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**TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING TOWARDS ISRAEL IN THE
POST COLD WAR: A STRUCTURAL REALIST EXPLANATION**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis/non-thesis master's term project titled as "Turkey's Foreign Policy-Making Towards Israel In The Post Cold War: A Structural Realist Explanation" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ÖZET

Tezli Yüksek Lisans Tezi

**Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Sonrası Türkiye'nin İsrail Dış Politikası: Yapısal Realist
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İsrail ile 1949 yılında ilk diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasından sonra geçen 40 yılda Türkiye İsrail ile ilişkilerini Soğuk Savaş nedeniyle temel seviyede tutmuştur. Genel olarak, iki ülke de Amerika yönlendirmesindeki Orta Doğu ülkeleri olmaları nedeniyle benzer bir profile sahip olmuşlardır. Ancak, 1990'lı yıllarda Amerika'nın da desteği ile ikili ilişkilerde yakınlaşma meydana gelmiştir. Hatta; bölgede Türkiye'ye karşı gelişen tehditler, Türkiye'yi güçlü bir devlet ile ilişkilerini geliştirmeye sevk etmiş ve o dönemde Türkiye için söz konusu devlet İsrail olmuştur. 1990'lı yılların aksine, 2000'li yıllarda Türkiye-İsrail ilişkileri ciddi bir biçimde değişikliğe uğramıştır. Bu değişimin temel nedeni ise İsrail'in Lübnan'a ve Hamas'ın kontrolü altında olan Gazze Şeridi'ne saldırıları ve AKP hükümetinin bu saldırılara karşı sert bir tutum sergilemesidir. Bu tezin amacı, Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası İsrail'e yönelik dış politikasının yapısal realizm açısından değerlendirilmesidir. 1990'lı yıllardaki askeri yakınlaşma ve 2000'li yıllarda ikili ilişkilerde yaşanan gerginlikler bu teori ile açıklanabilmektedir çünkü bölgesel tehditlerin hem İsrail için hem de Türkiye için tehlike yaratması 1990'lı yıllarda iki ülkeyi bu anlamda yaklaştırsa da, 2000'li yılların başında izlediği dış politikanın da etkisiyle dış tehdit algısının Türkiye açısından azaltılması, Türkiye'nin İsrail ile olan askeri işbirliği ihtiyacında belirgin bir azalmaya yol açmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, İsrail, Dış Politika, Yapısal Realizm, Neo-Realizm.

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

Turkey's Foreign Policy-Making Towards Israel in the Post Cold War: A Structural Realist Explanation

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In the four decades following the establishment of first diplomatic relations with Israel in 1949, Turkey had a low-contact relationship with Israel based on moderate cooperation within the framework of the Cold War. Roughly, the two states shared a common position of being members of the United States-led Western bloc in the Middle East. However, in the 1990s considerable improvement in bilateral relations occurred with the encouragement of the United States. In fact, rising regional security challenges arising from unfriendly policies of Turkey's neighbors had led Turkey to enter into a strong strategic relationship with Israel. In contrast to the 1990s, the 2000s have witnessed a critical transformation in bilateral relations as relations deteriorated due to a number of developments, most of which have been related with Israeli attacks on south Lebanon and the Gaza Strip under Hamas control, and the JDP governments' intense criticisms of these attacks. This thesis aims to analyze Turkey's relations with Israel in the post-Cold War period through the perspective of structural realism. It is argued that both the close military alliance between the two states in the 1990s and tensions in bilateral relations in the 2000s can be explained by a structural realist approach. Shared sense of common regional security challenges encouraged rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, whereas reduced sense of external enemies in the early 2000s has noticeably reduced Turkey's need for military alliance with Israel.

Keywords: Turkey, Israel, Foreign Policy, Structural Realism, Neo-Realism.

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ABBREVIATIONS

EU	European Union
IR	International Relations
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestine National Authority
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
UN	United Nations
UNGA	<i>United Nations General Assembly</i>
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

INTRODUCTION

In the four decades following the establishment of first diplomatic relations with Israel in 1949, Turkey had a low-contact relationship with Israel based on moderate cooperation within the framework of the Cold War. Roughly, the two states shared a common position of being members of the United States (US) -led Western bloc in the Middle East. However, in the 1990s considerable improvement in bilateral relations occurred with the encouragement of the United States. In fact, rising regional security challenges arising from unfriendly policies of Turkey's neighbors had led Turkey to enter into a strong strategic relationship with Israel. In contrast to the 1990s, the 2000s have witnessed a critical transformation in bilateral relations as relations deteriorated due to a number of developments, most of which have been related with Israeli attacks on south Lebanon and the Gaza Strip under Hamas control, and the JDP governments' intense criticisms of these attacks. This thesis aims to analyze Turkey's relations with Israel in the post-Cold War period through the perspective of structural realism. It is argued that both the close military alliance between the two states in the 1990s and tensions in bilateral relations in the 2000s can be explained by a structural realist approach. Shared sense of common regional security challenges encouraged rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, whereas reduced sense of external enemies in the early 2000s has noticeably reduced Turkey's need for military alliance with Israel.

In general, scholars tend to explain Turkey-Israel relations in the 1990s and 2000s through different theoretical approaches. While structural realism/neo-realism is commonly employed to explain Turkey's foreign policy-making towards Israel in the 1990s, social constructivism is preferred as a theoretical perspective to shed light on Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel in the 2000s. Unlike most of the existing literature on Turkey-Israel relations, this thesis adopts a uniform theoretical approach, that is structural realism, to explain Turkey's foreign policy-making towards Israel in the 1990s and 2000s. As a structural theoretical framework, structural realism prioritizes structure when compared with agents or units. To put it differently, structural realism attempts to explain international relations by focusing on the structure of the international system. Structural realists argue that states act in a similar way, that is they are interested in maximizing their power because the international

system is characterized by anarchy. Thus, explanation of international politics is neither through human nature nor through domestic political systems. Instead, it is associated with the international system. It is the international system which shapes the behavior of states.

Throughout the 1990s, changes and developments in the international system highly contributed to close military and economic cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Iran and Syria's increasing support for Kurdish terrorist organization, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which intensified its attacks on Turkey, highly disturbed Turkey. Turkish foreign policy-makers were also worried that Turkey's geo-strategic importance would decrease with the ending of the Cold War and that its access to American economic and military aid would come to an end. However, through its active foreign policy during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Turkish decision-makers reproved Turkey's importance for the US. As a result, Turkey's relations with the US evolved into a strategic relationship in the 1990s. The US decision-makers encouraged rapprochement among Turkey and Israel they believed that close cooperation among US' two leading allies in the Middle East would serve to American national interests in the region in a better way. It was that regional and international context, which shaped Turkey's willingness to enter into economic and military alliance with Israel.

Unlike the 1990s, changes and developments in the regional and international context starting with the early 2000s reduced Turkey's need for close cooperation with Israel. Abandonment of Syria and Iran's support for PKK and improvement of relations with these two countries within the framework of "zero problems with neighbors" reduced Turkey's perception of regional security threats. American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its outcomes created tensions in Turkey's relations with the US. Israel's unconditional support for the American invasion of Iraq was met by displeasure in Turkey. In addition, unproportional force used by Israel in its operations in South Lebanon and the Gaza Strip created reactions both within the Turkish public and among the Turkish ruling circles. This unfavorable regional and international setting played a remarkable role in the deterioration of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel.

In the first chapter of this study, structural realism will be explained as a theoretical approach within the International Relations (IR) discipline. Initially,

similarities and differences between structural realism and classical realism will be provided. Then the focus will be on leading concepts of structural realism including the international order, relative gain, balance of power concepts and polarity of the system. Lastly, impact of structural realism on foreign policy-making will be discussed through a number of examples.

In the second chapter, the concentration will be on Turkey's foreign policy-making towards Israel in the 1990s. In this regard, leading principles of Turkish foreign policy and determinants of foreign decision-making process will be explained. Then Turkey-Israel rapprochement in the 1990s will be analyzed in a detailed way. Here, leading factors behind this rapprochement including the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, common threat perception from Iran, Iraq and Syria, impact of the US, newly initiated dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, Welfare Party period will be covered. In the last section, main developments and achievements among the two countries regarding military and economic cooperation will be mentioned.

Contrary to good relations with Israel during the 1990s, 2000s have seen a number of tensions between Turkey and Israel. In the third chapter of this thesis, the main focus will be on Turkey's problematic relations with Israel in the 2000s. First of all, changes in Turkish foreign policy-making in the 2000s will be covered. After that, factors behind the deterioration of bilateral relations will be examined under two sections: change in the security context and Israel's handling of the Palestinian question. Finally, main developments between the two countries will be mentioned including the Operation Cast Lead (2008), Davos Incident, Mavi Marmara Incident, Low Seat Crisis and economic relations.

Turkey was obliged to follow a changing foreign policy due to transformation in world politics and regional politics with the ending of the Cold War. Both dynamics within Turkey and external policies implemented by the great powers that shape the world politics contributed to change in Turkish foreign policy. Final chapter will primarily examine and compare the foreign policy followed by Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. Leading changes in Turkey's foreign policy-making towards Israel will be reviewed and impact of neorealist approach on the implementation of Turkish foreign policy towards Israel in the post-Cold War will be analyzed.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: STRUCTURAL REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

At the very beginning of this work, theoretical explanation of structural realism will be examined. In the first part, what structural realism is and its relation with classical realism will be explained. In the second part, the focus will be on leading concepts of structural realism like international order, relative gain, balance of power concepts and polarity of the system. In the third part, the focus will be on impact of structural realism over foreign policy and in this part some examples will be provided to demonstrate how structural realism affects states' foreign policies. In the final part criticisms against structural realism will be explained.

1.1. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLASSICAL REALISM AND STRUCTURAL REALISM

Like each and every theoretical framework has, there also are some important concepts of realism and structural realism. It is generally pointed out that main orientation toward realism started with Hans Morgenthau and his famous book *Politics among Nations*. On the other hand, some scholars also accept that classical realism has its roots from Machiavelli in 16th century and that it was E.H. Carr who highly contributed to modern realism with his work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. After the World War II, Hans Morgenthau and his *Politics among Nations* book had the biggest intellectual commitment to realism in International Relations discipline. In his book, Morgenthau mainly focuses on the importance of power based on human behaviors and consequently states' actions. (Morgenthau, 2006: 3) Realists mainly focus on strategy, components of national power, diplomacy and management of state and this is not surprising as realists believed that setting bar against wars in the future depends on a deterrent balance of power in the system. (Aydın, 1996: 93) Additionally, Hans Morgenthau has an important effect on analyzing international relations by focusing on why a particular event occurred instead of how it occurred and this point shows changing methodology in realism (Ibid. 92-94)

Jack Donnelly, in his *Realism* chapter in Scott Burchill's *Theories of International Relations* book, mainly focuses on how classical realism perceives international relations. Classical realism focuses on national interests of states and the states have some unavoidable difficulties to pursue their national interests (Donnelly, 2005: 29). Political realism which also means 'power politics' and 'Realpolitik', is the oldest idea in International Relations terminology (Ibid.).

Structural realism can be accepted as the modern extension of classical realism, but it is also a critique of its predecessor. (Brown, 2009: 266) Structuralist explanations of international system start with Thucydides because he mentions specifically Athenian and Spartan propositions and Athenian speech against Spartans includes clues from offensive realism (Ibid.). In the International Relations discipline, structural realism (neo-realism) is accepted as continuity of classical realism but Kenneth Waltz believes that reductionist theories which are based on levels of units in the system are not satisfactory (Ibid).

E. H. Carr¹ is one of leading scholars of modern realism. According to Peter Wilson, *Twenty Years' Crisis* points out how realism occurred. In *Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr mainly focuses on the interwar period suggesting that political elites and leaders who played a significant role in the establishment of League of Nations were wrong because their liberal ideas were so 'utopic' (Carr, 1939: 87). Carr has some important predictions about power analysis and he quotes his argument as follows:

The intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, far from being the expression of absolute and a priori principles, are historically conditioned, being both products of circumstances and weapons framed for the furtherance of interests (Ibid.).

In his work Carr maintains that the ideas disarmament, free trade, and collective security belonged to the interwar period (Wilson, 2009: 6). *Twenty Years' Crisis* is a very important work because it was the first scientific work in International Politics, and it was the first counter-hegemonic criticism (Ibid.). It is also important because it criticizes not only utopian ideas, but also realistic narrowness. Wilson argues that

¹ His leading work on the issue is *Twenty Years' Crisis*. For more details see; E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939).

scientific theoretical debate in International Relations starts with the *Twenty Years' Crisis* through its focus on how realism emerged (Ibid.1-12).

Jack Donnelly also puts forward realists assume that politics between states is based on human nature, human selfishness and egoism; and it takes place in the absence of an international government, which is hierarchically higher than state (Donnelly, 2005: 30). Still, realism is highly based on state-centrism even though realist thinkers are different from each other when they define what is 'state' (Ibid). According to Gilpin, states are conflict groups, whereas according to Waltz, states are units (Ibid.). On the other hand, Donnelly points out Hobbesian understanding of human nature and statism and first of all, according to Donnelly, Hobbes is skeptical about changing human nature and it is evil and it is based on competition and glory and secondly, Donnelly also attracts attention to Hobbesian understanding of state (Ibid. 32). The Hobbesian state of nature idea is based on three basic assumptions. Firstly, men are equal based on elemental sense and this idea generally means that the weakest one in the system has enough power to confederate with the other to kill the strongest one, secondly, states are in the anarchy and their actions are under the anarchic structure and finally; states are under the pressure of competition, diffidence and glory (Ibid.).

Hans Morgenthau, in his famous work *Six Principles of Political Realism*, step by step explains six major principles of Political realism. (Morgenthau, 2007: 7). Firstly, politics is governed by objective laws with roots in human nature and to improve a society, its laws should be understood and should be reflected by a rational theory (Ibid.). Realism is instilled with the ethical soul that the pragmatists contended was additionally present in human instinct (Cristol, 2009: 240). Secondly, according to Morgenthau, the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way in international politics is interest which is defined in terms of power (Morgenthau, 2007: 8). Morgenthau sets global legislative issues as its very own scholarly circle (Cristol, 2009: 239). This concept differentiates politics from other spheres like economy, ethics, etc. and it gives politics an autonomous sphere of action (Morgenthau, 2007: 8). This concept also helps to differentiate domestic and international politics from each other (Ibid. 8).

Additionally, according to Morgenthau, political power is an important concept (Morgenthau, 2004: 52). In his *Political Power* work, he explains what political power is and how it can be understood (Ibid.). Whatever the ultimate aim is in international politics, power is always the immediate aim (Ibid.). Political power is a mental connection between the individuals who practice it and those over whom it is worked out (Cristol, 2009: 242). It gives the previous command over specific activities of the last through the impact that the previous has on the latter's brains (Ibid.) That impact gets from three sources: the desire for advantages, the dread of impediment, and the regard or love for men or establishments (Ibid.). States may define their interests by different terms like economic, religious etc. but whenever they define their interest by politics, power is ultimate and immediate aim (Morgenthau, 2004: 52). Power is defined as control of men over minds and actions of other men (Ibid.).

Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man (Morgenthau, 2007: 10). Thus, power covers all social relationships from physical violence to psychological ties (Ibid.). Because of this reason, Morgenthau believes that although power is an objective term, it cannot be understood by a fixed meaning (Ibid.). That is because a political action in a certain period depends upon the political and cultural context (Ibid.).

Political power should be distinguished from actual power or use of violence. A state uses its political power in its domestic issues with police action, imprisonment etc. (Ibid.). In international politics, a state's military power is an important element of that state's political power (Ibid.). On the other hand, political power is a psychological relation between the one who exercises it and on whom it is exercised (Ibid.).

According to Morgenthau, states want power because it is a basic virtue of human nature. (Mearsheimer, 2006: 72). On the other hand, structural realists believe that human nature does not have a very important effect on why states want power because the pressure point is international system (Ibid.). It is the system that forces states to pursue power and in an anarchic system, where there is no higher authority than states, states want power at least to protect themselves (Ibid.).

The question 'Why states want power' is very famous among realist thinkers. John Mearsheimer answers it by stating that there are five different assumptions that help

us understand the answer to this question even though none of these five assumptions can construct the answer alone because they should be considered all together (Ibid.73-74). First, great powers are the main actors in the international system and they operate in an anarchic system, second, all states have military capabilities in a way, third, a state cannot be sure of other states' intentions, fourth, a state's main aim always is survival, that is because states have to be self-seeking, and fifth, states are rational actors and they calculate their actions to maximize their prospects to survive in an anarchic system (Ibid.).

Structural realism also examines the question 'How much power is enough' and two different views have been developed on this. Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz believe that in order not to be punished by the international system, states should have enough power to secure themselves. On the other hand, offensive realists like Mearsheimer believe that states should have power as much as they can have (Ibid.72). Mearsheimer in his work asks the question of how much power is enough and he projects a division in structural realism. According to him, there are two types of structural realism that answer this question differently; defensive and offensive realism. According to defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz, states should seek 'appropriate amount of power' and that means enough power to defend themselves from other states in an anarchic system (Ibid.) On the other side off the argument, offensive realists like Mearsheimer believes that states should pursue power as much as they can as the intentions of other states are never clear and states can never be sure of what other state will do next (Ibid.74-78).

There is only one point on which both defensive and offensive realists share the same opinion and it is nuclear weapons (Ibid.76). Both perspectives believe that nuclear weapons have magnificent destructive power and states are aware that there will be no gain by attacking first (Ibid.).

Realism is aware of the moral significance of political actions. Political actions of a state should be in abstract universal formulations and they should be filtered by circumstances of time and place, but universal moral principles cannot be applied to any political action of a state (Ibid. 12). A specific state's moral aspirations cannot be applicable to all states (Ibid. 12-13). All states have their own moral aspirations. Each and every state has their own moral values and aspirations which change by time and

place and these aspirations cannot be used for examining another state's political actions (Ibid.).

Political realism is different from other schools of thought. Main difference of political realism is that it points out a political sphere which has its own autonomy (Ibid.13). It should be understood by its own terms and concepts (Ibid. 13). Structural realism, which is also called as neo-realism, has some similarities and differences with classical realism when the two are compared. These differences and similarities will be examined by referring to different scholars (Donnelly, 2005: 31).

Realists and Neo-realists share common ideas about general assumptions like states are the key actors in international system and this system is anarchic. On the other hand, realists have different views about some key concepts (Walt, 1997: 932). For example, as a classical realist, Hans Morgenthau believes in the importance of human nature and he believes that states' actions have roots from human nature, whereas as a neorealist Kenneth Waltz believes that states act under the pressure of international system (Ibid. 933). Brian Leiter also points out this difference and asserts that classical realism and neorealism are highly different from each other when the subject-matter is human nature. According to Leiter, classical realism views human nature as selfish to expect their well-being (Leiter, 2001: 249-250).

Classical realists and structural realists disagree about polarity of the system and importance of intentions of states. These reasons show how realism is a huge and diverse body of thought (Walt, 1997: 932-933). Morgenthau refers to human nature concept as the main reason of international conflicts (Shimko, 1992: 291). Kenneth Waltz believes that international conflicts occur because of the international system. Hans Morgenthau does not pay sufficient importance to the term 'anarchy'. Shimko thinks that Morgenthau does not explain the 'explanatory variable' of anarchy (Ibid. 293). Consequently, classical realism provides "bottom-up" explanations to state behaviors whereas neorealism provides 'top-down' explanations (Shimko, 1992: 291-294).

According to Brian Leiter classical realism follows three doctrines and these doctrines are as follows:

Naturalism: there exist certain (largely) incorrigible and generally unattractive facts about human beings and human nature. Pragmatism:

only theories which make a difference to practice are worth the effort: the effect or "practical pay-off" is the relevant measure of value in theoretical matters. Quietism: any normative theorizing which fails to respect the limits imposed by these facts about human nature is idle and pointless; it is better to "keep quiet" about normative matters than to theorize in ways that make no difference to practice (Leiter, 2001: 245).

Depending on these doctrines, Brian Leiter believes that classical realists do not chase normative or justificatory projects and they do want to understand things the way they really are rather than how they ought to be (Ibid.).

Neorealism takes classical realism's position over when Kenneth Waltz released his Theory of International Politics (Parent & Baron, 2011: 195-196). Neorealism accuses classical realism by two issues. Firstly, according to the authors, classical realism is focusing on human nature to large extent and secondly, classical realism is devoid of theoretical background (Ibid.). On the other hand, neorealists got rid of these accusations by adding domestic issues to explain foreign policies (Ibid.).

1.2. LEADING CONCEPTS IN STRUCTURAL REALISM

Structural realism has a number of unique characteristics. In this part, leading concepts of structural realism will be examined. Order will be as follows: In the first part, the world order by Kenneth Waltz will be examined through the concepts of state, survival and self-help. In the second part, balance of power concept and misunderstandings related with this concept will be explained. In the third part, structural realists' approach to the conditions which lead to cooperation; and their understanding with respect to 'relative gain' will be explained. Finally; the focus will be on what kind of polarities exists in the world and why bipolarity is good for international politics according to structural realists.

1.2.1.State, Survival and Self Help – the World Order

Kenneth Waltz explains how structural realism perceives international relations in his famous book '*Theory of International Politics*' (Waltz, 1979: 92-93). With general explanation, states are alike entities, but they are also very different from each other (Ibid. 92). They are different from each other in different aspects like their sizes, wealth, power and form, and these aspects also vary in other respects among these

alike units (Ibid.). States are the same based on the tasks that they undertake although they don't have the same abilities to perform them and the 'ability' refers to their capability and their aim survival to achieve their goals (Ibid.) Survival is the first ground of an action in the world arena because state security is not something that can be taken for granted (Waltz, 1979: 92-93). Waltz states:

The survival assumption allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with other states to their own survival in form (Ibid. 92).

The state of nature is a state of war and this is not because wars constantly occur but because each state decides for itself for use of force or not. (Waltz, 1979: 102). That's why wars may occur any time (Ibid.) Like in a family, conflicts may occur any time; thus, the world system is anarchic and by anarchy, he refers to absence of a world government in his statements – which will be explained in detail in the following parts (Ibid).

States may use force if they have either too much or too little power (Waltz, 1988: 103-104). For example, if a state has more power, it can use this power for prompting other states to increase their weapons and arms, or if a state has little power, it may face attacks from powerful states (Ibid.). Either way, states are always concerned about their survivals (Ibid.). They should be concerned about their own securities because in an unbalancing situation, international environment may grant the powerful state right to dominate of other states (Ibid.).

To understand the relation between states and international relations, Waltz uses the 'structure' term. He says that structure can only be explained by its arrangements. The changing arrangements are structural changes and a 'system' is composed of a structure and of interacting parts (Waltz, 1979: 80). Structure is not something that can be seen with eyes. It is not a collection of political institutions but it is the arrangement of them. To understand international structure, he says, we should differentiate domestic and international politics from one another (Ibid. 80-81).

Domestic politics is, first of all, hierarchically ordered (Ibid.). Units of domestic politics like institutions, agents, etc. have super and subordination relations (Ibid.). In this kind of a system, political actors and their duties are certain and they

are different by degrees of their authority (Ibid.). Their functions are also specified. Domestic political structure is also defined as distribution of capabilities across units and some of the units are entitled to obey and others are entitled to command

On the other hand, international political structure is anarchic. In theory, each and every unit in international arena is equal (Waltz, 1979: 88). There is no superiority and subordination between states and because of that there is no governmental body in the international arena (Ibid.). International arena is decentralized and that is why international politics is called as 'politics in the absence of government' (Ibid.). In such an environment, states should care only about their survival and self-help (Ibid.). To achieve their goals, and to sustain their security in an anarchic structure, self-help is a necessity (Ibid. 89). Kenneth Waltz's theory about operation of international system underlies basically four main points; firstly, the theory says in international system, politically and territorially organized entities are the main actors, secondly; states in the international system act rationally, thirdly; these entities in the international arena always seek their security and they organize their activities by looking their power comparing to other states, and fourthly; international system is anarchic because there is no higher authority in the system than states (James, 1995: 183).

International system has different components and according to this argument Waltz states that;

States continue to coexist in an anarchic order. Self-help is the principle of action in such an order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. Therefore, in weighing the chances of peace the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without actively using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to the possible gains (Waltz, 1988: 624).

International political system consists of self-regarding units- states. Structure is established by these co-acting units. The units of international political system are not different from each other by their functions, but they are different by their greater or lesser capabilities. Waltz;

The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A

government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force-that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by its subjects. If some use private force, others may appeal to the government. A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate here means public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force. Citizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do that. A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is (Waltz, 1979: 103).

In this kind of an anarchic system, each interacting unit cannot be sure about others' behavior or intentions (Waltz, 2000: 10). States can never know what today's friend will do tomorrow, as a foe (Ibid.). This positioning creates security dilemma, which is very important concept for structural realism (Ibid). Security dilemma concept was firstly used by John Herz in his work *Idealist internationalism and Security Dilemma*. According to Herz, in an anarchic system, each state wants to increase its military power to feel more secure. On the other hand, other states may feel like this kind of an action may be pre-warning of an attack against them. So, they decide to increase their military power as well. When states want to feel more secure, they find themselves in a worse situation (Herz, 1950: 173-176).

1.2.2. Balance of Power

Balance of power theory generally focuses on why a similar action is expected from another similarly situated state (Waltz, 1979: 123-128). First of all, it should be underlined that the concept of Balance of Power is basically a theory (Ibid.). It addresses the results of uncoordinated actions of the states. It makes assumptions about states' interests and motives. It does not explain why a state did a certain action.

In his work '*Structural Realism after Cold War*', Waltz points out the significance of balance of power theory (Waltz, 2000: 13). He believes that any kind of unbalanced power in international arena is a threat to other states (Ibid.). The most powerful ones and less powerful ones always exist, and the most powerful state may act as a predator believing that it acts for sake of peace and justice in the world (Ibid.). In reality, activities which are similar to that force other states to balance against it (Ibid.). Weaker states may increase their military capacities to feel more secure (Ibid.).

Expected behaviors of states are not identical, but similar. Because of this reason, balance of power theory has two problems (Waltz, 1979: 124-125). First of all, the theory offers some predictions and these predictions are not determined (Ibid.). Secondly, any action of a state is affected from its internal politics (Ibid.). Each and every state has unique internal conditions so every international activity cannot be predicted (Ibid.).

On the other hand, balance of power theory has some problems. First of all it is a theory and it makes assumptions about states' actions and these assumptions are theoretical, not factual. (Waltz, 1979: 119). States are unitary actors who seek their own survival and their interest and in this point balance of power theory does its job. (Ibid.) Balance of power comes up when the fear of danger occurs. First misunderstanding about Balance of Power theory is the idea that its assumptions are incorrect. These assumptions can be wrong or right at the same time because they are assumptions, according to him

Secondly, balance of power theory claims to make assumptions of the results of an action (Ibid. 126-127). Balancing is a political action to survive in a kind of anarchic structure, on the other hand, in the history we can see that states bandwagon more than balancing (Ibid.). Bandwagoning may seem like a less demanding and more rewarding strategy because it costs less. States should make reasonable decisions. They should avoid wars, so they decide on costs and benefits. They should think about what they have and what they will have after balancing. At the end of the day, balancing or bandwagoning are just strategies for survival and states may choose one of them by looking at their actual conditions (Ibid. 126-127).

In the hierarchic political order, actors do not hesitate to bandwagon because even if they lose, their security will not be in danger (Donnelly, 2005: 36). They believe that if they join to stronger party their gains will be increased or their lost will be reduced (Ibid.). On the other hand, in the anarchic structure, bandwagoning may be more painful because the greatest power in the system may use its power against this 'bandwagoners.' In anarchic system in which there is no higher authority to protect states, great powers always remain as a threat. Balancing strategy is always less risky to 'balancers' in the system (Ibid.). Jack Donnelly gives as Soviet-American relations as an example to this. United States was against Soviet Revolution, but World War II

brought them together against German Nazis. The main point here is that the common threats may bring two enemies together with the strategy of 'balancing' (Ibid.).

Thirdly, balance of power theory is criticized because it does not explain a state's certain move. (Ibid. 121-123). Waltz states that 'Balance of power theory does not explain why state X made a certain move last Tuesday.' States are unitary and self-seeking actors (Ibid.). No one can produce a must solution for an action neither balance of power theory does (Ibid.). According to him, if balance of power theory can predict a solution for an action, any kind of national or lower political theory turns on an explanatory theory for international conflicts or actions (Ibid. 121-123).

As a conclusion, in a self-help system actors or units tend to balance. Allies in this kind of a system is always useful and because of that reason, balancing is favored. (Waltz, 1992: 73). The only important point of balancing is subjects who are based on security are always sensitive (Ibid.). For example, in conventional weapons and nuclear weapons World, relations about security are very different. In a bipolar conventional World, states may calculate their moves with allying other states or contrary in a multipower conventional world strategies get more complicated because each state should calculate its power and other states' power (Ibid.).

1.2.3. Relative Gain and Cooperation

Anarchy is an obstacle for any cooperative activities among states and this situation is explained with Prisoner's Dilemma. Jack Donnelly explains Prisoners' Dilemma as follows:

Imagine two criminals taken in separately by the police for questioning. Each is offered a favorable plea bargain in return for testimony against the other. Without a confession, though, they can be convicted only of a lesser crime. Each must choose between cooperating (remaining silent) and defecting (testifying against the other). Imagine also that both have the following preference ordering: (1) confess while the other remains silent; (2) both remain silent; (3) both confess; (4) remain silent while the other confesses. Assume finally that their aversion to risk takes a particular form: they want to minimize their maximum possible loss. Cooperating (remaining silent) rewards both with their second choice (conviction on the lesser charge). But it also leaves the cooperator vulnerable to the worst possible outcome (serving a long prison term – and knowing that your partner put you there). Each can assure himself against disaster by confessing (defecting). The rational choice thus is to defect (confess) even though both know that they both could be better off by cooperating. Both end up with their third choice, because this is the only way to assure that each

avoids the worst possible outcome. In an environment of anarchy, even those capable of mastering their own desires for gain and glory are pushed by fear towards treating everyone else as an enemy (Donnelly, 2005: 37).

Robert Powell, in his article, focuses on why structural realism regards relative gain understanding as the only way for cooperation in an anarchic world. (Powell, 1991: 1303) In structural realism, relative gain is more important than absolute gain by referring to Waltz's work. A state's utility in structural realism is at least partly a function of some relative measure like power (Ibid.).

Kenneth Waltz is a supporter of relative gain idea and according to him states are alike units and they only care about their own survival and that's because the only way of survival is self-help (Waltz, 1979: 106). Structure of international politics limits cooperation among states and he explains his idea because they worry about how possible gains of cooperation are divided (Ibid.). State should also worry about becoming dependent on another state by cooperation (Ibid.).

1.2.4 Polarity of the System

In International Relations theories, there is an ongoing debate about polarity of the world. There are three different types of polarity; unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. Structural realism believes that bipolarity is the best way to maintain stability in the world. According to Waltz, bipolarity contributed to great stability in the postwar period (Waltz, 1964: 881-882).

Bipolarity limits violence in the world by four ways (Ibid. 882-887). First of all, if there are two major powers in the world there will be no peripheries, secondly, competition among countries becomes more intense and extended, thirdly, in a bipolar world, pressure and occurrence of crises will decrease (Ibid.). In a multipolar world, all great powers try to be more effective on other states and this situation brings constant violence and that is the cause of forth limitation which is the idea of diffusion of dangers, unclear responsibilities and vital interest definitions. (Ibid.) In this kind of an environment, every state would try to press other states more.

Competition in a multipolar world is hard when it is compared to bipolar world because there are uncertainties about capabilities of other states (Waltz, 2000: 6).

States can never be sure about other states' capabilities, especially in-military sense (Ibid.).

In the postwar period, bipolarity made world more stable according to Waltz. He mentions nuclear proliferation here (Waltz, 1964: 905). According to him, nuclear weapons increased the range of political decisions instead of using destructive power (Ibid. 886). In a bipolar world, states always reconsider to use nuclear weapons against other great powers because the state may use nuclear power against itself and using only one nuclear weapon may cause destructive effects on itself too (Waltz, 1964: 905).

There are four different advantages of bipolarity according to its advocates. (James, 1995: 184-185). First of all, with two leaders in the system, the system can be more manageable, secondly, distribution of power will be clearer and equilibrium in the system will be more maintained, thirdly, main powers of the two leaders encourage them to work on more these powers by intending on the stop conflicts in the system and fourthly, wars will become conflicts because crises are more relaxing when they are compared to wars between two leaders (Ibid.).

On the other hand, George Sorenson believes that, the world lost its bipolar system in the postwar period, instead, with the collapse of Soviet power, unipolarity gained prominence with the United States of America as the only hegemonic power (Sorenson, 1998: 98).

Kenneth Waltz, in his work emphasizes that Cold War period for four decades refused to turn world on a peaceful space (Waltz, 1992: 49). According to him during 1970's bipolarity could not help world to establish peace, but, during 1980's the structure helped the world to become open to peace (Ibid.). Kenneth Waltz believes that structural changes start with units in the system, that's because leaders in the system try to maintain their position in the system and during the cold war period they denied or hided their declines (Ibid.). On the other hand, Waltz says that polarity of the system has been changing because of basically three things; using of nuclear weapons has lost its importance because deterrence against it is so powerful, rising of political units to great power range like Germany, Japan and China and industrial developments of the countries (Ibid. 51-56).

1.3. STRUCTURAL REALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Structural realism is aware that wars can occur for a number of reasons. The question of why wars occur between states cannot be explained by only one theory. Generally, security based fears constitute main reasons for wars, but Mearsheimer says, this not always the case. Ideological changes, nationality or economic considerations can be also considered as other reasons to wars. Mearsheimer gives Bismarck's actions against Denmark, Austria and France in 19th century to create a unified Germany as an example (Mearsheimer, 2006: 78).

Great powers have little trust to each other because of mutual fear. A state's most important fear is another state's uncertain intentions because they may attack them any time. Anarchic system is the main reason for that because there is no higher authority above the states in the system (Ibid. 74).

States should only trust themselves because the world system is based on self-help and other states are potential threats. States should be relatively more powerful when compared with their competitors. Mearsheimer gives the US as an example because according to him, no state dares to attack the US because it is so much powerful (Ibid.).

Consequently great states try to shift the balance in the international system to their favor because they don't want other states to gain more power than themselves. That's because anarchic system forces states to assume the worst possibility each and every time (Ibid. 74-75).

Structural realism produces best results when it comes to application of theory to the practice (James, 1995: 181-182). Structural realism's rational choice theory is one of the leading theories of states' behaviors and moves and it is the best way to explain foreign policies of the states. This theory basically means the idea of minimizing lost and maximizing gains (Ibid.).

Realism's basic and fundamental argument for states actions in international arena is distribution of power. In a bipolar world, distribution of power is shared by two great Powers and their power competition forces smaller states to be more focused on security issues (Krasner, 1992: 39). As a conclusion, structural realism has different components from classical realism but it also shares the similar roots and generally, state, self-help and survival idea is the main focus on both theories.

In the following paragraphs a number of examples will be provided to explain how structural realism have shaped states' foreign policy-making acts. Firstly, theoretical explanation will be put forward and then the example will be given an act of the state will be associated with the theoretical explanation

Structural realism has an important effect on foreign policies of states'. Krasner says that international system has imposing effect on states and international system forces states to seek their self-help and protecting territorial and political integrity (Krasner, 1992: 40). This situation is mostly based on international distribution of power. Krasner gives Britain and Germany as examples during First and Second World Wars. Britain was forced to ally with Germany because of the system (Ibid.) During World Wars, Britain saw Germany as the potential dominator of the system, and it was a potential threat for the security of Britain Isles. On the other hand, after the Second World War, Eastern Europe had to be bounded with the United States because of the power of the Soviet Union (Ibid.).

Additionally, Krasner also gives Japan as an example. Although Japan's military power was highly weak, it has raised its financial power and has become a major actor in the world to solve financial crisis (Ibid.42). Japan has improved its financial power in the international system which is based on distribution of power and Japan became a major actor when financial crisis occurred. This situation also shows that Japan seeks its survival by using its economic and financial powers (Ibid.).

According to John Mearsheimer, during the twentieth century, there were four great powers including Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the system. These four countries sought to be a hegemon in the world and that wish can only be explained by offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2013: 88). Similarly, China's rising in international arena can be explained by both offensive and defensive realisms (Ibid. 89). Mearsheimer believes that the main aim of states according to offensive realism is to gain hegemony in the system because by gaining hegemony, states guarantee their survival in the system (Ibid). But it is really hard to be a global hegemon. States who seek to be a global hegemon, should seek to be a regional hegemon at first (Ibid.). China, in this case, firstly tried to maximize its gap with neighboring countries like Japan and increased its power in the region to be a regional hegemon. Neighboring countries of Japan are afraid of China's rise and at the

end of the day, they would tend to balance its power by allying with the USA in the region (Ibid.).

When we look at defensive realists' view, we can explain China's rise in a more optimistic way. According to Mearsheimer, defensive realists explain China's rise in the region by looking at its neighbors and its rivals in the region (Ibid. 90). China has right to increase its power in the region because the US is very active in the Asia. Defensive realists believe that, system forces China to increase its power in the region because there are states that have nuclear powers like India and Japan and if they see China's rise as a threat, they may increase their nuclear capabilities and these states may create a balance again China and pushing them back is really hard for China (Ibid.).

1.4. CRITICISMS AGAINST STRUCTURAL REALISM

It would be appropriate to take into consideration the criticisms raised against structural realism in order to understand the limitations of this theoretical framework to explain behavior of states. Robert Art and Robert Jervis in the first part of their, *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues* book criticize structural realism. In its *Anarchy and its Consequences* part, they mainly focus on three different points; how and why morality should play a role on statecraft, how anarchy affects states' point of view and how anarchy's barriers can be transparent or lightened. According to the authors, in classical realism or structural realism, morality has no effect on statecraft. If states think of power as a collective empowerment, conflicts and competitive activities will be decreased by it (Art & Jervis, 2007: 1).

As it was mentioned above, according to structural realists international system is anarchic because of the absence of a central government higher than states. That's why coexistence in that kind of an anarchic system requires self-help. On the other hand, states may not reach their goals all the time. One state's goal may be accepted by another state as a threat. That situation can also create security dilemma. One of the states may want to increase military power to feel more secure, but another state may accept this move as a threat to itself. According to structural realism, no one can be sure of another state's intentions. That's because security dilemma occurs. Wars may not be occurring just because of security dilemma. Security dilemma may explain most

of the causes of wars, but not all of them. Not all of the states seek expansionist aims. States also have different aims in different branches like economics. They also have trade activities with other states. That's the reason according to the authors why security dilemma cannot explain all reasons of wars (Ibid. 2-3).

In their work, Art & Jervis also quote Alexander Wendt, who adheres to the constructivist approach. According to Wendt, wars are socially constructed and states construct wars (Ibid. 4). Alexander Wendt suggests a structural and alternative approach to structural realism. In the last chapter of their *Anarchy and Its Consequences*, Art & Jervis explain how to mitigate anarchy, relaxing its boundaries. They point out Kenneth Oye's idea of cooperation. According to Art & Jervis, states find different ways to escape wars and cooperation is the first way of this attitude. Additionally, authors also point out Michael Doyle's democratic peace theory. According to Doyle, democracies do not fight each other (Doyle, 1986: 1160). Art & Jervis say that by depending on Doyle's argument, security dilemma and anarchic world order cannot prevent peace among countries and good relations (Art & Jervis, 2007: 5).

James Brown in his work criticizes the authors who suggest that Waltz's thoughts about human nature are weak (Brown, 2009: 269-271). He accepts Waltz's theory has not roots from the idea of human nature. James believes that Waltz's three images in the Man, the State and War are collapsed in Theory of International Politics and Waltz does not show enough importance to the concept of human nature (Ibid.). James believes that human nature is a variable instead of being a constant. At the end of the day, he believes that structural realism does not put enough importance to human nature idea because we can not specify nature in a scientific way and also we cannot separate nature and nurture from each other (Ibid.).

Richard K. Ashley also criticizes structural realism in his work, *Poverty of Structural Realism*. Especially state centricity of structural realism needs an emphasis. State centricism is a collectivist word and this concept has roots from state-bounded relations. According to him, human interest or individual interest are collected through these state-bounded relations. According to him, neorealists take side between individuals and states and most of the time neorealism takes its side with states' interests and legitimizations. Neorealism, ignores human or individual interests.

Secondly, Ashley criticizes neorealism by being 'structural'. Structural realism supports the idea of differentiation of units in the system and at this point, Ashley's criticism starts. Ashley says that neorealism put state beyond the international system. System is identified with the idea of states are individual units in the system. According to Waltz, "International political system is formed by coactions of self-regarding units" (Waltz, 1979: 104). Ashley believes that, Kenneth Waltz uses or understands the structuralist position on identity and difference because neorealism is statist before being structuralist. Recognition is not based on power, it is based on identity according to Ashley (Ashley, 1984: 239-241). Ashley also believes that neorealism has a utilitarian concept of view. According to neorealism, states shape the international system because states are rational and self-regarding actors. Ashley criticizes structural realism at this point with two steps (Ibid.). Firstly, structural realism has a utilitarian point of view because supporters of neorealism use other authors criticisms to reach their main purposes. There are two examples about this problem. Firstly, neorealism uses the 'power' term referring to capability instead of social power. Neorealists like Waltz or Robert Gilpin always use the term 'power' as capabilities, which is a common attitude among Neorealists. Secondly, Ashley points out international order concept. According to Neorealists, if a system occurs from different units – bipolarity – which have equal power that would lead to chaos. For order, power capabilities should be distributed hierarchically (Ibid.).

Ashley's second step is based on three different objections to neorealism by different authors (Ibid. 244-247). These three objections underline contradictions in neorealist thoughts (Ibid. 244). These objections are; sociological roots of neorealism which is supported by Talcott Parson which is the based on consensus idea (if no one says no, it is accepted), utilitarian concept of order which is put forward by Mancur Olson- rational self-regarding actors will not join to organizations to aim collective goods and finally Marx's 'contractarian understanding of order idea'. According to Marx, order of the system idea is based on the leading figure's ability to control the system, not counter-action of the units. That's why utilitarian idea needs class relations. According to Ashley, these objections are totally right and they shows neorealism's weaknesses (Ibid. 244-247).

Hartmurt Behr & Amelia Heath also criticize neorealism and Waltz's arguments. According to the authors, Waltz misreads classical authors like Jean Jacques Rousseau. Behr & Heath support that realism is a universal theory. Both realism and neo-realism can be used to understand international relations of the 20th century. They basically come up with two arguments. First of all, they pointed out Morgenthau's realism and his wrong assumption about anarchy. According to the authors, Morgenthau's universal ideas are reductionist because Morgenthau's understanding of politics between states is temporary and historically caused. Secondly, they believe that Waltz misreads Rousseau because Rousseau's understanding of state is different from what Waltz suggests, while explaining US foreign policy (Behr & Heath, 2009: 328-329).

Jack Donnelly also criticizes structural realism of having no theoretical basis for identity. According to Donnelly, structural realism fails to explain international relations because 'anarchy', 'order' or 'distribution of capabilities' terms don't explain everything in the international arena (Donnelly, 2005: 47-54).

1.5. USE OF STRUCTURAL REALISM AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE TURKISH FOREIGN-POLICY MAKING TOWARDS ISRAEL IN THE POST-COLD WAR

Different factors may effects countries attitudes toward other international actors. Change in any foreign policy may include different intentions and different strategies. Intergovernmental relations change in balance of power or polarity of the system or preferences of foreign policy actors may affects the system as a whole. On the other hand, the most important determinant of any change of a international actor, state, is the international system itself. Turkey, following the end of the Cold War, has attempted to redefine its position and role in the international system. In foreign policy analyses, a dual distinction may be made between a state-centered approach and pluralistic approach which takes the non-state actors into consideration. In the article a state-centered approach is preferred. Therefore, in order to establish an analytical framework foreign policy outcomes of the states must be used and the set of variables that help the analysis of these outcomes must be defined (Aka, 2014: 57). Turkey's

foreign policy approach after the Cold War; whereas the paradigm shift in foreign policy is associated with the renewal or revision of the position and role in the international system (Ibid. 58).



CHAPTER TWO

TURKEY-ISRAEL RELATIONS DURING THE 1990S

In this chapter, the main focus will be on Turkey's foreign policy toward Israel in the 1990's. In the first part, leading principles of Turkey's foreign policy and determinants of foreign decision-making process will be explained. In the second part, the focus will be on Turkey-Israel rapprochement in the 1990s and factors behind this including the 1990-1991 Gulf War, impact of the US on Turkey and domestic background of Turkey. In the last part, main developments between the two countries like military and economic cooperations will be mentioned.

2.1. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN THE 1990's

Before analyzing Turkish Foreign Policy-making in the 1990's, firstly, the term 'Cold-War' has to be explained. According to Burç Aka, 'Cold War' term is used to refer to bipolar system in international politics which started with Yalta Conference in 1947 and ended with Malta conference in 1989. On the other hand, according to the author, some scholars suggest that Cold War period ended with September 11 attacks or some other scholars believe that Cold War period is still in progress. Aka in his article divides Cold War period into three periods: The first period, which may also be called as the 'New World Order', ended with September 11, second period which ended with Russia-Georgia War can be called as post-September 11 and the third period is called as post-Cold War (Aka, 2014: 57).

Aka in his work, mainly focuses on post-Cold War period and he explains this period from Turkey's foreign policy point of view. According to him, in the New World Order period, military competition due to ideological differentiation was over and new threats from different ideologies occurred and these threats were not predictable, especially in the cases of Central and Eastern Europe (Ibid. 59). In this period, according to Aka, Turkey did not make a huge change in its foreign policy-making principles because of three fundamental reasons: foreign policy makers did not oppose to becoming a European state idea, becoming and staying as partners with USA was always beneficial for Turkey and Turkey transformed its economy with neo-liberal policies becoming more integrated to the West. On the other hand, according

to Aka, post Cold War era was not highly challenging for Turkey because Russia's expansionist policy and communism threat ended (Ibid.).

Aka also believed that, it was hard to be a key actor in the region for Turkey which is a medium sized state. Turkey was trying to gain its importance in the last years of 1980's and Gulf Crisis proved its geopolitical importance to the world (Ibid. 60). In this period, according to Aka, Turkey was ready to play a buffer role against threats which were directed to Europe, Central Asia and the Black Sea. Turkey's this new role was important for North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) new regional strategies. As this way, Turkey would play a bridge role between west-east and this was beneficial for western interest in the east to be a regional key factor (Ibid.).

Malik Müftü in his work points out three milestones for Turkey's foreign policy (Müftü, 1998: 42). Firstly, he believes that Turkey's perception of external threats includes experiments from World War I and War of Independence, second; Ankara learned that it has to be suspicious about Western allies when U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent his humiliating letter to his Turkish counterpart, İsmet İnönü in 1964 and thirdly, Turkey's intervention to Cyprus taught Turkey not to trust West, again (Ibid.).

Mustafa Aydın in his article explains Turkey's regional and international importance. He believes that, Turkey was not one of the great powers in the post Cold War, but its regional location in the world enabled Turkey to become an important player in world politics (Aydın, 2005: 197). Turkey has two important straits – İstanbul and Çanakkale- and these straits are gateways for western neighbor countries to reach to the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Seas (Ibid.). Turkey is also a bridge for Asian countries to reach to Europe and the Balkans. Turkey is also important because it is an ally of the NATO and it is an associate member of the European Union (EU). According to Aydın, after the Cold War Turkey's importance for world politics also increased (Ibid.). Although Turkey has importance for world politics it is still suffering from 'insecurity complex' or 'national security syndrome' as former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated (Ibid.).

1990's, according to Sabri Sayarı, was a hard period for Turkey's foreign affairs (Sayarı, 1997: 44) According to him, Turkey was not only having hard time on

foreign policy issues, but also domestic context of Turkey was having a rapid change (Ibid.). Turkey started to have a more active role in the Middle East. Especially, Turkey was suffering from Kurdish guerrilla activities not only in its own territories, but also in Northern Iraq and Syria (Ibid.).

According to Aydın, Turkey's foreign policy is mostly shaped by five different components (Aydın, 2005: 199-213). First of all, Aydın suggests that Turkey's foreign policy is highly under the effect of its historical past (Ibid.) Problems with neighbor countries and prioritization of territorial integrity and its continuity are the main components of historical experiences. That's why Turkey's foreign policy is always accepted as sceptical and cautious. Secondly, Turkey's geopolitical and geo-strategic importance has effects on Turkey's foreign policy. According to Aydın, Turkey has a unique position in world politics serving as a land bridge and a fortress between Europe, the Middle East and Asia (Ibid.). From the 1920's onwards, Turkey's strategic role has not changed. Because of that reason, the third component of Turkish foreign policy comes to scene. According to Aydın, Turkey has vulnerabilities like securing İstanbul and Çanakkale straits and borders with Middle Eastern countries (Ibid.). Fourthly; founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has a significant role on Turkey's foreign policy. According to Aydın, Kemalist ideology has an important impact on ruling elites on foreign policy-making process. Finally, dynamic changes in world politics affected Turkey's foreign policy. End of the Cold War - changing of balance of power in the international arena-, hopes to be a part of the EU had affected Turkey's both domestic and foreign policies (Ibid.).

According to Sayarı, during the 1990's, Turkey had been affected by Cold War remainings (Sayarı, 1997: 45). After the Cold War, Turkey started to question its role in the Western alliance and as a result, it started to establish closer ties with the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Sayarı points out that Turgut Özal, the prime minister during 1983-1989 and then president till 1993, had played an important role on this new more activist foreign policy (Ibid.). Özal believed that, Turkey still could be an important actor in the region by expanding its role and that economic progress could only be achieved by trade and commerce with neighbor countries (Ibid.).

According to Aydın, Turkey's foreign policy was shaped under the effect of its peripheral place and its dependence on Europe and fear of Soviet Russia before Cold War period (Ibid.). Consequently, during the 1990's Turkey's foreign policy changed rapidly. Aydın also points out domestic reforms and changes in Turkey (Ibid.). He says that constitutional revisions and domestic reforms aimed to be more humanitarian and democratic and these reforms were materialized to gain full membership to the EU (Aydın, 2005: 216-218).

William Hale also points out Turkey's rising importance in the region during the 1990's. According to him, during the 1990's Turkey's economy experienced a remarkable growth when it was compared with other Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries (Hale, 1992: 679). In this period, Turkey also became more democratic and pro-human rights (Ibid.). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Turkey started to be more active in the region, but with the Gulf War, Turkey had to be more careful and Middle East continued to be the sources of conflicts and global issues (Ibid.).

2.2. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND TURKEY-ISRAEL RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE 1990S

Turkey-Israel relations started by March 1949, shortly after the establishment of Israel (Zanotti, 2016: 3). United Nations (UN) resolution for the partition plan to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states was dated back to 1947 (Ibid.). This partition plan was accepted by Jewish policy-makers, but was rejected by the Arab League because this plan was unfair for Palestine's Arab majority (Ibid.). In 1948, Britain ended its mandate on the region and Israel declared its independence (Ibid.). This declaration was not welcomed by the Arab states in the region and the conflicts started. During this period almost 700,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homeland (Ibid.). These conflicts were partially ended by armistice agreements between Arab states in the region and Israel (Ibid.).

Süha Bölükbaşı points out that Turkey recognized Israel's establishment on 28 March 1949 and became the first Muslim majority country –to recognize Israel. Turkey was against the partition plan in 1947 in the UN meeting, but as Turkey was convinced

that Israel was a pro-Western country, it decided to recognize Israel (Bolukbasi, 1999: 22).

During the 1990's, Turkey and Israel had closer tiers when compared with that of the previous period (Oran, 2010: 568-569). Oran points out that, after Madrid Conference, Turkey increased its level of diplomatic mission to ambassadorial level in Tel Aviv on 31 December 1991 and with this step, bilateral relations increased additionally due to five reasons (Ibid.). Firstly, Palestinians, Arab states and Israel started to negotiate in a cautious atmosphere and these negotiations increased hopes about peaceful Middle East (Ibid.). Secondly, Turkey started to be closer with Israel during Özal's period because Jewish lobby in the USA was stronger than Armenian and Greek lobbies and Turkey wanted Jewish lobby's support (Ibid.). Thirdly; Turkey was forced to look for new partnerships in the region because of support for PKK activities by Iran, Iraq and Syria, water problems with Syria and bad feelings in Turkey about Iran's regime (Ibid.). Israel and Turkey had not had these kinds of problems and for this reason; Israel was a good candidate for new partnership (Ibid.). Fourthly, Welfare Party-led coalition government in Turkey increased economic and political relations with Middle Eastern Islamic countries following and in response to this development, opposition groups in Turkey advocated establishing partnership with an economically and politically equal state to Turkey, Israel (Ibid.). Finally and most importantly, USA needed reliable partners in the region during this period because of the 'New World Order' idea (Ibid.).

Hakan Yavuz in his work points out how Turkish-Israeli 'normalization' process started and continued (Yavuz, 1997: 28). According to him, this 'normalization' process started with the visit of Abdülkadir Ateş in 1992 (Ibid.). In this visit, tourism facilitation agreement was signed between the countries. On the other hand, Declaration of Principles between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 affected Turkey as with this positive development in the peace process, Turkey-Israel relations have gained a new dimension (Sariaslan, 2017: 5). Again in 1993, Turkish foreign affairs minister Hikmet Çetin visited Israel. In this visit, agenda was set on economic issues. During this time, Israel aimed to penetrate into Central Asia and Turkey wanted support from Israel about pipeline projects which went through Iskenderun (Yavuz, 1997: 28).

These visits were important when the subject is economy but these agreements were more important than they seemed. When Hikmet Çetin turned back to Turkey, he said Turco-Israeli Relations would be better than it was before. He added that Turkey and Israel agreed to restructure the Middle East. These statements showed how Turkey and Israel needed each other (Ibid.). After Hikmet Çetin's visits, other visits took place. For example; Israeli president Ezer Weizman and Shimon Peres visited Turkey in 1994 at different times (Ibid.).

According to Yavuz, Tansu Çiller's visits in 1994, made a turning point in Turkey-Israel relations. Çiller showed great effort to establish a free trade agreement and in 1997, this agreement was entered to force (Yavuz, 1997: 29). This effort was thanked by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin because she was encouraged like no one ever was before. After these efforts, military cooperation agreements were signed between Turkey and Israel in 1996. Military Cooperation and Training Agreement was about joint training of military personnel (Ibid.). According to Yavuz:

The contents of the agreement have not been released, but it reportedly involves a joint training agreement with the Israeli air force and navy. Under the agreement, Turkey and Israel will exchange military personnel and have visiting rights at each others' bases, and Israel will be permitted to conduct electronic surveillance flights along Turkey's borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Cooperation in counterterrorism and border security is stressed, including Israeli help in securing Turkey's borders against infiltration by Kurdish separatist guerrilla (Yavuz, 1997: 29).

In the following parts, main developments which led to Israel-Turkey rapprochement will be covered.

2.2.1. 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis

According to Haldun Çancı and Şevket Serkan Şen, Gulf Crisis had an important effect on Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s (Çancı & Şen, 2011: 44). Authors points out Gulf Crisis because Kurdish population in Iraq has important effect on Turkey's foreign policy decision-making in this period (Ibid.). First of all, Iraq was

a Sunni-Arab-led country during Saddam's regime but, Sunni population was not majority in Iraq. According to authors, this situation may be the reason of not having good relations with Shiites and Kurds in Iraq (Ibid.). On the other hand, Soviet Union was supporting Iraq during the Cold war period, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iraq lost its support and became vulnerable to external effects more than before (Ibid.). In this period, countries in the region had good and bad relations with Iraq like Iran, Kuwait, Syria etc. (Ibid.).

On the other hand, according to authors, Northern Iraq after the Cold War had demographic and political changes and these changes constituted concern for Turkey (Ibid. 44-45). The provincial existing conditions in the Middle East was compromised by the Iraq's attack of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Demir, 2007: 193). Amid the 1990s, Turkey attempted to wipe out the negative impacts of intensity vacuum in northern Iraq, for example, psychological oppression and the foundation of a Kurdish state, and to keep the oil pipelines opened under the UN Security Council goals (Gözen, 2005: 75). In Northern Iraq, Kurdish population started to organize and this organization was feared to encourage Kurds in Turkey to revolt against Turkish Government (Çancı & Şen, 2011: 44-45). Kurds in the region started to organize for mainly two reasons: firstly they felt they were under the protection of the US, as establishment of 'no-fly-zones' gave them a place to breath and secondly, northern Iraq became a heaven for Kurds (Ibid.). Under these circumstances, they started to organize and this was an alarming development for Turkey about both borders with Northern Iraq and domestic Kurdish population (Ibid.).

Nasuh Uslu in his work points out why Gulf War is important for Turkey, Israel and the US (Uslu, 1999: 182). According to him, USA wanted great allies during the Gulf Crisis and it especially focused on Turkey and Israel (Ibid.). Gulf Crisis changed the territorial climate such that it was obvious that the things won't be considered as it used to be The displaced person emergency which happened after the concealment of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein assumed a major job for significant forces to mull over Iraqi Kurds in the setup of the new air somewhere in the range of 1990 and 2000 (Demir, 2007: 194). Turkey and Israel were supporters and allies of the US and US also 'gifted' Turkey and Israel with monetary awards and by that Turkey and Israel

came together not only for bilateral relations, but also for serving US' policies in the region (Ibid.).

Stephen Larrabee also believes that the Gulf War has an important effect on Turkey-Israel rapprochement (Larrabee, 2007: 105). Gulf War had caused Turkey's entrance to the Middle East. During the Gulf War, Turgut Özal gave full support to US by letting US to fly from Turkish bases through Iraq and he supported UN sanctions. According to Larrabee, Özal saw Gulf Crises as an opportunity for Turkey because it would be a cement for Turkey-USA relations and it increased hopes for joining the European Community (Ibid.).

According to Burç Aka, after the invasion of Kuwait, Turkey showed its importance -especially geographically – to the west because Turkey had taken an important and active role in the Gulf War (Aka, 2014: 60).

2.2.2. Common Threat Perceptions from Iran, Iraq and Syria

During the 1990's, Turkey and Israel had suffered from different threats, but they had three common threat perceptions; Iran Iraq and Syria. In this part, how these three threats were accepted as common threats for both Israel and Turkey will be examined. According to Tocci, when the Gulf War started, Turkish-American cooperation was most important topic for Turkey. With the Gulf crisis, Turkey had to deal with three neighbour countries and problems with them (Tocci, 2011-2012: 66). Likewise, Sabri Sayarı points out that during the 1990's Turkey was having threats from the Southern neighbors because Syria and Iraq was supporting PKK activities in the northern part of Iraq (Sayari, 1997: 47). This was one of the major problems of Turkey's foreign policy especially toward Iraq and Syria (Ibid.). Disintegration of Iraqi government increased Kurdish nationalist activities and Turkey concerned about its domestic Kurdish population and the possibility of their revolt. At the same time, Turkey also wanted Iraq's territorial integrity (Ibid.).

During this period, leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was protected by Syria. This situation changed with Adana Agreement on 20 October, 1998 (Tür, 2009: 23). With this agreement, Syria had to accept sending Öcalan out of the Syria and the

relations between Turkey and Syria entered into a normalization period. After this period, Turkey began to establish good relations with Arab countries (Ibid.).

Saddam Hussein used violence in Iraq against Iraqi Kurds during his rule. (Hale, 1992: 687). He suppressed Kurdish rebellion brutally and reflections of these attitudes were seen in Turkey (Ibid.). Turkey faced a humanitarian problem with Kurdish massive migration to Turkey. As Hale notes, the Turkish Red Crescent did its best to reach to Kurds, who lived in valleys and mountain sides (Hale, 1992: 687).

Syria was following more active policy in the region when it was comparing to other countries. Syria was supporting PKK activities and Kurdish rebellion in the Northern Iraq and it was sending logistical support (Bolukbasi, 1999: 29). In the meantime, Öcalan, was living in Damascus until he was expelled in 1998 from Syria (Ibid.). Syria did not also hesitate to show its support to PKK activities in the region and Turkey was not happy about it. Although bilateral relations were mostly remembered during the partnership period when military and intelligence relations in the second half of the 1990s were over, this exceptional period ended in order not to be established once again (Ulutaş, 2016: 9). Turkey understood that relations with Iraq and Syria would not improve because of these states' attitudes on the water issue (Bolukbasi, 1999: 29). Turkey had problems with Syria about Euphrates and Tigris. Israel also was having difficulties with these countries, so this situation led Turkey and Israel to cooperate and increase relations (Oktav, 2003: 92).

Turkey-Syria relations did not only suffer from the PKK problem. Another disputes between Turkey and Syria was the water issue (Aka, 2014: 61). During the 1990's, Turkey started Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and it started to control Euphrates (Ibid.). Amid the majority of the 1990s, Damascus was a solid supporter of Kurdish nonconformity in Turkey (Taşpınar, 2012: 136). Syrian help for the PKK was incompletely a reaction to Turkey's arrangement of looking to amplify the utilization of the Tigris and Euphrates streams for water system and vitality extends in southeastern Anatolia (Ibid.). Euphrates was also important for Syria because this river was feeding Syria (Ibid.). An unexpected project which gave Turkey control over Syria's most important water resource made Syria disturbed (Ibid.). One other dispute between Turkey and Syria was the Hatay problem. Syria never accepted Hatay to be

included within the border of Turkey. Syria and Turkey relations, was a problematic case since the beginning. (Arı & Piriñçi, 2010: 8). Participation of Hatay to Turkey, recognition of Israel and the Cold War situations were basic of this problematic relations and the water issue and the PKK problem were added in years (Ibid.). At this point, Turkey started to think about getting closer with Israel because Israel would be a good partner to fight with PKK. Military cooperation between Israel and Turkey warned Syria about not to continue supporting PKK activities.

Turkey also had problems with Iran during the 1990's. According to Malik Müfti, Turkey and Iran, before everything else, had ideological differences and this problem–lied behind the following conflicts (Müfti, 1998: 39). Turkey's secular republicanism and Iran's Islamic revolution had showed how Iran and Turkey were different from each other. Both countries tried to be more active in the Middle East with their own ways (Ibid.). With the Gulf Crisis, Iraq threatened both Iran and Turkey. Iran warned Turkey about not to interfere into or to violate Iraqi sovereignty but Iran saw Turkey-Azerbaijani relations as a threat to itself because Iran accommodated a huge Azeri Turk population (Ibid.).

2.2.3. Impact of the United States

According to Nasuh Uslu, during the Özal's term Turkey was trying to have good relations with the US and that's because it also wanted to have the same with Israel because of regional interests. US wanted good allies in the region as well and Turkey was the best option (Uslu, 1999: 182). US wanted to establish a New World Order in the Middle East and to do that, it needed both Turkey and Israel. For both 1990-1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraqi intervention, US needed especially Turkey. Thus, the USA decided to support Israel and Turkey at the same time (Oran, 2010: 553).

Nick Zannoti makes a list about why the US and Israel needed each other. According to him, Israel was closely monitoring US' actions in the region and Israel had some concerns about this issue (Zanotti, 2016: 17). Zannoti states;

Given Israeli concerns about these issues and about potential changes in levels of U.S. interest and influence in the region, some of Israel's leaders and supporters make the case to U.S. decision makers that Israel's

security and the broader stability of the region continue to be critically important for U.S. interests; and Israel has substantial and multifaceted worth as a U.S. ally beyond temporary geopolitical considerations and shared ideals and values. U.S. officials views on these points could influence the type and level of support that the United States might provide to address threats Israel perceives, or how Israel might continue its traditional prerogative of “defending itself, by itself” while also receiving external assistance. It also could influence the extent to which the United States places conditions on the support it provides to Israel (Ibid. 17).

2.2.4. Newly Initiated Dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians

Turkey was a great supporter of Middle East's peace process for two reasons (Sayarı, 1997: 50). First of all, Turkey wanted a stable Middle East because it would increase economic cooperation between regional countries, which was desirable for Turkish interests and Turkey also believed that peace in the region would increase relations and ties between the Arab states and Israel, and this situation would set Turkey free from its balancing duty between Palestine and Israel even if it was criticized by Arab and Islamic countries (Ibid.). Turkey participated peace process in 1992, especially for economic development and arms control subjects (Ibid.). Second reason is that, Turkey was also supporting Palestine National Authority (PNA) and this situation put Turkey in a good and a bad position at the same time because Turkey didn't want to loose its ties with PNA and economic and military relations with Israel (Sayarı, 1997: 50).

During the 1990's, Turkey had a turning point about Israel-Palestine issue (Larrabee, 2007: 110). Turkey was successful about having good relations with Israel especially on military and defense issues (Ibid.). This cooperation brought Turkey and Israel closer to each other, but at the same time Turkey supported of Middle East peace process and because of religious ties Turkish public was supportive of Palestinians' rights (Larrabee, 2007: 110).

2.2.5. Welfare Party Period

After Welfare party gained power in Turkey, it started to be more focused on Middle Eastern countries and conflicts in the region because of having ties with

Islamic components of the region. According to Sayarı, with Welfare party, there was a great growth in domestic support for political Islam in Turkey (Sayarı, 1997: 51). Sayarı points out that Turkey had an identity problem in domestic politics because according to Welfare party, Turkey had to identify it as a part of Islamic world in contrast to its secular and pro-Western ideology (Ibid.). On the other hand, Turkey had a number of limitations to achieve foreign policy goals during the Welfare party-led coalition government including coalition partner True Path Party and regional factors like several Arab regimes in the region and Welfare Party's unrealistic wishes about Islamic unity (Ibid.).

2.3. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Relations between Israel and Turkey started to improve in two fields, military and economic relations. The two states signed two important agreements in 1996. In the following parts, these agreements and cooperation will be examined in detail (Oran, 2010: 571).

2.3.1. Military Cooperation

Turkey and Israel signed various agreements which are based on military cooperation. In September 1995, Turkey and Israel signed memorandum of understanding which was about training of Turkish military pilots by Israel and Israeli air forces (Ibid. 571-574). In return, with this agreement, Turkey allowed Israeli pilots to use Turkey's air space for maneuvers (Ibid.). Additionally, Turkey and Israel signed agreements in 1996 to exchange personnels and military- industrial cooperation (Ibid.). In this year, Turkey and Israel were seeking to follow common security policy and they decided to fight against terrorism. Therefore, the most important military agreement between countries was the Framework Agreement on Military Training and Technical Cooperation on security and secrecy principals (Ibid.).

Relations between Turkey and Syria had deteriorated because of Turkey's military cooperation with Israel in 1996 even if the main aim was military education (Sayarı, 1997: 49). In this agreement, sides were visiting each other, personnels were

exchanged and Israeli planes were unarmed during the flights (Ibid.). Turkish officials announced that this agreement was not targeting any other states or third parties as the agreement aimed military training only (Ibid.). According to Turkish officials, this agreement gave signals to Syria about Turkish military's strengthening of its force to fight against the PKK (Sayarı, 1997: 49).

When the Welfare party and Necmettin Erbakan gained power, Erbakan gave promises to cut ties with Israel because of his party's religious and Islamic base (Yavuz, 1997: 29). On the other hand, agreement with Israel was unavoidable. In 1996, agreement was about almost \$600 million because of the modernization of Turkish F-4 Phantom fighters by Israeli aircraft industry (Ibid.). As Yavuz states;

Turkey also is considering replacing the army's assault rifle, the Germanmade G3, with the Israeli-made Galil, and already has purchased fifty Popeye I missiles for its fleet of F-4s currently being upgraded at IAI. Israel and Turkey have agreed to produce jointly-through a consortium to be established between two Turkish firms and Rafael-the sophisticated Popeye II air-toground missile in a deal initially worth about \$100 million (Yavuz, 1997: 29).

Turkey and Israel relations increased rapidly after 1992, Turkey's Ministry of Tourism and culture visited Israel and tourism cooperation agreement with Israel was signed (Oran, 2010: 569-570). After this agreement, high representatives of the two sides exchanged visits and Tansu Çiller visited Israel in 1994 as a prime minister. Çiller also called Turkey-Israel relations as strategic partnership (Ibid.). Although Turkey and Israel had good relations during the first half of the 1990's, Turkey continued a cautious foreign policy because of its support to Palestinians (Ibid.).

Turkey had good relations with Israel basically for four different reasons (Yavuz, 1997: 27). First, Turkey saw Israel as a 'back door' for keeping in touch with Washington to counter Greek and Armenian lobbies in the USA, second, Turkey wanted to show its secular tendencies to world after its membership application was rejected by the EU, third, Turkey needed support of regional states especially regarding its fight against PKK and Islamic groups and fourth Turkey needed good military technologies which are compatible with human rights (Ibid.). According to Yavuz, after the establishment of Erbakan's coalition government, Turkey added another reason to these reasons which was opposed to previous government (Ibid.).

2.3.2. Economic Cooperation

In the second part of the 1990's, Turkey and Israel increased their economic relations. Israel and Turkey firstly signed Tourism Cooperation Agreement in 1992 (Bolukbasi, 1999: 31). In this period, Turkey and Israel also signed a free trade agreement in 1996 due to the obligations by the EU (Ibid.). With free trade agreement, Turkey started to sell its manufactured goods and taxes between countries were reduced to increase both countries' exports (Oran, 2010: 573-574).

Additionally, in 1997, countries also signed almost twenty educational, cultural and tourism agreements (Ibid.). 1999 earthquake in Turkey also led countries to strengthen their relations because Israel sent its aid forces to Turkey and this move gained Turkey's domestic appreciation (Ibid.). On the other hand, this appreciation lost its power when Israeli officials expressed their views on the so-called Armenian genocide (Ibid. 574).

Turkey and Israel signed the Free Trade Pact in March 1996 and expectations were on increasing economic relations (Yavuz, 1997: 32). Joint projects by the two countries included cooperations on satellites, electricity productions etc. Additionally, this agreement led to almost 300000 Israeli tourists to visit Turkey (Ibid.).

2.3.3. Criticisms against Cooperation between Turkey and Israel

Turkey-Israel Relations intensified in the 1990's as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, cooperation between Turkey and Israel had been criticized not only by other states, but also by different groups in these two countries (Sayarı, 1997: 33). For example, Turkish Islamist political groups and Turkish media had strongly criticized the government for becoming an ally with Israel (Ibid.). Especially, Welfare party representatives criticized these agreements strongly (Ibid.).

Turkey was criticized for not balancing its foreign policy because Turkey didn't have good relations with Middle Eastern countries other than Israel. (Oran, 2010: 574-575). This situation might cause problems in the long-term and when

Turkey realized that, it started to negotiate with other countries and returned back to its balancing foreign policy (Ibid.). In the second intifada (September 2000- February 2005) Turkey supported Palestinians and with this movement, Turkey announced its balancing foreign policy but Israel also faced criticisms for the same reason (Ibid.). Liberal groups in Israel criticized Israeli government for three reasons; Firstly, Israel might have become a third party in Turkey-Syria problems, Secondly, Israel might be a target for PKK and thirdly, Israel-Greece relations might be damaged because of getting closer with Turkey (Ibid.).

On the other hand, the question of how Turkey's and Israel's interests might coincide in the region was asked because the first threat for Turkey was PKK terror both in the domestic context along with Turkey's southern borders problem and Israel was a supporter of an independent Kurdish state (Yavuz, 1997: 33). Secondly, the question of how Turkey could play a leadership role in the Middle East by cooperating with Israel and alienating its neighbors (Ibid.). At the end of the day, these questions were mostly asked by Turkish and Israeli journalists and they remained unanswered (Ibid.).

CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY-ISRAEL RELATIONS DURING THE 2000S

Contrary to good relations with Israel during the 1990s, 2000s have seen a number of tensions between Turkey and Israel. In this part, the main focus will be on Turkey's relations with Israel in the 2000s. In the first part, changes in Turkish foreign policy-making will be covered which is closely related with changing of domestic political leadership with the Justice and Development Party (JDP). In the second part, the reasons of deterioration of bilateral relations will be examined. In the third part, main developments between countries will be mentioned and in the last part, there will be an attempt to address the role played by realpolitik or neorealism in Turkey- Israel relations in the 2000s.

3.1. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN THE 2000S UNDER THE JDP GOVERNMENT

JDP won the parliamentary elections in 2002 and Turkey had entered a different a new period in its foreign policy-making. Burç Aka in his work focuses on JDP government and its foreign policy attitudes and he states that; on November 2002, JDP government won general elections and gained power in the parliament (Aka, 2014: 64). According to this work, main focus of the JDP government was establishment of secure and stable environment in the region. (Ibid.) Aka also states, zero-problems with neighbor countries policy which is main foreign policy aim of JDP government should not be accepted as only solution for traditional conflicts with neighboring countries (Ibid.).

By establishing a secure and stable environment in the region, JDP government aimed to consolidate its power in Turkey. Dietrich Jung focuses on JDP period in Turkey in his work and he points out firstly how JDP government gained power in Turkey (Jung, 2011: 35-36). According to him, after the foundation of the JDP on 14 August 2001, as followers of the Virtue party, JDP followed a political strategy with three dimensions:

In order to establish itself as a legitimate actor in the Turkish political system, the AKP followed a political strategy with three dimensions. First, in its ideological outlook the party adopted the globally dominant discourse on democracy and human rights. Second, to mobilize broad political support for democratic legitimacy, it has made reference to Islamic norms and values while abandoning the Islamist rhetoric of the national outlook movement. Reportedly, many of the representatives of the old national outlook ideology were not nominated in the 2007 elections in which the majority of AKP deputies represented liberal and mainstream conservative worldviews. Finally, the AKP has built up a support base among liberal groups in Turkish society for achieving necessary popular recognition as a legitimate political actor within Turkey's multiparty system. However, this support from liberal circles might diminish due to Erdogan's increasingly autocratic and intolerant behaviour. The AKP's strategy to achieve political legitimacy in the domestic realm has been accompanied by a new foreign policy that breaks with a number of central views of the national outlook. First and foremost, the AKP has situated its foreign policy in the broader framework of Turkey's integration into the west. This is expressed in its party program, however, in combining Turkey's western partnership with a multilateral perspective as a response to enhanced globalization in the post-Cold War period. While it articulates religious issues in the context of human rights as a matter of religious freedom, the AKP's foreign policy strategy has not emphasized Turkey's Islamic identity at the expense of its partnership with the US and the EU. On the contrary, the destination of Erdogan's first official visit abroad was not a Muslim country but Turkey's historical "arch rival," Greece (Ibid.).

The JDP has religious components of Turkish culture and Islam plays an important role on JDP government's domestic policies. Turkish culture includes different religious roots, but most part of the Turkish society is Muslim and the JDP government not only used Islam to gain support in political issues, but also it used Islam to mobilize economic and political interest also in the international arena (Ibid. 36).

In general, the Arab states and peoples, military and economic sense, which is one of the most powerful countries in the region were happy to put on weight since the start of the Arab Palestinian issue in Turkey (Oran, 2013: 429). The main elements of the policy pursued in this period can be listed as follows: 1) To play a facilitating role in international initiatives related to the solution of the Palestinian problem, to demonstrate the will for mediation; 2) adopting a discourse that is sensitive to the Palestinian problem; 3) to create a dialogue process involving all sides of the problem;

4) Deepening economic and human relations with the Palestinians (Ibid.). The Palestinian policy during the JDP period was separated from the previous period, especially due to the weight given to the last two elements (Ibid.).

With respect to Turkey-Israel relations in the 2000s, Baskin Oran says, reasons for cooperation between Israel and Turkey disappeared with the 2000s because three important developments have occurred (Oran, 2013: 438-439). First of all, Turkey started to be more peaceful to its neighbor countries in the Middle East and it tried to solve its problems on regional bases because there would be less need to Israel's balancing support in the region (Ibid.). Secondly, with the second Intifada, peace process between Israel and Palestine came to a deadlock, Turkish foreign policy makers started to be more cautious about Israel and relations with it (Ibid.). Finally, relations with the EU forced Turkey to be more civilized. Because of that, Turkey's military power started to be less important and effective for Turkish foreign policy issues (Ibid.). According to Oran, till 2009, Israel was more cautious to not to comment about Turkey's sensitive foreign policy issues not to deteriorate relations with Turkey (Ibid.).

Turkey always followed a cautious foreign policy because it does not want to be against any western interest in the region. This situation continued under the JDP government. The JDP government, with Davutoğlu's strategic-depth doctrine, tried to have strong relations with non-western countries while it had continued its relations with western countries (Oğuzlu, 2011: 984). Tarık Oğuzlu states;

Turkey has the responsibility to help put its region in order. This is the mission Turkey inherited from the Ottoman empire. Though the fulfilment of this mission would likely serve Turkey's realpolitik security concerns, the idea that Turkey needs to fulfil a particular historical mission is very much idea-politik. "Zero problems with the neighbours" might appear to be a realpolitik calculation of how to achieve regional stability, yet it is also the ideational and visionary foreign policy strategy that Turkey should pursue in order to help resurrect the paxOttomanica (Ibid.).

Turkey adopted a new and more active role in the region after the JDP gained power (Oğuzlu, 2010: 281). Turkey felt no more isolated from the region because of JDP's more pragmatic and less ideological foreign policy (Ibid.). Turkey started to be

more engaged in the Middle East because of security issues instead of ideological intentions (Ibid.).

Another important development during this period not only for Turkey but also for all other countries was US invasion of Iraq and it had an important effect on Turkey's foreign policy attitudes (Larrabee, 2007: 106). Turkey had no sympathy for Saddam Hussein but he managed to establish stability on the northern borders of Iraq (Ibid.) Turkey was afraid of establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the region but Iran's effect on Iraqi fragmented territory effected Turkey's foreign policy more than Iraq (Ibid.). Iran was supporting Kurdish people in the region so Turkey had to deal with that issue. Turkey's worry was not only for an independent Kurdish state on its south eastern border but also for separatist Kurdish movements operating inside Turkey because Turkey had Kurdish population and Kurdish separatism was a threat to Turkish territorial integrity (Ibid.). After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan who was the leader of PKK movement, PKK declared a cease-fire and terrorists activities both in the region and in the domestic area stopped for a while (Ibid.). On the other hand, PKK started terrorist attacks again in 2004 (Ibid.). PKK launched attacks after 2006 from the Kandil Mountains and the organization killed almost several hundred Turkish security personnel (Ibid.). Even if Turkey wanted support from the US for the elimination of PKK camps in the region, the US did not favor taking military action in the region (Ibid.). The US supported the idea of not violating stability in northern Iraq because rest of the Iraqi territory was more instable during this period (Ibid.). Washington's this attitude caused anti-Americanism in Turkey (Ibid.). Most of the people of Turkey believed that the US was supporting Kurdish activities in the region and it refused to help Turkey about a terrorist problem which the US did not regard as similar to the case in Afghanistan (Ibid.).

September 11 attacks changed US foreign policy as well as it did Turkey's too (Aka, 2014: 63). Turkish officials believed that after this event, US needed Turkey more than before in the region (Ibid.). There was a competition between Russian Federation and Iran to be a regional hegemon and to control both Central Asia and the Caucasus. With this situation, Turkey learnt its role in the region had to be more strategic and cautious than before (Ibid.). Western world, not only the US but also EU, realized they had to be in more intense dialogue with the Muslim world because of the

Muslim population in themselves (Ibid.). Because of that reason, they needed Turkey as a bridge between Muslim world and Western world (Ibid.).

Turkey set its post-September 11 foreign policy based on the idea of complementary alliance policy. Aka states;

Ankara's foreign policy was still Western-oriented but was based on a "Muslim model state" concept. Thus, Turkey could establish a bridge between the Muslim world and the Western world. In addition, Turkey configured its foreign policy strategy by taking into account the balance between democracy and security. While Turkey became a strategic partner of the U.S. within the context of the Greater Middle East Project, it also succeeded to start the full membership talks with the EU in 2005 by transforming itself in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria since 1999. Thus, Turkey managed to increase the credibility and appeal of the model it proposed for the Middle East. (Aka, 2014, p. 64)

As it is stated above, Turkey had to be more cautious in its foreign policy attitudes because it was not only threatened by international terrorism, but also internal nationalist movements were threatening Turkey's integrity and zero problem policy with neighbors couldn't be effective as it was expected.

Turkish remote approach is established on strong customs and takes its quality from Turkey's attributes of being a law based, common and social state administered by the standard of law. As huge changes are overwhelming the world, Turkish outside approach is being led in the focal point of a geology where the previously mentioned advancements happen in the most serious manner. As the world is seeing fast improvements, both collaboration openings and the dangers that issues may present spread and extend more prominent than any time in recent memory. Tying down harmony, steadiness and security on firm establishments in such worldwide condition is perpetually troublesome. Furthermore, it additionally gains more noteworthy significance and turns into a need.

It is in this way occupant on Turkey to accept more obligations in its locale. Truly, one of the uncommon shared factors of numerous nations, which have noteworthy differences over profound established issues in its district, is their certainty towards Turkey. In like manner, the dimension come to by Turkey in the field of monetary advancement and vote based system has expanded its outside approach

exceed and expanded its capacity of effect in this area. This has made the unflinching and productive outside strategy received by Turkey perpetually required and looked for after in the district. Today, monitoring its expanding devices and abilities, and the obligations radiating from these, Turkey seeks after a multi-dimensional remote approach which is pre-emptive as opposed to being responsive. At the end of the day, Turkey steers advancements by taking activities instead of only watching them unfurl and decide a position in like manner. Furthermore, Turkish remote approach is result-arranged, down to earth and practical. Moreover, the most significant normal for Turkish remote arrangement is being a visionary one. Security for all, political exchange, monetary association and social concordance are the structure squares of this vision. Turkey tries in the long run to achieve a phase where all nations live in a condition of welfare and convey the incorporation among them to the most progressive dimension by making a zone of harmony and soundness, beginning from its neighbors.²

3.2. FACTORS BEHIND THE DETERIORATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Despite the ups and downs in political relations, these relations generally maintained their stability until the 2010. Mutual visits to the military authorities continued at the level of the national defense ministers and training activities, exercises and projects continued to take place between the military forces of the two countries due to the military cooperation agreement signed in, which will be handled more detail (Alsaftawi, 2017: 192-193). But, the deep crisis that emerged in political relations since 2009 also negatively affected military relations, and this process resulted in the suspension of all military agreements between the two countries by September 2011 (Ibid.). Until 2009, despite the political problems, Turkish governments did not hesitate to do business with Israel for weapons procurement and moderation (Ibid.). While fierce conflicts with the Second Intifada continued. It is pointed out that Israel is the only country that can carry out the desired comprehensive moderation on the

² For more information, please see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa>

reactions from the opposition and it should not be associated with the crisis in the Middle East (Ibid.). In the JDP period, arms procurement and moderation agreements continued with the Israeli prime minister (Ibid.). During Erdogan's visit in May 2005, talks were held on missile recruitment and more moderation of the F-4. Another example that military relations were not much affected by political relations was seen during the Lebanon War in 2006 (Ibid.193). After the deployment in southern Lebanon in December, a direct communication mechanism between the two countries was established in order to guarantee the security of the Turkish troops (Ibid.). Other important developments in the field of security-military relations in this period can be summarized as follows:

1) A cooperative agreement between the two countries for border control, international terrorism, organized crime, arms and drug trafficking was signed in December 2003, following al Qaeda 's massive terrorist acts in İstanbul in November 2003. The agreement was predicated on the fact that the police of the two countries had common educational activities; 2) During Erdoğan's visit to Israel in May 2005, a new agreement on the exchange of troop personnel was signed and a red line was established between the two countries to share instant intelligence in the fight against terrorism; 3) At the beginning of 2008, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül personally stated that the IHA, which was leased from Israel in the cross-border operations conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces in northern Iraq, was effectively used and very popular (Ibid.).

The political crises in 2009 were of a quality that influenced the military relations between the two countries as well as the former (Tür, 2009: 25). In previous crises, such reactions mostly belonged to Jewish lobby representatives, civil bureaucrats, or politicians. The fact that this time a force commander, moreover, referring to the issues that Turkey was sensitive, showed that the tensions begun to affect the military relations (Ibid.). Although the emphasis on the reaction of the Turkish General Staff to the Israeli side was that Mizrahi's statements were indicative of the tendency to reduce military co-operation with the orientation of Turkish politicians (Ibid.). One of the factors that fueled this tension on the Turkish side was related with the rumors that the pilots organizing the assaults in Gaza had been trained in Konya and the widespread publicization of these rumors (Ibid.). As a result of these, the cancellation of the international section of the Anatolian Kartal exercise, which

would be held by Israel in October 2009, for political reasons, brought the military crisis to a close (Ibid.). Then, in November 2009, when the contract was cancelled by the Turkish government on the grounds that the delivery of Heron-brand LHA ordered from Israel in 2005 was continuously delayed due to technical problems, the relations further deteriorated (Ibid.).

One of the most important factor for the deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey was the Israel-Palestinian issue (Oğuzlu, 2010: 8). Whenever a problem occurs between Israel and Palestinians, Turkey and Israel relations enters into a crisis during the 2000s (Ibid.). On the Israeli side, both Sharon and Netanyahu administrations wanted a two-side solution to peace process. On the other hand, the US was also unable to solve Israel-Palestinian issue. The US saw Turkey as a messenger bird which carries messages to the Middle East from the US (Ibid.). Turkey was not in favor of this mission because Turkish officials thought that Turkey is a regional power and it should not be directed from outside about its role on the region. (Ibid.) It has to decide its own role in the region (Ibid.).

3.2.1. Change in the Security Context

Security context in the 2000s in the Middle East had a sharp change. (Yılmaz, 2008: 165). After the Saddam Hussein in Iraq, it became clear that balance in the region will change including Turkey-Israel relations especially on reconstructing of Iraq (Ibid.). The US-wanted to establish a democratic regime in the Iraqi territory and this act affected Turkey-Israel relations (Ibid.). Iraqi territory included different ethnic communities and the US's effort to a democratic election in the territory became complicated because of this multi-dimensional population (Ibid.). Iraqi territory mainly included Arabs, Shiites and Kurds. The US decision was accepted as hard to reach national will (Ibid.). For example, Iraqi Kurds wanted to veto this election as soon as they had an autonomous region for themselves (Ibid.). Turkey was against the establishment of any autonomous Kurdish state in the northern part of Iraqi territory (Ibid.). On the other hand, Israel was in favor of this establishment because it will support its defense security industry and activities. Regional states, especially Turkey,

would need Israel more than before because of regional threats which were mentioned before (Ibid.).

3.2.2. Israel's handling of the Palestinian question

Turkey, the Arab uprisings (Arab Spring) before Israel sees as a threat to its national security of countries like Syria and Iran, as well as the rapprochement with Hamas, Palestinian, has been one of the most important reasons to change the nature of relations between two countries (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 592). Israel-Palestinian dispute always had significant effect on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and Israel. Second Intifada especially forced Turkey to be more careful about its foreign policy attitude towards Israel (Oran, 2013: 438). Political fluctuations can be explained as; starting with the Second Intifada, tension started to increase in Turkey about Palestinian people and from what they had been suffering Turkish people started to oppose Israel's actions towards Palestinian Muslim society and this situation affected Turkish policy-makers towards Israel (Ibid.).

After the change of power took place in Turkey's foreign policy discourse and the strategies adopted by the Turkish government; others followed Israel's intransigence, especially with Turkey in the context of the question of Palestine, the Arab world and is perceived as a threat to his rapprochement with Iran. (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 589) The political / regional disagreement between the two countries, despite the US factor, has reached such a point that it has been reduced from the context of strategic cooperation Mavi to the level of t jealousy, in the diplomatic sense after the Mavi Marmara raid (Ibid.).

3.3. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS

Turkey- Israel relations were not in a good shape during the 2000s as it was mentioned before (Oran, 2013: 440). During this period, there had been important developments between the two countries (Ibid.). JDP declared that, they had no special animosity towards Israel (Ibid.). Till 2009, relations between Turkey and Israel were fluctuated. After 2009, relations started to get worse (Ibid.).

Conversely with the pattern of the 1990s, spectators have progressively been astounded to see Turkish–Israeli connection experiencing a chilling period in the course of the most recent decade, especially following the triumph of the JDP in the parliamentary races held in November 2002 (Oğuzlu, 2010: 274). Indeed, even before the JDP's triumph, two-sided relations started to turn sour amid the 1999-2002 term of the three-party alliance government driven by the late Bülent Ecevit, the pioneer of the Democratic Left Party (Ibid.). For instance, Ecevit 'challenged in all respects unequivocally Israel's treatment of Yasser Arafat in 2001 and the Battle of Jenin in 2002, which he accepted was equivalent to "genocide" (Ibid.).

In 2002, JDP government gained power in Turkey and most of the politicians in JDP belonged to the national vision movement. (Kasapoğlu, 2012: 1-2). This situation caused questioning of bilateral relations with Israel (Ibid.). At the same time, JDP officials announced that, they had no bad feelings for Israel and they also wanted to improve bilateral relations and with this way, they gave a signal not to feed any ideological differences (Ibid.). Till 2009, relations with Israel were not in a bad shape but under the JDP government, relations were mainly affected by fluctuations in peace process (Ibid.). In this period, Turkey was trying to find solutions to Palestine issue and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 'Road Map for Middle East Peace' gained full support from Turkey (Ibid.). Such that, in July 2003, Friendship between Israel-Turkey Parliaments included 289 politicians and 183 of them were from JDP (Ibid.). In 2004, violence between Israel and the Palestinians forced road map not to be applicable anymore (Oran, 2013: 442). Israel's approach to Hamas and operations to Rafah Refugee Camp in the Gazza Strip, was strongly criticized by Turkey (Kasapoğlu, 2012: 1-2). Another event was Israel's efforts to build a wall encircling the West Bank (Ibid.). Turkey was strongly against these kinds of activities and Turkey showed its position by giving opposition votes against Israeli acts in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (Ibid.).

In 2005, relations with Israel were in a better shape because of three reasons; firstly, death of Yasser Arafat forced Palestinians to reorganize themselves and this situation gave a temporary silence to the conflicts and region (Oran, 2013: 441). Secondly, Israel's withdrawal from Gazza in 2005 had been accepted as a good intention by Turkey and thirdly, the discomfort of the US about tensions between its

two important allies in the region had led Turkey to fix its relations with Israel (Ibid.). The most important indicator for better relations was exchanges of visit by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Israel in 2005 (Ibid.). Israel also announced that it supported Turkey's candidacy to temporary membership to UN Security Council (UNSC) (Ibid.). In April 2005, with Ankara Forum, peace process to improve economic relations started (Ibid.).

As Turkey's relations with the U.S. wound up stressed, its relations with the EU started to fill that vacuum, and after 2005, as Turkey got its bid status, it started to take an increasingly European point of view toward its outside arrangement (Tür, 2009: 60). Turkey's expanding worry with the Palestinian issue and its basic position against Israel can be viewed as being tuned in to the European position (Ibid.). As eagerness for promoting the Turkey-EU relations has melted away, Turkey has endeavored to build up a progressively autonomous remote strategy (Ibid.).

Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Israel on 1 May 2005 was an important development in the early 2000s to normalize relations with Israel in a political manner (Sariaslan, 2017: 12). In January 2006, Hamas won elections in Palestine and Turkey-Israel relations entered into a new crisis period (Oran, 2013: 442). However, in the 2006 Palestinian elections as a result of the developments it has caused a negative air to be re-formed in Turkey-Israel relations (Sariaslan, 2017: 12). Hamas won 76 parliamentary elections and won an absolute majority in the 132-seat assembly on 25 January 2006 in Palestine (Ibid.). Turkey's support for Hamas' victory and Hamas leaders' visit to Turkey was not welcomed by Israel (Oran, 2013: 442). Ranan Gissinde, who was the speaker of Israel presidency then, pointed out that these activities of Turkey might break the relations with Israel but he got a strong reaction from Turkey and because of this reason, Israel's ambassador to Turkey was called to inform the foreign affairs ministry, but he rejected this invitation by saying there was nothing to discuss about this issue (Ibid.).

Turkey's JDP government to take the initiative on the Palestinian issue with the Israel also bothered to work (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 592). Israel's resistance to failing to take steps to deal with the problems of settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and especially from 2006 on the Hamas regime in Gaza, the airstrikes on Gaza by its

blockade against the region (Cast Lead and Cloud Column operations are the most important) after many have lost Palestinian lives, Palestinian Affair, changing as one of its most important elements of Middle East strategy, Turkey has led to severe criticism of Israel and Turkey have legitimized these criticisms in response to public opinion in Israel (Ibid.).

Israel's attacks to Lebanon and Gazza during 2006 made relations worse because Turkey's officials announced that they were strongly against this kind of violence (Oran, 2013: 442). Erdoğan said Israel was using disproportional force and it was killing women and children on purpose (Ibid.). While Israel claims to be a Jewish state, its discrimination against Arabs, which account for about 20 percent of its population, is deepening (Ulutaş, 2016: 15). However, approaching the Palestinian issue as a mere security issue and not avoiding disproportionate use of force has turned into one of the basic characteristics of Israel (Ibid.). At this point not only to maintain relations with Turkey are required to adhere to face the structural problems and decisions of the international community, the UN in particular in this regard for Israel's character can be normalized as a state and to be able to remove remains that criticism and sanctions facing the international community (Ibid.). Yet, even if these crises occurred, channels for communications were not completely deadlocked (Oran, 2013: 442).

As the 2007-2008 clashes between Israel and Palestinians relatively decreased Israel-Turkey relations were softened. Israel's president Ehud Olmert accepted a committee to investigate suspicion building activities around Al-Aqsa Mosque (Ibid.). During this period international activities to support peace process was also supported by Turkey and in this context, Israel's president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas met in Ankara. Secondly, Syria-Israel communication channel was opened by Turkey's efforts (Ibid.). This process entered into a short break with Israel's bombing of Syria through Turkey's air space. Foreign Minister of Turkey Ali Babacan visited both countries and said that this was not acceptable (Ibid.). The crisis ended with Israel's apology (Ibid.).

In Turkey-Israel Relations, one of the most important factors that lead to gaining a negative outlook also reflected in the media tension between the two governments and even the media has also been used in a way to articulate this tension

(Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 593). Performing Turkish televisions aired in the program of Israel's clearly rave reviews and the Government of Israel, also known as Low Chair Crisis and Turkey, Israel's ambassador for the implementation of diplomatic impoliteness in front of the cameras has been a clear indication of this condition (Ibid.). During the Davos Summit held in 2009, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israeli President Shimon Peres must also criticize harshly in front of the eyes of the world have demonstrated the dose of tension between the two countries, as well as the media has proved how much can be used effectively in this tension frame (Ibid.).

After the Iraqi invasion, there was no cooperation between the two countries about Iraq (Oran, 2013: 441). For Turkey, Israel's intentions regarding northern part of Iraq were suspicious (Ibid.). In 2004, suspicions about Israel reached to its peak with rumors about training of Kurdish guerrillas in the northern Iraq by Israel's army (Ibid). Israeli officials denied these rumors many times, but Turkey was not satisfied. (Ibid).

The main turning point of the bilateral relations in the political arena was the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 (Sariaslan, 2017: 10). Turkey's ally in the US invasion of Iraq and its region, which has led to the questioning of relations with Israel (Ibid.). The news of the Israeli authorities' activities in Northern Iraq and Israel's support and training of Kurdish groups after the occupation showed great repercussions in the Turkish public opinion and showed that the interests of the two countries in the future of the region differ and even conflict (Ibid.).

In fact, Iraqi invasion was not the only problem between Israel and Turkey. (Oran, 2013: 446-447) Another problem was about Iran (Ibid). Israel was expecting support from Turkey against any regional threat which comes from Iran (Ibid). The Israeli government has already been disturbed by the fact that the regional role of Iran, previously known with military operations rumors and embargoes, which is shown in the axis of evil and which is known for its extreme rhetoric about the existence of Israel, has begun to change (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 595). So change and regional activities consist of the Western countries and the UN at increasing the appearance of Iran, Turkey and Israel, has pushed the deal because of Iran factor (Ibid.).

Turkey's foreign policy approach was not to be part of any kind of international pressure-against Iran during this period (Ibid). In 2006, Israel requested Turkey to close its air and land spaces to Iran to dry Hizbullah's arm resources, but Turkey refused this request (Ibid.). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejected any kind of hesitations about Iran's nuclear proliferation by showing Israel's well-known nuclear power (Ibid).

Turkish foreign policy had serious problems with Israel after 2009. There are some critical flashpoints for Turkey. In May 2010, relations started to be the worst more than before (Tocci, 2011-2012: 73). In the following parts, these big crises will be covered one by one in a detailed way.

3.3.1. Operation Cast Lead (2008)

In 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon and this situation led another crisis between the two countries. (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Koordinatörlüğü, 2011) Hamas was gaining power day by day and ruling party (Kadima) in Israel was having troubles about their leaders. (Ibid.) They were accused of corruption. In 2008, Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni came to power in Kadima and in the same year Israeli Parliament decided to have early elections. (Ibid.) On the other hand, on 27 December 2008, Israel started Cast Lead operation towards Gaza. In this operation almost 1500 people died and almost 5000 people were injured. (Ibid.)

In 2005, Yasar Arafat died and Palestinian movement started to reconstruct itself and this situation led to silence and ceasefire in the region (Oran, 2010: 440-445). On the other hand, Israel's Gaza operation ended and Israel withdrew from the region and also the US didn't want Turkey and Israel to have unfriendly relations. Because of these reasons, 2005 was a kind of spring for Turkey-Israel relations (Ibid.).

In 2006, Hamas won elections in Palestine and Turkey immediately recognized the new government (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Koordinatörlüğü, 2011). This situation also led to deterioration in Israel-Turkey relations because Israel accepts Hamas as a terrorist organization (Ibid.).

The Operation Cast Lead was launched by Israel on 27 December 2008 and its consequences were greater than they were expected (Oran, 2010: 440-445). Israel

imposed economic blockade on the territory and the Strip had been prey to grave humanitarian hardship (Ibid.). Most of the injuries in the region were civilian and Gaza is one of the most densely populated regions in the world (Ibid.). As Richard Falk, the UN rapporteur for human rights, said almost 1500 Palestinians were killed in Gaza of which 960 were civilians (Ibid.). On the other hand, there were 13 Israeli deaths including 2 civilians (Ibid.). In this operation, the US support was obvious especially when we look at the weapons used by Israel during the operation, including F-15 and F-16 aircraft and Apache helicopters (Berrigan, 2009: 15). Additionally, Human Rights Watch's list of the U.S. system deployed by Israel showed Cobra helicopters and American made 30mm rockets (Ibid.).

3.3.2. Davos Incident

After Israel's attacks towards Gazza, bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel entered into a new critical period. In January 2009, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted Israel's UN membership should be questioned and Erdoğan had an argument in Davos with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (Oran, 2010: 442). The argument were about duration to speak for both leaders and Erdoğan's claims toward Peres by being barbarian with killing Israeli civilians and children (Ibid.). Erdoğan started the argument by saying "One minute" and he left Davos in the middle of the conference (Ibid.). Erdoğan used 'one minute' word because Erdogan believed that Peres was basically endeavoring to help legitimize the utilization of disproportional power by Israel's protection powers against Hamas and blamed Israel for realizing how to execute well (Oğuzlu, 2010: 275).

After the foundation of new government in Israel under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, relations got worse (Oran, 2010: 442). In October 2009, Anatolian Eagle operation was canceled by Turkey in which Turkey and Israel would work together on the international scene (Ibid.). This cancelation was accepted as a political move by Israel because of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Davutoğlu's speech about the Gazza situation by showing it as the reason for cancelation and this situation was accepted as Turkey gave more importance to Gazza's situation more than Arab countries.

3.3.3. Mavi Marmara Incident

On 31 May 2010, early hours in the morning, Israel attacked a Turkish aid ship named 'Mavi Marmara' which attempted to break the blockade imposed on Hamas-ruled Gaza by Israel, killing and injuring a number of civilians, the majority of whom were Turkish. The most important part of this incident for Turkey was that this attack took place in international waters (Oran, 2013: 444). Israeli soldiers killed 9 people and injured more than 50 people. Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu went to New York and called UN Security Council for an immediate meeting. After the meeting, Security Council announced a document which condemned Israel (Ibid. 443).

Turkey accepted this incident as 'piracy' and 'state terrorism'. After this incident, Oğuz Çelikkol was called back to Turkey and relations were reduced to charge d'affaires level (Ibid. 444). After the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey requested five different things: an apology, compensation, dismissal of blockade on Gaza, international commission to research on this incident and returning of the ships (Ibid.). With pressure of the US, the last two requests were fulfilled (Ibid.). Palmert commission was set up by UN and the commission prepared a report about the incident called as the Palmert Report (Ibid.). In September 2011, the New York Times explains the details about Palmert Report before it was announced officially. (Ibid.). Accordingly, report suggested that intervention of Israeli soldiers to the ship was legal (Ibid.). At the end of these events, Abdullah Gül announced that Palmert Report had no importance for Turkey and thus Turkey didn't recognize the report. (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Koordinatörlüğü, 2011). Foreign Minister of Turkey, Davutoğlu, announced 'Plan B' against Israel. In the same year, Israel's ambassador Gaby Levy left Turkey and relations worsened than pre-1991 period (Oran, 2013: 445).

According to Baskın Oran, relations were different than before because of three reasons (Oran, 2013: 449). First of all, this time, the channel for dialogue between Turkey and Israel started to be closed. Secondly, Israel was starting to hit Turkey from the belt and thirdly, Anatolian Eagle crisis showed that political crises affect military relations as well (Ibid.).

Naturally, it took a while for such a dispute to be resolved in the international politics area. Also, the timing of the incident is relatively tense as only one year ago the Davos crisis had occurred. Given these facts, the resolution of the conflict took three years for both countries to come to an agreement point. According to an article published in BBC in 2016, the conflict could only reach to a resolution in 2013, after the new president of Israel Netanyahu has issues a public apology (<https://www.bbc.com/news/10203726>). Still, normalization of the international affairs between the two countries took another three years and could only take place in 2016, when both countries agreed to normalize the relations. The BBC report that detailed the process reads as follows:

The breakthrough came after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke to Mr. Erdogan in a telephone conversation brokered by US President Barack Obama during a visit to Israel. A statement from Mr. Netanyahu's office said he had "made it clear that the tragic results regarding the Mavi Marmara were unintentional and that Israel expresses regret over injuries and loss of life. In light of the Israeli investigation into the incident, which pointed out several operational errors, Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to the Turkish people for any errors that could have led to loss of life and agreed to complete the agreement on compensation," it added. Mr. Erdogan, who became Turkey's president the following year, said they had also "agreed on making arrangements for compensation" to the victims' families, adding that he had "accepted the apology in the name of the Turkish people". In June 2016, Turkey and Israel agreed to normalize their relations. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/10203726>).

3.3.4. Low Seat Crisis

In 2010, two different television series *Ayrılık* ('Separation') and *Kurtlar Vadisi* ('Valley of Wolves') led to tensions in bilateral relations (Oran, 2013: 443-444). In this period, 'Ayrılık' which was showed in TV, included anti-semitic scenes and Israel requested cancelation of the soap opera, but Turkey didn't cancel it (Ibid.). Numerous Israeli government officials and individuals alike challenged unequivocally over this TV arrangement communicate on the state-run TRT TV in which Israeli operators were depicted as fierce enemies of blameless kids. (Oğuzlu, 2010: 275). Minister of Industry of Israel Benjamin Ben-Eliezer came to Turkey to fix the relations but that move was not enough (Oran, 2013: 443-444). In January 2010, 'Kurtlar Vadisi' also included anti-semitic scenes and these scenes caused another

serious tension between the two countries (Ibid.). Ambassador of Tel Aviv, Oğuz Çelikkol was called by Danny Avalon to discuss about the tensions, but Avalon used humiliating words about Turkey in front of the cameras (Ibid.). During the discussion, the seats on which the two officials were sitting were not at the same level and Çelikkol's seat was lower than Ayalon's (Ibid.). Additionally, Turkish flag was not put on the table and this occasion was accepted as disrespectful by Turkey. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül said unless Israel sent an official apology letter, he would call back Oğuz Çelikkol to Turkey and after that Israel sent a sincere apology letter and this move prevented another tension (Ibid.).

3.3.5. Economic Relations

During 2002-2011, economic relations between the two countries went on independently from political relations in a certain way (Oran, 2013: 449-450). Bilateral trade agreements and meetings continued and trade volume increased (Ibid.). On the other hand, number of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey was decreasing day by day (Ibid.). Additionally, both Turkish and Israeli contractors started to be more deliberate about works in other's lands (Ibid.).

The most important issue in this period for both Israel and Turkey was the issue of water trade. According to Manavgat Project, Israel would buy 50.000000 m³ water from Turkey in an annual base for twenty years, but Israel denounced the agreement in 2006 because of three reasons (Ibid.450). Firstly, privatization of Turkish industries led to limited state support to Israel. (Ibid.). Secondly, for Israel, cost of acquisition of drinkable water from sea water was cheaper than having it from Turkey. Thirdly, opposition party in Israel was against the idea of dependency to a Muslim country (Ibid.).

In May 2004, sides focused on the Medstream Project which was about constructing a pipeline between Ceyhan and Ashkelon, which would carry oil, water, natural gas, electric and fiber optic cables (Ibid. 450-451). Feasibility works started in 2008, but political crisis in 2009 and Israel's close activities with Southern Cyprus blocked development of the project.

CHAPTER FOUR

STRUCTURAL REALIST ANALYSIS OF TURKEY-ISRAEL RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR

Turkey was obliged to follow a changing foreign policy due to transformation in world politics and regional politics with the ending of the Cold War. Both dynamics within Turkey and external policies implemented by the great powers that shape the world politics contributed to change in Turkish foreign policy. This chapter will primarily examine and compare the foreign policy process by Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. Leading changes in Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel will be reviewed, and finally the neorealist understanding of its place in Turkish foreign policy and impact of neorealist approach on the implementation of Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed.

4.1. COMPARING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY MAKING TOWARDS ISRAEL IN THE 1990S AND 2000S

Neorealism spins around three center suppositions: (1) the contemporary world has an anarchic character; (2) states as sovereign units are the primary entertainers in this framework; and (3) the dispersion of abilities among units is of most extreme significance in the framework (Özçelik, 2018: 2). The initial two elements are held steady, while the third one is a variable and along these lines, the distribution of capabilities assumes an important job in this model (Ibid.). Global framework and the connection between the state and conditions existent inside that framework decides how the state would carry on (Aydın, 2005: 4). Besides, countries under strain adjust to changing conditions in their environment (Ibid.). Thus, foundational changes may create a significant driving force for change by modifying the conditions for remote approach (Ibid.).

Not only Turkish scholars, but also other scholars in the field suggest that Turkey has had remarkable changes in its foreign policy attitudes towards the Middle East in the post-Cold War. Different studies claim that Turkey's foreign policy shift towards the Middle East started with the JDP government (Aka, 2014: 56). However, in the 1990s, international system also significantly differed from the international system of

the Cold War period (Aka, 2014: 56). Turkish foreign policy also started to change in order to adopt international changes (Ibid). Burç Aka's article titled 'Paradigm Change in Turkish Foreign Policy after Post-Cold War' reflects this view. According to Aka, international changes after the Cold War forced Turkey to play a more active role both in the region and in the World (Ibid.). At the end of the Cold War, Israeli–Palestinian harmony process quickened, specifically the Oslo procedure, appears to have facilitated Turkish Israeli collaboration (Oğuzlu, 2010: 278). In the second half of 1990, expressed as Turkey and Israel strategic cooperation, has undergone a significant change in the period after the millennium (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 588). However, the Arab uprisings that appears, in particular as a result of events in Syria and Egypt, and in particular the articulation of the polarization of regional development as an effective actor in Iran, is pushing to get closer to Israel and Turkey (Ibid.). Turkey's foreign policy, as it was explained previously, changed significantly over the two decades. Natalie Tocci says; inside changes in Turkey's local setup have likewise adjusted on a very basic level the nature and style of Turkey's local approaches in the course of the most recent two decades (Tocci, 2011-2012: 67-69). Turkish outside approach towards nations, for example, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria can be seen just by considering the interests of this more extensive arrangement of residential on-screen characters in the remote strategy domain (Ibid.).

In the New World Order, Turkey, which is a medium sized state, adopted a rational and predictable attitude and complementary alliance policy was the best choice for Turkey (Aka, 2014: 68-70). By the 1990s, Soviet Union expansionism and threat of communism ended and Turkey started to be more complementary to its alliances which seemed to be mutually beneficial for Turkey and its allies (Ibid.). On the other hand, the gap between Turkey's aims and its capacity has limited Turkey's acts and gains (Ibid.). During the 1990s, within the framework of positive developments in the Israeli-Palestinian issue after the Madrid Conference and the Oslo negotiations toward a two-state solution on the way to the steps taken have been effective in Turkey's relations with Israel (Sariaslan, 2017: 5). After the Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin, who started the elections on June 23, 1992, who Oslo pushed the 'land for peace' approach, the peace process gained momentum (Ibid.). Also called as the "Declaration of Principles" September 13, 1993 signed at the White House and

with this positive development in the peace process Turkey-Israel relations have gained a new dimension (Sariaslan, 2017: 5).

The 1990s saw a developing rapprochement in relations among Turkey and Israel, which in 10 years' time have turned out to be stressed, achieving a record-breaking low with the Mavi Marmara episode in 2010 (Brown, 2009: 45). That may influence the developments in the Middle East, Turkey and Israel are two important regional actors, is also known as the most important US allies in the region. (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 589). Although the relations of these two countries have been fluctuating during the Cold War due to the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Palestinian Question, they have reached the level of-strategic cooperation in the second half of the 1990s in military and political terms (Ibid.). This cooperation, which is nourished from the perspectives of the two countries towards the Middle East and especially from the 'common threat, understanding, has been seen as one of the most important regional realities for the Middle East with the support of the US (Ibid.).

The writing appears to uncover two lines of contention clarifying the "contention" (Tür, 2009: 45). One line stresses "ideological reasons", contending that the "contention" between the different sides can be clarified by the way that Turkey's decision JDP was an Islamic gathering and along these lines had an enemy of Israeli position (Ibid.). The suggestion is that JDP authority is coordinating with Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria, and Iran (Israel's foes), and this is utilized to clarify the decay (Ibid.). The second line of contention takes a gander at the issue predominantly from a level of influence point of view (Ibid.). Concentrating less on ideological components, the clarification is that the outside conditions that united the nations amid the 1990s have changed and new local truths are on the ground (Ibid.). By augmentation, it is typical for relations to be reevaluated, and in the new power balance, the "union" of the 1990s is normally changed (Ibid.).

In the early 2000s, Turkey continued to follow its Western oriented foreign policy and developments in then international context led Turkey to gain importance because of its geopolitical significance (Aka, 2014: 68-70). Generally, Turkey made its proofreading of the conditions in the world well and took advantage of them and Turkey increased its importance for both being Muslim and Western actor and became an international actor in the world (Ibid.). Turkey also increased its influence in the

international organizations during this period (Ibid.). Being Western oriented in the foreign policy and cultural oriented in the domestic policy caused difficulties for Turkey. The Flotilla incident is the most important example here. The Mavi Marmara episode has been particularly critical in demonstrating how in light of the Palestinian issue, Turkish-Israeli relations have about achieved the final turning point and have stayed there (Tür, 2009: 62). The flotilla occurrence and strike on the Mavi Marmara denoted a characterizing occasion in the weakening Turkish-Israeli relations, prompting the breakdown of two-sided relations in about each division (Arbell, 2014: 2). Turkey set out three conditions for the standardization of relations: an Israeli statement of regret, pay to the flotilla occurrence exploited people's families, and a conclusion to the Gaza barricade (Ibid.). From Israel's point of view, concurring to the expulsion of the Gaza bar was inadmissible (Ibid.).

Changes at the fundamental and local levels have been imperative insofar as they have given the setting to Turkey-driven westernism, reinforce Turkey's capacity to move in its own district, and brought up issues over benefits of following an exclusively genius western remote arrangement (Oğuzlu, 2011: 993). The primary point to say in this setting is that the adjustments in the nature of universal political request since the finish of the Cold War, all the more as of late since then September 2001 assaults, seem to have a such average sized powers as Turkey to play more persuasive and autonomous parts in their own particular locales (Ibid.).

Coming to control after the November 2002 races, the JDP government wound up confronting significant remote strategy issues; for example, the Iraq War, the Cyprus issue, and relations with the EU (Tür, 2009: 61). The Iraq War, and the regular danger impression of other local powers, for example, Syria and Iran, conveyed Turkey closer to these nations (Ibid.) Advancing its "zero-issues with neighbors" arrangement, the JDP government started to fabricate close relations with Iran, Syria, and other Arab nations, which on occasion came to the detriment of Israel (Ibid.). Although Turkey's zero problem with its neighbors policy sounds good in practice, it has some problems (Köprülü, 2009: 185). First of all, it does not serve Turkey's overarching point of EU integration, nor does it contribute to the spread of equitable values from Turkey to its neighbors (Ibid.). There are, in

fact, numerous delicate equalizations in the neighboring locales of particularly in Eurasia and the Center East (Ibid.).

Overall, changes in Turkey's foreign policy are based on two things when we compare the 1990s and the 2000s. First, Turkey's foreign policy was affected by great powers' actions and their policies by looking at the US's foreign policy towards the Middle East in both 1990s and 2000s. Secondly, security in the meaning of neorealism, affected Turkey's foreign policy in both periods because Turkey has been seeking a more active role in 2000s because of more stable Middle East and its will to become a rising regional power.

On the other hand, when we contrast both periods, in the 1990s regional threats and offensive acts by regional actors like Iran and Syria led Turkey to enter into economic and military cooperation with Israel. Unlike the 1990s, in the early 2000s improved relations with regional neighbors had reduced Turkey's threat perception and decreased Turkey's need for cooperation with Israel.

4.2. IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REALISM ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY MAKING TOWARDS ISRAEL IN THE 1990S

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, radical changes occurred in world politics (Oran, 2010: 209). Politically, the West remained unrivaled and the unipolarity started to manage the international system (Ibid.). Unipolarity in worldwide legislative issues resembles an imposing business model in financial matters since just a single power exists in both cases (Kovac, 2012: 42). Great powers allude to the state with a subjective edge in respect to different states dependent on the total score on the measure of an area, population, economy, military, resources, gift, political solidness and political fitness (Ibid.). The breakdown of the "Soviet Empire" was trailed by the rise, or reemergence, of numerous genuine clashes in a few regions that had been moderately tranquil amid the Cold War (Yılmaz, 2008: 45). As the Soviet Union crumbled there was just a single superpower left: the US (Kovac, 2012: 52). In this manner, numerically it would be coherent that the world would be changed from a bipolar one into a unipolar one (Ibid.).

Structural realism sets reasons for interstate collaboration and struggle ought to be searched for in the framework (Oğuzlu, 2010: 273). In reacting to outer security dangers and provincial difficulties, states either attempt to expand their interior power abilities or go into union relations with different states and look with basic outer adversaries and sharing basic risk recognitions, states will in general set up coalitions (Ibid.). As per this view, the revolutionary idea of the framework from one perspective and the dispersion of material capacities on the other leave states with no alternative yet to pursue the manages of realpolitik (Ibid.).

For quite a while, Turkey, particularly amid the Cold War years overlooked the East or the Middle East because of some conjunctural as well as ideological reasons in spite of the way that the Middle East and Turkey has verifiable, physical and social limits (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010: 2). Starting with the 1990s, Turkey began to seek closer and more cooperative foreign policy approach towards its neighbors in the Middle East (Aka, 2014: 56). Turkey in general, and the Middle East, and in particular neighboring countries view geography as a threat, the articulation of the request to develop a collaborative approach with all geographies adjacent to it, especially in the Middle East and thus a foreign policy approach that aims to be a regional balancer in the medium term has led to a difference in the essence of its relations with Israel (Tüysüzöğlü, 2014: 590).

Tayyar arı and Ferhat Pirinççi mention Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern states in the post -Cold War era as;

Although the consequences of the World War II created a new atmosphere different from the past; Turkey still did not involve necessarily to the Middle Eastern affairs. Even one consequence of the new era for the Middle East was the breaking off the relations with the mandatory powers, the bipolar system and the Cold War determined the basic structures of the relations. Taking side with the Western bloc, Turkey evaluated its security policies through the Soviet expansionism and pursued its foreign policy through the perspectives of West. Even the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli wars as well as the Iran-Iraq war which lasted eight years, Turkey maintained to pursue the policy of non-interference and non-involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. So, in the Cold War era the main attitude that underlined the relations is the bipolar system not the self interests. But with the end of the Cold War there were systemic and geographical changes that Turkey and regional countries had to re-evaluate their positions (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010: 3).

US foreign policy towards the Middle East is an important factor. The US has reacted to the new dangers that were developed in the Middle East in the 1990's with a hard security driven methodology and brought the "soundness" of the tyrant political routines in the district to front line as a precautionary measure against potential strife which could excite if there should be an occurrence of democratization endeavor (Yeşilyurt & Akdevelioğlu, 2009: 45). In this setting, political Islam which has just been on the ascent since the 1970s, began to go to the fore as the most effective antisystemic development in the area (Ibid.). At the point when these advancements were joined with changeless military nearness of the US in the Persian Gulf after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the exercises of radical Islamic developments against the US and its partners in the locale expanded enormously (Ibid.). In this sense, September 11, 2001 assaults (9/11) led to both the peak of hostility to fundamental Islamic developments and the disappointment of US arrangement of "strength versus majority rule government" approach in the area and these two developments demonstrated to the US that the time has come to change its Middle East strategy (Ibid.).

The provincial existing conditions in the Middle East was compromised by the Iraq's attack of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Demir, 2007: 193). Throughout the 1990s, Turkey attempted to wipe out the negative impacts of intensity vacuum in northern Iraq, for example, psychological oppression and the foundation of a Kurdish state, and to keep the oil pipelines opened under the UN Security Council goals (Gözen, 2005: 75). To accomplish all these targets, Turkey kept up a nearby collaboration with the US, the most illustrative case of which was the arrangement of the Poised Hammer powers at the Incirlik base, set up in south eastern Turkey after the ending of the Gulf War (Ibid.). Gulf Crisis changed the territorial climate such that it was obvious that the things won't be considered as it used to be. The displaced people emergency, which emerged after the concealment of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein triggered a major job for significant forces to mull over Iraqi Kurds in the setup of the new air somewhere in the range of 1990 and 2000 (Demir, 2007: 194).

Throughout the 1990s Iraq was Turkey's driving exchanging accomplice, with the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan getting oil by pipelines beginning from Iraq's northern oil fields and Iraqi markets were appreciating a wide scope of products from

Turkey (Turunç, 2012: 41). However through time, UN sanctions had annihilating impacts both on the Turkish economy and Iraqi-Turkish exchange relations (Ibid.). From the 1920s until the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the two nations had close collaboration in financial and security matters. (Gözen, 2005, p. 75) Specifically, in the 1980s, Iraq stood out among Turkey's best financial accomplices, because of the twin oil pipelines between the two nations and certain focal points created by the Iran-Iraq war (Ibid.). Essentially, Turkey and Iraq collaborated in battling against fear based oppressor and nonconformist gatherings protecting in a one another's area; including the marking of the Turkish-Iraqi Agreement of 1978, which empowered them to lead 'immediate pursuit' activities to fight against such gatherings (Ibid.). The United States-drove intrusion in 2003 caused shakiness on Turkey's outskirts with Iraq similarly as its dread of Kurdish nonconformity in northern Iraq was developing drastically (Turunç, 2012: 41).

In view of the record of the first decade, one would have anticipated that Turkey should participate with the US in this case not just to proceed with its great relations with the US, yet additionally to keep up its interests and impact over Iraq (Gözen, 2005: 76). To be sure, this was what Turkey had done in the 1990s when, under the authority of President Turgut Özal, it had collaborated with the US by forcing sanctions on Iraq, and opening Turkish air bases for the utilization of US warplanes (Ibid.).

One of the most important cooperation in the context of Turkey-Israel relations has been the defense industry (Ulutaş, 2016: 12). In the 1990s some difficulties in fighting the PKK in Turkey had exceeded supply weapons out of Israel; Israel had used this cooperation to deepen its relations with the Turkish army (Ibid.) With the end of the Cold War, Turkey and Israel began to get closer to each other in many ways (Yılmaz 2010: 17-18). Turkey felt in the circle because problems faced by the border with the neighbors, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Greece itself, the second is military cooperation with Israel, which was supported by US (Ibid.). The 1990-1991 Gulf War and the resulting power vacuum emerged with the PKK, which had steadily increased Turkey's security concerns (Ibid.).

Syria and Turkey relations was a problematic case since the beginning (Arı & Pirinççi, 2010: 8). Participation of Hatay to Turkey, recognition of Israel and the Cold War developments were basic of this problematic relations and the water issue and the PKK problem were added through time (Ibid.). Through the 1990s, Turkey endeavored to settle the security issue with Syria by making concessions, for example, discharging 500 cubic meters of water every second (Oktav, 2003: 91). In any case, Damascus kept up its approach of playing the Kurdish card as a helpful instrument of pressure.

Through the majority of the 1990s, Damascus was a solid supporter of Kurdish nonconformity in Turkey. Syrian help for the PKK was incompletely a reaction to Turkey's arrangement of looking to amplify the utilization of the Tigris and Euphrates streams for water system and vitality extends in southeastern Anatolia (Taşpınar, 2012: 136). In 1998, after extensive coercive tact and under Turkish military pressure, at that point President Hafiz al-Assad at long last quit supporting the PKK and its pioneer, Abdullah Ocalan (Ibid.). The confrontation among Turkey and Syria in 1997 because of the latter's help for the PKK, came to an end after Turkey's cautioning Syria to stop its help or face the (military) results, Syria ventured back and on 20 October, 1998 consented to an arrangement in Adana that brought another desire for better ties (Aydın & Aras, 2005: 22). Relations among Ankara and Damascus started to standardize and gradually improve after 1999 (Taşpınar, 2012: 136).

In the 1990s, Turkey-Iran relations were not in a good shape. Iran's logistical support to the PKK and ideological differences were the two main reasons (Yeşilyurt & Akdevelioğlu, 2009: 45). Iran, like Syria, used the PKK problem as an element of oppression, but in 1998, with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK elements had ceased to be an element of pressure (Ibid.) Turkey and Iran are key nations in the Middle East thanks to their vital positions, characteristic assets, authentic progression, social roots/bases, statistic structures and universal collusions (Sinkaya, 2005: 1). Their positions in regards to the territorial advancements and their collusions with incredible forces have a profound effect in the progression of provincial improvements, yet in addition intently influence global frameworks (Ibid.).

During the Cold War between Israel and Turkey and originating from the Middle East's growing cooperation during the 1990s was caused by a multi-threat perception and fed this perception "security guard" common interests within the

framework of which underscore the foreign policy approach of "strategic" we can say that go into a collaboration (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 590). Turkey-Israel relations in the early 1990s evolved into very close cooperation (Yılmaz, 2010: 17). In parallel with the start of the Arab-Israeli peace process, level of Turkey's diplomatic relations with Israel was upgraded on 31 December 1991 to the level of ambassadorship (Ibid.).

From structural realist point of view, improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s would not be unexpected given common security challenges in the Middle East, shifting of the international system from a bipolar order to a US dominated unipolar order, ongoing involvement of the US in the Middle East and desire of the US to sponsor close cooperation among its allies in the region namely among Turkey and Israel. All these systemic factors played a critical role in the economic and military rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. The relevance of these factors in shaping Turkey-Israel relations underlines the strength of structural realism in explaining Turkey's foreign-policy making towards Israel in the 1990s.

Turkey-Israel relations in the late 1990s gradually declined and balancing factor in Turkey's policy began to shift in favor of the Arabs (Tür, 2009: 19). In particular, the signing of the Adana Agreement with Syria in 1998, and a rapid improvement in relations between two countries, a new door had opened for Turkey in terms of its Middle East policy and Turkey's relations with Arab countries, particularly with Syria began to flourish (Ibid.). Since the beginning of the 2000s, relations with Arab countries have seen a rapid development, while relations with Israel have entered a rather problematic period (Ibid.). Although bilateral relations were mostly remembered during the partnership period when military and intelligence relations in the second half of the 1990s were over, this exceptional period ended in order not to be established once again (Ulutaş, 2016: 9). The security-weighted relationship established by elites during this period was not a sustainable relationship type and corresponded to a deviation in the historical course of relations because of the history of relations, the turbulent past, especially Arab-Israeli wars and the developments in the Palestinian issue, either reducing the level of diplomatic relations or completely freezing the relations (Ibid.). At the end of the Cold War, Israeli-Palestinian harmony process quickened, specifically the Oslo procedure, appeared to have facilitated Turkish-Israeli collaboration (Oğuzlu, 2010: 278).

4.3. IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL REALISM ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY MAKING TOWARDS ISRAEL IN THE 2000S

The most critical development in the international system to shape Middle Eastern politics is the trend towards multipolarity (Kaya, 2010: 102). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US showed that it was able to intervene in the regional politics generally in the interest of Israel (Ibid.). American invasion of Iraq by 2003 also created question marks regarding the credibility and effectiveness of the policies developed by White House towards the region. The leading countries of the region (Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran) began to improve their relations with Russia and China (Ibid.) In the meantime, the American lion's share in the supply of conventional arms in the Middle East countries, the share of Western European countries (England, France, Germany, Italy) and Russia have rapidly expanded (Ibid.). Therefore, a new era in regional politics, in which non-regional actors such as Russia, China, England, France and Germany would also have significant influence began and in this new era, Washington's impact on Turkey-Israel relations has weakened and thus Ankara and Tel-Aviv have supposed to conduct more independent policies (Ibid.).

In 2002, decline marked bilateral relations following the coming power of the JDP government in Turkey. However, it is wrong to suggest Palestinian issue has been the only effective factor in this decline (Tür, 2009: 19). It is clear that regional events, especially the 2003 Iraq War, had a great effect on this decline (Ibid.). The process began with the US invasion of Iraq and Israel's existence in the north of Iraq both of which have made Turkey quite uncomfortable (Ibid.) Above all, Turkey was highly disturbed by how Israeli authorities have dealt with the Iraqi Kurdish administration (Oğuzlu, 2010: 281). While Turkish decision-makers have had doubts about the intentions and policies of the Iraqi Kurds, Israel has encouraged the bolstering of Kurdish authority in northern Iraq with the expectation that this would reduce its isolation in the region (Ibid.). The war launched in Iraq by March 2003 was quite favorable for Israel, who followed a policy of destroying and destabilizing its enemies in the Middle East from the moment it emerged as a state in 1948 (Tür, 2009: 19). To put it differently, Israel has aimed to weaken its Arab neighbors from the moment it was founded (Ibid.). The rejection of the March 1 memorandum allowed

the Israeli entry into northern Iraq, whereas Ankara's reputation was raised in the eyes of the Arab people (Kaya, 2010: 98).

Differentiation of targets in northern Iraq has created new tensions in Turkey-Israel relationship (Kaya, 2010: 104). Post-war Iraq has strengthened its relations with Israel leading to conflict of interests in Turkey and Israel relations (Ibid.). Israel's support for regional Kurdish administration in northern Iraq accelerated Turkey's concerns regarding stability in Iraq and contributed to growing nationalist sentiments within Turkey (Ibid.).

Since the early 2000s, developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a large role in determining the two countries' Middle East politics and other processes to shape Turkey-Israel relations (Kaya, 2010: 103). Ariel Sharon, the fanatical leader of the right-wing Likud Party, visited Israel's holy places on 28 September 2000, in particular the Al-Aqsa Mosque located in East Jerusalem which triggered the beginning of the Second Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) (Yılmaz, 2010: 19). Ariel Sharon became the prime minister as the result of the February 6, 2001 parliamentary elections in Israel and thus the Peace Process reached deadlock (Ibid.). Especially, with the Second Intifada, Israel's use of "disproportionate force" against the Palestinian civilians created reactions in Turkey against state violence by Israel (Ibid.). Overall, the disproportionate violence used by Israel during the Second Intifada and the assassination of Palestinian leaders led to tensions between the two countries and this tension has soared mostly because of Turkey's response to the attacks by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories (Kaya, 2010: 103).

Throughout the 2000s, various developments have contributed to gradual decline in Turkey's relations with Israel (Oğuzlu, 2010: 280). Among them, the leading development has been the negative turn in Israeli-Palestinian relations, which started with the Second Intifada in 2000 (Ibid.). The more Israelis and Palestinians conflicted with each other, the more difficult it has become for Turkey to see Israel in a positive light (Ibid.). Palestinian issue came to the front particularly through the Davos crisis, Low seat crisis and finally the Mavi Marmara crisis shifted bilateral relations to the lowest level with the freezing of diplomatic ties (Tüysüzoğlu, 2014: 603).

At first sight, Turkey's Middle East policy as of 2002 seemed to present a serious contradiction with the basic premise of the neorealist theory since "Zero Problems with Neighbors" policy formed the basis of a new approach to foreign policy (Pinar, 2014: 185-186). Turkey's new foreign policy concept initially brought positive results and Turkey's relations with the countries in the Middle East region had significantly improved (Ibid.). Yet, through prioritizing systemic influences on states' behaviors in the international system, structural realism continues to offer a relevant theoretical perspective to explain Turkey's changing foreign policy towards Israel in the 2000s. While systemic dynamics encouraged military and economic cooperation between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s, changing systemic dynamics have discouraged close ties between the two countries.

In the 2000s, Turkey-Israel relationship has seen many obstacles (Eminoğlu, 2016: 101-103). Both Israel's sense of insecurity, continuous armament, and Turkey's harsh rhetoric in the national arena as well as in the international arena have underlined the realist aspects of the relationship (Ibid.). While this relationship was based on military and economic cooperation in the 1990s, mistrust has characterized bilateral relations in the 2000s.

However, it is also difficult to suggest that Turkey had a consistent Middle East policy in the 2000s. Especially following the Arab Spring-related uprisings which began by late 2010 and early 2011, the nature of Turkey's agreeable ties with its southern neighbors have been changed (Tocci, 2011-2012: 67). The Arab Spring has uncovered the intrinsic strain between the standardizing and realpolitik measurements of Turkish remote approach (Ibid.). At the point when standards have dovetailed with interests, Turkey has been direct in its help for majority rules system (Ibid.).

The Arab Spring was the first in Tunisia in December 2010, when a peddler, Mohammad Buazizi, had committed a suicide, by firing himself, after a series of ill-treatment by security guards (Pinar, 2014: 191). In Turkey, Arab Spring which began in Tunisia and then quickly spread to almost all of the Middle East and the Arab countries was welcomed and even these social movements were encouraged (Pinar, 2014: 198-200). Turkey's approach to Arab uprisings has deteriorated its relations with the Arab states which attempted to control these widespread protests. Particularly, Turkey's relations with Al-Assad regime in Syria deteriorated.

In Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey was unambiguously in favor of majority rule government (Tocci, 2011-2012: 67). As the Arab Spring advanced, realpolitik went to the fore (Ibid.). In Turkey, there is neo-traditionalist perspective, which contains realist assumptions and prescriptions (Altunışık, 2009: 172). This position departs from the traditional line of the Cold War years in advocating active engagement with the Middle East, in response to increased perceptions of threats from the region (Ibid.). Part of the civil and military bureaucracy, political parties like the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP), as well as part of the intellectual elite seem to adopt this worldview (Ibid.). As a result of the Arab Spring process in the Middle East, Turkey has been unable to continue with its zero problem policy with neighbors policy (Pınar, 2014: 198-200).

Overall, Turkey-Israel relations were affected by different negative occurrences throughout the 2000s. Hasan Kösebalaban in his work explain this situation by saying;

The political relations between the two countries have been heavily hindered by a series of actions by Israel. The offensive orchestrated by Israel against the refugee camp in Jenin in April 2002, had occurred only months before the AK Party government took office. This attack, which had the nature of a massacre, and the subsequent US support, directly contributed to the development of an anti-American and anti-Israeli public sentiment in Turkey. US President George W. Bush's description of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as "a man of peace" provoked strong reactions in the Turkish public opinion. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the most important event that changed the strategic context of the Middle East, and in turn, affected the course of Turkish-Israeli relations. This has undoubtedly left a deep impact on the Turkish public opinion contributing to an already strong resentment against American foreign policy as well as Israel which was the only country in the region which supported the invasion. At the same time, the Iraqi war disrupted the traditional calculations regarding Turkish foreign policy within the Turkish political system due to the Northern Iraqi problem. The war helped the Iraqi Kurds emerge as a new actor in the region, and as a result, ensured that certain revisions in Turkey's internal and external political decisions were inevitable. With the new geo-strategic calculations that emerged on the Kurdish question, Turkey established close security relations with Syria and Iran. The Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance, which existed partially to end the support Syria was providing to the PKK at that time, lost its meaning within this new conjuncture (Kösebalaban, 2011: 96).

The neorealist theory recognizes that the behavior of the major states in the international system has a linearly limiting, directing or otherwise decisive influence

on other states that are part of the system (Pinar, 2014: 186). If we look at Turkey's Middle East policy during the Cold War era, neorealist approach clearly shows that this assumption is dramatically valid (Ibid.). In general, during the Cold War years Turkey aligned its foreign policy with that of the US in the Middle East.

The US following its national interests, has followed an unexpectedly low intensity foreign policy during the Arab uprisings (Pinar, 2014: 194). Therefore, in the Arab Spring process, the US adopted an overly cautious, non-prioritized, low-profile foreign policy attitude that displayed critical developments and followed critical developments to regional powers (Ibid.). The divergence between the manner in which the Bush organization anticipated that Turkey should carry on in the Middle East and how Turkey characterized its job in the district (Oğuzlu, 2010: 284-285). The Bush organization essentially needed Turkey to go about as the delivery person of the West, conveying its messages to Hamas and other enemy of American powers (Ibid.). Nonetheless, this job has been truly questioned by the JDP initiative since the ruling government has considered Turkey a local power that ought to characterize its interests and approaches itself, at times transmitting messages from the West toward the East, and at times endeavoring to force its very own strategies on others (Ibid.).

As a result, there is a very important point to be emphasized in order to increase the intelligibility of the theoretical evaluations (Pinar, 2014: 186). The neorealist approach argues that the anarchic structure of the international system is decisive on the attitudes and behaviors of the states operating in the international arena (Ibid.). However, it should not be forgotten that this determinism is indexed to the behavior of the great powers within the international system (Ibid.). It can be said that Turkish foreign policy-making towards Israel is probably the hardest foreign policy making process for Turkish governments, specifically for those of Islamic root and/or essence, such as JDP (Pinar, 2014: 196) This is so due to the conflict between the realities of international politics and domestic politics of Turkey (Ibid.).

In January 2009, two months before the neighborhood decisions of March 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan utilized the yearly World Economic Forum stage Davos to encourage his residential political objectives to Israel's use of force against Palestinian civilians (Köprülü, 2009: 190). Prime Minister Erdoğan, contended with Israeli President Shimon Peres in the panel in which the two

leaders participated as speakers. In his speech, Erdoğan attracted attention to the suffering of the Palestinians and he criticized Israel's operations in the Gaza Strip.

Turkey's hand seemed to be strengthened by the crisis in Davos, in spite of the way that this scene had negative outcomes for the bilateral relations, the most significant of which is the disintegration of trust between the two capitals (Oğuzlu, 2010: 285). In this regard, Davos meeting had profoundly injured the Turkish-Israeli relationship (Köprülü, 2009: 191). Erdoğan burst out in anger at President Shimon Peres, letting him know, "With regards to killing, you know well how to kill" (Tür, 2009: 56). At that point, bilateral relations, which had just been on the decrease, saw an extraordinary failure. Turkey appeared to get out of this crisis in a more advantageous position than Israel, since while Turkey's regional profile had expanded Israel's had declined (Oğuzlu, 2010: 285).

There are a number of elements that constitute the foreign policy-making of Turkish state towards Israel (Pinar, 2014: 196). The Mavi Marmara incident actually shed light on how Israel and Turkey seek their regional and political survival in the region (Ibid. 210). While Turkey emphasized humanitarian aspect of its foreign policy by sending urgent help to Gaza Strip, Israel sought to show its strength in the region and wanted to protect itself from any kind of anti-semitic action (Ibid.). After the Mavi Marmara attack, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel were severed and negotiations took a long time to decide on re-establishing their relationship (Ulutaş, 2016:8).

Reconciliation in bilateral relations occurred by early 2013 with the pressure of the US on both countries. By March 22, 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu phoned Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and officially apologized for the Mavi Marmara attack (Ibid.). Turkey and Israel then held rounds of negotiations to normalize their diplomatic relations. Following six years of interruption in diplomatic relations, the two countries concluded a reconciliation agreement by late June 2019. The reconciliation agreement paved the way for the return of ambassadors of both sides. Israel agreed to pay compensation to the families of Turkish victims killed in the incident.

As Kenneth Waltz points out; for the states which want to survive in an anarchic order, self help through the provision of own security should be their basic strategy

(Waltz, 1988: 624). The security assumptions of the neorealist approach emphasize that states within the international system should prioritize national security policies in order to sustain their existence (Pinar, 2014: 196). Accordingly, Turkey and Israel acted in line with their security considerations in both 1990s and 2000s. The rival alliances of the 1990s have encouraged Turkey and Israel to seek a counter alliances against those rival alliances. However, changing systemic dynamics caused a shift in threat perceptions of these two states. For instance, by the early 2000s Iran and Syria ceased to constitute security challenges for Turkey, whereas Israel's problematic relations with these two states continued. Thus, Turkey's interest in preserving its military alliance with Israel has not been as strong as it was the case in the 1990s.

Six years have passed since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally apologized to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for "operational blunders... that prompted the death toll," with respect to the Marmara incident (Arbell, 2014: 1). Yet, in spite of persistent dialogue among Turkish and Israeli authorities, there is still no return back to close alliance of the 1990s. War of words continue to occur between President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Erdoğan's criticisms over Israeli policies towards Palestinian have continued. Donald Trump's presidency has also complicated the picture further. Unlike former President Barack Obama, President Trump has given unconditional support for Israel's policies. By late 2017, Trump announced his country decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to move American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In addition, Trump has given support to Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights which was occupied by Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

CONCLUSION

While the World War I led modern states to establish themselves within their borders through social, democratic and economic aspects, the World War II taught them that they had to pursue enough power to protect their borders and statuses against other states and other potential threats. While supra-national institutions were established rapidly, the security dilemma brought up structural realism. In other words, the reality that having power is the most important factor in international relations become the center of foreign policy-making of many states, specifically those without extreme powers such as Turkey. Sub-categorized as defensive and offensive approaches, structural realism mainly states that power is the most important factor in international relations. While attitudes of countries in more peaceful areas can be explained by defensive structuralism, namely only to have power to protect themselves, offensive structuralism is the preference in countries more open to threats like Turkey and/or in countries with a claim to possess a leading position in certain regions or in the world, such as Turkey in Middle East or US, Russia and China in the world, respectively. Sure enough, this approach in foreign policy-making becomes more centralized in the relationships of certain countries, such as Turkey and Israel.

One of the leading concepts of structuralism is ‘balance of powers,’ which states that the any sort of unbalanced power in the international arena is a threat to other states. Structural realists argue that countries with less power need to increase their military capacities to feel themselves more secure. Being a less powerful country compared to the leading powers of the world and being located in the Middle East, a region that never goes by a century without military conflict, Turkey is one of those countries which constantly looks for increasing its military capacity against any unbalanced power in the region and in the world. This has been proved to be a realistic approach in Turkey’s foreign policy-making, specifically after the Iraqi invasion and the Arab Spring.

The relationship between Turkey and Israel has always been complex due to the positioning of each country in the international arena. The deterioration of the world order by the World War II led the world to be polarized between the two major powers, the US and the Soviet Union. Turkey chose to side with Western bloc under

the leadership of the US against the communist Soviet threat during the Cold War era. Even though it has never been easy for Turkey to keep the balance of its status in the international arena among the realities of choosing to side with Western powers, yet being constantly reminded that West is also not a reliable ally all the time, the country managed to reach to the 21st century without engaging in a serious military conflict with its neighbors.

While being on the same side of the polarized world order throughout the Cold War years, Turkey-Israeli relations only accelerated in the 1990s, after Turkey felt itself threatened by Iran and Syria and began to be more active in the region. Turkey's approach to establish good relations with Israel was mainly about having a more secure status, keeping its close ties with Western powers against the Greek security dilemma it had been living for almost a century. In addition, Turkey sought regional allies against the PKK threat and to increase its military capacity with the technological equipment supplied by agreements concluded with Israel. Therefore, it can be said that Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in the 1990s occurred due to Turkey's dependency on Israel regarding mostly security issues and therefore best be explained through structural realism. In other words, Turkey aimed to reinforce its power, as much as possible, against security threats in the region. Likewise, having fought four major wars with the Arab states in the region, Israel needed reliable allies in the region to overcome its feeling of insecurity. Economic and military alliance between Turkey and Israel was also desirable from the perspective of the US. The two states were members of the US-led Western alliance throughout the Cold War. The US provided unconditional support for Israel since its establishment and Turkey had become a strategic ally for the US in the 1990s.

The reality of the 21st century Turkey-Israel relationship is another story. Almost under all JDP governments, Turkish foreign-policy making has seen various challenges to preserve close ties with Israel. Remaining on the face of a boiling Middle East and constant PKK terrorism, Turkey has had to keep enhancing its military power, yet it has also sought to utilize its soft power to raise its profile in the region. As a way of ensuring better relations with the Arab countries and Iran, Turkish decision-makers have looked for better economic and trade ties with them, which eventually reduced Turkish dependence on Israel. Therefore, the nature of the relations between the two

countries changed, not at a major scale, but slightly. This does not mean that conflicts in the Middle East are close to an end and that Turkey is secure against any potential threat arising from the Middle East. On the contrary, conflicts in the Middle East have reached to their peaks in the last two decades. However, Turkey is no more a foreigner to Arab states as it was in the past with its democratic institutions and highly pro-Western foreign policy. Through its 'zero problems with neighbors' policy, Turkey was able to establish cordial relations with Iran, Syria and Gulf Cooperation Council states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This in return, reduced Turkey's need to cooperate with Israel on military issues.

In this thesis, Turkey-Israel relations in the post-Cold War period is examined through a structural realist perspective focusing separately on the 1990s and 2000s. Structural realism is explained with its leading concepts in the first chapter. Then, relations between Turkey and Israel are analyzed in the 1990s and 2000s. In the last chapter, the concentration is on the relevance of structural realism in understanding Turkey-Israel relations since the ending of the Cold War.

In light of the analysis in this study, it can be argued that structural realism offered a meaningful theoretical framework to understand Turkey's foreign policy-making towards Israel in the 1990s. Through prioritizing systemic influences on states' behaviors in the international system, structural realism continue to offer a relevant theoretical perspective to explain Turkey's changing foreign policy towards Israel in the 2000s. While systemic dynamics encouraged military and economic cooperation between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s, changing systemic dynamics have discouraged close ties between the two countries. As Turkey felt more secure due to improved diplomatic and economic ties with the Arab countries in 2000s, its need for Israel's military alliance has remarkably declined.

It is very clear that the crises that caused the deterioration of relations between the two countries, including Operation Cast Lead, Davos incident, Mavi Marmara incident and 'low seat' tension led the security dilemma to increase with an increasing sense of insecurity of countries against each other. It also shows that these two states have put their own security considerations at the forefront demonstrating the success of neorealism in explaining the bilateral relations. Since 2013, Turkey and Israel attempted to solve the Mavi Marmara crisis. Following a six-year interruption,

normalization of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel occurred by June 2016. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's apology for the Mavi Marmara incident, US pressure on both sides and rounds of reconciliation negotiations contributed to this normalization. Yet, it is difficult to suggest that a return back to close alliance of the 1990s would occur in the short or medium term.



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