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MASTER'S THESIS

Cansu KUNT



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
STRATEGIC RESEARCH

**FROM SOFT POWER TO SMART POWER: TÜRKİYE'S
GRAND STRATEGIC SECURITY IN SOMALIA**

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CONFIRMATION PAGE

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DECLARATION

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İmza

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X

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ABSTRACT

From Soft Power to Smart Power: Türkiye's Grand Strategic Security in Somalia

This study focuses on the shift from soft power to smart power of Turkish security policy towards Somalia under the framework of constructivism. Based on the theory of soft power, introduced by Joseph S. Nye, Turkish soft power employment is elaborated. Turkish-Somali relations are analyzed with relation to the concept of soft power, hard power, and smart power. After AK Party came to power in 2002, Türkiye's foreign policy experienced a shift towards soft power. In this context Türkiye has enhanced its current institutions as well as established agencies and institutions with the aim of improving its foreign and security policy. In relation with soft power the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, non-governmental organizations, and Turkish Airlines are among the most effective institutions in Türkiye. Naming year 2005 as "Africa Year" and following active engagement of Türkiye in Africa, Türkiye's serious approach to the continent is apparent. On line with the contributions to African countries, Türkiye proves its efficient and sincere contribution to Somalia as well. What makes Türkiye special is the use of soft and hard power in combination without creating an image of force or threat. Contrary Türkiye is welcome in the countries, particularly in Somalia. This shows the smart power in relation with security strategy that Türkiye implements strategically in Somalia. This thesis explores Turkish security policy in general and further specifically towards Africa and in detail on Somalia in short and long term.

Keywords: Hard Power, Smart Power, Soft Power, Turkish Foreign Policy, Türkiye's Somali Policy.

ÖZET

Yumuşak Güçten Akıllı Güce: Türkiye'nin Somali'deki Büyük Stratejik Güvenliği

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Somali'ye yönelik güvenlik politikasının yumuşak güçten akıllı güce geçişine konstrüktivizm çatısı altında odaklanmaktadır. Joseph S. Nye'in geliştirdiği yumuşak güç teorisini temel alarak Türkiye'nin yumuşak güç uygulaması incelenmektedir. Türk-Somali ilişkileri yumuşak güç, sert güç ve akıllı güç kavramlarıyla ilintili analiz edilmektedir. 2002 yılında AK Parti'nin iktidara gelmesinden sonra Türk dış politikası yumuşak güçte bir değişim tecrübe etmiştir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye, dış ve güvenlik politikasını geliştirmek amacıyla kurumlarında ciddi gelişmeler katetmiştir. Yumuşak güç kapsamında Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türkiye İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve Türk Hava Yolları Türkiye'de en etkili kurumlar arasında yer almaktadır. 2005 yılının 'Afrika Yılı' olarak ilan etmekle beraber Afrika'da gerçekleşen devamlı ve aktif katılım, Türkiye'nin ilgili kıtaya olan samimi yaklaşımını göstermektedir. Afrika ülkelerine sağlanan katkılar yanı sıra, Türkiye Somali'ye yapılan desteklerinde de etkili ve samimi olduğunu kanıtlamıştır. Türkiye'yi özel kılan ise yumuşak ve sert gücü bir arada kullanırken bir tehdit ya da zorlama imajı yaratmamasıdır. Aksine Türkiye ilgili ülkelerde ve özellikle Somali'de hoş karşılanmaktadır. Bu durum Türkiye'nin Somali'de stratejik bir şekilde uyguladığı güvenlik stratejisiyle ilişkili akıllı gücü göstermektedir. Bu tez, genel olarak Türk güvenlik politikasını, ayrıca spesifik olarak Afrika'ya ve detaylı bir şekilde Somali'ye yönelik kısa ve uzun vadeli politikalarını incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akıllı Güç, Sert Güç, Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye'nin Somali Politikası, Yumuşak Güç.

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ICONS AND ABBREVIATIONS INDEX

AFAD	: Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AFMED	: African Media Representatives Training Program
AK Party	: Justice and Development Party
AMISOM	: African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS	: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
BSEC	: Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
DAC	: Development Assistance Committee
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of Western African States
FDI	: Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
IGAD	: Intergovernmental Authority for Development
LDCs	: Least Developed Countries
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Cooperation
TDV	: Türkiye Diyanet Foundation
THY	: Turkish Airlines
TIKA	: Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TMF	: Turkish Maarif Foundation
TOGG	: Türkiye's Automobile Joint Venture Group
TOKI	: Turkish Housing Development Administration
TPAO	: Turkish Petroleum Corporation
TPE	: Turkish Proficiency Exam
TRT	: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
UIC	: Union of Islamic Courts
UN	: United Nations
US	: United States of America
USD bn	: United States Dollar in billion
YEE	: Yunus Emre Institute
YTB	: Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

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1. INTRODUCTION

As a key concept in political science, through power an actor achieves its goals and takes control over others. Hans Morgenthau considers power as the ultimate interest of politics. In order to maintain power, strategic policies and capable leaders are required¹. While Barnett and Duvall distinguish power into forms like compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive, each form includes different ways of indirect and direct control².

Until Cold War power was mainly implemented by means of military power. Since military power results with high costs and further negative consequences such as civil deaths, destruction, negative reputation, and more, after the Cold War the implementation of military power has shifted towards non-military exercise. Economic sanctions, forming alliances are example of these. In this context, Joseph S. Nye founded the concept of 'soft power' which deals with gaining the other's consent through attraction instead of force.³ However, advanced technologies and globalization opened the door of global threats like terrorism. Hence, the use of military power can be legitimized. According to Nye, soft power maintains its significance alongside with hard power. Highlighting the combination of soft and hard power, Nye defines smart power in being strategically able of the timing and extend of the use of smart power or hard power or both in combination. In this relation an actor will not lose its attraction but hold on to power and thereby reach its goals.⁴

The use of soft power, hard power and smart power can be related under the framework of constructivism. The constructivist approach became popular after the Cold War when scholars started to question the effect of power from liberal and realist perspectives.

¹ **Morgenthau, Hans Joachim and Thompson, Kenneth W.** (2006) *Politics among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace*, 7th Edition, revised by Thompson, Kenneth W. and Clinto, W. David, Boston, McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

² **Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond** (2005) 'Power in International Politics' *International Organization*, Vol: 59, No: 1, pp.39–75.

³ **Nye, Joseph S.** (1990) 'The Changing Nature of World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol: 105, No: 2, pp. 177–192.

⁴ **Nye, Joseph S.** (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st Edition, New York, Public Affairs.

Constructivism concentrates on individuals and societies constructing each other by way of social interactions, shared knowledge. The construction of identities and objectives form the state behavior and furthermore international relations.⁵ Since soft power instruments serve to spread values, policies and culture of a state, the construction of the addressed public is a matter of soft power as well. This enables the way to generating consent of the other.

With the AK Party government coming to power in 2002, soft power has been and is still an important tool in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish institutions, agencies and political engagement in the international arena have risen in the last 20 years. Türkiye's opening to the African continent is considered as particular since Türkiye does not approach with the aim of benefiting from the resources of the continent as former colonies or current players on the continent exercise. Contrary, Türkiye follows a sincere path to contribute in the African states' development, stability and security. Taking a closer look to Türkiye's Somali approach, the success of Türkiye's soft power in combination of hard power with the result of smart power is apparent.

The aim of this study is to explain Türkiye's engagement in Africa and particularly in Somalia under the umbrella of soft, hard and smart power. Highlighting Turkish diplomatic efforts, Türkiye's contribution to the security, development, and economy of Somalia will be explained. With relation to the theoretical framework of constructivism Türkiye's approach to the continent and Somalia will be discussed. The purpose of this analysis is to contribute the understanding of Türkiye's involvement, efforts and success to promote national, regional, and international stability and security with a win-win approach.

This section deals with the methodology of the study. In this relation following titles present the aim and objective of this study, research question, methodology, contributions, limitations, literature review, and general overview of sections.

1.1. Aim and Objective of the Study

The aim of this research is to analyze how Türkiye has constructed the way from soft power to smart power in Somalia. It explores the strategy Türkiye follows and the perception of Türkiye's presence in Somalia. By means of cultural, historical, and religious ties as well

⁵ **Wendt, Alexander** (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol: 46, No: 2, pp.391-425. 10.1017/S0020818300027764.

as by establishing economic and military relations, Türkiye's foreign policy towards Somalia and the relation to Türkiye's own security is explored. In this context, this research investigates following questions:

“What are the reasons and dynamics of Turkish-African relations and how does Türkiye implement soft power in the African continent?”

“How does Türkiye shift from soft power to smart power in its grand security strategy towards Somalia and maintains its attraction despite using hard power?”

One section among the other discusses Türkiye's opening to Africa with a focus on historical background, cultural and religious ties as well as diplomacy and development assistance. Türkiye's warmth and sincerity makes Türkiye to be welcome in the African countries. The impact of Turkish soft power tools bears fruit in enhancing Türkiye's attraction. Taking the cultural and societal situation in the addressing country plays an important role of which Türkiye proves its awareness. In this sense, this study aims to help the literature by demonstrating the success of Türkiye's involvement in the continent and in Somalia. Since Türkiye does not just gain attention in Somalia or just in Africa, Türkiye proved to the world how a win-win approach in an instable region contributes to both the contributing and the affected state. In contrary to other powers, Türkiye did not wait for a secure and stable situation to invest but contributed to secure safety through its investments. These results offer direction to politicians and academicians and encourage a win-win approach in investments and development assistance.

1.2. Literature Review

Since every discipline basically requires academic research and science, prior research, discovering new findings, and building on current knowledge compromise successful scientific studies. Thus, current literature helps to search for information. It is significant that a thesis is created in a systematically way of this search. In this context, this part shows a literature review on Türkiye's relations to Africa and Somalia with relation to its soft, hard and smart power implementation. The literature review enables the comprehension of the use of these powers. The aim of this review is to analyze and summarize the existing knowledge of Türkiye's foreign policy towards the region and the efforts of Türkiye under the framework of constructivism and smart power. The purpose of this literature review is

to address the deficiency in the literature and show new point of views to the academia. This review purposes to provide a comprehension of Türkiye's efforts in Somalia.

By studying Turkish-African and Somali relations researches in the period of 2011-2024 will be analyzed since Türkiye's use of soft power and its process started to bear fruit in literature.

Joseph S. Nye explains the concept "smart power" in combination of soft power and hard power.⁶ Soft power is to make the other actor decide according the powerful actors preferences. This is possible through attracting the other by means of values, policies, and culture. The transition of these tools are made through domestic and foreign policy as well as through governmental and non-governmental institutions' works abroad. The public and the actor of the addressed country will perceive a positive image of the affecting actor and will decide to collaborate in its favor. Since soft power is not enough to achieve political objectives and global threats necessitate military or economic respond or deterrence, hard power is an important power tool as well. Nye argues that the timing of the related power with the extent of its use help an actor in a strategic way to reach its goals.⁷

The use of smart power in foreign policy is relatable to the constructivist approach. Alexander Wendt explains how the construction of identity and interest are shaped by the interaction process of institutions.⁸ He gives an example of the interaction of two institutions named State A and State B. Acting based on its own identity and objective, State A takes an action on which State B makes an interpretation related to its identity and interest. According to its interpretation State B makes a responding step. This interaction goes on this way. This process leads to shaping the identities and interests of both states. While cooperative institutions act in empathy and mutual respect resulting with collective identity, competitive institutions interact in mistrust which avoids to shape a common identity. Since smart power is a mixture of the use of soft power and hard power, and soft power leads to spreading ideas, culture and values, this is related to shape identity as well.

⁶ **Nye, Joseph S.** (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 1st Edition, New York, Public Affairs.

⁷ **Nye**, 2004, pp.25-32.

⁸ **Wendt, Alexander** (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol: 46, No: 2, pp.391-425. 10.1017/S0020818300027764.

Referring to Türkiye's use of soft power, İbrahim Kalın defines Turkish soft power in terms of style and substance unique in comparison to other countries' soft power.⁹ The rich history, culture, and sincerity are among the most effective indicators of Turkish soft power. Onur Şen points out that Türkiye has gained attention through social and economic improvements and thus started to get a positive perception of others. Türkiye's advantage is its historical richness, geographical position and its Ottoman legacy. In addition, domestic developments lead to gain trust. Furthermore, Türkiye's improvement of its relations to its neighbors, region and the international world have positive impact on its attraction.¹⁰

Concerning military power in Turkish foreign policy, Arda Görkem Yatağan gives a theoretical point of the use and impact of military power.¹¹ H. Sönmez Ateşoğlu examines in two different articles Turkish hard power. In the one article he describes the economic power¹² and in the other article he focuses on military power of Türkiye.¹³ Both articles present the Turkish style of hard power in relation with Türkiye's national security with relation to international security. Türkiye does not use hard power to take control over others but to secure its territory, region and even the international world. In this context examples are given which form of military or economic power Türkiye has implemented or is still implementing. In terms of economic power, Serdal Temel emphasized technological developments in Türkiye that have effect on its economic strength.¹⁴ Combining soft power and hard power, in 2008 İbrahim Kalın published two articles about Turkish smart power which is possible through an efficient democracy, economic stability and pluralistic comprehension of unity and solidarity.^{15 16} In this context, Marwan Salim Ali demonstrated

⁹ **Kalın, İbrahim** (2011) 'Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey'. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol: 16, No: 3, pp.5-23.

¹⁰ **Şen, Onur** (2019) 'Targeted Soft Power in Turkish New Foreign Policy and its Impact on Origins of In-Bound Tourists', Journal of Tourism Theory and Research, Vol: 5, No: 1, pp.65-74. <https://doi.org/10.24288/jttr.532357>.

¹¹ **Yatağan, Arda Görkem** (2018) 'Sert Güç Unsurlarının Yumuşak Güç Aracı Olarak Etkileri', Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy, Vol: 28, No: 2, pp.69-94.

¹² **Ateşoğlu, H. Sönmez** (2019) 'Economic Power and International Security', Insight Turkey, Vol: 21, No: 3, pp.68-90.

¹³ **Ateşoğlu, H. Sönmez** (2024) 'Military Power and International Security', Insight Turkey, Vol: 26, No: 1, pp.41-50.

¹⁴ **Temel, Serdal** (2023) 'Insights into Türkiye's Technology Development Journey', Insight Turkey, Vol: 25, No: 1, pp.47-62.

¹⁵ **Kalın, İbrahim** SETA, Turkey's Smart Power, <https://www.setav.org/en/domestic-policy/turkeys-smart-power> i.a.d. 21.07.2024.

¹⁶ **Kalın, İbrahim** SETA, Turkey's Smart Power (II), <https://www.setav.org/en/domestic-policy/turkeys-smart-power-ii> i.a.d. 21.05.2024.

the success of Turkish smart power in the Arab Region after 2011 due to the use of military power in Libya or Syria which resulted with a positive Turkish image.¹⁷

Taking a closer look to Türkiye's approach to Africa, Abdurrahim Sıradağ underlines Türkiye's success in Africa in relating to its soft power institutions like Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, and more.¹⁸ Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan elaborate the impact of Turkish television series in Mozambique, Kenya, and Senegal and point out the positive impact of these materials on the perception of Türkiye.¹⁹ Harun Koçak argues that Türkiye proves its smart power in Africa as well as in the Middle East by means of diplomacy, development assistance, and high attractiveness leading to become a constructive actor²⁰ The uniqueness of Turkish influence in Africa is described by Abdinor Dahir with the benefits of the African states. Türkiye's involvement does not cause a dependency to Türkiye. In contrary, Türkiye contributes to African countries in terms of independence, stability, and security.²¹

Relating to the use of soft power under the umbrella of the contractual theory, Abdurrahim Sıradağ emphasized the security policy of Türkiye towards Somalia.²² He points three results out. The first is, that Türkiye approaches to Somalia with assistance in humanitarian and development fields as well as in possessing security and stability in Somalia. The second, Türkiye aims to become a regional power in East Africa through strengthening its position and active foreign policy. Lastly, the strategic relationship with Somalia is based on shared history and socio-cultural identity.²³ Giving examples of Turkish soft power implementations, Sıradağ highlights Turkish soft power tools from state policy to non-governmental organizations to media.²⁴ In his master thesis Tunç Demirtaş focuses

¹⁷ **Ali, Marwan Salim** (2023) 'Employing Smart Power in the Turkish Strategy Towards Arab Region after 2011', Political Issues, No: 72, pp.227-257, <https://doi.org/10.58298/2023352>.

¹⁸ **Sıradağ, Abdurrahim** (2022) 'Turkey's Growing Role as a Security Actor in Somalia: Dynamics and Motivations', Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi, Vol: 17, No: 2, pp.389-404, <https://doi.org/10.17550/akademikincelemeler.1115931>.

¹⁹ **Ruiz-Cabrera, Sebastián / Gürkan, Hasan** (2023) 'Effects of Turkish Cultural Products on its Foreign Policy toward Africa: Turkish TV Series as an Example of Soft Power in Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal', Profesional de la Información, Vol: 32, No: 2, e320226, <https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2023.mar.26>.

²⁰ **Koçak, Harun** 'Use of Smart Power of Turkey within the Middle East and Africa': Kaan Diyarbakıroğlu (Editor) (2019) Social Transformations and Globalization, Ankara, IKSAD, <https://iksadyayinevi.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SOCIAL-TRANSFORMATIONS-AND-GLOBALIZATION.pdf>, l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

²¹ **Dahir, Abdinor** (2021) 'The Turkey-Africa Bromance: Key Drivers, Agency, and Prospects', Insight Turkey. Vol: 23, No: 4, pp.27-38, doi: 10.25253/99.2021234.2.

²² **Sıradağ**, (2022a), pp.391-392.

²³ **Sıradağ**, (2022a), p.392.

²⁴ **Sıradağ, Abdurrahim** (2022) 'The Rise of Turkey's Soft Power in Africa: Reasons, Dynamics, and Constraints', Uluslararası Politik Araştırmalar Dergisi, Vol: 8, No: 2, pp.1-14, <https://doi.org/10.25272/1icps.1117810>.

on Turkish soft power in Somalia. His research presents the effectiveness of Turkish soft power in Somalia as well.²⁵ In terms of diplomatic success, Kaan Devecioğlu's analyze on Türkiye's mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia contribute to the knowledge of Türkiye's ongoing efforts in possessing security in that region.²⁶ Mustafa Şahin explains the bilateral relations between Türkiye and Somalia from Turkish perspective in humanitarian and development assistance, bringing Somalia into the international agenda, and in establishing security in Somalia.²⁷

Since Türkiye uses hard power tools in Somalia as well, Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz' article on Turkish defense industry helps to understand Turkish contribution to the development of military capability in Africa and Somalia. Relating to the economic power, Camacho, Çelik, Sezgin, and Tekinbaş present in their article the development and effect of Turkish-Somali economics relations of which both benefit.²⁸ Abdulkarim Yusuf Abdulle highlights the economic development in Somalia with the contribution of Türkiye in terms of finance and natural resources.²⁹

Türkiye safes its interests in economic and geopolitical terms in Somalia as well as in the Horn of Africa, which enhances its security policy.³⁰ Further joint economic efforts in fishing, hydrocarbon reserves and more are emphasized in Kaan Devecioğlu's article *Türkiye and Somalia: A New Cooperation Approach from Regional Security to Economic Development*³¹

The literature review gives a brief comprehension of the concepts power, besides soft, hard, and smart power and its relation to the constructive approach. Furthermore Türkiye's use of these powers and its opening to Africa and involvement in Somalia are emphasized with relation to the constructivist theory. In short, Türkiye applies a successful strategy of

²⁵ Demirtaş, 2015.

²⁶ **Devecioğlu, Kaan** ORSAM, Türkiye'nin Somali-Etiyopya Arabuluculuğunun Önemi ve Tarafların Bakış Açıları, <https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/turkiyenin-somali-etiyopya-arabuluculugunun-onemi-ve-taraflarin-bakis-acilari/> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁷ **Şahin, Mustafa** (2022) 'Türkiye'nin Somali Politikasının İncelenmesi', Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, Vol: 9, No: 1, pp.109-147, <https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.863114>.

²⁸ **Camacho, Paul R, Çelik, Ahmet, Sezgin, Erkan and Tekinbaş, Mustafa Refat** (2016) 'Soft power: The Turkish effort in Somalia' The Global: A Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol: 1, No: 2, pp.71-90.

²⁹ **Abdulle, Abdulkarim Yusuf** (2023) 'Economic Relations between Türkiye and Somalia: Prospects and Challenges' Somali Studies, Vol: 7. pp.64-86.

³⁰ **Siradag**, (2022a), p. 401

³¹ **Devecioğlu, Kaan** ORSAM, Türkiye and Somalia: A New Cooperation Approach from Regional Security to Economic Development, https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/turkiye-and-somalia-a-new-cooperation-approach-from-regional-security-to-economic-development.pdf l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

smart power which gained attention over the whole world. More important, Türkiye has grown to a regional trustworthy power with which countries are consent to collaborate. The uniqueness of Türkiye's soft and economic power is issued in various academic works. However, there is a lack of a research on Turkish smart power in Somalia. In this context, this study aims to contribute to fill the gap.

1.3. Research Methodology

This study is mostly based on qualitative method and on the empirical description from the literature. Involving various strategies of inquiry, qualitative research is based on image data and text. Creswell describes qualitative research as the employment of different methods of data collection, philosophical assumptions, analysis, strategies of inquiry, and interpretation.³² According to Cresswell, a qualitative researcher gathers data in natural settings, applies various methods, designs its research in an inductive way, relates to theoretical perspectives, and analyzes interpretively and holistically.³³ That qualitative research "is largely an investigative process where the researcher gradually makes sense of a social phenomenon by contrasting, comparing, replicating, cataloguing and classifying the object of study,"³⁴ the researcher searches for meanings and perspectives of the informants. Literature and document analysis serve among multiple sources to strengthen the validity of a research.³⁵ Document and literature analysis enable historical background, contextualization of the research topic, development of a theoretical framework and methodology, figuring out evidence and integration of knowledge.

In this study, qualitative research pursuits to build up a deep understanding of the literature about both soft power and hard power. Besides it helps to comprehend Türkiye's effectiveness, and smart power strategy in Somalia. Through this discipline the way of soft power employment by Türkiye particularly in the case of Somalia is elaborated. This study uses the qualitative method with methodological components such as literature and document analysis.

³² **Creswell, John W.** (2009) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd Edition, OAKS, Sage.

³³ **Cresswell**, p.186.

³⁴ **Cresswell**, p.180.

³⁵ **Cresswell**, p.185.

Documents analysis is used in order to identify the impact of Turkish soft power in Africa as well as in Somalia. Since this method is preferred in social sciences, it provides significant primary and secondary data for finding out the process of smart power and the lacks in current academic work. On the one hand Turkish scholars' works on soft, hard, and smart power helped to figure out the literature data. On the other hand, for an empirical and theoretical comprehension other scholars' writings in this field have been evaluated. While English literature was prioritized in this study, Turkish writings have also been used. Academic works, national reports, policies of government offices that were published by state institutions or by state press publication, non-academic publications such as reports, documents, newspapers, and journals are types of documents used in this study.

In purpose of measuring Türkiye's soft and hard power in Africa and Somalia, secondary data has been used. In this context data from Turkish Statistical Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, and from other governmental institutions play an important role.

Under the theoretical framework of soft power and smart power that Joseph S. Nye has coined, which deals with the ability of an actor to reach its objectives by its attraction and consent instead of force, this study is formed³⁶. Further, this research relates to the constructivist approach, which is about the construction of identity and interest through interactions.³⁷ Türkiye benefits from its rich history, cultural and religious bounds by implementing soft power. Hence, it can be argued that soft power in Turkish foreign policy bases on constructivist theory. In this context, the consideration of the constructivist idea as a theoretical framework of soft and smart power in Turkish foreign policy is possible.

While the theories are explained in an inductive approach for a better comprehension, the practical use of the concepts in Turkish foreign policy following the African relations and Somali approach are presented in a deductive way.

³⁶ **Nye, Joseph S.** (1990) 'The Changing Nature of World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol: 105, No: 2, pp. 177–192.

³⁷ **Wendt, Alexander** (1992) 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol: 46, No: 2, pp.391-425.

1.4. Structure of the Chapters

This thesis comprises five chapters. The opening chapter gives a brief summary of the subject and aim of the research. A comprehensive literature review gives a theoretical framework to the study and shows the contribution of the study. Further, the research methodology is explained. For a better understanding of the thesis the organization of the chapters are given. The second chapter deals with the theoretical framework. The concepts of power, hard power, soft power, smart power are explained. It goes on with the definition of constructivism in relation to identity, foreign policy, and interest. This chapter helps to follow the theoretical aspect of the practical use in Turkish foreign policy. In a deductive approach, Turkish foreign policy and the use of soft, hard, and smart power are described in detail in chapter three. Significant tools, institutions and examples to the related powers are given to understand Turkish foreign policy in a broader way. Chapter four contains Türkiye's relations to Africa. Here the reasons and dynamics as well as soft power implementations are on focus. Especially the impact of Turkish television series show the effect of Turkish soft power in Africa. The fifth chapter concentrates on Turkish-Somali relations in terms of Turkish soft power, hard power, and smart power. Türkiye's uniqueness is emphasized through examples and literature. The sixth chapter ends with a thorough conclusion based on the research done.

2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Power

Through power the goals or purposes can be achieved. Power enables doing things and even controlling others. In political science, power makes you able to make others do what the usually would not referred to do. Joseph S. Nye underlines the significance of knowing the preferences of the other in order to change preferably the behavior.³⁸

In the discipline of international relations, there are various definitions of power. Hans Morgenthau sees power as the goal of politics. Every state action aspires to achieve and increase power.³⁹ Having gained power does not equally mean that power will last or that the powerful will always win. In order to hold power, strategic policies and capable leaders are crucial in converting power resources to power behavior.⁴⁰

In general, through and in social relations are effects of power produced that shape the decisions of actors. Barnett and Duvall categorize power in compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive concepts.⁴¹ According to their taxonomy of power, power works through direct and indirect control of the powerful actor in interaction or in social relations of constitution on other actors.⁴² Compulsory and structural power are directly controlled by one actor, whereas institutional and productive powers are indirectly controlled to affect the other actor. Compulsory and institutional power are both used in interaction of actors while structural and productive powers exist in constitutive relations.

While power was mostly executed militarily, especially after the Cold War, the use of power changed. Instead of combat and military power states tend to apply economic sanctions in order to force, deter or threaten other actors.⁴³ Not just only sanctions lead actors to refuse military power but the costs of combat equipment, the physical damage to the

³⁸ Nye, (1990), p.177.

³⁹ Morgenthau, Hans Joachim and Thompson, Kenneth W. (2006) *Politics among Nations: The Struggle of Power and Peace*, 7th Edition, revised by Thompson, Kenneth W. / Clinto, W. David, Boston, McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

⁴⁰ Nye, (2004), pp.1–33.

⁴¹ Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (2005) 'Power in International Politics' *International Organization*, Vol: 59, No: 1, pp.39–75.

⁴² Barnett and Duvall, p. 47-57

⁴³ Demirtaş Tunç (2015) 'Türkiye'nin Afrika Politikasında Yumuşak Güç Unsurunun Rolü', (Master's), Bursa Uludağ University, Graduate School of Social Sciences.

environment, economic loss, and also loss of reputation are crucial factors leading to reject hard power. Taking economic sanctions, costs and legitimacy into account, states need new ways to implement power in order to reach their goals. One of these new ways is to influence the other with attraction. Thus, the other state will act without force but with its own consent in favor of the attracting state.⁴⁴ Even an economic growth rate for some years would add more strength to a country than an alliance with a powerful state.⁴⁵

Even though globalization and the development of technology brought new advantages such as global collaboration, agreements, transportation, communication, information storage, and more, global threats such as terrorism occurred as well.⁴⁶ In order to prevent any loss in economy and in reputation, states do also need to legitimize their use of combat and military power. Nowadays terrorism and global or regional security are the reasons for the use of hard power. However, states prefer to act with military power in international alliances. Nonetheless, Joseph S. Nye argues that the use of soft power is as important as the use of hard power.⁴⁷

2.1.1. Soft Power

Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as the capability to achieve your will through attraction instead of payments or coercion.⁴⁸ A country's policies, political ideals, and culture produce attractiveness. The reinforcement of soft power is seen when the attracting state's policies are considered legitimate by the attracted ones. Not just hard power shows strength but soft power as well. Soft power is the contrary to weakness and it would be a failure to leave it out of national strategy. Nye underlines the significance of soft power in growing allies than fighting enemies. In order to strengthen the importance of soft power Nye refers to the war in Iraq in 2003, in which the United States on the one hand succeeded against a terrorist but on the other hand lost its popularity. The killing of one terrorist did not solve the threat of terrorism. For fighting such a security threat, alliance and cooperation with other states play an important role. In this sense, getting the persuaded outcomes

⁴⁴ Nye, (2004), pp.1–33.

⁴⁵ Nye, Joseph S. (1990) 'The Changing Nature of World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol: 105, No: 2, pp. 177–192.

⁴⁶ Moran Andrew 'Terrorism': Hough, Peter, Pilbeam, Bruce, and Stokes, Wendy (Editors) (2015) *International Security Studies: Theory and Practice*, 1st ed., London, Routledge.

⁴⁷ Nye, (2004), p.5.

⁴⁸ Nye, (2004), p.5.

without force, the indirect way is to attract other countries in world politics. If they admire, follow, and aspire the values of the attracting country, they will cooperate freely in favor of the attracting state. In other words, with soft power the preferences of others are shaped. The attraction of the state leads to consent.⁴⁹

Soft power is applied in following steps: at first, setting an agenda. Secondly, attracting, and lastly gaining acquiescence to cooperate. Soft power is produced through the country's culture, values, and its domestic and foreign policy. These three resources need to be attractive to others, universal, moral and legitimate⁵⁰. Most likely soft power tools are institutions and organizations spreading values, culture and policies of the state⁵¹. Even the politics of the state present its values and culture. It is important to distinguish hard power tools from soft power tools. Hard power depends on economic and military practice while soft power is not related to hard power nor to its tools. The more a country spreads its values the less it will face resistance from attracted countries. The precondition for the attraction and seduction is that the spread ideology and values need to be attractive for other countries. Otherwise they will not acquiescence to follow.

Culture consists of shared practices and values, which shape the society. This combination creates an identity.⁵² Even though the concept of soft power was not found, the use of it tends back to 323 BCE. The Greeks spread their Hellenistic culture from Europe to North Africa and Asia.⁵³ More than 2 000 years later cultural exchanges increased due to the development of technologies and communications. Despite complex relationships in political and cultural diplomacy, cultural industries improved themselves progressively in a sophisticated way.⁵⁴ For the purpose of obtaining a desired outcome, the country needs a culture with universal values that arouse interest of the others. Here, Nye mentions that popular cultural power is not always a soft power tool that has impact on the other's behavior. For instance, a French cuisine does not assure attraction to French policy. Nevertheless it cannot be ignored that for example US popular culture appear to others modern, innovative, exciting.⁵⁵ After the Cold War, the capabilities of US public diplomacy

⁴⁹ Nye, (2004), pp.1–11.

⁵⁰ Nye, (2004), pp.30–32.

⁵¹ Nye, (2004), pp.10–11.

⁵² Udo-Udo, Jacob 'Cultural Approaches to Soft Power': Chitty, Naren, Ji, Li, Rawnsley, Gary F., and Hayden, Craig (Editors) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power, 1st Edition, London, Routledge.

⁵³ Udo-Udo, p. 138.

⁵⁴ Udo-Udo, p. 139.

⁵⁵ Nye, (2004), pp.12–15.

decreased due to its unpopular wars. However, American popular culture was one of the crucial effects to prevent a great decrease in American power. Udo-Udo refers to millions of people applying for the US Green Card. Particularly through Hollywood, America made massive exports of its popular culture which has more weight in millions of people who actually dislike American foreign policy. It is important to mention that not every component of a national identity can be spread affectively, but the distinctive attraction, which is involved in every identity, can be projected abroad effectively.⁵⁶ In short, culture is crucial in producing soft power as long as it is universal or interesting for the target group. Culture can be spread abroad through institutions, commerce, media, and even through popular culture. Popular culture mostly influence mass population. Cultural identity reaches elites through commerce⁵⁷. Successful foreign entrepreneurs serve as a bridge for transmitting culture in a realistic view.

Political values are another resource of soft power. It requires a great deal of effort to imply policies that are not recognized as legitimate by states. The ignorance of legitimacy leads to chaotic order and crisis. Considering this consequences, a state needs to present its political values in an ethical context. Therefore, the policies will be recognized and the international society will respect the state.⁵⁸

A state's domestic policy, relation to international institutions, and foreign policy create soft power as well. Policies in human rights, peacemaking or economic aid have particular effect on soft power. For instance, racial segregation policies in the 1950s in the US affected American soft power negatively. Weak laws in gun control lead to a decrease of American soft power in European countries. As policies may have short- and long-term effects, they can increase and even decrease the popularity of the country. If the policies appear arrogant, selfish or hypocritical to the others, it will decrease the interest to follow the values. Nonetheless hard power belongs more to the government than soft power.

While culture, values, and domestic and foreign policy produce soft power, technology platforms in terms of information and communication show the application of soft power.⁵⁹ Thus, soft power is related to communication and therefore to technologies, which states use

⁵⁶ **Udo-Udo**, p. 140.

⁵⁷ **Nye**, (2004), pp.45–47.

⁵⁸ **Demirtaş**, (2015), pp.24-26.

⁵⁹ **Hayden, Craig** 'Technologies of Influence: The Materiality of Soft Power in Public Diplomacy (Section Overview)': Chitty, Naren, Ji, Li, Rawnsley, Gary F., and Hayden, Craig (Editors) (2017) *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, 1st Edition, London, Routledge.

in transmitting information, mounting campaigns, and in conveying symbolism. Nongovernmental organizations like universities, firms, churches, and foundations also produce soft power that go in line with the country's foreign policy objectives. The combination of the above mentioned elements reflects the depth the country's social capital.⁶⁰

The sources of soft power are implemented through soft power tools which are institutions of the state and non-governmental organizations. Both tools are significant in using soft power and spreading cultural and political values of a state. It is important to mention that non-governmental organizations can be provided by the state in order to apply their actions.

With the technological development in communications and transport in the global world, states tend to collaborate with partner states. In this sense, ministry of foreign affairs with its representations abroad, especially through embassies, other ministries and organizations within the government, institutions, which are autonomous or semi-autonomous or state funded, take actions in terms of implementing soft power.

Ministries, and especially the ministry of foreign affairs play with the representations abroad an important role in forming the state's foreign policy affective for the international public. States cooperate in educational and cultural fields not just for short-term relations but for long-term relations. Especially educational exchanges play an important role.⁶¹ Related to educational exchange, European Union Erasmus Exchange Program or Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) in Türkiye are examples for scholarships and exchange programs. Through such educational actions states are able to present their own culture, language, lifestyle, and religion.

Non-governmental organizations such as civil society organizations take advantage of the communication technologies that lead to interaction without boundaries. Besides, associations, private companies, trade unions and even individuals are exercising soft power.

Figure 1 demonstrates a summary of soft power. It shows that the resources of soft power are culture, political values, and policy. These are implemented through soft power

⁶⁰ **Kalın, İbrahim** TASAM, 'Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi', https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/66920/turk_dis_politikasi_ve_kamu_diplomasisi l.a.d. 25.05.2024.

⁶¹ **Nye**, (2004), pp.127-148.

tools. Culture is mostly spread through state institutions such as the ministry of foreign affairs, through non-governmental organizations that work abroad as well, and through media in terms of movies, TV series and broadcastings. A state presents its political values by its actions. If its actions are considered legitimate, it gathers positive presumption. By means of domestic policy as well as foreign policy a state also gains attraction. Its sincerity and way of implementing the policies have impact on its image.




Figure 1. Soft Power Resources and Tools

Source: Nye, Joseph S. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

2.1.2. Hard Power

Since hundreds of years the resource of major power changed. In the sixteenth century Spain was a leading state with its resource in gold, colonial trade, army and its dynasty. In the following century Netherlands gained major power through navy, capital markets, and trade. The role of the economic power is noticeable in this century. Through its army, rural industry, population, and public administration, France became the leading state in the eighteenth century. The importance of governmental policies and technological development in the industry is remarkable in France's power. Industrial revolution and developments in finance and economy gave Britain the power in the nineteenth century. Besides its liberal norms and navy played an important role. In the twentieth century the United States became

the leading state through its resource in economy, science, technology, military, alliances, culture, liberal norms, and through the development of communication.⁶²

Until the end of the twentieth century the capacity of power resources increased dramatically because of the development of science and technology. Due to intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons the Soviet Union and the United States became superpowers. With the revolution of information, technology gained a new dimension. Through information technology the US improved its military superpower in terms of real-time intelligence, precision weapons, control and command, and broad surveillance of regional battlefields.⁶³

Features of a great power have been its capabilities in military and economy in relation with its available resources. These resources contain territory, economy, natural resources, population, political stability, and armed forces.⁶⁴ According to the realist approach, power needs to be visible and countable.⁶⁵

Anyways, based on the costly outcomes of the use of nuclear weapons, these weapons do not always serve as deterrence. Nye refers to the American loss in the Vietnam War and to Argentina's attack on the British Falkland despite Britain's nuclear weapons⁶⁶. The spread of nationalism impeded to control others. Besides technological development in weapons and communications, societal change such as democratization makes it more difficult to use military power as well. In order to use force, legitimization and justification are required and due to the costs, alliances and cooperation are preferred instead⁶⁷.

A country's military strengths conduce to intimidation, coercion, and threat. Nowadays, before implementing military power, states and organizations mostly apply economic sanctions in order to deter or threaten another state.⁶⁸ Relating to the carrot and stick theory, Nye explains hard power with naming inducements as carrots and sticks as threats.⁶⁹

⁶² Nye, (1990), pp. 178–179.

⁶³ Nye, (2004), pp.18–19.

⁶⁴ Ohnesorge, Hendrick W. (2020). *Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations*, 1st Edition, Cham, Springer.

⁶⁵ Ohnesorge, pp.28-30.

⁶⁶ Nye, (2004), p.19.

⁶⁷ Nye, (2004), pp.20–21.

⁶⁸ Ohnesorge, pp.28-30.

⁶⁹ Nye, (2004), p.5.

Military and economic power, both are tools for hard power. Democratic states do also use military power do achieve their goals. Through protective, deterrent or coercive behaviors, states threaten or force the others to act in favorable way. Related to the military power, governments implement policies such as coercive diplomacy, war or alliance. Economic power, as a hard power tool, can be on the one hand seen as inducements in ways of payments, aids or even bribes, which would be related to the 'carrot'. On the other hand, governments use coercive behaviors like sanctions. This is an example for the 'stick'.⁷⁰

That hard power is still a significant power tool in international relations is seen in the ongoing wars in Ukraine, Palestine or the conflicts in African states. For instance Russia faced economic sanctions because of its invasion in Ukraine in February, 2022. Along with economic embargoes and sanctions of other states and organization the Russian economy shrank.⁷¹ However, Russia does not step back from the ongoing war. Even though economic actions serve as deterrence in form of sanctions, economy is also a hard power tool for inducement. Supporting economic investments, agreeing on economic collaborations, providing economic support are ways of using the economy for inducement.

Considering global economy, military power causes economic threats for the state that uses force. Especially the increase of democratic values around the globe decreases the frequency of using force. This is again related with soft power that shared values lead to peace. Taking economic results into account, even nondemocratic states tend to not use force. In a global economy no state wants to intimidate its foreign investors. Alongside with globalization democratic values, alliances, and economic agreements lead to the transition of power. There are no superpowers anymore but there is a diffusion of power.⁷² The economic interdependence between nation-states is a reason why hard power is not preferred to use. Taking the huge revenues of international corporations and private foundations in consideration, states are not the only power keepers anymore⁷³.

Taking a comparison between hard and soft power, soft power is mostly used in diplomatic ways. Instead of forcing or threatening the other state, through soft power, a state can in a more comfortable way achieve its objectives through attraction. With influencing

⁷⁰ Nye, (2004), pp.5-11.

⁷¹ European Council, Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/> l.a.d. 12.05.2024.

⁷² Ohnesorge, pp.6-11.

⁷³ Ohnesorge, pp.6-11.

the public opinion through values, culture, and liberal norms, the state gets an attractive image and becomes recognized positively by the attracted states.

While in hard power, the use of military and economic forces may lead to isolation or to opposing behaviors of countries instead of supportive, diplomatic actions in soft power do not give a negative image. Contrary, diplomacy and communication enable the discussion of different ideas. Therefore agreements are made without force but with consent. Thus, the soft power using state gains support and secures its positive image. In this sense, alliances and cooperations give states the opportunity to act in support instead of taking actions on its own.

In terms of rapid and effective solutions, economic sanctions and embargoes play a significant role. In addition, it is not easy to collect data to measure the impact of soft power, while hard power can be measured in numbers and volumes. In order to measure the outcome of the soft power, surveys on public opinion are helpful.

2.1.3. Smart Power

Whilst globalization brought advantages in technological and communicational development, in international alliances and spreading democratic values, it also brought international threats. Terrorism is an international security threat to every region and cannot be fought just with hard power nor just with soft power, but with both of them in combination. This combination of soft and hard power is what Joseph S. Nye calls ‘smart power’. Public diplomacy is a smart power tool which requires the awareness of civil society, credibility, and self-criticism in applying soft power.⁷⁴

Especially with the invasion in Iraq, the United States faced a decline in international support and popularity. Despite its military and economic power, the increase of democracy gave other governments to make decisions against the favor of United States. For instance the Turkish government did not allow the American troops to use their military base in Türkiye. This gives an example that hard power or soft power alone did not shape public

⁷⁴ **Nye, Joseph S.** (2008) ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol: 616, No: 1, pp.94-109.

opinion affectively for the profit of the United States. Therefore the combination of them both are crucial in a more democratic world.⁷⁵

A state produces soft power through presenting its cultural and political values. Domestic and international policies as well as international relations serve for presenting and spreading these values. As an instrument for governments, public diplomacy, is a way to communicate with the international public and to attract it. The target group are not other countries but the countries' public. Means of public diplomacy are organizing exchanges, contributing cultural exports, and broadcasting. Broadcasting can only produce soft power, if the cultural and political values are attractive to the others. It is important to mention that public diplomacy should not corrupt into propaganda. Then it will not be affective and even more it will damage soft power.⁷⁶

Cultural diplomacy serves for public diplomacy. States or non-governmental organizations use media, cultural production or mobility in relation with their culture in order to construct relationships with others. These relationships will preferably lead to long-lasting and sustainable partnerships.⁷⁷

Besides public diplomacy, foundations, global developments, economic integration, and technological innovation play an important role in smart power. In order to respond international challenges, the United States has three different ways. Firstly, it may act on its own with taking the risk of opposition and isolation. The second option is to employ consensus-based internationalism, which is on the one hand in advantage of the United States in terms of solving problems at hand but on the other hand it is difficult to build such coalitions with likeminded states. The third way is that the United States can face global challenges with international treaties, organizations and alliances. The United States benefitted from such norms-based internationalism during the Cold War and can now again use this way to counter global challenges.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Nye, (2008), pp.96-99.

⁷⁶ Nye, (2008), pp.99-101.

⁷⁷ Chitty, Naren 'Soft Power, Civic Virtue & World Politics': Chitty, Naren, Ji, Lilian, Rawnsley, Gary D., and Hayden, Craig (Editors) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power, 1st Edition, London, Routledge.

⁷⁸ Armitage, Richard L. and Nye, Joseph S. (2007) Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America, <https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/csissmartpowerreport.pdf> l.a.d. 26.05.2024.

Global developments such as public health, humanitarian assistance and international assistance are important indicators for smart power as well. As well as public services in domestic policies, foreign aid contributes to the image of the state in terms of interest and concern for other publics. Here, it is important that the public is convinced of the application of these policies and that these actions are authentic.⁷⁹

So that all people can increase their profits from trade, economic integration is an essential mean. Instead of supporting the retrenchment, engagement is important against competition. Initiatives for free trade and market access for less developed countries are examples for economic integration which will give the state an attractive image. Not just entrepreneurs but also students will be positively affected through such steps.⁸⁰

Joseph S. Nye defines the concept “smart power” as a combination of hard and soft power. For the pursuit of achieving foreign policy objectives, the strategic use of both hard power and smart power are important. According to Nye, the significance lies on having the ability to know when to apply one of the powers efficiently. The awareness of the situation and context are determinant. If a powerful actor is able to decide when to apply soft or military power in which extend, it will reach its foreign policy goals in a strategic way. In this regard, smart power pursues to maximize the impact and achieving the goals. At the same time, the concept minimizes potential negative outcomes of using only one of the powers, hard or soft.⁸¹

For a better comprehension the following Table 1 demonstrates the how hard power with its military and economic instruments, and soft power work combined with a result of smart power. It is helpful to use the inductive method to explain the use of these powers. Starting with the military power, which belongs to hard power, military power is to create coercion, deterrence or protection through threats or through use of force. Examples for relating government policies are coercive diplomacy, war, and alliances. The other hard power tool, economic power, aims inducement or coercion in the way of payments or sanctions which are implemented as aids, bribes or sanctions by governments. Soft power pursues attraction or agenda setting. Tools like values, culture, policies, and institutions

⁷⁹ Armitage and Nye, pp.37-46.

⁸⁰ Armitage and Nye, pp.53-56.

⁸¹ Nye, (2004), p.25.

serve for this pursuit. States conduct public diplomacy and both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy for efficient soft power results.

Table 1. Smart power as a combination of hard power and soft power

	Smart Power		
	Hard Power		Soft Power
	Military Power	Economic Power	
Behaviors	Coercion Deterrence Protection	Inducement Coercion	Attraction Agenda Setting
Primary Currencies	Threats Force	Payments Sanctions	Values Culture Policies Institutions
Government Policies	Coercive Diplomacy War Alliance	Aid Bribes Sanctions	Public Diplomacy Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

Source: Nye, Joseph S. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

In order to address global threats such as energy security, innovations and technological developments are significant factors contributing smart power. International cooperation for alternative energy and for securing the climate serve as a means for an attracting state.⁸²

The requirements of a smart power strategy can be listed in five points: Firstly, making exchanges between competing priorities. Secondly, unifying diplomacy, public diplomacy, and development. Thirdly, as the country's parliament, supporting smart power strategy. Fourthly, providing field organizations and giving them more responsibility. Lastly, as the government, being aware of the significance of soft power and its resource and acting accordingly.⁸³

⁸² Armitage and Nye, p. 32.

⁸³ Armitage and Nye, pp.7-9.

2.2. Constructivism

People and societies act impulsively in constructing each other. In constructing, content or knowledge, that is made socially, is dominant. Knowledge relates to material reality. Social and material realities contaminate differently each other without being sovereign to one another. There is no harsh distinction between the both realities.⁸⁴

Instead of concerning about the human nature, after the Cold War, realist and liberal thinkers started to question how far structure, in terms of distributing power, process, related to interaction and learning, and institutions have impact on state actions. Rationalism provides an understanding of the process and the institutions due to their effect on behavioral change. It is important to mention that they do not change interests nor identities. While neoliberals and neorealists share the opinion that powerful states approach to security in a self-interested way, the both groups distinguish on how relative or absolute motivated states are for their own profit. If there is a security problem which cannot be solved collectively, the self-help system, which is related to an anarchical perspective in neorealism, will work. With the absence of institution and interaction, the process will be affected in terms of learning. But again, no formation of identity or interest occurs in this system. Contrary to the neorealist group, neoliberals value cooperation and therefore the process. Since neoliberal and neorealist research programs lack in understanding the change in identity and interest, taking identity and interest into account in a conceptual framework is essential. By focusing on constructing the subjectivity of a society, Alexander Wendt calls social theories that explain interests and identities as constructivist.⁸⁵

Alexander Wendt, presents how institutions and the process result in codetermination leading to the construction of identity and interest. Taking “State A”, “State B”, and “intersubjective understandings and expectations by A and B” as institutions, Wendt explains the process. Firstly, there is a stimulus demanding a step. State A, having its own identity and interest, defines this situation and then takes actions. This step by State A, leads to an understanding in an intersubjective way. The next step will be State B interpreting the step by State A and defining the situation with its own identity and interest. Afterwards, State B will respond with an action and the process will repeat. This model that forms the

⁸⁴ **Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood** (1989) *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press.

⁸⁵ **Wendt, Alexander** (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization*, Vol: 46, No: 2, pp.391-425. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027764.

identity and interest of the institutions can be applied to cooperative institutions as well as to competitive ones. Competitive identities would mirror the actions of the other due to its mistrust to the other. Thus lasting identities cannot be produced. Contrary, with cooperative institutions respecting each other, lasting identities can be produced. Through trust and empathy, collective meaning constitute identities and interests that always take action in process.⁸⁶

Common expectations, understandings, or knowledge form social structures. These structures shape the relationship of actors as well as the actors who are in a situation of a relationship. The relationship between the actors can be conflictual or cooperative. If it is a conflictual relationship, it presents a security dilemma. The states in this relationship do not trust neither respect each other and are interested in self-help solutions. In contrary, in a cooperative relationship, states trust each other and tend to solve problems without using force. This relationship results in security community. The social structure with the aim of collective security is suggested by constructivism. The reason why social structure more important than materiality is the quality of intersubjectivity. The shared knowledge highlights sociality. Material resources serve as a knowledge which is shared in social structure as action. Thus, social structures are material and social capabilities taken in combination in action.

Since interests and identities are socially constructed. For instance, Wendt illustrates that 500 British nuclear weapons are not seen as a threat to U.S. security due to shared values, whereas 5 North Korean nuclear weapons are considered a significant threat because of differing values and beliefs.⁸⁷

To understand constructivism, two developments in history play an important role. While there was a progress in technic and society, the awareness of its ambivalence and limits increased. This is one important historical development. The other one is related to debates in International Relations. After the Cold War, a potential change in Europe was expected. Constructivism definitely took advantage of the certainty of the change.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ **Wendt**, (1992), pp.406-407.

⁸⁷ **Sıradag**, (2022a), p.392.

⁸⁸ **Guzzini, Stefano** (2000) 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol: 6, No: 2, pp.147-182. 10.1177/1354066100006002001.

The increasing awareness of the progress in technology and society led to a pessimistic world view. Critiques of modern industrial societies explain this change by relating to the idea of endless technical capacities. In relation with an individualist approach, through technology and science people aspire to own nature. Yet, technological developments did not prevent ecological disasters, nor rising death rates due to famine but instead caused these disasters for example through nuclear powers, the faith in technological development with optimistic outcomes decreased. Thus, modernity is seen as mistaken or needs a redefinition. This progress of modernity is called reflexive modernity. Stefano Guzzini explains the reflexive modernity with constructivism in International Relations by relating to the European society. In the 19th century the European society expanded globally. Nevertheless, the society is still particular. It is relevant for constructivism in context with reflexive modernity that the European society became aware of this unexpected situation.⁸⁹

In the view of the realist approach, diplomatic culture did not serve as a power source. The international class, sharing same social values and rules did not control diplomacy anymore. Instead, democratic development, the rise of nationalism, decolonization became an obstacle to persuade goals in the frame of legitimacy.⁹⁰

With the end of the Cold War the constructivist approach referred to making a social world of a subject. The fall of the Berlin Wall led to question the social situation which was not objective as it seemed to be. The potentiality of change triggered the international system to understand constructivism.⁹¹

Constructivism is divided in observation, actions, and in the relation between observation and action. Observation is understood as the implementation of social construction in terms of reality and as the process of mutual interpretation between individuals and society. Constructivism constructs on the one hand the social knowledge, on the other hand the social world. Action is about analyzing the intersubjectivity. The relation between observation and action play an important role in constructing reality.⁹²

The dynamics of the international change, the role of non-governmental actors, institutional practices, and problems in human rights are focusing points of constructivism.

⁸⁹ Guzzini, pp.151-153.

⁹⁰ Guzzini, p.153.

⁹¹ Guzzini, pp.154-155.

⁹² Guzzini, pp.174-175.

According to constructivist thinkers, the identity determines the interest of the actor. The actor act accordingly to his interests. Thus, identities serve as a ground for the interest. This is the reason why the emergence or formation of social identities need to be researched on.⁹³

2.2.1. Identity

After the Cold War, the question of identity gained importance in International Relations as well as in constructivism. Constructivism focuses on the change of identities and interests. While realist and liberal approaches emphasize material features like power and trade, constructivist approaches concentrate on the impact of ideas.

By defining the identity there is a need of a narrative. According to Margaret Somers the narrative consists of two narrators which are “me” and “the other”.⁹⁴ An individual or a society identifies itself relating to how “the other” is defining it. No matter if as an individual or as a society, the identity is defined in how and were “me” and “the other” are put in a social environment.⁹⁵ The concept “me” is as crucial as the concept “the other” in creating the identity because without “the other” one cannot identify himself. An identity is comprised by several features. If a feature is threatened, it will be at the fore. For instance if the religious identity is considered under threat, the religious bound will come to the forefront.⁹⁶

“The other” provides unification and strength not just for the individual but also for the state. The concept “the other” is not just related to a state or an individual. Historical experiences, another idea or even image can be regarded as “the other”.⁹⁷

A state consists of material, ideational, and cultural features. Material capabilities consist of military and economic power through which a state distributes power. The ideational feature of the state is formed of self-understanding, perception, identities, and more. Relating to states’ ideational characteristics, cultural features play an important role

⁹³ **Wendt**, (1992), p.398.

⁹⁴ **Somers, Margaret** (1994) ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational Network Approach’, *Theory and Society*, Vol: 23, pp.605-649.

⁹⁵ **Mole, Richard C.M.** ‘Discursive Identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power’: Mole, Richard C.M. (Editor) (2007) *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics*, 1st Edition, London, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁹⁶ **Maalouf, Amin** (1998) *Les Identites Meurtrieres*, Grasset and Fasquelle (Translated by: Bora, Aysel (2000) *Ölümçül Kimlikler*, İstanbul, Yapı Kredi).

⁹⁷ **Hopf, Ted** (2002) *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies*, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, 1st Edition, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

as well. This cultural structure is compromised by “knowledge” of the state-members.⁹⁸ Ideas, perceptions, interlocking beliefs, understandings, and identities shape this knowledge. Institutions, rules, and norms are crucial in international cooperation. This cooperative relationships are regarded as a “society” of states.⁹⁹ Critical theories in International Relations elaborate the way of social construction of the world politics. Neo-Marxist, postmodern, constructivist and other critical approaches argue that the above mentions material structures are not fundamental. Instead, social structures are the base of international politics. Contrary to rationalist approaches, critical theories argue that social structure shapes in a greater extent the identity and interest of the actors. Because according to rationalists, social structure only forms the actors’ behavior.¹⁰⁰

Identities and interests of actors are constructed mutually through social structure in the interacting process.¹⁰¹ Actors are seen as social identities. Social identity is that an actor gives itself sets of meaning but with relating to the perspective of other actors. The identity of an actor in a social situation depends on the relation to the other. For instance, if there is no capitalist around, you cannot be an anti-capitalist. Therefore, the individuality of an actor relates to other who is in the corporate relation. This individuality is linked to the social identity. Even though social identities and interests are generally stable, they are always in interaction, thus in process. “This is an ongoing accomplishment of practices that represent self and other in certain ways”.¹⁰²

Constructivism points the significance of defining identities out due to their being the basis of interests. States form their identities in interaction with the others. Without a relation to another, state will not know the perception of the other about itself. Thus interests cannot be determined.

In the international world a formation of collective identity cannot be prevented. The reasons and chances for international cooperation lie on mechanisms contributing to collective identities. Wendt describes four corporate interests providing interaction. These

⁹⁸ **Wendt, Alexander** ‘3 Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’: Lapid, Yosef / Kratochwil Friedrich, (Editors) (1996) *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853952-003>.

⁹⁹ **Wendt**, (1996), p.49.

¹⁰⁰ **Wendt, Alexander** (1995) ‘Constructing International Politics’, *International Security*, Vol: 20, No: 1, pp.71–81, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539217> l.a.d. 28.05.2024.

¹⁰¹ **Wendt**, (1992), p.406.

¹⁰² **Wendt**, (1996), p.51.

interests are not based on self-interest. At first, he mentions the physical security of a state with distinguishing itself from the other states. At second, the ambition for steady social identities due to existential security in international relations. Thirdly, being recognized by others without using force. And lastly, development of human life for which states are responsible.¹⁰³ Yet, there is a challenge in specifying the roots of the collective identity and in what extend an action is based on this identity.¹⁰⁴

2.2.2. Foreign Policy

International Relations specialists elaborate foreign policy of states by referring to “identity”. The impact of the creation and perception of identity in foreign policy is worth analyzing. The shape of an identity occurs when the state crosses the nation.¹⁰⁵

Collective, corporate, role, and type identities are the ground of various interests. These interests form the behavior of the state as an actor. Opposing the realist approach that states are self-interested by nature, the international system constructs state interests. While the extent is arguable, the international system constructs collective, type, and role identities of states. The identities being pre-social interests leads to the understanding of the construction of state interests by the international system. Notwithstanding the nature of corporate stateness limits the construction by the system.¹⁰⁶

National interest is a concept referring to security issues or reproduction requirements between the state and society. This concept is regarded as an objective interest in terms of what a state should do instead of what it is actually doing which would be a subjective approach. National interests consist of four features: physical survival which is related to life, autonomy referring to liberty, economic well-being regarded as property, and collective self-esteem. The satisfaction of these interests results with a secure relation between state and society. Along with that state-society complex the objective constraints of a state’s foreign policy get formed. States are forms that fulfill themselves. After taking action to acquire their interests, states reproduce themselves and resist to fail in the international

¹⁰³ **Wendt, Alexander.** (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol: 88, No: 10, pp.384-396.

¹⁰⁴ **Wendt,** (1996), pp.58-59.

¹⁰⁵ **Doty, James R.** ‘Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity’: Bierstecker, Thomas J. and Weber, Cynthia (Editors) (1996) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰⁶ **Wendt, Alexander** (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

system. This self-fulfilling mechanism leads to a path-dependency in international politics. Even though organs of states are built upon internal structures, it cannot be ignored that the interaction with other states in the international area shapes the identity and interests of states.¹⁰⁷

According to constructivists, states' interests are formed through a complex process with a result of interaction between history, society, and culture. By creating the identity of foreign policy, the international, societal, and individual levels need to be compromised. Hence, in foreign policy, decision makers will behave on the line of the state's identity. While domestic events have impact on foreign policy, foreign policy plays an important role in national identity. Thus, socio-cultural features specify the means and the ways of implementations of foreign policy. In other words, national identity is a developing process rooting in historical values. In this process the specification of national interests occur. The identity and interests get shaped in interaction with other actors.¹⁰⁸

2.2.3. Interest

Through constructivist methods in foreign policy actors achieve their interests. Identity is a crucial indicator in specifying the interests of a state and later its preferences, world view, and perceptions. This steps lead to the specification of the behavior in foreign policy. Constructivists believe that norms construct the international system. The actors in the international systems have identities and interests that are constructed socially. These identity and interests have impact on the perception of the state actor.¹⁰⁹

Constructivism defends the idea that state interests are formed after the construction of an identity. Thus, in an international system, a state cannot form its own interests without interacting with other states. The reason for this condition is that states gain positive or negative perception of themselves and of each other through interaction.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ **Wendt**, (1999), pp.234-245.

¹⁰⁸ **Demirtaş**, (2015), p.12.

¹⁰⁹ **Wendt**, (1995), pp.71-73.

¹¹⁰ **Demirtaş**, (2015), p.7.

Identities give answers to the question ‘who or what states are’. Interests are the answers to the question ‘what states want’. The motivations of states are designed by interests. Even though behavior is dependent on beliefs as well, the extent cannot be measured. Nonetheless, motivations explain the state behavior. If a state does not know who or what it is in other words, if a state does not have an identity, it has no interests, so it does not know what it wants. Identities and interests are related to each other. “Without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction.”¹¹¹

¹¹¹ **Wendt**, (1999), p.231.

3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND SMART POWER

Türkiye implements an agile and insightful diplomacy for a powerful foreign policy. This foreign policy aims to eliminate global threats and challenges such as crisis and conflicts. Türkiye pays attention to have a strong foreign policy at the table as well as on the ground. Wealth of historical knowledge, geographical location, vigorous institutions, and string human resources are various indicators strengthening the long-standing diplomatic tradition of Türkiye. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy is identified as an integration of traditional values with future aspirations.

Türkiye's objectives in foreign policy are to protect the interests of Türkiye while aiming to form persistent peace and development with its neighbors in its region and beyond. For the purpose of securing Türkiye's interests, Türkiye gives value and takes action for peace, stability, and prosperity in the world. Turkish foreign policy is based on the stance "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" by the founder of Republic of Türkiye Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Relating to this direction and to the framework "Century of Türkiye" by the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye exercises a national and independent foreign policy.¹¹²

Rich history and culture, geographical position, political objectives, and economic needs are reasons for change in Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War. These four factors do also have impact on Türkiye's foreign policy in terms of diversification and interdependence. While historical and cultural ties and geographical location play an important role in relations with the neighboring countries, the Muslim world as well as the Turkic world, political and economic interests are the reasons why Türkiye started to integrate with the West.¹¹³

History, culture, and geography are also resources for Turkish soft power. Türkiye benefits from these not just in foreign but also in domestic policy. While Türkiye expands its foreign policy to new regions and interacts with emerging actors, it increases its capacities

¹¹² **Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, National Foreign Policy in the 'Century of Türkiye': A Synopsis, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa> l.a.d. 01.06.2024.

¹¹³ **Ataman, Muhittin** (2009) 'Interdependence and Diversification a New Framework for Turkish Foreign Policy', *Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, No: 1, pp.38-57.

for new soft power elements. Turkish public diplomacy serves for developing strategic communication in the region as well as around the world.¹¹⁴

As Türkiye faces security threats from terrorist organizations such as PKK/PYD, it uses its military power for the protection of its people and territory. That terrorism and extremism are threats for international security and peace, it can be fought in global cooperation and solidarity. Türkiye counters terrorism without regarding its organization or its pretext because terrorism can neither be explained by religion, nor race, nor geography, nor ethnicity. It is a crime against human rights.

Türkiye is aware of the importance of international cooperation in a global world. While Turkish foreign policy continues its relation with old partners, Türkiye aims to improve these relations to new cooperations and policies. That Türkiye is one of the top 5 providers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and top 8 provider to the budget of NATO, shows how Türkiye values the Alliance. Being a founding member of nearly every European institution, the Organization of Turkic States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) and many more are examples for Türkiye's active roles in international organizations and cooperations.

Türkiye regards itself as a driving force for long-lasting peace and development. A strong Türkiye will improve peace and prosperity domestically and internationally. While Türkiye pursues to secure its national objectives, it provides peace and prosperity for humanity.¹¹⁵

3.1. Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy

The internal and external dynamics in Türkiye, which are in fast transformation, are new risks and chances for Türkiye. After Cold War, Türkiye moved towards a multi-dimensional and comprehensive approach in foreign and domestic policy. With this approach, Türkiye contributes to democracy and justice around the globe. The international system faces problems of legitimacy due to lack of a consensus in terms of fair share of resources. Turkish foreign policy aims to take advantage of this lack in forming new relations with actors and therefore is becoming regionally and globally a significant actor. Benefitting

¹¹⁴ Kalın, (2011), pp.5-23.

¹¹⁵ MFA, National Foreign Policy in the 'Century of Türkiye': A Synopsis, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>, Erişim Tarihi: 01.06.2024.

from the convergence of rich Turkish history, geographical location, cultural depth, economy and strong democracy, the capacity of Turkish soft power plays an important role in foreign policy. The Office of Public Diplomacy which was launched in 2010 serves for implementing soft power. Through public diplomacy a state's history is shared with the international public. Thus, it is a mean for political communication.¹¹⁶

After AK Party (Justice and Development Party) won general elections in 2002 in Türkiye, Turkish foreign policy moved its orientation to create an infrastructure for soft power. The use of soft power tools resulted especially in the Middle East and the Balkans where Türkiye became an emerging regional power. Türkiye took advantage of its historical, cultural and religious bonds in improving its relations with its neighbors in the Balkans and the Middle East and with Turkic states in Central Asia. Being a democratic power in a region with conflicts gave Türkiye value to be a bridge between the West and the East. Economic growth gave Türkiye the ability to spread its soft power across Africa as well. Especially the increase of air travel by Turkish Airlines to far regions enabled Türkiye to invest in its foreign policy in terms of soft power. Economic power gave Türkiye the ability for humanitarian and development aids across the world. Not just the benefit of historical or cultural heritage but also the use of diplomacy and democratic values in foreign policy are significant in becoming a regional power. For instance, Türkiye acted as mediator between Israel and Arab states until 2010. Starting political dialogues with countries like Syria, Somalia or Myanmar do also present Türkiye's active role in diplomacy. Domestic policies in improving democracy gave Türkiye an attractive image as well. Strengthening the rule of law, transparency, minority rights, and religious freedom consist in the democratization reforms.

Ahmet Davutoğlu - who was chief advisor of foreign policy to the then prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between the years 2003 and 2009 and then became minister of foreign affairs in 2009 until 2014, became Turkish prime minister in 2014 for almost two years – has an important role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. He explains the power of Turkish foreign policy in three points. The first one is that Türkiye's position in international relations is based on its historical richness, geographical location, and its rich legacy. The second point refers to Turkish domestic order which enables Türkiye to form a self-confident foreign policy. Internal democratic values give Türkiye the ability to gain trust by its

¹¹⁶ Kalın, (2011), p. 8.

neighbors and other states in the international system. After having related to historical, geographic, traditional and democratic features, the third point deals with the confluence of these values actively in developing political relations with its neighbors, the region and beyond.¹¹⁷

According to İbrahim Kalın - who was special advisor to the then prime minister and then to the president of Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – Turkish soft power is unique in both its style and substance compared to other countries. Through the heritage of rich culture and history, the potentiality of Turkish soft power outspreads from the Balkans, over the Middle East, to Central Asia. Having shared and constructed together the Ottoman experience unites the community of Greeks, Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish as well as ethnic groups such as Turks, Albanians, Bosnians, Kurds, Circassians, Arabs, Abkhazians, Kazakhs, Azeris, Turkmens, Uzbeks, and more. Thus, people of the region are able to make historical and geographical reconnection. This process enables Türkiye to form a new geopolitical imagination and to benefit from new opportunities in the international system. This experience in spheres of influence gives Türkiye the strength to expand its political engagements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Thanks to its vibrant civil society, Türkiye improved and strengthened its democracy. The growth of democracy gave Türkiye the ability to manage balance between freedom and security. This ability made Türkiye attractive in the Balkans and the Middle East which are considered as Türkiye's geographic hinterland. These resource are significant in distinguishing Türkiye's unique soft power.¹¹⁸

Türkiye strategically prioritizes public diplomacy. The essential reasons of the strategic priority are the creation and presenting of the new Turkish identity both domestically and internationally. Due to incautious policies that were followed by Turkish politicians in the past and to propaganda actions against Türkiye, Türkiye had a negative image in the national and international public. While Türkiye made major steps in changing negative perceptions like killing Armenians or invading Cyprus, Türkiye gained attention on its change in society and its growth in economy. The international public sees the role of these changes in Turkish foreign policy. Becoming a regional and global actor needs to be communicated domestically and internationally in a realistic and efficient way. In this point, not just rich legacy but implementation of politics have huge impact. These include

¹¹⁷ **Sen**, (2019), pp.65-74.

¹¹⁸ **Kalın**, (2011), pp.8-11.

regulations in environment, energy resources, migration, and broadcasting. Along with states, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and other institutions use public diplomacy due to its impact on public opinion. Being aware of this importance, Türkiye contributes effectively in international organizations such as NATO, the European Council, United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, and more. Türkiye receives increasing and diverse attention since the change in domestic and foreign policy. This attention does on the one hand lie on the political, societal, and economic changes and on the other hand it lies on the new Turkish identity. It provides diversity, multiplicity, and distinctness enabling the process of globalization in a multi-centered way. With the efforts of Turkish actors in national and international policies, Türkiye became an emerging respected profile. Türkiye's high level visits, the rise of academic studies about Türkiye, reports in international media show that Türkiye's voice has increased and has impact on international public. These "... and many similar aspects have made the 'story of [Türkiye]' a significant one from east to west".¹¹⁹ Since Türkiye changed its government system from parliamentary to Presidential Government System in 2018, the Office of Public Diplomacy, which was under the office of the Prime Minister, became the Department of Public Diplomacy of the Directorate of Communications.

As state and autonomous institutions are tools to implement soft power, Turkish institutions need to be elaborated. Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), The Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) within the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, The Turkish National TV (TRT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Yunus Emre Foundation (YEE), the Turkish Maarif Foundation and more institutions have active impact on public diplomacy in terms of political, cultural, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and educational activities. For the pursuit of increased effectiveness, the relation between the state institutions are coordinated by the Department of Public Diplomacy. In addition to these institutions, non-governmental organizations, foundations, universities, media, and more platforms play an important role in public diplomacy as well.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Kalın, (2011), p.18, pp.16-18.

¹²⁰ Kalın, (2011), pp.20-21.

3.1.1. Turkish Soft Power Tools

Turkish has rich soft power resources which are implemented through various soft power tools. While state institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TİKA, YTB, and TRT are in this sense actively cooperating, autonomous institutions like YEE, Maarif Foundation, Kızılay and more play an important role in applying soft power as well.

Table 2. The number of missions abroad from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye

Year	Embassy	Permanent Representation	Consulate General	Consular Agency	Consulate Office	Trade Office	Total
2019	142	13	89	1	-	1	246
2020	142	13	91	1	-	1	248
2021	144	13	94	1	-	1	253
2022	146	13	94	1	-	1	255
2023	146	13	98	1	1	1	260

Source: 'Performance Program of 2024', Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye is one of the most important and fundamental implementer of Turkish foreign policy and soft power. The number of foreign representations increased in large amount. With the foundation of the Republic, in 1924 Türkiye had 39 representatives abroad. In 2002 this number has risen to 163.¹²¹ As shown in Table 2 in 2023 the number of foreign missions increased to 260. These missions consist of 146 embassies, 13 permanent representations, 98 consulate generals, one consular agency, one consulate office, and one trade office.

As of November 2023, 7 159 personnel work at the ministries headquarters and missions abroad.¹²² Türkiye has gained a regional power and enriches its relations with regional and international organizations like United Nations, NATO, European Union,

¹²¹ MFA, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Tarihçesi, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.tr.mfa#:~:text=Co%C4%9Fraf%C4%B1%C4%B1m%20bak%C4%B1m%C4%B1ndan%20257%20d%C4%B1%C5%9F,diplomatik%20kariyer%20memuru%20g%C3%B6rev%20yapmaktad%C4%B1r> l.a.d. 02.06.2024.

¹²² MFA, '2024 Yılı Performans Programı', <<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/DB-2024-yili-performans-programi.pdf>> p.10, l.a.d. 09.06.2024.

African Union and more. Table 3 demonstrates the distribution of the foreign representation of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both numbers and in percentage. It is noticeable that the missions in Europe make 38.08% of the total missions with a number of 99. Asia comes next with 28.85% of the mission which makes 75 representations abroad. 50 missions in the African continent reach 19.23% of the total missions. In North and South America there are 32 foreign representations of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which makes 12.30%. The least missions abroad are in Oceania with a number of four that make 1.54% of total foreign representations.

Table 3. Geographical Distribution of the missions abroad

Region	Number of Missions	Percentage of the distribution
Europe	99	38.08 %
Asia	75	28.85 %
Africa	50	19.23 %
America	32	12.30 %
Oceania	4	1.54 %

Source: 'Performance Program of 2024', Ministry of Foreign Affairs

With the fall of the Soviet Union, countries in Central Asia and in the Caucasus declared their independence. Türkiye was the first state recognizing the Turkic Republics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Particularly the common language, culture and memory are fundamental reasons for Türkiye to conduct projects in fields of education, society, economy, culture and more. For coordination these activities, the organization Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) was found in 1992. In its first years, TİKA aimed that the Turkic Republics construct their own identity and social structure. In addition, TİKA helped these countries to develop technical infrastructure and social and cultural rights. With the changing improvements in Turkish foreign policy, TİKA enlarged its action geography. The number of foreign Program Coordination Offices of TİKA was 12 in 2002 and this number increased to 33 in year 2012. As of 2017, TİKA carries actions in 61 countries with 63 Program Coordination Offices out. With this offices and headquarters in Türkiye, TİKA collaborates with 150 countries in five continents. In this sense, TİKA cooperates with public institutions, civil society organizations, universities, and with the private sector. While Türkiye increased its

development aids from 85 million US Dollars in 2002 to 8 billion 120 million US Dollars in 2017, Türkiye is the top state in human aids.¹²³

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was established in 2010 with the aim of execute duties concerning Turkish citizens living abroad, cognate and related communities, and concerning international students studying in Türkiye. There is a Turkish diaspora of almost 7 million. YTB pursues to preserve the identity, culture, and mother language and to strengthen the bound to Türkiye as well as improving the social, economic, legal, and cultural situation of Turks abroad. Concerning cognate and related communities, relations in fields like academy, society, culture, and economy are to be improved. In this pursuit, YTB carries activities out in regions from Africa to the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, from Central to East Asia. In relation with international students, YTB executes in collaboration with related institutions and organizations ‘Türkiye Bursları’ (Türkiye Scholarships). It is a scholarship program for talented international students in higher education in Türkiye.¹²⁴ While 150 thousand students graduated with Türkiye Scholarships, 15 thousand 472 students benefit from it in studying in 40 091 different programs and 207 universities.¹²⁵ This is the most comprehensive scholarship program in the world.¹²⁶ While graduated students contribute to their own country afterwards, they do also strengthen collaboration between societies and common understanding. Therefore, YTB plays an active role in Turkish foreign policy, public diplomacy and for Turkish soft power.

Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) is a public foundation founded in 2007 in order to support Türkiye and its cultural, historical, lingual values by reaching with documents and information in this context out to the world. With the aim of cultural exchange Yunus Emre Institute carries out services in education particularly in Turkish language, art, and culture. This institute collaborates with other countries’ educational institutions in order to provide Turkish teaching and Turkology departments. On this pursuit, Yunus Emre Foundation operates with more than 80 centers around the world.¹²⁷

¹²³ **TİKA**, “Hakkımızda”, <https://tika.gov.tr/kurumumuz/hakkimizda/> l.a.d. 02.06.2024.

¹²⁴ **YTB**, ‘Hakkımızda’, <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/baskanlik> l.a.d. 02.06.2024.

¹²⁵ **YTB**, <https://turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/> l.a.d. 02.06.2024.

¹²⁶ **Türkiye Bursları**, “Hakkımızda”, <https://turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/hakkimizda> l.a.d. 02.06.2024.

¹²⁷ **YEE**, ‘Yunus Emre Institute’, <https://www.yee.org.tr/en/corporate/yunus-emre-institute> l.a.d. 03.06.2024.

With the purpose of common wellbeing and civilization and cultural interaction, Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) was established as a non-profit public educational foundation in 2016. In line with the Ministry of National Education, Maarif Foundation is the only authorized entity to serve Turkish education abroad. TMF executes pre-school institutions to higher education internationally.¹²⁸ Maarif Foundation provides educational services in 52 countries from Africa to Australia, from Europe to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to Asia, from North America to South America. 67 countries cooperate in carrying these activities out. 467 educational institutions are active with 37 dormitories.¹²⁹

Along with the above mentioned institutions various other institutions, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations contribute to Turkish soft power as well. These will be elaborated in the case study of Somalia in following parts.

3.1.2. Turkish Culture and Attraction

Due to its richness and historical depth, Turkish culture is a major resource for its soft power. By benefitting of Turkish culture, Türkiye reaches out to far regions and attracts both other countries and their public. In order to evaluate the effect of the implementation of Turkish soft power, the activeness and continuity of the tools play an important role. With regard to this, the actions of institutions and organizations will be analyzed.

TİKA is a key factor in changing the comprehension of diplomacy from traditional and single-actor to multicultural, civilizational, historical, and cultural diplomacy. Therefore, this agency plays an important role in implementing soft power.¹³⁰ In comparison with the action plan of 2014 and 2023, and in relation to the strategic plan for the years 2024 until 2028, it is noticeable how seriously TİKA takes its mission. As of 2014, 47 Program Coordination Offices of TİKA were distributed in 43 countries.¹³¹ In the same year, the official development assistance were worth to 3 billion 591 million dollars. Dividing Turkish official development assistance by then Turkish Gross National Product gives the ratio of 0.41%. Compared to the average range of the contribution of member states of the

¹²⁸ **Turkish Maarif Foundation**, 'Establishment Purpose', <https://turkiyemaarif.org/page/about-us> l.a.d. 03.06.2024.

¹²⁹ **Turkish Maarif Foundation**, 'Maarif in the World', <https://turkiyemaarif.org/dunyada-maarif> l.a.d. 03.06.2024.

¹³⁰ **TİKA**, '2014 Faaliyet Raporu', 2015, <https://tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Faaliyet-Raporu-2014.pdf> l.a.d. 03.06.2024.

¹³¹ **TİKA**, 2015, pp.285-287.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which was then 0.29%, Türkiye proved its sincerity and seriousness in development assistance. According to this ratio, Türkiye became the tenth country of top development assistance.¹³² In 2014, TİKA run projects worth to 191.5 million dollars. This projects are divided into categories like project and program assistance, technic cooperation, food aid for development, contribution to local civil society organizations, administration and other.

Looking at the distribution of the development assistance into the regions, 28.6% of the assistance was invested on projects to countries in South and Central Asia. The Balkans and East Europe come next with an amount of 21.25%, followed up by the Middle East with 21.1%. The assistance to African countries were 23.86%. Assistance projects to other regions such as the Far East, North and South America and Oceania were in order 4.15%, 1.02%, and 0.02%. The most benefitting countries of the project assistance in year 2014 were Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Somali, Mongolia, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, and Yemen.

The executed projects were made in social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, production sector, and in multiple and overlapping sectors. Social infrastructure and services consist of subcategories such as health, culture, restoration, education, administrative and civil infrastructure, water and hygiene. In focusing on social infrastructure and services TİKA pursues contribution to the development of the relating country. Ranging this fields according to the assistance, 72.46% were spent on social, while 13.52% were spent on economic infrastructure and services. To the sector in production were spent 4.7% and 9.32% were spent to assistance in multiple and overlapping sectors.¹³³

As of 2023, the numbers of Program Coordination Offices have risen to 63 in 61 countries. 55 of the offices are actively in operation. New offices in following countries are in process of establishment or were established since 2014: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Gambia, Guinea, South Africa, South Sudan, Croatia, Iraq, Israel, Colombia, Union of the Comoros, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Syria, and Uganda. The office in Syria is due to current domestic situation not operating.¹³⁴ Along with the 63 offices, TİKA carried out reached out over 1

¹³² TİKA, 2015, p.14.

¹³³ TİKA, (2015), pp.14-17.

¹³⁴ TİKA, 'TİKA 2023 Faaliyet Raporu', 2024, <https://tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TİKA-IFR-202319-Mart-2024-Web.pdf> l.a.d. 03.06.2024.

300 projects in almost 170 countries.¹³⁵ This makes more than 30 thousand projects since the establishment of TİKA in 1992.

The official development assistance in 2021 were 7 711 million dollars. From 2014 to 2021 the most development assistance was made in year 2019 with 8 666 million dollars. The reason for the decrease in 2021 is the covid-19 pandemic having a negative effect on Turkish and global economy. In 2021, TİKA invested mostly on emergency and humanitarian aid, and education. While Türkiye became the sixth country most assisting in development with regard to the amount of its assistance, it became the second one regarding the ratio of dividing Turkish official development assistance by Turkish Gross National Product which comes to 0.96%. The first country is Luxembourg with 0.99%.¹³⁶

Regarding the distribution of the development assistance into regions, TİKA invested in 2021 the most in the Middle East with a percentage of 89.06%. Particularly Syria was the country in which the assistance was spent on. This is related with the conflict in that country. The investment in Central and South Asia were 1.81%. The projects in Africa were 1.3% of the overall development assistance expenditure. Europe with a focus on Bosnia Herzegovina benefitted from an assistance of 1.12%. Countries in North and South America, the Far East and in the Oceania got 0.25%, 0.09%, and 0.001% of the total assistance. 6.34% of the development assistance are not measured as regional distributions.¹³⁷

Comparing the values of the development assistance, despite the economic crisis since the pandemic, Türkiye made through TİKA a major increase in these projects. Even though Türkiye faced domestic challenges in terms of economy, local and general election, coup attempt, Türkiye did not step back from increasing continuity in development assistance operated by TİKA. The rise of the assistance ratio to Turkish Gross National Product has risen from 0.41% to 0.96% and the amount of the project values increased from 191.2 million dollars to 7 711 million dollars. These projects vary from building hospitals to providing scholarships to students. Countries receiving the sincere assistance from Türkiye, TİKA, trust in Türkiye's goodwill and the growing generations build a positive image of Türkiye.

¹³⁵ TİKA, (2024), p.13.

¹³⁶ TİKA, 'Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımları, 2021 Yılı Verileri', 2022, <https://tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/TurkiyeKalkinma2021Veriler.pdf> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹³⁷ TİKA, (2022), pp.16-17.

Türkiye gives value to children and the youth as TİKA provided 621 students scholarships in 2014¹³⁸ and in year 2023, TİKA contributed to more than 210 thousand students.¹³⁹

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, YTB, is another significant soft power tool playing an import role in presenting Türkiye's identity and attracting the others. YTB has three work areas: citizen abroad, sister communities, and international students. There are almost 7 million Turkish citizens living abroad. In order to improve their living standards abroad, YTB contributes with projects to their language skills, education, and to their personal and professional competencies. According to their political status as well as rights, YTB carries out strategies with the purpose of integrating them to the society abroad.¹⁴⁰ "Türkçe Saati" (= literally Turkish time) is a program for pre-school and school children to contribute their Turkish language. Türkçe Saati includes contribution to education institutions organizations serving in Turkish language. "Evliya Çelebi Culture Trips Program" consists of three modules. The target group of the module 'Meet Our Motherland' are teenagers who are 10 to 15 years old. Youths who are between 16 and 19 years old can participate the module 'Youth Bridges'. There is no age limit for the 'Entrepreneurship Module'. Evliya Çelebi Culture Trips Program aims to strengthen the bounds between Turkish citizens abroad and Türkiye. Through this project a sustainable communication between the participants. Another program for the youths of Turkish diaspora is "Youth Support Program". Throughout this program, YTB contributes to the ideas and projects of the young population. Additional contribution is the "Fuat Sezgin Outstanding Achievement Scholarship" for which undergraduate and graduate students, who are belonging to Turkish diaspora, can apply. Further support programs for Turkish citizens living abroad are carried by YTB as well.¹⁴¹

Societies, regions, and countries having long-standing ties with Türkiye in terms of geography, history, culture, religion, and politics are called 'Sister Communities' by YTB. Sister Communities are grouped in four categories. Regions, countries, and minorities that speak Turkish, societies, regions, and countries that are associated with Islam, societies and countries in need of Turkish development assistance, and 'Türkiye Mezunları' (Türkiye Alumni). YTB's activities for sister communities are under the framework of historical

¹³⁸ TİKA, (2015),p.17.

¹³⁹ TİKA, (2024), p.16.

¹⁴⁰ YTB, 'Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar', <https://ytb.gov.tr/daireler/yurtdisi-vatandaslar>> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴¹ YTB, 'Destek/ Burs Programları', <https://ytb.gov.tr/daireler/yurtdisi-vatandaslar/vatandaslik> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

responsibility and foreign policy of Türkiye. Peaceful and international development is the bases on the activities.¹⁴² The sub-category Türkiye Mezunları is a portal aiming to keep sustainable contact of graduates who have completed their education in undergraduate, graduate or doctoral level in Türkiye. Therefore each graduate is considered as a voluntary ambassador sharing their memories, employment opportunities with each other. In addition, the maintenance of Turkish culture and language serves as a bridge between Türkiye and the countries of the graduates.¹⁴³ In 184 different countries are more than 150 thousand graduates.¹⁴⁴ In pursuit of supporting communication and institutionalization of Türkiye Mezunları, 34 Türkiye Mezunları foundations are established in 30 countries.¹⁴⁵ Concerning this aim and activities, YTB's activities towards Sister Communities and Türkiye Mezunları are investments in new generations to present an attractive image of Türkiye with regard to future bilateral relations between Türkiye and their country.

In regard to international students, since 2012 YTB carries out "Türkiye Bursları" (Türkiye Scholarships) in order to provide equal opportunity for successful students to receive scholarship education in international standards. Along with Türkiye Scholarships, Türkiye improves its relations to other countries and strengthens collaboration in terms of academy, economy, technology, arts, and more. 15 thousand students are actually benefitting from the scholarship. While the number of applicants for Türkiye Scholarships increases every year, almost 5 thousand students receive every year scholarship. Türkiye Scholarships belongs to one of the most comprehensive scholarship program in the world. The reason for this is that the program offers not only monthly scholarships but department placement, health insurance, Turkish language courses, university tuition, housing, flight tickets, and tuition free cultural and academic programs.¹⁴⁶ That this scholarship program became famous is noticeable in the increasing number of applications. 40 thousand applications were made in 2012, which has risen to 117 thousand from 162 countries in 2023.¹⁴⁷

The actively conducted projects and programs in the work areas citizens abroad, Sister Communities, and international students mirrors its impact with the increasing applications and demand to collaborate. Addressing the youth, seizing their attention and maintaining the

¹⁴² YTB, 'Kardeş Topluluklar', <https://ytb.gov.tr/daireler/kardes-topluluklar> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴³ Türkiye Mezunları, 'Hakkımızda', <https://turkiyemezunlari.gov.tr/hakkimizda> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴⁴ Türkiye Mezunları, <https://turkiyemezunlari.gov.tr/> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴⁵ Türkiye Mezunları, 'Programlar: Mezun Dernekleri', <https://turkiyemezunlari.gov.tr/programlar/6mezun-dernekleri-2022-12-23T12-17-45> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴⁶ YTB, 'Uluslararası Öğrenciler', <https://ytb.gov.tr/daireler/uluslararasi-ogrenciler> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

¹⁴⁷ Türkiye Bursları, <https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/about> l.a.d. 04.06.2024.

communication, exchange and relations among the alumni through Türkiye Scholarships, Türkiye Mezunları, and other mentioned projects, represent the effectiveness of YTB as a soft power tool.

While institutions or organizations play a major role in soft power policies, media and film industry are important tools to present and spread the state's culture and identity. Within this framework, Turkish series reached out to 750 million people in the world. Series that are produced in Türkiye were published from America to Russia and from the Far East to Latin America, in more than 170 countries. With these publications, Türkiye is between the first five most exporting countries in the sector of TV series-film industry. The ministry of culture and tourism contributes to opening stands in international series and content fairs like MIPTV, MIPCOM, Content America, and more. In addition, the ministry plans to organize and host a series and TV content fair in 2025 in Istanbul. Furthermore, in order to provide film shootings in Türkiye, the ministry offers foreign film producers advantages and incentives. While Turkish TV series and films present Türkiye and its culture, foreign movies will serve for the same purpose.¹⁴⁸

3.1.3. Turkish Capacity to Generate Consent

The purpose of implementing soft power in foreign policy is to attract the other country and the international public in order to make them decide according to own profits. While Türkiye used soft power in its foreign policy, it prioritizes humanitarian aspects. It is noticeable that Türkiye did and still does not take advantage of its humanitarian aids in terms of making the other country dependent of itself or in terms of exploiting the country as Western states with colonial background did. It is known that these states firstly harmed the production in target countries and later helped under the umbrella of humanitarian aid in order to make the countries dependent on their exports. Thus the soft power of these insincere states results with countries that are economically related to them. There is only one that holds the victory.

In the case of Türkiye implementing soft power, the affected countries do not get dependent on Türkiye nor do they lose their own value and honor. In contrast, Türkiye helps

¹⁴⁸ **TRT Haber**, 'Türk Dizilerine Yoğun İlgi: 170'ten Fazla Ülkede 750 Milyon Kişiye Ulaştı', 19.02.2024, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/kultur-sanat/turk-dizilerine-yogun-ilgi-170ten-fazla-ulkede-750-milyon-kisiye-ulasti-838355.html> I.a.d. 05.06.2024.

with sincerity in fields such as development, education, infrastructure, administration, humanitarian aid, and more. In cooperation with the country's government, local non-governmental organizations, and institutions, Türkiye makes an effort to secure economic and political stability in countries. That the number of development, infrastructure, educations and further more projects are increasing and the cooperation with countries are strengthening show that Türkiye has gained enormous trust and it is implementing its policies with a win-win aspect in which every part of the collaboration takes advantage of it turns a profit.

The sincerity in Turkish soft power and the win-win aspect of its cooperation is felt by people of the countries as well. Those people trust in Türkiye and they welcome Turkish aid, assistance, and cooperation. People, who have the opportunity, became curious about Türkiye resulting with more and more tourist visits to Türkiye.

The results of active Turkish soft power implementations by the different institutions, organizations, and through media can be seen in the increase of visits to Türkiye. In year 2000, the number of arriving foreigners to Türkiye was 10 428 153 with an increase of almost 71.87% the number of foreign tourists in year 2023 was 49.209.180. As Türkiye focused on Turkish diaspora, the visits by Turkish citizens from abroad increased as well. In year 2010, 10 921 427 Turkish citizens visited Türkiye. In year 2023, this number increased to 18 551 349 which makes an increase rate of almost 69.9%.¹⁴⁹

Table 4 presents foreign and Turkish Citizens arriving to Türkiye in year 2010, when Turkish Soft was not actively implanted but planned to implement through various tools. In Comparison, the number of incoming foreigners and citizens of year 2023 is also listed. The first column shows from which region foreigners arrived to Türkiye. European OECD countries include Germany. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Greece. Other OECD countries involve the U.S., Australia, Korea, Japan, Mexico, and New Zealand. Communities of independent states are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.¹⁵⁰ The

¹⁴⁹ TÜİK, 'Giriş Yapan Yabancı ve Vatandaşlar', <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Turizm-Istatistikleri-IV.-Ceyrek-Ekim---Aralik,-2023-53661> I.a.d. 08.06.2024.

¹⁵⁰ TÜİK, 'Giriş Yapan Yabancı ve Vatandaşlar', <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Turizm-Istatistikleri-IV.-Ceyrek-Ekim---Aralik,-2023-53661> I.a.d. 08.06.2024.

last column shows the ratio, in which percentage the increase or decrease of tourist arrival to Türkiye changed relating to the numbers in year 2010 and 2023. The only decrease is seen by arrivals from the Oceania. Whilst 2 870 foreigners from Oceania visited Türkiye in 2010, the number has fallen to 1 007 in 2023.

Table 4. Tourist arrival to Türkiye

Arriving Foreigners and Citizens' Nationalities	2010	2023	Ratio
OECD Countries (Europe)	14 209 364	19 016 304	33.8%
OECD Countries (other)	1 293 272	2 199 958	70.1 %
Other European countries	2 412 354	5 615 126	132.7%
Communities of independent states	6 075 484	11 938 351	96.5 %
East Asian Countries	108 013	362 086	235.2%
Southeast Asian Count.	120 487	481 878	299.9%
South Asian Countries	1 986 910	3 018 071	51.9 %
West Asian Countries	1 887 040	4 690 490	148.6%
African Countries	377 300	1 415 332	275.1%
American Countries	135 902	401 586	195.5%
Ocean Countries	2 870	1 007	-35 %
Heimatlos	23 208	68 991	197.2%
Foreigner total	28 632 204	49 209 180	71.9 %
Citizens total	10 921 427	18 551 349	69.9 %
Foreigner and Citizens total	39 553 631	67 760 529	71.3 %

Source: 'Arriving Foreigners and Citizens' Nationalities', TUIK.

The lowest increase is seen from European OECD countries with a percentage of 33.8%. In contrary, number of foreigners from Southeast Asian Countries visiting Türkiye has risen by 299.9% from 120 487 to 481 878. The number of arriving foreigners from the regions Africa, East Asia and America increased in order by 275.1%, 235.2%, and 195.5%. These major increases clearly underline the impact of using soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Türkiye has reached to far regions such as Africa and Asia with its attraction so that people from these regions visit Türkiye increasingly from year to year.

Table 4 is one example of the results of the affective soft power use in Turkish foreign policy. It is remarkable that neither the coup attempt in July 15, 2016 nor the pandemic nor the following economic crisis stopped people visiting Türkiye. Due to the shut downs during the pandemic, tourism decreased over the whole world. Nonetheless visits to Türkiye increased after the pandemic. In other words, not just the governments of other countries but also their people trust in Türkiye and show their consent in collaborating together.




Figure 2. Türkiye's Soft Power Presence in % from 2010 to 2021

Source: 'Elcano Global Presence Index', Elcano Royal Institute

The Elcano Global Presence Index, created by the Elcano Royal Institute in Spain, measures the power projection of countries beyond their borders in terms of military, economic, and soft power. By measuring the soft power presence, activities in sports, migration, science, culture, development cooperation, climate change and more factors are taken into account. As presented in Figure 2, according to the Elcano Global Presence Index, Türkiye's Soft Power Presence has globally increased from 0.9% in 2010 to 2.2% in 2020.¹⁵¹ From 2020 to 2021 there is a decrease of 0.1%. Soft power projection of Türkiye is

¹⁵¹ **Elcano Royal Institute,** 'Elcano Global Presence Index', <https://explora.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/quotes/iepg/global/TR/TR/2021> 25.09.2024. l.a.d.

strengthened by means of Türkiye's multifaceted soft power implementation in various ways and regions. The continuing efforts and global active engagement lead to enhance Türkiye's positive image in different regions.

3.2. Hard Power in Turkish Foreign Policy

From a classical point of view, hard power is superior to other powers. It even rules over other powers. States having a great capacity of military power have control over world politics.¹⁵² International security theories regard economic power as a crucial indicator of military power. Thus, economic and military power are determinants of international security. That both of them are tools of hard power it is important to emphasize the impact of economic and military power on security. By doing this, relation and comparison to Turkish foreign policy will be made. Further on, Turkish economic and military means will be introduced in detail in following sections.

Given that major and regional powers have concerns about their national security, they aim to maximize their power in military. The growth of military power is linked to economic strength. That is why the economic power and its influence on major and regional powerful states is important to understand. According to H. Sönmez Ateşoğlu major powers are able to damage another major power through the employment of military power. Major Powers have the capability of producing their own weapons and the capability of deploying their military forces to other regions. In contrast, regional powers do not produce most of their weapons and cannot deploy their military forces to other regions. Regional powers have the ability to damage states in their region by employing their military forces or through economic power. While the U.S. is regarded as a major power, Türkiye is defined as a regional power in the Middle East.¹⁵³

Ateşoğlu furthermore explains economic power by defining its determinants. Having long-lasting impact on economic power its basic indicators are investments, technical progress, exports, the population, and its health and education. Major investments in sectors such as roads, hospitals, machinery, airports, factories, harbors, facilities that produce energy, and more means of production increasing the nation's productivity. In the last 20

¹⁵² **Yatağan, Arda Görkem** (2018) 'Sert Güç Unsurlarının Yumuşak Güç Aracı Olarak Etkileri', Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy, Vol: 28, No: 2, pp.69-94.

¹⁵³ **Ateşoğlu**, (2019), pp.70-71.

years it is noticeable that the Turkish government made huge investments in all these sectors. Not just domestically but also with development projects in cooperation with other countries, Türkiye gives assistance to increase the economic power of its partner countries.

Another determinant of economic power is the technical progress. With adaptation and integration of technological developments the rise of productivity of a country's labor force is inevitable. The Turkish industry is integrating advanced technology to its production progress. This leads on the one hand to a national production with a decrease of international dependence, on the other hand it leads to an increase of exports. This therefore leads to an economic growth.

Exports is another determinant of economic power. Exports serve as a balance of meeting the imported consumption. What distinguishes the major and regional powers is especially the import or export of advanced weapon systems. While major powers mostly produce their own weapon systems, regional powers are not capable of producing these systems. They have economic and technical obstacles for the production of advanced weapon systems. While Türkiye becomes popular with its success in defense industry, especially with Bayraktar TB2, it still purchases major weapon systems from other states.¹⁵⁴

Population and its health and education have an important impact on economic power. On the one hand population is regarded as the prior source of labor force, on the other hand a rise in population has an increasing effect on the goods and services' demand. Therefore the production will increase which leads to a raise in the nation's capital stock. Taking technological developments in consideration, well-educated population is required in modern production.

In other words, Ateşoğlu argues that a sustainable economic power is depending on five determinants which are investment, technical progress, exports, population and its health and education. If these indicators are working in combination effectively, a state gains an economic strength. Nonetheless this is not sufficient for national security and nor for being a regional or major power. Thus just economic power will not be adequate to have control over others.

¹⁵⁴ Ateşoğlu, (2019), p.75.

With the establishment of the United Nations after the Second World War, it is evident that the United Nations “remains a weak, ineffectual institution far from making member states accept international law and order enforced by an all-powerful and supreme organization.”¹⁵⁵ On other words, an international system that creates globally peace has not been possible. A nations’ highest goal is the national security. Military power serves as the basic indicator of a state’s security. These are the reasons why states aim not just to increase but maximize their military power.

Military power is composed of defensive and offensive weapons, technology, soldiers, intelligence and information capabilities, know-how, military management, and the skills and motivation of the army. A state needs to improve its military power due to unpredicted events. Russia started on February 2022 a war to Ukraine which was not predicted by any of the major or regional powers. If a state does not improve its military, an increase of military power of an enemy would affect the nation’s security negatively. Contrary, if a state shows a decrease in its military power this will affect the state’s military power and security positively.¹⁵⁶ Türkiye’s investment in defense industry and the result of its progress and productions gained the attention of the international defense market. Success of its productions were seen in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Syria, and in Iran as well. According to Ateşoğlu technical capability, economic power, and population are determinants of military power. Through economic strength productions and developments in military and defense industry can be enhanced. The population plays an important role in the production and in the military force. Nonetheless nor population neither technological capability can expand military power on their own. For instance, Israel has no great population but is the leading military power in its region. Thus economic power is a vivid indicator in military power.

Military power can be employed in four ways in order to achieve a nation’s interests in international security. A state can use its military power in war, deterrence, coercion or in special operations. These listed four instruments can be applied in combinations or by themselves. In 1974 Türkiye decided to employ its military power on war. With the Turkish Cyprus Peace Operation, Türkiye deployed its military force to Cyprus.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Ateşoğlu, (2019), p.76.

¹⁵⁶ Ateşoğlu, (2019), p.78.

¹⁵⁷ Ateşoğlu, (2024), pp.44-45.

In order to prevent an attack from an enemy a state presents its military's readiness for any military use of force. This military policy is called deterrence. An example of this instrument is the Efes military exercise which is in large scale annually applied by the military forces of Türkiye.¹⁵⁸

Through coercion a state threatens the other with its military power. Thus, the other accepts the demands of the powerful state. For instance, until 1998 Syria did not show an effort on stopping the separatist Kurds doing terror attacks on Türkiye. That is the reason why in September 1998 Türkiye made a response with a military deployment to the Syrian border. This resulted with Syria, accepting the military superiority of Türkiye and adapting the security demands.¹⁵⁹

The last instrument of military power is special operations. Special operations are a use of military force that is limited. This can be applied in covert operations or can be conducted by conventional forces. "During the recent Libyan conflict, in the war for Tripoli 2019-2020, Türkiye militarily and actively supported the elected Libyan government in several ways. These operations can be considered special operations, which also included Türkiye's military training the Libyan government's forces." ¹⁶⁰

In order to secure the national security and thereby the international security, states pay attention to strengthen their economic and military power. As long as the global system shows lack in preventing or stopping conflicts, wars, and terrorism, states will not step back from competing in security and military force. Considering the emerging war situation in Ukraine and Palestine with regard to ineffectiveness of the United Nations and to increasing of armament, the potentiality of the Third World War does not seem to be evitable. Relating to this significant security threat, Türkiye is still calling for a re-organization of the United Nations.

3.2.1. Economic Means of Türkiye

A strength and stable economy makes a state powerful. The economic power enables the strengthening of the military power. Both in combination result with a powerful state either in its region or even worldwide. Türkiye pays attention in enhancing its economy.

¹⁵⁸ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.47.

¹⁵⁹ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.47.

¹⁶⁰ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.48.

Since the AK Party government a great number of projects have been applied and are still planned with the pursuit of maintaining the regional power and increasing it to become a major power.

In order to comprehend Türkiye's economic power situation, it is important to clarify economic means according to the instruments that Ateşoğlu explains in its article *Economic Power and International Security* that was published in year 2019. According to Ateşoğlu, economic power consists of five determinants which are investment, export, technical progress, population, and health and education of the population.¹⁶¹

On the one hand Türkiye has made serious development in its infrastructure in order to improve its economy. The quantity and quality of roads, bridges, airports, tunnels, hospitals, buildings educational institutions and in other fields have increased. These domestic investments served to attract foreign companies to invest in Türkiye. On the other hand, resulting with an economic growth, particularly after the mid-2000's Türkiye enlarged its foreign investments. According to CEIC data, which provides macroeconomic data of developed and developing markets, in April 2024 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Türkiye increased by 1,3 billion US dollars. Türkiye has increased its direct investment abroad since 1992 to April 2024 with an average of 93 million US dollars throughout the period.¹⁶² From January 2005 to May 2024 Turkish direct investment abroad in mining and quarrying increased by 84 000 million US dollars. Investment in manufacturing increased by 45 000 million US dollars. In the same period the investment abroad in industrial sectors has risen by 139 000 million US dollars while in services it increased by 510 000 million US dollars.¹⁶³ This gives an overview of Türkiye taking investments serious and increasing foreign investments in different fields. Thereby the indicator investment of the economic power is applied by Türkiye.

Considering exports of Türkiye, in year 2013 the export value of Türkiye was 161 480 915 000 US dollars which has increased over the years to 255 412 194 000 US dollars in 2023. The imports were in the same years as following: 260 822 803 000 US dollars in 2013 and 361 763 873 000 US dollars in 2023. While the proportion of imports covered by exports

¹⁶¹ Ateşoğlu, (2019), p.73.

¹⁶² CEIC Data, 'Turkey Direct Investment Abroad', May 2024, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/turkey/direct-investment-abroad> l.a.d. 17.04.2024.

¹⁶³ CEIC Data, 'Turkey Direct Investment Abroad', May 2024, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/turkey/direct-investment-abroad> l.a.d. 17.04.2024.

was in 2013 by 61.9 % this increased in 2023 to 70.6%¹⁶⁴. Even though Türkiye increase the value of its exports the dependence of imports still remain. Especially the economic embargos in 2018, the pandemic in 2020 had a negative impact in Turkish exports.

In terms of technological progress, Türkiye pursues to improve its economic power through innovation, research and development, and technical development. Since 2000 Türkiye has a special focus on developing the capacity of innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Particularly since 2008 Türkiye makes huge investments in building capacity and creating awareness in innovation, technological development, and in firms for research and development.¹⁶⁵ This focus of Türkiye has shown its results with technological projects such as electric cars, satellites, aircrafts and projects in defense industry as well. While Türkiye improves its economic power with adapting technological developments in its industry, it attracts the international public with its defense products such as its first medium-range missile engine or Bayraktar Akıncı combat drone. In terms of space, Türkiye declared its national space program. With launching two satellites in a year, Türkiye proved its technological adaptation. In addition, TOGG (Türkiye's Automobile Joint Venture Group) entered in 2022 the mass production phase and got huge amount of orders.¹⁶⁶ Through this giant projects, Türkiye gained the attention of the international public, other actors and the trust of the reliance in production.

As Ateşoğlu underlined the importance of the population in economic power the Turkish government cares of the increase of birth rate and therefore of the young population. According to the data of Turkish Statistical Institute the total Turkish population in 2007 was 70.586.256. 26.4% of the total population were in the age group zero to 14. The proportion of the age group 15-64 was 66.5% and 7.1% of total population were over 65 years old. In 2023 the number of total population has increased to 85 372 377. In the same year 21.4% of which are in the age group zero to 14. In 2023, 68.3% of the total population are between 15-64 years old. The proportion of people elder than 65 years is 10.2%.¹⁶⁷ These data show that the proportion of young aged groups between zero to 14 years old has fallen

¹⁶⁴ TÜİK, 'Yıllara Göre Dış Ticaret', 2023, <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Dis-Ticaret-Istatistikleri-Mayis-2024-53529> l.a.d. 17.07.2024.

¹⁶⁵ Temel, pp.52-54.

¹⁶⁶ Ergocun, Gökhan, 'Turkey Continues to Make Strides in Becoming Global Tech Giant in 2021', Anadolu Agency, 26.12.2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/science-technology/turkey-continues-to-make-strides-in-becoming-global-tech-giant-in-2021/2457856> l.a.d. 17.07.2024.

¹⁶⁷ TÜİK, 'Population by Age Group and Proportion in Total Population', 2024, <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=The-Results-of-Address-Based-Population-Registration-System-2023-49684&dil=2> l.a.d. 17.07.2024.

by 5%. In contrary the proportion of middle aged group has risen by 1.8% and the proportion of people over 65 years old has increased by 3.1%. In order to secure economic sustainability the rise of young population is crucial as they play an important role in labor, education, production, thus in economic enlargement.

With the developments in technology and information, education and health of the population are important factors in economic power. According to OECD Better Life Index, “in Türkiye, 42% of adults aged 25-64 have completed upper secondary education, lower than the OECD average of 79%.”¹⁶⁸ In terms of health, Türkiye increased the life expectancy by 25 years and now stands at nearly 79 years.¹⁶⁹ With major investments in health sector Türkiye did not just improve the health of the population but also invested in health projects abroad. These facts present how Türkiye cares about the education as well as the health of its population and people abroad, too.

While relating to the five determinants of economic power and giving examples of Türkiye’s economic instruments domestically and internationally, it is clear that Türkiye pursues economic enlargement, stability and strength, thus a sustainable economic power. Türkiye has made important investments resulting with huge projects such as Bayraktar, TOGG, and more. By improving its economy, Türkiye pays attention on national production in order to lower the dependency of external markets and products. On the one hand, Türkiye’s efforts for maintaining the regional power and becoming a major power is remarkable. On the other hand, the fields export and population need an accelerated improvement.

3.2.2. Military Means of Türkiye

For accomplishing the international security interests, a state has more than one way. These various approaches can be in a diplomatic way, through alliances, the use of economic power or even through serving a superior power. In terms of diplomacy Türkiye has proven its diplomatic strengths in reducing the threat of a potential food crisis as a result of the Ukraine war that started in February 2022 with Russian attacks. Türkiye has extended the Black Sea Grain Initiative to eliminate the risk. In May 2023, a further extent of two month

¹⁶⁸ OECD Better Life Index, ‘Türkiye’, <https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkiye/> 1.a.d. 17.07.2024.

¹⁶⁹ OECD Better Life Index, ‘Türkiye’, <https://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/turkiye/> 1.a.d. 17.07.2024.

was announced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.¹⁷⁰ Being a full-member of NATO is an example of joining alliances for security interests. Relating to the use of economic power, on May 2024, Türkiye has stopped all trade with Israel. Every export and import operation concerning any product has stopped. The reason for this cut is Israel's brutal war against Palestine which is violating international law and human rights. In April 2024, Türkiye has firstly limited exports to Israel for 54 product groups. However Israel did not stop its aggression thereby worsened the humanitarian tragedy which led Türkiye to stop all trade.¹⁷¹ Giving an example for being subservient to a superior power in order to accomplish the security objectives, "Greece became subservient to the U.S., allowing the U.S. to stockpile weapons and other logistic supplies in various locations in Greece and following guidelines consistent with U.S. policies."¹⁷²

Liberal thinkers consider international disputes and cooperation in order to pursue international security. In contrast, the realist approach prefers military power for achieving international security. Military power consists of various components such as weapons for defense as well as offense, military management, soldiers, know-how, intelligence capabilities, organizational skills, technology, and the morale and quality of the army. While the amount of defensive and offensive tools play an important role, the weapons are distinguished between conventional and nuclear weapons.

In order to strengthening the effectiveness and readiness of military power, Ateşoğlu describes in his article "Military Power and International Security" four approaches a state can reach its interests in terms of international security.¹⁷³ A state can use military power in either war, deterrence, coercion or in special operations. These tools can be employed in several combinations as well as by themselves. It is important to mention that the political, geographical, and military condition of a state are fundamental in using the tools. In this sense, the effectiveness and size of a state's military is a significant indicator as well. A growing military can be used as a tool in one of the four tools or in any combination of them.

¹⁷⁰ Efesoy, Can, 'Turkish Diplomacy Focused on Mediation in Early 2023', Anadolu Agency, 27.12.2023, updated on 28.12.2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkish-diplomacy-focused-on-mediation-in-early-2023/3093616> l.a.d. 20.07.2024.

¹⁷¹ Özdemir, Mehtap Yılmaz, 'Ticaret Bakanlığı, İsrail'le Ticaretin Tamamen Durdurulduğunu Duyurdu', Anadolu Agency, 02.05.2024, updated on 03.05.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/ticaret-bakanligi-israile-ticaretin-tamamen-durduruldugunu-duyurdu/3208545> l.a.d. 20.07.2024.

¹⁷² Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.42.

¹⁷³ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.43.

Türkiye has employed or still employs its military power in these ways as well. In order to get a better understanding it is helpful to give examples to these four instruments. Starting with war, it is a comprehensive and highest use of military power with huge costs. However, the benefits can be larger than the costs if the state achieves victory. Currently, Türkiye is not in war with a state. The Turkish Cyprus Peace Operation serves as an instance of Turkish military power in a way of war for reaching security interests. Due to the island's geographic position being close to Türkiye it would threaten Turkish security if a hostile state took control over Cyprus because it can be used as a military base. While the population of the island consists mostly of Greeks, the Turkish Cypriots are an important minority. In 1974 Greece supported the military coup in Cyprus with the pursuit of bonding Cyprus to Greece. Due to its security objectives, Türkiye responded with a deployment of military force to Cyprus.

Ankara's Cyprus Peace Operation was complicated not only because it was overseas but also because it was a military operation involving the coordination of Türkiye's naval, air, and land forces. During the operation, Türkiye had complete air supremacy. The Turkish Air Force employed primarily F-100 Super Sabers. Turkish forces included the deployment of paratroopers, the transportation and deployment of troops by Bell UH-1 Iroquois (Huey) helicopters, as well as armored personnel carriers, tanks, and howitzers. The Turkish Navy and landing craft played a significant role in deploying the Turkish force.¹⁷⁴

Türkiye achieved its security interest in two steps. At the first step, circa three percent of the island was controlled by Turkish Forces. That no agreement on a negotiation could be made Türkiye extended its control on the island to circa 36 percent. With this second step Türkiye avoided Greece to take control of Cyprus as in Crete. Despite the high costs of the war, stability and peace could be secured since the war. Due to Türkiye's commitment to war, the U.S. imposed arms embargos to Türkiye for deterrence. Türkiye did not deter but contrary focused on producing its own weapons. Türkiye now has a defense industry which is technologically advanced, thriving, and competitive.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.45.

¹⁷⁵ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.45.

The use of deterrence as a military power tool aims to avoid any attack. Deterrence can be imposed by presenting the readiness and deployment of the military force. Recently, Türkiye demonstrated its naval power. A Turkish seismic drilling vessel was escorted by five warships belonging to the Turkish Navy. This escort was made in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since this deterrent activity was made various times, during one event a flyby of a F-16 occurred showing that air support is as well ready as the naval force. Even though it was not visible nor declared, it is thought that a Turkish submarine was escorting the seismic drilling vessel, too.¹⁷⁶

In order to make the opponent state agree with the state's demands, the state threatens the opponent with using its military to force. This is called coercion. For instance, Türkiye asked various times Syria to bring an end to the attacks made by separatist Kurds to Türkiye. Syria did not react to this ask. That is the reason why in September 1998, Türkiye imposed a military threat. Ankara decided to deploy additional troops to the Syrian border. This coercion resulted in favor of Türkiye because Syria agreed with the demands of Türkiye. A month later both regimes signed an agreement. Following this agreement "Syrian government expelled a militant Kurdish separatist leader. After being forced to leave Syria, he was captured by Turkish officials in Kenya in 1999."¹⁷⁷ This coercion demonstrates the military superiority of Türkiye.

A limited use of military force are special operations. Conventional forces or covert operations are part of special operations. Türkiye, for example, employed special operations with the aim of protecting the elected government of Libya during the war for Tripoli between 2019 and 2020. In this sense, Türkiye trained the forces of the Libyan government. Additionally, Türkiye used its howitzers which are self-propelled and named Fırtına. Besides, Turkish armed drones and electronic systems called Koral were employed in order to protect the government of Libya against its enemies. In terms of naval forces, Türkiye did also deploy its naval frigates near the coast of Tripoli. Türkiye has succeeded in securing its economic and political interest in Libya as its military support resulted effectively. Libya had won against its enemies that had invaded.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Ateşoğlu, (2024), pp.46-47.

¹⁷⁷ Ateşoğlu, (2024), p.48.

¹⁷⁸ Ateşoğlu, (2024), pp.48-49.

In order to increase the military power, a national defense industry plays a crucial role. Since the US embargo during the Turkish Cyprus Peace Operation Türkiye concentrated on national production of arms. Currently Türkiye has come to a position with innovative and modern weapons gaining attention in the international arena. The unmanned fighter aircraft *Kızılelma*, the unmanned high-attitude and long-range drone *Akıncı*, the remote recon and deep strike aircraft *Anka-3*, the remote carrier-based strike aircraft *TB3*, the fifth generation stealth fighter *Kaan*, the submersible submarine with long duration *Piri Reis*, the frigate that is technologically advanced *Istanbul*, the large strike ship serving as an aircraft carrier *Anadolu*, and the heavy torpedo *Akya*, are examples of the advanced weapons of Turkish defense industry.¹⁷⁹

In 2022 the Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye has published the document “Turkish Defense & Aerospace Industry” presenting the development of the industry with comparison to the year 2002. In year 2002 the number of defense projects was 62 with a total value of contracts of 5 billion US dollars. The annual expenditure of Türkiye in defense industry between 2002 and 2006 was 11,1 billion US dollars. These numbers have immensely increased until 2022. The number of defense projects has increased from 62 to 812. The total value of the contracts valued in 2002 60 billion US dollars. In year 2022 the annual expenditure in in defense industry has risen to 10,6 billion US dollars. Thereby the turnover of Turkish defense industry reached 12,2 billion US dollars in 2022.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Ateşoğlu, (2024), pp.45-46.

¹⁸⁰ The Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (2022), ‘Turkish Defense & Aerospace Industry’, <https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/publications/lists/investpublications/defense-aerospace-industry.pdf> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

Table 5. Export and import values of Turkish defense and aviation Industry

Turkish Defense and Aviation Industry	Exports (USD bn)	Imports (USD bn)
2013	1.6	1.3
2014	1.9	1.4
2015	1.9	1.1
2016	2	1.3
2017	1.8	1.5
2018	2.2	2.4
2019	3.1	3.1
2020	2.3	2.2
2021	3.2	2.1
2022	4.4	2.7

Source: The Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (2022), 'Turkish Defense and Aerospace Industry'

The document does also demonstrate the values of the export and import of Turkish defense and aviation industry from year 2013 to 2022. Table 5 illustrates in three columns these values. The first column from the left shows the years. In the second column the export values are listed according to the years in billion US dollars. The third column presents the value imports again in billion US dollars of Turkish defense and aviation industry along with the years.

In 2013, the export value of Turkish defense and aviation industry reached 1.6 billion US dollars while the imports valued 1.3 billion US dollars. In 2014, the exports increased to 1.9 billion US dollars. So, the imports did increase to 1.4 billion US dollars but still below the export value. In 2015 the export value did not change but the import decreased to 1.1 billion US dollars. Despite 2017, the export increased until 2020. In 2020 the export decreased from 3.1 billion US dollars to 2.3 billion US dollars due to the Corona virus pandemic. The imports decreased for the same reason from 3.1 billion US dollars to 2.2 billion US dollars. The exports of Turkish defense and aviation industry increased in 2021 to 3.2 billion US dollars following in 2022 with a values of 4.4 billion US dollars. The imports were 2.1 billion US dollars and 2.7 billion US dollars in 2021 and 2022. The increasing gap between the import and export in the years show that Türkiye exports more than it imports. This proves Türkiye becoming more independent in terms of weapon industry.

Furthermore, the document explains the development of the defense and aerospace industry in six following points. The first, Türkiye owns a well-developed human resource and industrial ecosystem. Secondly, companies that are national but globally-competitive produce and invest in this industry. The third, international partners signed large quantity of strategic agreements which enables trade and collaboration in defense industry. Fourthly, the strong Turkish government supports international partnerships, joint ventures, and defense cooperation. The fifth, the price-competitive defense technologies are equivalent to the Western produced ones. Thus, they suit government budgets, which have financial constraints. Finally, this industry has one of the biggest budget internationally in defense.¹⁸¹ These six points take the Turkish defense and aerospace industry to a “globally competitive edge”.¹⁸²

In conclusion, Turkish military power has increased in recent years and its effects are seen in various ways such as deterrence, coercion, special operation and the development in defense industry. As the given examples show, Türkiye does not use military power to control other states for selfish reasons. Türkiye pays attention to its national security and thereby to international security.

3.3. Smart Power in Turkish Foreign Policy

Relating to American foreign policy, Joseph S. Nye defines smart power as “developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power.”¹⁸³ In other words the combination of soft and hard power in foreign policy is a smart way to achieve a state’s interests. Since power enables a state to have an impact on the other’s behavior in order to get the favored outcomes, combining soft and hard power merges a successful strategy called smart power.

Ibrahim Kalın underlines the process of the results of the soft and hard power implementation because it takes time. It is not possible to expect a solution overnight. In this sense, the rules of Turkish engagement is to be made properly. As Kalın has written the article “Turkey's Smart Power” in 2008, Türkiye then started to combine soft and hard power into smart power. Türkiye uses soft power tools through politics, diplomacy, economy,

¹⁸¹ The Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, p.5.

¹⁸² The Investment Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, p.5.

¹⁸³ Armitage and Nye, p.7.

military, culture, communication, and perception. Notwithstanding, soft power should not be considered as a psychological impact. Soft power cannot only be put in the framework of education, diplomacy or culture but “it is the socio-political capital of a country's power to affect change for the long-term benefit of all sides.”¹⁸⁴ In the pursuit of a workable Turkish smart power, Kalin suggests three indicators. Türkiye needs an effective democracy, an economic strength, and a pluralistic notion of solidarity and unity.¹⁸⁵

Turkish democracy has gone through various tests after Kalin published these articles in 2008. With the referendum in 2022, the majority of Turkish citizen voted for the election of the Turkish president by the citizen and not by the members of the parliament.¹⁸⁶ Thus, in 2014 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the Turkish president with a vote of 51.79%. The participation rate on the elections was 74.13%.¹⁸⁷ That Turkish people stopped the attempt of coup d'état in July 15, 2016 clearly demonstrated the resistance of Turkish people against antidemocratic actions. That the Turkish government did not step back from its duty, did also prove the strength of democracy. In the recent presidential elections 85.75% of voters participated the election and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected with 52.18% of the votes.¹⁸⁸ The increase of the participation rate is one important feature presenting the functioning democracy.

Türkiye is still striving to enlarge, strengthen and stabilize its economy. Global economic crisis, domestic events such as the coup attempt in 2016, the global Covid pandemic between 2020 and 2021 and the Türkiye-Syria earthquake in 2023 had negative impact on the economic growth. As presented in Table 6, the economic crisis in 2008 caused a reduction of 6% in Turkish Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While Türkiye reached an increase of 10% GDP in 2011, the rate decreased in the following years. After the pandemic Türkiye's GDP increased to 9.7% in 2021. That the production and logistics were globally affected by the Covid pandemic, Türkiye did also struggle in economy which resulted with

¹⁸⁴ **Kalin, İbrahim** (2008) ‘Turkey's Smart Power’, SETA, <https://www.setav.org/en/domestic-policy/turkeys-smart-power> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

¹⁸⁵ **Kalin, İbrahim** (2008) SETA, Turkey's Smart Power (II), <https://www.setav.org/en/domestic-policy/turkeys-smart-power-ii> l.a.d. 21.05.2024.

¹⁸⁶ **BBC Turkish**, ‘Cumhurbaşkanını Artık Halk Seçecek’, 22.10.2007, https://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2007/10/printable/071021_turkey_vote.shtml l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

¹⁸⁷ **Adabaş, Selma Bıyıklı**, ‘YSK Seçim Sonuçlarını Açıklandı’, Anadolu Ajansı, 15.08.2014, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/ysk-kesin-secim-sonuclarini-acikladi/131114> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

¹⁸⁸ **Karakaş, İsmet**, ‘Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimi İkinci Oylamasının Kesin Sonuçları Resmi Gazete'de Yayımlandı’, Anadolu Ajansı, 01.06.2023, updated on 02.06.2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-secimi-ikinci-oylaminin-kesin-sonuclari-resmi-gazetede-yayimlandi/2912004> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

a shrank to 3.3% in 2022 and later an increase to 4.0. The Turkish Statistic Institute announced the economic growth of the first quarter in 2024 with an increase of 5.7%.¹⁸⁹ As a developing country, Turkish economy is affected by such indicators more than an economy of a first world country. For instance, the economic sanctions imposed by the US in 2018 caused an economic shrink. Nonetheless Türkiye has always the motivation for enhancing its economic power through development of the infrastructure, state intensives, investments, partnership and more. The economic growth does also affect the defense industry, thereby the military power.

Table 6. Percentage change of Turkish GDP compared to quarter IV in previous year

Year	Percentage change of Turkish GDP compared to the fourth quarter in previous year (%)
2008	-6.0
2009	3.0
2010	9.7
2011	10.0
2012	4.2
2013	7.0
2014	5.5
2015	7.6
2016	4.4
2017	7.3
2018	-2.6
2019	5.9
2020	6.3
2021	9.7
2022	3.3
2023	4.0

Source: 'GDP in chain linked volume, index and percentage change by expenditure approach', TUIK.

¹⁸⁹ TÜİK, 'Dönemsel Gayrisafi Yurt İçi Hasıla, I. Çeyrek: Ocak-Mart, 2024 (Düzeltilmiştir)', 31.05.2024, <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=D%C3%B6nemsel-Gayrisafi-Yurt-%C4%B0%C3%A7i-Has%C4%B1la-I.-%C3%87eyrek:-Ocak-Mart,-2024-53753&dil=1> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

Concerning the pluralistic approach of solidarity and unity, Kalın suggests to prevent a deepening of ideological division due to its prevention of innovation and creativity. In relation with Turkish foreign policy, the engagement of Türkiye in its south and east as well as in Africa play an important role. This is to avoid the polarities between the West and the East or between the West and Islam.¹⁹⁰ Kalın has made these suggestions in 2008 and it is noticeable that Türkiye has shifted its foreign policy according to the multipolar world. Türkiye designs its foreign policy in line with its national interests. Especially relations with Russia or China are criticized by Western states that Türkiye would distance itself from the West and thus become not a reliable partner of NATO. This is not reasonable since the “Axis of Türkiye” does not only belong to one polar.¹⁹¹ While Türkiye puts in effort to strengthen and improve its defense industry it does also put effort in Turkish social and cultural agencies like Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) to work globally. Thus, Türkiye’s axis is a merge of hard and soft power.

The strategy of smart power in Turkish foreign policy showed its success in the Arab region after 2011. While Türkiye used mostly its hard power tool in the Arab region, for instance sending troops to Libya or Syria, it did also implement soft power. The Turkish influence in the Arab region made Türkiye to become among the most impactful states not just regionally but also globally. This resulted through the use of smart power effectively. Türkiye does not just take advantage of its religious or intellectual features but its strategic importance in different areas makes Turkish foreign policy and the Turkish image successful.¹⁹²

Along with international strategic agreements in the field economy, politics, and culture Türkiye has strengthened and is strengthening its soft power. The efforts in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in the Arab League, in TIKA as well as in the Office of Public Diplomacy contributed to its relations to the African world and to the Middle East. The high attractiveness of Türkiye in these regions makes Türkiye becoming an actor with constructive power. While Turkish prestige has increased due to its soft power

¹⁹⁰ **Kalın, İbrahim** (2008) SETA, Turkey’s Smart Power (II), <<https://www.setav.org/en/domestic-policy/turkeys-smart-power-ii>> l.a.d. 21.05.2024

¹⁹¹ **Daily Sabah**, ‘Türkiye Finds Its Own Axis in the World: Presidential Spokesperson’, 26.04.2023, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-finds-its-own-axis-in-the-world-presidential-spokesperson> l.a.d. 21.07.2024.

¹⁹² **Ali**, p. 228.

tools in foreign policy, peace-keeping operations and military activities enhanced the trust to Türkiye.¹⁹³

What makes Turkish smart power special is, that Türkiye merges soft and hard power policies but not under the framework of the “carrot and stick” approach.¹⁹⁴ For instance Türkiye used its hard power for a humanitarian effort in Iran which can be considered as a tool of soft power.¹⁹⁵ In May 2024 the Turkish Akıncı drone located the helicopter wreckage as well as detected heat sources of the crash of the President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi. The soft attraction was notable on the live stream with 3.1 million viewers. After its mission in Iran the Akıncı “traced a crescent and star — emblems of the Turkish flag — thereby generating its own form of soft power and leaving a symbolic mark for the international community.”¹⁹⁶

Türkiye prefers to secure its national and international interests in a way in which the other country gains profit as well. Hence Türkiye approaches a win-win dialectic which results with the partnering countries readiness and consent to agree with Türkiye in economy, politics, security, socio-cultural policies and more.

¹⁹³ **Koçak**, pp.70-72.

¹⁹⁴ **Kalın**, (2011), p. 11.

¹⁹⁵ **Fahim, Muhammad and Islam, MD Nazmul** (2023) ‘Middle Power’s Soft Engagement: Whether Hard Power Can Be a Tool of Soft Power?’, The Arab World Geographer, Vol: 26, No: 2, pp.180–209.

¹⁹⁶ **İslam, M. Nazmul**, ‘Opinion - Turkish-Made Drone Akıncı's Charm Offensive in Iran: How Can Hard Power Be a Tool of Soft Power?’, Anadolu Agency, 21.05.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/opinion-turkish-made-drone-akincis-charm-offensive-in-iran-how-can-hard-power-be-a-tool-of-soft-power/3226106> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

4. TÜRKİYE’S OPENING TO AFRICA

4.1. Reasons and Dynamics for Turkish-African relations

Turkish-African relations have historical roots dating back centuries. In year 868, the Tulunid dynasty was established by the Turkic officer Ahmed ibn-I Tulun. This dynasty was located over present-day Egypt and has been ruled in the 9th and 10th centuries. North Africa has been governed by the Ottoman Empire from the 16th to the 19th centuries.¹⁹⁷ The Ottoman Empire played an important role in African politics because it has prevented colonial activities and has supported Muslim sultanates.¹⁹⁸ This is a reason why Africa is special for Türkiye and Turkish people.

In the 1960s during the decolonization of Africa Türkiye committed a long-term involvement in the continent in order to increase its influence in Africa. Diplomatic activities such as state visits and contribution to the new independent African states played an important role. Due to Türkiye’s domestic issues between 1970 and 1990 Türkiye did not show an effective commitment in Africa. However in the late 1990’s Türkiye has again concentrated on Africa with forming the Africa Action Plan that includes the establishment of cultural, economic, and political ties. With coming to power in 2002, the AK Party government took this plan serious and improved Türkiye’s presence in Africa. Türkiye’s relation to Africa has grown immensely since Türkiye named 2005 as ‘the year of Africa’. Türkiye increasingly engages in political, economic, and security fields in Africa which enables its markets to expand, particularly in defense industry and manufactured goods. Thus, Türkiye reaches its interests through its involvement in the African continent. Türkiye has become a key player differing itself from the Western powers. The reason for the difference is, that African countries do also benefit from the partnership with Türkiye. By means of attracting Turkish investment, African countries aim to diversify their both political and economic ties, become independent of current partners, and to enhance their effort in nation-building.¹⁹⁹

The improvement of Turkish-African relations are based on four dynamics and reasons. At first, since 2005 Turkish President Erdoğan has visited more than 30 African

¹⁹⁷ Camacho, Çelik, Sezgin et al. p.74.

¹⁹⁸ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.396.

¹⁹⁹ Dahir, pp.31-37.

states which underlines the sincerity of taking responsibility of common culture, religion and history. Secondly, Türkiye develops multifaceted relations with Africa in terms of collaboration through governmental and non-governmental organizations in activities like development or humanitarian aid. The third dynamic or reason is that Türkiye does not approach to Africa with political or economic conditions. This is why Türkiye develops its relations with the continent faster than the Western states since they put political and economic objectives forward. Lastly, Türkiye relies its relations to Africa on a win-win concept in order to support the continent. That Türkiye has no colonial history with African countries and that Türkiye enlarges its trade in the continent shows its sincerity.²⁰⁰

4.2. Turkish Soft Power in Africa

While improving its relations to the African continent, Türkiye actively uses its soft power tool. On the one hand the activities of Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the expansion of Turkish Airlines, and the influence of Turkish media in Africa will be emphasized in detail. On the other hand other important soft power tools will be briefly summarized as well.

Starting with the other soft power tools, Turkish Diyanet Foundation makes important projects in Africa. With the pursuit of deepening the relations to African countries, the AK Party government implemented soft power policy in social and cultural terms through the Turkish Diyanet Foundation (TDV). TDV aims to strengthen religious, cultural, and historical connections and has expanded its operations from 30 to over 140 countries since 2010. It runs 18 schools globally, built 294 water wells in 26 African countries, and operates four schools in Somalia, including Somaliland. TDV also offers scholarships to thousands of African students in Turkey and organized the third Summit of African Muslim Religious Leaders in Istanbul in 2019.²⁰¹

Being another soft power instrument of Turkish foreign policy, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) established in 2019 the African Media Representatives Training Program (AFMED) to which 20 journalists from 20 countries of Africa participated. YTB does not just provide scholarships for students but does also organize meetings with foreign students who have graduated in Türkiye. African students

²⁰⁰ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.398.

²⁰¹ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.6.

from countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Ghana, and Somalia are included.²⁰² The current Defense Minister of Somalia Abdulkadir Muhammed Nur has graduated from Ankara University. During his study he received scholarship from YTB. When he became Minister of Justice of Somalia, he has made his first visit abroad to Türkiye.²⁰³ This demonstrates the efficiency of Türkiye's and YTB's efforts as well as the gratitude of the beneficiary.

4.2.1. Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

A key point of Turkish soft power in Africa is its aid assistance which includes development assistance and humanitarian relief. During the AK Party government the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has expanded from 12 to 62 offices from 2002 on. The offices are in 60 countries from which 22 in Africa. TIKA conducts projects in Africa that contain drilling water wells, building schools and hospitals, and contribution to agricultural improvement.²⁰⁴ TIKA pursues to raise awareness and effect on lives in Africa by means of projects which take people to the center and support stability, cooperation and development through result-driven works. Across 54 African countries, TIKA has applied a lots of development projects. In the African countries “Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Union of the Comoros”²⁰⁵ are offices of TIKA located. TIKA prioritizes the promotion of sustainable development, addressing challenges in Africa with resources and expertise from Türkiye in the aim of mutual benefits, enhancement of the development aid to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by Türkiye, and the strengthening of Turkish-African relations.²⁰⁶

In the period of 2008 to 2019 TIKA has implemented 7 000 projects in Africa including health, education, vocational training, administrative and civil infrastructure, agriculture and forestry and farming, cultural heritage, empowering women, and water and

²⁰² Sıradağ, (2022b), p.6.

²⁰³ **Güvendik Murat Özgür**, ‘Somali'nin Türkiye Mezunu Adalet Bakanı Nur, Savunma Bakanı Olarak Atandı’, Anadolu Ajansı, 26.12.2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/somalinin-turkiye-mezunu-adalet-bakani-nur-savunma-bakani-olarak-atandi/2458057> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²⁰⁴ Sıradağ, (2022b), pp. 7-8.

²⁰⁵ **TIKA**, (2021) ‘TIKA in Africa’, https://tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Afrika_Zirvesi.pdf l.a.d. 03.08.2024.

²⁰⁶ **TIKA**, p.14.

sanitation.²⁰⁷ 1690 activities and projects were applied in the five years between 2017 and 2021 TİKA. These 1690 projects are distinguished in education, health, agriculture and forestry and fishing, economic infrastructure and services, industry and mining and construction, social infrastructure and services, administrative and civil infrastructure, emergency response and humanitarian aid, water supply and sanitation, and other. What draws attention is the highest number of projects in education, social infrastructure and services and in health which are in order 255, 236, and 220.²⁰⁸

In terms of education, TİKA focuses on modernizing institutions, reforming systems, enhancing the skills and knowledge of teachers, and improving teaching and learning experience with the pursuit of meeting international education standards with an updated education system in African countries.²⁰⁹ In relation to health projects, TİKA has constructed health centers and hospitals such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital in Somalia, Turkish Libyan Friendship Center for Physical Therapy, and Niger-Turkey Friendship Hospital.²¹⁰ During 2017 and 2019 TİKA has reached about 1 million people in fighting Covid-19. In this sense, in 2020 TİKA has implemented 53 projects of which 38 health projects and 15 humanitarian aid projects in 25 African countries.²¹¹

4.2.2. Expansion of Turkish Airlines

Being one of the most prestigious organization in Türkiye, Turkish Airlines (THY) plays an important role in contributing to Türkiye's global image. Thereby, it does also serve as a soft power tool of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish Airlines flew to 55 countries and 103 destinations in 2003²¹² which has expanded to 345 destinations in 129 countries in 2023.²¹³ In the same year, Turkish Airlines flew to 62 destinations in Africa.²¹⁴ Overall, the airline flies to 37 countries and 49 cities in Africa.²¹⁵

²⁰⁷ TİKA, pp.26-29.

²⁰⁸ TİKA, p.31.

²⁰⁹ TİKA, p.33.

²¹⁰ TİKA, p.26.

²¹¹ TİKA, p.33.

²¹² Sıradağ, (2022b), p.7.

²¹³ Turkish Airlines, (2023), 'Turkish Airlines 2023 Faaliyet Raporu', https://investor.turkishairlines.com/documents/yillik-raporlar/thy_frat_2023_web.pdf l.a.d. 03.08.2024.

²¹⁴ Turkish Airlines, p.55.

²¹⁵ Turkish Airlines, p.128.

This numbers demonstrate how the AK Party government's focus on African relations bore fruit in terms of flight network. While the increase of the flights to the continent strengthen the relations between Türkiye and African countries, the flight network does also serve as a link between Africa and the rest of the world. Due to the direct flights from Türkiye to Africa, not just political but also economical relation between Türkiye and African countries evolved. The expansion of the routes by Turkish Airlines contributed to an increase of projects between Türkiye and Africa from 769 million dollars in 2022 to 72 billion dollars today.²¹⁶

As being the only airline to fly to more destinations in Africa than other airlines, Turkish Airlines is a significant tool to connect the continent to the world.²¹⁷ Facilitating the travel of both businesspeople and tourists between Türkiye and Africa, THY strengthens soft power implementation of Türkiye in the continent.²¹⁸

4.2.3. Turkish Media in Africa

Being an effective soft power tool, Turkish television series make immense exports and are watched by people over the world. Also in Africa, Turkish television series are famous. Sebastián Ruiz-Cabrera and Hasan Gürkan found out that its media products are challenging the Western narratives which are prevailing. Both focused on the impact of Turkish TV series in Mozambique, Kenya, and Senegal. Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan identify three main pattern. The first is, that people watching the Turkish TV series change their perception of Türkiye. Secondly, Turkish sociocultural and spiritual identity has developed to a positive perspective of the viewers. Lastly, Türkiye become as preferred tourist destination for the watchers.²¹⁹ The study shows that Turkish series have the power to entertain, inform, and educate the audience about Turkish history and culture. It is worth mentioning that particularly in Mozambique and Kenya people admire Turkish culture and are acquainted with the characters and settings of Turkish series even though Türkiye has no previous historical ties in comparison with former colonial states or Latin American TV shows.²²⁰ Both authors point out that particularly the series *Diriliş: Ertuğrul* (Resurrection: Ertuğrul), *İstanbul Gelin* (The Bride of Istanbul), *Fatma*, *Fazilet Hanım ve Kızları* (Mrs.

²¹⁶ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.7.

²¹⁷ Dahir, p.33.

²¹⁸ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.397.

²¹⁹ Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan, p.12.

²²⁰ Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan, p.12.

Fazilet and her daughters), *Dolunay* (Full Moon) and *Bir Başkadır* (Ethos) are popular in the three African countries.²²¹

In relation with soft power tools and constructivist approach, the study of Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan demonstrates that Turkish television series underline Turkish historical and religious bounds, cultural identity, traditional factors, dynamic business atmosphere, and scenic beauty in the three African countries.²²²

In terms of TV channels, in 2017, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) started broadcasting in Hausa, spoken by 45 million people in West and Central Africa, and in 2020, it began broadcasting in Swahili, spoken by 150 million people in Eastern and Southeastern Africa. TRT World, launched in 2015, provides international news in English, focusing on developments in Africa. Additionally, the Anadolu Agency, founded in 1920, has expanded its international presence under the AK Party government, opening its first office in Ethiopia in 2014 and establishing representatives in South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Senegal.

A group of Turkish entrepreneurs established in 2017 in Ankara Natural TV to broadcast in 22 West African countries. The channel airs in both English and French languages and is watched by more than 5 million people in Africa. The content of Natural TV consists of history, culture, art of Türkiye and new developments in Türkiye. Particularly Turkish soap operas are famous and reaches people in over 20 countries in the continent. It is worth mention that especially in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania people mostly watch Turkish TV series. By way of these programs a positive image of Türkiye is created and prejudices can be prevented with a result of long lasting relations between Türkiye and African countries.²²³

²²¹ Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan, p.8.

²²² Ruiz-Cabrera and Gürkan, p.12.

²²³ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.7.

The development of TRT, Anadolu Agency, and Natural TV have significant impact on news exchange because “until the 2010s, the Turkish media was transmitting news about Africa to the Turkish society, mostly from western news sources.”²²⁴ Thus the direct transmission of news is on the one hand more precisely, on the other hand more objective. The spread of accurate and objective news as well as of Turkish TV series led to an increase of academic literature dealing with Turkish-African relations.²²⁵

²²⁴ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.3.

²²⁵ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.4.

5. TURKISH SMART POWER IN SOMALIA

5.1. Turkish-Somali Relations

For a comprehensive understanding of Turkish Smart Power in Somalia a brief summary of the history of the bilateral relations is significant. The implementation of Turkish soft power and hard power tools in Somalia will be demonstrated. With the historical overview and the soft power as well as the hard power policy in Turkish-Somalian relations, Turkish smart power towards Somalia can be analyzed.

Even though Türkiye increased its relations to Africa since 2005, the historical bound goes back to the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1517. Until the loss of Tripoli in 1912, the Ottoman State played an important role in African politics with its active engagement. The relations between the Republic of Türkiye and Africa remained limited. In 1926 a Turkish embassy was opened in Ethiopia. However Türkiye did not reach to develop its political ties to Africa. Especially with the Cyprus problem in the 1970s, Türkiye realized the significance of relations between Türkiye and Africa. This is the reason why the first Africa Action Plan was developed in 1979 by the then foreign minister Ahmet Gündüz Gökçün. Between 1983 and 1993 the then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal developed economic and political relations to Africa. In 1998 the second Africa Action Plan was prepared by the then foreign minister İsmail Cem. With Turkey's participation to the African Union in 2008, accreditation to the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and to the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Türkiye has expanded its global politics by taking Africa as a strategic continent serious. Türkiye organized Turkey-Africa summits in 2008, in 2014, and in 2021 with participation of African countries. These summits aim to improve the relations to the continent. That the Turkish Airlines fly to 60 destinations in Africa to 40 African countries demonstrate how serious Türkiye approaches to Africa.²²⁶

Turkish relations to Somalia started actively in 2011 when the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia in order to provide support against the civil war and the severe drought. "The first diplomatic mission in Somalia [...] was reopened in November 2011 but the largest complex of Turkey's diplomatic mission abroad was opened

²²⁶ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.397.

in 2016 in Mogadishu with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's participation. Turkey also opened a consulate general in Hargeisa in 2014, the capital of Somaliland."²²⁷ What made Türkiye's involvement in Somali special was particularly its engagement in humanitarian aid and in rebuilding Somali. Cooperating with the United Nations, in 2010 and 2012 Türkiye has hosted Somali Conferences with the purpose of solving the structural problems that the country was facing. In 2016 Türkiye organized a conference with the aim of reunification of Somalia and Somaliland in Somalia.²²⁸ Since Türkiye's sincere efforts and success in contributing to Somalia's development in administrative, military, humanitarian levels the relation between the both countries has improved to a trustful relation. Türkiye implements soft power as well as hard power tools in its foreign policy towards Somalia which proves its strategy for a long-term stay in Africa.²²⁹

In thinking of Somalia it is worth considering the strategic importance of the country. Its geographical location at the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and Bab al-Mandeb Strait plays a significant role. Being at the Middle Eastern countries' oil transit point is another important indicator. Being located in the region of Horn of Africa, Somalia's geopolitical position in the world trade in terms of logistic way for shipping is a main reason for states to be involved in that region. That the security engagement of Türkiye with Somalia has resulted with a strengthening Somali position and military force in that region as well as Türkiye's growing power and presence, other actors engage to profit from that region's benefits.²³⁰

5.2. Turkish Soft Power Resources and Tools in Somalia

After the state visit of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2011 to Somalia, Türkiye has actively engaged in Somalia to contribute the country's security, stability and development. In this context Türkiye does not show its efforts on state level but also on non-governmental level. The implementation of Turkish soft power in Somalia will be explored in this sections. Remembering Figure 3 that demonstrates soft power resources and tools, Figure 3 presents Turkish soft power in Somalia. Each soft power tool shown in the table will be emphasized in the following sub-sections.

²²⁷ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.398.

²²⁸ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.398.

²²⁹ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.401.

²³⁰ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.400.




Figure 3. Turkish Soft Power Resources and Tools in Somalia

Source: derived from Nye, Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.

5.2.1. Turkish Soft Power Behavior

5.2.1.1. Active Engagement and Agenda Setting in 2011

With the aim of preventing a return of hunger, famine, and health issues in Somalia, the integration of the country into the international system is essential. In this context, the isolation of Somalia broke through three important factors. The first, in 2011, today's president and the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has visited Somalia. Secondly, Türkiye has reopened its embassy in the capital of Somalia in 2012. At third, by means of Turkish Airlines' direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu by Turkish Airlines, Somalia connects to more than 144 countries over Istanbul.²³¹

Relating to the humanitarian assistance that Türkiye has provided to Somalia, following Turkish President Erdoğan's visit to Somalia in 2011 with a large delegation, the AK Party regime launched a significant humanitarian aid campaign alongside Turkish NGOs to assist famine and drought victims. Turkey has invested over 1 billion dollar in

²³¹ Demirtaş, (2015), p.112.

humanitarian activities in Somalia. This aid includes establishment of hospitals, schools, and government buildings, support to local businesses, provision of scholarships, and training Somali soldiers and police. Turkey's comprehensive humanitarian policy aims to provide both emergency and developmental aid to promote lasting peace and security in Somalia.²³²

Türkiye has shown its sincerity and uniqueness for instance in 2011 when Erdoğan assured to donate 49 million dollars for aid in Somalia. Later, in 2012, the Turkish state provided over 70 million dollars in scholarships from which 1 200 students from Somalia study in universities in Türkiye. What distinguishes Türkiye is, that it contributes in a rapid and efficient way. While the aid deliveries of the UN or Western states slow down due to bureaucracy, Türkiye approaches in a prompt and well-organized way.²³³

Another key point for Türkiye's distinctiveness is that it provides assistance despite risks of security. The threats towards Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu did not lead to a step back of Turkish contribution. In contrast to other countries that wait for security and stability to invest, Türkiye started to engage in Somalia during a time of insecurity and instability. Still, Türkiye is continuing to support the pursuit of Somalia's stability and strength by means of ongoing investments. Türkiye's active and affective engagement in Somalia is considered among its most outstanding success in Africa. Thereby Somalia serves as a significant landmark for both Turkish bilateral relations and Turkish Africa policy.²³⁴

5.2.2. Turkish Primary Currencies

5.2.2.1. Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)

Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) is an institution with focus on avoiding disasters and reducing damages that are related to disasters. AFAD published on September 30, 2019 a disaster report relating to Somalia. This report consists of humanitarian aids, aid campaigns and spending, and projects and investment in Somalia.

²³² Sıradağ, (2022a), p.398.

²³³ Demirtaş, (2015), pp.112-114.

²³⁴ Demirtaş, (2015), pp.112-114.

The Somali disaster report underlines that the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan kept the struggles in Somalia on the agenda. This effort gained the attention of the international public towards Somalia. With the instruction of the government, AFAD coordinated the delivery of humanitarian aid and employee in charge to Somalia. AFAD cooperated with relevant institutions and organizations, including the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and the Turkish Red Crescent.²³⁵

With the cooperated coordination circa 40 thousand tons of humanitarian aid supplies that was worth 105 million Turkish Lira was sent to Somalia. The deliveries were carried by 21 aircrafts and 10 vessels. The humanitarian aids consisted of clothing, food, shelter equipment, medical material and medicines, fully operational mobile hospitals and ambulances, electrical building supplies, computers and printers, garbage trucks, drilling machines and water pumps, off-road vehicles, and forklifts.²³⁶

According to the report, the aid campaign gathered great attention both nationally and internationally. With Türkiye Diyanet Foundation's transferred amount, AFAD has collected 275 million Turkish Lira. Other institutions and organizations collected separately which together made a total donation over 555 million Turkish Lira. The following Table 7 shows how the collected donation was planned to spend. While AFAD took care of the transportation and logistics, TİKA conducted its work on technical infrastructure. The Housing Development Administration of the Republic of Türkiye TOKİ was responsible for constructing a hospital and the Ministry of Health concentrated on medical service.

²³⁵ AFAD, "Afet Raporu – Somali", 30.09.2019, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/afet-raporu---somali> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²³⁶ AFAD, "Afet Raporu – Somali", 30.09.2019, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/afet-raporu---somali> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

Table 7. Spending of the Collected Donation

Institution	Cost Covering
AFAD	Transportation, logistics warehouse rental, port, customs clearance, and cargo
TIKA	Machinery, equipment, personnel expenses, Mogadishu Airport and drinking water projects, expenses of Somali students brought to Türkiye, airfare expenses of the wounded and their companions brought to Türkiye
TOKİ	Hospital Construction
Ministry of Health	Field hospitals, health personnel expenses, medical supplies, medicines and ambulance costs, and for the expenses of the relatives of the sick and wounded brought to Türkiye

Source: 'Disaster Report – Somalia', AFAD.

Concerning projects and investments that are dealt in the Somalia disaster report, AFAD and ASELSAN, a leading international defense electronics company, established a Digital Radio Communication System through which Turkish institutions can communicate to each other. Another project that AFAD has supported is the “Somalia Access to Clean Drinking Water Project” of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works under the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs. AFAD has send material for compressors, drilling machines, trucks, water tankers, generators and drilling to Somalia. This project has resulted with 20 water wells in Mogadishu for circa 175 000. This water wells provide potable and drinking water. Furthermore AFAS cooperated with Türkiye Diyanet Foundation to bring more than 400 Somali students to Türkiye in order to complete their education.²³⁷

5.2.2.2. Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

Since 2011 Türkiye's Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) conducts humanitarian and development projects in Somalia. With the opening of the Mogadishu Program Coordination Office in 2011, the coordination of assistance and aid activities are operated by TIKA. In Somalia, TIKA focuses on education, health, strengthening social and

²³⁷ **AFAD**, “Afet Raporu – Somali”, 30.09.2019, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/afet-raporu---somalii> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

administrative structures, urgent humanitarian aid, and agriculture.²³⁸ TİKA's approach emphasizes a cooperative development model rather than traditional aid, which is considered as a win-win concept. Its efforts include building infrastructure, such as roads and schools, and providing agricultural and health support. TİKA has also helped distribute wheelchairs, supported cultural activities, and provided fishing equipment. Additionally, it has collaborated with various Turkish organizations to address humanitarian needs exacerbated by drought and conflict. TİKA continues to contribute to Somalia's growth, aiming to improve education, agriculture, and tourism while addressing security and stability issues.²³⁹

In terms of health it is worth mentioning the Somalia Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital which was constructed by Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) in Mogadishu. TİKA contributed with provision of furnishing and medical equipment. Taking in consideration that out of 1 000 new borns 180 die in Somalia, the establishment of the hospital plays a vital role. In terms of capacity and technology this hospital is considered among the most advanced in East Africa.²⁴⁰ Besides the first woman to become a surgeon in Somalia is Maimuna Abdi Gelle who as studies medicine in Türkiye.²⁴¹ Furthermore, since 2012 TİKA drilled 26 water wells around Mogadishu and Burao supplying water to 45 000 people that is both potable and non-potable.²⁴²

Türkiye's involvement in Somalia contributed the country to reach out to the outside world since Somalia was for over 20 years in isolation. In order to enable the integration of Somalia with the international community, Türkiye has contributed in ways of development, transportation, infrastructure, and technology assistance. In this context, TİKA's efforts in improving the ease of access and the international connection through the Mogadishu Airport Rehabilitation Project plays an important role.²⁴³ TİKA contributed to the airport in terms of abolishing security weakness through the equipment of electronic systems.²⁴⁴

²³⁸ TİKA, 'Somali – Mogadişu Program Koordinasyon Ofisi', <https://tika.gov.tr/office/somali-mogadisu-program-koordinasyon-ofisi/> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²³⁹ Dhaysane, Mohammed, 'Projects in Somalia Based on Win-Win Development: Turkish State Agency', Anadolu Agency, 14.02.2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/culture/projects-in-somalia-based-on-win-win-development-turkish-state-agency/2501373> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²⁴⁰ TİKA, 'TİKA Africa', 2016, <https://www.tika.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/INGILIZCE%20SITE%20ESERLER/TANITIM%20BRO%C5%9E%C3%9CRLER%C4%B0/PDF/Africa%202016.pdf> l.a.d. 03.08.2024.

²⁴¹ TİKA, (2016), p.29.

²⁴² TİKA, (2016), p.34.

²⁴³ Demirtaş, (2015), p.112.

²⁴⁴ TİKA, (2016), p.54.

The recently establishment of the feed production facility at the Faculty of Agriculture of Somalia City University by TİKA in January 2024²⁴⁵ and the opening of Turkish classes at the Bondhere Orphan Girls Center²⁴⁶ present the ongoing and long-term efforts of TİKA.

5.2.2.3. Yunus Emre Institute (YEE)

Yunus Emre Institute (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü YEE) provides Turkish education and cooperates with educational institutions abroad to contribute learning Turkish. In this context Turkology programs are established or Turkish language and literature classes are opened in universities abroad. Turkish literature and language are studied in this program. Furthermore YEE opens cultural centers worldwide for Turkish education and activities to present Turkish culture and art.

In 2016 Yunus Emre Institute has established a cultural center in Mogadishu. The Turkology Project is also applied in Somalia. This protocol was signed with the Mogadishu University.²⁴⁷ In 2017 the Somali military school did also sign the Turkology Project.²⁴⁸ In the following year Health Ministry education and research hospital in Somalia did also sign the same protocol.²⁴⁹ In the same year a second cultural center was established in Mogadishu.²⁵⁰

With the project “Be Our Guest” YEE hosted almost 20 high school and university students from the US with an East African but particularly Somali background in Istanbul. Especially Muslim Americans’ confidence on their identity was aimed to be strengthened.²⁵¹

²⁴⁵ **TİKA**, ‘TİKA’nın Destekleriyle Somali’de Fenni Yem Üretim Tesisi Açıldı’, 26.01.2024, <https://tika.gov.tr/tikanin-destekleriyle-somalide-fenni-yem-uretim-tesisi-acildi/> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²⁴⁶ **TİKA**, ‘TİKA Encourages Turkish Education in Somalia’, 13.06.2024, <https://tika.gov.tr/en/tika-encourages-turkish-education-in-somalia/> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²⁴⁷ **Yunus Emre Enstitüsü**, ‘Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2016 Faaliyet Raporu’, 05.02.2018, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2016_faaliyet_raporu_05.02.2018-db.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁴⁸ **Yunus Emre Enstitüsü**, ‘Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2017 Faaliyet Raporu’, 27.11.2018, <https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2017-faaliyet-raporu-27.11.2018-dusuk-boyut.pdf> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁴⁹ **Yunus Emre Enstitüsü**, ‘Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2018 Faaliyet Raporu’, 16.07.2020, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2018_faaliyet_raporu_rev_02_db_16072020.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁰ **Yunus Emre Enstitüsü**, ‘Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2023 Faaliyet Raporu’, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2023_yillik_faaliyet_raporu.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵¹ **Yunus Emre Enstitüsü**, ‘Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2018 Faaliyet Raporu’, 16.07.2020, p.27, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2018_faaliyet_raporu_rev_02_db_16072020.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

On 04.01.2019 an UK Turkish Somali Diaspora Panel on Possible Collaborations was held. In the same year on June 14 the Global Somali Diaspora Conference was organized in Istanbul. From December 14 to 16, 2019 the Som-Türk AgroExpo 2019 fair find place in Mogadishu which aimed to present Turkish institutions. While the fair was mostly participated by Turkish companies, the visitors showed great interest.²⁵²

Paying attention on Somali diaspora, on November 28, 2020 YEE stressed the brotherhood between Somalia and Türkiye with the Global Somali Diaspora Summit. The challenges and solutions for Somali diaspora as well as Somalia's progress in recent years were on the agenda.²⁵³

Yunus Emre Institute has created a Turkish Proficiency Exam (TPE) to certify Turkish language for individuals who learn Turkish as a foreign language. This model complies the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages' proficiency definitions.²⁵⁴ In 2021 5 people took this exam in Mogadishu Turkish Culture Center. In this context it is worth to mention that there are 624 students in the three educational institutions in Somalia under the Turkology Project.²⁵⁵ The number of participants on the TPE has reached 19 in 2022 in Mogadishu. In the same year City University in Somalia also signed the Turkology Protocol with coming to a number of four universities in Somalia under the framework of Turkology Project.²⁵⁶ In 2023 11 participants took the Turkish Proficiency Exam in Mogadishu.²⁵⁷

On December 16, 2023 Global Somali Diaspora Conference was held. Building Peace and Economic Growth were the topics of the conference. Prof. Dr. Şeref Ateş, head of the Yunus Emre Institute, participated online to the conference.²⁵⁸

²⁵² Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2019 Faaliyet Raporu', 31.12.2020, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/yee_2019_v2_31122020.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵³ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2020 Faaliyet Raporu', 28.06.2021, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/faaliyet_raporu_2021_28.06_kucuk.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁴ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Take the Turkish Proficiency Exam', <https://www.yee.org.tr/en/content/take-turkish-proficiency-exam> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁵ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2021 Faaliyet Raporu', https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2021_yillik_faaliyet_raporu.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁶ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2022 Faaliyet Raporu', https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2022_faaliyet_raporu.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁷ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2023 Faaliyet Raporu', p.227, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2023_yillik_faaliyet_raporu.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁵⁸ Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 'Yunus Emre Enstitüsü 2023 Faaliyet Raporu', p.253, https://www.yee.org.tr/sites/default/files/yayin/2023_yillik_faaliyet_raporu.pdf l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

5.2.2.4. Maarif Foundation

Maarif Schools has started with its activities on November 21, 2016 in Somalia. These schools contribute to Somalian students' education with scholarships. Almost all education institutions are private in Mogadishu. Since the infrastructure of Mogadishu in terms of education was not enough, Maarif provides families who cannot afford to send their children to private schools in Mogadishu. Drought and conflicts lead people to live in camps in which children are hopeless towards their future. In 2022 Maarif schools were in Mogadishu and its neighboring city Hargeisa with 3 campuses and 1 200 students. While these schools give education from primary to high school levels, Maarif is working on starting educational activities in two other cities than Mogadishu and Hargeisa. While other foreign schools hesitate on establishing campuses in the cities due to security concerns, in contrast Maarif Foundation was not reluctant and reaches a success of 100% in national exams. Students in their last year in high school take the national exams.²⁵⁹

It is worth to mention that Somalia is the country who shows the most demand for Turkish language. Not just in education but in trade, politics, and diplomacy, there is a high demand of Turkish language. Turkey Maarif Foundation Somalia Representative Ihsan Cerrah underlines the importance of Turkish language on the improvement of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Somalia.²⁶⁰

In April 2024 Maarif Foundation has published the book Maarif Success Stories 2019-2024 (MAARİF Başarı Hikayeleri 2019-2024) in which examples of success of Maarif Schools in the period of 2019- 2024 are presented. In 2022 Samira Abdishakur Hussein, student of Somalia International Maarif Schools, gained the first place in Turkish Poetry Reading Competition in Somalia. Another example is Hudo Abdullahi Abdi, student of Somalia Maarif Banadir School, who became the fifth in Somalia in the National Exam in 2022.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ **Türkiye Maarif Vakfı**, 'Somali Maarif Okulları Somalili Gençlere Ümit Oldu', 24.05.2022, <https://turkiyemaarif.org/news/somali-maarif-okullari-somalili-genclere-umut-oldu> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶⁰ **Türkiye Maarif Vakfı**, 'Somali Maarif Okulları Somalili Gençlere Ümit Oldu', 24.05.2022, <https://turkiyemaarif.org/news/somali-maarif-okullari-somalili-genclere-umut-oldu> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶¹ **Türkiye Maarif Vakfı**, 'MAARİF Başarı Hikayeleri 2019-2024', April 2024, <https://turkiyemaarif.org/uploads/editions/files/1665746ed6e7e4.pdf> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

5.2.2.5. Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV)

Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV) also carries activities out in Somalia. The Abdulaziz masjid in Mogadishu was built by companions of Prophet Mohammad. Over time it was destroyed. This is why Türkiye Diyanet Foundation has restored the masjid. The restoration started in 2013 and the Abdulaziz masjid was reopened for worship in 2015.²⁶²

Türkiye Diyanet Foundation organizes humanitarian aid as well. In this context on July 5, 2024 Türkiye Diyanet Foundation has prepared with contribution of Turkish people three trucks of food packages that include 2475 parcels to deliver from Konya to Sudan and Somalia. The reason of this humanitarian aid is the ongoing famine and drought and the conflicts resulting with thousands of deaths. TDV sent these trucks in coordination of Turkey Disaster and Emergency Management Authority AFAD.²⁶³

In addition Türkiye Diyanet foundation drills water wells. In this sense it collects donations for drilling water wells. For instance TDV does currently collect donations for a water well in Marxeyley, Galgadud. This village's population is almost 8 500 and it is located 445 km away from Mogadishu. 87% of the population struggle with poverty. They need one hour to get water from another water well. It is apparent that that groundwater and surface water resources are very limited. Additionally the region has little rainfall. These are the reasons for the drilling water well. It is worth to mention that TDV wants to build an automatic electric water well with solar panel. Since there is no electricity in the region, eight solar panels will fill the needs of 24 hour water supply for 8 500 people in the region. Furthermore People, students, the mosque community, one state school and one health institute will benefit from the water well which is to have a tank of 10 tons. If the costs of 74 800 dollars are reached, the drilling will due over 90 working days.²⁶⁴

²⁶² **Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı**, 'Somali Abdülaziz Camii ve Müştemilati', <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/proje/somali-abdulaziz-camii-ve-mustemilati/> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶³ **Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı**, 'Konya'dan Sudan ve Somali'ye insani yardım malzemesi yüklü 3 tır gönderildi', 05.07.2024, <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/konyadan-sudan-ve-somaliye-insani-yardim-malzemesi-yuklu-3-tir-gonderildi/> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶⁴ **Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı**, 'SOSK019', <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/proje/sosk019/> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

5.2.2.6. Turkish Red Crescent

Turkish Red Crescent started its humanitarian aid activities in Somalia in August 2011. Eight months later it came out that more than one million people in Somalia get humanitarian aid from the Turkish Red Crescent. Those who stay at the camps in tents by the Res Crescent try to keep the joy of life alive.²⁶⁵

The Turkish Red Crescent opened a soup kitchen in Mogadishu in which hot meal for 3 150 people is cooked per day. This meal is for people who exposed to drought and famine, to orphans and to those separated from their homes. Additionally in Mogadishu are 19 points to deliver hot meal. In the period of 2011 to 2022, the Turkish Red Crescent has provided 10 tons of humanitarian aid to Somalia.²⁶⁶

In December 2023 the Turkish Res Crescent startet cataract surgery in Somalia for 512 people who cannot afford it due to financial inadequacy. This project was carried out in Mogadishu, Galkayo, and Dololow. The Turkish Red Crescent has on the one hand covered the surgery costs, on the other hand the medicine costs. The project has started in Mogadishu in the National Eye Hospital.²⁶⁷

5.2.3. Turkish Government Policies

5.2.3.1. Turkish Diplomacy in Somalia

For the purpose of bolstering and institutionalizing Turkish strategic relations with the African continent, since 2008 Türkiye has organized several Turkey-Africa summits. Türkiye hosted the first summit in Istanbul in 2008 with 49 African states participating. It was discussed to widen the collaboration in fields like energy, trade, agriculture, education, infrastructure, and more. Equatorial Guinea hosted the second summit with the participation of 32 African states in 2014 in Malabo. On December 7, 2021 Türkiye has again organized the Turkey-Africa partnership summit. 26 African government and state leaders as well as

²⁶⁵ **Öksüz, Cem**, ‘Somali’de Milyonlar Kızılay ile Sevindi’, Anadolu Ajansı, 10.04.2012, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/kizilay-somalide-milyonlara-ulasti> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶⁶ **Türk Kızılay**, ‘Kızılay Somali’de Günlük 3 Bini Aşkın Kişiye Yemek Ulaştırıyor’, 17.01.2022, <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Haber/HaberArsiviDetay/6578> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

²⁶⁷ **T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı**, ‘Türk Kızılay, Somali’de Yüzlerce Kişiye Katarakt Ameliyatıyla Işık Olacak’, 27.12.2023, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/yerel_basin/detay/turk-kizilay-somalide-yuzlerce-kisiye-katarakt-ameliyatıyla-ışık-olacak l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

102 African ministers participated the third summit. In this regard, Türkiye bolsters its relations with the African continent, improves itself to be recognized as a political player in Africa, and establishes a basis for deepening bilateral relations with related states.²⁶⁸

Focusing on strengthening diplomatic ties with African states are noticeable in the increase of state visits and increase of the number of diplomatic missions of Türkiye in the African continent. While in 2019 Türkiye had only 12 diplomatic missions in the African continent, the number has risen to 43 in year 2021. Vice versa, in 2008 there have been 10 diplomatic missions of African countries in Ankara. This has increased to 37. While the increase of the diplomatic missions enable Türkiye to improve its both bilateral and bilateral relations to the African states, it provides Türkiye becoming an active role as an influential actor.²⁶⁹

The first Turkish Embassy in Somalia was opened in 1979 in Mogadishu. Because of the civil war in 1991, it was closed. On November 1, 2024, it was again inaugurated. Due to the major drought disaster in 2011, then Prime Minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia in August 2011 which has become a historic visit.²⁷⁰ The reason why it became historic is that Erdoğan was the first leader to visit Somalia in the last 20 year not being an African leader.²⁷¹ On June 1, 2014 the Turkish Consulate was opened in Hargeisa. Later on more state visits were conducted by both the Turkish and the Somalian state leaders and ministers.²⁷²

5.3. Turkish Hard Power Tools in Somalia

This section is divided into two sub-sections each dealing with a mean of hard power which is military and economic power. The sub-sections are also categorized in various parts in relation with the classification of Joseph S. Nye. Nye explains soft and hard power in context with behavior, primary currency, and government policy. In the following parts of

²⁶⁸ Sıradağ, (2022a), pp.397-398.

²⁶⁹ Sıradağ, (2022b), p.3.

²⁷⁰ MFA, 'Relations between Turkey and Somalia', <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa>, l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

²⁷¹ Demirtaş, (2015), p.112.

²⁷² MFA, 'Relations between Turkey and Somalia', <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-somalia.en.mfa> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

the thesis military and economic power of Türkiye towards Somalia will be evaluated under the framework of behavior, primary currency, and government policy.

5.3.1. Military Power

Military power is the traditional way of power implementation and projection to achieve goals. As military power is a hard power tool, it creates deterrence, coercion, or serves for protection. While the primary currencies are considered as threats and force, common government policies for military power are war, coercive diplomacy or alliances.

5.3.1.1. Behavior: Counter Terrorism

In order to build a sustainable security and peace in Somalia it is important to be aware of the key factors having impact on the security of Somalia. Somalia has numerous and intricate security issues.

The civil war began in Somalia in 1991 after the fall of the Siad Barre regime. Until 2011 the Somali central government was not functioning. Despite the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012, there are four great indicators destabilizing the country's security. Being in the 19th century ruled by French, Italian, and British colonial powers, the clan system in Somalia, external powers involving in internal affairs of Somalia, and drought, famine, disasters, and poverty as natural disasters have negative impact on the insurance of security and peace in Somalia. These key dynamics are the reasons of the instability in Somalia. In such an instable atmosphere radicalization emerges.²⁷³

For a better understanding it is helpful to take explain these dynamics. Due to the colonial legacy, Somalia has been divided with no regard of the local population's ethnic identity. Therefore Somalis were not united. After gaining its independence in 1960, Somalia started a war with Ethiopia with the aim of uniting the Somali people who live in the neighbor countries. This war happened between 1977 and 1978.²⁷⁴

Relating to the clan system in Somalia, the Siad Barre regime supported its preferred clans against the opposing ones. The Isaaq clan was opposing the Barre regime and took

²⁷³ Siradağ, (2022a), pp.393-394.

²⁷⁴ Siradağ, (2022a), p.393.

advantage of the collapse of that regime in 1991. After fighting over the control of main territories and resources, the Isaaq clan took power of the northwestern part of Somalia. “The Isaaq clan declared independence in 1991, the de facto state known as Somaliland has not since been recognized by the international community.”²⁷⁵ Likewise, the Majertan clan declared the autonomy of Puntland in 1998. Its location is in the northeast of Somalia. The Isaaq and Majerten clan have an enduring conflict over the territories of the northern part of Somalia.²⁷⁶

*When the Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012, the balance between the clans has become the most significant in selecting presidents, prime ministers, and ministers. There is a 4.5 clan system in Somalia shaping the government structure. According to this system, the number 4 represents the four big clans selecting the top members of the government. The number 5 accounts for the small clans having a small impact in choosing the high members of the government.*²⁷⁷

International organizations like the United Nations, external powers like the United States, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and more have involved in internal affairs of Somalia. In order to sustain peace and to organize humanitarian aid, the United Nations employed operations between 1992 and 1995 in Somalia. These operations are called UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. As force commander of UNOSOM II the Turkish Commander Lieutenant-General Çevik was appointed between the years 1993 and 1994. From December 1992 to May 1993, the United States has involved with the Unified Task Force, called Operation Restore Hope. While none of these operations reached their goals in preserving peace, in contrary, they caused for a rise of anger in Somali people. The instable situation in Somali continued with Ethiopia supporting and militarizing the opponents in Somalia. Vice versa, Somali encouraged the opposing groups in Ethiopia. This support resulted in 2006 with Ethiopia interfering militarily in Somalia. The United States supported Ethiopia with the purpose of bringing the increasing power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) to an end. Al-Shabaab was a youth division of the UIC and has in 2008 been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. Al-Shabaab has attacked Turkish institutions and Turks in Somalia since it perceived Türkiye as a threat of Western invaders.

²⁷⁵ Siradağ, (2022a), p.393.

²⁷⁶ Siradağ, (2022a), p.393.

²⁷⁷ Siradağ, (2022a), p.393.

In 2011, when students were waiting to apply for Turkish scholarship at the Ministry of Education of Somalia, 72 of these students were killed by a suicide truck bomber. On July 27, 2013 the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was attacked with a bomb resulting with three people being killed and 9 being wounded. In order to preserve security and peace the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) started its mission in 2007, after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces from Somalia. The AMISOM forces have been attacked by Al-Shabaab as well. Besides the UN, US, and Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates established a military base in Somaliland with the pursuit of providing financial and political support.²⁷⁸

5.3.1.2. Primary Currency: TURKSOM Military Base

In 2012 Türkiye has actively started a security engagement with Somalia. Both countries signed on April 13, 2012 in Ankara a “Military Training Cooperation Agreements. Later, on January 25, 2015 Somalia and Türkiye have signed a “Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement in Mogadishu. Under the umbrella of the both agreements the Somali soldiers and police officers received military training by Türkiye in the capital cities of each country. Besides, on September 30, 2017, Türkiye has set up a military training complex in Somalia, TURKSOM, which has costed 50 million dollars and is the largest Turkish military training complex abroad. What makes this military base special is that the traditional Western military bases in Africa do not conduct military training. Yet, Türkiye provides military training to 1500 Somali soldiers every year. In addition, from 2009 on Türkiye cooperates with the United Nations in preserves a military naval force to secure Turkish business vessels against armed robbery and pirate activities. The naval forces are located in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and off the Somali coasts. Türkiye does not just protects its business vessels but does also support prevention of armed robbery and pirate activities in these locations.²⁷⁹

The provisions by the Turkish state contributed the Somali National Army in terms of strengthening the capacity. Since the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991, the country was not able to maintain peace and security due to its weak police force and national army. With the military trainings of Türkiye for the Somali National Army and the Somali police force, the capacity has improved. Beside trainings, Türkiye does also support the Somali forces

²⁷⁸ Sıradağ, (2022a), pp.393-394.

²⁷⁹ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.399.

with equipment. With a strengthened capacity, the Somali forces have the capability to fight effectively the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. Türkiye has developed itself to a unique actor in that country due to its sincere and effective training and sharing of technological and military experience without attaching any conditions in terms of politics or economics. The significance of military training and equipment by Türkiye to Somalia will demonstrate itself when the African Union peacekeeping mission will withdraw its troops from Somalia. While earlier in 2023, 2.000 peacekeeping troops retreated from Somali, another 3.000 troops were planned to leave in September 2023. A total withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which as previously called AMISOM, will be by the end of 2024.²⁸⁰ This is a development showing that there is no need for a peacekeeping mission due to improvement of Somali Forces and of maintaining security. Another result of Turkish contribution to the Somalian military is, that they have won various territories back from Al-Shabaab.²⁸¹

From both Turkish and Somali perspective there are opportunities and challenges concerning TURKSOM military training base. The opportunities and challenges from the Turkish point of view can be listed in four points. Starting with the challenges, Türkiye competes with other states which are also actively engaged in Somalia. Secondly, conflicts between groups in Somali Army take Türkiye in a difficult position, since it is claimed that those military personnel are trained in TURKSOM by Turkish Military Forces. Another challenge for Türkiye is its success against Al-Shabaab because it is considered that Türkiye intervenes into domestic policies of Somalia. Opposing groups that do not support the development of Somalia and other powerful actors try to disable the activities of TURKSOM.²⁸²

The opportunities for Türkiye are firstly, that TURKSOM proves the strength of Türkiye in terms of military training. By means of TURKSOM, Türkiye has on the one hand taken its military training experience abroad, on the other hand, it is following closely the developments in the African Horn countries. Thirdly, the success of providing security

²⁸⁰ **Dhaysane, Mohammed**, ‘African Union Peacekeeping Mission to Withdraw 3,000 More Troops From Somalia’, Anadolu Agency, 29.08.2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/african-union-peacekeeping-mission-to-withdraw-3-000-more-troops-from-somalia/2978693> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁸¹ **Kökçam, Selami**, ‘Türkiye-Somali İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem’, TRT Haber, 29.02.2024, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/turkiye-somali-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem-841042.html> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁸² **Daban, Cihan and Aktaş, Hayati**, ‘Savunma İş Birliği Kapsamında Türkiye-Somali İlişkileri: Türksom Askeri Eğitim Merkezi Örneği’, İmgelem, No: 14, pp.73-100.

through the military training in TURKSOM has not just gained trust of the Somali government but also of the Somali people. Finally, that the Somali government asks for military training at TURKSOM demonstrates Türkiye's non-colonial position towards Somalia.²⁸³

From Somali perspective, there are five points each for challenges and opportunities related to TURKSOM military training base. The first challenge to be mentioned is that the military training proves difficulties or lacks in Somali military power. Secondly, opposing groups counter with unfounded allegations against TURKSOM. States, which are uncomfortable with Türkiye's military presence in Somalia, challenge Somalia in bilateral relations. Fourthly, the reason for arguments between groups in Somali Armed Forces is considered as TURKSOM's military training. Lastly, even though the military training at TURKSOM aims to solve domestic conflicts, different perspectives to TURKSOM's presence have led to more conflicts in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait as well in the Gulf of Aden.²⁸⁴

However Somalia profits from TURKSOM military training base in five different aspects. The first one is that Somalia receives help outside the African continent in order to counter Al-Shabaab and other organizations. Secondly, Somalia has made a significant step towards providing security. Thirdly, due to the UN embargo Somalia cannot acquire combat aircraft. But Türkiye trains Somali Air Forces in Türkiye to fill the gap in Somali Army. The fourth opportunity for Somalia is to strengthen its historical ties with Türkiye which dates back to the Adal Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire. Lastly, TURKSOM's presence enabled the revival of military cooperation in bilateral level between Türkiye and Somalia. The military cooperation does also contribute to fight famine, hunger and to meet basic needs.²⁸⁵

Türkiye has contributed to Somalia in military aspects which plays an important role in counter terrorism. Due to its geopolitical position and instable security situation, Somalia has faced and still faces persistent terrorism. For supporting the fight against terrorism, Türkiye has on the one hand provided military training, equipment and on the other hand Türkiye is improving its contribution with the agreement on defense and economic cooperation, which has been signed on February 8, 2024. This agreement aims to stabilize

²⁸³ Daban and Aktaş, pp.90-92.

²⁸⁴ Daban and Aktaş, p.92.

²⁸⁵ Daban and Aktaş, pp.92-93.

the region through improved bilateral relations.²⁸⁶ The agreement includes fighting terrorism, illegal fishing, piracy, external threats, improvement of marine resources, and coastal protection. With an establishment of a joint naval force, the protection of Somali seas for 10 years will be managed. Furthermore, besides this protection, the agreement includes the possession of a Somali navy that will have the capability and ability to protect its seas on its own.²⁸⁷

Taking the opportunities and challenges of TURKSOM for Türkiye and Somalia in account, the opportunities outweigh the challenges for both states. Since every military base or training base face challenges the challenges for TURKSOM do not create a deterrent effect. From Somali point of view the rapidly regulated military training for Somali officers, non-commissioned officers and commandos and the graduation of thousands of them strengthen bilateral ties between Türkiye and Somalia. The presence of TURKSOM has to some extent facilitated the security problem in Somalia.²⁸⁸

Under the umbrella of the defense cooperation agreement, in July 2024 the presidential memorandum, which covers the deployment of Turkish Armed Forces in Somalia, was sent to the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The deployment of Turkish Armed Forces is planned to last for a period of 2 years. The aim is to contribute to Somalia's security against terrorism and other risks and threats. In addition, Türkiye extended the duration of Turkish Naval Forces in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and off the Somalian coast for one year on January 17, 2024. Thus, the fight against armed robbery, terrorism and piracy at the sea will continue with Turkish support.²⁸⁹ On July 27, 2024 the Turkish parliament has passed the motion approving the deployment of elements of the Turkish Armed Forces in Somalia.²⁹⁰

Under the terms of the agreements between Türkiye and Somalia, Türkiye has persistently provided assistance, consultancy, and training with the aim of securing safety

²⁸⁶ **Hamit, Dilara**, 'Türkiye, Somalia sign agreement on defense, economic cooperation', Anadolu Agency, 09.02.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-somalia-sign-agreement-on-defense-economic-cooperation/3132095> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁸⁷ **Kökçam, Selami**, 'Türkiye-Somali İlişkilerinde Yeni Dönem', TRT Haber, 29.02.2024, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/turkiye-somali-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem-841042.html> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁸⁸ **Daban and Aktaş**, pp.93-94.

²⁸⁹ **Ekiz, Aynur**, 'Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine Somali'de Yeni Görev', Anadolu Agency, 19.07.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/turk-silahlı-kuvvetlerine-somalide-yeni-gorev/3280005> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁹⁰ **China.org.cn**, 'Turkish Parliament Approves Motion for Sending Navy to Somalia', 27.07.2024, [http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off the Wire/2024-07/28/content_117335124.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off%20the%20Wire/2024-07/28/content_117335124.htm) l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

and stability in Somalia. Türkiye did also continue to contribute to Somali security and defense forces in terms of restructuring and becoming capable to combat terrorism. For more than 10 years Türkiye cooperates with the international community to support Somali.²⁹¹

In fighting terrorism and ensuring security in the region, in recent years Türkiye has taken the role of mediator. With the pursuit of improving the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, Türkiye hosted the Somalia-Ethiopia talks on July 1, 2024 in Ankara. The recognition of Somalia's territorial integrity by Ethiopia is a major step showing its openness to cooperate the stability in that region. The readiness of both countries relies on successful Turkish efforts in state-building in Somalia. That Türkiye stays in line with international norms is another indicator to trust its mediation efforts.²⁹²

Türkiye pays attention to its relations with Somalia and is sincerely supporting the security of the country. In this term, Türkiye has made on bilateral but also multilateral efforts to contribute counter terrorism in Somalia. Since Somalia's national army has strengthened, particularly with the military training and equipment, that Türkiye as provided, the active role of Türkiye in Somalia's fight against terrorism can be seen. That Türkiye uses various ways in fighting terrorism is shown with its mediation initiative. Türkiye is seen as a reliable actor in the region because of its mediation efforts, military supports, and to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Türkiye demonstrates its long-term support for the security in that region.

5.3.1.3. Government Policy: Cooperation in Defense Industry

Since the Cyprus War in 1974, Türkiye has focused on developing its defense industry. Particularly the arms embargoes made Türkiye clear to produce its own arms and weapons for its own and for the international security. Nowadays, Türkiye produces its own unmanned aerial vehicles, electronics combat systems, missiles and Türkiye belongs to one of ten countries producing its own combat vessels.

²⁹¹ **Ekiz, Aynur**, 'Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine Somali'de Yeni Görev', Anadolu Agency, 19.07.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/turk-silahli-kuvvetlerine-somalide-yeni-gorev/3280005> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁹² **Devecioğlu, Kaan** ORSAM, Türkiye'nin Somali-Etiyopya Arabuluculuğunun Önemi ve Tarafların Bakış Açıları, 22.07.2024, <https://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/turkiyenin-somali-etiyopya-arabuluculugunun-onemi-ve-taraflarin-bakis-acilari/> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

Defense and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association (Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayii İmalatçılar Derneği SASAD) has published the report of the data of performance for the year 2022 focusing on the Turkish defense industry. In 2022 Türkiye got order in value of 8.797 million dollars. The profits from exports have reached 4.396 million dollars, resulting with a turnover of 12.196 million dollars.²⁹³ According to the SIPRI Fact Sheet, Türkiye has ranked to the 11th major arms exporter globally. The share of global arms exports of Türkiye in the period of 2014-2018 was 0.7% which has increased with a change rate of 106% in the period 2019-2023 to 1.6%.²⁹⁴ These number show how Türkiye has improved its defense industry to a global success. In year 2023 the defense industry of Türkiye has again proven its capability. For instance, for the first time, Türkiye made its delivery in terms of electronic warfare. The Atak-2 helicopter which is a heavy class attack helicopter, Anka-3 that is an unmanned combat aircraft, Bayraktar TB3 which is an unmanned aerial vehicle, and Hürjet that is the first jet-powered training aircraft of Türkiye, all four aerial vehicles launched into the air. The helicopter engine TS1400, which is the first national and domestic helicopter engine, made the Gökbey helicopter fly.²⁹⁵ This major achievement of Turkish defense industry has impact on the relations with Somalia as well. In order to provide security and support for counter terrorism in Somalia, defense industry plays an important role.

Turkish defense industry has major projects with African countries. Since 2014, Türkiye has signed defense industry cooperation agreements with African countries like Mali, Benin, Senegal, Chad, Congo, Gambia, Gabon, and Somalia. With the extension of Turkish defense industry to Africa, Türkiye enhances on the one hand military cooperation with the African countries and on the other hand the Turkish-African relations.²⁹⁶ It is important to note that the success of Turkish drones in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan has significantly boosted Turkish defense exports to Africa. Despite the challenges posed by Covid-19, Turkish defense industry exports to Africa increased by 9.2% in 2020 compared

²⁹³ **SASAD**, (2023), '2022 Yılı Performans Raporu', <https://www.sasad.org.tr/sasad-sektor-performans-raporu-2022> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁹⁴ **Wezeman, Pieter D., Djokic, Katarina, George, Dr Mathew, Hussain, Zain et al.** (2024) SIPRI, 'Trend in International Arms Transfers, 2023', https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁹⁵ **Bürçeler, Damla**, 'Türk Savunma Sanayiinin Yükselişi Sürüyor', TRT Haber, 07.02.2024, <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turk-savunma-sanayiinin-yukselisi-suruyor-835204.html> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

²⁹⁶ **Yılmaz, Tuğrul Oğuzhan** (2018) 'Türkiye-Afrika İlişkilerinin Güvenlik Boyutu: Türk Savunma Sanayii ve Afrika', Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, Vol: 120, No: 237, pp. 41-66.

to 2019. While Africa was the fifth-largest market for Turkish defense exports in 2021, it rose to become the second-largest market in 2022.²⁹⁷

Since Türkiye has established a military base in Somalia and provides both military training and military equipment to Somali Armed Forces, the Somali army uses MPT-76 infantry rifle, which is produced in Türkiye²⁹⁸. Resulting with a significant demand, Somalia has in 2017 ordered 35 000 MPT-76 rifles of which 450 were rapidly delivered.²⁹⁹ Türkiye's arms trade with Somalia and its cooperation in the defense industry have been widely covered in the African press. Türkiye's activity in the region Horn of Africa bothers some countries, including the US. "Voice of America" reported that Türkiye armed the Somali army. Somalia's Minister of State for Defense Mohamed Ali Haga confirmed that Türkiye has provided weapons to the Somali army and equipped soldiers who graduated from the Turkish military training camp in Mogadishu. Türkiye's support is seen as an important support for the Somali army during a difficult transition.³⁰⁰

Kenya is also involved in providing security in Somalia. In order to fight against the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Kenya uses HIZIR 4x4 tactical wheeled armored vehicles (TTZA) which Kenya had purchased from Türkiye. Kenya employs the HIZIRs particularly in the Mandera region which is located at the intersection of Ethiopia and Somalia. This region involves mined areas. Thus, Kenya aims to avoid human casualties in terms of explosions caused by mines.³⁰¹

On December 1, 2023 The United Nations Security Council decided to stop the arms embargo towards Somalia. The arms embargo was imposed in 1992 in order to prevent Al-Shabaab seizing the arms. This embargo served as an obstacle for Somalia to procure its armed forces and strengthen its army.³⁰² After the lifting of the arms embargo, Somali is free

²⁹⁷ Sıradağ, (2022a), p.391.

²⁹⁸ Yılmaz, p.56.

²⁹⁹ Özer, Fatih, 'İki Senede 55 Bin Teslimat Yapılacak', Yeni Şafak, 01.11.2017, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/iki-senede-55-bintestimat-yapilacak-2806661> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

³⁰⁰ Yılmaz, p.57.

³⁰¹ Demirtaş, Tunç (2023) SETA, 'Türkiye'nin Doğu Afrika Ortaklığı: Öngörüler, Fırsatlar ve Riskler', > <https://www.setav.org/assets/uploads/2023/07/R236.pdf> l.a.d. 01.06.2024.

³⁰² Çetin, Şerife, Aktaş, Tufan, and Abdullahi, Hodan Mohamed, 'BMGK, Yaklaşık 30 Yılın Ardından Somali'ye Yönelik Silah Ambargosunu Kaldırdı', Anadolu Ajansı, 02.12.2023, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bmgk-yaklasik-30-yilin-ardindan-somaliye-yonelik-silah-ambargosunu-kaldirdi/3070995> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

to purchase arms and weapons to enhance its military capability and capacity. This enables Türkiye to enlarge its major arms trade to Somalia as well.

In this sense, on February 8, 2024 Türkiye and Somalia have signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement which proves Türkiye's aim to become a maritime power beyond its shores through its long-term investment in the region. Türkiye follows its ambition in a win-win approach as the pursuit of becoming a maritime player is as important as strengthening Somali naval capabilities, thereby ensuring security. The ambition of the agreement is the enhancement of maritime security, and of capability and capacity of Somalia Naval Forces. Thus, irregular and illegal activities in Somali waters will be fought. On the one hand this agreement aims to deter Ethiopia's ambition on the territory of Somalia, on the other hand it demonstrates the Turkish will of reaching power in the region. In terms of supporting Somalia's naval forces, this deal will lead to Somali procuring Turkish naval platforms as Türkiye belongs to few Middle Eastern states with a significant number of shipyards capable of constructing and outfitting military vessels locally.³⁰³

Not just Somalia but more than 25 African countries have agreements with Türkiye in defense industry and cooperation³⁰⁴. This shows the expansion of the Turkish defense industry as well as the willingness and trust of African countries signing agreements with Türkiye. Arms trade has also an impact of diplomatic ties. If a country buys particularly major arms from another country, the trade process, training for the weapon, the care of the weapon and further purchases to increase the quantity and to enhance the weapon system are indicators for a long-term trade and cooperation between the countries. In this sense, Türkiye has gained success and is increasing its defense market in Africa. This success relies on three significant factors. Firstly, in the last 20 years Türkiye has made major transformations in politics and economics. Secondly, the active foreign policy of Türkiye towards the Horn of Africa, Africa, and to the world has improved significantly. Lastly, Türkiye reaches out for new markets in African countries and in Somalia for Turkish defense industry products.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ **Helou, Agnes**, 'With Somalia Naval Defense Deal, Turkey Eyes Power Projection, Future Business: Analysts', Breaking Defense, 29.02.2024, <https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/with-somalia-naval-defense-deal-turkey-eyes-power-projection-future-business-analysts/> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

³⁰⁴ **Alemdar, Ahmet** (2021) 'Rekabetçi Afrika Pazarında Türk Savunma Sanayisinin Artan Varlığı', Kriter, <https://kriterdergi.com/dosya-afrikada-turkiye/rekabetci-afrika-pazarinda-turk-savunma-sanayisinin-artan-varligi> l.a.d. 27.07.2024.

³⁰⁵ **Sıradağ**, (2022a), p.391.

5.3.2. Economic Power

Economic power is another hard power tool which aims coercion or inducement by means of payments or sanctions. Aids, bribes or sanctions are ways of government policies to implement economic power. Joseph S. Nye relates to the carrot and stick theory that payments and aids are considered as carrot, but bribes and sanctions are related to stick. The following parts of the thesis will demonstrate how Türkiye applies economic power without relating to the carrot and stick theory. Türkiye does not aim to take control over Somalia, in contrary, Türkiye sincerely contributes to the strengthening of the State of Somalia, to its stability and security.

5.3.2.1. Behavior and Primary Currency

According to Joseph S. Nye, the behavior in projection of economic power is either inducement or coercion. The primary currencies are payments and sanctions which are implemented through government policies. Türkiye's relation to Somalia is based on a win-win approach which is far away from coercion, bribes or sanctions. The following sub-sections examine the way of Türkiye's economic power projection.

5.3.2.1.1. Economic Support and Cooperation

Türkiye has actively provided support in state building and development of infrastructure in Somalia. These projects included coordination and combination of humanitarian projects, diplomacy, economic aid, and trade. In 2012 “an International Crisis Group report indicated that they garnered Türkiye tremendous visibility and appreciation”³⁰⁶ and since then the efforts of Türkiye have just expanded significantly.

Türkiye's advantage in Somalia lies in its flexible approach, free from Western ideological constraints, allowing for a long-term strategy. As an Islamic nation, Türkiye has cultural advantages and less suspicion compared to Western nations. These factors position Türkiye as a key player in Somalia's peace development, with a middle power status across Africa. Türkiye leads through UN-affiliated efforts in training the Somali Police Force and provides expertise to enhance Somali stability, avoiding past failures of international

³⁰⁶ Camacho, Çelik, Sezgin et al, p.76.

interventions. The peace development strategy of Türkiye includes promoting entrepreneurship through Turkish business involvement in micro and small business mentoring projects, fostering economic revival and human capital development. Additionally, Türkiye encourages the development of a Somali National Civic Service Program targeting youth, former combatants, and displaced communities, focusing on mediation and broad national identity to reconstruct society.³⁰⁷

Mustafa Şahin elaborates the principles and prospects of Türkiye's policy towards Somalia in three key steps. The first step is humanitarian aid. Türkiye has assisted in urgent humanitarian aid, provided training activities that have resulted in short-term, contributed to establish an assistance infrastructure and conducted development aid. The second step was to bring Somalia to the international agenda. Through Somalia and international conferences, Türkiye globally gained the attention for Somalia. The final step deals with the establishment of security and institutionalization of the Somali state. For this purpose, Türkiye made efforts in national reconciliation and economic recovery in Somalia as well as in training activities with long-term effect. The expectations of Türkiye from Somalia can be considered in short-term and long-term expectations. In short-term Türkiye expects to expand its sphere of action, thus the influence of its foreign policy. In relation with the foreign policy impact, Türkiye aims to provide a basis for foreign policy discourse. Further, Türkiye aims to enhance its relations with African countries to become a player particularly in East Africa. In addition, through humanitarian assistance, Türkiye looks forward to gain international prestige and thereby new allies particularly in East Africa. The long-term goals of Türkiye consist of revitalizing regional trade, leveraging the benefits of the region's ports, and playing a leading role in both the current and future development of the continent.³⁰⁸

Relying on the above mentioned background it is important to emphasize the economic support and cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia. Turkey helped revive the Somali economy through development aid after the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to alleviate the deadly famine.³⁰⁹

The following Table 8 presents how the trade between Somalia and Türkiye has developed since 2013. Despite 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic had a negative influence

³⁰⁷ Camacho, Çelik, Sezgin et al, pp.83-84.

³⁰⁸ Şahin, pp.124-126.

³⁰⁹ Şahin, p.125.

on global and national trade, the imports from Somalia to Türkiye mostly increased since 2013. The value of the imports in 2013 were 1.11 million dollars which has reached 7.91 million dollars in 2021. In the last two years, it decreased to 2.67 million dollars in 2022 and to 1.02 million dollars in 2023. Relating to Turkish exports to Somalia, the value of exports has started in 2013 with 61.23 million dollars and has immensely increased to 424.92 million dollars in 2023. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been no decline in exports to Somalia. The bilateral trade volume increased from 62.35 million dollars in 2013 to 425.94 million dollars in 2023. These values prove how serious Türkiye takes its economic relations to Somalia.

Table 8. Bilateral trade volume between Türkiye and Somalia

Year	Imports from Somalia in million US dollars	Exports to Somalia in million US dollars	Bilateral Trade Volume in million US dollars
2023	1.02	424.92	425.94
2022	2.67	386.30	388.97
2021	7.91	354.91	362.82
2020	4.93	271.70	276.62
2019	6.98	256.52	263.50
2018	6.62	183.92	190.54
2017	1.23	147.45	148.68
2016	2.18	119.92	122.10
2015	1.22	72.55	73.77
2014	1.71	63.72	65.43
2013	1.11	61.23	62.34

Source: 'Imports by Countries' and 'Exports by Countries', TUIK.

The economic relationship between Türkiye and Somalia is significant, but it's also influenced by regional power rivalries, particularly with Gulf States like the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Türkiye's ambitions in global politics and its substantial investments in Somalia reflect this competition. For example, a Turkish company taking over Mogadishu airport

from a UAE-based company in 2013 highlights the soft power and economic influence competition.³¹⁰

Turkish investments in Somalia are concentrated in key sectors such as education, health, construction, real estate, and finance, as noted by Mohamed Dubo, Director of the Somalia Investment Promotion Office. On July 2, 2022, the Central Bank of Somalia approved a banking license for Türkiye's Ziraat Katilim bank, allowing it to establish and operate branches in Somalia. This move integrates the Turkish business community into Somalia's financial sector, contributing to its development and economic growth. The bank is expected to aid in rebuilding Somalia's economy, improve business transactions with the external world, and enhance the transparency and functionality of Somalia's financial industry.³¹¹

Somalia's untapped natural resources, including significant oil and gas reserves, are a key factor attracting countries to strategic economic relations with Somalia. Türkiye is among the foreign actors interested in these resources, evidenced by Genel Energy International's 2012 onshore exploration license in Somaliland.³¹²

5.3.2.2. Government Policy: Agreements on Hydrocarbon Exploration and on Economy

Türkiye and Somalia strive to improve economic cooperation. Especially the economic and defense agreement that was signed in February 2024 between Somalia and Türkiye points the growing partnership out. The agreement enables economic benefits for both countries, since the access to fishing resources and hydrocarbon reserves in Somali waters for Türkiye is mentioned. Joint efforts in extracting, exploring, and using maritime resources are strategic actions which will boost economic growth and improve food and energy security. From Somali perspective, this cooperation will offer opportunities for Somalia to fund projects in terms of development and strengthen its independence in the field of

³¹⁰ Abdulle, p.74.

³¹¹ Abdulle, p.73.

³¹² Abdulle, p.73.

economy. Furthermore, there is potential for reviving the tourism industry in Somalia as part of the growing bilateral relations.³¹³

On July 18, 2024 Somalia and Türkiye have signed an agreement on hydrocarbon exploration and production. Later in September or October 2024, Türkiye is to send Oruç Reis with five ships in support with Turkish naval forces, the research vessel, in order to study seismic off the Somali coast. This agreements enables the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to “carry out exploration activities in three different blocks in the Somali maritime areas”.³¹⁴ Earlier on March 07, 2024 the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of the Turkish Republic Alparslan Bayraktar and the Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed have signed an intergovernmental agreement and memorandum which includes the development of oil and natural gas cooperation. Thus, Türkiye strives to strengthen its presence in the Horn of Africa with this cooperation, since it covers the offshore blocks of Somalia. Türkiye’s ambition is not to exploit the resources but to bring them to Somali people.³¹⁵

Taking all the efforts of Türkiye in consideration, Türkiye cooperates with Somalia because of its sincere support to the stability growth in Somalia as well as its own economic extension. These supports and cooperation reveal the win-win approach of Türkiye, since both countries benefit from bilateral relations in politics, economy, security and more. Somali’s readiness to cooperate with Türkiye demonstrates the effective support of Türkiye.

5.4. Generating Consent

Türkiye proved its uniqueness in its soft, hard, and smart power towards Somalia. For a better understanding it is worth to highlight Turkish soft power in Somalia. Furthermore the evaluation of Turkish soft and hard power in combination in Somalia will provide a comprehensive cognition of the Turkish smart power being special.

³¹³ **Devecioğlu, Kaan** ORSAM, Türkiye and Somalia: A New Cooperation Approach from Regional Security to Economic Development, https://www.orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/turkiye-and-somalia-a-new-cooperation-approach-from-regional-security-to-economic-development.pdf l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

³¹⁴ **Daily Sabah**, ‘Türkiye, Somlia Sign a Deal on Cooperation on Hydrocarbons Field’, 18.07.2024, <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/turkiye-somalia-sign-deal-on-cooperation-in-hydrocarbons-field> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

³¹⁵ **Kabakçı, Fuat**, ‘Türkiye ve Somali, Petrol ve Doğal Gaz Alanında İşbirliği Yapacak’, Anadolu Ajansı, 07.03.2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/turkiye-ve-somali-petrol-ve-dogal-gaz-alaninda-isbirligi-yapacak/3157945> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

Starting with soft power in Turkish foreign policy urgent humanitarian assistance, Türkiye-Africa summits, diplomacy and the number of diplomatic missions, state visits, active participation of both governmental and non-nongovernmental institutions, the rise of the flights of Turkish Airlines to become the most flying airline to the continent, and more are tremendous examples of long lasting Turkish soft power implementations.

Taking the examples of Turkish soft power policies in Somalia in consideration, the tremendous efforts in humanitarian aid, development assistance and support in infrastructure attract notice. As a result not just the Somali state but also Somali people welcome Türkiye and its policies towards their country. This enables Türkiye to develop bilateral relations in economy and security. As examined in above parts of the thesis, Türkiye contributes to Somalia especially since 2011 in a permanent and increasing way. A distinctive example for the impact of Turkish presence in Somalia is that “‘Istanbul’ [has become] a common female name in Somalia as Turkish influence gains momentum.”³¹⁶

A way to demonstrate the effects of Turkish soft power implementation are the numbers of Somali students studying in Türkiye. Table 9 presents the total numbers of students from Somalia studying and having graduated in Türkiye from 2014 to 2024.³¹⁷ The numbers include students in public and private universities. There is no separation of students with scholarships or not. In both columns, the number of students and the number of graduates, a permanent increase of the amount of students for each year is noticeable, which proves the success of Turkish soft power application in Somalia. With the exception of the number of graduates in year 2018 and 2019 the continuing rise in the number is seen in the table. In year 2023 and 2024 there is a fall in numbers of Somali students in Türkiye which can be related to the global economic crisis. The number of students are not equal to the numbers of graduates since the study programs distinguish in their lengths. It is worth to mention that some Somali students face difficulties in integrating in Türkiye and learning Turkish language.³¹⁸ This is an indicator of possible extensions of the study program.

³¹⁶ **Dhaysane, Mohammed**, “‘Istanbul’ a Common Female Name in Somalia as Turkish Influence Gains Momentum”, Anadolu Agency, 24.12.2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/istanbul-a-common-female-name-in-somalia-as-turkish-influence-gains-momentum/2456289> l.a.d. 28.07.2024.

³¹⁷ Yüksek Öğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi: Uyuşma Göre Öğrenci Sayıları Raporu and Yükseköğretim İstatistikleri from 2013-2014 to 2023-2024, <https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/>, l.a.d. 23.09.2024.

³¹⁸ **Mohamed, Sirad Jafar** (2023) ‘The Role of Graduate Students in the Context of Somali-Turkey Relations’, AKEM, <https://www.akem.org.tr/post/the-role-of-graduate-students-in-the-context-of-somali-turkey-relations>, l.a.d. 24.09.2024.

However the increase of Somali students in Türkiye led Somalia to become the seventh country having students in Türkiye in 2021.³¹⁹

Table 9. Number of Somali Students and Somali Graduates in Türkiye

Year	Number of Students	Number of Graduates
2014	638	4
2015	915	1
2016	1383	31
2017	1735	164
2018	2310	131
2019	3764	145
2020	6104	248
2021	8141	239
2022	11074	328
2023	10043	367
2024	8872	458

Source: ‘Report on the Number of Students by Nationality’ and ‘Higher Education Statistics’, Higher Education Information Management System

While Türkiye applies both soft and hard power in its Somalia policy, the use of hard power is not considered as controlling Somalia for own benefits. In contrary, Türkiye has not just by the way of soft power policy gained the consent of the Somali state but also through its hard power implementation which based on a win-win concept. Türkiye has established TÜRKSOM, the military base, with conducting military trainings and equipment to Somali soldiers and police. This is unique for a military base that is located abroad. Türkiye’s ambition is to strengthen the sovereignty, security and stability of Somalia with enhancing its military forces. While Türkiye naturally does benefit from the economic and defense agreements of Somalia, the contributions made to Somalia are larger than the benefit of Türkiye. This is another significance underlining Türkiye’s win-win approach.

³¹⁹ **Şimşek, Furkan** (2022) ‘Uluslararası Öğrenci Hareketliliği ve Türkiye Yükseköğretiminde Afrikalı Öğrenciler’, Uluslararası Türk Kültür Coğrafyasında Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol: 7, No: 1, pp.12-36.

5.5. The results of Turkish Efforts in Somalia

Türkiye shows its particularity in a multi-stakeholder framework, as Frederico Donelli describes it, which consists of governmental and non-governmental actors. This reflects the principle of total performance. In this context, Turkish civil society and business organizations lead diplomatic effort. Thereby informal relationships, trust-building, and partnerships occur rather than dependent relations. Through Türkiye's coordinated activities, bilateral involvement, and direct aid supply, the total performance approach resulted successfully.³²⁰

The successful outcome of Turkish soft power in Somalia demonstrate itself in the use of Turkish language in the African Horn country. Dhaysane wrote in 2022 that the Turkish language becomes famous in Somalia since 100 000 Somalis speak Turkish in the country. Turkish language becomes the second most taught language in Somalia. This is a result of business, education, and tourism programs between the two countries. Not just students but also business people apply to learn Turkish language. The Somali diaspora to Türkiye and Turkish movies and TV series play an important role in the popularity of Turkish language in Somalia.³²¹

That Turkish soft power is effectively seen on the popularity of Turkish TV series as well as films watched in Somalia. Yesilcam, Turkish film industry, is preferred than Hollywood or Bollywood in Somalia. Especially Turkish soap operas are famous which are daily streamed on Somali television. Not just on TV but on internet Somali people like to watch Turkish movies and series. People have started to make business in downloading and translating Turkish movies and series to sell or upload them on social media. It is reported that “every evening, Somali families would gather in front of their TV screens to watch them.”³²² Due to religious bonds Somali people do more relate to Turkish film products than to Hollywood or Bollywood. However there are critics from religious figures and particularly from men that women waste too much time on watching Turkish series and movies and neglect their household, children and husbands. On their opinion some parts

³²⁰ **Donelli, Frederico** (2022) ‘Turkey in Africa: Turkey’s Strategic Involvement Sub-Saharan Africa’, 2nd Edition, London, Bloomsbury Academic.

³²¹ **Dhaysane, Mohammed**, ‘Turkish Language Gaining Popularity in Somalia’, Anadolu Agency, 27.01.2022, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkish-language-gaining-popularity-in-somalia/2486799> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

³²² **Nuur Mohamed**, ‘Yesilcam Overtakes Hollywood and Bollywood in Somalia’, Al Jazeera, 20.02.2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/2/20/yesilcam-overtakes-hollywood-and-bollywood-in-somalia> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

should be censored or even totally banned due to the impact on destroying families. Women argue that their husbands can watch football and let them watch Turkish series.³²³

The ultimate success of Türkiye's strategy in Somalia represents itself in Somali diaspora to Türkiye. It is a soft power policy to give scholarships to Somali students in order to study in Türkiye. But the fact that Somali people come with their own opportunities to Türkiye in order to work and live is an ultimate success. It was not usual to see Somali families visiting Türkiye before 2011. After Türkiye's active engagement in Somalia it is common to see Somali tourists in the Turkish streets. Bilateral diplomatic relations, development, and trade are reasons for Somalis to come to Türkiye. Somali diaspora is mostly in North America, Europe or in the Gulf States, where they contribute to the country as well as send annually almost 1 billion dollar to their motherland.³²⁴ Due to cultural and religious challenges Somali people do not live satisfied in the countries and search new locations. The historic visit of Erdoğan to Somalia in 2011, that Türkiye is a Muslim country, the affordable cost of living, the trade relations between Somalia and Türkiye are thriving reasons to move to Türkiye. Somali merchants created over hundred small trading offices in Istanbul. Restaurants and coffee shops in Ankara and Istanbul offer Somali tea and dishes.³²⁵

In relation with Somali diaspora in 2020 Can Aygöl made a research on Somali people migrating to Türkiye. He found out that education is the strongest reason to encourage Somalis to choose Türkiye. Business, culture and religion, family reunification, security, and health are other reasons to move to Türkiye. They mostly have a social live in Türkiye, keep their connection to their Somali friends in Türkiye. They do also meet with Turkish friends. They mostly want to continue their stay in Türkiye. Even though the participants of the survey said to have faced discrimination in bureaucratic experience they evaluate their Experience in Türkiye mostly as positive.³²⁶

Relating to smart power which is a result of a strategic combination of soft power and hard power, Türkiye's efforts in Somalia are demonstrated in Table 10 Türkiye firstly started

³²³ **Nuur Mohamed**, 'Yesilcam Overtakes Hollywood and Bollywood in Somalia', Al Jazeera, 20.02.2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/2/20/yesilcam-overtakes-hollywood-and-bollywood-in-somalia> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

³²⁴ **Sayid, Abdiwali Mohamed**, 'Somali Diaspora Flourishes in Streets of Turkey', Daily Sabah, 07.09.2021, <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/somali-diaspora-flourishes-in-streets-of-turkey> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

³²⁵ **Sayid, Abdiwali Mohamed**, 'Somali Diaspora Flourishes in Streets of Turkey', Daily Sabah, 07.09.2021, <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/somali-diaspora-flourishes-in-streets-of-turkey> l.a.d. 18.08.2024.

³²⁶ **Aygöl, Can** (2019) 'Somali Diaspora in Turkey in the Context of Social Network Theory', DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.35099.08480.

with soft power policy with a behavior in agenda setting in 2011. The international public became aware of the serious situation in Somalia. With time Türkiye did not reduce its involvement in Somalia, contrary the active engagement goes on in both governmental and non-governmental level. The primary currencies that Türkiye uses in its soft power towards Somalia is its sincere involvement along with the education of Turkish language, providing education, scholarships, religious activities and the popularity of Turkish soap operas. The spread of Turkish culture is made through various soft power tools such as YEE, TDV, Maarif Foundation and other institutions. Turkish soft power is also implemented through government policies that are seen in the openings of diplomatic missions, international summits, and conferences. Diplomatic relations are actively continuing. The results of soft power can be seen in the rising number of Somali students studying in Türkiye. After their graduation, Somali students either turn back to Somalia, contribute to the improvement of Turkish-Somali relations or they stay in Türkiye and contribute to Turkish economy or academy. Learning the Turkish language in Türkiye enables Somali graduates to enhance relations with Turkish investors in Somalia. This factor motivates businessmen from Türkiye to develop its business affairs in the African country.³²⁷ Medical students who graduate from the Turkish university, Recep Tayyip Erdogan Training and Research Hospital in Mogadishu, aim to serve as doctors in Türkiye.³²⁸ A diaspora of elites is a crucial indicator of smart power which shows Türkiye's success in its soft and smart power.

³²⁷ **Mohamed, Sirad Jafar** (2023) 'The Role of Graduate Students in the Context of Somali-Turkey Relations', AKEM, <https://www.akem.org.tr/post/the-role-of-graduate-students-in-the-context-of-somali-turkey-relations>, l.a.d. 24.09.2024.

³²⁸ **Dhaysane, Mohammed**, 'Somalia: Over 80 Medical Students Graduate from Turkish University', Anadolu Agency, 25.06.2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-over-80-medical-students-graduate-from-turkish-university/2285550>, l.a.d. 24.09.2024.

Table 10. Turkish Smart Power towards Somalia

	Turkish Smart Power		
	Turkish Hard Power		Turkish Soft Power
	Military Power	Economic Power	
Behaviors	Counter Terrorism	Inducement	Active Engagement Agenda Setting in 2011
Primary Currencies	TURKSOM to educate Somali Forces	Economic Support and Cooperation	Sincere Involvement Language, TV Series, Religion TIKA, YEE, TDV, AFAD, Turkish Red Crescent, Maarif
Government Policies	Defense Agreement	Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production Agreement, Economic Agreement	Diplomatic Missions Summits and Conferences Türkiye as a Mediator

Source: derived from Nye, Joseph S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.

Turkish hard power is explained in military and economic power. In terms of military power Türkiye approaches a behavior in counter terrorism with an aim of possessing security and stability in Somalia. There is no ambition in taking control of Somalia. Contrary, Türkiye educates Somali military forces and provides military equipment to strengthen the military capacity of the African Horn country. In this context the military base TURKSOM is considered as the primary currency of the military power. The Defense Agreement that was signed in early 2024 is a significant example of government policy in which both sides benefit from the agreement. Again, Türkiye does not apply a military power in Western-context, which is related to the carrot-stick theory. These policies aim the enhancement of military power, thereby the security of Somalia.

In terms of economic power, Türkiye uses this power as an inducement. The primary currencies are economic support and cooperation. It is worth to mention that Türkiye cooperates with Somalia in the pursuit of strengthening Somali economy to bring stability.

Relating to government policies the agreements about hydrocarbon exploration and production and about economy present that Türkiye does not aim an exploitation of Somali natural resources. In contrast, Türkiye supports the development of Somali to become strong and independent in terms of economy as well.

While Türkiye makes efforts in contributing to Somalia it also benefits from the activities. Türkiye has proven its sincerity in its soft power policies but more important in its hard power policies that are not with an attempt of controlling the other state. Türkiye provides support on a win-win approach. This is the reason why Somalia chooses Türkiye to work on its hydrocarbon searches and productions. This is also the reason why Türkiye is welcome by Somali people. Türkiye's active sincere role in Somalia leads Somali people to study and make business in Türkiye. It is right to say that Türkiye has built a smart strategy towards Somalia in which hard power is not considered as hard power in Western-approach. Rather it is considered as a soft power since Türkiye does not control Somalia. The use of hard power is balanced in a strategic extent that it is not perceived as danger or coercion. The use of soft power is also implemented strategically that it shows its effect on the spread of Turkish language, the will of study in Türkiye and the Somali Diaspora shifting to Türkiye.

Table 11. SWOT Analysis of Türkiye's Engagement in Somalia

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Attraction	Fixed Policy	Regional Power	Al-Shabaab
Regional Power	Diaspora of the Elite	Bab-el-Mandeb Strait	Competitor Actors
Economic Cooperation		Horn of Africa	Instability
Military Cooperation		Hydrocarbon Resources	
Education			

Source: Author's own work

For a broader understanding of Türkiye's opportunities and challenges in Somalia it is helpful to use SWOT Analysis on Turkish-Somali relations. A SWOT Analysis is a technique to evaluate strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of a company's or

state's position to identify a strategic plan. Table 11 demonstrates Türkiye's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in Somalia. The strengths are that Türkiye has successfully gained positive attraction through its smart power. The outcomes of Türkiye's win-win approach lead Türkiye to become a regional power with a positive image. The provision of education from primary to high school as well as to higher education has resulted in a great success as well. The increase of Somali students in Türkiye, the number of Somali graduates and the success of Somali students in Maarif schools in Somalia strengthen the fact of Türkiye's success in its soft power projection. While other countries have hesitated due to instability and security challenges, Türkiye courageously opened schools and also a research hospital. This is a significant prove that educational contribution and success is possible despite insecure environment. The economic and defense agreement are mirroring the trust that Somalia has in Türkiye. Somalia asked Türkiye to cooperate in military and economic fields which demonstrates the trust that Somalia has in Türkiye since both fields are crucial to become independent and strong. This again proves that Türkiye is not considered as exploiting or controlling Somalia but in contrary that Türkiye is sincerely contributing to the provision of security and development of the African country.

However there are weaknesses in Türkiye's Somali policy. Somalia is due to its geographic location, rich resources, young population, and its potential highly important. Since 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secured its position as Turkish Prime Minister and later as Turkish President. Under his governance the efforts in Africa as well as in Somalia continue in an active way. The question is, how the bilateral relations will go on if the government changes. In this context the Somali policy has to be fixed so that it will not be effected by a governmental change. Another weakness that comes up is that the Somali Diaspora in Türkiye is mostly seen in a merchant level. Even though this diaspora contributes to Turkish economy, for a sustainable impact it is significant that Somali elites move to Türkiye in a greater extend. Under the term elite it is meant educated and qualified people such as doctors, professors, business men, and more. This will lead to a powerful diaspora contributing to Türkiye with more impact.

With regarding the weaknesses and strengths of Türkiye's presence in Somalia, it is important to mention the opportunities of that country. Through the continuing active engagement Türkiye can improve its regional power status. Since Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the region Horn of Africa play an important role in sea logistics, Türkiye's involvement in

that region will also booster the logistic to its country and thereby its economy and security. The exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources in Somali waters will have an important effect on Turkish economy and energy as well. That these works will be made with Turkish vessels, demonstrate the strength of Turkish shipyard and defense industry to the world.

Along with the opportunities there are risks and challenges as well. The last column describes the threats that Türkiye faces in the African Horn country. The terror organization Al-Shabaab conducted terror attacks on Turkish missions in Somalia as well as on places related to Turkish activities. Since this terror organization nourishes by the instability and insecurity in the region it tries to deter Türkiye with its attacks. It will continue to gain dominance in the region. Türkiye's efforts in contributing Somali forces have helped to reduce the power of Al-Shabaab. Nonetheless it is still an active non-state actor in the African Horn. However Al-Shabaab is not a serious risk for Türkiye's power projection since Somali Army and Security Forces are countering the organization since being trained by Turkish Military Forces in TURKSOM. Türkiye does also provide support in countering terrorism in Somalia and in the African Horn. No attack by Al-Shabaab has led Türkiye to stop or reduce its activity in Somalia, thus its presence will not deter Türkiye in the future.

China, the US, Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are also active actors in the African Horn. They are also aware of the opportunities of the region and maintain power projection in order to achieve and sustain their goals. Since maritime trade plays a crucial role in industrial economics, maritime commerce in the Red Sea is one of the most important determinants for militarization of the African Horn. The presence of piracy and terror create serious security threads for the sea trade. The US has a military base in Djibouti with the intention of countering piracy and terror. The American military base has conducted 36 operations in 13 African countries. Besides the US is actively engaged in Somalia, the Red Sea and the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait. China has also a military base in Djibouti aiming to protect commercial transportation and peace. In this context, China's active involvement compromises countries bordering the Red Sea and being on the way of commercial ships traveling from Asia to Europe. France is another country owning a military base in Djibouti with the purpose of countering piracy and human trafficking and of maritime security. The UAE counters Houthis that are supported by Iran. In this sense UAE has military bases in Eritrea and Somalia. Saudi Arabia is also countering Houthis in Somalia

and in Yemen. With its military base in Djibouti, Saudi Arabia aims to stop supplies from Iran to the Houthis. By means of TURKSOM, Türkiye pursues regional stability and security and is particularly active in Somalia. Türkiye needs to step forward in order to improve its regional role and its power projection in the African Horn.³²⁹

The African continent is famous with civil wars, military coups, terror organizations, instability and thereby with poverty. Instability and lack of authority enable terror organizations to increase their activities weakening the state structure. Ethnicity and clan systems are also reasons for societal divisions leading to instability in the region which results with freeze of foreign investments. Domestic conflicts may also spread to the region and continent as well. Colonial powers intend to maintain their hegemony over the African countries which leads to political tensions and competition.³³⁰ In order to invest in a country it is important to trust its stability. The instable region is a threat for Türkiye due to its major investments in the last 13 years. However Türkiye's mediating role between Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Türkiye's prosperous activities in Somalia and in Africa show the effort to secure stability in that region.

With regard to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of Türkiye's presence in Somalia it is possible to analyze the impact assessment of Turkish power projection in Somalia. The rise of Somali students in Türkiye, the will to move or to stay in Türkiye after graduation, the spread of Turkish language among Somali people, the popularity of Turkish TV series and movies in Somalia are significant indicators proving Türkiye's soft power projection. The projection of economic and military power is enhanced by the increasing trade volume between Türkiye and Somalia, the economic and defense agreements between the both countries as well as by the agreements on Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production. The results of soft and hard power projections of Türkiye can be measured in long-term. However the developments of bilateral relations, the perception of Türkiye by Somali people, and the approach of the Somali government to Türkiye show that Türkiye is strategically implementing smart power in Somalia. While existing agreements and activities go on, new agreements show that Türkiye's power in Somalia and furthermore in the African continent will continue in long-term.

³²⁹ **Demirtaş, Tunç** (2022) 'Devletin Yeniden Yapılandırılmasında Riskler ve Fırsatlar: Afrika Boyunu Örneği', (Doctorate), Bursa Uludağ University, Graduate School of Social Sciences.

³³⁰ **Demirtaş**, (2022), pp.256-258.

6. CONCLUSION

Reminding the constructivist theory, the defenders argue that international politics is shaped by historical, cultural, ideological, and social indicators. They believe that power dynamics are not fixed by nature but can change through social interactions and communication. Constructivists also defend that interests and identities are socially constructed. For instance, due to shared values Wendt illustrates that 500 British nuclear weapons are not considered as a danger to U.S. security, whereas 5 North Korean nuclear weapons are seen as a significant security risk since they differ in beliefs and values. Having emphasized Turkish foreign policy, Türkiye's approach to Africa, and Turkish-Somali relations, it is noticeable that the motives of Türkiye's policy can be related to the constructivist approach. The historical ties lie back to the Ottoman Empire and common religious belief exists as well.

Joseph S. Nye has coined the concept of soft power explaining a state reaching its goal without using force but with attracting the other state. With regard to soft power tools and resources, Türkiye has developed its institutions for a soft power projection. In terms of social and cultural activity, Turkish soft power tools as well as Turkish Foreign policy have made huge progress. The use of soft power has immensely increased in Turkish foreign policy. The Elcano Global Presence Index has also proven how Türkiye has continuously improved its global appearance in terms of soft power. Regarding the relations with the African continent and especially towards Somalia it is obvious how strategic Türkiye has approached to the continent and the country. An increase of 275.1% in the number of tourist arrivals to Türkiye from African countries from 2010 to 2023 proves the effective soft power strategy of Türkiye on the continent. In 2014, 638 Somali students studied in Türkiye which has increased to more than 11 thousand Somali students in 2022. While four Somali graduated from Turkish universities in 2014, the number has risen to 458 in year 2024. The rise of Somali students and graduates in Türkiye shows an outcome of Turkish soft power towards Somalia. The popularity of Turkish TV series and movies in Somalia, the spread of Turkish language among Somali people, that 'Istanbul' is commonly preferred as a female name in Somalia, successful Somali graduates working in ministries or in hospitals as surgeon in Somalia are other crucial outcomes of soft power implementation.

Türkiye does not just base on ideological, cultural or historical values but has developed its African approach to a strategic one. In order to enhance national as well as international security, Türkiye is involved in multiple fields in Somalia. Boosting economic and defense relations and conducting the military base are crucial for Turkish security. As economic strength plays an important role in maintaining security, the enhancement of economic relations are vital. In this context, the bilateral trade volume has permanently increased from 2013 with a trade volume of 62.34 million dollars to 425.94 million dollars in 2023. Türkiye safeguards its economic interests, and makes efforts in enlarging economic relations. This is seen in the previously mentioned growing export and import numbers between Türkiye and Somalia. Türkiye finds new markets for its goods and increases its economic growth.

Another point of the strategic approach of Türkiye is, that it has developed its defense industry to become independent of the West, which again is related to economic power and security. Finding new markets in Africa leads to a growth in defense industry. The defense agreement signed by Somalia and Türkiye in early 2024 demonstrates on the one hand the trustworthiness of Türkiye in Somalia, on the other hand the demand of Turkish defense products, thus the success of Turkish defense products. Therefore, Türkiye becomes self-confident, strong, and independent in terms of military strength which enhances the provision of Türkiye's security.

Since Somalia's geopolitical location is at the logistic way of world trade in terms of shipping and since terrorism and piracy have been continuous problems in that region, Türkiye's contribution to preserve security in Somalia and thereby in the region results with a secure trade way for Turkish vessels or for vessels transporting Turkish products and for or from Türkiye as well. In this regard not just Türkiye's but also the international security is protected. Not just Türkiye but also China, Russia, the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France do also conduct military bases in purpose of providing security in that region especially in the maritime commerce through the Red Sea. As these states have interests in the African Horn as well, Türkiye faces a challenge in competing these actors and political difficulties in maintaining its regional power. While the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab is not considered as a dominant risk, the political instability in that region is a risk for investments. The reason for the risk is that due to political instability civil wars, military coups, ethnic clashes and terror actions can occur. However, Türkiye is aware of this risk and challenges

and is contributing Somali government in stabilizing the state authority. In this context, Türkiye is increasing its military and economic power in that region in purpose of possessing security and stability.

In relation with smart power, Türkiye does on the one hand apply efficient and successful soft power with the result of gaining consent, popularity, and particularly a positive image. The soft power tools like diplomacy, TİKA, YTB, Turkish Airlines, media, Turkish television series and more in combination have boosted Türkiye's presence and reputation not just in Somalia or in Africa but also in the global community. Türkiye has proven its strength and path of sincere contribution to a country's development. On the other hand, Türkiye used its hard power in order to secure stability and safety in Somalia and the Somali seas as well. While implementing hard power, Türkiye does not follow an ambition of controlling Somalia. In contrary, Türkiye provides training and assistance in order to contribute to the Somali army to become strong and independent enough for ensuring security in its territory and region. While the US, China, France, UAE, Russia, and Saudi Arabia conduct military bases in Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea, their aim is to preserve security for their own trade objectives. What distinguishes TURKSOM military training base of Türkiye in Somalia is that Türkiye does not intend to project power for its own profit but under the framework of a win-win approach. Türkiye trains Somali forces in order to contribute to the provision of security in the African country. Since Somali soldiers and police officers have graduated from TURKSOM, Somalia has made huge improvement in fighting Al-Shabaab and in maintaining security.

Somalia perceives Türkiye's power projection in a soft way which is seen in the economic and defense agreements as well as in the hydrocarbon exploration and production agreement. Turkish Naval Forces and vessels that are made in Türkiye and are in use of Turkish Navy will be actively conducted in Somalia under the framework of these agreements. This is important as the security of the sea transport has an effect on the international trade way. The warm combination of soft and hard power of Turkish foreign policy towards Somalia demonstrates a strategic smart power. Türkiye is aware of the time and extend of the use of either soft or hard power or even in combination of both powers. Especially Turkish hard power is not considered as a threat in that region, since it contributes to the security. The Somali Diaspora in the West shifting to Türkiye shows the ultimate success of Turkish smart power. Somali people do not just come with scholarships and

support to Türkiye but they travel with their own opportunity due to the attraction that Türkiye has built.

An important outcome of Türkiye's Somali strategy is, that Türkiye has gained prestige and attraction in proving its effective role in mediation, diplomacy, military support, defense cooperation, state development, humanitarian assistance and in economic relation. This makes Türkiye attractive to other countries with the consent to cooperate together. In this context, Türkiye has on the one hand contributed to its security, its defense industry and thereby to its military strength and economic trade volume. On the other hand Türkiye provided security in the Horn of Africa, in Somalia. Furthermore it has confirmed its political strength and capabilities in contribution to a country in various fields with no attempt of exploitation. Türkiye's success in terms of strategic security in the African Horn strengthens the continuous power projection of Türkiye in Somalia, the African Horn, and furthermore in the African continent.

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