# POLITICAL PARTY ELITES AND THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY: THE TURKISH CASE, 1973-1980

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to analyze the behavior of Turkish political party elites during the 1973-1980 period. It is particularly concerned with the extent to which political party elites seemed to have contributed to the breakdown of Turkish democracy in 1980. It starts from the assumption that breakdown of democracies is not determined by structural factors alone, however important they might be. Political actors, particularly those who professed commitment to a democratic regime, have a space for manuevre so as to lessen the unfavourable effects of these structures. It is argued that trials and tribulations of the Turkish democracy can be understood better if they are examined within the broader social-political framework in which it evolved, a framework which has both generated constraints and provided opportunities for political actors. At its simplest, that broader framework can be said to have consisted of the complex encounter and interaction of Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition and traditional social structure undergoing modernisation process. It is concluded that, although the interaction in question did not create particularly favourable soil for democracy to flourish, it certainly did not mean that democracy was doomed to fail in the 1980. Political party elites did have room for manuevre so as to affect the constraining conditions and to enhance the efficacy, effectiveness and therefore legitimacy of the democratic regime. The principal argument of the thesis is that political party elites, far from taking such a course of action, through their actions and non-actions -particularly their reactions to problem of terrorism and economic crisis- have done much to undermine the belief in the democratic system and paved the way to its breakdown in 1980.

Keywords: Breakdown of Democracy, Turkish Democracy, Turkish Political Party Elites

# ÖZET

## SİYASAL PARTİ SEÇKİNLERİ VE DEMOKRASİNİN KESİNTİYE UĞRAMASI: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ, 1973-1980

Tanel Demirel

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, 1973-1980 döneminde Türk siyasal parti seçkinlerinin davranışlarını incelemeyi amaçlamakta; özellikle de siyasal parti seçkinlerinin, demokrasinin 1980 yılında kesintiye uğramasına ne ölçüde katkıda bulundukları sorusu ile ilgilenmektedir. Tez, demokrasilerin kesintiye uğramasının, ne kadar önemli olursa olsunlar sadece yapısal faktörlerle açıklanamayacağı varsayımından yola çıkarak, siyasal aktörlerin, özellikle demokrasiyi savunanların, yapısal faktörlerin olumsuz etkilerini azaltacak bir manevra alanına sahip olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Çalışma, Türk demokrasisinin problemlerinin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için, siyasal aktörler için sınırlamalar kadar fırsatlar da yaratan, demokrasinin içinde evrildiği yapısal nitelikli sosyal-siyasal ortamın gözönünde bulundurulması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu ortam, en basit anlatımıyla, güçlü devlet geleneği ile modernleşme sürecinde olan geleneksel toplumsal yapının karşılıklı etkileşiminden oluşmaktadır. Adı geçen etkileşimin demokrasinin yerleşmesi için özellikle elverişli bir ortam yaratmadığı sonucuna varılmakla birlikte bu durum, demokrasinin 1980'de başarısızlığa mahkum olduğu anlamına da kesinlikle gelmemektedir. Türk siyasal parti elitleri, sınırlayıcı koşullara etki etme, diğer bir söyleyişle demokrasinin etkinliği ve meşruiyetini artırma konusunda bir manevra alanına sahiptirler. Çalışma, siyasal parti seçkinlerinin, sahip oldukları manevra alanında gerçekleştirdikleri ve gerçekleştiremedikleri davranışları- özellikle terörizm ve ekonomik kriz konusunda- ile demokratik rejime duyulan inancı zayıflattıkları ve demokrasinin kesintiye uğramasında etkin bir rol oynadıkları tezini savunmaktadır.



Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasinin Kesintiye Uğraması, Türk Demokrasisi, Türk Siyasal Parti Seçkinleri

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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CNTU. Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-MİSK)

CRWU. Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-DİSK)

CSTA. Confederation of Small Traders and Artisans (Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Derneği)

CTWU.Confederation of Turkish Workers Union (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-TÜRK-İŞ)

CUP. Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

DP. Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)

ICC. Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (İstanbul Ticaret Odası-ITO)

ICI. Istanbul Chamber of Industry (İstanbul Sanayi Odası-ISO)

IYA. Idealist Youth Associations (Ülkücü Gençlik Derneği-ÜGD)

LE. Liberty and Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası)

NAP. Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP)

NSP. National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP)

PA. Police Associations (Polis Derneği- POL-DER)

RPP. Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP)

RRP. Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi-CGP)

TIBA. Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Associations (Türk Sanayicileri ve

İşadamları Derneği-TÜSİAD)

TTUSA. Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Association (TÖB-DER)

TUC. Turkish Union of Chambers (Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği-TOBB)

TWP. Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP)

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# CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In the morning of 12 September 1980 the Turkish military high command announced that they had taken over the administration of the country. Prior to the intervention, the death toll resulting from mounting terrorism had reached an average of twenty people per day. The economy, plagued by industrial unrest, had stagnated for almost two years, while the inflation and unemployment continued to rise. The civil bureaucracy (including security forces) were heavily politicized, while political party elites continued to tear each other apart. The Grand National Assembly failed even to elect a head of the state let alone finding effective remedies for the crisis. The purpose of the intervention, as declared by newly formed National Security Council, was hardly an exaggeration:

> to preserve the integrity of the country, to restore national unity and togetherness, to avert a possible civil war and fratricide, to reestablish the authority and the existence of the state and to eliminate all the factors that prevent the normal functioning of the democratic order.[1]

The advent of democracy in Turkey that was installed in 1946 was far from a tranquil one, to say the least. Since the transition to a multi-party politics, it was the third time (the first in 1960 and the second in 1971 by pronounciamento) that Turkish democracy was interrupted by the military intervention, leaving aside unsuccessful coup attempts and intrusions of the military to civilian affairs in normal times. The quality of democracy that was in place never ceased to attract severe criticism. By any account, clearly, Turkish democracy suffered from chronic stability problems. At the most general level, this dissertation is concerned with the question of why democracy in Turkey has had such troubled existence. Specifically, it aims to analyze the factors that triggered the breakdown of democracy in 12 September 1980.

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[1] The General Secretariat of the National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey -Before and After* (Ankara:Ongun, 1982), 221.

The study uses the term democracy as Diamond, Linz and Lipset defined it in a recent major study. According to this definition (derived from Schumpeter and Dahl's seminal formulations) democracy is a system of government that meets three essential conditions. First, there should be a "meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power through regular, free, and fair elections that exclude the use of force." Second, there should be "a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is precluded from exercising the rights of citizenship." And third, there should be a level of "civil and political liberties...sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously."[2] It goes without saying that no country in the world can ever satisfy these conditions in full but only to a varying degrees. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of existence or absence of a democracy, but of different degrees of democracy.

This dissertation opts for this definition because various participatory definitions of democracy that stipulate socio-economic advances for the majority of the population, and/or active involvement of citizens in taking decisions that affect their lives broadens the criteria for democracy and makes the study of the phenomenon extremely difficult.[3] Otherwise, the study does not claim that it is either the sole or the ideal definition of democracy. In line with this definition, the study assumes that the breakdown of democracy occurs when the democratically elected rulers are changed through force (or with the threat of force), that is, when rulers are no longer determined by electoral competition, and the various guarantees that protects civil and political rights are

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[2] Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy,* second. ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995), 6.

[3] For a similar assessment, Samuel P.Huntington, *The Third Wave-Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7.

suspended.[4] It is obvious that such a definition of breakdown of democracy makes no reference to "quality" of the democracy that had been ended. One can argue (and it has been argued) that an authoritarian government that did not take its legitimacy from electoral competition but is more successful in delivering security of life and functioning state authority is better than a democratically elected government that fails in both. But still, this is a hypothetical case and even if authoritarian ruler may seem to be succesful for a while, in the long run there is no guarantee that (s)he would be replaced by a another benevolent ruler. Therefore, it is more accurate to conclude that the way to improve the quality of democracy is not to appeal to an authoritarian methods but to seek remedies within the democratic system as it is the only system that can gradually improve itself over time.[5]

Though, so far there has not been a single scholarly study focusing exclusively on the 1980 democratic breakdown, it is possible to find various accounts purporting to explain it in some more general studies on Turkish politics. The majority of scholars have tended to single out the role played by the political party elites in the breakdown as the most significant variable. It is argued that political leaders with their uncompromising attitude and short-sightedness were primarily responsible for the breakdown. Kemal

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[4] The definition of what is to be understood by "breakdown of democracy" is important. Heper, for instance, does not characterize the 12 September military intervention as the breakdown of democracy. The military, he suggested, never discarded the the ideal of democracy and promised (and more importantly kept its promise) quick return to democracy. In that conceptualization, open and straightforward renunciation of democracy as a system of government by military, is the requirement if the military intervention is to be regarded as breakdown of democracy. See, Metin Heper, "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish case in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Democracy and Modernity* ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 157. Similarly, the study uses the term "military intervention" rather than "coup d'etat" to characterize 12 September breakdown. Although both terms are usually interchangeably used, "coup d'etat" (which literally meant "stroke of state") is rather used to refer to sudden and illegal seizure of governmental power usually to satisfy desires of the executioners, while "military intervention" is a more neutral term, which implies that the move is motivated by some other aims other than pure power motivations of its executioners, and which concerns with the legitimacy of the move more than coup d'etats ever do.

[5] That does not mean, on the other hand, there would certainly be improvements with the passing of the time, particularly in new democracies. As O'Donnell suggests, in what he called delegative democracies, democracy may still be enduring while being far from consolidated (i.e. institutionalized). Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 15, 1 (1994), 56.

Karpat, for instance, argued that "The failure of democracy in Turkey was essentially a failure in leadership."[6] He even did not hesitate to state boldly that "all three crises resulted solely from the failure of civilians to compromise or learn to live with each other whether in power or in opposition."[7] İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, despite their emphasis on objective determinants of a regime change, saw the 1980 breakdown as being a result of "the inability of the centrist forces and leadership."[8] In the same line, Dodd argued that "polarization between the major party elites" was a major factor in the breakdown of democracy.[9] Likewise, Özbudun pointed out that political leaders' failure to show a high capacity for accommodation and compromise in moderating political crises was "...directly responsible for both the 1960 and the 1980 military interventions."[10] William Hale, too, advanced the view that the intervention could have been prevented only if the party leaders had been determined to rescue Turkey from the abyss.[11]

Not all authors, however, assigned as much importance to the political leadership. Influenced by world-system and dependency perspective, Çağlar Keyder and others had placed a premium on the crises that the Turkish economy underwent throughout 1970s as the decisive factor that led to breakdown.[12] Metin Heper (though not directly touching

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[6] Kemal Karpat, "Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics and the Third Military Intervention." *International Journal of Turkish Studies.* 2 (1981), 41.

[7] Ibid., 7.

[8] İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey:Problems and Prospects," in *Transition From Authoritarian Rule- Southern Europe,* ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 182.

[9] Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy,* second ed. (London: Eothen, 1990), 43.

[10] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in *Politics in Developing Countries -Comparing Experiences with Democracy,* second ed. ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995),253.

[11] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London:Routledge, 1994), 241.

[12] See, Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey- A Study in Capitalist Development* (London:Verso, 1987), 228; Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak, "Conclusion," in *Turkey in Transition,* ed. Irwin C.Shick and Ertugrul A.Tonak, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987), 374. Keyder, in the recent study, somewhat modified his earlier beliefs and argued that "the 1980 coup was not a

upon the 1980 breakdown) criticized those approaches that take the resourcefulness of the political actors as the crucial independent variable for the fortunes of democracy in the countries concerned.[13] Instead, he proposed a more historical approach that pays special attention to institutionalization patterns of previous regimes and subsequent cultural traits. In his view, one should study "the imprint left on the present political systems by their particular paths of development."[14] He, therefore, inclined to explain sources of instability in Turkish democracy with reference to the conflict between state elite and political elite, a conflict that has its roots in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition.[15]

Those explanations, though extremely helpful in understanding such phenomena as complex as breakdown of democracy, appear to have been in need of further development and refinement. For instance, the economic crisis that Turkey underwent during the seventies was extremely serious and caused tremendous economic and social problems such as inflation, unemployment, chronic balance of payments deficits, worsening income distribution and the like. But as recent scholarship has shown,[16] a democracy facing a severe economic crisis does not inevitably have to face breakdown. It would be misleading to attribute increasing violence; political elites' inability to reach a compromise on some critical issues; ever-present tendencies toward polarization; paralysis of state authority; low levels of legitimacy -all symptoms of a democracy on the brink of a breakdown- largely to economic crises.[17]

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bureaucratic-authoritarian one." See, Çağlar Keyder, "Democracy and the Demise of National Developmentalism: Turkey in Perspective," in *Democracy and Development*, ed. Amiya Kumar Bagchi (New York: St.Martin Press, 1995), 209.

[13] Metin Heper, "Transitions to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical Perspective," in *Comparative Political Dynamics - Global Research Perspectives*, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 194.

[14] Ibid.,196.

[15] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (London: Eothen, 1985)

[16] See, p.14-16 below.

[17] In the same line, Barkey argued that the crisis of import substitution industrialization (ISI), (and by implication crisis of democracy) was not inevitable. Rather than assigning critical significance to

The argument that the breakdown of democracy in Turkey should be considered in the context of state elite/political elite conflict is much more explanatory in understanding the military's self-appointed role as guardian of the state, the polarization, lack of consensus, destructive political party struggles that preceded the breakdown. It is very useful in describing the parameters of Turkish politics at a macro-level since the conflicting visions (of how society is to be organized) of the state and the political elites generated far-reaching legitimacy problems for the democratic regime. But, it is less than satisfactory at a micro-level, that is, in explaining why a breakdown occurs at a given time, but not others, despite the ever-present legitimacy problems. An explanation of breakdown of democracy at a micro-level would have to take into consideration, economic, international, institutional and rather contingent factors that appear to have contributed to breakdown. Besides, as it will be shown below, the distinctions between the state elite and political elite were somewhat blurred in the late seventies. There had been rapprochement between the Justice Party (JP), representative of the political elite and the military, the state elite. They seemed to have been united, at least, in their opposition to communism and ethnic separatism. Moreover, the JP was no longer perceived by the military as the party associated with religious reactionism and in opposition to the Republican principles. Meanwhile the Republican People's Party (RPP), the party of state elite, began to flirt with several ideas which were an anathema to the military. Therefore, the alliance between the military and the RPP started to look very feeble. In that sense the 1980 breakdown was not directly related to the conflict between political elite (the JP) and state elite (the military and civilian bureaucracy in implicit alliance with the RPP) as in 1960, and to a lesser extent in 1971, but between the military and all political elites. The military intervention was not conducted to overthrow a party believed to have betrayed Atatürk's principles, but to all political parties that were believed to have brought the

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the economic factors he emphasized the lack of state autonomy vis-a-vis variety of interests. As he put it there were solutions but "the absence of political leadership which combined with external pressures spiralled Turkey into crisis." Henri J. Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 104.

country through in-fighting to the brink of civil war. It is the endless party struggles between the political elites, equally disapproved by the military, that incapacitated the democratic system and paved the way to a breakdown.

Those explanations that placed a premium on political parties and leaders provided worthwhile insights, especially when they tried to situate political party behavior in a larger social-political context. These studies, moreover, did not seek to analyze in detail how the political party elites behaved during the crucial junctures before the breakdown. They did not, for instance, seek to find answer to the question of whether there appeared to be any other policy options that party elites could have chosen which might have alleviated the crisis of democracy. Nor did they aim to delineate the democratic regime's erosion of legitimacy that paved the way to its breakdown. Finally, they did not dwell on the question of why the party elites behaved in the way they actually did.

This study, which greatly benefited from these analyses and attempts to build on them by refining above mentioned points, starts from the assumption that the breakdown of democracies can not be completely explained by reference to underlying structural (or macro social-political) variables, however important they might be. Although structural conditions surely limit the possibilities for political actors, they do not totally determine it.[18] The actions and non-actions of the political actors[19] might have decisive impact on the fortunes of democracy. Political actors have room for maneuver that may increase or decrease democracy's chances of survival. Corollary to that assumption is that actions and non-actions of political actors can not completely be determined by the underlying

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[18] The structure versus action controversy is one of the central problems in social sciences. Following Anthony Giddens, we believe that the way forward in bridging the gap between the two approaches can be found if we recognize that the people, while influenced by social political structures, make and remake them in every day life through their actions. See, Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984)

[19] By political actors the reference is made to those incumbents or opposition politicians who profess commitment to democratic regime, or at least whose loyalty to democratic regime is not dubious. The term excludes various interest groups (such as media, trade and business unions) and the military. It is, of course, true that the military is one of the central actors in the any process of democratic breakdown. But in this conceptualization the military variable is considered as structural constraint.

macro social-political variables either. That is to say political actors, though influenced and constrained by social-political structures of which they are a part, are not the mere bearers of those structures. If they had been mere bearers of structures, then the very notion of the autonomy of the political, (and indeed politics) would be in jeopardy, since what we can regard as "political" would have been determined solely by the underlying social-structures. What is needed then, is an approach which while recognizing the autonomy of political actors, tries to situate it in the underlying structural context which introduces constraints and provides opportunities for them. In this way, it is hoped, one can avoid the pitfalls of subscribing to an action-oriented approach while ignoring the context in which actions take place or vice-versa.

### 1.1. WHAT MAKES FOR DEMOCRACY ? MACRO VARIABLES

Here we are concerned with what we called underlying structural variables that, presumably, increase and/or decrease the likelihood of the emergence and the stability[20] of democracy. Seeking roots of democratic (in)stability in socio-economic development levels, Seymour Martin Lipset, for instance, has asserted that there was broad and multistranded relationships between socio-economic development levels and democracy.[21] His argument was simply that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."[22] He arrived at such conclusion after comparing several countries' (of Europe, Latin America and other English speaking ones) experience with

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[20] Following Diamond, Linz and Lipset, we use the term stability to refer to "the persistence and durability of democratic and other regimes over time, particularly through periods of unusually intense conflict, crisis, and strain." Diamond, Linz and Lipset, "What Makes," 9.

[21] Lipset was not the only scholar in seeking to unravel structural conditions that are conducive to democracy. For an influential attempt see, Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy- Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[22] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded and updated ed. (London: Heinemann, 1983), 31. The first edition of the book was published in 1960, and Lipset has developed many of his ideas in an earlier article published in 1959. See, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisities of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review.* (1959): 69-105. Note that subtitle of this book is read as "The Social Bases of Politics."

democracy and dictatorship. He compared democracies and dictatorships on a range of indicators of socio-economic development; industrialization, per capita income, education, urbanization and communication, and found that the more socioeconomically developed a country the more likely that it will sustain a democratic regime. Similarly, the less socioeconomically developed a country, the lesser the chances that it will have a democracy.

Lipset claimed that socioeconomic development is likely to give rise to a more democratic political culture in which values such as toleration, moderation and restraint are highly valued.[23] High levels of education is likely to broaden man's horizons and thus "enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices."[24] It also tends to increase trust in fellow citizens. The higher level of income and security that it provides tends to reduce intensity of class struggles. The relative abundance of resources encourages (on the part of the lower classes) an attitude that favors longer time perspectives and more flexible and gradualist view of politics. "A belief in secular reformist gradualism," Lipset claimed, "can be the ideology of only a relatively well-to-do lower classes."[25] Related to this aspect, Lipset maintained that high levels of socio-economic development would reduce the premium on political power as "it does not make too much difference whether some redistribution takes place."[26] In this case the loss of office does not necessarily mean serious losses for major groups. Finally, Lipset stressed that economic development would contribute to democracy by encouraging the multiplication of intermediary, voluntary organizations which act as sources of

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[23] Ibid., 40.

[24] Ibid., 39.

[25] Ibid., 45.

[26] Ibid., 51.

countervailing power.[27]

Despite his stress on the significance of economic development, Lipset did not fully develop the argument that socio-economic development "leads" to democracy. He provided the example of Germany where many indicators of socio-economic development favored the establishment of a democratic system but "a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy and thus weakened its ability to withstand crisis."[28]

Ever since the publication of his findings, it has become the starting point, for all future works which analyze the relationships between economic development and democracy. His thesis has been (re)criticized, (re)interpreted, (re)tested but never been conclusively refuted. Critics have pointed out several shortcomings. Dankwart Rustow argued that Lipset's thesis establishes only correlation, not causality. To say that, Rustow continued, socio-economic development is associated with democracy does not necessarily mean that they are the causes of democracy.[29] That is to say, Lipset was not clear whether socio-economic development brought democratic system into existence or it only contributed to the stability of the legitimacy of democracy which was assumed to be already in existence. Although Lipset had claimed that all he intended to show was a correlation and that "a political form may develop because of a syndrome of unique historical circumstances even though the society's major characteristics favor another form"[30], Rustow was in secure ground in arguing that Lipset had repeatedly slipped "from the language of correlation into the language of causality."[31]

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[27] Ibid., 52.

[28] Ibid., 28.

[29] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Approach," in *The State -Critical Concepts*, ed. John A. Hall (London: Routledge, 1994), 348. (Originally published in 1970)

[30] Lipset, *Political Man*. 28.

[31] Rustow, "Transitions," 348.

Another line of criticism argued that Lipset was ignoring the strains and difficulties that the economic development created and its consequences for the stability of political system. A more radical challenge came from the dependency perspective to which we shall turn later. In an influential critique within the modernization school, Samuel P. Huntington criticized the classical modernization theory for assuming that "all good things go together" or compatibility assumption.[32] He argued that good things often did not and could not go together. Contrary to the widely held beliefs of the late fifties and sixties, Huntington asserted that "Rapid economic growth breeds political instability."[33] Economic development was likely to increase expectations to a level where nothing but disappointment followed, to change the traditional patterns of authority, and to intensify conflicts between major groups to share increasing wealth (economic growth is likely to increase social inequalities) which leads to extensive political participation. But institutions were often too inflexible or to weak to accommodate such demands. Failure to contain those pressures, Huntington has argued, results in breakdown or decay of the political system.[34] Huntington, however, did not rule out the possibility of the emergence of strong institutions. As such, Huntington's contribution was a "correction" to the optimistic expectations of some of the advocates of modernization theory rather a than sweeping rejection of it.[35]

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[32] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in *Understanding Political Development*, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston: Little Brown, 1987), 8.

[33] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics.* 17 (1965), 406.

[34] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1968); See also, Samuel P. Huntington and Joel Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976)

[35] In his subsequent works, Huntington took a more sympathetic approach to the Lipset's thesis. He indeed, can be said to have refined it by developing the concept of "transition zone." According to Huntington, economic development tend to produce a transitional phase in which political elites and the prevailing political values can shape choices that decisively determine the nation's future evolution towards democracy. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic." *Political Science Quarterly.* 99, 2 (1984).

Such critics aside, Lipset's claim that there is a close correlation between the level of economic development and democracy seems to be supported by the vast majority of empirical studies which have appeared since late sixties.[36] Larry Diamond summarized the findings of various statistical exercises in the period of 1963 and 1991. He noted that every one of those studies revealed statistically positive relations between the level of economic development and democracy.[37] The experience of East Asian countries seemed to provide another strong boost for Lipset's thesis. The emergence of ever stronger demands (which is yet to led a greater visible democratization in practice) for more democracy after years of impressive economic growth under non-democratic regimes, led many authors to revitalize the traditional arguments between economic development and democracy.[38] All in all, it seems fair to conclude that though the emergence of democracy is not an automatic result of socio-economic development and modernity, the socio-economic development plays an important role for in the making of stable

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[36] As early as 1971, Dahl have provided support for the Lipset thesis by arguing that the chances for a country developing competitive political regime was dependent on "the extent to which the country's society and economy (a) provide literacy, education and communication, (b) create a pluralist rather than a centrally dominated social order, (c ) and prevent extreme inequlities among the politically relevant strata of the country." Dahl, *Polyarchy.* 74.

[37] Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy reconsidered," in *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset,* ed. Garry Marks and Larry Diamond (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), 109. From that time to the time of writing yet more studies were published all noting positive correlation between the socio-economic development levels and democracy. See, Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryoung Seong and John Charles Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy." *International Social Science Journal.* 45, (1993), 155-175; Mick Moore, "Democracy and Development in Cross-National Perspective: A New Look at the Statistics." *Democratization.* 2, 2, (1995), 1-19.; Mark J Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis." *American Political Science Review.* 89, 4, (1995), 893; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongo, "What makes Democracies Endure." *Journal of Democrac.* 7, 1 (1996) 41.

[38] See, Francis Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy." *Journal of Democracy.* 6,2, (1995), 21; Robert A. Scalapino, "Democratizing Dragons: South Korea and Taiwan." *Journal of Democracy.* 4,3, (1993), 72.; Karen L. Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization." *Comparative Politics.* 28, 1, (1995) p.108. Similarly Martin.A Seligson makes the similar argument for the Latin American democratizations. He argues that by the 1980s "the socioeconomic foundations for the stable democracy had finally been established in Latin America" and subsequent democratizations should be situated in this context. See, his "Democratization in Latin America: The Current Cycle," in *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America,* ed. James M. Malloy and Martin A. Seligson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 7-10.

democracy. As Prezworski and Limongi neatly summed up "the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer" [39] and "if they succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nation."[40]

Another influential approach which emphasizes socio-economic determinants of democracies was developed by Guillermo O'Donnell. In a total contrast with Lipset, O'Donnel defended the view that socio-economic development levels and democracy was inversely related. He, in an explicit critique of the modernization theory, employed the premises of dependency theory that questioned the compatibility of capitalist economic development in periphery with the political democracy.[41] Impressed both by increasing number of Latin American countries that have experienced military coups and by the similarities in policies that those authoritarian governments followed, O'Donnell tried to explain the rise of what he called "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian" regimes.[42] Although, he developed his hypothesis with reference to several Latin American countries, he added that "its analytical frontiers extend to cases on other continents, subject to similar patterns of industrialization and incorporation into the world capitalist system."[43]

In a nutshell, he saw the emergence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state as a response to resolve the crisis of import-substitution industrialization (henceforth ISI) strategy. Import substitution is a policy of replacing imports by domestic production under the selective protection of high tariffs or import quotas.[44] It was a fashionable

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[39] Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization-Theories and Facts." *World Politics.* 49 (1997), 177.

[40] Ibid., 177.

[41] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley:Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973)

[42] Those countries in which the military as an institution seized power were Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Chile and Uruguay (1973).

[43] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State." *Latin American Research Review.* 12, (1978), 29.

[44] For ISI, see, Albert O. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America," in *A Bias for Hope,* ed. Albert O.Hirschman (New Haven: Yale

developmental strategy implemented by many undeveloped countries which, after the great depression, tried as much as possible not to be dependent on world economy. According to O'Donnell, at the initial stages of ISI (or what is called at the easy phase of ISI) considerable socio-economic development took place. The rapid expansion of consumer goods was able to satisfy the already existing domestic market that was heavily protected by the imposition of tariffs or import controls. Production for domestic markets also enabled the domestic producers to afford high wages to increase the purchasing power of workers. Trade Union activities were allowed, generous benefits for the workers were accepted. Thus, a multi-class political coalition that supported such strategies was consolidated and an "incorporating alliance" between the bourgeoisie and the working class that favors political democracy emerged.

The problems, however, started once the domestic market was satisfied and opportunities for industrial expansion became limited. What was required at this stage was the "deepening of industrialization." That is, the expansion of industrial production other than consumer goods, the intermediate and capital goods employed in the production of consumer goods. Due to the low level of technology and human capital, this deepening necessitates higher saving rates for investment and for attracting foreign capital. To achieve higher saving rates and to attract foreign investment measures such as tariff reduction, abolition of import and price controls, adoption of floating exchange rates, reductions in the cost of labor, creation of flexible labor market need to be implemented. But these measures are likely to attract stiff opposition from the already active popular sector.

Besides, with higher levels of social differentiation the role of technocrats (especially civilian and military bureaucracies in the public sector) becomes enlarged. By its very nature, they are likely to perceive the effective policy making as something that needs to be freed from political considerations. Disturbed by the ongoing economic and political crises and inability of the system to resolve the crisis within a competitive

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University Press, 1971)

democracy, these military and civilian technocrats ultimately establishe a "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime that proceed by repressing the active popular sector.

O'Donnell's thesis has led to considerable debates. Though popularized versions of it appeared to have enjoyed widespread acceptance, especially in non-academic circles, it was severely criticized in academia even in the heyday of the dependency perspective. Albert O. Hirschman, for instance, pointed out the need to look at purely political factors for a complete explanation of a regime change. He argued that, however great the crisis of ISI might have been, the rise of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America can not be explained without giving consideration to political factors, such as the fear and the determination of the United States and other ruling groups in Latin America to prevent a second Cuba and/or the spread of gerilla tactics on the left.[45] One can add to those political factors, the military's propensity to intervene, the behaviors and attitudes of incumbent leaders who appear to have triggered regime breakdown through gross miscalculation and/or indecisiveness.[46]

In a similar vein, it has been argued that the crisis of ISI in particular, and economic crisis in general do not necessarily lead to a breakdown of democracy. Countries such as Columbia and Peru in 1960s and 1970s and Mexico were able to resolve the crisis without the establishment of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state, suggesting that the implementation of painful economic measures does not necessarily require authoritarian governments simply because historical-political framework does have an autonomy (to a varying degrees of course) from economic structure. Robert Kaufman, for instance, explained those cases with reference to state structures' ability to insulate themselves from

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[45] See, Albert O. Hirchman, "The Search for Economic Determinants," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 71. In the same line, Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Rise of Postwar Military Dictatorships:Argentina, Chile, Greece." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 28, 1 (1986), 80.

[46] For instance, it was argued that Brazilian president Goulart's actions escalated the political crisis that paved the way to breakdown of democracy in 1966. See, Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in *The Breakdown of Democracies: Latin America*. ed. Juan J.Linz and Alfred Stepan, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 110-138.

those pressures emanating from active populist forces without having to rely on direct military rule.[47] Since then, many empirical studies cast doubt on the effect of economic crises on regime changes. In an insightful study which presented both diachronic and cross sectional analysis of the IMF standby programs, Remmer, for instance, concluded that "democratic regimes have been no less likely to introduce stabilization programs than authoritarian ones, no more likely to breakdown in response to their political costs, and no less rigorous in their implementation of austerity measures."[48] Likewise, Muller pointed out Greece, Peru and Philippines cases, which faced military coups despite good economic performance further dissociating the military intervention from economical causes. He then concluded that "democracy can survive in developing countries despite the severe crisis of economic performance."[49] Reaching a similar conclusion, Juan Linz pointed out that in capitalist economies, the blame for an economic crisis can be imputed to a variety of factors such as the impersonal forces of markets, monopolies, trade unions or international financial capital. He then arrived at the conclusion that "a crisis in the economic system does not necessarily carry with it a crisis of the political system."[50]

The fact that in his subsequent works O'Donnell himself emphasized the centrality of political actors suggests that the bureaucratic-authoritarian model (which was unambiguously and unabashedly structuralist in its approach) explaining democratic instability has been deserted even by its chief proponent.[51] The significance of O'Donnell's

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[47] Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,* ed. David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 250.

[48] Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984." *Comparative Politics.* 18, (1986), 23. For similar argument that the IMF stand-by arrangements do not significantly appear to increase or promote political instability, see, Scott R. Sidel, *The IMF and Third-World Political Instability- Is there a Connection ?* (London: Macmillan, 1988).

[49] Edward N. Muller, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World." *International Studies Quarterly.* 29, (1985), 457. See also, Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis," 812.

[50] See, Juan J. Linz, "Legitimacy of Democracy and Socioeconomic System," in *Comparing Pluralist Democracies,* ed. Mattei Dogan (Boulder:Westview, 1988), 65.

[51] Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, ed., *Transitions From*

thesis lies in the fact that it related regime changes with the economic crises (whatever its sources might be). As such it is an advancement that enhances our understanding of democratic breakdowns. This is especially so when it is supplemented with the two propositions that economic crises, "though trigger democratic breakdowns,"[52] do not necessarily have to lead to it and that democratic breakdowns can occur even in the absence of economic crisis.

Apart from those paradigms that emphasize the underlying socio-economic structures for the (in)stability of democracy, the other powerful approach in the same tradition singled out underlying cultural traits as the most significant variable.[53] It has been argued that various cultures contain some inherent obstacles which inhibit democracy from taking root. In the late sixties, many authors pointed out that Catholicism, with its alleged tradition of intolerance and hierarchy, with its failure to separate religion from politics was a significant obstacle for democracy.[54] Since many Catholic countries have replaced authoritarian regimes and have had fairly succesful experiences with democracy, this argument appears to have been seriously weakened.[55]

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*Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See also review article by Daniel H.Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy." *World Politics*. 3, XL (1988).

[52] Gaiorowski, "Economic Crisis," 812.

[53] A somewhat different approach in this tradition was developed by Harry Eckstein. Rather than pointing out various cultures' (in)compatibility with democracy, he pointed out the congruence (and/or the lack of it) between the authority patterns of democratic regimes and the socio-cultural norms that prevail in such intermediate institutions as family, schools and voluntary organizations as the most significant factors to explain democratic (in)stability. See, Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," in *Regarding Politics -Essays on Political Theory, Stability and Change*, (University of Chicago Press:Oxford, 1992), 186. (the article originally published in 1966).

[54] See, for instance, Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, ed with an introduction by Roy Pierce (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) (original publication 1965); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture." *Journal of Democracy*. 1,4 (1990), 80-83. For an argument that the Latin American (a mix of Catholic-Iberian tradition) cultures involve anti-democratic elements, see Howard Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).

[55] As Huntington noted "the third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave, ... Roughly three-quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic." Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy*. 2, 2

Yet, culturalist arguments are by no means exhausted. The Catholicism and Iberic tradition (which had been assumed to be as an obstacle for democracy) is now being replaced by Islam and Confucianism. The allegedly consummatory character of both religions are held to be inhibiting factors for the emergence and stability of democracy. It is argued that their emphasis on group over individuals, authority over liberty, and their failure to disassociate the religious from the political sphere makes democracy difficult to establish and (if established) maintain. Ellie Kedorie, for instance, writes that "...there is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world -which are the political traditions of Islam- which might make familiar, or indeed, intelligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional and representative government."[56] The basic difficulty with this culturalist argument is that social scientific analysis just can not tell whether and to what extent the absence of democracy in Muslim or in Confucian societies is to do with these religions but not with other possible variables. It can justifiably be argued, for instance that, the absence of democracy in Arab lands is more to do with the existence of "rentier state," or dominance of kinship and tribal bonds in the social structure than the impact of Islam as such. Moreover, it is becoming widely accepted that contrary to the claims of many culturalists, cultures are not unchanging, realities fixed once and for all. By contrast, they change, albeit slowly, as a result of socio-economic changes, international diffusion and political learning.[57]

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(1991), 13.

[56] Ellie Kedorie, *Democracy and Arab Political Tradition* (Washington D.C: A Washington Institute Monograph, 1992), 5. For other examples in this line, see, See, George F. Kennan, *Clouds of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy.* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); For an argument that the Asian cultures involve some elements that does not go hand in hand with democracy. See, Lucien Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority.* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University, 1985); Huntington, "Third Wave," 24-29; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review.* 59 (1994), 5-7; Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny- A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew." *Foreign Affairs.* 72, 2 (1994). For a counter view, Russell Arben Fox, "Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy." *Review of Politics.* 59,3 (1997); Fukuyama, "The Primacy," 21.

[57] See, Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy" in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries,* ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 9; Lipset, "Social Requisites," 7; Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," 50.

Rather than studying some specific cultures' (in)compatibility with democracy, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba attempted to identify the kind of political culture within which a democracy is more likely to survive.[58] They were concerned with the question of "why some democracies survive while others collapse more than with the question of how well democracies perform,"[59] particularly in the aftermath of collapse of German and Italian democracies and the chronic instability of French Fourth Republic. Their study was based on extensive surveys conducted in the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy and Mexico. What they called "civic culture", which presumed to enhance the stability of democracy, denoted a mixed political culture in which participant political culture is balanced by a more apathetical and subject political attitudes. They contended that the more "civic values" [60] -such as belief in one's own competence, participation in public affairs, pride in political system, limited partisanship, the propensity to cooperate with others, tolerance of diversity -prevailed, the more the chances that democracy would remain stable.[61] Linking the emergence of such values with socio-economic development levels, they implied that these values were more likely to be found in socio-economically developed urban societies than the

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[58] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture-Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[59] See, Sidney Verba, "On Revisiting the Civic Culture," in *The Civic Culture Revisited*, ed. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 407.

[60] These values (sometimes also called civility or civic virtue) basically refers to the qualities and attitudes expected of citizens. In its essence, it require members of the society to show "a solicitude for the interest of the whole society , a concern for the common good." Edward Shils, "Civility and Civil Society," in *Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies*, ed. Edward C. Banfield (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 1. More specifically, it refers to; citizens' sense of identity and how this is perceived when contrasted to competing forms of regional, ethnic or religious identities; their ability to work with others; their desire to participate in public affairs; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their public demands. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 284.

[61] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic*. There is a renewed emphasis on the significance of civic values for the democracy revolving around the recent work of Robert D. Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti), *Making Democracy Work -Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993). See also, Larry Diamond, "Nigera: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism," in *Politics in Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, second ed, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995).

economically backward peasant ones. Indeed, long before them, well-known dichotomies between Gemeinschaft and Gesselchaft (of Ferdinand Tönnies) or mechanical or organical solidarity (of Emile Durkheim) have all juxtaposed an urban or modern life with the traditional or peasant life.[62] While the former was characterized with high level of division of labor, the development of contractual relations alongside the growth of commerce and trade, the development of individualism and tolerance, the latter was characterized with low level of division of labor and subsistence economy, the primacy of shared values and sacred traditions, which were likely to result in communitarian structure. It was assumed that urban societies are capable of developing the means of organic solidarity as it is in the urban context where rational and material interests were likely to replace commonly subscribed communitarian outlooks as the bases of social relations. While the findings of the recent research[63] has cast some doubt into the validity of these dichotomies, it did not wholly reject them. David Karp and others, for instance, argued that in the face of the great diversity that both and urban communities displayed one should be careful not to overgeneralize. But they, nevertheless concluded that the city does produce "a distinctive culture of civility."[64]

Almond and Verba's emphasis on values was criticized in several respect. First, the precise mechanisms "linking culture to structure" (that is in which ways culture affected the structure or were affected by it) was said to be not clearly specified.[65] Second, it was

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[62] Influenced by such dichotomies, George Simmel and Louis Wirth had emphasized the distinctive features of city life. While Wirth placed a premium on size, density and hetereogenity of the city life, Simmel dwelled on psychological-cultural traits that are more likely to be found in the city residents. See, Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as Way of Life," in *On Cities and Social Life-Selected Papers*, ed. Albert J. Reiss, Jr (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). (Originally published in 1938); Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Readings in Introductory Sociology*, ed. Dennis H. Wrong, Harry L. Gracey (New York: The Macmillan, 1968)

[63] Mike Savage and Alan Warde, *Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity* (London: Macmillan, 1993), 97 ff; David A. Karp, Gregory P.Stone, William C. Yoels, *Being Urban- A Sociology of City Life*, second.ed, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 130.

[64] Ibid., 130. Putnam similarly found that the least civic areas of the Italy were precisely the traditional southern villages. Putnam, *Civic.*112.

[65] See, Arendt Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference" in *The Civic Culture Revisited*; David D. Laitin, "The Civic Culture At 30." *American Political Science Review.* 89, 9, (1995), 169.

argued that the political culture can be seen as the effect not the cause of political processes. That is, stable democracies are not stable because of the prior existence of civic values but rather the reverse, because they are stable they tend to produce civic culture.[66] While the first criticism appears to be plausible, the second one is based on a somewhat distorted picture of the Civic Culture. Almond and Verba, as they later indicated, nowhere in the study asserted that the political culture caused political structure. Instead they treated political culture as both "an independent and a dependent variable, as causing structure and being caused by it."[67]

Culture in general, political culture in particular is obviously a significant variable for the establishment and the maintenance of democracy, and after two decades of ignorance, it has now "returned" to the mainstream of political science.[68] No serious student of politics can ignore the impact of culture or values on the functioning of democracy. But, as with socio-economic development levels, by itself political culture can not account for the existence or the absence of democracy. There are always many other factors, alongside the political culture, that (dis)favor democracy. As Michael Hudson argues, political culture "is not likely to explain dependent variables as general as stability, democracy or authoritarianism. But it may help explain, why certain institutions (such as legislatures) function as they do.[69] Besides, an approach putting a premium on values or culture should also explain the mechanism of what factors led to these values in the first

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[66] Carol Pateman, "The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique," in *The Civic Culture Revisited* 66-8.; Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), 51.

[67] Gabriel Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in *The Civic Culture Revisited*,.29.

[68] See, Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture." *American Political Science Review.* 82, (1988), 1203-1230.; John Street, "Political Culture: From Civic Culture to Mass Culture." *British Journal of Political Science.* 24, (1993), 96; Diamond, "Introduction"; Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy"; Michael C.Hudson, "The Political Culture approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing It Back in, Carefully," in *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, vol 1, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[69] Hudson, "The Political Culture," 64.

place, and once a set of pattern has been established how it tend to reproduce itself in a changing socio-political environment.[70]

## 1.2. WHAT MAKES FOR DEMOCRACY ? POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Alongside those approaches that emphasized underlying macro variables, there existed, though certainly in minority, another tradition which placed a premium on political actors and their behavior as crucial variable for explaining democratic (in)stability. In a seminal article appeared in Comparative Politics in 1970, Dankwart A.Rustow had argued that given the single pre-condition of national unity, a stable democracy might emerge through respective phases of preparation (characterized by polarization among elites), decision (characterized by an agreement on the rules of the game) and habituation (internalization of the rules of the game by the elites). Rustow thus suggested that a functioning democracy could be established through elites disposed to bargaining.[71] Though concerned largely with the emergence of democracy, Rustow's arguments prepared the ground for a shift away from macro-structural variables towards more contingent political ones.[72]

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[70] We do not treat institutional factors (presidentalism vs parliamentarianism, proportional representation vs plurality, federalism vs unitarism and the like) as macro-variables and discuss it here. Because the institutional side, in comparison to socio-political structures, is more susceptible to manipulation in the short term. Even if we had included these (as we might) in our discussion, we would have seen that no scholarly agreement exists as to which institutional structure (or combination) is more conducive to democracy. As the recent major study on institutions has shown institutional structures "provide risks and opportunities, not certainties. They facilitate or hinder, but do not directly determine the outcomes." Bert A. Rockman, "Institutions, Democratic Stability and Performance," in *Institutions and Democratic State Craft*, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancıgil, Bert A. Rockman (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 22. What is important is not so much a particular institutional structure but rather, as Heper noted, their "appropriateness vis-à-vis the existing social structure and political culture" and their "capacity to fulfill salient goals and expectations of key actors" which is to be inquired in each particular case. Metin Heper, "Introduction," in *Institutions and Democratic State Craft*, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancıgil, Bert A. Rockman (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 8.

[71] Rustow, "Transitions."

[72] One should also refer to Otto Kircheimer's work which appeared in 1965 that emphasized micro-political variables. Kircheimer argued that "The social and economic frame of the particular society ... lays down a conditioning perimeter within which the original choice had to be made and solutions

Actor-oriented approaches, (exemplified by Rustow) which appeared to be out of touch with the spirit of times, began to gain ground in late seventies and eighties and theorists have begun to pay more attention to the political processes, particularly to the behavior of political actors in explaining the (in)stability of democracies.[73] The discrediting of Marxist determinism and structural-functionalism, the prevailing intellectual climate of postmodernism (which is more sensitive to cultural-historical specificities, human action and distrustful of grand theories) and dissatisfaction with structural theories appears to have stimulated such development.

The failure of the structural theories to account for regime change -either transition from authoritarian rule or the breakdown of democracy was at the heart of that dissatisfaction. As we remarked above, although various macro variables can be shown to be facilitating or hindering democratic stability, they are not very helpful in explaining regime change.[74] For instance, despite its impressive achievement in comprehending the relations between socio-economic development levels and democracy, Lipset's arguments have a lesser relevance for explaining the breakdown of democracies. It seems safe to conclude that poor countries are more likely to prone democratic breakdowns. Yet, still the mere fact of being poor is not in itself enough to lead to breakdown, while the mere fact of being rich is no guarantee that the democracy will survive forever. As Lipset himself accepted "a political form may develop because of a syndrome of unique historical

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have to be sought." Otto Kircheimer, "Confining Coniditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs." *American Political Science Review*. LIX, 4 (1965), 966.

[73] Juan J. Linz, *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdowns and Reequilibration.* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, "Transitions,"; Guiseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1990); John Highley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review.* 54, (1989), 17.; and Terry L. Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics.* 23, 1, (1990), 1.

[74] It is, therefore, not surprising that the two most important books in that tradition (that of Linz and O'Donnel et al) is concerned with the regime change.

circumstances even though the society's major characteristics favor another form."[75] Regardless of the levels of economic development, the breakdown of democracy needs to be accompanied by some other factors like violence, polarization, erosion of legitimacy which are not necessarily related to socio-economic conditions, but rather have to do with specific political variables. Similarly, political culture is obviously a significant variable for the establishment and the maintenance of democracy. But an explanation of the breakdown of democracy with reference to political culture is less than adequate. The political culture of the country concerned would obviously be useful in sorting out broader parameters of political process, but it would be of little help in explaining how the breakdown (which is the result of a complex constellation of various contingent and unique variables) occurred.

In this tradition, it was Juan J. Linz who wrote a novel essay on the breakdown of democracies. He claimed that those approaches putting a premium on underlying societal variables, though indispensable to proper understanding of any regime change, were inadequate. Even if they could explain "why" breakdown occurred, they are less than successful in explaining "how" it is realized in practice.[76] Beginning with the initial assumption that structural characteristics of societies "constitute a series of opportunities and constraints for the social and political actors, both men and institutions that can lead to one or another outcome."[77] Linz offered a dynamic analysis of political processes (instead of an exclusive analysis of underlying social-political variables at a given time) during which the actions of political actors increased or decreased the chances of survival of democracy.

In so arguing Linz was attentive not to belittle the impact of underlying structural

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[75] Lipset, *Political Man*. 28.

[76] Linz, *The Breakdown*. 4.

[77] Ibid., 5. Edward H. Carr have similarly noted that "Nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have to had to be different." See, his excellent discussion, Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), 96.

features, but pointed out that they were, by themselves, inadequate to account for breakdowns because it was the political processes which precipitated the ultimate collapse of democracy.[78] In that sense, Linz's attempt was concerned less with replacement and falsification of these theories that put premium on macro variables than supplementation (and refinement) of them with an approach more sensitive to political processes.

Unlike structural theories, his approach allowed the discussion of significant political variables. The most important of those variables is the behavior of incumbents. Linz argued that one-sided emphasis on the actions of opponents of the democratic regime such as radical and violent movements, the military's dispositions, disgruntled segments of society, has led to the underestimation of the actions of those who are interested in the survival of democratic regime.[79] Particularly important was the actions of political elites who professed commitment[80] to survival of democratic regime, namely presidents in presidential systems, and political party elites (both incumbents and loyal oppositions) in parliamentary regimes.

This is because in a democracy it is the incumbents (and not the other political or social actors such as the media and other interest groups, who usually also have an interests in maintaining democratic regime) who are primarily expected to deal with urgent problems and are held responsible through periodic elections. They occupy the positions of effective decision-making. Though these groups (that have a stake in maintenance of democratic regime) have also significant roles to play for democratic stability, none of

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[78] For an interesting argument that emphasis on political leadership and strategic choices has gone to far at the expense of structural factors, see, J.Mark Ruhl, "Unlikely Candidates for Democracy: The Role of Structural Context in Democratic Consolidation." *Studies in Comparative International Development.* 31, 1 (1996), 4. Another major work in structuralist tradition, that emphasized the role of the working classes in the emergence and consolidation of democracy, appeared in 1992. See, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens & John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).

[79] Linz, *The Breakdown.* 39.

[80] How real that commitment is, or whether these elites really internalized "democracy" are different questions. What is important, they do not, implicitly or explicitly, aim to replace democratic regime, despite the fact that in the final analysis their actions could trigger such an outcome.

them are expected to be directly responsible as political party elites and leaders are. For instance, imagine that a country suffers from rampant terrorism that has reached such horrendous proportions that it threatens the democratic regime. Though the attitude and responses of media and trade unions, of religious and other intermediary associations surely matter, it is up to the incumbents to envisage and devise effective ways of fighting - better law enforcement, better intelligence gathering, isolating terrorists etc..- with terrorism. If they fail in that task, no other group is likely to fulfill the same job. Therefore Linz maintained that the behavior of the incumbents was central to the any understanding of political process leading to democratic breakdown. The incumbents might have triggered democratic breakdown more than any other group that have a stake in the democratic system. They do so through their responses to violence,[81] if they create the impression that the state authority is used with lenience against some groups due to political sympathies; to their treatment of loyal or semi-loyal opposition[82]; to their setting of goals that can not be achieved,[83] thus reducing their credibility which is likely to be associated with that of the regime; to their political strategies that heighten the polarization and like.

This emphasis on political process brought the study of political leadership, which has been ignored in the literature on democracy,[84] back into the mainstream. The significance of political leadership for the survival of democracy became an established postula even among those who emphasized macro variables. Lipset, for instance, argued that "whether democracy succeeds or fails continue to depend significantly on the choices, behaviours and decisions of political leaders and groups."[85] In a similar line of argument

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[81] Linz, *The Breakdown.* 57-58.

[82] Ibid, 38.

[83] Ibid, 53.

[84] Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debates* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 171. Also Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership* (London: Sage, 1987), 36.

[85] Lipset, "The Social," 18.

Samuel Huntington asserted that "Economic development makes democracy possible, political leadership makes it real."[86] In an attempt to combine relationships between macro and micro variables, Diamond, Linz and Lipset offered an interesting observation that "the more constraining and unfavorable the structural circumstances, the more skillful, innovative courageous, and democratically committed, political leadership must be for democracy to survive."[87] Conversely, if the structural circumstances were very favorable, the role of leadership mattered less. Indeed, long before these authors, Tocqueville had observed that although leadership mattered less in democratic societies than in aristocratic ones, he still remained "...very well convinced that even among democratic nations the genius, the vices, or the virtues of certain individuals retard or accelerate the natural current of a people's history."[88] Thus, it was largely accepted that if there is "transforming leadership" as distinct from mere "power-holders,"[89] the democracy can survive even in the most unfavorable conditions.

Central to the Linzian approach to the breakdown of democracies is the erosion (or loss) of legitimacy. Linz defined legitimacy as "the belief that in spite of the

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[86] Huntington, *Third Wave*.316.

[87] Diamond, Linz, Lipset, "What makes,". 16. In the same line, Tatu Vanhanen, *The Process of Democratisation: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-1988*, (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), 12.

[88] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol 2, translated by Phillips Bradly (New York: Vintage Books, Alfred Knopf, 1945), 91. He cautioned that "if this doctrine of necessity ...infects the whole mass of community and gets possession of the public mind, it will soon paralyze the activity of modern society and reduce Christians to the level of Turks." Ibid., 93.

[89] Following Burns we use the term "transforming leadership" to refer to a leadership pattern (which is also characterized as mobilizing or inspiring leadership) in which "one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality." It has a moral purpose. It aims "to shape and alter and elevate the motives and values and goals of followers through the vital *teaching* role of leadership." It is not a leadership that is willing to perform under constraining conditions, but tries to affect or transform them. By contrast, "transactional leadership" or mere power-holding refers to a leadership pattern that is more like that of exchange relations in that leaders and followers "may exchange goods or services or other things in order to realize independent objectives." James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 20, 425. (Italics are his) See also Blondel, who defined leadership as "the power exercised by one or a few individuals to direct members of the nation towards action." Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 3.

shortcomings and the failures the political institutions are better than any others that might be established in a particular country and therefore can demand obedience."[90] Some points needs to be emphasized in that definition. First of all, because legitimacy is a belief on the part of the citizenry regarding the "rightfulness" of the political institutions, no country in the world enjoys (and/or is likely to enjoy) 100 per cent legitimacy, there always being citizens who question the legitimacy of their regime. Secondly, "no legitimacy is definitely anchored that ....one day or another it could not be threatened."[91] Likewise no legitimacy is doomed to fail for forever. Decreases or increases in legitimacy are possible and fairly common. And third, the legitimacy of given regime is closely related to whether there are available alternatives to that regime or not. Traditional definitions of legitimacy did not dwell on that point. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, has defined political system's legitimacy as "the degree to which it is generally accepted by its citizens."[92] The problem with such a definition is that it just does not allow for a distinction between citizens' acceptance of regime due to their sincere belief in it and because of the lack of any better alternative that might be envisaged. This point has crucial importance.[93] Imagine that two democracies, roughly similar in socio-economic development level, political culture, the longevity of democratic experience and in the capability of civilian political institutions, are suffering from similar problems, say, terrorism and economic crisis. Imagine that in one of the countries, the military has no tradition of intervention to politics and nobody expects it to intervene regardless of the seriousness of the problems, while the military in other country sees itself as the guardian of state and the country and its intervention is sought or

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[90] Linz, "Legitimacy," 65.

[91] Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, *How To Compare Nations -Strategies in Comparative Politics,* second ed. (New Jersey: Chatham House,1990), 109.

[92] Lipset, *Political Man.* 22.

[93] In emphasizing this point Adam Przeworski goes as far as saying that "What matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives." Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions From Autoritarian Rule-Comparative Perspectives,* ed. Guillermo O'Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 51-2

treated as normal by the bulk of its citizens. In that case the trajectories of the two democracies, which suffer from the similar problems, might be radically different. The existence of an available alternative, military takeover, to civilian democracy in one country might constitute an impediment to those efforts directed to resolve crisis within the democratic system as the majority believes that there are alternatives whose costs might be less than insisting on the democratic regime.

What affects (either negatively or positively) the legitimacy of regime ? Though specific historical-political factors namely initial conditions,[94] perceptions of regime[95] or citizens' perceptions of government in power heavily affect a regime's legitimacy, it is possible to make generalizations applicable (within the limits, of course) to all regimes. One such generalization, offered by Linz, is that both regime's "efficacy" and "effectiveness" can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken the belief in legitimacy.[96] Efficacy refers to "capacity of a regime to find solutions to basic problems facing any political system (and those that become salient any historical moment) that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens." Chief among these basic problems are the maintenance of civil order that makes peaceful living possible, security of life and property, adjustment of conflict through judicial process, and of course providing opportunities for a decent life for its citizens. To the extent that the regime successfully performs these duties it is likely to enhance its legitimacy.

Effectiveness refers to "the capacity actually to implement the policies

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[94] If the preceding regime was so badly failed (or if there was nothing like anything resembling regime) in its expected functions, the new regime might enjoy the benefits of bad memories of old regime since by comparison it is likely to be perceived better, even if its efficacy and effectiveness were to be low.

[95] For instance, Almond and Verba found that while Mexico had the lowest scores both in the frequency they attributed significance to government and its citizens' expectations of equal and considerate treatment from the bureaucracy and the police, they expressed pride in the political system nearly as much as civic culture countries (US and UK). They explained this apparent anomaly with reference to the continuing attachment to a set of revolutionary ideals associated with Mexican revolution. See, Almond and Verba, *Civic.* 414.

[96] Linz, *Breakdown.* 18

formulated,with the desired results."[97] As such effectiveness is related to regime's abilities to perform its expected functions of ensuring security of life and property, enforcability of contracts, providing opportunities for decent life and the like. Without effectiveness, efficacy defined as capacity to find solutions can not be realized since it does little to enhance the legitimacy of regime to say that we find (or know) solutions but can not actually able to implement it. The regime can be said to be effective to the extent that it penetrate society and implement political decisions throughout the realm.[98] As such effectiveness depends on the complex constellations of various historical-political factors and needs to be studied in the context of particular cases. But it is suffice here to note that the state-society relations (particularly how state and regime is perceived by society at large) and the mode of integration of various sectors of the society have crucial importance in determining the effectiveness of the regime.[99]

Relations between efficacy and effectiveness of the regime and its legitimacy are far cry from being simple and straightforward. A high level of effectiveness is likely to enhance legitimacy of the regime, but as Lipset[100] pointed out in the cases of Weimar Germany and Austria of 1920s, high effectiveness does not necessarily translate as higher legitimacy. Similarly, low level of efficacy and effectiveness does not necessarily mean weak legitimacy, at least in the short run, if the political system can engender the belief

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[97] Ibid., 22.

[98] Here, the reference is made to effectivenes of democratic regimes. Effectiveness of authoritarian regimes qualitatively different and depend upon rather the degree to which state has (and prepared to use) naked force. Effectiveness of democratic regimes, on the other hand, rather depend on the degree to which the regime can obtain the allegiance of citizens.

[99] For instance, if the regime is perceived as something alien that had been imposed on society regardless of society's preference, or if it is seen as something that neither responds nor satisfies the expectations of society despite it ensured initial support, its effectivenes is likely to be low. Because in that case its efforts to penetrate society and implement decisions are likely to face active or passive resistance. Similarly, if some sections of the society feel that they are not the part of the larger society, (i.e,. they had not been integrated) and their distinctiveness is not properly recognized, effectivenes of the regime, again, is likely to be low since those who feel excluded is likely to mount effective resistance to regime's efforts to penetrate and implement political decisions.

[100] Lipset, *Political Man*. 69.

that in the long run it would able to overcome problems. Though it might seem hypothetical, even a high level of efficacy and effectiveness does not guarantee high level legitimacy, if those who challenge existing regime can make people believe that they could bring about even higher levels of efficacy and effectiveness.[101]

Legitimacy is important because "changes in regime occur with the transfer of legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another."[102] That is to say, regime change is likely to occur when a regime is no longer seen by its citizens as better than any others that might be established.[103] This formulation, however simple it might appear at first sight, is beset with many difficulties. Citizens do not assemble to decide whether are there better alternatives to their existing regimes. It is true that regular surveys regarding citizens' attitudes towards the regime might be useful in measuring legitimacy. But in the world of real politics, abstract attitudes of citizens towards the regime measured by opinion polls might not matter much, not least because these polls can not measure the "intensity" of beliefs. At that point, we need to make further refinement and add that in addition to the use of various attempts (where available) to measure belief in the

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[101] Another point to be discussed concerns with whether democracy as it is defined in this study can itself produce legitimacy. One could reasonably claim that a democracy which neither encourages full participation of its citizens, nor aims at quickly advancing socio-economic equality among citizens can hardly be successful in producing -sustaining legitimacy since without full participation of citizenry and visible narrowing down of inequalities between citizens would not likely to look at democratic system with a sense of belonging. This critic, which contain much elements of truth, does not necessarily have to be in sharp contrast with the procedural definition of democracy which is used in this dissertation. Since it neither discourages full participation of citizens nor opposes narrowing down of the inequalities nor improvements in the daily life of its citizens. Where it differs from participatory variants is that while the latter takes these elements as 'indispensable' and to be realized as quickly as possible, it regards them as 'desirable' and favours a longer time perspective to realize them. In fact, this approach can be said to be much realistic and prudent and therefore be better at producing legitimacy. Simply because it does not inflate expectations of its citizens given the various constraints that market system poses for democracy, and thus prevents the possible disappointments that might follow which is likely to be detrimental to legitimacy of democracy. For a discussion of how markets can pose limitations on democratization process, see David Beetham, "Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization." *Political Studies.* XL (1992), 83-98; Andrew Gamble, "The Limits of Democracy." *The Political Quarterly.* (1996), 117-131.

[102] Linz, *Breakdown.* 27.

[103] This assumes, of course, there is a disloyal opposition ready to challenge the existing regime and to establish an alternative one.

legitimacy of system on part of the bulk of citizenry, one should also look at some critical groups namely army, business, press and international actors.[104] Not only because these groups might have a manipulative power over citizen attitudes towards regime, but also because regime change is not an ordinary event that is done in accordance with the wishes of the people, though it is pretended to be as such. But rather, it is very much an elite dominated, elite-led event, giving ordinary citizens a secondary, if any, role.

Particularly important in that respect is the belief in the legitimacy of the regime on the part of those who have direct control of armed forces.[105] When the armed forces come to believe that the political system has failed so miserably in the performance of functions expected of it that the establishment of a new political order (despite the uncertainty about its character) is only way out the democratic breakdown (through military intervention) is likely to occur.[106]

It seems unlikely, however, that the armed forces would try to overthrow the government if they do not see that "the significant segment of society shared their lack of belief and that others were at least indifferent to the conflicting claims for allegiance."[107] That is the armed forces are not by and large the central independent variable in the breakdown of democracies. They usually take into consideration, alongside the assessment of possible mass attitude towards the intervention, how the other social-political groups and international actors would react to their attempts to take power. Particularly, they are likely to look for the support, or at least indifference, of the business, the press and the

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[104] Lipset indicates the big business and the armed forces as powerful groups. We thought it appropriate to add these the press and international actors. See Lipset, *Political Man.* 64.

[105] Linz, *Breakdown.* 17.

[106] Needless to add that we have in mind here the breakdown of democracy as a result of military intervention. The military intervention is not the only way to end the democracy. Bingham Powell adds that democracies can be overthrown through anti-democratic party's seizure of power (as in Weimar Germany), the collapse of all-governmental authority in the face of civil war (as in Lebanon) and the suspension of democratic process by the elected head of state. See, Bingham Powell, JR., *Contemporary Democracies -Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 170-1.

[107] Linz, *Breakdown* .17

international actors.[108]

The possible reaction of the business community is important because in a market economy where investment decisions affecting the country's economic might is dominantly taken by the business, their support is indispensable to the survival of any regime. As Charles Lindblom put it, in market economies the businesses are structurally advantaged position vis-à-vis governments because they have been entrusted with the power to decide whether and where to invest,[109] a decision that affects whole of the community.

The press or the media, as is often claimed, is the fourth power in a democracy. In the words of one observer, the media "...do not simply report the world for us in any *neutral* or *objective* sense, they interpret the world for us."[110] The press' evaluation of regime performance is clearly very important in assessing to what extent the belief in democratic regime appears to have declined. As Raymond Aron remarked "In a country in which, every day, the newspapers state that the regime has reached the last stages of decomposition, a crisis point has undoubtedly been reached. In matters of this kind, opinion is reality and creates, in part, reality."[111] Therefore, the armed forces would try to ensure that the bulk of the press support their move, or at least would not oppose it for long.

Finally, in an increasingly interdependent world, international actors' (both

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[108] These are, by no means, the only critical actors the army would be likely to assess their possible reactions. In exceptional cases, the armed forces might also look for a possible reaction of single person with a moral authority to act. For instance, İsmet İnönü, the hero of war of independence and commonly regarded as the second man of Turkey, seems to played such a role in the 1960 military intervention. As we learn from the memoirs of the 1960 coup leaders' they wanted, among other things, to make sure that İsmet İnönü "even if he would not support a move, would at least not oppose to it." See, Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular* (Istanbul: Baha, 1967), 310.

[109] Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York:Basic Books, 1977)

[110] Ralph Negrine, *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain* (London: Routledge, 1991), 5 (authors' italics)

[111] Aron, *Democracy.* 135.

economic and political organizations and various powerful states) support or indifference is as much, if not more, important. Particularly important is to get the support or at least to secure apathy of the powerful state(s) that the country in question has conducted bilateral agreements, supranational organizations such as EU, and to a lesser extent non-governmental organizations. If the military see that those national and international actors would oppose such a move, they are likely to think twice before acting. Or even if they act in such conditions, their chances of seizing power will be remote.

Therefore we agree with the recent major study on democracy in developing countries that the military's "size, autonomy, professional doctrine, and role conception may determine its threshold for intervention, but do not constitute and independent cause of breakdown."[112] The military (even the ones which are ready to use force at ease) is likely to assess what sort of reactions its move would likely to generate from social and political forces. It is also important to note here that one always should take into consideration that these critical groups are not likely to behave similarly in different contexts. Historical specificities must not be ignored. For instance, if the business thrives on state support rather than its success in competitive markets, if it, historically, lacks the tradition of opposition to what comes from the top down then its views are not likely to be attached much importance by the military.

### 1.3. METHODOLOGY

As indicated above, in this dissertation it is the Linzian approach to the breakdown of democracies which is used. Such an approach allows us to analyze the 12 September breakdown in a way that takes into consideration both the underlying social-political

[112] Diamond, Linz and Lipset, "What Makes," 47. Earlier, Samuel P. Huntington had arrived the same conclusion arguing that "The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military, but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of society." Huntington, *Political Order*. 194.

constraints and actions of political elites and other political variables.[113] Following Juan Linz it is assumed that the structural characteristics of the societies (or macro-political variables) do not completely determine whether democracy survives or not. Since democracy is a particular kind of political regime, it is the political processes rather than underlying structural features that primarily affects the breakdown of democracy. Despite unfavorable structural conditions, political actors, chief among them political parties and leaders, "have certain choices that can increase or decrease the probability of the persistence and stability of the regime."[114]

With this approach in mind, the thesis seeks to answer three closely related sets of questions. Firstly, what were the larger framework (or basic parameters) of Turkish politics that generated both social and political constraints and/or opportunities for the advent of the democratic regime? It is argued here that at the most general level two prominent factors appears to have played a crucial role. Namely, the tradition of a strong state, and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of modernization. It is the complex encounter and interaction of these two strains that heavily affected the fortunes of Turkish democracy by creating constraints and opportunities for political party elites. We are interested in such questions as; how did the strong state tradition affect the Turkish army's disposition towards intervention, its perception of itself and its place within the political system over time ? How does the same tradition appear to have affected the culture of the periphery and its representatives in the political system ? How does the traditional social structure appear to have placed its imprint on, for instance, the emergence of the party system, or the organizational structure of parties ? How does it relate with the presence/absence of the civic values at mass level ? What kind of consequences followed for the political system as migration to cities and strains of

[113] Linz indicated that his analysis is applicable "only to democratic regimes in consolidated nation-states that had achieved independence or a measure of political autonomy a considerable time before the crisis of the regime. In addition, all the democracies analyzed are based on majority rule rather than on complex consociational mechanisms." Linz, *Breakdown*, 8. Prior to 1980 the Turkish democracy satisfied both conditions.

[114] Ibid., 4.

industrialization gained pace in sixties and seventies ? It goes without saying that our intention is not to treat the larger social-political framework of Turkish democracy in detail as this would require a separate (and much larger) study, but rather to emphasize the constraints and opportunities for political party elites. We believe that it is only through the understanding of such social-political framework that we can put party elite behavior in perspective.

Secondly, after outlining the larger framework within which political actions took place, the study inquire into political party elite[115]behavior in detail since it is the basic aim of this dissertation. We are concerned with how, in terms of enhancing and/or undermining the legitimacy of democracy, political party elites who professed open commitment to democratic regime acted during the period in question. Particularly, how did they respond to various problems, namely terrorism and economic crisis, that democracy faced? How did they (both incumbents and those in opposition) respond to those policy options (such as the formation of a coalition government between the two major parties; cooperation among major parties represented in the parliament to effect package of measures as favored by the military; agreement among those parties to achieve the election of a president; putting an end to politicization of civilian bureaucracy and the police force; reducing the tension in the country, etc.) which is presented by critical actors (the military, press, business and trade unions) as potentially effective remedies that might have alleviated the crisis of democracy ? It is not possible to reach a firm conclusion whether those options (had they been chosen) could have successfully ended the stalemate. But the crucial issue is that those policies seemed to be perceived (or at least presented as such) by the influential groups (particularly the military) as potentially

[115] Using positional definiton of elites, by political party elites' we mean those who occupy decision-making positions in political parties, and if their parties in government, in governmental positions. Moreover, we use terms like political party elites, political parties and leaders' interchangeably. In the Turkish context, as we shall see, it is hardly possible to imagine political parties without reference to their leaders. Indeed, it would not be misleading to say that quite often leaders alone decide which direction their party would take. Following Pareto, the notion of elite as used in this study does not necessarily implies elite's having some sort of superiority, be that moral, or ability, vis-a-vis non elites, as the term might imply.

effective remedies to resolve the crisis,[116] and that political actors' inability to achieve them, and to offer other viable policy options as alternative, appears to have shaken their belief in the system. Since "changes in regime occur with a transfer of legitimacy from one set of political institutions to another," their coming into the conclusion that there remained no way to resolve the crisis within the system was decisive for the fate of the democratic regime.

Thirdly, we are interested in the explanation of why political party elites behaved in the way they actually did. It goes without saying that we do not attempt to explain leadership behavior believed to be deviated from "rightful" leadership behavior, whatever it could be. In other words, the study, does not treat actual leadership behavior as pathological deviation which is in need of explanation. Quite the reverse, our concern here is, first, to understand, in a Weberian manner, the meanings attached to actions (and non-actions) of political elites themselves as well as understanding their mentality (zihniyet in Turkish) that underlies (guides) their actions. We, then, attempt to explain their action by taking into account institutional, political, and economic constraints that limited their room for manuevre. For instance, why was coming to power and staying there so important for them ? why have they intensified ideological polarization ? Why was government-opposition relations always tense ? Why have they tended towards extreme partisanship ? Why they could not end the politicization of bureaucracy ? Which factors appears to have prevented them taking those alternative course of action proposed-favored by critical groups ? Our explanation of elite behavior is, admittedly, incomplete. The fuller understanding of the elite behavior requires, first, taking into consideration the larger social-political framework, (environment so to speak) of socio-economical, cultural, institutional factors that presented obstacles and provided opportunities. It also requires a study of elites themselves -their culturally grounded orientations and beliefs, ideologies,

[116] We discuss in detail whether these policy options were put forward by the military so as to justify their intervention or not (i.e. whether there was a 'double talk' on the part of the military) in chapter six.

and short-term political considerations.[117] To fully understand the latter aspects, i.e, why they tend to hold some beliefs or ideologies rather than others, the study of childhood experiences, education and post-recruitment socialization patterns needs also to be taken into consideration. This study is incomplete in the latter. It is because ours is not a study aiming to explain behavior patterns of a single leader, but two major party elites (including their leaders, of course) as a whole in the specified period. Therefore, although we attempt to consider culturally grounded orientations, beliefs, ideologies, and short-term political considerations of party elites, we can not delve into detailed consideration of their political socialization process and more personal factors that surely have an impact on these.[118]

The study does not intend to test any grand theory or hypothesis, not least because specific cases are always too complicated to prove (or disprove) a single theory. But also because, however novel his analysis of breakdown of democratic regimes might be, Linz (whose approach that we use) did not develop the "highly abstract generalizing of a historical social scientific models of the type susceptible to computer simulations and applicable to all past and any future cases."[119] Believing that the "historicity of macro-political processes," [120] precludes such theory building, Linz preferred a "highly eclectic

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[117] As Fred Greenstein argued behaviour "...is a function of both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those situations..." Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago, Markham Publishing Company, 1969), 7. Similarly, Putnam remarked that "..a leaders' behaviour is a function, not just of his personal opinions, but also of the objective situation in which he finds itself." Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), 80. Also, Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership* (London: Sage, 1987), 4.

[118] The fuller understanding of the origins of the elite belief systems, as Putnam remarked, require at least an analysis of childhood experiences, education and post-recruitment socialization patterns. Putnam, *Elites*. 92-98.

[119] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Editor's Preface and Acknowledgements" in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Crisis, Breakdown & Reequlibration* (Baltimore and London:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), XI.

[120] Ibid., XI.

and broadly inductive"[121] approach. He did not, for instance, explore deductively the generic properties of democracies and motives of political actors resulting in eventual breakdown which might have led to some models.[122]

This study, therefore can be said to be in what Peter Evans called "eclectic messy center" [123] of the comparative politics. That is, it "draws on general theories whenever it can" it uses general theories as "lenses to identify what is interesting and significant about particular cases."[124] The concern with general theories is important because particular cases might provide further support for or disconfirmation of general theories which is likely to result in refinement of the theory in question. As Dogan and Pleassy indicates especially the analysis of deviant cases "...may disclose new causes and oblige the observer to develop or reformulate theory."[125] In that sense, this study, for instance, can be taken as counter-case for the view that presidential systems are more breakdown-prone than parliamentary ones. It also constitutes another counter case for the argument that moderate multi-party systems are likely to produce moderate politics.

It goes without saying that a concern with particular cases compels researches to do historical analysis. Without a rich and detailed historical narrative it would hardly be possible to understand specific sequences of events. History is necessary to place social-political groups and institutions in their proper place. This is especially so in a country

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[121] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Book Review: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes." *American Political Science Review.* 74, 3, (1980), 849.

[122] In fact, there has been a notable tendency in social sciences to abandon a simple overarching paradigm like modernization or dependency. Instead, scholars began to felt the need to develop "concepts and theories of medium range aimed at the description, analysis and interpretation of relatively precise and delimited process." See, Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Political Democratisation in Latin America and the Crisis of Paradigms," in *Rethinking Third World Politics* (London:Longman, 1991). See also, Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development -The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis." *World Politics.* 50, (1997).

[123] See, Peter Evans, "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium." *World Politics.* 48, (1995), 4.

[124] Ibid. 4

[125] Dogan and Pelassy, *How To Compare.* 123.

(such as Turkey) beset by cultural cleavages, an understanding of which is not possible without reference to formative influence of the past. The study of the past is also vital to analyze particular perceptions, and ways of, "doing politics" without which the mentality(ies) of the actors can not be properly understood.

Though the study does not make any comparison (in the strict sense) between two or three cases, we believe that an understanding of a breakdown of democracy (or any other particular phenomenon for that matter) in particular case is only possible if it takes into consideration how the democracy broke down in other countries. We believe that "one knows one's own country better when one knows other countries too."[126] It is through such a comparative approach that one could get an idea of what is distinctive about the Turkish case, and what is not, hence leading to better understanding of the particular case.

Qualitative analysis is employed as the prime research method. Because the study aims to achieve an understanding of phenomena that do not lend itself to precise measurement. We heavily rely on secondary historical materials that would allow us to delineate the essential developments precipitating the breakdown. Such a reliance on secondary materials risks temptation to select the historical evidence (and omit others) to fit a preconceived framework.[127] But, apart from interviews, other ways of collecting historical knowledge has yet to be found. An awareness of the problem as well as the nature of the thesis which does not aim to falsify or verify any preconceived framework, we believe, diminishes the magnitude of the problem. Yet another pitfall that we tried to avoid concerns with the tendency to present the flow of events (leading to 12 September breakdown) as if they had to happen, since we already knew the result. This tendency, if left unchecked, might obscure our understanding of unique and open-ended characteristics of historical process.

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[126] Ibid., 126.

[127] See, for an insightful discussion by Albert O. Hircshman, "The Search For Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding." *World Politics*. 22 (1970).

Editorials and other influential writers in chief Turkish newspapers (Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet and Tercüman) of the time is given attention both in their coverage of specific events and their evaluation of performance of the democratic regime at particular junctures.[128] Other newspapers and weekly magazines (both Turkish and international) are consulted with respect to their coverage of specific events. The proceedings of the Grand National Assembly are also considered where necessary as it constitutes an indispensable guide for the analysis of political elite behavior. Our other basic materials are books by politicians (especially those closely involved in political developments in that period) expressing their views and memoirs, political party programs and election manifestos. Regarding the army's views and how it came to believe that the intervention was the only viable option, we rely heavily on, the memoirs of General Kenan Evren, the chief of staff at that time, and an interview that we conducted with him.[129]

The dissertation has six more chapters. In the second chapter, the basic characteristic of Ottoman-Turkish social-political structure, which defined basic parameters of the Turkish democracy, is discussed in historical perspective up until the 1960 military intervention. The primary focus is on both the Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of modernization and their complex encounter and interaction. It is claimed here that this interaction has generated both constraints and opportunities for the advent of democracy.

The third chapter attempts to delineate the underlying social-political context in which the 1980 breakdown could be situated. It considers momentous changes that occurred both in the strong state tradition and in the modernizing social structure in the

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[128] Of these, Hürriyet and Milliyet are considered to be at centre, while Cumhuriyet and Tercüman can be characterized moderate left and right respectively. In terms of daily circulation (between 1975-1980) Hürriyet secured an average of 450 to 550 thousand, followed by Tercüman with 350 to 400 thousand. Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, averaged 250 and 100 thousand respectively. See for more detail, Bülent Özükan, "Basında Tirajlar" [Newspaper Circulations] *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 232.

[129] Our efforts to interview the pre- 1980 leaders of Justice and Republican People's Party remained unsuccessful.

sixties and early seventies. It advances the view that both changes in socio-economic structure -industrialization and urbanization- and the post-1960 political developments have affected previous constraints and opportunities for democracy as well as introducing new constraints and providing new opportunities. They ushered in a new era in which new forces were aroused, previous alliances dissolved, and perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical changes. Following Sunar and Sayarı[130] we argue that those developments promised both a danger and hope for the stability of democracy depending, to a large extent, on choice, actions and responses of the political parties and leaders. The remaining chapters, it would not be an exaggeration to say, tells the story of the inability of political actors to act on that promise for democracy and the subsequent realization of the danger as a result.

The 1973-1978 political developments are the subject of the fourth chapter. The chief theme of this chapter is that the National Front (1975-1977) governments are crucial to the understanding of the 1980 breakdown. It is argued that ideological polarization and party patronage, though these did not begin with the NF governments, were the hallmarks of the period. These policies led to heavily politicized, under-performing civilian bureaucracy as well as less than prudent economic policies, whose basic purpose, it seemed, was the distribution of public resources to party supporters. They were critical in the paralysis of state authority, that in turn negatively effected the democratic regime's ability to contain terrorism, and the emergence of the economic crisis that would make itself fully felt in the years to come.

The fifth chapter considers the Republican People Party government (1978-1979) which appears to have been perceived by the critical actors (the military, the press, trade and business unions, international actors) as the hope that would tackle economic problems and increasing terrorism. It considers in detail how and why the RPP

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[130] İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," in *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 177.

government failed to satisfy expectations in both grounds and how this disappointment affected the critical actors' perception of the democratic regime. The dismal performance of the RPP government in power, it is argued, was a heavy blow for the democratic regime. Critical groups (particularly the army high command) began to think that the possibility of solving problems within the democratic system were limited as the Justice party led NF governments were already discredited and were not perceived as viable alternative. Thus the view that the only hope for democracy was the co-operation (not necessarily coalition) of two major (the JP and the RPP) parties became prevalent.

It is the subject of sixth chapter how and why the political party elites have been unable to follow policy options that are perceived (and presented) by critical actors as opportunities that might have alleviated the crisis of democracy. It also considers their inability to come up with other potential alternative viable course of action(s) that might have led the way to alleviate the crisis of democracy. After the resignation of the RPP government, despite the calls for a cooperation between major parties, the JP insisted on forming a minority government with its former NF allies. Instead of co-operation political actors continued to tear each other apart engaging in mutual delegitimation. Even the army's warning in January 1980 did not seem to change their determination to pursue party lines. Alongside the increasing terrorism and continuing economic problems, the political parties' inability to elect a president, added fuel to the flames and further weakened belief in the democratic regime's ability to solve problems. The intervention, which appears to have took nobody but the leaders of two major parties by surprise, finally came on 12 September 1980.

The seventh chapter is an overall evaluation of basic findings of the dissertation. It argues that democracy in Turkey has not found particularly favorable soil to flourish. Both the legacy of Ottoman-Turkish state tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing modernization appears to have created several constraints for the development and stability of democracy. But these constraints by no means required that democracy in Turkey was doomed to fail as they also generated opportunities for democratic

development. Political actors, particularly those who professed open commitment to democratic system, did have room for maneuver so as to affect these confining conditions and enhance the likelihood of democracy's survival. It is the basic thesis of this dissertation that political party elites, far from taking such stance, through their actions and non-actions (particularly important was their reactions to problem of terrorism and economic crisis) undermined belief in the democratic system and paved the way to its breakdown in the 1980. That does not mean on the other hand that breakdown was solely the result of the failure of party elites. But rather political elites found it impossible to overcome the impact of various constraints. In a sense, they could not show a 'transformatory' pattern of leadership, but, were proven to be mere 'power-holders.'

# CHAPTER II: THE STRONG STATE AND THE "MODERNIZING" SOCIETY: AN UNEASY SETTING FOR DEMOCRACY

This chapter attempts to analyze the basic characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish social and political structure that established the fundamental setting and affected the initial conditions within which Turkish democracy emerged. It advances the view that the basic parameters of Turkish democracy are closely related to, and have been influenced by, the Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition, and the traditional social structure undergoing the process of modernization. It is the complex encounter and interaction of these two strains that had been instrumental in transition to democracy as well as introducing constraints and providing opportunities for the consolidation of democratic regime in Turkey.

## 2.1. THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Students of Ottoman-Turkish politics have quite often observed that the polity in question was marked by the existence of a strong state. The idea that Ottoman-Turkish polity evinced characteristic of strong state tradition and /or high level of stateness and that this factor has had an crucial impact on the fortunes of democracy have been put forward by Metin Heper.[1] He has drawn upon Nettl, Dyson and Badie and Birnbaum's seminal conceptualizations that degree of "..stateness is a useful variable for comparing western

[1] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington: The Eothen Press); "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective" in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. Shmuel. N.Eisenstadt (Leiden: Brill, 1992); "The Strong State as a Problem For the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared." *Comparative Political Studies.* 25,2 (1992). As Heper admits he was neither the first nor the only scholar who emphasised the distinctiveness of the Ottoman-Turkish state, but it was Heper who first thoroughly examined impact of such tradition on the fortunes of democracy. For an earlier attempt, see, Engin D. Akarlı, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1975).

societies..."[2] and that some societies are state societies "which have a historical and intellectual tradition of the state as an institution that embodies the 'public power,'"[3] while others not. Heper argued that Ottoman-Turkish polity, like certain continental European countries, had a "generalizing, integrating, and legitimizing state, that is a strong state."[4] In that use, the term strong state referred to a state "that is able to frustrate the development of civil society into an entity with political efficacy, by placing too great an emphasis on the long-term interests of the community at the expense of sectional interests."[5] In terms of the categories formulated by Nettl, strong state was both sovereign -sovereignty referring to "its independence in formulating goals for society" and autonomous -autonomy referring to its independence in working out its internal organization- vis-à-vis civil society.[6] Simplifying somewhat, it can be said that the societies with a state tradition were characterized by the existence of state as a formal organization and as an idea and state elites who had been socialized into distinct state norms, and who tend to perceive themselves as the true guardians of the state and the public interests vis-à-vis civil societal elements.[7]

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[2] J.P Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable" in *Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioural Era* ed. L.J Cantori and A.H.Ziegler (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 327 (originally published in 1968)

[3] Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: Study of an Idea and Institutions* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 19 ; Bertrand Badie, Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: London, The University of Chicago Press, 1983).

[4] Heper, "The strong state as a problem", 176. The state as an integrating idea referred to state's attempts for unification of "disparate elements of society around the norms and values in question," while the state as legitimizing idea required that "only that political power which is exercised according to said norms and values is legitimate." (Ibid., 143-4) Both concepts, drawn from Kenneth Dyson, in turn constituted complementary aspects of state's generalizing character.

[5] Ibid., 189.

[6] Heper, *Tradition.*5.

[7] Strong state does not necessarily mean capable (a state which has a strength to penetrate society, regulate its relations, extract and appropriate resources for its policy aims) state as the adjective 'strong' implies. It rather refer to the fact that state elites' tendency to perceive themselves as capable. In that sense, our use of the term strong state differs from, for example, that of Nordlinger, who characterized strong state as one which possessed high autonomy and high societal support. Eric Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in *Understanding Political Development,* ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston, Toronto, Little Brown Company: 1987), 369. It also differs from Joel S. Migdal's characterization, who tended to equate strong state with capable one. Joel S. Migdal, *Strong*

There is a virtual agreement amongst scholars that a complex constellation and interaction of various historical factors bears upon the emergence (and once emerged, enduration) of strong state. In what follows, an attempt is made to delineate the trajectory of strong state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity with an emphasis on where and how it seemed to divert from West European experience. From the very inception of the Ottoman Empire (1299) a constellation of several social-political and historical factors contributed the emergence of the strong center. Research has indicated that in the foundation of the empire the military elements, known as ghazis or frontier forces which had devoted themselves to the gaza, (Holy War) had played crucial role.[8] The geopolitical situation of the empire -Byzantine empire on the west and nomadic Turkish-muslim peoples on the east- combined with frontier mentality have put its imprint on the character of the Ottoman state, which is organized on the model of that military class.

Drawing upon islamic idea of Dar-ül-Harb -lands and people that are not under domination of Islam, and that should be brought into the area of Dar-ül-Islam,[9] the Ottomans emerged as major principality expanding to westwards at the expense of Byzantine. Despite their success against Byzantine increased its power and prestige among other Muslim principalities in Anatolia, their drive to build a strong state attracted stiff opposition from the native military class in Anatolia. After the Ankara war (1402), which resulted in defeat of the Ottomans by Timur and ensuing civil strife that continued for a decade, the consolidation of empire was finally achieved. It was during the reign of Mehmet II (Fatih the Conqueror) that the distinctive characteristics of the Ottoman state was already spelled out. The need to be strong both against an external enemies and divisive forces (military overlords, local and nomadic chieftains) within the country was one of its chief leitmotive. Drawing upon Turko-

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*Societies and Weak States, State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[8] Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire-The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, Phoenix, 1993). For a recent insightful study on the origins of the Ottoman state, Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[9] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 13.

Iranian state traditions rather than pure islamic theory, the Ottomans believed that the state had to be strong so as to defend and expand the realm of Islam against the infidel; to that end, one can take and implement various measures that might not, strictly speaking, be in accordance with Islam, that the state supposed to promote.[10] Thus, there developed the concept of örf-i sultani -laws that derived from Sultans in their capacity as secular ruler and that is differentiated from örf-i şeri- laws based on islamic rules.[11] Not only did sultans have secular powers, but they were also supposed to use them not in an arbitrary way but in accordance with definite rules and traditions based on "necessity" and "reason."[12] With the passing of time these developments signaled the emergence of the secular oriented state tradition, developed as a consequence of efforts to free the state from personalistic whims of the sultan and instead to "identify it with the established values."[13] This was, then, called "adab" which were assimilated by the bureaucratic state elite. To be sure, the Padişah or Sultan concentrated all powers in his hands. With some notable exceptions, the lands and administrative personel were thought to belong to Sultan. He was claimed (and believed) to be shadow of God on earth,[14] and demanded absolute obedience. But his powers in reality were not without limits that derived from bureaucratic character of the state and the need to rule with justice. In that sense, the characterization of the Ottoman empire as purely "patrimonial" or "sultanistic"[15] is less than adequate. It was true that, as İnalcık indicated, in the reigns of powerful sultans (Fatih, Selim I,

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[10] Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey," in *Islam in the Political Process* ed. James.P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 139.

[11] Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş: Örf-i sultani Kanunları ve Fatih'in Kanunları." [An Introduction to Ottoman Law: Örf-i Sultani and Fatih's Laws ] in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu-Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993) (first publication in 1958)

[12] Heper, *Tradition.* 25.

[13] Carter V.Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1980), 9.

[14] İnalcık, "Decision-Making," 11.

[15] It was, of course, Max Weber who argued that the Ottoman system was based on patrimonyalism. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology,* 2 vols., ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1025.

Murat IV, Mahmud II) the system tended to lean the patrimonial principle but in other times one can speak rather of "the supremacy of objective rules which place limits and guide the ruler in making decisions and determining policies."[16]

These developments give rise to the emergence of Ottoman bureaucracy, which though dependent on Sultans and far from approaching legal-rational bureaucratic model, did nevertheless have its distinct values and norms into which bureaucratic cadres had been socialized through distinctive recruitment and training process. It was called "Askeri" and consisted of the officers of the court and army, "ulema" and the other civil servants.[17] Dankwart Rustow must have had in mind this fact when he observed that the Ottoman State was "a military camp and educational institution."[18] The Askeri did not pay any taxes and constituted the ruling group under the absolute dominance of Sultans. To secure absolute independence of the state from society, the Ottoman Sultans used a variety of devices. They entrusted executive power to the "Kuls." Non-muslim youngsters were brought into the palace to be converted to the Islam and educated to be the loyal servants of the Sultans. Their removal from former social environments ensured the total devotion to the Sultan who could take their lives and confiscate their wealth at any moment. They were well aware that they were chosen from non-muslim subjects and having no roots whatsoever with their families, and therefore, in the case of "siyaseten katl" (execution based on the orders of the Sultan or Grand Vizier) no one would make much protest about them. Besides, they were taught that "death in the

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[16] Halil İnalcık, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State," in *Decision Making and the Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar.E.Farah (Missouri: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 15. Similarly, Eisenstadt remarked that the Ottoman center was "a mixture of imperial and patrimonial elements." Shmuel N. Eisentadt, "The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and Analytical Remarks," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), 14.

[17] Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of the Traditional Society, " in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A.Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 44.

[18] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 173.

Sultan's service was the greatest blessing."[19] The Sultans also tried to enlist the "ulema" (members of the religious institutions who also had administrative functions) in their service. The acceptance of örf-i sultani, and the dependence of Şeyhülislam (the highest religious authority) to the Sultans for their positions,[20] appears to have diminished the impact of purely Islamic norms on the state.[21]

The subordination of the economy to political power appears to have been another factor reinforcing the strength of the state. In fact, as was the case in most traditional societies, the distinction between the state and the society (and economy) did not seem to be recognized by the Ottomans.[22] The land as well as subjects all belonged to Sultan. The Ottomans showed the utmost care to ensure that the "Tımar" system, in which arable lands were given to fief holders in exchange for the military men, would not get out control -producing landlords that might challenge the state authority. Those fief holders were entrusted to collect taxes and to supervise the peasant under their jurisdiction. They could not themselves cultivate the land other than their own small pieces. Nor could they transfer peasants from one land to another as long as peasant tenants fulfilled their obligations. The fiefs were given by the Sultan and could easily be taken back. The peasants were treated equally vis-à-vis fief holders before the law. As such, fief holders, at least in the classical age of the empire, by no means constituted the kind of feudal lords found in the Western Europe.[23]

The strict enforcement of the Tımar system accompanied by the various ingenious devices to assure the state's control of the economic activity from production to distribution. It

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[19] İnalcık, *Ottoman.* 79.

[20] İnalcık cites the case of Selim I (1512-1520) who once denounced Şeyhülislam Ali Cemali for interfering in state affairs. But adds that in the period of decline "it became established practice to seek the opinion of şeyhülislam's opinion on every governmental matter of importance." İnalcık, "The nature," 43-44.

[21] Metin Heper, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.* 18,1 (1991), 46.

[22] İlkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1974), 5.

[23] İnalcık, *Ottoman.*109-112.

was the state, "as the linchpin of the redistributive mechanism, the pervasive network of patron-client relations, and the overarching political-administrative system" that provided for "the provisioning of society through the movement of goods from the producers to the political center and from the center to populace."[24] For the administrative controls of artisans and craftsmen, guilds were used. Even merchants could not escape the overbearing state which provided the security of trade and granted monopolies in exchange for loans, assistance in taxation, and supply of luxury goods.[25] To ensure that the reaya (or ruled) was protected against the fluctuations of prices in a protected- market, the central authority even determined the highest price at which goods could be sold.

In addition to its political and economic supremacy the Ottoman ruling groups took every opportunity to demonstrate their cultural preeminence.[26] They developed highly elitist great culture, an operational code for themselves which was to be unintelligible for ordinary folk. The traditional Ottoman state philosophy demanded that for the sake of the social order and harmony the state should keep each man in his appropriate social position. Each and every group should remain in their rightful place and thus, to be accorded appropriate treatment by the state. It preferred decentralized accommodation in the face of the great diversity of the periphery. When the loose ties appeared to be working, no further attempt were made for further integration.[27]

So far we have tried to present a short picture of the emergence, organization and basic characteristics of the Ottoman state. In what follows, the same is aimed for the defining characteristics of the Ottoman "traditional" society. The implicit[28] assumptions of early

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[24] İlkay Sunar, "State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 67. İnalcık, *Ottoman*.151-7

[25] Ibid., 66-7.

[26] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul:Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), 12. (Originally published in 1973 in Daedalus).

[27] Ibid., 10.

[28] We use the term "implicit" because these assumptions are not generally stated explicitly as

modernization theory,[29] -that countries can be divided into traditional and modern societies, that transition more or less follows the path that the western societies had followed, and that in the end all countries likely to have characteristics of modern western societies- have, by and large, been deserted.[30] It has long been accepted that despite the some common denominators societies that are dubbed as traditional tend to display great diversity. Moreover, these distinct features of the traditional society are likely to put its imprint on both the form of modernization process (or transition period) as well as on the end-product called modernity, if it emerges, since it is by no means a foregone conclusion that modernization process inevitably results in modernity. For us, therefore, it is important to know about the defining characteristics of the Ottoman society. Not only because the strong state we have referred to did not emerge in vacuum but rather in complex interaction with the traditional society, while also shaping it in variety of ways, but also because, the peculiar characteristics of the traditional society put its stamp on modernization process and modernization process, in turn, affected the state tradition. The complex interaction and encounter of these two strains, as it is remarked above, significantly affected the fortunes of democracy in Turkey.

Reinhard Bendix, who criticized simplistic assumptions of early modernization theory

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some critics of the modernization theory claimed it to be. In many cases they constitute unstated (or tacit) assumptions rather than clear expositions. For an interesting article in this line, Gabriel A. Almond, "The Development of Political Development," in *Understanding Political Development*, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987).

[29] It involved diverse strands that drew inspiration from separate traditions ranging from the cultural perspective of Max Weber to evolutionary European sociology, to structural-functionalism. Works that are generally regarded as the classical examples of the modernization theory are; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe III: Free Press, 1958); Walt.W.Rustow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961); David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[30] Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. IX, 3 (1967). Joseph Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change." *American Journal of Sociology*. 72, (196 7), pp-351-362; Samuel P.Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). These critics did not, on the other hand, reject the basic assumptions of the modernizaton theory. What they did was a correction to overtly simplistic and optimistic assumptions of the classical theory. It is for that reason they have been called as "modernisation revisionists." Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, *Political Change and Underdevelopment* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 34.

for overgeneralizing, and who advanced the view that there is not a single (universal) type of traditional society, carefully argued that despite great diversity these societies at their most basic level had something in common. According to Bendix, traditional societies are likely to be characterized by "lack of differentiation and the existence of high integration *within* the family and community (which) go together with a high degree of fragmentation *among* them."[31] Therefore, he argued, traditional societies "achieve intense solidarity in relatively small groups that tend to be isolated from one another by poor communication and a backward technology.."[32] These small groups tend to create "for their individual participants an intensity of emotional attachment and rejection which modern men find hard to appreciate and which they would probably find intolerable."[33] Moreover, in "each of these solitary groups and in the polity as a whole, society tends to be divided sharply between rulers and ruled."[34]

The Ottoman society[35] displayed many features that Bendix attributed to traditional societies. It also displayed other features that he did not touch. The sharp division between rulers and ruled was observed in Ottoman society. Whereas the ruling center constituted an active and somewhat homogenous, closed group, the ruled remained segregated, heterogeneous and primordial. The reaya was divided on the basis of religious-ethnic origins and occupation. The administrative "Millet" system ensured that major religious communities (Greek Orthodox, Armenian-Gregorian, Jews and later Maronite-Bulgarians) in the empire

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[31] Bendix, "Tradition," 319. (His italics)

[32] Ibid., 320.

[33] Ibid., 320.

[34] Ibid., 321.

[35] An important caveat applies regarding the Ottoman society. Due to the fact that the empire covered so large an area populated with various religions, and distinct traditions and that Ottomans had shown flexibility to accommodate these differing traditions, there emerged an empire which was far from approaching uniformity neither in land regime nor in regulations of trade and commerce, nor in status of various groups vis-à-vis state. As Ortaylı noted, for instance, the "tımar" system was applied only in some parts of Anatolia and Thrace. İnalcık, too, indicated that the only law that covered the whole of the empire and all groups in the empire was criminal law (ceza kanunnameleri). İlber Ortaylı, *Türk İdare Tarihi* [The Turkish Administrative History] (Ankara: Amme İdaresi Yayınları, 1978), 97-8; Halil İnalcık, "Örfi-Sultani," 336. Therefore when we refer to the traditional Ottoman society, we talk about only very general features of it.

would regulate judicial matters and tax collection with little outside interference.[36] It was also reinforced by ethnic division of labor in the economic sphere, while the Greeks and Jews engaged in trade and commerce, for example, the great majority of Muslims worked on the land as farmers. Each occupational group (not necessarily related to their religious ethnic origins) were further accorded different status determined largely by the taxes they paid such as peasants, townspeople and nomads.[37] Further divisions within the periphery derived from the existence of various religious sects and orders which found home within the peripheral groups. These groups differed from and were opposed to officially recognized version of Islam sanctioned by the "ulema." Each and every group (divided on the basis of religion, occupation and settlement patterns) came to co-exist side by side with a high degree of fragmentation among them accompanied by high level of solidarity and affectivity within their respective small groups.[38]

The Ottoman state's relations with these groups was different from the pattern that had been observed in Western Europe. As Reinhard Bendix indicated one of the chief characteristics of medieval Europe was that:

> certain persons and groups were exempted from direct obedience to the commands issued by, or in name of the ruler... This system of negative and positive privileges (which may be called 'immunities' or 'autonomous jurisdiction') became the legal foundation of representative government.[39]

The notion of reciprocal rights and privileges allowed for the corporate bodies (self-governing towns, for instance) with autonomous jurisdiction, and paved way for the development of a legal system of adjucation to mediate conflicting interests and the development of *Standestaat*.[40] The acceptance of both autonomy for various groups and the

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[36] Dankwart A.Rustow, "Turkey," 175.

[37] İnalcık, "The nature," 44.

[38] Ahmet Evin, "Communitarian Structures and Social Change," in *Modern Turkey- Continuity and Change* ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen: Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 17-19

[39] Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political Community," in *Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge,* ed. Reinhard Bendix (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 231-232.

[40] Giaffronco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, California: Stanford

principle that obligations be based on a contractual basis laid down the foundation on which civil society was built.

The centralized Ottoman state, deeply suspicious of the peripheral elements, did use everything in its disposal to ward off such an outcome. Instead of reciprocal rights, privileges and autonomous jurisdictions "all parts of the empire as well as the status of subjects and even their economic functions were placed directly under the jurisdiction of center, which issued laws, edicts and regulations, governing provinces, estates, vocational and professional groups."[41] The Ottomans were reluctant to recognize private property rights that could be claimed against the state, as noted above all lands and subjects thought to belonged to the Sultan. Quite frequently they resorted "confiscation" as a means to remove those (be it merchants or bureaucrats who accumulated wealth) who might challenge its authority. In their dismissive attitude against commerce, the Ottomans favored guild industry at the expense of commerce. They also denied the corporate personality and independent government to towns, which played such a crucial role in the emergence of civil society in the Western Europe.[42] The notion of protection and obedience, rather than reciprocal rights and privileges, governed the relationships between state and its subjects. The Ottoman rulers, in paternalistic fashion par excellence, sincerely believed that God had given them the duty to take care of their subjects. In fact, the ruler was seen as the shepherd protecting his flock (the reaya) and leading them in the righteous path.[43] The subjects, in turn, were expected to be obedient and productive. But this was not a 'contract' in the traditional sense. It was true that Islamic notion of contract called "Bay'a" between the muslim subjects and the Caliph must have affected the Ottoman rulers particularly after they assumed the title caliph. But, the concrete mechanisms by which in

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University Press, 1978), 33, 48.

[41] Ahmet Evin, "Communitarian Structures, Values and Cultural Behaviour in Turkey," in *Turkey and the European Community,* ed. Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (Leske, Budrich: Opladen, 1990), 27.

[42] Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire." *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 11, (1969), 260-2

[43] İnalcık, *Ottoman.* 67.

practice a ruler could be forced to obey the rules of contract were never specified. As Bernard Lewis wittily put it, good government "was a duty of the ruler, not a right of the subject, whose only recourse against bad government was patience, counsel and prayer."[44]

This specific conception of relations between the state and its subjects differentiated traditional Ottoman society in one respect from traditional society in Europe as characterized by Bendix. Bendix have argued that traditional societies are likely to be characterized by sharp inequalities in which:

> Those of gentle birth have a disproportionate share of wealth, privileged access to positions of formal authority, enjoy sociability, leisure and culture, whereas the bulk of the population lives in the drudgery of physical labor and in poverty, without access to literacy, culture or positions of influence, and without recognized means of airing their grievances.[45]

In traditional Ottoman society, basically as a consequence of the devşirme system, the emergence of the privileged class of rulers (with disproportionate share of wealth, and privileged access to positions of formal authority) appears to have been retarded at least until the seventeenth century.[46] Though one should be careful not to overemphasize the point,[47] the situation of subjects also appears to have been much better than subjects in other traditional societies. During the heyday of the Empire, the Ottoman rulers well meant the old oriental maxim that "a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice."[48] The need to treat subjects with justice interpreted as giving each person his due, i.e., treating him as his

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[44] Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History -İdeas, People, and Events in the Middle East* (revised and expanded edition) (Chicago: Open Court,1993), 324.

[45] Bendix, "Tradition," 321-322.

[46] Mardin, "Center", 11. That does not mean, however, the system as a whole was meritocratic. Even at the zenith of its power powerful families with a history of state tend to dominate decision-making positions.

[47] This is the favourite theme of the nationalist historiography. For the one of the most sophisticated example of this kind, see, Osman Turan, *Türk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi*, 2 vols [The History of the Idea of the Turkish Domination of the World], ninth edition, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1996) (original publication 1968)

[48] İnalcık, "The nature," 43.

social position required, seems to be appreciated by Sultans.[49] In an effort to secure the well-being of the reaya, at least in the classical period, it was accepted that any subject regardless of his social status "could petition the imperial council directly, and for important matters the reaya would send delegations to İstanbul."[50] The roots of the concept of the "father state" (devlet baba) can be traced back to that tradition. According to tradition, subjects tended to expected fair treatment from the state as children would be expected to be treatad by their father. They also tend to expect that the state would take care of their well-being as a father would care for his children.

## 2.2. EFFORTS TOWARDS MODERNIZATION

Before proceeding further into modernization efforts in Ottoman-Turkish polity, we should explain what we mean by the term modernization. Following Bendix, we use the term modernization to refer to "a type of social change, which *originated* in the industrial revolution of England, 1760-1830, and in the political revolution in France, 1789-1794."[51] The chief characteristics of social change which originated from the industrial revolution in England were the massive transformation of agriculture accompanied by the decline in the proportion of the labor force engaged in agricultural production. This transformation was both a cause and effect of the technological developments and further industrial development. The political revolution of the French on the other hand had shattered the sharp distinctions between the rulers and the ruled and paved way to democratization of society in the sense that rulers were no longer drawn from the ranks of privileged of birth, education, or religious authority.

The economic and political breakthrough that occurred in England and France "put every country of the world into a position of 'backwardness.'" Whether they wanted it or not,

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[49] As İnalcık noted Sultan's fermans frequently repeated that "God had given them the reaya in trust." See İnalcık, *Ottoman*.67. Koçi Bey, for instance, carefully reminded Sultan (IV Murad) that "If there is even a slightest degree of cruelty in the realm of Islam, Padişah is called into question in the day of judgement about it." *Koçi Bey Risalesi* [The Treatise of Koçi Bey], ed. Zuhuri Danışman (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1985), 69.

[50] İnalcık, *Ottoman*.91.

[51] Bendix, "Tradition," 329. (italics are his)

all other societies have been forced to respond to external stimuli (alongside the possible intrinsic stimuli) that derived from new ideas and techniques originating in both revolutions. 'To catch up' with modern societies became the central social-political project in the follower societies. In late modernizing (or follower) societies, it is usually the state that attempts to play the major role in modernization process.[52] It is basically because, external stimuli, in the main, forces governments to respond and no other social-political groups are willing or able to play such role. It is also because, they try to modernize in as short a time as possible by copying the available technology, and by trying to avoid the strains of industrialization process as they learned from the experience of leading modernizers. Modernization in follower societies is not a uniform process. The peculiarities of traditional society, the timing of the modernization thrust, leadership and the way the various crises of modernization are dealt with are all likely to affect the modernization process.[53] Moreover, it does not inevitably result in modern society or modernity. Earlier analysts implied that once a country started its modernization drive, it would end up with modernity, though some crises or even reversals can be faced. It is has now become accepted that this is not the case. Experience has shown us that it is only a handful of countries that have joined ranks of modernized countries, and that the gap between modern developed countries and the rest tend to grow wider each day. That does not mean to say, however, that these countries remained traditional. They have accepted many attributes of modern society (widespread literacy, modern medicine, communication technology, extension of franchise) in isolation from other characteristics of modern society, that is without becoming modern.[54]

Though there is not a single type of modern society, as early modernization theorists appears to have believed, one may still speak of defining characteristics of modern society that

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[52] Ibid., 335.

[53] Janet S.Coleman, "Modernization: Political Aspects," in *International Encylopedia of Social Sciences*, ed. Edward Shills, vol 10, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 400.

[54] Hence, Bendix concluded that "modernization in some sphere of life may occur without reculting in modernity." Bendix, "Tradition," 329.

had been originated from social-political changes associated with the English and French revolutions. According to Bendix, modern societies are likely to be characterized by "structural differentiation in technology and communications that has led to high level productivity and high degree of impersonal independence." The adjudication of legal disputes, the collection of revenue, the control of currency, military recruitment, the postal system, the construction of public facilities have become the functions of a national government instead of competing jurisdictions. And finally the erosion of the old division between the rulers and the ruled are no longer clear-cut as franchise and formal controls on rulers are widely exercised and status distinctions are no longer derived from those of birth.[55] In short, modern society is likely to have high level of socio-economic development as a result of high level of productivity, and a national government that are organized on legal-rational principles, and finally some of control of ruled over the rulers. After these introductory remarks about modernization, we may now proceed to the Ottoman-Turkish case.

The Ottoman classical order entered a long period of decline by the sixteenth century. Though a detailed study of the decline of the empire is yet to carried out, scholars generally agree that the origins of the decline of the empire sould be dated back to the late fifteenth century. The shift of international trade routes to the Atlantic Ocean, invasion of the Levantine markets of by cheap American silver, the end of the military expansion into Europe, the need to finance large standing army at the expense of Tımarli Sipahi and its detrimental effects on land regime, are generally argued to be the chief reasons of the decline.[56]

The Ottoman statesmen began to search for the causes of decline as the one military defeat followed another. Increasingly they turned towards the Western European countries, which had now upper hand vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Beginning with Selim III what came to be known as "modernization" have became high on the agenda of the Ottoman state. Referring to the fact that Ottomans resorted to reform when they were forced to respond to protect

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[55] Ibid., 322.

[56] See, Halil İnalcık, "The nature," 6.; Sunar, *Development*. 28-40.

themselves in a response to external stimuli, it was sometimes called as "defensive" modernization. This is somewhat inaccurate, as we noted above, after the modernization in England and France, all other late modernizing societies, combined intrinsic changes with responses to extrinsic stimuli. The same applies for the term "modernization from above" as it is characteristic of the late modernizing societies (or "induced modernization" as opposed to "organic" one) that usually the states take leading role.[57] Early modernization efforts concentrated on reforming the military as it was believed that if reformed along western lines, the Ottomans would return to the glorious old days. Both Selim III (1761-1808) and Mahmud III (1808-1839) based their reform programs chiefly on the establishment of a new army, as well as modernizing the state bureaucracy. Their efforts, however, proved to be less than successful. Lack of educated personnel and financial means, opposition of anti-reform forces led by the ulema, incessant power struggles within the palace bureaucracy, and increasing European pressure all appear to have played a role for such an outcome.

The second wave of the reforms known as "Tanzimat", (literally means reform or reorganization) period (1839-1876) tried, once again, to restructure the Ottoman state and society. The Tanzimat reforms were largely led by bureaucrats rather than Sultans. One significant consequence of the previous reform endeavors was the rise of a new genre of bureaucracy (Bab-ı Ali or Porte) and the shifting of the balance of power between Sultans and bureaucracy in favor of latter. This trend gained pace in the Tanzimat period. As the leading agents and (implementers) of the westernization, bureaucrats had strived to consolidate their positions vis-à-vis Sultan. Unlike the earlier Kuls they had begun to wield great power.[58] Reşit Paşa and his pupils Ali and Fuat Paşa rather than Sultan Abdülmecit were the leading actors in the reform process. True to Ottoman-Turkish state tradition these bureaucrats, "aspired to the

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[57] Peter F. Sugar, "Turkey (Economic and Political Modernization)," *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Dankwart A Rustow and Barbara A. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 148-9.

[58] Heper, *Tradition*. 44. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En uzun Yüzyılı* [The Longest Century of the Empire], third edition (İstanbul: Hil, 1995), 77.

status of state elite"[59] and came to see themselves as responsible for the well-being of the state and country. They no longer viewed themselves as the servant of the Sultan but the State.[60] Influenced by somewhat superficial reading of Western political experience and thought, bureaucratization and centralization and were perceived as prescriptions that would save the state. It was not only out of their desire for westernization that these policies were adopted. Centralization, especially of tax administration, was also thought to help state finances,[61] while bureaucratization and reorganization of existing bureaucracy was thought to help establishment of better staffed central government, and limiting the Sultans' arbitrary powers over bureaucracy.

The uppermost aim of the reform policy, therefore, had been directed to the "centralization and bureaucratization of the empire."[62] The Imperial Restcript of Gülhane (Gülhane Hatt-ı Humayunu) (1839) and Reform Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı) were promulgated in this period. Both documents promised the establishment of guarantees for life, honor and properties, equality before law for Sultan's subjects, the orderly replacement of tax-farming system and a system of conscription for the army.[63] The reorganization along these lines involved: restructuring in the bureaucracy's internal organizations and the bureaucrats' legal status, the establishment of "modern" schools to train qualified personnel for the state, development of consultative assemblies and commissions (Meclis-i Vala-i Ahkam-ı Adliye, Meclis-I Ali Tanzimat, Şura-yi Devlet), reforms aimed at improving provincial administration

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[59] Heper, *Tradition*. 64. Also, Halil İnalcık "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Humayunu,"[The Deed of Alliance and the Imperial Restcript of Gülhane], *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu- Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), 353.

[60] Heper, *Tradition*. 45.

[61] Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,"[The Implementation of Tanzimat and Social Reactions to It], in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu- Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), 365. (Original publication, 1964).

[62] Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 3 (1972), 90.

[63] Halil İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak," 351.

and the tax system.[64] Though considerable foreign pressure[65] had been involved in the promulgation of such reform edicts, that was by no means the sole reason. Due basically to the weaknesses of the socio-economic groups that were ready to push for its rights, movements towards limited government, rule of law and constitutionalism were all dominated by the bureaucrats and associated intelligentsia.

The centralization and bureaucratization continued even when the strong bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period had been removed from office by Abdülhamit II, who single-handedly ruled the country for more than thirty years.[66] During his reign the modernization of the educational institutions gained pace as well as increases in the number of those who were enrolled in these schools (including women). The construction of new railways and telegraph lines acquired a new momentum.

The reform movement, especially 'Tanzimat reforms', had truly been the turning point in an effort to transform the Ottoman state towards a rational-legal modern type of state. Despite the fact that the state system based on rational-legal principles were not yet totally in place and the old structure persisted for quite some time, it was a great leap forward in laying down the foundations of the modern state. The bureaucrats rather than the Sultan (with the exception of Sultan Abdülhamit II period) tended to become the locus of the state. The development of distinctive state norms (so-called adab tradition) into which they had been socialized and perceptions of themselves as true protector of state interests became embedded.

Equally significant changes occurred in the traditional social-structure of the Ottoman society. Despite the some notable achievements of the reform policies, it was less than

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[64] For the thorough treatment of Tanzimat reforms, see Carter V.Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Ortaylı, *Yüzyıl.*; Roderick Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, second edition (New York: Gordion, 1973).

[65] The 1839 reform edict promulgated when the empire needed the European support (or at least neutrality) against the Mehmet Ali of Eypt, who rebelled against the Ottoman rule. Similarly 1856 reform edict was promulgated on the eve of the treaty of Paris (that would meant the acceptance of Turkey as a participant in the concert of Europe) as part of good-willl on the part of Turkey.

[66] According to Bernard Lewis, Abdülhamit II was "a willing and active modernizer, the true

successful in arresting the decline of the empire in terms of land losses and improving the living conditions of the majority of the population. It is generally accepted that the success in these two areas of the reform policy appears to have been impeded by a combination of several internal and external factors. Most significant of these were; the resistance of vested interests (ulema and ayans) against reform, dependence on emerging capitalist market relations controlled by West European powers,[67] the multinational structure of the empire which made it very vulnerable to the rise nationalism, lack of trained personnel to implement reorganization policy, and unending power struggles within the center which brought it to halt and prevented regular action.[68]

Far from being improved, the living conditions of the majority of the population appears to have been worsened. Since the late sixteenth century, the weakening of the center's authority prepared a fertile ground in which the peasants' relations with the fief holders resembled more and more that of feudal lords' relations with the serfs as found in Western Europe. The tax-farming system, introduced as a way of increasing the Empire's cash flow, changed the nature of "Tımar" system on which the traditional Ottoman society was based. It helped to create a group of multezims with undesirable consequences for the peasants that composed the great majority of the population. Mültezim was a person (of usually military origin, that is with a history of service to the state) who paid price in advance for the right to use state-owned land. To maximize his benefits, multezims would squeeze the farmers, and bribe the high officials so as to prevent the strict control of the center which in the past served

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heir of Sultan Abdülaziz and the statesman of the Tanzimat." Lewis, *Emergence*.171.

[67] That does not mean, on the other hand, that the Ottoman economy was totally dependent on and dominated by Europe in the sense that its economic relations were determined by needs of the European economies. Never losing its political independence, the Ottoman economy was not dominated by the single European power, and the Ottomans even gained room for maneuvre by expoliting rifts between the various European powers. See, Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, 1820-1913* [Dependency and Growth in the Ottoman Empire, 1820-1913], second edition, (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları, 1984), 160.

[68] See, İlber Ortaylı, *En Uzun Yüzyıl*. 179-204 (chapter six, Reformcuların Çıkmazı); İnalcık, "Sosyal Tepkiler"; Donald Quataert, "Main Problems of the Economy During the Tanzimat Period," in *Workers, Peasants, and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire*, in Donald Quataert (İstanbul: ISIS, 1993) (originally published in 1989).

to protect the peasant majority from ruthless exploitation by fief holders. The weaknesses of the central authority also contributed what is known as Celali rebellions.[69] A movement of fief holders who lost the right to use their lands, of youngsters who could enroll neither in the army nor in medreses, of peasants who left (without permission of the state) their lands, celali rebellions led to widespread insecurity amongst the population and a dramatic fall in agricultural products.[70] The peasants in search of security and livelihood were, thus, squeezed between the mültezims who were usually in alliance with state officials[71] and bandits. These developments, in turn, resulted in the "clamming-up of rural communities" [72] and the development of higher degree of small group solidarity as they tried to protect themselves by strengthening primordial loyalties.

With the passage of the time these mültezims came to be recognized as de facto owners of the land they controlled, and constituted a kind of landed dynasty (Ayan- or local notables). Though many aspects of the politics of local notables are yet to be researched, available research indicates that they did not come to play the role, played by landed gentry which have gone through process of "embourgeoisement" in Western Europe. In the first place, local notables owed their positions to the state. They acquired state lands for cash payments but "made their profits mainly from tax-farming privileges granted them for life which they sold to sub-farmers approved by the state."[73] It was in their interest to tighten up their connections with the state. They, therefore, came to play a double role. On the one hand, their interest clashed with that of state especially when state officials believed that they constituted a threat to higher state interests and tried to reduce their power. But on the other

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[69] The best work on this period is, Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası-Celali İsyanları* [The Struggle of the Turkish People for Peace and Order -Celali Uprisings] (İstanbul: Cem, 1995) (originally published in 1963).

[70] Ibid., 446-454.

[71] It is for this reason that Mardin noted that "officials have become plunderers of their own society." Mardin, "Center," 14.

[72] Evin, "Communitarian," 19.

[73] Mardin, "Power," 207.

hand, they were "agents" of the state,[74] and had acquired all its powers, not so much from productive economic activities in competitive market place, but through connections with the state. Their power rested not on production for the market place but the exploitation of loopholes in a state-dominated economy. They were hardly interested in forming horizontal links with the center but rather were involved in a vertical relationship with the state on the clientelistic basis to exploit its resources.[75]

For a complex interaction of various reasons these landholders did not turn to economically productive activities, for instance, commercialized agriculture that have played a crucial role in the modernization of Western countries.[76] In the first place, despite some concentration of land having taken place in some parts of the country, small landholdings were still common.[77] Large estates existed both in some export oriented areas but they were the exception rather than being a norm. And many of them contained unused lands, and frequently concentrated on stock-raising that was much more profitable than production.[78] The perception of trade and commerce being somewhat lowly engagements not suitable for muslims was one of the reasons.[79] The dominance of non-muslim groups in trade and commerce constituted another hindrance as these people lacked what we today call the

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[74] As Karpat noted the title of Ayan was rewarded through a special charter by government. Kemal H:Karpat "Structural Change, Historical Stages of Modernization and the Role of Social Groups in Turkish Politics," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey- A Structural Historical Analysis*, ed. Kemal H Karpat and contributors (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 37.

[75] Heper, *Tradition*.33.

[76] Şevket Pamuk, *100 Soruda Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi, 1500-1914*, [Ottoman-Turkish Economic History, 1500-1914 in 100 Question] second ed. (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1990), 141.

[77] For the structure of Ottoman villages and the prevalance of smallholdings, see, Halil İnalcık, "Köy, Köylü ve İmparatorluk,"[Village, Peasant and the Empire] *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993) (originally published in 1990).

[78] Donald Quatert, "Agricultural Trends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1914," in *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914.* ed. Donald Quatert (İstanbul: ISIS, 1993), 21-22. (originally published in 1981).

[79] For an acute description of this culture see, Sabri F. Ülgener, *İktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dünyası* [The Ethical and Moral Values of the Economic Contraction], third ed. (Istanbul: Der, 1983) (originally published in 1951).

"enterprising culture" to compete with them. They did knew, for instance, neither the advanced techniques of agriculture nor how to market their products. They were attracted by the culture of the center, and tended to imitate it. Instead of capital accumulation they tend to use newly gained wealth in conspicuous consumption. This was basically because in the empire wealth became "interchangeable only after passing through filter of status"[80] and one way of displaying status was to maintain lavish consumption patterns.

Finally we should mention the impact of strong state tradition. True to tradition, those occupying effective decision-making positions (be it civil-military bureaucrats, or Sultan's) were reluctant to see the local notables (or any other groups) having autonomy and institutionalized privileges and being horizontally integrated into system. It was true that to create an indigenous class of commerce and industry, Tanzimat reformers resorted to various mercantilist-like policies. It was also true that they tried to remove the insecurity of property rights, and gave local notables place in administrative councils. However, these policies, it appears, were thought to serve to increase state revenues and thus strengthen central authority, rather than recognition of these forces as intermediaries between the state and society. For instance, while giving place local notables in administrative councils, the state supported small-landholders against the threat of their being strong.[81] When these forces appeared to be getting out of hand, bureaucrats easily resorted age-old methods such as confiscation.

In terms of modernization of social structure, therefore, this period was less than satisfactory. Despite the reformers' endeavors, the means of communication and transportation within the empire remained unevenly undeveloped. It consisted of 'segregated' economic entities with only loose connections between them. While some part of the country had been incorporated into market relations, the other parts showed characteristics of autocratic self-sufficiency.[82] Less than successful development of commercialized agriculture, in turn, hindered the generation of agricultural surplus value, which formed the backbone of industry in the

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[80] Mardin, "Power," 266.

[81] Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi*.162.

[82] Ortaylı, *En Uzun Yüzyıl*.183.

Western European countries. The existing small- manufacturing industry was far from ready to compete with European goods, which were easily flooded into the country thanks to liberal tariff regime. Despite reformers' attempts to nurture industry, for a variety of reasons (lack of capital, enterpreneurship, competition from European goods, reformers reliance on esnafs and their resistance), their efforts remained less than successful.[83] Thus, at the onset of the twentieth century, the Empire was predominantly agricultural country. It was estimated that more than 75 to 80 per cent of the population[84] lived in villages that were self-contained with a high levels of small group solidarity. In cities trade and commerce were dominated by minorities while, little small-manufacturing industry had been clustered around the Marmara region. Despite some courageous steps having been taken towards the modernization of the country, it was far from approaching the state of affairs called "modernity."

### 2.3. THE YOUNG TURK PERIOD, 1908-1918

The 1876 Constitution was the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire in the modern sense of the term. It was prepared by a leading bureaucrat (Grand Vezir) of the time, Mithat Paşa, and was promulgated by Sultan Abdülhamit II on 23 December 1876. The constitutional movement, like early efforts towards limited government, was based neither on widespread popular support nor an organized political parties but led by reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals. Particularly instrumental in that respect had been the Young Ottomans. Since the

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[83] In an influential analysis, Niyazi Berkes has argued that Tanzimat reformers did not understand "the essence and characteristics of European civilization" that they did fail to appreciate national-economic basis of it. And consequently they did not see that, apart from some superficial imitations of the western civilization, it was the economic-social structure that needed to be changed See, Niyazi Berkes, *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu* [The Problem of the West in Turkish Thought] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1975), 194-197. While the inability of the reformers (or Ottoman ststesman in general) to understand the socio-economic basis of society is not unknown, it is somewhat inaccurate to argue that reformers did not attempt to change the social structure. They did it, though efforts remained uncoordinated, piecemal, and ad hoc. Considering the magnitude of the tasks and obstacles involved, (the reformers had to fight in too many areas that ranged from the reforming state structure, to resisting pressures from European powers, to finance wars, to prevent land losses, to resist anti-reform forces) one tends to think that it is somewhat inaccurate to explain failure of reformers with reference to understanding of Western civilization. For an argument in this line, see, Ortaylı, *En Uzun Yüzyıl*, (esp.chapter six, Reformcuların Çıkmazı).

[84] Quatert, "Agricultural," 18.

late 1850s a group of intellectuals, who had been one way or another, been involved with state bureaucracy, had begun to raise their voice against the bureaucratic leadership of Tanzimat era. In their view Tanzimat reforms, have imitated the West, provided special economic and political privileges to minorities and European countries, and that it had led to absolutism of the bureaucrats. Though far from achieving ideological uniformity,[85] they tried to read into Islamic principles modern theories of constitutional limited government. The intellectual climate of the times, in the making of which the Young Ottomans contributed greatly, must have had an effect on Mithat Paşa. Like many of them Mithat too believed that in order to continue modernization and to prevent the break up of the empire the promulgation of a constitution that limited the prerogative of sultans and made ministers responsible to a popular assembly was necessary.[86] Consequently, the system of government brought by the 1876 constitution resembled that of a parliamentary system. But it had greatly strengthened the authority of the executive led by the Sultan vis-à-vis parliament. The parliament, chosen indirectly with limited franchise, sat for only two sessions, and was dissolved by Sultan Abdülhamit II in 1878 remaining closed for thirty years.

Opposition to Abdülhamit's autocratic rule came, true to Ottoman tradition, not from any clearly specified social-political groups but from the ranks of intellectuals and bureaucratic elites associated with the state. He was forced to reinstate the 1876 constitution in 1908 when the group of people situated in Balkans led by army officers affiliated with the secret political

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[85] Even a cursory look at Young Ottomans demonstrates that how far from they were far from having ideological uniformity. While Şinasi was in favour of wholesale adaption of Western civilization, Namık Kemal was agitating for the establishment of a parliament. Ali Suavi, on the other hand, opposed a parliamentary system on the ground that it was against the human nature. See, Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

[86] Like his precedessors, Mithat Paşa seemed to assumed that as all Western countries of the time happened to have some sort of constitutional representative government, westernization meant adopting some form of popular participation in government whether one liked it or not. It is sometimes assumed that this is an exclusive feature of Turkish modernization. That does not, on the other hand, seem to be the case. Shillony, for one, notes that Japanese leaders in the Meiji period were motivated by the same considerations. "The Meji rulers wanted their country to be rich, strong and well-regarded. Democracy was not among their aims. ...Nevertheless, as all the Western countries of the time happened to have some sort of constitutional government and representative institutions, westernization meant adopting some forms of popular participation in government, whether the Japanese leaders liked it or not." See, Ben-Ami Shillony, "The Political Tradition of Japan and Its impact on the Development of Japanese Democracy," in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 107.

organization, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ittihat ve Terakki) threatened to rebel against his rule unless he reinstated the 1876 Constitution. Believing that mass-based opposition to his rule had arisen Abdülhamit II decided to return to constitutional rule.[87] What was to be known as the Second Constitutional period in Ottoman-Turkish politics had begun.

The CUP was founded in 1889 in Salonika by the military medical college students, who were part of the movement called the Young Turks. Many leaders of the Young Turk movements were living in European capitals due to Abdülhamits' relentless pressure. In one sense, the Young Turks were heirs to the Young Ottomans and significant continuities between them can be detected. But there were differences as well. As a whole they were younger, graduated from modern schools opened in the Tanzimat and Abdülhamit period, rather had lower middle-class background. Finally, they were much less theoretically articulate in terms of the ideologies and world views they held than the Young Ottomans, and more practically oriented.[88] Like their predecessors, Young Turks, too, appears to have assumed through the right interventions by the enlightened, problems of Ottoman society could be solved. They were, first of all, believers in the power of reason and science. They believed, in a rather romantic and utopian manner, their powers and ability to shape social and political environment for the establishment of better social order. Social engineering, according to scientific principles, was a necessity and ethically desirable. It then followed that a small group of enlightened should have more say in governmental affairs than ordinary folk.[89]

As a political organization, the CUP's immediate aim was to end Abdulhamit's rule and to reinstate the constitution. Like the Young Ottomans, they believed that to arrest the decline

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[87] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Hürriyetin İlanı-İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatına Bakışlar* [The Declaration of Freedom-Some Observations on the Political life of the Second Constitutional Period] (İstanbul: Baha, 1959), 8.

[88] Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* [The Political Views of the Young Turks, 1895-1908] fifth ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 11. (originally published in 1964).

[89] Mardin indicated that they likened the relationships between state and statesmen to the relationships between doctor and patient. Ibid.,19. Also, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 200-212.

of the empire it was necessary.[90] Otherwise, they were a far cry from having a coherent ideology. Instead, the movement involved, at least at the beginning, various groups with different aims including the rather liberal Ottomanists, Turkists and Islamists. What unified these diverse strands was not as much the abstract ideals of freedom or constitutional government as the priority they assigned to "saving the state."[91] The inability of the reform movement to arrest the break up of the empire and the continuing meddling of European powers in internal affairs that helped minority nationalisms to rise, made the agenda of saving the state the first priority for both those who engaged in intellectual exercise and those who came to exercise power in that period.

From the beginning of the second constitutional period in 1908 to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the CUP controlled the destiny of the empire. It was Turkey's first real experience of a multi-party system, as 1909 changes in the constitution reduced the power of the sultan and made the system more parliamentary. In the words of one prominent student of the period it was a "laboratory of Turkish politics"[92] in the sense that it had a huge impact on both the ideologies, and political patterns (in terms of party organizations, opposition government relations, party-bureaucracy relations) of the following decades. This is so, not only because the bulk of the social-political elite of the Republic were involved in the CUP activities, but also because the alignment of different social-political forces which took shape in this period showed remarkable continuity up until the late forties.

These ten years were decisive for the Empire as the Balkan war reduced the Ottoman presence in the Rumelia to a minimum and the decision to enter the first world war (that would spell the end of the Ottoman empire) was made in that period. It was a tumultuous period in which two disorderly elections were held, eleven cabinets were formed, political assassinations

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[90] Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks-The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 16.

[91] One prominent leader of the CUP (Doktor Nazım) reported to have said that he had even not seen the 1876 constitution, which they forced Abdülhamit to reinstate. Cited in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* [A Man In Search of an Ideal], (İstanbul: Remzi, 1967), 292.

[92] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri* [Westernization Movements in Turkish Political Life] (İstanbul: Arba, 1996), 98. (original publication 1960)

of politicians and journalists took place and extremely harsh government-opposition relations observed. Between 1908 and 1913, the CUP did not directly hold power but they tried to wield power behind the curtain. Unlike the Young Ottomans they did not feel to competent to rule the empire.[93] It is perhaps because it was a secret organization with no clearly identifiable leader, that they did not know what to do in a response to this unexpected opportunity. With the Babiali coup (in 1913) by the CUP, in which war minister Nazım Pasa was killed (along with the resignation of Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa) during the cabinet meeting by the group of Unionist led by Enver Pasa, the virtually unlimited power period of the CUP had begun.

Although it is difficult to unravel exactly from which social and political groups the CUP had drawn support, the available research indicates that the CUP was led by young civil-military bureaucrats in alliance with local notables and others groups (such as minorities favoring decentralization) who were opposed to Abdülhamit's rule. Perhaps because it was the only organization that could be called political in the empire that it had such a heterogeneous social base. Rather than following consciously elaborated policies, the CUP supported governments had to react to momentous events as they unfolded. The main thrust of those policies, however, displayed significant continuity with the Tanzimat, but this time the military rather than civilian bureaucrats, clustered around the CUP, was on the driving seat.[94] The reforms in education continued. Further secularization of the state affairs (in the sense that the religious arguments were taken less and less into consideration in governmental decisions) was also one of the hallmarks of the period. The state's involvement in economic affairs gained new impetus as the CUP officials belatedly came to believe that a muslim-Turkish class of merchants would have to be created if the empire was to survive and have a viable economic existence.[95] Perhaps the most radical departure of the CUP had been the promotion, albeit in a disguised manner, of Turkish nationalism. The loss of non-Muslim territories in the Balkans

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[93] Ahmad, *Young Turks*.17.

[94] Heper, *Tradition*.46.

[95] Zafer Toprak, *İttihat Terakki ve Devletçilik* [The Union and Progress and Statism] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi, 1995).

had almost ruled out the policy of Ottomanism, a policy envisaging the equality of all Ottoman subjects regardless of religious origins. Not only the non-Muslims but also Muslim subjects tended to form nationalist organizations as the idea of Turkish nationalism gained new impetus through the works of Russian-muslim emigrants.

Both the patterns of party organization and government-opposition relations observed in that period were far away from being conducive to representative government. It has constituted mostly a negative tradition, which the Turkish political system found it hard to overcome.[96] The CUP had emerged when Adbülhamit II exercised relentless pressure on all opponents (real or potential) and forced them to go underground. Coupled with the Ottoman-Turkish perception of 'politics' as a dangerous business that might cost one's life, the CUP, too, accepted a model of organization heavily influenced by Balkan Guerrilla (komitacı) organizations. The Masonic lodges and their secretive organizations was another influence, as many members of the CUP were also members of the lodges and they used these lodges to escape from pressures of the government.[97] Its organization, therefore, was based on " the cell system" and was extremely secretive. All prospective members had to sworn in, promising that they were willing to work in an extremely secretive environment, ready to implement orders without questioning and to sacrifice their life if necessary. The members knew only those who were in the same cell but no one else. The non-compliance with the rules of the organization or the orders led severe punishment including the death sentence. The secretive organizational ethos was supplemented by religious ethos of "Tarikats." Many scholars of the period[98] have indicated that prospective members tended to assume that by entering such a supposedly secular organization they have entered Tarikat and started to behave as if they were member of

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[96] As Duverger noted "Just as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are profoundly influenced by their origins..." Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties- The Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, translated by, Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1959), XXIII.

[97] Sina Akşin, *100 soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* [The Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress in 100 Questions ], (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1980), 59.

[98] Ibid., 156; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, "İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasal Hayatımızdaki Yeri,"[The Place of the Second Constitutional Period in the Turkish Political Life] in *1876-1976 Türk Parlamentoculuğunun İlk Yüzyılı*, prepared by Siyasi İlimler Türk Derneği (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1976), 107.

"Tarikats."[99] True to Ottoman-Turkish state tradition the CUP members tend to believe that they had a sense of mission and unshaken belief in their righteousness. Their "mission" was to save the state. According to Tunaya, a typical Unionist (İttihatçı) "regarded himself as someone who had a God-given mission." He believed that if the Ottoman empire was to advance, to reform itself, it was to be led by the CUP but by no other institution, as it was the only force and agent.[100] It then followed that they were the only true representatives of state, patriotism, and nationalism and all those who criticized or opposed them were committing the "treason." Beginning with such assumptions, it was a short step for the members of the CUP to regard it just and legitimate to forcefully remove opponents be them Sadrazams or journalists. For the CUP members "nothing was sacred in the pursuit of power and those guilty of dissent must be prepared to pay with their lives."[101] It was also just and legitimate to do away with legal niceties when the higher interest of the state was thought to be in danger.[102]

The opposition to the CUP, accordingly, did have its distinctive characteristics, traces of which would have been observed in all opposition parties in the Republican period. The legal opposition was allowed to exist until 1913, after that date, the CUP became as the only organization recognized by law. Many parties had been founded in period following 1908,[103] but the main opposition party of the period was the Hürriyet ve İtilaf (Liberty and Entente) (LE), which had a short existence - only fourteen month- as it was closed down in 1913. Like the CUP it had a very heterogeneous social base. The unifying thread of this heterogeneous group was its' opposition to the CUP, as it has been in the case of Ahrar Fırkası (Liberal

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[99] See, in the same line memoirs of the member, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, *Siyasal Anılar* [The Political Memoirs], ed. Rauf Mutluay, (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 1976), 50.

[100] Tunaya "İkinci Meşrutiyet," 107.

[101] Ahmad, *Young Turks*. 163.

[102] The CUP supported governments quite often resorted to "the provisional legislations" (kavanini muvakkate). The idiom that "if there is no law, make one" (yok kanun yap kanun) is attributed to Cemal Paşa, one of the prominent members of the CUP. See, Tunaya, "İkinci Meşrutiyet," 113.

[103] For a detailed knowledge of these parties, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi-1908-1918, cilt 1*, [The Political Parties inTurkey, The Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918], second ed. (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1988).

Union), the party's predecessor. The LE was composed of those who had opposed, one way or the another, the CUP. It seemed to attract; bureaucrats who for some reason felt disgust against the CUP as its first (after 1908) job was to remove those bureaucrats and to replace them with their own men; those ambitious politicians or intellectuals who failed to make advances into the high positions; some local notables who could not get the support of the CUP; some part of the religious class; and some groups of ethnic minorities, who felt threatened by the CUP's policies of centralization.[104] Though the party program involved such policies as more autonomy for ethnic groups, decentralization, and a more liberal economic approach, it was not at all clear that party supporters had internalized such things or purposefully chosen the party because of these policies.[105]

From the inception of party[106]politics, relations between the CUP and LE was very tense. The imperial-patrimonial Ottoman principles of government had left no room for the concept of opposition. Opponents were seen as those people who needed to be removed rather than tolerated. Because, if one is in opposition, then one is not loyal since one could be loyal only to individual (sultan) and not the concepts of governance. This tradition reproduced by the CUP, which appeared to have believed in its sense of mission (of saving the state), and its absolute righteousness. When one holds such a firm opinion regarding one's own beliefs the likelihood of its acceptance of the notion of opposition becomes extremely difficult. Those who oppose are seen to possess evil intentions rather than viable alternative to themselves. The same attitude is likely to find its echoes within the ranks of the opposition. Product of the similar social political environment, the opposition, too, tended to have a similar beliefs, the

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[104] The most complete study to date is, Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası, İkinci Meşrutiyet Devrinde İttihat ve Terakkiye Karşı Çıkanlar* [The Party of Liberty and Etente, The Opposing Forces to the Committee of Union and Progress in the Second Constitutional Period] (İstanbul: Dergah, 1990).

[105] As Sayarı noted in the emergence of the party system intra-elite conflict rather than materialization of conflicts in the political arena had the decisive impact. See, Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish Party System in Transition." *Government and Opposition.* 13, (1978), 40.

[106] There is some controversy whether the CUP can be called as 'party' or an 'association'. The dominant view is that even after the 1908, the central committee, which preserved its secretive nature, dominated the party group in the assembly. Its claim to be parliamentary party were thus shadowed by the central committee. See, Akşin, *Jön Türkler.*151

government is seen as having brought the country into the brink of abyss, or more frequently, resorting the authoritarian methods.[107]

Coupled with weakness of the political parties' link with the social groups these perceptions of government and/or opposition gave rise to extremely "virulent and mutually destructive" form of political struggles.[108] Party struggles tended to be over largely abstract subjects[109] unrelated to broader social problems and tensions as well as involving a heavy dose of personalistic conflicts.[110] Public life appeared not as an arena in which solutions to common problems are sought but as an arena in which parties endlessly fight with each other. The early word to describe party was "firka" which literally meant "division" of "break up" within the islamic religious community. "Fırka", then, came to denote those who supported one religious sect against others.[111] Party struggles, too, in terms of intensity and the use of violence, tended to resemble fights between competing religious sects.[112]

The heavy dose of personalistic conflict should be traced back to the imperial-patrimonial system of the empire. It had prepared a fertile ground conducive to personalistic

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[107] Şerif Mardin, "Opposition and Control in Turkey." *Government and Opposition*. 1,3, (1966); Frederick W. Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in *Political Elites in the Middle East*, ed. George Lenczowski, (Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975).

[108] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations" in *Politics in Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, second edition, ed. Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan J.Linz (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 225.

[109] There are reasons to think that this is a feature of countries with the strong state tradition. Raymond Aron, for instance, notes the tendency of the French public to discuss such abstract subjects as disestablishment, the limits of raison d'etat, lacism rather than concrete ones such as rate of growth, the prevention of unemployment, Nato enlargement and like. See, Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Totalitarianism-A Theory of Political Systems* (edited with an introduction by Roy Pierce) (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1990) (originally published in 1965),141.

[110] Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's novel, *Hükûm Gecesi*, that narrates the period, captures well the political struggles of the time. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Hükûm Gecesi* [The Night of Judgement], second ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 1987) (originally published in 1927).

[111] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Siyasi Müesseseler ve Anayasa Hukuku* [Political Institutions and the Constitutional Law] second ed. (İstanbul: Filiz, 1969), 450.

[112] According to Tunaya, "the political life was not dissimilar to the war" (savaş meydanından farksızdı) and "it had lost its character of being a political struggle but came to resemble religious wars." Tunaya, *İlan*.46, 81.

conflict. Indeed personal rivalry had been central to such systems. As the rulers concentrated decision making in their hands, politics tend to become an exclusively center-oriented (palace) activity having little contact with society. Rulers, too, tend to encourage such personal rivalry so as to prevent one faction becoming too powerful.[113] Because in such a system no one within the ruling strata is secure and widespread insecurity tends to produce gossip, intrigues, mutual accusations, bickerings, and all sort of personal rivalries. The Tanzimat reforms introduced legal-rational norms but the imperial patrimonial traditions continued. As the center of gravity receded from Sultans to powerful bureaucrats, there occurred a cliques and factions around the bureaucrats. Anybody wishing to climb the ladder had to find a protector, someone who was powerful, and able to protect, and help him to rise on the administrative ladder. The relationship between these two was informal. Having bequeathed such tradition, the Young Turks, too, in a very short time, fell in mutual accusations (ranging from being a spy, to being someone who committed to treason, to having come from ethnic minorities), plots, and factional conflicts.[114] Thus, political life dominated by those tradition involved heavy dose of personalistic conflict.

While political life progressed along this line, the life of ordinary people did not undergo radical transformations. The proclamation of the second constitutional period had unreasonably raised expectations.[115] But nothing tangible have come out of it. The stark life of ordinary people appears to have remained more or the less same, if not worsened. As one member of parliament is reported to have said; "let alone providing everyone with life standards like human beings, it is very difficult to keep people at their present levels, which is more like

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[113] James A.Bill and Robert Springboard, *Politics in the Middle East* (Little Brown: Scott Foresman, 1990), 158-161.

[114] Mardin, *Jön Türk*.12.

[115] The words "hürriyet and meşrutiyet" appeared to have signified magic solutions to the pressing problems. According to Karal, with the proclamation of the constitution people even refused to pay for tickets for steamers and trolleys as well as rejecting tax-collector arguing that freedom has finally arrived. See, Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi -İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918),* [The Ottoman History-The Second Constitutional Period and the First World War, (1908-1918)] vol 9, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), 53.

that of animals."[116] The loss of the Balkan provinces, the most economically productive part of the empire, the influx of the Muslim refugees and the need to finance continuing wars had put an enormous burden on state and society. Nevertheless, the modernizing efforts of the CUP governments, notably in education continued. One other significant policy of the CUP had been the open support of muslim merchants. The rulers of the empire had openly embraced the idea that a class of muslim merchants and traders was to be nurtured by the state, though their efforts remained less than successful.

### 2.4.THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE ONE-PARTY PERIOD, 1923-1950

The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 following the break up of the Ottoman Empire in the first world war. It was the work of the victorious Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), which was opened in 1920 and conducted the war of independence, led by Mustafa Kemal. After the consolidation of new Republican regime, what became known as Atatürk's revolutions followed.

The main thrust of those revolutions was the further secularization and modernization of the country, a process which had been on the agenda of the reformers at least since Mahmud the Second. Like his contemporaries in the Young Turk movement educated in modern schools of Tanzimat, Mustafa Kemal believed that to save the country further secularization and modernization was necessary.[117] He, however, had dared as far as he could go in this path. According to Mustafa Kemal, the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire was piecemeal, hesitant, and not far sweeping, ready to give concessions to vested interests. It was based on the superficial imitation of western manners and rather prepared to satisfy western powers.[118]

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[116] Tunaya, "İkinci Meşrutiyet," 81.

[117] Mustafa Kemal, as well as having been involved in the Young Turk movement, was known to have had relations with the Committee of Union and Progress. According to Zürcher he was a "prominent though not a leading member of the military inner circle of the CUP." Erik J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Türkish National Movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 66.

[118] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* [The Speeches and Statements of Atatürk ], vol 1 ( Ankara: Türk Inkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1961), 203-206.

Accordingly it created a dysfunctional duality and prepared its own failure. Drawing his lessons he then concluded that the Republican reforms must be prompt, radical, far sweeping, and not to give any concessions to reform resisting forces.[119] Here, we see the complex interaction of strong state and traditional social structure. The very structure of traditional society is perceived to have presented obstacles in the way of reforms. To remove these obstacles, it was assumed, the state must respond by being more radical and heavy handed.

Like many of their mentors, the Young Turks, Atatürk and his associates appear to have held deeply entrenched belief that the influence of Islam in social-political affairs or more accurately its abuse by reactionary forces was one of the most significant causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the so-called iron-cast theory of Islam. They did not, however, aim to cause religion to vanish but wished to get rid of its primitivism and dogmatism which, in their opinion, created obstacles for modernization efforts. Their Islam was to be "a purified and reformed Islam which was both modern and Turkish."[120] The Republican emphasis on changing Islamic institutions and structures is closely related with the peculiarities of the Turkish revolution. As Mardin put it, the Turkish revolution was neither "the instrument of a discontented bourgeoisie" nor rode on "a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the social order" nor targeted "the sweeping away of feudal privileges."[121] But rather, "it did take as a target values of the Ottoman ancien regime"[122] of which Islam was an indispensable part. It particularly attempted to remove the Islamic theological justification of the origins and the ends of state power. Consequently the Sultanate, the Caliphate, office of Şeyhülislam, and all centers of religious learning and religious brotherhoods were abolished, followed by other

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[119] Ortaylı, *En Uzun Yüzyıl.* 26.

[120] Kemal H.Karpat, *Turkey's Politics-Transition to a Multi-party Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 60. In the same line Cizre-Sakallıoğlu indicated that Atatürk had favoured an understanding that revolved around the idea of "double Islams," one reactionary and one resonant with the civilization. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* 28, 2 (1996), 236.

[121] Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution." *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* 2, (1971), 202.

[122] Ibid., 202.

reforms aiming to secularize daily life.[123] What was came to known as laicism[124] became the central flank of Republican agenda.

This brings us to the related aspect of the new Republican outlook, the creation of the Turkish Republic as a modern nation-state. Indeed, secularization was an indispensable part of the attempts to create a modern nation state. Sovereignty was proclaimed to reside in the Turkish nation. This meant spelling the end of the multinational Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. This was a gigantic task, not only because Turks had been the last to have had nationalistic aspirations within the empire but also because the new regime confronted the problem of national integration of non-Turkish muslim (Kurds, Circassians, Arabs, Laz) subjects. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational state where, theoretically at least, loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty overrode all other loyalties. It was necessary to constitute a new identity acceptable to the remaining ethno-religious elements in Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal and his associates were not committed to ethnic-based nationalism (or what is sometimes called uncivic eastern nationalism), i.e. defining the nation by ethno-cultural traits. Instead they adopted what is known as western civic model that emphasized the political equality of citizens at the expense of their ethno-cultural origins. "How happy is the man who calls (not who is) himself a Turk" reflected that philosophy. Apart from the non-muslim minorities recognized by Lausanne agreement, all the muslim groups were called Turks. Be that as it may, as recent research[125] has shown, various nationalisms have tended to combine

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[123] Most important among these; outlawing of traditional Ottoman "Fez" in favour of hats (1925), adoption of gregorian calendar (1925), adoption of Swiss civil code (1926) and Latin alphabet (1928), the deletion of the second article of the 1924 Constitution which stated Islam to be the state religion. See, Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right," *Turkey in Transition-New Perspectives*. ed. Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 223

[124] The Kemalist conception of laicism involved, not sharp separation of religion and the state but the state control of religion through organizational links between religious institutions and the state bureaucracy. See, Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 2.

[125] Anthony D.Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 13. Specifically, Sazereesinghh notes how French nationalism, thought to be prime example of western civic nationalism, tended towards emphasizing ethno-religious dimensions. Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 124-151 (especially chapter five, 'The Two Faces of French Nationalism')

elements of both. Republican nationalism was not an exception. While it granted equal citizenship rights, regardless of ethnic, religious origins, to all those living in Turkey, it also involved "an ethno-cultural dimension highlighting the ethnic singularity of Turkishness."[126] The founders of the Republic had been less than sympathetic to the demands raised by various ethno-religious groups perceiving them as "irrelevant survivals from the dark ages of Turkey." Their official stand was "to dismiss the checkerboard structure of Anatolia by passing it under silence." [127] This official attitude determined the state's approach to nationalism and lingersto this day. As we shall dwell on it below, this approach led to a policy that tended to deny those, who while enjoying equal citizenship rights do not regard themselves as ethnically Turkish, the means to express their professed distinctive origins and identities.

Alongside the project of secularism and the establishment of the nation-state, the Republican regime launched a socio-economic modernization program. Atatürk and his associates had well understood that nationalism and secularism, the central flanks of the Republican regime, would be incomplete and insecure so long as Turkey remained an economically backward country. The new regime, therefore, tried to speed up the economic activities in the severely ruined country. The holding of the economic congress, in which economic policy choices, open to the new regime were thoroughly discussed, as early as 1923 attests to that fact.[128] In terms of economic policies, the 1923-1929 period does not signify a break from the CUP period. The nurturing of national bourgeoisie, a central aim of the National Economy (milli iktisat) policy of the Unionists was continued by Republicans.

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[126] Ümit Cİzre-Sakallıoğlu, "Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future of the Kurdish Problem: A critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question." *New Perspectives on Turkey.* 14, (1996), 6.

[127] Mardin, "Center-Periphery," 25.

[128] In the same line, Sugar, "Turkey," 164. It is sometimes argued that the preoccupation with secularism has come to dominate the republican agenda and led to the sidestepping of economic issues. Toprak, for instance, argued that "insistence of changing Islamic institutions and structures prevented the modernizing elite of the Kemalist era from turning attention to a broader definition of systemic change." Toprak, *Islam.* 132. We think that this is view less than justified basically because the leadership cadres appeared to have believed secularism is indeed an indispensable part of the efforts to prepare conditions for economic development as they believed that economic backwardness of the country was closely related with the abuse of Islam in the public domain.

However, it involved more liberal overtones than Unionists' -it encouraged foreign capital alongside the national one, it favored commercialized agriculture, it had to follow somewhat lesser protectionist policies- basically because several provisions of Lausanne treaty appear to have limited the new regime's room for maneuver. After the great depression of 1929 hit Turkey hard the government followed more protectionist and statist policies. Not only did the government intervene more and more into economy through extensive financial and foreign trade regulations, but also it directly invested in industry such as steel production, chemicals, metallurgy, and infrastructure particularly railways.[129] Alongside its efforts in establishing industry, steps were taken both to modernize agriculture and to improve inequalities in in land regime.[130]

Mustafa Kemal's way of conducting these modernizing reforms displayed unmistakable signs of elitism. True to Ottoman tradition and Young Turk views, he, too, concluded that the viable way to accomplish reforms was modernization from above under the leadership of the enlightened. In this view, the enlightened elite should lead the apathetic masses in the righteous path -to reach a contemporary level of civilization through the guidance of science free from all religious-mystical interferences. He argued that the true revolutionaries and populists (halkçı) were those who could discover "the real orientations and collective conscience of the people."[131] This, of course, implied that not all ideas or what as sometimes presented as public opinion corresponds to the real orientations of the people. Atatürk expressed this idea clearly when he said "if we leave the people to themselves, there will be no longer any steps forward."[132] He thought that "*consulting* public opinion really amounted to *shaping* it."[133]

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[129] For a detailed account see, Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* [Etatism in Turkey ], second ed. (Ankara: Savaş, 1982).

[130] For efforts of the republican regime towards the modernization of agriculture, see İlhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin, "Devletçilik Dönemi Tarım Politikaları" [Agricultural Policies in the Etatist Period ] in *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, ed. Şevket Pamuk, Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt, 1988). For an assessment of land reform policies, see, Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950)* [An Economic History of the Republican Period, 1923-1950] (Ankara: Yurt, 1982), 343-357.

[131] Cited in Heper, *Tradition*.50.

[132] Cited in Clement H.Dodd, "Atatürk and Political Parties," in *Political Parties and*

Though, he appears to have believed that this guidance was to be a temporary (that is when people's conscience reached a certain level it would no longer be needed), that does not diminish its elitist nature as it would still be the elites who would decide when that stage had been reached.

Equipped with such an outlook the Turkish state officials and social-political forces associated with it would now assume itself the task of elevating the people to a contemporary level of civilization through the Republican People Party (RPP) (founded in 9 September 1923). Earlier it has been noted that the civil-military bureaucrats in alliance with local notables (ağa or eşraf) and some religious leaders constituted the core supporters of the CUP. It is generally accepted that the same groups were at the forefront in the war of independence.[134] Many members of the Society for the Defense of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia which would later constitute the core of the Republican People's Party had in one way or another been involved in the CUP. With the proclamation of the republic the same elements were at the forefornt to constitute the RPP which was dominated by civil-military bureaucracy in an uneasy alliance with local notables and (at least in the beginning) some religious leaders.[135] While with the passage of the time, the religious leaders left the RPP, the link between local notables and party remained strong. Despite the fact that bureaucratic wing in the party sometimes clashed with these local notables, and that many local notables found them too radical, the RPP leadership could not renounce them since as in the empire, they played a useful role in linking the periphery with the center.[136]

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*Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M.Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 31.

[133] Heper, *Tradition*.51. (İtalics are his).

[134] Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, ed. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C.Hurst, 1981), 83.

[135] That does not imply, on the other hand, that the RPP was the same as the CUP in terms of ideology. The CUP had involved those who wanted the policy of Ottomanism, and islamism. Besides many of these had paid at least a lip service to sultan and islamic bases of the state, which the RPP harshly despised.

[136]Ayşe Güneş Ayata, "Class and Clientelism in the Republican People's Party," in *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, ed. Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (London: Routledge, 1990), 164. ff

The influence of the civil-military bureaucracy, in the sense of being the locus of stateness in the one-party regime remained limited during Atatürk's presidency (1923-1938). Atatürk did not mince his words regarding the civil-military bureaucracy based on his personal experiences in Ottoman period and remained skeptical of the bureaucrats throughout.[137] Despite the occasional disputes between Atatürk and the representatives of civil-military bureaucratic tradition including his premier İsmet İnönü, Atatürk seems to have had the last word. But the tendencies towards the fusion of party and civil-military bureaucracy that would constitute a new state elite with a distinctive ideology called "Atatürkçülük" or "Kemalism" had begun in Atatürk's life time.[138] Beginning with the third general congress of the RPP (1931), steps were taken towards the realizing that aim.[139] "Türk Ocakları" (Turkish Hearts), an association to promote Turkish nationalism founded in 1912, was brought under party control in 1927, then the association abolished itself in 1931 and its founder was sent to Bucharest as an ambassador. People's Houses (Halkevleri) and People's Rooms (Halkodaları) were established to promote the values of the Republican regime in towns and villages. The six principles of Kemalism -republicanism, revolutionism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism- were enshrined in the party program (1931) and then the 1924 Constitution (1937). Though some leading members of the RPP, notably secretary general Recep Peker, are suspected of having had such intentions, these efforts remained short of creating a party-state, modeled on fascist and communist parties of the time. Instead, the state (civil and military bureaucracy) tended to dominate the party.[140] In 18 June 1936, three days after Recep Peker had been removed from his post, it was decided that provincial governors would be the

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[137] Metin Heper, "Atatürk and Civil Bureaucracy," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder: Westview, 1984)

[138] According to Hughes, Atatürk himself did not use the term "Kemalism" but as early as 1931, history books prepared by ministry of national education written about Kemalism. See, Preston Hughes, *Atatürkçülük ve Türkiye'nin Demokratikleşme Süreci* [Atatürk and Turkey's Democratization Process] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1993), 64.

[139] For a detailed information, Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931* [The Establishment of One-Party System in Turkey, 1923-1931](Ankara:Yurt, 1981).

[140] Ibid., 322.

chairmen of the local party organization while the minister of interior was appointed as the general secretary of the party.

The Republican leaders neither flirted with the idea of mass transformation through mobilization led by political party in line with the strict ideology nor did they ever explicitly reject the ideal of democracy or developed a defense of anti-democratic currents.[141] But, particularly after Atatürk passed away in 1938 the tendency towards interpreting Atatürkism as comprehensive "ideology" in the Shilsian sense[142] appears to have gained pace, despite the fact that Atatürk did not seem to intend such an outcome.[143] During his period, those principles came to be interpreted in a flexible way. Rather than drawing policy implications from these principles, principles themselves tend to be interpreted in a way that provided justifications for policy choices that had been made. The principle of statism, for instance, was capable of several interpretations depending on the specific requirements of the period. While Celal Bayar, (a premier between 1937-1939 and a minister of economy between 1932-37) interpreted it as giving state help to foster private enterprise, İsmet İnönü favored a more comprehensive view that gave the state a powerful, and not a temporary, role. With the election of the İsmet İnönü, who unlike Atatürk always preferred to work within the established norms and gave priority to bureaucratic regulations, to the presidency the charismatic rule of Atatürk was routinized and

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[141] Özbudun, "Nature", 91. For the argument that Republicans were not ready to embrace the basic characteristics of liberal democracy fully either, see, Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm and Demokrasi* [Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy ] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990).

[142] Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology," in *International Encylopedia of Social Sciences*, vol 7. ed. David L. Sills ( The Macmillan Company, The Free Press: New York, 1968). See, also his comparison of ideological style of politics with a civil one, Edward Shils, "Ideology and Civility," in *The Intellectuals and the Power & Other Essays* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972).

[143] Some students of Turkish politics argued that Atatürk himself did not try to prevent the development of Kemalism in his life time and even encouraged it. See, Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1964),457; Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (İstanbul: Robert College, 1969), 5. We think that this view is less than accurate. The argument that Atatürk did encourage such a development can not withstand empirical scrunity. What can be said, however, is that Atatürk, probably not properly estimating where such actions could lead, have tolerated such attempts in his lifetime. That does not mean, however, Atatürk would have supported the dogmatic interpretations of his principles which fully emerged after his death. For a similar view, see, Hughes, *Atatürkçülük*. 68.

supplemented by bureaucracy.[144] The civil bureaucracy was organized as a career civil service. Special laws and regulations governed its recruitment policies and internal functioning, as well as securing protection from the interference of the executive. Bureaucrats as a whole constituted a well-cared for group, enjoying relatively high salaries. These developments prepared a fertile ground in which the Atatürkist thought, "what must be an example of a *Weltanschauung par excellence*, was gradually transformed into an ideology."[145] The fusion of civil-military bureaucracy with the RPP[146] gave rise to a powerful state elite, who would make a new locus of stateness and carriers of the state tradition. These state elites, who could be found in the party, and upper echelons of the civil or military bureaucracy, tended to perceive themselves as responsible for elevating the ignorant but capable Turkish people to the contemporary level of civilization, despite the fact that people may not have been interested or even opposed to such policy. "For the people, despite the people", have become their motto. They saw themselves as promoters, and true defenders of state interests and Atatürk's principles as *they* understood it. As self-appointed guardians, they assumed themselves entitled to take the action whenever they *thought* Atatürk's principles had been violated, which at times had been detrimental to democratic regime in Turkey.

The Republican modernization project, particularly the implementation of such policies of laicism and nationalism soon generated discontent and reaction to the new regime, especially among the educated strata. First of all, there were Islamists, whose roots can be traced back to Tanzimat period. They argued that the current troubles were the consequence of the Westernization efforts of the ruling groups that led to a diminishing of the Islamic rules in social and political affairs. Many of them opposed not the necessity of modernization but the way that the project was implemented. They were inclined to see the Republic and its

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[144] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of a State." *Daedalus.* 97 (1968), 794.

[145] Heper, *Tradition*.71.

[146] It should not be thought that the RPP dominated the civil-military bureaucracy in the way that the communist parties did, as in former the Soviet Union. A great mobility between bureaucrats and party officals had taken place. A bureaucrat could easily become an MP on the RPP ticket, while many MP's resigned to become judges, provincial governors, or directors of state monopolies.

modernizing policies as Zionist-masonic conspiracy that aimed to deprive Muslim people of their true guide- the Islamic law. Some policies of the Republic played into the hands of those who argued this line. The principle of laicism, understood by Atatürk and his friends as the vanishing of religious influences in social and political affairs and limiting the effect of religion in the realm of private conscience, gave way to an understanding of laicism "that came to border on irreligiosity."[147] The ruling bureaucratic elite adopted some policies[148] that resembled the allegedly imitative Tanzimat policies despised by Atatürk himself.

Though it was hard to assess the strength of these groups, from time to time they were able to secure the support of the Anatolian peasants and small groups of artisans (esnaf) who observed that Kemalist policies of modernization had done little to improve material conditions of life. Despite considerable advances having taking place on the socio-economic front, it remained less than satisfactory. In the period of 1926-1950, the GDP growth was estimated to have been 3.3 per cent alongside the 1.9 per cent population growth. The share of industry in the GDP rose to 18.4 in 1946 from 14.4 in 1926, while only a slight decrease was recorded in the agriculture.[149] The share of landless peasant families was estimated to have risen from 17 per cent of all families to 20 percent.[150] As it appeared to one American observer in 1949

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[147] Adnan Adıvar, "The Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," in *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, ed. T. Cuyler Young (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 128. In the same line, Kemal H.Karpat, "The Republican People's Party, 1923-1945," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), 58.

[148] There are no detailed studies on that question -which policies of the Republic came to border on irreligiosity. Some individual events and policies, many of them short term- are pointed out. For instance, in an effort to promote 'civilized' Western music ferries crossing Bosphorus played Ravel's Bolero, while traditional Turkish music was forbidden on state radios. But it was equally true that some of these policies were even opposed by and eventually abolished by the RPP elite itself. For instance, the Köprülü commission's report on religious reform that "would have turned the mosques into Christian Churches, complete with benches and instrumental music," was never implemented because of the opposition it meet. Toprak, *Islam*, 147. Similarly, a proposition put forward by some RPP members (and defended by premier Recep Peker) to change the name of "Hacıbayram square" into "August Square" was harshly critized and rejected by the Party itself. Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939-1954* [The Political Memoirs, 1939-1954] (İstanbul:Milliyet, 1977), 266.

[149] Tezel, *Cumhuriyet*. 100, 102.

[150] Ibid., 335.

"..40000 villages (in which four fifths of the population lived) have scarcely changed for one thousand years."[151] Perhaps, but not solely, because of this, the spread of the new Republican secular culture to the mass of people remained less than complete.[152] It seemed to be confined to privileged minorities in big cities, while the majority of the population imbued with traditional-Islamic values, had not been seriously affected. The inability of the new regime to generate drastic improvements in material conditions of life and to make them internalize new secular republican culture made the majority of the population an attractive target for those who wanted to mobilize them by using Islamic sentiments against the Republic.[153]

On the other hand, there were those who felt uneasy as a result of the Republican policies in the process of nation-building which necessitated inevitable homogenizing. The Kurdish speaking population of the Republic (according to 1927 census 9 per cent of the population, or roughly 1.2 million)[154] were the most affected and vocal group. Several reasons, however, eased the Kurdish opposition to new regime. The tribal structure of the Southern

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[151] Max W. Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York:The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), 4. Why the Republican regime was unable to generate improvements in the daily life of the majority of the population ? This question requires a separate and much larger study but it suffices here to note that the new regime chosen to use its already scarce resources to consolidate the political-cultural-institutions of new secular, republican state. It also had to deal with world recession of post-1929 and second world war period, not particularly conducive international environment for prosperity.

[152] Şerif Mardin, "Religion in Modern Turkey." *International Social Science Journal*. 29, (1977); Şerif Mardin, "The Just and Unjust." *Daedalus*. 120, 3 (1991),127. This, of course, raises the question of Kemalist model of integration and its impact on the mass of people. What we try to say here is not that the Kemalist model of integration was without its shortcomings, but that the regime's inability to improve daily life of its citizens exacerbated already problematic relationships between the regime and citizens. It would not be misleading to suggest that if the regime had been more successful in generating improvements in ordinary people's life, various problems of integration would have been less intense.

[153] In discussing the problem of Islamic opposition, one should fall into the trap of assuming that the secular Republican policies were implemented in the face of widespread opposition. This is chiefly because the secularizing reforms hardly influenced the life of the peasants who made up vast majority of the population. As Zürcher nicely put it; "A farmer or shepherd from Anatolia never worn a fez, so he was not especially bothered about its abolition. His wife wore no veil anyway, so the fact that its use was discouraged did not mean anything to him or her. He could not read or write, so the nature of the script was immaterial to him. .. The new family law made polygamy illegal, but those farmers who could afford it would still quite often take into the house a second woman..." Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey- A Modern History* (London: I.B Tauris, 1993), 202. In the same line, Karpat, *Transition*. 53.

[154] Cited in Tezel, *Cumhuriyet*. 88.

Eastern parts of the Turkey where the majority of the Kurdish speaking population lived constituted an obstacle for the development of ethnic consciousness of Kurdishness. The leaders of these tribes could easily found a place within the RPP and were incorporated into the system. Moreover, as noted above, under the republican regime all ethnic groups enjoyed equal citizenship rights regardless of their ethnic origins, though they were discouraged not to emphasize their distinctive identities. Indeed, most of the Turkey's Kurdish speaking peasants were not even aware that they might had a distinctive ethnical identity, instead they tended to embrace primordial and religious identities.

Islamic and Kurdish discontent managed to raise opposition to the new regime, which had been repressed only by recourse to extensive force, in its consolidation phase. In some cases, opposing movements claimed to fight for both religion and ethnicity (as in Şeyh Sait rebellion)[155] in other cases these movements were either dominantly religious (Menemen events) or ethnic.[156] Şerif Mardin had characterized peripheral rebellion movements in the Ottoman empire as 'flash in the pan.'[157] In the Republic, too, this feature perpetuated itself. These peripheral opposition movements were largely spontaneous, and disunited, based on exploiting immediate-existing grievances rather than being based on definite principles. They appear to have lacked the 'organizational autonomy' that might have allowed them to consolidate victories and gradually to build on these. Lacking such attributes the republican regime was able to contain them.

Apart from these anti-system opposition movements, the new regime tolerated and even sometimes encouraged the opposition. This can be explained by reference to the nature of the one party rule and their specific understanding of "opposition." As noted above, despite

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[155] Toprak, *Islam.* 69.

[156] We lack detailed, impartial academic treatment of these rebellions. A study prepared by the War History Institution (attached to the general chief of staff office) and entitled as *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938)* is not available to the researchers. A version of it was published by less than reliable publication house, *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları*,[Kurdish Rebellions as Documented by the Chief of General Staff Papers] 2 vols, (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1992). According to this study, there were 18 rebellions between 1924 and 1938, of which only one of them (Menemen) have taken place outside the eastern parts of the country.

[157] Mardin, "Power", 269.

several attempts, the Republican regime found it hard to develop an authoritarian ideology aiming to justify permanent one-party rule. Though unpracticed, the democratic system had never been explicitly rejected. The Grand National Assembly remained open, facade elections had been held, and some freedom of discussion and opposition had been allowed. Their understanding of opposition, however, was somewhat different. Opposition was not to oppose (or question) the basic tenets of the Republican policies, it was to stay in the narrowly defined parameters of the system. Mustafa Kemal believed "in a democratic pluralist political system provided all of the plural elements were republican and modernist progressive."[158] It was expected to oppose not the republican ideals itself but the ways of attaining those ideals. Given the Jacobinist-pozitivist background of the Kemalist approach perception of opposition as such was hardly surprising. Since science was proclaimed to be "the truest guide in life" and since there could only be one scientific truth, the opposition was meant to them opposition to the real (true) interests (wishes) of the people. If science and reason could find what route a society should follow and if the enlightened elite who were intent on applying those knew them, opposition (in the sense of opposing those principles) was unnecessary and adverse to true interest of the people. Opposition would not oppose basic principles but it would discuss and criticize governmental policies in order to arrive at new (and better) ways of realizing those principles. In this view political conflict was seen essentially as a "process of discussion,"[159] as a result of which the right policies were assumed to emerge.[160]

Such a perception of opposition was reinforced by proclaimed belief in the Turkish

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[158] Karpat, "The Republican," 150.

[159] Metin Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi,"[The Concept of a State in Atatürk ] in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, ed. Ali Gevgilili (İstanbul: Nejat Eczacıbaşı Vakfi, 1983), 228.

[160] Note that this Kemalist view of government-opposition relations resembles Islamic Meşveret tradition. In the Meşveret tradition, too, the umera and ulema are supposed to debate until they find an appropriate solution which enjoys unanimous acceptance. See, for a discussion, Ellis Goldberg, "Private Goods, Public Wrongs, and Civil Society in Some Medieval Arab Political Theory and Practice," in *Rules and Rights in the Middle East- Democracy, Law and Society,* eds. Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba and Joel S. Migdal (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 261-vd. See also recent discussion by Jean Leca, "Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa." *Government and Opposition.* 32, 4, (1997), 568 ff.

Grand National Assembly as the true representative which exercises unlimited sovereignty for people's behalf. Mustafa Kemal had declared that sovereignty belonged, without any limitation, to the nation. And both the 1921 and the 1924 constitutions stated that the Grand National Assembly was "the sole representative of the nation, on whose behalf it exercises the rights of sovereignty." Stated as such, the total sovereignty of the nation represented by the TGNA did not bode well for the right of opposition to exist. To oppose the specific decisions of the Assembly can easily be labeled as opposition to the dictates of the sovereign people, defense of local, particular interest against the higher interests of nation or even treason to the country.[161]

It was clear that this perception of opposition, not as rational expression of opinion and interest but as a malign force opposing the real interests of the people with divisive motivations did not bode well for the development of democracy.[162] Since many opposing movements in the early Republic were easily perceived as such and had not been tolerated despite the fact that research in retrospect has revealed that they were far from having such traits. What was called the second group (as opposed to the first group which had the majority that was to form the core of RPP) was the first opposition movement. Recent research[163] has shown that the second group, far from being dominated by those opposing the war of independence and defending the Caliphate actually involved those who were distressed by Mustafa Kemal's (what appeared to them) authoritarian -centralizing tendencies. Similarly the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was founded by some of the closest friends of Mustafa Kemal such as Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Refet Bele. Though more religion friendly and less centralizing and less radical, the PRP was not an organization that questioned the basic tenets of the Republican regime. It

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[161] Such a conception of national sovereignty and perception of opposition was not peculiar to Turkey alone. It first crystallized in France after the 1789 revolution, and can be observed in other countries influenced by French Republican ideas. See, for more information, Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga, *Opposition: Past and Present of a Political Institution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 38-40.

[162] Indeed, the idea of tolerance of opposition was very slow in coming in western society, which now stands as the model of liberal democractic state. See, Robert A Dahl, *Polyarchy -Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 45; Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation- United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (1963), 39.

[163] Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet- İkinci Grup* [The Opposition in the First Assembly - The Second Group] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994).

was rather a movement of prominent national leaders "who felt that the heritage of the movement of which they had been such leading figures was being monopolized illegitimately by one wing of the original movement.."[164] The PRP survived only seven months. The Seyh Sait rebellion in the eastern provinces which seemed to pose a serious threat to regime strengthened hand of the hard-liners within the ruling groups. The drastic "Law for the Maintenance of Order" was swiftly promulgated. It allowed the vigorous suppression of all opposing forces ensuring the closure of PRP in 1925. The Free Party, which was established by a close friend and associate of Atatürk, by his own encouragement and permission lasted only three months. It dissolved itself when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, assuming that it attracted all the discontented groups and could pose a threat to Republican order, made his preference clear in favor of the RPP instead of impartiality as was promised in1930. For the next fifteen years (until 1945) virtual one-party rule continued with no opposition having formal recognition being permitted to exist. The only exception was the independents MP's within the RPP who had been assigned quotas and "charged" to criticize the governmental policies, whose effect appears to had been, on the account of close observers, negligible.[165]

During this period the Republican regime managed to consolidate its basic tenets with some success. The complete loyalty of the armed forces and the establishment of the various institutions of the modern state (the courts, the police, tax administration) was ensured, alongside the new elites that would form the basis of other political parties. The creation of new a Turkish identity -or transformation from a multi-national theocratic empire to national secularist state- through cultural transformation was well under way. Ethno-religious movements did find it hard to come to surface to pose a threat to regime. On the economic front the shift from a peasant economy to industry and service, despite far from creating

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[164] Erik J.Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 111. In the same line, Feroz Ahmad, "The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), 67.

[165] See for Barutçu's comments that members of the independent group had been more in party line than ordinary members. Barutçu, *Siyasi*.221.

revolutionary changes, have made progress.[166]

## 2.5. THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST EXPERIMENT WITH DEMOCRACY, 1946-1960

Turkey's transition to democracy in 1946 was realized in this context. It was, again, the ruling center, not under irresistible pressures from a social-political groups, that took the initiative. As early as 1939 President İsmet İnönü signaled that the time had finally come to have another try at multi-party democracy, though he did not allow the establishment of other parties until 1945. İnönü's decision resulted from the careful considerations of the various factors. First of all, as indicated above, the one-party regime had never developed an ideology purporting to justify its permanence. It always retained the ideal of democracy at least in discourse. İnönü was reported to have said that "he was not able to look at the walls because he was so ashamed of the fact that countries around Turkey had elections and Turkey did not"[167] In the same line with Atatürk, İnönü, too, believed that becoming Westernized and belonging to contemporary civilization required having a functioning democracy. According to İnönü "This new (democratic) way of life would strengthen the Turkish nation internally and gain it the respect of the outside world for being a civilized (medeni) society."[168] Here we come across the favorable effect of the Turkish state tradition on the development of Turkish democracy. The state elites, believing in intrinsic values of democracy, and perceiving it as something necessary in order to be recognized as a civilized nation, played a crucial role in the transition and (later re-transition) to democracy.

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[166] In the same line see, Karpat, *Transition*.76.

[167] Cited in Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944-1950* [The Transition from a Single Party to the Multi-party System,1944-1950] (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1990), 17.

[168] Cited in Kemal H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, revised and enlarged edition, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (New York: Praeger, 1982), 388. Similarly his defence of the decision to have a multi-party regime in the party meetings clearly reveals such an outlook; "Is it not strange that when Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and even Arabs and Egyptians were able manage democracy, while Turks could not ? Is such a thing possible ? We will certainly do this, too." Cited in Barutçu, *Anılar*. 286. Note that all the nations mentioned had been under Ottoman domination in the past.

Alongside his valorization of democracy as an end in itself, İnönü defended democracy on utilitarian grounds and specifically planned the timing of the transition in a way that would best suit the future of the republican regime. He wished to have a democratic regime installed in Turkey, because he believed that one-party (or one-man controlled) regimes' future depended on the person at the helm. When that person withdrew, the regime's fate was bleak culminating in usually the collapse of the regime itself. He was reported to have said "I can continue to spend my life with one-party regime, but I consider what will happen after I have passed away." [169]

Having in mind favorable conception of democracy İnönü planned the timing of the transition very carefully. The defeat of the authoritarian regimes in the Second World War and subsequent division of the world between those which had democracy and which did not, forced Turkey to reconsider its place in the emerging world order. This was especially so in the face of Soviet Socialist Republic's expansionist ideals which targeted (along with other countries) Turkey. Only democratic Turkey, he conceded, could find a place in newly established international organizations of the free world which would help Turkey to protect herself against Soviet expansion.[170]

Internally, too, transition to a multi-party democracy, İnönü thought, would function as a safety valve. He was realistic in this diagnosis. Though Turkey was not directly involved, the second world war left the country in ruins with widespread opposition to the regime. İnönü thought that without legitimate outlets opposition might blow away the very essence of the

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[169] Toker, *Tek Parti.* 59.

[170] Some analysts suggest that external reasons were the single most important factor in Turkey's transition to a multi-party system. Bkz, Nihal Kara-İncioğlu, "Türkiye'de Çok Partili Sisteme Geçiş ve Demokrasi Sorunları," [The Transition to Multi-Party Politics and the Problems of Democracy] in *Türkiye'de Siyaset- Süreklilik ve Değişim* , ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (İstanbul: Der, 1995); Hakan Yılmaz, "Democratization From Above In Response to the International Context: Turkey, 1945-1950." *New Perspectives on Turkey.* 17 (1997). Having accepted the role of external factors, we think that İnönü's decision cannot be explained without considering the nature of the Kemalist regime and his interest-based defence of democracy. Besides, US support was available provided that the country in question would not be communist. It may be surmised that the US would preferred a democratic Turkey but would not make too much fuss if she remained under one-party rule provided that it was not under Soviet influence. For a view that external factors should not be exaggerated see, Karpat, *Transition.*141. Also, Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey." *International Affairs.* 27, 3, (1951), 322.

regime. Referring to his decision he was later reported[171] to have said that if he had had a different mind, and had made the wrong decision (for not allowing opposition to emerge), the RPP would have left the power much later. But it certainly would have left power in much worse circumstances that might have led the RPP's destruction.

The picture we present would be incomplete if we ignore İnönü's assumptions regarding the opposition. True to tradition he appears to have assumed that the opposition would not question the basic tenets of the regime and at least in the initial years would not be able to challenge the RPP rule.[172] He actively encouraged the establishment of an opposition party by Celal Bayar, who had been the close friend and prime minister of Atatürk. Celal Bayar even presented the Democrat Party program to İnönü and asked for his consent before applying for official status. İnönü was certain that if the opposition did not behave in this way he could easily postpone the whole experience. He was reported to have said that:

> I would not allow (for the opposition to create an anarchy) this to happen. I am both revolutionary and belonged to Kuvva-i Milliye. We have made this state out of nothing. We shall not allow some bandits to destroy it. What we are doing is an experiment. If we succeed, very good, but if we do not, we shall stop it. In that case we will go on as we did so far only to try it again later.[173]

Thus, it is not at all clear whether, if he did not expect the opposition to be manageable, he would still allow the emergence of an opposition party.

Nevertheless no one can overlook İnönü's positive role in installing the multi-party regime. He had a good sense of where the world was going and subsequent courage to take necessary steps. He handled hard-liners within the party with great success while ensuring that the opposition would not be so harsh so as to invite the hatred of hard-liners.[174]

This transition to democracy from above is taken to be the crucial variable that helps to

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[171] Toker, *Tek Parti*. 216.

[172] Karpat, *Transition*. 147.

[173] Toker, *Tek Parti*. 93-94.

[174] See, Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü-The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 180-193. The role played by İnönü in the transition process is accepted even by his opponents, see, Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş, 1945-1950* [Transition to Democracy in Turkey, 1945-1950] (Ankara: Olgaç, 1979), 130-1.

explain Turkey's troubled democratic development. Dankwart Rustow, for instance, have argued that "Turkey paid the price in 1960 for having received its first democratic regime as free gift from the hands of a dictator." [175] It is implied that what is "given" from above can easily be taken back. We think that this view is too deterministic. Underlying this thesis is the unstated assumption (based on a distorted reading of Western European experience of democracy) that democracy is an end-result of bourgeoisie's (and middle classess) long and arduous struggle for power and that transition to democracy was largely conditioned (determined) by socio-economic factors. This view and simplistic assumptions that underlied it, however, can be criticized on many grounds. Dankwart Rustow and others had called into question the "requisites" thesis arguing that "there may be many roads to democracy."[176] Rustow, particularly had argued that given the single precondition of national unity, democracy might emerge as a by-product. He contrasted many cases of transition to democracy in which "democracy was not the original or primary aim" but it was sought as "a means to some other end or it came as a fortuitous by product of the struggle."[177] Recently Guiseppe Di Palma dwelled on the same theme asking "why should paths to democracy elsewhere necessarily replicate a first path, or fail if unable to?" [178] Similarly Valenzuela pointed out that the origins and evolution of democratic institutions and procedures "are determined more by the choices made by key elites seeking to maximize their interests within the framework of specific structural and political parameters than they are by abstract cultural or economic factors." [179]

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[175] Dankwart A.Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Approach," in *The State -Critical Concepts*, ed. John A.Hall (London: Routledge, 1994), 362. Originally published in *Comparative Politics*. 2, (1970), 337-363. Taner Timur also implied this in his, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* [Transition to Multi-Party Life in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), 110.

[176] Rustow, "Transitions," 350.

[177] Rustow, "Transitions," 356. John Waterbury goes as far as suggesting that even the national unity should not be regarded as precondition. John Waterbury, "Fortuitous By-Products." *Comparative Politics*. 29, 3, (1997), 383.

[178] Guiseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 18.

[179] Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries- Comparing Experiences With Democracy*, second edition, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder 1995). See, also, Joseph La Palambora, *Democracy-Italian Style* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 7.

Therefore, in the light of recent experience, it can be suggested that just because Turkey's transition to democracy was not led by socio-economical groups, or that socio-economic or cultural factors did not seem favorable, did not necessitate that Turkish democracy was doomed to fail. Socio-economic or cultural factors constitute "at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation but do not determine the outcome of such situations."[180] This having been said, one should not ignore what Otto Kirchemiercalled the impact of "confining conditions."[181] A country might have a democracy when the socio-economic or cultural conditions were not favorable as fortuitous products of elite struggles who had no intention of promoting democracy but their own interests, but that does not mean that the impact of confining conditions is totally removed. The assumption is that once established, democratic regime might work out (improve) these confining conditions and thus consolidate itself. According to Rustow[182] the "very operation of these rules (of democracy) will enlarge the area of consensus step-by-step as democracy moves down its crowded agenda." Not only this is only an "assumption" not a certainty[183] but also even if it is realized it requires, according to Rustow, a long process "one generation is probably the minimum period of transition."[184]

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[180] Adam Przworski, "Some problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule -The Comparative Perspectives*, eds Guillermo O'Donnel, Philippe C.Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, ( Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 48.

[181] Otto Kircheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs." *The American Political Science Review*. LIX, 4 (1965). As Karl Marx remarked as early as 1852 in The Eigteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, "Men make their own History, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Karl Marx, *Selected Writings*, ed. David Mclellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 300.

[182] Rustow, "Transitions," 363. Similarly, Lipset provided further support arguing that "once established" a democratic political system "gathers momentum and creates social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence." Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Expanded and Updated ed (London: Heinemann, 1983), 31.

[183] Rustow, "Transitions," 359.

[184] Ibid., 351.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Turkey of late forties and fifties in terms of both socio-economic and cultural conditions as well as political ideologies and cultures of elites did not present a particularly favorable context for democracy to succeed, though they were not totally unfavorable either. Firstly, in terms of socio-economic indicators, in 1945, roughly 75 per cent of the population lived in villages and engaged in agriculture securing more than 46 per cent of the GDP.[185] The literacy rate amounted only 30.2 per cent in 1945, approximately 70 per cent of the population were being illiterate.[186] Though some urbanization has taken place, Turkey of the late forties was more of a "peasant society" than an urban one. In 1950 only 18.5 per cent of the population lived in places with a population of more than 10000.[187] In line with low levels of socio-economic development as well as the peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish state society relations, the institutions of civil society were scarce and remained vulnerable to the intrusions of the all-powerful state. In short, socio-economic structure of Turkey in late forties displayed many characteristics of traditional 'peasant society' with its less than civic values that would put its imprint on the development of Turkish democracy. Our argument is not that in the absence of definite characteristics of the state of affairs called modernity democracy is impossible. Unlike somewhat more deterministic earlier analysis,[188] the intellectual climate now became more receptive to possibilist approaches and it is, by and large, accepted that such countries can still have a democracy, provided that it sustains high levels of socio-economic development or that some other factors, such as exceptionally favorable culture, international conditions or an exceptional elite commitment to democracy prevails. But what is clear is that democracy is likely to face many more difficulties in those countries than others which have advanced on the hard road of modernity

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[185] Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey: From Atatürk to Present Day* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981), 187.

[186] Ibid., 154.

[187] Ibid., 65.

[188] In an insightful analysis of German democracy, Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, has written that "for a liberal democracy to become a reality French and industrial revolutions should become a reality." Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York, London: W.W Norton, 1967), 31.

characterized by high levels of technology, urbanization, intermediary structures, division of labor, and the dominance of impersonal relations and like.

This is because, as many analysts have pointed out, the traditional peasant society was characterized by an environment of scarcity due to lack of agricultural technology and therefore low productivity. Peasant people are generally poor people who barely make their livelihood above the subsistence level. A related feature is that of insecurity. Both a lack of surplus and the absence of social security as well as dependence on factors that are beyond personal control such as weather, peasants are likely to live in an extreme insecurity. These basic characteristics of peasant society are argued to be closely related to the prevalence of extensive vertical networks of patron-client relations and low levels of associational development combined with a high degree of small group solidarity and low level of political awareness.[189]

In Turkey of late the forties and fifties many of these characteristics have been observed. Many analysts have pointed out the prevalence of the extensive patron-client relations.[190] Ergun Özbudun pointed out that various forms of what Lemarchand[191] called "traditional political clientelism" could be found in Turkey. According to Özbudun,[192] there had

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[189] In an influential book that has been widely used Edward Banfield developed the concept of "amoral familism" to characterize peasant attitudes in Montegrano, an agricultural Italian town. Living in an environment characterized by poverty and insecurity, as well as lack of what we may call associations of civil society, Montegrano's were defined as amoral familist. The central guiding principle of amoral familist, according to Banfield, is the rule that "maximize the material, short run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do the same." See, Edward C.Banfield, *The Moral Basis of A Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), 83.

[190] According to Powell, the patron-client tie develops between two unequal parties. It depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services and rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties. See, John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics." *American Political Science Review.* LXIX, 2, (1970), 412.

[191] Rene Lemarchand, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building." *American Political Science Review.* 66, 1, (1972).

[192] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: The Politics of Political Clientelism," in *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*, ed. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (London: Sage, 1981), 254 ff. See also, Sabri Sayarı, "Political Patronage in Turkey" in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, eds, Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, (London: Duckworth, 1977).

been "feudal" political clientelism especially in Eastern parts of the Turkey where inequality in land distribution compelled peasants to seek for the support of landowner ağa's. The "mercantile clientelism" refers to relationships between town merchants and their peasant customers. Finally, "saintly clientelism"[193] refers to relations between a religious leader and his followers. In many cases, a complex mixture of all three forms of clientelism was observed. A landowner ağa could also be a religious leader, or a town merchant could also be an owner of large estate. Many of these patrons, perhaps with the exception of saintly type, all have some relationships with the RPP. Indeed many of them were ensured (especially the mercantile type) their patron status precisely because of such links with the party. The political significance of such phenomenon is such that, as we shall dwell on below, with the transition to a multi-party regime, traditional political clientelism tended to give way to extensive party patronage, and the phenomen of mobilized voting, which had not bode well for the development of democracy.

The related point about peasant society and its impact on the fortunes of democracy concerns with the existence (or absence) of values at mass level that facilitated/or hindered the development of democratic governance. What we labeled earlier as "civic values" - such as belief in one's competence, participation in public affairs, pride in the political system, limited partisanship, the propensity to cooperate with others, tolerance of diversity -values that are conducive to democratic development are to be found more in socio-economically advanced urban societies than backward peasant ones. These values at mass level matter not only because elites might be the product of the similar conditions and share similar values but also because even if they do not, they still have "a powerful incentive to pay attention to the views of these citizens" to get their vote.[194] They are likely to devise policies, behave in such a way that, they assume, is likely to gain the formers' votes and sympathy.

Though we lack a comprehensive empirical study of peasant attitudes in that period, empirical knowledge that can be gathered from a variety of studies suggests that in terms of the

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[193] Özbudun, "clientelism," 254.

[194] Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), 143.

existence of these civic values, Turkey of the late forties and fifties did not present a particularly favorable picture.

In one of the earlier impressionistic analyses of the Turkish village, Hasan Tankut (an MP and teacher at Language and History, Geography Faculty in Ankara, who had worked as Kaymakam) provided insightful observations. Tankut noted that Turkish peasants struggled even to meet basic daily needs, lived in miserable conditions and were mostly "hungry" for ages.[195] Villages, Tankut argued, were dispersed wide across the country because villagers preferred to settle in places where they would be secure from both the state and bandits.[196] He noted that widespread insecurity, pessimism about the future, and distrust of others dominated the peasants' world view.[197] Reminiscent of Edward Banfield's famous concept of "amoral familism," Tankut asserted, peasants tended to be extreme egoists, which constituted a basic moral hindrance for "cooperation" and "collective work."[198] In the same line, George and Barbara Helling[199]noted that a sense of insecurity, alongside fatalism, had been widespread among the Turkish peasants. İbrahim Yasa, in his study of relatively developed village of Hasanoğlan near Ankara, noted that "In 1944, about 70 per cent of the village families could barely earn their daily bread." He, too, found that fatalism, ignorance and inertia was common.[200] In his research Paul Stirling[201] observed a pervasive distrust that peasants displayed towards the government and a lack of belief in their sense of efficiency. He argued

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[195] Hasan Reşit Tankut, *Köylerimiz -Bugün Nasıldır, Dün Nasıldı, Yarın Nasıl Olmalıdır* [Our Villages- How Are They Today , How Were They in the Past, How They Should be in the Future](Ankara: Kenan Basımevi, 1939), 5.

[196] Ibid., 29, 37.

[197] Ibid., 42.

[198] Ibid., 32.

[199] George and Barbara Helling, *Sosyolojik ve İstatistiki Bakımdan Türkiye'de Köy* [A Study of the Village From Sociological and Statistical Perspectives in Turkey ], trans. by Ahmet E. Uysal (Ankara, 1956).

[200] İbrahim Yasa, *Hasanoğlan- Socioecenomic Structure of a Turkish Village* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1957), 92, 170, 174.

[201] Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 268.



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that peasants tended to see the government as a "legitimate robber"[202] and believed that without a contact with the right people it was impossible to get things done, a finding that is supported by Özer Ozankaya's work.[203] This study provided many interesting findings. He noted the peasants' tendency to perceive politics as something that is dangerous and outside the area of their competence.[204] He also noted that peasants had never been involved in organized, collective action, but made their wishes and grievances known through local patrons who acted as brokers.[205] Barely satisfying such basic needs as food and shelter, uneducated, living in constant insecurity, ignorant of the outside world, distrustful of others, imbued with religiously backed fatalism, Turkish peasants who constituted more than 80 per cent of the population could hardly expected to have, it is fair to conclude, civic values.[206]

On the other hand, one could also suggest that the picture was not all that bleak. The definite characteristics of the Ottoman state philosophy that we have dwelled on, have left its imprints on the Turkish mass culture. Turkish peasants were familiar with the idea of state representing and serving common good, undemocratic but still bounded by some definite rules. In that sense, the idea of limitation of state power, according to some transcendental rules, was

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[202] Ibid., 267.

[203] Özer Ozankaya, *Köyde Toplumsal Yapı ve Siyasal Kültür* [Social Structure and Politcal Culture in ( the Turkish) Village](Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1971), 48. Both Stirling's and Ozankaya's works had been conducted in the sixties. We think that unless one assumes that values can radically change in less than two decades these works can be taken to reflect the values of Turkish peasants in late forties and fifties.

[204] Ibid., 136.

[205] Ibid., 193. See, also acute observations of Turkish teacher of peasant background, Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy* [A Villlage in Anatolia], ninth ed. (Ankara: Bizimköy, 1970) (first published in 1950).

[206] It goes without saying that this should be related not only with the traditional social structure but also its interaction with Ottoman-Turkish strong state. It can be said, for instance, that their avoidance of collective action is related not only with distrust of others and scarcity of resources but also with their suspicion that collective action would not impress the authorities and might even led punishment. As Skocpol noted, states matter not only because of "goal-oriented activites of state officials" but because "their organisational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affects political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political action (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)." Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21.

not totally alien to them.[207] Imbued with Islamic traditions, they expected[208] the state to be "fair and just" to them, despite the fact that they, in most of the times, lacked the means to ensure that treatment. But, still, the ideal of the benevolent father state -from which one could expect both fair treatment and various goods seemed to have lingered on. The peasant attitudes towards government combined elements of "pragmatism, awe, myth and guile."[209]

The peculiar structure of Turkish peasantry also involved some elements that can be characterized as conducive to democracy. One such element was "..the absence of landed aristocracy and the dispersion of agricultural surplus among millions of middle peasants.."[210] Though considerable inequalities in land remained the characteristic feature in the Southern Eastern region and in some parts of the Mediterranean,[211] small land-holdings were the norm.[212] Regarding the prevalence of small land-holdings and their positive impact on democracy, Keyder suggested an argument that we also find convincing. He argued that

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[207] As Lewis remarked, in the empire, when a new sultan was enthroned, he was greeted with cries of "Sultan, be not proud ! God is greater than you." Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy." *Journal of Democracy*. 17,2, (1996), 56.

[208] This is akin to Almond and Verba's characterization of "competent subjects". These are subjects but they perceive themselves as "able to appeal to a set of regular and orderly rules in their dealings with administrative officials." It is a proof of the existence of sense of efficacy on the part of the subjects. Almond and Verba, *Civic*, 217.

[209] Frank Tachau, *Turkey- The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 121.

[210] Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy." *New Left Review*. 115, (1979), 29.

[211] Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *100 Soruda Kırsal Türkiye'nin Yapısı ve Sorunları* [The Structure and Problems of Rural Turkey in 100 Questions], expanded third edition, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları, 1979), 98. It was also estimated that in 1971, 709 villages belonged to one person, family or kinship group. p.100. Similarly, Tezel estimated that in 1950, 20 per cent of the rural families did not own and land. See, Tezel, *İktisadi*.336.

[212] According to Tütengil, in 1963, those who owned 1-50 decars of land constituted, 68.8 of the all agricultural enterprising units and 24.4 per cent of the all cultivated areas. While those who owned 50-100 decars of land constituted 18.1 of the all agricultural enterprising units and 23.9 per cent of the all cultivated lands. Tütengil, *Kırsal*.97. Similarly, Tezel indicated that in 1950, 62 per cent of all rural families owned some lands, however small they might be. Tezel, *İktisadi*.336. For a discussion, Çağlar Keyder, "Türk Tarımında Küçük Meta Üretiminin Yerleşmesi, 1946-1960,"[The Consolidation of Small Meta Commodity production in Turkish Agriculture, 1946-1960] in *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar*, ed. Şevket Pamuk, Zafer Toprak (Ankara: Yurt, 1988).

aspiring to what Christopher Macperson called 'simple market society' these small-land holders tended not to support radical or violent movements, probably because they felt, that unlike landless peasants, they have something lose. It reinforced egalitarian state of mind (which was more to do with Islamic-Ottoman principles of government) that we referred above. In the similar line, Dahl[213] have distinguished traditional peasant society from society of free farmers. In the former there is a "high propensity for inequality, hierarchy, and political hegemony" since the wealth is distributed in an extremely unequal way, while in the latter "more egalitarian and democratic" sprit thrives since some equality of in land is obtained. Regarding the impact of the absence of landed aristocracy, Keyder probably had in mind Barrington Moore's[214]argument that too strong landed aristocracy is not conducive to democracy since they can constitute a 'reactionary coalition' (with or without bourgeoisie) led by monarchy (and military class) that leads to authoritarian governments against the peasant and workers.

On the elite level, too, in terms both ideology and political culture there were unfavorable elements (for the development of democracy) alongside some favorable ones. True to the legacy of the strong state tradition, the state elites (consisting of military, civilian bureaucracy, the RPP and majority of Turkey's intellectual class) understood democracy not as method for aggregation and reconciliation of various interests but as an "end," something to be adopted so as to be regarded as a civilized nation and as a "process of discussion" through which "truth" is discovered. They also perceived themselves as true (and ultimate) guardians of public (and state) interests coalesced around "Atatürkian principles," while tending to see any opposition movement not as a benign movement but as traitors opposing the scientifically revealed "truths" with evil designs. Corollary to that was their belief that as the ultimate guardians of state interests they could even end the democratic system, if they came to the conclusion that the Atatürkian principles were in danger.[215] The trouble was that to decide

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[213] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy- Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 53-6.

[214] Barrington Moore., Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy- Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 431.

[215] Remember for instance, İnönü's remarks that he would end the experiment with multi-party

when these principles have been violated was left to state elites' themselves.

Apart from a specific understanding of democracy, both state elites and political elites shared a roughly similar elite political culture.[216] The founders and prominent members of the biggest party of the period, DP, have been socialized into political life in the RPP. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that both (state and political) elites tended to see power in absolute terms. This was accompanied by lack of tolerance towards opposition (be it intra-party or other) justified usually by reference to Atatürkism or national will. The tradition of ferocious accusation to discredit opponents was another legacy of Ottoman-Turkish polity and part of the elite political culture.

But on the other hand, there were other factors in terms of elite ideologies and political culture at work that can be seen as supporting democratic development in Turkey. The state elites' insistence on democracy as political system that Turkey should have, despite the fact that they perceived it as something that might allow those who challenged the basis of state was one favorable factor. Similarly, political elites formed around the DP, perhaps because they had been closely associated with state elites in past, refrained to flirt with overtly anti-democratic ideologies. And finally, Turkey has a relatively long experience with the ideas of rule of law and limitation of state authority, and the practice of political parties and elections dating back to 1840's.[217]

Thus, despite serious confining conditions, democracy by no means doomed to fail. Both the strong state tradition and the features of traditional society undergoing modernization generated serious constraints and provided opportunities for the development of the democracy. As Diamond, Linz and Lipset put it "no country that has become democratic has

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regime if it threatened Republican principles. Toker, *Tek Parti*. 93-4.

[216] Following Robert Putnam we use elite political culture to refer to "the set of politically relevant beliefs, values, and habits of the leaders of political system." Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology." *The American Political Science Review*, 65, (1971), 651.

[217] For the significance of longevity of experimentations with democracy for stable development, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave-Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklohama Press, 1991), 271.

done so under purely favorable structural conditions." [218] Whether democracy will survive or not depended largely on whether political actors would be able to overcome the impact of confining conditions and use opportunities to that end.

Founded in 1946 the Democrat Party was the biggest opposition party of the period. Its founders were as much part of the official class as their counterparts in the RPP as they had spent their entire political lives in the same party. Celal Bayar had been the close friend of Atatürk and his prime minister. Adnan Menderes was brought in to the RPP by Atatürk himself. Fuat Köprülü was a distinguished professor of history and former RPP member. Similar to other opposition movements from Liberal Union to Progressive Republican Party to Free Party, the DP were attracted to those social-political forces which had grievances against the party of center, the RPP. In that sense the DP was not organized by the peripheral forces themselves, but rather forces of the periphery participated and supported it when it was established by those who, while being part of official class, left it largely because of intra-elite cleavage.

It was an uneasy coalition of interests united in its opposition to the RPP.[219] It drew support from Islamists who opposed the perceived ultra-secular policies of the RPP. The newly emerging small-traders and business groups as well as those land-owners (in the Aegean and Western Parts of the country), who were suspicious of the statist-bureaucratic intentions of the RPP, also appear to have provided support for the DP. Even the younger army officers and some intellectuals[220] striving for more freedoms are known to have supported the DP. One should be careful, however, in advancing the argument that in terms of social-bases of support the two parties differed radically. The RPP, as the party of the center, continued to attract votes from the least modernized, semi-feudal Eastern regions through its long-standing ties

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[218] Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour M. Lipset, "Introduction:What Makes For Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy*, second ed. ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995), 53.

[219] Özbudun, *Social.* 52; Heper, *Tradition.* 95; Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75* (London: C.Hurst, 1977), 14.

[220] Mehmet Ali Aybar, who was later to become respectable face of Turkish socialism, was the DP candidate for the Assembly in 1946 elections.

with the local notables and Ağas. The DP, too, managed to gain the support of some local notables alongside the professionals and merchants that occupied its middle level leadership cadres.[221]

The traditional social structure of the country -the existence of traditional clientelism and peculiar characteristics of peasant society- can help us to untangle this apparent anomaly. There is an almost unanimous agreement among the students of Turkish politics[222] that with the transition to multi-party regime, many rural party organizations tend to be based on already existing factions (based on kinship, ethno-religious, community oriented differences) and clientelistic networks and that the initial party choices were heavily affected by local rivalries between these. In the single party-period, state and politics had remained peripheral to the daily life of the villagers, the main channel of communication being the local notables and other faction leaders which "provided a link between the state and the periphery."[223] With the transition to a multi-party regime, these local notables continued to perform similar functions and provided a main source of support for political parties through leverage they had upon the followers. The installation of multi-party regime now meant that "factions could obtain support from outside the village or small town by establishing linkages with political parties."[224] Indeed, rivalry between parties had given ample opportunities for competing factions to increase their influence. As Stirling put it, the "reigning faction had necessarily already identified itself with the existing government, so that the headman and his supporters were automatically RPP.

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[221] Özbudun, *Social*.47.

[222] Karpat, *Transition*, 412; Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York: Viley, 1965), 281-2; Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 123; Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *Political Change in Rural Turkey: Erdemli* (Hague: Mouton, 1966), 151-152; Sabri Sayarı, "Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation in Turkey" in *Political Participation in Turkey*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel B. Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), 124.

[223] Ayşe Güneş Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey," in *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, ed. Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1994), 51.

[224] Sayarı, "Mass," 124.

Those who opposed them were thus committed to the DP."[225]

This factor helps to explain the speed with which political parties established vertical linkages with the masses since the leaders of these factions easily controlled the vote of their clients. It also helps to make sense of the nature of the cross-class support parties obtained since differences between local factions were not basically derived from class differences but related to family, kinship or other primordial loyalties. Özer Ozankaya notes the case of a powerful family leader with linkages to the RPP. With a transition to multi-party regime, this man had the Democrat party branch established just because he wanted it established by saying that "bizde de bulunsun" (let's have one, too).[226] Szyliowicz likewise noted that many large important families "guaranteed their political future by having relatives enroll in both parties."[227] Karpat similarly provided another example that helps to illuminate the case:

> Local groups would get together and, often without prior knowledge of the party program, would establish the a branch and then notify the Democratic Party headquarters of the fact... Very often the whole Republican Party organization would go over to the Democratic Party and in some cases, there would not be any Republican Party members left to take over. The Republican Party sign on the wall or over the door of the party premises would be changed to Democratic Party.[228]

Thus, there did not emerge radical distinctions in the social bases of political parties, all parties appealing to broadly similar social groups. Yet another consequence of such state of affairs has been the centrality of "party patronage"[229] to gain votes, which would have been the

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[225] Stirling, *Village*. 280.

[226] Ozankaya, *Kültür*. 77-8. He also notes that with the passage of the time rival faction seized the control of the DP branch.

[227] Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey." *The Middle East Journal*. 16, 4, (1962), 434. "In Tarsus," he indicated, "the chairman of one of the parties had a brother in the other. In Mersin, one brother edited one party's newspaper, his sister the other. In Gaziantep, the CHP and DP presidents were second cousins." Ibid., 434-5.

[228] Karpat, *Transition*, 412.

[229] Following Alex Weingrod, we use party patronage to refer to "the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support." It means distribution of divisible benefits to supporters as opposed to thedistribution of collective benefits or appeal to a collective interests. In this conceptualization party-patronage differs from patron-client relations in some crucial respects. The patron-client relations arises "within a state structure in which authority is dispersed and state activity limited in scope, and in which considerable separation exists between the levels of village, city and state", while party-patronage "is associated with the expanding scope and

hallmark of party-competition to day. Many leaders of the existing, tradtional factions, and newly emerged ones (businessmen, traders and professionals),[230] often competing with each other, came to play brokerage roles. They tried to enhance their powers by promising bloc of votes to party leaders and promising their clients to deliver what they needed. [231] Political party leaders, in turn, were more than happy to use such channels in a desperate search for votes. This boded well for the voters. Peasants, which constituted the majority of voters, were politically unsophisticated, and had little concern with either party ideologies or programs. Party affiliation was "seldom a matter of ideological commitment."[232] What mattered for them, it appeared, was, first of all the satisfaction of immediate, local, personal needs (buildings of roads, mosques, finding employment, securing credit) and then loyalty to his (her) primordial group.

This non-ideological and pragmatic nature of party competition does not mean that there were no differences between parties. It was true that ideological differences between the parties, at least in the beginning, were not as great as some analysts portrayed it. Though it was much more sympathetic to the religious sympathies of ordinary people, and "did bring a significant degree of relaxation to the understanding and application of secularism" the DP

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general proliferation of state activities, and also with the growing integration of village, city and state." See, Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties." *Comparative Studies in Society and History.* 10, (1968), 379, 381.

[230] For more knowledge about these groups, which were usually be found in the DP rather than RPP see, Mübeccel B. Kıray, *Ereğli: Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası* [Ereğli: A Small Coastal Town Before the Advent of Heavy Industry] (Ankara: DPT, 1964); Frank Tachau, "Turkish Provincial Party Politics," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Ayşe Güneş Ayata, CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji) [The RPP (Organisation and Ideology] (Ankara: 1992)

[231] The emergence of political parties and forms of representations that are not exclusively class based but dominated by populist and/or clientelist forms is not peculiar to Turkey. Nicos Mouzelis, for instance, remarked that when urbanization and industrialization does not proceed far enough (as in Southern cone of Latin America and the Balkans), transition to mass politics is likely to be characterized by either the predominance of clientelistic or populist movements. Nicos P.Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late İndustrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 86.

[232] Szyliowicz. *Erdemli*. 151.

never questioned, let alone repudiate the central flank of Republican regime, secularism.[233] Menderes argued that "while being respectful to religious freedom", his government "would never tolerate reactionary provocations."[234] In fact, relaxation of jacobinist-secularism did not begin with the DP. It was the RPP that took the first steps to garner votes with the transition to a multi-party system.[235] The RPP government, for instance, introduced religious instructions into primary schools, and established faculty of theology in Istanbul University in 1949.

The DP did not aim to change Turkey's western oriented foreign policy nor it did radically alter the state role in the economy.[236] While accepting harmful effects of the RPP's interventionist policies, Menderes stated that his government would try to maximize state-led investment.[237] Indeed, as Boratav[238] notes the DP's victory did not significantly change economic policies and economy's general direction since the RPP set out to implement, albeit small in scale, economic liberalization measures from 1947 onwards. With the exception of the 1946 election, the social-background of two party MP's did not manifest great differences either, that difference being reduced in the 1954 and 1957 elections.[239] But, as Karpat noted, some differences between the two parties have resulted from "special historical and political circumstances which determined the inception of each party." The RPP, being the party of state and bureaucrats, who believed in the motto of "for the people, despite the people", were more

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[233] Toprak, *Islam*.73.

[234] Cited in Faruk Sükan, *Başbakan Menderes'in Meclis Konuşmaları, 1950-60* [The Speeches of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the Assembly, 1950-1960] (Ankara: Kültür, 1991), 13.

[235] Frank Tachau, "The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), 104.

[236] Çağlar Keyder was less than justified in arguing that in the DP period "Paternalism, control from the centre, and reformism from above were decisively rejected while the market (and capitalism) were given free rein." Çağlar Keyder, *The State and Class in Turkey- A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987), 124. Similarly, Ahmad also exaggerated when he wrote that Menderes was "the champion of the 'laissez faire' economy." Ahmad, *Experiment*. 67.

[237] Sükan, *Meclis*.6-7

[238] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* [Etatism in Turkey] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1989), 74-6.

[239] Frederick W. Frey, *Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965), 381.

"romantic and detached from the people." While the DP, "as a reaction to RPP" was "more realistic and close to the people."[240]

The 1950 elections witnessed a historical turning point in Turkish history in that for the first time a government was changed through the ordinary people's vote. The plurality system with multi-member constituencies gave the Democrats an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. The Democrats garnered 53.3 per cent of the vote and 403 seats out of 500. The Republicans had 39.9 per cent of the vote, gaining only 69 seats in the Assembly. This unbalanced picture had much to do with İnönü's decision not to initiate any change both in the constitution and elections laws with a transition to a multi-party regime. He had decided that the multi-party experiment might be conducted under the same framework. This, however, would prove to be, to say the least, less than wise decision. It is argued that certain of its electoral victory, İnönü just did not want to be deprived of the great benefits that the election system and the constitution provides.[241] But no to avail, the DP won the elections and enjoyed the quite unlimited powers that İnönü (according to critics) assumed the RPP would have. A simple plurality system exaggerated the DP's strength while underrepresenting the RPP's. Similarly, the unrestrained nature of legislative power that the 1924 Constitution envisaged would have encouraged the DP's authoritarian actions, leading them to argue that the Constitution itself authoritarized them.

Though, it is not our subject to discuss the failure of this experiment in detail, the basic characteristics of the period of 1950-60 are crucial to understanding the trials and tribulations of Turkish democracy as they recur over time. From the very start of the multi-party experiment the relations between two major parties was tense (and strained) and remained so throughout. At the root of the conflict was the state elites' suspicion of the DP as a party that

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[240] Karpat, *Transition*. 417.

[241] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı* [The Tragedy of Menderes] (İstanbul: Remzi, 1969), 152, 346; Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, third ed. (İstanbul:Çağdaş, 1979), 356; Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Kum Saatini İzlerken* [Watching the Hourglass](İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 162. Both writers do not provide conclusive evidence that this was really the case. To speak confidently on this matter, more detailed research is needed.

would undo the Republican reforms. From the inception of party politics conditions that are conducive to the emergence of "trust" between party elites had been blocked.[242] True to Ottoman-Turkish tradition, the RPP never doubted its self-appointed role to govern (to led) the country and the desirability of such a state of affairs. The majority of the RPP's top level cadres including İnönü had not foreseen that the DP would come to power in such a short time, and had been having difficulties swallowing it. In their turn, the DP leaders, who were equally surprised by their unexpected victory and exaggerated strength in the assembly, did not bother to assuage the fears and anxieties of the state elites in the post-election euphoria.[243] They believed that both İnönü and the rank and file members of the RPP had hardly perceived them as the legitimate party and were ready to get rid of them, if given an opportunity.[244] They did not seek a modus vivendi with the RPP and civil-military bureaucracy despite the fact that they needed it for the implementation of their political programs.[245] Despite their pre-election premise of not questioning actions of the single-party period, the DP in power set out to employ every means in their disposal against the opposition. Even if they come to power they were uncertain about control of bureaucracy which, they assumed, was ready to serve no one but the RPP. They, therefore, tried to reshuffle civil bureaucracy as they saw fit, bringing them

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[242] The significance of trust between political actors for a democracy to survive can not be overstated. As Dahl indicated, for a polyarchy to function, "requires a good deal of trust in one's opponents: they may be opponents, but they are not implacable enemies." Dahl, *Polyarchy*. 152.

[243] Aydemir. *Dram*.252.

[244] Celal Bayar (prior to 1950) is reported to have said that "İnönü could have sent two Gendermarie to close the party down and in that case nothing would happen in the country." Cited in Toker, *Tek Parti*. 94. Similarly, Samet Ağaoğlu, a leading member of the DP, said that majority of the DP supporters including himself have never believed in İnönü's sincerity. Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Partinin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebebleri: Bir Soru* [The Reasons for the Birth and the Rise of the Democrat Party: A Question] (İstanbul: Baha, 1972), 59.

[245] This is easier said than done as the task the DP faced required courageous efforts. As Heper put it, "political party elites had to strike a balance between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of democracy and arrive at a consensus on the procedural rules of democracy *all by themselves*, i.e without effective constitutional checks and balances. This they had to achieve, while pursuing a rigorous opposition to the bureaucratic military elites and, in the absence of effective linkages to social groups, that is without the benefit of moderation of such relationship might have brought about, and while constantly being socialized to the idea of the virtues of horizontal democracy only." Metin Heper, "Introduction," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 5. (his italics)

under the control of party officials.[246] The simple fact that the RPP had penetrated the bureaucracy rendered matters worse as the DP cadres failed to differentiate their dislike of the the RPP and bureaucracy and categorically opposed to both.

In the process, the conflict between the RPP and DP, that had its roots in each party's conception of other, have come to be intertwoven with the personalities of two party leaders and have become personalized. In line with Ottoman-Turkish tradition of intra-elite conflict, it is what was known as the Paşa (or İnönü) factor that is critical to our understanding the reaction of prominent DP leaders. İnönü's historical personality appears to have led to a feeling of inferiority in the DP leaders, particularly Menderes. For instance, when asked why he had not taken the RPP's view regarding the government's decision to deploy Turkish soldiers on the Korean soil (in 1951), Menderes told (Kasım Gülek) that "if he had asked İnönü on the subject, everybody would have said that they were plain inexperienced and had to turn their rivals at the first serious crisis for expert knowledge."[247] Suspecting that he was doing everything possible to secure their failure and overthrow they also felt "insecure as long as İnönü was active in politics."[248] If the account of former DP member of parliament and close aide of Menderes is to be believed, Menderes thought that "İnönü was a dictator, albeit a cowardly one." [249] Consequently, he estimated that "if you move first, he would be afraid of you, otherwise he would strike."[250] As the DP minister Mükerrem Sarol once put it bluntly "we have nothing to give or take from the RPP; the problem is the Inönü problem. If there were no

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[246] For a self-critique that the local organization of the DP directly tried to inluence decisions of civilian bureaucracy without appealing to party center and then government. See, Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat.* 219-220.

[247] Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu* ['Demirkırat': The Birth of a Democracy] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1991), 91.

[248] Ahmad, *Experiment.*37.

[249] Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *Yassıada- Öncesi ve Sonrası* [Yassıada-Before and After](Ankara: Çam 1976), 28.

[250] Ibid., 28.

İnönü, there would be nothing between us we could not resolve."[251]

The conflict between parties that became heavily personalized is not only to do with tradition, but also appears to have been fostered by circumstances. To say that intra-elite conflict had been an indispensable part of the Ottoman-Turkish polity, does not explain much. For a better and fuller explanation, one should also dwell on which factors appear to have sustained it in the period observed. Looked from this perspective, for the DP leaders the preoccupation with İnönü and the RPP appears to have provided an element of unity for an otherwise uneasy coalition whose raison d'etre was opposition to the single-party regime.[252] In addition, factors such as widespread illiteracy, the prevalence of clientelistic vertical bonds as the dominant linkage between political parties and citizenry, and lack of differentiation between parties in terms of the social support and programs and ideologies all appear to have prepared a fertile ground for the conflicts to become highly personalized. In such an environment, it requires a heroic efforts for leaders to base their critics on intelligent discussion of party programs and specific policy lines followed. Not only because programs did not differ significantly but also the electorate seemed to hardly understand the issues. Instead, parties chose the easy way -exaggeration of differences, using fierce accusations to differentiate themselves and personalizing of conflicts- while assuming that it would be understood and appreciated by the masses.[253]

The government-opposition relations, accordingly, were far cry from the liberal democratic model envisaged. Having been socialized into a tradition in which the power was taken as absolute, and the concept of opposition was perceived as an enigma, the DP leaders, too, had difficulties in accepting the opposition. [254] Like state elites before them, they, too,

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[251] Cited in Ahmad, *Experiment*.46.

[252] Ibid.,38.

[253] In her memoirs, Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, one time activist of the DP, comments on the reaction of a group of DP sympathizers from the province of Elmadağ. They criticized her and her friend for not being harsh enough against the RPP as the Nation Party officials had done. Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* [The Democrat Parti Tale](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1996).

[254] For the DP leaders' inability to shun habits of one-party period, see, Ali Fuat Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebebleri*, [The 27 May Revolution and Its Causes] translated by M. Ali Sebük, İ Hakkı Akın

favored political ideas in which the concept of opposition can not be easily accommodated. They favored what was called the majoritarian democracy in which the will of the majority reigned supreme. The majoritarian democracy appeared to be well-suited both to Turkish political traditions and to the short term political considerations of the DP. Atatürk himself was a firm believer in the undivided and unlimited sovereignty emerging through the will of the Grand National Assembly. It was a short step for the DP leaders, as had been for their counterparts in the RPP, to regard the TGNA's decisions as "national will." Though Atatürk was unclear whether the Assembly would have to be elected competitively or not, the DP strenuously placed a premium on the competitive election requirement for the TGNA. Hoping that competitive elections, if regularly held, would place themselves in power more than it would for the RPP which was supposed to be the party of (powerful in effect but minority in numbers) bureaucratic-elitists, they put enormous premium on the elections and "national will" which was supposed to emerge as a result.[255]

Celal Bayar, for instance, noted that they were the true heirs of Mustafa Kemal who had stated that sovereignty belonged to the nation without any limitations. [256] In this way, the DP leaders hoped, they could change the basis of legitimacy (on which state power is based) from that of self-proclaimed right of enlightened bureaucratic intelligentsia to the "national will" supposed to emerge through competitive elections.

Although even in a majoritarian form of democracy right for the opposition to exist is taken for granted, the DP leaders did not seem able to appreciate that fact. In a very Rousseaunian manner they assumed that even the function of the opposition is realized in the TGNA. That is the majority will. Menderes stated that:

> The 9th Grand National Assembly that represented the national will is both the guardian of freedom and the inspector (controller) of the executive on behalf of the nation. These are the best answers to

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(İstanbul: Çeltüt 1966), 74.

[255] Heper, *Tradition*. 107.

[256] Celal Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes* [My Premier Adnan Menderes] (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1986), 12-3; Celal Bayar, *Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk'ün Metodolojisi)*[Thinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk)], second edition. ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul: Yaylacık, 1998), 54-56 (originally published in 1978)

> those who want to monopolize the guardianship of freedoms and inspection of the executive and, who are in delusion to (or who deludedly) suppose that national inspection is dependent solely on their existence. [257]

They, too, appear to have favored a rational conception of democracy. Menderes expressed his favorite state of affairs as "National assembly, national temple, sacred roof and inside this temple and under this sacred roof, the discussion and deliberation of national interests, and arriving at decisions that are best interest of the nation." [258] Like their counterparts they wished to see an opposition which "would do everything possible to ensure government's success."[259]

The RPP in opposition, in turn, seemed to accept the maxim that "the duty of the opposition is opposition."[260] Having hardly grown accustomed to the fact that they were now in opposition, the RPP presented increasingly harsh opposition to the DP rule. "Like every great nation", İnönü argued in campaign for local elections of 1950, "the Turkish nation can be deceived through slander only once."[261] He thought that by choosing the DP people could not estimate where their true interest lay. He tried to give an impression that they were the real and true owner of the government and the country, hence reinforcing the Democrat's persisting fear of being ousted from power by force.

Despite being poisoned by serious problems, the democratic experiment did not run into trouble for the next several years. In terms of economic indicators the first DP government managed to do quite well. The same, however, can not be said of democratic development. The DP leaders were as suspicious of the civil societal (which were not many anyway) groups as the RPP had been. Relying on clientelistic relations and party patronage, they did not want to replace vertical relationships with horizontal ones. In the absence of mediating structures

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[257] Cited in Sükan, *Menderes.* 48

[258] Ibid., 463.

[259] Ibid., 158.

[260] Kemal H.Karpat, "Domestic Politics," in *Turkey*, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Janderhoeck, 1985), 63.

[261] Cited in Burçak, *Yassıada.*57-8.

between the state and the society, "party patronage" continued to become the main link between the people and their government.[262] The DP governments used party patronage through typical pork-barrel grants in the forms of roads, mosques, and various public works as well as through a wide variety of individual inducements from employment to securing agricultural credits.[263] Party patronage itself constituted an obstacle to the development of civil society by hindering organization and institutionalization,[264]a development that did not seem to bother DP leaders. Instead of opposing the overpowered state itself, as they claimed when in opposition, the DP leaders endeavored to employ that state for their own ends. They, in Heper's words, aimed to replace state-centered polity with a party-centered one.[265]

Alongside the use patronage, the DP leaders showed an inclination towards authoritarian practices. From the beginning of the second constitutional period in 1908,

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[262] Özbudun, "Clientelism," 260; İlkay Sunar, "Demokrat Parti ve Populizm," [The Democrat Party and Populism] *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 8 (1983), 2084. To characterize DP's policies, we prefer party patronage rather than populism since over the years populism came to be used in a variety of ways and began to denote different things to different people. Even if we define populist movements, as Di Tella did, as a "political movement based on mobilized but not yet autonomously organized popular sector, led by an elite rooted among the middle and upper echelons of society, and kept together by a charismatic, personalized link between leader and led, the result, in turn, of widespread social and cultural traits often found in the periphery..." the DP's populist characteristics are not outstanding. Torcuto S. Di Tella, "Populism into the Twenty-first Century." *Government and Opposition.* 22, 46 (1996), 188. As Sunar noted DP's populism was limited by two factors; that its founders were part of the Republican elite who had always been sceptical about mass mobilization and the appreciation on the part of the DP leaders that its possible use of mass mobilization would inevitably have to rely on Islam, which had been anathema to Turkish state elites, and might cost party a dear. Sunar, "populism" 2079-2080. It is also to be added that the DP had an relatively advanced institutional-organisational structure and all that it entails that made leader-mass relations somewhat institutionalized rather than purely charismatic.

[263] Sayarı, "Patronage," 129.

[264] Sunar, "Populism," 2084. Recently, however, perceptions of clientelism tends to be much more benign. Louis Roniger for instance, writes that even in developed democracies patronage continues to be instrumental and may be compatible with non-clientelistic practices. He then argues that once this fact overtly recognized, it "may lead to the strengthening of organisations, adding commitment and loyalty to occupational qualifications for access to office incumbency." Louis Roniger, "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World," in *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, ed. Louis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1994),15. Similarly, Joseph La Palambora argued that "clientelism is an efficient and effective way through which the political allegiances, preferences, and demands of citizens are brought to weight on public policies -exactly as the sprit, if not the narrower definitions of polyarchy would require..." Joseph La Palambora, *Italian*. 59.

[265] Heper, *Tradition*.106. See also, Engin D.Akarlı, "State," 148.

Turkish political parties had been democratic in opposition and authoritarian in power. The DP was not an exception. They were not prepared to expand (as they promised) the basic right and liberties which they harshly criticized when in opposition. Let alone expanding them, the DP tried to limit existing rights and liberties clearly violating accepted norms of the liberal democracy thus turning the majority of intellectuals and press against itself. Under the rhetoric of national will, which, according to their view, could accept no limitation whatsoever, they opposed to any move designed to curb excesses of power. The establishment of investigatory commission (tahkikat komisyonu) in the assembly that would assume quite unlimited powers[266] that, if it is used, would spell the end of liberal democracy, was one spectacular example of the DP's authoritarian actions. Another action of the DP leaders that intensified the polarization had been the establishment of "Vatan Cephesi" (Fatherland Front), which consisted of those who supported the DP. It was an effort on the part of the DP to broaden the party's base and to show the opposition that masses were on their side.

All these factors were instrumental in bringing down Turkey's first experiment with democracy. The use of extensive party patronage combined with the unplanned, uncoordinated economic policy of the DP governments[267] led to serious economic imbalances forcing the government to take painful measures. They did little, however, to reduce the DP's electoral appeal, though its vote declined from 56.6 per cent (in 1954) to 47.7 percent in 1957. Economic problems, in other words, were not the most important reason for the DP's overthrow. Winning two consecutive election comfortably, the DP leader Menderes' belief in himself as a person specially gifted to lead the country in the righteous path as he saw fit

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[266] The members of the investigatory commission would assume powers of the judiciary, and the right to prohibit publication (and to seize the published ones) of any material deemed to be harmful, and its decisions would be final. Cited in Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti- Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* [The Democrat Party- History and Ideology ](Ankara: İmge, 1990), 156. (first published in 1970). The fact that it was unconstitutional was accepted even by sympathizers of the DP. See, Başgil. *27 Mayıs.* 134. Professor Başgil, who had been invited to Çankaya to offer his views on the issue, had failed to convince Bayar and Menderes that it was unconstitutional. Ibid., 134-5

[267] For a critical account of economic policies of DP period, Morris Singer, *The Economic Advance of Turkey, 1938-1950* (Ankara: Turkish Economic Society,1977)

appears to have increased.[268] As he believed that what he had done was appreciated by the electorate he grew more and more authoritarian in power. The speech Menderes gave after the 1954 election victory reflect that mentality:

> The elections have clearly revealed how much the citizens like the road I have taken.
> So far I have attached value to consultation with you journalists. Metaphorically speaking I used to seek your advise on whether to use aspirin or optalidon as a cure for nerves. Now the people's lively confidence makes it obvious that there is no further need for such consultations. I am going to have the final word and use aspirin and optalidon as I please.[269]

As the economic problems come to the surface he sought consolation in attacking the opposition accusing it of planning to overthrow the government. Consecutive election defeats had affected the RPP no less degree. Parallel to Menderes' growing confidence and his harsh treatment of the opposition, the RPP leaders, too, increased the intensity of their struggle against the government. They charged it with aiming to establish an authoritarian government and violating Atatürk's principles, particularly secularism. They constantly implied that the overthrowing of the DP by force was imminent.[270] The DP's policies gained the hostility not only of the RPP but also other influential groups whose belief in the regime was so important if the regime was to survive.

Particularly significant was the military which, as the chief state elite, believed that they were the ultimate protector of the Atatürk's principles. It was known that in 1950 some of the younger officers supported the DP in the hope that it would help the army to modernize as well

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[268] Başgil, *27 Mayıs*.21.

[269] Cited in Ahmad, *Experiment*. 50.

[270] İnönü's harsh style of opposition was criticized even by anti-DP figures. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who had been a close friend of both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Inönü and an RPP member, wrote "Was not İsmet Paşa about to turn the country into a battlefield through his struggle (against the DP) which he conducted with a boldness and exuberance that he did not display even in his youth ? And who could stay out of this muddle ? This muddle has spread to every corner of the country." Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politika'da 45 Yıl* [45 Years in Politics] (Ankara: Bilgi,1968), 208. Similarly, Turhan Feyzioğlu (Professor who entered the assembly for the RPP in 1957 elections and lived through the 12 September breakdown as the leader of RRP) in 1984 remarked that, if he had chance to go back to 1957-60, he would do everything at his disposal to soften the conflict. Because "in those days the struggle between parties was getting unnnecessarily harsh. Unnecessarily because, there were neither terror not other fights based on race and religious sectarian cleavages. But (still) relations between the parties were far too harsh." Cited in Emin Çölaşan, *Biz Kırk Kişiyiz Birbirimizi Biliriz* [We are so Close to Each Other so, We All Know Each Other Well] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1985), 111.

as bring a fresh energy to solve pressing problems. These hopes, however, did not materialize. The DP leadership committed what was proven to be grievous mistakes in handling relations with the military. They assumed that by bringing their own men into the high command, they could control the whole army. Parallel to the general decline of the life standards (and prestige) of the bureaucracy the armed forces' economic situation deteriorated badly.[271] The DP's disdain of the bureaucracy was inevitably directed to the army as well. Rumors had it that Menderes uttered such words as "He would, if necessary, run the army even with the reserve officers."

Younger officers in the army came to believe that the DP government was in breach of Atatürk's principles (particularly secularism and etatism) which they were entrusted to protect. Their coming to such conclusion was, to a great measure, the result of the relentless opposition led by İnönü and RPP in association with the bulk of the intelligentsia (professors and the bulk of the press). Having been closely associated with the ruling center and its efforts of modernization and therefore hardly accustomed to accept the DP's right to govern, both the professors and the great majority of the journalist believed that the DP was blocking and reversing the Kemalist modernization efforts. They, thus, easily provided a constant source of devastating opposition led by the RPP. Orhan Erkanlı, one of the leading member of the National Unity Committee that overthrow the government, admitted that the coup was realized "as a result of the RPP's opposition. On the one hand, they enraged the DP, on the other hand, they prepared the army and the public opinion with constant opposition." [272] The RPP had accused the government by giving concessions and encouraging the religious reactionism, serving the interest of the few exploiters, deviating from Atatürk's principle of statism, damaging the country's independence by entering close relations with the United States,

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[271] George Harris, "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey." *Middle East Journal*. 24, (1970), 441; Kemal H. Karpat, "The Military and Democracy in Turkey, 1960-1964: A Sociological Analysis of Revolution." *American Historical Review*, 75, (1970), 1663.

[272] Cited in, Nazlı Ilıcak, *27 Mayıs Yargılanıyor* [The 27 May on Trial] (İstanbul: Kervan, 1975), 12. See, also Emin Aytekin (p.280) in the same book. Erkanlı was one of the fourteen members of the NUC who had been expelled from the community, who then, tend to blame the RPP for their expulsion. Therefore, one should not take Erkanlı's statement at face value, but it still involves significant amount of truth.

planning dictatorship, dividing the country and etc... In retrospect, it appears that the RPP had an enormous influence in shaking belief in the system and generating the feeling that "something has to be done" not only in the armed forces but also in the student community which through their actions played significant role in the overthrow of the DP.

Against the growing opposition to their rule, the DP leaders' came up with more authoritarian solutions. The closure of the newspapers, the arrest of leading journalists and academicians, were the order of the day. True to tradition, the DP leaders appear to have believed that compromise (to opposition's demands) was demeaning and only more force could handle opposition. Celal Bayar, for instance, even after 16 years, did not accept that the DP's measures against opposition were too harsh. He argued that "(if they had not taken these measures) the social atmosphere would worsen like it did in 1968-9 in early 1955, to such an extent that street fights, occupations might have turned into bloody fractride struggle."[273]

Impending economic crisis, heightening polarization, unending party political struggles, destructive opposition by the RPP and intellectuals have all been instrumental in bringing the downfall of the DP government. Its downfall, however, was by no means a foregone conclusion, an inevitable event determined by unfavorable confining conditions.[274] Particularly, political leaders of both parties had several opportunities that might have alleviated the crisis. It appears, for instance, that a call for early general election with the date fixed by the Menderes government, up until to the last days of the regime, was a real possibility that might have alleviated the tension. Since the RPP opposition based its strategy on the claim that the DP had no intention of holding elections and therefore leaving power.[275] Similarly Menderes' or Bayar's resignation probably would have had the same effect as might the declaration that the

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[273] Ibid., 634.

[274] Sunar, "Demokrat," 2086.

[275] Ali Rıza Cihan, *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları-(1920-1973), İkinci Cilt, 1939-1960* [The Speeeches of İsmet İnönü in the TGNA- (1920-1973), vol 2, 1939-1960] (Ankara: TBMM, 1993), 304. In fact, İnönü was reported to have said (before 27 May) that if Menderes declared the date in which general elections would be held, he would express its support to the Menderes government. Cited in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı* [The Logic of Revolution] (İstanbul: Remzi, 1973), 314.

activities of the investigatory commission had been ended two-months earlier than planned.[276] Or in the RPP's case a man of İnönü's caliber and experience who played a historical role in installing the multi-party regime must have thought that his inflaming speeches against the government might incite an open rebellion within the ranks of the army, which he knew very well, against the democratic regime which he had done much to instal and consolidate.

Because İnönü knew that within the army there existed rebellious groups. Metin Toker, who, as his son-in-law was very close to İnönü admits that "although İnönü was not involved any military plots to overthrow the government, he was well aware that there existed such groups." [277] According to Toker, "it is a reality that İnönü provided 'green light' for intervention."[278] Toker also added that, if İnönü could freely answer the question whether he would prefer intervention or dictatorship of DP, he would clearly say intervention, and "officers became aware of that."[279] Thus, as Hale, who argued that whether İnönü knew the coup in advance was not clear, accepted "it seems unlikely that he would have wanted to warn Menderes in advance."[280] Therefore, it is not a gross exaggeration to state that İnönü still pursued an opposition strategy which was "highly corrosive of the democratic process."[281] He had uttered such words in what was to be the final days of the regime; "If you continue on this

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[276] In fact, on 25 May 1960 Menderes had announced in Eskişehir that the investigatory commission had completed its activities. But it was too late to stop junior officers. Reported by Ercüment Yavuzalp, who was private secretary (özel kalem müdürü) of Menderes, cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, *Demirkırat*. 185. According to Orhan Erkanlı, Menderes had told him (in Yassıada) that it was Celal Bayar who convinced him that resignation was not necessary and would render matters worse. Regarding the declaration of the election date, Menderes was reported to have told Erkanlı that they first wanted to ensure law and order in the country and then to go to elections as they believed that because of unruly behavior of the opposition there was no way of conducting orderly election. Orhan Erkanlı, *Askeri Demokrasi* [Military Democracy] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1987), 311-312.

[277] Cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, *Demirkırat*. 161. See also, Metin Toker, *Demokrasiden Darbeye, 1957-1960* [From Democracy to the Coup d'etat, 1954-1960]. (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1991), 334.

[278] Ibid., 334.

[279] Ibid.,334. Toker does not tell us how and in which ways they became aware of this stance of İnönü.

[280] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and The Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 112.

[281] Harris, "Causes," 446.

road even I will not be able to save you,"[282] "(Referring to the overthrow of Sygmann Rhee in Korea) The Turkish nation is no less honorable than the Koreans,"[283] "When the conditions are fulfilled, (open) rebellion against government becomes a legitimate right of the people."[284] As we learn from memoirs of one of the coup makers, İnönü's speeches removed one of the most significant barriers for the coup, for now it was nearly understood that İnönü (even if not openly support it) would not oppose such a movement.[285] It is not our argument that both politicians deliberately set out to wreck the democratic experiment. But by not properly estimating where their actions might lead, they were played crucial role in paving way to the military coup. Thus, the military intervention, planned and executed by lower ranks officers, finally came in 27 May 1960, ending Turkey's first experiment with the multi-party democracy.

In this chapter, we have tried to delineate the larger social-political framework of Turkish politics. Both the strong state tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing modernization and their complex encounter and interactions, we argued, heavily affected the fortunes of Turkish democracy by creating constraints and providing opportunities. We then tried to present the particular development trajectories of both strong state tradition and the basic changes in the social structure resulting from the modernization process until the 1960 breakdown. Our cursory account of first Turkish experiment with democracy suggests how complex the interaction of various diverse factors had been that had led to its breakdown.

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[282] Cihan, *İnönü*. 300. İnönü has made this speech on 18 April 1960.

[283] Reported by Altan Öymen cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, *Demirkırat*. 168.

[284] Cihan, *İnönü*. 300.

[285] Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar ve Sorumlular* [Memoirs, Problems and Those ho are Responsible], (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), 310. In the same line, Heper had written that İnönü's remark that even he would be unable to save the democrats "was bound to encourage the military to intervene (which it did in 1960)." Heper, "The Strong State and Democracy," 161. In his subsequent work on İsmet İnönü, however, Heper took a different line and argued that İnönü acted harshly towards the opposition because he wanted to warn the DP government and thus "wanted to save the multi-party regime he cherished so much." According to Heper, "his remarks were not implicit appeals to non-democratic forces to intervene; they were his desperate pleas to the democrats to stop suppressing the opposition and to hold elections." Heper, *İnönü*. 209. This may be (and seems to be) the case, but it still begs the question of how İnönü's remarks might have been interpreted by potential coup-makers and why İnönü, who was so careful with the words he used and implications that these words might cause, did not seem to be concerned with the possible consequences of his words in that case.

There were, in the first place, the state elites. Never suspecting their self-appointed role as guardians of public interests, perceiving themselves as entitled to intervene whenever they *thought* the Atatürkist principles had been violated, they generated considerable tensions for new born democracy. Political elites formed around the DP, socialized in an RPP environment, bequeathing Ottoman-Turkish traditions, on the other hand, did not seek a modus vivendi with state elites. Quite the contrary, they tried to sideline them whenever possible. We also argued that to better understand that conflict deriving from state tradition, the social structure of Turkey also needs to be taken into consideration. Not only because some of the political elites are the product of that society but also because both parties were likely to opt for policies that they thought would attract votes from that society. We argued that Turkey of late forties and fifties demonstrated characteristics of "peasant society" hardly conducive to development of "civic values," a feature that help us to better understand elite behavior. It had for instance put its imprint on the way the parties formed linkages with the society, clientelism and party patronage being the dominant form. And finally, we indicated the impact of the legal-institutional framework of both the 1924 Constitution and other related regulations.

This being said, these constraints did not mean that Turkish democracy was doomed to fail. The party elites had room for maneuver that might have increased the chances of democracy. But, as our brief account suggested, political party elites appeared to have been unable to overcome the impact of these constraints and paved the way to its breakdown in 1960.

# CHAPTER III. SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE STATE ELITES 'IN TURMOIL' : POLITICS IN THE LATE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES

The 27 May 1960 military intervention led by lower and junior officers was enthusiastically welcomed by the state elites -the RPP, the intellectuals, universities and the bulk of the central bureaucracy. Professors' from both Ankara and İstanbul Universities, who were flown to Ankara to advise the ruling National Unity Committee (NUC which was composed of 38 staff officers' led by General Cemal Gürsel) issued a declaration justifying the intervention. This declaration, reminiscent of Ottoman fetvas issued by Şeyhülislams,' expressed the center's views regarding the state and government. It stated that the 27 May "Revolution" was not an ordinary coup. It was directed against a government which had become "a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition," and therefore "ended up by losing all spiritual bonds with the true sources of state power, which reside in the army, its court of justice and bar associations, its civil servants desirous of demonstrating attachment to their duties, and in its universities..." It accused the government of descending "into a position of virtual enmity toward the basic and essential institutions of a true state and also towards Atatürk's reforms.."[1]

The state elites had hoped that the golden opportunity to install a socio-political order that they deemed to be necessary (and good) for the country had finally arrived. The eventful decade ahead, however, would demonstrate that Turkey had changed to a great extent. Not only would their designs for the country prove to be futile, but the composition of the center itself was to undergo momentous changes. What was formerly referred to as state elites had begun to lose their former coherence as the RPP and the bulk of intellectual-bureaucratic elite

[1] Cited in Kemal H.Karpat, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-1970." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 8,3, (1972), 357. For the full text, see Server Tanilli, *Anayasalar ve Siyasal Belgeler* [Constitutions and other Political Documents] (İstanbul: Cem, 1976), 87-91.

started to depart from the values that the center held dear. Many members of this alliance started to flirt with socialism both at the level of ideas and in practice. Meanwhile, the old DP, representing what we called political elites, could not remain unaffected. In the radicalized atmosphere of the 1960s its islamist and ultra-nationalist wings established their own parties. While the Justice Party, differing in critical aspects from the DP, managed to establish itself as the main successor to the DP.

These developments in the political landscape have been associated with social structural changes -namely industrialization and urbanization- as a result of the modernization process that gained futher pace and changes in strong state tradition. It is argued here that both changes in socio-economic structure and strong state tradition have affected previous constraints and opportunities for democracy as well as introducing new constraints and opportunities. It was a period of realignment and remaking. It ushered in a new era in which new forces arose, previous alliances dissolved, and perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical changes. Following Sunar and Sayarı,[2] we argue that those developments promised both a danger and hope for the stability of democracy, depending to a large extent, on choices, actions and responses of the political actors. A new democratic center, composed of new RPP and the ex-DP successors the JP, could overcome the impact of various confining conditions associated with the strong state tradition and the strains that resulted from modernization process. That was the promise. The danger was that failing to do this, Turkey might be drawn into political chaos. Unfortunately, the danger was realized. Indeed, remaining chapters of this thesis tells the story of this failure that subsequently paved the way for the 12 September 1980 breakdown.

### 3.1.THE NEW ERA IN THE MAKING

The ruling NUC had promised a speedy return to civilian rule, with a new constitutional order. True to state elites' perception of democracy as an end in itself that

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[2] İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," in *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 177.

should be preserved if the country was to be regarded as civilized nation they honored their promise. That was one of the positive impacts of the strong state tradition on the development of democracy.[3] They decided to convene the Constituent Assembly (CA) to prepare draft constitutions. Composed of two chambers; the NUC and the House of representatives, it was "corporate in its composition" including representatives of the judiciary, press, universities, youth labor, agriculture and political parties.[4] Despite the appearance of embracing all social-political groups with a voice, it conspicuously left out the DP and its affiliated organizations, over 200 of the 265 members of the assembly belonged to the RPP.[5]

The CA worked on two constitutional drafts; one prepared by the Onar commission (named after Professor and rector of Istanbul University, Sıddık Sami Onar) and the other by Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. The Onar commission, which "had deep reservations about the working of democracy in Turkey,"[6] had proposed a constitution which aimed to reduce, as much as possible, the elected majorities' influence in governmental affairs. It included the establishment of a powerful upper house which would only partly be elected through elections, the establishment of very powerful Constitutional Court, holding the chief of the staff responsible to the president and like. The Ankara proposal, also distrustful of general vote, did not go as far. The final draft was a compromise text. It was put to referendum and accepted by 61.7 per cent of the vote. The result was, in many ways, disappointing for the NUC and spelled troubled a new start for democracy. Not only was participation in the referendum quite low, but also in some areas, including big cities such as Izmir (% 50.2), Bursa

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[3] It should not be assumed on the other hand that there was no pressure on the military to draw in to barracks. The RPP, led by İnönü, played a crucial role for ensuring quick transition to democracy. See, Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü- The Making of a Turkish Statesmen* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 215-220.

[4] For more information, see Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961* (Washington: Brooking Institution, 1963), 88.

[5] Ibid., 88. The DP was closed down by "Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi" (Court of First Instance) in 29 September 1960 for purely technical reasons. It was charged for violating the Law of Associations, for not holding national congress since 1955 as party by-laws required it to be hold in every four years.

[6] For a more detailed knowledge, see Clement H. Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 113.

(% 52.8), Samsun (% 57), Zonguldak (% 53.1), more than half of those who participated referendum rejected the new constitution.[7]

The exclusion of ex-DP cadres in the making of constitution, alongside the treatment they suffered at the hands of a new administration had sown the seeds of an almost incurable resentment on the part of the DP sympathizers towards the constitution.[8] There we come across the dilemma of post-coup constitution makers, which could be handled only with great skills. If they had included ex-DP cadres, they would have seemed to risked to contradict the legitimacy of their intervention. If they had not, the new constitution would have faced serious problems from its very inception. Turkish constitution-makers, however, did not seem to be concerned with such an outcome. They did not even endeavor to ensure, at least, neutrality of the DP supporters. As if to condemn the DP forever, the preamble of the constitution stated that it was the end-result of the "use of the right to resistance against a political power which had lost its legitimacy."

From the very beginning, this factor negatively affected the new regime's chances of consolidation. The history of democracies, as Linz remarked, highlights the significance of "the inauguration and initial consolidation of the regime for its future capacity to confront a serious crisis."[9] The DP supporters have inclined to see it, not as a compromise constitution in the making of which their views were taken into consideration, but as something that had been "imposed" on them by political rivals.[10] The RPP and other center forces, on the other hand,

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[7] For the figures, Weiker, *Revolution*. 165-166.

[8] Ergun Özbudun, "Constitution Making and Democratic Consolidation," in *Institutions and Democratic StateCraft*, ed. Metin Heper, Ali Kazancıgil and Bert A. Rockman (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 231, 232.

[9] Juan J.Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 40.

[10] The JP leader Süleyman Demirel, for instance, had noted that the 1961 constitution started with "disunion and hostility" (ikilik ve husumet) from the very beginning. He continued that "if you begin in the preamble to disparage the result of national will, after the parliament and government which had its (parliaments') confidence had been removed by coup, it is not easy to ensure peace and harmony in the country." Süleyman Demirel, *Anayasa ve Devlet İdaresi* [The Constitution and the Governing of the State] (İstanbul: Göktürk, 1977), 25, 28.

dogmatically (and reflexively) defended the Constitution, not so much because of they believed it to be the best constitution for Turkey but because the DP tradition opposed it, and it was prepared by themselves. The result was a legitimacy crisis[11] that impinged upon the regime's chances of consolidation.

It is necessary to pay attention to what sort of political system the 1961 constitution devised and how it affected the social-political development of the period. Under the assault of the behavioral revolution the study of constitutions as influences on political behavior of actors were neglected as being simplistic and formalistic. This was especially so in the Anglo-Saxon context where the study of constitutional law and political science was sharply separated.[12] Influenced by this tradition and as a reaction to the exclusive emphasis put on constitutions, scholars tended to neglect the role played by constitutions. But the constitutions are important because "political behavior may take place in a certain form simply because law commands it, the law permits it, or the law prohibits other types of behavior."[13] The 1961 constitutional order, too, had been essential in understanding not only the politics of new era, but also many crises that paved way to the breakdown of democracy in 1980.

In the main, the Constitution reflected the reaction to the severe problems that were observed in the 1950-60 period. Indeed, many of the Constitutions' new regulations were put forward by the RPP 1957 election manifesto.[14] The root of the problem, constitution-makers assumed, was the prevention of majorities' dominance of the governmental apparatus. They

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[11] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "1960 Sonrası Türk Siyasal Hayatına Bir Bakış: Demokrasi, Neo-Patrimonyalism ve İstikrar," [A Look at Post-1960 Turkish Political Life: Democracy, Neo-Patrimonialism and Stability] in *Tarih ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: Cem, 1992), 94.

[12] Ergun Özbudun, *Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı* [The Constitution Making in the Process of Transition to Democracy] (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1993), 49.

[13] James P. Mc Gregor, "Constitutional Factors in Politics in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe." *Communist and Post-communist Studies.* 29, 2, (1996), 149.

[14] For the text, see Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler - Siyaset Bilimi Açısından Bir İnceleme* [The Developments in the Republican People's Party in the period of 1960-1975 from the Political Science point of View] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1976), 126-128.

perceived the DP period as one in which majority dominaned minority. This preference for pluralist rather than majoritarian forms of democracy were also suited to the center's purposes of controlling power. Suspecting that general elections in the future might produce the similar results, statist-bureaucratic elite wanted to carve out a place for themselves to control the elected majorities. According to 1924 Constitution, the TGNA was the sole representative of the national will. By contrast, 1961 Constitution (art.4) stated that "the nation shall exercise sovereignty through the authorized agencies in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution." This formula suggested that "the legislature no longer had a monopoly on legitimate authority, in the exercise of which other branches and agencies of government also had a rightful share."[15] To this end, the constitution devised a complex system of checks and balances; an upper house, independent judiciary and constitutional court. It also granted constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to universities and Turkish Radio Television. Moreover, it also established a National Security Council (NSC) composed of top level commanders and civilian ministers to "advise" the government concerning the matters of national security.

The Constitution also differed in terms of the regulation of civil-political and socio-economic rights. The 1924 Constitution had, in a very individualistic manner, stated (art.68) that "limits to one's freedom is the freedom of other's." As such it provided the assembly an exclusive right to define their limits. The 1961 Constitution, on the other hand, did not wish to leave it the TGNA. It contained a much more detailed bill of rights (consisting of 52 articles) indicating under which conditions, if any, they might be suspended.

Rather more to the point (and new) was the extensive regulations of socio-economic rights and obligations. Ignoring the country's economic underdevelopment, the constitution makers wished all socio-economic rights to be included in the constitution "in the name of the progress."[16] The Constitution (art.41) stated that Turkey was a social state which was charged to provide "a living standard in accordance with human dignity through the regulation of

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[15] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkish Constitutional Law," in *Introduction to Turkish Law*, ed. Tuğrul Ansay and Don Wallace (London: Kluwer, 1987), 29.

[16] Kemal H.Karpat, "Domestic Politics," in *Turkey*, ed. Klaus Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Janderhoeck, 1985), 70.

economic and social life and in accordance with justice and full employment." It expected the state to provide land for those who either had none or insufficient land, to nationalize "where it is deemed necessary in the public interest private enterprises which bear the characteristic of public service" (art.59). It recognized the right "to establish trade unions and federations of trade unions without having to obtain prior permission" (art.46) as well as, of course, "the right to collective bargaining and strike" (art.47) for both employees and employers alike.

The constitution accepted the principle of separation of powers and a parliamentary system of government with a bicameral assembly. The president's powers were largely symbolical, while the prime minister was the actual head of the executive. The Judiciary was given "almost total independence"[17] so as to make judges immune from political pressures, while the Constitutional court was set up to review the constitutionality of laws. Though not constitutionally ordered, the constitution also "opened the way"[18] for the introduction of proportional representation (PR). PR seemed to be the best way to ensure the representation of various political currents in the assembly, and thus to prevent the majority's dominance.

It is not possible here to provide complete treatment of the Constitution, but on the whole, two prominent features of the constitution emerges. It was intended to be a truly "liberal" (in American sense) document that both cherished political participation and charged the state providing socio-economic welfare services. Both because those who drafted the constitution (intelligentsia) wanted the adopt best of every constitution in the world and their wishes did not always coincide with those of the army, the constitution involved many contradictory dimensions.

On the one hand, it cherished political participation, but on the other hand it desired some institutions to be as independently as possible, i.e. to be outside the control of governing majorities. These institutions included Turkish Radio and Television, National Security

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[17] Ibid., 70.

[18] Ibid., 69.

Council, and the Universities.[19] In terms of the limitations of the basic rights and liberties, the constitution introduced such vague concepts as "national security, public order, general morality." The 1924 Constitution, on the other hand, had stated that "limits to one's freedom are the freedoms of other's." Even a sympathetic observer of the 1961 Constitution[20] noted that that could allow executive to follow more restrictive policies than the 1924 constitution ever did. Last but not least, somewhat contradicting its welfare aims, the constitution also tried to tied up the hand of the executive through the second chamber and very strong judiciary eager to control every act of it.

Besides, and rather more technical point concerns the role of the constitution for aggravating crises -or not providing enough means to solve immobilism.[21] Specifically, the dissolution of the assembly by the executive, a central feature of the parliamentary system of government, was made extremely difficult. That severely weakened the hand of the executive. The constitution did not envisage the proclamation of a state of emergency (olağanüstü haller) for the prevention of social and political emergency cases. It legislated instead, direct martial law (sıkıyönetim) as a way of preventing crisis. In the case of an emergency that could not be dealt with under the normal democratic procedures, authorities were then left with the stark choice of appealing to the military or continuing under democratic procedure.

The constitutional order appears to have affected post-1960 politics to a significant degree. But it is sufficient to note here that the permissive atmosphere that the constitution cherished encouraged widespread political participation of various groups. It also severely constrained the elected governments, negatively affecting their ability to move swiftly and decisively. Having stated the constitutional orders' influence on politics of the late sixties and seventies, we should also pay attention to changes in traditional social structure undergoing

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[19] In the same line, believing that "political party rivalry at the village and neighborhod level may lead to disruption of basic social units" the political parties law prohibited the set up of a political organization below the level of sub-province. Dodd, *Politics.*133

[20] Bülent Tanör, *İki Anayasa, 1961-1982* [The Two Constitutions, 1961-1982] (İstanbul: Beta, 1986), 89.

[21] Ibid., 92.

modernization process that had gained further pace.

Since the fifties, the Turkish socio-economic structure had made considerable progress on the hard road of the modernization. Table 1., might provide an indication of the pace of the change. Alongside the respectable growth of GNP, significant improvements have been observed in the means of transportation and communication as well as the consumption of various goods.

Table 1. Growth Indicators, 1948-1968 [22]

| | 1948 | 1968 | Percent Increase | Annual Rate of Increase |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GNP (TL, 1961 prices | 27.5 | 76.8 | 178 | 5.2 |
| Per Capita GNP | 1375 | 2261 | 64 | 2.5 |
| Value added in agriculture (TL, 1961 prices) | 12.75 | 21.6 | 74 | 2.8 |
| Agriculture as % GNP | 45.4 | 28.0 | - | - |
| Value Added in industry (TL, 1961 prices) | 3.7 | 13.7 | 270 | 6.8 |
| Industry as % of GNP | 13.5 | 17.8 | - | - |
| Per Capita Consumption | | | | |
| Paper (kilograms) | 2.0 | 4.7 | 135 | 4.9 |
| Textiles (meters) | 6.3 | 19.4 | 208 | 6.5 |
| Stell (kilograms) | 10.0 | 39.7 | 297 | 8.0 |
| Electricity (KWH) | 33.7 | 163.2 | 384 | 9.2 |
| Road Transport | | | | |
| All-weather Roads (1000 kms, 1947-67 | 12 | 42 | 250 | 6.5 |
| Number of motor vehicles (1000's, 1948- 1967) | 19 | 225 | 1.084 | 13.3 |
| Goods (billion ton-kms./year, 1950-1968 | 1.0 | 14.1 | 1.310 | 15.4 |
| Travel (billion passenger-kms/year, 1950-1968 | 2.6 | 38.2 | 1.369 | 15.6 |
| Installed Generating Capacity (m.w., 1948-1967) | 305 | 2100 | 589 | 9.8 |
| Number of licensed radios | 234 | 2934 | 1210 | 13.3 |

Commensurate with the decline of the share of the agriculture in the GNP and parallel increase in the share of the industry and services a notable shift in the composition of the economically active population was also observed.

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[22] Cited in İlkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* (Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, 1974), 93. Sunar derived those figures from, Edwin J. Cohn, *Turkish Economic, Social and Political Change* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 48-49.

Table 2. Economically Active Population %, According to Sectors, 1927-1976[23]

| SECTORS | 1927 | 1935 | 1950 | 1962 | 1972 | 1976 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | 80.9 | 76.4 | 77.7 | 77.1 | 65.0 | 59.4 |
| Industry | 8.9 | 11.7 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 14.5 | 16.6 |
| Services | 10.2 | 11.9 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 24.0 |

It can be clearly seen that there was a steady decline in number of those who were employed in the agricultural sector from a high point of 80.9 per cent in 1927 to 65.0 per cent in 1972. A significant increase was recorded in the number of those who worked outside the agriculture, amounting to more than forty per cent.

A related phenomena of urbanization also gathered momentum. In 1935, only 16.4 per cent of the population lived in places with more than 10000 population. This figure rose to 25.1 percent in 1960 and 41.7 per cent in 1975. The rate of increase for the urban population was 6.4 and 5.1 per cent for the periods of 1950-60 and 1960-70 respectively. While the rural population increased only 1.9 and 1.5 per cent in the same period.[24]

Table 3. Urban and Rural Population in Turkey, 1935-1970[25]

| Years | Total Pop. | Urban Pop. | % | Rural Pop. | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1935 | 16.158.000 | 2.684.000 | 16.4 | 13.473.000 | 83.4 |
| 1940 | 17.820.000 | 3.234.000 | 18.1 | 14.586.000 | 81.9 |
| 1945 | 18.790.000 | 3.441.000 | 18.3 | 15.348.000 | 81.7 |
| 1950 | 20.947.000 | 3.883.000 | 18.5 | 17.063.000 | 81.5 |
| 1955 | 24.064.000 | 5.328.000 | 22.1 | 18.735.000 | 77.9 |
| 1960 | 27.754.000 | 6.967.000 | 25.1 | 20.787.000 | 74.8 |
| 1965 | 31.391.000 | 9.382.000 | 29.9 | 22.008.000 | 70.1 |
| 1970 | 35.605.000 | 12.734.000 | 35.7 | 22.931.000 | 64.3 |

Urbanization in Turkey, on the other hand, was uneven. It was the big cities that

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[23] Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950* [An Economic History of the Republican Period, 1923-1950] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982), 101.

[24] Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization -Government and Growth in Modern Turkey* (Holmes: Meir, 1985), 29.

[25] T.C Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı* [50 Years of Social and Economic Development in Turkey] (Ankara: DİE, 1973), 78.

continued to attract migrants. The population growth rate of the cities with more than 500000 people were 7.6, 8.4 and 10.9 per cent for the periods of 1955-60, 1960-65, and 1965-70 respectively. While it was 4.4, 4.0 and 4.0 per cent for cities with a population of 50000 to 100000 for the same years.[26] What is more and like many other developing countries, industrialization had not been commensurate with urbanization. That is to say, migration to the cities had taken place not only because the cities offered attractive employment in industry but because increasing poverty in rural areas resulting from population increase, mechanization of agriculture, and diversion of lands due to inheritance, pushed peasant to search for better life opportunities in the cities.[27] The inability of the industry to generate jobs for immigrants led to pervasive informal or marginal sector characterized by labor intensive small-scale service enterprise with low wages and without any social security. Many migrants who failed to find industrial jobs or employment in public sector worked as porters, shoe-shiners, and peddlers in the streets. Not being able to afford the rents in the established quarters of the city, they tended to live in the Gecekondu (literally houses "built overnight" on the public, and in exceptional cases private, land) or squatter houses.

Table 4. Number of Squatter Houses and Their Population[28]

| Years | Number of Squatters | Squatter Population | Urban pop. Living in squatters % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1955 | 50.000 | 250.000 | 4.7 |
| 1960 | 240.000 | 1.200.000 | 16.4 |
| 1965 | 430.000 | 2.150.000 | 22.9 |
| 1970 | 600.000 | 3.000.000 | 23.6 |
| 1980 | 1.150.000 | 5.750.000 | 26.1 |

[26] Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey- From Atatürk to the Present Day* (New York, London: Holmes Meier, 1981), 65.

[27] Sunar, *Politics*. 97; Danielson and Keleş, *Urbanization*.38. Karpat, who found that majority of the migrants he studied, have pointed economic hardship in the villages as the chief reason, adds that the pressure of some landlords and tribal cihefs and the kan davası (vendetta) were other factors for migration. Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 56, 73.

[28] Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası* [Urbanization Policy](Ankara: İmge, 1993), 383.

Table 4., demonstrates sharp increases in the number of squatter residents. While in 1955 only 4.7 per cent of the urban population lived in squatters, the figure rose to 22.9 per cent in 1965 and 26.1 per cent in 1980. It was estimated that in the late seventies that 65 per cent of the population of Ankara lived in Gecekondu, while it was 45 per cent and 35 per cent for İstanbul and İzmir respectively.[29]

In short, through the late fifties and sixties the economic and social structure of Turkey underwent considerable changes whose impact would be felt in the years to come. Turkey's increasing drive towards industrialization brought heretofore little-known new cleavages (economical in nature) into the fore; conflict between workers and businessmen (and state since most of them were employed in the public sector) and cleavages within the private sector between big business and smaller ones. Particular characteristics of the urbanization process generated many problems that have political connotations.

It was noted in the previous chapter that "civic values" that are conducive to democracy are more likely to be found in socio-economically developed urbanized societies than the backward rural ones. The Turkish urbanization process, however, appears to have not generated a fertile ground for the emergence of such values, at least in the short term. It tended to produce new forms of organization and culture "which were neither fully rural nor urban but combination of both."[30] The inability of the private industry to absorb flux of migrants and their subsequent turn to the informal sector to make their livelihood was one of the obstacles. Many migrants found themselves in an environment of insecurity characteristic of life in villages since they could hardly get a regular income, enjoy the feeling of security of having been covered by social security net, or be sure that his gecekondu would not be demolished by authorities.[31] In

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[29] Ruşen Keleş, *100 Soruda, Türkiye'de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, [Urbanization, Housing and Gecekondu in Turkey in 100 Questions] second ed. (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1978), 189.

[30] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Politics of Transition", 91.

[31] Mübeccel Belik Kıray, "Az Gelişmiş Ülkelerde Hızla Topraktan Kopma ve Kentle Bütünleşememe,"[The Gecekondu: The Fast De-Peasantization and non-integration with the City in Underdeveloped Countries] in *Toplumbilim Yazıları* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981), 347-348. (originally published in 1973); Peter Suzuki, "Peasants Without

search of economical and psychological security, migrants relied on primordial loyalties to find a job, to build their gecekondu, and to survive an alien environment. Heper, for instance, in his study of Gültepe and Telsizler squatter areas in İstanbul, found that migrants heavily relied on their kin and hemşeris (people from their home town) who had already settled in the city, to survive.[32] Alan Dubetsky in his study of factory organization in Güzelbahçe and Aktepe in İstanbul observed that the majority of workers especially in small factories that used low levels of technology tended to recruit workers from a specified area of the country, usually from that of the owner.[33] The new squatters, thus, were populated by individuals coming from the same village or district and forming clan and reproducing communitarian-mahalle syndrome in the midst of the city.

It was true that the migrants' dependence on kin, ethno-religious groups or hemşeris, and their continuing relations with villages, provided sort of an adjustment mechanism through which newcomers to city learned to cope with city life.[34] But, on the other hand, this factor appears to have constituted a hindrance for the development of such "civic values" usually associated with urbanization, as individualism, tolerance, sense of efficacy, trust and ability to work with others who does not happen to be in his primordial small group.[35] Individualism,

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Plows: Some Anatolians in İstanbul." *Rural Sociology*. 31, 4 (1966), 432.

[32] Metin Heper, *Türkiye'de Kent Göçmeni ve Bürokratik Örgütler* [Urban-Migrants and Bureaucratic Organizations in Turkey](İstanbul: Üçdal, 1983), 59.

[33] Alan Dubetsky, "Kinship, Primordial Ties, and Factory Organization in Turkey: An Anthropological View." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 7 (1976), 437.

[34]Kıray, "Bütünleşememe," 348; Suzuki. "Peasants," 432; Ned Levine, "Old Culture-New Culture: A Study of Migrants in Ankara." *Social Forces*. 51 (1973), 360 ff.

[35] Ahmet Ö. Evin, "Communitarian Structures and Social Change." In *Modern Turkey - Continuity and Change*, ed. Ahmet Ö. Evin (Opladen, Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 19-23. Heper, similarly noted that the migrants found it very difficult to come together with others (with whom they do not share primordial loyalties) for common aims. Ibid., 66. Regarding their sense of efficacy, Heper found that nearly 9 out of 10 squatters believed that they can not do anything against the decision (by authorities) which is likely to harm their interests. Ibid., 100. This having been said, it should not be assumed that old urbanities do very well on these counts. This does not seem to be the case. What can be said with confidence, however, is that old urbanities are better than the migrants. See, for an interesting article that asserts that not only for squatters but also for the long time residents of the city the family and kinship ties continue to play significant roles, Alan Duben, "The Significance of Family and Kinship in Urban Turkey," in *Sex, Roles, Family & Community in Turkey*, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (Bloomington:

tolerance, and sense of efficacy on the part of the individual can hardly be expected to flourish, if a person can barely sustain his life without help of his small group. In that case, a person faces the stark choice of either quitting his community or accepting norms and values of these groups which hardly fosters individualism and tolerance of diversity.[36] Similarly, while small group solidarity is likely to promote trust of those you know, it is also likely to foster distrust of those you do not know.[37] In fact, Bradburn argued that basically because life of an ordinary Turk turned around family and kinship groups, Turks had a difficulty to come together, with those outside this circle, to pursue common goals.[38]

The migrants' relations with political parties, not surprisingly, were largely based on vertical relationships of patronage, as it was in the village. To secure public employment, to secure legal guarantees for squatter houses, to get various public services they had to turn to political parties that had the power to realize these. Though it seemed to contribute to the sense of efficiency in the squatters and facilitated their integration into urban society, the relations resembled those of clientelist-dependency relations rather than horizontal ones. Political parties were seen as patrons that had the power to supply what they wanted only if they voted for them. Squatters, then, perceived right to vote "as an ideal avenue for transforming the communal opinion into a political will and as an instrument for participating in politics to secure benefits."[39] Like the villagers who cared mostly (if not only) about the satisfaction of

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Indiana University Press, 1982). Also, Dubetsky, "factory," 441.

[36] It should, in no way, be assumed that there is a direct relations between urbanization and the emergence of toleration, individualism and sense of efficacy. The emergence of civic values can be said to have been related with, at least, the socio-economic factors, experiences with political authority and the impact of traditional values, particularly religion (or more accurately particular understanding of religion). For an insightful attempt on how particular understanding of Islam (but not the Islam as such) came to promote fatalism, unquestioned obedience to authority in Ottoman-Turkish context, see, Sabri F. Ülgener, *Zihniyet ve Din* [The Mentality and Religion] (İstanbul: Der, 1981)

[37] Margaret Levi, "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work." *Politics & Society*. 24, 1 (1996), 51.

[38] Norman M. Bradburn, "Interpersonal Relations within Formal Organizations in Turkey." *Journal of Social Issues*. 19 (1963), 63.

[39] Karpat, "The Politics of Transition," 96. Karpat also noted the existence of large percentage of migrants who voted for the RPP in the village swithced for their votes to the JP and TLP in the city. Ibid.,

immediate local needs, squatters, too, seemed to little concerned with national issues, abstract principles, or honesty of leadership but immediate issues of ensuring the survival of squatter, and improving the local infrastructure (sewerage, roads, schools).

The relationships between the rise of radical movements and urbanization process were another factor that brought inhabitants of the gecekondu to the center of discussion. Many analysts predicted that constituting the new proletariat of the cities, migrants would provide a constant source of support for radical movements. This assumption did not hold in Turkey, at least in the short-run. The early settlers of squatter houses seemed to be happy with their life in the city and did not want to return to villages.[40] Since, however difficult, city life created a sense of relative (relative to village life) betterment. Many did vote for the JP because the party, as the party of power, skillfully used its patronage powers. Though they had not been fully integrated into city life, traditional family and local ties and the prevailing leadership patterns appeared to have prevented a sense of alienation. Many researchers, on the other hand, cautioned that with the second generation (and unless the sense of economic betterment continued) it might begin to change. This indeed, as we shall see, was what seemed to happen in the late seventies.

### 3.2. POLITICS IN THE NEW ERA

In the first election of the post-1961 political order, five parties contested. The elections demonstrated that those parties competing for the former DP votes still had a considerable following. The RPP, which had a misfortune of being equated with the military rule and its several misnomers, was able to gain only 36.7 per cent of the vote while the newly established Justice Party (JP) got 34.8 per cent. The RPP managed to win 173 of the 450 seats in the lower house and 36 in the senate, while the JP secured 158 seats in the lower house and 70 in the senate.

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[40] Keleş, *Kentleşme*.33; Karpat, *Gecekondu*. 140. Heper, *Göçmen*. 56-7

The 1961 elections were the beginning of the process of both the disintegration and change of outlook in what we called the state elites. In the first place, the army high command clearly saw that the radical officers, who were inclined to believe that socio-economic reforms had to be enacted under the prolonged military rule, might seriously damage both the internal hierarchy and tradition of non-intervention into daily political life. Their coming to such a conclusion was the beginning of a process of the bulk of intelligentsia's alienation from the military. The shedding of radicalism, within the army, have also prepared the ground in which the convergence, albeit very tentative, between the JP and the army would later take place on the basis of anti-communism and anti-separatism. To better understand how the military's outlook changed, it is necessary to review main events briefly.

After the announcement of the election results, some disgruntled officers (including seven generals and four admirals) decided to intervene in the political process. They signed what was known as the 21 October protocol. The protocol was a "manifesto of a coup otherwise unprepared."[41] It included the banning of all political parties and the dissolvement of both the NUC and election results. Facing such demands the NUC leadership tried to satisfy both the disgruntled officers and its pre-election promise that results would be respected regardless of the conclusions. Through their endeavors, what was known as Çankaya protocol was finally signed by party leaders on 24 October. The protocol stated that the RPP leader İsmet İnönü would become prime minister and that the parties would support Cemal Gürsel's (head of the NUC) election as president. There would, at the same time, be no attempt for the amnesty of convicted ex-DP members. Thus, the first coalition government, (one writer called it as "shotgun wedding"[42]) was formed under the leadership of İnönü.

The transition to civilian politics at a formal level was thus completed. But disgruntled radical officers did not stop there. Colonel Talat Aydemir and his friends and students at Harbiye attempted a military coup in February 1962.[43] Thanks to İnönü and military high

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[41] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and The Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 146.

[42] Ibid., 147.

[43] For the details, Ibid., 156-160; see also less than academic treatment by Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç*

commands' balanced and careful attitude, the coup was put down. İnönü had persuaded Aydemir that, if they surrender, they would be no trials. Though İnönü fulfilled his promise, Aydemir was unrepentant. He attempted another coup in May 1963, which also failed. This time, both the politicians and army high command were prepared to make him pay for what he had attempted to do. Aydemir and his collaborator Fethi Gürcan were tried and sentenced to death.[44] Soon they were executed.

This was an important event in that the armed forces high command had shown determination not to tolerate such actions.[45] If they had taken a different course of action, Turkey might have slid into the position of the many Latin American and African praetorian states, in which the spiral of coups and counter-coups followed each other endlessly. Be that as it may, the struggle between high command and junior level radicalism would continue and culminate only after the 12 March military intervention. The Aydemir case had shown that senior officers had a first round, and for the time being an accommodation between armed forces and civilian government was finally began to evolve.

Why did the army high command not tolerate junior level radicalism ? Several factors can be suggested. The Aydemir case had shown that as well threatening their own position, tolerance of junior level radicalism risked the division of army, as the Turkish air force jets came close to bombing the Harbiye in the second coup attempt to put down the rebellion. Secondly, post-election developments threatened neither the 27 May "Revolution" nor their own position. Though unsatisfied by the election results, the army high command managed to get Cemal Gürsel elected President and İsmet İnönü Prime Minister. Besides, there was the National Security Council where they could easily transmit their views to civilian governments.

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*İhtilalin Hikayesi* [The Story of Three Revolutions](Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1966).

[44] For details, Walter F. Weiker, "The Aydemir Case and Turkey's Political Dilemma." *Middle Eastern Affairs.* 14 (1963).

[45] As Hughes noted Aydemir case was also important for showing that the "Atatürkism" can be interpreted in a way that provides no place for liberal democratic order and can bu used as screen for personalistics aims. Aydemir had claimed that he was the true representative of Atatürk's ideas. Preston Hughes, *Atatürkçülük ve Türkiye'nin Demokratikleşme Süreci,* [The Atatürkism and Turkey's Democratization Process ] trans. Rabia Süer (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1993), 100.

They had also ensured that the legitimacy of the 27 May intervention would not be questioned. In addition, during the military interregnum they provided for themselves and army as a whole "by significantly raising officers salaries and establishing auxiliary benefits, including housing, commissaries and other prerequisites."[46]

A series of unstable coalition governments followed until the 1965 elections. The main issues affecting the coalitions were the amnesty of ex-DP officers and the struggle between the JP and New Turkey Party for the old DP's votes. Meanwhile Turkish politics was becoming truly radicalized in the sense that social and political problems of the country began to be discussed in the light of radical paradigms, discussions being dominated by socialist ideas. Socialism which had, as an idea and practice, been an anathema for the pre-1960 period came to life fully in the post-1960 period. As a leading figure in the Turkish Socialist movement Behice Boran put it "it is only after the 27 May 1960 that socialism as an political idea and movement seized the opportunity to make itself felt legally."[47] As a result of "an almost complete freedom of expression,"[48] that permissive atmosphere of post-1961 political order provided, many second rate socialist literature books translated, as well as propagandist books by Turkish authors,[49] which would contribute the rise of student radicalism. In a desperate search for solutions to pressing problems, academics, journalists, students, were all involved in hotly contested debates concerning the socio-economic structure of the country and how to overcome the problem of underdevelopment -of planning, of land reform, and of the role of

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[46] Weiker, *Revolution*. 103.

[47] Behice Boran, *Türkiye*.60. Similarly, for Ahmet Samim, 1961 signalled, "Brave New Beginning," Ahmet Samim, "The Left," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 155.

[48] Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 52.

[49] Among others see, Hilmi Özgen, *Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri* [The Principles of Turkish Socialism](Ankara: Mars, 1962); Cemil Sait Barlas, *Sosyalistlik Yolları ve Türkiye Gerçeklikleri* [The Ways of Socialism and the Realities of Turkey] (İstanbul, 1962); Ali Faik Cihan, *Sosyalist Türkiye* [The Socialist Turkey](İstanbul: Toplum, 1965); Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları* [Turkey and the Problems of Socialism](İstanbul: Gün, 1968); Çetin Altan, *Onlar Uyanırken- Türk Sosyalistlerinin El Kitabı* [While They Awaken-The Turkish Socialists' Handbook ](İstanbul: Ararat, 1967).

the private sector. The solutions they proposed were in favor of state-dominated economic and political order that did not always bode well with liberal democratic ideals. The YÖN declaration, signed by prominent figures of intellectual life and many bureaucrats, which favored a statist economic development, is a good indicator of the extent to which the intellectual stage had been dominated by socialist and socialist inspired ideas. Alongside this radicalization, an increase, which can be interpreted as sign of desire for further political participation, was also observed the number of voluntary associations.

Table 5. Growth of Voluntary Associations[50]

| | 1950 Num. | Percent | 1960 Num. | Percent | 1968 Num. | Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ECONOMIC | | | | | | |
| Employer assn. | - | - | 23 | .1 | 190 | .5 |
| Agriculture assn. | 49 | 2.3 | 272 | 1.6 | 683 | 1.9 |
| Labor Unions | 91 | 4.2 | 408 | 2.4 | 995 | 2.6 |
| Professional assn. | 53 | 2.4 | 189 | 1.1 | 259 | .7 |
| White Collar assn. | 166 | 7.6 | 665 | 3.9 | 2355 | 6.2 |
| Artisans (esnaf) | 253 | 11.7 | 2745 | 15.9 | 3670 | 9.7 |
| Subtotal | 612 | 28.2 | 4302 | 25.0 | 8152 | 21.3 |
| CULTURAL | | | | | | |
| Social Welfare and charity | 208 | 9.6 | 635 | 3.7 | 1520 | 4.0 |
| Sports | 699 | 32.2 | 3376 | 19.6 | 5334 | 14.1 |
| Religious-mosque buiilding and preservation | 142 | 6.5 | 4821 | 28.0 | 8419 | 22.3 |
| Other religious | 12 | .6 | 283 | 1.6 | 2311 | 6.1 |
| Culture | 285 | 13.1 | 2511 | 14.5 | 6327 | 16.7 |
| Beatification | 102 | 4.7 | 853 | 5.0 | 4644 | 12.3 |
| Subtotal | 1448 | 66.7 | 12479 | 72.4 | 28555 | 75.5 |
| OTHER | | | | | | |
| Foreigners and minorities | 75 | 3.5 | 218 | 1.3 | 290 | .8 |
| Miscellaneous | 36 | 1.7 | 230 | 1.4 | 809 | 2.1 |
| TOTAL | 2171 | | 17229 | | 37806 | |

As the table shows beginning from 1950 there was a steady increase in the number of voluntary associations from 2171 in 1950 to 17229 in 1960 and to 37806 in 1968. Though it does not seem that 1960 was the turning point for the proliferation of voluntary associations as

[50] Weiker, *Modernization*.74. These figures derived from Ahmet N. Yücekök's study of associations in Turkey is by no means non-contestable and must be looked at with care. But as a whole it gives a broad picture of the growth of voluntary associations. Ahmet Naki Yücekök, *Türkiye'de Dernek Gelişmeleri* [The Development of Associations in Turkey ] (Ankara: AÜ SBF, 1972).

many analysts implied, it is a fact that the post-1960 period was conducive to the proliferation of class-based associations, particularly labor unions and professional associations.[51] This is so despite the fact that table shows that the share of economic associations compared to the total number of associations declined from 28.2 in 1950 to 25.0 in 1960 and to 21.3 in 1968 due to phenomenal increases in the number of religious -mosque building and preservation- associations from 6.5 percent in 1950 to 28.0 percent in 1960 and to 22.3 in 1968.

We shall later turn to the impact of this radicalization and increased associational activity on both the student movement and on the emergence of ultra-nationalist movements, but these factors affected major parties no lesser degree. Responding to a rising wave of ideological debates the RPP adopted a "left of center" (ortanın solu) policy introduced in the eve of 1965 election by İsmet İnönü himself.[52] It was the beginning of a process of the RPP's defection from the values that the army (the main partner in the center) held dear. The RPP leadership hoped that with left of center policy it would ensure the support of workers, intelligentsia and students.[53] Otherwise, İsmet İnönü, a veteran politician, did not seem to seriously entertain the idea that the RPP would be modeled on West European social democrat and-or socialist parties. For İnönü, left of center policy referred "to the RPP's principles and party programs and its place on the right-left continuum. In no way is left of center policy outside the RPP's six arrows. It can not be interpreted in a way that changes the effect of those principles. It can not be implemented as a new idea. The RPP is not a socialist party."[54] But no to avail, as we shall dwell on below, left of center movement within the party would soon be channeled away from the direction that İnönü and his team wished, culminating in the victory

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[51] Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 163-164.

[52] Kili, *Halk Partisi*. 211.

[53] George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey." *Problems of Communism*. 29, 4, 29.

[54] Necip Mirkelamoğlu, *İnönü Ecevit'i Anlatıyor* [İnönü Talks about Ecevit] (İstanbul: Kerven, 1975), 80. He also argued that "the left of center policy emerged when I used the term for clearer expression of the RPP's principles. There is nothing in this policy which contradicts, or can not be explained, by the RPP's basic principles." Ibid., 119.

of Bülent Ecevit whose interpretation of "left of center" policy was much close to various shades of left than İnönü.

İnönü's this move, however, did not secure enough votes for the RPP to come to power. The 1965 election was undoubtedly, a victory for the JP. It had garnered away 52.9 per cent of the vote (and 240 seats out of 450 in the lower assembly) while the RPP got only 28.7 per cent of the vote (and 134 seats out of 450). Thus, only five years after the 27 May military intervention, another party claiming, however cautiously, to represent old DP constituency had come to power through the elections. Having said that one should not perceive the JP as the exact replica of the old DP. In the changing social-political structure of Turkey what we have called political elites underwent momentous changes (both in their composition and ideology), too.

Ironically, the JP (founded in 11 February 1961) was led by General Ragıp Gümüşpala, who had been chief of staff after the 27 May coup, but then retired as part of the "rejuvenation" of the armed forces by the NUC. Expectedly, the party leadership was careful to downplay their affinities with the former DP. According to Ahmad "initially the JP enjoyed the full confidence of the military."[55] At least their own men were leading the party. As time went on, however, rank and file membership and local organizations had begun to show a rather hostile attitude towards the military and 27 May intervention, which led to harsh threats from the leadership of the NUC. General Cemal Gürsel, for instance, once spoke in the constituent assembly arguing that "there are those who wish to revive the ex-DP with its old dangerous habits. They do not appreciate that they are playing with fire."[56] It was even attacked several times by a group of youngsters in the name of protecting the 27 May "Revolution."

With the unexpected death of General Gümüşpala in 1964, the party elected a new chairman Süleyman Demirel, who secured a resounding victory over his main rival Sadettin

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[55] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C.Hurst, 1977), 233.

[56] Feroz Ahmad and Bedia T.Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* [An Annotated Chronology of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey, 1945-1971](Ankara: Bilgi, 1976), 230.

Bilgiç, who was believed to be a candidate of ex-DP hard-liners. Süleyman Demirel was a new man in Turkish politics. Born in 1924 in a village in the province of Isparta, he was of peasant origin, who then rose to top through his abilities. He was capable technocrat who became the General Director of State Water Undertakings at the age of 32 in the DP period. He was known as "the King of Dams." Though not as charismatic as Menderes, his peasant background (which he quite skillfully used to portray himself as the people's man) combined with his proven administrative technocratic capabilities made him a symbol of "modernity and national authenticity."[57] He was a leader with whom the ambitious rural migrant could identify himself as a symbol of self-made man,[58] and "the first entrepreneur to lead a Turkish government."[59]

The JP under Demirel's leadership managed to assuage army's fears about revival of old DP and thus achieved a modus vivendi with the armed forces at least in the short run.[60] At times Demirel did not hesitate to pay tribute to the 27 May intervention and constitution that it brought.[61] At other times, he spoke of the need to forget past controversies and to look ahead: "27 May Revolution (ihtilal) is a reality. Nations should look to, not their past, but the future. Let us leave aside setting the accounts of 27 May. Let us discuss now how to cure existing wounds. We should search for securing 'unity and togetherness' in the country in the shortest possible time."[62] In power, Demirel always tried to assuage the fears of the army commanders

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[57] Karpat, "developments," 364.

[58] Ahmad, *Experiment*.234.

[59] İsmet Giritli, "Turkey Since the 1965 Elections." *Middle East Journal.* 23, (1969), 359 (pp-351-363).

[60] Karpat, "Developments," 363. Michael, P. Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections." *Middle East Journal.* 24, (1970), 5.

[61] For instance, when reading his governments policies in the assembly ( in 1965) Demirel spoke as following; "Before proceeding further into our government's policies, I should make it clear that it is our unfailing objective to implement the (1961) Constitution with its words and spirit, which rest on the 27 May revolution, and approved by national will." Cited in Dağlı, Nurdan, Belma Aktürk. *Hükümetler ve Programları II, 1960-1980*, 2. Cilt. [Governments and Their Programs II, 1960-1980, vol 2] (Ankara: TBMM, 1988), 92.

[62] Cited in Hulusi Turgut, *Demirel'in Dünyası* [The World of Demirel], vol 1 (İstanbul: ABC,

regarding his party's intentions. He provided virtual autonomy for the armed forces in their internal relations. He also tried to keep quiet about their intrusion into the civilian politics. The election of Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay to the Presidency in 1966 was also part of this strategy.[63] In taking such course of action, Demirel appears to have learnt from what he thought to be Menderes' mistakes.[64] The fact that he rejuvenated a movement whose leader had been hanged only four years earlier made him very cautious.[65] He was reported to have said that "(in Turkish history) forty-three Sadrazams had been executed alongside six Padişah" and was "ready to face this fact with dignity (vakar)" adding that "dignity does not mean voluntary acceptance" (vakar memnuniyet demek değildir).[66] He also said that the specter of three hanged politicians were always in his mind.[67]

In terms of the classification proposed by Duverger,[68] the JP, like its predecessor, had more in common with "cadre" rather than "mass membership" parties.[69] It was also an

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1992), 252.

[63] For a detailed treatment of the JP's relations with the army, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri, Bir İkilemin Anatomisi* [The JP-Army Relationships, An Anatomy of a Dilemma] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993).

[64] For an interesting article that elite political learning is key the success of the democracy, see Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship." *Comparative Politics.* 24,3 (1992), 276.

[65] A close aide, who worked both under Menderes and Demirel compared them; "Adnan Bey was a person who quickly got angry and flared up but afterwards tried to placate those. Demirel, by contrast, is a person who does not express his true feelings, does not react quickly, and does not say anything before its time is up. He is a man who does not decide quickly but, like a chess player take steps after careful considerations. In short, he is careful, planned person. He is a mathematician, who does not leave anything to chance, who takes decisions late, but his decisions are grounded." İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım* [My Memoirs] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1990), 91.

[66] Turgut, *Demirel*.197.

[67] Ibid., 384.

[68] In the cadre model parties rely on small groups of activists and maintain only loose membership. Their activites are limited in scope and largely devoted to electoral mobilization. In the mass party model, however, parties rely on due paying members and maintain strong gross roots organisations. Activites of these parties are not confined to election times but continue afterwards usually in line with well-defined principles. See, Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties-Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* , (second english edition), ed. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1959), 63 ff.

[69] Sabri Sayarı, "Aspects of Party Organisation." *Middle East Journal*, 30, (1976), 188. Also,

"indirect" rather than a "direct" party in the sense that it was not established by, nor maintained formal links with trade or business unions or other associations. Its organizational structure, accordingly, showed characteristics of indirect, cadre parties. Not aiming to attract the votes of one segment of the society, nor the mobilization of the electorate, it did not heavily rely on the number and active participation of members who paid dues. It was in the election periods, if at all, that ordinary party members became active. Their activity, however, did not mean that they could exert significant pressure on leadership cadres. The power of the central organs-vis-a-vis local organizations was remarkable and dissidents found it difficult to resist the party center's demands. It then became a foregone conclusion that the small and very limited number of top cadres and political leader formulated policies, prepared the programs, determined party strategies and maintained strict party discipline.[70] Indeed, especially after 1970 (when the rival faction left the party) the domination of its leader Süleyman Demirel became complete.[71] Its links with social groups, consequently, remained weak and based on vertical relationships of clientelism and patronage. The party, it seemed, was interested more in exploiting advantages of being in power through party patronage than planned-intelligent articulation/aggregation of various diverse interests and formulation of concise, well-thought out policies for the country's problems.[72]

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Arsev Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980)* [The Leadership Oligarchy in the Process of Democratization, the RPP and the JP, 1961-1980] (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993), 137.

[70] We do not have a comprehensive study (that takes into consideration cultural, institutional and economical factors) of why is the case. For an attempt that emphasized institutional aspects of the problem, see, Bektaş, *Liderler.*

[71] Bektaş, *Liderler.*162. One JP MP was reported to have said "Süleyman Demirel never accepted that there could be rivals for his leadership position. It is out of question that he wanted to train a second, third or fourth man. He always wanted to be at the top alone." Cited in Ibid., 166. See, also memoirs by ex-JP dissidents, who criticized him for lack of intra-party democracy. Mehmet Turgut, *Siyasetten Portreler* [Portraits From Politics](İstanbul: Boğaziçi, 1991); Kamran İnan, *Siyasetin İçinden* [Inside Politics], third ed. (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1995).

[72] This feature, too, is not unique to Turkey, but was observed in the majority of developing countries as well as in some developed countries. See, Vicky Randall, "Conclusion," in *Political Parties in Third World*, ed. Vicky Randall (London: Sage, 1988), 185 ff.

Like its predecessor DP, the JP's ideology, too, did not oppose the basic tenets of secular republican ideas, despite the fact it was frequently presented and perceived as such. Demirel claimed that Atatürk had stated two basic principles. That "sovereignty belonged to the nation without any limitations" and that "The Turkish nation shall reach a contemporary level of civilization." The Justice Party, according to Demirel, was the result of the first principle as it made this principle its motto. We have seen in the second chapter that Celal Bayar, too, had argued along similar lines. The second principle, Demirel continued, was embedded in the DP-JP tradition since they all made socio-economic development their priority. In other words, the ideal of "Great Turkey, (whose distinguishing mark is economic development) was nothing but what Atatürk had in mind when he spoke of reaching the contemporary level of civilization."[73] Economic development, Demirel believed, was only one facet of the contemporary level of civilization. To value an individual for being an individual and to give it a voice in social and political life was an equally important aspect of Western civilization. In his words, "our understanding, which values people highly, is nothing but what Atatürk had in mind when he spoke of Western Civilization."[74] He added that "the real Atatürkism is the acceptance of Western life and governing styles."[75]

In arguing this line Demirel was not on insecure grounds, unless we regard Atatürkism as an ideology in the Shilsian sense. As we indicated in the second chapter, Celal Bayar had argued along the same lines. The basic difference between Atatürk and the DP-JP tradition on the issue of sovereignty was that the latter placed great stress upon competitive elections through which the nation expressed its preferences, thus exercising sovereignty, while Atatürk did not in his lifetime. But, it is hard to claim that Atatürk did wish not to have competitive elections all the way along. On the second principle, too, the JP leaders were justified for

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[73] Süleyman Demirel, *Oniki Mart ve Sonrası-İkinci Kitap* [12 March and Its Aftermath-The Second Book ](Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1972), 50. Demirel would add the third principle of Atatürk that is the "use of reason" in achieving the first two goals, see, Süleyman Demirel, *1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru* [The 1971 Crisis and the Way Out] (Ankara: Doğuş,1973), 67.

[74] Süleyman Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye* [Great Turkey] (İstanbul: Dergah, 1977), 75.

[75] Demirel, *Buhran.* 352.

having such an interpretation since Atatürk did not advocate command economy and since he wanted Turkey to take its place in the western club of nations.

Though, it was frequently accused of tolerating (encouraging) religious reactionism, the JP leaders were careful to emphasize the party's secular nature. In the first place, Demirel made clear his opposition to some policies of the one-party period. He argued that Turkey did not experience a genuine free atmosphere regarding freedom of religion and conscience (din ve vicdan hürriyeti). In his view, "freedom of religion and conscience (in Turkey) oscillated from one extreme to other - from suppression to exploitation of religious feelings-."[76] Criticizing some ultra-secularists, he complained that there had been many people who thought that Turkey would fall into the hands of reactionaries "even by mentioning the word of Allah."[77] Having said that, Demirel had much common with the traditional, Republican approach to the Islam. He was content with the view that the state should control religious education, which would obviously have contradicted with the principle of laicism in the traditional sense. He argued that "it is clear (under Republican principles) that, if left unchecked, religious life could risk the principle of laicism."[78] Because, otherwise religious education would be provided by those who had no intention of exploiting religious sentiments for political ends. He reiterated the view that like army and schools, mosques too should not be involved in politics, while there should be respect for religious beliefs and conducts of the citizen. That meant, as Cizre-Sakallıoğlu put it, excluding "islam from the public sphere by declaring it irrelevant for political and economic development." [79] Therefore, the claim that the JP was aimed at encouraging anti-secular opposition to the Republic is less than convincing, despite the fact that it attracted (and

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[76] Demirel, *Büyük*. 106.

[77] Ibid.,107. Also, Demirel, *Anayasa*. 36-8. Here Demirel spoke of the need to remove article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Law, which prohibited the propaganda and establishment of a religious state. According to critics, this article has been used to hinder even non-political activites (pertaining to worship) of the muslim population.

[78] Ibid., 104.

[79] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Religion-State Interaction in Republican Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 28. (1996), 240.

provided for a place) those who seemed to oppose the secular Republic.[80] Indeed, it is probably the case that this soft attitude towards religion provided a firmer guarantee of stability for secularism in the long run.

On economic and social matters the JP was what Otto Kircheimer called a catch all-party.[81] The JP leaders were aware that in order to win as many votes as possible the party must "represent different and sometimes contradictory interests and aggregate them into policy packages acceptable to as many groups as possible."[82] The party refused to commit itself either ideologically to any "isms" or defended specifically interest of one group. As Demirel put it "(the JP) are not dependent on any class. We are the nation with its peasants, farmers, workers, artisans and merchants. As the JP we shall defend the rights of all these classes."[83]

In another place he argued that the path they had chosen:

> is neither capitalist nor socialist. It is a model of growth (within the limits of the Turkish constitution) that is based on mixed economy and that accepts private property and private enterprise while accepting the redistribution of national wealth according to a plan geared to the nations' needs. It is a model of growth that was directed nations needs and realities. Why should we copy a doctrine ?[84]

The Party, then, preferred a "mixed economy" in which the state would be active in

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[80] It is known that the JP leadership sought the support of some Tarikats and Islamic movements. Responding to that, tarikats and Islamic movements (some of whose opposition to secular republic is also open to debate) openly supported the JP. Indeed, the chief representative of the "Süleymancı" movement, Kemal Kaçar, son-in-law of movements' founder Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, was a member of parliament with the Justice Party ticket until the 1980. An influential Islamist poet-writer Necip Fazıl beatifully explained why they supported Demirel, which revealed that far from being seen as their own men he was best among those available for their ends; "(We like him) Not because he made believers happy through any concrete action, but because he made infidels burst through his inaction. Not because he is the person we are waiting for, but because he is not the person we are afraid of, and he does not hurt or disturb, the climate which would allow the person we eagerly wait to come." Cited in Abdullah Uraz, *Baba* [The Father](Ankara: Eka,1992),174.

[81] Otto Kircheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph La Palambora and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[82] Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1961-1980," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 140.

[83] Ahmad, *Experiment*.238.

[84] Demirel, *Büyük*. 191. Note how closely Demirel's speeches resemble the Republican principle of halkçılık whose motto was "we are a nation with no class distinctions."

those areas which were not undertaken by the private sector and which could only be performed by the state. It put great stress upon public investments as a means for the creation of "Great Turkey." Demirel argued that in Turkey the state will have to invest in infrastructure (meaning roads, ports, airports, railways) upon which industry could be built.[85]

Like many catch-all parties, Demirel, too, advocated a social welfare state.[86] He argued that in addition to "classical state functions, the contemporary state is charged socio-economic tasks and responsibilities."[87] He defined the social welfare state as "a state which has important roles to play in economic and social development, a state which has a regulatory, directive, service and helping tasks so as to arrive at welfare and a peace society." [88] According to Demirel, the social welfare state requires the state; to provide equal opportunities for everybody, to provide minimum life standards for every citizen, and to secure just income distribution.[89] He defended social welfare state not only because it was a proven vote-catcher electorally but also because he wanted to protect his party against the leftist charge that it was serving solely to upper classess.[90] In so doing, he was also influenced by the traditional Ottoman-Turkish conception of the father state. His peasant background made him sensible to the sufferings of the masses expressed in his speech "poverty is the biggest cruelty."[91] According to Demirel, "to deal with poverty, desperation, and misery is in the nature of the state. One of the most significant tasks of the modern state is this." [92] Besides, Demirel

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[85] Ibid.,263.

[86] According to Karpat, "Demirel's views are probably closer to a moderate form of social democracy than genuine capitalism." Kemal H. Karpat, *Social and Political Thought in the Middle East*, revised and enlarged edition, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (New York: Praeger, 1982), 396

[87] Süleyman Demirel, *1973'e Bakarken* [The Glance at the year 1973 ] (Ankara: n.d ), 107.

[88] Demirel, *Büyük*. 24-5.

[89] Ibid.

[90] He argued that "by defending the welfare of the masses I forestalled the charge that can be used against us." Cited in Turgut, *Demirel*.324.

[91] Nimet Arzık, *Demirel'in İçi Dışı* [Demirel in His all Aspect] (İstanbul:Milliyet, 1985), 49.

[92] Ibid. 49. When asked what the one policy area was, of which he felt most proud, Demirel

expected the social state to soften class struggles, thus help achieve social peace and harmony. In those democratic countries which accepted the existence of the private sector, Demirel argued, "there is a need for state intervention, first to increase the national product and second to secure peace and welfare for the working masses, which necessitates regulatory and conciliatory state intervention." [93] But Demirel, somewhat contradicting himself, emphasized that the social welfare state required the "reduction of various restrictions regarding individual freedoms and economic activities." [94] What he meant by this, we think, is that he was criticizing those who tended to see the ideal of mixed economy as the imposition of a strict plan. As Demirel put it "the plan is not something that is sharp and inflexible, a jacket to be worn as it is cut out. We do not share the view that use the plan for irresponsibility, inaction or the excuse of turning one's back to the people's real needs." [95]

When we turn our attention to how these ideas were translated into policy practices, we observe a close relation between these ideas and the economic policies of the JP that are based heavily on party patronage. Like its predecessor, the JP quite skillfully used patronage to ensure support. While rural party machine characteristics were dominant in the DP, the JP, in accordance with increasing urbanization, tended to have urban party machine[96] characteristics. Available research[97] indicates that the JP directed its efforts toward securing the support of migrants through patronage. It did took the forms of securing employment in public sector,

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pointed out his party's decision to provide a minimum income for those who were older than 65 years of age. Ibid., 47.

[93] Demirel, *Büyük*.171.

[94] Ibid., 26.

[95] Dağlı ve Aktürk. *Hükümetler*. 101.

[96] We use the term "party machine" to refer to "a non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leader and distributing income to those who run it and work for it." James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review*. 63, 4, (1969), 1144.

[97] W. B Sherwood, "The Rise of Justice Party in Turkey." *World Politics*. 20, 1, (1967), 57; Sabri Sayarı, "Political Patronage in Turkey," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 110.

tolerating- legalizing and the building of gecekondu's or demolishing them by strict implementation of law, allocating municipal services on the basis of party loyalties and like.[98] The JP's pragmatic ideology and cross-class support it secured can, thus, be better understood if we take into consideration party patronage. For instance, the JP was less than enthusiastic regarding planning not so much because of their belief in the intrinsic values of the market and inherent weaknesses of state intervention, but because it was likely to limit their prerogatives for patronage.

Relations with the armed forces was one era in which the JP differed sharply from the DP. We have noted above that the JP had shown the utmost care so as to present an image acceptable to the army. But it is also necessary to review changes in the army's outlook regarding the JP. The period of 1961-1971 was the period of struggle within the army, struggle between those who subscribed the Jacobinist interpretations of Atatürkism (ranging from desire for personalized dictatorship to heavily controlled economy and society) and those who, while staying in the same paradigm, did not subscribe such views. The radicalized atmosphere of post-1961 put the danger of "socialism-communism" on the agenda of the army, as a problem that needed urgent attention since senior commanders suspected that communists were trying to infiltrate the ranks of the armed forces. The army's opposition to leftist-communist movements was one policy area that the army and the JP at least seemed to share. When President Cevdet Sunay declared that the constitution was closed to socialism, the JP applauded it. It also supported the chief of general staff Cemal Tural, who issued a circular recommending the book, entitled "Methods for Struggling With Communism" to be read by the armed forces. Convergence on anti-communism was not, however, enough to dispel the army's doubts regarding the JP. The struggle *within* the army (between the moderates and radicals yearning for reformist government) was yet unfinished. The amnesty issue (of the ex-DP members) refused to go away. But still, it appears that the army's view of the JP was much

[98] Alongside this rather traditional forms of patronage, commensurate with industrialization and new import substitution strategy, there appears to have developed new forms of patronage where businessmen used political contacts to secure benefits. It is true that that form was not new, but because of the increase in the number of businessmen with industrialization, it became more widespread.

more favorable than the DP's had ever been throughout its life except the few years in the early fifties.

The proportional system of representation and the permissive atmosphere of the 1961 constitutional order accompanied by the changes in social structure affected not only the major parties but paved the way to the emergence of both socialist-inspired movements and also ultra-nationalist and fundamentalist religious parties. Amongst those newly established parties, the Turkish Workers Party, (established in 13 February 1961) was the first legal socialist party. Earlier (10 August 1960) General Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the NUC, had declared that providing it did not have "ill-intentions" he would permit the establishment of a socialist party.[99] Established by the trade unionists, the party did not have much appeal at the beginning. It is only when the respected former academic Mehmet Ali Aybar became the leader of the party, that it began to attract wider audience.

It is hard to read too much into its proclaimed program as legal constraints must have severely limited its founders regarding their real intentions. But it is possible to say that TWP did not advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat while "it was socialist and pro-Soviet in a peace movement fashion."[100] As Lipovsky remarked in the beginning neither the party charter nor program mentioned the word "socialist", an anathema word for many in Turkey.[101] The party made "the full implementation of the constitution"[102] its motto. This allowed them to advocate socialist ideas while staying in the framework of the constitution. The party leadership defended a third way, not as distinct from both capitalism and socialism but as a "transitional period" from capitalism to socialism.[103] While what the third way necessitated remained ambiguous, it would not be misleading to say that its most concrete policy offering was the

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[99] Ahmad, *Experiment*.221.

[100] Samim, "left," 155.

[101] Igor P.Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 15.

[102] Murat Belge, "Türkiye İşçi Partisi," [The Turkish Workers Party] *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* cilt, 8 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 2125.

[103] Lipovsky, *Socialist*. 15.

nationalization of various industries and control of the private sector through "obligatory" plans, and state-led industrialization. Though small in its organization and support at the level of voters,[104] it was disproportionately influential in spreading socialist ideas within the intelligentsia and student community. It would not be wrong to suggest that, for the first time, the TGNA witnessed the emergence of an openly ideological (bordering on an anti-system proportions) party.

The Nationalist Action Party, headed by Alparslan Türkeş, Turkey's first legal ultra-nationalist party, emerged in post-1961 era. Born in Cyprus, Türkeş was the strong man of the 27 May intervention. Not only he had been involved in the preparations for the intervention coup but also he assumed a prominent role in the post-coup administration. He was known to have favored prolonged military rule so as to complete socio-economic reform. But no to avail, his views was apparently rejected by the other leaders of the NUC. Türkeş and other 13 members of the NUC were given jobs abroad on November 1960. This group was far from united in their aims and did not speak with one voice. When they returned to the country, many of them found a place in different political parties. Türkeş entered into Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP). In 1965 he seized the control of RPNP, getting himself elected as leader.

The new RPNP ideology was developed through the works of Türkeş (which would change its name Nationalist Action Party -NAP- in 1969) and other party ideologues. As Karpat perceptively noted nationalist resurgence was to be related with the opposition to leftist social currents.[105] It was "defensive and conservative in character" prone to perceive social ideas as being "communistic and subversive" and suggesting instead a return to traditional virtues found in history.[106] The NAP opposed both capitalism and socialism as foreign ideologies. Instead it proposed "a third way" whose basic principle was to be "everything is for

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[104] At its peak (at the 1965 general elections), the party managed to garner 3 % of the vote (about 276.000) getting 15 MP's elected to the assembly. Afterwards it came nowhere closer to that point.

[105] Kemal H.Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960 -Nationalism and Socialism," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey - A Structural Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 335.

[106] Ibid., 335.

the Turkish nation, toward the Turk and according to the Turk."[107] In an effort to combine best of both worlds, Türkeş offered his theory called "dokuz ışık" (nine lights).[108] These nine lights which were supposed to guide the nationalist movement were; nationalism (milliyetçilik), idealism (ülkücülük), moralism (ahlakçılık), scientism (ilimcilik), socialism (toplumculuk), peasantism (köycülük), freedom and individualism (hürriyetçilik ve şahsiyetçilik), developmentalism and populism (gelişmecilik ve halkçılık), industrialism and technologism (endüstricilik ve teknikçilik). Though rejecting racism (based on Turkish race) at a formal level (party programs and electoral manifestos), the NAP leaders and affiliated publications did use racist themes quite frequently.[109] Realizing that the Turkish electorate was more receptive to religious sentiments than ideology, it also tried to appeal to Islamic sentiments in order to enhance its electoral fortunes.[110] The NAP also established (or seized the control of) many affiliated youth organizations and occupational interest groups such as Ülkücü Gençlik Derneği (Idealist Youth Association-IYA), Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions-CNTU), Ülkücü Polisler Birliği or Polis Birliği (Idealist Police Union-IPU). As we shall see in the next chapters, the party had a disproportionate (regarding its electoral strength) effect in the Turkish politics. Its affiliated organizations were quite prepared to engage in illegal acts against the left but also they were quite successful in penetrating supposedly impartial state institutions through their membership in National Front (1975-1977) governments.

Apart from socialist and ultra-nationalists, Islamists, also took their place in Turkey's

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[107] Cited Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, "The Ultranationalist Right," in *Turkey in Transition,* ed. Irwin C.Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 194. Note the resemblance with the Italian fascist Gentile's dictum that "Everything for the state; nothing against the state; nothing outside the state."

[108] Alparslan Türkeş, *9 Işık ve Türkiye* [The Nine Lights and Turkey] (Ankara: Emel, 1979). For a sophisticated discussion of the ideology of the NAP and its relations with the political traditions of Kemalism, see, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey." *C.E.M.O.T.I.* 13, (1992).

[109] Ağaoğulları, "ultranationalist," 197.

[110] Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Nationalist Action," 147-8.

increasingly ideological political landscape of the late sixties. The National Order Party (NOP) was founded in January 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of engineering and the head of the Turkish Union of Chambers (TUC). Though it was shut down by the constitutional court in May 1971, it reappeared (as National Salvation Party) in October 1972. Like all parties from TWP to NAP, the party had two discourses, one for official and one for daily use. Assessed by its party program, the party put the emphasis on moral development, which was understood as respect for human rights and freedoms, values and history of Turkish society and private property. It supported secularism and the freedom of religion and conscience. It also put great stress on the establishment of national heavy industry, and the elimination of inequalities. The party opposed what it called capitalist big business and opposed Turkey's relations with the then European Economic Association (EEC), instead supporting planned development informed by "Milli Görüş"(National View). It severely criticized Turkey's Westernization policies and offered to return to authentic (Turkish-Islamic) values and traditions. Apart from official documents, the party ideology was rather more clearly expressed by its leaders and ideologues. A study of these discourses presented an the image of the party which tended to use stern anti-Republican (alongside anti-western and anti-semitic) rhetoric that bordered on anti-system proportions.[111] It was also observed that, in line with Turkish political traditions, the party's demands for freedoms were only for those who thought similarly.[112] Like the NAP it truly began to play a role after the 1973 elections in which it became third biggest party in the parliament.

Even though, like the JP and the RPP, these political parties' links with the social groups remained weak and they too, to a much lesser extent, tended to have cross-class support, the impact of changes in social structure had put its imprint on these parties. The way in which the emergence of these parties was closely related to changes in social structure can be seen, when we look at which segments of the society these parties have drawn support

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[111] See, for such an analysis, Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in *Islam and Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Metin Heper and Israeli Raphael (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 91.

[112] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası -MSP Örnek Olayı* [Modernization, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey -The NSP Case] (İstanbul: Alan, 1985), 210.

from. The TWP drew its support mainly from socialist leaning intelligentsia and some of the newly emerged working class as well as and some migrants living in Gecekondu's, segments of society that are product of Turkey's industrialization-urbanization process. The NAP and the NSP, despite their somewhat divergent bases of support, seemed to have attracted those small businessmen and artisans or, more broadly, those who have threatened by the emergence of industrialization and big business which have tended to support the JP. It was also the case that both these parties disproportionately draw support from less-developed parts of the country.[113] It goes without saying that changes in social structure were not the only factor in such a multiplication of parties. The political factors -state elites' receptivenes to socialism, the permissive atmosphere of the 1961 constitution, the reinvigoration of ultra-nationalism as reaction to socialism, the decision of the JP leaders' not to tolerate Islamist extremists in their own ranks -all played decisive roles. It was rather the complex encounter and interaction of all these factors that determined the parameters of politics in that period.

### 3.3. THE 12 MARCH INTERLUDE

To repeat, the post-1961 period ushered in a new era in Turkish politics. Changes both in the composition of the state elites in interaction with the modernization process that gained pace as well as the impact of the 1961 constitutional order have all contributed their imprint. In this new era new social-political forces tended to flourish, the previous alliances began to dissolve, perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical changes. It was a period of remaking and realignment of various socio-political forces. The RPP, the staunchest ally of the military, and the chief state elite, were beginning to move towards the left, whilst the army began to appreciate how dangerous junior level radicalism might be. The army also seriously worried about a perceived advance of socialist ideas in its previous allies; intellectuals-academics, students, and the RPP. Whilst its anti-communism alienated this community, it also created a basis of convergence with the JP. Meanwhile the JP,

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[113] Ibid., 104.

the main successor of the old DP, also underwent a period of renovation. It was much more careful with its relations with the military. It was much less associated (in the eyes of the army high command) with anti-secularism, economic mismanagement and dependence on foreign power as the DP once had been. In addition to these changes in the previous parties and political actors, the post-1961 political order, in which politicization and radicalism dominated the intellectual climate, also paved the way for the emergence of both socialist-inspired movements and parties alongside the ultra-nationalist and islamist ones.

In the face of these changes, the crucial question was whether the Turkish political system, already crippled by the serious constraints deriving from its state tradition and traditional social structure undergoing modernization, would be able to adjust itself to these changes which themselves provided new constraints and offered opportunities, and maintain the democratic system of government.[114] The answer would turn out to be no as the country approached the 12 March military intervention to which we now turn. This intervention is significant because the military's justifications for the intervention is similar to its justifications for the 12 September intervention. In that sense, the 12 September intervention was the result of similar patterns that led to military intervention in 1971, but this time "on a much larger and more alarming scale."[115]

The 1965 elections provided a clear majority for the JP. Demirel soon formed a government. During his first government, the Turkish economy was in the midst of what economists called "an easy phase" [116] of import substitution. Tired of political instability, business community and international economic agencies welcomed the government. Boosted by such confidence, the Turkish economy achieved a respectable rate of growth, low inflation

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[114] İsmet Giritli had similarly noted that "...Turkey is headed for a time of trouble in which its political authorities are going to have to cope with an unreasonable revolution of rising material expectations on the part of the majority, an equally unreasonable revolution of utopian-spritual expectations on the part of the a significant majority, along with a general breakdown of individual and social discipline." Giritli, "Turkey," 363.

[115] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations," in *Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences With Democracy,* sec.ed. ed. Larry Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan J.Linz (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 236.

[116] Çağlar Keyder, "democracy", 48.

and unemployment. While considerable economic advances took place, the country's political life was far from stable. Ideological polarization within the political actors grew by each passing day. Thanks to the system of proportional representation, the TWP managed to gain 15 seats in the TGNA with 3 percent of the vote. They were quite vocal and instrumental in heightening the tension in the country. With their increasingly anti-communist stance, the Justice Party MP's particularly were not prepared to tolerate socialist ideas at the National Assembly level.[117] Apart from the TWP, the left of center movement in the RPP gained momentum towards the left. Party's Secretary General Bülent Ecevit emerged as the leader of the movement. Bülent Ecevit's pamphlet entitled "The Left of Center" contained ideas which were, in many ways, an anathema to İnönü and old vanguard of the party. Impressed by the TWP's electoral advance and the students' and intellectuals' alienation from the RPP, Ecevit appears to have thought that the RPP could come to power only if it appealed to workers, peasants and socialist inspired intellectuals. Though the struggle between Ecevit and the old guard would continue until the 1973 party congress in which Ecevit won the party leadership, his distinct interpretation of the left of center movement presented an image of a party that is torn by internal conflicts.

Meanwhile prevalent politicization was spreading into the universities. Encouraged by the fact that they had played a critical role in throwing out the DP government, students wished to remain always on center stage.[118] Indeed there existed a tradition of student involvement in state affairs. The distinguished place the Ulema had had in the Ottoman Empire provided a rather somewhat privileged place for both educational institutions and their students. Already in the late 18th and 19th centuries riots and demonstrations by the Medrese students (softas) had thrown the country into the chaos.[119] With the establishment of the Republic, students' self-

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[117] In his memoirs, Çetin Altan, was an MP from the TWP, exemplifies the prevailing athmosphere of the TGNA. Çetin Altan, *Ben Milletvekili İken* [When I was a Member of Parliament] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1971).

[118] Szyliowicz, Joseph S, "Students and Politics in Turkey." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 6, 2, (1970), 158.

[119] Nermin Abadan, "Values and Politcal Behaviour of Turkish Youth." *Turkish Yearbook of*

styled role perception was reinforced. Kemal Atatürk had called on Turkish Youth to watch over the secular Republic and the independence of Turkey. What Landau[120] called "nationalistic education" through which students were immersed in Atatürk's dictum, had sharpened their tendency to participate in political affairs. Student action in the sixties, however, was different from fifties and before. First of all, there were an increase in the number of students enrolled for education.

Table 6. Number of University Students, Selected Years[121]

| Years | Numbers |
|---|---|
| 1960-61 | 65.297 |
| 1962-63 | 70.649 |
| 1964-65 | 84.335 |
| 1966-67 | 108.637 |
| 1968-69 | 140.000 |
| 1969-70 | 147.175 |
| 1970-71 | 169.793 |

As observed from the table, student numbers increased by nearly twofold in a decade. Meanwhile, educational facilities (which were hardly satisfactory in the fifties anyway) could not keep up with increasing demands, affecting the quality of education negatively. Students were quick to seize the issue of low quality of education as an opportunity to protest. The quality of education was not the only reason. Many youngsters from smaller towns and cities who came to study in Ankara and İstanbul experienced cultural dislocation, alongside the growing concerns about their future.[122] All these factors significantly contributed to the volatile atmosphere in the universities attracted youngsters to various ideologies offering magic solutions.

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*International Relations.* (1964), 83.

[120] Jacob M.Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 30.

[121] T.C Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *Türkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı* [50 Years of Social and Economic Development in Turkey] (Ankara: DİE, 1973), 466. Figure includes students both in universities and other institutions of higher learning.

[122] Sabri Sayarı and Bruce Hoffmann, "Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976-1980." *A Rand Note, N 3228-USDP*, (no date), 8.

Prior to the 1960's, apart from scathy references to Ataturk and laicism, ideology was largely absent. It was widely believed that once the DP government was overthrown, all of sudden, everything would change for the better. As one student leader remarked in his memoirs they were supporting the DP (in pre-1960 era) without any logically sustained arguments. It was more like supporting a "football club."[123] Post-1961 student movements, on the other hand, were much more ideological and militant. Abadan notes that the nature of statements issued by student organizations radically changed after the 27 May 1960 intervention. [124] Prior to 27 May these statements "were more of an indicative nature, carrying only the only purpose to inform public opinion." After that date, however, statements were "much more dynamic, requesting quick action, containing warnings and some times even threats."[125] Parallel to the general popularity of socialism in the intellectual community, an increasing number of students appeared to have been attracted certain socialist ideals, however superficial their understanding of socialism might be.[126] Not only because there was now a stock of ideological material available to them, but also because the political climate both inside and abroad was in favor of such militanisation (on the line with leftist tendencies) of the movement. Apart from the Johnson letter, which angered the Turkish public as well as the students, American invasion of Vietnam in 1965 further fueled student radicalism. Besides, there were available idols whom could be imitated by excited youngsters. Che Guevara exemplified the romantic guerrilla movement in Bolivia in 1967, and, of course, 1968 student movements across the world. As Samim observed, students in Istanbul "began to occupy their campuses as soon as word reached them of the Sorbonne takeover." [127]

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[123] Harun Karadeniz, *Olaylı Yıllar ve Gençlik* [The Turbulent years and the Youth], eight ed. (İstanbul: Belge, 1995), 11. (first published in 1971)

[124] Abadan, "Youth", 90.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Özer Ozankaya, *Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Siyasal Yönelimleri* [The Political Tendencies of University Students ] (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966), 35.

[127] Samim, "left", 157.

Despite the parallels with the students movements in Europe and America, the Turkish student movements displayed unique features of its own. While (compared to its Turkish counterparts) well-to-do students in the West reacted against the social and political order arguing that it created alienation and "The One-dimensional Man" Herbert Marcuse portrayed, Turkish students were rather more interested in "national independence," "economic development," and stringent "anti-Americanism." Whilst their counterparts questioned (rejected) values of their own society, Turkish students appears to have been highly affected by the values of traditional Turkish society. For instance, their anti-Americanism was bred as much from concern with national independence as from American soldiers' behavior in Turkey rather than a sophisticated critique of American way of life and values that underlied it. [128]

This student activism were soon to lead to fateful consequences for political instability. It had began with sincere protests and boycotts confined the campuses. Later on, it involved student-police clashes, and damages to property. The most publicized student actions of the period were; student-police clashes in which one student were killed in July 1968; the burning down of US Ambassador's car in Middle East Technical University in January 1969. More significantly, leftist militant radicalism soon generated a reaction from ultra-nationalist youth groups (most of them affiliated with the NAP) who were quite prepared to use violent means under the banner of anti-communism. What was known as "Bloody Sunday" (16 January 1969) (in which right-wing student groups attacked left-wing students who were protesting the American 6. Fleet's visit to Turkey) was the first of the its kind in which two students were killed, and 114 injured. And finally, this student movement nurtured its own guerrillas, who, unlike earlier student leaders, believed that only way to change the regime was through the armed struggle. The continous charge[129] that the JP was blocking reforms that the constitution

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[128] Karadeniz's memoirs is telling in this respect; "(In 1968 June ) We were afraid of going out. But there was a hotel near to our student hostel where American soldiers, accompanied by Turkish girls, could easily enter. This was repeated many times and students witnessed it. Meanwhile the police (who quietly watched when American soldiers took Turkish girls to the hotel) were arresting student friends of us who have done nothing. These were terrible events to drive mad even those youngsters who had no ideological leanings." Karadeniz, *Gençlik*. 109.

[129] The YÖN movement and associated writers have argued that democracy as it was practicised in Turkey, would bring only reactionary conservative forces to power. And that because of this, Turkey

envisaged and that there did not seem to be a socialist party coming to power through elections were significant factors in pushing adventurist students to the illegal organizations that aimed for armed struggle. Usually violent clashes between conflicting student groups involved the danger of spreading out into other segments of the society. It created an image of a government which was unable to deal with increasing chaos in the universities.

The worker movements were not immune to (or spared from) increasing mobilization and politicization.[130] The founding of Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Organization (CRWU) as a split from pragmatist Confederation of Turkish Workers Union (CTWU) in 1967, was an indicator of the degree to which workers movement had been politicized. As stated in the program the chief aim of the CRWU was to defend the workers rights. It would do so through its endeavor towards the attainment of "revolutionary essence" (which would ensure radical transformations as envisaged in the constitution) by the Turkish working class.[131] As to the increasing mobilization of the workers, table 7. shows that beginning from 1963, when the right to strike was permitted by law, the number of unionized workers, number of strikes and workdays lost in these strikes increased considerably. [132]

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would enjoy neither economic growth nor socio-economic equality. Turkish democracy, according to their view, was a "pretty or Philippines" democracy. See, Özdemir, *Yön*.

[130] See, for a detailed treatment, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Labour and State in Turkey: 1960-1980." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 28, 4 (1992), 717, 721.

[131] Cited in Kemal Sülker, *100 Soruda, Türkiye'de İşçi Hareketleri* [Worker Movements in Turkey in 100 Questions] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1976), 147.

[132] Industrial unrest usually accompanied by violent clashes between workers and security forces in which injuries and even death have taken place. See, Kemal Sülker, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İşçi Hareketleri,"[Worker Movements in the Republican Period] *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, cilt 7, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 1846-7.

Table 7. Trade Union Activity[133]

| Years | Number of unions | Number of members | Number of agreement | Number of strikes | Number of workers in strike | Workdays lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1948 | 73 | 52.000 | | | | |
| 1950 | 88 | 76.000 | | | | |
| 1955 | 363 | 190.000 | | | | |
| 1960 | 432 | 283.000 | | | | |
| 1963 | 565 | 296.000 | 96 | 8 | 1.514 | 19.739 |
| 1965 | 668 | 360.000 | 871 | 46 | 6.593 | 336.836 |
| 1970 | 717 | 2.088.000 | 1.516 | 111 | 25.963 | 260.338 |

Thus, the late sixties witnessed a heavily politicized country in which strikes by the workers, marches and boycotts by the students, and violent clashes between rival political factions became widespread. In the face of such social-political unruliness, the JP government appeared to be ineffective. Though the JP was, again, the clear winner of the 1969 election, doubts began to occur regarding its ability to govern the increasingly politicized country. It may seem paradoxical that the ability of a government, that garnered away 46.5 per cent of the vote and 256 seats of out 450 in the lower assembly in the elections that held a couple of months earlier, to govern came to be questioned. This paradox is closely related to Turkey's being a state society. In state societies the votes might not always count as powerfully as in stateless societies.

In the first place, Demirel's position in his own party began to be seriously questioned. Powerful factions within the JP had again surfaced and Demirel could not contain dissidents in the party.[134] Only four months (11 February 1970) after his election triumph Demirel was

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[133] Weiker, *Modernization*.88. As Weiker himself indicated, there are, unfortunately, many widely varying figures on these items. Mehmet Şehmus Güzel, for instance, provides two different accounts. One these, prepared by ministry of labor, estimates the number of strikes at 72 and workdays lost in 1970 as 220.189. While the other prepared by International Labor Organisation estimates the number of strikes as 112 and workdays lost as 241.200 for same year. See, Mehmet Şehmus Güzel, "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde İşçi Hareketleri" [Workers Movements in the Republican Turkey]*Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol 7 (İstanbul: İletişim: 1983), 1860

[134] The principal charges that dissident directed against Demirel were; that the JP had become the party dominated by his clique, that he was involved in corrupt practices involving his relatives. It was known that ex-President Celal Bayar was supporting the dissidents. Many suspected that he opposed

forced to resign because the dissidents voted against the party in the assembly. Finally, those dissidents numbering total 27 announced the formation of Democratic Party led by Ferruh Bozbeyli.

Parallel to Demirel's loss of strength, violence and chaos in the streets was on the rise. Towards the end of the 1970 "universities were paralyzed by student agitation and violence and the factories by worker militancy and strikes."[135] The kidnapping of four US airmen stationed in Turkey by the outlawed Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) was only one of the more spectacular terrorist attacks. The 15-16 June worker demonstrations in Istanbul and Kocaeli was more serious and alarming. Protesting against the governments' amendments that would make the CRWU largely ineffective, workers almost spontaneously staged massive demonstration in which one policeman and one worker were killed. The government proclaimed martial law for three months tacitly confessing its inability to ensure law and order. In the words of a senior commander who would later sign the 12 March memorandum, the 15-16 June movement was "first of its kind, a movement (regardless of whether its causes are just or not) of these organizations whose strength was mistakenly underestimated, which turned out to be an act of aggression (reminiscent of military move) by 50000 people directed towards life, property and armed forces."[136]

In the face of escalating conflicts in the country, Demirel blamed the 1961 Constitution. He argued that it did not equip the state to deal with those who abuse freedoms. He even went as far as saying that it was very difficult to govern a country with this constitution without appreciating the fact that this also undermined his claim to legitimacy derived from the same constitution.[137] According to Demirel, it was "a fact that the 1961 Constitution values

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Demirel because he had shown no intention of the leaving party leadership to ex-DP cadres as they expected.

[135] Ahmad, *Experiment*.201.

[136] Muhsin Batur, *Anılar ve Görüşler- Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası* [Memoirs and Views-What Really Happened Behind the Curtain During Three Time Periods ](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1985), 196.

[137] For a view that prior to 1966 coup, President Goulart's similar claims undermined his claim to legitimacy see, Alfred Stepan, "Political leadership and the breakdown of democracy," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes- Latin America* (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University

non-infringement of the essence of rights (hakkın özü) than the destruction of the state. It is not easy to prevent street violence while staying within the limits put forward by the constitution."[138] As noted above, from the very beginning the JP had shown a rather hostile attitude towards the constitution. In the eve of the 1969 elections, the JP election manifesto urged changes in the constitution. The main thrust of this change was to be the strengthening of the executive. According to Demirel "the 1961 Constitution is promulgated to ensure that the executive would not execute... The constitution does not provide authority to government whilst it charged it with many duties."[139] Among its proposals for constitutional change, the JP offered; strengthening of the executive by giving it right to issue governmental decrees, removal of several constitutional barriers that would make parliament work faster, rearrangement of the issue of autonomy for universities, and curtailing the independence of the judiciary by giving more say to the executive in the appointment of the judges. [140]

Although the JP leaders had a point in criticizing some aspects of the 1961 constitution, the argument that public disorders would not be contained within the democratic system is clearly an exaggeration. It was true that the judiciary (both Constitutional court and Conseil d'etat) were eager to overturn the governments' decisions as they were entitled constitutionally. Also, the enactment of new laws had been made difficult by the constitution. It was also true that the constitution had strengthened trade unions and workers rights' and made it difficult for the government to reshuffle the civil servants. It also had granted autonomy to

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Press,1978), 128.

[138] Demirel, *12 Mart*.7.

[139] Demirel. *Büyük*.123-127.

[140] Demirel maintained this position through late seventies as well. In addition to above mentioned points, he proposed; the introduction of referandum; giving the president right to proclaim state of emergency; giving the executive right to proclaim state of emergency instead of directly calling martial law; making it easier for the executive to call for new elections and the like. See, Süleyman Demirel, *Anayasa ve Devlet İdaresi* [The Constitution and the Governing of the State] (İstanbul: Göktürk, 1977) 54-61. Celal Bayar, similarly, would criticize the constitution and blame it for being one of the chief causes of the anarchy in the late seventies. Celal Bayar, *Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk'ün Metodolojisi)* [Thinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul: Tekin, 1998), 142-150.

universities. But these in no way meant that it did not enable governments to deal with increasing chaos in the streets. The constitution itself allowed for declaration of martial law in which various rights and liberties could severely be curtailed. Besides, the notorious articles of Turkish penal code of 141-142 prohibiting communist propaganda and activities were in effect. Certainly, the constitution did not constitute great obstacle for the efforts to prevent the abuse of various rights and liberties without violating the essence of these rights. Therefore it is more accurate to conclude that Demirel's criticism was more to do with the DP-JP traditions understanding of majoritarian democracy and national will as well as his party's initial enmity to the 1961 the constitution.

Put in other words, Demirel's problem (in the face of increasing criticism and military unruliness) was more to do with his weakening grip on power which, in the main, was not related with the constitution, but the social-political climate in the making of which he played a part. Having in mind, the belief that Menderes' allegedly harsh attitude towards public demonstrations prepared his tragic end, Demirel has shown some hesitance in dealing with student unrest.[141] In 1968 he said "roads are not going to be worn out by demonstrating" and that "everybody has to accept the use of freedoms that the constitution brought and should look after his own business."[142] When the military high command urged him to recourse to harsher measures in the National Security Council Demirel was reported to have said that "the causes of 1960 revolution (ihtilal) were the press, TRT, and the universities. If we take the harsh measures, it can be used against us to justify another coup. Because those measures can not be reconciled with democracy."[143]

In fact, Demirel faced a dilemma. If he used harsh measures to deal with unrest, a less than sympathetic intelligentsia would blame him for authoritarianism. If he did not, he would be

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[141] For a study that places emphasis on the JP leaders' supposedly soft attitude as the chief cause of chaos in the streets, see, Metin Toker, *Sağda ve Solda Vuruşanlar -Türkiye'deki İki Yönlü İhtilal Ortamının Anatomisi* [An Anatomy of the Environment of Revolution: Fighters on both the Left and the Right](Ankara: Akis, 1971), 172 ff.

[142] Cited in Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP*.64.

[143] Cited in Batur, *Anılar*.183.

characterized as ineffective. This bring us to a important issue that is, his relations with the country's leading elites. In the first place the bulk of public opinion makers, namely intellectuals, journalists,[144] were of the opinion that as well as (knowingly or not) protecting ultra-islamists reactionaries, Demirel was also the representative of landed and big business interests and therefore unfit for the realization of the reforms that the constitution was supposed to have envisaged. Whatever his government achieved tended to be downplayed by this intelligentsia, who appeared to have assumed that he could hardly do right.[145]

This view find echoes both within the civil bureaucracy and the army. Though opposition to communism and Kurdish separatism had provided some convergence between the army and the JP, historical animosities were far from exhausted. For instance, in the National Security Council meeting in 28 Aralık 1970, commander of land forces Faruk Gürler openly opposed the proclamation of martial law because "it would give the impression that the armed forces are in the command of the government."[146] This is indeed what it should be. The

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[144] Some journalists' opposition to Demirel derived purely from personal reasons. Haldun Simavi, owner of the biggest (in terms of circulation) newspaper of the day, Günaydın, had taken an overtly hostile attitude toward Demirel. The apparent reason was that Demirel had refused to see the representative of his newspaper (who wished to declare his sorrow) after the appearence of some news (which was subsequently proven to be wrong) that Demirel's wife Nazmiye Demirel has been involved in a murder. For a view that the harsh opposition that Günaydın presented to Demirel (which had been instrumental in bringing the JP government down) was a lot to do with the personal feeling of revenge felt by Haldun Simavi, see Necati Zincirkıran (director of publication and editor of Günaydın newspaper) who characterized that event in his book as "An event that led Turkey to 12 March pronounciamento" (Türkiye'yi 12 Mart Muhtırasına Sürükleyen Olay). Necati Zincırkıran, *Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu* [Hürriyet and the Simavi Empire] (İstanbul: Sabah Yazı Dizileri, 1994), 129. According to Orhan Erkanlı, a member of NUC that overthrown the DP government, "it was the press that overhrew Demirel. They had done so not on the grounds of serving the nation or some other noble aims but for purely sentimental and personal reasons." Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular* [Memoirs, problems and Those who are Responsible], third ed, (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), 55.

[145] Demirel complained that "I am not of the opinion that we could nurture the intelligentsia of democracy. We have been unsuccessful in explaining democracy and Republic. And that has been an important point in the crisis." Demirel, *Buhran.* 67. He also added that his peasant background was one of the important factors that lay at the root of elite hostility to him. He said that "...and finally I come from Isparta. I am a peasant. It is not possible to say that our elite stomached that." Cited in Turgut. *Demirel.*323.

[146] Batur. *Anılar.*238; Arcayürek also confirms such an attitude on the part of Gürler. Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor, 5, Demirel Dönemi 12 Mart Darbesi* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains 5-The Demirel Period, 12 March Coup d'etat ] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1985), 279.

civil bureaucracy, carriers of a state tradition and a powerful state elite tended to see the JP with a condescending attitude as the representatives of partial interests opposing true public interests as represented by themselves. They continued to practicize what Heper called "negative politics" in which parliament and bureaucracy became hostile powers.[147] Of course, these animosities were mutual. Though the JP's attitude towards the army was radically different from that of the DP, the same thing can hardly be said for the civil bureaucracy. The JP in power tried to sideline the civil bureaucracy as much as possible. If the modus vivendi could not be realized between these two, the JP appears to have carried as much responsibility as the civil bureaucracy did.

True to Ottoman-Turkish political traditions, the relations between the JP government and the opposition parties was tense. As well as the continous charge that the JP was violating Atatürk's principles, and blocking the socio-economic reforms that the constitution envisaged, even the RPP came close to applauding youth violence (which threatened democratic stability) if only because it weakened Demirel government. The accusation that the JP was a reactionary party bent on undoing Atatürk's achievements and his principles was the standard criticism of the RPP politicians. In addition they supported several actions bordering on illegality, if only because they had the potential of weakening of government. For instance, speaking for the RPP Nihat Erim remarked that they saw nothing wrong in the youth's actions of boycotts and campus occupations. According to Erim "we must congratulate, not condemn, those youngsters who had brought into the attention of public opinion (with bright methods) serious reforms in the area of education is needed."[148] Similarly, the RPP secretary general Bülent Ecevit[149] defended the peasant's occupations of land in some parts of the country. He argued

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[147] Metin Heper, "Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context: The Turkish Case." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*. 1.1. (1977).

[148] Arcayürek. *12 Mart*.238. Ironically, Nihat Erim would later led to military backed interim government to deal with terrorism after 12 March. His government would preside over the execution of three students for violating the constitution. Demirel later called this as "ilahi adalet" (Sacred Justice) Süleyman Demirel, *Yeni Bir Sosyal Mukaveleye Doğru* [Towards a New Social Contract] Ankara,1974), 28.

[149] *Ulus*, February 13, 1969.

that:

> People who have lost the hope that the government and the state would implement the land reform the constitution envisaged, even ordered, have taken the initiative. This movement can not be prevented by Gendarmeries, by technological discoveries, or by new laws. There is a constitution above all laws. But above the constitution are the laws of nature. Those who appreciated advantages of living like a human, would know how to acquire that right.[150]

As Demirel also complained, the RPP leaders alongside the other leading elites' could not differentiate hostility to the JP's policies from hostility to democratic regime.[151] They hardly considered the possibility their harsh criticism could damage not only the party in power but the democratic system itself. Meanwhile the JP spokesman's implied that the RPP was behind the anarchy and chaos in the country. According to Demirel "the slogans of left of center and this order must change, have been the source from which the anarchy has been fed." [152] As in before 1960, an outsider observing government-opposition relationships might have been excused for assuming that the two parties were radically different (in terms of ideology, in terms of social bases of support, in terms of occupational background of deputies) so as to exclude any possibility of dialogue. That was clearly not the case. Neither were class parties nor did they appeal to one segment of voters alone. Though the 1969 elections demonstrated a shift in the regional bases of strength -the JP losing support in more modern regions while the JPP doing the opposite- it was still far from the case that the JP had become the party of less modern regions while the RPP commanded an outstanding lead in modern regions.[153] Nor it was possible to find radical differences in the occupational background of deputies of both parties as table shows.

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[150] Ecevit would later (in 1976) claim that with these words he meant to warn the government against possible social unrest if measures were not taken. Bülent Ecevit, *Ecevit'in Açıklamaları* [Statements of Ecevit] (Ankara, 1977), 16.

[151] Demirel. *12 Mart*.51.

[152] Demirel. *Mukavele*.26.

[153] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117, 180.

Table 8. Social Backgrounds of Two Major Party Deputies, 1965-1969 [154]

| Occupations % | | RPP | JP |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | Official | 23 | 22 |
| | Professional | 52 | 46 |
| | Economic | 31 | 34 |
| 1969 | Official | 30 | 36 |
| | Professional | 51 | 46 |
| | Economic | 21 | 33 |

It was true that ideologically there were some differences the between parties on some issues such as the role of parliament, judiciary, laicism, freedom of thought and economic planning. But these were not enough to account for harsh relationships between the government and opposition. We suggest that this state of affairs can not be explained without taking into account Turkish political traditions and culture. From the second constitutional period onwards it was a tradition to accuse (usually without any substance) your political opponent for violating what you assume to be unchangeable principles of the state. Its roots should be sought in the political traditions of Ottoman Empire, and particularly the institutions of "Siyaseten Katl."[155] The fact that Sultan's could take life of any of the state servants on the basis of higher interests of the state and religion, which had been fused, created an atmosphere where accusations, slanders, gossips became the primary means through which disguised power struggles within the ruling elite were conducted.[156] In such an environment, the easiest

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[154] Adopted from, Weiker, *Modernization*. 23

[155] Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Siyaseten Katl* ['Siyaseten Katl' in the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Birey ve Toplum, 1987).

[156] The literature might provide reader an idea of how 'politics' was conducted inside palace. Yahya Kemal's collection of short stories "Siyasi Hikayeler" (Political Stories) is an example. In one of these, entitled "Raif Efendinin Katli" (The Murder of Raif Efendi), Yahya Kemal tells the story of Raif Efendi, who had been retired from the palace service and chosen to live quiet life outskirts of İstanbul. One day, Raif Efendi suddenly is taken to the 'Kapı Arası' the place in which those who had been fined capital punishment were kept. Everbody wonders why he had been taken there facing the death. Ataullah Efendi, another influential man belonging the ulema who had also been retired after performing several important services in the palace, tells why. According to Ataullah Efendi, years ago Raif Efendi was approached by a man, Ali Bey, who had the wrath of Sultan Mahmud II and had been exiled. Ali Bey had, in the fury of being exiled person, told many displeasant things regarding Sultan Mahmud II and its close circle to Raif Efendi. Some time later Ali Bey have regained the Sultan Mahmud's confidence and

way to deal with an opponent was to blame him for violating the higher interests of the state. If you managed to convince the holder of state power that your opponent constituted harm to higher interests of the state, Sultan could take his life.[157] With the advance of Tanzimat reforms, the ruling bureaucratic cadres secured themselves legal guarantees, but the notion of higher interests of the state and the tradition of accusing opponents for violating higher interests of the state seemed to have lingered on. Though, the understanding of what the state interests were remained dependent on those who happened to have been, for that moment, the locus of state.

In the second constitutional period, due to its transitional nature, there was some ambiguity regarding what constituted the state interests, and who were to assume the role of chief state elite. This indeed provided the most powerful organization of the period the CUP, room for maneuver so as to define what the state interests were. The CUP and its military leaders, perceiving themselves as the only representative of Turkish nationalism and the only force to save the unity of the empire, tended to accuse opponents, who were not strictly speaking Turkish nationalists, of treason. In the republican period, this tradition appears to have been reproduced. As we noted in the previous chapter, after Atatürk's death, his principles began to be taken as ideology in the Shilsian sense and came to be regarded as embodying state interests, while the military (as the chief state elite) perceived itself as the protector of such principles and guardian of state interests.

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have come to influential positions, but could not get rid of the doubt that what happens if Raif Efendi tells anybody what he had told to him about Sultan Mahmud II. He founds the way out by securing the murder of Raif Efendi convincing the Sultan that he constituted harm to higher interests of the state. In all these stories, centrality of spying and clandestine activities for state officials, the virtues of keeping quiet and for not being too prominent, alongside the insecurity and fear felt by those who had, in some way, involved in politics in the palace, is narrated in a style peculiar to Yahya Kemal. Yahya Kemal, *Siyasi Hikayeler* [The Political Stories], third edition, (İstanbul:Özal matbaası, 1995). For an interesting assesment of the on the same book, see, Murat Belge, "Yahya Kemal ve Osmanlı'da Siyasi Gelenek" [Yahya Kemal and The Political Tradition in the Ottomans] *Toplum ve Bilim*, 28, (1985).

[157] Mumcu provides striking examples of such cases. Sultan Mehmet II, once commanded the execution of one his former vezir as his rivals, fearing he would become vezir again, circulated rumours that the vezir was wearing white clothes when he was expected to be in mourning due to the death of one of Sultan's sons. Ibid. 66. In another case, Sultan Ahmed I, once commanded the execution of his vezir-i azam Derviş Paşa, because his opponents convinced the sultan that he was digging a tunnel to reach the palace to topple him. Mumcu, *Katl*. 83.

With a transition to a multi-party system, the political party struggles in Turkey seemed to turn around, chiefly, mutual allegations (of being corrupt, dictator, communist, a traitor, a reactionary, being a reactionary, not a being a real Turk etc.) between government and opposition. The most serious charge being the charges and counter-charges of whether the government or opposition violated the Atatürkian principles (which came to be understood as embodying the unchangeable state interests) or not. Though there were many differences, and it would be a gross simplification, one can nevertheless still liken political party struggles in Turkey (as least until early seventies) to reminiscent of a state servant(s) who complained to Sultan that his rival(s) violated the state interests (or Sharia). Like these state servants in the empire the political parties in Turkey tended to claim, usually to provoke the military, that the other party(ies) was infringing the vital interests of the state or Atatürkism.[158] It is again for this reason that all but openly illegal anti-system political movements in Turkey needed to provide credentials that they were the 'true Atatürkists.' In the Ottoman empire, too, all movements from ultra-westernists to ultra-islamists all claimed that they were trying to ensure unchangeable true interests of the state, sharia (an interpretation of what it requires depended on those whom hold the power)[159]prevails. Though much more detailed studies remain to be done on these points to speak more confidently, it is interesting to note that even if the substance and ideological bases of the political cleavages changed, the style, work habits, assumptions and other cultural patterns-traditions of the Ottoman elite politics continued to affect the republican elites which claimed to represent a sharp break from the Ottoman past.[160]

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[158] Similarly Heper, after noting that "political parties in Turkey developed as a means of elite conflict" added that "always at issue was the bureaucratized version of Atatürkist thought." Heper, *Tradition*. 99.

[159] It is enlightening to note that the CUP which overthrew Abdülhamit II had accused him of "removing some of the materials from the sacred books and ordering the burning of the some of them." Many members of the CUP, which had a secular orientation, had later accused Abdülhamid II for being pan-islamists. See, Mete Tunçay, "Siyasi Tarih,"[Political History] *Türkiye Tarihi, 1908-1980*, vol 4. (İstanbul: Cem, 1992), 32.

[160] For a provocative article that attempts to show how the pre-revolution traditional Russian peasant culture (such as sense of commonality, working habits and leadership cult) have affected the Soviet elite, see, Stephen R. Burant, "The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the

In fact, noting the Turkish elite's deep suspicions about Demirel, Sherwood had commented (in 1967) that "it is yet to be demonstrated that the JP can rule Turkey successfully with the overwhelming majority of the Turkish elite in defiant opposition."[161] Sherwood was proven right that facing a majority of elite opposition the Demirel government appeared to be powerless and unable to rule the country. We have no social-scientific means to assess whether he was objectively so powerless, but even if we had the means to assess that it is irrelevant here. The important thing (for the regime stability) is, the beliefs of the critical elites regarding the regime, and the majority of Turkish elites' seemed to believe that the democratic regime was in crisis.

The military intervention of 12 March was conducted in this atmosphere. In chapter one, we noted that the military's "size, autonomy, professional doctrine, and role conception determine its threshold for intervention, but do not constitute an independent cause of breakdown."[162] The 12 March intervention was the one of the rare cases of military interventions in which the military's professional doctrine and role conception, rather than strictly societal-political variables, came close to be the most significant variable. Despite student and workers unrest, the death toll arising from such actions was far from reaching threatening proportions.[163] The economy, though experiencing hardships, was far from imminent collapse, and only one and a half years ago 46.5 % electorate had registered its preference for the JP.

Despite all this, as indicated above, the military and the country's elite, had semed to lose their belief (which was very low from the beginning) in the Demirel government's ability

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Soviet Elite." *Political Science Quarterly*. 102, 2, (1987).

[161] Sherwood, "Justice," 64.

[162] Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, "An Introduction: What Makes for Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy*, second ed. ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1995), 47.

[163] Demirel, too, expressed a similar opinion. According to him "there was nothing out of control before 12 March. All in all, only six people have been killed in violent clashes. Apart from 15-16 June events, there was nothing forcing the declaration of martial law. We had managed through this difficult period without recourse to martial law." Cited in Turgut, *Demirel*.358.

and right to rule. The intervention finally occurred on 12 March 1971. 12 March military intervention by "pronounciamento" is certainly one of the most complicated (in the sense that it was difficult to unravel) intervention in Turkish political history.[164] Not only because there are many conflicting explanations of which of the various factors compelled the military to act, but also because exactly whom was behind the military move was not clear.[165] Memorandum issued by the military high command stated that "parliament and the government have driven the country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and social economic unrest." It also accused them of not "carrying out the reforms which were envisaged in the constitution." It demanded the setting up of "powerful and credible government, which will end the present anarchic situation, will take up the reforms envisaged in the constitution, in the sprit of Atatürkism, and will implement reformist laws." William Hale perceptively notes the three elements that came together to produce the 12 March memorandum.[166] The first was the belief on the part of the senior commanders that Demirel had lost grip on power and had been unable to deal with mounting public disorder. The second was some commanders' coming to the conclusion that social unrest can not be prevented by force alone, it also required some socio-economic reforms, which the Demirel government was not particularly keen to implement. And thirdly, there were radical officers with connections in the press and academia, who concluded that no real progress can be expected within the liberal democratic order because the one-man one-vote principle were bound to produce what for them conservative governments.

According to the dominant viewthat relies heavily on the accounts of senior commanders who carried out the operation, it was a move designed to forestall far more extreme damaging intervention by the radical forces.[167] Some junior officers who were retired after the intervention, on the other hand, claimed that planning for a radical military regime was

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[164]Ahmad, *Experiment*.205; Hale, *Military*.185.

[165] Keyder provides an example of sociological reductionism arguing that "the development that had led to the removal of the JP and the establishment of a government not based on popular support was the division within the ranks of the bourgeoisie." Keyder "democracy," 51.

[166] Hale, *Military*. 187.

[167] Landau, *Radical*.44; Ahmad, *Experiment*.205.

done at the behest of their superiors and only at the last minute had they been abandoned by their superiors. [168]

What can be got from the memoirs of those who had been involved in the military intervention suggests a somewhat more complicated picture. There is little doubt that the chief of General Staff Memduh Tağmaç worried about street politics and the spread of radical socialist-oriented ideas within the army. In a much quoted phrase he was reported to have said "social awakening exceeded the level of economic development." But he was not particularly keen to use military pressure to implement what others argued as socio-economic reforms that the constitution was supposed to have ordered. Regarding the problems of disorder, he was reported to have said that the problem "must be dealt with force otherwise another possible coup, which would resemble not 27 May but the 1917 Russian revolution, might come." [169] He appears to have thought that it was the constitution with its ultra-liberal provisions which needed to be changed. According to Muhsin Batur, he has shown some reluctance in involving the military in day-to-day politics, but as he informed President Cevdet Sunay "he could not control his subordinates." [170] It appears that the commander of the air forces Muhsin Batur and land forces Faruk Gürler were in favor of military involvement to prevent anarchy and implement constitutional reforms. What is less clear, however, is the degree and closeness of their relations with the junior level radical officers who wanted to establish long term military rule in the name of Kemalism. According to General Gürkan who was one of the most prominent of those radical officers, Gürler and particularly Batur were well aware of their plans, and they were supposed to lead the new military government, but changed their mind in the last minute. When these junior level officers met with Gürler and Batur to get the order for military takeover on March 9, Gürler did not dare to lead them as "he was still undecided and

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[168] Celil Gürkan, *12 Mart'a Beş Kala* [On the Eve of 12 March] (Ankara: Tekin, 1986), 34, 252.

[169] Cited in Batur, *Anılar*. 182.

[170] Cited in Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, *12 Mart- İhtilalin Pençesindeki Demokrasi* [12 March-A Democracy in the Paw of Revolution] (Ankara: İmge, 1994), 181.

was not sure his control of the land forces."[171]

Similarly, and for the same reason (i.e. it was not clear whether all of the air forces that he commanded would support such move) Batur[172] too, was not prepared to lead the intervention. The meeting ended with the decision that all preparations should be stopped until another meeting which would be held in 10 March but this time with the Tağmaç. It appears that Gürler and Batur had some relations with junior level radicals but were not as close as these juniors claimed.[173] In the meeting, the military high command, perhaps sensing that after all these preparations, and rumors, some sort of military action was required, decide to issue a memorandum.[174] When their sincere worries about "something to be done,"[175] combined with the desire to give a message to junior officers that "something is done" appears to have provided main incentive for the intervention.

This last minute memorandum was a not well-planned and well thought out text but a compromise one. It threatened the takeover of government (if its demands were not fulfilled) but it lacked precise plans to stand up this threat. Like the 27 May intervention before it, it was not clear who was in charge. But soon, developments showed that Tağmaç and Sunay were in control. On 13 March five general (including Celil Gürkan), one admiral and thirty-five

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[171] Batur, *Anılar*. 238.

[172] Ibid., 238.

[173] In our interview, Kenan Evren (who worked with Faruk Gürler and who respected and liked him as his commander) told me that he had some materials regarding Gürler's involvement with radical officers which he characterized as "ugly." When I ask what was it, whether he could wish to make it public, he said to me that he had given it to the Presidency of War History (Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı), which is not, with few exceptions, open to reserachers. Kenan Evren, Interview by the author. Marmaris, March 31, 1998.

[174] According to Batur, in 11 March meeting, he told Memduh Tağmaç that "There was some preparations. We stopped these. But we can not continue like this. We have to take steps towards some sort of action." Cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, *12 Mart*. 203.

[175] Kenan Evren, who also particiapted in 10 March meeting with Tağmaç, noted that many high level commanders were deeply concerned with country's situation. Evren reported that some commanders had said that "our lungs had too much freedom so that it burst it (our lungs) which was not familiar with such things." Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*, [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren], vol 1, (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 152.

colonels were retired.[176] In 19 March Nihat Erim, who resigned from the RPP and thus made an "independent MP" overnight, was appointed to form a new cabinet, a decision that even Muhsin Batur, one of the signatories of the memorandum, learnt from the press. As he later confessed they (Gürler and himself) lost control of the developments soon after the presentation of memorandum because they did not abolish political parties and assemblies.[177]

Initially bulk of the press,[178] intelligentsia,[179] student and teachers associations all supported the military's memorandum and the JP governments' resignation. "Vigorous forces" (zinde kuvvetler), they believed, had finally taken over the reins of the government thus far dominated by conservative-reactionary forces and would now implement the socio-economic reforms that were allegedly ordered by the Constitution. Their hopes, however, were soon to turn sour. It was true that there was radical groups within the military wishing for a long-term authoritarian government to enact reforms envisaged in the constitution, but the military's (more accurately, senior commanders' who now held the control) foremost aim was to end what appeared to them public disorders.

Instead of directly taking over the administration the military commanders' had set up a reformist non-partisan government in the assembly. The unwillingness of General Tağmaç to assume governmental responsibilities, and the lack of unity within the high command regarding the aims of intervention appears to be dominant reason for such outcome. Professor Nihat Erim was charged to form a government (known as the brain cabinet) in order to end chaos in

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[176] The high command defended its action on the grounds that these officers constituted a danger to army unity. Many suspected, on the other hand, that they had been retired to support the claim that intervention was to forestall a left-wing intervention.

[177] Batur, *Anılar*. 309.

[178] Nadir Nadi, owner and editor of Cumhuriyet newspaper recalled that after hearing the 12 March memorandum "they had been rejoiced like children." Nadir Nadi, *Olur Şey Değil* [It is incredible ] (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1981), 173.

[179] Professor (of Law at Istanbul University) Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu have remarked (on 17 March) that "the sprit of Atatürk have just taken action to prevent the collapse of the modern Turkish republic and the sinking of the Turkish nation into the darkness just when the country was at the brink of the abyss, as he had done in the independence war." Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Üç Devir* [Three Periods in Turkey] cilt 1 (İstanbul: Sinan 1972), 422.

the streets and to enact socio-economic reforms. Despite the military pressure, his was a government dependent on the JP support in the assembly. Thus the JP was, through the ingenious use political maneuvers able to block the agenda of the Erim government.[180]

It was on the question of law and order that the Erim government had the full support of JP and the military. Continuing terrorist activities forced Erim government to proclaim a martial law on 17 April 1971 in eleven provinces. The proclamation of martial law had given virtually a free-hand to military commanders, who then proceeded with a policy of severe punishment of leftist terrorist and intellectuals suspected of sympathizing them.

The 12 March intervention also hastened the leadership struggle within the RPP. The struggle was between those favoring "left of center" policies as elaborated by Ecevit and those who stuck to the rather more traditional RPP line represented by İsmet İnönü. In the first reaction to military's memorandum, İsmet Inönü, this time representing the equally Atatürkist legacy of army's non-involvement in daily politics, harshly criticized the commanders' move.[181] But later he somewhat softened this attitude. The chief of staff Memduh Tağmaç had sent him a message (with Sadi Koçaş, a retired military men and an RPP, MP) that if they had not moved left-wingers would have taken the lead, and asked for a support.[182] As a Statesmen concerned before all else security of the Republican state, he took the more conciliatory attitude.[183] In doing so, he appears to have thought that to keep to parliament open such an attitude was necessary. It was more so especially since he was told that the intervention was

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[180] See the assesment of the period by Prime minister Nihat Erim himself, Nihat Erim, "The Turkish Experience in the Light of Recent Developments." *Middle East Journal*. 26, (1972). (pp.245-252)

[181] "If high-ranking military commanders" argued İnönü, "are to decide when a government is to be changed and what the short and long term tasks of newly formed governments are, and particularly if they put forward suggestions and insist on their implementation as unavoidable measures, then we cannot imagine that parliamentary life can be feasible." Cited in Ahmad, *Experiment*.290.

[182] Koçaş cited in Birand, Dündar, Çaplı, *12 Mart*.216. İnönü also had asked Fuat Doğu the head of the National Intelligence Agency to brief him on the intervention and recevied the similar answer. Tanju Cılızoğlu, *Kırık Politika- Anılarla Kamil Kırıkoğlu* [Politics of Disappointment- Kamil Kırıkoğlu Through Memoirs] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1987), 22

[183] Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü- The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 234.

conducted to forestall a radical coup by junior officers and the RPP men had been appointed as prime minister. As soon as Nihat Erim was appointed as prime minister (on 19 March) and it became clear that İnönü would support him Ecevit resigned (on 21 March) from his post as secretary general. With his resignation Ecevit set out to prepare for a final bid, which would eventually come in 1972 when he defeated İnönü and became the leader of the RPP.

To sum up, after 1960 Turkish politics had entered a new era. The "participatory" structure of the 1961 Constitution and the socio-economic changes as a result of the quickening of the modernization process were the crucial factors affecting the politics in the new period. In this era new social-political forces tended to flourish, previous alliances began to dissolve, perceptions of various political actors of themselves and others underwent critical changes. It was a period of remaking and realignment of various socio-political forces. The RPP, the staunchest ally of the military, the chief state elite, were beginning to move towards the left, whilst the army began to appreciate how dangerous junior level radicalism might be. The army also seriously worried about perceived advance of socialist ideas in its previous allies intellectuals-academics, students, and the RPP. Whilst its anti-communism alienated this community, it also created a basis of convergence with the JP. Meanwhile the JP, the main successor of the old DP, also underwent a period of renovation. It was much more careful in its relations with the military. It was much less associated with anti-secularism, economic mismanagement and dependence on foreign power than the DP once had been. In addition to these changes in the previous parties and political actors, the post-1961 political order, in which politicization and radicalism dominated the intellectual climate, also paved the way to the emergence of both socialist-inspired movements and parties alongside the ultra-nationalist and islamist-religious ones.

These changes, as we noted in the beginning of this chapter, introduced both new constraints and opportunities alongside the existing ones. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the 12 March military intervention occurred because Turkish political party elites' were unable to overcome these constraints. The intervention, expectedly, was a far cry from bringing a solutions. In the first place, it was naivete (to say the least) to expect the intervention

to correct the several imbalances that the democracy faced. The military interventions were more likely to create as many problems as they solved for the democracy. The 12 March intervention was hardly an exception.[184] Socio-economic reforms (such as land reform) that were allegedly envisaged by the constitution could not be enacted. It was true that public disorders (namely student radicalism and strikes by workers) were suppressed. But it was achieved only by recourse to martial law for the time being. There were amendments to the 1961 Constitution. The basic tendencies of those changes were towards the strengthening of state authority in relation to basic rights and liberties, the strengthening of military authority vis-à-vis civilians, the weakening of judicial control over elected governments, the strengthening of the executive vis-à-vis legislature.[185] Although those changes had been in the direction that had been advocated by the JP and Demirel, it did not suffice to make them cease their criticism of the 1961 Constitution.

Whatever its successes and failures it might be, the 12 March intervention and events in the military interregnum surely affected perceptions of several political actors themselves and their perceptions of others. These changes was important in understanding developments leading to breakdown of democracy in 12 September 1980. The military high command had now well-understood junior level involvement in politics was to be avoided. Because it might seriously damage the internal unity of the army. A process which began with the Aydemir case in 1963 was now complete. Afterwards, if the military had to intervene again, it would do so through the high command.

With that came the end of the alliance between the army and the left leaning intelligentsia and students. The severe treatment that students and the bulk of the intelligentsia suffered in this the period spelled the end of the alliance, between the military and this group.[186] It appeared that, the military had found radicalism of the students and intelligentsia just too

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[184] Hale, *Military*. 209.

[185] Tanör, *Anayasa*. 54-60.

[186] A stark account of this treatment can be found in İlhan Selçuk, *Ziverbey Köşkü* [Ziverbey Mansion](İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1987).

much. It has been noted earlier how the military gradually came to see leftist activities and allegations that some officers collaborated with it. The high command could not help but be concerned since it threatened both the unity of the army and the country's independence (in the commanders' eye socialism meant Soviet control) and its place in the Western bloc. The military's change of attitude towards this group can be observed from the changes that the high command made in the books that had been taught at Military schools. The 1971 edition of the book, was entitled *Türk Devrim Tarihi* (The History of Turkish Revolution) while 1973 edition was entitled *Türk İnkılap Tarihi.*[187] The exact rendering of these into English difficult. But while the word "inkılap" to denote "revolution" came to be preferred by more right-leaning interpreters of Atatürk revolutions, the word "devrim" was the option of more left-leaning interpreters of it. It was also the case that in the 1973 edition of the book, the characterization of the DP as "düşük" (or fallen) had been replaced by "eski" (or old DP).[188]

Yet another example of the army's changed attitude is the case of the arrests of Professors Bahri Savcı and Mümtaz Soysal (of Political Science Faculty of Ankara University) for subversive activities. These two professors had been involved in the preparation of the 1961 constitution by the invitation of the military. Professor Savcı even had declared that the military's move was "democratic" on the 13 March.[189] Even more interesting was the arrest of the Professor Bülent Nuri Esen (Law Faculty of Ankara University) who, just a couple hours before his arrest, had been eating with prime minister Nihat Erim, who had also been a professor in the same faculty. After the crackdown on the leftist activities no one would dare to advance the view that a progressive order or the constitutional reforms would be enacted by "vigorous forces."[190] The academic -turned journalist Uğur Mumcu, who had close relations

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[187] These book are, T.C Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, *Türk Devrim Tarihi* [The History of Turkish Revolution] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1971); T.C Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, *Türk Inkılap Tarihi* [The History of Turkish 'Inkılap'] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1973).

[188] Genelkurmay, *Inkılap*.197; Genelkurmay, *Devrim*.197.

[189] Ahmad, *Experiment*.320.

[190] Igor P.Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960-1980* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 166.

with some radical officers, made this point clear. When asked whether they supported the military intervention to implement Atatürkist reforms prior to the 12 March intervention, Mumcu[191] answered, "At that time, I was thinking of a revolutionary leap forward based on the clamping of all civil-military forces. But the 12 March experience had shown us that this road was blocked."[192]

The military also appears to have appreciated that unless it was seen as completely necessary by critical actors and was well-prepared, the military's direct involvement in politics damaged both internal discipline and their prestige.[193] As the 12 March military intervention failed in most of its professed aims except the suppression of terrorism for a time being. Perhaps the most face-losing (for the military) event of the post-1971 era was the presidential elections. The military failed to get the chief staff Faruk Gürler, elected as president in 1973.[194] Facing resistance of civilian politicians the military had to accept a compromise candidate ex-admiral Fahri Korutürk. It appeared that united civilians scored a significant victory against generals. The Economist, for instance, had remarked that "it may even prove a milestone in contemporary Turkish history."[195] In reflection it became clear that the bulk of the army was not united in its support for Faruk Gürler. Despite the army managed to get another ex-military

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[191] *Yanki*, January 27- February 2, 1975. For a similar assessment, İsmail Cem, *Tarih Açısından-12 Mart*, [The 12 March From the point of view of the History ] vol 2 (İstanbul: Cem, 1977), 282.

[192]Semih Vaner's comment even after 16 years reflects the impact of 12 March on the intelligentsia's perception of the military. According to Vaner, "by compromising itself gravely in the maintenance of order, including its most scandalous aspects, it (military) had irrevocably tarred its progressive image." Semih Vaner, "The Army," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. Irwin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 256.

[193] In the preface of the 1971 book, (referred above, footnote 187) it was argued that history of Turkish revolutions should be known very well because, as like in the past, in the future, too, "commanders might be forced to take the fate of the nation into their hands, rescuing it from the situation into which it had fallen." This sentence, reflecting the military post-1971 unwillingness not to involve itself in day-to -day politics, similarly does not appear in the 1973 edition.

[194] For the details, Hale, Military. 203-208; Roger P.Nye, "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Elections." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 8, (1977).

[195] *The Economist*, March 24, 1973. "Rebuff for the Generals."

men elected for the presidency, it was nevertheless, perceived as loss of face for the military.[196]

Similarly, relations with the RPP, which had entered a precarious course of events ever since it adopted the "left of center" policy, finally culminated in Ecevit's election to the party chairmanship. Ecevit was determined to restructure the RPP along what he called the democratic leftist line, appealing to workers, peasants, students and middle classes. With Ecevit's victory, in the army's eyes, the RPP was no longer the party associated with the traditional state philosophy as they interpreted it. Ecevit's anti-12 March posture and his failure to provide support for General Gürler have all affected the military's disenhancement from the RPP.[197]

Parallel to its anti-communism and anti-separatism, the convergence between the military and the JP was now clearer than ever, as the military (in broad agreement with the JP's diagnosis of Turkey's law and order problems) pushed for the constitutional changes the JP had campaigned for. Though overthrown by the military, the JP did not assume a hostile attitude toward the military and supported interim governments. Demirel was pleased to see that the military proceeded a policy of crushing subversive leftist activities which he would willingly subscribe but could not do under normal democratic procedures.[198] The fact that many martial law commanders subsequently joined the JP also supports the view that the relations between the army and the JP were further softened.[199] It was not, however, the case

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[196] Kenan Evren, for instance notes that with the Gürler event "the prestige of the armed forces have been damaged to a considerable extent." Evren, *Anılar*.159.

[197] The Economist observed that "Mr Ecevit is now as much disliked by the generals as the Justice Party's Mr Demirel is." *The Economist*, March 24, 1973. For a similar assessment, Engin D. Akarlı, "The State as Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1976), 153.

[198] As Muhsin Batur lamented "the JP has managed to attain many of its demands that it even did not dream of and now waiting for its future days in power." Cited in Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP*.114.

[199] Some of these commanders were; Cemal Süer, the former martial law commander of Izmir. Kemalettin Gökakın, the former general secretary of National Security Council, and the former military judge Ali Elverdi, who was a prosecutor in Dev-Genç trial that led to the execution of three members of organization.

that mutual historical animosities were all forgotten, rather, as Akarlı[200] perceptively pointed out, it was the case that the army now tried to put itself at an equal distance from all parties.

[200] Akarlı, "state," 154.

# CHAPTER IV: FRAGMENTATION, POLARIZATION, PARTY PATRONAGE AND POLITICIZATION: POLITICS IN THE POST-1973 PERIOD

In the previous chapter, we advanced the view that the 12 March military intervention could be seen as the result of the inability of the Turkish party elites to overcome various constraints -derived from the turbulent years of sixties- imposed upon already existing confining conditions. It was also noted that the 12 March military intervention could not solve many problems it aimed to tackle, and Turkish democracy entered the post-1973 era with the similar problems. The question (that we raised regarding the post-1961 period) that whether Turkish democracy would be able to adjust to the changing social-political conditions, imposed upon already existing constraints and opportunities, thus reasserted itself in the post-1973 era. In what follows we shall try to delineate how in the face of new opportunities and constraints - changes within the RPP, and the increasing fragmentation of the party system, the experience of the 12 March intervention which affected perceptions of various political actors, the continuing migration to cities, an economy that was completing an easy phase of import-substitution strategy- the political party elites behaved and how their behavior seemed to affect the stability of democratic regime.

It is the basic argument of this chapter that, far from advancing in the way of finding solutions, post-1973 governments (that of the RPP-NSP coalition and Demirel's National Front coalitions) further aggravated the situation. Apart from the only seven-month long RPP-NSP coalition, the National Front (NF) governments particularly, played a crucial role in the further escalation of many problems and subsequent degeneration of the democratic regime and thus constituted cornerstone of the 12 September military intervention. The remarkable features of this period were the increasing polarization of party elites (which was increasingly were transmitted to the masses) and the politicization of the bureaucracy accompanied by

extreme party patronage.

## 4.1.THE EMERGENCE OF BÜLENT ECEVİT AND THE NEW RPP

The leadership change in the RPP signified end of an old era as Bülent Ecevit took over leadership from veteran politician and hero of the independence war, İsmet İnönü. This was not a simple change in leadership. Bülent Ecevit wanted to restructure the RPP what he called along democratic leftist lines. It is, therefore, necessary to pay attention to the new RPP ideology and its chief propagator Bülent Ecevit. Unlike Süleyman Demirel, Ecevit had a distinguished background in the sense that his family belonged to the cultural elite of the new Republic. His father was a Professor (in Medical School) at Ankara University and a member of parliament on the RPP ticket, while his mother was an accomplished painter. Born in 1925, he attended the prestigious American Robert College, where he had been introduced to Anglo-Saxon culture. His early interests had been focused on poetry, literature, journalism and translation. After graduation, he attended Law School but left his education uncompleted. His first job was in the official press agency of the government. Then he was sent to England to work at the Turkish embassy as a press attache. After four years (1946-1950) in England he returned to Turkey and began to write articles (on literature and foreign affairs) for the RPP newspaper "Ulus." He was elected to the TGNA in 1957 on the RPP ticket, and was minister of labor between 1962-1965. Having a deep attachment towards underprivileged,[1] he played an important role in legislating workers right to organize and strike during his tenure as labor minister.[2]

Ecevit had wholeheartedly supported İnönü when he declared that the party was on the left of the center in 1965. Though his conception of left of center policy differed from that of

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[1] He was reported to have criticized his friends at Robert College, who were attending dancing parties where girls and boys come together. In the school newspaper he argued that "every party a youngster attends increases the distance between himself and peasant- as he became more and more demoted." Cited in Kayhan Sağlamer, *Ecevit Olayı- Bir Başbakan'ın Doğuşu* [The Ecevit Phenomenon, The Rise of a Prime Minister] vol 1, (İstanbul: Tekin, 1974), 43.

[2] Sabri Sayarı, "Bülent Ecevit," in *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Bernard Reich (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), 161.

İnönü, Ecevit stayed loyal to him as the struggle (between those who reject the left of center and those who did not) within the party continued. Indeed, it was reported that Ecevit would not allow anybody to criticize İnönü in his presence. [3] With İnönü's support, he became secretary general of the RPP in 1966. Ecevit wrote three books between 1968 and 1970, where he explained what the party's new ideology should be. With his high oratical skills and youthful image he soon came to be identified as the leader of the left-wing of the party as secretary general.

Ecevit's radical rhetoric occasionally brought him into clashes with İnönü. When İnönü declared that the RPP was not a socialist party, Ecevit responded that left of center policy should not be interpreted as rigid and close (i.e.whose limits were defined by party leadership) doctrine. He added that the RPP was always open to change implying İnönü's conception was not the only interpretation.[4] But İnönü did not unseat him when surely he could have done so. He appears to have thought that this would contradict the party's new image and cost votes in the elections. He must have supposed that he could unseat him anytime he wished, as he had done other challengers. The clash between these two came in the aftermath of the 12 March military intervention. Ecevit resigned when İnönü decided to support the Erim government and began to prepare for a final bid against İnönü. Ecevit's reaction to the 12 March intervention might provide some clues regarding his leadership style and qualities as leader. It is therefore necessary to pay close attention to it.

Proponents of Ecevit were quick to claim that he was a principled democrat who resigned from his position to protest the anti-democratic removal of elected government.[5] That did not, however, appear to have been the case. He resigned on 21 March 1971, that is nine days after the intervention and only two days after Nihat Erim (a determined critic of Ecevit)

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[3] Sağlamer, *Ecevit*.240.

[4] Feroz Ahmad and Bedia T. Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partilili Siyasal Hayatın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* [An Annoted Chronology of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey, 1945-1971](Ankara:Bilgi, 1976), 356.

[5] This view is not only held by proponents but by others as well, see for instance, Ahmet İnsel, "Türkiye'nin Kronik Rejim Bunalımı Üzerine," [On the Chronic Regime Crisis of Turkey] in *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1990), 129.

became a prime minister. Besides, his characterization of the 12 March intervention was not the reaction of a principled democrat who opposed military intervention regardless of its aims or its consequences, but rather as someone who took stance whether the intervention in question served specific policies or not.[6] In a strange way, he argued that "those provisions of the military's memorandum regarding government was not a 'coup d'etat,' but only those provisions of memorandum, perhaps and hopefully, unwillingly subscribed by the military commanders, regarding his party was a coup d'etat." This was because, he argued "it was the government that had tried to lengthen its period in power by getting support from the army." "Once any government found itself in that situation," he continued, "it is only to be expected that commanders could rightly say to it that they no longer protected it."[7] Therefore, he concluded that the 12 March intervention which was supposed to be above the party could not even be impartial regarding factions in the RPP. It was conducted, Ecevit asserted, against the march of left of center policy in the RPP. This was an obviously distorted view of the 12 March intervention, which was despised even by his sympathizers.[8]

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[6]As was his reaction to 27 May military intervention. His comment on 27 May in Ulus newspaper is also revealing: "Your dark days are over. Good morning Turkish nation. When the Turkish people woke up yesterday morning, they embraced the light of freedom alongside the sunshine. It was the Turkish army that brought this light as great news through its quiet struggles in the darkness of the night, and presented it with rise of sunshine (to the Turkish nation) as a present that she deserved. Thank you Turkish Army, Good Morning Turkish Nation." Cited in Sağlamer, *Ecevit*.56.

[7] Cited in Suna Kili, *1960-1975 Döneminde, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler* [The Developments in the Republican People's Party in the Period of 1960-1975 from the Politcal Science point of View ] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları 1976), 277. In February 8, 1972 Ecevit also argued that "my opposition to the formation of (Erim) government should not even be interpreted as opposition to 12 March intervention. In contrast, I was in favour of the establishment of a government in line with what the 12 March commanders wished. They had wished the formation, within the rules of democracy, of a persuasive government that would work in above-party sprit. I am of the opinion that it is not correct (proper) to appoint a person, who was a member of an opposition party, even the leader of one faction in that party, as head of government supposed be above party." Cited in Kemal Satır, *CHP'de Bunalım* [The Crisis in the RPP] (Ankara: Nüve, 1972), 25.

[8] Abdi İpekçi was reported to have said that it was a "nonsense." Cited in Tufan Türenç and Erhan Akyıldız, *Gazeteci* [The Journalist](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1987), 301. Similarly Çetin Altan was reported to have commented that "If a person says that the Turkish army, under American influence, have planned coup d'etat to prevent my coming into power, his nerves must have been quite disturbed." Cited in Sağlamer, *Ecevit*. 244.

It appears, then that Ecevit well-appreciated that the struggle was nearing to an end and he could capitalize on the situation by resigning at that moment. His handling of resignation affairs also revealed his rather emotional approach to politics. When asked why he had not let İnönü know about his resignation before making it to public, Ecevit answered that he did not go to İnönü because he could have persuaded him not to resign.[9] This suggests either that he was not totally confident of his own case, or he was so committed to him that he just felt it impossible to speak with İnönü face-to-face.

The struggle ended when Ecevit replaced İnönü as the third president of the RPP after Atatürk and İnönü. It appears that İnönü (who was 88 years of age at that time) underestimated Ecevit's strength and assumed that he could easily ward off the challenge as he had done so many previously. Ecevit, on the other hand, had built up his clientele within the party hierarchy, and public opinion was strongly on his own side. İnönü accepted defeat with dignity but resigned when the new RPP leadership decided to withdrew its ministers from the interim government. In his resignation letter he stated that the RPP's policy have taken a direction which was harmful to the interests of the country when the sensitive conditions of the 12 March still prevailed. The main thrust of İnönü's critique was that Ecevit had allowed to the various shades of the left to infiltrate the party. He was also concerned with Ecevit's leadership qualities to lead what was to him the biggest party of Turkey. He seemed to regard him as unrealistic, adventurist, lacking a sense of responsibility, and with low administrative capacity.[10] He answered those who mentioned Ecevit's achievements by saying that "an adventure might be successful, but it does not change the fact that it is still an adventure. If the adventure continues afterwards, this is an even bigger mistake."[11] Ecevit's popularity

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[9] Ibid.,284.

[10] Necip Mirkelamoğlu, *İnönü, Ecevit'i Anlatıyor* [İnönü talks about Ecevit] (İstanbul: Kervan 1975).

[11] Ibid.,194. It was even reported that İnönü asked to Kamil Kırıkoğlu (who was a general secretary of the RPP and seemed to be supporting Ecevit's bid for leadership) whether he did not know "the fact that Ecevit can not even watch over couple of gooses." Cited in Tanju Cılızoğlu, *Kırık Politika-Anılarla Kamil Kırıkoğlu* [Politics of Disappointment- Kamil Kırıkoğlu Through Memoirs] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1987), 152.

had reached such a nadir that few endeavored to understand what this old and experienced statesman was saying.

With Ecevit's election as the leader, the intra-party organizational changes towards more social democratic patterns developments were expected to take place as Ecevit also promised to increase intra-party democracy. The RPP, which was based on an alliance of local notables with civil-military bureaucracy throughout its life, showed the characteristics of an indirect, cadre party.[12] Its links with social groups, like that of the JP, remained weak and based largely on clientelism and patronage.[13] Having such charismatic and historical personalities as Atatürk and İnönü as leaders the concept and the tradition of intra-party democracy did not have deep roots. Ecevit's efforts in affecting the organizational structure of the RPP in that respect remained less than complete. Not only because legal constraints prevented the party having formal links with, say, trade unions, but also because it was very difficult to change party direction in such a short time in the face of the overwhelming opposition of the vested interests,[14] leaving aside the question whether Ecevit really wanted it to be so.[15] Despite some steps have been taken to increase both intra-party democracy and efforts towards turning the party toward mass membership parties, the RPP still continued to display cadre party characteristics and a lack of intra-party democracy.[16] While, as existing available research suggests, more class-based participation has been observed, it did not replace the older forms of participation based on clientelistic relations, rather both forms continued to exist side by

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[12] Arsev Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP (1961-1980)* [The Leadership Oligarchy in the Process of Democratization, the RPP and the JP (1961-1980)] (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993), 112.

[13] See, Ayşe Güneş Ayata, *CHP (Örgüt ve İdeoloji)* [The RPP (Organisation and Ideology)] translated by, Belkıs Tarhan, Nüvit Tarhan (Ankara: Gündoğan, 1992).

[14] As Bektaş noted there did not seem to be any significant increase in the number of those peasants, workers, or artisans in the central executive organs of the party even after the 1972. Ibid.,105. She also noted how Ecevit's efforts to curb irregularites observed in recording of the members, which have hindered intra-party democracy, faced resistance by the vested interests.

[15] Indeed, the intra-party factions has frequently criticized Ecevit for autocratic tendencies.

[16] Bektaş. *Liderler*.131.

side.[17]

Ecevit's political views, which provided a new direction to the RPP's new left of center policy, are scattered in his books and speeches. Expressed in an eloquent, poetic and sentimental language, they involve many contradictory themes concerning society and politics. In many ways they carry utopian connotations, which does not bode well with political realism. According to Ecevit, the underlying philosophy for the left of center policy was the opposition to the existing order because it was unjust in that it did not provide what we may call "equality of opportunities" for everyone. The opening sentences of his book entitled "The Left of Center"[18] read as:

> There is a level a human being can attain if his (her) personality are freed from material inhibitions, if he (she) can get the education deserved. If a political order does not allow everybody to reach that stage, it is contrary to humanity. If it allows some to reach that level while hindering others it is contrary to both humanity and justice.

For Ecevit, the left center policy first of all aimed at equality of opportunity so as to enable the underprivileged to develop their talents. Aspiring to have "all good things together" Ecevit characterized it in the following manner. It was "humanist" (insancı), because "it gave individuals highest importance." It was "populist"(halkçı) because "it strived for the removal of every kind of inequality and exploitation so as to melt class differences away." It stood for "social justice and security" and was "progressive, revolutionary and reformist" because it purported to "change social structure at the highest possible speed." It was "etatist" because it "views state as something that serves people not the vice versa." Its statism does not aim for removal of freedom of private enterprise but direct it for the public good. It was "for a planned economy" because only through rational regulations could its aims be attained. It was for "liberty" because it rejects the limitations of individual freedoms for the sake of future generations. And finally it was "for social democracy" because they appreciate that unless

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[17] Ayata, *CHP*.

[18] Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu* [The Left of Center], seventh ed. (İstanbul: Tekin, 1975) (Original publication, 1968), 11. Elsewhere Ecevit similarly argued that "the ideal (ülkü) of the RPP was to establish a dynamic and creative social order in which no one can oppress or exploit others, and where human personality can develop free from every kind of social obstacles." Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Demokratik Sol Düşünce Forumu* [The Forum of Democratic Leftist Thought](Ankara: Kalite, 1974), 7.

economic and social limitations are removed, democracy would not function in favor of people."[19]

According to Ecevit, "left of center" policy was in complete harmony with the 1961 Constitution and principles of Atatürk. Like the TWP and many intellectuals, Ecevit argued that the 1961 Constitution had envisaged a particular social and political order and left of center movement aimed at realizing that order. Accordingly, the popular slogan, and the title of the book Ecevit wrote, "This Order Must Change"[20] does not envisage changes in the existing 1961 constitution, but establishment of the new social-political order that was allegedly envisaged by that constitution. In another book, he even went as far as suggesting that the constitution had "ordered" such reforms. Therefore it was a "constitutional movement."[21] Ecevit's this claim, too, can not stand up to close scrutiny. Although the constitution charged the state to provide social welfare for everybody, it also provided a room for different interpretation by stating that "the state performs its socio-economic responsibilities given by this constitution -to the extent that its economic development and financial resources allow."(article 53)

Ecevit claimed that it was not only totally constitutional but also in line with Atatürk's principles. Like many political movements, Ecevit, too, wished to have the additional legitimacy that being an Atatürkist was supposed to provide. In a way Atatürkism (whose interpretation greatly varied) seemed to have been perceived as a state philosophy that no one could afford to ignore. According to Ecevit, Atatürk was a "revolutionary" (devrimci) and

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[19] Ecevit. *Sol*.24-26. Even a cursory look can reveal questions that are hard to answer regarding the realizations of these policy aims. For instance, how can a movement, aiming to change social structure at the highest possible speed, be also reformist at the same time ? How can a movement while giving highest importance to individuals be also strive for the removal of every kind of inequalities and melting away of class distinctions ?

[20] Bülent Ecevit, *Bu Düzen Değişmelidir* [This Order Must Change] (İstanbul: Tekin, 1968).

[21] Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik* [Atatürk and Revolutionism], second ed. (İstanbul: Tekin, 1973) (Original publication in 1970), 103.

revolutionism was indeed one of his six principles. But Ecevit[22]noted that "in the language of Republic, revolution (devrim) used not in the sense of "ihtilal" but "inkılab" it is antonymous of reformism (evrim)."[23] According to Ecevit founders of the RPP has made an "ihtilal" only once in 1919.[24] It, therefore, is not committed to the violent overthrow of the existing order.

For Ecevit, Atatürk's revolutionism involved two aspects. One was its concrete dimension, revolutions that were realized in his life time. The other was its abstract dimensions, that is his "permanent revolutionism."[25] It was only when these two came together that one could be a "real Atatürkist" and "real Atatürkist revolutionary."[26] To protect concrete revolutions, Ecevit continued, one must be a permanent revolutionary.[27] According to Ecevit, the left of center movement was to continue where Atatürk left off. It was to be revolutionary in this special sense.

In Ecevit's interpretation, Atatürk's revolutions were "superstructural revolutions" (üstyapı devrimleri), they were "affected superstructure, that is to say, political, administrative and legal institutions, organizations."[28] But the real revolutions Ecevit added were "base revolutions" (altyapı devrimleri). What he understood by base revolutions is not at all clear. On

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[22] Ecevit.*Düzen.* 223.

[23] In Ecevit's interperation, being an "inkılapçı" means the rejection of the violent overthrow of existing order. But, it also opposes reformism, that is gradual improvements in the existing order. So, according to Ecevit, "inkılapçılık" is something which opposes both the overthrow of existing order and its reform through gradualism. This usage of "inkılapçılık" seemed to be accepted by academics as well. Kemal Karpat, for instance, have preferred similar use of "inkılapçılık" to refer to both reformism and revolutionism. Kemal H.Karpat, *Turkey's Politics- Transition to a Multi-party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), vii. It is possibly because of the Republican elite's distaste with hesitant reformism of the Tanzimat period, the term "reformculuk" came to be understood as a term that has to be avoided.

[24] Ecevit.*Düzen*.223.

[25] Note that "permanent revolutionism" is a concept developed by Russian revolutionary marxist Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). Citing many examples like these, many critics charged that Ecevit is prone to have been impressed by the last book he read, or country he had just visited. See, Metin Toker of Hürriyet, *Hürriyet*, May 29, 1977, "Benim Oyum" [My Vote].

[26] Ecevit. *Atatürk*.18.

[27] Ibid., 20.

[28] Ibid., 62.

the one hand, it was said to involve a revolution "that aimed to re-order relations of productions and envisages changes in the possession of economic power."[29] On the other hand, his concrete proposals were nothing of the sort, concerning only land reform and social security. Ecevit indicated four areas which were yet to be realized despite the constitutions' clear instructions. These were land reform, steering of the private sector in line with public interest, the right to live in an humanly way (insanca yaşama hakkı), and the right to social security.[30]

He did not hold Atatürk responsible for not realizing "base revolutions" however. According to Ecevit, social and political conditions of the time -widespread poverty and illiteracy in the Ottoman Empire, lack of real knowledge regarding revolutions, oppositions of privileged classes- had prevented him from doing so.[31] Be that as it may, Ecevit believed, Atatürk had shown the direction that future generations should follow, that is "base revolutions." Besides, by realizing superstructural revolutions Atatürk had paved the way towards real base revolutions since without first the latter can not be realized.[32]

While it is not at all clear how far Atatürk himself would subscribe to what Ecevit called base revolutions, Ecevit was more in line with Atatürk's "populism" (Halkçılık) with its somewhat idealized picture of people and the rhetoric of "going to the people," and melting away the class differences.[33] But it should also be noted that Ecevit rejected the old formula of

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[29] Ibid., 61.

[30] Ecevit, *Düzen*.79-83.

[31] Ecevit, *Atatürk*.43.

[32] Ibid., 36, 63.

[33] There are many examples of Ecevit's idealized picture of people. "Protests do not necessarily show that people are against the revolutions (of Atatürk). ...For such an outcome, the intelligentsia must be held responsible. The task of vanguards is not done through writing or speaking but by going into people's daily life so as to present examples to show (the correct) the way." Ecevit, *Atatürk*, 79. "None of the professors can thoroughly know the socio-economic problems that concern poor people of Turkey as much as people in Pülümür mountains or landless peasants in Torbalı can." Ibid. 123. "The RPP should go to the people. It should be able to create an image of people that is more suitable to its real identity." Ecevit, *Sol*.99. For more information about the idea of populism in Turkey, see İlhan Tekeli and Gencay Şaylan, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi." [The Evolution of 'Halkçılık' Ideology in Turkey]

"for people, despite the people" a motto of Jacobinist interpretations of Atatürkism:

> We are a party which strives for reforms and revolutions to the extent that the people themselves are convinced the necessity of these. We take care of their wishes and look for their support. Therefore, we are ready to wait for this to happen even if this required remaining in opposition for a long time. [34]

He seemed to appreciate that unless the RPP wiped away its elitist image, it would not able to attract much support and come to power. He criticized Turkish intellectuals for being closed to the people and having a condescending attitude towards them.[35] He even preferred the term "agreeing with the people" (halkla anlaşma) to "telling the people" (halka anlatma) for the latter' elitists connotations.[36] Nevertheless, the very elitism of Ecevit (who was born and nurtured in an RPP environment) surfaced in many places. For instance, in his book The Left of Center he still could wrote of "people serving the state."[37] In other place, he spoke of "democracy of the state" (devletin demokrasisi).[38]

Ecevit frequently resorted to vulgar marxist slogans such as "revolutionism", the distinction between base revolutions and superstructural revolutions, or "land for tiller, water for user." In a much abused passage he even compared his revolutionism with that of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guievera:

> Castro and Che Guievera faced closed doors. So did Ho Chi Minh. So did Mao Çe Tung. To open these doors, whose key was not possessed by the revolutionaries, they had to use force to break the doors. But

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*Toplum Bilim.* 6-7, (1978).

[34] Ecevit, *Düzen*.224.

[35] He even said that intellectuals in small towns in Anatolia were living as if they were in colony having no relations with the local people whatsoever. Ecevit, *Atatürk*. 80.

[36] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. *Demokratik Sol*.5.

[37] In explaining why democracy was well-suited to the Turkish people, he argued that only with democracy "could one have (create) a conception of state that people could feel their own and thus serve willingly." (ancak demokrasiyle halkın benim devletim diyebileceği bir devlet imajı, kendinden sayarak ve gönlünden gelerek hizmet edeceği bir devlet kavramı yaratılabilirdi.) Ecevit, *Sol*.49. In another place, Ecevit argued that " (Turkish) people can not do without a state, but they can not unwillingly serve the state either" (Bu halk devletsiz yapamaz. Ama devlete gönülsüz de hizmet edemez). Ibid., 49.

[38] "Since our state is a social state, democracy of this state should naturally be, and will be, social democracy." (Devletimiz sosyal devlet olduğuna göre, bu devletin demokrasisi de sosyal demokrasi olacaktır, öyle olmalıdır). Ecevit, *Sol*.58.

in our country the doors are not closed. They can be opened if we turn doorknob.[39]

But what he has offered was nothing of sort. Despite not infrequent denunciations of the private sector as exploiters, Ecevit did not categorically oppose private enterprise. He noted that due to the possibility of reaping extreme profits in some areas, or what economists would call "rent-seeking," private enterprise in Turkey did not turn to productive industries. He promised to end this and to channel private enterprise into productive activities that would help to foster the economic development of Turkey.[40] At a more abstract level, Ecevit argued that "without a right to property and enterprise there can not be a democracy"[41] because when the state controls the whole of the economy there can be no counter power, a situation likely to lead to democracy's death.[42] However, he did not see democracy as the imperfect means to protect individual rights (including property) as classical liberals would. Quite the contrary, he believed that unrestrained freedom of enterprise and property was not compatible with democracy either.[43] The left of center attitude was committed to democracy "not because of freedom of enterprise and right to property" but quite the contrary "it respected them to sustain democracy."[44] In other words, the market economy was "a necessary evil."[45] Ecevit envisaged what is commonly called middle way in state-market relations in which the state would play a role (however not clearly defined) supposed to serve public good alongside the private sector.[46] He found, for instance, the statism of the YÖN movement just too much and signed

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[39] Ecevit, *Atatürk*.105.

[40] Bülent Ecevit, *Başbakan Ecevit'le Sohbet* [Conversation with Premier Ecevit](Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1974), 41-44.

[41] Ecevit, *Sol*.43.

[42] Ibid., 44.

[43] Ibid., 44.

[44] Ibid, 115.

[45] Clement H. Dodd, *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (London: Eothen, 1979), 115.

[46] In an attempt to lure the private sector, the RPP program dated 1976, stated that "a private sector that works within the framework that the RPP offered ensures the society's confidence as well as its own security in the most efective way on the hard road of transition to industrial society." Cumhuriyet

the YÖN declaration with reservations.[47] How far and through which channels the state would be involved in the economy were ambiguous. The RPP theoreticians put forward such concepts as "Halk Sektörü" (Peoples's Sector) and "Köy-Kent" (Rural-City)[48] but these did not appear to be well-thought out realistic proposals. Similarly, Ecevit did not oppose foreign investors provided that "they did not take more than they bring."[49] But he did not specify how his party would ensure that did not happen.

Ecevit was unrepentant in his defense of democracy as he understood it. Arguing that "every administrative system from workplace to university must be democratic. (because) if it (democracy) begins and ends with the ballot box, it does not satisfy needs of today's man"[50] he favored what is commonly called participatory democracy. He frequently stressed that left of center policy would function as a bulwark against both ultra-left and right.[51] The RPP's commitment to democracy, Ecevit argued, determined how far it could move towards the left. That is to say, the RPP would move to the left to the extent that that could be reconciled by its

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Halk Partisi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programı ve Seçimlerin Teknik Hazırlıkları ile İlgili Bilgiler* [The Program of the Republican People's Party and Information Regarding Technical Aspects of the Elections] (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1976), 155.

[47] Sağlamer, *Ecevit*.147.

[48] The Rural-City project aimed at setting up a new center (chosen with the help of the people) with infrastructural facilities such as roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, and agricultural know-how, which would attract several villages around it. As well as preventing migration to the cities they would function as the core of future cities. Bülent Ecevit, *Sohbet*. 36. People's Sector (Halk Sektörü) is based on the idea that savings of small shareholders, trade unions, various co-operatives, pious foundations and migrant workers abroad, should be used in establishing economically productive businesses. They would be supported by the state, their management would closely be supervised by its shareholders to a greater extent than is possible in private sector enterprises. Ibid., 24, see also, for more information see, Ali Nejat Ölçen, *Halk Sektörü* [People's Sector ] (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1974).

[49] Ecevit, *Düzen*.160.

[50] Bülent Ecevit, *Demokratik Solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar* [Basic Concepts and Problems in the Democratic Left] (Ankara:Ajans Türk, 1975), 31.

[51] Ecevit, *Sol*.117. As time went on, Ecevit's efforts to distance his party from Marxist-socialist ideas were considerably increased. In 1975, for instance, Ecevit argued that they preferred to use the term "democratic left" rather than "social democracy" to characterize the RPP's new direction simply because the latter term derived from Marxism, and they wanted to forestall charges that the party was influenced by Marxism. Ecevit, *Temel Kavramlar*. 52.

commitment to democracy and freedom.[52] His commitment to democracy was to do as much with the standard view (held by the Turkish state elite) that Atatürkism required the establishment of democracy as was his belief in intrinsic values of democracy. Like İsmet İnönü, he accepted that Atatürk's revolutions aimed at "familiarizing the Turkish nation with freedom, to open up mind of Turks to free thought, and to prepare Turkish society for democracy."[53] Therefore, Ecevit believed there was no contradiction between Atatürk's revolutions and democracy and criticized those intellectuals striving for the realization of Atatürk's revolutions through an authoritarian regime led by the military.[54]

Why Ecevit (and other prominent RPP ideologues) employed such radical rhetoric, despite close scrutiny reveals that the content of their expressed beliefs -involving many contradictory themes and arbitrary use of concepts[55]- appeared to be somewhat different.[56] One can suggest that one of the factors could be their desire to attract those (students, intellectuals, urbanized workers) who were influenced by prevalent socialist climate of the time. They seemed to assume that, if they could present their less than radical ideas in the form of simple, sentimental and radical language, they could attract this group. This was especially so, since they could justify the use of such language through the reference to Atatürk, as the various groups including TWP on the left had done before them. The other factor might be the RPP leaderships' indifference with what his words might mean to others, and how others could

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[52] Ecevit, *Sol*.32.

[53] Ecevit, *Atatürk*.52.

[54] Ibid.,51, 59.

[55] Ecevit, for instance, once stated that the "concept of father state (devlet baba) is replaced by concept of children state (evlat devlet)." He seemed to imply that the new concept of the state that the RPP espoused would require the state to behave like a hard-working, good-mannered children as "hayırlı evlat" would. Ecevit, *Temel Kavramlar*. 30.

[56] Even secret CIA report (dated 1974) concluded that "Ecevit is a moderate socialist with an apparently firm and sincere commitment to the principles of democracy, social justice and peaceful change. A major factor in his strong attachment to socalism is his belief that its adoption is essential to protect democracy in Turkey and ward off communism." These reports are claimed to have been seized by Iranian authorities in the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. *Documents From the US Espionage Den-US Intervention in the Islamic Countries, Turkey* (The Center For the Publication of the US Espionage Den's Documents, Tehran, no date), 24.

use these words.

The opponents of the RPP, on the other hand, were quick to seize an opportunity to portray it as more left-leaning than it really was. In fact as early as 1965, when İnönü introduced the term left of center, the JP leaders had responded by saying that "left of center is the road to Moscow" (ortanın solu Moskovanın yolu). Demirel as a stringent anti-communist whose belief that Turkey's troubles were caused by international communism was reinforced by the events of the 1969-73, used the RPP's radical rhetoric to portray himself as the only man to stop the RPP whose coming power might open way to the communism. Due, in part, fragmented party system, both parties and leaders benefited in presenting the other as more extreme than they actually were. The tradition of mutual allegations continued but this time their contents were somewhat different. In the sixties and early seventies, parties accused each other of being "reactionary," "violating Atatürk's principles," or "aiming to destroy democracy." With the advent of new RPP leadership, these allegations tended to be replaced in part by being rightist- fascist or leftists-communist. Therefore the use of radical rhetoric by the prominent members of the RPP seems to have been one of the chief factors for increasing polarization. It is true that the Turkish party system (politics) has never been free from polarizing tendencies, but it became more pronounced through the 1973 elections and afterwards.

## 4.2. THE 1973 ELECTIONS: TOWARDS FRAGMENTATION AND IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION

The 1973 elections were contested in a highly electrified atmosphere. The new RPP leadership made "the change of existing order" its motto, alongside the prevention of the threat fascism supposed to be nurtured by the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and tolerated by the JP. In line with Bülent Ecevit's views outlined above, the RPP's election manifesto, called "Ak Günlere" (To Bright Days) promised all good things together; restoration of democracy, low



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inflation, high growth and social justice.[57] The program promised a democracy in which people actively participated in public affairs. To this end it promised to remove all limitations, many of them brought to life during the 12 March period, upon the "freedom of thought,"[58] to remove various limitations that hindered the trade union's and associations,' civil servants and the universities' involvement in political life.[59] In a sentence that reveals party's conception of law, it promised "not to implement the constitutional requirement that the state security courts be established unless extraordinary circumstances require."[60] Concerning economic policy the manifesto presented only general statements setting the party's policy orientation rather than a detailed program of a what possible RPP government would do. It stated that there was no contradiction between rapid growth and social justice on the one hand, and industrialization and agriculture on the other.[61] Aiming to remove the "differences between village and city" it offered the implementation of rural-city projects.[62] It also promised a "land reform" that aimed not to end private property but to enable the landless peasant to have land of his own. Lands to be distributed should come from large estates as well as from unused but arable public lands.[63] It favored a mixed economy in which private sector, public sector and people's sector, "consisting of co-operatives and other public enterprises" would co-exist.[64] Big capital (or monopoly capital) and foreign investment is tolerated but would be subjected to clearly specified limits. The manifesto also promised to secure "social justice within the private sector"

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[57] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1973 Seçim Bildirgesi- Ak Günlere* [The Republican People's Party, 1973 Election Manifesto- To Bright Days] (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1973)

[58] Ibid.,178.

[59] Ibid., 189.

[60] Ibid.,189.

[61] Ibid.,90.

[62] Ibid.,41.

[63] Ibid., 35-36.

[64] Ibid.,84, 31.

by supporting small and medium sized firms as well as Anatolian industrialists.[65] In foreign policy, it did not propose anything profoundly different from traditional Turkish foreign policy. It promised "to stay in common defense organizations that Turkey participated in" but also stated that "it would not be contented with it."[66] It was further stated that the encouragement of the indigenous defense industry and the strict controls of NATO bases in Turkey were to be given priority. While supporting détente between blocs and great powers, it highlighted Turkey's need to advance economic and political relations with the non-aligned countries as well as all her neighbors.[67]

The JP's election manifesto, on the other hand, was relatively short (91 pages in comparison to RPP's 229 pages) and consisted of a restatement of the party's traditional policy line; mixed economy with social welfare provisions, emphasis on national will and the critique of some provisions of the (changed) 1961 constitution, which were thought to be in conflict with that ideal. If the election manifesto differed from previous ones in one respect it was in its emphasis on anti-communism. It mentioned the existence of the communist threat with an international backing directed to Turkey's political integrity and blamed it as the chief cause for the political instability that the country experienced for two decades.[68] It argued the events of the last two years had shown that violent events were not directed to the JP governments, as claimed by some RPP leaders, but to the integrity of the Turkey's democratic regime.[69] It promised that the JP would take every conceivable measure to "fight with communism, which was the biggest enemy of the Turkish nation and fatherland, and all other extreme currents."[70] The anti-communist rhetoric became more and more pronounced in the JP

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[65] Ibid., 81-85.

[66] Ibid., 217.

[67] Ibid., 219-220.

[68] Adalet Partisi, *Adalet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi -1973* [The Justice Party Election Manifesto- 1973] (Ankara, 1973), 7.

[69] Ibid., 8.

[70] Ibid., 17.

leaders election speeches. They tended to accuse the RPP of defending and nurturing commmunists through their defense of unlimited freedom of thought and through inflaming speeches. Their mutual allegations tended to raise the tension that sometimes led to violent clashes between party supporters.[71] Apart from the polarization on issues, the fact that the elections were perceived as severe test of the leaders themselves made them very rigid and worried. The JP leader, Süleyman Demirel, was anxious to prove that despite the intervention, he was still acceptable (to the army) as a premier. He also faced the task of uniting the right as three parties emerged for the former JP votes. The RPP leadership was equally concerned about whether their new policies would be approved by the electorate. Though the danger of terrorism seemed to be fading away, many believed that with a return to civilian regime it might resume.

Table 9. The 1973 General Election Results[72]

| Political Parties | Votes % | Seats(in the lower assembly) |
|---|---|---|
| RPP | 33.3 | 185 |
| JP | 29.8 | 149 |
| DP | 11.9 | 45 |
| NSP | 11.8 | 48 |
| RRP | 5.3 | 13 |
| NSP | 3.4 | 3 |
| TLP | 1.1 | 1 |
| Independents | 2.8 | 6 |

As table shows, the 1973 elections did not give any party mandate to govern alone. Contrary to expectations, the RPP became the first party with 33.3 per cent of the vote, whilst the JP garnered away 29.8 per cent of the vote, gaining 186 and 149 seats respectively in the lower assembly. It was the first time since the 1946 elections that the RPP finished first. The RPP's success was interpreted as an indication of the approval that the electorate had given

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[71] The angry crowd had attacked the RPP leader Bülent Ecevit in pre-election meeting in Isparta, hometown of Süleyman Demirel, which left more than 20 people wounded. Ecevit had blamed Şevket Demirel (Demirel's brother and the leader of JP organization in Isparta) for instigating the attacks. *Hürriyet*, September 29, 1973.

[72] Metin Heper, *A Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (Metuchen, N.J: Scarerow Press, 1994), 55.

towards Ecevit and his left of center policy. Analysis of the RPP votes had supported this interpretation. It has been shown that workers, inhabitants of the Gecekondu's and those living in urban areas increasingly voted for the RPP, a trend already observed in 1969 elections but becoming more pronounced in 1973.[73] Parallel to the rise in its votes in urban areas the RPP lost support in the less developed South East, as the big land-owners and Aghas tend to move away from the RPP basically due to its left of center policy.

The fact that the JP saw its share of vote decline in those areas that the RPP increased its vote suggests that an number of former JP supporters switched their support towards the RPP, but in itself it does not explain the JP's loss of its former position as the dominant party of Turkey. Surely, the National Salvation Party (NSP) led by Necmettin Erbakan and Democratic Party of Ferruh Bozbeyli, which had a 11.8 and 11.9 per cent of the vote respectively, appears to have appealed some segments of former JP supporters.[74] Despite these changes, it is hard to claim that social background characteristics of the RPP and JP deputies did significantly differ from each other, as table 10. demonstrates.

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[73] Ergun Özbudun, "1973 Türk Seçimleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme," [An Inquiry on the 1973 Turkish General Elections] *Bülent Nuri Esen'e Armağan* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1977), 277, 290; Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical realignment' ?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* 6 (1975).

[74] As Özbudun and Tachau noted, it was the Democratic Party to which former JP supporters appears to have defected while the NSP have drawn support from a various sources. Özbudun and Tachau, "Critical," 475.

Table 10. Social Backgrounds of Two Major Party Deputies, 1973 (%)[75]

| Occupations | RPP | JP |
|---|---|---|
| Official | 26 | 24 |
| Government | 10 | 12 |
| Military | 3 | 5 |
| Education | 13 | 7 |
| Professional | 49 | 39 |
| Law | 33 | 24 |
| Medicine | 7 | 6 |
| Engineering | 9 | 9 |
| Economic | 16 | 30 |
| Agriculture | 5 | 10 |
| Trade.ind. banking | 11 | 20 |
| Other | 9 | 7 |
| Religion | 0.5 | 4 |

One significant difference observed was that the RPP members tended to be younger, and somewhat better educated than other parties, and more heavily made up of professionals, especially lawyers and teachers.[76] The distribution of former military officers among the parties provides further evidence of the military's post-1973 disengagement from the RPP and rapprochement to the JP. A total of 17 former military officers, 8 (% 5.4 of JP membership) were affiliated with the JP compared 6 with the RPP (%3.2 of RPP membership).[77]

In terms of the categories formulated by Giovanni Sartori,[78] the 1973 elections marked the beginning of the trend away from predominant party system towards the moderate multi-party system.[79] Sartori characterized the moderate multi-party system as a party system with

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[75] Adopted from Weiker, *Modernization*, 22,23.

[76] Frank Tachau, "Social Backgrounds of Turkish Parliamentarians," in *Commoners, Climbers and Notables, A Sample of Studies on Social Ranking in the Middle East*, ed. C. Van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1977), 310.

[77] Ibid., 308.

[78] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems-A Framework for Analysis*, vol 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[79] Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish Party System in Transition." *Government and Opposition*. 13, (1978), 48; Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 17, (1981), 232. Üstün Ergüder, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in

more than 3-5 parties in which no one party is able to form a government unless it is supported by one or more parties, whose distinctive feature is the absence of anti-system parties and moderate form of politics. [80] Up until the 1973 election the combined votes of the two major parties never amounted less than 71.5 Even this was obtained in peculiar circumstances of 1961 elections in which there was a fierce competition for old DP votes.[81] But now it was only 63.1 percent. Moreover, the DP-JP tradition seemed to have lost the dominant position (in terms of votes secured) it once had.

This fragmentation of the party system was accompanied by ideological polarization[82] between party elites. Despite the moderate multi-party system the elements of moderate politics were lacking.[83] The major party elites tended to polarize on the right-left (or as they called it fascist-communist) divide. There was nothing new in the Turkish party elite's disposition towards polarization but the issues on which parties polarized changed from a progressive-reactionary to left-right (or fascist-communist) divide. But more significantly, three explicitly ideological and semi-loyal parties (NSP, NAP and TWP) have been able to command 16.3 per cent of the vote and 52 seats in the lower assembly.[84] This fragmentation and

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Turkey." *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*. 8-9 (1980-1981), 47.

[80] Sartori, *Parties*.173-180.

[81] % 93.2 (in 1950), 91.4 (in 1954), 87.9 (in 1957), 71.5 (in 1961), 81.6 (in 1965), 73.9 (in 1969).

[82] The term "polarization" is hard to define. According to Dahl, it involves three different notions; the idea of a dimension of bipolarity, dualism, the extent to which a population is divided into two categories; the idea of dimension of distance between the largest categories; the idea of various characteristic on which polarity or dualism might exist. Robert A. Dahl, "Some Explanations," in *Political Oppositions in Western Europe*, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 381. Giovanni Sartori appears to have equated polarization with a situation in which "spectrum of political opinion is highly polarized" and where "lateral poles are literally two poles apart, and the distance between them covers a maximum spread of opinion." Sartori, *Parties*.135. In line with these definitions we use the term "polarization" to depict a situation in which political opinions (held whether by elites or masses) literally is bipolar and there is a maximum distance between these poles.

[83] Sayarı, "Party system," 49.

[84] Whether the Turkish party system at this period can be characterized as polarized pluralism, is debatable, despite ideological polarization at the leadership level. True, there were five to six parties with coalition potential, the opposition showed some characteristics of bilateral opposition, and there was centrifugal drive, all symptoms of polarized pluralism as espoused by Sartori. But, on the other hand, the

polarization of the party system posed new challenges to Turkish democracy as it necessitated the formation of coalitions. The country had to pass through the experience during the transition period of 1961-65. But many did not find it satisfactory not only because it was a coalition that came to life only with the militarys' backing but also because governing with the coalitions requires values such as compromise, bargaining, shared decision-making, which are not highly valued in the Turkish political traditions and culture. It all seemed to depend on party elites ability to come up with viable coalition government that would set out to tackle Turkey's problems.

There were some talks in the business community supported by President Fahri Korutürk regarding the necessity of the RPP-JP grand coalition so as to make a swift transition to civilian democracy. Political party leaders did not entertain such a possibility. Demirel, who interpreted election defeat as the electorates' misunderstanding regarding their endeavor to keep parliament open, made it clear after election results that "nation has given them the duty for opposition."[85] He had consistently rejected the grand coalition with the RPP since 1969 and never thought of the JP participating in a coalition under Ecevit's premiership. On the contrary, far from forming a coalition with the RPP, Demirel tried to limit the RPP's chances of forming coalition with the NSP or DP by increasing ideological polarization.[86] The RPP leadership was no less repentant. Only one day after the election Bülent Ecevit declared that he was committed to reform the existing order and was not prepared to make concessions to form a coalition government. He appears to have thought that the premiership was in his own grasp and did not want to miss opportunity.

When it became clear that the two major parties would not collaborate, minor parties particularly NSP, came to play a prominent role totally out of proportion their electoral

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metrical center of the system was not occupied by a center party, there was no clear anti-system party and that with the 1977 elections the number of parties that have an a coalition potential declined to four, while the combined votes of two major parties arisen to 78.3 %.

[85] *Hürriyet*, October 23, 1973.

[86] Sabri Sayarı, *Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri* [Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları,1980), 186.

strength. The NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan did his best to secure the most advantegous coalition bargain. One day he visited Demirel, the next day Ecevit, then Demirel again. This endless bickering continued until February, that is nearly three months after the elections when the RPP-NSP coalition was ratified by President Fahri Korutürk.

The coalition seemed to be the bizarre combination that could be formed when we considered the ideologies and world-views of coalition parties. The NSP questioned very concept of laicism which constituted the central flank of the Republican regime of which the RPP had been one of its prime defender so far. Those who defended the coalition pointed out similarities between parties, i.e. that both of them opposed big business with multinational connections, that both favored state-backed industrialization, that both of them defended more independent (read western-sceptical) foreign policy, and that both had favored social welfare regulations.[87] Notably, it was suggested (by the pro-RPP supporters) that both the RPP and NSP appealed to same electorate; the underprivileged, the difference was that the NSP supporters sought solutions in the metaphysic, while the RPP supporters did it in economic and social sciences. They also pointed out that the coalition might help to bridge the gap or traditional cultural cleavage between laicist and pro-Islamists that generated considerable problems for Turkish democracy. Bülent Ecevit, for instance, argued that the "historical mistake" was now being corrected.[88]

However, as even pro-Ecevit scholars[89] accepted that political calculations and advantages of being in power counted more than anything else. For Erbakan it was a question

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[87] See, for instance, Muzaffer Sencer "Koalisyonun Ögeleri," [The Elements of the Coalition] *Cumhuriyet*, January 22, 1974.

[88] According to Ecevit, Turkish intellectuals have falsely assumed that religion constituted one of the most intractable force in opposition to progressive socio-cultural reform. They asssumed it to be so, because the vested interests of the status quo that resisted socio-cultural reforms have so far been able to disguise it by reference to religion. That was a historical mistake as it was not those prople who had a sincere belief in religion that stood in the way of reforms, but those who used religion to oppose reforms. Ecevit. *Sohbet*. 95. He also argued that the coalition was significant in that it showed that loyalty to democratic left does not contradict with loyalty to traditional customs or religion. *Cumhuriyet*, February 12, 1974.

[89] Ahmad, *Experiment*.334.

of survival since the predecessor to NSP (the National Order Party) had been closed down by the constitutional court. He appears to have thought that a coalition with the RPP would surely enhance its image, which would help to prevent any future possible closure of his party.[90] Besides, he also thought that the advantages of being in power would greatly enhance the party's patronage capabilities and thus help the party to consolidate its power base. Ecevit was equally concerned to get into power. Being a prime minister, he thought, would help to assuage the fears regarding the RPP's new "left of center" policy and his ability to govern.[91]

The coalition lasted only for seven months. What Ecevit called a coalition to correct the "historic mistake" at the end turned out to be a dismal failure for his party. It soon became clear to RPP leaders that the NSP was not interested in fulfilling what was in the coalition protocol, but rather furthering their own agenda in total disregard for it. They brought their own men into the ministries under their jurisdiction, without any respect to legal regulations and used the ministries they had as they saw fit. It became clear that they were using resources they controlled for patronage purposes. Necmettin Erbakan, as vice-premier, made many public speeches that many despised as cases of irresponsible leadership. On one day, he would speak of making one hundred thousand tanks, the next day he would declare that oil-rich Arab countries would provide cheap oil to Turkey because he reminded them of Islamic brotherhood.[92]

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[90] Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in *Islam & Politics in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Metin Heper and Israel Raphael (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 83. See also one of the party MP's speech that the coalition with the RPP enhanced the party's legitimacy. Cited in Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme Din ve Parti Politikası -MSP Örnekolayı* [Modernization, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey -The NSP Case] (İstanbul: Alan, 1985), 188.

[91] Some journalists' warnings went unnoticed. Metin Toker of Milliyet had argued that "This coalition can not be formed, even if it is formed can not survive long in the Turkey of 1973. From the very first day it will split up. It is a pity that the favourable winds (for Turkey) will be left unexploited. Those who live long enough are going to see it." *Milliyet*, November 4, 1973. "Köhne Bir Kilidin Paslı Anahtarı İle" [With the Rusty Key of Obsolete Padlock]

[92] Korkut Özal, who was then minister of agriculture in the RPP-NSP coalition, remarked how Ecevit cancelled cabinet meeting after waiting for Erbakan to come for 45 minutes, despite the fact that he twice went to Erbakan's room to tell him cabinet was waiting. Cited in Nail Güreli, *Gerçek Tanık- Korkut Özal anlatıyor* [The Real Witness- Korkut Özal Speaks] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1994), 79.

One notable work of the coalition that surely would have a lasting effect on democracy was the amnesty, in the honor of the fifth year of the republic, granted to those convicted of political crimes, as well as ordinary convicts. Critics have pointed out that those who had been released (for having been convicted for political crimes) would now be encouraged to continue their activities that have led the country into political chaos.[93] Even Ecevit himself had to accept that alongside the rightist militants, there might be leftist militants who had been freed by the general amnesty. But he put the blame on the assembly and the constitutional court for altering the original draft that upset the balance.[94] The amnesty issue was also important in deciding the coalitions' future. Despite initial agreement, the twenty NSP deputies voted for exclusion of those convicted from the notorious Penal Code articles 141 and 142 prohibiting the establishment (and according to some, propaganda) of the communist organizations. The bill finally passed as the constitutional court (acting upon the appeal of the RPP) decided that exclusion of those articles was unconstitutional.[95] It was the last straw that helped Ecevit to make his mind to dissolve the coalition.

The coalition might have lasted longer than it had, if only Ecevit had not believed that early elections might give him a landslide victory. The Turkish army's successful intervention in Cyprus[96] turned Ecevit into a national hero almost overnight.[97] He was hailed as a second Atatürk, the man who rescued Turkish Cypriots from extermination, and showed to the world,

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[93] The army especially seemed to have grave reservations about that release, and their confidence in Ecevit further declined as they believed that many of those freed from prisons would be likely to engage in terrorist activities. But since their last intervention in politics resulted in disarray they could not exert pressure on this particular issue and preferred to stay silent. It nevertheless reinforced their perception of civilians, that is distorting what they had achieved for political purposes. General Evren told me that with that amnesty "terrorists, who had been even more sharpened, have been freed." Kenan Evren, Interview by the Author, Marmaris, March 31, 1998. (Henceforth interview).

[94] Bülent Ecevit, *Ecevit'in Açıklamaları* [Statements of Ecevit](Ankara, 1977), 10

[95] It was reported that nearly four thousand prisoners who had been convicted of these articles have been freed by the constitutional court decision. *Cumhuriyet*, January 1, 1975.

[96] Turkey used her right to intervene as guarantor power when the ruling Greek junta backed colonel Nikos Sampson attempted to eradicate Turkish population forcefully from the island.

[97] Some writers even compared him with Atatürk, Safa M. Yurdanur, *Dün Atatürk Bugün Ecevit* [Yesterday Atatürk, Today Ecevit] (İstanbul: Göl, 1975)

once again, what Turks could achieve. The RPP leadership estimated that if they could take the country to the polls, they would win a landslide victory. Ecevit, then, created an opportunity to resign and used it, though the reason for resignation stated was to prevent the NSP's endeavors to seize the state.[98] However, he miscalculated the fact that the other parties in parliament would not agree to hold an early general election, which they were likely to lose. After it became clear that two major parties would not be able to form a government, President Korutürk entrusted the task of forming a government to senator Sadi Irmak. The Irmak government failed a vote of confidence, but continued (until the new government formed) as caretaker government. Thus, Turkey entered the longest governmental crisis in its history which would last more than two hundred days.

During this period, painstaking bargainings between parties took place. The JP leadership seemed to follow a two-tiered strategy. It aimed the prevention of possible RPP government and the seduction of enough Demokratik Party MP's to resign from their parties and thus to form a National Front government with NAP and NSP. The portrayal of the RPP as more left leaning than it was and blaming it for student violence in the universities was well suited to first strategy. The RPP leadership, on the other, did its best to persuade the other parties for an early general election. While the political scene was dominated by endless maneuverings, clashes between rival students groups, that had a potential to spread into larger segments of the population, tended to reemerge. The instability at the governmental level was beginning to have an effect on the social level as the caretaker Irmak government could do little to deal with the crowded agenda. The reactions of the major party elites to these events were telling in that they provided clues the direction of their attitude that they would show to increasing terrorism later. For instance, when TTUSA (a union of left-leaning teachers) meetings had been disturbed by unknown attackers, Demirel reacted that "it was the RPP that instigated attacks so as to say (to nation) that either we come to power or we would not allow

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[98] According to Ferda Güley (minister of transport in the RPP-NSP government) "Ecevit wanted it to be seen by everbody that we had nothing common with our partner. He seemed to aiming to create several reasons that would make it easier (for public opinion to accept) if the RPP left the partnership." Ferda Güley, *Kendini Yaşamak* [Living Oneself] (İstanbul: Cem, 1990), 541.

this country to live in peace."[99] Ecevit on the other hand responded that "those who are a fraid of possible RPP government were behind the attacks."[100]

The fact that the country had those days passed without any overt involvement of the military in politics was a positive sign of democracy's resilience, as perceptively noted by Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet.[101] But, it was more to do with the military's unwillingnes to engage in politics, rather than deeply entrenched belief in the virtues of democratic regime on the part of the citizenry at large and other critical groups. Indeed, it can be argued that endless discussions, turnarounds, broken promises, bluffs that politicians were engaged in, during the post election period was highly corrosive of the belief in the democratic regime. Lacking a tradition arriving at a compromise through the multiple confrontation of various groups, Turkish political culture does not look at favorably notions of "bargaining" that was the hallmark of the period. It tended to emphasize instead co-operation, harmony and unanimity.[102] We have noted in the previous chapter that the bulk of Turkish elite's (in the military and press) had a "rational conception of democracy" that is there is always one correct (rational) policy, which can be discovered through honest discussion, but not by bargaining and compromise. Bargaining was likely to be seen as means through which politicians pursued their narrow interest at the expense of public. And in Turkish case, endless bargainings reached a stage that even a consolidated democracy, that looks favorably on the notion of bargaining, can hardly accept as normal.

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[99] *Yanki*, (İstanbul weekly) 24 February- 2 March 1975.

[100] Ibid.

[101] *Milliyet*, 1 January 1975. Yankı has made it as cover subject asking "Why Turkey still endure ?" *Yanki*, 24-30 March 1975, "Türkiye Neden Ayakta ?"[Why Turkey still endure ?]

[102] These political traditions is not peculiar to Turkey. Both Ralf Dahrendorf and Myron Weiner notes prevalance of such values in German and Indian society. See, Ralf Dahrendorf, "Conflict and Liberty: Some Remarks on the Social Structure of German Politics." *British Journal of Sociology*. XIV, (1963), 197-211; Myron Weiner, "India: Two Political Cultures," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 235.

## 4.3.THE NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENTS: POLITICIZATION AND POLARIZATION

The crisis ended when Demirel was appointed to head first the National Front (NF) government. It composed of the NSP, NAP and Republican Reliance Party (RRP), and nine deputies who had resigned from Demokratik Party as a result of Demirel's relentless efforts.[103] The distribution of cabinet posts demonstrated again how important small parties had been in Turkey's fragmented party system. The NSP held eight portfolios out of forty-eight seats, the RRP had four out of thirteen while NAP got two out of three seats. The JP, on the other hand, held eighteen portfolios out of one hundred forty eight seats. In the vote of confidence, the NF coalition garnered away 222 votes while 218 voted against it.[104]

To better understand the NF period, it is necessary to take into account the views of those who composed it. According to Demirel, the rationale behind the formation of the NF governments was, "to unite the nationalist against the leftists and communists." [105] He argued that politics in Turkey was now divided into two; the leftist camp composed of RPP and other smaller socialist parties and rightist camp which included JP, NSP, NAP, RRP, and DP. Therefore, Demirel continued, it was necessary for right-wing parties to constitute a National Front to stop the march of socialism in the country. He was not the only man to argue in this line. The idea of National Front against the left was first suggested after the 1973 elections by

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[103] The establishment of the first NF government was interpreted as a proof of Demirel's resilience and his considerable political skills. For that reason, Yankı has chosen Demirel man of the year, 1975. *Yankı*, 29 December-4 January, 1976.

[104] According to the 1961 constitution, just a simple majority is enough to secure vote of confidence, while the qualified majority of 226 is required to oust government in power through vote of no confidence.

[105] Aware of the bad publicity and connotations asociated with the word "front" Demirel and other leaders of the coalition were careful not to call it as National Front, but were anxious to emphasize that it was a "cumhuriyet hükümeti" or "coalition of nationalist parties" at most. Celal Bayar, on the other hand, did not refrain to use the term National Front against the danger of communism. Celal Bayar, *Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk'ün Metodolojisi)* [Thinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk)], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul: Tekin, 1998), 138. (first published in 1978).

Celal Bayar and Ferruh Bozbeyli.[106] The sharp rise in the RPP's votes and the fear of Ecevit, whose radical rhetoric frightened influential right-wing circles in the country, and intellectual dominance of socialist ideas, motivated them to seek a united coalition against it.[107]

It was not altogether clear whether Demirel genuinely believed in the communist threat or used it as pretext to obtain the support of minor right-wing parties so as to persuade them to participate in a coalition. [108] It appears that both played a role. When Demirel's views since 1965 are examined there was a marked trend towards stringent anti-communism. Demirel appears to have believed that there was a threat of communism backed by several states and international organizations. Against the argument that the electoral strength of the socialist parties was negligible, he pointed out that the communists nowhere seized power through election, and that they would not seize it in Turkey either. According to Demirel, the communist conspiracy was behind the many problems that Turkey had to tackle. Alongside his belief in communist danger, the opposition to communism was well suited to Demirel's aim of attaining power. For Demirel, it was important to demonstrate that after 12 March he was again capable of governing the country. He had to dispel doubts raised in many circles that the army would not allow him to become prime minister. Many also believed that Demirel feared the parliamentary investigations in the assembly (regarding Demirel family's business connections, particularly his nephew Yahya Demirel) might result him being tried in the Supreme Court (Yüce Divan). Critics charged that Demirel craved attaining power because only if he came to power, could he prevent such an outcome as decisions of these commissions heavily affected by political considerations rather than impartial criterias. To come to power, to

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[106] In fact, the so-called "Patriotic Front" (Vatan Cephesi) of the DP period can be seen as the foreruner of the idea of National Front.

[107] Muharrem Ergin, one of the ideologues of the influential Aydınlar Ocağı had been constantly arguing for a nationalist front against the "storm of socialism." See for a collection of his writings. Muharrem Ergin, *Milliyetçiler, Korkmayınız, Birleşiniz* [Nationalists, Do not be Afraid, Unite] (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1976).

[108] The allegations of being communist or nurturing them did not begin with Demirel, however. In line with the tradition of mutual allegations, many had blamed the DP founders for being communist in the late forties. Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* [The Democrat Party Tale](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1996), 17.

prevent the RPP forming a coalition, Demirel, then, tended to exaggerate the "threat of communism."[109] He presented his case as if the communists would take over the government, if he did not form the NF coalition.[110]

The NSP was rather more interested in the benefits of being in office. Arguments that compelled the NSP coalition with Ecevit applied equally to NF governments. That is, being in power ensured an aura of legitimacy and helped to consolidate its power base through the enhanced opportunities for patronage. The NAP, which made the struggle against communism its motto, were more than happy to join such a coalition. In addition, they, too, were moved by the advantages of being in power.[111] As such the coalition was based on shaky foundations. Rather than uniting in the implementation of anything like a coalition protocol, each partner, particularly the NAP and the NSP followed their own strategies, which was to prove highly detrimental for democratic stability.

The most pronounced aspect of the NF governments was the extreme politicization of bureaucracy and an extensive party patronage. We use the term politicization to mean "the influence of party politics penetrating into public administration and pushing the special interests of political parties into the foreground at the expense of the realization of a unified national policy."[112] It refers to a state of affairs in which the political party or (parties in

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[109] According to Nadir Nadi, communism has became the biggest support of Demirel who has lost support both inside and outside the country. It is through the use of the fear of communism, Nadi argued, Demirel had been trying to cover his own defects. See, Nadir Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, August 3, 1976, "En Büyük Desteği," [His Greatest Suppport]. Even stringent anti-communist, Professor Aydın Yalçın criticized Demirel's this attitude of exaggerating the communist threat to Turkey. Aydın Yalçın, *Türk Komünizmi Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler* [Some Observations on Turkish Communism] (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1976), 134.

[110] Otherwise, Demirel's views on coalition governments (probably derived from the 1961-1965 experience) was overtly negative. Prior to the 1969 elections, he argued that "coalition governments can do nothing but to get along somehow (idare-i maslahat etmek). They mean frequent governmental crisis and engagement to small parties' programs rather than your own." Cited in Abdi İpekçi, *Liderler Diyor Ki -Röportajlar* [The Leaders are Speaking - Reports] (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1969), 50.

[111] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party." *C.E.M.O.T.I*, 13 (1992), 156-8.

[112] V. Merikoski, "The Politicization of Public Administration." *International Review of Administrative Science*. 3, (1973), 211. Merikoski differentiate two separate but interrelated aspects of the

power) tend to dominate and control bureaucracy and subject all decisions to the political preferences of the governing party (or parties). Subjecting the high level bureaucrats to party preferences is not a phenomenon unique to Turkey and, unless taken to the extremes, it is not seen as strictly detrimental to democratic stability. It is not easy to determine how the relationships between high level appointed officials and elected ones are to be arranged. On the one hand, it seems well-justified for a new government to appoint to bureaucratic positions those with whom it considers would cooperate best. Indeed, democratic ideals require that subordination (within well-defined rules) of appointed officials to the elected ones. Since they, not the bureaucrats, are elected by people and are called to account in every election period. On the other hand, a powerful, independent and non-politicized bureaucracy, which is not totally dependent on political authority, is indispensable for the sound implementation of policies.

How a balance ought to be struck between two principles is determined by such factors as country's history, culture, institutional structure in each case. Ferrel Heady noted two distinct tradition.[113] What he called "classic" administrative systems referred to existence of strong bureaucratic organization with a sense of esprit de corps, which is inclined to assume that what political parties stand for is not necessarily identical to the public interest. The French and German bureaucracies approximate this type. Here politicization at the higher echelons of the bureaucratic machine is resisted. "Civic Culture" administrative systems, on the other hand, prefer a bureaucracy which serves the political party in power. They do not have a conception of public interest independent of the political party in power. The United States and English bureaucracies approximate this type. In these countries, particularly in United States, elected politicians have an unmatched leverage over the bureaucracy.

Turkey, which has shown characteristics of "classic" administrative system, came to

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politicization. One concerns with the political appointments, the other political activities of civil servants. In this study our focus is on the first aspect.

[113] Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration -A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Marcel and Dekker, 1984), 179.

experience an extreme spoil system. During the NF governments, politicization of bureaucracy have reached a level heretofore unseen in the history of Turkish democracy. Each ministry was put under the complete jurisdiction of one party and each party (which controlled that ministry) reshuffled it in a way it saw fit from the rank of undersecretary to junior servants. To have the sympathy of one party or parties in power, not the merit or achievement, was the criteria, according to which bureaucratic positions were filled. When as soon as the new minister appointed, (s)he tended to change his private secretariat, then deputy minister then general directors, directors of department and even directors of sections.[114] We do not have any hard data basically because of difficulties inherent in the nature of the subject-matter and evidence remain largely impressionistic[115] but even rough estimates demonstrate the magnitude of the degree of politicization. Figures that Professor Sait Güran provided, for instance, might give an idea how the post-1975 governments (of which one of them was the NF governments) played with the bureaucracy. According to Güran, between 1962 and 1980 provincial governors (Vali) were changed 518 times. The average number of changes per year was 29 and average service duration was two an half years. Until the establishment of the first NF government, (that is in first thirteen years) the number of changes amounted to 284 and the average number of changes per year was 22 and average service duration was 3.1 years. Between 1975 and 1980 (beginning of the first NF government to July 1980), however, the number of changes amounted to 234. That meant 47 changes a year and duration of service of 17 months only.[116]

Alongside the politicization, each party tried to use state power and resources to

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[114] Cahit Tutum, "Yönetimin Siyasallaşması ve Partizanlık." [Politicization of Administration and Partisanship] *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*. 9, 4 (1976), 19.

[115] For other examples, Sait Güran, *Memur Hukukunda Kayırma ve Liyakat Sistemleri* [Spoil and Merit Systems in the Laws that Regulate Civil Servants](İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1980), 285-290 and Tutum, "Partizanlık,"18-19.

[116] Güran, *Memur*.291. The phenomenal increases in the number of civil servants in the seventies can be interpreted as further evidence of politicization as parties tried to recruit as many civil servants as possible from their supporters. While in 1970 number of civil servants was 655.737, it has risen to 962.537 in 1976 and 1.174.710 in 1977-8. While the population also went up from 35.232.000 in 1970 to 42.078.000 in 1977-8, the number of civil servants almost doubled in less than nine years. Ibid., 6.

further, not the coalitions, their own interests for patronage[117] purposes. To choose a place where public investment would be directed was determined largely by whether the investment in question would increase the chances of reelection of party in power. Local mayors, belonging to opposition parties could not get the revenues that the central government were legally to provide.[118] The changes in the position of Director General of a State Economic Enterprises is one indication of how the plundering of public resources reached high proportions. Believing that State Economic Enterprises provides them unbridled power to satisfy partisans, each party made it sure that their men administrated the SEE's. Between 1962-1974 the average number of years for duration of service (for a director of SEE) was 3.5 years, the corresponding figure for the 1974-1980 period was, on the other hand, 1.7 years.[119] The patronage and politicization, that had been observed in this period disturbed even otherwise loyal supporters of the coalition. Nazlı Ilıcak, for instance, complained of extreme partisanship:

> It is possible to understand a government that appoints higher civil servants with care and selectivity so as to implement its program successfully. But it is a great mistake to apply this rule to workers (to work in the factory) or students (to study in the schools). And this is against our understanding of nationalism. (Besides) this also means the violation of the oath that has been made. And because of these it is both undignified and unconstitutional.[120]

It was particularly minor coalition partners, the NSP and NAP, rather than the JP that went as far as they could go in this game of politicization and patronage. Despite its misgivings about bureaucracy, the DP-JP tradition had never attempted to scatter about civil bureaucracy as did the those two parties.[121] They were essentially moderate catch-all parties which could

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[117] The term patronage refers to "the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support." Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 10, (1968), 379.

[118] Protesting the NF government's partisanship, mayor of Ankara (chosen at the RPP ticket) even went hunger strike. *Hürriyet*, July 31, 1976.

[119] Güran, *Memur*. 290.

[120] *Tercüman*, November 16, 1976. "Milliyetçi Cephe Koalisyonu" [The National Front Coalition].

[121] Erhan Bener, *Bürokratlar-2* [Bureaucrats-2] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1978), 184, 196.

not afford to be too hostile to any significant group in society. Besides, even if they appointed their own men into bureaucratic positions, they at least showed some concern that they were able men. Basically in order to keep things going, as low quality appointments would likely have damaged chances of reelection through the low quality of services they would have provide. The minor parties, on the other hand, concerned solely with whether the appointee in question was one of their own men or not. From their point of view of themselves, this was a rationalistic option. Being a party which had little hope of gaining votes from moderates (and which was supported in the main by hard core believers) they had little incentive to show care about the quality of those appointed. Besides, these party leaders appear to have thought that they might not have another opportunity to participate in government, therefore it was in their best interests to maximize the advantages of being in power without any concern for legal, traditional or ethical rules.

To better understand why NF governments tended towards politicization and party patronage it is necessary to pay attention to both the impact of the strong state tradition and the social-structure of the country that undergoes rapid modernization.[122] Civil bureaucracy in Turkey displayed unique tendencies which distinguished it from French and German bureaucracies, countries which also had a state tradition. In the latter cases, despite having the notion of public interest, which is not always same as those of politicians in power, bureaucracies have came to accept that their definition of public interest is not the sole definition of it, that is, they do not have a monopoly on "truth." The strong "Esprit de Corps" tradition is balanced by the tradition of "service to the state, whatever masters the state may

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[122] These two factors having been singled out, the legal-institutional framework that regulated Turkish civil bureaucracy also appears to have contributed the prevalance of extensive politicization of bureaucracy. The lack of centrally organized examinations to recruit civil servants is argued to be one of the reasons. Since each public organisation tends to recruit civil servants in the way it sees fit, this led to gross differences in terms of the quality of civil servants. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that any civil servant could easily be moved through different institutions. Thus enabling one, who happened to have somehow become a civil servant, to be moved into other institutions which showed concern with the quality of appointees. See, Güran, *Memur*. 273 ff. See also, Cahit Tutum, "Türk Personel Sisteminin Sorunlarına Genel Bir Yaklaşım." [An Essay on the Problems of the Turkish Personnel System] *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*. 13 (1980), 102-3.

have." [123] Thus modus vivendi emerged as "the bureaucratic elite does not lay claim to becoming the political elite as well."[124]

In Turkey, on the other hand, bureaucracy strictly adhere to what Heper called "bureaucratic empire tradition." [125] Composing (with the military) the significant part of the what we called state elites, bureaucrats, too, assumed that there is only one correct policy in each case. They, also, appear to have lacked the notion that public interest would best be served through the conciliation of various interests. Instead, they maintained that it would emerge through discussion by intelligent people. Public interest, they assumed, is best represented and protected by bureaucrats who are free from pressures of electoral competition.

This tradition appears to have given way to oppositional mentality (or state of mind) in the peripheral forces. Thus, "having always been pushed around the Turkish periphery they could not develop a public interest and emerge as 'civil-society-as public.'"[126] Not only because lack of economic resources independent from the state hindered the formation of various groups that might constitute the core of the civil society but also the over-zealous state state looked to such groups with suspicion. The state easily resorted to their suppression when officials began to think that it might constitute harm to state interests. When the potential civil societal groups are treated in such manner, the emergence of "public realm"[127] and related concepts of 'responsibility' and indeed 'civility' in the public sphere becomes exceedingly

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[123] Heady, *Administration*, 202.

[124] Ibid., 202.

[125] Metin Heper, "The Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 7, (1976).

[126] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (London: Eothen Press, 1985), 104. Heper draws upon Gianfronco Poggi's phrase bourgeoisie-as-public in coining the term civil society-as public. Gianfronco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 83.

[127] We use public realm, after Poggi, to refer to a realm "formed by individual members of the civil society transcending their private concerns, elaborating a 'public opinion' on matters of state and bringing it to bear on the activities of state organs." Poggi, *State*. 82.

difficult. Since civil society is nothing but "citizens *acting collectively in a public sphere.*"[128] "The civility that makes democratic politics possible," as Michael Walzer argued "can only be learned in the associational networks of civil society."[129]

With this attitude towards the political system in general, and the state in particular, it can be expected that when they (forces of periphery) had an opportunity, they would exploit state institutions to the fullest possible extent, breaking legal rules let alone ethical and traditional rules as the NF governments did.[130] Since it is an alien (but not in the sense of colonial powers) force that mistreated them for so long, there should be no limits to what can be obtained from it.[131] This is more so since that kind of opportunity might never came again, as what the state gave them could easily be taken back. The idiom that "the property of state is like a sea, he who does not exploit it is a pig" (devlet malı deniz yemeyen domuz) reflects this mentality.[132]

Accompanied by this peripheral mentality one can also suggest additional elements

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[128] Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy*, 5, 3 (1994), 5. (his italics)

[129] Michael Walzer, "Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America," in *Citizenship-Critical Concepts*, vol 2, ed. Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1994), 104. (Original publication 1974), 1

[130] Metin Heper, "Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist Polity?." *International Journal of Turkish Studies*. 1, (1979-1980), 104.

[131] This state of affairs is not unique to Turkey, but was also observed in societies that have experienced with centralized, over-zealous state. In 1965, Alfred Grosser have noted similar tendency among Frenchmen who tended to see the centralized French state as "an enemy from which you must seize whatever advantages you can." Peter Ekeh noted existence of two different ethics for Nigerians. One for public realm and one for private realm. According to Ekeh, while in the western societies what is considered morally wrong in private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public realm, Nigerians associating public realm with memories of the colonial administration does not think in this way. Thus, several actions (all forms of nepotism, for instance) that would disturb them in the private realm does not ethically disturb them if it is conducted in public realm. See, Alfred Grosser, "France: Nothing but Opposition," in *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 293; Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 17, (1975).

[132] It is also significant to note that the word "devlet malı" (property of state) suggests that people tend not to perceive state as something that exists to serve them and that have no other aim or property of its own but quite the reverse.

that appear to have motivated the NAP and NSP for politicization and extensive patronage. Though we do not have hard evidence to sustain this claim, it would not be exaggeration to argue that NSP, for instance, tended to perceive the Republican Turkish state and its bureaucracy as something that imposed an irreligious secular framework and tried to eliminate Islam from Turkish society. As such its distrust and hostility to the Turkish state seemed to be doubled. The NAP, on the other hand, advanced a view that since very basis of Turkish nationalism and state was facing the threat of communism, anything deemed to have been of use against this struggle were to be regarded as legitimate. The widespread slogan of "everything is for the fatherland" denotes this state of mind. When the fatherland is seen to be in danger, principles like rule of law and other legal niceties were to be discarded since without a fatherland no rule of law is possible.[133]

It would, however, be insufficient to relate the NF governments' tendency toward politicization and patronage solely to the state tradition and subsequent particular state-society relations. If that had been so, we would not have observed such phenomenon in countries which do not possess such state tradition, which obviously is not the case. Like many societies in modernization process, undergoing rapid socio-economic change, the social structure of Turkey provided a fertile ground that increased political parties' predisposition towards politicization and patronage. The inability of the private industry to absorb migrant workers, the central governments' less than successful efforts to ensure decent life for the migrants who had to live in squatter houses, have all led these people to turn their face to political parties for help.[134] Political parties, in a desperate search for votes, find it hard to resist these pressures as

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[133] For the discussion of the NAP's conception of democracy, see, Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *Nationalist Action.* 151-153.

[134] Kemal Karpat, for instance, found that the people in the squatter houses "regarded voting as the vital, if not the unique means, which allowed them to bargain with political parties and with the city as well as the national authorities." Kemal H.Karpat, "The Politics of Transition: Politcal Attitudes and Party Affiliation in the Turkish Gecekondu," in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), 103. Similarly Sayarı noted importance of patronage "as a means for strengthening one's status or for achieving particularistic goals is clearly recognized by most citizens. Establishing proper connections with the right people, therefore, assumes priority in all types of social relations." Sabri Sayarı, "Political Patronage in Turkey," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 104.

their success is very closely related to their ability to secure specific benefits for their supporters.[135]

In addition, the organization of the parties as well as initial conditions in which successors of these parties emerged were such that it made prevention of patronage difficult. Turkish parties, as noted, had hardly emerged as the representatives of social groups, articulating/aggregating their interests and carrying them into the public arena, but they emerged largely as a result of an intra-elite conflict. They were not so much parties which articulated /aggregated and tried to reconcile various interests than parties which were more interested in distributing public resources along party patronage. Thus, as Turan Güneş (an academic and the RPP MP) insightfully observed, Turkish parties did not ideologically greatly differ from each other nor did try to appeal to only one segment of the society. Their local organizations were dominated by powerful local faction leaders (be it trader or big farmer) who needed party support to maintain their privileged position. The party groups needed to respond to particularistic demands of the local organizations because they had a say in who should be nominated for the elections in the years to come.[136] Similarly, Martin Shefter (who criticized those who put a premium on the sociological theories of patronage which emphasized characteristics of society in transition) observed whether a party would lean towards patronage is heavily affected by calculations of the party elites as to whether the party would gain more than it would lose if it intervened the administrative process on a partisan basis. This in turn depended on the relative strength of party elite who had a stake in maintenance of the patronage system, on the one hand, and the strength of the bureaucratic elites who had an interest in maintaining a more universalistic administrative system, on the other; and whether

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[135] For a study that relates what we called here politicization and patronage to the phenomenon of administrative diffusion (that express itself with increases in; taxes and public spending, number of civil servants, new public agencies, regulations) as a result of increased social mobilization. See, Cemil Oktay, "Türkiye'de Yönetsel Yayılma Olgusu ve Doğurduğu Sonuçlar," [The Phenomenon of Administrative Diffusion and Its Consequences in Turkey] *Türkiye'de Siyaset- Süreklilik ve Değişim*, ed. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (İstanbul: Der 1995). (first published in 1984).

[136] Turan Güneş, "Partizanlığa Çare Bulabilecek Miyiz ?"[Shall We be able to Find Solution to Partisanship] *Türk Demokrasisinin Analizi*, ed. Hurşit Güneş, (Ankara: Ümit, 1996), 195. (first published in 1961)

parties were internally created or externally mobilized ones.[137] In Turkey many of these conditions were obtained. The DP and JP were internally created and did not stay in opposition for a long time and thus were not compelled to seek other means (recruting due-paying members, to form organic relations with economic interest groups) of acquiring a following. In addition, the peculiar state-society relations favoured patronage the best way to gain votes from the inception of party politics. It was true that a bureaucracy had consolidated itself prior to the emergence of mass participation, but this bureaucracy, especially its civilian part, could not successfully resist the party elites' quest for patronage.[138]

Politicization and partisanship was not the only facet of the NF governments. Due to a lack of agreement on critical issues, each coalition partner had its own way in governmental affairs to a degree that common governmental policy just could not emerge. For instance, it took fifty-three days to elect the head of TGNA because partners in the coalition just could not agree on who should be elected. The coalition partners heavily criticized each other and tended to take the share of success on themselves.[139] The NSP was the most vocal in its criticism of the JP and NAP. An outside observer might have been excused for assuming that some of these parties were in opposition criticizing government. In one instance, Necmettin Erbakan blamed the JP for subverting the NF government. He claimed that in the incoming elections (1975 partial senate and lower assembly by-elections) the JP faced heavy defeat by the NSP. When reminded of the fact that they were in coalition with the JP, Erbakan remarked that "friendship is one thing, the commerce is another" and that "there can not be any gain from unification with the colorless JP."[140] In other instance, Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, vice -chairman of

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[137] Martin Shefter. "Party and Patronage: Germany, England and Italy," in *The State-Critical Concepts*, vol III, ed. John A. Hall (London: Routledge, 1994), 111. (first published in Politics and Society in 1977).

[138] One of the reasons why was this so related with internal organisation of Turkish bureaucracy. As Dodd noted in Turkey "each ministry is virtually autonomous in its personnel arrangements" so when a party control ministry, it could easily resuffle its bureaucracy, filling it with their own men who would not resist partisan demands. Dodd, *Crisis*. 47.

[139] Güreli, *Korkut Özal*. 100.

[140] *Hürriyet*, August 11, 1975.

the NSP, argued that the JP "belongs to a tradition that based on exploitative, rentist, materialist western mind."[141] Alparslan Türkeş, similarly argued that the "development plans that the RPP and the JP subscribed to amount to nothing but the deception of the nation."[142]

Their criticism of each other were not confined to pre-election campaigns. After the 1975 senate and lower assembly by-elections in which the JP came first, Erbakan blamed the JP as if they were not in the same coalition, the "JP has gained but it did so through the use of money and inflated promises, but its balloon will soon be deflate."[143] The general secretary of the NAP once urged the resignation of minister of education (from JP) for annulling the entrance examination of the Teacher Schools controlled by the NAP.[144] Coalition partners even accused each other of nurturing anarchy. Şevket Kazan, a prominent member of the NSP argued that "today the JP is nurturing the anarchy."[145] Similarly, Fehmi Cumalıolu of the NSP argued that "nowadays naked force are coming from both sides. We warn our partners in the coalition to take care of the situation."[146]

Demirel, on the other hand, complained that "we are successful, to the extent that the car with four different tires can go."[147] It seemed that the dominant reason that keep coalition together was the self-interest of the parties (of being in power) and prevention of possible RPP government. At the cost of preventing RPP government, the JP leadership seem to prefer a policy that involved a coalition with those who had no intention other than of advancing their own interests, a coalition that did nothing but get along with somehow. Despite all the unco-

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[141] *Hürriyet*, August 22, 1975.

[142] *Hürriyet*, October 1, 1975.

[143] *Hürriyet*, October 14, 1975.

[144] *Yanka*, November, 15-21, 1976. The annulment of the results came after the allegations that candidates were asked to answer such questions as the doctrine of nine lights, the birth date of Alparslan Türkeş, the names of first and second viwes of Türkeş and like. *Yanka*, 10-16 January, 1977.

[145] *Hürriyet*, March 23, 1976.

[146] *Hürriyet*, January 30, 1976.

[147] *Hürriyet*, September 17, 1975.

ordination, blackmail, politicization, and patronage, Demirel was able to argue that:

> I do not complain about our coalition partners. This coalition has a meaning that transcends the governmental stability. For that reason the left attempts to do everything in its disposal to end it. Those parties that formed the coalition well-appreciate that if the coalition ends, it is not only the government but the National Front that would also end. In that case the left would control the political space. It is not easy (for coalition partners) to shoulder that.[148]

Knowing that Demirel preferred a strategy of keeping the RPP out of power at any cost, the two minor parties went as far as they could go in their exploitation of advantages of being in office. When asked what he thought about the possibility of the JP taking the NSP to the constitutional court where a decision to close it down could be taken, Fehmi Cumalıoğlu said that "these days are over. No one party is crazy enough to dare to spoil the coalition. The JP are envious of our heavy industrialization effort."[149]

Extreme partisanship, politicization and lack of coordination went hand in hand with the ideological polarization. It was already noted how the new RPP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit and his harsh rhetoric has contributed to the emergence of ideological polarization. Instead of taking a more responsible stand, Süleyman Demirel added fuel to the flames. To remember, the basic rationale Demirel used for the formation of the NF was to unite nationalists against the threat of communism. That aim made it susceptible to polarization. As Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet perceptively noted:

> This coalition, which was formed in the spirit of uniting one thing to oppose another, and which made the war against communism its primary aim, can not mollify (polarization), but it carries the risk of encouraging further polarization. To declare a war under the banner of 'war against communism' on those who does not think similarly, can only consolidate this danger. It can also start the beginning of a process that may spell the end of multi-party democracy and therefore the country can be dragged on to bloody fascism.[150]

Abdi İpekçi was justified in his worries, "to unite nationalists against leftists" might have been a good idea to bring into line those reluctant Demokratik Party MP's, but it did not bode well for the stability of democracy. The country was on the way to being divided literally

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[148] *Yanka*, October, 13-19, 1975.

[149] *Hürriyet*, September 1, 1976.

[150] *Milliyet*, April 3, 1975. "Sonradan Giderilemeyecek Hataları Önlemek için" [To Prevent Mistakes that can not be Corrected Later].

into the two poles (left-right) and the distance between these poles tended to grow with each passing day. Demirel hardly seemed to notice differences between various shades of the left spectrum. He constantly argued that "those leftists can not be nationalists. Leftism means internationalism. There can be no agreement (or compatibility) between nationalists and leftists. The politics in Turkey is now practiced on these terms; leftism and nationalism."[151] In this view, the majority of the RPP supporters with moderate tendencies were held to be identical with the supporters of legal and illegal socialists, which was clearly not the case.[152] Similarly, by putting himself in the same category with Alparslan Türkeş since they were all nationalists (whose policies many JP supporters would also object to), Demirel played into the hands of those who tended to portray the JP as an extreme right-wing party.

Ecevit responded this stance of Demirel in a way that furthered polarization as he had his own strategy that required a heightening of tension. As Dodd noted polarization on the part of the RPP arose from their conviction that the JP was soft on the NAP and allowed them to infiltrate institutions of the state. [153] From the very first day, Ecevit blamed the NF coalition arguing that it "will threaten not only the democratic regime, but national unity and the principles of the Republic."[154] That was because Demirel:

> collaborated with the enemies of the democratic regime. Those who planned and instigated political attacks are now about to take power. A man who is so presumptuous that he does not refrain declaring that the nation has given him title 'Başbuğ' in the assembly, who is so disrespectful to the rule of law that he authorized what he called 'commandos' to help security forces, who was expelled from the country for trying to set up dictatorship, now is the vice premier.[155]

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[151] *Hürriyet*, June 9, 1977. Also, *Hürriyet*, May 21, 1977.

[152] As Metin Toker of Hürriyet noted "The claim that there can not be any left-wing but the ultra-left brings Demirel to same parallel with the communists, and Demirel is not even aware of that fact." *Hürriyet*, October 5, 1975. "Niçin, Kime ?" [Why, to Whom ?]. It was also criticized by influential conservative literary critic, Mehmet Kaplan, whose book entitled "The Dream of Great Turkey," is thought to aspire Demirel's own book entitled as Great Turkey. Mehmet Kaplan, *Büyük Türkiye Rüyası* [The Dream of Great Turkey] third ed. (İstanbul: Dergah, 1992), 201. (first published in 1969)

[153] Dodd, *Crisis*.36.

[154] *Hürriyet*, April 9, 1975.

[155] *Hürriyet*, April 12, 1975.

According to Ecevit, Demirel was not able to say that "he was not going to cooperate (elini uzatmak) with Idealists Youth Associations (IYA) whose hands were bloody" and could not condemn it as he himself condemned the ultra left Revolutionary Youth five years ago. "It is just because of that," according to Ecevit, "Demirel could not govern this country, could not bring peace and order as one could cooperate either with themselves (the RPP) or murderers."[156] Ecevit continued his harsh attacks during the whole period of government. He blamed the government for instigating attacks upon the opposition, to protect what he believed to be fascists. He argued that "the government has authorized those attackers to help security forces. Therefore, it is not necessary to search for who are behind the attacks."[157] In Ecevit's view, the parties in coalition "were trying to establish bloody SS forces from the grave."[158] They (through their actions) led to "youngsters' deaths."[159] Knowingly or not he tried to give an image that everybody was in danger of being attacked by forces that got support from the government. When Türkeş sent a card to celebrate a religious holiday which read that "Shoot anyone who backturned from Dava" Ecevit harshly reacted that "all our lives are dependent on bandits. I am expecting Turkish justice to collar those who provoke murders."[160] In one instance, after the RPP convoy had been attacked in Gerede, Ecevit accused the government, "the government has ignored to take necessary precaution even when it was suspected that the attacks might have taken place. I do not think that they will catch any of them. Because, *criminals and murderers are in government.*"[161]

In another case, when the RPP convoy had again been attacked in Elazığ, he became furious. He told that attackers were "the agents of bandits in Ankara" and blamed Demirel:

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[156] Bülent Ecevit, *Millet Meclis Tutanak Dergisi*, [The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA] Birleşim 57, Oturum 2, 16.2.1976.

[157] *Hürriyet*, April 26, 1975.

[158] *Hürriyet*, June 9, 1975.

[159] *Hürriyet*, January 11, 1976.

[160] *Hürriyet*, October 10, 1975.

[161] *Hürriyet*, June 24, 1975. (my italics)

> The chief responsibility for this events falls on Demirel. He is a person who could collaborate even with Satan to become prime minister. Artificial shows of sorrow can deceive nobody. Those who robbed the state for years are now collaborating with fascists, murderers and those obsessed with divine love (meczup). Even those bandits, who have taken to the hills, are less harmful than them.[162]

This was not an exceptional accusation uttered in a moment of anger. Ecevit continuously dwelled on the same theme going as far as suggesting that Demirel was the head of bandits (eşkıyanın başı):

> Those who execute conspiracies and provocations from abroad or from behind curtains, see Demirel as their biggest assistant. Political murderers are getting support from the government. Demirel is not only the head of government but the head of bandits because he protects them.[163]

It goes without saying that these kind of accusation did not bode well for democratic stability. If what Ecevit said about government had been said by ordinary citizen he would have been taken to the court for attacking the moral personality of the government.[164] Not only did these allegations impede the possibility of rational dialogue between the parties, they also generated a picture of a country which does nothing to solve tremendous problems, but is embedded in political infighting's that heightens tensions in the country and contributes the chaos in the streets.

The RPP leaderships' this attitude seemed to have rested on both political calculations and their conceptions regarding the NAP and the JP. To unite those leftist leanings, to exploit socialist potential fully, they tended to exaggerate the danger of "fascist takeover." Once the point was made the logical conclusion was that as the biggest party of the left the RPP was the only power to stop the march of "right and fascism" to protect the democracy. It made sense, for those on the left who did not think to vote for the RPP, to make them vote for the RPP

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[162] *Hürriyet*, September 7, 1975.

[163] *Hürriyet*, March 22, 1976. The other examples can be given: "Demirel and the JP is responsible for the events of the last one and a half years. If he can not prevent some actions of his coalition partners, he is so weak that he can not be a prime minister. if he is not that weak, he has as much fault as they have." *Hürriyet*, June 7, 1976; "The youth would get peace when the head of this government takes his bloody hands out of universities." *Hürriyet*, November 22, 1976.

[164] Similarly, Kemal Karpat commented on Ecevit's behaviour in opposition: "Bent on acquiring power at all costs, Ecevit embarked upon a war with the government in power, using what later proved to be his preferred tactics: passionate denunciations and appeals to class hatred and sweeping promises elaborated by sentimental visions of social justice and freedom." Kemal H. Karpat, "Domestic Politics," *Turkey*, ed. Klaus Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen: Janderhoeck, 1985), 74.

since any small swing in favor of the RPP would make a big difference while other socialist parties came nowhere close to affecting the political balance of power in the assembly.[165] This was indeed what the JP leadership had done to unify what they called nationalists (or rightist) against the leftists by emphasizing communist threat.

Whether Ecevit sincerely believed the NAP was a fascist party[166] which was powerful enough to take the reins of government is open to debate. In retrospect, his view of NAP as a party that could seize the reins of government seems exaggerated,[167] but there are also hints that his view of the NAP also involved a sincere belief regarding the party potential and did not result from solely political calculations. Ecevit seemed to believe that the NAP aimed at

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[165] Yalçın Küçük, writing from ultra-left perspective noted this tendency on the part of the Ecevit. He had argued that "leftists in Turkey pretend not to see the fact that the RPP needs the NAP to control leftist movements." Cited in Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler -5, 1830-1980* [Theses on Turkey-5, 1830-1980] (İstanbul: Tekin, 1988), 642. Also, Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Devrim ve 'Demokrasi Üzerine* [On Revolution and 'Demokrasi'] (İstanbul:Tekin, 1997),13. (first published in 1980)

[166] Whether the NAP could be characterized a fascist party depends on what is understood by the term fascism, which Ecevit declined to explain. If fascism is defined according to social backgrounds of its supporters as a middle class movement of those who felt alienated (with a sense of rootlessnes) in a modernizing society, and those who challenge the basic assumptions of enlightenment with a passionate desire to return pastoric romantic age, the NAP is not a fascist party. Though, it certainly expressed a reaction to socio-cultural changes of late fifties and sixties, it did not advocate the return to lost golden pastoric age except that some in the movement tend to interpret "Nizam-ı Alem" as such. But rather it aimed that those changes (modernization-industrialization) should be more in line with traditional Turkish culture and symbols. Therefore, it can not be said to be anti-enlightenment (or anti-modern) as they made the Turkey's economic development their motto. Mustafa Çalık, *MHP Hareketi- Kaynakları ve Gelişimi, 1965-1980* [The NAP Movement -Its Resources, and Development] (Ankara: Cedit, 1996), 202. Besides the NAP appears to have ignored social radicalism and mobilizational aspect of other fascist movements. But if fascism is defined through some political characteristics such as ultra-nationalism bordering on racism, the mystification of state, leadership cult, stringent anti-communism then the NAP ideology involves some elements that have affinities with fascism. Unlike other fascist parties, the NAP leaders rejected the charge of fascism. Alparslan Türkeş for instance, argued that "fascism aims at the establishment of a totalitarian political in a pluralist society. And it represents limitless and arbitrary brutal state. In that sense, there is no difference between communism and fascism." Alparslan Türkeş, *12 Eylül Adaleti- Savunma* [12 September Justice -Defence] (İstanbul: Hamle, 1994), 54. Elsewhere, Türkeş have based his opposition to fascism and Nazism on somewhat different argument and argued that "Turkish nationalists regard it as dishonorable (şerefsizlik) to follow (acccept) leaders, ideologies and programs of other nations." *Yanki*, 10-16 October, 1977.

[167] It might seem as exaggeration but Ecevit was not the only person to think in this line. Even Kenan Evren believed that the NAP could seize, not the state, but the JP as it seized for Republican Peasant Nation Party in 1965. He told me that he knew Türkeş' personality well because they were class-mates in Harbiye. According to Evren, the fact the NAP increased its share of vote in the 1977 election was a proof that it had begun to get the votes of JP supporters. Interview.

purposefully incite violence so as to make an authoritarian regime acceptable for the big business and other influential elites. Once established, Ecevit seemed to assume, the NAP could influence and/or control that authoritarian regime which would undo the gains of the democratic struggles of underprivileged as well as preventing their further awakening.[168] What is crystal clear, however, is that Ecevit seems to have supposed that the portrayal of the NAP as such would help his party in the elections. The fact that Ecevit spoke as if there had not been any substantial leftist terrorist groups and that only if government-supported (tolerated) fascist forces were to be suppressed would the problem of terrorism easily be eliminated give further credence to this interpretation, since such critiques might cost him votes.[169] Besides, accusing opponents with the harshest possible terms without paying much attention to its possible consequences for political stability was perfectly in accord with Ottoman-Turkish political traditions and constituted a limitation that Ecevit found hard to overcome.

The JP leadership was no less repentant in his attitude toward the RPP and Ecevit. Demirel accused Ecevit and the RPP of providing a support for anarchy (read communism). According to Demirel, the RPP's left of center policy, particularly the direction it took after Ecevit seized the control of the party, stimulated the ultra-left in Turkey. The RPP carried their slogans into center of the political arena. It gave its support when they acted (be it university students, or peasants and workers who violated the law) and provided amnesty to those who were convicted. According to Demirel, "Ecevit has became the instigator of anarchy as he wants to make the security forces ineffective by accusing them."[170] Responding to Ecevit's

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[168] See, also Attila İlhan's evaluations in the same line, Attila İlhan "Türkeşin Çaldığı Kapı" [The Door Knocked on by Türkeş] in *Hangi Sağ* (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1980) 206-208. Similarly, Cizre-Sakallıoğlu wrote that political terrorism and sectarian violence became the route to power for the NAP. Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Nationalist Action," 150.

[169] Earlier, however, Ecevit had criticized those leftist groups which wanted to create an anarchy so as to bring a dictatorial regime, which in turn, would sharpen class contradictions and therefore would quicken the eventual overthrow of the capitalist regime. Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk.* 106. He seemed to hold this belief throughout the seventies. But he seemed to assume that the threat of fascism was much more urgent (immediate) than the threat of communism.

[170] *Hürriyet*, May 1, 1975.

harsh critiques, Demirel went as far as suggesting that "today the only reason for the persistence of uneasiness in the streets, workplaces and Universities is the RPP."[171] According to Demirel, the RPP did this, "just to make everybody to say that Turkey can not be governed by this government."[172] When a man attacked Demirel and broke his nose, one cabinet minster remarked without proper inquiry "this person was morally committed to the RPP" (manen CHP'li). Süleyman Demirel even uttered such words which might be interpreted as encouragement for attacks on the RPP. He said that "without settling accounts with the RPP, this nation can not find peace and harmony."[173]

In this process and in line with Turkish political traditions, mutual allegations tended to be personalized. Demirel once argued that Ecevit was "an imitator of Castro, a liar that used the slogan of 'Bright Days', and 'a political swindler" (Castro taklitçisi, akgünler yalancısı, siyaset cambazı).[174] He even suspected Ecevit's mental health:

> Ecevit confuses opposition with rebellion. The RPP continue to slander. No body can find strange our characterization of him as mad. Because he is man who could said that the parliament was ten years behind the nation, that government was a bandit, that the district governor was thief, that the premier was a grocer.[175]

These mutual allegations between leaders appeared to be the chief reason for increasing polarization in the country, which tended to have an effect at mass level as was reflected in violent attacks on party buildings and party meetings.[176] While political party elites played a crucial role in that respect, it is less than accurate to argue that polarization among the

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[171] *Hürriyet*, November 8, 1975.

[172] *Yankı*, 20-26 December, 1976.

[173] *Hürriyet*, February 1, 1977. Demirel had even said that "if they had collaborated to form a government with Ecevit, it would have meant the collaboration with Satan." Süleyman Demirel, *CHP'nin Şerrinden Yılmayacağız* [The Evil Actions of the RPP will not Intimidate Us ] (Ankara: Doğuş, 1975), 11.

[174] *Hürriyet*, September 15, 1975.

[175] *Hürriyet*, October 5, 1975.

[176] As Sani pointed out, elite behaviour in political arena tend to have a much greater impact on the mass level in terms of intensification or reduction of cleavages. Giacomo Sani, "Mass Constraints on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-system Parties in Italy." *British Journal of Political Science*. 6, (1976), 9.

electorate "is not a consequence of cultural trait but the result of a conscious choice by the leadership of political parties.."[177] Such a view tends to obscure the socio-cultural structure of the country (constraining conditions, so to speak). It is true that political party elites added fuel to the flames but that does not change the fact that there was a fertile ground which propelled political elites to behave in such a way. Put in other way, ideological polarization may not originate from the electorate, but once originated, the electorate did not seem to object to it or show its dissatisfaction. Even if electorate did not approve, it did not pressurize the elites for policy change. As Linz noted, "it is not always clear if undesirable leaders have 'corrupted' the electorate, they often do, or if the voters for a variety of motives condone actions detrimental to the quality of democracy, not minding who would represent and govern them."[178] It may be surmised that political party elites tended to use such a language assuming that it would gain them more votes.[179] As we discussed in the second chapter, in terms of the existence of civic values, the Turkish society does not fare particularly well. The small group solidarity and in-group out-group orientation, and lack of tolerance, that we dwelled on above appears to have prepared a fertile ground that disposed Turks towards polarization. Besides, historical cleavages based on ethno-religious divisions -Alevi vs Sünni, Turk vs Kurd, seemed to facilitate such polarization at elite level. As Sayarı for instance, noted "pro- or anti-leftist postures appeared to be strongly influenced by religious (laicist versus pro-Islam), secterian (Alevi

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[177] İlter Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey," in *Modern Turkey -Continuity and Change*, ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen:Leske Verlag und Budrich, 1984), 99. Ergüder similarly remarked that "ideological polarization does not originate from the electorate." Üstün Ergüder, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey." *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*. 8-9 (1980-1981), 69.

[178] Juan J. Linz, "Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy," in *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Camridge University Press, 1997), 422.

[179] La Palambora, for instance, notes that Italian politicians tend to use ferocious language to make people think that they are really worth their pay implying that citizens expects such things from politicians. Joseph La Palambora, *Democracy-Italian Style* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 266. Though we lack an empirical data to show that is the case, an impressionistic observation of Turkish political scene might led one to consider same is valid for Turkish case, as we discuss it in the chapter seven.

versus Sünni) and intra-communal factional cleavages."[180]

In this electrified atmosphere the voice of those who urged for restraint and prudence went unnoticed. President Fahri Korutürk warned that "the political parties' accusations of each other to a degree that implies even treason to country, and finally appearance of supporting violence, is brusting the prestige of the democratic system."[181] An outside observer of Turkish politics might have been excused for assuming that both parties' (the JP and the RPP) visions of Turkey were so dissimilar, that their support was differentiated on sharp (and rigid) social and political cleavages and that the occupational background of their MP's was so different. But as indicated above this was not the case.[182] The JP was basically a catch-all party that favored a modern capitalist economy with moderate state intervention. It did not question the basic the basic tenets of the Republic, namely principles of laicism and nationalism. Its social support was not heavily derived from one section of society at the expense of others. Quite the opposite, it drew support from nearly all strata of society (to a varying extent, of course) from big industrialists, to a shanty-town migrants and peasants. Similarly, as noted above, the RPP was not a socialist party, it did not aim at the establishment of a socialist state in Turkey, despite some members' mild rhetoric. What it favored was basically moderate capitalism in which the underprivileged one would be cared for through social security measures. True, there were some disagreements regarding the perception of the threat of communism and how limitations to basic rights and liberties were to be handled, but these differences can hardly account for the harsh struggle between the parties.

If that is so, why were government-opposition relations so harsh and why was

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[180] Sayarı, "Party system," 51.

[181] *Hürriyet*, April 24, 1975.

[182] Dodd, *Development*.116; Dodd, *Crisis*.38; Weiker, *Modernization*.150. A frank recognition of this fact by party members appear to have taken place only after when they have come together as the military rounded them up at Zincirbozan military camp. As İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (an MP from JP) argued At Zincirbozan we came to appreciate that (through seminars in which everbody participated) "There was no difference between the JP and the RPP regarding diagnosis and prescriptions of Turkey. Of course there was some degree of divergence regarding the prescriptions but they were not something that could not surpassed." İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım* [My Memoirs] (İstanbul: Güneş, 1990), 252.

ideological polarization so high ? In the first place, the effect of the party system should be indicated. It has been noted above, after Sayarı, that the Turkish party system approximated a moderate pluralism format while lacking elements of moderate politics.[183] In a moderate multi-party system in which two major marties dominated the political scene, each of the two parties is likely to strive to retain support of the extremist on its flank. [184] This was especially so since minor parties were eager to absorb these extremist votes. The two major parties came to believe that only small margins of the vote might secure them clear a majority in the assembly, therefore they could not afford to the alienate extremists on both sides.[185] Thus in the process, the RPP and the JP were made to "appear" more extreme than they really were. Instead of fostering moderate tendencies both parties feelt urge to move further extremes, that fueled further polarization.[186]

The impact of the party system, does not, however, appear to have been the only explanatory variable. The Ottoman-Turkish political traditions (of intra-elite conflict and patterns opposition) needs to be taken into the consideration. As we noted in the previous chapter, accusing opponents with the harshest of terms -usually for violating unchangeable state interests- had become one of the favorite method in power struggles both in the empire and in the multi-party period. Thus, the political party struggles in modern Turkey turned around the charges and counter-charges of whether the government-or opposition were violating unchangeable state principles (called Atatürkism) or not. Both the 1960 and 1971

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[183] Ergun Özbudun similarly noted that the Turkish Party Sytem had shown characteristics of polarized pluralism in essentially limited pluralism format. Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 17, (1981), 230.

[184] It is sometimes assumed that the centrifugal competition is a feature of only "polarized pluralist systems." This view, based on the assumption that two-party systems tend to produce centripetal drive, however, is mistaken. Robert Dahl noted that when opinion is polarized in bimodal pattern, moderate and two-party systems would encourage antogonism and severe conflict as the parties would tend to retain the support of extremists on their flanks. Dahl, *Opposition*.376. For the similar conclusion see, Sartori, *Parties*.192.

[185] Dodd, *Crisis*.47.

[186] İlter Turan, "Stages of Political Development in Turkish Republic," in *Perspectives on Turkish Democracy*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara:Savaş, 1988), 88.

military interventions were made against a government which, allegedly, violated these principles.

Though in the post-1973 era Atatürkism was not the main axis around which political struggles were conducted as the new RPP changed its policy of accusing the DP-JP tradition in order to provoke the army since their attitude vis-à-vis army underwent important changes, the tradition of accusing your opponent with what you consider to be most despised terms appears to have continued. These terms were being fascists or communist. In this language "Fascists" (devised particularly to attract post-1960 intellectuals and youth) seemed to cover all evils together, that is, exploiters, racists, ultra-nationalist, religious reactionaries. The accusation of being communist, on the other hand, was well suited to attract the abhorrence of the traditional societal groups and their behavioral codes. It seemed to mean, first of all, being against religion and the traditional normative communitarian behavioral code to which an ordinary Turk adhered.[187]

One important factor that seemed to reinforced such traditions is related to peculiar organizational-ideological characteristics of Turkish political parties. As noted, Turkish political parties were not greatly differentiated in terms of policies, or the social support they secured. Due basically to the center's weight in the economy, all political parties seemed to share the view that the distribution of public resources (or party patronage) was essential for success. Consequently, both major parties were less parties of interest articulation and reconciliation as well as formulators of clear-concise policies than parties which accepted the assumption that resources 'were there to be distributed' without detailed concise policies

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[187] Şerif Mardin have noted that in Ottoman-Turkish society, being anti-religion has been perceived as the the most severe form of radicalism. Şerif Mardin, "Siyasal Sözlüğümüzün Özellikleri-2: Faşizm," [The Features of Our Political Lexicon-2 : Fascism] in *Siyaset ve Sosyal Bilimler*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 170 (originally published in 1962). In a more recent study on the NAP, Çalık found that for NAP supporters being communist meant being anti-religious or atheist, and rejection of such concepts as honor, dignity, (ırz ve namus) family, morality, respect for elders and discipline. Çalık, *Hareket*.155-156. Likewise, Haluk Kırcı, the NAP militant who committed various illegal acts, wrote that communism had meant to him as atheism and rejection of traditional values of honor and dignity. Kırcı tells us that "he was planning to kill his sisters in the case of communist take over of the reins of government then to take the hills." Haluk Kırcı, *Zamanı Süzerken (Hatıralar)* [Looking at Past (Memoirs)](İstanbul: Burak, 1998), 43, 68.

pertaining to the production of it. Perhaps because of this lack of differentiation they tended to appeal to mutual allegations (of being communists, fascists, reactionary, corrupt, liar and like) so as to conceal the fact that they are all similar to each other.[188] Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the polarization in this period was as much to do with Turkish political traditions of intra-elite conflict as it was related to logic of the party system and the peculiar organizational-ideological structure of parties itself. It was also related with social-cultural features of the Turkish society.

As the 1977 general elections approached the NF governments came to be despised by critical groups. The military, as guardian of the Republican ideal of secularism, was uneasy with the fact that the islamist NSP was in power and advancing its own agenda. Increasing politicization of bureaucracy and partisanship as well as an increase in terrorism appears to have disturbed the military.[189] Though the chief of general staff did not express it publicly, the president Fahri Korutürk, who had played role of transmission belt between military and civilians can be thought of representing the military's views as well. And Korutürk had been quite critical of the NF government from their inception.[190]

The bulk of the press (the majority of which was not sympathetic to the JP and/or Süleyman Demirel) equally disturbed by the behavior of the minor partners in the government. Erbakan's frivolous behavior in governmental affairs, the NAP's threatening posture and partisanship all affected their perception of government. Their sympathies lay with Ecevit. Though fearful of Ecevit's radical rhetoric, the business community, too, expressed dissatisfaction with the government. Similarly, there are hints that the Western community,

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[188] Though, we do not have hard data to sustain such conclusion, one can also surmise that party elites behaved in this way assuming that it would be appreciated by the electorate. Not many, for instance, would have understood the sophisticated critique of the new RPP line even if the JP leaders' had undertook such an enterprise. Instead, an easy was found through allegations that the electorate understood.

[189] Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları*,[The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] vol 1, (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 180.

[190] He, once, argued that "no body should act in the way that might create hostility between crescent and cross (hilal ve haç). No body has a right to present the image of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism." *Hürriyet*, May 28, 1976.

particularly the United States also was warm towards an alternative government without Erbakan. They just had too much of Erbakan, who was uncompromising on the Cyprus issue.[191]

The election campaign was conducted in a very electrified atmosphere. The pressing issues around which election campaigns were conducted were the escalation of terrorism and economic problems. The RPP leadership emphasized the lack of security of life and blamed the government for tolerating and supporting fascists NAP militants. The elections, the general secretary of the party argued, "was not about a choice between the JP and the RPP, but a choice between those who oppose fascism and fascists. It would be a referendum against fascism."[192] Having the sympathy of influential segments of society, Ecevit's election trips attracted very large crowds. "Ecevit, our hope" was the slogan many chanted. For many, Ecevit seemed to be hero who had been denied power by ingenious political maneuverings. He was presented as a real alternative to the much despised NF government. During these elections trips, various attacks on the crowds and Ecevit took place. The attacks and leaders' responses to it showed, once again, the degree of polarization in Turkish politics. After an attack on his party meeting in Niksar, Ecevit responded that "it was a plot designed by the JP and NAP."[193] The general secretary of the RPP went as far as suggesting that a minister in charge of youth affairs was the man behind the attacks. The general secretary of the JP, in turn, blamed Ecevit for events in Niksar arguing that "Ecevit continue his instigation campaign throughout the country."[194] Ecevit's response was harsher; "I am not going to run away from elections... Demirel is saying that I have taken shelter in the state. Of course, I would do that as

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[191] The Economist, for instance, remarked that "Turkey's allies in NATO need a Turkish government willing and strong enough to stop just sitting on its bayonets in Cyprus; to reach an agreement with Greece over the Agean; and to decide what sort of relationship it wants with NATO and EEC. Both major parties need to be short of extremist coalition parties if they are to get to grips with Turkey's problems." *The Economist*, June 4, 1977. "West's Far East"

[192] *Yanki*, 16-22 May, 1977.

[193] *Hürriyet*, April 27, 1977.

[194] *Hürriyet*, April 29, 1977.

long as I could find a state. I have not taken shelter in bandits as he has done."[195]

When in 1 May demonstrations 34 people were killed as an unidentified attacker fired on the crowd, Ecevit went out of his way to openly accuse the government of murder. He argued that "The leader of bandits and criminals is Demirel. He is also the head of liars, a man who could still continue to blame others even when he had citizens killed."[196] Ecevit argued that the JP supported NAP militants who were behind the attacks to intimidate people to ensure that they did not go to the polls which would demonstrate overwhelming support for the RPP.[197]

While raising the tension, Ecevit ruled out the idea (suggested by the illegal Turkish Communist Party and its sympathizers) that the RPP should constitute a new National Democratic Front (UDC in Turkish acrynoms) against the National Front that would involve all "progressive parties" as well as trade unions and other civil societal organizations against fascism. He had argued that it would be a contradiction if the RPP led such a movement as it was opposed to the very idea of "Fronts." Besides, he argued, it would have been harmful to the RPP as its direction clearly differed from that of the alleged members of such front. Instead, he expected these groups to proclaim their support for the RPP as it was only group to have a realistic chance to come to power. [198] Ecevit argued that the RPP could not come to power by trying to appeal to extreme marginal groups since it might alienate moderates and cost the party power.[199]

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[195] *Hürriyet*, May 1, 1977.

[196] *Hürriyet*, May 9, 1977. Even pro-Ecevit journalist Abdi İpekçi criticized Ecevit for heightening the tension; "It is right and even duty for Ecevit to attack and condemn the government. But the style he used, can stir (or bring into action) not only crowds in the meeting area but even those who read these in armchairs at home." *Milliyet*, April 10, 1977. "Gerginlik ve Ecevit" [Tension and Ecevit]

[197] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *1977 Genel Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları* [Radio Speeches in the 1977 General Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 6.

[198] Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union (CRWU) had declared its support for the RPP. Ecevit expected the TWP to do same. Reported in Orhan Duru, *Ecevit'in Çilesi* [The Agony of Ecevit] (İstanbul: Afa, 1995), 24.

[199] Bülent Ecevit, *Açıklamalar*. 72.

In the making of this electrified atmosphere, Süleyman Demirel and other prominent JP leaders played a role no lesser degree. Demirel reiterated his view that in the elections "the choice was between nationalists and leftists."[200] According to Demirel, nationalism which was unifying, integrating and constructive force, was the essence of Republicanism, while 'leftism' (solculuk) was present neither in the genesis of the Republic, nor within the framework of the 1961 constitution. No one, he argued, could claim that in the final analysis leftism did not rest on Marx.[201] "Leftism as understood in Turkey," he asserted, "is nothing but paving the way to communism."[202] He blamed the RPP saying that it had encouraged (yataklığını yapmak) those who disturbed the country's peace.[203] "There was peace in country when there was no leftism" he claimed, "it was with the RPP's decision to embrace the left that peace began to be disturbed."[204] The RPP had done this so through its opposition to what they called "existing order." The fact that the RPP labeled the existing order as "to be collapsed" (yıkılası), according to the JP leader, encouraged anarchy and disorder.[205] It was also the case, as general secretary of the party, Nahit Menteşe argued, that the RPP was encouraging militants in the streets because it was trying to trade on and to exploit chaos in the streets.[206] The crisis of confidence between two party elites reached such a degree that to call it schizophrenic can

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[200] *Hürriyet*, May 21, 1977.

[201] Adalet Partisi, *1977 Genel Seçimi- Radyo Konuşmaları* [Radio Speeches in the 1977 General Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 5.

[202] Ibid., 6.

[203] *Hürriyet*, May 24, 1977.

[204] Adalet Partisi, *Radyo*.5

[205] Ibid., 60. Likewise, Celal Bayar argued that the "fight arise from the fact that there are parties which protect the existing order and parties which try to change it." Celal Bayar, *Atatürk Gibi Düşünmek (Atatürk'ün Metodolojisi)* [Thinking Like Atatürk (The Methodology of Atatürk)], second edition, ed. İsmet Bozdağ (İstanbul: Tekin, 1998) (first published in 1978). In an effort to discredit what they called leftists, the JP did not hesitate to appeal to distorted religious arguments. A member of the JP general administrative council (Genel İdare Kurulu), for instance, argued that Koran had defined that leftists were those who deny God and the principles of Koran, while rigthist were those who believes in God and Koran. Accordingly, he continued, "no muslim can claim that he is leftist. Because one can not be muslim and leftist at the same time." Adalet Partisi, *Radyo*. 28.

[206] Ibid., 41.

hardly be regarded as an exaggeration. For instance, when the JP decided to start the election campaign later than expected, Ecevit was reported to have suspected that the JP was trying to start the election campaign only after they made the RPP unable to hold meetings."[207]

The elections did not give any party the mandate to govern alone, though the RPP secured the plurality of votes with 41.4 per cent as table 11 showed.

Table 11. The 1977 General Election Results[208]

| Political Parties | Votes % | Seats (lower assembly) |
|---|---|---|
| RPP | 41.4 | 213 |
| JP | 36.9 | 189 |
| NSP | 8.6 | 24 |
| NAP | 6.4 | 3 |
| RRP | 1.9 | 1 |
| DP | 1.9 | 1 |
| Independents | 2.5 | 4 |

One significant feature of the elections was that the combined votes of the two major parties increased from 63.1 per cent to 78.3 per cent. The RPP votes went up to an impressive 8 per cent. The expansion of the party's electoral base in urban areas, a trend gained pace since the early seventies, accelerated. Somewhat surprisingly in the face of massive opposition against the NF governments, the JP's success was equally impressive. It was able to increase its votes nearly seven percent from the 1973 elections. It was not that Demirel's strategy of rallying the anti-left vote in his party had proved successful as the NAP also nearly doubled its vote. It was rather the case that Demirel had managed to virtually finish (prior to elections he secured Celal Bayar's support) the Demokratik Party, which lost almost 10 per cent of its vote.

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[207] Cited in Duru, *Ecevit*.33.

[208] Regarding the election results, the NSP objected that some double-voting took place. In fact, the number those who were eligible for vote rose to 21.207.33 (in 1977) from 16.798.164 (in 1973), an increase of nearly five millions. İhsan Ezherli, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (1920-1986)* [Turkish Grand National Assembly (1920-1986)] (Ankara: TBMM, 1986), 87. When we consider the population increase in the same period, it is not easy to explain this unexpected increase. It may be the case that in 1973, some of those who were eligible for voting, might not registered for the election but registered for the 1977 elections. No official inquiry had been conducted on the issue.

One interesting result of the elections was that voters punished the NSP, as it was the only coalition partner whose vote declined. The social backgrounds of deputies did not display any distinct pattern from that of 1973 that are worth noting.

The rise in the combined votes of the two major parties and the parallel decline of NSP and Demokratik Party votes made the Turkish party system "less of a multi-party system"[209] and reversed the trend towards a multi-party system to two party system. But this , in no way, diminished the significance of minor parties. As Erbakan explained "the key (the emblem of the NSP) has become smaller but its force (and value) increased."[210] He knew well that in the face of uncompromising attitudes between two parties its 24 MP's would play a role totally out of proportion to its electoral strength.

He was not mistaken. Misinformed that his party had gained enough seats to form a government alone, Ecevit declared that "our nation has beaten the reigning fascism with its votes" and that "they were ready to form a coalition with any party but the JP and the NAP."[211] In fact, Ecevit had sharply ruled out a grand coalition between the JP and the RPP during the election campaign. He had argued that "after all this, and unless the JP administration is not purified of the bloody hands that killed youngsters, the coalition between the JP and the RPP is an illusion. If we form a coalition with the JP, we betray our commitment to ourselves, the people, democracy and the state."[212]

By ruling out the JP-RPP cooperation, Ecevit opened the way for a coalition with Erbakan as if the country and himself had no experience of NSP in power. Ecevit hoped that anti-NF sentiment would ensure some JP MP's to vote for the RPP or to abstain in the vote of confidence. He has reported to have said:

> I am not going to see them. I do not think that the JP and NAP's views on democracy differs much. But I also know that rank and file members (taban) of both parties is not like that. I believe that the MP's

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[209] Sayarı,"Party System," 53. In fact this trend has begun in the 1975 partial senate and lower assembly by-elections. The RPP had polled 44 percent, while the JP garnered away 41 per cent of the vote.

[210] *Hürriyet*, June 16, 1977.

[211] *Cumhuriyet*, June 9, 1977.

[212] *Hürriyet*, May 8, 1977.

would be under pressure from their wife's and children who would pressure them for the security of life and property.[213]

The mood in the country was in favor of Ecevit government. Prior to the elections, the great majority of the press had openly thrown their weight behind the RPP.[214] The trade unions -both left-wing CRWU and moderate Confederation of Turkish Workers Union (CTWU) supported Ecevit. Vehbi Koç, the head of Turkey's biggest holding company declared that it would be beneficial for Turkey, if the RPP were to form the government, as did both the presidents of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Associations (TIBA) and Istanbul Chambers of Commerce (ICC). Many businessmen were reported to have remarked that the business community's support for the RPP government derived from Ecevit's personal qualities as well as the hope that (unlike the NF government's uncoordinated, ad hoc approach to the economy) he would subscribe to planned development strategy and would be able to control radical elements within the trade union movement.[215] Otherwise, they had not become die-hard fans of the RPP's new line. As The Economist put it, although businessmen "distrust his (Ecevit's) trendy radicalism they prefer it to the paralysis under Mr Demirel's previous NF coalition."[216]

Demirel, on the other hand, did everything he could to prevent the RPP government getting a vote of confidence. He had ruled out co-operation with the RPP during the election campaign. After the elections his stance became more rigid. Some exuberances (in which

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[213] Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasinin Sonbaharı- Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor 7*, [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-7, The Autumn of Democracy] (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1985), 93.

[214] Both Milliyet and Cumhuriyet newspapers, and weekly magazine Yankı, have all openly supported the RPP, while Hürriyet and Günaydın made clear their distaste with any possible government that would involve Erbakan and Türkeş. After the elections, even Nazlı Ilıcak argued that the RPP should form the government. According to Ilıcak, "the NF government could not solve the problem of anarchy and inflation due basically to internal contradictions. The RPP, seeing every measure that was designed to fight with anarchy as something that would make it difficult for it to come to power, has prevented them. If the RPP now forms the government its attitude would change." *Tercüman*, June 13, 1977. "CHP mi yoksa AP mi ?" [The RPP or the JP ?]

[215] See, Buğra, *Devlet*. 204. Also, Henri J. Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 162-163.

[216] *The Economist*, June 18, 1977, "Give Him a Chance -or a Rope."

Demirel's wife was reported to have been teased) by the RPP sympathizers, who mistakenly assumed that the RPP had a majority to form a government, was pointed out as being a significant factor in Demirel stiff stance against the Ecevit government. This can be seen an exaggeration since animosities between the parties were not unknown. But it is an important example of how party politics had been personalized (party politics confused with personalities and vice-versa). Prior to the elections Demirel had declared that the struggle was between leftists and nationalists. After the elections he repeated the same argument. As if there was no difference between the JP the NSP and NAP, and as if these parties participated as united front in the elections, he argued that "the nation has not given the left the power" and the government parties (that had stayed in power for 26,5 months) had polled % 52 of the vote and increased the number of MP's to 232 from 213." [217] To prevent the possibility of the NSP's collaboration with the RPP, he argued that "whoever gives the power to the left that the nation has not given to it is under great sin in both worlds."[218]

The JP leaders' argument did not convince even his otherwise loyal supporters. Nazlı Ilıcak of Tercüman pointed out that electorate did not vote for the NF governments, but individual parties which constituted it. According to Ilıcak, if these parties had made it clear that after the elections they were going to cooperate, this might have been the case. But they did not. The right-wing electorate indicated their preference for not a coalition (NF) but a party.[219]

Demirel had the experience of the first NF government, as he himself criticized it most severe terms. Prior to elections, the JP spokesmen in line with their strategy of capturing the pre-1973 JP vote, had all claimed that any vote that went to the NSP would have gone the RPP. These three parties, particularly the JP and NSP, all accused each other in most

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[217] Süleyman Demirel, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* [The Verbatim Report of the TGNA], Birleşim 24, Oturum 3, 30.7.1977.

[218] *Hürriyet*, June 13, 1977. Note that to forestall the possibility of the NSP joining the RPP led government he appealed to religious sentiments.

[219] *Tercüman*, 8 July, 1977. "Milliyetçi Partiler Koalisyonu..." [The Coalition of Nationalist Parties...]

severe terms in the election campaign,[220] but still the cost of Ecevit's premiership seemed to him so high that he ignored them. This case showed once again that the struggle for political power dominated Turkish politics to such degree that no principle, no promises, no previous experiences counted much.

Not surprisingly, the RPP government failed to ensure a vote of confidence.[221] It obtained 217 votes (9 short of the required 226) against the NF's 229 vote. Ecevit, once again, miscalculated the hard facts of Turkish party politics. He had declared that "he had a trust in the MP's sense of personal responsibility."[222] In fact, Turkish party discipline was so tight that, unless resigned, MP's could hardly vote against his party's wishes. Besides if Ecevit had not been so harsh towards the JP, this might still have happened. As many critics noted, it was less than sincere act on the part of the Ecevit, to refuse even to see JP leader accusing him for being fascist on the one hand and to rely on the JP MP's for the vote of confidence on the other.

Failing to ensure a vote of confidence and facing severe opposition in his own party for missing the power when it was so close,[223] Ecevit offered a coalition to the JP under a neutral prime minister. It was all too clear that Demirel would not accept this offer which was

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[220] Necmettin Erbakan, for instance, argued that "we are not the traffic police of the bourgeoisie as the JP has been." *Hürriyet*, April 26, 1977. He made fun of the news that Demirel had hit the table with his fist (masaya yumruğunu vurmak) when speaking with the then US president Jimmy Carter. Erbakan mockeringly responded that "my God what a funny thing ! who you are to hit your fist to table in the presence of Carter. You did go there just to turn a somersault with your round body." *Hürriyet*, May 12, 1977. Süleyman Demirel, for instance, argued that "National View (milli görüş) is nothing but sophistry" and that "The NSP, which is far cry from seriousness, should not be given shelter as an anomaly in Turkish politics..." *Hürriyet*, May 18, and 19 1977, respectively. When reminded of these speeches, Demirel responded that "if what has been said during the election campaign were regarded as the cause of blood-feud, no government could be established in Turkey." Süleyman Demirel, *Millet Meclisi Tutanakları* [The Verbatim Reports of the TGNA] Birleşim 24, Oturum 3, 30.7.1977.

[221] The two revealing instances observed during the critical days of the vote of confidence might give an idea of how polarization at the mass level reached such a terrifying stage. In the first, a JP sympathizer was reported to have sent a letter to JP leadership wishing it to be read in the Demirel's presence in JP group meetings. The letter threateningly condemned those who might have been thinking of resigning from the party. In the second instance, an RPP sympathizer, a clerk in the bank, committed suicide when the RPP could not get vote of confidence. *Yanka*, 4-10 July, 1977.

[222] *Hürriyet*, June 16, 1977.

[223] See, *The Economist*, July 9, 1977 "The Rise and Swift Fall of Bülent Ecevit."

obviously a last ditch attempt to share a power and to silence those who argued for coalition. The RPP leader seemed to have forgotten that only a month ago he had ruled out the possibility of a coalition with the JP accusing them of being fascist (and or helping them). "Purporting to be deeply insulted by this charge,"[224] Demirel rejected the RPP's last minute offer and set out to form second National Front government this time leaving the RRP out. This he did, despite the 26-month experience of the first NF government, and virtual opposition of critical groups in the country. The composition of cabinet posts was "an arithmetical nonsense."[225] The NSP held 8 portfolios (out of 29 MP's), Türkeş held 5 (out of 16 MP's), while the JP held 16 (out of 189).

Demirel defended his action on the grounds that he wanted nobody to say that they were preventing the establishment of a government while they were also not forming it themselves.[226] He argued that eight million people had voted against the left and his party could not stay indifferent to it. The real reason, it seemed, was the fear of an RPP government, and its possible consequences. In that case, his leadership in his own party would be questioned. Knowing that if given another opportunity Ecevit would form a coalition with the NSP, Demirel himself did not want to miss the opportunity.[227] It shows how an obsession with power made Demirel opt for options which were, it seemed to many, doomed to fail.

From the very start, the NF governments continued where they had left off. They could not agree on who should be the president of the assembly as coalition partners began to tear each other apart. For instance, the NSP refused to authorize a visit by Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil to Egypt because of what he had said there. In the incoming local elections (of 11 December) coalition parties blamed each other. Many JP MP's, especially those who

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[224] *The Economist*, July 16, 1977 "A Glut of Leaders."

[225] *The Economist*, July 30, 1977 "Compromise Writ Large."

[226] Cited in Arcayürek, *Sonbahar*.260.

[227] In the words of The Economist, Demirel was "not the man to hand it over to Mr. Ecevit or anyone" when the premiership was "again within his grasp." *The Economist*, July 16, 1977 "A Glut of Leaders."

were expecting ministerial positions but could not get them, fiercely criticized the government during their party's tenure in government.[228] Besides, the government continued to attract a plethora of criticism from all quarters of the society. The mainstream press opposed it from the beginning anyway. The TIBA added to its frequent declarations a new one indicating its desire for dialogue between two parties.

In the face of such widespread discontent the second NF government lasted for just over than five months. During the final months of 1977 a total of twelve JP MP's, indicating their discontent with the government, resigned from their party, leaving NF governments short of a governing majority,. Finally, the government fell when the RPP put forward an interpellation. The government failed to obtain a vote of confidence (as those MP's who resigned voted against it) and Demirel resigned on 31 December 1977.

## 4.4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NATIONAL FRONT GOVERNMENTS

The NF period had been detrimental to the stability of democratic régime in several crucial respects. First, the civilian bureaucracy including the police became politicized leaving the bureaucratic structure in tatters. As a result of NF governments policies of patronage and politicization, the administration seemed "as if it has been divided into 'worlds' closed to one another."[229] Since the quality of those appointees was hardly taken into consideration, the quality of outputs was negatively affected. Thus, the performance of the administration (which had never been free from problems as far as citizens concerned) were severely jeopardized. This appears to have undermined efficacy and effectiveness, and as a result, the legitimacy of the democratic regime.

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[228] The head of JP İzmir province accused the NAP arguing that "this coalition must be broken. The NAP is defending fascism. There is no difference between Hitler and Türkeş." *Hürriyet*, October 4, 1977. Another MP (Zeyyat Mandalinci of Muğla) argued that the JP should enter into dialogue with the RPP as the Turkish state is undergoing its most severe crisis in its long history. *Hürriyet*, October 13, 1977.

[229] Cahit Tutum, "Politicization of Administration and Partisanship." *Turkish Public Administration Annual.* 4, (1977), 228.

Especially detrimental for democracy has been the politicization of the security forces.[230] The belief in the virtues of democracy is, in part, dependent upon the fact that the state authorities apply laws equally. That is, state officials stay neutral to any citizens and shall themselves be bound by the rule of law. If the belief that parliament, the president or prime minister, police, politicians, or judiciary deals with some violent political acts, because of the sympathy that they felt for those who committed them, the legitimacy of the democratic regime is much weakened.[231] In that case, both various elites and the citizenry at large are likely to feel uncertain regarding their own personal safety, as well as concluding that the liberal democratic regime has failed in its primary task, that is security of life and property. They are, therefore, likely to take the law into their own hands (if they can) or more commonly defer to their allegiances to stronger authority.[232]

In this respect, the NF governments did much which undermined belief in the democratic regime. The underlying rationale for the NF governments, as put by Demirel, was to unite nationalists against the danger of communism. Making this as its raison d'etre the NF coalition made itself susceptible to a charge that it would treat rightist leniently. They would do so, critics charged, through the politicization of the security forces by filling the positions with the sympathizers of the NAP. There are evidences that this had indeed been the case. The Minister of Interior of the second NF government, Korkut Özal remarked that he had personally observed how the police took sides with rightists and both attacked together left-wing students at the private high college of Yükseliş and could not do much to prevent it.[233] Even the stringent anti-communist Aydın Yalçın could wrote that "there is a common belief

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[230] Dodd, *Crisis*.19.

[231] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibrium* (London and Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 61.

[232] Linz noted that "one-sidedness in excusing or condemning such acts is both an indicator and a cause of loss of legitimacy of participants in the political system." Ibid., 61. He also remarked that the prevalence of such belief was instrumental in the loss of legitimacy of, most notably, the Weimar Republic and Italy. Ibid., 116.

[233] Güreli, *Korkut Özal*. 45-6.

that the police are behaving partially, that some criminals are not, knowingly, caught by the police."[234]

The other charge involved the role of the NAP militants in fighting with the alleged communists who had the support of their parties which were in government. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the NAP made the struggle against communism its basic aim giving scant (if any) respect to rules of democratic regime. Ecevit might have been exaggerating the danger of fascist takeover of government, but there is plenty of evidence that the self-appointed NAP militants perceived themselves as helping the security forces against communism. Indeed, Türkeş made the struggle against communism the raison d'etre of his party. So long as it remained within the legal framework, there was nothing wrong with it. But the actions of many NAP members clearly bordered on illegality. Though the prominent NAP members rejected these charges, a close reading of several materials reveals that they did not care much about legality in their struggle against communism. In his book entitled "Türkiye'nin Meseleleri" (Problems of Turkey) Türkeş wrote that "we, as a party, will crush communism and other conspirators. Not only them, but we also punish those who are in power and do not take necessary measures and those traitors who are in complicity with them."[235] On the back cover of that book it was read that "in this struggle if I fell down, you raise the flag and go further than I went. If I turn away from my struggle (Dava), shoot me! Shoot anyone who participated the struggle but then turned back." Indeed, Türkeş openly accepted that his party's members were helping security forces where they proved to be inadequate.[236] In his defense (at the military court after the military intervention) too, Alparslan Türkeş conceded that "without doubt, those who participated in real struggles were forced to go illegal but that was because

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[234] Aydın Yalçın, *Türk Komünizmi*. 137.

[235] Alparslan Türkeş, *Türkiye'nin Meseleleri* [The Problems of Turkey], fourth ed. (İstanbul: Kutluğ, 1975), 175.

[236] He argued that the struggle of the nationalist Turkish youth against foreign ideologies "which are the vanguard of imperialism, is above every kind of appreciation. It is because of their selfless struggles that Turkey has been rescued from the brink of abyss." Alparslan Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler* [The Basic Views] (İstanbul: Dergah, 1975), 142.

state power was weakened to such degree that it was non-existent."[237] He even went as far as telling judges that "if we had not been there, it was possible that the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces would have been too late, and you gentlemen, would not have had us in this court to try with your current uniforms and ranks under this flag."[238]

In the face of the NAP's this posture, Demirel seemed to tolerated it. He was the man who believed Turkey's law and order problems were caused by an international communist conspiracy and that those with rightist sympathies played no role in it.[239] He was the man also who stated the raison d'etre of the NF governments was the "unite the nationalists against communists." All of these reinforced the belief that the NAP militants used illegal methods and the JP tolerated it, and that the NF governments treated those terrorist on the right with lenience. Yankı, for instance remarked that "even the JP prominents are confessing that why Demirel has given two portfolios to the NAP which had only two ministers: That is because, they confess, the commandos of Türkeş is going to stop leftist youth in the street."[240] Even stringent anti-communist Aydın Yalçın accused the JP of tolerating the NAP's various actions:

> Though some ministers made it clear to Demirel that the NAP was involved in some actions bordering on illegality. But the JP leader Demirel thought 'They are our children. Even if they committed some excesses, it is not important. Because they are nationalists and anti-communist. The NAP is, approximately, in our side. Besides, they are the only political institution that does not create any problem for us. Therefore, at this moment it is not politically correct to have a conflict with them.' They therefore passed over our warnings and connived at their efforts to seize important state apparatuses like the communists.[241]

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[237] Alparslan Türkeş, *12 Eylül Adaleti.* 112.

[238] Ibid..15.

[239] Demirel argued that "Before and after the 12 March we continue to claim that what lay behind the anarchy was the communist conspiracy which aimed to overthrow the Republic. We claimed that those anarchists were the communists. Time has proved right our view that anarchy has little to do with socio-economic problems." Cited in Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *Türkiye'de Askeri Müdahalelerin Düşündürdükleri* [Some Thoughts Stimulated by Turkish Military Interventions] (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi, 1988), 9.

[240] *Yankı*, January 12-18, 1976. "Anarşi ve İktidar Çekişmeleri" [Anarchy and Power Struggles]

[241] *Yeni Forum*, September 1, 1980. "Şiddet Olaylarında Doğru Teşhis" [A Correct Diagnosis in Violence]. Similarly Harris argued that "with cabinets depending on support from the NAP, it was clearly difficult for security forces to act decisively against the commandos." George S Harris, *Turkey Coping With Crisis* (Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1985), 145.

We can not know precisely how important the NF governments' attitude was regarding the rise of terrorism. But we do certainly know that the number of those who died or injured from politically motivated attacks rose sharply from 27 in 1974 to 37 (in 1974), to 108 in 1976 and 319 in 1977. [242]

It is clear that the NF governments' failed to arrest increase the number of those who lost lives from terrorist attacks. The NF governments' diagnosis and ways of dealing with the problem of terrorism appears to have played a significant role in this increase. As great majority in the left *believed* that the NF governments treated rightists leniently. What really matters in such situations is not what really had happened but what the actors believed to have happened. Ecevit and the prominent RPP leaders' views reaching such conclusions have been stated above. The leaders of the legal socialist parties have aired the same view.[243] When the party leaders professed such convictions, it was all to be expected that youngsters too easily fall prey to this idea. For instance, Mesut Akın, (The head of Revolutionary Youth Union of İstanbul) declared that "the security forces of the state are helping those fascists militants of Idea Clubs when they attack youngsters and workers. Instead of helping the state's security forces, these idea clubs and other fascists institutions are attacking youth (with state forces)."[244] When such belief becomes prevalent, it is only a matter of time that they, too, will tend to take the implementation of law (or rather lawnessess) in their own hands, or defer to stronger authority.[245]

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[242] Keleş, Ünsal, *Kent*.35. These numbers (derived from Tercüman newspaper) as admitted by authors as well, by no means non-contestable. Due to definitonal problems and lack of reliable statistics there are differing figures on that point. According to Dodd, the numbers were 35, 90, and 260 for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977 respectively. While Mackenzie gives the figure of 231 for 1977. Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of the Turkish Democracy*, second edition, (London: Eothen, 1990), 142; Kenneth Mackenzie, *Turkey in Transition* (Ankara, 1981), 6.

[243] *Cumhuriyet*, November 19-22, 1975.

[244] Hürriyet, *Hürriyet Yıllığı 1977* [Hürriyet Annual, 1977] (İstanbul, 1977), 290. Similarly, Sami Şener, the general secreatary of national Turkish student union of Islamic youth argued that "to make events more bloody under the banner of helping the state security forces is, in a way, to help anarchy. We always defended that when violence occurred, it is in police's responsibility to deal with it." Ibid., 288.

[245] As Linz noted, "the tolerance of a democratic regime for the creation of paramilitary

It may also be surmised that general politicization and lack of coordination paralyzed the state's administrative ability to implement its coercive functions, namely to catch and punish those who violated law. The prevention of terrorism requires able and efficient security forces with necessary equipment. Appointments with partisan and political considerations must surely have reduced the quality and morale of the security forces. Since they were promoted or demoted on the basis political preferences, there was no need for hard work to bring those illegals into the justice. The politicization of the security forces alongside the problem of under-equipment of the security forces to deal with increasing terrorism would show its full impact in coming years, since the weaknesses of the state vis-à-vis violent actions tend to further encourage violence.[246]

On the economic front, the uncoordinated, piecemeal, and patronage directed policies of the NF governments had done much to the emergence of the economic crisis whose effects would be felt in 1978 up until 1980.[247] In terms of basic economic indicators, the Turkish economy was in a healthy situation -or what was in the midst of early phase of import-substitution strategy- in the early 1970s. This was basically due to 1970 stabilization measures (implemented by the JP government) and worker remittances from the Europe. Worker remittances were enough to balance the entire trade deficit in 1971-1973 period, giving even a current account surplus in 1973.[248] Exports also increased sharply; 15 per cent in 1971, 31 per cent in 1972, 49 per cent in 1973, while the GDP growth had been 7.3, 9.6, 5.1 per cent respectively in these years.[249] Therefore, Turkey did not initially need external financing to

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organizations by disloyal oppositions creates a most serious threat to its existence." Linz, *Breakdown*. 59.

[246] Keleş, Ünsal, *Kent*. 9, 109.

[247] As indicated above, it should not be forgotten that neither party patronage nor economic populism begin with the NF governments. What can be said, at most, is that the NF governments went as far as they could on both fronts. For the discussion of populist economic policies in the period of 1962-1976, see, Korkut Boratav, "Türkiye'de Populizm: 1962-1976 Dönemi Üzerine Notlar," [Populism in Turkey: Some Notes on 1962-1976 Period] in *İktisat ve Siyaset Üzerine Aykırı Yazılar* (İstanbul: BDS, 1989).

[248] Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey* (London: Verso, 1987), 185.

[249] T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, *Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1990* [Statistical

support its import-substitution strategy and resulting deficit.[250]

Troubles began when the world oil crisis (as a result of the 1973 Middle East war) hit all of the world.[251] It not only caused an increase in Turkey's imports (both petroleum and other imported goods) bills from two billion dollars in 1973 to almost six billion dollars in 1977[252] but also caused a decline in worker remittances. The ratio of imports paid for by foreign exchange earnings through remittances was 38 per cent in 1974, 28 per cent in 1975, 19 per cent in 1976, and 17 per cent in 1977.[253] The various costs of the Peace Operation in Cyprus (including direct assistance to Northern part of Cyprus, maintenance of army units, and several losses of financial resources as a result of the United States embargo) was another factor in the increasing balance of payment deficits.

On the face of the world oil crisis, the economically prudent thing to do was to try to order the domestic economy through a variety of measures such as restricting wages, limiting the rate of growth and increasing productivity. These measures required a stable and decisive government, which would be able to take (and implement) painful measures for the sake of the long-term stability of the economy. But "behaving as if they were opposition parties"[254] the NSP and NAP were a far cry from supporting a long term economic stabilization program. They were rather interested in distributing public resources to party supporters. Furthermore, the presence of the NSP in the coalition hindered Turkish governments relations with

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Yearbook of Turkey] (Ankara: DİE, 1992), 496.

[250] Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak, "The International Dimension: Trade, Aid and Debt," in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. Irvin C.Shick and Ertuğrul A.Tonak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 349.

[251] But that does not mean that if these had not happened, the Turkish economy would have remained in good condition. As Keyder remarked what he called an easy phase of ISI (accomplished in the periood of 1963-1971, which witnessed rapid industrialisation) had come to an end by 1973.

[252] William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 231.

[253] Keyder, *State*.185.

[254] Anna O. Krueger and İlter Turan, "The Politics and Economics of Turkish policy reforms in the 1980s," in *Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform*, eds. Anna O. Krueger and R.H Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 340.

international economic organizations that might provide economic aid. The NSP tended to perceive these organizations as the representatives of an imperialist-zionist conspiracy to keep muslim nations backward.

The JP, which had never freed itself from party patronage, could not manage to get prudent macro economic policies implemented. The fear of losing power since he could not trust his partners appears to have prevented Demirel from taking painful decisions. Not sure of whether he would stay in power to see the benefits of the short term sacrifices, the JP leader preferred free-for-all economic policies. Premier Süleyman Demirel once proudly remarked that they would not increase the price of oil despite the fact that OPEC has increased the prices. The Turkish economy continued to grow with external borrowings with high interest rate.[255] Its growth rates were 7.4 per cent in 1974, 8.0 per cent in 1975, 7.9 per cent in 1976. This was obtained at a time when all major economies cut their growth rate. It was achieved at the cost of postponing the inevitable foreign exchange crisis.

This imprudence in macro economic management would prove to be highly costly in the long term. The more the necessary economic adjustments were delayed, the more costly (in terms of sacrifices required) it became to implement. As Boratav indicated "an economic crisis which could easily have been dealt with in 1974 and 1975 with sound and rational measures, would come three years later with more severity."[256] In this sense, political crisis preceded economic crisis. Or rather the economic crisis was not the product of strictly economic forces which was totally beyond the control of the national governments, but rather political misadministration at the top intensified and facilitated the economic crisis.[257]

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[255] The chief means of external borrowing was "Deposits Convertible to Foreign Exchange" (Dövize Çevrilebilir Mevduat). Initiated in 1967 and ended in 1974, it was restarted by the NF governments. It was designed to attract the savings of migrant workers by using state guarantees (including losses incurred by the exchange rate adjustments) to rapidly obtain large amounts of foreign exchange. Instead of migrant workers, principal depositors turned out to be foreign banks. It had provided "an exceptionally short-sighted method" of obtaining short-term high interest loans for the treasury. Shick and Tonak, "The International," 349.

[256] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985* [The Economic History of Turkey, 1908-1985] (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1989), 115.

[257] Valenzuela noted that in Chile, too, political crisis had preceded the socio-economic crisis.

To sum up the basic argument of this chapter, post-1973 politics was marked by the end of dominant position of the JP with the fragmentation of the party system, and the rise of ideological polarization between major party elites on a right-left (or communist-fascist as they frequently called it) divide. The heightening of polarization was aided by the RPP leadership's radical rhetoric and the right's (the NAP and the JP's) reaction to it. The fragmentation of the party system necessitated the formation of coalitions. Apart from a seven-month-long RPP-NSP coalition, the National Front coalitions left their imprint in this period. It has been argued that the NF governments were detrimental to the stability of democracy in several respects. Through their politicization of state institutions, including the police and educational ones, they did considerable harm to the functioning of civilian bureaucracy and the security forces. The paralysation of state structures was one of the chief factors that weakened the state's effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, which paved the way to military intervention. The intensification of polarization, at the elite level, showed signs of spreading to mass-level which in turn, became a chief contributing factor to increasing terrorism. On the economic front, their inability to take concerted measures in the face of the world oil crisis, and their continuing practices of extreme party patronage prepared the ground for the crisis of 1978-1980. Besides, in this period many amoral and highly condemned practices of parties and politicians came to the attention of public opinion more than before, such as broken promises, accusations of theft, even murder, and frequent party changes, which was likely to be associated with the democratic regime itself.

Despite these detrimental effects, critical actors including the military did not come to think that democratic regime was unable to provide solutions to Turkey's problems. Since economic troubles and the problem of terrorism did not seem to be getting out of hand, and there were alternatives to NF governments. The JP-RPP dialogue was one of them, as the most preferable option. As a second possible option, there was the possibility of RPP government.

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Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes -Chile* (London and Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 106.

# CHAPTER V:THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY IN POWER: TERRORISM, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE LOSS OF HOPE, 1978-1979

The second National Front government resigned in 31 December 1977 when it failed to secure vote of confidence as a result of an interpellation put forward by the RPP-led opposition. The resignation was greeted with relief throughout the country, not so much because Ecevit was seen as great savior (though some thought so) but because, it seemed for a while that the alternative was hardly better.[1] The RPP was entrusted to form a government. The total number of the RPP deputies was not enough to ensure a majority in the assembly. The twelve MP's who had already resigned from the JP, and Republican Reliance Party of Turhan Feyzioğlu and Democratic Party of Ferruh Bozbeyli made their support clear soon.

At this stage the RPP leadership did not prefer to enter a dialogue with the JP, despite there were some discussions regarding the necessity of such dialogue. Nazlı Ilıcak of pro-JP Tercüman wrote that "nothing but the alternative of RPP-JP dialogue, would help to secure (political) stability in the country."[2] Abdi İpekçi of pro-RPP Milliyet argued that Ecevit should not close doors to the JP. Metin Toker of Hürriyet, too, defended the same view. Similarly, there are indications that the business community was also pushing for such dialogue. The head of Turkey's biggest holding company Vehbi Koç was reported to have said that "we need a period of peace. We have to unite again as if we are in the independence war. We can go nowhere by making 15 JP members resign. The JP-RPP co-

[1] The head of the CTWU, Halil Tunç expressed it well when he said that "it does not seem likely that we will have a government, which is as negative as the NF, and which does nothing to solve problems but bring them to an impasse. For that reason, I am of the opinion that this government would be consistent, persuasive and succesful." *Yanki*, 9-15 January, 1978.

[2] *Tercüman*, December 28, 1977. "Ecevit ve İhtimaller" [Ecevit and Possibilities]

Behind the demands for coalition and dialogue lay the tremendous problems that the incoming government would have to tackle. The problem of terrorism, which claimed nearly ten persons day, needed an immediate and prompt response that only strong government could deliver. The economy was likewise in tatters. Immediate stabilization measures with much needed belt-tightening seemed to be inevitable. In foreign relations, a strong and respectable government which would command respect abroad to improve relations with the United States and Europe was needed. It was reasonably put forward that a weak government (such as the RPP minority government) would not be well-equipped to overcome those problems, since the magnitude of the problems was such that only a strong government could handle them.

Despite these demands, the RPP preferred to go alone, and did not even consider this option. In an explanation that many find unconvincing, Ecevit was reported to have said that "nation has become sick of calls for coalition. It is too late for JP-RPP coalition. Even if Demirel accepts this, those who resigned their parties are disappointed." [4] He argued that if democracy had survived in Turkey, despite all negative factors associated with the more than two-year-long NF government, it was because of the hope that elections might secure a governmental change.[5] Now that the opportunity has arrived, Ecevit seemed to assume, the RPP could not reject such an offer which may further escalate the erosion of confidence in democratic system.[6] He was reported to have said to Abdi İpekçi that despite he knew that the RPP would not be able to implement its programs with such minority

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[4] Orhan Duru, *Ecevit'in Çilesi* [The Agony of Ecevit] (İstanbul: Afa, 1995), 52. Ecevit held regular meetings with some selected journalists. Duru was one of the journalists who participated in those meetings. Therefore, these ideas should not be taken as Ecevit's own words but expression of his ideas by someone else.

[5] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *1977 Genel Seçimi Radyo Konuşmaları* [The Radio Speeches in the 1977 General Elections] (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1977), 7.

[6] Indeed, in intellectual circles the JP-RPP coalition was perceived as the drawback for the RPP. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, (associate professor of politics and the RPP candidate in the 1977 elections) for instance, commented that in the possible grand coalition "Ecevit would be severely constrained, leading (sustaining) to a belief that there is no difference between the RPP and the JP. This, in turn, would prevent, for the time being, the possibility of the democratic left assuming power." *Yankı*, 16-22 May, 1977. Also, Doğan Avcıoğlu indicated that such a coalition would have meant the interruption of Turkey's democratization process for a while. Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Devrim ve 'Demokrasi' Üzerine* [On Revolution and 'Democracy'] (İstanbul: Tekin, 1997), 73.

government he had to try to form it "so as to arrest the speed of the country's falling into the abyss." He added that "it might be pernicious to spend time (for coalition). Everday more than ten youngsters are being killed in the streets. The country has been turned into a 'blood lake.' It is for these reasons that we are hurrying."[7] Ecevit appears to have supposed that as soon as the RPP assumed to power, all of a sudden, the bloodshed was going to stop.

On the other hand, it appeared unlikely that the JP would have accepted such coalition, even if Ecevit had offered it. Demirel had many times made it clear that any coalition between the two parties was unlikely. At this point Demirel was consistent throughout. Ecevit, who made so much of talk of coalition between parties, appeared to have remembered his promises only when his party was in no position to form a government alone. We have noted how Ecevit even rejected to talk with Demirel immediately after the 1977 election, but when it became clear that Demirel was forming a second NF government he remembered the coalition. The same pattern was now repeated. Ecevit did not want to miss the opportunity to become prime minister. He must have thought that his leadership position would be threatened if he again missed the chances of becoming premier.

The composition of Ecevit's cabinet exemplified, once again, the ill-operation of the Turkish political system. In a move that generated much uproar, Ecevit appointed ten of the twelve deputies who resigned from the JP as ministers.[8] In their resignation letter these deputies have stated that they were protesting Demirel's uncompromising attitude shown towards the RPP. And what they were doing was a miniature JP-RPP coalition. But now the other face of politics was, once again, on display.[9] While Ecevit portrayed himself as a

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[7] Cited in Tufan Türenç, Erhan Akyıldız, *Gazeteci*, [The Journalist] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1987), 442. This is confirmed by Arcayürek. Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor-8, Müdahalenin Ayak Sesleri* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-8, The Footsteps of the Intervention] (İstanbul: Bilgi, 1985), 348-349.

[8] The RRP and the DP got 2 and 1 ministership respectively while the RPP had 21.

[9] There were rumours, as it had been since 1973, that both parties tried to seduce each others' MP's, and to keep theirs, by offering tangible benefits. In one instance, an MP from the JP resigned in the morning stating his intention to continue political life in the RPP. In the afternoon, however, he changed his mind after meeting with Demirel, saying that he had underwent "psychological distress." Regarding this case, one of the JP MP's is reported to have said that the MP in question had wanted

man who have believed[10] in their sincerity, many did not find it convincing.[11]

Despite criticism of Ecevit's uncompromising attitude regarding the grand coalition and composition of its cabinet, the RPP government (which had secured 229 vote, only three more than necessary to stay in power)[12] was nevertheless acclaimed with warm acceptance both inside and outside the country. The great majority of the press had already recorded their support for the RPP government. President Fahri Korutürk claimed that everybody but those 'eccentrics' could agree on the government program.[13] Similarly, the general council of TIBA urged political stability and made their support for the government clear.[14] The Economist noted that the return of Ecevit as prime minister "is the second best thing (the first being grand-coalition) that could have happened to the country."[15] There were surely doubts regarding what a minority government of the RPP's

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the transfer (nakil) of one of the doctors from one place to another, but resigned when his wish was not fulfilled. He then returned his party when doctor in question had been appointed to his new place. Cited in *Yankı*, 2-8 January, 1978.

[10] Ecevit was reported to have said that "Oğuz Atalay is very honest man. He is so close to us that if everything goes right, he could yet assume even higher positions. Şerafettin Elçi, who had been sent to prison from the notorious articles of Turkish penal code of 141-142, is not a Kurdish nationalist. He is a progressive. Karaaslan's family had connections with the RPP. So are Mete Tan, Güneş Öngüt. Akova similarly, very honest man and cleric." Cited in Arcayürek, *Sonbahar*. 288. Similarly in Duru, *Ecevit*.51. Of these ten MP's who obtained ministership, Akova resigned in May 1979 and returned to the JP in October 1979, Septioğlu and İnkaya resigned in June 1979 and then entered to the JP. Defending his action in 1985, Ecevit continued to reject the charge that he had bargained with them for ministership; "Nobody bargained for ministership. Those ministers were leaving their parties very soon after the elections. Besides they were also accepting to contribute to the RPP, whose views they might not be sharing. Therefore their ministership was an insurance both for the government and themselves." Cited in Arcayürek, *Müdahale*. 351.

[11] Professor Muamer Aksoy was one exception. According to Aksoy, the action of these deputies would be written in "the history of Turkish democracy with golden letters as it exemplified an act of splitting (yarma harekatı), an act of rebellion against those who behaved contrary to the principles of democracy and constitution." He also defended their appointment as minister arguing that if they had stayed outside the cabinet they might both be alienated from the RPP government and be susceptible to JP's efforts to re-take (retransfer) them through slander, and even through threats to their life. Muammer Aksoy, *Cumhuriyet*, January 14, 1978, "Neden bu Feryat, Bu telaş," [Why this Outcry and Flurry ?]

[12] As Time noted, the RPP's narrow majority "seems to offer too little stability to spare Turkey yet another invitation to the dance (of premiers)." *Time*, January 16, 1978 "Pas de Deux-Dance of the Premiers."

[13] *Hürriyet*, January 7, 1978.

[14] *Hürriyet*, January 22, 1978.

[15] *The Economist*, January 7, 1978. "Poet in Power"

could do in power as well as the leadership capabilities of Bülent Ecevit[16] but it did not prevent the government from enjoying widespread support in public opinion in and outside the country, if only because the alternative could be worse.

From its days in the opposition the RPP leaders created an image of a country whose problems did not require such great sacrifices that a decent government could solve them easily. Ecevit, for instance, argued that "when we get rid of this government, the economic crisis shall end, the peace shall reign in the country."[17] It can be said, in retrospect, that this factor negatively contributed both to the success of the government and ultimately of democracy. The more a government inflated expectations, the more possibility of its being seen as unsuccessful increased, since by inflating expectations to a degree that it was not likely to satisfy, the government set high standards, against which they would be evaluated. If a government promises that terrorism and economic problems will be handled in a very short time without much sacrifice, as the RPP government did, it severely undermines its chances of success. Nothing less than miracle would led to its being regarded as successful by the majority after raising expectations to such degree. It would also not be likely to get a favorable response when it asked for, since the electorate were not prepared beforehand. Lastly, such a government seriously damages its ability to ensure the trust of its citizens since they are likely to feel cheated. It is in this sense Juan J. Linz stated that the principal sources of unsolvable problems was "the setting by the political leadership of goals for which it is unable to provide the necessary means, and its unwillingness to renounce those goals once it becomes apparent that the means can not be provided."[18]

In an increasingly interdependent world where many crucial problems are beyond

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[16] The Economist, for instance, noted that "where Mr Ecevit would take Turkey if he were left to himself is a mystery. He is uncommonly manysided character even by politicans' standards. In private, he is a gentle and courteous as a poet is expected to be on the public platform he is a demagogue". *The Economist*, Ibid.,.

[17] *Milliyet*, November 24, 1977. Though, Turhan Feyzioğlu tried to soften governments' that attitude arguing that anarchy can not be handled within the couple of months. *Yanki*, February 6-12, 1978.

[18] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes -Crisis, Breakdown, Reequlibration* (Baltimore and London, The University of Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 53.

also not be likely to get a favorable response when it asked for, since the electorate were not prepared beforehand. Lastly, such a government seriously damages its ability to ensure the trust of its citizens since they are likely to feel cheated. It is in this sense Juan J. Linz stated that the principal sources of unsolvable problems was "the setting by the political leadership of goals for which it is unable to provide the necessary means, and its unwillingness to renounce those goals once it becomes apparent that the means can not be provided."[18]

In an increasingly interdependent world where many crucial problems are beyond the reach of any national government to tackle, what is more likely to be successful is not to inflate expectations. This is easier said than done, of course. Generally the electorate are not likely to vote for candidates who promise "nothing but blood and tears" as Winston Churchil did in the wake of the second world war. It is, however, one thing to say "everything suddenly will change if you give us power" and another to say "we are beset with difficulties, but we will try as hard as we can, and we are better than the available alternatives."

### 5.1. TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE

With such heightened expectations the Ecevit government proceed to deal with pressing problems. One of the most serious problems was the problem of terrorism,[19] which claimed an average of ten people a day. It was noted earlier that the RPP programs, its diagnosis and remedies of the country's problems involved romantic, sentimental, general propositions rather than realistic, detailed, well-thought-out viable proposals. When in opposition this did not seem to matter much, as Turkey's intellectual circles, like that of the

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[18] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes -Crisis, Breakdown, Reequlibration* (Baltimore and London, The University of Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 53.

[19] There are many conceptualizations of terrorism. In this study the recent inclusive definition put forward by Peter Chalk is used. According to this definition, terrorism denotes "the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means to achieve specific political objectives." As such "it is a psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear-inducing effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate targeting of non-combatant victims and property." Peter Chalk, *West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 22.

March there was sharp polarization between the right and the left, but "during the NF period violence remained basically one sided."[20] "It was organized," Ecevit continued, "under the protection of the one of the coalition partners of ultra-right-wing government."[21] It must be for this reason that as soon as coming to power Ecevit implicitly threatened the NAP and even Demirel "if those who are responsible for violent acts of the past do not facilitate our efforts to bind up past wounds, we will have to lance the past."[22]

Parallel to this belief, Ecevit and other RPP prominents inclined to see leftist terror mainly as a means of self-defense against the state-backed rightist terrorism, though they accepted that a minority group on the left was determined to use terror. Ecevit, for instance, argued that activites of the right-wingers led "some ultra-leftists to retaliate through recourse to violence."[23] Taken to its logical conclusion, it was assumed that since state institutions would be cleared of fascists, and the RPP government would no longer be soft on them, the majority of those who were on the left, too, would leave the weapons. Interior Minister İrfan Özaydınlı's statement on the issue of terrorism shows how the government was embrassed when it faced the real face of terrorism. Özaydınlı confessed that:

> I had assumed that with our government we could prevent the right-wingers' endeavors to seize the state. I was mistaken. (But) they could still be eliminated. They are now using the cell system. They are going to destroy themselves. Left-wingers are now being divided into various factions themselves especially after our government came to the power. After the 16 March incident (at İstanbul University) every class was occupied by different factions that sang marches. A terrible (horrifying) situation. If we had not been there they were going to tear each other apart.[24]

In reality, however, the causes of terrorism were much more complex than the RPP leaders believed. It was closely related to a complex encounter and interaction of various socio-cultural, political and international factors, a serious study of which had not yet been

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[20] *Yanka*, December, 19-25, 1977.

[21] Ibid.

[22] *Hürriyet*, January 11, 1978. See, also, his open accusation of the NAP as responsible for terrorist attacks, *Hürriyet*, June 28, 1978.

[23] Cited in *Yanka*, December 19-25, 1977. He also added that "if provokators had not been involved, the ultra-left would not even have retaliated that much." Ibid.

[24] Reported in Duru, *Ecevit*.72.

done. What follows is a rudimentary account (based on available secondary materials) on the terrorist organizations and a variety of causes which supported terrorism. In the first place, terrorism did not originate from one side (right or left) as the RPP leaders themselves, however belatedly, came to admit. There were both left-wing and right-wing terrorist organizations. On the left there were illegal organizations which made violent overthrow of existing order and its replacement with what they called communist society their aim such as Turkish People's Liberation Front, Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army and Revolutionary Path.[25] Drawing inspiration from the guerrilla leaders of the 1971-2 period, these clandestine groups engaged in a wide variety of terrorist activities (against both the right and other rival leftist groups) from murder to robberies to bombing. There were also broadly based legal leftist organizations (such as CRWU and Turkish Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association TTUSA). It was claimed that some of these organizations were infiltrated by illegal groups and some members were suspected to have been engaged in illegal activities.[26]

On the right, too, a variety of legal and illegal organizations took part in violent battles against the left. These organizations can be divided into two; ultra-nationalist ones and those which strived for the establishment of an Islamic state. In many cases such organizations tended to use ultra-nationalist and Islamic arguments together. Like those on the left, ultra-nationalists, too, preferred to infiltrate legal organisations. The members of the NAP affiliated Idealist Youth Associations and other Idealist associations for various occupational groups such as teachers, workers, artisans have been suspected to have engaged in terrorist activities. Though not as effective as their ultra-nationalist and leftist counter-parts, there also were illegal Islamic organizations aiming to establish Islamic state.

The ethnic-separatists constituted yet another form of terroristic organizations aiming to establish a Kurdish state in the South East Turkey such as the Workers Party of Kurdistan and Ala Rızgari. The Workers Party of Kurdistan (known as Apocular after its leader Abdullah Öcalan) was the most vocal amongst them. The WPK also claimed to be a

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[25] These organisations have been further divided on the basis of factional rivalries. For instance, militants of the TPLF origins have established The Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party, The Turkish Communist Labor Party, and the Union of Revolutionary Communists.

[26] Many members of the CRWU and TTUSA have been sentenced to prison by the post-

marxist organization and as such it had co-operated with many illegal organizations on the left.

These terrorist organizations were hardly an associations of adventurist discontented youngsters with little or no links with the larger society as implied in some analysis. The second wave of terrorism seemed to differ from the first wave (1968-1972) in some crucial respects. While the first wave remained mainly student oriented violence having little relations with the wider society, the second wave was more than that. The number of groups multiplied and they involved overtly rightists and ethnic nationalist ones. While the students still occupied the central places in these groups, they were not the dominant element as in the first wave. Moreover, the capacity of the second wave to disturb society was much greater than the first as it managed to exploit latent ethnic-sectarian cleavages.[27]

The Turkish social-political structure that underwent rapid modernization and her geopolitical situation have been crucial in explaining such diversity and strength of terrorist organizations. In the first place one should note the socio-economic change that Turkish society underwent through sixties and seventies. Though we do not argue that Turkey's less than impeccable industrialization-urbanization process was the chief factor in the terrorism, it nevertheless played no ignorable part.[28] In the late fifities and sixties Turkish society were charaterized by large migrant flux from villages to cities. The first generation of those migrants tended to vote for the moderate JP, basically because they experienced relative betterment (in comparison to their life in village) in their lives. The second generation, however, experienced no such thing. The weakening of traditional family-based authority patterns observed in villages gave way to a more demanding protest culture. The development of various communication devices such as television and increasing interaction

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intervention military regime.

[27] Sabri Sayarı and Bruce Hoffman, *Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976-1980*, A Rand Note, N-3228-USDP (No date, 10); George S. Harris, *Turkey: Coping With Crisis* (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 144.

[28] Ruşen Keleş, Artun Ünsal, *Kent ve Siyasal Şiddet* [The City and Political Violence ](Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), 32; İlhan Tekeli, "Kent Suçluluk ve Şiddet" [The City, Criminality and Violence] *Türkiye'de Kentleşme Yazıları* (Ankara: Turhan, 1982).

between shanty-towns and cities made them to aspire to the city life enjoyed by inhabitants; they no longer felt it necessary to accept traditional values of endurance in the face hardships, to be content with what was available (that disposed the first generation towards acceptance of existing order). Experiencing a sense of powerlessness, lacking educational and other opportunities that would allow them to integrate into urban society, many of those youngsters (alongside their cousins who came to big cities to study and experienced similar feelings)[29] easily fell prey to illegal organizations that offered them money and status.[30]

Secondly, the latent religious sectarian cleavages between Alevi and Sünni sects which were exploited by terrorist organizations appears to have been another supporting cause of terrorism. While there had not been any legal or illegal organization fighting on these terms, it was observed that many of leftist organizations tended to draw support from Alevi's while rightist ones relied exclusively on Sünni's.[31] In the Kahramanmaraş and Çorum incidents, for instance, this intercommunal fighting cost the lives of 109 and 30 people respectively.

Thirdly, some prevalent cultural properties of Turkish society seemed to constitute

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[29] The memoirs of Mehmet Ali Ağca, who imprisoned for the killing of Abdi İpekçi but escaped from prison, and who then tried to assassinate the Pope, is telling in that respect. He came from a very poor family and lost his father at the age of ten from work accident. He had to work to finance himself in the Ankara, to where he arrived as university student. He stayed in cheap student hostel controlled by Idealists and became one of them. See, Mehmet Ali Ağca, *Ben Mehmet Ali Ağca-Mesih* [I am Mehmet Ali Ağca -Messiah] (İstanbul: Kuşak, no date), 29, 33, 35, 41.

[30] According to Karpat no other factor "contributed as much to social and political change and, indirectly, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant settlements around the major cities of Turkey.... Alienated youth in the gecekondus and elsewhere in the cities provided a large recruitment pool for every militant, radical, and terrorist group." Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention." *International Journal of Turkish Studies.* (1980-1981), 18. In the same line, Sayarı and Hoffman, "Insurgency," 12. In the study of 277 prisoners, who were arrested on terrorism charges in Ankara, striking conclusions emerged. Findings of the study suggested that the 93 per cent of these people were under 30 years of age while the 80 per cent of them were under 25 years of age. It also found that the majority of the prisoners had grown in major cities, that they dominantly came from poor families with three-four children, and that they were either graduate of Lycee, or left their higher education uncompleted. Doğu Ergil, *Türkiye'de Terör ve Şiddet* [Terror and Violence in Turkey] (Ankara: Turhan, 1980), 112-133.

[31] Terrorists aimed at the polarization of different ethno-religious groups by initiating violent incidents. Their idea was, "to break the community into angry factions through acts of violence and to present themselves as 'defenders' of minority groups.." Sayarı and Hoffman, "Insurgency," 14.

a conducive ground for violence. Şerif Mardin, for instance, noted that Turkish children were socialized into a culture that put a high premium on qualities of warriorship with aggressive tendencies to be shown towards any available outgroup.[32] Social psychologist Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı called this as "core authoritarianism" to denote dogmatic or intolerant behavior tendency.[33] In fact, the prevalence of blood feuds and honor crimes can also be seen as further evidence for the argument that culturally Turkish society well-disposed towards the use of violence.

Finally, many of these organizations maintained international links with a variety of international terrorist groups and some states. It was widely reported, for instance, that in an effort to destabilize Turkey and bring her into its own domination Soviet Union provided training and arms to many leftist organizations via Bulgaria and Syria (three of them share borders with Turkey).[34]

Thus, the problem of terrorism in Turkey was much more complex and therefore difficult to tackle with than the RPP leadership appears to have assumed. By not properly assessing its true nature and causes, the RPP government had a bad start in its fight against terrorism. Not only was the government caught in misdiagnosing the problem, but it also adopted rather a reductionist sociological approach towards the prevention of terrorism. They favored the view that the roots of terrorism should be sought in a social and economic environment which nurtures terrorists. Deprivation and subsequent frustration that derived from lack economic opportunities, the RPP leadership appears to have believed, was the prime cause of terrorism.[35] The individual responsibility of a terrorist for his (her) acts (since social-political conditions, upon which he had no control created him) and the

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[32] Şerif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey." *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie*. 19, (1978), 229-254.

[33] Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, "Social Norms and Authoritarianism: A Turkish-American Comparison." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 16, (1970), 445. For a fuller discussion, Paul J Magnarella, "Civil Violence in Turkey: Its infrastructural, Social and Cultural Foundations," in *Sex Roles, Family & Community in Turkey*, ed. Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1982).

[34] See, admittedly less than academic work by Paul B.Henze, *Goal Destabilization: Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South* (European American Institute for Security Research, 1981).

[35] Dodd. *Crisis*.21.

prevention of terrorism through strict administrative measures (within the rule of law, of course) were not given much priority. It was believed that unless socio-political conditions are significantly improved administrative-legal measures would not help.[36] This sociological-reductionist view has lost its salience in recent writings on terrorism.[37] While social-political conditions are significant, it is mistaken to assume that they are the biggest determinants of terrorism. Individual dispositions play a role in whether one should establish or participate in terrorist groups. Terrorism "is always choice among alternatives."[38] It is, therefore as much, if not more, important to pay attention to administrative measures such as provision of adequate resources, better intelligence gathering, establishment of anti-terror squads so as to discourage the potential terrorist from becoming an actual one.

One related aspect of this approach is the belief that the more free and open the society becomes the fewer terrorist actions there would be. The RPP leadership seemed to assume that terrorists recoursed to violence because they had not been allowed to express

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[36] For instance, the Justice Minister Mehmet Can once explained the fact that many convicted prisoners escaped from prison by reference to 'guardians' social background." *Hürriyet*, January 11, 1979. Note also that this view allows those who are in command positions to cast off their own responsibility. Those culprits escape from prison not because, the prisons are badly governed, and necesary precautions are not taken, which is the responsibility of justice minister, but because of guardians' social background upon which the justice minister have little power to control since university graduate would not prefer to work as guardian. Similarly, in 1976 Ali Topuz, powerful faction leader, criticized efforts of the NF government to legislate a traffic law. According to Topuz, the problem of traffic was related to socio-economic structure and efforts to solve it through administrative measures (zabıta önlemleri) was an example of old-fashioned thinking. Cited in Abdi İpekçi who criticized Topuz. *Milliyet*, July 19, 1976 "Asıl Geri Kalmış Düşünce" [A Real Old-Fashioned Thinking ]

[37] See, Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism & Liberal State*, (London: Macmillan, 1986), 35; Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorist Think: What Psychology can contribute to Understanding of Terrorism," in *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 253; Peter Janke, *Terrorism and Democracy: Some Contemporary Cases* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 187.

[38] Crenshaw, "How terrorist," 71. In an attempt to specify relative weight of social conditions and individual dispositions in creating terrorism, Friedland offers an interesting hypothesis. According to Friedland, when deprivation is intense, when group has well-articulated ideology and when group members have strong identity, individual dispositions would play a lesser role. On the other hand, when group does not aim to satisfy basic needs and elementary rights, when its ideology is not coherent, and when the group is lacking unique separate identity, individual dispositions would play a greater role. Nehemia Friendland, "Becoming a Terrorist: Social and Individual Antecedents," in *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 88.

themselves in peaceful ways. They particularly emphasized the notorious articles of Turkish Crime Law -141, 142 forbidding the communist propaganda. Leaving aside whether in Turkey of 1978 any political groups were denied peaceful expression of their political views,[39] this assumption, too, is severely flawed.

While it is true that open societies are likely to fight terrorism more effectively than authoritarian ones the assumption that in a freer society the terrorist will tend to prefer peaceful political activities (since they will be allowed to) is unproved. It should be accepted that in the short-term authoritarian governments may deal better with terrorism. Since it is difficult for liberal states "to act decisively and ruthlessly against insurgents" because unlike authoritarian states they had to respect fundamental rights and liberties even in the case of an emergency.[40] But on the other hand, democracies have inherent advantages vis-à-vis terrorism basically because they have a greater potential to alienate the terrorist from the larger public.[41] Despite the obvious advantages of democracy, we agree with the Jenkins' comment that the view that "if we provided access for terrorist groups to express their causes, they would not be bombing and shooting" is a "non-sense."[42] The range of open societies that face the threat of terrorism give credence to this view. Countries such as Britain, Germany, France and United States have never been immune from internally generated terrorism, despite the fact that they are open societies by any account.

Besides, unlike common perceptions, there is no contradiction between "expansion

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[39] True there was many articles (both in the constitution and other laws) prohibiting the establishment (and propaganda) of communist and Islamist organizations, but due to lack enforcement these were scarcely effective. It seemed that those, who believed in allegedly illegal ideas, successfully infiltrated legal associations and became effective in them. Similarly, many legal publications (newspapers, union or association weeklies, or ordinary magazines) could easily propagate allegedly prohibited communist or Islamist propaganda.

[40] Wilkinson, *Terrorism*. 104.

[41] For a discussion of the strengths and weaknessess of democracy, see Alex P.Schmid, "Terrorism and Democracy," in *Western Responses to Terrorism*, ed. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London:Frank Cass, 1993).

[42] Michael B. Jenkins, "Terrorism A Contemporary Problem with Age-old Dilemmas," in *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, ed. Lawrence Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 24. Jenkins also indicates that "terrorist operate most vigorously in those societies that provide the greatest opportunity to communicate via-press." Ibid.

of freedoms" and "the strengthening of the state." Quite the contrary, without a strong state to uphold law and order freedoms would not just be possible. Unrestrained by a general system of laws and a state to execute this law, self interested individuals might injure and even kill others. It is for that reason that John Locke remarked that "where there is no law, there is no freedom." [43] It is true that states have been the biggest threat to individual freedoms. But it is equally true that individuals could pose a threat to their fellow human beings' freedoms through private coercion. It is the primary task of the liberal state to prevent private coercion of one citizen over the other (to ensure citizens' security). It is the basic premise of the liberal democratic state that it must punish (within the rule of law, of course) those who violate or abuse their freedoms at the expense of others' freedom and security. Otherwise private coercion would prevail forcing everybody to take laws in to his own hands. In that case the will of the stronger would prevail, leaving weak ones at the mercy stronger ones. Therefore, even if freedoms are to be expanded to the utter limits there would still need to be coercive function of the state. Since, it is likely that even in the more freer societies there will be those who will try to abuse freedoms, and if they go unpunished, in the name of freedom, freedom of others will be damaged. For that reason, there should be no doubt whatsoever that the enjoyment of liberal democratic rights all ultimately depend upon the viability of the liberal state.[44] In Linz and Stepan's words "no state, no democracy."[45]

This basic characteristic of the liberal democratic state did not seem to be appreciated by the RPP leaders. Ecevit appeared to have believed that there is an inherent tension -and an adverse relation- between the law and the freedom. That is, the more laws prevail the more limited the freedom becomes. For instance, when Demirel argued that "it is very difficult to govern the country with this constitution and election laws," Ecevit

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[43] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 125.

[44] Wilkinson.*Terrorism*.4; Chalk. *Western Terrorism*.91.

[45] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies." *Journal of Democracy*. 7, 2, (1996), 14. See, also, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation-Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17.

Besides, unlike common perceptions, there is no contradiction between "expansion of freedoms" and "the strengthening of the state." Quite the contrary, without a strong state to uphold law and order freedoms would not just be possible. Unrestrained by a general system of laws and a state to execute this law, self interested individuals might injure and even kill others. It is for that reason that John Locke remarked that "where there is no law, there is no freedom." [43] It is true that states have been the biggest threat to individual freedoms. But it is equally true that individuals could pose a threat to their fellow human beings' freedoms through private coercion. It is the primary task of the liberal state to prevent private coercion of one citizen over the other (to ensure citizens' security). It is the basic premise of the liberal democratic state that it must punish (within the rule of law, of course) those who violate or abuse their freedoms at the expense of others' freedom and security. Otherwise private coercion would prevail forcing everybody to take laws in to his own hands. In that case the will of the stronger would prevail, leaving weak ones at the mercy stronger ones. Therefore, even if freedoms are to be expanded to the utter limits there would still need to be coercive function of the state. Since, it is likely that even in the more freer societies there will be those who will try to abuse freedoms, and if they go unpunished, in the name of freedom, freedom of others will be damaged. For that reason, there should be no doubt whatsoever that the enjoyment of liberal democratic rights all ultimately depend upon the viability of the liberal state.[44] In Linz and Stepan's words "no state, no democracy."[45]

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tension -and an adverse relation- between the law and the freedom. That is, the more laws prevail the more limited the freedom becomes. For instance, when Demirel argued that "it is very difficult to govern the country with this constitution and election laws," Ecevit had responded harshly showing his misunderstanding of the true nature of liberal democratic state. He argued that "Demirel wishes for a regime of oppression and brutality by changing the Constitution. He, therefore, proved himself as fascist. Demirel wants a state that punishes. Let us hope that God never give such men power again."[46] It is not clear why to argue for a changes in the constitution is equated with being a fascist. And why to want a state that punishes is such a despisable thing ? It is because Ecevit almost reflexively defended the 1961 constitution and that he appears to have failed to understand the nature of liberal democratic state. In other case, Ecevit argued that "his government would not use (or appeal to) to violence to fight violence" (..biz şiddetin üzerine şiddetle gidemeyiz)[47] and that the opposition "was pushing the government toward the use of violence" (hükümeti şiddet tedbirlerine itiyorlar).[48] In a booklet prepared for the RPP activists' 1979 partial senate elections and by-elections for the lower assembly, it was stated that:

> The Ecevit government has never resorted to violence in unravelling the roots of violence. It was possible that activists of various convictions could be rendered harmless by the use of force, but it would have been the realization of the atmosphere of violence they strive to establish. The Ecevit government has tried to transform the state, from the one that uses violence and resorts to a repression, to a state that attempts to secure an environment of peace and security, that generates sense of security on the part of the citizens.[49]

It is hardly possible not to agree with Ecevit about the argument that the state should never resort to violence only if the argument is qualified with the following; except

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[46] *Hürriyet*, May 29, 1977.

[47] *Hürriyet*, October 14, 1978.

[48] *Hürriyet*, September 8, 1978.

[49] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Zor Günleri Halkımızla Birlikte Aşıyoruz* [We Overcome Difficult Times Together with Our People] (Ankara: Ajans Türk, 1979), 93. In the same booklet, somewhat contradicting with above statements, it was also stated that the Ecevit government believes that police forces should be strong to catch terrorists. Ibid., 97.

for when it was lawfully entitled to do so, that is when it stays within the rule of law. It is indeed the defining characteristic of the state that it possesses the "monopoly of legitimate violence." It appears that Ecevit did not appreciate this last dimension. He seemed to be not aware of the distinction between a state that uses force arbitrarily and a state that resorts to force within the rule of law, and categorically opposed both.

In so doing Ecevit seems to fall into a fairly common confusion prevalent amongst Turkish intelligentsia that there is an adverse relation between the law and/or state and freedom.[50] The centrality of laws and a state to implement these laws for the ideal of freedom is not properly understood. The root of this confusion should, again, be sought in the impact of the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition. As Netll noted, in state societies (or societies with strong state) "law is essentially an emanation of the state (law as profession of the state par excellence)" while societies without such tradition "law does have a good deal of autonomy, not primarily concerned with the state."[51] It was primarily in the Anglo-saxon societies, which went through the stages of feudalism and standestaat, that the concept of law as a means for the peaceful regulation of conflicts between individuals and individuals and the state crystallized.[52] In the Ottoman Turkish polity, which came to

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[50] The reaction of a bunch of journalists, who charaterized themselves as "the representatives of all press agencies," to the assassination of journalist Abdi İpekçi was telling in that respect. Their statement urged the state to take the first step promptly and decisively to repeal some articles in Turkish Criminal law that, in their opinion, regarded freedom of thought and criticism as crime. The state should take that step, it continued, to prevent hostility towards freedom of thought that had been shown once again by the killing of Abdi İpekçi. *Yankı*, 12-18 February, 1979. The reaction of Professor Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu of Istanbul University Law Faculty, to the demands for martial law likewise, was another example. Velidedeoğlu have criticized Demirel for considering nothing but "the measures of violence" (şiddet önlemleri) such as "the proclamation of martial law" and the establishment of "the state security courts" to fight with anarchy. According to Velidedeoğlu, Demirel "did not appear to have appreciated the fact that the exertion of violence (şiddet uygulaması) during the 12 March period did solve nothing." Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, *Cumhuriyet*, November 1, 1978, "Ben, ben, ben demokrasisi,"[The democracy of I,I,I]. In the aftermath of the 12 March, on the other hand, Velidedeoğlu have blamed the JP government for not "resorting to martial law as in western democracies" when it was necessary. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Üç Devir* [Three Periods in Turkey] vol 1 (İstanbul: Sinan, 1972), 192.

[51] John P.Netll, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," In *The State-Critical Debates*, ed, John Hall, (London: Routledge, 1994), 322. (first published in 1968)

[52] Marshall Claget, "The Medieval Heritage: Political and Economic," in *Chapters in Western Civilization*, vol 1, eds, Joseph L. Blau, Justus Buchler, George T.Matthews (New York:

experience rather different historical trajectory, law came to be understood as something that emanated[53] from the state indicating what the subjects are prohibited -and sometimes allowed- to do.[54] Lacking a conception of law as means of peaceful conflict resolution, but associating it arbitrary state power that commands them what to do or not to do, there emerged a tendency to equate law with nothing but as infringement to freedom.[55]

Not assessing the true magnitude of the problem of terrorism, misdiagnosing its causes, its persistence, and the ways of handling it, the RPP leadership appeared to be indecisive and unable follow a consistent course of action regarding terrorism. Due basically to its misunderstanding of the nature of liberal democratic state and relations between law and freedom, the government was hesitant in strengthening legal-administrative regulations such as shortening the detention period of suspects, increasing police powers for search and capture, strengthening the security forces or recourse to martial law. The government's this attitude had been heavily criticized by several leading journalists of various shades of the political spectrum. Nazlı Ilıcak of Tercüman wrote that:

> What is happening in Turkey is the abuse of freedoms. We are saying that the government should prevent this within the limits of the constitution and other laws, within the rule of law. Ecevit refuses that. He continue to claim that he is going to heal wounds through tenderness and compassion. Is he not aware that this tolerance, which has reached a degree

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Columbia University Press, 1948),10-20; Gianfronco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1978), 33 and ff.

[53] The leading statesmen of the Tanzimat period, Fuad Paşa was reported to have said "if there is no law, make one." (Yok kanun, yap kanun)

[54] It is hardly surprising that in the Ottoman-Turkish lexicon, a code of sultanic laws was referred to as "yasak." Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix, 1993), 226. In modern Turkish, "yasak" literally means "prohibition." The fact that both law and prohibition was derived from the same word -yasak- is meaningful and tells about how the concept of law was closely related to prohibition.

[55] Similar state of affairs appeared to have been obtained in South Korea which has had a tradition of a centralized, absolute state. According to Steinberg, "...modern law gave repressive power to a state or a colonial regime and allowed, few, if any, rights for the individuals governed. Law, as Confucious indicated, was a tiger to be feared, not a protector of rights." David I. Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics," in *Politics in Developing Countries-Comparing Experiences With Democracy*, second edition, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 400.

in which it can be seen as weakness, despite the loyalty of Turkish people to democracy, is going to lead the country ?"[56]

Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet similarly urged Bülent Ecevit to fight against what he called fascists with "war methods." If you do not take such course of action, Mumcu continued, "this blood torrent will, in time, drag you down as well." [57] Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet reminded Ecevit of the well-known truth that "where the freedom to kill is allowed, neither freedom to life nor freedom of thought becomes possible."[58]

Important though these weaknesses in the RPP's approach towards terrorism might be, it should be noted that they were not the only factors that hampered the government's struggle against terrorism. The quality and the quantity of the security forces (not only police but also intelligence services and other supporting bureaucratic agencies) was one of the key factors negatively affecting the RPP's ability to succeed. It goes without saying that to secure "law and order" a functioning state requires so as to seize and punish those who violated laws. In terms of the quality and quantity of security forces the RPP government found inadequately equipped, ideologically divided, badly co-ordinated forces with low morale. Police forces were divided between leftist and rightist associations, Police Association (PA) and Police Unity (PU).[59] There was also a lack of co-ordination between various state agencies responsible for internal security such as the National Intelligence Agency, Gendarmerie and police.[60] This state of affairs in the security forces constituted a

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[56] *Tercüman*, October 31, 1978. "Demokrasiyi Bekleyen Tehlikeler" [Dangers that Await Democracy]

[57] *Cumhuriyet*, December 25, 1978. "Katliam" [Massacre]

[58] *Milliyet*, May 11, 1978. "Terörizme Karşı Gerçek Bir Savaş Gerek" [A Real War is Needed to Fight Terrorism]

[59] The left-wing oriented PA, which was by far the biggest police association, was established in 1970. Though we could not obtain the exact number of its members, its president claimed that it had more than thirteen thousand member. *Yanki*, 15-22 May 1978. The activities of the both police associations and others (such as 'Polis Enstitüleri Mezunları Derneği' and 'Tüm Emniyet Mensupları Dayanışma Derneği') had been suspended by martial law authorities during the martial law period in February 1979.

[60] Nur Bilge Criss, "Merceneries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in *Terrrorism and Politics*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 131.

serious constraining conditions for the RPP government that it found it hard to overcome.

The government tried to end politicization in security forces as promised in the election campaign, but that was not as easy as Ecevit appears to have thought. In an attempt to get rid of detrimental effects of politicization the RPP had to recourse similar actions that made them vulnerable to counter-charges of partisanship and politicization. This is a vicious circle. To decide who is "partisan" is not easily determined by rational criteria but rather rest on inevitably subjective information provided by your own sympathizers, which is not always objective. Therefore it is always susceptible to the counter-charge of partisanship. Ecevit government was no exception, and did not fare well on that score.

What Ecevit seemed to be doing was not that replacing partisans with hard-working meritios men but, replacing them with his own supporters.[61] He had promised too much to his own constituency, which was thirsting for the advantages of being in power. The RPP, as noted, was no less patronage oriented than other parties and its local organisations were now putting enormous pressure on the government to get their share.[62] Besides, according to Turkish Civil Servants Law, it was very difficult to remove civil servants from their post. What a government could do was either to transfer them to elsewhere or create limbo positions in the bureaucracy. Faced with such constraints the

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[61] Indeed, Turhan Feyzioğlu (vice premier) resigned in October 1978. He argued that the government could not prevent anarchy because it assumed that anarchy was coming from one side only and that it replaced nationalist affiliated militants with the leftists. *Yankı*, 25 September, 1 October, 1978.

[62] Haluk Ülman (an MP from the RPP) was reported to have said that as soon as the RPP formed government "rank and file organisation flowed to Ankara to get their share. An ordinary servant in the railway management wanted to be the general directorate of State Railways. Candidates for governorships (of provinces) continue to come to Ankara." Cited in Arcayürek. *Sonbahar*, 334. Ülman's observation was confirmed by another RPP member of parliament. See, Ömer Dedeoğlu, *Bir Milletvekilinin Günlüğünden Anılar* [Memoirs From the Diary of a Member of Parliament] (Ankara: Demircioğlu, 1998), 51-3. The general director Ziraat Bankası (the biggest state bank) Erdoğan Soral, once blamed the finance minister for forcing him to provide unlawful credits (to partisans) and to recruit unneeded personel. *Hürriyet*, October 6, 1978. Likewise, Uğur Mumcu criticized the RPP government for appointing their own men to the state economic enterprises. *Cumhuriyet*, June 15, 1978, "Arpalıklar" [Arpalık's].

Ecevit government seemed to give up. It is a telling example in this respect that interior minister İrfan Özaydınlı reported to have said that he was uneasy about the (PA) which threatened (in their meeting with him) to take issue with the ministry by giving it to the press, if the government wanted to reshuffle some of its members.[63] It was true that Ecevit government had taken a hard stance against PA[64] and governorship of Ankara closed down both associations in July 1978. But no to avail, Council of state has overturned governorships decision and associations continued their activities as before until martial law authorities in 1979 stopped its activity. In another instance, Ecevit (as prime minister in 8 October 1978) had reported to have complained about police forces:

> Police forces have lost their morale. Transfer of police (from one place to other) is harmful. For example, the police forces in Malatya had taken sides in political events. We removed them from their post and tried to send them elsewhere. But they did not go there by getting medical report. Those newly appointed ones, too, did not go to Malatya. Thus, a vacuum has been created. When the events flared up police officers put on their uniforms and helped those activists.[65]

In short, to erase partisanship from security forces in particular and civilian bureaucracy in general was proven to be beyond the reach of the minority government of Ecevit.

Partisanship, though vital, was not the only problem to be tackled. Years of neglect had left security forces in miserable situation in terms of quantity and quality. Not only the number of police forces were inadequate in violence ridden society but also professional education of police were neglected. Martial law commander Nevzat Bölügiray (covering the area of Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Hatay, and Mersin) provides astonishing examples regarding the quality the security forces. Among many problems he cites the lack of necessary tools and devices comes first. As we learn form his memoirs, guns were outdated, bulletproof vests and shields were inadequate, police cars and armor were old and due to lack petroleum were not always available for use, maps in rapidly growing cities

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[63] Duru, *Ecevit*.73.

[64] Some members of the PA had even been caught with university students while sticking posters on to walls to protest the RPP's behaviour.

[65] Duru, *Ecevit*.77.

and means of communications (wireless) were also inadequate as were the police's methods of seizing evidence.[66] Likewise education of security forces was much neglected. According to General Bölügiray, police had been put on duty after only couple of months' education. In this very short education, they were not provided with enough bullets. Nor were they provided with any specific education directed towards shooting.[67] Orhan Eyüboğlu and Faruk Sükan (vice premiers in the RPP government) have also touched upon similar problems.[68] The RPP leadership seemed to be aware of the problem but again financial, legal and political constraints, combined with the general administrative incapacity of government, proved to be too big an obstacle to overcome. Interior Minister Hasan Fehmi Güneş' reported speech in the martial law co-ordination committee reveals, once again, the miserable situation of the Turkish security forces at that time:

> ... Our police is very traditional, fed up, and on the brink of a psychological breakdown. My intelligence agencies follow the events from behind. ...We can not prevent the flow of illegal weapons. Our intelligence is very poor. The solution of all these problems requires money. Today, we are using the weapons that Germany scrapped and gave as charity. ...it is not easy to buy new tools and equipment. ...we do not have any appropriation. Outside the areas that are covered by the martial law, we have neither cars, nor wirelesses, nor staff, nor experts that are specialists on explosives. We have only one ballistic laboratory, and only one microscope. Let us assume that we bought a microscope, we still do not have experts. To educate experts, we sent them to England. We have a school that that provides special education to police officers who want to work for the intelligence services, but we could educate only 20 person per term. It is funny. We have many police officers, but few competent ones. It is only in 17 provinces that we have a camera, in the remaining 50 we do not have any cameras. ... I do my best to improve the situation. ... But when I wanted to reshuffle bureaucracy, many of our friends opposed such reshuffling. They should not interfere such things. They should not put pressure on ministers to deal with the appointment of police or nightwatchman.[69]

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[66] Nevzat Bölügiray, *Sokaktaki Asker- Bir Sıkıyönetim Komutanının 12 Eylül Öncesi Anıları* [A Soldier in Streets: Memoirs of a Martial Law Commander Before 12 September] second ed. (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1989), 54, 55. Similarly, the Scotland Yard officers who were invited to provide education for the Turkish police observed that "the first thing Turkish police did (upon its arrival to the place of incident) was to remove evidences." *Hürriyet*, July 23, 1978.

[67] Bölügiray, *Asker*.49.

[68] See respectively, *Yankı*, 11-17 July, 1978 and 24-30 July, 1978.

[69] Cited in Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] vol 1, (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 246-7. Similar remarks of Hasan Fehmi Güneş can also be found in *Yankı*, 8-14 October, 1979.

These sincere confessions by the interior minister provide clues regarding the various constraints that thwarted the government's efforts to cope with the problem. One obvious constraint is money as minister found it difficult to secure financial means to improve the quality and quantity of the security forces. Another problem seems to have been political constraints. It has been noted above how the previous interior minister had complained about the PA which threatened to give them to press if any of its members were involved in reshuffling the security forces. Güneş' statements give the impression that not only the PA, but also some members of the RPP proved to be an obstacle for the reshuffling. In fact, the left-wing of the party, to which the RPP government needed to stay in power, opposed any action that aimed to strengthen (and improve) the security forces.

In short, while heightening expectations unreasonably, the RPP government misdiagnosed and underestimated the problem of terrorism, and found it difficult to overcome various legal, political, financial constraints. It was, therefore, unable to take necessary measures required for an effective fight against it. In the coming months, terrorism continued to escalate.[70] A closer look at the terrorist activities suggests that terrorist groups increasingly opted for spectacular and violent attacks which were likely to kill as many people as possible. In 16 March 1978, a bomb was thrown at İstanbul University students killing six students and leaving forty-seven wounded. In 8 August, six people were killed in Balgat when terrorist shot at coffee house indiscriminately. In 9 October seven members of the TWP were taken from their house and killed outside the skirts of Ankara. The way they chose their victims and the way they executed them suggested that they were designed to explode latent divisions and fractions at a mass level. Another strategy of terrorism was the murder of distinguished, well known persons. In March 24, the vice-prosecutor of Ankara Doğan Öz (alleged to have left-wing sympathies)

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[70] The number of deaths from terrorist attacks rose to 319 (in 1977) to 1095 (in 1978) to 1362 (in 1979). Cited in Ruşen Keleş and Artun Ünsal, *Kent.* 35.

was killed. In 17 April, mayor of Malatya (from the JP) and member of the prominent Hamidoğlu family was killed when the bomb sent to him exploded. On 11 June, Associate Professor (of Hacettepe University) Bedrettin Cömert was killed, followed by Professor Bedri Karafakioğlu (of Istanbul Technical University) on 20 October.

In the face of escalating terrorism, the RPP government appeared to be unable to take effective action for reasons stated above. Ecevit had underestimated terrorism and heightened expectations before he assumed the power. He continued the same way when in power, despite being in government should have made the magnitude of the problems clear. A number of Ecevit's speeches show how he tried to inject moral to the country; "violent events are now being eliminated through effective and impartial measures"[71]; "we have ensured peace and security. Now, nobody can speak of the anarchy"[72]; "we have now very close to end this bloody game"[73]; "I believe that we have now eliminated anarchy."[74] These words helped neither the prevention of terrorism nor his and his party's standing in the country as his persuasiveness (credibility) were being damaged with every unheld promises.[75] Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet criticized Ecevit, noting that the government "could not overcome the (terrorist) events for months, despite the fact that they continue to claim these were 'the last flutters.'(Besides) the government could not sustain a belief that it would overcome it in the future."[76] It is for that reason, İpekçi continued, "what

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[71] *Hürriyet*, May 3, 1978.

[72] *Tercüman*, June 18, 1978.

[73] *Hürriyet*, October 14, 1978.

[74] *Tercüman*, December 15, 1978.

[75] According to Ömer Dedeoğlu, when Ecevit uttered similar speeches in the RPP group, some MP's were laughing at what they heard. Dedeoğlu, *Milletvekili*.139.

[76] *Milliyet*, October 7, 1978. "Son Çırpınışların Sonu Gelmedikçe..." [Unless the Last Flutters Really Proved to be the Last...] Similarly an editorial in Yankı noted that "it was a mistake for the Ecevit government to claim (upon its assumption of power) that it would be able to deal with terrorism in a short time, instead of staying silent until it grasped the subject well. When what they said was not realized, it inevitably generated disappointment." *Yankı*, "Önce Alternatif Bulmak Gerek" [First an Alternative Should be Found] 18-24 December 1978.

Ecevit called 'the last flutters' have an influence and create a panic that it aimed."[77]

Ecevit also implied and even openly accused the NAP of supporting terrorism. He believed that because the government was now about to uproot the sources of terrorism, the NAP increased its activities of instigating terrorism to prevent the government from doing so. Because it would clearly be seen that the NAP was behind these moves. He was reported (in January 3, 1979) to have said:

> The JP found itself in a difficult situation as the NAP felt the pressure of our efforts to uproot terrorism. Demirel could no longer say that nationalists were not involved in those events. The NAP is very hard-pressed. As a result of our quickened legislative activities the NAP is very flurried. The root of terrorism is now clear, what is expected is only a legal proof of it. ...So they (the NAP) tried to instigate social events.[78]

In other case, after the İstanbul University killing Ecevit said that "those who understand that the roots of violence are being effectively dealt with, are now get flurried."[79] In 27 July, he openly declared that the NAP was responsible for violent acts. Having blamed the NAP for instigating terrorism as prime minister, it could be expected that Ecevit would initiate legal proceedings. Ecevit did not even try this, leading many to think that the accusation of the NAP was merely a political maneuver. If he had any doubts regarding the NAP and its affiliations with terrorist organizations (and from the speeches it appears that he had), he should have commenced legal proceedings that included the right to appeal to constitutional court which could decide to close it down.[80] Otherwise, he would be blaming without any conclusive proof which made him vulnerable to the charge of slander. Besides, Ecevit spoke as if he had a right to

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[77] Ibid.

[78] Duru, *Ecevit*.93.

[79] *Hürriyet*, March 17, 1978

[80] According to the Turkish Political Parties Law (which was promulgated in 1965 and remained in effect until the new one was adopted in 1983) article 110/3, Ecevit had a right to appeal to the chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic, who would then decide whether to take the party to the constitutional court or not. In fact in July 1976 the constitutional court issued, acting upon the appeal of the chief public prosecutor, a warning fine (uyarı cezası) to the NAP concerning its organisation abroad which violated related article of the TPPL.

make an implicit deal with alleged criminals. He threatened the NAP that they should stop violent actions and if they did so, the government would no longer pursue legal proceedings. In liberal democratic states, however, elected governments have no right to decide whether to pursue alleged criminals or not. Ecevit's ambivalent attitude was criticized by pro-Ecevit journalists. Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet asked "..if these (legal proceedings regarding the NAP) are not (or can not be) pursued, is there any meaning of the rosy speeches uttered at the party meetings?"[81] Defending his action Ecevit was reported to have said (on 10 November 1979) that "they could not initiate the closure of the NAP. Because if they had done so, and could not get a result, it would be bad for them as they would be mortified."[82]

In line with his unwillingness to use stringent application of laws to deal with terrorism, Ecevit refused to declare martial law, as demanded by the opposition[83] and some segment of the press. Having in mind the NAP's demand for martial law, he said that "murderers are wishing for a regime of dictatorship."[84] Ecevit's opposition to the martial law derived as much from the familiar argument that it brings army to the center of politics as from the fear that the NAP could use the army for its own ends.[85] In 1985, he also

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[81] *Çumhuriyet*, February 11, 1979. "Söylemek ve Yapmak" [Saying and Doing]. In yet another example showing how common the lack of understanding of the true nature of liberal democratic state was in Turkish intellectual circles, the Yankı editorial, confused "impartiality" with "indifference" and approved the RPP's stance. It argued that by not initiating the mechanism through which the NAP and its affiliated organisations could be closed down, the RPP had brought "the air of impartiality" to the state. (devlete tarafsızlık havası getirmek) *Yankı*, July 30-August 5, 1979 "Ecevit'in En Büyük Hizmeti" [The Biggest Service of Ecevit] (my italics).

[82] Cited in Duru, *Ecevit*.123.

[83] Especially the NAP urged for the declaration of martial law. It even created the suspicion that the party favored a military takeover. The NAP general administrative council urged for the declaration of martial law, and delegation of responsibility (to administer the country) to the army. *Hürriyet*, October 3, 1978. Though subsequently the NAP leaders made it clear that they did not favour military intervention, it is reasonable to state that they would have prefered it to the RPP government.

[84] *Hürriyet*, October 14, 1978. Note that he seemed to equate demand for a martial law with demands for a dictatorship. In another speech, he blamed the opposition for wishing to "restrain freedoms." *Hürriyet*, September 10, 1978

[85] Duru, *Ecevit*.1994.

argued that he was hoping to overcome terrorism without recourse to martial law up until Kahramanmaraş massacres.[86] He also knew that the RPP's left-wing which urged for (what to them) freedoms of the fullest possible extent including the establishment of the communist party, would oppose it.[87]

The two shocking events provided a turning point for the RPP government's fight with terrorism. One was the Kahramanmaraş massacre in which more than 100 people, including many children, were killed in a sectarian conflict between Alevi's and Sünni's.[88] Ecevit's diagnosis regarding the causes of Kahramanmaraş incident was far from realistic. He said that those who were uneasy about the RPP's efforts to change the existing order in favor of underprivileged and his governments' successes in dealing with the terrorism, were behind these events. In reality, however, it was an indication of how polarized people had become over the years, and how the security forces had failed in their primary task of protecting the security of life. In the near absence of state authority, latent conflicts between religious sectarianisms was exploited and finally exploded, culminating in the bloody massacre. In the face of such cruelty, the RPP government was forced to declare martial law in thirteen provinces.[89]

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[86] Arcayürek, *Müdahale*.360.

[87] It also seemed to be the case that the painful memoirs of the 12 March period, in which the military commanders had a virtually free hand in dealing with what to them anarchy under the pretext of martial law, generated an overt hostility to the idea of martial law within the left including the RPP. Ignoring the fact that period in question was a covert military rule in the first place, they assumed that any martial law was bound to create similar situations for the liberties.

[88] Events in Kahramanmaraş began when a bomb exploded in the cinema known to be favourite of rightists. After that incident two teachers (both members of the TTUSA) were killed by an unidentifed attacker. At their funeral, both the leftist and the rightist groups clashed with each other, leaving three dead. The next day and after rightist groups marched into those areas populated by Alevi's, ensuing clashes resulted in the death of more than a hundred people. The minister of the interior, who resigned after the incident, argued that though rightists played a central role in the massacre, the left also played a provocative role.

[89] These provinces were İstanbul, Ankara, Kahramanmaraş, Adana, Elazığ, Bingöl, Erzurum, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Kars, Malatya, Sivas and Urfa. The chief of staff wanted Diyarbakır to be included in that list. But Ecevit fearing the wrath of left-wingers in his own party, refused the military's demand. Evren, *Anılar*. 235.

It is only after this incident Ecevit appears to have realized that the fight against terrorism could not successfully be waged with civilian security forces alone. He was reported to have said that "a civilian administration can not deal with these events. Due to lack of proper education police forces does not know how to handle anarchy. ...with martial law we now have a state mechanism that functions."[90]

The declaration of the martial law in thirteen provinces, however, did not have significant effect on terrorism for several reasons that we shall discuss later. Terrorism continued unabated. The assassination of journalist (and editor of Milliyet) Abdi İpekçi on February 2, 1979 "stunned the entire country."[91] He was known for his moderate tendencies. Despite his pro-Ecevit and pro-RPP posture, he was equally respected by the JP sympathizers. İpekçi assassination was remainder to everyone that not only those known as partisans, regardless of political tendencies, but everybody was in danger. In other words, as Chinese proverb put it, it killed one and frightened a thousand.

### 5.2.ECONOMIC CRISIS

The horrors of terrorism was not the only problem for the RPP to deal with. The country was in deep recession and the economy, afflicted by a chronic balance of payment deficits and danger of hyperinflation, needed immediate attention. The bitter pill required to normalize the economy that the NF governments refused to take, fell to the responsibility of the RPP government. The RPP leadership, however, did not seem to appreciate the true dimensions of the economic crisis. They appeared to have assumed that the Turkish economy was essentially in a healthy situation, and the crisis it was undergoing could be dealt with relatively easily.[92] The view, espoused by international economic organizations

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[90] Duru, *Ecevit*.93.

[91] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 171.

[92] Taner Berksoy, "Türkiye'de İstikrar Arayışları ve IMF," [The Pursuit of the Economic Stability in Turkey and the IMF] *IMF İstikrar Politikaları ve Türkiye*, der. Cevdet Erdost (Ankara: Savaş, 1982), 164. Seyfettin Gürsel, "IMF" [IMF] *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, cilt 2, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), 500.

such as IMF and World Bank, that Turkish economy needed radical restructuring that required the acceptance of a more market oriented strategy in the place of prevailing import substitution industrializing (ISI), did not make much impact on the government.[93] They attributed the causes of foreign exchange crisis and fueling inflation to the faulty policies of NF governments[94] without paying enough attention to the structural problems of the Turkish economy. They appears to have believed that with an additional foreign financing and short-term debt reshuffling Turkish economy could easily weather the crisis.[95] Given the fact that the RPP leadership's somewhat naive assumptions regarding the actual operation of market economy, it was hardly surprising that the diagnosis would be inadequate. The RPP government appeared convinced "of the paramount virtues of government intervention in the economy" [96] and it was "inclined towards a self-sufficient, even autarkic view of economic development, which restricted to a minimum the foreign role in the economy."[97]

Expectedly, relations between the Ecevit government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to which government needed to secure foreign exchange (not only because the government needed IMF credits but also without the IMF's green light private banks would not give credit) had a bad start. Many within the RPP appear to have believed that IMF was the tool of international capitalist conspiracy to retard the development of the

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[93] Krueger and Turan noted that serious efforts to balance the economy would require, as a minimum, the introduction of tight monetary policy, sharp reductions in public sector deficits and in the losses of state economic enterprises, reductions in public investments, and devaluation of the Turkish lira. See, Anna O.Krueger and İlter Turan, "The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy reforms in the 1980's," in *Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform*, ed. Anna O.Krueger and Robert H. Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 349.

[94] Osman Okyar, "Turkey and IMF: A Review of Relations," in *IMF Conditionality*, ed. John Williamson (Washington D.C: Institute For International Economics, 1983), 539.

[95] Colin Kirkpatrick and Ziya Öniş, "Turkey" in *Aid and Power & The World Bank Policy Based Lending*, vol 2, ed. Peter Mosley, John Horrigan and Jack Toye (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1991), 11.

[96] Okyar, "Turkey," 539.

[97] Ibid.

third world. Though Ecevit did not see IMF as such, he believed that IMF recommendations were too harsh to implement in a developing world.[98] He did, nevertheless, manage to arrange a standby agreement with IMF in April 1978 promising restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, devaluation and reduction in government spending and better debt management. Believing that the government was too weak to implement these measures and IMF signed agreement reluctantly private banks preferred to wait to give credit to Turkey. In August 1978, an IMF commission (visiting Turkey to monitor whether she was complying with the conditions) demanded further devaluation and new increases in taxes and reductions in public spending. After several visits by IMF officials the relations were suspended in December 1978.[99] The commission concluded that the government failed to meet IMF conditions therefore standby agreement was to be put aside.

Unable to meet IMF conditions the government wanted to use Turkey's geopolitical situation and its increasing importance for Western security to force IMF and other Western states to secure credit. At the summit meeting in Guadalope leading western countries announced that an economic assistance package of 1 billion dollars would be given to Turkey provided she signed a standby agreement with IMF. Thus, once again the government resumed negotiations with IMF culminating in yet another standby agreement in July.[100] Two and half months later, however, the RPP government had to resign leaving the last standby agreement in tatters.

Failing to ensure fresh credits (because of its inability to meet IMF conditions), and unable to take much needed austerity measures alongside the encouragement of exports and foreign investments, increasing productivity through better management of SES, the

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[98] Duru, *Ecevit*. 55.

[99] Berksoy, "istikrar," 166.

[100] For details, Okyar, "Turkey,"; Krueger and Turan, 342-345; Also, a less than academic account can be found in Yalçın Doğan, *IMF Kıskacında Türkiye, 1946-1980* [Turkey in the IMF Pincer, 1946-1980] (İstanbul: Tekin, 1986).

RPP government could not stop economic decline. Inflation rocketed (from 27 per cent (1977) to 45 (1978) and 59 (1979) per cent), while the GDP growth declined to 2.9 per cent in 1978 and -0.4 per cent in 1979. Due to foreign exchange shortages imports had to be severely reduced leading to several shortages of most basic goods, such as petroleum, medicine and spare parts. Shortages in these imported goods led to yet more shortages of locally produced goods. The double-pricing (one determined by government and the other by market) of SEE's products such as sugar, cooking oil and cigarettes became the order of the day. Ordinary citizens had to wait in long queues for ours even for such basic things as cooking oil, sugar, tea, light bulbs, and petroleum. Economic mismanagement, particularly the government's failure to control the black market, and its mistakes in timing of devaluation of Turkish lira, helped to generate a new group of businessmen, called as "the rich of Ecevit" (Ecevit zenginleri) who made their fortune by exploiting the loopholes in the RPP governments' economic mismanagement.

There are several reasons as to why the Ecevit government's economic policy turned out to be less than successful. The governments' incomplete diagnosis of the Turkish economy's problems was one of the chief reason, as indicated above. The government tended to insist on this faulty diagnosis and made few serious attempts in correcting it.[101] In addition (and perhaps because of this misdiagnosis) Ecevit promised a rosy future to everybody, not mentioning the serious sacrifices required to put Turkish economy on track. He tried to inject morale into the country by saying, that the economic crisis soon will be over, and that the light has appeared at the end of the tunnel, that the Western world was ready to rescue Turkey etc... But the more these promises turned out be unrealistic and (false), the further confidence in government (regarding its ability to deal with crisis) declined.

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[101] For instance, the government insisted on high growth rates, despite the fact that the Turkish economy just could not sustain it. Ecevit was reported to have proudly said that they upgraded the projected (in the Fourth Five Year Development Plan) growth rate from 5.7 per cent to 6.1 per cent for 1978. Cited in Duru, *Ecevit*.57.

The lack of co-ordination between various governmental agencies that were supposed to take decisions and implement it was another reason for its dismal failure. Within the cabinet various factions competed for political influence and it made the coherent application of policies extremely difficult. In one instance, energy and natural sources minister Deniz Baykal, who was the leader of a strong faction within the party, attempted to nationalize petroleum refinery -Ataş- while Ecevit was abroad negotiating for debt reshuffling and new credits with international banks, to which the word "nationalization" seemed to be an anathema. In another instance, the trade minister publicly criticized finance minister who had to pawn Turkey's agricultural products to meet the requirement of international bank Wells Fargo.[102] Ecevit himself is reported to have said that they can not "force bureaucracy to get things done" and were trying to administer governmental policy through "ad hoc committees" since various departments "are alienated from each other (closed to each other) to such an extent that they behave like different states."[103] Complaining about partisanship of leaders of one faction in 1985, he also argued that "every government recourse to partisanship to a varying extent but Ali Topuz (leader of one faction) has spread it even into the party."[104]

Having indicated the RPP government's failures and weaknesses it should also be noted that the implementation of painful measures to put the Turkish economy on track was a formidable task. Socio-political constraints severely constrained the room for maneuver for any government that faced re-election. It was very difficult for the RPP

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[102] The rift between the finance minister Ziya Müezzinoğlu and the head of central bank regarding the status of the central bank was another example of conflict. See, *Hürriyet*, April 26, 1978.

[103] Duru, *Ecevit*.56,85. See also, for more examples, memoirs of the RPP MP, Ali Nejat Ölçen, *Ecevit Çemberinde Politika* [Politics in the Circle of Ecevit] (Ankara: Ümit, 1995), 195, 201, 203-4, 213.

[104]Arcayürek, *Müdahale*. 308. In 1985, Ecevit explained why he could not exert pressure to ensure co-ordination in his government. He argued that "he did not implement strict discipline in the party because of the doubt that if the government fell as a result of this, fascism might assume power in the country." Ibid., 312. Ecevit seemed to equate discipline with arbitrary heavy-handedness. He did not seem to appreciate the fact that the failure of the government as a result of intra-party infighting would better serve, what to him, was fascism.

government, which had promised to implement more egalitarian policies, to cut back public expenditure, to remove price controls on state economic enterprises, to restrain wage increases in public and private sectors, to levy new taxes. The major constraint the Ecevit government faced was,then, a political one "involving the trade-off between the urgent need for stabilization and the desire not to alienate its supporters by introducing a stronger dose of stabilization measures."[105] Years of economic mismanagement had left the Turkish economy in such a miserable state that nothing less than Herculean efforts would secure its rebalancing. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that it would still have been difficult to put the economy on track even if the RPP government had correctly diagnosed the magnitude of problems and had stuck to the stabilization package. But in that case, at least it could inject a realistic hope to the country (and international organizations) that the government had at least seriously began to deal with economic troubles. This was what Ecevit government was unable to do.

In the area of foreign relations, the RPP government's record was perceived to be hardly better. The lifting of the US embargo by September 1978, many observers noted, was one of the rare successes of the RPP government. Relationships with the US and other NATO allies, however, entered a difficult phase for both sides. At the beginning, the RPP government was seen in a favorable light. It was expected that the RPP could make headway especially in the Cyprus issue. Relations, however, soured soon after the RPP came to power. The RPP, as noted above, has promised to follow more independent (vis-à-vis Turkey's Western allies) foreign policy that included the establishment of indigenous defense industry, increased political-economic relations with neighboring countries as well as non-aligned countries while staying in western camp. In 1976 Ecevit had argued that Turkey should formulate a "new defense concept" because over the years " the defense needs of Turkey are heavily affected by the priorities of NATO and US' defense needs." [106]

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[105] Fikret Şenses, "Turkey's Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program in Retrospect and Prospect." *The Developing Economies*, XXIX, 3, (1991), 214.

Turkey, Ecevit continued, "has become too dependent on NATO and NATO has developed the habit (and comfort) of taking Turkey's support granted."[107] Similarly, Hasan Esat Işık who was to be a defense minister in the RPP government, asserted ( in 1977) that Turkish governments have "behaved not like a member, but as bodyguard (fedai) of NATO."[108]

The government began to take steps in accordance with its stated policy line; it encouraged native defense industries, signed various rather symbolic agreements with the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern neighbors and Libya.[109] Though these appears to have created suspicions,[110] it was rather the RPP leadership's rhetoric, rather than any concrete actions, that appears to have led to the western community suspecting whether Turkey was sliding further away from the western camp. Ecevit once suggested (in 1978 in an extraordinary party congress) that Turkey was living in its most distressful period in the history of the Republic. He urged other states and international institutions not to exploit her weaknesses. In that case, Ecevit continued, "Turkey might well go to the other side of the wall." "We do not do this now," he asserted, "not because that Turkey can not do it, but because our sense of responsibility prevents us taking such policy line." [111] He then warned everybody "not to put pressure on Turkey."[112] In a booklet prepared for party activists for the incoming partial senate and lower assembly by-elections (October 1979) it was argued that "in a period in which east-west and north-south relationships increased to

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[106] Bülent Ecevit, *Ecevit'in Açıklamaları* [Statements of Ecevit] (Ankara, 1977), 45, 46. Also, Bülent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies." *Survival*. 20, 5 (1978).

[107] Ibid.

[108] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Radyo*. 44.

[109] The evaluation of these policies from the perspective of the NATO and West can be found in Michael M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept: What It Means For NATO." *Orbis*. 23, 3 (1979).

[110] Boll, for instance, asked "whither Turkey ?" Ibid., 626.

[111] Cited in Arcayürek. *Sonbahar*. 528-9.

[112] Ibid.

an unprecedented degree, it may lead to undesired consequences for both the world peace and Turkey's national interests if Turkey, which stands in the center of such dialogues, *wholeheartedly supports (or be certain partisan of) one side only.*"[113] Likewise, Ecevit's hard stance (in American eyes) on the U-2 flights seemed to be yet another factor in worsening relations. When American officials asked Turkish authorities to allow the use of Turkish bases for U-2 flights over Soviet Union to monitor the SALT II treaty, Ecevit showed extreme reluctance, insisting on the point that Soviet Union must consent to it first.[114] In the words of The Economist, this attitude of the Ecevit government, put the "Americans into a tizzy."[115] The issue soon faded way as America shelved SALT II treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but it, alongside the other things, seems to reinforced doubts about reliability of Ecevit on the part of the US government.[116] It is not implied here that Ecevit should have bowed to western allies each and every demand so as to be regarded as succesful in foreign affairs. (Indeed, many observers accepted that Ecevit's multi-dimensional policy and his efforts to widen Turkey's foreign policy options was instrumental in lifting of the US embargo).[117]But that national interests can better be protected not through emotional outbursts uttered in a moment of anger (whether in public or in private) but through well-calculated diplomatic moves; this is what the RPP government seemed to ignore.

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[113] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Zor Günleri*.107. (my italics)

[114] According to Birand, Ecevit opposed such a decision because he though that it might provoke the Soviet Union and thus harm Turkish interests. Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Saat: 04.00* [12 September 04:00] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1984), 97-98. Critics on the other hand pointed out that Ecevit's concern was excessive since "national means of verification had long been accepted and monitoring of Soviet compliance with SALT II would have a direct bearing upon the security of America's NATO allies, including Turkey." George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy." *Orbis*. 24, 2 (1980), 376.

[115] *The Economist*, May 19, 1979 "Dimming Eyes."

[116] Zbigniew Brzezinski, the head of US National Security Council, was reported to have been angered by Ecevit's remarks and said that "one can go nowhere with Ecevit." Birand. *12 Eylül*. 98.

[117] Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası, 1964-1980* [The US Policy Concerning

In evaluating how the RPP government responded to pressing problems of terrorism, economy and foreign relations, the behavior of the opposition needs to be mentioned. Since, the JP-led opposition did everything in its power to ensure the government's failure without ever thinking that they were wearing out not only the government in power but the democratic system itself. In line with Ottoman-Turkish tradition of opposition, the JP leader Süleyman Demirel opted for a destructive pattern of opposition. He believed that the resignation of eleven MP's and their subsequent participation to RPP government was " the stealing of national will." Not totally on insecure grounds, he accused Ecevit of seducing his MP's with cabinet posts, but seemed to forgot the fact that he was the politician who have seduced Democratic Party MP's to form a first National Front government (though he did not give them ministership) in 1975. Not only Ecevit, but also president Korutürk had been targets of JP attacks. The JP urged Korutürk not to ratify Ecevit cabinet.[118] They even went as far as suggesting that the RPP government was an "organized plot." (organize fesat hareketi).

Infightings, fists, pistol drawings displayed during the process of vote of confidence heralded how government-opposition relations would be conducted during the RPP's tenure. To emphasize that the government rested on illegitimate foundations the JP leader Süleyman Demirel never called Ecevit as "prime minister" but "head of government" (hükümetin başı). Like Ecevit when he was in opposition, he did not refrain in accusing him with outrageous words. According to Demirel:

> As a result of the activities of the RPP government which has been in power for seventy days, and which included interior minister who went to hospital to visit anarchists who fired on police, and that is based on immoral tricks, fraud, intrigues, the state has been seized by militants of the left and has become a state of anarchy."[119]

Once, he argued that "the hand of head of state is bloody. ...the government is

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Turkey, 1964-1980] (İstanbul: Der, 1995), 111-112.

[118] Journalist Arcayürek reported that Demirel had told him that "they were determined to raise the hell if president Korutürk appointed the Ecevit government." Arcayürek, *Sonbahar*. 302.

[119] *Hürriyet*, March 21, 1978.

solely responsible for the bloodshed."[120] Demirel, who appeared to have made no distinction between various shades of the left, implied that the RPP was not seriously engaged in a struggle against terrorism (derived from the left) since it both sympathized their aims and had become indebted to them as they collaborated when the RPP was in opposition. He implied that the RPP government was nurturing and protecting the leftist terrorists and thus paving way for communism. His speeches that "Ecevit is the chief separatist"[121] that "the head of government is the enemy of (existing socio-political) order"[122] and that "the RPP is nurturing anarchists to whom it gives twenty-five thousand Turkish liras"[123] reflect that belief.[124]

The claim that the RPP government was nurturing and protecting leftist terror can not stand up to close scrutiny. Despite its rhetoric reminiscent of the ultra-left, Ecevit was careful in his relations with the extreme-left. When in opposition he consistently rejected various calls to form a National Democratic Front (Ulusal Demokratik Cephe) in opposition to National Front. He was reported to have said "I am against the RPP entering such front. In the first place, it is not clear who would constitute such front. Besides, we as a party, have been opposing the very idea of creating fronts (whatever it could be)."[125] In power, too, Ecevit repeated the same pattern. When the CRWU urged for a political strike

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[120] *Hürriyet*, April 2, 1978. He reiterated this view up until end of the RPP government. He said (in July 1979) for instance that "the government was the basic cause of sea of blood, destructionism and separatism." See, Süleyman Demirel, *Basın Toplantıları* [Press Meetings] (Ankara: Ulucan, 1979), 13.

[121] *Hürriyet*, September 25, 1978.

[122] *Hürriyet*, October 12, 1978.

[123] *Hürriyet*, November 2, 1978. He also argued, when some work-places had been attacked soon after Ecevit's harsh criticism of the businessmen, that "the government protects bandits and bandits protect the government." Demirel, *Basın*. 122.

[124] See also his letters to President Fahri Korutürk and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. Süleyman Demirel, *AP Genel Başkanı Süleyman Demirel'in Cumhurbaşkanı Korutürk ve Başbakan Ecevit'e Gönderdiği Mektuplar*, [Letters that had been sent to President Korutürk and Prime Minister Ecevit by Süleyman Demirel] Ankara: 1979, 7, 16, 22.

[125] Cited in Duru, *Ecevit*. 45.

named "Warning to fascism" to protest İstanbul University massacre in which 6 student were killed, Ecevit stated his government's intention that it was illegal and he would take legal steps to prevent it. When the CRWU and TWP leaders tried to meet in Taksim square in 1 May 1979, despite the fact that martial law authorities' prohibited any demonstrations there, the RPP government did not raise finger as the prominent leaders of the CRWU and TWP (including Behice Boran) were taken under custody. He argued that the ultra-left outside the RPP polled only 1 per cent of the total vote in the 1977 elections, while the RPP got 42 per cent. Therefore, he argued, the RPP should aim to appeal not to 1 per cent but remaining 57 per cent. Otherwise, he noted, "we can not be strong enough if we are eclipsed by this 1 per cent."[126]

The JP leader Demirel's accusations (of the RPP's alleged protecting of leftist terrorists) appears to have been directed towards the aim of securing unity in his own party so as to prevent further transfers and to prevent a still stronger RPP government and secure unity in the right. For that aim, he portrayed the RPP more left leaning than it really was. That was a strategy that the JP had stuck to since the 1973 elections. A united nationalist front against the storm of socialism represented by the RPP suited Demirel's party interests well. Otherwise, even the loyal supporters of JP did not seem to believe Demirel's claims and criticized him. Nazlı Ilıcak, for instance, criticized Demirel's remark that "the hands of head of government is bloody." Ilıcak asked that "...were we not against the mentality that blamed the government (for the anarchy) instead of anarchists ? Were we not against the mentality, too, that wore out the state through its actions that aimed to

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[126] Cited in, Nazlı Ilıcak, "CHP ve Aşırı Sol" [The RPP and the Ultra-Left] *Tercüman*, October 1, 1978. Even Ilıcak appreciated this attitude of Ecevit. She argued that "the naughiest children of the class have now become the head (or prefect). It can now be discerned that (Ecevit) is tending to behave more maturely." *Tercüman*, June 17, 1978. "En Yaramaz Mümessil Oldu." [The Naughtiest have Become the Head (Prefect)]. Yankı editorial similarly argued that it was plain wrong to argue that the RPP government tolerated the leftist terror. According to Yankı, the erroneous approach of the government was responsible for increasing terrorism. But this derived from "ignorance regarding the causes and means of prevention of terrorism rather than a conscious political decision." *Yankı*, July 28-August 3, 1980, "Tedhiş Karşısında Çaresizlik" [Helplessness vis-à-vis Terrorism].

wear out the government ?"[127] Similarly, a Yankı editorial noted that "the leaders of the JP, like the RPP leaders before, has begun to follow an opposition strategy that is irresponsible and destructive and that does not care about the future of the democratic regime."[128] It warned the JP leadership that "it was a gamble in which democratic regime was at stake. The RPP which had played same gamble for long time could not gain anything from it. And there is no reason why Demirel would now get benefit from it."[129]

Demirel did not seem to be moved by such critics. To wear out the RPP government, he likened it to the tragic experiences of Salvador Allende and Kerensky. He said that "the way Ecevit government is moving through is the way Allende moved."[130] Rather than being a sincere warning, it seemed to be intended to further chaos in the country by implying that the government's overthrow by armed forces was imminent. When the RPP decided to be a member of Socialist International which controlled by democratic socialist /social democratic parties of Western Europe and sternly opposed to communism, Demirel accused the party of "acting against Turkish constitution and political parties law and being multinational and non-nationalist" (çok uluslu ve gayri milli).[131] He never denounced that he would not form a third NF government arguing that this would mean to do a service to "oppression."[132] In JP political mass meetings, people carried, banners (probably prepared by party activists) on which Ecevit was accused for being fan of IMF. To impede the government's efforts to put the economy on track, the JP

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[127] *Tercüman*, April 4, 1978. "Bir İpte İki Cambaz" [Two Acrobats on a Single Rope]

[128] *Yankı*, 8-14 January, 1979 "Yeni Yılda Türkiye" [Turkey in the New Year]

[129] Ibid.

[130] *Hürriyet*, March 20, 1979.

[131] Süleyman Demirel, *1979 Yılına Girerken* [Towards the Year 1979] (Ankara: Doğuş, 1979), 33-34.

[132] Interview with Nazlı Ilıcak, *Tercüman*, March 7, 1979. Ilıcak thought that if Demirel had denounced this possibility, the RPP's argument that the only alternative to their government was a

parliamentary group tried to hinder the TGNA's activities by a ruthless exploitation of legal loopholes. When the assembly met to review new tax laws, the JP parliamentary group always called for roll-call (yoklama) so that assembly would lose time before getting down to serious business. Proposing more than twenty proposals for a change in a single article and directing nearly hundred written question to minister of finance to answer, were other innovative means that the JP MP's excelled in. According to Ecevit, Demirel even criticized the then West German Christian Democratic Party leaders for giving a hand to Ecevit government.[133]

Just to score against the government, Demirel even did not hesitate to bring the military into the center of political discussion. In the first days of his government, Ecevit spoke of the existence of "Private War Office" (Özel Harp Dairesi) and claimed that though it was directed to deal with foreign threat, it was used, in crisis periods, in internal affairs. This was less than a prudent act on part of Ecevit. It is not that the existence of such institution was to be tolerated in the name of national security, but that he spoke in a sensitive issue without necessary proofs (as it later turned out to be). A prudent leader would either delve further into legal queries or would not accuse any state institution. Demirel had seized an opportunity to score against Ecevit by attempting to incite the army against the government.[134] Knowing that Ecevit would not be able to substantiate its claims, he accused Ecevit of slandering the army.

He also complained that the RPP was softening martial law through the establishment of "Martial Law Co-ordination Committee" (Sıkıyönetim Eşgüdüm Başkanlığı). Whether he seriously believed this charge is debatable. It seemed that Demirel thought this instance a good opportunity to sow the discord between the army and the RPP. Many cynics suggested that in this way Demirel (who appears to have believed that

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third NF government, would have been weakened.

[133] Cited in Duru, *Ecevit*.110.

[134] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri -Bir İkilemin Anatomisi* [The JP-Army Relationships, An Anatomy of a Dilemma] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), 142.

'the RPP plus army equaled power' formula was valid) was aiming at manipulating the army against the RPP. In fact, Ecevit had spoke of "martial law with human face" and asserted that despite the martial law democratic principles were not going to be sacrificed.[135] To this end, Ecevit revitalized the Martial Law Co-ordination Committee under prime minister's control to ensure "co-ordination" between military and civilian authorities. In fact, as General Evren noted, this institution was not new.[136] It had functioned in the 1971 martial law period. The difference was that Ecevit had changed its name. Its older name "koordinasyon" was replaced by new one "eşgüdüm." But opposition for the opposition sake suited Demirel well. Along the same lines, the JP, which had criticized government for delaying declaration of martial law now began to oppose the extension of it (required by the constitution) on the grounds that the government had diluted it. They claimed that the martial law court judges were not being appointed impartially, that martial law did not include ethnic separatism, and that martial law commanders were soft on terrorism.[137] Given the post-1973 sensitivity of Turkish military to keep itself in equal distance from all parties, these charges seems to be highly exaggerated.

The RPP leadership responded Demirel's destructive pattern of opposition in a similar way. Government-opposition relations were always strained; each leader exaggerating differences and accusing other for the ills of the country. In the process, government-opposition relations increasingly personalized. It increasingly became blurred whether the JP and RPP disagreed on some policies (which they did) or whether the disagreements increasingly derived from personalized Demirel-Ecevit conflict reminiscent of pre-1960 period in which Menderes-Bayar/İnönü conflict dominated the political arena. An interesting instance reveals how relations between these two men became strained.

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[135] *Hürriyet*, January 2, 1979.

[136] Evren, *Anılar*. 236.

[137] Arcayürek, *Müdahale*.82.

Journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek, who had contact with both leaders, prepared a kind of declaration that political leaders should unite against terrorism and in defense of liberal democratic order. While Ecevit accepted to undersign it, Demirel hesitated arguing that "this can be interpreted as dissimulation (muvazaa) prior to elections." After couple of hesitant days, he accepted the offer, but he undersigned another paper indicating he shared the views expressed in that paper, while Ecevit, who had promised to undersign the paper, did the same thing as if he had foreseen Demirel's action. [138]

There were serious warnings issued from various quarters of the society to major political party leaders urging them to be more responsible and more compromising. President Fahri Korutürk warned them at an early stage that "everybody should stop accusing each other. Do not put everybody to out of patience."[139] Journalist Nazlı Ilıcak warned both leaders:

> We wish Demirel and Ecevit to remember that they are not acrobats performing on one rope but two responsible leaders that control Turkey's fate. Because if anarchy continues at this pace, both are going to fall down and both we, spectators, and themselves are going to suffer harm that we can not correct.[140]

Professor Turan Güneş, an academic-turned- politician from the RPP, vividly expressed democracy's troubles and urged (reminiscent of Juan Linz's analysis of breakdown of democracy) both government and opposition to live up to their responsibilities in a speech made in TGNA. Güneş' speech deserves lengthy quotation:

> If our people begin to think that in the assembly so many people and so many parties sit idle, we, then will have a great difficulty in maintaining democratic order. Neither foreign powers nor illegal organizations (that kill innocent citizens and instigate terrorist events) can ruin our political regime and parliament. If anything can ruin political order, it is only us.[141]

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[138] Ibid., 254-260. Similarly, Demirel had sent a letter to President Korutürk to protest the stance of the RPP government when the JP MP of Urfa was attacked by Kurdish-separatists in his hometown. When Korutürk passed that letter on to Ecevit, who in turn answered Demirel's critiques, Demirel angrily answered back that the original letter was not for Ecevit. Since he did not accept him as "an addresse" (muhatap). (my italics). See, Süleyman Demirel, *Mektuplar*, 13-23.

[139] *Hürriyet*, April 24, 1978.

[140] *Tercüman*, April 4, 1978. "Bir İpte İki Cambaz" [Two Acrobats on a Single Rope]

[141] Turan Güneş, *Araba Devrilmeden Önce* [Before Car is Overturned] (İstanbul:Kaynak, 1983), 29.

But no to avail, major party elites continued to follow their own policy lines. Unending terrorism, mounting economic problems, several corruption scandals by cabinet members and destructive party politics all undermined Ecevit governments' popularity by the early months of 1979. Few believed that RPP government, which was characterized by internal divisions, lack of co-ordination and consistency, would be able to deal with country's problems.[142] The bulk of the press, which had supported the RPP government became increasingly critical of Ecevit. His government was blamed for indecision, uncoordination, lack of will and ability to press on terrorism and economic problems. Metin Toker of Hürriyet, who was also a member of Senate wrote that, "this country had had sometimes good sometimes bad government, but it had not so far had such a bad government, that even could not see how bad it was."[143] Uğur Mumcu of Cumhuriyet, exemplifying the socialist lefts' dissapointment[144] from the government, remarked that:

> If a government can not manage to be in power when in power, this result is inevitable! If a government can not make its security forces obey its orders, this result is inevitable. If a government watches the events as if it is in tribune (watching soccer), this result is inevitable. Government, that does not touch even an ant, wake up from that ignorance ! If you can not handle gangs that spread terror in İstanbul, resign in dignity. If people are killed like sheep (that are spared for sacrifice) when in you are in government,. and if your intelligence services cannot present a report of even a single line, it is you that are responsible ! Either you go, or do your job properly."[145]

It was not to be assumed on the other hand that opposition to Ecevit in the press was unanimous. Yankı, for instance, argued that unless a better alternative was found, which was not yet insight, they would continue to support the Ecevit government and

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[142] Parallel to the decline in its popularity, the government was shaken by the resignation of several cabinet members. Notable among them were interior minister Irfan Özaydınlı, (on January 2, 1979), defence minister Hasan Esat Işık (on January 14, 1979), minister of state Enver Akova (on May 30, 1979), work and social security minister Hilmi Işgüzar (on June 7, 1979).

[143] *Hürriyet*, August 19, 1979 "Geçim Değil, Seçim Ekonomisi" [Economic Policy not for Livelihood but for the Elections]

[144] CRWU, which had urged its members to support the RPP in the general elections of 1977, remained silent in 1979 by elections.

[145] *Cumhuriyet*, February 3, 1979. "Abdi İpekçi" [Abdi İpekçi]

regarded efforts to replace it as malevolent.[146]

The business community (particularly big business), which supported (with hesitation) the RPP government, made its opposition public after governments' approach to the economy seemed to be inconsistent and dangerous for themselves and the country. In its rather naive interpretation, Ecevit tended to see big business as an obstacles to be dealt with in its efforts to create a more equal society, especially after it began to raise its voice against government. Big business and industry were not happy with the governments' failure to end terrorism and its inability to take the necessary measures to put economy on track. The most organized and vocal business group, TIBA, indicated its opposition to the government through newspaper advertisements in the second half of the 1979.[147] Ecevit's reaction was overly sensitive.[148] According to Ecevit, these advertisements were well-timed in that it was published just when a breakthrough with the IMF was being obtained, to hinder governments effort to put economy on track. He threatened to take them to court for "being involved in politics." He called businessmen "exploiters" and said that "this government can not be killed as a result of such actions of businessmen. Even if it is killed no one shoulder the weight of funeral. The corpse of this government is stronger that the possible one (that would come to power as a result of businessmens efforts)."[149] It demonstrated that he had lost all hopes for a dialogue with the business community and

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[146] *Yanki*, July 2-9, 1979 "Aldatmacanın Yanındaki Gerçeklere Dikkat" [Watch out for Realities Behind the Trick]

[147] Business community as a whole, however, did not support TİBA. While Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ICI) supported it, the majority of Anatolian Chambers representing small business and artisans, were openly critical of it. Attila Eralp, "The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies," in *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, ed. Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sirman (London: Routledge, 1990), 322. For the cleavages within the private sector and prevalent disharmony vis-à-vis the Ecevit government, see, Henri J.Barkey, *The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder: Westview, 1990), 166-8

[148] Though not agreeing with the bulk of TIBA's critique, editorial in Yankı criticized Ecevit for being less than tolerant against a group that used the freedom to express its own views. *Yanki*, May 21-27, 1979 "İşadamları Ne İstiyor ?"[What do the Businessmen Want ?]

[149] *Hürriyet*, May 16, 1979. In 1985, Ecevit argued that these advertisements were published soon after he refused to allow the U-2 flights to take place. Cited in Arcayürek, *Müdahale*. 374.



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needed not to be conciliatory vis-a-vis them.

### 5.3. THE MILITARY VARIABLE

The military high command, like other socio-political groups and in interaction with them, came to share similar views that the RPP government, too, failed. The military's loss of confidence in the RPP government needs to be detailed since its failure signaled not only the failure of government in power which had an alternative, but the failure of the government with no realistic alternative.[150] If critical actors believed that there had been an viable alternative to the RPP, this might not have counted much. In democracies, the failure of one party in power does not necessarily mean the failure of the democratic system, as there are usually percevied alternatives. As Linz insightfully observed:

> the democratic system allows for a distinction between the system as a method of legitimization of authority and the people who exercise power for the time being (until the next election). Only when all the parties that sustain the legitimacy of a democratic system against an anti-system opposition (or oppositions) are also responsible for its efficiency is an acute loss efficiency likely to be detrimental to the legitimacy of the 'system.' [151]

But in the Turkey of 1979 no such an alternative, in the eyes of the critical actors, seemed to be in sight. The JP, which did not raise any great hope for democracy, was not strong enough to form a government alone. The possibility of a third National Front government was not even considered as a viable alternative. The only remaining alternative, it appeared, was, JP-RPP co-operation. But since, the animosities between these parties was well-known (they had accused of each other with the harshest of the words), this was a remote possibility. The RPP government was the hope for the democracy and since it had failed, and no promising alternative was in sight, very survival of the democratic regime was at the stake. Abdi İpekçi of Milliyet had very neatly summarized the situation:

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[150] In other words, in the *eyes of the critical actors* there seemed to be no viable alternative to the RPP government, except for possible RPP-JP coalition.

[151] Linz, *Breakdown*. 81. Similarly Dogan observed that "hostility towards the party in power is compatible with faith in the soundness of the democratic regime." Mattei Dogan, "The Pendulum Between Theory and Substance- Testing the Conceptions of Legitimacy and Trust," in *Comparing*

> Those, who thought that the situation would be better when the NF government resigned, are now disappointed. Their disappointment has increasingly led to widespread pessimism. Because, they tend to think that with the failure of an RPP dominated government, an only alternative to the NF, there are no democratic solutions. They are anxiously asking; 'what is going to happen ?'[152]

Obviously the military was preoccupied with the same question. It is during the RPP period that the military high command began seriously to think that an intervention might be necessary to uphold the integrity of the state and the country. In the following section we dwell on how the military came to the that point with particular attention paid to political party elites' contribution to it.

The peculiar characteristics of the Turkish military that determined its volition (predisposition) towards intervention in politics needs brief recapsulation. There is unanimous agreement among scholars[153]that the Turkish military perceives itself as the guardian of the Atatürk's principles -of republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and reformism/revolutionism- on which the Republican state is based. It is the chief state elite that assumes the role of watching over and protecting the Republican state and its philosophy, Atatürkism against external and internal enemies. The inculcation of Atatürkian principles starts from the very first day young students enter into the military schools. This socialization continues after graduation through a highly competitive selection process through which young officers promoted.[154] In that sense, the Turkish military did not need to develop what Alfred Stepan called "new professionalism" that emphasized not

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*Nations-Concepts, Strategies, Substance*, ed. Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 304.

[152] Milliyet, December 12, 1978. "What is going to happen ?" [Ne Olacak ?]

[153] Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic." *World Politics*. 11, (1958-1959); George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics I." *Middle East Journal*, 19, (1965); Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey." *Comparative Politics*. 16, (1983); Metin Heper, "The State, the Military and Democracy in Turkey." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*. 9, (1987); Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After the 1980s" in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

[154] James S. Brown, "Military and Politics in Turkey." *Armed Forces and Society*, 13, 2, (1987), 249. For an insightful account by journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, *Emret Komutanım* [Yes,

only military's traditional role against external enemies, but also the need to fight internal enemies, alongside the emphasis on national development and ideological warfare, a shift which, according to Stepan, was crucial in explaining military interventions in many Latin American countries. The Turkish military did not need to develop doctrine of "new professionalism" simply because, from very inception it had internalised such values.[155] A quotation from a former officer is telling in that respect:

> The education and training of the Turkish officers does not resemble to that of other armies. In these armies, officership is perceived as professional job same as that of civil servants. For us, on the other hand, it is held in high esteem, it is not only a professional job but also a national duty, and guardianship of the state. Trained with such beliefs in (army) schools, these officers spread these beliefs to their environment as move up the ranks, thus the duty to watch and to protect the Republic becomes an entrenched belief in their whole life in the army. When they deemed it necessary, to do that job (watching and protecting the Republic), either they spontaneously act or perform commands that tell them to intervene comfortably as if performing a normal duty.[156]

The military's well-entrenched guardianship role, in accordance with the principles espoused by Atatürk, has made a mixed (both negative and positive) contribution to the development and consolidation of democracy. On the one hand, inculcation with such principles has predisposed the army towards respect for civilian democracy and the tradition of not involving the military in the day-to-day politics. Mustafa Kemal, who witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the hands of young and ambitious officers who held the power after the first world war, appears to have appreciated the dangers of the army's involvement in mainstream politics. He therefore always urged officers to stay out of politics and to be obedient to civilian authority. His policy of non-involvement, however, did not mean that the army would serve any government properly elected with a total disregard to its policies, but that, while staying out of daily politics the army would always consider Atatürkian principles. His main concern, as Harris noted "with the army

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Commander] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1986).

[155] Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, second edition, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1976).

[156] Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular*, [Memoirs, Problems and Those Who are Responsible ] third ed. (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), 375.

was not to keep it out of politics, but to make sure it remained completely loyal to him and Republic."[157] It is for the fear of his rivals using the army against his ideals that Atatürk managed to insert article 24 of the 1924 Constitution which stipulated that "no person may be a deputy and hold office under the government at the same time." Nevertheless, his legacy of staying out of politics has been the most significant factor restraining the Turkish military to involve itself day-to-day politics.

The fact that the military valued democracy as an end in itself (a system of governance that a country ought to stick if it is to be regarded as civilized) is another positive aspect of Atatürk's legacy. As we discussed in chapter two, it was Atatürk who favored a rationalist conception of democracy. Inculcated by such values the military, too, understands and defends a rational conception of democracy. Democracy for them is not so much a means for reconciling various interests, but as a discussion process through which the best policy for the country was to be found. The military's voluntary tendency to return barracks after every intervention should be related with the positive legacy of Atatürk. "To reach a contemporary level of civilization," to be regarded as civilized nation, it is necessary to have democracy because only democratic countries are to be accorded such status. Therefore, Atatürkism worked as an obstacle for the establishment of long-term military dictatorship, though there existed a minority (who interpreted Atatürkism in this way) in the armed forces.[158]

On the other hand, Atatürkism was sometimes interpreted in a way that limited what elected majorities could do, which did not, at times, the requirements of democratic regimes well. The criteria with which elected majorities were criticized and overthrown were determined by according to the requirements of Atatürkism,[159] and it was the military

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[157] Harris, "role," 56.

[158] Turkey's long-standing commitments to NATO and European Union (which were the logical result of the westernization policies of Republic in the area of foreign policy) was another factor disposing the military return to barracks after every intervention.

[159] This can clearly be seen in a book that is taught at military academies. It is written there

itself which decided when these principles had been violated. In other words, "Atatürk's missionary role left the Generals with the task of deciding when they were entitled to infringe the equally Atatürkist rule that serving officers were not to be responsible for the government of the country."[160] Combined with the opposition which inclined to present any act of the government as a violation of Atatürk's principles, Turkish democracy survived (and broke down in 1960 and 1971) through tense times in which the military showed its restlessness on the grounds that the elected government was violating Atatürk's principles.

It is mistaken, however, to suggest that the Turkish military's interpretation of Atatürkian principles and its role in Turkish politics and society remains unchanged. Observers noted the Turkish army's tendency to learn from experience.[161] Its interpretation of both its role and the (interpretation of) principles that it professed to protect were not, subsequently once and for all, inflexible maxims. On the eve of the late seventies the military's interpretation of Atatürkism and the methods and usefulness of military interventions underwent some changes. Especially after the 12 March intervention "(the military's) role in the story thus became a secondary one"[162] Events leading to the 12 March intervention and military interregnum have shown, once again, that tolerance of junior level involvement in day-to-day politics carried the risk of dangerous division of the army as an institution, particularly if this division based on an ideology such as socialism. The division of armed forces through some ideologies meant the loosening of professional discipline and subsequent weakening of the army to perform its principal duty; protecting the state against internal and external enemies.

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that "unless, the Turkish revolution is in great danger, Atatürkism never opposed freedom of thought." Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi* [The History of Turkish 'Inkılap'] (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1973), 184.

[160] William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 161.

[161] Ibid.,166.

[162] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), 215.

The fact that civilians successfully resisted military men (appeared to have been favored by the military) in the presidential elections was also a loss of face for the military. As Evren indicated in his memoirs with the Gürler events "the prestige of the armed forces was bruised to a great extent."[163] One other reason might be that their traditional allies, the RPP and the intelligentsia was no longer enthusiastically backed them as they did previously. The military's somewhat secondary posture posed during the National Front governments, which seemed to question very values of Republican principles, should be explained by these factors. However, this does not mean, of course, that they approved (or remained indifferent to) it.

As we learn from Evren's memoirs,[164] the military high command, like large segments of society, greeted the Ecevit government with relief, despite having some doubts whether he would succeed or not. As he approvingly put, "in the eyes of the people, Ecevit (or Karaoğlan) was perceived as savior. He was a hope."[165] Indeed it was the case that like many in Turkish society the army, too, had had too much of the NF governments. Its politicization of the state institutions, the uncompromising attitude it showed in the case of Cyprus, which resulted in the American embargo that weakened the fire-power of the army and the existence of the NSP which questioned very basis of Atatürkian principles were reasons for the army's opposition.[166] It also appears that Kenan Evren personally liked Ecevit, but that does not mean that (as JP claimed) he was Ecevit's man.

The warm beginnings between the RPP and the military soon began to turn sour. Initially, as we pointed out in the previous chapter Ecevit had talked about the existence of counter-guerrilla organization attached to military which was not under the control of the

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[163] Evren, *Anılar*.159.

[164] To expose how the military perceived the situation in the country and subsequent actions it should take, we shall look at the military commanders' speeches appeared in the newspapers and written memoirs as well as our interview with General Kenan Evren.

[165] Evren. *Anılar*. 183.

[166] Ibid., 182.

civilian forces without presenting any evidence to substantiate his claims. Evren[167] obviously felt uneasy about Ecevit's act since it implied that the army tolerated illegal institutions in its body. The more serious disappointment related to the RPP government's handling of terrorism. Kenan Evren states that in National Security Council meetings they recommended to the government what they believed to be essential measures to deal with terrorism. Among the military's recommendations were; the establishment of State Security Courts, the prevention of politicization of security forces, particularly closure of police associations, changes in the laws concerning the police' rights and responsibilities and like.[168]

From the reading of his memoirs it appears that Kenan Evren came to the conclusion that Ecevit was soft on terrorism and Kurdish separatism in the South East. Ecevit had opposed a general search for guns in the South-East on the ground that "the gendarme could mistreat the people living there." Evren, on the other hand pointed out that this was not the reason for canceling such action if the anyone mistreats the people he can be punished.[169] Similarly Ecevit's appointment of Şerafettin Elçi as minister of public works made him angry.[170] Apparently in September 1978, Evren had given his realistic judgment on the RPP government. According to Evren's opinion, the government, too, was uncomfortable about increasing terrorism and tried to do something about it but:

> they cannot be impartial. They can not take necessary measures and can not strengthen intelligence and security services to make them more effective. ...They are bringing experts from England but can not implement their recommendations. Perhaps even more seriously they can not take legal coercive measures. They can not establish private courts (read state security courts). They do not see an increase in terror as the number one problem of Turkey.

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[167] Ibid., 186.

[168] Ibid., 197-8.

[169] Ibid., 207.

[170] Evren wrote that "The Ecevit government, that followed the principle of one vote is one vote, appointed Şerafettin Elçi, who is said to have been in collobaration with separatists, to the ministry of public works. Elçi, in turn, brought his own men the ministry. It was known that these men began to speak Kurdish in the corridors of the ministry." Ibid., 221-222.

They appear to have believed that with the passage of the time these could be prevented.[171]

The detailed analysis of this belief of Evren's is likely to enhance our understanding of what disturbed the military most, which specific conditions urged them to think of the possibility of intervention. From a careful reading of Evren's memoirs, it appears that the adverse effects of the politicization in the state institutions have very much undermined their belief in the state's ability to deal with the problem of terrorism. His memoirs are full of references to how he and his commanders perceived dangers of that phenomenon which paralyzed supposedly impartial state institutions. The declaration of martial law after the Kahramanmaraş incidents, allowed them to better evaluate the weaknesses of state apparatuses that was supposed to deal with terrorism, and appears to have sharpened their belief that the situation was more serious than they thought. The general commander of Gendermarie, for instance, was reported to have diagnosed the causes of Kahramanmaraş incidents as:

> The JP and NF governments have collaborated with the NAP and its affiliated organizations to come and stay in the power. They have prepared fertile ground that are conducive to partisanship for the militants both in administration and in schools. Thus, in that province, the militants of the NAP have dominated higher teacher schools and other educational institutions, alongside the Roads, Water and Electricity (Yol, Su, Elektrik-YSE) institution that provides services to villages, and an institution concerning the forestry and police. ...In the RPP's period, such institutions that have an ability to make an impact on the people's daily life, have been filled by the sympathizers of the opposite view. PA seized the police, while TTUSA controlled the education. ...it is my understanding that events resulted from the fact that this sense of rebellion created by partial administration that continued such a long time, came to the point of bursting.[172]

In another instance, martial law commander (of an area including Adana, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep) Nevzat Bölügiray complained about police partisanship in his own area:

> (after the killing of Chief Constable of Adana Cevat Yurdakul) more than 200 hundred police, many of them belonging to PA, in stark defiance of the state, have come to resist side by side the extremist-leftist workers. As a result of their resistance and rejection of work that

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[171] Ibid., 224.

[172] Ibid., 232-233. Similarly, Korkut Özal remarked that because of the partisanship of the RPP government, the Sünni population had come to support the NAP and that played a crucial role in the ensuing chaos. Nail Güreli, *Gerçek Tanık- Korkut Özal Anlatıyor* [The Real Witness-Korkut Özal Speaks] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1994), 107.

> is reminiscent of Janisssaries, Adana lacked total security on September 28 and 29, while people of Kahramanmaraş spent the day in fear of terror. One of the most important reasons for the persistence of terrorism in Adana is the fact that some part of the police, in fact, are involved in terrorist activities. [173]

More to the point they did not believe that there was the political will and strength to end the politicization of the security forces. They had witnessed how the NF parties had parceled out state bureaucracy. And now the RPP, let alone to preventing it was continuing the same practice.

The Ecevit government's failure was not the only reason for their weakening of the belief in democracy. It appears that the behavior of the opposition was as important. True they were not happy with the RPP government but they were equally uncomfortable with the JP, which did not offer a realistic alternative to the burnt-out RPP government. As noted above, the JP continued to repeat the traditional pattern of opposition in Turkey; to wear out the government, no principle, no promise, was regarded as sacred. Wearing out the government became such an overriding aim that, to this end parties committed several actions that undermined the very basis of democratic regime.

It is certain that a disturbingly opportunistic pattern of behavior observed particularly in the JP's leadership was surely one of the crucial reasons of military's coming to the conclusion that democratic system would not solve problems that it faced. For instance, Evren writes in his memoirs that "the opposition was happy that the terrorism continues with pace. (Because) they are eagerly waiting for (when the government fails) their time would come."[174] When Demirel criticized Martial Law Co-ordination Committee on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, Evren appear to have became furious. He wrote in his memoirs that Demirel did not abolish the institution when he became premier in 1979 and arrived at the conclusion that:

> Let alone support it, the opposition's aim is to fetter and to oppose every decision of the government in their struggle against terrorism. Because in their minds, opposition means to characterize "white" if the government says it is "black" even if it is black. The logic prevalent in

[173] Ibid., 292.

[174] Ibid., 229.

> our parties is this. They are not assessing from the point the point of view of whether it would be beneficial for the country or not. But they are trying (through demagogy) to convince people it is not.[175]

When this author asked General Evren whether he could single out the most important factor that led them to lose belief in the democratic system, Evren remarked that:

> The most important factor is the tendency of the government party (ies) to give every sort of concession to stay in the power and the tendency of the opposition party (ies) to regard every action as right and legitimate to bring down the government. ...We tend to understand opposition as to oppose every decision that the government takes. [176]

As Evren[177] states in his memoirs by July 1979, he had begun to think about the possibility of an intervention and wanted to have the views of other commanders in the high command. To repeate, political developments that brought Evren to this point can be stated (in his accounts) as follows: First, the RPP government had failed in its struggle against terrorism. It underestimated the magnitude of the problem and it could not take the necessary measures.[178] Therefore, if timely action was not taken the civil war was to be expected. Alongside the problem of terrorism, the government was not so successful in dealing with economic problems.[179] It should not be thought, however, that the economic

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[175] Ibid., 236. In another instance, when Demirel's complaints about the implementation of martial law was answered by Kenan Evren, Demirel accused Ecevit and the army of rejuvenating the formula of "RPP + army = power," Evren appears to have been very disturbed. He wrote that "our politicians still did not understand that such imputations does help neither the government nor the opposition. Now they want to make use of the armed forces for their ugly aims." Ibid., 250.

[176] Kenan Evren, Interview by the author. Marmaris, March 31, 1998. (Henceforth interview) These points have been expressed by seasoned observers of Turkish politics. Kamran İnan, a knowledgeable politician, for instance similarly argued that in the assembly (particularly in the expert commissions) "there always occurs a sharp division between government and opposition. Nobody seeks consensus even in the most critical and serious subjects as if it would be regarded as a shame. ....proposals put forward by the opposition are automatically rejected, irrespective of how just and fair they are. (Similarly), proposals of the government parties are automatically opposed. It is so strange that realities become a hundred percent different in the ten meters that separate the opposition benches from the ministers' seats. It is not easy to find similar politicians who in power argue and do the exact opposite of the what they said in the opposition." Kamran İnan, *Devlet İdaresi* [The Administration of the State] (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1993), 92.

[177] Evren. *Anılar*.276.

[178] Even the several ministers of the RPP government complained in the National Security Council meeetings about their inability to take necessary measures, see Ibid., 246-258. Knowingly or not they failed to appreciate what sort of impact their speeches might have on the commanders.

[179] Ibid., 277.

crisis was the predominant reason but rather economic problems further aggravated an already tense situation. Second, the viable alternative to Ecevit government was not insight. The possibility of second NF governments was a nightmare, but Demirel could not form a government alone. The RPP-JP dialogue[180] could have been the only way but since animosities between two party cadres was not well-known, this possibility seemed remote. Evren appears to have believed that if held, (which was difficult anyway because MP's would not take such a decision only two years after the election), an early election would not open the way towards stable and strong government.

Thirdly, General Evren worried that if they remained silent general division in the country could spread into the army. This was more so since the implementation of martial law had brought the army into close interaction with other civilian actors. The use of the army to provide internal law and order risked (as observed in other countries) the spreading of societal cleavages into the army. There occurred several events that reinforced the high commands' worries. Sabotage attempt at Savarona (Atatürk's private Yatch under the responsibility of the army), the increasing number of students that have to be expelled from military schools for being involved in political activities, the escape of Mehmet Ali Ağca (a person charged with killing Abdi İpekçi) from the military prison of Maltepe were among the most publicized ones.[181] Evren also told me that they had discovered (after the intervention) "that some officers at the rank of lieutenants (üsteğmen) and captains (yüzbaşı) had made preparations to participate with those under his command in the case of a possible communist takeover of government."[182] Evren also estimated that junior level officers could execute a coup by sidelining them. As he reported to have told the other commanders "I am receiving letters almost everyday

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[180] In October 1978, Evren wrote that (after President Korutürk and the CTWU urged for a grand coalition) the idea of a grand coalition as the only way out was beginning to occur in the military circles, too. Evren made this message clear in his 29 October speech. Ibid., 226-7.

[181] Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül.* 107-8.

[182] Kenan Evren, Interview.

from staff officers. I think you, too, are receiving such letters. I even suspect that secret organizations have been established within the army. If this state of affairs goes on like this, I fear another 27 May might happen."[183] Despite Turkish army's discipline, in the past young and ambitious officers had attempted to passed over their seniors and as in 1960 they succeeded.

It is also to be added that, with Ecevit's decline in popularity, Evren correctly assessed that and public opinion as well as Turkey's allies in the NATO were being more receptive than they had ever been towards any sort of military action to save the country from civil strife. We shall dwell on this point later. But it suffices to note here that he seemed to have been moved by visits of an MP (Celal Bucak from JP), and the president (and committee consisting of its various representatives throughout the country) of CSTA and another member of the second chamber (whose name Evren did not explain), persons who all have urged him to "do something" as well as unsigned letters that were sent to him by an ordinary citizens.[184]

General Evren ordered in September 1979 the establishment of a working group, under the chairmanship of second president of the chief of staff to assess "whether time was ripe for intervention, and or intervention or warning was the best option in this juncture."[185] He was quite anxious that if an intervention was to be conducted everybody should accept that no other possibility within the democratic system had been left untried.[186] Though cynics might rule that out as justification for the intervention, he seems to have been sincere when he worried about the possibility of military's involvement into politics:

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[183] Evren,*Anılar*.276. He also told me that as a commander "he was able to understand the reactions of lower cadres from their particular way of looking whether they were in favour of the policy you follow or not." Interview.

[184] Interview.

[185] Evren, *Anılar*.283.

[186] Similarly Hale noted that the high command "were determined to delay any intervention

> We occupy an important place in world affairs. Should we be like the countries in Latin America or Africa? Throughout the history, we have seen and experienced that how harmful the army involvement in politics might be. The most recent experience is 27 May revolution (ihtilal). We know what sort of (deplorable) situation the armed forces have found themselves in 27 May. Should we repeat the same pattern ?"[187]

Nevertheless as the guardian of principles of Atatürk and the state, Evren understood that they could not remain indifferent to it for long. But in that case, he believed, everybody should accept the legitimacy of the intervention as history have shown that an "intervention launched before the knife had cut through to the bone"[188] would do more harm than good.

While the high command was assessing what sort of action it should take, the country was preparing for a mid-term elections to fill one-third of the seats in the senate together with by-elections for five vacant seats in the lower house of the assembly. Elections were perceived as important for the future of the RPP government by political parties and public opinion at large. The result of elections spelled the end of the RPP government. It was a heavy defeat for the RPP. Its vote fell to 29 per cent from 41.4 per cent, while the JP's vote rose from 36.9 per cent to 46.8 per cent. The JP managed to gain all five seats (in the lower assembly) contested and 33 of 50 seats in the Senate. Though expected, only a few estimated that the RPP would face such a heavy defeat in the elections. Reflecting on the election defeat Ecevit said that the rise in the JP's vote might be a mathematical reality but it is not a sociological reality, he, then, resigned amidst the intra-party critiques directed to him. Thus, the period was came to an end. The ball was again on Demirel's court.

To sum up the main points in this chapter, the RPP government, seen as an hope for the future of democratic system (especially after the NF governments) failed to tackle pressing problems of law and order and economy. Its failure was more to do with its

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until there seemed to be no alternative and its legitimaqcy virtually unquestioned." Hale, *Military*.232.

[187] Evren, *Anılar*.277. In our interview Evren seemed to be particularly disturbed by the impact of the 27 May intervention on the army's hierarchy.

[188] Ibid., 262, 277.

misdiagnosis of the problems (be that in economy, terrorism, or foreign affairs) and subsequent political- administrative mismanagement (lack of co-ordination, inconsistency) rather than the gravity of the situation in the country. With the RPP government's failure, suspicions as to whether the democratic regime might survive for long increased as no viable alternative within the democratic system was in sight. It is at this point that the army, as the chief state elite and the guardian of republican state, seriously began to consider the possibility of military intervention.

The peculiar characteristics of the army high command necessitated that if intervention was to be executed as few people as possible should contest its legitimacy. To this end, they decided to push for (and made other actors to push it for as well) for a dialogue between parties, even if they suspected it would lead nowhere. While the regime's fate was not yet sealed, the process which would culminate in 12 September breakdown was set on course.

# CHAPTER VI: THE JUSTICE PARTY GOVERNMENT: THE MILITARY'S WARNING, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE MISSING OF THE LAST OPPORTUNITY, 1979-1980

The RPP government resigned as the 14 October partial senate and by-elections (for lower assembly) results showed a sharp decline in the party's popularity. The RPP's votes declined from 41.4 % to 29.1 % while the JP's votes risen from 36.9 % to 46.8 %. All the five seats contested (in the lower assembly) were captured by the JP. Ecevit's resignation took nobody by surprise. It was widely believed that the 22-month-long Ecevit government failed utterly to combat terrorism and economic crisis.

The ball was now in Demirel's court. In his resignation speech, Ecevit had already suggested that the JP should now try to form a government. There was a range of possibilities open to the JP leader Süleyman Demirel. He could form a third NF government. He could seek a grand coalition with the RPP. He could form a minority government with the outside support of the NSP and NAP. Or he could try to take the country to a general election. Since the experience of the second NF governments was all too recent to be forgotten Demirel ruled out the first possibility. If he could push to take the country to early general elections, the other parties were likely to oppose it since it was likely that, if elections were to be held, the JP would come first. He therefore had to rule out that possibility, too. Despite calls from all quarters of the society, he ruled out the idea of a grand coalition with the RPP. In fact, Ecevit, now in opposition, invited him to review the possibilities for forming a viable government. Demirel did not seriously consider this option. He had made it clear several times that he never thought that such coalition would have been viable arguing that such coalition was against the nature of things. In defending his action in an interview in 1986 Demirel explained (in addition his initial beliefs regarding such coalition) that if he had gone to Ecevit and said "Mr Ecevit you could not do it, please prop me up, and let's do it, or let's become partners in government, it

would have hurted Mr Ecevit's honor."[1] This appears to be less than convincing, designed to dispel his uncomprimising attitude, since he was the man who never called Ecevit as prime minister but head of government, who accused him in the most severe terms without ever thinking that it could hurt his honour.

He therefore sought the support of the NAP and the NSP, parties which once again came to wield disproportional (in relation to support achieved in polls) influence in Turkish politics. The two minor parties were more than happy to oblige. Though they did not have portfolios, they knew that, dependent on their support, Demirel would not be able to resist their partisan demands.[2] Since Ecevit made clear his willingness to co-operate with the NSP, which in turn strengthened Erbakan's hand while weakening Demirel's bargaining potential. The NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan expressed it well when he said they were supporting government repugnantly (kerhen) giving the message to (both Demirel and Ecevit) that he might withdraw support at any time.

The new government was a far cry from creating hope in the country. It was not seen as a government that might successfully tackle the problem of terrorism and economic crisis and might generate a new hope for troubled democratic system. Critics have pointed out that it was not a strong government that Turkey needed at this critical moment. As Metin Toker of Hürriyet asked:

> How would Erbakan be convinced in Cyprus issue ? Who would prevent the CRWU's excessive demands (likely to be encouraged by Ecevit) in the incoming collective wage bargainings ? Is it possible in an effort towards strenthening the state, the handling of opposing forces can be dealt with martial law alone, especially in the face of the RPP's screams that 'now, fascism arrived' ? Is it even possible that a government which is under fire from all sides could put the economy on a sound basis, to deal with an inflation that necessitates painful measures ?[3]

Even Nazlı Ilıcak of Tercüman was very cautious about governments chances of success. She wrote that:

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[1] Reported in Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor 10, Demokrasi Dur* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-10, Democracy Stop] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 469.

[2] The JP minority government was able get 229 votes, only three more than required 226 votes.

[3] *Hürriyet*, November 11, 1979. "Kurultayın Hükümeti" [Government designed by Party Congress]

> Of course Demirel has to say that he will achieve. His government can alleviate some problems. It can even create optimism for a couple of months. But unless you are a partisan, it is very difficult to argue that this government can cope with the tremendous problems of the country.[4]

The combined strength of the JP and other parties that supported coalition was just enough to secure a majority in the assembly. And it was not at all clear that these two parties would support the government when it needed their support in the assembly. It was known that the NAP and particularly NSP, even when in coalition, had blocked many proposals that the JP brought forward. They had behaved "as if they were in opposition."[5] Now it was not very realistic, to say the least, to expect them to provide support to a government they were supporting "repugnantly."[6] But at this point, the advantages of being in power as well as his desire to prevent another RPP led government appears to have led Demirel to ignore these considerations. Defending his decision in 1986, Demirel asserted that a party can not reject an opportunity to come to power because in that case its supporters would ask it why it did not take that opportunity.[7] Regarding his thin majority in the assembly, Demirel argued that "as long as you have enough seats to keep the government in power, to have 100 extra seats does not mean anything. You can do what you want to do. As long as you have a majority to take decisions, to look for extra support does not provide additional strength."[8] As perceptively

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[4] *Tercüman*, November 11, 1979. "Azınlık Hükümeti" [The Minority Government] Not all commentators were pessimistic, however. Aydın Yalçın of Yeni Forum, for instance wrote that the government's chances to prevent terrorism was much higher than it was two years ago. He pointed out that the RPP had put some distance between itself and ultra-left, and the JP's relations with the army was in much better condition now than it ever has been. *YeniForum*, December 1, 1979, n.6, "Anarşi Durdurulabilir mi ?" [Can Anarchy be Stopped ?] Similarly an editorial in Yankı noted that Demirel may succeed, if he seeks compromise with the RPP. It arrived at such conclusion after noting that the RPP was in no position to mount effective opposition to the JP government and constitutional institutions (read army) were ready, more than they have ever been, to work with the party. *Yankı*, 26 November-2 December, 1979. "Demirel Şanslı Başlıyor" [Demirel has a Lucky Start]

[5] Anna O. Krueger and İlter Turan, "The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reforms in the 1980's," in *Political & Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform*, eds. Anna O. Krueger and Robert H. Bates (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 340.

[6] As Erbakan indicated one of the reasons why the NSP supported the government was that they wanted the nation to see neither the RPP (which had just resigned) nor the JP could solve Turkey's problems. *Hürriyet*, October 24, 1979.

[7] Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*.470.

[8] Ibid., 469.

noted by Metin Toker of Hürriyet he confused "the idea of a majority that is enough to form a government with a majority that is strong enough to deal with Turkey's problems."[9]

Despite these (percevied) initial weaknessess, the JP government sincerely directed all its energies towards the prevention of the terrorism, and then economic problems. Unlike Ecevit, Demirel appreciated how serious the problem of terrorism was, though he, too, heightened expectations by promising that within 100 days, there would not be any liberated zones. He was also ready to push for harsh measures as he believed that the way out of the problem of the terrorism was to "get the state to regain its democratic authority."[10] In the first martial law coordinaton committe meeting he promised the commanders to provide "further authority if necessary, newer and better weapons if necessary, money if necessary, new cadres if necessary."[11] He argued they should extinguish the fire, because the martial law is the last device that the state had.[12]

But in politics good-will alone does not guarantee success. The JP government was not strong enough to take concerted measures to deal with terrorism. In the meeting, the martial law commanders came up with a detailed package, which was basically same as that presented to the RPP government. One part of this package involved the enactment of some laws and changes in others. Chief among these were; the enactment of law of extraordinary ordinances, the establishment of "judicial police" (adli kolluk), changes in both criminal and criminal procedure laws that would increase authority of security forces, changes in Turkish Criminal Law (TCL) that would make punishment[13] harsher, the enlargement of the security

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[9] *Hürriyet*, December 16, 1979. "Bu da Demirel Marka Laf Üretimi" [This is Another Empty Utterance of Demirel's]

[10] Süleyman Demirel, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* [Verbatim Report of the TGNA Debates] Birleşim 7, Oturum, 3, 22.11. 1979.

[11] Cited in Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 300.

[12] Ibid., 300.

[13] They wanted, for instance, that the punishment for the propaganda of ethnic separatism (article 142 of TCL) should be made more severe.

forces' right to use weapons, changes in martial law that would enable martial law courts to look at those cases related to illegal sale of weapons and the like.

The other package was related to administrative measures that would ensure prompt, efficient and impartial functioning of the state machine. These included; the strengthening of police forces in terms of quantity and quality through better education, the use of new tools and better wages as well as ending the prevalent partisanship, the betterment in intelligence gathering and evidence evaluation services, and the better protection of prisons.[14]

### 6.1. THE WARNING LETTER

The fulfilment of these measurements, many (including the high ranking officials in the military) believed, was beyond the reach of the minority government of the JP. The enactment of new laws or changes in existing laws required the full compliance of the NAP and the NSP, while the RPP was likely to block them. Understandably, the ending of politicization and partisanship was all the more difficult. In the first place it was difficult for Demirel to take such a line, even if he wanted to. Since patronage-oriented Turkish political parties' well-being depended heavily on support they provided to their clients. A problem with a deep roots in social-political structure of the country, this could hardly be changed in the short-term. Besides the NAP and the NSP would oppose (especially when it affected their clientele) such move. The betterment of security forces required not only a good will but also financial means which the government could hardly afford as the economy was also in tatters. Thus, the vicious circle of politicization and partisanship continued unabated. The first serious action of the JP government was to change 67 of the 67 province governors followed by the change of 52 chief of police (emniyet müdürü).[15]

Believing that the JP government could hardly cope with the pressing problems, the military high command decided to do something. This was not only because that they saw themselves as the ultimate guardian of state, but also because Evren was seriously worried

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[14] For that package, see, Evren, *Anılar*. 301-306.

[15] *Hürriyet*, December 4, 1979.

about junior officers executing a 27 May like intervention, as noted above. The working group that Kenan Evren established to assess whether an intervention might be necessary or not presented its report, according to Evren, before Ecevit's resignation.[16] This supported the view that, with the RPP's government's failure, the military's belief in the civilian regime's ability to deal with pressing problems had been much weakened. Demirel's decision to go alone only reinforced their that belief, as they come to such a conclusion without bothering to see how the minority JP government would perform in government.

According to Evren, the report stated that unless the military tookover the reins of government and abolished the assembly, anarchy and separatism could not be prevented and the country would drift into civil war with a resultant division of the country. [17] It also warned that the more such a state of affairs continued, the more the armed forces were likely to drift into civil war and faced the risk of being divided. The peculiar preferences of the high command, however, affected to a significant degree what course of action the military would pursue. It was noted above that General Evren was determined that the military would not move unless knife cut through the bones. He then preferred to wait. He told me that these reports were prepared by somewhat young officers who were much more "reckless" than senior ones implying that he did not take these reports at face value. He also added that:

> only those, who happen to have been in a position to decide whether to stage a takeover or not, are likely to know how difficult such a decision is to take. It is not an easy thing. You take all responsibility of the state with its economy, foreign policy, internal and external security, all of it. And it is not in our area of competence. Therefore we have resisted not to take over for a long time.[18]

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[16] Evren does not give an exact date. Given that he claimed to have ordered the establishment of such group in 11 September 1979, it seems that this report was prepared fairly quickly, in less than one month. In our interview, Evren told me that he can not remember the exact date.

[17] Evren, *Anılar*.296.

[18] Kenan Evren, Interview by Author. Marmaris, March 31, 1998. (henceforth interview). In fact, even those who did not like some of Evren's post-intervention policies accepted that he had never been one of these ambitious officers who craved for a military intervention. Turgut Sunalp, the leader of the Nationalist Democracy Party which (while seemed to be favored by the military) lost the 1983 elections, and blamed the military high command led by Evren afterwards for not giving enough support for his party, argued that "Evren was not a Pinochet." According to Sunalp, Evren had never shown any great interest in politics during the turbulent years in which many of his colleagues were involved in a variety of plots. Sunalp continued that Evren has led the 12 September intervention, because he had to as there was no way out for the country. See, *Milliyet*, August 17, 1989. Similarly, retired officer Osman Köksal, who was a member of the National Unity Committee established after the 1960 intervention, was reported to

He wanted that the necessity (and therefore legitimacy) of the intervention should have been accepted by as wide spectrum of society as possible. Evren appears to have been seriously concerned that the army in his command should not commit what seemed to him past mistakes. He had witnessed how the legitimacy of the 27 May intervention has been questioned by political parties. And how the subsequent portrayal of 27 May intervention as solely against the DP created divisions in the country. Similarly, he had learned from 12 March experience that, if the decision to intervene is taken, the military should be clear in its aims and prepare a detailed program of how to execute it and it should not trust major political parties to work out that program.[19]

Therefore to be able to say that they had tried everything possible the military high command decided to issue a letter to warn all political parties and constitutional institutions. That this was so clear can be gathered from Evren's memoirs. There, Evren stated that after the preparation of the letter he had told other commanders in the high command that; "I am not of the opinion that this letter would secure any tangible progress. As you will see nothing will change. Nevertheless, we should perform our duty so that history will not criticize us."[20] According to Evren animosities between political parties in the assembly had reached such horrific proportions that they just could not expect them to unite with that letter. Evren nevertheless, did not forget to add "I was not totally hopeless. I could think that out of the fear of intervention they might unite."[21]

The letter was given to President Fahri Korutürk. How it would be presented to the public was left to Korutürk's discretion. Evren did not want the letter to be read on state radio

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said that (in 1978 when Evren became the chief of general staff) Evren did have neither a political ambition nor favored military intervention in politics. Cited in Uğur Mumcu, *Inkılap Mektupları* [The 'Inkılap' Letters] fifteenth ed. (İstanbul: Tekin, 1995), 157.

[19] According to rumours, some officers in the high command were not as patient as Evren and wanted quick action. We do not have any evidence to sustain that claim. Even if that is the case, Evren appears to have convinced them. And in the final analysis the military high command as a whole appears to have shared Evren's this belief.

[20] Evren, *Anılar*. 330. He reiterated same view in our interview.

[21] Ibid., 333.

and television, a practice followed in the 12 March intervention. President Korutürk decided to not make the letter known before the new year. According to Evren's account, Korutürk did not want to spoil new year celebrations both at home and abroad.[22] The letter, which was made public on January 2, stated that:

> our nation can no longer tolerate those abusers of freedoms provided by the Constitution who sing the communist international instead of our national anthem, those who try to establish every kind of fascism in our country instead of democratic system and those instigators of Islamic law, anarchy and desctructionism and secessionism.

It added that:

> The employment in the statecraft of those who act according to the political views if their respective parties in power that hire them will inevitably divide the civil servants and citizens. This division created by political parties causes the formation and strengthening of domestic sources that support anarchy and secessionism and discrimination among the police, teachers and many other establishments as opposing camps which are each others' enemies.

Therefore, it continued:

> The Turkish armed forces have decided to warn those political parties which could not introduce solutions to the political, economic and social problems of out anarchy and separatism that have grown to dimensions threatening the integrity of the country. They have given concessions to the secessionist and subversive groups and continued their intransigent attitude as a result of unfruitful political bickerings.

After noting that commissions in the assembly had been formed 1,5 months after the elections and still there was no consensus on the agenda for the discussion of urgent problems in the assembly, letter concluded:

> In the face of today's vital problems in our country, the Turkish Armed Forces, fully conscious of its duties and responsibilities ensured by the Internal Service Code, hereby persistently demand all our political parties' to unite in the direction of the principles of the Constitution and Kemalism by taking into consideration and giving priority to our national interests, in order to take every measure against all sorts of movements such as anarchy, terrorism and secessionism aiming at the destruction of the state, and all other constitutional institutions extend efforts and assistance to this end.[23]

The letter was as clear as it could be. It stated the army's uneasiness regarding the

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[22] Ibid., 334. According to Evren, Korutürk had told him that if they had had the letter read on the radio, he would have resigned. Ibid., 333.

[23] For the full text, General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) (a body formed after the intervention and distinct from the National Security Committee 'Milli Güvenlik Kurulu' as functioned under democratic system) *12 September-Before and After*(Ankara: Ongun, 1982), 160-161.

terrorist and separatist events (those who aimed at the establishment of fascist or communist states) and the fact that the state could not punish those abusers of freedoms. It complained about reigning politicization of state institutions. It also complained about the fact that "parties have given concessions" to secessionist and subversive groups and continued their "intransigent attitude as a result of unfruitful political bickering." It warned all political parties and other constitutional bodies to unite in the face of pressing problems and reminded all the sides concerned that the Turkish armed forces were "fully conscious of its duties and responsibilities ensured by internal service code" a code that in the past used by the military to secure "legality" for its interventions.

President Korütürk called two party leaders to Çankaya and presented the letter to them there. The leaders' response to the letter was a gross disappointment for the public opinion and other elites but not the military. As Evren expected, nothing came out of it. The RPP leader Bülent Ecevit, totally ignoring the gravity of situation, did try to get a political benefit for his own party. He argued that:

> ...the RPP has never, whether in power or in opposition, received a warning of such magnitude (from the armed forces). But this government came to receive such a warning after only its 51st day in power. This shows the difference between us and them.[24]

Ecevit, then reiterated his calls for a dialogue (that he remembered only when his party was in opoosition) between the two major parties. The JP leaders' reaction was more balanced. Demirel argued that they had not built this fire, and they were taking pains to extinguish it. Therefore, he continued, "I can understand it if the existing government were the cause of current events or such an allegation were leveled at us. But it is not possible to interpret it like that."[25] As they had done what could be done in 35 days. Demirel chosen to behave as if his party had not governed since 1973 and as if its power to affect the course of events when in opposition was totally insignificant.

According to Evren's account Demirel sent defence minister Ahmet Birincioğlu to General Evren and let him know that he was seriously considering resignation. Evren explained

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[24] *Milliyet*, January 3, 1980.

[25] *Milliyet*, January 3, 1980.

(to Birincioğlu) that this letter was not a warning issued to government but to all political parties and constitutional bodies. He assured him that the situation then did not necessitate resignation,[26] and it might even help them if it could move the opposition to support the government in the assembly. Evren, then, visited Demirel and reiterated the view that the letter was directed, not at the governing party, but at all political parties and constitutional bodies. In interview, Evren said that he had told Demirel that "the letter was a warning to all parties. We know that you are not directly responsible for this state of affairs because you assumed power just a month ago and this letter even might help you in the assembly if it affects the opposition to take more constructive stance."[27] After that meeting Demirel told the Justice Party group that "he had been assured (in his meetings with president and the chief of general staff) that the letter was not directed to government."[28] In 7 and 9 January Demirel again came together with commanders. There, according to Evren's account, commanders complained of partisanship and increasing terrorism and urged Demirel to seek co-operation with the RPP. But while Demirel agreed with commanders regarding the gravity of the situation and what sort of measures should be taken to prevent them, he did not say a word on cooperation with the RPP.[29]

From this point on, the letter was left to sink into oblivion. The RPP leader Ecevit continued his calls for a dialogue while, Demirel resisted such demands, though he met Ecevit a couple of days later with no tangible agreement. Regarding the letter, Demirel seems to have to assumed that since his party was trying to do what the commanders asked for, the burden was on the shoulders of the opposition to support the bills in the assembly. Therefore, he pretended

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[26] Evren, *Anılar*. 341.

[27] Interview.

[28] *Milliyet*, January 5, 1980.

[29] After the meeting Evren noted (in his memoirs) that "What Demirel says is very good. He agrees to nearly all of our proposals. But he did not say anything on the JP-RPP co-operation, despite the fact that Ecevit has several times offered such cooperation. I think that this state of affairs can not go long. Because, what we want can not be fulfilled with outside support of the NAP and the NSP." Evren, *Anılar*. 345.

to behave as if his party was somewhat relieved of the burden of the letter.[30] According to an argument, President Korutürk had "played down the chances of a coup, thus giving the premier the firm impression that there was no such danger."[31] Though we do not know what really happened betwen these two, this appears to be an exaggeration. Instead, it is more to the point to argue that Demirel preferred to give such an impression so as to justify his own policy line which was based on the refusal of any dialogue with the RPP and continuation of his minority government.[32] Not only because the wording of the letter indicated "all political parties" but also the commanders made it clear that, if he tried to go alone without ensuring the support of the RPP, his government might not be successful. What the country needed was more than a handful of laws to combat the anarchy and terrorism, but all-out effort to cope with grave situation, one that many, including the military believed that it could hardly be achieved with a minority government. As Oktay Ekşi of Hürriyet perceptively noted, the country was governed by two major parties since 1973 therefore they could not relieve themselves of the responsibility by arguing that they had been in government for only a month (in the case of the JP) and /or they are not in power (in the case of the RPP). Ekşi, then, argued that "...nobody should deceive himself. It is you that the letter is adressed to. You, political leaders and members and administrators of the constitutional bodies."[33] No to avail, party elites ignored all these arguments behaved as if they had been

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[30] Nazlı Ilıcak, too, wrote that "this warning rather directed to opposition." Nazlı Ilıcak, *Tercüman*, January 3, 1980. "Mini-Muhtıra" [Mini- Warning]. Even in 1990, Demirel could write that he had believed that the letter reflected uneasiness of the military for the failure of the martial law and "that there was nothing in the letter that had been directed to themselves." Süleyman Demirel, *Anı Değil İtiraf* [Confessions, not Memoirs] (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1990), 49.

[31] William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 235.

[32] He was reported to have said to Arcayürek that "it is the feeling of faintness (on the part of the high command) with the martial law that did not bring success despite more than one year, that prepared the way for the letter." Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor- 9, 12 Eylül'e Doğru Koşar Adım* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-9, Rushing Towards 12 September ](İstanbul: Bilgi, 1986), 363.

[33] *Hürriyet*, January 4, 1980 "Muhatap" [To Whom the Letter is Adresssed to]. In the same line, Örsan Öymen, too, criticized party leaders for trying to avoid the burden of the letter. Örsan Öymen, "Tasada Ortaklık" [Partnership Concerning Troubles], *Milliyet*, January 4, 1980.

relieved of the burden of the letter [34]

Thus, the letter was left without an effect. As amiable politician İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil was reported to have said "both those who gave and received the letter were happy, only worried ones were those who read the letter!"[35] Only couple of weeks later, politics in Turkey was being conducted same as before, as if the military had not warned them by reminding that they "are fully conscious of its duties and responsibilities ensured by the internal service code."[36] Post-letter developments reinforced the military's belief that the civilian governments was unable to provide solutions. It may be speculated that since the commanders did not expect much from the letter they did not push too much in making it to have an effect. Indeed it was issued, as Evren honestly indicated, to enable them (in the case of intervention) to say that they did everything possible. It was also the case, as indicated above, that Evren personally assured Demirel (who was inclined to interpret the letter as warning to opposition) the situation did not require resignation as the letter was not directed to the JP alone. While this argument involved some elements of truth, it should also be considered that the commanders can not be expected to openly say that 'if you are not going the way we showed we are going to intervene.' That would have been another 12 March-like intervention that the high command did their best to avoid.

What was called the package of measures, prepared by the JP government was brought

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[34] This opportunism of political party leaders appears to have been well-noticed by the military. In a book prepared by General Secretariat of National Security Council this is stated as follows; "One of the parties made an effort to pass a 'package of measures', most of which was prepared by the former government, through the asseemblies under the pretext of the letter. The other one meanwhile, was taking advantage of the letter as an opportunity to become a coalition partner in order to regain the prestige it had lost in the elections, without expressing its views on the whole of this legislation." General Secretariat, *12 September*.164.

[35] Cited in Arcayürek, *12 Eylül*.356.

[36] Journalists seemed to possess a more realistic understanding of the situation. Çetin Emeç of Hürriyet, for instance, argued that that they should leave aside the question of whom the letter was adressed to since everybody had a share of responsibility in the making of such a state of affairs. Implying that, if this continued, the army would not stay silent, he finished his writing reminding everybody that postman knocked twice. *Hürriyet*, January 7, 1980 "Postacı Kapıyı İki Defa Çalar" [The Postman Knocks Twice]. On the other hand, Yankı's editorial wrote that "there is not even a little inclination among the commanders today towards intervention." *Yankı*, 21-27 January, 1980, "Ecevit ve Demirel Sık Sık Görüşmeli" [Ecevit and Demirel should Frequently Come Together].

into assembly in post-letter dialogue atmosphere. The package of measures included the enactment of new laws and changes in the existing bills favoured by the military. In the inital stage none of the political actors dared to be seen as uncomprimising. In the process of their being enacted, the persisting habits of Turkish political life, once again, showed themselves. The RPP opted for a strategy that, while giving an appearance of supporting it, actually hindered its actual enactment. This the party had done through introducing in the legislative process new motions aiming at insertion or deletion of articles, usually of minor importance. True to tradition, the RPP leadership assumed that whatever was deemed to benefit the government was to be interrupted by any means, even if had they introduced the same motion.[37] Like what the JP had done in opposition, they did everything at their disposal to prevent government from passing these laws.[38] The RPP leaders did not seem to understand the fact that "it was not only the the bough that the JP sits on that was on the brink of collapse but also a tree named democracy. If that happens, the RPP, too, would not remain on its foot."[39] This stance on the part of the RPP impeded already very slow legislative process.[40]

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[37] One of the reasons for Ecevit's opposition to package of measures appears to have derived from his less than realistic views on the prevention of terrorism that, it seemed, continued despite his 22 months of premiership. In a seminar organized by Journalists Associations (Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) to discuss terrorism in Turkey, Ecevit, who was at least expected to make some positive remarks on the hotly debated package of measures in the assembly, did not even mention it. He said that the "in coping with terrorism, alongside the social and/or state measures, (sosyal ve devlet önlemleri) priority should be given to solving it in people's minds, and souls." He then criticized Turkish novelists and artists for not dwelling on the theme of terrorism. He urged them to produce novels, plays that "would easily be understood by those who resorted to terrorism, who became an instrument of it, and that would allow them to see themselves." "Alongside this function of demonstration, it should", he continued, "also try to erase the sources and causes of terrorism in their mind and soul." Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, *Türkiye'de Terör-Abdi İpekçi Semineri* [Terror in Turkey- The Abdi İpekçi Seminar] (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1980), 30, 32.

[38] To be fair to the assembly, some parts of the package of measures was accepted. See, *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], "Kamu Güvenliğine ve Kolluk Hizmetlerine İlişkin Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması ve Bunlara Yeni Hükümler Eklenmesi Hakkında Kanun" [A Law Regarding the Changes and Additions of New Provisions to the Laws Related to Public Security and Security Services] n. 16909, (Ankara: Prime Ministry, February 23, 1980). But the parties could not agree on such vital parts of the passage as the establishment of State Security Courts and the changes in the Martial Law.

[39] *Tercüman*, February 10, 1980, Güneri Civaoğlu, "Sıkılmaktan da Sıkıldık" [We are Bored with Being Bored]

[40] Unfortunately, we do not have an academic study on the functioning of the lower assembly. For an acute observations of insider, Turan Güneş, *Araba Devrilmeden Önce* [Before the Car is

The NSP, on the other hand, went far more than the RPP in ingenuity. The NSP had provided its support for the Demirel government. But they have made it clear that it was a provisional support. Erbakan was quite determined to walk a tightrope road. He exploited Demirel's reliance on him, while flirting with Ecevit that they could form a government together. He frequently argued that "kadayıfin altı kızarmadı" (Kadayıf -a Turkish sweet- is not yet ready for service) meaning that they are not yet going to withdraw their support from the government. He, therefore, provided to be another hindrance. It was not the opposition alone, however, that blocked legislative process. Even some members of the JP failed to turn to the assembly in the crucial meetings.[41]

While package of measures were being debated in the assembly, the JP government was taking pains to right the economy as well. The inability of the RPP government on the stabilization package made the implementation of painful measures, (demanded by the international economic organisations) all the more urgent. The overall economic situation continued to deteriorate. Alongside the accelarating rate of inflation, "foreign exchange reserves were non-existent and the government was heavily in arrears on foreign debt."[42] While, as table showed, industrial unrest mounted followed by factory shutdowns as a result of the difficulties in importing.

Table 12. Number of Strikes and Workdays Lost, 1975-1980 [43]

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of strikes | 90 | 105 | 167 | 175 | 190 | 227 |
| Num.of workers in strike | 25389 | 32899 | 59889 | 27208 | 39901 | 46216 |
| Workdays lost in strikes | 1102682 | 1768202 | 5778205 | 1598905 | 2217347 | 5408618 |

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Overturned] (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1983), 31-35

[41] Nazlı Ilıcak, for instance, wrote that "Gentlemens, cancel your appointment with the tailor or dentists leave aside afternoon sleep and personal business so that you could say that the draft bill is being hindered by the RPP and the NSP." *Tercüman*, January 17, 1980, "Tasarıyı Kim Engelledi ?" [Who Prevented Draft Bills Being Legislated ?]

[42] Krueger and Turan, "Turkish," 351.

[43] T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *Türkiye İstatistik Yıllığı, 1983* [Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1983]. (Ankara: DİE, 1983), 208.

What was known as the 24 January measures was taken by the government in that dire situation. These measures were not discussed in cabinet so as to prevent lobbying by the powerful special interests. Even cabinet ministers have became aware of the program only on January 24.[44] The real architect of the measures was Turgut Özal (an undersecretary of the State Planning Organisation) and his small team. While, the government played down the IMF connection, it was clear that Özal and his team established and maintained informal relations with them.[45] The immediate objectives of the program were to restore the economic growth and to control the spiralling inflation and to overcome balance of payment crisis. The program, however, differed from those of 1978- and 1979 stabilization programs in that it was a first step of replacing the import substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) with an export-oriented one.[46] The main objectives of the the new stabilization package were; a reduction in government involvement in productive activities and an increased emphasis on market forces, and the attraction of foreign investment.[47] It involved devaluation of the Turkish lira vis-à-vis the US dollar by 33 per cent with the announcement that afterwards flexible exchange rate policy would be followed so as to maintain attractiveness of exports. Several subsidies on fertilisers and petroluem products were reduced followed by the removal of price controls on most state economic enterprise's (SEE) products. While the import regime was liberalized to a considerable extent, the government introduced new incentives for the exporters. Moreover, it also made institutional changes within the economic bureaucracy. In retrospect, it can be said that it was courageous attempt to put the economy on track. The fact

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[44] Krueger and Turan, "Turkish," 354.

[45] Colin Kirkpatrick and Ziya Öniş, "Turkey," in *Aid and Power & The World Bank Policy Based Lending*, vol 2, ed. Peter Mosley, John Horrigan and Jack Toye (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1991), 13.

[46] Krueger and Turan, "Turkish," 356. Indeed, the JP election manifesto for 1973 election promised that ISI, which was taken as dominant critera in the third five year development plan, would be replaced by a new export oriented one. Adalet Partisi, *AP Seçim Beyannamesi-1973* [ The JP Election Manifesto- 1973] (Ankara, 1973), 40.

[47] OECD, *Economic Surveys: Turkey* (Paris: OECD, 1980), 24.

that the minority JP government dared to take such unpopular measures can be interpreted as the proof that its decision-making ability was not that low.[48] But it should not be forgotten that Demirel attempted to take these measures only when he became convinced that there remained absolutely no way out other than taking the painful pill.

The RPP leader Bülent Ecevit harshly reacted these measures. As a social democrat who believed the intrinsic superiority of the visible hand of the state over the invisible hand of market, he criticized the program for increasing Turkey's dependence to international capital, opening up country's resources to foreign exploitation, economic anarchy and chaos and limiting social welfare rights of the majority of the population. According to Ecevit, "(with these measures) the government was trying to implement a Latin American model."[49] He believed that under a democratic system these measures did not have a realistic chance of being implemented, and suspected that an authoritarian regime, to better implement the measures, might follow. He, then, called workers to rise up against the implementation of these measures. Thus, 24 January measures ended what remained of the post-letter dialogue atmosphere in the assembly.

Meanwhile, the terrorism continued to increase. On the one hand, it targeted well-known figures. In 19 November 1979, the NAP sympathizer journalist İlhan Darendelioğlu was killed. The next day, Istanbul University Professor Ümit Yaşar Doğanay was killed. In 7 December another Professor (Cavit Orhan Tütengil) at Istanbul University was killed. On the other hand, violence in the streets and universities continued and spread into factories in which various factions competed for control. Moreover, in the face of striking absence of state authority, the number of "liberated zones" (an area exclusively controlled by one faction) increased considerably. Even moderates and impartial citizens had to bow and accept the

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[48] "Demirel Shakes the Ground" was the The Economist's reaction. *The Economist*, February 2, 1980. "Demirel Shakes the Ground."

[49] *Milliyet*, January 30, 1980. He also said that "Grey-wolves control the streets while the economy is also controlled by wolves" (Sokaklar bozkurtlara, ekonomi kurtlara bırakılıyor.) See, the collection his speechess concerned largely with economic situation after 24 January measures, Bülent Ecevit, *Sömürü Düzeninde Yeni Aşama* [A New Stage in the Order of Exploitation] (Ankara: İleri, 1980), 121.

authority of one side, simply because they faced the stark choice of being killed or removed from the area in question.

The fact that the martial law in many provinces did not seem to be effective to cope with terrorism, led many[50] to argue that the military, preparing for a total takeover, did not wholeheartedly and vigorously embarked on the struggle against terrorism. To substantiate the point, they had argued that after the intervention the number of those who were killed as a result of terrorism and number of terrorist attacks had sharply declined as if cut by a knife. The then prime minister Süleyman Demirel particularly reacted that "blood shed on 11 September was stopped in 13 September."[51] According to Demirel, while he was at pains to beat terrorism without sacrificing democracy, the high command had already decided that it was not possible and was trying to justify (and plan) the takeover.[52] In other words, Demirel claimed, there was a double talk on the part of the military. They asked assembly for more power, which they did not really need it.[53] They asked for this, Demirel implied, because they knew that the assembly would never be able to deliver it and then the military would use this inability of the assembly to justify the intervention.

On the basis of available evidence, these claims can not stand up to close scrutiny. In the first place, the number of those who lost their lives in terrorist attacks did not decline as sharply as it was claimed. It was reported that from 12 September 1980 to 11 February 1982, 330 people, including 66 security forces lost their lives in terrorist events.[54] Demirel himself accepted that (in an interview in 1986) from 12 September

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[50] The then prime minister Süleyman Demirel has been the chief propagator of this idea. Journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek implied the same. Similarly, Nur Bilge Criss, argued that Demirel's contention "...seems reasonable in that terror stopped immediately after the September 12 1980." Nur Bilge Criss, "Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War," in *Terrorism and Politics*, ed. Barry Rubin (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1991), 141.

[51] Demirel, *Anı*. 15.

[52] Ibid., 41-42.

[53] Ibid., 94.

[54] T.C. Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Türkiye'deki Anarşi ve Terörün Gelişmesi, Sonuçları ve*

1980 to 30 December 1985, 972 people had lost their lives in terrorist events.[55]

Secondly, unless supported by some other measures, martial law itself was not a panacea for terrorism. The quantity and quality of the security forces and civilian bureaucracy, as well as the prompt operation of the judiciary was as much important. A close co-operation between the military and all branches of the bureaucracy (police and other civilian bodies) would have been necessary.[56] Indeed, in February 1980, Demirel, as a prime minister, has issued a circular (genelge), which warned civilian bureaucrats not to expect everything from martial law authorities and urged them to help the soldiers.[57] The general climate in the country, too, just as important; if the citizens believe that the political authority as a whole is bent on overcoming anarchy and has the potential strength to do so, they are likely to help the state rather than simply wait in vain or to give up in the face of terrorists' demands. This is even valid for deeply divided civilian security forces. Citizens and security forces were not likely to hold such beliefs, on the other hand, when political elites continued to tear each other apart, engaged in political bickerings and unrestrained partisanship.

Thirdly, martial law does not mean that the state forces have a free hand in dealing with terrorism. Martial law is a constitutional device, it does not mean the total removal of all constraints on state power that limits it to protect individual rights.

If the military managed to fight effectively with terrorism only after the intervention, it was because, that they reshuffled security forces and civilian bureaucracy as they saw fit, that they made necessary changes in several laws (deemed to be necessary to deal with terrorism, which the TGNA have failed to deliver) in a minute as the ruling National Security Council

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*Güvenlik Kuvvetleri İle Önlenmesi* [The Development, Consequences and Prevention by the Security Forces, of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey ](Ankara, 1983), 210.

[55] An interview with Cüneyt Arcayürek in 1986. Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Demokrasi.450*.

[56] Kemal H. Karpat, "Military interventions: Army-Civilian Relaitions in Turkey Before and After 1980," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 150.

[57] *Milliyet*, February 16, 1980.

took over legislative and executive powers,[58] that they dealt with terrorists without being constrained by any legal hindrances as they would under democracy even with martial law,[59] and that the public at large trusted (and therefore helped) them as they were able to generate the belief that they would handle the problem of terrorism.[60] Finally, they freed themselves from the so-called Mustafa Muğlalı complex.[61] Knowing that they would not be tried for their acts during the military interregnum they showed scant respect for individual rights, a protection that no civilian regime could provide.

Therefore, the claim that the military did not properly deal with terrorism so as to justify (or prepare a conducive ground for) takeover seems to be an exaggeration.[62] What can be said, at most, is that the high commanders, who concluded that the struggle against terrorism could not successfully be waged under a democratic regime and who were planning

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[58] See, T.C. Başbakanlık, *Milli Güvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayınlanan Bildiri ve Kararlar ile Önemli Mezuat* [Laws, Declarations, Decisions and other Regulations that Had Been Adopted and Issued by the National Security Council] (Ankara: Başbakanlık, 1981).

[59] Indeed, this point was expressed by General Evren (prior to intervention) i.e that they could beat terrorism through special measures but it would also harm democratic procedures. He had argued that "they just did not want to shed blood" and added that "if we risked that we can prevent the terrorism." *Milliyet,* February 15, 1980. After the intervention, the high command did that and suppressed (for the time being) the terrorism as it promised.

[60] See, for an insightful observations on why the martial law in itself was not enough to combat terrorism under democracy, by martial law commander, Nevzat Bölügiray, *Sokaktaki Asker -Bir Sıkıyönetim Komutanının 12 Eylül Öncesi Anıları* [A Soldier in Streets: Memoirs of a Martial Law Commander Before 12 September], second ed. (Milliyet: İstanbul, 1989), 643-650.

[61] General Mustafa Muğlalı was sentenced to life (in the DP period) in prison as he was held responsible for the killing of 33 people in Özalp county of Van province. In fact, General Necdet Urüğ, who was a martial law commander of İstanbul, was reported to have argued (in martial law coordination committee meeting held on December 4, 1979) that "security forces were hesitant to fire (to use weapons) as they feared that they could be held responsible for undue firing." Cited in Arcayürek, 12 *Eylül.* 215.

[62] In our interview, Evren seemed to be deeply distressed by these charges and always emphasized that these allegations were grossly unfair. He asked that whether any sensible person could think of a chief of general staff who tells martial law commanders that they should not do their job properly so as to justify the high commands planned takeover. If any such implication had taken place, he added, it would, sooner or later, have come to the attention of the public. Interview. In fact, according to one martial law commander, "our commanders never in any way implied that we should ignore our duties so as to prepare a conducive ground for military takeover." Nevzat Bölügiray, *Sokaktaki Askerin Dönüşü (12 Eylül Yönetimi Dönemi)* [The Return of a Soldier in Street (12 September Administration Period)](Ankara: Tekin, 1991), 15. Bölügiray has criticized the post-intervention military regime "for tending towards the right." Ibid., 54.

the timing of the takeover, were likely to be less than imaginative and enterprising in performing their usual duties.[63] This is not, however, same as to say that they consciously ignored their duties, let alone prepared the ground for takeover. If the military is to be criticized, it is more appropriate to criticize it for arriving too easily to the conclusion that the struggle against terrorism can not be waged under the civilian rule rather than for preparing the ground for takeover.

### 6.2. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Increasing terrorism and continuing economic crisis were soon to be complicated by yet another political crisis. That was the election of a president. The reigning president Fahri Korutürk's term was to expire on April 8, 1980. Political parties did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that when on 22 March 1980 the assembly met to elect a president, it had to postpone the meeting because there were no candidates. It was true that parties were prohibited from officially nominating candidates for the presidency by article 95 of the constitution. This was result of a consideration that a president should be the president of all parties, not the one party alone. But in effect, of course, parties supported or opposed of candidacy of aspirants. What we mean here, therefore, is that main parties procrastined the whole event as if the country could afford yet another crisis.

Though mathematically possible, the distribution of the seats in the both lower assembly and senate required that unless two major parties agreed on a candidate, a president would not be elected. The article 95 of the 1961 Constitution stated that in the first two ballots a two thirds majority of the assembly (both senate and lower assembly) was required, if that was not secured an absolute majority would suffice. The total amount of seats was 634. Therefore at least 318 vote was required. The number of RPP seats in both assemblies were 267, for the JP it was 263, while NSP and NAP 29 and 18 respectively. Though in the senate National Unity Group and Qutoa senators had 18 and 14 seats respectively, and independents in the lower assembly amounted to 14 seats. That meant the RPP needed at least 51 extra votes

[63] According to martial law commander

while the JP needed 55. And this was required if all the RPP and JP deputies voted for their parties' candidates, which was by no means a foregone conclusion since there were many factions (which was bent on preventing other factions's candidates being elected) within the parties.

The JP appears to have adopted a two-tiered strategy. In the first place Demirel wanted to make sure that the president would not be an RPP men. He preferred a wait-and-see attitude and did not drop any hints that he favoured any of the possible candidates within the JP. Sadettin Bilgiç of former Demokratik Party İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and General Faik Türün were being mentioned as possible candidates.

Secondly, he appears to have wanted to delay presidential elections -by preventing an RPP candidate from being elected and by not giving support to any JP candidate- with his uncompromising attitude, because, he wanted presidents to be elected by general vote or if he could not do it, he wanted to take the country to early elections.[64] Demirel had what Toker called "negative power." He was able to block every solution that he opposed but was also unable to push for his own solutions.[65] When the RPP candidate -General Muhsin Batur came close to securing necessary majority, he threw in his weight and prevented him from being elected. He also did not support General Faik Türün favoured by some JP MP's. The fact that İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, as senate chairperson, became an acting president (which legally bears same responsibility and authority as presidents have) made Demirel content with what was at stake, since, his party men was an acting president. When Çağlayangil began his work as acting president Demirel said that the fact that "president could not be elected did not create any void in the state structure."[66]

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[64] As it was perceptively noted by Metin Toker of Hürriyet, "Kara Mizah ve Bazı Gerçekler" [Black Humor and Realities] *Hürriyet*, May 11, 1980. Also, Hikmet Özdemir, *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimlerinde, Ordunun Olağandışı Rolü- Türkiye Örneği* [The Extra-Ordinary Role That the Army Plays in the Presidential Elections-The Turkish Case ](İstanbul: İz, 1994), 346-350.

[65] *Hürriyet*, May 25, 1980. "Allahım Aklımız Sana Emanet!..." [ O God, We Entrust Our Mental Health to You !]

[66] *Hürriyet*, April 9, 1980.

This was what many commentators called "strategy of crisis." That is, to continue the crisis, to exploit already tense situation so as to make your strategy prevail. Demirel was reported to have answered to those who urged him to agree with Ecevit on presidential elections by saying that "we will have a dialogue, when the time is right."[67] This showed his determination to insist on this uncompromising attitude so as to make others to accept his own particular policy line. Demirel seemed to assume that, if he continued to muddle through in the presidential elections, the RPP would agree either to choose it directly by general vote or to hold an early election. It was, on the other hand, certain that Demirel's proposals would not find any support in the assembly, simply because without the RPP's support the constitutional change was not possible. And the RPP leadership was determined to protect the 1961 constitution. As to the early elections, here, too, parties other than the JP just would not vote for it as long as they suspected that the JP would come first.

This strategy of the JP leaders was proven to be highly detrimental for the legitimacy of the democratic regime. Not only because it added a new crisis upon already existing ones, but because it also reinforced the belief, already held by military and other critical elites, that even in such a grave situation politicians do not forsake their own particular policy line despite its being highly detrimenal to the democratic regime. It was true that politicians around the world resorted to similar strategies to force their policies prevail. But Demirel did not seem to consider whether the Turkey of 1980's could afford it long. If the economy was in a healthy situation, if terrorism had not been a problem, if the military had not warned them to unite in the face of these problems just three months ago, and if Demirel had the comfortable majority in the assembly, this strategy could have easily been justified, as perceptively noted by Arcayürek,[68] but even that for not long. However, in the Turkey of the early 1980's none of these conditions held. And Demirel carried on pushing this policy, at the cost of further

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[67] Reported in Arcayürek, *12 Eylül.447.*

[68] Cüneyt Arcayürek, "Bunalım Stratejisinden Beklenenler" [Expectations From Strategy of Crisis] *Hürriyet*, May 8, 1980.

weakening the legitimacy of the democratic system.[69]

The RPP leader Ecevit, on the other hand, did not seem to be wholeheartedly supporting any of the RPP supported candidates. Many believed that if the RPP leader had fully supported General Muhsin Batur's candidacy, he could have been elected.[70] He continued his calls for dialogue in presidential elections. It was clear that Ecevit remembered the idea of dialogue between the two parties only when the power was not in his own grasp. While calling for a dialogue, he did not refrain from calling Demirel a fascist.[71] In 19 May 1980, he argued that "Turkey just can not afford Demirel's destructiveness. If there had been another (destructive) person like Demirel, this country would have been ruined."[72] Two days later, he asserted that "the government has been seized by the NAP and fascism. Turkey is now going under the occupation of fascists or Nazi forces."[73] Besides, he also continued to flirt with the NSP to bring the government down.

The fact that no one took the election of president seriously in the assembly was one of the contributory factors in its weakening legitimacy.[74] Despite warnings at various quarters,[75] party leaders did not endeavour to find viable solutions. In time MP's began to

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[69] See for Oktay Ekşi's angry critique of Demirel's strategy. *Hürriyet*, May 8, 1980. "Bu Kadarı Fazla..." [This is Just Too Much...] The Yankı editorial also warned Demirel, "Başbakan Demirel'in Sorumluluğu Büyüktür" [The Responsibility of Premier Demirel is Great] *Yankı*, 21-27 Temmuz 1980.

[70] Ecevit is reported to have said that "he very unwillingly had to support Batur's candidacy, which had not been discussed in the party, and had been declared prior to his consent. Cited in Oral Çalışlar, *Liderler Hapishanesi* [Prison of Leaders ](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1989), 135.

[71] In an effort to relate (to use) presidential election to increase his party's chances to come to power, Ecevit also argued that "when a president is elected, the government should resign as president is constitutionally entitled to appoint the prime minister." *Yankı*, 7-13 April, 1980.

[72] *Hürriyet*, May 19, 1980.

[73] *Hürriyet*, May 21, 1980.

[74] How the military perceived these events and how its trust in civilians further declined can be seen in the post-intervention book; "...everyone observed that the political parties had driven into an impasse the election of the highest authority of the State due to calculations of their political interests. ...In no country of the world has the election of president been turned in to instrument for political interests. This situation was a new example clearly demonstrating the impasse of the Turkish parliament". General Secretariat of National Security Council, *12 September*.181.

[75] Evren reports that he told the defence minister that "their patience also has its limits." Evren,

regard elections as if it were a game. In the ballot-papers for presidency such words was reported to have been appeared,"we want a female president," "Çaycı Necmi Efendi," "Aynur Aydan."[76]

Because presidential elections consumed most of the assembly's working time and parties in opposition (assuming that Demirel benefitted from it) did not agree to spare an extra day for other bills, the assembly was blocked. Apart from unproductive presidental voting, it only discussed interpellations that the RPP opposition put forward against the government. The Turkish political system appeared to be deadlocked, offering no solutions to the pressing problems of terrorism and economic crisis. The efficacy (capacity to find solutions to problems) of the democratic system had been undermined with adverse consequences for its legitimacy. The JP leader, who appeared to have hoped to benefit from this deadlock, defended his action (in 1986) by saying that "what is important is not that the parliament should be a 'law factory' (kanun fabrikası), but that it should be open, that it should be free and that it should constitute a forum where the country's problems can be discussed."[77] While this contains some elements of truth, Demirel is on shakier ground in ignoring 'efficiency considerations.' If the parliament is seen as unable to produce much needed solutions (efficacy in Linzian terms) the fact that its being open or debating the country's problems would hardly secure and/or enhance its legitimacy.

In such a grave situation in which terrorism and economic problems continued to increase, political party elites appeared to be unable to find solutions, despite the military's warning that such state of affairs could not continue for long. At this stage, there appeared to be several policy options that might have created (in the eyes of the critical actors-the military,

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*Anılar*. 427. Journalist Metin Toker wrote; "One should not make others say that 'we can live without a president'... Because (once these words are heard) one can easily come to the point that we can do without other things, (and) it might even be better. ... Would not it be the case that to tomorrow similar things might not be said of parliament ?" *Hürriyet*, May 11, 1980. "Kara Mizah ve Bazı Gerçekler" [ Black Humor and Realities]

[76] See, an interesting asssesment, Yavuz Donat, "Haysiyet Nasıl Korunur ?" [How is Dignity Protected ?], *Tercüman*, April 2, 1980.

[77] Cited in Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 471.

the press, the businessmen and international actors) a new hope regarding the democratic system's ability to tackle the pressing problems. Let us try to assess what these apparent possibilities were and why were they not pursued.

First, the two major parties could have formed, as demanded by many since 1973 elections, a grand coalition that would agree on a presidential candidate, that would enact a package of measures to deal with terrorism, that would take measures to end partisanship and politicization in the bureaucracy, and that would implement stabilization programs. After a period of renewal and restoration, it might take the country to elections. This was the least likely possibility especially when the animosities between leaership cadres and their differing recipes for the problems were considered. Secondly, without forming a coalition, they could agree on presidential candidate, or on reform bills in the assembly, and they could agree on changes in the election laws that would allow the emergence of a strong government by reducing the role of the small parties and then go to the elections. Third, without agreeing either on a presidential candidate or on reform bills or on an economic stabilization package, they could agree on changes in electoral laws and could take the country to the elections. Finally, they could take the country to the elections without an agreement on all these issues and without a change in electoral laws. None of these apparent possibilities could not be pursued by party elites. A complex interaction of culturally grounded beliefs regarding coalition, compromise, state, law and democracy, and party elites' perceptions of each other as well as short-term political considerations seemed to have played a role in such outcome.

The JP leader Süleyman Demirel was consistent throughout in his rejection of the idea of a grand coalition. His opposition derived as much from the nature of coalitions as from his perception of the RPP. He did not believe that a grand coalition was workable since a coalition mean time-consuming bargaining and there might be the cases "where you are expected to take decisions in half an hour even in ten minutes."[78] He seemed to be particularly negatively effected by the coalition experiences of the 1961-1965 period in which the JP-RPP coalition was formed. He also opposed the coalition of two major parties because in the case of the

[78] Ibid., 470.

failure of such government, there would not remain any alternative within the democratic system.[79]

His perception of the RPP was another factor. He was reported to have said to journalist Abdi İpekçi (in 1975) that "the JP and the RPP represents two distinct theses, and there is no possibility of them governing together."[80] Since the early seventies he has made clear that the coalition between the two parties was against "the nature of things" that the two parties could come together only in the case of war.[81] The JP leader spoke as if the JP and RPP differed so much from each other that no coming together was possible. True, the ideological polarization at the leadership level was significant and based on serious differences regarding the causes of the problems and means of dealing with it, despite the fact that neither party appealed to one segment of the society at the expense of others and the social background of the two party MP's were not greatly differentiated from each other. In 1986 Demirel was reported to have said "how could we come together with the RPP, to which we have blamed for instigating anarchy ? ...how could we enact law of extraordinary ordinances with the RPP ? how could we take the 24 January decisions ?"[82] Demirel had a point in arguing such a line, but he is less than justified in presenting the RPP as a party, whose ideology was so different, and with which no rational dialogue was possible. He does not, for instance, tell us why they could not agree on a presidential candidate or changes in election laws that would help major parties or any other solutions that, while being unseen beforehand *might have emerged* if leaders had maintained a fruitful dialogue.

This brings us to the related point of his perception of "bargaining" and "compromise." True to the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition, the JP leader tended to see them in a pejorative way. In 1975, weekly magazine Yankı asked Demirel whether he was

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[79] Cited in Tufan Türenç, Erhan Akyıldız, *Gazeteci* [The Journalist] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1987), 353.

[80] Türenç and Akyıldız, *Gazeteci.* 353.

[81] *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1977.

[82] Cited in Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*.470.

thinking of meeting with Ecevit about the problems of the democratic regime. Demirel's answer was telling in many respects:

> Of course, we can meet at any time, but democracy is not 'regime of dissimulation' (muvazaa rejimi). *It is not something that are conducted through mutual compromises.* If it is done in this way, it becomes a guided democracy. It is a regime of openness in which everbody can say what he thinks. Parties come together when great national problems emerge irrespective of other conditions. Did we not come together on the Cyprus issue ?"[83]

He seemed to equate compromise with dissimulation (muvazaa). He also implied that "mutual compromises" which is the crux of democratic system of governance, meant for him a "guided democracy." Similarly, in an interview with Arcayürek (in 1986), he argued that compromise can not solve everything, and added that "if everything can be solved through compromise, there would not be any dispute or conflict."[84] In a sentence that suggests that he meant compromise as one's giving away what at one's disposition to rivals for appeasement, Demirel argued that "as a matter of fact, Chamberlain attempted to compromise everything with Hitler, but in the end the war broke out despite the fact he had given everything."[85]

When these views are taken into consideration, the JP leader's actions could be better understood. Holding such beliefs, Demirel did not seek a compromise candidate for the presidency. Because he believed that if president were elected, it should either be the candidate that they wanted or elections should continue. A compromise candidate, he seemed to think, would be a drawback and defeat for his party. By the same token, his attitude on the package of measures was similar. He insisted upon his point, while disregarding what the opposition was saying. He did not seek to incorporate the demands of the opposition to convince them to support the bills in the assembly. As Ecevit, too, complained, Demirel "tend to understand

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[83] *Yankı*, December 29-January 4, 1976. (my italics)

[84] Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 466. He had expressed that view in the aftermath of the 12 March. See, Süleyman Demirel, *Oniki Mart ve Sonrası-İkinci Kitap* [12 March and Its Aftermath-The Second Book] (Ankara: Ayyıldız, 1972), 14.

[85] Ibid., 468. This state of affairs, like many things, is not uniqe to Turkey. Richard W. Weather noted that in Latin America "...compromise as a political craft has little prestige and scant effectiveness. Indeed compromise has clearly deragatory overtones. The verb *transigir*, broadly meaning to "to compromise" implies giving in, in a very prejudicial sense." Richard W. Weatherhead, "Traditions in Conflict in Latin America" in Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, ed. *Politics of Change in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 37.

compromise as the opposition's full compliance with those bills it brought into assembly."[86]

At the root of this view of compromise lies the assumption that there is only one true or correct policy, known only to one of the sides, to be followed in each case. The central premise of liberal democracy that the apart from basic principles policies to be followed in each case are to be determined by discussions and mutual compromises is an anathema to that assumption.[87] Earlier we noted that Turkish state elites have been sympathetic to similar assumptions that there was a one best way and true policy, which emerged through rational debates and are known only to themselves. Demirel, who had at times wehemently criticized them, seemed to have more in common with this group than he was willing to admit.

On the other hand, it would be misleading to attribute Demirel's uncompromising attitude to only his beliefs regarding compromise and bargaining. Demirel's uncompromising stance was reinforced by his distrust of the RPP and Ecevit and his short-term political considerations. Years of political bickering, mutually harsh accusations, broken promises, personalized nature of conflict had generated an atmosphere of distrust between party leaders that hindered co-operation. As Dahl remarked "polyarchy requires two-way or mutual communication, and two-way communication is impeded among people who do not trust one another." [88] In that respect distrust between party leaders' had reached terrific proportions. When he was asked, for instance, whether he had told Ecevit that commanders were urging for co-operation between parties, Demirel was reported to have answered that in that case "Ecevit would have divulged the whole conversation to the public by saying that the government is puuting pressure on them through the military."[89] Indeed, In May 1977 Ecevit revealed then premier Demirel's letter, that urged him to annul pre-election meeting as the government

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[86] *Hürriyet*, August 13, 1980.

[87] Indeed, it is the basic premise of the liberal democracy that the "truth" is relative concept, and that no one has the monopoly of truth. It is the virtue of liberal democracy that by bargaining by discussion by compromise diverse views can be reconciled so that peaceful co-existence becomes possible.

[88] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy-Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 151.

[89] Cited in Arcayürek, *12 Eylül*.415.

was suspected of plans for assassination, to the public. That distrust between party leaders was significant for explaining the lack of dialogue. It appears to have led them not only disagreement on crucial issues but also prevented the possibility of their finding new points of convergence that were not conceived beforehand but *might have emerged* if leaders had trusted each other and maintained a fruitful dialogue.[90]

Finally, the JP leaders appears to have sincerely believed that they could take the country to elections in which, they assumed, they were likely to win an overall majority. That was yet other reason for them not to seek a compromise. The JP leadership assumed that their success in the 14 October elections was not a surprise. It showed the degree to which the electorate had became estranged from the RPP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. They also appeared to have assumed that the near-collapse of the Demokratik Party and decline in the votes of the NSP were other factors operating in favour of the JP. Short-term political considerations also appears to have been effective for the JP leaderships' opposition to change in electoral laws that would strengthen the major parties at the expense of smaller ones. Because, they tend to believe that with an only small swing of the vote, comfortable majority was within their reach.[91]

In comparison to Demirel, the RPP leader Ecevit was much less consistent regarding co-operation (including coalition) between parties. As noted above, Ecevit became a staunch defender of the idea of co-operation and dialogue when he himself could not form a government. For instance, when his government failed to ensure a vote of confidence in June 1977, he offered a JP-RPP coalition, forgetting that only a month ago he had accused and even refused to see Demirel, whom he labelled as fascist. When he had another opportunity to form a government in December 1977, he again did not seek the support of the JP arguing that he did not want to lose time to stop bloodshedding in the streets. It is only after resignation in

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[90] Even ten years after the intervention Demirel insisted that the JP-RPP coalition would have done nothing but presented General Evren further justification for the intervention since in that case he would have said that parties could do it neither alone nor together in coalition so there remained no other way but intervention. According to Demirel, such a coalition might have prevented the coup only if they had elected General Evren as president. Demirel. *Anı*. 116.

[91] Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, second ed. (London: Eothen, 1990), 43.

October 1979, he began calls for a dialogue between parties. His sincerity was further put into doubt by his constant accusations of the government as fascist.[92]

As remarked upon in the previous chapter, his conceptualisations regarding state, law and democracy, led him to reject some specific proposals in the package of measures. In an excellent example that revealed how Ecevit interpreted law and constitution, he opposed the establishment of state security courts which the constitution ordered. He argued that the article had been inserted in the 12 March interregnum and therefore it should not be regarded as an intrinsic part of the constitution, and, by implication, what it ordered should not be established.[93] Ecevit seemed to have forgotten the fact that in liberal democratic polity, however, everybody, whether he likes it or not, must obey the constitution until it is changed. Believing that there is an inverse relations between law and freedom, he also opposed the strengthening of the state. He argued that "all right let us increase powers of the state, but what would happen afterwards ? The Shah of Iran had the best of these powers, but did they help him to retain his throne?"[94] Here, too, Ecevit appears to have confused the issues. In liberal democratic regime, state should be strong (in the sense of effectiveness and capability) within the rule of law. And the strength of the democratic state is qualitatively different from that of the strength of authoritarian state.

As in Demirel's case, short-term political considerations and distrust of the JP and Demirel also played a role in his uncompromising attitude. For instance, one of the reasons for the RPP's opposition to the package of measures was related to his belief that, it would not

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[92] There are other evidences that cast doubt on Ecevit's sincerity. According to Arcayürek when he told Ecevit (in 24 April 1980) about Evren's views that even if the two parties came together, there would not be any significant change, Ecevit had answered back that "he shared the same view." Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 22.

[93] In fact the law regulating the state security courts had been adopted in 1973. *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], *Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemelerinin Kuruluş ve Yargılama Usulleri Hakkındaki Kanun* [Law Concerning the Establishment and the Judicial Procedures of State Security Courts], n. 1773. Ankara: Prime Ministry, July 11, 1973. But when the constitutional court, acting upon the appeal of İzmir state security court, found the two articles of the law (which constituted the cornerstone of the law) as unconstitutional, law as a whole became null and void in October 1976.

[94] Cited in *Arcayürek*, Demokrasi.227.

help the state but the political party in power (that is the JP). He argued that state structures had been subjected to great destruction due to political parties' tendency to fill supposedly impartial bureaucratic positions. Therefore, Ecevit was reported to have said that, if enacted, it would strengthen not the state but those public servants who were appointed by a government which led by a person who argues that "the source of anarchy is the RPP." [95] Instead, Ecevit first offered to reduce the elected governments' leverage on public administration and later to strengthen it.

He also did not want early elections to be held. This did not suit his short-term political calculations. In public, he argued that without preventing bloodshed the country could not hold proper elections, but many believed that it was a cover. He appears to have assumed that, if held, early general elections might provide a comfortable majority for the JP. Short-term political calculations also made him to lukewarm regarding possible changes in electoral laws that would reduce the significance of minor parties. Like Demirel he also believed that only a small margin of the vote might secure him overall majority in the assembly.

In short, both parties had their own policy lines that hindered the development of co-operation between parties. And party elites did not want to compromise, due to complex interaction of culturally grounded beliefs regarding coalition, compromise, state, law and democracy, and their perceptions of each other as well as short-term political considerations. That was so, despite the fact that there was a danger to democratic political order that allowed them to pursue their interests in the first place. This is a fairly common dilemma found in many democracies. The nature of the competitive party system is likely to force each party to insist on their own particular policy lines. Actors tend to believe that if they carry on insisting their policy lines just a little more, other parties either out of conviction or desperation, will come to accept their solutions. The question is where the limits ends and for how long democratic system can endure. In other words, how long a political party, that pursue its short term interests, can insists upon policy which is likely to be detrimental to the legitimacy of democratic system. The answer to that question is inevitably subjective. However, responsible

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[95] Cited in Ibid.257.

and prudent party behaviour requires that when the system seems to be strained and when there seems to be a grave danger to the survival of democracy, parties should be ready to make concessions on their policies. This is in their own interest so that when the normal situation resumes they can back to follow previous policy lines. On that score, Turkish political party elites did not seem to fare well. They insisted on pursuing their own policy options, despite the (plenty of) signs that the system could no longer endure such party lines and faced the risk of breakdown.

### 6.3.THE MILITARY'S DECISION TO INTERVENE

Amidst continuing terrorism that neared proportions of civil-war, economic problems, and endless bickering between party elites the military high command finally came to the conclusion that with existing political parties and leaders such grave problems would not be solved and there remained no other possibility for way out but intervention. According to Evren's account in March force commanders came to the conclusion that they should decide when to take over the administration whilst Evren have not yet been convinced about the timing of the intervention.[96] The high command's coming into such conclusion needs detailed exposition.

We know that even when presenting the letter the military did not expect much. They were proven right. The letter's positive impact lasted only for a couple of weeks and as expected this did not produce any tangible result. With Ecevit's harsh critique of the 24 January measures, and his reaction to Tariş events, post-letter dialogue atmosphere were faded away. Moreover, the JP government appeared to be powerless in the face of the pressing problems. Demirel's hopes, that his government would be able to enact new laws and change existing ones, was totally blocked by the oppositions' incessant bickering. Evren is reported to have written (probably on 20-25 March) in his memoirs that:

> I do not have any hope that the functioning of state institutions, which is so degenerated, could be put right. I do not believe also there will be changes in laws. Because, the RPP and the NSP oppose each

[96] Ibid., 391.

and every proposal. The NSP had promised to support the JP, but in practice they did the reverse."[97]

The examples Evren provided to exemplify politicization of the state institutions deserve long quotations as they sustained his belief that it could not be corrected under the civilian regime. Evren reported what Cemal Altınok, martial law commander, told the martial law co-ordination committee:

> We could find neither the head official of district (kaymakam) nor chief of police (emniyet amiri) in Siverek county (which is controlled by Apocu's and in which many violent events had taken place), that is in my area. The ministry appointed a head official of district but he did not come. I tell you another interesting case. (The ministry) sent chief of police from Bitlis to Siverek. But that person supposed to be in Bitlis was not actually there for two years. He is still in his former place. The chief Police Headquarters (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü) assumed him to be in Bitlis and asked Bitlis whether they were going to sent him to Siverek and ask their views.[98]

In the face of such disorder and politicization, the civilian leadership, it seemed to Evren, appeared to be unable to put things right. He blamed Ecevit for his inflamatory speeches and his blockage of package of measures in the assembly.[99] Likewise he held Demirel responsible for insisting on the NSP while it was all to clear that Erbakan was interested only in his own party's standings and was ready to withdraw support when it suited his own interests.[100] As if these were not enough the presidential crisis intensified. According to Evren, he told (on 31 March and on 24 April) defence minister Ali İhsan Birincioğlu "not to take presidential elections lightly."[101] Like many at that time he, too, believed that Demirel was

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[97] Evren, *Anılar*.408.

[98] Ibid., 376. Similarly, 16 province governors who met premier Demirel dwelled upon the same theme of partisanship and politicization of bureaucracy. Cited in Arcayürek, *12 Eylül*. 398-407.

[99] Ecevit's response to the 24 January measures and to Tariş events appears to have seriuously upset General Evren and played a role in making him believe that nothing could be done with these party leaders. Ecevit's response to the Tariş events was, according to Evren, "to extinguish fire with gasoline." Ecevit had said that "there is no possibility that Demirel could implement his economic policy outside the dictatorial regime. For that reason bandits (of government) that wore police uniforms began to torture people. We, too, want terrorists to be cleaned up from Tariş. But the government aims at filling it with rightist militants, and its (Tariş) exploitation by powerful interests." Ibid., 360.

[100] Evren was not alone in arriving this conclusion. Nazlı Ilıcak, too, shared similar views. She reminded the JP leadership that "what is important is not to stay in power but to be really be capable when you are in power." *Tercüman*, January 20, 1980. "İktidar Olmak ve Muktedir Olmak" [Being in Power and Being Capable in Power]

[101] Evren, *Anılar*. 411.

happy to see Çağlayangil[102] as acting president and therefore he was not hurrying to elect the one.[103] Besides, presidential elections occupied most of the TGNA's time nothing but interpellations put forward by the RPP were to be debated. As a result of all these developments, Evren finally ordered (in 18 May according to his memoirs)[104] that all preparations for the take over were to be finished by the first week of July. In his coming into such conclusion his belief that political parties (as they were) would not find a solutions to country's ills were the chief factor.[105] But equally important factor was his belief that the critical actors would not oppose, or at least stay neutral, to military intervention.

As we remarked in the first chapter, by critical actors we mean those social-political groups whose support or at least neutrality is essential for any regime to survive. Since, however authoritarian it might be, any regime needs a kind of public acceptance for survival, the most important critical actors can be said to be citizens. But citizens do not spoke from one voice, and what they think could be estimated, however imperfectly, through by their organized and vocal representatives as well as through imperfect inferences derived from their reactions to past events. Here too, one should be careful not to over-generalize. In some political

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[102] The military high command was not prepared to see Çağlayangil (whose name was mentioned for the presidency) as president. Evren told me in our interview that "he was to partisan to be a president."

[103] Evren appears to have got angry when Demirel told him that they were going to meet with Ecevit at Yugoslavian President Joseph Tito's funeral. Evren noted (in 5 May 1980) that "I became certain that the premier wants to deceive us, that he was using the strategy of delaying us." Ibid., 432.

[104] Ibid., 434.

[105] It would not be inaccurate to argue that the cabinet instability was not the prime factor for Evren to arrive at that conclusion. It was rather his belief that there was no strong government in sight, strong enough to tackle pressing problems, which is not the same as the cabinet instability. This is because less than strong cabinets just can continue to survive while having no effective power to affect the course of events. In fact, during the 1973-1980 period Turkey can hardly be said to have a cabinet instability in terms of the criteria put forward by Juan J. Linz. Linz noted that in the Europe of interwar period (which he also divided into two as predepression and postdepression period) amongst the seventeen countries in which governments lasted less than nine months, in only one country democracy survived, while within that group of countries in which governments lasted longer than nine months, only one experienced a regime change. Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes- Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration* (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1978), 44. When we look at the Turkish case, we observe that during the seven years between the October 1973 elections and 12 September 1980, Turkey had seven cabinets, average duration for cabinets being one year. If we exclude, only one-month-long Ecevit government in 1977, average duration for cabinet rises to the fourteen months, higher than Linz's threshold of nine months.

contexts where people at large do not look to democratic political system with a sense of belonging (or where they do not see democracy as qua sine non) this might not matter much. Or where there is traditional respect for the state and the military institution, as the core of state, or where there is no tradition of opposition to what comes from the state either out of sense of nicompetence or voluntary acceptance, the question of whether people would support the move or stay neutral becomes much less significant.

In Turkey a similar state of affairs appears to have been obtained. One of the most important factors was the perception of the Ottoman-Turkish state. As noted above, the belief that the state is a distant power that took, sometimes quite arbitrarily, decisions regarding their life (on the making of which they had little power to influence) appears to have been prevalent amongst the citizenry. It was perceived as something that preceded their existence and made it possible.[106] It was not, however, seen as totally repressive apparatus but as provider of order and welfare. It is seen as father and "father is the guardian of the family and whether good or bad at it, he is nevertheless the father"[107] and by implication should be not rebelled against.

This conception of state appears to have hindered the development of a concept resembling anything like the right of resistance (implying as it is contractual relations between the state and citizens) to take root in the public conscience as formulated in western political theory. It was true that in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition under the influence of Islamic doctrines rulers were held responsible to God but this had little practical value as the exact mechanisms of its enforceability were left ambigious. As Bernard Lewis remarked though, especially in earlier times, the Islamic doctrine had came to be interpreted in the sense that it was the *duty* of muslims to resist the impious government. In time, however, for a variety of reasons, "disobediance was hedged around with restrictions and qualifications

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[106] The Turkish idiom that "ya devlet başa ya kuzgun leşe" (either there must be a state, or ravens would crowd around the carcass) reflects this mentality.

[107] Engin D. Akarlı, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey Historical Background and Present Problems*, ed. Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), 138.

and was in effect forgotten in the general acceptance"[108] and it came to be understood that, "good government was a duty of the ruler, not a right of the subject, whose only recourse against bad government was patience, counsel, and prayer."[109]

This islamic notion of absolute obedience to ruler seemed to survive in the Ottoman-Turkish polity. It was understood that to keep each person in its proper place and to prevent him to violate others' right a ruler with absolute authority was required. It was thus formulated that "without Padişah there would be no order, leading to people's devastation."[110] More to the point, in the absence resources outside the state to support any countervailing power, and the segmented structure of the periphery made it extremely difficult for social-political groups to oppose state in an organized way. No such tradition appears to have developed. Whatever comes from the state, or whatever has happened to be in the court, tended to be accepted in fatalistic fashion.[111] If there was any expression of grievances it was rather through spontaneous, sudden, sproadic mass uprisings ("a flash in the pan" in Mardin's words) which was suppressed (at least in the long-term) by the state. Moreover, in these uprisings the "concept of state" (its organization, its philosophy, its relationships with its subjects-citizens) as such did not came under attack, they were rather against the given set of people who came to control the state. "The conception of state" as Akarlı perceptiely noted, "has been keep separate from the given set of people who controlled the state."[112]

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[108] Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History -Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East*, revised and expanded edition (Chicago and Lasalle, Open Court, : Illinois, 1993), 314.

[109] Ibid., 324.

[110] Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Padişahı." [The Ottoman Padişah] *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi.* vol XIII, 4, (1958), 75.

[111] Popular historian Ahmet Refik's assessment is revealing in that respect: "The palace was the heart of the all Ottoman lands. But any move in the 'Bab-ı Hümayun' would have no effect on the nerves of the empire. Even the great Ottoman provinces never raised opposition or gesture of approval to any facit accomplices in the palace." Ahmet Refik, *Lale Devri* [The Tulip Age] (İstanbul: Timaş, 1997), 98.

[112] Akarlı, "state," 138. Similarly, Karpat noted that squatters tend to attribute the state's failure in its protective mission "to the men who acted on behalf of the state" assuming that "as a sort of moral being" it, "could not do wrong." Karpat, "political attitudes," 94. The similar attitude can be observed in Turkish politicians. Süleyman Demirel, who accused Evren for not seriously engaging with terrorism so as to justify military takeover, is at pains to distinguish General Evren and Turkish Armed Forces, putting the blame solely on the former. Instead of questioning militarys' ideology, attitude and its organisation

Yet another peculiarity of the Ottoman-Turkish polity was the privileged status accorded to the military. The military elements played a crucial role in the initial stages of the Empire. The modernization efforts first began in the military institutions and was led by them afterwards. In the independence war, similarly, it was the military that occupied leading place. Most of the revered Ottoman-Turkish heroes came from the ranks of the military, and traditionally the military was held in high esteem by the people at large.[113] In military service, in the schools, in the mosques, people are socialized into norms that recommends them to defer to the state, the prime representative of which is the military.[114]

In addition to these socio-cultural properties of the Turkish society, widespread terrorism put people in a position in which they could register hardly any major response to what happened. In these tense times in which nobody feels secure the man in the street is likely to be more worried about his and his loved one's security rather than, what might seem to him, the niceties of democracy. S(he) is likely to defer any authority that promised law and order and protected his (her) right to life, without which no other right can be enjoyed. Or more commonly s(he) is likely to become resigned to whatever was happening and whatever was being done at the top.[115]

All of these considerations suggested that any military intervention in Turkey was not likely to face any resistance and military knew that tendency well.[116] When I asked Kenan

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within the state structures, Demirel criticized the persons who came to control it for a while. See, Demirel, *Anı*. 4, 54, 117.

[113] See, for an insightful analysis, Dankart A. Rustow, "Turkey (military)," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Dankwart A . Rustow and Robert E. Ward (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[114] Akarlı, "state," 137. Ahmet Kemal (Murat Belge) emphasized especially the role of the military service, for the promotion of such a concept of the state. According to Belge, those who performed compulsory military service, "acquire a feeling of total helplessnes which they retain for the rest of their lives." Ahmet Kemal, "Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey." *MERİP Reports*, 122, (1984), 14.

[115] As Bingham Powell remarked "the failure of government to maintain order and security leads citizens to look more positively on authoritarian alternatives." Bingham Powell., Jr, *Contemporary Democracies -Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 154.

[116] It was not only the military but also some MP's in the assembly that emphasized the same point. Oğuz Atalay, an independent MP from Konya argued that "nation would not find it strange if the

Evren whether they were considering the possibility that there might be resistance to intervention, he answered that "of course, we thought of that possibility. But I told my friends that I was 90 per cent of sure that there would not be any such thing and people would support us." (Halkın bizi destekleyeceğini de % 90'la ümit ediyordum). He also added that he was "98 per cent sure of the success of the military (to prevent terrorism)." His answer, to my following question of why it was the case, was revealing in many respects. Alongside the terorism and failure of the civilians to come up with solutions, Evren noted that Turkish people placed high confidence in the military because:

> It was the military that established the republic, that brought democracy. Whatever new came to Turkey after the abolition of Saltanat, and even before it, was brought through the channels of the army... for that reason people placed trust in the military. The soldiers do not behave partially (They are not partisan). (besides) there is a tradition as result of a military service experience. *(People) does want an authority, and does not like disorder.*[117]

Thus, as Evren too correctly estimated, the legitimacy of military intervention was not likely be widely questioned. Be that as it may, General Evren and high command were still anxious not to push the button until "knife cut through the bones." It was because, they wanted to protect (what to them) the highly esteemed privileged status of the army as the nations true representative and protector. One way of doing this was, they appears to have thought, to avoid the mistakes of the previous military interventions.

In the Turkey of the 1980's amidst continuing terrorism, economic crisis and little realistic hope left for civilian democracy the organized and vocal channels (that could be assumed to represent the citizens view) seemed to be content to accept the military authority. The press as representative (and makers) of the people's opinion had begun to drop hints that they had become so sick of civilian hagglings and bickerings that anything that would secure state authority would be welcomed. It was not that majority of them openly urged for

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military intervenes provided that it is impartial. (This is because) democratic regime is diluted to such an extent and the state is in grave danger." He then warned political parties that "they should well know well this fact." *Yankı*, 28 July-3 August, 1980. Yankı editorial in the same issue noted that many MP's from various parties were coming to the conclusion that the military should intervene as the JP could not beat anarchy and there did not seem to be an alternative government in sight. Yankı, 28 July-3 August, 1980 "Tehlikeli Bir Eğilim Doğuyor" [A Dangerous Tendency Emerges]. Likewise, Evren told me in interview that many MP's and senators (which he declined to give names) came to visit him to encourage takeover.

[117] Interview.

intervention (though some did) but that they made it clear that this state of affairs could not continue for long, thus indicating their dissatisfaction and readiness not to oppose an alternative regime that might be established.[118] In fact, journalists despised politicians (whether in opposition or in power) such a degree that it was all too clear to anyone that they would hardly show any negative reaction, if somebody removed them from power. Oktay Ekşi of Hürriyet for instance, once asked whether Turkish politicians "were leaders or scourges."[119] Evren, too, perceived the press' attitutude in this way. He wrote that the press' reaction to the letter had shown that in search of a leadership that would deal with terrorism the press had not refrained to express their gratitude and relief.[120] Perhaps because of this attitude of the press' (they made it so clear that any authority that restores order would be welcomed) Evren also told me that the military did not seriously concern itself with how the press would react to intervention. He said that alongside the above mentioned factors, "they thought that the press could easily be controlled through martial law."[121]

Businessmen as a whole, too, were worried about the country's situation and longed for political stability. Their support was important for the success of the intervention, despite the fact that the Turkish economy was heavily dominated by the state. As part of their peripheral mentality, businessmen, too, lacked the tradition of raising an organized opposition to the state.[122] To expolit loopholes, not making its views known in an organized way vis-a-vis

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[118] Headlines all expressed that feeling. In July 16, 1980 Tercüman's headlines read "This is Enough" (Yeter Artık). Newspaper editorial (in the first page) urged politicians to find solutions and finished with warning that "tomorrow will be too late." In July 23, 1980 Milliyet's headlines read "Stop Discussing." (Tartışmayı Kesin). It argued that "stop discussing... Come together to devise action plan to extinguish that fire... Do it as soon as possible. Otherwise it will be to late tomorrow."

[119] Oktay Ekşi, "Kadayıfçı" [Kadayıfçı] *Hürriyet*, June 7, 1980. In another writing, after expressing its embarrasment how parliamentary regime was able to survive in Turkey, Ekşi provided the answer by saying that leaders of Turkey were incompetent to such an extent that they could not even ruin the democracy, despite the fact that they seem to want to ruin it. Oktay Ekşi, "Meğer Dokuz Canlı İmiş" [It is More Resilient than We Thought], *Hürriyet*, June 9, 1980.

[120] Kenan Evren, *Ne Demişlerdi ? Ne Dediler ? Ne Diyorlar ?* [What had They Said ? What did They Say ? What are now They Saying ?] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1997),71.

[121] Interview.

[122] See, Ayşe Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları* [The State and Businessmen], trans. Fikret Adaman

the state has been the strategy of Turkish businessmen. They appears to have dropped hints that they would support military intervention in the hope that it would provide a political stability and that help to control already inflated wages. Evren, for instance, told me that some businessmen had complained about inflated wages. Businessmen, according to Evren, said that "they cannot cope with unreasonable wage increases and have even offered unions the opportunity to run the factories they owned."[123] Some businessmen were worried, too, that a new direction that the Turkish economy under 24 January measures might collapse in the unpredictable political environment of Turkey. Despite some of them (especially those which have not been export-oriented) were uneasy about the 24 January measures, they all seemed to appreciate the fact that the international community would not provide help to Turkey unless these measures was rigorously implemented.[124] Not only the big business, but also various representatives of Anatolian traders and small business, through their actions and non-actions made it known that they would support the military move. For example, according to Evren (which has not been subsequently denied) the President of Confederation of Small Traders and Artisans (CSTA) complained about the situation asked him "should we, as more than two an half million people, be armed as well ?"[125]

The situation for trade unions was likewise. The biggest trade Union, CTWU (which had always maintained close relations with the mainstream center parties and the state) was continously calling for a dialogue and they dropped hints that they would not oppose possible military intervention. For instance, in September 1980 the president of CTWU raised the issue on the socio-political crisis the country had been dragged into and asked what the parliament was doing to deal with it. He then answered:

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(İstanbul: İletişim, 1995).

[123] Interview.

[124] In the aftermath of the intervention, for example, the head of Turkey's biggest holding company, Vehbi Koç in a letter to President Evren, stated that to follow the direction of 24 January measures would be benefical for the country. Can Kıraç, *Anılarımla -Patronum Vehbi Koç* [My Boss Vehbi Koç Through Memoirs] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1995), 266.

[125] Interview.

we are as hopeless as we can easily say nothing. Political party groups are fighting and obstructing each other every day for power struggles. The parliament, which even unable to elect head of the state, has been made an instrument for sterile squabbles, while hundreds of bills and proposals which could be a remedy for the illness are waiting for inclusion in the agenda."[126]

The military did not appear to be concerned too much with how the CRWU and other radical trade unions would react to them as they saw them part of the Turkey's problems and determined to stop their activities. Evren told this author that they were considering the possibility that these radical unions might try to build up resistance the military intervention. It seems the military high command was seriously concerned with the pre-intervention militancy and radicalism of the trade unions. Indeed, prior to intervention, the only group that was perceived to have the potential to mount resistance to the intervention was, as Evren emphasized to me, the workers that were organized by CRWU and other smaller radical trade unions.[127]

The military high command was concerned equally, if not more, with how the outside actors, particularly Turkey's allies in NATO and European Economic Community, might react to possible intervention. It is not our argument that the military needed western encouragement or a green light to conduct an intervention. That would, on the basis of available evidence, be an exaggeration, given the well-known sensitivity of Turkish armed forces to protect its independence. But rather, in line with their policy of ensuring the maximum legitimacy and approval to intervention, they wished to estimate the possible reaction of outside world as they tried to estimate the possible reaction of the critical actors at home.

Up until 1945 Turkey had striven to maintain a policy of non-alignment in its foreign policy. The division of the world literally into two camps (the western camp of democratic nations led by the United States, and the Socialist camp led by Soviet Union) after the second world war made this policy untenable. Turkey was amongst the participants in the San Fransisco conference in which the foundations of the United Nations was laid. Beginning from Truman doctrine (in 1947) that pledged to Turkey and Greece support against Soviet

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[126] Cited in Secretariat, *12 September*. 186.

[127] Interview. Evren also emphasized the relief that they felt when they saw that "95 per cent of the working people supported their action." Interview.

expansion, Turkey's fate was closely linked to the US led Western camp. In 1947 Turkey was admitted to OECD. In 1951 she applied for the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and admitted in. In 1963, it signed association agreement with what was then European Economic Community (EEC).

Turkey's pro-western stance was the legacy of Republican project of modernization, which regarded the western club of nations as the examples of "contemporary civilization" to which Turkey should aspire to catch up with. The ties that bound Turkey to the western Camp were economic and political. It was economic in that Turkey continued to receive a foreign aid, and conducted her external trade heavily, though not exclusively, with the western camp. It also suited her guest for security against the traditional antagonist neighboor Soviet Union (USSR). The US led Western Camp, in turn, saw Turkey as an invaluable ally against USSR's expansionist policies both as the first hindrance against the possible Soviet attack and a base through which to gather intelligence regarding Soviet military might. Despite the occasional emergence of some problems,[128] Turkey's western oriented policy remain unchallenged. If on anything both state elites and the major political parties (despite Ecevit's flirtations with the non-aligned world) were in full agreement it was the Turkey's pro-western stance.

In the eve of the 1980's events around the world increased Turkey's importance to the western camp. After the first cold war in fifties and late sixties, the seventies had ushered a detente in US-USSR relations symbolized by the Salt I and Salt II agreement in 1972 and 1979 respectively. Parallel to that detente and presence of problems between Turkey and the US, Turkey appeared to have been losing its strategic value to the west. But this detente was more in rhetoric than in reality. When the Soviet Union invaded Afganistan in December 1979, it became clear to US policy makers that the USSR was not as benign as it was portrayed to be. The invasion of Afganistan was not the only event that negatively affected US interests in the world. A couple of months earlier the world had witnessed the fall of Shah in Iran and the

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[128] The President Johnson's letter in 1964 was one example. The President Johnson argued that Turkey if she had intervened militarily in Cyprus and if it provoked any direct involvement from the Soviet Union, the US would not honor NATO guarantees. The poppy growth debate and arms embargo after the 1974 Cyprus intervention were other examples.

Iran's new rulers did not hide their anti-US (anti-western) stance.[129]

All of a sudden, Turkey, whose importance seemed to have been declining, had regained its former situation as the most important ally in the Southern flank of NATO. In April 1980, Turkey and US signed a new defence agreement, Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) covering US-Turkish military cooperation. This agreement, according to The Economist, "may mark a milestone in Turkish foreign policy. It advertises the world that Turkey is now anchored to the west; the flirtation with Russia and non-aligned world which was part of Mr. Ecevit's 'multi-dimensional' diplomacy has been abandoned."[130] It was followed by the significant increases (from 125.2 million dollar in 1977 to 406.4 million dollar in 1980 and to 453.8 million dollar in 1981) in the US credit and aid to Turkey.[131]

Parallel to Turkey's increasing significance for the western camp as a whole, the US became more and more interested in Turkey's internal problems. A politically unstable Turkey, they rightly assumed, might easily fall prey into civil-war and come under Soviet influence. Under the influence of cold war doctrines, they seemed to have assumed that securing political stability (read the prevention of spreading communism) should have a priority over the promotion of democracy.[132] That is, even an overtly repressive and authoritarian regime might

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[129] It was also important that the alliance called CENTO (established to function like NATO) between US, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran had been dissolved in March 1979.

[130] *The Economist*, April 5, 1980. "Reoccidentation." The then US President Jimmy Carter had sent a letter to Premier Demirel stating that agreement "marks an important milestone for both the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America." According to Carter, the agreement "recognizes Turkey's crucial contribution to the Alliance and it adresses critical questions of defense and economic cooperation." He then added that it was his "firm conviction that Turkey should be assisted in every feasible way" and he "regard this effort as a high personal priority." For the full text of the letter and Premier Demirel's answer to it, see, George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance: US Interests in the Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy." *Orbis*. 24, 2 (1980), 378.

[131] Cited in Oğuz Babüroğlu, *A Theory of Stalemated Social Systems and Vortical Organisational Environments* (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 155. Baburoğlu shows Turkish Embassy in the US as his resource.

[132] According to Packenham, US economic aid was guided by three considerations; promoting US security interests by strengthening anti-communist forces, promoting US economic interests which, in turn, help to create stability and new markets for the US and promoting democracy through the rewarding of liberal democratic polities. Packenham argues that except for brief period under Kennedy Administration, the first and second policy objectives had priority over the third. Robert. A Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

be supported provided that it were anti-communist and did not harm the vital US interests.

It appears that like many segments of Turkish society and the military, the US policy-makers, too, had come to share the view that Turkey's civilian democracy would not, successfully, be able to cope with pressing problems. Rightly diagnosing that the US desired a stable (but not necessarily democratic) Turkey, many journalistic accounts of the 12 September intervention seemed to imply that the US was somehow involved in both the preparation and execution of the intervention.[133] In the light of available evidence, we think that, this view is flawed. It is true that the US actively encouraged, and even itself tried to provoke military intervention in many countries, notably it instigated a takeover against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.[134] But, to infer from these cases that same thing happened in Turkey would surely a gross exaggeration. In the first place, as we discussed above, the Turkish military was disposed to see itself as the guardian of the Republic and they did not need to be encouraged by the United States to takeover. It can be argued that, on the basis of other country's experiences, the US could have been more assertive if the Turkish army had been unwilling to intervene. In Chile, where the military had been reluctant to engage in politics until the 1973 intervention, the military might have needed to be encouraged by an outside force, but not in Turkey.

What the Turkish military high command appeared to have done is to carefully estimate how the US and other NATO allies would react in the case of the intervention. When I asked General Evren whether they had considered how the NATO allies would react to intervention, he told me that "of course, we considered what the NATO and other foreign countries ('dış alem') would say about the intervention." But he was very careful to emphasize the point that even if these countries had given signals that they would have opposed such a movement, it

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[133] Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Amerika* [America and the Coup d'etats in Turkey] (Ankara: Ümit, 1995); Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül - 04:00* [12 September- 04:00](İstanbul: Milliyet, 1984). Cüneyt Arcayürek also implies that in his several books on the subject.

[134] Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes -Chile* (London and Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 57. See also, the US role in the breakdown of Guatemalaen democracy in 1954, Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

would not have affected them. "If you began to consider," Evren told me, "what America says (about intervention), what NATO says, or what Russia says, you can not handle such a thing" as what was important for them was "the prevention of the possibility of civil war in Turkey."[135]

When I asked him in which ways they tried to assess the possible reaction of outside world, Evren told me that particularly in NATO meetings many officals came to ask him what was going to happen in Turkey, and where anarchy and terrorism might lead to. I also asked him whether he was aware of the alleged efforts of the then commander of the navy and post-intervention premier Admiral Bülent Ulusu to try to discover the reaction of the outside world. According to Cüneyt Arcayürek, Admiral Bülend Ulusu told him (in 6 September 1979) that:

> I went to a dinner in American Embassy where I met with 10 American senators and NATO staff. I told them that Afganistan is out, Iran is similarly. We are even more important than they are as we are in the Southern flank of NATO. What would your attitude be if anything happens here ? (Ulusu probably speaking of the possibility of intervention) The senators have told me that there would be no negative response from us. We do not interfere internal affairs of the states. Every state must take care of its internal order. [136]

He told me that he was not aware of this and did not particularly authorize Ulusu to perform such duties. But he did not seem to be particularly embarrassed by this and seemed to regard it as normal arguing that "Ulusu himself might have felt the need to prowl it."[137]

It seems that US and NATO allies behaved in the way that suggested that in the case of intervention by the high command, they would not make much fuss about it, while Turkish officials quietly tried to assess what their reaction might be. It was not much because without such signals the military would not conduct the operation (but surely would think twice) but because they wanted to ensure maximum legitimacy for the intervention through their encounters in several meetings. That this interpretation is more to the point can be gathered

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[135] Interview.

[136] Arcayürek, *Müdahale*.272.

[137] Interview. ("demek ki o orada kendiliğinden bu işi bir kolaçan edeyim diye sormuş olabilir.")

from Paul Henze's RAND Corporation paper entitled "Turkish Democracy and American Alliance." Paul Henze served as assistant to Zbigniew Brzerzinski in the US national security council at the time. He vehemently denied that "US government encouraged the generals or at least gave advance approval of their September 1980 assumption of power."[138] He argued that true to Turkish tradition General Evren was "wishing to avoid even the remotest appearance of need or desire for advance foreign approval of the action he and his colleagues took in September 1980, or subsequently." He concluded that "the Carter Administration would not have discouraged takeover, if informed in advance, but it preferred not to be."[139] To the extent that Henze's views represent the US governments views, the statement suggests that US, too, did not have much confidence in Turkish democracy's ability to cope with pressing problems and was expecting the military intervention to take place. Besides they were more than happy to support it "if informed in advance." And Turkish army commanders correctly estimated the United States' this posture and a kind of tacit understanding was thus secured.

Along the same line, James Spain, the ambassador for the US at that time, noted in his memoirs that the embassy staff had concluded in the various meetings within the June and July 1980 that "a major political upheaval was virtually inevitable, but it was not likely to happen in the next few months."[140] He also noted that "the U.S military staff that worked most closely with the Turkish military were virtually unanimous in saying that this (military intervention) was going to happen."[141] Yet, Spain continued, "all of our uniformed advisers admitted that they had received no direct indication of an intention to act from

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[138] Paul Henze, *Turkish Democracy and American Alliance* -RAND Paper- P-7796 (Rand: Santa Monica, 1993), 45.

[139] Similarly, James Spain, the US ambassador at that time, argued that "I personally did not know anything that would give the signals that the US would favourably respond to intervention. And I did not give any signals amounting to that. ...But like everybody, America, too, could estimate that the army was going to takeover." Cited in Ufuk Güldemir, *Kanat Operasyonu* [An Operation in the Southern Wing], second ed. (Ankara: Tekin, 1986), 24.

[140] James W. Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey-Memoirs of an Ambassador, Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary* (New York: Praeger, 1994), 12.

[141] Ibid., 12.

their Turkish colleagues." [142] They learned, Spain added, military intervention on 11 September night from the head of US Military Assistance and Training Mission, whom a high level Turkish officer had phoned on the same night.[143]

Similarly, the military's decision to continue the 24 January measures should be seen in this line. It is not because the military decided to take over the administration of country to better implement 24 January measures as is sometimes implied by those favouring 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' state thesis. This was especially so, they pointed out, since even Turgut Özal accepted that without an intervention full scale implementation of program was just not possible.[144] The fact that new administration officially informed (within the forty-eight hours of takeover) the the IMF and the World Bank and that they intend to continue same economic policy and that they did not remove Özal and his team are also stated in support of this view. The military appears to have continued these policies both because they assumed that, if they did not, international economic organisations would not provide much needed support for the new regime. They just did not want to take the responsibility for the troublesome area of tackling the economy on themselves. It was also the case that themselves appeared to have believed that there is no viable alternative to it.[145] Otherwise, they have not

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[142] Ibid.,12.

[143] Indeed, Spain wrote that he had told one junior US military official, who warned him military intervention would take place in the morning of 12 September on 11 September night, that "if a coup were as imminent as he said, I thought we would have had some kind of a direct hint from the military leadership." Ibid., 18. This young officer, Spain tells us, has arrived that conclusion because he had seen many tanks at Balgat ready to go into the city. Besides, one of his Turkish officer friends had returned from the US four days earlier than planned on 10 September and explained to his friend that his wife had to undergo a critical operation, while American officer saw his wife, supposed to be in critical condition, was well and healthy. Ibid., 17.

[144] Cited in Osman Ulagay, *Özal Ekonomisinde Paramız Pul Olurken Kim Kazandı Kim Kaybetti ?* [Who Gained, Who Lost, while Our Money became Worthless in Özal Economics ?] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1987), 63. See for the same view, Şenses, "structural," 214.

[145] The military high command were briefed by Turgut Özal on January 8, which was not reported in the press. In the briefing Özal spoke of the need for increasing exports and reducing inflation and gave the direction of measures to be taken. It appears that commanders were impressed by this meeting and the necessity of the measures. Krueger and Turan, "Turkish,"356. Regarding the 24 January measures General Evren have wrote that "I think that these decisions had to be taken. Because there was no other way for the country to overcome scarcities." Evren, *Anılar*. 354. In our interview, he repeated the same view arguing that they had seen harmful effects of "excessive statism" (aşırı devletçilik) and gave the

become free-marketers overnight, rather they followed what appeared to them the most pragmatic economic policy.[146]

Thus, the military high command came to the conclusion that there remained no other way but military intervention only after it carefully estimated that the critical actors would support, or at least stay neutral to it.[147] The high command wanted to be sure of that because they very seriously concerned to ensure that the intervention was seen by critical actors as a last resort to save the country from falling into civil war. On May 18, General Evren finally ordered that the takeover would take place in the first week of July,[148] subsequently deciding (on July 1) the day of takeover as July the 11th.

In retrospect, it can be said that after that stage regime's chances of survival were low. But it seems that up until the final point there was still a possibility of saving, albeit diminishing day-by-day, the regime. There is an important example suggesting that the military was sensitive to any hope for the regime and might, at least, delay the intervention if such opportunity arised. As we noted above, initially the first week of the July had been decided as the date for takeover. When the JP government secured vote of confidence as a result of interpellation put forward by the RPP in 3rd of July, Evren delayed the whole operation to 12 September. He argued that in that case they would give Demirel an opportunity to say the RPP + Army = Power formula was back on the agenda. Evren also added that between 8-10 June an important meeting would be held in Paris to reschedule Turkey's debts.[149]

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example of the differences in treatment of customers in private sector and in Sümerbank Store managed by state.

[146] General Evren's memoirs indicates that he was far from happy with what appeared to him ultra-liberal policies' of the 1980s. For instance, he was worried that the country was importing unnecessary products such as bananas. He, as president, had warned premier Turgut Özal that if this continued the country might run out foreign exchange. Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* [Memoirs of Kenan Evren ] vol 5 (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 362.

[147] It goes without saying that the military could not be 100 per cent sure of its success. Every military intervention involves risk of failure. While this can be minimized, it can not be removed.

[148] Evren, *Anılar*.434, 456.

[149] Evren, *Anılar*. 460.

In our interview Evren told me that if the parties could agree on holding elections, they would have to postpone the whole operation to see what happens after the elections. He said that they could not conduct an intervention because in that case, "we would have seen to intervene against the holding of the elections."[150] When I asked him whether election of a president could have made difference, he told me that "they might again have postponed their plans" but they would not abandon it, as it was not the election of president but the prevailing anarchy that they were moving against. I also asked him that what would have happened, if the RPP and NSP had managed to establish a new government, he answered that "it would not have made a difference." It seems that if unaccompanied by a strong government to tackle anarcy, even the election of a president, or formation of another weak government, would not make much difference but only prolong the process. The only way that might create a strong government, the military appears to have thought, might be the holding of the early general elections.[151] This suggests that in Turkish case Juan Linz's contention that "...at any point in the process up to the final point, chances remain, albeit diminishing chances, to save the regime" [152] appears to have been valid.

From that date to 12 September 1980, unaware of the military's plans, political party elites continued to tear each other apart thus reinforcing and providing further justification for the commanders' decision. The JP leadership was determined to pursue what has been called above crisis strategy in the presidential elections. To force the constitutional change that would

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[150] This point has been repeated by Süleyman Demirel as well. See, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, April 9, 1995. But here Demirel accused "those who have presented him a report which argued that people did not want elections."

[151] Interview. I also asked him what they would have done, if their plans had been discovered by the government in March or in April 1980 and government had tried to retire the high command as a whole. Evren answered that they (as high command) did not decide what they would do, but added that "if high command as a whole had been retired, they would not have said all right and gone." He also told me that from 11 July onwards, if the government had attempted to retire them, they would have immediately begun to implement the program. He also added that even if they had been retired, he was sure that new commanders would not think differently.

[152] Linz, *The Breakdown*. 11.

ensure the election of president by the general vote and to call for an early general election, Demirel procrastinated presidential elections.[153] He consistently rejected calls for the RPP-JP co-operation. Instead, he argued that if the dialogue was desired the RPP should provide support for the bills in the assembly.

The RPP leader, on the other hand, was much less consistent throughout. On the one hand, he continued to make calls for dialogue between his party and the JP, but on the hand he blamed it in most severe terms. He charged Demirel for "arming at least 200.000 people, as a result of a plan implemented by himself."[154] When in Çorum, 33 people were killed as result of sectarian killings, Ecevit argued that "today the government is led by a person, who is enraged in a hurry to bring fascism into the country"[155]

The RPP leadership also rejected Demirel's early election proposal which might have led to the postponement of military intervention for a while. He argued that conditions were inconvenient and that a healthy election just could not take place. Election security, according to Ecevit, was to be ensured under a impartial government and only then the country could hold elections. He asked that " if even funerals can not be brought on stone on which the coffin is placed (musalla taşı), then how are we get people voting ?"[156] Arguing that the state had lost its impartiality, and was helping, what to him were, fascists, he also argued that "if we go to elections with this government, it would not only be a shaded but also be bloody elections."[157]

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[153] He argued that in his view "it is meaningless to insist on a method (of electing president) which leads nowhere. Mutual accusations between parties also would not be enough to elect the president. Let's go to citizens (electorate)." *Hürriyet*, May 23, 1980.

[154] *Hürriyet*, June 4, 1980.

[155] *Milliyet*, July 12, 1980. For the Çorum events, Ecevit blamed the government; "Despite its being known that right-wing militants started the events, the government preferred to conceal this fact and pretended as if there was a communist danger. ... It is clear that the government was not partial in Çorum events, it cooperated with one of the sides and it tried to smother up their crimes." *Milliyet*, July 8, 1980. Regarding Ecevit's outbursts, The Economist noted that "Mr Demirel and the JP have been denounced as 'fascists" so often that many Turks have stopped listening." *The Economist*, August 23, 1980, "Let's Vote Again."

[156] Cited in Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 268.

[157] *Hürriyet*, June 3, 1980.

Many believed, however, that Ecevit was fearful of possible election defeat, and waited for the JP government to become worn out over time. Meanwhile he continued to flirt with the NSP just to bring down the government.[158] In 24 June 1980 Ecevit, brought forward an interpellation against the government. Erbakan promised him support in the voting. But, when Demirel persuaded him not to support the RPP, Erbakan backed down. Then the motion of interpellation was rejected. (In this way, Erbakan increased his power vis-a-vis Demirel government). In other instance, the RPP even supported an interpellation against foreign minister Hayrettin Erkmen, for his conduct of Turkish foreign policy regarding Israel. It was not that Ecevit in any substantial sense opposed Turkey foreign policy toward Israel but that he thought it might be a convenient opportunity to bring the government down.[159] Both leaders seemed to be enslaved by the NSP, a party which ruthlessly exploited its position as key to formation of any government.

While economy showed signs of improvement due basically to 24 January measures, terrorism continued to increase.[160] There appeared many more 'liberated zones' in which neither the security forces nor those opposing viewpoints were allowed to enter. The sectarian killings in Çorum, Yozgat and other places claimed many lives. The murder of well-known persons continued, too. In 27 May 1980 the general secretary of the NAP, Gün Sazak was killed. In 15 July, the RPP İstanbul MP Abdurrahman Köksal was killed followed by (only four days later) former premier Professor Nihat Erim who had been a prime minister during the 12 March interregnum.

The last attempt by acting president İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil to solve the political stalemate failed. Çağlayangil had managed to hold a meeting between Ecevit and Demirel on 24 June in Çankaya. To respond calls for dialogue, and not to portray themselves as

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[158] In 8 June 1980, he also talked about a coalition between the JP, the RPP and the NSP under a leadership of non-party premier. Cited in Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*.38.

[159] Metin Toker of Hürriyet commented on Ecevit's decision "...the the RPP is now degraded to such a degree that it even became a prop to those who threaten republic and democracy. It is pathetic !" *Hürriyet*, September 7, 1980. "Hükümet Böyle Kalamaz" [Government can not Continue Like This]

[160] According to Yankı's estimation between November 1979 and August 1980 death toll resulting from terrorism rose to 1942. *Yankı*, September 1-7, 1980.

uncompromising, both leaders, in the face of mounting public pressure, were compelled to attend the meeting. But nothing tangible did come out of it. Ecevit blamed Demirel for asking for his party support while not even considering what the RPP thought about the bills in the assembly. Arguing that there was a need to end politicization of the bureaucracy first, he rejected Demirel's offer for an early general elections as well as preventing his efforts to strengthen the state. Demirel, on the other hand, offered that if the RPP does not support the JP in the assembly they should take country into the elections.

The meeting ended with no tangible result. The political party leaders continued to stick their own particular policies thus pushing the limits of democratic system so as to make other politicians accept to their own view. They did so without appreaciating the fact that their stance might be detrimental to democratic regime, which allowed them to pursue these policies in the first place. As The Financial Times correspondent Metin Münir noted politicians seemed "like passengers in a sinking ship quarrelling about cabins."[161] They did not trust each other, suspecting that any compromising move by one side could be presented by other as victory. Nor did they try to understand what constraints their rivals were under. What Valenzuela wrote for Chilean case equally applies to Turkish one. He wrote that (in the last months of Allende regime) "neither side knew what the other side really wanted: neither side was fully prepared to believe that, even if the other side were sincere, it would be able to keep its word."[162] And that "neither Allende nor Christian Democratic leadership seemed fully to appreciate the enourmous political constraints the other was under."[163]

At this stage, it appears that party leaders, did not seem to expect the military to intervene. They did not seem to ask the question The Economist had asked "Is the Army losing patience ?"[164] and that seems to be one of the chief reason for them to allow "the state of the

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[161] *Financial Times*, July 10, 1980.

[162] Valenzuela, *Chile*.97

[163] Ibid., 98.

[164] *The Economist*, August 2, 1980, "Is the Army Losing Patience ?"

regime to deteriorate so disastrously."[165] In the Çankaya meeting (July 24, 1980) for instance, Bülent Ecevit was reported to have said that:

> despite the fact that restoration is more necessary than in the past, the possibility of military intervention is so low that it is almost non-existent. Why is this so ? Because they (the military) became experienced. They are intelligent people. They appreciated that interventions do not work, and that they can not prevent conflicts at mass level.[166]

Demirel's position on whether he was expecting the military intervention or not is not that clear-cut. On the one hand, Demirel several times appears to have indicated the possibility of military intervention. In 17 January 1980, when journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek told him about the NSP's decision to block package of measures in the assembly, Demirel was reported to have said that "God damned those, they would get the assembly closed down."[167] Similarly in 15 February 1980, Demirel was reported to have said (to Arcayürek) that "The military is planning something. This assembly will have itself abolished by the military. I am sincere in my belief that this will happen. If the assembly delays the election of president many things could happen."[168] On the other hand, in an interview in 1986, Demirel told Arcayürek that "up until 11 September he did not think of the possibility of intervention."[169] Similarly, James Spain (US ambassador at that time) reported that in early August he twice had a chance to ask Demirel whether he expected a military takeover and was assured by him that he was not expecting such thing.[170]

It appears that Demirel was not as certain as Ecevit regarding the likelihood of military

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[165] Hale, *Military*. 238.

[166] Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*.259. Bülent Ecevit came to this conclusion only couple of days after General Evren's sharp warning. General Evren, in the celebrations for the six anniversary of Cyprus intervention, argued that "...there are those who, while calling themselves followers of Atatürk's principles to deceive others, have actually deserted his principles. I, as the head of armed forces, indicate that we shall not allow this country, entrusted us by Atatürk, to be overrun by them. *We will punish those traitors soon.*" Cited in Evren, *Anılar*.465. (my italics)

[167] Arcayürek, *12 Eylül*.359.

[168] Ibid., 414.

[169] Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 287.

[170] Spain, *Memoirs*. 14.

intervention. Unlike Ecevit, Demirel (who was more realistic and down to earth) seemed to think that intervention was a possibility. What he could not estimate was, when the intervention might take place. There are indications that even if he had known the exact date, he would not be able to affect the course of events. Interestingly enough and revealing much about Demirel's leadership style, in an interview in 1986, he said that "by July, I became certain that we would not be able to overcome the anarchy, that the soldiers will not do it."[171] Despite that, he even did not attempt to change the direction of events. In a mixture of feeling of desperation and fatalism reminiscent of the Ottoman-Turkish conception of accesion to power that are determined by God's will alone,[172] Demirel argued that he just could not change commanders because Çağlayangil was an acting president and the opposition would make fuss of it. He could not take the country to the elections because other parties just did not want it. And he did not think of resigning because "he had proceed in this way and tried to go as long as he could."[173] "Governing (hükümetçilik)", he argued, "is not something that you could take when you want, and give up when you did not wish."[174] Thus, believing that the intervention was not imminent (in the case of Ecevit) or even believing that it might be imminent but not feeling himself strong enough to affect the course events (in the case of Demirel), both party leaders continued to put their own policy agendas first.

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[171] Ibid., 284.

[172] Exemplifying such conception of accession to throne, İnalcık cites, Süleyman I's remarks to his son Bayezıd, who had plotted for the throne, that "in future you may leave all to God for it is not man's pleasure, but God's will, that disposes of kingdoms and their government. If he has decreed that you shall have the kingdom after me, no man living will be able to prevent it." Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600* (Phoenix: London, 1993), 59.

[173] Arcayürek, *Demokrasi*. 284.

[174] Ibid., 284. This attitude of Demirel can also be seen his evaluation of the 27 May intervention and Menderes' reaction to it. He was reported to have told (to Cüneyt Arcayürek) that "Menderes knew that the intervention was coming. Three days earlier, people told him. I ask those who blame Menderes for being imprudent (basiretsiz): What could Menderes have done ? what sort of measures might he have taken ? *There can not be any viable measure against the armed forces.*. What is important is to prevent the armed forces' involvement in politics as being part of a tradition. Cüneyt Arcayürek, - *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor- 5, Demirel Dönemi, 12 Mart Darbesi 1965-1971* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains 5, Demirel Period, The 12 March Coup D'etat] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1985), 286.

Meanwhile the military finished all preparations for the takeover and began to wait for the morning of 12 September. The two critical events in the interim provided an additional justification for intervention and reinforced the military's belief that if they did not move, if they waited a little bit more, it might prove to be too late. In 30 August 1980, the national day, the NSP leader Erbakan did not attend the "Anıtkabir" (Atatürk's maosoleum) for the celebrations. In 6 September the NSP organized a meeting called "A Meeting to Rescue Jerusalem." In the meeting, a group of hardliners sat down while Turkish National Anthem were being played. They also shanted slogans such as "we want Şeriat," an anathema for military. In 12 September, the military finally stepped in, ending Turkey's troubled experience with democracy.

# CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to analyze the behavior of the major political party elites during the 1973-1980 period and how their actions seemed to have contributed to the breakdown of Turkish democracy in 1980. Following Juan Linz, we assumed that the breakdown of democracies is not determined by structural (economic and-or cultural) factors alone, however important they might be. Structural characteristics of societies "constitute a series of opportunities and constraints for the social and political actors, both men and institutions that can lead to one or another outcome."[1] Political actors, particularly those who profess commitment to democratic regime, have room for maneuver so as to affect the unfavorable effects of these structures. Corollary to this argument was that political actors were not the mere bearers of the structures, that is their behavior is not completely determined by structures into which they had been socialized.

With this framework in mind we began to examine the advent of democracy in Turkey expounding a series of opportunities and constraints for political party elites at each political juncture. We argued that the trials and tribulations of Turkish democracy can best be comprehended if we take into consideration the larger social-political framework within which it evolved. That larger framework, as conceptualized in this study, consists of the complex encounter and interaction of Ottoman-Turkish strong state tradition and the modernizing social structure. This particular combination, it is argued, did not present a particularly favorable conditions, when Turkey began its experiment with democracy in 1946. At the mass level, available research suggested that in terms of the existence of 'civic values' such as belief in one's competence, limited partisanship, propensity to co-operate with others and tolerance, Turkey of late fifties and sixties did not fare particularly well. It was related to various socio-economic indicators -GDP per capita, literacy level, associational life, rate of urbanization and

[1] Juan J.Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdowns and Reequilibration* (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1978), 4

industrialization- as well as the particular trajectory of the strong state. At the elite level too, the impact of the same factors were discernible. State elites tended to perceive themselves as true guardians of state and public interests, and possessor of ultimate truths. Political elites, on the other hand, tended to see democracy as the majority's unlimited power to do whatever it please. Apart from specific understandings of crucial concepts, the strong state tradition has left its imprint on the political culture of both elite groups -tendency to see power in absolute terms, tendency to personalize conflicts, lack of tolerance of opposition, pejorative view of the compromise,- as the majority of them had been socialized into politics in the RPP.

It is misleading, we have continued, to argue that the interaction in question generated only unfavorable conditions. State elites opted for a rationalistic conception of democracy, believing that to be regarded as civilized country one should have a democracy. Their insistence on democracy as political system, despite they perceive it as something that might encourage (from time to time) those who challenge the bases of the Republican state, was one favorable factor. The fact that Turkey had securely -at least in comparison to other developing countries- established its national identity was another. At the mass level, too, one can speak of some favorable cultural traits. Turkish people were familiar with the idea of the state representing public good, bounded by some definite rules, from which one can expect fair treatment. Turkey has also relatively long experience with the ideas of rule of law, limited state, and experiences of elections and party politics beginning with 1830s.

The first experiment initiated by the ruling RPP in 1946 ended with military intervention in 1960. The uneasy coalition which constituted the DP consisted of diverse elements, the common denominator being the opposition to the RPP rule. It was led not by those with peripheral origins but those who left the RPP for basically intra-elite conflict. In the single party period, local notables (whose power was based on land ownership, kinship, or ethno-religios leadership) had provided the main link between the party (and state) and the periphery. With a transition to multi-party regime, the situation did not radically change, linkages between parties and social groups remained weak and based on vertical, clientelistic relations as they had been in one-party period. The rank and file organizations of the DP was

dominated by already existing factions and clientelistic networks, which, for a variety of reasons had left the RPP and/or had been rivals to an RPP faction. This state of affairs helps to explain why the two major parties did not greatly differ in the social background of their deputies. True there were undeniable differences, but it was not the case that the parties draw support heavily from one segment of society at the expense of other. It also helps to explain why "party patronage" has been crucial part of the politics in Turkey, since leaders of these factions promised bloc of votes to party leaders in return for various benefits for their clients. With the emergence of the DP, securing benefits to supporters by exploiting advantages of being in power (which were plenty due to state's weight in the economy) rather than aggregating/reconciling various conflicting interests, as well as formulating clear-cut policies for the good of the community as a whole, has been the prime occupation of the political parties.

The DP had no intention of questioning the central tenets of the Republican regime, though it favored rather relaxed understanding of laicism and statism. Impressed by its electoral strength it tended towards a majoritarian understanding of democracy, believing the majority could do anything it please. In doing so, they referred to Atatürkist (influenced by Rousseauean conception of General Will) idea that the assembly was the true representative of the nation and that its authority could not accept any limitation. Atatürk had used this argument against the Caliphate and Sultan and he had not placed much emphasis on whether the assembly was elected on the basis of electoral competition. The DP leaders, hoping that competitive elections would give them comfortable majorities, used the same argument, but this time putting the emphasis on elections.

The DP did not feel secure in government and continued to exercise power under constant suspicion that they would be overthrown by a plot led by İsmet İnönü, whom they believed to control civilian and military bureaucracy. The RPP, on the other hand, could not easily accept being in opposition and opted for a harsh opposition style. True to tradition, they appear to have assumed that there was only one correct policy, known by them, to be followed in each case. The DP, in turn, did not seek a modus vivendi either. This ten year period,

therefore, was characterized by extensive government-opposition conflict, a cultural trait that had its roots in the Ottoman strong center tradition. In the absence of any great socio-economic differentiation upon which political parties might be established abstract ideological debates played the role of filler.[2] Each party exaggerated its difference from other, intensifying elite polarization at the top with a danger of its spreading into mass level. Political conflicts at that time evolved not on the articulation/aggregation and reconciliation of various interests but on whether the government was violating Atatürk's principles (and/or democracy) or on whether the opposition had been involved in divisive activities that aimed to overthrow the government. The DP's lack of tolerance of opposition (based on the idea that the opposition was planning a coup to overthrow government) led to it to push for various pieces of legislations that can hardly be reconciled by democratic system.

These extensive government-opposition relations as well as the efforts of the press and universities were crucial in some junior officials' coming to the conclusion that Atatürk's principles as well as the integrity of the state were in grave danger, a belief that forced them to intervene against DP rule. The intervention was widely supported by the RPP, civilian bureaucracy and intelligentsia, actors which perceived themselves, alongside the military as guardians of state and Republican principles.

The 1960's ushered in a new era in Turkish politics creating new opportunities as well as constraints for democracy depending to a large extent how political actors (both state and political party elite) were to respond to unfolding events. In that sense, post-1960 developments constituted a backdrop without which the 1980 breakdown can not be properly understood. The new Constitution of 1961 cherished political participation and recognized both classical and socio-economic rights but, somewhat contradictorily, it also put checks on the power of elected majorities. The new participatory atmosphere of that era allowed the emergence of various ideological parties and movements as well as the radicalization of intelligentsia, who increasingly tended towards socialist ideas. Alongside changes in the political landscape and in interaction with it, Turkish social structure also underwent significant

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[2] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (London:Eothen, 1985), 99.

changes as a result of the quickened modernization process. Since the late fifties, industrialization and its concomitant features like increase in the number of urbanized workers and migration to the cities acquired further momentum.

Politics in this new era was characterized by the JP's dominance until the 1973 elections. The JP was a successor to the DP in that it did not question the basic tenets of republican regime. It, too, favored a softer approach to laicism, and majoritarian democracy in which "national will" would reign. Continuing its predecessors' patronage-oriented outlook, it favored a mixed (moderately planned) economy in which state would play a significant role. The JP differed from the DP in its attitude towards the military. What is possibly a result of a learning effect, the JP leadership showed utmost care in its relations with the army.

The RPP, too, underwent significant changes in that period. To appeal to educated, urbanized middle class and newly emerging workers, who were increasingly drawn by socialist ideas, İsmet İnönü adopted a "left of center" policy which was a little more than polishing of the old RPP principles. The RPP did not undergo significant change, both in terms of ideology and bases of social support, until Bülent Ecevit took over it and replaced the old guard. Bülent Ecevit began to use eloquent socialist-sounding rhetoric to appeal to the underprivileged. Be that as it may, the new RPP program was based on the realization of such aims as economic development through mixed economy, social security, equality of opportunity, and participatory democracy. The new policy appeared to pay off as the RPP's share of vote tended to increase.

The main problems that democracy faced in that period were related with both socio-economic cleavages (workers versus industrialists, big industrialists versus small Anatolian businessmen) and law and order problems created, in part, by student activism. The participatory atmosphere of post-1961 era encouraged various socialist and marxist groups to emerge and to affect political landscape significantly. The emergence of the Turkish Workers Party and various associations promoting socialist ideas and student activism, almost instantly produced a backlash from ultra-nationalist groups (particularly the NAP and its affiliated

associations) who perceived themselves as the protectors of the Turkish nation from communism.

Street fights between these groups, increasing militancy of the working class, and the perception of the JP as unable to come up with a solution were the chief reasons that lay behind the 12 March military intervention. Though, power struggles between junior officers and the high command within the military played a crucial role, both government and opposition committed to grievous mistakes that triggered the intervention. The governing JP, which despised by military, intelligentsia and nations' other elites, and much weakened by intra-party conflict, appeared to be unable to cope with unrest in the streets. Meanwhile the RPP opposition tried to wear out the government without paying enough attention to the fact the democratic regime itself was likely to be damaged in the process. The two interim governments under the direct influence of the military muddled through, unable to make any significant contribution to solving Turkey's problems except for the suppression of terrorism, for the time being, through martial law.

The 1973 elections produced a party system which was both polarized and fragmented. Though, the Turkish party system has never been free from polarizing tendencies, the emergence of Ecevit and his efforts to move his party towards further left (though still not making it socialist) and his radical-socialist rhetoric was one of the contributory factor. As was the emergence of strictly ideological parties (the NAP and the NSP) which gained representation in the TGNA. Finally, assumptions of the JP's leadership, that the party can regain its former dominance if it unites the right against the 'storm of socialism' which entailed the strengthening of anti-communist rhetoric and the portrayal of the RPP more left leaning than it really was, was instrumental.

The post-1973 period, therefore, witnessed a Turkey which, despite considerable modernization of traditional social structures through not insignificant industrialization and its concomitant feature urbanization, was far from performing well on basic socio-economic indicators. For a variety of complex reasons, Turkey's urbanization-industrialization process did little to spread 'civic values' nor did it significantly help to moderate the latent religious-

sectarian cleavages. The failure of industry to absorb immigrants, led to a large informal sector and phenomenon of gecekondu with its distinctive values. The Turkish economy, completing the easy phase of ISI needed immediate attention (for both internal and external reasons) that would require serious sacrifices.

But on the other hand, there were other factors tending to support the democratic regime. Opportunities, so to speak. There was not a strong anti-democratic movement (with mass base) bent on overthrowing the democratic regime. Whatever the degree of civility it displayed, the Turkish electorate consistently voted for two major parties which did not differ much either in their programs (both favoring mixed economy, and social security, both favoring Republican principles) or drew support from one segment of society at the expense of the other, despite radical rhetoric of its leaders. Besides, in the aftermath of the 12 March the military firmly came to the conclusion that, unless "knife cut through the bones" its involvement in politics damaged its internal unity and prestige and they were determined to stay out of politics. In the previous interventions they had come to be identified with the RPP. In the post-1973 period, however, the RPP (alongside intellectuals and part of the civilian bureaucracy) was no longer perceived as the party of state elite by the army. In that period the military saw itself as the only true guardian of the state. Finally, the 12 March intervention and its aftermath seriously undermined arguments of those intellectuals, who looked down liberal democracy as practicised in Turkey by labeling it as "nice" (cici) democracy and who agitated for a progressive military rule.

These constraints and opportunities, which do not fully determine whether democracy survives or not, left a space for maneuver for political party elites. Post-1973 developments, however, demonstrated that that political party elites were not so successful in building on these opportunities, thus increasing the democratic regime's legitimacy. After a short RPP-NSP coalition and long haggling, the NF government were established. The central features of this period had been increasing polarization at an elite level, extreme politicization of the civilian bureaucracy and party patronage. The rationale behind this government was, in the words of Süleyman Demirel, "to unite nationalist against leftist" thus defining the situation in black and

white terms. With the help of Ecevit's relentless allegations that the government was soft on the NAP and treated rightists (i.e fascists in Ecevit's lexicon) leniently, the country had been drawn into elite polarization spreading into mass level where latent conflicts had prepared an already fertile soil. The extreme politicization of bureaucracy (especially the security forces) that the NF governments practiced presented another problem as without a well-functioning impartial, efficient state, liberal democracy would not perform its expected functions. It is in that period that terrorism was on the way to becoming an acute problem. Finally party patronage led to uncoordinated, piecemeal, free-for-all economic policies that triggered the economic crisis that would show its full effects in 1978-9.

The RPP minority government that replaced it in 1978 was seen as a hope for democracy by critical actors. It was expected to deal with increasing terrorism and economic problems. The twenty-two-months long RPP government was a dismal failure in both accounts. Not properly assessing the causes and true magnitude of the problem terrorism, the RPP government stumbled along for a while. Even when it seemed the appreciate true dimensions of the problem, both the ideology and composition of the government made it difficult for it take effective measures to cope with terrorism. In economic policy, due to both its approach and composition of its power base, as well as sheer administrative incapacity, the government had been unable to take painful measures to put Turkish economy on track. With the RPP's failure hopes in the democratic regime's survival severely diminished as the opposition JP was not perceived viable alternative. It is at this point that the military came to think that it might have to intervene. Both because they did not want the legitimacy of intervention to be contested and because due to army's pressure politicians could put their house in order, they issued a letter to all parties and constitutional institutions demanding their co-operation. Political party elites, once again, failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation and did not move after the military's warning. When the assembly even failed to elect a president, let alone find remedies for mounting terrorism, the military intervention became a foregone conclusion.

It has been our basic thesis that political party elites, through their actions and non-

actions, were unable to increase the democratic regime's efficacy and effectiveness and undermined the belief, on the part of the critical elites, in the democratic regime's ability to solve pressing problems, thus paving the way to its breakdown in 1980. Let us now broadly outline how Turkish party elites behaved in the face of pressing problems, and offer explanations as to why they tended to behave in the way they did.[3]

First, Turkish party elites were not good at in diagnosing the causes and roots of the problems that the country faced. A good mark of the leadership, as Tucker indicated, is to properly identify the problem, mobilize resources and then act decisively.[4] When problems are not placed in proper context with all its dimensions, it is difficult to envisage effective solutions. In the Turkish case, somewhat falsified analyses of the roots and prevention of terrorism on the part of the party elites, appears to have undermined the democratic regime's efficacy and effectiveness in its fight against terrorism. Major party leaders identified the causes of terrorism differently, tending to downplay left-wing and/or right-wing terrorism in the case of the RPP and in the case of JP respectively. It seemed that for the sake of petty party interests they failed to condemn it unanimously regardless of where it sprung from. While Bülent Ecevit sometimes accepted that those in the left recoursed to terrorism, Demirel showed extreme reluctance to accept what he called nationalists involved in violence.[5] As late as July 1979 Demirel still stuck

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[3] As has been noted in the first chapter, we do not claim to explain fully why party elites behaved in the way they did. This is because such an explanation requires; the consideration of various constraints and opportunities that larger social-political framework presented to them; culturally grounded beliefs, ideologies and short term political considerations of elite; their socialization patterns and more personal factors which have an impact in making of these ideologies and beliefs as well as their perceptions of what their interests are. Our explanation is concerned only with the impact of environment and elite beliefs, ideologies and short-term political considerations, but not with their socialization patterns or personal factors that surely have an impact in the making of these beliefs and ideologies and their perceptions short-term political considerations. This is chiefly because the study does not aim to explain the behavior patterns of a single leader, but two major party elites as a whole in the specified period. Therefore, despite our attempt to consider culturally grounded orientations, beliefs, ideologies, and short-term political considerations of party elites, we can not delve into the origins of these beliefs and ideologies. That would require detailed consideration of their pre-adult political socialization process and more personal factors.

[4] According to Tucker three elements that are analytically successive constitute the core of leadership. These are "diagnosis," "prescription of the course of action," and "mobilization." Robert C. Tucker, *Politics as Leadership,* revised edition (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 19

[5] In an interview with Abdi İpekçi in 1976 Demirel argued that "today, there is no rightist

to this attitude. When asked, once again, whether nationalists had been involved in the violence, Demirel did not say that they had, as surely was the case.[6] But, instead, he argued that "nobody was above law and nobody had a privilege to kill others and that whoever was committed to killing authorities must catch him up."[7] Party elites' failure to condemn terrorism regardless of where it came from did much to undermine the legitimacy of democratic system. As Linz noted, one-sidedness in excusing or condemning acts of violence was "both an indicator and a cause of loss of legitimacy of participants in the political process."[8]

Not only they could not agree on causes of terrorism but also, and perhaps because of differing diagnoses, they also differed on how to prevent it. The JP put an emphasis on legal-administrative measures to get the state to regain its democratic authority, while the RPP urged socio-economic improvements and expansion of freedoms. Assuming that there is an adverse relation between law and freedom, the RPP leadership in particular did not seem to understand the true nature of the liberal democratic state. Failure to agree on the causes and means of prevention of terrorism was one of the prominent reasons why the parties could not unite against it -a sine qua non, if democracy is to survive. That failure to find remedies for increasing terrorism was the chief reason for the critical groups' loss of belief in democracy. Likewise, party elites' flawed diagnosis of the Turkey's economic problems appears to have negatively affected their ability to put the economy on track. Both major party elites appear to have underestimated the true magnitude of Turkey's economic problems. Consequently, instead of coming up with compact packages to put the economy on track, they preferred ad hoc, daily measures that did not help the troubled Turkish economy, which in turn, exacerbated the

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terrorists that robs banks or kills people. You cannot show me a single person (with rightist convictions) that disturbs people in the university." Though in the same interview he accepted that "rightists had been involved in mutual clashes in the schools" he insisted that they did not "initiate" these events in and outside the schools. *Milliyet*, July 22, 1976.

[6] Even Alparslan Türkeş had accepted that "yes, there had been people within our rank who committed crimes but they did not do it to fulfil party's orders." *Yanki*, January 2-8 1978.

[7] Süleyman Demirel, *Basın Toplantıları* [Press Meetings ] (Ankara: Ulucan, 1979), 47, 65, 89.

[8] Linz, *The Breakdown*. 61.

economic crisis.

Ignorance on the part of the party elites regarding the causes of problems and their solutions, can better be understood if it is linked with structures of political parties. Political parties in Turkey have hardly emerged as direct, mass-membership parties representing various social groups aggregating and articulating their interests, devising policies formulating goals for the community. Internally created, being based on professional cadres, having little horizontal links with social groups, and aiming rather to exploit the advantage of being in power through patronage, political parties had little incentive to devise well-thought out proposals, to state as explicitly as possible what are they going to do if they assume power. Reinforcing the political parties' that attitude can be related to that of the expectations (or what leadership believed to be as expectations) of the mass of the electorate. As noted, the majority of the electorate in Turkey appears to have been concerned with the satisfaction of immediate, local, and personal needs rather than long-term, national issues as well as being politically unsophisticated. As long as a party could satisfy these needs, the electorate did not seem to ask more. Thus, parties have become oriented to coming power and distributing special favors to supporters rather than formulating concise policies for the community since, the leadership seemed to assume, it might not always be appreciated by electorate.[9] For party leadership it seemed like a burden to devise well-thought out policies. Various platforms, that were expected to discuss issues intelligently, were dominated by hagglings between intra-party factions related to who would get what positions when the party assumed the power.

Second, Turkish party elites, whether in power or in opposition, inclined towards heightening expectations. All leaders tend to play down the magnitude of the problems ahead and promised all good things to everybody, hardly mentioning inevitable sacrifices required. Both claimed that the problem of terrorism and economic crisis could easily be handled, if they were given an opportunity to assume power. The more they inflated expectations, the more the

[9] It was true that the RPP showed some efforts to change this state of affairs by establishing a research bureau within the party and by preparing more elaborate programs. But in terms of feasibility and viability of these programs, its efforts remained less than successful possibly because of the low quality of the intellectual-scholarly community that prepared or backed up these programs.

possibility of their being seen as unsuccessful increased. Since by heightening expectations to a degree which they were not likely to satisfy, governments set high standards against which they would be evaluated. This tendency did not bode well for democratic system since, it severely damaged belief in their ability to solve problems.

Third, both major parties exaggerated their differences and portrayed the others, not as benign forces with whom they differed on specific policy questions while agreeing on the basic rules of democratic game, but as an hostile force with malign intentions. The fact that democracy requires at least a minimum amount of civility between parties and commonly subscribed shared values[10] on the rules of game seems to be not to have been understood by party elites. The RPP leadership, for instance, easily labeled the JP as the protector of fascists (and sometimes even being fascist) while the JP accused the RPP for being (and-or being soft on) communists and ethnic separatists, despite the fact that these characterizations could hardly be justified. It has also been common occurrence to see Turkish party elites ferociously accusing each other of being 'head of bandits,' 'robber,' 'mad,' 'enraged,' and the like. They did not even refrain from characterizing each other as the sole reason for the country's problems. With the passing of time, conflicts tended to become highly personalized. It became difficult to distinguish whether it was the policy differences between major parties or personalized fights of the leaders that led to such state of affairs.

The exaggeration of differences and such use of language did not bode well for democracy's survival. Democracy is more likely to survive if elites try to bridge their differences by emphasizing what they share rather than differ and arrive at decision acceptable to both sides. Besides, the sharp exchange of words tended to heighten the tension unnecessarily. The fight at the top involved a potential danger of spreading into mass level which was already beset with various latent ethnic and sectarian cleavages as well as the prevalence of less than civic values. The image of a political arena in which party elites have been involved in a fierce exchange of words surely undermined belief in the democratic

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[10] In other words, a belief that opposing parties are not impeccable enemies. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy-Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 152.

regime's ability to solve problems. Since it is these party elites that are expected to deal with these urgent problems, and when they seemed to be tearing each other apart with no realistic chance of them being replaced in short term, people are likely to look at elsewhere for the solution. And finally, it made their coming together more difficult especially when such patterns continued for long. The longer they continued to accuse each other with the harshest of the words, the less the likelihood of their coming together to seek remedies.[11]

A closely related feature has been party elites' tendency towards what can be called 'opposition for oppositions' sake.' To oppose meant to them literally to oppose everything deemed to be in the interest of other party(ies). Whether the policies in question were beneficial to the country as a whole or whether the same policies had been advocated by them previously or whether their opposition were likely to wear out not only the parties in power but democratic system itself did not seem to matter. The desire to oppose what deemed to be beneficial (or is likely to make government successful) to government appears to have overridden all other considerations. If the government and opposition parties appear to have agreed on one single point, it was an agreement on not to agree.

The examples, as we put it throughout the dissertation above, abound. The new RPP government in 1978 had to campaign for the budget prepared by the NF government. When in opposition the RPP had staged a strenuous campaign to prevent its acceptance by the assembly. In power the RPP defended the same budget, while the former NF parties opposed it. A similar thing happened in package of measures designed to deal with terrorism. When in power both parties became its staunch defenders, when in opposition they tried to prevent its being legislated. In another example, the JP leadership, hoping that it could wear out the RPP government, complained that the RPP was trying to dilute martial law and opposed its extension. Despite the fact that only a couple of months ago they had criticized the RPP for

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[11] According to La Palambora, the use of ferocious language does not necessarily have to hinder co-operation and collaboration. He argues that the Italian political elite tend to use fierce language in the public arena but "in those less transparent places, where public policies are actually forged, political elite collaborate." Joseph La Palambora, *Democracy -Italian Style* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1987, 265. In Turkey, on the other hand, no such pattern was observed. The only thing parliamentarians of all persuasion easily agreed on was related to ensuring various benefits for themselves such as increases in MP's wages as the press has frequently brought to the public's attention.

not declaring martial law, and despite their knowing that the military felt incensed about what appeared to them an effort to involve the army in party politics. Similarly, Bülent Ecevit tried to exploit such a grave situation for his party interests when the army issued a letter by saying that "this government had such a warning in only 32 day whilst the RPP never had such thing." It goes without saying that such behavior on the part of party elites helped neither their credibility nor increased the critical actors' trust in them. Rather, they were seen as opportunistic egoists concerned only with their narrow party interest, which undermined the democratic regime's legitimacy. As Kenan Evren said in interview, Turkish party elites' tendency towards 'opposition for oppositions' sake' was the most important factor that led him to believe that democratic system could, and would, not be able to cope with problems.

As to why party elites tended to behave in such ways regarding government opposition relations, no simple answer can be offered. It is not the elite political culture, nor the structure of parties, nor the party system, nor specific beliefs and short-term political considerations of the elite alone, can help to explain elite behavior. It is rather the complex interplay of party systems and party structure, and elite political culture as well as short-term political considerations of elites seems to have played a role. There is an almost unanimous agreement that the fragmented party system of the post-1973 period encouraged centrifugal tendencies. The RPP, hoping that with a margin of the vote it could secure an absolute majority, began to use radical slogans so as to attract votes from the left. It chose to present the JP as the protector of fascists and themselves as the only party to stop them gaining power. Moved by similar motives, the JP leadership, too, had benefited in characterizing the RPP as the protector of communists and the only party to stop them coming to power. In that way, the JP leaders assumed that they could attract votes from right, while forestalling the possibility of a RPP-NSP coalition. These accusations also appears to have served party elites' aim of keeping their parties intact. The fact that in the fragmented party system even one vote might be decisive for the fate of government, party elites appear to have chosen to characterize other party(ies) as so different from them in order to prevent them transferring to the other party.

A closely related factor was the structure of Turkish political parties. They were hardly direct, mass membership parties, being the representative of social groups, articulating aggregating their interests and carrying them into the public arena, but rather they emerged largely as a result of an intra-elite conflict. They were less of party which articulated (aggregated) and reconcile various interests than parties which were dominated by professional cadres and which were more interested in distributing public resources along party patronage. Political conflicts between parties, thus, centered less on how to reconcile various interests, gear economic growth, reduce unemployment and inflation or strategies of fighting with terrorism. They were rather centered on largely personalistic intra-elite conflict and accusations of corruption that were in the main unrelated to broader social problems and tensions. When parties are all alike in crucial respects, as Turkish parties had been, the personalistic conflicts tended to dominate the scene because parties could differentiate themselves largely on these terms.

The impact of the party structure and party system is, however, less than adequate in explaining the character of the government-opposition relations. The elite political culture defined as "the set of politically relevant beliefs , values, and habits of the leaders of the political system"[12] needs also to be taken into consideration. In the making of the elite political culture history is likely to play a crucial role. The imperial-patrimonial Ottoman principles of government left no room for the concept of loyal opposition. If one is in opposition, then one is not loyal since one could be loyal only to an individual (sultan) and not the concepts of governance. It also prepared a fertile ground conducive to personalistic conflict. Personal

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[12] Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology." *American Political Science Review.* 65, (1971), 651. The concept of elite political culture rests on the assumption that "even in the most stable systems and the most homogeneous populations there will be significant differences in the outlook of political leaders and common citizens." Lucien W. Pye, "Identity and Political Culture," in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, by. Leonard Binder et.al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 103. Almond and Verba, on the other hand, tended to downplay differences between elite and mass political culture. They argued that "though our data can not demonstrate this, there is a reason to believe that political elites share the political culture of the non-elite. ...Elites, after all, part of the same political system and exposed to many of the same political socialisation process as are non-elite." Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture -Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 486.

rivalry was endemic to the Ottoman system of government as the rulers concentrated decision-making in their hands, politics tend to be exclusively a center-oriented activity having little contact with the wider society. The central problematic of the polity in such system was to gain the confidence of the absolute power-holder as he alone decided who would get what. Since there was fierce competition to acquire such acclamation competitors used everything at their disposal to outstrip others. Combined with widespread insecurity, also a central characteristic of the system, anything that could be called political activity turned around gossip, intrigue, mutual accusations and bickerings confined to palace.[13] This was because the easiest way to remove personal rival was to convince the Sultan that person in question constituted harm to higher interests of the state. The traces of that tradition appears to have been reproduced in the second constitutional period and in the Republic. From the very inception of party politics in Turkey, Turkish party elites have tended to characterize and blame (accuse) the opposition (and or government) with the harshest of the words. Especially in the Young Turk era party struggles resembled those between competing religious sects. With the Republic accusation of opposition for the violation of 'Atatürk's principles' and 'treason' and 'progressive-reactionary' lines continued. In the seventies government-opposition relations polarized on left-right (or fascist-communist) terms. It is has been an almost unchanging feature of Turkish political life that the government blames the opposition for having divisive motivations and the opposition accuses the government of violating basic principles of state and-or democracy. Thus, accusations of government and-or opposition with outrageous words and tendency towards personalistic conflict has become a "tradition"[14] and part of elite political culture[15] that

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[13] For a work on pre-1979 Iranian elite political culture, which exemplifies how the patrimonial regime of Shah helped to generate widespread insecurity, distrust and cynicism within the political elite. He sums up basic characteristics of elite culture as follows; "An inability to predict with surety, the behaviour of others; a disbelief in the sincerity and integrity of others (and, in the real sense, of oneself); absence of cooperation and mutual independence; a flight from responsibility and decision making; and pursuit of personalized, systematically nonsubstantive goals..." Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 336.

[14] We use Edward Shils description of tradition as "...the recurrence, in approximately identical form, of structures of conduct and patterns of belief over several generations of membership or over a long time within single societies -with a more or less delimited territory and a genetically continuous population- and within corporate bodies as well as over regions extending over several bounded territorially discrete societies which are unified to the extent of sharing in some measure a common

the party elites find it hard to overcome.

It may also be argued that party elites assumed that a harsh style of opposition was appreciated by their electorate and would secure them extra votes. In the democracies, members of the elites need to be responsive to needs and wishes of the people simply because they need votes to stay in power.[16] In other words, as Linz put it, "some of the quality of political class will be determined by the 'quality of the electorate,' the readiness of the voters to support leaders with clearly negative characteristics on the one hand and on the other a public opinion disinterested in the quality of leaders."[17] We do not have any hard data to sustain such conclusion, but admittedly less than scientific impressionistic evidence might lead one to suggest that it appears to have been appreciated, or more significantly political leadership think it as being appreciated, by the masses at large. Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, an academic who was also minister of culture in the RPP government, answered the question of why Ecevit, while calling for a dialogue, was so harsh towards Demirel as follows:

> The moderate style of opposition could not find resonance in the JP. By contrast, *it began to generate reactions within the rank-and-file members of the RPP*. If Ecevit had not expressed reactions of people, we might have came across terrible developments. Therefore, Ecevit was right to increase dose of opposition while not withdrawing calls for dialogue."[18]

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culture -which means common traditions." Edward Shils, "Tradition," in *Center and Periphery -Essays in MacroSociology* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), 183.

[15] Accusation of opponents or rivals with outrageous words and tendency towards personalistic conflicts seem to be valid not only for political elites but also for other elites in Turkish society as well. Emin Karaca, for instance, documented "fights" between various influential journalists from second constitutional periods to day (1997). What strikes the reader is the personalistic nature of the clashes. Rather than defending principles in an intelligent way, journalists in Turkey, with a few notable exceptions, have come to accuse each other by "treason" by being "corrupt," "communist," "reactionary," "stupid," "immoral," not being "a real Turk" and like. Emin Karaca, *Türk Basınında Kalem Kavgaları* [ Clashes of Pen in Turkish Press] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1998).

[16] Putnam, *Comparative*. 143. In the similar line of argument, Almond and Verba suggested that "law of anticipated reactions" plays a key role in mass influence over political elites. Almon and Verba, *Civic*. 487.

[17] Juan J. Linz, "Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy," in *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 422.

[18] *Yanka*, 28 July-3 August, 1980. (my italics)

Korkut Özal, likewise, noted that in 1975 a partial senate election campaign how the head of his party in Pınarbaşı county warned him to be more harsh, saying that "he should rebuke aggressively others so that people would listen you well" (ona buna vuracaksın bu millet duyacak). While he refrained from such style, party men did exactly what he said and attracted enthusiastic support from the crowd, which had remained very silent when Özal tried to talk intelligently about Turkey's problems.[19] In yet another example, Ömer Dedeoğlu, an MP from the RPP, recalled that a member of the RPP in his local province asked him "why could they neither see or hear that he has been involved in fights in the GNA, despite the fact that they sent him there in the hope that he could knock down the rivals with a single punch as he was tall and strong."[20] These might be specific cases and by no means constitute satisfactory evidence to speak confidently on the matter, but what can be said with confidence, is that even if the electorate did not like that style of opposition, it did not seem to make their discomfort known to leaders so as to compel them to change their behavior.[21]

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[19] Nail Güreli, *Gerçek Tanık-Korkut Özal Anlatıyor* [The Real Witness-Korkut Özal Speaks] (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1994), 211. In yet another example, Orhan Erkanlı, soldier turned RPP politican (who became member of parliament between 1965-68) recalls how in the election campaign the local head of his party warned him by saying that "you should use ferocious language (sert konuşun) as the attacks of the 'A' party's deputy on last Sunday have undermined our men's morals.." Erkanlı, then, continues, "what they understand by 'using ferocious language' is to attack and even insult the rival parties. The more you use ferocious language, the more applause you will get and satisfy your partisans. If you have not become harsh enough (towards your rivals), they complain about your attitude to head of province." He even notes that every party has its own special speakers who excelled at "provoking a quarrel" and parties sent them to "necessary places." Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular* [Memoirs, Problems and Those Who are Responsible] (İstanbul:Baha, 1973), 255. The same can be said for clashes between journalists. According to Emin Karaca, journalists behave in the way they do because "people like fights. Even they see a fight in the street, they stop and watch it to a degree that they forget appointments." He also noted that how in the recent "live" clashes on TV between two journalists (Emin Çölaşan-Mehmet Barlas) boosted the rating of the private television station which days before began to announce occasion. Emin Karaca, "Basın Tarihimiz, Bir Tekrarın Öyküsü..." [Our History of Press is the Story of Repetition] *Milliyet*, May 31, 1998.

[20] Ömer Dedeoğlu, *Milletvekilinin Günlüğünden Anılar* [ Memoirs From the Diary of a Member of Parliament] (Ankara: Demircioğlu, 1998), 63.

[21] This, of course, does not mean that there is, or there should be, one-to-one correspondence between the wishes of the electorate and the policies of the elite. In many cases, elites themselves help to shape, even sometimes create, the preferences and values of the masses to a varying extent. Even when it is not the case, political elites do not necessarily be simply responsive to demands of the electorate. As Sartori remarks, a "government that simply yields to demands, that simply gives in, turns out to be a

Fourthly, Turkish party elites had shown distaste for -the notions of bargaining and compromise- perhaps the most significant feature of democratic regime. Their failure to agree on ways and means of offering remedies for economic troubles and terrorism, which clearly had to do much with their inability to bargain and compromise, did much to undermine in democratic regime's efficacy and effectiveness and subsequently its legitimacy. Despite its leadership frequently called for dialogue and claimed to seek compromise, the RPP did not convince many in its sincerity. The RPP leadership appeared to have remembered the virtues of compromise only when it was in their party's interest, that is when the RPP did not have a realistic chance of forming a government. The JP leadership was even more strictly opposed to the notion of compromise. Believing that there was only one correct policy to be found (and followed) in each case, compromise seemed to them to be giving away concessions to adversaries. Finding a middle way with mutual concessions appeared something bad to be avoided.

It is necessary to introduce a distinction here. Somewhat paradoxically both major party elites seemed to have become uncompromising only against each other, otherwise they were more than willing to bargain and compromise with semi-loyal elements especially when there was an opportunity to wear out the government or to form a new one.[22] The RPP, for instance, made a coalition with the NSP (in 1974) which questioned the very basis Republican state the RPP have proclaimed to have upheld. In another instance, the RPP supported the NSP when it put forward an interpellation against the JP government's foreign policy regarding Israel while not totally agreeing with its substance. Similarly, the JP proved to be quite adept at bargaining (it left two ministerships to the NAP, which had only three members in the parliament) to form second National Front government, despite widespread opposition against it. It can be suggested that Turkish party elites bargain and compromise only when they think that compromise promotes their short-term, immediate, visible interests. The democratic

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highly irresponsible government that does not live up to its responsibilities." Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate* (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987), 170.

[22] Sabri Sayarı, *Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri* [Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies] (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1980), 204.

notion of compromise, however, requires that elites should be adept at compromise when there is a danger to democratic system, even if it is contrary to their short-term interests.

In explaining the lack of bargaining and compromise we should again refer to the complex interaction of elite political culture, policy differences between parties and distrust of leaders as well as their short-term political considerations. As noted, the belief that there is one correct policy to be followed in each case is in the Ottoman-Turkish political tradition. So is the belief that compromise is something "demeaning" and to be avoided. Political party elites, especially, the JP leader Süleyman Demirel, continued in the same tradition.

To say that it has been a tradition does not explain much. One should also take into account other factors that allowed/supported such tradition to regenerate (to support itself) itself. One factor seems to be short-term political considerations of the party elites. They seemed to believe that if they stick to (or insist on) uncompromising policy lines, they could achieve short-term policy agendas. In the last months of the regime, as we noted, Demirel seemed to believe that he did not need to bargain with Ecevit because he could take the country to early general elections in which he expected to garner a majority. Similarly, Ecevit guessed that he could unseat the JP government with the support of the NSP. Widespread distrust between party elites as a result of years of political bickering, mutually harsh accusations, broken promises, personalized nature of conflict, had also become one of the key factors that hindered co-operation. Distrust between leaders reached such a degree that each leader suspected that any compromising gesture would be presented as sign of weaknesses by its adversaries.[23] This brings us to the related point of their assessment of possible mass reaction to any compromising gesture. Though we do not have any hard data to support it, at mass level, too, values such as compromise and bargaining did not seem to be highly praised, at least to an extent that forced party elites to be more compromising. One can suggest that leaders' chose or afford to be uncompromising because they might have assumed that any

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[23] Some policy differences (especially regarding the roots of terrorism and economic crisis and means of preventing them) between parties, though it was not as great as leaders portrayed it to be, may also have played a role in their uncompromising attitude. But on the other, compromise is not something that you do with those whom you are in agreement but a way to reduce differences with those whom you differ in many respects.

compromising move would cost them votes. Süleyman Demirel, in an interview in 1986, for instance, presented himself as one who sincerely believed that the electorate did not crave compromise and his party's attitude reflected that of the electorate. He argued that "do you assume that the RPP and JP consist only of MP's, administrative elite? Behind these, there are masses."[24] Similarly, when he said that the coalition between the RPP and the JP was "against the nature of things," he had added that "citizens also would react (or oppose) to this."[25] According to Oğuz Aygün, a prominent JP MP, "both the RPP and the JP perceive it (cooperation between parties) as faintness towards their electorate."[26] This is by no means enough evidence to state this is the case but again, one can safely conclude that even if the electorate did not approve of parties' uncompromising stance, they were not 'pounding on' their doors to be more compromising.

Fifthly, party elites of the period observed did not refrain from politicizing bureaucracy as well as resorting to widespread party patronage. Politicization was particularly observed in the civilian bureaucracy, including the security forces. When in power, parties (especially during National Front governments) scattered about civilian bureaucracy as they please constrained, if at all, only by legal rules. The RPP was, it seemed, no less partisan either. The first thing every new government did was to 'clean' bureaucracy from what appeared to them harmful (read other party sympathizers) elements. Such extreme partisanship virtually paralyzed civilian bureaucracy and security forces as the positions were filled (or civil servants were promoted) not on the base of merit but whether the appointee in question was a party men or not. The politicization of bureaucracy appears to have had grave consequences for the survival of democratic regime. It, as might be expected, severely damaged the state's effectiveness as the state could not perform what it was expected to perform from punishing those who violate the law, to ensure law and order, to secure enforceability of contracts, to the

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[24] Cited in Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Cüneyt Arcayürek Açıklıyor, 10 Demokrasi Dur -12 Eylül 1980,* [Cüneyt Arcayürek Explains-10, Democracy Stop, 12 September 1980] second ed. (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 470.

[25] *Cumhuriyet*, July 29, 1977.

[26] *Yankı*, January 14-20, 1980.

tax collection, health service, and maintenance of the roads. Low effectiveness is, as we remarked, likely to be detrimental for regime loss of legitimacy.

Particularly important was the state's failure against terrorism, in which the paralyzed civilian bureaucracy played no ignorable part. Not only because the security forces just could not gather information (about terrorist activities), could not catch and could not keep convicted ones in prison, but also because it led to the state's being perceived as partial in its application of laws. This, in turn, prepared the ground for their taking laws into their hands and/or made them ready to defer strong one's authority. We also know that paralysis of the civilian bureaucracy played a particularly important role in the military's coming to the conclusion that unless the civilian bureaucracy was radically restructured (which they did after the intervention) the fight against terrorism could not be won, and that political party elites did not give a clue that they intend and able to erase politicization.

Similarly, party elites have frequently been involved in party patronage distributing public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support. Through the large economic resources that the state had in its disposal, governing parties tended to award many advantages for its supporters while depriving others. It took many forms such as securing credits to fellow businessmen, improving the infrastructure of those districts that voted for a party, appointing party men to state economic enterprises, directing public investment according to political criterias and the like. This extensive party patronage did not fit well with sound economic management and did pave the way for the economic crisis that played no ignorable part in the democratic regime's loss of legitimacy.

To explain why party elites engaged in widespread politicization and party patronage, we should again refer to the complex interplay of the structure of political parties, elite political culture and their short-term political considerations as well as the impact of the modernizing social structure. In Ottoman-Turkish polity, as noted in chapter four, the bureaucracy strictly adhered to what Heper called 'bureaucratic empire tradition.' It was assumed that public interest would be best served not through conciliation of various interests but instead through the discussion of intelligent people. Public interest, they believed, is best represented and

protected by bureaucrats who are free from electoral pressures. This attitude, in turn, reinforced oppositional mentality in the political elites.[27] To cut short what they perceived as unresponsive bureaucracy, they used whatever they could at their disposal, including staffing it by their own sympathizers regardless of merit or established recruitment patterns. Similarly, widespread party patronage is also related to the peripheral mentality displayed by party elites. They tended to behave as if resources to be distributed derived not from tax-payers money but somewhat mysteriously happened to be in the treasury controlled by overjealous bureaucrats.

These cultural dispositions, however important, should not be overemphasized. The traditional social structure undergoing rapid modernization process provided a fertile ground which increased political parties' predisposition towards patronage. From the inception of the transition to a multi-party regime party patronage came to play key role in determining a party's success in elections. Especially the DP and its successors, heavily relied on local notables and other faction leaders, which promised them bloc of votes in return for various benefits. The tradition of father state -expecting the state to help ensure decent life for people as father expected of his children- as well as governments' control of vast economic resources reinforced this patronage orientation.[28] With the advance of the industrialization-urbanization, and the emergence of somewhat stronger private sector, the situation did not significantly change. If anything changed it was the forms of the patronage as the private sector relied heavily on state protection in the forms of favorable credits, tax exemptions, allocation of limited foreign exchange, tariff and import quotas. It was not the private sector only which craved for patronage. The urban-migrants, like peasants and private industry, followed the suit. The inability of the private industry to absorb migrant workers, the central and local

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[27] This explanation is rather valid for, what is commonly called, right-wing parties. In the case of the RPP-led partisanship and politicization, strictly ideological factors and desire to clear the heavily politicized bureaucracy seemed to play prominent role.

[28] Though Hayek seems to exaggerate when he stated that "if the government has the power to grant their (various special interests) demands, it becomes their slave," he had a point in indicating direct positive relations between the resources at the disposal of the political elite and their disposition to patronage. Frederick A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty- The Political Order of a Free People, vol 3.* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 11.

governments' failure to ensure decent life for the migrants who had to live in squatter houses, all led these people to turn to political parties. Political parties, which are "viewed as networks through which public patronage is distributed"[29] found it hard to resist these pressures as their electoral success was very closely related to their ability to secure specific benefits for their supporters.

To sum up, this dissertation argued that democracy in Turkey did not find particularly favorable soil in which to flourish. Complex encounter and interaction of both the legacy of Ottoman-Turkish state tradition and the traditional social structure undergoing modernization appears to have created several constraints for the stability of democracy. But these constraints did, by no means, require that democracy in Turkey was doomed to fail as they also generated some opportunities for democratic development. Political actors, particularly those who professed open commitment to the democratic system, did have room for maneuver so as to affect these constraining conditions (in the making of which they also played a role) and enhance the likelihood of democracy's survival. It was also assumed that the behavior of the political actors is not totally conditioned by the environment as they are not mere bearers of these structures. It is the basic thesis of this dissertation that political party elites, far from taking such a stance, through their actions and non-actions -particularly important was their reactions to problem of terrorism and economic crisis- undermined belief in the democratic system and paved way to its breakdown in 1980. That does not mean, on the other hand, that the breakdown was solely the result of the failure of party elites. It was not the case that social-political conditions of Turkey presented very favorable conditions for the democracy to flourish but party elites spoiled it, as some analysts (and the military high command that led the intervention) implied. Quite the contrary, socio-political conditions of the seventies generated considerable constraints that necessitated courageous, innovative, insightful leadership. That sort of leadership would require the ability; to

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[29] İlter Turan, "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic," in *Perspectives on Turkish Democracy*, ed. Ergun Özbudun (Ankara:Savaş, 1988), 105.

diagnose problems correctly and devise effective ways to deal with them, to build up of coalitions, to reshape the preferences and values of the electorate, to soften the latent conflicts within them, to convince the electorate necessity of the short-term sacrifices for the long-term good of the community and the like. However, party elites found it impossible to overcome the impact of these constraints -cultural, economical, institutional. In term of the categories formulated by James Mac Gregor Burns,[30] they could not show the 'transforming' pattern of leadership or became 'leaders' but proved to be mere 'power-holders' and, many would argue not totally unjustly, less than competent even in that role.

[30] James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 5, 20, 425.

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