, pp. 64-65 and 70-71.

¹⁸⁶ Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Thoughts for Defence Planners”, **Survival**, Vol 52 No 3, 2010, p. 175.

¹⁸⁷ It is seen that the middle and small powers often engage in conflict if there is a threat to them, or fight for the pursuit of past issues such as territorial issues. Apart from that, those who take initiative in making international intervention due to a perception of the balance of power are usually big powers. The identification of the actors according to the power scale is done at the introduction of the second part.

for them, they can transfer these sources to them. This actor can be states within an alliance, supporters within the peace missions, and non-state actors. What important is achieving political goal by minimum use of the resources. Thus, a change in the character of the armed conflicts does not bring about a change in the handling of war and its instrumental position. In order to understand this distinction, it is necessary to go up to the operational level of the armed conflicts and to make an assessment based on the general framework drawn by international relations theories. For this reason, structural realism is chosen for the basis of the theoretical infrastructure.

The general acceptances described above are based on the principles of actor behavior. The first concrete structure that determines behavior patterns on these general principles is the international system that gives the political framework of power relations. In the post-1945 period, all actors, including the great powers, acted in keeping with the mechanisms of the United Nations (UN) system and determined their strategies accordingly. Therefore, the second dimension should be the impact of international systems on power relations.

In order to address the relationship between the system and the wars, it would be useful to return to Quincy Wright, one of the names that laid the foundations for the war studies. In a study by Karl Deutsch on Wright, he cited several reasons he called the "four factor models" for the emergence of wars. These factors are listed as the technology, laws (regulations on war), social organization and distribution of attitudes related to basic values. The deterioration of harmony observed in one or more of these factors is considered as the basis of the road to war.¹⁸⁸

In this regard, when considering at the UN system, it is seen that three of these four factors are directly and one is indirectly formed. Accordingly, the UN Charter and in particular its seventh section, regulate the situation in which military intervention can occur. Every other form and mechanism is considered as illegitimate.¹⁸⁹ In addition, hundreds of conventions and resolutions on every aspect of war have been drawn in a regulatory framework, and every actors are acting with these elements in

¹⁸⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, "Quincy Wright's Contribution to the Study of War: A Preface to the Second Edition", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 14 No 4, 1970, p. 474. Cited by Özgün Erler Bayır and Özden Selcen Sarı, "Quincy Wright", in *Savaş Kuramları*, edited by Erhan Büyükkancı, İstanbul: Adres Yayınları, 2015, p. 298.

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *UN Charter*, www.un.org/en/charters-united-nations/, accessed on 09.03.2018.

mind. In terms of social organization, the UN was built on a political structure based on sovereign nation states. Today, although the increasing role of non-state actors in all fields (and as military/political actors) is acknowledged, the system based on sovereign states is still the main anchor.¹⁹⁰ In means of basic values, the UN is the center in terms of norm and regime construction. Norms lead to the point in which sovereignty can be interfered and military interventions can be made in light of these norms.¹⁹¹ Technologically, there is an indirect effect of the UN system, and this indirect effect is expressed in five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The technological background, which also refers to a balance of power, will be discussed in detail below.

Another feature of the UN system is that it serves as a 'cost reducer'. As an example from the Cold War era, the UN was designed to include the territories of colonial control of Britain and France when the system was first established, and it was designed to represent the security-oriented control of almost all the earth's land. Nevertheless, when Britain and France lost control of their colonies by the independence movements after the 1950s, it brought the United States and the USSR to take action to influence these areas. This new situation created unexpected costs for both USA and USSR. Because, it expanded the eras in means of security guarantees, and also initiated a political rivalry which will be manifested as military expenditures. In this context, the study of Kalevi Holsti examines the correlations between international order and armed conflicts.¹⁹² Accordingly, through the principle which was finalized by the winners of WWII during the establishment period of UN and accepted by all the states that signed the UN Charter, the territorial conflicts have been reduced by half according to the previous systems.¹⁹³ The decolonization process and the subsequent struggle have been the most important source of conflict during the Cold War period,¹⁹⁴ as mentioned above. In addition, the religious and ethnic-based conflicts that escalated during this period continue to increase today. In summary, the

¹⁹⁰ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012, pp. 872-887 and pp. 900-913.

¹⁹¹ Menent Savaş Cazala, "Offensive Use of Force in Peace Operations: The Force Intervention Brigade", *European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol 4 No 2, 2016, pp. 115-116.

¹⁹² Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹⁹³ Ibid, pp. 307-310.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 311-317.

political structure, which is the main framework of the international security environment, continues to show its characteristics in a fundamental sense after 1945.

In this context, the date to be considered as the starting point in order to address the contemporary armed conflicts is 1945, not only in terms of technology but also in terms of politics. From a theoretical perspective in which the decisive role of the great powers is accepted, the UN system is still seen as a solution center. This is also important in terms of opposition to the current hegemony. Benitto Mussolini, who opposed the hegemony of Britain and France during the interwar period, targeted directly the system and said: *“the League of Nations is an alliance established by the plutocratic states, the Frank and Anglo-Saxon group, to exploit the rest of the world.”* However, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited the United States to act within the UN, rather than targeting the system, in his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, where he strongly criticizes the hegemonic initiatives of the US.¹⁹⁵

The main element that shaped the UN system, which was established in 1945, is the military background. As Wright states, military technology, the first of four components of war, is the key element in determining how war is considered as an option. In this context, it emerges again in 1945 as the date on which the main paradigm of contemporary armed conflict has shaped, as well as the international system. After the use of nuclear weapons, the meaning of the use of violence has been reshaped, both in the power struggle between the great powers and in the reestablishment of balance of power. In this aspect, the use of nuclear weapons has pointed out the ‘latest military revolution’.

In this direction, as explained in detail in the previous section, the military revolution refers to major military changes that change the framework for the use of violence. As Knox and Murray have explained, the military revolution is the fundamental paradigm that affects war and every organizational area accordingly. In this respect, nuclear weapons have a wide range of effects. The first is the change in the understanding of defense and deterrence with nuclear weapons, and the configuration of the armed forces in the light of these elements. Even the existence of

¹⁹⁵ Vladimir Putin, **Speech and Following Discussion at the Munich Security Conference on Security Policy**, 10.02.2007, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>, accessed on 16.05.2018.

these weapons is the basis of paradigm, because, unlike all other weapons, even the smallest actor possesses these weapons is enough to create symmetry among other forces.¹⁹⁶ As a result of the use of armed force, nuclear weapons disable all other power factors,¹⁹⁷ leaving no difference in the use of violence between big power and smaller powers. Undoubtedly, the formation of this situation is a basis that determines the face of the use of armed force as a political instrument.

The emergence and spread of nuclear weapons, has shaped the political relations between nuclear powers. This process, which will be defined over deterrence, has brought about the formation of blocks and large security zones. This process, which creates a balance of power based -also called as 'balance of terror'- on 'MAD',¹⁹⁸ among the great powers, has brought about the use of these weapons in situations where the two blocs of the Cold War were facing.

The power relations of non-nuclear states have shaped in the light of the possibility of a nuclear intervention of nuclear powers, however after it was observed that different actors are backed by different nuclear powers, it is understood that MAD will be decisive. As a result, it is understood that nuclear weapons are only effective in deterrence and that conventional weapons will be used in the cases involved. This has shifted the strategy of armed conflicts from symmetric to asymmetric, and shifted weapons from WMD to conventional weapons. The use of conventional weapons has revealed two major problems of the military background: the aging of weapons systems and the increase in costs.

Jack Levy and William Thompson emphasize the development of weapons technologies in parallel with political economy, arguing that the process of using armed force was shaped at the end of the process, which they called "coevolution". Accordingly, weapons technology, military organization, political economy and political organization are interrelated as a whole. The situation in these areas affects threat perceptions and decisions of armed conflict.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Herfried Münkler, "İmparatorluklar...", p. 191.

¹⁹⁷ Entities such as economy, demography, geography, natural resources are considered as important determinants of power elements.

¹⁹⁸ A situation where both US and USSR, as countries which have second strike capability, decide to use their thousands of nuclear warheads in a war and the consequence in which both sides, and inevitably the human life on earth, lose the war.

¹⁹⁹ Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, **The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation and Transformation**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011, pp. 54-87.




Figure 1.6: The Coevolution Process Illustrated by Levy and Thompson²⁰⁰

In this context, Levy and Thompson go further to expand the relationship between political economy and weapons technology. In this context, they state that industrialization is a breaking point in terms of the pressure on the cost of war, and that because of the increasing costs in the conventional wars, the gains of war are insufficient:²⁰¹




Figure 1.7: Relationship Between Organizational/Weaponry Complexity with Costs of War²⁰²

Friedman is the one who examine the same relationship through arms systems, but from another perspective. Friedman points out that the fundamental element that

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 56.

²⁰¹ Ibid, p. 70.

²⁰² Ibid.

increases military costs is that no military technology remains stable in one power and that it is balanced by other forces. He emphasizes that in cases, where the advantage of an improved weapon system can be eliminated with a much cheaper technology/methods, the cost increasing exponentially.

“Each weapon system (...) has a life cycle. It begins with the simple purity of the offensive and culminates in a weapon system overwhelmed by its own defensive measures. In the end, the effort required to defend the weapon dwarfs the weapons’s offensive power. (...)”

The weapon system reaches its limit of usefulness when the defensive measures necessary for its survival destroy the weapon’s cost effectiveness. That is to say, weapons reach their limits of usefulness when the cost of defending them is so great that it precludes purchasing other necessary weapons or cripples the civilian economy.”²⁰³

In the light of the above explained elements, it can be allege that the military background of post-1945 period consist of three components. In a structure framed by nuclear weapons, actors have again come under the cost pressure of conventional weapons, which has opened up asymmetric strategies. The key to these strategies is to increase the military expenditure of the strong side and make it meaningless at the same time. Thus, it will be possible to withdraw the opposing side through cost pressures, which cannot be done under symmetric military conditions. This function of asymmetric strategies will soon be noticed by the great powers shortly after 1945, indicating a significant break in the power transition.

When there are security commitments on the basis of the created system, the scope of these commitments and the cost of fulfillment take great importance. Because hegemon power(s), which has created the ‘peace zones’, is basically based on its own economic resources to provide it, and this economic sources derive from the share of hegemonic power from world economy. In this respect, it can be said that the two elements support each other. However, the process includes its own paradox. In this context, while hegemonic powers are trying to protect their area with security commitments, states that are not engaged in such commitments can allocate more resources to economic development by reducing defense spending. That reduces the

²⁰³ George Friedman, “**Savaşın Geleceği...**”, pp. 41-42.

share of the hegemon powers in the global economy. As a result of this paradox, the share of hegemon powers shrinks, while commitments stand same or increases.²⁰⁴

Hegemon powers use various methods to solve this paradox. The first of these is to share the cost with the stakeholders of the security guarantees. It is expected to support the operations against 'common threats'. The success of hegemon power to embrace common values or create consent to common threats becomes important in that point. In this context, especially demanding troops reduces political costs as well as reducing economic costs. In this practice, which is frequently seen in the use of peacekeeping forces, it is seen that the equipment, finance and technology provide by the great power and troops provide by other countries. In addition to that, provision of military bases which facilitate the deployment of troops and equipment is another way of sharing. However, in order to successfully implement this approach, which goes through states in general, it is necessary to have a soft power and 'obtain consent' that will have an impact on other states.²⁰⁵ For example, the Cold War period provided the foundation for these mechanisms for both of the hegemonic powers through common values and common threats. However, in many cases, the cost share of the United States, which could not produce sufficient consent in this matter after 1991, was very limited. This inability leads to the implementation of another method.

Accordingly, the forces capable of innovating in military technology are expecting to reduce costs based on these technological innovations. This pattern of behavior, which is in line with the power cycles of Modelski over the Kondratieff cycles,²⁰⁶ has been tried twice by the United States, once by the USSR after 1945, and all three have failed. There are two reasons of these failures. The first is that technological innovations do not have much meaning for the forces that are implementing asymmetric struggle. The second is the necessity to implement conventional methods in the peace building process, even if it follows a military success. The method found as a solution to this stalemate contributed significantly to the hybridization of armed conflicts after 1945. Because, in early periods of Cold War, great powers that did not understand the function of the asymmetric methods were directly engaged in many

²⁰⁴ Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 105-155.

²⁰⁵ For soft power-hard power distinction, see, Joseph Nye, **Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics**, New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004, p. 21 and pp. 47-63.

²⁰⁶ George Modelski, **Long Cycles in World Politics**, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1987.

cases. This has increased the costs of engagement, and therefore the costs of hegemony. The US understood that in Vietnam for the first time and USSR in Afghanistan. This experience has created a new pattern of behavior. The great powers that understand the function of asymmetric methods are not directly engaged in any region, but are focused on preventing others from engaging. The conflict, in which both rivalries are not directly engaged, soon turned into a conflict of actors supported.²⁰⁷ The experience of this experience after the US occupation of Iraq indicates that it is repeated as an actor's behavior.

This environment led to the behavior of the hegemonic powers, who are trying to protect their geo-economic interests on one hand and protecting from the imperial overstretch, on the other. These behaviors create waves that affect the behavior of other actors and every actor redefines strategies according to the fluctuation in the system. The expression of Münkler, who reads this relationship through the thesis of the 'empires', not hegemony, provides a useful summary:

"In the twentieth century, when the periphery gained considerable power from the fact that an empire could no longer use everything it had to crush an uprising, the idea that the age of empire had come to an end had a certain plausibility. But it soon turned out to be a rush judgement. Instead of an end of all empires, there was yet another change in the form of imperial order. First the imperial power gave up trying to control territory on the ground, which made it vulnerable to attack, and switched the control from the air or outer space. This made it possible to strike partially or selectively. (...) Anti-imperial players responded to this by changing the main form of resistance from classical guerilla warfare to new kinds of transnational terrorism. (...) Therefore, it is now a fiscal rather than a territorial burden that poses the greatest threat to empires."²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Apart from this method, there is another method proposed after the Cold War. US strategist Edward Luttwak has suggested that "give war a chance" in the conflicts that are not vital for the United States, and that US should treat as interlocutors only to those who have a decisive result in conflict. Thus, he asserted that the US will not charge the cost of the conflicts and can focus on its strategic goals. Joseph Nye, on the other hand, asserted that even if these conflicts are not strategic targets for US, avoiding humanitarian crises will damage the soft power of the long run, leading to greater costs. For Luttwak's approach, see also, Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 74 No 4, pp. 36-44. For Nye's approach, see also, Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

²⁰⁸ Herfried Münkler, *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States*, translated to English by Patrick Camiller, London: Polity Press, 2007, p. 138.

In the light of all these factors, it is considered that the determinant of where and how the armed forces will be implemented is ‘overstretch’. Therefore, it would be useful to first give Paul Kennedy’s definition of overstretch:

“The relative strengths of the leading nations in world affairs never remain constant, principally because of the uneven rate of growth among different societies and of the technological and organizational breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to another. (...) Once their productive capacity was enhanced, countries would normally find it easier to sustain the burdens of paying for large-scale armaments in peacetime and of maintaining and supplying large armies and fleets in wartime. It sounds crudely mercantilistic to express it this way, but wealth is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If, however, too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the long term. In the same way, if a state overextends itself strategically, (...) it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the greater expense of it all.”²⁰⁹

The characteristic of the armed conflicts after 1945 has shaped by asymmetric struggles. In these struggles, rival forces attempted to create unnecessary military expenditures for opposing forces and disrupt their position. Even in the cases that opposing force ‘winning’ the armed conflict, they aimed to sustain the resistance to increase the cost and acquire the withdrawal of strong side by the pressure of losing relative gain in global rivalry. Especially during the Cold War, the USA and the USSR used this new characteristic to create a black hole that would distort the relative position of their competitors. In other words, if the character of the armed conflicts after 1945 have shaped by asymmetric struggles, its strategy has shaped by overstretch which aims to ensure that the opposing power would go to extreme expansion.

The response of the big powers was to use technology and to support it with the warriors from external sources as much as possible. These external resources have risks for the big powers. For example supporting allies leads to political concessions, and the use of PMCs brings economic resource transfer. Supporting the local fighting groups, which are the cheapest of these methods, can cause them to face related states. Hence, rather than risky outsourcing, big powers tend to intervene directly, if they consider that they have a technology that will reduce their costs considerably.

²⁰⁹ Paul Kennedy, **Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri**, çeviri Birtane Karanakçı, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015, p. 14.

However, these attempts have not resulted as expected after 1945, creating cost increases, and the use of power fluctuates twice between direct use of force and hybridization, such as a pendulum. This fluctuation was not limited to great powers, but also influenced the behavior of other actors.

To repeat the fundamental assumptions of the hypothesis, which is blended with the theoretical background and described in detail above, will be a guide for further investigations. In this context, components of hypothesis are as they listed below:

- The system should be examined not after 1991, but after 1945. After 1991, there was a significant improvement in the relative position of the United States, but this did not change the balance of power based on the UN and continued to progress towards system balancing.
- The military paradigm was shaped not after 1991, but after 1945. In the military sense, the ultimate determinant is still nuclear weapons.
- Both symmetric and asymmetric strategies construct over cost.
- Cost-based asymmetric strategies are based on overstretch of big powers.
- Big powers, which consider new technologies as cost-cutters, expect to be freed from overstretch.
- After the failure of the expectation, outsourcing and proxy wars emerges and technology uses to support related powers, rather than engaging directly.
- Parallel to revolutions in military affairs, this process is beginning to swing like a pendulum.
- The first pendulum to begin with nuclear weapons, experienced the biggest difference in terms of cost-gain after Vietnam for the United States, and after Afghanistan for the USSR. Then the difference began to shrink with proxy wars. The USSR is disintegrated without experiencing the second pendulum. For the USA, the second pendulum began in the late 1980s and again reached its bottom line with the invasion of Iraq. Current issues constitute an example of outsourcing of wars and point to shrinking period of the second pendulum.

In this context, two components appear in hypothesis. The first of these is that wars are transforming parallel to the contraction between increasing costs and cost-cutting technologies. The second is the transition to asymmetric strategies and the logic of these strategies aiming at overstretch of the opposing force.

So, the first thing to do should be to explain the relationship between costs, technologies and the transformation of wars in the historical process. Secondly, it

should be to explain how different asymmetric methods meets in a common logic based on aiming overstretch of opposing force.



B. Costs and Transformation: How Costs Affected the Transformation of War

In order to explain how the costs affect the transformation of war, first it has to reveal how the war making is monetized. Because via monetization, all dimensions of war –except its political dimension- have become accountable/explicable through economic factors. In addition to that, actors have started to decide on war making after comparisons between costs and returns of war. In this respect, considering the fact that they were the first and most successful examples, it would be useful to start the explanation from Roman Empire and following European structures.

1. Monetization of War Making and Its Effects

In early periods of Roman Empire, military organization was based on pre-monetization practices. Soldiers, who have joined to Roman army as a civic duty parallel to ancient Greek's legacy, were rewarded with conquered lands. However, the transformation of Roman Empire from a small republic to an Empire also transformed the logic of the infrastructure and organization of their army. In this context, long term overseas expeditions left soldiers a very limited time for returning to their lands and collecting their products. Parallel to this transformation, the trade based transportation and economy affected the Roman army to change the system from agriculture based army to money based army.²¹⁰ As a result of those two developments in Roman system, the army transformed to a professional army. After transforming to professional army, the managers (generals) of the army started to plan the resources of Empire strategically to provide the needs of army. After a short while, Roman soils *equipped with roads, camps, hospitals, ammunition production centers, support services, retirement salaries and medical troops*.²¹¹ Despite the fact that the agricultural

²¹⁰ Victor Davis Hanson, "Falanjdan Lejyona", in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsün Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, pp. 52-53.

²¹¹ Ibid, p. 50.

production had been the fundamental component of Roman economy, the monetization of agricultural products in Roman markets had created the stability of salary-based professional army. Roman transformation has become the first example how monetization affects the organizations of armies.

However, after the dissolution of the Roman Empire, this military structure was also scattered and left a situation where some of the practices in Europe, Africa and Asia preserved and some replaced by other mechanisms. The most important aspect of shaping this structure was a new form of agreement between armored cavalry soldiers and village farmers who have security concerns in post-Roman anarchic environment.²¹² This phenomenon was not only a result of mutual interests but also a result of the understanding of protecting people to be in the service of the gospel in accordance with the religious *zeitgeist* and has become widespread throughout Europe.²¹³ However, aforementioned structure has corrupted with time and feudal system has become the prominent political organization in Western Europe. New form of European politics has also shaped the military infrastructure in European continent, because the endeavors of kings for controlling their vassal feudal units have become very effective to accumulate the financial and demographic resources in one single center. This attempts have also shaped the transformation process permanently by bringing every state to gather the monopoly on violence, technology and monetary. Those three dimensions have contributed firstly to European kings to eliminate their feudal rivals who behave independently, then they shaped warfare in means of organization, decision making and operation. In this context, it would be useful to start with how centralization of capital affected war making.

Castles, as one of the basic characteristics of feudal world, have also shaped the direction of central units' attempts. Castles were the biggest obstacle for kings who want to control their vassal because of their strong walls and self-sufficient structure. However the developments of cannon technology have changed the relationship between kings and other feudal lords. Big and destructive cannons, as expensive and expertise based technology, required accumulation of capital. So, kingdoms appeared as capital accumulation centers with their ability to collect taxes from new 'bourgeois

²¹² Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918'e**, Ankara, İmge Yayınları, 2005, pp. 72-75.

²¹³ J.M. Roberts, **Avrupa Tarihi**, translated to Turkish by Fethi Aytuna, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi Yayınları, 2010, pp. 204-205.

class' as money –unlike other feudal lords-. As a result of increasing role of capitalism in European economies, monetary economy became dominant in economic activities and capitalist transformation in economy gave kings a big advantage to collect the financial resources of war making.



Figure 1.8: Money Economy and Effects of Capital Accumulation on War Making²¹⁴

Capital-based financing of the war also marked the beginning of a process that separates civilian population and ‘officials’ by having use of force tools. As it summarized in the expression “*every nobleman had a sword in 13th century, but there was no one who has an anti-aircraft weapon in 20th century*”²¹⁵, transformation process affected central powers to take their authority back from their vassal units which they had to split it because of their inability by collecting the war resources. In this context, growing bourgeois class in Europe started to support kingdoms financially by increasing rates for both gaining political advantage against their rival class nobles and make lucrative trade. That relationship between bourgeois and kings will be summarized by Adam Smith after a few centuries:

“A country with plenty of merchants and producers (...) naturally, maintains many people who have ability to lend a big amount of money to their states when it required.”²¹⁶

The relationship between capital holders and central governments has brought creation of the first national budgets based on taxation and borrowing mechanisms, in the process of transforming into the sovereign state. In other words, capitalist economy and wars have begun to support each other’s role and give the state a central character.

²¹⁴ Charles Tilly, op.cit., p. 153.

²¹⁵ Ibid, p. 150.

²¹⁶ Adam Smith, **Ulusların Zenginliği**, translated to Turkish by Ayşe Yunus ve Mehmet Bakırcı, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985, p. 298.

As one of the prominent examples for first practices, Francois I started to borrow money from French bourgeois in 1520, by giving security on his future revenues²¹⁷ and this method made war-borrowing relationship one of the best options for European monarchies. Beyond any doubt, even though borrowing reveals the relationship between monarchs and capital holders, it shows only one hand of funding of wars (and states). On the other hand, taxes which was cutting from all incomes of capital/wage holders within the borders of the state have started to be used as the basis of debt payments of monarchies. As a result of this trend, budgets and taxes rose steadily. In order to illustrate this rise in numbers, the tax revenues of Castile in 1474, which were below 900,000 reals, rose to 26 million reals only 30 years later. This, undoubtedly points to the correlation in the increase in the tax burden per capita. France gives a useful example for that correlation. In this respect, in the year 1600, French taxes were equal to the 50-hour wage of the average worker, while in 1963 it increased to 700 hours.²¹⁸ It is also an important break that only central powers could reach the ability to collect big amounts of taxes rather than feudal units. For instance, the Duchy of Alecon, one of the feudal units in seventeenth century, captured the Cambrai region in today's Netherlands, however lost the region upon the disintegration of its army as a result of inability to support the army with enough and regular wages.²¹⁹ In addition to that, another advantage of Central powers against feudal units has been that they can deal with other kingdoms because of their central representation, thereby reducing their share by dividing the cost for a possible war with the Allies.²²⁰ These important steps, which enable States to collect taxes, are in fact parallel to another process that has a significant impact on the transformation of war. While central authorities have strengthened their armed forces in terms of quality and quantity, on the other hand they have increasingly disarmed the civilians. This distinction has divided the public into two groups. First group appeared as state, which will be committed by security service due to its monopoly on power and sources. And the second group, civilians who will be funded these security services. This distinction made state in Weber's expression,

²¹⁷ Charles Tilly, op.cit., p. 134.

²¹⁸ Ibid, p. 134.

²¹⁹ Jeremy Black, **Savaş ve Dünya: Askeri Güç ve Dünyanın Kaderi (1450-2000)**, translated to Turkish by Yeliz Özkan, Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları, 2009, p.371.

²²⁰ John B. Hattendorf, "İttifak, Kuşatma ve Yıpratma: İspanyol Veraset Savaşında İngiliz Büyük Stratejisi", in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, pp. 34-35.

the sole actor in certain borders which has the monopoly of legitimize power,²²¹ and the sole actor which decide on policies, war decisions and war making. In such an environment, only task for states, in their new form of sovereignty, is to control/suppress final feudal units which were protected behind castles. Central powers succeed that target in two ways, first by investing in firearms technology and second by creating increasingly growing armies. As a result, they not only completed their sovereignty, but also transformed wars.

The presence of the castles in Europe, where its transformation described above, dates back to the Roman period. During the Roman Empire, hundreds of castles have built in order to support logistics of the army and secure the regions against any potential attacks. The network of castles with these qualities has been built as self-sufficient capacity in means of soldiers and agricultural surplus.²²² Self-sufficient features of castles embraced by their new owners (nobles), and re-organized against foreign invaders, which can frequently include the kings. In this context, more than 400 castles were built in only Westford area of Ireland. Similarly, due to the abundance of castles built in central Spain, the region is called ‘Castilla’.²²³ This castle-based structure has shaped the face of wars in Europe in the framework of ‘siege wars’ until the development of the big cannons. The forces, having difficulty by taking the castles from the hands of noble owners, tried to take surrender the cities with siege wars instead of direct attacks. The development of cannon technology has changed this situation. Although their evolution has started in 13th century, real impact of cannon technology has observed in 16th century. In the first periods of cannon technology, it was a necessity to bring cannons significantly closer to the castle walls because of their low range; and that inadequacy led to their destruction by surprise attacks.²²⁴ Another problem with the development process is that if a large number of shots are fired, cannons would explode and cause serious damage to the attacker using the ball. Before 16th century, only the greatest States could use the cannon that could damage the city walls from a long distance, and these cannons, which were moved very slowly, as seen

²²¹ Max Weber, **Sosyoloji Yazıları**, translated to Turkish by Taha Parla, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006, pp. 132-133.

²²² Bernard S. Bachrach, “Roma’nın Surlarında”, in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 70.

²²³ Ibid, p. 89.

²²⁴ Geoffrey Parkey, “Barut Devrimi”, in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 113.

in the conquest of Istanbul, needed a great force to maintain a long logistics line.²²⁵ However, with advances in cannon technology, the production of smaller (and movable via wheels) cannons, as well as increasing firepower, have led cannons to a fundamental position in military strategies of the era. In this context, attackers have fortified their armies with cannons and defenders have also fortified their armies with cannons which they put them on bastions.²²⁶ So, two different developments emerged. First, kings who can borrow money from bourgeois to build big cannons, have taken a big advantage against feudal castles they want to conquer. Because their cannons with long ranges and high firepower affected the results of sieges against low range cannons of feudal units and this asymmetry led to the fall of feudal units one by one. For this reason, for those who were besieged during this period, the issue was not to overcome the siege, but to how long they could last.²²⁷ Second, the kingdoms, guarded by large walls and powerful cannons around the cities, have become the only force that can be protected against attacks from other kingdoms. As the wars have turned into wars of siege, relatively small fortress or small hinterland-based feudal units could not resist the great armies, they were either conquered or had to accept the full sovereignty of central power. On the contrary, kings with great hinterlands surrounded by great walls and guarded by strong cannons and great armies, have strengthened their sovereignty in their certain borders.

As it emphasized above, both of the siege wars and suppression of feudal units, required the second tendency –the expansion of armies- of this period. Accordingly, as of 1650, as calculated by Vauban, at least 20,000 people in any siege must be attacked with ten siege attackers against every single defender.²²⁸ This will undoubtedly require the serious growth of the armies.

²²⁵ Ibid., pp. 114-115.

²²⁶ Martin Van Creveld, “**Technology and War...**”, pp. 103-109.

²²⁷ Christopher Allmand, “Yeni Silahlar, Yeni Taktikler”, in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsün Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 99.

²²⁸ Geoffrey Parkey, “Barut Devrimi...”, p. 120.

Country	People Under Arms (thousand)			Ratio to National Population		
	1500	1600	1700	1500	1600	1700
Spain	20	200	50	0,3	2,5	0,7
France	18	80	400	0,1	0,4	2,1
Britain	25	30	292	1,0	0,7	5,4
Holland		20	100		1,3	5,3
Sweden		15	100		1,5	7,1
Russia		35	170		0,3	1,2

Table 1.8: People Under Arms In Europe (1500-1700) ²²⁹

As can be seen in the table above, it has become impossible to manage increasing numbers of soldiers and needs growing armies by means of past methods. The nobles, which were the basis of the military forces despite they were few of number, were only training for cavalry and not enough for the infantry. In addition, the number of people in nobles' self-armies was not enough to meet the need of the central army. Therefore, such as the use of the obtained capital for cannon production, the benefits brought by the monetary economy used to take new groups without military traditions into military services.²³⁰ Furthermore, there was an expectation of socio-economic relaxation by taking these new groups into military service which were accepted as economically inefficient and socially troublesome.

Although the changes in the organizational structure of the armies were in favor of the Kings in short term, they have also caused a very negative change in the military field in the medium and long term. The human resources of the armies began to emerge from people who joined the army for adventure and pillage, who, in short, *"had nothing to lose and hoped to win everything from the war."*²³¹ Thus, wars transformed from an agriculture and land based phenomenon to monetary based phenomenon. However, this transformation was seen at the level of soldiers; the nobility continued to do the post of army officers. In fact, this has been recognized as a right for nobles. In this context, 98% of the army officers consisted of nobles because they had a right

²²⁹ Charles Tilly, op.cit., p. 141.

²³⁰ Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: Savaş Sanatında Rönesans", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 14.

²³¹ Ibid, p. 14.

to come through the succession of the officers.²³² However, these big armies created new problems. Most importantly, feeding a big army including the peace periods became the biggest logistics issue for states. As a result of the need of economizing armies, mercenaries²³³ appeared as the ‘businessmen of wars’ who took in charge of wars in various regions. Although they operated in various regions of Europe with different names, the *Condottieri*²³⁴ in Italy came forward and marked the political life of Europe. However, the fact that the main motivation of mercenaries was to gain more money from endured wars has averted efficient use of those armies. Furthermore, this unreliable background of mercenaries has brought many measures taken by kingdoms. It has also been observed that for some mercenary armies hadn’t experience even one single loss in battlefields. These empirical facts created a reaction²³⁵ and started to create new alternatives for the understanding which sees the prolongation of wars as the most lucrative position.

Machiavelli will criticize it in the toughest form:

“These are scattered armies, with devoid of unity. They are ambitious, undisciplined and treacherous; they are bully in front of their friends, but coward against their enemies. They're not afraid of God, they don't trust people. (...)These people who wish to be with you in times of peace, leave or flee in times of war.”²³⁶

Because of Condottieri-based insecurity and the destruction of the civilian population, Machiavelli's voice was begun to echo in the second half of the 17th century. In particular, the improvements by firearms necessitated significant changes in the number of soldiers because of their use not only by cannons, but also in the hand

²³² Robert R. Palmer, “Büyük Frederick, Guibert, Bulow: Kraliyet Savaşlarından Ulusal Savaşlara”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 79.

²³³ In that point, it is important to distinct mercenaries and professional armies, as Yalçinkaya has emphasized. Since it is necessary to provide military service to its own country continuously, it is called as a professional soldier who provides his / her livelihoods from this profession. However, for those who have contracted with any political actor who provide money and, as a requirement, commercialized the killing for the foreign armies, they are called mercenaries. For further information, see also. Haldun Yalçinkaya, op.cit., p. 339.

²³⁴ Although the term Condottieri is used as a general name for mercenaries, it is only used for Italian mercenaries. Since the beginning of the 17th century, military contracts have been made in various regions of Europe. These Official certificates were called *Indenture* in England, *Lettre de Retenue* in France and *Condotta* in Italy.

²³⁵ Nicolo Machiavelli, **Savaş Sanatı**, translated to Turkish by Alev Tolga, Ankara: Say Yayınları, 2014, pp. 24-26.

²³⁶ Nicolo Machiavelli, **Hükümdar**, translated to Turkish by Necdet Adabağ, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, pp. 46-47.

of soldiers (as rifles). In addition to that, the uses of steadily developing technology and firearms in wars have led to the emergence of a group of officers specializing in new techniques. By 1600s, the practice of recruiting officers to technical training and supporting these officers with the technicians established from outside has become widespread.²³⁷ The vast majority of these technicians recruited from the bourgeoisie class, which had previously been exempted from participating in wars. Although these persons were not actively involved in the fighting part of wars, they became part of the military in technical issues such as artillery, deployment and logistics.

As a result of this whole transformation process, in 17th century, the composition of armies was consisting from three groups. First, the army officials who were recruiting from noble class, infantry soldiers who were recruiting from the lowest groups of civilians and a few of technicians who were recruiting from bourgeois class. Frequently, armies were supported by condottieris and the number of soldiers was growing steadily. However aforementioned composition was not adequate to control the masses that have joined as infantry and nobles based officials have lost the control of them especially in 30 Years Wars. As a result of this management failure, 30 Years Wars turned into a slaughter and plunder activity which would gave serious damage to civilians and resources of the region. After 30 Years Wars, soldiers are perceived as the lowest and most brutal sections of societies. Eventually, in France, social culture will be manifested as it will be observed in public spaces as “*dogs, servants, street women and privates cannot enter*”²³⁸ signs. This situation will change gradually in the post-Westphalia Peace process.

The most decisive feature of the post-Westphalia period is the prominence of the relationship between war and political interests which can be seen as a result of centralization of sovereignty. It has also understood that there is a ‘center of gravity’ for the struggle of interests between states. It has to emphasize that this situation did not appear suddenly after Westphalia, it appeared as a result of the centralization of power as it was formulated by Machiavelli from few centuries ago:

“Many believe that civil life and military life are completely opposite and contradictory to each other. However, given the structure of the government, we see that there is a very close

²³⁷ Henry Guerlac, “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War”, in **Makers of Modern Strategy**, edited by Edward Mead Earle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 44.

²³⁸ Robert R. Palmer, op.cit., p. 80.

relationship between the two, and that they are not only in harmony and stability, but are necessarily connected and united.”²³⁹

In this respect, the first change was to discipline the armies recognized by their lack of discipline and to take the necessary measures to keep them on the battlefield resistant. Accordingly, the barracks that spread all over the world started to offer soldiers regular and healthy living areas. Remarkable arrangements have been made for the health of the soldiers. First of all, the quality of food services improved steadily. The health infrastructure, such as the doctor, hospital, has been re-organized for soldiers. In addition, an intensive and regular training program was implemented in the barracks to bring military logic to the ranks. The duration of the training could be up to two years because of various reasons such as providing the technical information for using rifles.²⁴⁰ By considering the fact that 17th century was an early stage for rifle technology, it would be accepted that duration of training was conceivable. To give an example, in the ‘booklets’ prepared to explain the use of rifles; it was illustrated in 47 steps from handling of the rifle to the shooting of the trigger.²⁴¹ The time spent for training and the expenses for the soldiers inevitably increased the value of the soldiers. However, the measures taken to ameliorate the situation of the soldiers have only been a part of what was done to keep them on the battlefield. The control mechanisms against ranks that counted as untrustworthy were the focus point of military systems. As a result of trust problems toward ranks, responsibilities were given only in the supervision of the officers and that has eliminated the possibility of maneuvering in military strategies. In order to prevent possible escapes from army, a new type of conflict emerged in which the whole battalion was lined up in one row and tightly against each other.²⁴² However, the units are organized not in a single sequential contiguous order, but in a contiguous order with two or three sets. The reason for this is the technological condition of firearms at that time. Smooth-bore rifles, which were the technology of that period, had to be filled with gunpowder after each shot. In order to get advantage in opposing fire, two lines were firing successively. While first line was fired and kneeled on to load their rifle with gunpowder, the second line was started to fire simultaneously. For this reason, the units were organized in two or three lines

²³⁹ Nicolo Machiavelli, “**Savaş Sanatı...**”. Cited by Felix Gilbert, op.cit.,p. 9.

²⁴⁰ Robert R. Palmer, op.cit., p. 81.

²⁴¹ John Keegan, op.cit., p. 261.

²⁴² Palmer expresses that as "almost the elbows of the soldiers are equal to each other". Robert R. Palmer, op.cit., p. 81.

in parallel with the arms loading speed. Eventually, the new appearance of wars became a ‘gentleman’s war’ which was based on a ‘sequential murder’ of armies in some kind of an order.²⁴³ Another issue that requires serious regulation and supervision about the military has been logistics issues. Considering transportation difficulties, food and munitions stockpiling has started near the possible battlefields. In addition to that, protection of stockpiles has become one of the main duties of the war. To overcome this problem, interconnected fortification lines have been established. In this respect, castles, -as already constructed fortifications- have gained their importance for armies again in means of logistics. Contrary their pre-Westphalian role, they have started to be used as security zones with functions of storage, supplementation and communication.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, military units were forbidden to move away from their location to five-day long distances and the munitions were placed considering this limitation.²⁴⁵ Another problem encountered in the military area was the nobility in the military as an officer. The reason of that problem was the afraid of royal families from the possibility of using the soldiers against them. As a result of that perspective, they preferred loyalty to their family to meritocracy and the duty of being an army officer started to be given through inheritance. Eventually, European armies filled with untalented and inadequate commanders. Moreover, the fact that the nobles continued to use certain customs based behaviors and clothes during the war caused armies to move extremely slowly in their march and conflicts.

In the new environment of warfare, increased value of ranks has brought the concern to lose soldiers in battlefields. In addition, both of the logistics difficulties and disloyal soldiers based maneuver problems obstructed to use the army in effective ways. Eventually, all the components emphasized above created the ‘limited wars’, which were planned in order to get only strategic goals with using minimum sources. In other words, a new kind of warfare has emerged, which was based on limitations of

²⁴³ Max Weber narrates that French vanguard shouted to British army as “Honourable Britons, you shoot first!” in Fontenoy War in 1745. Max Weber, **Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Örgütlenme Kuramı**, İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 2011, p. 72.

²⁴⁴ John A. Lynn, “Çatışma İçindeki Devletler”, in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 187.

²⁴⁵ Robert R. Palmer, op.cit., p. 82.

objectives with defeating the enemy/enemies from a specific area while the least amount of resources is attempted to be lost.²⁴⁶

2. Appearance of Mass Armies: Cornerstone of Social and Political Costs

In the light of the aforementioned components, the real impact of the remarkable transformation is not military or technological, but political. French Revolution has pointed a milestone not only for world political history but also for history of warfare due to the creation of 'citizen-army'. Although the idea of the citizen-army was defended by thinkers such as Rousseau, Montesquieu and Mably²⁴⁷ in pre-revolution periods, the main factor that put into effect was that compulsory military service practice of revolutionary France, which had been in a very difficult situation militarily after the revolution. In this respect, it would be useful to include the first article of the 23rd August 1793 Convention:

"From that moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go to the battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and unity of the Republic."²⁴⁸

This article, called *Liveé en Masse*, has made a great contribution to France. Only a year after the adoption of the law, in September 1794, French army has emerged with 1,169,000 people, 750,000 under arms.²⁴⁹ This was a huge number for the period when it emerged, and it has brought the formation of the 'mass armies'.

Because of the nobles were one of the targets of The French Revolution, The Revolution has led to significant changes in composition of the French Army. As mentioned above, the nobles, which were representing with 98% at the command level

²⁴⁶ However, as Akad emphasized, limited wars apply to situations where States are not under an existential threat. Otherwise, there won't be a limitation in war. Bkz. Mehmet Tanju Akad, **Modern Savaşın Temel Kavramları**, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011, p.185.

²⁴⁷ Robert R. Palmer, op.cit., p. 97.

²⁴⁸ Cited by, Crane Brinton et al, "Jomini", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 115.

²⁴⁹ John Keegan, op.cit., p. 181.

of the armies, were down to 3% in post-revolutionary France.²⁵⁰ The 95% gap was filled by young officers who have trained with modern military curricula and have rose in the light of meritocracy. Napoleon Bonaparte, one of the fast-rising young officers, initiated the period of wars of annihilation by closing the period of limited wars. The components of this new era, which was represented by Napoleon's successes, built on two foundations. First one was massive and trustable armies and strategy of aggression which was targeting enemy's center of gravity by military maneuvers. These two components would affect the future of war. The fact that Napoleon had an army with hundreds of thousands of soldiers under his command, who was consisting of 'citizens'²⁵¹ who were ready to make all kinds of sacrifices unlike the historical examples, encouraged French commanders to change the strategies of the old era. In this context, old strategies based on controlling and auditing the ranks and based on fighting in lines without maneuvers were transformed to a flexible, maneuver based strategy of annihilation. In order to target the annihilation strategy was based on a tremendous firepower supported by hundreds of thousands of soldiers. This approach was tried to indoctrinate by Jomini, who served both French and Russian armies as a top military practitioner and theorician. According to Jomini, this approach was based on four components:²⁵²

- Bringing, by strategic measures, the major part of an army's forces successively to bear upon the decisive areas of a theater of war and as far as possible upon the enemy's communications, without compromising one's own;
- Maneuvering in such a manner as to engage one's major forces against parts only of those of the enemy;
- Furthermore, in battle, by tactical maneuvers, bringing one's major forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to overwhelm;
- Arranging matters in such fashion that these masses of men be not only brought to bear at the decisive place but that they be put into action speedily and together, so that they may make a simultaneous effort.

This strategic approach outlined by Jomini highlights the significant transformation in warfare. However, Jomini's explanations remained limited by the

²⁵⁰ John A. Lynn, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

²⁵¹ It is important to note that the 'citizen' concept, which refers the political individuals who is bounded with obligations and demand rights from its states, was new in that era. This dual relationship between state and individual bounded two separate areas and lead to the embracement of the states by their citizens. As a result of its first practice, created a great man power for revolutionary France.

²⁵² Crane Brinton et al., *op.cit.*, p. 85.

characteristics of war. The most comprehensive and satisfactory explanations on the nature of war have made by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz has emphasized an international environment which was consisting of sovereign states that were concentrated the political will by controlling not only political sphere, but also economic and military spheres and a structure which was represented by political interests and struggle of these interests via various tools. He also emphasized that wars were the prominent tool to success the political interests and he defended that in the environment of massive armies and firepower, it was possible only with a general annihilation of enemy's political will, rather than using limited wars. In this context, it was understood that the main aim of wars became to come across with enemy's army which represents the political will and annihilate that army –and the political will-. Beyond that, Clausewitz's approach to the wars of annihilation appears not as a superficial explanation of the appearance of the war at that time, but as a result of his assessment of the sovereign states created by the transformations in the political and economic structure.

In this context, first of all, he understood that, in an international structure composed of states that have succeed to concentrate political, economic, social and military resources at a central interest, it would inevitably to bring a power struggle between interests shaped by political targets based on maintaining or developing power for various reasons. Power, which was expressed by Weber as “*the ability of an individual or group to achieve their own goals or aims when others are trying to prevent them from realizing them*”,²⁵³ was explained by Clausewitz in a similar logic but different context. In this respect, Clausewitz explained power as the execution of political interests which is concentrated in governments through various tools. As a result of this approach, armies –as the most effective and direct way to represent the political interest- become the prominent tool of power execution in the international environment. As a result of all this evaluation process, Clausewitz concludes with his famous expression “*war is the continuation of politics by other means.*”²⁵⁴ In this

²⁵³ Max Weber, “**Toplumsal ve...**”, p. 96.

²⁵⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, **Savaş Üzerine**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 45.

context, he defines war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”²⁵⁵ and emphasizes that “war is settling the big interests by bloodshed.”²⁵⁶




Figure 1.9: Warfare in Clausewitzian Approach

Clausewitz's determination on the nature of war is important not only in terms of the ideational arguments, but also in terms of explaining the transformation of the war. In an international environment where political interests crystalized in single administrations are confronted, inevitably everything that supplies that interest would be a part of the war. In this context, the war will include not only in terms of the battles but also in terms of economic, logistic and demographic aspects that affect the continuation of these battles. This will lay the stones of the road that has reached ‘total wars’ over time. This inevitably leads to a rapid and continuous rise in costs. In this context, the war has not only been a technical phenomenon of the military, but it has started to progress in the balance of both the overall sustainability of the government, and the sustainability of people’s support who is the human resource of the military, and financial- political supporter. Otherwise, costs will eliminate the sustainability of the war, which will either lead to the fall of government or to cut the People's support.

²⁵⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, “On War...”, p. 101.

²⁵⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, “Savaş Üzerine...”, pp. 30-31.

Clausewitz also addressed this dimension and his evaluation was later referred to as the ‘Clausewitz trilogy’.




Figure 1.10: Clausewitz Trinity (Graphic and Vectorial)²⁵⁷

The government, the army and the people are the main elements that enable war to be fought and maintained, and ensuring the balance between them constitutes the basis for the winning of the war. In this context, the government which will evaluate the army as a capital similar in the field of business is doomed to failure if it does not regard it as a tool to use in its goals and does not use the resources of the people accordingly. In this respect, it became crucial to use every sub-units of the army in most effective ways in order to acquire maximum firepower in ever front. Bülow will put forth this approach by expressing “*Napoleon keeps his capital more active than others*”.²⁵⁸ Clausewitz expresses the same logic as, “*the soldier is gathered, dressed, armed, trained, the soldier sleeps, eats, drinks and walks, all of these attempts are only for fighting at the appropriate time and place.*”²⁵⁹ In summary, the approach to use the army as a whole to attack the enemy with the highest level of firepower and to break the will of the enemy with this high firepower will find its expression in the concept of "center of gravity".

²⁵⁷ For vectorial explanation also see Michael Handel, **Savaşın Ustaları: Klasik Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Berna Kara, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2004, p. 138. For a detailed explanation of Clausewitzian Trinity including graphical explanation and Handel’s vectorial explanation see also Kivılcım Romya Bilgin and Gülayşe Ülgen Türedi, “Carl von Clausewitz”, in **Savaş Kuramları**, edited by Erhan Büyükkakıncı, Ankara: Adres Yayınları, 2015, pp. 139-152.

²⁵⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, “**Savaş Üzerine...**”, p. 57.

²⁵⁹ H. Rothfels, “Clausewitz”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 109.

“[*Economy of force* is] The art of pouring out all one’s resources at a given moment on one spot; of making use there of all troops, and, to make such as a thing possible, of making those troops permanently communicate each other, instead of dividing them and attaching to each fraction some fixed and invariable function; its second part, a result having been attained, is the art of again so disposing the troops as to converge upon, and act against, a new single objective.”²⁶⁰

Despite the fact that wars of annihilation have appeared as the prominent characteristic of its era, it is also important to note that it has not shown all the characteristics of the wars in this generation. In this contest, Clausewitz states that the main objective is not annihilation itself, but the force to submit enemy’s will, and he explains the issues with various examples that the will forced to submit without annihilation. Accordingly, as long as it eliminates the ability to re-establish an army, the land invasion could be the main target. Similarly, he emphasizes that the "psychological disarmament" effect of the sudden and surprise attacks of the public psychology of the enemy nation will work the same way as ‘physical disarmament’. So he focuses on determining and then destroying the ‘center of forces’, where the forces of enemy strategically intensified.²⁶¹ Undoubtedly, the enemy army encountered in the battle or war will be the center of force, but as it mentioned above, there are cases where this doesn’t exist.

In short, in an international environment based on sovereign states, firearms technology became available for infantry and the French Revolution led to a new type of war carried out by the mass armies. And this has led to a rise in costs of human, munitions, war supplies and logistics. Following the interiorizing of this transformation by all actors, battles of the size of half a million people were fought, as seen in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813. In other words, limited wars with small armies and low budgets have been replaced by wars based on great armies and budgets. It also brought about the development of comprehensive strategies that do not only cover battles, but also distribute the ‘capital of the opposing party’ to take advantage in battlefields. This perspective which was later called as ‘high strategy’ it has aimed to damage the resources which give support to enemy’s political will, to dismantle enemy army and effect enemy’s perception on impossibility of winning the war. The first

²⁶⁰ Ferdinand Foch, **The Principles of War**, Londra: Chapman and Hall, 1920. Cited by, B.H. Liddell Hart, **Strateji: Dolaylı Tutum**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2003, p. 456.

²⁶¹ H. Rothfels, op.cit., p. 109.

examples of this perspective were implicated during the Napoleonic Wars. In this context, guerrilla groups in Spain succeed to pull many of the units of Napoleon's army on themselves by "targeting small platoons, killing soldiers who sick and left alone, destroying the convoys and annihilating the messengers/couriers".²⁶² Parallel, Russians in the same series of war, preferred to use retreat strategy rather than confronting with French army. With this strategy they provided their army from a war of annihilation and implemented a war of attrition. As a result of this strategy, a process has started which will eliminate Napoleon's army from 600.000 soldiers to 100.000 soldiers. In the light of these experiences, actors started to plan wars with their political, economic and social dimensions. However these new strategies couldn't prevent the rise of costs. A new development, the Industrial Revolution, caused a boom in all dimensions of the war and its costs.

3. Industrial Revolution: Cornerstone for the Economic Costs

The industrial revolution has led to a much greater rise in costs that have been steadily increasing since the wars have monetarized. In parallel with this revolution, which creates the mass production, the economic and political dimensions of wars have clinched. Thus, a pendulum-like model, which was mentioned in the previous section, began to emerge after the industrial revolution. In this sense, in parallel with the cost of war in post-industrial revolution era, the sustainability of war making has reduced and actors have become hesitant to be a part of wars. In order to overcome this hesitation, they applied to technological innovations which would have been reduce the costs and attempted technology based strategies which could have been resulted with victories in short term. These attempts will be met by the balancing efforts of other actors, and the cost of war will rise again. In the light of all these innovation-balancing attempts, it would be observed that the wars would have been much longer and much expensive than pre-revolution periods. In this context, in order to explain the effect of the rise in costs post-industrial revolution era on the transformation of the war, it would be useful to first address the areas in which the industrial revolution affected the wars. In this respect, it has to be emphasized that the effects of industrial revolution shall be examined in two phases. Because the process

²⁶² John A. Lynn, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

started with the effects of iron and steam, continued with developing of steel, electricity, chemistry and opened the fronts of total wars.²⁶³

The first major effect of industry revolution on economy and war is the mass production of iron and, in particular, transforming it into a major infrastructure component of wars. Railways significantly reduced the cost of logistics by bringing hundreds of thousands of soldiers to long distances in a short period of time. That development allowed maneuvers in battlefields and to use much more soldiers effectively than former periods. In this respect, it would be useful to exemplify the transformation. In pre-industrial revolution period, it was a huge problem to transport %1 of the population. In post-revolution periods it became possible to transport even %10 of population.²⁶⁴ In addition, railways based transportation has successfully reduced the illness, injuries and losses caused by long distanced march. This great advantage inevitably led countries to race to build a railway network. At this point, another prominent component that needs to be emphasized is that the economy played a role as crucial as the war in the creation of this network. Although war played the decisive role to establish a railway network in militarist states such as Prussia, railway networks were established in colonial empires such as Britain to establish a link between domestic industrial centers and markets and to transfer products from inner parts of the colonies to the ports.

Length of Railway (km)		Length Of Railway Network By Country (km ² per 10.000 persons)	
1831	332	More than 1000	Belgium
1841	8.591	More than 750	United Kingdom
1846	17.424	More than 500	Swiss, Germany, Holland
1851	38.022	250-499	France, Denmark, Italy, Austria
1861	106.886	100-249	USA, Sweden, Spain, Romania, Cuba
1871	235.375	50-99	Turkey, China Trinidad, Victoria, Cava
1876	309.641	10-49	Russia, Norway, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Jamaica, India, Ceylon, Tasmania, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Wales, Finland

Table 1.9: Improvement of Railway Networks²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih Cilt I: İlkçağlardan 1918'e**, Ankara, İmge Yayınları, 2005, pp. 208-213.

²⁶⁴ Haldun Yalçınkaya, op.cit., p. 179.

²⁶⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, **Sermaye Çağı: 1848-1875**, translated to Turkish by Mustafa Sina Şener, Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları, 2015, p. 335.

The increase by the length of railway networks indicated the race between states for the most suitable position towards a potential war. In this context, Friedrich List, one of the prominent German nationalists, summarized this race as, “*every mile of railway which a neighboring nation finishes sooner than we, each mile more of railway it possesses, gives it an advantage over us.*”²⁶⁶

Parallel to the development of the railway technology, progress in the fields of chemistry, health services, oil and electricity have affected the transformation process as well. The first of these is the productivity seen in agriculture field, which are the longest-term and the most influential among the fields mentioned above. In this respect, the losses seen in agricultural production decreased with the use of chemicals. In addition to that, due to oil and electricity-based technologies, much more production has been achieved with fewer people. This innovation created a ‘surplus value’ in means of human resources for nations. These people were driven to industrial production as well as to the front in the war, and so there was a significant increase in the number of people who could be coordinated in the event of a mobilization.²⁶⁷ The effect of the increase in products is to feed larger masses (especially the millions of soldiers on the front) at lower cost. The long-term contribution of this development in agriculture is its contribution to population growth.²⁶⁸ As can be seen in the table below, efficiency has increased according to the rate of using new technologies. In some countries, the number of people working in agriculture has decreased and production has increased. In others, there was a greater increase in agricultural production compared to the increase in the number of persons used.

	Value of Production (Million Sterling)		Number of Employed People (1000)	
	1840	1887	1840	1887
Britain	218	251	3400	2460
France	269	460	6950	6450
Germany	170	424	6400	8120
Russia	248	563	15000	22700
Belgium	30	55	900	980
Turkey	98	194	2000	2900
USA	184	776	2550	9000

Table 1.10: Effects of Agricultural Developments (Selected Countries)²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith...”, p. 149.

²⁶⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, **İmparatorluk Çağı: 1875-1914**, translated to Turkish by Mustafa Sina Şener, Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları, 2015, p. 375.

²⁶⁸ Oral Sander, op.cit., pp. 213-215.

²⁶⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, “**Sermaye Çağı...**”, p. 336.

Two other significant innovations in these areas have been the advances in medicine and the development of canned food. With the effect of both developments, praise worthy ameliorations have been observed in the health of the soldiers. This was a crucial development for the states that have lost a large proportion of their troops by non-battle reasons.²⁷⁰ Because, the number of soldiers who died due to various health reasons and injuries outside the war was more than those who died in the front until the Boer war which occurred between 1899-1902.²⁷¹ As a result, it has become possible to use millions of soldiers in wars and create strategies based on the knowledge that these soldiers will not be lost before the battles. Thus, the demographic background of the ‘total wars’ appeared which would be the fundamental concept of post-industry revolution period. As a result, the infrastructure of total wars prepared in the light of the developments in fields of agriculture, railways, chemistry and medicine. In other means, “*combine harvesters, rail and steamships are the real creators of the total war.*”²⁷²

In addition to the contributed elements seen in infrastructure, the innovation that would have the most remarkable impact on war-making has been the tremendous increase in firepower. In this context, the most outstanding progress has been experienced in rifle technology. In the context of this progress in rifle technology, it transformed first from smoothbores to rifles, then from rifles to machine guns. In this context, Smoothbores that need to be filled with gunpowder could be fired four times a minute, while rifles could be fired more than twenty times a minute. Eventually, with the development of machine guns, it became able to shoot more than six hundred shots per minute.²⁷³ Aforementioned increase in firepower affected positively the approach

²⁷⁰Hobsbawm gives a dramatic example for that problem. In this respect, in the naval British-French naval wars between 1793-1815, %80 of British sailors have died because of illness and/or accidents, rather than battles. Also see Eric Hobsbawm, **Devrim Çağı: 1789-1848**, translated to Turkish by Mustafa Sina Şener, Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları, 2013, p. 106. Similarly, despite the loss of 305,753 people in the First World War, the Ottoman Army lost 466,759 people from the diseases. For the source see also. Edward J. Ericson, **Size Ölmeyi Emrediyorum: Birinci Dünya Savaşında Osmanlı Ordusu**, translated to Turkish by M. Tanju Akad, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınları, 2003. In the Crimean War between 1854-1856, the French died 50,000 diseases against 20,000 combat deaths. The British lost 17,000 disease deaths despite 5,000 combat deaths. Although the Russians were fighting for their own country in this war, 38,000 died of disease despite the loss of 38,000. For data, see also, Mehmet Tanju Akad, **Savaş Tarihinin Dönüm Noktaları**, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, 2005, p.52.

²⁷¹ John Keegan, op.cit., p. 275.

²⁷² Mehmet Tanju Akad, op.cit., p. 205.

²⁷³ Burak Gülboy, **Mutlak Savaş: Birinci Dünya Savaşının Kökenleri Üzerine Clausewitzyen Bir Çözümleme**, İstanbul: Röle Akademik Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 148.

of using maximum number of soldiers. The logic of this approach caused by the understanding that the firepower based wars occur due to not linear but square function, as it explained in the Lanchester equation in 1914. Lanchester equation can be explained by comparing old and new generation wars. In the old-generation wars in which 2000 soldiers confronted by 1000 enemies with a linear function, in the circumstance of the armies had similar qualities and equipment, it was not expected that the troops would be able to acquire the victory by staying at least 1000 people. It was also assumed that this could change according to the qualifications of the soldiers and the army, and that in some cases; smaller armies could surprisingly win the war. Due to its superiority in numbers, 2000 soldiers based army would enlarge its advantage as square of the difference by every shoot. As it examined by equation, the firepower of armies would represent as 4 million to 1 million.²⁷⁴ It has been also calculated that this situation has not changed in qualified armies. This situation can be examined with an example which was based on the confrontation of 3000 soldiers against 1000 enemy with double qualification. As a result of the square function the ratio would be 9 million to 4 million and the quality of the 1000 soldiers would not change the balance of the battle.²⁷⁵ As it is seen in various instances, the firepower has become the most crucial component of total wars. To obtain the largest firepower, countries started to use millions of soldiers in battlefields. In addition, center of gravity gained importance as a result of the logic which based on determining enemy's center of gravity, focusing that with maximum soldiers and destroying it with maximum firepower. As will be explained below, the concept of mobilization would emerge with the merger of the innovations in transportation and communication with firepower, and all parties of wars would try to reach maximum number of soldiers (or firepower) as soon as possible.²⁷⁶ Both the new effect of firearms and the supporting of this with the understanding of economy of force would create a great acceleration in the increase of the number of soldiers.

²⁷⁴ George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", pp. 309-310.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 310.

²⁷⁶ Stefan T. Possony ve Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq ve Foch: Fransız Ekolü", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 305-324.

Country	Number of Soldiers							
	1710	1789	1814	1816	1860	1880	1900	1914
Britain	75.000	40.000	250.000	225.000	347.000	248.000	624.000	532.000
France	350.000	180.000	600.000	132.000	608.000	544.000	715.000	910.000
Australia	100.000	300.000	250.000	220.000	306.000	273.000	385.000	444.000
Germany	39.000	190.000	270.000	130.000	201.000	430.000	524.000	891.000
Russia	220.000	300.000	500.000	800.000	862.000	909.000	1.162.000	1.352.000
USA	-	35.000	-	16.000	26.000	36.000	96.000	164.000
Japan	-	-	-	-	62.000	71.000	234.000	306.000

Table 1.11: Number of Soldiers of European Powers (1710-1914)²⁷⁷

In the sequel of the total wars, the countries approached the maximum number of soldiers they could use,²⁷⁸ and reached the highest limit with 10% in the American Civil War, which can be deemed as the first practice of total wars. In addition, trench based defense lines have made it almost impossible to advance beyond the firepower and have created a new function for artillery technology. In this context, the artillery battalions, whose firepower and quantity have been significantly increased, have started to be used to disperse the trenches. The new importance of artilleries has created a new arms race by artillery production. It will be useful to sample the increase in artillery production. The Krupp Company, which produces a large part of German artilleries in 19th century, reached 16.000 employees in 1873 24.000 employees in 1890, 45.000 employees in 1900, and 70,000 employees in 1912.²⁷⁹ Doubling the firepower by artilleries led the parties who want to protect from the fire to spread their troops in larger areas.²⁸⁰ The troops which expanded wider areas have created gigantic fronts throughout continents, and have made the European continent a battlefield.

In order to take advantage in series of battles based on firepower in which millions of soldiers confront, all parties have mobilized scientific, industrial and economic sources to produce and/or develop new war equipment. In this context, the target to

²⁷⁷ Datas edited by, Paul Kennedy, "*Büyük Güçlerin...*", p.136, p.197 and p.253. Kennedy edited the data until 1789 from study of Andre Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe: 1494-1789*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. He also edited the data until 1914 from Correlates of War Project leading by Michigan University. For detailed information on the Project see also, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.

²⁷⁸ Maximum ratio of the population, which consists of non-combatants and contains providing the economic, logistic and industrial necessities of the army.

²⁷⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, "*İmparatorluk Çağı...*", p. 332.

²⁸⁰ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "*Modern Savaşın...*", p. 42.

protect from the firepower of the rifles has led to the development of tanks.²⁸¹ The tank, initially considered a transport vehicle, would then be transformed into a primary battle unit on its own. Similarly, the first planes were used to observe the armies, trenches and defense lines in same period.²⁸² In addition to basic innovations such as aircraft and tanks, hand grenades, chemical weapons and the first examples of submarines have been introduced in this new generation of technology. In the light of all these components, an enormous increase was observed not only in the number of soldiers but also in the production of war equipment throughout the I. World War. In this respect, it would be useful to give the increase in Britain.

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Machine Gun	300	6.100	33.500	79.700	120.900
Plane	200	1.900	6.100	14.700	32.000
Artillery	91	3.390	4.314	5.137	8.039
Tank	-	-	150	1.110	1.359

Table 1.12: Increase in the Production of War Equipment and Vehicles in Britain (1914-1918)²⁸³

In addition to the quantitative increase of war vehicles, there has also been considerable qualitative progress. Accordingly, great progress will be made in parallel with the developments in the industrial revolution in the performance of rifles, ships and aircraft.

²⁸¹ Tanks have developed in accordance with the necessity to transport the soldiers from the areas suppressed with high firepower. In order to keep the secrecy of the Project, it was shown as the production of water tanks because of its physical similarity. After many innovations, tanks became one of the prominent components of battlefields.

²⁸² Similar to tanks, planes have also developed during WWI but have become functional during WWII. However, in final years of WWI, it was also observed that planes used with rifles. The first use of bombs thrown by planes has been seen in 1911, on Tripoli, in Turkish-Italian war. But, as it emphasized above, the functional use of planes by rifles and bombs would be in WWII.

²⁸³ Gerd Hardach, **The First World War: 1914-1918**, London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 87. Cited by Paul Kennedy, "**Büyük Güçlerin...**", p. 325.

Infantry Firearms	Date	Effective Range (m)	Rate of fire (min)
Rifled Musket	1853	300	3
Magazine Rifle	1879	1000	30
Maxim MG	1885	2000	600
Battleships	Date	Guns	Armour (max.)
Dreadnought	1906	10*12"	11"
Queen Elizabeth	1913	8*15"	13"
Iowa	1941	9*16"	19"
Aircraft	Date	Guns	Speed (km/h)
Camel	1917	2*0,3"	196
Spitfire	1938	8*0,3"	588
Mustang D	1944	6*0,5"	703

Table 1.13: Growth in the Performance of Weapon Systems²⁸⁴

The great increase in numbers and costs of war equipment has made the economy dimension as the prominent component of war making. Mutually evolving weapon technologies have been found to be bi-directional in the field of economy. Firstly, newly developed weapons created an arms race between states. Secondly, protection systems of these weapons created an extra-unexpected burden with time. For example, the cost of warships increased more than 200 times between 1850 and 1950. In this context, the production of a warship dated 1896 in the United States cost 4.7 million dollars, while this figure will increase to 77 million dollars in 1937. The cost will exceed 100 million dollars on another ship produced only three years later.²⁸⁵ Similar examples exist by German Navy Forces as well. In 1899, a war ship made in Germany was cost 22.7 million gold German Marks, equivalent to about 20% of the German Navy budget. In 1906 the cost has reached to 46 million gold German Marks.²⁸⁶ Considering that the German economic growth in the same period was 27% in total, the burden of these costs can be understood clearer. Similarly, logistics needs have also created a huge burden on the economy. According to this, in 1870, the need of a division unit was 50 tons of food and animal feed, while in 1916 it was 150 tons, and

²⁸⁴ David L.I. Kirkpatrick, "Trends in the Costs of Weapon Systems and the Consequences", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 15 No 3, 2004, p. 261.

²⁸⁵ George Friedman, "**Savaşın Geleceği...**", p. 215.

²⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 219.

in 1945 it was 300 tons.²⁸⁷ The logic of military spending during the war is based on the benefit-cost account. In this context, during World War I, Germany will pursue an annihilation strategy against the states of continental Europe, but it will be an attrition strategy aimed the economic sustainability of Britain. German decision makers created a naval strategy against Britain which was basically constructed on *U-Boats*²⁸⁸ and targeted of British withdraw in five months because of economic reasons. In this context, Germans have targeted to sink 600,000 tons of ships each month and also to prevent 40% of ships not partying to the war from coming to British ports.²⁸⁹ However, despite the fact that Germans sank 932.000 tons weight British ships in 1916 and 2.097.000 tons weight British ship in only the first quarter of 1917,²⁹⁰ they couldn't obtain the British withdraw. In addition to that, these attacks against foreign ships affected the entrance of United States into the World War I. In the light of aforementioned historical lessons, the economic sustainability of war making became as crucial as winning the battles.

An important issue that increases both economic and political costs after the industrial revolution is the fact that the 'civilians', which were considered to be 'out of war', were also part of the war. In this context, the militarization of the productive part of the population or the employment of the army has shaken the economic balances of countries. Parallel, millions of soldiers based armies have created tremendous logistical requirements. In the political sense, civilians, who were the subject of the war and who began to influence the decisions of the war as 'voters', made support of the public opinion an important component of the war. This component has also led to the emergence of propaganda in war planning. In addition the progress in communication technologies like development of telegraph, linked war with public opinion. Especially beginning from the Crimean War, news from the front to the media began to be transmitted and civilians started to follow the wars.²⁹¹ In this context, wars have expanded from being a confrontation on a battlefield. Wars have added millions of soldiers into various fronts and have integrated them with tens of

²⁸⁷ Martin van Creveld, "**The Transformation of War...**", p. 109. The increasing trend explained by Creveld continues steadily. Friedman expresses that Daily supply need of a modern American mechanized division reaches to 3000 tonnes.

²⁸⁸ U-Boat is the short use of the *Unterseeboot* which refers to the submarines.

²⁸⁹ Mehmet Tanju Akad, **20. Yüzyıl Savaşları**, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 1992, p. 124.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 125.

²⁹¹ Ibid, p. 38.

millions civilians who support them with their economic, industrial and social sources. As a result, the "total war" emerged as a kind of warfare in which all the sources of countries, every area of daily life and every single citizen became component of the war. In this respect, the total war echoed Clausewitz's voice as an example for the struggle of political wills that applies violence at the highest level and combines the common characteristics of different types of warfare:

“Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had again suddenly become an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering 30 million, every one whom regarded himself as a citizen of the state. (...) By this participation of the people in the War instead of a Cabinet and an Army, a whole Nation with its natural weight came into the scale. Henceforth, the means available – the efforts which might be called forth – had no longer any definite limits; the energy with which the War itself might be conducted had no longer any counterpoise, and consequently the danger for the adversary had risen to the extreme.”²⁹²

As a result, the strategies based on total war have become the fundamental logic for every decision maker over time and thus has shaped the transformation of wars. Ludendorff, one of the top German generals who carried out the WWI explained the basis of the total war through five components:²⁹³

- The theater of war extends over the whole territory of the belligerent nations.
- Not armies but nations wage total war. Thus, the effective persecution of total war necessitates the adaptation of the economic system to the purposes of war.²⁹⁴
- The participation of large masses in war makes it imperative to devote special efforts, by means of propaganda, to the strengthening of morale at home and to the weakening of the political cohesion of enemy nation.
- The preparation of total war must begin before the outbreak of overt fighting.
- In order to achieve an integrated and efficient war effort, total war must be directed by one supreme authority, that of the commander in chief.

As it can be understood from Ludendorff's explanation, many subjects which were not a component of wars became a central place within the context of total war. In this context, it can be clearly seen that, the preparation phase has become as important as

²⁹² Carl von Clausewitz, *“On War...”*, , p. 384. Cited by Charles Tilly, **Coercion, Capital and European States**, New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, pp. 82-83.

²⁹³ General Ludendorff, **Der Totale Krieg**, München: Ludendorff's Verlag, 1936. Cited by, Hans Speier, “Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War”, in **Makers of Modern Strategy**, edited by Edward Mead Earle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 315.

²⁹⁴ It needs to be emphasized that that approach pointing out the German perspective. While this approach was more valid in militarist Prussia, British Empire evaluated with a holistic approach.

battle field and has started to determine the fate of war. This phenomenon has found its expression in the term of mobilization. As it explained above via Lanchester equation, the advantage and the asymmetry of higher firepower created the necessity to preparation of an army to give a symmetric response towards its enemy. This understanding was also valid for attackers because the army needs to be prepared very quickly in order to make the first move in asymmetry. To prepare such an army as soon as possible requires the support of civilians, believing in the necessity of war, to abandon civil work (and also to meet all costs and needs of war). And eventually, it was necessary to prepare the economic and industrial infrastructure that could support and sustain the war. In the light of the infrastructure, sources should be taken in a holistic approach and should be planned to economize the existing and potential sources. Everything about battlefield would be evaluated after the mobilization phase and after mobilization, the theater of war extends over the whole territory.

Considering the approach that total war based on mobilization brings with it the use of all resources from the moment of the clear possibility of war, it is generally accepted that this will bring an unprecedented use of resources throughout history, and therefore should be used as soon as possible. This approach was first experienced in the American Civil war between 1861 and 1865, followed by the Russian-Japanese war in 1905, and thus World War I strategies were prepared accordingly. For example, as it observed in American civil war, the North gained the victory against South via its higher firepower based on fast mobilization owing to its railway network which surrounds almost every edge of the region. In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese were the winners of the war, who were defending themselves with a much smaller number of soldiers but adapted to technological developments correctly. However, it has been observed that both sides suffered significant damage in parallel with the escalation of the war, no matter who the winner of these wars was. In this context, after Russo-Japanese war, Japanese economy has reached the limit of collapse, Russian economy collapsed and political authority weakened and that led to transformation of regime in 1905 revolution.²⁹⁵ Similarly, in American civil war, North gained the victory by taking %10 of its population under arms²⁹⁶ and using the vast of its

²⁹⁵ Williamson A. Murray, "Dünya Savaşına Doğru", in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsün Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 292.

²⁹⁶ John Keegan, "**Savaş Sanatı...**" p. 271.

economic sources. In the light of these early examples, Bloch revealed the impossibility of a prolonged war without consuming all resources within the total war by his study²⁹⁷ and he influenced all decision makers in his era. This approach has also been reflected in the planning. This influence was reflected in the strategies. For example, it is suggested in logistic plans prepared by Germany in 1911, a possible war should be completed within a short period of one year and it should be prepared accordingly.²⁹⁸ Because of this reason, strategies planned on short-termed annihilation war which was based on concentrating forces to attack to enemy's center of gravity with surprise moves. This strategic approach which was conceptualized by Delbrück as *Niederwerfungsstrategie* (annihilation strategy)²⁹⁹ would be practiced by Germany as Schlieffen plan. The appearance of the annihilation strategy as a dominant theoretical framework was based on the impossibility of the sustainability of the wars due to steadily increasing costs. In this context, Schlieffen has approached negatively for the aforementioned reasons regarding *Ermatungsstrategie* (attrition strategy), which is located on the other side of Delbrück's conceptualization and has defended the necessity of annihilation strategy:

“The Russo-Japanese war has proved that mere frontal attacks can still be successful in spite of all difficulties. (...) To be sure, the enemy is forced back, but after a little while he renews his temporarily abandoned resistance. The war drags on. Such wars are, however, impossible at a time when the existence of a nation is founded upon the uninterrupted progress of commerce and industry. (...) A strategy of attrition will not do if the maintenance of millions of people requires billions”³⁰⁰

Schlieffen's approach led to an annihilation strategy that would require a sudden attack on France and then quickly return eastwards (via railways), if necessary, to fight Russia, instead of an unsustainable war under a possible French-Russian attack.

However, with the start of the First World War, the presence of a trench system backed by barbed wire, artilleries and millions of machine guns, has shown that no

²⁹⁷ Jean de Bloch, **The Future of War**, BCR Publishing, 2010. Cited by, Michael Howards, “Dünya Savaşında İngiliz Büyük Stratejisi”, in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, p.44.

²⁹⁸ Hans Speier, “Ludendorff...” p. 423.

²⁹⁹ Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: Askeri Tarihçi”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 378.

³⁰⁰ Hajo Holborn, “Moltke ve Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School”, in **Makers of Modern Strategy**, edited by Edward Mead Earle, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, p. 187.

matter how rapid completion of the campaign, no matter how high the firepower of the attack, will not succeed in the strategy of annihilation. As soon as it was understood that the Schliffen plan could not be implemented in First World War, thus the war quickly transformed into a war of attrition in which the Parties would try to eliminate each other's capacity. As a matter of fact, this four-year war, contrary to all predictions,³⁰¹ ended not with a victory as required by the war of annihilation but with surrender as required by the war of attrition. As a dramatic example, it was stated in First World War that until the last three months of the war, the confronting forces were almost equal, and it was possible to sit on the peace table after all the bloodbath seen during four years.³⁰² In this context, it is clearly understood that in a great war in post-industrial revolution, only the party with strong technological, industrial and economic background will be the winner of a war. The data of First World War verifies that evaluation.

	Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungarian Empire)	Allied Powers (Britain – France –Russia)	Britain	France + Russia
Ratios in World by Manufacturing Industry Production (1913)	%19,2	%27,9	%13,6	%14,3
Energy Consumption (1913)	236,4	311,8	195,0	116,8
Steel Production (1913)	20,2	17,1	7,7	9,4
Total Industry Potential	178,4	261,1	127,2	133,9

Table 1.14: Industrial/Technological Comparisons of the 1914 Alliances³⁰³

Because of the reasons like the high firepower required by the annihilation strategy, the transformation of annihilation strategies into attrition strategies, and the consumption of resources during the wars have created a reality in which the winner Party faces huge losses and therefore ‘victory’ becomes meaningless. In this regard, it

³⁰¹ General Moltke, the General of German Armed Staff, was an exception for these predictions. Moltke asserted before the First World War that a potential war would lead to the initiation of series of wars which would endure for 30 years. In this context, as two World wars would be evaluated in a holistic approach as many historians considered, it wouldn't be wrong to accept that Moltke's prediction happened exactly as he foreseen.

³⁰² Mehmet Tanju Akad, “20. Yüzyıl Savaşları...”, p. 113.

³⁰³ Paul Kennedy, “Büyük Güçlerin...”, p. 315.

started to be questioned whether it would be regarded as a victory or not, if the situation of power background in peace table became worse than pre-war situation. In this context, Hobsbawm and Murray summarize the costs of post-industrial revolution wars:

“To this day to Civil War of 1861-1865 remains the bloodiest conflict in US history, which killed as many man as all the later wars of USA put together, including both world wars, Korea and Vietnam. (...) Even in the First World War Britain mobilized % 12.5 of its men for the forces, Germany, %15.4, France almost %17. (...) Again, twentieth-century wars were mass wars in the same sence that they used, and destroyed, hitherto inconceivable quantities of products in the course of fighting. Hence the German phrase *Materialschlacht* to describe the Western battles of 1914-1918 – battles of materials. (...) Yet even before the First World War, France planned for a munitions output of 10-12.000 shells a day, and in the end its industry had to produce 200.000 shells a day. Even Tsarist Russia found that it produces 150.000 shells a day, or at the rate of four-and-a-half millions a month.”³⁰⁴

“The human cost of [*the First World War*] is almost unimaginable for those who live at the final years of 21th Century. More than 70 million men were taken under arms. (...) 9 million soldiers died. (...) %30 of Turkish soldiers, %25 of Romanian and Bulgarian soldiers, %20 of Serbian soldiers, %11-17 of British, French, Russian, Austria-Hungarian and German soldiers (...) died.”³⁰⁵

In the face of the tragic picture of the Total War, all actors -winners and losers- realized that in the wars of attrition based on high firepower there would be no winner because of the military, economic and demographic exhaustion. This reality transformed the war again to a new approach based on high strategies, technological innovations, a warfare whose center of gravity changed and tactic transformations like maneuvering, in a very short term.

The devastation of the total wars on the fruits of the industrial revolution directed the actors to attrition strategies based on exhausting the sources of opposing power instead of annihilation strategies based on destroying opposing power's army only with high firepower. Actors, which have taken their lessons from the effects of attrition wars, have considered the return of war making in the light of costs of war. In the light

³⁰⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, **The Age of Extremes 1914-1918**, London: Abacus Publishing, 2011, pp. 57-59.

³⁰⁵ Williamson A. Murray, “Batı Savaşta”, in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parkey, translated to Turkish by Füsün Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, pp. 342-343.

of this reevaluation process, technological innovations considered as the ‘cost-cutting measure’ and that approach transformed wars one more time.

4. Post-1918 Process: First Pendulum Between Costs and Cost-Cutting Technologies

The first component in this transformation was the political domain. To explain this component, it is necessary to re-apply to Clausewitz and refer to the conceptual distinction made by him. Clausewitz divided the war concept with ‘absolute war’ and ‘real war’ concepts. In order to explain the logic of real wars, Clausewitz identifies the absolute war concept as a Weberian ‘ideal type’³⁰⁶ and explains the real war by comparing with absolute war. In absolute war, the struggle increases until the point in which parties eliminate their political goals and assumes that winning the war is the only goal. After that point, the higher authority, which determines the aim and the extent of violence, cannot be effective by decision making process. Therefore, it uses its political, economic, social, industrial sources for war until they were exhausted. As a result war eliminates all the logical reasons which leads to declaration of war and continues until the violence action terminate. In other words, the need to increase the capacity to win the war creates a violence action without limitation.³⁰⁷ However, as it was stated in Clausewitz trinity, governments which represents reasons and calculations, people who represents passions and hates, army which represents probabilities, ensure the termination of war in spite of all the damage it could bring. In this context, the First World War ended not with a military victory or defeat, but by the withdraw of German Government and its allies, who realized that their resources had come to an end in a process potentially goes to absolute war. Similarly, peoples were among the preventers of absolute war. Soldiers from both parties who believed that the war would endure for a short while³⁰⁸ and joined the war with nationalist feelings began to rebel in the last months of the war.³⁰⁹ In addition to that, in

³⁰⁶ Cemil Oktay, **Modern Toplumlarda Savaş ve Barış**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014, pp. 21-22.

³⁰⁷ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Muhteşem Ortaklık: Kant ve Clausewitz”, in **Uluslararası İlişkilerde Çatışmadan Güvenliğe**, edited by Mustafa Aydın et al., İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 11.

³⁰⁸ Cemil Oktay, op.cit., p. 31.

³⁰⁹ John Keegan, “**Savaş Sanatı Tarihi...**”, p. 182.

democratic countries, citizens started to organize massive demonstrations against wars and force their governments to resignation.

The attrition observed in total wars lead to the development of new strategies by various actors. Common point of these strategies constructed on minimizing the costs of war and maximizing profit. In the light of that fact, strategies developed in two different directions. First is ‘direct approach’ which uses technological innovations as cost-cutting measure and targets to overcome the will of opposing party with surprise attacks with minimum cost in means of time and sources. Second is ‘indirect approach’ which evaluates peace and war in a holistic approach and targets to deter or damage the opposing party without serious fighting. These approaches, which do not include only the war making processes, but also the peace-era preparations and measures, will later be called ‘high strategies’ and shape the wars. To exemplify the Second World War process, Britain and the United States prefer an indirect approach with its comprehensive maritime policies, while Germany which implements the attack strategy with the *Blitzkrieg*, and France which implements the defense strategy via the *Maginot Line*, have preferred the direct approach.

In this context, the first important phenomenon that becomes prominent in transformation is the concept of high strategy. Through high strategy concept, Hart constructs a new conceptual framework for war by making innovation on classical Clausewitzian approach which is combat-focused and sees the center of gravity as opposing army. Instead, he evaluated peace and war periods in a holistic understanding and treated war according to the positions of actors in peace period. In this context, he makes a new definition of victory, emphasizing that no victory can be achieved in the way Clausewitz has revealed. According to his definition, it can be defined as victory only if an actor’s position (in means of politic, economic, social and industrial) is better than pre-war position.³¹⁰ Otherwise, even if there was a victory in battle field, it cannot be called as a victory. In the light of his definition, he asserted that in an age of strategies of attrition, it would be inadequate to make a Clausewitzian evaluation of war. He also asserted that the strategies which based on only the battlefield successes

³¹⁰ Paul Kennedy, “Savaş ve Barışta Büyük Strateji: Daha Kapsamlı Bir Tanımlamaya Doğru”, in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 12.

“*make the politics as the slave of strategy*”.³¹¹ He also added that, Clausewitz has been assessed incorrectly in total war era and led to call him unfairly as ‘Mahdi of massacre’.³¹² His counter-proposal for this situation would be to act with a strategy that covers almost the entire area of life:

“The term strategy is best confined to its literal meaning of ‘generalship’-the actual direction of military force, as distinct from the policy governing its employment and combining it with other weapons: economic, political, psychological. Such policy is in application a higher level strategy, for which the term ‘grand strategy’ has been coined.”³¹³

The war, which has been recollected in the light of the high strategy concept, has become a re-interpretation of the Sun Tzu. As the Chinese philosopher expressed as “*the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting*”³¹⁴, it became the most prominent approach to weaken opposing power by avoiding costs of war and unbalance the enemy in battlefield with surprise maneuvers. In this regard, the war, which has become only one of the tools used to achieve high policy goals in light of high strategy understanding, has started to be seen as a phenomenon that should be used in situations where the most appropriate conditions were met. The transformation from battlefield focused war to high strategy focused war also transformed the decision making processes and took governments and presidents who coordinated the high strategy to a vital position. In this context, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler and many other presidents or prime ministers have determined the high strategies in World War II.³¹⁵ Accordingly, the war becomes “*to produce a decision without any serious fighting*”³¹⁶, otherwise, for example, in the case of a war of annihilation/attrition, as seen in the First World War, the war is regarded as ‘madness’. In summary, the goal of the high strategy has become to give the actor an appropriate strategic position among other actors considering with economic sustainability. This will reveal a type

³¹¹ B.H. Liddell Hart, “**Strateji:...**”, p. 476.

³¹² Alex Danchev, “Liddell Hart’s Big Idea”, **Review of International Studies**, Vol 25, N 1, p. 39. Cited by Hasan Deniz Pekşen, “Liddell Hart”, in **Savaş Kuramları**, edited by Erhan Büyükkancı, Ankara: Adres Yayınları, 2015, p. 321.

³¹³ B.H. Liddell Hart, **Strategy**, New York: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 10.

³¹⁴ Sun Tzu, **Savaş Sanatı**, translated to Turkish by Pulat Otkan and Giray Fidan, İstanbul:İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015.

³¹⁵ H. A. De Weerd, “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: Sivillerin Ortaya Çıkışı”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 397-417.

³¹⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart, “**Strategy...**”, p. 324.

of maneuver based, ‘strategic operations’ - aimed at getting better position at a minimum cost, rather than using annihilation based battles.³¹⁷

In this context, although there are different orientations in the land and Sea States, it is aimed to maintain a big amount of soldiers in both peace and war periods, provide their needs, and strengthen the deterrence with increasing the number of soldiers, military vehicles, equipment and munitions and support them with technological innovations. In this context, the transformation of USSR army, after the 5-year development plan made in 1934, can display as an example. USSR army, which is historically considered as a ground army and based on the ad hoc militia after the revolution, transformed rapidly from an ad hoc militia to an organized stable army in peace time. Although there was no war, the number of troops in 1934 increased from 560.000 to 940.000, and in the following year, 1.300.000 people.³¹⁸ In following years, the army is transformed to a self-sufficient construction in both east and west and in 1936, 77 percent of Soviet armed forces has transformed from militia to regular army.³¹⁹ Similarly, -like other actors - the implementation of regular military exercises has been observed, even if there is no war situation. France, another land-based State, has made its investment in peacetime on the Maginot Line, which they believe would attract the Germans and create a great deterrence, rather than other components of the army. This line, which was prepared in accordance with the doctrines required by World War I, was prepared on the motto of World War II hero Marshal Petain,³²⁰ “*firepower kills*”. Maginot, as a successor of Marshal Petain, envisioned a very high-powered defense by this line.³²¹ However, it has been also stated that France, which relies on the guarantee of the Maginot Line, has created problems in its high strategy

³¹⁷ B.H. Liddell Hart, **Paris or Future of War**, New York: E.P. Dutton&Company, 1925.

³¹⁸ Edward Mead Earle, “Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Savaşın Sovyet Konsepti”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, p. 484.

³¹⁹ This ratio will reach 100% in 1939 when the Second World War started. However, it has to be added that, the re-construction attempts were also affected from the ideological environment of USSR which considered peace and war as two components of a single politic struggle. Similarly, the state construction endeavours were also effective by transformation of army. For a comprehensive study which examines Soviet strategy from both concepts, see also, Condolezza Rice, “Sovyet Büyük Stratejisinin Evrimi”, in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, pp. 168-190.

³²⁰ Petain, one of the heroes of the First World War France, will replace this historic position by serving to create a France under German leadership in the Second World War.

³²¹ Irving M. Gibson, “Maginot ve Liddell Hart: Savunma Doktrinleri”, in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 504-505.

aimed at preserving its position with the help of this situation. In this respect, the criticizes made by Charles de Gaulle which contains that the Germans could cross these lines with mechanized troops, and therefore France should have mechanized troops, have not been considered enough.³²²

Britain, the United States and Japan, who have constructed their high politics on the seas, developed high strategies from different perspectives but acted on the same logic. In this context, Britain has shaped its high policy according to the doctrine of *Two Power Standards* that it developed before the First World War. Britain has established a high strategy to provide deterrence on the basis of seas and to control supply sources that make it a winner in any potential war of attrition. In addition, Britain tried to avoid from the commitments towards Continental Europe, which would lead to increase political and economic costs. In this context, the British Navy is planned to have more naval power than the sum of the two largest warships following it.³²³ This will lead Britain to a major production attack after the doctrine was adopted in 1898, and in the next generation to form its great strategy over the sea.

Country	1890	1900	1910	1914
Britain	679.000	1.065.000	2.174.000	2.714.000
France	319.000	499.000	725.000	900.000
Russia	180.000	383.000	401.000	679.000
USA	240.000	333.000	824.000	985.000
Germany	190.000	285.000	964.000	1.305.000
Habsburg Empire	66.000	87.000	210.000	372.000
Japan	41.000	187.000	496.000	700.000

Table 1.15: Increase of Warship Tonnages (1890-1914)³²⁴

The United States, on the other hand, pursued indirect-Tzuian/Hartian, and maritime-based strategies to achieve maximum benefits at minimum cost in both periods pre-World War II and the Cold War. Through the alliance established by Britain on the Atlantic coast, the United States has been able to move at a minimum cost against threats from continental Europe, especially from Germany. To maintain this alliance USA made many arrangements. Firstly, instead of being directly involved

³²² Ibid, p. 506.

³²³ Stephen W. Roskill, *The Strategy of Sea Power*, Londra: Collins Press, 1962, pp. 93-94. Cited by Burak Gülboy, "Mutlak Savaş...", p. 28.

³²⁴ Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin...", p. 253.

in the Second World War, it has changed the previously agreed 'laws of neutrality'.³²⁵ Secondly, through the 'loan and lease law', the Allied Powers, particularly Britain, were supported by food, munitions, financial support, military vehicles and voluntary troops. As a result, USA tried to emerge as a major power from the Second World War with minimum cost.³²⁶ In this way, USA tried to defeat both Japan and Germany 'without any serious fighting' as Hart stated, and to move his position in the system to a much better point than before the war by being a great economic power. In Pacific Ocean, it was observed that the two major powers in the Pacific Ocean, the United States and Japan, are the same approach to war. In a logic based on developing deterrence in the war on the other side by enlarging the navy, the two sides have enlarged their navy since the 1900s, as can be seen in the table above. However, this bilateral enlargement attempts created a security dilemma. In the first step, Japan applied to measures on strengthen its navy against the potential threat of its neighbors Russia and China, which have much bigger populations than Japan.³²⁷ In the second step, the consistently enlargement of Japanese army perceived by US decision makers and USA started to strengthen its navy against any potential Japan threat. Eventually these bilateral threat perceptions created a vicious circle. On the other hand, Germany and Italy,³²⁸ as revisionist forces, have prepared for war, not against deterrence. Despite the fact that these two actors were aware of the need to minimize costs, they were also aware that a new war will be essentially a total war again. For example, Beck, one of Germany's leading generals in the Second World War, stated that he has participated every single word of Ludendorff's *Total War* book and wished to take it further.³²⁹ As a result, military expenditures increased with great acceleration for both of deterrence and preparedness.

³²⁵ The US Congress's parliamentary investigations after the First World War revealed that the country's entrance into the First World War caused an engagement by Germany, as well as the funds provided by private entrepreneurs, military munitions sold to the sides of the war. The neutrality laws, therefore, aimed at preventing a similar situation from happening again, forbidding us-flagged ships to enter the trade and war zones.

³²⁶ Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih Cilt II: 1918-1994**, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2005, pp. 160-163.

³²⁷ Alexander Kiraley, "Japon Deniz Stratejisi", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 592-607.

³²⁸ Japan will later include these powers.

³²⁹ Dennis E. Showalter, "Sınırlı Amaçlar İçin Topyekûn Savaş: Alman Büyük Stratejisinin Bir Yorumu", in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, pp. 140-141.

	Japan	Italy	Germany	USSR	Britain	France	USA
1930	218	266	162	722	512	498	699
1933	183	351	452	707	333	524	570
1935	300	966	1.607	5.517	646	867	806
1936	313	1.149	2.332	2.933	892	995	932
1937	940	1.235	3.298	3.446	1.245	890	1.032
1938	1.740	746	7.415	5.429	1.863	919	1.131

Table 1.16: Military Expenditures of Great Powers (1930-1938)³³⁰

As it was explained, the basis of the post-WWI wars was based on a high strategy that would take into account the dependency of the war to the peace process and only when it requires vital interests and in the most appropriate conditions. This approach has created the tendency to develop geopolitical theories and to ensure that the best possible condition before entering into a possible war. However, this will create the stalemate, which will be evaluated by Mearsheimer as the ‘tragedy of great power politics’,³³¹ and cause the new generation of wars to become total war again. In this context, the coastal countries and continental countries would develop distinctive geopolitical approaches in line with aim of having best position in means of geopolitics.

According to this, the coastal countries encircle the continental forces by their geopolitical dominance in the oceans which can be considered as the basis of their global relations. Through the encircle function, they try to ensure their position on balancing and/or supervising the continental powers.

“The revolution commenced by the great mariners of the Columbian generation endowed Christendom with the widest possible mobility of power, short of a winged mobility. (...) The broad political effect was to reverse the relations of the Europe and Asia, for whereas in the Middle Ages Europe was caged between an impassable desert to South, an unknown ocean to West, an icy or forested wastes to North and north-east, and in the east and South-east was constantly threatened by the superior mobility of the horseman and camelman, she now emerged upon the World, multiplying more than thirty fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her influence wound the Euro-Atlantic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very existence.”³³²

³³⁰ Arnold J. Toynbee ve Frank Gwatkin, **The World in March 1939**, Londra: Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 454. Cited by Paul Kennedy, “**Büyük Güçlerin...**”, p. 359.

³³¹ John Mearsheimer, op.cit.

³³² Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, **Geographic Journal**, Cilt 23, pp. 432-433.

This approach, first introduced by Mackinder, will be largely developed by Alfred Mahan, and will fundamentally affect not only the Naval Powers like Britain, the United States³³³, Japan, but also the continental States like Germany. In view of Mahan's views, arguing that seas dominance is the cornerstone of the high strategy and supporting it with historical examples, actors believed that the only condition for strengthening their position was whether or not they were at war or not, the power to oversee international trade overseas.³³⁴ This will be one of the things that brought about the competition and then the war.

Continental powers evaluate the geopolitical environment from the opposite perspective. The approach of possessing strategic regions and depriving opposing forces from these regions' critical resources was the focus point of geopolitical theories preferred by continental powers. It was expected to gain control not only international trade but also international politics, through controlling strategic regions and critical resources. In this context, Retzel, Kjellen and Haushofer affected many continental powers. In addition to that, Haushofer, who developed the Lebensraum (living/survival space) by transforming Ratzel's and Kjellen's hypotheses by social Darwinist approaches, affected especially Hitler. In the light of these geopolitic understanding, revisionist continental powers started to perceive high politics as using military power to gain strategic positioning.³³⁵ As a result of this process, as Mearsheimer outlined, the quest to improve its position to the best strategic point in accordance with the high strategy, opens the way for hegemonic wars, which tragically threaten all of the actors' positions. In the process of transforming the high strategy into the Second World War, the two innovative warfare tools of the First World War, which have the potential to reduce the costs of future conflicts the most, will be the key components, daring to apply aggressive strategies: Aircrafts and Tanks.

³³³ Mahan's ideas affected to American decision makers most effectively after his close friend D.Roosevelt's presidency. In the light of Mahan's recommendations, the Panama Canal has been constructed and major steps have been taken to improve the capacity of the Navy. For further read on Mahan's effect, see also, Margaret Tuttle Sprout, "Mahan: Deniz Gücünün Vaizi", in **Modern Stratejinin Ustaları**, translated to Turkish by Selma Koçak, edited by Edward Mead Earle, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2015, pp. 566-569.

³³⁴ Alfred T. Mahan, **Deniz Harbi Üzerine**, translated to Turkish Tunçer Büyükonat, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2013.

³³⁵ Yılmaz Tezkan, **Jeopolitikten Milli Güvenliğe**, Ankara: Ülke Kitapları, 2005, pp. 25-52.

Aircraft and tanks have gained great importance due to the ability to reach and influence new gravity centers of wars. In this context, they have been evaluated as elements that will overcome the obstacle created by the trenches and reach the conclusion in a short time. According to this, the crucial point to use aircraft and tanks is to targeting two vital components which may lead to subdue the opposing will and withdraw from the war. The first of these, the air force, allows to attack economic and morale centers of opposing power without confronting the army where the will of the opposing power is concentrated.³³⁶ Thus, it was expected that it would force the opposing government to accept that it is impossible to continue the war or to sit on the peace table with public pressure that was terrified by the air strikes. The same logic exists for tanks, but oriented for battlefields. In this context, main target of tanks is to cut logistic and communication lines. By doing this, it was expected to disfunction of opposing chain of command. It was planned that tanks move quickly with its maneuver function beyond the trench lines without getting affected from firepower and destroy the background of opposing power. At this point it has to be emphasized that the center of gravity of the war is shifted from the military on the front, to the economic and moral elements behind the front, the civil society and the cities. In other words, the center of gravity of war has shifted to psychological elements. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the development, innovation and function of these two vehicles.

Although the use of aircraft in wars was actually based on the First World War, due to the restrictions in their use, they became functional since the Second World War. In this context, the first development of aircrafts developed by the Germans at the end of 1915 when they produced airplanes that made it possible to shoot through the propeller. After that innovation, aircrafts, which were engaged in field reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the First World War, started to targeting the opposing soldiers. Although there was an increase in the use of aircraft on the battlefield after that date, and especially Britain which considered air power as a distinctive force and implemented a major attack on aircraft production and personnel,³³⁷ the aircraft remained a secondary element of the First World War. The most important reasons for these was that they fly from low altitude and were hit by all kinds of surface elements, including rifles, low firepower and high

³³⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart, "**Strateji...**", p. 479.

³³⁷ Britain's air presence in 1914 consisted of 63 aircraft, 165 officers and 1264 personnel. In 1918, Royal Air Force (RAF), which became a separate force, consisted of 22,000 aircraft and 291.175 personnel as of 1919. The total number of aircraft produced during the First World War was 154.302. For further information, see also Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**20. Yüzyıl Savaşları...**", pp. 115-118.

production costs in the face of these risks. At the end of the First World War, however, significant developments have been made concerning the deficiencies of the aircraft. This led to the appearance of air doctrines on the next generation of wars. In this context, one of the main components of the Second World War and post-war armed conflicts will be the air doctrine. Although various air doctrines have been developed in different countries, the doctrine put forward by Douhet would brought the biggest echo, and the Douhetian approaches would be implemented in different countries in different periods. The highlights of Douhet can be summarized as follows:³³⁸

- Aircrafts are strategic instruments thus no effective defense can be foreseen,
- Civilian morale will be shattered by bombardment of centers of population. In order to get this aim, the primary objectives should not be military installations, but industries and centers of population.
- It is fundamental to acquire the position to conquer the command of the air. If this objective will be succeeded, effective defense and strike will be guaranteed. In that context, supply lines, communication centers and headquarters should be the targets.
- Surface forces should be obligated with supporting air forces.

At this point, one thing to emphasize is what Douhet pointing about the timing of use of the air force. According to this, Douhet emphasizes that the greatest impact will be made by a *Blitzkrieg* operation that will not allow mobilization to the opposing power:

“At this point I want to stress some aspect of the problem-namely, that the effect of such aerial offensives upon morale may well have more influence upon the conduct of the war than their material effects. For example, take the center of a large city and imagine what would happen among the civilian population during a single attack by a single bombing unit. (...) What could happen to a single city in a single day could also happen to ten, twenty, fifty cities. (...) I ask you, would be the effect upon civilians of other cities, not stricken yet but equally subject to bombing attacks? What civil or military authority could keep order, public services functioning, and production going under such as a threat? (...) A complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come when, to put an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war-this before their army and navy had time to mobilize at all!”³³⁹

³³⁸ Giulio Douhet, **The Command of the Air**, New York: Express Publishing, 1942. Examined by Edward Warner, “Douhet...”, pp. 617-618.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 491.

The fact that the air force appears as a strategic element will soon lead all actors to a race for aircraft production after the Douhet doctrine.

	1933	1935	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
USA	466	459	1.800	5.826	12.804	26.277	47.836	85.898	96.318
Britain	633	1.140	2.827	7.940	15.049	20.094	23.672	26.263	26.461
USSR	2.595	3.578	7.500	10.382	10.565	15.735	25.436	34.900	40.300
France	600	785	1.382	3.163	-	-	-	-	-
Alliances Total³⁴⁰				24.428	39.518	64.706	101.519	151.761	167.654
Germany	368	3.183	5.235	8.295	10.247	11.776	15.409	24.807	39.807
Japan	766	952	3.201	4.467	4.768	5.088	8.861	16.693	28.180
Italy	500	1.000	1.850	2.000	1.800	2.400	2.400	1.600	-
Axis Powers Total				14.762	16.815	19.264	26.670	43.100	67.978

Table 1.17: Aircraft Production of Great Powers (1933-1944)³⁴¹

One reason for the production of large numbers of aircraft is the vital role of the aircraft for opposing powers. In addition to that, another reason is that the cost of aircraft production was relatively cheap compared to today. In this respect, increasing the capacity of the aircraft in the future will bring with it the improvement of its quality rather than quantity. In this context, air battles shaped by the pilot's capabilities rather than technical features, and a group of pilots called 'ace pilot' emerged as prominent figures of air wars. The axis states, which had a large number of ace pilots but fewer planes in the early years of Second World War, were able to balance their deficiency. However, the entrance of USA into Second World War as an industry giant has distorted the balance. Beside, as it can be seen in the table above, the massive production of aircraft also displays the role of economy and industry by transformation of wars. In this context, Douhet doctrine-based strategic bombardments have targeted industrial centers and attacked the enemy economy rather than the enemy army. A

³⁴⁰ Numbers also contains the other allied power which doesn't exist in the table.

³⁴¹ Data edited from, Paul Kennedy, "*Büyük Güçlerin...*", p. 391 and p. 422. Paul Kennedy also edited the data from Richard J. Overy, *The Air War: 1939-1945*, Nebraska: Potomac Books (University of Nebraska Press), 2005, p. 21 and p. 150.

British report in 1944 outlines effectively how the transformation took place when it came to the Second World War:

“In other words, they³⁴² lost 2,400,000,000 hours of work in exchange for the launch of 116,500 tons of bombs. That means that every single tonne of bombs were lost 20,500 hours of work or more than a quarter of the time needed to build a Lancaster aircraft. (...) This means that a Lanchester needs to fly to a German city only for one time to compensate production costs; therefore, other subsequent flights will be returned as profit.”³⁴³

Nevertheless, the strategic air strikes proposed by Douhet and applied mutually by opposing powers, have not realized the expected impact. Both of the German attacks on British cities and British attacks on German cities created a disappointment about their effects. German attacks occurred below the expectations due to fortified buildings and using shelters and couldn't help the political goal of British withdraw from the Second World War.³⁴⁴ Similarly, it was calculated that British bombardments have only succeed to obstacle only 7 percent of German production.³⁴⁵ More importantly, the main hypotheses of Douhet, that air bombardments would create a terror wave throughout the cities and create a civil disobedience against government for preventing war, have happened in the opposite direction. It was already observed in 1930's China by Japanese bombardment. In that case, Chinese citizens supported their government more than pre-bombing process.³⁴⁶ As a result of all these elements, although the air force is a very basic, important and strategic force, it was understood that the expected goals would not be achieved unless it was supported on the land. Tanks will be the element that would innovate in the ground battles that were stuck in the trenches in the First World War.

Similar to aircraft, tanks also appeared at the final stages of First World War, but affected the wars in Second World War. The fact of the First World War that the ground conflicts were stuck to trenches, firepower and barbed wire, created the necessity to develop new equipment and vehicles for overcoming these obstacles. In

³⁴² It refers to Germany and German economy.

³⁴³ Peter Englund, **Menschheit am Nullpunkt: Aus dem Abgrund des 20. Jahrhunderts**, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 2001, p. 203. Cited by, Herfried Münkler, “Yeni Savaşlar...”, p. 199.

³⁴⁴ Oral Sander, “Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...”, pp. 176-191.

³⁴⁵ John Ellis, **Allied Strategy and Tactics on The Second World War**, New York: Viking Press, 1990, p. 186.

³⁴⁶ Thomas H. Greer, **The Development of the Air Doctrine in the Army Arm 1917-1941**, Washington: US Air Force Office of Air Force History Publishing, 1985, pp. 10-11. Cited by George Friedman, “Savaşın Geleceği...”, pp. 270-271.

this context, every country has sought to develop a tool to solve this problem. The French developed some kind of armored tractor to cut barbed wire. The British have developed another kind of armored tractor vehicle to provide transportation on the fire line.³⁴⁷ In order to ensure the confidentiality of this project, it is called the tank because of the fact that the manufactured equipment is compared to the water tank.³⁴⁸ The first attempts were made on the wheels, however it was understood that wheels were not functioned in bad weathers and muddy surface and wheels innovated by tank treads. In following attempts a space has created for machine guns and the use of oil has preferred as an energy source which produces the biggest energy for maneuvers.³⁴⁹ At the end of the aforementioned process, the first tanks were seen on the battlefield in September of 1916. However, as mentioned above, the real impact will be on the Second World War and after the development of both its equipment and maneuvering capabilities as well as the doctrine of the new generation, just like on aircrafts.

Theories of ground warfare based on mechanized troops have improved after the first tanks appeared in the First World War. However, the most effective approach was developed by Fuller and Hart, retired British officers and ironically, their work was effective in Germany and Russia, not in Britain. According to their approach, tanks which have an additional area that can rotate 360 degrees and communication skills via radio transmitters, can move beyond enemy's fronts without waiting for infantry attacks due to their high firepower and maneuver abilities. In addition to that, the move of tanks will divide opposing forces into small groups. While tanks were destroying the communication infrastructure and chain of command of enemies, infantry divisions can destroy all small groups which were divided by tanks formerly.³⁵⁰ Thus it was asserted that the will of opposing power can be broken in such a short time and with a small cost, including losses. Similar assertions have also been proposed in France by Charles de Gaulle. Apart from Britain, which did not consider this idea sufficiently, the great powers of the Second World War showed great importance to tank

³⁴⁷ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "20. Yüzyıl Savaşları...", p. 79.

³⁴⁸ George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", p. 159.

³⁴⁹ Chris Ellis and Peter Chamberlain, **Fighting Vehicles**, New York: Hamlyn Press, 1972, pp. 12. Cited by George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", p. 159.

³⁵⁰ J.F.C Fuller, **Lectures on Field Service Regulations III: Operations Between Mechanized Forces**, London: Sifton Praed & Cooperation Press, 1932. Cited by, Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot ve Liddell Hart...", pp. 510-515.

production; they also carried the competition in the production of aircraft to the tank area.

Germany	17.800
Russia	29.000
Britain	5.000
USA	17.500 (29.500 in 1943)

Table 1.17-2: Tank Production of Selected Countries in 1944³⁵¹

Germany has been the best practicing of the doctrine developed for mechanized troops. Germany achieved great success in the Second World War under command of Guderian; it managed to control a wide area in a short time and at minimum cost. As a matter of fact, the Germans have made strategic maneuvers in the light of the Blitzkrieg strategy on these new war vehicles, paralyzing the enemy army in means of cutting logistic and communicative moves, and then making attacks with infantry. However, these achievements are possible in the conventional war. In the cases where the defender part has implemented non-conventional ways of war, it was frequently observed that the balance of attacker part disrupted. Thus, many successful and unsuccessful examples can be given. In this context, at the beginning of the Second World War, Germany attacked Poland first with its air force. Through this surprise and rapid attack, Poland's aircrafts destroyed by German air force, mostly on the bases, and that provided air superiority to Germany.

Then, -as exactly Douhet asserted– transportation, supply, communication networks and headquarters were targeted. In the second step German motorized troops divided the backlines of Poland army and cut the communication between divisions. After the disorganization of the back lines as a result of the shock wave, whole of Poland has become controlled by a very few loss of power, by a very few cost and the break of the will of the other party.³⁵²

Similarly, in the Desert Storm operation conducted by USA in 1991-1992, the strategy was initiated by counteracting³⁵³ the air defense command centers and all

³⁵¹ Albert Seaton, **The German Army: 1939-1945**, London: Plume Press (Penguin Books), 1985, p. 329. Cited by Paul Kennedy, "**Büyük Güçlerin...**", p. 422.

³⁵² Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**20. Yüzyıl Savaşları...**", p. 283.

³⁵³ The basic of the first attacks will be precision guided missiles. Since the role of these vehicles will be explained in the next part, no details will be entered here.

kinds of communication centers of Iraqi army. Then all potential resistant divisions destroyed by heavy air bombardments and the ground army divided into smaller parts. Following the air attacks, ground forces have introduced to battle and have taken the control of Iraqi territory by disabling opposing ground forces in a short time.³⁵⁴ Many observers and researchers accept that Gulf War of 1991-1992 was the most successful execution of the maneuver based wars, due to the very few cost and losses of allied powers against great losses of opposing power.³⁵⁵ At this point, a Gulf War evaluation in 1990s would not be much different than that of Douhet in the 1920s:

“The allied air forces made it impossible for Saddam Hussein to know what his own troops-let alone troops-were doing. They destroyed his ability to communicate with his forces and, therefore, made it impossible for him to develop a strategy for dealing with the threat facing him. They destroyed the ability of the Iraqis even to supply their armies with food and, through constant attacks, broke the morale of many of the fighting units.”³⁵⁶

The obstacle to conventional strategies has been the emergence of non-conventional conflicts that have challenged tradition since 18th century. This was also examined by Clausewitz as a new type of warfare. Except its first uses in Napoleonic Wars, non-conventional warfare would have observed during Second World War and have increased its influence on warfare in following periods.

On the other hand, it has to be emphasized that Blitzkrieg could be effective only in rapid and surprise attacks. In the cases where the defender prefers to retreat and use its strategic depth,³⁵⁷ Blitzkrieg cannot be executed and costs increase because of time loss and attrition. In this context, Germany has accomplished favorable results with minimum cost when it attacked surprisingly and rapidly to strategic points and back fronts. In other examples, the attrition has become the decisive factor again. In other words, if it is not possible to sit on the peace table before the impact of the Blitzkrieg is over, the decisive factor is industry capacity which is based on creating more

³⁵⁴ George Friedman, “**Savaşın Geleceği...**”, pp. 318-352.

³⁵⁵ To give an example, the loss of more than 100,000 troops by the Iraqi army, while the loss of Allied Forces is below 300. The ratio is 1/1000 in areas such as wounded and ammunition casualties. Editors of Britannica Encyclopedia, “Persian Gulf War 1990-1991”, **Britanica Ansiklopedisi**, accessed on 03.05.2017, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War>.

³⁵⁶ George Friedman, **The Future of War**, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p.258.

³⁵⁷ Transforming the battle towards a war of attrition with using geographic advantages.

resources and distribute it effectively for production and other economic values during the war.

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
USA	1,5	4,5	20	38	42
Britain	3,5	6,5	9	11	11
USSR	5	8,5	11,5	14	16
Combating Alliances Total	3,5	19,5	40,5	63	69
Alliances Total	10	19,5	40,5	63	69
Germany	6	6	8,5	13,5	17
Japan	1	2		4,5	
Italy	0,75	1		-	
Axis Powers Total	7,75	9	8,5 (+...)	18	17 (+...)

Table 1.18: Arms Production in Second World War (1940-1944 period, billion US dollars)³⁵⁸

In this context, the defense of USSR against Germany in Second World War can be given as an example. In the light of the fact that USSR was not able to resist German Blitzkrieg through conventional methods, it initiated a war of attrition based on strategic retreat. USSR retreated by using its huge strategic depth. Throughout its retreat, Soviet army destroyed all useful sources, decelerated and weakened German army by executing non-conventional methods like guerilla strategies, and parallel, prepared to a symmetric battle in the most advantaged place. As the examples of Second World War displayed, aforementioned successes are only possible for symmetric confrontations which target the decision, communication and transportation centers of opposing forces. In the absence of symmetry, it was understood even in Second World War that conventional methods wouldn't be adequate. This reality would make a significant contribution to the transformation of armed conflicts and would shape the new characteristic of armed conflicts in post-1945 period.

However, the most important factor by the transformation to a post-1945 period will reveal itself paradoxically. This factor, on the one hand, success any target aimed

³⁵⁸ Eliot Cohen, "Churchill ve II. Dünya Savaşında Koalisyon Stratejisi", in **Savaşta ve Barışta Büyük Stratejiler**, translated to Turkish by Ahmet Fethi, edited by Paul Kennedy, İstanbul: Totem Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 64. and Rolf Wagenführ, **Die Deutsche Industrie im Kriege (1939-1945)**, Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt Verlag, 2006, p. 34-87.

at in the previous periods at a minimum cost. It destroys not only the enemy's logistics and command mechanisms, but also the entire will of the enemy at a time. However, it eliminates all the legitimacy of war and victory because of its nature which cannot separate military targets from non-military targets, military personnel from civilians. It also has the risk of making victory meaningless by creating disasters that would potentially affect the whole world. This factor, the nuclear weapons, first created the 'balance of terror' and then transformed the characteristic of armed conflict in post-1945 period with new types of conflict which derived from that balance. Because of this reason, the logic of "new faces" of armed conflict has to be explained before the examination of the effects of costs on warfare in post-1945 period.



C. Various Faces, Common Logic: Non-Conventional Strategies

In the first chapter of the study, it was asserted that the decisive component of the transformation of armed conflict is the relationship between costs and use of power. In this context, the hypothesis constructed on the costs based restrictions and opportunities by using of armed forces and influences on actor behaviors from great powers to non-state actors. In the second chapter, the historical background of the main thesis explained by examining the constant increase of costs and its influences. In this respect, the final component which should to be explained for completing the theoretical framework is how non-conventional strategies meet in cost-based common logic in the body of non-state actors. Through this, it would be concluded that despite the changing characteristics of armed conflicts on actors and strategies, the political goal based nature of armed conflicts remains and continues to progress in accordance with the historical flow. By completing the final component, it can be examined how actors responded towards the changing characteristic of armed conflicts.

1. Common Logic of Non-Conventional Strategies

Increasing share of non-conventional methods during mass wars and the transforming to the dominant armed conflict method during Cold War period, created the necessity for examining the strategic background of these methods. The analyses on non-conventional strategies revealed that they differ from each other with various aspects; thus different counter-strategies have been developed against these strategies, which are dealt with through different theoretical frameworks. However, it was also determined that these strategies, which differs in means of goals, tactics and tools, meet in common logic and characteristics. In this context, what should to be examined is to reveal common characteristics that lead to the emergence and the development of these strategies, to determine how they ramificated from their common root and to explain the ‘faces’ of these various strategies, which refer to the responses of the non-conventional strategies to international environment.

In this point it has to be emphasized that non-conventional methods are not new. However, the function of these strategies transformed. Throughout history, it is observed that both guerrilla strategies and similar methods of terrorism have been implemented, but none of them have been considered as the main element of the political struggle. Even the examples of 12th century reveal that the non-conventional methods were used in many historical issues:

“The light-armed people, based on their mobility rather than their forces, do not fight to conquer the battlefield. (...) They harass the enemy with ambushes and night raids. (...) Hunger, cold, or difficulties of war do not ruin their morale. It is easy to defeat them in a single battle, but it is hard to suppress their resistance in an extended battle.”³⁵⁹

The method which described above would not be different than the premises explained by Mao in 20th century. This similarity between historical examples reveals the need for the weaker actor to be organized to reverse this asymmetry against the stronger actor. However, the distinctive character of contemporary asymmetric struggles is international environment which requires more creative and more sacrifice-oriented organization. Because, even if there is a huge difference in the 12th century struggle (and therefore no power to conquer the battlefield), the two sides have similar weapons. In the examples of the 20th century, the asymmetric struggles form the basis of an encounter with means of surveillance and destruction that use technology to its fullest extent.

However, the logic of the opposition is the same: Protect the forces for fighting constantly without getting target as a whole to the opposing power, and target opposing power from its weaknesses to the point where it cannot endure the war. The logic of this approach is addressed in different cultures with different references, but emphasizes the same point. In this context, the example given by different modern researchers in the West about asymmetry is the struggle between David and Goliath. According to this narration, there is a very obvious power asymmetry between the Prophet David and Goliath. Aware of the situation, the Prophet David builds his strategy against Goliath on sling and stone, not to enter into a symmetrical struggle with him. He only goes out with a stick in front of Goliath so he can humiliate his

³⁵⁹ Lewis H. Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Standford: Hoover Institute Press, 1971, p.3. Cited by, Mehmet Tanju Akad, “*Tarihten Bugüne...*”, 2015, pp.16-17.

enemy and annoy him.³⁶⁰ Prophet David, who can move much more flexibly because there is no protective armor on him, threw a stone to Goliath with his sling and shot him in the soft belly. As a result he used the moment of anger which he created by humiliation and killed his opponent without engaging in a symmetrical struggle.³⁶¹

The example from Eastern culture is the ‘Iron Princess and Monkey King’ tale, told by Mao, which he personally gave from Chinese culture in order to teach the guerrilla warfare to the Chinese people. According to this narrative, to defeat the iron princess, which is almost impossible to defeat by any rival, the monkey king transform himself a small insect, instead of directly confronting the princess. The monkey, who can enter the Princess's stomach, can destroy the King's princess from the inside.³⁶² Another point emphasized at the story is that in the phase of achieving the goal (the phase of reaching the stomach) a variety of pain has been experienced and some of the insect has to be eaten by the iron princess. As a result, it is emphasized that non-conventional strategies in both Eastern and Western cultures have a common logic and are based on focusing on the sensitive points of the opponent by accepting the power asymmetry. It should also be pointed out from the focus of this study, that in the non-conventional strategies implemented in the modern era, the sensitive point will be the economic, social and political cost of the actors involved in the extended struggles.

Although there is a continuum observed since their initial use in non-conventional strategies, it is observed that their functions evolve in parallel with the international environment and historical conditions. In this context, the first use of non-conventional methods is observed in the mass wars after the French Revolution, when the battlefields extended to greater areas. Even the word ‘guerrilla’ was first used for operations against Napoleon's armies in Spain, which caused significant damage to France. With the influence of Spanish experience, non-conventional methods have been found in a chapter called ‘public armament’, in the classic ‘On War’ of Carl von Clausewitz, the prominent theoretician of the war.

³⁶⁰ In the narrative, it is stated that Goliath felt humiliated by saying, “he appears to me like a dog is standing in front of him,” and he approached to David uncontrollably.

³⁶¹ Lawrence Freedman, **Strategy**, translated to Turkish by Belkis Çorapçı Dışbudak and Taciser Belge, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2017, pp.56-59.

³⁶² Mao Tse-Tung, **Seçme Eserler III**, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012, p.109.

However, the initial use of non-conventional strategies is based on functions such as deploying enemy forces, disrupting their attention and morale, and creating the perception by enemy that they cannot control the situation with their current forces. It would be useful to give two examples of the Turkish history for using non-conventional strategies. First of the examples is the guerilla methods implemented against Ottoman Army during the First World War and the second example is the guerilla methods implemented by Turks during the preparation phase of Turkish War of Liberation. The British Empire, which fought against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, encouraged the Arab revolt in the Middle East, in order to disable the Ottoman army, and Thomas Edward Lawrence (Lawrence the Arabian), who played a major role in the coordination of these revolts, provided great advantage to British forces by implementing non-conventional methods. The Arabs, driven by Lawrence, have carried out many different activities in order to disintegrate the Ottoman army against the British forces, especially using the hit and run tactics in the back front line. These tactics have caused the Ottoman army to spread over a large area in small units and this has facilitated the main strategy of the British army.³⁶³ During the process goes to the Turkish War of liberation, non-conventional methods were used for the purpose of exhausting Greek forces to a maximum extent and saving time until the targeted capacity of the National Army was reached. The resistance groups in various regions of Turkey have started guerrilla actions in coordination with the Ankara government;³⁶⁴ after completing the preparations for the national army, -most of them- joined the army. The most obvious example of the attrition factor in these methods is Stalin's orders parallel to the German occupation during Second World War:

“In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated; to the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or a gallon of fuel. (...) In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, (...) must be formed, diversionists groups must be organized to combat enemy troops, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines and set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. (...)”³⁶⁵

The most important transformation of non-conventional methods was realized in the post-1945 period. Actors transformed non-conventional methods from a sub-factor

³⁶³ For logic and description of Lawrence, see also T.E. Lawrence, **Seven Pillars of Wisdom**, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1999.

³⁶⁴ Mehmet Tanju Akad, “**Tarihten Bugüne...**”, pp. 108-116.

³⁶⁵ Edward Mead Earle, “Lenin...”, p. 492.

to the main strategy in an international environment determined by the balance of terror and in a situation where it is not possible to create a symmetrical power –at least in the short and medium term - in the shade of the very important technological superiority. In order to explain this, it would be useful to make a comparison on the transformation of the power asymmetry. The most obvious observation of power asymmetry was the Battle of Omdurman between Britons and the Sudanese in 1898. In this battle, the British suffered only 48 casualties against the loss of 13,000 Sudanese.³⁶⁶ As this example shows, in the early stages of the industrial revolution, it was economically and politically possible to control large areas with a small number of staff.

This asymmetry decreased the costs of war making and direct military interventions. For that period, only decisive component which needs to consider was avoiding from a war with another great power. In this context, costs have increased not by asymmetric elements but also by counter-investments by other great powers. This balance has changed in post-1945 period. Since 1945, the element which increases the costs of wars or interventions, will be the asymmetric strategies. When this context merged with the balance of terror in global level, the political struggle between great powers transformed from direct confrontation to proxy wars which based on increasing the cost for opposing power. Thus, local state or non-state actors which have the opportunity to provide weapons or logistic support from global powers, started to implement asymmetric strategies which led to the great costs for interfering great powers.

In the new form of non-conventional strategies, it has to emphasize that the goal of these strategies doesn't based on gaining a victory. Except the initial examples like China and Cuba revolutions, the target of the non-conventional strategies is rarely contains strategic offensive strategy based on the concentration of forces. On contrary, the main goals of these strategies are creating an uncontrollable economic and political crisis for the opposing force and break the political will based on controlling the political (and usually territorial) structure. Henry Kissinger summarizes this approach as *"The guerilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if he does not win."*³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ Karl de Schweinitz, **The Rise and Fall of British India: Imperialism as Inequality**, London: Law Book Co of Australasia, 1983, p. 243. Cited by Herfried Münkler, *"İmparatorluklar..."*, p.187.

³⁶⁷ Henry Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations", **Foreign Affairs**, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1969-01-01/viet-nam-negotiations>, 1969, accessed on 25.06.2017.

Raymond Aron expresses the same approach with similar terms as³⁶⁸ *“Partizans win in political space if they don’t lose in military space. Conventional forces lose in both political and military space if they don’t acquire a certain military victory.”*³⁶⁹

As it is understood from both expressions, at the essence of non-conventional strategies is to engage in an attrition process to break the opposing power's political will and to force it to 'give up' as a result of a political process. Because of the asymmetric nature of these struggles, the strategy will never be preferred to confront with opposing force, but it will be focused on creating the perception of an 'infinite war'. In other words, the main strategy of non-conventional powers is giving the idea that they *“have started the most hopeless war that the world can see”*,³⁷⁰ like Ulysses Grant, one of the chief commanders of Northern Army, expressed during American Civil War. In this direction, it has observed that many of the stronger part of the struggles lost the control after a political crisis; not a military one. Bernard Fall expresses this as, *“a government that is defeated by an insurgency loses the war not militarily but because of a government crisis.”*³⁷¹ The most obvious example of this is the Algerian independency war. In that case, France had to withdraw from Algeria, although it was the most obvious case of military superiority against other examples. The French army, acting in the light of 'find and destroy' doctrine, has killed about 900,000 Algerians³⁷² in total. In addition, settlements, agricultural lands, and even transport animals were destroyed. Moreover, 78 of every 100 people trying to cross their bases in Morocco and Tunisia were killed, wounded or imprisoned.³⁷³ Despite all these military-security successes, France has not won the political struggle. Algerians have succeeded to establish the perception that the struggle was an ultimate struggle and that Algeria has become an economical-fiscal and physiological black hole for France. Through this perception they succeeded France's withdraw from the region although France was clearly superior in military space. This approach seen in guerrilla

³⁶⁸ Although the similarity of the two statements is obvious, since Kissinger does not refer to any later statement, both statements are included.

³⁶⁹ Raymond Aron, **Frieden und Krieg: Eine Theorie der Staatenwelt**, Frankfurt: S. Fisher Verlag, 1963, p.48. Cited by, Herfried Münkler, *“Yeni Savaşlar...”*, pp. 54-55.

³⁷⁰ Lawrence Freedman, *“Strategy...”*, p.206.

³⁷¹ Cited by David Kilcullen, *“Counterinsurgency...”*, p. 149.

³⁷² In different sources, it ranges from 350,000 people to 1.500.000 people.

³⁷³ Douglas Porch, "French Imperial Warfare 1945-62", in **Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare**, edited by D. Marston and C. Malkasian, Oxford: 2008, p. 104. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, *“Tarihten Bugüne...”*, p.219.

strategies is also observed in terrorist strategies. As detailed below, terrorist organizations, which aim to confront the civilian population with the state(s) they are targeting by provocations, want to eventually bring that state into an ultimate war. This approach is evident in the words of Osama Bin Laden, who led Al-Qaeda until he was killed:

“We gained experience in guerilla and attritional warfare in our struggle against the great oppressive superpower, Russia, in which we and the mujahidin ground it down for ten years until it went bankrupt, and decided to withdraw in defeat (...) We are continuing to make America bleed to the point of bankruptcy.”³⁷⁴

As it is understood from bin Laden's expression, non-conventional strategies, including terrorist attacks that have chosen the most brutal practices as a method, have been pursuing a strategy that would put the opposing side into a cost-effective spiral. In this sense, it is clear that the logic of the strategy is not independent of the war-politics relationship. In this respect, Herfried Münkler emphasizing that the asymmetric strategies have a Clausewitzian logic. Accordingly, non-conventional actors set out their goals with their vision developed as an alternative to the vision proposed by the hegemonic power which they target. Their strategies on the other hand, appeared as to frazzle the opposing force economically and psychologically. As a tool, they prefer violence in different forms is seen in political, economic and social order. Münkler argues that this approach is based on the ‘goal-strategy-tool’ triangle of Clausewitz.³⁷⁵ The Clausewitzian triangle is important because it is a decisive element that distinguishes contemporary non-conventional strategies from historical examples. Because historical examples are not considered as a political element; they remain at the level of individual actions or at the level of actions that support the main forces. In addition to that, these methods have been approached with suspicion, and are considered to be the elements that must be ultimately controlled. In this context, after the implementation of non-conventional methods by Marxist groups, Marx himself and Lenin made skeptical comments on these approaches. Karl Marx, in his essay on the Spanish guerrilla war, reveals his skeptical approach. Although Marx emphasizes the importance of non-conventional methods, he also states that the

³⁷⁴ Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism", *International Security*, Vol.31, No.1, 2006, p. 63. pp. 49-80.

³⁷⁵ Herfried Münkler, "Imperatorluklar...", p.194.

methods cannot be a part of a political plan if they are not then transformed into regular forces:

“The guerrillas opposed Napoleon, as did Don Quixote's spear against gunpowder. However, the result was different. (...) As for the guerrillas, it is obvious that after performing on the stage of bloody struggles, having a habit of touring, enjoying all the feelings of hatred, revenge and looting, they will be the most dangerous group of peacetime.”³⁷⁶

Similar to Marx and Engels, Lenin give a subordinate position to the guerrilla struggle, and is suspicious of its degenerative potential.³⁷⁷ The aforementioned concerns of the thinkers also emphasize the political target characteristic of non-conventional strategies. In this context, there are two different trends in non-traditional strategies. It has been observed that the movements which are based on a political goal and which are progressing through the strategy of protecting their own resources while consuming the resources of the opposing power have gained a certain discipline. It has also been observed that these movements can proceed to the strategic offensive phase from the strategic retreat phase, which will be explained below. However, in cases where actors have started to neglect the political goal of the struggle and rely on the armed forces, the process has evolved towards civil war after a while. In other words, it is a fact that, non-conventional strategies which deprived from strategic thinking are potential sources of ‘new wars’.

Parallel to the development process of non-conventional strategies, counter-strategies have been started to be developed against these methods. Just like the ramification of non-conventional strategies from the concept ‘insurgency’, the counter-strategies will be derived from the main concept ‘COIN’. In this context, new approaches have emerged, based on this new phenomenon and looking for a formula, by taking into account dynamics of these new forms of armed conflicts. These counter methods emerged through different concepts ranging from counter-guerrilla to counter-terrorism struggle or low-intensity war.

These approaches first emerged with an approach that dealt with the insurgencies as internal struggles in the colonies. Then it has been adapted to the struggles in

³⁷⁶ Karl Marx, "İspanya'da Gerilla Savaşı", in **Marksizm ve Gerilla Savaşı**, edited by William F. Poweroy, translated to Turkish by A. Sariali, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992, pp. 52-57.

³⁷⁷ Vladimir Lenin, "Gerilla Savaşı", in **Marksizm ve Gerilla Savaşı**, edited by William F. Poweroy, translated to Turkish by A. Sariali, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992, pp. 95-96.

different regions and different methods of the world. Similarly, methods based on the harsh suppression of the insurgency by military means have begun to evolve to the point of 'winning the people' after the failure of suppression attempts. In this context, it is observed that the first conceptual framework against the uprisings was developed by means of the concept of 'small wars', which was developed at the very beginning of the twentieth century. C.E.Calwell, who created the small wars concept, mentioned that the conflicts based on the suppression of uprisings in far colonies were, 'prolonged, ungrateful and invertebrate'.³⁷⁸

However, small wars concept based on colonial uprisings transformed to insurgency concept which is more than an uprising in political mean and also contains the attritional logic of various actors. Counter-strategies followed that evolution. In the first step, 'the Small Wars Manual', published in 1940 by the American Marine Corps, which was often faced with these practices, recognized the necessity to reorganize some of the military units on the basis of the uprisings.³⁷⁹ However, despite dozens of conflicts in different regions of the world, dozens of failures, including Vietnam, and dozens of studies which emphasize the importance of developing a doctrine for non-conventional conflicts, the counter-strategy will not be dealt with in a distinctive doctrine by separating from the conventional concepts until the introduction of the concept of 'low-intensity war' in 1985.³⁸⁰ Moreover, the concept emerged not as a 'winning hearts and minds' concept, but as a 'military' option that plans to carry out point-by-point operations with special units in a strategic direction. Nevertheless, it has been the first step in a concrete transformation from the perspective of the approach to asymmetric conflicts. The low-intensity warfare doctrine followed by counter-terrorism approaches, which were escalated after 9/11 attacks. In this context, it should be stated that there are two fundamental differences between the counter-strategies mentioned above.

The first of these approaches is to find and destroy operations based on military solution. These approaches focus on military operations and consider unsuccessful

³⁷⁸ Charles Edward Calwell, **Small Wars: Their Theory and Practice**, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1906, cited by Lawrence Freedman, "**Strategy...**", p. 328.

³⁷⁹ Fred Kaplan, **The Insurgents**, New York: Simon and Shuster Press, 2013, p. 83. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", p.155.

³⁸⁰ Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, "80'li Yıllarda Yeni Müdahalecilik: "Low Intensity Warfare", in **Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma: İlan Edilmemiş Savaş**, edited by Jochen Hippler, translated to Turkish by Saliha Nazlı Kaya, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1996, pp. 9-10.

cases as the inability of military logic to be perfected, escalates especially after technological innovations. They also consider the "winning hearts and minds" efforts as the compromises that cause the insurgents to strengthen. In this context, the proposed is to reorganize the units that will be shaped in a COIN and/or counter-terrorism logic, as well as the Special Forces, civilian and military intelligence facilities.

The second approach is "winning hearts and minds". This approach builds its focus and main strategy on socio-cultural, socio-economic issues without neglecting military measures. 'Winning hearts and minds' approach focuses on the disintegration of the civil-military elements that are fused in everyday life. Parallel to disintegration of these two elements, using of armed forces on military elements target annihilation while using social, economic and cultural measures on civil elements target loyalty for constructing order. The most important point emphasized by those who favor this approach is that it is very cheap for the party engaged in asymmetric struggle to carry out the conflict, and that human power is almost limitless, but it is very costly and unsustainable to initiate a continuous range of military operations in find and destroy concept. As Nguyen Cao Ky expressed as "*a shadow cannot be destroyed by a roller cylinder*",³⁸¹ in the find and destroy context, opposing forces blurring and wrong operations expends the resistance to whole community and create a massive insurgency.

The second approach is against the first not only at the theoretical level but also at the practical level. It is asserted that technological innovations would never be enough for finding and destroying the enemy because the responses of non-conventional actors always prepared on the creativity and unpredictability. In this context, the most important fact which is put forward as concrete data is the prominence of suicide attack method against surveillance possibilities. As it can be seen in the table below, after the Afghanistan and Iraq operations, where an obvious power asymmetry exist, suicide bombers, which were based entirely on civilian elements and virtually impossible to observe except for various intelligence elements,

³⁸¹ Cited by Sara Miles, "ABD Dış Politikasının ve Askeri Politikasının Unsuru Olarak LIC", in **Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma: İlan Edilmemiş Savaş**, edited by Jochen Hippler, translated to Turkish by Saliha Nazlı Kaya, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1996, p. 32.

were able to do as much damage as conventional troops against the superiority of technical superiority.




Figure 1.11: Number of Suicide Missions (1981-2007)³⁸²

The failures of the find and destroy approach allowed the other approach, the winning hearts and minds approach, become a dominant view; actors have changed their approach either from the beginning of COIN activities or after the failures of find and destroy experiments. From this point on, find and destroy have become a support concept which is used only for the armed elements that are separated from the civilizations. In this context, David Galula, one of the first theorizing theorists of COIN as a soldier who has experienced the French failures of both Algeria and Vietnam in this context, stated that only military solutions would not be enough in the first period. Galula emphasized the importance of separating the insurgents from the civilian population, and beyond that, the importance of being organized to understand the way people think and act to respond to their wishes.³⁸³ This approach shed light on the applications of the 21st century like 'Human Terrain System' (HTS). Similar to Galula, Sir Gerald Templer used the term winning hearts and minds for the first time on the Britain's Malaya experience, which he commands. In this context he expressed that *"using firepower makes only 25 percent of the job; other 75 percent is for the battle for winning hearts and minds."*³⁸⁴ In this context, Nagl has formulated COIN

³⁸² Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks", *International Security*, Vol.33 No.3, Winter 2008/2009, p.50.

³⁸³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International Publishers, New Edition, 2016.

³⁸⁴ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam*, London: Chatto&Windus Publishing, 1966, p. 84.

activities, which focus not on military but political, that emphasize winning minds and hearts concept. Accordingly, he alleges that in a successful COIN activity should have at least the following five principles must be applied:³⁸⁵

- The government must have a clear political goal, free, independent and united country should have constructed that is politically and economically stable and sustainable.
- The government must act in accordance with the law.
- The government should have a grand strategy.
- The government should give priority to defeating political insurgency, not the guerillas.
- In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, the government must first ensure the security of the bases.

Although these elements are the main determinants, there are other important issues in its implementation. In particular, it is observed that the work to be managed under two basic articles cannot be fully realized, even for the regions in the area of sovereignty, and it is known that there are even greater difficulties in the peace building activities following the international interventions.

The first reason for this is that in societies that have not completed nation-building process, the ruling groups move beyond the boundaries of the state of law to keep the power, and even some of them come to the level of ‘warlord’ after a while. In connection with this problem, the increasing rise in social exclusion and urban poverty creates the basis for the radicalization of young generations. In this context, studies show that the operations have achieved military success in the short term, but social and economic problems have re-produced themselves in the medium-long term when interfering forces will be unable to rebuild the region in a healthy way.

The most important indicator of this is the participant profile of radical organizations. Except for those who join radical organizations with political consciousness, or those who accidentally become guerrilla and revenge because of what they are living in, a big percentage of organization members consist of people who suffer from urban poverty and social exclusion. In this context, Ami Pedahzur determines that members of the terrorist organizations consists of people *"who have*

³⁸⁵ John A. Nagl, **Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife**, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 29. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, *"Tarihten Bugüne..."*, pp.185-186. For the original source cited by Nagl, see also, Robert F. Thompson, op.cit., pp.50-60.

never found their place in the community",³⁸⁶ through data on Hizbullah, PKK, Palestine and Chechenia organizations. Similarly, Gregory Johnson, in his research on the organization of Al-Qaida Yemen, found that most of the members were not dedicated jihadists, but rather young, largely ignorant and directionless.³⁸⁷ In the case of the PKK, it has been determined that many of the women members escaped from pressure elements such as domestic violence and / or sexual abuse, early age and / or unwanted marriage.³⁸⁸ For this reason, the COIN strategy requires a social program to eliminate poverty and social discrimination.³⁸⁹

The burden of integrating them into the economic, social and political system by reconciling all social elements has only been achieved in the number of international interventions that share the cost and the burden of the work. Therefore, the cost again appears to be the most important obstacle against the success of COIN operations. Actors who are aware of the importance of social integration in winning hearts and minds but are not able to provide all costs try to create 'joker groups' that will perceive the problems and try to solve the problem at a lower cost.

The most recent example of this is the HTS, launched by the United States, which cannot win hearts and minds despite all its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. HTS program, which was launched as a test for the inadequacy of the soldiers by winning their hearts and minds in accordance with their formations, was terminated 8 years later, after the cost of 725 million US dollars.³⁹⁰ Program formed by teams called Human Terrain Teams (HTT)³⁹¹ which consist of a staff colonel, a cultural analyst,³⁹² a regional analyst who is a judge in the regional language, a human field researcher³⁹³

³⁸⁶ Ami Pedahzur, **Suicide Terrorism**, London: Polity Press, 2008.

³⁸⁷ Gregory Johnsen", *Securing Yemen's Cooperation in the Second Phase of the War on Al-Qa'ida*", **CTC Sentinel**, Vol.1 No.1, 2007, p.34.

³⁸⁸ Hazal Özvarış, **Dağdan Dönen Kadınlar Anlattı: Neden Çıktılar, Ne Yaşadılar, Şimdi Ne Yapıyorlar?**, 16.05.2016, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/dagdan-donen-kadinlar-anlatti-neden-ciktilar-ne-yasadilar-simdi-ne-yapiyorlar,340604>, accessed on 01.10.2017.

³⁸⁹ For a detailed study, including participation motivations, beyond the compilation of the studies above see also, Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy", **International Security**, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2008, pp. 78-105.

³⁹⁰ Cristopher J. Sims, **The Human Terrain System: Operationally Relevant Social Science Research in Iraq and Afghanistan**, 2015, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdf/files/pub1308.pdf>, accessed on 27.11.2017.

³⁹¹ Hasan Köni, "**Dev Türkiye...**", p.187-190.

³⁹² Persons who have a Phd degree from anthropology or sociology areas are preferred.

³⁹³ Expert who makes profiling through intelligence methods.

and a human field analyst.³⁹⁴ These five-person based teams are tasked with determining the cultural codes of the field in which they are located, what messages should be given and how they should be communicated with local cultures, as well as the causes and disagreements between disputes between communities in the region.³⁹⁵ Failure of this project has also shown that field control cannot be achieved with external factors, which has accelerated the process of developing strategies based on local factors.

Despite many failures against winning hearts and minds, in many cases COIN forces succeed the strategic goals on winning hearts and minds in the light of the actualized COIN principles. Parallel, many non-conventional actors transformed their organizations from guerilla formation to terrorist organization. In addition to that, many organizations have born as terrorist organization. As a result, in post-Cold War period, terrorism appeared as the dominant method among non-conventional strategies. Terrorism uses provocation by targeting civilians with most brutal attacks to prevent the socioeconomic and sociocultural measures and bring the struggle again to hard power politics. Terrorist organizations distinct in that point form guerilla organizations because even a small group can be able to make attacks and so provocation. This context separates terrorist organizations from the guerilla principle *“to unite tightly the armed struggle and the political mass struggle”*³⁹⁶ as Beşir Ali³⁹⁷ expressed.

Another important point that must be pointed out at this point in relation to terrorism is that the applied brutality is not an irrational expression but rather a part of a consciously applied political approach. As a matter of fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is considered to play an indirect but important role in the emergence of Al-Qaeda, and therefore knows the logic of terrorism, wrote just after 9/11 that terrorism is a political will and should act in line with long, medium and short term targets prepared

³⁹⁴ Military personell are preferred.

³⁹⁵ Cristopher J. Sims, “Academics in Foxholes: The Life and Death of Human Terrain System”, **Foreign Affairs**, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2016-02-04/academics-foxholes>, accessed on 27.11.2017.

³⁹⁶ Beşir Hacı Ali, "Cezayir Dersleri, in **Marksizm ve Gerilla Savaşı**, edited by William F. Poweroy, translated to Turkish by A. Sarıali, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992, p. 321.

³⁹⁷ One of the prominent leaders of Algerian resistance forces.

within a political strategy.³⁹⁸ The fact that terrorism foresees an external military intervention after provocation and has a strategy to start a guerrilla war does not mean that the guerrilla organizations approve it. For guerrilla strategists who want to take the support of the civilian population and use them as much as possible in the political struggle, terrorism is an element that undermines this fundamental goal. This factor is clearly expressed by Ernesto Che Guavera:

“Terrorism and personal assaults are entirely different tactics [from sabotage]. We sincerely believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement, and that it can bring a loss of lives to its agents out of proportion to what it produces.”³⁹⁹

Parallel with Guavera's expression, many guerrilla organizations have been deterred from terrorist activities and have taken out groups involved in terrorist activities. The most important reason for this is the loss of the struggle of guerrilla organizations that make terrorist acts a part of their strategy.




Figure 1.12: Insurgent Use of Terrorism⁴⁰⁰

In the light of the elements listed above, it seems that guerrilla warfare and terrorism are ramified from the same logic and appear as two separate strategic choices. In addition to these, it is observed that the hybrid war approach, which uses

³⁹⁸ Zbigniew Brezizinski, "Bir Siyasal Savaş Planı" in **Düşmanını Arayan Savaş**, translated to Turkish by Osman Akinhay, edited by Metin Sever and Ebru Kılıç, İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2001, pp. 213-217. Original article called A Plan for Political Warfare published in **Wall Street Journal** on September 25, 2001. However there is no weblink.

³⁹⁹ Ernesto "Che" Guavera, **Guerrilla Warfare**, California: BN Publishing, 1969, p.100.

⁴⁰⁰ Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, op.cit., p.99.

non-conventional methods together with conventional ones, is shaped by taking into account the same logic. Therefore, these strategies should be discussed separately. By doing this, it will be possible to examine each one's political goals and how they use cost increasing methods in the light of these goals.

2. First Face: Guerilla Warfare

The first face of non-conventional strategies emerged as guerrilla warfare, becoming the basic and most common form of conflict that shaped the armed conflicts, especially during the Cold War era. In this context, it has become a main strategy based on the conditions of the power asymmetry, instead of being a subsidiary activity, differentiated from its historical background giving its name to itself. Guerilla strategies expanded to every corner of the world after specific successes. The political victory of Algerians even if they didn't gain a military victory became one of the prominent successes. Chinese success in means of theory and practice, Cuban success in the 'backyard' of US were other inspiring events.

After the spread of guerilla strategies, great powers aware that guerilla groups can be useful for attrition strategies in an international environment which superpower can't confront because of balance of terror. In this direction, superpowers provided many opportunities like basements, weapons, equipment and technical supervision. While some of the decreasing guerrilla activities ended after the end of the Cold War, some brought civil war conditions and the rest became either terrorist organizations or a hybrid structure including terrorist actions. Nevertheless, in a very short period, hundreds of different organizations have been nurtured on the same strategic basis, shaping the costs-war making relationship.

The main framework of guerrilla strategies is determined by three main factors: power asymmetry, time and cost. In this context, guerrilla strategies, as in other non-conventional strategies, arise in situations where one side is clearly stronger than other in a symmetrical confrontation. For this reason, the first thing to do is to distribute the conventional forces, which together constitute a very important force, to a large area so that they can be found in smaller groups and thus become more affordable.

There are two important components in the process of distributing the opposing force. The first component called as strategic withdrawal. This concept is based on

constantly drawing the military elements of the opposing power to the inner parts of the region without confronting them. The second is to blend in with the civilian population and to hide the forces. In particular, this latter is the most basic requirement of the guerrilla war, since, as quoted above from Ky, it is the case that a shadow cannot be crushed by a roller. At this point, the point to be mentioned is that strategic withdrawal is the first step of the main strategy. At the end of this process, the final step will be the strategic offensive. It is aimed to develop opportunities with the acquisition of the support of the civilian people during the time between strategic withdrawal and strategic offensive. In this way, the balance of power is aimed to become more equalized; after the necessary balance situation is passed, it is expected that control will be handled with a surprise operation.

The reason why this strategic attack is a surprise is that even during the offensive phase there is a power asymmetry. As emphasized above, guerrilla wars are planned on the concept of time which constitutes the period between the initiation and termination of strategy. However, the time factor refers not only to the process but also to the second strategic component of the strategy when used as a weapon. The use of the time is not only to strengthen the power balance to put the weight on the upper side of the scale. More important than that is to make the heavier side of the balance more costly by bringing a serious cost. Extending the conflict process as much as possible is an important element of pressure because time causes the strong side to lose blood constantly, because of the cost concepts of the two sides are different. Sun Tzu emphasized this phenomenon with the expression *"there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."*⁴⁰¹ For this reason, one of the strategic goals of the guerrilla war is to prolong the struggle as much as possible and to use time to create a concept of struggle that has long enough to create the perception of "endless, black hole-war" which is the key to achieving the political goal by using it in its own favor. However, prolongation of time is not sufficient for the formation of this perception. Because after a certain period of time,⁴⁰² it is observed that the states with wider possibilities can renew themselves by overcoming the shock of their perceptions

⁴⁰¹ Mark McNeilly, **Sun Tzu and The Art of War**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.20. Cited by Karl Eikenberry, "The American Calculus of Military Intervention", **Survival**, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2014, p. 268.

⁴⁰² Although this period varies from case to case, as can be seen in Table 1.19, it is considered to be about 30 years.

and during that time they are winning the struggle against the actors who could not convince the civilian people of a general insurgency.

	Years Out																				
Outcome	0	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38	40
Government wins	28	25	20	19	19	17	12	10	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	2	2	2	1	1	1
Mixed outcome	19	15	14	12	11	7	7	4	3	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Government loses	26	22	19	17	13	13	9	8	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0
Ongoing	16	15	12	10	9	9	9	9	7	6	5	5	5	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	1

Table 1.19: Surviving Insurgencies After Up To 40 Years⁴⁰³

Due to the fact that the time factor is not a sufficient factor alone, it is necessary to be able to give maximum damage with minimum cost in order to win the struggle of perception over time. The most important trump card of the guerrilla groups is also emerging at this point. Because the cost of human power is almost zero, the acquired equipment is provided for free from the supporting forces, or, while it is cheap, the cost created for the counterpart is very large. It would be useful to give examples. The organization of 'Mujahideen', which conducted a guerrilla war against the USSR, has started to hit the helicopters that play an important role in the field dominance of the Soviet Army with the man-portable air defense system (MANPAD), which is transmitted to them free of charge through the US-Israel-Pakistan line. While MANPADs' cost zero to the guerrilla organization, only the production cost of the helicopter they hit is about 12 million US Dollars.⁴⁰⁴

A more recent example can be given by the US experience of Iraq. The minimum annual salary of an American soldier is 30,314 US dollars⁴⁰⁵ and the cost of equipment

⁴⁰³ Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, op.cit., p.28.

⁴⁰⁴ The model of the helicopters is called Mil-Mi 24 and there is no data on the exact cost of production. To determine the cost, a comparison was made with Bell AH-1 Cobra, the attack helicopter used by the US army in the same period, on the port of armedforces.eu, and the cost was determined here. For the comparison see also: Armedforces, **Compare: Bell AH-1 Cobra and Mil Mi-24**, 2018, [http://armedforces.eu/compare/helicopters/Bell AH-1 Cobra vs Mil Mi-24](http://armedforces.eu/compare/helicopters/Bell%20AH-1%20Cobra%20vs%20Mil%20Mi-24), accessed on 17.01.2018.

⁴⁰⁵ Defence Finance and Accounting Service, **Military Pay Charts 1949 to 2018**, 2018, <https://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/Pay-Tables/military-pay-charts.html>, accessed on 18.01.2018.

is 17,500 US dollars.⁴⁰⁶ In addition to this, there are also food and drink, health, housing and logistics costs at the highest level. Furthermore, the compensation paid in the case of death or the rehabilitation costs after the injury constitutes a significant expense. The cost of the Iraqi insurgent who led to this cost is 150 US dollars (assuming he used Kalashnikov and bought it).⁴⁰⁷ Examples given above represent only economic costs. In addition, guerrilla groups often target the middle and lower level officials of the opposing party, thereby increasing social costs. Economic and social costs are ultimately reflected as political costs. In this context, suicide bombings display a very obvious example for the political costs created by minimum 'economic' expenditure. As Robert Pape expressed on that issue, between 1980 and 2003, *"half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the target governments"*.⁴⁰⁸

The concrete strategies are shaped in the light of the three factors explained above: power asymmetry, time and costs. Mao Tse-Tsung, who laid the foundations for these strategies, emphasized six requirements for guerrilla warfare. It is evaluated that it would be beneficial to go through the detailed examination of the strategy and tactical applications through this requirement. In this context, Mao's six requirements listed as,

- To show initiative and flexibility in planning the offensive during the defense, to engage in fast-paced battles during the prolonged war, and to perform external operations on inner lines.
- Coordination with regular war
- Construction of base zones
- Strategic withdrawal and strategic offensive
- Developing guerilla war and transforming it to mobile war
- A healthy coordination with command echelon

⁴⁰⁶ Chun Han Wong, **The Minuscule Cost of Equipping A Chinese Soldier**, 2014, <https://wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/12/08/the-minuscule-cost-of-equipping-a-chinese-soldier/>, accessed on 18.01.2018.

⁴⁰⁷ Small Arms Survey, **What Price the Kalashnikov?: The Economics of Small Arms**, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/full/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-08-EN.pdf>, accessed on 20.09.2017.

⁴⁰⁸ Robert A. Pape, **Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism**, New York: Random House, 2005, p.65. Cited by Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism", **International Security**, Vol.31, No.1, 2006, p. 49.

⁴⁰⁹ Mao Tse-Tung, **Selected Works Vol II**, New York: International Publishers, 1954, p.82. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, **"Tarihten Bugüne..."**, p.42.

The first thing to be pointed in the light of the aforementioned elements is that the application of a hit-and-run tactic based on small teams that is fully flexible and planned to be constantly in motion is required. Mao expressed that as, “*when the enemy moves, we withdraw, when the enemy soldiers’ sets up a camp, we harass them, when the enemy forces withdraw, we follow them.*”⁴¹⁰ The meaning of flexibility arises from this sentence. In accordance with the concept called strategic withdrawal, it is aimed to be divided into small pieces that cannot be found, followed or traced, and then blend among the civilian population when large units of the opposing power are engaged in the operation. Civilian population is crucial for guerilla strategy. Civilizations become the basic requirement for hiding and logistics, becoming elements of propaganda work, and eventually expanding the grass-roots organizations.

Moreover, the opposing force draws on the civilians, and if these forces make mistakes in distinguishing between guerrillas and civilians, or in the case of other erroneous practices,⁴¹¹ they could also be turned into 'accidental guerilla' by David Kilcullen's statement. After receiving a certain amount of support from civilians, it is aimed to spread this support to a wider audience and parallel, spread the military struggle to a wider area. This, in turn, reveals the importance of the tactical level of the strategy. This tactical level is based on moving with small, constantly mobile troops. For example, in the guerrilla struggle of the New People's Army (NPA) movement in the Philippines, the small number of militants who constantly hit and run with teams of 45-50 people remained at an appropriate level to quickly move away from the area and hide.⁴¹² Because of the difficulty of finding these small troops and the fact that they were further divided and stored in larger areas, extensive operations were required by large teams for the conventional force.

As a result, the time and cost that traditional forces had prepared their organization for a conventional war had failed to gather large units of troops and to activate helicopters and air elements. At this point, the other important issue is to engage in fast-paced battles, because small units of the hit and run operation will be destroyed in

⁴¹⁰ Ibid, p. 40.

⁴¹¹ One of the most important examples of these is the practice of evacuation of settlements that have been applied in different geographies since Vietnam. In some cases where it is considered that it is impossible to distinguish the armed elements from the civilian people, it was observed that the settlements were evacuated by the logic of separating the civilians from the guerrillas. It was observed that all of these practices had negative consequences.

⁴¹² Ibid, p.162.

a short period of time if the supporting forces arrive to the conflict zone before teams terminated their attack. In the struggle that begins in the light of the power asymmetry, the primary objective is to engage in operations that are fast-paced in tactical sense, since they do as much damage as possible while protecting the existing power.

Another issue that has an important place in the guerrilla strategy is to be able to construct the military and logistic bases and provide military ammunition. Because, no matter how small the guerrilla forces are moving, the chances of being destroyed are rising when they cannot safely get shelter in bases where they can move again. In this context, taking support of the foreign powers becomes the key point in means of both providing weapons and bases. Mao expresses that as, *"International support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country or of any nation."*⁴¹³ The importance of the present day is even more important considering that Mao expressed that at a time when the possibilities of surveillance and intelligence are much more limited than today. The guerrilla struggle in China has received weapons support from the USSR, the struggle in Vietnam has received weapons and logistical support from China, and throughout the Cold War many examples of external support have been constantly monitored, both as weapons and as bases.

In the post-Cold War period, PKK gives examples. It has been observed in almost every case that the members of the organization, which are based within the borders of Iraq, pass the border again after the actions. Another important component, strategic withdrawal and offensive, forms the main platform. According to this, it is aimed to lose power to the conventional power, to distribute its forces and to put psychological pressure through the hit and run actions carried out during the strategic withdrawal process. Strategic balance is changing as a result of losing the control of their territories by conventional force, which is divided into small groups parallel hit and run actions, and thus re-experiencing surprise attacks over and over again. In this process, which involves the transition from strategic withdrawal to strategic offensive, new bases settle in the regions left by the conventional power which began to retreat. After the settlement phase, it is prepared to pass to the strategic offensive phase. These steps are also embodied by Mao:

⁴¹³ Mao Tse-Tung, **Selected Works Vol I: On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism**, New York: International Publishers, 1956, p. 173.

“The enemy (...) went through a massive attack using a force of over 1,000,000. (...) Our army (...) has adopted the strategy of fighting inner areas and has allowed more than 300,000 casualties and the occupation vast territories by enemy in the name of keeping the initiative at all times and everywhere. As a result, we were able to destroy 1,120,000 enemy soldiers, force the enemy forces to disintegrate, strengthen our own forces.”⁴¹⁴

The experience expressed by Mao displays many features of non-conventional conflicts. The essential factor, territory doesn't have a central role for non-conventional powers. The essential point for those organizations is to create maximum cost for opposing power. As it observed in Mao's numbers, it can reach to the ratio one against four. When equipment and other elements are added to these losses, sustainability in terms of counter-power is questioned. This is followed by the strategic offensive phase. At this point, the guerrilla organizations, that increased their support in the first stages of the actions and the consequent propaganda work, are engaged in a final attack aimed at completely disabling the opposing forces by closing the gap with a surprise attack. Mao summarizes all these phases as, *“the principles of operation of our army remain as set out previously: First attack the enemy forces we have brought to the divided and isolated state. (...) Attack to the gathered and strengthened forces eventually.”*⁴¹⁵ However, it is important to note that only a small number of organizations can reach the strategic offensive stage. On the other hand, other successful guerrilla movements have achieved their goals in the previous stages, not implementing a strategic offensive, but creating the perception by opposing side's decision makers, that the struggle is endless.

In the face of the implementation of guerrilla practices, firstly, these approaches were tried to be responded by conventional methods. It has understood that conventional methods wouldn't be sufficient against non-conventional strategies, after many experiences like Chinese strategic offensive; the withdrawal process has been initiated in Vietnam, where the United States is in military superiority, but decides that political outcome will not be achieved. As a result, numbered new concepts developed against new paradigm.

In this context, it can be alleged that the struggle against the guerrilla has developed on two main axes. The first axis focuses on synchronizing the method with

⁴¹⁴ Mao Tse-Tung, **Seçme Eserler IV**, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012, pp. 135-136.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, p. 139.

guerilla teams rather than applying highly costly military methods and, in parallel, gaining the support of the civilians, in other words, their hearts and minds, as emphasized above. With the understanding that one of the three underlying factors of the guerilla strategy is time, a concession has been reached to destroy the belief that the non-conventional side will win the struggle in the long run. In this context, the actors who responded in the way that the prolongation of the conflict and the costs of the opposing power would increase in parallel with the approach taken by the actor as they applied it, tried to respond with the perception that those who will experience the actual damage from the prolongation of the war will be those who participate in these guerrilla groups. In other words, conventional forces understood that trying to control an entire territory to 'clean' the guerrillas has a background that is too much to cost, as well as damaging the civilian population. For this reason, they have implemented a tactic that responds to smaller operations at a wider time.

In this respect, the development of the first doctrinal change towards the concept of 'low intensity war' is meaningful. Thus, states are trying to gain advantage in the war of perception by expanding the 'victory' to a wider time. For both sides, the main target of the war of perception is the civilian population. In this context, either the guerrilla taking the support of the people, converts the struggle it started as a small group into a massive insurgency, or it is ensured that the organization is terminated before it reaches this point. The continuation of the same logic expressed by Clausewitz one century ago, reveals the importance of civilian support for both non-conventional and counter strategies:

"Like a smouldering fire, people's war destroys the grounds of the enemy army. Since the success of the people's war depends on time, there is a tension between the two sides that affects each other. This tension is either loosened by the drowning of the people's war in one or two places and/or slowly extinguished elsewhere, or the general fire turns into a bust with the enemy's army and the enemy has to withdraw from the country without collapse."⁴¹⁶

The second axis in the counter-guerrilla strategies is the increasing use of Special Force (SF) units, which will later play an essential role in the counter-terrorism strategies. Based on the fact that non-conventional actors don't consist of 'removable' members with PGMs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or different tools, the use of

⁴¹⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, "**Savaş Üzerine...**", p. 511. Cited by Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", p.30.

special troops trained to perform on the most difficult conditions has come to the forefront.⁴¹⁷ All these factors eliminated the geographical advantages of non-conventional actors. In this context, the number of SF has steadily increased in almost every country. To give an example from the US, which performs most of the cross-border operations among great powers, there is a constant increase in US SF in post-1945 period. The number of US SF personnel which counts in hundreds during the Second World War process, has reached to 63,650 people by 2012.⁴¹⁸ In addition to this, the plan, made in 2001 and aimed to extend the number of SF personnel to more than 70,000 person by 2018, has succeed in that year.⁴¹⁹ In this context, it is observed that SF have emerged from being 'special units' supporting the main elements in many cases, gradually becoming the main elements supported by other elements.⁴²⁰

After the end of the Cold War, a decline in the guerilla movements was observed as well as the decrease in the support of the states for guerrilla movements and the progress of the counter-activities in all directions after the understanding of the strategy. In this context, states that focus on winning hearts and minds in the struggle against the guerrilla have simultaneously increased pressure on guerilla organizations with using Special Forces and technological facilities. So they started to gain superiority not only in military area, but also physiological and political area as well. This transformation has triggered a shift from guerrilla warfare to terrorism in non-conventional strategies. Thus, terrorism and counter terrorism struggle has become one of the prominent forms of post-Cold War conflicts. Therefore, the next issue to be examined should be how terrorism develops and practiced a strategy for the current international environment.

⁴¹⁷ Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics", *International Security*, Vol.26, No:3, Winter 2003-2004, p.48.

⁴¹⁸ Linda Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces*, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Special_Operations_CSR66.pdf, accessed on 22.02.2018, p.9.

⁴¹⁹ Walter Pincus, 'Special Operations Wins in 2014 Budget', *Washington Post*, 11 April 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/special-operations-wins-in-2014-budget/2013/04/10/80757bc0-a15c-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_story.html?utm_term=.f0436bd9a48c. Cited by Jonathan Stevenson, "The Syrian Tragedy and Precedent", *Survival*, 2014, Vol.56 No.3, p. 126.

⁴²⁰ After the new position of the special forces, other units have been criticised them that they have reduced the pool of the future governing staff because of the elimination of best staff. However, due to the need for these units as a result of the transformation of the conflicts, the process continued in the same way. For that evaluation, see also, Mehmet Tanju Akad, "*Modern Savaşın...*", pp. 158-159.

3. Second Face: Terrorism

Terrorism, like guerrilla practices, is a phenomenon whose first applications go to very ancient histories. Again, like guerrilla method, has gained a new function in the struggle between actors. In this context, Audrey Kurt Cronin, who states that terrorism is “*as old as human history*”, takes the roots to the Jewish actions against the Roman authority, and later shows that terrorist activities are also seen in Hindus and various Islamic states in pre-modern ages. Cronin, meanwhile, states that modern terrorism emerged after the French Revolution.⁴²¹ The fact that terrorist actions were carried out in different forms and within different targets after the French Revolution also made it difficult to establish a common conceptual framework to cover these actions. In this respect, given that Alex Schmidt had to make almost a hundred-page discussion to define terrorism,⁴²² the difficulty of making a definition to cover the whole of the case arises. Therefore, rather than a conceptual framework that covers all aspects of terrorism, it is considered that the study should begin with a definition that will include the way it is implemented today. By considering its strategic use, it would be useful to define terrorism as “*the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals.*”⁴²³ Moving from that definition, it can be explained how terrorism has gained its current function and how it has achieved a position in today's political-armed struggles.

As can be understood from the definition above, terrorism is based on four components. The first of these, form of violence, is one of the two elements that play a fundamental role in the transformation of terrorism today. When this first component considered with the second one, targeting the civilians, the main strategy of terrorism also appears. In this respect, contemporary practices of terrorism which target civilians, distinguishes it from the historical examples which targets capital owners or statesmen. The fact that the civilians, who are not directly related to the political struggle, have been put on the target board at this level, have opened the debate about

⁴²¹ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind The Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism", **International Security**, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002-2003, p.34.

⁴²² Alex P. Schmid, **Political Terrorism: A Research Guide**, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1984. Cited by Audrey Kurth Cronin, op.cit, p.32.

⁴²³ Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism", **International Security**, Vol.31, No.1, 2006, p. 52.

the fact that terrorism is an action for the political targets defined since the past. However, it is soon understood that violence is a political goal that ties itself closely to the political goal, as explained below. In other words, parallel the transformation by actions from “pinpoint” political action to ‘random’ actions; the place and function of terrorism has also transformed in means of power struggle between actors. Numbers can be useful as examples. In this context, in 1991, 102 people lost their lives by 565 terrorist attacks worldwide. In 1998 the number of attacks decreased to 274 but the people who lost their lives increased to 791.⁴²⁴ These numbers shows the transformation of target audience of terrorist attack. Similarly, by 2016, as shown in Table 1.20 below, most of the targets are economic, social, cultural values and civilians. Government and military values take only a few part of the attack, contrary to the historical examples.

Target Type	Number of Targets
Private Citizens & Property	4734
Police	1760
Government (General) + (Diplomatic)	(1016) + (92)
Business	946
Military	558
Terrorists/Non-State Militia	366
Utilities	344
Religious Figures/Institutions	292
Educational Institutions	232
Transportation	228
Other	142
Journalists & Media	125
Violent Political Party + NGO	(74) + (52)
(Telecommunication) + (Food or Water Supply)	(50) + (12)
(Maritime) + (Airports & Airlines)	(33) + (32)
Tourists	11
Total	10.000

Table 1.20: Targets of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide in 2016⁴²⁵

⁴²⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin, op.cit, p.43.

⁴²⁵ START, **Annex of Statistical Information: Country Reports on Terrorism 2016**, July 2017, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272485.pdf>, p. 17, accessed on 4.2.2018. Some lines are merged to gain space.

In parallel with the turning of terrorist acts against civilians and the decline of guerrilla movements, terrorist actions gained momentum; they experienced a boom in the post-Cold War era.




Figure 1.13: The Rise of Terrorist Attacks (1970-2016)⁴²⁶

As Figure 1.13 shows, terrorist acts have emerged as a new form of use of force with new approaches after the Cold War, especially after the 9/11 attacks and the success of the terrorist campaign following the US invasion of Iraq. In this context, terrorist groups have formed their strategies with a logic based on ‘creating’ a new form of attritional war by provoking the opposing power. For this reason, the strategic choice should be examined.

The fundamental political goal of terrorist acts is to attract the targeted force and, if possible, to initiate a war of attrition by organizing an insurgency against it. Terrorist organizations do not need a massive support, as in guerrilla movements, because, as exemplified in the September 11 attacks, even a small group of targets can be drawn to the target country. After the attack, since the terrorists disappeared in the society where they live, the civilian population in which they live will also be targeted. In this context, it is envisaged that these people can be organized and an insurgency can emerge after the targeting of those who are not related to the conflict. In some cases, terrorist organizations want to engage in activities that would destroy the activity area of the targeted state, without seeking public support, and thus face the target state, not through soft power elements, but through hard power elements. The aim here is to convince the opposing power that it should first apply to major security measures, and

⁴²⁶ Anthony Cordesman, **The Patterns in Global Terrorism: 1970-2016**, 28.08.2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/patterns-global-terrorism-1970-2016>, accessed on 21.01.2018.

then to raise the cost of these measures to an unbearable level. This phenomenon, which Bin Laden describes as we will bleed the United States until its bankruptcy, is expressed by the Herfried Münkler as “*soft power is replaced with hard power (to use Joseph Nye’s terms) and that the costs of rule constantly increase.*”⁴²⁷

In light of the aforementioned political goals, terrorist actions focus on achieving five main targets. These can list as provocation, disorientation (of the target population), morale building, advertising and elimination of opposing powers.⁴²⁸ The first and prominent one of these goals is the provocation. Provocation is the connection of small group based brutal attacks with massive background based insurgency. Provocation creates the justification for conventional powers to intervene to a region with hard power. As David Fromkin expressed as “*provocation is the strategy of terrorism,*”⁴²⁹ violence emerges as a tool of provocation. Because the terrorist incitement tactic is shaped by the acts of brutality and cruelty to the extent that everyone will not be distracted and everyone will want to take measures in the name of humanity. In this context, the process started by al-Qaeda with the September 11 attacks is a useful example. Al-Qaida, a small group who hit all civilian targets at a very low cost, who directly targeted innocent American civilians in such a way that the whole world would curse, and who said that he acted in the name of Islam, has enabled the United States to use hard power against States like Afghanistan and Iraq, exactly as Al-Qaeda wanted.

Throughout the campaign, which was named the "war against terrorism" by the George W. Bush administration, it was observed that the issue was perceived as a global insurgency of the Islamic world, not an act of an organization. In this respect, Kilcullen, an active expert on counter-terrorism, emphasized a paradigm shift that requires addressing the issue as a global Islamic insurgency rather than on the basis of countries and organizations,⁴³⁰ and George Friedman, another influential expert, called

⁴²⁷ Herfried Münkler, “*İmparatorluklar...*”, p.194.

⁴²⁸ Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation" in **Internal War: Problems and Approaches**, edited by Harry Eckstein, London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 87. Cited by Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, op.cit, p.56.

⁴²⁹ David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol.53, No.4, 1975, pp. 683-698.

⁴³⁰ David Kilcullen, **The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

it the 'fourth'⁴³¹ global war of the United States'.⁴³² This demonstrates that terrorist strategies are proving successful in provoking what they are doing in order to bring soft power practices to hard power practices. In a matter of fact, a research by Michael Mousseau revealed that the basic motivations of terrorism in Islamic countries are urban poverty, not religious loyalties.

Moreover, it has also revealed that Islamist extremists share the same background as Marxist and Fascist groups in creating a large transnational structure by not recognizing the boundaries of nation states.⁴³³ In this context, it is evaluated that taking the issue as a global insurgency has shifted the focus of the struggle from social-economic area to social-cultural area. By merging unforeseen civilian casualties, this shift served to transform the terrorist attacks to an insurgency as terrorists demanded. However, this has not changed the Bush administration's approach, and the Afghan intervention, a multilateral intervention with international legitimacy, has turned into a campaign that is increasingly spreading into the region. In this context, it was observed that the provocation strategy of the Al-Qaeda worked and that the United States had "*fallen into a big trap*"⁴³⁴ in the words of Robert Fisk, responding to the terrorist attack with the concept of "war on terror". This situation has brought a very big economic cost to the United States -just as the organization has targeted- and has created a very serious decline in its soft power, which is one of the main targets of El-Qaeda.

In this respect, the economic cost of the interventions launched after 11 September has exceeded 4.8 trillion US dollars as of 2016.⁴³⁵ The total cost of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan rose to second place after the US cost in the Second World War, the greatest war ever experienced. Moreover, it is assuming that there is a possibility

⁴³¹ First three global wars listed as World Wars and Cold War.

⁴³² George Friedman, **America's Secret War**, New York: Broodway Books (Random House Inc), 2004.

⁴³³ Michael Mousseau, "Urban Poverty and Support for Islamist Terror: Survey Results of Muslims in Fourteen Countries", **Journal of Peace Research**, 2011, Vol.48 No.1, pp.35-47.

⁴³⁴ Robert Fisk, **Bush is Walking to A Trap**, 15.09.2001, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-bush-is-walking-into-a-trap-9220337.html>, accessed on 15.01.2018.

⁴³⁵ This cost analysis includes not only the analysis made by the US Department of Defense, which includes only war expenditures, but also the costs incurred by the compensation of returning soldiers, the care of the injured and other social expenses. For detailed information and full report see also, Neta C. Crawford, **US Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: \$4.79 Trillion and Counting**, 2016, <https://www.brown.edu/web/documents/nosearch/2016CostsofWar.pdf>, accessed on 18.10.2017.

of exceeding this costs in following terms.⁴³⁶ This makes long-term financing of interventions difficult.⁴³⁷ Moreover, the country's position in terms of relative gain has been weakened due to the inability to shift the resources allocated to the hard power methods to the soft power elements.

When all these factors came together, they caused a remarkable drop in American soft power. In addition, the death of thousands of US troops, the injury of tens of thousands, increases the political cost. With the help of all these elements, the hegemonic power on the region is to reduce the soft power that keeps it going. Soft power, a key factor that reduces the cost for the hegemony for the influencing powers, is falling for all regions and all states of the world after hard power-based practices. To advance from the same example, the global attitudes survey by Pew Company can be cited as an example. In the wake of the US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is understood that the United States has lost confidence in the UN, Muslim-populated countries and, more importantly, in the western allies with a similar perception of terrorism.

	Summer 2002 (%)	May 2003 (%)	March 2004 (%)	Rate of people who believe U.S. and British leaders lied on Iraqi WMD (%)
U.S.	89	---	81	31
Britain	69	63	63	41
France	75	60	50	82
Germany	70	60	55	69
Russia	73	51	73	61
Turkey	30	22	37	66
Pakistan	20	16	16	61
Jordan	13	2	12	69
Morocco	---	9	28	48

Table 1.21: Decrease to US-led Counter Terrorism in Selected Countries⁴³⁸

As shown in the table above, after the US interventions based on the response for the terrorist attacks, the process was settled on hard power, and the process soon moved

⁴³⁶ Stephen Daggett, **Costs of Major U.S. Wars**, 2010, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf>, accessed on 18.10.2017.

⁴³⁷ Uri Friedman, **Fighting Terrorism with a Credit Card**, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/cost-wars-iraq-afghanistan/499007/>, accessed on 18.10.2017.

⁴³⁸ Pew, **Global Attitudes Project: A Year After Iraq War**, 2004, <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/pdf/206.pdf>, accessed on 22.06.2017, p.3 and p.15.

to a point where US support was reduced and the leaders were not trusted. This loss of support was particularly serious in Muslim populations, and Obama needed to visit Muslim geography shortly after he began his presidency. The answers given by Muslim-populated countries in response to the cause of the Iraq war provide important evidence for the decline of the soft power of the United States in the wake of this process.⁴³⁹

The view of the hard power as a tool to be applied to any area that is necessary within an ambiguous concept such as 'war on terror'⁴⁴⁰ contributes to the disorientation goal, which is the second target of terrorist organizations. In this context, the goal of preventing radicalization and integrating individuals into social-political life is undermined, in order to win hearts and minds, the most important goal in struggle with non-traditional methods. After a while, the elements that need to be integrated are confronted with the forces that claim to build peace. It is hoped that the forces that claim to build peace will confront the community, which is the reason of their existence, will bring disorientation in the decision-makers and the public.

In this context, it is another example that the US experienced after the invasion of Iraq. The United States, which confronted with certain groups that it supported when the war started, was faced with a process that it did not expect. In Iraq, especially in Baghdad, after many attacks and conflicts, the soldiers who were expected to take part in the people and solve daily crises were forced to act in the opposite direction. In this context, armored vehicles identified with the battlefields became part of the platoons who would control the field and soldiers in the cities started to act in and/or around these armored vehicles, recalling the situation of the war.⁴⁴¹ This situation has caused a significant damage to psychological superiority and has led to a significant

⁴³⁹ Ibid, p. 19.

⁴⁴⁰ Adam Roberts points out that the "war on terror" phenomenon is used at the level of "war on drugs" or "war on poverty", which is used to fight against drugs or poverty problems in the field of sovereignty. Adam Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan", *Survival*, Vol. 51, No.1, 2009, pp. 29-60. He also emphasized that this 'open-ended' approach, which is based on doing everything necessary in the field of his sovereignty, would upset the masses if the same practice would be implemented in the world. Adam Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective", *Survival*, Vol.47 No.2, 2005, pp. 101-130.

⁴⁴¹ Kason Fark, "How Armor Units Adapted to the Urban COIN Mission in Baghdad", *Military Operations*, 2013, Vol.1 No.4, pp. 8-9.

confrontation in different parts of the American public opinion. So the US government has to deal with PMCs to solve the problem.

The key tactical instrument for terrorism is media, which is crucial for strategic goals like provocation explained above and other two strategic goals morale building and advertising. The media plays a key role in terrorist strategies because it is the primary tool of delivering the political message. In order to be able to explain this, it is necessary to mention on the separation by terrorist and guerilla approaches. The basis of the guerilla strategies is constructed on giving the political messages to the opposing force's decision makers. In this context, it is important to increase the costs of the opposing power, parallel to give the message that guerilla force will never be destroyed, and to give up the struggle politically by decision-makers who calculate that the costs cannot be increased.

However, since it is not possible to target decision-makers in terrorism, public opinion is targeted before decision-makers. Since there is not a large mass of support for terrorist groups, there is very little chance of influencing decision makers. For this reason, terrorist groups have been made to send messages to the public, that is, to the power that will be effective on decision makers. In this context, the actions that will attract the attention of the public are created and the pressure element is expected to guide the decision-makers of the public. In other words, after the failure of the message given directly in the guerrilla strategy, terrorist strategies have found an indirect path to the will of the opposing power. The main reason for the deliberate use of brutal methods in terrorist activities is the fact of this attention. Because, although the media is an effective tool, certain measures have been taken in order to convey cases to the public and to reduce the reactions to be followed. With the brutality in terrorism, these measures were tried to be overcome. For this reason, the development of the war-media relationship and the method developed by terrorist strategies against it should be examined.

As mentioned above, the role of the media in armed conflicts in the historical process has increased gradually and the parties have started to form strategies accordingly. Since the Crimean War in which the first war correspondent was held,⁴⁴²

⁴⁴² Mitchel P. Roth, **Historical Dictionary of War Journalism**, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997, p.68, cited by Haldun Yalçinkaya, op.cit., p. 309.

the telegraph and radio broadcasts have started to be broadcast simultaneously from the news which has been delayed for weeks. However, the real impact has emerged with the TV news on Vietnam War being watched by the American public. In the wake of these broadcasts, a great antagonism to war has started in the American public, creating a political cost that both the insurgents and the American government could not foresee. And eventually, CNN was able to simultaneously broadcast the Gulf War in 1991. CNN played a further role by transmitting the events to American public. After Somalia crisis, this power of influence called as 'CNN effect.' In this respect, CNN's release of footage of the bodies of American soldiers killed in Somalia in the streets has been an important reason for America to withdraw from this place without obtaining its political goals.⁴⁴³ Although American governments understand this fact and move on to 'embedded journalism'⁴⁴⁴ as if they were in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the organizations that will choose terrorist strategies have begun to build on the understanding of media's crucial role for their strategies.

This situation has reached the highest level in parallel with the global spread of social media. Terrorist organizations that have survived the editorial obstacles of the traditional media have become able to directly transmit their messages aiming at terrorizing the public and advertising for potential participants. After the emergence of social media, important efforts have been made not only to convey the brutality of actions but also to dominate the 'information war'. An example can be given from ISIS, as one of the most successful users of social media. In parallel with their attack towards Mosul, organization produced 44,000 tweets by organization members and sympathizers simultaneously.⁴⁴⁵ Next issue that needs to be addressed in the historical development process of media use in terrorist strategies is the use of violence, or rather brutality.

The brutality reflected in the media plays a central role for terrorist strategies, because the brutality creates a counter-reaction on the 'ordinariness' of violence and its effects on human behaviors including political behaviors. In this context, it is

⁴⁴³ Douglas J. Goebel, **Military-Media Relations: The Future Media Environment and its Influence on Military Operations**, Alabama: Maxwell AFB, Air War College, 1995, p.13, cited by Haldun Yalçinkaya, op.cit., p. 313.

⁴⁴⁴ For a detailed definition of embedded journalism see also, Martin Löffelholz, **Embedded Journalism**, 2014, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/embedded-journalism>, accessed on 11.02.2018.

⁴⁴⁵ James P. Farwell, "The Media Strategy of ISIS", **Survival**, 2014, Vol.56 No.6, p.51.

necessary first to mention the ordinariness of the war and then to explain how terrorism created a counter-reaction towards that. It can be alleged that the ordinariness of war made by two ways.

First of these is war broadcasting. Second one is computer games.⁴⁴⁶ To start with TV broadcasts first, the fact that war is becoming a part of everyday life through TV broadcasts, has also affected news broadcasting after Vietnam War and made the activities ordinary. It has become an agenda item in the news bulletins, such as financial news, artist news, or entertainment news, and has made people unresponsive to the political impact of the war. War has “*now become an ordinary thing consumed by dinner at 18:00*”⁴⁴⁷ as in the famous ‘living room war’ concept of Michael Arlen. After this process turned into instant transmitting with the Gulf War, the public opinion that would determine the political aspect of the war had actually acted on the images that were portrayed in the minds of the broadcasts. Baudrillard, who wants to put the influence of ordinariness in a striking way, will say, “*The Gulf War did not take place.*”⁴⁴⁸ This situation has been criticized not only by intellectuals, but also by administrators of wars. General Norman Schwarzkopf, chief of the allied forces in the Gulf War, also needed to express the phrase “*Operation Desert Storm is not a Nintendo game*”.⁴⁴⁹ Noam Chomsky will also criticize the notion of eclectic publishing of the news:

“Years ago, in the days when we were so sensitive and terrified to the fearful and desperate image of a poor bird blended to oil, we watched the death of nearly 100,000 women and children under bombs, while sipping coffee in our hot rooms and spreading to our seats, like watching fireworks. Apparently, the ‘society of the spectacle’, which was foreseen by Guy Debord in 1968s’ was realized.”⁴⁵⁰

Computer games, on the other hand, make the destruction of war ordinary, transform “*for what reason we are fighting?*” question to “*here we are fighting!*”

⁴⁴⁶ Other elements of the media such as films and TV series play an important role in terms of wars. However it has observed that thier role is focused on consent manufacturing. In this context, films and TV series uses rescue stories or gallant soldier stories, rather than justification of wars.

⁴⁴⁷ Roger Stahl, **Savaş Oyunları A.Ş.**, translated to Turkish by Yavuz Alogan, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2010, p. 44.

⁴⁴⁸ Jean Baudrillard, **The Gulf War Did Not Take Place**, Sydney: Power Publications, 2012.

⁴⁴⁹ Cited by, Roger Stahl, op.cit., p. 20.

⁴⁵⁰ Noam Chomsky, **Medya Gerçeği**, translated to Turkish by Abdullah Yılmaz and Osman Akınhay, İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002.

slogan.⁴⁵¹ In these games, the enemy 'dies' almost as rolling like an object to the ground, and even blood is not seen. As a result, war disconnects from the humanitarian aspect in the eyes of 'users.' Here terrorism has put the media at the heart of its strategy, just to overthrow that ordinariness. The purpose of terrorism is to create an 'awareness' by people on the war they believe they are in. The method they use to do this is the use of violence based on brutal methods to ensure attention, and the tool is the media. Through this, terrorists expect to ensure that the public opinion will question their government's operations. In other words, asymmetric structures, which cannot break the will of the governments by conventional means, nor can they affect the public opinion due to the ordinariness of the war, make a 'media show' to put the war on the agenda of society. The fact that the material of this show is human beings does not change the logic underlying the strategy. In this context it can be alleged that terrorist methods broke the dominance of governments on the information flow and the ordinariness which reflects the armed conflicts as a video game. In this direction, Naomi Klein reveals this in her article shortly after September 11:⁴⁵²

"Now is the time in the game of war when we dehumanize our enemies. (...) They are 'madmen' and their states are 'rogue.' Now is not the time for more understanding—just better intelligence. These are the rules of the war game. Feeling people will no doubt object to this characterization: war is not a game. It is real lives ripped in half; it is lost sons, daughters, mothers, and fathers, each with a dignified story. Tuesday's act of terror was reality of the harshest kind, an act that makes all other acts seem suddenly frivolous, game-like. It's true: war is most emphatically not a game. And perhaps after Tuesday, it will never again be treated as one. Perhaps September 11, 2001 will mark the end of the shameful era of the video game war."

This new form of terrorism has led to a cycle similar to the cycle in the counter-guerrilla activities. Like counter-guerrilla struggle, counter-terrorism attempts also started by find and destroy missions. The understanding based on that terrorist groups doesn't have public support contributed the find and destroy method. Although it has been emphasized even during the Cold-War years, that terrorism shares the same basis with other non-conventional understanding of blurring the civil-militant distinction,

⁴⁵¹ Roger Stahl, op.cit., p. 159.

⁴⁵² Naomi Klein, "Video Savaş Oyunlarının Sonu" in *Düşmanını Arayan Savaş*, translated to Turkish by Osman Akinhay, edited by Metin Sever and Ebru Kılıç, İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2001, pp. 140-141. For original source see also, Naomi Klein, *Game Over: The End of Video Game Wars*, 14.09.2001, <http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2001/09/game-over-end-video-game-wars>, accessed on 01.02.2018.

and measures have to be taken accordingly,⁴⁵³ it will be passed on to the practice after the mistakes of major operations, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. In this context, it is generally accepted that one or more of the seven elements must be accomplished for the termination of the terrorist organizations. These are listed as ‘capture or killing of the leader’, ‘failure the transition to the next generation’, ‘achievement of the group’s aims’, ‘transition to a legitimate political process’, ‘undermining of popular support’, ‘repression’, ‘transition from terrorism to other forms of violence’.⁴⁵⁴

Especially after the fact that major results have been obtained after the capture / killing of the leader team in old forms of terrorism, same method has been tried in contemporary organizations. However, unlike most guerrilla organizations, most of the terrorist organizations are not organized vertical but horizontal in a cell type, led to different outcomes. In this context, it has been observed that the disengagement of the leader has caused a control mechanism on the horizontal organization to partly wipe out, causing the cells to turn into ‘floating mines’, even leading to the emergence of ‘lonely wolves’ at the micro level.⁴⁵⁵ For these reasons, a different solution is being tried in each terrorist organization. But in all these different solutions, a counter-strategy is observed that is focused on winning the hearts and minds of civilians by preventing provocations requires use of hard power. In this sense, the Chechen experience of Russia constitutes a good example of the transformation of counter-terrorism strategies. Because this experience based on a failure in the first step, caused by the find and destroy method and also based on a success in the second step, which implemented on focusing political background and winning the civilians after the lessons of failure.

Russia, in the first step, could not prevent the targeting its military elements, which was constructed on the conventional doctrine, by Chechen militias. In this direction,

⁴⁵³ J. Bowyer Bell, **A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence**, New York: Basic Books, 1978, p. 134. Cited by Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics", **International Security**, Vol.26, No:3, Winter 2003-2003, p.46.

⁴⁵⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups", **International Security**, Vol.31 No.1, 2006, pp. 17-18. Cronin also made a list of which elements of the terrorist organization ended. For the list, see also, Audrey Kurth Cronin, "The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations(Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p. 404.

⁴⁵⁵ Bryan C. Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism", **International Security**, Vol.36, No.4, 2012, pp. 9-46.

Chechen militias hit Russian helicopters by portable missiles. Snipers and suicide bombers targeted the ground forces of the army and state officials. At the same time, Chechens displayed one of the first examples of the strategic use of the media and the information war. The militants published Russian soldiers they killed on the Internet, which caused a great indignation in the Russian public and made a major contribution to the withdrawal of the Russian forces. In the light of the lessons learned from the failure, political goals have been determined (limited) delicately, units have been planned accordingly and psychological targets of the operation have been considered as the main element. As a result, Russia separated civilian population from terrorist elements, accordingly made social and economic investments to civilian people, created a sustainable political structure loyal to the central government, while it was conducted successful military operations simultaneously.⁴⁵⁶

4. Third Face: Hybrid Warfare

As noted above, non-conventional strategies have entered a re-forming process in the circumstances based on power asymmetry, which have constituted within the end of the Second World War, and have become the main form of struggles of post-1945 period. Parallel to the transformation of armed conflicts from conventional to non-conventional forms, the faces of asymmetric strategies have embraced by actors and many counter strategies were developed by them. In this context, the struggle for power at the global level has shown itself to support non-conventional actors or governments (and in some cases other non-conventional forces) fighting them, at both regional and local levels. This process, which has progressed within a certain balance during the Cold War period, has lost its dynamics with the change of the international environment after 1991. After 1991, local actors, deprived of their global supporters, have turned terrorism into a new form of struggle.

Over the course of this transformation, a significant accumulation of non-state actors has created a situation in which, states are not directly intervening, but rather trying to achieve their own interests as 'sponsors' to these local factors, as outlined above. Eventually, considering the cyber space and information wars as contributors

⁴⁵⁶ Mark Kramer, "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2005, pp. 209-290.

to non-conventional methods, another transformation has emerged by using of non-conventional methods. A new understanding that blends the conventional methods of states with the non-conventional methods of non-state actors, and creates grey areas that uses as non-territorial buffer zones between conventional and non-conventional areas, emerged in the first decade of 2000 and developed in the second decade.

This approach, which is not entirely conventional, but systematically exploits non-conventional methods, has started to be called the 'hybrid war'. Therefore the approach to explain logic would be hybrid warfare.

As mentioned above, with the interiorizing and functionalizing of non-conventional warfare forms by states, it has started to be remembered as a phenomenon that has emerged as hybrid war. It is observed that states do not consider the crises in different regions as only a proxy war, so they not limit themselves only by arming one side. Instead, states adopt a proactive approach and take the initiative from the actors they support. In this type of struggle, states engage in conflicts with non-conventional methods so as to take into account certain phases, but only if they considered it as necessary, and use some forms of conventional methods. The key to this approach is that it is considered to be an engagement that will not be costly. In this context, this approach has been presented comparatively by Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, who is considered to be the best early enforcer of the hybrid war:

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
• Military action starts after strategic deployment (declaration of war). • Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units. • Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions or borders to gain territorial control. • Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation. • Combat operations on land, sea and air. • Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance.	• Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all) • Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable inter-specific fighting groups. • Annihilation of enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure. • Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles. • Use of armed civilians (4 civilians-1military). • Simultaneous battle on land, sea, air and informational space. • Use of asymmetric and indirect methods. • Management of troops in a unified informational sphere.

Table 1.22: Changing Character of Armed Conflict According to Gerasimov⁴⁵⁷

As can be understood from the comparison made by Gerasimov, conventional and non-conventional elements are used to maximize political interests. In this context, for example, if an information war to be carried out parallel to the insurgency of the civilian population and the will of the opposing party can be influenced, it will constitute the maximum political gain with the minimum cost. However, in the event of an armed conflict, weapons given to the supporting party and the soldiers placed inside the supporting party will increase the costs. However, both of them have much less economic and political costs than a direct intervention. In this context, one of the most critical steps in a line moving towards the traditional war comes to the control of the air space. Because air space gives the advantage to proxy elements to move freely. To exemplify this fact through Russia, it was possible to control the airspace as it did in Syria and provided an advantage to the Damascus government supported by Russia. However, Russia in that case is not the party, which intervening the case directly. But, in the Ukrainian issue, in which case it would not be appropriate to support the relevant forces (in other words, in the case which government didn't invite Russia), anti-aircraft weapons and GRAD missiles, that could not be found on black markets, provided to the insurgent forces.⁴⁵⁸ In the light of these examples, it can be assert that the Russian attempts to obtain the air dominance in

⁴⁵⁷ Cited and schematized by Janis Berzins, "Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Defence Policy", **Military Operations**, 2014, Vol.2 No.4, pp. 4-7.

⁴⁵⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Limited War", **Survival**, 2014, Vol.56 No.6, p. 16.

Syria coincides with conventional methods; however supporting insurgent groups in Ukraine overlaps with non-conventional methods. The only thing that remains constant in these different examples is that the use of armed conflicts as a continuation of politics and the reduction of costs to a minimum according to policy.

Since there is a coordinated use of different instruments within the hybrid warfare, the phase in which they should be used is also appears as a critical issue. In this context, when a hybrid warfare with sequencing logic is considered, eight stages can be listed:⁴⁵⁹

First Phase: Non-Military Asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, physiological, ideological, diplomatically, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic and military setup).

Second Phase: Special Operations to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media and top government and military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives and instructions.

Third Phase: Intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

Fourth Phase: Destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion.

Fifth Phase: Establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Sixth Phase: Commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types, forms, methods and forces, including special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service intelligence, and industrial espionage.

Seventh Phase: Combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons launched by various platforms.

Eighth Phase: Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.

⁴⁵⁹ G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, "The Nature and Content of New-Generation Warfare", **Military Thought**, 2013, No.10, pp. 12-23. Cited by, Janis Berzins, "Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Defence Policy", **Military Operations**, 2014, Vol.2 No.4, pp. 4-7.

As it is observed in the sequence, an approach emerges from the information war to the conventional war, where the conventional and non-conventional methods are intertwined in a logic. Comparing this logic with the proxy wars that took place during the Cold War will also reveal that the hybridization will be made as a framework of logic. According to this, the types of armed conflicts during the Cold War created an irregular warfare, separated by sharp boundaries from conventional ones. States have tried to develop counter-doctrines explained above for the irregular warfare, just as they have developed doctrines in the face of regular war. However, the hybrid war concept, which intertwined these two forms of warfare, has created a new approach that envisages a different doctrine at every step. It is the transformation of armed conflicts and international interests over non-state actors who are fighting conventional weapons but using non-conventional methods. Max Booth's statement about this complexity is descriptive:

“The boundaries between “regular” and “irregular” warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of states. And even states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of American power.”⁴⁶⁰

One factor affecting the separation of the hybrid war from the proxy wars is that, as explained above, the intertwined form of conventional and non-conventional methods that has been separated from each other during cold war period. The other factor is that the fundamental role of information and information war by hybrid wars. The reason for the prominence of information in hybrid warfare is that governments at the global or regional level as ‘implicit parties’ of conflict, are required to acquire the hearts and minds in order to mobilize groups (or to prevent the expansion of the actors from clashing) in those regions that are subject to operations. This new structure, which is also explained through the concept of psychological warfare,⁴⁶¹ is to reach cultural codes and provide appropriate information to these codes so that these groups can move as desired (towards positive or negative directions).

⁴⁶⁰ Max Booth, **War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today**, New York: Penguin Books, 2006. Cited by, Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", **Joint Force Quarterly**, 2009, Vol.52 No.1, p. 39.

⁴⁶¹ Lee Il-Woo, "Psychological Warfare: True Coercion, or a Byproduct That Has Yet to be Mastered?", **Military Operations**, 2015, Vol.3 No.1, pp.19-22.

In the light of this background, it can be evaluated that the main strategy of hybrid warfare is based on consumption of the opposing power(s) without using direct military force (or in a limited-covert way), and also it is foreseen to make the actions that will provide economic, political and social annihilation of the opposing power with minimum cost. As it can be observed in Ukrainian case, global powers target each other's relevant position as considering implicit actor, while regional level proxy forces were target by hybrid methods.⁴⁶² In this context, it is observed that there are similar practices of hybrid war implications, which are observed to be applied in different stages in different cases, and this indicates that hybrid war is beginning to settle as a new concept. Accordingly, the following elements can be listed as common points:⁴⁶³

- Creation of real strategic effect at the tactical level (sometimes called impact of the “strategic corporal”)
- Use of “soldiers” in unmarked uniforms (sometimes referred to as “little green men”), making their actions ambiguous under international law,
- Elevated use of information warfare, propaganda, and the spreading of false and highly inflammatory rumors to destabilize a region
- Heavy presence on social networks generating propaganda and lies
- Special operators acting across the entire spectrum of violence
- Use of insurgent techniques—including car bombs, torture, and kidnapping—to frighten the population
- Incorporation of nonmilitary forces—including police and carabinieri—into military operations
- A sophisticated cyber campaign

In the light of aforementioned dimensions, it appears that hybrid warfare is situated in the middle of two historical experiences and that it has gained a growing position in armed conflict as a new cost-based understanding. The first experience is that conventional wars require a direct confrontation and, as a result, bring great destruction and/or annihilation. It was understood that this experience was a cost-effective solution, especially after the two world wars, even if it was not a nuclear war. The second experience, however, is the experience of a proxy war with support for a non-conventional force, evolving into a structure that does not bring political

⁴⁶² Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Exhaustion", *Survival*, 2015, Vol.57 No.5, pp.77-106.

⁴⁶³ James Stavridis, **Maritime Hybrid Warfare is Coming**, 2016, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016-12-0/maritime-hybrid-warfare-coming>, accessed on 10.12.2017.

consequences if the opposing party responds in the same way. The hybrid war has developed a new cost-based approach, avoiding the deficiencies of these two experiences, but also addressing aspects of maximum impact at minimum cost.

As a result, the costs plays the central and crucial role by both the transformation of non-conventional strategies and the historical transformation of armed conflicts, as it examined in this and previous sections. As set out in the hypothesis in the first section, there are two points that are common in the different approaches that respond to different historical periods. The first of those is the close link between use of armed force and political aims. The second is the cost analysis taken into account in constructing strategies. Actors who are not able to give up their political goals prefer different ways throughout history due to cost pressures and can make changes in their strategies when they believe they have found cost-cutting methods. Within the limits of paradigms, states have tried to achieve their political goals at a minimum cost.

In this context, as stated in the first section, the paradigm of our age in terms of armed conflicts has been drawn not from the end of the Cold War or the period of revolution in the military affairs, but from the use of nuclear weapons. Within this paradigm, actors avoided direct intervention as costs increased in the post-1945 period, and when they found cost-cutting methods, they increased direct intervention rates. In this context, in the three sections of the first part, the hypothesis of the aforementioned approach has been constructed, the historical background of this hypothesis and the strategic implications for different environments have been examined. The second and final study to be made in this direction should be to examine empirical data on these theoretical propositions.

II. COST BASED PENDULUMS AND THEIR EFFECTS

In the first part of the study, the hypothesis was constructed and it was strengthened with historical and theoretical aspects. The second part should be to demonstrate the development of cost-based pendulums shaped in the hypothesis and its impact on armed conflicts.

In this direction, the second part will examine the two pendulums, which develop according to the increasing and decreasing of costs, over the periods of rise and fall, in a total of four periods. Each period will be explained through the infrastructure in the hypothesis. Accordingly, the first section of every chapter will be examined under the title of 'Strategic Environment'. In this section, the structure of the international system and the relative position of the decisive actors in this system will be revealed. The second sections will be examined under the title of 'Military Background and Its Effects On Costs'. In this section, the effects of the military background on the decrease or increase of costs will be explained. The third sections will be examined under the title of 'Effects on Armed Conflict'. In this section, it will be evaluated how the armed conflicts are followed by two factors discussed before. This examination will be conducted through the same variables, covering all four periods. In this way, it will be possible to support assumptions about the factors that create transformation in the process, with observable cases.

The first of these four periods is based on the decline of the cost associated with the appearance of nuclear weapons as a military paradigm and the creation of a new system in framework of the United Nations. However, both the restriction of nuclear weapons and the changes in the system have started to increase these costs. And eventually, in Vietnam, the understanding of how the irregular methods would cost direct interventions led the pendulum to the bottom in the first period.

The second period includes the reflections of a period when all actors have taken the necessary lessons from the Vietnam experience and are engaged in the light of

these lessons. According to this, the global powers, which fought by proxy instead of direct intervention, tried to get results by harming the counter-bloc economically and politically instead of military intervening. This reduced economic and political costs on great powers, while increasing the burden of small powers and NSAs. As a result, the cost of political engagement has begun to be reduced by keeping costly war vehicles and citizens away from war. The progression of the pendulum to the top point has been the two parallel progressive processes. The first of these is the RMA and the second is the termination of the Cold War. During this period of rise, which can be exemplify by Gulf War as the peak point, the United States was able to achieve a very successful political outcome at very low cost.

The third period includes a period in which the aforementioned cost reduction starts to increase again with terrorism, an updated non-conventional method. The forces aiming to provoke targeted force through terrorism were aimed at putting the other side into new military engagements and going to overstretch and attrition. Conventional forces on the other side of these provocations, based on past achievements based on technology, have used the military response option and the costs have started to rise again. During this process, which can be exemplify with the US invasion of Iraq, US has perceived increased costs and, just like after the Vietnam War, began to offer more indirect support instead of direct intervention.

The fourth period, which we are currently in, points to a period in which the pendulum after 2009 is going to reduce the costs. In this period, conventional forces began to use hybridized methods instead of directly intervening. Thus, the economic and political cost of political engagement began to decline, just as in the post-Vietnam period.

As stated in the first part, technological innovations are considered as cost-cutting measures. Weapons and methods that will damage these technologies cheaply are also considered as cost-risers. In addition, great powers are considered as technology-based transformers, while small powers and NSAs, which can be addressed in this context, stand out as cost upgrade-based transformers. In this context, since these concepts, which are frequently mentioned in various places in the first part, are in the focus of the second part as well. Thus, it will be useful to reveal the differences between these concepts before starting the second part.

According to this, the first difference is observed on the positions in the power scale and the distinction between ‘great powers’ and ‘small powers’ emerges. The distinction is seen in the Concert of Europe system, which can be regarded as the first international system⁴⁶⁴ with the structure it led to the creation after the Vienna congress in 1815.⁴⁶⁵ In the establishment of the first international system, the recognition of the decisive role of big powers, which are considered to be greater power than others,⁴⁶⁶ and the establishment of the system, can be considered as the first example of matching the transformational function with the power scale. The continuation of this understanding in other systems has given a historical consistency to the distinction.

Apart from this general understanding, it can be said that there is a problem to make a definition that will remain constant for different periods. Many different classifications have been developed for the definition of both big powers and small powers. As the focus of the study is on the effects of different forces on armed conflicts, the common points in the definition of big power and small power will be emphasized. Accordingly, the first acceptance is the distinction between ‘structural power’ and ‘relational power’ by Susan Strange. As the strength of the actors can remain big or small, only when evaluated with another, Strange stresses that structural analysis should be carried out to evaluate their strength.⁴⁶⁷ At this point, taking into consideration that the control over the structure is important to the control over the resources, it becomes important how the actors are effective in the structural areas on which the system is constructed.⁴⁶⁸

By analyzing power over these structural areas, Robert Keohane classify states into four categories. These are listed as *system-dominant states*, *system-determining*

⁴⁶⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, **Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi**, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012, p. 854.

⁴⁶⁵ Özlem Tür and Nuri Salık, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde ‘Küçük Devletler’: Gelişimi, Tanımı, Dış Politika ve İttifak Davranışları”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol 14 No 53, 2017, p. 4.

⁴⁶⁶ Britain, Russian Tzardom, Austria-Hungarian Empire, France, Germany and Italy defined as great powers in Concert of Europe system. Iver B. Neumann ve Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World”, in **Small States in International Relations**, edited by Christine Ingebritsen et.al., Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, pp. 5-6. Cited by, Özlem Tür and Nuri Salık, “Uluslararası İlişkilerde ‘Küçük Devletler’: Gelişimi, Tanımı, Dış Politika ve İttifak Davranışları”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol 14 No 53, 2017, p. 4.

⁴⁶⁷ Susan Strange, **States and Markets: An Introduction to Political Economy**, London: inter Publishing, 1988, p.25.

⁴⁶⁸ Susan Strange, **The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in World Economy**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 25-30.

*states, system-influencing states and system-ineffectual states.*⁴⁶⁹ Accordingly, system-dominant states stand out as actors who play a fundamental role in transformation. In this context, Hedley Bull has defined great power through its elements of force, vision and ability to assume a central role in the organization and management of the international system and to be accepted by other great powers'.⁴⁷⁰ In this respect, the US and the USSR emerged as the two system-dominant states during the Cold War period, while the US became the only system dominant power during post-Cold War period. This situation has developed towards multipolarism, and although there is no conclusive consensus today, system-determining actors such as China, the EU and Russia have again started to have a system-level decision-making effect. In addition, it can be allege that system-determining states have also played a role in the transformation of armed conflicts.

However, actors who played a role in the transformation of armed conflicts after 1945 are not only states. NSAs also played an important role in this period. Therefore, the last field to be conceptualized should be on NSA types. Although the NSAs are in very different areas and have different qualities, it is acceptable that three types of actors stand out for armed conflicts. The first of these are armed organizations. These groups, which can implement guerrilla war or terrorism, are the main actors that influence the emergence of asymmetric struggle as the dominant method. In the second part of the study, these armed organizations are referred to by the acronym NSA.

Second group is PMCs. In many cases, besides NSAs, these companies are also actors outside the state. However, as described in the previous part, these companies are not able to transform the main components of armed conflicts, many of which provide support. For this reason, although PMCs are a sub-cluster of NSAs, they need to be separated from armed organisations in the light of the focus point of study. For this reason, their acronyms (PMCs) will be used to express these companies.

The third group is foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). As Haldun Yalçınkaya explains, the FTF is an individual who was not previously considered a separate actor. These

⁴⁶⁹ Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", in **Small States in International Relations**, edited by Christine Ingebritsen et.al., Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, p. 59. Cited by, Özlem Tür and Nuri Salık, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde...", p. 10.

⁴⁷⁰ Hedley Bull, "World Order and the Super Powers", in **Super Powers and World Order**, edited by Carlsteen Olbraad, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971, pp. 140-154. Cited by Burak Gülboy, op.cit. p. 19.

individuals, who have undergone a transformation in their legal positions in the historical process,⁴⁷¹ are a subject to international legal regulations by themselves today. In this context, persons who involved a conflict in absence of a citizenship or kindship to any party or absence of expectation of gain, are defined as ‘foreign fighters’.⁴⁷² However, their position has changed after the resolution of the UNSC in 2014.⁴⁷³ After this resolution, the ‘romantic approach’ of the past has been replaced by a legal approach. In particular, some of these persons returning to their original countries or going to third countries have become ‘lone wolves’ after ISIS, and they have been able to engage in relations with different terrorist organizations, requiring them to be regulated by law. In this way, it is considered that these persons should be counted as a NSA after the definition of the UNSC after 2014.

In the light of all these factors, it is necessary to explain the data and cases within the scope of the aforementioned study plan. In the strategic environment shaped according to the relative powers of the actors, and in the cost pressures that change due to technological developments, four different periods will be discussed to examine how the actors approach armed conflicts. Transforming policies, conflicts and ultimately the strategic environment in these four periods will reveal the relationship sought to answer the initial question.

⁴⁷¹ For the comprehensive study of Yalçinkaya on the transformation and its impacts on Turkey, see, Haldun Yalçinkaya, “İŞİD’in Yabancı Savaşçıları ve Yarattığı Tehdit: Türkiye’nin Tecrübesi (2014-2016)”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol 14 No 53, 2017, pp. 23-43.

⁴⁷² Ibid, p.27.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, pp. 25-29.

A. In the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons: Declining Costs, Enlarging Engagements I

The end of Second World War meant the beginning of the establishment of a new system, as well as a global competition, clustered around two blocks. In this competitive environment, the perceptions of the actors based on the strategic environment and military background have been the main factors shaping the period. In this respect, the correlation between the decrease in costs and the increase of engagement can be examined.

1. Strategic Environment

The post-1942 period, when the future of the Second World War changed, also expressed a period when allied countries began to discuss about shaping the post-war world. In this context, the USA, USSR, Britain and China will first emerge as the ‘four policemen’. It will then include France, and the UNSC, which will form the centre of the new system. In other words, these five powers, the great powers of the winning side of the Second World War, have emerged as the ‘system-determining states’ of the new system to be established. Two of these five states, namely the United States and the USSR, will be ‘system-dominant states’ with their post-war capabilities. The fact that these two states represent two different worlds, both ideologically, economically and politically, caused the polarization in the system. The polarization pointed the progress in a struggle for the new order that is harmonized within the UN system. Here is the main element that determines the strategic environment after 1945: A system based on the power balance and security commitments of the winners and two blocks trying to increase their relative gains within the possibilities of this system. For this reason, it would be useful to examine the positions of these five states in the system after the Second World War.

To begin with the United States first, it is not wrong to assume that the state with the highest post-war relative gain is that state. As Gaddis expresses, “*if there could*

ever be such a thing as a 'good' war, then this one, for United States, came close.*"⁴⁷⁴

As a matter of fact, Washington had 20 billion dollar in gold reserves at the end of the war, nearly two-thirds of the world's 33 billion dollar.⁴⁷⁵ In addition, the United States achieved half of the total world manufacturing efficiency, and also one third of the world production of goods.⁴⁷⁶ It had one of the most modern conventional armies based on the world's largest industry. Parallel to the great economy mentioned above, US had the resources to maintain a large number troops outside its territory for a long period. Beyond all this, US was the only nuclear power in the world in 1945.

However, the USSR, which will be the leader of the 'eastern bloc' in following years, suffered the greatest destruction of the Second World War. In addition to 27 million human deaths, 7 million of 11,6 million horses and 20 million of 23 million pigs were killed. 137,000 tractors, 49,000 harvesters, a large number of villages and farm buildings have become unusable. The 65,000 km railway was destroyed. 15.800 locomotives, 428,000 freight wagons, 4280 riverships and half of all railway bridges have been seriously damaged.⁴⁷⁷ This destruction will be the basis of Soviet demands in the post-1945 years. While Germany's industrial infrastructure is looted, resources and land will be demanded from many countries in eastern Europe. The concern of these demands in Western Europe and the US will accelerate the blocking process. However, despite the destruction of the economic, agricultural and demographic areas, conventional armed forces of USSR were modern, powerful and ready for war. Industrial capacity was severely damaged, but the infrastructure remained intact. It had a wide range of natural resources and a centralized state that could use any kind of force to evaluate those resources. Its scientific infrastructure was robust and it would soon prove it by making nuclear weapons.

Although Britain managed to maintain its position of great power despite the destruction of the war, it lost its position of becoming a system-dominant state and in the light of this fact it made strategic moves. After the war, almost all of the gold and

* Second World War

⁴⁷⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, **Soğuk Savaş**, translated to Turkish by Dilek Cenkçiler, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2015, p. 9.

⁴⁷⁵ Benjamin M. Rowland, **Balance of Power and Hegemony: The Inter-War Monetary System**, New York: New York University Press, 1976, p. 220.

⁴⁷⁶ William Ashworth, **A Short History of the International Economy Since 1850**, London: Longman Publishing, 1975, p.268. Cited by Paul Kennedy, "**Büyük Güçlerin...**", p. 427.

⁴⁷⁷ Alec Nove, **An Economic History of USSR**, London: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 285.

foreign exchange reserves were exhausted, some of their industrial capacity was useless and the rest of them were damaged. Exports, the basis of the country's economy, fell to 37% of the level of 1938. Its economic development was largely dependent on the continuation and restructuring of American aid that began during the war.⁴⁷⁸ However, the British managed to maintain control of all its colonies. It had more than 1,000 warships, 3000 small warships, 5500 landing vehicles, and also the world's second largest Strategic Air Force.⁴⁷⁹ In the light of this background, Britain pursued a policy to withdraw itself from cost-increasing colonies, by acknowledging its new position or in order to impose a burden on it to recover. According to this, it will be withdrawn from India because of the transformation of the economical structure and the constant rebellions which creates cost more than profits. Similarly, it will be withdrawn from the Palestinian region, which has a high potential for conflict for Middle Eastern crossings, and will focus towards the Suez Canal.⁴⁸⁰ Withdraw of Britain from former colonies (parallel to France), will be created a new structure which increases the costs of security commitments.

France, which had been occupied by Germany during the war, plundered for nearly four years and carried out a partisan war, had been destroyed in the war.⁴⁸¹ Moreover, post-war GDP has decreased by 50% compared to the pre-war period, foreign exchange stocks have been exhausted, foreign trade has declined to zero point and its money has lost its value completely.⁴⁸² However France succeed to be a permanent member of UNSC. There are two reasons for the adoption of France. The first one relates to the balance of power, supported by Britain. In the wake of the Second World War, the USSR appeared as a force capable of controlling continental Europe, with the idea that France could play a stabilizing role, France recognized as a great power and Britain supported the French permanent membership in UNSC.⁴⁸³ The

⁴⁷⁸ Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin...", p.438.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 437.

⁴⁸⁰ Habibur Rahman, "British Post-Second World War Military Planning for the Middle East, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 5 No 4, 1982, pp. 511-530.

⁴⁸¹ Gordon Wright, *Ordeal of Total War*, Illionis: Waveland Press, 1997, p. 264

⁴⁸² Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin...", pp. 436-437. It can be said that this policy is the 'traditional' British foreign policy towards continental Europe. In the establishment process of the Concert of Europe system, Britain took measures to prevent a possible Russian expansionism and to prevent the emergence of a land power that could control the continental Europe. Britain, which supported France into the system, also evaluated Germany as a buffer zone between the two powers. In this context Oral Sander identifies Britain's balance of power policy towards the Russia as the first example of the Cold War.

⁴⁸³ Ibid, p. 436.

second is related to the establishment logic of the system, namely stability and security. The fact that France was still in control of large territories in Africa and Southeast Asia was envisaged to create a wider security zone in terms of the newly established system by economically strengthened France.

China, on the other hand, has emerged with a depleted economy and has entered the fastest period of an ideological civil war. For this reason, China's being a system-influencing state will find its position after 1950s, and the fact that it is a system-determining state will find it after 1970s. Germany and Japan, which will be the system-influencing states of the coming periods, started to Cold War period as exhausted, weapons-free and occupied states as the losers of the war. The re-emergence of these states will begin when they are inserted into the system (after there had been a reconciliation on their future, security guarantees, and economic aid).

As can be seen from the above, there was obvious economic superiority of the US in the post-1945 international environment, a closed economy of the USSR had that give the opportunity to oppose this supremacy, the US and the USSR had military superiority. All other countries, however, were not able to confront these two states economically or militarily, without the support one of these powers. The fact that the forces of these two countries create the Cold War, not cooperation, is due to the concerns of the system influencing states on Soviet power and the distrust of the two sides starting from the years of the Second World War.

In this context, the element that determines the conditions of the Cold War has emerged from distrust in the first step. The foundations of this distrust were laid during the Second World War. The USSR, which suffered huge losses in the war, made various demands to compensate for these losses, and these demands were doubted by its allies in the war. Similarly, the USSR suspected that its Western allies had begun to use the war to weaken itself, in the light of the relatively less losses of Western allies and the fact that US had doubled its gross domestic product (GDP) in that period. In this context, high Soviet officials stated that Normandy Invasion was a move that US has joined the European War *“only at the last minute, when it could easily affect the outcome of the war, completely ensuring its interests.”*⁴⁸⁴ On the other hand,

⁴⁸⁴ Kenneth M. Jehnsen, **Origins of Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946**, Washington: US Institute of Peace, 1993,p.3. Cited by John Lewis Gaddis, op.cit., p. 27.

Roosevelt, who was uncomfortable by the talks between Churchill and Stalin on compensation for their losses in the war, began to negotiate the surrender of the Germans without coordinating with the USSR. Suspecting Roosevelt's start of negotiations, Stalin warned his generals that the peace with the Germans could only cover the West, and war on the East could continue.⁴⁸⁵ After a while, Roosevelt will state that Stalin had *"broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta."*⁴⁸⁶ As a result of this process, Stalin who states that *"war is barbaric, but using the A-bomb is super barbarity"*, will also state that *"the balance has been destroyed (...) and that can not be."* and will shape the understanding of Cold War.⁴⁸⁷

Some of the attempts of the USSR, justified by its losses during the war, were combined with the existing military capacity and created a great concern was raised especially in European countries. This concern will cause the United States to be re-engaged with the security commitment to the continent, and the beginning of the polarization, as well as the beginning of the 'containment policy' of the United States. In this context, it was calculated that the USSR would reach the English Channel in a short time as 2-3 weeks if it marches to Europe with its conventional army.⁴⁸⁸ In parallel with this military power, the intense ideological interest in the regions which had saved by USSR during the war, and the transition of these states into communism one by one, frightened Western European countries, which already have a large socialist-communist mass. Moreover, the fact that the USSR demanded land from Turkey that neither was not on the opposite side of the war nor saved by USSR, and that USSR supported Marxist revolutionaries in Europe, especially Greece, has started to increase the anxiety.

Against these concerns, Gerorge Kennan, the US embassy official in the USSR, proposed a policy, which he formulated first in the 80,000-word 'long telegram' and then in the article which he send with nickname 'X' to the Foreign Affairs journal.⁴⁸⁹ This proposal will be implement as containment policy. This approach, although previously proposed to prevent the expansionism through diplomatic and economic

⁴⁸⁵ Vojtech Mastny, **Russia's Road to cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politcs of Communism (1941-1945)**, New York: Colombia University Press, 1979, pp. 156-162.

⁴⁸⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, op.cit., p. 30.

⁴⁸⁷ Simon S. Montefiore, **Stalin: The Court of Red Tsar**, New York: Knopf Press, 2004, p. 502.

⁴⁸⁸ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, **NATO'nun Dönüşümü**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 12.

⁴⁸⁹ George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol 25 No 4, 1947, pp. 566-582.

influence area, will further expand its scope against the military expansionist concern. The socio-economic initiative will be started with the Marshall Plan and the military initiative will be started with the establishment of NATO in 1949. Accordingly, the first phase of US containment policy was constructed in Europe. With the security guarantee of NATO's atomic bombs, it is designed as a basis for the strategy to ensure the development of Europe -with the help of Marshall Plan- and thus to make Western Europe able to provide support to the United States after a while. James Forrestal, the US Secretary of Defence emphasized that this strategy will be maintained *“as long as we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb.”*⁴⁹⁰ In the short term, the strategy is based on the development of the Europe under the security guarantees of nuclear bombs, until the USSR produces atomic bombs. However, the fact that the USSR produced the first atomic bomb in 1949 in a much shorter period than was estimated has led to the collapse of this strategy.

At the end of this process, the United States was invited to stay in Europe and the United States accepted it with a security commitment based on its nuclear umbrella, which meant that the first bloc would emerge through NATO. Thus, the United States did not only try to increase its relative gain by containing its global rival, but it also created hegemony on its European allies. Mearsheimer summarizes the formation of the first block and the American hegemony in the Western European states:

“(...) NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War and (...) NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat.”⁴⁹¹

The response of the USSR was to form its own bloc and to use the UNSC actively. The USSR, which did not use the Marshall Plan, established COMECON in 1949 and implemented an economic aid and development mechanism in eastern Europe. In the military sense, the USSR, which is already providing security by itself, will bring the Warsaw Pact into force in 1955 and shape its military block. The UNSC will be another mechanism that is actively used by the USSR. The USSR will use the veto mechanism in the United Nations in the first period of the Cold War, as Molotov, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs has outlined in his words:

⁴⁹⁰ Cited by John Lewis Gaddis, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

⁴⁹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", **International Security**, Vol 19 No 3, 1995, p. 14.

“The USSR is now one of the most powerful countries in the world. No serious problems in international relations can be resolved without the USSR.”⁴⁹²

Member	1945-1950	1950-1955	1955-1960	1960-1965	1965-1970	Total
China	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	2	0	0	2
UK	0	0	2	1	0	1
USA	0	0	2	0	0	2
USSR	41	15	10	12	2	80

Table 2.1: Veto Numbers of UNSC Permanent Members (1945-1970)⁴⁹³

Under these circumstances, the first effect on the Cold War environment was the Korean War. Through this war, which will be examined in following sections, it was observed that non-nuclear states were not avoid to enter a war against nuclear states. In this period, the other vital factor affecting the strategic environment was the decolonization process. These regions, which was formulated in the security guarantees of Britain and France, have become regions of global competition based on security guarantees. And that will significantly increase the costs in medium term. As a result, these two developments will completely change the security infrastructure of the system.




Figure 2.1: Security Guarantees by pre and post Decolonization Process⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹² Paul Kennedy, “Büyük Güçlerin...”, p. 435.

⁴⁹³ United Nations, **Security Council Veto List**, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>, accessed on: 30.04.2018.

⁴⁹⁴ There is no overlapping correlation between the enlargement of security commitments and the decolonization dates. However, in order to demonstrate the process, maps with maximum and minimum limits of guarantees have been designed.

As seen in Figure 2.1, when the system was established, most of the world was under the direct control or security guarantee of one of the members of the UNSC. In this way, the structure of the UNSC provided a territorial extent that would give stability to the system. In this context, the emergence of the first conflicts in regions such as India-Pakistan, Israel where British guarantee has ended and the Korea, where the guarantees were ambiguous, became important indicators of this transformation. In the 1950s, the independence process of third world countries would started a huge competition to influence these regions, and this competition will bring about conflicts. In this way, the cost of security commitments will rise considerably in a process that spans about 25 years.

In the short term, many of these states, which came together under the umbrella of the ‘non-aligned movement’⁴⁹⁵ have found the opportunity to be system-determining power position as a result of uniting their power in UN. This new function, which was undertaken especially after 1955, will be a determining factor in the system for about two decades.

Another effect of the decolonization process is that states like Britain and France, which are no longer in a system-dominant position, have accelerated their economic development by transferring the economic pressure of these former colonies to the USA. This will contribute to a increase in the relative power of European states in one hand and a decrease in the relative power of the United States in the other. In this context, Britain gives a useful example by the process with the decrease of defence share in GDP parallel to decolonization process.

⁴⁹⁵ The Non-Aligned Movement is a platform that emerged after the 1955 Bandung Conference and became a more coordinated platform after the 1961 Belgrade Conference. It is declared that member countries would continue their relations with both blocs, however it is also stated that they would not enter into official engagement with the two blocs. It also foresees solidarity to eliminate development problems. In this context, the platform realized this solidarity through organizations such as UNDP, UNCTAD, UNICEF and who, other than the UN General Assembly. In terms of security, it is based on and supported peacekeeping missions, which are also shaped under the umbrella of the UN.

Year	Issue	Growth Rate of GDP ⁴⁹⁶	Defence Share of GDP ⁴⁹⁷
1947	Independence of India and Pakistan		% 7,7
1948			% 6,3
1949			% 5,9
1950			% 5,8
1951	Korean War (British entrance)		% 7,5
1952			% 10,0
1954			% 8,8
1956	Independence of Sudan	%1,62	% 7,8
1957		%1,93	% 7,2
1961	Independence of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Cyprus (1960)	% 2,57	% 6,3
1963	Independence of Kenya	% 3,95	% 6,2
1964		% 5,04	% 6,1
1968	Independence of Yemen and Oman	% 3,98	% 5,5
1970		% 6,59	% 4,9

Table 2.2: UK Defence Burdens

As it is seen in Table 2.2, Britain tried to remain a great power by protecting its colonies first.⁴⁹⁸ However, after the Korean War, following the acceptance of the burden of the defense budget, which totaled 10% of GDP, it abandoned these areas one by one. By abandoning the claim of being a system-dominant state, it reduced its defence budget and left the most critical part of the burden (the protection from the USSR) to NATO and the United States. Thus, it was able to allocate resources for economic development by reducing its share of the defence within the GDP.

With the decolonization process mentioned above, the USA and the USSR have entered into a political and military competition in these regions. At this point, although the non-aligned movement has declared that any of its members will not be engaged in both blocs, it can be said that at the point of cooperation, the USSR conducted a more successful diplomacy at the first stage. After Stalin's death in 1953,

⁴⁹⁶ Between 1955-1960 see, UK Office for National Statistics, **Time Series: Gross Domestic Products**, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyr/pn2>, accessed on 21.02.2018. Between 1960-1970, see also, World Bank, **Gdp Growthh (Annual %): United Kingdom**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GB>, accessed on 21.02.2018.

⁴⁹⁷ Keith Hartley, "The Cold War, Great-Power Traditions and Military Posture: Determinants of British Defence Expenditure After 1945", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 8 No 1, 1997, p. 23.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 19.

the USSR started to 'de-Stalinization' process and implemented the policy of 'Peaceful Coexistence' under the leadership of Krushchev. Thus, the USSR, which offers a comprehensive approach to different systems and emphasizes that there is no obligation to participate directly in the bloc, has emerged as a more attractive partner for third world countries than the former colonists. The US response to this trend has been to establish and increase regional pacts with its existing partners and to prevent potential transitions of other countries' into socialist regime. These concerns resulted in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact,⁴⁹⁹ SEATO* and the ANZUS* Pact. The second, more comprehensive, counter-move was shaped by a theoretical approach called as 'domino theory' and became the basis of the USA's post-1960 engagement.

Although the domino theory gained weight after decolonization, its logical roots go back to US reflections towards the Chinese revolution. In this context, first Stewart Alsop, using the bowling metaphor, not domino, argued that communist expansionism would affect the entire Asian continent:

"The head pin was China. It is down already. The two pins in the second row are the Burma and Indochina. If they go, the three pins in the next row, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia, are pretty sure to topple in their turn. And if all the rest of Asia goes, the resulting psychological, political and economic magnetism will almost certainly drag down the four pins of the fourth row, India, Pakistan, Japan and the Philippines."⁵⁰⁰

The concern described by Stewart Alsop over bowling pins will then be explained by US President Eisenhower over 'domino' and referred to as 'domino theory' from that date:

"You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and (...) the last one (...) will go over very quickly. So you could have (...) a disintegration that would have the most profound influences"⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ It will be transform to CENTO will exist until 1979 Iran's Islamic Revolution.

* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

* Australia, New Zealand and United States

⁵⁰⁰ Michael Schaller, **The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 232. Cited by, Paul Kennedy, "**Büyük Güçlerin...**", p. 454.

⁵⁰¹ Cited by John Lewis Gaddis, op.cit, p. 112.

The domino theory, which is becoming increasingly widespread in the United States, is formalized in a National Security Council (NSC) document in 1952. Document emphasized that,

“Inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China (...) lead to relatively swiftn submission to or an alignment with communism by the reminder. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the possible exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probablity progressively follow.”⁵⁰²

In the context of domino theory, SEATO was first established. The United States, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Britain and France, which still had colonies in the region at that time, became a member. However, lack of a sufficient common stakeholder⁵⁰³ indicates that the states within the organization are still at risk. Moreover, the fact that the critical states in the region like India, Indonesia and Malaya (Malaysia) were in the non-aligned movement and refused to join SEATO. That reality prevents to establish a ideological model in Asia, and also reduced the attractiveness of the organization. For this reason, the military measures will begin to take place instead of diplomatic measures.

The Vietnam intervention, the foremost of these measures, was an engagement by the United States in thinking that the domino theory required it, but it was a case of the opposite effect. It will regress the relative power of the United States and become a case of increasing the relative power of the USSR and change the strategies of the two superpowers. The reason why the conflict in a small country has such an impact is that innovation in the military field is a major transformation. For this reason, the military background in the same period needs to be explained in order to complete the strategic environment explained above.

2. Military Background and Its Effects on Costs

In the form of the Cold War, the polarization under the leadership of both the United States and the USSR was active, while the superiority of these forces in the

⁵⁰² Cited by Henry Kissinger, **Diplomasi**, translated to Turkish by İbrahim H. Kurt, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008, pp. 605-606.

⁵⁰³ Cited by, Ibid, p. 616.

military field was the basis for easy acceptance and expansion of this leadership. A new warfare technology, which is used only as a deterrent without the need to use large and costly conventional power, has ensured that the security commitments needed to make this leadership can be given very cheaply. This cost-cutting technology was the atomic bomb.

After the first and last use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the horrors that it created changed the military background completely after 1945. Even in the early years when the United States was a nuclear monopoly, the military background was summarized in the sentences of Bernard Brodie as, *“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”*⁵⁰⁴ However, it has not changed the use of this effective weapon as a strategic tool and has since become the basis of the US and the USSR security commitments –even when the ‘balance of terror’ has been reached after the hydrogen bombs. The atomic bomb, which appeared as a ‘cost-cutting’, was not actually used after Japan, but it became a tool that created a great pressure on the possibility of being used and allowed to obtain political gains. Just getting political gains with the possibility of using them became an innovation that reduced costs dramatically. Paul Kennedy outlines how this cost-cutting device is turned into security commitments:

“Above all, the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic bombs. (...) American military power may actually have been less than it seemed (there were very few A-bombs in stock, and dropping them had large political implications), and it was difficult to use it to influence the conduct of a country as distant, intractable, and suspicious as USSR. But the image of ineffable superiority remained undisturbed until the Korean War, and was reinforced by the pleas of so many nations for American loans, weapons and promises of military support.”⁵⁰⁵

The impact of nuclear weapons on costs has also been understood by system-determining states and these states have started to work to acquire nuclear weapons. In the light of this cost-based approach, British Prime Minister Atlee, who claims to still protect his empire at the beginning of the Cold War, described nuclear weapons as follows:

⁵⁰⁴ Bernard Brodie, **The Absolute Weapon**, New York: Harcourt Publishing, 1946, p.52. cited by Colin S. Gray, **Modern Strategy**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 304.

⁵⁰⁵ Paul Kennedy, *“Büyük Güçlerin...”*, p. 428.

“a manifestation of the scientific and technological superiority on which Britain’s strength, so deficient if measured in sheer numbers of men, must depend.”⁵⁰⁶

As a cost-cutting measure, the effect of the atomic bomb actually lies in the prevention of logistics costs, possible equipment losses and, more importantly, human losses. In addition, bomb gives a superiority to nuclear powers on non-nuclear powers through its psychological⁵⁰⁷ and cost-cutting effects. To understand the difference, it is necessary to consider the logic of strategic bombardment. Despite the successful consequences of strategic bombardments, there were significant risks in terms of costs and risks. The first is the use of a large number of aircraft to create the aimed damage in the targeted area or areas. A ‘squadron’ or a ‘wing’ of airplanes and fighter planes that will protect them from the enemy’s air force, together with other air elements, accommodates a large number of planes. For example, the number of B-29 aircraft in the United States involved in the Bombing of Tokyo at the end of World War II was 334.⁵⁰⁸ With this fleet, an area of 16 square miles was targeted, 267,171 buildings (one quarter of the city) were destroyed, 83,793 people were killed and 40,918 people were injured.⁵⁰⁹ Although the production of so many aircraft can be overcome in the Second World War for giant economies such as the US, the increasing cost of construction and the duration of construction will make the creation and use of such fleets very costly. Another important problem besides the use of airplanes is that they have to fly many times because they can’t do the damage required at a single time. Another example can be given from Japan again. In a bombing process towards 6 Japan cities which endured for 14 months, an average of 50% of these cities were damaged, military facilities were destroyed, and military equipment was reduced by 54%, and motor vehicle production was reduced by 94%. To do this, the wings had to do a total of 176,059 sorties.⁵¹⁰ Even if no aircraft had been lost in these operations, the number of sorties represents an enormous cost. Thirdly, many personnel and ammunition (gasoline, oil, etc.) were needed to maintain these aircraft, prepare them for war, and continue logistics without

⁵⁰⁶ Margareth Gowing, **Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy (1945-1952) Vol I**, London: Palgrave Publishing, 1974, p. 184. Cited by Paul Kennedy, “Büyük Güçlerin...”, p. 441.

⁵⁰⁷ The effect of a single bomb destroying most of a city with everyone and everything inside it.

⁵⁰⁸ R.G. Grant, "Bombing of Tokyo", 02.03.2018, **Encyclopedia Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Bombing-of-Tokyo>, accessed on 09.06.2018.

⁵⁰⁹ John H. Bradley, **The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific**, New Jersey: Avery Press(Penguin Books), 1989, pp. 251-252.

⁵¹⁰ George Friedman, “Savaşın Geleceği...”, p. 101.

interruption. For example, there were 11,144 personnel at the 20th Bombardment Base, which played an important role in US bombing towards Japan.⁵¹¹

In this way, in discussions about the function of atomic bombs, the approach that the main function of atomic bombs is cost-cutting has gained weight. In particular, the first atomic bombs were not enough to destroy an entire country (especially large countries such as the USSR), but were also claimed to be less effective than many strategic bombings. The basis of these claims was due to comparisons made with other strategic bombings. In this context, in Hiroshima, the atomic bomb destroyed 60% of the buildings, killed 78,000 people and injured 51,000 people. In Nagasaki, while 40% of buildings were damaged, 35,000 people died and 60,000 people were injured.⁵¹² However, the critical element of these weapons has been to make the effect with much less infrastructure, beside for all other psychological factors. The ‘wing’ of Hiroshima attack gives a useful example. The wing was constituted from ‘Enola Gay’, which dropped the bomb, one fighter plane and a meteorology plane and the wing accomplished its mission only one sortie.

Similarly, it would be useful to compare the cost of the Manhattan Project, which creates the first atomic bomb, to the cost of the Tokyo bombardment. The Manhattan Project cost a total of 2 billion dollars, including R&D and production costs.⁵¹³ In the Tokyo bombing, the total cost of the B-29 bombs, which were 639,188 dollars per bomb, amounted to 214 million dollars.⁵¹⁴ These costs are not included in the cost of 334 aircraft involved in the bombardment, approximately 12,000 people working on top, and other logistics costs. Considering that each strategic bombing will cost the same budget as the Tokyo bombing, and on the other hand, the Hiroshima attack is only carried out by one bomb and three planes, the difference becomes more obvious. Bernard Brodie evaluated this difference comparatively:

⁵¹¹ Carl Berger, **B-29 The Superfortress**, New York: Balantine Books, 1970, p. 50.

⁵¹² The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, "Pacific War: Hiroshima and Nagasaki", **Encyclopedia Britannica**, 19.04.2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pacific-War/Hiroshima-and-Nagasaki>, accessed on 09.06.2018.

⁵¹³ US History, **Manhattan Project**, <http://www.ushistory.org/us/51f.asp>, accessed on 09.06.2018.

⁵¹⁴ Haywood S. Hansselt Jr., *Strategic Air War Against Japan*, Montgomery: Air Power Research Institute, 1980, p.67. Cited by George Friedman, "**Savaşın Geleceği...**", p.102.

“Nuclear weapons are several million times stronger than the most powerful explosives ever known when compared to equal amounts. (...) It should be obvious that there is much more than a logistic difference involved between a situation where a single plane sortie can cause the destruction of a city like Hiroshima and one in which at least 500 bomber sorties are required to do the same job. Nevertheless, certain officers of the United States Army Air Forces, in an effort to ‘deflate’ the atomic bomb, have observed publicly enough to have their comments reported in the press that the destruction wrought at Hiroshima could have been affected by two days of routine bombing with ordinary bombs. Undoubtedly so, but the 500 or more bombers needed to do the job under those circumstances would, if they were loaded with atomic bombs, be physically capable of destroying 500 or more Hiroshimas the same interval of time.”⁵¹⁵

This cost-cutting effect of atomic bombs has fundamentally affected the American strategy and allowed it to engage security issues much easier. For example, in terms of the security of the European continent, it was enough to have a strategic air force consisting of a small number of airplanes. Additionally, US obtained the conventional forces from the European allies and thus could extend the area of hegemony at a very low cost. That way, US could find the opportunity to commit security guarantees despite other powers, which don’t have such a cost-cutting technologies in that period. The fact that the European contingency forces were the only ‘necessary’ forces and creates no burden, displays a very positive picture that it did not cost the United States. The issue that disrupted this background was the development of the USSR's first atomic bomb in a much shorter time than estimated.

The fact that the USSR developed an atomic bomb much faster than the US had estimated would influence the US military strategy deeply. As described above, the US strategy was based on the creation of a safe zone that was cheaply secured by atomic bombs, and the construction of a Europe that would later support it. Accordingly, it is predicted that atomic monopoly of the US will last between 6-8 years.⁵¹⁶ However, after 4 years, the USSR exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949 and ended this monopoly. Two options have emerged for the United States, which is unable

⁵¹⁵ Bernard Brodie, *op.cit.*, p. 27 and pp. 33-34.

⁵¹⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

to abandon its European-based containment strategy. The first of them is to make a serious increase in the number of conventional forces in Europe and to keep them ready for a potential war. The second is to go a step further in nuclear weapons technology and try to develop the bomb called 'super bomb'. Thus, the same strategy on pursuing deterrence based on WMD at a low cost was expected to maintain. This choice paved the way for a thermonuclear bomb, or a hydrogen bomb with common name. However, until the development of hydrogen bomb, the number of conventional forces and parallelly the costs increased.

Since the USSR is a state with conventional Powers at the basis, this transition did not make a big cost difference. But there is a transformation for the United States. This shift after the transformation of the USSR into a nuclear power has shown itself in the new security strategy documents. The United States, which understands that only the atomic bombs will not be enough, but also that it will be seriously damaged in a nuclear war, has begun to tend to convene a conventional restructuring of Europe in the face of the prospect of conventional war. The main determinant of this was the 68th National Security Council Document in January 1950, which is one of the main sources of the containment policy. In this document, the use of conventional force is defined and shaped as 'bringing the conventional forces to a point that wouldn't be dependent on nuclear weapons as today.'⁵¹⁷ However, the European allies, who agreed with the US over the nuclear umbrella, had a negative approach to this conventional increase. The development that changed this was the Korean War that broke out at the other end of Eurasia. In the Korean War, the US entered a conventional war as a nuclear power, but didn't (or could not)⁵¹⁸ use the nuclear weapons in this war. In addition to that, US failed to obtain the desired effect militarily. These developments have aroused the concern that the USSR would do a Korea-like operation in West Germany.⁵¹⁹ This concern facilitated the increase in conventional power.

Since the American contribution to the conventional power needed was provided from the current infrastructure, it did not create a large cost in the first stage. A new

⁵¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, **Strategies of Containment**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 100.

⁵¹⁸ The reasons for this choose are discussed in a sub-section.

⁵¹⁹ Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe and Cihan Dizdaroğlu, **NATO-AB ilişkileri**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 12.

arrangement has been made between US troops⁵²⁰ in Eurasia for postwar regulations and the US has gone into a conventional balancing as it was recommended in the 1950 NSC document. The Korean War has revealed how conventional warfare is still not unlikely and how much it can increase costs. However, conventional conflict types will take place after the ‘balance of terror’. The balance of terror will emerge after the US and the USSR began ‘super-bomb’ experiments, which is the second option.

Studies by US strategy units revealed that less than 200 atomic bombs produced by the United States as of 1950 would not be enough to defeat the USSR in a war.⁵²¹ These reports have removed the ideological and bureaucratic barriers to U.S. efforts to make hydrogen bombs, and the process has accelerated. The words of Truman, who had previously been distant from the hydrogen bomb, are meaningful in terms of the psychological breakdown against the obstacles: *“Even if no one wants to use it, we have to do it. But(...) we must have it, even if it is only for negotiation with the Russians.”*⁵²² In this respect, the thermonuclear bomb, a bomb based on merging the atoms (fusion), instead of separating atoms (fission), was first detonated by the USA in November 1952 and by the USSR one year later. However, it is the BRAVO test conducted by the United States in the Pacific Ocean on March 1, 1954, which provides a clear understanding of the possible impact of these bombs. This experiment has led to unexpected consequences and has brought with the results that would affect the position of nuclear weapons. The radiation generated by this bomb, which reveals about three times the expected energy of 15 megatons, and thus has a effect of 750 times the bomb dropped to Hiroshima, has caused many environmental and other damage. The radioactive fallout in this experiment, along with the wind, reached hundreds of miles away, even poisoning a Japanese fishing boat where it reached, causing the death of a fisherman.⁵²³

⁵²⁰ *“To be sure, The war itself have been the primary cause of this projection outward of American power and influence. Because of it, for example, in 1945, it had 69 divisions in Europe, 24 in Asia and Pacific, and none in the continental United States. Simply because it was politically committed to the reordering of Japan and Germany (and Austria), it was ‘over there’.”* Paul Kennedy, *“Büyük Güçlerin...”*, p. 428.

⁵²¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 111-112.

⁵²² Ibid, p. 113.

⁵²³ John Lewis Gaddis, *“Soğuk Savaş...”*, p.64.

The effects of these experiments have led to an understanding that the use of these weapons at the same time brought about a situation that threatens the whole ecological life. In a report prepared in the USSR, it was stated that the explosion of 100 hydrogen bombs could create conditions that maintaining life would not be possible in the whole world.⁵²⁴ This will then be referred to by Churchill as *the balance of terror*.⁵²⁵ Until these bombings, nuclear weapons were considered as ‘ultima ratio’ that could be used when considering political risks. But in the presence of such powerful bombs, the use of nuclear weapons could only bring about the MAD.

In theory, the first effect of achieving the balance of terror was the chaos that emerged in terms of nuclear weapons strategies. This chaos which identifies by Lawrence Freedman as “*the inability to taming strategic weapons*”⁵²⁶ created the understanding as Bernard Brodie states as “*nuclear weapons have utility only in nonuse*”⁵²⁷ in the first step. Thus, the idea that atomic bombs can be used strategically, even if limited, has been theoretically abolished by the hydrogen bomb and it is almost impossible to implement it in practice with the Cuban missile crisis. In an international environment in which nuclear weapons cannot be used without a mass destruction, in other words, can not be tamed, two superpowers will begin attempts to limit these weapons systems and then eliminate some of them in order to decrease the costs.⁵²⁸

However, understanding of MAD both in theory and in practice did not prevent nuclear powers from developing bombs and systems quantitatively and qualitatively, in the light of the logic of ‘if used’ in a possible situation. For example, by 1961, the USSR was attempting a bomb that had seven times (100 megatonnes) the impact of the US's BRAVO experiment. There was a similar approach in the number of nuclear weapons. Not only the United States and the USSR, but also other nuclear states have tried to develop their nuclear arsenal.

⁵²⁴ David Holloway, **Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy**, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, p. 336-337.

⁵²⁵ Cited by Paul Kennedy, “**Büyük Güçlerin...**”, p. 461.

⁵²⁶ Lawrence Freedman, **The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 433.

⁵²⁷ Bernard Brodie, **War and Politics**, New York: Pearson Press, 1974. Cited by Colin S. Gray, “**Modern Strategy...**”, p. 322.

⁵²⁸ These attempts are explained in the section II.B.2.

Year	USA	USSR	UK	France	China	Total
1945	6					6
1946	11					11
1947	32					32
1948	110					110
1949	235	1				236
1950	369	5				374
1951	640	25				665
1952	1005	50				1055
1953	1436	120	1			1557
1954	2063	150	5			2218
1955	3057	200	10			3267
1956	4618	426	15			5059
1957	6444	660	20			7124
1959	15468	1060	25			16553
1960	20434	1605	30			22069
1961	24111	2471	50			26632
1962	27297	3322	205			30824
1964	29249	4238	280			33767
1965	30751	5221	310	4	1	36287
1966	31642	6129	310	32	5	38118
1967	30893	7089	270	36	20	39115
1968	28884	8339	270	36	25	39563
1969	26910	9399	280	36	35	38634
1970	26119	10538	308	36	50	37842
1971	26365	11643	280	36	75	38153
1972	27296	13092	220	45	100	39882

Table 2.3: Nuclear Stockpiles (1945-1972)⁵²⁹

A similar trend has been observed in nuclear weapon vehicles and systems. This started by step towards the development of bomber planes, the strengthening of fleets, and the establishment and development of defence systems. The transportation problem caused by the increase in tonnage of the bombs, as well as the creation of more high-quality aircraft fleets to protect from defense systems, triggered the cost increase in conventional vehicles. Following this, the USSR made the first mid-range missile in 1955, and in 1957, Sputnik set the ground in the earth's orbit and crossed the breaking point to make the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), this time required investment in missile systems and cost increase.⁵³⁰

Nevertheless, no matter how much the number of nuclear weapons increases, no matter how far the transmission systems develop; both poles have clearly understood

⁵²⁹ Colin S. Gray, **War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History**, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 212.

⁵³⁰ IISS, **Military Balance 1974**, London: IISS Publishing, 1975, pp. 74-75 and pp. 48-49.

that these weapons will be functional only in deterrence, after a period of about two decades of indecision.⁵³¹ As a result of this, the most important change was to return to the strategies based on the new conventional forces and to see a significant increase in these forces. The first reflection was observed in the Western block, with the change in NATO's strategic concept. The first strategic approach of the organization, 'the massive retaliation', was based on the nuclear superiority of the United States.⁵³² This was based on responding a communist aggressive move on any NATO ally country directly with nuclear weapons, and was believed to be a major deterrent. In addition, it did not need to feed a large army because it was based on nuclear weapons, and it was more economical in this regard.⁵³³

But the process did not evolve as expected. First, it was observed that the USSR and China did not abstain from the attack with conventional weapons and nuclear weapons did not provide security as a means of attack. In parallel with this, the strategic concept itself was creating problems and losing its functionality as it would not be able to use nuclear weapons directly to the tactical armed attacks. The Cuban crisis, which followed, revealed the balance of terror. In addition, the 1961 Berlin crisis and the blockade have shown the United States how the concerns of the allies have increased the costs of conventional power.⁵³⁴ As a result of all of this, NATO has changed its strategy and the strategy of 'flexible response' has been adopted.⁵³⁵ The progress towards the conventional area has helped USSR to improve its relative power, because of its effectiveness in this area, especially in the field of land forces. Since the Second World War, the United States has been closing its conventional shortfall against other powers with its enormous industrial capacity. For example, although the Sherman tanks used by the United States during World War II were considered weaker

⁵³¹ Thomas C. Schelling, "A World Without Nuclear Weapons", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations (Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p. 420.

⁵³² Gregory W. Pedlow, **NATO Strategy Documents (1949-1969)**, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf>, accessed on 14.07.2018.

⁵³³ J.M.Roberts, **Twentieth Century: The History of the World (1901-2000)**, New York: Penguin Books, 2000, p. 462.

⁵³⁴ For the effects of Berlin Crisis on US military expenditures, see Andreas Wenger, "Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Missile Gap: Determinants of US Military Expenditure in the Wake of Sputnik Shock", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 8 No 1, 1997, pp. 90-97.

⁵³⁵ Both NATO's massive retaliation and flexible response strategies have found their first implementation in the practice of US national doctrines. In this context, the military doctrine of the Eisenhower period effected the form of the massive retaliation doctrine of NATO, and the Kennedy's military doctrine has pioneered the flexible doctrine of NATO.

than the German Panzer tanks, it was observed that the U.S. produced a large number of tanks with its strong industry and increased its firepower and turned off this disadvantage.⁵³⁶ However, since the early years of the Cold War, the establishment of a strong military industry by the USSR eliminated the advantage in this area.

As a result of all this, a large investment and production trend towards conventional weapons has been implemented on both sides. With this trend, increased costs have led to more active use of allies, which have cost-cutting effects, and that increased political costs. In this context, US-Turkish relations constitute an important example. Turkey provided an ideal deployment area for the B-29s, which would drop the US atomic bombs. In addition, it was also a source of ‘cheap infantry’. Parallel to this, the United States was trying to minimize its troops in Europe. At this point, the Turkish soldier, which cost about 1 to 10 of the cost of a US soldier of about 5000 dollar,⁵³⁷ has become a very efficient option for the US.

The balancing efforts of the two superpowers with alliance relations and strategy changes have not prevented the upward trend in the costs, but also prevented them from affecting their relative position. However, after the implementation of a method of warfare that will develop beyond the current interstate paradigm in the global power struggle, it will be understood that a new method exist, that have the potential to boom costs. This understanding, which considers the non-conventional warfare as a substitute for global struggle and based on the ‘prolongation’ and ‘turning into a cost black hole’ of this struggle, will give a new form to the shaping of the military background. This new background, which will be revealed by the Vietnam experience of the United States, will form the main framework of the next period. As a result, it would be appropriate to put an end to this section with an assessment of how this new structure has changed the results of the struggle between blocks and certain states and it is appropriate to proceed with the study of conflicts:

⁵³⁶ George Friedman, “Savaşın Geleceği...”, p. 53.

⁵³⁷ Serhat Güvenç, **NATO'da 60 Yıl: Türkiye'nin Transatlantik Güvenliğe Katkıları**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 12.

“We have been charged with excessive quantification in respect to measurement of progress in Vietnam. And I have no apologies whatsoever for attempting to measure progress. Any military commander (...) would surely wish to be prepared (...) to answer the question ‘Are you winning or not?’ (...) In a conventional war, it’s relatively easy. You have front lines; they’re either moving forward in the enemy’s territory, or you’re being forced back further into yours, so you know whether you’re winning or not. This was not that kind of a war. The question was: are we winning? What are the proper measures? Are we getting the right information with respect to those measures? We didn’t choose the proper measures, and we weren’t getting the correct information. That was the problem.”⁵³⁸

3. Effects on Armed Conflicts

The period between 1945 and 1972 displays one of the best examples for the relationship between the use of power as a tool of international relations and costs. In this period, which started with a technological innovation that significantly reduced costs, the costs started to increase in parallel with the non-use of these weapons. This increase has also shown the close relationship between the use of power and relative power. Although the Korean War at the beginning of the period resulted in a significant increase in defence spending, the use of force was directly used as it did not cause significant change in the relative position of the United States. However, the Vietnam War at the end of the period brought about a policy change due to the decline in the USA's relative position, although it required a smaller expenditure than the Korean War. This process will be followed by the hybridization of use of force. For this reason, the relationship between cost and power should be examined through the process from Korean War to Vietnam War. Thus it should be started with Korean War first.

In the Korea region, which is divided into two separate Korean administrations after the Second World War, North Korea's mobilization to unite the two regions caused the Korean War in 1950 to begin and surprised international society. The reason for this surprise is that despite the nuclear monopoly of the United States, there was no hesitation in launching the war. A few important points emerged shortly after the war began. The first is to understand that collective security, which is based on the UN

⁵³⁸ Robert McNamara, **Interview**, George Washington University National Security Archives, 06.12.1998, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/>. Cited by Ethan B. Kapstein, "Measuring Progress in Modern Warfare", **Survival**, 2012 Vol.54 No.1, pp.137-158.

system, will only function in situations that affect the entire system, or in cases where there will be no conflict of interest. In this context, the resolution of intervention was taken by transferring the decision process to the General Assembly at a time when China was not in the Security Council and the representative of the USSR did not participate in the session protesting the recognition problem of China. Therefore, it has been observed that the system, which plays as the prominent cost-cutter for all members, is likely to be deactivated in conflicts, in which great powers involved.

Another important point is that the United States was not able to use another cost-cutter, atomic bombs. Although the USSR was a nuclear power when the Korean War began, the U.S. had a very clear superiority. It was estimated that the USSR had 5 or 6 bombs in return for the 369 atomic bombs in the US. Nevertheless, there are several assumptions why the US did not use nuclear weapons. First, it is the awareness that using atomic bombs except for vital situations will have long-term political consequences. Secondly, in a US-USSR war that could begin after the atomic bomb expulsion, it was calculated that the nuclear weapons at hand would not be enough to defeat the USSR alone.⁵³⁹ In addition, it could also have been the expansion of the war and the seizure of the whole continental Europe of the USSR.⁵⁴⁰ Moreover, conventional losses in the war and the risk of 5 atomic bombs will significantly reduce the post-war relative power of the United States, even if the war is won.

Finally, the atomic bombs were labelled weapons that were much cheaper and less risky than the strategic bombardment, designed to be deployed to industrial centers, military facilities, transport lines. Therefore, they had the same targets as strategic bombardment: targeting cities, industrial centers and military centers. If these were close together, the atomic bomb would have a huge effect. However, in a region like Korea in 1950, where rural, population and military troops were scattered, this bomb remained meaningless. Moreover, the production and support centers of the Korean War were in China, outside Korea. According to this, bombing transport lines was a very small gain in the face of the political costs of the atomic bomb. In this context, the railways were reorganized in Hiroshima for 12 hours.⁵⁴¹ As a result of all this, the understanding that nuclear weapons could not function as an attack weapon in many

⁵³⁹ Martin Walker, *The Cold War: A History*, New York: Henry Holt Press, 1993, p. 63.

⁵⁴⁰ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO'nun Dönüşümü...", p. 12.

⁵⁴¹ George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", p. 114.

issues was revealed. The result was the return of the conventional war. The repercussions of this return will be seen in the next three years following 1950 as death toll, injuries and increased defence costs.

In this context, the first thing to be noted is that the United States, which has led to a significant decline in conventional force due to the effects of nuclear weapons, has led to the increase of force on this issue again. In this context, immediately after the start of the Korean crisis, the United States in the first year of the crisis, 585,000 people have recruited and 806,000 reserve soldiers have started to keep ready.⁵⁴²

The second point is that, as mentioned above, it shows how difficult it is to ensure collective security, but at the same time that one or several countries should be ready to take on the cost of intervention if decisions are to be taken by the UN. In this context, the United Nations force created for Korea was largely the appearance of an American-South Korean army. In this context, the United States accounted for 50% of the ground soldiers, 85% of the naval forces, and more than 90% of the Air Force of the task force. The remaining part was provided by the South Korean troops. In this context, 90% of the ground and naval forces personnel, and almost 100% of the air force were composed of these two countries.⁵⁴³ The force composition in Korea also shed light on future conflicts. Accordingly, the US has been heavily weighing on the naval and air forces, and has been seeking support from its allies for the ground forces.

Another data on the relative power-cost relationship provided by Korean war is about incomes. Despite the increased costs of the state undertaking security, the countries who have no responsibility in the crises, used the economic advantages of these structure. In this context, while the costs of the states engaged in security commitments increased during the war, there was no increase in the costs of the beneficiary states and their revenues increased. The best example can be given as Japan, with recovering itself under American guarantees is the Korean War. Under normal circumstances, Japan, which poses a very important threat to itself and must take precautions, had no cost because of the American security guarantees. In addition,

⁵⁴² Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, "Savaş Sonrasında Dünya", in **Cambridge Savaş Tarihi**, edited by Geoffrey Parker, translated to Turkish by Füsun Tayanç and Tunç Tayanç, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006, p. 402.

⁵⁴³ A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, **Uluslararası Örgütler**, Çeviri: Nasuh Uslu, Ankara: BB101 Yayınları, 2015, p. 200.

the increased costs of the United States in this war provided a significant input to Japanese companies exporting products to the American military.⁵⁴⁴

In the Korean War, where nearly two million Koreans and 600,000 Chinese died,⁵⁴⁵ the United States spent 50 billion dollars, sent 2,000,000 soldiers and lost more than 54,000 of them.⁵⁴⁶ In addition to this, US has also undertaken a commitment to protect South Korea from this date. At the same time, the USSR, which was not directly involved in the war, improved its relative position, accelerated the economic development program and increased its atomic bomb up to 120 in three years.

An important inference from the Korean War is that the military operations would still be depended on the financial support of the system-dominant and/or system-determining states, even if international consensus is reached in any international event. The most important proof of this is the peace keeping mission, which was approved by the system-dominant states during the 1956 Suez Crisis.

The Suez crisis, which starts upon the attack of the secretly agreed French-British and Israeli forces to Egypt forces because of the nationalization of Suez Canal by Egyptian leader Nasser, immediately came to the attention of UNSC. The secret plan constituted on an Israeli attack based on security concerns in the first step, British and French interference ‘as neutral forces’ and by separating two sides in the second step. After a new status quo established, it was planned to give the control to UN. In this context, Israel attacked and seized several areas, including the Gaza Strip, Sharm el-Sheikh, and then Britain and France intervened and Egypt opposed the intervention. The UN then intervened in the conflict for preventing the potential expansion into a new Arab-Israeli war. This intervention was carried out with a ‘peacekeeping force’, which had not been implemented before.

The concept of peace keeping was, in fact, a structure that was not under the Charter of the UN, thus it was ‘developed’ by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld for solving the specific cases. He later conceptualized this new method

⁵⁴⁴ Michael Schaller, **The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 289. Cited by Paul Kennedy, “*Büyük Güçlerin...*”, p. 454. A remarkable example is the Toyota company. The company is on the verge of bankruptcy, the U.S. Army's truck purchases and reversed the situation.

⁵⁴⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, “*Soğuk Savaş...*”, p. 53.

⁵⁴⁶ 36.538 of these losses are dead, the rest are injured and lost.

as the ‘chapter six and a half’⁵⁴⁷ in 1960 Congo crisis. In this respect, the task of peacekeeping missions, defined as ‘soldiers without enemies’⁵⁴⁸ and expressed by the UN that it was not a party to any conflict,⁵⁴⁹ consisted of ending the conflict situation with involving between opposing parties. 1956 The Suez Crisis also provided important indications for the efforts made within the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the UN's first peacekeeping mission.⁵⁵⁰

The first of these indicators is political. The USSR and Arab states refused to support the UNEF, arguing that this intervention would be done in order to eliminate the advantages of the Arab countries and give the control of the region to Israel. For this reason, the Secretary General, who received the budget through the General Assembly, not through UNSC, was able to operate the peacekeeping mission with only volunteered countries. In this context, the cost of the UNEF operation lasted between 1956 and 1967 was around 200 million dollars. Most of this cost has undertaken by the United States through calculations on support ratios.⁵⁵¹ Although this cost is not a big problem due to the general capacity of the United States, the costs of operations and the decrease in the overall share of the United States will cause problems in the coming years.

The second indicator is the economic. In this context, some countries are able to provide support, even for the soldiers to contribute, provided that their salaries are covered by the UN budget or from a supporting country. For example, even a relatively strong country like France, in the ONUC mission to Congo from 1960 to 1964, refused to pay its share of the peace-keeping budget, taking into account the costs of \$ 400 million.⁵⁵² One important point to note at this point is that the annual cost of the Congo intervention is above the UN regular budget.⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁷ UN Information Center, **60 Years of Peacekeeping: Looking Back, Moving Forward**, 2008, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/60yearsPK/index.html>, accessed on 22.12.2017.

⁵⁴⁸ Haldun Yalçınkaya, **Savaş: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güç Kullanımı**, Ankara: İmge yayınları, 2008, p. 221.

⁵⁴⁹ Kim R. Holmes, "New World Disorder: A Critique of the UN", **Journal of International Affairs**, Vol. 46 No 2, 1993, p. 329.

⁵⁵⁰ It is also important to note that the ‘Acheson Resolution’ was very important to construct to such as a force. The resolution was based to bypass UNSC when it was not functional and solving the issue in UNGA, as it first experienced in Korean issue.

⁵⁵¹ The calculation is based on indicators such as economic size, per capita income, development problems caused by wars (if war realized) and countries' ability to obtain foreign currency.

⁵⁵² A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, op.cit., pp. 124-132.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

Another experience for the UN's impact on armed conflicts is that the impact of the UN peacekeeping mission in interstate conflicts, especially in conflicts involving system-dominant powers, will be only for 'preventing the conflict from going further.' In this context, 24 countries supported the UNEF and UNEF started its duty with 6000 soldiers from 10 countries. Although these soldiers prevented the expansion of the conflict by fortifying between opposing forces, they could not acquire pre-war positions and start peace negotiations. As Bennett and Oliver expresses:

"The last British and French troops left on 22 December 1956. Israel occupied most of the Sinai Peninsula, including the points of controlling the sea passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tirana. Israel did not want to withdraw its troops until the UNEF made arrangements for freedom of passage on this waterway. The process was completed on December 8, 1957."⁵⁵⁴

Although it has not been transformed into an armed conflict, the Cuban missile crisis had a major impact on the nature of security commitments and costs, and therefore needs to be briefly examined.

The crisis that started with the US detecting of missile systems in Cuba and blockade before the missiles reached the island, initiated a big crisis which revealed the possibility of practicing the balance of terror. This crisis ended when both sides made compromises in order to prevent MAD. Although this end has prevented the crisis and possible destruction, it also created a shock in terms of forces that largely bound their security to nuclear umbrella.

In this context, first of all, Cuban Missile Crisis has revealed how the balance of terror pushes the possibility of nuclear war out of possibilities (except for a great frenzy). Because it seems that the US, which has a much larger nuclear arsenal than the USSR during the crisis, will be the 'winner' of a war, but it avoids such a war by foreseeing the damage (rather the damage it will see). Kissinger's words summarize this understanding:

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 204.

"the Soviet Union had only 60-70 truly strategic weapons while we had something like 2000 in missiles and bombs. But (...) with some proportion of Soviet delivery vehicles surviving, the Soviet Union could do horrendous damage to the United States."⁵⁵⁵

This crisis has shown that the balance of terror will stop the nuclear war, but also shown that both sides can deprive of their allies from their nuclear umbrella. In this respect, the negotiation of the removal of the nuclear umbrella has been put forward by Dobrynin, the USSR Ambassador to the United States:

"Robert Kennedy said, 'You are interested in the missiles in Turkey?' He thought pensively and said, 'One minute, I will go and talk to the President.' He went out of the room (...) He came back and said, 'The President said that we are ready to consider the question of Turkey, to examine favorably the question of Turkey.'"⁵⁵⁶

Although this approach prevents the greatest cost, the destruction of Earth, by eliminating a possible Third World War, on the other hand, it will raise costs because of 'the life goes on'.

In this context, the crisis has given a major damage to the credibility of security commitments developed over nuclear weapons. The U.S. promise to withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey after the agreement with the USSR has created a shock effect for Turkey and all other European partners who think that its security provided by nuclear umbrella.⁵⁵⁷ Since then, many allies have sought support from the United States for conventional power, and France has sought to accelerate its nuclear program and provide its nuclear security. In this context, France will withdraw from NATO's military wing in 1966, almost a year after it became a nuclear power, although it cost 30% of its defence spending.⁵⁵⁸ This approach based on conventional forces will be another factor that draws up costs. In terms of the USSR, there will be no cost pressure

⁵⁵⁵ Cited by Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations(Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p.88.

⁵⁵⁶ Cited by David A. Welch, James G. Blight and Bruce J. Allyn, "The Cuban Missile Crisis", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations(Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, pp. 199-200.

⁵⁵⁷ Oral Sander, "**Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...**", p. 325.

⁵⁵⁸ Robert J. Lieber, "The French Nuclear Force: A Strategic and Political Evolution", **International Affairs**, Vol 42 No 3, 1966, pp. 421-431. Undoubtly, Cuban Crisis was not the only reason of increase in French defence spendings. The effect of Suez Crisis and 'De Gaulle effect' were also important. However, Cuban Crisis was a breaking point with bringing nuclear umbrella in question.

because the allies do not have an extra demand and the military infrastructure is distinctive.

Although the cost increase in the context of interstate conflict may be controlled by a certain price, as exemplified above, Vietnam experience of US will show how a new warfare approach based on costs, can make a political impact. It will be understood that it is not the end of direct costs after this conflict. Therefore, instead of directly engaging in cases, actors would prefer more indirect methods except their vital interest. This would initiate the first hybridization of armed conflicts with the cost pressure of the post-1945 process. In order to understand this, it would be necessary to experience the Vietnam War as ‘the last straw that broke camel’s back.’

The cost of the Vietnam War for the US has yet begun while France was fighting for keeping its colony. In this context, 120 million dollars of military aid was provided in 1950 and 1951 in accordance with the Mutual Defense Aid Program with France. In 1952, when Domino Theory entered into the National Security Council document, it increased to 300 million dollars.⁵⁵⁹ These aids to France will be given to South Vietnam first upon the withdrawal of France, followed by military advisors in addition to economic assistance, followed by bombings with air force and finally sending ground troops.

At the beginning of the Vietnam War, it was calculated over the possibility of a Korean-like conventional war that China would intervene. In this context, according to McNamara, the Secretary of Defence and the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was considered that at least 205,000 American soldiers would be needed to win a war in which China would be involved.⁵⁶⁰ What was not considered is that North Vietnam will pull more than 600.000 American soldiers to the region via its unconventional strategy.⁵⁶¹ One thing to mention in the calculations is that the rationale of war, which is reduced to quantitative capacity analysis in the inter-block and inter-state logic of the Cold War, is to be applied in a country like Vietnam. In this context, the understanding that shaped the Vietnam War became models based on

⁵⁵⁹ Oral Sander, “*Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...*”, pp. 287-288.

⁵⁶⁰ Henry Kissinger, “*Diplomasi...*”, p. 630.

⁵⁶¹ As will be discussed below, a similar miscalculation based on similar reasons will also be made in the 2003 Iraq war, as a result of which the United States, which entered into a non-conventional conflict, will have to send troops far above the calculated.

mathematical analysis, which were identified with Robert McNamara. Within these models, it was essential to achieve maximum results with minimizing costs. So much so that, even with nuclear weapons that make strategic calculations meaningless by the destructiveness it creates, there is a plan calculated according to its influence.⁵⁶² This planning will make a significant contribution to the transformation of Vietnam into a cost based black hole, which should be approached in the COIN logic.

In the context of the COIN,⁵⁶³ the US intervention could not achieve the political goals it targeted from the very beginning because of North Vietnam's guerrilla strategy. The U.S. and the South Vietnamese troops, trained by US officials, were waiting for a conflict environment where they would confront with the opposing forces directly. However, the North Vietnamese forces were interfering the conflict in their most suitable timing, implementing the hit-and-run tactics, and, more importantly, targeting the political infrastructure, not the military. In this context, the guerrillas, who were organized through small groups that were almost impossible to identify by the armies, were unable to separate from the peasants by their civilian appearance, were targeting civilian government officials, not the protected soldiers. In order to weaken and destabilize the institutions of the South Vietnamese government, government officials were targeted and nearly 2,500 officials were killed annually.⁵⁶⁴

In this context, the North Vietnamese troops entered into the traditional conflict only with a Tet Offensive, which they thought would have a great psychological impact. Despite their serious losses (around 40,000) in this attack, they were able to capture some regions of Saigon and enter into the American embassy area for a short while. That success provided the desired political pressure, and led to the U.S. withdrawing in long term.⁵⁶⁵ Otherwise, North Vietnam understood how great the

⁵⁶² An example given in this context summarizes the approach: *"The strategic force that emerged was supposedly limited by a target set intended for assured destruction. But rather than dividing the mission into thirds, with each part of the triad owing a share of the required, delivered 400 EMT, (EMT: Equivalent Megatonnage) McNamara chose, (...), that each strategic arm should be capable of accomplishing assured destruction, for a potential, deliverable total of 1200 EMT."* Colin S. Gray, **"Modern Strategy..."**, pp. 342-343.

⁵⁶³ The logic of the Insurgency and COIN activities is not discussed here as it is explained in the previous chapter. For further information see chapter 1.c.

⁵⁶⁴ George C. Herring, **America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam (1950-1975)**, New York: Knopf Press, 1986, p. 56.

⁵⁶⁵ It should be note in that point, that the cost, which affected the withdrawal process was not only the economic aspect. Political costs, which observed in mass demonstration, Washington Papers

traditional conflict would be destructive for them during the Battle of La' Drang on November 1965, the first organized meeting with the American troops. In this conflict, 3561 North Vietnamese died in spite of 305 American deaths.⁵⁶⁶ Based on this experience, they have entered into a traditional conflict only when they believe that it will have a major political influence.

In Vietnam, the guerrilla forces chose not to target the armed forces of South Vietnam, but the government officers, who provides the services and political stability of South Vietnam, when North Vietnamese forces learned that the real struggle was the political space. The government's military response and the fact that the government aimed at the civilian population with the guerrilla who had been mixed up with the people in rural areas, meant that the North's strategy worked. In this direction, the guerrillas, who first formed base areas and then took action, killed 452 village reeves between 1957-1958.⁵⁶⁷ In this period, it was estimated that their forces consisted from 3,000 guerrillas.⁵⁶⁸ In the following years, an average of 4,000 South Vietnamese officers began to be killed annually. And more importantly the formation of South Vietnam's response to the North, increased support to guerrillas. Because in 1961, it is estimated that the power of 3,000 guerrilla rose to 15,000. In 1963, the number of village reeves and officers who were killed exceeded 13,000 person.⁵⁶⁹ When the United States decided to fortification of ground forces into Vietnam, considering that it could not achieve enough results in the air operations, Viet Cong had a guerrilla force of 50,000 to 100,000 militias.⁵⁷⁰ The rise of the power of the Viet Cong had a multiplier effect in the conflicts and reversed the situation against it in the ground confrontations. According to this, there are 13,000 North casualties in 1961, despite the loss of 9,000 South. In 1962, 33,000 North casualties occurred despite 13,000 South casualties. In 1963, 28,000 North casualties occurred despite the loss of 19,000 South. This year the balance has begun to change. In the first half of 1964, the

case and the political pressure of US decision-makers. As a result, to withdrawing US troops from Vietnam became one of the commitments of Nixon in elections (just as Obama).

⁵⁶⁶ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", p. 190.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 189.

⁵⁶⁸ Bernard B. Fall, **Viet Nam Witness (1953-1966)**, New York: Preager Publishers, 1968, p. 239.

⁵⁶⁹ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**" p. 189.

⁵⁷⁰ Bernard B. Fall, op.cit., p. 239.

North lost 9,000 casualties, but the South lost 12,000 and this number increased every year.⁵⁷¹

The increasing influence of the North on the South has also increased US involvement in the region. The US's support for France, which began with financial and technical assistance, continued after the withdrawal of France with the same assistance to South Vietnam. As described above, political result could not be obtained because of the difference between the Northern strategy and target points of US led forces. As a result control and legitimacy of South Vietnam weakened while North Vietnam gained more support and legitimacy. The United States, which reads the process quantitatively over areas such as the mutual dead-wounded numbers and the effect of firepower, has started to increase its engagement in the region by evaluating that mistake is the absence of intense firepower.

In this context, the next step in military engagement was the Rolling Thunder operation, which consisted of air bombings. As part of the Rolling Thunder, 63,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 25,000 sorties in 1965, and the amount and frequency of bombs were increased after the bomb was not brought the political targets. In this context, by 1967, a total of 226,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 108,000 sorties.⁵⁷² In addition, after the Viet Cong guerrillas were hiding in the dense forests of the region, agricultural lands were also the target of air strikes, forests and agricultural lands were poisoned. In this context, only 3,2 million acres of South Vietnam's 32 million cultivated area were poisoned in 1967. As a result of this, 800,000 tons of rice aid was given to Vietnam, a country that exports millions of tons of rice until 1968.⁵⁷³

In spite of the aforementioned U.S. efforts, the bombardment approach, designed through cities and industrial centers, was not very effective in guerrilla-based agriculture-based countries. First of all, the process that started with the shooting of air operations, then the bombing of agricultural lands, and then the poisoning of agricultural lands, was nothing more than producing more guerrillas. On this, North

⁵⁷¹ Robert Taber, **The War of the Flea**, London: Paladin Press, 1970, p. 83.

⁵⁷² John Lewis Gaddis, "Implementing Flexible Response: Vietnam as A Test Case", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations(Seventh Edition)**, edited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Robert J. Art, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2009, p. 242.

⁵⁷³ These gases killed not only nature, but civilians as well. Although it is argued that gas targets only plants and does not affect humans, the rate of death later reached % 90 in children due to gases. Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", p. 200.

Vietnam's ammunition and its transport lines were targeted. One of these attacks was directed towards the Thanh Hoa Bridge, one of the major transport lines in North Vietnam, where it was seen as one of the first examples of how the power could cost counter-power by providing only arms support. Accordingly, in 1965, the United States attacked the bridge with a fleet of 79 aircraft, 46 F-105, 21 F-100, 2 RF-101 and 10 KC-135 tanker aircraft. Although 120 bombs (375 kg each) dropped and 32 missiles were thrown in the attack, they were not able to cause any major damage to the North Vietnam defense based on China and the USSR weapons. In addition, the United States has lost two planes during the attack. A day later, the attack was repeated, but this time 3 planes were shot down.⁵⁷⁴ After similar operations failed to serve the political purpose, the first ground forces were sent to support the Air Force from the ground.

Despite the terrible consequences of the bombings, the United States decided that the responsibility was in the deficiencies of the South Vietnamese troops and brought the military engagement to its final point: they decided to send American troops in large units.

Engagement to Vietnam with ground troops meant opening a black hole for the United States. Vietnam was taking advantage of the logistical facilities of Cambodia, which is covered with forests such as Vietnam, also taking the advantage of implicit foreign support from China.⁵⁷⁵ With this out of country based infrastructure, North Vietnam was able to implement a protracted war strategy. In this context, it was not a big influence to make more US fortification for the Viet Cong troops who had the advantage to attack first and who had been successfully hiding. In this respect, it was clear that the North Vietnamese took lessons from different conflicts, especially China and Algeria, as US, who has the conventional conflict approach, did not take lessons from the previous attempts. The Algerian insurgency, which ended only 10 years ago, was a good example.

In this context, the most important indicator of the Algerian War of Independence was that the absolute success in the military field could not mean anything in a political

⁵⁷⁴ George Friedman, "**Savaşın Geleceği...**", p. 294.

⁵⁷⁵ China, although not directly involved in the Vietnam conflict, as in Korea, provided significant support for the North Vietnamese. Even in the period of the struggle against the French, they gave the artillery batteries used by the Chinese in the Korean war, and with the use of these batteries where the French did not even know it, the North Vietnamese achieved significant military success. For the Chinese support during French colonialism period see, Henry Kissinger, "**Diplomasi...**", p. 609.

sense. Secondly, it would be important to have a significant contribution to foreign countries or 'at the back of beyon areas'. Algerian insurgents' bases in Morocco and Tunisia contributed significantly. Similarly, North Vietnam's bases in China and Cambodia will play a very important role. Another is that winning the civilian population is the basic element, while the oppression is counterproductive. In this respect, the sample villages of the French (and later tried in different regions) were frequently attacked and the strategy of abolishing the villagers was not working. The Americans will make the mistake of the French, and this will backfire.

In this context, a plan called 'strategic hamlets' has tried to implement. This plan, which based on transporting village civilians to new constructed and isolated residential areas and evaluated other rural areas as conflict zones, had successull examples like Britain's Malaya experience and failed examples like French's Algeria experience. In Tanju Akad's expression, "*since we can't get the guerrilla out of the peasants, let's get the peasants out of the guerrillas*", this trial, which was relatively successful in Malaya, failed in Vietnam. Because, US and South Vietnamese troops did not have enough military and social assistance to control these new areas. Thus, those who infiltrated the civilian population have initiated actions in the first trial villages and ensured that they were the targets. The villagers, whose lives deteriorated as well as they were displaced, moved closer to the guerrilla and the project failed after a short time and limited trial. Nevertheless, the rural development programme continued to be an essential element of coin's activities after the political dimension of the conflict was understood.

All these experiences will be the basis of the methods that will be observed by the people who are in the movement of independence and that will lead them to success. For the US, lessons that are not taken will mean more soldiers, more war vehicles, more costs. In this context, the attrition strategy in Vietnam required more engagement and more infantry to be placed in the area, exactly as it was feared for the United States. In 1965, when the American presence was raised from about 20,000 to 184,000, President Johnson declared the necessity of engagement of the United States as "*if we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in (...) American protection*".⁵⁷⁶ As a result, the American presence in

⁵⁷⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "*Soğuk Savaş...*", p. 120.

Vietnam has increased steadily and reached the highest number of 515,000 people in 1968.




Figure 2.2: Number of American Military Personnel in Vietnam per Year⁵⁷⁷

The last and most effective method that the United States tried in this conflict was the integration of special forces into the region with the logic of COIN and the testing of pinpoint operations. Within the program called Phoenix Program, special forces infiltrated the opposing side, then informed the Air Force, so that pinpoint operations were carried out. The North Vietnamese will then expresses this method as “*we never feared a division of troops, but the infiltration a couple of guys into our ranks.*”⁵⁷⁸ However, these elite units, which were few in number, provided support only. A large number of infantry troops were still needed in the face of the forces of North Vietnam, which made its real gain in the political sphere. Nonetheless, the increasing military presence of the US in Vietnam did not bring any results. A bombardment affecting civilians was also made part of the military strategy, as the result of the failure to obtain the desired political result by military units in Vietnam. However, even in areas such as cities where people live together, such bombings did not affect the political will, but on the contrary, they affected them for fighting. Despite the historical examples of Second World War, US continued the same mistake for a short term. In addition to

⁵⁷⁷ Associated Press, **Vietnam: The Real War**, <https://www.ap.org/explore/vietnam-the-real-war/>, accessed on 27.04.2018.

⁵⁷⁸ Max Boot, **Invisible Armies**, New York: Liverlight Publishing, 2013, p. 419.

that, this tactic was meaningless against Vietnamese population which scattered to rural areas.

The Northern construction of the Vietnam War as an prolonged war led to the collapse of the US strategy. With the duration of war which is almost double of American Civil War and massive human losses, it has severely damaged the United States and has caused political costs to be added to military and economic costs. The United States has been subjected to severe criticism not only by the international society but also by the American citizens and has been asked to withdraw from Vietnam.




Figure 2.3: Duration of American Wars Until 1975⁵⁷⁹

In the end, the United States will begin the process of withdrawing without any political consequences at the end of its longest war. After the start of the U.S. withdrawal process, it became clearer. As of the end of 1972, approximately 58,000 dead and 300,000 wounded were lost, and 2226 planes and 7,000 helicopters were also shot down.⁵⁸⁰ In spite of all the investment and other costs incurred beyond these human and economic costs, nothing has been achieved in the political arena. After that date, the U.S. will continue to withdraw its troops in Vietnam, providing only economic assistance and providing training and technical staff support. The U.S.

⁵⁷⁹ It is compiled from COW Project Database.

⁵⁸⁰ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", p. 195.

withdrawal from South Vietnam meant that it was accepted to withdraw entirely from the region. Because, in the period when the US pulled 2 billion dollars in aid to 1 billion dollars, the USSR provided 3 billion dollars in aid to the North.⁵⁸¹ Additionally, North Vietnamese forces maintained the Chinese support on weapons and ammunition.

The effect of the cost of the Vietnam War on the relative power of the United States was to be understood by the 1970s. The United States sends hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops to Vietnam without a political outcome, and China, which created this cost at a very small amount, ameliorated its position. Similarly, since the USSR did not face direct confrontation with the United States, it has obtained the nuclear balance by spending its resources to develop its strategic weapons. USSR also appeared to be a global power by making a breakthrough in its naval power in an area where it had not been very active before. In Vietnam, therefore, the most important reason why the United States not only withdrew but also changed its strategy, was related to the relative power of the US. Because, although the military expenditures of the United States increased by % 300 during the Korean War,⁵⁸² it has not created a significant change in the US's relative power, which comes from the US share of World GDP, which is around 50 percent. However, the Vietnam War presented an opposite picture for US. The United States took a % 39.77 share of world GDP in the period when it was the first engagement to Vietnam.⁵⁸³ However, as of 1973 when the Paris treaty was signed, the US share of the world's GDP fell to % 31.1,⁵⁸⁴ while the increase in military spending to %172,⁵⁸⁵ and that would affect the relative power of the United States. The Vietnam War's effect on the relative power of the United States will be understood by all actors and will suppress the pendulum to reduce costs.

⁵⁸¹ Bruce D. Porter, **The USSR In Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars (1945-1980)**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 22.

⁵⁸² SIPRI, **Military Expenditure Database (1949-2017)**, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, accessed on 30.01.2018.

⁵⁸³ World Bank, **GDP (Current USD)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US-1W&view=chart>, accessed on 30.01.2018.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ SIPRI, op.cit.

In summary, the most important experience of the US in Vietnam is to understand that the rise in costs could create a vicious circle that could prevent political goals. In this context, it is not the failure of the military operations that direct the US to the withdrawal decision, because significant military achievements have been obtained in the operations. Forcing the US to withdraw is a much greater loss in return for the damage given by these achievements. More importantly, it is the perception –or maybe belief-, which is created by North Vietnam forces, that it will not come to an end by killing. This contrast summarizes by Gaddis:

"The bombing was estimated to have done some 600 million dollars worth of damage in the North, but at a cost in lost aircraft alone of 6 billion dollars. %65 of the bombs (...) at a cost of around 2 billion a year. Such strikes, the analysts concluded, probably killed around 100 North Vietnamese or Viet Cong in 1966, but in the process provided 27.000 tons of dud bombs and shells which the enemy could use to make booby traps, which that same year accounted for 1.000 American deaths. But most devastating of all the systems analysts demonstrated in 1968 that despite the presence of 500.000 American troops, despite the expenditure of more bomb tonnage than United States had dropped in all of World War II, despite estimated casualties of up to 140.000 men in 1967, the North Vietnamese could continue to funnel at least 200.000 men a year into South Vietnam indefinitely."⁵⁸⁶

At the end of this process, the United States has experienced the most forcefully what it means to engage in security commitments without reducing the cost of the conflicts. In 1973, it reduced his economic and military share to %30, which was almost %50 in 1945, and entered the process of political-psychological repression called 'Vietnam Syndrome'. Despite this decline, there were agreements US had made during the period. For this reason, it faced similar problems experienced by earlier imperial empires. The United States, which had been engaged in various regions with its armed forces and personnel, continued to undertake the cost. In other words,

"The United States had more than 1.000.000 soldiers in 30 countries, was a member of four regional defense alliances. (...) It had mutual defense treaties with 42 nations (...) and was furnishing military or economic aid to nearly 100 nations across the face of the globe."⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "Implementing Flexible...", p. 257.

⁵⁸⁷ Ronald Steel, **Pax Americana**, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, p. 134. Cited by Paul Kennedy, **"Büyük Güçlerin..."**, p. 463.

Precisely because of this compelling picture, the United States will reverse the use of armed conflicts and will initiate a period called 'proxy wars'. The power that does not take lessons from this new approach this time, will be the USSR. But the overall economic and political erosion of Soviet Union will not allow it to pass through the course only with an 'Afghanistan Syndrome'.



B. Proxy Wars Era: Increased Costs, Transforming Engagements I

Although the post-1972 period displayed a global policy based on the supremacy of the two super powers parallel to the beginning of the Cold War, it also indicates a period in which significant changes had been occurred after 1945. During this period, which shaped with *détente* environment, many system-influencing actors appeared besides two system-dominant power of the bipolar framework. In this context, there have been several factors shaping the post-1972 period. The first one is the rise of Western Europe as a global actor through its economic community model. The second one is the decline of the third world countries and the competition between the two blocs for influencing them. The third one is the rise of Japan in the capitalist model and China in the socialist model. Therefore, the strategic environment is shaped not only through the competition of leaders but also through the approaches of these four main groups.

1. Strategic Environment

The year 1972 is not only important for the United States' decision to withdraw from Vietnam and start engaging in indirect strategies, but also for changes in the strategic environment. In the following year, 1973, when the United States signed a peace treaty with Vietnam, the OPEC crisis that took place would have significant consequences. While the USA was withdrawing from the economic guarantees within the Bretton Woods system during this period, many African and Asian countries have begun to approach to the Eastern Bloc. In addition to these, starting with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, the process of limiting and reducing the number of nuclear weapons had accelerated from 1972 onwards. Finally, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which started in 1973, will signify the institutionalization of the *détente* period. The different reactions of the actors to these processes will be the basic shaping forms of the strategic environment.

First, the role of nuclear weapons as the decisive tools which affect the entire system continued. However, in the decades following the year 1945, the strategic use of these weapons has changed and these weapons have gained a role both in terms of intra-block hegemony and in terms of off-block deterrence. In other words, as Raymond Aron emphasized, nuclear deterrence has become the highest diplomatic strategy.⁵⁸⁸ Besides, various measures have been taken to ensure that nuclear weapons remain 'proprietary' tools for aforementioned diplomatic strategy. The most important of them, the NPT, divided the world into two as 'nuclear powers' and 'non-nuclear powers' as of March 5th of 1970 and created a 'nuclear club' by prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. In addition, through particularly SALT, START, INF and other bilateral and multilateral agreements, it had aimed at the elusion of the cost of nuclear armament in a world of balance of terror.⁵⁸⁹ In summary, in the shadow of nuclear weapons, but within the traditional structure of international relations, the actors have sought to increase their relative power.

The first striking aspect in this structure was visibly increased relative power of USSR at the beginning of the period. As emphasized above, while the US was 'bleeding' in economic and political areas during the Vietnam War, the USSR, which did not engage directly in any major conflict, strengthened its position and made partial adjustments to its economy. In fact, it has become a force that can intervene in remote parts of the world, gain bases, control over the sea routes, and ultimately manage the 'gunboat diplomacy' by making a major leap in the field of Naval Forces, where the United States is the strongest. This advance of the USSR was observed by the decision makers of the United States and sought to prevent it. In this respect, it was observed that the USSR in particular, the Eastern Bloc in general, entered into an important psychological superiority. The statements in the party program of the Communist Party of East Germany confirm this:

⁵⁸⁸ Reed Davis, "An Uncertain Trumpet: Reason, Anarchy and Cold War Diplomacy in the Thought of Raymond Aron", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 645-668. Cited by, İsmail Cem Savaş, "Raymond Aron" in **Savaş Kuramları**, edited by Erhan Büyükakıncı, İstanbul: Adres Yayınları, 2015, p. 347. For original source see, Raymond Aron, **Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations**, London: Weinfeld & Nicolson Publishers, 1966.

⁵⁸⁹ These agreements are examined in the next section, which explains the military background.

“Change in the favor of socialism in the international correlation of powers, (...) the deepening crisis of capitalism, against imperialism (...), national independence movements, all of them have accelerated the revolutionary process in the past 25 years. These developments confirm our firm belief that one day all states on Earth will attain socialism and communism.”⁵⁹⁰

The USSR expanded its power to a wider extent with the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’, which had been developed to intervene in inter-block cases and it established the theoretical basis for the global intervention in socialist countries. In this context, the Doctrine, first mentioned in a newspaper article, in Pravda, by the president of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev in 1968 and later described in the Declaration of the United Labour Party Congress of Poland, was put into practice after this date. According to this doctrine, internal developments in socialist countries are of interest to others and joint interventions to protect the regime are normal. It will intervene with the Soviet army against the activities that ‘were claimed to be destructive’ with the concepts⁵⁹¹ of ‘joint intervention to destructive activities in friendly nations’ and ‘limited sovereignty.’ As a result, USSR will firmly control Warsaw Pact countries with these interventions.⁵⁹² However, these steps taken during the strongest period of the USSR will have very negative consequences for itself in the long term. The first one of these consequences is the emergence of the division with European communism. The other and the most important effect is China's opposition to the hegemonic initiative of the USSR. The importance of this effect stems from the fact that China's opposition was very well understood by the United States and strategic environment could be reversed through this opposition.

Another factor affecting the strategic environment was the decline of the third world states, which gained great influence by the Non-Aligned Movement. The activity of the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN’s sub-organisations such as UNDP and UNCTAD did not provide enough success in ensuring their development. Moreover, in most of these countries, the competition among the groups which fought

⁵⁹⁰ Cited by Michael Ploetz, "Varşova Paktında Düşmanın İmajı ve Kimliği", in **Tarih Boyunca Avrupa'da Savaş ve Barış**, edited by Anja V. Hartman and Beatrice Heuser, translated to Turkish by Onur Atalay, İstanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2006, p. 345.

⁵⁹¹ Stephan G. Glazer, "The Brezhnev Doctrine", **The International Lawyer**, Vol 5 No 1, 1971, pp. 169-179.

⁵⁹² Vladamir Woziuk, "Gorbachev, Reform and the Brezhnev Doctrine", **Comparative Strategy**, Vol 7 No 3, 1988, pp. 213-225.

together during the independence process started and this created instability. But the most important element that prevented these countries from being an system-influencing actor was the 1973 OPEC crisis.⁵⁹³ These states, which are all in the process of development, so as a result which are greatly affected by oil prices, have become directly dependent on the developed countries if they do not have any oil reserves. The other developing countries dependent indirectly⁵⁹⁴ due to the effects of the international economic system.




Figure 2.4: External Debts of Selected Countries in post-1973 Process⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹³ The OPEC crisis was caused by the extraordinary increase in global oil prices following the embargo on the OPEC by Arab states, which could not produce military and diplomatic solutions in the face of the support of the Western states to Israel in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

⁵⁹⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein summarizes the dependency relationship that destroys the Non-Aligned Movement after 1973 and also how the oil-rich countries are indirectly dependent to the Western countries:

"Oil revenues (...) went to the luxury spending of a certain part of OPEC countries from the West, (...) and huge arms spending (...). However, spending in oil-producing states is only a part of this money where it goes. The other large part (...) was going to Western oil companies. And what did they do with their extraordinary profits? In the absence of sufficiently profitable production markets, they transferred a significant portion of this money to the world financial markets and fed the incredible cash-ups and downs of the last two decades. (...) The rest was initially invested in bank accounts in the United States, but also in Europe. (...) And the banks had a huge surplus of deposits. Who could banks lend this money to? The answer seemed clear: to governments struggling with balance of payments difficulties(...) later, these debts helped Western countries and their multinational companies to overcome the impact of the world's inability to import goods from these countries." Immanuel Wallerstein, **Liberalizmden Sonra**, translated to Turkish by Erol Öz, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009, pp. 59-61.

⁵⁹⁵ World Bank, **External Debt Stocks**, Total(DOD, Current US \$), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.CD>, accessed on 11. 06.2018.

As seen in Figure 2.4, many states, including Egypt and Indonesia, two of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, will begin to experience significant economic difficulties. After the impact on their economic independence, these states, especially the sub-Saharan African states with severe economic fragilities, will have to receive support from one of the two blocs. Thus, in the following years after the 1973 crisis, the Non-Aligned Movement will lose its position as the system-influencing actor.

In contrast to the regression of the third world, Western Europe and Japan have succeeded a great improvement with the impact of security guarantees and they have even turned into an economic rival to the United States by the 1970s. The most important indicator of the rapid development under security commitments is the development strike according to their pre-war situation of Germany, Japan and Italy who lost the Second World War. According to this, Germany's GDP in 1946 was below the level in 1938.⁵⁹⁶ Japan's level was equal to 57% of the level in 1936 while the real wages in the production sector fell to 30%. Exports were equal to 8% and imports were 18% of the level in 1936.⁵⁹⁷ Italy, on the other hand, was also in very bad situation even though it had changed its camp after Mussolini's overthrown in 1943 and started the recovery process earlier. Italy's GDP fell to the level in 1911. According to the pre-war situation, the economy shrank by 40%. The wages in Italy in 1945 were reduced to 26.7% of the 1913 value.⁵⁹⁸ In 1974, however, there was a significant change in the table.

⁵⁹⁶ David S. Landes, **The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in the Western Europe from 1750 to Present**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 488.

⁵⁹⁷ Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin...", p. 435.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 436.

	1960	1963	1966	1970	1974
GDP (Current US \$) as Billion \$⁵⁹⁹					
<i>USA</i>	543	638	815	1076	1549
<i>Germany</i>				215	443
<i>Japan</i>	44	69	105	212	479
<i>France</i>	62	85	110	148	285
<i>United Kingdom</i>	72	85	107	130	206
GDP Per Capita (Current US \$)⁶⁰⁰					
<i>USA</i>	3007	3374	4146	5246	7242
<i>Germany</i>				2750	5617
<i>Japan</i>	478	717	1058	2037	4353
<i>France</i>	1338	1752	2189	2853	5299
<i>United Kingdom</i>	1380	1592	1959	2347	3665
Share of Global Exports of Goods and Services (%)⁶⁰¹					
<i>USA</i>	17	16,3	16	15,5	12,9
<i>Germany</i>				8,3	8,4
<i>Japan</i>	3	3,3	4,4	5,7	6,4
<i>France</i>	5,7	5,6	5,8	6,1	6
<i>United Kingdom</i>	9,3	8,6	8	7,2	5,5

Table 2.4: Change in World Shares of US and Selected Western Bloc Countries

In addition to the rise of the above-listed actors, China has succeeded in consolidating its power into a system-influencing power. The United States, which has been declining in the face of all these elements, has succeeded in integrating the rise of these actors into the Cold War competition beyond perceiving them as a threat and has changed the strategic environment in its favor after a while. Its success will bring the success of the containment, which is its long-term political goal, and it will play an important role in the dissolution process of the USSR.

Apart from the geopolitical elements in point, the strategy was another reason behind the United States' u-turn of direct interventions. Because, direct interventions

⁵⁹⁹ World Bank, **GDP (Current US \$)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1977&locations=GB-FR&start=1960&view=chart>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

⁶⁰⁰ World Bank, **GDP Per Capita (Current US \$)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

⁶⁰¹ World Bank, **Exports of Goods and Services (Current US \$)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD?end=1974&locations=1W-GB-FR&start=1960&view=chart>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

were designed for short-term operations which targets to build new governments. In this context, while eliminating the enemy by conducting military operations, supporting the new government economically and politically constituted the basic policy. However, political and economic support was not able to fulfil the same function in third world countries. Kissinger compares this with the European case:

“Besides this, as the containment policy migrated into the fringes of Asia, it encountered conditions quite opposite of those in Europe. The Marshall Plan and NATO succeeded because a political tradition of government remained in Europe, even if impaired. Economic recovery could restore political vitality. But in much of the underdeveloped world, the political framework was fragile or new, and economic aid led to corruption as frequently as to stability.”⁶⁰²

The experience that Kissinger wrote about will be an important problem even in post-Cold War period and it will become an important cause of the emergence of warlords in many countries. However, during the Cold War period, due to this experience, the first thing to be done was to deploy military units until the establishment of economic aid and political stability. Once the cost of this has been understood in Vietnam, preventing the region from Soviet effect would be the focus point. In this context, political stability and economic development would be the secondary priorities. The emergence of only military support without giving importance to the political structure in the period of proxy wars will lead to the emergence of very problematic practices in these regions and the association of United States as the country that supports those groups. This will be an element that undermines the soft power of the United States in proxy war period.

When it was evaluated by the US perspective in the early 1970s, the USSR was more advantageous, the US has reduced its relative position, while the other syystem-influencing powers strengthened their relative position in the light of security guarantees. Moreover, they were tended to behave independently. The Non-Aligned powers were focused on their economic development and foreign policy independence, as unaware of the impact of the appearing global economic turmoil. The United States, which analyses this strategic environment better, will assess the inter-bloc differences and by benefiting from these differences, it will focus on the balance

⁶⁰² Henry Kissinger, **Dünya Düzeni**, translated to Turkish by Sinem Sultan Gül, İstanbul: Boyner Yayınları, 2016, p. 323.

of power policy instead of confronting directly with the USSR. It will make important attempts both to divide the bloc and create different attractions for the groups within the blocs. Thus, US will terminate the Cold War as the survivor, which it reversed its declined position since 1970s. Kissinger outlines the starting point of the US analysis:

“Even without this purgatory,⁶⁰³ a major reassessment of American foreign policy would have been in order, for the age of America’s nearly total dominance of the world stage was drawing to a close. America’s nuclear superiority was eroding, and its economic supremacy was being challenged by the dynamic growth of Europe and Japan, both of which had been restored by American resources and sheltered by American security guarantees.”⁶⁰⁴

The Nixon government, which tried to bring US approach from ideological polarization to détente in order to practice the aforementioned strategy, attempted to cooperate with socialist countries with ‘national interest’ understanding. According to this, cooperation with China based on national interests would create a unique opportunity for the USSR to be balanced. This balance of power policy meant abandoning interests in Vietnam and not intervening outside the strategic regions. This approach, which also meant abandoning the domino theory, was also supported by an background which assumes that communist block will create its clusters if there won’t be an outsider interference.⁶⁰⁵ Nixon summarized this approach in his speech:

“We will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations pursuing their own interests as they perceive these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we see them. We will judge them by their actions as we expect to be judged by our own. Specific agreements, and the structure of peace they help build, will come from a realistic accomodation of conflicting interests.”⁶⁰⁶

This policy, shaped by Kissinger, was clearly declared by Nixon and the United States created its first strategic axis in the Eastern bloc through China. In this context, Nixon has openly expressed his attitude towards China in an article published in Foreign Affairs just in 1967:

⁶⁰³ Vietnam

⁶⁰⁴ Henry Kissinger, “Diplomasi...”, p. 681.

⁶⁰⁵ John Kenneth Galbright, **The New Industrial State**, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Press, 1967. Cited by Henry Kissinger, “Diplomasi...”, p. 687.

⁶⁰⁶ Cited by Ibid, p. 690.

“Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations. (...) There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”⁶⁰⁷

Through this approach, an unified Eastern bloc based on the USSR-China alliance was tried to be interrupted and it was succeeded. In fact, both in the border dispute and in the case of Cambodia, China and the USSR will confront. Thus, at the end of the first half of the 1970s, the US managed to create a balance in the geopolitical environment in which it had been disadvantageous and left the USSR with a two-sided challenge. One side of these will be NATO and the other side will be the China. This balancing will be taken one step beyond in Europe. Through the political gravity created on the Eastern Bloc countries, a process will be initiated that will accelerate the collapse of the USSR.

Within this context, the United States has not opposed, but even supported, the rise of Western Europe towards its potential of economic and political challenge against Eastern Bloc. As a result, Western part of Europe became a center of attraction for Eastern part, whose economic situation was deteriorating and the political mechanisms were unfunctional as Hungary, Prague and Poland interventions revealed.

Western Europe, which was creating its independent political organization apart from US, through the process from European Economic Community (EEC) to European Communities (EC), was becoming a model by its economic prosperity, life style, and political life based on human rights and freedoms, was ready to make its foreign policy move towards USSR. The ‘Ostpolitik’ initiative, started by German Chancellor Willy Brandt, was the first of these. Thus, the idea of an independent Europe from the two blocs began to emerge. And the emergence will open the way to CSCE-OSCE, which would be the primary mechanism of détente in Europe. Thus, the Helsinki negotiations, which started in 1973, evolved into the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in 1975. In addition to its significant contribution to peace in Europe, the CSCE has made easier for the forces to shift their weights to non-European areas. Besides, an important side effect for the USSR as a model with deteriorating economy and non-democratic regime has been the difficulty of keeping the Eastern European states in their own bloc, which are attracted to Western Europe through the channels of CSCE.

⁶⁰⁷ Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 46 No 1, 1967, p. 121.

Helsinki Final Act is considered as the peak of détente period that manages to set the rules of ongoing process in various areas. In Helsinki conference, rules to determine the European security system to overcoming the disagreements between the two blocs and the relations among the European states have been codified.⁶⁰⁸ In other words, a new ground has been built for competition and cooperation to operate independently of the competition between blocs. In this context, the Final Act consisted of three ‘baskets’: the first one, security, to regulate the confidence-building measures and the aspects of disarmament. The second, the basket on economy, science, technology and environmental issues, aims to strengthen cooperation. The third basket, human rights, focused on the coordination of human rights efforts. In this context, an improvement under the control of the CSCE has been the ‘Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)’.⁶⁰⁹

Among the three baskets of détente, the first one is mostly attached by the USSR and the third one by the United States. In this context, it was calculated by Soviet decision makers that the reduction in arsenals and the taking of security measures would enable to reduce Soviet spendings and shift its weight to other parts of the world. In addition, the leaders of the USSR thought they had achieved what they wanted in the CSCE. This was the acceptance of the European borders, in other words, the territorial map of post-Second World War Europe in its current form.⁶¹⁰ In addition, balancing of conventional forces with CFE could shift the weight of the military forces to other regions. For this reason, as many have criticized, this situation seemed to be a development that significantly strengthened the relative position of the Soviet Union.

However, the United States had established its strategy on the deep fragilities in the socio-economic structure of the USSR. The US assumed that initiating social channels and the emergence of human rights in the continent would lead to significant problems in the USSR. US also expected that Soviet economy and life style were lagging behind due to economic problems. The US approach, which sees détente as a strategic move through the third basket, is summarized in Kissinger's words:

⁶⁰⁸ John Borawski, “The OSCE: In Search of Cooperative Security”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol 27 No 4, 1996, p. 404.

⁶⁰⁹ OSCE, *History*, <https://www.osce.org/history>, accessed on 22.03.2018.

⁶¹⁰ J.M. Roberts, *Avrupa Tarihi*, translated to Turkish by Fethi Aytuna, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi Yayınları, 2010, p. 730.

“Soviet strength is uneven; the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system are glaring and have been clearly documented. Despite the inevitable increase in its power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any overall assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be reckless in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. And Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences and attractions of the outside world or impervious to the need for external contacts.”⁶¹¹

The interaction in the framework of the CSCE regime in Europe made a great impact on the reform demands of the Eastern Bloc countries, while the growing containment to USSR made an impact on their mistake like to make a direct intervention to Afghanistan. The direct intervention in Afghanistan⁶¹² has resulted in more severe consequences for the USSR than the US intervention in Vietnam. Because USSR economy was not able to respond to such rapid changes due to its economic structure and as a result its foreign resources have declined in a short time. Due to these structural problems of USSR, the measures taken by Michael Gorbachev will accelerate the dissolution rather than produce solutions.

In this context, Gorbachev assessed that the problems of the USSR were basically two-sided. The first was the constant deprivation of resources due to the fact that they were transferred to security spending in a very large scale and that it was a great inconvenience to the public. The second was the constant possibility of a social explosion because of the elimination of the mechanisms which enable the expression of these disorders and creation of solutions to them. Moreover, they were creating a vicious circle in connection with each other. The risk of social explosion increased security spending and security approaches continued the repressive regime based on a single party imposition. In the light of these factors, Gorbachev tried a ‘liberal solution’ by also opening the way for democratic demands in a transition process that started with regulations in the economy. In this context, he tried to restore the state through two well-known concepts.⁶¹³ But the process began to get out of control due to the simultaneous attempt to do both and the combination of individual and group demands with ethnic and national demands - a factor that he could not foresee.

⁶¹¹ Henry Kissinger, “Diplomasi...”, p. 725.

⁶¹² Intervention, its costs and effects are examined in 2.B.3 section.

⁶¹³ These concepts are ‘glasnost’ which refers to transparency and ‘perestroika’ which refers to reconstruction.

As a result of all this, the USSR has lost its economic and political ability to implement Brezhnev Doctrine against the demands of the Eastern Bloc countries. In this context, the inadequacy of the USSR has revealed by its response in Poland between 1980 and 1981, just before a decade from the end of Cold War. While a trade union movement called 'Solidarity' which is not under the control of the USSR increased its power in Poland, the USSR didn't implement Brezhnev doctrine and didn't send troops to Poland. The reasons for the Soviet Politburo not sending troops show that the issue is perceived by the relative power. According to this, the President of the KGB, Andropov said: *"If the capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Union (...) that will be very burdensome for us."*⁶¹⁴ Suslov, the USSR's leading ideologist, said that sending troops to Poland would be a 'disaster'.⁶¹⁵ In summary, the USSR, which entered into the 1970s with a significant increase in its relative power, did not hesitate its hard power in its area of influence like East Berlin, Prag, Budapest, experienced a significant decline in 10 years. Meanwhile the United States changed its strategic environment successfully and experienced a significant improvement. Through observing these, the United States has deepened the USSR's vulnerability and problems especially by increasing the amount of support for military expenditures and proxy wars over the last decade. As a result of all this, the USSR will dissolve and the United States will remain the only superpower.

The most important impact of relative power on the strategic environment has emerged in the last two decades of the Cold War. In this context, the USSR, as a country which was economically successful in the early 1970s, which had achieved a significant income surplus with the increasing oil prices following the 1973 crisis and which brought or was ambitious to bring the socialist groups to power in many third world countries, did not engage directly to conflicts. As a result, the US defense budget was cut in half due to the various reasons, especially the Vietnam failure of the United States. However, in the same period, it was important for the USSR to keep the percentage of military spending constant compared to its GDP and even to decrease

⁶¹⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, **The Polish Revolution: Solidarity**, London: Granta Press, 1991, pp. 95-96. Cited by John Lewis Gaddis, *"Soğuk Savaş..."*, p. 191.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid, p. 234.

the percentage against its increasing GDP.⁶¹⁶ Kissinger summarizes this change in relative power:

“Our relative position was bound to decline as the USSR recovered from World War II. Our military and diplomatic position was never more favorable than at the very beginning of the containment policy in the late 1940s.”⁶¹⁷

However, the structural problems of Soviet economy have caused this superiority to be short lived. As oil revenues could not be efficiently assessed due to the planned structure of the Soviet economy and the fact that “*arming like addicts*,”⁶¹⁸ as Georgy Arbatov stated, one of the most senior advisors of the USSR, had started to create a huge burden on the USSR. In this context, although the total GDP is one-sixth of the US economy, the fact that they spent three times more than the US expenditure⁶¹⁹ on its defense, was the most important reason.

In this background, the recovery of the American economy after the mid-1970s, at the same time the decline in the Soviet economy, combined with the economic development of Japan and the EC, further exacerbated the pressure on the USSR. In order to increase this pressure, the United States has started expensive defense initiatives during the Reagan period and has aggravated the burden on the USSR. In parallel, the fact that the USSR engaged directly to Afghanistan, not indirectly as they were doing before except the Eastern Bloc countries, created the same lessons which US learned in Vietnam. As a result, this time the USSR was the actor which entered a prolonged war and the cost of this conflict had a significant impact on its dissolution process.

As understood from the period outlined above, the term that started after 1972 and continues until the end of 1991 is based on reducing the costs globally and placing its ‘proxy power’ at regional level. In this respect, the military background has been the main element that shapes the two-sided process. For this reason, it would be useful to examine this area in order to integrate the strategic environment.

⁶¹⁶ Aaron L. Friedberg, **In the Shadow of Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 82-83.

⁶¹⁷ Henry Kissinger, **White House Years**, Boston: Little&Brown Publishing, 1979, p. 62. Cited by John Lewis Gaddis, “**Soğuk Savaş...**”, p. 185.

⁶¹⁸ Georgi Arbatov, **The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics**, New York: random House, 1992, p. 206.

⁶¹⁹ IISS, **Military Balance 1979-1980**, London: IISS Publishing House, p. 9.

2. Military Background and Its Effects on Costs

The military background of the post-1972 period was shaped by two aspects. The first is to maintain the strategic use of nuclear weapons and to regulate the nuclear balance. The second is the expansion of non-conventional conflicts and the emergence of the phenomenon of proxy war, which is the strategic use of this new type of war. The decisive element what was determined the future of both aspects is the decision of the United States to retreat after large costs in Vietnam.

The most remarkable example of how the United States approached costs after Vietnam emerged when it failed to defeat North Vietnam, and it was unable to use even the source to protect the South. In this context, the resources allocated to protect the South Vietnamese regime and the 6,000 US troops in this country were greatly cut after 1972. Accordingly, financial support was reduced by 50% to 2.5 billion dollars as of 1973, to 1.4 billion dollars in 1974, and to 700 million dollars in 1975.⁶²⁰ According to some discussions made and revealed by Kissinger during this period, even small amounts of budgets have not been approved, even for the progressive rescue operations and protection support package, from the moment when protection cannot be done:

“-Ron Nessen (Presidential Spokesman Of The Period): Well, I think the most difficult thing to overcome is the desire of the American soldiers to return there again. (...) And for the money (...) that you should explain about money is (...)”

-Henry Kissinger: What I'm going to do about money is to explain this: Whatever you think about Vietnam (...) you should demand for the same amount. Because unless you have something to help you get out of there, you can't leave now.”⁶²¹

“-George Mahon (Chairman Of The Committee Of Appropriations): In an additional budget we will try to prevent Vietnam from being considered in any way. (...)”

-Henry Kissinger: Not even 300 million?”⁶²²

“-Scrowcroft: They offer 200 million dollars for humanitarian aid (...)”

-Henry Kissinger: All right, we lost Indochina, but we're gonna make it pay. In all my testimony today, I said twenty five times that's the Congress's fault.”⁶²³

⁶²⁰ Henry Kissinger, **Kriz: İki Büyük Dış Politika Krizinin Anatomisi**, çeviri Beyza Sümer Aydaş, Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2004, pp. 374-375.

⁶²¹ Ibid, p. 400.

⁶²² Ibid, p. 414.

⁶²³ Ibid, pp. 416-417.

In the light of US experience of Vietnam, there will be a significant change in the tendency to intervene directly. However, the process of nuclear disarmament will continue. There are two reasons for this. The first is that in the event of a possible escalation, there is a theoretical possibility that two superpowers or two blocks will come across. The second is that, as mentioned above, nuclear weapons are transformed into a top-level diplomatic instrument.

Year	USA	USSR	UK	France	China	Total
1973	28335	15915	275	116	150	44791
1974	28170	17385	325	145	170	46195
1975	27052	19055	350	188	185	46830
1976	25956	21205	350	212	190	47913
1977	25099	23044	350	228	200	48921
1978	24243	25393	350	235	220	50441
1979	24107	27935	350	235	235	52862
1980	23764	30062	350	250	280	54706
1981	23031	32049	350	274	330	56034
1982	22937	33952	335	274	360	57858
1983	23154	35804	320	279	380	59937
1984	23228	37431	270	280	415	61624
1985	23135	39197	300	360	425	63417
1986	23254	40723	300	355	425	65057
1987	23490	38859	300	420	415	63484
1988	23077	37333	300	410	430	61550
1989	22174	35805	300	410	430	59124

Table 2.5: Nuclear Stockpiles (1945-1972)⁶²⁴

The mutual existence of nuclear weapons has formed an approach that “*simultaneously both endanger and enable the strategy function.*”⁶²⁵ Therefore, strategic regulations are based on two simultaneous processes. The first was to prevent both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation⁶²⁶ by arrangements such as NPT, SALT, INF, START. The second is the implementation of a ‘flexible’ strategy that requires a different engagement in each of the escalation phases, taking into account the escalation potential continuously.

⁶²⁴ Colin S. Gray, “**War, Peace and...**”, p. 212.

⁶²⁵ Colin s. Gray, **The Future of Strategy**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015, p. 101.

⁶²⁶ Horizontal nuclear proliferation is the increase in the number of nuclear states. Vertical nuclear proliferation is the increase in the number of nuclear warheads and systems.

The first regulation in this context was NPT. The road to this treaty is also an important process that demonstrates how nuclear weapons are strategically assessed and how changes in this field are reflected in the military background.

In the period of nuclear monopoly, the United States was defending the complete cessation of nuclear weapons production. It was emphasized that the destruction of nuclear weapons should no longer be produced and should be used only for peaceful purposes. However, after the USSR made its first atomic bomb in 1949 and produced its first hydrogen bomb in 1953, the US changed its strategy. In 1953, US President Eisenhower proposed an International Atomic Energy Agency with his *Atoms For Peace* speech. In 1954, the so-called safeguard system began negotiations with eight uranium-producing countries.⁶²⁷ It was based on an international mechanism for the safety of the raw material. In 1957, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was established. The launch of Sputnik⁶²⁸ in 1957 has once again opened the way for multilateral negotiations by changing balances. In 1958, Irish resolution outlines the NPT: in order to prevent 'nuclear anarchy',⁶²⁹ nuclear countries (group 1) and non-nuclear countries (group 2) were discriminated.⁶³⁰ It was banned for producing nuclear weapon for non-nuclear powers and nuclear countries were obliged not to transfer technology. At the end of the whole process, the treaty was opened to signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The treaty prevented the entry into nuclear balance of new variables.⁶³¹

The most important arrangements made within the existing variables were the restrictions and force reduction initiatives made in the sense of both nuclear and conventional weapons. The first of these initiatives is Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT), an effort to reach an reconciliation on the control of strategic nuclear weapons, launch systems and related systems between the US and the USSR.

⁶²⁷ The number of negotiators will rise to 12 before and to 18 in the following years.

⁶²⁸ The practical use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) has been opened with the USSR placing a satellite called Sputnik into the earth's orbit.

⁶²⁹ Jayantha Dhanapala, "The Management of NPT Diplomacy", *Deadalus*, Vol 139 No 1, 2010, p. 61.

⁶³⁰ India, Pakistan, which was advanced in their efforts to produce nuclear weapons at the time of signing the treaty, and also Israel, did not sign the treaty. North Korea signed the treaty in 1985, but will withdraw in 2003.

⁶³¹ According to the treaty, the first group has committed not to transfer nuclear technology. (Article 1). The second group committed not to take it (Article 2). It is also agreed that all facilities will be provided to IAEA auditors (article 3). Scientific production and Exchange are accepted on the condition of accepting inspection (article 4).

In this context, the first negotiations began in Helsinki in 1969. At this point, although the agreement was reached between 1969-1972 on anti-missile arms systems and launch systems, the agreement was not reached on multi-headed missile systems. After that, in 1973, the summit meeting between Brejnev and Nixon was held. According to the agreement signed in 1979, it was observed that a ceiling would be placed on aggressive strategic weapons, a control of the development of qualifications in the arms stores, and, in the end, a reduction of the strategic weapons.⁶³² However, the SALT II agreement was proposed to the US Congress for ratification, but US President Carter removed the treaty from the Senate consideration due to the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan, as well as various interventions in Asia and Africa. Although SALT II did not enter into force, it contributed by opening the way to the Agreement on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

During the Reagan period, negotiations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) began in Geneva in 1982, especially under the influence of NATO's European allies.⁶³³ In this context, the USSR has withdrawn from talks because of the US efforts for developing missile systems with guided missiles such as Cruise and Pershing and because of US initiatives such as Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The negotiations started again in 1985, and started to come to fruition in 1987. In 1987, both parties agreed to remove all of intermediate-range nuclear weapons with INF treaty. This meant the abolition of missiles in Europe. This also meant that the most important obstacle in front of the start had to be lifted. During the Gorbachev period, the USSR softened towards the SDI and START I could finally signed by Bush and Gorbachev in 1991.⁶³⁴

The most important arrangement for conventional weapons was the CFE. As mentioned above, the MBFR began in Vienna in 1973 (except France and Iceland), and all NATO and Warsaw Pact member states joined. It lasted until 1988 and as a result of these negotiations the CFE was signed in 1990 (it will enter into force in 1992). CFE has become one of the important pillars of European security architecture,

⁶³² The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks", **Encyclopedia Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Strategic-Arms-Limitation-Talks>, accessed on 10.03.2018.

⁶³³ Jeffrey Porro, "More Stops than STARTS: Reagan's Arms Control Policy", **Harvard International Review**, Vol 6 No 5, 1984, pp. 21-22.

⁶³⁴ US Department Of State, **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 1991 and 1993**, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/104210.htm>, accessed on 10.03.2018.

anticipating the mutual reduction of all conventional forces. CFE includes conventional forces in five categories as tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, warplanes and attack helicopters. Accordingly, the Treaty puts limitations for each category.⁶³⁵

This new approach on nuclear and conventional forces is not explained only by the balance of terror or the changing characteristics of armed conflicts. Another important reason for this was the remarkable technological shifts of the period. The starting point for this change can be found in the previous period, 1957.

The USSR's ability to put Sputnik on earth's orbit in 1957, fundamentally changed the transmission infrastructure of nuclear weapons. A satellite placed on orbit was the precursor of a missile that could be placed on orbit, and it soon became apparent that ICBMs had started to be produced. Therefore, the possibility of being hit by these missiles, has increased the importance of Europe for the USA again. Because, in order to respond a possible ICBM attack, US has begun to fill the USSR's perimeter with intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).⁶³⁶

The other importance of Europe was to make the first strike with the IRBMs in advance with air intelligence and to start the conflict here, and the U-2 case⁶³⁷ was meaningful in this respect. In this context, the possibility that the war would spread on European territory rather than U.S. territory, brought about the concept of 'limited nuclear war'. However, this situation has been met with suspicion and concern in most European states. With the possibility of limiting war in Europe, many European countries didn't request IRBMs on their territory, and, if nuclear weapons are deployed

⁶³⁵ TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, **Silahların Kontrolü ve Silahsızlanma**, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/silahlarin-kontrolu-ve-silahsizlanma.tr.mfa>, accessed on 10.03.2018.

⁶³⁶ John S. Duffield, "The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response: A Reinterpretation", **Security Studies**, Vol 1 No 1, 1991, p. 135.

⁶³⁷ The United States has developed U-2s, intelligence aircraft flying from NATO bases around USSR and flying far beyond the range of warplanes and anti-aircraft. The aim was to monitor and photograph nuclear-based military activities by flying over the USSR. These activities were carried out by operation of the CIA, and the bases used were located in England, Germany, Turkey and Japan. In 1960, world learned this activity by the shot down of a plane at the USSR soil. The United States declared that the plane was a meteorological survey aircraft. But when the U.S. declared that, it was assumed that the pilot had died or not spoken. However, the pilot spoke, accepted that he was working for the CIA, tracking the USSR since 1956, and flight over USSR many times with using İncirlik base of Turkey. On top of that, Krushev declared that USSR would respond to any attack with guided missiles and that not only the attacker, but also those who opened the base would be shot. On the other hand, the US government accepted the truth and Turkey stated that it would not be held responsible for the flight of the plane from Pesaver to Norway.

to their territories, they demand the right to use this weapon at any time. Because of the lack of consensus on these issues, (and with consideration of US approach in Cuban Missile Crisis) France has been directed to pursue a NATO-independent defence policy.

As a result of this, the answer to the question how to defence in 'concrete sense', began to be given in the form of a conventional weapons and a flexible form. This transition, which will later find its value in the doctrine of 'flexible response', began to be loudly voiced from the 1960s. In this context, Liddell Hart, accepted as one of the most prominent strategists in Europe and the world, emphasized that it would be impossible to defend with a strategy based on nuclear weapons only, in the early 1960s.⁶³⁸ Hart argued that concepts such as 'absolute war' or 'winning nuclear war' became meaningless because of the balance of terror.⁶³⁹ So that nuclear weapons could be only a 'deterrence element' from this date onwards, thus defense should still be done with traditional weapons.⁶⁴⁰

On this basis, NATO developed the flexible response strategy. Parallel the US improvement on ICBMs, both sides became able to throw these bombs from their submarines. As a result, the two sides became able to hit the other party out of their own territory. The balance of terror in this direction has pushed the United States into a strategy to escalate a possible war on European soil and to resort to nuclear weapons as a ultimate step. The first phase of the defense was the traditional weapons and small-caliber nuclear weapons, followed by a time - to-bargaining period, and ultimately a nuclear war.⁶⁴¹ The political consequences of this situation were clear: Europe had increased bargaining power against the United States. Both the great risk it took and the difficulty of relying on traditional forces during the bargaining process (and the difficulty/expense of having a large number of soldiers) gave European countries political power.

⁶³⁸ B.H. Liddell Hart, **Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look At the West's Military Position**, London: Frederick Praeger Press, 1960.

⁶³⁹ Hedley Bull, "Review: Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position by B.H.Liddell Hart", **International Affairs**, Vol 37 No 2, pp. 211-212.

⁶⁴⁰ Herman Kahn, "Review: Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position by B.H.Liddell Hart", **The Journal of Politics**, Vol 23 No 2, pp. 372-374.

⁶⁴¹ Oral Sander, "**Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...**", pp. 326-328.

The second aspect of the background of post 1972 period was the effects of unconventional conflicts and their strategic use. The emerging structure was actually seen before the US experience in Vietnam and warned that preparations should be made on this issue. In this context, the 'limited war' approach developed by Robert E. Osgood had put forward its predecessors as early as 1956, by his book. Accordingly, since there would not be a 'general war' between the great powers (defined in book through the US, USSR and China), a limited war necessitating the use of minimum resources to take only those targets was considered.⁶⁴² However, it took 15 more years to understand his emphasis. 15 years later, the change will be rewarded in the Nixon Doctrine.

In this context, it can be said that the transformation in the U.S. military approach after Vietnam found its expression in the Nixon Doctrine. This doctrine was based on three pillars. The first one was that the United States would adhere to its obligations. The second was the announcement that the nuclear power would remain on the basis of deterrence diplomacy:

"If a nuclear power threatens the freedom of our allies or a country where we consider its survival vital to our security, US will provide a shield."

The third column was the area where the transformation occurred in means of engagements. This column outlined the basic policy that determined the appearance the proxy wars as the prominent form of armed conflicts:

"In cases involving non-nuclear attacks, the United States expects the country directly threatened to assume the responsibility to provide the human power necessary to defend itself."⁶⁴³

In this last column, the U.S. declared that it could transfer funds and technology to the ongoing conflict in third world countries, but that it would not be engaged in the ground war, regardless of its outcome.⁶⁴⁴ The third column of the Nixon Doctrine,

⁶⁴² Robert E. Osgood, **Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy**, 1956, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Cited by, Hew Strachan, "Strategy and the Limitation of War", **Survival**, 2008, Vol.50 No.1, pp. 31-54.

⁶⁴³ US Department of State, "Foundations of foreign Policy (1969-1972)", **House of Historians**, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d29>, accessed on 30.05.2018.

⁶⁴⁴ Nixon's words on this subject are meaningful: *"United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."* For the

although elongated with the Carter Doctrine after the Iranian Islamic Revolution and more aggressive rhetoric throughout the Reagan period, remained largely intact.

Given the fact that the USSR was already engaged in this policy since 1950s,⁶⁴⁵ the strategic background needed to carry out proxy wars was constituted. The military presence of the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s included formal support to the USSR allied countries which had come to power, as well as the transfer of weapons and resources to the guerrilla forces, which is fighting for overthrow their governments. In this regard, USSR supported NSAs with the light arms and surveillance systems, while it supported conventional powers in the more advanced systems. In this context, the Soviet military presence in Egypt, a total of almost 21,000 military personnel, which includes 12,000 air defence personnel and more than 200 pilots,⁶⁴⁶ stands out as an important example. These defense systems will play an important role in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In addition, during the Reagan period, nuclear weapons were almost completely excluded from the military strategy and the weight was shifted to other areas. This approach, expressed by Reagan as “*a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought*”,⁶⁴⁷ has brought military spending back to a rising trend. In this context, the post-1972 proxy wars, unlike previous non-conventional conflicts, began to be built on new and cheap equipments, which targets traditional warfare equipment, whose costs are constantly increasing. In this context, to make a comparison, the effect of the previous period in examples such as Algeria, China or Cuba was provided by the military and political erosion of the other party in the prolonged war approach. Instead, with a process that started with development of antitank missiles in the new period, traditional weapons could targeted, aimed economic cost could be created easily and much shorter time. Therefore, the actors who have been fighting long-term with their own facilities have been replaced by the more organized forces that respond with new weapons they have obtained from the ‘sponsor great power.’

speech, see, NY Times, **The Nixon Doctrine**, 19.02.1970, <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/02/19/archives/the-nixon-doctrine.html>, accessed on 30.05.2018.

⁶⁴⁵ It refers to defense systems and military personnel network that it has established in many countries.

⁶⁴⁶ John S. Hopkins, **Anatomy of A Failure: Soviet Military Assistance To Egypt**, 1978, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a066234.pdf>, accessed on 22.04.2018.

⁶⁴⁷ For Reagan's speech, see, The Reagan Vision, **Ronald Reagan 1984 State of Union Address**, 1984, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-gzg9TMSBBk>, accessed on 12.07.2018.

The first implementation of this approach was observed in a traditional war, in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶⁴⁸ In this context, it is necessary to mention how the cost of tanks increases and how missiles create a cost difference. First, tanks emerged as an armored transport vehicle to overcome the problems posed by the trenches, and then began to have a wider arsenal, more effective weapons and thicker armor with the addition and increase of firepower. In this context, the firepower consisted of putting rifles into the tanks, and over time, small cannonballs were put in and armor was added to protect from other cannons. As a result, the process started with 35 mm balls, reaching to 90 mm balls at the end of Second World War. By the 1970s, 105-110 mm balls were used.⁶⁴⁹ Similarly, the armor has become thickened. In the 1940s, the armor in the range of 10-15 mm reached 100 mm at the end of the war. As a result, tanks weighing more than 60 tons were produced in the 1970s. This process has dramatically increased the cost of tanks. In other words, *“increased weight meant larger engines consuming more fuel; heavier armor meant more steel; larger guns meant more metal and explosives.”*⁶⁵⁰ Although several studies have been carried out to reduce the cost of tanks,⁶⁵¹ the pressure of tank production on the cost has increased steadily.

Developed in parallel with this period, anti-tank missiles uncovered a serious gap in the cost context. Similar to tanks, the anti-tank missiles has reached today's use as a result of an inverted evolution. With the 1970s, the tanks were able to stay away from the tanks, but also able to target the tanks. In order to understand the difference between the production cost of tanks and the anti-tank missiles, it would be sufficient to exemplify with an contemporary case. According that case, the cost of the T-90 tank used by Russian army in Syria is 8.58 million dollars,⁶⁵² while the cost of the US-oriented TOW missile, which hit this tank by rebels is 60.000 dollars.⁶⁵³

⁶⁴⁸ The conflict is examined in following section.

⁶⁴⁹ ArmedForces.eu, **Tanks Index**, http://armedforces.eu/land_forces/tanks, accessed on 25.12.2017. Today, the US Abrahams tank includes 120 mm, Russia's T90, China's Type 99 and Iran's Zulfiqar tanks include 125 mm balls.

⁶⁵⁰ George Friedman, *“Savaşın Geleceği...”*, p. 163.

⁶⁵¹ For example, British Lieutenant Colonel Whittaker, who worked to cut costs on armor, kept statistics on the most hit areas of tanks and ensured that the most hit areas were found. In parallel, 60 degree frontal areas of tanks thickened their armour, while thinning in some less hit areas was done. T.W. Terry et al. **Fighting Vehicles**, London: Brassey's Press (Macmillan Publishing), 1991, p. 125.

⁶⁵² ArmedForces.eu, **T-90**, http://armedforces.eu/land_forces/tanks/T-90, accessed on 25.12.2017.

⁶⁵³ For the news, which summerize the case, compare the costs and display the video, see, Chris Pleasance, **America and Russia's War by Proxy In Syria Laid Bare**, 27.02.2016,

In this context, the increasing cost of the war vehicles and equipment, the relatively cheap weapons that hit them, the dangers observed in Vietnam, the presence of local struggle groups, the ability of system-dominant states to provide explicit support instead of direct engagement, will have an impact on costs.

	1961-1970	1971-1980	1981-1990
US	8,61	6,15	6,35
NATO	5,22	3,85	3,89
Austria	1,22	1,15	1,17
Belgium	3,20	3,05	2,95
Denmark	2,73	2,30	2,22
Finland	1,73	1,56	1,85
France	5,15	3,87	3,90
Germany	4,18	3,42	3,14
Greece	4,14	5,83	6,11
Ireland	1,32	1,52	1,47
Italy	3,11	2,52	2,25
Luxembourg	1,18	0,92	1,04
Netherlands	4,00	3,24	2,99
Portugal	6,76	5,09	3,13
Spain	1,94	2,03	2,66
Sweden	3,93	3,29	2,62
UK	5,74	4,85	4,77

Table 2.6: Defence Spendings of US, NATO and Euro-15 as Share of GDP (%)⁶⁵⁴

This cost reduction in NATO-wide has resulted not only in changing the engagements for US, but also in a change of policy to share the cost with its allies. In this context, the United States, which began to shift the weight of the military background to conventional forces with its flexible response doctrine, has transferred some of its burden (by accepting political responses) to its allies.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3466590/The-moment-Syrian-rebels-fire-60-000-American-missile-4-5million-Russian-tank-missile-WINS.html>, accessed on 26.12.2017.

⁶⁵⁴ John Paul Dunne and Eftychia Nikolaidou, "Defence Spending and Economic Growth in the EU 15", *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol 23 No 6, 2012, p. 539.

Country	1975		1980		1985	
	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden
Belgium	1,24	1,34	1,25	1,61	0,91	0,70
Canada	25,92	2,05	25,64	1,76	25,53	1,98
Denmark	1,00	0,66	0,99	0,69	0,85	0,38
France	7,12	9,44	7,21	10,74	5,75	6,03
W.Germany	8,34	10,39	8,56	10,96	6,56	5,84
Greece	2,14	0,99	2,16	0,93	2,04	0,68
Italy	6,01	3,16	6,19	3,62	5,86	2,25
Luxembourg	0,05	0,02	0,05	0,02	0,04	0,27
Netherlands	1,77	1,98	1,85	2,23	1,40	1,12
Norway	2,83	0,64	2,86	0,69	2,76	0,53
Portugal	1,00	0,59	0,98	0,35	0,78	0,19
Spain	NA	NA	NA	NA	3,26	1,16
Turkey	3,68	1,53	3,80	0,99	3,78	0,69
UK	6,94	7,52	7,44	10,25	6,30	6,43
US	31,96	59,64	31,06	55,13	34,19	71,99

Table 2.7: Relative Defence Burdens and Benefits in NATO (1975-1985)⁶⁵⁵

Another indicator of indirect engagement in proxy wars was arms transfers and forms of financial support. In this context, there has been a significant increase in weapons transfer from both blocs towards the areas where the armed conflicts took place. Another point to be noted at this point is that there is also illicit arms transfers outside of these observable transfers.

⁶⁵⁵ Jyoti Khanna and Todd Sandler, "Conscription, Peace-Keeping, and Foreign Assistance: NATO Burden Sharing in the Post-Cold War Era", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 8 No 1, pp. 109-110.

Region	World Share (%)		Growth Rate (%)
	1972	1982	1972-1982
Africa	4,7	14,9	8,9
East Asia	37,7	9,8	-5,4
Europe	28,2	18,3	0,8
Latin America	3,8	7,6	13,9
Middle East	19,2	41,9	11,5
North America	1,8	1,9	3,7
Oceania	1,1	0,5	6,3
South Asia	3,6	5,0	9

Table 2.8: Increase in Arms Transfers (1972-1982)⁶⁵⁶

In this period, it is seen that the trend in arms transfers is parallel to the trend in financial supports. In this context, it is seen that arms transfers in the conflict zones made by system-dominant powers are either met by military assistance or by borrowing. This increase is more evident in comparison with the period after 1991 when the inter-block competition ended.

Year	Percentage Share of All Arms Imports		
	Paid for by net capital exporters	Delievered as military aid	Paid for by net capital importers
1970-1974	29	58	13
1975-1979	48	32	21
1980-1984	44	28	29
1985-1989	37	35	28
1990-1994	24	10	66
1995-1999	19	7	74

Table 2.9: Major Sources of Financing the International Arms Trade (1970-1999)⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁶ Composed from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). For sources, see, SIPRI, **Arms Transfers Database**, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php, accessed on 22.04.2018. US Department of State, **World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers Reports, WMEAT 1972-1982**, <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/c50834.htm>, accessed on 20.04.2018.

⁶⁵⁷ Michael Brzoska, "The Economics of Arms Imports After the End of the Cold War", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 15 No 2, 2004, p. 116. Brzoska composed the table by using data of US Department of State, US Department of Defence and World Bank. For original sources see, World Bank, **World Development Indicators 2002**, April 2002, <http://documents.worldbank.org/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=-kzgTN5Q-oi8eRCc->

This period, when conventional weapons-based military background was applied in non-conventional conflicts, also meant the long-term and low-intensity re-implementation of pre-1945 industrial-based Wars. The result was just like those wars. The party, whose industrial-economic background is not enough, has been defeated by failing to continue the war. The USSR has become a losing force in this long-term war against the United States. It has overstretched its commitments in the struggle against the United States, which allowed it to lose its economic resilience. Finally, USSR engaged a Vietnam-like black hole in Afghanistan and eventually entered the disintegration process. Therefore, the examination of the conflicts of the 1972-1991 period will constitute the most important empirical basis to show the cost pressure created by the overstretch of commitments. This is the subject of the next section.

3. Effects on Armed Conflicts

The period after 1972, as a milestone, was shaped in the light of the developments that led to the decision to withdraw the US from Vietnam and the subsequent practices. In this context, lessons learned from the Vietnam defeat are important.

As it mentioned before, after the start of the US withdrawal process, the picture in Vietnam came out more clearly. Beside its 58,000 dead and 300,000 wounded soldiers, 2226 aircraft and 7000 helicopters of US have shot down.⁶⁵⁸ Despite all the investments and other burdens beyond these human and economic costs, nothing has been achieved in the political sphere. Moreover, in parallel with military failure, a great cost was undertaken in the political field.

In this context, it can be alluded that the greatest cost of the Vietnam War has been political. Beyond the economic losses, the anger created as a result of soldiers who died and wounded, coupled with the methods used by the United States to win the war, a great reaction was born in the U.S. public opinion and the international community. Because the United States threw to Vietnam and Indochina in general 7 million tons

[hmRn6u7xEEbNCzegxy40jkDq60](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18724.pdf), accessed on 13.01.2018. US Department of State, **World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers**, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18724.pdf>, accessed on 13.01.2018.

⁶⁵⁸ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "Tarihten Bugüne...", p. 195.

of bombs.⁶⁵⁹ The fact that nothing has been achieved after the attacks that left 20 million craters on Indochina and destroyed all human and agricultural life in that region. In addition to that, the Vietnam victory didn't affect other countries as the domino theory predicted, so these facts have severely damaged the national and international image of the United States and its soft power. This combination of failures will also display itself as 'Vietnam Syndrome'.

A major lesson that Vietnam War gave to the United States and the world is the role of the media in war. The United States will have an understanding based on control media, which will be reach to the concept of 'embedded journalism', when it observes how the public opinion has been infused after the media's information.⁶⁶⁰ Similarly, the effect of this lesson is that non-state actors re-consider the media as the main basis for the restructuring of terrorism on a strategic level and the media play a central role in the concept of hybrid war.

In the light of these failure and these lessons, as of the 1970s, the indirect strategy of the USSR seemed to have been successful. Socialist governments were established in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and many Latin American countries. This success of the USSR increased Soviet military aid to these regions and increased Soviet costs. In this context, from 1973 to 1977, an amount of 14.8-16.5 billion dollars was calculated to be distributed.⁶⁶¹ This was undoubtedly a very significant success, which was cheaply compared to a direct confrontations, such as the Korean War or Vietnam War.⁶⁶²

This will change with the US starting to implement indirect strategies. With Kissinger's statement:

⁶⁵⁹ As Oral Sander points out, this amount is 80 times the number of bombs dropped into England during World War II and is equal to 300 of the atomic bombs dropped into Japan. Oral Sander, "**Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...**", p. 531.

⁶⁶⁰ It would be incomplete to say that only the Vietnam experience was decisive in this process. Because the 'CNN effect' in the Gulf War and the images in Somalia are also effective in taking experience.

⁶⁶¹ Bruce D. Porter, op.cit., p. 30.

⁶⁶² However, since the Soviet economic model is a model that can't transform these domains into economic development, it will do more harm than good in the medium term.

“Through the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets had abetted communist insurgencies against governments that were friendly toward the United States. Now, in the 1980s, America was giving the Soviets a taste of their own medicine.”⁶⁶³

In many cases, the United States will be giving the taste of the ‘medicine’ to the USSR, but it will have its real impact in the Afghan war. However, until this date, both sides will continue to harm indirectly through the local forces they support each other.

The first of these struggles would be the Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states in 1973. This war will provide a good example for the relationship of indirect strategies with costs and will show many aspects of the proxy war.

The Yom Kippur War started with a surprise Egyptian-Syrian operation (from the north to Syria and Egypt from the east), when Israel refused to return the territories it had acquired in the 1956 and 1967. With the support of other Arab states, the conflict will soon become a regional conflict, and with the interference of the USA and the USSR, it will become a global issue.

In this context, before the war began, there was a serious Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria. In addition to the support of around 20,000 personnel deployed in Egypt and the defence system established in the region, a total of 4.5 billion dollars of arms were transferred between 1967-1973.⁶⁶⁴

The majority of these aids were composed of two main components. The first is the air defense system established in Egypt. The second was anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. Each of these aids will function greatly. In the wake of the Egyptian-Syrian attack, the Israeli forces tried to stabilize the situation but the Israeli Air Force will give great losses, due to the effectiveness of air defence system. A similar situation will happen in the tank battle. Although this conflict was the largest tank war after Kursk,⁶⁶⁵ and most of the casualties came from Arabs, most of the damage Israel Defence Forces (IDF) suffered was not from Arab tanks, but from anti-tank missiles. In this context, the Egyptian forces left more than 3500 Israeli tanks in two weeks by

⁶⁶³ Henry Kissinger, “Diplomasi...”, p. 752.

⁶⁶⁴ Bruce D. Porter, op.cit., p. 22.

⁶⁶⁵ Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, “Savaş Sonrasında Dünya...”, pp. 426-428.

AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles, which were produced and transferred them by USSR.⁶⁶⁶

This development has revealed a new feature of the period of proxy wars. Through Vietnam, the costs of extended war were already known. In addition to the advantages of prolonged wars, the anti-tank missiles added a new dimension to proxy wars, with their ability to target expensive war vehicles to a cheaper cost. As a result, these new technologies will be the main transfer product of conflicts in many regions of the world.

In light of this information, it can be assumed that the arms transfers of the parties in the Yom Kippur War constitute an important example for the implementation of the indirect approach in interstate conflicts. Egypt and Syria, which entered the war with the support of the USSR, have achieved military success as described above, but the war has stabilised with Israel's recovery and the conquest of strategic areas such as Golan Heights. Following this war, the military stock of both sides came to a depleted point in a short period of time and received support from the blocks, gave the first significant result. The success achieved cheaply with the anti-tank missiles has given the second important result. The success of air defence systems has given the third significant result.⁶⁶⁷

Cambodia was the first case in which the benefits of proxy war were seen for the United States. The most important feature of this conflict is that it confronts the USSR and China, which are considered to be part of the same block. In fact, the bipolar structure of the Cold War allowed proxy wars to take place between blocks, however Cambodia conflict has shown that proxy war is a type of war, which actually shaped by a strategic choice based on costs, rather than ideology. In Cambodia, the conflict between the USSR-supported Vietnamese forces and the Chinese-backed Pol-Pot forces, in terms of ammunition, training and financial support, has displayed the same characteristics as other proxy wars. In this respect, Zbigniew Brezizinski, the National

⁶⁶⁶ However, Israel managed to repair most of these tanks and put them on the front line in a very short time. This has once again demonstrated the importance of industrial background in conflicts. Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Modern Savaşın...**", p. 128.

⁶⁶⁷ However, the fact that the two sides understood that they could not achieve results with armed conflicts, and that the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, abolished 20 years of Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation in order to sit on the negotiation table, and then sent more than 20,000 Soviet troops to their countries, has once again demonstrated the decisive role of politics.

Security Advisor of the time, described this conflict as “*the first case of proxy war between Soviet Union and China.*”⁶⁶⁸ While the Soviets supported Vietnam, which intervened in Cambodia with 200,000 soldiers, China supported the Pol Pot regime. What was important here was that the United States did not consider it an ideological issue, as it had in the early period, but supported Pol Pot, which was communist, supported by China and also known to have committed serious massacres.⁶⁶⁹

Although the parentheses in Cambodia reflect the cost-based background of the power struggle of the real logic of the proxy war, the ideological competition between the US and the USSR has outlined the period of proxy wars, due to their hegemonic positions sourced ideologically. The echoes of this have been observed in the continuation of a great struggle, even in geographies that are far from at least one of these super powers, such as Africa and Latin America.

One of the most obvious examples of these struggles was in Angola. The people's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)*, which took over the government in Angola in 1975, had made a significant accumulation of guerrilla methods. In this context, both the Angola movement and the communist movements in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, which are Portuguese's other former colonies, have carried out a guerrilla war on cost-based strategy. As a result of their efforts, Portugal had spent half of its national income to suppress these three attempts by the end of the 1960s.⁶⁷⁰ However, the three groups that fought together for the independence of Angola have embarked on the post-independence power struggle. In this way, a proxy war has started between parties, as the USSR supported MPLA on one side and the West and South Africa supported UNITA* and FNLA* on the other side.

In this proxy war, in accordance with the concept of the period, neither the US nor the USSR did not enter into direct engagement but supported the parties. In this

⁶⁶⁸ John Dumbrell, **American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton**, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 46.

⁶⁶⁹ In the Pol Pot period, 2 million people will be lost and many mass graves will be found in the 'death fields' entered in the 1990s.

* MPLA: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola

⁶⁷⁰ George Childs Kohn, **Savaş Sözlüğü**, translated to Turkish by Berna Kara, İstanbul: Doruk Yayınları, 2006, p. 44.

* Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

* Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (The National Front for the Liberation of Angola)

context, the Western bloc supported UNITA through the Republic of South Africa and Portugal. Additionally, white mercenaries first fought the FNLA and then the UNITA ranks. MPLA had weapons support by the USSR. In the 1980s, it became clear that the UNITA received the support of United States, United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia and a number of African countries, while the MPLA began to be openly supported by the USSR and Cuba. In addition, in the early days of the conflict, the Cuban power, consisting of 250 technicians and advisers, reached 15.000 people in the later years of the conflict.

In this conflict, holding the control of ocean-opening regions was a key factor and MPLA as the dominant force in these regions, also took the advantage of the conflict. In this context, MPLA control in coastal side of Angola was meant for USSR naval bases in Africa, and for US, the goal to reverse this situation. This clash of interests will determine the general framework of Angola conflict.⁶⁷¹ In addition to the regular activities carried out to capture certain regions, UNITA also used terrorist methods. In 60 attacks determined by Global Terrorism Database, UNITA used a machine gun or explosive, produced in western countries. In their actions, they target military personnel and areas as well as government members, civil servants, transport lines and a small number of civilian people were selected.⁶⁷²

A similar proxy was occurred in Mozambique, which took place in the parallel historical process with Angola. The Mozambique National Resistance Organization (MNR-RENAMO), which took fought for independence and wants to overthrow the communist government after independence, has emerged against the Front of the Liberation Movement (FRELIMO), which fought for independence, then established a communist government by taking power in the country. Although RENAMO has turned to military targets to erode the government, it has also targeted economic and social areas, unlike Angola. In this context, RENAMO sabotaging the oil other transmission lines that are vital for Mozambique, has also been directed to the civilian population to prevent support for the government and to destroy the rural economy. Because of the many massacres and forced displacement of 2 million Mozambicans,

⁶⁷¹ George Childs Kohn, op.cit., p. 45.

⁶⁷² Global Terrorism Database, **Angola (1970-1989)**, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=1989&dt2=all&country=8&count=100&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table, accessed on 20.05.2018.

support for RENAMO was made illicitly. However, the Republic of South Africa has provided a relatively more open assistance.⁶⁷³

The case of Nicaragua, which has been differentiated from other aspects of proxy wars, is still an example that needs to be addressed in order to understand this type of conflict. Because Nicaragua is an important example of what can be done to win the proxy wars. The forces loyal to the old regime and expelled from the country by the forces of Sandinista, which took power in this country and supported by the USSR, will then be organized under the name Contra. When the Contras caused massacres both in Honduras and Nicaragua, the US Congress decided to stop the aid to this group. In spite of this decision, secret assistance⁶⁷⁴ has shown the size of the competition, just as in the case of Pol Pot. In addition, the United States took the activities in Central America as a whole, and evaluated El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Granada together. In this direction, in 1983, US directly intervened Granada, which was far from the USSR, which could not get much help and could not get much support from other countries because it was the island, and changed the administration in this country. In the other three countries, however, US has launched an operation based in El Salvador, acting indirectly because of the risk it poses. The United States, which assisted El Salvador in 1979 for 79.3 million dollars, increased this assistance to 183.9 million dollars in 1980 and 523 million dollars in 1981.⁶⁷⁵ The main strategy was to keep the regimes alive first, and then to make a proxy force to carry out operations against Nicaragua and Honduras.

The increasing number of these struggles carried out in remote regions such as Africa, America and Asia will cause lower costs to rise, even if they are cheaper than even a single direct intervention. Therefore, although the marginal cost of the conflict is low as a supporting power, the cost of whole competition continues to increase. One of the most important indicators of this is the quantitative increase of the naval forces used to support the competition and the cost pressure it creates.

⁶⁷³ George Childs Kohn, op.cit., pp. 486-487.

⁶⁷⁴ The aid will be revealed as 'Iran-Contra Scandal. For the scandal see, p. 43.

⁶⁷⁵ Mehmet Tanju Akad, "**Tarihten Bugüne...**", pp. 240-242.

	Warsaw Pact			NATO		
	Outside USSR	USSR	Total	Total	US	Outside US
Nuclear Submarines	-	105	105	97	85	12
Diesel Submarines	6	168	174	137	5	132
Major Surface Warships	3	184	187	376	149	227
Naval Aircraft	52	755	807	2533	2250	283

Table 2.10: Comparative Naval Forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact in 1985⁶⁷⁶

Increasing costs in different geographies, although shaping the cross-block competition, were bearable for both the United States and the USSR. In this context, in the process until the 1980s, the continuation of the interventions by proxy allowed the struggle to continue even for the lost regions. In 1980, however, the USSR made the mistake that the United States had made before and was directly engaged in a political conflict. The cost pressure of the Afghanistan engagement will be greater than US's Vietnam engagement and will play an important role in the loss of influence of the USSR first and then the disintegration of the USSR.

In this context, just as the United States is step by step engaged in the region in order to protect the regime in Vietnam, the USSR has become step by step engaged in Afghanistan. The support, which began with the support of military experts-in the same way as Vietnam - has increased with the support of the Air Force. Soviet forces, who had achieved great success with the help of Soviet helicopters, had achieved great success in the military sense. However, again like Vietnam, they failed to transform military success into political success. In addition, the fact that the United States began to support the resistance in the region, provided training and money support, and, more importantly, transferred various munitions to the region, especially Stinger missiles, will change the course of the process.

After US support, the insurgents began to shot down Soviet helicopters with missiles, thus US decided to send ground troops to the region in order to prevent ground-to-air attacks and to support the regime. In this context, in the first step, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan with only a small number of troops to protect

⁶⁷⁶ Paul Kennedy, "Büyük Güçlerin...", p. 600.

strategic points, train the regime's armed forces and provide technical support, has reached 80,000 in a short period of time.⁶⁷⁷

The intervention of the USSR in Afghanistan coincided with a period in which the United States 'swing into a high gear' in the concept of proxy war. The new US balance of power policies were placed in the framework of inter-state diplomatic agreements, bilateral and multilateral agreements during the Nixon period. However, in the Reagan period, US was able to implement them through armed conflicts. To this end, in 1985, the Reagan government repealed the Clark amendment law, which prevented the aid of guerrillas operating against the communist government in Angola, and prepared the necessary enactment to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Reagan administration also prepared a broad programme under the coordination of the Pentagon, the CIA and the Department of Foreign Affairs to combat the communist guerrillas in Central America. In addition, it has strengthened and intensified humanitarian aid and support packages in Cambodian-like risky regions.

In parallel with this change in the United States, resistance in Afghanistan has begun to take shape. In this context, the Afghan resistance forces are organized in two different areas. Apart from the 'full-time fighters' wearing uniforms called *Moutarik*, the 'part-time militants' who protected their villages called *Sabet* were also forming resistance forces. They were using Kalashnikov rifles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades, and ZPU-2 anti-aircraft weapons captured from SSCB soldiers until the continued US and Saudi support came.⁶⁷⁸

The fact that the Afghan resistance has reached a certain form has also started US aid. Moreover, us support for *Mujahideen* has increased day by day. In this context, financial support, which started with 30 million dollars, rose to 630 million dollars in 1980 and 1.2 billion dollars in 1987.⁶⁷⁹ In addition, it is also possible to supply Stinger, which will have a very large impact on the quality, if not quantitative. These missiles have a great influence on shooting down of the Soviet helicopter that were the key to the USSR dominance in Afghanistan. The effect of Stingers played a crucial role by reversing conflict to a ground conflict in which the insurgents are dominant. In this

⁶⁷⁷ Oral Sander, "*Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...*", , p. 565.

⁶⁷⁸ Max Boot, "*Invisible Armies...*", p. 489.

⁶⁷⁹ This amount corresponds to 3 billion dollars in 2012. Max Boot, *Ibid*, p. 497.

respect, the US's investment in smart ammunition was in return for the Afghanistan resistance.

One thing to note at this point is that sensors, PGMs and air-space systems that feed them create another trend. The weapons that determine the vital elements of the armed conflict were monopolized by states, and billions of dollars of resources used for developing these weapons by control group consisting of scientists, technicians and soldiers with superior technical equipment. It brought an illusion with it. A tank costing millions of dollars, or a ship costing hundreds of millions of dollars, could be shot at by ordinary groups with relatively cheaper weapons, but these weapons could not be taken into the hands of these groups without the permission of the origin countries. This is where the first example of development, which will mark the beginning of 1979 to the later period, was seen. Taliban militants were able to shot down Soviet helicopters worth millions of dollars with a single missile, leaving their 'foxholes on the mountain'. But the missiles they had were weapons that had emerged at the end of the process, which contained billions of dollars in investment in the background, which mujahideen had no chance of developing. In other words, these 'cheap' weapons have actually been weapons that only states with very large financial resources can provide. This reality has always been seen in conflicts which supported by states implicitly or explicitly. Because the cheap weapons, which were used in conflicts, came as a result of not only the cheaper weapons markets, but also the re-specialization of states and centralization of military elements as Charles Tilly emphasized.

The reaction of the USSR to the increase in losses after the US, Saud and Israel support showed that some lessons were taken from Vietnam. In this context, the USSR tried to take part of the cost from the Afghan government rather than send more troops to the region. However, the lack of adequate support by the Afghan administration has caused more damage than the benefit of this target. For example, if the USSR asked the Afghan government to support ground forces, it was accompanied by a greater reaction in the medium term. Because the Afghan government, which could not afford enough control, was forced to conscript 14-year-old children.⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁸⁰ George Childs Kohn, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

This process is largely resembling the US experience of the United States. Between 1980 and 1989, the USSR spent 3 billion dollars, except for military support. In the light of all these factors, 1 million Afghans were killed, although the resistance movement was further strengthened. The most important reason for this is the fact that the USSR - like the US in Vietnam - acts in the concept of 'find and destroy', neglect political background and social transformation. In addition, out of 1 million deaths, 5 million people have fled the country and 500.000 people internally displaced.⁶⁸¹

With the impact of these elements, refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border will become the Taliban's recruitment, organisation and training areas, and participation in the organization will increase day by day. At the end of this process, it is estimated that at least 150,000 person participated in mujahideen. In the face of Taliban jihadists, there were around 160.000 people, including 120,000 Soviet troops, 30,000 Afghan forces and 15,000 Secret Service Workers.⁶⁸² This number also reveals the result of the conflict. Prior to all economic and political losses in Afghan intervention, the USSR lost 28,000 people.⁶⁸³

The economic erosion of the USSR and its resource problems, especially after the defeat of the occupation of Afghanistan, have also shown itself in the proxy wars it is carrying out. At the end of the Cold War, the decline of the USSR's support for these countries was realized by the United States and caused it to further increase its support to the opposite side. Although it is not true to generalize, the correlation between the fall of the USSR and the fall of one by one in these countries is another factor that confirms that the main element determining the nature and future of conflicts is the hegemonic power struggle.

In the light of all these conflicts, it can be alleged that the Cold War era continued to maintain the rationale in which the military paradigm has framed in the shadow of nuclear weapons, and shaped by the Industrial background. As a result, cost pressure remained as the main determinant. Moreover, this cost pressure is not the only pressure factor on conflicts and is directly related to relative power. In this context, even though direct economic support in the conflict created a significant cost of arms transfers, the

⁶⁸¹ In this period, the total population of Afghanistan, including those fleeing, is 16 million.

⁶⁸² Max Boot, *"Invisible Armies..."*, p. 493.

⁶⁸³ Ibid, p. 487.

period of proxy wars did not cover only arms transfers. It also included the involvement of military advisers, technical experts, intelligence specialists or voluntary support countries. Moreover, it included not only the United States and the USSR, but also the states that could be described as medium and small powers. In this context, in 1987, 730.000 military personnel of the USSR, 492.000 of the USA 190.000 of the Vietnam, 84.450 of the France and 29.250 of the Cuba were operating outside their territory.⁶⁸⁴

According to this, the strategies over both nuclear arms race and the attrition of the opposing power through proxy wars have put an important economic burden on both super powers during Cold War period. However, due to its free market and military-industrial complex, the United States, which can reduce costs and convert some of them into 'private sector profits', experienced the attrition less than USSR. As a result, in the 45-year period, the military spending of 18.45 trillion dollars⁶⁸⁵ was less severe than the USSR. However, besides the advantages of the planned economy, the USSR economy, which is not suitable for competing with a capitalist giant and which cannot gain the economy its expenses and which continuously consume the resources related to development, couldn't overcome the attrition and eventually has been disintegrated.

⁶⁸⁴ Charles Tilly, "Zor, Sermaye..."p. 347.

⁶⁸⁵ Center for Defence Information, **US Military Spending 1945-1996**, 09.07.1996, <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/milspend.htm>. Cited by Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, "Consequences of a New Cold War", **Survival**, Vol 57 No 2, 2015, p. 41.

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1987	1988	1989
US Share of Military Expenditures to GDP⁶⁸⁶	%8,6	%7,7	%5,4	%5	%6,1	%6,1	%5,7	%5,5
USSR Share of Military Expenditures to GDP⁶⁸⁷	%13,2	%12,2	%13,7	%14,8	%15,9	%16,4	%17,8	%15,6
US Military Expenditures (Billions-Current US \$)⁶⁸⁸	51,827	79,846	88,400	138,191	258,165	288,157	293,093	304,085
USSR Military Expenditures (Billions-Current US \$)⁶⁸⁹	49,720	70,663	102,453	141,627	190,142	225,021	246,011	218,759

Table 2.11: Comparative Military Spendings of US and USSR

In this context, the USA's Vietnam War and the USSR's Afghanistan war create a clear basis for comparison. The United States has been able to take over the burden of this war economically by reducing the rate of defence spending to its economy, despite the remarkable attrition in Vietnam War process. However, the USSR has not recovered from the impact of the Afghanistan War and has increased its military spending rates, which was already high. With the effect of this attrition, USSR has entered into a process that will result in its collapse shortly afterwards.

⁶⁸⁶ SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database...". Although there are different calculations about military expenditures, SIPRI database has been used. The reason for this is the calculation made on more comprehensive areas. For a review of databases comparing military spending calculations see also, GCOMS, **Global Campaign on Military Spending Handbook**, 2017, http://demilitarize.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/GCOMS_Handbook_2702_Final.pdf, accessed on 09.08.2018.

⁶⁸⁷ Christopher Davis, "Country Survey XVI the Defence Sector in the Economy of a Declining Superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 13 No 3, 2002, p. 153.

⁶⁸⁸ SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database...".

⁶⁸⁹ SIPRI data were used for 1987 and later. For the pre-1987 period, the figures given by Davis were rounded off by SIPRI values. Before 1987, there were no exact figures and they were used as a basis for comparison. Christopher Davis, "Country Survey XVI the Defence Sector in the Economy of a Declining Superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 13 No 3, 2002, p. 153.

As a result, in light of proxy wars, costs and strategies, a period has ended. Moreover, the end of this period has created a surprised strategy atmosphere. A period when the United States remains the only superpower and has some decisive advantages became the fundamental characteristic of this strategic environment, not only in the economic and political sense, but also in the military sense. The military technologies, which are the focus of these key features, will help the new position that the United States has been trying to achieve, starting decrease its rising costs since 1980.



C. RMA and the End of the Cold War: Declining Costs, Enlarging Engagements II

The end of the Cold War did not only mean the end of the bipolar international system, but also meant a major geopolitical and capacity gap as well. This ‘unexpected’ situation which is identified by the global supremacy of the USA, which derived from being ‘the solely superpower’, also left it as the only system-dominant actor. Both this unique position in the post-Cold War system and the military background acquired during the Cold War rivalry, will significantly decrease the cost of staying as one superpower. This decrease by cost will create a table similar to the previous decline, as it observed in post WWII period: the expansion of security commitments. However, new methods against the existing structure, like terrorism, will led to the increase in costs again. In this context, explaining the period in question will reveal the similarities and differences of this period with the previous period, and also give the opportunity to make comparisons between periods.

1. Strategic Environment

In the new era, which began with the absence of global competition, the strategic environment has determined by the US approach and policies, as well as the reactions of other actors towards US policies. In this context, it would be useful to start by explaining the new position of the US.

As examined in the previous two chapters, the United States has made significant military expenditures during the Cold War, and these expenditures, which are necessary for the competition of the period, have brought significant burdens to the United States. In particular, military spending in the last decade of the Cold War has had an impact on the decline of the US economic position before the collapse of the USSR. Parallel to the decline of US relative power, rising countries like Japan, Germany and China have strengthened their economic position. Helen Delich Bentley,

a member of Parliament from the Republican Party, expressed this situation as “*in the last decade, we have not strengthened by spending more than 1 trillion dollars in defense, actually we have been greatly weakened.*”⁶⁹⁰ However, two years after the collapse of the USSR as a result of its inability to sustain the economic rivalry against US, had left the United States as the only superpower. Thus, in a sense, the relative position of the United States has improved significantly thanks to these expenditures. The fact that the United States remains the only superpower, that the basic basis of this superpower is the military power, has revealed the approach that the relative power of US can be ameliorate through a new strategy designed in the light of new strategic environment. Accordingly, US attempted to configure the economic structure to maximize its own interests, to reduce and restructure the armed forces, to use international organizations, and as a result to behave as a soft power.

The relative power of the United States is more clearly understood by the ‘structural power’ approach developed by Susan Strange, beyond capacity-based power analyses. According to the structural power approach mentioned above, elements that determine the relative power of an actor are shaped in four basic areas. These fields are security, production, finance and knowledge.⁶⁹¹ At the beginning of the post-Cold War period, the United States has a clear superiority in these areas.

In this context, the security field stands out as the most obvious area, in which US superiority has observed in means of relative power. Because, despite the reduction of military spending after the end of the Cold War, in the power gap created by the USSR, the current state of the United States was above the total spending of about 10 states after it.

⁶⁹⁰ Cited by Kenneth N. Waltz, "Uluslararası Politikanın Değişen Yapısı", **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Vol. 5 No. 17, 2008, p. 13. The article translated to Turkish by Burcu Yavuz for Uluslararası İlişkiler Journal. For original text see also, Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", **International Security**, Vol. 18 No 2, 1993, pp. 44-79.

⁶⁹¹ For the distinction between relational and structural power and the sources of structural power, see, Susan Strange, "Finance, Information and Power", **Review of International Studies**, Vol 16 No 3, 1990, pp. 266-269.

	US	USSR/RF	UK	France	Germany	China	India	Japan
1990	306,107	219,111	38,943	42,589	42,318	10,085	10,537	28,800
1991	280,292	N/A	42,074	42,702	39,516	9,953	8,622	32,785
1992	305,141	N/A	40,774	45,123	41,965	12,420	8,083	35,999
1993	297,637	7,776	34,085	42,590	37,215	12,557	8,253	41,353
1994	288,059	13,547	34,493	44,392	36,330	10,050	8,880	45,285

Table 2.12: Military Expenditures of US and Selected Countries (Billion \$)⁶⁹²

In other words, the US's source for defence during the Cold War period was enough only to balance its opponent. Moreover, the source of the defence was increasing. However, the reflection of being the only superpower was almost 10 times higher, even though it reduced these spendings in post-Cold War period. This relaxation and resource transfer seen in the military area will be an opportunity to improve the position of the United States in the economic field.

The most important factors affecting the production area were the information technologies, energy and finance fields, which played an important role in winning the Cold War. With these new areas, the United States has started to close its deficit. The key role in this move has been the energy sector. In the 1990s, the energy field gained a strategic role as the most important factor affecting both the production and the financial field of the United States, and became decisive in many foreign policy moves. In this respect, it is important that between 1991-1995, there were seven American companies among the ten largest companies in the world, while four of them remained stationary as energy companies.⁶⁹³

Another function of energy companies has been in finance and has contributed to the fiscal strength of the United States by strengthening the dollar in the world's reserve currency. In addition, through its decision-making position in the IMF and WB, the United States has started to have an important political influence on developing countries. As a result of all this, there has been a significant improvement in the relative

⁶⁹² Composed from SIPRI, "Military Expenditures Database...".

⁶⁹³ For 1992 and following years, see, Fortune, **Fortune 500 List**, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1992/, accessed on 12.06.2018.

power of the US in areas of economy, which is shaped from the basis of production and finance.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
GDP (Current US \$) as Trillion \$ ⁶⁹⁴					
USA	5,098	6,174	6,539	6,879	7,309
European Union	7,573	7,859	8,564	7,808	8,292
Japan	3,133	3,584	3,909	4,454	4,907
China	0,360	0,383	0,426	0,444	0,564
Share of Global Exports of Goods and Services (%) ⁶⁹⁵					
USA	12,9	13,3	12,5	13,4	13,3
European Union	44,1	43,3	41,5	39,8	40,4
Japan	7,45	7,82	7,49	8,25	8,16
China	1,14	1,23	1,32	1,51	1,93
Total Reserves (includes gold, current US \$) as Billion ⁶⁹⁶					
USA	173,094	159,273	147,526	164,62	163,591
Germany	104,547	96,657	122,686	114,822	113,841
Japan	87,828	80,626	79,697	107,989	135,146
France	68,291	60,227	54,306	54,624	57,627
China	34,476	48,165	24,853	27,348	57,781
UK	43,146	48,572	42,844	43,982	48,079

Table 2.13: Comparative Economic Indicators of Selected Actors

In summary, the United States has improved its relative power in the fields of economics, albeit at a lower rate than the security area. At the end of this new process, it will be able to increase its share in the world GDP from % 24.2 in 1990 to % 31.3 in 2000.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴ World Bank, GDP (Current US \$), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1977&locations=GB-FR&start=1960&view=chart>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

⁶⁹⁵ World Bank, Exports of Goods and Services (Current US \$), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD?end=1974&locations=1W-GB-FR&start=1960&view=chart>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

⁶⁹⁶ World Bank, Total Reserves (includes gold, current US \$), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD?end=1995&locations=US-JP-CN&start=1990>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

⁶⁹⁷ Gülten Kazgan, *Küreselleşme ve Ulus Devlet: Yeni Ekonomik Düzen*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 61.

The fact that the power of the United States in the security field coincides with its economic targets has led to a variety of adjustments in geopolitical engagement. According to this, there is a global structure especially over sea power. The Marine Corps has restructured not only to control international trade but also to control critical transit points. In addition to oil, natural gas has also played a critical role in energy security, causing the United States to shift its territorial priorities to the Caspian basin.⁶⁹⁸ In addition, the Atlantic Ocean-based global economic relations network has begun to shift towards the Pacific Ocean, so the United States considers itself as the only great power on both oceans, as the leader of the global economy.




Figure 2.5: Strategic Straits and United States Forces

The area of knowledge, which is the last structural power field, is not only a field of US superiority, but also the foundation of the US ‘soft power’ that will appear as one of the most important cost-cutters of U.S. strategies. As envisaged in this approach, which is expressed as “*if I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do*”⁶⁹⁹ by Joseph Nye who developed the concept, it is possible to have an influence on other countries through norms, ideas, lifestyle and products. In the post-Cold War period, American institutions, which are the producers of norms, ideas and products, have a fundamental function for American soft power. In this context, the United States, apart from the existing giant-scale companies, has the majority of technology companies, as well as

⁶⁹⁸ For a leading study based on the geopolitical shift in the United States see, Zbigniew Brezizinski, **Büyük Satranç Tahtası: Amerika’nın Küresel Üstünlüğü ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gerekliklikleri**, translated to Turkish by Yelda Türedi, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitapevi, 2010.

⁶⁹⁹ Joseph S. Nye, **Amerikan Gücünün Paradoksu**, translated to Turkish by Gürol Koca, İstanbul: Literatür Yayıncılık, 2003, p. 11.

has become the most important center in higher education. This central role will ensure that most of the global information production is gathered in the United States.

Actor	High-Technology Exports (%) ⁷⁰⁰	Numbers of Journal Articles (2003) ⁷⁰¹	R&D Expenditure (% of GDP) ⁷⁰²	Patent Applications, Residents ⁷⁰³	Researchers in R&D (per million people) ⁷⁰⁴
US	30,759	321765	2,44	106892	3122
EU	16,804	388657	1,68	103554	2030
Japan	26,148	97235	2,69	339045	4974
China	12,417	86621	0,56	11628	442
Russia	9,665	32329	0,96	18014	3795

Table 2.14: Comparative Scientific Indicators of Selected Countries in 1996

The United States, which re-shapes its position in the strategic environment over the concept of ‘globalisation’, which has become a dominant paradigm after the Cold War, has positioned itself as a ‘leading country’ in the world to spread common values of the globalized world and remove obstacles to it. The foundations of the soft power of the United States have been expressed in a speech by President Bill Clinton:

“In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of marketbased democracies. During the cold war we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions. For our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression, in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace.”⁷⁰⁵

⁷⁰⁰ World Bank, **High-Technology Exports (% of manufactured exports)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS?end=1998&locations=US-JP-EU-CN-RU&start=1996&view=chart>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

⁷⁰¹ World Bank, **Scientific and Technical Journal Articles**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC?end=2005&locations=US-JP-CN-EU-RU&start=2003&view=chart>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

⁷⁰² World Bank, **Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?end=1998&locations=US-JP-EU-CN-RU&start=1996>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

⁷⁰³ World Bank, **Patent Applications, Residents**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.RESD?end=1999&locations=US-JP-CN-EU-RU&start=1996&view=chart>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

⁷⁰⁴ World Bank, **Researchers in R&D**, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

⁷⁰⁵ US Department of State, **Address by President Bill Clinton to the UN General Assembly**, 27.09.1993, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm>, accessed on 30.01.2018.

Therefore, the regional crises that require the use of hard power and the terrorist attacks targeting the soft power of the United States emerged as direct threats towards this approach. However, there were indirect threats as well. In this context, the EU, as an international actor which emerged in a 'peace zone' and on liberal values, was an indirect rival towards US's soft power. Similarly, Japan's and China's advances in technology were an indirect threat towards US's image constructed on being the center of scientific production.

In short, the United States, which forms a soft power over the image of the country as the driving force of globalization, has been able to enter the market of many developing countries which have been partially entered or never entered due to the Soviet Union. Moreover, its relative power has improved because it does not use hard power but instead used soft power, so it created no additional cost. The correlation between the decline in the share of developing countries in the global economy and the increase in the share of the United States confirms this.⁷⁰⁶ However, the fact that the third world has become a fully-backed area will trigger major economic problems and conflicts. Thus, these states, which have turned from the non-aligned movement to the 'Global South', will constantly need the intervention of the 'North'.⁷⁰⁷

Finally, the development and use of PGMs, which will be discussed in the next section, has played an important role not only in terms of American hard power but also in terms of soft power. Because the destruction of WMD in the Cold War led to the return of conventional weapons. But it was cost-effective for the use of these weapons, as well as for destruction. In the period when the United States would seek global hegemony and seek the defense of liberal values and democracy, this situation could turn into weapons that undermined these assertions, which therefore seemed unlikely to be used. The United States, which will set its hegemony on its soft power, has come up with a PGMs. With this technology, which is considered to have hit only 'targets', it was hoped that US would be able to intervene only with 'pin point

⁷⁰⁶ Gülten Kazgan, op.cit., p. 61.

⁷⁰⁷ For a comparative table on the transformation of these countries, see. Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, **The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 248. For original source, see also, World Bank, **World Development Report 1992**, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/995041468323374213/pdf/105170REPLACEMENTOWDR01992.pdf>, pp. 196 and pp. 218-219.

operations' without damaging the civilians and environment. This led to the strategic use of this cost-cutting technology as a supporting instrument of American soft power.

The most important point in which the use of this technology combined with soft power was the active use of the UN in the first decade of post-Cold War period. In line with this understanding initiated during the George Bush era, and largely activated during the Clinton era, the elements that threaten world stability were either caused by failed states or by aggressive leaders. This was the area where countries could cooperate to intervene collectively. The fact that the United States becomes a 'security guarantor and deterrent force' to use its PGMs when necessary has allowed it to withdraw from being a force that makes direct interventions. This helped to shift its resources into soft power fields. Thus, while the United States acts as the financier of various interventions, other countries became the providers of ground troops and military bases. Thus, the UN, as a cost-cutting and legitimacy provider, gained an important function for the United States.

The active use of the UN provided significant benefits for the US regime in one other area, the nuclear regime. In this respect, US has shifted to a unilateral 'counter-proliferation' approach in post-Cold War period, rather than multilateral 'non-proliferation' approach which was shaped in Cold War period and guaranteed by NPT. Accordingly, the United States has set out to implement a sanction mechanism, including military options, against actors who have not signed the NPT, who have withdrawn from the NPT, or who consider that they have violated the NPT explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the United States wants to eliminate the possibility that the geopolitical balance formed after the Cold War will be shaken by the emergence of a new nuclear power.⁷⁰⁸ In this regard, the US agenda on counter proliferation policy would be established on the capacity of terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons, or the possibility of 'rogue states'⁷⁰⁹ giving these weapons to those groups.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰⁸ Herfried Münkler, "İmparatorluklar...", p. 190.

⁷⁰⁹ The concept of rogue states is a term used for states that communicate with terrorist groups and try to harm their enemies through these groups, because they cannot directly target them as a result of their capacity inadequacy. There is no consensus on the definition of the concept and the existence of such as a state. The spread of the concept was after the Bush administration's 2002 Security Strategy document. For a study evaluating how it was read the relationship between rogue states and nuclear weapons, see, Ashok Kapur, "Rogue States and International Nuclear Order", **International Journal**, Vol 51 No 3, 1996, pp. 420-439.

⁷¹⁰ For a study based on data on why states would never give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, see, Keir A. Lieber and Darly G. Press, "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists", **International Security**, 2013, Vol.38 No.1, pp. 80-104.

In light of all these factors, the situation seemed quite bright for the United States during the first decade of post-Cold War period. There was no geopolitical center which can challenge it and additionally US had a good relative position was in the four pillars of structural power. However, the element that would undermine its position, increase its costs, and undermine its position among states by causing significant damage to his soft power would come from the type of actor he did not expect. NSAs will re-organize terrorism in a new model and initiate a process that will have a significant impact on American relative power. That will change the strategic environment.

The 9/11 attacks will damage the ideational hegemony that the United States provides in the security field in the short term. The military activities and the unilateral initiatives that have been increasing after these attacks will damage its soft power in the medium term. These attacks, which will be examined in the details two sections below, will cause the United States to engage costly operations instead of gradually controlling the changing global balances. Meanwhile, same process will significantly improve the relative positions of US's potential global rivals, the EU, Russia and China.

The first of these actors, the EU, appeared as an prominent actor in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which transforms the community into an Union from an economic community. Nevertheless, the area where the EU will be a rival to the US during this period will be a related with soft power. In the post-Cold War regional crises, and especially in Bosnia and Kosovo Crises, the EU experienced its inefficiency by defense infrastructure and needed US-NATO support. EU will make attempts to balance the US in the economy and normative areas after these experiences. One of the most important of these will be the opposition of the unilateral attempts by the US.

Russia and China, on the other hand, are in a relatively backward position after 1991, but will quickly undergo recovery. In the first decade of the post-Cold War period, China had developed rapidly, but still behaved low profile, while Russia had entered into a serious socio-economic crisis. In the first five years after the disintegration, the GDP of Russia decreased by %50, the average life expectancy reduced by 2 years, the swap economy became widespread due to the problems in money payments, and many 'healer' cases had started to be observed because of the

collapse of health system.⁷¹¹ China will transform its great manpower into economic advantage to improve its current situation and will enter a very rapid growth trend. Russia will improve its economic situation even if it is not as fast as China. However, Russia will reconstruct its re-emergence on hard power, energy politics and geopolitics,.

In this context, the doctrine declared in 1993 stated that the territory of the former USSR would be the area of vital interest of Russia and would not be indifferent. The military formulation of this approach was Karaganov Doctrine. With this doctrine, the approach that Russia would not be the first to use nuclear weapons was abandoned and it is declared that the RF troops could be deployed for RF-CIS security. It was also emphasized that the arms transfers would be preferred for financing this strategy. Gradually, Russian troops began to control the borders of the Central Asian-Caucasian states, and it was noticed that the Russian minority in former USSR countries could be the reason for intervene. With these doctrines, RF aimed economic recovery, protection of 25 million Russian dispersed to reigon and control the energy sources.⁷¹²

As a result of this process, since the second decade of post-Cold War period, Russia and China collectively, not as alone, could appear as a core of a potential counter power. The transformation of Shanghai Five to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 1996, is important in that perspective. In this context, one of the first documents published by the SCO, will be on counterterrorism.⁷¹³ That document will be an alternative approach to American counter terrorism understanding. Since then, both states will increase their influence steadily.

In parallel with the fact that the system-determining forces of the post-Cold War period started to rise with the 2000's, unilateral preferences of the US will increase the various tensions and competition. In this context, it would be correct to say that unilateral US practices have been increased since the end of Cold War. In this context, although the United States has increased its weight in peacekeeping missions, there has been a shift from the UN to NATO in addressing security issues. In this context, even in the first 5 years after 1991, where US influence was highest, about 15% of the

⁷¹¹ Gülten Kazgan, op.cit., p.101.

⁷¹² Sergei Grigoriev, "Rhetoric and Reality: Post-Soviet Policy in the Near Abroad", **Harvard International Review**, Vol 19 No 1, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 20-23.

⁷¹³ This document will be held in following section.

military conflicts were discussed and solved in the UNSC.⁷¹⁴ In this period, the first 'out of area intervention' will be carried out by NATO and NATO's enlargement period has begun.

Accordingly, NATO's enlargement process has been initiated with cooperation models. In this context, NATO has embarked on a broader function by overcoming the former function of being a regional defence organization, with initiatives such as Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialogue. States that feel insecure about the threat posed in post-Cold War period and especially perceive the risks that may occur after the disintegration of Yugoslavia have started to consider NATO as a solution mechanism. NATO, which wants to expand its sphere of influence through these countries, and if possible, wants to make these countries member, responded these concerns positively. However, NATO behaved very carefully in order to maintain cooperation without creating a sense of besieged Russia and thus maintaining stability in Europe.⁷¹⁵ PfP played a critical role as a process that emerged as a result of such an understanding. After this process, almost all of the former Eastern Bloc countries have become NATO members. After Vladimir Putin became president in Russia, this partnership program will be approached with suspicion and a sense of besieged. Russia's changing policy will show itself on the basis of discourse and then on the basis of action.⁷¹⁶

The decline of the role of the UN over NATO will turn into an unilateralism that neglect the role of international community will be formulate by the Bush Doctrine, and will change the face of the strategic environment. This process, which will attract the reaction of not only actors like Russia and China but also actors in the 'Western allies' of US like the EU, will extend to a 'transatlantic divide' in the process of the 2003 Iraq invasion. It would therefore not be wrong to say that the period when the United States reduced its costs and improved its relative power began to reverse with the engagement of the Bush Doctrine. For this reason, it would be useful to move to the military background by placing emphasis on the 2002 National Security Strategy

⁷¹⁴ Frank R. Pfetsch, "Yeni Devredeki Savaşın Rolü", in **Yeni Yüzyılda Yeni Dünya Politikası**, edited by Hans Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, translated to Turkish by Müjdat Kayayerli, Ankara: Sinemis Yayınevi, 2005, p.139.

⁷¹⁵ Tarık Oğuzlu, **NATO Ortaklıkları ve Türkiye**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, pp. 14-16.

⁷¹⁶ See II.D.1 section for the approach and response of Russia to the strategic environment that the United States wants to design.

document, which reveals the change in the strategic environment of that period and provides the background of military engagement.

"We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by (...) defending United States (...) at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the treat before it reaches our borders. While United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country."⁷¹⁷

2. Military Background and Its Effects on Costs

The end of the Cold War has also started important discussions on the military background. According to this, many researchers argue that conventional conflicts between states are no longer likely to be seen,⁷¹⁸ and that this is replaced by new wars based on different dynamics.⁷¹⁹ Beyond this, comments have been made that the element that stopped the conventional conflicts was not cold war,⁷²⁰ but that the war would have a negative impact on the interdependence⁷²¹ based global economy. Those who oppose this, responded these ideas as Mearsheimer expressed as *"if any war could have convinced Europeans to forswear conventional war, it should have been World War I, with its vast casualties."*⁷²² Those who support this approach states that a similar economic growth, interdependence and the decline of interstate war⁷²³ were existed in pre-WWI period, and thinkers like Norman Angell as well,⁷²⁴ and they add that these approaches could not foreseen and prevent the apparence of the following wars.⁷²⁵

⁷¹⁷ The White House, **The National Security Strategy of the United States of America**, September 2002, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, accessed on 24.05.2018.

⁷¹⁸ Michael Mandelbaum, op.cit., pp. 20-38.

⁷¹⁹ Mary Kaldor, **"New and Old Wars..."**.

⁷²⁰ John Mueller, **Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War**, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 219 and p. 222. Cited by Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure...", pp. 44-79.

⁷²¹ For the study which explains the role of interdependency and its effect on international environment, see, Robert E. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited", **International Organization**, Vol. 41 No 4, 1987, pp. 725-753.

⁷²² John Mearsheimer, "Back To The Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", **International Security**, Vol 15 No 1, 1990, p. 30.

⁷²³ Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, **Globalization in Question**, London: Polity Press, 1996.

⁷²⁴ For Norman Angell's famous thesis see, Norman Angell, **The Great Illusion**, New York: Putnam's Sons Press, 1910.

⁷²⁵ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future...", p. 42.

The post-1991 period, especially in the first decade, was an interesting period to support all these theses. On one hand, civil wars and NSAs are observed in many regions of the world, while on the other hand states have come together in the light of norms and practiced collective military interventions. In parallel with these, states have not given up their armaments to a conventional war. For an example, in the EU, as a 'peace zone' there has been an improvement in the opposite direction of expectations. The Union has initiated an initiative to build a European defence infrastructure that is likely to withdraw from NATO in the medium term. As a result of all of this, it can be said that the fundamental military structure continued but the infrastructure has been reshaped with many new components added to it.

In this context, it can be alleged that there are two basic elements that affect military background during this period. The first is RMA, which function as a cost-cutter. Based on PGMs based on electronic infrastructure and advanced surveillance technology, this revolution has progressed to implement largely in post-Cold War period. Second and cost-rising element is, new strategic use of international terrorism. Terrorism, which has been increasingly applied in post-Cold War period, has emerged as a method that will neutralize these cost-cutting technologies in many areas.

In order to understand how PGMs played as cost-cutter component, first it has to be focus on increasing costs. In addition to the cost increase of the methods applied in conflicts, the costs have increased steadily due to the complexity of weapons technologies and the role of protection systems.

In this context, the complexity of the munitions has increased costs, shorten the duration of the products, and as a result, increased the costs steadily. Tanju Akad summarizes the overall cost increase over a period of nearly 50 years:

“You could have ordered 500,000 artillery shells in World War II and bought them in a few months. Or if you have enough money, you could double the production of fighter planes in six months. If you order a missile today, you can get it at the earliest perhaps a year later and its storage life is much shorter than a cannon. In the Second World War, each of the great powers produced at least a thousand (for some, thousands) aircraft each month. Today, annual production around the world does not reach hundreds of units. Most orders are received in 2-4 aircraft parties per month, provided that they start three years later. These materials can not be kept in stocks because they are decaying or do not function technologically. (...) The United States, the country with the highest capacity for weapons production, was unable to replace the materials it had lost in Vietnam and had to borrow from its allies.”⁷²⁶

This general trend in the cost increase has been reflected in all areas of defence. The first of these reflections was observed in tanks. It would be useful to compare this increase with the M-60A3, which was launched in 1979, over today's Abrams tanks. According to this, the production cost of A M-60A3 is around 2 million dollars, while the production cost of Abrams tank exceeds 8 million dollars.⁷²⁷ The total cost of the M60 is 50,39 dollars per mile, while in Abrams this is 159,74 dollars per mile. In parallel, fuel prices multiplied by 3.5 units and spare parts prices by five units. The price of the HEAT bullet is 127 dollars in M60 and 1033 dollars in Abrams.⁷²⁸

The cost increase in the navies had a more pronounced effect than the increase seen in tanks. The cost increase in naval forces, which is important in terms of construct hegemony, has significant effects. In this context, the most important force required by the US to maintain its economic and political position after the Cold War was the naval forces. In order to secure trade and energy transmission lines, control critical transit points and intervene in the crisis regions in a short time, the naval forces laid the foundation for American strategy and continued through this Cold War. In this respect, the US strategy is similar to the British Empire strategy, another naval force. When the USSR was a global power, it also created an effective naval force to intervene in remote regions. Unlike Britain, however, the most important problem that the US (and USSR for a short while) faced was the dramatically increasing cost of

⁷²⁶ Mehmet tanju Akad, “**Strateji Üzerine...**”, pp. 78-79.

⁷²⁷ The production cost of the M-60A3 tank was calculated over Saudi Arabia's order in 1983. Saudi Arabia paid 176 million dollars for 100 M-60 A3 tank. For further information, see, Army Guide, **M60A3**, <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product476.html>, accessed on 15.06.2018.

⁷²⁸ George Friedman, “**Savaşın Geleceği...**”, p. 178.

shipbuilding and the vulnerability of these expensive ships by relatively cheaper weapons in face of emerging technologies.

Accordingly, shipbuilding, which is much cheaper for Britain, has begun to bring significant costs to the US at the beginning of the Cold War due to developments in systems and technologies. As a matter of fact, the cost of battleship construction increased by 200 times within a hundred years between 1850-1945.⁷²⁹ A comparison give more idea on this development. The production cost of the ship named Maine, which was built in 1896 by US, exceeded 4.7 million dollars, while the production cost of the ship named Iowa, which was built in 1940 by US, exceeded more than 100 million dollars.⁷³⁰ Thus, after the Cold War, the United States, acting with the claim of being the only superpower, introduced more cost to control more space and to be involved in more conflicts.

Furthermore, unlike the ground forces, this area will create a significant cost due to the cost of construction of each ship. Thus, the cost crisis of Germany and then of the USSR experienced before, began to be reflected in the USA. Moreover, the importance of the strategy of the US based on aircraft carriers, which are critical to the crisis intervention, is a cost source, since the cost of aircraft carriers between 1920 and 1980 has increased by 2000 times.⁷³¹ There is a similar increase for submarines. As Kaldor expresses, “*the Gato class submarine cost 5500 dollars per ton in the Second World War, while Trident cost 1.6 million dollars per ton.*”⁷³²

The most important reason for the increase in the costs of the ships is that they became an open target after the development of missile technologies and the establishment of highly developed protection systems for these ships. Systems have been developed to protect ships and aircraft carriers, which are almost never maneuverable in the face of missiles, in the middle of the seas, from cannonball, mines, torpedoes, portable missiles, and advanced missiles. In this context, the Aegis system used by the United States is an example of this.⁷³³ This system, which is used to cover

⁷²⁹ Philip Pugh, **The Cost of Seapower**, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986, pp. 166-169.

⁷³⁰ Siegfried Breyer, **Battleships and Battlecruisers (1905-1970)**, translated to English by Alfred Kurti, London: McDonald and Jane's Press, 1973. Cited by George Friedman, “*Savaşın Geleceği...*”, p. 215.

⁷³¹ Philip Pugh, **The Cost of Seapower**, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986, p. 201.

⁷³² Mary Kaldor, **The Baroque Arsenal**, London: Hill and Wang Press, 1982, p. 18.

⁷³³ For an analysis and video of Aegis system see, CSIS, **Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence**, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/aegis/>, accessed on 11.03.2018. See also, Lockheed Martin,

a ship and/or fleet, which is normally intended for a large area, has inevitably increased costs. In addition to all this, the first of which was seen in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was aimed that the ships could shoot and/or launch missiles more far after the targeted ships were targeted with portable missiles. This is another factor that increases costs. And finally, in non-preventable attacks, the cost of equipping ships with more robust armour to keep the damage to a minimum has been another factor.

The most obvious aspect of the increase in cost was the air forces. In this context, the cost of defense systems of the B-Stealth aircraft, which is considered not to be detected by radar systems,⁷³⁴ increased to more than \$ 1 billion. It is stated that this aircraft, which can carry 25 tons of bombs, can only be used in some sensitive tasks due to its cost.⁷³⁵ More importantly, beyond the cost per unit of air elements, there is a cost increase from the use of air power. Acting in accordance with the strategic bombardment logic, the fleets act as a group of bombers and planes with various classes protecting them, as described below. And according to the calculations made in this aspect, the money required for the protection of US bombers in 1995 required each aircraft to spend as much as the defense budget of Brazil or Indonesia in 1994.⁷³⁶

This is where the importance of RMA arises. Because, it provides a technological infrastructure that can make the work done so high costs much cheaper. In this context, the technological innovations that started to be applied in a holistic manner after 1991 find their roots in the competition of the Cold War period.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), pioneered by the Reagan administration, had a strategic orientation to gain political advantage by re-launching the arms race, putting the USSR economy under great pressure.⁷³⁷ However, the 'sensors revolution', which is the basis for SDI related works, has opened the door to the great developments that triggered a process later called 'revolution in military affairs'. Since SDI's work had the idea of detecting and destroying missiles that could throw to the United States was to be eliminated in the air, it is needed sensors to perceive these missiles and then 'smarter' systems to shoot them. In this respect, sensors developed by the 1980s

Aegis Combat System, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/aegis-combat-system.html>, accessed on 11.03.2018.

⁷³⁴ It has been noted that it was detected in some cases.

⁷³⁵ George Friedman, "**Savaşın Geleceği...**", p. 43.

⁷³⁶ Ibid, p. 371.

⁷³⁷ Oral Sander, "**Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...**", p. 453.

emerged as⁷³⁸ laser, infrared image,⁷³⁹ infrared homing,⁷⁴⁰ visible light, synthetic aperture radar,⁷⁴¹ millimeter wave radar⁷⁴² and acoustic sensor.⁷⁴³ As can be seen from the sensors in question, to determine a target and to shoot at it, getting near to the 'distance of sight' that has been done throughout history has eliminated. Thanks to sensors operating through a variety of observation tools, especially satellites, detection of vehicles has become very easy, risk-free and cheap. The fusion of this innovation with missile technology greatly facilitated the target of large war vehicles such as tanks and ships. It also affected the conventional superiority USSR in the Europe as well. After the dissolution of the USSR, it will be one of the main strategic elements of the United States as a cost reduction.

In this context, the most important feature of PGMs is that their ability to hitting targets at a minimum cost. It has been considered a significant cost-cutter because it eliminates the need to getting close to a target in order to hit it, and often does not require more expensive defence systems to protect itself. So, instead of attacking fleets or squadrons with tens of thousands of dollars of planes in each operation, each costing hundreds of millions of dollars, it was a very logical option, to get results with missiles of around one million dollars. Moreover, the ability of PGMs to make 'pinpoint' shootings, has led to a belief that it would end operations that resulted in massive deaths without distinction between civilian-military targets, thus creating an important political cost.

It is possible to compare this effect of PGMs over the development line of aircraft usage (hence the cost). The loss of a large number of aircraft during the World War II brought the idea of using 'fighter planes' to escort these aircraft and prevent enemy aircraft from only hitting the bomber aircraft. This arrangement also increased the costs while it was securing the operation. Response to this development has been the development of anti-aircraft weapons. However, this was also a significant cost-increaser, because, according to calculations made in the Second World War, 162.000.000 anti-aircraft bullets were needed to shot a plane flying 100 m/s at an

⁷³⁸ James Rawles, "A Missile Guidance Primer", **Defence Electronics**, 1989. Cited by, George Friedman, **Savaşın Geleceği**, çeviri Enver Günsel, İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2015, p. 181.

⁷³⁹ Infrared image of the spectrum to detect and convert to image

⁷⁴⁰ Makes detection via directing the cooling systems to heat source

⁷⁴¹ a method that can be used by satellite or airplane

⁷⁴² a short radar sensor to show objects that are invisible to the naked eye.

⁷⁴³ makes detection of engine noise

altitude of 8500 feet.⁷⁴⁴ Then, the aircraft have enlarged, air replenishment was added to this, in order to drop more bombs to the targets. Later, simultaneous bombings were implemented with fleets based on the launch of a large number of bombs. This method became dominant to be sure the target was definitely destroyed. In this context, according to calculations made in the Second World War, “*a bomb pattern delivered by a single combat box of 18 bombers had a %75 probability of one hit out of 108 bombs. (...) 54 bombers had hit probability of %98,5. (...) If (...) 108 bombers use, then the probability of one hit was %99.9.*”⁷⁴⁵ This 'strategic bombardment' approach emerged during World War II continued in the following years with more advanced bombers and fighter aircraft, accompanying tanker aircraft, electronic signal-intercepting aircraft, more sophisticated weapons and protection systems, and ultimately doubling costs for each of these aircraft.

However, the PGMs were working on the opposite logic. Just as the atomic bomb alone did the same damage what an entire fleet did, the PGMs could have the same effect without risking the planes and costing them. In this context, Friedman summarizes the transition from conventional munitions to PGMs:

“Traditionally, the projectile has been a hunk of iron –sometimes with an explosive inside– tapped by its trajectory. The new projectile both senses its surroundings and can make sense of it. Thanks to the development of lightweight, relatively low-cost sensors and the ubiquitous microchip, the controls and intelligence that had previously been concentrated in the tank gunner are now being reconcentrated in the projectile itself, with men pretty much excluded from the loop. The entire range of weapons –from cruise missiles right down to the hoary antitank round fired by a gun– has been affected by this shift toward the centralization of function into the projectile.”⁷⁴⁶

In this context, it can be said that the technologies that affected the armed conflicts in the 1990s and later, or, in other words, the RMA, actually integrated the systems developed during the Cold War into the military space by bringing them together into *system of systems*. According to this, satellites were first developed for aerial

⁷⁴⁴ Kenneth P. Werrell, **Death From The Heavens: A History of Strategic Bombing**, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009, p. 17.

⁷⁴⁵ Cited by George Friedman, “**Savaşın Geleceği...**”, pp. 277-278. For original sources, see, Haywood S. Hansell, **The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler**, New York: Arno Press, 1980, pp. 289-294. and Lee Kenneth, **A History of Strategic Bombardment**, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons Press, 1982.

⁷⁴⁶ George Friedman, “**Savaşın Geleceği...**”, p. 182.

surveillance, then for communication,⁷⁴⁷ computers were developed for communication, then for multiple targets, and missiles were developed to transmit nuclear headers. But after the Cold War, they were brought together in integrated systems within the concept of PGMs in an upper system. Thus, a military understanding based on these weapons has become ready to be used in wars. The first implementation of this would be the Gulf War.

According to this, it would be useful to include a table showing the number of bombs needed to hit the 60*100 feet area and the number of planes needed to drop them.

War	Number of Bombs (tonnes)	Number of Required Aircraft
Second World War	9070	3024
Korean War	1100	550
Vietnam	176	44
Gulf War	30	8

Table 2.15: Requirements for Hit Area of 60 * 100 Feet in Selected Wars⁷⁴⁸

The impact of the revolution in military affairs has also been observed in surveillance vehicles. This innovation in surveillance has made the difference between those who have this technology and those who are not. For example, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) developed and Joint Surveillance and Target-Attack Radar Systems (JSTARS), developed by United States, have the characteristics of observing very large areas and selecting very small vehicles in these wide areas. Developed by the radar system placed under the Boeing 707/767 aircraft, this system can observe an area of 50,000 km², while it can choose individual vehicles with zooming in this area.⁷⁴⁹ This situation has revealed that those who do not have such systems should receive support. Thus, a limited number of power with these technologies, has the opportunity to direct conflicts to very low costs. Until the

⁷⁴⁷ Although the satellites have been on the basis of the military race since Sputnik, their active use in the surveillance area has not been realized until the RMA based on digitization. Until this period, it has been considered as part of the missile technology. The reason for this was the technical deficiencies in the Cold War era in which it emerged. In the first space surveillance used during this period were based on cameras attached to the satellite. When the observation ended, the released camera fell to the base via the balloon. This technology transformed to snapshots after digitization.

⁷⁴⁸ George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", p. 329.

⁷⁴⁹ Air Force Technology, **JSTARS – Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System**, <https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jstars/>, accessed on 24.02.2018.

appearance of UAV, these surveillance vehicles have provided significant advantages to their own countries.⁷⁵⁰

From these aspects, it can be considered that new technologies are the basic military element. However, the course of the transformation of the conflicts shows that the fact that ground and naval forces are the main elements of the military background has not changed. In other words, despite the changes seen in military technology, another trend that had an impact on the background of this period has been the increasing role of internal conflicts. In the case of Rwanda, considering that 500.000-800.000 Tutsis were killed only by 'machetes', there was a big problem that the current military development could not be overcome. The necessity to use ground forces to intervene in such conflicts has brought with it the problem of 'who will be engaged' to these conflicts. The answer to this was the "peace keeping forces" created under the leadership of the United States during the period when the US was the system dominant actor. Since peacekeepers have served in a wide scope, like ending the conflicts to protecting civilians or providing humanitarian aids,⁷⁵¹ the cost of engagement, especially the political cost has increased.

The solution for this cost has been to finance operations, but to put as few soldiers on the field as possible. In other words, countries with technological and financial superiority use these advantages to avoid political costs, whereas countries without such advantages send their troops to this region. As an example, according to 2008 figures, *the annual cost of a US soldier is 81.235 dollars, of Canada soldier is 62.903 dollars, of Portugal soldier is 7.692 dollars, of Turkish soldier is 3.148 dollars and of Poland soldier is 2.700 dollars.*⁷⁵² The cost difference will be held from various perspectives by the countries that provide financial support and the countries that provide troops.

⁷⁵⁰ However, these tools will be relatively overlooked after the use of drones. Thus, they will be referred to as *hangar queens* because of their space and maintenance costs. Valerie Insinna, **JSTARS Recap is Officially Dead**, 24.07.2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/07/24/jstars-recap-is-officially-dead/>, accessed on 01.08.2018.

⁷⁵¹ The seizure of humanitarian aid has been one of the important tactical applications of local forces. To give examples of Kosovo for the size of these aids: "By the end of May 1999, over 4666 tons of food and water, 4325 tons of other goods, 2624 tons of tents and nearly 1600 tons of medical supplies had been transported to the area." KFOR, **Facts and Figures**, <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history/facts-figures>, accessed on 12.01.2018.

⁷⁵² Mahmut Güler, "1949'dan 2008'e NATO", Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, <http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index2.xhtml>, 11.04.2008. Cited by Serhat Güvenç, op.cit., p.51.




Figure 2.6: Top Five Providers of UN Missions (2010)⁷⁵³

The transformation of understanding seen in the RMA and peace missions after the Cold War has made a difference in terms of NATO's burdens, which were previously built against the Soviet threat. In this context, the United States, which is able to confront the Soviet threat, has distributed vast portion of its responsibility within NATO, to its European allies upon the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the arrival of regional crises in European continent.

Country	1985		1990		1995	
	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden	Average Benefit Share	Defence Burden
France	7,70	5,79	9,30	8,45	9,28	10,12
Germany	9,37	5,58	11,76	8,39	14,25	8,72
Italy	6,58	2,12	8,61	4,64	7,10	4,10
Spain	3,25	1,10	4,42	1,80	4,07	1,83
Turkey	2,62	0,65	2,91	1,05	2,95	1,40
UK	6,92	6,51	7,96	7,89	7,32	7,17
US	52,61	72,82	43,27	60,74	46,46	60,87

Table 2.16: Relative Defence Burdens and Benefits in NATO by Selected Countries (1985-1995)⁷⁵⁴

The EU's tendency towards this new structure was initially to create an independent European defence infrastructure. In this context, first, 'Petersberg Tasks'

⁷⁵³ UN, **United Nations Peacekeeping**,

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf>, accessed on: 30.04.2018.

⁷⁵⁴ Binyam Solomon, "Nato Burden Sharing Revisited", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 15 No 3, 2004, pp. 254-255.

declared in 1992 to define the areas of activity and operational power of the Western European Union (WEU), which was established in Cold War years and assigned as the defence arm of the EU but in a dormant position.⁷⁵⁵ It was decided that member states give power from their own forces to carry out these tasks.⁷⁵⁶ The United States called this situation as ‘European Security Defense Identity’ (ESDI) and required that EU activities should contribute to NATO's European pillar. In addition to this ambiguous situation, the ‘grey zone’ emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after 1991 has started to discuss whether NATO or the EU will be included in the security area. These discussions have determined the EU's response to regional crises and the effect of Russia.

In this context, the weight of NATO was repeated as a result of the EU's failure in the Bosnian crisis. The EU has announced that it will intervene in areas such as humanitarian operations, collective security and rescue missions. Nonetheless, independent European defense initiatives have not come to an end. At the Malo Summit in 1998, France and Britain initiated a new process of reconciliation of Europe as a defense system. However, this time it was seen that the EU was insufficient against the possible intervention of Russia after the Kosovo crisis. Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of a NATO base in the region, the main framework of relations has been established. According to this, the Berlin Plus treaty, which regulates the principles of the use of NATO resources by the EU, has largely clarified the issues that the US would not accept in this case. Madeline Allbright, the US Secretary of State, has explained these three issues with ‘3D’.⁷⁵⁷

Thus, after 1990, the so-called ESDI was transformed into European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2000s. In this context, first, Javier Solana was appointed as the High Commissioner of the ESDP in 1999 and then the 1999 Helsinki Tasks were determined. According to this, until 2007, it was decided to establish an EU emergency

⁷⁵⁵ European Union, **Petersberg Tasks**, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html, accessed on 28.03.2018.

⁷⁵⁶ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, **Batının Yeni Güvenlik Stratejileri**, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2006, p. 123.

⁷⁵⁷ No Decoupling: Not breaking the transatlantic link in defence, that refers to that Europe does not make the decision-making mechanism independent of NATO. No Duplication: Europe does not produce the same defence infrastructure as it already provided by NATO. No Discrimination: Preventing the exclusion of NATO members who are not members of EU.

For details see, RAND, **The Three Ds- And A Fourth (RAND Report Chapter Six)**, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1463/MR1463.ch6.pdf, accessed on 11.06.2018.

response force of 180.000 people, 60.000 of which were operational. This goal has been achieved. In addition, the European Defense Agency was established after the 2004 Thessaloniki Summit. Following the Lisbon Summit, the term Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been used instead of the ESDP. Thus, apart from the transatlantic division seen in 2003, the European defense infrastructure was also shaped to a great extent.

At this point, the change in military background after the Cold War was the 9/11 attacks, which led to the appearance of terrorism as the fundamental element of changing military agenda. Although the strategic approach of terrorism has been examined in the first part, and the post 9/11 process will be examined in the next section, it is necessary to examine the costs of terrorism and its impact on military background.

According to this, one of the most prominent characteristics of a terrorist act is its cheapness. The cost of a bombing operation is worth tens of millions of dollars, even for PGM that uses the most advanced technology. Which is not included in the political risks. However, the bombing activity for a terrorist activity is much cheaper. Indeed, the cost of the 9/11 attacks also shows this. Comparisons make it very clear. The total cost of the 9/11 attacks on Al Qaeda is estimated to be around 500.000 dollars.⁷⁵⁸ However, the cost of this on the other side is much higher. The direct economic cost of the attacks to the United States is around 178 billion dollars.⁷⁵⁹ From a broader perspective, the table is getting worse. The cost of the armed conflicts launched by terror through the 'provocation strategy' is 1.6 trillion dollars, according to the US government's 2017 figures,⁷⁶⁰ and 5.6 trillion dollars, according to studies that do not only add to defence spending but also evaluate post-war costs.⁷⁶¹ Although it was a 'tweet' rather than an official statement, the latest American President Trump claimed

⁷⁵⁸ CNN, **September 11th Terror Attacks Fast Facts**, 24.08.2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html>, accessed on 3.7.2018.

⁷⁵⁹ CNN, **9/11 Panel: Al Qaeda Planned to Hijack 10 Planes**, 17.06.2004, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/16/911.commission/>, accessed on 03.07.2018.

⁷⁶⁰ Amy Belasco, **Congressional Research Service Report: The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11**, 8.12.2014, <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>, accessed on 15.07.2018.

⁷⁶¹ Neta C. Crawford, **Costs Of War Report: United States Budgetary Costs of Post 9/11 Wars Through FY2018**, November 2017, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Costs%20of%20U.S.%20Post-9%2011%20NC%20Crawford%20FINAL%20.pdf>, accessed on 14.01.2018.

that the total cost of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria was \$ 7 trillion, with his tweet.⁷⁶² As a result, terrorism, no matter what number is true, has made the United States the biggest defense spending boom since the Korean War.⁷⁶³ Innocent people who have lost their lives in US operations and terrorist attacks, and the cost of the decline of the soft power of the United States, are revealed as an incalculable reality.

Thus, conflicts will be affected in parallel with military background development. In this context, the process that started with the Gulf War, which is a conventional war, will continue with the peace missions in which the technologies blended with the use of multinational forces. In post-2001 period, a process of interventions, which is shaped by the struggle of states with non-state actors, will begin. These interventions will increase again the costs that have fallen before. In this respect, a repeating pattern of the Vietnam-like process will be experienced. The examination of these conflicts will display that clearer.

3. Effects on Armed Conflicts

The post-1991 period is similar to the post-1945 period in terms of the reflection of the military background to the conflicts. According to this, an important technological innovation has reduced the cost of war, while the superiority of this technological innovation has increased the engagement. The response came from a type of struggle built in a different logic that did not derive from the dominant field, and this type of struggle brought back costs. Therefore, examining the period between 1991-2009 will provide great benefits in terms of comparison.

The first conflict of this period was the Gulf War, which started in 1991. The intervention by the US-led UN coalition forces on Iraq's occupation of Kuwait also constituted a major breaking point. Because in this war, the products of RMA were

⁷⁶² RT, **Trump Says \$ 7 Trillion 'Foolishly Spent' in Middle East'**, 23.12.2017, accessed on 27.08.2018. The Cost of War Project, which calculates the figures by adding human costs, stated to Trump that his estimate of using project's data was incorrect and stated that the figure they calculated was 5.6 trillion dollars. For the statement, see, The Cost Of War Project, **The \$5,6 Trillion Price Tag of the Post 9/11 Wars**, 23.05.2018, <https://watson.brown.edu/news/2018/56-trillion-price-tag-post-911-wars>, accessed on 03.06.2018.

⁷⁶³ National Commission on Terrorit Attacks Upon the United States, **The 9/11 Commission Report**, 2004, <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>, accessed on 28.06.2018, p. 361.

tried and the success was achieved beyond expectations. This also affected the engagements in the following period.

Before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's strategy was to prolong a conventional war as much as possible, to increase the number of dead and wounded Americans in this extended war. As a result of this, Hussein expected the withdrawal of the Americans who had experienced Vietnam, and many who were still in 'Vietnam Syndrome.' Hussein summarized this strategy as "*yours is a society that cannot accept 10.000 dead in a war,*"⁷⁶⁴ when he expressed this idea to the American ambassador in Iraq. These words were a threat which was constructed on reminding the possible costs of war.

However, in a changing strategic environment, the United States was very prepared for the process. Despite its economic power, it will be able to finance war through its allies. This will be the first factor to greatly reduce the economic cost of the war for the United States.




Figure 2.7: Variation in United States War Financing Strategies⁷⁶⁵

Militarily, the United States, which uses PGMs and surveillance systems most effectively, will achieve one of the greatest military successes ever observed. For

⁷⁶⁴ Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, "Savaş Sonrasında Dünya...", p. 430.

⁷⁶⁵ Rosella Cappella Zielinski, **Costs Of War Project Report: How Do War Financing Strategies Lead to Inequality? A Brief History from the War of 1812 Through Post 9/11 Wars**, 28.06.2018, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Cappella%20Zielinski_June%202018_War%20Financing%20and%20Inequality.pdf, accessed on 12.08.2018, p. 3.

American history, the Gulf War, which is the shortest period of time, will also be the war in which the least amount of resources is used and, above all, the loss of soldiers. Moreover, in return, the casualties of the Iraqi people are enormous. Despite the loss of 85,000 dead and 175,000 prisoners of war by the Iraqi army, the allies have lost only 234 dead and 479 wounded.⁷⁶⁶ Thus, in Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi army, with a total of 650,000 people, was withdrawn from the war in only 6 weeks. This resulted in the most successful conventional war with the loss rate.⁷⁶⁷ Thus, the rate of German capture in Poland and the rate of Israeli capture in 6 Days War left behind by Americans.⁷⁶⁸

This great success of the United States in the military field has been achieved through the successful integration of RMA-based systems into the conflict. Accordingly, the coalition army first eliminated the air defence system and communication infrastructure of the Iraqi army without using any conventional units or vehicles, only with PGMs. Then, the Iraqi army's decision-making and communication infrastructure was targeted with PGMs without taking any risks. As a result, the Iraqi army, which could not communicate with each other, gave significant human losses and was divided into pieces by the Air Forces, which couldn't have stopped by Iraqi air defence system. These small pieces were destroyed or captured by ground forces as the final phase of the operation. In other words, the conventional ground war, which Saddam Hussein had been waiting for, was fought to achieve the final result, after everything was finished.

In spite of all these developments, no one had expected such a big impact in the Gulf War. According to this, the estimates made about the losses of Allied armies before the Gulf War ranged from 10.000 to 30.000 soldiers.⁷⁶⁹ Instead, the loss of

⁷⁶⁶ Oral Sander, "**Siyasi Tarih Cilt II...**", p. 570.

⁷⁶⁷ However, since the Gulf War was defined as the goal to prevent Kuwait's occupation and a great victory (100 hours in the ground war) in a very short period of time, it was intended to send a message to the international community. As of the hour, the operation was completed. These objectives also constituted some of the issues that would later bring about the second Gulf intervention. According to this, the rest of the Iraqi army was withdrawn at the end of the operation, and among those who were withdrawn, there were the Republican Guards, who were then the elite soldiers, who would be the basic basis of the regime. In addition, some of the military equipment that the regime could use could not be confiscated or destroyed. Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, "**Savaş Sonrasında Dünya...**", p. 432.

⁷⁶⁸ Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict", **International Security**, 1996, Vol.21 No.2, pp. 139-179.

⁷⁶⁹ George Friedman, "**Savaşın Geleceği...**", pp. 318-319.

hundreds and the enormous damage inflicted in return will have a major impact on the US military approach, creating a strong tendency to intervene directly into many crisis areas as the only superpower.

War	Tonnage	Sortie	Loss	Loss/Sortie	Loss/Tonnage
First World War	138	28.000	289	%1,302	2.094
Second World War	2.150.000	1.746.568	18.369	%1.052	0.009
Korean War	454.000	341.269	605	%0.177	0.0013
Vietnam War	6.162.000	1.992.000	1.606	%0.081	0.00026
Gulf War	60.624	29.393	14	%0.048	0.00023

Table 2.17: The Decrease of the US Air Force Loss Rates ⁷⁷⁰

The great success of the United States in the Gulf War will also affect the way it intervenes in the crises that have occurred in the following years. The United States will begin to offer significant staff to many peace missions. However, after a case in Somalia, the way in which the U.S. intervenes will change, even if it is not the understanding of intervention.

In this context, the form of direct US intervention in internal conflicts is shaped by Somali intervention. The United States's first tendency was to create a peace force by the UN, terminate the conflict by giving the force as many soldiers as possible, and then to shape peace as the most powerful state in the world. In this respect, the United States at the head of the Somali operation provided 28.000 soldiers of the 37.000-strong peace mission.⁷⁷¹ However, the killing of 18 American soldiers in an attack during an operation, the injury of 78 soldiers and the shotting down of two Black Hawk helicopters with the most advanced technologies of that time have created an important break. Moreover, it was decided to withdraw the US troops after the images of the dead American soldiers who were dragging in Somalian streets and were seen by the American public.⁷⁷²

⁷⁷⁰ For original source see, Richard P. Hallion, **Storm Over Iraq**, Washington: Smithsonian Press, 1992. George Friedman re-compiled this data to compare the losses of Allied Forces. George Friedman, "Savaşın Geleceği...", p. 328.

⁷⁷¹ Colin S. Gray, "War, Peace and...", p. 225.

⁷⁷² For images that give rise to a great reaction by the American public, see, ABC News, **US Casualties in Somalia**, <https://abcnews.go.com/Archives/video/oct-1993-us-casualties-somalia-11229194>, accessed on 30.07.2018.

This case will have very important effects. The first one is the change in the way the United States evaluate the peace operations. NATO and the EU are also actively involved in the operation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the other allies have contributed significantly, and thus the 'adequate number' has been provided. However, in Rwanda, where a genocide occurred, a very late and very limited support has been provided. Another important consequence was that NSAs who wanted to create a strategy against the United States could understand new ways to effect American public opinion and politics to a cheaper budget. This experience will then be one of the key elements of Al-Qaeda's strategy on terrorism.

In the post-Cold War period, Somali case will be noted as the first case in which the intervention decision of the international community is inadequate. With the effect of this experience, it can be said that the tendency to engage in interventions that only affect the relative position of the United States has occurred. In this context, such as the Bosnian case, the United States has been directly involved in cases where allies have taken on different roles. However, in cases where strong allies could not be found, such as Sierra Leone case, adequate intervention could be very delayed.

This change after Somalia will have its first impact in the Bosnian conflict. The process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, which started in mid-1991, turned into a major conflict in Bosnia in following year. In this context, the Serbian forces, which controlled 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina and besieged the Muslim capital Sarajevo, started one of the longest-lasting siege (3 years) in European history.⁷⁷³ This process has revealed a situation which cannot be solved by conventional forces or PGMs like ethnic cleansing, organized rape and displacement.⁷⁷⁴ But in this case, which took place in Europe, unlike the examples that took place in Africa during the same period, the intervention could implement as a result of the reconciliation of US, EU and NATO. In this case, which implemented as NATO's first 'out of area' operation, it was understood that the conventional weapons in the internal conflicts were usually meaningless and therefore needed to maintain constant control of the ground forces.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷³ Jonh R. Lampe, "Bosnian Conflict (1992-1995)", 24.03.2009, **Encyclopedia Britannica**, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-conflict>, accessed on 20.05.2018.

⁷⁷⁴ Nesrin Kenar, **Bir Dönemin Perde Arkası: Yugoslavya**, Ankara: Palme Yayınları, 2005, pp. 165-189.

⁷⁷⁵ Gareth Winrow, "NATO and Out of Area: A Post-Cold War Challenge", **European Security**, Vol 3 No 4, 1994, pp. 617-637.

According to this, for the first time in post-Cold War conflicts, the process was controlled by an intervention in which the necessary interventionist rate⁷⁷⁶ was provided and the road to Dayton peace talks could be established. It can be said that the United States has taken a fundamental lesson in the future of armed conflicts. Accordingly, taking into account the cost of building large military units in the region to be intervened, the understanding of providing ground forces from allies and supporting these forces financially and technologically gained importance. In this context, Bosnia operation constitutes a good example for this understanding. United States used PGMs and air forces to target Serbian conventional forces and decision making centers. However, the following peacebuilding process and control of militia groups was made by European NATO allies. In the light of this experience, US troop contribution to the peace missions will be gradually decreased.

Year (October)	1993	1994	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Rate	%5,56	%1,2	%5,34	%4,28	%4,08	%3,01	%2,29	%1,68	%1,5	%1,08

Table 2.18: Rate of American Soldiers in UN Missions (1993-2003)⁷⁷⁷

The change in the US approach to peacekeeping missions has been observed not only in terms of troop contribution, but also in financing. In this respect, following the negotiations on the proposal of Richard Holdbrooke, the UN representative of the United States, in 2001, the share of the United States in the peacekeeping budget has been reduced from % 31 to % 22.⁷⁷⁸

In this way, the US approach to the post-Cold War conflicts has been largely shaped in the post-Bosnian process. Seeing that the critical process in such conflicts is peace-building processes, the United States is focused on providing critical air support by keeping the military on the ground at a minimum. After preparing the background for this under the NATO umbrella, it left ground forces and, therefore, peace-building activities to its allies, especially to the EU. The benefit of this approach will be clearly seen in Kosovo intervention.

⁷⁷⁶ For a table comparing the rate of military power required for a population of 1000 person, see, Figure 1.4.

⁷⁷⁷ Data composed from UN, by various years. For main source see, UN Peacekeeping, **Troop and Police Contributions**, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed on 25.07.2018.

⁷⁷⁸ A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, op.cit., p. 139.

In 1999, NATO intervened to the conflict between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK).^{*} In the context of Operation Allied force, over 38,000 flights have been carried out for 78 days,⁷⁷⁹ 10.484 of which are air strikes, while Belgrade and other critical Serbian areas have been shot up as well as the Serbian army's targets in Kosovo. Although this process forced Serbia to start the negotiation process and paved the way for Kosovo's independence, it has also been experienced that the attacks by the Air Force did not succeed in finding and destroying all Serbian weapons, or in largely neutralising the forces against the Kosovo forces.⁷⁸⁰ Therefore, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was established with around 50.000 troops and peace-building activities were largely carried out by EU.⁷⁸¹

The United States, which only participates in the Kosovo operation with NATO air force and thus benefits at a low cost, has also been caught in an illusion and the tendency to intervene directly has increased. According to this, as long as the US was operating from 'air' and found partner state(s) or local power(s), which would manage the peace building process, it was only necessary to set up a NATO base. This belief, based on that air interventions with PGMs are capable of achieving low cost results, would give the shape of US engagements in post-2001 period. Max Boot evaluates this belief in a comparative manner:

“Although it is a mistake to think that every intervention risks becoming another Vietnam-style disaster, it is equally wrong to suppose that every intervention can be as painless as the Kosovo War, which produced no casualties (and only two lost airplanes) among NATO forces.”⁷⁸²

In order for the United States to understand this illusion, it will need to be provoked by 9/11 attacks, which was made by Al-Qaeda, the rising threat to US for a while, by one of the most brutal methods possible.

^{*} UÇK: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosoves

⁷⁷⁹ NATO, **NATO's Role In Kosovo**, 15.10.2007, <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm>, accessed on 22.02.2018.

⁷⁸⁰ Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, “Savaş Sonrasında Dünya...”, pp. 440-441. See also, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, **Kosovo One Year On**, October 2000, <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/report-en.pdf>, accessed on 25.04.2018, pp. 13-16.

⁷⁸¹ KFOR, **Contributing Nations by Years**, <https://ifcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/contributing-nations>, accessed on 12.01.2018.

⁷⁸² Max Boot, **The Savage Wars of Peace**, New York: Basic Book, 2014, p. 364.

Although terrorism is a method that goes back to ancient times, its implementation as a strategy is in post-Cold War era. The maturation of this strategy was also a result of the evolution of terrorism in the light of lessons learned from the 10 years of conflicts since the end of old War. In addition, some extremist groups, which have seen the process from a different political context, have also transformed this political assessment into a part of their political strategies.

Accordingly, the first lesson was taken in the first Afghanistan war involving the cooperation of US-Islamic extremists against the USSR. The ‘mujahideen’ who fought in Afghanistan began to understand US approach to the conflicts and its methods. This process was also the origin of a transnational müjahideen network. The 1991 Gulf War was an important element in shaping political assessments. In this war, especially Saudi Arabia's permission to US troops and bases, and also the entrance of most of the Muslim populated countries in UN force against Iraq, created the perception that nation states are under the control of US. Following years continued with re-organization process of the aforementioned transnational network. In fact, this process gave the first frame of Al-Qaeda's political goals. Friedman outlines this ‘learning’ process:

“The returning fighters drew some conclusions from their experience. First, Islamic countries are not by nature weak. (...) Second the current leadership of the Islamic world was weak and corrupt and could not possibly lead this fight. Finally, the United States, as the only superpower and a Christian state, had to be humiliated if the psychological dependency on the United States wants to be broken—and, more important, in order to generate confidence among Islamic masses.”⁷⁸³

Another process of learning also realized in practical area simultaneously the process of political construction. In this context, the Chechen insurgency against Russia between 1994 and 1996 have also provided significant practical experiences, beside other experiences like the Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, mentioned above. In this context, Chechen experience can be considered as the first example of the continuous use of terrorism as a strategic method. According to this, the insurgents who could not resist the intervention of RF on the basis of mechanized units, and who were retreat to the mountains, responded with the methods of terrorism. Several suicide

⁷⁸³ George Friedman, “**Amerika'nın Gizli Savaşı...**”, p. 38.

bombings, including the Beslan massacre,⁷⁸⁴ shooting two Russian airliners down, and also a large number of small terrorist acts have taken place.⁷⁸⁵ In this respect, the transformation of conflict is remarkable. The insurgents first tried to wage guerrilla war against the Russian army through the region they defended. But after their defeat in this area, they attacked instead of defending and used terrorism as an attack method. Similarly, in the Chechen War, the disclosure of the murdered Russian soldiers over the Internet will result in a Russian public opinion similar to the American reaction to the Somalia case. Thus, for the first time a terrorist strategy will give a political result. In the First Chechen War, Russian troops had withdrawn. This success will be carefully observed by the future leadership of Al-Qaeda, who has also played an active role in the Chechen conflict.

Al-Qaida leadership team, which has taken lessons from all these experiences, has started its first attacks by completing its organization. This strategy, which is largely new, will create a major disturbance in the threat perceptions of states that are based on traditional strategies. In other words, the fact that terrorism dealt with provocation as a strategy left decision-makers in a difficult position.

In this context, in pre-9/11 period, it was a long-standing question of whether an attack on U.S. territory could be carried out and which defense concept should be preferred in the terrorist attacks. This was due to certain problems. The first of these was the possibility that the attacks would provoke a great reaction when the perpetrators did not undertake the attack. The second was the difficulty in which country and region would be covered by the attack, which would target terrorists, who don't stay in fixed location. At this point, the concern was the risk of gaining the enmity (or accidental guerillas with Kilcullen's words) of a wider audience due to an attack that was faulty or poorly explained. Indeed, in the discussions after the USS

⁷⁸⁴ Chechen terrorists have taken students and teachers hostage in a school in the Beslan District of Ossetia. Then the Russian army organized an operation. As a result, around 400 people, half of them children, died. Euronews, **Beslan Baskını Üzerindeki Sis Perdesi Geçen 10. Yılda da Aralanmadı**, 01.09.2014, <http://tr.euronews.com/2014/09/01/beslan-baskini-uzerindeki-sis-perdesi-gecen-10-yilda-da-aralanmadi>, accessed on 18.06.2018.

⁷⁸⁵ According to Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Chechen rebels made 601 terrorist attacks toward Russian targets in and outside Chechnya, between 1991-2001. For the list of attacks see, Global Terrorism Database, **Search Results: 601 Incidents**, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=6&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1991&end_yearonly=2001&dtp2=all&country=167&count=100&expanded=yes&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table, accessed on 16.08.2018.

Cole ship attack, which Al Qaeda only made for 50.000 dollars,⁷⁸⁶ it was stressed that a kind of missile attack seen in the previous examples⁷⁸⁷ would not create a political outcome, but rather gain more enemies to the United States. Economist magazine commented this dilemma as *“if they have created 10,000 new fanatics where there would have been none, they will be judged a mistake, but that will not be known for years, if ever.”*⁷⁸⁸

This dilemma will be met by the Bush administration with an understanding that terrorist acts will not come to an end unless there is a decisive military response, and therefore a comprehensive response should be given to eliminate the source regions of terrorism. This approach to the Bush Doctrine will be implemented under the slogan ‘war on terror’ following the 9/11 attacks. The first dimension of this doctrine is that it connects the phenomenon of international terrorism, which is not a territorially qualified, to the territoriality. In this context, territorial states became target, who considered to give opportunity to terrorist organizations. The ‘failed states’ and the ‘rogue states’ concepts used to clarify this dimension. According to second dimension, it is emphasized that the terrorist organizations who find the opportunity in failed states or supported in rogue states in means of organization, training and financing, could be able to target United States. In the third dimension, the pre-emptive strikes emphasized, which aims to target terrorist organizations and the states which gives the opportunity to them, before terrorist attack occurred in US territory. Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy document outlined the main framework of this approach, then will be expressed by Bush in a shorter manner:

“Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. (...) Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁶ Yemen açıklarındaki gemiye zodyaklarla yapılan intihar saldırısında 17 Amerikan denizcisi ölmüş, 40'ı yaralanmıştır. Gemiye batırmak hedefine ulaşılamamışsa da, gemi de zarar görmüş, bölgeden çekilmek durumunda kalmıştır.

⁷⁸⁷ Suicide attacks to American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

⁷⁸⁸ The Economist, **Punish and be Damned**, 27.08.1998, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/1998/08/27/punish-and-be-damned>, accessed on 19.08.2018.

⁷⁸⁹ The White House, **Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People**, 20.09.2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, accessed on 24.05.2018.

In summary, the Bush administration defined terrorism politically and placed all the similar structures (states) that could be related to terrorism to its target board. It was also quite ambiguous in defining the supporter states (failed or rogue), and demonstrating where the struggle against terrorism would reach. It was exactly what al-Qaeda wanted to expand its war.

A conventional war, instead of a method of struggle that is appropriate to the nature of terrorism, will lead the United States back into a 'prolonged war' after Vietnam. Even if this war will proceed as the US wishes and the Taliban government will be overthrown in the short term, there will be no political outcome due to the nature of the conflict. This will lead to the longest war in US history.⁷⁹⁰ The first successful phase was similar to other post-Cold War interventions: the elimination of the enemy with Air Force and PGMs, and the initiation of peacekeeping operations in coordination with the local elements to establish the new order. However, the peace building activities will not be as easy as it thought.

In this context, the biggest problem of the United States in Afghanistan has been the inability to reveal new institutions to build peace. In this context, the tendency of many allied tribes and group leaders to turn into warlords⁷⁹¹ in the post-military victory period has led to a lack of reliable political regime in Kabul. As a result, the peace-building activities remained largely to NATO troops, which consist largely of American soldiers. However, U.S. plans were based on previous experiences. It was based on the idea that the war would be fought and the first construction would be shared with its allies, and then the local partners would be willing to build their own country. In this way, the war was accompanied by huge gains in return for very low cost, as was the case in the last 10 years. However, after the awareness that the reality in the field was not the same as in the plans after 2002, American troops began to participate in the peace building activities. In this context, soldiers have become

⁷⁹⁰ Adam Taylor, **These Are America' Longest 9 Foreign Wars**, 29 March 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/29/these-are-americas-9-longest-foreign-wars/?utm_term=.5831936ff4d8, accessed on 30.07.2018.

⁷⁹¹ Kimberly Zisk Marten, "Warlords as Stakeholders", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol 83 No 4, 2004, pp. 149-150. See also, Kimberly Zisk Marten, "Warlordism in Comparative Perspective", **International Security**, Vol 31 No 3, Winter 2006/2007, pp. 41-73.

‘social workers’.⁷⁹² In addition, the cost of the US soldier as a social worker is much higher than the cost of the US soldier as a warrior. In this context, the annual cost of a US soldier, who is one of the 100.000 soldier troop at that time, was 1 million dollar. As a result, only this dimension costs US to 100 billion dollars annually.⁷⁹³

Whether Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants carry out an unconventional war, or whether the peace-building activities failed partly, will prolong the conflict. Moreover, the conflict will expand in Pakistan as well. In addition to this, the failure of the soldiers to become a social worker and the death of many civilians will cause the Taliban to become stronger by the day.

	Deaths	Injuries
Afghanistan		
<i>Afghan Civilians</i>	31419	40977
<i>Afghan Military and Police</i>	30470	17000
<i>Taliban and Other Militants</i>	42100	19000
<i>US Forces</i>	2371	20179
<i>US Allies</i>	1136	3800
<i>Contractors</i>	3540	15348
<i>NGO Workers and Journalists</i>	406	299
Pakistan		
<i>Civilians</i>	22100	40792
<i>Security Forces</i>	8214	14583
<i>Taliban and Other Militants</i>	31000	11415
<i>Contractors</i>	90	134
<i>NGO Workers and Journalists</i>	145	87

Table 2.19: Estimated Total Direct Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-mid 2016)⁷⁹⁴

The US-led invasion of Iraq, which has been initiated about 1.5 years after the Afghanistan intervention, and which has initiated before the consequences was observed, will cause the United States to confront all the negative elements of Afghanistan experience. Unlike the Afghanistan intervention, without the support of

⁷⁹² Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations(Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p. 276.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Neta C. Crawford, **Costs of War Report: Update on the Human Costs of War Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016, August 2016**, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf, accessed on 25.04.2018.

the international community, without creating a legitimate ground, an occupation based on unilateral aggression will result in a great reaction to the United States. This reaction will soon manifest itself as a wave of terrorism.

Contrary to the Afghanistan war in which the USA was caught unprepared, the fact that the occupation of Iraq is a planned process has revealed that the mistakes are caused by a problem of understanding. The problem of this was the initiation of the occupation with the understanding that eliminating the Iraqi army with its existing technological superiority would be sufficient to achieve political results. The first signs of this problem were seen in the pre-war cost estimates. The first signs of this problem were seen in the cost estimates made before the war. Joseph Stiglitz summarizes the error of this approach by the statements of the high officials of Bush Administration.⁷⁹⁵ According to this, Larry Lindsey, the President of the National Economic Council said that the possible cost could reach 200 billion dollars.⁷⁹⁶ However, this estimate was found very high by Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, and interpreted as *nonsense*.⁷⁹⁷ Paul Wolfowitz hoped the development cost would be low enough to be achieved by oil revenues.⁷⁹⁸ Rumsfeld also believed that the cost would be between 50-60 billion dollars, and that part would be financed by other countries, just like the first Gulf War.⁷⁹⁹ However, this war, which costs trillions of dollars, will become one of the biggest black holes for the United States, which can only be financed by external borrowing as an exception in US history.⁸⁰⁰

The United States will understand the real cost only after the inter-state conflict is over. In this context, as in Afghanistan, the groups in which he had previously agreed to overthrow Saddam would declare that the United States should return home with the end of the war. When the United States responded negatively to this demands and begun occupation, the trend of a variety of attacks against the United States –as opposed to each other - begun. In this context, first of all, a Shia insurgency has started in the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr. Certain groups in the Gulf countries, which are

⁷⁹⁵ Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, **Üç Trilyon Dolarlık Savaş: Irak Savaşının Gerçek Maliyeti**, translated to Turkish by Dilek Cenkçiler, Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 2009, p. 7.

⁷⁹⁶ Bob Davis, **Bush Economic Aide Says the Cost of Iraq War May Top \$100 Billion**, 16.09.2002, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032128134218066355>, accessed on 29.05.2018.

⁷⁹⁷ Cited by Stiglitz, “**Üç Trilyon Dolarlık Savaş...**”, p. 7.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Rosella Cappella Zielinski, op.cit., p. 3.

concerned about Iran's growing population in the region, have also given indirect support to Al-Qaeda, which is organized under the leadership of al-Zarqawi.⁸⁰¹ As a result of this process, it was understood that the situation in Iraq transformed to an insurgency. In this context, David Petraeus, who was a COIN expert and says “*every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation*”⁸⁰² will be the responsible of COIN based re-construction process.⁸⁰³

In this context, the lack of cost financing that started in the post-war period has become a much more serious problem after the growth of the insurgency. Compared to the difference between the two Gulf Wars, the picture is more clearly revealed. In the first Gulf War, there was a military force of about 600.000 people supported and financed by US allies. However, during the Second Gulf War, the operation started with 150.000 soldiers.⁸⁰⁴ In the short term, the difference gave the idea that it will not bring a great cost, because of the less number of soldiers comparing to the first Gulf War. Despite the fact that US was the only supporter of 150.000 soldiers, the shortness of the inter-state war used as the verification of the aforementioned idea. And the *Mission Accomplished* speech, made by George W. Bush in May 2003 as a ‘victory speech’, was a representation of this idea. However, when it was understood that the issue was a peace-building and COIN activity, it was also understood that the number of soldiers was very low. This inability has turned to losses, and eliminated the sense of confidence in the newly established regime, which is the basis for building peace. This will lead to greater security problems in the medium and long term and, of course, costs. This so-called ‘credible commitment trap’⁸⁰⁵ has been the most important problem preventing political results.

In this context, continuous policy changes also disrupt the reliability of the established institutions and decision makers, thus leading to further investment that requires more costs. In this context, it would be useful to include the evaluation on

⁸⁰¹ Max Boot, “**The Savage Wars...**”, p. 341.

⁸⁰² Cited by Peter R. Mansoor, “The Second Iraq War”, in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations (Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p. 254.

⁸⁰³ David Petraeus will then be the Director of the CIA.

⁸⁰⁴ Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, “Savaş Sonrasında Dünya...”, p. 450.

⁸⁰⁵ Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, “Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq”, **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 22 No 6, 2011, p. 630.

Afghanistan, made by Rory Stewart, chairman of the Defence Committee of the UK House of Commons:

“We [the U.S. and its allies] armed militias in 2001, disarmed them through a demobilization program in 2003, and rearmed them again in 2006 as defense forces. We allowed local autonomy in 2001, pushed for a strong central government in 2003, and returned to decentralization in 2006. First we tolerated opium crops; then we proposed to eradicate them through aerial spraying; now we expect to live with opium production for decades.”⁸⁰⁶

Thus, both the intervention of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq will create unforeseen huge costs and repeat the Vietnam experience for United States. The short-term reflection of rising costs will be dead and wounded soldiers, and the medium-term reflection will be economic and political costs.

	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Iraq	Total
US Military ²	2,371 ³		4,489	6,860
US Contractors ⁴	3,540	90	3,481	7,071
National Military and Police ⁵	30,470 ⁶	8,214 ⁷	12,000 ⁸	50,684
Other Allied Troops ⁹	1,136		319	1,455
Civilians	31,419 ¹⁰	22,100 ¹¹	137,000 - 165,000 ¹²	190,519 – 218,519
Opposition Fighters	42,100 ¹³	31,000 ¹⁴	36,400 ¹⁵	109,500
Journalists and Media Workers ¹⁶	24	53	221	298
Humanitarian/NGO workers	382 ¹⁷	92 ¹⁸	62 ¹⁹	536
TOTAL	111,442	61,549	194,000 - 222,000	366, 991 – 394, 991

Table 2.20: Direct War Death in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2016) and Iraq (2001-2015)⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁶ Rory Stewart, **Afghanistan: What Could Work?**, 14.01.2010, <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/01/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/>, accessed on: 29.02.2018.

⁸⁰⁷ Costs Of War Project, **Human Costs of War: Direct War Death in Afghanistan ad Pakistan (Oct. 2001-July 2016) and Iraq (Oct. 2001- Apr. 2015), August 2016**, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2016/direct-war-death-toll-iraq-afghanistan-and-pakistan-2001-370000>, accessed on 30.04.2018. This list doesn't include 800.000 civilian deaths as well.

Category	\$ Billion
DOD and State (Overseas Contingency Operations or OCO) FY2001-2016	1,742
Other War-Related: estimated additional DOD base budget (\$733 B) and Veterans (\$213 B) spending, FY2001 - FY2016	946
Homeland Security spending for prevention and response to terrorism, FY2001- FY2016	548
Interest on borrowing for wars, FY2001-FY2016	453
<i>Total War Appropriations and War-Related Spending through 2016</i>	<i>3,689</i>
Estimated Future Obligations for Veterans Medical and Disability 2017 - 2053 ⁸	1,000
FY2017 Request for DOD and State OCO, incl. Afghanistan, Iraq/Syria	66
FY2017 Request for Homeland Security for prevention and response to terrorism	37
<i>Total Spending and Future Obligations through 2053</i>	<i>4,792</i>

Table 2.21: US War-Related Spendings in 2016 Dollars (in post 2001 Wars)⁸⁰⁸

The holistic reflection of post-2001 wars will be appeared on American relative strength. Accordingly, the relative strength of the United States, which ameliorated its economic situation while reducing the costs, showed significant improvement in the post-1991 process. However, its direct interventions, initiated after 9/11 attacks, will reverse the process. While costs increase, revenues will decrease.

⁸⁰⁸ Neta C. Crawford, **Costs of War Project Report: US Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: \$4.79 Trillion and Counting**, September 2016, <https://www.brown.edu/web/documents/nosearch/2016CostsofWar.pdf>, accessed on 30.04.2018.

Year	Defence Share of GDP ⁸⁰⁹	Growth Rate of GDP ⁸¹⁰	US Share of World GDP ⁸¹¹
1990	% 5,3	% 1,91	% 27,18
1991	% 4,6	% -0,07	% 25,07
1992	% 4,7	% 3,55	% 25,73
1993	% 4,3	% 2,74	% 26,62
1994	% 3,9	% 4,03	% 26,31
1995	% 3,6	% 2,71	% 25,53
1996	% 3,4	% 3,79	% 26,12
1997	% 3,2	% 4,48	% 27,74
1998	% 3,0	% 4,45	% 29,32
1999	% 2,9	% 4,68	% 30,18
2000	% 2,9	% 4,09	% 30,68
2001	% 2,9	% 0,97	% 32,18
2002	% 3,2	% 1,78	% 31,66
2003	% 3,6	% 2,80	% 29,61
2004	% 3,8	% 3,78	% 28,02
2005	% 3,8	% 3,34	% 27,06
2006	% 3,8	% 2,66	% 26,97
2007	% 3,8	% 1,77	% 25,02
2008	% 4,2	% -0,29	% 23,18
2009	% 4,6	% -2,77	% 23,96

Table 2.22: Relationship Between GDP Growth and Military Expenditures in US (1990-2009)

The result of the short and medium term reflections mentioned above will be a strategy change. Just like in Vietnam, the US, whose resources are not enough to overcome the new methods of opposing force, will start to implement more indirect strategies. Thus, it will attempt to reverse its deteriorated relative position.

In summary, as a result of this whole process, once again the cycle has been completed, and the relative power that is recovered by decreasing costs has deteriorated again with increasing costs. In this respect, 2009 can be assumed as a breaking point for the transformation. US has consistently spent its resources into these

⁸⁰⁹ SIPRI, "Military Expenditure Database...".

⁸¹⁰ World Bank, GDP Growth (annual %), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2008&locations=US&start=1990&view=chart>, accessed on 05.06.2018.

⁸¹¹ World Bank, GDP (Current US \$), <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2008&locations=US-1W&start=1991&view=chart>, accessed on 05.06.2018.

‘black holes’ until 2009, which points that US awared the costs of these black holes. Although US remains the most prominent power in the world in many respects, many states have increased their relative power in parallel with declining power of US. This power transition will be the main element shaping the strategic environment after 2009.



D. Hybrid Wars Era: Increased Costs, Transforming Engagements

II

As the period after 1991 is similar to the period after 1945 in terms of cost-commitment relations, the period after 2009 is similar to the period after 1972 in terms of the same relationship. The belief that increasing costs create a black hole has brought with it the quest for more indirect ways to achieve the political outcome. As with the cases and periods where indirect methods have been applied, the chance of obtaining results has decreased, but the chances of preventing competing forces from getting results have increased. Above all, all these activities have been made at a lower cost. Therefore, examining this final period through three components in accordance with the review plan will also explain the final component of the study.

1. Strategic Environment

The most important characteristics of the post-2009 strategic environment, shaped by the international interventions led by the United States and within the framework of a major global economic crisis, will be the declining relative strength of the United States and the emergence of states that are likely to be able to balance the United States when they are united. Although these states do not challenge, they will criticize the US unilateralism and take various alternative initiatives. However, these alternative initiatives will be criticized by the United States as well.

The US intervention after the 9/11 attacks and the security measures it has taken will have an impact on both the American national capacity and the American soft power. The United States will then take a back seat not only to take over costs, but also to undermine the image that it is the primary part of interventions. This approach, which is being carried out through local elements, will begin to be referred to as

‘leading from behind’ motto.⁸¹² Similarly, the fact that the United States has put forward hard power in the Bush era and that military engagement will continue to use hard power has started new searches in terms of conceptually. In this direction, in the United States, which wants to continue its emphasis on soft power, but continues to practice hard power, the concept of ‘smart power’, which blends the two concepts, has been emphasized.⁸¹³

In this context, the decline of the United States in the sense of soft power has shown itself in the loss of support in the Islamic geography. Accordingly, the answers to the questions of a survey conducted after the invasion of Iraq provide important data.




Figure 2.8: America's Motives in Iraq War According to Selected Countries⁸¹⁴

⁸¹² This understanding has developed and created a debate over the US position during the “Odyssey Down” operation in 2011 towards Libya. For a study evaluating this approach over neo-classical realism, see, Kevin Marsh, “Leading From Behind: Neoclassical Realism and Operation Odyssey Down”, **Defence and Security Analysis**, Vol 30 No 2, 2014, pp. 120-132. For a study evaluating this approach over the humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect, see, Simon Chesterman, “Leading From Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya”, **Ethics and International Affairs**, Vol 25 No 3, 2011, pp. 279-285.

⁸¹³ Although the concept gained popularity with statements that Hillary Clinton used in 2009, it was originally developed by Nye in 2003. However, it is significant and important to stand out in 2009. For a response article on the process, see, Joseph S. Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”, **Foreign Affairs**, Vol 88 No 4, 2009, pp. 160-163. Beside, the concept of ‘sharp power’, which is used to meet the activities of Russia and China, is becoming widespread with similar content. For a study addressed through this approach, see, Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil and Jessica Ludwig, “Forget Hearts and Minds”, **Foreign Policy**, 14.09.2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/forget-hearts-and-minds-sharp-power/>, accessed on 18.09.2018.

⁸¹⁴ Pew, op.cit. p.19.

Another point to be considered at this point is the negativity of the approach to the US in Islamic geography, while the other thing to note is the high percentage of negative responses given in the US ally countries. This approach will first manifest itself with the transatlantic division and will influence the transatlantic relationship in a decreasing ratio for approximately 10 years. When its declining soft power combined with an attack and the image of a ‘humiliated’ country, obstacles have been set in the way that the United States acts as a defender of liberal values.

Another impact of the armed conflict on the US relative force in post 9/11 period is seen in the relationship between military spending and political gain. It would be useful to make a comparison to reveal this.

	Duration of War (Years)	Funding of War	% of Military Spendings to GDP (average)	% of American Share of World GDP (average)
Korean War	3 years	%100 Taxes	% 12	% 48
Vietnam War	10 years and 2 months	%80 Domestic Borrowing, %20 Taxes	% 7	% 35
Post 9/11 Wars	17 years (Afghanistan), 9 years (Iraq)	%60 Domestic Borrowing, %40 Foreign Borrowing	% 4	% 24

Table 2.23: Selected American Wars and American Relative Power⁸¹⁵

As shown in the table above, the most vital impact of wars is the cost, as well as the overall economic situation of the country at the time of the cost. According to this situation, which reveals the relationship between the use of armed violence with the relative power, although the US spends much more of its GDP in the Korean War, it did not create any pressure due to its general economic situation. In addition, this war ended in 3 years and cost 341 billion dollars with 2011 figures.⁸¹⁶ For this reason, the entire economic cost can be met from American taxpayers.

However, the Vietnam War, despite the cost of a lower GDP ratio, the US has reduced the share of the world economy and the war has taken a greater burden due to

⁸¹⁵ The information composing the table is compiled from different parts of the study.

⁸¹⁶ Stephen Daggett, **Costs of Major US Wars**, 29.06.2010, <https://fas.org/srg/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf>, accessed on 27.06.2018.

the longer and has affected the relative strength. With the 2011 figures, the total cost of this war, which cost us 738 billion dollars,⁸¹⁷ has shown itself in the funding of the war. Only % 20 of this war met governments with taxes, and the rest with medium-term domestic borrowing.

The post-2001 wars revealed a more negative picture. These wars, which lasted much longer than other wars, were costly because the share of the US in the global economy decreased even though it was met with a smaller expenditure rate. As a matter of fact, these wars, which can be covered by % 60 domestic borrowing and %40 by external borrowing, amounted to at least 1.5 trillion dollars⁸¹⁸ by 2011 figures and created cost for American taxpayers in the long term. Thus, comments were made that 'a modest US strategy',⁸¹⁹ which re-assesses the priorities of United States, is needed in post-2001 wars, which could not afford to pay a huge tax burden on US citizens, and not able to continue for a long time.

In parallel with the declining relative power of the United States, Russia and China have entered the process of progress. In this context, Russia restructured its military power and showed its reflections on geopolitics. Similarly, China has made great progress in the economic field and has spread it all over the world. Furthermore, structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS platform, where the two forces meet, will be an alternative to the US's structural power sources.

In this context, it would be useful to first consider Russia's relative position. The date when the approach transformation began in Russia was 2000 and the date that could be considered as a breakpoint in terms of its reflection to the international environment was 2007 November. Putin, who was elected president of Russia in 2000, served in this position for 8 years. Then he transferred his position to Medvedev and went to the prime minister, but his influence in the administration did not decrease. Putin, who is the president again in 2012, is the most prominent decision-maker of Russian security and foreign policy.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid. As mentioned earlier, these figures are the official figures presented to the US Congress. Considering other dimensions of the war, it is stated that even in 2011, the cost reached 4 trillion dollars.

⁸¹⁹ David A. Schlapak, "Towards a More Modest American Strategy", *Survival*, 2015, Vol.57 No.2, pp. 59-78.

In this context, Putin described Russia as a ‘global power’ and stated that it is aimed to put Russia among the top 5 economies in 2020.⁸²⁰ Putting forward his vision with the three-legged⁸²¹ security strategy concept he first published in 2000, Putin published a comprehensive security strategy document three years later. In the light of these documents, the 2007 Munich Security Conference will constitute a breaking point. This speech will be made into a state policy with the 2008 Medvedev doctrine and will display its first implementation in the Five Days War with Georgia. Updating this infrastructure was with the 2013 Security Strategy Document. In 2014, the military doctrine was updated and this update will show its reflection with the hybrid war in Ukraine.

In the first step of this process, which demonstrates the transformation of Russia, the 2000 concept and the 2003 National Security Strategy document are included. The most important differences in these doctrines, which resemble the ‘Near Abroad Doctrine’, are the emphasize that the military authority is subordinate to the civilian and the statements that nuclear power can be used if necessary.⁸²² In other words, Russia declared that it would not hesitate to put the most important trump card on the field against those who want to limit the sphere of influence and emphasized that it would preserve its integrity in the light of the Chechen-like threats.⁸²³

In addition, instead of liberal democracy, the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ developed by Russian intellectuals came to the fore.⁸²⁴ It is also declared that Russia could be the first to use nuclear power. In addition, it is emphasized that crises in the border regions may be the cause of the intervention. Furthermore, the issue of foreign Russians is also shown as a cause of interference.

⁸²⁰ Andrew C. Kuchins, Amy Beavin and Anna Bryndza, **CSIS Report: Russia’s 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of International Integration**, July 2008, <http://www.ifpa.org/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=m46W8x-J5YVMdd8CpsjrBRKmqohrel1CgYISQrAYrd4>, accessed on 10.07.2018.

⁸²¹ Foreign Policy, Security and, Military Fields.

⁸²² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, **National Security Concept of the Russian Federation**, 10.01.2000, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/589768, accessed on 09.07.2018.

⁸²³ Andrei P. Tsyanov, “Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power”, **Post-Soviet Affairs**, Vol 21 No 2, 2005, p. 143.

⁸²⁴ Phillip Casula, “Sovereign Democracy, Populism and Depoliticization in Russia”, **Problems of Post-Communism**, Vol 60 No 3, p. 3.

The 2000-2003 documents will be followed by Putin's 2007 Munich speech and by the 2008 Medvedev doctrine. In this context, the 2007 speech will constitute a breaking point. Until this date, the policies shaped in the light of Russia's near abroad will begin to evolve towards a reaction to the international environment.

The most important emphasis in this speech was on multilateralism. The focus of the speech is criticism of the unilateralism.

“The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either. The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? (...) it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making. (...) And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. (...) I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation. (...) Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension.”⁸²⁵

The point to be mentioned at this point is that the focus of Putin's criticism is not to the system but to the unilateral effort in system. In this respect, Putin has objected to the function of NATO and the EU and recalled the role of the UN and its importance in terms of multilateralism.

“I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. (...) The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.”⁸²⁶

⁸²⁵ Vladimir Putin, op.cit.,

⁸²⁶ Ibid.

Finally, Putin listed the element on which multilateralism is based. He stated that BRIC,⁸²⁷ as a platform where the world's rising powers come together, has the capacity and will to support multilateralism.

"The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future. There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity."⁸²⁸

Geopolitical criticism was made following criticism of the function of the system. Both the missile defense system planned to be established in Europe, and the openings towards Georgia and Ukraine were criticized. These two elements will become areas of conflict in the following years.

In the light of Russia's success in the Georgian war, the 2007-2009 global economic crisis, the beginning of Arab rebellions and the lessons learned from the Western interventions, a new regulation was made in 2013. Accordingly, the security and foreign policy document dated 2013 and the military doctrine of 2014 which completed it have been placed in the conceptual and theoretical framework of the new era.

The critical emphasis in this document is that the US hegemony is weakened and its political and economic potential is gradually declining. In addition, it was emphasized that the Arab revolts put forward identity-based policies and that the international law-violating interventions further destabilize the system. In the light of these assessments, it sets out its target at the system level: the launch of a new construction process within the UN system. The emphasis on the reconstruction of the system in this concept will then be expressed more clearly in Putin's speech at Valdai Discussion Club:

⁸²⁷ This group of countries, composed of Brazil, Russia, India and China, has been grouped by an investment analyst and later transformed into a group of collaborators for multilateralism. South Africa will then join the group and the group will begin to be referred to as BRICS.

⁸²⁸ Ibid.

“What we needed to do was to carry out a rational reconstruction and adapt it to the new realities in the system of international relations. But the United States, having declared itself the winner of the Cold War, saw no need for this. Instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential for maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep imbalance. The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty. (...)”⁸²⁹

Russia's reactions and warnings will not create the desired effect on the United States and the West. In fact, many times, especially in the Ukrainian Crisis, Russia confronted with the United States and the EU at various levels. Even it was questioned that a new Cold War is possible or not.⁸³⁰ For this reason, more effective initiatives which echoed in US, will be the efforts in which Russia and China act together. The first of these will be SCO and the second will be BRICS.

In contrast to the decline of the US hegemony, China will be another power that has progressed in its relative strength. It is perceived as the rising power that has the greatest potential for the United States. In this context, China is close to the US in almost every field, or has passed the US. Accordingly, the GDP approached the US. In addition, as a development, pointing to the next period, it has been far ahead of the US in patent applications. Moreover, it is far above the USA in terms of total reserve and its importance is seen in the 2009 crisis.

	1982	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007	2012	2017
GDP (Current Trillion US \$)⁸³¹								
<i>China</i>	0,205	0,272	0,426	0,961	1,471	3,552	8,561	12,238
<i>USA</i>	3,345	4,87	6,539	8,609	10,978	14,478	16,155	19,391
Patent Applications⁸³²								
<i>China</i>	N/A	3.975	10.022	12.672	39.806	153.060	535.313	1.204.981
<i>USA</i>	63.316	68.315	92.425	119.214	184.245	241.347	268.782	295.327
Total Reserves as Billion Dollars (Includes Gold)⁸³³								
<i>China</i>	17	22	24	146	297	1546	3388	3236
<i>USA</i>	143	161	147	146	157	277	574	451

Table 2.24: Comparative Economic Indicators of China and USA (1977-2017)

⁸²⁹ President of Russia, **Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Group**, 24.10.2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>, accessed on 09.07.2018.

⁸³⁰ Jonathan Marcus, **Russia v the West: Is This a New Cold War?**, 01.04.2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43581449>, accessed on 25.07.2018.

⁸³¹ World Bank, **“GDP...”**, accessed on 21.02.2018.

⁸³² World Bank, **“Patent Applications...”**, accessed on 21.02.2018.

⁸³³ World Bank, **“Total Reserves...”**, accessed on 21.02.2018.

In the area of security, although still significantly behind the US, the gap is rapidly closing.

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2015	2016	2017
Defence Spending (Current US million \$)										
<i>USA</i>	348,55	455,90	617,15	696,26	693,60	663,44	596,9	589,564	593,371	602,783
<i>China</i>	68,96	84,30	35,22	60,18	76,36	102,6	129,4	142,40	143,66	150,458
<i>Russia</i>	50,80	61,50	24,57	40,48	41,94	58,76	70,04	52,201	44,470	45,600
Defence Spending % of GDP										
<i>USA</i>	3,3	3,9	4,68	4,88	4,77	3,99	3,34	3,08	3,02	2,95
<i>China</i>	1,6	1,5	1,32	1,36	1,30	1,25	1,30	1,27	1,28	1,26
<i>Russia</i>	4,8	4,4	2,48	2,41	2,84	2,91	3,40	1,37	1,33	1,34

Table 2.25: Comparative Defence Spendings of USA, China and Russia⁸³⁴

In addition, China made new moves in the new security areas, like the space and cyber space. In geopolitical terms, it has significantly increased its activity in its 'geographical first circle' in means of quality and quantity. The US responded by re-activating the institutions, such as ASEAN and APEC, which had previously been relatively subordinate and inactive. It also reorganizes its relations with Japan and Austria, and seeks regional balancing parallel to global balancing.

In short, as China rose rapidly, Russia began to argue that the United States should change its post-Cold War position based on geopolitical goals and military infrastructure. In this context, the United States's approach to unilateralism, bypassing the UN and especially launching NATO at this point, has started to react. Russia has expressed its highest level of opposition to this process in Putin's 2007 Munich Security speech. Similarly, it is important that Russia and China take the support of three other Asian countries and establish the 'Shanghai Five', which will later become the SCO. Because one of the first acts of the organization was the signing of a

⁸³⁴ Datas between 2002-2006 composed from, IISS, "International Tables of Comparison", **Military Balance**, Vol 106 No 1, 2006, pp. 397-410. Datas between 2006-2008 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics", **Military Balance**, Vol 110 No 1, 2010, pp. 441-472. Datas between 2008-2010 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics", **Military Balance**, Vol 112 No 1, 2012, pp. 436-476. Datas between 2010-2012 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics", **Military Balance**, Vol 112 No 1, 2012, pp. 436-476. Datas between 2010-2012 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics", **Military Balance**, Vol 114 No 1, 2014, pp. 471-492. Datas between 2012-2014 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics", **Military Balance**, Vol 115 No 1, 2015, pp. 481-492. Datas between 2014-2017 composed from, IISS, "Country Comparisons and Defence Data", **Military Balance**, Vol 118 No 1, 2018, pp. 499-508.

counterterrorism document that envisages a perspective by creating an alternative to the US definition of terrorism.⁸³⁵ Apart from these two forces, many Muslim-populated communities and Iran, which was described by the United States as one of the countries belongs to 'the axis of evil', have expressed their displeasure with these approaches of the United States. The reactions of the radical groups within these societies have been in the form of acts of terrorism, as is known. Karaosmanoglu reveals the international environment through NATO's activities:

"NATO's new mission and responsibility areas extends from Russia to North Africa and the Middle East, from the Balkans to the western borders of the People's Republic of China. This enormous geography is Eurasia, the expanded Middle East or the Euro-Atlantic Region with NATO terminology. NATO or the United States do not dominate this region. (...)There are three forces in partnership with NATO, but also monitor NATO's activities in the region with a certain suspicion and occasional discomfort. Russia, China and Muslim societies as more vague, non-state actors. NATO cannot contribute to the stability of the region by confronting these three forces."⁸³⁶

Military technologies that will be discussed in the next section are also important in the competitiveness of these forces. International organizations are becoming an important instrument in order to integrate countries that want to have these technologies into sphere of influence and to create models of cooperation. In this context, missile systems are a good example. The USA, Russia and China have used their superiority in this field for the countries they want to establish their domain. Although China has a more commercial appearance, the other two actors have used these systems actively.

In this context, Russia has made the missile defence system an important component of its restructuring process by activating the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in its 'near abroad' area.⁸³⁷ In addition, the most important trump gained in the Syrian case was the anti-ballistic missile system deployed in this country. The United States, on the other hand, has been active through its missile defense

⁸³⁵ SCO, **The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Seperatism and Extremism**, 2001, https://read.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism_d6956b09-en#page1, accessed on 16.05.2018.

⁸³⁶ Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO'nun Dönüşümü...", p. 60.

⁸³⁷ Guy Plopsy, "Russia's Big Plans For Air Defence in Euroasia" **The Diplomat**, 07.04.2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/russias-big-plans-for-air-defense-in-eurasia/>, accessed on 23.08.2018.

systems called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) launched by NATO. In parallel to addressing the missile threat as a primary threat at the 2010 NATO summit, the four stages are planned to establish an anti-ballistic missile system that will cover the entire alliance.⁸³⁸ The key to having an impact on this system is the economic-technological infrastructure available in these countries to build such a system. As a result, missile systems have settled on the basis of a post-2009 strategic environment as an area where relative advantages are transformed into political instruments.

On the other hand, the EU has concentrated on aims such as overcoming the effects of the economic crisis, overcoming the growing perception of threat to Russia and consolidating its political power and taking a secondary role in the strategic environment. In this context, the EU's 2009 Lisbon Treaty and the new strategic concept adopted at NATO's 2010 Lisbon summit have expressed a critical turning point in which this role emerges. At the end of this period, although not as much as the Cold War era, a common sense of action against the growing impact of the NATO structure and the threat of Russia will be seen to be settling down. This process and the increasing decisive role of the United States will become even more evident after the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.

Although not an autonomous international actor, the BRICS platform is a function of balancing the relative position of the United States. In this context, it is an alternative to the structural power resources of the USA, especially through its economic power. In this context, the platform undertook an attempt to establish a monetary fund with similar functions with the IMF after the 2009 crisis.⁸³⁹ In parallel, the creation of a development bank called 'The New Development Bank' with a similar function as the World Bank (WB) is one of the most important examples of this assessment.⁸⁴⁰

⁸³⁸ The White House, **Implementing Missile Defence in Europe**, 15.09.2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/fact-sheet-implementing-missile-defence-europe>, accessed on 23.08.2018.

⁸³⁹ Başlangıç olarak 100 milyar dolarlık bir fon ile başlayan bu yapı, IMF'ye alternatif oluşturup oluşturmadığı tartışmalarını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Söz konusu tartışmaya bir örnek için bkz. Benn Steil and Dinah Walker, "Is the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement A Substitute for the IMF?", 06.08.2014, **CFR Blog**, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/brics-contingent-reserve-arrangement-substitute-imf>, accessed on 12.07.2018.

⁸⁴⁰ New Development Bank, **History**, <https://www.ndb.int/about-us/essence/history/>, accessed on 11.06.2018.

In the light of all these elements, there is a significant decline in the role of the United States in the aftermath of 2009, and in parallel with this, there is a significant progress in the Relative Strength of the alternative forces. In this context, if they do not have the capacity to challenge the United States, they can prevent the United States from advancing in the areas of structural power, and even create alternatives in some areas. This transformation was also observed by the United States and in the US Security Strategy Document published in December 2017, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea were considered among the threatening states to the interests of United States.⁸⁴¹ According to the document, *“China and Russia challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”*⁸⁴² Document identified Iran as, the country which *“supports terrorist groups and openly call for destruction,⁸⁴³ and also destabilize regions, threaten Americans and (...) allies, and brutalize its own people.”*⁸⁴⁴

Such a change in the strategic environment will show its repercussions in military and armed conflicts. Accordingly, hybridization methods will be used to prevent direct engagement in armed conflicts and costs will be reduced again.

2. Military Background and Its Effects on Costs

The cost pressures of the US experiencing in post 9/11 wars have brought forward approaches and practices by all actors to prevent it. In this context, as the previous pendulum, direct engagement is replaced by proxy actors, while the use of new technologies for the success of these actors has been one of the leading components in the practice.

Accordingly, the first element to be mentioned is the increase in cost pressure in traditional military technologies. In this regard, it is observed that the tendency to increase the overall cost since the industrial revolution continued with an increasing

⁸⁴¹ President of the United States, **The National Security Strategy of USA**, December 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, accessed on 24.02.2018.

⁸⁴² Ibid, p. 2.

⁸⁴³ Ibid, p. 7.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 2.

percentage. While the amount of vehicles in the air and sea forces is decreasing, the increase in cost is a striking example.




Figure 2.9: Inventory and Budget Deficit of US Navy and Air Forces (2018 Budget)⁸⁴⁵

The cost increases in maritime forces are caused by missile defense systems, which are designed to protect ships that become easily hit, as described in 2.c.2, and significantly increase the unit cost of each ship. In this context, the budget of the Aegis system, which has a fundamental place in the defence of American naval forces, gives a useful example when comparing the budgets of US missile defense systems.



Figure 2.10: Components of US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) Budget (2018)⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴⁵ Todd Harrison and Seamus Daniels, **Analysis of the FY 2018 Defense Budget**, 07.12.2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/analysis-fy-2018-defense-budget>, accessed on 04.03.2018, pp. 9-11.

⁸⁴⁶ Tom Karako, "Missile Defense Budget Trends", **CSIS Missile Threat Project**, 15.06.2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/colorofmoneygraphs/>, accessed on 20.08.2018.

In the air force, the cost is not only in the production stage, but also in the usage stage. In this context, it would be useful to include the hourly flight costs of some aircraft.

Plane	Class	Hourly Cost (US \$)
KC-10A	Tanker	21.170
E-3B	AWACS Radar	39.537
F-15	Fighter	41.921
B-1B	Bomber	57.807
C-5B	Cargo	78.817
B-2A	Stealth Bomber	169.313

Table 2.26: Hourly Flight Costs of Selected Aircrafts⁸⁴⁷

Military operations based on these vehicles also bring increased cost pressures. For this reason, new technological fields played a critical role as cost-cutters, and played a critical role in changing military strategies and in giving the application of conflict to different actors. In this context, UAVs are a good example. To compare the chart above over the hourly flight cost, the MQ-1 model drone's hourly cost is 3679 dollars, while the MQ-9 model drone's cost is 4762 dollars.⁸⁴⁸ As the drones begin to accomplish what planes do, there is a transformation in the strategies.

This transformation can be observed by US defence documents. According to this, the US Quadrannual Defense Review (QDR) 2014 Report reveals the military background based on new technological elements. According to this, cyber security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, air and sea security, PGM technologies, surveillance and intelligence areas and counter-terrorism are defined as the main elements that shape the defense environment.⁸⁴⁹ The emergence of these new areas has led to a transformation in defense budgets by taking an important part from conventional areas and bringing them into new areas. In this context, as the budget of the USA in 2018 displays, the majority of the budget excluding the personnel salaries

⁸⁴⁷ Mark Thompson, "Costly Flight Hours", **Time**, 02.04.2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/>, accessed on 20.05.2018.

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁹ US Department of Defence, **Quadrannual Defence Review 2014**, 04.03.2014, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, pp. x-xi, accessed on 23.05.2018.

and physical elements, which have an important place in each period, is transferred to investments in this new areas.⁸⁵⁰

In order to reduce the costs explained above, the RMA began to be doctrine as a cost-cutter and military interventions started to be shaped according to these doctrines. The most obvious expression of this approach is in Bush's *Mission Accomplished* speech, which symbolizes 'military victory' during the invasion of Iraq.

"In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred of years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities (...) Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power (...) With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians."⁸⁵¹

However, both during the occupation of Iraq and the intervention of Afghanistan, it was understood that this military doctrine has been inadequate in the face of practice.⁸⁵² The fact that the Air Force-based operations have caused intense civilian deaths⁸⁵³ due to the characteristics of the conflict has shown that the understanding of achieving military targets without harming the civilians, which stated in Bush's speech, has no practical implementation. Thus, the center of gravity of the operations shifted to the ground forces and the methods that gained importance with RMA became the elements of support. The first reflection of this experience has been the dramatic increase in the number of infantry in the field, in other words, 'boots on the ground.' This increase explained in the previous chapter did not yield the desired result and the increase of death, injury and psychological losses⁸⁵⁴ of the soldiers created two parallel trends.

⁸⁵⁰ US Department of Defence, **Defence Budget Overview**, 2018, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_Press_Release.pdf, accessed on 04.07.2018.

⁸⁵¹ The White House, **President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended**, 01.05.2003, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>, accessed on 21.05.2018.

⁸⁵² Adam Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan", *Survival*, Vol. 51, No.1, 2009, p. 29.

⁸⁵³ Human Rights Watch, **Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan**, 08.09.2009, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/08/troops-contact/airstrikes-and-civilian-deaths-afghanistan>, accessed on 01.03.2018.

⁸⁵⁴ Boots on the ground is not only about economic cost, but also includes social and political costs that will spread to other areas of society, starting with the psychological weakness seen in personnel.

The first of these trends was the withdrawal of the infantry,⁸⁵⁵ which is the ‘soft-belly of the US’, and the beginning of a proposal to build doctrine in a structure that “reduces American costs and is not based on boots on ground efforts.”⁸⁵⁶ In this context, the first step was to support the number of declining infantry with increasing number of PMCs, and to train local elements to drive to the field. Because the governments do not account for the losses of private military companies which accept all possible results by signing the contract. Similarly, local factors also eliminate political costs. Thus, even a small decline in terms of economic cost is provided, political cost is largely eliminated.




Figure 2.11: American Boots on the Ground (2001-2017)⁸⁵⁷

As seen in the figure above, the rapid decrease in American forces reflects the change in understanding. The decrease in the figure does not mean that the political objective has been achieved, but indicates the change in the instruments used to achieve this objective. Because both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weight has been

In this context, the phenomenon known as psychological casualty has been known since the Second World War. The psychological impact of war was clearly observed in the experiments conducted during this period. For example, during the Second World War, an experiment in 2000 soldiers in the same division revealed that more than %84 of the soldiers experienced heart palpitations, more than %60 tremors, more than %50 abdominal pain, more than %25 vomiting, and more than %20 loss of bowel control. Mehmet Tanju Akad, “**Modern Savaşın...**”, pp. 166-167.

⁸⁵⁵ Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony", **International Security**, Vol.28 No.1, 203, pp. 5-46.

⁸⁵⁶ H.R.McMaster, "On War: Lessons to be Learned", **Survival**, Vol.50 No.1, 2008, pp. 25-26.

⁸⁵⁷ Amy Belasco, op.cit., p. 9.

given to local elements trained with PMCs, and the number of these units has become superior to the number of American units.⁸⁵⁸

The second trend was to increase the quality of the relatively reduced personnel through Special Forces and to support them with advanced technology based surveillance and attack vehicles. At this point, the UAV, which plays a critical role for both functions, will be the backbone of this approach. In parallel with the declining number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Air Force has increased, and the United States has started to engage in air strikes in seven countries.⁸⁵⁹ In this context, it is necessary to include the development and functions of UAVs.

The UAVs were developed primarily as observation tools, but after a while they were transformed into an attack vehicle beside their surveillance function, just as in the development line of the aircraft. In this context, the development of UAVs as a means of supervision started as a result of developments in the Cold War conditions and progressed as a separate area. Accordingly, the development of surveillance vehicles started with aerial reconnaissance. Then, with the development of satellite surveillance has reached an advanced dimension. With the development of unmanned air vehicles, a multi dimensional development has been achieved. Satellites were unable to control the same area continuously due to their orbital-based structures. In order to be able to observe in a wide area, a large number of satellites were required to be used and this increased the cost. In this respect, they have begun to provide the necessary information for decision-makers at strategic level.

However, the UAVs emerged as a very useful tool for providing tactical information and spread rapidly. In addition, they started to fly very quiet at very high altitudes with their engines based on solar energy and batteries. In the end, missiles have been deployed to attack.⁸⁶⁰ As a result, states have begun to observe areas where

⁸⁵⁸ Mark F. Cancian, **U.S. Military Forces in FY 2018: The Uncertain Buildup**, 27.10.2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/171024_Cancian_MilitaryForcesFY2018_Web.pdf?wLffPrxbS7E5NsiDo9MDKI6VjSG4uHYN, accessed on 22.01.2018.

⁸⁵⁹ Costs Of War Project, **Current United States Counterterror War Locations**, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Current%20US%20Counterterror%20War%20Locations_Costs%20of%20War%20Project%20Map.pdf, accessed on 21.08.2018.

⁸⁶⁰ Jack McDonald, **Drones and the European Union: Prospects for a Common Future (Chatam House Research Paper)**, 02.2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-02-05-drones-eu-mcdonald.pdf>, accessed on 12.05.2018.

they had previously experienced significant difficulties and the UAVs have become one of the essential tools in the world. As of 2012, the investment amount to UAV and Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) has reached 6.6 billion dollars and by 2020 it is expected to exceed 10 billion dollars.⁸⁶¹ The cheapness and easiness⁸⁶² of these instruments has also brought about the immediate use of them as a basic armed element that increases the effectiveness of both states and NSAs.

The increasingly widespread use of UAVs has gave them a fundamental position in military strategies and thus it has been evaluated that RMA targets can be achieved. However, the inadequacy of these vehicles in distinguishing militants from civilians, the experience of the wrong practices, which resulted civilian casualties, has led to the appearance of an important opposition. In this context, UAVs have brought damage as much as benefit in Pakistan, where they are most frequently used;⁸⁶³ civil targets that were mistaken in operations caused many people to be 'accidentally guerrillas.' In this context, field surveys confirm this. According to Pew's research in Pakistan, % 98 of Pakistanis who are aware of the drone attacks have been opposed to these attacks. In addition, % 56 believe that drone attacks are useless in neutralizing terrorists. Those who think the drone attacks are working are up to % 32. In addition to all this, the proportion of Pakistanis who had a positive approach to the United States in the period of increased attacks decreased to 12 percent.⁸⁶⁴

This new use of UAVs has brought the development of anti-UAV tools, vehicles and methods. According to this, beyond the use of conventional weapons to prevent UAVs, new weapons focused on these weapons are being tested. The reason to these development is costs. Because these new anti-UAV tools are created to catch or shot UAVs, which is relatively cheap, with a lower cost. These methods are as follows:⁸⁶⁵

⁸⁶¹ Abigail R. Hall and Christopher J. Coyne, "The Political Economy of Drones", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 25 No 4, 2014, p. 445.

⁸⁶² An anecdote on this issue is very useful in terms of understanding the ease of use of these tools. In March 2000, Sony encountered problems in the distribution of Play Station 2, the world's most famous game console. The Japanese government classifies the game console as a 'product linked to conventional weapons' with justification that console is powerful enough to be used as a real missile guidance system. Therefore, the government has implemented export control of PlayStation games, provided that distributors provide a specific license. Cited by, Roger Stahl, op.cit., p. 133.

⁸⁶³ After the 2002 defeat, most Taliban activities have shifted to Pakistan's Afghan border areas and refugee camps.

⁸⁶⁴ Trevor McKrisken, "Obama's Drone War", **Survival**, 2013, Vol.55 No.2, p. 102.

⁸⁶⁵ Those counter measures listed and explained by, Serkan Balkan, **DEAŞ'ın İHA Stratejisi: Teknoloji ve Yenilikçi Terörizmin Yükselişi**, İstanbul, SETA Yayınları, 2017, pp. 41-48.

'batelle drone' system with electromagnetic properties that prevents the signal of UAV and data flow,⁸⁶⁶ systems based on radio frequency and/or GPS mixing,⁸⁶⁷ anti-UAV defense systems that work directly against UAV,⁸⁶⁸ capture with eagle⁸⁶⁹ and capture with net.⁸⁷⁰ However, the increasingly developing technology of UAVs, the increasing number, the emergence of very difficult and sophisticated instruments such as micro drones, and the orientation of the terrorist organizations to sophisticated UAV technologies rather than handmade UAVs, have brought the states to prefer anti-ihas systems. In this context, the budget requested by the US Department of Defense for counter-UAV based studies for 5 years from Congress has reached 332 million dollars.⁸⁷¹

Despite the increasing role of UAVs, the technology underlying it is still based on PGMs. Therefore, in parallel with the efforts to integrate PGMs into UAVs, studies in

⁸⁶⁶ After the signals of these vehicles, the target UAVs either remain suspended where they are, return to the point of departure or fall to the ground. Jeff Schogol, **Marines Seek to Destroy Enemy Drones**, 31.01.2017, <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2017/01/31/marines-seek-to-destroy-enemy-drones/>, accessed on 20.06.2018.

⁸⁶⁷ Department 13, **MESMER System**, <https://department13.com/mesmer-3/>, accessed on 09.07.2018.

⁸⁶⁸ Huw Williams, "AUDS Achieves TRL 9, Deploys with US Forces", **Jane's** 360, 23.01.2017, <http://www.janes.com/article/67118/auds-achieves-trl-9-deploys-with-us-forces>, accessed on 04.05.2017.

⁸⁶⁹ The method of catching UAVs with eagle was first started by the French police and then became widespread. However, this method is only effective against four propeller UAVs and is ineffective against multiple UAVs. In addition, the Eagles trained in about 8 months are dying in the event of an explosion of hand-made bombs added to the UAVs. Eventually, Netherlands has terminated the eagle-based method. For initiation of Eagle based practices, see, Taylor Essary, "These Drone Hunting Eagles Aren't Messing Around", 17.02.2017, **Time**, <http://time.com/4675164/drone-hunting-eagles/>, accessed on 22.07.2018. For a video shows how eagles 'hunt' drones, see, Stephen Castle, "Eagle Catches Drone", 29.05.2016, **New York Times Video**, <https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000004415524/eagle-catches-drone.html>, accessed on 22.07.2018.

⁸⁷⁰ The eagles and the nets are used against the UAVs used by terrorist organizations that fly at low altitude and are usually handmade. Damien Gayle, "The Drone Catcher: Flying Net is Designed to Stop Terrorists from Flying Bomb-Laden Gadgets Into Nuclear Power Stations", 10.02.2015, **Daily Mail**, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2948062/The-drone-catcher-France-reveals-flying-net-stop-terrorists-flying-bomb-laden-gadgets-nuclear-power-stations-following-spate-sightings.html>, accessed on 22.07.2018.

⁸⁷¹ Seth J. Frantzman, "New Defense Budget Bill Foresees US-Israel Counter-Drone Cooperation" 13.08.2018, **Defence News**, <https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/08/13/new-defense-budget-bill-foresees-us-israel-counter-drone-cooperation/>, accessed on 22.08.2018. See also, Jen Judson, "US Army seeks new missile to counter drones, rockets and more", 23.02.2018, **Defence News**, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/23/army-wants-brand-new-missile-to-counter-wide-variety-of-threats/>, accessed on 22.08.2018.

Daniel Cebul, "US Army increases investment on counter-drone program", 01.08.2018, **C4ISRNet**, <https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/08/01/us-army-increases-investment-on-counter-drone-matv-program/>, accessed on 22.08.2018.

missile technologies have continued and missiles have played a fundamental role in the military background of the period. In this respect, many states have started to develop or buy missile defense systems. To give an example from the Middle East, one of the insecure regions of the world, almost all countries in the region have developed a ballistic missile system.

Missile Type	Range (km)	Origin	Customer Countries
Scud-B	320	USSR, N.Korea	Syria, Iran, Armenia, Georgia, Russia
Scud-C	600	N.Korea	Syria, Iran
Şahap-3	1300-1900	Iran (N.Korea)	Iran
Sejil-2	2000+	Iran	Iran
DF-3	2700	China	Saudi Arabia
Jericho-2	1500	Israel	Israel
Jericho-3	4800	Israel	Israel
SS-26 İskender	400	Russia	Russia
SS-21 Tochka	120	USSR	Syria, Russia, Armenia
ATACMS	145	USA	Turkey, Greece

Table 2.27: Missile Systems in Turkey and Selected States⁸⁷²

In parallel with the position of the missile technology for the states, the NSAs have sought to use these tools, just like UAV technology. In this context, in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, it was seen how these missile technologies could be used by NSAs. Hezbollah's short-range missiles and significant damage⁸⁷³ to Israel have allowed the importance of these missiles to be emphasized once again. In addition, in the light of the estimates that Hizbullah, who launched 4,000 short-range missiles to Israel during the 2006 war, today has about 100,000 rockets,⁸⁷⁴ the vital role of these weapons is clearly understood. The frequent and effective use of the missiles has enabled anti-ballistic missile defense systems, and the countries that can provide these systems technologically to gain importance. In this context, beyond developing and producing anti-ballistic missiles that could successfully hit missiles, countries that have the technology and multifaceted resources to shoot these missiles

⁸⁷² Sıtkı Egeli, **Füze Tehdidi ve NATO Füze Kalkanı**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 14.

⁸⁷³ Andrew Chadwick, "The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History", 2014, **Small Wars Journal**, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-2006-lebanon-war-a-short-history>, accessed on 15.06.2018.

⁸⁷⁴ William Booth, "Ten Years Later After Last Lebanon War, Israel Warns Next One Will Be Far Worse", 23.07.2016, **Washington Post**, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/ten-years-after-last-lebanon-war-israel-warns-next-one-will-be-far-worse/2016/07/23/58d7a6ca-4388-11e6-a76d-3550dba926ac_story.html?utm_term=.e0926ff4be28, accessed on 13.02.2018.

out of the atmosphere are becoming more prominent and have created a new area of political expansion through their technological superiority.⁸⁷⁵

The last essential factor that influenced the military background of the period was a new and highly effective field, which could be very cheap. Cyber space is a very convenient area for all actors. Clarke and Knake summarized the effects of cyber war as follows:

“Cyberspace is not just about the internet. (...) They enable the implementation of transactions such as money flows. (...) Some also allow machines to talk to other machines. Control machines communicate with pumps, elevators and generators. But how do military units fight in these networks? When they capture the network, they can steal money and disrupt the economic system. They can pour oil, blow up gases, blow up generators. They can derail the trains, remove the satellites from orbit and crash the planes. They can open dams and collapse the electricity grid. He can seize correspondence, industrial espionage, steal personal information and blackmail. (...) They can even short-circuit the machine with the remote control and even fire your office.”⁸⁷⁶

In this context, the prominent aspect of the cyber space is that it will disable defence systems that protect extremely expensive infrastructures and weapons systems from potential attacks. For example, the US Navy, which helps the United States to achieve global efficiency, is turning into a very vulnerable position in light of developing technologies as described above. However, defence systems are equipped with sensors and counter-attack systems to prevent such as attacks. At this point, if a cyber attack and these defensive systems, or the satellites they are connected to, can be disabled, these vehicles (ships, helicopters, planes) could be shot. In this respect, it will be possible to target these vehicles with a range of equipment ranging from hand-made explosives to missiles.

Beyond that, the RMA, which shaped the military background after 1991, also has electronic and signal-based systems based on cyberspace. For this reason, since PGMs, UAVs, and all other communication and command systems are carried out in

⁸⁷⁵ US Department of Defence, **Balistic Missile Defence Review Report**, February 2010, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/BMDR/BMDR_as_of_26JAN10_0630_for_web.pdf, p. 22, accessed on 24.08.2018.

⁸⁷⁶ Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, **Siber Savaş**, İstanbul: Kültür Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2011, pp. 44-45.

cyberspace, cyber security has become the core subject of security. In this context, the United States, Russia and China undertake security measures against the risk of hacking or disrupting including satellite codes, communication codes and missile command codes. As a result these states have established their cyber-military commands. In this context, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) activities are one of the main security areas.

In summary, the three areas listed above have become the basic technological elements that form the military background of the period. Strategies developed in the new era include the most effective use of these elements. However, one thing to mention is that conventional weapons and strategies continue to maintain their dominant positions, and another is that new types of weapons are constantly being added to these technological areas. For example, the first of these is weapons that use laser to blind for a certain period of time, or permanently blind by emitting isotropic rays around.⁸⁷⁷ Non-nuclear electromagnetic weapons (NNEMP), which have the capacity to break down and/or collapse the entire infrastructure,⁸⁷⁸ which is an electronic basis of another kind of weapon that has been partially used. There are also various energy waves that disrupt mental balance, prevent perceptions, and cause mental disorientation.⁸⁷⁹

The military background transformation described above has led to the emergence of a more indirect, 'hybrid' doctrine that uses such technologies as nourishing elements, including direct engagement based on the RMA. This approach, also known as the hybrid war, will have an impact on the conflicts of the period.

⁸⁷⁷ Although the use of laser weapons is restricted by legal regulations, there are claims that they are being tested and used. For a study on the legal status of laser weapons, see, Jeffrey S. Morton, "The Legal Status of Laser Weapons That Blind", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 35 No 6, 1998, pp.697-705. For a claim on Chinese use, see, Ankit Panda, "Possible Use of Blinding Laser Weapon Near China's Djibouti Base Spurs US Warning to Aviators", *The Diplomat*, 03.05.2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/possible-use-of-blinding-laser-weapon-near-chinas-djibouti-base-spurs-us-warning-to-aviators/>, accessed on 21.06.2018.

⁸⁷⁸ For a study on the types and effects of electromagnetic pulse weapons on various scenarios prepared over the United States, see, Colin R. Miller, *Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010*, November 2005, <http://www.dtic.mil/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=oM927suggZb3KUwmUBAcB2zP2wgVGb0qt9hGrVShDM0>, accessed on 18.08.2018.

⁸⁷⁹ Hubert Feigl, "Yeni Silah Teknolojileri", in *Yeni Yüzyılda Yeni Dünya Politikası*, edited by Hans Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, translated to Turkish by Müjdat Kayayerli, Ankara: Sinemis Yayınevi, 2005, p. 294.

Although technology is a fundamental element in the emergence of a hybrid war approach, it is at least as important that the shift in the center of gravity of armed conflicts is accompanied by different strategies. Accordingly, the rapid urbanization of all societies at an increasing pace after the industrial revolution has brought about serious problems that may arise if infrastructure is targeted in the country. As Akad expresses,

“Even in the most advanced countries until the middle of the twentieth century, and nearly half of the population is composed of peasants and (...) even if the country's infrastructure collapsed, most of the population could feed itself. (...) Today (...) in case of collapse of infrastructure, it is certain that, at least three-quarters of the population (...) will fall to the limit of hunger within a few weeks.”⁸⁸⁰

Within the concept of hybrid war, there are various tools in the hands of actors targeting the damage of infrastructure that can move without revealing themselves. Accordingly, it is possible to target dams, energy transmission lines, electricity networks and transport channels via supported NSA or via special forces infiltrated into supported NSAs. More importantly, it is possible to achieve these targets via cyber attacks without using these physical elements. Thus it becomes possible to succeed all these, in a structure where computers are controlling many areas, from the control of the dams to agricultural irrigation systems, from economic infrastructure to all kinds of energy production and transmission networks.⁸⁸¹

In this context, it is possible to use hybrid elements and methods, both in terms of actors and in terms of technology, as mentioned above through different dimensions. In this context, Frank Hoffman describes the hybrid war as follows:

⁸⁸⁰ Mehmet tanju Akad, “**Strateji Üzerine...**”, pp. 76-77.

⁸⁸¹ The best examples of these are the cyber attacks of Iran and Israel-USA, which they accuse each other. The 'Stuxnet' virus, which affected Iran's nuclear facilities in 2015, has greatly damaged Iran's energy infrastructure. In 2016, the control of a dam in the US was seized by cyber attack. For the attack to the US dam, see, Mark Thompson, "Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War", **Time**, 24.03.2016, <http://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/>, accessed on 12.05.2018. For a review of the Stuxnet attack on Iran, see, Michael Holloway, **Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities**, 16.07.2015, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/holloway1/>, accessed on 12.05.2018.

“hybrid warfare incorporate a range of different models of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”⁸⁸²

One of the foundations of the hybrid war is the impossibility of providing full control of territories because most of the societies live in cities. The fact that the military targets are intertwined with civilians in the light of their strategies, has revealed a new structure of operations. Accordingly, the central struggle focuses on controlling the ‘contested zones’ as much as possible and to neutralize the opposing forces in these areas.⁸⁸³ In this context, transport networks, public services and infrastructure, every component of economic resources and even the population itself, are becoming contested zones. Moreover, using only military forces become meaningless in such as a struggle. For this reason, elements such as cyber war, information war, economic war have started to be carried out and intertwined in parallel with armed struggles.

It can be said that Russia has been the actor integrating this background in its military doctrine in the most effective way. As explained above,⁸⁸⁴ Russia has played an important role in shaping the concept of hybrid war, making this approach a fundamental component in the military doctrine of 2010. Russia's 2010 military doctrine modern warfare described as:

“the integrated utilization of military forces and resources of a non-military character” and also as “the prior implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military force and, subsequently, in the interest of shaping a favorable response from the world community to the utilization of military force.”⁸⁸⁵

In parallel with Russia, the United States has given a fundamental place in its military strategy to the hybridization of armed conflicts. In 2015, the US military

⁸⁸² Frank G. Hoffman, **Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars**, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 14. See also, Frank G. Hoffman, "Complex Irregular War: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs", **Orbis**, 2006, pp. 413-430.

⁸⁸³ Robert E. Schmidle and Frank G. Hoffman, "Commanding the Contested Zones", **Proceedings**, 2004, No 9. <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2004-09/commanding-contested-zones>.

⁸⁸⁴ The concept of hybrid war is discussed in detail in the 1.c.4 section.

⁸⁸⁵ Carnegie Endowment, **The Newly -Approved Russian Military Doctrine**, 05.02.2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_militaryDoctrine.pdf, accessed on 22.02.2018. Cited by, Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, "A Closer Look at Russia's 'Hybrid War'", **Kennan Cable**, No 7, 2015, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf>, accessed on 18.06.2018.

strategy document published after the Ukrainian case, conflicts are classified in three different scope and it is stated that three different military approach will be applied for each of them.




Figure 2.12: American Approach to Hybrid Threats⁸⁸⁶

In parallel with the transformation seen in the United States, NATO has also experienced an important transformation. As regards the proposed concept change, there has been a transformation from the army, which is structured according to conventional threats, to smaller and more effective units. Accordingly, although the alliance's membership increased by about % 50 after the Cold War, the number of troops decreased by about 50 percent. Similarly, despite new tasks and expanding areas, the number of military headquarters has been reduced from 66 to 11,⁸⁸⁷ as there is no need for a conventional war based organisation. Another shift has been made by doctrine to transform armies and NATO against new threats and to coordinate them in a common doctrine. The Allied Joint Doctrine APY-01-D document, prepared in the

⁸⁸⁶ US Joint Chief of Staff, **National Military Strategy 2015**, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, accessed on 21.11.2017, p. 4.

⁸⁸⁷ Bruce Weinrod and Charles L. Barry, **NATO Command Structure: Considerations for the Future**, Washington: National Defence University Press, 2010, p. 8. Cited by Ali Karaosmanoğlu, **NATO'nun Dönüşümü**, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, p. 36.

light of the new strategic concept adopted in Lisbon in 2010, has determined the principles of military behaviour and become a guide to transformation.⁸⁸⁸

Finally, in parallel with the concepts of hybrid war in Russia and the United States, China also conceptualized its hybrid war approach and embarked on a massive transformation activity. In this context, an effective study written by Liang and Xiangsu, titled *Unrestricted Warfare*, has been a guide for the China. In this study, expressions for the transformation of war are remarkable:

“The great fusion of technologies is impelling the domains of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy, and religion to overlap each other. The connection points are ready, and the trend towards the merging of the various domains is very clear. All of these things are rendering more and more obsolete the idea of confining warfare to the military domain and of using the number of casualties as a means of intensity of a war.”⁸⁸⁹

As a result, during the post-2009 period in which the pendulum pointed out indirect approaches for the second time, the system-dominant power and system-determining states used their technological and economic opportunities to achieve their targets through the proxy forces they supported. This was observed by the increase of arms transfers as in the post-1972 period. Although quantity is not as high as the Cold War period, there is a serious similarity as an increase percentage.⁸⁹⁰ More than half of these transfers were made by the United States and Russia.⁸⁹¹ In addition, it has been observed that countries like China, Israel, which are making a breakthrough in the weapons technologies that occupy the basis of hybrid war have significantly increased their arms transfer share.⁸⁹² These transfers are another element that shows similarities between the two periods.

⁸⁸⁸ For the updated version, see, NATO, **NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine**, February 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602225/doctrine_nato_allied_jointDoctrine_ajp_01.pdf, accessed on 15.04.2018.

⁸⁸⁹ Qiao Liang ve Wang Xiangsui, op.cit., p. 162.

⁸⁹⁰ Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, **Trends in International Arms Transfers 2014 (SIPRI Fact Sheet)**, March 2015, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1503.pdf>, accessed on 11.06.2018, p. 1.

⁸⁹¹ Pieter D. Wezeman et al., **Trends in International Arms Transfers 2017 (SIPRI Fact Sheet)**, March 2018, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf, 11.06.2018, p. 3.

⁸⁹² Ibid.

The combination of the military background and the strategic environment, as in other periods, has shown its effects in armed conflicts in the last period to be examined. The study of selected armed conflicts will complete the missing part.

3. Effects on Armed Conflicts

The dates that are considered to be the breakpoints are used in order to better demonstrate the transition that has been observed to spread throughout a large transformation process. In this context, 2009 is the result of such an understanding, which is considered to be the breaking point for the last period of this study, which examines the impact of cost in the hybridization of armed conflicts. In this context, it was chosen as the breaking point in this year when the costs of the USA after 11 September came to the highest point and the process of withdrawal from Iraq started. However, the processes seen after this break point can be observed before and include an evolutionary transformation.

In this context, in parallel with the years in which the US costs increased in Afghanistan and Iraq, different actors in different regions started to give examples of the new type of war. In the years following this process, more holistic examples of the hybrid war have become observable. As of the end of 2018, this process continues to increase its weight.

Accordingly, the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict that took place in 2006 presented one of the first examples of this type of struggle and influenced the strategies in the following years. In this context, Israel launched an operation against Southern Lebanon and the Hezbollah administration, due to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. IDF based this operation on air and land blockade. However, Hezbollah's approach to hybrid warfare in this 34-days conflict has led to the ineffectiveness of IDF operations and it also helped to Hizbullah's influence on Israel.

In this context, the Israeli Air Force dropped 12.000 tons of bombs from the air and sent 150.000 rocket. At the same time, Israeli Navy blockade Lebanon from the sea. Hezbollah, however, has thrown a large number of Katyusha missiles into Israel from different parts of the city with using tunnels, transmission systems and communication networks that it has established throughout the city. They also inflicted

damage to the Israeli naval forces with the C-802 missiles, which were produced by China and supplied to Hezbollah by Iran. In parallel with the military and political influence Hezbollah have created through these cheap weapons, they have successfully managed to receive the support of the international community and the public by using communication channels. In this respect, they have realized one of the first examples of hybrid war. At the end of the conflict, while there were 250-650 deaths on Hezbollah side, 119 soldiers died in the Israeli Armed Forces. However, while there were 1100 civilian deaths in Lebanon, there were 42 civilian deaths in Israel.⁸⁹³

Considering the operational characteristics discussed above, it is clear that the IDF experienced difficulties in applying the military doctrine against unpredictable struggle of Hezbollah. In this context, the most important feature of the hybrid war implemented by Hizbullah is that it has carried out a high-intensity conflict with its non-traditional units. In other words, a struggle that is organized according to irregular warfare, but which carries a high-intensity conflict rather than low-intensity conflict, and does not confront with the IDF in the conventional sense, has been observed.⁸⁹⁴ This approach was also observed in the weapons and organization as well. As an Israeli observer points out:

“Prior to the war most of the regular forces were engaged in combating Palestinian terror. When we transferred to Lebanon, they were unfit to conduct combined forces battles integrating infantry, armored, engineering, artillery forces, and other support forces.”⁸⁹⁵

In the face of this new situation, which was expressed by an Israeli officer as “*you can tell Hezbollah has been trained in guerilla fighting by a real army*”,⁸⁹⁶ the method of the paralyzed IDF was to respond with the conventional methods. According to this, methods such as shooting military targets-if they can be found-, blockade of the country with naval forces, bombing strategic areas such as Beirut airport have been the main elements of the IDF operation. With these attacks, it was planned to destroy the

⁸⁹³ Max Boot, “Invisible Armies...”, p. 511.

⁸⁹⁴ David E. Johnson, **Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defence Forces Lebanon and Gaza (Rand Cooperation Occasional Paper)**, Arlington: Rand Cooperation Publishing, 2010, p. 3.

⁸⁹⁵ Yehuda Wegman, “The Struggle for Situation Awareness in the IDF”, **Strategic Assessment**, Vol 10 No 4, 2008, p. 23. Cited by David E. Johnson, op.cit., p. 4.

⁸⁹⁶ Greg Myre, “Israel’s Wounded Describe Surprisingly Fierce, Well-Organized and Elusive Enemy”, 12.08.2006, **New York Times**, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/12/world/middleeast/12soldiers.html>, accessed on 29.04.2018.

Hezbollah's conventional force if it transferred that from supporting countries. In addition, counter-terrorism units were ready if Hezbollah would use terrorist tactics.

However, as mentioned above, Hezbollah's method has progressed in a completely different way. Their weapons were not ordinary 'hand-made bombs', but the kind of weapons that states with certain infrastructures would supply. However, non-conventional methods were preferred for use. In this context, the IDF tanks could be stopped with anti-tank rocket Launchers such as Russian RPG-29, AT-13 Methis and AT-14 Kornet. 40 percent of IDF fatalities were provided with ATGMs, and these weapons have eliminated 18 Israeli Merkava Mark IV tanks.⁸⁹⁷

The damage to Israel's naval forces was made by missiles. The C-802 missiles, which were produced by China as YJ-83 model, which were given to Iran and then transferred to Hizbullah as Iran's copy, were used against the Israeli Navy. Similarly, Hezbollah used a small number of Iranian-made Mircad-1 and Ababil-3 UAVs in the air. Finally, Katushya and Kornet missiles, which were supplied by Iran, but originally produced by China, played the most crucial role for Hizbullah to show its real impact to the war. Hizbullah has sent 4100 of these missiles (including 250 in the last day) to various places of Israel, especially to the northern parts.⁸⁹⁸

Hizbullah, thus, could not be eliminated in a short time⁸⁹⁹ due to its decentralized organization, which stopped the IDF with the 'anti-weapons', and it has increased the political pressure by launching rockets all over Israel. In addition, it was able to use the media effectively and successfully transfer his civilian losses to international public opinion. In the face of Hizbullah, which paralyzes the daily life of Israel and thus increases political pressure⁹⁰⁰ and becomes dominant in the information war, the Israeli government had to terminate the operation without having a decisive result. The Israeli Counter-Terrorism Institute, which examines the conflict after the operation, will summarize this first example of the hybrid war as follows:

⁸⁹⁷ Anthony Cordesman, **Preliminary Lessons of Israeli-Hezbollah War (CSIS Report)**, 17.08.2006, http://www.mafhoum.com/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=XyHqBg_Bo6HDRSD18Vqkh3fUypkLYhPISGFJ8Ne0i7c, accessed on 29.04.2018.

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁹ Hatta irregular warfare'in uzunluğu göz önünde bulundurulunca yıllar alabileceği kabul edilebilir.

⁹⁰⁰ Martin V. Crevel, "The Second Lebanon War: A Re-Assessment", **Infinity Journal**, No 3, 2011, p. 5.

“The first resistance movement with traditional army capabilities, within the framework of guerilla war, and it is the first armed unorganized splinter movement which has strategic weapons.”⁹⁰¹

It is understood that this new type of conflict will expand to different conflicts, after the experiences of 2008 Russia-Georgia War, which is a conventional war but many hybrid methods have used. A Russian intervention to Georgia on the grounds of Russian population activities in South Ossetia, led to a conventional war between Russia and Georgia. This conflict, also known as the ‘Five-Day War’ because Russia has only achieved its political goals in five days, is useful in terms of showing the change of approach.

The first feature of the conflict lies in the implementation of the indirect approach towards the targeted region. The ‘deep’ reason for this conflict is the enlargement process of NATO towards Georgia and the Georgian support to the process in means of government and public opinion.⁹⁰² Drawing attention to this situation at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Russia acted in 2008 in line with its political objective, which was defined as opposed to NATO enlargement. In this context, a ‘white paper’, published by the US Special Forces Command, states that Russia's Georgia intervention is the prototype of the hybrid war in Ukraine and includes hybrid war practices in many respects. According to this, the applications of hybrid war, which was made by Russia in the Five Days War, are listed as follows:

- Use proxies or surrogates for subversive activities and establish conditions for future operations,
- Employed intelligence operatives to support separatives (...); recruit, organize, arm and conduct sabotage and subversion;
- Present actions as operations of independent groups, whose interests merely happen to coincide with those of the Russian government;
- Issues passports to ethnic Russians to claim it is acting in the defence of its citizens authorizing the deployment of forces;
- Supports and stages demonstrations that are pro-Russian; flags and propaganda;
- Supports leaders sympathetic to Russian interests;
- Employ forces with unmarked uniforms and denying their presence;

⁹⁰¹ Jonathan Figchel, **Hamas and the Hizbullah Experience (ICT Report)**, 21.08.2006, <https://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=238#gsc.tab=0>, accessed on 29.04.2018.

⁹⁰² Bu dönemde yapılan anketlerde Gürcistan halkının %77'sinin NATO'ya katılımı desteklediği görülmüştür. NATO, **Deepening Relations With Georgia**, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/Deepening_Relations_with_Georgia_EN.pdf, p.15, accessed on 11.03.2018.

- Employed 'peacekeepers' in Georgia to counter Georgian forces claiming self-defence;
- (...) employed and sponsored cyber operatives to disrupt Georgian government communications;
- Applying economic pressure.⁹⁰³

There are two similar aspects of 2008 Georgia conflict with the 2006 Lebanon conflict. The first is to hybridize the conflict and the second is to achieve political results at low cost through hybridization. However, in order for these developments to become a dominant practice, it will be necessary to understand the effects of the costs of the two ongoing American interventions. Indeed, in the year when the first example of hybrid war was observed in Lebanon, the United States will begin to change its approach. In this context, the fact that terrorist acts can be carried out despite the military success shown in Afghanistan, and beyond, the wave of terrorism that started in Iraq, has brought with it the understanding that the conventional methods will be very costly despite the existence of PGMs. That facts have brought with the 'rediscovery of COIN.' In this context, 2006 QDR includes the phrase "*in post 9/11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States.*"⁹⁰⁴ In the following year, David Petraeus, who specializes in irregular warfare and COIN, will be appointed commander of Iraqi troops.

The Afghan intervention was one of the most important examples of what a direct engagement could cost for the United States. The United States has clearly experienced the cost difference in Afghanistan conflicts, which was indirectly in the first and directly in the second. According to this, in the calculations for the struggle started in 1979, although the USSR spent 45 billion dollars, it was stated that the United States spent 10 billion dollars.⁹⁰⁵ In this respect, it was very reasonable for the USA and very expensive for the USSR. However, after the withdrawal of the USSR, the groups supported by the United States began to fight to control the country, use the resources they received from the United States, and many later turned into warlords caused the

⁹⁰³ US Army Special Operations Command, **Counter-Unconventional Warfare: White Paper**, Fort Bragg: USASOC, 2014, p. 31.

⁹⁰⁴ US Department of Defence, **Quadrennial Defence Review 2006**, 06.02.2006, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>, p. 36, accessed on 15.06.2018.

⁹⁰⁵ Herfried Münkler, "**Yeni Savaşlar...**", p. 155.

U.S. to lose interest in the region. When US returned to the region, it was faced with a cost of billions of dollars.⁹⁰⁶

In light of the increase in cost, the United States has reshaped not only the configuration of force but also the whole approach of intervention. Based on the fact that the main factors that led to the increase in costs were the peace-building process, a transformation has been initiated in COIN logic. While military practices have been transferred to local elements and PMCs, and the focus is on reconstructing the social foundations of the problem. In this context, the changing weight of areas of peace building in Afghanistan over the years is remarkable.

	Fiscal Years							Sector Totals
Category	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2013	
Security	57.4	564.8	1,909.1	2,751.7	9,168.5	9,201.2	4,947.6	58,839.4
Governance & Development	195.9	1,355.5	950.8	2,161.6	4,577.7	2,952.0	2,340.2	29,970.1
Counter-narcotics	60.6	295.5	364.4	546.4	1,000.5	800.4	907.2	7,545.9
Humanitarian	595.5	204.9	150.2	281.1	169.7	215.9	145.2	2,835.1
Civilian Operations	155.6	212.4	131.9	449.3	1,796.1	1,487.4	1,347.6	8,914.3
Total Funding	1,065.1	2,633.1	3,506.4	6,179.2	16,712.5	14,658.9	9,690.4	104,104.8

Table 2.28: US Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction Until 2014 (million \$)⁹⁰⁷

Similar to Afghanistan case, the implementation of the non-conventional methods in Iraq War, which was planned as a conventional war, revealed the possibility of ‘Vietnamizing’ of Irak War. However, with the lessons took from Vietnam, the United States soon began to take measures to reduce costs. As it transferred the responsibility of armed forces from American soldiers to regional forces, it also supported them with PMCs and sought to reduce his costs. Thus, while the duration of the war and its political influence approached Vietnam, the number of losses remained below Vietnam.

⁹⁰⁶ Mehmet Tanju Akad, “**Tarihten Bugüne...**”, p.252.

⁹⁰⁷ SIGAR, **Quarterly Report to the United States Congress**, 30.07.2014, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf>. Cited by, Catherine Lutz and Sujaya Desai, **US Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan: The Dollars and Sense (Cost Of War Project Paper)**, 2015, <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2015/us-reconstruction-aid-afghanistan-dollars-and-sense>, accessed on 20.10.2017.

	Vietnam War	Operation Enduring Freedom	Iraq Invasion
Wounded in action per 100.000 troop-years	11640	3385	2380
Hostile deaths per 100.000 troop-years	1820	310	260
Total deaths per 100.000 troop-years	2230	395	330
Survival rate among all troops	86,5	91,6	90,2
Maksimum level of troops (thousands)	537	112	259
Total troops-years (thousands)	2609	591	1341

Table 2.29: American Military Casualties in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq⁹⁰⁸

The most important factor for the United States to be able to transition to hybrid strategies has been the various air elements, especially the UAVs. However, these weapons will bring significant losses in addition to their benefits and speed up the process of providing support to various ground actors. In this context, to start with Afghanistan, after 2009, in a four-year period where the UAVs were heavily used, 3300 Taliban militants were killed with these vehicles.⁹⁰⁹ However, it has also been observed that the use of UAVs also poses major risks. In this context, 900 civilians, - 200 of them were children- died in the same region as well.⁹¹⁰ The huge proportion of the civilian deaths in Afghanistan occurred similarly in Iraq, and most of the civilian deaths in the region were carried out by air strikes.

⁹⁰⁸ Matthew S. Goldberg, "Casualty Rates of US Military Personnel During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan", **Defence and Peace Economics**, Vol 29 No 1, 2018, p. 53.

⁹⁰⁹ Daniel M. Byman, "Why Drones Work", in **The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations (Eight Edition)**, edited by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015, p. 313.

⁹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 314.




Figure 2.13: Coalition Caused Civilian Deaths In Short Duration Events in Iraq (2003-2008)⁹¹¹

Although there are approaches to finding the problem in human-based use of UAVs and arguing that these problems will disappear after they are autonomous through artificial intelligence,⁹¹² the fact that the US strategy is not able to continue through only air elements and that the weight of ground elements (and therefore costs) will be increased. In this context, the use of UAV operations in more precise cases has increased the costs falling with these tools to a certain extent.

Lack of support with the air elements has brought with it an increase in the weight given to ground elements. In this period where direct intervention was not preferred, the main elements were PMCs and local NSAs with a hybrid approach. In this context, the structure of force in Afghanistan and Iraq has changed dramatically after 2009. The number of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan has equalized the number of American troops as of 2007, with the effect of withdrawal and shift of troops increasing to a much larger proportion.⁹¹³ In this context, the United States' approach to change after

⁹¹¹ Neta C. Crawford, **Civilian Death and Injury in Iraq War 2003-2013**, March 2013, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/Civilian%20Death%20and%20Injury%20in%20the%20Iraq%20War%2C%202003-2013.pdf>, accessed on 25.04.2018, p. 12.

⁹¹² For an assessment of the autonomization process of UAVs, see, Gjert Lage Dyndal and Arne Berntsen, "Autonomous Military Drones: No Longer Science Fiction", 28.07.2018, **NATO Review**, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/EN/index.htm>, accessed on 04.02.2018. for a more general assessment on the same subject, see also, Elinor Sloan, "Robotics at War", **Survival**, Vol 57 No 5, 2015, pp. 107-120.

⁹¹³ Composed from different charts published by Private Security Monitor. See, University of Denver, **Private Security Monitor**, http://psm.du.edu/articles_reports_statistics/data_and_statistics.html, accessed on 16.04.2018. For data on the comparison of military personnel-contractor in different conflicts, see, Dyfed Loesche, **Contracted Security**, 02.03.2016, <https://www.statista.com/chart/4440/private-military-and-security-company-sector/>, accessed on

the experience of Iraq shows a great similarity to the British practices during the period of hegemonic power. The assessment of Münkler, which summarizes the logic of the US's outsourcing of war by comparing with Britain, is valuable in this respect:

“The problem with empire building on the basis on economic rather than military superiority is that it cannot avoid military deployment to safeguard newly opened economic areas. No serious difficulties arise if small contingents are sufficient for this purpose. (...) But the picture changes if uprisings or disorders make it necessary to deploy large units for a lengthy period of time: both because this entails considerable costs, and because troop losses can rapidly erode popular support at home. Once again the British were the first to attempt the obvious solution: (...) That is, to recruit troops on the periphery of the empire, where they cost significantly less and serious losses do not attract such general attention as in the case of units originating in the imperial centre. (...) Today, moreover, 44 percent of the manpower in US army units comes from ethnic minority groups.⁹¹⁴ (...) The real functional equivalent of the colonial troops (...) are PMCs, which meant that the need for self-sacrifice in the imperial centre can be replaced with monetary payments.”⁹¹⁵

In the light of all these developments, cost-cutting measures in armed conflicts have enabled new approaches to be preferred by the great powers, and the hybrid war approach has started to take place. However, the prevalence of the approach was due to the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine in 2014.

On November 21, 2013, protests began after the then Ukrainian President Yanukovich cancelled his decision to join the EU accession talks, and soon spread all over the country and armed conflicts in some areas. The Ukrainian case has become the ‘first case of a total hybrid war’⁹¹⁶ in terms of its harmony with the elements highlighted by Gerasimov, who played an important role in theorizing the hybrid war, as well as the full implementation of the phases⁹¹⁷ of this hybrid war.

In this context, the process began with an information war involving the asymmetric struggle. An information war was fought against the growing process of

16.04.2018. See also, Anthony Cordesman, **US Military Spending: The Cost of Wars**, 10.07.2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-spending-cost-wars>, accessed on 06.04.2018.

⁹¹⁴ Chalmers Johnson, **Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic**, New York: Holt Publishing, 2008, p.144.

⁹¹⁵ Herfried Münkler, “İmparatorluklar...”, pp. 247-248.

⁹¹⁶ Ali Nedim Karabulut, “Eski Savaş, Yeni Strateji: Rusya’nın Yirmibirinci Yüzyıldaki Hibrit Savaş Doktrini ve Ukrayna Krizindeki Uygulaması”, **Uluslararası İlişkiler**, Cilt 13 Sayı 49, 2016, p. 34.

⁹¹⁷ For the approach of Gerasimov and the classification of the stages, I.C.4 section can be examined.

information production through official statements and through informal media. With publications and information produced mainly in Russian and English, both Russian and Ukrainian society and the international community were tried to be affected. During this period, it was claimed that the resources allocated by Russia to the communication activities were up to 300 million euros.⁹¹⁸ This information is not just an image transmission. In addition to the news of various journalists, the opinions of commentators from various politicians, NGO leaders, businessmen were included and thus tried to be influenced on different communities. At this point, another claim has been argued that there is a group of ‘troll’ who makes comments supporting positive news on the internet, tries to refute negative news, and also participates in the current discussions. It is also argued that a salary of around 1000 dollars per month is given and the annual budget is over 1 million dollars.⁹¹⁹

In parallel with the information war, the process of destabilizing the region and putting pressure on government officials was another development observed in Ukraine. In this context, there is a significant increase in activities, especially in the Eastern Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the separatist movement in the Donbas region, which includes the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, has shown many characteristics of the hybrid war. First of all, the possibility of separation of this region, has become a sword of Democles hangs over the Ukrainian politics. In terms of armed conflict, the composition of rebel soldiers and their weapons are remarkable. It has been noted that the ‘insurgents’ in a process that has no infrastructure in the region and which has been exacerbated in a short period of time are highly educated. In addition, the number of Russians who have been advocated as ‘volunteering to support these militias’ has risen to 11.000, according to Ukraine's chief military prosecutor, Anatoly Matios.⁹²⁰ It was later revealed that many of these people were Russian soldiers who were involved in militia by removing their ranks. These soldiers, later to be

⁹¹⁸ Mikelis Berzins, “JBANC Report on Russian Propaganda Efforts”, **Estonian World Review**, 21.08.2014, <https://www.eesti.ca/jbanc-report-on-russian-propaganda-efforts/article42927>, accessed on 21.10.2017.

⁹¹⁹ Vitalii Usenko, **Russian Hybrid Warfare: What Are the Effects-Based Network Operations and How to Counteract Them**, 25.01.2017, <http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/01/17/russian-hybrid-warfare-what-are-effect-based-network-operations-and-how-to-counteract-them/>, accessed on 21.10.2017.

⁹²⁰ Reuben F. Johnson, “Russian Forces ‘Now 11.000 Strong in Donbass’”, 06.10.2017, **IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly**, <https://www.janes.com/article/74682/russian-forces-now-11-000-strong-in-the-donbass>, accessed on 22.06.2018.

remembered as *little green men*, carried out covert military activities in the region.⁹²¹ Russian authorities, on the other hand, reject these claims in a certain way. In addition, during this period, the war of information continued and Russia was largely successful in this war. A poll conducted in the Donbas region in April 2014 revealed that the public opinion of the region accepted the Kiev government illegal.⁹²² In addition, it has been reported that the Russian intelligence units have been extensively deployed among the civilian population and offer significant support for their activities. The impact of the activities of the members of the Secret Service will emerge in particular during the annexation process of Crimea. With these activities, the effective use of the opposition groups in the country has been realized.⁹²³

The annexation process of Crimea, which is the next stage, refers to a process in which the last phases are realized. In this process, Russian soldiers were deployed in Crimea and then a referendum was held on the annexation of Crimea.⁹²⁴ After that, the last military obstacles were eliminated and the Crimea was annexed.

The technological advantages of the Russian army were used both during the deployment of the Russian army to the Crimea and during the activities of the rebels in the east. The use of this superiority has arisen in weapons such as high-tech portable missiles, especially used by militia forces. Again, in accordance with the concept of hybrid warfare, weapons and tools which are normally not in the hands of an insurgent group has been 'provided'. Matios summarizes these tools as follows:

"The Russian volunteer units possess 650 tanks, 1,310 armoured combat vehicles, almost 500 pieces of artillery of various calibres, almost 260 multiple rocket launchers, and up to 100 anti-aircraft missile systems. (...) In addition to these numbers, Donbas force (...) has almost 200 tanks, 400 APCs [armoured personnel carriers], 140 artillery pieces, and the latest types of anti-aircraft missile systems"⁹²⁵

⁹²¹ Vitaly Shevchenko, "Little Green Man or Russian Invaders?", 11.03.2014, **BBC**, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154>, accessed on 22.06.2018. See also, Steven Pifer, "Watch out for Little Green Man", 07.07.2014, **Brookings Institute Op-Eds**, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/watch-out-for-little-green-men/>, accessed on 22.06.2018.

⁹²² Poll cited by Samuel Charap, "The Ghost of Hybrid War", **Survival**, Vol 57 No 6, p. 54.

⁹²³ Ali Nedim Karabulut, op. cit. p. 35.

⁹²⁴ BBC, **Crimea Referendum: Voters 'Back Russia Union'**, 16.03.2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097>, accessed on 22.06.2018.

⁹²⁵ Reuben F. Johnson, op.cit.

Over the hybrid war that Russia has successfully carried out in Ukraine, NATO is almost alarmed. In parallel with Ukraine conflict, NATO in Wales discussed what could be done in relation to military and non-military areas and the view that Russia is operating based on two elements came to the fore. First of these two elements was Russia's activities based foreign Russians in near abroad countries. Second element was its information war over various channels and networks. Military power was considered as the 'complementary element' in this respect. In the final declaration of the Wales summit in 2015, the hybrid war was defined as "*a wide range of over and covert military, paramilitary and civil measures are employed in a highly integrated design*".⁹²⁶

Through this definition, it was decided to create a power called *Spearhead Force* for the Baltic countries where the Russian population is high. As the original name, *Very High Readiness Joint Force* suggests, it is aimed to respond to possible crises as quickly as possible.⁹²⁷ The force created in this context is composed of 30.000 people and will be deployed in Germany, which is very close to the Baltic countries and Poland. In addition, there are units of this task force, which will constitute from 5000-7000 soldiers and will be ready for operation within 2-7 days.⁹²⁸ This new structure reveals lessons learned from Ukraine. In this regard, NATO's effort aimed at establishing a mechanism of military deterrence that would prevent the spread of 'fait accompli' to a wider area.⁹²⁹ It is also worth to note that the United States offers and accepts a burden share to meet this new structure that is not in the account. In this context, in light of the growing Russian threat to Europe, it was accepted that the contribution of the European members should not be less than % 2 at the Wales Summit.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁶ NATO, **Wales Summit Declaration**, 05.09.2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, accessed on 25.07.2018.

⁹²⁷ NATO, **NATO Response Force / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force**, <https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-force--very-high-readiness-joint-task-force>, accessed on 25.07.2018.

⁹²⁸ Deutsche Welle Türkçe, **NATO 'Mızrak Ucu'nu Gösterdi**, 05.02.2015, <https://www.dw.com/tr/nato-m%C4%B1zrak-ucunu-g%C3%B6sterdi/a-18235340>, accessed on 25.07.2018.

⁹²⁹ For a study on the prevention of a new appeasement policy by comparing the annexation of Russia of Crimea to Nazi Germany's annexation of Austria (Anschluss), see, James J. Wirtz, "Life in the 'Gray Zone': Observations for Contemporary Strategists", **Defence and Security Analysis**, Vol 33 No 2, 2017, pp. 106-114.

⁹³⁰ NATO, **"Wales Summit Declaration..."**.

NATO and the EU have set up new mechanisms for the second field, information war, that Russia has successfully implemented. In this context, NATO's Press and Media Division has only published 3.000 media queries⁹³¹ in 2014⁹³² and this trend continues. Similarly, Euronews, BBC and CNN, as well as many news agencies in the world, have started to create short information videos by creating new networks, especially from the social media, with the exception of existing channels.

As a result of all this, Russia has realized one of the most successful examples of the hybrid war in Ukraine as a cost-cutting method. In a matter of political will, it prepared the conditions so that it wouldn't have to enter into direct engagement and then annexed the Crimea at a very small cost. The first attempt was made in Georgia, and although Russia succeeded in hybridizing the first phases in terms of reasons and methods, it took the risk of military intervention directly. In Ukraine, however, it has successfully implemented all the phases and managed to achieve a significant political gain at a small cost.

Components of the hybrid war in Ukraine are already being used in a more complex conflict: Syria. Although the study is limited to 2015, and the Syrian conflict remains out of the examination as an ongoing conflict, it would be useful to include some important information on the relationship between cost and hybridization.

The Syrian case provides important information on how costs change if direct engagement is replaced by hybrid engagement. In this context, the 'sponsorship strategy',⁹³³ which has been seen since the Obama era, will be the implementation of the new approach, which will be called *leading from behind* and which coincides with the *no boots on the ground* approach. In this context, the armaments, airspace, military training, military consultancy and in some cases special force reinforcement, which was provided to the supported proxy power, reduced costs. In this context, the daily spending of the US in Afghanistan intervention between 2001 and 2014 was calculated as 145 million dollars. The daily spending in occupation of Iraq between 2003 and

⁹³¹ This corresponds to four times the number of media queries released in 2013.

⁹³² Barbara Maronkova, "NATO: An Alliance In The Midst Of Information Wars", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol 14 No 3, 2015, p. 41.

⁹³³ Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, "The Strategy of Sponsorship", **Survival**, Vol 57 No 5, 2015, pp. 121-148.

2014 was calculated as 190 million dollars. And the daily spending of the US for counter-ISIS struggle between 2014 and 2015 was calculated as 9 million dollars.⁹³⁴

This difference is also seen in the share of U.S. military intervention overseas. As of the end of 2017, the share of Iraqi operations is 44 percent. Afghanistan-Pakistan operation has a %47 share. Syrian operations have only a total share of 1 percent.⁹³⁵ But with this % 1 share, the threat of a 'state-owned terrorist organization,' a more successful example than Al-Qaida, has been largely eliminated. However, peace building activities were not initiated, but instead cooperation with local groups was sought. As a result, as of the end of 2018, the region under the control of the US-led YPG has exceeded 25% of Syrian territory. These results are a clear example of the effects of the approach difference. Moreover, the United States goes beyond that and tries to distribute its cost to its allies in conflict. Accordingly, after the escalation of the war in Syria, the Trump administration went into cooperation with France and Saudi Arabia and began to share its burden with these countries.⁹³⁶

Another issue similar to Ukraine case in Syria case was the information war. It would be useful to exemplify this through *White Helmets*. The White Helmets Organization defines its activities as saving the wounded and revealing the international community that the civilians were bombed.⁹³⁷ The Russian government is responding to the assertion that videos are fictional. In addition, some videos published by organizations close to the Russian government show that at least some of the activities are fictional.⁹³⁸ In any case, the information war, which continues to take place on the subject of targeting civilians, is located in the centre of the struggle. The echoes of this war of information are expanded across a wide range of areas and individuals.⁹³⁹

⁹³⁴ BBC, **US spending on Islamic State fight totals \$2.7bn**, 12.06.2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33104829>, accessed on 22.06.2018.

⁹³⁵ Neta C. Crawford, "**United States Budgetary...**", p.10.

⁹³⁶ Tom O'Connor, "US, Saudi Arabia and France Talk Military Action In Syria As Russia, China and Iran Warn Against It", 10.04.2018, **Newsweek**, <https://www.newsweek.com/us-saudi-arabia-france-talk-military-action-syria-russia-china-iran-warn-879921>, accessed on 20.07.2018.

⁹³⁷ For White Helmet's side, see, The White Helmets, **Support the White Helmets**, <https://www.whitehelmets.org/en>, accessed on 30.08.2018.

⁹³⁸ For counter thesis, see, RT, **They Don't Care About Us': Syrians on White Helmets' True Agenda**, 22.09.2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jq4LEIO740A>, accessed on 30.08.2018.

⁹³⁹ In this context, while documentary films on White Helmets are made, even Roger Waters, the famous singer of Pink Floyd, also participates in the debate, arguing that this organization is fake and consists of Al-Qaeda members.

Finally, the decisive element of armed conflicts is the weapons as always. In this context, the use of conventional weapons significantly determines the face of hybrid wars, as in Syria. In the case of Syria, one of the first works of Russia, which settled rapidly in Syria due to the hybrid war doctrine, was to establish the S-400 air defence system in the region. These systems are important because states don't want to take the risk of being hit because of the increased cost of aircraft. The risk is quite high compared to the world after the Second World War. The reason for this is costs. In 1945, while the cost of an F-15 fighter plane was 300.000 dollars,⁹⁴⁰ the cost reached 108.2 million dollars 5 years before the Syrian war.⁹⁴¹ Therefore, even the loss of a single plane means a huge cost, thus states don't put their aircrafts to the areas, which is defending by air defense systems. However, these expensive aircraft can be used in areas which was not protected by an air-defense system for limited operations. Considering that the F-15's hourly cost is 41.921 dollars as of 2013, it is certain that this cost, which is smaller than the loss of aircraft, is still a significant cost. This also applies to drones. The Global Hawk aircraft, which flies in higher altitude than others, can carry weapons and has a defense system on it, costs more than 48.000 dollars per hour.⁹⁴²

In summary, if the cost pressures created by direct engagement were observed during the Cold War period, the ways of overcoming these costs and achieving political goals were developed during the post-Cold War period. This approach, which combines power of proxy wars with technological capacities and innovations of the period, has started to become an understanding based on political results. It is also important to note that, there are even some studies that have read the international environment as a global hybrid war on which the US and the EU are on one side and Russia and China on the other.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴⁰ Walter Cross, **Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces**, Washington: National Defence University Press, 1986, p.46.

⁹⁴¹ Defence Aerospace, **Estimating the Real Cost of Modern Fighter Aircraft**, 12.07.2006, <https://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/FighterCostFinalJuly06.pdf>, accessed on 26.06.2018.

⁹⁴² Mark Thompson, "Costly Flight Hours", **Time**, 02.04.2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/>, accessed on 20.05.2018.

⁹⁴³ Andrew Korybko, "Hybrid Wars. The 'Greater Heartland' , Crossroads of the Multipolar World", **Global Research**, 27.03.2016, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/hybrid-wars-the-greater-heartland-crossroads-of-the-multipolar-world/5516657>, accessed on 29.04.2018. For the article series see also, Andrew Korybko, "Hybrid Wars 1: The Law of Hybrid Warfare", **Oriental Review**, 04.03.2016,

As a result, this period, which is still in progress, displays great similarities to the post-1972 period and gave an impetus to the downward trend of costs. The conflicts in the following years will show how this process will evolve.



CONCLUSION

This study focuses on understanding what is the main determinant of the post-1945 transformation of armed conflicts and demonstrating the effect of this transformation on power relations. The hypothesis was developed in this direction and the hypothesis developed was tested in cases. The conclusion should be made to reveal the findings of the main components of this hypothesis.

The main finding of the study is the presence of power pendulums in the post-1945 period. On the basis of the costs, power pendulums can demonstrate the behavior of states acting in the light of their relative power, as well as provide a clearer understanding of the rationale of the strategy behind non-conventional methods. In other words, via power pendulums, the question of what transformed the armed conflicts after 1945 can be answered and the logic of the power relations can be revealed. The power pendulums appear in an environment shaped on the basis of costs, at one end cost-cutting technologies and at the other end by hybridization methods. Costs served as an independent variable to facilitate the analysis, because as Peter Mathias expresses, “*one of the few invariants in history is the increase in appropriations allocated to military spending.*”⁹⁴⁴

The node of the power pendulum is also untied at this point. System-dominant powers try to prevent the cost increase, which is the most decisive factor in their efforts to maintain their relative position. The powers that challenge these states, on the other hand, follow a method in the opposite direction and try to find cost-increasing methods that will cause overstretch of the confronting power. In other words, the goal of the challenger actors is not to defeat the power they are in asymmetry militarily, but to

⁹⁴⁴ Peter Mathias, **The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain (1700-1914)**, New York: Routledge Publishing, 2001, p. 44.

diminish its relative power. Through this method, it is aimed to ensure that the opposing power is withdrawn by understanding that it will be weak against other states, which it considers as its 'true rival'. The power pendulums have shown that the system-dominant actors, based on their technological and systemic superiority, tend to expand their field of influence, and in the wake of the events that downgrade their relative power, preferred hybrid strategies that would provide their political goals indirectly. Sub-variables supporting this finding exhibited similar characteristics during the periods of comparison.

The first comparison was made between the first and third periods. With the effect of a cost-cutting technologies in both, the system-dominant states have expanded their areas of influence, and therefore their security commitments. As a result of the issues which remain existing technologies meaningless or the cost of protection of weapon systems exceeds the cost of the commitments they have already installed. In this context, cost-cutting technology in the first period was atomic bomb and PGMs in the second. In this context, atomic bomb provided a similar effect to Tokyo Bombing, which made with 334 B-29 planes, thousands of sorties and millions of dollars spending, only with 3 planes, as it shown in 2.A.2 section. Similarly, the use of PGMs had a similar effect in third period. Again, from 1945 to 1990, the number of aircraft and bombs (hence the cost) used to make the same effect in the same area has been reduced by 300 times, as shown in Table 2.15 in 2.C.2 section. Moreover, with the ability of PGMs to hit its target without making a mass effect, it has become much easier to perform operations and it has started to be voiced even more louder than in 1945.

These innovations have brought about the creation of areas of influence through security commitments. In the first period, the nuclear umbrella commitment could become the main instrument of creating a political influence in the areas to be defended, and the two superpowers were able to provide this without any major burden, but only by the threat of use of weapons. Similarly, in the third period, the US air control with the PGMs has made it possible to easily engage in political intervention through international organizations such as the UN and NATO. As explained in 2.C.3 section, the US, which won one of the lowest cost victories in the 1991 Gulf War, implemented this approach in the most appropriate way in the Kosovo intervention. As a result of this, as shown in Figure 2.6 in the 2.C.2 section, it has passed to a method

that leaves the use of ground troops, which includes political cost, to allied countries, trying to reach the political goals by giving only technology and financial support.

Challenge to the positive and facilitating impact of cost-cutting technologies on commitment expansion has come with transforming the type of struggle. In both periods, it is aimed to increase the cost by using non-conventional methods which make the existing technological superiority meaningless by non-conventional actors. At this point, it should be noted that these methods are not only related to nuclear balance. In this regard, the nuclear balance, even at an early date as 1960s, has become a mechanism which is constructed by system-dominant actors. However, the cost-increasing point is the difference between cost of the production of conventional weapons, the cost of the systems developed to protect them, and the cost of the weapons that target them. In particular, it is important to neutralize war vehicles, whose costs of production have increased hundreds of times and the duration of production has increased tens of times. This approach will be summarized if it is compared to the data in the 2.A.2 section and 2.D.2 section. The United States was able to produce more than 300,000 planes during the Second World War.⁹⁴⁵ However, given that the costs of the aircraft produced today are close to billions of dollars and the hourly costs are close to tens of thousands of dollars, the economic value of the losses becomes clearer. Similarly, the effect of the production duration of the aircraft extending from a few months to tens of months⁹⁴⁶ gives another example. In addition, beyond the economic cost created by this stage, ground forces are being sent out instead of control that cannot be achieved through these tools, which leads to a rise in political costs.

In both periods, the weak party tried to prolong the war as long as possible and to increase the cost of the power it confronted. As a result, it is expected that the economic balance will deteriorate due to the increasing spending of the counterparty, the political cost rise after the rise of the economic cost, and the decision-makers will decide to withdraw from the war. Cases also support this. The US has been engaged in the Vietnam and Iraq cases, the USSR has been involved in the Afghan case with financial support first, then with war vehicles and eventually with ground troops. And since it

⁹⁴⁵ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Does War Have Its Own Logic After All?", *Infinity Journal*, Vol 3 No 3, 2013, pp. 4-7.

⁹⁴⁶ Mehmet Tanju Akad, *Çağdaş Toplumda Savaş*, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 2009, p. 19.

is not a conventional enemy confronting with it at every stage, it is stuck in a swamp where costs are increasing. The decline of U.S. share in the world's GDP after the Vietnam and post-9/11 wars –without any major economic problems - provides the most important proof of this. Although no quantitative data on the post-Afghan decline of the USSR has been found, it is the most important evidence that the funds allocated by the country to other conflicts have been gradually reduced and eventually the disintegration of the USSR as a result of economic reasons. To give an example of the other cases involved in the study, it is an example that Portugal has to allocate a share of up to 50% of GDP due to its struggle for its former colonies and, as a result, it has to leave control of these regions. Similarly, France's withdrawal from Algeria, despite its clearly superior military position, or Britain's withdrawal from its colonies for the same reasons, and then, as Table 2.2 shows, a process of economic development, can be given as other examples.

As a result, the hybridization of armed conflicts has become dominant. The hybridization process refers to two other periods of comparison.

Accordingly, the second and fourth periods of the study show similar characteristics. The forces, which understood that their existing technological advantages did not make sense in non-conventional struggles, began to prefer more indirect methods. In this context, the periods in which actors, methods, targets and weapons intertwine have emerged. It was also possible to monitor the constants in this period over certain variables.

The first of these variables is the use of proxy elements and thus the stratification of conflicts. In this context, local and global (sometimes regional) powers, whose interests are overlapping, have begun to cooperate. Thus, in each case, system-dominant states supported either confronting government or non-state actor. Reflections of this have been observed in arms transfers. Both in the 2.B.2 section and in the 4.D.2 section, there has been a significant increase in the transfer of weapons to conflict zones in both periods.⁹⁴⁷ Another observable factor is the role of financial support to local authorities in lowering costs. According to this, to give an example of

⁹⁴⁷ Farklı bölümlere dağılmış silah transferleri verilerini bir arada gösteren bir rapor için bkz. Aude Fleurant et.al, **SIPRI Report: Trends in International Arms Transfers 2016**, February 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf>, accessed on 10.12.2017.

the 2.D.3 section, the data used in the case of two cases in which the USA intervenes may be included. The US, which used American soldiers against the organizations that emerged after the occupation in Iraq, paid these soldiers a minimum salary of 3.000 dollars a month and did not include equipment costs and other expenses. However, the salary paid to SDG forces in Syria is only 250 dollars. In the first case, despite the political cost of the soldiers who died, injured or suffered from psychological problems, there was no cost in domestic politics in the second case. In the first case there is an important political cost of the soldiers, who are killed, injured or suffered from psychological problems. In the second case there is no cost in domestic politics.

The second variable seen in these periods is the cost distribution within the alliances. As seen in the tables in the 2.B.2 and 2.D.2 sections, the burdens of US allies, especially NATO countries, have increased in the period when the US preferred indirect strategies. While this situation undoubtedly points to a decline in the relative position of the leader country against rising forces within the alliance, it also gives this country a chance to economically recover itself. In this context, it was observed that the US, which focused on proxy wars in the first of the comparison periods, shifted the security of European continent to European allies except nuclear weapons. This shift, which can be seen in Table 2.4, has been able to position the weight of US economic resources against its global rival, although it has strengthened the position of European allies against the US. Similarly, after the post 9/11 wars, the United States cooperated with regional allies and, more importantly, with the local powers in the Middle East, focusing itself on states such as China and Iran. In the face of Russia, it shared a burden with his European allies, as in the case of an Emergency Response Force.

The other variable is observed in the transformation of counter-methods. In this context, the actors who first developed a counter-strategy in the approach of ‘find and destroy’, realized that this approach was precisely what counter forces expected. As a result, they preferred the method that tries to ‘winning hearts and minds’. In this context, ‘leading from behind’ and achieve political results in this way became the most preferred method. In other words, counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism methods are replaced by counter-insurgency, a more general and political concept. According to this, the increase in force at the beginning of the conflicts was initiated in high cost operations, and then the cost was reduced significantly by exchanging loads with local actors. Thus, the opposing power was tried to be hit with his own gun.

In other words, states have begun to show that they are no longer affected by prolonged wars and can continue their war forever. In this context, as revealed in Table 1.19, it has been found that the states, which have succeeded in doing so, gained a great deal of share in the conflict for at least 30 years.

This logic, which is observed in power relations and summarized above, answers the other question of the study. Accordingly, the main element that transforms and hybridizes armed conflicts is the transformation of power relations. And since the power relations do not change the nature of the war, the responses of the other two fields are insufficient. The main actors are the states and the primary rivals of the states are still other states. The impact of non-state actors and non-conventional strategies is limited to preventing the expansion of the sphere of influence of states. One of the most important assumptions of the other clusters, the approach of the obsolescence of the inter-state war, even when considering from this point is the subject of discussion. As Colin Gray expresses as “*when great-power rivals feel able to challenge American hegemony, interstate war will return*,”⁹⁴⁸ it remains uncertain whether the inter-state war will return during the transformation of power relations. For this reason, the inter-state power scale remains determinative and the system-dominant states continues to be the main actors shaping international relations.

The costs gain special importance in this regard, and the activities of actors who want to maintain and change their positions in the world economy and politics are shaped in some kind of profit-loss mechanism. With the effort to protect/expand the power by increasing its own earnings, the effort to protect/improve the power by increasing the cost of the opponent goes simultaneously.

The battles that resulted in a short period of time have been the most basic means of inter-state struggles for centuries as the easiest and most effective way of reducing their competitor's strength while increasing their own power. The fact that the increasing costs have prevented the benefits in the last century has brought with them the evaluations that the basic instrumental position of the war is disappearing. However, as demonstrated in the study, this has only changed the ways of creating benefit and harm in interstate competition. This has inevitably ‘blurred’ the matter.

⁹⁴⁸ Colin S. Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of Cold War?", *Parameters*, Vol 35 No 2, 2005, p. 15. Cited by Steven C. Williamson, *From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War*, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2009, p. 19.

However, the blurring of these roads has not prevented the clear view that the underlying logic of the conflicts has not changed.

In the light of all these findings, it is believed to have reached another fundamental conclusion on armed conflicts in this study. Although this finding is not the subject of the study, it would be best to end the study with this finding. Throughout history, transforming actors, changing systems, developing technologies have been reduced to a component of the constant effort to protect 'what is achieved', and wars have become a historical state of how mankind's entire accumulation is used to destroy itself. However, it is clearly understood in the studies on armed conflicts and as in this study, that the forces will always rise and fall; and thus technologies, economic and demographic resources, political systems and geopolitical efforts will not prevent this continuity.

Because of this reason, until humankind considers war not as a technical issue, but as a symptom of its own disease, and until develop a collective consciousness, all the studies will be define only the new forms our our story of self-destruction.

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