

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM UNDER STRUCTURAL REALISM

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TE. YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU
DOKÜMANTASYON MERKEZİ

To My Family;
Ayser, Mehmet İhsan, Kerim Altuğ Sarı.




I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of IR in International Relations



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ABSTRACT

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STRUCTURAL REALISM

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This thesis aims to analyze the concept of terrorism under the impact of international structure. For that purpose, first, the concept of terrorism is compared with other types of violence and its common characteristics were defined. Second, terrorism is classified and historical examples were given accordingly. Third, terrorist organizations were assessed as smart mechanisms that are able to learn and adapt into the conditions in which they subsist. Last, it is highlighted that in the development of terrorist organizations, besides their internal dynamics, states' tendency to cheat plays a crucial role. Terrorist organizations make use of the feeling of uncertainty and grow stronger out of the states' rivalry. In the end, they emerge as secondary actors. As units interacting in the international system, the behaviors of terrorist organizations are also shaped and shoved by the structure. They both affect and become subject to the impact of structure. The impacts of the new actor on the international system were evaluated according to the basic principles of Structural Realism. As a result, it is concluded that since structural factors plays a crucial role in the emergence of terrorism, as long as the structure endures, terrorism will also persist. Therefore, states should find ways to coexist with terrorism with the possible least hazard.

Key words: International Relations, Terror, Transnational Terrorism, Terrorist Organizations, Structural Realism, System, Change, Structure, the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

ÖZET

SINIRÖTESİ TERÖRİZM VE YAPISAL GERÇEKÇİLİK

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Bu tez çalışması terörizm olgusunu uluslararası yapının etkisi altında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, terörizm kavramı diğer şiddet çeşitleriyle karşılaştırılmış ve bu kavramın taşıdığı temel özellikler tesbit edilmiştir. İkinci olarak, terörizm kavramı sınıflandırılmış ve bu sınıflandırmaya uygun olarak tarihsel olarak örneklendirilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, terörist organizasyonlar yaşadığı koşullara uyum sağlayan ve akıllı mekanizmalar olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak, terörist organizasyonların gelişiminde kendi iç dinamiklerinin yanı sıra devletlerin aldatma temayülünün öneminin de altı çizilmiştir. Terörist organizasyonlar devletlerin rekabetlerinden ve sistemden kaynaklanan belirsizlik duygusundan yararlanarak daha da güçlenmektedirler. Bunun sonucunda terörist organizasyonlar ikincil aktörler olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Uluslararası yapıyla etkileşim halinde bulunan terörist organizasyonların davranışları yapı tarafından kısıtlanıp şekillendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, terörist organizasyonlar yapını hem öznesi hem de nesnesi olmuşlardır. Bu yeni aktörlerin uluslararası ilişkiler sistemi üzerindeki etkileri yapısal gerçekçilik teorisinin temel prensipleri temel alınarak değerlendirilmiştir. Yapısal faktörlerin terörizmin gelişiminde oynadığı önemli rol gözönüne alınarak yapı devam ettikçe terörizmin de varolacağı sonucuna varılmıştır. Dolayısıyla devletler terörizm ile mümkün olabilen en az zararı gözeterek birarada varolmanın gerektirdiklerini yapmalıdırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Sınırötesi Terör, Terörizm, Terörist Organizasyonlar, Yapısal Gerçekçilik, Sistem, Değişim, Yapı, Kitle İmha Silahları

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you."

Paul Wilkinson¹

On September 11, 2001, the sole superpower of the international politics got past a shot that will never be forgotten. Whole world witnessed shocking and dreadful terrorist attacks live on the televisions. It was a scene that would be evaluated as an exaggeration, if it took place in a Hollywood production. Emotional and fearful ramifications of these attacks on the entire world were intangible. Besides the shock they stimulated, the assaults served as lessons for the world public that no one could escape being a victim of terrorism, even superpowers. A terrorist organization, claimed to be Al Qaeda, carried out such an operation that no state could dare against the US. These terrorist attacks on the US raised questions regarding the future security environment of the world. The fear and the sense of vulnerability and insecurity increased among states and their constituents. 'Nothing will be the same again' became almost a motto in the discussions of the academic circles and daily conversations in the period subsequent to the September 11 incidents. The amount of academic studies focusing on terrorism augmented. Many questions were asked beginning with 'Who', 'What', 'When', 'Where', 'How' and 'Why' and tried to be answered.

¹ *Terrorism Quotes, Terrorism Quotations, Terrorism Sayings* [on-line]. Available on <http://home.att.net/~quotesexchange/terrorism.html>; Internet.

In this thesis, terrorism, in general, and transnational terrorism, in particular, will be the main analytical focus and the research herein will pursue answers to such crucial questions as: What is terrorism? What should be our measurement while defining the term? Is it a distinct kind of violence? What are the features of terrorism that distinguish it from other types of violence? Is it possible to make a typology regarding terrorism? What historical examples can be given regarding these typologies? What are the continuities we faced while studying terrorism and what changes took place in its logic and the methods of violence? What are the factors that helped terrorism to become too outrageous? What are the internal and external dynamics of terrorism? Did terrorism really become an interacting unit in the system invalidating the importance of the states? What is the relationship between the international system and terrorism? What are the permissive factors in the international system assisting the development of terrorism? What were the features of the international system did play a role in strengthening of terrorism? Can we see any factor in the international system constituting underlying reason for the development of terrorism? What are the similarities or the differences that exist between terrorist organizations and the other actors in the system? Why do they act alike or in a different way? What changes can we foresee for the future security environment of the world under anarchy? Is it possible to get rid of terrorism?

Some of these questions are going to be answered by empirical-historical framework. Historical and empirical parts of the discussion will be utilized so as to establish the argument that transnational terrorism constitutes a peak point in the evolutionary process of terrorism and deserves special

attention from structural theories. In the descriptive parts of the thesis we will make a connection between the enriched capabilities of transnational terrorist organizations and states' tendency to cheat. Therefore, the remaining inquiry will be held theoretically by using basic assumptions of Structural Realism. This theoretical part, which is going to be the main focus of this thesis, aims to elaborate on the relationship between the international system and transnational terrorism. The impact of the international structure on transnational terrorism will be closely scrutinized. Structural Realism is a theory usually criticized for its ignorance of the changes and focusing on the continuities in the system. Here, we aim to analyze the changes and the continuities in the international system due to transnational terrorism by using Structural Realism as a theoretical framework.

The second chapter of this study is going to focus on the definitional problem concept of terrorism. We will compare terrorism with classical warfare, guerrilla warfare, ordinary and political crimes in order to distinguish terrorism from other types of violence. Having an overlook to the other definitions, we will specify common tenets of terrorism and argue that an objective approach is necessary to reach a common definition of terrorism. Hence, we will define our position in favor of looking at the means used by terrorist organizations. Consistent with our position, we will prefer a definition used by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler and justify the reasons for this preference.

In the following chapter, we will divide terrorism into sub-titles, initially, according to the perpetrator of the act of terrorism as state and non-state terrorism. Later, we will make a further division of terrorist organizations as

domestic state terrorism and international state terrorism based on their target selections. We will also use same categorizations for non-state terrorism and classify it as domestic and transnational non-state terrorism. In order to provide a better understanding, historical examples are going to be given in detail. We will pursue historical trajectory of terrorist organizations and argue that transnational terrorism constitutes a peak point in the evolution process of terrorist organizations.

In the fourth chapter, we will further our trajectory on the continuities in the logic of terrorism and the changes in its methods of violence with the future prospects and elaborate on the increased effectiveness of terrorism. Terrorism is going to be mentioned as an independent factor that is able to learn and adapt to the conditions of modernity. While discussing terrorists' ability in adapting, we will highlight a fact that terrorist organizations are not irrational actors as it was assumed to be. We will emphasize that they are effective in making cost-benefit calculations and making preference orderings. As terrorist organizations want to kill more with the least cost, we will comment on the prospects of change in the methods of terrorism especially by the virtue of the weapons of mass destruction.

In the fifth chapter, we will combine terrorism and structural realism in the same picture and discuss the relationship between the international system and terrorism. The emergence of the terrorist organizations as important actors in the field of security as adversaries of states in the system, their interactions with states and the structure, as well as, the impact of the structure on both terrorist organizations and states will be discussed. Later, the changes asserted by

terrorist organizations on the composition of the system, the sameness principle of the units, and the distribution of the capabilities across the units will be studied.

In the concluding part, we will make an overall evaluation and argue that terrorism is going to be endemic in the international system due to its anarchic composition. It is affirmed that transnational terrorist organizations were added as secondary actors in the international politics. This is evaluated as a change not because of their addition to the system as actors but due to the hole they opened in the positional picture in the international system. We will argue that as terrorists and their capabilities are secret, states cannot calculate terrorist organizations juxtaposition with respect to themselves, which also increase states' feeling of insecurity and lead the continuity of the anarchic structure.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

The literature on terrorism in international relations (IR) suffers from the lack of a commonly accepted definition of terrorism.² The use of a hackneyed phrase such as 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' indicates the problem of clearly defining the term. Alex Schmid, a very prominent scholar in the field, states that 'the question of defining of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency'.³ The definition of terrorism changes depending upon the political, philosophical or emotional situation of the definer.⁴ Defining agencies mostly focus on the perpetrator of the act of terrorism not on the characteristics of terrorists' acts. To focus on perpetrator of terrorist act prevent academicians and researchers develop

² The problem of definition includes academic debates on the subject, not the political reasons of states in avoiding to produce a common definition. To mention political reasons briefly in 1980s, Third World countries does not cooperate with American and European efforts to identify and combat international terrorism since they see antiterrorist efforts as part of a broader campaign aimed at outlawing the irregular methods of warfare that are developed in the Third World during the war of liberations under the framework of decolonisation, and the irregular methods used by natives. Brian Jenkins, "Defense Against Terrorism," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, Issue: 5 (1986): 781. Also, Thackrah claims that in the international forum neither the Soviet bloc nor the most Third World countries would be likely to vote in favor of a definition geared to Western interest. The Soviet Union has an interest in trying to label all individuals and groups working against Western interests in a violent manner as 'freedom fighter's participating in the 'wars of liberation, not in terrorist acts. As many third World countries achieved independence as the result an armed struggle, which typically began with terrorist acts, they do not want outlaw terrorism. Ronald Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in *Contemporary Research On Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 1987), 32. Aynur Ak claims that states tend to produce their own definition of terrorism that serves best to their national and political interest. Some governments avoid producing an accepted definition in order to be able to suppress internal and external oppositional groups. Some states refrain from a general definition because they do not want to be restricted with a general rule that would limit their sovereign rights. Aynur Ak, "Uluslararası Terörizm." (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ankara University, 1995), 12-14.

³ Donald J Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare* (Washington: Pergamon Press, 1989), 104.

⁴ Elegab states that no definition would be comprehensive enough to encompass all possible aspects of terrorism, which is so varied in its forms, motives, targets, and logistic backup. Omer Yousif Elagab, *International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism* (London: Cavendish Pub., 1997), iv.

standard criteria for production of a single definition. To complicate matters further, there is a near consensus among scholars on the impossibility of avoidance from the subjectivity problem and impossibility of having a single definition of terrorism.⁵

Due to the absence of a recognized definition of the term, the studies of terrorism mostly focus on the problem in historical and descriptive terms.⁶ Naturally, without having a fixed definition, historical materials increase the confusion about the concept. In order to avoid the confusion and not to fall into subjectivity, we will consider terrorists' means and we will attempt to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence and to compose a general framework for terrorist actions. Looking at the components outline, we will prefer a parsimonious definition that is going to be helpful to cover varieties of terrorism.⁷

2.1 Is 'terrorism' a type of warfare?

It is a very commonly made assertion that terrorists regard themselves as freedom fighters. Many terrorist organizations select names including words like liberation and freedom. These organizations state that the real terrorists are

⁵ Paul Wilkinson, claims that it is naive to assume to find a value-free language for the study of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism: British perspectives* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), xii. Walter Laqueur also is despaired of defining terrorism so, to him; it is not worthwhile to make the attempt for finding a definition. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), 39. Thackrah also claims that it is not possible to find an objective definition of terrorism. Ronald Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," in *Contemporary Research On Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 1987), 26.

⁶ Laqueur states that terrorism cannot be generalized. Therefore, it should be studied as case studies including the political values of the researcher. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 32.

⁷ We use this simple definition because it enables us to add particularities of varieties of terrorism and produce definitions for typologies of terrorism.

the social political system and its rules. In their fight against the strong, they justify their methods by claiming their numerical inferiority compared to the states' national defense and security apparatus. In this regard, they make use of terrorism as the weapon of the weak against the strong oppressor. According to terrorists, states also kill innocent people and cause destruction while making war; hence, terrorists cannot be blamed of killing the innocent and making destruction in their 'war against the oppressor'. Terrorists regard no difference between the violence they used and violence states assert.⁸

Conversely, there are qualitative differences between types of terrorist violence and war. War can be defined as 'a contest between two or more independent state carried on by the authority of their respective governments'.⁹

Traditionally war is fought between armies, whose members carry out insignias

⁸ There are similarities between war and terrorism as well. According to Hanle, war has three component; political aim, moral plane and physical plane. As Clausewitz's famous dictum 'war is the continuation of politics with other means', meaning that war is fought for a political purpose. The employment of force targets the moral plane of the adversary in order to harm its cohesion. Cohesion is a factor that can explain why small powers gain war against stronger adversaries. Moral and Sociological bounds create higher social organisms out of ordinary and weak mass. It is also important to determine whether the force employed is subject to the principles of combat that govern the manipulation of physical force against physical force in war. Therefore, if there is not an activity facing two physical forces, then we cannot claim a war among two. As terrorist has political purpose and mainly attack on the moral plane they can be regarded as war. Yet, it does not fulfill the third condition it cannot be evaluated as war in the end. Hanle claims that some types of terrorism can be form of warfare; such as state-supported terrorisms including international and transnational ones. See, Hanle, 35-52. Also, Everett L. Wheeler claims that terrorism can be a form of primitive warfare as in the ancient times when terror is used as a tool in the wars. The author discusses its primitive character because the users of terrorism are not abide with the rules of war as primitive societies in ancient times. See, Everett L. Wheeler, "Terrorism and Military Theory," in *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, ed. Clark McCauley (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 13-14. The former approach regards the state involvement as the criterion for terrorism to be claimed as a type of warfare. The latter approach assumes the terror caused in the absence of rules regarding the use of violence as a criterion to distinguish between war and terrorism. Yet, if we consider contemporary terrorist organizations and their actions on their own merits, then we should accept that terrorism is a distinct kind of violence.

⁹ <http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/w038.htm>, Clausewitz defines as such 'War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will'. Available from internet: http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/BK1ch01.html

defining their nationality. Terrorists, on the other hand, are not military branches of governments. They cannot be defined and on purpose, they conduct their operations in secrecy. In this regard, it is not possible to talk about a war between two parties.

Moreover, soldiers or states are bound with the rules and accepted norms of behavior proscribing various tactics and the outlawing of attacks on specific categories of targets. Geneva and Hague Conventions prohibit regulations governing the treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers (POWs), outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs, recognize neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states, and, uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives.¹⁰

In history, there are instances in which states consciously violated the rules of war. However, such violations are defined as 'war crimes'. Even though international and national measures against war crimes are inefficient and weak, the perpetrators of the war crimes are held responsible of their acts and condemned. It is true that soldiers might damage the innocent in a war but this does not transform soldiers into terrorists¹¹ because soldiers do not intend to kill the innocent or civilians during war conditions.¹²

Dissimilarly, terrorists intend to kill non-combatants. The deliberate killing of civilians is one of the prominent characteristics that discern terrorists from

¹⁰ Hoffman, 5.

¹¹ Hanle, 174.

¹² In military literature, civilian deaths are called 'collateral damage'.

soldiers. Terrorists endeavor to create 'fear', 'terror'¹³ among civilians by their indiscriminate selections of target. Terrorists do not regard themselves bound with any kind of moral rule and rules of war. The very nature of the international terrorist organizations is to reject such principles. Considering these, Brian Jenkins describes international terrorist organizations as the groups who disregard international norms, rules and laws.¹⁴

In few words, we can conclude that terrorist organizations are not armies of independent states respecting the international law and moral rules concerning the use of violence. They do not fight wars and they fight covertly. They target on military or civilians without any declaration. Hence, as opposed to their own self-perceptions, they are not warriors but terrorists.

2.2 Is 'terrorism' guerrilla warfare?

The lack of an exact definition and consistent criteria for the term multiply the usage of terrorism. The term terrorism is very often used interchangeably with some other words such as insurrection, rebellion, civil strife and guerrilla warfare. The multiple use to the term especially increases, as states tend to label oppositional groups as terrorist usually because such a policy helps to produce immediate countermeasures. Nevertheless, among these terms, guerrilla warfare is mostly confused with terrorism.

¹³ The word of terror means intense and overpowering fear. The roots of the word go to Latin 'terror' from 'terrere' and to old French 'terreur.' Available from the internet. <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=terror>.

¹⁴ Brian Jenkins, "International terrorism", in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, eds. Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 73.

Indeed, terrorism and guerrilla warfare share common characteristics. For instance, both concepts are characterized as being the weapons of the weak. Both are too cheap to conduct and too expensive to be protected against. They are also secret and unconventional ways to combat the opposed states' forces. In addition, guerrillas often employ similar tactics with terrorists, such as assassination, kidnapping, bombings, and etc¹⁵. Moreover, guerrillas and terrorists do not wear uniform and carry any insignia that distinguishes them from the non-combatants.¹⁶

Despite the fact that both groups are classified under the word of irregulars, there are fundamental differences between the two. The term of guerrilla warfare was originally used to ascribe military operations carried out by irregulars against the rear of an enemy or by local inhabitants against an occupying force.¹⁷ In guerrilla warfare, the weaker side assumes tactical offensive in selected forms, time, and place against its adversary, usually a foreign occupier.

Paul Wilkinson states that guerrillas may be outnumbered and endowed with inadequate weaponry.¹⁸ However, they can and often do fight according to the conventions of war, taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the rights of non-combatants.¹⁹ In another saying, internationally accepted rules of war apply in guerrilla wars. Either tactically or ethically, guerrilla leaders

¹⁵ Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet.

¹⁶ Richard L. Clutterbuck, *Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 9.

¹⁷ Sean Anderson, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1995), 92.

¹⁸ Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet.

¹⁹ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 71-80.

deliberately avoid attacking civilians. Pursuing such a policy, they aim at public support and avoid provoking severe governmental repressive actions.²⁰

Terrorists in contrast to guerrillas do not respect the rules of war and they do not take actions in the face of foreign occupation. They place no limit on the means they employ and frequently resort widespread killings. They aim at repressive governmental reactions by disregarding general rules of war. According to terrorists, repressive actions and governments policies would justify terrorist acts. In this regard, terrorism is a means intentionally used to create a severe reaction from victimized party. By its deliberate use, terrorist violence aspires to create impressions that 'the terrorists may attack anytime on anybody, and anything' and harm moral its counterpart. In another saying, unlike guerillas, aim of terrorist is psychological not material.

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are distinct at this point as well. Guerrilla warriors do not aim solely a psychological impact. They use violent methods in order to acquire a material goal. Walter Laqueur states that 'the essence of the guerrilla war is to establish a liberated area in the country side and set up small military units which will gradually grow in strength, number and equipment to fight battles against government troops.²¹ In those liberated areas, the guerrillas establish their own institutions, conduct propaganda, and engage in political activities. They prefer the countryside, since such places provide geographical advantages to guerrillas over their enemies.

²⁰ Wilkinson, "Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and Rule of Law," 4-8.

²¹ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 102.

On the other hand, terrorists and guerillas differ in their location preferences. Terrorists make their preferences calculating the tactical advantage provided by location. Terrorist organizations do not attempt to seize and hold territory to sustain secrecy and safety. They do not aim to acquire a definite place. Terrorists chose cities because they provide advantages to terrorists.²² They infiltrate easily in cities to conduct operations and cause a greater degree of terror and become able to create more publicity for their actions. Since terrorist actions undertaken in a city have a greater likelihood of causing severe damage (such as higher amount of death). Also, cities are places where terrorist actions can have more access to media, implying publicity for terrorists.

It is claimed that almost all guerrilla movements make use of terrorism at one point or another during the stage of their developments or some solely rely on it alone.²³ Common use of terrorist methods does not eliminate the fundamental difference among terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups. Terrorist organizations use violence to acquire a psychological impact while guerrillas use the same violence as a tool to acquire a physical or material target. While guerillas apply rules of war, terrorism is based on violation of these principle rules. Hence, it can be concluded that terrorism and guerilla warfare are distinct types of violence.

²² According to Jeffrey Ian Ross, geographical locations are included in the permissive causes of terrorism. Permissive causes are endemic to all societies. They are necessary but not sufficient conditions for terrorism. Type of political system, and the level of modernization are the other permissive factors. See, Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 30, No: 3 (Aug., 1993): 320.

²³ Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet.

2.3 Is 'terrorism' an ordinary crime?

It is argued that terrorism is a type of crime, which is a valid assessment. Yet, terrorism cannot be considered as an ordinary crime even though both use violence as a means to attain their aim.²⁴ The use of violence for both have different aims or motivations, purpose and self-perception²⁵, which differentiates them fundamentally.

To begin with, criminals apply violence because they aim to obtain money, to acquire a good or a place. The aim of an ordinary criminal is usually personal and material. However, the use of violence serves multiple aims of terrorists. Terrorists simply use violence to inject terror. They strive to form a public opinion favorable to them. They take advantage of the same violence as an instrument to increase group cohesion. Additionally, they claim to use the violence as a means to change the 'corrupt system'. In this regard, terrorists' aims are not personal or material but organizational and psychological.

Terrorists aim to give a political message by their actions.²⁶ An ordinary criminal usually does not aim to give a political message unlike a terrorist. To kill a political leader for personal reasons is different from doing it to give political message to the rest of society. Also, unlike terrorists, criminals do not intend to create a fearful impact on society. They undertook their planned action for its

²⁴ Kronenwetter claims that as the purpose of terrorists and ordinary criminals are different it is very important for the ones who want to fight against terrorism. As terrorists assume that they act for the benefit of the others, methods used for restricting criminals would not work for terrorists. Micheal Kronenwetter, *The War On Terrorism*, (Englewood Cliffs: Simon and Schuster, inc., 1986), 23-25.

²⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 41-44.

²⁶ Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003), 116.

own cause. While terrorists' desire is to create an indirect impact upon the society, ordinary criminals do not have further purposes rather than their immediate actions.

Individual political crimes and terrorist acts are also different. It is possible that a frustrated person kills a politician; however, this does not make one a terrorist. To qualify an act or a person as a terrorist, the observed violence should remind an organizational aspect. The organizational entity should have a structure and a chain of command creating the impression that a single individual did not act on his/her own will.²⁷

Lastly, terrorists and criminals have different self-perceptions. Terrorists usually regard themselves as those responsible or liable to mobilize the suffering members of society. Therefore, they call themselves freedom fighters, survivors, or national heroes. They assume themselves as survivors. As their action is going to end the existence of a harmful entity for the society, the terrorist act of destroying that entity is regarded as public good not as the realization of personal aim. However, an ordinary criminal knows that he or she is a murderer or a burglar and undertakes action for his or her personal aims. Unlike terrorists, ordinary criminals do not pretend a societal role for themselves.

Concluding in few words, organizational and political aspects and self-perceptions of terrorism are crucial factors that discern it from individual ordinary or political crimes. Terrorists claim a societal role for themselves and instrumentalise violence to 'enlighten' the rest of the society. Negatively, they

²⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 43.

endeavor to install fear on their opposed audience. Terrorists acting as organized groups claiming societal responsibility make them much more complicated than ordinary criminals. To accept them as the same is the oversimplification of the matter.

2.4 An Overlook to Other Definitions

As an overall evaluation, we can infer that terrorism is a distinct type of violence. It is not warfare, guerilla war, and ordinary political crime.²⁸ Despite most of the researchers in the field agree on its distinct character, this consensus did not help to produce a commonly accepted definition of terrorism. A prominent researcher and academician in the field of terrorism, Alex Schmid²⁹ conducted a study identifying more than a hundred different definitions of terrorism. These definitions include some common focus points. According to Schmid's study, the frequently used terms for terrorism and their percentages are:

- Violence, force (% 83.5)
- Political (% 65)
- Fear, terror emphasized (% 51)
- Threat (% 47)
- Effects (psychological) and (anticipated) reactions (% 41.5),
- Victim-target differentiation (% 37.5)
- Purposive, planned, systemic, organized action (% 32)
- Method combat, strategy, tactic (% 30.5)
- Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints (% 30)
- Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance (% 28)
- Publicity aspect (% 21.5)
- Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination (% 21)
- Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims (% 17.5)
- Intimidation (% 17)
- Innocence of victims emphasized (% 15.5)

²⁸ Jenkins "Defense Against Terrorism, 780.

²⁹ Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (Newyork: Tauris Publishers, 1995), 19.

- Group, movement, organization as perpetrator (% 14)
- Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others (% 13.5)
- Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence (% 9)
- Clandestine, covert nature (% 9)
- Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence (% 7)
- Criminal (% 6)
- Demands made on third parties (% 4)

Considering these frequently used terms in the other definitions of terrorism, we find it appropriate to use a definition offered by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler. According to them, terrorism is defined as 'a premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience'.³⁰ As discussed above, organizational aspect of terrorism is a crucial matter while dealing with terrorism. Yet, this definition does not specify the organizational aspect of the subject. While using this definition, we also connote the organizational aspect, including state and non-state perpetrators.

The definition contains significant features of terrorist acts and aims to represent an objective approach to the act of terrorism. To begin with, it helps researchers to qualify the acts not according to the perpetrators or their aims but the means and the results of these acts. As discussed formerly, one of the crucial problems in the study of terrorism is to decide whether the ends of terrorists justify their means.³¹ Since the definition focuses on 'the use of extra-

³⁰ Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 43, (1999): 146-147.

³¹ Brian Jenkins states that the ones arguing that no body who stands for a just cause is a terrorist further complicates the problem of definition. He asserts that if the cause is the criterion, only to the extent that everyone in the world can agree on the justice of a particular cause is there likely to be agreement that an action does or does not constitute terrorism. This led to the cliché that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, which implies that there are no universal standards of conduct in conflict as opposed to the way it should have been in the civilized nations. See, Jenkins , *Defense Against Terrorism*, 779.

normal violence', researcher can define an act as terrorist by looking at the means only. Looking at the means only can help researchers to reach at least an agreement facilitating the development of a consistent framework to study terrorism. Otherwise, taking the ends of terrorists as measurement multiplies definitions as such an approach lead to subjectivity problem.

Second, the definition provides researchers a necessary tool to distinguish terror caused by accidental incidents and intentional acts of terrorism. Fear created by terrorist act is an intentional result of it as opposed to fear caused by accidental cases. The premeditated use of violence is a purposive act undertaken so as to intimidate a large audience. Fear is the ultimate intended effect of terrorism. According to Brian Jenkins, terrorism is undertaken for its effect not on the actual victims but on the audience.³² Terrorists, by means of fear they install, aim to create examples for the audience to create the sense of 'I might also be a victim.'³³ As terrorists cannot be identified easily, the sense of cohesion among the public becomes vulnerable. Also, as the society lacks the sense of security, the authority and legitimacy of governments become susceptible in the eyes of their citizens. Therefore, the fear caused by the decreased sense of security is not a by-product of terrorism but an instrument for terrorists to reach their aims.

Third, 'political' characteristic of terrorism differentiate terrorist acts from mere criminal acts. The use of the term 'political' implies that terrorism can have different objectives ranging from religious, ethnic, separatist, to ideological

³² Brian Jenkins says that terrorism is a theatre and it aims people watching. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: The Other World War" in *International Terrorism, Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (London: Macmillan Education Press, 1990), 35.

³³ Hanle, 112.

issues. This feature has a very important impact on terrorists' self-perceptions. Their positions as opposed to their target is defined according to their political standings. They justify their acts according to their political reasoning and try to manipulate their audience by using it. They claim that the purpose of their actions is to defend the political rights of minority exploited by the powerful. Hence, political character of terrorism is a very crucial element included in the definition.

Also, the emphasis on the 'use of extra-normal violence' implies that terrorism violates normative values concerning employment of lethal force. Since Abel to Kabul, humans have adhered to certain feelings and rules, which affect how, why, and when they will apply the lethal force.³⁴ The development of the rules of war illustrates the impact of feelings on the creation of law regarding the international use of force. The adherence to these rules and norms provides predictability, contributing to the sense of security. According to terrorists, the more the violence unpredictable, the greater the psychological impact upon the audience. The greater the psychological impact upon the target, the less the sense of security among the audience. Therefore, terrorists do not hesitate to use extra-normal violence and to violate any rules of war, if the violation serves their interest.³⁵

Lastly, the definition emphasizes that terrorists act to influence 'a large audience'. We can presume that the audience may consist of civilian or military

³⁴ In his famous work, 'Perpetual Peace', Kant argues that in order to acquire peace; parties of conflict should be bound with some rules. For instance, parties should avoid holocaust or poisoning. Therefore, he discussed the necessity of the rules even in destructive activities of the mankind. Ariboghan, 173.

³⁵ Hanle, 106-107.

targets. Civilian targets are mostly focused while discussing brutality of terrorist incidents since they are held immune from intentional attacks conventionally. Terrorists prefer attacking on civilians because it provides a greater psychological impact upon the audience. Yet, this does not mean that attacks on military personnel and military targets cannot be evaluated as terrorist acts. Unless the attacked military personnel is an occupier in a foreign territory, the attacks on military personnel or military target can be regarded as acts of terrorism. Furthermore, attacks on the military targets indirectly terrorize civilians since military personnel and organs of states are supposed to protect its nationals. Terrorists attack on military personnel lead citizens to feel vulnerable against further threats. Therefore, such attacks increase the fear aimed by terrorists and reach a large audience.

To sum up, in this chapter, we discussed different types of violence and stated the distinct characteristics of terrorism. We argued that terrorism should be defined by the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. We tried to figure out general characteristics of the act of terrorism considering the other definitions as well. As a result, we summarize that all terrorist acts entail violence or threat of violence, usually coupled with particular demands. The brutality is directed mainly against civilian targets, but occasionally against the military targets. The purposes are political. The actions are carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group and unlike other criminals, they often claim recognition for the act. And, finally the act is intended to produce

effects beyond the immediate physical damage.³⁶ Besides highlighting the features of terrorism, as a distinct type of violence, we preferred a short definition including the features above. Terrorism is defined as 'a premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience'.³⁷

In the following chapter, we will utilize this definition and multiply the definition of terrorism for its varieties according to the main characteristics of these varieties. It should be kept in mind that even though we produced a definition here, as the historical path of terrorism suggests, states' position towards terrorist organizations have always been under the impact of states' security concerns. States have avoided producing a common definition of terrorism not to restrict themselves on an issue that might help them to reduce others' security in the system. Therefore, the following chapter will also infer states exploiting some types of terrorism as a foreign policy tool and helping terrorist organizations to gain transnational characteristics.

³⁶ Thackrah, 26.

³⁷ Enders and Sandler, Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era, 146-147.

CHAPTER III

TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM & HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

In the previous chapter, the term of terrorism defined as 'the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective-through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.' In the contemporary understanding of terrorism, the perpetrator of the act is generally a non-governmental organization. Yet, the history of terrorism illustrates the fact that perpetrators of terrorism also include states or governments as well. We stated that terrorism is an organizational act. As the states are the highest political organizations, we also included states among the perpetrators of terrorism as a typology.

In this chapter, we will first divide terrorism into two basic categories: state and non-state terrorism. Later, we further classify state terrorism in domestic and international parts due to their targets. Second, non-state terrorism is separated according to referents of the terrorist act into two categories: domestic and transnational terrorism. This chapter discusses the use of terror for political purposes in the light of historical examples and infers that terrorism has evolved throughout the centuries and become outward oriented rather than inward oriented in its scope and targets. Also, the historical examples will indicate terrorism gained a more complex composition, as the time gets closer. Therefore, the classification in this chapter works both vertically and horizontally in time, meaning that we argue that while some types of terrorist organizations remain limited in scope and category, some terrorist

organizations turn out to be a different terrorist organization in categorization in proceeding time as their capabilities have changed.

3.1 State Terrorism

3.1.1 Domestic State Terrorism

Domestic state terrorism consists of acts conducted by a government against its own citizens and within its own borders.³⁸ In this respect, the roots of state terrorism are based on the philosophical thoughts of Thomas Hobbes. In his famous book, the Leviathan (1651), Hobbes argues that the state was evolved by man to check his savageness. The Leviathan was granted rights of the man and became the sole authority that can use violence to provide social obedience and order.³⁹ Given the right to use violence for these purposes were granted by the common will, the state use of violence became legitimate within its own territory.

However, including state terrorism in the study of terrorism is a disputable issue. Many researchers⁴⁰ accept the existence of state terrorism but some⁴¹ argue that state-perpetrated acts towards its own citizens should also be qualified as terrorism. According to their argument, the exclusion of state terrorism from the study of terrorism would make the study flawed and incomplete. They establish their arguments on the appearance of the term

³⁸ Wayman C. Mullins, *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: an Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses* (Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1997), 37.

³⁹ Albert Parry, *Terrorism: from Robespierre to Arafat* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), 9.

⁴⁰ Paul Wilkinson, Martha Crenshaw, Walter Laqueur are among these academicians.

⁴¹ R D Crelinsten, "Terrorism as a Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled " in *Contemporary Research On Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 1987), 4, Noam Choamsky "International Use of Terror for Political Aims: Terrorism Image and Reality," in *Western State Terrorism*, ed. Alexander George (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 12-38.

'terrorism' in the political history for the first time with the French Revolution and claim that non-state terrorism should not be studied by looking at the results of terrorist acts. Non-state terrorism should be evaluated as a reaction to the domestic or international state terrorism. In another saying, the roots of non-state terrorism should be searched in the acts of suppressor states' violent policies towards their constituents. Hence, this approach claims that non-governmental terror organizations born out of the necessity to oppose the strong even though it is not legal.⁴²

The word 'terrorism' was firstly used as a political concept during the French Revolution.⁴³ During this period, the term was used with positive connotation as opposed to today's usage. This was because of the fact that terror was the means helping the state to re-establish order during the transition period after the uprisings of 1789 and to consolidate the revolutionary government's power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and other dissidents who did not want the new regime.⁴⁴ The period lasted from March 1793 to July 1794. The reign of terror was created by two mechanisms: the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal. Both institutions were accorded wide powers of arrest and judgment. By decisions of these mechanisms, people who were convicted of treason were put to death by guillotine. This act of the state aimed to carry a message to the French people

⁴² Temel Demirer, "Terörist mi Dediniz? Küreselleşme ve Terör," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 55.

⁴³ John Francis Murphy, *State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions* (London: Mansell Pub, 1989), 4. See also, Wayman C. Mullins, *A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: an Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses* (Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1997), 46-49.

⁴⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 15.

that anyone who might oppose the revolutionary regime would be brutally punished. The rule of 1793-1794 constituted the very basic example for the use of terror for political tool.

It is most likely that this type of terrorism has become a controversial issue in the contemporary politics, as perceptions regarding a government's duties have changed. There are many repressive governments in the world applying violence. This type of violence may be regarded as legitimate as the repressive governments were also entitled to rule their states with the recognized right of using violence. In some parts of the world, the use of 'legitimate violence' on their own citizens through state mechanisms is criticized of violating human rights. And, there are lots of countries that are still being governed by dictators. However, our focus here is not to develop a normative approach to international relations, though as individuals we accept this kind of terrorism as a very cruel thing.

We study international relations considering states as major actors without looking at their domestic composition. According to the assumptions of mainstream International Relations theories whether a state's domestic composition is democratic or terrorist is not questioned. States also in the real political world generally avoid from labeling other states as terrorists due to domestic oppression they assert for political and legal reasons.⁴⁵ Therefore, states usually prefer not to be concerned about others' internal affairs unless

⁴⁵ All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Available on <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>; Internet.

they become subject to the impacts of these actions.⁴⁶ However, to make the same judgment with a retrospective perspective constitutes less risk of political conflict with the labeled state. Therefore, states prefer such an attitude usually. For instance, the rules of Maximillien Robespierre, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung and their states were exemplified under the title of state terrorism.

3.1.2 International State Terrorism

International state terrorism is a type of terrorism as it is very problematic to find a direct connection with states perpetrating terrorism for their political purposes. The difficulty in dealing with this type of terrorism also lies in the fact that academicians cover the issue either under state-sponsored terrorism⁴⁷ or they use it interchangeably with transnational terrorism, another type of terrorism. We argue that international state terrorism is perpetrated by organizations or individuals⁴⁸ controlled by a sovereign state for its political

⁴⁶ These impacts may be migration or domestic terrorist organizations' activities transcending borders or repressive states using its mechanisms to suppress its citizens abroad.

⁴⁷ Enders and Sandler include this type of terrorism under transnational terrorism. Enders and Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era", 145-67. Boaz has three categories of state sponsored terrorism. First, states supporting terrorism, consisting of states that support terrorist organizations, providing financial aid, ideological support, military or operational assistance. Second, states operating terrorism consisting of states that initiate direct and perform terrorist activities through groups outside their own institutions. Third, states perpetrating terrorism, includes states perpetrating terrorist acts abroad through their own official bodies—members of its security forces or its intelligence services, or their direct agents. In other words, states attacking intentionally civilians in other countries in order to achieve political aims without declaring war. As mentioned above, according to international conventions, intentional acts of aggression against civilians by official agencies of a state, either at times of war or in occupied territories, will be considered war crimes rather than terrorism. Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet. Jenkins and Wilkinson use transnational terrorism same as international terrorism.

⁴⁸ In Chapter I, it is stated that terrorism is an act of organization; therefore, individual activities were excluded from the scope of terrorism. Yet, in international terrorism, it should be kept in

interests. Domestic and international state terrorism differ from each other as in the latter the target of the perpetrator state is the components of another state. The act of international terrorism is carried out in another territory by a foreign-state agent. In this respect, international terrorism is perpetrated by the individuals or groups who have a direct relationship with a sovereign state.⁴⁹ The perpetrators of international terrorism might be either an agent of the security institution of a sovereign state or a state might have a secret security branch to conduct terrorist operations in foreign territories.⁵⁰

Despite the fact that there are some cases in which international terrorism was perpetrated, it is almost impossible to find and prove direct state connection with a terrorist act. One of the fundamental principles of terrorism is secrecy, which provides some advantages to the perpetrators. The covert nature of terrorism makes it attractive for the states that coexist in the anarchic structure of international relations.

According to structural realism, the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy. Therefore, states have conflicting interests. Security is scarce for the states. States compete in order to ensure their security. However, one's security means insecurity for the other. States do not want their opponents to become stronger. In order to prevent the other state from becoming stronger, a state might become involved in international terrorism.

mind that individual activities are also connected with an organization, that is a foreign sovereign state.

⁴⁹ John Richard Thackrah, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 33.

⁵⁰ Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet.

Especially, a weak state without enough capabilities to oppose stronger states might well use international terrorism as a tool to compensate for its weakness. Or, on the contrary, a strong state might perpetrate terrorist acts against an ascending state. By causing a chaotic environment through terrorism the strong state can damage morale of the ascending states' population and bring about new opportunities for the perpetrator. For instance, Mumcu and Öke claim in their books that the British secret service played an important role in the Şeyh Said insurrection in 1925 because the insurrection weakened the hands of the young Turkish Republic on bargaining over Mosul against the British government.⁵¹

International state terror is conducted very covertly in order to harm others' well-being to increase one's own. Yet, states' involvement in terrorism takes different shapes as well. In the following part, we will elaborate on transnational terrorism under non-state terrorism, which states benefit this kind of organizations as a foreign policy tool by escaping the cost of war and retaliation. The indirect role of states in the emergence and development of transnational terrorism will be discussed in detail.

3.2 Non-State Terrorism

The history of non-state terrorism goes back to ancient times. As it can be inferred from its title, non-state terrorism is 'the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through

⁵¹ Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması, 1919-1925* (İstanbul: Um:ag Vakfı, 1991). Mim Kemal Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu: 1918-1926* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992).

intimidation or fear directed at a large audience⁵² by a non-state perpetrator. This category of terrorism can be further divide as domestic, and transnational terrorism. These categories can be increased using different criteria as nationalist, separatist, ideological or religious aims of terrorists. However, we will briefly mention domestic and transnational terrorism as general categories covering other sub-titles and for better illustration give some historical examples.

3.2.1 DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Domestic terrorism is 'the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear such that it is directed at the citizens of one nation, which has the same nationality with the terrorist organization.'⁵³ In this type of terrorism, terrorist organization attack on the citizen of its nationality. States also indirectly support such organizations; it does not have to be immune from the support of a state.

If we exemplify domestic terrorism, we can predate it to ancient times. The earliest known examples of the domestic terrorist organizations in the contemporary sense are the Sicarii. The Sicarii were highly organized religious men of a lower class active in the Zealot struggle in Palestine (AD 66-73). Historians claim that the sources about the Sicarii are contradictory. Some historians believe that the Sicarii used their acts to raise social awareness

⁵² Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," 146-147.

⁵³Mullins, 35.

among the poor and cause social unrest against the rich.⁵⁴ Some of their activities indeed give that impression. They have destroyed the house of Ananias, the high priest, as well as the palaces of Herodian dynasts; they have burned the public archives so as to intimidate the bonds of moneylenders and to prevent the recovery of the debts. They have also sabotaged Jerusalem's water supplies. Another comment on Sicarii's philosophy is that they had an elaborate doctrine that accepted God as the Lord and refused to have any political allegiance to any earthly power. Sicarii were characterized as extremist, nationalist, and anti-Roman.⁵⁵ As in those ages nationality bound was not the same of the contemporary understanding, we can argue same nationality for Sicarii under the Roman rule.

A more clear-cut example of domestic terrorism is Narodnaya Volya (or People's Will) in Russia. Narodnaya Volya appeared as the most significant terrorist movement in the nineteenth century. It undertook its action from 1878 to 1881. The organization was founded by some Russian constitutionalists and aimed to challenge tsarist rule. The organization undertook its actions selectively. The targets were the individuals whom the group considered as symbols of the autocratic and oppressive state. Their victims, thus, were the tsars, leading members of the royal family and senior government officials such as the governor general of St. Petersburg and the Head of the Third Section (the tsarist political police), General Mezentsev.⁵⁶ Yet, the most important action was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Ironically, the group's most

⁵⁴ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 7.

⁵⁵ Altuğ, 17.

⁵⁶ Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 12.

successful action became its last action because after the death of the tsar, most of the plotters were arrested and hanged.⁵⁷ The Narodnaya Volya aimed to realize the ideas of Carlo Pisacane, who was an Italian Republican extremist. Pisacane argued that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to a cause, or to generate publicity for the cause, but also to inform, educate, and rally the mass behind the revolution.⁵⁸ The members of the Narodnaya Volya endeavor to attract the attention of the Russian people to their cause and the organization. The use of terrorism for political purposes on the selected target of one nation's governing elite lead the Narodnaya Volya to be defined as a good example of domestic terrorism.

Lastly, Irish terrorism⁵⁹ exemplifies an enduring domestic terrorist organization. The organization can be also categorized as nationalist and separatist. The activities of the Irish terrorism started in 1791 by the United Irishmen. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British rule increased its pressure on the Irish population. Due to this pressure, an uprising occurred in 1916 against British rule. As a result of the uprising, Prime Minister Lloyd George legislated two parliaments for two groups in Ireland in 1929. One of the parliaments was in Dublin for the Roman Catholic majority in the south and the other was in Belfast for the protestant minority in the north. The Anglo-Irish treaty promised an Irish Free State of 26 counties in 1921. Protestant counties accepted a Parliament in Belfast. By the time England and South Ireland signed

⁵⁷ Combs, *Terrorism in the 21st Century*, 64.

⁵⁸ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 17.

⁵⁹ For more information see; Edgar O' Ballance, *Terrorism in the 1980s* (New York: DAG Publications, 1989), 56-78. İsmet Gürbüz Civelek, *Terörizm ve Kuzey İrlanda Örneği* (Ankara: Ümit Yay., 1996). Yılmaz Altuğ, *Terörizm: Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını* (Ankara: T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, 1989).

an agreement and established the Irish Free State. Acceptance of the Irish Free State caused a split within the IRA and a hard-line element in the IRA wanted to fight for a United Ireland. The activities of the hard liners were against Great Britain to divert it from Northern Ireland as well as against the Irish Free State in the Northern Ireland. Due to their violent activities, the IRA was banned by the Irish Free State. After the declaration of Ireland in 1949 the IRA focused on Northern Ireland. During the 1950s and 1960s, the IRA maintained its activities at the Northern Ireland border and caused the deaths of many British and Northern Irish security forces.⁶⁰ The activities of the IRA still persist against Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As the activities of the IRA are directed against the citizens of a particular nation and its activities do not target the citizens of the other nations, the IRA also can be classified as an example of domestic terrorism.

3.2.2 Transnational Terrorism

Transnational terrorism is a significant type of non-governmental terrorism.⁶¹ States have a distinct role in the development of terrorist organizations with transnational character. States may give support to an already established terrorist organization or their supports may lead terrorist organizations become transnational. Supports to terrorist organizations may be

⁶⁰ Jay M. Shafritz, *Almanac of Modern Terrorism* (New York: Facts on File, 1991), 156.

⁶¹ Thackrah claims that, as it is hard to find out whether a particular terrorist organization was financed by a sympathizer state or commissioned by a foreign government is usually so difficult to determine the distinction between transnational and international terrorism seems to be meaningless in the real world. Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem," 27.

financial aid, ideological support, or military and operational assistance.⁶²

Having support of a state, transnational terrorist organizations enhance their capabilities and become able to undertake severe actions.

The acts of transnational terrorist organizations have clear international consequences. For instance, incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, or in which terrorists select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign state (diplomats, local executives, or officers of foreign corporations), or in which terrorists attack airlines in international flight, or in which force airlines to fly to another country are typical types of terrorist actions having transnational character.⁶³

According to this, transnational terrorism is 'the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective by a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority. These actions intend to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims. Also, the ramifications of these actions transcend national boundaries through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution.'⁶⁴ Paul Wilkinson claims that historically it is

⁶² Boaz Ganor, *Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter*, available on <http://www.ict.org>; Internet.

⁶³ Jenkins "Defense Against Terrorism," 776. Although terrorism does not have a widely accepted definition, acts like hijacking, kidnapping, hostage taking, assassinations are defined and accepted as international terrorism in international law. For more information see, Aynur Ak, "Uluslararası Terörizm," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ankara University, 1995), 4-65. Nand, *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict: A Study of Strategy* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1989), 49-129.

⁶⁴ Mullins, 35.

hard to find a pure case of internal terrorism because if a terrorist attack has transnational consequences or origins, it becomes transnational terrorism.⁶⁵

Transnational terrorism and state involvement is an interesting subject. Transnational terrorist organizations mostly have domestic political origins. Yet, these organizations need support from outside to be more effective. Usually, despite the improbability of proving direct connection, a state and a terrorist organization may cooperate, as their mutual interests require. Both terrorist organizations and its supporter state desire to weaken the targeted state. As the targeted state primarily deals with the imminent threat of transnational terrorism the security of other states in the system tends to increase especially in the supporting state.⁶⁶

For states, to support terrorism is cheaper, easier, and much more advantageous than to be involved in a direct war or a similar organization against a state with their own capabilities.⁶⁷ As it is hard to identify a direct relationship with terrorist organizations the supporting state does not face the possibility of retaliation. As one's opponent state that is victimized by a transnational terrorist organization constitutes a lesser threat, the other one secures its own position.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Paul Wilkinson, *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, vii.

⁶⁶ In the case of the US war on terrorism, however, it is possible to argue the opposite. As the US has the capacity and the will, as it clearly stated in its National Security Strategy 2002, its imminent threat perception creates a threat for the other nations such as Iraq or other supporters of terrorism. Yet, the US constitutes an exception because it is most probably the only power that can afford a total war on terrorism.

⁶⁷ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Setting the Scene", in *Common Ground on Terrorism, Soviet-American Cooperation Against the Politics of Terror*, eds. Igor Beliaev and John Marks (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 35-38.

⁶⁸ Turkey can be given as an example of this proposition. In the 1980s and 1990s Turkey was dealing with the PKK and most of its military resources were extracted to fight against the PKK. Therefore, Turkey constituted less of a threat to Russia, for instance, and then it could because

There are numerous examples of transnational terrorism in history. ASALA (the Secret Army of Liberation of Armenia), the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) and Al Qaeda are three of them to be mentioned.

The roots of Armenian terrorism against the Ottoman Empire rule began in the early 1880s. It lasted until the late twentieth century against the Turkish Republic.⁶⁹ The Armenians had a very long tradition or concern of protecting their ethno-cultural identity. The Hunchak and Dashnak parties were founded to defend the Armenians and attack Ottoman officials, including Enver and Talat Pashas accusing them to be responsible of the deportation of Armenians in 1915. The contemporary Armenian terrorist groups claimed to be the heirs of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties and they claimed that the Turks were responsible of a [so-called] genocide or massacre in 1915.⁷⁰

The Secret Army of the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, both founded in 1973, were the most known heirs of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties. Armenian terrorists killed Turkish diplomats, their relatives as well as other civilians.⁷¹ The Armenian terrorist organizations had linkages with other terrorist organizations in their formative periods. For instance, ASALA members received training in PLO camps in Lebanon until 1982. ASALA later moved its camp to Southern Cyprus

of its close ties with the former Turkic-Muslim states of the USSR. Economic spending on the military might be used as credits to these newly established states. Ercan Çitlioğlu, *Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala* (Ankara: Ümit Yay., 1997), 119-121.

⁶⁹ Altuğ, 23.

⁷⁰ Alexandre Yonah, *Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1994), 155.

⁷¹ Altuğ, 22-29.

and Syria after the Israeli invasion of 1982.⁷² Along this, the organization has claimed that they had cadres in a number of countries, including Switzerland, France, West Germany, Italy, the United States, Southern Cyprus, Greece, Australia, Spain, Portugal, and Iran.⁷³ The group also had contacts with another terrorist organization in Turkey, namely the Kurdish Workers party (PKK).⁷⁴

ASALA reached support from different states in different shapes. There are various reasons for the support ASALA received. Some states may have been sympathetic to the cause of ASALA or some states may have regarded the activities of ASALA as harmless for their own interests. Some states may not have wanted to be involved in counter-terrorism efforts towards ASALA as they were frightened to be subject to the same kind of attacks. Some states might also have supported ASALA for their national interest. Whatever the causes were, some states did not cooperate to end ASALA's terrorist actions. Interestingly, unlike the low level of cooperation among the states, the example illustrates a significant cooperation among terrorist organizations. Here, we can argue that transnationalisation of ASALA was realized due to the lack effective cooperation among states.

Another example of terrorist organizations with transnational characteristics is the PKK. The PKK aimed to create a separate Kurdish state in the Southeastern part of the Turkish Republic. The activities of the PKK

⁷² Francis P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 46-47.

⁷³ Alexandre Yonah, *Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and Future Prospects*, 155.

⁷⁴ Çitlioğlu, 87-111.

endured from the 1970s to November 12, 1998.⁷⁵ Nearly three decades of activities of the PKK had close relations with different states with distinct motivations and forms. Interestingly, the emergence of the PKK came to coincide with the end of terrorist actions of ASALA in the 1970s. Naturally, the emergence of a terrorist organization cannot be bound only to foreign support but the foreign support must have helped the organization live longer. In the following part, the helps of states in transnationalisation of the PKK and increasing its effectiveness are going to be illustrated mentioning two states: Greece and Syria.

These states preferred to use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool in their conduct of relation with Turkey. They benefit from the PKK in order to weaken Turkey's hand. To begin with Syria, it is a documented fact that Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) and the members of the organization resided in Syria. The recruits of the terrorist organization used the facilities in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanese territory under Syrian control.⁷⁶ They were trained in the territory under Syria and used the territory as a safe-haven after carrying out terrorist attacks in the Turkish territory.⁷⁷

Turkey and Syria had conflicts over territory, water, and terrorism. Syria used terrorism as a card against Turkey in their conflicts over the water issue.⁷⁸ Syria conditioned its counter-terrorist policies towards the PKK on the Turkish

⁷⁵The terrorist organization precedes its existence under a different name, KADEK. For more information see: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

⁷⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998).

⁷⁷ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *PKK Terrorism* [report on-line]; available on <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh01/default.htm>

⁷⁸ Serdar Guner, "Signaling in the Turkish-Syrian Water Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Volume 16, No: 2 (Fall, 1998): 186.

concessions of water.⁷⁹ Reaching a deal on the river Orontes would imply the recognition of Hatay as a part of Turkish territory; however, Syria did not officially recognize until today that Hatay is a part of Turkish territory.⁸⁰ Therefore, Syria used terrorism as a crucial tool against Turkey.⁸¹

Secondly, Greece also preferred to use the card of PKK against Turkey. The attitude of Greece towards the PKK can be closely related to the maxim 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. Greece has the famous Megali Idea, in order to reclaim the borders of ancient Hellenistic times.⁸² The use of the PKK for the purpose of weakening Turkey was stated by Undersecretary Kuluris of the Greek Ministry of the Interior, in the 1994 edition of the Agon newspaper. It is stated that 'it will not be difficult to cope with a Turkey facing big troubles.'⁸³ There are also several photos that pictured Greek Generals and parliamentarians visiting the Bekaa valley under Syrian control and touring the PKK training camps.⁸⁴ Some arrested Kurdish terrorists confessed that they were trained in places very close to Athens. And, the leader of the PKK was arrested in the Greek Embassy in Kenya. It is for certain that role of the external supports played a very crucial role in the PKK's growth as a transnational terrorist organization.

⁷⁹ Guner, 191.

⁸⁰ Guner, 189.

⁸¹ Grand Wardlaw states that even though the US officials could not find evidence for Syria's involvement in terrorism, they concluded that this state may be much more professional, and much more deadly' than Libya. Wardlaw, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy", 238.

⁸² The Turkish Democracy Foundation, *The Terrorist Base In Europe: Greece* (Ankara: The Turkish Democracy Foundation, 1995), 11.

⁸³ The Turkish Democracy Foundation, 11.

⁸⁴ Milliyet Newspaper, 1 July 1995.

Lastly, Al Qaeda is going to be discussed. The organization directed the attention of world public opinion towards transnational terrorism after its attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. In fact, the birth of this transnational organization lays its roots during the conflict between two superpowers, over Afghanistan in the 1970s. During the Cold War, the US and the USSR sought to compete in indirect ways and with lower risks due to the presence of nuclear weapons. As the European theatre was too risky for conflict, the Soviet-American rivalry went on to the Third World.⁸⁵ In that period, due to the risk of direct confrontation, terrorism is used to promote the ideas and ideologies, especially in the Third World. Terrorism indeed became an instrument of the foreign policies.

Superpowers had similar external behaviors due to the international system.⁸⁶ The similarity in the superpower foreign policies took the form of support to terrorism directed against friends and allies of the rival super power or directly against the superpower. The support included providing funds, weapons, training, political endorsement or other logistical assistance (passport, intelligence, use of diplomatic facilities, etc).

The US aid to Afghani Mujahedeen resisting to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan can be evaluated under this framework. According to an American diplomat of Afghanistan, Robert Neumann, policies of the US concerning this country aimed at protecting the borders of Afghanistan, to promote a stable

⁸⁵ Donna M Schlagheck, "The Superpowers Foreign policy and Terrorism," in *International Terrorism, Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (London: Macmillan Education Press, 1990), 170.

⁸⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Volume 18, No: 2 (Fall, 1993): 45.

economic and political system, to prevent Soviet influence that could restrict freedom of maneuver of Afghanistan, and to promote good relations among Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.⁸⁷ However, the passive policies of the US led the Soviet Union to pursue active policies towards Afghanistan and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.⁸⁸

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created a serious concern for the US. As a result of the Soviet expansion, the Soviets became closer to the Indian Ocean, Basra Bay, and Middle Eastern oil resources.⁸⁹ The regime change in Iran especially provided the USSR a comparative advantage over the US in the region. This general political environment disrupted the US and led it to plan more active policies towards Afghanistan.

As a result of Soviet occupation, the scattered religious and ethnic groups came together against the USSR. The US granted aid to Afghani mujahedeen resisting the Soviet occupation. It is claimed that during this period, the US granted arms to the Afghani mujahedeen amounting to 600 million dollars in addition to cash 300 million dollars.⁹⁰

An interesting group, namely, Mekteb-el Hidamet, received some of these grants. Osama bin Laden was a member of the group and he undertook some voluntary actions in favor of the Afghans. He participated in several military confrontations against the USSR in 1989. After his experiences among

⁸⁷ Michel S. Swetnam and Yonah Alexander, *Bir Terörist Açının Profili Usame bin Laden*, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2001), 24.

⁸⁸ Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was due to the 4th article of Friendship and Good Neighborhood and Cooperation Agreement of 5 December 1978. Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914-1980* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1973), 776.

⁸⁹ Armaoğlu, 761-771.

⁹⁰ Afghanistan, Taliban ve Ladin, (İstanbul: Birey yayıncılık, 2001), 30

Afghani mujahedeen, he founded his own organization with his mujahedeen cohorts. The aim of the organization was to fight against the US and Israel.

The Taliban regime did not cooperate with the US and the organization of Osama bin Laden preferred to reside in Afghanistan. It should not be forgotten that the Taliban constituted a fraction of the fighting for the total control over Afghanistan. They could less likely succeed without US support; ironically they later provided the safe-haven for Al Qaeda, the most wanted enemy of the US.

To conclude in few words, as Wilkinson claims 'terrorism has an inherent transnational character',⁹¹ yet terrorist organizations did not appear with their transnational characteristics. They passed through different phases and some evolved as transnational terrorist organizations. As we discussed in these chapter, terrorist organizations proceeded different steps. Different terrorist organizations in different time periods asserted distinct characteristics. Even though terrorism existed in all time periods, we observe that as the time period gets closer, terrorist organizations' compositions also come into view as more complex mechanisms. Therefore, in order to figure out this proposition better, we will question continuity in their logic and the change in the methods of terrorist organizations.

⁹¹Kegley Jr, "The Characteristics, Causes, and Controls of International Terrorism: An Introduction," 42.

CHAPTER IV

CONTINUITY IN THE LOGIC & CHANGE IN THE METHODS

In the previous chapter, we stated that terrorism evolved throughout the centuries and it became a more complicated matter. States' vital role in evolution of terrorism is briefly highlighted with specific examples. In this chapter, even though terrorist organizations' evolutionary process cannot be evaluated without the roles of states under structural imperatives, here, we will cope with terrorist organizations, as independent actors possessing their own internal dynamics and making a path in the history. In the end of the path, we will observe that terrorist organizations become more effective in scope of their actions geographically and emotionally by using their predecessors' heritage.

As it can be observed that terrorist organizations have learned much and adapted themselves to the conditions of the contemporary world. They became able to take advantage of technological opportunities. The claims on terrorists' irrationality or insanity seem to have little credibility. Conversely, terrorists are highly organized and posses considerable capabilities to reach their goals. Their inclination to increase their capabilities also leads us to consider future terrorist threats. Considering some terrorist organizations' desire for the weapons of mass destruction, we will speculate on the future terrorist threats that might be posed at the global level. Hence, we will try to analyze the continuity in the logic of terrorism, the change in its methods and the prospects of novel threats by means of modern science and technology. More importantly, we will imply the growth of transnational terrorism in the end of this historical

path by using the experiences of its predecessors and using its internal balancing mechanisms. Even though Waltz argues this proposition for states, we assert that like each unit in the system; terrorist organizations also have their own dynamics to become stronger. Therefore, focal point of this chapter is going to be terrorists' logic and methods in making internal balancing.

4.1 Continuity in the Logic

4.1.1 Opposing the despot or unjust governance

In the ancient period, terrorism was always justified as a means of resisting despotism⁹², which is the worst form of government according to Aristotle and Plato. In that period, the opposition to the ruler was not undertaken as a mass movement or in the sense we understand terrorism today.⁹³ Nevertheless, the logic of the Trannicides in ancient Greece has provided coverage to terrorism to justify assassinations. In ancient Greece, it was assumed that there existed a divine and natural law between the tyrant and the public.⁹⁴ If tyranny violates natural law, the public has a right to resist its rule. According to the assumed contract, the ruler was entitled to maintain justice and order. If one fails to do so, one has no right to claim obedience. Therefore,

⁹²Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, 22.

⁹³ Laqueur argues that there are many things that are mystified about terrorism. First, political terror is a new and unprecedented phenomenon. Second, terrorism is a left wing and revolutionary in character. Third, terrorism appears whenever people have genuine, legitimate grievances. Remove the grievance and terror will cease. Forth, terror is highly effective. Fifth, the importance of terrorism will grow enormously in the years to come as the destructive power of its weapons increases. Yet, he claims that such a danger really exists if terrorists acquire the weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, political terrorists are more intelligent and less cruel than ordinary criminals. Last, terrorists are poor, hungry, and desperate human beings. Walter Laqueur, "The Futility of Terrorism," in *Characteristics of Contemporary International Terrorism*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Hampshire: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1990), 69-73.

⁹⁴ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 22.

killing the tyrant was an honoured mission for any of the ruled. Terrorists have regarded themselves as opposing an unjust and corrupt government and claimed righteousness in utilizing political violence.

Later on, terrorists recognized the fact that killing the tyrant made no difference in their situation. The dead tyrant was replaced by his successor and the system remained the same. Recognizing the fact that the end of the dictator is not the end of tyranny but a just a new beginning with a new despot, terrorists decided on the necessity of attacking the system.⁹⁵ The aim became to provide change in the system rather than just killing the oppressor. Terrorists assumed a role of doctors for themselves for the sick society and believed in the creative power of destruction.⁹⁶

According to many writers, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 were an illustration of the system wide attack. After the collapse of the USSR, the liberal economic and political system remained uncontested. As the leader of the rival pole, the US was perceived by many as the hegemon in the international political system. Liberal values and principles that the US represents in the post-Cold War era were claimed as

⁹⁵ Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna*, 130.

⁹⁶ Johnson claims that terrorists employ terrorism as a desirable for of action. Some of them are influenced by Satre who presented violence as liberation. Terrorists found violence as a positive and creative way of communicating their thoughts. He also states that not only the intellectual justification for murder but also the instinctive humanity in terrorists is systematically blunted. Terrorists reject politics as a means of communicating their political positions. Therefore, it tends to despotism as it rejects politics as an arena to discuss conflicts. It poses more threat to democracies and exploits freedom. Last, terrorists attempt to induce civilizations to commit suicide as they sometimes negotiate and obey the demands of terrorists. Paul Johnson, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Terrorism" in *Characteristics of Contemporary International Terrorism*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Hampshire: Macmillian Education Ltd., 1990), 63-68.

Americanization of the world.⁹⁷ Many problems related to the international economy were bound to American politics. The US was held responsible of the system wide economic and political problems. After the attacks of September 11, some intellectuals posited that terrorists wanted to illustrate that they do not share the American dream and its liberal values in politics and economics.⁹⁸ The selection of the targets as the World Trade Center and Pentagon constituted meaningful and symbolic acts⁹⁹ signaling that the attacks targeted mainly the system and its values.¹⁰⁰ From the perspective of the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks their action targeted a corrupt system and its leader perceiving the US as the global tyrant. According to terrorists, their actions are legitimate given American policies in the Middle East and the other parts of the world.¹⁰¹

Interestingly, the attacked and the attackers qualified 9/11 attacks as a system wide assault. Discussing the reasons for the attack, the US President George W. Bush concluded that the perpetrators hate freedoms that the US

⁹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," (James Madison Lecture: Columbia University, 1999), 6.

⁹⁸ Robert Fisk, "Batı'nın Tecavüzcü ve Katil 'Müttefikler'i," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 284. Immanuel Wallerstein, "11 Eylül 2001, Niçin?" in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 264. Noam Chomsky, "ABD Saldırısı Korkunç Sonuçlar Verecek," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 303.

⁹⁹ Thornton defines terrorism as a symbolic act in an internal war designed to influence political behavior by means of entailing the use of the threat of violence. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 145.

¹⁰⁰ Sibel Özbudun, "Modern Dünyadaki Cadı Avı," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 17. Immanuel Wallerstein, "11 Eylül 2001, Niçin?" in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 268.

¹⁰¹ Temel Demirel, "Terörist mi Dediniz? Küreselleşme ve Terör," in *Küreselleşme ve Terör: Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği*, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 129. Michel S. Swetnam and Yonah Alexander, *Bir Terörist Ağının Profili Usame bin Laden*, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2001), 99-114.

promoted all over the world.¹⁰² Therefore, they do not want to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life. He claims that terrorists stand against the US because the US stands against them.¹⁰³ Terrorists' challenge of a global power was realized with unconventional methods. A non-state actor challenged a global power with its unconventional methods, which contain no morality in its choices on target and tools.

4.1.2 No Moral Consideration on targets and tools

The lack of moral consideration provides additional continuity in the logic of terrorism. Terrorist groups remain very small and weak as compared to the well-equipped powerful majority. Therefore, they disregard any moral consideration in their choice of targets and tools. In order to compensate their weakness against states they disregard peaceful and conventional ways of dealing with conflicts. Terrorists claim that the ends justify the means. According to terrorists murder for political purposes cannot be regarded as a crime.¹⁰⁴ A German radical Karl Heinzen (1809-1880), whom it was purported, created the doctrine of modern terrorism, stated that physical liquidation of hundreds or thousands of people could be justified, as it could still be the higher

¹⁰² National Security Strategy, available from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>: Internet

¹⁰³ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Volume 37, No: 3 (2002): 338.

¹⁰⁴ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 26.

interest of humanity.¹⁰⁵ The mass killings were deemed as obligatory actions for political progress and physical necessity.

4.1.3 Secrecy

Terrorists' logic states that killing is a physical necessity. Accomplishing the task of ending existence of the target is very closely related with secrecy of terrorist plots. Secrecy has provided the perpetrators advantages in strategies of attack and defense against governments. In order to keep these advantages over states or governments terrorist organizations avoid being open targets.

The fundamental necessity of secrecy for terrorists was illustrated in the nineteenth century by a Russian philosopher named Nechaev.¹⁰⁶ He stated that a terrorist should live under an assumed name or a number, break all ties with his or her friends, and forgo marriage. Terrorists should be cut off from his or her comrades and find his friends in the underworld. On the day of action, the terrorist should disfigure his or her face with chemicals to avoid being recognized. In his pocket the terrorist was to carry a manifesto explaining motives and if surviving after the attack he or she would poison himself. Another thinker, Bakunin, suggests that terrorists should live under an assumed name and infiltrate the normal social life in churches, the world of business, bureaucracy, army, even the secret police so as to be able to reach the targets easier.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Everett L. Wheeler, "Terrorism and the Military Theory: A Historical Perspective," in *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, ed. Clark McCauley (Chippenham: Frank Cass, 1991), 19.

¹⁰⁶ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 31.

¹⁰⁷ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 32.

4.1.3.i Secrecy and liberal societies

Most of these tactics related to secrecy are still used by contemporary terrorists as well. Terrorist organizations pay a lot of attention to their secrecy. Many terrorists live in cities with assumed names and ordinary jobs and wait for the right time and place for their operations. The recent example of September 11 illustrated how terrorists can infiltrate societies.¹⁰⁸

Terrorist organizations have gained more advantages in the liberal societies, most of whom recognize the right of free travel and provide political asylum. The issue of political asylum is a very value-loaded and ambiguous matter. However, it is a fact that some terrorists take advantage of the opportunities offered by liberal states. Due to the night-watch state ideal in the liberal societies, the control of the state over the daily lives of the citizens is desired to be minimized. Liberal states became places where terrorists easily flourish.¹⁰⁹ In his study, ironically, Walter Laqueur argues that whenever the

¹⁰⁸ It is claimed that the September 11 attack destroyed America's sense of invulnerability because it showed that terrorists were capable of mounting major attacks on soil of the US without being detected. Brian Jenkins state that at least 20 operatives from a terrorist organization that was already being closely watched by American intelligence services could enter the US, remain in the country for months while training to carry out multiple terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale, receive instructions and hundreds of thousands of dollars from abroad, even travel out of the country and return, all without being detected by the authorities, raised questions about the adequacy of American intelligence that are still being debated. Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 6; available from <http://www.rand.org>. Beyond the failure of the intelligence services, all of these also illustrate the fact that terrorist organizations developed their capabilities in infiltrating in the societies.

¹⁰⁹ We can also argue that terrorism also flourish in the states that have problems with establishing governmental authority on their territory. As it is discussed in the National Security Strategy of the US, states incapable of providing control over their domestic jurisdiction harbor terrorism. These places become safe-havens for terrorists. Yet, in terms of technological infrastructure and publicity opportunities, liberal states are much attractive than states without control over their territories. See for a detailed argument for America's perception of states harboring terrorism, National Security Strategy 2002, available from, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>: Internet

means of repression has been most complete and perfect, there has been no terrorism at all.¹¹⁰ Adding to the opportunities presented by modernity, without control of government, terrorist organizations gained advantages that they cannot have in autocratic regimes.¹¹¹ The lesser the amount of control over the society, the easier it is for the terrorists to conduct their activities secretly in the liberal regimes. Ironically, this is the dilemma that liberal states face in the contemporary world.

Liberal states have a response problem in the face of terrorism. As terrorists and their activities are secret, states need to take severe precautions that may also be inconsistent with the principles of liberal society. These precautions may violate privacy of its citizens and restrict their actions.¹¹² In liberal societies, governments have to be legitimate and legal in their actions. Terrorists try to push governments knowing the limitations of liberal governments undertaking severe countermeasures. Terrorists use these kinds of actions to justify their action when governments give strong responses. If governments do not take countermeasures then governments might be criticized as (if) they cannot fulfill their duties of providing order and security.

Terrorists understand quite well the limitations of governments that are responsible to their citizens. The thoughts of German radical Karl Heinzen on the weapons of mass destruction clearly illustrate the perception on the weakness of governments. According to him, terrorists should use weapons of

¹¹⁰ Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 142-173.

¹¹¹ Brian Jenkins, "International terrorism", in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, eds. Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 73-76.

¹¹² See Robert Jervis for his discussion on the domestic implications of the war on terrorism. Robert Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 117, No: 1 (2002): 37-54.

mass destruction because states cannot make use of indiscriminate violence without considering morality and civilians. Terrorists' secrecy basically provides terrorists an advantage over governments because governments are obliged to pursue moral and legal qualities in their actions. Probably for this reason, Paul Wilkinson claims that anyone who pronounces to have a total solution to terrorism is either a "fool or a knave" because the measures the liberal and open democracies would need to take in order to eradicate terrorism would mean the violation of basic freedoms.¹¹³ Being aware of the limitations of governments, terrorists develop strategies of making propaganda by action.

4.1.4 Propaganda by deed

Terrorist organizations hardly want the gains of conventional combat such as taking and holding ground or destroying the physical forces of its opponents. Terrorism is a means for their goal. Terrorists aim to make their propaganda through their fearful actions. Terrorists historically believed that propaganda by deed is more influential than thousands of leaflets.¹¹⁴ Being aware of their weaknesses compared to states and governments, terrorists aim to reach a large audience through their violent action. They want to give messages to three groups of audience, namely: their supporters, their opponents, and neutrals.

To begin with, terrorists aim to give their passive supporters two messages. First, terrorists always assume themselves responsible for suffering

¹¹³ Wilkinson, *Terrorism: British perspectives*, 12.

¹¹⁴ Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 59.

people. They claim to defend the rights of their supporters in the face of the opposed state or government. They want to legitimize and strengthen their position in the eyes of their supporters. By strengthening their position, terrorists want to create consciousness and increase active participation too. Second, through their frightful actions, terrorists claim that they are strong enough to challenge governments or states. Perceiving the strength of terrorists, obedience and cohesion among active and passive supporters increase. Therefore, it would be appropriate to claim that violence is instrumental for terrorists. Terrorists perform their propaganda through their actions among their supporters, and aim to gather more active supporters, as well as to keep current recruits.

Additionally, targeting their opponents, terrorists want to create the impression that they are strong enough to challenge their opponents. The opponents are aware of the fact that terrorism has no rule. Without any established rule it is very hard to make estimates on the day of attack, means, and targets. This uncertain situation creates insecurity among the citizens of governments. The feeling of insecurity aims to decrease the credibility of the opposed state or government. As the states are bound to the framework of some rules the governments' counteractions may not be as sufficient as they should be. States or governments are presented as if they cannot fulfill their basic responsibilities. Second, terrorists aim to create upon their opponents' audience 'who or what is next?' syndrome and 'it could be me' impression. The fearful actions of terrorists aim as a dictum simply says 'kill one and frighten thousands.'

Lastly, terrorists' fearful actions endeavor to raise consciousness and sympathy among neutrals. Terrorists giving the impression that they are strong intend to increase more supporters out of the neutrals. Terrorists also want governments or states to produce a severe reaction so that terrorists become able to damage the credibility of the opposed party. By providing overreaction of the opposed, terrorists may really create a positive impact on the society and potential constituency who may give active support as well. Also, terrorists would like to gain more sympathy for their actions. They want to utilize their sympathizers to hinder governments. In democratic states, governments take into account public opinion. The actions of governments should be supported by public opinion otherwise governments' actions may remain limited. Therefore, a neutral mass that put out of government action hardens counter-terrorist measures and provides terrorists a chance of maneuver.

4.1.4.i Propaganda by deed and 'self-imposed constraint'

It should not be forgotten that terrorists' action might lead to a strong enmity among neutral parties. Terrorists aim to gain domestic and international recognition on the basis of an assumed legitimate cause. So as to be able to claim some degree of legitimacy and to present themselves as the representatives of the weak against the strong, terrorists apply self-imposed control over their actions.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Volume 13, Issue 4 (Jul., 1981): 387.

Self-imposed action strategy of terrorists is supported by two arguments. First, terrorists seem to avoid taking terribly damaging and terrifying measures, apart from the technical difficulties, such as poisoning a city's water supply or spreading chemical or biological agents that could cause mass killings. Actually, there are several examples of the usage of such weapons, like the use of sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo Subway in March 1995 and letters with anthrax sent in the US in 2000.¹¹⁶ However, these few incidents do not constitute a trend in terrorists' methods.¹¹⁷ Analyzing the recent events of September 11 in the US, it can be claimed that the methods used despite its destructiveness, are quite conservative in terms of terrorist strategy.¹¹⁸

Second, terrorist organizations do not only want to be seen as selective in their methods. They also want to be seen as selective in their targets for the claim of legitimacy in the eyes of their audience. Selectivity helps terrorists to justify their actions. Terrorists argue that they punish the ones who cause the sufferings of terrorists and, therefore, deserved to be killed. They assassinate particular leaders or even sometimes warn their victims or potential victims publishing a death list. On this ground, terrorists may be characterized as selective in their targets.

¹¹⁶ 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'; available on:

http://www.terrorismfiles.org/weapons/weapons_of_mass_destruction.html. Internet.

¹¹⁷ It is, however, necessary to indicate that terrorist organizations show a little tendency to change their willingness to have weapons of mass destruction, even though it cannot be generalized as it is claimed commonly. Brian Jenkins claims that nuclear terrorism, defined as the use of credible threatened use of a nuclear explosive device, has not occurred suggests that nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined. Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear: A Reprisal", in *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, ed. Kushner, Harvey W. (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 248.

¹¹⁸ The method used in the 9/11 events was a modified version of the Russian revolutionaries in 1907 that paid 20.000 rubles to an inventor who was working on an aircraft in the futile hope of bombing the Russian imperial palaces from the air. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 382.

However, some also argue that terrorists may be selective in choosing their physical targets.¹¹⁹ Terrorists indiscriminately chose individuals, buildings, ships, airplanes, trains, etc. that they consider purposeful for publicizing their cause. They may choose these physical targets as symbols to demonstrate their actual target. The genuine targets may be ideas and principles and terrorists, by attacking on the physical actors of these ideas and principles, may indicate that they want to destroy the system. This type of violence is called indiscriminate violence because of its human causalities. Terrorists do not value the human factor and attack places where individuals reside or directly on the individuals whom they know belonging to one nationality. In both cases, terrorists claim selectivity but attacking on just one nationality and not attacking on the others cannot be regarded as such. For instance, Armenian terrorists aimed at the Turkish diplomats since they regard the Ottomans and the Turkish Republic as responsible of the 'so-called' Armenian Genocide of 1915.¹²⁰ By means of indiscriminate use of violence terrorists want to manipulate the opposed governments or states. Indiscriminate use of violence is a very consistent action with the principles of terrorists. They create fear among the audience and became able to promote their propaganda through their dangerous actions.

¹¹⁹ Brian Jenkins, "International terrorism", 73-74.

¹²⁰ The word of 'so-called' added by the writer, for detailed information, See, Çitlioğlu, 9-122.

4.1.4.ii Propaganda by deed and Media

Propaganda by deed is used to create more publicity. Even though terrorists have not used unconventional methods with higher indiscriminate targeting, their actions so far seem to create serious intimidation among the audience. According to propaganda by deed strategy, terrorists take the plunge to become publicly known and recognized. Media enables terrorists to reach a larger audience causing the 'echo effect'.¹²¹ The repeated audio-visual performances about terrorists' actions increase their publicity and fame. The more the terrorists' actions become frightening and dreadful, the more it takes up room in the media. Therefore, the publicity of terrorist action becomes just as important as the magnitude of it. If enough attention is paid, it can be recognized that most of the terrorist actions occur when access to media is more available.¹²²

However, in long term, it is claimed that the echo effect creates acceptance and ignorance among the society as the public got used to terrorist actions. As the public gets used to terrorist actions, terrorists have a tendency to go to extreme lengths to shock the audience,¹²³ which is larger and more

¹²¹ Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann agree on Laqueur's thought that media is the best friend of terrorists. However, they distinguish between conventional media and new media technology, namely the Internet. The authors state that terrorists, interestingly, use the Internet in order to justify their cause and draw an impression of political movement. Terrorists do not use their web sites for publicity of their violent actions. Terrorist organizations aim to reach potential supporters, to their enemies, and to international public opinion. Terrorist organizations are capable of freely communicating with their audience that is not possible through conventional media due to journalistic standards. Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann, 'www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 25, (2002): 317-32.

¹²² Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," 320.

¹²³ Bruce Hoffman states that at least some terrorists have come to believe that attention is no longer as readily obtained as it was. In their minds, both the public and media become increasingly inured or desensitized to the continuing spiral of terrorist violence. These terrorists feel pushed to undertake ever more dramatic or destructively lethal deeds in order to achieve

diverse due to the media. It is, therefore, argued that media in democratic countries contribute to the growth of terrorism. It is accused of magnifying the impact of terrorist actions.¹²⁴ Interestingly, terrorists take actions to ensure a place in the media, as media creates acceptance among the audience, terrorists need to take more dreadful actions. Even though media can also be used as a counter-terrorism tool, the relationship between media and terrorism seems to be a vicious circle.

Until now, we elaborated on the continuities in the history of terrorism. Terrorists still make use of these basic principles, while taking action. They undertake covertly dreadful actions in order to publicize their cause and select targets that would bring the most reaction. We asserted that terrorists limit their actions not to bring a severe backlash and disrupt their active or passive sympathizers. They also face a legitimacy concern towards their constituents. Therefore, they use conventional methods. Conventional means the methods employed by terrorists for a long time period and therefore can be estimated in kind, such as assassination, hijacking, bombing, and embassy takeover. The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 illustrated how destructive terrorists can be even without using unconventional methods, namely weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the following part of the chapter, we will try to converse the prospects terrorists have by comparing the conventional methods that are still in use.

the same effect that a less bloody action may have had in the past. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, 13; available on <http://www.rand.org>.

¹²⁴Elegab, *International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism*, iv.

4.2 Change in the Methods

Terrorists have discovered the possible contributions of modern technology to terrorism. Terrorists recognized that technology could compensate terrorists' weakness against states or governments. Technology provides an increase in the quality of terrorist attacks. The application of modern technology in terrorism provided perpetrators with cost effectiveness and higher destructiveness.¹²⁵ Terrorists' success in creating power out of impotence is very closely related with technological advances. Technological advances in weapons technology, explosives, transportation, communication and banking ease terrorist calculations as their effectiveness increases and the cost of their actions decreases.¹²⁶ In a way, terrorists also adapted themselves into the global civil infrastructure to inflict considerable challenge. This adaptability provided terrorism an internal dynamic, and changed terrorist actions in quality.

Developments in technology and communication have played a very crucial role in terrorists constituting a global challenge.¹²⁷ Interestingly, in the International Anarchist Congress, in 1881, one of the delegates named Ganz

¹²⁵ John Lewis Gaddis states that '[T]he attack's cost-effectiveness was equally striking. No previous act of terrorism came to close to this one in lives lost and damaged inflicted. The dead were almost twice the number killed in some three decades of violence in Northern Ireland. They are ten times the toll on the both sided in the most recent round of the Israeli-Palestinian *intifada*. They exceed, in the deaths suffered on a single day, the most violent battles of the American Civil War. The operation required the lives of nineteen terrorists and expenditures of about \$ 500,000. The 'payoff', if we can use such a brutal transaction, was approximately 5,000 dead and perhaps as much as \$ 100 billion in recovery costs. Ratios like these-some 263 victims for every terrorist, and \$2000 in damages for every dollar expended- cannot help but set a standard to which future terrorists will aspire.' John Lewis Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era For The New One," in *The Age of Terror*, eds. Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 9.

¹²⁶ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 380.

¹²⁷ Some argue that terrorism is the dark side of globalization. See Rasmussen, "A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization," 323-49.

suggested that greater attention should be paid to the study of chemistry and technology in order to supply dreadful weapons for the struggle against the adversary. Upon his suggestion, Congress passed a resolution stating that affiliated individuals and organizations should devote themselves to the study of these sciences.¹²⁸ The weapons of mass destruction were an ideal for the terrorists of the nineteenth century as they could cause mass killings and response problems for governments. The ideals and wishes of terrorists came true and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries were marked by the developments in the fields of technology and transportation. These developments served the welfare and comfort of the humanity, unfortunately, to the brutal aims of terrorists. Especially, in the contemporary times, terrorism has gained advantages over the states due to the abundance of technological developments and vulnerabilities of modern states due to their dependency on technology and their political systems.¹²⁹

4.2.1 The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Cold War and post Cold War era

The most fearful development in the field of technology is the weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century. The weapons that sustained peace through a balance of terror¹³⁰ in the Cold War era have been declared as the

¹²⁸ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 51.

¹²⁹ The increased threat posed by terrorism is mentioned in the National Defense Strategy of the United States in 2002 as 'Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and turn the power of modern technologies against us'. The National Security of the United States of America, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Michael Stohl, *Terrible beyond Endurance: the Foreign Policy of State Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 22.

most important challenge to world peace in the post-Cold War era, especially after the events of September 11.

It is argued that the difference between the Cold War and its aftermath stems from the risk of proliferation of the WMD. Before discussing the possibility and the risk of proliferation, we intend to describe the situation in the Cold War era with respect to the use of WMD. During this period, the weapons of mass destruction were in the hands of a few states. These few states, most of whom are the permanent members of the Security Council, had strict control over these capabilities to avoid proliferation. To assure that other states do not intend to have these capabilities, nuclear-power states promoted some international treaties.¹³¹ Most of the non-nuclear states became satisfied with the security umbrella provided by the superpowers since the acquisition of the weapons of mass destruction were quite expensive. Besides financial problems and control of the have-states, other states were relatively weak in technology and had limited personnel in the field.

Compared to the Cold War era, however, it is claimed that in the post-Cold War era the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a very problematic issue because of the fact that it became much easier for terrorist organizations to acquire those capabilities.¹³² It is argued that terrorists

¹³¹ There have been numerous nonproliferation agreements including, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). Mike Shuster, "National Security, Nonproliferation, and The War Against Terrorism," in *After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Monterey*, ed. Michael Barletta (California: Institute of International Monterey, 2002), 1-5.

¹³² Considering the relative ease in finding destructive weapons in the contemporary period Brian Jenkins claims that, terrorists still use the classical methods like bombing, hijacking, or assassination and that terrorists have self-imposed constraints. According to the author, this is because of the fact that terrorists want lots of people watching not lots of people dead without

developed their capabilities to acquire weapons of mass destruction in legal ways as well as illegal ways.

Terrorists are capable of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for various reasons. First, some nuclear states are willing to sell their nuclear capabilities. Russia is the most well known state supplying nuclear materials to other states or organizations.¹³³ In the Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,¹³⁴ 2001, Russia is mentioned as the supplier of a variety of know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Academicians and researchers do not claim that the Russian government directly sold its nuclear capabilities, though in some cases it does.¹³⁵ Corrupt officials and profit hungry firms are suppliers of non-conventional weapons.¹³⁶ These groups constitute a real security concern because they take advantage of the weaknesses of Russia by providing terrorists and other groups materials related to non-conventional weapons. Considering the Soviet legacy the concern about these organizations having and selling non-conventional weapons continues to increase. The exact quantity of nuclear materials

gathering a strong opposition from their own audience and the neutrals. Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal" in *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 225-250.

¹³³ Alex Schmid, "Terrorism is the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," in *The Future of Terrorism*, eds. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 116-118. John B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina Wolfsthal, "Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia," *Survival*, Volume 44, No: 2 (Summer 2002): 71-83. Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb," *Survival*, Volume 44, No: 2 (Summer 2002): 51-70.

¹³⁴ 'Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 30 June 2001,' available on http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bian_jan_2002.htm#13. Internet.

¹³⁵ Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb," *Survival*, Volume 44, No: 2 (Summer 2002): 61.

¹³⁶ Schmid, "Terrorism is the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 116.

produced in the former USSR is unknown. The security at the facilities storing the nuclear materials and warheads are not satisfactory.¹³⁷ Also, there are corruption and control problems in Russia, providing smugglers sufficient conditions to take these materials out of the country.¹³⁸

Besides the risk of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction on their own, states might help terrorists having the capability directly or indirectly. State involvement increases the probability of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. They can get the weapons of mass destruction by using their own methods (legal or illegal) or sympathetic states may donate these weapons to the terrorist organizations.¹³⁹ Considering the probability of terrorists having the weapons of mass destruction, some argue that terrorists can no longer be excluded from the calculations related to security.

It is true that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction really constitutes several problems. First, the possibility of terrorist organizations having the same destructive capabilities as states constitutes a strong security challenge for states. In the Cold War, a nuclear war was avoided by deterrence. Deterrence worked because the nuclear states had something to

¹³⁷ For instance, from 1993 to 2000, the United Nations agency, which monitors the nuclear security, confirmed 153 cases of theft of nuclear materials, as well as 183 cases of thefts of other radioactive materials that could be converted into dirty bombs, that uses dynamite to disperse radioactive material in an urban setting. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 30 June 2001,' available on http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bian_jan_2002.htm#13. Internet.

¹³⁸ One special investigator remarked with some exaggeration that Potatoes are guarded better than radioactive materials. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 117.

¹³⁹ Thomas C. Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," *International Security*, Vol:6, No:4 (Spring 1982): 61-77.

loose such as territory, population, and sovereignty. However, terrorist organizations have no defined borders, population, or reputation to lose.¹⁴⁰ This increases the vulnerability of the states. Traditional methods such as retaliation after or deterrence¹⁴¹ before the attacks of the terrorist organizations became obsolete. Increasing the capabilities of intelligence remains the most applicable solution in this instance. However, developments in communication and traveling as well as technical weaknesses in detecting small and portable weapons decrease the probability of success against terrorists.

It is also true that whether terrorist organizations have the weapons of mass destruction or not, the sole existence of these kinds of organizations discredit the traditional methods of opposition such as retaliation or deterrence. Terrorist organizations having the WMD do not gain a comparative advantage over the states in attack, as they are already capable of secretly acting against states. Yet, terrorist organizations with the capability of weapons of mass destruction have a chance to change their status from terrorist organization to something else. Shelling states that groups having weapons of mass destruction would have a radical change in their status and after having the

¹⁴⁰ Mike Shuster, "National Security, Nonproliferation, and The War Against Terrorism," in *After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Monterey*, ed. Michael Barletta (California: Institute of International Monterey, 2002), 1.

¹⁴¹ Brian Jenkins claims that the very nature of the terrorist enterprise makes the traditional strategy of deterrence difficult to apply to terrorist groups. He claims that, in traditional deterrence, the adversaries do not exceed mutually understood limits and will not employ certain weapons, although their continued existence is accepted. Deterrence worked in the Cold War because decision-makers of both sides were fully in control of their offices and were aware of the limits and consequences of their actions. Therefore, coexistence was acceptable. Deterrence regulated the conflict. However, this kind of usage for terrorism is not acceptable for terrorism. Deterring terrorism is a very different matter. Deterrent strategies may be appropriate for dealing with the terrorists' support structures: economic supporters, supporting states, supporting communities etc... Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 25-26; available from <http://www.rand.org>.

same capabilities the actors can be claimed as 'the equals' strategically.¹⁴² The will of the terrorist organizations to be a 'nuclear power' and to have other chemical and biological weapons should be considered from this perspective. As it is mentioned before, terrorists have 'the will' to have the weapons of mass destruction. Yet, they have no sign of using these capabilities, except the Aum sect in Japan.¹⁴³ Besides this case, terrorist organizations' choices and acts indicate that terrorists still use conventional methods.

¹⁴² Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," 68.

¹⁴³ Leitenberg claims that the Aum sect totally failed to produce biological weapons despite its financial capabilities. The author claims that the case was misinformed to the public in order to justify budgetary policy in the US. Milton Leitenberg, "Aum Shinrikyo's Effort to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in The Serial Propagation of Misinformation," in *The Future of Terrorism*, eds. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 148-157.

4.2.2 Conventional Methods of Terrorism

Before discussing possible reasons of terrorists' preference on conventional means, we shall analyze these conventional methods.¹⁴⁴ In a long-term analysis of the RAND Corporation, it has been observed that terrorists use methods like bombing, hijacking, assassination, embassy takeover and hostage taking.¹⁴⁵ The RAND study on terrorists' methods concluded that the frequency of terrorist attacks declined when the targets are hardened. However, the action undertaken by governments to increase difficulty of one kind of attack leads terrorists to fabricate other types of relatively cheaper and easier attacks. For instance, examining the embassy takeovers, it has been observed that these actions declined as the embassies became better protected; the governments became more resistant to terrorists' demands, more skillful in negotiating with terrorists holding hostages, and more willing to use force when the negotiations failed.¹⁴⁶ As the study indicates terrorist organizations undertake their actions when the counter terrorism measures are low and they increase their attacks when the governments relax their measures.¹⁴⁷ Taking action, terrorists consider allocating their resources among various modes of operation, so as to

¹⁴⁴ John Lewis Gaddis claims that '[w]hat was striking about September 11 was the success with which the terrorists transformed objects we had never before regarded as dangerous into weapons of lethal potency. There was nothing exotic here like bombs or even firearms. They used instead the objects of everyday life: pocket knives, twine, box-cutters, and of course, commercial aircraft. The terrorists also combined what may seem to us to be a primitive belief in the rewards of martyrdom with the most modern methods of planning, coordination, and execution. We confront, therefore, not only a new category of easily available weaponry, but a new combination of skill and will in using it.' Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era For The New One," 9.

¹⁴⁵ Brian Jenkins, *30 Years and Counting* [article on-line] available from <http://www.rand.org>.

¹⁴⁶ Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: Vector Auto Regression Intervention Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Volume 87, (1993): 831. Brian Jenkins, *30 Years and Counting* [article on-line] available from <http://www.rand.org>.

¹⁴⁷ Enders and Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," 162.

equate the expected marginal gain per dollar spent on alternative operations.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, they learn from governmental countermeasures and their own failures and they adapt¹⁴⁹ their methods in order to increase effectiveness of their operations. Considering the increasing effectiveness of terrorism, in the subsequent part, we will question terrorists' tendency to shift unconventional methods by acquiring the weapon of mass destruction.

4.2.3 Terrorism and 'the will to use' and 'the will to have' WMD

It is obvious that the use of weapons of mass destruction would provide more effectiveness than the use of conventional weapons. However, except one case, terrorist organizations show a little tendency to change their willingness to have weapons of mass destruction so far, even though this desire cannot be generalized for all terrorist organizations.¹⁵⁰ Jenkins allege that nuclear terrorism has not occurred suggests that nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Enders and Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," 150-160.

¹⁴⁹ Bruce Hoffman states that every terrorist generation learns from its predecessors- becoming smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate. For instance, the members of Red Army Faction after learning German police can find their fingerprints from the bottom of the toilet seats or inside of refrigerators, began to apply a special ointment to their fingers that after drying prevented fingerprints from being left. Thus, preventing its members' identification or incrimination. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects* [article on-line] 25; available from <http://www.rand.org>.

¹⁵⁰ Subsequent discoveries in Al Qaeda's training camps showed that the use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons certainly was an aspiration, even if the organization lacked the actual capabilities. Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 7; available from <http://www.rand.org>.

¹⁵¹ It is, however, necessary to indicate that terrorist organizations show a little tendency to change their willingness to have weapons of mass destruction, even though it cannot be generalized as it is claimed commonly. Brian Jenkins claims that nuclear terrorism, defined as the use of credible threatened use of a nuclear explosive device, has not occurred suggests that nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined. Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear: A Reprisal", in *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*, ed. Kushner, Harvey W. (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 248.

Unattractiveness of the use of weapons of mass destruction is related with several factors such as general reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar weapons; lack of familiar precedents; fear that weapons that would harm the producer or user; fear whether it would work at all or only too well; fear of alienating relevant constituencies and potential supporters on moral grounds; fear of unprecedented governmental crackdown and retaliation to them, their constituencies or sponsor states; lack of perceived need for indiscriminateness, high causality attacks for furthering goals of the group; and lack of money to buy nuclear material on the black market¹⁵².

Some of these factors are related to technical problems or financial limitations. These kinds of obstacles can be easily eliminated. Yet, we should keep on questioning the willingness of terrorist organizations to use weapons of mass destruction. The real factor that will hold terrorists back from using these capabilities originates from the uncertainty that they would encounter in the case of their usage of the WMD. As it was discussed formerly, terrorists hope to reach a wide audience in order to publicize their cause and to gain sympathy for terrorist organizations. They do not want to alienate the audience. By means of terrorism, the perpetrators of the act claim to have power; power to have a political bargaining right over their cause. It should also be kept in mind that terrorism is not an end in itself but a means.¹⁵³ Terrorists do not solely want to

¹⁵² Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 120.

¹⁵³ Gaddis states, about September 11 attacks, that ' [t]he whole point of terrorism is leverage: to accomplish a lot with a little. This operation, in that sense succeeded brilliantly- even allowing for the fact that one of the four planes failed to reach its target, and that more planes may have been in danger of being hijacked. As a consequence, the images of terrified New Yorkers running through the streets of their city to escape great billowing clouds of ash, dust, and

kill people but to frighten them by killing some. Assuming these widely accepted prepositions on terrorism, we can conclude that terrorists get no benefit from killing vast numbers of people. The risk of losing their justification in the eyes of their constituents and the risk of losing support from other international actors are quite costly for terrorists. If terrorists lose their sympathy in the eyes of their supporters they would be strained to hide and conduct operations. Especially, sympathetic governments are the most likely to abolish their support. If these governments do not take their support from the terrorist organization they would both have a bad reputation and probably become subject to retaliation of a victimized state, unless the supporting state has nuclear power. Nevertheless, these assumptions do not challenge the will of the terrorist organizations to have that capability.

Terrorist organizations especially some¹⁵⁴ of them are willing to acquire the weapons of mass destruction. Considering the risk that they will encounter in case of using WMD, why should terrorist organizations strive for getting the capability? Shelling states that an organization that had the qualified, people,

building fragments; or of the government in Washington forced to seek shelter; or of several days of skies devoid of the contrails we have come to aircraft to add to atmosphere over our heads- these memories will remain in our minds just as vividly as the images, from six decades earlier, of within an American naval base on American territory.' John Lewis Gaddis, "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era For The New One," 10.

¹⁵⁴ Bruce Hoffman states that although the total volume of the terrorist incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents resulting in fatalities has nonetheless grown. He states that the increase in the lethality of terrorism is closely related with religious terrorism, besides other reasons. To him, religion provides a mechanism for legitimization and justification, concepts of morality. For a religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects* [article on-line] 7-21; available from <http://www.rand.org>. Yet, as it was discussed in the Chapter II, religious terrorism is not a new phenomenon. This type of terrorism existed in the ancient ages as well. Despite religion can be categorized, as a motivating factor lethality of terrorism should be considered in the framework of their increasing capabilities, weaknesses of the states, and the adaptability of terrorists.

money, the teamwork, and discipline to bring off the successful construction of a nuclear bomb would have plenty of time and plenty of reasons to think carefully about how to use this potential.¹⁵⁵ The usage of the nuclear weapons so far was to 'deter' the other party. Deterrence means the act of preventing or discouraging someone from acting by means of fear, doubt, or the like.¹⁵⁶ Deterrence requires a capability whose existence would lead fear and inaction. In this sense, Schelling asserts that nuclear weapons are themselves terrorist; nuclear terror is not related with the identity of the user. Therefore, national governments and non-governmental entities cannot be differentiated from each other by the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁷ To him, if a government that exploited any real or pretended nuclear capability would appear to 'descend' to the level of terrorist organization while a terrorist organization that possess credibly to possess nuclear weapons might 'ascend' to the status of a government.¹⁵⁸ Terrorists come to the point that they can apply passive terror rather than active terror.¹⁵⁹

The shift from 'to terrorize' to 'to deter' would originate a considerable degree of change in the status of terrorist organizations. While terrorist organizations reach the capability to deter the states more than ever, states' power positions remains the same. Terrorist organizations are secret and aim to cause uncertainty, fear, and insecurity. Terrorist organizations with nuclear capability or other types of the weapons of mass destruction would make them

¹⁵⁵Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?," 86.

¹⁵⁶Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?," 86.

¹⁵⁷Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," 68.

¹⁵⁸Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," 66.

¹⁵⁹Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," 67.

more frightening. Due to the risk of terrorists' using their capability, states might feel obligation to negotiate with terrorist organizations. Change in the distribution of capabilities among the non-state and state actors would bring recognition to terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations with the capability of the weapons of mass destruction might become international actors who should be taken into account by states in their calculations related to security especially.

Terrorist actors' role and position would also be different if they acquire the WMD. If a terrorist organization obtained the WMD power then it would be very hard for a state to retaliate, states that are suspected to provide safe haven, financial help, or political asylum. Terrorist organizations with the WMD power would come to the help of its supporters. For instance, if Al Qaeda had had nuclear capabilities and it made the same conventional type attacks on the US; the response of the US would have been different. If we apply the state to state relations in the Cold War period to the relations between terrorist organizations and states, then it would be possible to claim that by means of WMD the terrorist organizations could have second strike capability over the states. As terrorists are secret and undertake their surprise attacks on a target, even if states have the capability to retaliate, due to the WMD capability of terrorist organizations, a state has to consider the next action of terrorists before terrorists get WMD. This situation definitely leaves states vulnerable against terrorist organizations.

Yet, terrorist organizations not only become threats to states in the security realm but also in the public realm. A terrorist organization with the

WMD capabilities would, without a doubt, have an enormous amount of enemies. It; however, would also have strong friends and a supporting audience than without that capability. As we discussed before, terrorist organizations claim that they undertake terrorist actions for sacred causes. They claim to be representatives of suffering people for some reason. If or when a terrorist organization has the WMD capability, its supporters would increase among the audience. The supporters would believe that they are represented by the terrorist organization in the way it should be. If we again consider the Al Qaeda case, Osama bin Laden has a great deal of support in the Arab world. If the terrorist organization had acquired the WMD, before the US reaction after September 11, then it would be almost impossible to deter Osama bin Laden.¹⁶⁰ Therefore, it would not be wrong to conclude that the stronger terrorist organization, the more public support for its cause. Larger public support means that more possible recruits for terrorist organizations, therefore, an increase in the population of the terrorist organizations.¹⁶¹

Also, it should be kept in mind that a terrorist organization with WMD capability would put a precedent for the other terrorist organization and increase cooperation among them. A terrorist organization with capabilities would help

¹⁶⁰ Bruce Hoffman states that Al Qaeda could use WMD against the US but retaliation –certainly escalation – would be difficult because (1) the US will not use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, (2) its nuclear weapons will seldom be suitable for use, and (3) there are no good targets. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects* [article on-line] 39; available from <http://www.rand.org>.

¹⁶¹ Brian Jenkins claims that quantity of terrorist organization translates into its quality because quantity enables organizers of terrorist organizations to exploit and identify specialized talent that would be scarce or not available in a smaller enterprise. If we interpret the quantity and quality relation, then we can conclude that terrorist organizations with higher constituents gain an important component of power, which is population. Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 4; available from <http://www.rand.org>. See also, Philip B. Heymann, "Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview," *International Security*, Volume 26, No: 3 (Winter, 2001/02): 24-38.

other terrorist organizations to acquire similar capabilities or it would provide necessary conditions for that purpose such as proctoring and training. These activities would become easier for terrorists because retaliation, deterrence, or attempts of preventive strike would be harder for states. States would also suspect that terrorists have nuclear weapons more than they claim because states would assume that once terrorists make the bomb they could also make more of them. Also, as the terrorist organization gets stronger, the group cohesion would increase; therefore, the success of intelligence would decrease for states. Under these conditions terrorist organizations would flourish easier and would constitute harder challenges for states.

Considering these likely threats that terrorists with the WMD capabilities would pose to the states, we can claim that states would strive to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring this capability. Assuming that states are like units and they function similarly in international relations, it can be inferred that states do not want any other organization's power to exceed their own powers or they can less likely accept to be 'equals' with a non-state actor. Although some states might use terrorist organizations for their political purposes, it is less likely that they can allow them to grow up and challenge their power. Current political coalitions on terrorism illustrate states' willingness to prevent terrorists having the capability. Some states, especially nuclear states, are ready to challenge even other states that are suspected to be willing to provide the capability to terrorists. The control of nuclear weapons and proliferation remains to be one of the hottest issues among the US and Russia. The concern of the sole superpower and its allies for prevention of proliferation,

illustrate possible challenges that terrorists would encounter in acquiring the WMD. Considering the still known nuclear powers are states, it can be said that states pose a real obstacle in front of terrorists whatever their willingness is.

To sum up, we discussed logical continuities of terrorism and desire for changes in its methods. As the logic of terrorism is analyzed, it can be observed that it is not a static phenomenon. It has some fundamental principles and constant and adaptable methods. Observing their methods, we can infer that terrorism is not bureaucratized. Terrorism has an internal dynamic that keeps it still a dangerous phenomenon. Terrorists adapt the conditions of modernity providing the same opportunities as it does to citizens of the world. Two of these opportunities are in science and communication. As terrorists cannot be identified, it cannot be estimated who will be a terrorist. A terrorist might get the same scientific education with others and use his or her organization. Or, he or she can follow the recent improvements in science from the internet or other means. Therefore, terrorists can acquire the WMD easier than before due to technical developments.

Also, terrorist organizations might acquire the WMD thorough legal or illegal means. Theft, purchase, grants are some of the ways that terrorists can acquire the WMD. The recent research and the expressions of some terrorist organizations as well as the findings about them indicate that terrorist organizations have the will to acquire the WMD.

However, we differentiate the will to use weapons of mass destruction and to possess them. The use of the WMD leads a great fluctuation in the logic of terrorism. As many experts accept, terrorists want to undertake terror that

would help their cause but not risk their existing position and legitimacy. On the other hand, having the capability would lead an enormous amount of prestige for terrorist organizations among its supporters and other terrorist organizations while the same situation causes a great degree of risk and uncertainty for the states. Having the capability of WMD, states and terrorist organizations become equitable actors. Terrorists leave to be the weaker side and they transfer their relations with state from 'terror' to 'deterrence'. However, we also discussed that states constitute a considerable amount of challenge to terrorists in their ways to acquire the WMD.

The most important conclusion that we can draw from this chapter is that terrorist organizations become more effective in their actions through internal balancing and they grow up as important transnational actors in the international system. This assumption refutes Waltzian assumption that states are the major actors in the international politics; therefore, taking account non-state actors would leave one at the unit level analysis. We will argue the opposite and claim that the gap between scholarly structural studies and the reality should be narrowed and transnational terrorist organizations should be taken into account at the system level. In the following chapter, assuming that transnational terrorist organizations are also actors in the system, we will elaborate on the impacts of structure on terrorist organizations' becoming transnational, the prospects of change in the international system according to

Waltzian principles¹⁶² and further implications of transnational terrorist organizations on states' security.



¹⁶² Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 89-101.

CHAPTER V

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM UNDER STRUCTURAL REALISM

The gap between the reality and the scholarly reconstruction should be narrow as much as possible; otherwise theoretical studies fall short of providing accurate picture of the reality. In the international politics, states are taken as the primary actors in the realm of security. Yet, some happenings imply that transnational terrorist organizations emerged as secondary actors that are able to constitute serious challenge to security of states. Unlike other transnational actors that are assumed to rival the role of states in economics, the development of transnational terrorist organizations is not subject to the control of states. These organizations do not exist to provide a better security for the states in which they undertake their actions. They are established to destroy or harm security of their target states. As terrorism constitutes a serious threat to the primary actor of the international politics, in the following part, we intend to analyze the relation between structure and transnational terrorism and the changes in the system due to the transnational terrorism, if there are any.

5.1 Structure and Transnational Terrorism

Waltz states that transnational movements are among the processes that go on within the system and states are main actors of international politics, whose importance can be denied only when a non-state actor develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor

ones.¹⁶³ Transnational terrorist organizations are also among the actors that survive in the international system. Yet, due to their ability in adaptation and learning, they become to the point of challenging states, even the super ones as the September 11 attacks indicated. Since transnational actors interact in the system as well, transnational terrorist organizations also have different types of interactions with the structure, states and other terrorist organizations.

Structure produces a higher impact on the units than the units posed to structure in general. Structure imposes its impact on the units in two ways: through competition and socialization.¹⁶⁴ Structure forces its units to act in the desired ways. It punishes and rewards the behaviors of the units. These impacts of the structure, in the end, cause the units to produce similar actions and avoid variance in the system. Due to the existence of a higher institution, meaning the structure, states' relations with each other, states' interactions with transnational terrorist organizations, and these organizations' relations with each other assert similarities.

In fact, these interactions are overlapped. States play an important role in emergence of transnational terrorism as a secondary actor. States' desire to ensure their security at the expense of the others lead them to support terrorist organizations by providing sanctuary, financial aid, training, technical and ideological support. This assistance enriches the capacity and capabilities of transnational terrorist organizations for certain. However, we cannot state that

¹⁶³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 94.

¹⁶⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 74.

the competition and socialization among states plays the primary factor for development of transnational terrorism.

As Laqueur states that without their internal dynamics terrorist organizations would show a little or temporary existence even if there exists external support.¹⁶⁵ Alexander and Myers also highlight that a small number of terrorist organizations have domestic character and are self-sufficient; also unless they do not have domestic roots it is very hard for them to develop without external support. The significance of external support stems from its efficiency increasing influence of the terrorist organizations.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, transnational terrorist organizations will be considered as units having their own internal and external dynamics under the same structural impacts with states.

5.1.1 Survival as an indicator of Socialization

Similar to states, the primary structural motive for terrorist organizations is survival. Terrorist organizations assure their basic motivations by using their internal dynamics and features. Parallel to states, they try to increase their economic and military capabilities. They establish alliances among themselves and with states. Yet, above all, terrorist organizations guarantee their survival with their secrecy.

Secrecy is the main principle ensuring terrorist organizations' survival. Terrorist organizations are secret by definition. Unlike states, they do not have defined territory, population, flag, or any insignia as indicator of their identity.

¹⁶⁵ Laqueur, *Terrorism*, 137.

¹⁶⁶ Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers, *Terrorism in Europe* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1982), 3-4.

They inflict in societies, live under assumed names, work as ordinary workers, and participate in other social activities as they were one of us. As they cannot be detect in place and identity, taking counter measure against them become very problematic at national and international level. By means of secrecy, terrorist organizations sustain their existence.

Sustaining their mere existence is not the primary goal of terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations aim to terrorize. In order to terrorize more they have to increase their capabilities. Terrorist organizations' strive for more capabilities can be evaluated as their attempts for duplication of states. All states can be examples for terrorists, even the smallest states. What makes a state primary actor is the accumulation of its capabilities.¹⁶⁷ States use their economic capabilities to increase their military and political powers and military and political means to enhance their economic positions.¹⁶⁸ These are the components of the power of states and cannot be separated from each other. Terrorist organizations' behaviors indicate that they also try to acquire all components of power, except a defined territory.

5.1.2 Internal Balancing as an Indicator of Socialization

Economic development plays a crucial role in terrorists' attempts to enhance other components of their power. As Levitt articulates terrorist groups ability to act more efficiently and effectively is closely linked to financing.¹⁶⁹ Terrorist organizations try to increase their economic capabilities by exploiting

¹⁶⁷ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* , 94.

¹⁶⁸ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 94.

¹⁶⁹ Matthew A. Levitt, "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," *MERIA Journal*, Volume 6, Issue 4 (Dec., 2002): 1.

the deficiencies in liberal economic and political systems. Al Qaeda constitutes a successful example indicating the case. As we all know, the terrorist organization developed enough capability to attack on the US. Levitt states that according to the FBI, the attacks cost between \$300.672 and \$500.000.¹⁷⁰ The finance of these attacks were acquired by using sympathizers who opened bank accounts in the Western banks, and who donated money to so-called charity organizations. As the case of Al Qaeda suggests terrorist organizations' economic strengths are reflected into their military capabilities. Terrorists become able to undertake actions that increase their fame by means of turning cash to death.

At this point, it is convenient to remember that terrorists make their propaganda by their actions. The more their capabilities, the more dreadful their actions become. As the more dreadful their actions are, the more terrorist organizations become able to terrorize and collect sympathizers and recruits. Therefore, terrorist organizations' secret capabilities, in terms population, also tend to increase as their attacks kill more people. Cronin asserts that terrorist organizations cannot exist without the availability of broader sources of active or passive sympathy, resources and support.¹⁷¹ An increase in the numbers of recruits enables terrorist organization to select more talented recruits for the more destructive attacks. In Jenkins' words, 'quantity translates into quality'.¹⁷² It is known that the impact of September 11 attacks on the some part of the

¹⁷⁰ Levitt, "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," 3.

¹⁷¹ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve," *International Security*, Volume 27, No: 3 (Winter, 2002/03): 54.

¹⁷² Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 4; available from <http://www.rand.org>.

Islamic world become positive. After the attacks, Osama bin Laden became a hero and sympathizers for the terrorist organization increased.¹⁷³ In short, economic strength translated into military success also leads to an increase in the supporting populace, which in turn provides economic and military resource for terrorist organizations.

Terrorist organizations act in a justifying way this proposition and strive to increase their capabilities more by duplicating the most successful military actors in security realm. They try to acquire the weapons of mass destruction. In the previous section, we stated that terrorist organizations have the 'will to have' that capability even if they might not have the same 'will to use' it. Terrorist organization with the weapons of mass destruction will become differentiated among other terrorist organizations. As its supporters and solidity in-group would increase, terrorist organization's ability to terrorize would reach its peak even if it does not use the capability. In Schelling's saying, the terrorist organization would change its status from terrorizing to deterrence.¹⁷⁴

Researches and intelligence activities verify that some terrorist organizations have strong tendency to get those weapons.¹⁷⁵ Al Qaeda is mentioned among the most suspected terrorist organizations that strive for acquiring the weapon of mass destruction. Jenkins states that subsequent discoveries in Al Qaeda's training camps showed that the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons certainly was an inspiration even if it lacked the

¹⁷³ Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?," 44. Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna*, 127.

¹⁷⁴ Schelling, "Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism," 66-68.

¹⁷⁵ Leonard S. Spector, "The New Landscape of Nuclear Terrorism," in *After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation* Monterey, ed. Michael Barletta (California: Institute of International Monterey, 2002), 6.

real capability.¹⁷⁶ In his testimony, one Al Qaeda member also stated that they made several attempts to acquire uranium to develop nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁷ Another example is the PKK. Schmid states that PKK shows an interest in acquiring Sarin, Potassium Cyanide and Mustard Gas and to use these chemical weapons in order to blackmail against the Turkish government for release of Abdullah Öcalan.¹⁷⁸ The most concrete example indicating the tendencies of terrorist organizations is Japan Aum Shinrikyo. In 20 March 1995, this group launched an attack aimed at killing 40.000 personnel from government offices and National Police headquarters on their way to work on Tokyo subway system by using Sarin nerve gas.¹⁷⁹ These terrorist organizations' strive to become differentiated according to their ability to perform so-called tasks of terrorizing due to their resoluteness in acquiring the weapons of mass destruction.

In this part, we discussed that terrorist organizations are subject to same structural imperatives and they try to create their power by taking advantage of their internal capabilities. Terrorist organizations rely on their internal means rather than external ones. Looking at the history of terrorism, we can clearly observe that terrorist organizations have smart mechanisms. They are not static. They learn and adapt to the conditions in which they live. As a result of

¹⁷⁶ Brian Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 6; available from <http://www.rand.org>. See also U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000* [report on-line]. 2000; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/>; Internet.

¹⁷⁷ Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden, Monterey Institute of International Studies, available on <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm>.

¹⁷⁸ Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 115.

¹⁷⁹ This attack resulted in 12 deaths and about 5.500 injured. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 127.

their historical developments and adaptation processes they began to assert threat to the existence of states. This fact verifies Waltz's claim, that is internal balancing is more reliable and more precise than external balancing.¹⁸⁰

However, sometimes, mere internal means do not satisfy the necessities. Then, units tend to search for external balancers, especially when their capabilities fall short of as opposed to a third party. As terrorist organizations face the same structural forces, they also tend to find external balance mechanisms. As the researches indicate terrorist organizations with domestic roots and external support flourish better than the organizations without external aid.¹⁸¹ Therefore, in the following part, we intend to discuss terrorist organizations external balancing tendencies as an indicator of their socialization in the system.

5.1.3 External balancing as an Indicator of Socialization

External balancing means simply establishing alliances against a common threat. Similar to states, terrorist organizations establish alliances when they regard necessary. As historical data and observations indicate, terrorist organizations have two sources of external balancing: states and other terrorist organizations. States' alliance making against a third party is named as 'balance of power', in which states know the identity of their counterparts, can judge their strength and reliability. However, in this part, the alliance type that we will mention does not permit identification and calculation of power regarding

¹⁸⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 168.

¹⁸¹ Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna*, 189.

the allied block where terrorists exist. Therefore, we will mention this alliance as 'unconventional alliance'.

5.1.3.i Unconventional Alliance Among Terrorist Organizations¹⁸²

Transnational terrorist organizations form linkages in order to operate together and create an independent impact on states. Even though it is very hard to find proof relating to extent of the connection between them, there are historical evidences illustrating terrorist organizations' cooperation. Terrorist organizations may cooperate for several reasons such as a shared ideology, a shared enemy, or shared logistic capabilities.¹⁸³ Cooperative activities of terrorist organizations include making associated activities against a third party, exchanging funds and recruits, training one's members, and providing intelligence one another.

Normally, since terrorist organizations are secret their extent of alliance cannot be documented. However, Kishore states that representatives of Latin American terrorist organizations came together in order to coordinate their activities, in Colombia, in February 1970.¹⁸⁴ As a result, they decided to start

¹⁸² Theoretically, under the same structural imperatives we assume that terrorist organizations should have a competitive environment among themselves. As these organizations are secret we cannot find enough open data regarding to this assumption. However, there are two cases mentioned related to this case. First one is about the PKK and the other Kurdish terrorist organizations. Gürses, mentions a member of central committee of the PKK and his words saying that 'we are like political viruses and we do not allow another Kurdish organization in our domain.' Gürses, *Ayrılkçı Terörün Anatomisi / IRA-ETA- PKK*, 166. Another example is the competition between the ASALA and the JCAG (Justice Commandoes for Armenian Genocide). Ercan Çitlioğlu claims that the ideological differences and the conflict over the leadership of their cause led these organizations to fight against each other. Çitlioğlu, *Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala*, 23-25.

¹⁸³ Louise Richardson, "Terrorists as Transnational Actors," in *The Future of Terrorism*, eds. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 216.

¹⁸⁴ Kishore, *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict*, 40.

mutual exchange of funds and personnel among themselves, in 1973-1974. This is a very extraordinary case as it is documented; however, it indicates the resoluteness of terrorist organizations in helping each other against a third party.

There are also other examples in which terrorist organizations provide training, equipment, finance, and personnel to one another. For instance, some articulates that the PLO plays a crucial role in the internationalization of terrorism.¹⁸⁵ Besides its own actions carrying transnational character, the organization provided necessary conditions for the development of other terrorist organizations such as ASALA and PKK.¹⁸⁶ The PLO was able to help other terrorist organizations due to its abundant resources devoted by Arab countries against Israel.¹⁸⁷

Also, some terrorist organizations' relation went beyond just providing assistance. There became instances in which terrorist organizations undertook joint operations. For instance, German Red Army Fraction (RAF) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) engaged in kidnapping of 11 OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1975, in hijacking of an Air France airliner to Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and hijacking of Lufthansa plane to Mogadishu in 1977.¹⁸⁸ Also, the PKK and ASALA had some joint operations.¹⁸⁹ For example,

¹⁸⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 69-80. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, 24-27.

¹⁸⁶ Hyland states that members of the ASALA leadership also admitted that the PLO and the ASALA had similarity in their tactics stemming from their trainings. Also, the ASALA commandos who seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris in September 1981 told the police they were trained in Palestinian camps. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, 46-47.

¹⁸⁷ Kishore, *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict*, 38.

¹⁸⁸ Richardson, "Terrorists as Transnational Actors," 217.

on 10 November 1980, an explosive device exploded at Turkish Consulate in Strasburg, France and the following day, in Rome, another device detonated at Turkish tourist office.¹⁹⁰ These were among the joint operations of both terrorist organizations.

As a result of cooperation among the same kind, they became able to increase their capabilities. As the PLO provided training, finance and equipment to ASALA and PKK these terrorist organizations became able to commit deadly actions against Turkey. It should be kept in mind that the PLO was an organization having the support of the Arab countries among whom Syria¹⁹¹ and Iran existed. Besides, these terrorist organizations' political affiliations, weakening Turkey and satisfying their supporters should have been important aims for all.¹⁹² In the case of the RAF and the PFLP, it was likely that both terrorist organizations without taking joint action might have not succeeded. Therefore, examples indicate that terrorist organizations increase their capabilities and become more efficient by binding their forces together.

¹⁸⁹ In its first public announcement of policy publicly available, ASALA declared that revolutionary movements fighting against Turkey and American imperialism are ASALA's friends, the revolutionary parties of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, both of them oppressed by the State, are only official allies of ASALA. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, 26-27.

¹⁹⁰ Hyland claims that underlying reasons of the cooperation among these terrorist organizations were the ASALA's need for territorial base in Turkey and PKK's need for training from the ASALA. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects*, 48.

¹⁹¹ Boaz concentrates on Syrian involvement in international terrorism in order to balance Israel and provides detailed information on the support for the PLO. He also mentions Hizballah's relationship with Syria. He claims that in order to better coordinate and direct the activity of satellite terrorist organizations, Syria has established a multi-faceted military and intelligence apparatus responsible for terrorist activity. Hizballah maintains a good relationship with Syria, the latter controlling the deployment areas of the organization in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, Beirut and southern Lebanon. Hizballah must satisfy the Syrian regime both because the organization's bases, training camps and headquarters are located in areas controlled by Syria, and because Hizballah weapons and activists arriving from Iran must cross Syrian territory to get to the bases in Lebanon. Boaz Ganor, *Syria and Terrorism* [article on-line] (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs); available on <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa26.htm>. Internet.

¹⁹² Çitlioğlu, *Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala*, 56-59.

Terrorist organizations also take advantage of opportunities provided by states and they establish alliances with them.

5.1.3.ii Unconventional Alliance Among States and Terrorist Organizations

States take place among the external capabilities of terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations are smart mechanisms that exploit the weakest points of states. States strive for relative gain and sustain their wellbeing at the expense of the other states in the system. Therefore, they cheat and provide support for terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations become sub-contractor of states, carrying out one's conflictive relations against another state. Naturally, terrorist organizations do not undertake this contract for its own goodness. Contract is accepted as it works for the interests of parties involve. When the interests of two parties coincide, then an unconventional alliance comes to being.

States tend to use terrorist organizations as sub-contractors because its costs and risks are low, and if successful the benefits are high.¹⁹³ The use of terrorism is believed to be the weapon of the weak states. Yet, history shows that this assertion has a little credibility because even the superpowers used terrorism as a tool for their foreign policy conducts. There are cases when small powers use terrorism against very strong state or equal power states using the same tool. This fact indicates that there are structural factors that force each range of states acting in the similar way. Therefore, we can assert that every state in the system might use supporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool when

¹⁹³ Richardson, "Terrorists as Transnational Actors," 212.

it deems necessary. As discussed before, the relation among terrorist organization and its supporter based on mutual dependency.¹⁹⁴ Regardless of degree of dependency between two parts of unconventional alliance, terrorist organization benefits out of the untraditional contract even its actions ends up with total failure. It emerges as an actor with increased capabilities and operation experience.¹⁹⁵

The use of terrorism is not directly connected with the power conditions of the supporter state. As behaviors of the USSR and the US indicated in the Cold War era, even the superpowers might take advantage of the opportunities provided by terrorism. In order to avoid a direct conflict that might escalate into a global holocaust, the US and the USSR carried out arms race and arms control talks, conducted clandestine activities and covert operations, and

¹⁹⁴ Here, we assume that terrorist organizations as independent actors whose capabilities increased by states. The importance of support by terrorist organization depends on its internal capabilities. Also, importance of the actions undertaken by terrorist organization depends on the need of the supporting state and its own capabilities. Boaz distinguishes terrorist organizations under the influence of Syria into two types according to their dependency on this state. First, Palestinian terrorist organizations totally dependent upon Syria: These organizations receive heavy (and sometimes total) support from Syria and are incapable of acting independently. They depend on Syria in every way: economically, militarily and politically, and their operations are under constant Syrian scrutiny. Second, Palestinian and other terrorist organizations that benefit from Syrian aid: These organizations receive ad hoc military and financial assistance from Syria. Syria allows them to train in its territory and set up offices and bases in its towns. Such organizations, however, are not completely under Syrian control, and they may act independently. Boaz Ganor, *Syria and Terrorism* [article on-line] (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs); available on <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa26.htm>: Internet.

¹⁹⁵ Brian Jenkins states that growing state sponsorship of terrorism has serious consequences. It puts more resources in the hands of terrorists; money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence, and technical expertise. It also reduces the constraints on terrorists, permitting them to contemplate large-scale operations without worrying about alienating perceived constituents or provoking public backlash, since they need not depend on the local population for support. Also, they need less bank robberies and ransom or kidnappings to acquire finance for their operations compared to organizations without state support. Jenkins "Defense Against Terrorism", 778.

sponsored and engaged in terrorism to promote their ideas and political objectives.¹⁹⁶

In the most of the scholarly studies concerning terrorism, only the USSR is mentioned due to its support for terrorism.¹⁹⁷ Yet, as Waltz argues superpowers tend to produce similar behaviors due to the systemic imperatives.¹⁹⁸ It is true that the USSR supported terrorist organizations in accordance with its local, regional and global interests.¹⁹⁹ For instance, the superpower provided training in the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University, in Moscow, to terrorist organizations from different countries.²⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the US did not act in a different way from its rival. It granted training to the terrorists of various countries in the US. Specifically, anti-Cuban exile groups such as Alpha 66 and Omega 7 were among those groups that received American support.²⁰¹

However, the most illustrating example is the support of the US to Afghani mujahedeen resisting Soviet occupation and Soviet support for Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation. As discussed formerly, the US' support

¹⁹⁶ Schlagheck, "The Superpowers Foreign Policy and Terrorism," 170-171.

¹⁹⁷ For example Claire Sterling's book named *Terror Network* is the most referred book on the Soviet connection with terrorism. See, Wardlaw, "International Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy", 239.

¹⁹⁸ Waltz, "Emerging Structure of International Politics," 45-47.

¹⁹⁹ Golan claims that the Soviet Union provided arms, training to terrorist organizations such as the PLO, the PKK, and several groups in Iran, Pakistan, Africa, and Europe. Its training camps were in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries, namely, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and Cuba. Galia Golan, *Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' on Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 19-32.

²⁰⁰ Stephen Atkins, *Terrorism: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1992), 8.

²⁰¹ Kishore, *International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict*, 40. Schlagheck, "The Superpowers Foreign Policy and Terrorism," 170-171. For more information about discussion please see, Chomsky, *Pirates & Emperors*, 18-40. Schlagheck, "The Superpowers Foreign Policy and Terrorism," 170-171.

of mujahedeen played an important factor in emergence of Al Qaeda²⁰² while the USSR support backed the PLO's position²⁰³ that was already better off due to Arab countries supports. Out of this rivalry, these groups enhanced their powers and increased their support from their clients and became alternative challengers in the field of security.

Superpowers cooperated or supported terrorist organization to escape a risk of more serious confrontation that might have required the use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, some states cooperate with terrorist organizations to balance a common enemy's power. The relationship between the PLO and Arab countries is a typical example for this argument. Arab countries were defeated by Israel for several times and they become discouraged to wage war on it.²⁰⁴ Therefore, Arab countries supported PLO against Israel.²⁰⁵ Arab states expected to harass Israel, in a cheaper way and deported Palestinians got the support they needed for their cause. As a result, both parties profited out of this unconventional alliance.

Another terrorist organization benefiting from the rivalry among the states is the PKK. Syria and Greece provided sanctuary, training, economic and military assistance to the PKK.²⁰⁶ Empowered with this assistance, the terrorist

²⁰² Demirer, "Terörist mi Dediniz? Küreselleşme ve Terör," 140-141.

²⁰³ 'The Six day War, Israel Defense Forces, IDF Spokeperson's Unit,' available on <http://www.idf.il/english/history/sixday.stm>. Schlagheck, "The Superpowers Foreign Policy and Terrorism," 170-171.

²⁰⁴ In 1967, Six Day War resulted with a very disappointing conclusion for the Arab countries and Israel got strong out of this war. After this war, the Arab States escaped facing Israel in a direct war and supported the PLO instead.

²⁰⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 70.

²⁰⁶ Crelinsten, "Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: Challenges and Opportunities," 171-173.

organization became able to constitute a serious threat to Turkey's security.²⁰⁷ These states used the organization as sub-contractor to gain comparative advantage over different issues without facing the cost of war and the PKK found available conditions to flourish in the region.²⁰⁸

There are also cases in which the unconventional alliance is established against a rival, who cannot be deterred with traditional ways. In those cases, there exist a huge gap between the capabilities of the target and alliance makers. Utilization of terrorism, provide the parties of unconventional alliance a chance to escape the risk of retaliation. The September 11 attacks on the US can be evaluated under this framework.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US remained as the sole superpower that 'enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence'.²⁰⁹ Some academicians name this structural situation as 'unipolarity',²¹⁰ which tends to be balanced. Layne states that preponderance policy of the US gives the message that the world is governed by it.²¹¹ To him, as new world order is an assertive projection of America's democratic and human right values, which reflect to its desire to press its

²⁰⁷ Turkey spent more than 10 years in dealing with the terrorist organizations. Thousand of people died during this process and Turkey's military spending increased and its economic situation was badly affected out of this experience. Gürses, *Ayrılkçı Terörün Anatomisi / IRA-ETA- PKK*, 104-105. Also see, Çitlioğlu, *Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala*, 83-86.

²⁰⁸ For a detailed information see, Hasan Yılmaz, "Türkiye-Suriye İlişkileri," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, 2001)

²⁰⁹ National Security Strategy of 2002, ix, available on <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. Internet.

²¹⁰ For further discussion on unipolarity see, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," *International Security*, Volume 17, No: 4 (Spring, 1993): 5-51. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, Volume 24, No: 1 (Summer, 1999): 5-41. Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," *International Security*, Volume 21, No: 4 (Spring, 1997): 49-88.

²¹¹ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 33.

preferred policies on others, therefore, its policies tend to be misperceived as if it compels others to act as it wish.²¹² Some structural theorists argue there is no benign power in the international relations since states face uncertainty problem regarding the future intentions of the powerful in the absence of a higher authority and they tend to produce balance against it.

Nevertheless, current picture of the US indicates that it cannot be balanced by the capabilities of traditional powers. The military capability of the US exceeds the all other combined great powers' capabilities.²¹³ As Wohlforth states, since the US power is unchangeable, the great powers know the fact that counterbalancing is a doomed idea.²¹⁴ The observations up until the September 11 indicated that these words have validity in terms of the title of the challenger. The US was not challenged by any great powers but a terrorist organization.

As Waltz states unbalanced power tends to be balanced by the other actors in the system.²¹⁵ Waltz meant great powers as candidates to provide balance against the US supremacy. Yet, the challenge came from a terrorist organization. No state in the history dared to attack the US militarily on its soil, as Al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001. Researches on terrorism indicate that most of the terrorist attacks involving US targets are uprising.²¹⁶ Cronin states

²¹² Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 34-35.

²¹³ Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," 4.

²¹⁴ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 37-39.

²¹⁵ Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 915.

²¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism", available on <http://164.109.48.86/topical/pol/terror/2002patterns.htm>

that the terrorist attacks against the US increased²¹⁷ in the 1990s, coinciding the end of the Cold War.²¹⁸ To him, terrorism is a by-product of the shifts in the international distribution of power in political, economic, military, ideological and cultural forms.²¹⁹ Since to assert a military challenge to the global power in conventional ways is too risky, some states, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia²²⁰ use transnational terrorist organizations as sub-contractors against the US due its policies in the Middle East.²²¹

The US is the state according to which the polarity of the system is defined. The terrorist attacks on it indicate that terrorist organizations appear as the secondary actors in the system.²²² The use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool may become the only option when there is a huge imbalance of power among the rivals. In such situations terrorism becomes the weapon of the weak against the strong. Terrorist perception of the strong is very similar with the perceptions of the weaker states regarding the unbalanced power. In order to

²¹⁷ Brian Jenkins states that Americans are the number one targets of the international terrorism. Terrorists focus much on the US for several reasons. Anti-American terrorism is the price paid for influence and presence. The US is the principle capitalist nation in the world. Radical Moslem groups in the Middle East may view the US as the principle source of wicked western secular influence. The US is involved in contentious issues around the world, Central America, the Middle East, and Western Europe. Local terrorist groups may exaggerate the degree of influence exercised by the US government thinking that attacking the American targets or seizing American hostages they will indirectly wield leverage over the governments they want to influence. And, American diplomats or businessmen, tourists reside everywhere, so they are also easy targets. When Brian Jenkins wrote this article the year was 1986, yet since then a little seems to change. Jenkins "Defense Against Terrorism," 779.

²¹⁸ Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 43.

²¹⁹ Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 53.

²²⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism", available on <http://164.109.48.86/topical/pol/terror/2002patterns.htm>. Internet.

²²¹ Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?," 42-44.

²²² Currently, terrorist organizations are secondary actors important actors in the system in the security field. Even though they have some advantages over states, they are not fully independent from the opportunities that states provide. However, as we discussed formerly, if these organizations acquire the weapons of mass destruction then they would become uncontrollable.

stop unbalanced power's undesired action both collaborate. This collaboration descends states to the level of terrorist organizations but provides them a chance to escape detection and retaliation. In the following part, we will discuss the victimized states' prospects of response in the face of unconventional alliance among states and terrorist organizations.

5.2 Identification and Response Problem

Terrorist organizations' most valuable advantages over the states are their secrecy. Terrorist organizations' capabilities are very weak compared to states'. Benefiting from their secrecy, terrorist organizations escape retaliation of states. In the unconventional alliance between states and terrorist organizations, supporting states exploit the principle of secrecy and strive not to be retaliated. As the unconventional alliance not declared as opposed to traditional ones, victimized state encounter a serious problem in producing a strategy of response. To be able to produce strategy on how to respond, a state first should be aware of the identity, location and capabilities of its counterparts. In the face of unconventional alliance, victimized states' ability to identify its counterpart depends on its capabilities. States with distinguished capabilities may get rid of problem of identification; however, this might not allow them to produce an efficient counteraction. In this part, we aim to discuss the options of victimized states and elaborate on the effectiveness of classical methods such as war and deterrence.

According to Waltz, states are differentiated according to their capabilities in functioning similar tasks.²²³ States use their internal dynamics to assure their security and develop capabilities to get rid of the threats coming from the outside.²²⁴ Therefore, there may be states able to solve the problem of identification. Victimized state may detect the parties of unconventional alliance, but still, it may not produce solution for several reasons. First, it may be a consciously made choice to avoid a greater risk such as a nuclear war. Second, supporter state may be such strong that victimized state may not produce response. Third, degree of dependency among the supporter and terrorist organization may prevent the desired solution. Last, even the victimized state have the necessary means available, it face problem of location.

To begin with, states may prefer tolerating the use and development of terrorism consciously. For instance, during the Cold War both superpowers were aware of the fact that each of them utilized terrorism as a means to conduct their relationship, especially in their spheres of influence. Yet, this acknowledgement did not bring the superpowers to the edge of a nuclear war or a conventional war. In fact, both preferred this unconventional method in conducting their conflictive relationships. While they were preceding their conflictive relations by means of their subcontractors, they became able to conduct their cold peace relations and escaped a nuclear war risk, at the same time. In this case, identification was not the problem. However, to respond back

²²³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 96.

²²⁴ Military intelligence plays a crucial role in solving the identification problem. Some states like the US have effective intelligence agencies. Even though, the effectiveness of these agencies was questioned after September 11, the US is among the most capable states in dealing with terrorism. Jervis, "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?," 47.

was a really huge problematic issue due to prospect of a nuclear war. Therefore, under the same structural imperatives, superpowers preferred to support terrorist organizations against one another and their solutions against terrorist organizations remained limited.

Second, terrorist organization may be supported by a super-state and producing response may exceed the capabilities of victimized states with the conventional methods. Even though identification of the perpetrators is solved, the problem of response is remains. If the state party of an unconventional alliance is stronger from the victimized state, then victimized state may not be able to respond the identifiable pat of the unconventional alliance. For instance, superpowers supported terrorist organizations in the third states. These states' response options were limited domestic countermeasures against terrorists. They could not attack on the super powers as they supported terrorism. Turkey can be a specific example for this situation. During the 1970s and 1980s there were severe terrorist incidents in Turkey. It is known that some of the left-wing terrorist organizations were supported by the Soviets, even the PKK.²²⁵ Yet, Turkey could not respond directly to the USSR due to its support for terrorism. Possible repercussions of such a respond could spread and there could be another world war between the two blocks.

Third, if there are not such higher structural constraints, and the victimized state succeeds to solve the identification problem, the success of the

²²⁵ There may be middle power states supporting terrorism. In this case, if these states are belong to different power blocks then a war among them would be less likely due to the possibility of involvement by the block leaders. Again, Syria supported the PKK against Turkey, if Turkey had waged war on Syria, the USSR and the US would need to interfere in this war due to their interests in the region.

victimized state impeding terrorism depends on the relation between the parties of the unconventional alliance. If terrorist organization is highly dependent on its state partner, then deterring the state party or waging war on it can bring the desired solution. However, if terrorist organization succeeds to develop independent capabilities from the capabilities of state partner, then victimized states countermeasures targeting the supporter state would not give desired conclusion.²²⁶

This highlights the most important problem in fighting against terrorism that is the undefined locations of terrorists or simply their secrecy. Transnational terrorist organizations mostly have independent capabilities. These organizations may conduct independent operations than their supporters. Therefore, deterring their supporter state would not help solving the problem regarding transnational terrorism, even though deterrence may harm terrorist organization's capabilities. Since terrorists inflict in societies, and do not carry any insignia identifying themselves they cannot be fought against or deterred. Therefore, a state with a great capability may solve the problem of identification regarding transnational terrorist organization but it may not be able to respond due to the problem of location. More specifically, the US identified that Al Qaeda is its principle non-state enemy. Without a doubt, the capabilities of the US exceed the capabilities of the terrorist organization. However, secrecy of the terrorists turned against the US as a great handicap. Problem identification is intensified by the problem of location.

²²⁶ Having identified the supporter, producing response to state part of unconventional alliance is easier for victimized states. Initially, states try to deter supporting states and if deterrence fails they attack on them. The US' attack on Afghanistan can be evaluated under this framework.

Since the location of terrorist organizations as well as their approximate capabilities cannot be known certainly, traditional methods in security realm almost fail to defeat terrorism.²²⁷ By definition, states and terrorist organizations cannot make war. War is fought between the armies of states. Armies do not fight covertly. Their locations are known and approximate powers can be estimated. Therefore, if deterrence fails, then war can be fought. Deterrence works because both of the parties involved have things to lose, such as territory, population, economic and military resources. These capabilities also have permanent locations. They do not move as terrorists do. Yet, terrorist organizations do not have permanent locations. Even, in order to weaken the hands of their target states, terrorists inflict in even societies that they will attack. Due to these, states cannot make use of traditional methods against directly terrorists.

Tendencies of terrorist organizations in acquiring the weapons of mass destruction imply that states will face severe problems in dealing with terrorism. Researches and findings indicate that terrorists desire to acquire the capability of weapons of mass destruction. And, no one can be certain about the

²²⁷ Brian Jenkins states that deterrence may work in deterring the state or individual supporters of terrorists. Economic sanctions against the state supporters may have some effect as well as the fate of Taliban constitute an example for the states supporting terrorism. Also, financial contributors to terrorist fronts may be also deterred by threats of negative publicity, blocked investments, assets seizures, and exposure to lawsuits, or merely increased scrutiny of their financial activities. Institutions assisting or tolerating terrorist recruits may be deterred by the prospects of all members close surveillance. Communities supporting terrorism might be deterred by the threat of expulsion, deportation, selective suspension of immigration, and visa applications, or increased remittances. Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda*, 25-26; available from <http://www.rand.org>. Yet, deterring the individual supporters may justify the causes of terrorist organization and may backlash. Terrorists might get more supporters out of such applications. The basic principle of law is that no one can be punished due to another's guilt. If states punish the nationals of terrorists' just because of this reason, then states' fall into trap of terrorists and make self-justification of their being unjust. Therefore, repercussions of such policies should be considered very detailed before they are applied.

intentions of terrorist organizations. Hence, there is a consensus on the idea that terrorists should not be allowed to develop this capability, whether they use it or not. Schmid states that 'in desperate situations desperate people can do terrible things'.²²⁸ If proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is not prevented then states became extremely vulnerable against the weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist organizations' advantage over states doubled by means their 'secret' weapons of mass destruction.

The level of terror imposed by terrorist organizations would certainly increase. States would need to be responsive to the demands of terrorists. If they not, they would dare to face unpredictable results. States are already in trouble with calculating the capabilities and estimating the intentions of terrorist organizations. If terrorists posses the capability of the weapons of mass destruction, then states would be helpless. Terrorist organizations with the weapons of mass destruction would lead a radical change in the distribution of capabilities across the units in the system. Under these circumstances, even great capabilities of the states would be insufficient in dealing with the 'global'²²⁹ terrorism. This risk, therefore, should be eliminated before it is realized.

As Waltz asserts that global problems require great capabilities and states using their capabilities to solve the global problem do not act to create a global public good.²³⁰ The US is the global power with unprecedented capabilities. After the September 11 attacks, the United States developed a new

²²⁸ Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk," 114.

²²⁹ If terrorist organizations acquire the weapons of mass destruction then we can talk about a global terrorism because the extent of terror imposed would be a global one.

²³⁰ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 109.

security strategy. The reason for a new security strategy was to avoid more severe attacks of the developing threat of transnational terrorism. According to this, the United States changed its security doctrine from 'threat to 'capabilities' based one.²³¹ This is a preventive understanding based on avoiding threats before they emerge. Therefore, the initial security and defense objective of the US turned out to be the prevention of its state or non-state enemies' or rivals' developing capabilities that exceed the capabilities of the US'. The new strategy of the US has global implications for world security.²³² The target of the US is not only the existing enemies but also future ones. Asymmetric war, that is terrorism, constitutes a special place in this new doctrine. After September 11, the US begins to define its allies according to their position with regard to terrorism. The US is determined to punish the states supporting terrorism, especially the ones having the likelihood of providing the weapons of mass destruction to the terrorists. The US' controversial war on Iraq took place in the framework of 'war on terror'. Whether Iraq had the weapons of mass destruction is another matter but the reality is that the US developed a new criteria for the classification of states. It classifies states according to their position with respect to terrorism, which also implies a novelty for the establishment of alliances in the leadership of the US. The words of George W. Bush clearly indicate this attitude: 'you are either with us or against us'.²³³ The 'against' category is composed of states trying to develop the weapons of mass destruction and

²³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* [report on-line]. 2001; available from <http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf>; Internet .

²³² Arıboğan states that terrorism became an instrument for the powerful states that help them to reshape the world. Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna*, 189.

²³³ *You are either with us or against us* [news on-line]. Available on <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/>; Internet.

having relation with the terrorist organizations. The US, distracted with the 'possibility' of an unconventional alliance, is determined to take countermeasures before such a circumstance occurs. The US' resoluteness in fighting terrorism with the prospects of richer capabilities may produce reverse effects on terrorist organizations. Yet, the US' perception of threat changed with terrorist attacks indicates the fact that even the US would not be able to handle terrorism if they acquire the weapons of mass destruction; therefore, it necessitate to produce some preventive policies.

In an overall evaluation, transnational terrorism by exploiting internal and external means of balancing takes advantage of the weaknesses in the international political system. Some terrorist organizations succeeded to develop distinct capabilities as the September 11 attacks indicated. These attacks gave the signals of the threat posed by terrorist organizations to state. States become distracted with these signals because their ways of conducting conflictive relations came under the pressure of change. This change occurred because of the changes in the increased capabilities of the terrorist organizations. Related to this factor, states' already existing insecure environment enhanced with the uncertainty asserted by terrorist organizations. In the following section, we will elaborate on the impacts of terrorist organizations on the international system and indicate changes and continuities in the system.

5.3 Impact of Transnational Terrorism on the International System

After the September 11 attacks, numerous academic and daily discussions took place regarding the change in the system. Waltz says we can talk about the importance of the transnational actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones.²³⁴ As historical data and observations indicate, terrorism created troubles for many states since the ancient times. Yet, until the September 11 attacks, there was no discussion on the change of the system stemming from transnational terrorism. These attacks indicated that terrorism succeeded to reach a high point in its evolution process and become able to challenge even a superpower. This challenge was an unprecedented one; yet, whether it is sufficient to claim a change in the system or do we need other conditions to claim change in the system are going to be discussed in the following section.

According to Waltz, system is composed of a structure and its interacting units and system level change occurs in three ways.²³⁵ First, if the ordering principle of the system changes, then the system is transformed, which means a shift from anarchy to hierarchy. Second, if the character of units changes, then a system level change occurs. This change implies the abolishment of each unit's sameness in functioning. Third, if the distributions of capabilities across the units change then the system also transforms. Changes in the distribution of capabilities are changes of the system whether the system is anarchic or a hierarchic one.

²³⁴ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 94.

²³⁵ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 100-101.

To begin with the first condition, in order to have a change in the system, the ordering principle must change from anarchy to hierarchy. Anarchy means that none of the units in the system entitled to command the orders of a higher authority. Units coexist under the conditions of anarchy. As they are on their own in the system, they try to assure their survival through duplicating the successful actors in the system. They use their capabilities to enhance their current position compared to others, as they are not certain about the intentions of other units in the system. Since they all compete for relative gains and all get socialized as a result of this competition. Needless to say, the major field of competition takes place in the field of security.

When we consider the terrorist organizations, we can make similar arguments in relation to them. Terrorist organizations emerged as units challenging states in the field of security. They are also subject to the same structural constraints. They try to increase their capabilities in order to assure their survival. They search for relative gains. They get socialized and act similar to states. They make internal and external balancing. They interact and coexist with the other units, even though covertly, in the system.

Nevertheless, their emergence as transnational actors does not lead a change in the anarchic composition of the system. The ordering principle of the system remains still the same. Besides, as discussed in detail above, this composition of the system plays an important role in the development of transnational terrorism. Terrorist organizations take advantage of the systemic weaknesses like viruses and use states against each other to make their conditions better. As states cheat, terrorist organizations come up as stronger

units out of their rivalry. Therefore, instead of changing the system, they provide continuity in the system. States observing success of the cheaters tend to cheat and this relation goes on as a vicious circle. As a result, terrorism increase states' uncertainties regarding the others' intentions as it is used as a foreign policy tool.²³⁶ In this regard, we can conclude that emergence of transnational terrorism is solely an addition of a new actor; it is not the abolishment of the ordering principle of the international system.

Second, transnational terrorism does not determinate the sameness principle as well. Instead of changing this principle, as discussed above, states and terrorist organizations act similarly in the system. Both seek relative gains. Both establish alliances and compete. Both have inclination towards balancing their counterparts by using each other's as external means of balancing. Both try to increase their capabilities in order to be distinguished from the others. Both do not make division of labor with the other units in the system and do not get specialized in the area that they accomplish best. They try to develop their capabilities in all areas. As terrorist organizations did not changed states' similar functioning, and do not lead them to get specialized, and they themselves became subject of this impact of the system, we cannot claim a change regarding this condition.

²³⁶ Kenneth Waltz claims that terrorism did not changed the basic principle of the international politic. In reverse, it enhanced the military and security concerns of the states. He elaborates on the US policies after the September 11 and claims that the war on terrorists enables it to establish bases on Russia's southern border and to further its encirclement of China as well as Russia. Waltz, "Continuity in International Politics," 350.

Last, the impact of terrorist organizations on the distribution of capabilities across the units²³⁷ cannot be calculated because these organizations and their capabilities are secret. Yet, we cannot deny that terrorist organizations have an impact on the distribution of capabilities. Terrorist organizations appearance as actors in the system itself implies an important change in the system. These organizations emerged as actors having interaction with other units and creating impact on their behaviors. Their existence is a war of having more capability to destroy. Therefore, our acceptance of terrorist organizations as units brings the result that there is a change in the distribution of capabilities and in the system as well.

However, we cannot articulate to what extent these organizations led a change in the distribution of capabilities. Terrorist organizations originate an indefinable alteration because we cannot put terrorism anywhere in the positional picture. Due to the lack of certain knowledge of their capabilities, we cannot give a certain value and compare their capabilities with the other actors in the system. Normally, major units in the system are grouped according to their compared capabilities and structural changes can be anticipated from the changes in their capabilities. A change in the number of great powers indicates a change in the distribution of capabilities across the units. Looking at the change in the distribution of capabilities, we can state whether the world is

²³⁷ It should be remembered that distribution of capabilities across the units is a factor that is different than the capabilities of units. Terrorist organizations as parts of unconventional alliance may lead to a change in the distribution of capabilities among the opposing groups. Terrorist organizations as parts of unconventional alliances may constitute a change in the power calculations among the conflictive groups. States support terrorist organizations to spend less and harm more to their adversaries. If their sub-contractors' action is successful, then the distribution of capabilities changes in favor of their sides. Turkey's position with respect to Syria and the PKK can be considered an illustration of this.

multipolar, bipolar or unipolar.²³⁸ Even though, it is hard to have complete information regarding the powers of the states, it is possible to make some approximate calculations regarding their military, economic, and political situations. This enable states to calculate their respective strategies and enable them to produce countermeasures, which provide some degree of certainty in the system.

Nevertheless, terrorism emerged as such an actor whose strength can be observed only when it accomplishes some destructive actions. As a consequence of this, it is not possible to make a beforehand power estimation related to terrorist organizations and situate them into the positional picture of the distribution of capabilities. Terrorism creates a hole in the positional picture of the system, and increases the uncertainties at the system level. This hole leads a change in the distribution of capabilities because it represents an actor that should be taken into consideration but whose place, power and intentions cannot be estimated. Terrorist organizations take place in the security equations and in the positional picture as an undefined factor.²³⁹

Moreover, terrorist organizations try to create a radical change in the distribution of capabilities as their desires to acquire the weapons of mass destruction propose. Terrorist organizations' have strong aspirations for

²³⁸ Looking at the history we can claim that the impact of the use of these terrorist organizations on the general distribution of capabilities across the units seems insignificant so far. Since the structure of the system was not defined according to one unit's having terrorism as a capability and the others deprivation of it.

²³⁹ In fact, the hole that they open in the distribution of capabilities makes terrorist organizations serious actors in the system. The uncertainty posed by terrorist organizations on the distribution of capabilities across the units constitutes a change in the system. If their capabilities were calculated and they had permanent locations their impact on the distribution of capabilities across the units would be insignificant. For instance, their impact would be similar to the impact of an additional small state in the system.

acquiring more power through the weapons of mass destruction because this capability lead them and their supporters to emerge as independent actors who are immune to assaults of their opponents. Fearing from a terrorist attack realized with the WMD, states might not be able to pursue classical methods. This radical alteration in the position of terrorist organizations would enhance their advantages over the states and by means of the credible secret military capability; they endeavor to leave states in an extremely vulnerable position.

Such a case would not resemble the situation in the Cold War era, in which both superpowers sustained peace through 'balance of terror'. In case of terrorist having the capability, we cannot estimate the terrorists' intentions utilizing the capability against states for certain. Terrorists might stop shedding blood with their conventional methods, as they would become more horrifying than before. Even though, this could be evaluated as a positive implication, we would need to talk about 'imbalance of terror'. As terrorist organizations are secret by definition, response options of threatened states' would be quite restricted. Even, there would not be options but an option that is to comply with the demands of the terrorist organization. Terrorists would appear as totally independent actors from states and would become immune to states' countermeasure in classical military terms. We need to talk about the total failure of deterrence or warfare as counter-terrorist measures.

Currently, victimized states face a limited response problem, which is states may respond back to states providing support for terrorism at some degree. However, if terrorist organizations acquire the weapons of mass destruction, then victimized states cannot attack to supporter states under the

security umbrella of terrorist organizations with the WMD. States would need to severely consider a risk of retaliation when they perform actions against terrorists' wishes. For instance, if this scenario was real and Al Qaeda had the weapons of mass destruction, we should ask ourselves that whether the US could attack on Afghanistan or Iraq in the framework of 'war on terrorism' or whether it would try to find other means to deal with it. We assume that the latter option would be valid.

When we turn to the current picture, leaving aside the scenario, we notice that terrorism played no significant role in the calculations related to distribution of capabilities across the units so far. There became no time in the history that terrorism was used as a measurement while defining the structure due to its impact on the distribution of capabilities. However, from September 11 on, terrorism seems to constitute an important factor in the distribution of capabilities across the units. The attacks on the US gave a sign that well-planned terrorist attacks may harm a superstate's security and lead it to change its security doctrine.²⁴⁰ These attacks indicated that a terrorist organization could reduce the relative power of a superpower. Therefore, a relative decrease in the power of the sole super power might lead a serious change in the distribution of capabilities across the units. It is claimed that the US' relative position in the world security decreased because it faced such a threat that it

²⁴⁰ Brian Jenkins claims that terrorists and their state sponsors have altered American foreign policy and affected the ability to implement that policy. They have demonstrated that the US has difficulty in striking back; they have provoked the US into taking military action, thereby straining relations with allies. They also compelled the US to divert increasing resources to protect itself and facilities to protect itself and its facilities against their attacks. Jenkins, *Defense Against Terrorism*.⁷⁷⁴ Jenkins's arguments still have validity. After the September 11 attacks, the US increased its defense spending (about \$48 billion) and it had some problems with its allies due to its policies under the framework of 'war on terror'.

need the cooperation of the other states. The multilateralist²⁴¹ approach confirmed that the US' capabilities do not work against terrorism and leaves it at a very vulnerable position. As states in the system tend to cheat, other actors may provide support to terrorist organizations in order to deteriorate the US' power position in the world. Jenkins states that states avoid developing a generally accepted definition of terrorism and combining their forces to defeat it because they consider that they might also need terrorist organizations as surrogate warriors in the future.²⁴² According to this, terrorism is not eliminated because states want to keep it as an option to erode their rivals' supremacy. The tendency to cheat assure that terrorism will remain as a means among the other capabilities of states and terrorist organizations will build up their capabilities by benefiting from the systemic weakness. Therefore, the use of terrorism as a means of foreign policy having impact on the distribution of capabilities 'among' several units may have further applications on the distribution of capabilities 'across' the units.²⁴³

²⁴¹ Kenneth Waltz claims that this multilateral approach was adopted only to meet immediate and pressing requirements of the US in the face of terrorist attacks. The US needed the police and intelligence capabilities of the other states in order to track and catch terrorists. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Continuity in International Politics," In *World in Collusion: Terror and Future of Global Order*, eds. Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (New York: McMillan, 2002), 348.

²⁴² Brian Jenkins, "International terrorism", in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, eds. Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 76. Also James Rosenau claims that there will be no wars in the world after the Cold War but low-intense armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism. Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, *Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003), 188.

²⁴³ The author added italics. As the history indicates, terrorist organizations and states made unconventional alliances. Most brutal of these alliances established against the US since the end of the Cold War and the US became target of terrorist attacks more than ever in the history. And, most of these terrorist organizations have the support of states, mostly from Middle East origin, and they distracted with the policies of the United States. As Jervis asks why the Americans are hated and answers that because of the policies it followed, especially in the Middle East. These facts give us an idea about the future of the affairs among the states. Terrorist organizations and states will persist to establish unconventional alliances against a common enemy. As the more terrorist organizations involve the relations among the states the

To conclude, terrorist organizations have their own dynamics to increase their capabilities. They act as the other units in the system and try to increase their own capabilities. The transformation in their capabilities leads them to become more dreadful and appear as actors having transnational characteristics. However, the development process of terrorist organizations is not totally independent from the major actors of the system. States also contributed to the process by providing sanctuary, military, economic resources. Since the states cheated in the system, terrorist organizations become more transnational. As mentioned in the previous chapters, transnational terrorist organizations have their own means and their existence is not solely based the support of states. Yet, the positive impact of states in the development of these organizations cannot be denied.

Hence, we can claim that systemic forces are effective in development of transnational terrorism as an actor. It became able to transcend the national borders of states and to threaten states from within and outside. As Paul Wilkinson states that in an international system which is inherently anarchic due to the lack of a single supranational legal sovereign, the states supporting terrorism are able to block any effective global effort against international terrorism.²⁴⁴ The long history of terrorism also indicates that terrorism will endure. Therefore, 'the conclusion is that we are going to continue to be faced terrorism. Hence, the question that we face in the free world have to ask is, *how*

more the interactions among the states will change. In the end the terrorist organizations will make profit out of this change in the interaction of the states.

²⁴⁴ Wilkinson, "Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and the Rule of Law", 255.

*to live with terrorism?*²⁴⁵ As Waltz states 'the only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change'²⁴⁶, without such a radical change we should not expect a world without terrorism. Even, we should become accustomed to the changes asserted by transnational terrorism.



²⁴⁵ Hanan Alon, "Can Terrorism Be Deterred," in *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism*, ed. Anat Kurz (New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), 130.

²⁴⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 111.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VI

"The world community is now required to deal with unprecedented problems arising from acts of international terrorism... which raise many issues of a humanitarian, moral, legal, and political character for which, at present time, no commonly agreed rules or solutions exist."²⁴⁷

Even though terrorism has a very long history, the prospects of change in the international politics due to transnational terrorism, became intensified particularly after the September 11 attacks. Those incidents gave the signals of the birth of a significant actor who has no definite place and identity. And, the compound nature of the concept of terrorism became one of the most popular issues debated in the academia. The problems concerning producing a general definition, right approach for dealing with terrorism, making typology, assuring international cooperation and producing a legal accepted basis for the judgments of terrorism, have been discussed. We also conversed some of these issues and reached some conclusions.

As it is nicely put in the quotation above, the problem has many aspects without any general rule to deal with it due to the lack of a unified definition of terrorism. We also agree that the first obstacle for fighting against terrorism is to produce a single definition. There are two approaches regarding terrorism. One considers looking at the causes of terrorist acts is necessary to understand it, and the other claims that the means should be taken as a measurement. In our study, we discussed the necessity of the second approach in order to produce

²⁴⁷ Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, 223.

an objective and general definition that would not confuse researchers and prevent the continuation of the dictum 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'

However, we are not so optimistic about the solution of definition problem because of the structural reasons. It is for certain that academic studies help to create a general framework, nevertheless, development of terrorism is connected with the practices of states in the international system. Since the international structure has been anarchic, the history of terrorism represents a long path parallel with the clashes of interest among states. States tend to support, directly or indirectly, terrorist organizations that are inclined to weaken their opponents in the system. In another saying, terrorism takes place among the external means of states for a long time and they contributed to the development of terrorist organizations in one way or another.

Naturally, terrorist organizations are not born just because of external inducement. Most terrorist organizations have domestic origins and as they got support from the outside they grew stronger. As it is discussed in the second chapter, some terrorist organizations proceed their existence, some not. Loosing external and internal support are the two major causes for the disappearances of some terrorist organizations. We argued that these factors are closely related to each other. Since the external support increases the capabilities of terrorist organizations, terrorist organizations become more destructive in their actions; as they become more destructive they make heard their voice better; as they succeed better publication they get more support. In the end as they get more support they grow in the number and quality, and they

become more destructive again. Hence, states' support for terrorists has a very crucial place in the growth of terrorist organizations as important actors in the system.

Terrorist organizations as smart mechanisms not only took advantage of states' debility stemming from the anarchic composition of the international system but also learned and adapted the conditions of the modern environment they coexist with the other units. They benefited from the opportunities provided by liberal and weak states. They infiltrated in both societies. They used science and technology as a compensating mechanism for their weaknesses against states. They aim to reach a desirable equilibrium between the cost and the destructiveness using technology and science. Enhancing their internal capabilities with external support, terrorist organizations emerged as secondary actors who have prospect of challenging states in the security realm.

Theories studying transnational actors and claiming a challenge by these organizations to the prominence of the states in the international politics generally assume a competition so as to fulfill a task in a better manner. Yet, we claimed a very fundamental difference between the other transnational actors and terrorist organizations. The former group develops its capabilities under the control or the cognizance of the states. Therefore, if states need to restrict one's functioning they do not face a serious problem in identification and producing response. First of all, these transnational organizations do not pose a threat to the survival and security of states. Terrorist organizations do not compete to provide a better security environment for states they insert a real challenge to them with uncertainty in time, place and perpetrator. September 11 attacks put

a very important remark onto the history of terrorist organizations and states since it informed the magnitude of terrorist organizations' capabilities. These attacks make aware of the major actors of the international system that they coexist with undefined actors whose capabilities can only be measured by the activities they performed. Hence, we claim that appearance of terrorist organizations as indefinable actors in the system lead a change. Yet, this change resembles to the addition of a new state in the system. The sole difference of the new actor is its secrecy. It does not change the anarchic composition of the system. In fact, it enhances the structural imperatives as it increases the uncertainty and insecurity of the units about the others' intentions.

The new actors are similar to the states in their functioning. Similar to states, they differentiate according to their capacity. Terrorist organizations differ from each other as they cause more destruction and fear. Like states, terrorist organizations also strive for turning their economic capabilities into military and political advantages over their opponents. In order to increase their power and become more fearful, terrorist organizations desire to acquire the weapons of mass destruction as an internal balancing process, which is also comprehended as duplication of the most successful states, militarily. Moreover, in parallel to states, they establish unconventional alliances and balance their opponents by external means. These are the indicators that structure also influence terrorist organizations and become socialized as other units. Similar functioning is a criterion for Waltz to claim a change in the system. As all units in the system use internal and external means, and get socialized under the influence of the structure, we concluded that system has not changed.

We assert that the impact of the terrorist organization on the distribution of capabilities cannot be calculated as the organizations are secret by definition and their capabilities can be measured when they undertake their actions. However, we argued that terrorist organizations opened a hole in the positional picture of the international politics. States are not capable of defining certainly their terrorist adversaries and therefore, they cannot pursue the classical methods in conduct of the conflictive relations with them. Unless states identify a state allied with a terrorist organization whose dependency on its supporter is high, methods of war and deterrence seem to fail in the face of terrorism. This indicates a change in the interactions of states with the other units when they encounter terrorist attacks. If victimized state solves the identification problem, then it faces location problem. In short, identification and location problems avoid states defining their respective position regarding to terrorist organizations. These problems triple uncertainty of states in the system due to indefinite position in the distribution of capabilities.

As an indirect impact of the new actor, we argued that the US policies in the near-term might indicate changes. As the US cannot fight the new challenge alone, because of the characteristics of the threat, multilateral approach might open a way for other great powers to have an active part in the world politics. The US' spending on military may lead a decrease in the relative power of the US in the long term. Its involvement in the conflicts in order to take preventive steps against terrorism in the other parts of the world may annoy other great powers, and such actions may lead more terrorist operations. Most importantly, states may use terrorist organizations as a foreign policy tool and may strive to

counterbalance the supremacy of the US by this means. As a long-term projection, terrorism may lead the hegemon to become a great power and turn the unipolar world into a multipolar one or into a bipolar world in which poles are defined according to their positioning with respect to terrorism.

Again, we also argued that a radical change might take place when a terrorist organization acquires the weapons of mass destruction. If this happens, the terrorist organizations' attitude would be very crucial in defining the world politics. Terrorist organization with this capability would have a second-strike capability. Terrorists have already an advantage over the states, as they are secret. With their extensively destructive capability, terrorist organizations' demands would be seriously considered even obeyed. Hence, nuclear-states should take very serious counter measures against terrorists and prevent them before they acquire the capability, otherwise to take action against it would be really problematic.

In the end, we suggest in line with Waltz's assertion, as terrorism is a product of international structure and unless the anarchic make-up of the system changes, the problem of terrorism will endure to decades to come. As it is not possible to control every single unit's actions and intentions, as the units tend to cheat to be better-off by using terrorism as a foreign policy tool and escaping the risk of open conflict, and as terrorist organizations have their internal dynamics, it seems that states need to control terrorist organizations' capabilities and handle the uncertainty enhanced by the increased knowledge about the threats posed by terrorist organizations. In short, states will continue

to coexist with terrorist organizations and strive for getting the minimum damage.

It should be kept in mind that, structural realism as a theory helps us to explain continuities and some structural changes at the system-level. It does not propose solution to policies to deal with the subject. Therefore, as a future projection of this study, first, the theory of Structural Realism should be revised. States may still be the main actors in the international politics but they are not the sole actors anymore. The emergence of transnational terrorist organizations as very important challengers in the field of security implies the necessity of such revision.

Such a revision would require further elaboration on the conduct of the conflictive relations among the units of the system. If we take into account transnational terrorist organizations as important actors in the system, we need to face the weaknesses of the conventional methods to fight against terrorism. Validity of classical warfare, deterrence or compellence seems to be reduced. Therefore, a new research can be conducted on the best ways to deal with terrorism at structural level. Possibilities of a positive change should be questioned with states' will to cooperate so as to create a public good by reducing terrorism. While producing solution to the problem of transnational terrorism systemic factors, such as fear on the intentions of others, should be taken into account. The impact of these systemic factors on the behaviors of the sole superpower must be considered seriously. Even though Waltz's theory does not tend to explain behaviors of a state, the US defines the structural

composition of the world politics and its actions must be evaluated at the system level due to possible repercussions of these actions.

Another implication of transnational terrorism for security studies is that terrorists multiply the sources of threat and fear in the international system. Even though terrorism is an organizational action, it is undertaken by individuals who sometimes inflict in the societies that they will attack. Therefore, transnational terrorism deduces the source of structural fear to the individual level, meaning that persons also may constitute serious threats to the states' security. Such a development would cause a radical change in the thinking about security, also may lead a chain of changes that would help the cease permissive factors for terrorism, such as cheating in the system. This might lead the hegemon to decide to have more control over the international system and abolish anarchy or create a semi-anarchic composition, which would decrease the freedom at the international level stemming from the principle of anarchy. In few words, all of these possibilities require a revision for Structural Realism even though the theory preserves its explanatory power at a considerable degree.

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